

1974

The Secretary-General and His Leadership Role in International Crises

Richard Grant Condit
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: <https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd>



Part of the [International Relations Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Condit, Richard Grant, "The Secretary-General and His Leadership Role in International Crises" (1974). *Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects*. Paper 1539624866.
<https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-adda-ax93>

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

**THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS LEADERSHIP ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES**

A Thesis

Presented To

**The Faculty of the Department of Government
The College of William and Mary in Virginia**

In Partial Fulfillment

**Of the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts**

by

Richard G. Condit

1974

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Richard G. Condit

Richard G. Condit

Approved, August 1974

Chonghan Kim

Chonghan Kim

Margaret L. Hamilton

Margaret L. Hamilton

Louis J. Noisin

Louis J. Noisin

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
INTRODUCTION	2
CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND	6
The Predecessors	6
Sir Eric Drummond	8
Joseph Avenol	13
Sean Lester	17
The Appointment Process	20
The Constitutional Role of the Secretary-General	28
CHAPTER II: FORMS OF INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	32
CHAPTER III: EXAMPLES OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL	50
Trygve Lie	50
The Iranian Question	52
Palestine	55
The Korean Crisis	59
Dag Hammarskjold	62
The U. S. Fliers Mission	64
The Suez Crisis	67
The Congo	71
U Thant	75
The Cuban Missile Crisis	77
The Problem of Cyprus	81
Kashmir	84
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS	87
BIBLIOGRAPHY	99

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the proposition that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has played a vital leadership role in the United Nations during periods of international crises. Although it is generally agreed that the Secretary-General was given a political role by the Charter, not entrusted to the head of the League of Nations Secretariat, opinion is divided as to whether this political role extends into the realm of providing direction and decisive action in periods of high tension and conflict.

The study provides a background of the role played by the League Secretaries-General, the election (or selection) process of the UN's chief administrator, and the authority and duties given him by the Charter. A second section examines the several ways in which the Secretary-General is able to exert some sort of influence over UN activities during the crucial periods, including participation in Security Council debates and direction of UN peace-keeping operations. The third section consists of a detailing of the Secretary-General's activities in connection with nine crisis situations, three in the term of each of the first three men to hold the office. This chapter demonstrates that the Secretary-General has actually given direction to UN activities during these periods as opposed to merely acting as an administrator and an implementing agent for UN decisions.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND HIS LEADERSHIP ROLE
IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES

INTRODUCTION

This study concerns one significant aspect of the political role played by the UN Secretary-General in the functioning of that Organization in the realm of interstate politics. More specifically, it deals with the proposition that the UN's chief administrator has actually provided the Organization with vital leadership during periods of international crisis. This contention is one side of the argument that has grown up around the subject of the Secretary-General's role in the administrative and political workings of the UN. The other side of the argument suggests that the Charter provisions dealing with the office envisioned the Secretary-General as the head of the Secretariat and little else. This argument continues by noting that Article 99 of the Charter generally acknowledged as his political duty of bringing before the Security Council matters he deems a threat to international peace and security, was meant to facilitate the continued functioning of the Council and not to greatly augment the powers of the Secretary-General. In addition, any other action he takes must be at the direction of one of the other principal organs of the Organization which can at any time cease these functions should they not meet with the approval of the delegating body. Further, his appointment and reappointment by the Council and the Assembly places additional limits on the Secretary-General's freedom of action.

The thesis of this work is that the Charter gave the Secretary-

General political duties, provided the potential for others, and that during periods of international crisis, the UN's Secretaries-General have used the provisions as well as personal initiatives to provide the Organization with vital leadership. This is not to say that he has performed this function in every such case to come before the Organization, for his ability to do so varies according to many factors such as the states involved, the political environment, and his own personality. But in many cases he has played a leadership role in UN activities in spite of the constitutional and real limitations placed upon him. This is not a study simply of the Secretary-General's political role, which is assumed to exist to some degree, but of his function of initiating and guiding UN action during critical moments.

In investigating such a proposition, a substantial body of literature confronts the researcher. Unlike source material on League Secretaries-General, there are few primary sources on the UN's chief administrator. In that the UN archives are closed at this time, heavy reliance must be placed on secondary sources in addition to published UN documents. Secondary sources might be placed in three general categories. First are general texts on the Secretary-General in either the traditional (biographical) mode, such as Arthur Rovine's detailed study, or the functional mode of Leon Gordenker's work (see bibliography). The second category is that of biographies, but these are basically limited to one of Trygve Lie and three of Dag Hammarskjold. The third general category consists of articles dealing with the office, studies of individual UN actions, such as the Congo and Cyprus, and a number of more broadly oriented studies. Of greatest use among UN documents are naturally the

official records of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The general texts mentioned above examine the office and the men who have held that office in respect to the influence they have exerted upon the Organization, basically in political and security matters. They describe the many forms of this influence and how it has varied according to the man in power. The present study approaches the office from a different, narrower perspective—that of actual leadership. It is hoped that it, in some small way, may shed some light on this less publicized subject and perhaps provide an outline or direction for further detailed research in this area.

The work is broken into four general divisions. The first is designed to give background by briefly describing the roles played by the Secretaries-General of the League of Nations, which provided guidance for the UN's founders and to the UN's chief administrators. It also includes the nature of the appointment process of the UN Secretary-General as well as the duties and freedoms granted him by the Charter. The second division describes the four major ways in which the Secretary-General influences UN activity in the area of political and security questions, including the use of personal initiatives. Following that is a closer examination of nine specific crises, three under each of the first three Secretaries-General, which highlight their actions in an attempt to determine their exact role in each case. The final section makes some conclusions on the Secretary-General as a leader based upon the preceding chapters. Here an attempt is made to draw a number of inferences about the type of leadership each Secretary-General exhibited as a product of the combination of the prevalent international political

environment and the approach taken by the Secretary-General. This approach is for the most part determined by his background, his perception of his role as Secretary-General, and his assessment of the situation.

The study considers only the terms of the UN's first three Secretaries-General—Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjold, and U Thant—and makes no attempt to evaluate the first two years of the office under Kurt Waldheim. It should also be noted here that the descriptions of events and actions during these crisis situations are in no way intended to be biographies of the three men but only a selection of facts pertinent to the evaluations of the aforementioned thesis.

CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND

The Predecessors

In consideration of the exact role played by the UN Secretary-General in the functioning of the Organization during critical periods, it is important to note that his job in the realm of international politics is not the first of its kind in the history of organized inter-state relations. Some 26 years before Trygve Lie came into office, another relatively unknown national citizen was elected to the post of the chief administrator of an international civil service. It was Sir Eric Drummond and his successors as Secretaries-General of the League of Nations who laid the groundwork in a new field with ill-defined borders. It was they who made the first mistakes and it was also they who achieved successes which pointed the way toward the future development of the office within the United Nations. The founders of the United Nations, in designing the basic function of the new secretariat and its secretary-general, gave careful attention to the experiences of and roles played by the League's three chief administrators. They also provided precedents and directions for the development of the office of their successors in the UN. A brief examination of the nature of the secretary-generalship under Sir Eric Drummond, Joseph Avenol, and Sean Lester, therefore, seems warranted here.

The origins of the League Secretariat lay in the international conferences which became very numerous in the nineteenth century. These

conferences dealt with social and economic matters as well as with political ones. To handle secretarial and administrative functions, each required a temporary staff which was usually provided by the host state with some members coming from participating states. In the cases where the conferences were a series of meetings dealing with the same topic, these staffs took on a semi-permanent nature adding to their duties and responsibilities.

But of perhaps greater significance to later institutionalization of the League Secretariat was the growth of public international unions during this same time period. Organizations such as the Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Labour Bureau brought increased inter-state cooperation and the need for permanent staffs. They kept permanent records, prepared reports, budgets, and gave continuity to the periodic meetings of the Unions. These staffs also came to be more and more international in composition.¹

World War I brought about a total breakdown in global politics and the normal relations between states and it also brought about the determination to create an international organization that would institutionalize the contacts among states and prevent future wars. Such an organization required a permanent civil service to handle a rather formidable administrative function. A chief officer was also needed to organize and direct this international staff. A number of plans (mainly British and American) emerged prior to the Paris Conference laying out possible designs

¹Leon Gordenker, "The Secretary-General" in James Barros, ed., The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 110.

for the organization and which dealt with the function of the Secretariat and its chief officer in varying degrees of detail.² A number of the plans, such as that of Sir Robert Cecil of January 14, 1919, envisioned the head of the Secretariat as a person of rather significant duties and initiating powers with the title of "Chancellor." But the Committee on the League of Nations at the Peace Conference gave little attention to these plans and basically accepted the revised version of the drafting subcommittee. The limited role eventually given him and the change from Chancellor to Secretary-General reflected the difficulty in finding a qualified person who would accept the job envisioned by Lord Cecil and it also reflected the fear of some representatives of electing an international "dictator."³

Sir Eric Drummond. The League's first Secretary-General became known to certain influential members of the British government as a result of his rapid rise through the ranks of the Foreign Office and to President Wilson and his adviser, Colonel House, due to his involvement in the planning of the League and his dedication to its success. But the office assumed by Sir Eric Drummond in 1919 had few guidelines and was given only a small number of duties by the Covenant. He was to act in the capacity of Secretary-General at all meetings of the Assembly and of the Council, he was to summon a meeting of the Council at the request

²For the text and description of many of these plans see David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York: E. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928), Vol. I and II.

³Howard B. Calderwood, "The Higher Direction of the League Secretariat," Arnold Foundation Studies in Public Affairs, Vol. V, No. 3 (Winter, 1937), pp. 3, 4.

of any member in the case of war or the threat of it, and, in the event of a dispute likely to lead to a rupture of the peace, the Secretary-General was to "make all necessary arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof."⁴ The founders of the League described his duties in rather vague terms but basically envisioned the Secretary-General as the head of the League's permanent administrative staff and as a glorified secretary in connection with meetings of the two deliberative bodies. Drummond certainly did not interpret the words of the Covenant as giving him a politically active role and "remained true to the tradition of the British Civil Service, of which he had been a member, and regarded himself primarily as an administrator."⁵ According to this tradition, he worked quietly and efficiently and constantly strove throughout his fourteen years in office to keep out of the public eye and to refrain from publicly expressing a political opinion in word or action. Dag Hammarskjold once noted that "He [Drummond] never addressed the Assembly of the League and in the Council 'he tended to speak...as a secretary of a committee and not more than that.'"⁶

The Secretary-General's official perception of his role fit in nicely with his personal nature. He was a man who vigorously avoided publicity and public appearances and was described by Arthur Sweetser as "a shy and modest man, terrified of speeches."⁷

⁴See Covenant of the League of Nations, Articles VI, XI, and XV.

⁵Georges Langrod, The International Civil Service (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1963), p. 309.

⁶Quoted in Langrod, p. 310.

⁷Stephen M. Schwebel, The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 5.

But these tendencies do not give an accurate picture of the actual role played by the first Secretary-General in League activities. Drummond's influence can be seen in a number of areas, one of which was his rather significant decision as head of the Secretariat that the group should be a truly international civil service; that is, "officials who would be solely the servants of the League and in no way representative of or responsible to the Government of the countries of which they were nationals."⁸ He vigorously opposed early moves to constitute the Secretariat as a group of representatives from a select number of member states who would consult with each other in paving the way for Council and Assembly decisions. Later on in his tenure, he resisted attempts by the great powers to control the appointment of the principle officials under the Secretary-General and insert the representatives in important posts. Drummond was less successful in preventing this action. But his working concept of an impartial and geographically international civil service was the first of its kind in inter-state politics and its success is evidenced in its carry-over to the United Nations Secretariat. Frank Walters has described Drummond's creation as "without a doubt one of the most important events in the history of international politics."⁹

A second major example of the effects of Sir Eric Drummond's influence is in the realm of political activity. Although he vehemently opposed public political initiatives, which would compromise his impartiality, this did not preclude such activity behind the scenes. One

⁸Sir Eric Drummond, "The Secretariat of the League of Nations," Public Administration, Vol. IX, No. II (April 1931), p. 229.

⁹F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), Vol. I, p. 76.

student of the office has described Drummond's constant efforts in this area in these words:

There was no important political issue before the League that escaped his attention,¹⁰ and rarely did a problem emerge untouched by his influence.

Indicative of the Secretary-General's activity that went beyond his administrative duties was his efforts in connection with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931.¹¹ His actions, which were aimed at a satisfactory settlement of the dispute through the League, were later successfully adapted to similar situations by the United Nations Secretaries-General. His unquestioned impartiality and well-informed knowledge of the situation were his strong points as he unceasingly worked throughout the two-year period (up to his retirement in 1933) to pressure member and non-member states alike into certain courses of action. He was the principal communication link between the League and the U. S., which he felt to be essential to a quick solution to the greatest challenge to the authority of the League in its eleven-year history. Drummond helped in the drafting of resolutions which came before the Council in the debate of the problem. He also personally participated in direct negotiations with Japan in further attempts at a solution. As evidence of his central position in matters and of his influence upon member states, he sent his aide Frank Walters to Tokyo to pressure the Japanese government into some conciliatory gesture such as the acceptance of a commission of inquiry. In November 1931 the

¹⁰ Arthur W. Rovine, The First Fifty Years, The Secretary-General in World Politics 1920-1970 (Leyden: A. W. Sythoff, 1970), p. 53.

¹¹ For a detailed account of Drummond's actions in this dispute, see Rovine, pp. 77-96.

Japanese representative to the Council recommended such a commission (to be known as the Lytton Commission, after its chairman), and the acceptance of the group by China, which saw it as a delaying action, was arranged by the Secretary-General in lengthy discussions with China's representative. Drummond was also important in enlisting American support for the commission.

Although the efforts of the Secretary-General and others did not reverse the effects of Japan's use of force, and nor was Drummond able to spur the Great Powers to any concrete action against the aggressor, his "part in the negotiations was more extensive than that of any other single individual, and his recommendations and influence clearly not insubstantial."¹²

In characterizing the Secretary-Generalship of Sir Eric Drummond, a number of points are outstanding. First, he headed a highly efficient and, for the most part, impartial Secretariat. He shunned public views and appearances for both professional and personal reasons which maintained his impartial reputation. This impartiality combined with his in-depth knowledge of problems before the League caused him to be a trusted source of ideas and opinions to individual member states, as well as a mediator in disputes between states. But Drummond's narrow outlook on the public role of his office has also been criticized as severely limiting the development of the position in a time when it was still in a state of flux and without defined limits. When even the founding members were unsure as to the exact role of the Secretary-

¹²Rovine, p. 94.

General, the office could most easily have been expanded and initiatives taken.

However, the role played by Sir Eric Drummond must be seen in the perspective of the newness of the job and the League, of the political environment in which he functioned, and of the expectations of the League members. Still further perspective can be gained by noting the rather different role played by his successor.

Joseph Avenol. The League's second Secretary General, whose background was in many ways similar to that of Sir Eric Drummond, performed his duties in a radically different manner from his predecessor and in such a way as to demonstrate the potential of the office, but in a negative sense. Like Drummond, Avenol was a civil servant, spending nearly twenty years working at various levels in the French Treasury. His appointment to the position of Deputy Secretary-General by Drummond in 1923 was based upon two criteria: his nationality, in accordance with an understanding previously reached by the great powers providing a Frenchman directly below the British Secretary-General, and his established financial and economic expertise, a valuable commodity for the League still facing the destructive result of World War I.

With Drummond's resignation in 1933, he made two suggestions regarding his replacement: (1) that he be the national of a small power, if possible, and (2) that in any event, it not be Joseph Avenol. He objected to the appointment of his deputy on the grounds that countries such as Germany and Italy would object to a Frenchman and personally

because he did not believe Avenol was suited for the job.¹³

Although political bargains and understandings put into office the only man objected to by the first Secretary-General, history has shown Drummond's evaluation of Avenol's suitability to be correct. Raymond Fosdick, who served as an Under Secretary-General early in the League's history, describes Avenol in these words:

Politically and emotionally...he was a conservative of the extreme right...his instinct was for stability, represented in his mind by what he liked to believe was the unquestioned power of France. A man of limited vision.¹⁴

James Barros notes how men who worked with Avenol described him in terms such as "vain," "secretive," and "lazy."¹⁵

Perhaps Avenol's greatest failing in his years as Secretary-General was his extreme rightist leanings that corrupted the reputation of uncompromised impartiality that Drummond had given the office. The effect of this bias was to cause Avenol, both personally and in his influence upon League actions, to attempt to antagonize the fascist governments of Hitler and Mussolini as little as possible. He fully supported British and French policies of appeasement and when the fascist states withdrew from the League, he did his utmost to leave the door open for their return. His actions during the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia were typical of this tendency.¹⁶

¹³James Barros, Betrayal From Within (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), p. 2.

¹⁴Raymond B. Fosdick, The League and the United Nations After Fifty Years (Newton, Connecticut: Raymond B. Fosdick, 1972), p. 49.

¹⁵Barros, pp. 20-21.

¹⁶For a thorough description of Avenol's actions, see Barros, Betrayal From Within, Chapters 3 and 4.

The Secretary-General personally came up with means of preventing Council consideration of the Italian aggression. He also formulated possible plans for a settlement which gave Italy virtually all it desired and suggested to Rome that a solution might lay in having Ethiopia expelled from the League. When the Council later declared Italy the aggressor, Avenol refused to support League sanctions against that state. With the Italian victory, Rome demanded the Ethiopian delegates be expelled and when they were not, Italy withdrew from the League. Avenol responded by working for the expulsion of the Ethiopian delegates as the price for Italy's return. Then, in September 1936, on his own initiative, the Secretary-General went to Rome in an attempt to talk Mussolini into returning to Geneva if the Ethiopian delegation were dismissed, but his efforts were in vain--the League's Credentials Committee refused to make the sacrifice Avenol had arranged.

This is not to say that he was a total liability to his office and to the League. It should be noted that Sir Eric Drummond presided over the most peaceful of the League's years and Avenol faced the growth of totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy, Russia, and Japan and the total breakdown of the effectiveness of the Council and the Assembly. In the area of economics and finance, in which Avenol had greater interest and training, progress was made. The best example might be his work in establishing the Bruce Committee in 1939.¹⁷ The group was charged with the task of examining and making recommendations for the improvement of the League's economic and social organization, which was functioning

¹⁷See Rovine, pp. 146-149, and Barros, pp. 194-197.

inefficiently. Avenol suggested the creation of the committee and selected its very capable chairman, Stanley M. Bruce of Australia. The findings of the group closely paralleled earlier recommendations of Avenol and provided the basis for the UN's Economic and Social Council. He lobbied hard to have the plan adopted by a limited Assembly in 1940 and his efforts were successful. Arthur Rovine termed the adoption of the new organization Avenol's "most significant contribution."¹⁸

In the seven years of Joseph Avenol's tenure, numerous examples can be seen of the considerable influence that could be exerted by the Secretary-General upon League activity and upon member states individually. In a number of cases, he decided or was a major factor in the decision of what action was taken by the League. The tragedy was that in the political realm his personal and national interests came before the interests of the League and of his office and that his influence was used to the detriment of both. His actions in the last few months before his resignation in August 1940 were a fitting end to his career. His resignation was in compliance with the desires of the Vichy government of France and against his own personal wishes. During these last months it appears that he made an earnest attempt to completely shut down what remained of the Secretariat, which was at the time the only functioning part of the League, but it is unclear whether this action was his own notion or an order from Vichy. In the words of Arthur Rovine:

Joseph Avenol felt no overriding attachment to the League of Nations and when the Organization had reached the end of its usefulness, he not only abandoned it, but endeavored to destroy even its symbolic value to the international community. At a time of war and under pressure

¹⁸Rovine, p. 149.

from occupied France, Avenol's reaction was understandable, but it is perhaps not asking too much of the world organization's highest official that his first devotion be to his international obligations.¹⁹

The lesson to be learned from Avenol's seven years as Secretary-General is in the potential for influence, especially in crisis situations, and therefore the potential for misdirection. Some would claim this as justification for limiting the actions (or powers) of the Secretary-General. But of far greater benefit to the cause of world peace and to the functioning of international organization would be the more careful selection of the man who fills the office. The effects of political compromising should be minimized.

Sean Lester. To Irishman Sean Lester fell the unenviable task of picking up the pieces of the League left by Joseph Avenol. The second Secretary-General had dismissed or "accepted the resignations of" a large number of Secretariat officials in the last months of his tenure and attempted to convince the remaining League members that the war precluded the approval of a budget by the Assembly and thus, the continued operation of the League was impossible.²⁰ Lester, who had been appointed Deputy Secretary-General in 1937, had taken on a growing number of the Secretary-General's duties, especially the political ones (what few remained) as war approached and then engulfed Europe. Avenol had almost totally lost interest in his office and retained control only in economic and financial matters.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 166.

²⁰Ibid., p. 162.

When Avenol's resignation became official on August 31, 1940, Sean Lester became the Acting Secretary-General of the League of Nations. But the Organization over which he presided was a league of nations in name only. The war obviated any meetings of the Council or of the Assembly which effectively eliminated the League's political functions. In fact, Lester had to be constantly on his guard that none of the activities of the Secretariat could be interpreted as "political." Such activities would have been grounds for the Bern government to demand the removal of the League from Switzerland, which was completely encircled by hostile forces.²¹

Thus Lester, with the Supervisory Commission which had been established by the Assembly in 1939, administered the remaining technical functions of the League. Besides the value of the League Treasurer, the International Labor Office, and the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Acting Secretary-General saw considerable merit in the continuation of the League in the event that the U. S., which had belatedly come to support its existence, desired an international organization with similar goals after the war was won. In commenting on his war-time years in Geneva in 1958, Lester suggested that such a desire by the U. S. would lead most countries to believe such an organization was essential, as well, with or without the U. S. He further wondered:

But could it be re-made de nouveau. Perhaps. But if so with much international anguish and many difficulties. A great deal of this could be avoided if the fabric, however attenuated, were there; if the foundation were there...²²

²¹Ibid., p. 180.

²²Barros, Appendix, p. 268.

Lester was able to solve the problem of the budget despite Avenol's claims that a solution was not possible. A budget was drawn up and approved by the Supervisory Commission, which had been given complete authority to act in the absence of the Assembly and the Council. This system was used through 1945 to administer what little funds were available.

Perhaps the hardest part of the Acting Secretary-General's job was in giving direction to the widespread sections of the Secretariat under the severe limitations on travel and communication imposed by the war. Agencies were centered in Washington, D. C.; Princeton, New Jersey; Montreal; London; and, of course, Geneva. Many of these groups had been evacuated in the early stages of the war in the event that Hitler failed to respect Swiss neutrality. Lester and a skeleton staff decided to remain at the League headquarters knowing that if Switzerland was not attacked, they would be isolated there until the war ended. It was the reasons mentioned earlier as well as a deep loyalty to the Organization that kept Sean Lester in Geneva.

It cannot be said that Sean Lester, who was named the League's third Secretary-General retroactive to 1940 in the Assembly's last session in 1946, provided any significant leadership to the League of Nations during his seven years as Secretary-General. The unique circumstances of the Second World War did not provide him an opportunity to do so. The Secretariat carefully served no political purposes and most of the technical agencies had to be administered from the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

However, it seems justified to say that he offered a symbolic

leadership for the scattered segments of the Secretariat, which was the League during the war. He was a constant source of inspiration and of ideas that sustained the Organization through difficult times. His efforts made possible the transfer of the League functions to the United Nations, a task completed by July 1947. At that time, his office and the League of Nations ceased to be.

This, then was the legacy of experience handed to the founders of the UN and to its first Secretary-General, Trygve Lie. It was they who profited from two and a half decades of experiments, successes, failures, reorganizations, and precedents. The tenures of the League's three Secretaries-General provided the foundation or the model (with alterations) for the design of the office of the new Organization's chief administrator. In addition, the type of role played by each afforded the members of the UN a lesson in the type of man needed to fill the office. A short examination of the appointment process under the UN shows that the lesson was only partially learned.

The Appointment Process

Article 97 of the UN Charter states in part that "the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." The simplicity of this constitutional provision is deceiving in that it fails to reflect the controversy that raged over the process by which the Secretariat's chief executive would be selected. This problem, as well as one over the selection and terms

of his deputies, were the only matters of serious disagreement within the topic of the Secretariat at the San Francisco Conference.²³

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals suggested only that the Secretary-General be elected by the General Assembly on recommendation of the Security Council. But at San Francisco, the Big Four, under pressure of the Soviet Union which favored great power control of the Secretariat, amended the original proposal to include the election, by the Assembly on recommendation of the Council, of the Secretary-General and four deputies for a term of three years. It was in this form that the matter was considered in different committees at the Conference. The small powers were quick to propose other means of selecting the Secretary-General and to object to the election of his deputies. They favored the appointment of the deputies by the chief officer and in numbers he deemed necessary. There was also disagreement as to whether the Council recommendation would require concurrence of the five permanent members, a provision they favored, believing it essential that the Secretary-General should be acceptable to all of them.²⁴

The final committee decisions generally reflected great power desires by requiring the Yalta voting formula in the Council, but the influence of the small powers can be seen in the fact that any reference to the Secretary-General's term of office or to his deputies was omitted from the Charter and these questions would be settled later. Another change was in the final wording from that of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposal

²³Ruth B. Russell and Jeanette E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1958), p. 854.

²⁴Ibid., p. 858.

was that the Secretary-General would be "appointed" instead of "elected," which one source suggests was made to emphasize the administrative character of his duties.²⁵

With the constitutional framework established, one of the first tasks facing the first General Assembly in January 1946 in London was the election of the President of the Assembly, an event that preceded the selection of the Secretary-General. Although the term of the President was only one year, special attention was given to the election of the man that would be the first to hold the position and who would be the first indication of the type of political leadership for the new organization.²⁶ The first choice of both the U. S. and Russia for the presidency was Trygve Lie, a man both countries had come to know and respect as a representative of the Norwegian government. He had been Foreign Minister of that country's government-in-exile during World War II. Lie might well have been elected had it not been for some last-minute parliamentary maneuvering, the result of which was that Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak was elected the Assembly's first President.

The selection of the Secretary-General was the next problem to be solved. A major difference in the political environment caused a significant change in the man chosen as opposed to the League's first Secretary-General. In 1919 it was the major powers who made the decision as in 1946 but in the former case the states involved were in relative harmony permitting agreement upon a great power national as the chief

²⁵Leland M. Goodrich and Evard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946), p. 269.

²⁶Leon Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 36.

administrator. But the early effects of Cold War distrust facilitated no such concurrence. To be sure, nationals of the superpowers and their allies were considered for the post,²⁷ but neither would accept candidates clearly in the other's camp. This left the need to compromise on the citizen of a small power and again Trygve Lie's name came to the fore and was acceptable to both the U. S. and Russia. He was therefore nominated by the Council on January 29 and dutifully appointed by the Assembly on February 1.²⁸ This system had the result of selecting a man who, initially at least, had the support or acquiescence of the major powers but it did have the inherent danger of not necessarily selecting the best man for the job.

It is difficult to know exactly what reasoning lay behind the final agreement on the Norwegian Foreign Minister with regard to his future role in UN activities. As will be discussed later, the Charter provisions clearly designed the office of the Secretary-General to be more political than its predecessor in the League had been. Yet at the same time the job, like the Organization, was brand new and despite the similarities to the League's chief administrator, the first man to occupy the office would likely move cautiously at first. In the choice of Trygve Lie it would appear the Council selected a man who would naturally play a more political role—he was a national of a small state but had spent years as a labor lawyer and then as his country's Foreign Minister. He was

²⁷Including names such as Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, Lester Pearson of Canada, Stanoje Simic of Yugoslavia, and Wincenty Rzymowski of Poland.

²⁸Trygve Lie, In the Cause of Peace (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954), pp. 416-17.

therefore a man versed in the art of politics and no stranger to the world of international diplomacy. On the other hand, he was not the first choice of the superpowers for Secretary-General but was one of the few men both could agree on.

More can be learned by the experience of the selection process as it progressed over the years. The sequence of events that surrounded the extension of Lie's term in 1950 clearly demonstrated the political nature of his office.²⁹ As the end of his five-year term neared, he appeared to be the favorite of all the major powers (including Russia) to succeed himself. But with the outbreak of the Korean War and his public stand against the North Koreans, the Soviet government no longer desired his reappointment. The sides of the battle were instantly drawn along Cold War lines and his reappointment became the symbol of the public endorsement or condemnation of the UN reaction to the invasion of the Republic of Korea. When the Soviet Union used its veto in the Council to prevent Lie's nomination and the US threatened to use its first veto against any other candidate, the matter was handed over to the General Assembly which approved the extension of his term of three years by a majority of nine to one.

The Secretary-General described the resulting situation in these terms:

...the immediate political objectives had been won: United Nations action in Korea had been affirmed, the continuity of United Nations administration had been assured, and the independent position of the Secretary-General had been preserved against the threats and pressures of a great power.

²⁹The Secretary-General provides a graphic description of the political battle that ensued, see Lie, pp. 367-385.

But the winning of these objectives—vital as they were—was a heavy cost to me and my office. The immediate advantages to the Organization have to be weighed against the serious impairment in the usefulness of my office that followed.³⁰

The five members of the Soviet bloc refused to admit the existence of Trygve Lie as Secretary-General from that point until his resignation in 1952. Obviously, this severely limited any role he could play in the international politics of the Cold War. It pointed up the futility of putting into the office (or continuing in office) a man who is opposed by one or more of the great powers, especially if one is the Soviet Union.

In searching for a successor to Trygve Lie, the situation differed markedly from 1946. The evolved political potential of the office was evident as was the type of role played by a politically-oriented Secretary-General. Therefore, the permanent members were more careful in their selection, so careful that it took five months to find a suitable compromise candidate. The Russians were obviously looking for a quiet administrator-type and the British and the French "wanted to get back to the tradition established by Sir Eric Drummond at the League of Nations."³¹

The Americans, who knew little of Hammarskjold, compiled this impression of him from Americans who had had dealings with him:

...a Swedish civil service aristocrat [formerly in the Foreign Office and at the time Minister of State], gifted administratively, unobtrusive rather than flamboyant, a

³⁰ Ibid., p. 385.

³¹ Joseph P. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold, Custodian of the Brushfire Peace (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961), p. 8.

brilliant technician, an executant rather than a political leader, and some feared, a compromiser rather than a fighter.³²

For the sake of progress, the U. S. was forced to accept the nomination of a man who appeared to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France to be a Secretary-General who would quietly reverse the dynamic trend of Trygve Lie.

Although he clearly failed to fulfill these expectations during his first term, he was generally acknowledged to be executing his many duties and he easily won reappointment in 1957. It was not until 1960 and the crisis in the Congo that Hammarskjold took actions that ran counter to the direct interests of the Soviet Union and he, as his predecessor had, drew intense criticism from Moscow and demands for his resignation. The ferocity of the Soviet accusations surpassed even that leveled at Lie and only his tragic death in 1961 prevented another confrontation of Soviet demands and the opposing desires of the majority of the member states.

Although one political battle was averted, another struggle followed of larger proportions. No clear constitutional method existed for filling Hammarskjold's place and to worsen the confusion, the Soviet Union continued to press for its "troika" plan, originally intended to replace the objectionable Secretary-General. When this plan was rejected, the Russian delegates attempted to have a set number of Under Secretaries-General established with specific geographic origins and with greater power vis-a-vis the Secretary-General. After numerous alternative plans and numerous candidates were discussed and rejected,

³²Ibid., p. 8.

U Thant was selected as Acting Secretary-General with no specific requirements in the appointing of his Under Secretaries-General. The soft-spoken Thant was known to both sides as Burma's permanent representative to the UN since 1957. He had less background in foreign affairs than his predecessors and no experience in the democratic politics of Europe and North America. But his selection showed the growing importance of the Afro-Asian states with the Organization.³³

U Thant's appointment to a full term in 1962 was a result of U. S.-Russian consultations and the general recognition of his competence in the office after a year at the post which included his contributions in the Congo, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and in West New Guinea. Similarly, in 1966 Thant had considerable support in the Council and in the Assembly and to such a degree that he was persuaded to accept another term after previously voicing his desire to step down.³⁴

The experience of the first three Secretaries-General with the appointment process points out that the chief administrator of the UN is chosen as the end product of political battles and is therefore judged less on his personal abilities than on his acceptability as a compromise among the permanent members of the Security Council. The process responds to the different roles played by officeholders but also places a limit upon them. The lesson coming from this experience is that if a Secretary-General is to be reappointed (or if he is to function effectively) he must execute the duties of his office without

³³Gordenker, p. 56.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 59-61.

incurring strong opposition from any of the great powers. Two of the first three UN Secretaries-General were unable to do so.

The Constitutional Role of the Secretary-General

To further set the stage for an examination of the ways the Secretary-General influences UN activity, it would be best to delineate the exact duties and freedoms granted him by the Charter and the understandings that lay behind these provisions. They provide the constitutional basis for his office and it is in these articles that the actions of the Secretary-General must technically be founded.

The number of Charter articles that deal with the Secretariat and its chief administrator are very limited, describing their functions only in general terms. But the status of the two, as compared with their predecessors in the League, was altered by the new Organization's founders. Article 7 of the Charter names the Secretariat as one of the UN's six principal organs, whereas Article 2 of the Covenant seems to imply that the Secretariat is a subsidiary organ meant only to serve the Assembly and the Council. Chapter XV (Articles 97 through 101) of the Charter is concerned with the composition and function of the Secretariat. According to Article 97, the Secretariat shall be comprised of the Secretary-General (the chief administrative officer of the Organization) and such staff as is required, as well as the means of his selection as described earlier. Article 98 assigns him the duties of acting in his capacity as Secretary-General in the other major organs, of performing other duties assigned him by those organs, and of making an annual report to the Assembly on the work of the Organization. The

Secretary-General is given the right to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion is a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security in Article 99. Article 100 is meant to insure the impartial, international character of the Secretariat and its chief executive by requiring that they neither seek nor receive instructions from any government or external authority and by stating that they will refrain from actions "which might reflect on the position as international officials responsible only to the Organization." In addition, member states are urged to respect this international character and not to attempt to compromise it. Article 101 deals solely with the appointment of the Secretariat staff by its chief officer.

For the subject of this study, Articles 98 and 99 have special significance. The first line of the former reads:

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Council and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs.

The last clause was not part of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and received little attention at the San Francisco Conference where it was added in the final version of the Charter. Its intent was probably to cover any unforeseen administrative duties in connection with the myriad of concerns of the Secretariat which the Secretary-General directed. Although considerable attention has been given to Article 99 as giving him a political role, this line in Article 98 would appear to have had as much impact on the Secretary-General's role in non-administrative activities. One of the functions entrusted to the

Secretary-General has been mediatory roles such as Hammarskjold's flight to Peking in 1954 and his trip to the Middle East in 1956. Another such function was the organization and direction of peace-keeping operations as in the Middle East and the Congo. The vast dimensions of these assignments will be described later. Often the wording of the authorizing resolutions from the Council or the Assembly in these highly sensitive situations has been purposely vague giving the Secretary-General wide latitudes but also putting him in very dangerous circumstances in which any action was opposed by one or more of the great powers. He has also been entrusted with missions of investigations and observation as in the case of Hungary in 1956, when little else was possible against the actions of the Soviet Union. Missions under this provision of the Charter have had serious consequences for the Organization and for the office of the Secretary-General, as was the case with Hammarskjold's conduct of the Congo operation and the resulting Soviet criticism. They have also peacefully ended serious international confrontations as exemplified by the eventual release of the American airmen by Peking in response to Hammarskjold's efforts.

The obviously political nature of the right given the Secretary-General by Article 99 caused little controversy before its inclusion in the Charter. The discussion over this article was basically a consensus of opinion in the semi-political nature of the Secretary-General's job. In the Draft Constitution for the new organization submitted to the major powers at the Dumbarton Oaks conversations by the U. S. Department of State, the "General Secretary" was the permanent chairman of the Council in addition to his administrative duties and he could summon a

Council meeting in the event of a breach, or threat of a breach, of the peace.³⁵

During the discussions at Dumbarton Oaks, Great Britain and China suggested the adoption of a clause which allowed the Secretary-General to bring such matters before the Council. They felt, as did State Department experts, that one weakness of the League was that only a state could bring an alleged threat before the Council and this prevented the speedy consideration of the matter in some cases. The U. S. and Russia readily agreed to the inclusion of the clause in the final Proposals.³⁶ The provision was also accepted with little discussion by the San Francisco Conference.

Article 99 has been invoked only once in the case of Hammarskjold's bringing the crisis developing in the Congo before the Council in July 1960. But it has also been used twice "by implication," as Leon Gordenker described it,³⁷ or in other words, through the threat of its use. These were Trygve Lie's quick reactions to the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 and Hammarskjold's opposition to the British and French actions against Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956. In both examples, the Secretary-General clearly stated his intention to invoke the article to force the Council into its Charter obligations and in both cases events made the action unnecessary. The significance of these three episodes was that they were evidence of the Secretary-General taking a definite political stand. In the crisis in 1950,

³⁵Russell and Muther, p. 371.

³⁶Ibid., p. 432.

³⁷Gordenker, p. 143.

Lie's stand preceded the UN effort in Korea and eventually forced him from office under a savage Soviet attack. In both cases under the second Secretary-General, Hammarskjold's use or implied use of Article 99 was the initial step in the sequence of events that lead to full-scale peace-keeping operations which he organized and directed. In the first case, Hammarskjold greatly added to the prestige of the office and in the second, the result was almost the opposite. Thus, the use of the article, implied or real, has been tied to three of the most critical periods in the UN's history.

The provision of Articles 98 and 99 have had profound effects on the office of the Secretary-General and on the Organization itself. But actions of the Secretary-General in connection with these articles do not include all of the principal ways in which he influences UN activity. An attempt to define and examine more closely the different means by which he does so is the object of the next chapter.

CHAPTER II

FORMS OF INFLUENCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

If we accept the fact that the UN Charter has given the Secretary-General a political as well as an administrative role which makes him more of an actor in international relations than was the League Secretary-General, this is still little evidence that he provides the Organization with a source of leadership. The words of the Charter surely do not imply such a function in the few paragraphs devoted to the Secretariat and its head.

It would seem, however, that a person who acts as the chief executive of an international bureaucracy of more than 5,000 civil servants, who is the executive secretary for all of the principal organs of the UN, and who is in daily contact with high-ranking representatives (and at times governmental leaders) of numerous member states must have influence beyond the constitutional provisions. Actually, a considerable number of ways exists for the Secretary-General to exert influence in the functioning of the Organization, including his ceremonial post of UN representative, the submission of the Annual Report, and the preparation of the annual budget. For the purpose of this study, however, the focus will be upon four basic ways in which the Secretary-General plays an influential role in periods of international crisis. These are (1) participation in Security Council and General Assembly debates, (2) personal missions under the direction of the Council and the Assembly, (3) direction

of UN observer groups and peace-keeping forces, and (4) personal initiatives taken by the three men. Although their participation in Council and Assembly debates were ordinarily personal initiatives on the part of the Secretaries-General and could be placed within the last category, they were of such special significance that they will be considered separately.

Taking part in debates of the two deliberative organs was a means used by each of the Secretaries-General, in varying degrees, to voice personal opinions, to provide legal or constitutional opinions, or to suggest courses of action in dealing with a specific problem. This participation was in the form of speeches before the organs and written communications to them while debates were in progress. It is extremely difficult to measure the exact degree to which states or their UN delegates were influenced by these acts on the part of the Secretariat's chief executive, but the reaction to them on a number of occasions indicates that their impact was indeed felt.

This tendency can easily be seen in the tenure of Trygve Lie. The first Secretary-General drew considerable notice by taking firm stands on political issues which many saw as deviating from the neutral path to be taken by the holder of that office. Although accused of favoring the position of the "West" or the "East" in Cold War issues that continually plagued the Organization, Lie believed he was looking out for the best interests of the United Nations. Such a case came early in the UN's history with the problem of Russian troops in Iran in 1946. The details of the crisis are described in the next chapter, but suffice it to say that the Secretary-General submitted a memorandum to the

President of the Council which gave a legal opinion supporting the position taken by the Russian delegate. This action was meant to set the legal facts straight and perhaps keep the Council from setting a precedent it might later regret. To the Western states on the Council the Secretary-General was over-stepping his authority.¹ The end result, in terms of the Secretary-General's efforts was that although his opinion was not accepted by the Council majority, he was granted additional authority to intervene in Council and Assembly debates.

Trygve Lie clearly came out in favor of the UN's partition plan for Palestine in 1947 and tried to goad the Council into taking action to implement the plan in a speech to the Palestine Commission that was obviously directed at the members of the Council. But, as in the Iranian case, his efforts produced no concrete results and no UN force was established as he hoped.

In the case of the outbreak of the Korean War, the Secretary-General's intervention in the workings of the Security Council proved to be fatal to his career. When he learned of the North Korean invasion, he prepared to call a special meeting of the Council under the authority granted him by Article 99, but the U. S. delegate called for the meeting first while Lie waited to receive a report from the UN Commission in Korea. The Secretary-General did, however, speak first at the Council session at which time he labeled North Korea the aggressor and called for Security Council action to restore the peace.² It was this stand that brought

¹Lie, pp. 74-88.

²Security Council Official Records (SCOR), Fifth Year, 473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950.

down the anger and criticism of the Soviet Union that eventually caused him to resign.

Lie's successor, Dag Hammarskjold, also addressed meetings of the Council and the Assembly in some of the stormiest periods of the Organization's history. Whereas Lie made greater use of written opinions, Hammarskjold preferred speaking directly to the delegates who must make the final decision on the course of action to be taken. His first speech in a crisis situation was in connection with the Suez Crisis and the Franco-British plan to invade Egypt with the cooperation of Israel. Hammarskjold addressed the Security Council on October 31, 1956, and

...for the first time he publicly rebuked two governments, and two great powers at that, and served notice that there were situations in which he felt obliged to enter the political arena as an active participant.³

He stated that although it was his duty to remain impartial he was bound to serve the principles of the Charter and he expected that all member states would honor their pledges to observe all Charter Articles. He also expected the organs of the UN to uphold the Charter, which meant he expected the Council to take action to halt the invasion of Egypt.⁴

Four days later he spoke in the same chamber in regard to the brutal suppression of the Hungarian Revolution by Soviet forces. In two sentences he declared that the statement he made in reference to the Suez Crisis applied equally well in this case.⁵ He was indirectly condemning the Soviet Union and urging action by the Council.

³Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 174.

⁴SCOR, 11th Year, 751st Meeting, October 31, 1956.

⁵SCOR, 11th Year, 754th Meeting, November 4, 1956.

Dag Hammarskjold took part in the debate in the Council session which established the observer group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) in 1958. His comments gave quick meaning to the plan and the guarantee of its implementation.⁶ But by far, the Secretary-General's most significant participation in such debates was in July 1960. With the outbreak of civil war in the Congo which threatened to involve one or both of the superpowers, Hammarskjold invoked Article 99 to bring the matter before the Security Council on July 13. In addressing that body, the Secretary-General made his case for a military force to be sent to the Congo and outlined the form the force would take, if approved.⁷ The resolution adopted early the next morning closely followed Hammarskjold's recommendations. Evidently, his efforts had influenced the actions of the Council.

The UN's third Secretary-General, U Thant, continued this pattern of personally addressing the Council and the Assembly, although on fewer occasions and in a more reserved manner than his predecessor. Reminiscent of Hammarskjold's address to the Council during the Suez Crisis, Thant urged the Council to take action to deal with the threat to peace posed by the superpower confrontation over Russian missiles in Cuba in October 1962. His communication further implied disapproval of the American blockade of the island.⁸

The flare-up of violence between India and Pakistan in Kashmir in August 1965 prompted the Secretary-General to make more concrete suggestions to the Council. On September 6 he suggested an order for a

⁶ SCOR, 13th Year, 825th Meeting, June 11, 1958.

⁷ SCOR, 15th Year, 873rd Meeting, July 13, 1960.

⁸ Rovine, p. 370.

cease-fire with the threat of economic sanctions to put more force behind the order. The resolution passed called for the cease-fire but without any mention of sanctions.⁹ The resolution also started the Secretary-General on a trip to the troubled area to attempt to bring peace.

Communications between the Secretaries-General and the Council and the Assembly, both verbal and written, met with varying degrees of success. In some cases, the proffered opinion was politely ignored by all of the members while at other times, as in Hammarskjold's plan for the Congo operation, the Secretary-General seemed to determine the policy adopted by the United Nations. There were also cases between the two extremes such as in the Korean example in which Lie's opinion may have at least legitimized activity already taking place.

The second category of influence exerted by the UN's chief administrator is one that entailed less initiative on his part but had greater potential for controlling the Organization's response to critical situations. The Secretary-General was given a number of personal missions by the two deliberative bodies. These were mainly for the purpose of conducting investigations to clarify the facts of a situation or mediating between disputing parties. Trygve Lie drew only one such assignment in his seven years when these two functions were usually entrusted to commissions which ordinarily made little progress. The Secretary-General was an unknown and untried commodity in the UN's first years. Lie's only experience in this area was in 1952 when the General Assembly sent him to attempt to mediate a dispute between South Africa and the

⁹Rovine, p. 387.

two states of India and Pakistan over the treatment of Indian and Pakistani minorities in South Africa. Not surprisingly, the Secretary-General made little progress in this hopeless task.¹⁰

This was not the case with Dag Hammarskjold. A number of reasons account for the fact that the second Secretary-General was often called upon for these personal missions. First, although Trygve Lie's efforts eventually caused him to resign in the face of constant Russian criticism, his tireless activity and involvement brought increased prestige and exposure to the office despite a poor record of success. Secondly, seven years of UN commissions showed their limited worth in a crisis situation, when one man could act more quickly and more decisively than a group of people. Thirdly, Hammarskjold's considerable diplomatic skill enabled him to achieve a better record of success which in turn caused the Assembly and the Council to call upon him with greater frequency. He was ideally suited for many of these missions in that he was regarded as impartial yet was informed and held the confidence of many of the globe's top statesmen.

Hammarskjold's first major venture in this category came in the second year he held the office. Late in 1954, Communist China announced that eleven American fliers, who had been shot down in January 1953, had been tried and given lengthy prison sentences. At American insistence, the General Assembly passed a resolution instructing the Secretary-General to seek their release through measures he thought appropriate.¹¹

¹⁰Mark W. Zacher, "The Secretary-General and the U. N.'s Function of Peaceful Settlement," International Organization, Vol. II, No. 4 (Autumn, 1966), p. 731.

¹¹General Assembly Resolution 906 (IX), December 10, 1954.

In a manner described in the next chapter, Hammarskjold was able to secure the release of the airmen. His success in this potentially explosive situation was noted by the members who were quick to make further use of his talents.

In another instance (also detailed in the following chapter) in 1956, it was the Security Council which called upon the Secretary-General to attempt to mediate in the Middle East as the level of violence between Israel and her Arab neighbors began to rise. After 26 years a final solution has yet to be found, but Hammarskjold was able to secure a temporary halt in the fighting. His efforts were soon overturned by the Suez Crisis, however, so he applied his skills in trying to work out a solution between the disputants in this conflict.

Dag Hammarskjold was also directed to make trips to troubled areas for the purpose of investigations which would supply the directing organ with the facts of troubled situations. In some instances this was a token action taken when none other was possible. Such was the case in 1956 when the General Assembly passed a resolution¹² sending the Secretary-General to Hungary to observe first-hand the aftermath of the Russian suppression of a popular uprising.

Just as Hammarskjold had been relied upon on numerous occasions to act as mediator in international disputes, so, too, was his successor. One example of Thant's efforts in this field was a ten-day trip to India and Pakistan in September 1965 at the request of the Security Council.¹³

¹²See General Assembly Resolution 1004 (ES-II), November 4, 1956.

¹³See Security Council Resolution 210, September 6, 1965.

A renewed outbreak of fighting and accusations of heavy infiltrations of armed troops prompted the Secretary-General's discussion with President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Shastri of India. But as in so many of the UN's perennial problems, little progress toward a solution could be made. U Thant reported back to the Council and proceeded to strengthen the observer group, UNMOGIP, which had been on duty in the Kashmir since 1949.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity for the Secretary-General to influence the actions of the UN has been in the direction of observer groups and peace-keeping missions. The role of military commander had not been foreseen nor intended by the founders of the Organization. Article 43 was meant to provide the basis for such operations by instituting a military command that would organize and direct military forces as requested by the Security Council. But the provisions of Article 43 were never put into motion and the UN was left without the nucleus of an international police force.

The first use of a significant number of military personnel was in 1948. As requested by the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte in Palestine, Trygve Lie arranged for uniformed personnel from the three states comprising the Truce Commission as well as 51 UN guards to aid in observing the cease-fire arranged by the Mediator. This group, the UN Truce Supervision Organization, eventually numbered about 750.¹⁴ Lie worked in close cooperation with the work of the Mediator and UNTSO.

¹⁴David W. Wainhouse, International Peace Observation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), p. 252.

In this case, as in those to follow involving military forces under UN control, the Secretary-General was the only one who could quickly and efficiently organize the group as envisioned in the authorizing resolution. It was his task to implement the decisions made by the Council and the Assembly.

Dag Hammarskjold planned, organized, and directed the first armed force, the United Nations Emergency Force, authorization for which came from the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. The Secretary-General was instrumental in determining the size, composition, and exact function of the peace-keeping force. Although the Force was placed under the direct command of General E. L. M. Burns of Canada, it was clear that overall control remained in the hands of Hammarskjold.

The crisis in Lebanon in 1958 brought about a Security Council resolution which established the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL). The exact composition of the force was again left to the Secretary-General who insisted, against the wishes of the U. S. and Lebanon, that the group was intended to observe and need not be armed.¹⁵ Hammarskjold organized the force and gave basic direction to its functioning through some rather difficult circumstances. At one point, he backed a Japanese resolution in the Council which would authorize the Secretary-General to enlarge UNOGIL to permit the withdrawal of American Marines. The Russian representative vetoed the resolution so Hammarskjold went ahead and enlarged the force without specific approval of the Council. This enabled the UNOGIL to adequately observe all border areas

¹⁵Rovine, p. 300.

and thereby fulfill the mission for which it was established.¹⁶

Clearly the most adventurous operation within this category was the UN force sent to the Congo. Hammarskjold's efforts in organizing ONUC were similar to those in UNEF. But the Congo crisis had many unique facets that demanded considerably more of the Secretary-General. It was he who recommended the force to the Security Council and won its approval of the operation as he envisioned it. He accomplished the massive task of equipping ONUC within a few days and soon had it in place in the riot-torn African state. Hammarskjold directed the operation even more closely than UNEF in a situation whose complexity virtually defies description and with very little guidance from the Council which was soon deeply divided on ONUC's exact mission. The depth of Hammarskjold's involvement was demonstrated graphically when he personally led a contingent of UN troops into the rebel state of Katanga. Ultimately, the UN commitment to the Congo operation was about 20,000 men.

The tragic death of Dag Hammarskjold in 1961 did not, however, end the responsibility for the command of the operation. Acting Secretary-General Thant inherited the problem of continued fighting and the task of securing a settlement in the Congo with the other responsibilities of the office. Under Thant's direction, the path to a final settlement included a greater use of force and offensive action on the part of the UN forces. When progress toward a solution came to a halt with the continued intransigence of Tshombe in Katanga, U Thant urged a plan of economic and military sanctions but he found insufficient support to make the plan work. Finally, UN troops were forced to occupy Eliza-

¹⁶Ibid., p. 302.

bethville and other major cities in the province to end the fighting.¹⁷
A political settlement followed.

Secretary-General Thant also served a limited executive function in the dispute that arose in 1962 between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the territory of West Irian or West New Guinea. After armed conflict developed from the dispute, U Thant was put in charge of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority which was to act as a government for the area until transfer to Indonesian control was completed. The General Assembly also authorized the establishment of a peace-keeping force (the United Nations Security Force), which the Secretary-General organized to enforce the peace. The force was needed for only a few months and a complete transfer of authority was made by May 1, 1963.¹⁸

Besides the direction of a peace observation group in Yemen in 1962, the strengthening of the United Nations Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), and creation of the personally-authorized United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM), which was designed to aid the efforts of UNMOGIP, Thant's other major effort in this category was the peace-keeping force ordered to separate the warring factions on Cyprus in 1964. With the authorization of a Security Council resolution,¹⁹ the Secretary-General organized the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and appointed its commander as well as the UN Mediator, charged with trying to aid in a political settlement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Thant closely cooperated with

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 358.

¹⁸ Wainhouse, pp. 414-415.

¹⁹ Security Council Resolution 186, March 4, 1964.

successive UNFICYP commanders in directing the UN troops placed in the middle of deep-set hatreds confined to a small area. He also defended the work of the force before the Council to secure extensions of the mandate, extensions of only a few months at a time. He also worked closely with the Mediator in searching for a mutual accord. Although a total peace between Greek and Turkish Cypriots still remains elusive and foreign troops are still stationed in Cyprus, open fighting has not occurred in years and some economic and social progress has taken place there.²⁰

The last major category of actions that influenced UN activity is that of personal initiatives taken by the Secretaries-General. The term "personal initiatives" encompasses a large variety of written opinions, political stands, mediatory attempts, and investigations. The efforts were made without specific approval of either the Council or the Assembly and were often direct attempts to steer the deliberative bodies to a selected course of action. The record of success in the ventures varies greatly, according to the man, the boldness of the move, and the environment within which each was attempted. Generally, Trygve Lie's record is the worst and Hammarskjold's the best.

The majority of Lie's might be described as political stands which tended to elicit considerable controversy. His object in each case was not to "take a side" but to establish the legality of a certain situation, but his action tended to favor the argument of one of the superpowers.

²⁰Fosdick, pp. 153-155.

Such was the case with the Iranian issue. His legal opinion was heartily supported and defended by the Soviet Union but was seen by the U. S. and other western states as being beyond his authority. The sides were similarly aligned on the issue of Chinese representation which came up in 1949. He openly supported the representation of Communist China for a number of reasons: the Communists were in effective control of the mainland, he saw no benefit in ignoring one-fifth of the world's population, and he saw it as necessary if the UN was to achieve a true universality.²¹ Lie must also have been troubled by the Soviet walk-out—it could have been the first step in the early disintegration of the Organization. His opinion was poorly received by the Western states.

In the case of Korea, the sides changed. Lie saw himself as protecting the integrity and the future effectiveness of the UN by labeling the North Koreans as the aggressors and urging quick efforts by the Organization to halt the invasion. The Soviet reaction was a vicious line of criticism and accusations that continued until Mr. Lie left office two years later.

The first Secretary-General made an independent attempt at mediation during the Berlin Blockade in 1948. He continually tried to help the two sides reach a compromise but in the end, it was direct negotiation between the two that ended the crisis.

Virtually all of Dag Hammarskjold's initiatives were in the realm of mediation. Few, if any, were completely successful, but many did achieve some improvement in the situation. Most were in connection with issues later considered and acted upon in the Security Council or in the General

²¹See Lie, p. 254.

Assembly. Prior to assignment by the Council, Hammarskjold traveled to the Middle East in 1956 and 1957 and brought about a series of limited agreements between Israel and the surrounding Arab states.

Another example of this sort of activity involved the crisis that developed in Laos in 1959 and 1960 between the central government and the Communist-backed Pathet Lao. Knowing that any meaningful resolutions toward a solution would be vetoed in the Security Council, Hammarskjold made a number of trips to the troubled area without Council or Assembly authorization. He left behind a personal representative and steered the Laotian government toward a more neutralist position in hopes of bringing about some measure of peace. His efforts had little success toward a real solution but they were significant enough to draw the criticism of the Soviet Union.²²

Perhaps it could be said that, more than did Lie or U Thant, Hammarskjold made extensive use of what would be termed "quiet diplomacy." Because of its nature, little of this form of diplomatic discussion is documented. But it is clear that he spent much time and energy working behind the scenes to sound out delegates for their views or those of their governments. Here, too, was a means of acting as intermediary between governments, a means of persuading and suggesting. In this way he made advance preparations for other initiatives and assignments such as the large peace-keeping forces and the acceptance of same by the host countries. Thus, to differing degrees, Hammarskjold was aware of a crisis before it broke and was able to prepare for it.

²²Rovine, pp. 305-309.

This is not to imply that the same system was not used by the other Secretaries-General but they did not appear to be quite as successful in using it.

The independent efforts of U Thant can, in the main, be classified as mediation attempts. His initiatives, as was his tenure generally, were low-keyed and tended not to raise the controversy that, at times, limited the effectiveness of his two predecessors. Examples of his independent mediations are Cyprus and Kashmir, in both of which his efforts went well beyond the directives of the Council resolutions. A third example was his attempts to provide a line of communication between the United States and Soviet governments in the Cuban Missile Crisis. As was the case with Lie and Berlin, Thant was not able to aid in the discussion significantly and once again the problem had to be resolved by the superpowers themselves.

On a larger scale was Thant's attempts from 1963 to bring about negotiations and a peaceful settlement to the war in Vietnam. His basic stand was in opposition to American involvement in the area but, unable to control that aspect, he worked unceasingly to bring the two sides together. He approached the Americans directly and often used the Russian delegate to the UN to relay messages and proposals to Hanoi. But his efforts were in vain.²³ Once again he discovered that when one or more of the superpowers is directly involved in a dispute, it is they that decide how and when a solution must be achieved.

In summary, the four major influencing activities described above were used to differing degrees by the three Secretaries-General,

²³Ibid., pp. 401-409.

under a variety of circumstances, and with widely differing degrees of success. The states involved, the timing of the action, and the existing political environment were among the factors contributing to the Secretary-General's success or failure in each case.

Participation in the debates of the deliberative bodies was used most constructively by Dag Hammarskjold in well-timed and well-conceived plans for necessary UN action. Trygve Lie tended to take political stands which often displeased one of the Cold War camps and thereby raised considerable controversy and achieved less success. U Thant participated in a manner less controversial and less political than his two predecessors. His efforts were more within the limits of what most states saw as his delegated duties.

The mediatory function of many personal missions assigned to the Secretaries-General was one of the more significant developments of the office. Although not always successful in the role of international mediator, the assignment itself and any success increased the prestige and usefulness of the office in the maintenance of international peace and security.

The direction of UN observer groups and peace-keeping operations was an important increase in the power of the Secretary-General. It placed him in personal control of large-scale military operations and often with great latitude. The results of these actions were mixed but, in the majority of cases, were favorable to the standing of the Secretary-General and his office.

The effect of personal initiatives taken by the UN's chief officer was in some cases damaging to the office, as was Lie's stand on Korea

and in other instances they were a determining factor in UN action, as in a number of cases under Hammarskjold.

What remains is to determine if the tendency of the Secretary-General to influence UN activity was for the most part a push behind such activity or actually a form of direction or guidance, in effect, leadership for the Organization. The purpose of the following chapter is to elucidate the actions of the Secretary-General in a number of crisis situations to aid in this determination.

CHAPTER III

EXAMPLES OF THE ACTIVITY OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The preceding chapter suggested the more significant ways in which the Secretary-General exerts influence within the United Nations during periods of international crisis. This chapter will more closely examine the activity of the Secretary-General in nine separate instances in an attempt to discern the degree to which he actually played a leadership role. The crises to be discussed were chosen from what appeared to be the most crucial cases during the terms of the three Secretaries-General under consideration. They include crises to which one or more of the permanent members of the Security Council were a party and others in which none was directly involved. The nine cases should demonstrate each of the four basic means by which the Secretary-General exerts influence upon the Organization's activities. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide a full explanation of each of the cases but only an examination of the Secretary-General's role in each crisis situation.

Trygve Lie

As mentioned earlier, the first Secretary-General of the United Nations had a political background, unlike his two predecessors, and this factor was sure to affect the way he approached his position as head of the Secretariat. From the age of 16 he was involved in Norwegian party politics rising to the position of National Executive

Secretary of the Labor Party and later serving as general counsel to the Norwegian Trades Unions Federation. He held various cabinet posts in the late 1930's and was Norway's Foreign Minister during the war and up to the time of his selection to the Secretary-Generalship.

Trygve Lie's approach to the newly-created post in 1946 was, not surprisingly, a cautious one. Neither he nor the member states which had put him into office knew exactly what his function would be. Initially he saw himself as the head officer of a Secretariat designed to serve the other principal organs, much as the League's Secretaries-General had seen their job. But Lie quickly perceived himself to be more than just an administrator.¹ He felt it was his place to use his high office to influence political decision-making as will be described in the Iranian Case of 1946. He continued to develop this political role, often with respect to his view that he was the representative (and protector) of the Organization's interests. This prompted his intervention in the Security Council debate at the time of the invasion of South Korea in 1950. Although he did not have the theoretical mind of Hammarskjold, he did see the UN in a central position, as a uniting and protective force which had the mission of preventing or at least controlling international conflict. Essential to this mission was the minimization of Cold War confrontations.²

It was this politically-oriented defender of the welfare of the Organization that came into office and quickly had to face the Cold War dispute in Iran.

¹Rovine, p. 257.

²Ibid., p. 261.



The Iranian Question. The situation that developed in March of 1946 by the continued presence of Russian troops in Iran, contrary to the terms of an international treaty, was significant to the concern of this paper in several ways. On one hand, it was the first crisis of major proportions to confront the new Organization. Trygve Lie had been elected by the General Assembly only a few months before. The basic guide for the actions and reactions of the member states, of the Security Council, and of the Secretary-General lay in the general terminology of the Charter. Precedents that govern much of the functioning of the principal organs of the UN had not yet been established. Potential for both good and bad with respect to the office of the Secretary-General existed in this fluid situation.

On the other hand, the necessity for some positive yet considered action from the UN was heightened by the fact that the dispute directly involved one of the superpowers. This condition could be crucial to the future of the UN. A debate or decision that went counter to the direct interests of the Soviet Union might bring an early death to the fledgling organization. The history of the League of Nations had taught a hard lesson concerning the non-participation of one of the great powers.

According to the 1942 Tripartite Treaty, Britain and Russia were required to withdraw from Iran the troops which they had stationed there during the war, within six months of the end of the hostilities, that is, by March 2, 1946. The British complied and withdrew but the Soviets remained in the province of Azerbaijan. Russian interests in the area included an independence movement within the province and

the hopes of oil concessions in the future.³

As Trygve Lie describes the events in his autobiography, on March 18 he was approached by the Iranian ambassador for his views concerning the ambassador's intention of taking the matter before the Security Council.⁴ It appears the Iranian representative saw the Secretary-General as an impartial and informed source who might provide him with some guidance in dealing with the Soviet Union in the Council arena. Instead, the Secretary-General advised that the Iranian government first try direct negotiations with the Russians in that he believed "a debate in the Security Council now would probably intensify rather than ease the dispute."⁵ Lie realized that a debate in the Council could prove embarrassing to the Russians. He also must have presumed that the Soviet Union did not see it the mission of the Security Council to be reprimanding one of the superpowers. Lie therefore tried to avert a debate that might seriously weaken the functioning of the Council, only a few months old.

But the Iranian ambassador had his instructions and he made a formal complaint to the Security Council. In a cloud of conflicting statements in regard to the actual status of Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, the Council instructed Secretary-General Lie to ascertain the actual state of affairs. The item was deferred but not dropped from the agenda, as the Russian delegate had requested (he had walked out of earlier meetings in which the question was debated).

³Ibid., p. 214.

⁴Lie, p. 74-75.

⁵Ibid., p. 75.

By April 15 the Iranian position had reversed—the ambassador expressed confidence in Soviet claims that its troops were being evacuated and he withdrew his government's complaint. This action followed negotiations between the disputing parties which brought about an agreement.⁶

In that both parties had settled the matter in private and Iran had withdrawn its complaint, there seemed little reason to retain the issue on the agenda. But the U. S. and other states insisted the item be retained and this brought about an important initiative by the Secretary-General.

Lie felt that further discussion of the dispute would only inflame matters so he, with the help of his legal adviser Abraham Feller, drew up a memorandum (in effect, a legal opinion) which he submitted to the President of the Council.⁷ The memorandum, which the President had read aloud to the Council, cited numerous Charter articles and paragraphs under which issues were debated in the Council. Since none of the articles seemed to apply to the Iranian case, the conclusion was that "it may well be that there is no way in which it [the Council] can remain siezed of the matter."⁸

The Committee of Experts, to which the Memorandum was referred, voted with the same 8-3 ratio of the Security Council against the recommendation and the question remained on the agenda.

⁶Rovine, p. 214.

⁷Lie, p. 80.

⁸Security Council Official Records (hereafter abbreviated SCOR), First Year, 1st Series, 33rd Meeting, April 16, 1946.

Although Lie's opinion was not supported by the majority of the states involved, it was important in several respects. It marked the first intervention by the Secretary-General into the debate of the Council and in so doing necessitated some procedural clarification of the Council's rules concerning the Secretary-General's right to intervene. This clarification was handled in the Committee of Experts, to whose members Lie sent his chief assistants to lobby for a broad interpretation of the pertinent Charter provisions. With strong Russian support, the final text approved by the Committee gave the Secretary-General even broader powers than he requested. He was authorized to intervene at any time in Security Council debates without the invitation of the President, a prerequisite in the General Assembly.⁹

It should be noted that although Secretary-General Lie was not able to prevent a debate of the Iran question and was not able to affect its deletion from the agenda, he did set an important precedent with his intervention and so caused a widening of the powers of his office. The fact that he had not yet had time to gain prestige and experience might help to explain his lack of success in influencing the parties concerned to any major degree.

Palestine. The events which surrounded the partition of Palestine and those that followed it were many and involved. For the sake of brevity, only the events which concern the actions of the Secretary-General will be considered.

⁹Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 149.

The matter itself came to the UN in 1947 when Britain, which had administered the area as a League mandate since 1920, finally gave up in its attempts to govern Palestine, especially in the face of growing Arab pressure, and surrendered its authority to the Organization. The first reaction there was the creation of the UN Commission on Palestine by the General Assembly. After a study had been made, a partition plan was adopted with the full support of the U. S. and the Soviet Union, for their own reasons.

Secretary-General Lie had followed the trouble of the Palestine Mandate and he personally saw partition as the only solution. But more importantly, he supported the plan because it was the decision of the UN. Thus, "as Secretary-General, I took the cue and, when approached by delegations for advice, frankly recommended that they follow the majority plan."¹⁰ He quickly saw that the next big hurdle lay in the implementation of the plan in that it was soon evident that there was little support (from either large or small powers) for any action that enforced the partition plan. A five-nation Palestine Commission was created to oversee the administrative changeover, but nothing more. With threats and occurrences of violence increasing between Jews and Arabs, Lie quietly initiated studies concerning the creation of an armed force under the UN flag to keep the peace. He made inquiries to both small powers and the five great powers about contributing troops to such a force. But he found little support. In an address to the first meeting of the UN Palestine Commission in January 1948, he suggested to the members of the group that the Security Council

¹⁰Lie, p. 162.

would "assume its full measure of responsibility in implementation of the Assembly's resolution."¹¹ Lie later wrote:

I prodded the Security Council so openly, not because I was confident ¹²that it would act, but because I feared that it might not.

Despite the Secretary-General's efforts, including the threat of his resignation, the great powers remained intransigent and no action was taken, with the exception of the appointment of a UN Mediator who was to try to negotiate a peace. Still firm in the belief that he should bring about the implementation of the plan, Lie sent representatives to Washington and London urging action by the Council and he also sent a letter to each of the permanent members with the same purpose in mind.¹³

The Council finally demanded a cease-fire to be implemented by the UN Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte. Arthur Rovine describes the manner in which Lie assisted in this effort once the Council made its decision:

The Secretariat and the Secretary-General were instrumental in assisting Bernadotte's mediation effort. Lie worked efficiently to get UN observers into the field, and ultimately some 750 UN personnel were stationed in the Middle East for purposes of observation, negotiation, truce supervision, and to act as a buffer between Arab and Israeli forces...Lie also provided Bernadotte with United Nations

¹¹Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume I, Trygve Lie (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 109. This volume also contains a portion of a working paper prepared by the Secretariat which concerns the creation of a UN armed force, pp. 110-115.

¹²Lie, p. 164.

¹³See Cordier and Foote, pp. 116-117 for the text of the letter.

Secretariat guards just a few days after they had been requested by the mediator.¹⁴

Lie continued to work closely with Bernadotte in attempting to negotiate a lasting peace in spite of the irreconcilable differences between the two sides. His intense concern for the mediation efforts was evidenced by his quick appointment of Ralph Bunche as Mediator with the tragic assassination of Count Bernadotte. This unauthorized action was later approved by the Security Council.

Throughout the trying months, the Secretary-General's actions drew considerable criticism. He was accused of overstepping his authority in attempting to spur the Council to action, but more often he was labeled as pro-Israeli and anti-Arab. His reply to both types of criticism was that he had acted in the interests of the United Nations. He felt obligated to see that the General Assembly resolution was implemented and not ignored. He saw this as the best means of restoring international peace and security. Although the Secretary-General was meant to be a neutral party, Lie believed that he must act politically when the reputation and future effectiveness of the United Nations are at stake.

As a by-product of his actions and suggestions, Lie provided the groundwork for future UN actions in the Middle East and for easier acceptance of the peacekeeping forces during the term of Dag Hammarskjold. As one observer has noted, "the Palestine issue...constituted a major opportunity for the political development of the Secretary-General's office, and one grasped quickly and skillfully by Trygve Lie."¹⁵

¹⁴Rovine, p. 221.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 224.

The Korean Crisis. The efforts of the Secretary-General and their impact upon the actions of the UN in connection with the outbreak of the Korean War differ markedly from those of the crises described above. In both of those cases Trygve Lie attempted to provide the new Organization with leadership or a source of direction but was, for the most part, unsuccessful. In one instance (Iran), he was unable to overcome early Cold War prejudices and in the second (Palestine), he was unable to exert sufficient influence to bring about the creation of a United Nations force that was perhaps too new or radical for the Council to accept in its second or third year of existence. In the case of Korea, however, Lie's actions had considerable impact and, in effect, determined how the UN would react to a given situation much of the time.

The task of unifying the Korean peninsula into a single state with a freely-elected democratic government was officially handed over to the UN in 1947. A Temporary Commission was set up to supervise elections throughout Korea, but it soon became evident that the Communist government of the North would resist all efforts of the UN Commission. The group was able to supervise elections only in the South in May 1948. The General Assembly then established the UN Commission on Korea (UNCOK) which was designed to observe progress toward unification and to further observe the changing military situation. This Commission was evidence of the UN's concern for the problem of a divided country and for the welfare of South Korea which had been established as a free and lawful state under UN auspices. This involvement of the Organization in Korean affairs helped to explain Trygve Lie's reaction to the events of June 1950.

The Secretary-General was notified during the night of June 24 by an official of the U. S. State Department of what appeared to be a full-scale invasion of the South by North Korean forces. Lie took action quickly—he made preparations for the convening of an emergency session of the Security Council (under Article 99) and sent a cable to the UNCOK headquarters in Seoul for an immediate report from its observers along the 35th Parallel. When the report arrived the next day (prior to the Security Council meeting), it confirmed the North Korean invasion and suggested the Secretary-General take the issue to the Council meeting. Lie described his response in these words:

I resolved to take up the Commission's suggestion, not only because the United Nations organ most immediately involved so advised, but because this to me was clear-cut aggression—apparently well calculated, meticulously planned, and with all the elements of surprise which reminded me of the Nazi invasion of Norway—because this was aggression against a "creation" of the United Nations, and because the response of the Security Council would be more certain and more in the spirit of the Organization as a whole were the Secretary-General to take the lead.¹⁶

The Secretary-General was the first to speak at the Council meeting where he read a statement he had prepared with his aides Feller and Cordier. His historic pronouncement was in these terms:

The report received by me from the Commission, as well as reports from other sources in Korea, make it plain that military actions have been undertaken by Northern Korean forces. These actions are a direct violation of the Resolution of the General Assembly...as well as a violation of the Principles of the Charter...The Security Council is, in my opinion, the competent organ to deal with [the present situation]. I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to reestablish peace in that area.¹⁷

¹⁶ Lie, pp. 328-329.

¹⁷ SCOR, 5th Year, 473rd Meeting, June 25, 1950.

The intentions of the Secretary-General were obvious—he was anticipating Soviet objections and suggesting the basis for a Council resolution. He named the North Koreans as the aggressors and demanded that the Council take action against them. These were not the words of a chief administrator but those of an executive providing leadership at a crucial moment when time was all-important. He realized that if the Council was to take action it must do so quickly and decisively. His clearly partisan stand was reminiscent of his "pro-Israeli" stand in the Palestine issue—both were based on a concern for the interests of the UN. He felt it to be his responsibility to see that this case of aggression was brought before the Council and he feared the inaction which had signaled the decline of the League with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria.

A strong resolution was drafted and passed by the Council condemning the North Korean action, its passage made possible by the absence of the Russian delegate who was boycotting Council over the Red Chinese representation issue.

American and South Korean forces were soon embroiled in a bloody conflict that was to continue for years. Trygve Lie's efforts continued, as well. He worked tirelessly to keep the UN in the picture, to make a truly international force a reality. He worked to involve more nations in the UN cause, and to a greater degree, he worked with all parties involved (including the Chinese) to negotiate an end to the war.¹⁸

¹⁸For a full description of his efforts see Lie, pp. 349-366, or Rovine, pp. 236-251.

In the end, it was Lie's strong stand against North Korean aggression in defense of the principles of the Charter that caused him to be driven from the office by the vicious personal attacks of the Soviet Union. Although it ultimately ended his usefulness to the UN, Trygve Lie provided the Organization with leadership in a time of crisis when its future was at stake. For him there was no choice involved.

Dag Hammarskjold

The second Secretary-General of the UN was from a family of public servants, his father serving in a number of high governmental posts while two of his brothers also had public careers. But Dag Hammarskjold was noted more for his intellectual achievements as a young man obtaining advanced degrees in philosophy, law, and economics. Throughout the 1930's and 1940's, he held a variety of offices within the Swedish government, mostly in technical and administrative areas. During the late 1940's he held a number of high positions within the Foreign Office including Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs. In 1952 he was a member of his country's delegation to the United Nations. As mentioned previously, he was most noted for his abilities as an economic administrator and technician.

Hammarskjold's conception of the role of the UN and of his office reflect many of the intellectual experiences of his earlier life. He saw the UN not as a central unifying force, as had his predecessor, but as one of the major political actors. This resulted in his theoretical

concepts of means by which the Organization could contribute to the maintenance of peace. These were "quiet diplomacy," for the behind-the-scenes-discussion of major issues, and "preventative diplomacy," to react quickly to outbreaks of violence and thereby preventing its expansion to include the superpowers.¹⁹ He turned these theories into practice during his years in office.

Although he often justified his actions and those of the Organization legally or constitutionally, he firmly believed the Charter implied an independent and political role for the Secretary-General and took every opportunity to expand the powers of the office. He held that an independent Secretary-General was essential to the smooth running of the Organization which was itself an independent actor in world politics.

Dag Hammarskjold came into office at a time when the political effects of the Korean War had badly damaged the reputation and the utility of both the UN and the Secretary-Generalship. The extreme displeasure of the Communist bloc with the "illegal" actions of the Security Council had brought the Organization to the lowest point of its short history.

Within a few years the UN was to be involved in its most extensive operation to date in the cause of international peace, that is, the United Nations Emergency Force. But before the Organization was able to take this type of role in interstate politics, there was the need to restore prestige and stature to the UN and to the office of its chief

¹⁹Rovine, p. 328.

administrator. An opportunity to take a first step in that direction came to Dag Hammarskjold in the fall of 1954.

The U. S. Fliers Mission. On November 24, it was announced by Radio Peking that eleven U. S. airmen, who had been shot down some twenty months earlier in a B-29 assigned to the United Nations Command, had been tried and sentenced to lengthy prison terms as "spies" who had violated Chinese territorial air space. In addition to these crewmen, the Chinese held four U. S. jet pilots who had been shot down before the end of the Korean War. The outrage of the American public was soon evident in newspaper and magazine editorials and in the U. S. Congress where some members called for a naval blockade of the Chinese mainland.²⁰ Thus President Eisenhower was obliged to take some action quickly but he feared a hasty decision which might lead his country right into another war. The fact that the United States had no diplomatic relations with Communist China and had no desire to enter into any at that time made communications between the two states difficult. Therefore, if a solution was to be sought through negotiations rather than threats of force, a third party would be needed. The decision was to take the matter to the UN in the form of a resolution in the General Assembly sponsored by the sixteen nations who had fought under the UN flag in Korea. The resolution, finally passed December 10 after some heated Assembly debates, had two parts: (1) a condemnation of the trial and sentencing of prisoners detained illegally and (2) a request of the Secretary-General that he attempt to secure the release of the airmen

²⁰Lash, p. 57.

"by the means most appropriate in his judgement."²¹

Hammaraskjold, who privately took issue with the words of the resolution which condemned the Chinese and then hoped for productive negotiations with them, lost little time in responding to the vague request of the Assembly. Within an hour he surprised everyone by sending a cable to Chou En-lai which requested a chance to discuss the matter of the downed airmen with him in Peking at an early date.²² The Chinese Premier's response came within a week in the form of two cables received virtually at the same time. The first stated that Chou would receive the Secretary-General in Peking to discuss pertinent questions and the second condemned the UN's interference in the internal affairs of the Chinese people.²³

Hammaraskjold and a small group of aides arrived in Peking on January 5 and were cordially received by Chinese officials. The Secretary-General and Chou soon established mutual respect and understanding which was vital in their discussions. As one source has described it, Hammaraskjold's object in their talks was

...essentially to make a good case for the release of the prisoners without calling in question the legal rights of the Chinese authorities or putting them on the defensive over their attitude toward the United States.²⁴

²¹General Assembly Official Records (hereafter abbreviated GAOR), Ninth Session, Resolution 906 (IX), December 10, 1954.

²²Richard I. Miller, Dag Hammaraskjold and Crisis Diplomacy (New York: Oceana Publications, 1961), p. 33. For the text of the Secretary-General's letter see UN Document A/2888, December 17, 1954.

²³See UN Document A/2889, December 17, 1954.

²⁴Urquhart, p. 105.

Throughout the visit, the Secretary-General was careful to make the distinction between the Assembly resolution and their talks by not mentioning the former while basing his authority to conduct the latter in the duties given him by the Charter. Thus, he was in Peking not on the orders of the Assembly resolution but on his own authority to aid in the maintenance of international peace and security. This device became known as the "Peking formula."

The Secretary-General returned to New York without any written guarantee of the release of the prisoners but with an understanding that they would be freed. He knew the Chinese would need time so as not to appear to be giving in to American pressure. He publicly urged restraint and as the months passed he kept at both sides—urging patience of the American officials and urging the Chinese to release the prisoners.²⁵

In May the four pilots were released as were the other eleven crewmen early in August. Although Hammarskjold wished not to accept credit for the releases and the ulterior motives of the Chinese surely played an important role, a few facts remain. Hammarskjold's diplomatic talents and astute use of the "Peking formula" permitted constructive talks to take place. His position as Secretary-General gave him international prestige while leaving him a neutral in a very tense situation. In addition, his ability to take some form of action as the representative of the United Nations in a short period of time may well have averted an extremely dangerous showdown between the United States and China. He reacted quickly when states would not or could not.

²⁵Lash, p. 63.

The Suez Crisis. The fragile peace in the Middle East achieved under the 1949 Armistice Agreement had deteriorated slowly in the early 1950's, but the pace quickened markedly in 1956. The growing intensity of raids between Israel and her Arab neighbors brought the threat of a full-scale war to the troubled area. The efforts of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, at first of his own initiative and later under the direction of the Security Council,²⁶ in stressing the necessity of all parties respecting the Armistice Agreement and skirting the larger issues, enabled him to reduce the level of hostilities which in turn brought a relaxation of tensions.²⁷ This was in April, May, and June. Another series of events, which began in July, was to negate what little progress had been made. On April 19 the U. S. Government announced it was withdrawing aid for the construction of the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. A week later the government of Abdul Gamal Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal.

With these actions, tensions again began to rise, numerous truce violations occurred, and once again war seemed imminent. Sides were quickly drawn, with the British and the French urging the establishment of an armed force to deal with the Egyptian move, and most other states either backing Nasser or opposing force in favor of negotiation which was the U. S. stand. A joint British and French letter brought the matter to the Security Council on September 26. Little progress was made there so the shift was made to private meetings of the foreign

²⁶See U. N. Document S/3575, April 4, 1956.

²⁷For a description of Hammarskjold's efforts see Lash, pp. 67-79 or Urquhart, pp. 132-158.

ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt with the Secretary-General through the month of October. Here, too, little agreement could be found between the two sides.

Toward the end of October, the threat of military action by Britain and France increased, possibly with Israeli cooperation. A plan formulated by the three governments was set into motion on October 29 with the Israeli invasion of the Sinai. An Anglo-French ultimatum followed calling on both sides to pull back from the canal. This was a means of providing a pretext for an invasion of the Canal Zone by those two states when Egypt ignored the ultimatum. Efforts by the Security Council to put a halt to the invasion met French and British vetoes at the Council meeting on the 31st. Hammarskjold read a significant statement²⁸ which has been described as "an important turning point in his career; it represented a new type of leadership for him."²⁹ He spelled out his concept of the Secretary-General's role in international crises, noted his willingness to invoke Article 99, if needed, and stated his commitment to resign if the Council saw his duties in other terms.

The matter of the invasion of Egypt was quickly referred to the first Emergency Session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution on November 1. This all took place amid reports of British and French bombing raids on Egyptian targets and the closure of the Canal.

²⁸SCOR, 11th Year, 751st Meeting, October 31, 1956.

²⁹Miller, p. 69.

The first resolution to come out of the Assembly (on November 2) called for a cease-fire and a troop pull-back but the resolution was criticized by Canadian delegate, Lester Pearson, for having no provision to enforce the cease-fire. On November 4, the Assembly passed a second resolution similar to the first but with a call for the Secretary-General to submit "within 48 hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the nations concerned, of an emergency international United Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance with all terms of the aforementioned (November 2) Resolution."³⁰

The events that followed the approval of this resolution are a tribute to the drive and desire of Dag Hammarskjold to see that the UN took definite action to restore peace. Within several hours he had a preliminary report ready. (During this same time he made a statement to the Security Council concerning the Russian invasion of Hungary.) His report called for Canadian General E. L. M. Burns, the UNTSO Chief of Staff, to head a United Nations Command but there was no stipulation about which states would contribute troops except that they not be any of the great powers. The report was approved, creating the first international peace-keeping force.

However, the approval of such a force was not sufficient to halt the Anglo-French invasion—the condition for a halt was the arrival of the force in Egypt.

During this first week Hammarskjold worked virtually without sleep in arranging commitment of troops, in negotiating the right to introduce

³⁰General Assembly Resolution 998 (ES-I), November 4, 1956.

the force with Nasser, and in pressuring the British and French to halt their invasion. He submitted a second report to the Assembly on November 6 which generally described the purpose of the United Nations Emergency Force.³¹ This report was also approved.

By November 15, Hammarskjold had an initial contingent of 95 Norwegian and Danish troops in Egypt as evidence of the de facto existence of UNEF. He continued his efforts, from both New York and Egypt, to negotiate the exact functions of the force as well as in securing the withdrawal of British and French forces. As soon as this was accomplished (by December 27), he began the organization of an unprecedented international salvage team to clear the Canal. The work was done in record time--the job was completed in April, 1957. He also negotiated with the Israelis in attempts to secure a complete withdrawal.³²

One student of the office of the Secretary-General summarized Hammarskjold's efforts in these terms:

Essentially, Hammarskjold had turned the United States away from the impossible concept of collective security... and turned it forcefully toward the notion of a third party neutral intermediary that could serve as a buffer keeping hostile states apart while simultaneously insuring that great power intervention did not create a meaningful threat of world war...Above all, Dag Hammarskjold had opened new vistas in the life of the United Nations and made an enormous contribution to the development of his Office.³³

³¹See U. N. Document A/3302, November 6, 1956.

³²Rovine, p. 293.

³³Ibid., pp. 294-295.

The Congo. Although it cannot be said that all of the members of the UN heartily approved of the way the Secretary-General had handled the operation in the Middle East, it was generally acknowledged that he had done a creditable job which included separating the opposing forces and ushering out (and then keeping out) great power intervention. Such was not to be the case in the Congo. Complex problems, both internal and external, seriously hindered the success of the operation and the result was a near fatal blow to the prestige and influence of the United Nations and to its Secretary-General.

The potential for serious problems in the Congo had not escaped the notice of Dag Hammarskjold who had taken a special interest in Africa and its wave of newly independent states. He saw the continent as an area that could greatly benefit from UN economic and technical assistance. He had seen the Congo in January 1960 as part of a tour of Africa and his uneasiness about conditions there prompted him to send Ralph Bunche in May so that he might closely observe conditions as Independence Day (June 30) drew near.³⁴

With independence, political and social collapse followed close behind. Due to the complexity of how this internal crisis affected the UN and the role played by the Secretary-General within it, the description given here is intended as no more than a very brief summary of the events.

Independence meant the gradual withdrawal of the Belgian nationals who had provided virtually all of the Congo's administrative organization and the officers for its army, as well. Within a week of

³⁴Urquhart, p. 389.

independence, the army staged a mutiny against its Belgian officers, which in turn prompted the insertion of Belgian troops, ostensibly to protect Belgian civilians and restore order. In fact, the troops supported a secessionist movement led by Moise Tshombe in the rich southern province of Katanga.

In consultation with Bunche, Hammarskjold deemed that the Congolese government could benefit from UN-supplied military advisers who would help stabilize the army and thereby restore law and order. But conditions worsened rapidly and, acting upon Hammarskjold's suggestion, Premier Lumumba and President Kasavubu cabled the Secretary-General to make a formal request for military assistance needed to restore order and deal with the influx of Belgian troops. This was on July 13. In a characteristic manner, the Secretary-General took quick action to bring the UN into the picture. Invoking Article 99 of the Charter, he called for an emergency session of the Security Council for the next day and in preparation for it, lined up support for another international peace-keeping force. With American support and Soviet acquiescence, brought about by African-bloc pressure, the Council approved Hammarskjold's recommendations to supply a force that would replace Belgian troops and aid in the restoration of law and order. The resolution as approved authorized the Secretary-General to:

...take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary, until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks.³⁵

³⁵Security Council Resolution S/4387, July 14, 1960.

The force was quickly organized and its basic guidelines laid down. In the mold of UNEF, ONUC, as it was known, would be entirely under UN command, would not interfere in internal affairs, would not become party to any domestic conflict, and its make-up would not include any great power forces.

Within 48 hours of the passage of the Council resolution, the first contingents started to arrive in the Congo. At its peak, ONUC numbered about 20,000 men.³⁶

On July 22 the Council passed a resolution which commended the Secretary-General for his efforts in the creation and deployment of ONUC and it also called for the withdrawal of all Belgian troops. It seemed that the crisis might be resolved in a short period of time. But ahead lay a struggle that would seriously damage the reputation of the UN and bring the Secretary-General under Soviet criticism surpassing in intensity that leveled at Trygve Lie over his Korean War stand.

Joseph Lash claims that this state of affairs probably would not have come about if Patrice Lumumba "had been politically more experienced, and temperamentally less volatile." He also describes him as "a dictatorial, self-intoxicated nationalist politician" who was "impatient, unpredictable," and "swift in change of mood."³⁷ His erratic behavior and changing loyalties made a consistent UN policy virtually impossible.

³⁶Rovine, p. 312.

³⁷Lash, p. 233.

In the months that followed and the political situation in the Congo worsened, Hammarskjold strove to conduct the operations within the guidelines he had initially laid down; that is, the UN forces attempted to restore law and order while not interfering in internal affairs, perhaps an impossible task. All parties insisted upon ONUC's neutrality yet Hammarskjold was at one time or another pressured by Lumumba, Tshombe, Kasavubu, Col. Mbutu, the Soviet Union, the U. S., Belgium, and assorted African states to use the force to further their particular interests. And when he refused to do so, he was criticized by all, to varying degrees, for his handling of the operation.

In ONUC's worst stages, it had lost U. S. support, the essential Afro-Asian consensus, and demands for its complete withdrawal came from Russia, the Lumumba faction, and Belgium. But the Secretary-General remained firm believing such a withdrawal would have been followed by a civil war of unparalleled proportions. In this case, as in many others, his pleas to the Security Council for guidance went unanswered. He was forced to use his own judgement in these situations.

In the end, consensus returned to the Congo operations which permitted ONUC to carry out its mission, and in August of 1961 a central government under Cyrille Adoula was formed from the many factions. Although this did not solve all of ONUC's problems, it did limit its enemies to one--Tshombe and his continuing secessionist movement. It was in the midst of attempts to negotiate with Tshombe that Dag Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash on September 17, 1961.

Without a doubt, the Secretary-General's conduct of ONUC was not without its faults, perhaps the worst of which was his desire that the

force remain purely defensive. The UN forces were thus unable to take controlling actions when it became necessary to do so as in dealing with Tshombe and his white mercenaries. In addition, Hammarskjold waited too late to use members of the Afro-Asian bloc as advisers in the direction and evaluation of the operation. This made him vulnerable to charges of Western bias, which naturally damaged his "neutral" image.³⁸

Although he made his mistakes, it should be noted that Dag Hammarskjold did organize and have authorized a force to deal with a situation he saw as a serious threat to international peace and security. He took action when the members of the Security Council did not and with unceasing efforts directed the operation with minimal guidance from the Council. He and his aides alone continued to work for a negotiated settlement without favoritism while the states concerned worked for their particular interests in the conflict. Hammarskjold must be given credit for providing the United Nations with leadership in the crisis when national interests dominated the actions and non-actions of the member states.

U Thant

U Thant provided the UN with a Secretary-General of origins and background different from his two predecessors. He was Burmese and spent much of his life as an educator and journalist in his home town of Pantanaw. In 1947 he held the first of a series of positions in

³⁸Ibid., pp. 260-261.

the Burmese government, including Press Director and Secretary in the Ministry of Information. During the 1950's he represented his government abroad at many organizations and conferences, including the Bandung Conference in 1955. In 1957, he became Burma's Permanent Representative at the UN and remained at that post until his appointment as Acting Secretary-General in 1961.

Whereas both of his predecessors had been European and generally reflected a Western point of view, Thant was an Asian and a Buddhist with strong neutralist and anti-colonialist sentiments. He was acutely aware of the economic and social problems of the less-developed states and was a spokesman for "Third World" interests.³⁹

Compared to Lie and Hammarskjold, Thant's style was closer to the pragmatic and sometimes blunt methods of the former. Like Lie, he tended to delegate many technical details of administering the Secretariat to his subordinates. He also took political stands on a number of occasions and was not afraid to voice his disapproval of policies of the major powers, such as the American involvement in Vietnam. And like the first Secretary-General he saw the UN as the central institution in the international political process. Thant was sensitive to the dangerous effects of the Cold War and believed the UN should be used in any way possible to eliminate the awesome potential of the superpower rivalry.⁴⁰ His actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated his firm commitment to this belief.

³⁹Rovine, p. 341.

⁴⁰Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 68.

The United Nations, inherited by its third Secretary-General in 1961, was far different from the one Dag Hammarskjold confronted in 1953. Some of the changes had come about as a result of the continuing problem of the Congo—Soviet and French distrust of the Organization's chief executive, and the peace-keeping operations he directed and a general hesitancy in the governments of the great powers to conflicts before the Security Council. They could not be sure of how it would be handled. Some changes had come about more slowly such as the large influx of newly independent Afro-Asian states that caused a shift in power in the General Assembly. Gone or going was the so-called "mechanical majority" enjoyed by the United States since 1946.

To the Secretary-Generalship of this evolving UN came the soft-spoken U Thant of Burma, the Organization's first chief civil servant from the Afro-Asian bloc. He was to bring a new perspective to the office and to the handling of international crises when a different approach was needed to subdue the criticism and mistrust that accompanied Hammarskjold's last months in office.

The Cuban Missile Crisis. A series of events which began in October of 1962 lead to a direct confrontation of the two superpowers and thereby brought about one of the most dangerous situations to face mankind since the creation of the United Nations. In that month, U. S. reconnaissance planes confirmed what had been feared by some high-ranking members of the national intelligence community—the Soviet Union was emplacing intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba, creating a strategic threat to a large portion of the continental U. S.

From the 16th to the 20th of October, a select group of President Kennedy and his closest advisors, later to be referred to as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, debated possible reactions to what was considered an intolerable situation. The alternatives included doing nothing other than informing the Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei Gromyko, of the discovery, a naval blockade of the island, a surprise bomber attack on the missile sites, and an invasion plan.⁴¹ The President publicly announced the Committee's decision to establish the blockade or "quarantine" and, with the approval of the Organization of American States, it was put into effect by the morning of the 24th.

The U. S. representative to the UN, Adlai Stevenson, took the matter before the Security Council on the 23rd with a draft resolution calling for UN supervised dismantling and removal of the missiles prior to the lifting of the quarantine. The plan was, of course, rejected by the Cuban and Soviet delegates and the crisis worsened.

The next day, under pressure from a large number of non-aligned Afro-Asian states to halt the frightening trend of events, Acting Secretary-General Thant took his first action during the crisis by sending identical letters to Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy urging a two or three week suspension of arms shipments and of the quarantine. He also suggested the two parties meet and attempt to negotiate a solution. On that same day, he further requested the cooperation of the Cuban government in that task.⁴² As the group of

⁴¹Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966), pp. 60-63.

⁴²Foreign Policy Association, "The Cuban Crisis: A Documentary Record," Headline Series, No. 157 (January-February 1963), pp. 63-64.

non-aligned states and the Acting Secretary-General realized, no constructive action was possible through the Council or the Assembly when both superpowers opposed it; thus, action by Thant was virtually the only way in which the United Nations could attempt to affect a solution.

In President Kennedy's reply to the Acting Secretary-General's letter the President agreed to participate in preliminary talks but made no mention of Thant's suggestion that the quarantine be lifted. Elie Abel states that "the President was anything but grateful for this intervention...To accept would be to pull the plug on the elaborate machinery of diplomatic and military pressure that he had just set in motion."⁴³

Khrushchev was far more receptive to Thant's letter and declared his agreement with the proposal in his reply of the 25th. Arthur Rovine describes the Chairman's reasoning in this way:

The Soviet Union was already beginning to yield, as word came on October 25 that a dozen Soviet vessels had turned back, and Khrushchev needed the best face-saving device available. At the time, this was the United Nations, in the person of the Secretary-General.⁴⁴

On October 25, in an attempt to prevent an accidental confrontation at sea which might preclude a peaceful settlement of the crisis, Thant sent second letters to both leaders proposing that U. S. vessels do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships and that Soviet ships on their way to the island be instructed to temporarily stay away from the interception area. Both men accepted the suggestions and, as in the case of Thant's first letter, the Soviet

⁴³Abel, p. 150.

⁴⁴Rovine, p. 371.

Chairman was happy to do so, still needing a face-saving device to justify concessions being made directly to President Kennedy.

Although sometimes hardening Soviet position threatened to further endanger the tense situation, the combination of American threats of bombing raids, Soviet realization of the superior American strategic position, and behind-the-scenes negotiations between the two governments brought about a solution, basically in the manner demanded by President Kennedy. Throughout the height of the crisis, a period of about five days, U Thant continued to communicate with the two leaders and to meet privately with their representatives in an effort to ameliorate the dangerous situation.

The Acting Secretary-General's last action during the crisis was a personal trip to Cuba in hopes of convincing Castro of the wisdom of permitting UN supervision of the removal of the missiles, but the Premier could not be persuaded and the monitoring of the removal was done with U. S. reconnaissance planes and naval vessels.

In a number of ways, U Thant's efforts in the Cuban Missile Crisis paralleled those of Trygve Lie during the Berlin blockade of 1948. In neither case could it be said that their actions were instrumental in finding a solution to the direct confrontation of the U. S. and Russia. In the end, the terms of settlement were worked out between the two governments.

However, as Lie did in 1948, Thant provided a communication link between the disputants, was a source of tension-easing proposals, and, perhaps most importantly, was a face-saving device for the Soviets. This last function may have actually permitted the Russians to concede

and has, through the terms of the three Secretaries-General, come to be a vital part of their role as international mediator.

The Problem of Cyprus. The nature of the dispute on the island of Cyprus is not dissimilar to that of the Middle East in its insoluble quality. Since World War II, the Greek and Turkish populations had become more and more alienated from each other until the differences led to open conflict in 1963. Agreements reached between British, Greek and Turkish representatives, and representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in 1959 established a Cypriot constitution which was meant to deal with the problem of the two national groups on the island with the gaining of independence. The constitution made substantial guarantees to the civil rights of the Turkish minority which lived in a ratio of 1:4 with the Greek majority. The provisions of the constitution established the ratio in the House of Representatives, in the civil service and security forces, and in the army. The constitution also made provision for a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president, each of whom had a veto power over certain actions of the House of Representatives.

In 1963, the Greek majority, under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios, proposed amendments to the constitution that would reduce the Turkish guarantees so as to enable the government to function.⁴⁵ The proposals triggered an outbreak of fighting in December of 1963. Through an arrangement made in the 1959 agreement, a joint peace-

⁴⁵James A. Stegenga, The United Nations Force in Cyprus (Ohio State University Press, 1968), p. 30.

keeping force of British, Greek, and Turkish troops was established to bring a temporary end to the fighting and a conference was set up in London to work out a lasting peace.

Secretary-General Thant had stayed abreast of the events surrounding the conflict and, at the request of all parties involved, sent an observer, Lt. Gen. P. S. Gyani of India, to Cyprus. The matter was further taken up by the Security Council in February. During these debates Adlai Stevenson proposed a larger peace-keeping force, under UN auspices, be established to augment the forces already there.⁴⁶ Although the idea was not immediately acceptable to President Makarios, he did approve of a resolution passed on March 4 which established such a force.

According to the words of the resolution "the composition and size of the force shall be established by the Secretary-General," who was also to choose the commander of the force.⁴⁷ It was this paragraph of the resolution that was objected to by the Soviet Union and France as it entrusted the Secretary-General with too much power. However, they abstained in the voting so as not to veto the entire resolution of which they generally approved.

The purpose of the force was to be "in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."⁴⁸

⁴⁶Wainhouse, p. 443.

⁴⁷Security Council Resolution 186, United Nations Document S/5575, March 4, 1964.

⁴⁸Ibid.

In a number of ways, the resolution and the Secretary-General's response to it demonstrated a recognition of mistakes made in past peace-keeping forces. The resolution required the Secretary-General to report back to the Council periodically in order that the Council might maintain a firm control over the operation. The stated purpose implies that the force might need to take action not purely defensive in maintaining order. The resolution also provided for the costs of the force to escape the problem having states refuse to help in financing as the Soviet Union had done in earlier peace-keeping operations. The force was also authorized only for three months after which extensions would have to be obtained from the Council--this was another means of keeping control of the mission in the Council's hands.

Thant quickly began negotiations for contingents of troops and soon found that he had a difficult task. States were slow to volunteer forces which they themselves had to finance and offers of monetary contributions were also slow in coming. But through considerable effort on the part of the Secretary-General a force was established by March 27.

Even before this date, Thant had appointed General Gyani as commander-in-chief of the force which was labeled UNFICYP.

In many cases, the Secretary-General used the precedents of UNEF and ONUC in establishing guidelines for the operation. He negotiated a "status of Force Agreement" with Cyprus in March which delineated the functions and limits of UNFICYP in detail. In addition, Thant published an aide-memoire⁴⁹ on April 11, 1964, which carefully laid

⁴⁹United Nations Document S/5653, April 11, 1964.

out the guiding principles for the force's operations. This included the non-intervention clause used in UNEF and ONUC as well as the self-defense-only principle. The Secretary-General was thus protecting the operation from the types of criticism leveled at its predecessors. He continued to do so in months and years that followed with periodic reports of the activities carried out by the international force.

U Thant continued to remain in firm control of UNFICYP which continues to perform the mission of separating the disputing sides and maintaining a relative peace in the troubled island. At the same time, he worked closely with the UN Mediator assigned to Cyprus in efforts to negotiate a lasting peace, but with little success.

The peace-keeping force in Cyprus reflects the more reserved and cautious attitude taken by the members of the UN toward such operations. They were determined to learn from the mistakes (as they saw them) of the past. But within this limited scope, the Secretary-General showed himself to be firmly in control of the day-to-day functioning of UNFICYP. The relative success of the operation in maintaining peace and order in Cyprus since 1964 would seem to attest to his ability in a very tense situation that defies a permanent solution.

Kashmir. The problem of Kashmir came to the Security Council initially in 1948 with the outbreak of hostilities between India and Pakistan over the disputed area. The conflict was temporarily settled by 1949 when both sides agreed to a cease-fire and the Security Council created the United Nations Military Observation Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to watch over the uneasy peace.

The year 1965 brought renewed military actions and personal initiatives on the part of the Secretary-General that marked the beginning of his considerable involvement in the search for a permanent peace in Kashmir. His first actions were to twice appeal to both sides to abide by the cease-fire agreement of 1949 and he proposed sending Ralph Bunche as Personal Representative, an idea that was poorly received by the disputants.⁵⁰

The matter was taken up by the Security Council in September and much of that organ's actions was based upon information supplied by U Thant. The Council approved a resolution⁵¹ which authorized the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to renewed calls for a cease-fire and to strengthen UNMOGIP. He responded by leaving on a nine-day trip to talk with Pakistan's President Ayub Khan and India's Prime Minister Shastri. He was able to do little to bring the two sides closer together and on his return reported to the Council that a cease-fire was impossible at that time.

On September 17, the Secretary-General spoke to the Security Council making a number of suggestions of ways with which the Council might secure compliance with a cease-fire including the use of sanctions and a meeting between Shastri and Khan. The Council acted upon his proposals and adopted a resolution⁵² demanding a cease-fire and asked Thant to provide the assistance needed to supervise its implementation.

⁵⁰Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 198.

⁵¹UN Document S/6662, September 6, 1965.

⁵²UN Document S/6694, September 20, 1965.

The Secretary-General thereupon more than doubled the size of UNMOGIP and, on his own initiative and financed by his emergency fund, created a 90-member United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) to patrol areas of conflict in which UNMOGIP did not operate. This action drew criticism from the Soviet Union and France, who claimed he was acting without Council authorization.⁵³

When these actions failed to bring an end to the fighting, the Council acted upon another of Thant's suggestions and ordered both governments to send envoys to meet with a representative of the Secretary-General to draw up a plan for troop withdrawals. But this attempt also met with failure. A solution was finally worked out between Shastri and Khan under the auspices of Soviet Premier Alexi Kosygin in Tashkent and a declaration was signed January 10, 1966.

A primary reason for the agreement lay in the fact that both sides were militarily exhausted. But it should be noted that the Secretary-General played a large part in the eventual cessation of hostilities. He took some actions of his own in trying to stop the fighting and more significantly, he stayed well informed of the changing conditions in Kashmir. This fact permitted him to give thorough reports to the Council and to make suggestions that were usually adopted by that body. He was therefore making policy and then carrying it out under the nominal direction of the Council. His efforts were not without criticism nor did they, in themselves, bring about a solution, but they played an essential part in making the final accord possible.

⁵³Gordenker, The UN Secretary-General, p. 199.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Having examined in some detail the actions of the United Nations' first three Secretaries-General during crisis situations, an attempt will be made here to draw some conclusions as to the degree to which the holder of the office has played a leadership role in the functioning of the Organization and how a number of conditions, both external and internal, have affected his ability to play this role. A short evaluation will be made of the performance of each of the three men discussed and a final section will describe general factors which have affected past and will affect future Secretaries-General in this area.

As was noted in a previous chapter, the office of the Secretary-General, created by the UN's founders was obviously designed to be more politically oriented than was the chief administrator of the League. It was decided that he could, of his own initiative and according to his own judgement, bring matters before the Security Council when he deemed them to be a threat to international peace and security. This was meant to correct one of the League's major faults--inaction. To this at least slightly politicized post, the Security Council first appointed a man who had lead a very political career in the Norwegian government and who was definitely not of the same predilections as Sir Eric Drummond, a career civil servant.

In evaluating the performance of the first Secretary-General,

a number of considerations are important. One is that he was the first. This distinction worked both for and against him. The exact nature of his role was unknown, so there were few established limits on his actions, no binding precedents, and therefore many chances to expand the scope of the office. This also meant that he had little guidance or direction in the conduct of a position more political than his League predecessors. It was for him to find the limits of his freedom of action (which incurred the displeasure or wrath of one or more of the great powers) and it was for him to make the mistakes his successors would not.

The political environment in which Trygve Lie took office was already showing the effects of the Cold War. Instead of the relative harmony of the great powers that existed in the League Council and that was envisioned by the founders of the UN, the Security Council was immediately handicapped by ideological divisions that were to shift increasing amounts of responsibility upon the General Assembly, a larger body less able to find a consensus for decisive action and without the power of resolutions binding upon member states.

The divisiveness of the Cold War was quickly felt with the problem of Russian troops in Iran in 1945. It became a battle of wills--Russia versus the U. S. and its allies. Into this ideological dispute stepped the Secretary-General with a legal memorandum, actually a political move designed to lead the members of the Security Council away from making a mistake that could have far-reaching effects for the UN. In so doing, Lie was performing what he saw to be one of his most important personal duties--safe-guarding the interests of the Organization. He

attempted to point the Council in the right direction when the Western states (the majority opinion) were in the wrong and unable to see the matter objectively.

Although his view was rejected by the majority (probably due to his as yet limited influence and in a matter which directly involved both superpowers), the technical machinations that followed greatly expanded the Secretary-General's power to intervene in Council debates.

The partition of Palestine, on the other hand, directly involved neither superpower and actually was supported by both. The Secretary-General, who was well-informed of the conditions in Palestine before and after the plan was adopted, fully backed the decision and when support for the implementation of the plan waned he again acted quickly to protect the interests of the Organization and the cause of peace in the Middle East. He felt the partition would have to be enforced to work and this called for a UN military force to keep the two sides apart. In much the same way Dag Hammarskjold organized for UNEF a few years later, Lie worked hard behind the scenes to secure commitments of troops and support for the force but in this case his efforts were in vain. His failure can be credited to several factors including his lack of personal influence and the boldness and unprecedented nature of an internationally-sponsored military force. States found it easier to ignore the problem and the logical answer supplied by the Secretary-General than to take the rather large first step implied by such an operation. Once again, Lie failed in his attempt to direct the Organization (actually the Council) to a certain course of action.

The Korean War was perhaps the best example of the political

Trygve Lie. Recalling the League's inaction to German, Italian, and Japanese military adventurism, he spoke quickly and bluntly before the Council, naming the aggressor and demanding UN action. Despite the probable adverse reaction from a number of states to his initiative and the damaging effect it might have on his office, Lie did what he believed would ensure a positive response from the Organization. It seems likely that the strong American military action would have come about without any UN support, but the Secretary-General's stand and subsequent initiatives played a major part in securing UN approval of and participation in the war effort. The negative side of his efforts was of course that they provoked such criticism from one of the superpowers and its allies that he was driven from office leaving the prestige of the Secretary-Generalship at a very low point.

The first Secretary-General's ability to provide the UN with leadership during crisis situations was severely hampered by the fact that he took political initiatives but at a time before he and his office had built up sufficient prestige and influence for many of his efforts to be fruitful. His own political background worked against him when many member states favored a more conservative role for the Organization in its early years. In addition, in many of the crises faced by the UN during Trygve Lie's term the direct involvement of both superpowers limited the role played by the head officer of the Secretariat, as in Iran, in the Berlin Blockade, and in the Korean War.

Dag Hammarskjold also faced the Cold War divisions, but his term was considerably more successful with respect to his ability to make

and direct policy for the Organization. One of the main factors in this success was his personal style. Hammarskjold was more the intellectual who provided himself and the UN with theoretical justification for his actions. In addition, he was more technician than politician which tended to make his approach to crucial situations more reserved and less controversial. His diplomatic skills are generally acknowledged to have been the best of the three officers and they enabled him to cope better with the complex field of international diplomacy. Another factor was that in few of the cases dealt with by Hammarskjold were both superpowers directly involved, enhancing his ability to take a larger part in the activities of the Organization. The order in which the crises came before the UN also allowed him greater freedom. The first was the U. S. Flier Incident which involved only one superpower. Hammarskjold acted almost as soon as the authorizing resolution was passed by the Assembly to prevent further deterioration of the situation. His diplomatic activities were testimony to his ingenuity and to his firm belief that the Charter implied considerable independence and authority to the Secretary-General to act on his own initiative in the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, he evolved the "Peking formula" which allowed productive negotiations unhampered by the condemnation of China in the Assembly resolution. His skills, combined with the ulterior motives of the Peking government finally brought freedom for the fliers and considerable prestige to the Secretary-General.

The Suez Crisis marks the point at which Hammarskjold committed himself to a more managerial approach to UN activities. The super-

power concurrence and only indirect involvement in the action facilitated his playing a large role. Even before the authority was given to him to conduct the operation he planned it, organized it, and secured support for it. He was giving reality to his theory of "preventative diplomacy." Once the plan was approved it was mostly a case of his making policies that were quickly approved by the Assembly. He even arranged the composition and financing of the unprecedented and highly successful Canal salvage operation. He laid down the ground rules for this and for future peace-keeping operations such as no great power troops would be included and the operation must be approved by the state or states on whose soil the UN force must operate.

Despite his growing ability to take executive action, Hammarskjold was well aware of the type of situation in which he could function in this manner and those in which he could not. With the Russian invasion of Hungary, in which the direct interests of a superpower ran counter to the principles of the UN, the Secretary-General proceeded carefully and with little hope of any success. The situation was not dissimilar to the Iranian case and he learned from Trygve Lie's experience. Hammarskjold did not try to force action against the Soviet Union, an effort that would probably have failed and at the same time turned Moscow against him.

His successes and growing reputation culminated in the UN operation which he brought before the Council, organized, and directed. His belief in preventative diplomacy, his natural desire for executive responsibility, and the lack of direction from the Council brought him to an increasing amount of personal control of the operation. The

muddled internal conditions in the Congo, the variety of national interests involved, and the hope of preventing a bloody civil war forced the Secretary-General to take action. But any action was sure to run counter to the desires of one or more of the parties concerned. His actions finally brought on a storm of Soviet criticism that would have put him in the same handicapped position as Trygve Lie in 1950 had it not been for his tragic death. His ability to direct the course of the UN's action lessened as the involvement of the superpowers (especially Russia) increased.

Hammarskjold's soft-spoken successor had the personality and style that may have saved the Secretary-Generalship. An outspoken or overtly political Secretary-General might have permanently crippled the office and the Organization itself. U Thant seemed to give the office a certain serenity or composure when it was badly in need of it. His quiet, pragmatic approach managed to put a stop to much of the controversy that had come about in the last few months of Hammarskjold's life.

Thant's approach helped him deal with the Cuban Missile Crisis, a direct confrontation of the superpowers. As had been the case with Lie and the Berlin Blockade, the Acting Secretary-General knew he could play only a limited role and therefore did his best to ease tensions, to provide a communication link between Moscow and Washington, and to provide mutually acceptable suggestions.

The operations in Cyprus and Kashmir, however, demonstrated the evolving and expanding role of the Secretary-General at a time when any action he took was suspect to the Soviet Union and France. Both

operations were similar in some ways to UNEF and ONUC. Neither super-power was directly involved and Thant was selected to organize the operations. UNFICYP was on a smaller scale than the previous peace-keeping operations, was financed outside of the UN, and was carefully scrutinized by the Soviet Union. Even so, the Secretary-General managed to play a substantial role in the direction of the force and in the attempts to negotiate a permanent solution.

About a year after UNFICYP was approved, the Security Council gave Thant authority to create a military force for Kashmir. His efficient handling of the Cyprus operation, his involvement in the Missile Crisis, and his creditable performance in other cases, gave the Secretary-General greater influence among the member states and therefore greater freedom in the Kashmir case. His suggestions all but determined UN policy and the Council's vague resolutions gave him the freedom to create UNIPOM on his own initiative. This action drew only token Soviet criticism and no real limitations were placed upon him. The greater degree of leadership shown by Thant during the Kashmir problem as opposed to the operation on Cyprus showed a growing confidence in his judgement and capabilities on the part of the members of the Council and perhaps a greater willingness on the part of the Secretary-General to direct UN activities during crucial periods.

During his years in office, U Thant played less of a leadership role than did his predecessor for a number of reasons. In his first few years as Secretary-General, he suffered under the handicap of diminished prestige, influence, and support that resulted from the controversy of Hammarskjold's conduct of the Congo operation. Although

Thant felt strongly that the office of the Secretary-General was a valuable tool in the maintenance of international peace and security, compared to Hammarskjold's theory of the independent authority of the office, his views were more conservative. In the later years of his administration, an ever-enlarging Afro-Asian bloc in the Assembly caused a change in the attitude of the great powers toward the Organization. They no longer controlled majority votes in the Assembly and had to contend with a sometimes unpredictable group of non-aligned states. Thus the major powers tended to handle more disagreements outside of the UN. A growing spirit of detente between the superpowers meant fewer Cold War disputes to come before the Organization. This is not to say that the Secretary-General was functioning in a period of international peace and harmony, but only that there were fewer major disputes.

The foregoing does seem to bear out the thesis proposed in the opening pages of the study. The contention that the Secretary-General has been no more than a slightly politicized chief administrator appears to have no logical justification. The Secretary-General has, in fact, provided the Organization with decisive leadership in a number of international crises. The evidence has certainly shown that he has not done so in every case and that his ability to direct UN activities has varied widely under different circumstances. But Hammarskjold's conduct of UNEF and the early phases of the UN operation in Congo as well as U Thant's efforts with the crisis in Kashmir clearly demonstrate the degree to which the Secretary-General can decide upon and direct UN policy.

A few generalizations can be made here as to the conditions under which he has maximized his capabilities in this area. It appears that the Secretary-General's power or influence increases with his time in office. He has the chance to become known and therefore to be consulted and his advice taken seriously by government representatives. Confidence in his judgement and in his abilities tends to cumulate over time.

For his influence to be felt and for his initiatives to succeed he must be supported in his efforts by a majority of the medium and small states that make up the General Assembly. Especially in the last decade, these states have had a greater effect upon the actions and attitudes of the great powers.

In that a major part of his leadership roles has depended upon his ability to persuade governments to see his point of view, states must be receptive to his ideas and proposals. This ties in with the opinion held by member states of his abilities, impartiality, knowledge of the problem at hand, etc.

As described above, the Secretary-General's personality has had considerable effect upon his ability to lead. His political or non-political background, his willingness to serve the states, his intelligence, his perception of his role and that of the UN, and his diplomatic skill are just some of the factors which determine how he, as an individual, will react to a given situation. A detailed analysis of how the many facets of the human personality affect leadership is far beyond the scope of this paper but suffice it to say that there has been a considerable relation between the two.

But perhaps the single most important variable in the leadership equation has been the degree of involvement of the superpowers. History has shown that the Secretary-General had the least influence in cases in which both superpowers were directly involved, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis or the Berlin Blockade. In these cases, the disputes were elevated beyond the influence or control of the UN and they were decided by the powers themselves. Here the UN and its Secretary-General could only hope to be of some small assistance in finding a solution.

Few cases have directly concerned only one of the superpowers, such as the U. S. Fliers Incident and in these instances, the Secretary-General has played a role if the interests of the UN, for which he worked, were in line with the interests of the superpower. In direct opposition, his part would be a small one.

The Secretary-General has maximized his leadership role when neither superpower was directly party to the dispute. This circumstance has permitted the creation of observer groups and peace-keeping operations which, of necessity, entail a large executive role for him. Any divisions within the Council and the Assembly, whichever was the authorizing body, have facilitated, and in some cases forced, an expanding role for the Secretary-General.

It is indeed hazardous to attempt to predict future events, but it seems safe to say that man will continue to fight with his fellow man. And even if the major powers were to learn not to fight amongst themselves, small states will not. When small states (or factions within them) turn to the use of violence, the UN has the task of

halting such breaches of the peace or at least of controlling the level and type of violence. Stopping the small war has the rather large by-product of preventing a larger one. In that these conflicts will continue, there will always be a need for quick, decisive leadership on the part of the Secretary-General if the United Nations is to accomplish that task.

A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abel, Elie. The Missile Crisis. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1966.
- Bailey, Sydney D. The Secretariat of the United Nations. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962.
- Barros, James. Betrayal From Within. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
- Burns, Arthur Lee and Heathcote, Nina. Peace-Keeping by United Nations Forces. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.
- Calderwood, Howard B. The Higher Direction of the League Secretariat. Dallas: Southern Methodist University, 1937.
- Cordier, Andrew W. and Foote, Wilder, eds. Public Papers of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations Vol. I Trygve Lie. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
- Drummond, Sir Eric. "The Secretariat of the League of Nations," IX Public Administration (1931), pp. 228-235.
- Foote, Wilder, ed. Dag Hammarskjold--Servant of Peace: A Selection of his Speeches and Statements. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- Foreign Policy Association. "The Cuban Missile Crisis," Headline Series (January-February 1963), pp. 63-83.
- Fosdick, Raymond B. The League and the United Nations After Fifty Years. Newton, Connecticut: Raymond B. Fosdick, 1972.
- Goodrich, Leland M. "The Political Role of the Secretary-General," XVI International Organization (1962), pp. 720-735.
- Goodrich, Leland M. and Hambro, Evard. Charter of the United Nations. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1946.
- Gordenker, Leon. "The Secretary-General" in Barros, James, ed. The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future. New York: Free Press, 1972, pp. 104-142.
- Gordenker, Leon. The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.

- Hammarskjold, Dag. The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Harbottle, Michael. The Blue Berets. Harrisburg, Peninsula; Stockpole Books, 1971.
- James, Alan. The Politics of Peace-Keeping. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.
- Langrod, Georges. The International Civil Service. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1963.
- Lash, Joseph P. Dag Hammarskjold: Custodian of the Brushfire Peace. Garden City: Doubleday and Co., 1961.
- Lie, Trygve. In the Cause of Peace. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1954.
- Miller, David Hunter. The Drafting of the Covenant. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928.
- Miller, Richard I. Dag Hammarskjold and Crisis Diplomacy. New York: Oceana Publications, 1961.
- Morley, Felix. The Society of Nations. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1932.
- Rovine, Arthur W. The First Fifty Years: The Secretary-General In World Politics 1920-1970. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1970.
- Russell, Ruth B. and Muther, Jeanette E. A History of the United Nations Charter. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1958.
- Schwebel, Stephen M. The Secretary-General of the United Nations—His Political Powers and Practice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952.
- Stegenga, James A. The United Nations Force in Cyprus. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1968.
- Stoessinger, John G. The United Nations and the Superpowers, 2nd rev. New York: Random House, 1970.
- Thant, U. Toward World Peace—Speeches and Public Statements 1957-1963. New York: Thomas Voseloff, 1964.
- UN Yearbook.
- United Nations General Assembly. Official Records.
- United Nations Secretary-General. Report on the Work of the Organization.

United Nations Security Council. Official Records.

Urquhart, Brian. Hammarskjold. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972.

Wainhouse, David W. International Peace Observation. Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins Press, 1966.

Walters, Frank P. A History of the League of Nations. London: Oxford
University Press, 1952.

Zacher, Mark W. "The Secretary-General and the United Nations' Function
of Peaceful Settlement," XX International Organization (1966),
pp. 724-749.

Zimmern, Sir Alfred. The League of Nations and the Rule of Law.
London: MacMillan and Co., 1939.

VITA

Richard Grant Condit

The author was born in Orange, New Jersey on December 17, 1949. He graduated from Springbrook High School in Silver Spring, Maryland, in June 1968 and received a B. A. in Modern Languages from Virginia Military Institute in May 1972.

In September 1972, he entered the College of William and Mary and completed his course requirements for a M. A. in Government in May 1974.