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The vice presidency of Richard M Nixon: One man's quest for national respect, an international reputation, and the presidency

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The Vice Presidency of Richard M. Nixon:
One Man's Quest for National Respect, an International Reputation, and the
Presidency

A Dissertation

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by

Benjamin J. Goldberg

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
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
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
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

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
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Dedication

I dedicate this dissertation to my parents Josh and Betty, my wife Amy and my son Alexander. My parents gave me the skills, knowledge and confidence to approach this project and any others that cross my path. Amy gives me a reason to succeed. Alexander makes almost everything and everyone else, no matter how important, unimportant. You all give clarity to life.

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Abstract

Richard M. Nixon served as Vice President under Dwight Eisenhower from 1953 to 1961. During this time, he worked to portray himself to the public as an international affairs expert and integral advisor within the Administration. Drawing on experiences as a Congressman and his close relationship with John Foster Dulles, Nixon made every effort to gain a meaningful advisory and decision-making role. His actual success was limited. The Vice President was motivated by his love of international affairs, desire for respect and vision of his position as a possible jump off point to the presidency in 1960. This last goal proved his most enduring accomplishment. Nixon improved public awareness of the vice presidency and added political overtones to the office that previously had not been evident.

The Vice Presidency of Richard M. Nixon:

*One Man's Quest for National Respect, an International
Reputation, and the Presidency*

submitted by

Benjamin J. Goldberg

***Introduction:
Nixon - Vice President Unexplored***

Richard M. Nixon is remembered by most people for his presidency: Watergate, Vietnam, Kissinger and his resignation. His eight years as Vice President to Dwight Eisenhower rarely come to mind. The 1950s are less well remembered by people than the sensational events from 1968 to 1974. Pick up a book about Nixon and chances are good it will dramatize Nixon's downfall and ignore the rest of his life.

Our perception of the thirty-seventh President is reinforced by most Nixon historians, who concentrate on his presidential terms also. When they look at the earlier period, they typically emphasize elements that foreshadow Nixon's later problems. Although the vice presidential tenure in office was far less spectacular than Nixon's later incarnation, it nonetheless can stand on its own. In 1953, Nixon certainly was not preparing for the calamitous events of Watergate.

Scholars largely ignore Vice President Nixon because his importance in the Eisenhower Administration has always been in doubt. They ask did Nixon do anything significant as Vice President and did he make an impact on the decisions? Historian Stephen Ambrose concludes "As Vice-President, Nixon had no important influence on policy decisions. Nor could he, nor can any Vice-President."¹ In fact, Nixon's influence in the Administration has never been fully examined. And, more importantly, the amount of

influence Nixon gained is less interesting than the amount that he attempted to exert on policy decisions. Although his actual success was limited, Richard Nixon made every attempt to build a reputation inside and outside the Eisenhower Administration as an integral, knowledgeable and admirable member of the government. His efforts transformed the Vice President from the constitutionally mandated second in command, to the publicly acknowledged presidential successor. Before Nixon, the vice presidency was a political dead end. By 1960, he had turned it into a launching point. Concurrently, he sought to gain an influence on policy decisions. Nixon expanded the vice presidential role as he pursued his particular ambitions.

As Vice President, Richard Nixon worked toward three goals. First, he hoped to pursue his interest in foreign relations. He genuinely enjoyed the field. Second, whenever possible, he exploited his growing international relations experience to increase his influence on Administration decisions and/or give him more sway when he presented his advice. Finally, he demonstrated his foreign policy expertise and reputation to the populace as a qualification for succeeding to the presidency in 1960. These goals were completely intertwined, and thus pursued by Nixon simultaneously. Sometimes one might be better served than the others, but always Nixon pursued them all. The Vice President pressed for roles that would give him a significant place within the Administration, thus presenting his leadership abilities to the widest possible audience.

But, he found the vice presidency did not bring with it a great deal of autonomy. Often unable to follow his own inclinations, two men generally determined his roles, Dwight

D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles. Each had a different agenda for Nixon.

While the Vice President looked to his own interests, these two set Nixon to tasks of their choosing. Eisenhower saw Nixon only as a political advisor and presidential aspirant. He used Nixon primarily as a congressional liaison, frequently putting Nixon in charge of recruiting votes in Congress for support of Administration legislation. But, Ike held Nixon's political aspirations in low regard and therefore did little to help the Vice President in that area. Ironically, while Nixon preferred international exposure, his grassroots campaigning and constant congressional activities had benefits when he finally ran for the presidency.

Dulles' assignments fell somewhere in between those coveted by Nixon and those mandated by Eisenhower. He wanted to help Nixon realize his objectives, but recognized the limits Ike imposed. Like the President, Dulles took advantage of Nixon's congressional skills. Foster Dulles, however, appreciated Nixon's international relations abilities. He allowed the Vice President to advise him on most foreign topics and used Nixon as a surrogate Secretary of State. Nixon delighted in both of these roles.

This dissertation analyzes Nixon's progression from Representative in the House to presidential candidate in 1960. It begins in the late 1940s with his earliest foreign relations experience. Nixon developed an insatiable interest for international affairs as a Congressman appointed to the Herter Committee. The committee existed to assess the economic aid needs of Europe after the Second World War. Out of this episode, Nixon confirmed and formulated much of the international relations perspective on which he later based his expertise. The Herter Committee acted as a catalyst for Nixon, propelling him toward foreign relations,

which in turn led to his presidential bid. He enjoyed this assignment and also discovered foreign affairs enhanced his resumé.

Nixon's experiences in Congress brought him into contact with John Foster Dulles, a top Republican foreign affairs consultant. From the beginning of their relationship, Nixon viewed Dulles as a powerful ally. In time, they became friends. The friendship and consultation they shared gave Nixon a critical link to the inner circle of presidential advisors in the Administration. It was thanks in large part to Dulles' appreciation of the Vice President that Nixon had any foreign relations role at all. Dulles acted as a patron to Nixon, helping him gain experience and build his reputation.

The Vice President, however, sought ways to improve his position in the Administration beyond Dulles' help. Nixon needed to display some independence from the Administration, if he were to avoid the fate of most previous vice presidents, unknown and unelectable. He used every opportunity to influence decisions, or at minimum, create the appearance that he did.

Despite his efforts, and those of Dulles, Nixon faced an incredible impediment because of Eisenhower. The President did not see him as a foreign relations expert and failed to consider seriously Nixon's advice. To Ike, the Vice President was a political advisor at most, and usually just an attack dog to be set on the Democrats. While Nixon performed both roles well, he preferred the more glamorous foreign relations work. Eisenhower's resistance to any expanded role for Nixon greatly reduced Nixon's ability to achieve his goals.

Stanley Kutler points out "that after 1946, Richard Nixon was a public man. His

history thereafter is a matter of record, and consists of conscious and unconscious deeds, as well as both calculated and accidental incidents, that together form a complex mosaic of explanation of the man and his actions."² It is therefore appropriate to begin where the public record starts.

ENDNOTES:

1. Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon The Education of a Politician 1913-1962, Volume I, Simon & Schuster Inc.: New York, 1987: 617.
2. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon, W.W. Norton and Company: New York, 1992: 37.

***Chapter 1:
Beginning a Career - The Herter Committee***

In 1946 Richard Nixon's foreign relations experience consisted only of his overseas assignment during World War II. As he prepared to return to his native California that year, Lieutenant Nixon received an offer to run for the House of Representatives on the Republican ticket. He agreed and managed to unseat the five term incumbent of the twelfth district, Jerry Voorhis. In January 1947, Nixon joined the 80th Congress and began his steady rise within the party ranks. His ascent was helped by superb timing. His party gained 56 seats in the House and 13 in the Senate making, for the first time in fifteen years, a Republican controlled Congress. With the newly regained strength came an ability to place Republicans on committees of their choice. Nixon wrangled a pair of coveted committee seats and an opportunity to adopt foreign policy as a career cornerstone.

Representative Nixon asked to be assigned to the Education and Labor Committee and the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). He received both posts thanks to the help of an influential supporter.¹ To his credit, he distinguished himself on both committees through exceptionally hard work. On the first, he helped convince constituents and Congressmen to support the Taft-Hartley bill.² As a member of HUAC, he effectively questioned witnesses who came before the committee, with his most famous prosecution being the Alger Hiss case in 1948. But, during his first year in Congress Nixon had already made a

name for himself.³

From the start, Nixon had connections enough to warrant the attention of Speaker of the House, Joseph Martin. At the end of July, Martin appointed the freshman Congressman to the Foreign Aid Committee, better known as the Herter Committee. The committee borrowed its name from its chairman, Christian Herter. Their task was to ascertain the necessity of the huge economic aid package for Europe, that eventually became known as the Marshall Plan. The Committee would sail to Europe and make a first hand assessment of the situation. Members were divided into subcommittees, each responsible for an in-depth investigation of a specific region.

Nixon attributed his inclusion on the roster to Martin's search for a geographically balanced membership. Thanking fellow freshman Congressman Charles Kersten for a congratulatory wire, Nixon wrote "I think one of the reasons I might have been picked was that I happen to be the only Westerner who was selected and from the news stories, it appears that they wanted a cross-section of the whole country. In any event, as you of course know I am very pleased at the opportunity to go. . . ." ⁴ While Nixon's assessment had veracity, Martin also chose him because of the Californian's willingness to exert himself for whatever cause he supported. One of those causes was the Marshall Plan.⁵

Once aware of his appointment, Nixon set out to educate himself. He sought as much information as possible on areas he expected to visit. This became a standard operating procedure for Nixon when preparing for foreign trips. His search for every scrap of paper and bit of advice never diminished, although his sources for information expanded when he attained higher office. In this case, because he was assigned to the Italy-Greece-Trieste

subcommittee, he directed research toward those Mediterranean zones.⁶

Before Nixon began his own search for information, he received offers of help in the mail. The first assistance came from John Phillips, another Republican Representative from California (22nd district). Phillips wrote Nixon on Friday, August 1, to recommend Dr. Frank B. Gilgiotti as an expert on Italy. The following Monday, Nixon responded "I know very little about the Italian situation and a little briefing in advance should be most helpful." He planned to consult with Dr. Gilgiotti and added this was especially important because of his sub-committee assignment.⁷ Although he knew the committee would be briefed by government experts, he searched outside the standard sources for any additional information.

Along with official documents provided by Herter, Nixon accepted help from a private group called the America Friends Service Committee. Founded by the Quakers in 1917, the AFSC was committed to humanitarian services. The Herter Committee purported to embrace similar ideals. On August 2 James Reed, the Secretary of the Foreign Service Section of the AFSC, offered a list of the organization's representatives in Europe. Nixon expressed an interest in the list and had a copy of it within a week. Reed mentioned that Christian Herter was the only other committee member with a copy of the list.⁸ Whether Nixon's peers declined the offered names or were not given that option is unclear. In any case, they did not directly receive help from this source. Quite probably, Reed knew of Nixon's Quaker background and selected him as an appropriate recipient of the information. While Herter could have shared his copy with other committee members, Nixon gave no indication he did. The limited circulation of these names probably appealed to Nixon because of his expediency and ego. He saw the contacts as an opportunity to establish an overseas network. Even this

early in his career, Nixon attached importance to increasing his associations. The more people who he knew, the more people who knew him, the greater his name recognition and resources.

Nixon's desire to expand his knowledge of European affairs was revealed as he responded to a letter from a constituent, John J. Garland. To Garland he explained that the Herter Committee needed to maintain an "independent attitude in considering the needs of Europe and our ability to satisfy those needs." The Executive branch held too much foreign relations power. "The Congress has more or less had to go along because we haven't had access to the facts. The Foreign Aid Committee [a.k.a. Herter Committee], in my opinion, has a great responsibility to reverse this trend. . . ."9 Nixon worked hard to learn those facts when in Europe. He did so for the party - his comment about Executive dominance in foreign policy was a not so subtle criticism of the Truman and Roosevelt Administrations - and for his own benefit. There was a bright future to be made in foreign relations if he could establish himself in the field.

These examples are probably the first illustrations of Nixon's continued search for contacts abroad. His preparation was an adaptation of a practice he had utilized on both of his domestic committee assignments. Nixon consistently sought to expand his own knowledge to better deal with every possible situation. To that end, he increased his circle of associates to enlarge the resources from which he could collect information. Nixon's interest in foreign relations blossomed during this trip to Europe. His experiences helped cement his perception of the world and determine the course of his political career.

On August 26, the entire Committee met in New York City for a pre-departure

briefing. Charles "Chip" Bohlen led the presentation. The State Department's foremost expert on Russia, Bohlen had been in foreign affairs for twenty years. Fluent in Russian, he served as Roosevelt's translator at Yalta. Now he discussed the latest developments in Europe. Lewis Brown, a business man who had just returned from Europe, followed with a second briefing. The next day the Committee boarded the *Queen Mary* and sailed from New York Harbor, destination England.¹⁰ Upon reaching Europe, the Congressmen spent nearly a month inspecting and assessing. They traveled sometimes as a group, but more often in their subcommittees. All of the Committee members were affected by the war torn landscape of Europe. Despite the later perception of Nixon as unfeeling, the Congressman from California was no exception.

Nixon spent his life taking prodigious notes. This first non-military trip abroad was no exception. But, unlike any of his subsequent trips, on this early visit to Europe, Nixon also wrote a 37 page personal journal recounting his experiences. It was, he noted a decade later, "not made public and it was not used officially. These are my own recollections -- dictated from notes I had jotted down on the trip at the end of each day."¹¹ This document provides a close and rare portrait of Nixon's mentality and perspectives. Unlike so many of his later reports, Nixon wrote this without the input of aides either in drafting or revising. It was for himself, not for publicity or partisanship. As such, it is particularly revealing about his early lessons in foreign relations.

Nixon's unofficial log documents his trip from England to the continent and then to his subcommittee's assigned region. The paper reveals some basic foreign affairs principles and tactics that Nixon developed during his trip. It also illustrates some character traits that

would later determine his reactions on the international tours he made during Eisenhower's Administration (and his own).

The *Queen Mary* docked in Southampton. From there, the Herter Committee members boarded a train to London. Once in London the group met with various members of the British government.¹² Among them, Nixon seemed most impressed with Stafford Cripps, the top economic advisor for the Labor Government. Although he was generally opposed to the policies of Labor, Nixon mentioned two character traits displayed by Cripps that he admired and attempted to emulate.

First, Nixon commented that during an hour of questioning from Committee members Cripps responded without relying on notes or "his corps of advisors." By the time he was Vice President, Nixon had made speaking without notes - either off the cuff or from memory - a hallmark. Ignoring the advice of advisors came naturally to Nixon. As Nixon's positions in the government increased in power, it became easier for him to pick and choose whose advice he considered. The difference was one of political position. When Nixon was a Congressman he listened to most offered opinions, regardless of where they originated. As Vice President he followed the suggestions of Administration experts and his superiors, and less so those of his subordinates or constituents. Cripps' ability to rely only on his own knowledge appealed to Nixon because it showed his independence and authority. Nixon admitted this admiration for Cripps' style and the example probably affirmed his own preferences.

Even more telling was Nixon's praise for the practical and tough stance Cripps expressed for dealing with England's economic woes. The Englishman informed the

Committee that "'We will meet our export quotas in every case in which we will be able to take it out on the hides of the British people.'" That kind of no-nonsense statement appealed to the freshman Congressman. The Californian was equally impressed by the fact that Cripps repeated the comment to the British media.¹³ Given Nixon's general dislike of the press and his penchant for seeking the "tough" stance, the examples provided by Cripps reinforced similar traits in Nixon and remained integral aspects of the Nixon persona, reappearing in profusion later in his career. They reflected his attraction to decisiveness and unyielding need to lead.

While in England Nixon began another practice that became part of his foreign relations repertoire - a constant effort to talk to the commoners of every nation he toured. He explained in the report that "in order to round out a picture" one had to talk to people besides politicians. It was a tactic that possibly related back to his domestic campaigning style. He met with all comers on the campaign trail and learned the mood of the country through his efforts. His goal was similar in this circumstance. Thus, in England, Nixon talked with dock workers, farmers and shop keepers. As Vice President and President, his efforts to "reach the people" proved popular internationally with both press and public.

In 1947, Communism was already an important theme for the Congressman. His report reflected that fact. He concluded that England would never go Communist because its roots in democracy were so deep. But, in France he saw a greater problem. Complaining about the weakness of the French political structure, Nixon wrote "the Communists control the labor unions and also are the second strongest party in France, and the French government is plagued with the multi-party system which does not place responsibility on any political

party." He concluded that without U.S. aid "France would undoubtedly end up with a totalitarian government - probably of the Communist variety."¹⁴ Nixon's anti-Communism remained ardent to the end of his political career.

Besides aid from the United States, the best hope for France would come from a strong leader with a good plan. France had the former in Charles DeGaulle. DeGaulle's independent nature hindered the formation of a plan. The French leader "too often acts upon impulse rather [sic] upon a predetermined plan which is needed by the country if it is going to recover." DeGaulle "refused to work with other people in developing programs for the country."¹⁵ Nixon's critical comments also contained an ironic element.

Without admitting it, he admired the strong leadership example. At least unconsciously he appreciated impulse, since he acted on his own regularly. He illustrated as much during the latter parts of this trip. And, the longer Nixon stayed in political office the more he reflected DeGaulle's refusal to work with others. He came to rely only on himself and a few trusted advisors.¹⁶ Like Cripps, DeGaulle's personality appealed to Nixon because Nixon sought to manifest those same characteristics. DeGaulle's example bolstered Nixon in his desire to be a man of action and a man who made his own decisions.

While Nixon failed to mention any contact with the public in France, he definitely moved among the German populace. As he did, Nixon revealed that not only did he seek out and talk to members of the public, but he also sought out adventures. Nixon's willingness - even desire - to take risks in foreign relations never decreased. He recognized it as a flaw in DeGaulle, but employed it as a model for himself.

Nixon enjoyed risk taking. He saw it as an integral part of taking action. In the field,

he combined both by creating opportunities for exploration. He made his first unplanned excursion in Germany and followed it with several more in his subcommittee's region.

While other members of the Committee remained in relative isolation from the German people, Nixon and another Congressman obtained a guide and a driver. They proceeded "down into the ruins of Essen." The city was filled with people in overcrowded cellars, living in atrocious conditions. Nixon witnessed tuberculosis in every living quarter. Dresden contained similar squalor. Visiting a hospital amongst the bombed out ruins, he found 200 children "suffering from advanced stages of tuberculosis."¹⁷ This undoubtedly affected him. His brother Harold died after a long battle with TB. According to historian Fawn Brodie, Nixon never recovered from that traumatic loss.¹⁸ If nothing else, Nixon's exploration of Essen and Dresden would have made him sympathetic to Germany's plight. He certainly gained an intimate picture of the horrific conditions there.

Before Nixon had left the country, he gained additional reasons to support German aid. His notes documented his ever deepening belief in German redevelopment. As Vice President, he would find allies for this cause in Secretary of State Dulles and President Eisenhower, but in 1947 Nixon was willing to support German manufacturing alone, if necessary.

His advocacy arose partly because of a special briefing made to the Committee by General Lucius Clay, then Commander of United States Forces in Europe and Military Governor of the U.S. Zone in Germany. Nixon came away from that meeting firmly believing that "if the American taxpayers are going to get the German people and the rest of the people of Europe off their backs, it is essential to increase German production of

peacetime goods." Much of Europe traditionally relied on German manufacturing and without it recovery could not succeed.¹⁹ Clay's briefing reinforced Nixon's support for the Marshall plan. It also helped cement Nixon's unwavering defense of foreign aid. He had concluded that such aid improved America's prestige and influence, while reducing potential Communist advances.

From Germany, Nixon's subcommittee traveled to Italy. In Rome, Nixon and his three subcommittee colleagues used the U.S. embassy as a base camp. From there, the Congressmen took reconnaissance trips through their assigned regions, Italy, Trieste and Greece. Nixon began his discourse with Greece.

In Greece, Nixon's report took on a new level of detail and analysis. His subcommittee's responsibility for the region undoubtedly led him to report in greater depth than England, France or Germany. He concentrated on Communist influence there, relating his first meeting with Communist operatives, in a foreign country. He continued to interview peasants, managed another adventure and talked with Greek government officials. Nixon's commentary on his experiences provides an excellent view of his solidifying foreign policy beliefs and tactics.

As in Germany, the Committee had the benefit of a briefing by the resident expert. Nixon excluded this conversation from his personal report, but the minutes, presented in a memo, retell what happened at that meeting. Nixon's mindset going into the briefing was highlighted by an exchange between himself and staff consultant L. J. Cromie. Cromie asserted that a Communist take over in Greece would cause a "political chain reaction against the United States . . . should the United States fail to live up to its moral commitment to

defend Greek independence and territorial integrity." Nixon asked "whether there would be any difference between our 'moral failure' to protect Greece and our 'moral failure' to protect the countries of eastern Europe now integrated into or dominated by the Soviet Union." To this Cromie replied that leaving aside moral questions different political consequences arose from "being obliged to recognize a fait accompli . . . and the weakness that would be implied by relinquishing something we hold to the adversary."²⁰

The exchange illustrated several things about Cromie and Nixon. First, Cromie revealed he was not a politician. Nixon identified "moral" as the defining word in Cromie's statement, but as the response indicates, Cromie used the term loosely. He wanted to emphasize the serious repercussions to not halting Communism. Nixon's response pointed to his political training. He put Cromie on the defensive, probably not maliciously, but by instinct. His questioning of U.S. moral failure in Eastern Europe reflected his partisanship. The loss of that region could be blamed on the Democrats.

Cromie clarified the stakes for Nixon, when he realized his poor word choice. He dismissed the moral issue as a means of analyzing the Communist threat and instead concentrated on the political cost of additional losses. Nixon's question stands in interesting contrast to his later statements, which have a tone similar to Cromie's answer. And, it is safe to conclude that Cromie's argument convinced Nixon of the dangerous situation in Greece. The conversation showed Nixon shifting from his political side to his developing international mantle. He would learn to integrate the two more smoothly before much longer.

After Cromie's warning, the subcommittee ventured away from Athens "and to the north of the country where the fighting is going on between the Greek government and the

guerrillas." Not satisfied with getting close to the area controlled by guerrilla forces, Nixon and Congressman James Richards flew to Florina, a town on the Yugoslav border, "completely surrounded by guerrillas." In comparison to Essen, this adventure proved far more exciting. Before reaching the ground the danger had begun. Their Greek pilot expected to land his twin engine Douglas airplane on a 2,500 foot runway. Both Nixon and Richards were sure the plane needed 32,000 [sic] feet to stop. With all assurances the Greek successfully brought the plane down.²¹ Once safely on the ground, Nixon and Richards began interviewing local officials, captured guerrillas and town residents. His experiences in Florina would influence his perception of Communists and his reactions to Communism for all future confrontations.

In Florina, Nixon learned that Communist propaganda portrayed the guerrillas as nationalists fighting for a democratic Greece. One captured soldier told Nixon that the guerrillas were being supplied by the "democratic" countries of Albania, Serbia and Bulgaria. His leaders claimed they would be fighting soon side by side with Russians to conquer the United States and Great Britain.²² These deceptive and manipulative tactics fit extremely well into Nixon's own image of Communist operatives. Nixon also heard the story of a woman who claimed Communist guerrillas had "sliced off her left breast when she refused to tell them where her brother was hiding."²³ Whether or not the story was true, Nixon recorded it as fact. This type of barbarism surely disgusted Nixon and increased his hatred and distrust of Communism.

Analyzing his observations, Nixon concluded that Greece could be saved simply by taking action. He advised that "if the United Nations were to step in and assume the

responsibility of policing the Greek border and keeping out help from Communist dominated Albania and Yugoslavia for the guerrillas, that the Greek Army would dispose of the guerrilla situation in Greece within a matter of weeks." His optimism was based on the proposition that by eliminating Communist demagoguery and intervention, Greek inclinations toward democratic ideals would reassert themselves. He continued "It is only the support from the outside which is being received by guerrilla forces that allows them to disrupt the entire recovery program of Greece, which the United States, of course, is financing." He was confident that "this is simply another case when the Communists by force are attempting to impose upon the people of a country the system of government which they are unable to impose upon them legally through ballot."²⁴

Nixon's conclusions applied to every corner of the world. A firm supporter of containment, his Greek adventure reiterated the basic soundness of that policy in an extremely personal way. He saw first hand how Communists operated. Action, definite and direct, would solve the problems. This was a formula Nixon called upon again and again.

Italy and Trieste also were important markers in Nixon's lessons on how to deal with Communists. With the headquarters for the subcommittee in Rome, Nixon was able to spend enough time there to do some in-depth research. He arranged for interviews with many of the top political leaders of Italy, Communist and otherwise. These were Nixon's first recorded debates with leading members of the Communist party, and he made the best of the opportunities.

The Congressman from California interviewed three high ranking Communists party leaders in Italy. Umberto Terricini, according to Nixon, held a position parallel to Joseph

Martin's (Speaker of the House). Terricini wore "the red flag of Moscow in the button hole of his coat and significantly enough, his beautiful office was decorated in red velvet." Nixon missed the irony of referring to the office as beautiful, then hinting its color implied a Communist affiliation. He noted Terricini was suave and smooth, the "brain of the Italian Communist Party." In Terricini, Nixon saw a formidable opponent positively tied to Russia, as evidenced by the pin.

Nixon next described Palmiro Togliatti, head of the CP in Italy. Togliatti exiled himself to Moscow during Mussolini's reign. He used nationalism to win adherents by linking the Communist party to the nineteenth century Italian hero Garibaldi.²⁵ At an adversarial level Nixon probably admired Togliatti's clever methods, and may have taken note of them so as to be able to react to such tactics later. He observed these same tactics repeatedly during his career, including among the Greek Communists who also displayed an aptitude for misrepresentation.

The third Communist whom Nixon interviewed was Giuseppe De Vittorio. This meeting was the most notable of the three, assuming Nixon's more detailed account of the event is an indication of the importance he placed on it. In some ways, it was a precursor to the famous kitchen debate with Nikita Khrushchev. At the meeting Nixon and De Vittorio verbally sparred about the merits of their respective political credos.²⁶ The exchange appealed to Nixon's self-created tough guy image and to his desire to learn more about Communist thought.

Nixon first asked his adversary "what kind of government he favored in relationship to the labor unions in Italy." De Vittorio replied he preferred one that gave the right to strike.

Nixon retorted that this described the United States, but not the Soviet Union. De Vittorio, according to Nixon's account, responding with a doctrinal diatribe. He claimed U.S. workers had to "obtain rights from the Capitalist reactionaries and employers" and thus needed to strike to gain anything, but Soviets were not capitalistic and so had no need to strike. De Vittorio also explained, in response to further questions from Nixon, that U.S. foreign policy was imperialistic because of Capitalism. He reapplied the reasoning about strikes stating that, lacking Capitalists, Russia's foreign policy could not be imperialistic. However, when Nixon countered the arguments, De Vittorio complained that "the gentleman and I are not speaking the same language." While probably the literal truth, figuratively the Italian meant he and Nixon did not see eye to eye. That was the only point on which the two politicians agreed. Nixon gained from this conversation lessons he would never forget.

First, the inflexibility of Communist dogma did not escape Nixon. De Vittorio rejected any position that did not support his own. The only result of such a conversation could be disagreement. The next time Nixon debated a high ranking Communist, he did so in public. At least then the audience might be swayed, since the Communist would not be.

Nixon came away from the experience having no doubts about a Communist's allegiance. Analyzing the discussion Nixon wrote "From this conversation it can be seen that the Italian Communist, despite his protestations of loyalty to his own country in the event of a struggle of that country and Russia would be bound to be on the side of the Communist country, because by definition the foreign policy of the Communist country is always right and the foreign policy of a non-Communist country is always wrong in the eyes of the Communist." Nixon provided further proof by claiming he had had an identical conversation

in Great Britain with a member of the miners' union. This was enough evidence to convince him that Moscow controlled international Communism.²⁷ The inflexibility of their doctrine kept Communist operatives in line.

In Rome Nixon gained important experience in verbally confronting Communists. He expanded his intellectual understanding of Communism. Trieste, the third region assigned to the subcommittee, presented Nixon with a physical understanding. There he encountered, first hand, the violence of their aggression.

Nixon performed a bit of deception in making Trieste the final section of his report. He placed it after the discussion of Greece and Italy, when he actually visited Trieste before Greece and possibly before his Italian encounters.²⁸ But, Nixon's experiences in Trieste were far more dramatic and potentially dangerous than in Italy or even Greece - as he told the story. A politician and showman, he probably saved the best for the last. Even though this report was never made public and there is no evidence the document circulated among more than a few close associates, Nixon wanted to present the events in the most enticing order. In Trieste, Nixon experienced his first taste of Communist inspired mob rioting and his first images of the people who instigated it. If the De Vittorio escapade was a precursor to the kitchen debate, Trieste was the pilot for Lima, Peru and Caracas, Venezuela.

Nixon's party arrived in Trieste on Wednesday, September 17. As he settled into his hotel room, Nixon heard a commotion outside. The Californian claimed that, looking out the window, he saw a parade of 500 people waving red flags and singing the *International*. They gave a clenched fist salute to "Moscow" as they passed the Communist Party Headquarters, adjacent to the subcommittee's hotel.

Nixon, the risk taker, could not resist this opportunity. He reported "Immediately, two of us obtained an Italian interpreter and went down into the street to see what the situation was. Just as we reached the street we heard an explosion at the end of the block." According to Nixon's account, the explosion was a hand grenade tossed from the second story window of the Communist HQ. It landed amongst a group forming to protest the Communist parade. Now a young man of about 20 was dead, his head blown off by the explosion. In the street Nixon saw a pool of blood.

As he made his way toward the town square, residents became more aggressive. "We moved up on the street with the crowd and by this time it was getting out of hand. People were gesticulating wildly shouting at the top of their voices and gathering at the town square." As the rioting and violence continued through the night, 5 people died and 75 were wounded. The Communist instigated demonstration illustrated their inhumanity. This became more evident when Nixon witnessed a large CP member run down a 75 year old woman, while being pursued by the police.²⁹ In such an atmosphere, Nixon gained a new appreciation for the violent methods of Communists and the warlike battle that had to be fought for the survival of Democracy. His dramatic retelling portrayed his courage and impressed its reader with the gravity of the situation.

Nixon's report of the explosive events in Trieste was frightening. He intended it that way. The veracity of his report, however, comes into question after examining his handwritten notes, made just after the incident. His notes made no mention of many of the details he included in his report. The location of the Communist headquarters, paraders carrying red flags and singing the *International*, the clenched fist salute and the physical

description of the head blown off, were not written down at the time.³⁰ It is impossible to know whether he fabricated these details or simply remembered them while rereading his comments. But, because these details add much of the drama to Nixon's story, one cannot help but suspect he embellished events to some extent. His penchant for manipulating facts, apparent later in his career, probably had a place in this story.

However embellished this report was, additional evidence corroborates that Nixon did not fabricate the entire adventure in Trieste. After the committee returned to the United States, the chairman of Nixon's subcommittee, Thomas Jenkins (R-OH), created gag stationery with the heading *Jenkins Raiders*. Nixon was listed on the left margin as a commando. On the right edge, under engagements, Jenkins included "Nixon's Charge, Trieste."³¹ That accolade supported Nixon's claim of running from his hotel into the mob filled street.

From either version of the events - notes or report - Nixon would draw the same conclusions about the Communist menace and the dangers it posed to the free world. He had witnessed distressing violence in Trieste. Not surprisingly, he applied and refined the lessons learned from these experiences again and again.

Nixon's party spent several days in Trieste, then returned to Italy. After his visit to Greece, the group traveled to Paris. From Paris, the subcommittee flew to London and on October 4 all the Herter Committee members boarded the *Queen Mary* and sailed back toward the United States. The entire European journey took over a month.³² In that time Nixon's opinions about Communism were confirmed and his foreign affairs experience expanded. As a bonus, he made the acquaintance of intelligence expert Allen Dulles, a contact that would

prove to be extremely important to his future.

Historian Fawn Brodie admitted Nixon became "something of an internationalist" because of this trip. She claimed that Nixon's primary concern remained containment of the Communists and that he saw the Marshall Plan as the best means to that end.³³ The report supported Brodie's conclusion, since it concentrated on the Communist threat and revealed Russia's influence in Europe. Concurrently and contradictorily, Nixon's report also downplayed the Communist threat. In that respect it showed his true concern for humanitarian issues, especially with Germany. This juxtaposition of Communism and social issues remained a constant with Nixon. Communism was important, but Nixon consistently examined the grassroots side also. His political instincts attracted him to themes that stirred public interest.

During the trip, he remarked on the improbability of England, Germany and Greece going Communist, regardless of how terrible conditions became. Upon his return from Europe, he concluded that Italy was almost out of danger. He found danger in Trieste, but remarked "in free elections [they] have overwhelmingly voted against a Communist form of government." With firmness Trieste would survive. Only in France was the "danger of Communist domination of the country . . . a great one." France also had the best chance of recovery because of its near self-sufficiency.³⁴ That raised the possibility of Communist influence, since a recovery independent of U.S. supervision opened doors to non-democratic infiltration.

Despite Nixon's concerns about Communism in Europe, a careful analysis of the report revealed a de facto acceptance that Western Europe was relatively safe from Red

domination. Also, whatever level of concern he maintained about Europe's freedom, it was not so great as to eclipse his distress about Europe's plight. Nixon did not ignore the hardship and need.

The Congressman made numerous sympathetic remarks about the destruction in Europe, and especially the physical devastation of Germany. He expressed his disgust at the hunger in each country and the lack of material goods. In Essen, he retold how Representative Edward Eugene Cox (R-GA), who "had never previously been noted for being particularly emotional" gave clothing, soap and candy to the children he met by the train. Cox said he could not help himself. Nixon described a woman in Verona whose child suffered from rickets. She had no fuel to heat her house. When Nixon asked what they did in the winter she replied, "'We go to bed.'"³⁵ Nixon did not paint an appealing picture.

At the same time, the Communist issues were not ignored. Nixon did not justify the Marshall Plan only on humanitarian grounds. He saw the tremendous need in Europe as an opportunity which Communist infiltrators sought to exploit. He wrote in an article in the Spring of 1948, "The only chance for the forces of Communism to succeed in their attempt to dominate the still free peoples of Europe and Asia is for the United States to discontinue its aid program. Communism thrives on misery, hunger and desperation, and where a political vacuum exists the Communists are there. . . ." ³⁶ There was an unspoken confidence that Western Europe was safe from Communist rule. There was also the explicit warning that U.S. aid had to continue to maintain that security.

Nixon's post trip correspondence concentrated on Communist threats, rather than the humanitarian needs. The former was a political issue, much harder to predict and control

than the tangible flow of supplies and food to Europe. Communist aggression required constant counter-action. Humanitarian aid did not. This mail represented the final element in Nixon's foreign trip methodology - the follow-up. As with any campaign, after the vote was in, a series of letters went out discussing any outstanding details and rehashing the issues. Probably because he stayed at the US embassy in Rome, his messages were limited to a few foreign service officers stationed in Italy. In subsequent years, his post-trip correspondence significantly increased.

The most informal advice came from a woman identified only as Rosette R. She must have been associated with the foreign service, since she wrote on foreign service stationery. Her comments sound whimsical, as though she were attracted to the young Congressman. She bade him not to think her a revolutionary, because she was just teasing some, "though I still hold the opinion that certain things like the danger of Communism in Italy are very much exaggerated."³⁷ Nixon read the letter, but did not answer her. Or if Nixon replied, a copy did not end up in the files. Despite this, evidence suggests he agreed with her conclusions.

Rosette's second letter lacked the playful tone of the first. She held to the notion that Communist Party influence had waned in Italy. As she saw it, those who had joined the party now discovered that the Communists would not fulfill their promises of reform. Young and moderate members were leaving the CP as they became increasingly disillusioned.³⁸ Nixon seems not to have answered this letter either. In both, however, Rosette provided a moderate's view of the situation in Italy. More analytical, the second memo contained a perspective Nixon could not ignore. Her themes paralleled Nixon's later conclusions. Communist deceptions could not be concealed indefinitely. Rosette believed they were being

discovered in 1947.

The Congressman also maintained a brief correspondence with Foreign Service officer, J. Wesley Jones. Before leaving Rome, Nixon had asked for biographical sketches of the top ten Italian government officials - several of whom Nixon had met. On October 14, Jones satisfied Nixon's request. It is difficult to know whether Nixon had made more or less of an impression on Jones than he had on Rosette R. Jones opened his memo "Dear Nick," which was either a typo or a reference to Nixon's Navy nickname.³⁹

Whichever, five weeks later Nixon asked Jones to confirm his own opinion on Italy. "The recent disturbances in Italy have been very interesting to all of us who were there and, in my opinion, indicate that the Communists realize they are defeated and are simply making a last ditch stand. If your opinion is otherwise I would appreciate your dropping me a note to that effect."⁴⁰ Nixon did not mention Rosette R.'s comments - also made during November - but his message contained the essence of her conclusions. Italian Communism was on the decline.

Why Nixon chose to discuss this with Jones, and not Rosette, can be surmised. First, the gender discrimination of the time made it probable that Jones held a higher position in the embassy than Rosette. Nixon's practice was to consult with the upper echelon whenever possible.

Also, his reply to Jones alone implied he did not fully trust Rosette's analysis. Brodie claimed that Nixon was hostile to women who spoke out, were adept at politics or who went beyond their accepted station, as he defined it. "The women Nixon openly resented were those gifted at attack."⁴¹ He could easily interpret Rosette's comments as an attack. She

offered an opinion with which he must have disagreed, at some point. Why else would she begin by defending herself as not a revolutionary? Added to that was the apparent flirtatious nature of the first note. One can assume that for Nixon, Rosette's opinions did not carry the same weight as those of Jones.

While Nixon failed to respond to Rosette's comments, he nonetheless adopted her conclusions. Communism could not represent a tremendous threat, if the Italian CP was disintegrating. In December, Nixon received a final confirmation of Italy's safety from Henry Tasca, a senior Foreign Service officer. Tasca commended the speed with which Congress had approved interim aid and jubilantly reported "the Italian picture shows considerable signs of vitality and ability to resist Communist violence. . . ." Tasca attributed his optimism also to the Truman Doctrine which was "making Moscow think twice before ordering its Italian wing to go into action."⁴² For partisan reasons, Nixon may not have agreed with Tasca's praise of the doctrine, but Tasca did end at the same point as Nixon - democracy would prevail over Communism. Tasca also confirmed the Congressman's conclusion that humanitarian relief could counteract Communist propaganda.

Nixon's communication with Foreign Service officials recalls his unending search to increase his knowledge. He studied prior to the trip and continued to educate himself following it. By the time of his vice-presidency, international relations education like this had become an ongoing occupation. In 1947, it exposed him to a subject he found intriguing and exciting.

Nixon's report carries with it an aura of relative inexperience, naiveté and youth. It is unlike any official paper he wrote after this trip, being both less formal and less dogmatic.

Through his comments, Nixon unintentionally revealed some of his infamous character traits. He appreciated action, risks and toughness. He also hinted at an already developed distrust of the media. More importantly, the nature of this document allows a rare glimpse at the dawning of Nixon's foreign relations interest and the formation of his tactics.

Visiting Europe as a member of the Herter Committee he quickly established a regimen he followed on all subsequent trips abroad. In many ways, this formula mimicked his campaigning tactics. He met with countless people, including government officials and commoners. He debated his opponents by confronting Communist sympathizers. He took bold actions, going on adventures where ever he could.

The trip also gave Nixon first hand experience with Communism. From his exploits in Greece, Italy and Trieste, Nixon developed his conclusions about Communist infiltration, methods and operatives. He integrated those components into his foreign policy philosophy. The Communist threat attracted him to international relations.

Nixon's next extended exposure to foreign relations would not come until he joined the Eisenhower Administration. In the meantime, he returned to his congressional duties. But, he did not leave the foreign arena all together. Instead, he built his reputation among international affairs experts in the Republican party.

ENDNOTES:

- 1. Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon. The Education of a Politician 1913-1962. Volume 1. Simon & Schuster Inc.: New York, 1987: 142-143. Nixon had a patron in the form of Herman Perry. Perry asked the soon to be House Speaker Joseph Martin to "take an interest in him [Nixon]."**
- 2. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 152**
- 3. Ibid.: 149**
- 4. Letter from Richard Nixon to Charles Kersten, 1 August 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1 -14: PPS206.10.**
- 5. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 154.**
- 6. Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131. Members of the subcommittee also included Thomas A. Jenkins (OH), James P. Richards (SC) and George H. Mahon, (TX), consultant Franklin A. Lindsey. These Congressmen each had over a decade of service in the House. PPS206.47.3 Trip File Correspondence 1947, August 15-31.**
- 7. Letter John Phillips to Richard M. Nixon, 1 August 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1 -14: PPS206.11. Letter Richard M. Nixon to John Phillips, 4 August, 1947: PPS206.14.**
- 8. Letter James Reed to Richard M. Nixon, 2 August 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1 -14: PPS206.12; Letter James Reed to Richard M. Nixon, 9 August, 1947: PSS206.32.1; Letter Christian Herter to Richard M. Nixon, 6 August 1947: PPS206.21; Letter W.J. Mougey to Richard M. Nixon, 22 August, 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 15-31: PPS206.56. Also the chairman of General Motors sent Nixon the name of a man who had just completed a trip to Europe and a report the man had written about his experiences.**
- 9. Letter Richard M. Nixon to John J. Garland, 21 August, 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 15-31: PPS206.53. Nixon's perspective reversed when he became Vice President. Ironically, as President, he inadvertently achieved this goal when Congress asserted its control over foreign policy.**
- 10. Letter Christian Herter to Richard M. Nixon 6 August 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library**

and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1-14: PPS206.21; Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131

11. Memo Richard M. Nixon to Rosemary Woods, 12 March 1958, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder: "typed report of the observations by country": PPS206.164.

12. England: 1, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.156.

13. Ibid: 4.

14. Ibid: 5; France: 1-3, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.157.

15. Ibid: 2.

16. Nixon would experience this type of leadership again when he was excluded from Eisenhower's inner circle of admirers. He adopted it as President also.

17. Germany: 4-5, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.158.

18. Fawn Brodie, Richard Nixon The Shaping of his Character, New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1981: 106. Brodie's argument rests on Nixon's personality being a reflection of his childhood experiences. Harold as the older brother was in ways revered by Nixon. His emotional distress over the loss of Harold and the mental scars that resulted are an important aspect of Brodie's explanation of why Nixon reacts as he does.

19. Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Volume X, "Columbia University, " Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD, 1984: 69. Clay was also a close friend of Eisenhower's; Germany: 2, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.158.

20. Memorandum of conversation between members of Subcommittee on Italy & Greece and staff consultant and Embassy staff, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, October: PPS206.88.2 .

- 21. Greece: 1, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.159; Report on Visit to Florina, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, October: PPS206.88.3. One wonders if Richards was also the Congressman who toured Essen, Dresden and Trieste with Nixon.**
- 22. Greece: 2-3, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.159; Report on Visit to Florina, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, October: PPS206.88.3. In his report, Nixon changes the countries mentioned by the informant to Yugoslavia, Albania, Poland and Russia. His embellishment is designed to increase the angst about Soviet influence in Greece. To some extent, he probably equated all the countries with the Communist monolith he believed to be controlled by Moscow.**
- 23. Ibid.**
- 24. Greece: 3-4, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.159; Letter Richard Nixon to Frank Lindsey 16 December, 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PPS206.110. By December, Nixon had expanded his time table to months instead of weeks. With perspective, he may have realized how overly optimistic he had been.**
- 25. Italy: 3, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.160. Nixon apparently had debated Communist party members in England, but made no note of it until after returning to the United States.**
- 26. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 156.**
- 27. Italy: 5-6, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.160.**
- 28. Letter Christian Herter to Richard M. Nixon, 6 August 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1 -14: PPS206.21; Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131.**
- 29. Trieste: 1-2, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.161.**

- 30. Notes, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947, Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "Hand Written Notes Summaries of Observations by location.": PPS205.152**
- 31. Memo Thomas A. Jenkins to Richard M. Nixon, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PSS206.103.1.**
- 32. Letter Christian Herter to Richard M. Nixon, 6 August 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA.. Trip File 1947 Correspondence, August 1 -14: PPS206.21; Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131.**
- 33. Brodie: 190.**
- 34. England: 5, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.156; Germany: 5: PPS206.158 ; Greece: 2: PPS206.159; Letter Richard M. Nixon to J. Wesley Jones, 21 November, 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PPS206.94; Trieste: 3: PPS206.161; France: 2: PPS206.157.**
- 35. England: 1, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Nixon, Richard Milhous 1913- Folder "typed report of the observations by country.": PPS206.156; Germany: 3-4, 6-7: PPS206.158; Italy: 8: PPS206.160.**
- 36. Richard Nixon article in the New Dominion (Vol. 2, # 9 May, 1948). Titled "What I Think of the Marshall Plan": Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA, Trip File 1948 Correspondence 1948, March - May: PPS206.128 .**
- 37. Letter from Rossette R. to Richard M. Nixon, 1 October 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, October: PPS206.77. The letter is intriguing also for the personal glimpse we get of Nixon. We can imagine him in the eyes of Rossette - a 35 year old Congressman. Well dressed, intelligent, interested and interesting. This is not an image of Nixon often seen.**
- 38. Letter from Rossette R. to Richard M. Nixon, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PPS206.95. Rossette's second note might have been less playful because of a rebuff from Richard Nixon. If he had responded, he probably would have written a formal, cold note - most of his notes are just that, even to family.**
- 39. Letter from J. Wesley Jones to Richard M. Nixon, 14 October, 1947, Richard M. Nixon**

Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, October: PPS206.80.1; Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, October: PPS206.80.2-11; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 112. Nixon was shortened to Nick by poker playing buddies.

40. Letter Richard M. Nixon to J. Wesley Jones, 21 November, 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PPS206.94

41. Brodie: 236, 238.

42. Letter from "Henry" [probably Henry Tasca] at US Embassy Rome to Richard M. Nixon, 29 December, 1947, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947 Correspondence 1947, November: PPS206.114 . Tasca's praise of Truman probably did not impress Nixon. It may have helped create Nixon's distrust of State and Foreign Service Democrats.

***Chapter 2:
An Uncommon Bond - Nixon Dulles Relations***

Nixon's initial attraction to foreign relations was personal. He enjoyed travel, he appreciated the challenges and he adored the attention. But, the Congressman soon began to consider international relations in professional terms, as well. He developed contacts on the Herter Committee which he maintained and expanded to eventually include Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. Nixon and Dulles would become close friends after 1953, but their initial contact predated the Eisenhower presidency. The two had met and consulted in 1948. In fact, Foster Dulles probably recognized who the Representative from California was even before their first meeting. Dulles' younger brother Allen had been a consultant to the Herter Committee, the previous year. He and Nixon became friendly during the trip. Since the Dulles brothers frequently talked, it would be reasonable to assume that Allen mentioned the young Congressman to Foster.

During the Second World War, Allen pursued a successful career in the Office of Strategic Services. After the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency, however, he resigned. Dulles family biographer Leonard Mosley claimed that Allen left because the Democratic administration would not allow him to retain a position in the CIA that reflected his accomplishments and experience. Despite his exclusion from the CIA, Allen maintained contacts in the intelligence community by taking advantage of any opportunities he had for

European travel. According to Mosley, Allen used his status as Herter Committee advisor to join the Congressmen on the *Queen Mary*. Once on the continent, he could refresh his European associations. Allen's presence was especially suspicious because the trip itinerary listed him as a "home consultant," implying he might brief the Congressmen before they embarked, but probably would not travel with them.¹

Mosley noted that Allen and Nixon became close friends during the trip.² Nixon made no mention of his new familiarity with Allen in his report or notes, but then Allen probably did not accompany Nixon, while in Europe. He did not specialize in Nixon's subcommittee region. More likely, Nixon and Allen struck up an easy repartee during the cruises to and from Great Britain. The *Queen Mary* took about seven days to cross the Atlantic Ocean.³ That provided them with two weeks to become well acquainted. Their friendship continued after the trip. And, in time, it expanded to include Foster Dulles.

Taking advantage of his acquaintance with Allen, Nixon initiated a relationship with Foster. The two corresponded intermittently after the Herter trip. Nixon immediately recognized the utility of connecting his name and Dulles'. Dulles held an influential position among Republicans and stood as heir apparent to head the State Department. On June 2, 1948 Dulles wrote the Representative about supporting legislation Nixon was associated with - probably the Nixon-Mundt bill. "I was a little bit embarrassed by the press handling of my letter to you, particularly in Oregon, where headlines apparently gave the impression that I had unqualifiedly endorsed the Bill in every particular."⁴ Chances are Nixon planted the notion that Dulles whole heartedly supported his bill by referring to the letter. Dulles' note mentioned at least one previous letter to Nixon and implied a response from Nixon. Dulles

and Nixon were not total strangers when they met for their first documented face to face conversation on August 11, 1948.

This initial consultation concerned the Hiss Case. As a member of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC), Nixon listened to the testimony of Whittaker Chambers, a self-acknowledged former Communist party member. Chambers accused the respected foreign relations expert Alger Hiss of pre-World War II espionage against America. After hearing secret testimony given by Chambers, Nixon wanted to pursue the case in earnest. But, before he followed this instinct, he asked for a meeting with John Foster Dulles. Dulles chaired the Carnegie Endowment, a foreign policy think tank that employed Alger Hiss. Nixon sought Dulles' blessing, particularly because Hiss had asked Dulles for a letter of support in regard to the HUAC case.⁵ Nixon did not want to upset or embarrass Dulles.

On that second Wednesday of August, Nixon met Foster Dulles in Manhattan's Roosevelt Hotel. The meeting included several of their mutual acquaintances. When Nixon arrived, he found along with Foster, brother Allen, Christian Herter and New York Banker, Douglas Dillon (appointed Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration).⁶ Whether Nixon knew Dillon cannot be determined, but he did know Allen, Herter and Foster. These four men formulated much of the Republican international relations platform.

Nixon made a good impression on Foster by carefully and methodically presenting his evidence against Hiss. Dulles valued a well defended argument. A few years later an Assistant Secretary of State noted "if he [Dulles] determined that you could hold your own, then he would permit you to say anything you wanted to, without any real dressing down or

embarrassment."⁷ Nixon held his own. By the end of the meeting he had the group's support for an in-depth investigation of Hiss' Communist connections. The Hiss trial introduced Dulles to Nixon's style and gave Nixon a prominence he previously had not had. Nixon's career benefited from both factors.

In Six Crises Nixon claimed that the Hiss case, as his first major political crisis, taught him an important lesson. "I would never forget that where the battle against Communism is concerned, victories are never final so long as the Communists are still able to fight. There is never a time when it is safe to relax or let down. When you have won a battle is the time when you should step up your effort to win another - until final victory is achieved."⁸ Nixon would press his advantage.

Of course, Nixon had actually adopted this perspective as a Herter Committee member. The Hiss case simply reiterated and reinforced his conclusions. The debate with De Vittorio, and conversations with Greek guerrillas, had illustrated the necessity for constant vigilance. The dangers in France and Trieste revealed the importance of a strong defense and an active offense. The Hiss case, while important in bringing Nixon to greater prominence in the political scene, did little to further his foreign relations career. In that respect, the more important effect of the case was his personal introduction to the future Secretary of State.

From this first meeting, Nixon recognized Dulles' expertise and ability. Dulles presented the younger man with an opportunity for further education and access to powerful people. Nixon pursued these avenues, while maintaining deference and loyalty to the man who accepted the role of patron.

Building on the positive impression he had made, Nixon made it a point to keep Dulles

informed on the HUAC proceedings against Hiss. On September 7, he sent Dulles two letters pertaining to the case, one general and the other specific. First, Nixon had to maintain Dulles' confidence. In the general letter he answered Democratic charges that the espionage hearings were a "red herring." He stated Elizabeth Bentley was a viable witness, despite questions about the veracity of her testimony and claimed Truman should "forget politics and . . . cooperate with the Congress in getting the Communists out of the government." The second letter appealed to Dulles' predilection for the law. It could have been the closing argument against Hiss. Nixon explained the latest testimony in the case and asked Dulles to reconsider Hiss' position on the Carnegie Endowment.⁹ His effort to keep Dulles informed about the trial recognized Dulles' position as a top ranking Republican. From these contacts a foundation on which the two Republicans built stronger ties was created.

Even after the Republican candidate for president, Thomas Dewey, lost the 1948 presidential election - ending Dulles' immediate chance to be Secretary of State - Nixon continued to provide Dulles with information about the trial. At the end of 1948, he sent Dulles a transcript of the espionage hearings with the noteworthy sections underlined.¹⁰ At the year's end, Hiss was indicted on two counts of perjury. The indictments ended Nixon's main excuse to write to Dulles and a year long lapse in correspondence followed. Undoubtedly, in 1949 they had some inter-action but it was not documented.

That year proved a particularly busy one for Dulles. Dewey, then governor of New York, offered Senator Robert Wagner's seat in Congress to Dulles. Near the end of his term, Wagner had resigned because of poor health. Dulles reluctantly agreed to take the position for the six remaining weeks, but made no commitment to run for the seat that Fall. Dulles

wanted a position that allowed him to work on international relations, not legislative jockeying. But, once in Washington, he changed his mind. Although a freshman Senator, Dulles immediately spoke on the floor - in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty. The Senate gave him a public forum to discuss international affairs. With the help of Dewey's political advisors, he tried to retain Wagner's seat. It was to no avail. His opponent, Herbert Lehman, won the election.¹¹

While Dulles tried his hand in the Senate, Nixon continued his activities in the House. He worked diligently on HUAC and attended to other House duties. His responsibilities kept him busy. With both men members of Congress, it is probable they communicated less formally than by letter.

As such, it was not until February 1950 that Dulles sent Nixon another letter. While they had left no record of contact in 1949, Dulles had been watching Nixon. He wrote on the heels of Hiss' perjury convictions: "I often think of our long talk together at the Hotel Roosevelt and I think that the result justifies your perseverance in this matter."¹² Nixon welcomed Dulles' support. About to run for retiring Senator Sheridan Downey's seat, Dulles' compliment could only bolster Nixon's confidence. Although the compliment might have been pro-forma, it also reflected Nixon's rising star. The young Representative's success earned him respect and influence in the Republican party.

Nixon campaigned against Helen Gahagan Douglas for the seat and won. Soon after the victory, Dulles took time from his now full schedule - he was negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty - to contact Nixon. Again Dulles recalled the Hiss case and complimented Nixon. His formal letter of November 15 opened: "Dear Mr. Nixon: I am delighted at your

election to the United States Senate." Dulles expressed his regret that he could not personally welcome Nixon into the Senate chamber, but noted "I recall very well your sound and sober judgments as a member of the Committee on Un-American activities and am very happy that this will now be available in the Senate." Nixon had made an indelible impression on Dulles at the Roosevelt Hotel, and with his subsequent prospectation of Hiss. Dulles' repeated compliments indicate that he respected and admired the Californian. His letters foreshadowed the later decision to take Nixon under his wing.

The Nixon-Dulles communications lapsed yet again after this note. Through most of 1951 Dulles was either negotiating the Japanese Peace Treaty, or arranging for its international and domestic support. Not until March 20, 1952 did the Senate ratify the treaty and provide Dulles with an opportunity to send Truman his resignation. The day before the vote, Nixon conferred with his colleague William Knowland that General McArthur approved of the treaty. Knowland claimed, when he asked McArthur if he would vote for Dulles' treaty, the general replied, "I would." This convinced Nixon to vote yea on the treaty.¹³ By then, the Republican party was gearing up for the 1952 presidential campaign. Dulles and Nixon crossed paths once more as both became involved in the election.

During 1952, Nixon and Dulles formed a more personal association. They wrote to each other repeatedly about campaign issues and tactics. The most interesting aspect of these letters was not the topics discussed, but the increasing geniality of relations. Previously, Dulles and Nixon had carried on a stiff and formal correspondence. By January 1952, Nixon addressed his notes to "Foster" instead of Mr. Dulles and signed them Dick or Rich. Dulles, accordingly, began to respond "Dear Richard" and, within several months, "Dear Dick."¹⁴

Their increased contact reflected their expanding roles in the campaign, as well as Nixon's efforts to court the man who would likely be Secretary of State. This increased contact further paved the way for Dulles' patronage of the Vice President. Nixon reciprocated Dulles' earlier praise with notes complimenting Dulles on speeches. He asked for a copy of the talk Dulles delivered at the National Conference of Christians and Jews because "I would like to have the views of a man I respect as an expert!" Nixon did not over exaggerate his respect, but at the same time he clearly fed Dulles' ego.¹⁵

The solidifying relations were not only a result of Nixon's efforts. Roderic O'Connor, one of Dulles' top State Department assistants, claimed that Dulles was intrigued by political power. It was what attracted him to Eisenhower. By extension, Dulles would have been attracted to Nixon. Nixon had used his exposure on HUAC and his monumental efforts for the party to climb the rungs of the Republican party with amazing speed.¹⁶ If Dulles wanted to watch a master political strategist at work - and a self-promoter - Nixon was the man.

Hence, by 1952, Nixon's interest in Dulles was mirrored by Dulles' interest in Nixon. They pursued each other in hopes of developing a stronger relationship for their own individual self-interest. In the process each profited, creating by the end of Ike's first Administration an almost symbiotic relationship, in which each man manipulated and was manipulated, largely to the benefit of both.

The Nixon-Dulles correspondence prior to Eisenhower's election was intermittent, at best. It tended to center on official and mundane topics and therefore does not reveal a great deal about their relationship between 1949 and 1953. Yet, it does illustrate their interest in one another and a growing mutual respect. They were not close before the Eisenhower

Administration, but these few letters show that each had a working knowledge of the other and sought to maintain a positive impression. Their limited association in the late forties and early fifties provided them with a good basis for the ensuing close interaction during Ike's presidency.

Richard Nixon's role in the Eisenhower Administration was dichotomous. He was, without question, the most well informed, involved Vice President America had seen to that time (and possibly since). Concurrently, he was excluded from Eisenhower's inner circle of advisors. Ike failed to consult with the VP about priority policy options, except in terms of domestic political consequences. Furthermore, despite his status as outsider, Nixon managed to obtain inside information. He developed a means of breaching the closed circle through his increasingly close association with John Foster Dulles. Dulles aide, John Hanes, once commented that his boss was an expert in diplomatic negotiations, but a novice at cocktail party small talk. Hanes said Dulles "was a very shy man in private. . . . [who] was not good in light conversation. . . . He had trouble relating to people not of his generation, especially those who lacked his experience in foreign relations."¹⁷ Nixon shared Dulles' discomfort with small talk. And, because of his unflinching interest in foreign relations, he proved the exception to the generational rule.

Nixon and Dulles formed a strong bond during the Administration, despite the twenty five year age difference. In 1953, they began regularly consulting each other on a bevy of official subjects including speeches, post assignments and legislation. More than that, in a city where neither man had many close associates, they formed a strong friendship. Dulles shared with Nixon information on U.S. policy toward its allies, enemies and neutrals and updated

Nixon on summit negotiations. During crises like Quemoy and Matsu, Suez and Sputnik, the Vice President turned directly to Dulles for his briefings. By consulting with and advising the Secretary, Nixon gained an influence on Administration decisions.

While the Nixon-Dulles relationship has not been closely examined by scholars, some historians have delved into the post-election period and noted Nixon's appreciation for Dulles. They universally concluded that Nixon respected the Secretary. He considered Dulles, not Ike, the foreign relations expert of the Administration and worked to learn from the master. Nixon acted as his un-official advisor/assistant, in Herbert Parmet's words, "as an adjunct to the Secretary of State, doing those things that Dulles thought he should not do for himself." While Nixon served as Dulles' alter-ego, Dulles served as Nixon's informant. But, none of this interaction could have been possible, had Nixon and Dulles not discovered early on that they shared many interests and from these commonalities forged their relationship.

Historian Stephen Ambrose pointed out that Nixon had few close friends in Congress or the Cabinet "except for Dulles, with whom he continued to exchange almost daily calls and often visited at home for a late-night drink or a weekend meal." When they had the chance Mr. and Mrs. Nixon liked to join the Secretary and his wife for a relaxed dinner. Dick and Foster shared family news with each other and talked sports together. Nixon might invite Dulles to join him for a New York Yankees baseball game. While Dick left Pat at home, Foster usually brought Janet to the game.¹⁸

Nixon consistently claimed Dulles as one of his closest friends in the Eisenhower Administration. In Six Crises, he referred to Dulles as "one of my warmest friends and supporters in government." Twenty five years later Nixon still maintained "he was closer to

John Foster Dulles than to any other member of the cabinet." ¹⁹ While Nixon and Dulles grew significantly closer in 1955, as a result of their consultation immediately after Eisenhower's heart attack, they had formed a definite friendship during the preceding two years.²⁰

Their relationship was built on similar beliefs and working styles. Both men studied hard to prepare for overseas trips. They read and reread briefing books and situation papers. They listened to oral briefings with great care and interest. And, they processed every scrap of information with calculated efficiency. Dulles and Nixon were ardent anti-Communist crusaders, fully steeped in the Cold War ideology. They believed that America could only persevere if its policy-makers refused to submit to the Soviets. A tough stance would keep the Communists in line. At the same time, both men wanted to keep their options open for as long as possible. Closed doors were difficult to reopen, and they saw no reason to limit the direction in which they might next move.²¹ Both men had a drive for power that made them crave the wrangling so prevalent in politics and diplomacy. It was a lifestyle for which, incidentally, their respective wives harbored serious misgivings.²²

The expanding relationship between Nixon and Dulles can be traced through an examination of their respective letters during the Eisenhower Administration. The bulk of this correspondence consists of congratulatory notes and general praise of each other's accomplishments. However, enough of the documents illustrate the Nixon-Dulles consultation, shared perspective and genuine mutual concern, to gain an understanding of how these men related to one another.²³ I will leave it to the next chapter to examine how they manipulated each other.

Dulles was not content to rely on providence to expand his relations with Nixon.

Taking advantage of Nixon's eagerness, the Secretary of State regularly assigned three duties to his protégé. All ensured Nixon an increased role, but also served a purpose for Dulles. First, Dulles sometimes asked Nixon to help meet or entertain foreign dignitaries. In addition, he used Nixon to support his positions in meetings, the Administration and on policy. This probably was not a formalized arrangement, but an incidental consequence of their relationship. They agreed on many tactics, in any case. And, it was in Nixon's best interest to support the Secretary when he could, since Dulles acted as his patron. Finally, Dulles combined his use of Nixon with Eisenhower's. He employed Nixon as congressional liaison for the State Department. In this capacity, Nixon gained a hand in foreign policy discussion and still acted in a position Eisenhower considered appropriate.

Just two months into the new Administration, Dulles went out of his way to give the Vice President press exposure and an opportunity to meet a foreign dignitary. On March 24, Dulles called Nixon to ask if he cared to greet French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault at the airport. Nixon could accompany Dulles after that morning's National Security Council meeting. "The Vice President said he would be glad to do so. The Secretary said that they would draft up a little statement for him." While the Secretary may have invited Nixon to accompany him in order to increase the number of US officials waiting for Bidault, the tenor of the conversation implied additional motivation. Dulles specifically offered a ride and a speaking role to Nixon. In fact, neither of these gestures were necessary to enhance Bidault's arrival. Coming from Dulles, a man who ignored most social niceties, the offer can only be seen as an effort to ingratiate himself to Nixon.

On July 13, 1954 - about six months after Nixon returned from an extended trip to

- Dulles asked the Vice President to host a luncheon for Prince Wan, an Asian dignitary.²⁴ Dulles would be flying to Paris for the Indochina Peace talks then. The Secretary chose Nixon over one of his undersecretaries. As second to the President, Nixon brought more prestige to the affair than anyone under Dulles. Whether or not the luncheon required someone of the Vice President's caliber was determined by Dulles. Undoubtedly, Nixon relished the chance to practice his statesmanship.

While Dulles found Nixon to be a reliable diplomatic aide, the Vice President discovered he and his mentor shared similarly partisan visions of the government. Nixon detected in Foster deep suspicions concerning the Democrats. This paranoia allowed them to envision a conspiracy directed against the Republican Administration by their foes.

The conspiracy extended to many civil servants in the State Department. Thus the Vice President and the Secretary of State concluded that most of these veterans were "Middle-aged New Dealers." Both Dulles aides, John Hanes and Roderic O'Connor, agreed that Dulles believed a large portion of State Department staffers were not loyal to the Eisenhower Administration. Relics from the Roosevelt-Truman era could not be trusted to support the new initiatives or assist in the implementation of policy. Nixon expressed his distrust when he made disparaging remarks to the Secretary about American diplomats who had served in the Truman Administration, and carried over after 1953. "This gang is constantly undercutting. You sat with them in Manila and they leaked. This proves his [Nixon's] point above re talking too much." Nixon referred to a claim he had just made that the more people Dulles brought to an upcoming meeting, the more probable someone - implicitly a Democrat - would talk to the press. The Vice President felt certain 75 percent of State's Planning Board

Department was against the Secretary. In Nixon's view, it was him and Dulles against the entire Planning Board Department. The odds were stacked against them, but this challenge appealed to Nixon's tough guy image and the bi-polar analytical system he employed.²⁵ In a world of Democracy challenging Communism, Republican opposing Democrat, Administration versus media, it was not surprising that Nixon relied on a confrontational scenario. Dulles frequently applied the same basic formula, although he allowed for more subtle distinctions.

Nixon's comment illustrated that a fear of leaks to the press was a second suspicion shared by these men - unless they had themselves sanctioned the disclosure. For example, on June 5, 1953 they discussed Nixon's fall travel plan, his first overseas trip as Vice President. Dulles suggested a destination of Asia, since the Secretary had just returned from the Middle East and Milton Eisenhower was about to visit Latin America. Notwithstanding the region, Nixon and Dulles dismissed Eisenhower's idea of taking Senators along for the ride. While some of these legislators would have been Republicans, Nixon realized from his experiences as a Congressman, that regardless of the party affiliation, they could not be relied on to remain silent. "They would be anxious to report back and get in the news and would probably leak everything." In a similar situation Nixon would have.

A month later, Nixon complained that Robert Allen's latest column had leaked his proposed trip. Nixon suggested to Dulles "Since it has apparently leaked out it might be better to announce it." If ignored, the media would ask Eisenhower about the rumor at his next press conference.²⁶ Nixon's famous anti-media stance during his own presidency was not a distrust that developed out of Watergate and Vietnam. As Vice President, he privately

derided the news industry for unfair stories about him, the Administration and the State Department. He charged that reporters wanted to trap him in inaccuracies or contradictions, and that they overemphasized minor statements in order to misrepresent his actual intent.²⁷ His dislike of leaks may have been encouraged by Dulles. But, his extreme hostility toward the media - although a logical extension - was not shared by his mentor.

Both of Dulles' assistants maintained that the Secretary decried the leaks, but appreciated the power of the press. O'Connor noted that Dulles enjoyed the sparring and debating of a press conference. He and Hanes agreed that Dulles attempted to foster positive relations with reporters because "a great many people in the Department had close relations, very often with rather unfriendly sectors of the press." Those personnel would leak to their friends. It was essential for Dulles to win over as many media people as he could to avoid embarrassing leaks. But, O'Connor pointed out Dulles "never attempted to try to stop them in any formal sense. He recognized that would have been a grave mistake."²⁸ Any such program to crack down on leaking would only have made more enemies within the Department, and among the press corps. Nixon never comprehended that subtlety.

Hane's and O'Connor's comments imply that the Secretary had a more reasonable grasp than Nixon, on the problem of leaking. While Nixon hoped for a vendetta against leakers, Dulles accepted unauthorized leaking as par for the course. He took a more relaxed perspective on leaks, so much so, that he actually joked about the topic. In a meeting with Chancellor Adenauer on May 29, 1956, he reported "We discussed the problem of leakages and Chancellor Adenauer expressed the opinion that it was very wrong and dangerous to make memoranda of conversations [because they could be leaked]. Therefore, this is a

memorandum to end all memoranda." This was an uncommon glimpse of Dulles' often noted, but rarely recorded, sense of humor.

While Dulles' remark poked fun at the overly cautious stance, there was no doubt that he shared Adenauer's displeasure with leaks. Two weeks later, Adenauer asked to visit President Eisenhower, who had checked into Walter Reed Hospital after an ileitis attack. Dulles stated that if Ike was up to the visit, Adenauer could proceed, but "there should be absolutely no advance leakage of this possibility."²⁹ When Dulles perceived national security risks he was as disturbed by leaking as Nixon. He made it clear that he did not want the media present while Adenauer talked with the bed ridden President. Generally, however, his concerns - and those of Nixon - centered on unauthorized leaks. Both men detested leaks from the opposition, but they were willing to use the same tactic to benefit personal or Administration interests.

On April 16, 1954 Nixon made an off the record comment advocating American troop intervention in Indochina, in the event of an imminent Communist victory. He claimed the US would have to "send in the boys" to head off such a defeat. The remark, which came during a luncheon with the American Society of Newspaper Editors, immediately leaked. It was viewed as a trial balloon for the Administration. Evidence suggests, however, that Nixon was at most expressing Dulles' view, and probably only voicing his own opinion. In any case, Nixon claimed he had been double crossed by the press. He never explained what he expected would happen when he made a controversial statement to a room full of newspaper editors. A savvy politician like Nixon assumed the comment would get out and his actions displayed his own willingness to leak information when it suited his purposes.³⁰

Nixon's "send in the boys" comment illustrated a deceptive method for presenting his unofficial opinion as one with an authoritative aura. Just by saying it, he gained national attention and bolstered his reputation in foreign relations. Indeed, many of the leaks Nixon approved during his presidency were intended to improve the public's perception of him. He had the same goal in mind when he grabbed headlines after the American Society of Editors speech.

Because Nixon's role in foreign policy was largely determined by Dulles, it was no surprise that Nixon sought to improve Dulles' public reputation when he could. Making the Secretary look good through well crafted leaks earned him Dulles' gratitude and fit with approved tactics. The seasoned statesman also released unofficial statements to benefit his reputation. Nor were Nixon and Dulles above jointly planned leaks.

An excellent example of this came on March 11, 1955. Dulles had just returned from a trip to South East Asia. There he consulted with King Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and Chaing Kai Shek of Taiwan. That afternoon Nixon and Dulles discussed the situation between Nationalist and Communist China. Nixon suggested that he leak some positive statement about Dulles. Dulles' secretary transcribed the conversation: "N. asked if it would be helpful if an authoritative source said that the President has been very greatly impressed by the Sec.'s briefings on his return and is solidly united behind the Sec.'s policy. The Sec. said he thinks it would be good. They agreed N. would do it with Drummond."³¹ The comfort with which Nixon recommended, and Dulles approved, an authorized leak implied the process was neither distasteful nor unprecedented.

Nixon also recommended strategic leaks as a means for improving the State

Department's public image. In an animated discussion about department performance, Dulles claimed "each in his Dept. should be thinking in terms of not just doing a competent job but do things out of the ordinary and provide a basis for showmanship." In support, Nixon added they should "do it the right way. Leak stories and meet with off-the-record groups. . . ." ³² Nixon's experience with off-the-record groups proved they were just another means of delivering unofficial information.

Such shared characteristics attracted these men to one another. In addition, the circumstances and events of the early 1950s brought them together. Every Administration has cliques competing for the President's attention. The Dulles-Nixon partnership was one such alliance. Nixon and Dulles worked together to thwart Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, White House advisor Sherman Adams or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Administration rivalries particularly strengthened the alliance between Nixon and Dulles immediately following Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack. During the crisis, Dulles advised Nixon on his conduct and statements. After Ike recovered, the Secretary took a more personal interest in Nixon's political career. Dulles backed his man when he could. And, Nixon needed the help in 1956.

During the 1956 presidential campaign Nixon contended with Ike's obstinacy. The President refused to state for the record that he wanted Nixon as his Vice President. Publicly, he claimed Nixon had to choose his own road. Away from the media, Eisenhower hinted that Nixon should take a Cabinet position instead of remaining Vice President. Eisenhower sensed Nixon's presidential aspirations and did not appreciate them. He believed Nixon needed better administrative skills to be a good president. As head of a department, Nixon could

gain that experience. But, even behind Oval Office doors, Ike would not definitively tell Nixon to stay on or get off the ticket. He hoped Nixon might take his cue. And, because Ike had no better vice presidential candidates, his efforts to exclude Nixon were not constant or exhaustive.

Ike's ambivalence allowed a "dump Nixon" movement to develop, making Nixon's place on the ticket appear precarious. Dulles came to his friend's aid when Eisenhower remained aloof. The Secretary of State was enough of a patron and friend to look for opportunities to increase the Vice President's prestige and also offer him well considered advice.

Helping Nixon, however, placed Dulles in a potentially awkward position. He sought to simultaneously promote Nixon's ambitions, advocate Eisenhower's preference, and protect his own relationship with the President. Dulles succeeded in his triangular balancing maneuver, although he did not achieve any compromise between Nixon and Ike.

Dulles talked separately with the Vice President and the President to try to find a satisfactory resolution. First, he advised Nixon to take some Cabinet post. Dulles informed his friend that, in American history, vice presidents rarely succeeded to the presidency. Nixon could and should be a US President, but first the Vice President needed to prepare via an important Cabinet position.³³ His argument paralleled Eisenhower's, except in that Dulles had more confidence in Nixon's ability to perform the duties of a president.

From the other side, Dulles attempted to convince Eisenhower that he should offer Nixon a more prestigious slot than Secretary of Commerce. Dulles had in mind his own assignment, Secretary of State. If the research of historians Ambrose and Parmet was

correct, Dulles twice suggested to Ike that Nixon replace him. Ambrose wrote that on February 9, 1956 Dulles and Ike discussed Nixon's predicament. "Dulles doubted that Nixon would take it [Secretary of Commerce], and suggested that Nixon succeed him as Secretary of State. Eisenhower laughed and said Dulles was not going to get out of his job that easily, then added that 'he doubted in any event that Nixon had the qualifications to be Secretary of State.'" In Parmet's account, Dulles brought up the subject two weeks later. He stated the Secretary "somewhat whimsically" suggested that Ike make Nixon his next Secretary of State. Neither historian presented Dulles' suggestion as serious. Parmet wrote, "If Dulles was, after all, truly prepared to step down at that point, there were far more seasoned potential candidates."³⁴ While Parmet's conclusion appeared viable, it ignored too much of Dulles' character and experience. Several factors point to the idea that Dulles made the comment in earnest.

First among them is the importance that Dulles placed upon language. He wrote and revised his own speeches to help clarify his thoughts. Similarly, he drafted, edited and re-edited his press statements before delivering them. In Cabinet meetings, Dulles was known to start talking, stop in mid-sentence while he formulated the exact meaning he wanted and then resume his thought.³⁵ In short, he did not speak without thoroughly considering each word. It is improbable that Dulles would "whimsically" suggest to the President of the United States that he be replaced in the next term unless he intended to retire.

Further, Dulles did not joke about foreign policy issues. He had been raised to understand the implications of international relations because his grandfather and uncle both had diplomatic careers. His maternal grandfather, John Watson Foster, had enjoyed a foreign

relations career spanning from the mid-1870s to 1910. John Foster served as minister to Spain, Russia and Mexico and also spent a short time as Secretary of State under Benjamin Harrison. Dulles' uncle, Robert Lansing, was Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of State during World War I. Dulles himself attended the Versailles Peace Conference. A man raised on international relations, and devoted to the secretaryship, would not nominate his own replacement without considering the consequences. Had Ike accepted his suggestion, Nixon could have become Secretary of State. Dulles recognized this possibility and he would not have introduced the subject had he not considered Nixon a suitable successor.³⁶

In addition, Ike's final comment in the Ambrose quotation illustrated that he took Dulles seriously. The President gave a direct reason why Nixon would not be an acceptable replacement as Secretary of State - inexperience. Eisenhower did not change his mind.

Rather than just trying to amuse Eisenhower, Dulles probably had an involved game plan. He hoped to subtly manipulate both Nixon and Ike into accepting his compromise. The Secretary recognized that Eisenhower occasionally latched onto ideas that were presented in an informal setting. The President sometimes heard an off-the-cuff suggestion and immediately adopted it. If one assumed Dulles was considering retirement (this will be addressed below), he might have hoped to secure the position for Nixon. That would provide Nixon with a Cabinet post sufficiently prestigious for him to leave the ticket and still be in a position to launch a presidential campaign in 1960.³⁷ Dulles possibly mentioned Nixon as his own successor intending to gauge Eisenhower's response. In the best case, Ike would like the idea and pursue it. In the worst, he would laugh it off as a joke. Neither reaction could jeopardize Dulles' working relationship with the President.

As long as he was Secretary of State, he needed to maintain Ike's confidence. But, if Dulles saw Nixon as a suitable replacement, one must ask why he was looking to name his heir. Was he ready to retire?

On February 25, 1956 John Foster Dulles would be 68 years old. Grandfather Foster had been 57 when his term as Secretary ended. Robert Lansing had been 56 at his term's end. On top of that, the average retiring age of all twentieth century Secretaries of State through the Truman Administration was 62. If Dulles retained the secretaryship through a second term he would be 72 before he retired, older than all but Secretaries Cordell Hull and Frank Kellogg. And Dulles was aware of the age issue. In 1953, he refused to reappoint Joseph Green - a Princeton classmate - to the Ambassadorship of Jordan because he believed Green was too old.

In addition, there was his own life expectancy to consider. He was far from perfect health. And, of the family males with an immediate connection to Dulles, only Grandpa Foster lived a bit past age 80. Dulles' father was 76 when he passed away and his paternal grandfather had died in 1886, at age 63.³⁸ If family history revealed anything, it told Dulles that he could not expect to live more than a few more years. A man like Dulles wanted to have time to write his memoirs (as his Grandfather had). If he stayed on another four years as Secretary his chances of completing an autobiographical work would be significantly reduced.

Eisenhower might have accepted Dulles' recommendation, had it come ten months later. On November 2, Dulles was hospitalized for severe stomach cramps that mimicked appendicitis. Exploratory surgery revealed it was actually cancer of the colon.³⁹ Doctors

removed the cancer, but it would return within two years and cause Dulles' death in 1959.

From this analysis, one can conclude that Dulles probably did consider Nixon as a viable replacement after 1956. He and Nixon discussed the international situation. If Dulles saw Nixon as his protégé, perhaps he was ready to pass the torch in 1956. Although inexperienced in comparison to Dulles or Ike, Nixon had shown his competency to the Secretary's satisfaction. They shared a similar world view, with America as the preserver of democracy and Russia the destroyer. Dulles knew Nixon would work to maintain the same principles he upheld. He knew the Vice President would not fold in the face of Communist aggression. And, he knew Nixon would continue to consult him often. Nixon was the perfect successor because he ensured Dulles maintained a hold on foreign policy. Nixon could cement Dulles' legacy. Of course, he never found out how Nixon would have handled himself, since Eisenhower refused to accept the suggestion.

That Dulles recommended Nixon at all, illustrated his own respect for and confidence in the younger man's foreign relations abilities. Dulles' suggestion also reflected his friendship with the Vice President. At the tender age of 43, Dulles believed Nixon could take on the responsibilities of Secretary of State.⁴⁰ When his efforts to obtain the position for Nixon failed, he dropped the subject. Ike would not consent, so there was no reason to pursue the topic. Dulles remained the Secretary of State, died in office and never published a page of memoir.

While it is possible Nixon would have accepted an appointment as Secretary of State, his real objective was the Oval Office. He had sipped the presidential nectar following Eisenhower's coronary in 1955. Given Ike's health and age, Nixon's chances at a promotion

were better than ever. Pundits commonly wondered if the General would live through another four years. If Ike died in Office, Nixon advanced to the presidency without even the trouble of a campaign.

He also declined a Cabinet position because he assumed his chances for winning the Republican party presidential nomination in 1960 were higher coming from the VP spot than any other. Nixon was evolving the role of Vice President. Using his political connections, public recognition and expanded duties, Nixon transformed the vice presidency into the position he envisioned - a jump off point for the top slot. Historically that was not the case. From 1956 onward he worked to present himself as a viable and capable candidate for President. However, he had to be cautious to balance his presidential aspirations against his subservient position in the Administration.

Although Dulles could not secure his secretaryship for Nixon, he could offer advice on the Californian's quest for the presidency. And, despite his battle against terminal cancer, Dulles remained focused on world affairs. Nixon continued as his confidant and pupil. After 1956, their consultation still included official and personal issues, but expanded to cover Nixon's political prospects as well.

In November 1958, Dulles and Nixon discussed the recently held congressional elections. The Republicans had lost 50 seats in the House, but both men concluded Nixon's heavy campaigning before election day had kept the results from being a complete Democratic triumph. Looking forward, Dulles mentioned to the Vice President that "we need to be thinking pretty hard pretty soon about 1960. . . ." They decided to meet on Saturday to assess the situation and discuss options. The Secretary mentioned that he also wanted to talk

about his own future plans, but did not give any details.⁴¹ Exactly what they discussed on Saturday, November 8, was not recorded. It probably covered Nixon's strategy for the immediate future, his chances at the Republican nomination and the potential competition in 1960. Both men understood Nixon had to remain in the public eye and maintain his contacts in the Republican party.

A memorandum from January 1958 hinted at what Dulles' personal plans might have been. The Secretary and Nixon were discussing some type of transfer of responsibility in the State Department. For national security reasons, the subject matter could not have been widely discussed. The transcribed conversation, as often happened, used the preposition "it" in place of the topic at hand. But, the subject can be determined even if the exact plan being considered cannot.

Dulles explained to Nixon that "he talked to AWD [Allen Welsh Dulles] about the matter they discussed and he is very much opposed to it. He said there could not be such a transition without giving an impression of weakness." Dulles stated that his brother did not see a way to change the current State department structure "that would not be misinterpreted." Nixon concluded that the plan could only work if it were tried "from scratch" - probably meaning in a new Administration. The implication was that Dulles wanted to reduce his work load. He hoped to transfer some of his responsibilities - knowing Dulles, probably the onerous administrative duties - to a subordinate. Undoubtedly, his advancing illness played a role in this proposal. Nixon tried to support Dulles' goal despite Allen's advice. He was concerned for Dulles' welfare. "N still thinks we can explore ways in which the Sec can call Herter in and have him take greater responsibility in certain areas."⁴² That Dulles formulated

his plans with Nixon - the memorandum makes it clear they had previously discussed these issues - illustrated the personal trust and the valued judgement that he placed in the Vice President.

Allen Dulles, as brother and CIA director, was a person with whom to confide. But, Nixon, as Vice President, had no business knowing Dulles' plans, unless Dulles determined Nixon would provide constructive and sound advice. Perhaps Dulles still believed Nixon might be convinced to succeed him as Secretary of State. He certainly maintained an interest in Nixon's political course.

Dulles reiterated his concern for Nixon's political future on Saturday, January 24, 1959. The two discussed the merits of a reorganization plan Eisenhower had revealed at the Cabinet meeting that week. Neither Dulles nor Nixon was pleased with the scheme which called for, in Dulles' words, "two 'Assistant Presidents,' one dealing with more or less domestic affairs and the other dealing with international affairs." The greatest concern they voiced revolved around how the proposal might appear to Congressmen and the public. Nixon complained that unless there was "broad support in the Congress for this and not great debate about it, it would very likely play into the idea of the President wanting to get rid of some of his duties." Just as Dulles could not pass any of his work to a subordinate, Ike could not assign his tasks to assistants. To implement such a modification so late in the Administration had domestic ramifications in addition to international consequences. And, in terms of Nixon's future, the reaction could disrupt the party, increase desire for change, and "make Nixon's prospects [in 1960] pretty dim."⁴³ This prognosis did not comfort either man.

Dulles' interest in the political future of Dick Nixon reflected his concern for the

younger man. By January 1959, it was clear that Dulles could not remain Secretary of State to the end of the Administration. The only question was when he would resign. He entered Walter Reed Hospital with terminal cancer in February and so had no personal stake in the 1960 election.⁴⁴ While he wanted a Republican to remain in the Oval office, his choice of Nixon was not a foregone conclusion. Eisenhower had a list of five or six men whom he believed qualified to take up the reigns. Nixon was on the list, but not at the top of it. Yet, Dulles concluded that the Vice President was the best choice. His close association with, and observations of Nixon, helped confirm this conviction.

In the Spring of 1959 Dulles' poor health became a higher priority than Nixon's election prospects. On April 13, Dulles called Nixon. Presumably discussing his own resignation, Dulles noted he had made no decision yet, "although the Sec recognizes the inevitable more or less." Dulles planned to wait another week, while Nixon encouraged him to "give it every chance." The Secretary mentioned that he would start a new treatment the next day and the conversation ended. He resigned two days later.⁴⁵

Dulles was dying, new treatment or not. In under a month and a half he would be gone. But, Nixon continued to meet with the Secretary in his room at Walter Reed Hospital. And Dulles continued to advise Nixon on his political predicament. On May 2, they discussed the Vice President's upcoming trip to Moscow. In addition, Dulles offered the names of various Republican party members whom he believed could be helpful in Nixon's pursuit of the presidency. Dulles, only three weeks from death, "urged the Vice President to keep in touch with Mr. Dewey. . . . The Secretary also suggested that Mr. Arthur Dean has an influential, although inconspicuous, role in Republican affairs."⁴⁶ Dulles' death bed advice

was concerned and paternalistic. Nixon knew the Republican party better than almost anyone. And he understood who he could rely upon as allies. Dulles could not offer anything greater by then, however, and for his part Nixon graciously accepted the suggestions.

John Foster Dulles died on May 24, 1959. Nixon wrote a tribute about the Secretary of State two weeks later for Life magazine. In it, Nixon not only expressed his deep admiration and respect for Dulles, he revealed their close relationship by way of a personal comment Dulles had made to him. Days before his death Dulles described his last negotiations. The dying man admitted to Nixon "I never felt any pain while the negotiating was taking place. Then at the end of the day it would come down on me like a crushing weight."⁴⁷ His statement reflected more than an ability to control excruciating discomfort. It was a confession that admitted his weakness and described his hardship. Dulles, a reserved man, did not share such intimate details about himself with most people. But, Nixon was not just anybody.

Dulles' death brought to an end what Ambrose referred to as "a solid team. . . [that] had helped each other as occasion demanded . . ." since 1953. Their similar beliefs and methods attracted them to each other. The friendship and trust that ensued was rare for Dulles and even more so for Nixon. It allowed them to discuss both private and Administration topics with great ease. Nixon admired Dulles' great experience in the realm of foreign policy and Dulles respected Nixon's grasp of the issues and desire to learn more. They had a genuine concern for one another that was manifested in their personal association as well as their professional consultation.

The Nixon-Dulles relationship went much further than friendship and respect. They

maintained a close working relationship which although hinted at in this chapter, has not been fully examined. Nixon took full advantage of Dulles' inner circle status, while Dulles probed Nixon for advice on numerous decisions. The image of Nixon as uninformed about Administration policy disregards Dulles' frequent willingness to brief Nixon on the most up to date information. Their professional relationship, the mutual consultation they shared, will be the subject of the next chapter.

ENDNOTES:

1. Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131; Leonard Mosley, Dulles A Biography of Eleanor Allen, and John Foster Dulles and Their Family Network, New York: The Dial Press, 1978: 243.
2. Ibid.
3. Itineraries, Background Information, Richard M. Nixon Library and Birthplace, Yorba Linda, CA., Trip File 1947: PSS206.131.
4. Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richard M. Nixon, 2 July, 1948, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 37. Folder: Richard M. Nixon, 1948.
5. Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon. The Education of a Politician 1913-1962. Volume I. Simon & Schuster Inc.: New York, 1987: 170, 177.
6. Ibid.: 177-78; Richard Milhous Nixon, Six Crises, New York: Double Day and Company, Inc., 1962: 21.
7. The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project [hereafter JFDOHP], Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Mr. R. Richard Rubottom, Jr. Professor Richard D. Challenger Interviewer. Dallas, Texas 12 June, 1966: 5, 27; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Mr. Walter S. Robertson. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Richmond, Virginia, July 23 and 24, 1965: 2, 13; JFDOHP, John W. Hanes, Jr. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Great Fall, VA 29 January and 12 August, 1966: 19.
8. Nixon: Six Crises: 38.
9. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 7 September, 1948, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 37. Folder: "Richard M. Nixon, 1948."
10. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 31 December, 1948, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 37. Folder: "Richard M. Nixon, 1948."
11. John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles A Biography. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957: 87-88; Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of

Japan, 1945-1952, Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1989: 239; Mosley: 216-218.

12. Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richard M. Nixon, 10 February, 1950, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 49 Folder: "Nixon, Richard M. 1950."
13. Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richard M. Nixon, 15 November , 1950, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 49 Folder: "Nixon, Richard M. 1950."; Schonberger: 277; Letter from John Foster Dulles to Harry S. Truman, 1952, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library - John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 66 "Truman, Harry S. 1952."; US Congress, Senate, Congressional Record Proceedings and Debates, 82nd Congress, Second Session. 1952, Volume 98, Part 2. February 26, 1952 to March 24, 1952. US Printing Office Washington D.C.: 1365-2786, 2594.
14. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 14, January, 1952, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library - John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 62 "Nixon, Richard M. 1952"; Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richmard M. Nixon, 16, January, 1952; Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richmard M. Nixon, 13, August 1952.
15. Letter from Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 13, May, 1952, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library - John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material. Box 62 "Nixon, Richard M. 1952."
16. JFDOHP, Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor. Philip A Crowl Interviewer. Far Hills, New Jersey 2 April, 1966: 94; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with John W. Hanes, Jr. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Great Fall, VA 29 January and 12 August, 1966: 209.
17. JFDOHP, John W. Hanes: 4, 220.
18. Garry Wills, Nixon Agonistes. The Crisis of the Self-Made Man, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970: 136, 421; Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered. New York: Basic Books, 1994: 137; Herbet S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company., 1990; 325, 337; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 431; Mosley: 336, 343; Richard Milhous Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, Volume One and Two. New York: Warner Books, 1978: 204; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 8, August, 1956 (12:16pm), John Foster Dulles Papers Eisenhower Library 1951-1959 [hereafter JFDPEL 1951-1959], Box 5 Telephone Conversations Series January, 3 1956 - December 29,

1956; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 5 June, 1953, JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 1 Telephone Conversations Series January 1953--October 31, 1953; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24, December, 1953 (9:15am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 22 August, 1958 (6:52pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959.

19. Nixon, Six Crises: 161; Nixon, Memoirs Volume 1: 203; Parmet: 532.

20. Mosley: 394; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Richard Nixon. Dr. Richard D. Challenger Interviewer. New York City 5 March, 1965: 10.

21. JFDOHP, Roderic L. O'Connor: 37, 70; Nixon, Six Crises: 186; Nixon, Memoirs, Volume 1: 203; Memo of Conversation John Foster Dulles and Henry Cabot Lodge, 6 March, 1958, JFDPEL 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z; Nixon, Six Crises: 200; Ambrose, Nixon Volume II: 31; JFDOHP, John W. Hanes: 204, 205. Even in personal habits Nixon and Dulles shared similarities. As examples: they both swam for exercise and enjoyment; both took notes on yellow legal sized pads; they loved adventure and risk taking (After World War I, Dulles and an acquaintance traveled from Ruhr - following a Red coup - through Essen using only bravado and courage [Beal: 75]. Nixon's trip through the ruins of Essen nicely parallels Dulles' earlier foray); and they enjoyed relaxing over a conversation about sports.

22. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973: 43. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I: 126, 244, 350. Janet and Pat hated it for slightly different reasons. Janet always traveled with her husband, but unlike Pat did not meet with anyone. Instead she sat, bored in her hotel room for hours on end, while Dulles sat at the negotiating table. Pat Nixon detested the campaign trail that she and her husband pounded about every two years and felt consuming guilt when she left their daughters to travel abroad.

23. Most of the Dulles-Nixon notes read like greeting cards with Dulles or Nixon writing, "Thanks for the text of your speech," "You did a great job," or "Thanks for the compliments in your last speech," etc.

24. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 March, 1953, JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 12 July, 1954, JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series November 1, 1953--August 31, 1954.

25. JFDOHP, John W. Hanes: 15; JFDOHP, Roderic L. O'Connor: 65; Hoopes: 5, 142; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 19 May, 1955 (12:07pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 4 Telephone Conversations Series May 2, 1955 - April 30, 1956.
26. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 7 July, 1953 (12:45pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical." Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 5 June, 1953, JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 1 Telephone Conversations Series January 1953--October 31, 1953. There is some question in my mind about whether or not Nixon was actually the source of the leak revealing his trip. Making the trip public knowledge could only increase the VP's visibility.
27. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 19 May, 1955 (12:07pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 4 Telephone Conversations Series May 2, 1955 - April 30, 1956; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 21 July, 1958 (10:31am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series, January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 16 October, 1958 (12:38pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959.
28. JFDOHP, Roderic L. O'Connor: 67; JFDOHP, John W. Hanes: 31.
29. Memo of Conversation John Foster Dulles and Conrad Adenauer, 29 May, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z; Memo of Conversation John Foster Dulles and Conrad Adenauer, 12 June, 1956, JFDPEL 1951-1959, General Correspondence and Memoranda Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z.
30. Parmet: 319; JFDOPH, Richard M. Nixon: 44; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 344; James R. Arnold, The First Domino: Eisenhower, the Military, and America's Intervention in Vietnam. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991: 184.
31. Dr. Philip A. Cowl, (compiler), "A Chronology of United States Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State." 1955: 3. Princeton University, 1964; Telephone call John Foster Dulles to Richard Nixon, 11 March, 1955 (3:42pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper.
32. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 November, 1958 (3:26pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957. Nixon had shown how off-the-record meetings could be used as a means to leak with his comments about US intervention in Indochina.
33. Nixon Six Crises: 161.

34. Parmet: 264 ; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, Volume II, New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984: 292. The sources cited by Parmet and Ambrose have two separate dates. It is possible, however, one of these citation has the wrong date and Dulles only brought up the subject of Nixon as Secretary of State once.

35. Hoopes: 36, 71; David Shelley, "How Dulles Averted War Three Times, New Disclosures Show He Brought U.S. Back From The Brink." Life. Volume 40, number 3, January 16, 1956. Time, Inc: Chicago, IL: 71.

36. Schonberger: 238; William A. Degregorio, The Complete Book of Presidents. New York: Barricade Books, 1991: 338; JFDOHP Allen Dulles, Interview 1: 2, 12, 22-26; JFDOHP Allen Dulles, Interview 2: 49; JFDOHP, Eleanor Lansing Dulles: 9; Hoopes: 11; John Robinson Beal, John Foster Dulles A Biography, New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957: 51-52, 59-60. Several sources, including Dulles himself, attest to his interest in being the Secretary of State. In May 1952, Dulles told C.L. Sulzberger it had been an ambition of his since boyhood [Sulzberger, In a Row of Candles: 749]. Ike told his assistant Bernard Shanley that Dulles "was trained from boyhood to be Secretary of State. . . . with the experience he's had in the past, all these factors make the difference between Foster Dulles and the ordinary mortal." [JFDOHP Bernard Shanley: 12]. And Allen Dulles admitted his brother probably aspired to the position [JFDOHP Allen Dulles, Interview II: 49.]

37. Nixon claimed in Six Crises [160-162] that Dulles offered him the Secretaryship but he turned it down because he concluded it would appear as a demotion from the Vice Presidency. If Nixon truly believed that he was living in denial. Few people in the Administration, media or general population would have considered Vice President Nixon as in a higher position than Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles was Ike's enviable right hand man, while Nixon was a political hack. As such, the position of Secretary had to have carried at least as much prestige as that of Vice President. Nixon most likely turned down Dulles' gift in the hopes that Eisenhower would not live through the second term.

Dulles did point out to Nixon that only three of eleven 20th century vice presidents had ascended to the presidency. Of those, only Calvin Coolidge did it through election. Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman succeeded by right of survivorship. Vice President was not necessarily a strong jumping off point for the higher office.

38. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I: 382.; Beal: 22; Eleanor Lansing Dulles, Eleanor Lansing Dulles: Chances of a Lifetime A Memoir, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980: preface. Dulles' paternal grandmother died when she was 50, but his maternal grandmother lived until she was 82. His mother died at age 81; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library, Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Joseph G. Green. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Chevy Chase, MD 16 October, 1965: letter from Joseph C. Green appended to interview.

39. Nixon, Volume I:: 366; Beal: 285.

- 40.** Edmund Randolph 1794 to 1795 (under President George Washington) had been the youngest Secretary of State (age 41). Only a handful of other men younger than 50 have served as Secretary of State since Randolph.
- 41.** Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 5 November, 1958 (2:55pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959.
- 42.** Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 13 January, 1958 (4:20pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958.
- 43.** Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 January, 1959 (11:30am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959. Nixon's argument against Ike's plan has ironic overtones given his later reorganization of the Executive office. Nixon noted that "what concerned him was that it was a much more revolutionary plan than the President realizes. In effect it puts in two people between the Cabinet and the Pres. who would have the power of 'Assistant Presidents'." Nixon's analysis in 1959 parallels the complaints made against his two assistants, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman from 1968 through 1974.
- 44.** Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I: 517.
- 45.** Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 13 April, 1959 (1:08pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959; Crowl (compiler), "A Chronology of United States Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State." 1959: 3.
- 46.** Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, Walter Reed Hospital, 2 May, 1959 (11:30am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper. Interestingly, Dulles separated the topic of Moscow and the more personal conversation containing the advice to Nixon into two memoranda. They have the same date, time and place, but different topics. This example illustrates how Dulles differentiated between professional and private relations.
- 47.** Richard M. Nixon, "Vice President Nixon Writes About Dulles." Life Vol. 46 #23 6/8/59: 36 (Time Inc., Chicago, IL).

Chapter 3

An Unequal Partnership - Nixon and Dulles in the Administration

After Dulles' death, Vice President Nixon recalled "at least four occasions when he [Dulles] was under attack he asked for my advice."¹ In truth, Dulles sought Nixon's advice often, irrespective of any outside criticism. To do that, the Secretary regularly briefed Nixon on a host of subjects, sharing with Nixon his thoughts on domestic and international topics. Nixon gained an insider's knowledge of foreign relations because Dulles fed him information on the Middle East, Far East, Soviet strategies, State Department appointments, content of speeches and Nixon's own role in the Administration.² By examining the consultation between Nixon and Dulles, beginning in earnest about 1955, and continuing up until Dulles' death in May 1959, Nixon's actual role in the Eisenhower Administration becomes clear. His efforts to adapt the vice presidency to suit his political ambitions also appear.

Dulles assistant John Hanes reported that the Secretary often conferred with individuals in private 15 to 30 minute interviews. He met with his Undersecretaries for such meetings early in the morning, but these mini-conferences extended beyond State Department staff. Allen Dulles often came in for short briefings. Hanes noted "whoever it might be, would come in and just the two of them would sit down and go over things. . . . And he would do it with others that he was close to -- have long personal conversations. Most of those things he never recorded, of course. He would record things, only if he felt there was a

reason to."³ Although Hanes did not mention Nixon, he was undoubtedly one of the "others." Dulles kept transcripts of many of the phone calls and meetings he had with Nixon. However, there are nowhere near the number of memoranda of conversations to match the number of discussions that Nixon and Dulles had. Hanes admitted that Dulles only kept notes on official conversations. Since many of the talks between him and Nixon were personal, they did not get transcribed. The professional exchanges, however, shed light on their consultative relationship.

From early in the Administration, Dulles and Nixon consulted on speeches. Dulles regularly circulated his drafts for comments from trusted associates. Nixon was among those consulted. In deference to his mentor, Nixon cleared many of his speeches with Dulles and asked for guidance on the content. He wanted Dulles to synthesize the Eisenhower-Dulles policy. Or Nixon asked Dulles if he should emphasize any particular foreign policy topics.⁴ Such dialogue was frequent, typically involving suggestions about word choice or syntax. Rarely did their discussions about speeches move beyond literary criticism, although sometimes they talked of political ramifications.

Dulles and Nixon also conferred about candidates to fill vacant State Department positions. Dulles' reason for asking Nixon about these choices might have been the Vice President's political savvy. However, Dulles also seemed to value Nixon's assessment of the abilities of these candidates. At least twice, Dulles asked for Nixon's nomination advice without any consideration of politics.

In August 1954, the Secretary called Nixon to discuss a replacement for outgoing Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, Henry Byroade.

Nixon argued that it would be difficult to find a candidate who would be impartial about the Middle East. Most were either pro- or anti- Zionist. Reacting to an unrecorded statement by Dulles, Nixon advised against the appointment of George Allen. The Vice President complained Mr. Allen was too flexible. However, as the conversation ended Nixon seemed to sense Dulles' advocacy of the candidate, and admitted Allen "will be very loyal to any principles the Sec. laid down." Nixon's advice came in a non-confrontational package. He disliked Allen, but did not dismiss him. Perhaps Nixon was trying to avoid a disagreement with the Secretary. Just as probable, the Vice President expressed his true assessment of George Allen. The man did not fit Nixon's ideal, but a loyal subordinate was hard to find. Dulles agreed and Allen assumed the position in January 1955. Nixon's concern centered on how Allen would perform his duties, not the political efficacy of nominating a Republican.

In the Spring of 1957, they again talked about a high level appointment to the State Department. On the morning of April 18, Dulles asked Nixon about a replacement for the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Nixon immediately suggested Deputy Director of the Office of European Regional Affairs, Joseph Palmer II. Dulles asked the Vice President to call him if he had any names to add. At the end of May, Dulles and Nixon again talked about who to appoint to the position. Dulles mentioned two candidates: Julius C. Holmes (Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs) and Ambassador James P. Richards. Nixon preferred Holmes and claimed that Richards did not "have the subtlety necessary to deal with the kind of problems that arose in South Africa. . . ." Presumably, partisan requirements were not at issue in this case, since Richards was a Democrat.⁵ The Secretary did not need Nixon to advise him on the political suitability of a nominee. The

Vice President instead offered an assessment of Richards' capabilities. Who filled the position is not clear, but neither man named that day.

Although Nixon had a role as the Administration's political workhorse, Dulles often asked for his advice on non-political issues. The patron genuinely respected the Vice President's opinion. Certainly Dulles' confidence in Nixon was unprecedented between any other Secretary of State and Vice President. The relationship that they shared helped transform the vice presidency from obscurity to celebrity.

Given Nixon's political specialization, however, Dulles did not ignore him as a partisan tactician. For example, when planning the tenth anniversary United Nations conference, Dulles asked if Nixon thought it would be acceptable to invite major participants of the 1945 U.N. conference. He mentioned several well connected Democrats, including President Truman and Eleanor Roosevelt, and one or two Republicans (Harold Stassen being the most prominent). Nixon immediately affirmed the appropriateness of inviting them. Had Dulles been concerned about the partisan consequences of inviting Truman and Roosevelt, Nixon's nonchalant reply laid his mind to rest. Nixon instantly understood the major participants of 1945 could not be excluded because of their party affiliation.

More overtly political were Dulles-Nixon consultations on gaining congressional support for Executive initiatives. A veteran Senator and Representative, Nixon used his many contacts to sound out members of both houses. As Vice President, he presided over Senate sessions adding to his effectiveness in guiding legislation through Congress. Nixon represented a direct line to the Executive branch, a factor that made him important to Senators seeking the President's ear. Throughout the Administration, Dulles and Nixon discussed how

to help their legislative program survive Capitol Hill.⁶

Richard Nixon's input on political issues does not come as a surprise to anyone. But, his international involvement with Dulles is less familiar. The Secretary treated the Vice President like a foreign policy advisor, rather than a powerless appendage of the Executive branch.

On April 26, 1954, representatives from Europe and South East Asia met in Geneva, Switzerland to begin negotiating an end to hostilities in Indochina. As the conference neared its close, Nixon and Dulles recognized that the Geneva settlement probably would not parallel American goals for the region. When Dulles admitted he might join the American representatives for the closing ceremonies, Nixon advised against it. He believed "the line will be that Geneva is a sell-out - a failure of diplomacy." Dulles' presence at the meeting would serve to increase the US stake at Geneva, and he did not "like to see us give respectability or be a part of a deal which we don't believe in." Nixon abhorred the US being associated with an agreement that left Ho Chi Minh's Communist government in power. He may also have recalled the stigma attached to the Democrats who negotiated the Yalta Accords. Making deals with Communists led to domestic political vulnerability. Dulles undoubtedly agreed with his friend's assessment, but he could not act otherwise. Despite the risk of legitimizing the negotiations, as Secretary of State he could not ignore such proceedings.⁷

This was neither the first nor the last time Nixon and Dulles consulted on American foreign policy. Although Nixon's suggestion could not be followed, Dulles supported the principle behind it. At the conference, he refused to shake hands with Chinese Foreign

Minister Chou En Lai, resulting in a diplomatic slight that would not be rectified until Nixon went to China in 1972. Dulles' insult left no doubt that the United States viewed the settlement as a capitulation to Communist forces.

In November of the following year, Dulles was again in Europe. In between visits to Franco in Spain and Tito in Yugoslavia, Dulles sat in on security talks with the Soviets, again in Geneva. On the fifth, the Secretary sent Nixon a detailed description of the negotiations. "The original Soviet proposal on security was a moth-eaten draft which had first appeared at Berlin two years ago. . . ." Dulles complained that it lacked any substance. But, "under pressure of our proposal and argumentation about it, the Russians then came up with a new proposal which coincides in most important respects with our own proposal." Unmentioned, was the diplomatic maneuver of visiting and wooing neutralist governments away from Soviet influence. Dulles included a long exposition detailing how the Soviets had been forced to abandon the position that their security depended on a reunified Germany. The Secretary claimed that the Soviet argument for reunification now rested on the weaker ideological and political concepts, rather than strategic considerations. This modified Soviet position helped clear the way for what Dulles anticipated would be the eventual reunification of Germany.⁸

Dulles was under no obligation to keep Nixon briefed on the negotiations in Geneva, let alone explain how the proceedings were moving forward and provide as well a personal analysis of the progress. Such a report might have gone to Eisenhower, but not to the Vice President. Dulles' message could only have been motivated by his desire to keep Nixon informed because he was a friend and protégé.

In October 1957, Dulles asked for Nixon's advice for dealing with an official from

Ghana - presumably because Nixon had stopped in that West African country during his Spring trip. The issue was one of form, rather than policy. Dulles had entertained the Ghanaian minister at his home and now wondered whether or not it was appropriate for the man to breakfast with Eisenhower in the White House. Nixon thought it was and noted that the official "was a very sensitive fellow. All those people were." Somehow Dulles interpreted a political aspect to such a breakfast also, since he asked "if it would be regarded as playing politics. . ." The Vice President replied candidly, "everything was regarded that way."⁹ Since the Vice President could see politics in every government action, he assumed the Democrats could also.

Often during phone calls either Dulles or Nixon suggested they meet. Dulles would ask Nixon to drop by, or Nixon might suggest that they "get together and talk about current developments." During these conversations they discussed treaty negotiations, economic aid issues, international events and the Cold War in general. These were informal meetings - like those Hanes mentioned - that occurred after standard working hours.¹⁰

During the last year of his life, Foster Dulles spent many hours evaluating the dangers of Soviet economic warfare; the potential for the Communists to disrupt the global economy. The Soviets employed two tactics. Primarily, the U.S.S.R. disbursed economic aid to developing countries as a means of gaining political influence. Russia's willingness to finance the Aswan Dam project in Egypt stood as the most prominent example of these efforts.

Second, Dulles feared any Communist government's ability to ignore profit. Russia could bribe foreign nations by arranging trades that had no economic benefit to itself. By bartering or selling commodities below cost, the purchasing country became indebted to and

dependent upon the U.S.S.R. And, because Russia had a totalitarian government, the domestic effects were not an issue. Dulles held similar concerns about the People's Republic of China's influence in Asia. At the beginning of 1958, he shared these concerns with the Vice President.

At the Cabinet meeting on January 3, 1958, Dulles and Nixon both recommended that Eisenhower include something about economic warfare in his State of the Union address. "Sec. Dulles saw some possibility that the message would be criticized as being on the complacent side and he called attention to the various forms of the Russian threat, especially economic warfare." "The Vice President hoped the message would contain at least a sentence on the great increase in Russian economic efforts." As it turned out, Ike devoted two paragraphs to the subject. But the President's speech greatly emphasized the military threat over the economic one. As such, it was not surprising to find Dulles again discussing this issue with Nixon, after the speech. Ike had included a passage about economic warfare, but he had not given it the weight Dulles thought it deserved.

Dulles privately broached the topic with Nixon on January 8, during a morning talk at the Secretary's home. Nixon had not arrived expecting to discuss the Soviet economic offensive. He initially "referred to a talk which he had just had with the President dealing with possible 'inability'. He referred to an exchange of letters [outlining when Nixon would assume command] between him and the President along the lines of a draft which the President had shown me and on which I had made comments the day before." Eisenhower had consulted with Dulles before he talked with Nixon about a matter concerned specifically with Nixon, not the Secretary. But, Dulles did not reveal this to the Vice President. The

secret arrangement was of great interest to Nixon because it put in writing Nixon's role as leader in the event of Ike's incapacitation. Not even Nixon could justify leaking that agreement, but his reputation as a leader would have benefited had the media been informed. Uninterested in discussing the arrangement, Dulles changed the subject to economic warfare. As senior partner, he typically determined the content of meetings. On topic, Dulles immediately proposed the formation of a "Cabinet level group to study possible Soviet Economic Warfare." Although he feared the potential Soviet economic aggression, he did not detect it readily enough to dispense with a study group.

In a formal memorandum on January 10, Dulles presented Nixon with his plan for a Cabinet investigation. His fears stemmed from "the ability of the Western-fashioned economic system of private enterprise, the operation of which depends on profits, to survive in the event of all-out economic warfare by the Sino-Soviet industrialized totalitarian state system, which operates without regard to profits and which can channel the economic efforts of its people into international economic warfare."¹¹ Dulles saw dangers in Communist natural resource barter deals, intentional manipulation of staple markets and advocacy of nationalization of foreign investment. His concerns were that the U.S.S.R. could negotiate transactions far more beneficial to small countries in Asia and Africa, than America could manage. With trade came influence over a vast sector of non-aligned nations.

Economic warfare, although important, was still a single weapon among many in the Communist arsenal. Dulles visited the Vice President's residence in the early evening of Saturday, January 11, to discuss Cold War strategies in macro terms. He was troubled by the current "organization of cold war activities on the part of the United States." Nixon

maintained that that organization had to be improved. Typical of Dulles memoranda, the Secretary excluded all specifics, except to write that "We reviewed the problem in considerable detail, weighing the pros and cons and possibilities. I suggested the Vice President should give this matter further thought, and he said he would do so." Their discussion almost certainly covered US foreign aid, military preparedness, allied policy and America's reaction to Soviet global influence, including its economic presence. Once again, Dulles' trust in Nixon's foreign policy expertise prompted him to consult.

The Secretary actively sought Nixon's advice on issues that concerned and determined America's international policy. Because of this, the Vice President was able to mimic Eisenhower's hidden hand maneuver and maintain an influence on policy while the illusion persisted that he had none. He exploited a situation that brought him into the policy making circle, without actually stepping inside the ring. In fact, however, Nixon would have preferred to publicize the role.

On Tuesday, January 21, Dulles again mentioned a Cabinet subcommittee investigation of economic warfare. The Secretary expected to give Nixon a copy of his proposal by the end of the week. Nixon updated Dulles on his efforts to gain support for the program. He had scheduled, for the following day, a meeting with Clarence Randall (one of Ike's special economic advisors) and C. Douglas Dillon (advisor, Ambassador to France and soon to be Undersecretary Of State for Economic Affairs).

Dulles brought Nixon into his campaign to examine economic warfare for several reasons. First, he understood that Nixon was a loyal ally on this topic. Nixon agreed with Dulles' analysis and fears. He had always - especially after the Herter Committee - supported

foreign aid initiatives to counteract Soviet economic intrusions. Dulles' answer to Russia's economic warfare was increased US aid. In addition, Dulles knew Nixon could help recruit the support of other Administration officials, not yet convinced of the efficacy of Dulles' plans. The Vice President undoubtedly met with Dillon and Randall to gain their approval of Dulles' proposed study group.

In February and March, Dulles and Nixon continued to discuss the ramification of and possible defenses against economic warfare. On Saturday, February 8, they met at the Secretary's house. "We discussed at some length the project for a study of economic warfare." They again concluded that the Soviet Union could potentially disrupt the capitalist economy. In terms of meeting the Soviet threat, Nixon and Dulles determined that US economic aid programs "and meeting the Soviet bloc competition of the less developed countries" were important tactics. Nixon expressed his belief, with Dulles' agreement, that there remained room for "greater unity and efficiency . . . in this field of foreign aid."¹³ The conversation reiterated much of what Dulles and Nixon had been discussing for a month. Dulles' concern was high, as is apparent by his repeated broaching of the subject with Nixon. But, it was not until the beginning of March that the Cabinet actually discussed Sino-Soviet economic warfare.

During a lunchtime conversation at the State Department, the two associates talked about a possible summit conference, future dates for Nixon to travel to Europe and economic warfare. Dulles reported that they had "discussed the possibility of looking into the economic threat from the Soviet Union along the broad lines that had been discussed at Cabinet and our conversation at my house on February 8."¹⁴ His comment illustrated three facts. First, the

Cabinet had at least examined the topic. Next, the conversation of February 8 must have been in-depth and significant. It had occurred a month before and Dulles still cited it as an example. And finally, Dulles still was not satisfied with the Administration's efforts in regard to economic warfare. He continued to want an investigation of the economic threat posed by the Soviet Union. He continued to seek Nixon's assistance. He continued to debate the issues with the Vice President.

Nixon's close consultation with Dulles gave the impression that he worked for the Secretary, rather than the President. No past Vice President had enjoyed nearly the contact with the Secretary of State that Nixon shared with Dulles. Just the consultation with Dulles about overseas trips marked a notable departure from previous administrations. Up to that point, Vice Presidents simply had not traveled extensively, domestically or internationally. In a revolutionary evolution of the vice presidential office, Nixon gained a role as policy advisor to Dulles, as well.

Immediately after Gamal Nasser's 1956 seizure of the Suez Canal, Dulles phoned Nixon to discuss the situation. During the conversation the Secretary admitted "it is bad. The British and French are really anxious to start a war and get us into it etc. The Sec. said he is doing his best to make them realize they [British and French] may have to do it alone etc."¹⁵ Nixon expressed an interest in talking about the situation in person, and Dulles agreed that they should. Events, however, did not allow them to consult at length about the Suez crisis. Within a few weeks Dulles was incapacitated by his first battle against cancer, and Nixon became distracted with a battle of his own - against Democrats in the 1956 presidential campaign.

The Vice President and the Secretary both won their respective engagements of 1956. And Nixon's involvement with Dulles during the second Administration remained constant, if not greater. Perhaps as Dulles' illness returned and increased following the election, he relied more on the advice and talents of the Vice President.

In 1957, Dulles arranged for another departure from the traditional vice presidential role. Nixon requested, in February, that Dulles assign him some substantive task. The Vice President claimed he wanted a low publicity job, and "had in mind such tasks as disarmament, international economic development, or possibly such tasks as the development of the OAS." Dulles responded positively to this request, stating "I was confident that things of this sort would come along and promised the Vice President that I would be on the lookout for opportunities of public service of this character which he might perform." The Secretary proved true to his word, although it took him six or seven months to offer the expanded role, and it was not what the Vice President had envisioned. Instead of a greater foreign policy role, Dulles expanded Nixon's congressional relations function.

Dulles once complained that "the Secretary of State nowadays doesn't have nearly enough time to really create policy. He is tied up on Administration and he is always going to congressional committees." Dulles resented the hours that congressional hearings took from his schedule. Nixon's new assignment meant Dulles could concentrate on foreign relations.¹⁶ It amounted to the formalization of an ad hoc chore Nixon already performed, since the Vice President had participated in State-Congress relations from the first months of the Administration.

At dinner on August 24, Dulles and Nixon "spoke at some length about the possibility

of a more active role of the Vice President in relation to congressional affairs, having in mind the fact that he was the only official having constitutional and legal authority both with the Executive as a statutory member of the NSC and in the Congress as a presiding officer of the Senate." Dulles conceived of an assignment that took advantage of the few responsibilities given to someone in the vice presidential office, and therefore also met the parameters Ike set for Nixon's administrative duties.

Dulles' recollection of this conversation failed to mention one important aspect of the plan. The Secretary intended to allow Nixon to handle international affairs legislation in Congress, not just domestic. This made an otherwise unwelcome chore palatable for Nixon.

The Secretary carefully aligned supporters before approaching Eisenhower with his proposal. A week after discussing the enlarged role with Nixon, he broached the subject with Ike's close friend, Attorney General Herbert Brownell. Dulles told Brownell "Nixon should play a greater role as an intermediary between the Executive and the Congress . . ." adding he "did not think that the Vice-President would take the responsibility unless he had a clear-cut [presidential] mandate."¹⁷ The Attorney General agreed with the idea, thereby providing Dulles with a strong ally and legal clearance when he approached the President. Dulles knew that the additional voice would bolster his case and help him obtain the mandate. The directive served two purposes. First, it gave added prestige to the assignment, something Nixon always appreciated. Second, it gave the Vice President no choice but to accept.

On September 2, Dulles suggested to Eisenhower that Nixon be given "a greater role in preparing our congressional plans." He clarified his position further by noting "I did not of course think in terms of the VP doing liaison work and dealing with members of Congress,

but merely functioning at the upper strategy level." Dulles presented upper strategy level as something less crucial than front line liaison work in Congress. But Eisenhower's military career had been as a strategic planner, not a trench soldier. The value Eisenhower placed on liaison work versus planning was apparent in the fact that Nixon already performed the former for the President.

Ike expressed reservations, explaining he did not want to give Nixon a hand in all the programs. But, Dulles convinced Ike to accept Nixon's help in planning strategy for Mutual Security Assistance, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act and the Bricker Amendment.

That same day, Eisenhower dictated a draft letter to Nixon. He presented the Vice President with a bounded version of Dulles' plan. He began "My basic thought is that you might find it possible -- and intriguing -- to be of even more help in our whole government program with affairs abroad than you have been in the past." Eisenhower praised Nixon's "inestimable assistance to the Secretary of State and me" and his "unusual and comprehensive" knowledge of US foreign affairs. The President then relayed Dulles' plan for Nixon to take a greater role in steering Executive legislation through Congress. He limited the Vice President to "strictly State Department legislation. . . ." Ike told Nixon the "main mission I would see for you would be helping the State Department plan its legislative presentations." To ensure Dulles did not expand Nixon's role, Eisenhower insisted that the Vice President consult with the White House staff in charge of congressional relations "so that the entire legislative program could be presented in the most advantageous manner."¹⁸ While correlating State and White House efforts was a sound procedure, the directive also allowed Ike to monitor Nixon's actions.

The letter appealed to Nixon with rare presidential praise. Eisenhower, however, avoided any reference to strategic planning and implied Nixon would not commence an advisory position in State. Still, the President's coolness did not inhibit Dulles from using Nixon as a congressional relations consultant. And, while Nixon longed for a greater influence in foreign policy decisions, he recognized that openly advising Dulles on international legislation in Congress was an important advancement.

Dulles repeated the tactic he had used when he recommended Nixon for the position of Secretary of State. His plan included elements that appealed to both Nixon and Eisenhower, but was motivated by enlightened self-interest. He lost no time in consulting with Nixon about how to push the 1958 legislative program through Congress. And, Nixon quickly appropriated the Development Loan Fund issue, a project acceptable to Eisenhower.¹⁹

Congressional relations was by no means the only interaction Dulles and Nixon shared after the 1956 election. The Secretary continued to rely on Nixon's advice. During a term plagued with international crises, Dulles included Nixon in the deliberations concerning at least three: the Soviet launching of the first man made satellite, Sputnik, the US intervention in Lebanon and the second mainland Chinese bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu.

On October 4, 1957, Russia launched Sputnik. The orbiting satellite shocked Americans in every walk of life. For the Administration, it raised questions about the adequacy of US missile development, scientific education in schools and security from surprise attack. On top of these issues came the problem of dealing with the psychological blow dealt to the American people by losing the race into space to their nemesis. The November 3 launching of Sputnik II intensified all the US reactions. This second Russian

satellite carried a live dog into space.²⁰

In the midst of this crisis, Nixon fell prey to Dulles' revised agenda. With his new legislative aide, the Secretary's willingness to send Nixon abroad waned. On October 15, Dulles withdrew support for a trip to Europe he and Nixon had discussed for several months. Instead, Dulles claimed he needed Nixon for the legislative program. As they discussed Congress and the reaction to Sputnik, the Secretary, suggested "We have to break down the [congressional] insolidarity which is imposed upon us so we can have a larger measure of cooperation on nuclear weapons among our allies." Dulles wanted to expand missile programs. Nixon advised that the Administration had to seize the initiative, before Congress opened an investigation on why America had not launched a satellite first. He offered his analysis, but did not abandon his travel request. Ignoring Dulles' initial suggestion to sideline the trip, Nixon restated his willingness to tour Europe, only adding that if Ike wanted him to stay home, he would.²¹ The Vice President did not go abroad.

Sputnik spurred high level meetings throughout the Administration to discuss the US reaction. Dulles, the new Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy (appointed October 9), his Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles, Nixon, presidential assistant, Sherman Adams, and unnamed "others" came together for one such meeting on November 27.²² The situation required that Dulles and Defense department officials consult outside of regular Cabinet meetings. However, the reason behind Adams' and Nixon's inclusion was not immediately clear.

Adams maintained that White House staff members rarely took part in policy discussions, yet he sat in on this critical meeting. He never would have attended had the

President not fallen ill two days before. Eisenhower suffered a minor stroke on November 25 and he was not yet up to attending meetings. He spent that Wednesday working on papers in his private rooms. If not ill, he would not have missed a meeting that dealt with the national security of the United States. Adams undoubtedly acted as Eisenhower's representative.

Nixon's inclusion also was unexpected. While he went to most Cabinet and National Security Council meetings, he seldom attended this type of inter-departmental session. Like Adams, his presence at this meeting might best be explained by Eisenhower's lack of attendance. With Eisenhower briefly out of commission, it was appropriate that his technical second in command attend an important meeting. Appropriate or not, however, Dulles did not have to invite Nixon because Eisenhower had not been fully incapacitated and Adams represented the President. Nixon's presence was a result of the good will of Dulles. The Secretary took advantage of the situation to bring Nixon, at least this once, into the inner circle of advisors.²³

Dulles chaired the event, if not officially, then by default. McElroy was new to his position and Dulles outranked everyone else, except technically Nixon. The discussion centered on two issues. First, was the need to accelerate work in the long range missile program. Second, the question of the psychological importance of deploying intermediate range missiles in NATO countries as a response to Sputnik. Russia's ability to orbit a satellite was taken as a sign that the US had fallen behind in rocket science. Thus, America's missile program instantly became a national concern.

At the meeting, Dulles explained that he favored a single missile program instead of the current double efforts with the Thor and Jupiter projects. He admitted, however, "other

factors were controlling and that there was an irresistible pressure to accelerate the program and demonstrate our capacity as rapidly as possible." The participants appeared to be in accord.²⁴ There was little to disagree about. The United States had to illustrate its own technological aptitude or concede to Soviet superiority.

Despite the small role Nixon took during this meeting, his participation represented a rare chance for him to join directly in the foreign policy decision making process. The next time Dulles included Nixon in a national security concern, the Vice President was unable to come directly into the fold. They reverted to their standard method of unofficial consultation.

In 1958, the Administration detected increasingly disturbing trends in the Middle East. American intelligence perceived Nasserite subversion in Iraq and threats to the pro-US monarchy in Jordan. In July, concerns compounded when Lebanese President Camille Chamoun requested an American military intervention to help stabilize his government and end a coup against him. Examining the region using domino theory logic, Administration members feared the loss of one anti-Communist or pro-western regime would weaken resistance among the other Arab countries and lead to Communist domination. They were faced with three possible defeats in the Middle East.

Chamoun's request for US intervention presented Eisenhower with a perfect opportunity to increase America's presence in the Middle East, and protect its interests. On the morning of July 14, the President gathered his advisors to discuss the US response to Lebanon's plight. Eisenhower wanted an invasion force. That afternoon he explained the situation to a bipartisan group of Congressmen. The following day marines were on the beaches of Lebanon. The US force, consisting of at least 5,000 troops, remained in Lebanon

until October.

The historical importance of the Lebanese landing generally has been downplayed. If mentioned at all, historians include only a few sentences about the event. The marines found beautiful beaches and surprised vacationers, but little more insidious. Yet, at the time, Administration officials considered the action with a greater urgency. This is evident both in Eisenhower's recollection of the events - discussed in Waging Peace - and in documents relating to the intervention.

It is therefore of some significance that Nixon knew about the operation from the beginning. This was an operation that would become public abruptly - when the marines landed - so perhaps Dulles felt it prudent to keep Nixon informed. In any case, he and the Vice President talked on the phone just minutes before the marines went ashore. Nixon predicted "if it works we are all heroes and if not we are bums and it will probably be something in between." Dulles noted "in 7 minutes they [marines] should land. The Pres will issue a short statement as soon as we get a flash and Lodge will speak at the UN at 10." Without Dulles, it is doubtful Nixon could have amassed as much information as he did before the landing.²⁵

A second telephone conversation between Dulles and Nixon illustrated both the importance of the intervention, and Nixon's line to the Oval Office through Dulles. At 6:49 in the evening on July 15, Nixon called Dulles to discuss current affairs. They touched on two subjects - the Sherman Adams scandal and the situation in Lebanon.²⁶ The Vice President's interest in Adams' predicament rested on two factors. Since Eisenhower's heart attack in 1955 their rivalry for Ike's attentions had become more definite. Nixon rarely came

out ahead. Also, with a touch of irony, Eisenhower ordered Nixon to convince Adams to resign. So, it was no surprise that Nixon talked about the Presidential assistant. In regard to the decision-making about Lebanon, however, Nixon had no direct involvement. Both Dulles brothers were officially consulted about the intervention, Nixon was not. Nevertheless, Nixon and Dulles discussed the situation in detail.

Nixon advocated a strong US position in the Middle East. He feared that Eisenhower might vacillate, despite having taken the initial step. While Jordan and Iraq still faced anti-western influences, Nixon concluded that Great Britain could take the lead in those areas. But, he maintained that America had to support any British action in those areas "in the event [of] similar circumstances [to Lebanon]." Dulles cautioned that the US did not want to "get bogged down like the Br in Suez and have to pull out. We have assets in Lebanon we don't have in other places." Dulles, hesitant to commit to Jordan and Iraq, did not sway Nixon. He ignored the caution and addressed what he saw at the heart of the issue. "N said the point is Lebanon is not too important and the Sec agreed. The Sec said Jordan is unimportant." They agreed that "Iraq is the big thing" - probably because of oil interests. Dulles mentioned that British Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd might come to Washington to discuss the situation.²⁷

This after-hours conversation revealed how Nixon gained access into the decision making process. Without Dulles, he acted only as Eisenhower's messenger boy, as in the case of Sherman Adams. Dulles provided Nixon with opportunities to expand his knowledge of the Administration's foreign relations activities. The Vice President made the most of those opportunities.

Another international incident broke a month later. On August 23, 1958, mainland China began shelling two islands claimed by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces. Four years earlier the islands Quemoy and Matsu first had been attacked by the Communist regime. In response to that assault, Eisenhower proposed and saw passed the Formosa Resolution, a congressional act authorizing the President to protect the area from Communist aggression using whatever means he deemed necessary. When the Chinese Communists attacked again in 1958, Eisenhower had the ability to respond instantly and did. He sent the Seventh Fleet to protect supply convoys from Taiwan to Quemoy.²⁸

Nixon's first recorded briefing on the situation in Asia came during a lunch conversation with the Secretary on September 5. Dulles "discussed with the Vice President the situation in the Taiwan Straits and briefed him on what we are doing about it." The Vice President wondered whether certain Congressmen should be briefed. Although Nixon recommended a standard tactic - Ike used it with the Lebanese intervention - Dulles probably rejected it in view of the blanket authority provided by the Formosa Resolution.

The upcoming congressional elections gave Nixon a valid excuse to pester Dulles for up-to-date information on the crisis. The Vice President had speeches to make and media to inform. He used the situation to broach foreign relations topics in terms of domestic politics. On September 25, he asked how to handle Quemoy and Matsu at an upcoming press conference.²⁹ Although not prompted to, the Secretary launched into a detailed explanation of the situation, laid out his position and gave Nixon the opportunity to present his own viewpoint.

Dulles first explained why America had to protect Quemoy, despite a common belief

that US involvement was not worth risking a Sino-American confrontation. Dulles said "we don't want to fight for them but the problem cannot be simplified in that way." He complained that Chaing would not give up his island bases, regardless of US wishes. Further, if American aid stopped the islands would be captured and Communist China could continue its aggression until it conquered Taiwan. "The broad challenge is are we going to keep the Western shores of the Pacific in friendly hands or not?" Working in the domino theory mindset, Dulles saw no choice but to defend Quemoy and Matsu to prevent Formosa from succumbing to China. As China's influence expanded, Dulles envisioned Japan eventually being forced to make terms with this foe. The Secretary's analysis mirrored Eisenhower's own conclusions, and thereby provided Nixon with an accurate understanding of top policy decisions.

Nixon assumed he "would be on firm ground to take the same firm line." Dulles replied that the Administration was "flexible on the offshore islands. We would take any solution short of retreat or surrender so these islands would cease to be provocations." What Dulles intended as an alternate solution is not clear. But, it was apparent that he did not want Nixon to publicly espouse a plan that the Administration might later renounce. By advising Nixon against the firm line approach, he protected his ability to change his policy without media or partisan recriminations.

By reputation, flexibility was not Dulles' hallmark, but in fact he opposed one track responses. In public he favored simple, judicious remarks. Historian Frederick Marks, however, noted that Dulles' "straight forward public statements were totally at variance with the wealth of distinctions and qualifications that regularly informed his private thought." The

Secretary believed the public did not have the sophistication to deal with the nuances of foreign relations and simplified his public remarks to present a concise, easily digestible product. Yet, he also recognized the dangers of the exaggerated statements which appealed to Nixon. He reminded Nixon of the need for cautious comments, with the hope of maintaining his policy options.

Dulles' response also provided Nixon with a little more insight on American aims in the region. The Secretary wanted to end this confrontation quickly because he feared it might expand inadvertently. Already a recurring problem, he hoped to find a solution that would remove Quemoy and Matsu as contentious factors. To most inquirers Dulles probably would not have dispensed this detailed analysis. But then, Dulles did not invite most people to Sunday dinner as he did Nixon, when their conversation ended.³⁰

About two weeks later, Nixon asked for another briefing on Quemoy and Matsu - this time in regard to a speech the Vice President had scheduled. When Nixon asked for advice Dulles responded in kind. Discussing Red China's decision to bombard the islands every other day, Dulles asked for Nixon's guidance, but did not present the Vice President with any policy questions. Instead, he described the situation in full and waited for Nixon to respond. "The Sec said it is an extraordinarily interesting development. We had always hoped that there would come about not through our talks in Warsaw but through force of events a de facto cease-fire. . . ." Now, during off days, ships could resupply the outposts as much as desired. China had effectively closed the doors on an invasion. The Secretary expressed his disbelief and satisfaction with the new Chinese policy. By unilaterally withdrawing, China had submitted to world pressures and limited its ability to reinitiate hostilities. "Unless they

[PRC] can get some pretext from the Nationalists it does not make much sense. They would take the onus of starting it again." Renewed shelling would create an international outcry against the Communists. The US just had to ensure Chaing did not provoke an attack from the mainland.

The Secretary assumed that global opinion would keep the PRC in check. He recognized that the size of mainland China precluded its isolation from world affairs for more than a few decades. In fact, he welcomed their participation. He reasoned that for mainland China to gain acceptance, it would have to renounce its more aggressive philosophies and accept international laws. The Red Chinese retreat signified an acknowledgment that world opinion influenced mainland China. Dulles guessed that "they have decided the better line is to try at the moment to work on internal dissension in Taiwan" That tactic avoided the international forum. Eisenhower joked that the revised bombarding schedule resembled a "Gilbert and Sullivan war." Certainly, the face saving tactic of shelling on odd days was unimpressive to the vast majority of global spectators.

When Dulles finished, Nixon replied. He considered both his immediate question of how to deal with the upcoming speech and, by implication, provided Dulles his counsel. Trying to determine guidelines, he asked if "a [dependable] de facto cease-fire would be sufficient to allow a reduction of forces." Nixon also wondered "if the Sec had no objection to his continuing to say our policy of firmness in rejecting the concept of the use of force to accomplish international objectives and with our willingness to negotiate in the event force is not used. . . ." ³¹ These two positions were not contentious and therefore satisfied Dulles. In voicing them, Nixon also offered the Secretary a practical policy stance. A de facto cease-fire

meant Dulles could advocate a decreased role for American forces (and probably a troop reduction of Chaing's garrisons on Quemoy and Matsu). Plus, Nixon noted the US willingness to negotiate, after Red China ended its aggression. The PRC would then be working within the free world's moral framework. Nixon's analysis implied a previous familiarity with Dulles' conception of how to deal with the Red Chinese.

Nixon consulted with Dulles almost to the last day of the Secretary's life. On April 4, less than two weeks before Dulles resigned as Secretary of State, they discussed a bevy of topics. Nixon asked whether or not he should meet with the newly empowered Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Dulles recommended it, but only after thorough consultation with R. Richard Rubottom - Undersecretary for Latin American Affairs. The Vice President also mentioned his reluctance to head the American delegation to the Inter-American Conference, "in view of the experiences of his last trip to South America" - although Eisenhower had already raised the subject. Whether or not Nixon feared a return to Latin America, or just raised the topic for dramatic effect, he did not go to the conference. And, in fact, by April Dulles probably did not have any influence on that decision.

Finally, Nixon wondered if Dulles had any misgivings about him visiting the Soviet Union during the summer. To Nixon's great pleasure, Dulles supported the initiative. "The Secretary. . . said he would have no objection to the Vice President raising the matter with the President."

On May 2, Nixon talked with Dulles at Walter Reed Hospital. By this time, Nixon's trip to Moscow had been approved. Dulles advised the Vice President not to stop in Great Britain, Germany or France before he visited Russia. Instead, Nixon could consult with the

allies on his way back if "during his visit to Moscow the Vice President learned something of real significance. . . ." On May 20, four days before Dulles died, they met again to discuss the trip to Russia. Dulles advised his friend to let Khrushchev know that America would not allow the Soviets to compete in the Capitalist world, while banning competition in the Communist world.³² His comment harkened back to his fear of economic warfare. Whether Nixon listened to this advice out of respect for his dying mentor, or to gain an edge with Khrushchev is unknowable. With the loss of his strength, Dulles also lost his influence. Nixon's incentive to follow Dulles' suggestions over his own instinct waned. When the Vice President reached Moscow, he largely ignored the Secretary's concerns.

However, throughout most of their association Nixon valued the consultation he and Dulles shared. In appreciation, he developed a fierce loyalty for the Secretary - defending Dulles, when the Secretary could not do so himself. During the June 15, 1955 NSC meeting - over which Nixon presided - the Vice President revealed this allegiance. After listening to various Council members discuss "what we should and should not do with respect to getting rid of outmoded military concepts. . ." he noted they were overstepping their bounds. Nixon remarked that Dulles (probably absent from the meeting because Chancellor Adenauer was in Washington) "may well have something to say about what is feasible and what is not feasible from a political point of view with respect to dumping old concepts and defense strategies." ³³ Invoking Dulles' authority, Nixon brought the discussion to a halt. He assumed the Secretary would not support the line of reasoning that these NSC members were following. The interruption made it easier for Dulles to argue against their positions later, since they had no chance to draw conclusions, or make recommendations. It also bestowed authority on Nixon

as the Secretary's representative. He specifically avoided mention of Ike because he could not claim a close association with the President.

Recognizing Dulles' patronage, Nixon used whatever opportunities he found to support the Dulles position. He admitted as much during a telephone conversation at the end of August, 1955, while consulting with Dulles about a speech. Dulles instructed Nixon to deny the talk was cleared by State. The Vice President accepted that. An un-sanctioned speech gave the illusion of some independence from the Administration. With that came a modicum of perceived foreign relations authority assigned by the media. Nixon added "he likes to say things the Sec. might want to say but can't himself." This remark revealed the adroitness of his scheme. The authority Nixon gained by speaking independently of Dulles was reinforced by the fact that he was actually proposing a State Department condoned policy. He could be an unofficial spokesman for State without ever admitting it, benefiting his and Dulles' causes. Nixon remained steadfast for the Secretary, until Dulles' final day. Yet, he did not put Dulles' priorities before his own.³⁴

It should never be concluded that the Nixon-Dulles relationship had any basis in equality. Dulles helped his friend when he benefited from the arrangement. If the Secretary anticipated detrimental results to State, he gave no aid. Nixon understood that Dulles would preserve his own position over Nixon's. And, if he did not, Dulles made it completely apparent in 1957.

One Saturday in February, the Secretary raised the subject of a proposal to appoint Nixon as Chair of the Operations Coordinating Board - a committee that organized foreign relations efforts throughout the government. Dulles disapproved of the suggestion. He

candidly explained "I did not consider it compatible with good organization that someone speaking with the authority of the Vice President and presumably in the name of the President should go over my head to give directives to my subordinates in the State Department. . . . I must oppose a step which seemed to be to be [sic] incompatible with my authority in the State Department." Dulles expected to be Eisenhower's primary source in foreign relations decisions, and was not about to hand over some of that authority to his apprentice.³⁵ While Nixon wanted to accept the promotion, he knew Dulles would not allow it. If he pressed for a determination from Eisenhower, he would lose the argument and in the process injure his relationship with the Secretary. Nixon preferred to fight battles less costly.

Dulles died eighteen months before the end of the Eisenhower Administration. He would have appreciated some of the events that occurred during that year and a half. Most obviously, Dulles missed the event on which he had advised Nixon during the final month - the Vice President's trip to Russia. Despite Nixon's lack of concrete results, Dulles would have admired Nixon's historic tour, highlighted by the kitchen debate with Khrushchev and the televised broadcast of a speech to the Russian people. The Secretary also did not live to see Khrushchev's reciprocal visit to the US or the invitation Ike received to visit Russia in 1960.

On the other hand, almost a year after Dulles' death a U-2 airplane piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down over Soviet airspace. Following American denials of wrongdoing, Dulles was spared the embarrassing Communist revelation that Powers was alive and his mission one of espionage. The Secretary also did not live to see the resultant breakdown of the 1960 Summit and rising tensions between the U.S.S.R. and America.

The Secretary's death left Nixon to fend for himself. During the next year, the Vice President worked alone to maintain his presidential prospects. Unfortunately for Nixon, as the end of the Administration approached, Eisenhower began asserting his own character. Ike wanted to bring peace to the world.³⁶ He wanted his leadership skills to show.

The President publicized his international relations expertise by taking four overseas goodwill tours before the end of his term. Had the U-2 incident been avoided, Eisenhower would also have visited Moscow. Although Khrushchev manipulated the US government with great skill during the crisis, the President still handled the events with courage and determination. Despite his failure to bring a new understanding between the Capitalist and the Communist worlds, Ike left office with much of his popularity and respectability intact. Nixon's public forum was eclipsed. His foreign travel was restricted by Ike's actions and his own campaign. He lost the 1960 presidential election and had no obvious future prospects.

The Nixon-Dulles alliance was close both in terms of friendship and consultation. The previous chapter illustrated the amicability present between the Secretary of State and the Vice President. This chapter has shown the professional side of their relationship. Dulles frequently discussed his positions with the Vice President. He brought Nixon into his confidence, shared ideas, listened to advice and suggested tactics. The relationship affected both men in their official capacities.

But, Dulles' patronage had limits. He revealed them in October 1957, when he adopted the same stance Eisenhower had taken in December 1953. The Secretary valued Nixon's help on legislative matters above his friends' desire for international affairs experience. The change confirmed that the Secretary would help his friend until their

respective purposes contradicted. Then Dulles gently pulled rank, as in the OCB incident.

Nixon's relationship with Dulles was a determining factor in how the Vice President was able to present himself to the world. Dulles handed Nixon opportunities to enhance his image and increase his power that the President would not consider. Nixon made the best of Dulles' help, while still seeking to expand his role beyond what the Secretary offered. And, of course, he had always to contend with the limits that Eisenhower placed on his office.

ENDNOTES:

1. Richard M. Nixon, "Vice President Nixon Writes About Dulles," Life, Volume 46, number 23, June 8, 1959. Time, Inc: Chicago, IL: 36.
2. Eric P. Roorda, "The President and His Boy: The Relationship Between Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon." (Unpublished Honors Thesis) Williamsburg, Virginia: College of William and Mary, 1983: 58. Eric Roorda writes in his Masters thesis about several methods Nixon used to obtain policy information independently from Dulles. Roorda notes, "Nixon was not treated to special briefings in order to insure his knowledge of the Administration agenda, rather he obtained his detailed grasp of current issues through persistence and individual study, taking every opportunity to increase his formidable store of information. One of his regular practices was daily visits to the White House for coffee, at which time he kept abreast of various situations in an ad hoc way." While this description is undoubtedly accurate, it does not take into account Foster Dulles, the tremendous fountain of information from which Nixon regularly quenched his thirst.
3. The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project [hereafter JFDOHP], Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with John W. Hanes, Jr. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Great Fall, VA 29 January and August, 1966: 242.
4. Ibid: 57; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library. Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor. Philip A Crowl Interviewer. Far Hills, New Jersey 2 April, 1966: 142; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 19 April, 1954 (5:15am), John Foster Dulles Papers Eisenhower Library 1951-1959 [hereafter JFDPEL 1951-1959], Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series, November 1, 1953--August 31, 1954; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 16 March, 1955 (5:38pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 3 Telephone Conversations Series, September 1, 1954 - April 29, 1955.
5. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 13 August, 1954 (10:53am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series November 1, 1953--August 31, 1954; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 18 April, 1957 (11:43am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 6 Telephone Conversations Series January, 1957 - June 27, 1957; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 28 May, 1953, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Volume XII. (ed. Louis Galambos) "NATO and the Campaign of 1952." Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, MD, 1989: 437; The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961: 187.
6. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 3 May, 1955 (11:44am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 4 Telephone Conversations Series May 2, 1955 - April 30, 1956;

Conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 30 September, 1957 (1:00pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper.

7. *A Chronology of United State Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles As Secretary Of State.* Compiled by Dr. Philip A. Crowl. Princeton University Library, June 1964, 1954: 2; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, July 9, 1954 (3:48pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series November 1, 1953-- August 31, 1954.

8. Letter from John Foster Dulles to Richard M. Nixon, 5 November, 1955, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton, NJ, John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material, Box: 96 Nixon, Richard M., 1955. Dulles' letter to Nixon is interesting in its detail and the opportunity it provides us with to see Dulles, as he thinks. He wrote to Nixon, "This represents the major gain which I hoped we might achieve at this conference, namely to create a situation so that the Soviets could no longer effectively claim that the reunification of Germany would involve their security." Dulles did not believe immediate reunification would be achieved, but noted that the tremendous progress toward that end. He continued, "We have, however, maneuvered the Soviets into a position where their defense of the division of Germany has now to be based primarily upon ideological and political considerations, i.e., the unnatural and dangerous division of a great people merely to extend the rule of Communism rather than upon security factors. This makes their moral position much weaker and I believe over the coming months it will be possible to hammer it hard. Their whole world position can be damaged by the weakness of their present position on German Reunification."

9. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 27 March, 1957 (10:30am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 6 Telephone Conversations Series January, 1957 - June 27, 1957; Telephone conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 9 October, 1957 (9:25am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957.

10. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 April, 1957 (11:51am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 6 Telephone Conversations Series January, 1957 - June 27, 1957; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 23 July, 1958 (5:54pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 30 July, 1956 (5:06pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 5 Telephone Conversations Series January, 3 1956 - December 29, 1956.

11. Informal meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 8 January, 1958 (11:00am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6: Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Cabinet Meeting, 3 January, 1958, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Cabinet Series, Box 10; Memorandum John Foster Dulles to Richard

M. Nixon, 10 January, 1958, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper.

12. Informal meeting, Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 11 January, 1958 (5::00pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 General Correspondence and Memoranda; Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 21 January, 1958 (11:18am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956-1961, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965: 321; Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963: 581.

13. Informal meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 8 January, 1958 (11:00am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6: Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper.

14. Meeting, State Department, Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles 4 March, 1958, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper.

15. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 30 July, 1956 (5:06pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 5 Telephone Conversations Series January, 3 1956 - December 29, 1956.

16. On June 9, 1953, Nixon organized a breakfast meeting between Dulles and several young senators. Interestingly, the following day the morning repast had expanded to 40 Representatives and ten Senators. The intended purpose of the meeting was to provide a briefing to Republican Congressmen on the world situation. The breakfast apparently went well, since Nixon continued to advise Dulles on congressional relation to various degrees. Like Eisenhower, Dulles recognized the Vice President as an able congressional liaison. In 1954, Nixon advised Dulles on which Congressmen to take to Geneva with him. Later during the year he recommended against consulting with Congress on the Quemoy/Matsu crisis, although he added that immediately before Ike took action, Senator Knowland should be informed. This was even a suggestion that Dulles passed onto Eisenhower, in Nixon's name. Likewise, during the early days of the Suez Crisis, Dulles discussed congressional relations with Nixon to determine which Congressmen should accompany him to the London Conference. Cyrus L. Sulzberger, A Long Row of Candles: Memoirs and Diaries [1934 - 1954]. The Macmillan Company: Toronto, Canada, 1969: 749; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 9 June, 1953 (6:20pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 Telephone Conversations Series January 1953--October 31, 1953; Ibid: 10 June, 1953 (9:45am); Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 29 March, 1954 (11:21am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series November 1, 1953--August 31, 1954; Telephone call John Foster Dulles and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 5 October, 1954,

Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: DDE Diary Series, Box 7, File Phone Calls - June-Dec. 1954; Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles Paper, 3 January, 1957 (10:41am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 6 Telephone Conversations Series January, 1957 - June 27, 1957.

17. Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 August, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Memorandum of conversation John Foster Dulles and Herbert Brownwell, 1 September, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 General Correspondence and Memoranda; Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z.

18. Memorandum of conversation John Foster Dulles and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 2 September, 1957 (3:00pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Ibid: Draft letter Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, 2 September, 1957; Memorandum on Appointments, 3 September, 1957, Eisenhower Library. Whitman File: DDE Diary Series, Box 27, File September - 1957.

19. Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 30 September, 1957 (1:00pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper.

20. A Chronology of United State Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles As Secretary Of State. Compiled by Dr. Philip A. Crowl. Princeton University Library, June 1964, 1957: 10.

21. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 October, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957; Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 24 August, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper. Dulles continued to employ Nixon as a congressional advisor and lobbyist for State Department programs. In October, the Vice President met with "a fairly potent group." He told Dulles, "his primary purpose will be to give a shot in the arm to economic aid etc." The topic was a State Department cause which Nixon hoped to convince these men to support. Whether or not they were Congressmen, undoubtedly they would have an influence in Congress. This assignment, however, revealed that despite Dulles' attempt to make Nixon a political strategist for State Department legislation, the Vice President frequently ended up in his role as liaison - just as Eisenhower preferred. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon to John Foster Dulles, 21 September, 1957 (5:13pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957.

22. Memorandum of meeting, 27 November, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 General Correspondence and Memoranda; Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z. I assume the "others" mentioned in this memorandum were low level advisors and support

staff, since they are not recognized as holding any positions of authority.

23. The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project [JFDOHP], Princeton University Library. A Transcript of a Recorded Interview with Sherman Adams. Richard D. Challener, Interviewer. Lincoln, New Hampshire. 15 August 1964 3, 6; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, Volume II. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984: 435, 437.

24. Memorandum of meeting, 27 November, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 1 General Correspondence and Memoranda; Conversation Subseries A-Conversation Subseries Z Folder 1. I only noticed this memorandum because of Nixon's extraordinary inclusion in the meeting. He did not attend many inter-departmental meetings.

25. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 171-176; A Chronology of United State Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles As Secretary Of State. Compiled by Dr. Philip A. Crowl. Princeton University Library, June 1964, 1958: 8; Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan American Foreign Policy A History Since 1900, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1989: 507; Walter LaFeber, The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Volume 2 - Since 1896, New York: W. W. Norton, 1994: 565; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 17 July, 1958 (8:46am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958.

26. Adams was accused of taking bribes from a New Hampshire businessman, Mr. Goldfine. In exchange Adams supposedly attempted to influence an SEC investigation of Mr. Goldfine's real estate company.

27. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 July, 1958 (6:49pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958. In fact, Great Britain intervened in Jordan on July 17, at the request of Jordan's King.

28. Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 297.

29. Memorandum of lunch meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 5 September, 1958, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper. Keep in mind that Nixon did not ask many people for advice on what to discuss in his press conferences or include in his speeches. He was notorious for doing things his own way. That he consulted Dulles on how to discuss foreign relations matters implied that he a) hoped to flatter Dulles by asking him, b) wanted to increase his knowledge about Administration foreign relations issues, c) respected Dulles' analysis and information.

30. Frederick W. Marks. III, Power and Peace: The Diplomacy of John Foster Dulles. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993: 7; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 25 September, 1958 (12:30pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series

August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959.

31. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 7 October, 1958 (3:32pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 9 Telephone Conversations Series August 1, 1958 - May 8, 1959; Herbert S. Parmet, Richard Nixon and His America. Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company., 1990: 341; Eisenhower, Waging Peace: 304; Sulzberger: 750; JFDOHP, John W. Hanes: 166, 177; JFDOHP, Roderic L. O'Connor: 44.

32. Informal meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, Walter Reed Hospital, 4 April, 1959, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Informal meeting Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, Walter Reed Hospital, 2 May, 1959 (11:30am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon, Volume I - The Education of a Politician 1913-1962. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1987: 517.

33. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990: 331. (NSC 288 6/15/55).

34. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 29 August, 1955 (10:09am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 4 Telephone Conversations Series May 2, 1955 - April 30, 1956; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 7 April, 1954, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 2 Telephone Conversations Series November 1, 1953--August 31, 1954. In 1954, Dulles had asked Nixon to deliver a speech to the OAS Council. He instructed Nixon to "mention Latin-American solidarity, good will, some kind words for the Caracas conference, etc."

35. Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 2 February, 1957, JFDPEL 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical, Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon – Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper; JFDOHP John W. Hanes: 8, 184; JFDOHP Roderic L. O'Connor: 30; Shelley: 77.

36. Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, Volume II: 513.

Chapter 4
Nixon's Search for a Role - The First Term

Richard Nixon's vice presidential duties were considerable and varied. For the Administration as a whole, he acted as a congressional liaison, political advisor, roving ambassador, die hard campaigner, international relations expert and media target. Among those roles, however, Nixon sought to emphasize his expertise in foreign affairs. Although he did not shy away from political name calling or congressional wrangling, he yearned for the prestige and respect accorded a statesman. He also understood experience in international affairs could help him toward the Oval Office.

During his vice presidency, Nixon attempted to enhance his image as a foreign specialist publicly and in the Administration. Concurrently, Eisenhower envisioned a much different picture of Mr. Nixon. When they entered the White House in 1953, Ike assured Nixon a greater role in the Administration than any previous Vice President, and he was true to his word.¹ But, that did not mean Nixon was informed of every decision or that he was consulted on each crisis. Ike valued the Vice President's political worth above all else. He emphasized Nixon's ability as a congressional advisor and negotiator for the Executive branch. Although a much less dignified job than foreign relations advisor, there was no question that Nixon managed this role well.

Nixon's friend and patron Foster Dulles saw a combination of roles for the Vice President. He found Nixon's talents extended beyond congressional relations. He attempted to use the Vice President's skills wherever they could be applied. Hence, Dulles gave Nixon some of the foreign relations prestige he desperately craved, kept Nixon working on congressional problems and had the Vice President serve as an information source.

Although they had built a relationship by 1953, Dulles' earnest mentorship of Nixon did not begin from day one. Nixon was without an ally at the start of the Administration, as he would be again after Dulles died. Of necessity, the Californian fended for himself.

Nixon's position in the Administration took most of the first year to solidify. As he sought to carve a niche out, Nixon responded to the personalities of Ike and Dulles. He attempted to make his responses compatible with theirs. Initially, he was unsure of how to act. At the pre-inaugural cabinet meeting in the Commodore Hotel, Nixon manifested this insecurity. According to historian Stephen Ambrose, "Nixon limited his remarks to heartily endorsing whatever Eisenhower said" during the meeting.² It was not a surprising reaction, given the circumstances. Ike exuded confidence and control. Nixon was unsure of his position in the Administration and of how to approach the situation. For all of his political expertise, he was out of his element, part of a meeting where everyone was his senior and most knew the President-elect more intimately than he did. He may even have been star struck by his close proximity to the commanding general of World War II.

The Vice President did not remain passive for too long. Following the inauguration, he began to carefully feel for his footing, taking exploratory steps to find where he could comfortably stand and where he hit quicksand. He would spend the entire Administration

doing this to some extent. However, after his first trip abroad in the Fall of 1953, he adopted a more confident and assertive manner.

In Administration meetings Nixon made a point of being heard, even if his comments were ignored. When he had something relevant to add to the discussion he did, but he sometimes interjected remarks that only marginally concerned the topic at hand. This probably reflected his insecurity and his desire to be an active participant in the decision making process.

At one of the first National Security Council meetings Nixon revealed his discomfort as Vice President. The discussion dealt with Mohammed Mossadegh's reign in Iran. When Nixon spoke up he relied on his debating techniques and inserted a prosecutorial diatribe against Communist infiltration in Iran that was vaguely reminiscent of his verbal attack on L. J. Cromie in 1947. As though on HUAC, Nixon predicted "greater rather than less hostility was to be expected from the Russians after Stalin's death. It was quite likely, therefore, that they would increase their presence in Iran to secure its control as rapidly as possible by a *coup d'etat*."³ Nixon's reference to Stalin came without warning. His emphasis on Russian intervention had not been discussed. Finally, his analysis that the Soviets would become more aggressive, rather than less, did not reflect the general belief expressed at the meeting. Nixon's line of argument did not seem to convince anyone, nor did he again raise it in this manner. He realized the inappropriate tone of his outburst and adapted his anti-Communism to be less demagogic. The next time he spoke up, Nixon would be more analytical.

At the May 13, NSC meeting, the minutes recorded that "The Vice President again reverted to the view he had expressed at last week's Council meeting, that the decision which

the Council must presently take, with respect to alternative courses of action in Korea in the event of a break down of the armistice negotiations, should be taken only in the context of the longer-term problem which would confront us when the Soviet Union had amassed a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiatives in the area of foreign policy." Nixon's anti-Communism was still evident, but now he presented his argument in a more sophisticated manner. To his disappointment, Eisenhower explained that Project Solarium "was being initiated with this precise problem in mind."⁴ Nixon appeared to be a step behind. Worse yet, he was excluded from the Solarium discussions.

Nixon continued trying to refine his comments to better mesh with the demeanor of the Administration. In the process, he also worked toward defining his own role as Vice President. He seemed naturally attracted to foreign relations policy-making. His interest arose from the anti-Communist reputation he had earned on HUAC and his European trip with the Herter Commission. Eisenhower did not believe these experiences endowed Nixon with special qualifications and expressed no interest in Nixon's foreign affairs appraisal. The Vice President, however, never stopped trying to advise the President.

Throughout the two terms as Vice President, Nixon made sure he said something in almost every Cabinet or NSC meeting he attended. He frequently waited until the last few minutes of the meetings to make any comments. This perhaps reflected his own interest in hearing everyone else's position before revealing his own. He may, however, have used this as a tactic to ensure his ideas were remembered. As almost the last part of the discussion, Nixon's remarks might be better recalled than comments heard earlier in the meeting.

An example of Nixon's need to be heard came on June 25, 1953. The conversation centered on Japan. During the discussion the subject of anti-American feelings in Japan was raised. The President commented on how in his experience, almost universally, occupational forces earned the malignity of the native people in whose country they stayed. He noted that this very problem now afflicted American-Japanese relations. Nixon commented that he was disturbed by this aspect of occupational forces. Nixon's concern, however, did not come until several minutes after Ike's original comment. In the interim seven different people talked. The conversation had drifted away from Eisenhower's aside, to Japan's strategic importance. By the time Nixon voiced his opinion, it was totally out of context in the conversation. He said nothing more in the meeting, which ended soon thereafter. It was a reasonable comment which showed an interest and respect for Ike's experience. But, the statement added nothing of consequence to the discussion. Nixon's response provoked no more reaction than that it was recorded in the NSC minutes.

As Nixon found his place in the Administration, he more often raised salient points, rather than disconnected comments. But the latter behavior sporadically reappeared for the duration of the Administration. Nixon wanted to be heard, whether or not his point bore any relevance on the conversation. The tactic ensured he had some voice in the Administration.

That first year Nixon seemed more comfortable at meetings Eisenhower did not attend. Left to preside over the Cabinet meeting on August 27, he stepped up to the role of leader without any hesitation. When in charge, Nixon had no problem querying the second most intimidating man in the Cabinet, Dulles. After the Secretary briefed the Cabinet on his recent trip to Korea, Nixon questioned him intelligently and with confidence. The Vice President

asked about the possibility of reunification for Korea and learned of South Korean President Syngman Rhee's "desire for huge armaments which is inspired more by fear of Japan than of the Communists." Given these forces, however, North Korea would not consider negotiating. The Vice President knew by June 5 that he would be going to the Far East in the fall and he probably was researching his trip.⁵ Most of his itinerary was set by August, so he knew Korea was a stop. However, had Eisenhower attended the meeting, Nixon would not have pursued the topic as steadily.

The trip to the Far East helped Nixon move toward the role he hoped to play within the Administration. While he had established his interest in foreign relations years before, it was on this trip that he discovered how to explore this passion while serving a President who expressed no interest in furthering Nixon's education on the subject.

Nixon admitted in his memoirs that his first overseas trip as Vice President had "a tremendously important effect on my thinking and on my career . . . it established my foreign policy experience and expertise in what was to become the most critical and controversial part of the world." During the trip he learned that Asia's view of the US was based on European and Communist propaganda, and that these people, long dominated by the West, wanted independence from colonial powers. Beyond the tangible facts, the trip had a profound impact on the role he would play in the Administration. It gave him the ability to discuss a foreign region where neither Dulles nor Eisenhower had as much knowledge.⁶

It is not completely clear whether Eisenhower or Dulles first suggested the destination for Nixon's Fall trip. After the fact, Nixon claimed that Eisenhower offhandedly introduced the subject. In a 1965 interview, he reported that his trip was discussed just after Dulles had

returned from a tour to the Middle East (Dulles visited eleven countries in May). The Secretary explained to Eisenhower and Nixon that "he had found a great deal of misunderstanding as to what our policy was. And he said that just sitting down and talking to these men had an immensely good effect."

Dulles' comment reflected his basic maxim that international incidents arose from misunderstandings. Garbled communication resulted in disagreements with allies and wars with enemies. To this end, Dulles built relations with allies and made it clear to enemies that the United States would not fold to their pressures or accept Communist infiltration. According to Roderic O'Connor, Dulles believed "you had to make sure that the enemy knew that if he made a move, you were going to move. If the enemy had any doubt that you would move, that could lead to the misunderstanding and miscalculation that would start a major war."⁷ With allies, face-to-face meetings minimized misinterpretations and maximized solutions.

Perceiving Dulles' direction, the President asked Nixon what his plans were for the Fall. Nixon responded "'Well, anything you like.' And he said, 'Well, why don't you take a trip to Asia.'" Nixon concluded, "It was Eisenhower's idea. He threw it out. Of course, Dulles then had to execute it." Nixon also cited Eisenhower as the originator in his memoirs. In fact, Dulles probably conceived of the trip, rather than Ike. The Secretary already had begun his mentorship, as well as his manipulation, of Nixon.

On June 5, Dulles and Nixon discussed the Vice President's plans to take a trip abroad in September or October. "The Secretary said he thought that the Far East (Korea, Japan, Formosa, The Philippines and possibly Djakarta) would be best. He has just returned from

the Near East, Milton E. is going to Latin America, and everybody goes to Europe." ⁸ If Eisenhower already had expressed his desire for the Vice President to go to Asia, Dulles would not have brought up the subject as he did. Dulles suggested the destination without any reference to Eisenhower. Had he obtained prior approval from the President, he would have made it clear to Nixon.

Dulles provided the Vice President with a rationale for going to Asia prior to the conversation Nixon remembered having with Eisenhower. He presented a case that appealed to Nixon's desire for a visible role in foreign policy, and sweetened it when he explained why Asia was the best place for Nixon to visit in terms of Nixon's image, not US policy-making. While Nixon always considered his public image, later in the Administration he became more adamant about the foreign relations substance of his trips.

His interests often wavered between enhancing public image and increasing policy-making duties. But, when Ike reiterated the suggestion - probably spurred by Dulles - the Vice President had even greater motivation for taking the trip. He would need that motivation, since this trip lasted over two months.

Vice President Nixon and his wife Pat (brought along on the suggestion of Dulles) visited nineteen countries during their tour including, Taiwan, Korea, Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia), Burma and Japan. The couple followed a pattern similar to the one Nixon developed on the Herter trip. They met and talked to the common people, visited families and shook hands. Nixon also consulted with the government officials of each country, asking about Communist influences, and listening to their concerns. He formed relationships with these leaders, while he assessed their abilities.

Nixon came to resent goodwill tours, but in 1953 he was too excited. No tour of this sort had ever been made by an American President or Vice President. He was thrilled with the opportunity and anxious for the experience. Dulles had assigned Nixon the task of scouting out Asia.

The public announcement about Nixon's first international trip came on July 7, 1953. Early that day, the Vice President called Dulles to advise him to issue a press release about the trip. Nixon explained that journalist Robert Allen had already revealed it in his column, and if Dulles held off, Eisenhower would face questions about the trip at his press conference the following day. Nixon suggested that the announcement emphasize the fact he was "going as representative of the President and the State Department." By reaction Nixon sought to give his assignment the presidential seal of approval. Dulles replied he would make the announcement in the same way the notice of Milton Eisenhower's trip had been made. He issued a statement explaining "the purpose of the visit will be for the Vice President and his party to become acquainted with leaders of the countries visited, to hear their views, to gain firsthand impressions and to convey the sincere greetings of the people of the United States to the peoples of the areas visited and carry the personal greetings of the President." In short, a goodwill trip.

Who leaked the plans for a trip was not discussed. One could speculate it was Nixon, himself. He was the only person in the Administration who benefitted by making the information public. He was also the person who suggested the leak be substantiated with an official announcement. Perhaps, the Vice President concluded that if the rumor was not confirmed, the media would not take notice. Despite the leak and the official statement,

White House correspondents ignored the announcement at Eisenhower's next press conference.⁹ Nixon would have preferred it had come up, since without press coverage it was hard to promote his public image.

In some aspects, this trip shared similarities with the 1947 trip to Europe. As with the Herter Committee, Nixon received unsolicited advice from people about the regions he was scheduled to visit. A letter arrived from a Chinese businessman living in Saigon condemning Communist China. He told the Vice President "It happened like a bad dream that the whole China mainland - our home land - being devoured by the Communists." The exile claimed "we have come to know clearly by now that liberation is only meant for the Communists while we the real Chinese people are being oppressed and tortured out of our breadth [sic]." The letter confirmed every suspicion Nixon held about Communist regimes and reflected the typical conclusions reached by Anti-Maoists. For Nixon, it reinforced his view of mainland China. Following his trip, the Vice President would report that "Formosa is still a definite symbol to the many overseas Chinese communities. . . ." ¹⁰ The letter provided him with a first hand critique of the situation in Asia, which he reconfirmed while on the trip. It illustrated, once again, that Communism had to be guarded against everywhere.

In 1947, Nixon was a Representative from California considering the Marshall plan. Six years later he traveled from the United States as its second highest representative. With the new position, Nixon lost much of the scheduling flexibility that he had enjoyed as a Congressman. The State Department provided an itinerary instructing who to see and where to go. Nixon's folder - labeled "Suggested Activities" - contained detailed plans on every aspect of the trip. If he hoped to repeat his adventurous approach of 1947, he would have to

unofficially modify some of the State Department's recommendations.

One of the first liberties Nixon took was to mandate that, whenever possible, he would meet foreign dignitaries alone -with no additional staff. Writing about himself in third person, as he often did, Nixon instructed "On this trip unless there is a necessity to have somebody for translating purposes the V.P. does not want to have anyone with him when he talks with representatives of foreign countries. He does not want any of his staff, any state dept. personnel or anyone else unless it is absolutely necessary for him to have an interpreter." Nixon concluded with the order "I want to talk to as many controversial people as possible. The natural tendency is usually to discourage them but I want to see them all if possible."¹¹ Still the risk taker, Nixon sought to gain control over how the trip progressed.

His directions assured him full credit for any diplomatic achievements reached during the trip. By prohibiting other American officials from sitting in on talks, Nixon created an opportunity to dominate the trip. He put himself in charge. He also gained prestige by conducting one-on-one discussions with world leaders, and ensured confidentiality. Plus, the Vice President guaranteed himself media attention. A final benefit would be that he could impress Dulles by performing well in talks.

Nixon's specific effort to meet with "controversial people" reflected his experiences on the Herter Committee. He had debated Communist party members in 1947. Now he hoped for the opportunity again. His interest arose out of the propaganda possibilities for the US, as well as the advantageous news coverage he could gain from such confrontations.

The President perceived a single objective for Nixon: he was to obtain a commitment from Syngman Rhee to support the armistice that ended the Korean war. But, State saw

additional possibilities for Nixon's trip, in Korea and the other countries on his tour. Just before the Vice President left the United States, he received instructions from the State Department.

Dulles' people asked him to bolster the American Economic Coordinator in Korea by showing the man special attention in public. Privately, Nixon could relate to Rhee the respect Eisenhower had for the Coordinator. Essentially, this was a public relations ploy borrowed from campaign tactics and intended to improve the Economic Coordinator's position with Rhee. Here was a task Nixon could perform instinctually. He knew campaigning thoroughly. The more complicated assignment involved direct talks with Rhee.

State department advisors suggested Nixon serve as a negotiator, if he found the opportunity. In face-to-face discussions with Rhee "an idea might be hit upon for compromising the present deadlock over the hwan [won]-dollar exchange rate and related subjects, and in doing so, a formula might be found for dealing with the RK [Republic of Korea] President on other questions now and in the future."¹² These instructions presumed Nixon would serve as diplomat as well as goodwill ambassador. Nixon's coincidental directive to meet alone with foreign leaders, ensured he had the opportunity to test his diplomatic skills at every possible opportunity.

The first stops on Nixon's itinerary were New Zealand and Australia. Both countries were American allies and the vice presidential visits were simply courtesy calls. Nonetheless, Nixon received high praise from the American Ambassador to Australia for his performance there. The Vice President attracted large and admiring crowds. He impressed the Australian Prime Minister and the opposition leader. The Ambassador wrote, "as one member of the

Cabinet expressed it, the visit fortified them in the desire of the leaders of both parties for increasingly close ties with America." The New Zealand/Australian portion got the trip off to a grand start, but Nixon found little of interest on these island countries. He expressed this indifference only after his return to America. The minutes taken during his State Department debriefing session stated "the Vice President merely described a few personal impressions of these countries but said little concerning our policies or the relationship between Australia and New Zealand with the other countries in Asia."¹³ Perhaps Australia and New Zealand were too civilized to appeal to Nixon's risk taking nature.

Several weeks into his trip, Nixon met the High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Gerald Templar. Discussions with Templar greatly influenced his perception of Communist tactics. On October 26, Templar wrote Eisenhower thanking him for the note delivered by the Vice President. About Nixon, Templar added "he's so obviously a very fine man, and I am much looking forward to a long talk with him in my office before dinner this evening." It was from this talk that Nixon gained a tremendous respect for Templar and a new perspective on how to fight Communism in Asia.

The private meeting lasted an hour and a half. American foreign service officials complained that Nixon revealed few details about the conversation. But in his memoirs Nixon related some of the discussion.

Templar explained that the most effective method of fighting insurgent Communism in Asia was to enlist the natives. The indigenous people had to believe they were fighting for the independence of their country, not foreign colonialism. Nixon took the lesson as a truism and relied on it for his future analysis. During his post-trip debriefing, he stated the British

had kept Malaya safe from Communism and "General Templar is thoroughly familiar with the entire problem."

Templar made enough of an impression for the Vice President to mention the Brit again at an NSC meeting in May 1954. During the discussion about the Geneva conference on Korea and Indochina that had begun some weeks before, Nixon suggested that Templar join the US delegation because the High Commissioner "had a keen understanding of the realities of the Communist threat to Southeast Asia."¹⁴ The Vice President considered Templar a foremost expert, otherwise he would not have made the comment.

Nixon found Templar's analysis compelling, if for no other reason than he placed great value in the support of the people. After three major campaigns, Nixon realized voters had to be convinced to elect candidates. He needed to offer them a reason to put him in office. A successful campaign against Communism had a similar element. If the natives grasped onto an inspiring cause - their freedom - they would vote, or in this case fight, for it. If Asians were asked to risk their lives to maintain a foreign regime, they would favor the alternative, Communism. In Italy and Greece, Nixon had seen how communism could mask itself in nationalist rhetoric and win support. It was a simple choice of which candidate had the more appealing platform.

Another reason Nixon latched onto Templar so quickly was that the High Commissioner's interpretation verified conclusions the Vice President had already reached. When Secretary Dulles and he met with the Cambodian President six months before, Nixon concluded the problem in Indochina was "the fact that the native peoples were unwilling to fight Communism in order to perpetuate French colonialism."¹⁵ Templar applied the same

reasoning to Asia in general. This confirmation from the field solidified Nixon's conclusions.

One other individual during this trip left a permanent mark on the Vice President. South Korean President Syngman Rhee affected Nixon's perception of Asia and his foreign affairs outlook. Ike wanted Nixon to obtain assurances from Rhee that he would not attack North Korea. The State Department hoped Nixon could convince Rhee to cooperate more with America. Rhee granted both of these and also espoused his personal strategy for dealing with Communists. As with Templar, this unsolicited advice taught Nixon a lesson he added to his analytical lexicon.

Rhee complained that the United States insisted on publicly limiting his options. US officials stated that America would not support Rhee if he resumed hostilities against the North. The US even implied it would keep South Korea from making any such assault. The Korean President understood he could not act without US aid, but admonished that it was "foolish for the U.S. to 'tie his hands' publicly." America would be better off to foster the image of South Korea's President as a loose cannon, uncontrollable and therefore unpredictable. That would keep the Chinese and the Russians guessing. It would create an unknown factor that could deter Communist forces from pursuing their own aggressive aims.

Rhee also wondered why the US failed to take advantage of his country as a resource. He described South Korea as a pawn that Washington could manipulate in order to weaken the Communists. Rhee complained "'Why doesn't the U.S. use me as the Russians use their satellites - India, North Korea and China?'" He wanted American planners to use South Korea as a proxy. Of course, if that led to an attack on North Korea, he would be amenable.

Nixon probably appreciated the role Rhee suggested for his country. He had a similar

function, in microcosm, as Vice President. Nixon certainly valued the Korean's determination to keep the Communists guessing. He recalled in his memoirs, "Rhee's insight about the importance of being unpredictable in dealing with the Communists."¹⁶ He adopted this principle of doing the unexpected to keep his own enemies guessing. The idea appealed to Nixon because of his need to take risks and remain in the public eye.

For his immediate well being, Nixon obtained much more from this Asian trip than two concepts on how to fight Communism. He returned from the trip with a working knowledge of the political, economic and social problems that region faced, and an acquaintance with most of the pro-western Asian leaders. Most important, the tour illustrated to Dulles Nixon's effectiveness as a representative of the United States. Embassies throughout Asia reported on the tremendously positive reaction resulting from Nixon's visits.

From Thailand came a telegram "Visit distinguished not (repeat not) only unusually helpful warm exchanges with Thailand leaders but also unprecedented contacts between Nixon and people. Visit did much further United States Objectives." An equally positive report came from Hong Kong. The visit was particularly successful in "increasing goodwill toward the United States among the people." The Vice President received special praise for meeting with the populace, in addition to leaders. "On every occasion Vice President went out of his way to shake hands with persons on fringes of crowds assembled to see him. When he raised his arms to greet crowds, they frequently responded with clapping and cheering, a reaction seldom witnessed in Hong Kong, where bystanders normally apathetic to visits of people in high positions." Nixon utilized tactics he had developed on the campaign trail and during the Herter Committee trip. The greatest change since 1947 was that as Vice President he had

attained celebrity status in foreign countries.

During the trip, Nixon sent a telegram to State relaying his recommendations about the Philippines. He reported that Ramón Magsaysay "combines two qualities needed for leadership in Asia: (a) magnetic appeal to all classes of people, (b) genuine regard for the people's welfare." Both attributes were desirable for any politician in the US. He suggested that the Filipino leader come to the United States once he had consolidated his power and address a joint session of Congress. Dulles penned "I agree with this" in the margin of telegram.¹⁷ Dulles' agreement illustrated Nixon's utility to the Secretary.

Ambassador George V. Allen in India also sent accolades. Allen wrote the visit "contributed notably to our prestige in India and to better understanding of our respective points of view." Allen concluded "I do not believe we could hope for any more beneficial results to be obtained from single visit."

There was reason to praise the Vice President. Nixon's visit reassured the Indians that America considered India a world power. Allen explained, "Mr. Nixon's presence here. . . [has] fitted in admirably with Indian desire to be consulted on world and particularly oriental problems."¹⁸ Nixon's trip gave Asian countries the impression that the United States respected their opinions. His trip resulted in better communication all around.

Nixon performed beyond expectations in Pakistan. He was instrumental in clarifying the American position about Afghani claims on Pushtoonistan. He received instructions from the Department of State to discourage hostility and encourage direct talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The United States would not act as a mediator. These positions, he explained, had the complete support of Dulles and Eisenhower. The American Ambassador

to Pakistan reported that Pakistani officials believed Nixon's candid talks with Afghan leaders helped to develop improved relations between the countries.¹⁹ Nixon was proving his international affairs skills as both a representative and a negotiator. Could Dulles hope for a more effective goodwill Ambassador?

In Libya, Nixon's visit brought further achievement. There Nixon succeeded in moving forward negotiations for an American military base, where previous efforts had been stalled. Henry S. Villard, of the American Legation, noted that Nixon's position in the US government gave him greater sway with the King. He "could speak in the name of the President and no higher authority could be cited to impress on the Libyans the need for action in this regard." Villard reported, "As concerns the base agreement, no more can possibly be done than was done by the Vice President of the United States to emphasize our desire to expedite the negotiations." The King assured Nixon that efforts would be redoubled after January 1, and an agreement reached soon thereafter.²⁰ Nixon increased American prestige in Libya and helped move toward the establishment of a military base in that nation. Dulles had found a superior agent in the Vice President. Nixon's office gave him the authority of America and his persuasiveness got him results. The Secretary would deploy his protégé again after this test run.

The experience Nixon gained in Asia was mainly one of acquaintanceship. In 1947, he had established a formula for such trips. He continued to follow it, whenever he could. This trip confirmed many of his suspicions and certainly increased his celebrity in the United States. It gave him the unprecedented opportunity for the Vice President to talk privately with most of the leaders of Asia.

In terms of increasing Nixon's role in the Administration, the most important aspect was the overwhelming success of his trip. If Dulles harbored any doubts about the Vice President's qualifications, he abandoned them, given the tremendous praise that followed each stop. Nixon performed flawlessly. Plus, Nixon provided his benefactor with first hand reports on relations with all of the countries he visited. Dulles rewarded Nixon for his efforts. Beginning in 1955, and continuing until Dulles' death in 1959, Nixon traveled abroad at least once a year. The Secretary of State could rely on Nixon to carry the message he had in mind and reconnoiter for him. In return, Nixon could expect positive press coverage and a boost in his national and foreign prestige.

This trip was a great triumph in Asia and America. When the Nixons returned to Washington on December 14, they were greeted by a delegation from the State Department, all the Ambassadors from the countries they visited and a number of Senators. Nixon went straight to the White House, where Eisenhower met him on the porch.²¹

Nixon's experiences gave him the first visible block to build his reputation as an international relations expert. He returned to America with a new sense of foreign relations proficiency, which he immediately attempted to apply. The Vice President hoped to share his many insights about the regions he had visited. But, Eisenhower's interest focused on whether or not he had curtailed Syngman Rhee's aggressive behavior toward North Korea. Ambrose noted that "All Eisenhower seemed to care about was getting Rhee to promise not to fight; the President was not interested in what Nixon had to say about the situation elsewhere in Asia." Ike's dismissal of everything else must have been a blow to Nixon. He probably took some consolation, however, in the fact that he did achieve the President's primary goal.

Before arriving in Korea, Nixon received a telegram from Dulles instructing him to convince Rhee that America would not support aggression on the part of South Korea. One day after his arrival, Nixon could boast that Rhee had verbally pledged he would not attack unilaterally, without first informing Eisenhower. He and the Ambassador to Korea viewed this as significant progress. Rhee's statement implied a measure of autonomy from US control, but implicitly acknowledged the importance of American support if South Korea were to attack.

By the time Nixon landed in the United States, he could state that Rhee was under control. The day after returning, he reported to the NSC on his talks with Rhee. He concluded his presentation by stating, "I do not believe that Rhee will take any action of the sort we fear without prior notification to the President. Nor will he take any action unless he is assured that the U.S. will go along."²² That was the reassurance Eisenhower, and Dulles, had desired.

Nixon hoped that after completing his assignment he would be rewarded with an expanded foreign affairs role. Toward that end, a week after his return, Nixon sought to underscore his status as an international expert. On December 23, he made a second presentation to the NSC on South East Asia. He adopted two tactics in an effort to catch the attention of NSC members. First, he couched his analysis of the region in terms of Europe. This might attract Ike's interest. Second, reflecting his frustration with Ike's sole concern about Korea, Nixon de-emphasized the importance of Korea and concentrated on Indochina. Drawing on his talks with Templar, he explained the contradiction with France wanting to keep South Vietnam in the French Union and the South Vietnamese desire for independence.

Nixon closed, "I am convinced in my own mind that what happens in Indochina is more important, from the standpoint of strategic interests of Europe, than what happens in Korea."²³ He disputed Eisenhower's conclusion. But his disagreement came in terms of European security, making it a well crafted position designed to intrigue, rather than upset Ike.

Nixon's talks were not limited to the Cabinet and National Security Council. On January 8, 1954, he made a presentation to the top 22 State Department officials, two CIA representatives and Defense department personnel. Certainly, Foster and Allen Dulles were among the attenders. Nixon reported for three and a half hours, and then answered questions for another one and half hours. The Vice President methodically noted his findings about each country. Emphasizing Communism, most of the remarks concerned which countries were in danger of infiltration (a theme prevalent in his Herter journal, as well). He generally concluded that Asians favored economic progress and independence, over Communism.²⁴

The trip to the Far East got a foot in the international affairs door. After it, Nixon considered himself an expert in Asian foreign policy. Although Nixon's experience on the continent in 1947 might have led him to emphasize his European knowledge, he never attempted to advise on that region. Nixon assessed the situation early in the Administration, perhaps when the Secretary explained why he could not go to Europe, the Middle East or Latin America. Eisenhower's primary concern and expertise was Europe. Ike had formed strong relationships with the leaders of free Europe during World War II. Dulles could also claim a proficiency in continental matters, and Ike's trust of the Secretary of State led him to consult with Dulles on European policy. Nixon had little hope of gaining any say in a region

where Ike was so well versed, and already had a competent advisor.

Dulles' expertise also included Asia, and to a lesser extent Latin America, where he had traveled during his career as a lawyer. On the latter, Milton Eisenhower (the President's brother) had claims. Nixon could not gain a hearing there - not early in the Administration, at least. In 1953, Africa and the Middle East were still considered Great Britain's problem, so American interests there remained limited.

That left Asia. With Dulles' primary duty to advise Eisenhower on Europe, Nixon could begin building his reputation as an expert on the Far East. The Secretary had an interest in the area, but his time was occupied by higher priority issues. His grandfather had worked for the Chinese around the turn of the century and Dulles had acted as a translator for the Chinese delegation at the Second Hague conference in 1907. Additionally, in 1950 Dulles had hammered out the Japanese Peace Treaty.²⁵ Nixon capitalized on the Secretary's experience in Asia. He used his interest in Asia to catch Dulles' attention and gain a voice in the Administration.

Besides the niche to be filled, Nixon had just returned from an extensive tour of an extremely contentious area. Among top officials he had the most up-to-date working knowledge of the region. Asia represented a perfect opening through which Nixon channeled his ambitions for a role in American foreign relations policy-making. First, he had all he learned on his trip to use in any analysis. Second, he could act as an advisor for Dulles, while not encroaching on Eisenhower's domain.

Foreign travel enhanced the Vice President's credentials, but he did not go abroad again until early 1955. In 1954, most of Nixon's time was split between campaigning for

Republican candidates and dealing with Joseph McCarthy. Nevertheless, he pursued his foreign affairs inclination. He constantly sought to illustrate his Asian - and general foreign policy - expertise within the Administration. The best place for that was at National Security Council meetings. Through a combination of debating with Dulles, presenting of his own analysis and inserting arbitrary comments, Nixon did secure himself a minor role in the foreign policy aspects of the Administration.

At the January 14, 1954 NSC session, Secretary Dulles suggested that if France abandoned Vietnam, and allowed a Vietminh government to fill the vacuum, "we should be able to make as much trouble for this government as they had made for our side and against the legitimate governments of the Associated states in recent years." He proposed non-Communist natives could conduct guerrilla operations against the Vietminh regime. Nixon disagreed. "While Secretary Dulles' idea had merit, he was not clear as to where we would find the guerrillas." Jungle fighters did not spontaneously appear. The Vietnamese might be inspired to fight if the French withdrew, but they would not fight to preserve French rule. Nixon undoubtedly based his criticism on the lessons he mastered in South East Asia. But, he may also have been relying on his initial contact with guerrilla fighters to draw his conclusions. He had, in 1947, interviewed Communist guerrillas in Florina, Greece. To offer convincing testimony against Dulles might not have helped his relationship with the Secretary, but it went a long way toward proving his expertise. And, in fact, the Secretary probably respected Nixon more for arguing a good case against him.

Two months later, Nixon again raised his voice to comment at the end of a meeting discussing South East Asian policy. Much of the conversation concerned foreign aid to the

region. Although the method of assistance had not been directly addressed, Nixon offered his opinion on how best to provide aid for South East Asia. US aid to Asia often carried colonialist overtones for those who received the aid. He therefore recommended the use of U.N. auspices to deliver American money, noting in Asia the United Nations was seen as "a bulwark against colonialism." Since US assistance was intended primarily to "build up these countries, would it not be sensible to emphasize the channel provided by the UN agencies and to put less emphasis on direct US assistance?" American interests would be served in either case. No one in the meeting responded to his idea, but he had been heard and made a viable point.

In May, Nixon again took Dulles on in debate and reiterated his position on Asian perceptions of colonialism. The Secretary advocated a Five Power Staff Agency to oversee problems within the region. Nixon claimed "in his opinion the five-power arrangement would be almost as bad for the United States as would be Unilateral U.S. intervention, since it would be interpreted by the Asian nations as sheer colonialism." The Vice President had confidence in his Asian expertise. Dulles responded that it would not be five white powers in charge. The Agency would be an organizing group, not one intended to dominate the region. Nixon accepted this explanation, although he may not have been totally persuaded by it.

Twice in June, Nixon voiced his opinion during top level meetings. In both instances his comments concerned Asia, the only foreign area he seemed comfortable discussing in-depth. First, Nixon was given an opportunity to lecture NSC members when both Dulles and Eisenhower left the meeting early.

As the ranking official, Nixon took charge of a meeting at which he had been silent up

to that point. He immediately criticized the Administration decision to consult with allies before taking action, in the event of an attack by the People's Republic of China on a non-Communist country. He exclaimed "if the Chinese Communists moved overtly against any free country in the Asian area, and the United States, with allies or without them, did not move to resist such an aggression, 'the jig was certainly up.'" The remark brought to mind his off the record comment made in April about "sending in the boys" into Vietnam, if Communist forces were on the verge of victory - another effort to gain a voice in foreign policy decisions. Later that month, he complained that the United States "watched, hesitated, and didn't know what policy to choose; whereas our enemy knew his policy and proceeded to carry it out." He advocated a policy of action in Asia and he repeatedly called for it.

In August, Nixon's recommendations produced a tangible foreign policy step. A report dated the twelfth, mentioned a new Special Book Program in Asia. The program provided an additional \$325,000 in aid. It was "undertaken as a result of Vice President Nixon's survey of the area. The funds have gone into an expansion of the USIA book program in the Near and Far East where Soviet activity in the field of publication is immense." While not a major policy initiative, it did prove Nixon's opinions had some influence. Nixon undoubtedly celebrated this minor triumph.

Another small victory came after eight months of harping on Asia. Nixon finally received some recognition of his knowledge from a peer on the National Security Council. Robert Cutler, the NSC staff coordinator, "pointed out the particular interest of the Vice President in the Asian area, and asked him to express his views." Unwilling to admit to his self-promotion, Nixon denied any expertise. He initially agreed with the conclusion Dulles

had expressed, that there needed to be greater consideration of options for how to handle Asia. Nixon, deferential to his patron, claimed that Dulles was the authority. But, he could not contain himself. He added that "without any claims to being an expert, the Vice President said that at least he was convinced that China was the key to Asia." Dulles preferred not to make a blanket statement. Despite his disavowal, he considered himself proficient in Asian affairs. Cutler's request illustrated that other NSC participants agreed with him, or at least had an interest in hearing his opinions.²⁶ Either way, the Vice President took the opportunity to unequivocally express his position.

Nixon parleyed his first lengthy excursion through Asia into a career path he would pursue for the entire Administration. Yet, he had to constantly work to maintain his position. Eisenhower did not view him as an international relations asset, and Dulles often chose to use Nixon as his foreign affairs agent, rather than allow him an independent role.

As Nixon worked to maintain an influential position, his goals expanded. He found that international travel provided opportunities to improve his reputation among world leaders and the American people. When abroad, he stepped out from under the shadows of Eisenhower and Dulles and shone in his own right. He met world leaders, became internationally recognized and learned about most regions of the globe. Nixon took six or seven major trips abroad as Vice President, visiting over 50 different countries before he left office in 1961.

Despite the associated benefits, he concluded before the end of the first term that his international tours carried little prestige with them. The first one was noteworthy because of its novelty, but subsequent trips lost their uniqueness. They did not provide him with the

ability to set policy, or even enunciate it. Between his second and third international expeditions, he began complaining to Dulles about their inconsequence. In conjunction with his objections, he sought means to increase the prestige associated with this travel. Nixon recognized that even though he considered that the international inspections lacked substance, he could promote them as important, and improve his foreign affairs reputation.

The Vice President did not fully realize the limited image attached to a goodwill ambassador until after he and Pat made their second overseas trip. During most of February, 1955, the Nixons visited Central America and the Caribbean. Although Milton Eisenhower had made a trip to Latin America in 1953, Dulles saw need for another mission.

The trip was actually intended for 1954. Dulles proposed it in August, writing to Nixon, "I hope that later on, probably in December, you and your wife can take a swing through Central America for us." Circumstances kept Nixon from embarking until February 6, 1955. Although the trip lasted only about one month, Nixon managed to visit ten countries and two territories, including Cuba, Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama and the Dominican Republic.²⁷

The resulting praise from American embassies throughout Central America re-inspired Dulles' confidence in Nixon. From Mexico, Ambassador Francis White reported "The newspapers have devoted greater space to it than to any other visit or happening in the nearly two years I have been here." All the editorials praised the Vice President.

From Havana, Cuba foreign service officer, Arthur Gardner, commented on "the good effects of Nixon's trip to Cuba at this particular moment. . . . The basic fact is that in the most unequivocal manner the Vice President and his wife did a tremendous selling job."

With such positive reviews, the Vice President earned Dulles' respect and gratitude. The only other Administration official who garnered that level of praise was Ike. The President would do just that in 1960, but for the moment, Dulles ensured that Nixon traveled and Eisenhower stayed in the Oval Office.

The accolades continued. On February 23, Robert Hill, Ambassador to El Salvador, reported "It is my opinion . . . that the prestige of the United States has never been as high as it is right now as a result of Mr. and Mrs. Nixon's visit." Nixon was the first American Vice President to see El Salvador and the natives appreciated him. He followed his usual format and talked with the populace, not just the leaders.

Regardless of whether it transferred to Nixon personally, the office of Vice President carried a good deal of prestige. Nixon's presence implied a level of US concern that had not been revealed earlier. Whether or not Dulles intended to increase State Department efforts in Central America, Nixon's visit gratified, or at least placated, these Hispanic countries. It did imply a renewed interest in Latin American affairs.

Ambassador Hill also commented on the Vice President's visit to Guatemala. He noted the importance of the trip for increasing American prestige and "helping arrive [at] better understanding between our two countries."²⁸ The goodwill aspect of the trip clearly succeeded.

At the time, Guatemala represented the most critical area in Latin America to the United States. The previous summer - with CIA and United Fruit complicity - Castillo Armas had overthrown the legally elected President Jacobo Arbenz. State Department analysts feared a connection between Arbenz and the Communist party. Armas, who followed

American directions, could be trusted to appreciate US interests. The situation remained volatile in 1955. Nixon forwarded his assessment of Guatemala to Dulles, through the American Ambassador, Norman Armour. He recommended increased US aid and support of the Armas regime. Neither were alarming suggestions, nor did they reflect the insight of an expert. Any State Department analyst acquainted with Latin America would have given the same counsel. But, that Nixon had the opportunity was more important than that he offered a different perspective on US-Latin American relations.

As in Asia, the State Department hoped that Nixon could also help resolve a few minor international disputes. Cooling a simmering feud between Costa Rican leader José Figueres and Nicaraguan ruler Anastasio Somoza had priority. Somoza supported Costa Rican dissidents in their on going coup against Figueres. Although some historians have concluded that the United States sided with Figueres, Nixon's instructions were to encourage accommodation and peace on both sides. The State Department briefing about Costa Rica recommended that Nixon: "a. Suggest that they [Costa Rica and Nicaragua] live in peace in their own country. b. If possible, convey to Figueres that he cease blasting Somoza and other leaders." The briefing notes for Nicaragua simply reversed the names and hoped Somoza would "cease blasting Figueres." Nixon followed this course as best he could. After his return to the United States, the Vice President wrote to Figueres. He stated he believed Costa Rica favored peace in the area. He suggested that leaders in the area had "to eliminate friction wherever possible" and that "it is my belief that our conversations have contributed to that end."²⁹ Nixon did not resolve the feud, but he did attempt to end it. This was another step forward on the road to becoming a statesman.

Nixon's letter to Figueres typically would be a State Department initiative. Nixon must have had Dulles' approval before sending it, and possibly received orders from him to do so. Whether Nixon or a State Department official was the impetus behind the letter, that Nixon sent it at all highlights how he and Dulles had modified the responsibilities of the office. Nixon was performing a diplomatic function for State. Such assignments transformed the vice presidency from a position with limited importance to the Administration, into one commanding domestic and international recognition.

Within the Administration, Nixon's trip did not make much of an impact. The one positive result for Nixon was that it provided him with another region of the world in which he could claim familiarity, if not expertise. He definitely gained an understanding of the region.

On March 10, five days after his return to the United States, Nixon reported his findings. Besides advocating increased economic aid - a standard recommendation for Nixon, almost without regard to where he traveled - he displayed a clairvoyant understanding of the consequences of Communist expansion in that area. Speaking at an NSC meeting, he warned, "what happened in Guatemala would have been much worse for the United States if it had occurred in Mexico or in Cuba. . . . We should never forget that once one of these countries succumbs to Communist control, it would prove very difficult indeed to remove that control."³⁰ His prediction had no impact on policy, but proved accurate for Cuba a few years later.

When not traveling, Vice President Nixon continued his efforts to gain a more influential role in American foreign relations. During the summer, he tried, unsuccessfully,

to impress his conclusions about Russian tactics upon Eisenhower. Despite Ike's lack of interest, Nixon presented his case. He was determined to voice his opinions to the highest power and in mid-summer sent the Commander-in-Chief a rambling letter explaining his concerns.

The letter initially recounted the events that prompted Nixon's analysis. The "extraordinary scene at the garden park [*at the U.S. Embassy*] [handwritten], taken in conjunction with the drunken hippodrome at Belgrade, suggests that it is part of a concerted effort by the Kremlin leaders to make the world think that they they [sic] are truly a changed, human, approachable hail-fellow-well-met bunch of characters with whom any reasonable man can argue [sic] or bargain on a reasonable basis and that ANY FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT IS NOT THEIR FAULT." Nixon did not mask his disgust in the succeeding three paragraphs. He warned that the Soviet's new amicability could not be taken at face value. It was designed to swing world opinion to favor the Communists. These jovial displays were a public relations tactic designed to give the sense that America was to blame if diplomatic talks faltered. In Nixon's concluding words: "It must be the West's [sic] fault if they can't do business with good old Nikita -- that is the impression they seek to leave, in advance of the meetings." Here Nixon probably referred to the Geneva Summit, which began on July 18.³¹

The memorandum reflected Nixon's true concern. The document, far more emotional and informal than typical (for Nixon), probably came straight from the Vice President's hand. In style, it reflected his personal 1947 Herter report more than any other document from his desk during the intervening years. The preponderance of typos implies that Nixon himself

dashed it off, without the benefit of secretary Rosemary Wood's typing skills.

Nixon considered this topic important enough that it could not wait. However, there is no evidence that his letter had any effect on the President. Nixon's fears were not realized. Eisenhower out-maneuvered his adversaries with a plan for US-Soviet reciprocal aerial reconnaissance. Ike's "Open Skies" proposal was intended to protect against surprise attacks. His unexpected proposition, announced at the Geneva summit in 1956, put the Russians on the defensive. Despite this, the overall conference talks were amicable. Out of them came hopeful praise for the "Spirit of Geneva." Ike's capable handling of the Soviet Union made Nixon's analysis seem alarmist. If the President recalled the essay after the summit, it would only have reinforced his belief that Nixon was too reactionary and inexperienced to lead the nation. The summit went well and the Russians did not gain the upper hand.

Since Nixon's efforts to advise Ike won him no points, his best means of advancing his foreign affairs reputation remained travel abroad. By July 1955, the Vice President was determined that his next trip would be important. Ideally, Nixon wanted US foreign policy to be affected by what he uncovered during talks with foreign leaders. He wanted the trips to have a greater significance than that of a friendly gesture by the United States toward some smaller nation.

At the end of July, the Vice President and the Secretary of State met for a morning conference. Responding to a request by Nixon, Dulles "expressed the opinion that it would be of doubtful wisdom for the Vice President to seek to make a trip to the Soviet Union at this time." Clearly Nixon had asked for Dulles' permission to go to the U.S.S.R. He understood such a trip would have astounded Americans and impressed Europeans. Nixon took the

rebuff in stride. He switched to his auxiliary plan, and according to Dulles, explained "he would like to make this fall some kind of a further trip, if this would serve a useful purpose. I [Dulles] suggested the Near East where he had not been." To Nixon, travel abroad meant greater independence and better press. Whether or not he went to Russia, he would go somewhere. Dulles concluded "that if we [he and Dulles] were together and had an opportunity at Gettysburg, we would speak about the possibility of the Vice President's going to the Near East and not going to the Soviet Union." The Secretary's reiteration that Nixon was not going to Russia made it clear, the Vice President was not to broach that subject with Eisenhower. But, Dulles accepted an expedition for Nixon to a less critical region. Nixon's desire to travel would be satisfied and the Secretary might receive valuable intelligence.

One final comment in the conversation illustrated Nixon's careful effort to protect his role in the government, and simultaneously reinforce his relationship with Dulles. Before they ended the discussion, the Secretary "mentioned to the Vice President the invitation of [Jawaharlal] Nehru to the President to visit India. The Vice President was very emphatic as to the unwisdom of the President's undertaking good will trips."³² Such travel represented one of Nixon's only outlets. If Ike began traveling to exotic lands anything the Vice President did would be less impressive. Coincidentally, Dulles believed Eisenhower's friendliness could lead to promises that had dangerous consequences for the US. Nixon advised against Ike going to India because it would both detract from his own role, and disturb Dulles.

In August, Dulles again suggested the Near East as a possible destination for the Vice President. The trip would include Turkey, but omit Iran and Libya. Nixon, silently invoking the adage "nothing ventured, nothing gained" asked again about visiting Moscow. Dulles

reiterated his objections. According to Dulles, "there was danger of overdoing the sentimental side of our relations." Nixon agreed, knowing his chances of going to Russia were not high. He saw no reason to aggravate the Secretary.

As it turned out, the Vice President did not take his Fall constitutional. On September 24, Eisenhower suffered a heart attack. With the President's sudden incapacity, Nixon's public role altered. Nixon found himself technically in control of the Administration, but politically unable to make independent decisions. He could not appear to take command without facing tremendous criticism for usurping the presidential powers. Through December, he, Dulles and Eisenhower's assistant Sherman Adams performed a careful balancing act. They maintained the illusion that the Administration could function normally without the President, while simultaneously anxiously awaiting Ike's return.

Nixon's well practiced political savvy accounted for his success in this role. He understood how his actions would be interpreted, and took great pains to avoid any negative press. His role as stand-in President, however, did not last. By the second week in November, Eisenhower was out of the hospital. Although his full recovery would take several months, the immediate crisis was over. Eisenhower could reclaim his position as Commander-in-Chief. Nixon resumed the roles he had been assigned and created for himself, expanding them when possible.

On December 13, Dulles asked Nixon if he could go to South America for the January 31 inauguration of the new Brazilian President, Juscelino Kubitschek. Nixon wondered if the assignment was truly important. Dulles assured him it was, adding, "Brazil is a good friend and we would like to keep it that way." Nixon, however, would have preferred to keep his

January 30 dinner appointment with British Prime Minister, Anthony Eden. Dulles had asked him to accept that assignment three days earlier. Now he offered to sit in for Nixon. The Vice President had little real choice but to accept.

With his revised assignment, came a new dinner to host. Dulles had the Vice President entertain the president-elect of Brazil on January 5. The Secretary would not attend Nixon's dinner because he planned to host Kubitschek the following night. Undoubtedly disappointed about missing an opportunity to meet with Eden, Nixon resigned himself to the new task and performed it well. Even if Dulles reserved the prime international work for himself, he still gave Nixon more to do than did the President. Nixon accepted almost any duty, for the ability to work in foreign affairs.

He attended the inauguration, serving again as a quasi-goodwill ambassador, but he did not appreciate the chore. On the plus side, Eisenhower took an indirect interest in the trip. He had a friend involved in the oil industry who expected to talk with Kubitschek about a Brazilian bill that would attract US capital. He informed the Vice President of his friend's interest. Nixon commented "that Brazil's greatest need was to get more capital." Their discussion of Nixon's international trip, however, went no further. The conversation drifted onto political topics. But, at least the Vice President had had the opportunity to discuss a foreign relations matter one-on-one with the President.³³

On May 11, 1956, Dulles asked Nixon to make another trip abroad. This time Nixon would represent the United States at the tenth anniversary celebration of independence for the Philippines. To give an impression that the trip was presidential in stature, Dulles mentioned that Eisenhower would have gone, but India's President Nehru intended to visit Washington at

that time. Appealing to Nixon's interest in Far Eastern affairs, Dulles noted the trip provided a forum to call for unity among non-Communist Asians. Speaking in a convoluted and cautious manner, Nixon discussed his reservations. "The VP asked the Secretary what he thought about the worthwhileness of the affair. The Secretary said he thought it very worthwhile." With that assurance, Nixon continued, "he certainly would not be unsympathetic to the idea. The Secretary said this would not be unhelpful to Nixon at this particular time." Dulles implied that agreeing to the task might result in some reward - it "would not be unhelpful to Nixon" - even if that amounted only to positive media coverage.

But, Nixon revealed his dissatisfaction with the role of goodwill Vice President. He added "the main thing he was concerned about was that it should be made clear this trip was in the interest of the country, not just a trip out there." Nixon wanted a real purpose for making the trip. He hated representing America abroad for show only, without consequential results coming from his efforts. By implication, Nixon had not been swayed by his status as surrogate President. In fact, had there been no conflict in scheduling, Dulles probably would have opposed Eisenhower's attendance anyway, and invented a reason for Nixon to go.

Three days later, Dulles and Nixon again talked about the proposed trip. Now, disregarding his implication that Eisenhower might have attended, Dulles revealed that the Manila affair probably warranted only the presence of the diplomatic corps. The celebration would not require someone of vice presidential caliber. Filipino leaders might upgrade the celebration if pressed, but Dulles saw no reason to ask them.

Nixon's response exposed his own interest in the affair. Rather than miss the chance to go abroad - regardless of his capacity - Nixon suggested that the Secretary hint that Nixon

would be willing to show up, if there was reason. Although the Vice President aspired to a higher function than the emissary of Ike or Dulles, he recognized that playing that part still carried more prestige than staying at home. On May 24, Dulles instructed Nixon to be in the Philippines on their independence day, July fourth. Nixon agreed to go. He left from Hawaii at the beginning of July.

Dulles was not without the means to reward Nixon for acquiescing without any argument. To satisfy Nixon's desire for a more important assignment, the Secretary approved an expanded travel itinerary. As usual, this advanced his purposes, as much as it appeased Nixon. The new route included Taiwan, South Vietnam, Thailand, Pakistan, Turkey and the Balearic Island of Majorca.³⁴ Nixon's trip provided for Dulles an updated report on Asia from a source he considered reliable. For Nixon, the trip served as another learning experience, and a chance to increase his domestic and international reputation.

Among other leaders, Nixon spoke with the Thai Prime Minister and his advisors. These officials expressed frustration with American economic aid and tactics. They commented that Washington had to "'do, don't just talk,' adding US should cut red tape and get things done to make Thailand 'showcase of Asia.'" The Deputy Prime Minister complained that neutralist and pro-Communist countries were receiving more aid than anti-Communist ones like Thailand. Nixon had made similar complaints about his country's foreign policy, so he sympathized with the Thai grievances.

The Vice President also met again with Chaing Kai-shek. Chaing sent Nixon home with his standard message to Eisenhower. He claimed mainland China could never succeed as long as Taiwan and America continued their alliance. He also insisted that the US must

not "yield any ground whatever on any front" because the "Communists will test our intentions by some aggressive action." The aggression Chaing feared, came two years later, when PRC artillery shelled the islands of Quemoy and Matsu.

Nixon also met with the leaders of South Vietnam, Majorca, Pakistan and Turkey. He asked about their fears, listened to their advice, offered US aid where he could and reported all his findings back to Dulles.³⁵ The Vice President served not only as a high ranking dignitary attending the Philippines celebration, but also as an assistant to the Secretary of State.

Nixon returned to Washington on July 11, having managed to take his aborted 1955 Near East tour in condensed form. He arrived just in time to catch the beginning of the Suez Crisis. Although Nixon did not have much involvement in the events that followed, he did end up taking another foreign trip because of them.

Ostensibly, the crisis came about as a result of failed efforts to negotiate a loan between the World Bank and Egypt, to build the Aswan Dam. With US and U.K. backing, the World Bank developed a loan package for Egypt, that provided the capital to construct the dam. The project was intended to increase crop productivity. Egyptian negotiators considered too severe the controls on their economy that World Bank officials demanded to secure the loan. They would not agree to the terms. While counter offers were made, Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser became increasingly anti-American in his rhetoric and bought weapons from Czechoslovakia. The lack of progress in negotiations, combined with the anti-Americanism and fraternization with a Soviet satellite, led Dulles to withdraw the World Bank's offer. Nasser took the opportunity to nationalize the Suez Canal, owned mostly by

Britain and France.

Regardless of Aswan, Nasser probably would have expropriated the canal within the next few years. It represented a last vestige of colonial power. By seizing it, he illustrated his independence from Western powers and supported his pan-Arabic movement.

Nevertheless, Dulles weathered a great amount of criticism for what appeared to the outside world as an abrupt withdrawal of the loan offer. When strategic and economic concern inspired the U.K., France and Israel to hatch a scheme to retake the Suez by military force, Eisenhower condemned the attacks and forced the allies to end their assault.

Despite (or perhaps because of) the significance of these events, Nixon's role in the Suez crisis remained limited. The Vice President had a full calendar with the approaching presidential campaign. On top of that, Dulles fell suddenly ill with serious stomach cramps. The pains in his stomach turned out to be cancer. Thus campaign commitments monopolized Nixon's schedule, and his most reliable foreign relations source temporarily ceased to provide information. Nixon was cut abruptly out of the loop. It was not until after the election and the Suez crisis that Nixon and Dulles discussed future journeys for the Vice President. Then Dulles suggested the Vice President visit Austria.

The trip related to the recent debacle. Simultaneous to events in Egypt, a rebellion flared up against the Communist regime in Hungary. The Hungarians might have achieved success had Soviet military forces not intervened and crushed the insurrection. Because of the concurrent nature of these events, the United States faced a dilemma. Allied attacks on Egypt could be interpreted as similar to the Soviet aggression in Hungary. American officials felt unable to strongly censure the Soviet actions without either appearing hypocritical or publicly

denouncing Great Britain and France. The former option might result in a loss of international confidence in the US. The latter could cause irreparable damage to America's already weakened relations with Western Europe.

On Pearl Harbor Day, 1956, Dulles had few means to condemn the Soviet aggression without negative repercussions for the United States. His most promising option was to use the Hungarian situation against the Russians without actually criticizing their actions. The failed uprising forced thousands of Hungarians to flee to Austrian refugee camps, instantly formed to handle the émigrés. Dulles decided to send a delegation to tour the Hungarian camps. That trip could illustrate Soviet harshness without actually mentioning Russian attacks.

Nixon's tremendous skill as a roving fact finder landed him the assignment. His visit was primarily humanitarian, not diplomatic. The Vice President initially resisted. He claimed he would go, "if Sec. thinks it is useful." Yet, the Vice President suggested that he might stay home and they could send an alternate delegation. He proposed that Mrs. Eisenhower or his own wife fly to Austria on Air Force One and pick up a plane load of refugees - as a "mission of mercy."

Dulles said he would consider Nixon's idea, probably a subtle hint that he had already dismissed it. Nixon then concluded he "does not want to go if it will be interpreted as a grandstand play." Dulles would not accept any excuses. Eleven days later Nixon was in Austria.

Before he left, however, Nixon made sure to obtain as much presidential sanction and authority as he could. He asked for letters from Eisenhower to President Koerner and

Chancellor Raab. He also suggested Ike autograph a photograph for him to present to Koerner. The request reached Ike via Dulles. Nixon sought a more important assignment than that of official US refugee camp inspector. The letters afforded him a higher stature by making his trip "presidential."

An official announcement explained Nixon's trip. "The purpose of the Vice President's trip, concurred in by the Secretary of State, is to consult with American, Austrian and international officials as to problems relating to relief and resettlement of Hungarian refugees and to visit while there as many as possible of those who have recently escaped from oppression." Previous announcements named both Dulles and Eisenhower as authorities supporting Nixon's trips.³⁶ Perhaps, attempting to limit possible criticism of the President related to allied attacks in Egypt and almost no condemnation of Soviet offenses in Hungary, only the Secretary's prestige was invoked. And, while Nixon would have preferred Ike's name be mentioned, Eisenhower might not have agreed to let Nixon "consult" with international officials about refugee questions. Dulles gave Nixon the spotlight. The assignment worked well with Nixon's practice of meeting large crowds and international leaders, during a single trip.

As with the Brazil trip, after Austria the Vice President gained an audience with Eisenhower to discuss his findings. He informed the President that the refugees were a desirable "leadership type." He "emphasized that it is important that the United States not drag its feet . . . that we continue to take [immigration] applications at the current rate." In conclusion, Nixon "urged that here was an opportunity to get needed flexibility into our Immigration laws." Eisenhower side-stepped the Vice President's recommendation to ask

Congress for \$30 to \$40 million to alleviate the crisis. Instead, Ike suggested that these skilled refugees might be useful to Middle Eastern or Latin American countries. He authorized State to continue processing Hungarian applications even beyond allowable quotas, but took no other tangible action on Nixon's specific advice.³⁷

Nixon probably advocated an increase in Hungarian refugee émigrés to America for three reasons. From a humanitarian perspective, the refugees would be better off in America, away from the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe. Such a move also represented an excellent propaganda opportunity to contrast the beneficence of Democracy to the cruelty of Communism. Lastly, Nixon recognized the refugees might be a source of intelligence about Communist methods. The three rationales were all connected by a common thread of advantage gained by America. Eisenhower, however, had little interest in his Vice President's counsel. Despite Ike's continued indifference, Nixon assumed every meeting in which he enunciated his viewpoint improved his chances of gaining a voice in foreign affairs.

Nixon's trip to Austria was his last of the first term and 1956. Although his efforts to gain a say in the Administration had not led to great success, he remained vigilant. Dulles continued to provide Nixon with travel assignments of varying importance. And, the unceasing struggle by the Vice President to expand his role during Eisenhower's second presidential Administration, resulted in some of the desired recognition Nixon desperately craved.

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35. FRUS, 1955-1957. Southeast Asia. Volume XXII. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1989: 648-49; Cable from Bishop in Bangkok to John Foster Dulles, undated, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers NARA, Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 367 World Trip July 1956 Folder Cables June 30 - July 11, 1956; *Ibid.*: Telegram Ranking in Taipei to John Foster Dulles, 10 July, 1956.

36. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 7 December, 1956 (11:01am), JFDPEL 1951-1959 Box 5 Telephone Conversations Series January, 3 1956 - December 29,

1956; Press Release, 12 December, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Official File Series, Box 853 File 161-B Vice President's Trip to Austria Dec., 1956; A Chronology of Richard M. Nixon's Pre-Presidential International Travel (And Selected Important Events Affecting Nixon). Compiled by Benjamin J. Goldberg, 6/10/96; Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 15 December, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Official File Series. Box 853 File 161-B Vice President's Trip to Austria Dec., 1956. Nixon's eagerness to send Ike's wife and Pat on the President's aircraft and unwillingness to go himself if it would be deemed "a grandstand play," illustrates Nixon's ability to ignore the truth, even when it was undeniable. How much more grandstand could you get than sending the wives of America's leaders to pick up some refugees? It was fine to send others on such missions, as long as he did not have to go!

37. Memorandum of conversation Richard M. Nixon and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 26 December, 1956, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-62, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Administration Series Box 28, File Nixon, Richard M.; Ambrose Eisenhower Volume II: 375.

Chapter 5
Nixon's Search for a Role - The Second Term

The Vice President did not have to wait long after the new year for more orders. Only two weeks after Nixon returned from Europe, Dulles phoned with a new assignment. On Tuesday, January 8, 1957, at 6:30p.m., the Secretary "wondered what he thought about the Vice President heading the Delegation to the Gold Coast when it gets its independence." Dulles hoped to maintain positive relations with this "coming continent." Nixon refrained from a direct answer, explaining it depended on whether or not the congressional situation allowed him to leave. The irony was that Nixon invoked the congressional duties he typically wished to avoid, to evade a tour he liked even less. Three weeks later, Nixon proposed his conditions for making the trip. He gently demanded a presidential mandate. "N said that if the Pres asks him to go to Africa, he will." The Vice President repeated the tactic he used before going to Austria, in order to raise the diplomatic importance of the assignment.

Wednesday evening Dulles called Nixon to relay Ike's personal request that the Vice President go to Africa. The same day, Eisenhower wrote a memorandum asking, "could you [Nixon] find it possible to head the United States Delegation to the Gold Coast Independence Ceremonies, to be held on March 6, 1957."¹ Regardless of this presidential directive, the Vice President continued to seek ways of attaching more importance to the trip.

In February, Nixon pressed the Secretary again for an expansion, during a Saturday

lunch meeting at the Dulles home. The younger man turned the discussion to his Gold Coast trip. "He wanted to be sure we really felt this amounted to something and the President really wanted him to go." Dulles' first draft report of the conversation revealed Nixon's angst about traveling for openly self-serving purposes. Crossed out and guarded by hand written brackets Dulles wrote, "He said there had been gossip that Nixon himself promoted these missions and they did not serve a vital government purpose." By pointing out the lack of utility he believed others attached to these trips, Nixon expressed his own dissatisfaction. He needed to dispel any hearsay that his job was anything less than vital.

Dulles gave the Vice President all assurances that he and the President believed the trip was important. Not placated, Nixon suggested that he also visit Ethiopia and Liberia. Dulles agreed, and by February 28 the itinerary included Gold Coast, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Ghana, Sudan, Libya, Tunisia and Italy. For Italy, Nixon convinced Dulles again to ask the President for a personal letter, this one to Pope Pius XII.² As usual, despite his displeasure at being a messenger boy, Nixon played the role because it increased his domestic and international prominence.

Before departing, however, Dulles found an additional task for Nixon. On February 21, 1957, the Secretary explained to him that the visiting Vice Presidents of Bolivia and Peru wanted to meet with their US counterpart. Nixon at first deferred, claiming he had only seven days before his African tour to master pertinent background materials. Dulles replied that he could not give lack of time as an excuse, but could inform the two Latin Americans that receiving foreign dignitaries devolved on the Secretary of State and President, not the Vice President.

When presented in those terms, Nixon immediately changed his position and agreed to a meeting. Accepting his patron's explanation meant permanently closing himself off from an avenue of international relations work. The excuse would have set a precedent that blocked Nixon from seeing any foreign official. The argument challenged Nixon to accept the assignment, or lose the privilege for the future.³ Nixon met with the Vice Presidents and still managed to prepare for his upcoming trip.

The African travels expanded Nixon's international affairs resumé by a continent. He mentioned in a letter to British Governor of Uganda, Sir Frederick Crawford, "I [feel that I] have a much better grasp of current conditions in East Africa. I am certain that this first-hand knowledge will prove beneficial to me in the months and years ahead, and will enable me to understand more fully the future developments in this great continent [Nixon's brackets]." Although an official thank you, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Nixon's statement. He gained valuable experience on this trip. Each new country he visited, represented another notch in his foreign relations belt, and added to his public prestige.

While in Africa, Nixon acquired a taste for Middle Eastern relations. After returning from the trip, he wrote to Ambassador Donald Heath in Lebanon "my experiences and conversations during this trip put me in complete agreement with your views on the importance of the Arab refugee factor to the over-all problem of Arab-Israeli relationships." Nixon judged that no solution would present itself without a preceding resolution of the Arab refugee problem. Although the Vice President made little use of this information at the time, fifteen years later his reactions were tied to these early conclusions.

Unable to deny completely Nixon's success abroad, Eisenhower took advantage of it.

Writing to the Sultan of Morocco, he noted that the Vice President's discussions "have given new impetus to the further strengthening of the close ties which we have both worked to forge." The American Ambassador had been instructed to open discussions on US military operations in Morocco and Ike invited the Moroccan leader to come to America. The initiative for talks would have originated with Dulles, rather than Eisenhower. Probably, Ike wrote the letter at Dulles' request, or at minimum in consultation with Dulles. The important factor for Nixon was that his visit provided the opportunity to expand American-Moroccan relations.⁴ The trip again served the purposes of Dulles, while expanding Nixon's role within the Administration.

Nixon's badgering appeared to bring him some of the responsibility he craved. The expanded itinerary gave him the opportunity to write a 69 page paper containing his observations and recommendations for US foreign policy toward Africa. In no way comparable to the personal report he compiled after the Herter Committee experiences, this document was official and reflected his expertise, not his curiosity.

To advertise his review of Africa throughout the Administration, he asked that the report be distributed among all "interested departments and agencies of the government." Both Dulles and Eisenhower approved this request, despite the document's classification as top secret. Clearly, neither man believed the account was too sensitive.

Nixon's paper made sound policy suggestions, but contained no earth-shattering insights. Nixon recommended that France be gently warned to leave Algeria before it faced serious anti-colonial opposition there. He suggested that the US also encourage North African countries to pay less heed to Egypt and its leader, Gamal Nasser. On Israeli-Arab

relations, he ambiguously advised that "we give new and careful attention to the Arab refugee problem with a view towards evolving a plan which at the appropriate time could form the basis for an equitable settlement." And he recommended increased American economic aid for Ghana, Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan and Libya. In general, he called for the State Department to increase its attention and representation in Africa.

Interestingly, Nixon took his own report to task during the formal presentation on August 22. "He detected a tendency in the present report to underestimate the seriousness of the Communist threat in Africa." Augmenting the written document, he orally explained how the Red International might infiltrate Africa using the guises of Islam, racism and nationalism.

Nixon may have had two possible reasons to omit his Communist focused analysis from the report. First, it could have related to a lack of first-hand evidence of a threat. He discussed what had appeared the most important aspects during his in-country time. Prior to leaving the US, however, the State Department had stressed Russia's influence in Africa. Dulles' Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations, Robert C. Hill, wrote Nixon a memorandum about Communist infiltration in Northern Africa. Hill concluded, "I need hardly emphasize the fact that your leadership of the United States Delegation is considered by the Department of State as extremely significant in demonstrating the American interest in Africa" and implicitly against Soviet penetration.⁵ To emphasize the importance of Communist influence in Africa, Nixon attended a State Department briefing on the topic, just three days before he departed.

After the trip, however, the report reflected his experiences, rather than the briefing. As he presented it, he realized the threat emphasized by State had not been thoroughly

integrated into his report. Thus, he added it orally when he submitted the report.

Alternatively, Nixon may have excluded information on the U.S.S.R.'s potential intrusions under the direction of Dulles. Relaying his position verbally would put it at the top of every NSC member's thoughts, perhaps underscoring the threat more effectively. And, possibly Dulles wanted to keep those concerns out of the official record.

The paper did illustrate Nixon's understanding of the problems found in North Africa. It also coincided with Dulles' basic foreign policy tenets. Within the Administration, the paper went far in advertising Nixon's newly gained expertise on Northern African policy. If he could not hold the President's ear, at least he could share his knowledge with the advisors to whom Eisenhower did listen.

In August, Dulles and Nixon were talking about Nixon's next trip. The Vice President expressed an interest in visiting Europe, as long as it was scheduled in conjunction with events he could attend, such as building dedications and honorary degrees. Nixon also expressed his interest in traveling to Poland. As with previous proposed trips to Eastern Europe, Dulles doubted it would be possible.⁶

Whether or not they intended to plan a Fall expedition events again prohibited any travel for the Vice President. The October fourth launch of Sputnik shocked the Administration and the American people. The implications such an accomplishment raised about intercontinental missiles terrified most Americans. In addition, Ike's minor stroke on Monday, November 25, meant Nixon could not leave the country. As Vice President, he might be required to step up to the duties of President.

Irrespective of a second 1957 trip, Nixon had now established himself as a foreign

relations expert, outside the Executive branch, if not within it. In November, Nixon received a request from the editor of Foreign Affairs, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, to write an article. He declined through Allen Dulles, probably because it would not be appropriate for the Vice President to express his foreign affairs analysis in such a public forum. Armstrong's request, however, illustrated that Nixon's expertise was acknowledged by non-Administration international relations specialists.

That month, Morocco placed Nixon in the same grouping as Ike and Dulles. Moroccan officials wanted to give the President the Order of Mohammed. Ike agreed to accept the medal and subsequently turn it over to the Department of State. Telling Nixon about the situation, Dulles noted that the Moroccans also hoped to decorate himself and Nixon. Without thinking, the Vice President stated, "if the President accepted he would too." Probably recalling his own visit to Morocco, Nixon believed he had as much right to the honor as Ike. But, Dulles discouraged that action and "explained the President was accepting in behalf of the country."⁷ Nixon was out of luck - one country, one leader, one Order of Mohammed. The Vice President agreed to decline the honor. Nonetheless, by implication, the Moroccans' tribute reflected their respect for Nixon and his foreign relations expertise.

In 1958, Nixon again went abroad. On February 8, Dulles asked him to attend the inauguration of Arturo Frondizi, the first nationally elected President of Argentina in two decades. Dulles explained that America wanted to show support for the new regime, because Latin Americans believed the US had been too close to Frondizi's predecessor, dictator Juan Perón. Nixon complained to Dulles that he did not want to act as the Administration's goodwill ambassador anymore. Contradicting what he had said six months before, Nixon

now claimed that inaugurations diminished the prestige of his trips (in August 1957, Nixon requested that any trip to Europe be scheduled around events similar to inaugurations).

Although he preferred not to travel just to attend them, he conceded to go to Latin America in the Spring for seven to ten days.

Nixon took the opportunity to again express his willingness to travel to Europe. He included one proviso, which reflected his unceasing desire to raise his stature. He would only take a European trip if allowed to visit Poland and Yugoslavia also.⁸ Nixon did not go to Europe in 1958.

He did go to Latin America, but Dulles did not insist he attend the inauguration. Instead, he had someone else recommend it. On March 6, Dulles officially asked Nixon to visit Venezuela, Uruguay, Argentina and Bolivia. The Secretary added a handwritten note stating, "assuming you do not go to B.A. [Buenos Aires] inaugural this may be proposed by Chris Herter. F" One week later, Undersecretary Herter sent a memorandum to Nixon recommending that he attend the May 1 inauguration.⁹ Thus, the directive came from Herter, instead of Dulles. It was an intriguing illustration of Dulles' efforts not to upset his friend, while maintaining control over his protégé.

By the end of March, Nixon was preparing for the trip in earnest. He instructed a staff member, Robert Cushman, to find out the status of Ike's letters to the Presidents of the Latin American countries he was scheduled to visit. Nixon recommended "the desk officer -- man in charge for each country -- should write these letters and they should be started immediately as it takes quite a while to get them approved at State and then by the President."¹⁰ Enlightened self-interest worked to motivate the Vice President to ensure these

letters were written. He greatly valued the authority carried by presidential notes - too much to leave their drafting to chance or carelessness.

Nixon's week to ten day trip stretched into twenty days. Ending with dramatic violence in Caracas, Venezuela, it was everything but a friendly visit. Ironically, the events proved Nixon's belief that he could accomplish more if allowed to go beyond the goodwill veneer attached to his travel.

The South American excursion emerged as a one of the most important trips for him. It gave Nixon more public exposure than any previous foreign excursion. It also made him a symbol of courage and democracy, two extremely important characteristics for a man hoping to be the 1960 Republican presidential candidate. The journey served as an excellent example of Nixon implementing the touring formula he developed in 1947 - meet people, talk with leaders, debate controversial individuals and take risks.

The first half of the South American expedition went smoothly. Nixon received agreeable welcomes in his host countries, although American coverage of the events was not particularly high. He encountered limited anti-American - Communist inspired, he believed - demonstrations in several regions. Recalling experiences in Italy eleven years before, he seized the opportunity at the national university in Montevideo, Uruguay, to engage several "Communists" in a heated debate about American foreign policy. Nixon proclaimed himself the victor, and reaffirmed his belief in confronting Communists face-to-face. The exchange made excellent media fodder.

In Peru, the protests took a more aggressive turn. When he arrived at his hotel students shouted "*Fuera Nixon*" and reports stated Nixon's visit to San Marcos University

would be met by a large demonstration. Always willing to take a risk when traveling, Nixon went to San Marcos anyway. It was probably a mistake, as the intelligence proved accurate. A mob awaited the Vice President.

To his credit, Nixon displayed courage and dignity. The students shouted anti-American slogans and threw objects at the Vice President. After a brief foray into the crowd, his party retreated and drove to a backup destination, Catholic University. There Nixon debated a group of unorganized anti-American students. In a situation where he retained much greater control, Nixon won the battle of words. Standing on the front table in a classroom, Nixon effectively fielded questions about American policy toward Latin America. The Vice President left this second school to cheers of "*Viva Nixon!*"

The supportive shouts were not to last. Returning to his hotel, Nixon found another mob. Instead of driving to the hotel door, he decided to walk through the mob. The hostile crowd shouted epithets, threw pebbles and spit on the American group. Nixon stood up to the abuse, carefully controlling his desire to respond, even when a student spit tobacco juice directly in his face.

For his trials, Nixon received praise from the media and his countrymen. It was a public relations coup. In American eyes, Nixon was unjustly attacked, both verbally and physically. His unwillingness to withdraw when faced with danger, or show fear in the midst of it, had made him an instant hero.

Besides the fantastic media attention that resulted from Nixon's adventure in Peru, the events earned him praise from the President. A soldier, Eisenhower had been impressed with Nixon's resolve. He sent a telegram exclaiming, "Your courage, patience and calmness in the

demonstration directed against you by radical agitators have brought you new respect and admiration in our country."¹¹ Nixon rarely received such accolades from Ike.

Nixon's success in Peru left him in a quandary. Having endured Peruvian protests, he could not back down if faced with additional demonstrations, in other countries. He had shown himself brave and strong. Now he had to maintain that image.

The day Nixon left Lima, Dulles received a warning about further demonstrations in Latin America. Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William Snow, informed the Secretary that, "The incident in Lima may inspire similar ones in Quito, Bogotá, or Caracas. Before the Vice President reached Lima, there had been small demonstrations also inspired by Communists, in Montevideo and Buenos Aires." Whether or not Dulles responded is unclear. Certainly, Nixon would not willingly abort a trip that had brought him such attention, irrespective of the associated dangers.

Nixon's desire for press coverage guided the trip itinerary from the beginning. Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, R. Richard Rubottom, had recommended against visiting Chile and Venezuela. Rubottom explained that the Chilean President had just canceled a visit to the United States. Diplomatic etiquette thus prohibited a visit by the Vice President. Rubottom had no comparable reason to avoid Venezuela, so Nixon could not be deterred from going to Caracas. According to Rubottom, the Vice President pushed for the stop because Venezuela had the largest American colony in Latin America (besides Mexico) and numerous US investments. State Department staff experts pointed out that the Venezuelan dictator, Marcos Pérez Jiménez, had been driven from power earlier that year and subsequently found asylum in the United States. Resenting the US protection of Jiménez,

anti-American sentiment in Venezuela ran extremely high. In search of adventure and generally interested in an American audience, Nixon could not be dissuaded. His resistance to State Department advice also reflected his constant desire to make his own decisions, thereby establishing his independence in the Administration.

Since Nixon insisted on going to Venezuela, South American experts in State suggested Caracas be the first stop on the itinerary. They hoped to reduce the amount of time anti-American agitators would have to prepare for the visit. Nixon again refused. He believed the best send-off for his tour would come in Caracas, from its large American population. Their presence could also increase the media interest from home in a story. Rubottom recalled that Nixon "had in mind always what the newspapermen would be reporting. . ." He would not retreat, for fear of criticism in the press. Added to that, was the attractive chance to impress reporters further by taking risks and debating Communists.

Nixon stumbled into the adventure of his life in Caracas. He and his wife were greeted at the airport by a waterfall of saliva as they stood at attention for the Venezuelan national anthem. What followed was worse. The motorcade was stopped by a roadblock and a hostile mob specifically attacked Nixon's automobile. Mainly luck saved those in the Vice President's car from serious injury or death. Certainly, no other American Vice President has experienced anything similar to the Caracas attacks. Perhaps, that is because no one but Richard Nixon insisted on visiting such a dangerous environment.

Rubottom wondered whether Nixon's initial anti-American contacts in Montevideo resulted in the Caracas debacle. He implied that Nixon's successful debates in Uruguay fueled the reactions that followed. In effect, Nixon's quest for greater adventure became a

self-fulfilling prophecy. The more Nixon succeeded, the more dangerous the altercations became.¹²

Nixon got his big send-off, but it was not the positive one he had imagined. His party left Venezuela for Puerto Rico the day after it arrived. Still, the humiliation and danger which he survived increased his hero status. He debated Communists and he stood up to mobs. By displaying his courage, he rhetorically defeated them.

Following this second trip to Latin America, Nixon freely offered his opinions on policy concerns in South America. He had nearly lost his life to Communist inspired mobs (as he saw it). If that did not give him the aura of Latin American expert, nothing could.

Upon returning, Nixon explained that his visits to the university in Montevideo and San Marcos confirmed the value of the impromptu calls. The element of surprise, claimed Nixon - doing the unexpected thing - had immeasurably positive effects. He had taken to heart the lesson Syngman Rhee taught in 1953.

Nixon also noted that he had shown the United States would not retreat from Communist aggression, whether in the form of a mob or something more nefarious. He believed only a demonstration of fortitude would convince the enemy. Of course, Dulles entirely agreed. His underlying goal was to avoid misunderstandings with the Communists. Dulles "felt that the most important thing for the Russians and the Chinese was to understand American foreign policy."¹³ A main element of that policy was US resolve. Nixon's forbearance in Latin America was just one method by which America illustrated its message.

The Vice President never doubted that a Communist insurgency had directed all the Latin American violence. On May 16, one day after returning to Washington, he addressed

the Cabinet. Nixon stressed that "Communist inspiration was evident from the similarity of placards, slogans and techniques in all the areas in question. Particular items of American policy bearing on individual countries could not be considered the major cause." Similar slogans and signs across international borders indicated Red intrigue. He had learned that as a Herter Committee member.

Nixon absolved the US from responsibility for the attacks, but not from all the problems in Latin America. While the demonstrations were Communist inspired, he concluded the Administration's policy had resulted in an underlying hostility to America. He stated "that the political complaint against the United States for harboring refugee dictators was more important than various economic complaints. . . ." Nixon suggested raising the standard of living in these Hispanic countries, thereby supporting the masses rather than the elite, would go far in winning their trust. He did not admit any direct connection between animosity in reaction to the US sheltering dictators, and the assaults made on his person.

Six days later, Nixon expanded his conclusions for the NSC. He still maintained that Communists orchestrated the attacks, but that Washington's relations with ex-dictators fomented distrust throughout Latin America. For the NSC, he offered additional analysis connecting these topics. The Vice President noted because anti-dictator fervor now "constitutes the most emotional issue in Latin American. . . . we should accordingly in Latin America attack Communism not as Marxist economic thought but as a dictatorship and, worse from the Latin American point of view, a foreign controlled dictatorship." His suggestion displayed an understanding of US-South American issues, bounded within his bipolar world perspective.

Nixon feared the hispanic governments to the south were naive in their understanding of Communism and could not believe "they regard the Communists as nothing more than a duly-constituted political party." He advocated developing a pro-United States contingent of Latin American students. George Allen, head of the USIA supported the idea, but remarked "the real problem was what we were going to give them [the student groups] as a message to rally around and about which they could become enthusiastic."¹⁴ His comment illustrated the true problem America faced in Latin America - anti-Americanism. Communism was a cursory problem. Interestingly, Nixon had pointed out a similar contradiction in 1954 when Dulles proposed recruiting natives to fight a guerrilla war against the Vietminh, if US backed forces lost control of Vietnam. Nixon stated then that no Vietnamese would fight to help France maintain its claim on their country. The Vietnamese would sooner accept Communist rule than return to French subserviency. In the same way, the Latin-Americans had no reason to favor United States domination over domestically based Communist rule. After four years under Dulles' guarded tutelage, Nixon no longer acknowledged the relevance of this argument.

Nixon's report emphasized Communist elements in Latin America, but also supported the policy changes recommended by State Department officials which stressed other concerns. A June memo from R. Richard Rubottom to C. Douglas Dillon - reiterating recommendations made to Dulles in April - illustrated the policy direction State experts advised. Rubottom suggested increasing economic aid, approving loans, improving the ability of those countries to borrow funds and deleting the "widespread belief in Latin America that the United States prefers dictators."¹⁵ This counsel paralleled that provided by the Vice President in May.

Clearly, the Dillon/Rubottom proposal had merit. US assistance that benefited the populace, improved Latin America's image of her northern neighbor. Rubottom's memo revealed the artificiality of Nixon's singular reliance on Communism. He and others did not discount the Communist influence, but they stressed economic issues and socio-political resentment over Nixon's explanation.

Notwithstanding his Communist-centric analysis, Nixon held a more liberal assessment of the region, than might have been expected. During the June 19 NSC meeting, he advocated an increase in economic aid for countries friendly to America, but he also suggested the Administration go a step further. "Where funds are not available to support private enterprise in Latin America, the US would have to look at the situation as it is and not as we might wish it to be. Accordingly, we will have to be more flexible in regard to our views on aiding nationalized enterprises in several Latin American republics." Although a "revolutionary idea," Nixon claimed the aid was necessary to maintain good relations and prevent increased Russian influence. The Vice President warned "that we must be much less rigid than in the past in our definitions of what constituted 'democracy' or 'self-government' as these related to Latin America."¹⁶ The United States had to expand its relations with those countries, even if their governments tilted toward the socialist side.

Despite their difference in emphasis, Rubottom used the Vice President's basic agreement to enhance his own argument for a new foreign policy toward the southern continent. To his relief, events in Lima and Caracas had already made his case. The violence exercised against Nixon's party prompted a reassessment of US economic policy toward Latin America. The Administration approved an expansion of commodity agreements,

vastly increased the USIA budget for Latin America and endorsed the creation of a development bank specifically associated with the region. And, the Administration actively reduced its fraternization with Hispanic dictators to increase its appeal to the more democratic regimes.

According to Rubottom, the Nixon trip had moved Latin America from the lowest interest to the first or second priority. The violent events were "interpreted as a symptom that US-Latin American relations were in some peril."¹⁷ It was the great irony of Nixon's 1958 trip that it resulted in a major shift in US policy in reaction to Nixon's physical presence and activities, rather than because of his foreign relations expertise and advice. His method of campaigning and debating (essentially what he did in Lima) fomented the riotous behavior that the American delegation survived. Only that hostility - and it could have been enacted upon any high ranking Administration official - inspired the modifications in foreign policy. Thus, when Nixon finally managed to affect a major international decision, it was because he had been attacked, not because he was an expert. In fact, the President's brother, Milton Eisenhower, and Rubottom both advocated the policy changes Nixon presented. However, until the Latin American resentment manifested itself in tangible form, Washington ignored the signs of unrest.

Nixon, although battered, could not take direct credit for the change. No one would accept the idea that Nixon nearly sacrificed himself in Caracas knowing it would result in a shift in US attitude toward Latin America. He had sought adventures in hopes of attaining media attention and this he achieved. Only as a bonus - because Rubottom invoked the Vice President's name in support of the new policy - did Nixon receive some indirect credit for the

new initiatives.

Nixon's adventures helped him enhance his public image and reinforce his authority within the Administration. Only a proposed congressional investigation of the Caracas events detracted from the trip. Eisenhower advisors feared an inquest might prove embarrassing, especially to Nixon. On May 16, Dulles called Nixon about the partisan investigation. He recommended those involved "get our position coordinated here." Nixon said he would not attend the committee hearings, but would talk with the people giving testimony. They "agreed [Wayne] Morse is out to discredit all as much as he can." At that moment, Nixon was careful not to take too much credit for the trip and the planning of it. He noted threats had accompanied all his foreign trips, but none had ever been realized. Caracas was simply a matter of overestimating the ability of the Venezuelan government to provide adequate protection. He claimed that despite reports of possible violence in Lima and Caracas, "the govt still insisted the invitation was open and urged him to go."¹⁸

Nixon ignored his own role in inviting trouble. He had refused to cancel several engagements, insisting instead that the regimes admit it was too dangerous for him to attend. He did not want to be criticized for weakness. Of course, those governments could not rescind any invitations without embarrassment at their inability to provide adequate security. So, Nixon courted peril through his unwillingness to bare the onus of retreating. His claim that the Peruvian and Venezuelan governments urged him to venture onto unsafe campuses was a fabrication. To the relief of the whole Administration, the inquest did not result in any lasting harm.

The Vice President took advantage of the positive image he inadvertently had gained.

Once the threat of an investigation passed, he wanted credit for the entire trip. In a memorandum he noted, "One thing the State Department did after my Asian trip -- they put out some canard that everything I said was prepared by State and read by me. This is not true -- also get out the word that virtually anything that we did on this trip that was worth anything we thought of ourselves." Nixon would not get much argument from Rubottom, who recalled the Vice President's order that all State Department suggestions be routed through his close advisors.¹⁹ Nixon avoided working closely with the State Department experts when possible, and he disregarded State advice when it inhibited his aims. He wanted both a measure of independence from Dulles, and a public image reflecting his presidential caliber.

In September, Nixon requested updated background material from his May excursion to use in conjunction with an upcoming Latin American Ministers' visit. He wanted the report to include recommendations for a Latin American agency, stabilizing programs for commodities and a more focused economic effort. His primary motivation for the revised information was to counteract criticism that no public report was made, and to emphasize his enduring attention to the subject. "My main interest is in getting action, and I am continuing to push through on these things."²⁰ Nixon was laying the ground work for his presidential bid in 1960. He was a man who got things done. It was imperative that the public knew it.

While Nixon sought benefits from his dramatic experiences in Latin America, he also unceasingly demonstrated his global foreign relations expertise. His advice typically addressed whatever he saw as the latest Russian incursion. In an August NSC meeting, he counseled "it might be difficult to reduce US assistance programs in South Asia at a time when Communist activities there are increasing." Specifically, "It would be unwise to

consider reducing assistance to Pakistan without remembering what the Soviets are doing." Pakistan was "the one solid pro-U.S. country" in that part of the world. Here Nixon revealed his affinity for Pakistan long before the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War. He also implicitly drew on his Asian experiences to give the recommendation authority.

Nixon made one additional trip abroad in 1958. Just after returning from Venezuela, Dulles had asked the Vice President to visit Great Britain in November. The trip, purely ceremonial, was to dedicate the American Memorial Chapel at St. Paul's Cathedral. Upon arrival, Nixon made a statement at the Pilgrims Society. After listening to speeches given by one of the royal Dukes and the Prime Minister, he spoke in Guildhall. He even held a televised press conference. The Vice President received a warm welcome and high praise from the British during his four day tour. To be sure, it was not a trip he enjoyed. There was no opportunity to display his foreign affairs proficiency. It was a goodwill trip and Nixon could not manipulate it to appear as anything more substantial.

By December, the US-Soviet wrangling over Berlin again came to the forefront. Khrushchev sent a letter to Eisenhower proposing that West Berlin be made a demilitarized free city, with its own government. The Russian leader threatened that if the four powers did not withdraw from West Berlin in six months, his nation would accede its control of East Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. When officials gathered to discuss this new Berlin crisis, Nixon presented himself as a seasoned Communist expert. He suggested that Khrushchev wanted more than a free West Berlin. The U.S.S.R. "stirred up trouble as a device to lure us into a conference."²¹ None of the other participants at the meeting responded to the Vice President's remark. They favored alternate explanations for

Khrushchev's statement. But Nixon's mentor, and primary ally, was not in the room. Had the Secretary attended the meeting, he probably would have agreed with Nixon's assessment. The concept of the Soviet Union willing to talk made a good impression on the rest of the world. By that time, however, cancer was depleting Dulles' strength so he did not attend the meeting.

One of the final assignments Dulles gave to Nixon came on January 15, 1959. Dulles asked the Vice President to join him at a dinner given for Anastas Mikoyan, Nikita Khrushchev's deputy. Nixon was reluctant. But, "after discussion, the Vice President changed his mind and decided to attend the Sec's dinner for Mikoyan as the Sec said he felt he could contribute to the evening. N said he would see the Sec before the dinner to see if there is anything he wants him to needle Mikoyan about." Nixon's initial unwillingness could have been related to Mikoyan's lack of a diplomatic agenda. He was in the United States to research and learn, not to negotiate. Stephen Ambrose was probably correct in concluding that Nixon accepted the invitation after he decided the event had a propaganda aspect to it.²² International affairs was a passion with Nixon, but public relations also appealed to him. And, propaganda against Communists did make a diplomatic statement. In addition to publicity, the meeting may have served Nixon well that summer, when he journeyed to Russia and met Mikoyan in the Kremlin. For his part, Dulles, fighting cancer, might have welcomed Nixon's support.

As the Berlin Crisis heated up, John Foster Dulles lost ground. He was in and out of the hospital starting in November 1958. In February, Dulles requested a leave of absence for another cancer operation, and time to recuperate after the surgery. Eisenhower immediately

granted the furlough. Doctors tried radiation therapy. Meanwhile, Nixon continued his attempts to be heard. But, Eisenhower had taken the matter into his own hands and was not interested in Nixon's assessment. When the Vice President did get listened to about Berlin, it was as a liaison between the Executive and top Congressmen, not as an advisor presenting his own ideas. In March, Nixon briefed Representatives and Senators on the situation. That was as far as Eisenhower believed his subordinate's role should go.

About the only influence Nixon had in determining Berlin policy ironically came after Christian Herter replaced Dulles as Secretary of State. Nixon suggested that Herter make his first speech on the Berlin Crisis. Until that time, only Eisenhower's March 16 radio/TV broadcast, discussing the Berlin situation, had received national attention. Some Congressmen had publicly broached the subject, but they did not spread the Administration's message far. But, Secretary Herter's first speech could do just that. Ike approved the plan.²³ Nixon's idea related more to domestic reaction, than foreign relations. The President would listen to Nixon's political assessments. Without question, to Nixon's mind, it was crucial to maintain national support for the Administration. Unity behind Republican policies could translate into votes for Nixon in 1960.

Just before the end of Dulles' life, Nixon moved to shift his alliances. For nearly eight years, he had relied on Dulles as a patron. It was the Secretary who allowed him a role in international affairs. When Nixon approached Eisenhower with unsolicited foreign policy ideas, he generally received an indifferent response. But, with the passing of Dulles from power, Nixon needed to appeal more to the President. His relations with Chris Herter, although dating from 1947, were not nearly as close as they had been with Dulles. Nixon and

Herter exchanged almost no correspondence once the latter was named Secretary of State.²⁴ Besides, when Dulles could no longer function as primary international advisor, Eisenhower tightened his own grip on American foreign relations. He neglected to take Nixon into his confidence.

Nixon reinvigorated his attempts to win Eisenhower's confidence in May 1959. At the NSC meeting on the twenty-first, Nixon heartily agreed with Ike's proposal to unilaterally invite 10,000 Russian students annually to American universities. If the Soviets accepted, the US got to expose Soviet youth to the advantages of capitalism. If the offer was refused, America received world accolades for making the effort. Nixon also stated, that he had supported the idea two years before, when Ike first proposed it.

Such a plan appealed to Nixon's preference for bold policy initiatives. He claimed "the President's statement caused him to think that the time might well be at hand to re-examine the basic principles on which our policy with respect to East-West exchanges had been developed." He proposed an end to quid pro quo exchanges, in favor of US initiatives like the one Ike advocated. This idea contradicted Dulles' basic principles, but coincided with Eisenhower's perspective.²⁵ There was no surprise when Ike agreed with his second-in-command's analysis. Nixon, however, may have had a sense of dejavu, since he had resurrected his pre-inaugural role, created in the Commodore Hotel, as yes-man.

John Foster Dulles would not have leapt at the President's one-sided plan. He had opposed Open Skies, even though that initiative also benefited America regardless of the Soviet response. The Secretary wanted to be able to predict with a degree of certainty, the results of any diplomatic move. Despite apparent clarity, Dulles did not rush into anything

without first analyzing all the ramifications. He would have advised greater caution, or at minimum, time to examine the proposition in detail. Seeking to win Eisenhower's confidence, Nixon had no such compunctions.

Since an alliance with Ike could not be relied upon, Nixon looked again to his travel as a means to expand his horizons. His 1958 tour of Latin America, because of its dangers, had reinforced his public image as the beacon of Democracy, indomitable in the face of communism. It was a perception the Vice President had worked hard to develop through all his trips. But, to out shine his life threatening expedition in Venezuela would be difficult. The secret to success, however, is often timing. In 1959, Nixon was in the right place, at the right time. His final trip abroad presented him with a more spectacular opportunity than he had inadvertently found in Caracas.

The Vice President's grand finale was a trip to Russia and Poland in July and August 1959. His good fortune came out of circumstance, not persistence: Khrushchev was searching for an chance to visit the United States. The Russian Premier used the opening of an American exhibition in Moscow, as an excuse to invite Nixon to Russia. By having the Vice President as a guest in his country, he set himself up for a reciprocal offer to see America. If all went well, he would then extend an invitation to Eisenhower. The highly publicized trip offered Nixon an opportunity he had hoped for throughout his vice presidential career: to confront the Communists on their home territory. Previously, his requests were rejected by Secretary Dulles. Finally, on his death bed, Dulles favored it. The Secretary had several reasons to support the mission.

Although Khrushchev extended an invitation to Nixon for self-serving purposes, the

gesture still constituted a friendly move toward the United States. It behooved the Administration to accept. Agreeing to the visit avoided criticism that Washington was not making an effort for peace. It also provided the State Department with Nixon's valued - at least by Dulles - assessment of Russia.

The Secretary of State generally took a dim view of 'personal diplomacy' with Communists, believing "more often than not these meetings were used by Communists, not to settle differences, but to exploit them and to gain propaganda advantage." One factor behind his opposition to meeting with the Soviets could have been his goal of limiting Soviet influence on the free world. Stephen Ambrose contended that, "Dulles could see no reason to reach out to the Russians. . . ." Meetings with the West added legitimacy to the Communists, who already had been accepted into the international community. Dulles wanted to deprive Russia of its global respectability, in order to force peaceful change from within. However by 1959, he trusted Nixon not be manipulated, and supported the trip to Moscow. He also must have recognized the domestic public relations opportunity it presented to Nixon, just before the 1960 presidential campaign began.

Nixon claimed to have vigorously prepared for the trip to Russia. He "spent every spare moment studying reports and recommendations from the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the White House staff." Yet, the information preserved in his files did not reflect the extensive resources Nixon implied. His trip file for the Soviet Union contained only basic information from public sources. The State Department provided Nixon with American Automobile Association travel guides of the U.S.S.R., implying US analysts had few of their own sources. Additional information came

from published booklets about Russia. There existed a tremendous disparity between the briefing materials available for other regions Nixon had traveled to and those provided about Moscow, illustrating just how little interaction occurred between the US and the U.S.S.R. during the 1950s. Undoubtedly, Nixon received more information than the file contained - especially in the form of talks with Dulles - but how much more would be impossible to judge. It appeared that he received fewer research materials from the Administration on this trip, than he had received on his previous vice presidential goodwill journeys.

Nixon relished the relative freedom of action that resulted from State's inability to brief him. A few days before departure, he revealed that he would observe his standard audacious style in Russia. Nixon used a conversation with journalist Paul Nevins to emphasize his desire to meet the people of Russia, not just the leaders. Nevins recommended that Nixon "from time to time try to duck us [the media] and spend some time with the people." The Vice President concurred. He instructed his staff to remember "I cannot always have all of the press with me. There will be times when we will slip out without anyone from the press at all."²⁶ That would give Nixon an opportunity to talk directly with the people, and the pleasure of deceiving the media. In addition, one can surmise, Nixon expected somehow the story would end up in the newspapers. There was no public relations advantage to sneaking out to speak with the people, and not having it reported to American constituents. He had never done that before, he would not start in the Soviet Union.

Despite the invitation, American-Russian relations remained tense in 1959. Khrushchev renewed threats on West Berlin immediately before Nixon's departure, making the Western world uncomfortable. The same week Nixon left on his trip, Eisenhower

responded to the annual congressional passage of a "Captive Nations" resolution by encouraging Americans to pray for an end to totalitarian rule over Eastern Europe. In essence, the declaration called for an end to all Communist regimes. Moscow's leadership would berate Nixon unmercifully for the timing of this resolution. Other tensions were unspoken. The Central Intelligence Agency continued to launch U-2 flights over the Soviet Union, despite Russian protests. Also, the space and arms races were quietly accelerating. In this atmosphere, Nixon finally made his way behind the Iron Curtain.

Even without State Department directives, the Vice President had to contend with Eisenhower's unwillingness to allow him an official policy making role. Although the Vice President had proven himself, Ike would not budge. Before Nixon left the United States, Eisenhower informed the presidential staff "the Vice-President is not part of the negotiating mechanism of government." Nixon was fully aware of Eisenhower's position. With Milton Eisenhower chaperoning the trip, he did not attempt to negotiate - at least not when Ike's brother was watching him.

True to his word, one of Nixon's initial maneuvers in Russia was to slip away from the press. The morning after his arrival, he left the American Embassy with Secret Service agent Jack Sherwood, who had accompanied him to Latin America as well. Nixon and Sherwood made their way to the Danilovsky market, giving the Vice President his chance to meet with the local people. Some in the crowd asked if Nixon had extra tickets to the exhibit he was scheduled to open. Nixon misunderstood the question and offered 100 rubles to pay for 100 tickets. There were no more tickets available.

Nixon guessed he would be under Soviet surveillance and probably expected some

mention of his generosity in the Russian newspaper. The story was not what he anticipated. To Nixon's consternation, the following day *Pravda* carried a photo of him giving money to a Moscovite and accused the Vice President of offering a bribe. That the Soviets obtained the photo, in addition to the story, illustrated how closely they were watching his movements. The Vice President learned from the incident. After it, he did not attempt anything more than conversation with the common people. No gifts. Despite Russian efforts to provoke him, Nixon did not again provide the Communists an opportunity to twist his actions or words in order to embarrass him and the United States. At the same time, he faced down hecklers planted in the crowds, who asked questions about America's racial inequalities and aggressive military stance.

The Vice President spent almost two weeks talking with Soviet leaders and touring parts of Russia. Khrushchev put on a good show. Nixon and the Premier matched wits repeatedly. At the American Exhibition, they debated the respective merits of Democracy and Communism. First, they were filmed on camera in the section promoting American television technology. Nixon and Khrushchev defended the accomplishments of their particular countries. They moved on to a life-sized model American kitchen. There the debate continued, with loud exchanges and finger pointing. Although the dialogue almost degenerated into a shouting match, Khrushchev seemed to enjoy it.²⁵ And, Nixon had the satisfaction of knowing he had stood up to the most powerful Communist in the world.

Stephen Ambrose claimed that Nixon learned a new lesson from his exchanges with Khrushchev. On his return to the states, he would warn Eisenhower not to "expect to change Khrushchev's mind by arguing with him about the merits of the two competing systems."

According to Ambrose, "it was a lesson he learned so well that he never again, in all his dealings with Communist leaders, made the mistake of trying to do so."²⁸ Of course, this was a lesson Nixon had actually absorbed over a decade before, dealing with Giuseppe De Vittorio. Like Khrushchev, the Italian refused to concede his point.

Nixon never believed he would change Khrushchev's mind by engaging him in debate. He primarily hoped to win over those watching, and display his stalwart defense of the American-way. Khrushchev was not about to give into Nixon's arguments. The best outcome of the dispute either one could expect was a stalemate. When they managed it, each man claimed victory.

Eisenhower had not authorized the Vice President to negotiate with the Soviet representatives, but when Nixon found the opportunity, he tried anyway. In his private meetings with Russian leaders, he made every attempt to fill the role of plenipotentiary statesman. Nixon emphasized the need for a thawing in relations. Khrushchev had previously called for diminished tensions also. An early version of Détente, he probably reasoned that neither country benefitted from their ongoing rivalry. The diplomatic effort, however, was as self-serving as it was altruistic. A tangible improvement in US-U.S.S.R. affairs would enhance Nixon's reputation among American voters in 1960.

On July 25, Nixon had two meetings in the Kremlin. His first meeting was with Khrushchev's deputy, Anastas Mikoyan. Mikoyan complained that the United States waged an economic war against the Soviet Union, and deprived Russia of needed goods. Mikoyan probably made a valid charge, since the US discouraged its allies from trade with non-democratic regimes. Nixon replied that trade could only increase after political relations

improved. "He [Nixon] could not agree that trade agreements must precede political settlements." The talks with Mikoyan ended at 10:15am. Soon thereafter, Nixon found himself face-to-face with the Deputy Premier, Frol Kozlov.

The Vice President explained to Kozlov that diplomatic breakthroughs could only be made by cutting through the bureaucratic red tape inherent in the large governments of America and Russia. Nixon remarked those impediments "should be cut where important and far reaching decisions are to be made. The purpose of high level diplomacy is precisely to cut red tape."²⁹ Nixon, the constitutional second-in-command of the United States, was talking to the number two man in Russia. They were thus engaged in the highest level talks going on between their nations. The Vice President's statement implied he could be a part of the tape removal process - expressly ignoring Ike's orders. Nixon did not assume that Kozlov had the authority to reach any agreements, but everything said to Kozlov, Khrushchev was certain to hear also.

Nixon had met with Khrushchev on July 22. That first exchange exposed Nixon to the Russian leader's bluster, as Khrushchev railed against the "Captive Nations" resolution. In subsequent talks, however, Nixon attempted to make headway. Foster Dulles had insisted that the U.S.S.R. could not expect to intervene in the non-Communist world without allowing the free world do the same in Russia's satellite countries. The Secretary had explained that Khrushchev "should be told that until he puts a stop to such activities, his call for reducing of tensions and for peaceful co-existence will have a completely false and hollow ring." Nixon might have listened to this strategy in May, but Dulles was two months in the ground by the time Nixon was in Eastern Europe. And, it was perfectly clear from his public discussions

with Khrushchev that this line of reasoning would be rejected.

Nixon's tactic actually seemed to be more conciliatory. He informed Khrushchev that respect for the military power of each country could replace the unceasing race for military and economic superiority. The debate about which nation was stronger only created tensions and fear. Nixon's perspective actually was more enlightened, and realistic, than what Dulles suggested. He understood Khrushchev would not back down unilaterally, but hoped the Soviets would mirror US steps away from confrontation.

When given the unprecedented opportunity to address the Russian people via a televised speech, Nixon again disregarded advice he had received from his mentor in May. Dulles suggested the main objective should be to put "the responsibility for peace upon Khrushchev's shoulders." In 1955, Nixon had decried the Premier's efforts to place the onus of peace on America, so it was conceivable he would reciprocate, as Dulles recommended. Instead, Nixon responded to complaints raised by hecklers, denied *Pravda's* bribe story and gently explained that the West would not allow Communism to overrun the world. Nixon knew the speech was not as hard-line as conservatives back home wanted. But, hoping his words might be believed by a few of the Russians, Nixon stopped short of a harsh condemnation of the Soviet system.

Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson wholly praised the Vice President's performance. He claimed Nixon's foreign relations experience had served him extremely well on the trip. The Vice President succeeded in "getting our story across and at same time not upsetting bigger game we are playing by provocative statements." Thompson remarked that Nixon's radio/TV address may have sounded soft to US citizens, but it was "extremely effective with

Soviet audience."³⁰ In fact, the Russian people probably were not affected by Nixon's words. Most importantly, he had presented the United States positively and the Soviets less so, and from Moscow no less. Concurrently, he checked his vitriolic anti-Communism throughout the entire speech. Both details were undeniable accomplishments.

After twelve days in Russia, the American group flew to Poland. In terms of media attention, the Polish segment of the trip surpassed the Russian. Nixon received a much warmer welcome from the citizens of Warsaw than the Moscovites. Personally, however, the Vice President must have been dissatisfied with his time there. Unlike Moscow, he did not manage any private meetings with the Polish officials. Instead, Milton Eisenhower attended his conference with President Wladyslaw Gomulka. With Ike's brother in the same room, Nixon could only inform Gomulka that he was a messenger, not a negotiator. He repeatedly explained to Gomulka "that under his constitutional position as Vice President of the United States he does not originate foreign policy nor does he engage in negotiations. He would report fully to the President and to the Secretary of State the views expressed by Mr. Gomulka of this subject."³¹ Obviously, this was not the role Nixon had so often attempted to make for himself. Constitutionally acceptable or not, Nixon aspired to be a statesman. In Moscow, he had removed this yoke. In Warsaw, Milton reasserted that control.

On the whole, both parts of the trip were triumphant for the Vice President. It was an historic visit because of the precedent it set, and the publicity Nixon gained. Here was another great media success for the Vice President. In September, however, Nixon was not given an opportunity to again boost his image when Khrushchev made his reciprocal trip to America. Eisenhower gave the job of tour guide to US Ambassador to the U.N., Henry

Cabot Lodge, Jr. Although the highest ranking official to have spent time with Khrushchev, Nixon was not considered for the assignment.

In August, the Vice President had claimed that he should not be the person to accompany the Russian party because it would be "improper since he had not done so with any other head of state."³² Eisenhower did not bother to contradict the Vice President, despite obvious counter-arguments. First, Khrushchev had accompanied Nixon on some of his trip in Russia. Second, as leader of the America's greatest opponent, Khrushchev was a person who required special attention. Lodge's position carried prestige, but Nixon's probably carried more. It was Eisenhower's decision, and the President held more faith in Lodge, than in Nixon. Perhaps, Ike wanted to avoid another confrontation between the Vice President and the Premier.

Acting as a host to the Russians would have increased Nixon's exposure and his foreign relations reputation. Regardless of whether the visit had any diplomatic negotiations attached to it, talking one-on-one with the head of the Soviet Union gave official stature to the guide. Nixon had gained some from his visit to Moscow. He would not have declined the opportunity to debate the Soviet Premier again, had Ike dismissed the "improper" argument. Possibly, the Vice President raised the idea with the hope that Eisenhower would discount it. Nixon miscalculated, as no one else offered arguments in favor of the Vice President showing Khrushchev the US. Dulles was gone and could not intervene on the Vice President's behalf. Nixon had lost any chance of participating in the Russian leader's visit.

Whether or not Nixon hosted Khrushchev was less important than that he had gone to the Russia. He could add to his credentials that he had established a relationship with the

Soviet government unrivaled by any other American political figure. James Reston admitted the trip was a superb way to launch a presidential campaign.³³ Nixon was hailed for his stalwart defense of capitalism and his firmness in dealing with the communist leadership. He returned home to showers of congratulatory letters and high praise from the American press.

The tour behind the Iron Curtain brought the Vice President's overseas traveling to an end. By the time he returned from Poland, Nixon had built an impressive foreign affairs resumé. He was a Vice President with fantastic name recognition who, through his trips and efforts in the Administration, constantly displayed his experience and competence. By the summer of 1959, Nixon had created an image of himself that was quite presidential in character. He achieved something no previous vice president had managed. He turned his position into a viable jump-off point for a presidential campaign. In so doing, he transformed the office for all those who followed him.

Nixon's main obstacle to maintaining his unprecedented position was Eisenhower. Ike refused to see Nixon as anything more than a political hatchet man. Although the Vice President consistently worked to expand his role in the Administration, Ike was steadfast. While Dulles was alive, Nixon had an advocate who could help in his efforts to attract responsibilities beyond political jobs for the Administration. Without the Secretary of State, Nixon's international role shrank each day the election came closer.

Ambrose accurately described the position Nixon found himself in after Dulles' death. "Eisenhower in his last two years was going to put the long-term good of the country ahead of all other considerations, and would not gear his actions or his ideas to the immediate problem of electing Dick Nixon in 1960."³⁴ In fact, Ike's plan included boosting his own image,

rather than Nixon's. He hoped to leave a legacy of peace and action. To attain his goal, Eisenhower supplanted Nixon as goodwill ambassador. World peace would be his crowning achievement and ensure him an enviable global reputation. Given the President's authority, and Nixon's growing need to concentrate on his campaign, it was not difficult to lock the Vice President out of the foreign policy picture. This was a frustrating end to a hard fought battle to increase his exposure and reputation.

Until the second half of 1959, Nixon had made slow but steady progress in his quest for an extended role in the Administration. At National Security Council and Cabinet meetings, Nixon displayed his foreign affairs competence. After each of his international voyages, he presented a detailed analysis of his findings. He offered a considered opinion on any topics for which he could claim the slightest knowledge. And, in such regions as South East Asia, he spoke with authority and confidence. His input in high level meetings and briefing sessions earned him some of the respect and rank he thirsted after. Because it was largely a behind the scenes role, however, it could never satisfy his goals.

The public opportunities to portray himself as an international relations expert came most often when the Vice President traveled abroad. His expeditions made him a global figure. Yet, throughout the Administration he tried to mutate the goodwill ambassador image into one of statesman. He did not avoid these assignments for fear of injuring his relationship with Dulles, and reducing his role in the Administration. But he did attempt to elevate the relevance of each overseas assignment. He sought presidential directives to improve the stature of excursions and endeavored to convince Dulles to expand his assignments beyond bringing good wishes to foreign dignitaries. Nixon craved a prestigious mission.

Despite his reservation about goodwill trips, Nixon used them as much to his advantage as he could. In foreign countries, he could hold press conferences that received media attention because of his exotic location. He could project himself as a decision-maker, without being tied directly to Eisenhower or Dulles.

In addition, Nixon worked to modify the public perception of his travels. Since the trips were not statesmanlike in nature, Nixon promoted his travel as more important than he actually believed it to be. In such an effort, the Vice President once wrote three pages of notes about the merits of goodwill trips. His scribbles included the phrases "There will be peace - if people can know people -" and "good will is essential to good relations." Nixon ended up with an eighteen page speech justifying goodwill visits as important for assuring positive communications with allies, learning and sharing respective cultures and determining the thoughts of governmental leaders.³⁵ Nothing he said was inaccurate. He simply believed his untapped diplomatic talents could be used more effectively, to benefit his country and himself. Not a man afraid of manipulating public perceptions, he promoted the importance of his trips, disregarding his own doubts about their utility.

Nixon's tours between 1953 and 1960 did not possess the level of foreign policy importance that his 1947 excursion had. But, they were significantly better than no international role at all. Through surveys abroad and participation in foreign policy discussion in the Administration, the Vice President achieved some of his goals. He gained an expertise in foreign relations and a reputation as a risk taker. International relations was probably his most admired quality among the populace. Certainly, his vicious partisanship did not endear him to the majority of voters, although it did win him allies among grassroots

Republican organizations. And, Nixon's role in the Administration was larger because of his efforts - efforts which included maintaining a patron/protégé relationship with Dulles - than would otherwise have been possible.

ENDNOTES:

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Nixon The Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Vice President. General Correspondence Box 228, Folder, Dulles, Allen; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 22 November, 1957 (1:15pm), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 7 Telephone Conversations Series July 1, 1957 - December 27, 1957. Nixon again received attention from a foreign country in July 1959, when Indonesia President Sukarno "especially requested that the President and Vice President be informed of the essence of conversation which he summed up as an appeal to U.S. to find some way - and he thought recognition of Indo-Iranian claims best way - to strike a response from the heart of the Indonesian people and thus help him combat Communist influence and promote understanding and friendship for U.S."; FRUS, 1952-1954, East Asia and The Pacific, Volume XII, Part 2, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1987: 457.

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13. Memorandum from Vice President's office concerning conversation with Herbert Matthews (NYT) and Maurice Bernbaum (OSA), 15 May, 1958, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 390 South American Trip box 3 of 3 Folder - San Marcos; JFDOHP, Princeton University Library, Transcript of a Recorded Interview with John W. Hanes, Jr. Philip A. Crowl Interviewer. Great Fall, VA 29 January

and 12 August, 1966: 182.

14. FRUS 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V: 238, 240, 243, 244.

15. Memorandum R. Richard Rubottom to Douglas Dillon, 3 June, 1958, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 401 South American Trip, 1958.

16. FRUS 1958-1960, American Republics, Volume V: 31. Nixon's remarks contradicted some he had made supporting Dulles on May 22. Dulles expressed disapproval of a Commerce Department proposal to alter US trade relations with Soviet dominated countries. Nixon sought to reinforce the position by drawing on his Latin American expertise. More importantly, he noted that the issue concerned international Communism and therefore the State Department, not Commerce, had jurisdiction. FRUS 1958-1960, Eastern Europe Region: Soviet Union: Cyprus. Volume X, Part 1. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993: 16

17. Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism, Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1988: 110-112; JFDOHP, R. Richard Rubottom, Jr. : 36-37, 44.

18. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 16 May, 1958 (11:39am), JFDPEL 1951-1959, Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958. I am assuming they referred to Wayne Morse, the maverick senator from Oregon. Morse sat on the foreign relations committee and could well have called for an inquiry.

19. Memorandum titled *Future Trips*, undated, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 390 South American Trip box 2 of 3 Folder - Miscellaneous (2 of 2); JFDOHP, R. Richard Rubottom, Jr.: 38.

20. Memorandum from Richard M. Nixon taken by phone by lgg, 18 September, 1958, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 401 South American Trip, 1958 Folder Richard Nixon Memos.

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24. Folder: Herter, Christian, Richard M. Nixon The Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Vice President. General Correspondence Box 334.
25. FRUS 1958-1960, Eastern Europe Region: Greece: Finland: Turkey, Volume X, Part 2. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1993: 26-27.
26. Richard M. Nixon, Six Crises, New York: Double Day and Company, Inc., 1962: 241, 236; Ambrose, Eisenhower The President Volume II: 96; Folder: The V.P.s Trip to the U.S.S.R. July - August 1959, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 405; Folder: Russian Trip, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers: Series 410; Memorandum Richard M. Nixon to Staff, 17 July, 1959, Richard M. Nixon Pre Presidential Papers, Laguna Niguel, CA: Series 411 Soviet Union and Poland Visit Folder - Miscellaneous. Unlike other files, the U.S.S.R. trip file does not contain a list of confidential documents removed for national security reasons. Therefore, I believe this folder does reflect the sources Nixon could access.
27. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 520-523, 529.
28. Ibid.: 534.
29. FRUS 1958-1960, Eastern Europe Region: Soviet Union: Cyprus, Volume X, Part 1: 352, 357. Mikoyan's concern about economic warfare paralleled Dulles'. It was ironic that during the Cold War many of the worst American fears about the Soviet intentions, mirrored Soviet fears about US aims.
30. Nixon, Six Crises: 242, 266, 280; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 529-531; FRUS 1958-1960. Eastern Europe Region: Soviet Union: Cyprus: 380.
31. Ambrose, Eisenhower The President Volume II: 534; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 519-528; FRUS 1958-1960, Eastern Europe Region: Greece: Finland: Turkey. Volume X, Part 2: 193.
32. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 534; Ambrose, Eisenhower The President Vol. II: 542.

33. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 529.

34. Ibid.: 513.

35. Folder: Are Good Will Trips Worth While, Richard M. Nixon The Presidential Papers, NARA Laguna Niguel, CA: Vice President, General Correspondence Box 49.

Chapter 6

Down to Earth: The Eisenhower-Nixon Relationship

While the Vice President worked hard to expand his foreign policy role in the Administration, President Eisenhower's authority remained supreme. Regardless of how Nixon proved his worth, he was limited to the roles Ike assigned or Dulles devised. Herbert Parmet commented that Nixon's "activism as Vice President, however much a landmark in the evolution of the office, also carried with it the penalty of subservience that galled and humiliated Nixon and others who held the position." Another historian explained, Nixon rebelled against the notion that Eisenhower was his mentor, "for he felt personally that he owed nothing to Eisenhower except the memory of uphill struggles and political martyrdom."¹ Ike did not pave the Vice President's way with gold, or even asphalt. He used Nixon only as a political workhorse and congressional contact. Any exceptions arose from requests made by Secretary Dulles, who had his own agenda for Nixon. From the start, Eisenhower reserved judgment on Nixon's character. In 1952, Ike effectively forced his runningmate to make public his personal finances in order to disprove media charges that he had accepted illicit campaign donations. Eisenhower told reporters Nixon would have to show himself clean as a hound's tooth to prove his innocence. The result was the famous "Checkers speech" in which the Californian disclosed his finances, but also melodramatically announced he would not give up the family dog Checkers - a gift from an admirer - regardless of what anyone said. Nixon

stayed on the ticket, but resented the embarrassing invasion of his privacy, and Eisenhower's unwillingness to lend him more support. The President never became close to Nixon.

Nixon's assignments from Eisenhower typically fell into two categories: election campaigner and legislative advocate.² Through all the elections of the Administration - congressional, gubernatorial and presidential - Nixon campaigned for Republican candidates. Eisenhower kept his hands clean, while Nixon hurled political accusations and insults. This was a task with which Nixon already had great familiarity, and he performed it well. He knew how to play a crowd, how to deliver a catch phrase and how to praise an ally.

His second job was as executive liaison to Congress. Nixon's work on Capital Hill was tied to his position in the Administration, rather than to the Republican party. Because he presided over the Senate, he had constitutional authority to work with the Senators and the Representatives. Ike recognized that and used it.

Both of these assignments were essentially political in nature. In the President's mind, that was the main purpose of a Vice President, or specifically of his Vice President. Nixon had no choice but to accept these two roles and perform them to his utmost ability. His successful expansion of the vice presidency, in terms of foreign relations, came about only through skilled opportunism. Eisenhower's vision of the position, although more extensive than previous presidents, did not include a globe roaming second-in-command.

By the first election of the new Administration, Nixon already had his marching orders. During the March 5, 1954 Cabinet meeting, Nixon recommended that the attendees keep speaking calendars open for September and October. Although an off year election, they might be called upon to lend support to Republican candidates before the vote. High ranking

officials made excellent celebrities for campaign podiums.

At the first Cabinet meeting after election day, Eisenhower called on Nixon for an analysis of the results. The Vice President explained that the Republican party had lost some seats, but not an astounding number. He claimed the election had been a "dead heat." To conclude his presentation, he wound up a mechanical drummer boy and released it across the conference table. With that he noted "that the Administration must continue to 'beat the drum' of achievement."³ Unfortunately for Nixon, Eisenhower liked the effect. The Vice President's proven political skill assured that he received these domestic assignments.

By its nature, the vice presidency included a domestic collar. Nixon never abandoned these duties, although he continued to work to increase his international role. The Vice President supplied political advice and analysis to Eisenhower through the entire Administration.

Ironically, Nixon's reluctant work in domestic politics helped his presidential aspirations as much, or more, than his aspired role as statesman. Through his campaigning, he gained a national reputation among Republicans of all ilk. Nixon helped small time politicians running for county seats, just as he sat on podiums with congressional candidates. Before the end of the Eisenhower Administration, he had used his position to build a loyal grassroots support network.

By Fall 1953, Eisenhower had determined the Vice President's primary duty. While Nixon was still traveling through Asia, Dulles recommended the addition of Saudi Arabia to the itinerary, but Ike would not agree to it. Although Dulles wanted an updated report on a region he had visited in May, Eisenhower preferred that Nixon manage congressional

relations.

Dulles noted on November 21 that the President "is not disposed to recommend it [expanded itinerary]. . . . he is very anxious that the Vice President should get back as soon as possible to participate in meetings scheduled in early December with congressional leaders."⁴ Implicitly, Ike exposed his own insecurity about addressing the Congressmen without Nixon's experience to support him. Perhaps, another reason Ike vetoed the detour was that he was uncomfortable with the young Vice President representing the United States overseas.

One of the most important congressional liaison/advisor assignments the President delegated to Nixon, came about in December 1953. At that time, Eisenhower put Nixon to work on a major challenge - dealing with Republican Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. Nixon and McCarthy had been colleagues on HUAC and Eisenhower hoped that the Vice President could reason with the unmanageable Senator. On Ike's orders, Nixon met with the powerful anti-Communist demagogue, and seemingly convinced him to cease his indiscriminate attacks on the Republican Administration. Nixon's immediate success with McCarthy was short-lived. The Wisconsin native soon abrogated the agreement and renewed his charges of Communist security risks in the government. For the next year, Nixon attempted to control McCarthy. To reduce his potency, Ike used Nixon as an anti-Communist spokesman and drew attention away from McCarthy. In the end, it was committee hearings involving an Army dentist that brought McCarthy's reign to an end.

Once a national audience witnessed the sloppy, abusive, cruel methods employed by McCarthy, he lost his credibility.⁵ Without an audience, he had no power. Although Nixon

did not contain McCarthy's attacks as Ike wanted, he did make every attempt. He completed the assignment as well as possible.

More characteristic of Nixon's role under Eisenhower was recruiting congressional support for Administration initiatives. May 1954 brought a crisis requiring the Vice President's persuasive skills. As the agonizing defeat of a French garrison at Dien Bien Phu approached, Eisenhower assigned him the task of reconciling the Republican right wing to the President's middle of the road approach. Conservatives called for immediate military support of the French. Ike refused to intervene unilaterally. Nixon's lobbying succeeded and serious right wing opposition to Eisenhower's plan never materialized.

After Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, Nixon again stepped into his congressional liaison role. He recommended that top senatorial leaders of both parties be fully briefed on the crisis. The Vice President expected to mute reaction from the Hill by giving the Senators enough information to make them feel apprised and consulted. Eisenhower reacted to the suggestion as though the Senators might try to limit his actions. He warned "he won't stand by and let our nationals be abused." He implied any legislative move to block an aggressive response would be side-stepped by the Executive branch. Within a few days, however, Egyptian actions made it clear that US nationals were safe and canal traffic would sail smoothly. Ironically, the Administration condemned the allied attack on Egypt, instead of partaking in it. How much Nixon's briefing helped to control the reaction from legislators is unclear, but by keeping the Congressmen informed the session must have benefited executive-congressional relations.

Eisenhower repeatedly handed Nixon the Administration's Capital Hill problems. The

legislature was the only issue on which Eisenhower consistently consulted Nixon. Ten days before his stroke in November 1957, Ike wrote Nixon a memorandum. "Will you carefully read the enclosed documents, both of them directed to the subject of establishing good relationships with the Congress." There were two letters, one addressed to US Ambassador to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and the other to White House staff congressional liaison, General Wilton B. "Jerry" Persons. To protect the Administration from recriminations, the President ordered Nixon to personally destroy the notes after reading and approving them. He sought to avoid leaks about "any concerted effort along this line. . . ."⁶ Ike assumed the media would publicly criticize a White House that deliberately tried to obtain congressional conformity. It was thus imperative that secrecy be maintained. Nixon undoubtedly followed his instructions and obliterated the documents once he had read and commented on them.

When Washington was presented with a foreign crisis, Nixon usually arranged for the briefing of Congressmen by White House officials. He also acted as a middle man when Eisenhower met with Representatives and Senators. The Vice President presented the situation and responded to questions, while Eisenhower listened. Occasionally the President would add some comment, but Ike left the wrangling with individual legislators to Nixon.⁷ While the Vice President resented this work - as he did campaigning - it again eased his path toward the presidency. Nixon formed relationships with powerful Congressmen whom he called on for support in 1960, and again in 1968.

Unexpectedly in the spring of 1959, Nixon almost found himself performing an international task solely at the President's behest. On March 31, Eisenhower asked him to

head a delegation to the Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires. The request was conditional on Dulles not being able to attend the Foreign Ministers Conference beginning in six weeks. Ike explained "if Foster was not able to go to the Foreign Ministers Conference on May 11th, he [Ike] was in quite a jam for someone to head the delegation to Buenos Aires for the Conference beginning April 27th. Dillon has to go to the SEATO Conference." Eisenhower continued that "he did not want to add a burden to the Vice President, but wondered if he would consider this and in a day or two call Acting Secretary Herter. . . . [Instead of sending Milton Eisenhower], he thought it would be more desirable to have the highest possible ranking official of government [attend]. . . ." The President did not wish to offend the Latinos. Implicitly, if Dulles could not go to the Foreign Ministers Conference, the President would take his place. Otherwise, Ike would go to South America and Dulles to Geneva. One can surmise that Ike asked Nixon to cover in Buenos Aires because the latter had experience there. Eisenhower would go to Europe, his area of expertise, and probably the more important conference. But, the President carefully appealed to Nixon's own sense of importance by mentioning he wanted the highest level person available to attend the conference in Latin America. The request came only because Ike envisioned a lack of top personnel for the events he listed. However, such a shortage never actually occurred, so Nixon did not attend the Buenos Aires conference.⁸

From his clean as a hounds tooth pronouncement onward, historians concur that Ike maintained a respectable distance between himself and the Vice President. The ambivalent attitude became apparent early in the Administration. For example, during a September 1953 NSC meeting, Nixon commented on some leaks that had appeared in the newspapers that

morning. The story discussed the Council's consideration of continental defense issues. According to the Vice President, "What really concerned him was the problem of public reaction to the present continental defense problem in view of the great hullabaloo in the press on the subject." Nixon's comment did not seem unreasonable.

Ike, however, trivialized the younger man's concern, in a less than complimentary way. The President responded: "it was unwise for the members of the Council to let themselves get so excited about what the columnists reported, as to fail to use common sense in reaching a decision. He said he was inclined to order Council members in the future not to read the newspapers on mornings before meetings of the National Security Council (Laughter)." The only member who appeared "excited" was Nixon and thus the laughter was at his expense. Although not an overt insult, Ike's comment was demeaning, in implying the Vice President had overreacted. And it undoubtedly embarrassed Nixon.

Eisenhower routinely belittled worries that Nixon brought before the National Security Council. On August 12, 1954, Nixon expressed apprehension about making decisions without adequate discussion time. He told the Council "He thought it unwise to make final decisions on the Far Eastern Policy on the basis of an hour's discussion." Eisenhower responded that in principle he was correct, but after all, "it was necessary to reach decisions and that this was the place to reach them."⁹ The comment had a humiliating aspect to it, as though the President were speaking to a child, and not a seasoned professional. It must have stung the Vice President and certainly reflected Ike's notion that Nixon was inexperienced and immature.

Although careful not to openly voice his ambivalence to Nixon, Eisenhower did not

effectively hide it when he talked about the constitutional second-in-command. His public pronouncements about the Vice President often hinted at his true aversion. Responding to a letter from Clare Francis praising Nixon, Eisenhower could not completely hide his discomfort. Ms. Francis lauded Nixon's performance at the Union League Club. "He not only sold this group of 'moss-backed' Republicans on the actual position of the Republican party and the need of their active and enlightened support, but in so doing he sold them on Dick Nixon right down to his heels." Eisenhower accepted the compliment to Nixon in stride, while himself responding with a back handed compliment to the Vice President. "Dear Clare, I am delighted -- but not astonished -- at your report of Dick Nixon's talk to the members of the Union League Club. He has a remarkable and enviable ability to adjust his remarks to the mood and background of his audience." ¹⁰

That Eisenhower actually envied his subordinate's aptitude for deceptive speaking is improbable. Ike valued honesty and integrity. Nixon's uncommon gift for tailoring his words to his audience was the mark of a consummate politician, not necessarily a model citizen. The Vice President could change the topics he emphasized and modify his position just enough to please any specific group of people. It did not reflect an undying commitment to truth, but his artifice. So Ike's comment, while an accurate reflection of Nixon's skills, was not the compliment it might have appeared to be to a casual reader.

The President's doubts about the Californian were most public during the 1956 Presidential campaign. At the March 7 presidential news conference, a main topic of discussion was Nixon's place on the ticket. Eisenhower explained that he would not condone any maneuver to remove Mr. Nixon from the ticket. However, he claimed "I have not

presumed to tell the Vice President what he should do with his own future. . . ." Ike continued that his second-in-command was a "comer" in the Republican party who "so far as I know . . . is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that I am." Then the President made the comment that would find its way to newspaper headlines. "The only thing I have asked him to do is to *chart out his own course*, and tell me what he would like to do [italics added]." Regardless of what Eisenhower claimed, his statement carried with it negative connotations. Political analysts, pundits and the Democratic opposition interpreted the statement to mean Ike did not support Nixon's candidacy. The Vice President took it the same way. He immediately wrote a letter of resignation, which he only destroyed after Republican National Committee Chair, Leonard Hall, convinced him to wait.

The President's public comments not only revealed his skepticism about Nixon as a candidate, they labeled the Vice President only a comer and indirectly cast doubts about Nixon's political integrity. Although not much remembered, Eisenhower also noted "so far as I know he [Nixon] is deeply dedicated to the same principles of government that I am." Ike was not sure. He knew Nixon was "vigorous, healthy, and deeply informed on the processes of our Government," but would not unequivocally endorse the man who would replace him in the event death or disability.¹¹ It was another subtle sign of Eisenhower's ambivalence about the Vice President.

Eisenhower's 1957 New Year's well wishing to Nixon also showed how he felt. In a formal note, Ike thanked Nixon for his indispensable help. The note came across as cold and Eisenhower added the post script "In view of the intimacy of our friendship, this letter may seem to you a bit on the formal side. It is not meant to be. I am simply trying to make of

record an expression of my grateful thanks."¹² When Eisenhower wrote a letter that reflected the intimacy of his relationship with someone, there was no mistaking it. He did not see Nixon socially, nor did he banter with the Vice President. The card did establish, for the record, Eisenhower's official gratitude. It did not, however, confirm their close relationship. The President considered Nixon distasteful for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was Nixon's political aspirations.

In a December 1954 letter to childhood friend, Everett "Swede" Hazlett, Eisenhower wrote a denouncement of politically motivated men. Presumably, the elections of November brought the subject to mind. He told Swede, "so great is the politician's thirst for power and personal prestige that philosophical and doctrinal differences are unimportant to partisans seeking office." The remark seemed to describe someone like Nixon and perhaps provided a hint about why Eisenhower doubted his runningmate's principles of government in 1956. It was not until later in the Administration, however, that Eisenhower directly complained about the Vice President's political expediency.

On June 11, 1959, Ann Whitman, the personal secretary to the President, recorded an incident involving Ike and Nixon. She noted Nixon had joined the President for breakfast that morning. After the Vice President left, Eisenhower made a remark she felt compelled to record. He commented "'it is terrible when people get politically ambitious -- they have so many problems'. He did not elaborate." In fact, he did explain a little by adding that Nixon had urged the President to "take some of his [Nixon's] friends for a weekend on the Barbara Anne [the presidential yacht], playing golf at some of the nearby courses such as Quantico."¹³ Given the context - Eisenhower's preceding comment and the approaching 1960 presidential

campaign - "friends" probably referred to Nixon's political backers.

The General did not respect motives derived from a craving for personal power, rather than national duty. Ike might understand a desire to enhance one's prestige, but "political ambitions" were distastefully Machiavellian. His own goal to bring peace to the world before he left office, was motivated not only from a desire for personal recognition, but also from an altruistic need to save the world from itself. Nixon's request, however, was too political and self-centered for Ike to entertain.

During the final year and a half of the Administration, Nixon's political aspirations began to surpass his sense of duty. To help win election, the Vice President hoped to appear to wield more power than commonly perceived. He wanted to demonstrate his leadership skills. He needed to display at least a competency in dealing with the Communists. All would improve his reputation among the voting public. Eisenhower found exactly this behavior disagreeable. Intellectually, he understood that some of the maneuvering was necessary. He did not, however, respect the practice of selling one's image for public consumption, or respect Nixon for doing it.

Even after his trip to Russia, Nixon could not command the respect he yearned for from Eisenhower, or for that matter, the president's staff. At the Cabinet meeting on August 7, Nixon presented an hour and a quarter briefing to the assembled officials. Just before he began, the President excused himself but invited Cabinet members to remain. They all did. Nixon explained that he had already "informed the President and the Secretary of State in detail on those aspects of his discussion with Mr. Khrushchev which bore upon substantive issues; he did not recount these discussions in the Cabinet." According to the hand written

notes of the meeting, Secretary Herter stayed for Nixon's talk, even though he had already heard the pertinent information. Whatever Nixon said, it could not have been too interesting. L.A. Minnich, who took the minutes, made no more mention of the lecture than that the presentation occurred.¹⁴ One can assume also, that Minnich concluded Eisenhower had no interest in preserving a record of Nixon's remarks. Ike's departure reflected his priorities. Listening to the Vice President pontificate about Russia ranked lower than most any other business.

In a way, the performance was a repeat of one in 1953, after Nixon returned from his first Asian trip. At that time, the President only expressed an interest in assurances that Syngman Rhee could be controlled. Once the Vice President confidently stated this was true, Ike's attention went elsewhere. Even this late in the Administration, Nixon could not gain a serious hearing from the President. His position degraded further when Eisenhower usurped his most impressive foreign relations credential, travel abroad.

During the summer, Eisenhower decided to make a series of international tours before he left office. He had already visited Europe that August. In December, the President embarked on a trip that took him to Greece, India, Italy, Pakistan, Spain and Turkey (among others). On December 8, from Karachi, Pakistan, Eisenhower sent a telegram to Nixon. Except for a message following Latin American confrontations in 1958, Ike had not communicated with Nixon when either one of them was abroad. This bulletin described the throngs of adoring crowds that met Eisenhower at each stop. While public reaction in Rome was dampened by poor weather, the "reception in Turkey was colorful and outstandingly warm. Here in Karachi, however, I was literally overwhelmed by the sheer number of people

on the street." Ike mentioned in a few sentences the basic foreign policy goals of the countries he had visited. These were simplistically stated and Nixon undoubtedly already knew these fundamentals.¹⁵

The point of this telegram was not clear. Ike might have sent it because he was visiting a region in which the Vice President claimed expertise. It was as close as the President ever came to informing Nixon of the foreign policy situation, the way Dulles had. Unlike Dulles' messages, Eisenhower reported little of substance. Rather, Ike, ebullient about the welcoming crowds and unable to contain his excitement, wrote Nixon this note to describe the events. If Eisenhower enjoyed spite, he might have written the note to illustrate his popularity, in comparison to Nixon's. Certainly, the public effect of Ike's trips for the Vice President was to highlight Eisenhower's achievements, skills and expertise over those of Nixon.

It is doubtful, Eisenhower wrote to keep Nixon informed about the world situation. Even after the international trips taken for the Administration and the competence the Vice President showed in foreign policy analysis, Eisenhower did not see the his second-in-command as a foreign relations expert. It was perhaps in this respect that the President and his Secretary of State differed the most. Ike and Dulles saw foreign relations in particularly similar terms. They agreed on most aspects of policy. But, on Nixon's foreign relations skills, they were near opposites. Dulles respected the Vice President's international affairs expertise and sent him to Asia, Africa, Latin America and Europe on State Department business. According to Herbert Parmet, "[international] travel, all coordinated with Secretary Dulles, became a more prominent function of his office than any previous Vice President. . .

.” Nixon served as “an adjunct to the Secretary of State, doing those things that Dulles thought he should not do for himself.”¹⁶ Dulles’ aid helped empower the vice presidency with new importance domestically and internationally. This modification of the office became a standard after 1960.

From 1959 until the election in November 1960, Eisenhower provided few opportunities to Nixon. Although the President preferred Nixon over John F. Kennedy, he could not suppress his discomfort about Nixon. Ike believed the Vice President was not yet ready to be President - “immature.” He found the media’s concentration on the campaign, and consequent inattention to his Administration, infuriating. This combined displeasure led to one of the most damaging remarks about the Vice President that Eisenhower ever made.

August 24, 1960, marked Eisenhower’s one hundred and ninetieth presidential news conference. As it closed, newsman Charles H. Mohr asked about Richard M. Nixon’s role in the Administration. It was a question that had been rephrased several times that day. Mohr wanted Eisenhower to “give us an example of a major idea of his [Nixon’s] that you had adopted. . . .” Eisenhower, feeling besieged and frustrated, replied “If you give me a week, I might think of one. I don’t remember.” Annoyed, he ended the session immediately after the comment. The President’s closing answer nearly set in stone the image of Nixon as un-influential in the decision making process. Eight years of effort evaporated with that single phrase. The Vice President must have seethed with anger.

The response made headlines and in doing so overshadowed Eisenhower’s positive comments about Nixon’s role in the Administration. A few minutes before the Mohr question, Ike had noted that the Californian took an active role in the advising process in the

government, "the Vice President has participated . . . in all of the consultative meetings that have been held." Nixon had "a full part in every principal discussion."¹⁷ These remarks were ignored by the papers. "If I had a week" was the lead story.

In addition, the President's position that Nixon should only serve as perennial campaigner, election advisor and congressional liaison, immeasurably hurt his ability to further his foreign relations reputation. Without Ike's permission, the Vice President could not gain the active role in government he constantly worked to attain. At the same time, Eisenhower's ambivalence was as great an obstacle to Nixon's goals as his active efforts to restrict the vice presidential role. Eisenhower was Nixon's nemesis.

ENDNOTES:

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2. Stanley I. Kutler, The Wars of Watergate: The Last Crisis of Richard Nixon. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990.: 46; Roorda: 39.
3. Cabinet Meeting, March 5, 1954, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Cabinet Series. Box 3; Cabinet Meeting, November 5, 1954, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Cabinet Series Box 4; Stephen E. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I - The Education of a Politician 1913-1962 New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1987: 342, 358; Meeting Richard M. Nixon and Dwight D. Eisenhower, 7 February, 1956, Eisenhower Library: Whitman File: DDE Diary Series, Box 9, File Copies of DDE personal [1955-56]; Parmet: 333.
4. Before leaving for Asia, Nixon had proven his worth as a congressional negotiator and analyst. FRUS [hereafter FRUS] 1952-1954. National Security Affairs. Volume II. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1984: 300; FRUS 1952-1954. Indochina. Volume XIII: 787. A Chronology of United State Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles As Secretary of State. Compiled by Dr. Philip A. Crowl. Princeton University Library, June 1964, 1953: 5; Memorandum of conversation John Foster Dulles and Henry Byroade, 21 November, 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers Eisenhower Library [hereafter JFDPEL] 1951-1959 Subject Series, Alphabetical. Box 6 Alphabetical Subseries - Nixon -- Alphabetical Subseries - Summit Paper Folder 5.
5. Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 328-329, 333-340; Fred I. Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower As Leader. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982: 189, 220.
6. Parmet, Nixon: 260; Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 26 July, 1956, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: DDE Diary Series, Box 16, File July 1956 Phone Calls; Memorandum Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, 15 November, 1957, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Administration Series Box 28, File Nixon, Richard M.; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1963: 194. It is interesting that Eisenhower specifically asked that Nixon destroy these letters. His comment implied that Ike suspected Nixon had leaked information at other times (which he had). By putting the destruction of the documents on Nixon personally, Ike ensured that if the information leaked, the Vice President would be the only suspect as a source.
7. FRUS 1958-1960, Berlin Crisis. Volume VIII: 422-423, 431, 433-34. Telephone call Richard M. Nixon and John Foster Dulles, 19 May, 1958 (11:25am), JFDPEL 1951-1959

Box 8 Telephone Conversations Series January 2, 1958 - July 31, 1958. The Berlin Crisis is a good example of this practice. First, Nixon arranged the congressional meeting. Eisenhower attended the meeting, but made only over-arching comments. He left it to Nixon to discuss the particulars of the situation and placate the Congressmen.

8. Telephone call Dwight D. Eisenhower and Richard M. Nixon, 31 March, 1959 (11:02am), Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: DDE Diary Series, Box 39, File Telephone Calls March 1959; A Chronology of United State Foreign Relations During the Career of John Foster Dulles As Secretary of State. Compiled by Dr. Philip A. Crowl: 3. I am not clear what happened with the Buenos Aires conference to which Eisenhower referred. It does not appear to have met. Certainly, Eisenhower was in the United States throughout April and the beginning of May, so he did not attend. Nixon talked of this conference with Dulles on April 4, 1959 (see chapter three), but otherwise did not make an issue of it.

9. FRUS 1952-1954. National Security Affairs. Volume II: 472-73; FRUS 1952-1954. East Asia and The Pacific. Volume XII, Part 1, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1984: 725-26.

10. Letter Clare Francis to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 24 June, 1955, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Official File Series. Box 339, File 99-B 1955; Ibid.: Dwight D. Eisenhower to Clare Francis, 28 June, 1958.

11. The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956. Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961: 287; Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower The President, Volume II. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984: 391; Ambrose, Nixon Volume I: 321. As the election approached, Ike did issue a blanket order to Cabinet Secretaries encouraging them to "wherever possible give Dick Nixon a boost in his speeches." The recommended approach was to praise Nixon as wise, self-restrained, cleared headed, of great personal courage, "extraordinary patience and resilience, a man of boundless energy in the execution of an agreed plan." The memorandum stated "President Eisenhower has summer [sic] up his qualification very eloquently in these words: 'Never has there been a Vice President so well-versed in the activities of the government . . . Whatever dedication to country, loyalty and patriotism and great ability can do for America, Dick Nixon will do—and that I know . . . He is the most valuable member of my team.'" Officials could point to Nixon's personal history: son of a grocer, of the people, hard worker, etc. While the praise sounded good, it rang hollow and insincere to the reader. It was a campaign tactic, rather than a personal assessment by Ike. Memorandum from the White House, I. Jack Martin Administrative Assistant to the President to John Foster Dulles, 10 October, 1956, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library - John Foster Dulles Papers: Selected Correspondence and Related Material.

12. Letter Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, 30 December, 1957, Eisenhower, Dwight D.: Papers as President of the United States, 1953-62, Eisenhower Library, Whitman

File: Administration Series Box 28, File Nixon, Richard M.

13. Robert Griffith, Ike's Letters To A Friend. Kansas: University of Kansas, 1984 137; Diary entry, 11 June, 1959, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: ACW Diary Series; Ambrose Eisenhower the President Volume II: 203. In passing, Ambrose mentioned that Ike recorded many conversations in the Oval office. He had an activation switch under his desk. While he often forgot to turn the system on, Ambrose claimed Ike nearly always remembered to record Nixon. Eisenhower stated the equipment was installed because "there are some guys I just don't trust in Washington, and I want to have myself protected so they can't later repeat that I said something else."

14. Hand written notes of Cabinet Meeting, August 7, 1959, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Cabinet Series. Box 14; Eisenhower Library, White House Office: Office of the Staff Secretary: Records 1952-61. Cabinet Series: Box 5 File C-51 (4) August 7, 1959. Minnich did not include a synopsis of what Nixon said on the official typed record of the meeting. In addition, he failed to make any hand written notes of the Vice President's presentation.

15. Ambrose Eisenhower The President Vol. II: 537, 551-552; Memorandum Dwight D. Eisenhower to Richard M. Nixon, 8 December, 1959, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File: Administration Series Box 28, File Nixon, Richard M. 1958-61. Italy wanted to have a real say in the formation of Western policy. The Turks wished to improve economic development and requested assistance from the US. The Pakistani President had definite ideas for what his country needed. That Eisenhower choice to communicate with Nixon in December 1958, might have reflected Eisenhower's awareness of the Vice President's need to have the image of being informed and involved in the Administration. It might have, but it did not. For an indiscernible reason this document remained classified until May 1982. As such, it could not have been made public as an example of Ike's consultation with Nixon.

16. Parmet: 337.

17. The Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960-1961: 658.

Conclusion:

A Limited Role - Nixon Assessed

During his tenure as Vice President, Nixon logged more international miles than any member of the Administration, except perhaps Dulles. He visited at least 50 countries and took every opportunity to learn. He was an avid student of foreign relations.

His interest germinated from the 1947 Herter Committee trip. In Europe, Nixon came face-to-face with Communism. As he explored foreign lands, he followed his instinct and savored risk filled adventures. He observed and talked with the leaders of the free world, gaining a first hand awareness of the European situation, as the committee had been instructed. In the process, Nixon acquired his obsession with international relations and a body of knowledge on which he developed his foreign affairs expertise.

The Herter Committee did more than provide Nixon with information. It provided him with connections to influential people. The most beneficial association grew into a sincere friendship with John Foster Dulles. The Nixon-Dulles relationship fundamentally shaped Nixon's role in the Administration. Their first introduction, no doubt, came through Foster's brother Allen, whose acquaintance Nixon made on the *Queen Mary*. By the time both joined the Eisenhower Administration, they were well known to each other.

Dulles and Nixon shared a mutual respect that blossomed into admiration and friendship. As Ike's influential Secretary of State, Dulles used his position to help the Vice

President expand his foreign relations knowledge and reputation. The elder man also understood and sympathized with the political goals of his friend. If Dulles had anything to say about it, Nixon would be President in 1961. Without his friend to champion his cause, Nixon had few opportunities to display his foreign relations expertise.

The Vice President and the Secretary created a complicated and intriguing relationship. Dulles was friend, mentor and superior to Nixon. Although he acted as a patron, he acted simultaneously out of enlightened self-interest. Foster Dulles benefited from the help he gave to his protégé. He used Nixon directly as an adjunct, field researcher, unofficial spokesman and loyal supporter. The Secretary's good auspices brought to the vice presidential doorway trips abroad, an unsanctioned advisory role and additional efforts to enhance Nixon's status. In doing this, Dulles assured Nixon's gratitude and indebtedness. Each assignment made the Californian a better aide to the State Department. Each success increased his reputation and his expertise.

Although Nixon needed Dulles' support, concurrently he hoped to create an autonomous role for himself. Repeatedly, the Vice President insisted that the President supervised and commanded him, not Dulles. He demanded that Eisenhower issue his orders, often pressing for a directive from the President, before he would undertake a project. While Nixon underscored that his authority emanated from Eisenhower, his overseas assignments originated from Dulles. And, when it came down to the line, Nixon owed his allegiance to Dulles. Whoever sponsored his travel, however, Nixon pressed for prestigious international trips instead of unglamorous foreign presidential inaugurations and goodwill tours.

In addition, the Vice President hoped to impress his colleagues with his foreign

expertise. In meeting after meeting, Nixon demonstrated his vast international affairs knowledge. He analyzed Soviet actions, discussed Africa and Latin America and openly pontificated on Asian policy. The efforts to convince fellow Administration members were intended to gain him a greater role in the decision-making process. Eisenhower, however, maintained a firm hold over who, when and how foreign relations policy was determined. Nixon's efforts, and those of Dulles, frequently had no tangible results.

The President never gave Dulles the latitude to grant his second-in-command a more important role in American foreign policy. Ike knew Nixon was politically motivated. The Vice President was a perennial campaigner, Republican partisan and anti-Communist demagogue. Thus, Ike assigned Nixon tasks that he thought best suited to the office of Vice President and the skills demonstrated. Also, Eisenhower had to consider his own reputation as a foreign relations expert. By the end of the Administration, the General was looking to posterity. His concerns turned to his own image as world leader and peace maker. Nixon's political ambition led him to attempt to project an aura of statesman that outshined the rest of the Administration. But, Ike would not allow his own reputation to be dulled by Nixon's growing image as world diplomat. Finally, Eisenhower refused to modify his international affairs formula to include Nixon, just to benefit the Vice President's political prospects. In short, Eisenhower did not sympathize with Nixon's goals.

Stephen Ambrose concluded that Nixon established his foreign policy tenets by 1954.¹ Ambrose may be correct in his general assessment. Nixon formed a basic formula as a Herter Committee member, and his experiences on the 1953 trip to Asia had a profound impact on him. But, in terms of international relations education - experience that colored his policy

ideas - Nixon expanded his vision with each expedition. While the 1947 Herter Committee trip afforded him a taste of international subjects, the vice presidential tours allowed him to gorge. Nixon learned new lessons about foreign relations, and applied older models to new situations. These trips abroad represented a primary means by which Nixon attempted to expand his role in the Administration and build a presidential resumé.

Nixon reinvented his position in a way none of his predecessors had managed. In 1956, Nixon disregarded Dulles' advice to abandon the vice presidency (in favor of a Cabinet position) because it was not a good jump off point for a presidential campaign. Nixon applied his political skills, and infinite ambition, to keep his name in the public eye. Unlike his forerunners, he established a global reputation while Vice President. That fact altered the role of the second-in-command for those who came after Nixon. By making the position an active one, Nixon revolutionized the vice presidency. Nevertheless, the role Nixon managed was not all he desired.

Nixon's efforts to portray his international travel as important were only partially successful. And, his role within the Administration never grew as encompassing as he wanted. He scratched a carefully crafted niche that gave him some say through Dulles and the NSC. He concentrated his advice on South East Asia, with forays into Latin American and Africa international relations. With Eisenhower primarily interested in European affairs, Nixon took the opportunity to fill a void. His best option for a policy making role was in Asia, where he stayed off of Ike's turf, but still in an area of US interest.

There is a good deal of irony to Nixon's efforts in the Eisenhower Administration. The Vice President, primarily held back by the President, was also entirely beholden to him.

The opportunities that Nixon took advantage of, or tried to exploit, appeared because he was swept into office with Eisenhower. Those openings were restricted because of the same man. No matter what he tried, regardless of how much Dulles helped, Nixon could not overcome that obstacle.

Once in office, Eisenhower allowed Nixon a greater role in the Administration than any previous Vice President, and many since. That role concentrated on domestic politics. As much as Nixon longed for an international reputation, his political fortune was made because of his domestic wrangling. His work as primary Republican campaigner through the 1950s represented a new kind of vice presidential role, as well as a valuable asset during his own presidential bid. Nixon's annual campaigning supplied him with political allies in all parts of the country, allies that made a greater impact on his 1960 presidential bid, than his international relations reputation.

Nixon longed for a substantive role in American foreign policy. His education in international relations was motivated by both personal inclination and professional aspirations. In 1947, he developed a taste for foreign policy. As Vice President, he focused his attention on the subject whenever possible. And by 1956, he saw it as a political tool to bolster his image. Nixon constantly sought to expand his role in the Administration through foreign relations work. His success had its limits. His level of direct influence may not have been vast, but he clearly maintained a greater role than Eisenhower had anticipated, and any previous vice president had imagined. While that role did not bring him the presidency in 1960, its legacy did play an important factor in 1968.

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





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