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Weapons Innovations and Arms Control: Three Case Studies

William Frank Gerard
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

WEAPONS INNOVATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

Three Case Studies

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by

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This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of

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

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

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

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

Chonghan Kim

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ABSTRACT

This study inquires into the reasons for the onset of three arms control negotiations; the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907 (considered one continuing conference), the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 and SALT I. Of special interest is the role of qualitative changes in weaponry. Attention is focused on the periods immediately preceding each conference in order to identify qualitative changes in weaponry which appeared to be of concern to major participants. Next, each conference itself is examined to determine if such weapon innovations were important in the context of the conference. Finally, the conferences are compared to determine similarities and differences in the reasons for the onset of each conference.

The results suggest that whereas no single factor or group of factors can be said to always be present to provide the impetus for arms control negotiations, it can be stated that three factors, economics, security, and technological innovations in weaponry, provide the prime determinants for most.

WEAPONS INNOVATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL

Three Case Studies

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

> Certain subjects seem quite clear as long as we leave them alone. The answers look obvious until we ask questions, the concepts appear to be well understood until we wish to define them, causes and effects are easily recognized until we seek to explain them, and all the rules pass for valid until we try to prove them.[1]

Such is true with arms control and disarmament. The subject has been bandied about over many decades so that a large amount of "conventional wisdom" has emerged to enshroud the topic and thus confuse certain issues, among them the reasons for arms control conferences.

This study will inquire into reasons for the onset of three sets of arms control negotiations: the Hague Conference of 1899 and 1907, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, and SALT I (the phase of the strategic arms limitation talks of 1969-1972). Of special interest will be the role of qualitative changes in weaponry. Attention will be focused on the periods immediately preceding each conference in order to identify qualitative changes in weaponry which appear to be of concern to major participants. Next, each conference itself will be examined to determine if such weapon innovations were important in the context of the conference. Finally, the conferences will be compared to determine similarities and differences in the reasons for the onset of each conference.

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[1]Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 1.

A frequent assumption throughout history was that armaments cause wars; therefore, to halt wars, armaments must, by definition, be abolished, or controlled to a significant degree. Qualitative changes, or improvements in weaponry, appeared to widen the effect of these armaments so as to multiply their destructiveness. A brief look at the evolution of weaponry will show this as true. As the weapons of war changed from the feudal horse soldiers to bows and arrows, the crossbow, the various stages of muskets and rifles--flintlocks, repeaters, machine guns, automatic handguns--to tanks, ships, artillery, airplanes--and finally to nuclear weapons--war became more of a deadly affair, affecting more people. As Charles A. Barker aptly states; "War has always been limited by the capacity of a nation to organize its military and apply it with political effect. The limitations of weaponry . . . entered the calculations of the prosecutors of war."[2] As the destructiveness of weaponry through its qualitative changes increased, however, men appear to have more earnestly sought means by which to limit this weaponry or its deployment.

The first really successful negotiation of this type culminated in the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817. The negotiation was between the United States and Great Britain, and concerned the question of armaments, especially naval armaments, along the common border of America and British North America. Agreements were reached which limited both sides to one armed vessel each on Lakes Champlain and Ontario, and two each on Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan and Superior. Each armed ship was limited to one 18 pound gun.

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[2]Charles A. Barker, "Disarmament; a Problem of Time," in Problems of World Disarmament, coordinated by Charles A. Barker (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), p. 9.

Little else concerning arms control and disarmament was attempted, however, until the advent of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907; but these negotiations failed to halt armament production or improvement in any but very minor ways. After World War I, however, certain maritime nations appeared to experience a revulsion against large-scale armament production, especially in the area of naval weaponry, and came together at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 in order to limit this type of weaponry. This conference culminated in 1922 with an agreement which established ceilings on production of certain kinds of naval warships, in the form of ratios for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy. Following this, other attempts were made to halt armaments.

In 1930 the London Naval Conference managed several minor limits on battle cruisers and submarines. Following this, in the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, President Hoover proposed that all armaments which could be used for offense be forbidden, but this request failed. Hoover then suggested that a 30 percent reduction in armaments across the board be made by all nations attending the conference, but this was rejected by France. Following this, in 1933, Germany withdrew from the conference, thus in effect ending any chance to reach any agreement at all. Next, in December 1934, Japan decided to withdraw from the Washington Treaty, and submitted its formal notice of termination. As Barker says, "the disarmament effort following World War I withered and died under the heat of these events."[3]

By the end of World War II, the scope of weapon innovations in the form of atomic weapons had further enlarged the destructive

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[3]Ibid.

capability of armaments. From 1945, half-hearted attempts by the camps of the East and West toward disarmament were undertaken, but ideological differences and repeated qualitative jumps in weaponry made the nuclear nations very skeptical and suspicious of each other. It was not until the early 1960's that disarmament began to be sought earnestly by the nuclear nations, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, and peripheral agreements to the main topic of arms control began to proliferate. Finally in 1969 the United States and Russia began the so-called SALT negotiations. Phase I ended in 1972 with an agreement on limitation of certain defensive missiles, and a temporary ceiling on certain types of offensive weaponry.

Thus, the twentieth century saw an increase in the efforts of nations, mostly as the improvement in quality of weaponry began to insure more destructiveness in war, to reach some sort of agreement on arms control. The majority of writings on arms control, however, show very little, if any, concern about the reasons for the onset of these arms control negotiations. Practically nowhere are valid generalizations made. The only attempts made to explain the "why" have come in the manner of "conventional wisdom" assertions; for example, assumptions attributing them to the effects of economics, morality, good will or public opinion. While these may be valid explanations, no steps have been taken to determine their effects.

Moreover, the fact of the matter appears to be that the great concern with arms control is in reality a post-World War II phenomenon, and studies on the subject have appeared to evolve around the technical considerations of nuclear armaments and ways to conduct mutual inspections. Historical studies of the factors influencing the onset of

arms control negotiations are few, and studies attempting to generalize are nonexistent. This paper, then, is to tread on relatively unbroken ground. For that reason, this inquiry is done cautiously, with broad-based descriptions of the conferences and the preceding periods in an attempt to examine, briefly, all the reasons for arms control which appear especially applicable. This inquiry will necessarily observe other factors than solely weapon innovations, even if no more than just to acknowledge their existence and their possible effect. The advances in weaponry, on the other hand, will be examined in more detail. In the final analysis, however, it is doubtful that, at this stage, any positive, concrete relationships of weapon innovations and arms control can be ascertained. However, if this inquiry serves to focus on certain reasons for the onset of negotiations and is able to generate hypotheses concerning weaponry which may be explored at a later time, then the thesis has served its purpose.

These three conferences were specifically chosen because they are generally recognized as representative of the efforts at arms control in this century. The Hague Conferences, for example, took place at the head of a cycle of arms control negotiations. Before these, very little had been done to gain arms control, because it was not seen as a viable possibility. We can even ask if the Hague Conferences were, in reality, disarmament conferences; but it is generally recognized that the 1899 conference was at least conceived of as such, and nations gathered together knowing they would speak of armaments. The Washington Conference is generally seen as the only successful pre-World War II arms control conference, involving fewer nations than Hague but more than SALT. It was the first such

conference in the interwar period, and it laid the groundwork for those which were to follow. SALT, on the other hand, is an entirely new concept. It directly involved only two nations, but literally involved the world. It came at a time when technological innovation was at its highest peak. It is currently the subject of intense debate, and arms control "experts" constantly attempt to generalize from this conference.

Before beginning the studies, however, it is necessary to clarify the terminology which will be used. The singular term "disarmament" has been used intermittently to represent any of three basic ideas: the total abolition of armaments, the absence of increases in armaments in general or in particular, or the reduction of armaments in general or in particular. Likewise, "arms control" has been used to cover several ideas. For example, Bernard Brodie says that arms control "includes disarmament, arms limitation, and specific guidance of future development."[4] Thomas Larson suggests that disarmament be "used to refer to measures envisaging the reduction or elimination of armaments or armed forces"; and that arms control or arms limitation be used interchangeably to represent "measures envisaging other kinds of limitations."[5] Others take arms control out of its historical context and use it to represent a certain idea, such as "steps aimed at reducing the risk of accidental, inadvertent, or miscalculated war, or

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[4]Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Co., 1973), p. 324.

[5]Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964-1968 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 4.

at reducing the frightfulness of nuclear war if it should break out."[6] John W. Spanier says that "disarmament refers to the complete abolition or partial reduction of the human and material resources of war. . . ."[7] These definitions combine to confuse, rather than to amplify.

This study will use, as a point of clarification, the definitions presented by Merze Tate in The Disarmament Illusion. Disarmament, then, is "the reduction of armaments to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety--which implies sufficient arms not only for internal policing but for the protection of territory against invasion." In sum, this is not to "lay down your arms," but rather the "limitation and reduction of armaments," and thus is a political problem. Limitation is the "abstention from increase of armaments," and reduction is "the general and simultaneous decrease or curtailment of armaments."[8] Any other nuances will be defined where they appear. "Arms control," then, means any and all of the above: disarmament, arms limitation, and arms reduction.

Weaponry refers to the actual armaments, land, sea, or air, which can be used in combat, either for defense of one's own possessions, or offensively against another nation in order to gain influence or possessions. Most will have a dual purpose: offense and defense. Qualitative innovations in weaponry are those improvements made in

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[6]Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964 (Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1966), p. 1, Fn. 1.

[7]John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament; A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 5.

[8]Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1971, c 1942), pp. ix-x.

weapons of such a nature so as to alter in some major way the then established manner of making war. In a word, these are changes which increase the "destructive potential of existing and follow-on systems"[9] so as to create concern in a nation not having this innovation.

The terms arms control "conference" and "negotiation" will be used interchangeably to mean "a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realization of a common interest. . . ." These proposals are not part of "tacit bargaining," but rather deal with such items as the agenda, rules, and technical and legal issues. Negotiations, in this sense, are needed anytime "explicit agreement is essential."[10]

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[9]John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), p. 3.

[10]Iklé, pp. 3-4.

CHAPTER II

THE HAGUE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907

The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were the result of a series of events, fears, and perceptions which had taken place in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The direct "antecedent act" was the Rescript of Czar Nicholas II which called for the nations of the world to meet at a conference in order to discuss ways which would hopefully lead to a lessening of the "arms race" then in effect. This original intent of the Rescipt was subsequently broadened to include other concerns, specifically international arbitration, and the first conference at the Hague began on May 18, 1899. These conferences did show that some topics could be discussed amenably with hope of agreement, but also that certain topics were not negotiable. If these latter topics were broached, a chorus quickly arose to render any discussion unproductive. As a result of the intransigence of several of the nations represented at the Hague, very little in the way of agreement on disarmament was reached. In the second conference the subject was even rejected as part of the formal program, and only peripheral agreements concerning the use of armaments were reached.

In the period preceding the conferences, the philosophy of most European nations appeared to be "if you wish for peace, you must prepare for war."[1] Bismark, for one, took this statement so seriously that he

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[1]William I. Hull, The Two Hague Conferences and Their Contributions to International Law (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1908; reprint ed., New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1970), p. 52.

converted Prussia and Germany into what has been described as a "modern Sparta." Other nations followed his lead to such an extent that, as William I. Hull, a noted expert on the conferences, stated, the "armed peace" became more of a burden than actual war had been before. This armed peace manifested itself in intense suspicion between nations. What may have been defensive moves by one nation, appeared as highly offensive to others. For example, on December 6, 1898, the Kaiser announced a request to the Reichstag for an increase in the army of 26,576 men. This was necessitated, he said, because of the unfortunate geographical position of Germany. Since Germany's neighbors were increasing armaments and military expenditures at a very rapid rate, the vulnerability of her two exposed fronts caused much concern. This increase in German troops, on the other hand, appeared to provide the "Austrian militarists" with a reason to clamor for increases in their armaments, which they did. In sum, as tensions became more intense toward the end of the century, alliances formed and military men prepared for war.[2]

As a response to this, peace societies became louder in their condemnation of war preparations. Also, many nations began to feel the economic pinch created by channeling large amounts of their national economic wealth into arms production. Because governments saw great utility in a militaristic posture, however, the onus was on those who proposed disarmament to show how it would benefit all. Since the peace movement after 1850 (the Universal Peace Congress, the churches, the Arbitration Alliance), could not convince governments to take action

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[2]Merze Tate, The Disarmament Illusion: The Movement for a Limitation of Armaments to 1907 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1971, c1942), pp. 252-56.

against armaments, another force had to provide the impetus to get the nations to a disarmament conference.[3]

This is not to imply, however, that the peace movement had no effect on the creation of the conferences at the Hague. The fact of the matter is, according to Merze Tate, an expert on disarmament conferences, that these peace societies did play some part in the eventual conferences, but it was not an overt role. Rather, it was a covert process which served to educate the publics of the various nations to a sense of their responsibilities. The peace groups were faced, however, with a massive effort on the part of government to maintain adequate defense capabilities. They attempted to convince their publics that it was impossible for them to limit armaments while neighboring states were increasing theirs. This ploy by the governments was successful, and the publics in most nations began to see disarmament as a "utopian dream."[4]

"In short," Tate argues, "in 1898 there existed in England, the United States, and to a lesser extent in France and Germany, an inchoate opinion in favor of a limitation of armaments, but this opinion did not exert a great influence upon governments. At the close of the century it was beginning to affect statesmen only in what they said, not in what they did."[5] The impetus for the top decision makers of the various nations, the kings, diplomats, emperors, presidents, etc., to finally begin to seriously consider a limitation in armaments resulted

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[3]Ibid., p. 160.

[4]Ibid., pp. 160-63.

[5]Ibid., p. 163.

not from public opinion, but primarily from budgets which became unmanageable in peacetime. They also became fearful of other things: the terror and hazards of war, internal revolution and "economic and political convulsions" in the social order--anything which might cause their downfall. Nevertheless, there was no movement towards a disarmament conference. They seemed content to live with their fears because of the thought, perhaps unconscious in some cases, that to reduce armaments might dangerously increase their vulnerability.[6]

Ironically, a proposal for a conference to discuss disarmament came from what Tate describes as, "a country where even pacifist opinion on the subject was only in a nascent form and still inarticulate, where all peace propaganda was carefully censored and where no Peace Society existed."[7] This was the Rescript from Czar Nicholas II of Russia.[8]

The reason for the Rescript, says Hull, was that the Czar and his advisors recognized the immense costs involved in keeping their army and navy at a quality and quantity equal to, or better than, the other major nations of the world, especially in Europe. The actual idea for the Rescript, according to Hull, came from an attempt by the Minister of War, General Alexie N. Kuropatkin, Finance Minister Count Witte, and Foreign Minister Count Muraviev, "to avoid the necessity of replacing an antiquated kind of artillery by a new and expensive one."[9]

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[6]Calvin Davis, The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), pp. 16-30.

[7]Tate, p. 163. According to Hull, p. 2, Russia at this time was considered the "world's largest military power."

[8]A Rescript, as defined in Webster, is "an official or authoritative order, decree, or formal announcement." Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 3d Ed. (1969), s. v. "Rescript."

[9]Hull, p. 2.

Calvin Davis, the author of The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference, agrees that Kuropatkin instigated the Rescript. It appears that Kuropatkin was very concerned over a relatively new qualitative advance in weaponry: a rapid-fire field gun which was reported to be capable of firing six rounds per minute, as compared to the one round per minute field guns then in existence. His concern heightened when he learned that the Austro-Hungarian Army was to acquire a number of these new weapons, which Both France and Germany already had. The problem faced by Kuropatkin was that if Russia was to join the armaments competition concerning these guns, it would cost approximately fifty million dollars, which the Russian treasury did not have. He also felt that loans would be impossible to obtain.[10]

Miss Tate's story, taken from the diary of E. J. Dillon,[11] differs only slightly from the above. It appears that the minister of the Marine, Admiral Grigorsvitch, requested a loan from the Czar for the reconstruction of the naval fleet; primarily because Germany was exceeding Russia in terms of naval strength. The Czar initially declined, but later partially gave in and authorized an amount of money for this purpose. Eight days later General Kuropatkin requested that the Czar authorize a national loan for the purchase of new firearms, and for the refurbishment of the Russian army along the same lines as then existed in France. The Czar declined this request, but Kuropatkin argued that intelligence reports indicated that Germany was becoming

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[10] Davis, p. 43.

[11] Dr. E. J. Dillon enjoyed an intimate friendship with Count Witte. He had lived in Russia under three Czars, had graduated from two Russian Universities, wrote for two Russian newspapers, and was Professor of Comparative Philosophy at the University of Kharkov.

too powerful and should be feared. He also pointed out that under a military convention which she had signed with France, Russia was obligated to retain a common system of weaponry with her ally. The Czar replied that he would consult with Count Muraviev to see what could be done to avoid this kind of expenditure.[12]

It was at this point that the influence of Nicholas' advisors come into the picture, for it was they who actually wrote the Rescript. Their motives appear different from the Czar's, however. They saw that "Russia needed peace for consolidating her new territorial acquisitions, for improving her economic and financial system, for the completion of her strategic railways and canals and for carrying out her new naval program."[13] Any respite in the competition for armaments would be an advantage to Russia.

The ministers to the Czar, in particular Count Witte, were certain that weakness and disunity of Russia would mean that any conflict with Germany would probably result in disintegration of Russia. In this regard, all wars must be avoided and peace sought. Peace would have the effect, and be a prerequisite for, the stabilization and regeneration of a solid financial base for Russia.[14]

What appeared as the final push for Russian initiation of the Rescript, according to Tate and Dillon,[15] was Kuropatkin relating to Muraviev that Austria-Hungary was on the verge of increasing and

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[12]Tate, p. 179.

[13]Ibid., p. 182.

[14]Ibid., pp. 184-87.

[15]The following is largely from Merze Tate and E. J. Dillon, The Eclipse of Russia (London: Curtus Brown, 1918). Davis echoes it to some extent, but rests his argument more on the military effects of the field gun.

replacing her artillery weapons. If she did so, thought Kuropatkin, Russia would have to do likewise. Kuropatkin's idea was that Russia propose to Austria that some form of compromise be reached between the two for the elimination of the excessive burden of refitting for artillery. This proposal was to be for a temporary period of ten years.

Count Witte, when informed of this plan by Muraviev, was in disagreement. He believed this arrangement would only serve to inform Austria and Germany that Russia was in financial straits, which would definitely not be in Russia's best interest. What Witte proposed was a "ruse" to be used to convince Austria that disarmament should be discussed. He envisioned the development of a group of pacific nations in competition with each other over trade, science, and industry. To make this a reality, thought Witte, the nations should begin to think in these terms. What should be proposed, he suggested, was a plan to bring all of the major nations in the world together at a conference.[16]

If the above explanation for the origination of the Rescript is accepted, says Tate, then the conclusion which has to be reached is that the Rescript was not brought about through "idealistic motives," but that it was conceived by Witte and Muraviev as an attempt to help Russia out of her extreme financial difficulties.[17] As E. J. Dillon states:

> There would in all probability have been no Hague conference if General Kuropatkin had asked in the ordinary way for the necessary credit to enable him to follow the example of his German colleague and supply the Russian

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[16]Dillon, pp. 270-79.

[17]Tate, p. 195.

> army with a new gun. It is equally probable that if Witte had simply accepted or rejected the War minister's suggestion of a 'deal' with Austria, the peace conference would not have been convoked or thought of. . . . However high we may rate the contributory causes of the peace movement inaugurated by Nicholas II, history will retain the decisive fact that the motive of its prime author [Witte] was to hoodwink the Austrian Government and to enable the Tsar's War Minister to steal a march on his country's future enemies.[18]

Davis also sums it in this light. He says that "the truth was that the peace rescript had been conceived in fear, brought forth in deceit, and swaddled in humanitarian ideals."[19]

The Rescript, which acquired the name the Czar's Rescript, was formally issued on August 27, 1898. It said that:

> The maintenance of universal peace and a possible reduction of the excessive armaments . which weigh upon all nations represent, in the present conditions of affairs all over the world, the ideal towards which the efforts of all governments should be directed.[20]

It further stated that the time was ripe for a discussion of this problem on an international scale. It also made reference to the movements and opinions directed towards peace in the preceding decades, and alluded to efforts of governments toward entering into alliances, and strengthening their military forces for peace. It finally pointed out that these efforts had not brought peace.

Next, the Rescript spoke of the financial burden undergone by the various nations of the world because of the development of their

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[18] Dillon, p. 278.

[19] Davis, p. 43.

[20] I use the Rescript as quoted in Tate, pp. 167-69.

military forces and the role of technology in improving their weapons. It said:

> Hundreds of millions are spent in acquiring terrible engines of destruction which are regarded to-day as the latest inventions of science, but are destined to-morrow to be rendered obsolete by some new discovery. National cultural, economical progress, and the production of wealth are either paralysed or developed in a wrong direction. . . . The constant danger involved in this accumulation of war material renders the armed peace of to-day a crushing burden more and more difficult for the nations to bear.[21]

The Rescript went on and said that if this burden increased, then disaster could be the only result. Thus, the Rescript called for a limitation on the increase of armaments through the convocation of a conference to take up this question. It was signed by Count Muraviev.

Copies of the Rescript were given to all foreign ambassadors then in Russia. Muraviev expressed the Czar's reason for such a conference as a desire to open hearings on halting all increases of armaments. In clarification he said that armaments in existence would be allowed to remain, and no political questions would be discussed. Because of Russia's vast military forces the Rescript surprised the diplomats, conservatively speaking, and the reactions evoked were generally of a suspicious nature.[22]

In the United States the Rescript elicited a divided opinion. One group believed that the Czar feared "rapprochement of England and America and [the] appearance of the United States in the Far East."[23] Another group believed that the Czar was not concerned with the armaments

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Davis, p. 39.

[23] Ibid., p. 38.

of the United States at all, and, therefore, the cry for a limitation on armaments was of no concern to them. In any regard, since at the time the United States was in a war with Spain and rapidly increasing armaments, it consequently saw that a conference concerning armaments was essentially impractical. The United States decided to attend the proposed conference, but let it be known beforehand that it would not limit arms.[24]

Russia was surprisingly skeptical herself. She quickly let it be known that decisions made at the conference would not be binding; but the Czar, at a minimum, hoped to establish some commission which would insure that discussion of armaments would continue. He and his advisors were especially concerned because Russia had no industry to speak of: especially an armaments industry. Thus Russia was forced to purchase all powders and armaments abroad, thereby contributing to the drain on her financial resources.

Germany appeared to be outwardly agreeable, but privately skeptical. The Kaiser was the first to react to the Rescript, and did so by sending a telegram to the Czar saying, diplomatically, that Russian motives were good and "pure," but the idea of a general disarmament was not in itself a simple scheme, but rather very complex and difficult. He did not reject the Rescript out of hand, but said that it would be studied.[25]

In essence, Germany felt nothing of much value would come from the conference since, having to defend two frontiers, any limitation

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[24]Ibid., p. 40.

[25]Ibid.

of armaments was seen as placing her at an extreme disadvantage with her neighbors. The Kaiser thought that Russia's financial difficulties accounted for the Rescript, and that since Russia could no longer obtain money from France (the Russian debt to France had reached large proportions), she was attempting to obtain loans from England and Germany by means of a facade of pacifism. But to reject the Rescript out of hand, thought the Kaiser, might cause other nations to blame Germany for scuttling a chance for peace in the world.[26]

Two letters from the Kaiser reveal the above as probably true. In one he states:

> The whole plan seems to me to be due merely to the financial exhaustion of Russia . . . . Taxes can hardly be increased, and culture is at the lowest ebb. Witte had no further [financial] sources, since France has given out and Germany and England are no longer willing. Whereby it is clearly proven that so far Europe has paid for the Russian armaments. All this must be counted in, along with the young Tsar's humanitarian nonsense which has led him to this incredible step. There's a bit of deviltry in it too, because any one who refuses the invitation will be said to want to break the peace and that at a moment when Russia cannot go further, while others--especially Germany--can now begin and make up for lost time.[27]

In another letter, speaking of Muraviev and Witte, he said:

> The vanity of the former was tickled by the idea of presiding over a conference, and thus having the opportunity of bringing himself into prominence and getting himself talked about, a consideration which influenced most of his actions, and the latter was in a serious want of money, and thought that the proclamation of a pacific policy

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[26] Tate, pp. 250-51.

[27] Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4219, pp. 149-50. Prince von Bülow to Kaiser William II, August 28, 1898, quoted in Tate, p. 252.

> would open for him the money markets of London and Berlin, which had now become a matter of vital necessity, since he had lost all hope of receiving further supplies from France.[28]

The British view of armaments appears best expressed by a statement made in the House of Commons in 1899 by George J. Goschen, the first Lord of the Admiralty, when he declared that the British would reduce naval constuction if other leading naval powers would do likewise. Britain, however, was the only major power to make this gesture.[29] In any regard, the British remained skeptical of a conference. Lord Salisbury, the Prime Minister, had been concerned about armament increases for some time, but he saw no solution which would lead to a halt in these increases, or any reduction. He accepted the Russian invitation, but reasoned that until others reduced their armaments, England could not.

Tate states that, although he had been concerned over armament increases, Lord Salisbury

> was far from sure that a reduction was desirable even if the powers were to agree to a scheme. Although its immediately [sic] effect might be to decrease the burdens of taxation, it would, at the same time, rob war of some of its terrors, and thus add a new peril to those threatening the general peace. He was of opinion [sic] that no peace is possible in Europe without an armed force behind it. . . . He believed that the perfection of the instruments of warfare, their extreme costliness, and the horrible carnage and destruction which would accompany their employment on a large scale

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[28] G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, British Documents on the Origin of the War, 1898-1914, vol. I. (London, 1927), p. 222, Sir F. Lascelles to the Marquess of Salisbury, Berlin, December 22, 1898, quoted in Tate, p. 252.

[29] Davis, p. 84.

> acted as a serious deterrent from war; armaments were so adjusted as to render a successful war not worth striving for.[30]

France was initially cold but polite toward the Rescript. Due to its previous close contacts with Russia, France was initially offended by not being consulted by the Czar before he issued the Rescript. France was convinced of the infeasibility of arms limitation for itself, but went along because it did not want to be accused as being the one responsible for obstructing the conference.[31] France's real feelings appear to be recorded in a letter to Count Münster of Germany from foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé of France. Delcassé said:

> In this conference we have entirely the same interest as you. You will not limit your forces at this moment nor agree to proposals of disarmament, we are in the same position. On both sides we wish to spare the Tsar and to find a formula to circumvent this question; but we will not let ourselves in for anything which might weaken our forces on either side. But to avoid a complete fiasco we may possibly be able to make a few concessions about arbitration. But these must not in any case limit the full independence of the great States.[32]

Italy, on the other hand, was very interested in reduction of budgets, while Turkey was not interested in disarmament at all. Japan acknowledged that due to heavy expenditures for both its army and navy, it was anxious for the conference.

The reaction of the mass media to the Rescript was at first cautious but, by and large, sympathetic to the humanitarian interests shown by the Czar. From this, however, the media soon turned to ridicule

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[30] Tate, p. 259.

[31] Davis, p. 89.

[32] Die Grosse Politik, XV, No. 4253, p. 186, Count Münster to Prince von Hohenloke, Paris, April 21, 1899, quoted in Tate, p. 256.

and skepticism. It saw that Russia was in a financial bind, and was therefore promoting a conference on limiting arms primarily because the Czar lacked the money for purchase of armaments. The media further questioned the viability of the Czar's proposal for a disarmament conference at the same time he was refurbishing his armed forces.

Due to the tremendous amount of skepticism resulting from the original Rescript, Czar Nicholas II and his ministers made an effort to ameliorate what seemed to be the artificially altruistic motives of the Rescript by issuing a second notice, or circular, which considerably broadened the scope of the original. The question of disarmament was made subordinate to other problems and proposals, for example, arbitration; and this modification was better received.

This second proposal contained the following:[33]

> 1. An understanding stipulating the non increase, for a definite period, of the present effective military and naval forces, and also of the military budgets pertaining to them; and a preliminary investigation of the means by which even a reduction in these forces and budgets may be secured in the future.
>
> 2. A prohibition of the introduction, in armies and navies, of any new kinds of firearms whatsoever, as well as of new explosives or any powders more powerful than those now in use, either for muskets or for cannon.
>
> 3. A restriction of the use, in military campaigns, of the formidable explosives already existing; and a prohibition of the hurling of projectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons or by analogous means.
>
> 4. A prohibition of the use, in naval warfare, of submarine torpedo boats or plungers, or of

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[33]James Brown Scott, The Work of the Second Hague Conference (New York: American Assn. for International Conciliation, 1908), pp. 45-46. A slightly different translation can be found in Davis, pp. 111, 112, 115, 120, and in Tate, pp. 267-69.

> other similar engines of destruction; and an agreement not to construct in the future war vessels with rams.
>
> 5. The application to naval warfare of the stipulation of the Geneva Convention of 1864, on the basis of the additional articles of 1868.
>
> 6. The neutralization of ships or boats employed in saving those overboard during or after naval battles.
>
> 7. A revision of the Declaration concerning the laws and customs of war, elaborated in 1874 by the Conference of Brussels and remaining unratified to the present day.
>
> 8. The acceptance, in principle, of the employment of good offices, of mediation and of facultative arbitration, in cases adaptable to them, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between nations; and understanding as to the method of their application, and the establishment of a uniform practice in their employment.

All invited countries accepted this program as it stood.

Most of the delegates appointed to the conference carried with them the skepticism of their governments. Some even appeared embarrassed to be attending a conference in which they would be expounding goals which they felt to be rather ludicrous. On the American side, Andrew D. White, the highly-regarded Ambassador to Germany, was chosen to head the delegation.[34] The instructions to the American delegation by Secretary of State Hay were that the conference should not stand in the way of continued development of the United States military forces. In sum, says Davis, "These instructions made certain

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[34]Other members of U. S. delegation were Frederick W. Holls, private citizen (speciality intl'law); Capt. W. R. Crozier (ordinance officer); Capt. Alfred T. Mahan (naval expert); Stanford Newel (Ambassador to the Netherlands); and Seth Low (President of Columbia University).

that the United States would not participate in any moves concerning the major intent of the peace rescript, namely, control of armaments, but they did indicate desire by the State Department to regain for the United States its reputation as a champion of arbitration."[35]

Germany appointed as one of its delegates the Baron Karl von Stengel, a professor at the University of Munich. He had published a pamphlet, Der Ewige Friede, in which war was glorified and the impending conference was characterized as a "daydream". This went along with the essential distrust the Germans held for the conference.[36]

The Conference opened on May 18, 1899, in closed session.[37] M. de Staal of Russia was elected as President of the Conference, with the offices of official secretary going to the representatives from Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Russia. Three commissions were formed to consider the points presented in Count Muraviev's second circular. The First Commission was concerned with questions of armaments: points one, two, three, and four of the circular. The Second Commission considered points five, six, and seven, dealing with rules of war; and the Third Commission dealt with point eight, concerning arbitration. Each country was allowed to have representation on all three commissions, with one vote per commission. The only exception was Russia, for Montinegro had no representative at the

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[35]Davis, p. 80.

[36]They saw the conference as a game of strategy.

[37]Hull, p. 22, states that the meetings were to be secret with no stenographer to record the proceedings, but pressure was brought to bear on the delegates by the press, resulting in information briefings being given to the journalists. The information given, however, was, according to Hull, "meager, half-true, or wholly false."

conference, and commissioned Russia to act on her behalf. On the First Commission, Auguste Beernaert of Belgium was selected as president, with Münster of Germany and White of the United States as honorary presidents.

The emphasis of the conference, beginning with the remarks at the opening session, was on arbitration and not armaments; but some work was done in the First Commission to attempt to salvage something on this question. At the opening session of the First Commission, de Staal stated that there was a need for "alleviating the burdens of peace, not by disarmament, but by a limitation, a halt, in the ascending course of armaments and expenditures."[38]

Colonel Gilinsky of Russia, after speaking of the need to curb increased armaments, presented the specific Russian proposals for land warfare to the First Commission.[39] These, in summary form, were as follows: 1. A proposal for prohibiting an increase in the number of troops maintained in peacetime in each country (this prohibition was to last for a period of five years); 2. A means to determine the present level of troops; and 3. A prohibition against increasing military budgets over what was then in force.

The German reply, delivered by Colonel von Schwarzhoff, was that:

> The German people are not crushed beneath the weight of expenditure and taxes; they are not hanging on the edge of a precipice; they are not hastening towards exhaustion and ruin. Quite the contrary: public and private wealth is increasing; the general welfare and standard

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[38]Quoted in Hull, p. 55.

[39]The following points (Hull, pp. 56-57) and most of the following arguments reference the First Commission are summarized from Hull.

of life are rising from year to year.[40]

He continued by stating his belief in the impossibility of the tasks presented in each of the proposals. He expressed his "confidence" in the rulers of nations, meaning that an excess of armaments alone would not cause war. He went on to say that the technical difficulties implicit in the proposals were in fact "insurmountable obstacles." He also objected to the advisability of considering the question of troops by itself. The number of troops, he said, was connected to too many other conditions, like length of service and public training of citizens, to be a separate entity with any specific meaning. The defense of a nation, he pointed out, was not simply a question of the number of troops. One should also consider a nation's "character, its history, and its traditions, taking into account its economic resources, its geographical situation, and the duties which devolve upon it."[41] To determine the effect of any single one of these items would be impossible. He concluded by saying that although Germany was receptive to the notion of a limitation of armaments, the problems in the way of such an agreement made the notion impossible to obtain in actuality.

Gilinsky's reply was that it was first necessary that an agreement be made, then the states could arrange for its enforcement. Von Schwazhoff's answer was to note that a nation's strength can be increased by means such as railroads, and this without raising the levels of troops.

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[40] Quoted in Hull, p. 58.

[41] Ibid., p. 59.

Mr. van Karnebeck of the Netherlands attempted to bring the two views closer together. He said that even if monies spent on military needs were not a heavy burden to a nation, as appeared the case in Germany, it should at least be recognized that better uses could be found for the money. The question must be looked at, not from a parochial view, but from a more universal one. It may be, he went on to say, that these expenditures were not really necessary for national defense, but rather were "the result of international competition." The Russian proposal, he pointed out, was that the cost could be reduced to those who could not afford it by eliminating or reducing international competition. However, if this was not a suitable argument, he went on to say, there was another way of looking at this problem. If those at home favoring reduced military spending were not satisfied, then the "enormous military expenditures which burden nations may furnish dangerous weapons against the established social order."[42] This type of argument changed no-one's minds.

A military committee[43] was formed to consider the above discussion. No minutes were kept, but its report to the commission was as follows:

> The members of the committee charged with the examination of the propositions of Colonel Gilinsky, relating to the first topic of Count Mouravieff's circular, have met twice. With the exception of Colonel Gilinsky, they have decided unanimously: first, that it would be very difficult to fix, even for a term of five years, the number of troops, without regulating at the same time other elements of the national defense; second, that

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[42] Ibid., p. 61.

[43] The members, all military, were from Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Romania, Russia, and the United States.

> it would be no less difficult to regulate by an international agreement the elements of this defense, organized in each country upon very different principles. Hence, the committee regrets its inability to accept the proposition made in the name of the Russian government. The majority of its members believe that a more thorough study of the question by the governments themselves would be desirable.[44]

This was accepted by the commission.

When the specific questions which concerned armaments were finally discussed at the Conference, they revolved around three subject areas: air warfare, warfare on the high seas, and warfare on land.[45]

With regard to air warfare, the main topic discussed was the throwing or dropping of explosives or projectiles from balloons. In commenting on this, and this appeared to reflect many of the thoughts of the delegates on this particular subject, General Poortugael of the Netherlands said the following: "Since such attacks can not be guarded against, they resemble treachery; and all that resembles treachery should be scrupulously eliminated. Let us be chivalrous even in the manner of making war!"[46] Gilinsky echoed this, saying that what each nation then had for war was adequate. Mounier of France expressed his concern for the safety of non-combatants.

The subcommittee agreed to prohibit this use of balloons, but Captain Crozier of the United States made a proposal that this prohibition be limited to a period of five years. His argument was that the use of balloons at some time in the future might be humanitarian by

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[44] Quoted in Hull, pp. 62-63.

[45] For the best discussion of this see Davis.

[46] Quoted in Hull, p. 77.

"localizing" destruction at specific critical points, thus turning the tide of battle there without involving persons at other locations on the battlefield. The proposal with this amendment was adopted by unanimous vote.

In the discussions of warfare at sea, the subcommittee handling the problem quickly became tied down in a discussion of the second topic of the circular, specifically the definition of what "new kinds of firearms" meant. Captain Scheine of Russia said that "the term should be understood in the sense of an entirely new type, and should not include transformations and improvements."[47] This definition was in turn opposed by Japan, France, and Great Britain. Admiral Fisher of Great Britain said that a country would have the best arms it could afford, because they "tend to shorten and to prevent wars."[48] If restrictions were placed on new types of weaponry, he went on to say, then the "civilized" nations come to be at a disadvantage vis-a-vis "savage" nations.

In response, Scheine cited proposals to illustrate what he had meant by new types. First, reference marine cannon, he proposed that a temporary agreement be made to limit the caliber and initial velocity of these weapons. Captain Mahan objected saying that if these were to be limited, then the type and size of armor should also be limited. Admiral Pephan of France then suggested that an agreement should be reached whereby all nations would pledge not to introduce, for a temporary period, "a radical transformation in existing types, such as

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[47] Ibid., p. 83.

[48] Ibid., p. 84.

that from a muzzle-loading to a breech-loading cannon."[49] He also suggested that the caliber of weapons remain as they presently were. The vote was seven for, and seven against, with the affirmative votes being given by small powers, and the negative votes coming from the large powers. The result was a vote on a proposal to have this subject sent to the governments for serious study. This passed ten to three, with the three negative votes from Germany, Italy, and the United States.

Schéine's next proposal was a prohibition on "new explosives, or any powders more powerful than those now in use." The delegate from Siam opposed this because "the employment of explosives, particularly for the small powers, constitutes a special means of defense." Great Britain and France also objected. Schéine changed his proposal to read a prohibition of the use of "projectiles charged with explosives which diffuse asphyxiating or deleterious gases . . . . [these] include only those projectiles whose object is to diffuse asphyxiating gases, and not to those whose explosion produces incidentally such gases."[50]

This new proposal was supported by Austria-Hungary, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Portugal, and Russia. Their argument was that the purpose of the conference was to reduce what the various countries had in the world for destruction. Their primary goal, then, was to attempt to prevent the occurrence of new means of destruction. The phantasm of death from asphyxiation, to them, was more cruel and ghastly than by other means then in existence. This prohibition passed with

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[49] Ibid., p. 86.

[50] Ibid., p. 87.

only one dissenting vote, that of the United States. Its argument was that these new weapons had not been adequately tested as yet; therefore, they might, in the end, be more humane than others which were then in use. The proposal for the provision was passed at a meeting of the entire conference with only Great Britain and the United States dissenting.[51]

The next subject discussed by the naval subcommittee was the question of torpedo boats and rams. Torpedo boats (including submarines) had not seen much use prior to 1899, and their future was questionable. With this in mind, no specific proposals were advanced by Russia for their prohibition. Through general conversation, Denmark, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia all agreed to prohibit their use, but only if unanimity was attained. The United States reserved the right for the unrestricted use of the boats, however, and Austria-Hungary, France, and several other smaller nations saw that they were a good defensive weapon for their ports. The subject was dropped, and the subcommittee concentrated on rams. No agreement was reached on these, either.[52]

In the area of warfare on land, Gilinsky proposed that the use of explosives in any conflict be confined to that which was presently in existence, and that a moratorium be placed on manufacturing of new explosives. Crozier of the United States opposed this with the standard answer that new explosives may be better and cheaper than the old ones; therefore, money could be saved. A vote was taken, and the subject was

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[51]Great Britain voted no because unanimity had not been attained.

[52]Davis, p. 120.

referred to the will of each state.

The subject of field guns was then discussed. The Russians proposed that the cannon then in use in several nations, the new rapid-fire field gun, should be the limit of innovation, and that these cannon should not be modified further. Gilinsky further stated that armies should be permitted to acquire these new guns if they did not already have them. However, the reaction was entirely negative. No nation except Russia wished to limit innovations. The proposal was voted on, with no affirmative votes, and Bulgaria and Russia abstaining. The subject was dropped.

Next the subject of muskets was discussed. Gilinsky suggested that since the majority of the muskets in use by the armies of the world were approximately of the same caliber and quality, a period of time should be established during which a moratorium would be placed on changes in the types of muskets presently in use. He made this into a proposal and also added that no one could improve the quality of their muskets, even if the weapon was of inferior quality than those held by some nations. In other words, he went on, existing types of muskets could be improved, but a transformation of the weapon itself could not be made; e.g., to make them automatic.

This proposal evoked much response. General Zuccari of Italy saw that in reality the differences in quality and caliber of muskets in the armies of the world was very great. Colonel Kuepach of Austria-Hungary said that it would be hard to define the effects of innovations, because even small improvements could essentially transform the character of the weapon.

In light of these responses, Russia made a counter-proposal

covering a minimum weight and caliber for muskets, a minimum weight for bullets, a maximum muzzle velocity, and a maximum rate of fire of twenty-five rounds per minute. Colonel von Schwarzhoff of Germany responded that this would not work because it would make the weapon too heavy for the soldier. In addition, he said, muzzle velocity depended on the type of powder used, and since no provision was made on development of new powders, the proposition was faulty. The proposal was rejected.

General Poortugael of the Netherlands then proposed that a five year moratorium on improving muskets and on producing new ones be instituted, and that all nations be allowed to adopt the best muskets then in use. The vote was ten yes, and ten no.[53] Colonel von Schwarzhoff reflected the views of the major powers when he said: "We should not tie our hands in advance so that we should have to ignore more humane methods which may be invented in the future."[54]

Next, the subject of bullets, specifically "dumdum" bullets, was discussed. The argument against the dumdum was that they made "incurable wounds" because of their tendency to flatten out upon entering the body. Gilinsky formulated a resolution stating; "The contracting Powers prohibit the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with hard jackets, whose jacket does not entirely cover the core or has incisions in it."[55] Since these bullets were used in large part by the British army, the provision appeared to be directed at them. The vote was nineteen for the resolution, and one

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[53]Negative votes were cast by Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Switzerland, Turkey, and the U.S.

[54]Quoted in Hull, p. 181.

[55]Ibid., p. 182.

against (Great Britain, later joined by the United States).[56]

The efforts of the First Commission resulted in only three declarations being brought before the Conference for vote. First, the prohibition against throwing projectiles from balloons was passed unanimously. Second, the prohibition against use of dumdum bullets was passed with negative votes coming from Great Britain and the United States. Third, the prohibition on projectiles containing asphyxiating gas was passed with negative votes coming from Great Britain and the United States.

The only major reservation at the conference apparently came from the American delegation. It was read into the conference permanent record and said:

> Nothing contained in this Convention shall be so construed as to require the United States of America to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions or policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything contained in the said Convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.[57]

With respect to armaments, the Hague conference of 1899 was a failure. A reason appears to be that, as Davis concludes,

> No great power--and few secondary powers--really desired limitation of armaments. Cherishing national and imperial ambitions, fearful of their enemies, and distrustful of their friends, nations sent representatives to the Hague not to promote peace but to prevent success for the principal Russian

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[56]The above discussion of the workings of the conference is taken from Hull, Scott, and Davis. They agree on all important points.

[57]James Brown Scott, The Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences: The Conference of 1899 (New York, 1920), pp. 84, 87, quoted in Davis, p. 179.

> proposals--proposals in which the Russians themselves had no faith.[58]

It also appears that the conference attempted much more than the delegates were willing to be party to. The issues were decidedly complex, and when one country suggested a way to control armaments, others were quick to point out the infeasibility of the proposal; e.g., the rifle problem. The complexity of the problems helped stymie any movement towards armament control. In the end, the main objective of the original Rescript--the limitation of armaments--had been rejected, with only peripheral and, by and large, meaningless restrictions on armaments passed. The major accomplishments came from the works of the other two commissions: neither having to do with armaments.

In the period between the two Hague conferences, two major wars were fought: the Anglo-Boer war, and the Russo-Japanese war. Moreover,

> a combined European and American army avenged the outrages of the Boxers by sacking Peking. England fought in the Transvaal, five thousand miles from her base of supplies; the United States had just conquered and now held under military rule possessions at even greater distance from home water. All these wars demonstrated the new significance of sea power in history and intensified the naval armament competition.[59]

Nevertheless, the subject of armaments control was becoming more prominent in these years between the two conferences at the Hague. This was due to the tremendous arms competition which ensued after the Conference of 1899, and to the determination by some of the major powers that the subject should be spoken of at the next conference.[60]

There was also a rising consensus that the discussions

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[58]Davis, p. 212. [59]Tate, p. 294. [60]Ibid.

of armaments at the Conference of 1899 had been taken up, as Hull says,

> "at the wrong end"; that it had devoted itself chiefly to the balancing of ship against ship and tonnage against tonnage, and had consequently fallen into a hopeless technical tangle and mathematical snarl; that what was needed was a thorough study of the economic and political aspects of the question. But this study, recommended by the conference itself, was not entered upon by the governments; and statesmen continued to suggest mathematical solutions of the problem, such as the reduction of the size of battle ships, or the restriction of military budgets for a term of five years to the amounts expended during the preceding five years.[61]

Moreover, the various peace societies around the globe continued to show their concern over the cost and quantity of new naval weapons. Many resolutions made and passed at the various peace congresses from 1904 to 1907 called for a limitation on armaments. One such congress, the Inter-Parliamentary Union, played a vital role in the onset of the 1907 Conference. It held its 1904 conference at St. Louis, Missouri, where a resolution was adopted calling for an international conference, made up of governmental delegates of the various countries of the world, to discuss those questions left for future consideration by the Conference of 1899. The Union requested that the President of the United States call on other governments to establish this new conference. On October 21, 1904, President Roosevelt sent a circular proposing a second Hague Conference to the various governments of the world, but Russia and Japan in particular (both then engaged in war), felt that the time was not right and the matter was postponed.[62]

After the Russo-Japanese war, the cry for a conference was again

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[61] Hull, p. 69.

[62] Tate, pp. 319-20.

heard, but the tone had changed. Russia, for one, no longer wanted to limit armaments, but rather to increase them. Great Britain, on the other hand, felt that the conference should include talk of disarmament. Roosevelt also wanted the conference to include talk of limitation of armaments, and advocated the limiting of the size of battleships to 15,000 tons. France, Great Britain, Spain, and the United States all indicated their willingness to discuss the topic of arms limitation at the conference; but Austria, Germany, Japan, and Russia indicated that they would not discuss the question, even if it was introduced.[63]

Hull feels that Russia did not want to bring up the subject for two reasons: first, the opposition the Russian government had faced during the first conference, and second, the Russian's suspicion that if they included a discussion of limitation of armaments in the program, it would create discord and a lack of co-operation among the delegates at the conference.[64] Tate, on the other hand, feels that the desire to increase arms was due to Russia's poor conduct in the Russo-Japanese war.

The Germans apparently felt that it would not be to their advantage to limit armaments either. They saw themselves as becoming a great power, and were in the process of increasing the size of their already large merchant marine. To become a great power, a large, strong navy was a necessity. In sum, in the intervening years between the two conferences, especially during the period between the proposal for the Second Conference and its actual acceptance by the major powers;

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[63] See Tate, pp. 324-29, for further discussion of Great Britain's views.

[64] Hull's basis for this was a speech made during the Second Conference by the Russian delegate, M. Nelidow.

the question of disarmament, the feasibility of such a topic being discussed, was a subject of much debate among the major nations of the world. In order to show her desires and good will, Great Britain did announce in 1906 the scrapping of one battleship which was to be built, and likewise reduced the number of submarines and destroyers it did have; however, this was of no help.[65]

The President of the United States then sent a circular to the various governments of the world proposing a new conference. The response was favorable, but out of deference to the Czar, Roosevelt yielded the making of the program and the actual protocols to Nicholas II. The conference was called for 15 June, 1907, but when the Russian proposal was sent to the various nations, it excluded any discussion of the limitation of armaments.

Russia proposed a program but specifically excluded those questions "which concern the restriction of military or naval forces. . . ."[66] The program consisted of improving the rules of land and maritime warfare, and of improving the arbitration procedures agreed on at the Hague Conference of 1899.

Not all governments agreed to the above conditions, however, and several reservations were noted. The United States, Great Britain, and Spain, reserved the right to submit questions on the reduction or limitation of armaments.[67] On the other hand, Austria, Bolivia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Japan, the Netherlands, and Russia, all reserved the

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[65]Tate, pp. 350-52.

[66]Quoted in Hull, p. 48.

[67]The change in U.S. views from 1899 represented Roosevelt's conceptions.

right to abstain from discussion of any topic which would appear to be leading to no useful result.

It was almost two months into the conference in 1907 when Sir Edward Fry of Great Britain finally brought up the subject of disarmament. He pointed out that since the 1899 conference the actual expenses for military forces had increased in large amounts. These expenditures, he went on to say, could be put to better use. He acknowledged that the idea embodied in the limit on armaments was "noble," but the important question was, "Is this wish attainable?"[68] Great Britain, he said, was willing to work towards this goal. He saw, however, that it was the duty of any and all states to provide for a defense capable of protecting the inhabitants from any danger from outside forces; and that only these states could decide best how to fulfill this duty. In this, then, lay the fact that any armament limitation must come through the "good will" of each nation. He concluded by proposing to establish the "means" for securing this good will. His declaration was as follows:

> The Government of Great Britain will be ready to communicate each year to the powers that will do the same, its plan of constructing new war ships and the expenditures which this plan will require. Such an exchange of information will facilitate an exchange of views between the governments on the reduction which by common agreement may be effected. The Britannic Government believes that in this way an understanding may be reached on the expenditures which the states that agree to pursue this course will be justified in entering upon their budgets.[69]

He then proposed a resolution which stated:

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[68]Quoted in Hull, p. 72.

[69]Ibid., p. 73.

> The Second Conference of Peace re-affirms the resolution adopted by the Conference of 1899 regarding the limitations of military charges, and considers that these military burdens have considerably increased in almost all the countries since the last date. The Conference declares that it is especially to be desired that the governments should undertake again the serious study of this question.[70]

Following this, M. Nelidow of Russia, the President of the Second Conference, stated that if the discussion of disarmament "was not ripe in 1899, it is not more so in 1907. Nothing has been done in the matter, and the conference is quite as little prepared to deal with it to-day as it was then."[71] Any discussion of the topic at this conference, he went on to say, would be "fruitless" and a probable cause of enormous disagreement, thus jeopardizing the aims set forth in the proposal. The best course of action, he suggested, was that the British resolution be affirmed to demonstrate that there was "unity" in the general intent to limit armaments, and a consensus that the problem may "some day" be solved. The resolution was then adopted by acclamation. This was the extent of discussion on this question during the Second Conference.[72]

In conclusion, an excellent case can be made for the proposition that as disarmament conferences, both of the Hague Conferences were colossal failures. Proving this, however, was not the intent of this chapter. It was, rather, to define the role of technological weapon innovations in bringing the conferences about.

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[70]Quoted in Scott, Work of the Second Conference, p. 24.

[71]Quoted in Hull, pp. 74-75.

[72]Ibid. The best account of the fourteen conventions of the 1907 conference is to be found in Scott, Work of the Second Conference, pp. 14-23.

It has been shown that the majority, if not all, of the major nations of the day did not feel that limitations of armaments, or even arms budgets, could be discussed with any hope of a successful conclusion. They were concerned about armament expenditures, to be sure, but up to the time of the Czar's Rescript, no other nation had come forward to seriously propose that a conference be initiated to limit these arms.

Thus, when the question of the impetus for the Hague Conference of 1899 is examined, it must be noted that if it were not for the concern of Russia over a new rapid-fire field gun, the conference might never have been called. It is quite easy to reason, however, that if arms expenditures were growing to the concern of all, then the impetus would have come from this fact; and if not for this field gun, other actual "causes" would have come about eventually.

To reason this way, however, is to neglect the fact that qualitatively speaking, the existence of this new weapon changed, to a large extent, the then prevalent concept of war. War became a more bloody venture where the firepower of this new gun would increase by six times the amount of artillery explosives which could be brought to bear on an enemy. Tactics would have to be changed. Also, Russia found herself, not as the strongest armed nation in the world, but as one which qualitatively had been relegated to an inferior position in firepower vis-à-vis other nations. This evidently caused great concern to the Russians. Other nations in Europe which always had inferior forces, and which did not see themselves as major powers, were not concerned. Moreover, Great Britain and the United States, separated from the threat of ground combat in Europe, were also unconcerned. Thus

the only major "have-not" nation was Russia.

When Russia went to her treasury to finance these desired guns, however, it found itself in financial straits. It could barely afford these weapons, and what of the next technological innovation in weaponry? In the financial sense, Russia had reached the limit of its ability to purchase innovative changes. In this light, the arguments of Tate and Dillon of the Russian financial straits, brought on by what Kuropatkin and Muraviev saw as a necessary purchase of a field gun, appear most logical. The question that needs to be resolved, then, is was it the new advance in weaponry or a financial problem which provided the impetus for the Rescript? This is an unanswerable question (any answer is probably related to the timing of both occurrences).

In addition, one may ask if the above point is moot in the light of the Russian proposal at the conference for a limitation on innovations beyond these field guns. To this I would say no, because logic appears to suggest that France, Germany, and even Austria-Hungary, would not give up their advantage in these weapons. The only alternative for Russia was to propose that they establish this as a limit, and allow other nations (Russia) to attain this same level. If they could do so, and this level remained the ceiling of qualitative advances in field artillery weaponry, then Russia would once again have the superior force on the Continent.

By the time of the 1907 conference, however, Russia found herself in a position of having lost face to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war of 1905. To admit under these circumstances, especially after the negative reaction at the 1899 conference, that it desired a limitation of armaments, would only show insecurity and weakness. It is entirely

possible that Russia expected the subject to be brought up by others at a third conference (a third conference was proposed at the 1907 conference).

It remains, then, to point out that the other nations entered into these conferences not out of a real desire to limit armaments, but out of an obscure desire not to be the government which could be singled out as having scuttled a conference with such high ideals. Also, as the emphasis on limitations of armaments was reduced as a result of the Czar's second circular, more possibilities were opened for discussion which were of interest to the other nations; e.g., arbitration, care for sick, wounded, and prisoners of war, etc.

CHAPTER III

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE FOR THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT, 1921-1922

The Washington Conference for the Limitation of Armament of 1921-1922 undertook to solve two fairly distinct problems; limitation of armaments, and Pacific and Far Eastern questions. Because both were discussed at a single conference, there is a tendency among scholars to attribute to the latter the primary motive for the onset of the conference. This is not necessarily so. The impetus derives from both a desire for limitation of armaments, and a desire to solve certain problems other than armaments. These desires interacted so as to obscure any single reason for the onset.

Hector C. Bywater states that "in the winter of 1920-21 the situation in the Far East was so ominous that well-informed observers believed war between the United States and Japan to be only a question of time. . . ."[1] Perceptions were very important to each nation. Japan saw her moves as necessarily defensive and vital for her national interest. Then, as now, she was largely dependent on imports to provide her with sufficient raw materials to feed and clothe her population, as well as to provide for the creation of industries for her economic growth. She saw the Far East and Pacific region as a vital domain which must remain secure. Any actions by any other nation to intrude into the

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[1]Hector C. Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific; A Study of the American-Japanese Naval Problem, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1934, c 1921), p. ix.

area and halt this lifeline flow of materials would hurt Japan immensely. The fact that the United States was in the best position to oppose Japanese ambitions in the area, especially in China, served to create strong feelings of tensions between the two.[2]

On the other hand, especially after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, the United States began to perceive Japan as an imperialistic power and a definite threat to American interests in the Pacific. This war had ended with Japan the surprising victor, and her "victor spoils"; the establishment of a "virtual protectorate" over Manchuria, the annexation of Korea in 1910, her issuance of the "Twenty-one Demands" to China in 1915, and her actions in Siberia in 1918-1921, only served to sharpen the United States' suspicion of Japan.[3]

China had the potential for causing the largest problems. Antagonisms rose as Japan was able to gain control over portions of previously-held German possessions in China and the Pacific after the war. Japan needed China, said Raymond Buell, because without her, Japan could not accomplish her goal of "Pan-Asiaism . . . the union of all yellow peoples under Japanese leadership. . . ."[4] To gain China's loyalty, Japan sought to convince the Chinese that if they did not align with Japan, they would become "an anglo-American sphere of influence. . . ."[5]

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[2]Jonathan Mitchell, Goose Steps to Peace (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1931), p. 22.

[3]Ibid., pp. 39-44.

[4]Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1922), p. 48.

[5]M. Sato, speech entitled "If Japan and America Fight," 1921, quoted in ibid., p. 49.

It appears, according to Buell, that World War I allowed Japan to use the West's "preoccupation" with Europe to "consolidate" her position in Asia. As she took control of portions of China, annexed various German islands north of the Equator, and moved into Siberia, however, she came to be seen by the United States as a highly imperialist nation with the ultimate goal of "establishing complete political and economic control" of East Asia.[6]

In many ways, Buell states, Japan was protected and could continue to pursue her ambitions because of the existence of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This alliance had "for twenty years not only protected the aggressions of the Japanese military machine from the interference of outside powers, but . . . [had] encouraged them."[7] This alliance had been formulated in 1902 as an insurance against continued Russian imperialism in East Asia. Great Britain not only had to be concerned with the German threat in the European theater, but with Russian incursions into British "spheres of influence," in South Asia and the Pacific as well. British strength was such that alone she could protect either her homeland in the North Sea, or her possessions in the Pacific, but not both. With this alliance, however, she could remove most of her Pacific fleet into the North Sea. In essence, this alliance provided each nation with more security as well as freedom of movement in the area than it would have had alone.[8]

To Japan, the alliance was just as advantageous. She likewise

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[6]Buell, p. 10.

[7]Ibid., p. 103.

[8]Ibid., p. 107.

wished to halt Russian imperialism, but by declaring war on Russia. She "dared not do so single handed," however, "because of the probability of the intervention of France, if not Germany, in behalf of Russia."[9] An alliance with Great Britain could effectively preclude this occurrence. In addition, an alliance with an established and sophisticated power such as Great Britain would do much to enhance Japan's diplomatic position in the world. This would "serve admirably as a billet d'entree into the international community.[10]

The alliance, however, was due to expire on July 13, 1921, and many officials in Great Britain wished to abrogate it altogether. The Japanese, it was thought, had bent the agreement numerous times and in the process had managed to ruffle too many British feathers. A member of Britain's Far Eastern Department voiced a popular view when he stated that the policies of the Japanese were now "almost diametrically opposed to the best interests of not only Great Britain and the United States but of China. . . . [It had] for its ultimate aim a complete Japanese hegemony over China, politically, economically and probably militarily."[11] Others saw that the alliance had simply outgrown its original usefulness. Most critics saw a possibility of a war between the United States and Japan, and were afraid that if this did happen, Great Britain, under the alliance, would be obligated to support Japan.[12]

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[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Rohan O. Butler et al, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939 (London, 1966), Memorandum by Victor Wellesley, June 1, 1920, F. O. F2159/199/23, quoted in Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 29.

[12] Lloyd George denied that the British would oppose the United States. Pressures for ending the alliance also came from Canada and Australia.

Some members of the British government wished to retain the alliance in its current format for economic reasons; i.e., to relieve Britain of her need to keep a fleet in the Pacific, which was to protect her importation of raw materials and foodstuffs from that region. To most, however, the dilemma was that, if the alliance was renewed, the United States would look unfavorably on the matter. If it was not, the Japanese could become the "enemy" and wreck havoc on British interests in the area. It appears to have been a case of "damned if you do, and damned if you don't." Many, then, appeared to opt for a condition resembling the alliance, but without the obligations then inherent in it.

The Japanese, on the other hand, were positive in their desire to preserve the alliance. They saw the alliance as useful as it had been initially. It had helped shield Japan from adverse reactions to her various moves, especially in China; and it had, above all, enabled Japan to operate a flexible policy in her relations with other powers in the area.[13] The Japanese were so intent on its retention, for example, that when the rumor reached Japan in early 1921 that Lloyd George wished to abrogate the Alliance, Crown Prince Hirohito was rushed to England to appeal to the British government.[14]

In the midst of these occurrences, an arms race was beginning to take place which was of growing concern to these nations. Before 1916, the United States Navy ranked a poor third behind those of Great Britain and Germany. In that year, however, Congress passed the Naval

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[13]Alfred Dennis, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1923), pp. 89-91.

[14]Mitchell, p. 50. It was quite an unusual move for a member of the royal family to be sent on such a mission.

Appropriations Act of August 29, 1916, which provided funds for, and authorized construction of, 156 vessels for the navy. These included 16 capital ships[15]: 10 battleships and 6 battle-cruisers.[16] The entire program was to have been completed in three years; but due to the United States' entry into World War I, much of it had been suspended. At the end of the war only one battleship had been completed, with most of the others in various stages of construction.[17]

At this time, a decision was made to fulfill Woodrow Wilson's 1916 statement that the United States should have "incomparably the most adequate Navy in the world."[18] The navy opted to continue the 1916 program, and construction either continued or began on all capital ships authorized by the act. The General Naval Board also called for another three year program to build three more battleships with the objective, as stated in one official navy report, to create a "navy equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation in the world."[19]

One of the major reasons for this desire, according to Thomas Buckley, was "the old rivalry between the governments of Great Britain

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[15]Buell defines a capital ship as "a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10,000 tons . . . standard displacement, or which carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches (203 millimeters)."

[16]The battleships were to have 12-16 "guns apiece, and the battle-cruisers 8-16" guns.

[17]Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 29.

[18]Quoted in Buell, p. 141.

[19]"Report of the General Board of the Navy, September 24, 1920" in Report of the Secretary of the Navy, 1920, Appendix A, quoted in Buell, p. 140.

and the United States. . . ."[20] After the end of World War I, this rivalry became concerned with who would be the superior sea power. The British were adamant that their "naval supremacy" be retained. In October, 1918, says Buckley, Prime Minister David Lloyd George told a Wilson confidant, Colonel Edward M. House, that "Great Britain would spend her last guinea to keep a navy superior to that of the United States or any other power."[21] Winston S. Churchill, also in 1918, stated to the House of Commons:

> Nothing in the world, nothing that you may think of, or dream of, or anyone may tell you; no arguments, however specious; no appeals however seductive, must lead you to abandon that naval supremacy on which the life of our country depends.[22]

As it became obvious to Great Britain that the United States was not to enter the League of Nations and was to continue its 1916 naval program, says Buckley, Britain "publicly began to veer toward a naval race with the United States . . . which threatened to make the Anglo-German competition of the early 1900's look like a lobster quadrille."[23]

The Japanese also viewed the 1916 Naval Appropriations Bill, coupled with renewed American interest in the Pacific and Far East,[24]

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[20]Buckley, pp. 19-20.

[21]Mary Klachko, "Anglo-American Naval Competition, 1918-1922," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1962), p. 77, quoted in Buckley, p. 20.

[22]Speech of November 1918, in Benjamin H. Williams, The United States and Disarmament (New York, 1931), p. 137, quoted in Buckley, pp. 24-25.

[23]Buckley, p. 23. I see no physical evidence of this; however, I will accept the supposition of the existence of a fervent arms race "mentality."

[24]As the war began to close European markets, the U.S. began to move more fully into the Pacific region in search of trade and the development of new foreign markets. This was very suspicious to Japan.

with great trepidation. They began various armament programs of their own in response. The Tokyo journal, Yorodzu, indicated in 1920 that the United States was forcing Japan to arm. It stated, "If America were not augmenting her naval armaments, Japan would be at liberty to economize in the same direction. It is, however, because of the American menace that we are forced to enhance our naval power at the cost of heavy taxation, under which the people are groaning."[25] During the naval budget debates of 1920, a member of the Diet stated, "America appears to think she is divinely appointed to rule the world with a big stick. What is the purpose of her colossal navy if it is not to make her power supreme in every part of the world."[26]

The newspaper, Nichi Nichi, stated, in an article carried in 1920, that "all the powers" were of agreement that naval armaments should be limited, but because of the United States' increasing naval strength, "even if other Powers should strictly and faithfully adhere to the principle of reduction, . . . the peace of the world will just the same be menaced by the naval power of America."[27] The paper went on to say that the "Double-Eight Program" was not enough for proper defense of Japan, and claimed that Japan needed a minimum of 24 capital ships.[28]

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[25]Quoted in Bywater, Sea Power, p. 151. [26]Ibid., p. 156.

[27]Pall Mall Gazette, November 2, 1920 (correspondent writing from Tokyo on October 17, 1920), quoted in Archibald Hurd, "Naval Supremacy: Great Britain or the United States," Fortnightly Review CVIII (December 1, 1920): 921.

[28]The "Double-Eight Program" is called by many different names. I have chosen the one used in Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928). The program itself was formulated after the 1905 war as Japanese naval experts saw a need for two-squadrons, each consisting of 8 capital ships, to be replaced every 8 years. It was finally passed by the Diet in 1920, and designed to be completed by March, 1928.

The chart, as Table 1, shows a reason for Japan's fears.

The chart tells us that if the currently authorized construction programs in each country were to be carried to completion, by 1924 the United States and Great Britain would have been almost equal in capital ships, but Japan would have been only half as strong. This conclusion, however, is not complete. It also must be noted that in 1924 the vast majority of British ships would have been very old and outdated. The United States and Japan, on the other hand, would have had capital ships with more firepower (notice the disparity in 1st class vessels), more armor, and a faster speed. "Actually, the American Navy by 1924 would have been as strong in capital ship efficiency as the British and Japanese Navies combined, if no further building programs had been adopted by any of these powers."[29] By 1924, then, the United States would have been supreme on the high seas: a position that Great Britain had held in most, if not all, of the nineteenth century.

The three countries involved in this "race," however, soon began to realize the folly of pursuing their present paths. Japan's buildup was beginning to cost her dearly by 1921. Her naval expenditures alone rose from $85 million in 1915 to $245 million in 1921. The 1921 figure represented approximately one-third of her entire budget for that year.[30] But even by spending at this high level, Japan could only hope that if both nations built all that was authorized, then the ratio of Japan to United States in capital ships would be 1:2. In

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[29]Buell, p. 144.

[30]Ibid., pp. 139-42.

TABLE 1

CAPITAL SHIPS, ON HAND AND AUTHORIZED[31]

	1921	1924 (estimated)
United States:		
Ships*	17	35 (27-1st class/18-2d class)
Displacement, tons	467,250 tons	1,150,650 tons
Guns	188	340
Great Britain:		
Ships	32	36 (18-1st class/18-2d class)
Displacement, tons	808,200 tons	883,290 tons
Guns	284	. . .
Japan:		
Ships	11	17 (14-1st class/3-2d class)
Displacement, tons	319,140 tons	543,140 tons
Guns	108	164

*For 1924, figures are divided into 1st class (those ships with 14 inch or larger guns) and 2nd class (those ships with guns under 14 inches).

[31]From figures in "Leading Navies Compared," Scientific American (February 12, 1921), and Archibald Hurd (fn. 27). The figures for 1924 differ slightly in both of these articles, but the larger figure has been used here whenever differences occurred.

other words, even spending as much as they were, Japan could hope to come no closer than one-half the size of the United States' capital ship fleet.[32]

Baron Kato, then Japan's Minister of the Marine, let it be known that enough was enough. In an interview with the Associated Press in March, 1921, he stated that Japan would be willing to give up her Double-Eight Program if the other major naval powers would agree to halt their naval construction. Japan recognized, as Yamato Ichihashi states, that the expense of naval armaments was "almost ruinous to Japan's general interests."[33] Mitchell, writing in 1931, stated that Japan's financial crisis of 1921 was the worst of any in its entire history.[34]

Great Britain also recognized the dangers inherent in any arms race; and, in fact, had begun a small-scale limitation program a few years earlier.[35] In 1921, Great Britain's navy was a total of 1,753,539 tons; the United States had 1,302,441 tons; and Japan had a total of 641,852 tons. Britain had not begun construction on many vessels since 1916, however, and in 1921 was constructing only 182,950 tons of all types of navy ships. Of these, four capital ships were under construction, totaling 172,000 tons. The United States, on the

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[32]Bywater, Sea Power, pp. 155-56.

[33]Ichihashi, (fn. 28), p. 19. Yamato Ichihashi was the Secretary to Baron Kato, Senior Delegate of Japan to the Washington Conference in 1921-1922.

[34]Mitchell, p. 50.

[35]In 1918, expenses caused two-thirds of British battleships to be placed in reserve. The remaining one-third was seen as still too expensive to operate, however, and several of these were also placed in reserve. Bywater, Sea Power, p. 28.

other hand, had 15 capital ships (618,000 tons) under construction, as did Japan (599,700 tons).[36] Publicly, Britain spoke for continued supremacy of her navy. Privately, however, this was not so. Lloyd George, in a meeting of the Standing Defence Subcommittee of the Cabinet on December 4, 1920, "pointed out that a naval race could ruin Britain, for the country might have to repay its war debt to the Americans before starting construction, and the country was already having serious financial problems."[37] Even though Lloyd George wanted a large navy, he was enough of a realist to recognize that any naval race could bankrupt Britain.

The United States also began to face up to the reality of arms expenditures. In 1915-1916, her naval expenditures had been only $155,029,000. In 1917-1918, however, this figure had risen to $1,268,000,000. After the war, the expenses rose even higher as America began a program "designated to make its navy second to none."[38] The 1916 act, however, had called for the manufacture of 16 capital ships, but with a stipulation that each vessel not cost more than a certain amount. Capital ships, by this time, were approaching $40 million apiece to build, and projections estimated that they would become obsolete within two decades. Replacement costs at that time, considering inflation, would be astonomical.[39] By 1919, it was estimated that it would take $850,000,000 just to complete the capital ship portion of the

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[36]Buckley, p. 23. Figures are from "Limitation of Armaments: Part II," General Board Report 1088a, (September 17, 1921).

[37]Buckley, p. 25.

[38]Ichihashi, p. 4.

[39]Buell, pp. 144-46.

1916 program, not to mention future maintenance costs.[40] The United States was spending 12 percent of her national budget on naval expenditures.[41] In other words, in the United States and Great Britain, budget considerations began to override considerations of supreme naval power.

In addition to predicted financial problems, each nation was confronted with changes in the technology of weaponry which was beginning to change the concept of war, at least on the high seas. Prior to World War I, the use of the capital ship by the navies of the world had indicated that an absolute top priority was given this weapon by all. To have a strong, viable naval force meant to have a fleet of capital ships. By 1921, however, these nations were willing to give up production of capital ships, and even scrap some of the older ones. This can be described by explanation of the growth of the popularity of two more or less novel innovations in weaponry: the submarine and the airplane.

Before World War I, the potential of the submarine had been seen by Admiral Sir Percy Scott. He stated, in 1912, that the "battleship had outlived her usefulness, and ought to be scrapped forthwith as an extravagant anachronism."[42] His prediction and argument was that the submarine would rule the high seas in the future because of its stealth and killing power.[43] It had been in existence for several decades, but the initial stages of World War I had not seen its extensive use. As the German navy began to receive a considerable beating at the hands of Great Britain's fleet, however, it found itself, as Arthur Pollen states,

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[40]Hector C. Bywater, "The Limitation of Naval Armaments," Atlantic Monthly (February 1922): 260-61, hereafter referred to as Bywater, L. N. A.

[41]Buckley, p. 60. [42]Quoted in Bywater, L. N. A., p. 261.

[43]Bywater, L. N. A., p. 261.

"condemned to utter sea helplessness--unless a new navy could be called into existence and a new sea war fought."[44]

As this weapon system began to be completed and placed into service, the death totals attributable to its use began to take on quite impressive proportions. In February, March and April, 1916, submarines sank 450,000, 500,000 and 900,000 tons of shipping, respectively. At February and March rates over 25 percent of the world's shipping would have been sunk in one year. At April's rate, over 40 percent would have been. With these facts, Pollen says, "For the first time since August, 1914, the complete failure, if not the defeat, of the Allies was in sight.[45] Allied tactics were changed to meet the threat of the submarine and, by and large, they were successful. In total, Germany sank over 11 million tons of shipping, but it failed when up against capital vessels.

This failure, however, was not to discredit the submarine's potential value to a nation. This was recognized, and after the war, capital ships came under verbal fire again. Admiral Sims, for example, stated that "battleships are not worth the powder to blow them to hell; the future of the battleship is that it is just going to fade out of existence."[46] Sir Percy Scott again reiterated his view that "the introduction of the vessels that swim under water has, in my opinion, enitrely done away with the utility of the ships that swim on the top of the water. . . . No man-of-war will dare to come even within sight of a coast that is adequately protected by submarines.[47] In addition,

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[44]Arthur H. Pollen, "The Submarine," Foreign Affairs V (July 1927): 557.

[45]Ibid., p. 558. [46]Quoted in Buell, p. 235. [47]Ibid.

German Admiral Von Scheer stated that "an adequate submarine navy would enable a comparatively weak nation to pursue an overseas policy."[48] This latter comment coincides with Bywater's assessment in Sea Power in the Pacific that the torpedo, by whatever means launched (mostly submarines), would become "a favourite weapon with those countries which have to maintain a naval establishment on limited funds."[49]

The Japanese, for one, were rapidly expanding their submarine fleet. By 1921, estimates placed the Japanese submarine force at 107; all but 15 ocean-going. It was rumored at that time that Admiral Kato wanted to increase the number to 150 by 1925. Bywater also states that "several writers in the Japanese Press" began to urge the Japanese government to change its naval policy by decreasing reliance on capital ships and increasing the use and size of the submarine fleet. He does add, however, that at the time of the publication of his book (1921), Japanese as well as American and British naval experts were still considering the capital ship as "the first and most important element of sea-power."[50] Admiral Kato appears to have summed the official naval philosophy of all concerned when, in the Diet in 1919, he said, "The more we study the lessons of the war, the stronger does our conviction grow that the last word in naval warfare rests with the big ship and the big gun."[51]

Bywater sums the above best in The Limitation of Naval Armaments. He states that the submarine started slowly in World War I, but soon it began to become the dominate naval weapon system. The question of its

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[48] Ibid., p. 236.

[49] Bywater, Sea Power, p. 216. Also, keep this in mind when observing France's objections to abolishing submarines at the conference.

[50] Bywater, Sea Power, p. 236.

[51] Ibid.

worth relative to a capital ship was never answered, however, because the Germans never confronted an allied capital ship in a head-to-head battle. They were confined, instead, to attacks on merchant vessels. "Broadly speaking," Bywater states, "it may be said that the submarine has not proved its claim to have superseded the battleship; and the fear of the submarine alone would not have justified the suspension of battleship construction. At the same time, it has compelled naval architects to pay increased attention to the safety of large warships."[52] This proved to be very expensive because of the large increases in armor thickness necessary below the water-line.

Another novel weapon innovation which caused similar comments was the airplane. Bywater concludes that the use of the airplane in World War I by the United States "may prove to have been the death-blow" to the capital ship.[53] The United States conducted post-war tests on the effect of aerial bombs on captured German ships. These tests were very impressive. The following is a portion of the report on the testing.

> Aircraft carrying high-capacity high-explosive bombs of sufficient size have adequate offensive power to sink or seriously damage any naval vessel at present constructed, provided such projectiles can be placed in the water close alongside the vessel. Furthermore, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to build any type of vessel of sufficient strength to withstand the destructive force that can be obtained with the largest bombs that aeroplanes may be able to carry from shore bases or sheltered harbors. . . . It is probable, however, that future development will make such operations practicable. . . .[54]

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[52] Bywater, L. N. A., p. 262. [53] Ibid.

[54] Report of the Joint Board (J. B. No. 439, Serial No. 159) to the Secretary of the Navy, August 18, 1921, quoted in Bywater, L. N. A., p. 263. Also in Buell, pp. 236-37.

This, to Bywater, was "the most serious indictment of the capital ship which has yet been framed."[55]

When cost comparisons were made of these novel weapon innovations against capital ships, the differences were very impressive. Bywater states that in 1921, 400 of the largest airplanes or 15 of the most sophisticated submarines could be built for the cost of 1 battleship. Also important to consider, he said, was that the airplane and the submarine both were just beginning their evolutionary process; while innovative development of the capital ships had all but halted. All of this meant that capital ships were becoming obsolete. As these newer innovations were devised and perfected, the capital ship would need more armor, bigger and longer range guns, more speed. As these were added, however, the price would climb. The British Hood, just finished in 1920, was cited as an example. This ship cost $35,000,000 to complete, and in 1920 it was seen as the best ever made; however, as Bywater shows, it was outdated by 1921. At that time, Sir George Thurston estimated that the ideal battleship would need to be at least 57,000 tons, with 8-18 inch guns (the Hood was almost 20,000 tons and several guns short). This "ideal" would cost $60,000,000.[56]

This discussion indicates the situation as it existed prior to the onset of the Washington Conference. As each nation grew more concerned with its special interests, financial burdens and conceptions of existing and new weaponry, it began diplomatic moves designed to bring about some sort of conference to help settle the existing problems. On July 11, 1921, for example, Lloyd George, in a speech, made the point

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[55] Bywater, L. N. A., p. 263.

[56] Ibid., pp. 262-64.

that Japan was an "old and proud Ally," and that the United States was the nation "closest to our aims and ideals with whom it is for us not merely a desire and an interest but a deeply rooted instinct to consult and co-operate."[57] What George said was that Great Britain had a great interest in both nations, and would dislike to see war between the two. It also appears that George was warning Japan that she could not expect Great Britain to join her in a fight against the United States.

This brings to light the possibility that Great Britain, therefore, desired to act as arbiter to reduce the confrontation between the United States and Japan, as well as to change the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The excuse of arms limitation, then, may have been "only a door through which the British might enter into negotiations with both the United States and Japan."[58] As Buell conceives it, Great Britain wished to terminate the Alliance, but "as long as the question of naval competition remained unsolved, the termination of the . . . Alliance was impossible."[59]

To Japan, the request for a conference may have been a sincere desire to limit armaments. She wished to perpetuate the alliance, for she was afraid of the United States' naval buildup. In 1918-1920, because of an inability to achieve equality with the United States, Japan resolved to maintain at least a 10:7 ratio[60] in order to achieve what she conceived of as adequate security.[61] This desire, however, was

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[57] London Times, 12 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 20.

[58] Buckley, p. 34. [59] Buell, p. 124.

[60] All ratios are given with the base figure of 10 assigned to the United States' naval strength.

[61] Buckley, pp. 78-80.

halted by budget constraints.

Also involved, but to a smaller degree, in the desire to convoke a conference was the rationalization that armaments had been a root cause of World War I. Arthur Pollen is convinced that after the war the powers in the world realized that it was the "military autocracies" of Central Europe which had caused the war. They did this by, in essence, following "policies abroad that only material force could sustain. . . ." These policies had bred the need for armaments, and "armaments had bred war. . . ."[62] Whether true or not, the important factor, as would be indicated in the opening remarks at the conference, was that various governments perceived that they were at least a cause of war. Buell states that prior to World War I, many nations' leaders saw armaments as a preserver of peace in the world, especially in Europe. It came to be recognized after the war, however, that a large quantity of arms does not necessarily mean an absence of war. As Buell says, it was seen that "armaments serve merely to disturb peace. . . . [and] if nations feverishly construct great battleships and conscript great armies, it is certain that some time <u>they will be used</u>."[63] It was, after all, he suggests, the presence of large numbers of naval armaments that "made war between Japan and the United States a probability."[64]

The election of Warren G. Harding as President of the United States appears to have "tipped the scales" and brought about a U.S. desire to convoke a conference. As pointed out in Buckley, Harding

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[62] Pollen, p. 554.

[63] Buell, p. 146. (emphasis his).

[64] Ibid.

desired a conference because it would provide the means by which "just, thoughtful, righteous peoples, who are not seeking to seize something which does not belong to them, can live peaceably together, and eliminate causes of conflict."[65] Even though Harding oversimplified, says Buckley, he did reflect a common idea of rationality of the day: if rational men were to gather about a conference table, disputes could be settled.[66] In his inaugural speech, Harding appeared to set the stage for the conference. He intimated that although the United States would not enter into the League of Nations, it would be amenable to meeting with other nations in order "to recommend a way to approximate disarmament and relieve the crushing burdens of military and naval establishments."[67]

Great Britain was also moving in this direction.[68] At the Imperial Conference in London on June 20, 1921, Lloyd George stated that sea power was the basis of British existence; therefore, he said, "We have . . . to look to measures which our security requires. We aim at nothing more. We cannot be content with less."[69] With this, he called for a conference to discuss the potential explosive issues over the Pacific and Far East.

On July 8, 1921, the United States' Secretary of State, Charles

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[65]Transcript of Presidential Press Conference of December 23, 1921, Harding Papers, quoted in Buckley, p. 15.

[66]Buckley, pp. 15-16.

[67]Congressional Record, March 4, 1921, pp. 4-6, quoted in Buckley, p. 14.

[68]Buckley, p. 30.

[69]Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India: Held in June, July, and August, 1921; Summary of Proceedings and Documents (London, 1921), p. 13, quoted in Buckley, p. 31.

Evans Hughes, sent a wire to his ambassadors in Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan, directing them to determine whether or not the above countries would meet "in a conference on limitation of armament . . . to be held in Washington at a mutually convenient time."[70] At the same time, the United States also suggested that, since the question of limitation of armaments was so closely intertwined with certain Pacific and Far Eastern problems, perhaps questions of this nature should be included in the conference. All indicated their tentative agreement to the formal proposal by July 11, 1921. Formal invitations were mailed to France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, and China on August 11, 1921. On October 4, 1921, invitations were extended to Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal.[71]

It is difficult to tell whether the British or the Americans were the instigators of the Washington Conference, but several messages translated by Herbert O. Yardley in The American Black Chamber do indicate that there is reason to suspect that it was Great Britain who convoked the conference through the United States.[72] In a telegram of July 5, 1921, from the Japanese Ambassador in London to the Japanese government, it was stated that the ambassador and Lord Curzon had spoken of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in connection with the possibility of opening a Pacific conference. In this discussion, Lord Curzon indicated

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[70]Telegram from Charles Evans Hughes to United States Ambassador to Great Britain George Harvey, July 8, 1921, quoted in Buckley, p. 32.

[71]Ichihashi, pp. 10-11.

[72]Herbert O. Yardley was the creator and director of the Cryptographic Bureau (colloq., The Black Chamber) of the United States which was in operation during the time of the Washington Conference. Yardley and his group were involved with code breaking; especially with regard to Japanese codes. Many of the telegrams quoted have been destroyed and can be found only in his book, The American Black Chamber.

that he wanted Japan's views before communicating with the United States' Ambassador. A telegram from the same source on July 8, 1921, indicated that both Japan and Lord Curzon wanted the invitation for such a conference to "appear to proceed from the American Government and not to have it appear as the plan of the British government."[73]

The Japanese were reluctant to come to a conference on Pacific and Far East problems, however, and a cable dated July 13, 1921 from Tokyo set forth Japan's guidelines. It stated:

> The Japanese Government wishes the subject of discussion to be limited to the limitation of armament questions, but in case it is necessary to discuss also Far Eastern and Pacific problems, this discussion should be limited to questions of general principles . . . concerning merely China.[74]

The next cable directed the Japanese Ambassador to go directly to Hughes and agree to a conference on the limitation of arms, but to indicate that an inclusion of Pacific and Far Eastern problems would complicate the conference too much. The cable went on to state that if Hughes would not agree to drop these subjects, then the Japanese Ambassador should revert to the guidelines shown in the preceding cable (footnote 74).

In a cable dated July 15, 1921, the Japanese revealed that they were afraid that Great Britain had proposed the conference to quash the Anglo-Japanese Alliance by destroying its value; and they were convinced that Great Britain's first concern was not arms limitation as was the United States', but rather Pacific and Far East problems. Because of

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[73]Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1931), p. 284.

[74]Telegram No. 286, July 13, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted in Yardley, p. 287.

their fear, a cable dated July 23 from Tokyo to the Japanese Ambassador in London stated that they thought

> that it would be an opportune policy to inform Great Britain of the substance of our answer to America, and to work to secure a complete understanding between Great Britain and Japan before the conference.[75]

Additional cables alluded to this same desire for Anglo-Japanese collaboration prior to the conference.

The formal invitation mailed to the various nations indicated that arms limitation was to be the top priority at the conference, primarily because of cost considerations. In part the invitation stated:

> The President is deeply gratified at the cordial response to his suggestion that there should be a conference on the subject of Limitation of Armament, in connection with which Pacific and Far Eastern questions should be discussed. . . . The enormous disbursements in the rivalries of armaments manifestly constitute the greater part of the encumbrance upon enterprise and national prosperity; . . . expense of this nature is not only without economic justification but is a constant menace to the peace of the world rather than an assurance of its preservation.[76]

It went on to say that while the consideration of naval armaments would have priority, questions of all types of arms limits would be considered.

All invited nations entered the conference willingly except for Japan. She was interested in the limitation of armaments, but, as

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[75]Telegram No. 884, July 23, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted in Yardley, p. 296.

[76]Conference on the Limitation of Armament; Washington, November 12, 1921-February 6, 1922 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 4-5, hereafter referred to as C. L. A. C. L. A. is an official publication of the United States government, supposedly containing all of the committee as well as subcommittee proceedings in its 1,757 pages. It also contains all official documents (which can also be found in International Conciliation, Nos. 169-182, December 1921-January 1923).

shown above, she was very skeptical of joining a conference designed to deal with Pacific and Far East problems. She was entrenched in Siberia, Korea, parts of China, in several islands in the Pacific, and in Manchuria. As Buell states, "Japan had never been closer to realizing the dream of . . . hegemony over Asia [than] in 1921."[77] Much of the Japanese media's response was to lament the fact that Japan had to enter into such a western "plot" designed to give the United States control of China.[78] Buell says that a large portion of the Japanese government also felt somewhat the same way. If the above is so, then why did Japan agree to participate? Buell states that Japan could not refuse. If it did, he states, then Japan would have been admitting imperialist ambitions to all. To do so would place her as an "outcast" (in her view) in international society.[79]

Japan's reply on July 14 to the invitation indicated her skepticism. After agreeing to enter into the limitation of arms portion of the conference to "seek to secure an enduring peace of the world and to promote advancement of human welfare," Japan asked for time to consider

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[77]Buell, pp. 148-49.

[78]H. W. Kinney, "Puzzled Japan," The Outlook August 24, 1921, p. 642. Kinney speculated that the Japanese might have seen the conference as "a gigantic international conspiracy of white nations." Ichihashi says that this was a "childish" way to think.

[79]Buell, pp. 149-50. Ichihashi also indicates this skepticism on the part of Japan; not about arms limitation which it desired, but about Pacific and Far East problems. The Japanese writers began to call the conference the "Pacific Conference," and stated that arms limitation was evidently not so important. The reason for the Japanese lack of enthusiasm, said Ichihashi, was because of inclusion of complicated Pacific and Far Eastern questions into a simple idea of arms limitation. As Ichihashi says, to the Japanese, "armament limitation required no argument, the only requisite being an international understanding fixing a simultaneous action on the part of the interested powers." Ichihashi, p. 13.

the other purpose of the conference. Its request said: "but in regard to a conference on the Pacific and Far Eastern questions the Government, before it would express its views, would desire to know the nature and scope of the American proposal in order to ensure the success of such a conference."[80] The Japanese government notified the United States on July 27 that they would accept the invitation for both "sub-conferences."

Ichihashi says that to understand Japan's initial reluctance to enter into the conference, one must realize that Japan had expected, initially, to be invited to an arms limitation conference involving only three powers. These powers, to Japan, were the only nations which had the expertise, finances, and the desire to engage in massive naval building programs. Because of this, they were also bound to realize the inherent dangers in "competitive construction."[81] This was what Japan was interested in; not war, or in letting other powers seize gains in the Pacific region which it had achieved over many decades.

The other powers invited appear to have been favorably disposed to the notion of a disarmament conference. Some initially questioned the motives of the United States, and entertained questions as to the worth of such a conference; but, by and large, they looked forward to its opening. In accepting the invitation to the conference, however, Premier Briand of France stated in his message to parliament on July 12, 1921, that he appreciated having been invited to a conference which would assure the continuity and the stability of peace in the region of

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[80] Jiji (Tokyo), 15 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 16.

[81] Ichihashi, pp. 18-19.

the Pacific."[82] Nowhere did he mention the question of, or his willingness to discuss, arms limitation.

The proposed agenda for the conference was announced by the Department of State on September 10, 1921. It was divided into two major headings; the "Limitation of Armament," and "Pacific and Far Eastern Questions." Under the former were three subheadings: "Limitation of Naval Armament"; "Rules for control of new agencies of warfare"; and "Limitation of land armament." Under the latter heading were "Questions relating to China," to Siberia, and to the mandated Islands of the Pacific.[83] As the agenda was being circulated, France and Great Britain requested explication of "new agencies of warfare" and were told that these were gas, submarines, and airplanes. Japan accepted the agenda on October 17 and stipulated that it retained the right to raise questions not covered in the agenda at the conference.[84]

In preparing for the conference, the American delegation[85] decided to make its top priority the limitation of naval armaments and not questions concerning the Pacific and Far East. The reasons for this, states Buckley, was that this topic was more concrete and had a direct effect on the taxpayer's wallets. Far Eastern problems, in turn,

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[82] La Matin (France), 13 July 1921, quoted in Ichihashi, p. 15.

[83] The Agenda can be found in C. L. A., p. 10, or in Buell, pp. 150-51, Fn. 23.

[84] Buckley, p. 41.

[85] The American delegation was headed by Charles Evans Hughes, with Elihu Root, Senator H. C. Lodge, and Senator Underwood as members. Great Britain's delegation was headed by Lord Arthur Balfour, with Lord B. Lee as an important member. Japan's delegation was headed, in actuality, by Baron Kato Tomashaburo, not to be confused with Admiral Kato, the Minister of the Marine. The French delegation was headed by Premier Briand, later Rene Viviani. For a complete listing of all participants and staffs, see C. L. A., pp. 12-41.

were "mysterious." The United States' plan took a great deal of preparation to formulate. The delegation was suspicious of the Japanese, and decided initially to call for a capital ship advantage of 2:1 over Japan, and equality with Great Britain. The Navy's input was to say that it needed either to have the Anglo-Japanese Alliance quashed, or a navy as large as that of Great Britain and Japan combined. Hughes finally devised a proposal which would scrap construction programs of the major naval powers and insure a ratio of 10:10:6 for Great Britain, the United States and Japan.[86]

The Washington Conference officially opened on November 12, 1921, with Charles Evans Hughes as permanent chairman. At the opening session Hughes welcomed the delegates and quickly stated that to the United States, naval disarmament was the top priority of the conference. He reiterated the principles articulating the need to disarm as stated in the Czar's Rescript of 1899, the United States' desire for a limit of armaments in 1907, and read the resolution for disarmament which had been passed by the 1907 Hague Conference. He went on to say:

> What was convenient or highly desirable before is now a matter of vital necessity. If there is to be economic rehabilitation, if the longings for reasonable progress are not to be denied, if we are to be spared the uprisings of peoples made desperate in the desire to shake off burdens no longer endurable, competition in armament must stop.[87]

He continued by stating that in order for arms limitation to work, "all" must sacrifice in reality. With this introduction, he then surprised the entire conference with several broad and innovative proposals on how these sacrifices should be accomplished.

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[86] Buckley, pp. 49-56.

[87] C. L. A., p. 56.

He began by proposing a 10 year "holiday"[88] on the construction of capital ships. He further stated that since it was fairly accepted that capital ship tonnage was the "measure" of the "relative strength of navies," the proposal would rest primarily on capital ships. His four principles to guide the conference were:

> (1) That all capital ship building programs, either actual or projected, should be abandoned;
> (2) That further reduction would be made through the scrapping of certain of the older ships;
> (3) That, in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned;
> (4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed.[89]

Hughes then proposed specific limitation programs for each of the major naval powers.

He proposed that the United States scrap all of her capital ships which were still under construction at the time of the conference, no matter how far complete. This amounted to, he stated, 15 capital ships; including 6 battle-cruisers and 7 battleships under construction, as well as two battleships already launched but not yet regarded as complete. This would amount to scrapping 618,000 tons of capital ships which were under construction.[90] He also proposed that the United States scrap all of her older battleships up to a certain date of manufacture. This amounted to 15 battleships of 227,740 tons. The total number of

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[88] Defined as a period in which there should be no further construction of capital ships.

[89] C. L. A., p. 60.

[90] $332 million had already been spent on these 15 ships.

capital ships proposed for destruction was 30, equal to an aggregate 845,740 tons.

Hughes then proposed that Great Britain halt further construction on four new battleships currently in the planning stages,[91] and the scrapping of 19 older capital ships. The latter would total 411,375 tons, giving the British a total tonnage reduction of 583,375 tons.

Hughes then proposed that Japan abandon her Double-Eight Program, and agree to scrap 3 battleships and 4 battle-cruisers "not yet laid down but for which certain material has been assembled." This would amount to scrapping 7 new capital ships with a total tonnage of 289,100 tons. Next he proposed that Japan scrap 10 older capital ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons. This would make a grand total of 448,928 tons to be scrapped.

Of France and Italy he said:

> In view of certain extraordinary conditions due to the World War affecting the existing strengths of the navies of France and Italy, the United States does not consider necessary the discussion at this stage of the proceedings of the tonnage allowance of these nations, but proposes it be reserved for the later consideration of the Conference.[92]

For all three major naval powers, then, the above would entail scrapping 66 capital ships with total tonnage of 1,878,043 tons. When enacted, the United States would be left with 18 capital ships of 500,650 tons; Great Britain with 22 capital ships[93] of 604,450 tons; and Japan with

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[91] This involved "a reduction of 4 new capital ships not yet laid down, but upon which money had been spent, with a total tonnage when completed of 172,000 tons." C. L. A., p. 80.

[92] C. L. A., p. 80.

[93] A special allowance of 4 capital ships was given to Great Britain due to the age of her on-hand vessels.

10 capital ships of 299,700 tons. The replacement tonnage was stipulated as 500,000 tons each for Great Britain and the United States, and 300,000 tons for Japan. Each country would be allowed to replace their fleets after the 10 year holiday; but they could only replace a capital ship after it was at least 20 years old. For submarines, Hughes proposed a limit for the United States and Great Britain of 90,000 tons, and 54,000 tons for Japan. In aircraft carriers, a limit of 80,000 tons was proposed for Great Britain and the United States and 48,000 tons for Japan.[94]

To Ichihashi, Hughes' proposal "electrified the calm session; some [delegates] were shocked, some were even alarmed, but others were pleased."[95] To Buell, the reason for this shock, as well as the pleasure, was that Hughes had "presented an actual workable plan" to the conference.[96]

At the Second Plenary Session on 15 November, all powers agreed "in principle" to Hughes' proposal, but at various subcommittee meetings, debate over the ratios ensued. Admiral Kato requested that changes in the proposal be made "with regard to the tonnage basis for replacement

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[94] C. L. A., p. 66. Replacement tonnage was the total tonnage allowed once all ships in existence in 1921 had "worn out."

[95] Ichihashi, p. 35.

[96] Hughes presented the following account of his reasons for presenting the proposals as he did. "It was evident that each country would have its own conception of its needs; that general considerations of needs and aspirations could be brought forward by each power in justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength and the result would be an endless discussion; getting us nowhere. Looking at the question from every angle, I found no hope of success unless the three great naval powers, United States, Great Britain, and Japan, were willing to end their competition by a determination to stop now. See David J. Danelski and Joseph S. Tulchen, eds., Autobiographical Notes of Charles Evans Hughes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 243.

of the various classes of vessels."[97] He requested that because of her geographical proximity, Japan should receive a better ratio than the 10:10:6 proposed by Hughes. This request went to a technical subcommittee headed by Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Kato's arguments were "national security" on the one hand, and a charge that Hughes' figures on completed capital ships was wrong on the other. Kato concluded by saying that Japan "considers it impossible to provide for her security and defense with any force modified so that the relative strength of the three navies will be 10-10-7."[98]

Certain Japanese cables of Japanese intentions at the conference are most revealing in the matter of the capital ship ratio. A cable sent on November 28 from Tokyo instructed the Japanese delegation to give in on the 10:7 ratio deadlock. It stated that "it is necessary to avoid any clash with Great Britain and America, particularly America, in regard to the armament limitation question." The cable further stated that if the Americans did not agree to a 10:7 ratio, the delegation was to attempt a 10:6.5 ratio. As an absolute minimum, the cable went on to say, the delegation was to accept a 10:6 ratio, but then only with "a guarantee to reduce or at least to maintain the status quo of Pacific defenses. . . ."[99]

Yamato Ichihashi attests to the above as true, and gives the reason for the Japanese capitulation. He quotes Baron Kato as saying:

> The costs of armament have now become so heavy that they are a burden hampering productive

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[97] C. L. A., p. 106.

[98] Quoted in Ichihashi, p. 48.

[99] Cable No. 13, November 28, 1921, Tokio to Washington, quoted in Yardley, p. 313.

> activity throughout the world. . . . The limit of reduction to which Japan will go is marked only by the necessities of her security. . . . Up to the present Japan has had fears which have caused her to continue building [her fleet]. . . . [She] had hoped that the conclusion of the Great War would bring a cessation of construction, but as the United States, with her unassailable position, deemed it necessary to continue her naval development, no alternative was permitted to Japan.[100]

Kato went on to say that it never had been Japan's intention to "rival" the United States and Great Britain in naval strength, because Japan's naval program had "always been defensive" and would continue to be. What he was looking for at the conference, he stated, was a "complete understanding that will terminate distrust and suspicion."[101]

The final agreement reached, then, was that the ratio of 10:10:6 was acceptable to all parties. Second, all agreed to maintain the status quo on fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific. Third, Japan was allowed to keep the brand-new ship, the Mutsu, and would, in turn, scrap the Settsu (an older battleship). The number of ships which Japan would retain was 10; the number in Hughes' original proposal. The retention of the Mutsu made a total difference in tonnage of 13,600 tons; thus, giving Japan total tonnage of 313,300 tons. Fourth, in order to preserve the equality in "efficiency," the United States was allowed to complete the Colorado and Washington, and scrap the Delaware and North Dakota (older ships). This would leave the United States with 18 ships, but would increase her total tonnage to 525,850 tons. Fifth, Great Britain would be allowed to build two new ships, but they would

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[100]Quoted in Ichihashi, p. 40.

[101]Ibid.

have to scrap 4 older ones. This would leave Great Britain with 20 capital ships of 582,050 tons. Sixth, maximum tonnage for each replacement vessel would be placed at 37,000 tons, and the replacement ratios were now raised to 525,000 tons for the United States and 315,000 for Japan. Lastly, the 10 year naval holiday was declared.[102]

The above results were then presented to France and Italy with a proposal that they retain a ratio of 1.75, or 175,000 tons each.[103] Admiral de Bon of France, however, delivered a speech in which he stated that because of her vast colonial network and her dependence for raw materials on these colonies, a large French navy was a necessity. He further stated that France's "desire" was to replace her current capital ships with 10 new ones of 35,000 tons each. In view of this, she needed to have a replacement tonnage of 350,000 tons minimum. Hughes, therefore, sent a wire to Briand (who had returned to Paris by this time), in which he stated that Great Britain, Japan, and the United States had agreed to scrap 68 "capital fighting ships" totaling 1,861,000 tons. He also pointed out that Italy had agreed to a small tonnage requirement, and then suggested that "the attitude of France will determine the success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval armaments."[104] He went on to point out that if France's portion was in the same ratio as the United States' reduction, then by all rights France should be allowed only 102,000 tons. The 175,000 tons, in actuality, was

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[102] C. L. A., pp. 446-52.

[103] Italy had already expressed her desire to have naval numerical equality with France. To the end she had agreed to limit her navy to 175,000 tons of capital ship as long as France did likewise.

[104] Telegram from C. E. Hughes to P. Briand, December 16, 1921, in C. L. A., pp. 454-58.

an allowance for France to increase her present tonnage (she had only 164,000 tons then available). Briand's answer was to agree on the 1.75 ratio on capital ships but to stipulate no further limitation on other ships. He stated that "As regards naval armament, it is not the offensive, but solely the defensive, point of view with which France is preoccupied." He therefore agreed to the 1.75, or 175,000 ton limit, for France on capital ships, but went on to say:

> But so far as defensive ships are concerned [light cruisers, torpedo boats and submarines], it would be impossible for the French Government . . . to accept reductions. . . . The dominating idea of the Washinton Conference is the restriction of offensive and costly naval armaments. But I do not believe it to be any part of its program to restrict a nation which, like France, has a large extent of coasts and numerous distant colonies, in the means essential to its communications and security.[105]

The French attitude began what Buell calls "the submarine controversy." Hughes' original proposal had proposed tonnage limitations of 90,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, 54,000 tons for Japan, and it had not mentioned France and Italy. All of the then existing tonnages of the major powers, however, were below these figures at the start of the conference.[106] Lord Lee, Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty, stated that it appeared "strange" that the proposed "limit" on submarine tonnage would allow nations to build more to reach the stated level. In addition, he stated that the allowance was particularly odd in view of the moral objections to the uses of the submarine

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[105]Telegram from P. Briand to C. E. Hughes, December 18, 1921, in C. L. A., pp. 458-60.

[106]The figures of existing total tonnages of submarines differed in British and U.S. calculations. American figures were considered more correct. They were; United States--95,000 tons, Great Britain--82,464 tons, France--42,850 tons, Italy--20,228 tons, and Japan--31,400 tons.

in World War I. In the war, he went on, German submarines had sunk at least 12,000,000 tons of merchant shipping, worth over $1,100,000,000 not including the cargoes. He further stated that 20,000 noncombatants had been killed by drowning. He then called for total abolition of all submarine fleets in existence, starting with England's own 100 vessels.

The French delegate then stated France's position.

> France believes that the submarine is the only weapon which at present permits a nation scantily supplied with capital ships to defend itself at sea. For France, therefore, the submarine is an essential means of preserving her independence which she can not give up, especially in view of the sacrifices to which she has been asked to consent in the matter of capital ships.[107]

At the next meeting, Admiral de Bon presented a lengthy speech stating that France would not abolish the submarine under any circumstances, as it was an especially effective defensive weapon for those nations without a large navy. Its low cost, he went on to say, made it much the more valuable, especially when compared to capital ship construction. After further lengthy explanation, he concluded that "90,000 tons is the absolute minimum for all the navies who may want to have a submarine force."[108]

Great Britain's reply was to point out that France had stated that she could not disarm her land forces because of her fear of Germany (to be discussed below). However, the British spokesman went on to suggest that submarines could not protect France from Germany; therefore, Britain's only conclusion was that the submarines were to be used against

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[107] C. L. A., p. 486.

[108] Ibid., p. 518. De Bon's address on submarines is from p. 504 to p. 518.

Great Britain.

The representative from the United States urged that abolition be dropped, and a consideration of tonnages and numbers ensued. Great Britain, however, remained concerned with French submarines attacking her "lifeline" of merchant ships. In an attempt to ameliorate the impass, Elihu Root introduced several resolutions to attempt to state in simple terms the moral standards to be used by submarine commanders in order to ease the trepidation of Great Britain. One such resolution stated:

> The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and noncombatants, and to the end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they declare their assent to such prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto.[109]

Italy, Japan, and France referred the matter to their governments for instruction.

On 30 December, Lord Lee, while awaiting the governments' return on the above, read into a speech he was delivering an article written by Capitaine de Frégate Castex in the Revue Maritime of January, 1920.[110] At the time of these articles, Lee stated, Castex was chief of an important bureau in the French Naval Staff. He was now Chief of Staff to the Admiral of the Second Division in the Mediterranean, and was to be the principal lecturer at the next year's French Navy's Senior Officers Course. At first, Lee said, Castex defended Germany's use of the

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[109] C. L. A., p. 596.

[110] Revue Maritime was an official publication of the French Naval General Staff.

submarine in World War I. At the end of the article, Lee quoted Castex as having stated, "After many centuries of effort, thanks to the ingenuity of man, the instrument, the system, the martingale [the submarine] is at hand which will overthrow for good and all the naval power of England."[111] Lee now called on the French government to disclaim these remarks, and to do so by agreeing to accept the Root Resolutions. France did apologize and, as a face-saving device, reluctantly accepted the resolutions in their entirety. This was a victory for Great Britain, for the submarine was prohibited from acting as a "commerce destroyer."

The problem of land armaments was also discussed at the conference. In 1921, France had the largest land army in the world,[112] but she was reluctant to reduce her forces at all. The problem, said Buell, was that a sea power felt very reticent about giving up ships while land armies were at a high level. In addition, France's alliances with Belgium and Poland made her a very potent force on the continent. As Buell saw it, this was a policy of "Armed Peace," and it was forcing Europe to continue in "a passive state of war." It appears, as Buell also suggests, that when Briand came to the conference, he "brought one mandate with him." That was to tell the world of France's particular problems in Europe which prohibited her disarming.[113]

In a speech on November 21, 1921 (at the Third Plenary Session), Premier Briand set forth France's position. Portraying helplessness,

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[111] C. L. A., p. 652. Lord Lee was quoting from Capitaine de Frégate Castex's article entitled "Synthèse de la Gueire Sous-Marine," Revue Maritime (January, 1920).

[112] Buell's figures show France with 818,000 men, Poland--450,000, Japan--300,000, England--215,000, U.S.--175,000, Germany--100,000.

[113] Buell, p. 203.

he told the audience that he would desire nothing more than being able to state that "we come prepared to make the greatest sacrifices; our country is safe; we lay down our arms and, in so doing, we rejoice in helping to lay the foundations of a permanent peace." But, he went on to say, "Unhappily we can not do this. . . . We have not the right to do it." His point was, as he further explained, that

> It takes two to make peace: yourself and your neighbor. To make peace--I speak from the standpoint of land armament--it is not enough to reduce armies and to decrease the munitions of war. That is the material side of things. There is another consideration. . . . A nation must also be surrounded by . . . an atmosphere of peace; disarmament must be moral as well as material. . . . In Europe . . . there are still, alas, grave elements of instability, conditions of such a character that France is forced to look them in the face and to measure their consequences from the point of view of her own safety.[114]

Briand went on to say that France could not possibly disarm until Germany had a change in her philosophy of war and reduced her army. Her army of 100,000 as then presently constituted, said Briand, was made of non-commissioned and commissioned officers from her old regular army. This would, therefore, form a nucleus for a new, great army whenever Germany decided to have one. For France's safety, he stated, she could not possibly disarm her land forces.

Japan was generally pleased with the stance France took on land armaments. A report of Major General Tanaka on Briand's plea was deciphered by Yardley. In this report Tanaka stated, "It is the feeling that through Briand's fight Japan without any effort has achieved a

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[114] C. L. A., p. 116.

large part of its objective."[115] In public, Great Britain showed sympathy for France's predicament, but privately was very hostile. In a telegram to Lord Balfour, Lloyd George stated, "Europe, led by France, was again becoming an armed camp." He also stated that the statistics used by Briand (in his speech citing the threat of Germany) were "faked and disingenuous."[116] George thought that France was in no danger of a German invasion. Nevertheless, the subject of land armaments was, for all intents and purposes, dropped from consideration at the conference.

The subject of aircraft carriers was also discussed. The original Hughes proposal had limited aircraft carriers to 80,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain, and 48,000 tons for Japan. On December 30, 1921, it was proposed that France and Italy be limited to 28,000 tons. The Italian delegate quickly pointed out that with this provision Italy would only be allowed one aircraft carrier of 27,000 tons. He then stated that if the carrier was either in dry dock or sunk, Italy would find herself without a ship of that type. Italy then asked that it be allowed a tonnage allowance high enough to grant it leeway to have two such vessels (or 54,000 tons). In addition, Italy asked for the right to have parity with the allowance granted to any other Mediterranean Power, if this other power was to be allowed over 54,000 tons.

France followed the same logic, but also requested a third carrier because of her colonial possessions, for a total of 60,000 tons. Japan stated that she could construct only one and one-half carriers with

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[115]Report of Major-General Tanaka from Washington to Tokio, quoted in Yardley, p. 311.

[116]Butler, Telegram from Lloyd George to Lord Balfour, November 27, 1921, F. O. A8763/18/45, quoted in Buckley, pp. 105-6.

her allowance and this, Admiral Kato concluded, would not be enough. He stated that Japan also needed three carriers, but unlike France he asked for the maximum size of 27,000 tons each, or a total tonnage of 81,000 tons. In view of these requests, Hughes noted that a ratio of 10:10:6 could be established by giving Great Britain and the United States a 135,000 ton allowance, Japan an 81,000 ton limit, and France and Italy a 60,000 ton limit. All powers agreed to this.[117]

In 1921 France had the largest air force in the world,[118] but after she had refused to limit her army and had threatened to build capital ships and submarines, the British concluded that the French were aiming their air force at the British Isles. In view of this Great Britain clamored for some peacetime restriction on manufacture of aircraft. After numerous meetings, however, a committee only managed to agree that it was "not practicable" to limit commercial or military aircraft in any way; and that the question of adaptation of rules of warfare to aircraft should be reserved for another conference to be held sometime in the future.[119]

The treaty of the limitation of armaments was signed at the end of the conference by Great Britain, the United States, France, Italy, and Japan. Article IV set capital ship replacement tonnage at 525,000 for the United States and Great Britain; 315,000 tons for Japan; and 175,000 tons for Italy and France. Article V established a 35,000 ton limit on capital ships, and Article VI established a limit in the caliber

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[117] C. L. A., pp. 670-78.

[118] France had 1,722 military aircraft, Great Britain--1,048, U.S.--537, Italy--494, Japan--537. Figures from Buckley, p. 121.

[119] C. L. A., p. 790.

of gun on these ships as not greater than 16 inches (406 millimeters). Article VII established the aircraft carrier limit of 135,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain; 60,000 tons for France and Italy; and 81,000 tons for Japan. Articles IX and X established that the tonnage limits on aircraft carriers was to be 27,000 tons and the gun size was established as 8 inches (203 millimeters) or less. Article XI stated that all vessels other than capital ships to be held or constructed by the agreeing powers must be 10,000 tons or less with a gun size of 8 inches or less. The treaty also listed the ships and their tonnage which may have been retained by each country. It further stated that a 10 year holiday would be undertaken, and only after 10 years could capital ships and aircraft carriers, which were at least 20 years old, be replaced. The treaty was to last until December 31, 1936, and a two year notice had to be given before the treaty could be abrogated.[120]

A treaty concerning the use of submarines and poisonous gases was also passed. Article I stated that merchant vessels had to be ordered by the submarine commander to submit to a search. Crews and passengers had to be set to safety before the merchant ship could be destroyed. Also, if the merchant ship failed to submit to search, it could be destroyed. Article III stated that if the above were to be violated, the submarine commander would be considered a pirate. Article IV prohibited the use of submarines as commerce destroyers (a ship engaged in the wanton destruction of merchant vessels). Article V prohibited the "use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world. . . ."[121]

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[120]Ibid., pp. 1573-1604.

[121]Ibid., pp. 1604-10.

Finally, in the realm of arms limitation, a resolution entitled "Resolution for a Commission of Jurists to Consider Amendment of Laws of War" was passed. This resolution proposed that a commission be established with power to consider: 1) If rules of International Law presently in existence covered all changes in "methods of attack or defense . . . of new agencies of warfare" since the 1907 Hague Conference; and 2) If not, then what rules should be adopted.[122]

In conclusion, it appears that the Washington Conference was called because of several reasons; not all dealing with armaments. A particular reason for the conference, the "causal factor" if you will, does not seem to be present. Many reasons intertwine, reinforce each other, even come together; but the impact of each is difficult, if not impossible, to measure. The reasons themselves are almost as hard to define.

It does not appear that there were any specific weapon innovations during the period preceding the conference. The submarine and the airplane, the "novel" weapons discussed at the conference, had been in existence for quite a few years prior to the conference. World War I, however, had shown the immense killing potential of these two weapons systems, and both were still at the beginning of their evolutionary process. As the costs of the older mainstay of the fleet, the capital ship, reached new heights, the burdens of continuing with the programs for further construction of these vessels were seen as oppressive.

Perhaps, as several authors suggest, the idea of arms was only a facade to cover the real reason for the conference: the British desire to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The reasons for this are not

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[122]Ibid., p. 1640.

the subject of this chapter, but a superficial view would indicate that this was entirely likely. Japanese imperialism, as perceived by Great Britain, most certainly caused the British government to reconsider the reason for the alliance in the first place. By 1921 Germany was defeated and Russia was still undergoing the throes of rebellion. The latter appeared weak and of no major consequence to British holdings in East Asia. The alliance appeared to be a cover for Japan's ambitions, however, and a potential threat if Japan and the United States were to engage in war. There still were advantages, however, and if Great Britain was to abrogate the obligations of the alliance, and yet still retain these advantages of security for British interests in Asia and the Pacific, then perhaps a conference which could end in a new pact of some kind would be advantageous.

Japan, on the other hand, did not appear to want a halt to the alliance and, therefore, was reluctant to enter into a conference on Pacific and Asian problems. They were, however, in very deep financial straits as a result of their fears of the United States, which were driving them in an attempt to retain at least a 10:7 ratio with America's 1916 naval program. To continue to attempt to gain this ratio, however, could have bankrupted Japan. A limitation in armaments, on the other hand, could halt the construction of the expensive capital ship, and perhaps the slack could be taken up by an investment in the submarine; i.e., witness Kato's desire to increase Japan's submarine force to 150 ocean-going submarines. To Japan, arms expenses appeared to be the motivating force.

To the United States, no special reason appeared sufficient to drive her to a disarmament conference. Harding initially spoke of a

conference on disarmament, but had not pushed the subject, and even had opposed the first Senate resolution for such a conference. He appeared to be about to oppose the second, but capitulated for some reason, and allowed the resolution to pass without opposition.

The call for negotiations from the United States was initially for a conference to discuss naval arms limitation, particularly capital ships. If Japanese imperialism was a definite cause in American eyes for a conference, it does not appear to be corroborated anywhere. In the United States, however, there does appear to have been a moralistic and perhaps naive desire to halt armaments. The desire for naval supremacy does not appear especially strong, especially after the war; but the concern with domestic priorities does. In any event, the United States appeared to be concerned with reduction of the arms costs as a primary motivator for the conference. Economically, as well as militarily, she was as well off, if not more so, than any other nation. She was able to fulfill national security obligations with the capital ships she presently had, the submarine, and the airplane; therefore, she saw no need for a race with capital ships.

In the final analysis, the Washington Conference of 1921-1922 was called for various reasons, none of which appear to have been a decisive force for all concerned. Costs and security, however, appear to be common perceptions of all nations involved.

CHAPTER IV

THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, PHASE I (SALT I)

PART I

Introduction

"SALT," says John Newhouse, "is perverse; it enlists our curiosity, yet discourages comprehension."[1] Its language is in terms of the technical, yet, in essence, it is political in the sense of involving decisions which affect allocations of resources, for both external and internal priorities. These two aspects of SALT, the political and the technical, are intertwined in such a way that it is difficult if not impossible to explain them separately. Basic to an understanding of SALT is the recognition that technology, in the form of weaponry in this case, is a political asset to be used by one nation at the expense of another. In the case of SALT, weapons technology appears to have brought the United States and Soviet Union to the point of wanting some type of limitation agreement (witness the peripheral agreements on hot-line, test-ban, and non-proliferation), but the political utility of weaponry causes both nations to resist a limitation. If a limitation is agreed upon, as it was in SALT I,[2] each nation utilizes other qualitative weapon innovations as "hedges"[3] in order to "steal a march" on its

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[1] John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, the Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), p. 1.

[2] The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks are commonly called SALT.

[3] "Hedge" is a term used to denote one nation's attempt to protect itself qualitatively in weaponry while entering into agreements on quantitative limits.

opponent.

By and large, however, there is agreement on the basic, underlying rationale for SALT. This is that SALT represents "a mutual need to solemnize the parity principle"[4]: a desire to acknowledge that both sides accept the fact that each could destroy the other. In essence, "SALT is a political negotiation concerned with finding an equilibrium in which the great powers feel secure."[5]

Although basic agreement can be reached on the underlying rationale for SALT, it is extremely difficult to find agreement on the reasons for the actual onset of SALT. This, I believe, is because there is no single factor causing SALT, and therefore it is an interplay of what Thomas Wolfe describes as "strategic, military-technical, political, psychological, economic, and bureaucratic factors . . . [which] all influence . . . interests in the limitation of strategic armament."[6]

It is difficult to tell which factor is more important. Some may overlap others, and even the actors are not completely sure of the greatest influence. Even within each factor there are priorities, perceptions, and nuances not discernible to the outsider. The best anyone can do, therefore, is to identify the possible factors influencing the onset of negotiations in hopes of showing their interrelatedness, and perhaps

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[4]Strategic parity, as used by Walter Slocombe, is an abstract term which denotes more than a numerical equality. It is "the link between a nation's military (including nuclear) forces--a collection of weapons systems with certain certain technical capabilities and characteristics--and its political power and influence." Walter Slocombe, "The Political Implications of Strategic Parity," Adelphi Papers No. 77 (May 1971): 2.

[5]Newhouse, p. 5.

[6]Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Interests in SALT," in SALT; Implications for Arms Control in the 1970s, eds. William R. Kintner and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1973), p. 21.

to suggest that one "reason" is more probable than another.

PART II

Soviet Attitudes Towards Arms Control, and Factors Influencing the Soviet Decision to Enter into SALT

It appears that Soviet policies on arms control and nuclear weapons in the post-World War II period have been executed with a particular goal in mind: the attainment of at least strategic nuclear parity with the United States. The methods used to attain this goal have been a matter of controversy within the Soviet Union. In fact, as Lincoln Bloomfield argues, "the significant source of Soviet arms control policy is to be found in 'trade-offs' among several key underlying factors"[7]: both internal--the bureaucracy and the economy, and external--the international environment.

Internal Setting

The decision to enter into SALT has reflected the views of the foreign affairs intelligentsia, the scientific community, and the military. They constitute specific "interest groups" within the Soviet bureaucratic establishment.

For purposes of analysis, the foreign affairs intelligentsia refers to the professionals concerned with foreign policy. They are primarily found in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence services, diplomatic schools, and the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. This group had little influence during the years of Stalin and Khrushchev, but since that time their power has

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[7]Lincoln P. Bloomfield et al., Khrushchev and the Arms Race; Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament 1954-1964 (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966), p. 3.

grown and they might be suspected of playing a significant role in the decisions leading to Soviet involvement in SALT. This group does not have a single view, but, as Wolfe states, its "general orientation" has been "pro-negotiation" on arms control, with the stipulation that "openings" would be exploited as they presented themselves.

The scientific community is an influential group because of the expertise it commands, particularly in the area of nuclear technology. Its "general orientation," like that of the foreign affairs intelligentsia, is pro-arms control. Its political influence, however, is muted because of the fear some of the Soviet leadership and the military have that it may become too powerful.[8]

The military is an organized agency of the bureaucracy, with specifically defined interests and goals. Its importance is reflected in the strategic functions it performs within the Soviet political system. The Soviet Union craves great power status, and to this end perceives the need for a large, sophisticated military establishment. This establishment, says Wolfe, is characterized by professional independence, specialized knowledge,[9] and organizational autonomy. Furthermore, it has developed its own values, codes of conduct, and specific esprit de corps. Next to the party organization, the military constitutes the most powerful organized group in the Soviet Union. This means that it has considerable influence because it can insure that its "advice" is brought to bear

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[8]Wolfe, pp. 30-32.

[9]An example of this is a story that Newhouse tells of one session during the second round of SALT. M. Semenov, the chief Soviet delegate, was comparing Minuteman silos with SS-9 silos, but was corrected by the U.S. He had to be told by Colonel-General Ogarkov that the SS-9 silos were much larger. Later Ogarkov told a United States delegate to please not tell U.S. knowledge of Russian military matters to the civilian members of the Soviet delegation.

on the top leadership. The military supports SALT, but is wary lest something happen to hurt the Soviet military posture. It did not "call the tune" for SALT, but did provide a conservative force on the eventual Soviet position.[10]

The decision to enter into arms control negotiations has been difficult to take for the Soviet leaders. Among many factors which influenced its outcome, the economic considerations have played an important role, albeit not a decisive one.

In the post-World War II period there do not appear to have been any real economic pressures of the nature of an "urgent motive" driving the Soviet Union to enter into arms control negotiations. Beginning in 1945, the Soviet Union devoted a large amount of its budget to research and development (R & D) activities in order to develop an atomic capability and thereby erase the American monopoly. Even after the U.S.S.R. exploded an atomic weapon in 1949, her expenditures remained high, principally due to the Korean War. After the war, defense expenditures dropped somewhat, but increased in 1955. They were lowered again in 1956 and 1957 (see table 2). They grew rapidly after 1957, with the biggest jump in 1961.[11] By 1962, defense spending was almost 40 percent higher than in 1957. In 1963 the published outlay for defense was a full 10 percent more than in 1962. The fact that agriculture was in shambles in 1963 and civilian industry began to stagnate as more and more engineers and scientists were pulled into the arms industry, probably caused defense expenditures to drop in 1964 and 1965, but by 1966 this spending was on its way to an all-time high in 1968.

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[10]Wolfe, pp. 34-36.

[11]Bloomfield, pp. 105-7.

TABLE 2

DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS IN U.S.S.R. BUDGET FOR 1955-1968[12]
(in Billions of Rubles)

1955	10.7	. .	1962	12.7
1956	9.7	. .	1963	13.9
1957	9.1	. .	1964	13.3
1958	9.4	. .	1965	12.8
1959	9.4	. .	1966	13.4
1960	9.3	. .	1967	14.5
1961	11.6	. .	1968	16.7

[12]Reproduced from a table in Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964-1968 (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 82.

The actual influence of the economy on the decision to enter into SALT, however, remains in doubt to this day. Two opposite views are presented by Thomas Wolfe. One view holds that economics played a large role in the decision to opt for SALT. This view maintains that the Soviet Union needed "growth investment" for "meeting rising consumer demands" and that strategic arms purchases took too many resources needed for consumer industries. Another view holds that "economic constraints can no longer be regarded as a severe brake upon Soviet capacity and willingness to compete strategically with the United States, and that therefore the prime motivations behind Soviet participation in SALT must lie elsewhere."[13]

Wolfe says that the first view was used more extensively in the first stages of SALT as the answer to why the Soviets decided to opt for it, especially in light of the slowdown in the Soviet economy in 1967-1968; but if this was the correct view, he suggests, Soviet interest in SALT should have declined altogether as the economy resurged in 1970. The interest, however, remained high, thus indicating that the Soviet's main reason for SALT may have been other than economic. Furthermore, the statistics of the Five-Year Plan of February, 1971, in which consumer industry still retained a low percentage of the total production, even with an economic upsurge, may indicate that the second view is more reasonable.[14] As evidence for this, Wolfe cites the debate over investment priorities which still raged during the SALT negotiations, with the military faction carrying the most weight. Thus it appears, as Wolfe

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[13]Wolfe, p. 25.

[14]The 1970 plan showed consumer goods as a percentage of total production as only 24%. This had been raised to only 30% in 1971. Heavy industry took the rest.

suggests, that "the Soviet leaders are prepared to devote at least as large a proportion of the national income to military purposes as was the case during the strategic buildup of the sixties--provided that they consider such a level of military preparation necessary to support Soviet interests."[15] Therefore, it appears that the economic factor is not decisive.

In sum, as Thomas Larson aptly states: "Soviet leaders as a group are well-trained to resist acceptance of disarmament measures whose attraction is mainly economic."[16] Thus, the majority of economic resource allocations, it is probable, are heavily influenced by the strategic considerations which appear to affect Soviet security.

External Setting

Soviet perceptions of the international environment may have been a most important influence in Russia's decision to opt for arms control in general, and SALT in particular.

The period from 1945 to 1954 in Soviet strategic policy was characterized by a drive to acquire atomic weapons, and arms control was anathema to the leadership at this time. The Soviet desire for nuclear weapons, however, does not appear to have been motivated as much by fear of the United States, as from the knowledge that the weapon was of vital necessity in the Soviet's drive to become a superpower. As Adam B. Ulam writes, "Absolutely nothing suggests that Soviet policies in 1945 were dominated by the fear of or were a reaction to America's possession of the atom bomb."[17] As a matter of fact, Ulam continues, it

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[15] Wolfe, p. 28.

[16] Larson, p. 81.

[17] Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America & Russia since World War II (New York: Viking Press, 1971), p. 95.

was during this period that the U.S.S.R. solidified its control over East Europe, blockaded Berlin, and demobilized her armed forces from just over 11 million men in 1945, to 2.8 million men in 1948. A Soviet assumption during this period appeared to be that the United States would not use the weapon, even for intimidation.

The 1946 United States' plan (the Baruch Plan[18]) to turn over atomic weapons to an agency of the United Nations for management was not acceptable to Stalin, because of his suspicion that the "superagency" created would be detrimental to Soviet interests. He also knew that under this plan Russia would be denied nuclear know-how, but the United States, though disarmed, would retain the knowledge. His counterproposal, that all atomic weapons be destroyed but with no inspection guaranteed, was unacceptable to the United States, as he probably was certain it would be. In essence, says Ulam, Stalin was convinced of the absolute desirability of nuclear weapons and, therefore, embarked upon a program to insure their development and acquisition. The fact that Russia was able to explode a nuclear device by 1949, Ulam claims, is proof enough of Soviet devotion to that goal.[19] The Soviet attitude towards the West during this period was characterized by hostility. Bloomfield concludes that after Stalin's death, uncertainties, such as which side would profit more from a strategic arms race, "combined with the as yet unresolved questions of inspection and control, the fixing of ratios, and Moscow's assessment of Western intentions, probably made comprehensive

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[18]The Baruch Plan was presented to the United Nations in 1946. See Trevor N. Dupuy and Gay M. Hammerman, A Documentary History of Arms Control and Disarmament (Dunn Lorins, Va.: T. N. Dupuy Associates, 1973), pp. 301-8, for a full reproduction of the plan.

[19]See Ulam, chap. 4.

disarmament appear infeasible in 1954-1956. . . ."[20] After 1956, however, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev appeared to become more agreeable to notions of arms control. A softer line appeared, accompanied by a shift toward accommodation with the West.[21]

Khrushchev announced in February 1956, that war was no longer inevitable and that in some cases the movement to Communism could be accomplished by peaceful means. This was intended to show that Soviet Russia did not want military confrontation with the West.[22] Influencing this accommodation was the fact that by 1954 and 1955 the Soviet R & D programs began to deliver their "fruits" in the form of new delivery capabilities and larger warheads for its strategic arsenal.[23]

In the period 1956 to 1962 several optimistic assumptions concerning future Russian strategic power caused the leadership to become very confident concerning Soviet nuclear capabilities. This, in turn, probably caused the Soviet Union to soften its approach to arms control, at least until the Cuban Missile Crisis in October, 1962. One reason for this optimism was that Russia successfully tested an ICBM in 1957 (before the United States), after which Khrushchev announced that bomber forces, such as those belonging to the United States, were becoming obsolete. As the Soviets began to perceive that they were reaching a position of relative parity with the United States (their assumption combined with cries of "missile gap" in the United States), they began to speak more seriously of arms control. At the Pugwash talks

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[20]Bloomfield, p. 44.

[21]Ibid., p. 17.

[22]Leo Gruliow, ed., Current Soviet Policies: A Documentary Record of the 20th Communist Party Congress and Its Aftermath (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 36-38.

[23]Bloomfield, p. 37.

in Moscow in 1960, the Soviet scientists asked the American delegation to report to President-elect Kennedy that "the Soviet Union is serious about disarmament"; and that its position was "not wholly propaganda."[24]

After the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 exposed the idea of Soviet missile superiority as a myth, the Soviets became quite concerned about their vulnerability. They reacted by becoming more hostile, and their position on arms control hardened. Although some negotiations were still conducted on peripheral topics (hot-line agreement), movement towards a comprehensive negotiation was halted for a considerable period.[25]

The Soviet strategic buildup after 1962 was not just the result of the Cuban crisis, says Wolfe, but was the culmination of planning in the late 1950's to increase nuclear forces in order to reach full parity. When Khrushchev was finally ousted in October 14, 1964, however, the Soviet strategic forces were still very weak (consisting of only about two hundred launchers); but initial steps for the deployment of the third-generation SS-9 and SS-11 had been taken.[26]

After Khrushchev was removed, the remaining leadership was virtually the same as before, but its style changed, involving a different emphasis. The "new" leadership accused Khrushchev of "subjectivism," "voluntarism," and impulsiveness. He had been too addicted to "leaping before looking" and to "bombast." What the leadership would now emphasize, it said, would be group decisions, with "sobriety, caution, [and]

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[24]Quoted in W. W. Rostow, "Introduction: the Politics of Arms Control or How to Make Nuclear Weapons Wither Away," in Kintner, Fn. 6, p. ix.

[25]Bloomfield, pp. 176-85. [26]Wolfe, p. 39.

careful preparation."[27]

In 1964-1966, the new leadership conducted a review of defense policy and for a time new programming was in limbo. At the Twenty-third Party Congress in April 1966, however, Kosygin indicated that larger defense expenditures were being programmed, with the emphasis on strategic forces. In 1968 the Soviets modernized their submarine force with new Y-class submarines.

In addition to perceptions of the West, it is almost certain that internal rifts within the Communist camp affected Soviet actions towards arms control. As the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1956 began to diverge from the Soviet model of development and to take an independent stance on other matters as well, the relationship between the two giants became very antagonistic.[28] This hostility became more intense after 1957, especially when the Soviet Union refused to continue to provide the Chinese with nuclear aid. Nevertheless, exactly how this affected Soviet arms control policy is debatable.[29]

There is agreement that the dispute did exert some influence on Soviet policies; that Soviet arms control policies following the removal of Khrushchev probably were "framed" so as to avoid giving unnecessary offense to China. This meant that the Soviets were influenced, restrained if you will, because all arms control decisions had to take the attitude

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[27]Quoted in Larson, p. 8.

[28]Robert A. Scalapino, "The American-Soviet-Chinese Triangle: Implications for Arms Control," in Kintner, p. 143.

[29]For a good discussion as to this debate, see Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "The Chinese Factor in Soviet Disarmament Policy," and Morton H. Halperin, "Sino-Soviet Nuclear Relations, 1957-1960," in Morton H. Halperin, ed., Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1967).

and military posture of the PRC into consideration.[30]

In sum, great power status via atomic weapon parity has probably been a constant goal of the Soviet Union during the post-World War II period; therefore, Soviet arms control policy is very concerned with the military-strategic balance which exists at a given time. This means that arms control and disarmament policies are formulated with regard to how they affect security and, therefore, they change with changes in the military and strategic situation. A prime concern is to avoid a general war, but at the same time to pursue security in the form of parity. The actual timing of their arms control efforts, therefore, depends upon both internal and external factors, plus one other, technology, which will be discussed below.

PART III

American Attitudes to Arms Control, and Factors Influencing the United States' Decision to Enter into SALT

The arms control policy of the United States in the post-World War II period, generally speaking, has been one which allowed arms limitation to be discussed, but the proposals offered, however, have been only those which would have insured continued United States superiority, if not in actual on-hand forces, at least in technology. Thus, the American decision to enter into SALT was a combination of factors, both internal and external, coupled with a strategic philosophy which allowed the United States to accept strategic parity with the Russians.

In the mid-1960's, for example, the United States' long-range strategic strike force was four or five times as large as that of the Soviet Union. In 1966-1967, however, the United States decided to place

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[30]Sonnenfeldt, pp. 103-8.

a quantitative ceiling on strategic weaponry, which allowed the U.S.S.R. to move past U.S. strategic force levels in ICBMs and deliverable megatonnage by 1970 (see table 3). This part will discuss the non-strategic factors which possibly brought about that decision.

Internal Setting

The U.S. bureaucracy has been influential to the extent that it functions as do bureaucracies in general: by "funneling" inputs in the form of options into the leadership. From these, decisions are made. Concerning arms control, the most influential agencies in the U.S. bureaucracy are the State Department and the Department of Defense. Of the two, the Department of Defense has been the more conservative force, and the State Department, via the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), has been more inclined towards arms control. All in all, however, these two agencies have balanced each other. This has resulted in a cautious, but pro-arms control policy. The bureaucracy's main influence, as with the Russian apparatus, however, is to help set the parameters of decision making and perhaps to affect the timing of negotiations, but overall its contribution was not decisive.[31]

Public Opinion and Congress, on the other hand, have generally adopted the "guns or butter" conception of defense. Until Vietnam they were mainly conservative in their views of military spending; i.e., the public and Congress, nurtured on anti-Communism, accepted government requests for military and weapons appropriations.

After 1965, however, the public began to feel the pinch of

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[31]Harland B. Moulton, From Superiority to Parity; the United States and the Strategic Arms Race, 1961-1971 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 270-75.

TABLE 3

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC-STRIKE FORCE, 1970[32]

Type	U.S.	U.S.S.R.
ICBMs		
Small (SS-11, Minuteman)	(1,000)	(940)
Medium (SS-8, Titan II)	(54)	(220)
Large (SS-9)	. . .	(280)
Subtotal	1,054	1,440
SLBMs	656	350
Bombers	550	145
Total	2,260	1,935
Number of warheads carried (approximate)	5,300	2,225
Deliverable megatonnage (approximate)	5,600	9,700

[32]Chart in J. J. Coffey, "American Interests in the Limitation of Strategic Armaments," in Kintner, p. 58.

supporting the war in Vietnam, strategic forces and the Great Society programs.[33] Defense budgets, for example, went from $46 billion in 1960 to $49.9 billion in 1965, $66 billion in 1966, $70.6 billion in 1967, $75 billion in 1968, $81.4 billion in 1969, and to $82.3 billion in 1970.[34] As large as these expenditures were, they were declining as a proportion of G. N. P. The rapidly increasing total budget was becoming oppressive.

However, due to the war in Vietnam, the percentage of the defense budget devoted to strategic arms declined greatly from 1965 to 1968, as compared to the percentage prior to 1965, and this was to decline further by 1970. Whereas in 1965, 13.8 percent of the defense budget was earmarked for strategic forces and 9.8 percent for R & D, in 1970 the percentages were 11.7 and 6.8 percent respectively.[35]

The attitude of the bureaucracy and Congress to arms control became more positive as the 1960's drew to a close. Whereas some agencies and congressmen urged caution in approaching any sort of negotiation

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[33]In 1967 a Gallup poll showed that 76% of Americans sampled held either a "mildly unfavorable" or "highly unfavorable" attitude toward Russia. In George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 vol. 3. (New York: Random House, 1972), March 8, 1967 Poll. By 1969, however, Vietnam had caused much of the Congress and the public to be skeptical of "experts," and they began to pressure for more funds for domestic needs. In an August 14, 1969 poll, 52% of those surveyed felt that the U.S. was spending "too much" on military and defense. Only 8% felt that the U.S. was spending "too little." In Gallup, p. 2210. How much influence public opinion had on the decision to opt for SALT is highly debatable. In national security matters, public opinion has mattered little. However, in this case public opinion may have influenced Congress, which, because they control appropriations, did exert influence on the government to decide on SALT.

[34]Charles L. Schultze et al., Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1971), p. 12.

[35]The Federal Budget; its Impact on the Economy (New York: National Industrial Conference Board, 1969), p. 12.

with the Soviet Union, others welcomed the advent of a spirit of détente and urged SALT as an immediate step.[36]

External Setting

In 1951 John Foster Dulles set forth his ideas on the inherent dangers which he and many others associated with world communism. It was his contention that the communists' goal was to become locked in a "death struggle" with capitalism. Communism, then, was a diabolical scheme designed to subjugate the entire world. The Soviet Union, under the guidance of a "fanatical Communist Party," was evil and bent on "destruction, terror, and madness."[37] Since these views were widely shared throughout American society, the conception of negotiating seriously with Russia on its terms of total disarmament was conceived to be impractical.

This view began to give way after Stalin's death in 1953, gradually moving towards détente. In the United States after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, "an air of cautious optimism about East-West relations" appeared to evolve. This was, says J. I. Coffey, "from an apparent recognition of the new realities and an adjustment that reflects the limits of U.S. power, . . . [and also] from a willingness to use that power for negotiation rather than for confrontation."[38] This feeling was reciprocated somewhat by the Soviet Union.

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[36]Détente is a nebulous term literally meaning a "relaxation of tensions." It does not imply an "entente," but includes perceptions of improving East-West relations. See Department of State, The Meaning of Détente (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Office, June 1974).

[37]John Foster Dulles, War or Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 2-10.

[38]Coffey, p. 61.

In essence, the lessening of tension in the international environment provided a catalyst for the advent of SALT, but it was not the decisive factor. The general statement which can be made is that without a relaxed environment SALT probably could not have taken place, but without other factors, such as the economic and strategic-technological (yet to be discussed), détente would not alone have caused SALT. What is important and, as Walter Slocombe suggests very relevant, is that the United States would not have embraced strategic parity unless it did, in America's estimation, provide for security.[39] This, then, leads to the most important factor urging SALT (on the United States' side at least): the effect of technological innovations.

PART IV

The Technological Incentives for SALT

SALT is a political negotiation, but wrought with technological considerations.[40] Because nuclear weapons so drastically altered the previously-held concepts of warfare, in the nuclear age atomic technology becomes a tool which allows one nation to exert influence on another's political decisions. Technological innovations have the ability to create feelings of insecurity in others, and if these innovations alter the strategic power balance between antagonists, the psychology of the nuclear age appears to cause the nation with the most powerful strategic force to perceive that it is in a position to exert more influence in the world. Ironically, the "lesser" power appears to accept its role of

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[39] See Slocombe, Fn. 4.

[40] Technological in the sense of weapons developments that affect the strategic doctrine. Appendix A contains a brief summation of the strategic concept of deterrence.

having less influence, although its ability to obliterate its opponent is unimpaired. Like Hertz and Avis, both nations strive to be "Number One" in the strategic arms race, each attempting to halt the race once it has reached a superior position. Thus, it was only when both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to accept strategic parity as the basis of negotiation that SALT was able to begin. Part IV will attempt to trace the evolution of parity, and the strategic, technological and military decisions which influenced the decision to begin SALT.[41]

During the period of the American nuclear monopoly, 1945-1949, the defense planners in the United States appeared convinced of U.S. atomic superiority. The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in 1949, followed by the Korean War in 1950, however, caused an urgent drive to "regain" superiority in nuclear weaponry. In 1950, President Truman decided to develop the hydrogen bomb (what Harry Moulton considers an "exponential"[42] jump in the technological sequence of nuclear weapons), and this helped the United States to "spurt ahead."

The "H" bomb was a vast improvement over the "A" bomb, and it was successfully tested in late 1952. By 1955 the United States was far superior to the U.S.S.R. in strategic delivery means (see table 4). The Soviet R & D efforts during this period which would dramatically alter the strategic status quo in just a few years were being urgently carried forth, however, and they culminated in another "exponential" jump, the

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[41]Strategic-technological-military means simply that in the nuclear age, one affects the other, and that it is almost impossible to separate them completely.

[42]This means that a qualitative innovation so vastly changed the strategic situation that the "have not" nation frantically attempted to negate the feat in some manner.

TABLE 4

STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS, 1955[43]



[43]Chart in Bloomfield, p. 37. ICBMs were only in R & D stages.

development of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). The Soviet Union successfully tested this weapon in early 1957, but the United States was not able to duplicate that feat until December of that year.[44]

The Soviet ICBM test caused great concern within the U.S., and several agencies and "think-tanks," including the Rand Corporation and the Department of Defense, began to stress the vulnerability of the United States' Strategic Air Command (SAC).[45] It appeared to defense officials "to be the most dire threat to the security of the United States in its entire history."[46] The reaction of the United States was to begin more intensive R & D efforts to "regain" superiority in strategic arms. These efforts culminated successfully when a Titan I was placed in operation by 1959 and the Minuteman and Polaris by the early 1960s. The "Triad"[47] was now in operation, and the United States saw itself in a secure, superior strategic position.[48]

In 1964 President Johnson began to make moves to reach agreement on mutual arms reduction with the Soviet Union. He wrote to Khrushchev in 1964 proposing that both nations destroy some of their older bombers, and on March 19, 1964, Adrian Fisher (the Deputy Director of the ACDA) proposed that a number of U.S. B-47s and Soviet TU-16s be destroyed at the rate of twenty per month for two years. In August, 1964, the United

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[44]Moulton, pp. 252-63.

[45]SAC contained what was then the U.S. main nuclear delivery means: the long-range bomber.

[46]Moulton, p. 263.

[47]Triad is the term to denote that the balance of the U.S. strategic strength lies in ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers.

[48]Moulton, pp. 21-23.

States proposed a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic offensive and defensive weapons, and a ban against "novel" systems. Both proposals were rejected by Russia.[49]

By the mid-1960's, spending for U.S. strategic forces leveled off and a tacit understanding was accepted in the defense circles of Washington which allowed 639 as the ceiling figure for B-52 bombers. It was further stipulated that they would be phased out as they became worn-out (current figures show approximately 460 in commission). This understanding also called for deployment of a Minuteman force of up to 1,000 missiles and a maximum of 41 Polaris submarines. With this understanding, the United States reached its self-imposed ceiling of 1054 ICBM launchers in 1967.

During the 1960's, the Soviet Union earnestly began to increase its ICBM force. In 1964, for example, it only had approximately 200 ICBMs in soft sites, but as table 5 shows, this number was to greatly increase by 1967.

Strategically speaking, the U.S.S.R. bases its strategic doctrine almost exclusively on ballistic missiles, particularly ICBMs (see table 5). Its largest weapon, the SS-9 Scarp, is an expensive, liquid fueled weapon, costing almost twice as much as the United States Minuteman. The SS-9 gives the Soviet Union a credible first-strike capability,[50]

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[49] Newhouse, p. 69.

[50] A first strike is defined as: "The launching of an initial nuclear attack before the opponent attacked has used any strategic nuclear weapons himself." See Glossary in Kintner, p. 425. A first-strike capability involves "the substantial elimination of the attacked nations retaliatory second-strike force." A first-strike weapon, then, is simply a very sophisticated, accurate, or large-yield weapon which gives one nation the ability to destroy its opponents retaliatory, or second-strike force. A second strike, then, is "the capability to absorb a surprise nuclear attack, and survive with sufficient power to inflict unacceptable

TABLE 5

STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS (OCTOBER 1, 1967)[51]

	United States	U.S.S.R.
ICBM Launchers	1054	720
Submarine Ballistic Missile Launchers	656	30
Intercontinental Bombers	697	155
Warheads	4500	1000

damage on the aggressor." In U.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Scope, Magnitude, and Implications of the United States Anti-ballistic Missile Program, Hearings before the subcommittee on military applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1968, "Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the United Press International editors and publishers, San Francisco, Calif., Sept. 18, 1967, "hereafter referred to as McNamara, "Remarks. . . ."

[51]Chart from Larson, p. 104. The discrepancy in warheads is due to the large number of U.S. bombers.

which would give to it the possibility of destroying much of the United States' Minuteman force. When the United States learned in August, 1968 that the U.S.S.R. had begun to test multiple re-entry vehicles (MRV) for the SS-9,[52] however, it became more concerned. Now more warheads could be carried to the Minuteman fields, thus insuring more destruction.

The MRV development meant to many U.S. defense experts that the Soviets would soon test a multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV). An SS-9 with MIRV would increase the Soviet threat ten-fold, at least. As few as three hundred SS-9s with six MIRVs apiece, says Newhouse, might be able to destroy the entire Minuteman system on a first strike. By 1973 the U.S.S.R. had 288 SS-9s.[53]

MIRV

MIRV and MRV have increased the amount of nuclear firepower which can be delivered from one nation to another. MRVs are warheads which, once released by the launcher over enemy territory, scatter along a single path and are not individually targeted. MIRVs, on the other hand, are released at different times, at different angles and are individually targeted. An excellent analogy is given by Newhouse. He states:

> MIRV is a wondrous technology. The low-thrust final stage of the missile is a bus. The bus, pushed along by a single guidance and propulsion system, carries all of the re-entry vehicles. These it releases one at a time by changing velocity and direction. Incredibly, these adjustments actually define the path of the re-entry vehicle to its target. The bus follows a meandering course, now zigzag, now rolling over

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[52] Ian Smart, "Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide," Adelphi Papers No. 63 (December 1969): 31.

[53] Newhouse, pp. 20-21.

> and releasing a cloud of chaff, now perhaps rolling again to fire another decoy, now shifting directions and releasing a real warhead.[54]

It is argued by some the MIRV is a very destabilizing weapon because, in one qualitative jump, a nation's strategic firepower is vastly improved. The counting of forces no longer becomes practical because one launcher does not equate another. A MIRVd missile is "worth" more than one without MIRV.

Others argue the MIRV is not as destabilizing as it would appear, because even though it implies a first-strike capability against land based missiles, it cannot threaten either bombers or submarines. Nevertheless, it remains a major threat and is destabilizing at the very least "simply because governments think it is."[55] The main problem with MIRV is, as Newhouse states, that since governments think in terms of "worst case," the Soviets are as afraid of the U.S. MIRV which was already deployed, as the United States is afraid of the Soviet MIRV (for the SS-9 especially), which was (at the time of SALT) not deployed.[56]

As will be shown, anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) were easily discussed at SALT and eventually limited. MIRV, on the other hand, appeared very ominous to the Russians and they refused to discuss it. Since the Soviet Union had not developed the MIRV technology by SALT, they were not about to limit its use. Their reason appears as V. V. Larionov, a noted Soviet scholar, states, that "What appears 'sufficient' to one side can look like a desire for superiority to the other side."[57]

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[54] Ibid., p. 28.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Ibid., p. 29.

[57] V. V. Larionov, S. Sh. A., No. 3, 1970 Moscow: S. Sh. A. Ekondmika, Politika-Ideologioa, quoted in Newhouse, p. 31.

ABM

The political implications of ABM (in the sense of security considerations) are very involved and very basic to SALT.[58] The idea of an ABM force originated long before SALT, but the U.S. decision to deploy was deferred until 1967. It was seen as a necessary system for security, but it was also seen as a system which would weaken the strands of deterrence. If one side felt it could shore itself behind a wall of ABM, it would be able to launch a surprise attack, ride out a retaliatory attack and win a nuclear war. ABM defense, as Jeremy J. Stone, a noted expert on strategic doctrine states, is "pernicious, destabilizing, and dangerous."[59] Nevertheless, the decision was made by both nations to deploy ABM.

The two air defense systems developed by the Soviet Union were Tallinn and Galosh. Tallinn was an air defense system using SA-5 missiles, and was originally designed to cover the bomber routes of approach into Russia. Galosh, on the other hand, was an ABM system[60] established around Moscow. The deployment of Galosh, however, caused the United States to fear that Tallinn might also be an ABM system. As a result, the United States earnestly began to step up its development of ABM and MIRV (designed principally to maneuver through an ABM system). U.S. defense planners saw Tallinn and Galosh as steps taken to begin fortifi-

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[58] The ABM was not an "exponential" technological breakthrough, although it did utilize much of the technology learned over the years, but rather it represented a dire threat to the deterrence theory.

[59] Jeremy J. Stone, Containing the Arms Race: Some Specific Proposals (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1966), p. 21.

[60] ABM is defined as: "A defensive missile fired to intercept an offensive ballistic missile." A ballistic missile is one which reaches an altitude outside the earth's atmosphere, and falls back by force of gravity. See glossary, in Kintner, p. 423.

cation of Russian urban centers.[61]

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara did not desire to deploy ABM, however, and his concern developed into finding ways to block the Soviet Union from its further deployment. His views were presented in a statement given before the House Armed Services Committee in 1966. He said:

> It is a virtual certainty that the Soviets will act to maintain their deterrent which casts such grave doubts on the advisability of our deploying . . . [our ABM] system for the protection of our cities against the kind of heavy, sophisticated missile attack they could launch in the 1970's. In all probability, all we would accomplish would be to increase greatly both their defense expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side.[62]

President Johnson, however, wanted the United States to have an ABM system in some form. A reason for this appears to be, as Newhouse states, that "Johnson was . . . looking ahead to the 1968 elections. Having helped mightily to foster the notion of a missile gap in the late 1950s--an issue used to advantage against Nixon in the 1960 elections--he obviously wished to avoid facing a Republican charge of an ABM gap."[63]

At a meeting in the Texas White House on December 6, 1966, relates Newhouse, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) urged that the President support an anti-Russian ABM defense of American cities. McNamara had already cut the requested funds for the initial ABM procurement from

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[61]Many U.S. intelligence agencies were predicting a large expansion of Galosh in 1964-1966.

[62]U.S. Department of State, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fy 1967-1971 Defense Program and 1967 Defense Budget, February 1966, p. 53.

[63]Newhouse, p. 84.

the next year's budget; but at this meeting it was decided to restore these funds in the amount of $375 million. McNamara then urged a compromise: "A suggestion that the Administration hold off spending the money, or making a firm decision on what type of ABM system to deploy until the State Department had explored with Moscow the idea of talks on limiting strategic arms, especially ABM's."[64]

McNamara next authorized Llewellyn E. Thompson, then leaving to become Ambassador to Russia, to contact the Russians in order to suggest negotiations limiting strategic arms. As Newhouse says, "the days and weeks that followed marked the precise beginning of SALT."[65] Thompson then contacted Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and emphasized talks on the ABM. Dobrynin, in turn, placed equal stress on some form of accord on both offensive and defensive systems. As a result of these contacts, President Johnson said on January 24, 1967, in his budget message to Congress, that he would continue to develop ABM, but would "take no action now" with respect to its deployment.

On January 25, 1967, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee on appropriations, McNamara stated the U.S. position on ABM. He said:

> We propose: (1) To pursue with undiminished vigor the development, test and evaluation of the . . . [ABM] system . . . but to take no action now to deploy the system. (2) To initiate negotiations with the Soviet Union designed, through formal or informal agreement, to limit the deployment of antiballistic missile systems. (3) To reconsider the deployment decision in the event these discussions prove unsuccessful. . . .[66]

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[64]Ibid., p. 86.

[65]Ibid., pp. 86-87.

[66]U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, Statement of Robert S. McNamara, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, January 26, 1967. 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 239.

When the Russians announced in February that they were deploying an ABM system around Moscow, Secretary of State Dean Rusk replied that ABM development by both nations would result in increases in offensive missiles. This, he said, could lead to "new plateaus of expenditures . . . with no great change in the . . . strategic situation."[67]

On February 18, Thompson told Kosygin that the United States was willing to discuss limiting offensive systems also, and suggested that the talks be held in Moscow. On March 2, President Johnson announced that Kosygin, in answer to a letter of 27 January, had agreed to meet with the United States in bilateral talks on "means of limiting the arms race in offensive and defensive nuclear missiles."[68]

In 1967 at a meeting held at Glassboro, New Jersey, Kosygin took a very hard attitude towards arms control.[69] Dean Rusk, years later, recalls that at Glassboro, President Johnson said in effect to Kosygin, "'Just set a date and I'll have McNamara there in Moscow.'" Rusk further states that:

> Kosygin's problem was that he didn't have a negotiating position. He clearly had no authority to discuss limiting arms, least of all ABM's. He replied, in effect: 'How can you expect me to tell the Russian people they can't defend themselves against your rockets?'

Nevertheless, as Rusk recalls, Kosygin did appear to be interested in notions of stable deterrence, an interest which the Russians had not shown before. To Rusk, therefore, Glassboro "may have been the start of

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[67]Quoted in Newhouse, p. 90. [68]Ibid., p. 91.

[69]On 17 June, 1967, the PRC detonated its first thermonuclear explosion, of at least 3 megatons. See Jonathan Pollack, "Chinese Attitudes Towards Nuclear Weapons, 1964-9," China Quarterly, vol. 50. (April-June, 1972): 247.

SALT for the Russians."[70] At this time, however, Johnson perceived that a decision on whether or not to deploy ABM had to be made. It was McNamara who stated the Administration's final position on ABM in an address at San Francisco on September 18, 1967.

In his address McNamara at first acknowledged that

> The cornerstone of our strategic policy continues to be to deter deliberate nuclear attack on the United States, or its allies, by maintaining a highly reliable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any single aggressor, or combination of aggressors, at any time during the course of strategic nuclear exchange--even after our absorbing a surprise first strike.[71]

This was, he said, America's "assured destruction capability," and this capability, he went on to say, was vital for it was the "very essence" of deterrence.[72]

The problem was, he said, that even though the United States had nuclear superiority at that time, the Soviet Union could still destroy the United States, even after a U.S. first strike. Furthermore, "either side relating to the build-up of nuclear forces, be they either offensive or defensive weapons, necessarily trigger[s] reactions on the other side, . . . [and it] is precisely this action-reaction phenomenon that fuels an arms race." In any regard, he went on to say, the United States did not want a nuclear arms race with Russia, but "if the only way to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining first-strike capability over us

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[70] Quoted in Newhouse, p. 95.

[71] McNamara, "Remarks. . . ." p. 105, (see Fn. 50).

[72] To deter by promised retaliation is to have an "assured destruction" capability. To do so one needs a credible second-strike force. Assured destruction is defined as "the infliction of an unacceptable degree of damage upon an aggressor, even after absorbing a surprise attack." Smart, p. 4.

is to engage in such a race," then the United States has the capability and will to do so. What was preferable, however, was "to come to a realistic and reasonably riskless agreement with the Soviet Union" on both offensive and defensive missiles in order to prevent this arms race. All each side needed to insure, he said, was that both sides, after such an agreement, retain an assured destruction capability.[73]

The main point, then, was that the Soviet Union was deploying an ABM system. The question this brought up was whether or not the United States should deploy it too. He then argued for ABM, but as a "thin" rather than "heavy" system.[74] His rationale against any heavy system was that it could "rather obviously be defeated by an enemy simply sending more offensive warheads, or dummy warheads, than there are defensive missiles capable of disposing of them." Thus a "heavy" system is unnecessary. A heavy system, besides being expensive and unnecessary, would only serve to cause the Soviets to increase their offensive capability. As he stated: "It is futile for each of us [U.S. and U.S.S.R.] to spend $4 billion, $40 billion, of $400 billion--and at the end of all the spending, and at the end of all the effort, to be relatively at the same point of balance on the security scale that we are now."[75]

McNamara did not really believe in any ABM system, but capitulated to its proponents and agreed to back a "thin" anti-Chinese system. A thin system could also be used as a bargaining counter, since the

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[73]McNamara, "Remarks. . . ." p. 109.

[74]A "thin" system would provide minimal protection, primarily used as protection against accidental launches and nuclear fire from the PRC.

[75]McNamara, "Remarks. . . ." p. 110.

Russians already had it. But, in essence, "the United States launched its ABM program because Washington felt pressed to do something, sensible or not." It appears the Johnson Administration felt that

> ballistic-missile defense, especially defending ICBM sites, was an option well worth exploring. It was not, however, explored systematically and dispassionately in 1966 and 1967. Washington instead found itself caught up in a wave of ABM hysteria, and the decision, like so many others, was not measured. It was driven by essentially tangential concerns, among them: the failure to start immediate talks with the Russians; the pressure to appease members of Congress who insisted on emulating the Russian example; the understandable White House fear of ABM becoming a solid Republican issue in 1968.[76]

When on 20 May 1968 First Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov, in a speech at the United Nations, announced that his government was "ready to reach an agreement on practical steps for the limitation and consequent reduction of the strategic means for delivering nuclear weaponry," Johnson was ready. Talks appeared to be absolutely confirmed on 27 June when Foreign Minister Gromyko announced to the Supreme Soviet that the Russian leaders were then prepared to enter into talks concerning the "mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, including anti-ballistic missiles."[77]

When Czechoslovakia was invaded by Soviet forces on August 20, 1968, however, the preparations for SALT stopped. Dean Rusk describes the U.S. feelings as he said:

> The Russians, so far as we knew, were still prepared to go ahead. We felt we could not. Public Opinion in the United States and in the

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[76] Newhouse, pp. 100-101.

[77] Quoted in Newhouse, p. 103.

> West would not have comprehended a summit meeting and the start of talks right after the invasion. . . ."[78]

He went on to say that the idea of SALT was discussed again in November at U.S. initiative, and the Soviets were agreeable. President Johnson wanted the negotiations to begin before leaving office; a notion that was firmly rejected by President-Elect Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger. In denying Johnson's request, they indicated that they wanted strategic options to remain open and free from any residual policy of the Johnson Administration.

At this time the Soviet Union appeared even more eager to begin SALT. It announced on inaugural day, January 20, 1969, that the U.S.S.R. was ready to "start a serious exchange of views" on a "mutual limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic nuclear vehicles, including defensive systems." The spokesman also stated that "when the Nixon Administration is ready to sit down at the negotiating table, we are ready to do so, too."[79]

Nixon's reply of January 27 indicated that he favored strategic talks with the Soviet Union, but he tied the talks to the solution of "outstanding political problems," like the Mideast. He was attempting, says Newhouse, to show that arms control was one of several issues, all interrelated. On February 13, Dobrynin told Secretary of State Rogers that the Soviet Union was ready to go ahead with SALT as part of an "era of negotiation" in which other areas, such as the Mideast, could be discussed.

President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger perceived that with MIRV the

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[78]Ibid., p. 130.

[79]Ibid., p. 141.

United States had greatly increased its counterforce capability, but with this advantage also came the fear that when the Soviets deployed MIRV, the size of their SS-9 would make the United States extremely vulnerable. This, then, caused the Nixon Administration to see itself as having very few alternatives. Without SALT the options were to expand the United States' strategic strike forces, or to strengthen ABM in an attempt to attain superiority.[80] The latter option would "be difficult if not impossible" to achieve, however, because of the resources; technology, industry, political system, and economy, available to the U.S.S.R. This would, as McNamara stated in 1967, "increase greatly both their expenditures and ours without any gain in real security to either side."[81]

President Nixon did not foresee great dividends from expanding the stike forces either. On February 18, 1970, he stated his views as: "Sharp increases in U.S. strategic nuclear forces might not have any significant political or military benefit. Many believe that Soviet political positions would harden, tensions would increase and the prospect for reaching agreements to limit strategic arms might be irreparably damaged."[82] The only viable option appeared to be SALT.

As the summer of 1969 began, Nixon announced his readiness to begin SALT. On July 10, Foreign Minister Gromyko delivered an address to

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[80] Newhouse, pp. 141-43.

[81] Coffey, pp. 57-59. McNamara's quote from Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara before a Joint Session of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Sub-Committee on Department of Defense Appropriations on the Fiscal Year 1968-72 Defense Program and 1968 Defense Budget, mimeographed (January 23, 1967), p. 53, quoted in Coffey, p. 59.

[82] "Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A New Strategy for Peace," New York Times Magazine February 19, 1970, p. 24.

the Supreme Soviet in which he stated that the arms race between the two great powers was foolish, and that the U.S.S.R. regarded SALT as a matter of "paramount importance." On October 25, a joint announcement proclaimed that SALT was to begin at Helsinki on November 17, 1969.

The Talks

Since SALT opened in Helsinki, information about the talks has been shrouded in secrecy. This has made it extremely difficult to determine the positions of each nation. However, ideas of each nation's positions can be ascertained.

In a message to Gerard Smith, the chief U.S. delegate to the negotiations, President Nixon stated the general position for the U.S. delegation. He said:

> I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency" in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it possible, however, that we carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.[83]

Secretary of State Rogers further amplified these instructions by stating the three main objectives of the United States as:

> 1) To enhance international security by maintaining a stable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship through limitations of the deployment of strategic armaments.
> 2) To halt the upward spiral of strategic arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.
> 3) To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation.

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[83] U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and National Security, 2d ed., Pub. 49, revised Aug. 1973, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970), p. 7.

He further stated: "What we hope that we can do is negotiate an arms limitation agreement which will keep us in the same relative position that we are now--and which can be verified."[84]

This meant, says Robert Bowie, that the United States' negotiating position involved the need to keep the Triad in effect, including land-based missiles, SLBMs, and strategic bombers.[85] Moreover, the objectives for SALT were to be the prevention of any unilateral advantages to either side, and to insure that a "stable strategic equilibrium" (under assured destruction) be achieved.[86] All in all, said Gerard Smith, the U.S. delegation was "to see what could be ripe for agreement."[87]

SALT evolved through seven rounds, alternating the place of meeting between Helsinki and Vienna. Round I, which opened at Helsinki on November 17, 1969, lasted for thirty-five days. At its conclusion, a communiqué was issued which stated very little except that "an understanding was reached on the general range of questions which will be the subject of further U.S.-Soviet echanges."[88]

The stress in Round I, Newhouse says, was on defining the parameters of the main, or central, weapon systems. Moscow appeared to be very concerned over ABM, much to the surprise of the United States. Newhouse quotes "a closely involved American" as recalling that "both sides [were] making McNamara-like noises about the destabilizing effects of ABM deployment; the Russians were surprisingly explicit on this

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[84]Ibid., p. 8.

[85]Robert R. Bowie, "The Bargaining Aspects of Arms Control: The SALT Experience," in Kintner, p. 131.

[86]Moulton, p. 302.

[87]Arms Control. . . ., p. 8.

[88]Quoted in Newhouse, p. 173.

point."[89] At this round Moscow supposedly offered three alternative postures for ABM: heavy, limited, or no deployment. The U.S. reply was "vague and noncommittal." Quantity was discussed in great detail, but both sides "were much less willing to do so about quality--about MIRV's, improved support systems, and potential innovations." Furthermore, "the Russians had clearly been instructed to avoid talking about them at all. They could discuss numbers of launchers, for example, but not the size of launchers, or the accuracies of warheads."[90] The Russians would discuss ABM and when the Americans attempted to raise other subjects, the Soviets would become greatly concerned over the U.S. Forward-Based Systems (FBS).[91]

Round II of SALT began in Vienna on April 16, 1970. The United States hoped that by proposing "very limited ABM deployment," they could eventually attain a ceiling on Soviet offensive missiles, and especially a subceiling on the number of SS-9's. At this round an option was pre-. sented by the United States delegation which would have banned MIRV. This was quickly refused by the U.S.S.R. as it represented an attempt, said a Russian delegate, to "freeze" Moscow in a technologically inferior position. The Russians did, however, quickly accept a United States proposal for an ABM plan which limited deployment to one site located around each nation's capital. This, as the U.S. delegation soon realized, was to the Soviet's advantage because of the over three hundred ICBM's around Moscow, which would have come under the protective coverage of their ABM.

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[89] Ibid.

[90] Newhouse, p. 173.

[91] FBS consists of U.S. aircraft located in continental Europe and on aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. These are dual purpose aircraft, capable of carrying nuclear or non-nuclear bombs. Russia wanted to count these as central weapons systems.

There were no ICBM's located around Washington. The United States, says Newhouse, had not expected the Russians to accept this proposal; therefore, it had to retreat and renegotiate its ABM posture. There were no other important results and Round II recessed on August 14.[92]

Round III began November 2 in Helsinki, and was to last only forty-six days. Here, both nations appeared very far apart in their positions. Apparently the major portion of time was spent in defining what types of weapons should be limited: offensive, defensive, or both. The United States wanted limitation on both, while the Soviets would agree only to limit ABM's. Very little was resolved at this round, but a short while after its conclusion a joint statement was released in both Washington and Moscow on May 20, 1971 stating:

> The governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.[93]

As the ABM issue was resolved bit by bit during the succeeding Rounds, the Soviets agreed to quantitatively limit their ICBM and SLBM forces for a temporary period. The main points of the actual negotiations, however, were the interest each nation displayed in ABM, and the reluctance of the Soviets to agree to limit MIRV.

Two agreements were finally reached at SALT I; The ABM Treaty,

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[92]Newhouse, pp. 177-89.

[93]Michael Getler, "U.S. Plan would Limit U.S. ABM if U.S.S.R. would Freeze SS-9," The Washington Post, 21 May 1971, p. A8.

and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons, both signed on May 26, 1972.[94]

The ABM Treaty provides for the deployment of a limited-scale ABM system, although ABM R & D is permitted. The treaty recognizes that "nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind," and therefore a limit on ABM would be a "substantial factor" in halting, or limiting a strategic offensive arms race. It is hoped, the treaty continues, that this agreement will lead to "further negotiations on limiting strategic arms." Some of the more important provisions of the ABM Treaty are as follows.

It prohibits a nationwide deployment of ABM by specifying that each nation may only defend its "national capital area" and one ICBM area. Each nation is limited to 100 launchers at each ABM site, and radars are also limited. Each launcher is limited to one missile which must be designed for intercept, and the actual ABM system deployed cannot be made up of any components which are "sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based." Several articles provide for non-proliferation of ABM components. Any inspections, the treaty further points out, will be by use of the "national technical means of verification" at each nation's disposal. Furthermore, the treaty is established to be of "unlimited duration," with either party allowed to withdraw by providing the other with a six-months notice "if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."

The Interim Agreement provides for a five-year moratorium on the deployment of strategic offensive weapons; e.g., it acknowledges that

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[94]The text of these are from Dupuy, pp. 603-9.

such a limit would temporarily serve to "contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms, as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States. . . . "It also halts construction, as of July 1, 1972, on additional land-based ICBM launchers, and it limits SLBMs to the "numbers operational and under construction" on May 26, 1972. The agreement, like the treaty, is to be in force for five years, unless superseded. Each party is permitted to withdraw from the agreement by providing the other with a six-months notice. The numbers specified in the agreement are:

(1) U.S.--no more than 710 SLBMs on no more than 44 submarines.

(2) U.S.S.R.--no more than 950 SLBMs on no more than 62 submarines.

These agreements meant that the U.S.S.R., potentially, could have 564 ICBMs more than the U.S.: 1,618 to 1,054. This numerical advantage was allowable, said the U.S. government, because the United States' ICBM with MIRV was generally regarded as more reliable and accurate. The U.S. had 1,000 Minuteman II, but were to MIRV 550 of these (to be called Minuteman III) with three MIRVs each. It was expected at the time of the ratification of the treaty that even with the numerical discrepancy in launchers, the United States would have almost 400 more warheads than the Soviet Union. In payload the U.S.S.R. would have an advantage, but the U.S. planners felt that accuracy was more important. Many felt that whenever the U.S.S.R. developed MIRV, the advantages in warheads would be quickly erased.[95]

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[95]James M. Roherty, Class Lecture, College of William & Mary in Virginia, February 21, 1973.

"Even before the ink was dry," so to speak, both nations were already executing technological "hedges" against the other. Whereas the Soviet's "hedge" appears to be a MIRV for its land-based missiles, especially the SS-9, the United States' "hedge" appears to rest with improvements in its SLBMs. The latter improvements are an adoption of the Trident submarine, and a new SLBM to go with it, the underwater long-range missile system (ULMS). ULMS' advantage is that its range is approximately 4,500 nautical miles, as compared to the approximate range of 2,500 nautical miles for Polaris and Poseidon. The importance of ULMS, as Newhouse points out, is that it "will increase the operating area of the submarine by a factor of ten."[96]

PART V

Conclusion

The factors contributing to the onset of SALT are numerous and very complex. The most important of these could be summarized in the following manner.

Bureaucratic Influence

It is apparent that the bureaucracies in both nations function to influence the decision-making processes by shaping the inputs being funneled into the leadership. Simply because they have this function, both bureaucracies did influence the onset of SALT; for example, possibly in defining when security in the form of parity had been met, or defining what weapon systems should be limited, or by some other means. Nevertheless, even though the bureaucracies were not decisive, they should not be disregarded as factors. Even if they did not push for SALT, they did

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[96]Newhouse, p. 23.

define the parameters in such a way that it was seen as a viable option.

Economy

The economy defines the resources a decision-maker has available to execute policy. To that extent it affected both nations in the decision to opt for SALT. It is doubtful that it was decisive in Russia, however, because, as Thomas Wolfe says, if it was then one would have expected the U.S.S.R. to withdraw from SALT as their economy resurged in 1970. Likewise, if the economy had been particularly influential in the U.S. decision to enter SALT, the United States probably would have welcomed the opportunity to halt strategic spending after SALT terminated. Neither was done.

Perceptions of the International Environment

The international environment provided the setting in which to conduct SALT, and for that reason, at least, it has to be taken into consideration. In the final analysis, unless SALT offered an opportunity to enhance Russian and U.S. security it would never have begun. SALT dealt primarily with security, but even though this is said to be mostly a political matter, in the nuclear age it becomes quite technical in nature. It appears, therefore, that notions of strategic security are intertwined with the interaction of the international environment and the strategic-technological-military factor.

Strategic-Technological-Military

This combination of factors was vitally important to the onset of SALT. Strategically, security depended on the prescriptions of the strategic doctrines then in vogue; i.e., deterrence and defense. Militarily, a nation's power, and consequently its influence and security,

is perceived to depend on its military forces. Technologically, qualitative innovations in weaponry affect both strategic and military factors. Militarily, they add to power, and "exponential" jumps such as MIRV are looked on with great favor. Strategically, they are placed into the schema of the strategic doctrine and are judged as stabilizing or not by each nation. If not, then security is harmed and action must be taken.

Qualitatively speaking, the only major "exponential" jumps in weaponry since World War II have been the atom and hydrogen bombs, the development of the ICBM, and the development of MIRV. None, until MIRV, caused a SALT because the U.S.S.R. had failed to achieve parity and the U.S. refused to give up the idea of superiority. MIRV, on the other hand, was probably unknown by the Soviet Union until preliminary steps had already been taken to begin SALT. The U.S. knew of MIRV, but were concerned lest the Soviets perfect it for their SS-9. As the negotiations began, however, the U.S.S.R. quickly turned down a limit on MIRV, therefore indicating a desire to retain the opportunity to develop it.

ABM, on the other hand, was the primary interest of SALT.[97] Ironically, this weapon was not regarded as an "exponential" jump in qualitative innovation because it was composed of older ICBM technology, and it did not strengthen a nation's offensive power as such. It did, however, drastically affect the strategic doctrine of deterrence. It was a defensive weapon and there was an excellent possibility that if deployed, it would, as McNamara suggested, have precipitated a major arms race. Not only would it have been expensive to build, it would also have created the additional expense incurred in the construction of more

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[97] Of the nine options originally created for SALT by the U.S., seven were to limit ABM.

offensive weapons. It would have adversely affected the economics of both nations, without increasing security at all. The political decision was made, therefore, to limit ABM. This has been followed by both powers.

A decision was also made to limit offensive arms, but qualitative hedges have already been developed: MIRV for the U.S.S.R. and ULMS for the U.S.

In the final analysis, all of the above factors influenced SALT to a degree, but none was decisive. The most influential, however, were those which affected security: the strategic-technological-military factors.

APPENDIX A

The Language of SALT

Since theoretical jargon has influenced the thinking and decisions of the United States policy-makers,[98] it becomes necessary to devote time to a discussion of the theoretical aspects of deterrence. In essence, the language of SALT is rooted in the abstract, vague terminology of deterrence. This terminology is a hybrid mix of terms, including those of a military-strategic, technical, and pyschological-political nature.

Deterrence is a theory that assumes that parleying with other actors in the international environment will not be fruitful if a state is not in the position to make its views a reality to the other party. Goodwill cannot be relied upon. The term suggests that the purpose of arming is to disuade, preclude--"deter"--conflict. If one power can convince a potential adversary that conflict would be more disadvantageous to the latter, then the issue will not be tested. There are several assumptions in the concept which have to be met, namely: (1) that both sides are rational in the calculating sense of the word; (2) that a credible threat is presented, that both sides have the force structure necessary to impose unacceptable damage on the other side, and that they both have the will to do so; and (3) that a stable environment exists

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[98] The Soviet strategic doctrine is not fully known, although it is suspected to be somewhat along the same lines as that of the U.S. This appendix, of necessity, will utilize the U.S. strategic doctrine.

in which there are no "surprises" of either a political or technological nature.[99]

Deterrence as a strategic-military policy is a paradox in the sense that its success

> depends on essentially psychological criteria. Deterrence seeks to prevent a given course by making it seem less attractive than all possible alternatives. It therefore ultimately depends on an intangible quality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor. . . . Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor.[100]

In essence, then, strategic stability requires that the great states know the resources the other has. It is a fragile notion, which can be upset by improvements in technology.

The difference between deterrence, as described above, and defense is central to the strategic discussions in the post-World War II period. Glenn H. Snyder in his comparison of the two notions essentially agrees with the notion of deterrence as shown above.[101] Defense, on the other hand, means reducing one's "own prospective costs and risks in the event that deterrence fails," by some "defensive" means; e.g., a missile defense system, civil defense activities, fortification (hardening) of one's own missile sites. The difference between deterrence and defense then, can be said to be analogous to the difference in

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[99] See Roherty, Fn. 95.

[100] Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New York: Harpers, 1960), p. 12.

[101] Snyder defines deterrence as "discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain." Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense; Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 3.

"reducing the probability of war and mitigating its consequences."[102]

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[102]Snyder, p. 4.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, there seem to be certain factors which are common to the onset of each of the three arms control conferences under study. However, the effects of each of them appear to differ according to the circumstances surrounding the specific negotiation.

Economics

The state of a nation's economy appears to have been a major determinant of its willingness to enter into arms control negotiations, especially with regard to the Washington Conference and SALT. The Hague Conferences also exhibit this factor as important, but to a lesser degree. Before the Czar's Rescript, for example, it appears that Russia was in financial straits for many reasons, but primarily due to the costs of maintaining its immense armed forces. Russia was heavily in debt to other nations, particularly France, and the outlook for future credit was bleak. The expected cost of refitting the armed forces with a new field gun was too high, thus the Czar attempted to reach some sort of arms control agreement with other continental powers, particularly Austria-Hungary and Germany.

Granted, there were other powers in the world having financial problems, but even though it would have been possible for most of them to use the proposed conference as a vehicle for reducing armaments and therefore arms budgets, they did not. Germany, for example, ridiculed

the idea that arms control was necessary for economic reasons. Moreover, although England recognized that armaments were an expensive proposition, the financial burdens were not large enough to bring about British agreement on arms control.

Furthermore, during the conference, the vast majority of nations did not appear to be concerned with the economic problems created by armaments and no concerted effort was made to eliminate any item on economic grounds. In the final analysis, if the cost of armaments was a "crushing burden" driving nations to the Hague, this was not in evidence in any case but that of Russia.

The economic factor appears to have played a more important role in the decision to opt for the Washington Conference in 1921. The American naval program of 1916, for example, was proving to be a very expensive proposition. By 1919-1920 it came to be considered economically infeasible, and ways to reduce naval spending without harming security were discussed. One viable option was the conference.

Japan was having similar, and possibly more severe, financial problems. Her buildup of naval weaponry appears to have been tied to the United States' 1916 naval program. Her attempt to stay at two-thirds the level of American naval construction, however, was placing her near bankruptcy. Moreover, appropriations were becoming more difficult to obtain from the Diet, and articulate opinion pushed for financial relief. Great Britain was also in financial straits. World War I had caused the British to incur massive debts, and on top of these, post-war domestic expenses were astronomical. Finally, financial problems became so severe that the decision was made to place a very large portion of the British fleet on reserve status. This concern over financial

problems was to continue into the negotiations, and the main agreements finally reached limited the most expensive type of vessel--the capital ship.

The actual effect of economics on the Russian decision to enter into SALT is probably unknowable, at least to Western analysts, but it does appear to have been a factor. The fact that the decision to negotiate was made during a year when defense spending had reached its highest peak and the economy was in a severe downturn, however, is coincidence enough to suggest a probable correlation. Likewise, the fact that the Soviets decided to stay in the negotiations as their economy resurged in 1970 probably indicates that finances were not a decisive factor.

The decision of the United States to enter into SALT probably was influenced heavily by economics. The war in Vietnam, among other things, had caused the defense budgets to soar after 1965, a fact which became painfully obvious as major, vocal disagreements on spending priorities erupted in 1967. Arguments appeared to center around whether to spend money on <u>either</u> "guns" or "butter." As Congress began to become more concerned with defense spending, the executive branch turned to ways of economizing. One such way was an attempt to halt the proliferation of strategic weaponry. This was done by placing a unilateral, quantitative ceiling on offensive missiles in 1967, the decision to deploy a "thin" ABM system, and the decision to halt ABM, or limit it to a severe degree (twelve sites were originally planned) through SALT.

In the final analysis, economics played a different but major role in each of the three conferences studied. At the Hague it was

influential for Russia, though not for other nations. At the Washington Conference it played a large role, at least with respect to Japan, Great Britain, and the United States, the three great naval powers. Economics also had a major influence on SALT. Here, both nations apparently wished to divert funds to domestic needs, at least on a temporary basis, hence agreement was reached on a potentially expensive item--the ABM.

Qualitative Innovations in Weaponry

Qualitative innovations in weaponry appears to be a common variable at the conferences. A factor in the onset of Hague, for example, was the existence of a new type of field gun. Russia, until then the strongest military power on the Continent, saw that possession of this weapon was vital to its continued well being. Because of Russia's financial status, however, it was felt that this innovation could not be purchased, thus leaving Russia in a qualitatively inferior status. The invention of this weapon, its desirability and its cost, appear to have been major influences on the Czar's decision to issue his first call for an arms control conference.

The original Rescript, however, was greeted with skepticism from the other nations of the world. Those nations which were not continental powers showed little, if any, concern over the existence of the new field gun, or any other qualitative advance in weaponry for that matter. Therefore, they were under no "urgent need" to procure such a weapon for themselves and they remained skeptical of the Czar's motives. The continental powers likewise felt that the Czar's motives were selfish, and they saw that the Rescript was the result of Russia's financial problems. Their original skepticism was ameliorated somewhat by the issuance of a second circular, however, and the nations did gather at the Hague to

discuss, among other things, arms control.

Although arms control proposals were presented at the conference by the Russians, it soon became quite clear that no major agreements were to occur. Only the peripheral agreements described in Chapter II were reached, and none of these were of especially great consequence. In essence, once the conference convened, it quickly showed that the nations of the world were not then ready to conscientiously seek arms control. The rejection of arms control as part of the 1907 conference's program only served to emphasize this point.

Two major qualitative innovations in weaponry came into prominence during or immediately after World War I, however, and both influenced the decision of the major participants, Great Britain, Japan, and the United States, to enter into negotiations on arms control at the Washington Conference of 1921-1922. These innovations were the submarine and the airplane.

The submarine had shown its potential as a devastating weapons system in World War I. Its killing power may not have been as great as that of a capital ship, but its stealth, quickness, and economy were adequate compensations. It was an excellent weapon, both offensively and defensively, and was being promoted as a revolutionary new concept--one which made a large capital-ship navy an unnecessary extravagance.

The airplane was another weapon with immense potential as both an offensive and defensive weapon. It was not as advanced as the submarine, and therefore had not had the same impact, but it had shown promise during the war, and post-war tests had shown its probable future effectiveness. The airplane could be constructed very inexpensively, particularly compared to the capital ship.

The existence of these two weapon systems provided the opportunity for the nations to keep up both their offensive and defensive strength at relatively little cost. Though the submarine and airplane were not as formidable as the capital ship, they could provide adequate, and far less expensive, security for each nation.

In the final analysis, however, exactly how much effect these weapon systems had on the advent of the Washington Conference is in doubt. Both were discussed at the Washington Conference, with the largest controversy centered around the submarine. It must be noted, however, that the submarine was a weapon ideally suited for a defensive as well as offensive role, and those nations without extremely powerful navies, like France, would have no part in its abolition. They saw Britain's offer to abolish the submarine, therefore, as working in her own favor, especially since she was assured of the second largest fleet of warships in the world. To limit capital ships and not submarines, on the other hand, would bring Britain closer to the lesser powers in naval strength. It can be said, then, that Britain's offer to abolish the submarine showed that she was not prepared to use it as an alternative to the capital ship, and that, for Britain at least, the factor of qualitative weapons innovations may not have been of prime importance. If, however, Great Britain knew the offer to abolish the submarine would be refused and that therefore the gesture was made only to induce France to vote for the Root resolutions, then it was effective. The sudden improvements in Britain's submarine forces following the Washington Conference may show the latter as the case. For the most part, however, qualitative advances in weaponry were not a decisive factor in the decisions to enter into the Washington Conference.

After World War II, weapons technology changed in rapid, "exponential" jumps. This meant that, relative to the interwar period, qualitative improvements now came about in quick succession. These improvements, in turn, were of such magnitude, either in terms of firepower or delivery capability, that they altered the strategic status quo in some form. Thus, the reaction of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. was to match the innovation, thereby perpetuating an "arms race" until both sides finally decided to accept parity as a basis for negotiation. Therefore, it can be said that these qualitative advances in weaponry affected the onset of SALT.

To digress for a moment, it appears that military technology creates a particular hazard for any arms control negotiation: it affects its timing. Because of technological innovations, one nation may be a distance (in the R & D spectrum) ahead of another at any specific point in time. For example, in January 1967, President Johnson proposed SALT to Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin. At that time, however, the United States was well ahead of the U.S.S.R. in both the number and quality of strategic arms. The U.S.S.R. was in the midst of a build-up program designed to attain equality with the United States. By June 1968, when Foreign Minister Gromyko signaled Soviet agreement to SALT, Soviet strategic production was rapidly catching up with the United States forces, then at their 1967 ceiling.

Finally, technological improvements allowed the Soviet Union to achieve quantitative parity in payload, at least, with the United States by 1970. By that date, the Soviet Union was able to absorb a sizeable counterforce attack and still have enough nuclear weapons left to destroy the United States.

It appears, then, that qualitative innovations destabilize an existing strategic balance--a status quo which is understood, and has led to plans and policies designed with it in mind. When an innovation, such as ABM or MIRV, creates instabilities in strategic thinking, fear and tension are the result.

The qualitative, or "technological," implication of weaponry in the nuclear age, then, is that each "exponential" jump dramatically alters the existing strategic status quo. If the Soviets are outdone, as in the case of MIRV, an agreement to limit it is impossible, at least until both nations have the innovation. However, the case of MIRV is complicated. Its possession can be hidden, and without on-site inspection it cannot be verified. To limit MIRV without inspection guaranteed is ludicrous. ABM, on the other hand, is a destabilizng weapon like MIRV, but it can be inspected by satellite reconnaissance and hence limited. It is unstable because it limits deterrence; that is, it allows one side to feel that if it builds enough ABM, then it can win a nuclear war. Deterrence depends on a "standoff" where both sides are equally vulnerable. To have ABM on both sides would mean that emphasis would have to be in two areas, in a large, expensive ABM force to provide defense, and a large, expensive offensive force to overcome an opponent's ABM system.

What this means, in the final analysis, is that arms control is based on <u>security</u>, not economics or technological innovations. Only when a power feels secure at its force level can negotiations take place. It appears that the Soviet Union felt secure only in a position of strategic parity, where the strategic force structure was stable. ABM was a threat to this, could be limited, and hence the agreement.

Security

It appears that all arms control negotiations in this study were undertaken to advance security. In all three cases, the development of new weaponry altered the then existing strategic status quo, thus affecting the then prevalent notions of security. In the case of the Hague, the field gun affected Russia's ability to defend itself, especially under the old rules of warfare where nations massed their armies. A new gun would bring murderous concentrations of firepower to bear on an enemy, thus forcing military commanders to recognize that deciding combat power on a battlefield, all else being equal, would have to favor those having this weapon. The "have not"--Russia in this case--became quite insecure. Since it wanted the weapon but could not afford it, Russia opted for a conference.

At Washington, the existence of the submarine and airplane changed the then prevalent manner of waging war, on the sea at least, because it began to make capital ships anachronistic. Security was not that severely hurt, however, by the existence of these new weapons. Instead, the interaction of the three great powers in the Pacific created security problems for all three. The problem appeared greatest for Japan, however. Japan knew it could not win in any war with the United States, and it was becoming bankrupt over arms expenditures. In addition, the British were making inquiries which led the Japanese to believe that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was soon to be abrogated. Without some agreement to control arms, Japan would have had to enter an arms race to protect its security, which would have proven to be devastating. The same reasoning existed for Great Britain and the United States, but to a lesser degree.

Security was also a prime consideration at SALT. The entire doctrine of deterrence deals specifically with security. If deterrence fails,then security is irrevocably damaged because a nuclear war has already begun. Once both nations become convinced of the destabilizing effects of ABM on deterrence, then both nations moved to limit its use.

Through a study of these conferences, several things become apparent. One is that agreement in the matter of armaments is possible when there is mutual interest in reaching an agreement, and security policies are parallel. If security policies collide, as was the case of Russia and the United States until the mid-1960s, negotiations cannot be undertaken. As John Newhouse aptly states, "arms control becomes a serious matter only when directly linked to national security."[1]

Another similarity in the conferences was that in two of the three, a decision was made by at least one major participant to go from a formerly superior position in armaments to one of parity with at least one other nation. The decision was also made by a nation formerly seeking superiority to resign itself to acceptance of parity.

Before the Washington Conference, Great Britain had enjoyed a superior position in terms of naval power for at least a century, possibly more. Yet, after World War I, it decided to "hold the line" with regard to further naval expansion, thus conceding the opportunity for the United States, at least, to achieve a position of equal strength if so desired. The United States, on the other hand, had seemingly made a commitment to achieve naval superiority in its own right. By 1921, however, the United States began to abandon this goal, especially as the

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[1]John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), p. 69.

British reduced naval construction and the expenses necessary to attain this "superior" navy became apparent. Consequently, both nations resigned themselves to a position of what they perceived as parity in naval power. These political decisions thus paved the way for the negotiations to take place.

The post-World War II period saw a similar occurrence. The United States, after its atomic monopoly period had ended in 1949, had resolved to maintain superiority in nuclear weaponry. This it was able to do, in both size and quality of nuclear forces, for a long time. In the 1960s, however, the U.S. dropped the desire for numerical advantage in all aspects of the Triad, especially in ICBMs, and decided to opt for quantitative equality, thereby resting its security on perceptions of a vast qualitative advantage in weaponry. This decision allowed the Soviets to gain numerical equality, then superiority, in terms of launchers, by default. This superiority was supposedly balanced, however, by the somewhat fuzzy nuclear conceptions of the "balancing" qualitative superiority of the U.S., specifically because of the existence of MIRV. In any regard, it was only after this decision to hold the line on deployment of weaponry that the negotiations were able to take place.

In essence, it appears that parity defined as a nation's perception of what constitutes strategic equality, is possibly a necessary precondition for negotiations to take place. The "successful" negotiations (in the sense of those where the participants gathered in good faith with some hope of success), appear to have this in common.

In the final analysis, at the present time it cannot be generalized that any single factor or combination of factors provide the impetus

for arms control negotiations. All that can be said is that four factors are usually present as "influencers" in the decision to enter into arms control negotiations. These, in sum, are economic considerations, qualitative innovations in weaponry, the acquiescence by the major participants of perceived parity, and the consideration of enhancement of security. In actuality the last three pertain to security considerations, therefore, it is possible to state that security is the most important factor in bringing about arms control negotiations, and this must be recognized in any attempt to solve the political problems through arms control. Qualitative advances in weaponry are a prime determinant of security because they upset the status quo, thereby challenging decision makers either to match the improvement, or to attempt arms control to avert an arms race. Thus, qualitative advances in weaponry always have the potential to create negotiations, but their actual effect can be known only to the decision maker.

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VITA

William Frank Gerard, Jr.

Born in Charleston, South Carolina, July 1, 1943. Graduated from Burges High School in El Paso, Texas, May 1961, B. S. Industrial Management, Clemson University, 1965. M. A., College of William and Mary in Virginia, 1974, concentration in Government.

A professional army officer, the author is a graduate of the U.S. Army's Air Defense Artillery Officers Advanced Course, Airborne School and Civil Affairs School, and was a political warfare advisor in the Republic of Vietnam in 1967-1968.

The author will enter the faculty of the College of William and Mary, Department of Military Science, in September 1974.