

1970

## North Korea and Sino-Soviet Competition

William A. Hazleton

*College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences*

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd>



Part of the [Asian Studies Commons](#), and the [International Relations Commons](#)

---

### Recommended Citation

Hazleton, William A., "North Korea and Sino-Soviet Competition" (1970). *Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects*. Paper 1539624695.

<https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-a1sj-gf97>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [scholarworks@wm.edu](mailto:scholarworks@wm.edu).

NORTH KOREA AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION

---

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government  
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

---

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

---


By

William A. Hazleton


1970


APPROVAL SHEET


This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of  
the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Arts

  
Author

Approved, March 1970

  
Chonghan Kim, Ph.D.

  
James M. Roherty, Ph.D.

  
Donald J. Baxter, M.A.

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Chonghan Kim, under whose supervision this thesis was written, for his criticism, suggestions, and encouragement throughout this project. The author is also indebted to Professor James Roherty and Professor Donald Baxter for their careful reading and criticism of the manuscript. Final recognition is also expressed here to my father, Edward Hazleton, for his interest and help in my academic endeavors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
APPROVAL SHEET. . . . .	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . .	iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . .	iv
ABSTRACT. . . . .	v
INTRODUCTION. . . . .	2
CHAPTER I. THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1945-1948. . . . .	8
CHAPTER II. FROM SATELLITE TO INDEPENDENT STATE, 1948-1955. . . . .	48
CHAPTER III. THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS AND THE PERIOD OF EXPERIMENTATION, 1956-1961 . . . . .	86
CHAPTER IV. P'YONGYANG-PEKING AXIS, 1962-1965 . . . . .	115
CHAPTER V. RECONCILIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1965-. . . . .	141
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION. . . . .	177
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .	187
VITA. . . . .	197

## ABSTRACT

The object of this study is to determine North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute through an historical investigation of the effects of competition between Moscow and Peking on the formulation of North Korean foreign policy.

Four basic propositions are set forth as the major determinants of North Korean foreign policy. They are the following: (1) the pursuit of national interests, (2) the achievement of Korean reunification, (3) a pragmatic approach to external assistance, and (4) the regime's effort to construct a modern self-image. Evidence is presented in the form of a descriptive narrative of North Korean foreign policy-making from which logical deductions can be derived to support the above propositions.

It is suggested that the pursuit of national interests, a universal phenomenon in the nation-state system, has influenced the behavior of Communist satellites, specifically North Korea.

It is suggested that North Korea's major policy goal is to bring the entire peninsula under its direct control through constructing a self-image of a rapidly modernizing state.

It is suggested that the P'yongyang regime does not discriminate between the means available for achieving the above objective and relies upon both Moscow and Peking to obtain the best of what each has to offer in the way of military and economic assistance.

Furthermore, it is suggested that North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet conflict has been determined largely by the nature of its efforts to build a self-image.

The results suggest that competition between Moscow and Peking has served to enhance P'yongyang's paramount foreign policy goal of reunification and permitted the North Korean regime to maintain a relatively "independent" position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

2

3

NORTH KOREA AND SINO-SOVIET COMPETITION

## INTRODUCTION

Throughout modern history, Korea has occupied the unenviable position of being a strategic objective coveted by its larger, and often more aggressive Asian neighbors. Due primarily to its advantageous geographic location, control of the Korean peninsula has been contested in no less than four major wars in the last three quarters of a century. The traditional rivals in this struggle for predominance over the peninsula have been Japan, Russia, and China. For each nation Korea has represented a different prize: a bridge to the mainland of Asia to Japan, an access to warm water ports for Russia, and a centuries-old and erstwhile vassal to China. After fighting two wars -- the Sino-Japanese War of 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, Japan successfully eliminated its two main competitors, thus securing Korea as a protectorate in 1905. By 1910, when Korea was fully annexed into the Japanese Empire, the international political order Korea had known under the Yi dynasty had been completely eradicated by years of alien rule and the contending forces of foreign nations.

After thirty-five years of Japanese rule, Korea was liberated by the victorious Allied troops in the final days



of the second World War. At first, Korean leaders welcomed the Allied occupation, anticipating their country's prompt emancipation from foreign subjugation in accordance with the Allied proclamations issued at Cairo (1943) and Potsdam (1945).<sup>1</sup> But the wartime declarations proved ambiguous and meaningless, and soon the Koreans realized that the initial period of Allied occupation would mean the continued foreign domination of their homeland. The occupation arrangements, concluded by the Allied Powers in 1945, served to set the stage for renewed international rivalry over the Korean peninsula. Although the peninsula was originally severed at the thirty-eighth parallel to facilitate American and Soviet action against expected Japanese resistance, the unforeseen post-war breakdown of Soviet-American cooperation and the ensuing Cold War hardened the temporary line of demarcation into a permanent armed frontier separating the two spheres of influence.<sup>2</sup>

North and south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the Soviet Union and the United States each established a "Korean" regime that reflected Soviet and American ideological

---

<sup>1</sup>U.S., Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification, Far Eastern Series 101, Pubn. 7084 (October, 1960), p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>Shannon McCune, "The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea," World Politics, I (October, 1948), 223-32.

positions: the Soviet Union created the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (D.P.R.K.) in the north, while the United States established the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) in the south. Even though the national boundaries and ideologies of the two Koreas have remained virtually unaltered since their inception, the international positions of North and South Korea have not consistently reflected those of the United States and Russia. Rather, the two regimes have exercised increasing independence in formulating their respective foreign policies.

Of the two Korean regimes North Korea, or the D.P.R.K., has displayed without a doubt a greater degree of independence, or at least non-conformity, with respect to the policies of its mentor, the Soviet Union. Needless to say, the independent posture of North Korea has been greatly enhanced by the internal rupture of the Communist bloc, and the resulting Sino-Soviet competition to recruit peripheral Communist states into their respective camps.

Historically, North Korea's course of action has been determined by its national interests, which have necessitated the regime's somewhat ambivalent position with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute. North Korea is not firmly committed to either side and remains a point of contention for its two traditional Asian rivals. The prize, however is no longer

possession of a strategic position, now outmoded by the advanced technology of weapon systems, but rather an ideological ally in the intra-bloc Communist struggle.

The subject of this thesis will be an examination of the effects of Sino-Soviet competition on North Korea, and the emergence of that regime's nationalistic position within the Communist world. Evidence will be presented to support the following propositions:

1. The pursuit of national interest, a universal phenomenon in the nation-state system, has influenced the behavior of Communist satellites, including North Korea, given the condition that prevails in the polycentric Communist world today.

2. North Korea's paramount goal is the reunification of its divided peninsula by means of constructing a self-image of a rapidly modernizing state.

3. The Communist regime in the North does not discriminate between the resources available for achieving its objectives and relies on both Peking and Moscow to obtain the best that the two Communist giants have to offer.

4. And finally, North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet conflict is largely determined by the nature of North Korean efforts to build a self-image.

These propositions are interrelated and interacting. In analyzing North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute with reference to the above propositions, this study also seeks to answer the following questions: What are the tactics and strategies that North Korea has employed in attempting to obtain her goal of unification? To what extent do North Korean policies reflect the Stalinist posture of Premier Kim Il-sung? And lastly, what motivated the North Koreans to seize the U.S.S. PUEBLO, and what were they attempting to gain in the Pueblo Affair?

The traditional approach of historical analysis will be employed in this study. Essentially, the manuscript will be a descriptive narrative of North Korea's policy-making from which logical deductions are derived concerning the various influencing factors that determine the regime's position in the struggle between Moscow and Peking.

Finally, a brief comment on the sources and materials utilized in this project. Although the author admits that a working knowledge of the Korean language would have expanded the number of primary resources available, he feels that his lack of facility with the language did not seriously hamper his investigation, since many excellent works in this field are in English. By drawing on the collections of the Swem Library at the College of William and Mary,

Alderman Library at the University of Virginia, and the Library of Congress in Washington, D. C., many primary and secondary sources were found in journals, magazines, newspapers, and government publications.

Most of the sources consulted were authored by South Koreans now residing permanently in the United States and teaching at our universities. On the whole, their scholarship, as exhibited in American periodicals, is quite objective and demonstrates a penetrating insight of North Korean politics. Caution must be exercised, however, in analyzing English language materials in Korean publications; for they are often times biased, and the facts are frequently unreliable. In the United States, the Korean War, and more recently the Pueblo Affair, have focused greater attention on Korean politics, which has been reflected in the mass of literature that has been forthcoming after these events. Therefore, the sources presently available in English proved adequate for a study of this scope, but they, of course, could not compensate entirely for the lack of primary English language sources or for the unavailability of accurate information from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

## CHAPTER I

### THE FORMATIVE YEARS, 1945-1948

On August 8, 1945, the Soviet Union formally declared war on the Japanese Empire, and two days later dispatched troops across the Korean frontier. Since only scattered resistance was encountered from the retreating Japanese forces, the Red Army readily secured its area of responsibility, northern Korea. In accordance with General Order Number 1, the Soviets pushed down the peninsula to the Allies' predesignated rendezvous point in sixteen days, arriving at the thirty-eighth parallel a full month ahead of the Americans.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, the Soviet Union had failed to formulate any specific plans for the future "colonization" of Korea at the time of the invasion. In fact, the Russian record during the first months of occupation, which will be more fully discussed later, suggested that the Kremlin was grossly ignorant of conditions existing inside Korea.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>For the background on General Order Number 1, see U.S., Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup>For evidence supporting this argument, see Dae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 326.

Indeed, this need not have been the case for the Soviet Far East contained a sizeable Korean population.<sup>3</sup> Yet, this potential source of intelligence remained unused because "Soviet authorities apparently did not encourage the activities of Korean revolutionary organizations on Soviet territory."<sup>4</sup> Nor did the Russians draw on their pre-1945 experiences in dealing with Asian minorities and Outer Mongolia to construct a blueprint for a Korean satellite. Nevertheless, the Soviets did have one overriding priority for the post-war reconstruction of Korea: insuring the establishment of a "friendly" government on Russia's eastern frontier.

In attempting to fulfill this imperialistic ambition of Korean subservience, the U.S.S.R. formulated its Korean policy around the following two objectives: First, a mechanism had to be instituted through which the complete responsiveness of the Korean government to the dictates and interests of the Soviet Union would be insured; and second, the same

---

<sup>3</sup>There were an estimated 300,000 Koreans inside the Soviet Union in the pre-war period. See Walter Kolarz, The Peoples of the Soviet Far East (New York: Praeger, 1954).

<sup>4</sup>Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 19-20.

government had to be capable of perpetuating itself in power and exploiting any potentialities for growth.<sup>5</sup>

More specifically, the Kremlin formulated its policy with certain basic aims in mind, namely (1) the creation of a strong indigenous regime, (2) the suitability of the Soviet political system -- specifically the concentration of authority and employment of coercion -- as a model for the indigenous regime, (3) the reservation of internal political power in the hands of Soviet officials or trusted Koreans, and (4) the necessity of "reform" programs and a "democratic" popular facade to procure mass support for the regime and preserve the fiction of an independent state.<sup>6</sup> In the end, the Soviet course of action proved to be highly successful. As Ro Chung-hyun stated, "In a little more than three years after August 1945, the Soviet Union achieved in north Korea something never within sight of the Japanese after forty years of colonial control: the Soviet Union was able to withdraw its occupation army, set up an apparently independent regime, and still exercise firm control over north Korea."<sup>7</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover, Far Eastern Series 103, Pubn. 7118 (January, 1961), p. 5.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>7</sup>Chung-hyun Ro, "Economic Growth and Manpower Administration in North Korea," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), p. 151.



Undoubtedly, certain fortuitous circumstances greatly enhanced the "sovietization" of war-torn northern Korea. Not only was Korea contiguous to the Soviet Union<sup>8</sup> and under Soviet military occupation, but its relatively small size, shattered political organizations, and colonial history created a favorable climate for Russian imperialism. Perhaps the complete absence of political parties was the most crucial factor facilitating a Soviet takeover. Rudolph wrote:

The case in Korea is unique in that, having been governed by the Japanese for forty years, the Koreans had no government or political parties of their own at the end of the war. Consequently, the Communists were spared the necessity of smashing an existing political structure.<sup>9</sup>

Overall, Korea's colonial experience witnessed the annihilation of traditional folkways and the destruction of internal order. Japanese colonialism was best described by Gregory Henderson, who said "Chōsen [Korea] was clasped in a vice-like grip by the Japanese military with ubiquitous security pre-occupations: the instruments of repression weighed far more heavily than in colonial India, Africa, and Southeast Asia."<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>8</sup>The D.P.R.K. and the U.S.S.R. share an 11 mile common frontier.

<sup>9</sup>Philip Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959), p. 17.

<sup>10</sup>Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 72.

In addition, two external conditions proved to be highly favorable to the "sovietization" process. The first was the previously mentioned reservoir of Koreans residing in the eastern provinces of the U.S.S.R. Following the liberation, many of these Koreans returned to their homeland on the heels of the Soviet soldiers. Because of their loyalty to the Soviet Union -- a major criterion for Korean officials, they were frequently selected to execute certain administrative and political functions in the occupation government. Their presence in post-war Korea enabled the Russians to implement a system of indirect rule. The second was the chaotic, internal conditions gripping the Soviet Union's major Asian rival, China, which eliminated China as a potential competitor after the war. Uoong-tack Kim recalled that China had periodically tried to reclaim its traditional position of influence over the peninsula, and both the Nationalists and Communist Chinese considered Korea a portion of their "lost territories."<sup>11</sup> For instance, as early as 1936, Mao Tse-tung intimated a sphere of Chinese influence extended over Korea.<sup>12</sup> Barring the internal strife

---

<sup>11</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1967), pp. 29-30.

<sup>12</sup>Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 96.

which enveloped his country at the war's close, Chiang Kai-sek probably would have attempted to reassert China's old ties with the Korean peninsula.

Thus, when the Russians entered Korea in late August 1945, they met conditions that lent themselves perfectly to the creation of a satellite regime. These advantages were further enhanced by the lack of foreign competition and the institution of an ostensibly autonomous political apparatus. The latter consisted solely of Korean nationals, since the Soviets were content to sit on the sidelines and call the plays.<sup>13</sup> Such an indirect form of rule never could have been implemented without the arrival of the Soviet-Koreans.

These Soviet-Koreans had not participated as a group in any of the previous Korean independence movements and had lost touch with their homeland.<sup>14</sup> Most of them were second-generation descendants of Korean revolutionaries, who had sought refuge in the Soviet provinces of Uzbekistan

---

<sup>13</sup>Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea: A Study in Communist Rhetoric and Behavior (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 2.

<sup>14</sup>For a background of Soviet-Korean activities in the pre-1945 period, see U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 13.

and Kazakhstan from Japanese persecution in the first quarter of the twentieth century. For the most part, they were long-time residents of the U.S.S.R., students in leading Soviet schools, members of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU), and participants in local government in their Soviet communities.<sup>15</sup> Naturally, Soviet administrators would rely heavily on such individuals to fill the newly created positions of authority in their zone of occupation. "The basic Russian strategy," according to Paige, "was to place native Koreans -- some rather inept, but all undoubtedly responsive to Communist direction -- in positions of the highest formal authority, and to place Soviet-Koreans or Russian advisers in locations of de facto power."<sup>16</sup> Ho Kai, for example, a Korean and former member of the Central Committee of a Soviet Central Asian Republic became the architect of the Communist Party in North Korea and "perhaps the most powerful official in the regime."<sup>17</sup> Although they remained essentially in the background, the Soviet-Koreans formed an

---

<sup>15</sup>For the personal backgrounds of the Soviet-Koreans, see Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 29.

<sup>17</sup>Cohng-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, "The Russian Faction in North Korea," Asian Survey, VIII (April, 1968), 275-76; and U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 3.

important, final link in the Soviet chain of command, which extended down from the Kremlin to the Korean community.<sup>18</sup>

Wisely, the Soviets obscured the presence of the Soviet-Koreans. As a group, they were resented because they retained their Soviet citizenship and CPSU membership, therefore, enjoying dual Soviet-Korean citizenship and party membership. This status was extremely valuable in that the Soviet-Koreans could avail themselves of the special privileges reserved for the occupation personnel, such as access to stores distributing scarce goods. Generally, it was not so much their favored status that provoked resentment as it was the Soviet-Koreans' "arrogant air of cultural superiority."<sup>19</sup>

Accompanying the Soviet-Korean entry into Korea were about three hundred Korean partisans. These guerrilla fighters had conducted anti-Japanese activities from bases in south eastern Manchuria and apparently had spent the final war years in the Soviet Union.<sup>20</sup> This group is frequently called the "Kapsan faction"; the name being derived from

---

<sup>18</sup>For the strongest case maintaining that the Soviet-Koreans dominated the political scene, see U.S., Department of State, North Korea; however, this argument is often disputed, see Sae-Sook Suh, The Korean Communist Movement.

<sup>19</sup>Glenn D. Paige and Dong Ju Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 23.

<sup>20</sup>Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 317.

their 1937 victory over the Japanese at the battle of Poch'onbo near the Korean town of Kapsan. More recently, authors have preferred the label "partisan group" because in the first years of the occupation this faction was not sharply differentiated from the Soviet-Korean faction.<sup>21</sup>

The partisan group centered around its ranking officer, Kim Il-sung -- a thirty-three year old major in the Red Army.<sup>22</sup>

The Soviet-Koreans and Kim Il-sung's forces were not the only exiles to return in the first post-liberation months. In fact, numerically, the largest group came from the Communist controlled areas of northern China.<sup>23</sup> Collectively known as Yen-an Koreans, this group had both a military and political background of Korean independence movements. Organized militarily as the Korean Volunteer Corps, the Yen-an faction first received military training

---

<sup>21</sup>For Dae-Sook Suh's persuasive argument that the term "Kapsan faction" is a misnomer, see Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 33.

<sup>22</sup>Although most accounts describe Kim Il-sung as a Soviet officer, Dae-Sook Suh states, "There is no confirmation . . . of his relations with the Russians or the Russian Army in Russia during 1941-45. . . . It is primarily because of the undue favor Kim won after the liberation of Korea that the rumor of his service in the Russian Army is more convincing." Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 292-93.

<sup>23</sup>For the background of the Yen-an Communist faction, see Chong-sik Lee, "Korean Communists and Yen-an," China Quarterly, No. 9 (1962), pp. 182-92.

from the Nationalist Chinese Army but its later development was under the aegis of the Chinese Communists. By the time of the Japanese capitulation, the corps was a well-trained and battle-tested fighting force boasting of three to four hundred veteran officers.<sup>24</sup> In the political sphere, the Yen-an Koreans organized the Korean Independence Alliance under the guidance of Kim Tu-bong in 1942.<sup>25</sup> With such a well-structured organization, the Yen-an group posed a powerful threat to Soviet-Korean domination in Korean politics.

Worried that the Chinese-trained Koreans would upset their post-war plans, Soviet occupation forces vigorously opposed Yen-an advances. An excellent example of Soviet suspicion was the reception the Yen-an faction received when it first arrived at the Korean border.

At first they were refused permission to enter North Korea, and 4,000 armed Yen-an Koreans were halted at the Yalu River bridges in late 1945. After considerable bickering, the Soviet command in P'yongyang at length cabled permission for them to enter the border city of Sinuiju, where

---

<sup>24</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 9.

<sup>25</sup>For the details of the Korean Independence Alliance's organization, see Chong-sik Lee, Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1966), p. 221.

they were put up for the night in a high-school building -- only to be surrounded and disarmed before morning by the local "self-defense" forces.<sup>26</sup>

Throughout 1945, members of the Korean Volunteer Corp were refused entry into the Soviet occupation zone; however, a few, like commanding General Mu Chong, managed to cross the border as a private citizen.<sup>27</sup> Regardless of Soviet attempts to emasculate the Yenan faction, this group survived to challenge the Soviet-Koreans monopolistic control.

An indigenous Communist movement had managed to outlive the period of Japanese colonialism, but it suffered from internal divisions and repeated attempts at suppression.<sup>28</sup> The movement had a relatively long history in Korea. According to Henderson,

Koreans were among the first people in Asia to come into contact with Communism, and its spread among them was, initially, quite rapid. Koreans . . . had spilled across the north eastern border into the Maritime Provinces in large numbers from the time of the Taewon'gun on. . . Communism established rapport with many such Koreans, not only because of its

---

<sup>26</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 33.

<sup>27</sup>Jae-souk Sohn, "Factionalism and Party Control of the Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana Quarterly, IX (Autumn, 1967), 20.

<sup>28</sup>For a general history of the Korean Communist movement from its birth to 1945, see Robert A. Scalapino and Chong-sik Lee, "Origins of the Korean Communist Movement," Journal of Asian Studies, XX (November, 1960), 149-167.



summons to revolution and anti-colonialism, but because of Korean political and military identity of interest with the attempt of the new Bolshevick state to dislodge Japan from its post-World War I position in the Maritime Provinces.<sup>29</sup>

In the Maritime Provinces, the Irkutsk Communist party had formed a Korean section as early as January 1918, and six months later a Korean Socialist party was organized at Khabarovsk.<sup>30</sup>

On the peninsula, a Korean Communist party enjoyed an active existence from 1925 to 1928. Plagued by dissent and factionalism, internal strife paralyzed the movement to such an extent that the Comintern disbanded the party for "incessant factionalism" in December 1928.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, a portion of the cells endured the repressive colonial environment, which actually may have nourished them by forging their membership closer together as a means of self-defense. Paige concluded that "the pre-1945 Communist movement seemed to have been characterized by the clandestine activities of tiny Communist factions."<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup>Henderson, Korea, p. 312.

<sup>30</sup>See Ibid.

<sup>31</sup>David Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 52.

<sup>32</sup>Glenn D. Paige, "Korea," in Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, ed. by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton (Princeton; N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 218.

Aside from the fact that their party apparatus was badly diffused after the war, the domestic Communist faction was further handicapped by the absence of its major leaders. Expecting the imminent reunification of their country, most Communist leaders had flocked to Seoul in the American occupation zone and made it the center of party activity. Only a few veteran Communists of any note, such as O Ki-sop and Hyon Chun-hyok, retained their roots in the north.<sup>33</sup>

The shortage of prominent domestic Communists necessitated the recruitment of local, obscure party members for positions in the Soviet controlled zone. By concentrating in the south, the domestic Communist faction created a void which enabled the foreign Communist factions to gain power. As Suh remarked:

Had the Communists consolidated their forces in the North under the Russians, as the Nationalists did in the South under the Americans . . . it would then have been extremely difficult, if not totally impossible, for Kim Il-sung and his revolutionaries to advance to positions of such prominence in so short a period of time.<sup>34</sup>

Only after the old Communists awoke to the permanence of their homeland's division and experienced complete failure

---

<sup>33</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 4.

<sup>34</sup>Suh, The Korean Communists Movement, p. 301.

in the south did they begin to seek the protection of the Soviet fold. However, they arrived much too late to secure a foothold in the north Korean regime. Beaten in all their attempts to reach the pinnacle of authority, the domestic Communists withdrew from the main political arena and deluded themselves with thoughts of future unification and their ultimate domination. In fact, the supposedly temporary developments in the north led many old Communists to ignore and belittle those in power.<sup>35</sup> Very quickly, the domestic Communists would suffer the tragic consequences of their mistaken judgment and critical attitude.

Still, the domestic Communists, who had remained in the north, proved to be no more successful than their brothers in the south. Reaching the ideologically correct conclusion that Korea was still undergoing the stages of a bourgeois revolution as described by Marx, the local Communists completely ignored the realities inherent in the Soviet occupation. Therefore, instead of forming the vanguard of the revolution the old Communists took a back seat and favored Nationalist initiatives. The entire program of the local Communist leader, Hyon Chun-hyok, obscured the importance of Communism and became too closely identified

---

<sup>35</sup>Ibid, p. 312.

with the ideals of Korean nationalism.<sup>36</sup> Obviously, Hyon's thoughts and actions did not endear him to the Soviet officialdom. On September 28, 1945, he was shot in broad daylight in front of P'yongyang City Hall after emerging from a conference with the Soviet commandant. His assassin was never apprehended.<sup>37</sup>

It is evident, then, that the old Communists committed two flagrant errors which caused their influence to be supplanted by the foreign factions. First, an overwhelming majority abandoned their strongest potential power base in pursuit of political gain in the south. Second, the remnants of the party in the north totally misjudged the political situation by adopting the Nationalists' cause. Because of its anti-foreign bias, nationalism posed a threat to Soviet hegemony and forced them to exclude the domestic Communist faction from the post-liberation leadership. Indeed, a tragic comedy of errors on the part of the old Communists resulted in the ascendancy of the Soviet-Korean and Yen-an factions.

In discussing the various political factions existing

---

<sup>36</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 6.

<sup>37</sup>For details of the assassination, see ibid.

in post-liberation Korea, the non-Communist groups cannot be omitted for they occupied the center of the political stage in the period immediately following the Japanese surrender. The nationalists composed the most important faction, of which the Korean Democratic Party, created in November 1945, formed the nucleus. Cho Man-sik, the party's chief architect, skillfully joined the nationalists, Christian leaders, and community leaders from the various provinces into this coalition party.<sup>38</sup>

Frequently in open conflict with Soviet policies, such as grain and land reform programs, the Democratic Party and its leaders did not gain the favor of the Soviet officials, and as a result, its initial prominence was short-lived.<sup>39</sup> The party's opposition to the Korean trusteeship plan under the auspices of the United Nations finally brought about Soviet repression.<sup>40</sup> Cho Man-sik was charged with defying the Soviet administrators, imprisoned, and

---

<sup>38</sup>Ibid., p. 4.

<sup>39</sup>Ibid., p. 5.

<sup>40</sup>The plan was formulated at the December 1945 Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference and the Communist factions inside Korea parroted the Soviets support for the plan. For the details of the proposed Korean trusteeship, see U.S., Department of State, The Record of Korean Unification, p. 5.

later reported executed by Russian occupation forces.<sup>41</sup> His arrest in January 1946 set off a panic among Korean nationalists and the party was destroyed as they fled south for safety. The persecution of the nationalists indicated the Soviet's intolerance of dissent and their firm resolve to establish a Communist state in northern Korea.

In order to ensure the Soviet orientation of the newly created regime in northern Korea, the Kremlin concluded that it was necessary to eliminate, or at least neutralize, all the Soviet-Korean faction's rivals, including Kim Il-sung's partisan group. In line with their policy of indirect rule, the Russian occupation authorities sought a native Korean to implement the proposed plan of political consolidation. Ultimately, Kim Il-sung was selected. His selection was not surprising, in that Kim possessed all the prerequisites for the task: "He was a Communist professing to serve their interests, and he had a record of anti-Japanese revolutionary activity under the popular pseudonym of Kim Il-sōng, known to many Koreans."<sup>42</sup>

Chong-sik Lee believed the "crucial factor" in Kim's selection "was the simple fact that he had been in eastern

---

<sup>41</sup>Tae-ho Kim, "The Ruling System of North Korean Regime," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 179-80.

<sup>42</sup>Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 313.

Siberia since 1941."<sup>43</sup> Lee asserted that the choice of a leader was made before Russia's entry into the war and that Soviet leaders presumably knew Kim because of his war-time cooperation with the U.S.S.R.<sup>44</sup> Actually, Kim Il-sung's activities and whereabouts from 1941 to 1945, as well as the exact time of the Russian decision to promote Kim as a Korean hero and figurehead of the occupation government, are extremely hard to document. Therefore, let it suffice to say simply that the choice of Kim was a "logical one" in the absence of any relationship between the Korean Communists and the Russians prior to the close of World War II.<sup>45</sup>

In accordance with Soviet plans, Kim Il-sung was presented to the Korean people in an elaborate welcoming ceremony in P'yongyang on October 10, 1945. Evidently, Soviet authorities felt that Kim should be promoted as a genuine Korean hero rather than an auxiliary to a foreign movement.<sup>46</sup> However, Kim was such a relatively young man, thirty-three years old

---

<sup>43</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea," Asian Survey, VII (June, 1967), 378.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid.

<sup>45</sup>For a defense of this statement see Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 313.

<sup>46</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea," Asian Survey, VII (1967), 382.

in 1945, that very few actually believed his revolutionary past.<sup>47</sup> It was the Soviet, and later North Korean, efforts to shore up Kim's revolutionary reputation that have completely distorted the record of his pre-1945 activities. Often events in Kim's life were pure fabrication. For example, the least credible part of the Kim Il-sung legend is the allegation that Kim became a "general" at the age of nineteen.<sup>48</sup> But Dae-Sook Suh, who probably has compiled the most objective and factual account of Kim's life,<sup>49</sup> maintained that Kim did have "a revolutionary past, not as splendid as he claims and perhaps not devoted solely to the spread of Communism in Korea or to the independence of Korea, but still a revolutionary record of some repute, of which any man thirty-three years old could be proud."<sup>50</sup>

The major controversy concerning Kim Il-sung centers around his true identity.<sup>51</sup> Around the turn of the century, a legendary, patriotic hero named Kim Il-sung was said to

---

<sup>47</sup>Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 318.

<sup>48</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 6.

<sup>49</sup>Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 256-93.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 261.

<sup>51</sup>The true identity of the legendary Kim Il Sung has never been uncovered.



have courageously fought against the Japanese and become widely admired by the Korean people. Because of his age, Kim could never have been involved in these legendary exploits. Thus, it seems that the present premier of North Korea was just one of many who adopted the popular pseudonym, "Kim Il-sōng" during the anti-Japanese struggle of the 1930s and 1940s.

Although the material is sketchy, Kim's personal history is valuable because his background has, at times, influenced decisions effecting the whole course of North Korea. Born on April 15, 1912 in northern Korea, Kim originally was named Kim Song-ju. While he was still very young, his family left Korea for Manchuria. Subsequently, Kim spent his most formative years outside of Korea in a Chinese environment. A commonly ignored fact in North Korean history books is that Kim attended Chinese schools while in Manchuria. According to Suh, "It was not because there were no Korean schools in Manchuria that he attended the Chinese schools; he must have done so by choice, for there were many Korean schools in Kirin."<sup>52</sup> It is believed that Kim's Chinese education had a definite "impact on his future activities."<sup>53</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup>Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 263.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid., p. 264.

In part, his educational experience may explain the fact that Kim was neither a member of the Korean Communist movement nor an active participant in Korean nationalist causes. Rather Kim joined the Chinese-sponsored military organization, known as the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army (NEAJUA). Throughout the 1930s, Kim's guerrilla unit of approximately one hundred men was under the overall command of General Yang Ching-yii, head of the NEAJUA and member of the Manchurian Provincial Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.<sup>54</sup> Therefore, until Kim and his guerrilla band ventured into Siberia, his only experience with the Communist movement had been confined to the Mao Tse-tung variety.

Once on Soviet soil, Kim opportunely transferred his allegiance to the CPSU. His activities during the years he spent in Siberia are not at all clear, but it seems that he had some connection with the Soviet armed forces since he wore the uniform of a Red Army major in 1945. However, when Kim Il-sung entered Korea, he was not a "Made in Russia" Communist in the same sense as the Russianized Koreans who

---

<sup>54</sup>For details, see Sohn, "Factionalism and Party Control of the Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana Qrtly., IX (1967), 18.

had also arrived with the Soviet Army.<sup>55</sup> Kim Il-sung, then, was as unique as the conditions that produced him -- a Chinese-trained, Soviet supported, Korean revolutionary hero.

Kim owed his rapid rise in North Korean politics to his country's liberators and not to popular support among the Korean people. In terms of mere survival, not to mention advancement, Kim had no other viable alternative than to cooperate and obey the occupation officials. He lacked any form of power base from which to operate, for the native Korean Communists considered him an alien and even his partisan supporters were not unified solidly behind him. But with Soviet support, his natural Machiavellian talents, and borrowed tactics from his political mentor, Joseph Stalin, Kim survived the arduous climb to the peak of authority.

Kim's pattern of consolidating power was reminiscent of Stalin's approach in that he shared power and responsibility with rival groups, but when they exhausted their usefulness, he purged the rivals from the party.<sup>56</sup> Kim's

---

<sup>55</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 45.

<sup>56</sup>For an account of his Stalinist technique, see Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," in The Communist Revolution in Asia, ed. by Robert A. Scalapino (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 116.

first efforts at consolidation involved the threatening domestic Communist faction. Exhibiting "unwarranted self-assurance and over confidence," the native Communists lent themselves perfectly to their own systematic elimination.<sup>57</sup>

A variety of tactics were employed in the purge of the domestic Communist faction. They ranged from cold-blooded murder in the case of Hyon Chun-hyok to engineering an alliance between the Yenan and Soviet-Korean factions.<sup>58</sup> By eliminating the old Communists from the political arena, Kim Il-sung and his supporters could adopt their mantel in posing as the true Communist group devoid of foreign influence.

Shortly after his arrival in P'yongyang, Kim Il-sung had played a most instrumental role in the formation of the North Korean Branch Bureau of the Communist Party.<sup>59</sup> Eager to create a Communist party structure more in line with their foreign policy objectives, Soviet authorities called the Conference of the North Korean Five Party Representatives

---

<sup>57</sup>Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 232.

<sup>58</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 20.

<sup>59</sup>The North Korean Branch Bureau was created on October 13, 1945. For background, see Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, pp. 316-19.

and Enthusiasts to meet in P'yongyang on October 10, 1945. The Kremlin decided there was much less risk in initiating a new party than in reviving the more-or-less dormant Korean Communist Party. Today, North Korean text books credit the Soviet-inspired Bureau with being the "first Korean Communist Party organization established on the principle of Marxism-Leninism and guided by true Communism."<sup>60</sup>

Surprisingly, it was not Kim Il-sung, who had done much of the organizational work for the Bureau, but Kim Yong-bom who was elected secretary of the organization. However, Kim Il-sung assumed the leadership of the Bureau, re-named the North Korean Communist Party, two months later.<sup>61</sup>

At this time, the Yen-an faction was also in the process of political reorganization. The title Korean Independence League was dropped in favor of the New People's Party on March 30, 1946. Under the guidance of Chairman Kim Tu-bong, the party appealed to the more literate and well-to-do elements of North Korean society. In fact, it enjoyed such wide popularity that Soviet administrators became alarmed and North Korean Communist Party members grew envious. Finally,

---

<sup>60</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea," China Qrtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 6-7.

<sup>61</sup>See, Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 8.

Soviet authorities decided the best strategy was to abandon their attempts to form an exclusive, Soviet-Korean Communist party and to amalgamate the New People's Party into an amorphous group to lessen their influence.

By the summer of 1946, Soviet apprehension over the increasing strength of the Yen-an faction and the possibility of Yen-an leaders attempting to integrate their party with the Chinese Communist movement demanded immediate action. A joint North Korean Communist Party-New People's Party Conference was summoned in P'yongyang. There the delegates of both groups agreed to a merger of the two parties into a single organization to be known as the North Korean Worker's Party, or the NKWP, and having a membership of roughly 160,000.<sup>62</sup> In the early phases of the conference, Yen-an delegates were openly contemptuous of the proposed amalgamation but Kim Tu-bong rallied his party to the support of the merger by stating that it "was necessitated not only by the tactical need for unity, but by the lack of intellectual leadership in the North Korean Communist Party."<sup>63</sup> The formation of the NKWP not only marked the

---

<sup>62</sup>The membership count was given in John N. Washburn, "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (March, 1950), 60.

<sup>63</sup>Cited in Suh, The Korean Communist Movement, p. 321.

end of an independent Yenan Korean party but also clearly separated the Soviet-sponsored Communist movement in the north from the indigenous Korean Communist Party in Seoul.

As a mere formality, the conference held an election for party chairman but all present knew Kim Il-sung was slated to be the victor. The Yenan faction, however, became uneasy and criticized Soviet attempts to railroad Kim Il-sung into the office. According to reliable accounts,

Their the Yenan faction unfavorable reaction was so obvious that the Russian colonel present on the dais as an honored guest advised a temporary recess. Upon reconvening, a Communist delegate, O Ki-sop argued (as instructed) that the chairman need not necessarily be Kim Il-sung, and his speech won thunderous applause from the New People's Party delegates.<sup>64</sup>

Later, Kim Il-sung personally nominated Yenan leader Kim Tu-bong for the chairmanship in order to allay their fears of Soviet-Korean domination. Kim Tu-bong was, indeed, elected chairman and Kim Il-sung was rewarded with a vice-chairmanship; an honor he shared with a relatively unknown member of the domestic Communist faction, Chu Nyong-ha.<sup>65</sup>

The Soviets did not lose anything by sacrificing the

<sup>64</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Politics in North Korea," China Qrtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 10-11.

<sup>65</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 37.

chairman for the Yen-an faction might have bolted the union had they pressed the selection of Kim Il-sung. Also, regardless of whom was elected leader of the NKWP, the power relationship would not be drastically altered for the Russian troops still occupied the streets and Kim Il-sung remained as their link between the Kremlin and the Korean populace.

In the South, Pak Hon-yong formally recognized the split in the Korean Communist Party by organizing the South Korean Worker's Party (SKWP), with headquarters in Seoul. Although it claimed to have a membership of over 370,000,<sup>66</sup> the party was never a viable instrument of control due to continuous factional disputes and harassment from the South Korean authorities. When the SKWP structure began to crumble, the membership streamed north but they were entirely too disorganized to challenge effectively the NKWP for leadership. Therefore, the combined purge of the kungnae (domestic) faction in the north and establishment of the NKWP guaranteed the future domination of the foreign faction.

Another bastion of Yen-an influence, the Korean Volunteer Corps, was also neutralized by combining it with Soviet-controlled forces, such as the Peace Preservation Corps and

---

<sup>66</sup>Ibid., p. 42.



the Railroad Guards, under the banner of the Korean People's Liberation Army.<sup>67</sup> To prevent Chinese influence in the Korean People's Liberation Army, Soviet administrators saw to it that the officers corps was composed of recruits from Kim Il-sung's guerrilla band and returnees from the Soviet Maritime Provinces. There was, however, a notable exception: Yen-an Communist Mu Chung, a veteran of the Chinese 8th Route Army, was commissioned as second in command.<sup>68</sup>

Actually, plans for the Korean People's Liberation Army were rushed to completion in 1947, when Lin Piao's army in Manchuria was caught by a Nationalist Chinese offensive and forced to retreat toward the Korean frontier. Kiwon Chung believed that "probably Kim and possibly the Russians became increasingly alarmed least the Yen-an faction should feel encouraged by the proximity of Chinese Communist forces, and called for the rapid creation of military forces."<sup>69</sup> Once established, the Korean army became entirely dependent upon the Soviet Union for training

---

<sup>67</sup>For background, see Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 43.

<sup>68</sup>Henry Chung, The Russians Came to Korea (Washington: Korean Pacific Affairs Press, 1947), p. 72.

<sup>69</sup>Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and Party," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 108.

and equipment.<sup>70</sup> For instance, under a clandestine program, roughly 10,000 men, the best of the Korean ranks, were dispatched to the Soviet Union, where they received military, technical, and political training.<sup>71</sup>

Since there were no alternative sources of guidance or economic assistance available, the Korean armed forces had to accept Soviet domination. General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Communist Armies, states in 1947:

Fighting is going on fiercely in Manchuria. All our troops are busily engaged. It would be impossible for us to help others.<sup>72</sup>

Surely, the Soviet background of the Korean officer corps served to perpetuate Russian influence within the military.

In addition to an army and a party, the Soviet Union passed down another legacy -- a civilian structure of government -- to the people of North Korea. Japanese authorities, in anticipation of their eventual defeat, had begun to transfer certain administrative duties to local Korean officials in the final weeks of the war. Later, local people's committees were formed to preserve order in

<sup>70</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 114.

<sup>71</sup>For this example see Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and Party," China Q'tly., No. 14 (1963), p. 107.

<sup>72</sup>The New York Times, March 10, 1947, p. 2.

the wake of the Japanese withdrawal. Post-war Korean politics was officially born with the establishment of Lyuh's Committee on August 15, 1945.<sup>73</sup> The Committee changed its name to the Korean People's Republic in early September, and carried on operations on either side of the thirty-eighth parallel.

As they advanced down the peninsula in pursuit of the Japanese, Soviet officers found that the people's committees were a convenient mechanism for administering local affairs in the newly liberated areas. They proved to be so popular with Russian administrators that in areas where committees had not been established the Russians created them. For example, in P'yongyang, political discord among rival leaders prevented the formation of a people's committee until the Soviet commander intervened and authorized a small group of Koreans, under the leadership of a Communist, to set up a provisional people's committee.<sup>74</sup> Pleased with the initial operation of the committees, the Soviets abandoned plans for a military government and decided to use the committees as a civilian

---

<sup>73</sup>Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex, p. 116.

<sup>74</sup>For example see Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 9.

front for the occupation government. On August 25, 1945, the Soviet command ordered the Executive Committee of the Korean People to assume the administrative powers of the Korean government.<sup>75</sup>

In many ways, the sanctioning of the people's committees as the official government proved to be extremely beneficial for the Soviet Union. Since they were ignorant of internal developments and conditions, the Russians could avail themselves of a pre-established governmental structure. By hiding behind the civilian facade, the Red Army gave the "appearance of encouraging local Korean government while retaining power securely in its own hands."<sup>76</sup> Within the committees, pressure was brought to bear on untrustworthy members, and dissidents were often purged as in the case of Cho Man-sik. Even though they were extremely active in committee affairs, however, Soviet political officers were generally kept well in the background.

Cho Man-sik became the first post-liberation head of state in northern Korea when he was appointed chairman of

---

<sup>75</sup>George M. McCune, "Post War Government and Politics of Korea," The Journal of Politics, IX (November, 1947), 619.

<sup>76</sup>Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 9.

the Provisional Political Committee. Soon it was succeeded by the Five Provinces Administration Bureau which Cho also headed.<sup>77</sup> Both governmental bodies had jurisdiction and authority throughout the Soviet zone of occupation. Following a governmental shake up -- stemming from the purge of the nationalists' faction, the North Korean Interim People's Committee was formed on February 7, 1946 to replace the Bureau. The Interim People's Committee restricted considerably the amount of local autonomy allowed to the regional people's committees.<sup>78</sup> As an additional precaution against another outbreak of nationalist sentiment, as was experienced under the Bureau's administration, Kim Il-sung was appointed chairman instead of a native Korean as had been the practice. The passing of the Bureau marked the demise of nationalist power and influence in Korean politics and the ascendance of the Soviet-Koreans and Kim Il-sung.

The Soviets consolidated all of their administrative and political programs under the Interim People's Committee. Almost immediately, Chairman Kim introduced a package of

---

<sup>77</sup>The Bureau assumed control from the Provisional Committee in October, 1945.

<sup>78</sup>Wilbert G. Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (December, 1950), 381-82.

twenty reform measures dealing with agriculture, finance, education, welfare, and transportation. Although the U.S.S.R. was in no position to be generous in the post-war period, it did encourage and assist the economic rehabilitation of North Korea. The government stressed industrial education and Russian instructors came in to fill the demand for experienced personnel. (Reportedly, these instructors trained 1,500 experts and 2,000 skilled laborers alone in January 1947.<sup>79</sup>) In addition, the Interim People's Committee's early projects were financed from a 212 million ruble low interest loan from the Soviet Union.<sup>80</sup>

In search of popular support, the Soviets instructed the government to inaugurate programs involving land reform and nationalization of large industry. So rapid was the nationalization process that after a year of Soviet rule 90 percent of the major industries had been nationalized.<sup>81</sup> Lattimore described the ease with which the factories were taken over:

---

<sup>79</sup>George McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 185.

<sup>80</sup>See, Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 61.

<sup>81</sup>Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 30.

Because they had belonged to the Japanese, no Koreans had been expropriated. . . . Cut off from Japan it could not stand alone and had to be integrated with Russian industry in Siberia. The Russians had only to organize labor unions, import technicians and begin to train a new Korean management under nationalized ownership.<sup>82</sup>

Land reform traditionally has been a valuable propaganda instrument, and the Korean case proved to be no exception. After land reform programs were implemented in March and April of 1946, they were reported to have secured the much needed peasant support for the regime as well as making a favorable impression on the peasant farmers in the American zone.<sup>83</sup> Of course, the presence of the Red Army helped to convince the North Korean land owners to passively submit to the division of their property. Although they were responsible for formulating these reform policies, Soviet administrators preferred to let the civilian government take full credit for their formulation and implementation.

In order to secure control of the government, the Communists created a popular front coalition, known as the United Democratic National Front. Subject to the NKWP's

---

<sup>82</sup>Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1949), p. 95.

<sup>83</sup>McCune, Korea Today, p. 201.

direct control, the Democratic Front aimed at capturing the support of the more dissident political elements in order to manufacture mass enthusiasm for the government's policies. By late 1946, the Democratic Front claimed a membership in excess of five million.<sup>84</sup> Assured of success at the polls, the Soviets decided to hold a general election in November 1946 to gain a popular mandate to continue their programs. To no one's great surprise, the United Democratic National Front won a resounding victory.

Immediately after the election, the Interim People's Committee was called to convene in February 1947 to institute a permanent People's Assembly of North Korea. The NKWP had the largest delegation, but their eighty-eight members were far short of a majority in the new 237 member chamber.<sup>85</sup> The first session of the People's Assembly lasted only a few days and mainly concerned itself with the election of officers. Harmony in the new body was preserved by distributing the elected positions among the more powerful foreign factions. For example, Kim Tu-bong was chairman of the eleven member Presidium and Kim Il-sung headed the twenty-two man People's Committee.

---

<sup>84</sup>For membership figure, see Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 12.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., p. 15.



Realizing that their position in North Korea was more or less secure in that they controlled the party, army, and government -- the three pillars of power -- the Kremlin permitted the regime to advance toward nominal independence. Accordingly, Kim Tu-bong, as chairman of the Presidium, was instructed to present a draft of a provisional Korean constitution to the Assembly. Modeled after the 1936 Stalinist Constitution of the Soviet Union, the Korean document was subjected to much public discussion before it was enacted and finally promulgated on September 8, 1948.<sup>86</sup> Elections were called under the constitution to fill the seats in the newly created Supreme People's Assembly. Since the constitution was intended to constitute the basic law of both North and South Korea, the representation in the Assembly was proportioned between the two zones.<sup>87</sup> Because the American occupation authorities refused to recognize the validity of the 1948 constitution, the delegates representing the South had to be indirectly elected at a P'yongyang convention.<sup>88</sup> The Democratic Front

---

<sup>86</sup>Tae-ho Kim, "The Ruling System of North Korean Regime," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 175.

<sup>87</sup>Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (1960), 382.

<sup>88</sup>Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 17.

again won an easy victory, and as a result the Assembly asked Kim Il-sung to form a government.

Following the ratification of the constitution in September 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea proclaimed itself the legal government of all Korea. The newly independent state designated Seoul as its capital but for the time being was content to remain in its "temporary" quarters in P'yongyang. However, its control in the north was assured by the legacy the Soviet occupation troops left after three years of strict domination and monopolistic power. Actually, "the Soviets," according to B. C. Koh, "succeeded in installing in the northern half of the Korean peninsula a political regime thoroughly subservient to their dictates and interests -- that is, a satellite."<sup>89</sup>

The progress made in three short years in North Korea is even more impressive when compared to the two decades needed by Stalin to consolidate his power inside the Soviet Union. By 1948, Soviet influence was pervasive in North Korea, affecting not only the formal governmental structure but the country's political and economic institutions as well. The success of the "sovietization" process was verified,

---

<sup>89</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 1.

when the Russian Foreign Office delivered a note to the United States Embassy in Moscow on September 19, 1948 announcing the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Korean soil by the end of the year.<sup>90</sup> The new Korean leaders, and especially Kim Il-sung, were more than generous with their praise for their friend and liberator, the U.S.S.R. For instance, on September 21, 1948, Kim telegraphed Stalin the following communiqué:

In strengthening in every way the friendship with the Soviet people and in the establishment of stable political, economic, and cultural relations with the Soviet Union, our people see the guarantee of their national independence, the guarantee of the state . . . may the eternal and inviolable friendship of the people of the Soviet Union and Korea long endure and prosper! Long live Generalissimo Stalin -- the liberator and best friend of the Korean people.<sup>91</sup>

Therefore, as the last regiments of the Red Army returned home in December 1948, they left a technically "independent" state which actually remained totally subservient to the Soviet Union in every way. Indeed, this was quite an accomplishment; the Japanese tried to control Korea for

---

<sup>90</sup>For a background on the Soviet troop withdrawal, see U.S., Department of State, Korea: 1945 to 1948, Far Eastern Series 28, Pubn. 28 (October, 1948), pp. 114-15.

<sup>91</sup>Cited in John N. Washburn, "The Soviet Press Views North Korea," Pacific Affairs, XXII (March, 1949), 57.

nearly four decades and never even approached such success.

However, under this placid surface of Russo-North Korean cooperation and friendship, there brewed a tempest of Korean nationalism. Even Kim Il-sung promoted nationalists objectives. As early as October 18, 1948, Kim said:

We must strengthen our unity so that we may build a new government with our own hands. We must strive to become a completely democratic and independent nation which can stand on a footing of equality with our allies in the world. One of the most urgent tasks confronting us today is the rehabilitation and reconstruction of our national economy.<sup>92</sup>

This speech outlined the regime's course of action for the next two decades. Realizing that national pride was a prerequisite to the task of nation-building, Kim Il-sung appealed to the population's nationalist sentiments as he embarked on a full scale program of economic reconstruction. Kim's aim was to establish a self-identity for North Korea by achieving a self-reliant national economy and making the D.P.R.K. a nation worthy of international respect. In this way, he hoped to accomplish his ultimate

---

<sup>92</sup>Cited in B.C. Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (January-February, 1969), 296.

goal -- the "communization" of the entire Korean peninsula under the leadership of Korean hero, Kim Il-sung.

## CHAPTER II

### FROM SATELLITE TO INDEPENDENT STATE, 1948-1955

The months of November and December 1948 were dominated by elaborately-staged farewell ceremonies for the departing Soviet Army of Occupation. As they left the newly "sovietized" state of North Korea, Russian officers knew that the Kremlin need not fear that its influence over the northern half of the peninsula would disappear when the last Russian soldier crossed the border. The experts who had pushed for the troop withdrawal proved to have assessed correctly the situation for after independence, pro-Soviet propaganda and political education campaigns became even more intensified.<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, North Korean leaders constantly stressed the strengthening of ties with the U.S.S.R. On October 8, 1948, Kim Il-sung cabled Stalin to request the establishment of diplomatic and economic relations between the two

---

<sup>1</sup>For example, in 1949, some 500 Koreans were reported to be studying inside the Soviet Union under a program purportedly designed to imbue Koreans with Stalinist doctrines and Russian culture. See U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 112.

countries. Three days later Stalin enthusiastically replied in the affirmative, stating that he was most ready "to establish diplomatic relations . . . . and to exchange ambassadors, and, together with this, to establish corresponding economic relations."<sup>2</sup> The agreement was formalized quickly by an exchange of ambassadors. The first Soviet emissary, Colonel General Terentli F. Shtykov, was already a familiar figure in P'yongyang since he formerly was the commander-in-chief of the Soviet occupation army.

Shtykov headed an immense Soviet Mission which officially replaced the old occupation organization but still carried on many of its activities. Located in P'yongyang, the mission consisted of the embassy proper, representatives of Soviet agencies active in Korea, special advisers, technicians, and managerial personnel. Direction for all Soviet activities was centered in the Embassy, and Ambassador Shtykov was responsible only to the Kremlin. The other sections of the mission each had their own special functions. For example, in order to further their economic interests in North Korea, the representatives of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade headed a trade mission that had responsibility

---

<sup>2</sup>Washburn, "The Soviet Press Views North Korea," Pacific Affairs, XXII (1949), 57-58.

for applying pressure on North Korean authorities to meet export commitments to the U.S.S.R.<sup>3</sup> Advisers and technical personnel were reportedly dispersed throughout the entire D.P.R.K. regime, including the Cabinet, National Planning Commission, and Ministry of Defense.<sup>4</sup> In fact, intelligence information indicated that even Premier Kim Il-sung received weekly instructions from the U.S.S.R. officials.<sup>5</sup> The continued all-pervasiveness of Soviet control led C. L. Sulzberger to editorialize in 1949 that "Ambassador Shtykov appears to be the true boss of the satellite state."<sup>6</sup>

Just as in the occupation period, the Soviet Union supervised developments within the North Korean regime by using a small number of strategically placed personnel inside the North Korean government and party apparatus. Within the governmental apparatus alone, an estimated two hundred critical positions were staffed by Soviet personnel of Korean extraction.<sup>7</sup> "Through a calculated policy,"

---

<sup>3</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 105.

<sup>4</sup>Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup>Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 7.

<sup>6</sup>Editorial, The New York Times, Jan. 18, 1949, p. 17.

<sup>7</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 101.




according to a U.S. Department of State report, "the U.S.S.R. infiltrated Soviet-Koreans into nearly all major government agencies, usually in the position of vice-chairman, from which position they were able to exercise power unobstrusively."<sup>8</sup> The nominal heads of North Korean ministries were typically locally trained Communists; however, in most cases they were outflanked in authority by Soviet-Korean vice-ministers and high-ranking Soviet advisers. The Soviets reinforced the chain of command from the Kremlin to the North Korean ministries with various and sundry political and psychological devices. These included formal agreements, quasi-religious adherence to Marxism-Leninism, monopolistic control of North Korea's foreign relations, supervision of the education of future Korean leaders, and outright MGB (Soviet Secret Police) surveillance.<sup>9</sup>

North Korea was bound even closer to the Soviet Union by the joint economic and cultural ventures launched after 1948. One of the more important agreements, signed on March 17, 1949, called for the contracting parties -- the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.S.R. -- to facilitate the exchange of

---

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>For general information on the controls employed, see ibid., pp. 103, 119. For the specific charge of the Soviet use of the MGB in North Korea, see ibid., p. 101.



mutual experiences in industry and agriculture, to grant each other the right to reciprocal most-favored nation treatment in all matters relating to commerce, and to promote cooperation in the fields of culture, science, and the arts.<sup>10</sup> In furthering their interests in North Korea, Soviet officials took advantage of Korea's cultural lag and attempted to "sovietize" the population. For example, an increasing number of Koreans were compelled to study the Russian language; Russian literary works became standard tests; and Russian movies, plays, dances and other art forms were given wide dissemination.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, in every way -- politically, economically, militarily, and culturally -- North Korea was subservient to the Soviet Union, making the D.P.R.K. "unquestionably" a Russian satellite.<sup>12</sup>

By 1948, the pressure of South Korean authorities had become so intense that most SKWP activities were driven

---

<sup>10</sup>For excerpts of the text of the U.S.S.R.-D.P.R.K. agreement on economic and cultural cooperation, see Donald G. Tewksbury, Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies, Source Books on Far Eastern Ideologies, Vol. II (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), pp. 127-28.

<sup>11</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 4.

<sup>12</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 129.

underground. Their effectiveness being drastically curtailed by the police suppression, party stalwarts, like Chairman Pak Hon-yong, finally succumbed and fled north as most of the membership had previously done. After arriving in P'yongyang, Pak encountered a well-entrenched NKWP organization that did not view the recent SKWP invasion with much enthusiasm. Pak realized his own position was rapidly deteriorating since he was cut off from his power base in the South, and Kim Il-sung worried about the SKWP's potential as a rival political faction if it remained outside his control. For these reasons, both parties welcomed the merger of the South Korean and North Korean Worker's Parties. Formally joined in June 1949, the new party was christened simply the Korean Worker's Party (KWP) and headed by none other than Kim Il-sung, who was assisted by Vice-Chairman Pak Hon-yong.<sup>13</sup>

Once established in P'yongyang, the South Korean Communists had established the United Democratic Fatherland Front which was designed to coordinate anti-American guerrilla activities in the South. The aims of the Fatherland Front were the following: (1) expulsion of American troops and the United Nations Commission from South Korea,

---

<sup>13</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, pp. 10-11.

(2) achievement of Korean unification, (3) accomplishment of "democratic reforms" in a United Korea, and (4) cooperation with the Soviet Union and Communist China in achieving these goals.<sup>14</sup> Since Pak's position in the North Korean power structure greatly depended upon the kind of leadership he could exert in the South, the apparent failure of the Fatherland Front caused him deep anxiety and profound apprehension. Therefore, in order to compensate for the Front's lack of success and to bolster his tenuous position in P'yongyang, Pak became one of the leading "hawks" advocating unification by force.

Even before their "independence" in 1948, North Koreans had doggedly pursued their overriding objective of reunifying the peninsula. Of course, they won full Soviet approval since the Russians assumed that unification meant "communization" of the entire peninsula. Big power politics also conditioned Soviet support for North Korean reunification attempts. In 1945, Russia welcomed the United States as a mandatory power on its eastern flank with as much enthusiasm as the United States would have mustered in the event that the Soviets arrived in Latin America, or more specifically Mexico, as a mandatory power.

---

<sup>14</sup>Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (1950), 389.

While world politics greatly influenced the Soviet stance on Korean unification, the North Korean position was influenced by a messianic, nationalistic desire to reunite their country. Indeed, in North Korean eyes, they were merely pursuing a policy of manifest destiny in struggling to communize the South. Although the strategy periodically changed, North Korea originally hoped to build a revolutionary base in the South which would serve not only as a center for operations disruptive of the South Korean government but also as a springboard toward the eventual establishment of a Communist regime there.<sup>15</sup> In quest of this objective, the North Koreans experimented with various tactics that ranged from peaceful persuasion to armed invasion. In the pre-1948 period, for example, demonstration, strikes and terrorism were employed; while from 1948 to 1950, hostile activities were escalated when the Democratic Fatherland Front began using guerrilla warfare.<sup>16</sup>

Perhaps, it was inevitable that North Korea would be forced to resort to military means of unification. The

---

<sup>15</sup>B. C. Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (April, 1969), 269.

<sup>16</sup>Paige, "Korea," p. 220.

demonstrations, terrorist activities, and Fatherland Front movement had led only to increased polarization of North and South. In any event, North Korea began to formulate a military strategy aimed at conquering the South very soon after its liberation.<sup>17</sup> The development of a modern, well-trained military establishment received top priority from the Soviet occupation officials. On February 8, 1948, the Korean People's Army (KPA) was activated and readied to assume control after the Soviet withdrawal. In addition to the Soviets, the Communist Chinese assisted the development of North Korea's offensive potential by redeploying two Korean divisions of the People's Liberation Army to North Korea in July 1949 and by conveying Russian war materials to P'yongyang via the Manchurian railroads.<sup>18</sup>

Just as they had penetrated the North Korean government and party, the Russians infiltrated the Korean People's Army with Soviet advisers and strategically placed Soviet-Korean officers. An estimated 3,000 Russians were involved

---

<sup>17</sup>Yoon Chang Sun, former head of the Peace Preservation Corps in P'yongyang said that plans for the attack on South Korea were presented to North Korean security forces as early as September 1947. The New York Times, Oct. 25, 1947, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>Deok Kim, "Communist China's Intervention in the Korean War," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), 212-12.

in the KPA prior to June 1950.<sup>19</sup> For the most part, they served as military advisers, possessing various technical and organizational skills lending themselves to special projects; however, these Soviet officers were frequently handicapped by their ignorance of Korean customs and the language barrier. In the beginning, the KPA was top heavy with advisory personnel; for example, there were as many as 150 advisers per division, or almost one per company, in 1948. Gradually, the number of advisers was scaled down to more realistic proportions with twenty per division in 1949 and, finally, three to eight per division in 1950.<sup>20</sup>

Besides offering technical assistance, the Soviet Union assumed the responsibility of arming the new Korean army. Cautiously, the KPA was supplied with weapons in well-defined stages: first, it was given captured Japanese weapons; secondly, limited amounts of Russian equipment were introduced; and finally, heavy artillery, tanks, and trucks were supplied in the spring of 1950. Soviet material assistance gave the North Koreans the military muscle needed to launch an attack on the South. Although the Soviets

---

<sup>19</sup>Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 7.

<sup>20</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 114.

claimed that only Russian material left in the wake of the 1948 evacuation was used in the Korean War, markings on some of the captured North Korean equipment revealed its Soviet manufacture between 1949-1950.<sup>21</sup> Even though they were striving on the one hand to develop a viable, independent Korean fighting force, the Soviets kept close check of the reins in the other. For instance, gasoline was rationed to the North Korean air force on a monthly basis.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, at this time, thousands of Koreans were learning the art of modern warfare from Soviet instructors. Locally, high Soviet officers were assigned to North Korea's two military academies and to the naval training school. However, conditions necessitated that most personnel, such as pilots, aircraft mechanics and automotive experts, be trained abroad in the Soviet Union. By 1950, the U.S.S.R. had succeeded in molding the KPA into a cohesive, modern fighting force while firmly implanting Soviet influence throughout its ranks.

Having been fully prepared for combat, the KPA took the world by surprise and suddenly invaded the South on June 25, 1950. Exactly why the Korean command launched

---

<sup>21</sup>Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 12.

<sup>22</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 114.



the offensive continues to be a matter of conjecture. There are several factors that possibly could have influenced their decision. For one thing, Moscow, Peking and P'yongyang had every reason to expect an expeditious and self-contained success from the venture.<sup>23</sup> Likewise, all three feared the post-war redevelopment of Japan and the rapprochement of Japanese and American policy.<sup>24</sup> Then again, the events inside China may have had some effect in that, they could have created a revolutionary tide which swept over into Korea, causing emotions to rule over reason. But more likely, there was an internal struggle in the KWP, touched off by the United Democratic Fatherland Front's complete failure in achieving unification that compelled the North Korean leadership to adopt a more militant stance.<sup>25</sup> Whatever the cause, one thing is certain: the U.S.S.R., P.R.C., and D.P.R.K. all had a definite interest in excluding American influence from the mainland of Asia.

---

<sup>23</sup> James Reston commented that "the Russians were trying for a quick and easy victory in Korea and that they were not trying to get us off balance in order to start a major all-out war." Editorial, The New York Times, July 23, 1950, p. 23.

<sup>24</sup> Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 36.

<sup>25</sup> Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 69.

Considering the Soviet's position in the satellite state of North Korea, it was inconceivable that the North Korean regime reached the decision to invade independently of the Kremlin. It was said that several Soviet general officers and a number of field grade officers attached to the Defense Ministry in P'yongyang possessed the authority to review all decisions and check all information dealing with North Korean military affairs.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the war decision was, in all likelihood, made in Moscow or, at the very least, reluctantly approved by Kremlin officials. If the latter was the case, the Soviet Union had no real choice but to support the North Koreans (for the chauvinistic Korean Communists most certainly would have attempted an invasion sooner or later anyway) in order to preserve its position of influence.

Likewise, it was probably a Soviet tactic that excluded the Communist Chinese from the preliminary planning stages of the war lest they become too influential.<sup>27</sup> Evidence indicated that the Chinese were, indeed, neglected; for example, no reports on the outbreak of hostilities in

---

<sup>26</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 113.

<sup>27</sup>For evidence of Communist Chinese exclusion, see Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 45.

Korea appeared in the Peking press until June 27, 1950 -- two days after the opening engagement, perhaps reflecting China's embarrassment on not being informed that an attack was imminent.<sup>28</sup> Undoubtedly, June 1950 marked the peak of Soviet hegemony in North Korea, a position that would soon decline as a result of the war's disastrous consequences.

At first, the decision to invade appeared to be well-calculated and faultlessly executed as the North Korean armies swept down the peninsula experiencing one success after another. However, when the United Nations' forces came to South Korea's assistance, the tide quickly turned against the D.P.R.K. and its army was put on the defensive. At this point, with the KPA in full retreat, the Kremlin was confronted with a quickly deteriorating situation that made the survival of their puppet regime in the North highly questionable. The situation clearly called for Soviet intervention but Stalin refused to be moved by Kim Il-sung's pleas, preferring instead to avoid the risk of a major war with the United States.<sup>29</sup> Uoong Tack Kim asserted that "in all likelihood, Stalin would have

---

<sup>28</sup>Deok Kim, "Communist China's Intervention in the Korean War," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 213.

<sup>29</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 120.

tolerated reluctantly, without military counteraction, a U.N.-sponsored American-South Korean conquest of North Korea, as Khrushchev tolerated a capitulation in Cuba in 1962."<sup>30</sup> Stalin's decision not to intervene had two important consequences: (1) China would become, by default, the power that rescued North Korea from the clutches of "western imperialism"; and (2) it raised grave doubts of whether or not the Soviet Union would "risk its neck" to defend other fraternal Socialist countries in the future.

Historically, the D.P.R.K. regime had enjoyed cautious relations with the People's Republic of China. In October 1949, Kim Il-sung had extended recognition to Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary regime, but it was not until August 1950 that Communist China finally dispatched an ambassador to the North Korean capital. General Ni Chih-liang, Peking's first representative, became the second ranking diplomat in P'yongyang; and on ceremonial occasions he was treated with markedly less deference than was Soviet Ambassador Shtykov.<sup>31</sup> After a few months of residence, Ambassador Ni

---

<sup>30</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 81.

<sup>31</sup>Dubin, "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government," Pacific Affairs, XXIII (1950), 384-85.

retired to China, leaving only a chargé d'affaires to represent Peking until 1955.<sup>32</sup> Therefore, relations with mainland China were cool at best in 1950, since both countries had failed to establish the usual channels of diplomatic intercourse, to negotiate formal pacts, or to give fraternal assistance.<sup>33</sup>

What motivated the P.R.C. to intervene in the Korean War? First, it was highly unlikely that Stalin ordered the Chinese initiative. Premier Stalin's contempt for the Chinese Communist leadership has been well-documented with references to "margarine Communists," "cabbage Communists," and "radish Communists;" the latter, specifically, insinuating that they were red on the outside only.<sup>34</sup> In fact, Whiting tentatively concludes that Russian influence was more of a contributing, rather than a determining, factor in the Chinese decision and that Stalin, at most, gave his reluctant assent to the move.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, p. 44.

<sup>33</sup> Kim Il-sung had requested Chinese assistance as early as October 1950 but his pleas were rejected. Mao Tse-tung ordered the intervention only after the U.N. forces had approached the Sino-Korean border. See Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (August, 1968), 709.

<sup>34</sup> Herbert Feis, The China Triangle (New York: Atheneum, 1965), pp. 140-41.

<sup>35</sup> Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 153-160.

Second, there were numerous strategic considerations that may have dictated the Communist Chinese decision to openly ally themselves with the North Koreans. Deok Kim subscribes to this theory. He stated, "The Chinese Communists were motivated in the decision primarily by their own necessity and interest while Soviet prompting might have existed."<sup>36</sup> For mainland China, North Korea was a buffer state, separating it from a hostile Western world. In geopolitics the Korean peninsula resembled the hilt of a dagger pointed into the heart of Manchuria. What assurance did the Communist Chinese have that the United Nations forces would stop at the Yalu River? The answer, of course, was none. Therefore, the leaders in Peking rightly feared that the United States and company, sparked by their initial success in conquering the peninsula, would invade Manchuria in an attempt to restore the Nationalist Chinese government. Furthermore, security-conscious Communist China was concerned about Manchuria vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in case North Korea fell into American hands. Possibly, the Soviets would use just such an event to justify the installment of Russian troops on Manchurian

---

<sup>36</sup>Deok Kim, "Communist China's Intervention in the Korean War," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 216-17.

territory,<sup>37</sup> a possibility almost as repugnant as an American attack.

In addition, some other lesser reasons may have prompted Mao Tse-tung to enter the conflict. He believed that open combat with a great power would enhance China's international stature, while domestically it would help consolidate power under the Communist regime by rallying the population's nationalistic sentiments against an external enemy. Mao also felt that the expulsion of the "Western Imperialist" from their last stronghold on the northeast Asian mainland would facilitate the liberation of Formosa.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, Chairman Mao may have been repaying a debt to Premier Kim Il-sung in that, the latter had sent some 10,000 Korean youths to fight in the final stages of the Chinese Revolution.<sup>39</sup> Even though the major considerations to intervene were most certainly based on security questions, these lesser reasons cannot be entirely discounted.

---

<sup>37</sup>W. W. Rostow, The Prospects for Communist China (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1954), p. 69.

<sup>38</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 68.

<sup>39</sup>Kiwon Chung, "The North Korean People's Army and the Party," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 109.

The Communist Chinese intervention brought about some significant changes in the relationship between the three capitals -- Moscow, Peking, and P'yongyang. For one thing, Communist China gained a "relatively independent position" in relation to the Soviet Union.<sup>40</sup> However, the costs involved were great; for example, Peking had been forced to borrow over \$2 billion from Moscow to finance its war effort in Korea -- a loan that took more than ten years to repay at the high rate of interest the Soviets charged.<sup>41</sup> Tempers between Moscow and Peking flared as Mao claimed it was "unreasonable for China to bear all the expenses for the Korean War<sup>7</sup>." <sup>42</sup>

Chinese intervention also resulted in mixed blessings for Kim Il-sung's regime. Chong-sik Lee explains:

It is reasonable to assume that North Korean leaders were compelled to sacrifice their control of the war and to swallow their pride in accepting the Chinese "volunteers" who came to the rescue. Evidence suggests that the North Korean communists were not always in harmony with the Chinese, and one may suspect that the differences were rarely settled in favor of the Korean position.<sup>43</sup>

---

<sup>40</sup>Deok Kim, "Communist China's Intervention in the Korean War," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 201-21.

<sup>41</sup>Allen Whiting, "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis," Journal of Politics, XX (February, 1958), 13.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 120.



From the end of the Korean War onward, North Korea would experience a conflict in allegiance between its benefactor, the Soviet Union, and its preserver, the People's Republic of China.

In three years of fighting, the war reaped a heavy toll of human suffering and mass destruction in North Korea. After the first year alone, North Korean losses had exceeded 1,162,500 killed, wounded, or captured.<sup>44</sup> A North Korean radio broadcast of May 28, 1954 announced that the country had suffered more than a billion dollars worth of damage, lost eighty-seven hundred industrial plants, and incurred a drop in production to less than forty percent of the 1949 level.<sup>45</sup> Yet, North Korea's devastation may not have been the major factor that brought Kim Il-sung to the conference table.

Kim Il-sung was under pressure from both proponents and opponents of the war. Domestically, the "hawkish" South Korean faction, led by Pak Hon-yong, demanded a fight to the finish for reasons already discussed. Meanwhile, North Korea's two powerful allies pressed Kim's

---

<sup>44</sup>The New York Times, June 23, 1951, p. 1..

<sup>45</sup>Shannon McCune, Korea's Heritage (Rutland, Vt.: Charles and Tuttle, 1959), p. 123.

regime to accept the cease-fire agreement. By 1953, Communist China was exhausted after almost twenty continuous years of fighting civil and foreign wars. No longer could Red China afford to wage war against the United States, especially in the light of Truman's, and later Eisenhower's, threats of a nuclear attack.<sup>46</sup> Whereas, in the Soviet Union, the death of Stalin had left the huge Russian bear without a trainer; thus, necessitating a temporary Soviet withdrawal from world politics, while the succession question was settled. Since it was totally dependent on foreign support, the D.P.R.K. had little choice but to acquiesce to demands for negotiations, a decision that was sweetened with promises of post-war economic assistance from Moscow and Peking.

After the Korean War, the Soviet Union suffered a noticeable loss of popular esteem among the North Koreans because of its failure to make a larger commitment to the war effort when the D.P.R.K. was struggling to stay alive.<sup>47</sup> Although the U.S.S.R. was not immediately dethroned from

---

<sup>46</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies, 1950-1965," World Politics, XIX (January, 1967), 221-22.

<sup>47</sup>Glenn D. Paige and Dong Jun Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 18-19.

its paramount position of influence over North Korea, Russia's war-time unpredictability did initiate a reaction that stressed independence and self-reliance. Soon, the regime instigated a policy designed to create a North Korean self-motif or self-identity (chuch'e). Generally, chuch'e could be described as a policy of self-reliance that adhered to the following tenets: (1) solve all problems dealing with the revolution and the construction of Communism independently, in conformity with local conditions, (2) rely mainly on your own strength and oppose both dogmatism and revisionism, (3) finding a solution to your problems is strictly your own responsibility.<sup>48</sup> Chuch'e put heavy emphasis on nationalistic symbols which were found to be highly effective in mobilizing the population for the rigors of post-war development. More will be said about this movement later when it went into high gear around 1955-1956.

Another side effect of the war was the reopening of party wounds and a post-war struggle for power. Kim Il-sung, already a proven political tactician as evidenced by the pre-Korean War purges, quickly began Machiavelli-like

---

<sup>48</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 331.

maneuvers to enhance his control over the KWP. As in the past, Kim employed the Stalinist tactics of formulating temporary alliances with his rivals for expediency. During the Korean War he openly attacked the members of the Yen-an faction. With the cooperation of Russian advisers, North Korean officers of Chinese Communist origin were removed from their commands and replaced with veterans of the anti-Japanese, partisan band of Kim Il-sung. As a means of illustration, one Yen-an personality, General Mu Chong, was attacked for belonging to a suspect "Chinese clique" and for bringing military disaster down upon North Korea.<sup>49</sup> After Kim's accusations of December 4, 1950, Mu Chong was stripped of his rank and sentenced to hard labor. Later, at the request of the Chinese Communists, he was transferred to China, where he died within a few months. Premier Kim was faced by two problems brought about by the war: (1) Chinese Communist troops were on North Korean soil, and they might very well support a Yen-an-inspired coup d'etat against Kim's regime; and (2) a scapegoat had to be found to shoulder the blame for North Korea's war-time failure if Kim Il-sung himself was to escape the responsibility. "Kim came to realize that the disaster of the war would inevitably be his own

---

<sup>49</sup>See, U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 115.

responsibility," Roy Kim said in explaining the Yen-an purge, "and he probably hoped to protect himself against possible replacement by a potential rival who enjoyed great popularity with the Chinese Volunteers."<sup>50</sup>

A second purge occurred at the Fourth Plenum of the KWP in November 1951. Because of increased resentment over the Soviet Union's failure to openly commit itself to North Korea's defense, Kim Il-sung and the Yen-an Koreans coalesced to launch an attack on the Soviet-dominated KWP apparatus. Kim's prime target of criticism was the leader of the Soviet-Korean faction and architect of the Korean Communist Party, Ho Kai. Officially, Ho Kai was charged with "formalism," "bureaucratism," and using a "closed-door" policy in admitting new KWP members.<sup>51</sup> Reportedly, Ho Kai -- known for his pompous boasts -- blustered upon being attacked, "Don't you realize who Ho Kai is?"<sup>52</sup> Finally, under unbearable pressure, he committed suicide.

Then, in 1953, Kim Il-sung delivered a speech attacking the "anti-party" clique which advocated the continuation

<sup>50</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 710.

<sup>51</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," pp. 89-90.

<sup>52</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 107.

of the Korean War.<sup>53</sup> Two days after the speech the regime announced the arrests of twelve members of Pak Hon-yong's South Korean faction. During the war, the South Korean Communists had infuriated Kim Il-sung by not providing ample support to invading North Korean troops or promoting a stronger insurgency movement in the South. Furthermore, these "Left adventurists" -- as Kim Il-sung branded them -- were attempting to block the pending cease-fire agreement so eagerly sought by North Korea's allies.<sup>54</sup> Since they threatened to split the party over the issue of the cease-fire, Kim Il-sung saw to it that a special military court charged the South Korean leadership with "treason against the state" for allegedly plotting to overthrow Kim Il-sung and install Pak Hon-yong as premier.<sup>55</sup> Nine of the twelve received death sentences. Because of his tremendous popularity, Pak Hon-yong escaped the 1953 purge. However, the North Korean government later disclosed that Pak was executed for treason and espionage in 1955.

---

<sup>53</sup>The speech was delivered before the Central Committee of the KWP on August 5, 1953, while the defendants were actually arrested on July 30, 1953. See Cho, "The Politics of North Korean Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 220.

<sup>54</sup>Ibid, p. 221.

<sup>55</sup>In the charges leveled against them, the defendants were called, somewhat inconsistently, "American spies." See ibid., p. 220.

Needless to say, the successive purges greatly strengthened the position of Kim Il-sung's partisan faction. However, Kim was still a long way from being omnipotent. According to Chong-sik Lee, "divergence of opinion on policy matters was permitted among the top echelon personnel," a fact that indicated that "Kim Il-sung may have been at the top, but he was not beyond challenge."<sup>56</sup>

Besides the purges, a massive membership drive was mounted in an attempt to limit foreign, especially Soviet, influence in the KWP. Between 1953 and 1956, the size of the KWP membership almost doubled.<sup>57</sup> The important implications in this increase of membership were that the new members were not subject to Soviet-controlled recruitment procedures or dependent upon Soviet favoritism for party promotions. Therefore, the more recent party recruits tended to support Kim's nationalistic chuch'e campaign because they had no foreign allegiances.

In the immediate post-Korean War period, economic reconstruction received primary consideration from the North Korean regime. In April 1954, the government

---

<sup>56</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Kim Il-sung of North Korea," Asian Survey, VII (1967), 379.

<sup>57</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 107.

promulgated a Three Year Plan -- which was actually a modification of Stalin's early industrial policy -- designed to restore 1949 production levels to most sectors of the economy.<sup>58</sup> Light industry and agriculture received little stress, the major emphasis being reserved for the development of vast capital construction. With an estimated price tag of \$321.2 million, North Korea could not possibly undertake such an expensive and comprehensive project without a vast amount of foreign financial assistance.<sup>59</sup>

In September 1953, Kim Il-sung had personally headed a North Korean delegation to the U.S.S.R. in search of funds for his country's redevelopment. After two weeks of deliberations in Moscow, the Soviets finally agreed to contribute a \$250 million grant for North Korean recovery.<sup>60</sup> In addition, Soviet officials promised that North Korea's payments for previously advanced Soviet credit would be substantially reduced.<sup>61</sup> The Soviet aid was helpful, but it was far from adequate to meet North Korea's needs.

---

<sup>58</sup>Theodore Shabad, "North Korea's Post War Recovery," Far Eastern Survey, XXV (June, 1956), 81-82.

<sup>59</sup>Yoon T. Ruark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 52.

<sup>60</sup>Ibid., p. 61.

<sup>61</sup>Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 94.



Therefore, a similar mission was dispatched to Peking two months later. As a result of their visit, Communist China made its first venture into the foreign aid field with a four-year grant of \$324 million for Korea's economic rehabilitation.<sup>62</sup> The grant was made payable in goods badly needed for the development of major industries; for example, the Chinese contributed building materials, communications equipment, tools, etc. Also, Red China waived all claims and expenses against North Korea arising from the Korean War and promised to initiate a training program for North Korean workers and technicians. "This aid," Thomas An remarked, "was amazingly generous considering the major economic difficulties which beset mainland China, and it was also better suited to the conditions and needs of North Korea than was Soviet aid."<sup>63</sup> Probably, the Chinese funds came out of a massive loan it had previously received from the Soviet Union; therefore, this sacrifice showed the extraordinary importance Mao Tse-tung's regime placed on the North Korean recovery.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>62</sup>Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. by A. Doak Barnett (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 238.

<sup>63</sup>Thomas An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV (July-August, 1966), 70.

<sup>64</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 710.

The two large economic grants from Moscow and Peking seem to have manifested a pattern of competition over the allegiance of P'yongyang shortly after the conclusion of the Korean War. Meanwhile, the smaller socialist republics were also making a contribution to North Korea's economic development. For example, East Germany gave 545.4 million rubles, Poland donated 326 million rubles, Czechoslovakia volunteered 113 million rubles, and poor Mongolia sacrificed 6,054 head of horses, 39,760 head of sheep, 18,693 head of goats, and 446 head of dairy cows.<sup>65</sup> During the immediate post-war period, foreign assistance was absolutely vital; as the figures show, foreign aid accounted for nearly a quarter of North Korea's national income in 1954.<sup>66</sup> Since this time, foreign economic aid gradually has declined as North Korea moved ahead on its program of self-sufficiency.

The influx of foreign capital enabled the North Korean economy to undergo a rapid metamorphosis after the Korean War. Among the changes that took place was the phasing out of the colonial-like trading agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the D.P.R.K. J. A. Kim reported, "all the pre-Korean

---

<sup>65</sup>Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 61.

<sup>66</sup>Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 41.

War trade was oriented toward the Soviet Union with raw materials exported in 'exchange' for machinery and other essential equipment."<sup>67</sup> The Soviets, who had profited immensely from this arrangement, attempted to forestall trade reform and argued against the implementation of the Three Year Plan in hopes of preserving the pre-Korean War trading patterns. Later, the North Korean leadership charged that "the U.S.S.R. used, or attempted to use, its economic and military assistance as a lever to direct North Korean planning."<sup>68</sup> Soon, trade agreements were concluded with Communist China and other socialist republics as well as with its former enemy, Japan.<sup>69</sup> Thus, Kim Il-sung was thoroughly convinced that political independence could only be achieved with emancipation from Soviet economic domination, and he actively strove to diversify North Korea's trading relations.

In hopes of increasing food production, Kim Il-sung also made radical changes in the agricultural sector. Just

---

<sup>67</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea," Asian Survey, VI (May, 1965), 256.

<sup>68</sup>M. T. Haggard, "North Korea's International Positions," Asian Survey, V (August, 1965), 380.

<sup>69</sup>See, Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 45.

as Soviet troops had facilitated earlier land reforms, the post-Korean War encampment of the Chinese Volunteers on North Korean territory enabled the regime to institute rapid collectivization policies. Cooperative farms were created that closely paralleled the Soviet 'collective' farms in organization. On each farm, the land, draft animals, and major farm implements were owned jointly by the cooperative's members, and the workers were paid for the number of days they worked.<sup>70</sup> The rapid pace of collectivization is evidenced by the following statistics: In 1953, only 0.6 per cent of the arable land and 1.2 per cent of the peasant households were in cooperatives; in 1956, 77.9 per cent of the land and 80.9 per cent of the rural population were collectivized; and by 1958, 100 per cent collectivization had been achieved.<sup>71</sup>

Simultaneously, the Three Year Plan began to have an impact on North Korea's war-damaged industrial base. Russian advisors had promoted more moderate proposals for industrial development but Kim Il-sung admonished against any relaxation

---

<sup>70</sup> Chong-sik Lee, "The 'Socialist Revolution' in the North Korean Countryside," Asian Survey, II (October, 1962). 10.

<sup>71</sup> Rudolph, North Korea's Economic and Political Structure, pp. 52-53.

of pressure. Premier Kim declared, "We must appeal to the patriotic dedication of the masses to develop mass labor mobilization in the effort to reconstruct the war-torn industrial enterprises and the educational and cultural facilities."<sup>72</sup> Just as in the agricultural sphere, the industry was quickly transferred from private to state hands. For example, revenues from socialist enterprises steadily increased from 53 per cent in 1954 to 92.5 per cent in 1958.<sup>73</sup> It was the hope of the North Korean economic experts that the stricter supervision and tighter organization inherent in nationalization would result in greater economic mobility and higher levels of production, thus advancing the country on the road to self-reliance.

Although the North Korean regime stressed economic development to improve internal conditions in their country, they actually had a more overriding motive in mind -- Korean reunification. As B. C. Koh observed, "By raising the standard of living of the North Korean people, so the reasoning goes, economic growth can make North Korea both more tolerable to its own people and more attractive to the South Korean

---

<sup>72</sup>Cited in Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 121.

<sup>73</sup>Kuark, "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 55.

people."<sup>74</sup> Therefore, the goals of economic development, or creating a self-image, and communization of the Korean peninsula are deeply intertwined in North Korean strategy. North Korea, according to the master design, should form a solid revolutionary base that will guarantee the eventual takeover of the Republic of Korea in the south. But in order to build a revolutionary base, the D.P.R.K. must increase its national power, of which economic power is a crucial component.

Even though North Korea broadcasted appeals for a popular uprising in the South and sponsored mass strikes, boycotts, and sabotage in attempts to disrupt the South Korean regime, it generally followed a policy of "peaceful" unification in the post-Korean War years. At the Sixth Assembly of the KWP's Central Committee in August 1953, the membership passed a declaration stating, "The unification of our Motherland must be achieved only by peaceful means without foreign intervention."<sup>75</sup> The policy was founded on a massive psychological campaign which continually bombarded South Korea with various proposals for unification.

---

<sup>74</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 265-66.

<sup>75</sup>Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 220.

The North Koreans used "the tactics of invidious comparison (in which the North is portrayed as heaven and the South as hell) and the tactics of anti-foreignism (in which the American involvement in Korea has been depicted in the most barbarous terms)"<sup>76</sup> in the psychological war. In addition, the North offered to send relief to the starving, the unemployed, and the orphaned of South Korea. Finally, the D.P.R.K. would periodically offer a unification formula, such as free all-Korean elections under the supervision of neutral powers.<sup>77</sup> However, as time passed without yielding any concrete results, the peaceful psychological offensive gradually became overshadowed by subversive activities aimed at the South Korean government.

Invigorating North Korea's drive toward economic development and unification was the regime's constant invocation of national symbols. Chong-sik Lee has remarked that "the outstanding characteristic of the post-Korean War policies of the P'yongyang regime was the emphasis on nationalism."<sup>78</sup> Most commonly, nationalism glorified

---

<sup>76</sup>Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 27.

<sup>77</sup>Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 218-219.

<sup>78</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 119.

the country's pre-colonial past and resurrected the native culture. Noticeable attention was focused on Kim Il-sung's struggle against the Japanese, for instance. Premier Kim repeatedly criticized the excessive adulation of the Soviet Union that remained from the occupation and pre-war satellite period. For example, he attacked the hanging of pictures of Siberian fields in army recuperation centers, charts of the U.S.S.R.'s Five Year Plan in the "democratic propaganda rooms," photographs of "factories of foreign nations" in Korean plants, and the lack of Korean hero's portraits in schools.<sup>79</sup> Nationalist themes were also employed in North Korean efforts to unify the peninsula under their aegis.

More and more, Kim Il-sung's rhetoric alluded to the implementation of a chuch'e policy. He stressed that Korea should become the master of its own destiny and that political independence was meaningless unless it was undergirded by economic independence. The term "chuch'e" was first publicly uttered by Premier Kim in a speech to a group of propaganda and agitation workers of the KWP on December 28, 1955. In that address Kim said, "The primary motivation for studying the histories of the Communist Party

---

<sup>79</sup>Ibid., p. 124.



of the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Revolution, or the principles of Marxism-Leninism, is to apply them for the implementation of Korean revolution."<sup>80</sup> In insisting that North Korea work toward autonomy, then, Kim Il-sung was denying the value of learning from other countries. He continued:

We must learn from all the Socialist countries, particularly from the Soviet Union. The important thing is to know the purpose of our learning. . . .<sup>81</sup>

According to Kim, the experiences of other fraternal Communist nations can aid the revolutionary development of North Korea but should not necessarily direct, in an absolute sense, the regime's course of action. Kim concluded his 1955 speech with the statement: "We must learn our own national history, the history of the struggle of our people, and propagate this into the minds of our workers . . . ."<sup>82</sup>

The 1955 Chuch'e Speech pointed up the drastic changes that had taken place in the decade since North Korean liberation. No longer a Soviet satellite, indiscriminately

<sup>80</sup>Cited in Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 711.

<sup>81</sup>Cited in B. C. Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII, 3 and 4 (1965-1966), 295.

<sup>82</sup>Cited in Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course of North Korea," Koreana Quarterly, V (Summer, 1963), 52-53.

ratifying the Kremlin's policies, the D.P.R.K. now earnestly pursued the creation of a viable self-image. The methods employed in seeking this goal were immaterial to Kim Il-sung's regime. All that mattered was the end result. As Premier Kim said, "It makes no difference whether we eat our food with the right or the left hand, with a spoon or chopsticks."<sup>83</sup>

Conditions stemming from the Korean War dictated that North Korea adopt a more independent stance in its relations with other Communist states. For one thing, the D.P.R.K. had to rely on economic assistance from all the socialist republics in the years immediately following the Korean Conflict to ensure its survival. For another, the lack of Soviet wartime support left the North Koreans highly suspicious of future Soviet commitments and desirous of an independent security force. Therefore, the Soviet Union could never return to the position of hegemony it enjoyed from 1945 to 1950. In 1955, Kim Il-sung asked "have we not now reached the point where we can construct our own way to socialism?"<sup>84</sup> This query was an excellent

---

<sup>83</sup>Cited in Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 295.

<sup>84</sup>Cited in Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Qrtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 24.

indication of what had happened since the war and of what could be expected from the regime in the future as it labored toward the goal of constructing a self-motif in hopes of achieving reunification under the direction of Kim Il-sung.

CHAPTER III  
THE 20TH PARTY CONGRESS AND  
THE PERIOD OF EXPERIMENTATION, 1956-1961

By the mid-1950s, North Korea was well on the road to economic recovery; its foreign policy was cautiously emerging into the light of independence; and, as usual, the regime had moved no closer to achieving its paramount goal of unification. However, a rift was to develop shortly between the Soviet Union and Communist China that would have wide-spread implications for the Communist world and affect the behavior of every member state of the Communist bloc, including the D.P.R.K. Although the full extent of the Sino-Soviet dispute was not officially known outside of Communist circles until 1960, the first evidence of the conflict became visible at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU held in Moscow from the 14th to the 20th of February 1956.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>For general reference, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York: Viking Press, 1966), David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev (New York: Praeger, 1964); G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, The Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1962); and Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962).

At the congress, CPSU Chairman Nikita Khrushchev introduced three major doctrinal innovations, specifically: (1) peaceful coexistence with the West, (2) a multiplicity of forms of socialist development, and (3) rejection of the cult of the individual. These three doctrinal pronouncements have since caused numerous ideological disagreements over global strategy, intra-bloc relations, de-Stalinization, permissibility in constructing socialism, and bloc leadership between the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R.<sup>2</sup>

With regard to Russian foreign policy and the strategy of global revolution, Chairman Khrushchev outlined three new axioms of international conduct at the Twentieth Party Congress. First, he declared that peaceful coexistence, and not military confrontation, was a "fundamental principle" of Soviet foreign policy because of "our certainty" of a Communist victory in peaceful competition.<sup>3</sup> Stressing that there was no longer a practical alternative to peaceful coexistence in the thermal-nuclear age, the Soviet leader claimed,

There are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.<sup>4</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup>Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Cited in Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p. 228.

Khrushchev made it clear that in proposing a détente between East and West he was acting as the spokesman for the entire Communist world, for peaceful coexistence was not solely a "principle of Soviet foreign policy" but "one of the cornerstones of the foreign policy of the Chinese People's Republic and the other people's democracies."<sup>5</sup> Indeed, this turned out to be news for some Communist leaders.

Second, Marxist-Leninist dogma which preached that wars were inevitable as long as capitalism existed was modified to conform to the policy of peaceful coexistence. Therefore, wars no longer remained a "fatalistic inevitability";<sup>6</sup> because the Soviet Union had risen to great power status, thus giving the socialist camp the formidable means to deter any imperialist attempt at aggression. Lastly, Khrushchev foresaw the possibility of a non-violent transformation from capitalism to socialism in most countries.

Ever since the death of Stalin, the U.S.S.R. had been plagued with the problem of re-establishing a viable pattern of intra-bloc relations. Stalin's passing had sounded the death knell for Stalinist techniques of control

---

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 40.

over the Communist world. No longer could the socialist camp be ruled as a personal empire; therefore, a new relationship that insured unity, yet allowed diversity, somehow had to be constructed. Hoping to have discovered the middle course, Chairman Khrushchev endorsed the diverse forms of socialist development by citing China's "creative Marxism in action" and Yugoslavia's "specific forms of economic management and organization of the state apparatus" as excellent examples of "much that is unique in socialist construction."<sup>7</sup> A few months after the congress, Khrushchev finally committed himself to "a multiplicity of forms of social development" in an attempt to woo freethinker Tito back into the Soviet fold.<sup>8</sup>

However, the Kremlin continued to formulate its policy toward other fraternal Communist states as if the old monolithic, Stalinist structure still existed. Evidently, Soviet leaders hoped that words alone would satisfy demands for greater Russian tolerance of diversity. Meanwhile, Communist China and the other more restless Communist states kept proposing a flexible, federal approach based on equality and mutual respect as a new foundation for the Communist

---

<sup>7</sup>Cited in ibid., p. 50.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

camp. Kremlin leaders remained unmoved until the tragic events of the Hungarian and Polish uprisings convinced them that their words had opened the way for proponents of greater equality and diversity and that it was already too late to revert back to the days of Stalin. As the Italian Communist Palmiro Togliatti observed, in enunciating his famous locution "polycentrism",<sup>9</sup> independent autonomy in the Communist community indeed had replaced the former, Soviet-controlled monolithic bloc.

However, the most significant pronouncements at the 1956 Congress were made in secret sessions, in which Khrushchev exploded in a violent tirade against methods of leadership employed by the late Premier Stalin.<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin led the congress to adopt a resolution censuring "the cult of the individual."<sup>11</sup> Of all the doctrinal reforms, the rejection of Stalinism, or the cult of personality, had the greatest impact on the Communist world.

---

<sup>9</sup>Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, Polycentrism (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 127.

<sup>10</sup>For Khrushchev's secret speech of February 24, 1956, see Leo Gruliov, ed., Current Soviet Policies, II (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 172-188.

<sup>11</sup>Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev, p. 231.



So far as we know, Khrushchev's criticism of Stalin came as a complete surprise to the other Communist leaders in attendance. It probably was shocking to many of them and may have seriously undermined Soviet influence. In many socialist countries, Communist China and North Korea among them, Stalin had been enshired as a demigod and the political leaders religiously adhered to and relied upon his methods of control. Moreover, a fear was aroused in Peking that the Russian leader's attack on the cult of Stalin actually might have been intended for Chairman Mao.

Regardless of the hostile reception Khrushchev's doctrinal pronouncements received in Red China, the D.P.R.K.'s initial reaction was cautious and non-committal. Choe Yong-kun, North Korea's chief delegate to the Twentieth Party Congress, simply avoided the more controversial issues and fully endorsed the Soviet position when his turn came to address the congress. At home, the North Korean press gave favorable comment to Khrushchev's doctrinal innovations in their editorials but, at the same time, were careful to omit any details of the de-Stalinization campaign except for the congress' resolution on the cult of personality. However, the KWP organs enthusiastically lauded the 20th Congress for creatively applying the principles of Marxism-

Leninism "by recognizing that the transition to socialism would have various forms according to different backgrounds and conditions of the countries involved."<sup>12</sup> Very often, excerpts from Kim Il-sung's 1955 Chuch'e Speech were cited in conjunction with Khrushchev's remarks on the numerous paths that led to socialist development.

Nevertheless, Kim Il-sung could not ignore the implications that Khrushchev's anti-Stalinist campaign might have on his own position of authority. Purely as a precautionary measure against possible accusations that Kim was promoting a cult of personality, the KWP newspaper, Nodong Sinmun, reported:

The collective principle in party leadership is of enormous practical significance. The Central Committee of our Party, mindful of Comrade Kim Il-sung's repeated emphasis on the matter, has therefore spared no effort to strictly observe the Leninist principle of collective leadership, to encourage intra-party democracy, criticism, and self-criticism,<sup>13</sup> and to further strengthen ties with the masses.

Yet, Kim could not isolate himself from the repercussions of the de-Stalinization movement in the Soviet Union.

Kim Il-sung was especially vulnerable to charges of

<sup>12</sup>Cited in Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 712.

<sup>13</sup>Cited in Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 47.

sanctioning a personality cult because "for North Korea this was a Stalinist age, and Kim was the all-conquering, all-wise hero to whom everyone must pay homage."<sup>14</sup> During this period, signs of Stalinism were very much in evidence; for example, huge portraits of Kim hung in front of public buildings and gigantic characters proclaiming "Long Live Marshall Kim Il-sōng" were perched on top of prominent buildings.<sup>15</sup> A more unobtrusive illustration was the firing of a high official from his party post because he referred to Kim Il-sung as tongmu (the ordinary word for "comrade") instead of t'ongji (the honorific form).<sup>16</sup> Still, the Kim Il-sung clique made some weak attempts at correcting the situation. For instance, when the Third Congress of the KWP convened in April 1956, pictures of Kim Il-sung were conspicuously absent from the convention hall -- "an obvious sign that the KWP leadership was anxious to avoid any manifestation of the cult of Kim Il-sung."<sup>17</sup>

Yet in spite of all their precautions, Kim Il-sung

<sup>14</sup> Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), p. 34.

<sup>15</sup> Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 119.

<sup>16</sup> Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 29.

<sup>17</sup> Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 48.

was faced with the first, and only, serious challenge to his power position in August 1956. While the premier was making a two month "good will" tour of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, a cabal of Soviet and Yenan Koreans was organized in the party's hierarchy. The leaders of the secret movement, Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik, a vice-premier and chief theoretician of the Yenan faction, and his counterpart from the Soviet faction, Pak Ch'ang-ok, jointly authored a series of articles suggesting that the KWP was guilty of forming a personality cult around their chairman, Kim Il-sung. Upon his return, Kim came under fire at the August Plenum of the KWP Central Committee from this rebellious Soviet-Yenan coalition which accused him of seeking to perpetuate a personality cult of his own, of violating the principle of collective leadership, and of enforcing stringent economic policies.<sup>18</sup> Not content with mere verbal attacks, Pak Ch'ang-ok took it upon himself to write to Premier Khrushchev and complain that the CPSU pronouncement on collective leadership had been ignored in North Korea.<sup>19</sup> However, the revolt was shortlived since the anti-Kim faction failed to

---

<sup>18</sup>B. C. Koh, "North Korea: A Profile of a Garrison State," Problems of Communism, XVIII (January-February, 1969), 20.

<sup>19</sup>Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Qrtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 23.

attract many recruits and, therefore, remained badly outnumbered by the premier's supporters.

As could be expected, a wholesale purge was quickly implemented in the wake of the anti-Stalinists' defeat. Very likely a horrible blood bath would have resulted had not the Soviet Union and Red China decided to intervene. Apparently, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan and Chinese Communist Marshall P'eng Teh-huai secretly flew from their respective capitals to P'yongyang to act as an international Communist court of appeal. Both representatives urged moderation and suggested the reinstatement of the anti-Kim faction in the KWP as loyal critics of Party policy.<sup>20</sup> Although most of their proposals were ignored, Mikoyan and P'eng did manage to temper the purges' effect by giving many of the Soviet and Yenan victims time to escape to their respective homelands. Most certainly, the events of August 1956 did not help to endear Khrushchev to Kim Il-sung. Almost immediately, Premier Kim responded to the Soviet intervention by intensifying his nationalistic policy and by asserting his country's independence within the Communist camp. More importantly, the absence of the purged Soviet-Korean faction's traditional moderating

---

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 24-25.

influence was felt as the KWP shifted to the left on ideological and economic issues, roughly paralleling the moves made by the Communist Party of China.<sup>21</sup>

As a postscript, the efforts at de-Stalinization were only temporary in North Korea. Most of the attacks on Stalinist practices were engineered merely to please the Soviet Union and to assure the Kremlin that the Kim Il-sung regime was actively eliminating the evils of Stalinism. Since P'yongyang refrained from attacking Stalin personally, the D.P.R.K.'s anti-Stalinist campaign also met with complete P.R.C. approval.<sup>22</sup> Once Soviet pressure had diminished, Kim's personality cult quickly rose to the surface again. For example, in the interest of "history," the North Korean regime created numerous revolutionary (i.e., pre-1945) "shrines" to glorify the past achievements of the supreme leader.<sup>23</sup> Slogans, such as "Let's study from the leader's life" and "Glory of the Kim Il-sung anti-Japanese guerrillas," were promoted in the aftermath of the de-Stalinization campaign.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup>Chong-sik Lee and Ki-wan Oh, "The Russian Faction in North Korea," Asian Survey, VIII (April, 1968), 287-88.

<sup>22</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 130.

<sup>23</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 49.

<sup>24</sup>Sohn, "Factionalism and Party Control of the Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana Quarterly, IX (1967), 25.

In November 1961, Kim Il-sung buried the question of Stalinism once and for all by stating, "The problem of Stalin and anti-party factions in the CPSU has nothing to do with our Party and cannot be the subject of discussion by or in our Party."<sup>25</sup>

In 1957, the rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China was further widened by problems arising from arms sharing agreements and Soviet superiority in the field of space. Toward the end of the year, the twelve ruling Communist parties gathered in Moscow as part of the fortieth anniversary celebration of the October Revolution. Their meeting -- the 1957 Moscow Conference as it came to be called -- resulted in a declaration that stressed the need for bloc unity and solidarity and that condemned "modern revisionism" -- an obvious slap at defiant Yugoslavia.<sup>26</sup>

Throughout the conference, North Korea's chief delegate, Kim Il-sung, seems to have supported Mao Tse-tung's centralist position which placed more emphasis on national autonomy. However, this should not be misinterpreted as P'yongyang's

---

<sup>25</sup>Cited in Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, V (1965), 380.

<sup>26</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 53.

blind endorsement of Peking over Moscow.<sup>27</sup> Actually, Kim was hoping to maintain a middle-of-the-road policy between the two Communist giants by recognizing the Soviet Union's fundamental role in the international Communist movement while simultaneously emphasizing that intra-bloc relations should be based on "principles of complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in one another's affairs."<sup>28</sup>

Yet, the pleas of unity issued by the 1957 Moscow Conference were soon drowned out by the intra-bloc discord raised over the "revisionist" Communist state of Yugoslavia.

Khrushchev's original pronouncements on the multiplicity of forms of socialist development and bloc equality were aimed at achieving an ideological rapprochement with Tito. In the summer of 1956, North Korea reacted favorably to the readmission of Yugoslavia into the Socialist camp by hailing the rapprochement between Moscow and Belgrade as a "positive contribution" to the easing of world tensions and to the restoration of an atmosphere of confidence essential to harmonious international relations.<sup>29</sup> But

---

<sup>27</sup>See Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 712-15.

<sup>28</sup>Ibid., p. 713.

<sup>29</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 53.



even though they fully endorsed the doctrine that there were a variety of ways of building socialism depending upon the historic circumstances found in each case, the North Koreans did not believe that a Communist state like Yugoslavia could deviate from the principles of Marxism-Leninism at will. After the 1958 attacks on Tito's "modern revisionism" by Pravda (Moscow) and Jen-min Jih-pao (Peking), the North Korean press began printing mild criticisms of the Yugoslav regime.<sup>30</sup> Then urged on by the Khrushchev-Mao statement of August 3, 1958 on Tito's tactics, the North Koreans blasted the "dirty Yugoslav revisionists" and announced their determination to "wage an uncompromising struggle" against Yugoslavian revisionism.<sup>31</sup>

Although the events happening within the Communist world were the prime topics of conversation in many Communist-controlled capitals, North Koreans generally tended to be more parochial and ignore the almost daily developments in the dispute. Almost all their attention was taken up by the domestic scene, for 1956 marked North Korea's official entry into the period of socialist construction.<sup>32</sup> For

---

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., p. 55.

<sup>31</sup>Ibid.

<sup>32</sup>Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 56.

example, at the KWP's Third Congress in April 1956, future economic policies, and not the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU, was the major topic of discussion. Always looking ahead, Kim Il-sung wanted to use the Five Year Economic Plan he introduced at the KWP Congress as the cornerstone of an independent, self-reliant national economy. Undoubtedly, he relied on his revolutionary base argument as a means of justification for the continued emphasis on heavy industry in this plan. <sup>33</sup> But in order to ensure the viability of the domestic base, North Korea had set very ambitious goals for collectivization and industrialization under the Five Year Plan (1957-1961); in reality, they were close to impossible targets that could only be achieved by bold innovation and experimentation.

Two additional factors -- the evacuation of the Chinese Volunteers and the 1958 Yen-an purge -- also caused North Koreans to orientate their attention inward. Apparently, the stationing of Chinese troops inside Korea had become too great a burden, both politically and economically, for Kim Il-sung's regime. Ever since 1956, the North Korean premier's calls for unification had included a demand for

---

<sup>33</sup>Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 227.

the withdrawal of Chinese and American forces from Korea.<sup>34</sup>  
 On February 5, 1958, Radio P'yongyang broadcasted a detailed proposal to the United Nations' forces for the withdrawal of the "U.S. Army and all other foreign troops including the Chinese People's Volunteers."<sup>35</sup> The Chinese responded on February 7th that "in order to break the deadlock on the Korean question" they were prepared to evacuate the peninsula.<sup>36</sup> Roy Kim believes that "P'yongyang made the initial February 5 request for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops on its own initiative, possibly with the advance understanding of the Kremlin in 1956."<sup>37</sup>

On February 14, Premier Chou En-lai and a small Chinese delegation made an unannounced sojourn to P'yongyang. Upon arriving at the P'yongyang Airport, Chou En-lai not only reaffirmed the "ever-lasting" Sino-Korean friendship, but appealed to North Korea's national pride by expressing China's eagerness to "learn" from North Korea's experience in socialist construction.<sup>38</sup> A week later, a joint Chinese-

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., pp. 228-29.

<sup>35</sup>Cited in Carl Berger, The Korean Knot (Rev. Ed.; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), p. 220.

<sup>36</sup>Cited in ibid.

<sup>37</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 716.

<sup>38</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 53.

Korean communique revealed that the Chinese intended to completely evacuate by the end of 1958.<sup>39</sup>

Even though the U.N. forces failed to reciprocate and withdraw from their positions in the South, the Chinese Volunteer Corp departed from North Korea as planned. In retrospect, the presence of the Volunteer Corp had been a mixed blessing for North Korea. On one hand, they had provided a significant portion of the badly needed manpower for the post-war rehabilitation programs and had rescued the North Koreans from military collapse; while on the other, the regime could never achieve an independent self-motif with foreign troops camped on its soil. Moreover, the Chinese presence represented a direct threat to Kim Il-sung's leadership position within the regime. The Chinese withdrawal of some 30,000 troops definitely weakened North Korea's military position in respect to South Korea, for the latter now had twice as many men under arms.<sup>40</sup>

Still, many of these same Chinese regiments were immediately redeployed along the Sino-Korean frontier, where they could readily serve as reinforcements in the event of future conflict on the peninsula.

---

<sup>39</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 715.

<sup>40</sup>A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 119.

As soon as their protective shield -- the Chinese Volunteer Corp -- had been weakened, Kim Il-sung initiated a purge against the Yen-an leadership which had been active in the 1956 anti-Kim movement. Kim Tu-bong, still the head of the Yen-an faction, was accused of divisive activities, nepotism, and corrupting the young cadres of the Party; and he was expelled from the KWP in March 1958, along with Ch'oe Ch'ang-ik (prime Yen-an leader in the 1956 attack on Kim Il-sung).<sup>41</sup> In a last ditch effort to retain power, the Yen-an Koreans plotted a coup d'etat to have General Chang P'yong-san, a veteran of the Eighth Route Army, remove Kim Il-sung from office on May Day 1958. However, the plan was prematurely exposed, and the Yen-an faction was summarily swept from the North Korean political arena.<sup>42</sup>

Against this backdrop of external and domestic vicissitude, the North Korean regime embarked on a policy of experimentation in hopes of speeding the process of economic development. Already by 1958-1959, North Korea had made such giant strides toward industrialization that it was

---

<sup>41</sup>Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 228.

<sup>42</sup>Sohn, "Factionalism and Party Control of the Military in Communist North Korea," Koreana Qtly., IX (1967), 23.

now a predominantly industrial nation.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the collectivization of agriculture was completed at this time. With these accomplishments under its belt and a rapidly declining dependence on foreign assistance, North Korea was more in a position to choose its own policies. Although P'yongyang had been more responsive to Peking since the Korean War, it was not until late 1958, and the Korean experimentation with Chinese agricultural communes, that Soviet hegemony was seriously challenged.

Numerous explanations for the 1958-1961 period of experimentation with Communist Chinese policies have been offered, but most center on the close parallels between D.P.R.K. and P.R.C. experiences in development. For both economic development has been a critical factor. Koh observed that "although they have had varying degrees of success in their campaigns to wipe out poverty and to stand on their own feet, they still remain in the ranks of the 'have not' nations."<sup>44</sup> Moreover, North Korea's pattern of socialization resembled the Red Chinese model rather than those of the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe.

---

<sup>43</sup>Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 302.

<sup>44</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 62.

In fact, the timing and tempo of P'yongyang's collectivization effort coincided exactly with China's.<sup>45</sup> In addition, Rudolph commented, "The fervor of the ideological campaigns, the extensive use of mass organizations in the regimentation and mobilization of the population, and the current drive to hasten the building of socialism [in the D.P.R.K.] also exhibit much of the same intensive character as the Chinese effort to transform the country."<sup>46</sup>

In their common pursuit of economic development, China and North Korea came into direct conflict with many of the Kremlin's policies. As has been previously mentioned, Kim Il-sung and Mao Tse-tung continued to perpetuate their personality cults, which ran counter to the Soviet de-Stalinization campaign. For another thing, Russian leaders were becoming more preoccupied with meeting the increasing demands for consumer goods in the Soviet Union and, thus, more divorced from the rigid controls needed by the Koreans and the Chinese to implement the socialist economic structure.<sup>47</sup>

---

<sup>45</sup>Yoon T. Kuark, "North Korea's Agricultural Development During the Post-War Period," China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 82-93.

<sup>46</sup>Rudolph, North Korea's Political and Economic Structure, p. 62.

<sup>47</sup>Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course of North Korea," Koreana Quarterly, V (Summer, 1963), 54.

And finally, the P.R.C. and D.P.R.K. engendered a constant mode of hatred against the "U.S. imperialists" and nurtured a bellicose spirit in an effort to spur its population to continually excel previous production records. Therefore, Kim Il-sung was profoundly dissatisfied with Khrushchev's overtures to the United States for regularizing relations; and, furthermore, he regarded the United States "as the major enemy blocking attainment of his primary goals -- the destruction of the anti-Communist regime in South Korea and the reunification of the whole country under Communist domination."<sup>48</sup> Likewise, American military presence was preventing Chairman Mao's absorption of Taiwan.

Furthermore, Khrushchev's practice of meddling in intra-party affairs of other Communist states produced a nationalistic reaction to what the North Koreans and the Chinese Communists called Soviet "big-power chauvinism." Griffith believes, "Khrushchev probably attempted to bully Kim into line as he did Mao, Hoxha, and others."<sup>49</sup> Also, Kun has pointed out that "in the example of Khrushchev's roughness toward smaller Communist parties such as the

---

<sup>48</sup>An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV: (1966), 69.

<sup>49</sup>William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," China Quarterly, No. 25 (1966), p. 77.



Albanian, the North Korean leadership saw a potential menace to the independence of the Korea Worker's Party."<sup>50</sup> Therefore, the Kremlin's well-intended moves to bring greater inter-party discipline by interferring in intra-party affairs actually had the reverse effect in that, Kim Il-sung and other Communist leaders responded by avowing an even more independent line.

Although so many Soviet policies conflicted with North Korean goals, Kim Il-sung's regime still could not afford to completely alienate the Russians. Therefore, throughout the period of experimentation, North Korea's relationship with the Soviet Union remained essentially intact. The regime continued to pay homage to the U.S.S.R. as the leader of the socialist camp. In Kim Il-sung's eyes,

Solidarity centered on the Soviet Union was necessary yesterday, is necessary today /1959/, and will be necessary tomorrow. This solidarity around the Soviet Union does not mean that somebody is dominating somebody else, it also does not mean that we are suffering from sadaejjuui /sycophancy/.<sup>51</sup>

Since P'yongyang did not reject Soviet teachings or deny

---

<sup>50</sup>Joseph C. Run, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence," The Reporter, February 22, 1968, p. 19.

<sup>51</sup>Cited in Paige and Lee, "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 24.

Moscow's position of supremacy, it must be stressed that their pro-Peking gestures from 1958 to 1961 were wholly independent of its posture toward the Soviet Union.

During the period of experimentation, the Korean Communists emulated at least five major aspects of Chinese behavior. According to Paige,

They decided to imitate the frantic pace of the Great Leap Forward, to combine economic and administrative units at the lowest rural administrative level, to reorganize the agricultural cooperatives in the direction of the people's communes, to adopt handicraft methods of local industrial production, and to make party organs directly responsible for economic and administrative decisions.<sup>52</sup>

Less significant, but still important, was the Korean decision not to emulate one facet of Chinese behavior -- the 1957 "Hundred Flowers" Campaign. Under the slogan "Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools contend," Mao Tse-tung invited his country's academic, artistic, and managerial intelligentsia to criticize his regime. The reaction was so overwhelming that the critics had to be silenced after six weeks.<sup>53</sup> It seems that Premier Kim

---

<sup>52</sup>Glenn D. Paige, "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior," in Communist Strategies in Asia, ed. by A. Doak Barnett (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 244.

<sup>53</sup>Roderick MacFarquhar, The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Intellectuals (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 3.

was unwilling to risk his leadership of the KWP by adopting such modes of self-criticism; and the Chinese experience with the "Hundred Flowers" movement most certainly must have reinforced Kim's solicitude over dissent.

Unquestionably, the most important event of this period was North Korea's imitation of the Great Leap Forward -- the Korean Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) movement. The term was coined by Kim Il-sung in January of 1958, when he urged the workers to "rush forward as if we were riding a Ch'ollima /Flying Horse".<sup>54</sup> Once the movement was fully initiated, six months later, its primary goal was the completion of the Five Year Plan ahead of its 1961 target date. Since the Ch'ollima Undong (Flying Horse Movement) had such considerable consequences, a detailed look at its operation is entirely justified.

Clearly modeled on Communist China's Great Leap Forward which was launched a few months earlier, the Flying Horse Movement soon drew criticism from the Soviet capital.

---

<sup>54</sup>Wan-shik Yoo, "The Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement," Korean Affairs, II, 3-4 (1963), p. 163. Literally translated Ch'ollima Undong means Thousand-ri Horse Movement. One ri equals about one-third of a mile, and this was the distance, a thousand ris, that the mythical horse was said to have traveled in a day. For further explanation, see Kuark, "North Korea's Agricultural Development During the Post-War Period," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 90.

The Russian Premier boldly stated that as long as a strong socialist fortress like the Soviet Union existed, any endeavor for leaping economic growth was more or less harmful to the construction of socialism.<sup>55</sup> Of course, Khrushchev's criticism was motivated by the threat such radical policies presented to Soviet influence in the Communist world, especially since the Chinese Communist Party had announced that its chairman had solved the problem of constructing Communism in underdeveloped countries.<sup>56</sup>

Unlike the Russian Stakhanov movement which stressed a production augmentation drive, the Ch'ollima movement aimed at not only increasing production but reforming the worker's ideology to support the production endeavors as well. To maximize the movement's impact, the North Korean regime mobilized all available manpower for production and requested that those engaged in farming, livestock, fishing, forestry, transportation and communications, education, and the arts also participate in the Ch'ollima movement. The regime's hierarchy established a frantic pace for the movement; for example, it was reported that

---

<sup>55</sup>Yoo, "The Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 164.

<sup>56</sup>Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 77.

people were often forced to work more than fourteen hours a day.<sup>57</sup> Their strenuous efforts paid great dividends for Kim Il-sung, for in January 1960 he was able to announce that the Five Year Plan had been fulfilled nearly two years ahead of schedule.

Fortunately for Kim Il-sung, the Ch'ollima movement had nowhere near the disastrous results that the Great Leap Forward had inflicted on mainland China. A saving factor could have been that Kim Il-sung (perhaps with Russian persuasion) decided to abandon the movement a year before the Chinese finally did.<sup>58</sup> However, the movement's undue concentration on heavy industry had severely tightened the industrial bottleneck in the North Korean economy and caused a serious imbalance between agriculture and industry by the time the Ch'ollima movement was over. Since then, Kuark observed, "The North Koreans seem to have been cautious . . . and returned to the Leninist line in agriculture."<sup>59</sup> But regardless of its many failures, the

<sup>57</sup>Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 229.

<sup>58</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea," Asian Survey, VI (1965), 260.

<sup>59</sup>Kuark, "North Korea's Agricultural Development During the Post-War Period," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 91.

movement did have a great impact on North Koreans. Overall, the Ch'ollima movement was neither a complete rejection of Soviet experience nor an exact imitation of Chinese behavior but rather a nativistic application of Marxism-Leninism, utilizing the valuable experiences of Russia as well as China.

The Flying Horse movement, in itself, brought about no radical divergence from the policy of achieving unification by constructing a self-motif that had been in effect since 1953. However, events outside the state -- namely the 1960 student riots in Seoul and, later, the downfall of Syngman Rhee -- necessitated new, "peaceful" proposals for reunification from the D.P.R.K. In response to the popular interest in negotiations which accompanied the civil unrest in the South, Kim Il-sung proposed that a loose confederation between the two halves of Korea be established immediately as an initial step toward unification.<sup>60</sup>

Specifically, the plan called for the creation of a "confederated government" by combining the existing North and South Korean governments and organizing a Supreme National Committee to administer such common state functions as

---

<sup>60</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 269.

foreign relations, currency, postal service, and cultural affairs.<sup>61</sup> Representation on the Supreme National Committee would be evenly distributed between North and South, and, more importantly each side would have a veto.

Hedging against the confederation's rejection, Kim suggested forming a Joint Economic Committee that would coordinate only economic and commercial matters. This committee was to be composed of businessmen and industrial representatives from each side.<sup>62</sup> In addition, offers were tendered for cultural and other "non-political" exchanges. P'yongyang purposely appealed to the nationalistic sentiments of the South Koreans with slogans like "Chaju T'ongil" ("independent unification"). Many South Korean students were intoxicated by the propaganda from the North, but they failed to create enough pressure on their government to ensure negotiations. The Korean Communist party, without a viable party apparatus in the South, simply could not take advantage of the events of April 1960 which had all the potential for a Communist revolution.

As the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C. drifted farther apart in

---

<sup>61</sup>Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 231.

<sup>62</sup>Ibid., p. 232.

the aftermath of the 20th CPSU Congress, Kim Il-sung was faced with a serious dilemma for it obviously was difficult to choose between his regime's two benefactors. P'yongyang's solution was to adopt a nebulous, middle-of-the-road policy. Scalapino has outlined North Korea's techniques of neutralism that were designed to placate both disputants as follows:

(1) Approximately equal space was accorded to the Soviet Union and Communist China, and equally laudatory terms were used to describe their respective accomplishments. The one exception was that when listing the "fraternal socialist allies" North Korea placed the U.S.S.R. first. (2) Only complimentary terms about other Communist parties were used in public, and the emphasis was on unbreakable solidarity. (3) Revisionism was regarded as the bloc's primary internal danger, and Yugoslavia was mercilessly attacked.<sup>63</sup> In all, North Korea managed to remain neutral between 1958 and 1961, while exerting all of its energy to close the gap between the two Communist giants.

---

<sup>63</sup> Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 43-44.



## CHAPTER IV

### P'YONGYANG-PEKING AXIS, 1962-1965

During the period of experimentation with Chinese policies, North Korea -- trying as it did to remain non-aligned -- gradually began to stray from the narrow and treacherous path separating Moscow from Peking. At first the evidence was inconclusive but, by late 1962, the world saw Kim Il-sung's regime firmly entrenched in the camp of Communist China. It seems that the Korean Worker's Party started to waver from its position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute in the aftermath of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU held in 1961. At the congress, Kim Il-sung had hailed the U.S.S.R. as "the recognized vanguard of the international Communist movement" and had declared that the "consolidation of unity with the CPSU is the duty of Communists of all countries and is a principle of proletarian internationalism."<sup>1</sup> Yet, when Khrushchev openly attacked the Albanian party leadership -- provoking an

---

<sup>1</sup>Alexander Dallin, et. al., eds., Diversity in International Communism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 387.

angry retort from Chou En-lai, Kim and his Korean delegation had remained conspicuously silent.<sup>2</sup> Under such circumstances, silence could easily be construed as an endorsement of the Chinese position.

Immediately following the congress, North Korea again took up its middle-of-the-road tactics. For example, the North Korean regime selected two ceremonial occasions to unmistakably portray their non-alignment by sending an effusive message of congratulations to the Soviet Union on the forty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution and, on the next day, by dispatching words of praise to the Albanian Party of Labor (Communist Party of Albania) on its twentieth anniversary.<sup>3</sup> Therefore, P'yongyang attempted to preserve its cautious attitude in the first months after the congress but divergences from Moscow endorsed positions gradually began to appear with increasing regularity.

Among the wide range of issues confronting the Communist world during the 1961-1962 period, Chinese and

---

<sup>2</sup>Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 38-39.

<sup>3</sup>Robert A. Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, XLI (January, 1963), 329.

Korean Communists found themselves allied against the Soviets on the following questions: Albania, Yugoslavia, Cuba and the Sino-Indian border dispute.

Ever since Khrushchev's 1955 overtures to reestablish friendly relations with Tito's Yugoslavia, friction had existed between the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) and the CPSU.<sup>4</sup> The Albanian party leadership feared that such a reconciliation eventually might lead to a restoration of Yugoslav control over the APL, thus endangering their personal positions.<sup>5</sup> Another blow to the Albanian Communists was Khrushchev's attacks on Stalin for the late Soviet Premier was revered as Albania's liberator, and Albanian Premier Hoxha faithfully adhered to his methods of control. Typical of the animosity existing between Albania and Yugoslavia was an exchange between Hoxha and Tito when the former accused the latter of being responsible for Albania's domestic difficulties as well as those of

---

<sup>4</sup>For a discussion of this friction, see William E. Griffith, Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963), and Stavre Skendi, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Foreign Affairs, XL (April 1962), 471-78.

<sup>5</sup>The Albanian Party of Labor was founded under the auspices of the Yugoslav Communist Party and remained under Yugoslav tutelage until Stalin expelled Tito from the Cominform in 1948.

Hungary and Poland.<sup>6</sup>

It was never clear whether the Albanian's first approached the Chinese Communists or vice versa, Regardless, the issue of Yugoslav revisionism quickly brought them into public accord. "Since May 1958," Skendi reported, "the press of the two countries has never stopped denouncing Yugoslav revisionism, linking it often to the principle of peaceful coexistence."<sup>7</sup> In his endeavors to win the Yugoslavs back into the Soviet fold, Khrushchev attempted to silence Albanian criticism and, at the same time, to isolate the Chinese Communists from the rest of the Communist community as punishment for its pro-Albanian stance. However, he failed on both counts for Hoxha and his comrades could not be muzzled and a new phenomenon in the Communist world -- neutralism -- prevented Chinese exclusion. In regard to the latter, Scalapino explained, "The great bulk of the Asian Communist movement chose to remain non-aligned between Moscow and Peking, and this in itself was a defeat for Khrushchev, especially when, as in many

---

<sup>6</sup>For details of the exchange see, Skendi, "Albania and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Foreign Affairs, XL (1962), 472.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 473.

cases, it was non-alignment that leaned toward Peking."<sup>8</sup> North Korea's position on the Albanian question typified this "pro-Peking" non-alignment.

Initially, Korean Communists maintained that relations between the CPSU and the APL were "abnormal" and that if this situation persisted it would cause "grave damage" to the Communist movement.<sup>9</sup> In December 1961, Kim Il-sung said, "our party wishes to see a satisfactory solution to the Albanian question achieved through enduring efforts to remove present disputes and differences of views and to attain mutual understanding in the full spirit of international solidarity . . ."<sup>10</sup> At first, North Korea employed the tactics of "mutual recognition" in the Albanian dispute as evidenced by the following statement: "We firmly believe that the friendship and solidarity between the peoples of Albania and Korea will continue to develop and become stronger in the future under the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism -- within the great family of

---

<sup>8</sup>Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, XLI (1963), 324.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 328.

<sup>10</sup>Cited in Alexander Dallin, et al., eds., Diversity in International Communism, p. 390.

the Socialist camp headed by the U.S.S.R."<sup>11</sup>

Thus, the North Koreans stayed on the periphery of the Soviet-Albanian conflict and urged the respective parties to consent to negotiations so that inter-party harmony would be preserved. Then, in the early part of 1962, P'yongyang began to closely identify with Albania's stance on Yugoslav revisionism. Finally, in March 1962, Kim Il-sung openly showed his endorsement of Hoxha's policies by entering into a direct agreement with his regime, despite the fact that Albania remained a constant target of Russian criticism.

North Korea's non-aligned policy further gave way in the wake of Soviet President Brezhnev's September 1962 visit to Belgrade. Following the Sino-Albanian lead, the KWP organs blasted the Tito revisionist clique as soon as Brezhnev departed. For example, a P'yongyang newspaper reacted to the Brezhnev-Tito Summit in a September 28, 1962 editorial which "accused them [the Yugoslavs] of being revisionists who serve only to block the struggle of the Communists against the Imperialists."<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>Speech made at a KWP meeting on November 8, 1961. Cited in Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 39.

<sup>12</sup>Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course of North Korea," Koreana Qtly., V (1963), 50.

Later, in an October 1962 speech intitled "Immediate Tasks of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Kim Il-sung claimed: "The modern revisionists represented by the Tito clique of Yugoslavia are faithfully serving U.S. imperialism, attempting to undermine the unity of the socialist camp, defend the aggressive maneuvers of imperialism and paralyse the revolutionary struggle of the popular masses."<sup>13</sup> He went on by attacking all revisionists for "their vicious policy of slandering and dividing the Socialist countries, in an attempt to overthrow the parties and governments of these countries."<sup>14</sup> This last statement strongly suggests that Premier Khrushchev himself was being brought under attack for revisionist tactics. Therefore, just as in the Albanian dispute, North Korea had endorsed the Chinese position and attacked Yugoslav revisionism much to the dismay of the CPSU.

Khrushchev's adventurism and capitulation in Cuba was widely criticized by the Korean Communists for it brought to mind the frustration and dissappointment they themselves had experienced during the Korean War. Indeed,

---

<sup>13</sup>Cited in Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 32.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 42.

North Korea had been the first victim of such policies when the Soviets set it up and then unexpectedly left it stranded in the face of American resistance. In fact, the North Korean press never did report the existence or removal of Russian missiles from Cuba, perhaps fearing that excessive public indignation over Moscow's retreat would breed undesirable results.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, Radio P'yongyang continually censured the Soviet Union for its "soft line,"<sup>16</sup>

In addition to bitter memories, the Cuban missile crisis raised an important question of whether or not the Soviet Union -- in adhering to its policy of peaceful coexistence -- would ever risk a possible confrontation with the United States for the defense of a socialist ally. Judging from the Cuban case and their own experience, the North Korean leadership reached a negative verdict. The Cuban crisis marked an important alteration in North Korean policy. As Thomas An stated, "P'yongyang abruptly abandoned its 'neutralist' posture and, after January 1963,

---

<sup>15</sup> Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 718.

<sup>16</sup> Il-kun Ham, "The North Korean Regime and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), p. 145.



began solidly backing Communist China on practically all issues in the Sino-Soviet clash."<sup>17</sup>

North Korea fully supported China in its border conflict with India just as it had openly backed Cuba against the United States. Soon after the border entanglements became intensified, the North Korean communications media launched a vigorous campaign against the Nehru government.<sup>18</sup> For instance, editorials stated, "India has made illegal encroachments upon the territory of China and the reactionary circles of the Indians have risen against China, instigated and abetted by America."<sup>19</sup> In most cases, Korean propaganda blasts at the Indians were accompanied by persistent demands for a peaceful settlement. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), for example, broadcasted the following: "The Korean people are of the opinion that India should discontinue at once its illegal intrusion into Chinese territory, withdraw its troops from

---

<sup>17</sup>An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV (1966), 69.

<sup>18</sup>Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qlty., No. 14 (1963), pp. 42-43.

<sup>19</sup>This particular statement appeared in the September 26, 1962 issue of Nodong Sinmum (P'yongyang). See Ham, "The North Korean Regime and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 144-45.

that territory, and respond to the just proposal of the P.R.C. on settling the question in dispute by way of negotiation."<sup>20</sup> A few contend that North Korea's support for Communist China was not really very enthusiastic because Kim Il-sung did not wish to jeopardise his country's newly established trade relations with India.<sup>21</sup> How enthusiastic their support actually was is hard to determine, but it is known that P'yongyang's advocacy of China's cause did bring the regime into direct conflict with Moscow which had sided with New Delhi.

By the end of 1962, North Korean expressions of neutralism must have had an ominous ring in Soviet ears. Soon the subtlety vanished from the North Korean attacks on revisionism and peaceful coexistence, and the P'yongyang-Peking Axis was firmly cemented by their mutual hostility to Moscow's "self-centered" policies. Probably, Communist China gained North Korea as an ally not by its own doing but rather because the Soviet Union had committed these successive foreign policy blunders -- the most notable

---

<sup>20</sup>KCNA broadcast to Asia in English, 0600 GMT, September 26, 1963. For transcript see, "Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sept. 27, 1963.

<sup>21</sup>For example, see Uoong Tack Kim, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea," p. 302.

being the Cuban missile crisis.

The coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea was a more immediate factor driving the P'yongyang regime to the side of Red China. The coup ushered in a defiantly anti-Communist, military regime headed by General Park Chung-hee. Kim Il-sung sensed a military threat from the South, and a jittery North Korea became thoroughly convinced that the United States and South Korea were only marking time before they would attack in an attempt to destroy the D.P.R.K.<sup>22</sup> This fear led North Korean leaders to renew their contacts with the two giants of the Communist bloc in hopes of committing them to North Korea's defense.

In search of foreign support, Kim hurriedly traveled to Moscow and Peking in July 1961. At the Kremlin, on July 6th, Premier Kim signed a formal ten-year military assistance treaty. Scalapino noted,

In speeches for the occasion, Kim and Khrushchev sought to strike common notes: the menace of American imperialism in Asia, the great progress of the Communist world, and its unbreakable unity . . . The Kremlin speeches certainly covered the basic ground 'correctly' in a formal sense.<sup>23</sup>

---

<sup>22</sup>Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, V (1965), 379.

<sup>23</sup>Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), pp. 37-38.

Before leaving Moscow, Kim Il-sung signed a joint communique railing "deviations from the principles of socialist internationalism," phraseology which in this context could only be aimed at Peking's anti-Moscow activities.<sup>24</sup>

From the Soviet capital Kim and his party flew directly to Peking, where on July 11 an almost identical treaty was concluded with the Chinese People's Republic. While in Peking, Kim heaped praise upon Chinese leaders, "asserting that their successful construction of Socialism was consolidating the power of the whole Socialist camp, and of particular encouragement to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America in their struggle for peace, national independence and social progress."<sup>25</sup> In the joint Sino-Korean communique issued on Kim's departure (July 15th), he and Chou En-lai declared that the chief danger to world Communism was "Yugoslav revisionism", the euphemism that Peking commonly employed to denote "soft" Soviet policies.<sup>26</sup> Thus, in the space of three short weeks, Kim Il-sung had parroted the lines of both Moscow and Peking but this

---

<sup>24</sup>Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 380.

<sup>25</sup>Cited in Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 38.

<sup>26</sup>See Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 380, and The New York Times, July 21, 1961, p. 3.

was thought to be a comparatively small price to pay for the military benefits he had so dexterously reaped from his nation's rival suitors.

From articles inserted in both treaties, the D.P.R.K. obviously tried to protect its "independent" position in a steadily worsening Sino-Soviet dispute. Each document emphasized North Korea's independence, territorial integrity, and autonomy of internal affairs. More specifically, they accentuated P'yongyang's strict neutrality in dealing with Moscow and Peking. For example, Article 2 of the Soviet-Korean treaty underlined that "each of the parties undertakes to conclude no alliance and to participate in no coalition or action directed against the other;" while Article 3 of the Sino-Korean treaty stressed that "neither party should conclude any alliance directed against the other party or take part in any bloc or any action or measures directed against the other party."<sup>27</sup> Thus, the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. unofficially recognized the D.P.R.K.'s neutrality for as Zagoria said "each preferred to keep the Asian parties in the middle rather than see them openly allied with the other."<sup>28</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup>Portions of the two treaties are cited in Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 717-18.

<sup>28</sup>Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 380.

With a potential military invasion threatening from his Southern flank, Kim Il-sung grew even less enthusiastic about the Kremlin's policy of achieving a détente with the West. The Soviet reaction to American demands in the Cuban crisis made them even more apprehensive of Soviet intentions. Then, when former Defense Minister Kim Kwang-hyop visited Moscow in November 1962 to request additional military aid, he was apparently cold-shouldered by Kremlin leaders.<sup>29</sup> Because of this and similar incidents, Kim Il-sung concluded that the Soviet Union offered little in the way of assistance or protection.

Under such circumstances, North Korea had only two alternatives; it could either put itself at the mercy of the Communist Chinese or strike out on an independent course. They decided to go it alone at a December 1962 Central Committee plenary meeting, when the KWP leadership adopted what it referred to as a "military line."<sup>30</sup> The "military line" consisted of modernizing and strengthening North Korea's military capacity in anticipation of an invasion from the South. Essentially, it placed the entire

---

<sup>29</sup>Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 24.

<sup>30</sup>Ibid.

country on a war footing. B. C. Koh listed the following goals of the new "military line": (1) make a cadre out of every soldier, (2) modernize the army, (3) arm the entire people, and (4) turn the whole country into an impenetrable fortress.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, North Korea began to organize itself into a garrison state.

In conjunction with the "military line", the D.P.R.K. altered its strategy for communizing the South in order to take into account the appearance of a military regime in the South. Although P'yongyang continued to issue pronouncements advocating the peaceful unification of the peninsula without foreign interference, the regime was actually planning to launch a war of national liberation in the South. At the same December 1962 plenary meeting, Kim proclaimed: "They the South Korean people should rise up in a nationwide struggle to repel and smash the reckless onslaught of the counterrevolution."<sup>32</sup> The North Korean hierarchy still believed that unification hinged on the D.P.R.K.'s rapid advance toward socialism, not only in the creation of a self-image but in the development of a military capacity as well.

---

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

<sup>32</sup> Cited in Cho, "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies," World Politics, XIX (1967), 236-37.

In the wake of the 1962 "military line", there was a sharp increase in cease-fire violations by North Korean forces. These attacks along the thirty-eighth parallel were somewhat reminiscent of the events that preceded the June 25, 1950 attack.<sup>33</sup> They also paralleled the Communist strategy in uniting another divided Asian country -- Vietnam. According to Scalapino,

Basically, the tactics and strategy of North Korean Communists are similar to those of the North Vietnamese Communists. The Communist leaders of North Korea hope to see the development of a "liberation front," a political-military movement in South Korea dedicated to the support of the communist unification plan, and operating as a broad nationalist-Communist alliance.<sup>34</sup>

Kim Il-sung was firmly convinced that the route to unification laid along bellicose actions of subversion and infiltration designed to overthrow the Park Chung-hee government. However, such tactics and strategy were no longer acceptable according to the Kremlin; whereas, the Red Chinese enthusiastically promoted national liberation movements throughout Asia. Therefore, P'yongyang's unification policy placed

---

<sup>33</sup>Glenn D. Paige, "1966: Korea Creates the Future," Asian Survey, VII (January, 1967), 27.

<sup>34</sup>Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 35.



the regime in sympathy with Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Again, the question of Moscow's peaceful coexistence policy had arisen in connection with unification. Kim Il-sung always saw the United States as the major barrier to communizing the entire peninsula. "The issues between Russia and China in 1960," according to Zagoria, "must have appeared to the North Koreans primarily as a question of whether there was going to be a bloc-wide policy of militant struggle designed to remove the Americans from South Korea and the rest of the western Pacific."<sup>35</sup> By 1962, the Kim Il-sung regime came to believe that "Peking's more militant line offered more protection from the United States and was more likely in the long run to bring about Korean unification on Communist terms."<sup>36</sup>

Other explanations for the Sino-North Korean alignment focus on geographic propinquity, common culture, collaboration in the Korean War, common anti-Western bias, shared

---

<sup>35</sup> Leopold Labedz and G. R. Urban, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1964), p. 65.

<sup>36</sup> Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, V (1965), 376.

problems of underdevelopment, and historic xenophobia.<sup>37</sup> Yet, these reasons, including North Korea's desire for reunification, were not the sole determining factors in the emergence of a P'yongyang-Peking Axis. Perhaps it was that the Soviet Union proved to be its own worst enemy. For besides its foreign policy blunders, Moscow had outwardly displayed the tactics of "big-power" chauvinism in its relations with P'yongyang and ignored the principles of equality and mutual respect among fraternal parties in its dealings with the Korean Worker's Party.<sup>38</sup> There was some evidence, for example, that the Kremlin inspired an intense intra-party struggle in the KWP around November 1962, when the remnants of the old Soviet-Korean clique demanded the country return to its former association with the Soviet Union.<sup>39</sup> Therefore, Khrushchev's "adventuristic" foreign policy, failure to make a firm defense commitment, and meddling in intra-party affairs probably played a major role in the North Korean decision.

---

<sup>37</sup>For such explanations, see Ham, "The North Korean Regime and the Sino-Soviet Dispute," Korean Affairs, II (1963), 147, and Tong Won Lee, "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course of North Korea," Koreana Qtly., V (1963), 52.

<sup>38</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 135.

<sup>39</sup>Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 227.

It is interesting to note that Donald Zagoria believes that the Korean Communists were the earliest Chinese ally in the dispute. He maintains that North Korean support for the Chinese position goes back at least to 1960 for as he claims "They certainly supported the Chinese at the Moscow Conference in 1960 and they were in the field alongside the Chinese before the Albanians."<sup>40</sup>

Regardless of the exact date, Moscow did not delay in retaliating once it became evident that North Korea had joined the Chinese camp. Kremlin leaders demanded that P'yongyang be severely penalized for its deviant behavior and quickly curtailed its economic and, particularly, military assistance to North Korea.<sup>41</sup> In addition to economic sanctions, Khrushchev went so far as to excommunicate the KWP from the international Communist community. In the 1963 edition of the International Yearbook of Politics and Economics published by the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations, North Korea was excluded, along with Albania and Communist China, from the family of socialist countries.<sup>42</sup> Thereafter, only

---

<sup>40</sup>Labeledz and Urban, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 65.

<sup>41</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 266.

<sup>42</sup>Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. xvi.

Albania, China, Cuba, North Vietnam, and a few nonruling Communist and labor parties remained on friendly terms with North Korea.

In 1963, North Korea attempted a double edged position in the Sino-Soviet dispute in that, it openly supported Peking while it was attempting to forestall a worsening of relations with Moscow. But such a stance proved to be impossible as the split became progressively more discernible. For example, at the congress of the East German Communist Party in January 1963, the KWP was publicly snubbed for its pro-Peking line. For once the congress was officially convened, the Korean Communists were denied the opportunity to make a customary congratulatory speech and then systematically excluded from presenting its case in written form.<sup>43</sup> Duly incensed, Nodong Sinmun (a P'yongyang newspaper) responded by extinguishing any lingering doubts about the regime's ideological alliance with Peking with an explicit defense of the Chinese Communist position.<sup>44</sup> In a later Nodong Sinmun editorial, the KWP stressed that

---

<sup>43</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 66.

<sup>44</sup>For excerpts of the Jan. 30, 1963 edition of Nodong Sinmun that featured the defense of the Chinese position, see ibid., p. 67.

"it was impossible . . . that one big power could represent the socialist camp and dictate the course of the world revolution."<sup>45</sup> Although the criticism printed in the North Korean papers was often brutal, the regime, on the whole, did try to go out of its way not to antagonize the Russians in 1963.

However, throughout 1964, the animosity between Moscow and P'yongyang steadily increased. The North Korean regime continued to issue venomous attacks against the revisionist camp, "which amounted to a declaration of war upon Khrushchev and his successors."<sup>46</sup> Griffith summed up North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute for 1964 thusly: "P'yongyang explicitly refused to attend Khrushchev's planned conference, defended the Chinese splitting policies, and by September 1964 was attacking Moscow explicitly for Soviet economic policies toward North Korea and Soviet interference in North Korea's internal affairs."<sup>47</sup>

There seems to be no clear consensus why North Korea

<sup>45</sup>The editorial appeared on Oct. 28, 1963. Cited in Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," pp. 133-34.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>47</sup>William E. Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," China Quarterly, No. 25 (1960), p. 77.

became more closely aligned with the Chinese Communists in 1964. Perhaps, Soviet cut backs in foreign aid and attempts to isolate P'yongyang forced Kim Il-sung to adopt a more recalcitrant attitude toward Moscow. Or, as Patrick J. Honey suspected, the Russians may have attempted some manoeuvre to replace Kim Il-sung, causing him naturally to turn more toward China.<sup>48</sup> Whatever the cause, relations between Moscow and P'yongyang had been reduced to an absolute minimum by the end of 1964.

However, during the year North Korea actively pursued a policy of extending relations with other socialist and non-socialist states. In a large part, such a policy may have been necessitated by their excommunication from the Soviet bloc in 1963. Kim Il-sung journeyed to Indonesia in April and met with President Sukarno. As a result of this visit, the two countries established formal diplomatic relations.<sup>49</sup> Then, Ch'oe Yong-gon -- Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly visited the UAR, Algeria, Mali, Guinea, and Cambodia in November and

---

<sup>48</sup>Honey, by his own admission, has no positive proof that such an event did take place. See Labeledz and Urban, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, p. 64.

<sup>49</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Korea: Troubles in a Divided State," Asian Survey, V (January, 1965), 30.

December; and early the next year Premier Kim sent his special envoy -- Vice Foreign Minister Kim Tae-hui -- on an African tour.<sup>50</sup> As these trips indicate, North Korea concentrated on establishing relations with the "uncommitted nations" of the Third World.

One of the highlights of 1964 for P'yongyang was the hosting of the Asian Economic Seminar which met from June 17 to June 23. Representatives of twenty-eight nations -- including Australia, New Zealand, and Japan -- attended and discussed topics, such as "Self-Reliant Recovery and Construction of Independent National Economy" and "Neo-Colonialism and the Asian Economy."<sup>51</sup> The seminar drew sharp criticism from Moscow; for example, Pravda charged that it was "guided by interests far removed from the economic problems of Asian countries" and that it sought to "split the Asian and African movements" and "vilify the socialist countries."<sup>52</sup>

Although a Soviet-Korean trade pact was renewed and

---

<sup>50</sup>C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of Ulsa," Asian Survey, VI (January, 1966), 39.

<sup>51</sup>For a more detailed account of the Seminar, see Chong-sik Lee, "Korea: Troubles in a Divided State," Asian Survey, V (1965), 29-30.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

a group of Russian technicians was dispatched to North Korea, conditions remained basically unchanged until the CPSU ousted Khrushchev on October 17, 1964. This event evoked no immediate response from P'yongyang except for a congratulatory letter to the new leaders of the Soviet regime.<sup>53</sup> Unlike the Chinese, the North Koreans never speculated on the factors causing Khrushchev's fall from power. Instead, P'yongyang ignored the past and stressed the indispensability of unity for the socialist camp.

After October 1964, Griffith wrote,

P'yongyang made it clear that it continued to differ with Moscow and agreed with Peking on policy toward the United States, on revisionism (including support for the pro-Chinese parties and opposition to their pro-Moscow opponents), on Albania (with which cordial relations were still maintained), and on "self-sufficiency", independent<sup>54</sup> all-round industrialization, and Rumania.

Such statements indicated that P'yongyang's policy toward Moscow, in the post-Khrushchev period, would be based on the latter's actual performance that is, the Soviet Union would have to present a stronger front toward the United States and increase its support to the revolutionary

---

<sup>53</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 719.

<sup>54</sup>Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations," China Qtly., No. 25 (1966), p. 77.



struggle to win the allegiance of the North Korean regime.

The most important aspect of the Sino-North Korean alliance from 1962 to 1965 was not so much the existence of ideological ties but rather a dominant motive which drew the two countries together and gave some permanency to their tenuous union amidst the tempest of the Communist doctrinal polemics of the times. This magnetic motivating force was the common desire for independence. Nationalism had made a tremendous impact on both their foreign policies and dictated the assumption of independent positions. Therefore, North Korea's rejection of the Soviet Union was, in essence, a reaction to the U.S.S.R.'s neo-colonial intervention in its internal political affairs and manipulation of its economy.

In reality, North Korea had not enlisted in the Chinese camp solely out of reverence for Red China's ideological position but rather had done so in an attempt to further its own perceived national interests. That is, Kim Il-sung fully expected his affinity with Mao Tse-tung to facilitate his primary goals of Korean unification and the construction of a viable self-image for North Korea. However, national self-interest did not provide a strong, permanent foundation for the P'yongyang-Peking Axis for, as Koh observed, "North Korea's perception of its national self-interest

could be no more steady than the hostile tides with which it had to contend."<sup>55</sup> Therefore, when 1965 brought about changing conditions that indicated its national self-interests would be served best by a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., the D.P.R.K. did not hesitate to leave the Chinese camp in search of greener pastures closer to Moscow.

---

<sup>55</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 81.

## CHAPTER V

### RECONCILIATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1965-

In retrospect, North Korea really never had totally committed itself to the Chinese position in the Sino-Soviet schism. Instead, the Korean Communists merely had emitted emotional, pro-Chinese responses to the stimuli of Soviet intra-bloc politics. As was readily seen, the Kremlin's actions -- which usually placed P'yongyang on the defensive -- constantly provoked emotional outbursts from the North Korean press. Yet, three fruitless years of collaboration with Red China and a resulting lack of progress toward his national objectives led Kim Il-sung to reappraise his foreign policy position in 1965. Being a pragmatist, Premier Kim realized that his intimate association with Communist China actually may have been inimical to North Korea's self-interests. Accordingly, the North Korean hierarchy agreed that their goals of national independence and unification might, in fact, be best served by a reconciliation with the U.S.S.R.

Before summarizing the circumstances which led to a policy re-evaluation, one point must be clarified. North

Korea did not necessarily undergo an ideological reorientation at this time. Actually, after its rapprochement with Moscow, P'yongyang remained much closer ideologically to Peking than the Kremlin. Thus, the heads, and not the hearts, of the North Korean leaders dictated a reversal in their international posture, resulting in a swing of almost one hundred and eighty degrees from a pro-Chinese to a pro-Soviet stance.

Of the half dozen or more probable reasons causing North Korea's deviation from the Chinese line, financial problems were the most immediate. For after enjoying continuous economic prosperity since the Korean War, North Korea now had difficulty in fulfilling the ambitious goals of its Seven Year Plan (1961-1967). The plan had called for an optimum G.N.P. growth of more than ten percent annually in an attempt to further enhance the D.P.R.K.'s image as a worker's paradise.<sup>1</sup> In formulating the plan, the Koreans had deviated noticeably from previous Russian models by concentrating its emphasis on light rather than heavy industry during the first years.<sup>2</sup> After

---

<sup>1</sup>C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of Ulsa," Asian Survey, VI (1966), 39.

<sup>2</sup>Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 298-99.

a futile attempt to dissuade the Koreans from implementing their plan, the Soviets showed their displeasure by exerting their economic leverage.

The cessation of Soviet economic assistance caused the D.P.R.K. to fall far behind the projected production quotas of the Seven Year Plan. For not only had the North Koreans established pretentious and unrealistic targets, but a number of unforeseen circumstances arose that hampered the plan's completion. First, the production limits of many products had been reached already, and further technical advancement was hindered by the withdrawal of Soviet advisers.<sup>3</sup> Frankly, North Korea's economy was overheated from years of rapid expansion and simply had reached a point of diminishing returns. Second, the unexpected emergence of a military regime in the South had necessitated the diversion of a substantial amount of North Korea's already scarce resources from industrial expansion to military spending.<sup>4</sup> The rise in military expenditures was accentuated by the Soviet Union's cutback in military aid allocations to North Korea. Chinese assistance simply

---

<sup>3</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea," Asian Survey, VI (1965), 268.

<sup>4</sup>Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 22.

could not compensate for the funds North Korea forfeited by antagonizing the Kremlin.

By 1963, there were outward indications that the Seven Year Plan was faltering. Most notable was the announcement that the light industrial period would be extended another year.<sup>5</sup> Conditions continued to worsen; the official figures -- usually inflated -- revealed that the plan never did achieve the desired growth rate of eighteen percent.<sup>6</sup> The D.P.R.K.'s decision in 1966 to extend the entire plan for three more years spoke for itself. Ever mindful that economic disaster could spell ruin for North Korea's self-image and, ultimately, unification, the KWP press exhorted the public with such phrases as "We must meet our production goals, because in this way we can liberate our brothers in the South."<sup>7</sup> Therefore, P'yongyang was faced with the reality that after more than a decade and a half of independence it still was dependent on the technical and economic assistance bestowed

---

<sup>5</sup> Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea," Asian Survey, VI (1965), 262.

<sup>6</sup> Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 267.

<sup>7</sup> Cited in C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of Ulsa," Asian Survey, VI (1966), 38-39.

by its former mother country, the Soviet Union.

As was previously indicated, North Korea sorely needed Soviet military assistance in order to strengthen and modernize its armed forces. Since its founding, the North Korean Army had been dependent on Soviet military hardware.<sup>8</sup> When Khrushchev abruptly terminated Soviet military assistance to Korea in 1963, he seriously impaired North Korea's defense capabilities. For example, this move halted Soviet shipments of jet fuel and spare parts for the five hundred Soviet-supplied MIG-15 jet fighters, leaving North Korea with a crippled air force.<sup>9</sup>

Also, P'yongyang became more disillusioned, and even disgusted, with Chinese conduct in regard to the Vietnamese War. Koh stated, "Mao's refusal to join with the Soviet Union in a Communist united front against U.S. 'imperialist aggression' in Vietnam infuriated P'yongyang."<sup>10</sup> Whereas, the Soviet Union, in response to regular American air strikes on North Vietnam, increased its assistance to Ho Chi Minh and stiffened its attitude toward

---

<sup>8</sup>Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 228.

<sup>9</sup>An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV (1966), 70.

<sup>10</sup>Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 26.

the United States. The latter's policy pleased the North Korean ruling clique and gave them hope that Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence was being re-evaluated by the new Kremlin leadership.<sup>11</sup> Because China so far had failed to make a positive contribution to the war, P'yongyang began to suspect that Mao was merely exhorting Ho Chi Minh to commit military suicide.

Finally, North Korean nationalism -- or perhaps more accurately, Kim Il-sung's egotism -- most certainly influenced the regime's rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. The ideological alliance between the D.P.R.K. and the P.R.C. often had led foreigners to the hasty assumption that North Korea was a Chinese satellite which irked Kim Il-sung. Koh believed,

P'yongyang found the role of the junior partner to a Peking regime afflicted with megalomania increasingly distasteful. Mao Tse-tung's immodest claim to be the fountainhead of revolutionary strategy and ideological orthodoxy not only for all Asian Communists but for the Communists throughout the world deeply annoyed the independent-minded and parcissictic Kim Il-sung.<sup>12</sup>

Moreover, China's internal situation alarmed North

<sup>11</sup>Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, V (1965), 376.

<sup>12</sup>Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 26.



Korean leaders, and precautions were taken to prevent the Cultural Revolution and Red Guard Movement from spilling over into Korea. For instance, Nodong Sinmun has never carried an article on the Red Guard, while the danger of dogmatism frequently has been mentioned.<sup>13</sup>

Overall, the posture of North Korea in 1965 was best summarized by Griffith; he wrote,

North Korea . . . has not only returned to neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute but also, like Rumania, has become at least for the present a truly "nationalist communist" regime determining its own policies, furthering its own influence, and balancing skillfully between the two communist giants. Moscow has been the winner thereby, but only because it has been prepared to adjust to Korean desires.<sup>14</sup>

The Soviet Union's first manifest act toward re-establishing normal relations with North Korea was Premier Kosygin's state visit to P'yongyang in February 1965. After reaffirming Russian friendship with the Korean people, Kosygin said -- in an apparent attempt to soften North Korea's militancy -- that "We in the Socialist camp can be proud of the fact that we are marching together in the greatest movement of our time," but we must never forget

---

<sup>13</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey, VIII (January, 1968), 40.

<sup>14</sup>Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965," China Qtly., No. 25 (1966), p. 79.

that "imperialism, although losing momentum, is still strong and that struggle against it is by no means easy."<sup>15</sup> The cordial reception accorded the Soviet premier seemed to herald a turning point in North Korean policy. For after February 1965, P'yongyang ceased to reiterate Peking's vicious tirades against the Brezhnev-Kosygin leadership and toned down its references to "modern revisionism" considerably.<sup>16</sup> Overall, the premier's visit was a great success for the Soviet Union because he apparently lured P'yongyang into a neutral position in the intra-bloc struggle with promises of economic rewards -- the first of which began arriving three months later in the form of military hardware.<sup>17</sup>

Taking advantage of a trip to Indonesia in the spring of 1965, Kim Il-sung was quick to elaborate on his country's independent position. His speeches to the Indonesian people followed the chuch'e theme; for example, Premier Kim maintained that the North Korean economy was

---

<sup>15</sup>Cited in Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 304-05.

<sup>16</sup>An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV (1966), 68.

<sup>17</sup>C. I. Eugene Kim, "Korea in the Year of Ulsa," Asian Survey, VI (1966), 40.

rebuilt after the Korean War largely through the efforts of the Korean people and not a single direct reference was made to foreign assistance.<sup>18</sup> By emphasizing the point that the KWP "invariably" adopted an independent stance in its foreign relations, Kim Il-sung portrayed a North Korean foreign policy that was very similar to those of the Third World states.

Meanwhile, there was a visible deterioration in Sino-North Korean relations. For instance, in honor of North Korea's twentieth anniversary on August 15, 1965, the U.S.S.R. dispatched a high level delegation headed by Alexander N. Shelepin -- member of the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat and a rising young man in the Kremlin; while in marked contrast, the P.R.C. sent an undistinguished delegation led by Wu Hsin-y -- deputy secretary-general of the National People's Congress Standing Committee and not even a member of the Central Committee; furthermore, the Albanians sent no delegation at all.<sup>19</sup> The P'yongyang regime was deeply offended by Peking's behavior. In retaliation, Nodong Sinmun editorials praised the Soviet

---

<sup>18</sup>Haggard, "North Korea's International Position," Asian Survey, V (1965), 379.

<sup>19</sup>For details, see Griffith, "Sino-Soviet Relations," China Qtly., No. 25 (1966), p. 79.

Union in glowing terms for its part in "crushing Japanese militarism and liberating our country," while it conspicuously omitted any reference to Communist China.<sup>20</sup> Later, the Korean Communists returned the Chinese snub by rejecting an invitation to the October 1, 1965 celebration of the People's Republic of China's sixteenth anniversary.

By 1966, it was clear that P'yongyang was attempting to play the classic role of the balancer in the Sino-Soviet struggle for hegemony. Kim Il-sung hoped to extract the maximum political and economic advantage that could be achieved in playing Mao against the Brezhnev-Kosygin team. But in order to succeed at such a policy, North Korea had to steer a course midway between Moscow and Peking. For example, when China declared that to oppose imperialism it is imperative to oppose revisionism, Premier Kim lashed out that "any party, no matter which it is, must not regard other fraternal parties as going against Marxism-Leninism because their stand is different from its own . . . ."<sup>21</sup> Whereas, only five days before, its delegates had remained

---

<sup>20</sup>Koh, "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy," Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII (1965-1966), 305.

<sup>21</sup>Kim Il-sung's statement was made at a KWP conference on October 5, 1966. Cited in Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 721.

for the Communist Chinese National Day parade after the Soviets had walked out.<sup>22</sup> Such was Premier Kim's neutral stance that when asked what side of the dispute he was on, he replied, quite naturally, on the side of Marxism-Leninism.<sup>23</sup>

North Korea's behavior made it subject to charges of opportunism from other Communist states. In an effort to counteract this criticism, Nodong Sinmum on August 12, 1966 published an editorial entitled "Let Us Defend Our Independence" that spelled out P'yongyang's independent position in unusually bold language.<sup>24</sup> Most observers interpreted the editorial's doctrinal statements as further evidence of national differentiation within the Communist bloc.<sup>25</sup> While "some critics in Seoul," according to Paige, "argued that the editorial ought to be interpreted

<sup>22</sup>The New York Times, Oct. 2, 1966, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 721.

<sup>24</sup>For the complete text of the editorial in English, see transcript of KCNA International Service, 1706 GMT, Aug. 11, 1966, in "Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, August 12, 1966.

<sup>25</sup>For American newspaper commentaries, see Drew Middleton, "North Korean Reds Reject Chinese or Soviet Control," The New York Times, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 1., and Robert Trumbull, "North Korea Talks 'Independence'," The New York Times, Aug. 21, 1966, sec. E, p. 3.

more as a subterfuge designed to appeal to South Korean desires for unification and to disguise the subservience of the North to the Soviet Union."<sup>26</sup>

The editorial asserted that North Korea was its own master and demonstrated the correctness of the independent line. Doctrinal statements, such as "Communists cannot live ideologically shackled to anyone" and "revolution can neither be exported or imported," closely paralleled Kim Il-sung's philosophy of chuch'e. Therefore, the editorial contained nothing new or startling but rather was an echo of the 1955 Chuch'e speech.

At the time, many correspondents speculated that the editorial's references to "ideological survivals of flunkysm" in the party implied that another KWP purge was in the making.<sup>27</sup> Sure enough, two months later a reshuffling of the Korean Worker's Party took place.<sup>28</sup> In its aftermath, the notable Soviet-Koreans Nam Il and Chong Il-yon, in addition to Yenan Communist Kim Ch'ang-man, were

<sup>26</sup>Paige, "1966: Korea Creates the Future," Asian Survey, VII (1967), 28-29.

<sup>27</sup>Middleton, "North Korean Reds Reject Chinese or Soviet Control," The New York Times, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 2.

<sup>28</sup>For details of the party shake up, see Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 20-21.

conspicuously absent from the leadership. Of those remaining in positions of power, most had close personal connections with Chairman Kim Il-sung; for example, Kim Il -- the second in command of North Korea -- previously had served under the Chairman in the Manchurian guerrilla campaigns.<sup>29</sup> With the 1966 purge, the partisan faction eliminated its last foreign rivals and assured its absolute control of the KWP.

As a result of the shakeup, a large number of high ranking army officers were recruited into the KWP's upper echelon, leading to the belief that there was some connection between the changes in leadership and the increase in North Korean belligerence.<sup>30</sup> It is difficult to estimate how influential the new military members were in the decisions to augment hostile activities in the South. However, the entire North Korean ruling clique remained firmly convinced that violence was necessary and continued to delude themselves with the fantasy that if American troops were forced to withdraw the South Korean population would overthrow their government and install a pro-Communist regime.

---

<sup>29</sup>Chong-sik Lee, "Stalinism in the East," p. 118.

<sup>30</sup>Run, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence," Reporter, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 21.

In 1967, P'yongyang's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute assumed a more stationary posture. North Korea had cautiously allied itself with the Soviet Union. In fact, not a single anti-Soviet article appeared in Nodong Sinmun after December 1966. Relations with China, however, ran hot and cold and, generally, deteriorated. For instance, after P'yongyang refused to follow Peking's lead and boycott the Twenty-third CPSU Congress, the Chinese Communists accused the Koreans of betraying their friendship with China and the entire revolutionary movement in Asia.<sup>31</sup>

In January 1967, Peking reported the rumor that "there had been a disturbance in North Korea and that Premier Kim had been arrested by the army for having followed a revisionist line."<sup>32</sup> Yet, P'yongyang evidently wanted to maintain relations with mainland China for a few months later Nodong Sinmun printed a pro-Chinese editorial under the heading "The Aggressive Friendship Bound by Blood."<sup>33</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup>An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV (1966), 68.

<sup>32</sup>Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 721. The Chinese charges were vehemently denied, and countercharges of big-power chauvinism were leveled at Peking by the Korean Communists.

<sup>33</sup>Cho, "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 40.



Overall, the D.P.R.K.'s foremost obligation rested with its self-image, causing it to adopt policies of political independence and economic self-reliance and not those of foreign states.

Similarly, throughout 1968, Kim Il-sung doggedly clung to his independent line, criticizing the revisionism of the Soviets and the dogmatism of the Chinese. He cautioned against big-power chauvinism and proposed that the principles of equality and mutual respect become the basis of international Communism.<sup>34</sup> P'yongyang's ideological predilections toward the Peking line continued, while its relations with Moscow became warmer and more intimate. As in previous years, this anomaly could be explained in terms of North Korea's perceived national interests.

However, Premier Kim fully realized that neither his policy of national independence nor his domestic accomplishments had enhanced the cause of unification. The continued American presence south of the thirty-eighth parallel augmented the P'yongyang ruling elite's feelings of urgency and frustration. Desperate, Kim Il-sung concluded that more forceful and adventuresome tactics must

---

<sup>34</sup>Soon Sung Cho, "North and South Korea: Stepped-Up Aggression and the Search for New Security," Asian Survey, IX (January, 1969), 36.

be employed if he was ever to witness the "communization" of the South.

Besides the omnipresent desire for reunification, there were other, more immediate, reasons dictating an intensification of the unification movement. For one thing, the war in Vietnam, and the subsequent increase in American investments in Asia, had erased South Korea's balance of payments deficit.<sup>35</sup> Seoul's resulting prosperity dashed P'yongyang's hopes of appealing to the South Koreans with superior growth rates and low unemployment figures. The Korean Communists realized that they could not compete indefinitely with a dynamic South Korea and, therefore, decided to act while conditions were still favorable.

In addition, the D.P.R.K. leadership was suffering from acute paranoia, believing the United States was plotting their ultimate destruction. Envisioning an American-sponsored North-East Treaty Organization -- comprising Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea -- P'yongyang saw itself encircled by foreign bases and threatened with nuclear war.<sup>36</sup> These suspicions led North Korean leaders

---

<sup>35</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 109.

<sup>36</sup>Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of North Korea," China Qrtly., No. 14 (1963), p. 36.

to conclude that their international position in Asia could only deteriorate in the future and that immediate action was necessary to offset America's schemes.

Partly in retaliation against South Korea's participation in the Vietnamese War, North Korea had firmly committed itself to the defense of Communist North Vietnam by supplying Hanoi with arms and equipment. Thomas An stated, "It is not at all inconceivable that Peking may have urged P'yongyang to launch a Vietnam-like guerrilla war in South Korea, partly in order to open a 'second front' which would drain American forces from Vietnam."<sup>37</sup> Others have argued that the North's intensification of violence in South Korea was a self-initiated attempt to divert American attention from Southeast Asia and was calculated to necessitate the withdrawal of South Korean troops from Vietnam.<sup>38</sup>

Nevertheless, the North Koreans were well aware that a significant portion of America's military power was tied down in Vietnam, presenting them with the opportunity to further advance their own interests. Ho Chi Minh's relative success -- if measured in terms of durability --

---

<sup>37</sup>An, "New Winds in Pyongyang?," Problems of Communism, XV (1966), 71.

<sup>38</sup>For example, see Run, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence," Reporter, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 21.

with the National Liberation Front had impressed Kim Il-sung and had suggested the possibility of employing a similar strategy in South Korea. Therefore, even though P'yongyang's guerrilla activity has served as a second front for the Vietnamese War, this was not its sole intended purpose.

In large measure, North Korea's decision to step up subversive activity in the South, like its posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute, was determined by Premier Kim's perception of his personal needs and interests as well as those of his regime. Koh remarked, Kim's "personal power and glory are inseparably bound up with the vicissitudes of the regime he so firmly controls."<sup>39</sup> Consequently, a sober assessment of North Korea's international behavior must be predicated on an understanding of Kim Il-sung's power position. For he completely dominates the North Korean political system by simultaneously holding the positions of premier, party chairman, and marshall of the army. By controlling the three pillars of power, Kim Il-sung is a one-man distillation of the North Korean regime

---

<sup>39</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 265.

itself, closely approximating Stalinist one-man rule.<sup>40</sup> By 1965, Premier Kim had purged all his potential rivals, thus leaving his position virtually unassailable.

Kim Il-sung further enhanced his dominant position by promoting a vigorous cult of personality to which all North Koreans had to pay unlimited and unending homage. Recent years have witnessed a marked increase in the cult's vehemence as Kim's portraits are displayed in all public places, his words of wisdom are tirelessly studied in schools and factories, and his person is exalted as the "beloved leader of the forty million Korean people."<sup>41</sup> Indeed, even Stalin would have been envious of Kim's esteemed position.

In addition, the personality cult has been reinforced by the "Guerrilla Myth" which exaggerates the partisan faction's, and especially Kim Il-sung's, role in achieving Korean independence. According to Paige, the myth's objectives "are to confirm faith in the final victory of Communism in Korea (even under trying circumstances the guerrillas never lost their faith in the eventual defeat

---

<sup>40</sup>Scalapino, "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia," Foreign Affairs, XLI (1963), 324.

<sup>41</sup>Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 19-20.

of Japan) and to promote organizational loyalty (a major reason why success was possible was that the guerrillas were extremely self-sacrificing)."<sup>42</sup> Hence, the partisan faction, under Kim's direction and with the support of the North Korean people, would achieve the reunification of their divided homeland just as they had eventually brought about Korean independence. The "Guerrilla Myth" also contained two significant omissions: (1) Mao Tse-tung was not mentioned as an expert in guerrilla warfare; and (2) the myth did not contain any critical statements about the use of violence. The latter caused Paige to remark that "as an instrument of political socialization, this myth would seem conducive to a propensity to violence."<sup>43</sup> Through the promulgation of cult and myth, North Korea came to believe unification was imminent, and thus pressed their all-knowing, all-conquering premier to deliver his promises.

Perhaps, this was why Kim Il-sung adopted an ever-hardening line toward the overthrow of the South Korean government. More than anyone else, Kim realized that he could not keep North Korea in a constant state of

---

<sup>42</sup>Paige, "Korea," p. 219.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

preparedness, driving his people to make endless sacrifices for the fatherland, without producing some concrete threat to their survival or some progress toward reunification. After twenty years in power, Kim's endurance was a testimony to his skill of manipulating political power and mass consensus, but even such proficiency has its limits. Since anti-Americanism was becoming one of the strongest props under his dictatorship, Kim Il-sung was compelled to constantly heighten the tempo of his hate campaign against the United States by creating more novel and alarming evidence of America's evil designs. Therefore, the North Korean premier was gambling that an external threat would unify his people behind him and conceal his regime's apparent shortcomings.

To this end, the North Korean people had to be convinced that another Korean War was near at hand. Bellicose statements dominated the North Korean press, and military spending was markedly increased, accounting for almost a third of the regime's budget in 1967.<sup>44</sup> The regime boasted of its impressive military strength -- 350,000 men, 500 Soviet-made jet aircraft, modern air-defense

---

<sup>44</sup>Cho, "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 40.

missile complexes, and a militia of 1.2 million men -- and their state of immediate readiness to defend the fatherland.<sup>45</sup> Such a large military establishment, however, heavily taxed North Korea's limited resources.

In this respect, North Korea's firmer relations with the Soviet Union began to pay dividends. The Kremlin responded to P'yongyang's request for increased assistance with tanks, radar, jet aircraft, two Soviet W-class submarines, four Komar-type guided-missile ships, and forty motor torpedo boats.<sup>46</sup> Besides giving the D.P.R.K. a viable deterrent against foreign aggression, the Soviet arms build up strengthened the regime's revolutionary base, enabling it to aggrandize the guerrilla activities in the South.

In fact, the renewed guerrilla offensive posed a serious threat to Park Chung Hee's regime and was quite reminiscent of the tactics used by the North in the 1948 to 1950 period. Instead of sending small reconnaissance missions across the De-Militarized Zone, or DMZ, the North Koreans now penetrated the South's defenses with well-organized

---

<sup>45</sup>Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 18.

<sup>46</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 268-69.



and well-armed platoons. North Korean commandos engaged in ambushes, mine-laying, dynamiting of barracks, and even in harassing the South Korean fishing fleet in international waters. Indeed, the number of clashes between North Korean raiders and South Korean and United Nations forces multiplied rapidly; for example, in 1967 there was a ten fold increase of such activity over the previous year alone.<sup>47</sup>

Although the trend of Northern terrorism was expected to continue, Washington and Seoul never anticipated the intrepid format that it would assume in January 1968. Indeed, the daring commando raid attempted on the "Blue House" (South Korea's Presidential palace) by thirty-one members of a North Korean suicide squad on January 21, 1968, took Seoul by complete surprise.<sup>48</sup> The commandos nearly succeeded in accomplishing their objective of assassinating President Park and his top aides, for they came within eight hundred meters of the "Blue House" before being repulsed by South Korean police forces. Once in custody, the sole survivor of the commando unit disclosed that "a total of 2,400 commandos, all belonging to a special unit of the Korean

---

<sup>47</sup>For specific figures, see ibid., p. 272.

<sup>48</sup>For an account of the raid, see The New York Times, Jan. 22, 1968, p. 1.

People's Army formed in July 1967, were undergoing special training in North Korea for guerrilla missions in the South."<sup>49</sup> The same commando also stated that it was his understanding that the D.P.R.K. would soon launch a major offensive in compliance with its goal of forcibly unifying the Korean peninsula by 1970.<sup>50</sup>

Two days after the abortive raid on the presidential palace, Kim Il-sung made one of his boldest moves since the outbreak of the Korean War. On January 23, 1968, North Korean patrol vessels captured the United States Navy's intelligence ship Pueblo and her crew of eighty-three men, triggering an international crisis of major proportions. Although Washington claimed the vessel was well outside the recognized twelve mile limit,<sup>51</sup> P'yongyang charged that the "U.S. imperialist aggressor army . . . committed a premeditated hostile act by infiltrating an armed ship

---

<sup>49</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 147.

<sup>50</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 272.

<sup>51</sup>Before the naval court of inquiry in Coronado, California on January 21, 1969, Commander Bucher stated, "At no time did I penetrate into the claimed territory of North Korea." He added, "The closest point we came to North Korea was 13.1 miles at some point along the coast." The New York Times, Jan. 22, 1969, p. 1.

into the coastal waters of our side in the east sea . . . <sup>52</sup>  
 North Korean sources contended that the Pueblo was brought  
 into Wonsan harbor after its naval vessels "returned the  
 fire of the piratic gang, who put up an arrogant resistance,"  
 thus seizing "the warship of over 1,000 tons together with  
 the anti-aircraft machine guns installed in it and scores  
 of shooting weapons, tens of thousands of rounds of ammuni-  
 tion and hand grenades, and quantities of arms and equip-  
 ment for espionage activities."<sup>53</sup> P'yongyang's portrayal  
 of the Pueblo as part of an American invasion force con-  
 trasted sharply with Washington's version of the incident,  
 the latter maintaining that the ship was on a routine  
 intelligence gathering mission and that it was unequipped  
 to offer sustained resistance.<sup>54</sup> The United States responded  
 to the North Korean provocation with a restrained behavior --  
 warning P'yongyang of the gravity of the situation and by  
 flexing its military muscles -- in an attempt to ease a  
 potentially volatile situation.<sup>55</sup>

---

<sup>52</sup>KCNA International Service in English, 0338 GMT, Jan. 24, 1968. For transcript, see "Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Jan. 25, 1968.

<sup>53</sup>Ibid.

<sup>54</sup>See The New York Times, Jan. 24-28, 1968.

<sup>55</sup>At the time, the United States called up 14,787 air force and navy reservists and dispatched the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise to the area. See ibid., Jan. 25-30, 1968.

Clearly, the Pueblo's seizure was neither a rash decision on the part of a North Korean naval commander nor part of an international Communist conspiracy, but rather a carefully premeditated act that was planned and executed by Kim Il-sung's regime. Previous to the Pueblo incident, the North Korean government had issued repeated warnings against the violation of its territorial waters by "American spy ships," warnings that seem to have been ignored by North Korean watchers in Seoul and Washington.<sup>56</sup> In addition, the Pueblo's skipper, Commander Bucher, later reported that he had sighted North Korean vessels on various days before his ship's capture, thus enabling the latter to relay the Pueblo's position to P'yongyang and allowing time for a calculated response from the North Korean capital.<sup>57</sup>

Indeed, the polycentric nature of the Communist bloc negated the hypothesis that the Pueblo's capture was part of a well-coordinated international Communist plot to catch the United States off guard. General Jan Sejna, who defected

---

<sup>56</sup>For example, warnings were issued on Nov. 11 and Dec. 21, 1967 as well as Jan. 8 and 12, 1968. For further details, see Koh, "North Korea," Problems of Communism, XVIII (1969), 24.

<sup>57</sup>For reports of the sightings, see The New York Times, Jan. 22, 1969, p. 1.

from Czechoslovakia, claimed that the Soviet Union engineered the seizure of the Pueblo.<sup>58</sup> According to Sejna, the morning following the Pueblo's capture Soviet General Kusheher informed him of the event by stating, "During the night we learned that, with the collaboration of our Korean comrades, we have achieved a great success . . ." <sup>59</sup> Whereas Koh maintained that "given [North Korea's] incessant apotheosis of operational autonomy in the world arena and given the existence of a tacit understanding between Moscow and Washington regarding the operation of intelligence vessels . . . it is improbable that the decision was instigated or cleared in advance with the Soviet Union."<sup>60</sup> The fact that Senja's information has not always been reliable leaves Koh's argument the more convincing of the two. In regard to Communist China, Roy Kim believed "it was not unlikely that the Pueblo incident [was] instigated by Peking,"<sup>61</sup> while Koh contended that

---

<sup>58</sup> Jan Sejna, "Russia Plotted the Pueblo Affair," Reader's Digest, XCV (July, 1969), 73-76.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p. 75.

<sup>60</sup> Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 275.

<sup>61</sup> Roy U. T. Kim, "Sino-North Korean Relations," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 722.

such a prospect was "utterly out of the question."<sup>62</sup> Therefore, in all likelihood, North Korea acted alone, without the advice or consent of its allies.

Although the Pueblo's seizure was a seemingly brash act -- without any apparent provocation in Western eyes -- the North Koreans had reason to believe that such blatant harassment of the United States would serve a positive purpose, Korean unification. Actually, the Pueblo incident was little more than a manifestation of P'yongyang's "unification by force" policy; and, therefore, the reasons underlying the ship's capture were very similar to those already mentioned in connection with the North Korean regime's reorientation toward violent means of achieving the "communization" of the South.

In desperate need of propaganda issues at home and abroad, the Pueblo was used as a symbol by the North Korean regime to magnify the threat of American aggression. At home, such a device was needed to increase the vigilance and revolutionary fervor of the North Korean people. Also, it had the intended purpose of covering up the regime's economic failures and unsuccessful attempts at

---

<sup>62</sup>Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 275.

promoting reunification. After the event, Radio P'yongyang constantly alerted the population of the danger of American imperialism by blaring, "The provocative act of U.S. imperialists' armed spy vessel is a new flagrant tramping on the Korean armistice agreement, an open aggression against the D.P.R.K., a link in the deliberate machinations of the U.S. imperialists for touching off new war in Korea and a grave menace to peace in the Far East and in the world."<sup>63</sup> The regime exhorted the population to resist the "reckless provocations" of the "U.S. imperialists and the traitorous Pak Chung-hui puppets" by increasing their production efforts and uniting more solidly behind Premier Kim to complete the task of revolution in the South.

Although the regime declared that "the heroic Korean People's Army -- which is prepared as an ever-victorious revolutionary armed force, each man a match for 100 enemies -- will, in cooperation with all the Korean people, wipe out the aggressors at one blow at any time,"<sup>64</sup> the incident was

---

<sup>63</sup>P'yongyang Domestic Service in Korean, 0435 GMT, Jan. 27, 1968. For translated transcript, see "Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Jan. 28, 1968.

<sup>64</sup>KCNA International Service in English, 0338 GMT, Jan. 24, 1968. For transcript, see ibid., Jan. 25, 1968.

needed to stimulate foreign military assistance, Kim Il-sung had to have some concrete evidence of intended American aggression in order to convince the Soviet Union that he urgently required military hardware to counter the anticipated American offensive.<sup>65</sup>

As most of North Korea's foreign and domestic policy was formulated by the whims, caprices, and perceptions of Kim Il-sung, few acts could have been more personally gratifying for the premier than to seize an American naval vessel. For such an incident could only raise his ego by thrusting him into the center of the international stage. Interestingly enough, the Pueblo was captured on the eve of a preparatory meeting for a world Communist party conference, causing speculation that Kim hoped the affair would occupy the major portion of the conference's attention.<sup>66</sup>

Finally, the North Korean regime wanted to attack the American shield that had enabled South Korea to resist its endeavors toward reunification. In addition, the United States was held directly responsible for South

---

<sup>65</sup>Joungwon Alexander Kim, "The Long March of Premier Kim," The New York Times Magazine, Feb. 25, 1968, p. 109.

<sup>66</sup>Cho, "Korea: Election Year," Asian Survey, VIII (1968), 38.



Korea's economic prosperity and maturing political stability, which hindered North Korea's designs. Therefore, the Communist Koreans concluded that a direct blow at the United States might lead to an American re-evaluation of their involvement in South Korea as well as to retard the South's economic growth by causing it to increase its military expenditures in response to P'yongyang's bellicosity. Overall, then, North Korea's actions may not have been as hasty and irrational as they appeared on the surface.

At least on a short term basis, the Pueblo's seizure did produce a number of beneficial results for the North Korean regime. First, the vessel's capture provided the regime with an invaluable propaganda tool, and throughout their eleven months in captivity, the crew with their alleged confession and news conferences was fully exploited for propaganda purposes. Second, for Kim Il-sung, it was a personal victory, boosting his stature among Communist and non-aligned nations and furthering his heroic image among his own people. Third, the incident created a temporary strain in American-South Korean relations. Seoul was angered over its exclusion from the secret negotiations over the crew's return at P'anmunjom and worried about Washington's conciliatory approach to the crisis. Dong-A Ilbo, Seoul's most influential newspaper, editorially

lamented what it called "the diplomacy of humiliation" being pursued by the United States, saying that the Korean people were saddened by its myopic and "ungreat-power-like" behavior.<sup>67</sup> Fourth, the intelligence ship was a virtual gold mine for North Korea's, and presumably Russia's, intelligence and counter-intelligence forces. At the naval inquiry, Commander Bucher testified that "very close to 100 percent" of the ship's sophisticated electronic equipment had been destroyed before it fell into North Korean hands but that "an unknown quantity" of top-secret intelligence data had been seized by the raiding party.<sup>68</sup> And last, the incident did draw American attention away from Vietnam momentarily as American troop strength was augmented along the Korean DMZ and the carrier Enterprise was dispatched to the Wonsan Bay area.

But when viewing the consequences of the Pueblo incident in the perspective of North Korea's long-range objective of "communizing" the South, the results only could be considered to be disfunctional. For the United States became even more willing to help combat the threat of Communism in Korea in the wake of North Korea's hostile

---

<sup>67</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 153.

<sup>68</sup>The New York Times, Jan. 21, 1969, p. 1.

act. Within weeks, the Republic of Korea's armed forces received "modern jets, a destroyer, air defense missiles, radar, anti-infiltration devices, rifles, and ammunition from the United States."<sup>69</sup> In addition, President Johnson pledged \$100 million in special military aid to South Korea and dispatched Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance to Seoul for secret consultations.<sup>70</sup> Thus, South Korea's military shield was strengthened by military hardware and a firm commitment from the United States that it would prevent a Communist takeover in the South. Actually, the only positive purpose that the Pueblo incident served in the long-run was to expose the Achilles' heel of the United States, showing a superpower's vulnerability to the humiliating harassments of a "fourth rate" power.

However, the Pueblo incident did win increased Soviet and Chinese Communist support for North Korea's position. In fact, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations acted as the guardian of North Korean interests in the Security Council debate over the Pueblo in January 1968. Throughout, the Russians were very cautious not to

---

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., Feb. 23, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>70</sup> Koh, "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective," Asian Survey, IX (1969), 278.

jeopardize their newly acquired rapprochement with North Korea and thus refused to accept indirect American requests that the Kremlin assume the role of peacemaker in the dispute. For if the Soviets had offered advice on the delicate political situation, the P'yongyang leadership would have surely sighted it as evidence of Moscow's inclination "to preach class collaboration and to give up to imperialism."<sup>71</sup> Therefore, Moscow merely stated that the situation was like "a powderkeg, liable to explode into a war" and claimed that the solution rested in a complete evacuation of United States forces from the peninsula.<sup>72</sup> Although the Chinese Communists delayed the news of the Pueblo's capture for two days, they likewise voiced full support for "the just stand of the Korean Government and people in countering U.S. imperialism's flagrant violation."<sup>73</sup>

After eleven months of secret negotiations at P'anmunjom,

---

<sup>71</sup>Run, "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence," Reporter, Feb. 22, 1968, p. 20.

<sup>72</sup>Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1830 GMT, Jan. 30, 1968. For translated transcript, see "Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Jan. 31, 1968.

<sup>73</sup>NCNA International Service in English, 1837 GMT, Jan. 28, 1968. For transcript, see ibid., Jan. 29, 1968.

the North Koreans released the eighty-two surviving members of the Pueblo crew. The terms of the final settlement were rather bizarre because they included an American admission of its alleged guilt in addition to an advanced oral repudiation of the admission.<sup>74</sup> The circumstances surrounding the crew's release were just as enigmatic as those that triggered the incident. Perhaps, Kim Il-sung desired to end the whole affair before President-elect Nixon took office, fearing he would prove to be more intractable.<sup>75</sup> But more than likely, the crew's usefulness as a propaganda tool had been exhausted. For by December 1968, the North Koreans probably could have cared less about the crew, knowing that its "victory" in the eyes of the Communist world and their own people could never be erased by American counterclaims or denials.

Therefore, the Pueblo incident was part of North Korea's attempts to establish a viable self-image. The ship's seizure, like the "military line" and the rapprochement with the Soviet Union, was designed to further the

---

<sup>74</sup>The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1968, p. 1.

<sup>75</sup>However, President Nixon's behavior proved to be the same as his predecessor's when North Korean planes shot down a U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane, killing its crew of thirty-one men, on April 15, 1969.

regime's ultimate goal of Korean reunification under the direction of Premier Kim Il-sung. In each instance, P'yongyang's perceived self-interests had dictated the drastic, and sometimes even adventurous, change in policy. As yet unification has evaded Kim Il-sung's perseverance. Now the question remains whether or not Premier Kim, in his frustration, will trigger a fatal response for himself and/or his regime by his next aggressive actions.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

Over the last two decades, the D.P.R.K. has evolved from Soviet satellite status to a nation which is vehemently asserting and pursuing its political and economic independence. After its liberation from Japan, Korea's greatest political aspiration was for national independence. But instead of emancipation from external domination, the divided peninsula became a cold war battleground for the great powers. In the North, the population's desire for independence and self-determination was thwarted by the U.S.S.R.'s successful effort to integrate the northern zone of occupation into the Soviet orbit. Although Stalin purposely established a puppet "Korean" regime in P'yongyang to avert the danger of arousing Korean xenophobia and to protect the Soviet Union from his own well-known charges of "Asian colonialism," the Soviet premier's scheme failed to eradicate the population's nationalist sentiments.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>U.S., Department of State, North Korea, p. 119.

From 1945 to 1950, the Soviet Union's policies with respect to North Korea, especially in the area of foreign trade, were quite reminiscent of those previously employed by Imperial Japan. Enjoying rapid success, the Soviet-dominated hierarchy became so well-entrenched in North Korea that the Kremlin felt confident enough to withdraw its troops by the end of 1948. However, the Soviet triumph was short-lived. For Communist China's intervention in the Korean War initiated a weakening of the Soviet integrative pattern.

The disillusionment and frustration generated by the Soviet Union's failure to come to their assistance as the United Nations forces were overrunning the peninsula caused North Korean leaders to reevaluate their country's Soviet tutelage. Consequently, when faced with the enormous task of post-war reconstruction, the P'yongyang government stressed a policy of self-reliance in order to compensate for Moscow's unpredictability of action. This move toward greater self-emphasis was correlated with certain attempts to diversify its foreign relations both within and without the Communist system. Actually, North Korea's policy of self-reliance served a dual purpose, for it not only multiplied the possible sources of foreign assistance and created competition amongst them but benefited



the cause of unification as well by presenting a facade of political independence to the South Koreans. Still, Soviet hegemony did not vanish overnight. It was not until 1955 -- two years after Stalin's death -- that Premier Kim began to issue ideological pronouncements emphasizing North Korea's political autonomy and only in the aftermath of the 1956 Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU that P'yongyang dared to deviate from Soviet policy direction.

North Korea's experimentation with various ideological methods of national development, and its eventual alliance with Communist China in the widening Sino-Soviet dispute, sprang from a complex web of perceived national interests, capabilities, and deficiencies. The changes in policy direction were, in fact, "a product of the interaction between internal needs and external opportunities."<sup>2</sup> On the one hand North Korea coveted rapid modernization, while on the other it was no longer dependent solely upon Soviet economic assistance and protection. Red China, having risen in international status, now represented a viable alternative to the Soviet Union. Internally, the rising national consciousness of North Koreans demanded

---

<sup>2</sup>Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 51.

more independence in international affairs. In addition, the North Korean leadership realized that their country had now outgrown the peripheral status accorded it by the Soviet Union. P'yongyang's deviation from the Moscow line, supposedly aimed at political non-alignment and economic independence, was in large measure a reaction to the Kremlin's resented neo-colonialist policies.

In truth, North Korea never did implement a non-aligned foreign policy. Instead, P'yongyang followed a policy of flexible neutralism in that it was non-aligned only with respect to certain issues. Although the concept of an "independent" foreign policy is theoretically correct, North Korea could not realistically pursue foreign policy objectives as if the country was situated in an international vacuum where only its domestic self-interests counted. Since North Korea lacked the essential pre-conditions of political and economic power that enable states to act with a minimum of external restraint in the international sphere, it was bound irreconcilably to the wishes and desires of the more powerful Communist states. For example, P'yongyang declared its independence from Soviet policy direction only with the protection of Communist China. Therefore, regardless of the fact that North Korea expounded an "independent" line, the state

was not, nor could it be, truly independent.

Moreover, the policy of non-alignment did not correspond to North Korea's true national interests. Although aimed at stimulating the country's economic development, the policy actually had a reverse effect in that it proved to be detrimental to North Korea's economic growth. Faced with P'yongyang's ambiguous policy of independence, the Soviet Union resorted to severe sanctions to bring the Korean Communists back into the Soviet fold. Curtailment of Soviet economic assistance noticeably hampered the D.P.R.K.'s Seven Year Plan, and cutbacks in Russian military aid reduced North Korea's offensive and defensive capabilities. After finding itself virtually isolated from the Communist community, the North Korean regime came to the realization that its national self-interests would be best served by a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Thus, North Korea's foreign policy of "independence" between 1956 and 1965 failed to produce positive results because it had not been a policy of national interests conditioned by a realistic assessment of international circumstances.

North Korea's contemporary foreign policy which has brought about a reconciliation with the Soviet Union has not sacrificed its national interests but rather enhanced them by taking the realities of international politics

into account. After establishing a rapprochement with the U.S.S.R., the North Korean regime reaped the benefits of renewed Soviet economic and military assistance so necessary for the pursuit of its national objectives. In addition, the D.P.R.K. and the U.S.S.R. seem to have reached a tacit understanding that the latter will tolerate P'yongyang's independent actions within certain bounds. For example, North Korea was free to spell out its independent position in the Nodong Sinmum editorial of August 12, 1966. A more graphic illustration of North Korea's independence can be seen in the seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo. In capturing an American intelligence vessel, Kim Il-sung's government demonstrated that it was still capable of embarking on a self-directing course of action. In the last case, the Soviet Union overlooked North Korea's belligerent behavior, for it did not draw itself into a direct confrontation with the United States or hamper its relations with the P'yongyang regime.

Throughout, the ideology and strategy of P'yongyang's foreign policy have remained remarkably constant in that it has always pursued the objectives of communization and modernization. As correspondent Wilfred Burchett noted, "the question of reunification of Korea is listed as a major national task to be accomplished during the 'life

of the present generation' as everyone from Premier Kim on down expresses it."<sup>3</sup> By creating a modernized state, the North Korean leadership hopes to achieve its paramount objective of communizing South Korea. Not only would modernization give North Korea the potential economic and military capability to conquer the South by force of arms, but, more importantly, it would create an attractive self-image to the South Koreans that might persuade them to peacefully integrate into a Communist-controlled, united Korea. Therefore, the twin goals of communization and modernization are inseparable, and both "emanate from and are guided by the ideologies of Communism and nationalism."<sup>4</sup>

While the strategic foreign policy objectives have remained unchanged, the tactics employed in pursuing them have responded to the constantly changing internal and external conditions. For example, P'yongyang over the last two decades has adopted numerous tactical moves subordinated to the following operational directions of its foreign policy: (1) non-alignment in the Sino-Soviet dispute, (2) alliance with Communist China, (3) reconciliation

---

<sup>3</sup>The New York Times, May 15, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup>Koh, The Foreign Policy of North Korea, p. 218.

with the Soviet Union, (4) forceful takeover of South Korea, (5) psychological warfare against South Korea, (6) guerrilla activities in South Korea, and (7) extension of relations with the nations of the Third World. Each change in direction has been a product of North Korea's self-assessment of its political, economic, and military capabilities, discernment of its current relations with Moscow and Peking, and perception of the internal situation in South Korea.

Such changes in operational direction have given P'yongyang somewhat of an oscillating posture in the Sino-Soviet dispute. For North Korea's position has been largely determined by its efforts to construct a viable self-image. In other words, national self-interest reigns paramount and dictates that North Korea ally with whichever Communist giant that can best enhance its tactical drive for reunification and modernization at a given time. For example, although P'yongyang still remains more closely allied with Peking on ideological issues, it now backs Moscow's position for pragmatic reasons correlated to its national goals and present operational direction. Therefore, national self-interest is the primary criterion determining North Korea's position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and accounts for the

fact that P'yongyang has periodically emulated Soviet and Chinese behavior in an effort to obtain the best that both have to offer.

Overall, the D.P.R.K. has enjoyed mixed success in achieving its major objectives of communization and modernization. A review of North Korean reunification attempts since 1945 suggests that forceful, direct methods have been unsuccessful, while tactics involving peripheral political violence seem to have brought more favorable long-run results. But the attainment of Communist control over the entire peninsula seems highly unlikely as long as America maintains its military presence in South Korea. Still, the North Korean regime's notable strides toward modernization in the last two decades have enabled the P'yongyang regime to construct a self-image that has increased its power and international prestige. As a result, North Korea has consistently gained support for its position on reunification, especially from Third World states in the United Nations General Assembly.<sup>5</sup> Yet, the future of Korea remains uncertain. The threat of political violence continues to lurk just below the

---

<sup>5</sup>For a list of nations supporting North Korea in the United Nations from 1965 to 1967, see *ibid.*, chart 3, p. 183.

surface status quo as the North adamantly adheres to a policy of eventual conquest of all Korea by exhorting its people to "Carry the hammer and sickel in one hand and a gun in the other."



## SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

### Books

- Appleman, Roy E. South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961.
- Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China and Asia. New York: Harper & Bros., 1960.
- Beloff, Max. Soviet Policy in the Far East: 1944-51. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.
- Berger, Carl. The Korean Knot. Rev. ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964.
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. The Soviet Bloc. New York: Viking Press, 1966.
- Chung, Henry. The Russians Came to Korea. Washington: Korean Pacific Affairs Press, 1947.
- Chung, Kyung Cho. Korea Tomorrow. New York: Macmillan, 1961.
- Dallin, Alexander, et. al., eds. Diversity in International Communism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.
- Dallin, David. Rise of Russia in Asia. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1949.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1961.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Soviet Russia and the Far East. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948.
- Eckstein, Alexander. Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.
- Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle. New York: Atheneum, 1965.

- Floyd, David. Mao Against Khrushchev. New York: Praeger, 1964.
- Gordenker, Leon. The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.
- Griffith, William E. Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1963.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
- Gruliov, Leo, ed. Current Soviet Policies - II. New York: Praeger, 1957.
- Henderson, Gregory. Korea: The Politics of the Vortex. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Hudson, G. F.; Lowenthal, Richard; and MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Sino-Soviet Dispute. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Kaser, Michael. Comecon: Integration Problems of the Planned Economy. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.
- Kerner, Robert J. The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1942.
- Koh, Byung Chul. The Foreign Policy of North Korea: A Study in Communist Rhetoric and Behavior. New York: Praeger, 1969.
- Kolarz, Walter. The Peoples of the Soviet Far East. New York: Praeger, 1954.
- Labeledz, Leopold, and Urban, G. R. The Sino-Soviet Conflict. Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1964.
- Laqueur, Walter, and Labeledz, Leopold. Polycentrism. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Lattimore, Owen. The Situation in Asia. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1949.
- Lee, Chong-Sik. Politics of Korean Nationalism. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1966.

- Lee, Chong-Sik. "Stalinism in the East." The Communist Revolution in Asia. Edited by Robert A. Scalapino. Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.
- Lensen, George Alexander. Russia's Eastward Expansion. Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- McCune, George. Korea Today. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951.
- McCune, Shannon. Korea's Heritage. Rutland, Vt.: Charles Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1959.
- \_\_\_\_\_. Korea: Land of Broken Calm. Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1966.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick. The Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Intellectuals. New York: Praeger, 1960.
- Paige, Glenn D. "Korea." Communism and Revolution: The Strategic Uses of Political Violence. Edited by Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. The Korean People's Democratic Republic. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1966.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "North Korea and the Emulation of Russian and Chinese Behavior." Communist Strategies in Asia. Edited by A. Doak Barnett. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Rostow, W. W. The Prospects for Communist China. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1954.
- Rudolph, Philip. North Korea's Political and Economic Structure. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1959.
- Scalapino, Robert A., ed. North Korea Today. New York: Praeger, 1963.
- Shulman, Marshall D. Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. New York: Atheneum, 1965.
- Snow, Edgar. Red Star Over China. New York: Grove Press, 1961.

Suh, Dae-Sook. The Korean Communist Movement, 1918-1948. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967.

Tewksbury, Donald G. Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies. Source Books on Far Eastern Ideologies, Vol. II. New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950.

Whiting, Allen S. China Crosses the Yalu. New York: Macmillan, 1960.

Wolfe, Bertram D. Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost. New York: Praeger, 1957.

Zagoria, Donald S. The Sino-Soviet Conflict. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Articles in Journals, Magazines, and Newspapers

An, Thomas. "New Winds in Pyongyang?" Problems of Communism, XV (July-August, 1966), 68-71.

Bradbury, John. "Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea." China Quarterly, No. 6 (1961), pp. 15-28.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K. "Patterns and Limits of the Sino-Soviet Dispute." Problems of Communism, IX (September-October, 1960), 1-7.

Chen, Yi. "10th Anniversary of the Entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean War." Peking Review, III (November 1, 1960), pp. 10-11.

Chio, Kwang-sok. "Philosophy in North Korea." Koreana Quarterly, VIII (Summer, 1966), 61-69.

Cho, Soon Sung. "Korea: Election Year." Asian Survey, VIII (January, 1968), 29-42.

\_\_\_\_\_. "North and South Korea: Stepped-Up Aggression and the Search for New Security." Asian Survey, IX (January, 1969), 29-39.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Politics of North Korea's Unification Policies, 1950-1965." World Politics, XIX (January, 1967), 218-241

- Chung, Kiwon. "Japanese-North Korean Relations Today." Asian Survey, IV (April, 1964), 788-803.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The North Korean People's Army and the Party." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 105-124.
- Conquest, Robert. "After The Fall: Some Lessons." Problems of Communism, XIV (January-February, 1965), 17-21.
- Dubin, Wilbert B. "The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Government." Pacific Affairs, XXIII (December, 1950), 381-392.
- Grajdanzev, Andrew J. "Korea Divided." Far Eastern Survey, XIV (October 10, 1945), pp. 281-283.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Korea in the Postwar World." Foreign Affairs, XXII (April, 1944), 479-483.
- Grebennikov, V. "Korean People's Democratic Economic Successes." International Affairs (Moscow), January 1968, pp. 79-86.
- Grey, Arthur L., Jr. "The Thirty-Eighth Parallel." Foreign Affairs, XXIX (April, 1951), 481-487.
- Griffith, William E. "Sino-Soviet Relations, 1964-1965." China Quarterly, No. 25 (1966), pp. 3-143.
- Guins, George C. "The Korean Plans of Russian Imperialism." The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, VI (October, 1946), 80-85.
- Haggard, M. T. "North Korea's International Position." Asian Survey, V (August, 1965), 375-388.
- Halpern, A. M. "The Emergence of an Asian Communist Bloc." The Annals, Vol. 349 (September 1963), pp. 117-129.
- Ham, Il-kun. "The North Korean Regime and the Sino-Soviet Dispute." Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 140-149.
- Han, Jae-duk. "Unmasking Russian Proposal for the Withdrawal of Foreign Forces in Korea." Korean Affairs, I, 4 (1962), pp. 368-376.
- Kim, C. I. Eugene. "Korea in the Year of Ulsa." Asian Survey, VI (January, 1966), 34-41.

- Kim, Deok. "Communist China's Intervention in the Korean War." Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 212-221.
- Kim, Ilpyong J. "North Korea's Fourth Party Congress." Pacific Affairs, XXXV (Spring, 1962), 37-50.
- Kim, Joungwon Alexander. "The Long March of Premier Kim." The New York Times Magazine, February 25, 1968, pp. 32-33ff.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Peak of Socialism in North Korea." Asian Survey, VI (May, 1965), 255-269.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Soviet Policy in North Korea." World Politics, XXII (January, 1970), 237-254.
- Kim, Roy U. T. "Sino-North Korean Relations." Asian Survey, VIII (August, 1968), 708-722.
- Kim, Tae-ho. "The Ruling System of North Korean Regime." Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 174-186.
- Koh, B. C. "North Korea and Its Quest for Autonomy." Pacific Affairs, XXXVIII, 3 and 4 (1965-1966), pp. 294-306.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "North Korea: Profile of a Garrison State." Problems of Communism, XVIII (January-February, 1969), 18-27.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective." Asian Survey, IX (April, 1969), 264-280.
- Kuark, Yoon T. "North Korea's Agricultural Development During the Post-War Period." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 82-93.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "North Korea's Industrial Development During the Post-War Period." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 51-64.
- Kuo, Mo-jo. "Chinese and Korean Peoples Defeat U.S. Imperialism, Saved Asian and World Peace." Peking Review, III (November 1, 1960), pp. 8-10.
- Lee, Chong-sik. "Kim Il-sŏng of North Korea." Asian Survey, VII (June, 1967), 374-382.

- Lee, Chong-sik. "Korea: In Search of Stability." Asian Survey, IV (January, 1964), 656-665.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Korea: Troubles in a Divided State." Asian Survey, V (January, 1965), 25-32.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Korean Communists and Yen-an." China Quarterly, No. 9 (1962), pp. 182-92.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Korean Partition and Unification." Journal of International Affairs, XVIII, 4 (1964), pp. 221-233.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Land Reform, Collectivisation and the Peasants in North Korea." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 65-81.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Politics in North Korea: Pre-Korean War Stage." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 3-16.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The 'Socialist Revolution' in the North Korean Countryside." Asian Survey, II (October, 1962), 9-22.
- Lee, Chong-sik, and Oh, Ki-wan. "The Russian Faction in North Korea." Asian Survey, VIII (April, 1968), 270-288.
- Lee, Tong Won. "Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Course of North Korea." Koreana Quarterly, V (Summer, 1963), 35-55.
- Lim, Youngil. "Foreign Influence on the Economic Change in Korea." Journal of Asian Studies, XXVIII (November, 1968), 77-99.
- McCune, George M. "Korea: The First Year of Liberation." Pacific Affairs, XX (March, 1947), 3-17.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Post War Government and Politics of Korea." The Journal of Politics, IX (November, 1947), 605-623.
- McCune, Shannon. "The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea." World Politics, I (October, 1948), 223-232.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick. "Korea's Mini-Mao." New Statesman, February 2, 1968, p. 132.

- Middleton, Drew. "North Korean Reds Reject Chinese or Soviet Control." The New York Times, Aug. 13, 1966, p. 1.
- Mosely, Philip. "The Soviet Policy in the Developing Countries." Foreign Affairs, XLIII (October, 1964), 87-98.
- Paige, Glenn D. "1966: Korea Creates the Future." Asian Survey, VII (January, 1967), 21-30.
- Paige, Glenn D., and Lee, Dong Jun. "The Post-war Politics of Communist Korea." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 17-29.
- Poter, Catherine, and Holand, William. "North Korea's Economic Development." Far Eastern Survey, XXIV (May, 1964), 171-173.
- Richards, Edward B. "Pravda and Izvestia Look at Korea." Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XLI (September, 1960), 163-168.
- Ro, Chung-hyun. "Economic Growth and Manpower Administration in North Korea." Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 150-161.
- Rudolph, Philip. "North Korea and the Path to Socialism." Pacific Affairs, XXXII (June 1959), 131-143.
- Run, Joseph C. "Behind North Korea's New Belligerence." The Reporter, February 22, 1968, pp. 19-21.
- Scalapino, Robert A. "The Foreign Policy of North Korea." China Quarterly, No. 14 (1963), pp. 30-50.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Moscow, Peking, and the Communist Parties of Asia." Foreign Affairs, XLI (January, 1963), 323-343.
- Scalapino, Robert A., and Lee, Chong-sik. "Origins of the Korean Communist Movement." Journal of Asian Studies, XX (November, 1960), 149-167.
- Sejna, Jan (General). "Russia Plotted the Pueblo Affair." Reader's Digest (July, 1969), pp. 73-76.



- Shabad, Theodore. "North Korea's Post War Recovery." Far Eastern Survey, XXV (June, 1956), 81-91.
- Skendi, Stavro. "Albania and the Sino-Soviet." Foreign Affairs, XL (April, 1962), 471-78.
- Sohn, Jae-souk. "Factionalism and Party Control of the Military in Communist North Korea." Koreana Quarterly, IX (Autumn, 1967), 16-40.
- "Testimony of History." Peking Reivew, III (November 1, 1960), pp. 7-9.
- Trumbull, Robert. "North Korea Talks 'Independence'." The New York Times, Aug. 21, 1966, sec. E, p. 3.
- Washburn, John N. "Russia Looks at North Korea." Pacific Affairs, XX (June, 1947), 152-160.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Soviet Press Views North Korea." Pacific Affairs, XXII (March, 1949), 53-59.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Soviet Russia and the Korean Communist Party." Pacific Affairs, XXIII (March, 1950), 59-65.
- Whiting, Allen. "Contradictions in the Moscow-Peking Axis." Journal of Politics, XX (February, 1958), 130-142.
- Wolpert, V. "Turns in North Korean Trade." Far Eastern Economic Review, XLIII (February 13, 1964), 385-387.
- Yoo, Wan-shik. "The Ch'ollima (Flying Horse) Movement." Korean Affairs, II, 2 (1963), pp. 162-173.
- Yoon, Young-kyo. "North Korean Regime's Rejection of the Competence and Authority of the United Nations." Korean Affairs, II, 3-4 (1963), pp. 247-263.

#### Government Publications

Documents on the Eighth Session of the Second Supreme People's Assembly of the D.P.R.K. Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960.

For the Peaceful Unification of the Country. Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1958.

U.S. Department of State. Korea: 1945 to 1948. Far Eastern Series 28, Pubn. 3305 (October, 1948).

\_\_\_\_\_. North Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques of Takeover. Far Eastern Series 103, Pubn. 7118 (January, 1961).

\_\_\_\_\_. The Record of Korean Unification. Far Eastern Series 101, Pubn. 7084 (October, 1960).

Unpublished and Other Material

Kim, Uoong Tack. "Sino-Soviet Dispute and North Korea." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1967.

"Daily Reports," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 1950-1969.

The New York Times, 1945-1969.

Washington Post, 1968-1969.

## VITA

### William A. Hazleton

Born in Evergreen Park, Illinois, July 12, 1945.

Graduated from Morgan Park High School in Chicago, Illinois, June 1963, A. B., DePauw University, 1967. M. A. candidate, College of William and Mary, 1967-70, with a concentration in Government. The course requirements for this degree have been completed, but not the thesis: North Korea and Sino-Soviet Competition.

In September 1968, the author entered the University of Virginia as a graduate student in the Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs.