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1975

The Evolution of the Soviet Bloc

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College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET BLOC

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
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
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
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DEDICATION

For my Mother and Father

and

For Kim and Jonathan

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ABSTRACT

An assumption widely shared among Western observers is that the normalization of East-West relations will lead ultimately to a loosening of the bonds between the Soviet Union and its East European allies. It is the purpose of this paper to assess the evolution of the East European alliance system during the period of diminished tension between East and West.

The disintegrative tendencies within the alliance are by now well-known: Yugoslavia and Albania have successfully withdrawn from the alliance; Soviet troops have been sent to "normalize" situations in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia; and for a decade Rumania has pursued policies at odds with those of its allies. It would be premature, however, to see those developments as indicative of the dissolution of the alliance. A number of factors, not the least of which is the presence of the Red Army in four East European countries, are operating to maintain cohesion; and there is evidence to suggest that considerations of domestic political security may constitute a new cementing element in the alliance.

By 1970, it had become apparent that the process of change in the Soviet bloc had yielded a new form of relations among the states of Eastern Europe. Under the rubric of "socialist internationalism," this new form of relations has manifested itself in a new drive for economic integration, in an expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, in an intensive ideological campaign, and in a coordinated policy of cooperation with the West.

In an important sense, however, the unity of the past few years is deceptive, for among the East European leaders there are two opposing tendencies: one impelling them toward closer unity in the interests of immediate political security, and the other impelling them to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union. Although the question of which impulse will prevail will be determined by the course of domestic events in Eastern Europe and by the progress of détente, the most likely outcome for the near future is what one Polish scholar has termed a "shifting of forces," a process whereby the states of Eastern Europe would be afforded greater room for maneuver within the existing alliance framework.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET BLOC

INTRODUCTION

The character of contemporary East-West relations is generally understood in terms of détente. No consensus exists, however, as to the precise meaning of détente or its implications. Though a distinction is commonly made between détente as a psychological phenomenon--implying a general relaxation of tension--and détente as a set of substantive policies, the meaning of détente remains a topic of debate.

Similar disagreement exists concerning the possible impact of détente on the Soviet-sponsored East European alliance system. Recent changes in the international environment--including the increased economic cooperation between East and West, the arms limitations agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the various West German initiatives associated with Ostpolitik-- suggest the possibility of a profound systemic impact on the Eastern bloc. Simultaneously, however, the reiteration of the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty and the Soviet drive for ideological unity within the socialist system indicate a continued determination to maintain alliance cohesion.

The disintegrative tendencies within the Soviet bloc are by now well-known. Of the eight communist states in Eastern Europe, two have successfully withdrawn from the alliance: Yugoslavia, in 1948, and Albania, in 1962. Though still a member of the alliance,

Rumania has pursued an increasingly independent foreign policy line since the mid 1960s. Soviet troops have been sent to "normalize" crises in the alliance three times: in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary in 1956, and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Poland, too, submitted to strong Soviet pressure in resolving political crises in 1956 and 1970. Of the East European alliance members, only Bulgaria has followed without serious challenge the prescribed Soviet line in both foreign and domestic policies.

The developments of the 1970s have introduced into the alliance a new set of potentially disruptive tendencies. The rapid expansion of East-West trade, as well as local variations in economic development, have seriously undermined established trade relations within the alliance. Additionally, the developing East-West détente and the stabilization of the territorial situation in Eastern Europe have diminished the military threat which the Warsaw Treaty Organization was formed to counter.

It would be premature, however, to see these developments as indicative of the dissolution of the alliance. A number of factors, not the least of which is the presence of the Red Army in several East European countries, are operating to maintain alliance cohesion. At the very least, the maintenance of close formal ties among the socialist states of Eastern Europe remains of vital importance to the political security of the various Party leaders. Ideological considerations aside, the simple fact of geographic proximity to a large and powerful neighbor severely limits the range of alternatives available to the East European countries.

The conflicting developments of the past few years point to a need for a systematic study of the East European alliance in the period of developing détente between East and West. It is clear that the alliance is a vastly different one from that which existed, say, twenty years ago. The precise nature of the transformation, however, is far from clear. Are the ideological ties among the socialist states sufficiently strong to maintain cohesion? Will considerations of political security replace military considerations as a cementing element in the alliance? Will the alliance evolve into an authentic socialist commonwealth, in which each member would be afforded greater latitude to pursue independent policies? Or will the alliance simply disintegrate, to be replaced by a framework of bilateral and multilateral arrangements in Eastern Europe?

The year 1975 is particularly appropriate for an assessment of the Soviet bloc. It marks the conclusion of the long awaited agreement on security and cooperation in Europe. It also marks the twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Pact and the thirtieth anniversary of the beginning of the Soviet bloc, which has already established itself as one of the more enduring alliances.

Alliances: Theories and Propositions

In the last twenty years, a vast number of theories and propositions concerning the behavior of international alliances have been advanced. The unfortunate truth is that there are not too few theories, but too many: for virtually every assertion concerning alliance behavior, there exists another assertion stating the opposite

idea. Nevertheless, it is possible to list a few of the more widely

shared, or at least the most commonly stated, theories and proposi-

tions about alliances.

Alliance theories generally fall into one of three categories:

the formation of alliances, ·alliance performance, and alliance

duration and disintegration. What follows will be a survey of some

of the more widely accepted propositions and of those which are

particularly relevant to the alliance system in Eastern Europe.

Theories concerning alliance formation are concerned with

the questions of why alliances are formed and of what criteria are

involved in the decision to enter into an alliance. Most theorists ·

agree that alliances are formed primarily to counter an external

threat. George Liska, for example, has argued that external threat,

rather than national strength or weakness, is the primary source of

alliances.[1] Liska's proposition was stated in somewhat different

form by K. J. Holsti, who held that nations undertake alliance

commitments with nations which face similar external problems.[2]

Although a case might be made for this line of argument as applied

specifically to the formation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, it

is clear that the alliance system in its early stages was simply

imposed on Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union.

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[1]George Liska, Nations in Alliance (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 13.

[2]K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for
Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co.,
1967), p. 110.

Closer to the mark is a proposition by Harold Guetzkow, who held that the less successful a nation's experience with self-reliant policies, the greater the tendency to join alliances.[3] The fact that Eastern Europe has for centuries been consigned a dependency status has implications both for the reasons for the formation of the Soviet bloc and for its persistence. In a more specific sense, the geopolitical results of World War Two provided the Soviet Union with an opportunity to impose an alliance on East European leaders who were scarcely in a position to resist.

Theories related to alliance performance are concerned with the cohesion and effectiveness of alliances and with the distribution of influence within alliances. Probably the most widely stated of all the propositions about alliances is that cohesion depends upon external danger and declines as the threat is reduced. This hypothesis, derived from the studies of small group behavior by German sociologist Georg Simmel,[4] has been restated in one form or another

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[3]Harold Guetzkow, "Isolation and Collaboration: A Partial Theory of Inter-Nation Relations," Journal of Conflict Resolution 1 (1957):54.

[4]Georg Simmel, Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1955), pp. 92-93.

by Kenneth Boulding, Arnold Wolfers, and many others.[5]

If the hypothesis is valid, one would expect that the general relaxation of tension between East and West would have a profound and divisive impact on NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Soviet bloc. The acceptance of this hypothesis has been reflected in Secretary of State Kissinger's defense of the policy of détente as part of an evolutionary process leading to the liberalization of the societies of Eastern Europe and to the loosening of the East European alliance. In response to a question during the hearings on his nomination to be Secretary of State, Kissinger stated,

> . . . about ten years ago it was axiomatic in the intellectual community and among students of foreign policy that the reason the Soviet system was able to maintain its authoritarian hold was because of its invocation of foreign danger, and that to the degree that the foreign danger diminished it would not be able to maintain the more repressive aspects of its system. And I believe that, in the long run, this will turn out to be a correct judgment, because, in a way, as we live in a world in which these countries become more related to the free countries and economically more interdependent, the pressures . . . are going to become more numerous.[6]

Two other hypotheses, however, suggest the existence of

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[5]Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962), p. 162; and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 29.
For an extensive listing of these and other alliance theories, see Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), Appendix C.

[6]"Excerpts from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings on the Nomination of Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State," in Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1969; expanded edition, 1974), p. 211.

cohesive factors in the alliance. Haas and Whiting argued in 1956 that centralization of alliance decision-making contributes to greater cohesion.[7] In this regard, the record of the East European alliance system is mixed: while it is clear that the Soviet Union remains the dominant force, it is equally clear that the junior partners in the alliance have greatly improved their bargaining power within the decision-making structures. A related proposition advanced by Liska holds that "a hegemonic alliance would repress strains underneath the supremacy of the leading ally."[8] The question which emerges from consideration of this proposition is whether the preponderant power of the Soviet Union is in itself sufficient to maintain cohesion in the alliance.

The third category of propositions about alliance behavior is concerned with alliance duration and disintegration. Most prominent among these is the logical extension of the various hypotheses concerning external danger and alliance cohesion: as external threat disappears, alliances disintegrate. Since external threat is not likely to disappear in any absolute sense, however, concern might better be directed toward the question of the extent to which the invocation of external danger acts as a genuine cohesive element affecting alliances.

A factor not yet mentioned is the role of ideology in

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[7]Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, _Dynamics of International Politics_ (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1956), p. 183.

[8]Liska, _Nations in Alliance_, p. 73.

alliances. Richard Lowenthal, Herbert Dinerstein and others have argued that common ideology may provide a source of alliance unity, though Dinerstein adds that the need for ideological homogeneity betrays underlying tendencies toward disintegration.[9] It should be added that under Marxism-Leninism, ideology takes on an added dimension: it affects the very legitimacy of the Communist Party. As regards Eastern Europe, it is clear that any threat to the politi- cal security of the Party leadership would provide a powerful inducement toward alliance unity.

In summary, the theoretical literature on alliance behavior constitutes a vast potential storehouse for the systematic investi- gation of the East European alliance. Of the many propositions surveyed here, however, only a few have been applied to studies of the situation in Eastern Europe.

Recent Studies of the Soviet Bloc

The great majority of studies of the East European alliance have been traditional descriptive analyses. Even a brief survey of the major scholars would have to include such names as Bromke,

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[9]Richard Lowenthal, "Factors of Unity and Factors of Conflict," Annals 349 (September 1963):107; and Herbert Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems," American Political Science Review 59 (September 1965):601.

Brzezinski, Ionescu, London, Rubinstein, and Ulam.[10] Without

necessarily endorsing Adam Ulam's scornful reference to the "new

and militant faith called behavioralism,"[11] it can fairly be said

that most of the current knowledge of the Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe has come from the work of the area specialists. At least

two factors may account for the persistence of traditional modes

of analysis in Communist studies. First, the relative scarcity of

reliable data precludes the application of scientific techniques

in a number of areas of inquiry. Second, the supposed uniqueness

of the Communist system has, until recently, deterred scholars from

attempting comparative analyses.

The first attempt away from the area studies approach was

the totalitarian model, which dominated Communist studies during the

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[10]A partial listing of books written or edited by these
authors includes Adam Bromke and Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, eds.,
The Communist States in Disarray, 1965-1971 (Minneapolis, Minnesota:
University of Minnesota Press, 1967); Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The
Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1967); Ghita Ionescu, The Breakup of the Soviet
Empire in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965); Kurt
London, ed., Eastern Europe in Transition (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1964); Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed., Communist Political
Systems (New York: New York University Press, 1966); and Adam
B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign
Policy 1917-1967 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1968).

[11]Adam B. Ulam, "USA: Some Critical Reflections,"
Survey 50 (January, 1964):57.
        For another view, see Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "Soviet
Area Studies and the Social Sciences: Some Methodological Problems
in Communist Studies," Soviet Studies 19 (January 1968):
313-39.

1950s and the early 1960s.[12] Useful as it may have been as an

alternative to traditional analysis, the totalitarian model failed

to provide a conceptual framework for the analysis of change in

Communist systems. The problem was not that the model failed to

allow for change in any form, but that it limited itself to those

changes which were initiated by the regimes in power.[13] Moreover,

the totalitarian model provided little insight into the nature of the

Communist interstate system.

By the early 1960s, the totalitarian model was increasingly

seen as inadequate for the analysis of Communist systems. It was

argued, for example, that Friedrich and Brzezinski's five pre-

requisites for a totalitarian system had diminished in significance

with the decline in ideology, the growth of bureaucratic elites,

and the decline in terroristic police tactics.[14] Among the alterna-

tive models presented were the model of the one-party state, the

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[12]The most prominent of the early books on totalitarianism are
Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt
Brace, 1951); and Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
eds., Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956).
     For more recent studies, see Carl J. Friedrich, Jr.,
"Totalitarianism: Recent Trends," Problems of Communism 18 (May/June
1968):32-43; and Robert Burrowes, "Totalitarianism: The Revised
Standard Version," World Politics 21 (January 1969):272-294.

[13]For a discussion of totalitarianism and change, see
Chalmers Johnson, "Comparing Communist Nations," in Change in
Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 1-32.

[14]Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and
Autocracy, pp. 9-10; and Allan Kassof, "The Administered Society:
Totalitarianism Without Terror," World Politics 16 (July 1964):558-75.

bureaucratic model, and the structural-functional model.[15]

More importantly, scholars began to attach significance to change, rather than to stability, in Communist systems.[16] The proliferation of new models in the late 1960s reflected both an emphasis on the process of change and an attempt to apply techniques used in studies of non-Communist systems.[17] In addition to analyzing the processes of modernization and political development, recent studies have been concerned with such factors as nationalism, ideology, bureaucracy, and the roles of elites and interest groups in both national and cross-national studies.[18] At the interstate level, the new concern with change was reflected in the "polycentrism"

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[15]See, for example, Robert C. Tucker, "Toward a Comparative Politics of Movement Regimes," American Political Science Review 55 (June 1961):281-93; T. H. Rigby, "Traditional, Market, and Organizational Societies and the USSR," World Politics 16 (July 1964): 539-57; and Frederick C. Barghoorn, Politics in the USSR (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1966).

[16]See, for example, Johnson, Change in Communist Systems; and Andrzej Korbonski, "The Prospects for Change in Eastern Europe," Slavic Review 34 (March 1975):219-39.

[17]For an excellent discussion of recent trends in Communist studies, see Paul Shoup, "Comparing Communist Nations: Prospects for an Empirical Approach," American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968):185-204.

[18]See, for example, Dennis Clark Pirages, Modernization and Political-Tension Management: A Socialist Society in Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972); Kenneth Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971); Paul E. Zinner, International Communism: Ideology, Organization, Strategy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963); H. Gordon Skilling, ed., Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971); and Barry T. Farrell, ed., Political Leadership in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1970).

literature of the mid- to late-1960s.[19]

Finally, the so-called "behavioral revolution" has begun to have an impact on Communist studies.[20] In the face of a number of constraints inherent in the study of closed political systems, however, behaviorally oriented Communist studies have achieved only limited success. Surveys of recent emigrants from Communist East Europe, for example, have been justly criticized for having been drawn from a biased sample. An encouraging sign for the behavioralists, however, is the recent accumulation of more reliable data, much of which is being generated from within the Communist countries themselves.

The continuing dichotomy between the behavioralists and the anti-behavioralists notwithstanding, it is becoming increasingly obvious that there is no one best method in Communist studies. The most encouraging sign of the past few years is that the previous emphasis on stability has given way to concern for the nature and direction of change in Communist systems at both the national and international levels.

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[19]"Polycentrism," which in the strictest sense denotes the existence of multiple centers for the legitimate interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, has been used by many scholars to describe the disintegration of the Soviet bloc.
See, for example, Richard T. deGeorge, The New Marxism (New York: Pegasus Publishing Co., 1968); and Walter Laqueur and Leopold Labedz, eds., Polycentrism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962).

[20]For two recent collections of behavioral works, see Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies (New York: Free Press, 1971); and Johnson, Change in Communist Systems.

Alliance Transformation

Because of its commitment to a utopian ideology and because of the preponderant power of the Soviet Union, the Soviet bloc is an alliance particularly resistant to change. To an extent unparalleled in the history of alliances, stability in the Soviet bloc depends on the uniformity of its members. Both Marxist-Leninist doctrine, on which the very legitimacy of the East European leaders rests, and practical political considerations preclude significant deviations from the accepted pattern of uniformity.

According to Lenin's interpretation of Marx, history is governed by universally applicable laws of socioeconomic development which must be uniformly followed by the Communist parties in their positions at the vanguard of the progression toward Communism. Any manifestation among the Communist parties of different interpretations of historical laws, therefore, weakens both the solidarity of the movement and the position of the parties within their own societies. Moreover, close cohesion of the states of the Soviet bloc is ideologically required for the simultaneous entry into socialism and for the eventual achievement of Communism on an international scale.

Closely related to the ideological imperatives of close unity are a number of practical political considerations. The preservation of political security in Eastern Europe requires the maintenance of existing patterns of control over the economy, the military, the press, and virtually every other area of political and social activity.

Since all states are said to be governed by the same historical laws, any change in the nature of political control in one state ultimately would raise demands for change in other states. The 1968 Czechoslovak experiment to allow political participation outside of the Communist Party, for example, threatened political security throughout Eastern Europe.

Thus, cohesion acquires far greater importance in the Soviet bloc than it does, say, in the NATO alliance or in the Common Market. If the requirement for alliance cohesion has remained a constant theme in the Soviet bloc, however, the means by which that requirement has been satisfied have varied considerably. It can be said, in fact, that the major changes in alliance relationships have been associated with efforts to construct integrative links designed to promote cohesion through means short of coercion.

Although "cohesion" and "integration" are often used interchangeably, there is an important distinction between the terms: where "cohesion" denotes a uniformity of thought and action, "integration" refers to the process whereby distinct units are linked in specific areas of their activities. In this vein, Liska has observed,

> One may ask "how much cohesion?" referring to the degree that allies stay together and act together. And one may ask, "how much integration?" implying how intimately allies must be tied together so that they cannot act separately.[21]

The distinction is not merely a matter of semantics, for in an

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[21]Liska, <u>Nations in Alliance</u>, p. 116.

analysis of the Soviet bloc in particular, apparent conformity may

obscure fundamental changes in interstate relations.

Where cohesion is seen as the degree of uniformity at a

given time, integration is a dynamic process of growing interaction

which produces greater interdependence and which may promote a more

stable cohesion. Thus, the special concern of any analysis of

alliance transformation, particularly in the Soviet bloc, is the

process of integration.

Perhaps the most useful definition for this analysis is that

of Morton Kaplan, who defined integrative processes as "processes

which join systems or organizations with separate institutions and

goals within a common framework providing for the common pursuit of at

least some goals the common implementation of at least some policies."[22]

At the most basic level, then, an analysis of alliance transformation

should be concerned with the nature and direction of change in the

following elements: alliance purpose or function, the influence and

interests of alliance units, the structural framework of the alliance,

and alliance policies. Accordingly, this analysis will assess the

patterns of change in the alliance, primarily during the period from

1956 to 1968, and will investigate the altered nature of alliance

relations since 1970.

Despite the similarities of the invasion of Hungary in 1956

and the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the period between

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[22]Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 98.

those two dates was one of profound change in the Soviet bloc.
Following the revolutionary upheavals in Eastern Europe in the late
1940s and early 1950s, the East European leaders were confronted
with new demands which were ill served by the existing alliance
framework. It was this deficiency which Nikita Khrushchev sought
to remedy through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). During the same
period, however, the impact of Sino-Soviet split on existing
polycentric tendencies served to upset the ideological unity of the
alliance and to introduce new disruptive tendencies into the bloc.

By the end of that period, the patterns of change in the
bloc had generated a new form of alliance relations designed to
serve new purposes. Under the rubric of "socialist internationalism,"
this new form of relations has been characterized by a new emphasis
on voluntary cooperation and by accommodation of pluralistic tendencies,
moderated of course by continued Soviet predominance. Moreover, the
new form of alliance relations became intimately tied to the
emerging policy of cooperation with the West.

Where alliance developments in the 1950s and the early 1960s
were determined by the profound domestic changes in Eastern Europe,
the course of the alliance relations since that time has been
primarily affected by the nature of external developments. In
bilateral relations with the West and at the recently concluded
European security conference, the Soviet bloc has demonstrated a
new solidarity which reflects an awareness of both the possible
benefits and the possible dangers of cooperation with the West.

Although it can be said that the nature of change in the Soviet bloc in the future will be determined by the progress of détente and by the course of events domestically in Eastern Europe, it is too early to specify the precise direction of that change. A number of trends in the alliance are only beginning to become apparent, and a number of contradictory developments have yet to be resolved. As one prominent scholar on Eastern Europe has noted,

> The purpose of scholarly study should be to acquire knowledge about the relatively clear tendencies of the past and the much less discernible trends of the present, and to indicate a range of possible alternatives for the near future. It cannot, however, forecast which of these prospects will in fact materialize, nor foresee entirely new ones, which will, no doubt, make themselves evident in the long run.[23]

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[23]H. Gordon Skilling, The Governments of Communist East Europe (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishing Co., 1966), p. 228.

CHAPTER I

FROM BUDAPEST TO PRAGUE

By 1953, the foundations for the alliance system in Eastern Europe had been laid. In the East European states, the processes of state-building and the tasks of consolidating power had largely been achieved, and the more convulsive aspects of revolutionary social transformation had been endured. Everywhere loyal Stalinists were entrenched as leaders of the new socialist states.

Notably lacking in the Stalinist system were any formal institutions designed to promote integration within the bloc. Those institutions which did exist were designed more to meet existing demands than to form the basis for future integration. Cominform, established in 1948 to counter Yugoslav ambitions and to restore ideological purity to the bloc, lapsed into inactivity the following year. COMECON, founded in January of 1949 in response to the challenge of the Marshall Plan, may have been intended initially to supplement Cominform as a formal link in the system. After the initial meetings of 1949 and 1950, however, COMECON remained dormant until its revival in the late 1950s.

While the reasons for COMECON's early failure will require elaboration in a subsequent section, it may be said at the outset that a major factor was Stalin's preference for indirect methods of control in the alliance. In the Stalinist system, the only

significant formal ties among member states were the bilateral

treaties signed between 1947 and 1952.[24] While the treaties formally

guaranteed the sovereignty of the People's Democracies, they also

formally prohibited the East European states from entering into

alliances opposed by the Soviet Union. On balance, however, the

treaties were significant more for what they obscured than for what

they revealed about the Stalinist system.

Following the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform in

1948, Stalin made it clear that "domesticism" would no longer be

tolerated in Eastern Europe.[25] Strict adherence to the Soviet

line was achieved through a variety of means, including frequent

consultations among top leaders, direct participation by Soviet

ambassadors in East European domestic affairs, the threat of the

Soviet army, and, above all, by the imposition of leaders trusted

by Stalin. By 1953, each of the East European leaders had been

personally approved by Stalin by virtue of previous Comintern service

or on the basis of their successful employment of Stalinist methods

within their own Parties.

Stalin himself, of course, constituted the most important link

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[24]For a more detailed analysis, see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 107-12.

[25]For a discussion of the term and its implications for bloc
affairs, see ibid., pp. 51-58, 67-83.
    "Domesticism," in the strictest sense, refers to the pre-
occupation of East European leaders with domestic problems at the
expense of the broader international goals of the Communist movement.
In a more general sense, the term refers to manifestations of differing
interpretations of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.

in the system. As the successful builder of socialism in the Soviet Union and as the creator of the socialist system in Eastern Europe, Stalin embodied the very direct source of legitimacy of the East European leaders and of the systems they had erected. The Stalinist system, successful as it was for the purposes of revolutionary social and political transformation, did not include the kind of cohesive elements which could endure. No stable framework existed for the containment of conflicts within the system; and basic economic, political, and military integration had been abandoned in favor of direct personal rule.

Stalin's immediate legacy was a period of semiparalysis, both in the Soviet Union and in the bloc. Since all elements of Stalin's rule had been personal, his heirs were left with the task of reconstructing the bases for stability and cohesion. During the years immediately following Stalin's death in March of 1953, developments in Eastern Europe largely reflected the upheavals going on within the Soviet Union. The long-term impact of those developments, however, is still being felt.

The internal crisis in the Soviet Union culminated with Khrushchev's "secret speech" to the Twentieth Party Congress, in which he vigorously denounced Stalin and his methods. In the East European states, a denunciation of Stalin could only be interpreted as a denunciation of the "little Stalins" in power throughout the bloc. While Khrushchev was undoubtedly motivated by concerns for consolidating power domestically, he must have been aware of the catastrophic impact the speech would have in Eastern Europe. On balance, it

appears that Khrushchev's aim was to reshape the Stalinist legacy both in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. In any case, the upheavals in Hungary and in Poland bore witness to the failure of the new Soviet leadership to successfully transform the Stalinist system it had inherited.

The Hungarian and Polish "Octobers"

Stalin was replaced in the Soviet Union by an unstable collective leadership headed by Georgi Malenkov, who, in the face of conflicting domestic pressures, announced a "new course" for the Soviet economy. Encouraged by the easing of world tensions following the Korean armistice, Malenkov apparently hoped to enhance the viability of the Soviet regime (and of the regimes of Eastern Europe) by redirecting the economy toward the production of more consumer goods.

The two principles of the Malenkov period, collective leadership politically and the New Course economically, had an immediate impact on the alliance system. Alterations in the Soviet model, still of profound importance to the system, in 1953 were duplicated with knee-jerk rapidity in the states of Eastern Europe. The Stalinist assertion that Soviet interpretations of the correct path to socialism "are binding upon all countries"[26] had been challenged only by Yugoslavia, and the political realities of the day dictated that no further challenge would be tolerated. The erratic

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[26]Bolshevik, No. 17 (1948), as cited by Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc, p. 77.

course followed in Moscow after 1953, however, served to upset the monolithic quality of the alliance.

In most cases, the Malenkov reforms were adopted in Eastern Europe without serious political strains. The New Course, only the first of what was to be a series of measures toward economic reform, was adopted in varying degrees. The principle of collective leadership, which meant in effect that the posts of Premier and First Secretary would not be held by one man, had a serious impact only in Hungary.

The principal recipient of Soviet accusations of economic excesses in Hungary was Matyas Rakosi, the Moscow-trained First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party. Accordingly, the New Course in Hungary was conceived and announced by Imre Nagy, who had assumed the post of Premier in keeping with the principle of collective leadership. It seems clear that either Rakosi or Nagy alone might have been able to implement the plan without crisis-- Rakosi through the continued use of Stalinist methods and Nagy by a partial liberalization of domestic policies. The combination of the two, however, coupled with the erratic policies emanating from Moscow, set in motion conflicts which could not easily be resolved.

The reversal of the Soviet New Course following Khrushchev's elevation to the Premiership in 1954 seemed to constitute an implicit endorsement of Rakosi. Before Rakosi was able to consolidate power, however, his position was hopelessly undercut by Khrushchev's de-Stalinization speech. Neither Rakosi's compromise plan nor the short-lived Gero government was able to stem the tide of reform which

began in 1953. Nagy, who had systematically been forced into a
position of strict national communism, was appointed Premier on
October 23, 1956. The well-known events of October and early
November, 1956, ended in the Soviet liquidation of the Nagy government.

While the events in Hungary can scarcely be said to be
representative of developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe, they are
instructive in that all of the potentially disruptive elements at
work in the system converged at once. Hungary, which had endured
one of the most repressive Stalinist regimes, was particularly
ill-prepared in 1953 to sustain erratic tampering with the sources
of political authority. Encouraged by the course of events in
Poland, dissident groups in Hungary began to press for far-reaching
domestic reform. Once the previous source of governmental legitimacy--
Stalin--had been repudiated, the leadership was forced to turn
inward to erect a new basis for legitimacy. That this search took
on a decidedly anti-Soviet tone was symptomatic of the forces at
work within the alliance system.

When the Soviet army intervened in Hungary on October 24
and again on November 4, it did so in clear violation of Articles
1 and 8 of the recently signed Warsaw Pact. If Khrushchev had hoped
that the Warsaw Treaty Organization would assist in containing
crises within the system, his hopes were not realized in 1956. While
the Treaty was mentioned as one of the many justifications for the

Soviet action,[27] the Warsaw Treaty Organization never specifically endorsed the intervention, nor did it respond to Nagy's accusation that the Pact had been violated. Despite its inaction--or perhaps because of it--the Warsaw Pact continued to figure highly in Khrushchev's plans for a restructured alliance system.

It should be noted that each of the East European Communist regimes, including the Yugoslav regime, did unilaterally endorse the intervention. In addition to the ideological implications of the possibility of a Communist state "going neutral," the developments in Hungary posed a clear threat to the maintenance of Party control elsewhere in the bloc. With the possible exception of Gomulka in Poland, it is clear that none of the East European leaders was reluctant to .endorse the Soviet action, and it is likely that most welcomed the added measure of political security.

The same forces at work in Hungary revealed themselves in somewhat different form in Poland, though with quite different results. The death of Stalin, the early experimentation of Malenkov, and particularly the Soviet criticism of the activities of the secret police all served to set off a wave of criticism and reevaluation · in Poland. The defection of a high ranking Polish secret police officer and his subsequent revelations about the police activities in Poland contributed to growing public resentment of the role of the Party in Polish society. What began with the questioning of some

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[27]The various justifications for the invasion are discussed in Andrzej Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International Conciliation, no. 573 (May 1969), p. 24.

Stalinist practices quickly spread to unprecedented official questioning of the role of the parliament, the viability of economic programs, and the methods of the Politburo.

In the wake of workers' riots in Poznan and increasing domestic dissent, the Polish leadership became increasingly divided. The principal issues dividing the two factions seem to have been domestic policies, Poland's relationship to the Soviet Union, and the position of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been imprisoned in 1948 for advocating the "Polish road to socialism." Events came to a head when the Polish army refused to act to suppress a second workers' riot on October 18, 1956.

The following day, a Soviet delegation arrived uninvited in Warsaw to discuss the situation. It is apparent that the Soviet leaders came to realize that developments in Poland had gone beyond the point where the domestic crisis in Poland could be resolved on Soviet terms. For a number of reasons the Soviet delegation, like the Polish leadership, had come to realize that Gomulka alone could resolve the domestic conflicts in Poland without seriously damaging Soviet-Polish relations. With a wide mandate to pursue a separate course toward viability in Poland, Gomulka emerged from the crisis as the symbol of renewal.

The Soviet response to the events in Poland represented a new willingness on the part of the Soviet leadership to recognize the existence and validity of differences among the states of Eastern Europe. This new orientation was made explicit in the following excerpt from a Soviet declaration of October 30, 1956:

The process of establishing the new system and implementing far-reaching revolutionary reforms of social relationships was attended by no small number of difficulties, unsolved problems and outright mistakes, which extended also to relations between the socialist countries. . . . The Twentieth Congress declared that full account must be taken of the historical past and speci-fic features of each country. . . .[28]

The break with the past was, on the surface at least, complete. Stalin had been denounced, past mistakes had been admitted, and the possibility of separate roads to socialism had been acknowledged. Throughout the bloc surviving Stalinist leaderships responded to demands for domestic reform through largely repressive methods. Nowhere, however, did the patterns of domestic control retain the authoritarian hold exercised before 1956. The task which remained was to replace the discredited Stalinist system with a framework which could restore a measure of cohesion to the alliance.

Toward a New Cohesion

The cohesion Khrushchev sought was one based on a more complex and resilient pattern of interrelationships among the socialist states. Specifically, he saw the Warsaw Treaty Organization and COMECON as the basic elements of a new and viable alliance. The first task, however, was to reestablish the ideological founda-tions of the socialist system, which had been termed "polycentric" by Italian Communist Party leader Palmiro Togliatti as early as

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[28]"Declaration by the Soviet Government on 'Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States,' October 30, 1956," in *International Relations Among Communists*, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 92.

June of 1956.[29]

Clearly, the events of 1956 had raised a number of questions which had not been satisfactorily resolved. The issues of greatest importance were the definition of the "correct" road to socialism, the historical meaning of Stalin and Stalinism, and the position of the Soviet Union in the socialist system. Following a series of bilateral and multilateral meetings among top party leaders, a conference of representatives of all the Communist countries met in Moscow in November of 1957. The conference declaration, which was signed by the representatives of all the Communist countries except Yugoslavia, warned against both dogmatism and revisionism and affirmed the leading role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).[30]

As a consequence of the absence of any institutional framework for the resolution of ideological differences,[31] the pattern of 1957 was repeated in subsequent ideological conferences. The 1960 meeting reaffirmed the "vanguard" position of the CPSU, but at the 1965 and subsequent conferences no special precedence was accorded the Soviet Union. In fact, it could be said that the development of more elaborate interstate relations was paralleled by the gradual

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[29]"Togliatti's Speech on 'Polycentrism' to the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, June 24, 1956," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 87-90.

[30]"Declaration of the Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, November 22, 1957," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), pp. 98-101.

[31]Cominform was officially dissolved April 17, 1956.

deterioration of interparty relations.[32] Nevertheless, 'the newly acknowledged principles of "complete equality" and "state independence" had established the basis for a new system.

Founded in May of 1955, the Warsaw Treaty Organization represented the first institutionalized expression of the new form of relations in the system. For the first five years of its existence the WTO, like COMECON in its early years, was little more than a shell for the future development of an integrative framework. As a political and military counterweight to NATO, the WTO did prove useful during the Geneva Conference as a symbol of unity in Eastern Europe. WTO also proved useful as a forum for the announcement of such decisions as troop reductions in Eastern Europe and the removal of Soviet troops from Rumania. It was not until 1961, however, that any serious steps were taken toward military integration in the bloc; and until the late 1960s it was difficult to discern any WTO defense policy which amounted to anything beyond a simple extension of the Soviet defense system. As for WTO's activity as an agency for political integration, there is little evidence to suggest that until the 1970s the organization functioned as a genuine forum for political consultation.

Nevertheless, the Warsaw Treaty Organization has served a number of functions. First, as has already been mentioned, it

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[32]This argument is developed by Nish Jamgotch, Jr., in Soviet--East European Dialogue: International Relations of a New Type? (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 89-126.

provided at least the beginnings of a unified East European defense command. Second, it provided an additional legal basis for the continued presence of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. While such justification was probably not essential, it was in keeping with the new Soviet emphasis on "socialist legality" in both domestic and foreign policies.

The third principal function of WTO has been its use as a means of replacing the dysfunctional Stalinist control devices with a new framework for the tightening of Soviet military control in Eastern Europe. With the departure of such direct Soviet military officials as Konstantin Rokossovsky, who had been the Minister of Defense in Poland, it became increasingly obvious that a less visible form of Soviet control was necessary. Additionally, the refusal of Polish troops to repress the workers' riots in October, 1956, must have confirmed Soviet fears about the reliability of the national armed forces in Eastern Europe. While the extent of Soviet control over the East European military has become a matter of some dispute,[33] it is undeniable that the WTO has been the principal agent of efforts toward tighter Soviet control.

Perhaps the greatest significance of the WTO, however, is its existence as a formal body for the possible development of integrative links in the future. While little is known about the workings of the Consultative Committee and its auxiliary bodies, it

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[33]For a more complete analysis, see Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 19-23.

is clear that the important political decisions have been made outside of the formal framework. The fact that the realities of the operations of the organization has not reflected its formal constitution, however, should not obscure the importance of WTO's potential for the development of a viable integrative framework in the future.

The second pillar of the emerging system, COMECON, was clearly anachronistic at its inception. It is obvious now, and it must have been obvious to Stalin in 1949, that the local requirements of rapid industrialization were incompatible with regional economic integration and coordination of national trade. It may be true that the original purposes of COMECON were related to immediate needs, such as preventing Poland and Czechoslovakia from participating in the Marshall Plan or establishing a forum for the coordination of national economic plans. On balance, however, Stalin's establishment of COMECON seems to have been motivated by an awareness of the inadequacy of the integrative links in Eastern Europe and by a desire to initiate a framework for the future development of economic integration in the system.

In any case, COMECON remained inactive from 1950 until after Stalin's death, and its Charter was not signed until 1960. COMECON activity increased in 1954, as the Council met four times between 1954 and 1956 to discuss problems of coordination of national plans and economic specialization. The creation of nine Standing Commissions

in 1956[34] provided the first permanent framework for the discussion

of problems related to specific fields of activity. More importantly,

the Standing Commissions, which had grown in number to twenty-one

by 1962, established a base for the future expansion of COMECON

activities.

COMECON's institutional framework, like that of the WTO,

consists of organs with vaguely defined powers. The Standing

Commissions and the COMECON Council are empowered to make recommenda-

tions, but in no cases are their decisions binding on the member

states. As in the case of a Soviet administrative agency, COMECON's

structure is designed to conceal rather than to specify the nature

of the decision-making process. Perhaps in response to the growing

success of economic integration in Western Europe, the decision was

made in the early 1960s to upgrade the integrative activities of

COMECON.

The COMECON declaration on "Basic Principles of the

International Socialist Division of Labor," signed on June 7, 1962,

represented the first serious step toward economic integration in

Eastern Europe. The principal objectives of the new program,

improved coordination of national economic development and restructured

patterns of economic exchanges among members, were to be achieved

through the COMECON Executive Committee, which was created in 1962 to

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[34]The original Standing Commissions were concerned with oil and
gas, coal, electricity, ferrous metallurgy, chemicals, machine build-
ing, agriculture, foreign trade, and atomic research.

act as a genuine supranational body.[35] As was made clear in a subse-

quent article by Chairman Khrushchev, the ultimate goal of the pro-

gram was that of "building the socialist world economy into a single

entity."[36]

By July of 1963, however, Khrushchev had abandoned his

ambitious plan.[37] Opposition to the Basic Principles program was

directed toward two specific concerns. First, the contemplated

program for the division of labor would have meant, in effect, that

the less developed bloc members would be relegated to a status of

suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products. Such a

program was clearly incompatible with the domestic and ideological

requirement of rapid industrialization. Second, the planned creation

of a supranational agency, which doubtless would have been constituted

in such a way as to ensure Soviet predominance, was viewed as a

violation of the principle of national sovereignty so recently

articulated by Chairman Khrushchev. Arguing against the creation of

a "single planning body," the Rumanian Worker's Party issued a

statement declaring that "the planned management of the national

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[35]For an analysis of the origins of the Executive Committee, see Andrzej Korbonski, "The Evolution of COMECON," in International Political Communities: An Anthology, Anchor Books (Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 359-67.

[36]Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development of the Socialist World System," World Marxist Review 5 (September, 1962):9.

[37]For an analysis of the reasons for Khrushchev's decision, see Jamgotch, Soviet--East European Dialogue, pp. 79-88.

economy is one of the . . . inalienable attributes of the sovereignty
of the socialist state."[38] Similar reservations were expressed by
Hungary and Poland.

Despite the failure of the attempt to integrate "from the
top down," substantial success was achieved through more limited
bilateral and multilateral projects. The number of Standing
Commissions continued to increase through the 1960s, and a number
of bilateral treaties were signed to facilitate the gradual
coordination of national plans. Additionally, a number of joint
production plans, such as the "Friendship" pipeline and an integrated
power grid, were adopted. It was not until 1971, however, that
another attempt was made to promote large-scale integration.

The failure of the 1962 program revealed the existence of
a number of factors militating against successful economic inte-
gration. In the wake of the de-Stalinization campaign, leaders in
Eastern Europe had been forced to emphasize national considerations
in order to restore authority, and they were understandably reluctant
to submit to any supranational planning body. Even in an abstract
sense, economic integration among countries with centrally planned
economies presents a number of problems.[39] The difficulties of

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[38]"Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Worker's Party
Concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class
Movement, April 22, 1964," in International Relations Among Communists,
ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Publishing Co., 1967), p. 128.

[39]For a more complete analysis of the problems of integration
in the bloc, see Jozef M. P. van Brabant, Essays on Planning in
Eastern Europe (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), pp. 7-42.

introducing uncertain external market forces into a planned economy
could probably be surmounted only through the activities of a
supranational agency. Such an agency would be supported in Eastern
Europe only if it were so constituted as to ensure equal participa-
tion among members. While economic integration on equal terms
remains a possible development for the future, genuine integration
is not likely so long as Soviet and East European leaders continue
to differ as to its basic constitution.

The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split

The failure of the 1962 economic plan was only one manifes-
tation of the growing disunity in the alliance. Even before the
Sino-Soviet split had escalated to the point of open enmity, the
very success of the Chinese experiment represented a challenge to
Soviet domination in the Communist movement. The Chinese announce-
ment[40] in 1958 that China was on the threshold of Communism
strengthened the position of those who argued in favor of "many roads
to socialism." For the surviving "little Stalins" in Eastern
Europe, Maoism provided an attractive alternate source of legitimacy.

The impact of the Sino-Soviet split on Eastern Europe has
been largely indirect. Aside from the special case of Albania, only
in Bulgaria, which briefly attempted its own "Great Leap Forward,"
were Chinese domestic policies directly adopted. The indirect

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[40]"Concerning the Creation of the People's Communes in the
Village," Jen Min Jih Pao, September 10, 1958, as cited by
Brezezinski, The Soviet Bloc, p. 370.

impact of the split, however, has been profound. Not only did the manifestation of "polycentrism" further weaken ideological unity in the bloc, but the Soviet preoccupation with the Chinese challenge provided the East European leaders with increased latitude to pursue independent policies.

The East European country·most directly influenced by China was, of course, Albania. Guided primarily by fears of Yugoslav domination and concern for consolidation of power domestically, the Albanian leaders came to look to China as a source of external support. At the same time, Albania, which had never reversed its course of domestic Stalinism, came under increasing attack from the Soviet Union, particularly during the CPSU Twenty-second Congress. As early as 1960 Albanian leaders accused the Soviet Union of attempting to exclude Albania from the Warsaw Pact.[41] By 1961 the Soviet Ambassador had left Albania, and by 1962 Albania was de facto excluded from the alliance system.[42] In terms of the alliance as a whole, the impact of Albania's exclusion was minimal. On balance it would seem that Albania's participation in the system, never of vital importance, was by 1962 more a liability than an asset.

Of far greater significance to the system was the growing

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[41]BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Summary of Hoxha's Speech to the November, 1960, Moscow Conference of Communist Parties, as cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 49.

[42]Albania formally withdrew from WTO in 1968 and continues to be a nonparticipating member of COMECON.

independence of Rumania. Rumania's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union and its economic backwardness should have made it a "safe" ally from the Soviet point of view. Yet by maintaining firm domestic control and by adopting a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute, Rumania was able to exploit its own weakness to expand its room for maneuver within the alliance.

In April of 1958 a joint Sino-Rumanian statement called for the removal of "armed forces stationed on foreign territory."[43] While the subsequent Soviet decision to withdraw its troops from Rumania may not have been a direct consequence of the joint demands, it is likely that a major factor was the Soviet desire to minimize Chinese influence in Eastern Europe through a gesture of accommodation. In any case, Rumania continued to be the principal beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

By 1963 Khrushchev was firmly committed to isolating the People's Republic both organizationally and ideologically. The 1962 COMECON plan and the initiation of joint WTO military maneuvers in 1961 were both conceived with the Chinese problem in mind. Not surprisingly, the principal opposition to both endeavors came from the Chinese and the Rumanians. Throughout 1963 and 1964 Khrushchev attempted in vain to gather sufficient support in Eastern Europe to convene an international conference in which the Chinese would be denounced and the Soviet Union acclaimed the leader of the

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[43]"Sino-Rumanian Joint Statement," April 14, 1958, as cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 62.

international Communist movement. His failure, due in part to Rumania's assumption of the role of mediator in the Sino-Soviet dispute, was the final blow to his hopes for unity in the alliance.

By 1964, it was clear that Khrushchev's policies had escalated the Sino-Soviet dispute without improving the Soviet position in Eastern Europe. His position already weakened by a number of other setbacks, Khrushchev was replaced in October of 1964 by the collective leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin. The first order of business of the new Soviet leadership was to reverse the deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe. In light of the continuing divisions in COMECON, efforts toward improving economic relations were confined to fostering bilateral and multilateral cooperation. By the time of the Warsaw Pact's tenth anniversary, it was clear that the major efforts of the new leadership would be in the direction of expanded military integration.

Joint WTO military maneuvers had been held on a regular basis since 1961, and the practice of placing East European military leaders in command of certain exercises had been followed since 1962. Though the precise nature of the WTO integrated command structure is not known, it is certain that the Soviet Union plays the dominant role. The most explicit condemnation of Soviet influence in WTO was made in July of 1968 by a Czech Lieutenant General, who asserted that the joint command is formed by "marshals, generals, and officers of the Soviet army and that the other member armies

have only their representatives in this joint command."[44] Soviet

officers, holding the titles of Members of Joint Supreme Command of

the Warsaw Pact Forces, are known to play active roles in the national

armed forces of WTO members. While Soviet motives regarding the

integrated command are clear enough, the extent of Soviet influence

should not be exaggerated. Strong nationalist factions continue

to exist, particularly in the Polish and Rumanian armies; and

Bulgaria officially reported an attempted coup by a nationalist

faction within the Bulgarian army in 1965.[45]

In any case, Brezhnev's efforts toward "further perfecting

the Warsaw Treaty Organization"[46] met with some opposition in Eastern

Europe, particularly from Rumania. In 1966 Rumania repeated, in

a strongly anti-Soviet context, an earlier call for the liquidation

of all military blocs. The alliance was rapidly becoming polarized

over the issue of the Warsaw Pact and its relationship to the West.

Rumania's policies were viewed with increasing concern, especially

in East Germany, which continued to view the WTO as vital to its

political security.

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[44]"Report on Press Conference with Lieutenant General Vaclav
Prchlik, Head of the State Administrative Section of the
Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee," July 15, 1968, in
Winter in Prague: Documents on Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, ed.
Robin Alison Remington (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969),
p. 218.

[45]For an analysis of military integration in the bloc, see
Korbonski, "The Warsaw Pact," pp. 36-37.

[46]Brezhnev's Speech to the Soviet-Czechoslovak Friendship
Rally, Pravda, September 16, 1965, as cited by Remington, The
Warsaw Pact, p. 83.

During the same period, Rumania began to see cooperation with the West as a means of loosening the Soviet hold in Eastern Europe. Having led the drive for a pan-European conference on security and cooperation the previous year, Rumania exchanged recognition with West Germany in 1967. The establishment of Rumanian--West German diplomatic relations was seen as a direct threat, not only to the security of the northern states of the alliance, but to the Pact itself, established initially as a defensive measure against West German revanchism.

The disunity resulting from Rumanian policies was undoubtedly high on the agenda at the international Communist conference held in Karlovy Vary in 1967. Although a measure of unity was evident in the conference resolution, Rumania--having refused to attend the conference--was not among the signatories. There was little time left to restore unity in the alliance, however, for by 1967 attention was being turned to developments of more immediate concern in Czechoslovakia.

The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath

A major legacy of the Khrushchev years was a wave of domestic economic reform in Eastern Europe. Enunciated in the Soviet Union in 1962, the reforms were adopted with various results in Eastern Europe in the mid 1960s. The Soviet reforms, designed to modify the archaic Stalinist bureaucratic system, included the granting of partial autonomy to individual enterprises, the use of economic incentives to stimulate production, and the creation of a rotation

system among Party and state officials. The reforms were gradually
phased out in the Soviet Union, but not before they had an impact
in Eastern Europe.

The reforms, often termed the New Economic Mechanisms (NEM),
were adopted in most cases without serious problems. Hungary and
East Germany achieved substantial success with their NEM, though
East Germany gradually reversed some of the reforms for fear of
a possible liberalizing effect on East German society. In Rumania
and Bulgaria, the reforms were initiated with little enthusiasm
and later phased out. Initially repressed in Poland, reforms were
gradually implemented following the riots of 1968 and 1970.

The developments in Czechoslovakia, in many respects
reminiscent of Hungary's experience with the New Course, led to
a political crisis. The Czech leader, Antonin Novotny, responded
to the initial wave of reform in Eastern Europe by going on a
neo-Stalinist offensive. Novotny's repressive measures, aggravated
by a full-scale economic slump in 1962-1963, led to growing domestic
criticism among intellectuals and economists. Supported by an
increasingly vocal group of dissidents, economists denounced the
"cult of the plan" as a version of the discredited "cult of
personality."[47]

The economic reforms, finally adopted in 1966, were imple-
mented in an atmosphere of domestic chaos. As was the case in Hungary

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[47]For a summary of the program announced by Czechoslovak
Professor Ota Sik, see Remington, Winter in Prague: Documents on
Czechoslovak Communism in Crisis, pp. 32-36.

in 1956, the leadership became critically divided between those who demanded reform and those who were committed to the Novotny government. To the already serious situation was added the issue of Slovak nationalism. The Slovak Party, led by Alexander Dubcek, .vigorously supported reform of the centralized political system which had been dominated by Czechs.

In October of 1967, brutal police repression of student demonstrations served to unite the factions opposed to Novotny's rule. Unable to maintain support in the Central Committee and unable to secure Soviet endorsement of his position, Novotny was replaced by Dubcek as Party First Secretary. Though obviously committed to domestic reform, Dubcek never seemed fully in command of the situation. By the time of the hastily conceived Party Action Program, which would have guaranteed democratic elections in the Party and which would have dramatically liberalized domestic policies, events in Czechoslovakia were being viewed with great concern in Eastern Europe.

Clearly, any basic change in the nature of Party rule in Czechoslovakia had profound implications for the political security elsewhere in Eastern Europe. While the Dubcek government never attempted to pursue the kind of neutralist policy asserted by Hungary in 1956, its policies were viewed as a direct threat to the alliance. Though later justifications for intervention would include mention of Czech collaboration with West Germany, the central issue was the course of domestic and political reform in Czechoslovakia.

The first bloc attempt to contain the Czech crisis was the Dresden meeting in March, a meeting which Rumania characteristically refused to attend. In May, Warsaw Pact forces conducted joint exercises in Poland, near the Czech border. The next exercises, held in June on Czech territory and followed by a long delay in the withdrawal of WTO troops, were obviously intended as a warning to the Dubcek government. Heeding the warning, Czech leaders met with a Soviet delegation in Cierna and again in Bratislava during July and August. Less than three weeks after the apparent compromise at Bratislava, however, the Soviet Union and four Warsaw Pact allies--East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria--invaded Czechoslovakia.

The invasion was as disastrous politically as it was successful militarily. Not only did the Warsaw Pact forces fail to produce the loyal comrades they ostensibly had come to assist, but they failed to persuade Svoboda, who had replaced Novotny as President, to form a new government. Ultimately, the Soviet Union was forced to accept Dubcek's continued leadership until his final ouster the following April.

Throughout the conflict, Rumania had refused to participate in Warsaw Pact activities. Despite Rumania's exposed position, President Ceausescu vigorously denounced the Pact's interference in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. In order to erase any doubts about Rumania's determination, Ceausescu activated the People's Militia and announced his intention to respond with force to

any violation of the Rumanian border.[48] Rumania was far from alone

in its condemnation of the intervention. Aside from the countries

which actually participated in the intervention, virtually every

Communist party, whether in power or out, echoed the Rumanian

denunciation.

The official Soviet justification for the intervention was

an appeal by an unidentified group of members of the Czechoslovak

Communist Party Central Committee.[49] The subsequent theoretical

justification made it clear that the Soviet Union considered the

defense of socialism, as defined and interpreted by the Soviet

Union, to be its international right and duty. It is interesting

to note that this justification, which has become known as the

Brezhnev Doctrine, did not mention the Warsaw Pact or its role in

the invasion. Only through oblique reference to the threat of West

German revanchism was the Warsaw Treaty used as an explicit justifi-

cation for the action.

Despite the fact that the 1968 crisis eventually led to the

use of force, it should be noted that the alliance system was able

to demonstrate considerably more flexibility than it did in 1956.

Unlike the unilateral invasion of 1956, the Czechoslovak invasion

was conducted by five members of the WTO after extensive consultation.

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[48]Scinteia, August 21, 1968, as cited by Remington, The
Warsaw Pact, p. 107.

[49]"Appeal by Group of Members of CCP Central Committee and
CSR Government and National Assembly," Pravda, August 22, 1968, as
translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 20, September
11, 1968, pp. 3-5.

Had the Czechoslovak leadership heeded the warnings implicit in the May and June maneuvers, it is even conceivable that the use of force could have been averted. The fact that the crisis did result in the use of force, however, was an indication of a need for a comprehensive integrationist program. Such a program was to be an essential part of Soviet policies toward Eastern Europe after 1968.

CHAPTER II

AN INTERIM ASSESSMENT

The events of 1968 bore witness to the failure of East

European integration as conceived by Nikita Khrushchev a decade

earlier. Although the joint participation of the Warsaw Pact allies

bestowed a degree of legitimacy to the intervention, the fact that

coercion became necessary betrayed the insufficiency of the inte-

grative mechanisms in the system. Two major lessons emerged from

the experience: that the failure to construct a viable framework

for consultation and coordination had allowed events in

Czechoslovakia to exceed acceptable limits, and that the failure

to achieve basic economic integration had denied the Soviet Union

and its allies the possibility of bringing economic sanctions to

bear on its wayward ally.

Clearly, the alliance system of 1968 was a considerably

more flexible and sophisticated one than that which had existed

under Stalin. An institutional framework had been constructed on

the basis of state sovereignty, and, within certain vaguely defined

limits, pluralistic tendencies within the alliance had been tolerated

and even accommodated. The far-reaching 1962 COMECON integration

program had failed, but substantial success had been achieved through

bilateral and multilateral cooperative ventures. Finally, military

integration through the WTO served as the basis for growing

institutionalization of Soviet military control in the bloc.

By the mid 1960s, the evidence of change in the Soviet bloc had convinced many Western observers that the pattern of direct Soviet influence had been replaced by a new, more equitable form of relations. Writing in 1966, for example, one analyst concluded:

> A reversion to the charismatic/terroristic policy of Stalin or the military interventionism of 1956 is out of the question. . . The essence of Soviet relations with East Europe is now negotiation--a process of multilateral and bilateral dealings with leaderships which, although certainly not equal to the Soviets in power and prestige, are sufficiently autonomous to preclude any form of direct Soviet dictation.[50]

As the events of 1968 demonstrated, however, the Soviet leaders did return to the pattern of direct dictation, and they did so with the willing support of most of their Warsaw Pact allies.

Thus, for Western analysts, the intervention of 1968 seemed to bear out the old dictum, "The more things change, the more they stay the same." While many analysts correctly identified the forces at work in the Soviet bloc, the conclusions they reached were often based on false assumptions about the process of integration in the Soviet bloc.

Integration Theories Reconsidered

Perhaps the most widely accepted view among Western observers during the 1960s was that the forces at work in Eastern Europe were leading inevitably to the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. Writing in 1965, for example, Herbert Dinerstein argued,

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[50]Stephen S. Anderson, "Soviet Relations with East Europe," Current History, October 1966, p. 205.

> . . . it is hard to imagine Eastern Europe as anything but
> much altered ten years from now and Western Europe as remaining
> essentially the same. Paradoxically, it seems that the cohesion
> of the Communist alliance system, once pressed into a rigid mold,
> will suffer much greater disintegration than the always loose
> noncommunist system.[51]

In 1975, ten years after that article appeared, it is difficult to

argue that the Soviet bloc has suffered "much greater disintegration"

than the noncommunist system.

While analyses predicting the dissolution of the Soviet bloc

might have appeared vindicated by the events in Czechoslovakia,

such predictions simply have not been borne out in the years which

have followed. Not only were the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact

allies able to restore stability in Czechoslovakia through an imposed

leadership, but in the past few years they have demonstrated

substantial cohesion and have embarked on a new drive for integration.

Thus while analyses of "polycentrism" may have accurately assessed

the existence of disruptive elements in the bloc, they failed to

account for the ability of the system to contain disruptions and to

build a new form of stability.

To be sure, many analysts found that the events of 1968

confirmed their convictions about the nature of Soviet intentions

and the persistence of bloc power relationships. However, there is

a danger of erring in the opposite direction as well, for the

similarity of Soviet actions in 1956 and 1968 should not obscure

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[51]Herbert Dinerstein, "The Transformation of Alliance Systems,"
American Political Science Review 59 (September 1965):601.

fundamental changes in the alliance.

Misapprehensions before 1968 concerning Soviet willingness
to resort to coercion were perhaps defensible, for all the evidence
suggests that the decision to invade was made with great reluctance
on the part of the Soviet leadership. Those analysts who, in the
mid 1960s, predicted the imminent disintegration of the Soviet bloc,
however, made a more fundamental error, an error which was often due
to reliance on false assumptions concerning the nature of integration
in Eastern Europe. Specifically, faulty conclusions regarding
East European integration may be seen in terms of three fallacies
of integration theories: the teleological fallacy, the fallacy of
static analysis, and the fallacy of applying assumptions derived
from the Western experience.

The teleological fallacy is inherent in many of the defini-
tions of integration. Haas, Etzioni, Deutsch, and others have all
defined integration in terms of some posited future condition,
usually political unification, "political community," or a "socialist
commonwealth of nations."[52] Thus many analysts have assessed East
European integration only to the extent to which interaction among
the states of Eastern Europe is progressing toward or receding from

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[52]See, for example, Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), p. 29;
Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1965), p. 329; Karl W. Deutsch and others,
Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5; and Leon N.
Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic
Integration (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963),
p. 6.

the posited end state. The point to be made is not that there is anything inherently wrong with the definitions, but that analyses based on such definitions have been inadequate for the assessment of the interaction within the Soviet bloc.

There is, for example, a tendency among Western observers to view economic integration in the Soviet bloc in terms of efforts to create a supranational agency of the kind known in the Common Market. Developments of the past few years in the Soviet bloc have shown, however, that substantial integrative links, especially in terms of import-dependence, have been achieved without the implementation of a supranational planning body.

The second source of error is that of static analysis: many observers have assessed integration in the alliance in terms of previous goals, objectives, and functions which may no longer be relevant. The problem of static analysis is at once the most common source of wrong thinking about the Soviet bloc and the one most difficult to avoid. If integration is broadly defined in terms of alliance function, whether officially acknowledged or not, the problem will always remain of redefining what is meant by integration. While such a process sacrifices precision and rigor, it seems to be an inescapable facet of any valid analysis of the Soviet bloc.

The problem of static analysis is at the root of faulty conclusions derived from the hypothesis which holds that as inter-system conflict decreases, intrasystem cohesion decreases. Applying the hypothesis to European alliances, several analysts have concluded

that the reduction of interbloc tension in Europe has contributed to the disintegration of both blocs.[53] As regards the Soviet bloc, such conclusions rest on the assumption that the military threat from the West, which may well have been a motive for the initial formation of the alliance, continues to be a major factor in alliance cohesion.

The basic foundation for this hypothesis is found in the work of Simmel concerning group behavior. The essence of Simmel's proposition is that <u>so long as the basic values of a group remain intact</u>, as out-group pressure decreases, in-group cohesion decreases.[54] Accepting for the sake of argument the validity of Simmel's proposition, the question becomes, have the basic values of the Soviet bloc remained intact? (Clearly, "basic values" refers not to Communist ideology, but to "alliance ideology," or the goals, objectives, and functions of the alliance.) It seems clear that "out-group pressure," defined in terms of military threat, has indeed diminished during the past decade, but it seems equally clear that the presence or absence of external military threat has diminished as a source of cohesion in the Soviet bloc.

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[53]See, for example, P. Terrence Hopmann, "The Effects of International Conflict and Détente on Cohesion in the Communist System," in <u>The Behavioral Revolution and Communist Studies</u>, ed. Roger E. Kanet (New York: Free Press, 1971), pp. 301-38; and Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, and John D. Sullivan, <u>Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances: Comparative Studies</u> (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973), pp. 88-148.

[54]Georg Simmel, <u>Conflict</u> (New York: Free Press, 1955), pp. 92-93. [Emphasis added.]

There are, it seems, two possible conclusions to be made from the previous discussion. First, it might be argued that external conflict, defined in terms of military threat, does not necessarily have a profound effect on alliance cohesion. Second, the hypothesis might prove to be valid--on the condition that "external threat" is redefined to include external economic and ideological threats. Both conclusions appear to have been supported by recent developments in the Soviet bloc, for with the decrease in military threat from the West have come new forms of economic and ideological dangers which have required a new emphasis on alliance cohesion.

The third source of error in studies of Communist systems results from excessive reliance on assumptions derived from the Western experience. At the domestic level, such fallacies are revealed in the many "convergence" theories.[55] Simply stated, convergence theorists have argued that similarities between socialist and Western societies, in terms of industrialization and urbanization, for example, will lead ultimately to similarities in the nature of political control. While such analyses may illustrate the nature of problems faced by the Soviet and East European leaders, predictions of convergence simply have not been borne out. In fairness, it should be noted that most convergence theorists are well aware of the limitations of their analyses. What is intended here is simply to

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[55]For a discussion of the weaknesses of theories of convergence, see Alfred G. Meyer, "Theories of Convergence," in Change in Communist Systems, ed. Chalmers Johnson (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 313-41.

reiterate their own reservations concerning the applicability of the Western experience to that of the socialist countries.

The Western experience in alliance behavior has produced similar misapprehensions concerning the nature of the alliance system in Eastern Europe. Western preoccupation with parliaments, political participation, and political development, for example, have led to certain expectations and predictions which have not been realized with regard to the Soviet bloc. When compared to the Western system of alliances in terms of structural sophistication and the existence of joint decision-making, the East European alliance is surely less well developed. Yet the alliance has, despite its structural deficiencies, served well its intended functions, which include the formalization of Soviet control in the bloc, the development of bloc economies, and the guarantee of a measure of political security for the regimes in power.

Excessive reliance on Western standards has led observers to two general conclusions. First, many have concluded that the Soviet bloc is not integrated or that it is in a process of disintegration. The second extreme conclusion, adopted when behavior has not conformed to expectations, is that the Soviet bloc is not a "true alliance."[56] The first conclusion is either incorrect or irrelevant: incorrect if it refers to the pattern of interaction in Eastern Europe, and irrelevant if it refers to integration as it

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[56]Malcolm Mackintosh, "The Evolution of the Warsaw Pact," Adelphi Papers, no. 58 (London, England: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1969), p. 18.

has been understood in other settings. The second conclusion simply
begs the question.

The preceding discussion has attempted to show some of the
sources of error in integration theories applied to the Soviet bloc.
If there is a danger of reaching false conclusions regarding the
nature of change in the alliance, however, there is also a danger
of concluding that there has been no change at all. According to
such a view, it might well be concluded that the invasion of
Czechoslovakia simply confirmed the permanence of Soviet motives and
the immutability of the Soviet bloc power relationship. The
totalitarian literature of the 1950s and the assessments of the
monolithic quality of the Soviet bloc, for example, implicitly
precluded the analysis of change. The very terms "totalitarian"
and "monolithic" made it difficult to acknowledge, much less
analyze, change in the alliance.

In summary, to be understood at all, the Soviet bloc must
be understood in terms of its own distinctive functions, structures,
and relationships. This is not to say that methods of analysis
which have been applied in other settings must necessarily be
inappropriate, nor is it to say that integration must be so narrowly
defined as to apply only to the situation in Eastern Europe. The
point to be made is that any valid approach must be free of those
assumptions derived from other analyses which are not relevant to
the nature of interaction among the states of the East European
alliance system.

The starting point for analysis of alliance transformation

must be a definition of integration in terms of the functions it is

to serve and the structures and relations which have been established

to perform those functions. From that perspective, it is necessary

to identify the patterns of change and the patterns of continuity

in the alliance, to examine the relationships among them, and to

indicate the prospects for alliance change in the near future.

Patterns of Change, Patterns of Continuity

As Morton Kaplan has proposed, integrative processes are

> processes which join systems or organizations with separate
> institutions and goals within a common framework providing for
> the common pursuit of at least some goals and the common
> implementation of at least some policies.[57]

Integration, in this sense, is not a unidirectional process: it

varies with the goals being pursued at a given time.

In order to assess the nature of integration, it is first

necessary to break down the process into those components which

perform integrative functions. As part of a conceptual framework

for the study of the integrative process, Philip E. Jacob has

suggested ten "integrative factors": geographic proximity,

homogeneity, level of transactions, mutual knowledge, functional

interest, communal character, structural frame, sovereignty-dependency

status, governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative

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[57]Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 98.

experience.[58] By establishing the relationships among the factors which exert an integrative influence, Jacob argues, it is possible to assess the progress achieved toward integration.

More important for an analysis of the evolution of the Soviet bloc, however, is the assessment of the nature of change in each of the factors and possible impact of change in one factor on changes in other factors. While all of the factors have the potential for change, not all of the factors have in fact constituted elements of change in the bloc. By assessing the patterns of change and the patterns of continuity, however, it is possible to indicate the nature of alliance transformation.

The treatment of the ten "integrative factors" will be primarily directed toward the assessment of change in the alliance from 1956 to 1968. Since 1968, it will be argued, the patterns of change and of continuity had been woven into a new pattern of relationships within the Soviet bloc.

Of Jacob's ten integrative factors, three--mutual knowledge, governmental effectiveness, and previous integrative experience--seem to be of marginal use in the study of the Soviet bloc. While mutual knowledge among the alliance leaders has probably increased, particularly in relation to the turbulent years of 1953 to 1956, it would be difficult to argue that any change has had a profound

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[58]Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune, "The Integrative Process," in The Integration of Political Communities, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 1-45.

impact on the alliance. The other two--governmental effectiveness
and previous integrative experience--may be treated together.
Governmental effectiveness refers to the degree to which the
alliance has met the needs and demands of its members, while
previous integrative experience refers to the extent to which
earlier cooperation may contribute to further integration. In both
cases, the impact has been largely indirect: the evolution of a
pattern of interaction in the Soviet bloc has led to the emergence
of leaders more or less committed to the existing bloc arrangement.
In this sense, then, all three of the factors cited constitute
elements of continuity in the alliance.

The factors of proximity and homogeneity are two additional
elements of continuity. In terms of geographic proximity, the only
change in the alliance from 1956 to 1968 was the departure of
Albania from the system. It need hardly be said that the fact that
alliance members are contiguous constitutes an important integrative
factor in the system, particularly in light of the geopolitical
situation in Europe.

Despite the evidence of "polycentrism" and "domesticism,"
homogeneity remains the most important integrative factor in the
alliance. As Leonid Brezhnev has repeatedly observed,

> There is every objective condition for the cooperation
> between Socialist countries to grow increasingly stronger.
> Our peoples are united by a community of fundamental
> interests. (1) We have an economic foundation of the same
> type--the social ownership of the means of production. (2) We
> have similar state systems--the power of the people, headed by
> the working class. (3) We have a single ideology--Marxism-
> Leninism. (4) We have common interests in insuring security,
> in safeguarding the peace and security of the peoples, and in

. defending the revolutionary gains from the encroachments of the imperialists. [5] We have a single great aim--communism.[59]

Of course, the existence of similar economic, political, and social systems is not sufficient to promote integration: it is the combination--of basic homogeneity, shared interests, and the existence of a core power committed to the maintenance of its sphere of influence--which contributes to the persistence of existing bloc relations.

Patterns of change in the alliance may be seen in terms of the other five integrative factors: sovereignty-dependency status, structural frame, functional interest, transactions, and communal character. These five correspond closely to the components Samuel Huntington has suggested for the analysis of change in a political system: groups, structure, leadership, policies, and culture.[60] Jacob's sovereignty-dependency factor corresponds to Huntington's groups; structural frame corresponds to structure; transactions, to policies; and communal character, to culture.

Not included in Jacob's analysis, however, is the leadership component. Clearly, the political leadership in Eastern Europe is in a position to influence the direction of change in the alliance. On balance, however, the kind of leadership which might have been

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[59]Speech in Moscow at the celebration of the 47th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, New York Times, November 7, 1964, p. 8.

[60]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, and Politics," Comparative Politics 3 (April 1971): 316-17.

expected to follow the wave of nationalism in Eastern Europe has not emerged. Constrained both by the need to maintain firm party control and by Soviet determination to have loyal comrades in positions of leadership throughout the bloc, East European leaders simply have not exercised the kind of control envisioned in the totalitarian models. Moreover, the kind of influence they have been able to exercise has generally served as an element of continuity in the alliance. The exceptions--Nagy and Dubcek, whose regimes were quickly terminated, and Ceausescu--merely prove the general validity of the rule.

The sovereignty-dependency factor taps two dimensions: the sovereignty of the alliance as a whole and the sovereignty status of its component members. In this latter sense, the extent of Soviet domination can hardly be exaggerated: Soviet Gross National Product (GNP) is more than twice that of the other alliance members combined, and the Soviet Union continues to play the only significant role in bloc military affairs. In terms of national control over the instruments of force--a basic criterion of national sovereignty-- Soviet influence persists. As Walter Ulbricht has said, "Firm friendship with the Soviet Union is the law of life for our people and state."[61] At the very least, the power relationships in the alliance dictate the limits beyond which any restructuring of the alliance may not go.

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[61]_Neues Deutschland_, October 23, 1968, as cited by Peter Bender, _East Europe in Search of Security_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1972), p. 31.

Nevertheless, important changes have taken place, changes which have had an impact on the structure of alliance relationships. By 1968 Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were, by virtue of their respective GNPs, significant powers in their own rights; and East Germany's GNP per capita exceeds that of the Soviet Union. While the dramatic increase in industrial production in Eastern Europe has not resulted directly in increased autonomy, it has been reflected indirectly in terms of expanded influence in bloc affairs, particularly in bloc trade relations. Moreover, the Soviet need for East European finished goods and the signing of long-term trade agreements have transformed the previous exploitative arrangement into a more interdependent one.

Beyond these objective factors were a number of subjective changes reflecting a new sovereignty status in Eastern Europe. The de-Stalinization campaign, coupled with growing domestic demands following the initial revolutionary fervor, resulted in demands for increased autonomy and the acknowledgment of the legitimacy of "separate roads to socialism." In the wake of the crises in Hungary and Poland in 1956, Khrushchev sought--for the sake of regime viability and alliance cohesion--to restructure the alliance on the basis of national sovereignty. Even when the propaganda motives of the Khrushchev campaign are considered, it is clear that the alliance after 1956 was based on a new form of relationships.

The first impact of the change in sovereignty-dependency status, then, was reflected in the creation of a new structural frame for the alliance. Though Khrushchev's apparent objective--

the creation of a supranational agency dominated by the Soviet Union—was never realized, the alliance framework he created served to alter the nature of bloc relationships and expand the scope of alliance activities. Paradoxically, the same forces which prompted attempts toward the creation of a supranational agency eventually served to subvert them: that is, the forces of national self-awareness and assertiveness, which were to be checked by WTO and COMECON, proved sufficiently strong to prevent the creation of a supranational agency. To repeat a previously cited quotation, the Rumanian Worker's Party responded to the 1962 COMECON integration plan by declaring that "the planned management of the national economy is one of the . . . inalienable attributes of the sovereignty of the socialist state."[62]

For any understanding of the interaction among the states of Eastern Europe, the "structural framework" of the alliance should be conceived in the broadest sense to include, in addition to WTO and COMECON, the network of bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements, joint production and planning ventures, and the system of meetings and conferences among top party and government leaders. By 1968 the states of Eastern Europe were linked through the Warsaw Pact, COMECON (with its twenty-three permanent commissions), and six

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[62]"Statement on the Stand of the Rumanian Worker's Party concerning the Problems of the World Communist and Working Class Movement, April 22, 1964," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 128.

other major international organizations.[63] Additionally, a series

of nine bilateral treaties signed in the mid 1960s.served to supple-

ment the Warsaw Pact and to replace the expired treaties of the

1940s. Thus by 1968 the alliance had progressed from the Stalinist

system, characterized by a few formal treaties and a pattern of

direct Soviet influence, to a system in which the East European

industries were linked through joint production arrangements and

in which the national military forces were almost totally committed

to the Warsaw Pact unified command.

Within the new alliance framework, the expanded scope of

bloc activities was reflected in the increase in intrasystem

transactions. Some analysts have assessed integration in terms of

transaction flows, using such indicators as trade data, communication

flows, and levels of governmental contacts.[64] As Haas has observed,

however, an increase in transaction levels may either precede, cause,

reinforce, or result from integration.[65] For the purpose of analysis,

transactions may be seen as a product of integration, though the

nature of the transactions may stimulate further integration. The

signing of a trade agreement, for example, may provide for long-term

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[63]*Europa Year Book, 1974* (London, England: Europa Publications, 1974), pp. 102-332.

[64]See, for example, Karl W. Deutsch, "Transaction Flows as Indicators of Political Cohesion," in *The Integration of Political Communities*, ed. Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 188-89.

[65]Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," *International Organization* 12 (Autumn 1958):445.

cooperation, and satisfactory cooperative ventures may have a

"spillover" effect: that is, they may contribute to cooperation in

other areas of activity.[66]

One area of increased interaction among alliance members was

in the expansion of Warsaw Pact activities from 1956 to 1968. As

shown in Table 1, the frequency of Warsaw Pact meetings began to

increase in 1961, the same year that joint military maneuvers began

to be held on a regular basis. Additionally, the level of represen-

tation increased dramatically: where in 1956 the Political

Consultative Committee (PCC) delegations were headed by the chief

or deputy chief of Government of the member states, in 1960 the

delegations were led by the first secretaries of the Communist

parties, and by 1966 some delegations included (in addition to the

first secretary) other members of the Politburo, members of the

chiefs-of-staff, and the ambassador to the Soviet Union.[67]

In trade relations, too, the alliance system showed a steady,

if unspectacular, increase in activity. As illustrated in Table 2,

the total amount of trade within the system increased three-fold, and

the percentage of total trade accounted for by intrasystem trade

remained stable. While the level of transactions reflected in the

trade data increased substantially, the most profound change was in

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[66]Haas' concept of "spillover" is similar to the doctrine
of "ramification" developed by David Mitrany in "The Functional
Approach to World Organization," International Affairs 24 (July
1948):350-63.

[67]Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 165-98.

TABLE 1

WARSAW PACT ACTIVITY, 1956 TO 1968

Year	Number of Warsaw Treaty Organization meetings	Number of joint maneuvers
1956	1	. . .
1957	. . .	. . .
1958	1	. . .
1959	1	. . .
1960	1	. . .
1961	3	3
1962	2	5
1963	3	2
1964	. . .	2
1965	5	3
1966	4	2
1967	1	5
1968	7	2

SOURCES:

The Europa Year Book, 1974.
London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1974.
Pp. 410-11.

Korbonski, Andrzej. "The Warsaw
Pact." International Conciliation, no. 573
(May 1969).   Pp. 20-21.

Remington, Robin Alison.   The
Warsaw Pact.   Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT
Press, 1971.   Pp. xvii-xix.

TABLE 2

COMECON TRADE DATA, 1956 TO 1968
(Values in Millions of U.S. Dollars)

Year	Total trade Exports	Imports	Trade within COMECON	Percent-age of total exports (%)
1956	8 440	7 800	4 830	57
1957	9 600	9 380	5 940	62
1958	10 110	9 740	6 060	60
1959	11 990	11 690	7 390	62
1960	12 970	12 920	8 080	62
1961	14 120	13 820	8 970	64
1962	15 770	15 280	10 170	64
1963	17 000	16 380	11 030	65
1964	18 400	18 100	11 960	65
1965	19 710	18 990	12 460	63
1966	20 910	19 670	15 540	60
1967	22 820	21 100	13 740	60
1968	24 900	13 000	15 240	61

SOURCES:

Statistical Yearbook, 1966. New York: United
Nations, 1967. Table B.

Statistical Yearbook, 1973. New York: United
Nations, 1974. Table B.

the nature of the transactions. The increase in coordination, specialization, and interdependence is suggested by the expansion of COMECON Standing Commissions and agencies. As indicated in Table 3, by 1962 twenty-one Standing Commissions had been created to deal with problems of coordination in virtually all areas of economic activity. Thus by the end of 1962, of 2,500 kinds of industrial equipment produced in East Europe, only 300 were produced in more than one country.[68]

As the previous discussion has suggested, the most important manifestation of the increased activity through COMECON has been not in the level of transactions, but in the qualitatively different nature of cooperation. Functional interest, the next of Jacob's integrative factors, has not only increased but has become more specialized. As the states of Eastern Europe gained power, and as they began to face new domestic problems, they came to expect from the existing structural framework more specific benefits. Where the previous motives for economic cooperation were ostensibly based on ideological concerns (often expressed in the desire for a simultaneous leap into socialism), by the mid 1960s economic cooperation was based on more explicit economic motivations seen in terms of national interest.

A major factor promoting functional cooperation through COMECON has been the need for a cooperative arrangement providing

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[68]S. Jendrychowski, "The Economic Effects of the International Socialist Division of Labor," World Marxist Review 6 (March 1963):4.

TABLE 3

COMECON COMMISSIONS AND AFFILIATED
AGENCIES, 1956 TO 1968

Field of activity	Year of creation
Standing commissions (23)	
Coal	1956
Electricity	1956
Oil and gas	1956
Ferrous metallurgy	1956
Nonferrous metallurgy	1956
Chemicals	1956
Machine building	1956
Agriculture	1956
Atomic research	1956
General economic questions	1958
Transportation	1958
Building and construction	1958
Light industry	1958
Atomic energy	1960
Statistics	1962
Coordination of research	1962
Standardization	1962

TABLE 3--Continued

Field of activity	Year of creation
Finance and foreign exchange	1962
Electronics	1962
Geology	1962
Food industry	1962
Water administration	1965
Labor	1968

Agencies (associated committees--7)

	Year of creation
Post, telegraph and telephone (communications)	1957
Druzba pipeline (gas and oil)	1962
Mir powerline (electricity)	1962
Intermetall (ferrous metallurgy)	1964
Ball bearings (machine building)	1964
International bank (finance)	1964
Shipping and freight (transportation)	1965

SOURCES:

The Europa Year Book, 1974. London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1974.   Pp. 186-87.

Brabant, Josef M. P. van. Essays on Planning in Eastern Europe. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974. Pp. 8-16.

Korbonski, Andrzej. "The Evolution of COMECON." In International Political Communities: An Anthology. Edited by Anchor Books. Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1966. Pp. 367-88.

protection from the economic giants of Western Europe. Moreover,

it has come to be recognized in Eastern Europe that in order to

reach a stage of economic viability, economic cooperation must be

conducted, not on the basis envisioned in the 1962 COMECON Basic

Principles plan, but on the basis of state equality and functional

specialization.

In the Warsaw Treaty Organization as well, substantial,

if less easily discernible, changes in functional interest took

place. To be sure, two important functions of the organization

have persisted: namely, its function as an extension of the Soviet

defense command and its function as an instrument of Soviet influence

in Eastern Europe. With the gradual reduction of the military

threat from the West during the 1960s, however, the WTO began to

serve a less purely military function. As has been seen, the

nature of the threat from the West is no longer seen in purely

military terms, but in terms of the threat to political security

posed by the expansion of East-West contacts.

The expansion of WTO's political functions has been seen in

the increased emphasis on the Political Consultative Committee. Not

only has the nature of representation at the PCC demonstrated its

new importance, but the Committee has dealt with problems of an

increasingly political nature. As several analysts have concluded,

during the 1960s the functions of the Warsaw Pact came to include the

recognition and accommodation of divergent interests, and the

organization began to be used as an agency for conflict resolution

in the alliance.[69]

In summary, the change in sovereignty-dependency status of the states of Eastern Europe necessitated the creation of a more flexible and sophisticated alliance structure, and emerging demands in Eastern Europe led to new forms of transactions and new functional interests. Moreover, the patterns of change in the alliance have led to the evolution of a new communal character, Jacob's final integrative factor.

In 1956 the East European alliance system was characterized by a communal character, or alliance ideology, which included a number of ambitious, often utopian, goals. In the broadest sense, the alliance reflected a commitment to the establishment of Marxism-Leninism on an international scale. In terms of military security, it was committed to the defense of socialism against the forces of Western imperialism. Economic coordination, seen primarily in ideological terms, was aimed at preparing the states of East Europe for the simultaneous leap into socialism with the eventual aim of building "the socialist world economy into a single entity."[70]

During the following decade, however, a number of external and internal developments had served to alter the character of the alliance. The problems which followed the revolutionary social

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[69]See, for example, Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 456-512; and Remington, The Warsaw Pact, pp. 165-98.

[70]Nikita S. Khrushchev, "Vital Questions of the Development of the Socialist World System," World Marxist Review 5 (September 1962):9.

upheavals in Eastern Europe, heightened by the denunciation of Stalin, diminished the importance of ideology as a cohesive element in the alliance. Additionally, the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on existing polycentric tendencies in Eastern Europe tended to subvert the grandiose aims of the alliance as it was originally conceived. Finally, the rapid decline in East-West hostilities served to erode the original basis of the military arm of the alliance.

As previous threats subsided, however, new ones emerged. The expansion of East-West trade and the increase in human contacts presented a potential threat to the regime security of the states of Eastern Europe, and economic problems in the face of growing consumer demands presented a threat to economic viability and political security. New problems created new motives for integration-- integration based, however, on a new communal character.

Thus by 1968 considerations of military security had given way to concern for regime security as a cementing element in the alliance, and ideological aspirations had been, for all intents and purposes, set aside. The grandiose objectives of economic coordination had been abandoned in favor of limited functional cooperation and specialization based on economic motives and national priorities. Moreover, the very essence of interstate relations had been altered to accommodate divergent views and interests. Thus by 1969, an official document from the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties could assert,

> All parties have equal rights. At this time when there
> is no leading center of the international communist movement,
> voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order

effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased importance.[71]

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[71]"Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," _Pravda_, June 18, 1969, as translated in _The Current Digest of the Soviet Press_ 21 (August 1969):24.

CHAPTER III

"SOCIALIST INTERNATIONALISM" IN THE 1970S

The elements of change and of continuity which evolved during

the 1960s had by the end of that decade been woven into a distinctively

new pattern of interstate relations in Eastern Europe. In theoretical

literature, the new pattern has been linked to "socialist inter-

nationalism" and "international relations of a new type," terms

which date from the early years of the Khrushchev era.[72] Since

1970, however, the terms have received increased attention, and the

new form of interstate relations has been the subject of considerable

ideological interpretation and justification.[73] The following excerpt

from an article in the Moscow journal International Affairs is

representative of a consistent theme in the Soviet press.

> Proletarian internationalism constitutes a basic principle
> of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism and of the policies of the
> communist parties. . . . In the course of creating and

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[72]See, for example, G. I. Tunkin, "Socialist Internationalism
and International Law," New Times [Moscow], October/December, 1957,
p. 10.

[73]For a development of the terms in relation to Marxist-
Leninist doctrine, see Jan F. Triska, "The Socialist World System
in Search of a Theory," in The New Communisms, ed. Dan N. Jacobs
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1969), pp. 18-46; Nish
Jamgotch, Jr., "Alliance Management in Eastern Europe (The New Type
of International Relations)," World Politics 27 (April, 1975):405-29;
and Nish Jamgotch, Jr., Soviet--East European Dialogue:
International Relations of a New Type? (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 89-104.

consolidating the multinational Soviet state, building socialism and communism in the USSR and in the process of socialist construction in the fraternal countries, for the first time it became the foundation for the development of inter-state relations of a new, socialist type. Under socialism, the social base of proletarian internationalism has immeasurably been extended, and now has become the state policy of socialist countries. . . . Thus, socialist internationalism has become the chief principle of relations among the fraternal countries.[74]

Like proletarian internationalism, of course, socialist internationalism is held to be a transitional stage toward the achievement of Communism on an international scale, justified as being "the most acceptable and objectively inevitable form of combining national and international interests, of materially preparing for their fusion in [the] future."[75] During this transitional stage, it is argued,

despite the coincidence of basic interests, different approaches to some questions are not ruled out. . . . Under socialism, however, unlike the basic contradictions inherent in capitalist society, they are not antagonistic.[76]

Like Khrushchev's 1956 reference to the "commonwealth of socialist nations" based on "full equality" and sovereignty,[77] socialist internationalism represents a distinct departure from the

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[74]B. Kozin, "Socialist Countries: Unity and Cohesion," International Affairs [Moscow], March 1974, p. 5. [Emphasis added.]

[75]B. Ladygin, "Socialist Internationalism: Fraternity and Cooperation," International Affairs [Moscow], June 1973, p. 10.

[76]Kozin, "Socialist Countries: Unity and Cohesion," p. 7.

[77]"Declaration by the Soviet Government on 'Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and Other Socialist States,' October 30, 1956," in International Relations Among Communists, ed. Robert H. McNeal (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Publishing Co., 1967), p. 92.

past. Not only does it represent a further acknowledgment that the "fraternal countries" may justifiably exercise independence in inter-state relations, but it suggests that the transitional stage may be prolonged and will be characterized by "nonantagonistic" contra-dictions. When taken in context, moreover, references to socialist internationalism clearly imply a limiting of the term to apply to the East European "core" of the socialist system.[78]

The rhetoric of socialist internationalism should not, of course, obscure the reality of current alliance relations. If by "commonwealth of socialist nations" is meant an association of free and equal states, it is clear that no such arrangement exists. Nevertheless, fundamental changes have taken place within the alliance. If the Soviet bloc is conceived in terms of a continuum running from Stalinist cohesion to a socialist commonwealth, for example, it is clear that the alliance has moved a long way from the completely Soviet-controlled system of the early 1950s.

In practical terms, the new form of interstate relations has been manifested in both internal and external policy. Internally, alliance relations have become increasingly charaterized by unity through accommodation of pluralistic tendencies, moderated of course by Soviet predominance. Specifically, the alliance has been character-ized by increased efforts toward functional economic cooperation, by an expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization,

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[78]For an assessment of Eastern Europe as the "core" of the socialist system, see Jamgotch, Soviet--East European Dialogue: International Relations of a New Type?, pp. 29-33.

and by a campaign to restore ideological unity. Externally, socialist internationalism has been reflected in new forms of relations with the West, conducted through intensified coordination of bloc foreign policies.

There have been instructive parallels between domestic Soviet policy and the emerging form of alliance relations. In 1971 the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party announced a "peace program" abroad and an "ideological war" domestically, reflecting a desire to derive specific benefits through cooperation with the West while maintaining firm domestic control.[79] Similarly, the new form of alliance relations has been characterized by growing cooperation with the West and by increased concern for tight alliance management.

The linkage between external developments and internal alliance relations has been the fundamental feature of socialist internationalism. While the reduction of East-West tension and the expansion of trade relations between East and West during the 1960s presented the states of Eastern Europe with the opportunity for importing much-needed technological assistance, the new form of relations with the West threatened to introduce disruptive tendencies into the alliance.

With the failure of the 1962 Basic Principles plan for COMECON

[79]Report to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress, Pravda, March 31, 1971, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 23, April 12, 1971, pp. 3-13; May 4, 1971, pp. 1-12.

integration, Eastern Europe began to turn increasingly to Western

markets. While trade among COMECON members doubled from 1962 to 1972,

trade with Western Europe during the same period quadrupled, and

trade with the United States and Japan increased eight-fold.[80] While

the total volume of trade with the West amounted to less than one-

third of COMECON trade even by 1972, the bilateral nature of the

exchanges and the rapid expansion of trade relations threatened to

upset the nature of COMECON trade and, ultimately, of East European

integration. Thus by the late 1960s the need became apparent for a

coordinated approach to the West on the one hand and a new basis for

East European integration on the other.

By 1966 the East European alliance had already formulated,

in general terms, a plan for a European conference on security and

cooperation. Following a meeting in Bucharest in 1966, the WTO

Political Consultative Committee issued a proposal for the recognition

of existing European boundaries, the creation of a new security

system in Europe, the exclusion of West Germany from access to

nuclear weapons, and the promotion of economic, scientific and techni-

cal cooperation between East and West.[81] The problem which remained,

however, was to build a tight, integrated socialist community in an

era of East-West détente and expanded contacts between East and West.

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[80]Statistical Yearbook, 1973 (New York: United Nations,
1974), Table B.

[81]Pravda, March 18, 1966, as translated in The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press 18, July 27, 1966, pp. 3-7.

Alliance Management in the 1970s

The process of change in alliance relationships was accelerated by two developments: the exchange of diplomatic recognition between Rumania and West Germany in 1967 and the crisis and subsequent intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The Rumanian action underscored both the altered nature of interbloc relations in Europe and the potential problems of independent East European policies toward the West. The crisis in Czechoslovakia and its difficult resolution revealed both the inadequacy of bloc consultative arrangements and the need for creating long-term economic ties among the states of Eastern Europe. Additionally, the manifestation of pervasive anti-Soviet sentiment may have convinced the Soviet leadership to attempt to weld a more genuine form of ideological unity in the alliance.

During 1968 and 1969 a number of official pronouncements set the stage for coming alliance developments, developments which seemed to bear out the promise of "international relations of a new type." Not only did these pronouncements reflect new alliance functions and purposes, but they reflected a new pattern of interstate relations in the alliance system.

In June of 1969, for example, a communiqué from the International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties asserted,

> All parties have equal rights. At this time when there is
> no leading center of the international communist movement,
> voluntary coordination of the actions of parties in order
> effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased

importance.[82]

Even when allowance is made for the rhetorical aspects of the Conference

statement, the departure from past communiqués is apparent. Moreover,

developments since 1969 have affirmed the "increased importance"

which has been attached to "voluntary coordination" among communist

parties on ideological topics.

The second official pronouncement was the well-known Brezhnev

Doctrine. The ideological justification for the invasion of

Czechoslovakia, delivered in September of 1968, asserted that "the

weakening of any link in the world socialist system has a direct

effect on all the socialist countries." Arguing that the socialist

states had an "internationalist duty" to defend socialism, the

pronouncement went on to justify the "actions taken in Czechoslovakia

by the five allied socialist countries" as "actions aimed at defending

the fundamental interests of the socialist commonwealth."[83] At

first glance, the Brezhnev Doctrine did little more than officially

affirm the long-standing Soviet determination to preserve its sphere

of influence in Eastern Europe. The fact that this determination

was justified at such length, however, signalled a basic shift in

the function of the Warsaw Pact, which includes no provision for

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[82]"Basic Document Adopted by the International Conference
of Communists and Workers' Parties in Moscow, June 17, 1969," Pravda,
June 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 21, August 6, 1969, p. 24.

[83]"Sovereignty and International Obligations of Socialist
Countries," Pravda, September 26, 1968, as translated in The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 20, October 16, 1968, pp. 10-12.

concerted action against a Pact member. Thus, following 1968, the Warsaw Pact functions had been officially broadened to include, in addition to defense against external attack, the defense of socialism from both internal and external enemies.

The third official pronouncement was significant not for what it did say, but for what it did not say. In the months preceding the April, 1969, special COMECON session, it was widely feared in Eastern Europe that the Soviet Union would attempt to create a supranational agency of the kind envisioned in 1962.[84] The communiqué which followed the summit, however, called for improved cooperation, coordination, and specialization by any "interested countries according to necessity."[85] No reference was made to a supranational agency, and the word "integration" was not mentioned. In fact, a month earlier the Soviet representative to COMECON, Mikhail Lesechko, had argued that the implementation of any cooperative measures "wholly depends on the wishes of interested Comecon countries and must be founded on their voluntary participation."[86] The theme of voluntary participation was to be the foundation of the COMECON integration program announced two years later.

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[84]For an excellent summary of statements in the East European press, see Henry W. Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 3-48.

[85]"Communiqué on the Twenty-third Special Comecon Session," Pravda, April 27, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 21, May 14, 1969, p. 9.

[86]Cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, p. 43.

The Comprehensive Program of Integration

A West German economist, using the analogy of a ship, has assessed the problems of East European economic integration in this way:

> Neither the helmsman nor several of the crew of the East European boat are willing to unleash this economic integration _from within_. Or in terms of the metaphor, they are unwilling to coordinate the various activities and duties of the crew because none of its members has sufficient authority and power to do so, and the abilities of the captain are doubted and distrusted. Consequently, the ship moves back and forth and ahead by the sheer force of the wind (e.g. the demand for manufactured goods by the USSR from Eastern Europe) and by the resultant of the various forces exerted by the members of the crew. Frustrating attempts to create the conditions for integration _from without_ . . are being introduced. . . .[87]

Clearly, economic integration through the use of a supranational agency would be more in keeping with the modus operandi of the Soviet Union. As the experience of 1962 had shown, however, attempts to create and promote integration "from within" arouse strong opposition in Eastern Europe. From 1969 to 1971, COMECON sessions and interparty meetings were devoted to the problem of approaching integration "from without" through the gradual processes of specialization and cooperation.

Attempts toward COMECON integration remained intimately tied to the emerging bloc policy toward pan-European security and cooperation. Meeting in Budapest in 1969, the Warsaw Pact members repeated

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[87]Jozef M. P. van Brabant, _Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration in Eastern Europe_ (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974), p. 22.

the call for a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.[88]

Thus between 1969 and 1971 there began to emerge a complex strategy

of coordinating bloc policies toward the West, while at the same

time promoting basic integration of key industries in Eastern Europe.

It is evident that the debate over the future of COMECON inte-

gration was marked by sharp differences of opinion and that the program

ultimately announced reflected a compromise solution. An article in

the Hungarian press concerning the November, 1970, meeting of COMECON's

Permanent Economic Committee reported fundamental differences, "espe-

cially concerning the estimation of the relationship between, and

importance of, plan and market," and noted that "debate was particularly

trenchant on the question of [currency] convertibility."[89]

Despite the conflict over particular aspects of COMECON

integration, the general consensus among East European leaders was

that coordination of bloc policies toward the West was vital to all

their interests and that improved COMECON relations--so long as they

did not involve the creation of a supranational agency--were necessary

for economic development.[90] Maintaining its maverick role, Rumania

consistently opposed. COMECON integration, rejecting what an article

in the Rumanian press called "proposals of an integrationist nature

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[88]Pravda, March 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 21, April 2, 1969, pp. 11-12.

[89]Report on the conference by K. Apatini in Penzugyi Szemle, January, 1971, as cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, p. 143.

[90]For an assessment of attitudes as expressed in the East European press, see ibid., pp. 61-158.

bordering on transgression of the independence of the socialist states, their sovereignty, their right to decide independently about their entire economic activity."[91]

During 1971, however, Rumania was increasingly forced into a position of isolation which it could not maintain. At the Twenty-fourth COMECON Executive Council, an International Investment Bank (IIB) (see Table 4) had been created to supplement the activities of the International Bank of Economic Cooperation. Rumania initially abstained from joining IIB, apparently because the bank's procedures provided for a three-fourths majority vote on some issues, rather than the rule of unanimity which had been followed in all previous COMECON ventures. The case of the IIB quickly exposed the limits of Rumanian independence. Unwilling to deny itself the use of much-needed investment funds and afraid of finding itself unable to exercise any influence on decisions of potential importance for all of Eastern Europe, Rumania reluctantly joined the Investment Bank.

Rumania, which had almost single-handedly subverted the 1962 COMECON integration plan, found itself utterly unable to resist the forces of integration in 1970. Threatened with the withdrawal of Soviet oil supplies, Rumanian President Ceausescu signed a five year Soviet-Rumanian protocol on coordination of national economic plans in return for a Soviet pledge to increase oil deliveries. Rumania's reluctant endorsement of COMECON programs, demonstrated again in

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[91]I. Radulescu, Probleme Economice, April 1971, as cited by Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, p. 112.

TABLE 4

COMECON COMMITTEES, CONFERENCES AND
AGENCIES CREATED SINCE 1968

Organization	Year of creation
Committees	
Interstate Commission on Calculating Techniques	1969
Committee on Economic Problems	1970
Committee for Cooperation and Planning	1971
Committee for Scientific and Technical Cooperation	1971
Committee for Scientific and Technical Information	1971
Conferences	
Conference on Legal Affairs	1970
Conference on Technological Inventions and Patents	1971
Ministers of Home Trade	1971
Agencies (associated committees)	
Interchim (Petro-chemical industry)	1969
International Investment Bank (currency and finance)	1971
Interatominst (atomic energy)	1972

SOURCES:

The Europa Year Book, 1974. London: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1974. Pp. 186-87.

Brabant, Josef M. P. van. Essays on Planning in
Eastern Europe. Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1974. Pp. 8-16.

Rumania's decision to join Interchim and Intermetall, removed the

final obstacle to the new integration program.[92]

Although Rumania succumbed to strong Soviet pressure in 1970

and 1971, it should be noted that Rumania was able to extract signifi-

cant concessions from its larger neighbor. The very fact that the

Soviet Union felt constrained to increase oil deliveries in return

for Rumanian cooperation reflected the existence of "international

relations of a new type."

Concessions and compromise also marked the Comprehensive

Program of Socialist Integration signed in August of 1971 (see

Table 5). The reference in Section 2 to the problems of the less

developed East European members stands in marked contrast to the

Basic Principles plan of 1962, which would have relegated them to the

status of suppliers of raw materials. The same theme was developed

in a recent article in the Soviet press. Arguing that "the existing

differences in development levels retards the deepening of the

international socialist division of labour and the process of

integration," the article noted that "the maximum gap in the per

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[92]For a discussion of Soviet-Rumanian relations during 1970
and 1971, see Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration,
pp. 98-113.

TABLE 5

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM
OF INTEGRATION

Section	
1. Introduction	The purpose of the Program is "the gradual . . . equalization of the members' economic development levels, and the formation of profound and stable ties in the fundamental sectors of the economy." "Integration," it is emphasized, "is taking place on the basis of complete voluntaryism; it is not accompanied by the creation of supranational organs."
2. Leveling	Less developed members are promised "preferential conditions for cooperation."
3. through 9. Consultation, Planning, Cooperation	The nature of cooperation is to be decided upon by all interested countries, and integration is to be a process "regulated in a deliberate and planned manner." Financial reform is to be negotiated according to a planned

TABLE 5--Continued

Section	
	schedule. Direct bilateral ties and joint production ventures are permitted, but joint organizations "will not be supranational in nature, or touch on internal planning questions."
10. through 14. Cooperation in Specific Spheres	Specific timetables are drawn up for cooperation and specialization in industry, agriculture, transportation, construction, and water resources utilization.
15. through 17. Legal and Organizational Questions	The legal basis of cooperation is to be improved "by bringing closer together the corresponding national legal norms and also through their unification by the interested countries." Provisions are made for multilateral decisions on the legal regulation of joint organizations and for the creation of new organizations by interested states. "Every COMECON country has the right to state at any moment its interest in participating in a measure of the

TABLE 5--Continued

Section
comprehensive program in which it has previously refused to participate for one reason or another." Participation, it is repeated, is to be on a "completely voluntary" basis.

SOURCE: "Complex Integration Program," Pravda, August 7, 1971, as cited by Henry W. Schaefer, COMECON and the Politics of Integration. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Pp. 159-72. [Emphasis added.]

capita production of national income between the CMEA countries from 1950 to 1970 declined from 3.1:1 to 1.9:1."[93] The new emphasis on "leveling" appears to be a concession and an inducement to the less developed COMECON members, particularly to Rumania.

The emphasis in the Comprehensive Program is entirely on voluntary cooperation among interested countries: supranational planning is explicitly ruled out. Aside from the emphasis on voluntary participation, the most striking feature of the Comprehensive Program is the limited nature of its objectives. It has been frequently repeated in the Soviet press that integration must be a gradual and deliberate process.

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[93]A. Shabalin, "The Comprehensive Programme of Integration," International Affairs [Moscow], April 1975, pp. 18-19.

The vagueness of Sections Three through Fourteen has led one

analyst to conclude that "the concept of socialist integration, as it

appears in the [Comprehensive Program], leaves much to be desired:

it clearly amounts to a very long-term aim, if even that."[94]   Such

a conclusion is justified only if one defines integration in terms

of unification through a supranational agency. The objective in 1971

was clearly more limited. Aside from the purely economic objectives

of improved cooperation, the principal aim of the Soviet Union, and

to varying degrees of its East European allies, was to construct ties

so complex that no member could extricate itself from the alliance

without suffering economic catastrophe.

It should also be noted that the Comprehensive Program was

superimposed on an already complex network of organizations and trade

agreements. More importantly, the Comprehensive Program represented

the first serious effort to deal with a number of problems of East

European economic integration: investment funding, pricing, currency

convertibility, and central planning through coordination of national

plans.

Central planning had, of course, been tried on previous

occasions. As indicated in Table 4, however, the 1971 plan created

three new commissions to deal with planning and coordination, and by

1974 several COMECON members had for the first time included in their

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[94]van Brabant, Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration
in Eastern Europe, p. 109.

national economic plans sections dealing with integration.[95] On balance, it appears that the improved coordination of national plans is the best compromise between two extreme alternatives: planning through a supranational agency and reliance on market forces.

A number of problems, it should be noted, were simply tabled for further discussion. Agreement of the use of the transferable ruble as international currency, for example, was to follow prolonged discussion during the 1970s, with a final decision to be made no earlier than 1980. Specialization and coordination of scientific research, to be conducted through some 1,600 research institutes,[96] is also likely to be a long process.

The chief virtue of the Comprehensive Program was that it improved the general framework for cooperation. The provision for voluntary participation, for example, means that a veto by one member can no longer prevent activity. Additionally, Sections Ten through Fourteen established detailed programs for joint planning and cooperation in key industries and in agriculture. By 1975 it was already apparent that coordination of national plans and cooperation through COMECON agencies had increased significantly the import-dependence of COMECON members.[97]

The implementation of the Comprehensive Program, however, has not been an entirely smooth process. Since 1971, the Soviet Union has used its near monopoly on bloc raw materials as a means of assuring

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[95]Shabalin, "The Comprehensive Programme of Integration," p. 15.

[96]Ibid., p. 16.

[97]Schaefer, Comecon and the Politics of Integration, pp. 170-94; and van Brabant, Essays on Planning, Trade and Integration in Eastern Europe, pp. 270-93.

cooperation from reluctant allies. Earlier this year it was announced that Soviet oil prices would no longer be based on previously agreed rates, but would fluctuate with the world market. The impact of the Soviet decision on Eastern Europe has been profound. Referring to balance of payments problems resulting from increased oil prices, Hungary's Janos Kadar recently spoke of the need for "much better utilization than previously of the great opportunities inherent in the economic cooperation of the socialist countries."[98]

The most interesting case has been that of Rumania, where Soviet influence has been more direct. Soviet-Rumanian trade, which has increased by 40 percent in the last five years, was expanded another 10 percent by the Soviet-Rumanian trade protocol of 1975. The 1975 protocol, which followed negotiations over the continuance of Soviet oil deliveries, was accompanied by five-year agreements on Soviet-Rumanian technical cooperation.[99] Thus while Rumanian President Ceausescu has continued to assert that "attempts are sometimes made to deny and underestimate the historic role of the nation in the present stage of building socialism,"[100] he has been forced to increase systematically Rumania's economic dependence on

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[98]Cited by Dusko Doder, "Hungary Reports Economic Setbacks," Washington Post, March 18, 1975.

[99]Rumanian Situation Report/1, Radio Free Europe Research, January 10, 1975, p. 4; and Rumanian Situation Report/5, Radio Free Europe Research, February 5, 1975, pp. 3-4.

[100]Ceausescu's speech of March 28, 1975, as quoted in Rumanian Situation Report/14, Radio Free Europe Research, April 17, 1975, p. 3.

the Soviet Union.

The existence of Soviet pressure should not, however, obscure the fundamental consensus of views in Eastern Europe. It is widely believed among East European leaders that economic stability, particularly in the period of expanded East-West trade relations, demands close cooperation among the states of Eastern Europe and tight coordination of bloc foreign policies. At a more basic level, it is believed that political security in Eastern Europe demands a strong and unified alliance.

The Changing Role of the Warsaw Pact

Writing in 1969, one analyst, referring to the decline in East-West hostilities, concluded that "once both sides had realized that the threats were largely imaginary, [NATO and the Warsaw Pact] lost their raison d'être."[101] Since that writing, the military threat faced by the Warsaw Pact countries has continued to diminish. In the Moscow-Bonn agreement of 1970, the Soviet Union and West Germany agreed to "respect unreservedly the territorial integrity of all states in Europe in their present frontiers."[102] The Moscow-Bonn Treaty, the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, and the treaties signed between West Germany and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia have served to formalize the status quo in central Europe. As one Soviet

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[101]Andrzej Kobonski, "The Warsaw Pact," International Conciliation, no. 573 (May 1969), p. 73.

[102]Soviet--West German Treaty, as translated from the West German Press in Current History, October 1970, p. 238.

spokesman recently observed,

> The situation in Europe has changed considerably in the past
> few years. . . . Whereas back in the 1960's we Communists'
> correctly brought to the forefront the task of consolidating the
> territorial and political results of World War II, now we have
> every reason to say that the major successes in accomplishing
> this task are indisputable.[103]

Thus by 1972 the threats which the Warsaw Pact had been formed

to counter had gradually dissolved. The conclusion that the Pact

has lost its raison d'être, however, is wrong on two counts. In a

purely military sense, the WTO continues to serve to maintain the

European power balance, and a strong WTO remains vital to the

negotiating position of the Eastern bloc in relations with the West.

More importantly, the WTO's role in bloc affairs has been altered to

meet a new type of threat. As one analyst has argued,

> The absence of danger can itself become a danger--a paradox
> that sometimes has very concrete consequences. Détente and
> cooperation do indeed reduce the possibility of a military con-
> flict, but they increase the possibilities of ideological
> "infection."[104]

The possibility of ideological infection, in turn, increases the threat

to the preservation of political power and authority in Eastern Europe.

Of course, the Warsaw Pact has always represented a good deal

more than simply an integrated military defense command. It is not

going too far to say that never before have a group of rulers depended

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[103]Speech by B. N. Ponomarev at the meeting of European
Communist and Workers' Parties, _Pravda_, October 18, 1974, as translated
in _The Current Digest of the Soviet Press_ 26, November 13, 1974,
p. 3.

[104]Peter Bender, _East Europe in Search of Security_ (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), p. 7.

so much on an international alliance system for their continued legiti-
macy. The difficulties of applying revolutionary doctrine on a broad
scale, as well as the international requirements of Marxism, have
served to imbue the Warsaw Pact with an "internationalist duty"
which far exceeds pure military objectives. As the Brezhnev Doctrine
has made clear, the "internationalist duty" of the socialist states
includes the defense of socialism from internal, as well as external,
enemies.

All the evidence suggests an expansion, rather than a
contraction, of Warsaw Pact activities since 1968. In 1969 alone, the
Warsaw Pact held six conferences and conducted six joint military
exercises. Additionally, the reorganization of the joint armed
forces, announced by the March, 1969, Political Consultative
Committee, provided for the creation of three new WTO organs: the
Military Council, the Technical Committee of the Joint Armed Forces,
and the Committee of Defense Ministers.[105] Although the nature of the
reorganization plan has never been made public, assessments by East
European leaders, including Rumania's Ceausescu, suggest that the
new structure permits greater participation in WTO by the East
European allies.[106]

As has been the case in COMECON, Rumania's policies toward the

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[105]The Europa Yearbook, 1974 (London, England: Europa
Publications, Ltd., 1974), p. 409.

[106]For an assessment and a summary of East European press
reports, see Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 114-33.

Warsaw Pact provide a yardstick for the assessment of the emergence

of new bloc relations. Although he endorsed the reorganization plan,

Rumanian President Ceausescu made it clear that he felt defense

against external aggression to be "the only plausible reason for the

existence of [the Warsaw Pact]."[107] Since 1969, however, the

Soviet Union apparently has endeavored to elicit Rumania's cooperation

in Warsaw Pact activities by granting Rumania a greater decision-

making role. Following the 1969 Moscow summit, for example, the

Rumanian press commented that now each country could "make a contri-

bution of major importance" in bloc affairs.[108]

As a result of continuing Soviet pressure, Rumania has

expanded greatly its participation in Warsaw Pact activities since

1969. Following extensive consultation throughout 1970, Rumania and

the Soviet Union signed the long-awaited Soviet-Rumanian Friendship

Treaty, agreeing "unswervingly to observe the commitments envisaged

in the Warsaw Treaty."[109] The expansion of Rumania's role in the

Warsaw Pact was capped in 1973, when for the first time since 1962

joint WTO exercises were held in Rumanian territory.

By 1970, the new role of the Warsaw Pact had become more

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[107]Scinteia, April 11, 1969, as cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 130.

[108]Scinteia, December 7, 1969, as cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 125.

[109]"Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Rumania," Pravda, July 8, 1970, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 22, August 11, 1970, p. 8.

apparent. With NATO's tentative acceptance of the Warsaw Pact proposal for a European security conference and the signing of the Moscow-Bonn agreement, attention in Eastern Europe was turned to the problems inherent in the rapid expansion of contacts with the West. Specifically, the reorientation of WTO activities has been reflected in the increased concern over the ideological danger from the West and in the expanded use of the PCC as a means of coordinating bloc foreign policies.

The August, 1970, PCC meeting was attended by delegations which included all Party First Secretaries, as well as various Politburo members, representatives of the chiefs-of-staffs, East European ambassadors to the Soviet Union, and central committee secretaries in charge of interparty relations.[110] The increased emphasis on the PCC has been paralleled by regular meetings of the newly-formed Military Council and Committee of Defense Ministers. The importance of the WTO was emphasized by Leonid Brezhnev in his address to the Twenty-fourth CPSU Congress: "The Warsaw Pact has been, and remains, the main center for coordinating the fraternal countries' foreign policy."[111]

The December, 1970, meeting of the PCC--the second in five months--reflected the difficulties of establishing a unified bloc policy toward the West. The conference communiqué was a study in compromise. The emphasis on "sovereignty, . . . equality and

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[110]Remington, The Warsaw Pact, pp. 188-89.

[111]Cited by Remington, The Warsaw Pact, p. 165.

noninterference" was obviously a concession to Rumanian concerns.

Additionally, explicit references were made to the concerns of

Czechoslovakia, and "the conference unanimously expressed solidarity

with the peace-loving policy of the German Democratic Republic."[112]

Beyond these surface difficulties, however, were the more profound

problems associated with détente.

With the rapid improvement of Soviet-American relations and

the West German Ostpolitik of 1970-1972, the threat from the

"Washington-Bonn axis" became increasingly difficult to invoke as a

rallying cry in Eastern Europe. Not only did the decline of East-West

tension diminish the objective need for bloc unity, but the rapid

expansion of contacts with the West increased the less tangible threat

of ideological "softening up." Thus the process of détente poses a

twofold threat in Eastern Europe: on the one hand, it threatens to

undermine the socialist unity on which the stability of the East

European regimes rests; and on the other, it threatens to introduce

liberalizing elements into East European societies.

The threat of ideological "infection" has been felt most

keenly in East Germany. Since ideology has always been the principal

justification for the existence of a separate German state, East

Germany has attached great importance to the policy of abgrenzung, the

sharpening of the ideological struggle. As a recent East German

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[112]"Statement on Questions of the Strengthening of Security
and the Development of Peaceful Cooperation in Europe," Pravda,
December 4, 1970, as translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet
Press 22, January 5, 1971, p. 2.

Communist party resolution warned, "In view of the mass contacts of human beings of opposite ideologies and ways of living, the greatest degree of class awareness and activity are mandatory."[113] It is transparently obvious, however, that the real threat perceived in East Germany is not to Communist ideology but to the political security of the existing regime. Despite the economic expansion enjoyed in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), the attraction of Western standards of living, it is feared, will raise new expectations and new demands within East German society.

Similar fears have been voiced in Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak leadership, faced with the task of political consolidation in the wake of the Prague Spring, has endorsed the East German call for the sharpening of the ideological struggle. A recent article in Rude Pravo, for example, warned,

> Bourgeois politicians and ideologists who decide to attain old anticommunist goals by new "peaceful" means rely on the development of commercial and other contacts between capitalist and socialist countries to revive inside socialism the influence of ideas completely alien to socialism.[114]

For the East European leaderships, the solution to the problems inherent in expanded East-West relations has been a revival of domestic conservatism and political repression. With the exception

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[113]Cited by John Dornberg, "East Germany: The Special Case," in East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed. Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 116.

[114]Cited by Robert W. Dean, "Foreign Policy Perspectives and European Security: Poland and Czechoslovakia," in East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed. Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 161.

of Hungary, which continues to have the most liberal domestic policies

in the bloc, every country in Eastern Europe has reverted to domestic

orthodoxy through economic recentralization, political purges, and

ideological campaigns. The problem, of course, is to justify and

to maintain the campaign of repression in an era characterized by the

relaxation of tension in Europe.

The increased concern for political security in Eastern Europe

explains the recent expansion of Warsaw Pact activities. By reaffirm-

ing the requirements of socialist internationalism, including those

implicit in the Warsaw Pact, the East European leaders are able to

provide at least some justification for the maintenance of domestic

conservatism. The threat implicit in the Brezhnev Doctrine provides

an additional source of justification. By alluding to the example

of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and by pointing to the presence of Soviet

troops in Eastern Europe, the East European leaders may justify

domestic repression as being necessary for the maintenance of "correct"

relations with Moscow. As was argued, with perhaps a touch of

sarcasm, in the Hungarian press, "In its own national interest, a

socialist country cannot do better than aim at close unity with the

Soviet Union."[115]

The paradox could hardly be more complete. The process of

détente, far from promoting liberalism in Eastern Europe, has

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[115]Nepszabadsag, Budapest, July 24, 1973, as cited by Charles
Andras, "European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," in East
European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed.
Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers,
1974), p. 31.

contributed to a revival of domestic repression and renewed concern

for bloc unity. In the long run, of course, détente and the expansion

of East-West contacts may bring about profound changes in Eastern

Europe. It is through an awareness of the possible long-range

consequences of détente that the Soviet Union and its allies have

stepped up the campaign for ideological unity in the bloc.

Ideological Unity and Disunity

Another paradox of the era of détente is that the expansion

of pragmatic contacts between the communist countries and the advanced

capitalist countries has been accompanied by an intensification of

the communist ideological campaign. The Soviet press in particular

has gone to some lengths to affirm the continuation of the "histori-

cally inevitable" class struggle. One article, significantly

entitled "The Dialectics of Détente," argued,

> Soviet-American relations are clear evidence that the
> peaceful coexistence policy is a dialectical blend of cooperation
> and struggle. . . . The normalization of Soviet-American relations
> shows what impressive results can be achieved for peace and
> international security without renouncing principle and the class
> approach.[116]

Thus at the same time the Soviet Union has expanded its con-

tacts with the historic "class enemies" in the West, the Soviet press

has reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to Marxism-Leninism. This

seeming contradiction was addressed by Robert Tucker, who argued,

> Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in the process
> of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final

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[116]Jan Prazsky, "The Dialectics of Détente," World Marxist
Review 17 (September 1974):128.

goals of the movement; it would, by virtue of the dialectic of the process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done. For intensified <u>verbal</u> allegiance to ultimate ideological goals belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.[117]

The same pattern has been demonstrated in the alliance during the period of détente. The "deradicalization" implicit in expanded East-West relations has been accompanied by ostentatious pronouncements of ideological unity in Eastern Europe. As is the case in Soviet domestic policy, ideological unity in the alliance serves to justify domestic conservatism and to safeguard political security.

A number of developments not necessarily related to détente have prompted the new ideological campaign as well. Widespread political apathy, particularly among socialist youth, has tended to erode the source of political support in Eastern Europe. The new emphasis on consumer goods production, too, reflects the concerns of a populace increasingly interested in achieving a standard of living comparable to that in the West. Symptomatic of the growing domestic problems in Eastern Europe is the growth of small but vocal groups of political dissidents. "Thus," one Soviet journalist has concluded, "internal developments as well as the external political situation objectively [demand] closer cohesion and unity of the socialist countries."[118]

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[117]Robert C. Tucker, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements," <u>American Political Science Review</u> 61 (June 1967): 358.

[118]V. Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries--A Condition for Strengthening the Position of Socialism," <u>International Affairs</u> [Moscow], December 1973, p. 9.

Obviously, socialist unity cannot be of the monolithic character known under Stalin. Soviet acceptance of different interpretations of the correct path to socialism has been well demonstrated: examples include toleration of Rumania's national self-assertiveness, acceptance of Hungary's economic experimentation, the cautious approaches to Poland's domestic crises of 1968 and 1970, and, most recently, the partial rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The new approach to socialist unity, conducted under the banner of "socialist internationalism," reflects a new willingness to acknowledge and accept polycentrism in the socialist camp.

Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia in 1971, followed by the 1973 visit by Kosygin, marked the beginning of the new drive for unity among the socialist states. The high point of Soviet-Yugoslav relations came in 1974, during talks in preparation for the pan-European conference of communist parties. Significantly, the talks were attended by representatives of the Yugoslav and Rumanian regimes, both of which had refused to send representatives to the 1967 Karlovy Vary conference. During the first round of talks, a Yugoslav report suggested a new Soviet willingness to expand the conference decision-making procedures. "The rules of procedure," it was reported, "contain, among other things, those political-procedural problems, including the provision for decision-making by consensus, on which

the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had insisted."[119] Despite

the fact that new disputes have emerged since the time of the

Yugoslav report, it is apparent that the Soviet Union continues to work

to achieve at least the appearance of unity at the international

conference.[120]

The major effort of the Soviet ideological campaign, of

course, has been to establish unity among the Warsaw Pact allies. In

addition to the expansion of the activities of the Political

Consultative Committee, efforts toward bloc unity have been manifested

in an increase in the number of bilateral and multilateral meetings

among top party officials. Moreover, a new forum for the expression

of bloc unity has been added: a yearly conference of Soviet and East

European leaders in the Crimea.

In 1973, following the first conference in the Crimea, Soviet

party leader Leonid Brezhnev noted, "participants in the Crimea

meeting were unanimous in the opinion that at the present stage it is

essential to improve considerably the standard of ideological coopera-

tion among the fraternal countries and parties."[121] The nature of the

[119]Radio Belgrade, October 16, 1974, as cited by Kevin Devlin, "The International Communist Movement: European Communist Conference," Radio Background Report/5 (Eastern Europe), Radio Free Europe Research, January 17, 1975, p. 10.

[120]For an analysis of the continuing debate over the confer- ence, see Kevin Devlin, "Pre-conference Debate Behind Closed Doors," Radio Background Report/31 (Pan-European Communist Conference), Radio Free Europe Research, February 26, 1975.

[121]Radio Moscow, August 15, 1973, as cited by Andras, "European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," p. 28.

meeting was made more clear in an article in the Czechoslovak news-paper Rude Pravo, which argued that the meetings were made necessary by the fact that "the revival of international relations [had] activated anticommunist propaganda." The final goal of ideological consolidation, the article went on to say, must be "to protect the building of socialism at home against the aggressive endeavors of imperialism."[122]

Thus by 1973 the implications of "socialist internationalism" had become clear. The intensive ideological campaign was designed to confront a threat seen in terms of political security rather than in terms of pure ideology. Similarly, Warsaw Pact activities were expanded to confront new problems of policy coordination and new threats to political security in Eastern Europe. In the face of expanded East-West trade relations, economic integration through COMECON was designed to establish new and long-term links among the states of Eastern Europe.

Internal alliance developments were, of course, closely related to the emerging pattern of Soviet bloc détente diplomacy. As Leonid Brezhnev emphasized at the 1973 Crimea meeting, "The cohesion of the socialist countries and our close interaction are at the basis of everything we have secured in relaxing tension."[123]

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[122]Rude Pravo, August 25, 1973, as cited by Andras, "European Cooperation and Ideological Conflict," p. 28.

[123]Cited by Dolgin, "Unity of the Fraternal Countries," p. 11.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: DETENTE AND

ALLIANCE COHESION

An assumption widely shared among Western observers--scholars

and statesmen alike--is that the normalization of East-West relations

will lead ultimately to a loosening of the bonds between the Soviet

Union and its East European allies. While it is still too early to

render a final judgment, recent developments in the East European

alliance suggest the opposite conclusion. The process of détente,

far from contributing to the disintegration of the alliance, has

served to stimulate a renewed drive for alliance cohesion.

The relationship between internal and external developments

does, however, provide some insight into the nature of East European

integration, for one way of judging the viability of any system is

to assess the ability of the system to react and adapt to changes

in its external environment. As Morton Kaplan has proposed, "The

stability or flexibility of a system depends upon its capacity to

overcome environmental disturbances."[124]

The changes in alliance relationships between the early

1950s and the mid-1960s were primarily attributable to the profound

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[124]Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), p. 99

changes taking place domestically in Eastern Europe. In the early

years of the alliance, cohesion was imposed by the Soviet Union on

East European regimes which were scarcely in a position to resist.

Once the East European regimes had gained and consolidated power,

however, they were soon faced with domestic crises which demanded

new forms of alliance relations. The response to these new demands

was Khrushchev's attempt to create a more complex and resilient

alliance framework through a revived COMECON and through the Warsaw

Treaty Organization. For the remainder of the Khrushchev era, it

was primarily the interplay between domestic developments and

alliance relations which determined the course of integration in the

alliance. Aside from the disruptions of polycentric Communism, the

international environment remained generally stable until the early

1960s.

Since that time, however, the situation has been reversed.

Domestic disruptions in Eastern Europe have, if not disappeared,

at least subsided, but profound changes in the international environ-

ment have created new demands for the alliance system. An interesting

commentary was recently provided by a Soviet journalist, who, refer-

ring to crises in NATO relations, argued that "these developments

have once again exposed the futile and outdated character of the old

structure . . . , a structure that was adapted to the period of tough

confrontation with the socialist world."[125] The same line of argument, of course, could be applied equally well to the crisis faced in the East European alliance system, which was adapted to confront the perceived threat from the West.

Since the early 1960s, the tight bipolar system, characterized by "tough confrontation" between the two power blocs, has given way to a much more fluid and unstable situation. The gradual process of East-West détente, which dates at least from the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, has accelerated rapidly since 1970. The improvement in Soviet-American relations and, more importantly, the settlement of the territorial disputes in central Europe have dramatically altered the nature of the international system. Thus by 1974, a Soviet analyst could argue, "By the early 1970's, the prerequisites for a radical restructuring of the system of contemporary international relations developed on the world scene."[126]

In addition to demanding new forms of interbloc relations, the altered international situation required new forms of relations within the Soviet bloc. Associated with the new interbloc situation were a number of specific concerns, including the rapid expansion of East-West trade, the development of increased human contacts with

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[125]Y. Davydov, "USA--Western Europe: A 'New Relationship,'" International Affairs [Moscow], January 1974, pp. 36-37.
Davydov, who had been a frequent contributor to International Affairs, defected to the West while on assignment to Japan early in 1975.

[126]A. Stepanov, "Soviet Foreign Policy and the Restructuring of International Relations," International Affairs [Moscow], January 1974, p. 5.

the West, and the decline of military tension in Europe. The nature
of alliance change in response to these developments has been examined
in some detail. Through a new drive for economic integration, an
expansion of the political role of the Warsaw Treaty Organization,
and an intensive ideological campaign, the East European alliance
has adapted to the requirements of the altered external environment.

By the opening of preliminary negotiations for a conference
on security and cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki in late 1972
and early 1973, the second half of the new alliance strategy began
to emerge. During the preliminary meetings and during the Conference
of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the talks on Mutual Force
Reductions in Europe, both of which began in 1973, the nature of the
coordinated alliance policy became more clear. Intimately tied to
the development of new relations within the bloc, the alliance posi-
tion at the sessions in Helsinki, Geneva, and Vienna represented a
coordinated vision of a restructured interbloc situation in Europe.

Helsinki, Geneva, and Vienna

Soviet and East European initiatives toward a conference on
security and cooperation in Europe actually date from the signing of
the Warsaw Pact, in which the allies affirmed "their desire to
create a system of collective security in Europe based on the parti-
cipation of all European States, irrespective of their social and

political structure."[127] In 1955 and in the decade which followed,

Warsaw Pact proposals were motivated by the desire for the recogni-

tion of the post-World War Two boundaries in Europe. In 1965, with

the territorial situation in Europe considerably more stable, the

Warsaw Pact allies issued a more urgent proposal for "the convocation

of a conference of all European states to discuss measures ensuring

collective security in Europe."[128]

By the time of the 1969 Budapest Message, the Warsaw Pact

position reflected a more serious desire to confront the new situa-

tion in Europe. Moreover, the Budapest appeal betrayed the existence

of conflicting views among Warsaw Pact members as to the nature and

purpose of the proposed conference. As Harland Cleveland, former

United States representative to the North Atlantic Council, observed,

> A close reading of the Budapest appeal suggested a hard-fought
> compromise: The Soviets got their appeal . . . The East German
> and Polish "Hawks" got the pre-conditions on which they had been
> insisting; and the Czech and Hungarian "Doves" managed to delete
> most of the traditional polemics.[129]

It might also be added that, through the reference to "respect for the

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[127]United Nations, Treaty Series, Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed and Reported with the Secretariat of the United Nations, vol. 219 (1955), No. 2962, "The Warsaw Treaty," 14 May 1955.

[128]"Session of Political Consultative Committee of Warsaw Treaty States Communiqué," Pravda, January 22, 1965, translated in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 17, February 10, 1965,

[129]Cited by Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, Détente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., 1970), p. 85.

independence and sovereignty of states,"[130] the Rumanians got the

formal guarantees on which they had insisted.

Beyond the differences revealed in the Budapest Message were

a number of basic differences among the Warsaw Pact allies. The East

Germans, because of the GDR's advantageous position as the principal

exporter of finished goods in COMECON and because of the leadership's

acute fear of ideological infection, were wary of East-West coopera-

tion in any form. At the other extreme were the Rumanians, bent on

using the process of détente as a means of loosening the Soviet grip

on Eastern Europe. Between these two extreme positions were a number

of other sources of disagreement in Eastern Europe. Hungary, for

example, because of its success through bilateral trade arrangements

with the West and through regional cooperation, showed little interest

in pursuing a collective approach toward East-West economic coopera-

tion.[131]

Nevertheless, between 1969 and 1972 the Soviet Union was able

to promote a substantially unified bloc position toward East-West

cooperation. Aside from Rumania's Ceausescu, the East European

leaders generally consider the continued presence of Soviet troops to

be useful, and perhaps necessary, for the preservation of domestic

political security. In terms of economic relations, East European

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[130]*Pravda*, May 18, 1969, as translated in The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press 21, April 2, 1969, p. 12.

[131]For a comprehensive study of East European policy posi-
tions, see Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean, eds., East European
Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1974), pp. 102-90.

leaders share an interest in expanded East-West trade, and they per-
ceive the advantages of presenting a coordinated position in dealing
with the West. Similarly, there is full agreement that relations with
the West must be regulated in such a way as to minimize the possibility
of introducing liberalizing tendencies into the socialist societies.

As the Warsaw Pact position became more unified, the pro-
posals for a European security conference became more specific. The
Prague Declaration of October 31, 1969, set two priorities for the
proposed conference: the first was a vague recommendation for a
statement renouncing the use of force in Europe, and the second was
a call for "the expansion of trade, economic and scientific and tech-
nical ties."[132] From that time on, it has been clear that the main
Warsaw Pact objective is economic cooperation in specific, limited
spheres of activity. Notably absent from the Prague Declaration was
any mention of mutual force reductions in Europe. In subsequent pro-
posals, too, the Warsaw Pact policy has been simply to avoid the
issue of troop reductions.

The NATO response to the Prague Declaration revealed three
obstacles to holding the conference: the issue of boundaries in
central Europe, the question of the inclusion of the United States
in the conference, and the issue of the proper scope of the talks,
particularly with regard to the issue of force reductions. Between
1969 and 1972, West German Ostpolitik successfully resolved the issue

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[132]Pravda, November 1, 1969, as translated in The Current
Digest of the Soviet Press 21, November 26, 1969, p. 19.

of European boundaries. The other two obstacles, however, were the subject of intense debate between NATO and the WTO.

The United States was instrumental in establishing a negative NATO response to the vague proposals in the Prague Declaration. "Why not, the Americans said, get down to cases and ask the other side where it stood on balanced and mutual force reductions in Europe?"[133] The issue of symmetrical versus asymmetrical cuts, or balanced versus imbalanced reductions, has remained the principal obstacle in the MFR talks. From the NATO perspective, force reductions in central Europe must be "balanced," rather than equal, to reflect the Warsaw Pact numerical advantage in troop levels. The Warsaw Pact position, by contrast, was that the word "balanced" should be removed from proposed talks and that force reduction talks should be held separately from the broader Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Agreement on M(B)FR was eventually achieved through the Warsaw Pact "concession" on American participation, an issue which was obviously raised as a bargaining card for the WTO negotiating position. In return for the Warsaw Pact's acceptance of American participation, and in return for an apparent concession on the nature of force reductions, the NATO Council finally agreed "that multilateral explorations on mutual and balanced force reductions be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in

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[133] New York Times, November 9, 1969, sec. IV, p. 6.

Europe."[134] The Council resolution went on to say, however, that the

conference should also concern itself with the free movement of

people, ideas, and information between East and West Europe.

As agreed, the preliminary negotiations for force reduction

talks and for the European Security Conference were held separately.

Although the preparatory talks for the Conference on Mutual and

Balanced Force Reductions officially opened in Vienna on January 31,

1973, the first plenary session did not meet until May 14 because of

procedural differences over participation. As expected, the principal

source of disagreement was the question of "balanced" force reductions.

In the final communiqué of the preparatory talks a compromise solu-

tion was reached: the word "balanced" was dropped in return for the

guarantee that any decision reached would "conform to the principle

of undiminished security for each party."[135] It was further agreed

that the first phase of the MFR talks would be held in Vienna in

October.

The preliminary negotiations for the Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe were held in Helsinki during four sessions

from November, 1972, to June, 1973. As was the case in the MFR nego-

tiations, the Warsaw Pact strategy was to make concessions which were

sufficiently vague that they could later be reversed. On the issue of

human and cultural contacts, for example, the Soviet Union agreed that

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[134]New York Times, February 20, 1972. [Emphasis added.]

[135]Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London: Keesing's
Publications, 1974), p. 26315.

the agenda could include discussions on the "expansion of cultural co-operation, of contacts between organizations and individuals, and of dissemination of information."[136] The only evidence of Warsaw Pact dissension was Rumania's successful insistence that the conference take place "outside the military alliances."[137] Having agreed on a general agenda for CSCE, the participants opened the first phase of the conference in Helsinki on July 3.

Although it lasted for only four days, the first phase of CSCE established the basic positions of both East and West. In a reversal of the previous Soviet proposal, Foreign Minister Gromyko argued,

> It is clear that co-operation in the cultural field, and the development of contacts and of exchanges of information, should be carried out with full observance of the principles . . . of sovereignty and non-interference. Any departure from this would be rightfully regarded as an attempt to intrude upon another's affairs.[138]

Representing the general view of the West, British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home countered by arguing that it is

> essential that we should do something to remove the barriers which inhibit the movement of peoples and the exchange of information and ideas. . . . The peoples of our countries . . . want to know whether their lives will be affected for the better by our efforts.[139]

By the time the second phase of negotiations began in Geneva

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[136] Ibid., p. 25699.

[137] Ibid., p. 26013.

[138] Ibid., p. 26014.

[139] Ibid., p. 26015.

in September, 1973, East and West were firmly divided over the "Basket Three" proposals regarding human and cultural contacts. From the point of view of the West, any meaningful normalization of relations between East and West should include the expansion of human and cultural contacts. Implicit in the Western position, of course, was the belief that expansion of human contacts would lead to the liberalization of the socialist societies and to a loosening of the Soviet hegemonic position in Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact position, reinforced through frequent bilateral and multilateral meetings among top party leaders and through meetings of the PCC, has been that the CSCE should result in a resolution formally legitimizing European borders and establishing, without reference to "Basket Three" proposals, a new framework for East-West economic cooperation.

By mid-1975, the Warsaw Pact nations had realized most of their CSCE objectives. By offering minor concessions, such as agreeing to a proposal to reunite families separated by the now rusty Iron Curtain, the Soviet bloc had elicited the reluctant agreement of the West. The final CSCE declaration included a statement on the inviolability of European borders, an agreement on noninterference in internal affairs, a general agreement on the possibility of peaceful border change, and a vague statement on the virtues of expanded flows of people and ideas between East and West.[140]

It became apparent early that an agreement on MFR could not

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[140]For a recent assessment of the security conference, see Scott Thornton, "Helsinki Summit: New Era or False Hopes," Washington Post, July 23, 1975, p. 17.

be timed to coincide with the CSCE resolution. Throughout the MFR

negotiations, which have remained virtually stalled since they began

in October of 1973, East and West have been deadlocked over a number

of questions: whether troop cuts should be symmetrical or asym-

metrical, who should participate in the initial cuts, whether or not

the cuts should include nuclear armaments, and whether or not cuts

should include air as well as ground forces. The only perceptible

area of agreement was in the decision to provide a few days'

advance notice of military maneuvers.

It has been clear from the start of MFR that the Warsaw Pact

objective was to prevent an agreement on force reductions. From the

perspectives of the East European leaders, the maintenance of the

power balance in Europe is not enough: the political leadership in

Eastern Europe, with the exception of Ceausescu, considers the main-

tenance of current troop levels to be essential for the preservation

of political security. Once the initial Warsaw Pact aim--the separa-

tion of MFR from the broader security conference--was achieved, the

Warsaw Pact position was to oppose any NATO proposal on force reduc-

tions.

From an assessment of the CSCE resolution and the MFR talks at

their present stage, it is clear that no new Concert of Europe is in

the offing. It is equally clear that the conferences will yield no

specific blueprint for the future of East-West relations in Europe.

Nevertheless, a number of objectives of the Warsaw Pact countries

have already been realized. First, the resolution on the inviolabi-

lity of European borders serves to institutionalize the status quo

in central Europe. Second, the agreement on noninterference in internal affairs serves to legitimize the existing nature of political control in Eastern Europe. Finally, by having avoided major concessions on the issue of human and cultural exchanges, the Soviet bloc will be able to promote limited cooperation with the West on a strictly government-to-government basis. In other words, the CSCE resolution helps enable the Warsaw Pact countries to regulate the pattern of East-West exchanges in such a way as to minimize the danger of ideological "infection."

Of course, the conference resolution has established only a very general framework for East-West cooperation. A major question is whether the Soviet Union and its allies can continue to promote expanded relations with the West without introducing substantial changes into the socialist societies. As has been made clear, it is through an awareness of the possible consequences of détente that the Soviet and East European leaders have maintained their determination to control the character of East-West relations. Once the flow of events begins to exceed the capacity of the Warsaw Pact leaders to deal with them, the new form of cooperation with the West may well be reversed.

Beyond Détente

To an extent unparalleled in the history of the East European alliance, the course of alliance integration in the future will be determined by the nature of external developments. Domestically, the process of East-West cooperation has provided the East European

leaders with an opportunity to revive their stagnant economies, promote greater consumer goods production, and, ultimately, bolster their political security by establishing a firmer relationship between the party and the people. At the same time, the process of détente has contributed to a drive for alliance unity through improved economic integration, political coordination, and ideological regeneration.

In order to achieve their objectives in East-West cooperation, the East European leaders have demonstrated considerable solidarity at the pan-European conferences. In an important sense, however, the solidarity of the past few years is deceptive, for among the East European leaders there are two opposing tendencies: one impelling them toward closer unity in the interests of immediate political security, and the other impelling them to seek greater independence from the Soviet Union. This second inclination is seen in terms of a long-term process through which the East European leaders, following a period of growing cooperation with the West, will be able to exercise greater latitude in order to satisfy the needs of their increasingly restive populaces and restore public confidence in the party.

These two tendencies are far from inconsistent. For the immediate present, close alliance unity and "firm friendship with the Soviet Union," to repeat Ulbricht's phrase, are absolutely required to control the character of East-West relations. Once East-West relations have been established on a new, firmer basis, however, the opportunity may present itself for new forms of relations within the bloc. It is well-recognized, of course, that the Soviet Union is presently in a position to block any developments perceived to be detrimental to

Soviet interests. The hope in Eastern Europe is that the Soviet Union, in the belief that its position in the bloc is secure, will permit a greater degree of independence in Eastern Europe.

Clearly, whatever independence is gained in Eastern Europe will be of a limited sort. As one Polish scholar has argued, the era of détente will bring with it "a shifting of forces within the blocs."[141] The ties within the bloc--economic, political, and ideological--are sufficiently strong to assure that any changes or "shifting of forces" which may occur will take place within the existing alliance framework. Moreover, Soviet determination to maintain its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, reinforced by preponderant Soviet power, dictates the limits of independence in the bloc.

If there is a model for the desired result of this "shifting of forces," it is that of the Hungarians, not the Rumanians. The kind of self-assertiveness in foreign policy familiar in Rumania for a decade would not be in the interests of the other East European countries, nor would "another Rumania" be tolerated by the Soviet Union. The experience of Hungary in the past few years has considerably more appeal. Through the gradual implementation of economic reforms and through the cultivation of beneficial trade relations with the West, Hungary has been able to achieve what is desired most in

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[141]Jan Sczepanski, "The Fate of Poland and the Polish Character," Zycie Warszawy, June 4, 1970, as cited by Robert W. Dean, "Foreign Policy Perspectives and European Security: Poland and Czechoslovakia," in East European Perspectives on European Security and Cooperation, ed. Robert R. King and Robert W. Dean (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 122.

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based on the general support of the population. Moreover, the

Hungarian leadership has been able to achieve its success without

damaging the leading role of the party.[142]

Whether or not the "shifting of forces" occurs depends on

two factors: the nature of domestic change in Eastern Europe and

the progress of East-West cooperation. In the first case, the East

European leaders are well aware that they will be treading a thin

line between expanding the scope of political support on the one

hand and creating the kind of chaos which occurred in Czechoslovakia

on the other. Any repetition of the Czechoslovak experience, with its

economic experimentation and its acknowledgment of political plural-

ism, would result in action as determined, if not as brutal, as the

1968 invasion. Moreover, any domestic disruptions would raise fears

for political security and would prompt another drive for bloc

unity, a drive which would be supported by the East European as well

as the Soviet leaders.

The second factor affecting alliance change will be the

progress of détente. It is clear that the Soviet and East European

leaders have great hopes that the new form of cooperation with the

West will provide a partial solution to their economic and political

problems. One possibility is that the East European leaders may

gain through the process of East-West cooperation sufficient security

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[142]For an assessment of the situation in Hungary, see Peter
Bender, East Europe in Search of Security (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1972), pp. 100-11.

to permit a gradual relaxation of internal policies. If internal change occurs precipitously as the result of expanded East-West contacts, however, the process of détente may well be reversed in the interests of bloc unity and political security.

The long process of East European integration has resulted in substantial and durable ties between the Soviet Union and the states of Eastern Europe. Within the existing framework, however, there is room for substantial change in alliance relationships. It may well be that the process of East-West cooperation fails to yield the specific benefits expected in Eastern Europe, or that the process brings with it liberalizing elements which cannot be tolerated. If either of these two possibilities materialize, the result may be a reversal of détente and a return to domestic repression and orthodoxy.

There is, however, a more optimistic view of the future. According to this scenario, the progress of East-West cooperation will promote mutually beneficial relations and will lead to a situation in which the East European leaders feel sufficiently secure to permit, with the endorsement of the Soviet Union, a gradual liberalization of domestic policies.

In any case, it should be remembered that the objectives of the two blocs remain basically opposed. The current era of détente is the product, not of the abandonment of basic objectives, but of the existence of an East-West power balance and of the recognition that certain objectives can better be achieved through cooperation than through confrontation. For the near future, the best that can be

hoped from the process of détente is that the "shifting of forces"
will encourage greater stability and cooperation within the frame-
work of existing alliances.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CEMA	)	
CMEA	)	
COMECON	)	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CPSU   Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSCE   Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

EEC   European Economic Community (Common Market)

GDR   German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

MBFR   Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

MFR   Mutual Force Reductions

NATO   North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PCC   Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization

WTO   Warsaw Treaty Organization

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