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Continuity and change: Consociational democracy in the Benelux countries

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CONTINUITY AND CHANGE:

CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN THE

BENELUX COUNTRIES

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A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of Government

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In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

————————

by

John Hunter Porter Williams

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

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ABSTRACT

This study seeks to examine and refine the concept of consociational democracy, a political system in which political leaders of socially and politically distinct groups interact with one another in an atmosphere of moderation and mutual accommodation.

A discussion of the explanations, suggested by various political theorists, of the political behavior and relationships in a consociational democracy produced a list of the basic characteristics of the system. Characteristics which were either ambiguous or ascribable to other political systems were eliminated.

The Benelux countries--Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg--are three countries which have moderate political systems similar to the general definition of a consociational democracy. Using the Benelux countries as test cases made it possible to refine further those characteristics isolated in the theoretical discussion, and to synthesize a model of the political activity of a consociational democracy. This model, in turn, provided the basis for a theory as to why elites of distinct social groups are able to interact in a moderate, mutually accommodative fashion.

The results of this study suggest, in broad terms, that consociational democracy exists because most individuals within the system see this type of interaction to be the normal and proper approach to politics. In actual political practice, relations between different groups or leaders are based upon mutual recognition of legitimacy. Distinct social groups and their political leaders recognize the right of other social groups to participate in the political system, and the individual groups recognize the right of their political leaders to act as spokesmen for the group and to interact freely with the leaders of other groups. Finally, there is the common recognition that the political system, represented by the sovereign authority of the State, is the legitimate forum for political activity.

As an afterword, there is a brief discussion as to the possible impact of the domestic practice of consociational politics on a country's approach to foreign affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

In the study of comparative politics, many authors have sought to produce theories explaining why different political systems behave in different ways. One pattern of political behavior that is now under scrutiny is called consociational democracy.[1] Consociational democracy is a term which is applied to countries which are divided into distinct social blocs, and which, at the same time, exercise a moderate style of political activity through the adoption, by the elites, of certain techniques of conflict management or conflict avoidance.

Various authors have sought to define the essential nature of this arrangement, to explain where it comes from and how it works. So far, several theories have been produced, some of which agree with one another while others do not. The purpose of this thesis then is to examine the various theories of consociational democracy and to synthesize a coherent theory of consociational politics from them.

Before explaining how this is to be done, let us examine the origin of the term 'consociational democracy.' Democracy refers, of course, to a political system where the government is subject to popular control. Consociation can be thought of as being a cross between association and confederation. An association is a group of individuals formally organized for the pursuit of a specific common purpose or specific common purposes, but members are not required to surrender their individuality to the group. Similarly, a confederation is a group

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of provinces or countries (pre-existing political entities) which have banded together to form a single political entity for certain purposes, but which retain a strong measure of autonomy. Consociation refers to the relationship between a set of distinct religious or social groups which, for various purposes have come to act as a single unit even though retaining some measure of their individuality. Consociational democracy then is consociational behavior in the political system.

The first step in examining this pattern of political activity is to discuss the various theories of consociational democracy in terms of their relative merits. Then, to test the results of our discussion, we must examine the theory in the context of several political systems. In this regard, the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, are the most suitable for our purposes.

The Benelux countries possess certain qualities which make them useful as objects of study. First, all three countries have extensive histories of representative government as well as traditions of moderation in their political system. The practice of moderate politics means that the countries already fulfill one of the broad definitions of consociational democracies. Extensive histories of representative government give us a larger amount of political data than would be available in a country whose regime was only thirty or forty years old.

All three countries are in the same general geographic area and share traditions of Western culture, general though these traditions may be. Comparing the Netherlands and India, on the other hand, would be more difficult because cultural differences would be far more apparent; the Dutch are a Western society while the Indians have strong traditions of caste and religion influencing their behavior. By

examining countries with common Western traditions, we eliminate a number of variables which could otherwise cause considerable confusion.

Belgium and the Netherlands are about the same size while Luxembourg is considerably smaller. Size is not, in and of itself, important except that larger countries, such as France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, and the United States, have been more often studied and, indeed, form the foundation for many of the existing models of socio-political behavior.

The Swiss, the Austrians, the Scandinavians, and the tiny countries like Liechtenstein are all potential subjects for further study, and, indeed, the first two of these countries have undergone considerable scrutiny in previous examinations of consociational politics. The Benelux countries, however, present a special case in that they are at present working together in close harmony as an international unit, the Benelux Economic Union. While the Scandinavian countries have formed the Nordic Council, their efforts have been more limited than the Benelux countries. What is the reason for this cooperation between the countries of Benelux? If the countries are indeed consociational, it may be that this has an impact on their international behavior. We shall speculate on this possibility when the examination of the countries in terms of consociational democratic theory is complete.

The study of consociational democracy will proceed in four stages:

    (1) a discussion of the major theories of consociational democracy;

    (2) an examination of the governments and historical development of the Benelux countries;

    (3) an analysis of the circumstances in the individual countries

in terms of the theoretical information supplied in Chapter One;

(4) the construction of a theory explaining the nature of consociational behavior, and a model describing the special qualities of political interaction associated with consociational democracy.

In addition, our study will allow us to speculate about the implications of consociational democracy on both national and international politics.

Before beginning this discussion of consociational theory, there are several terms which recur in this thesis which need to be defined:

Elite - here meaning the political elite, is a collection of individuals who are involved in the formulation of policy or who seek to influence the policy-making process for the benefit of a group for which they are spokesmen.

Social bloc, social group, bloc, group - used interchangeably, these terms refer to any collection of individuals who share a common bond of language, religion, ideology, or culture, and who see themselves as distinct from other groups.
N.B. Although these units are distinct, this does not imply that they are static. Members of one group may elect to join another group. The important quality is that, on the whole, the members recognize commonality within a group which is different from other groups.

Cleavage - a fundamental division in society created by adherence of individuals to differing attitudes, religions, etc.

Segmented society - a society which has cleavages.

Over-lapping or cross-cutting cleavage - a characteristic or attitude shared by individuals which cuts across cleavages, e.g., Catholicism would be an over-lapping cleavage in the case of French workers and French middle class.

Reinforcing cleavage - a cleavage which accents existing cleavages, e.g., Catholicism reinforces the ethnic cleavage between the largely strong Catholic Flemings and the largely secular Walloons.

Political system - the activities of, and relationships between, leaders and any other individuals who exert an influence on governmental policy and the way it is determined, e.g., political parties, voters, judges, etc. Also, rules of order.

Pattern - a recurring relationship between elements in a political system.

<u>Model</u> - a collection of patterns which is used to describe the aggregate activity in a political system by relating various facets of activity.

<u>Theory</u> - an explanation of the circumstances which cause and maintain the interrelated patterns of a model.

NOTES--INTRODUCTION

[1]Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System," European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975):378. See also Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: the Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland," International Social Science Journal 23, 3 (1971):355.

CHAPTER I

THEORIES OF CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

Consociational democracy is a relationship between political elites and social groups. Various authors have used different approaches to assemble theories of how a consociational democracy works and why. This chapter will discuss, first, why consociational politics demands a model separate from other major models, and then will examine different theories of consociational democracy, comparing their respective merits or demerits.

Gabriel Almond envisioned two possible models of society in a country with a representative democratic political system. The Anglo-American model represents a relatively homogenous society characterized by many over-lapping social groups (cross-cutting or over-lapping cleavages). The other, the fragmented model of Italy, for example, is characterized by predominantly non-over-lapping groups (reinforcing cleavages).[1] Almond draws these models from what is known as the pluralistic system, which is based upon three assumptions:

(1) Society contains groups with discernible differences of race, religion, or language. At the same time, these groups are technically equal in the eyes of the law. A Catholic banker receives the same treatment as a Jewish farmer.

(2) The different groups are small in that no one group has a clear majority.

(3) There are certain cross-cutting affiliations. For example, regardless of the nature of a country, all citizens are citizens. These common bonds are sufficient to allow all individuals to be classed as members of a single unit, a state for

example. At the same time, there are differences which show the country to be made up of several different sub-units, yielding some non-over-lapping affiliations, which is to say, reinforcing cleavages.[2]

Ralf Dahrendorf proposed that social conflicts occur more often within societies with a predominance of reinforcing cleavages. Societies with overlapping cleavages predominating, on the other hand, tend to have fewer conflicts because individuals moderate their opinions to fit the various positions of the several groups to which they adhere.[3] The United States, which has mostly over-lapping cleavages, is characterized by a moderate, relatively calm political scene. There is a slow rate of political turn-over, few politicians being ousted after one term or less, and non-campaign activity tends toward moderation and compromise. In Italy, on the other hand, where cleavages are strong and reinforcing, competition is more severe. The possibility of compromise to achieve goals is small.

However, there is a flaw in the approach of Almond and Dahrendorf. The two authors, who associate moderation with over-lapping cleavages and competition with reinforcing cleavages, do not take into account conditions in the Netherlands or Switzerland. In those countries, moderate political activity, which they identify with the over-lapping model, occurs within societies with strong, reinforcing cleavages.

Various authors, such as William Mitchell, Sidney Verba, and David Truman, have sought to modify the original model to include these countries.[4] Their general conclusion was that moderate politics did not rely exclusively on social structure, but arose also from traditions. One source of these traditions is 'habit background', that is, the political system was moderate because the citizens were accustomed

to moderation. Traditions of moderation could also arise from 'rules of the game', the way people approach politics.[5]

Almond explains how the over-lapping model works: an individual who is making political choices is subject to ambiguous influences from over-lapping attitudes of the many groups to which he adheres. On the other hand, a Swiss, in a segmented society, makes political decisions based largely on the influence of habit background or rules of the game, as his political attitudes arise from the homogeneous ideas of his particular group. What is the nature and source of these influences? How can we differentiate between moderate countries of Almond's model and those countries which present both a moderate political atmosphere and reinforcing cleavages? Consociational democracy, as described earlier, displays this combination of moderation and reinforcing cleavages. An examination of consociational theories should enable us to determine, at least in part, the answers to these questions.

There are several different theories and understandings about how a consociational democracy works and how it comes into being. Some of these theories focus exclusively on the interaction among the elites of distinct social groups. Others include the interrelationship between the elites and the social blocs, i.e., between elites, between elites and blocs, and between blocs. A third group focuses on the process of cultural growth of the whole society, examining the political culture and attitudes of the elites and masses rather than technical qualities of moderate interaction, such as relying on formal rules of order to restrict large-scale dissent in parliamentary debates.

Two writers who deal exclusively with the nature of elite interaction are Robert Putnam and Gerhard Lehmbruch. Putnam, who uses the

term "coalescence" to describe the consociational mode of elite inter-action, suggests that this coalescence is the result of elites mutually attempting to halt the spread of fragmentation in their political system. If the effort is successful, the system can be maintained. If elite efforts should break down, the system would break down. Putnam suggests that ". . . the behavior of American political elites in the years before the Civil War may be interpreted as an attempt to create conditions of elite coalescence. The last major social institution to crack along regional lines was the party system."[6]

The problem with Putnam's argument is that the system he is examining, in this case the U.S.A., had many over-lapping cleavages. The combatants could not be differentiated exclusively by regional origin. Northerners fought for the South, Southerners for the North, and large numbers of individuals remained neutral. Hence, Putnam's idea of fragmentation control is not based upon control of friction between discrete units of society. Another problem with Putnam is that his intention is to explain consociational politics as being an aberration in normal elite interaction rather than as a different system. To Putnam, coalescence is a type of conflict management rather than a normal way elites go about their business.

Another author who focuses on elites is Gerhard Lehmbruch. Lehmbruch, when describing elites of consociational countries, argues that the social groups are distinct and are held together through compromise and mutual accommodation on the part of the elites. He suggests that elites are mutually accommodating because the attitudes of the existing elite structure support such action, and, as new elite members enter the system, they are socialized into the attitudes. Lehmbruch suggests

five influences which craate the attitude pattern:

(1) Some basic national symbols are accepted by all the elites of the system;

(2) Past violence is seen as having had traumatic effects, i.e., violence is not seen as a profitable means of problem-solving;

(3) There has been a tradition of representative government; that is, the elites representing the different groups have traditionally had an opportunity to discuss their views;

(4) There exists intense informal communication among the elites which is not open to non-elites;

(5) Given the number of groups involved and their relative size, majorities can be formed only by bargaining.[7]

Lehmbruch's list of influences, although they describe conditions which probably exist in a consociational country, does not show whether or not it describes a pattern of elite behavior unique to a consociational system. In addition, we need to know more about the ability of the elites to maintain their own legitimacy in the eyes of the masses, and about the ability of those same elites to deal with new elite members who are not so completely inculcated into the values of the tradition.

A proper description of elites should reflect their ability to deal with changing circumstances and attitudes, especially in view of the conflicts associated with distinct social groups. Changes in circumstances and disaffection with on-going policies can cause further fragmentation (creation of fringe groups) and lead to the appearance of extremist leaders who owe no allegiance to the system.

If questions of on-going elite legitimacy and non-cooperative leaders were only lesser concerns, and the system operates under influences which approached Lehmbruch's ideal, can his list be considered a description of only a consociational state? Under Almond's model, the

United States is a country with over-lapping social cleavages and a moderate political system. Comparing qualities of the United States to qualities of Lehmbruch's model, it is immediately obvious that at least four out of five influences are, indeed, characteristic of the United States, too. Although leaders disagree as to methods and programs, they all claim to seek the well-being of the whole country; hence, they share some basic symbols. Past violence, such as the Civil War or labor riots, are seen as traumatic and generally unprofitable. American traditions of representative government predate the creation of the country by centuries. The fourth influence, informal channels of communication, are found in traditions of informal button-holing and smoke-filled rooms which abound in the United States.

The fifth influence, that majorities can be formed by bargaining only, is found in Germany and Great Britain, two countries which have political parties based on cross-cutting affiliations. Although it does not occur all of the time, we find circumstances where no party was able to gain an absolute majority and the most successful party was obliged to seek to form a coalition with one or more parties.

Lehmbruch's list of influences, then, can be said to be common to moderate political systems, but it cannot be said to be the exclusive domain of consociational democracy.

The elite analyses by Lehmbruch and Putnam are inadequate as descriptions of consociational systems, although Lehmbruch's does give some possible clues as to the source of consociational activity. The two authors do, however, show, by the nature of the flaws in their arguments, the need for establishing the relationship between the elites and the social groups as a mainstay of a consociational theory, i.e., the

flaws show a need for additional information. Without such a relation-
ship being shown, a study which showed Lehmbruch's qualities could be
about any moderate polity.

One author who examined this relationship was James Dunn. In his
work, "Consociational Democracy and Language Conflict: A Comparison of
the Belgian and Swiss Experiences," Dunn suggests that a particular
ethos had been established such that the elites behave in an accommoda-
tive fashion in a consociational country because the society as a whole
had come to expect it of them.[8]

Arend Lijphart also approached this question of the relationship
between elites and society. Lijphart's image of consociational elites
places them in the context of their country. He argues that the conso-
ciational system will succeed to the degree "(1) . . . that the elites
have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of
the sub-cultures . . .; (2) . . . that they have the ability to trans-
cend cleavages and to join in common efforts with the elites of rival
sub-cultures; (3) . . . (that they have) a commitment to the maintenance
of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability; and
(4) . . . that the elites understand the perils of political fragmenta-
tion."[9]

These elite characteristics were generated by a fragmented
society. Lijphart, in a discussion on the crisis in Northern Ireland,
tried to explain why consociational politics does not work in that situa-
tion. Important Northern Irish leaders, both Protestant and Catholic,
do not display the characteristics we have summarized. The Reverend Mr.
Paisley, for example, sees the perils of fragmentation as being less
important than the protection of Ulster Protestant values and forms.

He makes no attempt to transcend cleavages, nor does he seek to accommodate divergent interests. The cumulative result of elite activity in Northern Ireland is that stability is, at best, a cease-fire rather than a lasting peace. Although Paisley does not typify all Northern Irish leaders, he is in a sufficiently strong position to negate the efforts of more moderate leaders.

It can be said that the presence of the first two characteristics in Lijphart's list indicate the presence of the second two. Willingness to bind the interests of various groups together, rather than seeking to dominate, indicates that elites define the system as more than the will of their individual group. As such, the elites will tend to seek to fulfill the first two characteristics. Hence, only the first two need be considered in detail.

Lijphart, in addition to the above elite characteristics, suggests six socio-political characteristics which he felt typified consociational countries, some of which fit Northern Ireland, while others did not. As Lijphart's concern in this article was Northern Ireland, the model is rather sketchy, seeking only to prove its applicability or inapplicability in that setting.

The first two socio-political characteristics that Lijphart suggests are the presence of a multiple balance of power,[10] and the presence of distinct social cleavages.[11] Drawing upon the experience of the Dutch, Lijphart suggests that three or more distinct sub-cultures, no one of them able to form a majority alone, are necessary to prevent the domination of a minority by a majority. Such domination could occur in a bi-cultural state like Northern Ireland, with consequent political instability. The problem with the multiple balance of power concept is

that it is not numbers of groups, but rather biases and attitudes which maintain peace or generate hostility between groups. Three groups in a five-group setting, for example, could band together against the other two. Likewise, in a bi-cultural setting, peace is maintained because moderates seeking co-existence are predominant, or extremists, seeking absolute division, create disorder, drive the moderates and their attitudes into hiding.

Lijphart next argues that if there were several distinct social groups, a grand coalition might be acceptable to the various parties.[12] In simpler terms this means that, if necessary, it would be possible to unite the elites of all of the major groups into a single government. This does not mean that grand coalitions, which occur only in exceptional circumstances, must appear regularly, but rather that the creation of such a body is not impossible and is facilitated by the existence of a number of major groups.

Fourthly, Lijphart suggests a need for some degree of national solidarity.[13] Many Catholics in Northern Ireland identify with their Catholic compatriots in the Republic rather than with Ulster Protestants. Protestants often treat the Catholics as conquered subjects, at worst. As a result, the Northern Irish have few common bonds of shared experience or tradition. Owing fealty to the same monarch, a symbol which joins the Flemings and Walloons of Belgium, has no effect in Ireland. The Belgian king is a Belgian rather than a Fleming or Walloon, but to the Irish Catholics, who have their own traditions (many kingdoms, destroyed centuries ago), the Anglo-Scots, Ulster Protestants and their Queen are little more than foreign oppressors.

The fifth characteristic that Lijphart suggests is a small

population.[14] In this regard, he sees two interdependent qualities.

(1) In a society where groups are very distinct, the population must be small lest the intense, elite interaction demanded in managing many distinct groups becomes impossible to carry out.

(2) The elite membership will deal with primarily domestic rather than foreign affairs.[15]

Lijphart's ideas here come from the notion held by others, such as Lehmbruch, that consociational countries tend to be neutral in the field of foreign affairs. He offers as an explanation of that neutrality that there are not enough leaders to act decisively domestically and abroad and that strong cleavages are politically relevant only in smaller countries.[16] The quality of leaders is, however, not really a function of size of polity. Athens in the fifth Century B.C., for example, had a population of 100-200,000, and even fewer citizens; yet it produced many great leaders and thinkers. Furthermore, the political relevance of social cleavages also has nothing to do with size. Unrest among Hispanics of Blacks over civil rights in the United States is as much a product of exacerbated social cleavages as a language-group confrontation in a small country. Smallness is not significant, then, in and of itself.

Lijphart's sixth point is that social cleavages must be distinct. It is important to understand that a segmented society must be more than purely an array of social groups which are different or which perceive inequities. Unlike social groups in the United States, they must be discrete, with each group having its own political elite and there being relatively little intermingling with other groups.

The final socio-cultural characteristic that is mentioned is that the external threats to a state can impress upon the leaders the need

for intergroup cooperation.[17] Lijphart adds that the threat must be

recognized by all of the rival sub-cultures as a common threat. Catho-

lics in Northern Ireland, for example, might not view Irish Republican

intervention as a threat, but rather as liberation.

In the discussion of the six socio-cultural characteristics, the

notion that politically distinct social groups exist is most important.

A multiple balance of power among distinct groups, although conceivably

present in a consociational system as a conflict-restraining influence,

is not a guarantor of mutual restraint. Mutual restraint, as a norm,

is found in the acceptability of a grand coalition as a normative model.

This characteristic can, in turn, be expressed in the broader terms of

Lijphart's elite characteristics, since the power to form a grand coali-

tion demands the elites have the support of their own sub-culture and

are recognized by other sub-cultures as a legitimate political voice.

The actual presence of a grand coalition is merely the pinnacle of a

broader political consensus.

Of the remaining three influences, two, small population and ex-

terior threats, while possibly having an impact, are not reliable

guarantors of peaceful interaction. The former was shown to be irrele-

vant, while the latter's validity depends on the relationship between

the threat and the social group, i.e., it must be a threat to all par-

ties in order to encourage joint action.

Finally, there is "some measure of national solidarity," a very

important value as it reflects the ability of elites to convince masses

that common action is more than a passing phenomenon. Indeed, it

represents the unity needed against external threats. Hence, Lijphart's

ideas of social cleavages, elite interaction with society, and national

solidarity are significant socio-cultural characteristics.

Lijphart's descriptions of elites and socio-cultural characteristics gives us an idea of how a consociational country is able to function. Why are the masses willing to live in a system like this rather than demanding a government which deals exclusively with their problems and is divorced from all other social blocs? This question becomes especially important when there is trouble between social groups. As was mentioned earlier, James Dunn suggests that society has been cultured to expect cooperative behavior on the part of elites.[18] How does this process of culturing come about? Another way of looking at this question is how does a consociational democracy come into being? The answer will indicate whether a consociational system could be produced in any country with distinct cleavages, or whether it is a system which arose because special circumstances had existed at one time.

Two views concerning the culturing process are those of Hans Daalder and Val Lorwin. Lorwin suggests that consociational practices arise from a tradition of localism, i.e., social groups in a consociational country were once geographically distinct.[19] In his discussion on this concept, he suggests that these distinct groups experienced gradually increasing political interaction in areas of mutual interest. At the same time, however, the bulk of political power remained in the hands of the local sub-groups long after a single political unit was formed. The relationship was confederal. More power began to be transferred to the central regime as more and more joint decisions were demanded of the sub-groups. This process led, eventually, to the creation of a consociational state out of a confederal body.[20] Lorwin also notes that in spite of this transfer, there remains strong identification with the old localisms.[21]

Hans Daalder agrees, by and large, with Lorwin's position of growing interaction between distinct groups. In his treatment, however, he puts more emphasis on the involvement and importance of elites in the transition.

In Daalder's words, "Consociationalism is . . . not a response to the perils of subcultural splits, but the prior reason why the subcultural divisions never did become perilous."[22] Instead of elite accommodation being the force that restrains political division, ". . . earlier consociational practices facilitated the peaceful transition towards newer forms of pluralist political organization. . ."[23]

Daalder and Lijphart differ in their analysis of elites. Lijphart is similar to Putnam in that the focus of his study is on the present, a present where elite interaction is forced into certain patterns by the problems of fragmentation. For Daalder, on the other hand, both the patterns of elite interaction and the array of politicized social groups reflect the way in which both elites and masses feel the political system should be organized. Daalder presents an image of consociational democracy that suggests that the elite practice of mutual forbearance and accommodation is a product of a long process and is infused in the political culture of the nation. Can a consociational pattern be reproduced elsewhere? Daadler says yes, it can be. Elite culture, he argues, should not be viewed as a process which only reflects objective cleavages, but rather as an independent variable. Leaders, in short, should be viewed as people who lead, not merely people who temporarily counteract other political forces. They should be seen as the elites of states with the capacity to influence developments, especially over the long run. By using the available repre-

sentative traditions and cultures, Daalder feels that stability between distinct groups could be achieved without destroying cultural integrity and without resorting to violence for nation-building.[24]

Lorwin's and Daalder's descriptions of the culturing process present possible images of how conflict was avoided during developmental stages. Still, we need to know which argument is stronger. If Lorwin is correct, then certain physical relationships between the groups are necessary; particularly, they should begin contact while separated by distance. There should be no economic or social need for a person to move from one region into the other, i.e., no group is being driven by a desire to expand, by an outside threat, or by economic scarcity to move into its neighbor's territory. Daalder's view, on the other hand, depends less on physical relationships between groups and more on who is in charge. A strong, active elite can effect changes in attitudes and circumstances if they have an opportunity to stop trouble before it gets out of hand. Neither writer totally contradicts the other; yet each is different. To determine which argument is most useful, or if both or neither are useful, we must compare their descriptions with actual circumstances.

As was mentioned earlier, it is known that the Benelux countries exhibit qualities which may be deemed consociational. This study, then, will proceed in two stages: an introduction to the government and history of each of the three countries, and an examination of the socio-political systems. The first stage will present a summary of how each country's government operates and how each country developed. This summary will, in turn, give us some insight into whether Lorwin's or Daalder's ideas are most useful.

The second stage, the examination of the socio-political system of the three, will be based on Lijphart's list of characteristics. This analysis will allow us to make any additions that are necessary and to further refine the ideas that we have of how a consociational democracy works and how it is different from other systems.

[1]Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics 18, 3 (August 1956):406-9, cited in Lijphart, Arend, The Politics of Accommodation, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 10.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Standord University Press, 1959), pp. 213-8, cited in Lijphart, p. 9.

[4]William C. Mitchell, "Interest Group Theory and 'Overlapping Memberships': A Critique," cited in Lijphart. See also Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," Journal of Politics, 27, 3 (August 1965):497. See also David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 501, cited in Lijphart.

[5]Lijphart, p. 13.

[6]Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 120.

[7]Lehmbruch, pp. 380-5.

[8]James A. Dunn, Jr., "'Consociational Democracy' and Language Conflict: A Comparison of Belgian and Swiss Experiences," Comparative Political Studies 5, 1 (April 1972):16.

[9]Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," quoted in Daalder, p. 367.

[10]Arend Lijphart, "The Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories, and Solutions," British Journal of Political Science, 5, part 1 (January 1975):99-102.

[11]Ibid., p. 101.

[12]Ibid., p. 100.

[13]Ibid., pp. 100-101.

[14]Ibid., p. 101.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid.

[18]Dunn, p. 16.

[19]Val R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," Comparative Politics 3, 2 (January 1971):151.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Ibid., pp. 151-2.

[22]Daalder, p. 368.

[23]Ibid.

[24]Ibid.

CHAPTER II

THE BENELUX COUNTRIES: GOVERNMENTS AND HISTORIES

One facet of political interaction that was not discussed in the previous chapter was the distribution and interrelationship of authority among the different branches of government. The reason for this is that, although the basic patterns of government in various countries may be similar, many interrelationships will be influenced by attitudes or circumstances which are unique to the individual countries. It would be extremely difficult to draw meaningful generalizations concerning those aspects of a political system which yield consociationality because some functions which are technically the same are different in practice. It is in this context that we will examine the governments and the socio-political development of the Benelux countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. This discussion will provide a background for the examination of elites and socio-political characteristics in the next chapter. In addition, the examination of socio-political development should allow us to resolve the questions raised by Daalder's and Lorwin's proposals on the culturing process.

All three of the Benelux countries are constitutional monarchies. They each have a monarch, a Cabinet, a legislature, and free and open elections. It is at this point that similarities begin to break down. The three monarchs arose from different circumstances and, perforce, have different characteristics. The Dutch monarchy, for example, has

lost most of its power over the last century and a-half. Today, its
powers have become severely limited and virtually no real power is exer-
cised by the monarch. However, the powers of the Grand Dukes of Luxem-
bourg are far broader than those of the Dutch monarch, as they still in-
clude a wide array of royal prerogatives. The Grand Duke, if circum-
stances demanded it, could control or dissolve the legislature and rule
by decree.[1] Even without the presence of a crisis, the Grand Duke
exerts considerable influence as he hand picks his ministers and
appoints the members of the Council of State (described below).[2]

When the Kingdom of Belgium was established, the monarchy and its
function were sharply defined. Most European monarchs remained distinct
from their legislature and, gradually, the royal authority passed from
King to Parliament until the monarch reigned while the legislatures
ruled. For Belgium, however, the monarchy was defined as being an
integral part of the legislative system of checks and balances.[3] The
King acts as overseer to the legislature and can, in the event of a
crisis, act decisively to break legislative dead-locks. The advantage
enjoyed by the King here is that while other monarchs have surrendered
their power to the legislature, the Belgian King is legally bound to
be ready to act if circumstances demand and to remain involved as a
non-partisan force in the legislative process.[4]

An important quality of all three Benelux monarchies is the per-
son in the position. While, legally, there are potentially powerful
monarchs in Luxembourg and Belgium and a limited monarch in the Nether-
lands, in actual practice the strength of the office of monarch lies
in the holder of the title. If an individual is actively involved in
policy-making, the monarch is strong, whether he has constitutional

powers or not. If he is content to allow his Cabinets to decide policy and deal with crises, then regardless of constitutional authority, he is outside of the mainstream of political activity and serves a primarily ceremonial function.

The legislatures of the three countries also differ one from the other. In each of the three countries, the lower house (Netherlands--Second Chamber, Belgium--House of Representatives, Luxembourg--Chamber of Deputies) is elected by popular suffrage. All three countries use proportional representation, i.e., seats in the house are distributed to the parties according to the percentage of votes each party won in the election. This is a common practice in most European countries.

The upper house of the Netherlands, the First Chamber, is elected by the Provincial Councils in the same way that legislatures of German Länder still send and pre-1900 American States once sent representatives (Senators) to one house of the national legislature. The Belgians, on the other hand, choose their upper house through a combination of royal appointments and elections from the lower house (the selections are in different proportions). Luxembourg's upper house, the Council of State, has no real legislative power and is little more than a collection of advisors to the Duke and Chamber of Deputies who are appointed by the Duke.

While the Dutch upper and lower houses are both involved in legislation, the Belgian and Luxembourger upper houses are left, by and large, out of the legislative process. They can suggest legislation or changes in existing legislation, but their actual purpose is to oversee events and, if necessary, adjudicate questions of constitutionality.

The real power in most democratic states in Europe is found in

the Cabinet, or Government as it is sometimes known. For the Dutch, a
Cabinet minister is expected to make decisions on policies which do not
demand legislative action on his own initiative, or after consultation
with other ministers. Dutch ministers can be, at times, their own mas-
ters. In Belgium, on the other hand, all policy is subject to Parlia-
mentary debate. To institute or change policy, a minister must first
justify it before the Parliament.[5] Luxembourg lies somewhere in the
middle as policy is subject to the review of the Council of State which
would, in turn, bring any questions to the Chamber of Deputies.

A final quality which can be used to describe all three countries
is that all three have a constitution which is based upon rules of order,
guidelines for interaction, rather than being a description of 'correct
thinking', which ties the political system to the maintenance of parti-
cular socio-political relationships, what in Article 45 of the Irish
Constitution are known as "Directive Principles of Social Policy." Al-
though it is only a framework for cooperation, consociationalism must
also depend upon the willingness of the actors to deal with one another
in an atmosphere of mutual trust.

In summary, we can describe the three countries according to the
relationships between the monarch, the legislature, and the Cabinet.
The Dutch have a system where the Cabinet holds most of the effective
power while the legislature acts as a check on their power. The monarch
has only a minor role. In the Belgium government, on the other hand,
the most important feature is the Parliament with the Cabinet working
closely with the legislators themselves. The King is an important actor
and is also bound to the legislature. Finally, Luxembourg's government
has a strong Cabinet with a strong system or review and recall. The

monarch has great potential influence and can counter-balance either
the Cabinet or the Chamber of Deputies.

* * *

One fact that is apparent from the discussion on the governments
of the Benelux countries is that, although they border upon one another,
each country has undergone different influences. The task now is to
describe and analyze these influences. This examination will focus
upon the circumstances surrounding national intergration such as out-
side influences and their impact, the relationship between groups, and
political changes, such as the movement toward universal suffrage and
its effects.

The Netherlands

The Netherlands declared its independence from Spain in 1571.
At the time, the country was more a loose confederation of provinces
than a united state. The national government consisted of a council
of representatives from the Provincial Councils. While the day-to-day
mechanics of local government were carried out by the Provincial Coun-
cils, the representatives to the national government met in what Daalder
describes as ". . . something more akin to a series of negotiations be-
tween independent states than to a national legislature."[6] There was,
however, a strong recognition of a community of interest such that all
parties recognized themselves as part of the Republic of the Nether-
lands.[7]

The people in the original set of provinces were all Calvinists,
a fact which undoubtedly enhanced their ability to work together. There
were, however, local differences and traditions which could make indi-
viduals suspicious of the motives of their neighbors. There were also

distinctions in dialects which ranged from minor local idioms in most provinces to a completely different dialect in Gröningen.

During the 1620's, the religious situation was complicated when the Netherlands annexed parts of Brabant and Limburg, two Catholic provinces which were part of the Spanish Netherlands, or what we now know as Belgium and Luxembourg. This had little affect upon general Dutch policy because the country as a whole was heavily involved in expansion of trade, colonization, and wars with Spain, France, and England which occurred intermittently until the mid-1700's. In time, however, Catholics would become a significant political force.

From about 1792 until 1814, the Netherlands fell under the control of France. Although French liberalism, a mixture of democratic ideals and anti-clericalism, had an influence, the Netherlands remained a semi-independent state, first as the Batavian Republic and then as a kingdom under one of Napoleon's brothers. The administration and internal policy remained in Dutch hands.

In 1814, at the time of the fall of the First French Empire, William of Orange, head of one of the most important families in the Netherlands, was proclaimed King of the United Netherlands. One of his first acts was to persuade the Congress of Vienna to allow him to administer the provinces of the Spanish (Austrian as of 1713) Netherlands. These provinces made up what was to become, in 1830, Belgium and Luxembourg. Although the Congress did give these to William, Belgium eventually revolted in 1830 and Luxembourg was granted independence in 1867.

During William's reign, the arrangement of Parliament (the States-General, as it is known) was altered at the suggestion of the King's Belgian subjects so that it became bi-cameral.[8] Instead of being purely

a body of Provincial representatives, a council of notables was added

as a second (upper) chamber. In 1848, the States-General was altered

again, in response to the local unrest arising from political disturb-

ances sweeping all of Europe. The chamber of Provincial representatives

became the First Chamber, replacing the Council of notables. A new

Second Chamber was henceforth to be elected by direct popular vote.[9]

During the period 1814-1848, large changes began occurring with-

in the political structure of the Netherlands. A liberal movement

arose from the ashes of French influence.[10] To counteract this move-

ment, the Calvinists began organizing into the Anti-Revolutionary Party

(ARP) and were dedicated to retention of older, more traditional values.

Over time, an upper-class, less fundamentalist faction of the ARP broke

free and formed the Christian Historical Union. After 1848, the

Socialist and Catholic Parties also gained strength. The establishment

of universal suffrage in 1919 established these five groups as the con-

trolling forces in Dutch politics. Today each group, by government

fiat, has its own newspaper, is entitled to specific times on television,

and is a discrete unit within Dutch society.

In the Netherlands today, sociologists describe this pattern of

discrete units as verzuiling, or pillarization.[11] The continued viabil-

ity of verzuiling is in doubt today because of the number of splinter

parties which appeared during the 1960's. The splinters appear, how-

ever, to be losing ground back to the older Big Five parties and the

system is returning to the status quo ante. I will attempt to document

this in the next chapter.

In terms of the culturing processes suggested by Lorwin and Daal-

der, circumstances in the Netherlands support both arguments. The

government of the provinces remained largely a local concern for over
two hundred years, while national politics per se were handled as a
community of interest. When interest groups became ideological or
religious, rather than provincial, the elites were already accustomed
to mutual accommodation. Hence, Lorwin's idea that local bodies gradu-
ally grew together is supported.

At the same time, Daalder's suggestion that a desire for coopera-
tion predated unification is also necessary as it helps explain, first,
how the Dutch provinces were able to get together in the first place
and, second, it explains how the system was able to survive the transi-
tion from regionally oriented attitudes to religious and ideological
ones. Lorwin's idea is bound to the maintenance of localism as the
foundation of elite cooperation. Daalder, by focusing on the result
of culturing, allows for the decline of such regional bias in the con-
tinuing maintenance of the political system as well as change in circum-
stances.

Belgium

Belgium came into existence in 1789 when there was a momentarily
successful revolt against Austria, which had gained the territories
from Spain in 1713. Prior to 1789, Belgium was a set of discrete pro-
vinces, only a few of which had enjoyed short periods of independence or
semi-independence. There was no history of either ethnic or political
unity among any of the provinces.[12] The revolt in 1789 had been brewing
for only a few years, arising from the effects of the French revolution,
which were spreading across Europe. The parties involved were Walloons,
a French-speaking group from the southeastern half of the territory,
and Flemings, who came from Flanders in the north and west and who spoke

a dialect of Dutch. The revolt lasted only a short time before a new army arrived from Austria and retook control.

In 1792, France annexed the territory outright, giving the area French courts and a French administration. The Walloons soon embraced French liberal ideas and actively supported the French. Among the Flemings, the nobility, clergy, and peasantry found themselves being controlled by the middle classes who had also embraced the fashionable French language and French ideas. Until 1814, Belgium was run completely by French-speakers (Francophones) from both Wallonia and Flanders.[13]

When William I of the new Kingdom of the United Netherlands took control of Belgium and Luxembourg in 1814, he began instituting reforms whereby the Flemings would be administered in Flemish while the Walloons would be administered in French. In spite of this, and indeed many other conciliatory gestures by the King, there remained distrust and friction between the Calvinist Dutch and the Francophone Walloons and Flemings. The conservative Catholic Flemish-speakers, influenced by the Catholic clergy, trusted neither group.[14]

In 1830, a revolt began in Brussels, which soon spread throughout Belgium. A liberal constitution was written, establishing Belgium as a monarchy with a strong legislature. The Belgium leaders invited Leopold of Saxe-Coburg to be the new King. His acceptance gave the country a monarch who was neither Flemish nor French, but rather would be Belgian. In addition, since Leopold was uncle to Victoria, then British heir apparent, Belgium gained strong support from the pre-eminent power in Europe. Although the war with the Netherlands dragged on until 1839, Belgium was assured of an independent existence.

The unity of the 1830's gave way to the factionalism of the 1840's.

Exponents of anti-clerical French liberalism began forming a strong

political movement, especially among the Francophone middle-class.

This movement was opposed by a strong, traditional, pro-Catholic body

which was led by the old nobility and the clergy. In addition, in 1846,

a vocal body of Flemings began protesting the decline of Flemish culture

caused by the disdain in which the Francophone elite held all things

Flemish. A study committee appointed by King Leopold examined Flemish

grievances and Francophone counter claims that Flemish was only the

language of the uneducated. The committee concluded that the Flemings

were correct in their contentions, so Leopold began a program of annual

competitions to encourage Flemish art and literature.[15]

The four-way split of Catholic-secular and Flemish-French was

limited in its scope during the 1800's because only a small part of the

population was enfranchised. The Catholic Party, which had begun mak-

ing significant gains during the latter half of the century because of

troubles brewing within the Liberal Party, worked, nevertheless, for

the enhancement of Flemish rights. During the 1880's, for example, the

Catholics passed laws making it mandatory that the courts and adminis-

tration would use Flemish with those who spoke it.[16]

With the coming of the twentieth century, a French-inspired

Socialist movement began making significant political gains in the in-

dustrial regions of Wallonia. Even before the establishment of univer-

sal suffrage, a small offshoot of the Liberal Party was calling itself

the Socialist Party. The two movements, the Walloon industrial workers

(Socialists) and the Flemish peasants needed only the change to univer-

sal suffrage and the concurrent increase in potential voting support

to blossom forth as significant parties.

World War I was a time of great internal turmoil because, while some Flemings embraced the Germans as liberators, others fought in trenches under officers who spoke a different language. King Albert rewarded the loyal Flemish over Walloon protests by granting universal suffrage. The language conflict was now fully under way.[17]

Since 1920, most political activity has centered on making adjustments to ease tensions between religious and secular groups, and between the language groups. Between 1920 and 1932, Flemish rights and privileges were gradually improved until finally, a language boundary was established such that the country was divided into two language regions, Flanders and Wallonia. Each region was to be administered in its own language. The laws of the 1880's had dealt only with specific cases, i.e., only if a person could not speak French was any consideration made. The 1932 law provided that all of Flanders would automatically be administered in Flemish. Brussels, the capital, was to be bilingual.[18]

During the early 1950's, a new problem arose where there was a question whether King Leopold III had behaved properly during the fall of Belgium in 1940. A referendum showed that the King was supported by 54% of the people. A breakdown of the vote showed that the Flemings supported by over 60%, while the Walloons and Bruxelloises (French-speaking citizens of Brussels) supported the King by only 46 and 48%. Rather than risk a crisis, Leopold abdicated in favor of his son Baudouin.[19]

A second major dispute of the 1950's fell along religious-secular lines. A question over the relationship between the parochial and state schools was resolved in a great compromise called the Pact Scholaire which guaranteed equal standing to both groups.

During the late 1950's and the 1960's, protest rallies took place over the legal position of language groups. The growth of Volksunie, the Flemish language party, caused a concurrent growth of a Walloon counterpart, the Walloon Rally. This growth caused the Constitutional Amendment of 1970, only the third amendment ever to the Belgian constitution. This amendment created cultural councils for each region to act as advisors to the government on the problems of the individual regions.[20] Problems over the creation and implementation of this amendment have caused the downfall of several governments. The possibility of a resolution of the problems is very real, however. Further discussion of this situation will be presented in the next chapter.

In Belgium, the forces of division, especially during the last sixty years, have been titanic. The ability of the elites to hold the country together and to at least limit the violence is remarkable. Similar circumstances have led to bloodshed and revolt elsewhere.

What knowledge does the case of Belgium give us with regards to the question of culturing? Lorwin's localism gains obvious support from Belgium as it describes the mechanics of both creation and maintenance. The provinces of Belgium had been administered individually for some time yet had been under a common overlord, whether Spanish, Austrian, French, or Dutch. French influences had undermined the discreteness of the divisions as there was now an overlap in the worst possible place; the entrepreneurs and administrators in Flanders, though of Flemish stock, had become "foreigners" by adopting the French values and language. The control of much of the political sphere by these Francophones between 1830 and 1932 led to considerable unrest among the non-Francophone Flemings who felt that the normal channels for airing

grievances or for seeking justice had been closed to them. The reinforcement of localism through the 1932 language boundary and the 1970 Amendment will probably reestablish a viable balance without dividing the country into two separate countries, as it establishes an atmosphere of Flemings solving Flemish problems and French solving French problems.

Daalder's thesis also holds because recognition of the rights of Flemings and a willingness to find a common solution demands the foundation of commonality of interest and desire. Belgians, both Flemings and Walloons, had been willing to work together in 1789 and were prepared to do so again in 1830. If this had not been the case, Belgium would not have survived.

An important aspect of the culturing process, which is involved in both Lorwin's merging localities approach and Daalder's approach of pre-existent accommodative elite attitudes and which emerges from the discussion, is the recognition by each social group of the legitimacy of the other social units· than themselves. The political system is malleable and can be altered to fit changes in circumstances or changes in the prevailing mood of the people. The political events in Belgium over the last sixty years bear this out as the elites have sought to absorb Flemish and Walloon language parties and create circumstances which would remove the threats perceived by the two groups.

Luxembourg

Luxembourg presents a different set of circumstances to us than did its Benelux partners. Unlike the other two countries, Luxembourg has been a unified state for over one thousand years. The only time that it has not had its own administration was briefly during the fourteenth century and during the French occupations of 1792-1814.

Founded in 963 by Count Sigfrid, Luxembourg was ruled by the same dynasty for several hundred years. A part of the Holy Roman Empire, it produced several Emperors, one of whom greatly expanded the territory (it was reduced to one-third of its size in 1839) and raised it to the status of a Duchy. In 1442, the dynasty died out and the Duchy passed into the hands of the last Duke's cousin, the Duke of Burgundy. Control passed shortly thereafter to the House of Hapsburg, in-laws to the Burgundians. Luxembourg was to have famous Hapsburgs such as Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Spain, as its Dukes.

During one of the endemic wars with France, Luxembourgers successfully resisted a French invasion. Pleased with his subjects, Charles arranged that a provincial council of notables should run the country in his absence. This arrangement continued for over two hundred years when, as with most of Europe, Luxembourg was invaded by revolutionary France.[21]

As with Belgium, Luxembourg was incorporated as a department or administrative district of France. Although there was a French-style liberal movement already extant in Luxembourg, even the liberals opposed the annexation. Sporadic fighting occurred for about ten years, culminating in a large-scale revolt. Peace was restored by Napoleon Bonaparte, by then Emperor, who returned most of the control of local administration to the Luxembourgers.[23]

French occupation had several influences on Luxembourg, most important of which is that it reinforced the sense of Luxembourger nationalism which had lain untested for some time. Catholics and secular liberals, who had been drifting apart, were drawn together against a common foe. At the same time, French administration caused the ideas

of representative democracy and anti-clericalism to become more firmly entrenched.

In 1814, as previously mentioned, William I of the Netherlands annexed Luxembourg. This annexation was different from that of Belgium in that the Congress of Vienna made Luxembourg a Grand Duchy and William was its Grand Duke. The term Grand Duchy means that the ruler of the country was an autonomous sovereign, recognizing no higher authority. Hence, William was sovereign of two separate countries, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. So, in spite of sharing a common monarch and administration, Luxembourg was more than a province of the Netherlands. In practical terms this distinction is probably unimportant, but it does give a psychological flavor of continuity to Luxembourg's traditions of discreteness and semi-autonomy.

In 1839, at the conclusion of the Dutch-Belgian conflict, Luxembourg was partitioned with Belgium annexing over two-thirds of its territory. The remaining territory remained under Dutch rule. During the 1840's, Lexembourg was granted a Belgian-style constitution, a measure which included direct election of deputies to a legislature which had for centuries been a council of appointed notables, together with representatives selected by cantonal and professional organizations. Although this constitution was restricted somewhat during the late 1850's, parliamentary activity was in full swing by the time Luxembourg became independent in 1867.[24] Luxembourg became independent because the title of Grand Duke had passed to the family of Orange-Nassau, the junior line of the Dutch royal house. No real change had taken place in Luxembourg except that its tie with the Dutch had been severed.

Luxembourg's government decided at the end of World War I that

the country needed an economic linkage with another country to enhance
its own industrial capacity. Such a linkage was formed with Belgium in
1921 when the two formed BLEU, the Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union.
Not only did this linkage put industrialization into high gear, it also
restructured Luxembourger society. Luxembourg's factory workers, in
1921, were predominantly Socialist and nominally Catholic. A substan-
tial part of the country's electorate was still agricultural. Between
1921 and the present, that arrangement changed substantially. The
farmers moved to the city, bringing their more traditional attitudes.
Government efforts to diversify the nation's industries from 70% steel
into other areas led to the reordering of society through growth in
international banking and other services, rather than industrial work.[25]

The changes taking place in Luxembourg led to the exacerbation of
existing social divisions. Richard Rose and Derek Urwin examined poli-
tical development in various countries, among them Luxembourg. Their
study focused upon the processes through which the lower classes, both
workers and peasants, were brought into political organizations. Rose
and Urwin found that the conflict between secularism and religion led
to a segmentation of voluntary associations and the press.[26] As workers
and peasants found themselves becoming more politically involved, be-
cause of changes in the patterns of national political activity and
organization, they were encouraged to join in voluntary politically-
oriented associations such as peasants' leagues and labor organizations.
Many of the lower classes were unwilling to join except within a tradi-
tional framework. The Christian party leaders and prelates provided
this framework.[27]

This study by Rose and Urwin is a propos to our study on Luxembourg

in that it points to the existence of a relevant and discrete social cleavage along religious-ideological lines. A cursory examination of changes in trade union memberships further supports this contention. In 1947, most industrial workers were members of socialist trade unions like the politically active Confederation Générale du Travaille du Luxembourg (C.G.T.), which had appeared during the pan-European socialist movement of the late 1800's. The C.G.T., like similar unions in France and Italy, favored social reform, pacifism, and the dissolution of national boundaries.[28] At the time, the C.G.T. and a few smaller socialist unions could draw only 2,300 members in toto. The number of non-union workers was marginal.[29]

Today, the trade unions form a markedly different array. Although membership in the socialist unions has risen from 58,000 to 59,000, in actuality, there is a strong division within the socialist ranks. While the C.G.T. has 35,000 members, a more nationally-oriented union, the Letzburger Arbechter Verband (L.A.V.), has grown in size to include 24,000 members of the socialist bloc.[30]

At the same time, two other unions which reflect other political affiliations have also become politically prominent. The Federation des Employes Privees du Luxembourg (F.E.P.), a moderate, secular body, and the Letzburger Chrestliche Gewerkschaftsbond (L.C.G.B.), a Catholic workers union, have attracted 18,000 and 15,000 workers, respectively. These two unions, together with the L.A.V., have formed the Conseil National des Syndicats, a government-sponsored sounding board for worker-oriented desires and grievances.[31] A fifth major union, the railway employees union, falls neither into the camp of the Conseil nor of the C.G.T.

The array of unions and the growing strength of the non-pan-European socialist unions suggests that, as Luxembourgers migrated to the industrial regions, individuals were not absorbed into existing groups but did indeed band into groups which carried over from their previous affiliations and which continue to reflect social divisions. Hence, there is a discrete division between Catholics and Socialists, and a division between various kinds of socialists.

This argument is very important to the thesis as a whole because it resolves the question of whether Lorwin's localism or Daalder's elite influence is the proper foundation for the culturing process. The Catholic prelates and party leaders organized the new workers into political forces and brought them into the political spectrum as discrete legitimate political units. The fact that these leaders were already involved in political activity with the secular opposition means that they were dealing with that opposition on the basis of mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the two parties, Catholics and secularists, to exist in the political intrastructure; i.e., as Daalder suggests, elite cooperation predated interaction between politicized groups. Hence, Lorwin's idea of separate groups growing together was not necessary to generate accommodative interaction between distinct socio-political units.

Once again the idea of mutual recognition of political legitimacy plays an important role in our discussion. In the case of Luxembourg and, as had been mentioned above, Belgium and the Netherlands, as the different groups found themselves gaining greater political leverage, they were not ostracised by the elites, but rather the elites made an effort to integrate the groups into the system as relevant political units.

These two ideas, that the desire of elites to cooperate pre-dates the emergence of potential conflict between diverse groups and the mutual recognition of political legitimacy, describe the circumstances necessary to create a political system based on consociational democracy. We can say, then, that consociational democracy arises from a common recognition of the legitimacy of the regime, the agreed-to forum for interaction among the elites, and that the system is maintained by the legitimization of new political forces as they enter the system.

This chapter has described the governments of the Benelux countries and has examined the historical development of their political cultures. From this discussion, we have suggested how consociational democracy arises and, in broad terms, how a system using such a pattern is maintained.

The next step is an examination of more specific characteristics of how the system operates. This analysis will allow us to determine whether the elite and socio-political characteristics defined in the previous chapter are sufficient to describe the patterns that arise from the culturing process we have examined, or whether more or fewer characteristics are needed. In addition, we should be able to discover parameters of individual characteristics which will allow us to determine systematically whether other countries are consociational. The interrelationship of political parties, for example, may indicate the presence of social cleavages or the ability of elites to work together.

[1]Pierre Majerus, "The Institutions of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg," <u>Acquaintance with Luxembourg</u>, no. 2 (Luxembourg: Ministry of State, 1976), p. 17.

[2]<u>Ibid.</u>

[3]Robert Senelle, "The Political Structure of Belgium," <u>Memo from Belgium</u>, no. 122 (Brussels: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade, March, 1970), pp. 10-11.

[4]<u>Ibid.</u>

[5]<u>Ibid.</u>

[6]Pieter Geyl, <u>History of the Low Countries</u> (London: MacMillan & Co., 1964), pp. 144-6. See also Clough, pp. 29-31.

[7]<u>Ibid.</u>

[8]"Constitution, Justice," <u>The Kingdom of the Netherlands</u>, no. 3 (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1974), pp. 5-6.

[9]<u>Ibid.</u>

[10]Lijphart, <u>Politics of Accommodation</u>, pp. 79-80. See also "Constitution, Justice," pp. 28-9.

[11]Lorwin, p. 142.

[12]Shepard Clough, <u>A History of the Flemish Movement in Belgium</u> (New York: Octagon Books, 1968 (reprint of 1930 ed.), p. 8ff.

[13]F. Gunther Eyck, <u>The Benelux Countries</u> (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1959), p. 40.

[14]Geyl, pp. 144-6.

[15]Clough, p. 78.

[16]Glenn V. Stephenson, "Cultural Regionalism and the Unitary State Idea in Belgium," <u>Geographical Review</u> 62 (October 1972):522-3.

[17]Vernon Mallinson, <u>Belgium</u> (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 96.

[18]Clough, p. iii.

[19]Mallinson, p. 103.

[20]"Trois Regions et Deux Communautes: Le Nouveau Visage du Pays en Cas d'Accord en Palais d'Egmont," <u>Le Soir</u>, May 5, 1977.

[21]"Short History of Luxembourg," Acquaintance with Luxembourg, no. 3 (1976), pp. 16-46.

[22]Ibid., pp. 46-50.

[23]Ibid., p. 54.

[24]Ibid., pp. 54-5.

[25]"Recencesement de la Population du 31 Decembre 1970," Service Central de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques 1 (July 1974):152f.

[26]Richard Rose and Derek Urwin, "Social Cohesion, Political Parties, and Strains in Regimes," Comparative Political Studies 2 (April 1969):7-67.

[27]Ibid.

[28]Kenneth Edwards, "Luxembourg," Geographic Handbook Series, B. R. 528 (Naval Intelligence Division, U.S. Government), pp. 51-2.

[29]Ibid.

[30]"Luxembourg," Europa Yearbook 1977: A World Survey, vol. 1, p. 912.

[31]Geyl, pp. 144-6.

CHAPTER III

THE BENELUX COUNTRIES AND CONSOCIATIONAL THEORY

In the discussion on theories of consociational democracy, it was discovered that an adequate description of a consociational system must include an analysis of the relationships between elites, between the elites and society, and between the social blocs. The previous chapter indicated that, based on the theory that moderation between discrete units is the result of a culturing process, the three Benelux countries are consociational. We were left, however, with two questions. First, is there a pattern of activity which typifies consociational politics, yet which is more specific than saying accommodative elite interaction produces moderate politics? Second, can the characteristics which make up this pattern be described in a systematic way so that the presence or absence of consociational political patterns can be determined with maximum efficiency?

Arend Lijphart isolated several characteristics which together seemed to provide the pattern desired in our first question. These characteristics were:

(1) the presence of distinct social groups which are politically relevant;

(2) elites which have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the blocs, and have the ability to transcend cleavages and join in common efforts with the elites of rival blocs;

(3) the existence of some degree of national solidarity and some national symbols.

Using the information provided in the previous chapter, we can examine Lijphart's characteristics and determine their applicability or if more or fewer characteristics are needed. We should also be able to draw upon the previous chapter to determine if there are any particular points of social or political interaction which we can use to further refine the characteristics.

Social Cleavages

We know, from the previous chapter, that social cleavages exist in the Benelux countries. This fact is not in and of itself remarkable, as virtually all European countries have some kinds of social cleavage, either language, religious affiliation, class, or ideological outlook. The difference between the Benelux countries and other countries is the way in which the social blocs behave politically. This section, then, will examine these differences in political behavior and the inter-relationships which generate them. Finally, we will look at cleavages in the countries themselves to see how the relationship between cleavages appears in practice.

In the discussion on theories of consociational democracy, it was mentioned that the relationship between political parties and social groups generated different types of political activity. In France, regional, ideological, and religious groups have been fragmented into sub-groups and many parties, with several parties representing a single bloc. For example, the Gaullists and the catch-all Popular Republican Movement represent traditional, right-of-center values. Competition between all parties is intense, with strong concentrations of larger parties at the ends of a left-right continuum vying with one another in efforts to woo the tiny parties inhabiting the center (moderates).

In Germany, or more properly the Federal Republic of Germany, the situation is different. Although there are distinctions of class, dialect, religion and ideological preference, and regional distinctions, the political parties are 'catch-all' parties drawing strength from several social groups at once. This is the phenomenon of over-lapping social cleavages, and it produces a moderate political atmosphere.[1]

The Benelux countries lie somewhere between the two extremes. They are different from France because their political activity tends toward moderation; but, unlike Germany, Benelux political parties tend to reflect only one social bloc, such as Catholics, Flemings, or Socialists. In Derek Urwin's words, the cleavages are institutionalized, producing, in effect, a political system which moderates among discrete political units. These units have their own media, trade unions, political parties, and, in some cases, educational systems.[2]

These political units were generated by the process described in the discussion on the historical development in Luxembourg in the previous chapter. As new groups were drawn into the political system, existing elites provided a framework which individuals could use as a channel for airing grievances or expressing desires. The political parties in a consociational country, therefore, are the visible political elites of the individual social blocs.

The only problem, then, is showing the linkage between the social bloc and the political party. If the pattern of party identification is similar to the pattern of social cleavages, then we can say that the system is consociational. This relationship is useful to know because, first, it is the only real difference between the consociational and the moderate systems, and second, elite behavior can then be defined

in terms of party as well as individual behavior.

The linkage between the blocs and the parties can be shown by the level of party identification in the individual blocs, a high level indicating that the conditions which we describe do exist. If a low level appeared, the linkage would not be strong, and the political system would show over-lapping rather than reinforcing cleavages.

The social cleavages in the Benelux countries are basically similar, with a few differences arising from individual circumstances. The basic divisions, common to all, are religion vs. secularism and a left-right ideological division. In the Netherlands, the basic divisions are complicated by religious sects and by social class. The religious parties, which have recently formed a loose association called the Christian Democratic Alliance or C.D.A., are the Catholic Party, lower class, fundamentalist Calvinists of the Anti-Revolutionary Party or A.R.P., and a middle- and upper-class party of less orthodox Calvinists called the Christian Historical Union (C.H.U.). Prior to 1972, these parties operated with complete independence, and it is only recently that they felt circumstances demanded they form a united front. The circumstances that caused this union will be discussed later.

The class division also manifests itself in the left-right ideological cleavage, the secular lower- and lower-middle classes belonging largely to the Socialists, while the rest of the secular middle class, together with the upper class, adhere to the Liberal Party. Although there are other splinters, over the long run these five blocs* have accounted for in excess of 85% of the voting population of the Netherlands.

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*Catholics, Socialists, Liberals, strong Calvinist (ARP), weak Calvinist (CHU).

In Luxembourg, the formula of religious-secular and left-right accounts for the bulk of Luxembourg's politicized divisions. There is no real history of class conflict, and virtually everyone is a nominal Catholic.[3] All Luxembourgers are at least bi-lingual, speaking Letzemburgish, a local dialect, and either French or German. The use of Letzemburgish provides a linguistic over-lap, preventing social ostracism for speaking a different language. Likewise, both French and German are used in schools, so no students are held back because of language.

There are a few regionalisms in Luxembourg which have been growing over time. The north-west is largely rural and produces conservative, traditionalist Catholics. The new industrial areas, in middle and eastern Luxembourg, have been growing only in the last fifty years, also have this flavor, having gained many individuals who migrated from the rural north-west. In the older industrial areas of the south, there is an admixture of different groups in Luxembourg-City, and concentrations of specific groups in other cities, most notably the strong Communist bloc in Esch-zur-Alzette.

Belgian cleavages also follow the basic format described above. With the addition of the language and regional cleavages—Flemish in Flanders, French in Wallonia, German in the Cantons of the East, and both French and Flemish in Brussels—a new complication is added in that all political parties are required by law to have a separate political machine for each area. In other words, there are religious and secular blocs and ideological blocs which are unique to each region. Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels also have a party unique to the area whose primary impact is only in national politics. These are the language

parties, intent on defending cultural integrity.

An interesting part of Belgium cleavages is that Wallonia tends politically toward the traditions of French liberalism while Flanders maintains older values. Wallonia tends to be more secular and desires greater amounts of government-supplied social welfare. Flanders tends to be more moderate, and Catholics still hold a strong position politically.

One factor which must be heavily emphasized is that the major cleavages in all three countries are strong and politically relevant. Here Val Lorwin's idea of localism as an influence re-emerges. Countries like Germany and Great Britain have each engendered an ethos where all groups feel that the state has over-shadowed diversity.[4] This ethos moderates the effect of social cleavages because individuals, when policy places no threat to them directly, are willing to go with the general flow of national policy. Lorwin suggests, as a result, that in spite of common recognition of cleavages, the political impact of the cleavages is light to moderate.[5] Characteristics of cleavages, such as the media, education, party identification, and socio-economic organizations such as labor unions, and the bureaucracy, will, with a few exceptions, display a low to medium range of cleavages.[6] In Britain, the only characteristics that really show a strong cleavage arise from the perquisites of class, hence education and elements of the bureaucracy will show social segmentation. In Germany, there are few characteristics which do not fit into a middle-range or low-range category. This means that it would be very difficult to determine someone's social identification by determining his political affiliation.

This conclusion is borne out by the actual circumstances in the

countries. In Germany, 70% of all industrial workers belong to the Social Democratic Party.[7] The remainder are broken up among the other major parties and, indeed, form the primary foundation for the strength of virtually all parties.[8] This figure is lower than for Scandanavian, British or Belgian Social Democratic Labor parties and also lower than Communist-Socialist voting blocs in France and Italy. It was, however, more homogeneously working class than British Labor. It was a working-class party, but not a party of the whole working class. A similar situation exists in Great Britain.

In the Benelux countries, on the other hand, the situation is the reverse from Great Britain or Germany. Characteristics of religious-party identification, trade union membership, media, and education all indicate a high degree of social segmentation.[9] This segmentation translates into relatively strong predictibility with regards to the relationship between social bloc and party preference.

The Netherlands is the only country for which a direct study was available. Tables A and B show the relationship between religious and party preference and between occupation and party preference. Table A shows a drift from the less orthodox Dutch Reformed Church to the secular ranks, while the Catholic and Reformed Churches (orthodox) remain strong. This trend is especially interesting in view of the general decline of Calvinism over the last two centuries. It was during the early 1800's that the Dutch Reformed Church broke free politically as an upper-class movement. Since 1900, the Dutch Reformed Church has undergone a serious decline, falling from being the largest church (48%) to third place (28%) behind the Catholics and the Reformed Church.[11] The Catholics grew to from about 35% to 42%, probably through normal

TABLE A[10]

RELIGION AND PARTY PREFERENCE (%) 1964**

Religion	Catholic Party (328)	Labor Party (462)	Liberal Party (141)	Anti Rev. Party (143)	Chr. Hist. Union (147)	Other Parties (83)	Don't Know (266)	Total Sample (1,570)
Catholic (regular attendance)	90	6	5	2	1	2	20	25
Catholic (irregular attendance)	9	7	9	0	1	2	11	7
Reformed*	0	2	1	71	8	20	6	10
Dutch Reformed* (regular attendance)	0	3	4	15	61	4	7	10
Dutch Reformed* (irregular attendance)	1	41	39	8	22	16	17	22
Other Religions	0	4	4	3	5	8	5	4
No Religion	0	37	39	1	2	47	34	23
Catholic bloc	90	6	5	2	1	2	20	25
Secular bloc	10	89	90	12	30	73	67	56
Calvinist bloc	0	5	5	87	69	24	13	20

*The Reformed and Dutch Reformed Churches are not the same. The Dutch Reformed Church is a Calvinist body which gradually became less rigid. The Reformed Church is an off-shoot of the Dutch Reformed and preferred the more rigid doctrines of the original Calvinist movement.

**Tables A and B are the results of a random poll taken in 1964 by the Dutch government.

TABLE B[13]

OCCUPATION AND PARTY PREFERENCE (%) 1964

Occupation	Catholic Party (333)	Labor (Socialist) (465)	Liberal (142)	Anti-Rev. (143)	Chr. Hist. Union (147)	Other (85)	Don't Know (280)	Total (1,595)
Businessmen	12 } 37	4 } 27	24 } 64	13 } 47	7 } 39	14 } 34	16 } 42	11 } 38
Professionals	2 }	2 }	5 }	5 }	3 }	4 }	4 }	3 }
White-Collar	23	21	35	29	29	16	22	24
Blue-Collar	34	48	11	17	30	42	28	34
Farmers	8	0	1	8	7	7	2	4
Farm-Workers	2	1	0	1	3	2	0	1
No Occupation	19	22	25	27	21	14	28	23
	100	98	101	100	100	99	100	99

population growth. While the Reformed Church has remained at a stable level, the secular bloc has grown to about 18%.[12] We also have, on Table B, the fact that the Dutch Reformed Church's political party, the Christian Historical Union, is split about 40-30% between middle to upper-class people and blue-collar workers. This pair of circumstances suggests that the C.H.U. and the Dutch Reformed Church have been, at least for a while, a sort of social cross-over point from Orthodox Calvinism to political secularism. The process is slow, taking place over generations. It is the kind of social change, coupled with a sudden increase in strength and number of splinter parties which has led some writers, such as Lorwin, Lijphart and others, to suggest that the blocs are disappearing.[13] Table C shows this trend as between 1946 and 1972 there is a substantial decline in the strength of the Big Five parties. This strength was being lost to the newer splinter parties rather than to the old ones.

The 1977 election suggests a reversal of this trend as the strength of the Christian Democratic Alliance has stabilized, while the traditional Socialist and Liberal parties have blossomed into secular giants. The splinters have fallen to half of their previous strength. This reversal has taken place since the authors began predicting the decline of blocs. In spite of the turmoil, all that has really occurred is that there has been a realignment of the blocs toward greater secularism and a united-front approach to politics among the religious parties. The discussion so far gives us two characteristics of consociational political parties in the Netherlands:

(1) the distribution of votes among the various political parties will be relatively stable, i.e., changes will come from the

TABLE C[14]

SECOND CHAMBER ELECTIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS
1946-1959, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, and 1977 (%)

	1946-1959	1963	1967	1971	1972	1977
Labor	29.2	28.0	23.5	24.7	27.4	35.0
Catholic	30.8	31.9	26.5	21.9	17.7)	
Anti-Revolutionary	11.3	8.7	9.9	8.6	8.8) C.D.A.	
					) 32.0	
Christian Historical Union	8.5	8.6	8.1	6.3	4.8)	
Liberal	8.8	10.3	10.7	10.4	14.4	18.7
Communist	6.3	2.8	3.6	3.9	4.5	1.3
Political Reformed	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.3	2.2	2.0
Ref. Pol. League	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.6	1.8	0.6
Pacifist Socialist	0.4	3.0	2.9	1.4	1.5	0.6
Farmers	0.1	2.1	4.7	1.1	1.9	0.6
Democrats '66	--	--	4.5	6.8	4.2	5.3
Dem. Socialists '70	--	--	--	5.3	4.1	0.6
Radical	--	--	--	1.8	4.8	2.0
Roman Catholic	--	--	--	--	0.9	0.0
Other	1.9	1.5	2.7	3.9	1.1	1.3
Big Five	88.6	87.5	78.7	71.9	73.0	85.7
Old Splinter Parties	9.4	8.9	9.4	9.2	10.0	5.3
New Splinter Parties	0.1	2.1	9.2	15.0	15.9	8.0

gradual growth or decline of a political bloc. Although

parties may gain or lose 3-4 percentage points, major gains

or losses (over ten points) will occur only over many years,

and several elections.

(2) When new parties appear, they will tend to be off-shoots from older parties, rather than being completely new parties.[*] In non-consociational countries, where parties represent ideologies rather than social units, new parties are created when a new ideology becomes popular. In consociational countries, splinter parties will tend to represent extreme factions of existing blocs. Also, when the need for a splinter is gone, the splinter disappears in a short time.

The salient cleavages in Belgium and Luxembourg, unlike the Netherlands, have not been broken down by party identification. This is because most studies examine only the language problem in Belgium, and Luxembourg is so small that few researchers bother to study deeper than the surface characteristics. As a result, the linkage between the political parties and the social groups can only be established by comparing voting patterns with various cleavages. By determining where a party's strength lies, we can ascertain whether there is a relationship between group and party. This process, in the case of Belgium, is aided greatly by the law which requires separate party machinery in each language region. A second indicator of the linkages is a comparison of the changes in society with the changes in the parties. In the

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[*]An exception is Democrats '66, a party fostered by young intellectuals during the mid-1900's. Democrats '66 favors the dissolution of the existing systems, seeking to replace the bloc system with a pragmatic model.

case of Luxembourg, this is only information which points to the rela-
tionship. Although this is probably the weakest of the possible
approaches, it is the only one which can be used under the circum-
stances.

Belgian cleavages, as was mentioned earlier, are similar to
cleavages in the Netherlands, but are further complicated by the pre-
sence of a cleavage arising from a division of language and culture.
The cleavages between Catholics and secularists and between various
ideological groups on a left-right continuum arose during the 1800's.
The language crisis did not become a dominant political problem until
the 1900's. When the language boundary was established in 1932, Bel-
gium was divided into three regions, Flanders, Wallonia, and the capi-
tal, Brussels. Each of these regions is dominated by political affili-
ates of the majority language group. At the same time, these regions
are not homogeneous enclaves, because, as Shepard Clough noted in a
study on Belgium cities, as much as five to fifteen percent of a given
city's population might be of a different ethnic origin than the major-
ity of citizens.[15] Hence, in the study of the individual regimes, we
can expect that there will be significant minorities which will vote in
a pattern predominant to another region, i.e., although the division
shown by the data will be strong, the split will not be perfect.

Before examining the individual regions in Belgium, let us study
the country as a whole. The various social blocs have political par-
ties, the relationship between the various parties being delineated in
Figure 1. In 1974, the Flemish section of the Christian Social Party
(P.S.C.) became the C.V.P., the Christlijke Volkspartij. All other
parties are secular except Volksunie, which includes some defense of

FIGURE 1

BELGIAN PARTIES

Flemish	LEFT	French
Communists————————	—————Communists and Democratic and Progressive Union	
Belgian Socialist Party————	—————Belgian Socialist Party	
	—————Walloon Rally (language)	
	—————Democratic Front of Francophones (language) F.D.F.	
C.V.P.————	————P.S.C.	
Party for Liberty and Progress (PVV)————	————Party for Liberty and Progress (now: Party of reforms and liberty) PLP-PRLW	
Volksunie————		
	RIGHT	

Catholicism in its program of regionalism. Liberal parties, the PVV
(Party of Liberty and Progress) and its French counterpart, the PRLW,
control the secular-right vote.

Table D lists the election returns since 1894. The two parties
which have maintained the largest following since the passage of uni-
versal suffrage in 1919 are the P.S.C. (now PSC-CVP) and the Socialists.
The P.S.C. attracts relatively conservative, traditional, strong Catho-
lics, mostly from Flanders. The Socialists, on the other hand, repre-
sent the old secular left, attracting the workers from Wallonia where
the older established industries are located and where traditional
French egalitarianism is strong.

The Liberals, once a single party, are, functionally, several
parties because of confusion from the law requiring separate political
organizations in each region. These parties represent the secular
middle class, especially those whose traditions arise from French
Liberalism and egalitarianism which arose during the 1800's. Their
ideas of egalitarianism are those of old-style liberalism, where indi-
viduals are responsible for their own well-being while the state merely
forms a framework for their common actions. It is interesting to note
that except for the sharp decline of 1919 and the great expansion of
1949 and 1965, the Liberals have fluctuated only slightly, a few per-
centage points at a time.

The other parties in Belgium have arisen from crises. When the
Communists and Rexists and new marginal parties blossomed into their
greatest levels, political turmoil was at its greatest. The Depression
of the 1930's and the language troubles of the early 1960's caused many
individuals to leave the main blocs and join these more militant fringe

TABLE D[16]

BELGIAN ELECTION RETURNS 1894-1978

YEAR	P.S.C.	SOCIALISTS	LIBERAL PARTIES	VOLKSUNIE	FRANCOPHONE PARTIES	COMMUNISTS	REXISTS & OTHERS	
1894	51.6	17.4	28.5				1.3	
1896-8	50.7	23.6	22.2				1.6	
1900	48.5	20.5	24.3				1.7	
1902-4	49.8	20.6	25.3				2.1	
1906-8	48.6	21.5	26.7				1.9	
1912	51.0	22.0	25.1				0.3	
1919	36.0	36.6	17.6	2.6			6.5	
1921	37.0	34.8	18.8	3.0			7.4	
1925	36.1	39.3	14.6	3.9			5.9	
1929	35.4	36.0	16.6	6.3			5.7	
1932	38.6	37.1	14.3	5.9			4.1	
1936	27.7	32.1	12.4	7.1		17.6	3.2	(Rexists)
1939	32.7	30.2	17.2	8.3			11.6	(Comm. & Rex.)
1946	42.5	32.4	9.6	--		12.7	2.7	(Other)
1949	43.6	29.8	15.3	2.1			9.4	(Comm. & other)
1950	47.7	35.5	12.1	--			4.8	
1954	41.1	38.5	13.1	2.2			5.1	
1958	46.5	37.0	12.0	2.0			2.6	
1961	44.5	36.7	11.1	3.5			6.0	
1965	34.5	28.3	21.6	6.8	2.4		6.4	
1968	31.74	27.99	20.88	9.78	5.9	3.3	.41	(Other)
1971	30.05	27.27	16.39	11.11	11.23	3.08	.81	
1974	32.34	26.66	15.19	10.2	10.94	3.23	1.44	
1977	35.94	26.43	15.55	9.75	7.7	2.7	1.6	
1978 Fl)	38.6	12.2	10.3	6.6		4.7	.95	
1978 Fr)		15.0	7.0		7.0		.45	

groups. As troubles subsided, these parties either shrank to a constant figure, as with the Communists' three percent for three consecutive elections, or have vanished completely.

The language parties are of a similar nature, by and large. The Flemish Volksunie, the Walloon Rally, and the Front Democratique des Francophones of Brussels all arose quickly during the long language crisis of the 1960's and, now that the situation is being resolved, have gone into a slow decline. Walloon Rally will probably disappear over the long run, absorbed by the Socialists. Volksunie may survive because it represents a conservative group with some Christian party overtones, combining values which would otherwise be lost in the middle-of-the-road policies of the Christian Socials. The FDF may also survive, for much the same reason; that is, it attracts liberal, secular, French-speakers who are not as conservative as the Liberals, nor as liberal as the Socialists.

The relationships described above are reinforced by the voting patterns in the individual regions. In Wallonia, for example, over half of the population voted for leftist parties, most of these having voted for the Socialists. The P.S.C., a mass party (no pun intended), came in second with about twenty-five percent, while the Liberals finished third with about eighteen percent (see Table E).

By contrast, the voting in Flanders reflects different circumstances. Except for the ports like Antwerp and a few textile cities like Ghent and Brugge (Bruges), most of the factories of Flanders are very new, many having been built with money from the American Marshall Plan program. When French culture was imported, it spread mostly in the cities and among the bourgeoisie. The predominantly agricultural lower-class Flemings retained their traditional Catholic outlook, as

TABLE E[17]

REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF THE 1977 BELGIAN ELECTION

Brussels--622,820		%		Flanders--3,246,064		%
P.S.C.	112,932	18.11	C.V.P.	1,459,997	44.9
P.L.P.	9,738	1.56	P.V.V.	475,912	14.6
P.S.B.	c.200,000*	32.11	P.S.B.	c.630,000*	c.20.0*
F.D.F.	237,280	43.9	V.U.	599,634	18.4
R.W.	1,297	.2	P.C.	c. 30,000*	1.0
P.C.&Other	c. 25,000*	4.2	Other	c. 60,000*	

Wallonia--1,705,346		%		Known Brussels & Flanders--3,868,884		%
P.S.C.	430,676	25.25	P.S.B.	829,901	21.45
P.L.P.	319,833	18.75	P.C.	57,904	1.49
P.S.B.	643,428	37.73	Other	62,088	1.6
R.W.	157,262	9.22			
Cartel RW-PSB	33,862	1.98			
P.C.	93,517	5.48			
Other	26,928	1.58			

*Estimates

did the nobility and part of the bourgeoisie. Most of the middle class

was lost to French secularism. This is again borne out by the voting

described in Table E, where 44% of the vote in Flanders went to the

C.V.P., the pro-Catholic party, and another 18% went to what amounts

to the Catholic far right, Volksunie. Of the secular parties, the lower-

class Socialist Party, with its mass appeal, did better than did the

middle-class Liberals (P.V.V.).

An interesting note is that the language parties from the two

regions, Volksunie and Walloon Rally, are off-shoots from the major

party of the region, Volksunie from the C.V.P., and Walloon Rally from

the Socialists. In addition, the difference in the strength of the

Communist Party in the two regions sharpens the image of a liberal

Wallonia and a conservative Flanders.

The results for Brussels are to be expected from the nature of

a capital city. The city has traditions of French liberalism which

controlled the country until the passage of universal suffrage in 1919.

As a capital, it is filled with civil servants, bankers, and a plethora

of service-type agencies. Hence, Brussels can be characterized as a

middle-class community. It is not surprising, then, that the FDF, which

was described above, is the dominant party in the city. The poor

showing of Walloon Rally suggests that the growth of the FDF represents

as much a split in the liberal party as a move to protect linguistic

and cultural integrity. The second-and third-place showings by the

Socialists and P.S.C. are to be expected as the parties represent the

older choices of French liberalism and Catholicism. The third 'old'

party, the Liberals, took a beating because the liberalism of the FDF

is more acceptable to some modern middle-class liberals than the old-style

bourgeois liberalism.

As expected, the political cleavages in Belgium flow along lines of religion and class. Language parties will survive only by being convenient vehicles for particular sub-segments of existing blocs. Most political activity, now that the cultural groups have been safely separated, will continue to reflect the cultural backgrounds of the parties, but language, per se, will probably decline as a point of major political contention. The discussion on language re-emerges under the discussion of the elites.

Luxembourg's cleavages fit the basic pattern attributed to the other two Benelux countries in that there are Catholic and secular blocs and division along a left-right ideological continuum. The governments in the past have worked to prevent other potential cleavages from becoming problems. In the case of religion, the country is 92% Catholic. Protestant and Jewish minorities are under the protection of the State, being administered by government-sponsored organizations. Although everyone in Luxembourg speaks the local dialect of Letzemburgish, the country is split into bi-lingual or tri-lingual bodies, speaking Letzemburgish and French or German, or all three. The schools are organized bi-lingually so that if a student's family language is French, he is not handicapped in the pursuit of an education. The common use of Letzemburgish provides a comfortable overlap for all language groups.[18]

The cleavages which continue to exist have been exacerbated by industrialization. France had exerted a strong influence on Luxembourg, especially among the Francophones of the south-west. In 1839 most of the south-west, together with most Francophone Luxembourgers

and a healthy portion of Luxembourg's industrial base, was given to Belgium. South-western Luxembourg today is very similar to Belgian Luxembourg; it is an old industrial area and tends toward the secular-left, especially toward the Socialists. An extreme case is the great steel center of Esch-zur-Alette which has a strong Communist enclave.

In 1839, most of the rest of Luxembourg was similar to Flanders, that is, it was predominantly Catholic, traditional, conservative, and rural. Since the turn of the century, much of this rural population has migrated to the industrial cities.[19] As was mentioned in the previous chapter, these people have tended to join organizations which provided familiar surroundings, such as Catholic trade unions and other religious organizations.

The bureaucracy, the old nobility, the prelates, and what little bourgeoisie that existed encouraged the politicization of Catholic values. As these leaders controlled virtually all parliamentary activity prior to 1867, and controlled the capital city completely, it is not surprising that, by the 1930's, the Catholic party was pre-eminent with the Socialist workers placing second in most elections (see Table F). This division continues to the present day.

This growing division between Catholics and Socialists, created by social migration, has been paralleled by changes in other parties. Before 1940, for example, there were some farmers' parties which were independent from the urban-based Catholics. As the rural population declined, these parties died out. The real change in Luxembourg politics, however, is the growth of the secular right and center.

In the 1930's, the Liberals were a small, right-wing, secular party. In 1937, the party broke in two, forming the conservative

TABLE F[20]

LUXEMBOURG -- ELECTIONS, LOWER HOUSE 1931-1974

Year	Chris-tian Social*	Labor (Social-ists)	Democrats (Liberals)	Commu-nists	Indepen-dent	Indepen-dent Socialist	Farmers	Indepen-dent Farmers	MIP	Social Demo-crats	Total Seats
1931	13	5	5	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	25
1937	13	7	3(2)	-	-	-	1	0	0	-	26
1946	25	11	9	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	51
1948	22	14	9	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	51
1951	21	18	8	4	-	1	-	-	-	-	52
1954	26	17	6	3	-	0	-	-	-	-	52
1959	21	17	11	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	52
1964	22	21	6	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	56
1968	21	18	11	6	-	-	-	-	0	-	56
1971**	21	12	11	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	56
1974	18	17	14	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	59

*The Catholic became the Christian Social Party in 1945.

**Split between Socialists and Social Democrats occurred between elections.

Liberal Party and the moderate Democrat Party. In 1946, these parties

merged as the Democrat Party. Their strength remained about the same

for some years with the low ebb coming in the mid-1950's when economic

confusion arose from problems with the integration of the Benelux coun-

tries. In a show of pro-integration solidarity, many individuals

rallied to the support of the Christian Social Party's efforts.

Since 1954, the secular-center and right have blossomed as never

before because of the increased government efforts to encourage the

development of service-oriented activities, such as international bank-

ing, rather than relying exclusively on the steel industry to maintain

economic stability. These efforts have expanded the bureaucracy and

the number of white-collar workers in private industry to the point

that there are more service-workers than industrial laborers. This ex-

pansion has expanded the middle class and has caused a deterioration

of the solidity of the secular-left.

Moderate factions in the Socialist and Democrats parties have

broken with the main body and struck out on their own. In the case of

the Democrats, the break was short-lived, the faction, known as the

Mouvement Independent Populaire (MIP) having quickly disappeared. The

Democrats have more recently gained a large number of votes from the

Christian Social Party and have emerged as a very important political

unit.

As for the secular left, the Socialists lost a fraction, which

became the Social Democrats, and which will probably not return to the

parent party. The PSD represent the part of the Socialist bloc which

has been drawn into the middle class. Although they adhere to the

principles of the old bloc, there are differences in programs such that

the Socialists have been backing policies which threaten the new-found

livelihood of the PSD voters. The split itself was actually precipi-

tated, for example, by a decision by the main leadership to support the

Communists in certain municipal elections.[21]

The Communists, who gain about the same vote at every election with

remarkable consistency, are adherents of Stalin's approach to creating a

Communist state, such as the destruction of the elements which retard the

transition. For example, they were on record as having praised the 1968

Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. To the PSD, the Communists are

too fundamentally different to indulge in any association.

The cleavages in Luxembourg have changed insofar as an alteration

in the basic structure of society; the expansion of the middle class

has caused the blocs themselves to change in size and has created a new

bloc, the Social Democrats.

Do these cleavages create institutionalized political blocs? The

outer trappings, such as media and labor-union organization, do indi-

cate a high degree of segmentation,[22] but there may still be some ques-

tion as to whether the relationship between bloc and party characteris-

tic of consociational democracies is present here. The only real means

to determine this, given the scarcity of information on Luxembourg, is

to briefly re-examine the nature of political activity in Germany. In

both Germany and Luxembourg, there are three relevant political parties,

discrete social cleavages, and cooperative, moderate political inter-

action. Germany's political parties are catch-all parties, i.e., al-

though a party may be especially attractive to a particular group, the

political party does not identify itself with that group alone, seeking

instead to maximize votes by issuing a general appeal. In Germany, the

lower classes were brought into the political arena as a new, distinct unit, the Social Democratic Party, independent of the upper- and middle-class factions already extant. Since the 1950's, the Social Democrats have modified their goals and programs so as to be attractive to a broader range of voters.[23]

Luxembourg's workers were incorporated into the existing framework of political interaction by elite encouragement. Rather than creating new influences, then, the workers have expanded support for the existing system. Since the existing elites were divided into pro-Catholic and pro-secular groups, it is a reasonable supposition, then, that the segmentation of society is present in the relationship between the political parties and society, and that the political interaction in Luxembourg can be explained by consociationalism.

The examination of the three Benelux countries has shown that the changes in social blocs caused by social migration and economic expansion are paralleled by changes in the strength and number of political parties. We have also seen that the blocs can, if circumstances demand it, split into factions. The maintenance of relations between those factions require the same kind of interaction that would be expected between the blocs themselves. Elite activity, then, plays a vital role in coordinating the efforts of the blocs. It is in this light that we turn to the discussion of consociational elites.

Elite Interaction

The second characteristic in Lijphart's description of consociational politics has two parts: first, that elites have the ability to accommodate diverse interests of rival sub-cultures and, secondly, that the elites are able to transcend cleavages and to join in common efforts

with elites of rival sub-cultures. We have already seen that both elites and society as a whole have been cultured by the mechanics of the system to recognize the legitimacy and integrity of other social groups, and to seek the good of their group through the growth of the whole. What we seek in this section is some indicator which shows that the different elites are indeed working together and some specific qualities of the political systems which permit this kind of elite interaction.

The discussion in the previous chapter provided a relatively simple means to determine if the elites of rival sub-cultures can interact for the mutual benefit of the sub-cultures. It was discovered that, in the case of segmented societies, the elites of a given social group will be, by and large, congruent with the political party which represents the group. There may be other individuals who exert an influence on policy-making, but the visible elite interaction will be in the hands of the parties. Carrying this a step further, the ability of the elites to interact will be shown by the ability of the parties to associate freely in coalitions, regardless of ideological or religious conviction.

What about other characteristics of coalitions? The rate of change from one coalition to another should be relatively slow, about the rate of the regular elections. This slow rate exists because the Cabinet is not so likely to be brought down because of ideological questions as would occur in say France or Italy. Policy is given a greater chance to succeed because the Opposition is not utterly opposed to any and every Cabinet proposal. Variance from this norm, however, is not necessarily significant as special elections arise from special

circumstances. Over the long run, the rate of change should not approach that of a new cabinet being created every year or so, as occurs in Italy, but some rapid changes are not impossible.

The party that produces the prime minister is not significant either, as a formateur, a person who must form a cabinet coalition, may be chosen because of their leadership within the party, their popularity among the members of other parties, or because, even though an individual may hold only a middle-range position in his party, the monarch has been advised of the individual's integrity, intelligence, and wise policies. When coalitions are formed, the prime minister might not even be from the majority party. In short, a prime minister could be from any party, even though the tendency in the long run is to give the position to the head of the biggest party. This trait is not found exclusively in the Benelux countries, but also occurs in France and other competitive systems.

Tables G, H, and I delineate the coalitions in the three Benelux countries over the last forty or so years. Although some coalitions, especially in Luxembourg, contain the same parties, the actual arrangement of the coalition depends on the size of the electoral victory. A substantial victory by one party will give it grounds to demand a proportional increase in the number of ministries that it controls.

We can see in the case of the Netherlands (Table G) that even though electoral success has moved from party to party, few parties have formed coalitions without crossing ideological or religious lines. This is shown strongly in the results of the 1972 and 1977 elections.

In the early 1970's, as has been mentioned, scholars like Lorwin and Lijphart felt that the blocs were fragmenting and that, as a result,

TABLE G[24]

THE NETHERLANDS: CABINET COALITIONS, 1933-1977

1933	ARP, Catholic, Radical, Liberal
1937	C.H.U., ARP, Labor (then Social-Democrats), Liberal, Catholic
1946	Catholic, Labor
1948	Labor, Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U.
1952	Labor, Catholic, ARP, C.H.U.
1956	Labor, Catholic, ARP, C.H.U.
1959	Catholics, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP
1963	Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP
1967	Catholic, Liberal, C.H.U., ARP
1971	Labor, Democrats, '66, Catholic, ARP
1972	Labor, Democrats '66, Radical, Catholic, ARP
1977	C.D.A. (Catholic, C.H.U., ARP), Liberals

NOTE: The first party in each coalition is the dominant party. In 1977, Labor won a relative majority, but could not negotiate an absolute majority coalition.

consociational democracy was in decline. This tendency was recognized
by Joop den Uyl's Labor (Socialist) Party which felt that this trend
was good and sought to capitalize upon it. Their intention was to dis-
solve the blocs entirely to allow more rapid social reform. They hoped
to build sufficient support among Labor's allies to create an absolute
majority (more than 50% of the seats), thus making accommodation with
religious and secular-right parties unnecessary. Although they did
unite a substantial part of the left, their efforts, for better or for
worse, fell short of the mark.

In response to the challenge of den Uyl, the religious parties
and the right-secular bloc also reformed their policies. They continue
to compromise but are cautious in their interaction. Labor, the
Liberals, and the C.D.A. each have enough votes to prevent any one of
the other two from forming a majority coalition with splinter parties
alone. Two of the three is the minimum combination for forming any
coalition, except for the weakest of minorities. At the same time,
the splinter parties represent so many different attitudes that creat-
ing a consensus among them would be difficult. In short, the distribu-
tion of authority has returned to a somewhat altered, yet generally
unchanged, form of the pre-1960 arrangement.

The 1972 den Uyl government, which had consisted of the Labor
Party, the Radicals, Democrats '66, the Catholics, and the A.R.P.,
could not be rebuilt after the 1977 elections. Attempts to combine
Labor with the new C.D.A. failed. Instead, a center-right coalition
of the C.D.A. and the Liberals was formed under Van Agt.[25]

The results of these elections suggest that, in the Netherlands
rule by a single bloc, in this case the secular-left bloc of Labor,

Democrats '66 and the Radical Party, is not yet politically possible.

Successful government still depends upon the ability of the diverse

elites to negotiate mutually agreeable programs. The consolidation of

the religious parties and the general decline of the small parties

indicate that the deterioration of the blocs has slowed and the blocs

are once again becoming rigid.

Table E lists the Belgian coalitions including changes which did

not involve elections. As with the Dutch, the Belgians join freely in

coalitions, regardless of ideological or religious preference. In a

country with several major cleavages, it is interesting to note that

the results of the last two elections indicate that the people expected

coalition members to behave in a consociational fashion.

In 1975, Walloon Rally joined a coalition of C.V.P. (Flemish

Catholic) and Liberals. In 1977, W.R. leaders claimed that Prime Minis-

ter Leo Tindemans was moving too slowly on implementing programs to

jurisdictionally separate Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels, and had

acted improperly when he had dismissed two cabinet ministers who were

members of Walloon Rally. Walloon Rally backed out of the coalition.

In the ensuing election, Walloon Rally was dealt a crushing defeat,

falling from 7% of the vote to 2.53%.[27] The Flemish Catholics, Tinde-

mans' party, garnered an extra three percent of the vote, a strong vote

of confidence.

Tindemans formed a new coalition of his CVP, Walloon Socialists,

Volksunie (Flemish regionalists), and the Front Democratique des

Francophones (FDF), a Brussels-based Francophone party. In October

1978, Volksunie began pressuring Tindemans to alter certain policies

regarding the implementation of the regional arrangement. Volksunie

TABLE H[26]

BELGIAN COALITIONS, 1946-1978

Elections		Duration
1946-1949	Socialist (minority)	$\frac{1}{2}$
	Socialist + Liberal + Communist	4
	Socialist + Liberal + Communist	$7\frac{1}{2}$
	Socialist + Catholic	29
1949	Catholics + Liberal	10
1950-1954	Catholic	2
	Catholic	16
	Catholic	27
1954-1958	Socialist + Liberal	51
1958-1961	Catholic	4
	Catholic + Liberal	30
1961-1965	Catholic + Socialist	51
1965-1968	Catholic + Socialist	8
	Catholic + Liberal	23
1968-1971	Catholic + Socialist	41
1971-1974	Catholic + Socialist	10
	Catholic + Socialist + Liberal	12
1974-1977	Flemish Catholic + Liberal (minority)	12
	Flemish Catholic + Liberal + Walloon Rally	22
1977	Flemish Catholic + Walloon Socialists + Volksunie + F.D.F.	18
1978	Catholic + Walloon Socialists + F.D.F. (pro tem)	

finally pulled out of the coalition, forcing Tindemans to resign.[28] In
the election of December 1978, Volksunie suffered a similar fate to the
one that its Walloon counter-part had suffered in the previous election,
losing 6 of its 21 seats. The CVP and its Walloon counter-part, the
Parti Social-Chretien, had, in the meantime, climbed to over 38% of
the vote, its highest total in almost twenty years.[29]

The efforts of the Belgian elites to end the language problem
has helped reinstate the older pattern of cleavages, at least in part.
The traditional powers in Flanders, the CVP and the Liberals are re-
asserting themselves. The parties in Brussels are entering a new order
with an emphasis on moderate secular liberalism. The crisis seems to
have abated.

Luxembourg, as indicated in Table I, has been controlled by
Christian-Social-led coalitions for some time. These coalitions, how-
ever, are not always the same two parties, and even when they are, re-
shuffling of portfolios among ministers and numerical redistribution
of appointments to ministerial positions is by no means uncommon. The
only significant change that has taken place in Luxembourg's political
atmosphere in many years is the recent expansion of the Democrat party,
the secular middle class. In one election, they have jumped from being
a perennial also-ran to the head of a coalition.

In Luxembourg, in Belgium, and in the Netherlands, one fact is
apparent: no bloc can form a coalition with other blocs unless it is
willing to negotiate with those other blocs from the standpoint of
mutual legitimacy. There is, in addition, a tendency for fragmentation
of the individual blocs to be limited. Coalitions, even with the five
blocs of the Netherlands, tend to revolve around the parties which can

TABLE I[30]

CABINET COALITIONS IN LUXEMBOURG, 1937-1974

		Seats
1937	Catholic* & Liberal**	16/26
1946	P.S.C., Socialists, Democrats, Communists	50/51
1948	P.S.C. & Socialists	37/51
1951	P.S.C. & Socialists	39/52
1954	P.S.C. & Socialists	43/52
1959	P.S.C. & Democrats	32/52
1964	P.S.C. & Socialists	43/56
1968	P.S.C. & Socialists	39/56
1971	P.S.C. & Socialists	33/56
1974	Democrats & Socialists	31/59

*P.S.C.

**Democrats

most consistently maintain a strong following from their individual
bloc.

How do these coalitions function, or more precisely, what aspects
of political behavior permit the elites to behave in a moderate fashion?
The answer to this is different in each country, but, by and large,
moderate behavior arises from a system of informal or formal rules.
The Dutch use a system based on informal rules which Arend Lijphart has
termed "unwritten, informal and implicit."[31]   There are seven of these
rules, several of which over-lap:

(1) the business of government,

(2) agreement to disagree,

(3) summit diplomacy,

(4) proportionality,

(5) depoliticization,

(6) secrecy,

(7) the government's right to govern.

Two rules which are especially closely related are (1) the busi-
ness of politics, and (7) the government's right to govern.[32]   For the
Dutch, political interaction is an activity which is geared toward
problem-solving rather than ideological victories. This does not mean
that ideologies are abandoned but rather that the elites seek to fulfill
goals for their blocs through compromise with other groups rather than
holding their position to be an all-or-nothing demand.

The cabinets are expected to operate efficiently with little
interference from the opposition parties in the States-General in the
day-to-day functions of the national government. Although individual
attitudes concerning desirable policies vary, ". . . doctrinal disputes

should not be allowed to stand in the way of getting the work done."[33]

This approach to government is contrasted with French politics. For the French, politics is not viewed in the same light as it is in the Netherlands. Questions of economic and social welfare are viewed as political questions, that is, they are argued for their philosophical or ideological, rather than purely functional, qualities. If the Gaullists were to suddenly abandon their functional programs and embrace those of the Communists, the two would, in spite of their practical agreement, probably continue opposing one another on most other levels, e.g., international, because their ideological attitudes would still be at variance. In short, attitudes, not programs, govern France.

Two other rules mentioned by Lijphart are, in effect, trade-offs which allow the blocs to feel confident that the Cabinet is not likely to harm them, even though the party with the most votes speaks with the biggest voice. These rules are (2) agreement to disagree and (5) depoliticization.[34] In the former case, the Dutch recognize that individuals have different beliefs and that these beliefs need not be changed. Toleration of the convictions of others is seen as mandatory.[35] "Disagreements must not be allowed to turn into either mutual contempt or proselytizing zeal."[36] The principle here is not that all legislation must be absolutely acceptable to all parties, but that widely divergent opinions on one subject should not be allowed to stand in the way of possible cooperation on other, more immediate questions. Political interaction is not, therefore, a matter simply of majority rule. Recognizing that antagonism in the present only reinforces future conflict, the elites approach legislation with a primary goal of reaching a generally acceptable agreement.

The idea of depoliticization arises from the same principle, but it works from different perspectives. Agreement to disagree implies a desire of individual leaders to limit their fervor in defending their group's interests. Depoliticization is the act of making programs politically neutral so that the program is not especially offensive to a particular group.

Lijphart cites two examples. In the first case, opinions in a four-party coalition on colonial policy were so divergent that the only alternatives were to table the question, which would mean the policy would continue, or to try to solve it, which would cause deadlock. The matter was tabled and business proceeded as usual.[37] In a second case, a piece of legislation involving a lottery was opposed by the Anti-revolutionary Party on religious grounds. Although supporters had the necessary majority, they continued debates until compromises could be worked out which would be attractive to the ARP.[38]

Lijphart's third and sixth characteristics are summit diplomacy and secrecy.[39] These two characteristics are closely allied. When circumstances demand, leaders of the various parties can meet in private to work on problems which require inputs from more than just the ruling coalition. As moderation and compromise may sometimes give the appearance of selling-out one's constituents, the compromises are best made in private. The ability to deal in secret allows the elites to follow rule (2), the agreement to disagree.[40]

Lijphart terms his final point 'proportionality', that is, when parliament passes legislation, the distribution of funds is, by custom, already set according to the proportion of individuals who formed each bloc. Whether it be funds for schools, membership in the Civil Service,

appointments for burgomeister, or whatever, the funds of positions are distributed according to the proportion demanded by the array of relevant social blocs. Although this sounds arbitrary, it must be remembered that, while the legislation was being passed, it was already being designed to suit the needs of the various social blocs[41] (see Rule 2).

This last point is perhaps the most significant as it includes the concept of the mutual recognition of the discreteness of the individual blocs. In France, the government is run to suit the will of the majority, the parties that won the election. In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the government runs its programs in a fashion which will fit the needs of as many of the various groups as possible, based upon the size of the group and the problems that it faces.

What the Dutch do by informal traditions, the Belgians do by statutes in the national constitution. Proportionality and the government's right to govern are the primary goals of these statutes.[42] While many countries' governments operate exclusively on a system of checks and balances controlling the abuse of power by a particular branch, Belgium, as was suggested in the previous chapter, relies on concrete rules of order to permit closer coordination of the efforts of the executive and the legislature.[43] Although a system of checks and balances does exist, Belgian law evolves in the legislative hall rather than appearing fully grown from a council chamber.[44] Hence, an MP could conceivably make unnecessary demands concerning the functioning of the bureaucracy in exchange for approval of some other measure. The constitution, however, is worded so that parliament is obliged to allow the government to attend to the business of running the country. MP's may ask questions concerning substance and procedure in new legislation,

but existing programs cannot be modified, except by extreme measures such as dissolution of parliament.

Recognizing the presence of diverse social groups, the Belgians were obliged to make allowances for the needs of all groups; the legislation was amended so that similar benefits were extended to other relevant groups, in proportion to the size of the groups. In summary, then, Belgium operates from a system of legally-mandated proportionality and right of the government to govern.

In the case of Luxembourg, there is virtually no information on how the elites approach policy-making. All that there is to go on are the results of political activity, such as the compromise on schools, where all schools are run by the state, but are under clerical influence with regard to such procedures as which texts are most suitable. Law is made for the general welfare and yet it is shaped to fit the desires of the individual groups.[45] Functionally, then, Luxembourg works in the same fashion as its Dutch and Belgian neighbors.

Symbols of National Unity

The third of Lijphart's characteristics of consociational politics is the presence of some common symbol of national unity. Each of the three countries contain social blocs which have evolved into a single unit in terms of national identity. One aid in this evolution has been the monarch, who represents the state as a whole. Cabinets rise and fall, social blocs wax and wane, but the regime itself symbolized by the monarch is sacrosanct. All tradition is embodied in the monarch, and, indeed, the monarchs provide all three countries with a sense of continuity in the face of a changing world. Although all three countries display these influences, we need only examine one--

Belgium---to see how the influences work in practice. Focusing on the Belgian kings alone may seem peculiar, but as we remember from the discussions in Chapter Two, all three monarchs have surrendered most of their power to the legislatures and, of the three, only the Belgian kings are constitutionally obliged to remain involved in more than ceremonial activity. This means that the Belgian kings display the greatest scope of involvement and, hence, have the highest profiles. In the Belgian kings, we are seeing the most active monarchs possible.

The Belgian royal house, Saxe-Coburg, is neither Flemish nor Walloon, but German. As such, the monarchy is unaligned on questions of social justice, representing all the Belgian people. The kings of Belgium have always had an active role in politics. Wielding more authority than their Dutch counterparts, they have often promoted legislation or have intervened to resolve a deteriorating situation. In 1846, for example, Leopold I was informed of the concern held by some for the safety of Flemish culture which was being buried by French influences and by a "French in the parlor, Flemish in the kitchen" attitude.[46] He began a series of annual festivals and competitions devoted to the advancement of Flemish culture.[47] Likewise, it was a royal initiative to propose Edmond Leburton for Prime Minister in 1971 even though Leburton did not lead the majority party. Finally, it was also a royal initiative to call for elections in 1974, when Leburton could not resolve a crisis.[48]

As the monarchs are symbols of nationhood, it is mandatory that they avoid becoming tarnished. In 1954, as was previously mentioned, questions were raised regarding the conduct of Leopold III during World War I. A referendum showed that 54% of the people supported the King.

A breakdown of the vote showed that while the King was well supported in Flanders, only 48% of the Francophones supported him. Rather than risk becoming a 'Flemish' king to his Francophone subjects, Leopold abdicated.[49]

The Benelux countries represent a variety of backgrounds: provincial, monarchical, religious and linguistic. The cleavages of Luxembourg seem minor compared to those of its Benelux partners, but it should be remembered that without the benefit of the works of such writers as Lijphart and Daalder, few people who had not made a study of the Netherlands would be aware of the sharpness of the cleavages in the Netherlands. The important quality that is shared by the three countries is that each country's social blocs have been politicized in such a way that political parties tend to correspond to social or ideological blocs, i.e., there is a close correlation between the characteristics of an individual and the party for which he votes. The blocs, to be sure, do not chase away potential converts, but they do present distinct qualities and work to maintain that distinctiveness.

The other important quality of consociational countries is their approach to political activity. Perhaps the most obvious characteristics are (1) that the elites tend to approach programs in terms of trade-offs and compromises, gearing their individual goals to the desires and needs of the whole, and (2) that the elites pursue their task in a business-like fashion, seeking to resolve problems when possible and to by-pass problems when a ready solution is not available. In contrast to this, we have the example of the French and Italians, who approach politics from the stand-point of ideological purity. For

them, the sacrifice of an ideological position is far worse than the seeming chaos of the political system. Operating from the position that their individual group has the best conceivable program, to create flaws in it in the name of "accommodation" is little more than a betrayal of one's party and one's constituency.

The consociational elites do not seek compromise for its own sake, but rather seek to gain part of their goals, which is to say benefits for their group, by a process of bargaining with trade-offs. Hence, political competition is just as intense in consociational countries, and negotiation just as difficult, but competition is more informal and tends to be obscured by the accommodative practices which are seen on the surface.

[1]Juan Linz, "Cleavage and Consensus in West Germany: The Early Fifties," from Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 283ff.

[2]Derek Urwin, "Social Cleavage and Political Parties in Belgium: The Problems of Institutionalization," Political Studies XVIII (September 1970):326.

[3]"Short History of Luxembourg," p. 20.

[4]Lorwin, p. 155.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Linz, pp. 287-9.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Lorwin, p. 155.

[10]Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p. 31.

[11]Hans Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society," in Robert Dahl (ed.), Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 203f.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p. 196ff. See also Lorwin, op. cit., passim; and Warren Miller and Phillip Stouhard, "Confessional Attachment and Political Behavior in the Netherlands," European Journal of Political Research 3 (1975):219ff.

[14]Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation, p. 205. See also "Constitution, Justice," p. 33.

[15]Clough, pp. iv-ix.

[16]"Les Elections du 17 Avril," Crisp Reports CH763, 29 April 1977, pp. 1-10. See also Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems, vol. 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 182.

[17]"Les Elections du 17 Avril."

[18]"Institutions of Luxembourg," p. 12.

[19]"Recencesement de la Population du 31 Decembre 1970," p. 153.

[20]<u>Keesing's Archives</u>, Vol. II, 1934, p. 2613E; Vol. III, 1937, p. 7686C; Vol. VI, 1946-8, p. 9330A; Vol. VIII, 1950-1, p. 11539E; Vol. IX, 1954, p. 13639B; Vol. XII, 1959-60, p. 16636B; Vol. XIV, 1964, p. 20204C; Vol. XVII, 1968, p. 23148C; Vol. XX, 1974, p. 26610A.

[21]<u>Ibid.</u>, Vol. XVIII, 1972, p. 25516C.

[22]Lorwin, p. 155.

[23]Linz, p. 285f; see also Kirchenheimer, Otto, "The Transformation of the West European Party Systems," in Joseph La Palombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), <u>Political Parties and Political Development</u> (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 187.

[24]Daalder, "The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented Society," pp. 416-422. See also <u>Keesing's Archives</u>, Vol. XVII, 1967; Vol. XIX, 1971; Vol. XIX, 1972; Vol. XXIII, 1977.

[25]<u>Ibid.</u>, Vol. XXIV, 1979, p. 28837A.

[26]Sartori, pp. 180-8; see also <u>Keesing's Archives</u>, Vol. XIII and XIV, "Elections in Belgium."

[27]<u>The New York Times</u>, April 24, 1974, 9:1. See also FBIS-WEU-77-48, Friday, 11 March 1977, vol. VI, no. 48, pp. Fl-F2. See also "Les Elections du 17 Avril."

[28]"No Wiser," <u>The Economist</u>, 269 (December 23, 1978):32.

[29]<u>Ibid.</u>

[30]<u>Keesing's Archives</u>, op. cit.

[31]Lijphart, <u>The Politics of Accommodation</u>, pp. 113-115ff.

[32]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 134.

[33]Alan Robinson, <u>Dutch Organized Agriculture in the International System</u> (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961), p. 37, cited in Lijphart, <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 123.

[34]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 129-31.

[35]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 124.

[36]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 126, 135.

[37]<u>Ibid.</u>, p. 124.

[38]<u>Ibid.</u>

[39]<u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 126, 131.

[40]Ibid., p. 131.

[41]Ibid., pp. 127-9.

[42]Mallinson, pp. 187ff.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., p. 103; see also Clough, p. iii.

[45]Gordon Weil, The Benelux Nations: Politics of Small Country Democracy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp. 210-11; see also Majerus, p. 12.

[46]Clough, pp. 59-71; see also Stephenson, pp. 522-3.

[47]Ibid.

[48]"Elections in Belgium," The New York Times, April 24, 1974.

[49]Mallinson, p. 96.

CONCLUSION

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY

In the preceding chapters, we examined the major theories of
consociational democracy and then analyzed them in the light of the
experience of the Benelux countries. When we began the study, we
wanted to know how consociational countries developed, and if these
countries had particular qualities which could be identified and dif-
ferentiated from those in non-consociational countries. Chapter Two
examined the countries in terms of their socio-cultural development,
allowing us to discover the source of consociational democracy; Chap-
ter Three, in turn, provided information on the specific consociational
qualities.

In Chapter Two, two points seemed especially significant:
Daalder's theory of consociational development, and the concept of
mutual recognition of legitimacy. Daalder proposed that consociational
political activity, moderate interaction among elites of distinct groups,
pre-dated the development of tension between the groups. As larger
units of society were enfranchised, the elites provided, in the words
of Rose and Urwin, a framework for the political mobilization of these
people. The social groups made this arrangement as a channel for
grievances, allowing their elite to handle interaction with other elites
in a manner to which the elite had grown accustomed. As a result, the
mutual accommodation practiced by the early elites became the modus

operandi of the elites of the new social blocs.

A good way to describe this process is through the concept of legitimacy. As the patterns of elite interaction evolved, and as the masses entered the political framework provided by the elites, in short, as the whole system developed, political development was based on the recognition of a right or propriety of each group to exist as legitimate units. This mutual recognition of legitimacy occurs on three levels:

(1) There is, on the part of all social groups, recognition of the right of the other groups of society to exist as discrete parts of the system;

(2) The elites of the social groups are recognized by their group, by other groups, and, especially, by the elites of those other groups as legitimate representatives of their group;

(3) There is a common recognition by both elites and masses of the legitimacy of the regime, that is, all parties recognize that they are part of a single political unit, and that their fortunes are bound to the fortunes of all groups that recognize the common allegiance.

In short, legitimacy occurs on three levels: social groups, elites, and the whole regime. The good of the individual unit is bound to the good of the whole.

These three facets of a political system, social groups, the elites, and the State, were examined in terms of the specific qualities of political interaction in Chapter Three. This examination allows us to describe each of the facets, and the type of interaction and interrelationships which occur in a consociational democracy.

A consociational democracy is generated by political interaction between discrete social blocs. Although other countries have reinforcing cleavages in society, the cleavages in a consociational country are institutionalized. Each group provides its own means of dissemination

of information throughout the group, that is, each group has its own
leaders, media, social and professional organizations, and at times,
its own educational system. The most important quality of social blocs
in a consociational country, however, is that each bloc generates its
own political party, the political party representing the political
elite of the social group. To determine if a country has its social
cleavages arranged in a consociational pattern then, we must examine
the relationship between the major social groups and the relevant poli-
tical parties.

In Chapter Three, we discovered three methods for discerning this
relationship. The first method is to determine the relationship between
party preference and social group. In a consociational country, identi-
fication by members of a particular group with one of the parties will
be extremely strong. We find that knowledge of the social group to
which an individual belongs allows us to determine his political affilia-
tion and vice versa.

A second possible method is to compare the voting patterns in the
various regions to the array of social groups. We can expect in most
cases that, as each group has its own socio-political attitudes, those
attitudes will be reflected in the voting pattern of the regions where
a specific group predominates. This method is not as precise as the
actual comparison of party preference to social group because the data
can be obscured by the presence of enclaves from other groups. As a
result, it is best that this method be used in tandem with the third
method, the comparison of changes in the strength of the political
parties to changes in society.

In a consociational system, the political parties are reflections

of the social groups. If changes in the parties are congruent with the social change, then we can expect that a consociational system is present. Certain specific qualities of consociational political parties were noted from examinations which used this method. By and large, changes in party strengths will be slow, because changes in attitudes or in social groups generally occur only over the passage of a long period of time. New parties will be generated by two influences: either by the expansion and defection of a particular sub-group, or by an extremist wing breaking free in a time of crisis. In the former case, the new party will continue to exist as long as the sub-group recognizes a need for independence from the groups to which it had adhered. In the case of extremist parties, these parties exist as long as a perceived threat or need exists, then go into a rapid decline. In both cases, new parties will be obvious off-shoots of the older parties.

These three methods allow us to determine if politicized social cleavages exist in a given country because they show the close relationship between the social blocs and their elites. The second facet of political activity, elite interaction, is equally important in the discussion of consociational democracy because it is the ability of the elites to work together in a system of compromise and mutual accommodation which gives consociational democracy its moderate political atmosphere.

From our earlier discussion, we know that consociational elites recognize the legitimacy of other elites to act as representatives of other groups. They also recognize the right of other elites to assume a leadership role in determining common policy. These elite characteristics are shown by the way in which parties associate and by the formal

or tacit rules which govern elite interaction.

The most convenient measure of the willingness of consociational elites to work together is shown by Cabinet coalitions. In consociational systems, the parties associate without regard for ideological or religious background, but rather with a desire to establish a workable coalition. Hence, coalitions can be formed freely among the various political parties.

Elite interaction is governed by rules of the game which have been established by traditional custom and usage. These rules may vary in exact form from country to country, but the political foundation for the rule will be the same.

(A) A Cabinet has a right to govern in a business-like fashion.
(B) The benefits of legislation will be distributed according to proportionality, that is, each group receives its fair share.
(C) Political negotiations between elites can be carried out by means of "summit diplomacy" and in secrecy.

The first of these rules reflects the recognition of elites that certain members of their body, although from a different group, can assume a leadership role in the policy-making process. Although these elites who are not in the Cabinet can oppose policy, it is opposed because it is not the best policy, not because it is someone else's policy. The second rule is a reciprocal arrangement between elites with regard to the first rule. While the Opposition leaders are expected to act in a judicious fashion, the Cabinet is expected, in turn, to recognize the rights of the other blocs. An electoral majority does not give license to the Cabinet to ignore the other blocs, but rather gives the responsibility of taking basic policy and amending it so that no group suffers from that policy.

The third rule, summit diplomacy and secrecy, arises from the

recognition by the blocs of the elites' right to govern. Acting as representatives of the individual blocs, the elites must approach policy flexibly so that the needs of individual blocs can be fulfilled by mutual accommodation. The ability of elites to interact in what Lehmbruch termed intense, informal discussion points to a high level of trust placed in the elites by the blocs as a whole.

The three rules then could also be described as the mutual recognition of legitimacy between elites, the recognition of the rights of the individual blocs, and the recognition by the blocs of the elites' ability to act as legitimate representatives. These perceptions include all of the facets of a political system except one, the State itself.

The State represents the common interests shared by all of the members of society, the sense of community. It transcends all cleavages and provides a point of reference to which all groups can look to for protection. Even though individuals may not like members of a certain other group, all parties can look to the same ultimate source of sovereign authority, whether it be symbolized by a monarch or by a set of common traditions. At the same time, we found in our discussion that this symbol of national unity should remain sacrosanct, free from tarnish in the eyes of the majorities in all relevant groups. If it seems to one group that the symbol is associated with an opposing group, then the situation must be repaired. A symbol is a legitimate point of reference only if it has the same attraction to all groups.

The symbol of national unity's most important quality, beyond providing a point of commonality, is that it gives the system a sense of continuity in the face of change. Even though cabinets and leaders

may rise and fall, and social groups wax and wane, the symbol remains

as an umbrella over all political interaction.

AFTERWORD

CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The Benelux countries, as moderate polities, represent one of
two types of political activity which can exist in a country with
politicized social cleavages. The other type is the competitive sys-
tem of France, where groups seek to achieve goals which reflect the
ideals of their group alone. This situation is the same as the inter-
national system, where there are countries which favor cooperation for
mutual benefit and those which seek to gain regardless of the cost to
others. These attitudes are not discrete, but in fact represent a con-
tinuum of ideas ranging from strong competition to limited cooperation
to strong cooperation. How could this understanding of socio-political
activity affect the internal or external politics of countries?

With regard to internal politics, Hans Daalder has suggested that
it is not only possible, but perhaps necessary for developing countries
to employ a consociational approach to the maintenance and expansion of
their regime.[1] Many new countries have boundaries which have little
regard for social identification, but rather were laid down by Europeans
to divide spheres of influence. Countries like Zaire have upwards of
two hundred and fifty separate tribes which must be psychologically
inculcated with the concept of belonging to a single nation. Daalder
suggests that the most convenient means would be to build on old founda-
tions such as tribal councils or similar bodies so that individuals come

to attach the development of their tribe or religious group to the
growing well-being of the whole state.[2] In countries with on-going
crises, like Bolivia, Northern Ireland, or Spain, the implementations
of a consociational system would assuredly be more difficult, but as
the system is a product of attitudes, and attitudes can change over
time, the construction of such a system is not utterly impossible.

In the broader context of the international system, the same
rules apply. If the general public can be influenced to believe a
particular goal is best, then the system can be altered so that that
goal is pursued. We can examine this approach on three levels, coop-
eration between countries which are forced to cooperate, those which
only wish limited cooperation, and those which feel cooperation is the
best possible course of action.

Cooperation is often forced upon competitive groups when a com-
mon threat presents itself. Usually cooperation will take the form
of a loose association such as an alliance. By its very nature, an
alliance tends to fade in importance over time. In the first place,
an alliance is formed to guarantee peace, either by presenting a united
front to an external threat or by unity under some dominant alliance-
member to insure peace among the alliance members (collective security).
When the threat--either internal or external--is no longer a threat,
then the necessity of maintaining tight coordination also fades. A
good example of this is the alliance that developed during the 1940's
between Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, et al.,
which lasted only as long as Germany was fighting. When Germany fell,
the alliance, being purely a military convenience, collapsed. The
alliance achieved its purpose, but could do no more. If Hitler's

Germany had lasted longer, so too would the alliance.

The collapse of an alliance is not bad in and of itself as long as it was able to achieve its hoped-for result. It is quite often impossible for more to be accomplished because alliances are intended to freeze the international status quo. No country gives special privileges to other countries beyond what is necessary for joint action, and no country gives up any of its sovereign right to independent action. In a purely competitive system, then, each country is responsible only to itself. The good of the country is defined in terms which emphasize the independence of action rather than interdependence.

A system of limited cooperation is based upon the recognition that the events in different countries are interdependent, that the internal policies of one country, e.g., economic policy, can influence international situations. If conquest is impossible, then countries must resort to cooperation to influence these otherwise discrete events. It is in this type of forum that consociational countries begin to make their presence known.

Consociational elites are professional bargainers, dealing daily with situations demanding complex negotiations. Their goal is to reach a mutually acceptable compromise which will yield the greatest benefit possible for their individual group. The transfer to an international gathering seeking the common good is not, therefore, substantially different from activity at home.

In this regard, Robert S. Wood and J. L. Heldring have produced works which describe the Dutch approach to politics within the confines of the European Community as communitarian, that is, the Dutch are actively promoting policies which will bind the countries of the E. C.

into a strong unit both economically and politically.[3] Their efforts

have not stopped there, but rather have been geared toward the expan-

sion of the Community to include important actors which were not at

first part of the Community, such as Great Britain. Heldring and Wood,

in their articles, both agreed that the Dutch were trying to promote a

system which had united several provinces into a single unit as a means

of gradually integrating several States on the international level.

Within the European Community, the common political attitudes of

the six original countries were much the same as the Dutch position.

In 1958, when France came under the control of Charles de Gaulle, the

situation changed. While the Dutch remained ostentatiously pro-

integration, the French sought instead to use the framework of the E. C.

to establish economic hegemony for themselves over Europe. The struggle

became one of 'greater Holland', the gradual unification of separate

provinces, against 'greater France', the retention of older national-

isms.

Today the position has altered slightly with the primary obstacles

to integration arising from economic difficulties and from recalcitrance

on the part of the British. The economic difficulties arise from unem-

ployment, the energy crisis, and the deteriorating position of the Uni-

ted States in the international economic system. As for the British,

they are simply not convinced of the advisability of strong integra-

tion. In spite of all of these problems, the Dutch efforts, now joined

by most other E. C. members, are continuing.

Strong cooperation exists when all of the actors agree, tacitly

at least, that cooperation is the best approach to generating benefits

and minimizing losses. A system of limited cooperation can drift to

this level from time to time, but the ideal results occur when cooperation is the policy, no matter who is running the Cabinet. Strong cooperation exists among the Benelux countries, stronger than in any other international economic organization. In spite of the difficulties involved, such as the massive exchange rate adjustments necessary to prevent wage and price imbalances,[4] problems have been viewed as obstacles to be overcome rather than reasons for abandoning the program entirely.[5] The Benelux countries, which have resisted unification in the past, are now building a union based on the same principles used to govern the individual countries: the good of the part is bound to the good of the whole, and every group gets its fair share. It may well be, therefore, that the consociationalism practiced in each Benelux state has enabled them to engender successful policies of moderation and accommodation in their relations with each other.

NOTES--AFTERWORD

[1]Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations," p. 368.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Robert S. Wood, "Europe and the Communitarian Image in Dutch Foreign Policy," Internationale Spectator 26, 9 (1973):826. See also J. L. Heldring, "Europe: A Greater Holland?" Internationale Spectator, 1964, cited in Wood.

[4]"Origin, Object, and Operation of the Benelux Economic Union" (Brussels: Secretariat-General of Benelux, 1976), p. 1.

[5]Ibid.

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