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Spyware prevention using graphical passwords

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Abstract— our future work will be based on Click-based graphical password schemes require a user to click on a set of points on one or more presented background images. With the Pass Points and to create users to a password by clicking five ordered points anywhere on the given image. CaRP addresses a number of security problems altogether, such as online guessing attacks, relay attacks, and, if combined with dual-view technologies, shoulder-surfing attacks. Notably, a CaRP password can be found only probabilistically by automatic online guessing attacks even if the password is in the search set. To log in, users must correctly the repeated sequence of clicks, with each click falling within the acceptable tolerance of original point. To implemented this aspect, along with a scheme converting the user-entered graphical password into a cryptographic verification key and "robust discretization" scheme. It consisted of three overlapping grids (invisible to the user) used to determine whether the click-points are login attempt were close enough to the original points to be accepted.

Key words: Graphical password, hotspots, CaRP, Captcha, dictionary attack ,security primitive, password guessing attack, password.

I. Introduction

The security and the usability of problems inherent in textbased password schemes have resulted in the development of graphica password schemes as a possible alternative. However, most of the current graphical password schemes are vulnerable to spy wer ewhich is a program that gathers information about a computer sand relays that information back to a third party. There have been some schemes which have made contributions to the development of graphical password in term of spyware resistance. Using a challengeresponse protocol, they have an advantage in that they are resistant to replay attacks. Namely, even the third party who observes a successful login session cannot perform a replay attack. Though they have a positive effect on protecting users' password, they are not yet sufficient to stop attackers from harvesting passwords. A CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart) is a program that generates and grades tests that are human solvable, but are beyond the capabilities of current computer programs [4].CAPTCHA uses open algorithms based on hard AI problems, and has been discussed in text-based password schemes to resist dictionary attack [5]. Innovatively, we explore CAPTCHA in the context of graphical passwords to provide better

protection against spyware. As long as the underlying open AI problems are not solved, CAPTCHA is a promising way to resist spy ware attack in graphical password schemes. Based on this key idea, we have proposed a new graphical password scheme using CAPTCHA, designed to be strongly resistant to spyware attack, either by purely automated software or via human participation. A preliminary user study indicates that our scheme needs to improve in terms of login time and memo ability.

However, this new paradigm has achieved just a limited success as compared with the cryptographic primitives based on hard math problems and their wide applications. Is it possible to create any new security primitive based on hard AI problems? This is a challenging and interesting open problem. In this paper, we introduce a new security primitive based on hard AI problems, namely, a novel family of graphical password systems integrating Captcha technology, which we call CaRP (Captcha as graphical Passwords). CaRP is click-based graphical passwords, where a sequence of clicks on an image issued to derive a password. Unlike other click-based graphical passwords, images used in CaRP are Captcha challenges, and a new CaRP image is generated for every login attempt. The notion of CaRP is simple but generic. CaRP can have multiple instantiations. In theory, any Captcha scheme rely ingon multiple-object classification can be converted to a CaRP scheme. We present exemplary CaRPs built on both text Captcha and image-recognition Captcha. One of them is a text CaRP wherein a password is a sequence of characters like a text password, but entered by clicking the right charac ters equence on CaRP images. CaRP offers protection against online dictionary attacks on passwords, which have been for long time a major security threat for various online services. This threat is wide spread and considered as a top cyber security risk [13]. Defence against online dictionary attacks is a more subtle problem than it might appear. Intuitive countermeasures such as throttling logon attempts do not work well for two reasons:

1) It causes denial-of-service attacks (which were exploited to lock highest bidders out in final minutes of eBay auctions) and incurs expensive helpdesk costs for account reactivation.

2) It is vulnerable to global password attacks where by adversaries intend to break into any account rather thana specific one, and thus try each password candidate on multiple accounts and ensure that the number of trials on each account is below the threshold to avoid triggering account lock out.CaRP also offers protection against relay

attacks, an increasing threat to bypass Captchas protection, wherein Captch a challenges are relayed to humans to solve. Koobface [33]was a relay attack to bypass Face book's Captcha in creating new accounts. CaRP is robust to shoulder-surfing attacks if combined with dual-view technologies. CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart) is a program that generate sand grades tests that are human solvable, but beyond the capabilities of current computer programs [27]. The robust ness of CAPTCHA is found in its strength in resisting automaticadv ersarial attacks, automatic adversarial attacks, and it hasmany applications for practical security, including online polls, free email services, search engine bots, worms and spam, and preventing dictionary attacks [27]. Our proposal creates aninnovative use of CAPTCHA in the context of graphical passwords to provide better password protection againstspyware attacks.

In this paper, we have proposed a new authenticationscheme combining graphical passwords with text-basedCAPTCHA. The scheme is easy for humans but makes italmost impossible for automated programs to harvestpasswords. The novel scheme is friendly for legitimate users,while simultaneously raising the time and computer capacitycost to adversaries by several orders of magnitude.

Experiments showed its effectiveness, but also indicated further research would improve its usability.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2briefly reviews related work. Sections 3 and 4 present ourscheme and analyses its security. Section 6 provides the resultsof experiments described in section 5. Section 7 discusses additional observations and possible extension to our scheme.Conclusions and future work are addressed in section 8.

II. Related Works

Most current graphical password schemes, such as require users to enter the password directly, typically by clicking or drawing. Hence, passwords are easily exposed to a third party who has the opportunity to record asuccessful authentication session. There have been a fewgraphical password schemes devoted to secure passwordsagainst spyware attacks. In the following, several representatives will be described.Man, proposed that users remember a number oftext strings as well as several images as passobjects. To passthe authentication, users should enter the unique codescorresponding to the displayed pass-object variants and a codeindicating the relative location of the pass-objects in referenceto a pair of eyes. It is relatively hard to crack this kind ofpassword, but the complex memory requirement is an obstacleto its popularity.In [26], users need to recognize pass-objects and clickinside the convex hull formed by all of the pass-objects. Ifproperly designed, this method can provide good security.

In essence, the above methods adopt a challengeresponseprotocol to confuse the spyware. They can prevent thepasswords being cracked by the spyware and falling into thehand of an adversary, along with resisting replay attacks. Taking the previous mechanisms for reference, our scheme alsouses a challenge-response protocol to enhance security. But, unlike these methods, our scheme innovatively applies

CAPTCHA to graphical passwords to create a highly secureauthentication method.



Figure 1. The interface of the basic scheme (The pass-images are circled).

III. Our Scheme

Our approach is motivated by the observation that effective spyware attacks are launched from automated programs. We realized that to increase security passwords should be accompanied by a product of a "computation" that is difficult for machines. As an authentication method, the scheme should also be user friendly. Considering these requirements, we applied CAPTCHA to graphical password schemes. CAPTCHA is a program designed to test whether the user is a computer or a human, by creating a task easy for humans but difficult for machines [27]. It is based on hard AI problems which cannot be solved with any greater accuracy than what is currently known to the AI community [31]. CAPTCHA is now almost a standard security mechanism for addressing undesirable or malicious Internet bot programs [28] and major web sites such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft all have their own CAPTCHAs. The state-of-the-art CAPTCHAs mainly include three types: text-based schemes, sound-based schemes and image-based schemes. The most widely deployed schemesare text-based CAPTCHAs and we also use this in our schemes



(a) The interface of register.

fter introducing a basic scheme with a hidden safety loophole, we will describe an improved scheme that is designed to fill the hole. The performances of the both schemes depend extremely on the property of CAPTCHA.

A. The Basic Scheme

The basic scheme embeds a text-based CAPTCHA into a simple graphical password scheme. Each image has a

CAPTCHA instance called adjunctive string and the strings are generated at random by the system. In the register phase, users are required to select and remember images as their password images (pass-images). To be authenticated, users need to distinguish his/her pass-images as well as solve a test by recognizing and typing the adjunctive string below each pass image. For example, in Figure 1, assume the three images with red circles are pass-images, users should input the adjunctive strings 'mewo', 'xnco' and 'nvso' correctly to pass the authentication. For simplicity, we assume that the CAPTCHA here is an ideal CAPTCHA that is hard enough for machines to recognize while easy for humans to solve. In the case that adversaries are automated programs without human intervention, the scheme has a strong resistance to replay attack. Namely, even if it observes a successful login, a spyware program cannot launch a replay attack. This can be illustrated from two aspects. Firstly, pass-images are entered by typing random adjunctive strings rather than clicking directly. In other words, the entered strings are the trap instead of the real password. Secondly, machines have no ability to recognize the characters embedded in each image. It follows that it is rather difficult for an automated program to find pass images according to the recorded strings. The loophole in this scheme occurs if the adversary is a person and the spyware is an assistant. The password will be in danger because CAPTCHA is easy for a person. In this case, the person can see what the spyware has gathered, a successful login scene along with the entered characters. Then, a person can crack the passwords without much effort. For 26 lower case letters in the scheme, the probability that different images have the same string is 1/456976, which can be ignored. One useful method for password cracking is to divide the gathered strings with four characters into groups and then compare each segment with that below each image. To close this loop hole, we constructed an improved version.

B. The Improved Scheme

The vulnerability of the basic scheme lies in two factors.

One is the requirement that CAPTCHAs should be human userfriendly. The other is the reversible relationship betweenpasswords and what is entered. That is, pass-images determinewhat is entered and vice versa. What's more, we noted that thereversible relationship depends greatly on the fact that theprobability of different images with the same adjunctive stringis close to zero and that the trap of each pass-image has auniform length. While the former is necessary for a popularauthentication scheme, we are encouraged to disturb the latter. One possible method is increasing the probability by decreasing the types of letters or the length of adjunctive string. This method might work, but it will increase the probability of illegal login by random guessing. Thereby, it is ineffective as asecurity method. Our alternative is to replace the uniformlength with a random one predefined by users. In other words, the number of characters entered is determined by users.In our improved scheme, users are required to select andremember letter positions, ie choose several specific letterpositions within a string of letters; for example, letters in 1st, 4th and 5th position in the string will become the code. These

letterpositions are the called pass-positions for each pass-image.

During the authentication, users should enter the charactersshown in the pass-positions of each pass-image. An example isshown in Figure 2.In Figure 2(b), the three circled images are pass-images, thestrings with them are 'qarwrxex', 'heeqseio', and 'mvgqqebh'respectively, and the corresponding pass-positions are (1, 2, 4),(4, 6, 8), and (3, 5) shown in Figure 2 (a). A user can input anycombination of the three sequences, 'qaw', 'qeo', and 'gq' tobe authenticated successfully. This scheme is strongly resistant to attacks launched byhumans with spyware, while simultaneously preserving theadvantages of graphical password schemes. The relatedsecurity analysis will be given in the following section andusability problems will be discussed in Section 5, 6 and 7through experiments.

IV. Security Analysis Of The Improved Scheme A. Capability to Withstand Spyware

There are many different kinds of spyware [1, 2], such asbrowser hijackers, keyloggers and spybots. We have focusedon the spyware cluster that runs in the background collectingpasswords. The security of our scheme relies on the robustnessof CAPTCHA in resisting automatic adversarial attacks. However, it is not clear whether there is a true CAPTCHA atall and some reports show that some text-based CAPTCHAscan be partly or almost broken by automatic programs [3, 29, and 30]. With the assumption that spyware is capable of detectingand recording screen snapshots, entered strings and the systemfeedback, we will analyze the security of the improved schemefrom two extreme aspects. Firstly, it is impossible for machinesto solve the CAPTCHAs in our scheme, the ideal case.Secondly, CAPTCHAs can be completely solved by machines, the worst case. Under ideal conditions, spywares have no chance of gaining the passwords without human invention, similar to the discussion in sections 3.1. If people are involved, spywareassistance can help users to break the scheme. What thespyware needs to do is to catch the password string entered bythe legal user. To crack passwords, adversaries should solve theCAPTCHA himself or by employing human workers. It is costly to obtain a password because the pass-positions of eachpass-image are unknown and thereby it is hard to manually findthe correspondence between pass-images and what is entered. Even for the lowest level security, adversaries must

recognize400 CAPTCHAs. In this case, there are three passimages, eachwith a pass-position and then the attacker can easily divide the entered string into three segments each with a specificcharacter. The probability of a letter displayed below oneimage is 0.2726100 images on screen in our scheme with about 27 imageswhich have a common specific character. That is, there are 27candidates including a passimage and 26 decoys. Through interaction, the attacker cangradually get rid of all the decoys. For the second observation, third observation, there will only be about three CAPTCHAswhich contain the specific character. The attacker can find theusers passwords correctly in four sessions. So the attacker must solve approximately 400 CAPTCHAs and conduct manyobservations and comparisons, which is time consuming andcostly. More complex work is required if the correspondencebetween pass-images and entered strings are unknown. Therefore, our scheme has a strong resistance against spywaresunder the ideal environment.

Projecting the worst condition, that CAPTCHAs can becompletely solved by machines, it is possible that spywarescould crack passwords because each successful login revealssome information about the password. One method is to dividethe entered strings into different segments and find thepasswords from images which contain the same segments fromanalyzing different login sessions. Another method is to find he common images by excluding images without any characterof the entered string. For instance, when the passwords lie in he lowest security level, it is possible to crack the passwords infour sessions, as discussed above. This worst case scenario is not probable, unless spywarescan gather sufficient information in the background and canbreak CAPTCHAs quickly. Currently, no programs can break aCAPTCHA automatically in a short time. Furthermore, even if the currently applied CAPTCHAs are effectively broken, therewill always be versions with higher security in production. Inaddition, as long as the hard AI problems underlyingCAPTCHA are unsolved, successful attacks will advance the development of more robust CAPTCHAs. Therefore, it is demonstrated that our scheme is secureagainst spyware as long as CAPTCHAs cannot be broken byautomated programs. Any defeated CAPTCHAs will besubstituted by more robust ones. If humans are involved, the cost of cracking a password is significantly increased.

Automatic Online Guessing Attacks

In automatic online guessing attacks, the trial and error process is executed automatically whereas dictionaries can be constructed manually. If we ignore negligible probabilities, CaRP with underlying CPA-secure Captcha has the following properties:

1. Internal object-points on one CaRP image are *computationally-independent* of internal object-points on another CaRP image. Particularly, clickable points on one image are computationally-independent of clickable points on another image.

2. Eq. (3) holds, i.e., trials in guessing attacks are mutually independent. The first property can be proved by contradiction. Assume that the property does not hold, i.e., there exists an internal object-point on one image *A* that is non-negligibly dependent of an internal object-point on another image

B. An adversary can exploit this dependency to launch the following chosen-pixel attack. In the learning phase, image *A* is used to learn the object that contains point \cdot . In the testing phase, point on image *B* is used to query the oracle. Since point is non-negligibly dependent of point \cdot , this CPA-experiment would result in a success probability non negligibly higher than a random guess, which contradicts the CPA-secure assumption. We conclude that the first property holds. The second property is a consequence of the first property since user-clicked internal object-points in one trial are computationally-independent of user-clicked

internal object-points in another trial due to the first property. We have ignored background and boundary object-points since clicking any of them would lead to authentication failure. Eq. (3) indicates that automatic online guessing attacks can find a password only probabilistically no matter how many trials are executed. Even if the password guess to be tested in a trial is the actual password, the trial has a slim chance to succeed since a machine cannot recognize the objects in the CaRP image to input the password correctly. This is a great contrast to automatic online guessing attacks on existing graphical passwords which are deterministic,

i.e., that each trial in a guessing attack can always determine if the tested password guess is the actual password or not, and all the password guesses can be determined by a limited number of trials. Particularly, brute-force attacks or dictionary attacks with the targeted password in the dictionary would always succeed in attacking existing graphical passwords.

Relay Attacks

Relay attacks may be executed in several ways. Captcha challenges can be relayed to a high-volume Website hacked or controlled by adversaries to have human surfers solve the challenges in order to continue surfing the Website, or relayed to sweatshops where humans are hired to solve Captcha challenges for small payments. Is CaRP vulnerable to relay attacks? We make the same assumption as Van Oorschot and Stubblebine [15] in discussing CbPAprotocol's robustness to relay attacks: a person will not deliberately participate in relay attacks unless paid for the task. The task to perform and the image used in CaRP are very different from those used to solve a Captcha challenge. This noticeable difference makes it hard for a person to mistakenly help test a password guess by attempting to solve a Captcha challenge. Therefore it would be unlikely to get a large number of unwitting people to mount human guessing attacks on CaRP. In addition, human input obtained by performing a Captcha task on a CaRP image is useless for testing a password guess. If sweatshops are hired to mount human guessing attack, we can make a rough estimation of the cost. We assume that the cost to click one password on a CaRP image is the same as solving a Captcha challenge. Using the lowest retail price, \$1, reported [34] to solve 1000 Captcha challenges, the average cost to break a 26-bit password is 0.5 • 226 • 1/1000, or about 33.6 thousand US dollars.

Shoulder-Surfing Attacks

Shoulder-surfing attacks are a threat when graphical passwords are entered in a public place such as bank ATM machines. CaRP is not robust to shouldersurfing attacks by itself. However, combined with the following dual-view technology, CaRP can thwart shouldersurfing attacks. By exploiting the technical limitation that commonly-used LCDs show varying brightness and color depending on the viewing angle, the dual-view technology can use software alone to display two images on a LCD screen concurrently, one public image viewable at most view-angles, and the other private image viewable only at a specific view-angle [38]. When a CaRP image is displayed

as the "private" image by the dual-view system, a shouldersurfing attacker can capture user clicked points on the screen, but cannot capture the "private" CaRP image that only the user can see. However, the obtained user-clicked points are useless for another login attempt, where a new, computationally-independent image will be used and thus the captured points will not represent the correct password on the new image anymore. To the contrary, common implementations of graphical password schemes such as Pass Points use a static input image in the same location of the screen for each login attempt. Although this image can be hidden as the private image by the dual-view technology from being captured by a shoulder surfer, the user-clicked points captured in a successful login are still the valid password for next login attempt. That is, capturing the points alone is sufficient for an effective attack in this case. In general, the higher the correlation of user-clicked points between different login attempts is, the less effective protection the dual-view technology would provide to thwart shoulder surfing attacks.

Others

CaRP is not bulletproof to all possible attacks. CaRP is vulnerable if a client is compromised such that both the image and user-clicked points can be captured. Like many other graphical passwords such as CCP and PCCP, CaRP schemes using the basic CaRP authentication are vulnerable to phishing since user-clicked points are sent to the authentication server. However, CaRP schemes such as TextPoints4CR used with challenge-response authentication are robust to phishing to a certain level: a phishing adversary has to mount offline guessing attacks to find out the password using the verifiable data obtained through a successful phishing attack.

V. Recognition-Recall Carp

In recognition-recall CaRP, a password is a sequence of some invariant points of objects. An *invariant point* of an object (e.g. letter "A") is a point that has a fixed relative position in different incarnations (e.g., fonts) of the object, and thus can be uniquely identified by humans no matter how the object appears in CaRP images. To enter a password, a user must identify the objects in a CaRP image, and then use the identified objects as cues to locate and click the invariant points matching her password. Each password point has a tolerance range that a click within the tolerance range is acceptable as the password point. Most people have a click variation of 3 pixels or less [18]. Text Point, a recognition recall CaRP scheme with an alphabet of characters, is presented next, followed by a variation for challenge response authentication.

Authentication: When creating a password, all clickable points are marked on corresponding characters in a CaR Pimage for a user to select. During authentication, the user first identifies her chosen characters, and clicks the password points on the right characters. The authentication server maps each user-clicked point on the image to find the closest click able point. If their distance exceeds a tolerable range, login fails. Otherwise a sequence of clickable points is recovered, and Its hash value is computed to compare with the stored value. It is worth comparing potential password points between Text Points and traditional clickbased graphical passwords such as Pass Points [5]. In Pass Points, salient points should be avoided since they are readily picked up by adversaries to mount dictionary attacks, but avoiding salient points would increase the burden to remember a password. This conflict does not exist in Text Points. Clickable points in Text Points are salient points of their characters and thus help remembera password, but cannot be exploited by bots since they are both *dynamic* (as compared to static points in traditional graphical password schemes) and *contextual*:

Dynamic: locations of clickable points and their contexts

(i.e., characters) vary from one image to another. The clickable points in one image are computationally independent of the clickable points in another image, as wewill see in Section VI-B.

Contextual: Whether a similarly structured point is aclickable point or not depends on its context. It is onlyif within the right context, i.e., at the right location of aright character these two features require recognizing the correct contexts, i.e., characters, first. By the very nature of Captcha, recognizingcharacters in a Captcha image is a task beyond computer'scapability. Therefore, these salient points of characters cannotbe exploited to mount dictionary attacks on TextPoints.

sB. TextPoints4CR

For the CaRP schemes presented up to now, the coordinates of user-clicked points are sent directly to the authentication server during authentication. For more complex protocols, save challenge-response authentication protocol, a response is sent to the authentication server instead. TextPoints can be modified to fit challenge-response authentication. This variation is called Text Points for Challenge-Response or TextPoints4CR.Unlike Text Points wherein the authentication server stores a salt and a password hash value for each account, the server in TextPoints4CR stores the password for each account. Another difference is that each character appears only once in a TextPoints4CR image but may appear multiple times in a Text Points image. This is because both server and client in TextPoints4CR should generate the same sequence of discredited grid-cells independently. That requires a unique way to generate the sequence from the shared secret ,i.e., password. Repeated characters would lead to several possible sequences for the same password. This unique sequence is used as if the shared secret in a conventional challenge response authentication protocol. In TextPoints4CR, an image is partitioned into a fixed grid with the discretization grid-cell of size μ along both directions. The minimal distance between any pair of clickable points should be larger than μ by a margin exceeding a threshold to prevent two clickable points from falling into a single grid-cell in an image. Suppose that a guaranteed tolerance of click errors along both x-axis and y-axis is , we require that $\mu=4$.

VI. Results







FIG: Admin activating blocked user

VII. Discussion

In comparison to other graphical password schemes, such as there are some advantages and disadvantages inour improved scheme. One disadvantage is that it is morecomplex and increases users' memory load. Users have toremember both the pass-images and pass-positions. To beauthenticated, users need to recognize the pass-images and input the characters of the text-based CAPTCHAs on the passpositionscorrectly. These factors have increased the complexity of the login process. However, although it iscomplex and cumbersome, the improved scheme is stronglyresistant to spywares, which is our primary focus. A comparison of login time for our scheme shows that, ourscheme, as other graphical schemes, is longer than that of textbasedschemes. However, when compared to other graphicalpassword schemes our login time is shorter. For instance, themean login time of CHC is 72 seconds and Déjà vu is 27 to 32seconds because there are multiple rounds of challenges in these schemes [26]. In [18], a typical entry takes over 3minutes using a high-complexity protocol and over 1.5 minutes with a low-complexity protocol. Moreover, schemes againstspyware also challenge user's memory capacity to agreat extent. In [18], the high-complexity protocol asks the userto remember 30 pictures. And in [20], the user needs toremember 16 random strings for corresponding 16 passimages. The mean login time of our

improved scheme is 22.04seconds. We believe that our login times will decrease withfamiliarity with the scheme. All experiments were undertakenin lab and all the participants were new to our scheme. Theusers' login speed should be faster with the extended use. If the scheme is moved to real usage, the settings of theparameters can be adjusted to adapt to different securitydemands and application situations. There are M imagesrandomly generated including N pass-images, and there are Srounds of challenges for one login this requires recording of hundreds of logins andrecognition of a huge number of CAPTHCAs. Gathering somuch information may take a long time and recognizing theCAPTCHAs also needs an extensive manpower. Certainly, increasing the setting for high security is at the expense of usability.

There are also some user behaviors which create risks forour scheme. First, the passwords selected by user often accordwith a particular trend. For example, in order to make thepassword easily remembered, most users select the sameposition for different pass-images, first or anterior positions, consecutive positions or one position for each pass-image. Andcertain images were selected by a number of users as passimages.All the factors mentioned above can reduce the practical password space and increase the possibility of "guessing" attacks. Second, we find that there is always a significant time gapwhen entering characters belonging to two different passimages. The reason is that users are used to enter correspondingcharacters after he finds a pass-image. Such a situation will berecorded and utilized by spywares. This problem can be solved by entering characters by turns which belong to differentCATPCHAs in a certain order.In summary, our improved scheme is resistant to spywareattack, and the rules for setting passwords have increased the cost and time of the human intervention attack.

VII. Conclusion And Future Works

In this paper, we have presented a new approach to protectuser's password against spyware attack. Our main contributionis that we introduce CAPTCHA into the realm of graphicalpasswords to resist spyware programs. From a securityviewpoint, this exploration is expected to advance thedevelopment of graphical passwords. While the design ofCAPTCHA is an interdisciplinary topic and the currentcollective understanding of this topic is still in its infancy, wedo not claim that our scheme is immediately feasible.However, we believe that our method will enhance currentsecurity and as CAPTCHA increases in effectiveness ourmethod will also increase computer security. The results of our experiments show that the future researchshould concentrate on improving the login time and memo ability. Furthermore, when a user inputs the corresponding substrings which belong to differentCAPTCHAs, the time gap is longer than the time between two characters in one substring. So a method for narrowing the timegap in the entering process and reduction of the impact of user's choice trend on security, provide other areas for futureresearch. Acknowledgment

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