1986

Organization as Process: The Life Histories of CORE and SNCC

Elizabeth M. Zeiders Farmer
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

ORGANIZATION AS PROCESS:

THE LIFE HISTORIES OF CORE AND SNCC

_____

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Sociology

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

_____

by

Elizabeth M. Zeiders Farmer

1986

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

_____
                  Author

Approved, August 1986

_____
Gary A. Kreps

_____
Edwin H. Rhyne

_____
Satoshi Ito

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

A structural analysis of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) explores the organizational dynamics of such social movement organizations (SMOs) and contributes to the generalizability of a core species concept of organizations. Kreps' core species concept of organization and Gamson's previous research on protest groups provide the underpinnings for this focus on SMOs as instances of organization. Kreps specifies four elements --domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A)--which are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to exist. The following analysis focuses on the series of changes in the values of these elements--the chains of restructurings--which comprise the histories of CORE and SNCC. The relationships between these organizational changes, the achievement of success, and other organizational variables are also explored. Findings from the current work are compared to the findings from previous research using Kreps' theory in order to evaluate the generalizability of Kreps' work.

Findings for CORE and SNCC uncover a similar sequence of restructurings over the life histories of these social movement organizations. Additional similarities between the groups suggest that earlier restructurings take longer to complete, are more tranquile and are associated with relative prosperity. The achievement of success is associated with more extensive restructurings, changes which arise from nonconflictual catalysts, and periods of relative prosperity. Similar findings for coterminous time periods suggest the need for future research in order to isolate truly organizational patterns from broader societal influences. Similarities between SMO findings and previous non-SMO conclusions point to the generalizability of Kreps' theory of social structure.

ORGANIZATION AS PROCESS:

THE LIFE HISTORIES OF CORE AND SNCC

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Analyses of social movement organizations (SMOs) have generated a
plethora of competing and complementary theories. For the most part,
these attempts to understand SMOs have looked at them as atypical
entities which need to be understood in terms of their social
psychological dimensions (Miller, 1986), or the underlying plausability
and requisites of their existence (Oberschall, 1973; McCarthy and Zald,
1977). Even those analyses which have attempted to look at them as
groups per se have frequently focused on the unique aspects of protest
groups rather than on the underlying recognition of them as forms of
organization (Zald and Ash, 1966; Oberschall, 1979; Gamson, 1975). A
potentially fruitful approach in studying these movement organizations
is to view them not as unique entities somehow divorced from other more
standard organizations, but rather as expressions of that social form we
call organization, but about which we actually know very little. By
analyzing SMOs according to a general theory of social structure, the
research reported here attempts to illuminate the organizational
dynamics of SMOs and contribute to the refinement and generalizability
of a core species concept of organization.

The current work will focus on social movement organizations--or
more specifically on the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)--as instances of

2

organization. But, as is so intuitively apparent in such groups, organization cannot be conceived as static or absolute; rather it must be seen as both extant entity and continuously evolving process (Kreps, 1985a). SNCC and CORE are definable units, but they are also units that change and evolve during their life histories. If we are going to grasp how these organizations change in a very specific way, it is necessary to move beyond broad assertions that they do change to very precise desciptions of how, when, and under what circumstances such changes occur.

In analyzing SMOs as organizations sui generis, several questions need to be answered. First, how can organization be captured accurately and precisely enough to delineate both its aspects of consistency along with its changes, transformations, and fluctuations? Then, if such structural components can be captured, can we trace this history of consistency and change in a way that meaningfully and validly captures the history of a specific SMO? Third, assuming the above questions can be addressed adequately, precisely how do SMOs change over time? Fourth, is there any apparent patterning in these changes with regard to exogenous and endogenous variables? And if there are some discernible patterns, are they evident only within a single SMO's history or do they hold true across SMOs? Sixth, do these changes in any way appear to be related to the achievement of successes by the group? And finally, do the findings on SMOs appear to apply only to these protest groups, or are there findings that would suggest uniformities for organizations in general rather than just SMOs in particular? The current research seeks to answer these questions through a historical comparative analysis of CORE and SNCC. The analysis is built upon a core species concept of

organization formulated by Kreps (1985a, 1985b) and previous analysis of

protest groups by Gamson (1975). Very brief synopses of the histories

of CORE and SNCC provide an orientation to the substantive focus of this

research before outlining the theoretical underpinnings in Kreps and

Gamson.

CORE was founded in Chicago in the early 1940's. Throughout the

1940's and '50's the organization engaged in small-scale nonviolent

direct action against segregated public accommodations. With the onset

of the 1960's and the Freedom Rides, CORE began a period of rapid growth

and change. It expanded both its size and focus by becoming involved in

voter registration, focusing on the more subtle forms of discrimination

in housing and employment, and looking beyond integration to the

problems of the black poor. From the onset of serious financial

problems by the Spring of 1964 until the current analysis ends with the

ascension of Roy Innis in 1968, CORE shifted its emphasis even further

to community organizing and Black Power.

SNCC was started in 1960 as an attempt to coordinate the various

campus protests that proliferated following the Greensboro sit-ins.

While the focus of the organization was originally to coordinate direct

action protests against segregation, SNCC very shortly changed its

emphasis to voter registration and community organizing in the Deep

South. The summer of 1964 marks one of SNCC's most famous

endeavors--Freedom Summer--and also the beginning of its decline. On

the path to its virtual dissolution in 1969, SNCC moved its focus to the

cities (with a corresponding abandonment of its previous rural

projects), set off the wave of Black Power rhetoric, and formally

excluded whites--all of which served to create internal friction and

further isolate the group.

KREPS' CORE SPECIES CONCEPT OF ORGANIZATION

Kreps' theory of social structure evolved from both grappling with the metatheoretical questions of action and order in social phenomena (Alexander, 1982) and an empirical mining of the Disaster Research Center's archives on community responses to natural disasters. All previous works building on Kreps' theory (Francis and Kreps, 1984; Kreps, 1985a, 1985b; Bosworth and Kreps, 1986; Saunders and Kreps, 1986; Linn, 1986) have focused on the circumscribed temporal and spatial parameters of community responses to natural disasters. The present analysis of SNCC and CORE seeks to illustrate both the applicability of Kreps' theory in a non-disaster setting and, at the same time, to utilize this theory to examine a neglected aspect of social movement organizations--the dynamics of the organization itself.

Kreps delineates a taxonomy of structural forms from four core elements of organization: domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities (A). Employed as a structural code, the elements capture empirically both the origins of new organizations and the transformations of existing ones. As expressed in Kreps' work, organization is posited as an paradox: it exists as a definable entity which is constantly changing; but the change is constrained by what exists. In effect, organization must be described as unit and process simultaneously.

The four elements are defined as follows (Bosworth and Kreps, 1986): Domains are collective representations of bounded units and

TABLE 1

Taxonomy of Sixty-four Forms of Association

One Element Forms	Two Element Forms	Three Element Forms	Four Element Forms
D	D-T	D-T-R	D-T-R-A
T	D-R	D-T-A	D-T-A-R
R	D-A	D-R-A	D-R-A-T
A	T-R	D-R-T	D-R-T-A
	T-A	D-A-T	D-A-T-R
	T-D	D-A-R	D-A-R-T
	R-A	T-R-A	T-R-A-D
	R-D	T-R-D	T-R-D-A
	R-T	T-A-D	T-A-D-R
	A-D	T-A-R	T-A-R-D
	A-T	T-D-R	T-D-R-A
	A-R	T-D-A	T-D-A-R
		R-A-D	R-A-D-T
		R-A-T	R-A-T-D
		R-D-T	R-D-T-A
		R-D-A	R-D-A-T
		R-T-D	R-T-D-A
		R-T-A	R-T-A-D
		A-D-T	A-D-T-R
		A-D-R	A-D-R-T
		A-T-D	A-T-D-R
		A-T-R	A-T-R-D
		A-R-D	A-R-D-T
		A-R-T	A-R-T-D
4	12	24	24

Total Forms of Association = 64

their reason for being. Tasks are collective representations of a division of labor for the enactment of human activities. Resources refer to individual capacities and collective technologies. And activities are the conjoined actions of individuals and social units. By arranging the four elements in all logically possible combinations and permutations, a taxonomy of sixty-four alternative forms of social structure is derived (Table 1).

The elements are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to exist. Thus only when all four elements are located empirically has organization come into being. With the quantitative transition from a three- to a four-element form, a corresponding change of system states occurs--from origins to maintenance [1]. The maintenance system state is synonymous with organization. This system state involves various transformations of the elements until the organization goes out of existence. It is this period during which organization exists, and more specifically the elemental changes during this period, that are the focus of the following analysis of CORE and SNCC.

Restructuring

A dialectical view of organization as both process and unit demands that each of the four elements (D,T,R, and A) has an empirically tangible value. At the same time, it requires that changes within these values be documented. Restructuring is the term used to refer to instances of change in an organization's elemental values. An organization can undergo any number of these changes during the maintenance system state. It is the chronology of these transformations--the chains of restructurings--that comprises the

history of an organization. Delineating specific changes within the organization gets at the dialectical relationship between existing unit and continuously evolving process.

Restructuring occurs with a change in the value of one or more of the elements once they are all in place. Theoretically any restructuring affects all of the elements to some degree. However, in locating changes empirically, some of the elements do not change a perceptible amount. These thresholds of observability, imprecise though they are, serve as the guide for determining the form of each restructuring. A restructuring can display any of the sixty-four logically possible configurations of the elements (see Table 1), which are referred to as alternative forms of restructuring. The letters represent which of the four elements change, and the order of the letters indicates the temporal sequence of this change.

In addition to pointing to the dialectic of process and unit, the detailing of specific forms of restructuring points even more directly to the dialectical relationship between the means and the ends of organization. Activities (A) and resources (R) refer most explicitly to the means of organization, while domains (D) and tasks (T) refer to its ends. In means-based restructurings the organization's activities and usable resources are altered within relatively fixed collective representations of the group's focus and division of labor. Ends-based restructurings, in turn, are changes in the collective representations of the organization's focus and division of labor in conjunction with relatively unchanging resources and activities. In means-based restructurings participants are changing what they are doing or what they have to work with before (or without) a change in the

organization's ends. In ends-based restructurings the collective representations associated with the organization are altered before (or without) a change in the organization's means. Ends-based restructuring points to the participant as actor, manipulating the organization itself; while means-based restructuring suggests the participant as object, working within established organizational boundaries.

A dialectical approach implies some balancing of both types of restructuring during a social movement organization's life history. While ends-based restructuring allows for greater flexibility, it also opens the possibility of uncertainty and confusion about the organization's goals and operation. On the other hand, means-based restructuring offers greater direction with its relatively stable ends, but it can produce an inflexibility that is detrimental in a rapidly changing environment. It is posited that the viability of a social movement organization, or of any organization, hinges on a balance or interplay between means-based and ends-based changes.

Delineating changes in each of the elements involves judgment, since discriminating thresholds are not explicit at this point. Looking at domains, tasks, resources, and activities in terms of social movements rather than disasters suggests the following representative examples of each element.

Activities refer to the types and amount of conjoined action carried out by CORE's or SNCC's constituency (i.e. the people the group attracts to work for its cause). A restructuring of activities can indicate a significant increase or decrease in the amount of a particular activity, the commencement of a new type of activity, or the termination of an extant endeavor. An increase in the intensity and

quantity of voter registration drives, a circumscribed change in activities such as the Freedom Rides, and a progressive radicalization of protest activities by participants are all examples of changes in activities.

Resources capture fluctuations in available money and the size and composition of the staff or constituency. A restructuring of resources takes into account the degree of change given the extant resources in addition to reflecting changes in absolute figures. A decrease or increase in contributions, CORE's appointment of James Farmer as national director, an increased number of supporters, or a decrease in the dedication of SNCC's field staff are all considered to be significant changes in usable resources.

Tasks reflect the division of labor within the organization. Changes in the internal boundary delineations as seen in the creation of new positions, the reassignment of responsibilities, and changes in the collective representations of who does what within the organization would all be recorded as restructurings of the task structure.

Domains are collective representations of bounded units and their reason for being. "Bounded units" include the ideological and purposive aspects of the organization (goals or legitimate focus) and the geographic locus of its activities. Both of these categories, though, must be recognizable as collective representations to be considered as components of the group's domain. Domains detail boundary demarcations involving the social world beyond the organization. CORE's inclusion of the South, early SNCC's formal emphasis on voter registration and direct action, CORE's shift of emphasis beyond integration to the problems of the black poor, and both groups' invocation of Black Power are all

examples of domain restructuring.

The following example of a three-element (D-R-A) restructuring in SNCC illustrates the empirical delineation of these changes:

In September 1963 SNCC's executive committee committed the organization to a shift in its voter registration campaign. Before this date SNCC's drive to register voters had centered around registering black residents of the Deep South as qualified voters in accord with the states' obscure and frustrating registration requirements. The change in September to a formal platform of "one man, one vote" (D) abandoned the early more accomodating approach in favor of a belief that all blacks, regardless of educational attainment, deserved the right to vote. As such it signified a change in what the organization saw as its legitimate focus, not merely in what it was doing. November's election allowed SNCC to move beyond rhetoric to an implementation of its new emphasis. The proposed plan called for a SNCC-run and legally unrecognized election to take place on election day so that black Mississippians could demonstrate their desire to vote despite their conspicuous scarcity on Mississippi's lists of registered voters. Two weeks before the election, approximately one hundred students recruited from Yale and Stanford arrived to assist in the polling (R). On election day in early November, the first Freedom Vote took place (A). The turnout verified SNCC's claim that it was intimidation and discriminatory registration guidelines rather than apathy that kept Mississippi's black residents away from the legally sanctioned elections.

Restructurings, then, are changes within an organization during its maintenance period. The empirical application of this concept in the current work captures the series of changes--the chains of restructurings--that compose the histories of CORE and SNCC. As such it is an analytical tool that allows detailed discussion of the process of social movement organizations. Not only is it possible to delineate the chains of restructurings that constitute these organizations' histories, but it is also possible to determine precisely which of the crucial aspects of organization change in each instance. Thus, we can document dialectical tensions and patterns both within and across restructurings.

GAMSON'S CATEGORIES OF SUCCESS

In addition to drawing on Kreps' work to analyze social movement organizations, Gamson's (1975) analysis of social protest groups comes into play. Gamson's study analyzes a representative sample of challenging groups in the United States between 1800 and 1945. He explores the permeability of a pluralistic society and finds influences of organizational, ideological, and operational variables on the groups' chances of success.

For this analysis of CORE and SNCC, Gamson's work contributes to the conceptualization of the achievement of success as an indicator of effective response. In Kreps' original work the criteria for deeming a disaster-related organization successful was "need met, response terminated." For SMOs such a simple criterion does not capture the essense of effective response. Mere longevity is not a valid indicator of an effective protest, and there is no "normal state," as in disasters, toward which the organization is striving to return. An operational conceptualization of success, then, provides a basis for looking at the SMOs not merely as strings of restructurings, but also as historical entities which attained various types and degrees of desired change. In short, it gives an indication of how well the groups did what they set out to do.

Gamson proposes two heuristic categories of success--(1) acceptance for the group itself as a legitimate spokesman for a constituency (Gamson, 1975:31), and (2) gains in advantages for the intended beneficiaries (Gamson, 1975:34). Within the category of acceptance, four specific types of such legitimacy are delineated: consultation,

negotiations, formal recognition, and inclusion. Consultation involves an exchange of ideas initiated by the antagonist. Negotiations must occur between the challenging group and the antagonist on a continuous basis, not just in times of crisis. Formal recognition entails an explicit (usually written) statement by the antagonist recognizing the challenging group as a legitimate spokesman for the constituency. Finally, inclusion occurs when a member (or members) simultaneously retains his membership in the challenging group and is placed in a position of status or authority in the antagonist's organizational structure.

The second major category of success--the gaining of new advantages--is achieved when a common good (Olson cited in Oberschall, 1975) is garnered for the SMO's beneficiary. A common good is a benefit that is distributed among all members of the group the SMO is attempting to assist by its activities and program, not just those who actively participate in the campaign for change.

Gamson scores each challenging group at the end of its protest period with a series of pluses (+) and minuses (-) to derive a single indicator of the group's level of success. Because the current focus is not only the overall levels of success for CORE and SNCC, but also the relationship between restructurings and success, a modified system is employed. Rather than creating one final score which respresents the group's level of success for its entire history, *each gain in either acceptance or advantages for CORE or SNCC is recorded*. In the final analysis, this results in a series of successes, which can then be anayzed both in composite and individually with relation to relevant restructurings.

Successes in the current sense are rather tangible things--accomplishments that can be quantified or located in legal edicts or formal meetings. Increases in the number of registered voters in the Deep South, desegregation of specific public accommodations, legislation outlawing segregation in various facilities, a meeting with a federal government official, or a preferential hiring agreement are examples of gains which are recorded as instances of success.

METHODOLOGY

The analysis of CORE and SNCC incorporates an intertwining of both qualitative and quantitative techniques. The data for the qualitative descriptions of the changes and successes in CORE and SNCC were garnered primarily from existing histories by both professional historians and participants in the organizations. Original documents were used only sparsely to fill in gaps or to clarify issues in the comprehensive histories [2]. A general chronology detailing the course of each organization's history was created and augmented from the various sources. Each entry in this chronology was then analyzed to determine if it constituted a restructuring or an instance of success for the group. If it was deemed a significant restructuring or success, the form of the variable was determined and a detailed description was recorded.

After reanalysis of the historical sources, in an attempt to accumulate an exhaustive list of restructurings and successes, the qualitative descriptions of each restructuring and success were quantified to allow for statistical analyses (see Codebook, Appendix A).

Due to the exploratory nature of this investigation, statistical analyses focus on correlations among various aspects of restructuring, success, and organizational characteristics at the time of each restructuring or success. These correlations indicate the direction and magnitude of relationships among the central variables which suggest tentative hypotheses about the dynamics and successes of social movement organizations. By retaining and incorporating the qualitative descriptions which preceded this quantitative analysis, both the mathematical precision of statistics and the descriptive validity of qualitative data come together to give a more accurate depiction of the organizations under scrutiny.

OVERVIEW OF FOLLOWING CHAPTERS

The following chapter details the chains of restructurings and instances of success that comprise the histories of CORE and SNCC. Historical narratives with detailed descriptions of several restructurings in text provide an orientation to these histories and more fully demonstrate the application of Kreps' theory in the social movement realm. The narratives are augmented by Appendix B, which provides complete chronologies, in list form, of both organizations' restructurings and successes. Chapter two concludes with a detailed critique of the application of Kreps' theory in this new substantive area. Chapter three explores a more quantitative analysis of the histories of CORE and SNCC. It begins with a delineation of patterns in the forms of restructurings, timing of restructurings, and successes, both within and between CORE and SNCC. A transitional section

introduces the central variables of the statistical analyses. The remaining portions of chapter three detail the various correlations among these variables. Chapter four focuses on the generalizability of Kreps' theory. The current findings on social movement organizations are compared to previous disaster-related conclusions in an attempt to identify commonalities which refer to organization, regardless of the substantive context in which it occurs. Concluding comments synthesize the findings and offer cautions and directions for future studies.

Several boundary delineations and specifications must be kept in mind throughout these following chapters. The focus of the analysis of CORE and SNCC is pointedly on social movement organizations as organizations. Therefore the following discussions focus on the structural elements and variables associated with organization itself. In an attempt to communicate precisely what a structural framework can illuminate, non-organizational variables which may provide clarity or explanation about historical occurrences will not formally enter the study. This leads to a second specification--the emphasis on description rather than explanation. This research seeks to explore the sequences of changes and successes within CORE's and SNCC's maintenance system states. It is concerned with a precise detailing of what happened rather than with an explanation of why it occurred. Finally, the analysis of CORE and SNCC focuses on these groups as broad regional or national entities. It is the wholes, analytically distinct from their sub-unit parts, which are the focal units of study. The dual attempt throughout is to shed light on the organizational dynamics of social movement organizations and to assess the generalizability of Kreps' core species concept of organization.

CHAPTER TWO

EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF KREPS' THEORY: CORE AND SNCC

The following histories of CORE and SNCC convey the histories as

they are depicted in restructurings and successes. These histories

include only the organizational details that can be captured by the

framework derived from Kreps' and Gamson's theories. Additional

interpretive comments are withheld to avoid distorting or embellishing

the historical accounts that structural analysis can provide. The

majority of restructurings are discussed simply as portions of a running

historical narrative. However, representative restructurings are

delineated in more precise detail to illustrate the determination of

instances of restructuring in this historical context. (See Appendix B

for complete chronologies of restructurings and successes in CORE and

SNCC.)

CORE: 1941 - 1968

The temporal sequence of CORE's origins is best depicted by an

R-A-D-T sequence:

In October 1941 the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) founded a
"peace team" in Chicago. The young members of this pacifist enclave met
for weekly discussions which often centered around the application of
Gandhian techniques to the racial issue (R). Cell members established
Fellowship House to challenge housing restrictions in Chicago, and in
March 1942 engaged in their first large scale direct action project

17

against the segregated White City Roller Rink (A). Riding the enthusiasm generated by the White City project, fifty people met in April to form a "permanent interracial group committed to the use of nonviolent direct action opposing discrimination" (D). This formalized domain was externally legitimated by FOR's agreement to retain James Farmer on its payroll with a primary responsibility of establishing this new group. Between the summers of 1942 and 1943 a task structure evolved which was composed of a set of committees and three action units concerned with specific spheres of segregated facilities (T).

By 1943, then, all four elements were present and organization is considered to exist. At this early stage CORE was explicitly interracial and nonviolent. Among the small band of members, many were pacifists and virtually all were college educated.

The new organization's first restructuring occurred in June 1943. The domain (D) of the organization was extended beyond Chicago in a federation of local units working to abolish the color line through direct nonviolent action; and the task structure (T) was redefined to include a chairman and a combination secretary/treasurer, and to make the relationship between the central office and the local units that of a loose federation.

CORE showed a tendency throughout the 1940's toward restructuring the ends of the organization. More specifically, the task structure was repeatedly restructured in an ongoing effort to more effectively coordinate the local units' activities and to give more control to the central office. Two important exceptions to this trend were the commencing of a national project as seen in the Journey of Reconciliation and an explicit statement excluding communist-controlled groups from CORE's ranks.

The 1950's began on an unpromising note with activities, membership, and income noticeably declining. With a rather complex restructuring in the summer of 1951 the task structure was altered to

create the position of part-time fund raiser. James Robinson filled

this position, and the active pursuit of funds increased. This

restructuring, in turn, served as a catalyst for a perceptible increase

in monetary resources by the summer of 1954. In the latter half of the

decade, the promotion of Robinson to executive secretary and the

beginning of interest and activities in the South were setting the

course for CORE's tremendous growth in the '60's.

The Greensboro sit-ins of February 1960 served as an external

catalyst which sparked an A-T-R restructuring in CORE:

> Almost immediately following the initial sit-ins CORE's activities
> broadened and increased. The field workers intensified their efforts to
> initiate new chapters in the South and to teach protesters proper
> nonviolent techniques. Activity in the North also surged with the
> proliferation of sympathy protests (A). Two months later, in April,
> CORE altered its task structure to allow for three additional field
> secretary positions (bringing the total to five) under the leadership of
> the newly created field director (T). At its annual convention in July,
> CORE expanded this response to the new fervor in the South by recruiting
> the help of student advisors to encourage ties between the student
> movement and CORE. It also shifted the bulk of its field workers and
> funds to the campaigns in the South (R).

A change of leadership in early 1961 brought James Farmer to the

position of National Director. One of Farmer's first undertakings in

his new position was a change in activities as seen in the resurgence of

a truly national project--the Freedom Rides:

> The Freedom Rides were carried out to test compliance with the
> Supreme Court's Boynton decision which prohibited segregation on
> carriers and terminal facilities connected with interstate travel. The
> Rides were modeled on CORE's Journey of Reconciliation during the
> 1940's, but the Rides of the 1960's were more daring in the plan to
> penetrate the Deep South. On May 4, 1961 CORE commenced the Freedom
> Rides as an interracial group of thirteen people left Washington D.C.
> on a bus headed South (A). CORE's segment of the Rides continued for
> two weeks.

This was a crucial undertaking for CORE and one which can be causally

linked to the September Interstate Commerce Commission order banning

segregation in facilities connected with interstate travel (a success in the form of advantages). These Rides sparked enthusiasm for CORE's programs and served as a catalyst for a change in resources as seen in the commencement of an upward trend in membership during later 1961 and into 1962. As an answer to this growing size, CORE restructured and augmented its task structure in an attempt to best coordinate and accommodate this increased size.

Beginning in early 1962 CORE shifted its activities from rather narrowly bounded civil rights issues and targets (in the form of public accommodations) to the more general problems of housing and employment. This shift and the increasing proportion of blacks (especially working class blacks) joining the organization led finally, by the fall of 1963, to a change in domain beyond integration to the problems of the black poor. As far as successes are concerned, the Route 40 Freedom Ride, the following Freedom Highways campaign in the summer of 1962, and the Sealtest preferential hiring agreement later in 1962 account for the last major block of successes that can be attributed to the national organization itself.

Martin Luther King's Birmingham campaign in May 1963 sparked new interest in civil rights. For CORE this increased publicity of an external occurrence acted as a catalyst for an R-A restructuring:

Immediately following King's May campaign, CORE's useable resources increased on all fronts. People rushed to join the group while existing members became more involved and active. In addition, many non-members participated in CORE's protests, making demonstrations and projects larger than ever before. The increases were not limited to human resources, as contributions rose significantly in the aftermath of this catalyst (R). By mid-summer, two months after the benchmark of a change in resources, the number of direct action projects carried through by CORE flourished. Not only did the volume of protest increase, but its character also shifted. The formerly disciplined nonviolent

demonstrations for integration were increasingly replaced by civil disobedience by protesters who courted arrests and minimized the role of negotiations (A).

By the following Spring the size and frequency of protests were noticeably decreasing and direct action became a decreasingly important activity.

A decline in contributions in the Spring of 1964 combined with a standing history of overspending placed CORE quite firmly in debt. By late 1964 this financial difficulty had become urgent enough to necessitate an additional transformation of resources--securing loans, closing down some offices, and streamlining the field staff. Following the initial set-back in usable money in early 1964, CORE focused direct and singular attention on its ends for the first time since the 1950's and created Regional Action Councils in yet another attempt to reorganize its task structure to more effectively coordinate its parts.

During the ensuing year CORE changed both its activities and its domain to incorporate partisan politics. This period during late 1964 also witnessed the increasing importance of community organizing--first as an activity and then as a formalized domain. By September of 1965 this trend was so pronounced that the previous emphasis on voter registration was virtually abandoned as this concentration on community organizing around the felt-needs of the community came to dominate activities.

From the 1965 annual convention until I stop tracing the organization in 1968, CORE progressively edged toward a more radical and exclusively black focus. At the 1965 convention the long-debated question of the role of whites in the organization was finally formally addressed with a specification of tasks which decreed "members of the

minority community shall substantially constitute the leadership of the chapters." The gradual dwindling of finances and constituency allowed long-subverted criticisms of Farmer to surface, finally resulting in a change of leadership to Floyd McKissick in January 1966. Controversy surrounding the selection of McKissick created further friction and a substantial number of resignations by key staff members.

The pronouncement of Black Power, a dismissal of the standing commitment to nonviolence, and an anti-war pronouncement at the 1966 convention formalized the continuing trend toward separatism and radicalism. Almost instantly this extensive change in domain led to a significant drop in contributions and the loss of most remaining white supporters. The trend toward black exclusivity was even more fully articulated at the 1968 convention with the change in leadership from McKissick to Roy Innis, an explicit transition in domain from civil rights to black nationalism and an accompanying formal exclusion of whites, and a transformation of the task structure to a much smaller more centralized staff. Although CORE limped along into the early 1970's, at this point in 1968 it seems to have made a sufficient break with its past to consider the original CORE defunct, and my analysis ends.

SNCC: 1960 - 1969

The origins of SNCC can be characterized as a D-R-T-A form:

An invitation sent by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's Ella Baker succeeded in bringing together two hundred representatives from Southern college protest groups to coordinate their disparate projects. At this founding meeting in April 1960, the

representatives adopted a religious and philosophical treaty on nonviolence as their statement of purpose and agreed that the group should coordinate communications between local groups (D). In June a temporary office worker was hired to oversee the newly donated corner of SCLC's Atlanta office (R). At its October meeting the group created a formal task structure. The coordinating committee was to include one representative from each of the sixteen Southern states and the District of Columbia. Local groups would still be autonomous, and each member of the coordinating committee was authorized to speak on behalf of the group (T). The coordinating committee was relatively inactive until February 1961. At this point, eleven months after origins began, SNCC responded to pleas for assistance from students in the Rock Hill jail-in by sending representatives to join the demonstration (A).

Shortly after organization was achieved in February 1961, SNCC members were invited to a meeting with President Kennedy to discuss voter registration. This meeting (to which CORE leaders and other major civil rights leaders also were invited) constitutes an instance of consultation--a type of acceptance within Gamson's categories of success.

Unlike CORE, which formally excluded communists from the organization, SNCC's first restructuring involved its assertion of free association in conjunction with its acceptance of a grant from the Southern Conference Educational Fund. Also during the summer of 1961, SNCC began the transition from a coordinating committee to a field-based organization with the creation of a field worker position which was filled by Charles Sherrod. Later in the summer Bob Moses and two volunteers began voter registration efforts in Mississippi. This area of activity was formalized in August in the compromise which created both direct action and voter registration wings, with accompanying changes in tasks, activities, and resources.

Publicity of Bob Moses and his co-workers' activities is regarded as the catalyst which preceded a complex (R-D-A-T) restructuring in the Fall of 1961:

Twelve students decided to drop out of college to work full-time for SNCC (R). A month later at the October staff meeting, the March on Mississippi was adopted as the focus of SNCC's activities to be carried through by this new full-time contingent. By adopting this campaign, SNCC refocused its scope of influence by recognizing the Deep South rather than college campuses of the entire South as its legitimate locus of activities (D). Very shortly after this reformulation of SNCC's focus, field workers began to shift their activities from the rather narrowly delimited areas of direct action and voter registration to the more general emphasis on community organizing in the black communities of Mississippi (A). With this addition of new staff, the change in domain, and the more diffuse activities directed at bringing communities together to realize their own potential, SNCC's center of power shifted (T). The coordinating committee became merely the titular head of the group. After this Fall it was the actions of the field staff rather than the decisions of the coordinating committee that formulated SNCC's policy.

Throughout SNCC's history there was an unresolved tension between members who abhorred any suggestion of creating internal hierarchies or bureaucracy and those who felt that SNCC needed some type of formal organizational configuration to be effective and durable. By late 1961 Jim Forman, SNCC's new executive secretary and a strong advocate of this latter view, began pushing for more organizational structure within SNCC. During the ensuing year or so the task structure was modified to include a set of specialized jobs in public relations and coordination. Strategic resources were augmented when key people were introduced to fill these positions.

Another facet of this protracted debate about the internal organization of SNCC itself was the related issue of SNCC's role with relation to the local communities in which it worked. On this question, SNCC formally specified very early that local leadership should be encouraged regardless of the more finely honed organization or communication skills of the more formally educated SNCC members. This simple declaration did not avert all conflicts, however, especially with

the influx of white volunteers during and after Freedom Summer.

By the spring of 1962 there was a discernible trend toward a more radical staff. New SNCC members were likely to be radicalized and involved in the civil rights movement before they joined SNCC. Simultaneously, current members were quickly becoming radicalized by their harsh experiences in the Deep South--leading overall to an increasingly radical band of workers.

SNCC had carved a niche for itself in the most inauspicious of territorial domains--the Deep South. When Voter Education Project funds were allocated in the sumer of 1962, they were distributed on the basis of anticipated success in voter registration drives. SNCC therefore received very limited support. To augment this sum, SNCC adjusted its domain to focus its fund raising activities in the North and restructured resources by hiring white staff members to man these offices. By the end of the year these northern efforts produced a significant increase in income so that SNCC ended the year out of debt. In addition to strictly financial support, these northern affiliates also provided donations that made it possible for SNCC to successfully carry out additional peripheral activities such as the LeFlore County food drive in late 1962.

By the summer of 1963 SNCC had made some significant gains in voter registration (a success in the form of advantages). However it was the relative insignificance of these gains compared to the enormity of the work that needed to be done, rather than the achievement itself, that affected SNCC's future course. In response to this dubious success, SNCC carried out the restructuring detailed in Chapter One by shifting to a "one man, one vote" doctrine and program.

During the Spring of 1964 SNCC expanded its activities in the North

in a successful effort to raise funds and foster alliances for its

proposed summer project--Freedom Summer. This summer itself is

expressed as an R-A restructuring:

> Freedom Summer was a plan to recruit Northern college students to
> spend their summer working with black residents of rural Mississippi.
> Beginning in May SNCC underwent a shifting and augmenting of resources.
> The organization shifted the bulk of its resources away from its more
> dispersed projects and into the Freedom Summer jurisdictions in
> Mississippi. The augmentation of resources included the arrival of
> Northern volunteers beginning in June (R). With this influx of a large
> number of highly educated volunteers, SNCC diversified and expanded its
> activities. Existing activities such as voter registration were
> magnified. In addition new activities such as Freedom Schools, which
> sought to supplement local black's inadequate public education, were
> implemented (A). This change in resources and activities continued, as
> anticipated, throughout the summer.

During this time SNCC was in an interesting and uncertain

organizational state. While it was definitely in existence (although

arguably as a one- to three-element form rather than an organization),

its primary activities were carried out under the auspices of the

Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) and the Mississippi Freedom

Democratic Party (MFDP). It was under these two banners that SNCC's

successes of this summer of 1964 occurred. First, SNCC (COFO) managed

to register, either as bona fide voters or as MFDP voters, a sizeable

number of Mississippians (success--advantages). Second, the MFDP

challenge at Atlantic City can be seen as inclusion, a form of

acceptance. Like its previous gain in voter registration, however,

these successes were viewed by outsiders, rather than by SNCC, as

meaningful changes [3].

> In September 1964 SNCC encountered another restructuring as a
> result of Freedom Summer. When SNCC recruited the Northern volunteers
> for the summer project it was anticipated and expected that they would
> depart when the summer was over. At the conclusion of the project,

though, approximately eighty of these summer volunteers chose to remain in Mississippi to become full-time SNCC workers instead of returning to school (R). This unanticipated retention of a sizeable white constituency in SNCC's full-time staff radically altered the organization's racial composition. It also compounded the simmering question of the role of whites in SNCC.

After Freedom Summer SNCC began to lose the support and financial backing of northern liberals, and the performance and reliability of its staff waned. In this "freedom high" period many projects fell apart and were terminated due to a lack of dependable staff. Similar to the occurrence in CORE, this set-back in usable resources was followed by a singular restructuring of the task structure--the first such concentrated focus on ends in nearly three years. This trend of declining income and increasingly uncommitted staff was marked by a virtual end of institutional support by the end of 1965 and another series of office closings due to inactive staff in the summer of 1966.

A contested election in May 1966 brought Stokely Carmichael in as chairman and created a secretariat of members who favored greater militance. This tendency toward greater militance was soon proclaimed to the nation in Carmichael's infamous and inflammatory (but imprecise) change in domain to Black Power.

In addition to its proclamation of Black Power, SNCC shifted and broadened its scope by focusing on international events. As early as 1964 and throughout 1966-67 members made both SNCC-authorized and unauthorized visits to African and other foreign nations. The incorporation of an anti-war stance through a written denunciation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam in January 1966 was SNCC's first official venture outside of explicitly domestic racial issues. By May 1967 with Rap Brown's ascension to chairman, the group proclaimed itself to be a

human rights organization and formally set up an international affairs commission. A final involvement in international events served as a catalyst to further alienate SNCC from its remaining white supporters. A pro-Palestinian article authored by a SNCC member was interpreted by readers as a reflection of SNCC's formal position on the Mid-East conflict and caused a substantial drop in the already dwindling contributions.

As early as the first half of 1965, SNCC began activities in urban areas in conjunction with Julian Bond's campaign for the Georgia House of Representatives. However it was not until the fall of 1966 that this transition was definite, as urban areas, rather than the rural Deep South, became SNCC's legitimate domain. A gradual shift of staff to cities of the North (in addition to some cities in the South) could, by this date, be considered a definite redefinition of the organization's reason for being. With this transition to urban areas, the previous projects and communities of the rural Deep South were virtually abandoned.

By this point SNCC was crumbling both internally and externally. Chairman Rap Brown's preoccupation with his own legal entanglements meant that SNCC had a very visible but ineffectual chairman. With Brown's resignation in June 1968 SNCC reconstituted its central structure to appoint nine deputy chairmen. Internal bickering escalated as SNCC declined, and during 1968 two distinct firings--Carmichael in June and Sellers and Ricks in December--were evidence of the critical evaluations of the old members by the newer SNCC people and of a last-ditch attempt to rid the organization of those people who were seen as responsible for its decline.

Finally in June 1969 Rap Brown and a band of followers demanded control of the organization which they redefined as a paramilitary unit. With this usurpation Forman, a remaining vestige of "old SNCC," resigned. The revised SNCC was nominally headed by Brown but controlled by the Revolutionary Political Council. Like CORE, SNCC straggled on for several more years; but with a renaming as the Student National Coordinating Committee, it was sufficiently divorced from its predecessor to consider my analysis complete.

FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THE EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF KREPS' THEORY

The narratives above, in conjunction with the detailed accounts of several restructurings in text and the chronologies provided in Appendix B, demonstrate that Kreps' theory can capture much of what constitutes the histories of CORE and SNCC. Before proceeding to the actual analysis of these relationships among the separate variables, I am going to conclude this chapter with a more detailed discussion of the specific criteria and the difficulties associated with using Kreps' theory in such historical arenas.

In the switch from disasters to social movement organizations, domain is the most difficult of Kreps' elements to translate. Tasks as an internal division of labor, resources as usable assets, and activities as conjoined action translate fairly easily from disaster-oriented definitions to social movement organizations. Domains, however, are somewhat troublesome. In disasters domains are seen as the ends of organization which are expressed in both internal and external legitimation. In social movement organizations this

concept of legitimation is much more difficult to grasp. At times

internal legitimation is tenuous; for my research such restructurings

were not characterized as changes in domain if internal legitimation was

unclear. External legitimation, though, leads to a variety of difficult

problems. Rarely is there written communication indicating what the

focus of the organization should be. Also, there is rarely any formal

external acknowledgement, let alone support, of the groups' specific

sphere of influence. If the distinctions to be made are simply, for

example, civil rights/beyond civil rights, these are rather clear. But

CORE and SNCC are more intricate and subtle than these gross categories

would indicate, and a meaningful discussion of their patterns of

restructuring needs to capture more than such simple dichotomous

distinctions.

Since formal domains are so rarely specified, it becomes necessary

to make more subjective judgments than would be the ideal situation.

While formal recognition of a domain is rarely given positively, it is

sometimes acknowledged through the condemnation of external sources.

This is particularly clear in the transition to Black Power. Few

sources applauded the change, but many gave it legitimacy with their

denunciations. For my purposes, such refutations constitute external

legitimation. These responses are acknowledging the group's

collectively represented legitimate sphere of activity, despite the fact

that the external source does not agree with the propriety of such a

focus.

At other times it is difficult to get any reliable picture of how a

change is regarded externally. In these cases the original positioning

of domains in the model as ends of organization must be foremost in the

researcher's mind. Take, for example, the transition that both CORE and SNCC made to urban ghettos. It is clearly not that they simply changed their activities (means) to include techniques applicable in an urban area. Rather they came to see their legitimate focus as these ghettos and their residents. This is definitely a shift in their reason for being, not simply in what they are doing. Therefore, regardless of formal legitimation, this change is seen as an adoption of a new domain. This explains how I can state, in my analysis of SNCC, that it was involved in urban activities in 1965 and early '66 but did not gain urban areas as part of its domain until late in 1966. In the early attempts it changed only its activities. Only later did it incorporate urban areas as a sphere it specifically wanted to influence rather than as just a particular arena for its activities. A very elusive distinction at times, but the strictest observance of means/ends distinctions is necessary to capture accurately what is changed. Are the goals and focus changing, or is it merely a change in the actions being employed and carried out?

A final question on determining domains: if legitimation is supposed to come from both internal and external sources, who are the relevant others who can provide external legitimation? In disasters where formal recognition is much cleaner, this isn't terribly difficult to ascertain. In social movement organizations, it becomes rather tricky. The group's antagonists are one possibility of relevant others. These individuals or groups, though, often concentrate on the group as a whole rather than on what the group and others perceive as its purpose. They see the group in caricatured terms and often are quite oblivious to its subtle (and even not so subtle) changes.

For SNCC and CORE, the black population could be seen en masse as the relevant others. But then the question of what constitutes legitimation becomes cloudy. If any blacks follow a group in a certain pursuit, does that become a legitimate domain of the organization? This criterion makes the distinction between activites and domains, or means and ends, rather moot. Ostensibly, a social movement organization cannot carry out activities without some people joining it. Therefore all activities would become domains.

Another possibility is other similar social movement organizations-- in these particular cases other civil rights groups. For most restructurings this set of relevant others is a fairly good source of external support or denunciation--either way giving external validity to the fact that the group is now seen as having a specific area in its legitimate domain, regardless of the externally perceived legitimacy of the domain itself.

Once again the most important determination of domain is gained by searching for the organization's members' collective representation of what they should be doing (D) (in terms of legitimate focus, not in moralistic terms) rather than just what they are doing (A). While the concept of external legitimation is important to see organization as an open system, perhaps for organizations that are not working within prescribed spheres, it is sufficient to view the concept of open system as involving boundary delineations with the broader environment, while closed system (tasks) involves only the inner workings of the organization itself.

A few questions with regard to the restructurings themselves need to be addressed. First, how can separate restructurings be delineated?

It is quite simple to say that analytically restructurings are separated by temporal and/or spatial disjunctions and that between each restructuring there is some configuration of the elements that can be considered a normal or stable state of some defined length. In reality it is not this clear cut. For in analyzing a national or regional organization many things are apparently occurring simultaneously or in a long chain of events that could perhaps be seen as a single restructuring. What becomes crucial in these distinctions between separate restructurings are both discontinuities in time and/or space, and unique identifiable catalysts to each restructuring. Keeping these three distinctions in mind makes delineations between most restructurings fairly clear. A unique value on any, not necessarily all, of these criteria can be used to isolate a unique restructuring.

There are instances, though, in which it _is_ difficult to determine if one restructuring ends and then this restructuring serves as a catalyst for a second unique restructuring, or if both restructurings are really part of one larger restructuring. Again, it is important to look for discontinuities in time, space, and catalysts. Cases in which the organization seems to be at some sort of equilibrium between the changes and with unique catalysts, are documented as separate restructurings. If, however, regardless of time breaks, an initial change appears to be preparatory for an additional change and the organization is not really, then, at rest between the two instances of change, the restructuring is considered to be one larger restructuring. This implies a common problem of historical research: were the two changes seen as united by the participants, or is their connection apparent only in retrospect.

Another problem in the determination of unique restructurings occurs when a change in a single element leads to another change in the same element. For instance a change in R in the form of hiring new fund-raisers, produces an increase in income (also R). From the above guidelines, this may appear to be a single restructuring. Here, though, it is important to keep both theoretical and empirical distinctions in mind--a change in R is a change in R, but a change in people is not a change in money. If both the additional staff and the increase in income are considered to be individually significant changes, they cannot be captured by recording a single change in R. In these cases the first change is regarded as a completed restructuring and then is cited as the catalyst for the second change.

Moving out of the rather circumscribed time and space of disasters also makes it increasingly difficult to focus on the relevant unit of analysis. CORE and SNCC are regional or national organizations which are composed of smaller units of variously defined clarity and autonomy. This is particularly relevant in CORE, where each local unit has its own officers, funds, and individual projects. Although I have not analyzed them, I would suspect that New York CORE or St. Louis CORE or, for that matter, SNCC's Lowndes County activities or Atlanta project are as analytically viable as organizations as CORE and SNCC themselves. It must be remembered, though, that just because New York CORE is involved in employment campaigns, or Atlanta Project workers are vehemently anti-white does not mean that an element in the larger organization's configuration has restructured. These are units within a larger unit, and when the larger unit is the focus of analysis it must always be the specific locus of restructurings.

Focusing on a single unit of analysis is crucial to depict accurately the structural configuration and changes of this given entity. At the same time, though, it necessarily oversimplifies the dynamics of the entire organization (which includes these smaller units). It portrays an artificial sense of stability and linear change that is frequently much more conflictual and chaotic in reality. Elemental values in some component units may be ahead, behind, or in actual conflict with the broader organization's values. However if this difference is never recognized by the larger organization in the form of a restructuring, it will go unrecorded in this research.

In addition to creating a sense of stability due to the single unit of analysis, the focus on restructurings themselves creates a facade of artificial calm and consensus. Take for instance the question of the role of whites in both CORE and SNCC. This question was not formally resolved until fairly late in each organization's history. However, the fact that it was not resolved earlier does not mean that it was not a recurrent problem. In reality it was a hotly debated issue for several years before it was addressed in a restructuring. If an existing problem is never resolved or manifested in a restructuring, it will not formally become a part of the analysis. In a history depicted through restructurings much of the intraorganizational dissension and dynamism is buried because it never, or only very belatedly, becomes manifest in a structural change. Perhaps incorporating an analysis of unanswered catalysts would reduce this bias toward stability: perhaps what an organization doesn't do is as important as what it does.

This underlying lack of stability and consensus is depicted in part in the time lag between a catalyst and its subsequent restructuring. In

most instances, though, a specific event shortly before the restructuring serves as the "straw that breaks the camel's back," and therefore the long-standing dissensus and unrest remains effectively hidden. Perhaps it would be more accurate to declare the first evidence of problem in an area as the catalyst. This modified technique would more obviously display the long-standing uncertainty that eventually is manifested in a restructuring. At the same time, though, a complete exclusion of immediate catalysts would obscure those occurrences that directly bring about change.

Assigning time dimensions to restructurings presents several difficulties. Take the Freedom Rides as an example. CORE's segment of the Rides lasted two weeks. Since the Rides are considered to involve a change in only one element (A), however, they are recorded as a single date. As another example look at SNCC's Food Drive of October 1962 through the following spring. Since it, too, is only a change in activities (A), it is recorded simply as October 1962. Although this creates a linearity in the sequence of restructurings that does not correspond precisely to reality, this technique of using the first date at which an element changes appears to be the best means of handling this ambiguity: regardless of the duration of the new value of the restructured element(s), there is a discernible point at which a change is noted. The two types of cases in which this question arises are temporary shifts in the value of one or more elements and trends, or gradually changing values of the elements.

A temporary change in an element (i.e., the element changes its value and then reverts to its previous value) is recorded temporally as occurring at the onset of the change. A difficulty with some

restructurings like these is that often the reversion to the original value of the element is not a meaningful change for the unit. Take for instance Freedom Summer and the tremendous influx of white volunteers. The increased resources represented by these volunteers is definitely a significant change; however, the fact that most of the students left at the end of the summer is not really a significant restructuring. Granted human resources are decreased here, and rather significantly numerically. But in terms of the organization, this loss is not considered to be a restructuring because the students were brought in for a predetermined time period and were leaving at the predetermined time. (This is similar to receiving a grant--it is the reception of the grant that is important; it is not considered to be a separate restructuring when the grant has all been spent.) What is significant for SNCC is not that the majority of the students left, but rather that 80 of them stayed. In other words if something occurs temporarily when it was anticipated to be temporary, its conclusion is not a separate restructuring. On the other hand, if something turns out to be temporary when it was planned to be permanent, or vice versa, the second change in the elemental value is considered to be a significant restructuring.

This leads to a related issue which does not appear to be relevant to disasters: the documentation of trends. If there is intensified fund raising, and consequently the organization begins to receive increased income, what is the relevant date for the increase in income? It seems necessary here to make a judgment call about what is a significant change in income. If, for instance, three months after the initiation of increased fund raising the organization has raised enough

money to get itself out of debt, the date for a change in resources is assigned to this point as a definable threshold. A gradual increase in income is then considered to be the normal state until some significant increase or decrease in income occurs. If, however, income begins to increase almost immediately after intensifying efforts and does not make any discontinuous leaps, the restructuring of resources is said to occur at this early point. Future gradual and continuous increases again are considered to be part of a normal state.

Take a slightly different example of radicalizing protest activities. If the protests of 1963, for example, are noticably more radical than the protests of 1962, an empirically justifiable date in 1963 is used as the relevant date for this change. After this date, if there is no evidence that there was another great burst of increased radicalization at a later date and there is no reason to suspect that they became less radical, radicalization of activities is considered to be an extant and continuous aspect of activities which needs no further discussion. Since radicalization is noted and a change to less radical behavior is not in evidence, it is assumed that progressive radicalization of protests continues until a subsequent restructuring denotes a significant leap, either positively or negatively, in the degree of radical activities.

Any single element change or any elemental change that is seen as a threshold mark of a trend, then, is assigned a single date according to the above criteria. This appears to be relatively unproblematic as long as the researcher and the reader recall that *trends are considered to be a component of a normal, though not static, state*. Once an element takes on a value it is assumed to maintain that value until the

end of the prearranged duration of the value or until it is specifically overruled by a new value of the element. Restructurings signify discontinuous changes while trends point to continuous change (Wallace, 1983:144). A trend must be initiated and terminated by a restructuring: such a restructuring can document an extant trend which has crossed the threshold of observability, or it can refer to a sudden dramatic change in the element's value. Either way, *once documented a trend is assumed to remain in existence until another threshold of observability is crossed or an abrupt change occurs*.

For the current research Gamson's categories of success also must be empirically defined and refined. Gamson's categories consider gains in advantages for the constituency and acceptance for the group itself as a legitimate spokesman to be appropriate dimensions of success. Little attention is given in this scheme to very non-material forms of success such as consciousness raising. For my research such elusive forms of success are not recorded. A case could be made that what CORE and SNCC were attempting, with varying intensity throughout their histories, was not so much to create formal changes but rather to make black Americans overcome their false consciousness. In historical research it is very difficult to delineate formal successes accurately. To add to this the very ambiguous categories of sub-cranial changes in individuals or groups would make this variable hopelessly complex. Also the alternative point can be made that if a social movement organization is to be considered truly successful, it must gain some concessions from its antagonists rather than merely improving its beneficiary's subjective perceptions.

Many of the successes coded here are commonly regarded as successes

of these particular groups. However, there are some successes that may

appear to be missing from the analysis. Keeping in mind two

stipulations may make it easier to realize why these apparent gains are

not considered to be successes of CORE or SNCC. First, the success must

be directly attributable to the organization itself. Unlike Gamson, who

does not assume that the protest groups caused the change, I stipulate

that the group must be involved in activities which directly facilitated

the success. The group's activities preceding the attainment of some

form of success are seen as necessary but not necessarily sufficient for

the success to have occurred. Under this criterion, then, neither CORE

nor SNCC can be directly tied to a success such as the 1964 Civil Rights

bill; for although they were active at this time, they were not pushing

specifically for federal legislation in any direct way. To give them

credit for this legislation would be to assert that any group in

existence at the time of sweeping reform is responsible for the relevant

change. For Gamson's purposes this is applicable, but when analyzing

groups that existed during the same temporal period it only confuses the

issue and does not permit analysis of the relative successes of separate

groups.

Second, in addition to being directly attributable to a group, a

success must be linked to the broadest level of the organization to be

considered an organizational success. For instance a success achieved

by New York CORE working completely without direct assistance or

authorization by the national office would not be considered a CORE

success. The activities leading to a success, therefore, must be linked

through either initiation or support to the national organization if the

advancement is to be considered a success for the organization itself.

These stipulations definitely underrepresent the population of successes that could, in some way, be linked to each organization. At the same time, though, such restrictions must be implemented so that a single level of analysis is maintained throughout the research [4]. Underrepresentation of successes is assumed to be random so that comparisons between groups are valid.

CHAPTER THREE

A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CORE AND SNCC

INTRODUCTION OF CENTRAL VARIABLES

Table 2 describes the central variables for the analysis of CORE
and SNCC and gives marginals for those variables not provided on
subsequent tables. These include variables that pertain to several
facets of restructuring, an indication of each restructuring's linkage
to relevant successes, and other variables that are primarily
organizational characteristics. These latter measures refer to
characteristics of the organizations at the time of each restructuring;
however, they are not necessarily directly linked to the immediate
change.

The first two variables--NUMBER OF ELEMENTS and METRIC
SCORE--indicate the degree and relative means/ends strain of each
restructuring. NUMBER OF ELEMENTS indicates how many of the four
possible elements are changed above a threshold of observable difference
during the restructuring. As discussed in Chapter One, this involves
determinations of which elements change and in what order in relation to
the sixty-four possible configurations (Table 1, p.6).

METRIC SCORE arrays the sixty-four possible FORMS OF RESTRUCTURING
according to the relative predominance of either means-based or
ends-based change. The metric (Table 3) is created by weighting the

TABLE 2

Central Variables and Their Measurement

Variable	Measurement
Number of Elements	Number of elements changed during restructuring
Metric Score	Score on derived means-ends metric (+7 to -7)
Time to First Element	Time (in weeks) from appearance of catalyst until change in first restructuring element
Total Time	Time (in weeks) from appearance of catalyst until restructuring is completed
Related to Success	Indicates if restructuring is linked either causally or temporally to an instance of success
Year Restructuring Starts	Calendar year in which actual transformation of elements begins
Conflictual Catalyst	Distinguishes catalysts involving overt conflict from those catalysts that do not involve the organization in overt conflict 0 = nonconflictual CORE N=32, SNCC N=29 1 = conflictual CORE N=8, SNCC N=13
External Catalyst	Distinguishes catalysts generated within the organization from those that involve external entities or events 0 = internal CORE N=26, SNCC N=26 1 = external CORE N=14, SNCC N=16
Relative Size	Indicates organizational trend in size (membership or staff) at time of each restructuring 1 = Decreasing CORE N=7, SNCC N=11 2 = Maintaining CORE N=22, SNCC N=23 3 = Increasing CORE N=11, SNCC N=8
Relative Income	Indicates organizational trend in income at time of each restructuring 1 = Decreasing CORE N=13, SNCC N=18 2 = Maintaining CORE N=11, SNCC N=13 3 = Increasing CORE N=16, SNCC N=11

TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

Type of Disjunction

Delineates whether the change in the
value of the first element is problematic or
smooth
1 = change (nonproblematic)
    CORE N=29, SNCC N=29
2 = contingency or intra-element disparity
    (problematic)   CORE N=11, SNCC N=13

Scope of Restructuring

Specifies spacial parameters of
organization affected by restructuring
1 = local   CORE N=0, SNCC N=5
2 = regional   CORE N=17, SNCC N=15
3 = national   CORE N=23, SNCC N=22

TABLE 3

Metric: Means-based versus Ends-based Restructurings

+7	+6	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7
						DR	DRAT	RD						
						DA	DART	RT						
		D				TR	TRAD	AD			R			
		T				TA	TARD	AT			A			
		DTR	DTRA	DRT	DRTA	RDT	RDTA	DRA	RDAT	RDA	RADT	RAD		
		DTA	DTAR	DAT	DATR	RTD	RTDA	DAR	RTAD	RTA	RATD	RAT		
DT		TDR	TDRA	TRD	TRDA	ADT	ADTR	TRA	ADRT	ADR	ARDT	ARD		RA
TD	__	TDA	TDAR	TAD	TADR	ATD	ATDR	TAR	ATRD	ATR	ARTD	ART	__	AR
+7	+6	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7

value of the first restructuring element, and regressively weighting each subsequently changing element in a restructuring. Specifically, each transformation of either D or T is assigned a plus (+), and each change in A or R is given a minus (-). This sign is weighted four times for the first changing element (i.e., a change in D or T receives a +4 as first transforming element, and an A or R is scored -4 if it changes first). The second changing element is weighted three times (i.e., +3 for ends and -3 for means); the third element is weighted twice (+2 or -2); and the fourth element is not weighted at all (+1 or -1). For example, a T-D-A form receives a score of +5 [i.e.,(+4)+(+3)+(-2)] while an A-D restructuring is scored as -1 [i.e.,(-4)+(+3)].

The resulting distribution (Table 3) spans from +7 (pure ends-based restructuring) to -7 (pure means-based restructuring). All scores falling between these pure forms display some interplay between means and ends in the restructuring. The scores falling below the zero midpoint are referred to as means-based because the means elements change before (or without) a corresponding change in ends. Conversely, positive scores point to ends-based change in which changes in the collective representations occur before (or without) changes in means. Referring back to Chapter One, means-based changes suggest the participant as object and greater stability for the organization, while ends-based restructuring suggests the participant as actor and greater flexibility. The four-element forms falling at the midpoint suggest a balancing of means and ends, since neither ends nor means is dominating the change.

The next two variables, TIME FROM CATALYST TO FIRST ELEMENT and TOTAL TIME of restructuring, are intertwined but distinct measures of

the time factor in restructuring. TIME FROM CATALYST TO FIRST ELEMENT documents the time from the occurrence of an identifiable catalyst until the organization responds with the first change in an element. TOTAL TIME is simply the time from the catalyst until the last restructuring element is in place and the restructuring is considered complete.

SUCCESS indicates whether the restructuring is linked in some manner to the achievement of an instance of success, as evidenced in either acceptance for the organization as a legitimate spokesman, or the gaining of advantages in the form of a common good. Linkages to success are rather broadly defined. The linkages include both temporal links (meaning the restructuring occurred either immediately before, after, or coterminously with the success), and causal links. A link is considered to be causal if and only if the restructuring is seen as necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) for the success to have occurred for the organization, or if the reverse occurs (i.e. the success is a necessary (but not sufficient) cause of the restructuring). Due to the small number of restructurings that are connected in either sense to one or more instances of success, this variable is coded as a dichotomy (0=restructuring is not associated with any success, 1=restructuring is associated with at least one success either temporally or causally). SUCCESS simply documents whether or not a restructuring is linked in any way to an instance of success. An instance of success can logically be linked to anywhere from one to five restructurings (see Codebook, p.). Similarly a specific restructuring can be associated with any number of successes. This variable, then, is a general measure of linkages between restructurings and successes. It does not distinguish between different degrees or types of linkages, and it does not provide a valid

indication of how many successes a group achieved.

YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS codes each restructuring according to the calendar year in which the first element change occurs. This determination arrays the restructurings chronologically within each organization, and allows for comparison of restructurings occurring at the same time in different units.

EXTERNAL CATALYST and CONFLICTUAL CATALYST refer to the catalyst which precedes each restructuring. It is assumed that some event or occurrence precedes and initiates each restructuring; in other words, there would be no changes if there were no reason to change. The actual types of catalysts cover quite a spectrum of occurrences, from ideas, to external perceptions of the organization, to the appointment of a key individual, to a debate within the group. For comparative purposes the catalysts are distinguished on the above mentioned dichotomies: is the catalyst conflictual or nonconflictual, and is it internal or external. To be considered conflictual, a catalyst must evidence overt conflict involving the organization (e.g., a quarrel among members or the alienation of outside supporters. Something such as a riot that does not directly involve CORE or SNCC would be considered nonconflictual in this scheme, because although it is a conflictual event, it does not involve the organization in question in a directly conflictual situation.) The internal/external variable distinguishes those restructurings in which the catalyst is confined to events or participants within the organization, from those in which the catalyst involves people or situations which are outside the organization. Each catalyst receives a score on both these variables.

TYPE OF DISJUNCTION refers to the type of change in the first

element of the restructuring. As such it is analytically and empirically distinct from the catalyst. In Saunders and Kreps' (1986) work all initial changes are termed contingencies. In the current work the definition for this term has been refined and narrowed, and two additional categories are introduced to describe first element changes. CONTINGENCY here refers only to those elemental changes where there is a problem with the element (e.g., a loss of income, staff not performing their jobs). An INTRA-ELEMENT DISPARITY is considered to occur when there is disagreement about the new value an element should assume--in this case there is more than one value of the element that is seen as valid by participants (e.g. Carmichael's gaining the leadership position in SNCC through contesting an election, the compromise which created two wings in SNCC in 1961). The third form, termed simply CHANGE, occurs when the transition to the new value of the first element is smooth and non-problematic (e.g. a generally agreed upon change in tasks, positive change in resources). For statistical purposes, CONTINGENCIES and INTRA-ELEMENT DISPARITIES are combined to achieve a simple problematic/non-problematic dichotomy.

SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING refers to the geographic parameters affected by the restructuring. Each restructuring is coded as affecting either a local (i.e., single state or smaller geographic area), regional (i.e., either North or South), or national region. For CORE, this distinction is most validly viewed as an organizational variable because the scope of the restructurings and the corresponding scope of the organization are almost perfectly correlated. For SNCC, however, it is a meaningful distinction between individual restructurings.

The final two variables--RELATIVE SIZE and RELATIVE INCOME--refer

to the organization at the time of restructuring rather than to the restructurings themselves. What these variables refer to is the general trend in income and membership (or staff) at the time of a restructuring: is it increasing, decreasing, or remaining relatively constant? While a significant and abrupt change in either of these areas constitutes a restructuring of resources, the trend lines of these resources do not offer clearly defined restructurings; rather they point to normal states in which money or people are gradually changing or remaining constant. A gradual change in human or material resources, then, is not necessarily a restructuring. The current variable distinguishes between those periods in which the normal state for these resources is a positive or negative gradual change and those periods in which resources are held at a rather constant level.

FREQUENCIES AND PATTERNS OF RESTRUCTURINGS AND SUCCESSES

Table 4 arrays the 64 logically possible forms of restructuring and indicates the forms and frequencies which were located in CORE's and SNCC's histories. For both CORE and SNCC the mean metric scores indicate a strain toward means-based restructuring. SNCC's mean metric score of -2.0 quite emphatically points to this greater emphasis on restructuring means, while CORE's mean of -0.8, although still displaying a strain toward changes in means, points to a more nearly balanced history of restructurings. For both organizations the modal metric score is -4, indicating that a single element restructuring of means (i.e., a change in either R or A) is the most frequent change.

Looking at the actual number of times CORE and SNCC changed the

TABLE 4

Distribution of Empirically Located
Forms of Restructuring in CORE and SNCC

Form	Metric Score	Frequency CORE	Frequency SNCC
TD	+7		
DT	+7		
TDA	+5		
TDR	+5		
DTA	+5		
DTR	+5		
TDRA	+4		
TDAR	+4		
DTAR	+4		1
DTRA	+4		
T	+4	8	3
D	+4	1	2
TAD	+3		
TRD	+3	1	
DAT	+3		
DRT	+3		
TADR	+2		
TRDA	+2		
DATR	+2		
DRTA	+2		
TA	+1		
TR	+1	2	2

Form	Metric Score	Frequency CORE	Frequency SNCC
DA	+1	1	
DR	+1	1	2
RTD	+1		
RDT	+1	1	1
ADT	+1		
ATD	+1		
ATDR	0		
ADTR	0		
RTDA	0		
RDTA	0		
TARD	0		
TRAD	0		
DART	0		
DRAT	0		
AT	-1	2	
AD	-1	3	
RT	-1		2
RD	-1		2
DRA	-1		1
DAR	-1		
TRA	-1		

Form	Score	Frequency CORE	Frequency SNCC
TAR	-1		
ATRD	-2		2
ADRT	-2		
RDAT	-2		1
RTAD	-2		
ADR	-3		
ATR	-3		
RTA	-3		
RDA	-3		
A	-4	4	7
R	-4	10	11
ARDT	-4		
ARTD	-4		
RADT	-4		
RATD	-4		
ARD	-5		
ART	-5		
RAT	-5		
RAD	-5		
AR	-7	1	2
RA	-7	1	4

CORE

Mean Metric Score   -0.82
Median Metric Score -1.00

4 of 4   One-Element Forms: N=23 (100%)
8 of 12 Two-Element Forms: N=12 (67%)
5 of 24 Three-Element Forms: N=5 (21%)
0 of 24 Four-Element Forms: N=0 (0%)

SNCC

-2.05
-4.00

4 of 4   One-Element Forms: N=23 (100%)
6 of 12 Two-Element Forms: N=16 (50%)
3 of 24 Three-Element Forms: N=3 (12%)
2 of 24 Four-Element Forms: N=2 (8%)

value of each element, irrespective of the full configuration of each restructuring, it is apparent that the metric is not creating artificial distinctions, but is highlighting actual tendencies in the data. For both CORE and SNCC domain was the least frequently changed element--transformed nine times by CORE and in eleven instances by SNCC. Tasks were restructured eighteen times by CORE and eleven times by SNCC. The most frequently restructured element was resources--twenty-two times by CORE and thirty times by SNCC. Activities changed in thirteen instances for CORE and sixteen times for SNCC. In sum, CORE changed the values of its ends elements twenty-seven times and its means elements thirty-five times. SNCC altered ends twenty-two times and means forty-six times. These raw data clearly point to the more means-based strain of SNCC's restructurings, and the more nearly balanced changes undergone by CORE.

CORE restructured tasks much more frequently than SNCC did. SNCC, however, invoked pure means-based restructuring (A-R or R-A) more frequently than did CORE. From the rest of the distribution shown on Table 4, CORE and SNCC appear to be fairly parallel. Therefore it seems that the disparity in mean metric scores between the organizations is primarily attributable to CORE's prolific restructuring of tasks and SNCC's more frequent introduction of pure means-based restructurings. In addition, the slightly higher incidence of single element means-based restructuring (A or R) by SNCC, and the single instance of pure ends-based restructuring (D-T) undertaken by CORE also contribute to the disparity in the two means.

The bottom of Table 4 details the portion of logically possible forms of restructuring located in CORE's and SNCC's histories. In both

cases all possible one-element forms occurred during the relevant history. The percentage of total forms that can be empirically located in CORE and SNCC decreases drastically with the transition to two-element forms. For CORE 67% of these possible forms were documented; for SNCC exactly half (50%) of the logically possible two-element forms were observed. With regard to three-element forms, CORE experienced only 21% of these possible configurations, and SNCC displays only 12%. Four-element forms were delineated only in SNCC, and even there only 8% of the possible configurations were documented.

What is not clearly stated on Table 4, but which is also very relevant, is the portion of total restructurings that one-, two-, three-, and four-element forms each contribute. There is a clear predominance of one-element forms: 58% of all CORE's restructurings and 55% of SNCC's are of this very limited degree. Adding two-element forms to the single-element totals accounts for 88% of all restructurings in each group. The remaining 12% of CORE's changes are accounted for by three-element forms. For SNCC 7% of the remaining restructurings are three-element and 5% are four-element configurations. This points to the dialectical nature of organization as both process and unit. That which exists is always changing, but change is constrained by what exists.

Tables 5a and 5b provide chronologies of the restructurings in CORE and SNCC. From these tables and Appendix C, it is apparent that although I traced the maintenance system state of CORE for twenty-five years and of SNCC for only eight years, the two organizations restructured approximately the same number of times. While it is acknowledged that all possible changes have not been documented, it is

TABLE 5A

CORE--Chronology of Restructurings

DATE	FORM	METRIC SCORE	SUCCESS	DATE	FORM	METRIC SCORE	SUCCESS
6/43	DT	+7	YES	6/61	DA	+1	YES
6/44	T	+4	- - -	10/61	R	-4	YES
6/45	T	+4	- - -	10/61	RT	-1	YES
4/47	A	-4	- - -	4/62	ARD	-5	YES
6/47	T	+4	- - -	4/63	RA	-7	YES
6/48	TR	+1	- - -	6/63	R	-4	
6/48	D	+4	- - -	4/64	A	-4	
6/49	T	+4	- - -	4/64	R	-4	
0/50	AR	-7	- - -	6/64	T	+4	- - -
6/51	TRA	-1	- - -	6/64	AD	-1	YES
1/54	RT	-1		8/64	R	-4	YES
6/54	R	-4		10/64	AD	-1	YES
3/56	T	+4	- - -	10/64	TR	+1	
9/56	R	-4	YES	1/65	R	-4	
10/57	TAD	+3	YES	6/65	T	+4	
10/59	T	+4	YES	9/65	A	-4	
2/60	ATR	-3	- - -	1/66	R	-4	
10/60	RT	-1	- - -	3/66	R	-4	
2/61	R	-4	- - -	6/66	DR	+1	
5/61	A	-4	YES	6/68	RDT	+1	

TABLE 5B

SNCC--Chronology of Restructurings

DATE	FORM	METRIC SCORE	SUCCESS	DATE	FORM	METRIC SCORE	SUCCESS
6/61	RD	-1	YES	2/65	T	+4	
6/61	TR	+1	---	3/65	A	-4	
7/61	RA	-7	---	5/65	A	-4	
8/61	DTAR	+4	YES	12/65	R	-4	
9/61	RDAT	+1	---	1/66	D	+4	
12/61	TR	+1	---	1/66	A	-4	
2/62	T	+4	---	5/66	RT	-1	
4/62	R	-4	---	5/66	A	-4	
4/62	T	+4	---	6/66	D	+4	
6/62	DR	+1	---	6/66	R	-4	
10/62	A	-4		7/66	AR	-7	
12/62	R	-4	---	10/66	RD	-1	
6/63	R	-4	YES	11/66	RA	-7	
9/63	DRA	-1	YES	12/66	DR	+1	
2/64	A	-4	---	2/67	R	-4	
4/64	AR	-7	---	5/67	RDT	+1	
5/64	RA	-7	YES	7/67	R	-4	
9/64	R	-4	YES	6/68	RT	-1	
9/64	A	-4	---	7/68	R	-4	
10/64	R	-4		12/68	R	-4	
10/64	RA	-7		6/69	DRT	+3	

assumed that additional restructurings occurred randomly throughout the organizations' histories, and that the current research has captured a comparable portion of the total possible restructurings for both groups. CORE, then, displays 40 instances of restructuring in 25 years for a mean of 1.60 restructurings per year. SNCC restructured 42 times in 8 years resulting in a mean annual rate of 5.25 restructurings.

In the years immediately following the transition from origins to maintenance (i.e., the initiation of organization as marked by the co-presence of all four elements), both CORE and SNCC were more ends-based in their restructurings than they were later in their histories. For CORE this results in a mean metric score for the 1940's of 3.6--a very pronounced ends-based strain. For SNCC this ends-based period falls only slightly above the midpoint with a mean of 0.4 for the first ten restructurings. For both organizations this orientation towards changing the organization's ends is even more specifically a concentrated focus on subsequent changes in the task structure. CORE's period of ends-based restructuring was much more pronounced and longer than SNCC's, although both groups clearly show a greater emphasis on ends (especially tasks) early in their maintenance system states.

In absolute chronological years, then, this early period of ends-based restructurings lasted much longer for CORE than for SNCC--six years for CORE compared to a single year for SNCC. In relation to the temporal duration of each organization, this disparity between the groups diminishes, but does not disappear. For CORE this early ends-based phase encompassed 24% of its total temporal history, while for SNCC it occupied only 12.5% of the total duration. However, in looking at the portion of restructurings ecompassed in this phase, the

disparity between the two groups virtually disappears. CORE's focus on ends-based changes encompassed its first eight restructurings, or 20% of its entire chronology; for SNCC this early period was composed of the first ten restructurings, or 23.8% of its total changes. CORE, then, spent more years and a larger portion of its total history in initial restructurings which focused quite specifically on ends. SNCC underwent approximately the same number of restructurings during this phase, but its changes occurred in a much shorter absolute and relative time period and were less dominated by single changes in ends.

Following this early ends-based sequence, both groups switched to a period of strict means-based changes. For SNCC this second phase continued uninterrupted for two years (October 1962 through October 1964). CORE made this transition to a means-based period in 1950; however, during the latter half of the 1950's it reverted to another series of predominantly ends-based changes. By 1960 CORE once again began a means-based series of restructurings, which continued for slightly more than four years (February 1960 through April 1964). Similar to the initial phase of ends-based changes, this major period of means-based changes (CORE's second means-based segment and SNCC's total means-based phase) lasted longer in terms of actual chronological years for CORE than for SNCC (four years for CORE compared to two years for SNCC). Also like the earlier series, this disparity virtually disappears when the actual number of relevant restructurings is considered--twelve restructurings (30%) for CORE and eleven changes (26%) for SNCC).

The final segment of both organizations' histories was composed of a mixed series of restructurings. In both cases individual ends-based

restructurings were interspersed among the more abundant means-based changes. For the final mixed segment, the comparability between groups is evident in absolute time, but not in the proportion of time or restructurings encompassed by this phase. Both CORE and SNCC spent approximately four years in this final phase. For SNCC, though, this means that 29% of its entire history and 50% of all restructurings occurred in this final period, while for CORE only 16% of its total time and 30% of its restructurings fell in this mixed period.

In both groups this final period of mixed restructurings coincided with decreasing prosperity. These mixed periods were immediately preceded by a restructuring which decreased usable resources. Throughout the rest of this final phase, with the exception of the introduction of single key individuals, neither organization underwent any positive restructurings of resources. SNCC, then, spent half of its history in this period of progressively declining prosperity. CORE, however, spent the majority of its life-span in the relatively prosperous earlier phases.

In addition to displaying similar, though not identical, patterns of restructuring, there are several interesting patterns within coterminous time-frames for the two groups. CORE and SNCC existed coterminously as organizations from early 1961 until June of 1968. (Remember that technically both groups remained in existence until the early 1970's, but that significant breaks with their former identities as noted by the final restructuring for each group signifies the end of the current analysis.) The first similarity is the marked strain toward means-based restructurings that prevails throughout the 1960's. For CORE this is seen in a mean metric score for this decade of -2.1

(compared to a pre-1960 mean metric score of 1.1 and an overall mean of -0.8), while for SNCC it is simply the overall mean metric of -2.0. The restructurings of this decade are also relatively frequent. SNCC restructured an average of 5.6 times annually during this coterminous phase. CORE's annual average increased from one restructuring per year during the 1940's and 1950's to an average of three changes annually during the 1960's.

Not only is the decade predominated by frequent means-based changes, but there is also a similarity in the date of transition from the segment of uniformly means-based changes to the phase of mixed restructurings--mid-1964 for CORE and the end of 1964 for SNCC. This similarity is seen also in the restructuring which immediately preceded the transition to the mixed-phase for each group--a restructuring in 1964 involving a decrease in usable resources.

In addition to the similar dates for the transition from means-based changes to a phase of mixed restructurings, the two groups remained in this final phase for approximately the same number of years. This is striking because a similarity in absolute time is not noted in earlier phases. Regardless of the date used for the final demises of CORE and SNCC (the late 1960's as they are traced here or the early 1970's), they existed for approximately the same amount of time after their temporally similar transitions to the period of mixed restructurings. Extrapolating from the fact that the earlier common phases showed consistency between the number or proportion of restructurings encompassed by each segment, it would be hypothesized that this final phase would also show such a pattern. However, what is apparent here is a consistency in absolute time, not relative

proportions. This similarity, and the initiation of the mixed phases by temporally similar set-backs in resources, might be pointing to the importance of external variables and conditions. This, however, leads to a level of explanation that cannot be approached in the current research. Rather I can only say that CORE and SNCC both entered their final phases within less than a year of each other, these final periods began following a set-back in resources, and within approximately four years both groups had ceased to be viable or effective entities.

The final similarity among temporal parameters involves the clustering of successes. The majority of restructurings associated with successes for both groups occurred between the summer of 1961 and the fall of 1964. On Tables 5a and 5b the columns labeled "Success" indicate those restructurings that are linked either temporally or causally to at least one instance of success. Using this relatively lax criteria six of SNCC's restructurings and thirteen of CORE's changes are considered to be related to successes. Each restructuring can be connected in a variety of ways to any number of successes (see Codebook). Therefore, the size of the cluster is not necessarily indicative of the number of successes associated with it. For instance, the cluster of three CORE restructurings between June and October 1964 is pointing to a single instance of success. However, the preceding cluster of six success-connected restructurings depicts multiple linkages for each restructuring to a corresponding cluster of five successes.

The majority of success-connected restructurings are composed of solely temporal links. Several restructurings are linked both temporally and causally to an instance of success. In both groups only

one link is solely causal--meaning that the causally linked
restructuring and relevant success are separated in time. Most
success-related restructurings, therefore, are detailing temporal
connections. In general CORE's and SNCC's success-related
restructurings are related by virtue of when they occurred rather than
by their content. Even most of those restructurings that showed causal
relationships with an instance of success occurred in close temporal
proximity to the relevant success.

A portion of the noted clustering of success-related restructurings
is to be expected since temporal, in addition to causal, links are
delineated. This clustering of success-related changes, though, is
reflecting something more--clusters of successes themselves. CORE is
coded as having achieved eight instances of success, and SNCC is
considered to have gained four such successes. These successes are not
randomly scattered throughout CORE's or SNCC's total histories. Rather,
five of CORE's eight successes occurred between the summer of 1961 and
the end of 1962. For SNCC this clustering is less pronounced, but even
here two of its four successes occurred in the summer of 1964. For both
CORE and SNCC, then, the majority of successes occurred during the
means-based phases of the early 1960's.

As is the case with all temporally coterminous similarities in this
research, it would be mere speculation rather than rigorous science for
me to attempt to explain this commonality by reference to either the
effect of similar organizaional configurations or to external events.
As will be seen later, the chronological year in which a restructuring
takes place is a very central variable with regard to many other
measures. However, to speculate about the specific influences or

conditions of this larger world environment would lead to the type of unsubstantiated conjecture that plagues so much of social science. While it provides an incomplete answer, the current work seeks to remain within the limits of what is known rather than to venture into the intuitively satisfying but scientifically untenable realm of premature explanation and haphazard causal relationships.

Patterns of Sequential Restructurings

Linn (1986) introduced (from Wallace, 1983) the term rhythm to describe consistency of forms of restructuring (as seen in metric scores) across a sequence of changes. While the term itself is imprecise, the patterning that it, in part, points to is important to recognize. A search for patterns in exploratory work such as this is an attempt to capture an absence of randomness rather than to demand absolutely pure forms of pattern. There are several types of patterns across subsequent restructurings that are potentially informative to detail. The first type is the general pattern across the organization's entire maintenance state. This is most broadly delineated as the ends-based, means-based, mixed period sequence detailed above.

The second type of patterning is most closely aligned to what Linn termed rhythm--an absolute consistency of metric scores across a sequence of two or more restructurings. This consistency is noted in both CORE and SNCC in several series. Referring back to Tables 5a and 5b, CORE displays seven such chains, and SNCC shows six sequences of identical adjacent metric scores. The majority of such chains involve only two restructurings, and none continue for more than three consecutive changes. It is difficult to interpret these short chains of consistency within the longer chains comprising the organizations'

histories. SNCC's chronology suggests that a phase of means-based changes shows most rhythm, while a period of ends-based change is least rhythmic. For CORE this same pattern is evident but it is much less clear. Here three of the seven chains occur in means-based phases, with two chains in the ends-based periods and two in the final mixed phase. In general it could be concluded that, in Linn's definition of the term, means-based phases tend to be most rhythmic.

Given the posited value of interplay between means-based and ends-based restructuring during an organization's history, rhythm in the above sense would theoretically be a detrimental patterning. Unless the rhythm involves a series of four-element forms which fall at the mid-point of the metric, such patterning points to a repetitive focus on changes of either ends or means. This is clearly seen in CORE and SNCC where the majority of rhythmic chains are composed of series of either -4 or +4. These scores point more toward a pure form of either means-based or ends-based restructurings than to the balanced mid-point.

Since both groups show approximately the same number of these short rhythmic chains, the relationship between rhythm and longevity appears to be negligible. The value, or debility, in terms of success is not clear. In general successes were achieved during means-based phases of restructuring, and these means-based periods tend to be most rhythmic. For SNCC three of its six success-related restructurings are members of rhythmic chains. CORE, though, has only one of its success-related changes involved in such a chain. In fact most successes were achieved during CORE's non-rhythmic segment of its primary means-based period. In terms of extended periods, then, phases encompassing more rhythm tend to be associated with success. With regard to individual

restructurings, though, the majority of rhythmic restructurings are not associated with successes and at best only half of all success-related restructurings are involved in rhythmic chains. From this it appears that while periods of means-based changes are associated with success, absolute rhythm is neither beneficial nor detrimental to either the organization's viability or its attainment of success.

A patterned mixture of means and ends is another potentially important form of patterning. If rhythm should theoretically be detrimental to an organization, a mixed pattern should provide the needed dialectical interplay between ends and means. Overall the average metric scores point to a greater interplay between means and ends for CORE than for SNCC. This is not capturing the exact patterning among adjacent changes, but it appears that overall balance may be associated with longevity. Balance could also be associated with success since CORE was more balanced and more successful than SNCC. As another component of this, it is noted that CORE's period of most concentrated successes (i.e., the means-based phase of the early 1960s) included one ends-based restructuring compared to SNCC's strictly means-based phase, pointing to a slightly, although perhaps negligibly, more balanced period. Overall balance, then, may be associated with both longevity and success.

Within these complete histories, however, *it was during a strongly means-based period, not a mixed phase that most successes were achieved. The final phase when means and ends were most pointedly and consistently interspersed was also the time of disintegration for both groups.* This is not to say, necessarily, that an intermingling of means and ends is detrimental. It seems more accurate to point to the

commencement of decline before the organizations began these phases. The content of these changes in the final period may also be important in understanding this final period.

The value of any type of patterning is not clear in this small number of cases and these short patterned chains. Rhythm (indicated by consistent metric scores on adjacent changes) appears to be associated with means-based and successful periods, but not necessarily with success-related restructurings. Overall balance is associated with longevity and greater success, but again it is restructurings during the unbalanced periods which are specifically related to successes. Rhythm occurs most pointedly during periods of prosperity while balance is associated with the final declining phase. This is opposite of the hypothesized value of the dialectical relationship between means and ends. However, it fits quite closely Starbuck's (1983) view of organizations as propelled by inertia when things are going well and questioning their ends only when an unignorable problem arises.

Timing of Restructurings

CORE and SNCC restructured approximately the same number of times during their relevant histories. Since SNCC existed for a much shorter time than CORE, it logically follows that it restructured much more frequently in its given time-frame. From the first columns in Tables 6a and 6b it is possible to fully grasp this disparity. Comparing the dates of subsequent restructurings provides a measure of the intervening time between the commencement of one restructuring and the next. CORE's history displays an average intervening time of over ten months between the early restructurings in the ends-based phase. This time between restructurings drops drastically with the onset of the 1960's. During

CORE--Chronology of Restructurings and Timing of Elements
(Time Expressed in Weeks)

Date	Form	Time From Catalyst To First Element	Time From First To Last Element	Time From Catalyst To Last Element
6/43	DT	XX	0	XX
6/44	T	XX	--	XX
6/45	T	52	--	52
4/47	A	40	--	40
6/47	T	260	--	260
6/48	TR	52	0	52
6/48	D	20	--	20
6/49	T	XX	--	XX
0/50	AR	XX	XX	XX
6/51	TRA	104	0	104
1/54	RT	52	0	52
6/54	R	156	--	156
3/56	T	XX	--	XX
9/56	R	XX	--	XX
10/57	TAD	16	116	132
10/59	T	104	--	104
2/60	ATR	2	20	22
10/60	RT	32	8	40
2/61	R	16	--	16
5/61	A	20	--	20
6/61	DA	12	28	40
10/61	R	0	--	0
10/61	RT	20	52	72
4/62	ARD	36	76	112
4/63	RA	0	8	8
6/63	R	0	--	0
4/64	A	36	--	36
4/64	R	XX	--	XX
6/64	T	XX	--	XX
6/64	AD	0	52	52
8/64	R	16	--	16
10/64	AD	8	3	11
10/64	TR	8	12	20
1/65	R	36	--	36
6/65	T	104	--	104
9/65	A	0	--	0
1/66	R	4	--	4
3/66	R	8	--	8
6/66	DR	3	0	3
6/68	RDT	52	12	64

XX = Uncertain
-- = Not Applicable

TABLE 6B

SNCC--Chronology of Restructurings and Timing of Elements
(Time Expressed in Weeks)

Date	Form	Time From Catalyst To First Element	Time From First To Last Element	Time From Catalyst To Last Element
6/61	RD	32	0	32
6/61	TR	XX	XX	XX
7/61	RA	0	4	4
8/61	DTAR	8	5	13
9/61	RDAT	4	8	4
12/61	TR	12	19	31
2/62	T	64	--	64
4/62	R	XX	--	XX
4/62	T	0	--	0
6/62	DR	0	24	24
10/62	A	0	--	0
12/62	R	24	--	24
6/63	R	XX	--	XX
9/63	DRA	0	10	10
2/64	A	12	--	12
4/64	AR	12	3	15
5/64	RA	20	4	24
9/64	R	0	--	0
9/64	A	3	--	3
10/64	R	8	--	8
10/64	RA	6	12	18
2/65	T	0	--	0
3/65	A	2	--	2
5/65	A	16	--	16
12/65	R	XX	--	XX
1/66	D	0	--	0
1/66	A	24	--	24
5/66	RT	0	0	0
5/66	A	XX	--	XX
6/66	D	0	--	0
6/66	R	6	--	6
7/66	AR	12	12	24
10/66	RD	16	0	16
11/66	RA	20	0	20
12/66	DR	12	20	32
2/67	R	4	--	4
5/67	RDT	16	0	16
7/67	R	0	--	0
6/68	RT	16	0	16
7/68	R	1	--	1
12/68	R	0	--	0
6/69	DRT	0	4	4

XX = Uncertain
-- = Not Applicable

the means-based phase early in this decade, CORE restructured on an average of once every 4.5 months. In the final mixed phase the average intervening period between the onset of subsequent restructurings was even slightly less (an average of 4.3 months).

SNCC began its history by averaging a new restructuring every 1.3 months during its ends-based phase. This rapid initiation of new restructurings slowed down slightly during its later phases to average one change every 2.4 months in the means-based period and a change every 2.6 months in the final mixed phase. The 1960s were a time of very frequent restructurings, then, for both CORE and SNCC. CORE, however, never restructured as quickly in succession as SNCC. An interesting disparity between the two groups here is that as CORE progressed though the stages from predominantly ends-based, to means-based, to mixed restructurings its changes occurred with progressive frequency. For SNCC, though, each subsequent period included a slight decrease in the frequency of restructuring.

SNCC restructured much more frequently than CORE: it also restructured much more quickly. The mean time for CORE restructurings from the appearance of a catalyst until the last restructuring element was in place was 51.75 weeks (median=38 weeks). For SNCC the comparable mean was 12.73 weeks (median=10 weeks). The disparity in total time is not a result of first element lag, for in the actual time of restructuring (the time from the change in the first element to the change in the last restructuring element) the vast disparity is still apparent: 24 weeks for CORE compared to 6.7 weeks for SNCC.

Comparable disparities between the mean total time are evident in every period of the organizations' histories, as is a common trend of

later restructurings being completed much more quickly. During the

initial ends-based periods, CORE's mean total time of restructuring was

approximately 85 weeks, while SNCC's comparable mean was 22 weeks. The

means-based phase encompassed changes that took an average of 33 weeks

for CORE to complete and 11 weeks for SNCC. Finally in the mixed phase,

both organizations experienced their fastest overall restructurings--29

weeks for CORE and slightly under 10 weeks for SNCC. In general, then,

both organizations restructured much more quickly later in their

histories. SNCC always restructured more quickly than CORE. Across the

comparable periods this disparity between the groups persists, and even

in its fastest period, CORE did not complete restructurings as quickly

as SNCC did in its slowest phase.

Due to the tremendous difference in the average number of

restructurings per year, this disparity between the two groups in total

time may appear to be a foregone conclusion. This is not necessarily

the case. Since restructurings can overlap temporally, the more

frequent SNCC restructurings could be arranged in a muddled

configuration of overlapping restructurings with relevant "normal"

states being discernible only with respect to a particular

restructuring. This is not what is occurring in SNCC, though. Rather

the relatively linear arrangement of restructurings is maintained with

the restructuring process just occurring much more quickly and with

shorter time periods between restructurings.

CORRELATIONS AMONG CENTRAL VARIABLES

The following section will provide a discussion of the

relationships among the central variables. First, the correlations common to both organizations will be outlined, followed by additional relationships which are unique to CORE and SNCC, respectively. Correlations involving changes in each specific element will complete this chapter. A comparison of current findings to disaster-related findings using Kreps' model and a synthesis of the findings on CORE and SNCC will follow in Chapter Four.

All correlations discussed in the following sections surpass a criterion of significance at the 0.1 level. This is a rather loose criterion for inclusion in rigorous statistical analysis; however, the current work is an exploratory undertaking which seeks to illuminate potential patterns and directions of relationships rather than a rigidly structured testing of extant hypotheses. So, while such an inclusive level of significance may allow relatively weak relationships to enter the study, it is better at this point to bring these possible relationships to light so that they can be more rigorously tested in future research, than to eliminate potentially meaningful relationships at this preliminary stage.

Common Correlations for Both CORE and SNCC

As seen on Tables 7a and 7b, TOTAL TIME is negatively related to the YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS (CORE r=-.45, SNCC r=-.32). Earlier restructurings take longer to complete and later ones are completed much more quickly. As discussed above, restructurings during the 1960's for CORE were much shorter than those that occur prior to 1960. It is quite possible that something about the general environment of the 1960's promoted faster restructurings. If this is the case, it is an interesting finding, and corresponds to the previously discussed finding

TABLE 7A

CORE--Correlation Coefficients and Levels of Significance

	Number of Elements	Metric Score	Time To First Element	Total Time	Related to Success
Number of Elements	1.000	.001 (.496)	-.145 (.214)	.139 (.224)	.216 (.091)
Metric Score		1.000	.406 (.011)	.446 (.005)	-.076 (.319)
Time to First Element			1.000	.888 (.000)	-.248 (.085)
Total Time				1.000	-.003 (.494)
Related to Success					1.000
Year Restructuring Starts	.062 (.353)	-.428 (.003)	-.498 (.002)	-.446 (.005)	.139 (.196)
Conflictual Catalyst	-.213 (.094)	-.075 (.323)	-.130 (.240)	-.237 (.096)	-.214 (.093)
External Catalyst	.097 (.277)	-.320 (.022)	-.337 (.029)	-.369 (.019)	.050 (.379)
Relative Size	-.064 (.347)	-.263 (.050)	-.365 (.020)	-.267 (.070)	.378 (.008)
Relative Income	.098 (.273)	-.124 (.222)	.060 (.371)	.182 (.159)	.316 (.023)
Type of Disjunction	-.083 (.305)	-.379 (.008)	-.047 (.398)	-.077 (.337)	-.188 (.122)
Scope of Restructuring	.097 (.276)	-.275 (.043)	-.535 (.001)	-.454 (.005)	.165 (.155)
Mean	1.550	7.175	39.656	51.750	.325
Std Dev	.714	3.727	54.984	56.401	.474

TABLE 7B

SNCC--Correlation Coefficients and Levels of Significance

	Number of Elements	Metric Score	Time To First Element	Total Time	Related to Success
Number of Elements	1.000	.267 (.044)	-.027 (.437)	.146 (.194)	.274 (.039)
Metric Score		1.000	.029 (.432)	.070 (.341)	-.014 (.465)
Time to First Element			1.000	.887 (.000)	.080 (.318)
Total Time				1.000	.091 (.296)
Related to Success					1.000
Year Restructuring Starts	-.195 (.108)	-.111 (.243)	-.206 (.111)	-.315 (.029)	-.317 (.020)
Conflictual Catalyst	-.129 (.207)	-.064 (.344)	-.172 (.154)	-.206 (.111)	-.273 (.040)
External Catalyst	-.054 (.366)	.122 (.221)	-.128 (.226)	-.185 (.136)	.100 (.264)
Relative Size	.125 (.216)	.069 (.331)	-.038 (.411)	.009 (.479)	.451 (.001)
Relative Income	.084 (.299)	-.102 (.260)	.012 (.471)	.085 (.309)	.502 (.000)
Type of Disjunction	.060 (.353)	-.225 (.076)	-.123 (.235)	-.072 (.335)	-.126 (.213)
Scope of Restructuring	-.022 (.445)	.184 (.122)	-.215 (.101)	-.152 (.185)	-.140 (.188)
Mean	1.619	5.952	9.460	12.730	.143
Std Dev	.825	3.568	12.639	13.541	.354

that SNCC's average time of restructuring was much shorter than CORE's.

There appears to be a bit more to this relationship than a simple

response to external factors, because SNCC, whose entire life history

was contained in the 1960's, also exhibits this same trend. If it were

just that the 1960's were a time of rapid change, we would expect the

disparity between the two groups' means, but would not ,expect SNCC to

show a significant decrease in time of restructuring throughout its

history.

METRIC SCORE is negatively related to the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION (CORE

r=-.38, SNCC r=-.22). The more problematic the change in the first

element, the lower the metric score. Keep in mind that a problematic

first element can entail a sudden problem with an element or can refer

to a disagreement about the element's potential new form. This

relationship is much stronger for CORE than for SNCC. The mean metric

score for a restructuring with a nonproblematic first element for CORE

is 0.0, while those with problematic disjunctions average only -3.1 on

the metric. For SNCC nonproblematic disjunctions show an average metric

score of -1.5 while restructurings with problematic disjunctions have a

mean of -3.2. A problematic change in the first element occurred more

frequently in changes of activities or resources than in domains or

tasks. While 31% of SNCC's restructurings with problematic disjunctions

and 44% of CORE's involved changes in the ends elements (i.e., D or T),

in the vast majority of problematic disjunctions, the problematic

first-element change itself involved either A or R. A sudden problem

with an element, the most common type of problematic disjunction, occurs

more frequently in an organization's means than its ends.

A restructuring's relationship to SUCCESS is positively correlated

with the NUMBER OF ELEMENTS (CORE r=.22, SNCC r=.27). More complete restructurings are more likely to be linked to an instance of success than are those that are less complete. Since only thirteen restructurings for CORE and six for SNCC are linked to at least one instance of success, any statistical relationship involving these few cases must be viewed very tentatively. Similar to the overall distribution, the majority of success-related restructurings involve changes in only one or two elements. However, one-element forms are significantly under-represented in success-related restructurings compared to their overall frequency. For CORE one-element forms account for 58% of all restructurings but for only 38% of success-related changes. Similarly for SNCC, 55% of all restructurings but only 33% of success-related changes consist of a change in a single element. For CORE this under-representation of one-element forms is compensated for by an over-representation of two-element changes, while success-related three-element forms occur in comparable proportion to their overall incidence. SNCC's two-element forms account for 33% of both total and success-related changes, but both three- and four-element forms are significantly over-represented in the success-related restructurings. The few extensive changes combined with the small number of success-related restructurings makes definite statistical assertions impossible. At this initial step in the exploration of social movement organizations, however, it appears that changes in more than one element are more likely than single element changes to be related to success.

A CONFLICTUAL CATALYST is less likely to be associated with SUCCESS than a nonconflictual one (CORE r=-.21, SNCC r=-.27). For CORE only one of the thirteen restructurings associated with success sprang from a

conflictual catalyst, while none of SNCC's six success-related restructurings started from a conflictual catalyst. While it is true that successes occurred during the time in the organizations' histories when they were experiencing less conflictual catalysts, it is also true that in periods encompassing both conflictual and nonconflictual catalysts, linkages to success are conspicuously absent for conflictual catalyst restructurings. In short, changes that arise as a response to overt conflict are less likely than their non-conflictual counterparts to be associated with success.

RELATIVE SIZE and RELATIVE INCOME are both positively related to SUCCESS (CORE size r=.38, income r=.32; SNCC size r=.45, income r=.50). Recall that these variables are referring to trends in the organization at the time of the restructuring rather than to specific changes in the immediate restructuring. It is not so much that restructurings occurring during periods of increasing trends in income and size are more likely to be associated with success than those occurring during stable phases of resources. Rather this correlation is pointing to the virtual absence of success-related restructurings when size and income are decreasing. Because most linkages between restructurings and successes are at least in part temporal, this points again to the relatively prosperous means-based period of restructurings in the early 1960's as the prime era for the achievement of successes. Once again this is only descriptive; evaluating the independent contributions of prosperity and broader effects of specific time frames can come only with more research on temporally disparate groups [5].

Appendix C depicts all correlations between the twelve central variables. Looking only at the relationships among the seven variables

whose intercorrelations are not presented on Tables 7a and 7b, the following common relationships are apparent. YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS is significantly correlated with all of these variables except EXTERNAL CATALYST. For both CORE and SNCC it is positively correlated with CONFLICTUAL CATALYST, TYPE OF DISJUNCTION, and SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING. The later the restructuring occurs, therefore, the more likely it has a conflictual catalyst, a problematic change in the first element and affects a broader scope.

The correlations relating YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS with CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and TYPE OF DISJUNCTION are much higher for SNCC than they are for CORE (CORE: conflictual catalyst r=.30, type of disjunction r=.28; SNCC: conflictual catalyst r=.53, type of disjunction r=.42). Before the comparable cutting points in 1964 (i.e., the onset of the final mixed phase) both CORE and SNCC had relatively few conflictual catalysts. During this early period only 11% of CORE's restructurings were started by a conflictual catalyst, and only 5% of SNCC's changes were connected to such catalysts. In their later years, though, the portion of restructurings set off by conflictual catalysts increased dramatically. In this final phase, 31% of CORE's changes and fully 52% of SNCC's restructurings were preceded by conflictual catalysts. In both groups, then, later restructurings were much more frequently carried out as responses to a disputive environment than were early changes.

A similar pattern is evident with regard to disjunctions. Twenty-two percent of CORE's restructurings before April 1964 involved a problematic change in the first element. In the final period, this percentage increased to include 38% of all changes. For SNCC only 5% of

its pre-October 1964 changes involved a problematic transition in the first element. After this date, though, fully 52% of SNCC's restructurings involved either a sudden problem in an element or a disagreement over an element's new value. Both groups, then, experienced significant increases in the proportion of restructurings involving conflictual catalysts and/or problematic disjunctions during their final years.

SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is correlated with YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS much more strongly for CORE than for SNCC (CORE r=.79, SNCC r=.34). The later the year the broader the geographic scope affected by the restructurings. For CORE this means that later restructurings quite consistently affected the entire organization, while for SNCC some local and regional restructurings were interspersed among its later changes. For CORE the correlation between SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING and SCOPE OF THE ORGANIZATION is so high that the former becomes an artifactual variable which does not discriminate among individual restructurings within a given time-frame. For SNCC there is enough fluctuation in the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING with respect to the organization's scope during various periods, that the former delineates meaningful distinctions between unique restructurings.

RELATIVE INCOME is negatively correlated with YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS for both CORE and SNCC (CORE r=-.25, SNCC r=-.67). A later year is associated with a decreasing trend in income. The fact that this correlation is stronger for SNCC is a reflection of SNCC's overall shorter history. It will be recalled that a negative trend in income began in mid-1964 for CORE and in late-1964 for SNCC. CORE's temporal mid-point fell in the mid-1950's; therefore, its relatively

later period encompassed a period of economic growth and maintenance as well as its final decline. With SNCC's shorter total history, the transition from relative prosperity to progressive impoverishment coincided with its temporal mid-point. Therefore for SNCC, "later" points to a time when income was steadily decreasing. For CORE "later" covers a much longer time which encompassed both positive and negative trends in monetary resources.

Although RELATIVE SIZE is significantly correlated with YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS for both CORE and SNCC, the relationship is in opposite directions. For CORE later restructurings are associated with periods of higher relative size (r=.24), while for SNCC later changes occurred during phases of decreasing size (r=-.70). This again is a reflection of the very different durations of the two organizations' histories. After the relevant dates in 1964 the size of both CORE and SNCC never again increased. For both groups, though, size is considered to remain relatively constant until the adoption of Black Power in 1966. For CORE, then, the long period of very slow growth at the beginning of its history coupled with the tremendous growth in the early sixties (a part of CORE's "later" history) and the rather late date for an actual decline in size, work together to create a slightly positive correlation. SNCC's increasing size fairly early in its history combined with the pattern of constancy and then decline in its later history create a significant negative relationship. It is also important here that SNCC has more restructurings recorded in the post-1966 period, and therefore this period of decline for both organizations is more evident in SNCC's correlations.

A CONFLICTUAL CATALYST is negatively correlated with RELATIVE

INCOME and positively related to TYPE OF DISJUNCTION for both CORE and

SNCC (CORE: relative income r=-.26, type of disjunction r=.25; SNCC:

relative income r=-.43, type of disjunction r=.44). As income decreased

conflictual catalysts increased, and problematic disjunctions were more

frequently associated with conflictual catalysts than were

nonproblematic disjunctions.

This relationship with RELATIVE INCOME is reflecting a significant

increase in conflictual catalysts as size decreased rather than a

reduction of conflictual catalysts while size was increasing. In both

CORE and SNCC a decrease in income preceded an increase in conflictual

catalysts. The lack of a significant relationship between EXTERNAL

CATALYST and RELATIVE INCOME for SNCC shows that the conflict was not

predominantly internal or external, but rather that it increased on all

fronts with decreasing income. For CORE, there is a slight (though not

significant) negative relationship between EXTERNAL CATALYSTS and

RELATIVE INCOME and a significant negative relationship between

CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (r=-.24) indicating that as

income decreased, catalysts became slightly more externally generated;

however, the conflictual catalysts remained exclusively internally

generated. Therefore, as income decreased (i.e., during the final

period of mixed restructurings beginning in 1964), both CORE and SNCC

experienced an increase in conflictual catalysts. However, for CORE

these conflictual catalysts remained internally generated, while for

SNCC conflictual antecedents to change arose in both the internal and

external environment.

For SNCC the relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and

PROBLEMATIC DISJUNCTIONS is very straight forward: conflictual

catalysts are more frequently associated with problematic disjunctions than nonconflictual catalysts, and the majority of conflictual catalysts are followed by problematic disjunctions. For CORE, though, the relationship is not so obvious. Most problematic disjunctions are associated with conflictual catalysts, but fully half of the conflictual catalysts are associated with nonproblematic disjunctions. In short, if a restructuring is known to have a problematic first element, it can logically be retrospectively surmised that the restructuring had a conflictual catalyst. However, if a restructuring has a conflictual catalyst, there is no reason to assume that it will have a problematic disjunction.

RELATIVE INCOME and RELATIVE SIZE are positively related (CORE r=.48, SNCC r=.68). In both CORE and SNCC an increase or a decrease in income precedes the corresponding change in size, indicating that these organizations did not gain income because they were large or lose income because of a waning constituency. Rather their human resources began trends that mimicked extant trends in material resources.

In sum, the following correlations hold for both CORE and SNCC. *Earlier restructurings are completed much more quickly than later restructurings. Such early changes also arise from less conflictual catalysts, rarely involve problematic changes in the first element, and are enveloped by periods of relative financial prosperity. Changes which spring from conflictual catalysts are more likely to occur in periods of decreasing income and to involve a problematic change in the first restructuring element. These restructurings with problematic disjunctions, in turn, exhibit a pronounced means-based strain. Trends in the organization's size tend to mimic extant trends in income.*

Restructurings occurring while these trends in resources are decreasing are least likely to be associated with successes. Additionally, success-related restructurings tend to arise from nonconflictual catalysts and to involve more elements.

CORE's Unique Correlations

In addition to the common correlations above, CORE and SNCC each display some unique relationships among the variables. The following section highlights relationships among the variables which appear only for CORE. METRIC SCORE is positively correlated with both TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT (r=.41) and TOTAL TIME (r=.45). For those changes that took longer than the mean total time to complete, the average metric score was 0.6. Restructurings completed faster than the mean time averaged a metric score of -2.6. Although longer time is associated with earlier restructurings (r=-.45) and a higher metric score is also related to earlier restructurings (r=-.43), this relationship between time and metric score is not merely an artifact of YEAR THE RESTRUCTURING STARTS. The relationship is just as obvious after April 1964, when everything was happening much more quickly. For this later period restructurings taking longer than the mean time show an average metric score of 1.6, while those restructrings faster than average exhibit a mean metric score of -2.4. *Regardless of when the restructuring occurs within the organization's chronology, ends-based restructuring takes time. Conversely, at least for CORE, means-based restructurings enhanced speed.*

EXTERNAL CATALYSTS are negatively related to the METRIC SCORE (r-.32) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.34, TOTAL TIME r=-.37). This makes sense since it is saying that internal catalysts

tend to produce restructurings that take longer and, as noted before, longer restructurings tend to have higher metric scores. Internal catalysts initiated restructurings with a mean metric score of 0.5, while external catalysts led to changes averaging -2.4 on the metric. Again this is not merely an artifact of the year, for after April 1964 internal catalyst restructurings averaged -0.3 while externally initiated ones display a mean metric score of only -2.2. With relation to time, restructurings begun by internal catalysts took an average of 52 weeks to complete (36 after April 1964), while external catalysts were answered by restructurings that took only 21.7 weeks (20.4 weeks after April 1964). *Changes in response to external catalysts, then, are more means-based and are completed much more quickly than their internally generated counterparts.*

RELATIVE SIZE also is negatively related to METRIC SCORE (r=-.26) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.36, TOTAL TIME r=-.27). The average metric score is -3.3 for restructurings occurring while size was increasing, whereas the average metric score for restructurings that occurred while size was decreasing or maintaining is 0.1. During times of flourishing membership, CORE restructured primarily within relatively fixed ends and focused its transformations on its activities and resources. It is when the trend in membership was either static or declining that CORE brought its domain and task structure more pointedly into question.

Restructurings that occurred while size was increasing took an average of only 33.3 weeks to complete; those occurring while size was maintaining were completed in 56.9 weeks; and during periods of decreasing size the average length of restructuring was 75.8 weeks.

Overall this is saying that restructurings were completed much faster in the early 1960's than at any other time in CORE's history. The disparity between the strengths of the correlations with TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT and TOTAL TIME indicates that it was the reaction time from the catalyst to the onset of restructuring more than the actual time to transform the elements once restucturing began that was most severely affected by the relative size. As size increased CORE reacted more readily to the relevant catalysts than it did while size was decreasing or maintaining. In short, CORE restructured its elements more quickly in the early 1960's, but these correlations also show that a significant part of the decrease in total time was a result of more immediate reaction to appearing catalysts.

SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is also negatively related to the METRIC SCORE (r=-.28) and the time measures (TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT r=-.54, TOTAL TIME r=-.45). Remember that for CORE the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is regarded as an organizational rather than restructuring variable. Therefore this is just reaffirming that earlier restructurings have higher metric scores and take longer to complete. Again the disparity within the correlations for the time measures indicates that relevant catalysts were not responded to as quickly early in CORE's history as they were in later years.

In addition to these unique correlations for CORE seen in Table 7a, Appendix C shows two additional relationships. CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS are negatively correlated with EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (r=-.24) and positively with SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING (r=.30). Since SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is basically an organizational variable, this is stating that conflictual catalysts occurred later in CORE's history.

The relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS was discussed briefly above. Internal catalysts were more likely to be conflictual than were external ones. Overall only 20% of all CORE's catalysts were conflictual. Twenty-three percent of all CORE's internal catalysts were conflictual, while only seven percent of the external catalysts can be classified as involving conflict. CORE's later restructurings were more frequently in response to conflictual catalysts than its earlier changes, but even here CORE is changing in response to internal conflict rather than to disputes involving the external environment. Since unanswered catalysts do not formally enter this study, it is difficult at this point to say if CORE actually experienced very few conflicts with the broader social world, or if it did encounter many of these externally conflictual episodes but did not readjust its organizational configuration in response to these disputes.

In addition to the correlations shared with SNCC, then, CORE displays the following relationships. *Means-based restructurings are completed more quickly than ends-based changes. A trend of increasing size, a larger score of the restructuring, and an external catalyst are all associated with these relatively quick means-based changes. Finally conflictual catalysts most frequently are generated within the organization and occur later in the group's history.*

SNCC's Unique Correlations

SNCC displays fewer unique correlations than CORE. METRIC SCORE is positively related to the NUMBER OF ELEMENTS ($r=.27$). Similar to the effect noted in the relationship between NUMBER OF ELEMENTS and SUCCESS, this correlation is statistically created due to an outlier effect. For one-element forms of restructuring, the mean metric score is -2.3, and

for two-element forms it is -3.0. In contrast, three-element forms show

a mean metric score of 1.0 and four-element forms average 2.5 on the

derived metric. For the majority of the cases (i.e., those involving

one or two elements), the larger the number of elements, the lower the

metric score. By including all restructurings, though, the drastic

disparity between the mean metric scores for one- and two-element forms

compared to three- and four-element changes points to a slight

correspondence between extensive changes and ends-based strains.

Although the statistical finding is partly artificial with this sample,

the fact that it is such a dramatic difference warrants its inclusion in

the findings. Perhaps a sample with more three- and four-element forms

will provide a normal distribution which could clarify this point.

Later restructurings are less apt to be related to successes

(r=-.32). The six restructurings associated with successes occurred

during the first three years, or eighteen restructurings, of SNCC's

history. This also makes sense because SUCCESS is additionally

correlated with other variables (less CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS, higher

RELATIVE SIZE, and higher RELATIVE INCOME) which are themselves

associated with an earlier year. This points once again to the early

1960s as the prime era for the achievement of successes.

CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS are negatively correlated with RELATIVE SIZE

(r=-.39). As size decreased conflictual catalysts increased. An

increase in conflictual catalysts preceded a decrease in size, pointing

to the previously mentioned relationship between CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS

and RELATIVE INCOME. Conflictual catalysts are slightly more

significantly tied to a decrease in income, which is then followed by a

decrease in the size of the constituency.

An EXTERNAL CATALYST is positively related to the RELATIVE SIZE (r=.23). Only 18% of the restructurings associated with a decrease in relative size had an external catalyst. For restructurings occurring while size was maintaining or increasing, though, the increase is significant: 39% of those occurring during periods of maintaining size and 50% of those occurring while size was increasing sprang from external catalysts. In proportional terms a restructuring that occurred during a period of growth in the constituency was most likely to be preceded by an external catalyst. In reality the majority (ten of sixteen) of external catalysts occurred during the long phase of constancy in size. It is, therefore, the very few external catalysts during the final period of decline rather than numerous external catalysts during periods of growth that is surfacing here.

RELATIVE SIZE is also negatively related to the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION (r=-.47). Again this is reflecting the predominance of problematic disjunctions as size is decreasing. With the transition from a trend of increasing size to a phase of stable size in late 1964, the proportion of restructurings with problematic disjunctions increased. However, it was not until mid-1966, when size began to steadily and consistently decline, that problematic disjunctions became the mode--occurring in 62% of the restructurings. A similar pattern is seen in relation to RELATIVE INCOME (r=-.43). Since a decrease in income preceded a decrease in size, and a decrease in size preceded the predominance of problematic disjunctions, it seems appropriate to conclude that as SNCC began to disintegrate with regard to resources, changes within the organization became more problematic. Problems were occurring which the organization could not control, and internally there was less consensus

on how things should change.

SNCC's unique restructurings add the following relationships to the total picture of the organization's history. *Successes occurred early in SNCC's history. Those restructurings involving three or four elements leaned toward more ends-based changes. And, as SNCC's size decreased it responded to less external catalysts, more conflictual catalysts, and had more problematic changes in the first element of its restructurings.*

Common Correlations with Changes in the Elements

In addition to looking at relationships among the central variables, it is potentially informative to delineate correlations between changes in each of the individual elements and these central variables in order to illuminate the conditions in which each particular variable changed. For this analysis changes in each element are coded dichotomously: 1 if the element changed in a given restructuring and 0 if it did not. This section will focus on only those relationships which are significant for both CORE and SNCC. (Correlation coefficients are provided in Appendix C.)

A change in activities is negatively correlated with CONFLICTUAL CATALYSTS (CORE r=-.35, SNCC r=-.21) and positively related to RELATIVE SIZE (CORE r=.22, SNCC r=.38) For CORE a conflictual catalyst never resulted in a change in activities. For SNCC 23% of restructurings preceded by conflictual catalysts produced changes in activities, but this is still an under-representation of changes in A compared to its overall incidence. During periods when size was increasing, 54% of CORE's restructurings and 75% of SNCC's changes involved a change in activities. Conversely, when size was decreasing only 28% of CORE's and

18% of SNCC's restructurings involved a change in this element. Therefore, changes in activities are most likely to occur in restructurings responding to nonconflictual catalysts and during trends of increasing size.

A change in resources is positively correlated with the TYPE OF DISJUNCTION (CORE r=.33, SNCC r=.42) and the SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING (CORE r=.24, SNCC r=.22). Interpretations of these correlations must proceed cautiously because R was such a frequently changed element, especially for SNCC, that it occurred in the majority of restructurings, regardless of other variables. SCOPE OF THE RESTRUCTURING is again an organizational variable for CORE, and therefore a positive relationship here is pointing to the fact that changes in resources occurred most frequently later in CORE's history. For SNCC there is a significant difference, though, between the involvement of resources in over 70% of the regional and national restructurings and in only 40% of the local restructurings.

For CORE 82% of restructurings with problematic disjunctions involved a change in R while only 45% of non-problematic disjunctions brought resources into play. For SNCC all problematic disjunctions involved R in the restructuring. However, only 43% of all changes in resources had problematic disjunctions. A problematic first element change is a sure indicator that resources were involved in the restructuring; however, a change in resources does not necessarily imply a problem with the first element.

Resources, then, were often involved in restructurings which had a problematic change in the first element and affected a broad geographic area. Not only were resources involved in these restructurings with

problematic disjunctions, but in the majority of these cases resources
was actually the first, and therefore the problematic, element.
Resources change profusely throughout the histories of CORE and,
especially, SNCC. The current correlations reveal that these changes
were most frequent later in the groups' histories, and that resources
were most often changed during this period in the form of a sudden loss
of either money or a usable constituency rather then as a calculated and
planned change within the organization.

Changes in the task structure display no common correlations across
CORE and SNCC; however, domain is positively correlated with SUCCESS
(CORE r=.39, SNCC r=.22) and EXTERNAL CATALYSTS (CORE r=.23, SNCC
r=.20). External catalysts led to a disproportionate amount of changes
in domain: 36% of CORE's external catalysts and 38% of SNCC's were
answered, in part, by a change in D. Also slightly over half of all
domain changes occurred in response to external catalysts. Therefore,
although the majority of external catalysts did not involve a change in
D, this element most frequently changed in response to an external
catalyst.

Approximately half of all restructurings associated with successes
involved a change in domain. This is in contrast to less than 30% of
all restructurings which involved such a change. For CORE this means
that 66% of all domain changes were somehow associated with successes,
but for SNCC only 27% of the changes in domain were so involved. The
relationship between success and a change in domain, therefore, is
unclear. The role of domain changes appears more crucial when it is
recognized that three of CORE's four causal linkages between
restructurings and instances of success, and two of SNCC's three such

linkages involve a change in domain. These causal linkages involving domain are evenly distributed among restructurings which preceded, occurred coterminously with, or followed an instance of success. So while changes in domain are over-represented in success-related restructurings, the value of domain changes for encouraging successes or the effect of success on realigning the organization's goals or focus is unclear.

In short *changes in activities occur most frequently during periods of growth and in response to nonconflictual catalysts. Changes in resources are abundant throughout CORE's and SNCC's histories. However, they occur most frequently in later years and often involve a problem with the element rather than a calculated decision to change. Finally, domain changes most frequently occur in response to an external catalyst and are, in some unclear way, linked to the attainment of success.*

CHAPTER FOUR

THE GENERALIZABILITY OR KREPS' THEORY AND CONCLUSIONS

If Kreps' theory and the applications of it are illuminating

characteristics of organization sui generis rather than of groups in

specific substantive contexts, findings from different substantive areas

should display some convergence. Not all findings from disaster studies

have a relevant counterpart in other social settings. Variables from

previous research using Kreps' theory such as Scope of Impact, Length of

Forewarning, and others clearly are applicable in the disaster setting

but are irrelevent in other non-disaster-related forms of association

and organization. However, the more strictly organizational variables

are relevant to all structural configurations. If the findings of

previous disaster-related research point to relationships that do not

appear in other contexts, the best that can be said of the theory is

that it is applicable only in disasters, and the worst would be that

previous research has somehow been significantly flawed so that

documented relationships have little relationship to actual events. It

is important, then, not only to examine the possibility of using the

theory to study organizations outside of disasters, but also to compare

the findings from these disaster- and non-disaster-related analyses to

test the theory and to grasp the dynamics of organization itself.

For Kreps' (1985) variables that are relevant to CORE and SNCC, the

correspondence between previous findings and the current research point

to relationships that <u>can</u> be generalized outside the disaster setting. Of course, we are still dealing in an analysis of social movement organizations with extra-normal organizations. To more persuasively document the generalizability of both earlier findings and the current findings, it will be necessary to look not at the margins of conventional society, but directly into the structural and organizational forms of common existence. Perhaps there <u>is</u> something structurally unique about forms of association that are created to change an aspect of the existing environment, whether the change is seen as an attempt to return to "normal" (as in disasters), or if it is an attempt to change what exists and to move on to a new "normal" (as in social movement organizations). This research cannot point to such peculiarities. Only through more research on conventional organizations can such anomalies be exposed and can more universal relationships be asserted.

Moving back in the life histories of the organizations for a moment, Saunders and Kreps (1986) and Bosworth and Kreps (1986) discuss the origins system state. According to the logic of the origins metric (Kreps, 1985a) CORE's pattern of origins (R-A-D-T) is scored -1, while SNCC's D-R-T-A origins configuration receives a score of +2. In origins, then, CORE was more oriented to means, or action, than was SNCC. According to the earlier studies in disaster, a greater degree of action at origins is associated with less means based restructuring at maintenance. These previous findings are substantiated here with CORE's more action-driven origins (metric score of -1) paired with less means-based restructuring (mean metric score of -0.8). In turn SNCC's more order-driven origins (metric score of +2) is linked to a greater

degree of means-based restructuring (mean metric score of -2.0).
Neither CORE nor SNCC exhibits a pattern of predominantly ends-based
restructuring, however CORE and its action-driven origins period is
significantly less oriented toward means-based restructurings than is
the order-driven SNCC.

Kreps also found that the more complex the social network of the
organization at maintenance, the greater the degree of means-based
restructuring. CORE, with its higher average metric score, was linked
to an average of 1.2 other organizations at the time of each
restructuring, while for the more means-based SNCC the organization
displayed three inter-group links at the time of each restructuring.
For CORE the correlation between the total number of links and the
metric score is -.27, clearly indicating that there was a tendency for
more means-based restructurings to occur when the organization was
linked to a larger number of other units. Although this relationship is
still negative for SNCC, it is neither significant nor sizable.

Looking at the actual mean metric scores for those restructurings
which occurred while the organization was linked to a small number of
other groups (one or two) compared to when it was involved in a more
complex social network (links with three to five other groups), the
relationship between a complex social network and means-based changes is
apparent, as is the reason for the disparity in correlation strengths.
CORE's restructurings with few links have a mean metric score of 0.04,
while those which occurred in conjunction with a larger number of links
have an average metric score of -3.2. Part of this disparity can be
attributed to the higher metric scores of earlier restructurings when
CORE also had fewer links to other organizations. However, looking at

only the 1960's the difference is still evident, although it is not so extreme. In this later period restructurings with few links had a mean metric score of -1.5, while those with more links show an average score of -3.0.

For SNCC, the relationship is evident, but it is much less clear. Restructurings which occurred when the organization had fewer links show a mean metric score of -1.6, while those with more links had an average metric score of -2.2. This slight difference is further clouded by the fact that the majority (9 of 11) of restructurings with a metric score above the mid-point were also associated with a more complex social network. Also, slightly more of the restructurings which occurred during periods when SNCC had a complex social network display metric scores above the mid-point. There is, then, a slight tendency for restructurings occurring during periods of more complex social networks to have lower scores for SNCC, but it must be remembered that the majority of ends-based restructurings also occurred in conjunction with more complex social networks.

The current findings tend to support Kreps' original finding. There does seem to be a pattern here, but it is not an unambiguous relationship. Looking at SNCC as the organization with a more complex network, it is true that, overall, more inter-organizational links are associated with a stronger means-based orientation. This is the dimension and unit of analysis employed in Kreps' previous work, so I am confirming what he found. Looking within SNCC's history, though, there seems to be reason to doubt whether the links the organization maintains at the time of a particular restructuring are significantly related to the means-ends strain of the change.

A final finding from Kreps is that a larger size is related to a greater degree of means-based restructuring. Support for this finding is equivocal. CORE was a much larger organization than SNCC in terms of formal constituency, but it was _less_ means-based in its average restructuring than SNCC. Another way of testing this previous finding is to see if periods of increasing size are related to more means-based changes. For CORE this is clearly the case as seen in the negative correlation between RELATIVE SIZE and METRIC SCORE ($r=-.26$). SNCC, however, shows no significant relationship between these two variables. The most supportive finding is in the correlation between ABSOLUTE SIZE of the organization (i.e., number of people in active constituency) at the time of each restructuring and the METRIC SCORE (CORE $r=-.45$, SNCC $r=-.34$). Here both CORE and SNCC clearly show that a larger constituency is related to means-based changes. This final relationship reinforces Kreps' original finding that the larger the organization, the more means-based the restructurings. However, this finding pertains to individual instances of restructuring, not to the entire history of a group, and the relationship between periods of growth and the means-ends strain of relevant changes remains unclear.

The current work can lend further support to Kreps' (1985) finding that a greater degree of order at origins is related with a greater degree of means-based restructuring at maintenance. With the above qualifications in mind, research on CORE and SNCC can also support the finding that a more complex social network and a larger size of the organization are associated with a greater degree of means-based restructuring.

If findings from the current work reflect organizational patterns

rather than merely patterns of social movement organizations, they should also show some similarity with Linn's (1986) initial study of organizational restructuring in the disaster context. As with all disaster-related research, the temporal parameters of the organizations in this previous project were much shorter than CORE's and SNCC's. In Linn's work it was found that means-based restructurings are most prevalent. The current work can certainly support this. Linn's mean was -3.5 for his sample of disaster related restructurings, and his median was -4. In the current work both CORE and SNCC display average metric scores leaning towards means-based restructuring. CORE's median is slightly higher than Linn's finding at -1, but SNCC's median is -4, the same as in the previous research.

In addition to this predominance of means-based forms, Linn found that the majority of restructurings involved very few elements. Of the restructurings he uncovered in disaster-related organizations, 67% were one- or two-element forms. This predominance of less extensive restructurings is even more apparent in CORE and SNCC, in which fully 88% of all restructurings involved only one or two elements.

Linn also found that the greater the degree of the restructuring (i.e. greater number of elements changed) the higher the metric score. More specifically he found that one- through three-element forms tended to be means-based while complete four-element restructurings showed a strain toward ends. In SNCC a similar pattern is found. However, for this organization both three- and four-element forms show a strain towards ends. The relative consistency in mean metric scores across CORE's one- to three-element changes also lends partial support to this previous finding. While the current work cannot fully either support or

refute Linn's finding, it does apear that less extensive restructurings are means-based and that there may be a tendency towards ends in more extensive changes. However, the specific number of elements at which the switch from means-based to ends-based forms prevail is not clear. Other than the strain toward means, the findings are far from decisive.

Finally, Linn found that means-based restructuring does not necessarily enhance speed. In my research the METRIC SCORE and TOTAL TIME OF RESTRUCTURING are positively correlated for CORE, but are not significantly related for SNCC. This means that for CORE means-based change _does_ enhance speed, while for SNCC the means-ends slant of the restructuring makes little difference with regard to speed. I cannot say, then that means-based restructuring undeniably enhances speed. I can say, though, that during periods of predominantly means-based changes total times of restructurings are much shorter. When changes are occurring very rapidly and frequently, means-based restructuring predominates. However, specific instances of means-based restructuring are not necessarily faster than individual ends-based changes.

The current analysis of CORE and SNCC can lend some support to earlier disaster-specific findings, and therefore suggest a degree of generalizability for both the theory and these previous conclusions. A strain towards order in the origins system state is associated with a greater degree of means-based restructuring at maintenance. There is also some support for the assertion that a more complex social network also corresponds to more means-based changes, at least in the overall history. The relationship between a larger size of the unit and means-based restructurings also receives some confirmation, but in this case it holds true with regard to individual changes rather than total

histories.

As in the previous study of restructuring, a clear dominance of means-based and less extensive forms is displayed by CORE and SNCC. The relationship between a higher metric score and more extensive changes is tenuous, and the specific parameters of this relationship are unclear, but the current findings hint at the possibility of such a pattern. Finally in CORE and SNCC increased speed is not unequivocally tied to means-based changes, but it is clearly associated with periods in which means-based restructurings predominate.

CONCLUSION

CORE and SNCC display very similar patterns of restructuring across their entire histories. An initial period of ends-based changes during which the task structure of the organization is repeatedly defined gives way to a period of almost exclusively means-based restructurings. It is during this means-based phase that most successes are achieved. Immediately following a setback in usable income, the organization once again brings its structural ends into question, and a mixed period of restructurings commences. This final mixed phase lasts until, on a note of ends-based change, the group transforms to a smaller enclave of militant members.

Earlier restructurings are enacted in response to less conflictual catalysts and are, themselves, relatively unproblematic. These earlier changes take a longer time to complete and affect a smaller geographic area. It is also during this earlier phase that income is most consistently increasing. Although the relationship between trends in

size and the calendar year are different for CORE and SNCC, trends in
the size of the constituency mimic existing trends in income.
Irrespective of the chronological placement of a restructuring, those
changes with a non-problematic transition in the first changing element
tend to be less means-based.

With regard to the achievement of success, several relationships
emerge. Restructurings which occur while income and size are steadily
increasing or holding constant are much more likely to be associated
with an instance of success than changes that occur when resources are
decreasing. Additionally, changes that result from a nonconflictual
catalyst and which call into play more elements are more frequently
linked to the achievement of success.

Findings for coterminous time periods show that the 1960's were a
time of very rapid and means-based change for these groups. The first
four years of this decade encompassed a series of almost exclusively
means-based changes and the majority of all successes. After temporally
similar setbacks in income, the groups both entered phases during which
ends-based changes were interspersed among the frequent means-based
restructurings. Finally, within a year of each other both groups
transformed into small cadres of militant members.

With such apparent consistencies for coterminous time frames,
Goldstone's (1980) critique of Gamson's original work on protest groups
must be kept in mind. Perhaps, as Goldstone asserts, there are periods
during which broader societal variables are such that success is much
easier to achieve. It could be that this is what is occurring in the
early 1960's. In addition, perhaps these external events and forces are
not important just with regard to successes; perhaps they are also key

in determining the life histories of social movement organizations overall.

The limited time span during which most successes are achieved, the transitions between and the duration of subsequent phases, the patterns within these phases, and the temporally similar demises of CORE and SNCC all bring into question the importance of organizational variables and dynamics versus the influence and importance of larger society factors. It seems that both organizational and larger world phenomena are influential in these groups. While the external variables are indeed crucial and intertwined with many of the current findings on CORE and SNCC, there is also evidence throughout these findings of organizational patterns which are apparently independent of the encompassing time frame or external environment. While many questions remain unanswered, the current research can only state these relationships as they appear, without conjecture about the explanation behind them. This task of separating temporally coterminous findings from independent structural relationships can be advanced only in more extensive research on a variety of social movement organizations.

Kreps' structural theory has shed some light on the patterns and relationships of CORE and SNCC, both as representatives of social movement organizations and as organization sui generis. The current research, in turn, has illustrated that Kreps' theory can be employed in substantive areas other than disasters. The convergence between findings from these social movement organizations and previous disaster-related findings also suggest that Kreps' theory has uncovered some aspects of organization in general rather than just disaster-related organizations in particular. Most of the difficulties

and necessary revisions associated with employing Kreps' theory were discussed in Chapter Two. Just a few issues which need to be kept in mind for future research and for refining the theory will be presented here.

The definitions of the elements must be precise for each piece of research. The concepts are very precise analytically. However the theoretical integrity of the concepts is difficult to maintain across the many judgment calls that are necessary in delineating restructurings. At present these operational terms are precise enough to ensure fairly consistent delineations across subsequent restructurings within a research project by a single researcher. The consistencies between current findings and previous research using Kreps' theory also suggest that there is a degree of inter-researcher agreement. With each progressive addition to the research employing this theory, though, the goal of more standard and explicit operational definitions and boundaries for the elements should be attempted and, hopefully, approached.

In this same vein, criteria of discontinuity between unique restructurings need to be more precise. Articulating these will not be a simple task. Discontinuities in time and space and unique catalysts served as adequate guidelines in this research, but there are still restructurings that it is possible to defend analytically as either multiple-element changes or as strings of less extensive changes.

These refinements can come only with extensive research in a variety of substantive areas. To expand and test the viability of the theory itself, research into forms of association and organization in all spheres of the social realm is necessary. With regard to the

current work, only through research on a broad sample of social movement organizations can the present uncertainty about the generalizability of the findings and the independent effects of external and structural variables be clarified.

We need to work toward increased operational precision and to explore social phenomena in diverse substantive areas. Consistency among the completed research projects suggests that to a large degree the collective representations of these elements and of the points of discontinuity between restructurings are fairly well developed. With each subsequent application of Kreps' theory such definitions and boundaries should become more clarified and specified. As with all social phenomena, theories must always be conceived as both extant entity and ever-evolving process. Only by recognizing both the underlying constancy of a framework and the ever-present potential for revision and improvement can a given theory and the field of sociology progress.

NOTES

1) "System state" refers to Dubin's (1978) definition of the term. It is an analytical entity in which (1) all units of the system have characteristic values, (2) these values are all determinant, and (3) the constellation of unit values persists through time (1978;144). While it is very helpful, this definition obviously does not facilitate precise delineations of separate system states. Questions concerning the thresholds of change for unit values and the duration which constitutes "time" remain to be grappled with by the individual theorist. Kreps has chosen to designate only three system states--origins, maintenance, and suspension--within his theory. A case could clearly be made that the restructurings I am analyzing are not only reformulations of the organization but that each actually signifies a transition to a new system state. By choosing to place all forms containing all four elements within one system state, Kreps is allowing for some fluctuation of the values for each element while maintaining that as long as all four are present in some configuration, organization exists. Kreps' designation of system states can therefore be thought of as "pre-organization" (origins), "organization" (maintenance), and "demise of organization" (suspension). The current work focuses on the second system state--maintenance. The origins system state is introduced only briefly, and suspension is not considered.

2) To present the relevant sources here and minimize distractions during the upcoming historical chronologies, bibliographical paragraphs are provided for each CORE and SNCC in place of in text citations. The principle sources for documenting the history of CORE were Meier and Rudwick's (1973) comprehensive history of CORE, James Farmer's (1965) discussion of the organization and its focus, and Farmer's (1985) autobiography. Inge Powell Bell's (1968) sociological analysis of CORE was also informative. The microfilm edition of the CORE Papers was useful for filling in the gaps left by secondary sources. Shorter pieces by Rudwick and Meier (1969), McKissick (1968), and many others provided specific bits of information to the gradually evolved picture.

Of central importance in tracing SNCC's history was Carson's (1981) analysis of the group's evolution. Zinn's (1964) coverage of the group, and Sellers' (1973) exposition provided valuable information, but the focus of these works did not always remain on central historical facts. Jim Forman's (1972) tome on SNCC provided both valuable insight and a rather precise chronology. Various other works such as Carmichael and Hamilton's (1967) demand for Black Power, Stoper's (1977) interpretations of the group, Sutherland's (1965) compilation of Freedom Summer communications, and Matusow's (1972) history helped to complete this picture.

For both groups numberous general histories of the civil rights movement added crucial points and a clearer synthesized picture of the groups' lives and position in the larger picture.

3) While this lack of internal satisfaction with externally noted gains is crucial to SNCC's ensuing history, it is not directly linked to any restructuring. This brings to the front a point worthy of note: The

current theory (or any strictly structural analysis) can document the course of an organization. However in a "redemptive organization" (Stoper, 1977), such as SNCC, a successful comprehension of its history requires the incorporation of non-structural dimensions as well. The current analysis can accurately document SNCC's changes. To understand these changes, though, requires a very subjective type of explanation that is not even attempted here. This incompleteness does not cripple the current analysis; for the purpose of this study, and all research, is to augment existing knowledge, not to render previous research unnecessary.

4) This analysis of CORE and SNCC is specifically interested in the generalizability and applicability of Kreps' theory, but a few words about the difficulties of documenting successes must also be mentioned. Like with many restructurings, successes often appear as the culmination of an elongated period of gradually increasing gains. As in restructurings, such trends in success are documented when they pass a threshold of observability. More than with regard to restructurings, the problem of previous author's selective inclusion of successes plagues the research. Gamson's criteria included collective representations of various factions to delineate successful groups. This inter-reporter consistency is also relied on less formally in the current work. However in delineating individual instances of success rather than overall gains, such convergence by a full range of sources is often not possible in each case.

Successes for SNCC are particularly difficult. Its largest gains were arguably in consciousness raising--a category not included in the current research. Even more difficult, SNCC considered many of the gains attributed to it by others to be insults or testimony to the remaining enormity of the task before them rather than as crucial accomplishments. Finally, two of the group's primary gains were achieved under the formal banners of COFO and the MFDP. In my view both COFO and the MFDP were basically pseudonyms for SNCC at the time of these gains, so the successes can be assigned to SNCC. Distinctions such as these decrease clarity, but it is by struggling with such delineations that a better grasp of "success" as a concept is concretized.

5) It is noted that TOTAL TIME is very highly correlated with TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT. This relationship is saying that there is a very strong relationship between the lag from the catalyst to the initiation of restructuring and the total time from the catalyst to the last restructuring element. Because the second of these variables encompasses the first, this is primarily an artifactual relationship. In addition, with the large number of one-element forms, the fact that both CORE and SNCC have a correlation of .89 on this measure means very little.

APPENDIX A

ITEMS	VARIABLE LABELS	COLUMNS
CASE I.D.	---	1-3_____
DATE STARTED	MONTH _ _ 00 = UNCERTAIN	4-5_____
DATE STARTED	YEAR _ _ 00 = UNCERTAIN	6-7_____
DATE COMPLETED	MONTH _ _ 00 = UNCERTAIN	8-9_____
DATE COMPLETED	YEAR _ _ 00 = UNCERTAIN	10-11_____
CONTINUED AS TREND	1 = YES 0 = NO 9 = UNCERTAIN	12_____
FORM OF RESTRUCTURING	01 = D	13-14_____

```
02 = T          33 = RTD
03 = R          34 = RTA
04 = A          35 = ATR
05 = DT         36 = ATD
06 = DR         37 = ART
07 = DA         38 = ARD
08 = TD         39 = ADR
09 = TR         40 = ADT
10 = TA         41 = DTRA
11 = RD         42 = DTAR
12 = RT         43 = DRAT
13 = RA         44 = DRTA
14 = AD         45 = DATR
15 = AT         46 = DART
16 = AR         47 = TRAD
17 = DAT        48 = TRDA
18 = DAR        49 = TADR
19 = DTR        50 = TARD
20 = DTA        51 = TDRA
21 = DRT        52 = TDAR
22 = DRA        53 = RADT
23 = TRD        54 = RATD
24 = TRA        55 = RDTA
25 = TDA        56 = RDAT
26 = TDR        57 = RTDA
27 = TAR        58 = RTAD
28 = TAD        59 = ADTR
29 = RDA        60 = ADRT
30 = RDT        61 = ATDR
31 = RAT        62 = ATRD
32 = RAD        63 = ARDT
        64 = ARTD
```

```
CATALYST              1 = BENIGN/INTERNAL              15_____
                      2 = BENIGN/EXTERNAL
                      3 = CONFLICTUAL/INTERNAL
                      4 = CONFLICTUAL/EXTERNAL
                      0 = UNCERTAIN

DISJUNCTION           1 = CHANGE                       16_____
                      2 = INTRA-EL. DISPARITY
                      3 = CONTINGENCY
                      0 = UNCERTAIN

TIME: CAT - 1         WEEKS                            17-19_____
                      999 = UNCERTAIN
                      888 = N/A

TIME: 1 - 2           WEEKS                            20-22_____
                      999 = UNCERTAIN
                      888 = N/A

TIME: 2 - 3           WEEKS                            23-25_____
                      999 = UNCERTAIN
                      888 = N/A

TIME: 3 - 4           WEEKS                            26-28_____
                      999 = UNCERTAIN
                      888 = N/A

TOTAL (CAT - LAST)    WEEKS                            29-31_____
                      999 = UNCERTAIN
                      888 = N/A

TOTAL (1 - LAST)      WEEKS                            32-34_____
                      999 = UNCERTAIN
                      888 = N/A

CHANGE IN DOMAINS     0 = N/A                          35_____
                      1 = COORDINATE
                      2 = LOCATION
                      3 = NONVIOLENCE
                      4 = MEMBERSHIP
                      5 = EMPHASIS
```

```
SPECIFIC D CHANGE      00 = N/A                                  36-37_____
                       01 = COORD./ FEDERATE
                       02 = NORTH
                       03 = SOUTH
                       04 = NORTH (FUNDS)
                       05 = DEEP SOUTH
                       06 = NATIONAL
                       07 = INTERNATIONAL
                       08 = URBAN
                       09 = NONVIO (PHIL.)
                       10 = NONVIO (TACTIC)
                       11 = END OF NONVIO
                       12 = ANTI-COMMUNIST
                       13 = FREE ASSOCIATION
                       14 = ALL-BLACK
                       15 = INTERRACIAL
                       16 = DIRECT ACTION
                       17 = VOTER REGISTRATION
                       18 = COMMUNITY ORGANIZING
                       19 = PARTISAN POLITICS
                       20 = POOR BLACKS
                          (INCLUDES 1 MAN, 1 VOTE)
                       21 = ANTI-WAR
                       22 = BLACK POWER
                       23 = PARAMILITARY
                       24 = COORDINATE LOCAL UNITS


ADDITIONAL D           SEE CODES ABOVE                           38-39_____
   CHANGE


CHANGE IN T            00 = N/A                                  40-41_____
                       01 = COORDINATING COMM.
                       02 = INCREASE OF POSITIONS AT NATIONAL OFFICE
                       03 = DECREASE OF POSITIONS AT NATIONAL OFFICE
                       04 = INCREASE IN POWER OF ONE SEGMENT
                       05 = DECREASE IN POWER OF ONE SEGMENT
                       06 = INCREASE IN # FIELD POSITIONS
                       07 = DECREASE IN # FIELD POSITITONS
                       08 = DIVISION OF EXISTING POSITIONS
                             (INCLUDES CREATION OF BRANCHES)
                       09 = CHANGE OF POSITION TO SIMILAR POSITION
                       10 = CREATION OF NEW GOVERNING BODY
                       11 = WHO SHOULD LEAD?
                       12 = SYSTEM OF COMMITTEES
                       13 = FEDERATION OF LOCAL UNITS


ADDITIONAL T CHANGE (SEE CODES ABOVE)                            42-43_____
```

CHANGE IN R	00 = N/A	44-45 _____
	01 = INCREASE MEMBERSHIP	
	02 = DECREASE MEMBERSHIP	
	03 = ADDITION OF KEY INDIVIDUAL(S)	
	04 = LOSS OF KEY INDIVIDUAL(S)	
	05 = CONCENTRATION OF RESOURCES	
	06 = DISPERSION OF RESOURCES	
	07 = INCREASED STAFF	
	08 = DECREASED STAFF	
	09 = INCREASE IN WHITE STAFF	
	10 = DECREASE IN WHITE STAFF	
	11 = INCREASE IN INCOME	
	12 = DECREASE IN INCOME	
	13 = INCREASE IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT	
	14 = DECREASE IN OUTSIDE SUPPORT	
	15 = INCREASED DEDICATION OF STAFF	
	16 = DECREASED DEDICATION OF STAFF	
	17 = CLOSING OFFICES	
	18 = FIRING STAFF	
	19 = RADICALIZATION OF STAFF	

ADDITIONAL R   SEE CODES ABOVE   46-47 _____
   CHANGE

CHANGE IN A	00 = N/A	48-49 _____
	01 = START DIRECT ACTION	
	02 = INCREASE DIRECT ACTION	
	03 = DECREASE DIRECT ACTION	
	04 = END DIRECT ACTION	
	05 = START VOTER REGISTRATION	
	06 = INCREASE VOTER REGISTRATION	
	07 = DECREASE VOTER REGISTRATION	
	08 = END VOTER REGISTRATION	
	09 = COMMUNITY ORG. - EDUCATION	
	10 = COMMUNITY ORG. - URBAN	
	11 = COMMUNITY ORG. - GENERAL	
	12 = NATIONAL PROJECT	
	13 = START PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES	
	14 = INCREASE PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES	
	15 = DECREASE PERIPHERAL ACTIVITIES	
	16 = POLITICS -- PARTISAN	
	17 = POLITICS -- EXTRA-PARTISAN	
	18 = DECREASED ACTIVITY	
	19 = INCREASED ACTIVITY - FIELD	
	20 = INCREASED ACTIVITY - FUND RAISING	
	21 = COORDINATE PROTESTS	
	22 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING	
	23 = RADICALIZING ACTIVITIES	
	24 = INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL	

ADDITIONAL A CHANGE   SEE CODES ABOVE   50-51 _____

SCOPE OF RESTRUCTURING	1 = LOCAL 2 = REGIONAL 3 = NATIONAL	52_____
POST-RESTRUCT. SCOPE OF ORGANIZATION	1 = LOCAL 2 = REGIONAL 3 = NATIONAL	53_____
SIZE (RELATIVE)	0 = UNCERTAIN 1 = DECREASING 2 = MAINTAINING 3 = INCREASING	54_____
SIZE (ABSOLUTE)	0 = UNCERTAIN 1 = 50 OR LESS 2 = 51 - 100 3 = 101 - 200 4 = 201 - 500 5 = 501 - 1000 6 = OVER 1000	55_____
MONEY (RELATIVE)	0 = UNCERTAIN 1 = DECREASING 2 = SAME 3 = INCREASING	56_____
MONEY (ABSOLUTE) (CONTRIBUTIONS PER YEAR)	1 = 0 - $10,000 2 = $10,001 - $50,000 3 = $50,001 - $100,000 4 = $100,001 - $500,000 5 = OVER $500,000 9 = UNCERTAIN	57_____
CONSTITUENCY (RACE)	0 = UNCERTAIN 1 = INTERRACIAL (INCLUDES PREDOM. WHITE) 2 = PREDOM. BLACK 3 = ALL-BLACK	58_____
CONSTITUENCY (CLASS)	0 = UNCERTAIN 1 = PREDOM. MIDDLE CLASS 2 = MIXTURE 3 = PREDOM. WORKING/LOWER CLASS	59_____
LINKAGES--VEP	0 = NO 1 = YES 9 = UNCERTAIN	60_____
LINKAGES--COFO	0 = NO 1 = YES 9 = UNCERTAIN	61_____

LINKAGES--MFDP   0 = NO   62_____
                        1 = YES
                        9 = UNCERTAIN

LINKAGES--OTHER CIVIL 0 = NO   63_____
 RIGHTS (EXCLUDES   1 = YES
 COFO, VEP, AND MFDP   9 = UNCERTAIN
 ALLIANCES)

LINKAGES--NON-CIVIL   0 = NO   64_____
         RIGHTS   1 = YES
                        9 = UNCERTAIN

LINKAGES--NON-CIVIL   0 = NO   65_____
   RIGHTS (COMMUNIST)   1 = YES
                        9 = UNCERTAIN

TOTAL LINKS (LOCAL)   # (NUMBER)   66_____

TOT LINKS (REGIONAL)   # (NUMBER)   67_____

TOT LINKS (NATIONAL)   # (NUMBER)   68_____

ANTAGONISTS: 0 = NO   69_____
   LOCAL   1 = YES
      SEGREGATIONISTS   9 = UNCERTAIN

ANTAGONISTS: 0 = NO   70_____
   LOCAL   1 = YES
      OFFICIALS   9 = UNCERTAIN

ANTAGONISTS: 0 = NO   71_____
   NATIONAL   1 = YES
      SEGREGATIONISTS   9 = UNCERTAIN

ANTAGONISTS: 0 = NO   72_____
   NATIONAL   1 = YES
      GOVERNMENT   9 = UNCERTAIN

ANTAGONISTS: 0 = NO   73_____
   POWER   1 = YES
      STRUCTURE   9 = UNCERTAIN

DIPLACEMENT GOALS   0 = NO   74_____
                        1 = YES
                        9 = UNCERTAIN/UNCLEAR

CENTRALIZATION   1 = DECENTRALIZED   75_____
                        2 = COMBINATION
                        3 = CENTRALIZED

PHILOSOPHY: NONVIOLENCE	0 = NO 1 = BEING QUESTIONED 2 = AS TACTIC 3 = YES (PHILOSOPHY) 9 = N/A	76_____
PHILOSOPHY: INTER-RACIAL	0 = NO 1 = YES 9 = N/A	77_____
PHILOSOPHY: WORK ITSELF	0 = NO 1 = YES 9 = N/A	78_____

PHILOSOPHY:
  TOWARD BLACK
    CONSCIOUSNESS OR
    SEPARATISM
	0 = NO
	1 = YES
	9 = N/A
		79_____

PHILOSOPHY: BLACK POWER	0 = NO 1 = YES 9 = N/A	80_____
METRIC SCORE	01 = -7 02 = -6 03 = -5 04 = -4 05 = -3 06 = -2 07 = -1 08 = 0 09 = +1 10 = +2 11 = +3 12 = +4 13 = +5 14 = +6 15 = +7	81-82_____
BETSY'S METRIC	03 = -5 04 = -4 05 = -3 06 = -2 07 = -1 08 = 0 09 = +1 10 = +2 11 = +3 12 = +4 13 = +5 00 = N/A	83-84_____

```
JOHN'S METRIC           06 = -2                                          85-86_____
                        07 = -1
                        08 = 0
                        09 = +1
                        10 = +2
                        00 = N/A


ORIGINS METRIC          05 = -3                                          87-88_____
                        06 = -2
                        07 = -1
                        08 = 0
                        09 = +1
                        10 = +2
                        11 = +3
                        00 = N/A


NUMBER OF ELEMENTS      (NUMBER)                                          89_____
                        0 = N/A


COMPLEMENTARITY         0 = NO                                            90_____
                        1 = YES
                        9 = N/A


IN DEBT                 0 = NO                                            91_____
                        1 = YES
                        9 = UNCERTAIN


IS RESTRUCTURING        0 = NO                                            92_____
RELATED TO A            1 =IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
   SUCCESS              2 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
                        3 =CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
                        4 =COTERMINOUS ONLY
                        5 =COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
                        6 =IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
                        7 =CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
                        8 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
                        9 =UNCERTAIN


SUCCESS CASE I.D.       _ _ _  (NUMBER)                                   93-95_____
                        000 = N/A


DATE OF SUCCESS                                                           96-97_____
   (MONTH)              00 = N/A


DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)                                                    98-99_____
                        00 = N/A


SCOPE OF SUCCESS        1 = LOCAL                                         100_____
                        2 = REGIONAL
                        3 = NATIONAL
                        0 = N/A
```

LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS:

ALONE OR WITH OTHERS	1 = ALONE 2 = INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS 3 = AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION 4 = BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL 0 = N/A	101_____
VEP	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	102_____
COFO	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	103_____
MFDP	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	104_____
OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	105_____
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	106_____
ACTIVITIES PRECEDING SUCCESS	0 =N/A 1 = DIRECT ACTION 2 = VOTER REGISTRATION 3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING 8 = OTHER 9 = UNCERTAIN	107_____
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES PRECEDING SUCCESS	SEE CODES ABOVE	108_____

TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE	0 = N/A 1 = CONSULTATION 2 = NEGOTIATION 3 = FORMAL RECOGNITION 4 = INCLUSION	109_____
RELEVANT ANTAGONIST	0 = N/A 1 = LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS 2 = LOCAL OFFICIALS 3 = NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS 4 = NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 5 = POWER STRUCTURE 9 = UNCERTAIN	110_____
TYPE OF ADVANTAGES	0 = N/A 1 = VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION 2 = PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 3 = HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT 9 = OTHER	111_____
ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES	SEE CODES ABOVE	112_____
ENFORCEMENT OR NEW REGULATION	0 = N/A 1 = ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS 2 = CREATION OF NEW LAWS 3 = COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION 9 = UNCERTAIN	113_____
DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE	0 = N/A 1 = NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP 2 = CONCESSION 3 = IMPORTANT GAIN 4 = CRUCIAL GAIN 9 = UNCERTAIN	114_____
SUCCESS OCCURS DURING ORIGINS	1 = NO 2 = YES 3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING, PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING 0 = N/A	115_____
NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN PLACE (FOR THOSE OCCURING DURING ORIGINS ONLY)	_ (NUMBER) 0 = N/A	116_____

```
IS RESTRUCTURING      0 = NO                                      117_____
RELATED TO            1 =IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
ANOTHER SUCCESS       2 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
                      3 =CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
                      4 =COTERMINOUS ONLY
                      5 =COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
                      6 =IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
                      7 =CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
                      8 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
                      9 =UNCERTAIN

SUCCESS CASE I.D.     _ _ _ (NUMBER)                              118-120_____
                      000 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS                                                   121-122_____
  (MONTH)             00 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)    _ _                                     123-124_____
                      00 = N/A

SCOPE OF SUCCESS      1 = LOCAL                                   125_____
                      2 = REGIONAL
                      3 = NATIONAL
                      0 = N/A

LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS:

ALONE OR WITH OTHERS  1 = ALONE                                   126_____
                      2 = INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
                      3 = AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
                      4 = BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL
                      0 = N/A

VEP                   0 = N/A                                     127_____
                      1 = NO
                      2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                      3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                      9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

COFO                  0 = N/A                                     128_____
                      1 = NO
                      2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                      3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                      9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL

MFDP                  0 = N/A                                     129_____
                      1 = NO
                      2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                      3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                      9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL
```

OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	130_____
NON-CIVIL RIGHTS	0 = N/A 1 = NO 2 = INFORMALLY LINKED 3 = FORMALLY LINKED 9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL	131_____
ACTIVITIES PRECEDING SUCCESS	0 =N/A 1 = DIRECT ACTION 2 = VOTER REGISTRATION 3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING 8 = OTHER 9 = UNCERTAIN	132_____
ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES PRECEDING SUCCESS	SEE CODES ABOVE	133_____
TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE	0 = N/A 1 = CONSULTATION 2 = NEGOTIATION 3 = FORMAL RECOGNITION 4 = INCLUSION	134_____
RELEVANT ANTAGONIST	0 = N/A 1 = LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS 2 = LOCAL OFFICIALS 3 = NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS 4 = NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 5 = POWER STRUCTURE 9 = UNCERTAIN	135_____
TYPE OF ADVANTAGES	0 = N/A 1 = VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION 2 = PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS 3 = HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT 9 = OTHER	136_____
ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES	SEE CODES ABOVE	137_____
ENFORCEMENT OR NEW REGULATION	0 = N/A 1 = ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS 2 = CREATION OF NEW LAWS 3 = COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION 9 = UNCERTAIN	138_____

DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE   0 = N/A   139_____
                                     1 = NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
                                     2 = CONCESSION
                                     3 = IMPORTANT GAIN
                                     4 = CRUCIAL GAIN
                                     9 = UNCERTAIN

SUCCESS OCCURS DURING   1 = NO   140_____
         ORIGINS   2 = YES
                                     3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
                                         PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING
                                     0 = N/A

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN   _ (NUMBER)   141_____
         PLACE (FOR THOSE   0 = N/A
         OCCURING DURING
         ORIGINS ONLY)

IS RESTRUCTURING   0 = NO   142_____
         RELATED TO   1 =IMMEDIATELY PRECEDES ONLY
         ANOTHER SUCCESS   2 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY PRECEDES
                                     3 =CAUSALLY PRECEDES ONLY
                                     4 =COTERMINOUS ONLY
                                     5 =COTERMINOUS AND CAUSALLY RELATED
                                     6 =IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWS ONLY
                                     7 =CAUSALLY FOLLOWS ONLY
                                     8 =IMMEDIATELY AND CAUSALLY FOLLOWS
                                     9 =UNCERTAIN

SUCCESS CASE I.D.   _ _ _ (NUMBER)   143-145_____
                            000 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS   146-147_____
         (MONTH)   00 = N/A

DATE OF SUCCESS (YEAR)   148-149_____
                               00 = N/A

SCOPE OF SUCCESS   1 = LOCAL   150_____
                                     2 = REGIONAL
                                     3 = NATIONAL
                                     0 = N/A

LINKAGES FOR SUCCESS:

ALONE OR WITH OTHERS   1 = ALONE   151_____
                                     2 = INFORMALLY WITH OTHERS
                                     3 = AS PART OF FORMAL COALITION
                                     4 = BOTH FORMAL AND INFORMAL
                                     0 = N/A

```
VEP                      0 = N/A                              152_____
                         1 = NO
                         2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                         3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                         9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL


COFO                     0 = N/A                              153_____
                         1 = NO
                         2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                         3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                         9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL


MFDP                     0 = N/A                              154_____
                         1 = NO
                         2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                         3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                         9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL


OTHER CIVIL RIGHTS       0 = N/A                              155_____
                         1 = NO
                         2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                         3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                         9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL


NON-CIVIL RIGHTS         0 = N/A                              156_____
                         1 = NO
                         2 = INFORMALLY LINKED
                         3 = FORMALLY LINKED
                         9 = UNCERTAIN IF FORMAL OR INFORMAL


ACTIVITIES PRECEDING     0 =N/A                               157_____
          SUCCESS        1 = DIRECT ACTION
                         2 = VOTER REGISTRATION
                         3 = EMPLOYMENT/HOUSING
                         8 = OTHER
                         9 = UNCERTAIN


ADDITIONAL ACTIVITIES    SEE CODES ABOVE                      158_____
PRECEDING SUCCESS


TYPE OF ACCEPTANCE       0 = N/A                              159_____
                         1 = CONSULTATION
                         2 = NEGOTIATION
                         3 = FORMAL RECOGNITION
                         4 = INCLUSION


RELEVANT ANTAGONIST      0 = N/A                              160_____
                         1 = LOCAL SEGREGATIONISTS
                         2 = LOCAL OFFICIALS
                         3 = NATIONAL SEGREGATIONISTS
```

```
                            4 = NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
                            5 = POWER STRUCTURE
                            9 = UNCERTAIN
```

TYPE OF ADVANTAGES   0 = N/A   161_____
                            1 = VOTING RIGHTS/REGISTRATION
                            2 = PUBLIC ACCOMMODATIONS
                            3 = HOUSING/EMPLOYMENT
                            9 = OTHER

ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES   SEE CODES ABOVE   162_____

ENFORCEMENT OR   0 = N/A   163_____
  NEW REGULATION   1 = ENFORCING EXISTING LAWS
                            2 = CREATION OF NEW LAWS
                            3 = COMBINATION ENFORCEMENT AND CREATION
                            9 = UNCERTAIN

DEGREE OF IMPORTANCE   0 = N/A   164_____
                            1 = NOT SEEN AS SUCCESS BY GROUP
                            2 = CONCESSION
                            3 = IMPORTANT GAIN
                            4 = CRUCIAL GAIN
                            9 = UNCERTAIN

SUCCESS OCCURS DURING   1 = NO   165_____
         ORIGINS   2 = YES
                            3 = IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING,
                                PRIOR TO ANY RESTRUCTURING
                            0 = N/A

NUMBER OF ELEMENTS IN   _ (NUMBER)   166_____
    PLACE (FOR THOSE   0 = N/A
    OCCURING DURING
    ORIGINS ONLY
```

APPENDIX B: THE CHRONOLOGIES OF CORE AND SNCC

Complete Chronology of CORE's Restructurings and Successes
With Specific Changes in Elements and Gains

| Date of Restructuring or Success | Form of Restructuring or Success | Specific Changes in Elements or Type of Success |
|---|---|---|
| June 1943 | D-T | D:Geographic scope of organization expanded to national. "The purpose of this organization shall be to federate local interracial groups working to abolish the color line through nonviolent direct action." <br> T:Loose federation of local chapters. Officer positions included chairman and combination secretary/treasurer. |
| June 1944 | T | T:Executive Committee created. Officer positions expanded to include three vice-chairmen. |
| June 1945 | T | T:Executive Committee no longer primary policy-making body. Council, which was composed of the executive committee plus two representatives from each chapter, was created and became policy-making unit. Officer positions now shifted to include a chairman, one vice-chairman, a secretary, treasurer, and executive secretary. |
| April 1947 | A | A:Direct action project by national group in the form of the Journey of Reconciliation. |
| June 1947 | T | T:Field representative position created. |
| June 1948 | T-R | T:Second field representative position created. <br> R:Manuel Talley selected to fill this second field representative position. |
| June 1948 | D | D:Statement on Communism drafted which formally stated that Communist-controlled groups could neither join nor be retained as a part of CORE. |
| June 1949 | T | T:Increased field positions to include six field representatives. Increased the strength of the Council and abolished the Executive Committee. |

| 1950 | A-R | A:Initiation of trend of decreasing amounts of direct action projects.<br>R:Trend of declining membership and number of active units. |
|---|---|---|
| June 1951 | T-R-A | T:Created positions of part-time fund raiser and full-time field worker.<br>R:James Robinson appointed as fund raiser.<br>A:Increased active pursuit for contributions. |
| January 1954 | R-T | R:Resignation of Houser as executive secretary.<br>T:Duties of executive secretary divided into three positions. Field worker position abolished. |
| June 1954 | R | R:Benchmark of upward trend in income. |
| March 1956 | T | T:National Action Committee created as new central body. |
| September 1956 | R | R:Promotion of James Robinson to executive secretary position. |
| 1957 - 1960 | T-A-D | T:Creation of two field worker positions in the South.<br>A:Added voter registration and enforcement of school desegregation as central types of action.<br>D:Expanded geographic area of influence to include the South. |
| December 1957 | Advantage | Passage of Sharkey-Brown-Isaacs Bill, a New York City fair-housing law |
| October 1959 | T | T:Created positions in public relations and special fund raising. |
| February 1960-<br>July 1960 | A-T-R | A:Increased activity of field workers in the South. Sympathy protests proliferate in North.<br>T:Created three more field secretary positions and post of field director.<br>R:Student advisors brought in. Increase in number of new units being formed. Bulk of workers and funds shifted to the South. |
| October 1960-<br>December 1960 | R-T | R:Ousted James Robinson as Executive Secretary.<br>T:Eliminated position of Executive Secretary and created new post of National Director. |

| February 1961 | R | R:James Farmer assumed new National Director position. |
|---|---|---|
| May 1961 | A | A:Resurgence of a national project in the Freedom Rides. |
| June 1961 | Acceptance: Consultation | Meeting with Kennedy to discuss voter registration. |
| June 1961- April 1962 | D-A | D:Voter registration part of legitimate focus rather than just another activity.<br>A:Intensified activities in voter registration. |
| September 1961 | Advantage | Interstate Commerce Commission Order which banned segregation on facilities concerned with interstate travel. |
| October 1961 | R | R:Marvin Rich promoted to fund raiser position. |
| October 1961- October 1962 | R-T | R:Demarcates initiation of trend of rapidly growing membership.<br>T:New position created--Assistant to National Director. National Action Council replaced National Action Committee and National Council. Field secretaries became responsible for specific geographic areas. |
| April 1962- October 1963 | A-R-D | A:Focusing on discrimination in employment and housing.<br>R:Marks end of concentration of resources in the South. Demarcates initiation of a trend of more blacks and especially working class blacks joining organization.<br>D:Beyond integration to the problems of the black poor. |
| June 1962 | Advantage | Baltimore City Ordinance barring segregation in public accommodations following the Route 40 Freedom Ride. |
| August 1962 | Advantage | Desegregation of substantial portion of Howard Johnson and Holiday Inn chains in North Carolina from Freedom Highways campaign. |
| December 1962 | Advantage | Preferential hiring agreement from Sealtest Dairies Co. following two month boycott. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| April 1963-<br>July 1963 | R-A | R: Increased number of people joining CORE, and current members becoming more active. Financial support increased.<br>A: More direct action projects incorporating more radical techniques. Increase in profusion of direct action temporary, but increase in radicalization marks commencement of a trend. Radicalization included courting arrests, civil disobedience, and emphasis on ghetto improvement. |
| June 1963 | R | R: Floyd McKissick appointed as National Chairman. |
| April 1964 | A | A: Marks recognition of a declining trend in the importance and profusion of direct action projects. |
| April 1964 | R | R: Decreasing contributions, combined with history of over-spending, placed CORE in debt. |
| June 1964 | T | T: Five Regional Action Councils created. |
| June 1964-<br>June 1965 | A-D | A: Involvement in partisan politics to oppose Goldwater's nomination as a presidential candidate.<br>D: Partisan politics as part of legitimate focus. |
| August 1964 | R | R: Resignation of Norman Hill as program director. |
| September 1964 | Advantage | Benchmark for Gains in Voter Registration in the South. |
| October 1964 | A-D | A: Marks benchmark of an increasing emphasis on community organizing<br>D: Community Organizing--focusing on the felt needs of the community. Freedom and equality rather than integration became central focus. |
| October 1964-<br>January 1965 | T-R | T: Creation of Associate National Director position.<br>R: George Wiley named to this new post. |
| January 1965 | R | R: Response to rising debt: Acquired loans and developed CORE Scholarship, Educational, and Defense Fund as sources of support for programs. Closed some offices; streamlined the staff and programs |

of those that remained open.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| June 1965 | T | T: Formal declaration that members of the minority community "shall substantially constitute the leadership" of the chapters. |
| September 1965 | A | A: Virtual end of voter registration in deference to previously noted increasing trend in community organizing. |
| January 1966 | R | R: Change in National Director from Farmer to Floyd McKissick. |
| March 1966 | R | R: Substantial loss of staff. |
| June 1966 | D-R | D: Endorsed Black Power rhetoric. Discarded commitment to nonviolence. Adopted an anti-war statement.<br>R: Many white supporters turned away from CORE. |
| June 1968 | R-D-T | R: Roy Innis replaced McKissick as National Director. Smaller staff and fewer chapters.<br>D: Black nationalism rather than civil rights. Formally excluded whites from becoming members.<br>T: Fewer staff positions arranged in more centralized configuration. |

Complete Chronology of SNCC's Restructurings and Successes
With Specific Changes in Elements and Gains

| Date of Restructuring or Success | Form of Restructuring or Success | Specific Changes in Elements or Type of Success |
|---|---|---|
| June 1961 | R-D | R: Received a grant from the SCEF, an organization that was popularly viewed as communist-oriented. Hired Bob Zellner with this grant.<br>D: Assertion of the group's prerogative of Free Association. |
| June 1961 | T-R | T: Created field worker position.<br>R: Charles Sherrod hired to fill this position. |
| July 1961- August 1961 | R-A | R: Bob Moses broke his ties with the SCLC and became a full-time SNCC worker.<br>A: Moses and two students began voter registration in Mississippi. |
| August 1961- September 1961 | D-T-A-R | D: Formally shifted emphasis to include both direct action and voter registration as part of SNCC's focus rather than as the responsibility of local college groups.<br>T: Two wings established--voter registration and direct action--with coordinators for each. Executive secretary position created to coordinate things from Atlanta.<br>A: Involving local Mississippi blacks in direct action rather than relying on college students to do the protesting.<br>R: Jim Forman selected as Executive Secretary. |
| September 1961- October 1961 | R-D-A-T | R: Twelve students dropped out of college to become full-time SNCC workers.<br>D: Shifted sphere of influence from college campuses of entire South to the rural Deep South--Operation MOM (March on Mississippi).<br>A: Community organizing.<br>T: SNCC policy made by actions of field staff. Coordinating committee became more of a titular head. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| December 1961-<br>June 1962 | T-R | T:Created new positions: full-time secretary, communications director, administrative assistant, and publicity and public relations.<br>R:Key people introduced to fill these posts (e.g., Julian Bond, Dotty Miller, Ruby Doris Robinson). |
| February 1962 | T | T:Formalized emphasis on the primacy of local leadership as seen in a proposal to the Voter Education Project. |
| April 1962 | R | R:Benchmark for trend of increasingly radical band of workers. New members likely to be involved in movement before joining and older members becoming radicalized by their experiences in the Deep South. |
| April 1962 | T | T:Coordinating Committee re-oriented to include representatives from each group rather than each state. Executive Committee created to carry out policies between conferences. |
| June 1962-<br>December 1962 | D-R | D:North designated as principal area of fund raising.<br>R:Two white Northerners hired to direct these efforts. |
| October 1962 | A | A:Direct aid project in form of LeFlore County food drive. |
| December 1962 | R | R:Benchmark of trend of increased income from Northern fund raising operations. |
| June 1963 | R | R:John Lewis elected as chairman. |
| July 1963 | Advantage | Designates significant increase in the number of black Mississippians who were registered to vote due to SNCC's efforts. Still only approximately 5% of eligible black voters were registered. |
| September 1963-<br>November 1963 | D-R-A | D:"One man, one vote."<br>R:One hundred student volunteers from Stanford and Yale came to Mississippi to assist SNCC.<br>A:Freedom Vote. |
| February 1964 | A | A:Freedom Registration. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| April 1964 | A-R | A: Expanded Northern operations to develop alliances and raise funds for proposed Summer Project.<br>R: Increased income. |
| May 1964-<br>June 1964 | R-A | R: Shifted resources to Freedom Summer project areas of Mississippi. Influx of Northern college students as volunteers for the Summer.<br>A: Intensified existing projects and activities. Began new activities such as Freedom Schools. |
| August 1964 | Acceptance:<br>Inclusion | MFDP challenge at Democratic convention resulted in offer of two seats with no voting rights and promise to bar representatives from discriminating states at next convention. |
| September 1964 | Advantage | Marks increase in registered voters on both Mississippi registrars' formal lists and in the unrecognized MFDP following the intensified efforts of Freedom Summer. |
| September 1964 | R | R: Eighty of the Summer volunteers decided to remain in Mississippi and become full-time SNCC workers rather than return to school. |
| September 1964 | A | A: First instance of SNCC-sponsored international travel: eleven members toured Africa. |
| October 1964 | R | R: Benchmark for trend of eroding support from Northern liberals. |
| October 1964-<br>January 1965 | R-A | R: Staff not dependable or performing their jobs well. "Freedom high" faction developed who valued personal freedom more highly than adherence to any organizational goals.<br>A: Closed a portion of the Freedom Schools and community centers established in the Summer due to this undependable staff. |
| February 1965 | T | T: Field staff demanded formal votes for themselves within the organization. They then voted themselves onto the coordinating committee. Secretariat created to make decisions between executive committee meetings. |
| March 1965 | A | A: Beginning of activities in Lowndes County. |
| June 1965 | A | A: Partisan politics in an urban area in |

conjunction with Julian Bond's campaign for the Georgia House of Representatives.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| December 1965 | R | R:Benchmark for declining trend in contributions. SNCC no longer received significant contributions from institutional sources, and individual contributions were steadily decreasing. |
| January 1966 | D | D:Formal statement against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. This is the first instance of expanding the group's legitimate scope beyond domestic racial issues. |
| January 1966 | A | A:Initiation of the Atlanta Project (a group of urban organizers who were authorized by SNCC to build local community support for Julian Bond). |
| May 1966 | R-T | R:Stokely Carmichael elected chairman after a contested re-election of John Lewis. T:Ten-member committe created to replace the executive committee. Declaration that whites should work in the white community and blacks in the black community. |
| May 1966 | A | A:Beginning of a series of trips to foreign countries. |
| June 1966 | D | D:Black Power. |
| June 1966 | R | R:Resignation of John Lewis. |
| July 1966 | A-R | A:Many projects not being carried out because staff members not doing their jobs. R:Fired some of the ineffective staff and closed some offices. |
| October 1966 | R-D | R:Benchmark for a discernible shifting of staff from rural projects to urban areas. D:Emphasis on these urban areas as the legitimate focus of SNCC's activities. |
| November 1966 | R-A | R:All Lowndes County staff, except Rap Brown, left their posts after the November election. A:End of previously active Lowndes County project. Signifies virtual end of voter registration. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| December 1966-<br>May 1967 | D-R | D:Formal declaration of an all-black organization.<br>R:Loss of white staff. This was seen most distinctly in SNCC's refusal to officially support Bob and Dotty Zellner's work in New Orleans. |
| February 1967 | R | R:Fired Atlanta Project staff. |
| May 1967 | R-D-T | R:Rap Brown elected to replace Carmichael as chairman.<br>D:Expanded legitimate focus to international arena with declaration of the group as a "human rights organization."<br>T:Established an international affairs commission. |
| July 1967 | R | R:Loss of most remaining contributions from white supporters following publication of a pro-Palestinian article by a SNCC member. |
| June 1968 | R-T | R:Rap Brown's series of arrests made it impossible for him to be an effective chairman.<br>T:Replaced the position of chairman with nine deputy chairmen. |
| July 1968 | R | R:Carmichael expelled. |
| December 1968 | R | R:Cleveland Sellers and Willie Ricks fired. |
| June 1969 | D-R-T | D:Redefined focus as a paramilitary group.<br>R:Resignation of Jim Foreman.<br>T:Rap Brown in position of titular leader, but control of the organization actually was in the hands of the newly created Revolutionary Political Council. |

APPENDIX C

CORE--Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations

| | V1 | V2 | V3 | V4 | V5 | V6 | V7 | V8 | V9 | V10 | V11 | V12 | V13 | V14 | V15 | V16 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V1. | 1.00 | .00 | -.14 | .13 | .22 | .06 | -.21 | .10 | -.06 | .10 | -.08 | .10 | .44 | .28 | .29 | .51 |
| V2. | | 1.00 | .41 | .45 | -.08 | -.43 | -.07 | -.32 | -.26 | -.12 | -.38 | -.28 | -.38 | -.60 | .72 | .28 |
| V3. | | | 1.00 | .89 | -.25 | -.50 | -.13 | -.34 | -.36 | .06 | -.05 | -.54 | -.24 | -.18 | .40 | -.23 |
| V4. | | | | 1.00 | -.00 | -.45 | -.24 | -.37 | -.27 | .18 | -.08 | -.45 | -.05 | -.23 | .46 | .03 |
| V5. | | | | | 1.00 | .14 | -.21 | .05 | .38 | .32 | -.19 | .16 | .32 | -.12 | -.20 | .39 |
| V6. | | | | | | 1.00 | .30 | .12 | .24 | -.25 | .28 | .79 | .09 | .32 | -.37 | .07 |
| V7. | | | | | | | 1.00 | -.24 | .02 | -.26 | .25 | .30 | -.35 | .20 | -.20 | .03 |
| V8. | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -.03 | -.19 | .02 | .10 | .50 | -.07 | -.45 | .23 |
| V9. | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | .48 | .08 | .43 | .22 | -.02 | -.21 | -.08 |
| V10. | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -.12 | -.16 | .19 | .02 | .04 | -.12 |
| V11. | | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | .19 | -.07 | .33 | -.22 | -.20 |
| V12. | | | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | .06 | .24 | -.24 | -.10 |
| Mean | 1.55 | 7.18 | 39.66 | 51.75 | .32 | 58.25 | .20 | .35 | 2.10 | 2.08 | 1.28 | 2.58 | .32 | .55 | .45 | .22 |
| Std Dev | .71 | 3.73 | 54.98 | 56.40 | .47 | 7.30 | .40 | .48 | .67 | .86 | .45 | .50 | .47 | .50 | .50 | .42 |

V1 = NUMBER OF ELEMENTS
V2 = METRIC SCORE
V3 = TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT
V4 = TOTAL TIME
V5 = RELATED TO SUCCESS
V6 = YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS
V7 = CONFLICTUAL CATALYST
V8 = EXTERNAL CATALYST

V9 = RELATIVE SIZE
V10 = RELATIVE INCOME
V11 = TYPE OF DISJUNCTION
V12 = SCOPE OF RESTRUCTURING
V13 = CHANGE IN ACTIVITIES
V14 = CHANGE IN RESOURCES
V15 = CHANGE IN TASKS
V16 = CHANGE IN DOMAINS

SNCC—Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations

| | V1 | V2 | V3 | V4 | V5 | V6 | V7 | V8 | V9 | V10 | V11 | V12 | V13 | V14 | V15 | V16 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| V1. | 1.00 | .27 | .03 | .15 | .27 | -.19 | -.13 | -.05 | .12 | .08 | .06 | -.02 | .25 | .48 | .48 | .61 |
| V2. | | 1.00 | .03 | .07 | -.01 | -.11 | -.06 | .12 | .07 | -.10 | -.22 | .18 | -.46 | -.25 | .67 | .59 |
| V3. | | | 1.00 | .89 | .09 | -.20 | -.17 | -.13 | -.04 | -.01 | -.12 | -.21 | -.01 | -.08 | .12 | -.08 |
| V4. | | | | 1.00 | .09 | -.32 | -.20 | -.18 | .01 | .08 | -.07 | -.15 | .01 | .08 | .11 | .07 |
| V5. | | | | | 1.00 | -.32 | -.27 | .10 | .45 | .50 | -.13 | -.14 | .10 | .26 | -.09 | .22 |
| V6. | | | | | | 1.00 | .53 | -.08 | -.70 | -.67 | .42 | .34 | -.19 | .00 | -.14 | -.02 |
| V7. | | | | | | | 1.00 | .00 | -.39 | -.43 | .44 | .05 | -.21 | .08 | -.05 | -.05 |
| V8. | | | | | | | | 1.00 | .23 | .04 | .00 | -.10 | .09 | -.26 | -.13 | .20 |
| V9. | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | .68 | -.47 | -.35 | .38 | -.22 | .06 | -.02 |
| V10. | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -.43 | -.30 | .34 | -.06 | -.08 | -.08 |
| V11. | | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | .13 | -.10 | .42 | -.05 | -.16 |
| V12. | | | | | | | | | | | | 1.00 | -.46 | .22 | .04 | .20 |
| Mean | 1.62 | 5.95 | 9.46 | 12.73 | .14 | 64.43 | .31 | .38 | 1.93 | 1.83 | 1.31 | 2.40 | .38 | .71 | .26 | .26 |
| Std Dev | .82 | 3.57 | 12.64 | 13.54 | .35 | 2.30 | .47 | .49 | .68 | .82 | .47 | .70 | .49 | .46 | .44 | .44 |

V1 = NUMBER OF ELEMENTS
V2 = METRIC SCORE
V3 = TIME TO FIRST ELEMENT
V4 = TOTAL TIME
V5 = RELATED TO SUCCESS
V6 = YEAR RESTRUCTURING STARTS
V7 = CONFLICTUAL CATALYST
V8 = EXTERNAL CATALYST

V9 = RELATIVE SIZE
V10 = RELATIVE INCOME
V11 = TYPE OF DISJUNCTION
V12 = SCOPE OF RESTRUCTURING
V13 = CHANGE IN ACTIVITIES
V14 = CHANGE IN RESOURCES
V15 = CHANGE IN TASKS
V16 = CHANGE IN DOMAINS

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander, Jeffrey C.
  1982  Theoretical Logic in Sociology, Volume One:
         Positivism, Presuppositions, and Current Controversies.
         Berkeley: University of California Press.

Allen, Robert L.
  1970  Black Awakening in Capitalist America: An Analytic
         History. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company.

Bell, Inge Powell
  1968  CORE and the Strategy of Nonviolence. New York: Random
         House.

Blaustein, Albert P. and Robert L. Zangrando
  1968  Civil Rights and the Black American: A Documentary History.
         New York: Washington Square Press.

Bosworth, Susan L. and Gary A. Kreps
  1986  "Structure as Process: Organization and Role." American
         Sociological Review 51: in press.

Carmichael, Stokely
  1970  "What We Want." in Peter I. Rose, ed. Old Memories, New
         Moods. New York: Atherton Press, Inc. 237-46.

Carmichael, Stokely and Charles V. Hamilton
  1967  Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America.
         New York: Vintage Books.

Carson, Clayborne
  1981  In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s.
         Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Chafe, William H.
  1980  Civilities and Civil Rights. New York: Oxford University
         Press.

Dubin, Robert
  1978  Theory Building. New York: The Free Press.

Farmer, James
  1965  Freedom--When? New York: Random House.

Farmer, James
  1985  Lay Bare the Heart. New York: Arbor House.

Forman, James
  1972  The Making of Black Revolutionaries. New York: The Macmillan
         Company.

Francis, Patricia R. and Gary A. Kreps
    1984  "Disaster and the Social Order: Organization and Social
          Network." Unpublished paper.

Freeman, Jo
    1979  "Resource Mobilization and Strategy: A Model for Analyzing
          Social Movement Organization Actions." in M.N. Zald and
          J.D. McCarthy, eds. The Dynamics of Social Movements.
          Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.

Gamson, William A.
    1975  The Strategy of Social Protest. Homewood, Illinois:
          The Dorsey Press.

Gamson, William A.
    1980  "Understanding the Careers of Challenging Groups: A
          Commentary on Goldstone." American Journal of
          Sociology 85: 1043-1060.

Goldstone, Jack A.
    1980  "The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson's
          The Strategy of Social Protest." American Journal of
          Sociology 85: 1017-1042.

Good, Paul
    1970  "Odyssey of a Man--and a Movement." in August Meier and
          Elliott Rudwick, eds. Black Protest in the Sixties.
          Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 252-66.

Killian, Lewis M.
    1984  "Organization, Rationality and Spontaneity in the Civil
          Rights Movement." American Sociological Review
          49: 770-783.

Killian, Lewis M.
    1975  The Impossible Revolution, Phase II.  New York: Random
          House.

Kreps, Gary A.
    1985a Structural Sociology, Disaster, and Organization.
          Unpublished Monograph.

Kreps, Gary A.
    1985b "Disaster and the Social Order." Sociological Theory 3:
          49-65.

Linn, John R.
    1986  "Disaster and the Restructuring of Organization."
          Master's thesis. College of William and Mary.

McKissick, Floyd B.
    1968  "Programs for Black Power." in Floyd B. Barbour, ed.
          The Black Power Revolt. Boston: Extending Horizons
          Books. 179-181.

McLaughlin, Barry, ed.
    1969  Studies in Social Movements: A Social Psychological
          Perspective. New York: The Free Press.

Matusow, Allen J.
    1972  "From Civil Rights to Black Power: The Case of SNCC,
          1960-1966." in Barton J. Berstein and Allen J. Matusow,
          eds. Twentieth-Century America: Recent Interpretations.
          New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. 494-520.

Meier, August
    1963  "Negro Protest Movements and Organization." The Journal
          of Negro Education 32: 437-50.

Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick
    1973  CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968.
          New York: Oxford University Press.

Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick
    1969  "How CORE Began." Social Science Quarterly 49: 789-99.

Meier, August and Elliott Rudwick
    1970  "Radicals and Conservatives: Black Protest in Twentieth-
          Century America." in Peter I. Rose, ed. Old Memories,
          New Moods. New York: Atherton Press, Inc.

Miller, David L.
    1986  Introduction to Collective Behavior. Belmont, California:
          Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Morris, Aldon
    1981  "Black Southern Sit-in Movement: An Analysis of Internal
          Organization." American Sociological Review 46: 744-67.

Morris, Aldon
    1984  The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement. New York: The
          Free Press.

Muse, Benjamin
    1968  The American Negro Revolution: From  Nonviolence to Black
          Power, 1963-1967. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
          Press.

Myers, Frank E.
    1971  "Civil Disobedience and Organizational Change: The
          British Committee of 100." Political Science Quarterly
          LXXXVI: 92-112.

Oberschall, Anthony
   1973   Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs,
          New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Oberschall, Anthony
   1979   "Protracted Conflict." in M.N. Zald and J.D. McCarthy,
          eds. The Dynamics of Social Movements. Cambridge,
          Massachusetts: Winthrop Publishers, Inc.

Redding, Saunder
   1969   "The Black Youth Movement." The American Scholar 38.4:
          584-7.

Roberts, Gene
   1970   "The Story of Snick: From 'Freedom High' to Black Power."
          in August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, eds. Black Protest
          in the Sixties.  Chicago: Quadrangle Books.

Roberts, Ron E. and Robert Marsh Kloss
   1974   Social Movements: Between The Balcony and The Barricade.
          Saint Louis: The C.V. Mosby Company.

Samuels, Gertrude
   1970   "Two Ways: Black Muslim and N.A.A.C.P." in August Meier and
          Elliott Rudwick, eds. Black Protest in the Sixties.
          Chicago: Quadrangle Books. 37-45.

Saunders, Sarah L. and Gary A. Kreps
   1986   "The Life History of Emergent Organization in Disaster."
          Currently under review.

Sellers, Cleveland with Robert Terrell
   1973   The River of No Return: The Autobiography of a Black Militant
          and the Life and Death of SNCC. New York: Wiliam Morrow &
          Company, Inc.

Sitkoff, Harvard
   1981   The Struggle for Black Equality: 1954-1980. New York: Hill
          and Wang.

Skocpol, Theda
   1979   States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge
          University Press.

Smith, Jean
   1968   "I Learned to Feel Black." in Floyd B. Barbour, ed.
          The Black Power Revolt. Boston: Extending Horizons
          Books. 207-18.

Sobel, Lester A.
   1967   Civil Rights 1960-66. New York: Facts on File, Inc.

Starbuck, William H.
   1983   "Organizations As Action Generators." American Sociological
          Review 48: 91-102.

Stoper, Emily
   1977   "The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee: Rise and Fall
          of a Redemptive Organization." Journal of Black Studies
          8: 13-34.

Sutherland, Elizabeth, ed.
   1965   Letters From Mississippi. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

The Papers of the Congress of Racial Equality, 1941-1967.  Microfilm
          Edition.

Useem, Bert
   1985   "Disoganization and the New Mexico Prison Riot of 1980."
          American Sociological Review 50: 677-688.

Von Hoffman, Nicholas
   1964   Mississippi Notebook. New York: David White Company.

Wallace, Walter L.
   1983   Principles of Scientific Sociology. New York:
          Aldine Publishing Company.

Waskow, Arthur I.
   1967   From Race Riot to Sit-In, 1919 and the 1960s. Garden
          City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.

Wood, James L. and Maurice Jackson
   1982   Social Movements. Belmont, California: Wadsworth
          Publishing Company.

Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash
   1966   "Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change." Social Forces
          44: 327-41.

Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy, eds.
   1979   The Dynamics of Social Movements. Cambridge, Massachusetts:
          Winthrop Publishers, Inc.

Zangrando, Robert L.
   1969   "From Civil Rights to Black Liberation: The Unsettled
          1960's." Current History 59.339: 281-6.

Zinn, Howard
   1964   SNCC: The New Abolitionists. Boston: Beacon Press.

VITA

<u>Elizabeth M. Zeiders Farmer</u>

Born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, February 12, 1962. Graduated from
Carlisle High School, 1980; B.A. College of William and Mary, 1984
with concentration in Sociology; M.A. in Sociology College of William
and Mary, 1986.