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## Private Self-Consciousness, Self-Esteem, and Perspective-Taking

Riia Kaarina Luhtanen

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<https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-kv63-dp93>

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PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-ESTEEM, AND PERSPECTIVE-  
TAKING

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A Thesis  
Presented to  
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology  
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment  
Of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

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by  
Riia Kaarina Luhtanen  
1986


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
APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

  
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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
AKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	iv
LIST OF TABLES .....	v
ABSTRACT .....	vi
INTRODUCTION .....	2
METHOD .....	17
RESULTS .....	28
DISCUSSION .....	34
REFERENCES .....	42
TABLES .....	48
APPENDIX .....	52
VITA .....	61

## AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to express her appreciation to Professor Neill Watson, under whose guidance this investigation was conducted, for his advice, encouragement, and patience throughout the research. The author would also like to thank Professor John Nezlek for his valuable statistical advice and helpful criticism throughout the investigation, and Professor Virgil McKenna for his thoughtful reading and criticism of the manuscript. The author is also indebted to Shannon Berry, Jane Birchbach, Amy Flint, Lisa Fraim, Joan Hopkins, Michele Johnson, Amanda McCombs, Sara Trexler, Kim Welch and Kathleen Wilson for their help in constructing the videotapes used in this study.

## LIST OF TABLES

Table	Page
1. Subjects' Mean Accuracy Scores for Tapes A and B According to the Order of Presentation (Pretest) .....	48
2. Mean Accuracy Scores for High and Low Private Self-Conscious Subjects with High or Low Self-Esteem .....	49
3. Mean Self-Reported Perspective-Taking Scores for High and Low Private Self-Conscious Subjects with High or Low Self-Esteem .....	50
4. Subjects' Mean Target-Specific Accuracy Scores on the Free-Form and the Adjective Matching Tasks .....	51

## ABSTRACT

This study examined the effects of private self-consciousness and self-esteem on perspective-taking, testing the hypothesis that high private self-conscious persons with high self-esteem would be best able to take the perspective of other individuals. Perspective-taking was operationalized as the ability match self-descriptions with the correct authors. Two groups of five females were recruited as target persons, and participated in a videotaped group discussion after providing written free-form self-descriptions. In a pretest, 66 female subjects watched both videotapes, and matched the self-descriptions with the target females after each tape. Because no convergence was found between the two matching tasks, one of the tapes was dropped from further study on the basis that it resulted in significantly lower accuracy scores. The target females also provided self-descriptive adjective lists, and in the final study, 61 female subjects, recruited on the basis of their private self-consciousness and self-esteem scores, completed a self-report measure of perspective-taking and matched both the free-form self-descriptions and the adjective lists with the target persons appearing on the remaining videotape. Overall, subjects were significantly more accurate in matching the adjective lists than the free-form self-descriptions. Self-reported perspective-taking was associated with subjects' accuracy in matching the free-form self-descriptions but not the adjective lists. Lack of convergence between the two matching tasks was also evidenced by a nonsignificant correlation between the two accuracy scores. Test of the main hypothesis showed that only self-esteem had an effect on perspective-taking, and only when the task was to match the adjective lists, such that high self-esteem subjects were significantly more accurate than lows. Private self-consciousness had no effect on subjects' performance on either matching task, and the analysis failed to show a significant interaction. The results are discussed in terms of their implications to self-consciousness, self-esteem and perspective-taking.



PRIVATE SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, SELF-ESTEEM, AND PERSPECTIVE-  
TAKING

## Private Self-Consciousness, Self-Esteem, and Perspective-Taking

According to Duval and Wicklund's (1972) theory of objective self-awareness, attention can be directed either inward toward the self or outward toward the environment; when people focus their attention on themselves, they are in a state of self-awareness. Expanding from this theory focusing on states, Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) proposed that individuals differ in their tendency to direct attention inward, and labeled this disposition to attend to oneself as self-consciousness. These authors constructed a scale assessing individual differences in self-consciousness, and factor analyses revealed three separate components of this construct, private and public self-consciousness, and a third factor labeled social anxiety.

Private self-consciousness concerns attention to one's own personal thoughts and feelings. Two sample items from the private self-consciousness subscale are "I reflect about myself a lot" and "I am generally attentive to my inner feelings." High private self-conscious persons are more aware of their feelings, beliefs, attitudes and predispositions than are lows. Public self-consciousness, on the other hand, concerns awareness of

oneself as a social object. Items on this subscale include "I'm concerned about my style of doing things" and "I'm concerned about the way I present myself." Persons high in public self-consciousness are concerned with their social appearance and the impression they give to others. Social anxiety refers to a discomfort in the presence of others, and presumably results from a negative evaluation of oneself in the eyes of others. Private self-consciousness, public self-consciousness, and social anxiety are theoretically distinct constructs, and have been shown to be relatively independent empirically, as the correlations among the subscales have been found to be invariably low (e.g., Carver & Glass, 1976; Fenigstein et al., 1975). Investigating the reliability of the three subscales, Fenigstein et al. found test-retest correlations of .84, .79, and .73 for public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety, respectively. Considerable discriminant and convergent validity has also been established for each subscale (Carver & Glass, 1976; Turner, Scheier, Carver & Ickes, 1978).

Whereas self-awareness refers to a state, self-consciousness refers to the disposition to be self-attentive. In essence, the two concepts refer to the same psychological state. The higher individuals are in private or public self-consciousness, the more frequently

they engage in self-reflection by focusing on their inner selves or on the public aspects of themselves, respectively (Buss, 1980). As self-awareness and self-consciousness have received an increasing amount of attention among researchers in recent years, evidence indicating parallel effects for manipulated and dispositional self-attention and divergent behavioral consequences of public and private self-focus has been built up (see e.g. Carver & Scheier, 1981; Scheier & Carver, 1981).

By definition, high private self-conscious individuals are very cognizant of their private selves, i.e., their emotions, values, predispositions and the like. Private self-consciousness has been found to be associated with personal rather than social aspects of identity, as high private self-conscious individuals endorse items such as "my emotions and feelings" and "my future goals and aspirations" as important to their sense of who they are (Cheek & Briggs, 1982). A growing amount of research literature suggests that individuals high in private self-consciousness both possess more extensive and accessible self-knowledge and are more accurate in their self-reports than those low in private self-consciousness.

Researchers investigating the greater self-knowledge of high private self-conscious persons have often based their studies on the notion of self-schemata, defined as

"cognitive generalizations about the self, derived from past experience, that organize and guide the processing of self-related information contained in the individual's social experiences" (Markus, 1977, p. 64). Elaborate, well articulated self-schemata should lead to more complete self-descriptions and be more easily accessed than poorly articulated ones. The accessibility of self-schemata in high private self-conscious persons has been demonstrated in several studies. For example, high private self-conscious individuals, as compared to lows, named more self-descriptive adjectives when asked to describe themselves (Franzoi, 1983; Turner, 1978a). Turner (1978b) also found that high private self-conscious persons were faster in judging whether unfavorable trait labels were descriptive of them or not. They also showed greater recall of trait, but not nontrait, words in a surprise recall task, presumably because they made more spontaneous decisions of self-reference of trait words (Turner, 1980).

The self-knowledge of high private self-conscious individuals is also reflected in the accuracy of their self-reports. In one study (Scheier, Buss & Buss, 1978), subjects who had earlier completed a self-report measure of aggressiveness took part in what was ostensibly portrayed as a learning experiment. They were given the opportunity to deliver shocks to another person in order

to punish the person for mistakes in a concept formation task. It was hypothesized that the correspondence between self-reported aggressiveness and the aggression exhibited in the laboratory situation would be higher for individuals high in private self-consciousness than for those low in it. The results provided clear support for this; the correlation between the subjects' self-reports and actual behavior was .66 for the high private self-conscious subjects but only .09 for the lows.

Another experiment investigated the relationship between self-reports and dominance behaviors (Turner, 1978c). Subjects first described their dominance behavior in two ways. They were given a hypothetical group participation situation and wrote one story describing their typical behavior in such a situation, and another story describing their behavior were they to act as dominantly as they could. They later participated in an experiment that ostensibly investigated problem solving in groups. Each subject participated in two sessions, both times with two confederates, and the group task was to solve an ambiguous real-life problem. In the first session, no instructions regarding dominance were provided; in the second session, the subjects were told to try to be a leader of the group and act as dominant as possible. Both sessions were tape recorded, and the subjects' levels of dominant behavior were assessed by the

proportion of the discussion period they had been talking and by the confederates' ratings of the subjects' dominance. Again, the correlations between the earlier self-reports and the actual behavior were significantly higher for the high private self-conscious subjects than for the lows both in terms of their typical (.27 versus .13) and their maximal (.67 versus .33) dominance.

The accuracy of high private self-conscious persons self-reports was also supported by Franzoi (1983), who studied the self-concept differences of high and low private self-conscious individuals who were also high or low in social anxiety. His subjects were given the Adjective Check List (Gough & Heilbrun, 1965) and asked to check the adjectives that they felt were descriptive of them. They were then asked to give the list to a friend who was to evaluate them independently. The results indicated that when the subjects' self-ratings were compared to their friends' ratings of them, high private self-conscious subjects evaluated themselves more in line with their friends' evaluations than did lows. For the low private self-conscious subjects, the discrepancy between their self-ratings and the ratings of their friends was such that those who were high in social anxiety rated themselves more negatively and those low in social anxiety tended to rate themselves more positively than their friends rated them.

Whether the results obtained by Franzoi (1983) were actually due to more accurate and articulated self-knowledge of the high private self-conscious subjects or to their friends' greater knowledge of them is a question that can be raised. In fact, private self-consciousness has been shown to be associated with increased self-disclosure to friends (Franzoi & Davis, 1985). This suggests that the correspondence between subjects' self-descriptions and their friends' evaluations of them may have been due to better acquaintance rather than to greater or more accurate self-knowledge of the high private self-conscious subjects. Several points concerning this issue can be raised, however. First, Franzoi found no differences in the degree to which the subjects' friends rated how well they were acquainted with the subjects. Second, although private self-consciousness has been found to be related to intimate self-disclosure and, through that self-disclosure, to relationship satisfaction (Franzoi, Davis & Young, 1985), the reasoning underlying this relationship is that the greater self-disclosure of the high private self-conscious individuals itself stems from their more detailed self-knowledge. In other words, their awareness of their private self-aspects, and the importance of those aspects to their self-concept, is proposed to predispose them to engage in intimate self-disclosure. Third, the accuracy of the high



private self-conscious persons' self-reports is not only reflected in their being in line with friends' evaluations. In one study, outside observers with no previous exposure to individuals participating in a videotaped group interaction were better able to identify the self-descriptions of high than low private self-conscious individuals as descriptive of them (Bernstein & Davis, 1982).

Finally, several other studies indicate that high private self-conscious individuals may be better in touch with their internal states than lows. They have been shown to be more responsive to their emotions, which appears to be due to their greater awareness of their affective experiences rather than greater emotionality (Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977). They have also been found to be less suggestible than low private self-conscious persons as evidenced by their more accurate rating of the intensity of solutions consisting of peppermint extract and water (Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1979).

If we accept that private self-consciousness is associated with well articulated and accurate self-knowledge, how might it be related to the perception of others? Previous studies have focused on the self-perception of private self-conscious individuals and the behavioral consequences of the awareness of one's private

self-aspects, while neglecting the possible effects of private self-consciousness on such interpersonal processes as perspective-taking. Because private self-consciousness refers to attention directed to the private aspects of the self, one could argue that persons high in this disposition should attend less closely to the verbal and nonverbal cues of others and consequently be less able to take another person's perspective. However, Rogers' (1951, 1959) argument that the ability to process information about personal experience is related to empathic understanding suggests that high private self-conscious individuals are better able to "take the internal frame of reference of another with accuracy" (Rogers, 1959, p. 210). According to Rogers, a person comes to perceive others more realistically and accurately, being able to understand them from their own point of view, as a consequence of decreased defensiveness and increased openness to and acceptance of his or her own experiences. In other words, the more readily people assimilate their own experiences, the less defensive they are, and the more aware they are of which behaviors and experiences are theirs and which belong to others. Rogers sees self-knowledge accompanied by self-acceptance as an important determinant of empathic ability.

It is important to note that Rogers (1951, 1959) also puts emphasis on self-acceptance. Considering the concept

of self-consciousness, it is conceivable that some people score high on the private subscale by agreeing to such statements as "I'm always trying to figure myself out" and "I'm alert to changes in my mood," and have negative views of themselves. Awareness of one's inner experiences does not necessarily imply self-acceptance and lack of defensiveness. In fact, private self-consciousness has been found to have a low but significant negative correlation with self-esteem (Turner et al., 1978). Thus, one could separate high private self-conscious persons into those who engage in self-reflection in a way of self-criticism, and those who do so with acceptance of one's self and experience. If both awareness of one's own experiences and self-acceptance are necessary for accurate understanding of others, high private self-conscious individuals with relatively high self-esteem, as compared to those low in private self-consciousness or high in private self-consciousness but possessing low self-esteem, should be best able to take the perspective of another person.

Although no research has been done to test this hypothesis directly, there are some findings suggesting that self-consciousness and self-esteem may be relevant to perspective-taking. For example, Davis (1983) found that self-esteem was related to the self-reported tendency to adopt the point of view of another person as measured by

the Perspective Taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980). A study bearing some relevance to self-consciousness and perspective taking was done by Stephenson and Wicklund (1984). They found that high private self-conscious subjects made fewer perspective taking errors than did lows in a very concrete perspective taking task where subjects gave instructions directing a confederate to go through a maze with his finger. The subjects were seated opposite to the confederate, and were consequently required to consider a different spatial perspective from their own in giving the directions.

A study by Alcorn and Torney (1982) relates to the possible effect of private self-consciousness on empathic understanding, defined in their study as the ability to identify others' emotions. The subjects in the study were experienced counselors who provided self-reports of experiences of emotional states such as anger, depression, and happiness. These reports were then scored for complexity according to the number of different aspects used in describing the experiences. The subjects also listened to audiotaped statements expressing emotions, and chose descriptive words for the expressed emotions from a word list. The responses were compared to those of a panel of judges consisting of five psychiatrists and a clinical psychologist in order to arrive at a score for

accurate empathic understanding for each individual. Controlling for the effects of verbal ability, a significant positive correlation (.48) was found between subjects' complexity in describing their experiences of various emotional states and their ability to identify accurately the emotions expressed in the audiotaped statements. The authors concluded that these findings indicate that counselors' levels of emotional awareness are related to their ability to understand the emotional communication of others. Because high private self-conscious individuals appear to be more cognizant of and responsive to their experiences and dispositions than lows, it is expected that they are better able to identify the experiences of others.

Cognitive perspective-taking or role-taking falls under the construct of empathy, but is only one of the ways empathy has been defined in the past (see Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell & Hagen, 1985; Davis, 1980, 1983; Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Gladstein, 1983). In a broad sense, empathy refers to the sensitivity to others' experiences. Recently, attempts have been made to define empathy as a multidimensional construct or a set of constructs (e.g., Davis, 1980, 1983). Two major types of empathy have been traditionally identified: cognitive empathy or perspective-taking, referring to the ability to identify the psychological perspective of another person

(e.g., Dymond, 1949; Hogan, 1969), and affective empathy, referring to an emotional reaction or the tendency to vicariously experience the feelings of others (e.g., Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).

Researchers investigating cognitive perspective-taking have often asked subjects to predict stimulus persons' self-descriptions on a variety of scales. As argued by authors such as Cronbach (1955), and later by Cline (1964), such measures of empathy have several shortcomings. For one, the accuracy scores from such tasks may actually reflect assumed similarity on the part of the judges. Judges who happen to be similar to the stimulus person(s) can achieve high accuracy scores just by projecting their own characteristics onto the stimulus person(s). Such accuracy scores hardly reflect any "true" perspective-taking ability.

Cronbach (1955) also differentiated four components (elevation, differential elevation, stereotype accuracy, and differential accuracy) of the accuracy score. The elevation component reflects a response bias or artifact in that it refers to the tendency of a judge to use the same part of the rating scale as the stimulus persons. The differential elevation component refers to a judge's ability to rank order the mean self-ratings of the stimulus persons across all traits. Stereotype accuracy refers to a judge's ability to rank order traits averaged

across the stimulus persons and concerns the accuracy of a judge's stereotype of the stimulus group as a whole. The last component, differential accuracy, is the one that comes the closest to any "true" accuracy, referring to a judge's ability to predict differences among the stimulus persons on each trait separately. Thus, earlier research that failed to take into account the complexity of the accuracy scores is often regarded to be ambiguous at best (see Hastorf, Schneider, & Polefka, 1970; Tagiuri, 1969).

Recently, Bernstein and Davis (1982) attempted to develop a technique that yielded accuracy scores that were relatively free of the artifacts pointed out by Cronbach (1955). They designed a forced choice method where subjects viewed a group of people interacting and were provided with short self-descriptions of each individual appearing on the tape. The subjects' task was to match the self-descriptions with the correct individuals, and their accuracy scores were determined by the number of correct matches they made. This procedure was intended to eliminate the bias of projection or assumed similarity, since the targets and the self-descriptions were provided for the judges, and the judges were not asked to make ratings on scales also endorsed by the targets. For the same reason, the procedure minimized artifact of elevation, i.e., similarity between subject and target in endorsing a certain range of scores on a scale. Thus, the

task of matching targets with their self-descriptions depended primarily on judges' ability to detect differences among the targets, which is what the differential accuracy component has been proposed to measure and has been considered "true" accuracy.

Constructing several target tapes, Bernstein and Davis (1982) found that their technique resulted in accuracy scores that were better than chance guessing, and that individuals scoring high on perspective-taking as measured by one of the subscales of Davis (1980) Interpersonal Reactivity Index were best able to match target subjects with their self-descriptions. The present study employed the same technique in assessing the relationship between self-consciousness, self-esteem, and perspective-taking. It was hypothesized that high private self-conscious individuals with high self-esteem would be best able to take the perspective of others by matching self-descriptions to correct target individuals after watching a videotaped group interaction. No differences were expected between high private self-conscious individuals with low self-esteem and low private self-conscious individuals with either low or high self-esteem.



## Method

### Instrument

Target persons who appeared in the videotapes constructed for the present study were recruited from upper-level undergraduate psychology courses at the College of William and Mary. The investigator explained to female students that several volunteers were needed to participate in videotaped group discussions that would later be used in the investigator's Master's research among female introductory students. The Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) was distributed to a total of 65 upper-class females who were willing to be contacted later for possible participation. Prospective target persons were selected on the basis of their scores on the Private and Public subscales of the Self-Consciousness Scale. Of approximately 20 females who were contacted, 10 agreed to participate in the construction of two videotapes. Four of the females scored in the upper 30th percentile and four in the lower 30th percentile on the Private subscale. Two of the High Private targets and two of the Low Private targets also scored in the upper 30th percentile on the Public subscale, and the other half of each group scored in the lower 30th percentile on the Public subscale.

Additionally, two target persons who scored close to the median on both subscales were recruited. Thus, two groups of five target females were formed; in both groups, each one of the following types of targets was represented: High Private/High Public, High Private/Low Public, Low Private/High Public, Low Private/Low Public, and Medium Private/Medium Public.

The selection of the targets according to their self-consciousness scores was conducted for two reasons. First, in their study using a matching task similar to the present one, Bernstein and Davis (1982, study 2) found that targets' level of self-consciousness influenced the observer subjects' ability to match the self-descriptions with the targets. More specifically, it was found that High Private targets were significantly more easily matched with their self-descriptions than Low Privates, and that Public self-consciousness also had an effect on the observers' matching accuracy such that targets low in public self-consciousness were more easily matched with their self-descriptions than were those high in it. Second, because the effect of private self-consciousness on perspective-taking was one of the main variables of interest in the present study, the selection of targets based on their levels of private self-consciousness was seen as also serving the purpose of keeping any possible effects of real similarity between observer subjects and

the targets constant for both tapes.

The two target videotapes were constructed using a method similar to that of Bernstein and Davis (1982). The two target groups were videotaped separately, and the procedure used with each group was the same. The five target persons in each group gave their written consent to being videotaped in a group discussion, and filled out the following self-description questionnaire:

Please write a short (about one or two paragraphs) description of yourself as you see yourself. That is, write a "personality sketch" of yourself. Try to focus on characteristics that are predominant in the way you see yourself as a person. Please do not include any physical characteristics.

This self-description questionnaire was different from the one used by Bernstein and Davis (1982). In their study, each target subject was asked to write down three words that were descriptive of her and could be easily identified by others as being a description of her (as here, their subjects were asked not to include physical characteristics). The purpose of the present study was to have the target subjects describe themselves as they saw themselves (with no consideration of how others might view them), so that the observer subjects' ability to take each target person's self-perspective would not be confounded by 1) how accurate the target subject was in describing how she appears to others, and 2) how similar the observers were to that generalized "other" in their view

of each target. Also, in the present study the target subjects were asked to write a free-form self-description rather than single words or adjectives. This was done to avoid possible artificiality of descriptions containing single words and to allow for greater personal depth in the self-descriptions.

After the self-descriptions were completed and collected, the target subjects were taken into a studio and seated in a semicircle facing a videocamera. A microphone was placed in front outside of the camera's view but so that all the target subjects' voices could be recorded clearly. The target subjects then completed another questionnaire before the group discussion took place. The questionnaire asked each target to imagine being stranded alone on a tropical island and to choose four items she would bring with her to the island. After the island questionnaires were completed, the topic of the group discussion was introduced in a manner identical to that of Bernstein and Davis (1982). The target subjects were asked to imagine that they were stranded on the island together, and to choose six items they would take with them as a group. Four of those items were to come, in any way the targets wished, from the five individual lists, and the other two items were additional ones that the group was to come up with during the discussion. The group started the discussion by having each target read

off the items on her own list. The investigator then left the room, and the videotaping of the group discussion was monitored from the the control room adjacent to the studio. The first target group completed the group discussion in 11.40 minutes (Tape A) and the second group completed it in 15.25 minutes (Tape B).

After the completion of the group discussion, the investigator explained the general purpose of the self-descriptions and the videotapes to the groups. In order to assure as much confidentiality as possible, the target subjects were told that their names would not be used in connection with the showing of the tapes in subsequent research, and that their self-descriptions would remain anonymous and unconnected to the correct individuals on the tapes. No target subjects in either group wished to withdraw the use of the tape or their self-descriptions. The target subjects were then thanked for their participation and dismissed.

In a pilot study designed to test for the equivalence of the two target tapes, 66 female undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology classes at the College of William and Mary were shown both tapes. After viewing one tape, the observer subjects matched the five self-descriptions that belonged to that particular target group with the correct individuals. The procedure was then repeated for the other tape. The order of the tape

presentation was randomized across groups. In each matching task, the subjects also indicated whether they knew any of the target females and if so, whom. Each observer subject received two summed accuracy scores, one for Tape A and one for Tape B. The scores for each tape ranged from 0 to 5, because for any one tape, a subject could make 0, 1, 2, 3 or 5 correct matches.

The number of targets the subjects knew on Tape A correlated with the subjects' matching performance on that tape ( $\underline{r}$  (64) = .55,  $\underline{p}$  < .001), but there was no correlation between knowledge of the targets and performance on Tape B ( $\underline{r}$  (64) = -.02, n.s.). The subjects' matching accuracy scores were then submitted to a 2 (Order of tape presentation) X 2 (Tape) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the second factor, using knowledge of the targets as a covariate. This analysis indicated that knowledge of the targets on Tape A appeared as a significant covariate in the overall analysis of covariance, but it had little influence on the significance levels or the means. The covariate was consequently excluded from further analyses. Subsequent analysis revealed a significant main effect of Tape ( $\underline{F}$  (1, 64) = 6.87,  $\underline{p}$  < .02), such that subjects were more accurate in matching the self-descriptions with the targets on Tape B ( $\underline{M}$  = 1.82) than on Tape A ( $\underline{M}$  = 1.35). The interaction between Order and Tape was also

significant,  $F(1, 64) = 13.48, p < .01$ . Inspection of the means indicated that the difference between the accuracy scores for Tape A and Tape B was greater when Tape A was seen first (means .89 and 2.11, respectively) than when Tape B was seen first (means 1.68 and 1.61, respectively). This suggested a practice effect, and it appeared that the difficulty of matching the self-descriptions with the targets in Tape A was somewhat alleviated when Tape B was shown first. Table 1 shows the mean accuracy scores for Tapes A and B according to the order of presentation.

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Insert Table 1 about here

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Because the analysis failed to demonstrate equivalence for the two tapes and no correlation was found between the two accuracy scores ( $r(64) = .06, n.s.$ ), it was decided that only Tape B would be used in further study. To investigate whether convergence could be demonstrated between matching free-form self-descriptions and matching self-descriptive adjectives with the correct individuals, the target subjects were called in to fill out an additional questionnaire approximately a month after the construction of the videotapes. The instructions for the additional questionnaire read:

Think of five to ten words that describe you.

That is, write down five to ten adjectives that you think are descriptive of you as a person. Do not include any physical characteristics.

Although this form of self-descriptions was closer to that used by Bernstein and Davis (1982), there were still two differences. In the present study, target subjects wrote down five to ten self-descriptive words rather than three, and they described themselves as they saw themselves rather than in a way that other people would recognize as descriptive of them.

### Subjects

Subjects were 61 female undergraduates enrolled in the introductory psychology classes at the College of William and Mary who received credit for their participation. The subjects were recruited based on their earlier completion of the Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and the Rosenberg (1965) Self-Esteem Scale as these scales were administered to the departmental subject pool in a masstest administration. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale was chosen because it is proposed to measure a more global or overall privately experienced self-evaluation rather than situationally fluctuating self-attitude and has been widely used in the past (cf. Demo, 1985). In the final sample of 61 subjects, scores on the Private Self-Consciousness subscale ranged from 17 to 38, with a median of 25 ( $M = 25.95$ ), and scores on the Self-Esteem Scale ranged from 1



to 6, with a median of 5 ( $M = 4.49$ ). Subjects were identified as high in private self-consciousness if they scored above the median on the Private Self-Consciousness subscale, and low if they scored on or below the median. Subjects whose scores on the Self-esteem Scale were on or above the median were identified as high self-esteem subjects; those scoring below the median were identified as having a low self-esteem.

#### Procedure

The subjects were run in groups of four to 12 individuals and were seated in a classroom in front of a TV monitor on which the target videotape (Tape B) was shown. The subjects were told that they would be asked to watch a videotaped group discussion and asked to respond to some questions concerning it. They then read and signed a consent form, and completed the Perspective-Taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980), a seven item scale that measures the self-reported tendency or ability to take the point of view of other people. This measure was included to test for the convergence between subjects' performance on the matching tasks and their self-reported perspective-taking ability.

After the completion and collection of the consent forms and the Perspective-Taking subscale, the subjects were explained their task in greater detail. They were told that they would be watching a videotape of five

females deciding on six items to take to a deserted island. The subjects were also told that prior to the videotaped discussion each female had written a short description of herself and later provided five to ten adjectives that she thought were descriptive of her. The instructions given to the target females regarding the free-form self-descriptions were read to the subjects. The subjects were then told that they would be given both the free-form self-descriptions and the self-descriptive adjective lists separately after they had seen the videotape, and asked to match them with the correct individuals.

The subjects were then explained the instructions given to the target females concerning the group discussion task, and the videotape was turned on. At the end of the group discussion, the tape was stopped but the image of the target group was kept frozen on the screen to help the subjects in their task. The subjects were given two questionnaires, one with the free-form self-descriptions and one with the self-descriptive adjectives the target females had generated. The order of the questionnaires was randomized across sessions. On both questionnaires, five lines corresponding to the seating positions of the five target females were printed on top of the self-descriptions. The instructions asked the subjects to match each self-description with the

individual they thought wrote it by placing the number of the description on the line corresponding to the seating position of that female. The self-descriptions appeared in a random order and were numbered from 1 to 5. After each matching task, the subjects also rated how confident they were that they chose the right description for each of the target individuals. These ratings were made on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (extremely confident). They also indicated whether they knew any of the females appearing on the tape, and if so, whom. After the completion of the tasks, the subjects were briefly explained the purpose of the study, thanked, and dismissed.

## Results

Two accuracy scores in perspective-taking were computed for each subject by summing the total number of correct matches she made on the free-form self-description matching task and on the adjective matching task. Thus, subjects received two scores ranging from 0 to 5. The number of females the subjects knew on the target tape did not correlate with their performance on the adjective matching task and had only a marginally significant correlation with their performance on the free-form matching task ( $r(59) = .17, p < .10$ ). Preliminary analysis of the accuracy scores indicated that knowledge of the targets was not a significant covariate, and revealed no effects for the order of the two matching tasks. These two variables were thus excluded from further analyses.

A test of convergence between the two matching tasks was conducted by computing a correlation between the two accuracy scores. A nonsignificant correlation of  $r(59) = .14$  was obtained, indicating a lack of convergence between the two tasks. Subjects performed significantly better on the adjective matching task ( $M = 3.10$ ) than on the free-form matching task ( $M = 1.79, t(60) = 5.39, p <$

.001, two-tailed); inspection of the distributions of the scores on the two tasks did not show any apparent anomalies, and the standard deviations were similar (1.32 for the free-form matching and 1.57 for the adjective matching tasks). To test further for the convergent validity of the two tasks, each accuracy score was correlated with subjects' self-reported perspective-taking tendency, as measured by the Perspective Taking subscale of the Davis (1980) Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Self-reported perspective-taking was associated with subjects' performance on the free-form matching task ( $r(59) = .35$ ,  $p < .005$ ), but not with their performance on the adjective matching task ( $r(59) = .02$ , n.s.). Thus, convergent validity was demonstrated only for the matching task using the free-form self-descriptions.

To test for the hypothesized effects of private self-consciousness and self-esteem on subjects' perspective-taking ability, each accuracy score was first analyzed with a 2 (private self-consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) analysis of variance. Neither private self-consciousness nor self-esteem had a significant effect on the subjects' ability to match the free-form self-descriptions with the correct targets, and the interaction was also nonsignificant (all  $p$ s  $> .20$ ). For the adjective matching accuracy, only a significant effect of self-esteem was revealed, ( $F(1, 57) = 7.49$ ,  $p < .01$ ), such that subjects

with high self-esteem were more accurate in that task than those with low self-esteem (means 3.57 and 2.46, respectively). Correlational analyses also indicated that self-esteem was significantly related to subjects' accuracy scores on the adjective matching task ( $r(59) = .33, p < .005$ ) but not on the free-form matching task ( $r(59) = -.006, n.s.$ ). Private self-consciousness did not correlate with subjects' performance on either the adjective matching task ( $r(59) = -.18, n.s.$ ) or the free-form matching task ( $r(59) = .06, n.s.$ ). Table 2 shows the mean accuracy scores on each matching task for subjects high and low in private self-consciousness and high or low in self-esteem.

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Insert Table 2 about here

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Subjects' scores on the Perspective Taking subscale (Davis, 1980) were also analyzed in a 2 (private self-consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) analysis of variance. Neither private self-consciousness nor self-esteem showed a significant effect, and the interaction was also nonsignificant (all  $p_s > .10$ ). Table 3 shows the mean self-reported perspective-taking scores for subjects high and low in private self-consciousness and high or low in self-esteem. However, although a nonsignificant correlation of  $r(59) = -.05$  was found between self-esteem

and self-reported perspective-taking tendency, private self-consciousness did have a low but significant correlation with self-reported perspective-taking ( $r(59) = .21, p < .03$ ). In order to check whether private self-consciousness and self-esteem had an effect on subjects' performance on either or both of the matching tasks after holding self-reported perspective-taking constant, two 2 (private self-consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) analyses of covariance were conducted on subjects' accuracy scores on the free-form and the adjective matching tasks, using self-reported perspective-taking as a covariate. These analyses did not change the results reported above.

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Insert Table 3 about here

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Although the analyses of variance performed on subjects' total accuracy scores failed to show the hypothesized effects, revealing only a main effect of self-esteem on the adjective matching task, it is possible that private self-consciousness and self-esteem have differential effects on subjects' ability to take the perspective of another person depending on who that other person is. In other words, how able different types of subjects were to match a self-description with its author may be in part a function of the type of a target person. Recall that the target individuals were recruited on the

basis of their levels of private and public self-consciousness. To investigate this possibility, an additional 2 (private self-consciousness) X 2 (self-esteem) X 5 (target) analysis of variance with repeated measures on the last factor was conducted on both the free-form and the adjective matching tasks. On the free-form matching task, only a significant main effect of target was found,  $F(4, 228) = 4.40, p < .003$ . No other main effects nor the interactions were significant. Further analysis indicated that subjects were significantly better able to match the correct free-form self-descriptions with the High Private/Low Public and the Low Private/High Public targets ( $M = .48$ ) than with the other three targets (i.e., the High Private/High Public, Low Private/Low Public, and Medium Private/Medium Public targets,  $M = .27$ ),  $F(1, 57) = 12.57, p < .002$ . On the adjective matching task, no significant effects involving the type of a target were found, and the only significant effect that was revealed was the main effect of self-esteem,  $F(1, 57) = 7.49, p < .01$ . Table 4 presents subjects' mean target-specific accuracy scores on the free-form and the adjective matching tasks.

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Insert Table 4 about here

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Finally, did subjects' subjective estimates of their



performance on the two matching tasks correspond to their actual performance on those tasks? As indicated before, subjects rated how confident they were that they chose the correct self-description for each given target individual after each of the two matching tasks. For each matching task, the five confidence ratings were averaged for each subject to get an index of overall confidence.

Correlational analyses revealed a nonsignificant relationship both between subjects' actual performance on the free-form matching task and their overall confidence in their performance on it ( $r(59) = .14, n.s.$ ), and between their actual performance on the adjective matching task and their overall confidence in their performance on it ( $r(59) = .09, n.s.$ ). It thus appeared that subjects were not very good at estimating how well they could match the self-descriptions with the targets.

## Discussion

The results failed to support the hypothesis that high private self-conscious individuals with relatively high self-esteem are better able to take the perspective of others than individuals with any other combination of private self-consciousness and self-esteem. It appears that the combination of being attentive to one's inner experiences (such as emotions, values, and dispositional tendencies) and being accepting of oneself may not be a necessary precondition of accurate understanding of others' experiences or perspectives. Another possibility is that both high private self-consciousness and high self-esteem are necessary, but not sufficient, factors in perspective-taking ability. The present study did not look at any other individual difference variables, such as cognitive complexity or intelligence, that may also play an important role, possibly in combination with private self-consciousness and self-esteem, in the ability to understand others from their own points of view.

Private self-consciousness had no effect on subjects' perspective-taking ability, as it was operationalized in the two behavioral tasks in the present study. One possibility for this lack of relationship is

that any benefit private self-consciousness may have on the accurate perception of others and their viewpoints is attenuated by the consequent lesser attention paid to environmental stimuli as one habitually directs attention inward. Interestingly, however, private self-consciousness was positively related to self-reported perspective-taking, which in turn was associated with subjects' accuracy on the free-form self-description matching task. Yet the relationship between private self-consciousness and self-reported perspective-taking and the relationship between self-reported perspective-taking and free-form matching accuracy appeared to be independent, which also suggests that a more complex model, taking other factors into account, may be needed to explain individual differences in perspective-taking ability. Another possible explanation for this finding is that the two self-report measures, namely private self-consciousness and perspective-taking, shared some variance due to a response bias.

The way perspective-taking was operationalized in the present study may also be problematic. The lack of convergence between performances on the two tapes that were initially developed, and the lack of convergence between the two matching tasks associated with the same tape and target individuals is discouraging. Decision as to which of the two tasks is more valid in measuring

perspective-taking ability cannot readily be made from the present data; further validation of both tasks is needed. Nevertheless, the finding that self-reported perspective-taking was related to subjects' performance on the free-form matching task, but was unrelated to their performance on the adjective matching task, suggests that the former task may be more valid and more sensitive to perspective-taking ability.

Overall, the adjective matching task was relatively easy for the subjects, evidenced by the significantly higher accuracy scores on that task. Yet it was only on this easier task that self-esteem revealed a significant effect, high self-esteem subjects performing better on the task than lows. According to Davis' (1983) reasoning, perspective-taking and self-esteem are positively related because both should be associated with better social functioning. It may be that perspective-taking ability leads to smoother social relationships (cf. Franzoi & Davis, 1985), which, in turn, results in greater relationship satisfaction and more opportunity for positive feedback and thus higher self-esteem. On the other hand, theorists such as Rogers (1951, 1959) tend to see self-acceptance or self-esteem as a necessary, although not sufficient, precondition for empathic ability. Berkowitz (1972), in turn, has argued that responsiveness to others is inhibited by personal

concerns. Aside from the problem that no evidence of convergent validity was found for the adjective matching task, the present results suggest that high self-esteem may have a beneficial effect on perspective-taking in situations where it is relatively easy to identify the viewpoints of others, but lose its advantage as the task gets harder. Why this would happen is a question that needs to be addressed in further research.

The finding that matching the adjective lists was an easier task than matching the free-form self-descriptions with the correct targets was somewhat surprising. After all, free-form self-descriptions should allow for more personal style and depth than merely listing self-descriptive adjectives, and thus make discriminations among individuals easier. It is possible, however, that the stylistic differences allowed in the free-form self-descriptions may actually divert the readers' attention from the core content, whereas in the adjective lists the substance of the authors' self-views is more readily available and explicitly stated. In our daily lives, we rarely encounter situations where such explicit, to-the-point statements about personal views and self-conceptions are made; rather, we are usually presented with broader and more complex information. It appears that it is those more realistic situations where perspective-takers excel in their ability to identify the viewpoints and

experiences of others. One interesting finding in the present study was that, unlike the adjective matching task, the free-form self-description matching task was both related to self-reported perspective-taking and sensitive to differences among the target individuals. In their study, Bernstein and Davis (1982) found that high private self-conscious target individuals were more easily matched with their self-descriptions than were lows, which fits in nicely with the findings that private self-consciousness is associated with more articulated self-knowledge and more valid self-reports (e.g., Franzoi, 1983; Scheier, Buss & Buss, 1978), and that targets' public self-consciousness tended to have the opposite effect. The results of the present study, however, differ from the findings of Bernstein and Davis. In the present study, subjects were better able to match a free-form self-description with the correct target individual not only when the target individual was high in private and low in public self-consciousness, but also when the target was a low private/high public self-conscious person. Why was this the case? Although the present data do not lend themselves to any firm conclusions concerning this finding, one plausible explanation can be offered. The low private/high public self-conscious individual appearing on the videotape was the only one in her group who indicated in her free-form self-description that her

religious beliefs were very important to her; she was also the only one who read off "the Bible" as one of the items she had written down to take to a deserted island at the beginning of the videotape. It seems very likely that the observer subjects were consequently able to connect her to her self-description just by remembering that specific piece of information. This possibility indicates that the quality of the matching task associated with this method of operationalizing perspective-taking can be extremely sensitive to small but unique details that may come up in targets' self-descriptions and their choice of items in the group discussion task.

Recently, Swann (1984) made an interesting point concerning accuracy in person perception. He differentiated between global accuracy and circumscribed accuracy. Global accuracy refers to a perceiver's ability to predict a target's behavior in the presence of all individuals, across all situations or contexts, and over a long period of time. Circumscribed accuracy, on the other hand, refers to the perceiver's ability to predict the target's behavior in the presence of the perceiver, within a relatively limited number of contexts, and for shorter periods of time. Swann argued that researchers have generally attempted to measure global accuracy by moving the perceivers and the person perception process from the interpersonal context to a laboratory, and having the

perceivers identify targets' overall dispositions. According to Swann, this type of research ignores the interpersonal processes and the perceivers' and targets' goals in social interactions. He proposed that most often individuals are concerned with circumscribed accuracy, and, in fact, achieving global accuracy may be close to an impossible task as individuals tend to adjust their behaviors according to situational demands. Thus, for everyday perceivers, circumscribed accuracy is the type of accuracy that they desire and pursue.

Researchers' concern with only global accuracy may have led them to infer lower levels of accuracy than perceivers actually have, according to Swann (1984). Following the past research, the present study also focused on global accuracy only; more specifically, the present study concerned the ability to accurately match general self-descriptions of dispositions with the correct individuals. That form of accuracy is not argued to be unimportant, however. In fact, it is often the goal of professional perceivers such as clinicians, as Swann pointed out. However, it may be important to also look at circumscribed accuracy, as it is usually the primary and salient concern in everyday interactions. Any further research on the effects of private self-consciousness and self-esteem on perspective-taking should consider the possibility that while individual differences in those



dispositions may not be strongly related to forms of global accuracy, studying their effects on circumscribed accuracy may prove to be a more fruitful approach.

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Table 1

Subjects' Mean Accuracy Scores for Tapes A and B  
According to the Order of Presentation (Pretest)

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		<u>Tape</u>	
		A	B
<hr/>			
<u>Order</u>			
A First	<u>M</u>	.89	2.11
	<u>SD</u>	.83	1.45
	<u>n</u>	28	28
B First	<u>M</u>	1.68	1.61
	<u>SD</u>	1.54	1.24
	<u>n</u>	38	38

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Note. Higher numbers indicate higher matching accuracy.  
 Each subject performed both matching tasks (Tape A  
 and Tape B).



Table 2

Mean Accuracy Scores for High and Low Private Self-Conscious Subjects with High or Low Self-Esteem

		<u>Matching Task</u>						
		Free-Form Self-Descriptions			Adjective Lists			
		<u>Self-Esteem</u>						
		Low	High	Total	Low	High	Total	
<u>Private</u>	Low	<u>M</u>	1.67	1.55	1.59	2.50	3.95	3.41
		<u>SD</u>	1.37	1.23	1.27	1.57	1.23	1.52
		<u>n</u>	12	20	32	12	20	32
<u>Self-Conscious-</u>								
	High	<u>M</u>	1.86	2.13	2.00	2.43	3.07	2.76
		<u>SD</u>	1.46	1.30	1.36	1.45	1.67	1.57
		<u>n</u>	14	15	29	14	15	29
<u>ness</u>	Total	<u>M</u>	1.77	1.80		2.46	3.57	
		<u>SD</u>	1.39	1.28		1.48	1.48	
		<u>n</u>	26	35		26	35	

Note. Each subject performed both matching tasks.

Table 3

Mean Self-Reported Perspective-Taking Scores for High and Low Private Self-Conscious Subjects with High or Low Self-Esteem

		<u>Self-Esteem</u>			
		Low	High		
<u>Private</u> <u>Self-</u> <u>Conscious-</u> <u>ness</u>	Low	<u>M</u>	17.17	18.80	18.19
		<u>SD</u>	2.59	3.04	2.95
		<u>n</u>	12	20	32
	High	<u>M</u>	19.14	19.67	19.41
		<u>SD</u>	3.39	4.08	3.71
		<u>n</u>	14	15	29
		<u>M</u>	18.23	19.17	
		<u>SD</u>	3.15	3.49	
		<u>n</u>	26	35	

Note. The higher the score, the higher the self-reported perspective-taking tendency.

Table 4

Subjects' Mean Target-Specific Accuracy Scores on the  
Free-Form and the Adjective Matching Tasks

	<u>Matching Task</u>		
		Free-Form	Adjective Lists
		Self-Descriptions	
<u>Target</u>			
High Private/	<u>M</u>	.262	.656
High Public	<u>SD</u>	.444	.479
High Private/	<u>M</u>	.410	.640
Low Public	<u>SD</u>	.496	.484
Low Private/	<u>M</u>	.557	.656
High Public	<u>SD</u>	.501	.479
Low Private/	<u>M</u>	.295	.623
Low Public	<u>SD</u>	.460	.489
Median Private/	<u>M</u>	.262	.525
Median Public	<u>SD</u>	.444	.504

Note. All 61 subjects performed both matching tasks and contribute to all these means. A score of 0 signifies an inaccurate match and a score of 1 an accurate match.

## APPENDIX

## The Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975)

Below are twenty-three statements that may or may not be characteristic of the way you see yourself as a person. Read each one carefully and rate whether the statement is characteristic or uncharacteristic of you using the rating scale below. Place the number of your answer on the appropriate line.

Extremely uncharacteristic of me = 0  
 Generally uncharacteristic of me = 1  
 Equally characteristic and  
 uncharacteristic of me = 2  
 Generally characteristic of me = 3  
 Extremely characteristic of me = 4

- \_\_\_\_\_ 1. I'm always trying to figure myself out.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 2. I'm concerned about my style of doing things.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 3. Generally, I'm not very aware of myself.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 4. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 5. I reflect about myself a lot.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 6. I'm concerned about the way I present myself.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 7. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 8. I have trouble working when someone is watching me.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 9. I never scrutinize myself.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 10. I get embarrassed very easily.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 11. I'm self-conscious about the way I look.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 12. I don't find it hard to talk to strangers.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 13. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 14. I usually worry about making a good impression.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 15. I'm constantly examining my motives.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 16. I feel anxious when I speak in front of a group.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 17. One of the last things I do before leaving my house is look in the mirror.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 18. I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 19. I'm concerned about what other people think of me.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 20. I'm alert to changes in my mood.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 21. I'm usually aware of my appearance.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 22. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem.
- \_\_\_\_\_ 23. Large groups make me nervous.

The Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)

Please read each of the following statements carefully, and indicate how much you agree with each by using the following scale:

- 1 = Strongly Agree
- 2 = Agree
- 3 = Disagree
- 4 = Strongly disagree

\_\_\_\_\_ I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others.

\_\_\_\_\_ All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.

\_\_\_\_\_ I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

\_\_\_\_\_ I am able to do things as well as most other people.

\_\_\_\_\_ I feel I do not have much to be proud of.

\_\_\_\_\_ I take a positive attitude towards myself.

\_\_\_\_\_ On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.

\_\_\_\_\_ I wish I could have more respect for myself.

\_\_\_\_\_ I certainly feel useless at times.

\_\_\_\_\_ At times I think I am no good at all.

The Perspective-Taking Subscale (Davis, 1980)

Interpersonal Reactivity Index

The following statements inquire about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate number on the scale at the top of this page; 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4. When you have decided on your answer, fill in the number next to the item number. Read each item carefully before responding, and try to answer as honestly and accurately as you can.

Answer scale:

- | 0                               | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4                            |
|---------------------------------|---|---|---|------------------------------|
| Does NOT<br>describe<br>me well |   |   |   | Describes<br>me VERY<br>well |
- 
- \_\_\_ 1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.
- \_\_\_ 2. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision.
- \_\_\_ 3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective.
- \_\_\_ 4. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's arguments.
- \_\_\_ 5. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.
- \_\_\_ 6. When I'm upset at someone, I ususally try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.
- \_\_\_ 7. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

Free-Form Self-Description Questionnaire for Tape A

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Below are the self-descriptions of the individuals appearing on the tape. Please try to match each of them to the correct individual by placing the number assigned to the description on the line (above) corresponding to the seating position of that person.

1. I am definitely not shy around people, but am outgoing in almost all aspects of my life. I am very competitive and set high standards for myself. I do not worry about what other people, outside my family, think about me and I don't think I'm very self-conscious. However, in close personal relationships, like with my family and boyfriend, I am very anxious to please and thus often have to re-evaluate my goals. I am very optimistic and rebound from problems and defeats rather well. I like being challenged mentally and physically (I am an athlete). I am very organized and self-disciplined.

2. I am a self-confident person with high self-esteem. I find that when I am a part of a group project or organization, I assume the leadership positions and strive to be the best at what I do.

I also enjoy friendly competition. I enjoy seeing others reach their highest level of potential. I feel friendly competition is the means to help motivate each other to do greater accomplishments.

Although I am goal-oriented, I find myself drawn to people and their problems. I am a good listener and take time to evaluate my own opinions and comments before I help counsel others.

I can be very introspective -- striving always to better myself -- while at the same time I feel I have an outgoing personality and love to do spontaneous things with friends.

3. I feel I'm basically easy to get along with. I don't have a bad temper and am pretty easygoing about things. At first, I'm shy unless I know people; and I am very accepting of other people. I feel I am very tolerant and patient. I let few things bother me. I try to make the best of everything -- I guess I'm basically optimistic. I can get very emotional at times. I don't see myself as selfish or aggressive in my behavior.

4. I am a sincere and honest person, yet I think I act differently in different situations. With my close friends, or people younger than me, I am funny (the clown), outgoing, and assertive. I tend, in larger groups of people that I don't know, to be quieter and I may even be less than assertive. I could be characterized then as shy. Not withdrawn -- I can and like to talk to strangers and will be funny -- but I don't shine and present the definite personality that I do with close friends.

I like people, and would never consciously be mean to someone else. Yet if I perceive them to be mean people -- I can't stand that, and that would make me dislike them. I don't hate anyone really (well, maybe some people) but I do have definite likes, loves, and dislikes. I'm not really a wishy-washy about things.

5. Basically I view myself as somewhat of a "Free-spirit." I have many interests in many different areas and enjoy diversity in my life. One of the most important values which I try to incorporate into every aspect of my life is integrity. I firmly believe that everything I, or anyone for that matter, does should reflect that person's individuality and responsibility for action.

I believe I am viewed by others as much more extreme than I really am. I realize that at times I project this image (of an extremist) purposefully. I love being alive and thinking about the world. I tend to be rather introspective. I am loyal and will fight for what I believe.

Do you personally know any of the people appearing on the tape? \_\_\_\_\_

If so, which one(s)? \_\_\_\_\_



Free-Form Self-Description Questionnaire for Tape B

Below are the self-descriptions of the individuals appearing on the tape. Please try to match each of them to the correct individual by placing the number assigned to the description on the line (above) corresponding to the seating position of that person.

1. Someone once described me as a nervous perfectionist, which probably sums it all up! I am very self-conscious of how others view me -- the picture of myself that I present to others. My ideals and values are very important to me for this reason. The beliefs I hold, especially my religious beliefs, don't waver very easily. As far as the perfectionist side, it results in a lot of internal drive, but a lot of external nervousness. When I don't do something to perfection (or to my best standards), I am disappointed in myself.

I consider myself responsible and dependable, although sometimes too overly conscious of this fact (making me somewhat of a pest!). Believe it or not, I am also extremely shy around people I don't know. Large crowds bother me! But when I do know people well, the shyness is not that apparent. Then I am almost overly sensitive and my emotions sometimes (usually) rule. The people I am close to are very important to me.

2. I see myself as a caring person -- caring about other people, and caring about things I do, sometimes to the point of nervousness and worry. I enjoy doing things for others and giving. At the same time, I am a very introspective person, and I value my own "space" a lot. I am mostly relaxed when I am alone. I am usually enthusiastic and full of energy, constantly looking for new things to do. I see myself as an intense person -- I am either involved in constant activity or deep, purposeful thinking. I get restless during "in between" situations, such as watching TV for a long time.

3. I see myself as someone who cares a lot about other people. I enjoy working with them and helping them. I try to do what I feel is right and not what others think I should do. My basic attitude towards life is fairly laid back and relaxed. At times I procrastinate but I get everything done in the long run. When there is something I believe in or that I enjoy doing I work really hard at it.

4. I am generally rather introverted in non-purposeful gatherings or in situations in which I have nothing to offer the group (i.e., I am quiet when I don't know about the topic of discussion). However, I am a good listener, organized, and have adequate leadership skills. I am generally more comfortable conversing with members of the opposite sex, and prefer small gatherings to larger parties.

I am creative and consider my best "virtue" my flexibility. I take initiative and follow through in doing new activities (i.e., spelunking, traveling, whatever). It irritates me when a person seems enthusiastic about something and then "backs out." In general, I am very open about my feelings.

5. I am a fairly independent person that is very interested in the welfare of others. I like for people around me to be happy. However, I can be very impatient at times which can be detrimental in my relationships with others. I love to work with kids because they are so open and honest about what they think. There is no need to second guess how they are feeling.

I am a person that unfortunately tends to let things get to me, so handling stress better is something I am working on. Self-improvement is a goal I think all people have, and I would say I am very goal-oriented. Success, though, is being happy with yourself and for me that includes good relationships with others, without sacrificing my independence.

Do you personally know any of the people appearing on the tape? \_\_\_\_\_

If so, which one(s)? \_\_\_\_\_

Self-Descriptive Adjective List Questionnaire for Tape B

Each person appearing on the videotape was asked to write down five to ten adjectives that she thought were characteristic of her. Those adjectives are listed below. Please read each list carefully, and decide who it belongs to. The lists are in a random order; your task is to match each list with the correct individual by placing the number assigned to the list on the line (above) corresponding to the seating position of the person you think it belongs to.

- |  |   |   |
|--|---|---|
| 1. Cooperative<br>Easygoing<br>Hard-working<br>Enthusiastic<br>Happy<br>Energetic<br>Sensitive | 2. Perfectionist<br>Creative<br>Shy<br>Conservative<br>Dependable<br>Worrisome<br>Nervous | 3. Enthusiastic<br>Creative<br>Independent<br>Adventurousome<br>Caring<br>Intense |
| 4. Practical<br>Creative<br>Well-disciplined<br>Compassionate<br>Spontaneous                   | 5. Impulsive<br>Flexible<br>Shy<br>Person-oriented<br>Hard-working<br>Diverse             |   |



## VITA

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The author was born on July 3, 1962, in Lahti, Finland. Majoring in psychology, she received her B.A. with Honors from Denison University in 1983. She entered the Master's program in Psychology at the College of William and Mary in August, 1983. The author is presently working towards a doctoral degree in Social/Personality/Organizational Psychology at the State University of New York at Buffalo.