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Marshall J. Getz
August 2012

ON THE MIND'S FOREIGN SHORES: THE ORIGINS OF HENRY A. MURRAY'S
PERSONOLOGY

A Dissertation Presented to the
Faculty of the College of Education
University of Houston

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

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Approved by Dissertation Committee:

Dr. Jacqueline Hawkins, Co-Chairperson

Dr. Robert McPherson , Co-Chairperson

Dr. David Baker, Committee Member

Dr. Rick Olenchak, Committee Member

Dr. Robert McPherson, Dean
College of Education

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Abstract

Henry A. Murray (1893-1988) became one of America's premier scholars in personality research. While most psychologists remember him as the co-developer of the Thematic Apperception Test, he and a large and devoted staff at the Harvard Psychological Clinic devised numerous techniques for studying personality, in support of a theory that Murray called personology (Morgan & Murray, 1935; Robinson, 1992). Personology was described at length in Murray's first major work, *Explorations in Personality* (Murray, 1938). An amalgam of Jungian analysis and trait psychology, Murray obviously borrowed from a number of theoretical sources, including Gordon Allport (1967) and Kurt Lewin (1936, 1937/1999).

A study of the origins of personology will contribute to a better understanding of the early years of personality psychology, including the limits of methodologies used in the 1930s. The term "individual differences" was not in vogue with Murray and his circle, but his system addressed a subject's unique needs and external pressures. Since much of Murray's original documentation has been archived at Harvard, the story of how Murray and his colleagues communicated and conceptualized their work may now be told. Questions remain about Murray's specific influences. Murray (1959a, 1967) credited medicine and literature for inspiring personology, he later confessed an almost exclusive debt to his colleague and mistress, Christiana Morgan (Anderson, 1999; Douglas, 1993; Robinson, 1992).

If a researcher looks beyond Murray's brief autobiography (Murray, 1967) or the Robinson (1992) biography, which was primarily based on interviews with Murray, it is possible to find other roots to personology. The Henry A. Murray Papers in the Harvard University Archives offer extensive materials, most of which have not been previously used. Murray had close friendships with three senior scholars: mathematician Alfred North Whitehead, physician George Draper and biochemist Lawrence Henderson, and his notes and correspondence suggest that all three played a subtle but important role in establishing the foundations of personology. Previous Murray scholarship focused on Morgan and Carl Jung, but the importance of patterns and personology's incorporation of evolution came from these now-obscure figures.

Preface

Choosing to write about Henry A. Murray is not a task to be taken lightly. He lived to be 95, had multiple careers, myriad interests, and had an extremely complicated personal life. Although he held two advanced degrees, neither was in psychology. An intellectual, he also described himself in highly-charged, emotional tones. In one article, he noted being attracted to dark-themed pictures, but also wrote that he had an enthusiasm that he dubbed a “sanguine surplus” (Murray, 1967). To the joy and alarm of an archival researcher, Murray saved virtually every paper connected with his life from age 20 until his death.

Murray’s true legacy is a school of thought called personology. His theory differs from the personology system devised by a judge, who believed that he could decide on a defendant’s moral standard by examining his or her face. Murray’s personology has three basic concepts: needs, press and themas. Needs are Freudian drives, while press would be external forces acting on an individual. Themmas are the life themes that arise from needs and press. Murray considered needs first, and as he defined them, they seem comparable to the drives of psychoanalytic literature. According to Murray, people are preset to react in given ways because of needs. Adopting the language of psychoanalysis, Murray viewed needs as causing tension, although satisfying a need may generate further tension. Themmas impact individuals at an unconscious level, although a therapist may make an individual aware of them.

Personology addresses the individual. Darwinism and psychoanalysis inform it in equal measure. Environments vary widely, yet few are experienced only by a single individual. University classes, corporations, wars and stranded elevators all provide

environments which will be shared by many, and each of those people will seem to have a unique experience. Literature and history offer numerous examples of the young soldier who matures on the battlefield, while another finds his calling, and a third returns home traumatized. Personology offers a way to conceptualize both the individuals and the situations.

The purpose of this study is not to define personology – Murray (1938, 1959a, 1967) did that himself – but to research its origins. Murray did not explain himself clearly on that point. Murray changed his story frequently, associating personology with psychoanalysis, his medical education, his reading of Melville, and ultimately thanking the mysterious and complex woman who was at the center of his life. Murray followed many leads in his life, and became overly enthusiastic with each discovery. Still, his private papers suggest other significant factors behind his theory. Three scholars made a lasting impact on his work, yet in the relatively limited forums adopted by Murray, their names were not necessarily left out, but not fully explained. This study explores their influence on personology.

Murray warrants study because he pioneered personality research when few American psychologists considered it. He designed and implemented a comprehensive research methodology that would be used at Harvard and other institutions. Not only have others followed him, but they should credit Murray for completing one of the first major longitudinal studies. His team studied 50 Harvard students and duplicated their testing on the same subjects two years later. Murray's theory of personology led to much of the groundwork in motivation research, mainly through the efforts of Murray's student, David McClelland, and McClelland's student, John Atkinson. They carried out

the first projects on the so-called “Big Three” needs – Achievement, Power and the Affiliation/Intimacy – which have become the keystones of motivation. Murray made a lasting impact in industrial psychology, because of his work for the US military during the Second World War. Recruited into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in 1943, he developed a battery for officer candidates that would eventually be adopted by major companies, with AT&T being one of the first.

This project focuses on some of the many origins of personology, with a particular focus on three figures who have not yet been sufficiently covered in this story. Before setting the limited parameters of this research project, some of the fundamental issues for justifying it might be helpful. Most psychologists remember Murray as the man behind the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), which he co-developed with his mistress, Christiana Morgan. Murray believed that the TAT was the ideal way to make a theme explicit to a patient. While the TAT remains one of the major projective instruments in use today (Lilienfeld, Wood & Garb, 2000), personology contributed more to psychology. Murray (1940) did not wish to be remembered for a test, but rather as the scholar who brought psychoanalysis and research psychology together. When Murray found himself at odds with some of Harvard’s psychology faculty, he took an extreme, almost anti-scientific stand, which masked his truly remarkable research endeavors. He took Freudian theory, and Jung’s great *Personality Types*, and attempted to test them empirically, while at the same time appreciating the “art” and philosophy behind their ideas.

Murray’s lasting influence may be seen in the work of Theodore Millon, one of the few psychologists who have sat on the committee writing the *Diagnostic and*

Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). What Millon terms “integrationism” reflects his well-known multi-axial model of mental illness, as well as his clinical inventories. Like Murray, he found a parallel between conceptualizations in medicine and psychology. Over centuries, physicians moved from attention to symptoms to a complex understanding between the patient, disease and his or her social milieu. Millon appears to have incorporated Murray’s evolutionary thinking into his system. Any behavior, including pathological, must be examined in the context of adaptability. If one considers the DSM-IV’s Axis II (and being a specialist in personality disorders, Millon would), the symptoms shown in many patients compare to Murray’s needs, while the shattered relationships of Axis IV might be part of the press (Millon, n.d.).

A reexamination of Murray’s first and only major book, *Explorations in Personality*, becomes another impetus for this project. Since its publication in 1938, it has been a topic of discussion by many personality psychologists. In honor of its 70th anniversary, it was reprinted in 2008. Those who were around when it first came out, or who were actually taught with it, still talk about the impact it made on their own thinking (Smith, 1990). How many of us remember our textbooks ?

Murray was frequently asked about the origins of personology, and never ceased to alter his story. He enjoyed criticizing Freud (Murray, 1967), yet some aspects of Freudian thinking turned up in personology. In his important 1940 article, “What Should Psychology Do about Psychoanalysis ?,” Murray made his views clear. Needs are drives, and Murray credited Freud for bringing the unconscious world to the attention of psychologists and doctors. He later reflected on the psychoanalytic underpinnings of Melville’s *Moby-Dick*, in a piece titled “*In Nomine Diaboli*.” (Murray 1940, 1951/1952).

Murray's papers, such as the undated pieces called "Projection" and "Personology Theory Abbreviations," strongly reflect Freudian thinking. In an interview with University of Chicago psychologist James William Anderson (1988), Murray discussed his interest in Jungian analysis. While personally closer to Jung, Murray appeared to limit Jungian thinking to the axes of introversion/extraversion and intellectual/sensual, and worldly archetypes.

At other times, depending on his audience, Murray claimed that he conceived of personology after reading Herman Melville, whose deep character portrayals taught him more about understanding people than any psychologist or philosopher he ever encountered. He was equally likely to indicate that his medical training informed his beliefs about behavior and emotions. Controversially, he told his closest associates that it was Christiana Morgan, his lover, muse and colleague, who truly developed personology. She encouraged him to read great literature, and actually introduced him to Jung. Morgan's biographer, Claire Douglas (1993) finds her story murky, but gives Morgan her due when evaluating Murray's work. Morgan's granddaughter, Dr. Hallee Morgan, told this author that Christiana was a remarkable thinker who gave much to Murray, and received unhappiness in return (H. Morgan, personal communication, September 11, 2010). This contrasts with remarks from Murray's student, Robert R. Holt, who indicated that she certainly had a personal relationship with Murray and worked at the Harvard Psychological Clinic (HPC), but was not the intellectual driver behind personology (R.R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009).

These contradictory statements and the fact that Murray ran off on numerous tangents, only serves to muddy the waters of personology. Those who interviewed

Murray reported what he said at that moment, but the body of evidence can be tantalizingly scant. Murray rarely finished a project, no matter how small. This means that with the exception of *Explorations*, one has a few chapters and many fragments of archival documents to put the story together. It suggests multiple origins for personology.

To find the origins of Murray's thinking, his own life and context should be examined. He was born and reared in New York City to a wealthy and distinguished family. He grew up during the very middle of the Gilded Age, that wonderful and prosperous time in America that began after the Civil War (1861-1865) and ended with the next great war, World War I (1914-1918). Privilege brought him security regardless of innate skills or ideal choices. He went to Groton and then on to Harvard, where his abilities as an athlete and student leader mattered more than grades. Murray would come to psychology when he was in his thirties, after earning a medical degree and a Ph.D. in biochemistry.

According to Robinson (1992), Murray first read *Moby-Dick* while on a trip to Europe in 1924. He had begun his Ph.D. work, and he thought that by studying basic biological systems, he would find the scientific "truth" of life itself. His work specialized in embryology, but he realized that it did not address the complexities of man. The mental life of the ordinary human had far more truth, depth and mystery than anything under a microscope. Herman Melville discovered this long before psychology emerged as an academic discipline in America. Now well-known, *Moby-Dick* received relatively little attention it was published in 1851, and the author was no longer part of the literary conversation in Murray's time. Murray championed it, along with *Pierre, or the*

Ambiguities, an obscure Melville novel released one year after *Moby-Dick*. The story of the white whale offered rich psychological interpretations, including the fatal Freudian drive of Captain Ahab to Ahab's punishment for ignoring the lessons of the Bible. *Pierre* amazed Murray more than *Moby-Dick* for its struggle with family traditions and social mores, and its subtle incest theme (Murray, 1949/1962/1981, 1951/1952).

Three scholars whose work has been ignored for decades played a significant part in both the career and thinking of Henry Murray. They were George Draper, his medical school professor, Lawrence Henderson, a biochemist who directed his doctoral research and secured his position at Harvard, and the mathematician-philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, who became a close friend at Harvard.

George Draper (1880-1959) was a professor at Columbia University's College of Physicians and Surgeons (P&S), who taught Murray when he studied medicine (1915-1919). Strongly Darwinistic, Draper pioneered what he called "constitutional medicine," which today would be referred to as psychosomatic medicine. Draper believed that diseases, as living organisms, followed Darwinian, adaptive principles, or they would die. "Constitution" became synonymous with personality, and Draper suggested that the interaction of an individual's personality and environment would directly impact the likelihood of catching a disease, and its prognosis. At a time when medical education stressed almost rote learning of factual material and valued only the diagnosis and correct treatment, Draper informally taught psychology and insisted that his students listen to their patients.

In 1927, Draper published an article, "Science, Art and the Patient" in *Harper's*, a popular magazine with a national following. In it, Draper chastised his colleagues for

forgetting the very lessons of Hippocrates, and trying to apply the rules of physics to the practice of medicine. Draper became involved in research on disease etiology, including polio (Oshinsky, 2006). Draper eloquently spoke of patient's as coping individuals who might have environmental stressors. This would be Murray's press. Ironically, Murray would write a very similar indictment of his peers some eight years later, in *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*. The piece, "Psychology and the University," condemned psychologists for also shadowing physics in an effort to be more scientific (Murray, 1935/1981).

Archives was respected in its field, but had a limited audience compared to *Harper's*. Still, some of Murray's fellow professors became strongly emotional over what was really a tongue-in-cheek bit of light reading, more meant for psychology students than established academics (Robinson, 1992). The official responses to Draper and Murray could not have been more different. Columbia established a Constitutional Clinic at Columbia-Presbyterian Hospital. Some within Harvard's psychology faculty tried to oust Murray.

Lawrence Henderson (1878-1942) was perhaps closest to Murray of the trio. A distinguished biochemist who also found great meaning in Darwin's theory, Henderson believed that all living things, regardless of their simplicity, became biospheres for smaller organisms. He spoke of dual adaptability – with living things adjusting to the world they lived in, and the organisms within them also needing to survive. Henderson's fellow scientist, the Canadian Archibald Macallum, theorized that seawater served as blood for marine invertebrates, and the blood of higher creatures, particularly mammals,

would be based on it. Henderson proposed that oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen and carbon had vital life forces within their atomic structure.

Murray used Henderson's thinking in his biological application to mental life. In the 1930s, a "biological psychologist" could refer to a neuroscientist, but Murray thought of biology more literally. In *Explorations* and a long chapter, "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System," Murray (1938, 1959a) described personality as a living entity, with biological needs – called "viscerogenic drives" – acting on higher-order needs, called "psychogenic drives." Like a creature coping with a changing or hostile natural environment, the forces of press, which might be loved ones, a neighborhood or the folks at the office – work on the individual. According to Murray, the unique qualities of a personality determine success or failure. Given the ideographic nature of people, Murray expected varying results to the same situation. For example, multiple subjects could see an identical TAT plate and develop very different story lines. In Murray's system, the parallels between biology and psychology were so strong that they almost eclipsed his adherence to psychoanalysis (Murray, n.d., "Complexes, a Discussion").

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) never taught Murray, but was a close friend of his. He specialized in Boolean mathematics and the philosophy of Henri Bergson, and he brought both areas to Murray's thinking. George Boole proposed a means of generating and predicting patterns, and today computer programmers have adapted this to search engines. As Henderson maintained that hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and nitrogen were no ordinary elements, Bergson wrote of a life force being in everything. Whitehead combined vitalism with the significance of patterns, and proposed the permanence, or

“thread of identity.” Whitehead and Murray agreed that this concept related to personality itself. Moods and emotions float, and behaviors may be changed as required, but the personality would be an on-going entity.

Whitehead inspired Murray with yet another concept, the so-called “eternal object.” This could be anything that a person was not conscious of. While it sounds like a religious term, Whitehead meant that this object was beyond knowledge, and not necessarily forever. Murray found relevance in eternal objects to the themas. Morgan and Murray’s reason for creating the TAT was to illuminate the themas to subjects or patients.

The psychologists Gordon Allport and Kurt Lewin were among the few established professors in the psychology section of Harvard’s Department of Social Relations who liked Murray personally and thought his ideas were valid. Allport researched traits, which he saw as permanent and the building blocks of personality. Lewin proposed his field theory, in which an individual acts and influences the objects around him or her. He also said that humans are, of course, conscious beings, who process their own cognitive activities and emotions, and depend on what they perceive from the outside (Lewin, 1936).

Lewin and Allport did not generate the controversies that Murray truly enjoyed, and they had solid reputations at Harvard. Murray marked his years there with arguments and rivalries that Murray naturally took personally. Still, Harvard was divided between those who viewed psychology through a lens of the individual being passive, versus those who maintained that individuals had a will and acted accordingly. Behaviorists and most of the specialists in perception took the passive argument, based on stimulus-response.

Allport, Lewin and, of course, Murray, conceptualized the individual as monitoring the environment and acting on – or actually changing it – and being internally programmed to do so. To borrow a word that came into being long after Murray, they thought people were “hard-wired” to act. In an undated writing fragment, “Complexes, a Discussion,” Murray tied the ideas of Whitehead, Freud, Lewin and Allport together.

Murray ran off in multiple directions throughout his lengthy career, and many did not contribute much to personology. Given his mercurial disposition, it became a task for him to write up – and actually finish – a project. For this reason, his archival papers offer insights that the published sources did not reveal. An examination of a mere fraction of this collection at Harvard University becomes the basis for this dissertation. Murray may not be consistently a part of the discussion in today’s psychology, but he made a contribution to personality research, and his 1938 project has been adapted by many others over the past 70 years. Murray also indirectly helped establish motivation as a legitimate endeavor of study. If Murray warrants consideration for his personology, then its tangled roots must be untangled. That becomes the reason for *On the Mind’s Foreign Shores*.

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Chapter I

Introduction

Henry Murray offers historians of psychology a rich subject for study. He lived for nearly a century, essentially had three careers, wrote prodigiously, and apparently kept all correspondence and notes for his studies. While he is, of course, best known as the chief developer of the Thematic Apperception Test, or TAT, he also had his own “school” of psychology, which he called personology. For Murray, personology had aspects of a theory, but it was mainly an approach to research, which he used in the 1920s, 30s and 40s. Personology, his life’s work, remains Murray’s major contribution to psychology. It proved to be a labor of passion, and he infused his varied and often colorful relationships into his growing body of psychological thought. Allowing the people he met, worked with or loved to be among the driving forces of personology may seem chaotic; frankly, at times Murray could be scattered in his approach and felt plagued by red herrings, false starts and his own distractions.

By the end of his career, Murray still accomplished something. In many ways, personology united the scientific discipline of mainstream psychology with the creative, depth psychology of Jungian analysis. For decades, Murray searched for the means of revealing core elements of personality, for neither alone could fully answer his questions.

Since Murray’s death in 1988, researchers of psychology, psychoanalysis and the history of social science have neglected personology. Perhaps because it lacked the distinction of a unified theory, it failed to generate interest. Yet Murray trained hundreds of psychologists and students of other disciplines who were once drawn to the Harvard Psychological Clinic (HPC). The survivors from Murray’s heyday would be retired now,

and apparently their students moved into other areas. One cannot avoid Murray's critics who accused him of being unscientific, and for discouraging ongoing work on personology. Murray incorporated science into his projects, but *even if he had not*, that would not justify ignoring someone who had such influence in his day. Using the empirical methods of the time, Murray offered a way to synthesize much of the work on trait and personality psychology with psychoanalysis. Through personology, Murray attempted to compensate for the failures of each with principles of the other. The strongest argument for investigating personology is the detailed methodology devised by Murray. At the time, psychoanalysts lacked a facile way to conduct experiments. Murray and his team found ways. Personality testing offered clinicians little application to their work, yet psychoanalysts focused on therapy.

Given its inherent value and flexibility, and the strength of Murray's circle, why has personology been all but forgotten? Even the few scholars who have considered Murray and his collaborator and mistress, Christiana Morgan, made scant use of the many documents in the Harvard Archives. I located their papers, likely untouched since Murray's death. The papers proved to be an invaluable source of insight into his thinking, how it developed over years, and how his research related to biology, literature, cultural studies and even politics. This study has made extensive use of some of these materials.

As a psychologist (albeit, one without formal training), Murray railed against the rigidities of so-called "scientific psychology," and yet his own research was very empirically-derived, and fit many of the standards of the time. Murray himself declared empiricism to be at odds with his research, and he began to cultivate enemies within his

department. As the story of personology becomes apparent, Murray takes on the role of provocateur, blaming behaviorists in particular. His work had many unique features, but he still maintained its scientific roots. In reality, there was contention within Harvard's Department of Philosophy and Psychology, but it was less clear-cut than the story Murray loved to tell. Morton Prince directed the psychology faculty and hired Murray for his new Harvard Psychological Clinic. Prince shared some of his interests, but Murray's colleagues, on the whole, did not.

In fact, department leaders such as Karl Lashley and E. G. Boring stressed projects that could be precisely measured. Murray and his team collected massive amounts of data, and recorded some of it quantitatively, but Murray's use of psychoanalytic language and his close ties to Carl Jung offended them. Murray ultimately hoped to find the very origins of personality, which differed from their areas of expertise. Lashley's work dealt with neural functioning in animals. Boring, who became head of the department, studied perception. The faculty they hired and supported approached psychology very differently from Murray, and often focused on very specialized areas. Murray relied on science, but his rivals appeared more scientific because of their intolerance for psychoanalysis. In Murray's eyes, personology became a casualty.

Ongoing opposition pushed Murray into the role of an iconoclast. His conflict with psychology was really a clash with his fellow professors, but it was fueled with accusations that behaviorists and neuroscientists missed the complexity of the mind and that they tried to imitate the work of physicists. What Boring regarded as a successful experiment Murray condemned as being so constrained that the results could have been

assumed without conducting an experiment. Murray frequently allowed his grudges to interfere with his intellectual apparatus, with the consequence of isolating himself even further. This conflict of personalities and struggle for influence hurt Murray and forced him to adopt increasingly extreme positions. Murray found himself at odds with Boring and Lashley, and he responded by claiming that empiricism hindered psychology.

Murray was trained as a scientist and never rejected the values of science, but he publicly took this position to offend those who disagreed with him.

A discussion of personology shows that Murray (1938) certainly followed a legitimate research methodology, taking a sample of 50 young males and detailing aspects of their personalities over a two-year period. The sample was small but the testing was intensive. The data, primarily qualitative, received team evaluation to insure standards, and was judged according to Murray's principles of personology. Murray found that having small teams review the results, rather than individual staff handling a certain number of subjects alone, helped everyone adhere to the basic conceptualizations. The Harvard study became *Explorations in Personality*, published by Oxford University Press in 1938. It remains one of the classic studies in American psychology, and it introduced personology to the academic community. Murray scoffed at Lashley's delight in precise response times, but he and his team certainly categorized the material they collected into types of needs, press and themas. The Murray team enlisted both structured and less-structured interviews, questionnaires, and highly novel projective techniques to assess the histories, personalities and emotional conditions of the volunteers. This was the first major use of the TAT, an instrument Murray devised with Morgan.

The TAT and *Explorations* both came out of the early phase of Murray's career as a researcher in psychology, and while they show his approach to personality study, they do not offer the antecedents to his thinking. Perhaps the first eclectic in the field, Henry Murray used any current inspiration to refine his thinking. For this reason, he read widely, traveled often, and kept a coterie of fascinating people around him. My study examines the some of the multiple sources of Murray's personology, including three figures who have yet to be credited for their influence on Henry Murray. They are physician George Draper, biochemist Lawrence J. Henderson, and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead. This trio came from different disciplines and never collaborated, but their work had the common theme of a strong Darwinian influence. Murray rarely failed to mention Darwin as a prophet for all science, but it is possible that evolutionary theory came to Murray not from *Origin of Species* or the other classics, but through the ideas of Whitehead, Henderson and Draper.

If one examines *Explorations*, Darwin received no credit. Still, Murray tied his most biological aspects, such as the various needs, to an evolutionary gradient. Draper was not credited, and Henderson was mentioned in a footnote. Whitehead, likely the most well-known at the time, was given the briefest attention. *Explorations* is a large volume and had extensive citations, but these mainly came from psychoanalysis and the classics of early scientific or the so-call "new" psychology.

Murray recounted the story of his research at various times in his career, and always for publication. In 1959, he contributed a lengthy chapter for Sigmund Koch's *Psychology: A Study of a Science* series. This oft-cited piece, titled "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System," detailed his medical and embryological studies,

and how that aspect of science informed his future work in psychology. Like many of Murray's best-known writings, "Preparations" described his challenges within Harvard's psychology department. Murray found himself at odds with his colleagues over their differing approaches, but he stood firm in his belief that mental activities followed biological laws (Murray, 1959a).

In describing the future of personology in "Preparations," Murray (1959a) shared his enthusiasm for psychoanalytic concepts and suggested that Kurt Lewin and he shared similar versions of needs. Henderson appeared in the chapter mainly as the Harvard faculty member who arranged for Murray's first post at the HPC. Murray credited Darwin for enhancing psychology with evolutionary ideas.

Much of Murray's (1967) autobiographical sketch, "The Case of Murr," pitted him as a curious, self-directed lad cast adrift in the academic world. A non-conformist who cared more for athletics than classes, and one who typically discounted any teacher or professor, Murray eventually found himself teaching and directing a research team. He had a line of study that absorbed him, and again, he claimed that his scientific training guided him. Here, he briefly complimented Draper and thanked Henderson for his job. More relevant to personology, he also explained the impact of Jungian analysis and the writings of Herman Melville on his life. In "Murr," he admitted a lack of cohesiveness in his own thinking to make personology accessible to the world.

In a series of interviews given as an elderly man, he frankly discussed Christiana Morgan, and her role in both his life and theory of personology. Morgan died in 1967, so Murray was offering recollections decades after the fact. In speaking with his biographer, Forrest Robinson (1992), he described her as a driving force behind his work,

and yet at times her personal problems and extreme possessiveness hindered Murray's productivity and divided some members of the HPC staff. In an interview with this author, Murray's former student, Robert R. Holt, recalled Morgan fondly, but did not believe that she ever contributed anything fundamental to personology (personal communication, August 19, 2009). Morgan's own biographer believes that a combination of the academic climate at the time and Murray's own selfishness denied Morgan her due (Douglas, 1993). In her interview with me, Morgan's granddaughter, Hallee, said that Morgan was a frustrated intellectual who was broken by her lover (H. Morgan, personal communication, September 11, 2010).

Personology offers a comprehensive approach to personality, and provides the framework for actually testing psychoanalytic theory. One of Murray's goals was to bring Jung into the psychology laboratory, and apply scientific methods to a field that had based its canon strictly on clinical observation. In a famous article, "American Icarus," Murray (1955) used projective techniques and an extensive case history to describe an HPC test subject. No one knows why this subject, called "Grope," turned up at that HPC. He may have actually wanted help, or he could have been a typical undergraduate volunteer, taking a psychology course and participating in a study as part of his work. Had he been treated by a Boston analyst, he probably would not have been written up.

But he was. Grope received the same interviews and testing that was given to the subjects described in *Explorations*. The protocol was the same, the conceptualizations were the same, and the scoring remained unchanged. Under Murray, the HPC found the means to standardize the early stages of psychoanalysis. No subjects were treated there, but diagnoses were determined in such a way that the process could be called scientific.

Given the importance of Murray's ideas and research, personology's tangled roots warrant some investigation. Murray's own writings on the subject only confuse his readers more. Murray and many of his associates have since died. For this reason, archival sources will be the new area for investigators. Previous writers on Murray used few of his papers. This study reflects a remedy to this situation. Murray was not always an enthusiastic writer of letters, but many of his associates were, and he kept most, if not all of them. He also kept extensive notes for books and chapters, many of which went unfinished. Murray's notes reveal ties to Draper, Henderson and Whitehead that his public statements never implied. Evolution and biology were never far from his thinking. Letters suggest closeness, and an active sharing of ideas. No study will ever discount Christiana Morgan. She remains a controversial figure among historians of Jungian analysis, but Whitehead, Draper and Henderson seem to have drifted into obscurity. This is unfortunate, since in the years before the Second World War, they made major contributions in the fields of philosophy and mathematics, medicine, and biochemistry, respectively. As antecedents to personology, they taught Murray how ordinary and unusual interactions with an environment evolve into broader themes of life. Henderson and Draper, both Darwinian in outlook, saw environments as active participants in life, and that whatever furthered life would likely continue. Through Draper and Henderson, Murray added strong aspects of evolution to personology. When Murray studied the life-themes of an individual (what he called *themas*), he looked for the ways in which those themes reflected the individual's situation. Whitehead believed that patterns were the basis of major systems in the natural world, and Murray used that in *themas*, as well as in his adoption of a scientific basis for his research.

Murray's life was a recipe for producing an eclectic scholar. He was born at the end of the 19th century into a fairly comfortable Manhattan family, and despite his own resistance, received one of the best educations any American could have hoped for. He flitted from one academic field to at least two others before adopting psychology.

Murray found excitement and epiphany in almost everything except his peers' efforts. I chose the word "peer" rather than "colleague" for an important reason. The people he actually worked with and surrounded himself with inspired him endlessly. His peers or fellow professors left him cold. For this reason, his immediate circle of friends, students and associates played such an important role in shaping personology. Murray's life was tied to that of Christiana Morgan's, so she needs to be part of the story.

Lawrence Henderson and George Draper never considered psychology directly in their extensive research, but still provided other supports in what Murray would later describe as personology's scaffolding. Alfred North Whitehead provided genial companionship to both Morgan and Murray, but it would seem that Whitehead followed an entirely different line of thought. Murray made use of some of Whitehead's ideas, in terms of consistent patterns that evolve into traits.

Explorations became Murray's best-known monograph, and while he did much of the writing, the research behind it was a team endeavor. Where does it fit in modern psychology, and why should we pay attention to its at times tenuous antecedents ?

Explorations stands more than seven decades later as a testament to Murray's effort to find the fundamentals of personality. Some of his contemporaries, particularly those who had been in conflict with him, condemned the work as flawed and direly unscientific. Obviously, the time between a stimulus and response can be measured, but the number of

needs reported in a two-hour testing session can certainly be counted. Prior to this HPC project, personality psychology often became a discussion of traits, meaning styles of responding independent of an individual's state. Trait theorists regarded the personality as a collection of traits. Other psychologists stayed closer to biological psychology, and considered the physiological functioning of the brain.

Twenty-three years before *Explorations*, Cornell University's Edward B. Titchener (1915/1923) hypothesized about broader psychological mechanisms that could explain a person's consistent way of dealing with others. The experiments conducted by Titchener and his peers never adopted such an elaborate protocol as described in *Explorations*. Murray and his colleagues and students at the HPC deserve credit for tackling an issue that daunted so many others.

Titchener and most other leading psychologists of the first quarter of the 20th century had either worked in the Leipzig laboratory founded by Wilhelm Wundt or studied under professors who did. Murray, with his almost contemptuous attitude toward the restrictive standards of existing psychology, never became Wundt's follower, and, in fact, basically ignored psychology courses when he studied for his bachelor of arts at Harvard. It could be seriously argued that this likely gave Murray a fresh attitude toward the issues psychology could address. *Explorations* became an important work, and Murray influenced a generation of personality and motivation specialists, including Gardner Lindzey, David C. McClelland and Robert W. White. Pioneering suicidologist Edwin S. Shneidman (1980) used tenets of personology to suggest that the traditional Freudian death wish may serve a need, even if it is something as simple as easing psychic tension. M. Brewster Smith (2006), commenting on Shneidman's work, credited

Murray's influence in Shneidman's ability to examine death atheoretically, as a universal condition that may be either faced or avoided.

Murray used *Explorations* as a manifesto, a call for other psychologists to reconsider behaviorism and be open to looking for "depth," or what Murray's biographer, Forrest Robinson (1992), called "deep diving." Though not entirely in agreement with psychoanalysis, Murray (1940) felt that its practitioners were examining the construct of personality far better than other psychologists. In a move that would alienate him further from his colleagues, Murray endorsed *Moby-Dick* and other works of fiction as a springboard for understanding personality (Murray, n.d., "Narcism;" also see Murray, 1949/1981). Novelist Herman Melville became his lifelong passion.

In writing post-*Explorations*, Murray showed that personology would always be a developing system. He was convinced that psychological research needed to include concepts from other fields, such as sociology and anthropology. He saw value in Jungian archetypes, which went beyond the individual and reflected historical and nationalist sensibilities. An archetype could be an iconic figure or image, such as America's Uncle Sam, Marianne for the French, or John Bull in the United Kingdom. Exposure to Jungian analysis informed his collaboration with Harvard anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn. Their book, *Personality in Nature, Society and Culture* (1953), enabled Murray to speculate about a new interpretation of personality. Personality required a more fluid conceptualization, one that addressed social change and social structures.

Murray was born at a time when many adults remembered the American Civil War, and he lived through two world wars. He saw triumphs of the far right and left. The Cold War, with its underlying nuclear threat, unsettled him as much as any

intellectual (Murray, n.d., "A Personologist's Abstract of Human Nature;" also see Murray, 1960a/1981). The study of personality in an age when people had the means to end all life required novel and highly complex myths, images and archetypes.

Murray was a young man during World War I and participated in the Second World War, but the threats from Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang alarmed him as never before in his life. The clash between East and West and the "military-industrial complex" that troubled President Eisenhower forced Murray to alter his optimistic worldview. Maybe Murray saw evidence of Thanatos, Freud's Death Force, and that discomfited him. He claimed to find mankind's chance at redemption in creativity. After his first exposure to Melville, he became convinced that novelists and artists had access to their own mental depths and that inwardness gave them a better understanding of the psychology of others.

It should not surprise anyone that Murray enjoyed the company of many creative individuals. Earning a university salary, Murray needed to use his private resources to entertain extravagantly, and his guest list typically mixed professors and students with writers, actors or social critics. He befriended the critic Lewis Mumford and the distinguished Southern poet Conrad Aiken. Murray's most significant relationship was the life he shared with Christiana Morgan. Morgan was primarily a sketch artist and illustrator.

Murray's former student and longtime associate, psychologist Robert R. Holt, told me that Paul Robeson, the actor, lawyer and early civil rights activist, visited the HPC in the 1940s. Holt recalled that Robeson starred in a play and his appearance impressed everyone (R. R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009). Speaking with Forrest

Robinson (1992), Murray explained that his friendship with Robeson began while Murray was still a surgeon. Robeson had been a college athlete and suffered a leg injury that eventually required an operation in the 1920s. Murray, an athlete himself, became fast friends with Robeson, and Murray eventually introduced Robeson to his wife. Mrs. Robeson worked in Murray's biochemical research laboratory. Despite his closeness to Murray, Holt did not know of Murray's role in bringing the Robesons together.

Murray's writings after 1938 would never quite have the impact of *Explorations*, but they showed that he wanted personality psychology to incorporate culture, archetypes and creativity in pivotal roles. Murray hoped that finding new archetypes would lead to an uplifted society and better world. Creativity also plagued him at a personal level, as he frequently battled writers' block and left a number of unfinished projects (R. R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009).

Murray's contributions to psychology warrant careful consideration. Two new generations have entered the field since Murray's major book, and few researchers look to classic works when writing. Murray developed an approach to studying creativity within the context of personality. When giving the TAT, he stressed the value, not only of detailed stories but unusual responses to the essentially neutral pictures. In projective testing, no response is incorrect, but HPC researchers regarded the mere description of the scene as disappointing. Murray encouraged psychologists of the 1930s and 40s to investigate creativity with the TAT, Rorschach and similar means. Anne Roe (1951) studied major scientists, and Frank Barron conducted research on authors, and both adopted Murray's techniques (Murphy, n.d.). Sigmund Koch, a psychologist associated with Duke and Boston Universities, edited the landmark *Psychology: A Study of a*

Science series in the late 1950s and early 60s, which included Murray's above-mentioned chapter, "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System" (Murray, 1959a).

Koch obviously respected Murray's research methodology and saw it as meeting empirical standards, and he also conducted research similar to Barron's (Freeman, 1996).

Motivation research owes much to Murray. His concepts have been adapted for the seminal work by David McClelland, who defined the Big Three needs, *n* Achievement, *n* Affiliation and *n* Power, after thirty years of applying personology to experimental psychology. McClelland became a professor at Wesleyan and later Harvard, and he saw that Murray's instrument could be used to measure levels of motivation. McClelland and his student, John Atkinson, found that hungry subjects had more food or eating related themes in their TAT stories. Increased hunger correlated with more vivid content. Beyond the experimental use of the TAT, this line of research led McClelland to realize that motivation did not fall under the field of traits, but was an ego process. He credited Murray for that (McClelland, 1999; Winter, 1999).

Murray's significance to psychology guaranteed that he would become a significant figure. Forrest Robinson, an American Studies professor at the University of California-Santa Cruz, published the definitive biography of Murray in 1992. He claimed to have written it over a period of more than twenty years, and most of his primary sources centered on a series of lengthy interviews with Murray and his associates. He made some use of the Henry A. Murray Papers in the Harvard Archives, and his work shaped the present project in many ways.

Love's Story Told, Robinson's biography, as superb as it was, accentuated Murray's private life at the expense of personology. Holt both complimented and

criticized it when he told me, "I remember feeling that I learned an awful lot about him from it. ...I think a little that he overemphasized the sensational aspects of his life and career. But, well, I think that the man came through reasonably well" (R. R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009).

The present study does not purport to be a biography of Henry Murray. For that, readers should seek the enjoyable *Love's Story Told*. Robinson's book is extremely valuable because most of the story Murray told himself. Murray credits Christiana Morgan for being the living version of his anima, the Jungian feminine self. Murray insisted that he would not have pursued psychology as he did without her support, and that his most significant ideas were not born on the Harvard campus, but in the home he shared with her. Murray and Morgan, as people married to others, essentially flaunting their affair to all, maintained that their behavior was as much an exploration in personality as longitudinal Rorschachs. How does my study differ from Robinson's? Murray might well have tried to live out his theory, an unusual path for any academic, but his archives and published materials offer ample evidence that personology came from a variety of ideas, not just Morgan's. At the very least, the Harvard collection enables a review of personology.

Surviving documents, such as class notes, writing fragments and TAT teaching guides show how Murray viewed personology and projective testing, and what he wanted more than one generation of Harvard students to know about them. Letters and articles sent to Murray by his many friends illustrate his life and times, and certainly reinforce his image as a bon vivant and scholar totally immersed in science, psychology, art, world affairs and the goings-on of these friends. Correspondence by Murray, Erik H. Erikson

and their colleagues has been preserved in the Erikson Papers, housed at Harvard's Houghton Library rather than in the Archives. Robinson cited some documents, but generally he and others who wrote about Murray relied on their personal associations with him.

Through these documents, the scientific underpinnings of personology are exposed. Draper's letters to Murray, likely written in the 1930s, reflected his belief that individual differences – including psychological factors – could determine resistance to disease. Murray and one of his medical school classmates, Alvan Barach, corresponded long after the death of their Professor Draper, and still discussed this. Henderson wrote to Murray when the latter was a young medical researcher, discussing environments and biology. This would later become press in Murray's system. Whitehead's ideas about patterns would show up in Murray's writings about consciousness.

Chapter 2 is a biographical sketch. While I am writing about Murray's work rather than his life, separating the two may not always be ideal. Murray lived to be 95, held multiple degrees and pursued three professions – surgeon, research scientist and psychologist. He had two marriages and a significant love affair outside the traditions of matrimony. Perhaps the most consistent qualities of his life were his love of psychology and lengthy association with Harvard.

Chapter 3 explains personology and its origins in Murray's life, his choices in literature, encounters with Carl Jung and his relationship with Christiana Morgan. Personology has unexpected roots in literature. Murray encountered both archetypes and *Moby-Dick* at roughly the same time. He responded with passion that seemed intense even for Murray. Jung encouraged him to pursue that “deep diving” in his own mind and

the psyche of others. Discovering Melville as an adult changed Murray as well. Murray generally dismissed what academic psychologists regarded as important, and insisted that Melville and few others knew more about psychology *without* having been trained in it. What figure, from history or fiction, illustrated motivation more effectively than Captain Ahab ?

Initially, Murray used his own insights, based on his life experiences, as he contemplated the core of personality. Then, with Morgan's prodding, Murray discovered psychoanalysis in the 1920s. Obviously, it held extraordinary potential as a means of self-exploration. Few had actually tried to conduct research using its principles. Murray wanted to attempt longitudinal research on people's emotional lives, and he turned to Jungian principles. He relied mainly on projective tests, including the Rorschach and others that he or his colleagues developed. Projectives assess subjective data, and often have a subject tell a story based on a picture or object. Murray collected an extensive amount of data from his subjects, and began to find patterns in the psychological functioning and life histories of the people he studied.

Murray's personology owes much to the efforts of Christiana Morgan, who loved him and drove him to explore the depths of the psyche. In an academic atmosphere that Murray felt was generally unsupportive, Morgan shared his interests and saw personology as a powerful system. They believed personology had the potential to alter Western culture. Morgan reinforced that when Murray became distracted.

Chapter 4 covers Murray's early life. His family of origin and development during a key period in American history shaped him and led him to embrace traditional values, but also to rebel against anything he viewed as morally restrictive. Coming from

privilege and growing up in New York City, he had an early sense of class and felt an obligation to serve and succeed. He began as a less-than-promising student, but like a Yankee noble, he went to the Groton School and then moved on to Harvard, seemingly without effort. Despite lackluster grades, the future scientist-psychologist in him showed up early as well; he had a need to find the truth, or basis of everything around him. That journey would take him 90 years.

As a psychologist, Murray felt that his chosen field had been stifled by an anti-humanist trend. His fellow professors conducted research that stressed measurable constructs. The development of American psychology as a science is discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter covers some of the major figures who took psychology away from classical philosophy, and then faced difficulties in establishing a new field. How certain theories became important to personology becomes the central theme here.

Chapter 6 introduces the scientific and philosophical roots of personology beyond psychology. Alfred North Whitehead, a mathematician who made an impression on Murray, promoted two main ideas: permanence and patterns. In an indirect way, Murray would incorporate this scholar's philosophy into his own. What is important here is that personology adopted broad views, and far from rejecting scientific values, as Murray could easily claim when vexed, he sought them. Theism required patterns, and this applied to the personality, which existed over time and manifested itself in consistent ways. Murray showed a Whiteheadian influence when he discussed the idea of civilization evolving but still remaining as an intact entity.

My Chapter 7 follows a similar vein. As Murray shifted from physician to research biochemist-embryologist to psychologist, he found kindred spirits in two

scientists, the biochemist Lawrence Henderson and physician George Draper. Both believed in Darwinian evolution, and Henderson thought that organic chemicals responded to evolutionary pressures. In Henderson's world, environments attracted and selected life forms. This biological dynamic appealed to Murray, whose concept of press meant that the psychological environment acted on individuals and shaped their personalities. Personology gave press as much weight as any individual needs. Draper taught Murray at Columbia's medical school. Draper promoted "constitutional medicine," meaning that the types of diseases that humans caught or avoided could be attributed to a number of physical and psychological traits.

The last chapter of this study reassesses the development of personology and how Henry Murray cultivated it during a long and grand career. As suggested earlier, Murray's theory remains important to personality and motivation specialists. Adapted versions of his comprehensive assessment strategy have been used elsewhere. Murray himself introduced it into the military and espionage branches of government. His technique would later take on a life of its own in the commercial world. Few would dispute that Murray advanced psychology in a lasting way. Unfortunately, his colorful and turbulent life often obscured the record. In this study, archival sources – most rarely or never cited before – are used to trace the origin of personology. If one primarily relies on Murray's recollections – as Robinson did – one might easily get the impression that personology came from Christiana Morgan, with minimal influence from other sources. Robinson did a comprehensive job of analyzing Murray's published works, but Murray directed him to subtleties that he said came from Morgan.

Murray could make use of any experience, and, while he did not always acknowledge this, he stayed open to the ideas of others. Living in Manhattan contributed to personology, as did having a wealthy family. He cultivated friendships with a stellar array of great minds, and personology likely had a myriad of influences. The story here concentrates on three of the lesser-known, Whitehead, Henderson and Draper, along with Melville, psychoanalysis, and earlier trends in psychology. It appears that Murray developed personology from existing ideas, and that his synthesis of what he learned became something unique and valuable. Lastly, few had the personal and professional capabilities to promote their views as effectively as Henry Murray.

Chapter II

Biographical Sketch

Henry Alexander Murray (1893-1988)

Henry Alexander Murray, Jr., was the second and middle child of Henry, Sr. and Fanny Babcock Murray. He was born on May 13, 1893, in New York City. While Murray would always report a happy childhood, his parents had marital tension, and young Henry did not always get along with his apparently demanding mother, nor did he have cordial relations with his older sister, Virginia. Normally, childhood squabbles heal with maturity, but Robinson (1992) described lifelong arguments, particularly after Virginia married Robert Low Bacon, a prominent Republican politician. Murray was close to his father, who encouraged his love of myths and adventure. Perhaps the most intense, and certainly the most rewarding, family relationship was with his brother, Cecil. Cecil was about four years younger than Henry, and Cecil idolized him. In turn, Henry cultivated him, and this shaping extended to changing his name to Ike or Mike. Most people knew him by the latter name. Mike became a physician like his older brother and was associated with the Harvard Psychological Clinic.

The Murrays had wealth and pedigree that included Revolutionary War figures on his mother's side and British nobility on his father's. Young Henry went to the Groton School and then on to Harvard. He pursued athletics vigorously; often sports meant more to him than his grades. At Harvard, he majored in history and graduated in 1915. He studied medicine at Columbia University (1915-1919), where he trained to be a surgeon. During his medical school years, two important things happened. For the first time in his life, Murray applied himself to his academic work and thrived as a medical student and

resident (Robinson, 1992). He also found out that he had visual problems that interfered with his perception (Murray, 1967).

In 1916, when Murray was 23, he married Josephine Rantoul of Boston. As with Murray and every other woman in his life, she had a blueblood's pedigree. They had a daughter, named after her mother. Murray and everyone else always called Josephine senior simply Jo (Robinson, 1992). This conventional marriage would soon be tested.

Obviously, his eyesight limited his potential as a surgeon, but Murray's interests began to extend in the direction of research. In 1920, he graduated with a Master's degree in biology, through Columbia. At the time, Murray worked for Lawrence J. Henderson at his laboratory at Harvard. From 1924-1927, Murray studied biochemistry with a specialty in embryology in the United Kingdom and New York. He earned a Ph.D. in it from Cambridge University in 1927, although he actually did much of the bench research and defended his dissertation at the Rockefeller Institute in Manhattan (Anderson, 1999; Robinson, 1992). Unfortunately, one of the most recent biographical sketches on him, Pickren and Rutherford (2010), erroneously reported that he earned this degree from Harvard. He did not; Cambridge awarded it.

As with nearly everything Murray touched, he made biochemistry a broad endeavor. He studied embryology, but he later moved on to physiological functioning. He worked at the Rockefeller Institute, where he began as a promising scientist, and published frequently while he conducted his doctoral research. His mentor, Lawrence Henderson, put him in touch with Morton Prince. Henderson knew that his former student had begun to grow in yet another direction, and Prince headed the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at Harvard. Prince needed a new staff researcher for his

psychology laboratory, known as the Harvard Psychological Clinic or HPC.

(Anonymous, 1935; Stein & Gieser, 1999).

Murray was enthused when he found out that the HPC had an opening. This move from biochemistry to psychology could be attributed to a special summer in Europe in 1924. While aboard a cruise ship, someone passed him Melville's *Moby-Dick*. In Melville's greatest novel, Murray found an engaging plot, highly complicated but still a ripping yarn. Murray pronounced the author's true talent in his characterizations. Melville gave Ahab and the rest of the *Pequod's* crew – as well as the whale – inner lives. Their thoughts as much as their experiences became important aspects to the story. Murray's reading at the time also included Jung's *Psychological Types* and other works by Freud's leading disciple. Murray had not met Jung at that point, but he appreciated Jung's holistic approach to personality. With Jung, Freudian structures were less structured and more evolving.

The year 1924 marked a sea change in Murray's personal life. Prior to leaving for Europe, he met Christiana Drummond Councilman Morgan (1897-1967), who would become his mistress and sometime collaborator. For Murray, Morgan added something to his life that his wife could not. The Murrays should have been fulfilled and happy. They lived a fine Jazz Age lifestyle. Wealth gave them the ability to live more freely than most families of bench scientists, and the same could be said for Christiana Morgan. Henry and Jo traveled regularly. They went to nightclubs and Broadway theaters, and had dinner parties. Morgan represented something dark and unconventional. She shared Murray's interests in Melville and Jung. In fact, she had already read *Moby-Dick* when he suggested it, and she actually introduced him to Jung's many books and to the man.

Murray began two love affairs almost simultaneously. With Henderson's blessings, Murray took that opening at the HPC, and with Jo's full knowledge, he embarked on a 40-year affair with Christiana Morgan. Murray started his line of research that would become *Explorations in Personality*. The Rockefeller Foundation gave Murray grants, but he also spent his own money (Robinson, 1992). Morton Prince hired him, and within two years Murray became the Clinic's director (Anderson, 1999). Murray's investigations of broad humanistic and philosophical questions in psychology, and his reliance on subjective methods of gathering data alienated him from his department. Murray and his staff and students hoped that personology would eventually lead to a new conceptualization of personality, one that would incorporate individual differences, culture and even mythology. This blend of a private mental entity directly linked to culture reflects Jung's influence (Murray, 1959a; Murray, 1967). Choosing personology as his life's work enthralled Murray, but not following the departmental standard delayed his promotion to a full professorship for more than 20 years.

Trying to separate Murray's work and belief system from his private life can be tricky. His drive to teach and publish made him not unlike any other Harvard faculty. Of course, he decorated the Clinic in his style and at his own expense; he held formal luncheons for honored guests. At the end of the workday, Murray's hours took interesting turns. He had two homes, one with Jo and another with Morgan. Throughout our history, in all circles, there have been adulterers, and there have been spouses who have found ways of dealing with them. Divorce may not have been as common in Murray's years as it is today, but it certainly took place. Somehow Jo and William O.P.

Morgan, Christiana's husband, stayed married and made lives for themselves when Henry and Christiana stayed away.

If a written record of Will or Jo's reaction to the affair exists in the archives, I have yet to discover it. Jo raised Josephine, and when the girl became a grown woman, Jo plunged into charity work and social activities. Will Morgan seems to be the tragic figure here. He became a Harvard teacher in the anthropology department. Christiana and Will had a son, Councilman Morgan. Councilman, like Josephine, became a physician (Douglas, 1993). His relationship with his mother has been portrayed by Robinson (1992) as troubled. Essentially, Christiana separated herself from him for lengthy periods of time, so his resentment should not surprise anyone. Douglas (1993) portrayed her as devoted to Councilman. He apparently had mixed feelings toward Murray. While he described Murray to Robinson as the man who would steal his mother away from him, the written record suggests that they could be close, and Councilman signed letters to Murray with "love" (Morgan, 1967).

Perhaps the saddest document relating to their private lives was an article that Will Morgan coauthored with Alfred North Whitehead in the 1930s. It appeared in a 1945 issue of the *Journal of American Folklore*, ten years after Will's death. Kluckhohn held Will's papers, including his field research from Arizona, where he worked with the Navaho. The editorial board thanked Christiana Morgan, implying that she commissioned the issue. Whitehead, an inspiration to Murray and a visiting professor at Harvard, became a close friend to Christiana. They did not have an affair, but he and Mrs. Whitehead visited her when Murray cooled off, returned to his two Josephines, or dove too deeply into a research project. Christiana might have evoked sympathy in the

Whiteheads, because she drank to excess, particularly when Murray ignored her (Douglas, 1993; Robinson, 1992).

Whitehead wrote the preface to Will Morgan's "The Organization of a Story and a Tale," an unusual step, as journal articles usually do not have prefaces (Morgan & Whitehead, 1945). It was presumably written closer to the publication date. Whitehead praised Will for his use of themes from psychology and said that he appreciated that a folktale had a sense of ecology. He thought the psychological factors that shaped stories as a community passed them on could be useful for understanding universal aspects of culture. Will suggested that psychology informed anthropology, and it seemed as if he considered archetypes here. Will wrote of "points of reference" when describing common beliefs, traditions or popular aspects of stories found in Navaho or other cultures (p. 171). He used the term "canalization" to describe how people integrate stories or myths into their cultures. According to Will Morgan, they "mat[e]" personal beliefs with their myths to make them stronger – and more talismanic. He described characters such as magic snakes and shape-shifters to illustrate his point. This fit with Jungian archetypes, which certainly considered culture, as well as Murray's interest, especially in the 1950s and later. As early as the *Explorations* project, Murray tried to categorize some of his subjects according to the mythical figure they most resembled. Had someone other than Christiana's husband done this work, it would have meaning to the few who study folklore or Native American oral traditions. In the context of the Murray-Morgan dyad, the article stands out. Was this Will's attempt to be close to Christiana and Murray? Did he try to deep dive into culture and make a contribution to personality

psychology to be “one of them ?” What was Christiana thinking, a decade after Will's death, paying a journal to publish him ?

Despite a private life that might have smothered a more domestic man, Murray prospered. At the HPC, he and his colleagues produced their major study, *Explorations in Personality*. Robert Holt told me that Murray did most of the writing, and Robinson (1992) suggested the same. World War II (1939-1945) marked a particularly interesting time in Murray's life. He turned 48 in 1941, the year the United States joined the Allies. World politics meant nearly as much to him as literature, but due to his age, he found it difficult to join the military. In 1943, he was given a special commission in the OSS, or Office of Strategic Services, where he worked in psychological operations and wore the uniform of a captain (Robinson, 1992). This early spy network would become the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947, and during the war, it participated in a variety of activities, including the organization of partisans, generating propaganda, countering disinformation and writing reports on the Axis (Weiner, 2008).

In 2009, Holt shared stories about psychology and the government in that distant time. Holt became a graduate student at Harvard in the fall of 1939, and already Murray had the reputation for being “off on some mysterious business elsewhere.” Murray returned to the university the following year, and soon became Holt's dissertation chairman. When Holt earned his Ph.D. in 1944, Murray tried to recruit him for the OSS. Actually, Holt did not share any specific stories, since Murray approached him by saying, “It's very important government war work. Unfortunately, I can't tell you what we do or anything about it until you're here, but it'll make use of the skills that you learned at the

Clinic, and we'd love to have you" (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009).

Holt alluded to Murray's main OSS role, vetting candidates for the espionage program. Murray devised an intensive battery of personality and intelligence tests to determine who would likely finish the training and work effectively in risky environments. Holt told me that he turned Murray down because he had just married and did not want to commute to OSS headquarters in Virginia. Had Holt joined the Virginia cell, he might have co-authored Murray's next important work, *The Assessment of Men*, based on the OSS testing program.

Robinson (1992) theorized that World War II marked the zenith of Murray's career. Aside from his 1953 collaborative effort with Kluckhohn, and chapters of books edited by others, Murray's accomplishments waned. In 1947, 20 years after he first shook Prince's hand, Harvard gave him long-awaited tenure. He turned 54 that year (Allport, 1967; Murray, 1967; Online Archival Search Information System, 2001).

Murray essentially faced writer's block and dealt with personal grief from middle age onward. He told Robinson (1992) about a number of books that he began but failed to finish. Holt told me that those incomplete manuscripts certainly bothered him. Unfortunately, each project became broader and more unwieldy, so each instance of failure – possibly ten – hurt Murray more. His private life, always unusual but under his control, often seemed on the verge of exploding after he reached his fifties.

Will Morgan died in 1934, when he was in his 30s. Will had a number of health problems, including the tuberculosis that took his life. Robinson portrayed Murray as feeling sharp guilt over the death, while Morgan became more demanding of her lover.

Claire Douglas (1993), Morgan's biographer, described the impact of Will's death on her as the loss of someone loveable, though not particularly engaging. Douglas does not describe Murray's reaction.

The widowed Morgan had her own serious health issues. She had serious high blood pressure that required two surgeries in 1943, prior to Murray's military service. Doctors regarded the procedure – cutting certain spinal nerves – as a last resort measure, but used it in the 1940s. She recovered with Murray's attention, but she began a two-decade decline (Robinson, 1992). Morgan and Murray were children of the Jazz Age, and, as F. Scott Fitzgerald (1920/1996) wrote in *This Side of Paradise*, "... there would be more drunkenness than wine in the softness of her eyes..." (p. 144). The couple smoked and drank, but Morgan's drinking accelerated. Just as everyone in Murray's circle knew about his double life, all could see Morgan deteriorate over the 40 years they had spent together. Morgan wanted Murray to spend less time at the HPC and his Melville critiques, and to write their story. Holt joked when he mentioned the endeavor, saying that, "like all the others [unfinished books], it died of boredom" (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009).

In the 1960s, Murray's life changed dramatically. He lost the two women closest to him. Jo had remained a quiet and likely comforting presence for Murray until she died in the winter of 1962. The coronary attack that killed her shocked everyone. Much to Christiana's surprise, her lover did not marry her. They carried on much as before, with Murray getting on with his life and Morgan deteriorating.

Christiana Morgan became mentally and physically sick for the next five years, until she died in the waters of the Virgin Islands in 1967. The couple always preferred

Caribbean holiday destinations, and Morgan usually returned briefly sober and lively. Many have speculated about Morgan's drowning death – did she actually have a heart attack, pass out or intentionally kill herself? Naturally, Holt heard the possibilities, and told me, "Oh, I have no idea."

Murray experienced months of guilt – and then married his second wife in 1969. Murray knew educational psychologist Caroline Chandler Fish through family connections. Known as Nina, she raised a large family and practiced in the Boston area. She happened to be divorced (Robinson, 1992). Prior to her death, Morgan began telling people that Murray had found a new love interest. Holt told me that he thought Nina and Murray had already met and become involved before Morgan died. Holt knew both women, and particularly liked Nina, and said of her, "She's a wonderful woman, and I think ... a much better companion for him than Christiana" (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009). Despite being nearly 30 years Murray's junior, the marriage worked, and Nina saw him through his later years. Ten years before his death, Murray's health declined, which included at least one major stroke. He died on June 23, 1988, at the age of 95.

I asked Holt if he thought Murray had any regrets, and he responded that Murray left so many incomplete manuscripts. Murray rarely showed any of his writing in draft form, but Holt managed to see part of a book. He and Silvan Tomkins, another psychologist in Murray's circle, stumbled onto part of the legendary Melville biography in a cabinet in the HPC. He recalled, "And I remember very vividly reading the first page or two, which was reminiscent of what William James had written about the 'blooming, buzzing confusion' of the infant's world that Murray had recreated for the

infant Melville, but I never got an opportunity to read any more of it, ..." (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August, 19, 2009).

Holt also revealed that Josephine, Murray's daughter, left him disappointed. When pressed about the nature of his disappointment in someone so professionally trained, and, I presumed, successful in her day, he reminded me that Murray "was an awful hard act to follow." Holt believed that Murray expected her to write and create, because that meant much in his life.

Murray and Morgan family members survive Henry and Christiana. Murray's widow, Dr. Nina Murray, and daughter, Dr. Josephine Murray, live in the Northeast. They are both elderly women. Morgan's son, Councilman, died in 1990, and he had several children (Anonymous, 1990).

Chapter III

The Origins of Personology

Murray's true exposure to formal psychology occurred while on a trip in Europe in 1925. Through Christiana Morgan, he met the legendary Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) in Switzerland, and had sessions with him over a brief length of time (Anderson, 1999). Why he sought psychoanalysis remains uncertain, but he never described their time together as therapy. He had received psychiatric help before, because of stuttering (Murray, 1967). Jung encouraged Murray in two ways: to pursue psychology and to launch an affair with Christiana Morgan (Anderson, 1999). While both Morgan and Murray remained married to their spouses, their relationship lasted for about 40 years. Details of their affair have been covered by Robinson (1992), Douglas (1993) and in a tabloid style by Paul (2004). Obviously, private and professional lives melded, but the important considerations are Christiana Morgan's contribution to personology, and something about her – and only her – inspired Henry Murray to further explore the human mind.

Among the many people Murray encountered in his long life, no one but Morgan drew his immediate and intense interest as powerfully. Robinson (1992) noted that Murray and Will Morgan, Christiana's husband, had been acquaintances, but nearly 18 months prior to that European vacation, they attended an opera and later went for a nightcap. As Will and Jo casually chatted or greeted those they knew in the audience, their spouses shared interests in art, literature and the growing popular attention to the psyche. Murray had recently read Jung's *Psychological Types*, and it impressed him because this offered an approach that considered the personality as a broad complex

entity, rather than a collection of traits (Robinson, 1992). Additionally, Jung offered a form of analysis that differed from Freud's, in that it replaced defenses and psychopathology with a collective human experience (Fordham, 1966).

In a sense, one has difficulty separating the influences of Jung and Morgan in Murray's thinking. All three shared similar worldviews, but clearly, Jung was a theorist and Morgan was not. She brought Jung and her lover together, and that was a significant act in itself. At the time of his sessions with Jung, Murray had not fully transitioned from physician-researcher to psychologist. To the sophisticated European, then middle-aged and at the height of his career, this enthusiastic American who was in his thirties probably seemed brash or immature. Likely because of Morgan, Jung adopted the role of professor in sharing Murray's ideas about psychology.

In the early and mid 1920s, Murray went through the first and most intensive period of introspection in his life. His marriage and career failed to completely satisfy him, and life took on an existential concern. In "The Case of Murr," Murray (1967) never discussed his private life, but framed his discontent in terms of feeling intellectually dissatisfied. Perhaps that was partially the case, as his student and colleague, Robert R. Holt, said that he always plunged into a variety of projects, and started numerous books without completing them (personal communication, August 19, 2009). Given his mercurial disposition, it is understandable that Murray may have wanted to move on to another endeavor after completing his medical degree, a Ph.D., and conducting several research projects. Robinson (1992) chronicled the state of Murray's marriage to Jo, concluding that a basic bond existed, but he required excitement from other women.

The Murr piece alone suggested that its author had speculated on questions about Truth and the reasons for certain human behaviors. History attempted to explain the movements of nations, but the fascinating private world of the individual remained elusive. Like Freud and most of the pioneers of psychoanalysis, Murray devoted considerable time to his own questions and thoughts. He wondered how someone who found it so difficult to engage formal education could pursue self-edification. He speculated about being his father's son, his role in society and how best to make himself useful.

Prior to his contact with Jung, Murray believed that some authors of literature discovered the unconscious depths of human emotions. Melville in particular reached this special level of understanding. Murray reached this conclusion after reading *Moby-Dick* on a cruise to Europe. At first, it might appear that creative writing, even at its deepest, might be far from psychoanalysis. Authors may have a variety of reasons for producing great fiction. Any high school literature student knows that any author who picked up the quill with the express purpose of generating a piece of literature surely failed. The skill and acquired talents and knowledge are all conscious efforts, but much of what makes great literature great comes from something beyond control. Murray (1967) said that was the unconscious at work, and he credited Melville as "a very potent factor" in his development. *Moby-Dick* impressed him for several reasons, including the writing itself, which he compared to classical music, but the author also used his creative abilities to make an allegory out of a story about a whaling crew.

Murray could see that Melville used his considerable imagination and talent for self-exploration to develop a host of characters who seemed sufficiently fleshed-out to be

believable. Captain Ahab, the driven protagonist who allowed his obsession for killing the white whale to destroy nearly everyone, becomes a demonic figure. That change, from injured man to ferociously determined leader to an embodiment of Satan walking the deck of the *Pequod*, enthralled Murray. In one of his few pieces of literary criticism, titled "*In Nomine Diaboli*," Murray (1951/1952) wrote that Melville enlisted the imagery of myth or legend, but he also understood biology and what was philosophically rational. Murray (1967) saw that Melville used what Jung described as archetypes – primitive images or characters that symbolize basic psychological elements. Literature has always depended on clever or deep symbolism, but what astounded Murray was that the images "had been recognized as projections, checked, and modified" (p. 84). Melville "might redeem us from the virtue of an incredible subjective belief, on the one side, and from the virtue of a deadly objective rationality, on the other" (p. 84). Perhaps because he read *Moby-Dick* as an adult, the novel moved him beyond any classic work in psychology. Melville explored mentality without the benefit of knowing psychology, and Murray realized that even with the clinician's training, he or she approached a real person in a parallel way to what the novelist did with imaginary characters.

Melville predated psychoanalysis, and Murray (1951/1952) thanked both Freud and Jung for providing the basics to understanding depth psychology, and initiating the language one would need to best interpret Melville. Melville had all the more iconic impact on Murray because the American author died long before the psychoanalytic movement took hold in America. Northwestern University psychologist James William Anderson (1999) interviewed Murray toward the end of his life. Murray told him that art

and literature made him aware that he had emotions, and the darkness within the Melville's Yankee psyche affected him deeply.

Melville always remained a sacred cow for Murray (Erik H. Erikson, 1957), and he spent years working on a biography of the author. According to Robinson (1992), that manuscript was started and resurrected many times, but Murray never came close to finishing it. Instead, Murray published only four pieces of literary criticism on Melville. Edwin S. Shneidman, Murray's associate and editor, excused Murray in his commentary for *Endeavors in Psychology* (1981). Simply put, Murray disliked most of what he wrote about the great novelist. In a touching tribute to his friend, Shneidman wrote, "There was in him, figuratively speaking, (he never wore any personal jewelry), a keen disdain for lesser gems than flawless diamonds." (p. 4)

Melville's characters had lives, but their emotional torments gave them a mythical aspect. The idea of the myth played a major role in Jung's thinking, and Murray would consider that in his personology. Jung turned to the myth and archetype in his youth, when he studied world religions and anthropology. He would eventually receive a medical education, but myths held a special appeal to him. Just as nearly all people could be vulnerable to specific germs, and the infected may well show their illness in typical ways, people from all lands, from the "primitive," to borrow the vernacular of Jung's day, to the most advanced, shared certain emotions and built remarkably similar legends to communicate them for posterity. The myth was the best representation of what Jung called the "collective unconscious" (Fordham, 1966, p. 26). He believed that myths originated from a deep area of the psyche, making them the result of an unconscious process. The fact that most of the stories struck people emotionally suggested the work

of the unconscious. Scholars such as Thomas Bulfinch or unknown folklorists often wrote them up in stylized, highly conscious ways, but the content had the hallmarks of the psyche.

Jung said that people see and interact with nature, and they have a multitude of experiences. When some of what they see and experience impresses or confuses them, they may devise a myth to color the event and provide the vehicle for sharing it with others. A common example from the literature would be the movements of the sun. Sunrise has a godly aspect, while the drama of sunset has inspired many legends of dragons or other monsters swallowing the sun at night. Jung thought that the story gave people a connection to the natural world, even if the story had no basis in truth. Myths cross cultures frequently, and the strongest ones are passed through generations and modern people know them. The archetypes that illustrate myths have appeared in literature, but Jung reminded his followers that comparable imagery may visit the dreamers, or be the deliriums of a fevered patient, or manifest itself in the hallucinations of a psychotic.

The myth traveled through time, place and varied human conditions. In myth, the normal neurotic shares something intimate with the mentally ill. As a physician, Jung specialized in psychiatry, and many of his early hospitalized patients would have been diagnosed as schizophrenic today. One patient in particular showed Jung how psychoanalysis could benefit by recognizing the significance of myth. In sessions with Jung, this patient described scenes that reminded Jung of Greek mythology. Jung found an account of a Classical Greek relic, and that helped him understand what his patient told him.

As Murray developed his personology, he sought a system that put modern man in the greater cultural or historical context. Murray had a medical background and respected Darwin too much to view contemporary people as psychologically estranged from their ancestors. The Jungian concept of archetypes provided the connections Murray sought. Jung's archetypes would be included in Murray's system. Murray viewed people as having deep drives that were influenced by emotion-laden imagery, because "[archetypes] move and speak, they perceive and have purposes – they fascinate us and drive us to action which is entirely against our conscious intention" (Fordham, 1966, p. 27).

Murray applied Jungian archetypes to his elaborate 1955 case study, "American Icarus." He looked at the struggles of one of his research subjects from *Explorations* in a long piece, and found both literary and Jungian ideas to be relevant. Murray referred to him as "Grove," and he apparently came from a Midwestern, middle-class background. His TAT stories impressed Murray with their vividness, with one story particularly shocking. Initially, Murray's team used a TAT plate showing the mythical winged horse Pegasus in flight. Grove responded to that card by talking about his desire to fly on Pegasus, urinating on the women below. He reported limited sexual knowledge or experience, and, not surprising, the rest of his TAT and other personality tests revealed repressed psychological drives. His assessments and interview also suggested a determination to be economically successful and overshadow his domineering father, which caused him further pain (Murray, 1955/1981).

While this young man's figurative struggle to soar over his earthly bounds reminded Murray of the Icarus story, he also seemed to embody an obscure Melville

character. Murray compared him to Pierre, the protagonist of Melville's 1852 eponymously-named novel. Both Grope and the incestuous and emotionally crushed Pierre lashed out at their families, causing anguish. Despite having a mental landscape that could have made a Gothic author wince, the student Grope still melded work and achievement with a form of virtue, and Murray accepted this (Murray, 1949/1962/1981, 1955/1981).

Northwestern University psychologist Anderson (1999) interviewed Murray in his later years, and he discussed the impact of all forms of art on his life and career. When biology and medicine failed to answer his questions, Murray looked to the efforts of the creatively gifted for fulfilment. He told Anderson about his frequent visits to major museums, and that he spent many evenings at the opera or theatre. He came from a cultured family, so museums were part of his childhood, but he did not appreciate them until much later. Murray claimed that the art scene made him more aware that he had emotions. He had become a modernist.

What literature brought to Murray personally was the very essence of what he tried to do for psychology. It seemed that only one other person understood this noble task.

Christiana Morgan.

Christiana Morgan served an unusual role in the development of personology. Although it sounds trite, she became Murray's muse, giving him ideas, disputing, encouraging or refining his own, and being a partner to an important figure. Historians refer to women of the early part of the 20th century who broke the traditional social roles "emancipated women." Deirdre Bair (2003), Jung's biographer, described her in similar

terms. She came from a distinguished Boston family, and she was awed by her father, a well-respected Harvard professor. Had she been born in contemporary times rather than 1897, she would have likely had and benefitted from an extensive education (Bair, 2003; Douglas, 1993).

The women of Morgan's day rarely had professional degrees or graduate education. Society required that an upper-class woman know enough to avoid being viewed as ignorant, and anything beyond would have been considered unusual and counter to being an ideal wife. By her granddaughter's account, Morgan was anything but usual and barely a wife and mother. Both her biographer, Claire Douglas (1993), and her granddaughter, Dr. Hallee Morgan (personal communication, September 11, 2010), described her as deeply intellectual and passionate about art and psychology. Both agreed that she was harmed by her complicated relationship with Murray.

Her role as the co-developer of the TAT is well established, and as an artist, she took the initiative in drawing many of the plates. Most significantly, Morgan's name appears first in the 1935 article that introduced the assessment, in the *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry* (Morgan & Murray, 1935). Just as Murray hoped that his contributions would go beyond giving a projective test to the world, Morgan wanted something more as well. Murray brought her to the HPC, where she joined the team of researchers.

Not unexpectedly, their affair complicated their work. Robinson (1992) and Douglas (1993) agreed that this affair, an open secret at Harvard, symbolized something other than a typical relationship for the couple, and Murray seemed always on the verge of making it completely public. In his interviews with Forrest Robinson, he suggested

that the world could be changed when a true Jungian dyad came into being. The perfect *amina* (feminine spirit) could turn a willing but ordinary man into a hero from Ancient Greece. Murray said that he and Morgan planned to write about their affair as a Jungian epic, a bible for modern romance and a way of life. At this point, Robinson and Douglas diverge. Robinson claimed that Morgan demanded that he work on this story, an unpublished manuscript called *What Joy!* She became angry and frustrated when he became too involved with Harvard matters or general personality research. Douglas portrays a very different Morgan, shepherding Murray's work and serving as an untitled chief administrator of the HPC. She described Morgan as one of the great founding mothers of psychology, and sympathized with her. Morgan could never assume the role of a professional or professor. Murray stifled her, and she died in his shadow. Douglas insisted that she spent her life "advancing Murray's career" (p. 191). At the beginning of *Translate this Darkness*, her study of Morgan, Douglas wrote, "Morgan's ambivalence toward her own gifts makes it extremely difficult to assess her written work, because beyond the few articles or books that bear her name, most of her contributions to psychology rest unsigned and unattributable, jumbled among Henry Murray's unsorted papers in three libraries. Recovering Morgan's work challenges a biographer, because Morgan gave her ideas so freely to others" (p. 15).

Some of Morgan's role is known. Holt (personal communication, August 19, 2009) remembered her clearly. Like nearly everyone who recalled Christiana Morgan, he brought out her good looks, style and intelligence. He told me that she was part of the research team, but Murray directed all projects and certainly gave the general theme to the HPC, which included studying the origins of personality, taking a comprehensive

approach to psychology, and respecting Jungian principles. Perhaps only the last point can be traced.

In 1923, Morgan was in the middle of an affair with another Murray. Mike Murray, Henry's brother and a tragic figure who had many parallels with Will Morgan, had fallen in love with Christiana. But Christiana seemed to want powerful figures, not men who felt lost in their private lives and careers. Far from lost, Henry Murray grabbed anything novel with both hands. When he could find new experiences, he exulted in life. Christiana and Henry had actually met years earlier, but in the fall of 1923, she and her husband encountered the Murrays at a night at the opera in Manhattan. A month later, Morgan invited the Murrays to a dinner party. She recommended the writings of Jung to Murray. At the time, Americans had little familiarity with Freud's disciple. Murray almost immediately read *Psychology of the Unconscious*. Morgan and Murray remained close from that time through the rest of her life.

One should credit Morgan for introducing Jung to Murray, both through his works and in a formal introduction in 1925. Murray had recently read *Psychological Types*, which was just published in America in 1923. That book fascinated Morgan and Murray, and decades later, it still guided their research. Douglas (1993) reported that Morgan actively tried to create an informal "test" to accompany that book. It is obvious that *Psychological Types* informed *Explorations in Personality* (1938), in that Murray wanted to find the life themes (or *themas*, in the HPC lexicon), to account for personality differences. Both Murray and Morgan believed that certain emotionally-driven patterns for dealing with internal drives and external "press" caused people to act in certain ways (Murray, n.d., "Chapter 1;" Untitled notes on "Formulative projections;" "Projection").

In *Psychological Types*, Jung (1976) offered a relatively simple system; he generally divided people into introverts and extraverts. The former basically existed with their libido flowing inward. The external world likely made them uncomfortable. The introvert typically had difficulty reaching out to others. With his interest in anthropology, Jung associated this sense of being apart from the world with the Asian psyche. The other main type was the extravert, who lives to connect with other objects. In the extravert, the libido circulates like blood, touching the external world and rushing enriched back to the person. Jung proposed that the Western psyche could be generally described as extraverted (Fordham, 1966). Murray, who trained in history and, like Jung, wanted psychology applicable to nations as well as individuals, heartily agreed.

Jung (1976) overlaid a psychological compass over the basic introverted and extraverted types. He used thinking, feeling, sensation and intuition for subtypes, and each could be applied to introverts and extraverts (Fordham, 1966). Murray likely envisioned himself an extraverted thinking type, who embraced the world – warmly until he became bored – and reveled in intellectual stimulation. Although many, including Holt (personal communication, August 19, 2009) and Hallee Morgan (personal communication, September 11, 2010) described Christiana's intellectual prowess, Douglas (1993) and Bair (2003) insisted that she was introverted and sensual. Hallee Morgan knew her grandmother well, and in a family that had become fractured and distant, she stayed close to Christiana. Dr. Morgan told me that she was her grandmother's "favorite" and as a young married woman, she and her spouse lived next door to Murray and Nina. Hallee Morgan remembers her grandmother as a sensual

individual, a woman given to interpretive dancing in her later years, and one who appreciated wearing saris or exotic clothes.

Jung had his own background with Morgan. In 1926, she probably approached him for formal analysis. Bair (2003) believed that Morgan took this opportunity as an intellectual exercise. With the doors to the universities virtually closed to her, anything that involved mental work with a distinguished scholar held appeal. It became apparent that she was only interested in her personal growth and self-fulfillment. In her sessions she never mentioned her family or any relationship other than with Henry Murray. In an incredible show of self-disclosure, Jung freely talked about his wife and mistress, and compared his situation to Morgan and Murray's. He offered his own example as the only therapeutic device. Morgan might have been forgotten as one of many patients, except that Jung found her useful.

On one of her excursions to Switzerland, she stayed at a guesthouse where Robert Edmond Jones spent the season. Jones, a neurotic and depressed New York theater set designer, advocated "trancing" as a means of relaxation, being creative or attempting self-discovery. He served as an informal therapist to any visitor who was interested, and Will and Christiana Morgan became eager to try the technique (Bair, 2003, p. 390). Will, a traumatized World War I veteran who suffered from a number of health and emotional problems, was in therapy but sought unconventional relief, and was likely influenced by his wife. Christiana matched her innate skill at trancing with a keen ability to chronicle, draw and paint what she saw in her mind. She pleased Jones and Jung became highly intrigued when he discovered her unusual talent. Christiana had been compiling a

collection of fantasy materials for four years, when Jung decided to present them to the psychoanalytic community as the Vision Seminars (1930-1934) (Douglas, 1993).

Deirdre Bair (2003) summed up Jung's treatment of Morgan nicely. She wrote, "[Jung's] stated intention, to which he adhered throughout, was to show how Morgan's drawings contained symbolic and archetypal material that reflected the ways in which the collective unconscious revealed itself to one particular patient. As his lectures developed, Jung seems to have abandoned the woman who created them and substituted his own theoretical abstractions in her place" (p. 391).

In my opinion, Morgan's drawings had the flavors of Hieronymous Bosch when she was florid, to the quiet mystery of Rousseau when she felt subdued. She produced shape-shifting beasts, plants with bizarre root systems and sexual unions with powerful figures or odd creatures. She favored snakes and masks that might have come from a Pacific or African culture. Morgan's fantasies could also return to Western, Judeo-Christian themes. A dragon, perhaps St. George's nemesis or a denizen of Wagner's world, once appeared to her. In another vision, Morgan imagined herself crucified and supporting her husband and lover, in front of an old man that she thought might be Jung (Douglas, 1993).

The specifics of the arrangement between Morgan and Jung remain unclear, but Morgan expected Jung to safeguard her privacy. When she felt that he failed to do that, a rift developed. Professional analysts and the lay community attended Jung's lectures, and since Morgan enjoyed prominence among Jung's followers, her privacy dissolved. Her open marriage and affair with Murray became the stuff of audience questions and post-lecture reception chatter (Bair, 2003).

The controversy over the Vision Seminars raises questions about Jung's character and respect for his patients. It also illustrates the tragedy of a woman who had a talent and a desire to make a lasting contribution to psychology. At a time when psychoanalysis allowed lay practitioners, Morgan tried to do more, but her efforts ultimately humiliated her. Her desire to use her personal emotions and fantasies, matched by a belief that they could benefit others, suggests the depths of her introversion.

It becomes easy to think of "introvert" in the popular sense of the word when considering Christiana Morgan, as a shy, retiring type. True, Jung suggested that introverts may not interact smoothly with others, but the guiding principle behind the category involves being committed to one's internal world. To state the case bluntly, Christiana Morgan wished for Murray to base personology on her emotions, thoughts and artistic visions.

Morgan's introversion did not detract from her social skills, which everyone agreed were sophisticated. The men who knew her in her youth and early middle age often responded to her physical attractiveness, and if they caught her attention, her obvious seductiveness. As with many, Morgan's excessive alcohol use led to more extreme behavior, which could range from flirtatiousness to being argumentative. When at her best, Murray wanted her to be the feminine face of the HPC. In turn, Morgan wanted Murray to devote himself to her, cherish her and never cut the thread of personology that she regarded as the gold strand in the fabric; together, they would bring Jung's work to life, evangelizing students or even the world, carrying on their research and fighting psychology's mainstream.

Obviously, the story of personology could not be told without including the Murray-Morgan relationship. While Murray seemed to find inspiration, frustration and challenge in Christiana Morgan, it took place within the context of a highly destructive love affair. The both seemed to enter into a sexualized existence as a way of defining themselves apart from conventional society (Douglas, 1993; Robinson, 1992), and yet they also took Jung for a role model (Bair, 2003). Jung, married and quite open about having a long-term mistress, encouraged Murray and Morgan to explore the reaches of their passion. It would be pointless to judge the behavior of the psychoanalytic community of the 1920s using modern ethical standards, but it suffices to say that Morgan and Murray impacted each other in both positive and negative ways. Morgan became an anima figure to a man who appreciated – no, craved – that aspect of her, while her own marital relationship was conventionally fine but did not stimulate her. In turn, Murray felt like a Greek god when they were together. To psychology's benefit, Morgan wanted Murray to conduct a certain type of research that added the psychoanalytic elements to personology. Of course, she had one proviso that continues to cloud her influence; she insisted that his research be based on a study of her and their affair. Murray started such a project, but never came close to finishing it or making it for public consumption. It is likely that had Morgan been out of his life, his wife could never have generated the physical, emotional and intellectual passion that Morgan gave him so generously. It is also likely that personology would have been a method of investigating the personality based on detailed case histories and categorizing traits. The elaborate drives and themas would have either been less important, or completely forgotten.

Personology. Innovation in psychological assessment or theory-building does not occur in a vacuum. Scholars build on each other. In *Explorations*, Murray said, “Personology, then, is the science of men, taken as gross units, and by definition it encompasses ‘psychoanalysis’ (Freud), ‘analytical psychology’ (Jung), ‘individual psychology’ (Adler), and other terms which stand for methods of inquiry or doctrines rather than realms of knowledge” (Murray, 1938, p. 4).

In this research design, Murray hoped to address life issues. Many psychologists in the 1920s and ‘30s concentrated on Pavlovian animal research or measured perceptions, or the emergent areas of applied psychology and behaviorism. When Murray began studying his Harvard subjects, he felt the need to obtain their life story data, and assumed that key areas would be revealed. He regarded personologists as “centralists,” seeking the most fundamental structures of personality. Drawing on his chicken egg research, he maintained that in returning to the origins of psychological development, the investigator finds the truth (Murray, n.d., “Chapter 1;” also see Murray, 1938, p. 6).

Murray included certain aspects of Kurt Lewin’s theory of needs and Gordon Allport’s trait psychology in personology. Gordon Allport (1897-1967) certainly influenced Murray, by not only conceptualizing traits, but by pioneering the study of personality. A Harvard student as well, Allport studied in the Department of Social Ethics, which coexisted with the faculty from philosophy and psychology – and offered a similar curriculum. Allport taught at Harvard and elsewhere, where, like Murray, he began an eclectic mix of psychoanalysis, social psychology and other new theories. Allport is credited for teaching the first seminar on personality ever offered in the US.

Like Murray, Allport had a strong grounding in science. Allport considered the work of John Watson (1878-1958), and shared his belief that the environment helped guide human actions. Allport took this one step further by asserting that it also guided the personality. Borrowing from Watson, Allport accepted that when a response worked in a setting, it became rehearsed and likely even more effective. This could become a trait (Nicholson, 2003; Reber, 1995).

Perhaps most importantly, Allport clarified the differences between traits, character and personality, with a trait as the “basic material” or the “units” of a personality. Allport’s predecessors generally avoided the personality, but when they commented on it, they debated if it was flexible or set (what today might be described as “hard-wired”) (Nicholson, 2003, pp. 152-153). Interestingly enough, both Allport and Murray wanted to renounce behaviorism, but incorporated some of its aspects into their theories.

What made Murray’s work unique was his use of three constructs: needs, press and themas (Murray, n.d., “Complexes”). In contrast to the simple stimulus-response activities that characterize the way nerves function, this need-press dyad incorporated the complexities of biology and psychology. They result in behavior. The themas become revealed patterns of need-press combinations (Murray, n.d., “Odd Notes;” also see Murray, 1938).

Murray defined *need* as “a hypothetical process the occurrence of which is imagined in order to account for certain objective and subjective facts” (Murray, 1938, p. 54). Needs are very much natural processes, and subject to context. Murray (1938) went on to say, “... a need is the immediate outcome of certain internal and external

occurrences” (p. 60). He considered needs physiologically, as glands create hormones that make organs act in set ways. Endocrinal activity can change emotional tides. Murray conceptualized needs as complicated mental structures with biological and psychodynamic aspects (Murray, n.d., “Projection”). When considering the physical, Murray, like many scientists before him, included a mechanistic model for human functioning. Physicians in the 18th and 19th centuries, influenced by the Industrial Revolution, promoted the idea of “man as a machine.” Freud adjusted this model, writing of drives as exerting psychic pressure, not unlike steam in a motor.

Murray saw needs as functioning similarly to Freudian drives, particularly those relating to more central processes. Murray acknowledged a traditional stimulus-response dynamic, but he regarded the response as a certain “effect,” while the stimulus was actually a *press* (Murray, 1938). He also understood the neuroscience of the time, likening various brain activities to needs. Basic drives, such as craving food, sex and toilet activities, fell into the category of “vicerogenic” needs (p. 74). “Psychogenic” needs developed from the vicerogenic, taking on higher functions of achievement and the drive to superiority (p. 74). As needs become more sophisticated, they lose their mechanistic qualities; this was Murray’s addendum to Darwin. Needs serving adaptive functions could not be purely mechanistic. Man responded to his environment with ongoing changes (Murray, n.d., “Personology Theory,” “Rules”).

Need and Press in the Broadest Sense. In 1953, Henry Murray collaborated with his close friend, Harvard anthropology professor Clyde Kluckhohn (1905-1960), on a book dealing with psychology and culture. Fifteen years after *Explorations in Personality*, Murray seemed to have difficulty conceptualizing personality. They

concluded that personality has complex, multiple factors, but this was merely a more vague way to express need-press. They added a mix of psychoanalytic emphasis on easing psychic tension, along with the importance of meeting goals, a professional nod to Erikson and Piaget. Murray's psychological research was naturally based on projective testing, including his TAT. Murray and Kluckhohn introduced a novel factor, the need for pleasure. Fully accepting his colleague's background and with his own interest in non-Western societies, Murray believed that Western culture spoiled enjoyment, and he sought ideas from Asia. The book offered two ways to study personality: "dynamic analysis" and "formal analysis." Dynamic analysis focuses on the subject's behavior in specific situations, while formal analysis takes a more comprehensive approach (Kluckhohn & Murray, 1953; & Murray & Kluckhohn, 1953; University of Iowa Libraries, 1999).

Perhaps Murray's growing interest in anthropology guided the selection of one of the most unique plates to be selected for the final version of the TAT (Murray & Staff, 1943). Murray and his HPC colleagues meant to choose ambiguous scenes for the TAT cards, but they also wanted respondents to be able to relate to the figures and situations (Murray, n.d., "A Few Comments," "TAT Rules"). Some pictures illustrated earlier times, but they all had a distinctly Western look, save one. R. Nevitt Sanford, a Californian, chose an interesting scene for Card 13G that introduced a distinctly Eastern sensibility to the most American projective test. The uninitiated might think the drawing shows a little girl, her head turned away and down from her observer, but this scene has exotic origins. In the 1920s and '30s, camera aficionados and art collectors adored the famous California-based photographer, Hisao E. Kimura. The drawing was adapted from

his work, entitled *To Roof Garden*, which he published in 1934. He actually showed his wife, Chieko, purposely making her appear so young (Morgan, 1999). Another card, obviously Japanese, showed a large spider crab and a noh mask, with little else, but this was never shortlisted for a permanent set (Murray, n.d., "Thematic Apperception Test Pictures")

Thirty years after the publication of *Explorations in Personality*, Murray contributed an article to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. He acknowledged that *Explorations* gave his ideas recognition, and he was pleased with personology's implication for issues ranging from creativity and culture to mental illness. In this brief study, he returned to the adaptability of needs, serving development, and, when necessary, helping people through their reactive or tension-making qualities (Murray, 1968/1981; also see Murray, n.d., "Personology: Human Nature").

Throughout much of his writing, Murray spent less attention on press. One should bear in mind that all press originated in the environment. He described the various types of press in *Explorations* (Murray, 1938; also see Murray, n.d., "Chapter 1"). His surviving notes show that it was still part of personology (Murray, n.d., "Personology: Human Nature," "Personology Theory"). He gave press little space in the *Encyclopedia*, but in his personological system, internal actions received emphasis. Press took on significance with TAT data (Murray & Staff, 1943).

While at times personology seemed vague, it did undergo frequent revision through professional publications. Murray's changes could be viewed as an attempt to broaden personology, as when he applied it to different aspects of mental life (Murray & Kluckhohn, 1953). He also made continuous efforts to find connections between

personology and psychoanalysis. He incorporated a “hierarchical constitution” as a means of keeping basic Freudian structures in personology (Murray, n.d., “Complexes, A Discussion,” “Personology: Human Nature”). He also reminded his readers that fantasies served as the currency of emotions, and that an adult may carry the childish within (Murray, 1968/1981). This seems Freudian, and yet Murray identified more with the findings of his colleague, Gordon Allport. Needs were never meant to be the equivalent of traits, but both scholars broke a psychological construct down to elements. This fit with Murray’s youthful desire to find beginnings, and his earlier career in embryology (Murray, 1938).

Murray and his team would never be interested in people as nameless and numbered; they considered the whole person, and whenever possible, subjects would be studied longitudinally. As the chief interpreter of the data, Murray tried to find the trend, or themas, in a person’s life. Themmas would show if and when that subject’s needs were being fulfilled (Murray, n.d., “Claustral Aggression Fantasies”). Surprisingly, Murray gave much weight to finding a social niche, which he deemed the hallmark of success. He also incorporated essential tenets of biology into his theory of personality. He assumed that whatever a subject repeats is likely adaptive, and becomes part of the subject’s response behavior. Murray wrote at length about infants, who need to build up their behavior repertoires. As behaviors become more complicated in both children and adults, he considered what stimulated those actions (Murray, n.d., “Complexes, A Discussion;” also see Murray, 1938).

Murray was a proponent of double aspect theory, in that he accepted the idea of man never being fully aware of all that takes place within himself physiologically and

psychologically at a given moment. The individual likely focuses on *something*, and reports that. Murray realized that a human can become aware of his mental processes, but not all at once. Murray also knew that the most effective means of stimulating a mental process could be found in the thin blue box of 32 cards. The TAT would be his main assessment.

Murray's friend and editor, Edwin Shneidman (1981), claimed that Murray brought psychology to psychoanalysis. Finding flaws in both fields, he hoped that a line of research based on personology would remedy both. Shneidman wrote in *Endeavors in Psychology*, "[Murray] is in relation to most theoretical systems (including his own) – is, from almost the beginning, an iconoclast and a civil rebel. He incorporates psychoanalytic theory, as he incorporates everything, into his own larger, more catholic, and certainly more flexible continuous theory-building" (p. 271).

For Murray, four personal factors drew him into psychology: his own psychological world, reading Melville, exposure to Carl Jung and Christiana Morgan. Murray's continuous self-evaluations and monitoring of his emotional life meant more to him than anything that could be taught. Obviously, his focus on himself suggests a one-sided psychoanalysis. The second factor would be his introduction to literature. Murray's true introduction came long after high school, when he chose *Moby-Dick* for his vacation reading. Melville's skill in creating characters with depth and psychological lives mesmerized Henry Murray. After reading *Moby-Dick*, he approached literature, and to a lesser extent, the various creative arts as part of his education in psychology. Time spent reading or wandering museum galleries would be his curriculum in psychology.

This fact has such irony, since for all of his time spent in graduate schools, he never took a degree in psychology.

By the mid-1920s, Murray had encountered practitioners of psychoanalysis, including Carl Jung. Jung became one-time therapist and lifetime friend and mentor to Murray. Jung inspired Murray, encouraging him to pursue any opportunity that arose, and served as a sounding-board for Murray's ideas and passions. Exposure to Jung more formally initiated Murray into the field. Of course, Murray may have never seriously considered Jung had it not been for the influence of Morgan. Morgan became lover, goddess and intellectual companion to him. Her vision of personology was far more intimate than his own, since she believed that their affair illustrated the theory, methodology and practice more than any formal research. Murray took from her ideas about fantasy and related them to themes, and he used Jungian terminology at her insistence. She also contributed an artistic sensibility to personology. She drew many of the TAT plates, but the idea of using visual stimulations seemed to come from her as well.

Aspects of classical psychoanalysis fascinated Murray, but he was also intrigued by newer theories regarding traits and personality. If behaviorism and empiricism were the orthodoxies at Harvard, Allport and the other pioneers showed Murray that psychology was not monolithic in its systems. Murray's goal, outside of his job description as director of the HPC, was to bring psychoanalysis and personality psychology together. While best remembered as one of the people who developed the Thematic Apperception Test, Murray's real contribution to psychology was his theory and application of personology. His personology was not revolutionary in its uniqueness,

but special because Murray – and those around him – found a way to hybridize European psychoanalysis with newer American contributions. Murray felt comfortable discarding classic Freudian structures for categories of *needs* and *press*. He also felt confident that by exploring the unconscious and bringing that secret world to light, he would take trait psychology to the ground truth of the mind. The TAT offered one of many ways to reach it.

Murray's chief work, *Explorations in Personality*, published in 1938, not only covered the large project undertaken by the HPC, but it introduced personology as an aspect of psychology and an approach to research. In his 1940 article, "What Should Psychologists Do About Psychoanalysis?," Murray did not condemn psychoanalysis, but urged its adherents to make the effort to bring their learning into mainstream psychology. He issued this call because he thought that Freudians and Jungians had something to offer the discipline at large. Four years later, he published a paper that began as a convention presentation. In "Research Planning: A Few Proposals," Murray (1944/1981), he told his audience, "It is a man's basic conception of reality which determines his mode of analysis..." (p. 354). This would seem to be a profounder way of telling scholars that the John Godfrey Saxe poem, "The Blind Men and the Elephant" really can be the basic lesson of psychology and hard science. Normally Murray disdained Freudian structures, but here he enlisted them and saying, "No doubt [psychoanalysis] is the most adequate set of theories we possess for the understanding of many critical human states and symptoms" (p. 355). This may sound as if Murray damned Freud with faint praise, but it was not meant that that way. He noted that Lewin said that Freud's writings included sufficiently cohesive constructs to launch an empirically valid, scientific study.

Chapter IV

An Eclectic Personality in the Making

In considering the biography of a psychologist, one often hopes that childhood might offer useful clues and insights into the person's future. Unlike doctors, firemen or teachers, psychologists infrequently intrude into the lives of children. Even those youngsters who have no awareness of the field may still have interests or a quality in their relationships that can later lead to a greater affinity to this type of study. Henry Alexander Murray, by his own admission, did not. Other psychologists may reminisce that as children, they had a powerful curiosity about others, or sensed something in their early thinking that identified them as different from the future physicians and bus drivers they spent time with. Again, this does not seem to fit with Murray, who always viewed himself as being at the center of activity, which does not lend itself to lonely introspection. He had unlimited curiosity about the world, but never considered himself apart from it.

The adult Murray emerged with all the interests of his youth, plus others, and for that reason, I call him eclectic. As his career developed and he refined his version of psychology that he called personology, it could be argued that he was an eclectic professionally, as well. Murray entered the field rooted in Jungian analysis, but influential associates in personality, social, and psychodynamic psychology challenged him to make personology a flexible approach to studying emotions and behavior.

Accounts of his life agree that he grew up happy and privileged, a child of America's Gilded Age. Like most families, the Murrays had conflicts, but few, if any, tragedies. Henry Murray subjected his background to scrutiny only after he became a

renowned scholar. He would still insist that he had all the common, nonacademic passions of a typical, privileged American lad. Athletics would be the main reason for attending school, and entertainment had to be adventurous. Murray would later write about exploring the psychological makeup of people as a type of adventure, little different from a Greek myth or Jules Verne novel. He also became fascinated with the truth, an abstract concept, but one that children often struggle with. He would move from history to science for this Holy Grail of understanding, but then realized that psychology would be the likeliest endeavor to fulfill that need.

Vignettes from the Gilded Age

Murray was born on May 13, 1893, in New York City, the middle child in a family that included a brother and sister. Virginia, his sister, was the oldest, and his brother, Cecil, was four years younger than Henry. His parents, Henry Alexander, Sr., and Fannie Babcock Murray, had a strained marriage, apparently over Henry, Sr.'s unstable finances. Murray, when writing about his life, did not stress that aspect of his family life, but mentioned regular trips to the country and foreign travel, suggesting a comfortable life. Like many of the wealthier residents of Manhattan, the Murrays enjoyed summering on Long Island or going to the mountains upstate or in New England. The family visited Canada, the American West and Europe's centers of culture. According to Murray, he enjoyed any and all outdoor activities, and sports became an early and continuing passion. Before considering the other episodes in a long and accomplished life, it might be worth exploring two childhood conditions that may have influenced his path. Murray stammered, and he had an eye condition called strabismus, which is popularly known as crossed-eyes. (Robinson, 1992).

Strabismus, Murray noted in his writings, impacted his eye-hand coordination, which made him pursue football and baseball with harder determination. His other sports included wrestling and rowing. Someone with a more analytic background might have considered the young Murray's physicality as a form of compensation for a disability, however minor. A surgeon operated on Murray when he was a child, an event Murray recollected as somewhat traumatic. The procedure took place in the dining room of the Murray home, which was the custom for minor, and sometimes even more extensive, surgeries. Murray reported (and later photographs clearly show) that the surgeon did not correct his eyes, but allegedly caused a new problem, a stammer. According to Murray, his speech impediment developed after that operation (Murray, 1967; Robinson, 1992).

Harry Murray's schoolwork did not provide a prelude to later accomplishments. He went to excellent schools, however. After finishing at a local private middle school, the Murrays sent young Harry to the Groton School in Massachusetts, where he studied from 1906-1911. Murray joined Groton as a Form 2 student, meaning that he entered Grade 8, instead of beginning with a new class (Robinson, 1992). Not unexpectedly, he spent more time on the athletic fields than in front of textbooks, but Groton offered something beyond mere academics. Elite schools offered more than an education; they gave families with old and new pedigrees a link to a glorious past. Further, Groton and similar institutions maintained powerful traditions, including the promotion of elitism and the value of alumni networks (Ashburn, 1934).

In the late 1800s and early 1900s, America had undergone certain profound changes, and these developments generated reactions. From 1861-1865, the nation was split by the Civil War, and there were large numbers of people in Murray's youth who

had either lived through those four years, or were the children of those who had. The North won, and in places like New York City, that victory was seen by many in moral terms. The Union survived, slavery ended, and major cities – mainly in the North – began to enjoy unprecedented economic growth. The nickname for the postwar period, the Gilded Age, reflects that. Of course, the Industrial Revolution had reached its apex, but the idea of a Union forged by war, changing the South culturally and economically, and growing rich while doing so allowed a new era for some elite Yankee families.

The men some described as “robber barons” called themselves “captains of industry,” and they would soon occupy the role of nobility in America. The captains of industry had accumulated wealth, to be sure, but they also profoundly changed American society by supporting its cultural growth. Andrew Carnegie, with his literal rags to riches story, began as an impoverished immigrant from Scotland and launched the steel industry in Pennsylvania. John D. Rockefeller, Sr. began the Standard Oil empire, while Cornelius Vanderbilt became a transportation mogul (Chernow, 1998). *Noblesse oblige* would not be for Europeans only. They became the chief financiers of cultural institutions, but their social role went far deeper. Certain trends became almost exclusively associated with the industrialists and their families, specifically a deep sense of charity and an ingrained snobbishness. The generation produced by the Gilded Age espoused the twin goals of making children, especially males, educated with a respect for science and high art, as well as being physically fit and adept at sports. In addition, the gospel of wealth combined the existing religious faith with the promotion of the capitalistic approach to business (Lears, 2009).

Of course, social forces, including the budding labor unions and the organized left, condemned the abuses of business and economic disparity, but many mainstream Americans had jobs, and if they chose, could make comfortable lives beyond the family farms. For the wealthy, it became an obligation to raise their children in a way that supported American values, especially economic ones. Compounding this economic issue was the social change caused by increased immigration, mainly from Eastern and Central Europe.

Nativists soon viewed these new arrivals as foreign in appearance, customs, language and ideas. To those who disliked immigrants, the immigrants posed a threat to American life. When immigrants found work, it could irk the locals who assumed Americans would eventually face unemployment. Ethnic neighborhoods earned reputations for shady enterprises and malignant poverty. Among books written in unintelligible languages, nativists knew that some very non-American ideas, including socialism and other radical philosophies, could well have been taking root. As the locally born passed by fruit-stands, cafes and tenement stoops, foreign-born strangers glared and returned to discussions that did not necessarily include plans for country club luncheons (Lears, 2009).

The wealthy people of Gilded Age America reacted to changing demographics by redoubling their efforts at promoting their way of life. Charitable activities served the public good, with the creation of educational foundations, museums and libraries. These could bring culture to people who could not afford it. Hospitals in poor neighborhoods could short-circuit the street-corner rants of factory socialists, and new schools for immigrant children might not bring them closer to the elites, but could further the

necessary assimilation process. Liberals in the press, academe, and even within government took advantage of the prosperity and spirit to accelerate this process. This became the Progressive Era, and it marked the final quarter of the Gilded Age (1900-1916) (Foner, 2006). This was the time when Henry Murray received his education.

Insularity

Columbia University's well-known liberal historian Eric Foner (2006) wrote a controversial but extremely popular undergraduate text for the American survey course. He made the point that the public school movement had goals beyond educating large numbers of early 19th century American children. Americans indeed revolted against England, but our early countrymen found themselves with British-style divisions of social class. Social planners realized that protecting democracy required broad popular support, and that the poor and working class had to be an integral part of it. If only the rich learned to value freedom, and their struggling neighbors – really the American majority – did not, that freedom would remain at serious risk. Foner justified the efforts to expand American education to a system incomparable to any other nation's for its inclusiveness. All children would be educated, regardless of personal wealth.

Of course, Foner only discussed the role of *public schools*. The rich had alternatives. Education should bring people together, but wealth brings differences, including a chance to remain apart. The upper class had no desire to mix with others, particularly as the general population grew, and they used all social means to keep to themselves, including private schools, clubs and even religious institutions. Murray's life reflected this trend. He was raised to be one of the elites, shared many of the expected values, and through family and education, reaped the benefits of an active social life.

While he did not use alumni connections for business purposes, Harry Murray enjoyed rich friendships and was welcomed into the leading clubs, organizations and private dinner parties in Manhattan and Boston.

Prior to the Civil War, America certainly had industry, large landholdings and venture capitalism, but not the spectacular generation of money as witnessed during the Gilded Age. Historians remember the era mainly for its splendor and colorful anecdotes, but more significantly, a sub-class emerged that had little interaction with the rest of society. They lived mainly on the Eastern Seaboard, although Chicago could rightfully boast of participating in this capitalist glory. The Gilded Age essentially stopped south of Washington, DC, unless one counts the winter homes of outstanding Manhattan or Pittsburg families. The captains of industry and their children purposefully organized their lives to enforce the separateness. They socialized mainly with each other, often intermarried or risked ostracism, and shared a common outlook. Unlike the Antebellum plantation owner who lived on his land and at least *saw* what some of his slaves did, the venture capitalist was removed from the actual operations of his business. He also was removed from the majority of Americans who could not participate in the extraordinary lifestyle.

For people like the Murrays of New York, sending their sons to Groton served both educational and social purposes. They could be confident that students would receive a strong Protestant foundation, be exposed to a classical education that was the standard of the time, and earn a likely ticket into an Ivy League university. In an article about his life, Murray recalled consistently average grades, but he did get accepted into Harvard in 1911 (Murray, 1967).

Groton divided students into “houses” and used the term “form,” the British alternative to grade level. The socialization process at Groton and similar private schools had been imported from England, and involved intense bonding at many levels. Entering students likely identified with their classes, meaning the boys who joined at the same time, but the house system cut across forms. Senior classmen would be house leaders, and they encouraged loyalty within and fierce competition with the other houses. Sports would be the most obvious outlet for cultivating this spirit, but speech festivals, debates and subject prizes all supported the drive to excel, and share victories with housemates.

Schools such as Groton or Choate (today called Choate Rosemary Hall) expected their alumni to remain lifelong associates, if not close friends. These bonds kept the children of elites within their close social boundaries, and became one of many ways of isolating themselves. Burrows and Wallace (1999) mention that being from the “right school” became as important as joining a specific church or the finest country club. In the preface to a special chronicle, Frank D. Ashburn (1934), a Groton alumnus and headmaster of his own school, said, “I have long felt that the first fifty years of Groton made up a patch of life or history or education that was unique. Few schools have been so suspected or so criticized, yet I have felt that few, if any, have been so loved or had such a remarkable atmosphere” (p. ix). Groton and other fine schools benefited from establishing strong ties, as alumni associations provided funding and other forms of assistance.

Groton obviously cultivated team sports and physical fitness. The Rector and Headmaster, Reverend Endicott Peabody himself, joined the football games. Young Henry Murray participated in many sports, but excelled at rowing, and he later joined the

Harvard crew (Ashburn, 1934; Robinson, 1992). That choice of sport seemed telling, since it certainly involves teamwork, and it has cultural connotations as well. While rowing did not explicitly guarantee a place at an Ivy League university, Ashburn proudly noted that “[t]here was at least one Grotonian on every Harvard crew from 1905 to 1922” (p. 120).

Football and baseball always dominated high school and collegiate athletics, but the American Northeast, with its historic ties to the United Kingdom, adopted certain aspects of the British sporting tradition. Groton recreated a British public school in New England, while about two centuries earlier, the founders of Harvard took their inspiration from Oxford and Cambridge.

If the Harvard-Yale football game became an icon of American culture, the Harvard-Yale regatta became equally important to the people of New England. Murray remained a fan of the sport, and kept up with baseball as well. Friends would invariably mention Groton or Harvard sports when they wrote to him, particularly bringing up problems since he matriculated from Groton. A Groton boy named Irving Arch (1913a, 1913b) described a hapless summer crew practice, with the lads ending up in the water. Murray would be a legend at Groton, after he became a controversial rowing crew captain at Harvard, and even participated in amateur competitions long after he graduated (Ayles, 1913-14; Robinson, 1992).

The extent of Murray's further acculturation remains dubious. It did not produce a devout Christian. Robinson (1992) documented Murray's mixed feelings about religious instruction at Groton, but one must tease out his response to having a minister as a head teacher. Organized religion never held much influence on Murray, and he would

be the first to challenge the intellectual and moral authority of a man of the cloth. Nathan G. Hale, Jr. (1995) raised the issue of psychoanalysis serving the function of a religion to those who believe in it. Murray never adopted Jungian analysis instead of a faith, and he was far from discovering it while a student at Groton. He would soon become an explorer of the psyche – but not then.

When he matriculated in 1911, Murray would have been regarded as the typical Grotonian. He made friends easily, especially because of his participation in team sports, and he apparently kept his friends beyond graduation day. While Murray was never admired for being a dedicated correspondent, people from his early life stayed in touch with him. An extensive collection of letters to him remains at the Archives of Harvard University. A telling example of Murray's influence was shared with this author by Doug Brown, the Groton School's archivist. When asked about Harry as a student, Brown said that a family had been informally looking into him. It seemed that their relative graduated from Groton after Murray, and applied to Harvard. The School's founding headmaster, Endicott Peabody, would only "recommend him if Murray agreed to look after him." Unfortunately, no written documentation likely exists in support of this story (Doug Brown, personal communication, October 7, 2008).

As He Talked

As mentioned earlier, Henry Murray stuttered throughout most of his life, a condition he described as having developed after undergoing eye surgery in childhood (Murray, 1967). It would appear that the operation traumatized him. A stutter, perhaps more than other defects of speech, seems to suggest a psychological component; lay people witness someone struggling to communicate, and they may react to the stammer.

A person who stutters may be ignored, as others automatically conclude that he or she is “nervous” or “dumb.”

Murray did not discuss the impact of stuttering on his life, but perhaps that deserves some attention, too. In the 1910s and 20s, stuttering became the focus of a number of leading mental health researchers. Few conditions have generated such intense debate as stuttering did in decades past. They found it intriguing because unlike other speech impediments, it tended to appear in intelligent children and successful adults. Many speech disorders accompanied further deficits, but that was usually not the situation with stuttering. Wendell Johnson (1963) wrote that it differed from other verbal pathology due to the emotional storms it generates. He described it as a problem of “hold[ing] back” one’s affect or specific feelings (p. 1952). When Murray was a teenager, psychologists and psychiatrists usually interpreted stuttering in psychoanalytic terms. Murray apparently had a contentious relationship with his mother and had many friends, which contradicts the image of a withdrawn youngster, fearful of speaking (Johnson, 1963; Murray, 1967). Reed (1921) predicted that stuttering people would feel hindered, but could adjust. This is interesting, when one considers that another outstanding Harvard physician also stuttered. Pioneering neurosurgeon Stanley Cobb shared Murray’s impediment (Pressman, 1998). Coriat (1912) described stuttering as an “anxiety neurosis,” and he focused on the fact that it often occurred after the individual started speaking (p. 150). Coriat found it interesting that stuttering children usually had no previous problems, and the speech impediment did not seem to have an association with other symptoms.

Coriat believed that stuttering could be corrected through Freudian analysis, and he had confidence enough in this approach to criticize a book he reviewed in 1915 for discounting that therapy (Coriat, 1912, 1915). As late as the 1960s, clinicians regarded stuttering as a sign of mental disorders (Travis, 1968), but research has since discredited that view.

The Truth About Babies

As an elderly man, Murray insisted that truth was extremely important to him, especially when he was young, and this insistence had some bearing on his future. He might have dedicated his life to wildlife or adventure, except for an ordinary event – but one that certainly excited the Murray family. In 1897, Fanny Murray gave birth to Cecil. Like most women of the time, Fanny delivered in a bedroom at home, but she had a physician in attendance, instead of a midwife (Murray, 1967).

In an autobiographical piece titled “The Case of Murr,” Murray (1967) wrote that he was an amazed and precocious toddler, and he asked the doctor where the infant came from. Perhaps to amuse the family or to avoid a delicate lesson, he told little Harry that he dropped off Cecil in his doctor’s bag. That doctor inadvertently set Henry Murray off on a lifelong quest, to find the truth about life.

Murray (1967) recollected that the air of mystery – at least to a four-year-old – fostered a powerful desire to know where life came from. To Murray, the ultimate truth meant the origins of life. In his undergraduate years, he thought that history might answer those questions, but he gradually moved toward research medicine and biochemistry.

In reviewing Murray's youth, his choice of undergraduate major warrants comment. Murr made no secret of his academic standing at Groton. When he applied himself, he could do the work, but in the main, Murr preferred dormitory high jinks or sports to finishing homework or studying. In the Murr piece, Murray (1967) reported being surprised that he could have a higher education, but Harvard gave him a place. Ashburn (1934) suggested that Harvard admission was almost *de rigueur* for good Groton lads, particularly for rowers and football players. One gets the impression from sharing Ashburn's happy memories that Ivy League committee members and trustees were far more concerned about athletic skills than grades. Perhaps even Murray himself assumed that had he sat rather than participated in varsity activities, Harvard would have declined him a spot. Few would treat any Harvard department as second-rate, but it was possible that the level of difficulty of the history program might have been lower compared to science.

Murray (1967) might have been cagey or even vain, as he endorsed history as the natural first step in answering life's great questions. By the end of four years at Harvard, he concluded that it did not, but medicine and science could. His explorations of science brought him closer, but he needed more self-study as his questions multiplied. Science prepared him for more growth and necessary experiences. He would then discover literature, psychoanalysis, and an extraordinary woman named Christiana Morgan.

Murray's childhood, described most thoroughly in "The Case of Murr," was his chatty attempt to explain the making of a prominent American psychologist. He remarked on an improbable journey, considering the interests and experiences of his youth. He reported little that might have suggested his future. The product of late 19th

century prosperity, he grew up in a city, and he was educated to believe in the values of his time. He would, of course, defile some of those values and keep those he preferred, but that would come later. Considering his youth, his love of the wilderness, and adventurous pursuits, he would have been more likely to become an editor for *Field & Stream* than the developer of an important psychological instrument, or a major personality theory.

Murray spoke of wanting to know the truth about life, but as a child and young man, that meant biology as a model. Had he been one of those rare youths who showed a precocious self-insight, he might have considered the implications of strabismus and stammering on his life. He did not, preferring to leave his readership and future biographers to speculate on his flaws. The Murr he wrote of was surprised at how ordinary his school years had been. In his mind, psychology belonged to the intellectuals, a pursuit for those who preferred books to racing shells, and the lecture halls to regattas.

Chapter V

A Finished Science - The Origins of American Psychology

At the turn of the last century, in the years when Murray was growing up, American psychology began to emerge as an academic discipline. Writing in 1884, educator John Dewey (1859-1952) said, "The least developed of the sciences, for a hundred years [psychology] has borne in its presentations the air of the one most completely finished" (Dewey, 1884, paragraph 1). Dewey did not express a contradiction, and in fact, he was really being parsimonious in his thinking. At its core, psychology had a completeness in itself, covering classical knowledge through modern biology. This would become Henry Murray's range, yet even as Dewey wrote those words, the academy had begun a process of applying doctrines to mental phenomena. Psychologists in Europe and America, aware of their newness, wanted to establish their "turf."

Ironically, Murray would come to psychology through literature, after a graduate education that included medicine and biochemistry. During Murray's undergraduate years (1911-1915), psychologists moved forward under what Dewey called the "New Psychology," but Murray could not be inspired. To the contrary, he recalled that he "had been immune to the enticements of all encountered versions of the science of psychology: a single lecture at Harvard . . . , the course in psychiatry at the Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons, and a single hour at the hospital with Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams* had been enough to cancel whatever potential gust for that sort of thing was in the offing" (Murray, 1967, p. 290). Murray became a psychologist by default; he took no coursework, never trained and joined the Harvard faculty out of exuberant interest. He

had no intention to study psychiatry, although close colleagues such as William Ernest Hocking (1953) assumed that he had that qualification. He could not be moved by the firestorms brewing in dusty psychology departments, waged by figures he could not respect.

Nonetheless, Murray had been a product of a liberal arts education, and psychology played a role in the making of this unique scholar. The central factors in the development of American psychology from the 1880s through the 1920s were a) defining the field; b) addressing the nature of mind; c) the implications of structuralism and functionalism; and d) explaining New Psychology.

The American Border

J. C. Flugel, the great British historian of psychology, pointed out that in the 19th century, the field was very different from what would eventually emerge as academic psychology. Psychology in the 1800s first needed to break away from philosophy (Flugel, 1934). As late as the 1880s and '90s, psychology in the United States would be regarded as a branch of philosophy by the learned community, as it was in Europe. Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) opened the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, creating a revolution that brought psychology into the family of sciences. Across the Atlantic, the founding fathers of the discipline stressed its most scientific aspects (Haggbloom et al., 2002; Hilgard, 1987). Despite the empirical rigor, most American universities followed the European tradition and housed psychology faculty within their philosophy departments.

Sokal (1992/2002) found it significant that American psychology developed during the Gilded Age. Generous donations to educational projects from the new tycoons

led to pursuits of all things scientific, in the hopes that America's professors and graduate students could benefit business, industry and society. Sokal stressed the rapid launch of many outstanding universities, including Clark and Cornell, which had the mission of promoting science, in contrast to those grand institutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, which mainly produced ministers.

The attempt to comprehend the thinking, feeling and behavior of people moved away from the strict proprietorship of departments of theology, and on to the philosophers and psychologists. James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934) asserted that by adopting empirical methods and by making the study of the self the central theme, psychology would distinguish itself from religion (Baldwin, 1913; Green, 2002; Hume, 1909). Flugel (1934) said that American psychology could define itself as an area apart from philosophy as well, while in Europe, it remained subsumed. James Gibson Hume (1909) defended the relationship between psychology and philosophy, since truth and morality could broadly apply to both areas.

Michael M. Sokal (1992/2002) disagreed with Flugel, by regarding American psychology as a mixture of German Idealism, Scottish realism, phrenology and Darwinism. Sokal added that the philosophical roots of American psychology weakened as the new empirical standard began to dominate the social sciences. Scottish realism would welcome the grounding of true science in any form, but by definition, German Idealism required of its adherents an open mind. Idealism emphasized the mental activity of the individual, with less attention given to universal laws and empirical evidence. Idealism contradicted Wundt's efforts to shepherd psychology into the sciences, but even sciences need philosophies to establish their goals.

Unfortunately, the strict empiricists of the 19th century and early 20th may have been eager to discount those who contemplated psychology's grand mission, while those scholars who were averse to quantitative data-gathering felt that the Wundtians approached psychology too narrowly. The battle still raged when Murray joined the HPC in 1927. His great contribution was in mixing both a tight research agenda with efforts to define psychology's broadest questions. Murray's greatest scholar, Forrest Robinson (1992) praised him for his philosophical efforts, but seemed to miss the fact that he and his colleagues desired statistical results to support their conclusions. Letters from Nevitt Sanford (1945a, 1945b, 1945c, 1945d) provide the direction of Murray's work in the 1940s, and the commitment to use quantitative data.

Murray may have come from a distinguished Scottish clan, and his medical research background showed him that manipulation and control of factors offered certain truths, but he would be seduced by idealism (Robinson, 1992). At the same time, Murray debunked orthodoxy. One of his most radical approaches to psychology was his attention to individual differences. In contrast to many of his peers, who endeavored to define laws, his personology, in addition to finding the depths of thinking, also celebrated the unique reactions to stimuli. That became the core value of the research done at the Clinic under Murray's leadership. The unique reaction is the essence to any response to a projective test, including the Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, n.d., "Chapter 1: The TAT;" also see Murray, 1938; Robinson, 1992). Clearly, this attention to individual differences reflects some of the work Gordon Allport published at roughly the same time. Allport (1967), also at Harvard, defined personality by traits, and also reflected a nomothetic view, in which the most unique aspects of an individual warrant study.

Psychology fully broke away from theology and philosophy, and advanced as a science, with the start of departmental laboratories in the late 19th century. Sokal (1992/2002) wrote that in 1892, the year before Murray's birth, about 20 psychology laboratories functioned in the US. By the 1920s, when Murray was starting his career, the number of laboratories more than doubled (Hilgard, 1987). Psychology quickly attracted research-minded individuals, but Sokal noted that some professors taught both pure philosophy and neuroscience. A number of American psychologists studied with Wundt, including G. Stanley Hall (1844-1924) and Edward Bradford Titchener (1867-1927) (Flugel, 1934; Hilgard, 1987).

Many who began laboratory work with Wundt devoted their energies to reflexes and perceptions, which seemed to be far from Murray's endeavors. Murray and his generation would use their laboratories for studying broader areas, including individual differences (Sokal, 1992/2002).

As the first generation of American psychologists began to define their niche, they could not completely divorce themselves from philosophy. One powerful question remained unanswered: what is the nature of mind ? In what way, if at all, can it be separated from the body ? Merrill Hiscock (personal communication, September 2001) humorously refers to this issue as "naïve realism and mundane dualism." The idea that all people experience a stimulus in a predictable way does not hold true in the laboratory or in real life. The overly simplistic argument of reducing the mind to the brain itself, and the brain to a mass of neurons and glia cells, and then conclude, "that is human consciousness" intuitively seems to be in error, yet some have supported it.

Trying to *prove* that the mind and brain are distinct posed its own set of challenges, but dualism seemed to be the course adopted by most of the early psychologists in the US. Dualistic thinking could be categorized as either parallelism or interactionism. In parallelism, the two realms of mind and body operate independently. René Descartes introduced interactionism in the 17th century, and according to his theory, mind and body have the potential to change each other (Benjafield, 1996). Dualism prevailed, but that only told its adherents that the brain and what took place within it were not the same thing. From the mind-body issue, early 20th century psychologists began to consider the question of the very nature of the human mind.

The more modern approaches to the subject of mind often consider the role of consciousness. Trinity University's Daniel M. Wegner is one of the foremost American psychologists to address this. Wegner (1980) sees consciousness as comprehensive, with the individual taking in a variety of stimuli, responding to environmental needs, and behaving as necessary. Generally, those writing about consciousness stress that the individual be aware of what he or she is aware of. Wegner is best known for a famous series of experiments in which subjects were asked *not* to think of white bears, and were then asked if they were able to block out that image (Wegner, Schneider, Carter & White, 1987). This study showed the inherent difficulty in suppressing a specific mental image, but also the subjects' need to create the mental image before avoiding it. Wegner proposed a social-cognitive interpretation of consciousness, in which the lines between what was attended to versus suppressed material were blurred.

Baldwin (1913) identified psychology's basic core issues that make mental life unique, compared with biological functioning. He also found another form of dualism,

“a parallelism between racial reflection and individual thought” (p. vi). Here “racial” does not refer to skin color, but the archaic concept of “human race.” Baldwin, going against the scientific current of focusing on commonalities, looked for and valued individual differences. Twenty-five years later, Murray would celebrate the individual in his landmark book, *Explorations in Personality*. The context for this shift in the field toward variations and the natural role of consciousness can be traced to the beginning of evolutionary biology in the mid-19th century. Darwin (1872/2006) had even suggested that humans developed emotions and cognitive skills as part of their means of survival. As psychologists considered these implications of man’s mental activity, the nature of mind became as important an issue to American scholars as the mind-body problem was to Europeans of the Enlightenment.

Consciousness and the Self at Harvard

William James (1842-1910), regarded as the Father of American Psychology, was a Harvard-educated physician and philosopher. James, perhaps more eloquently than his peers, offered a reflection on psychology as a field in his *Principles of Psychology*, published in 1890. This work, integrating the attitudes of 19th century French and British thinkers, did not limit itself to the more popular German views on psychology. Rather than direct scholarly attention to cognition, he assumed cognition was merely a function of consciousness. James described consciousness in almost kaleidoscopic terms, with a rapidly changes series of processes, which he described as “The Stream Of Thought” (Hilgard, 1987; James, 1890/1918, p. 224).

As life changed, so did the aspects and contents of human consciousness (Hilgard, 1987). In his 1879 essay, “Are We Automata ?,” James wrote, “A man’s Empirical

Thought depends on the objects and events he has experienced, but what these shall be is to a large extent determined by his habits of attention” (pp. 11-12). James elaborated on that point in *Principles*, saying “Consciousness, from our natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed often to a very high degree” (James, 1890/1918, p. 224).

Ernest R. Hilgard (1987), a professor at Yale and Stanford and an important historian of psychology, used a river analogy to explain James's ideas. With attention flitting from one external stimulus to another, that “stream of consciousness” may be hard to control (p. 53). James himself wrote along such a line, saying, “... we see that the mind is at every stage a theatre of simultaneous possibilities. Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by ...Attention” (James, 1879, p. 13).

James proposed the self as an aspect of consciousness. Classic philosophers, including David Hume and Emmanuel Kant, believed in the existence of a self-entity, and James built on them, contributing something important. James overcame the chief obstacle that divided the self in psychology from how it was used by philosophers and clergymen. Hilgard put it nicely. “The uneasiness about the self shared by experimental psychologists reflected the fear of distraction that might be encountered through discussion of the soul as conceived in accepted religions or by having to confront the pure or transcendental ego for which empirical knowledge was denied by the idealistic philosophers” (p. 53).

James left the soul to religion, but promoted the concept of a self made of private thoughts. This concept could be explained easily enough, but its individual nature would

pose a challenge for an outsider to “know” the true self of another. Like Descartes, he defined man as a cognitively-functioning individual. His endorsement of scientific psychology led to his rejection of the ego. For James, self and mind were almost synonymous, and he believed that the mind evolved as an epiphany of the body (Hilgard, 1987).

This idea of mental life having its origins in the physical world would influence Murray's personology. Although Murray had initially been drawn to psychoanalysis, his own model had needs originating in the physical aspects of living, such as bodily functions. In an obscure and undated set of notes, he referenced respiration, specifically releasing carbon dioxide and perspiration, as part of building up a good body (Murray, n.d., “Personology ‘Theory’ abbreviations”). Some of this material appeared in the second chapter of *Explorations in Personality* (Murray, 1938). The handwritten notes were obviously for his own use, but even Murray's published writing may be difficult to grasp. Murray believed that the self was as much a biological entity as an eye or kidney, but far more artistic in its functioning and more occult as well. Bodily needs developed before most psychological functions, and they served biological advancement – a healthy body. In a letter to Murray, Jung (1938) commented that a zoologist he knew supported archetypes and, by implication, points made in *Explorations*. Murray appreciated support, especially Jung's, but his reaction to the zoologist's speculations is unknown – but might have been interesting. A zoologist would seek laws, but Murray focused on individual differences.

James died only a year before Murray began his university studies, but after Murray graduated from Columbia's medical school and a doctoral program at

Cambridge, he then approached psychology. For a man who had so much formal schooling, it is ironic that Murray would educate himself through intensive reading. On his own, he discovered James, and although Jamesian psychology never became an integral part of personology, Murray regarded James as important (Shneidman, 1981). For James, who was more of a philosopher of psychology than a researcher, a tripartite soul served as a meaningful conceptualization. James disdained the Freudian ego, but he still offered something for the psychoanalytic camp to consider (James, 1890/1918). The social self incorporated culture, and Carl Jung based his version of analytic psychology on cultural archetypes (Jung, 1944/1976). Murray, in turn, tried to find further archetypes in his research, especially when using the TAT (Murray, n.d., "Odd Notes on Themas"; also see Murray, 1936/1981, 1938)

Mary Whiton Calkins (1863-1930) could be regarded as one of William James's hidden colleagues, and she offered a view of the self that fit with his theory. Her role in the debate centered on the concept of self. In her view, the self included consciousness, and for Murray, this could be applied to personality. Calkins did uncredited graduate work in psychology at Harvard, but the college did not acknowledge female students, and she would not accept a Radcliffe degree. Calkins still became a distinguished researcher and Wellesley professor nonetheless, and specialized in education (Furumoto, 1990; Stevens & Gardner, 1982). She also wrote a well-known study of consciousness and the self. Calkins (1908) conceptualized the self as a scaffold, with consciousness as part of the structure. She differed from her peers, such as William James and James Rowland Angell (1869-1949), in that she did not equate self with consciousness, while they used the terms almost interchangeably. In Calkins's article, consciousness mainly exists in

terms of having emotions and “feelings of realness” (p. 113). She included aspects of perception, and the need for the individual knowing the connections between self and others. This obviously had a parallel with James’s social self.

Granville Stanley Hall began life as a Massachusetts farm boy, but had the calling to become a clergyman. He studied and worked at Harvard, teaching English. William James enjoyed a superb reputation as a teacher, so many who might not otherwise have taken a psychology course joined James’s class. After having this nonpareil as an instructor, Hall decided to become a psychologist. In fact, both did graduate work at the same time, and they earned their Ph.D.’s together in 1878 (Flugel, 1934; Sokal, 1992/2002).

Hall spent four years in Europe, which included the almost obligatory internship at Wundt’s laboratory. Hall became one of Wundt’s first American trainees, although his approach would be more humanistic than what was taught in Leipzig. Hall’s formal career in academic psychology began in the new psychology department at Johns Hopkins. In 1883, Hall created a lab there, the first in the US. Hall’s enterprise had obvious parallels to Leipzig, including the large numbers of students who would become influential psychologists in their own right. They included James McKeen Cattell (1860-1944) and John Dewey (Benjafield, 1996; Flugel, 1934). Hall moved psychology in new directions, since he did not hold to Wundtian structuralism. Hall was America’s first great genetic psychologist, which today would fall under the umbrella of developmental psychology. His perspective foreshadowed Murray, who regarded childhood experiences as crucial to the establishment of a personality (Murray, n.d. *Claustal Aggression*

Fantasies, 1959a). Like Hall, Murray took an interest in how emotions tempered decision-making in childhood (Murray, 1933/1981).

While Hall earned professional recognition for his studies of children, he, like William James, also considered the philosophy behind psychology, and how it should be shared with students (Flugel, 1934). Unlike his former teacher, Hall stressed the empirical aspects of psychology over philosophy (Sokal, 1992/2002), however, Hall wrote that psychology was really “mental philosophy” (Hall, 1879, p. 94). In Hall’s “Philosophy in the United States,” John Locke and Emmanuel Kant had made as significant contributions to the muddier world of human behavior, as they had to the more abstract areas of morality and social contracts. Hall’s essay is interesting for two other reasons. While he and William James had just graduated, he only mentioned William’s father, Henry James, Sr., who was prominent for his religious beliefs, but did not mention his distinguished friend.

Hall also warned American academe not to become too propagandistic in its teachings; professors should educate, not expect students to hold an imaginary party line. Professors should treasure their students as free thinkers (Hall, 1879). In 1935, Murray would fire a wittier and more caustic salvo in a similar vein (Murray, 1935/1981). Both felt equally frustrated over the same obstacles, but five decades apart. For Hall, departments failed to recognize the value in studying thought, and those who had never had the benefits of learning from a scientific legend such as Wundt only compounded their ignorance by leading their classes down the sterile paths of ethics and religious morality. Hall attacked ethics and morality not because he could see no worth in those topics, but he insisted that any field must grow to survive, and a reliance on philosophy

styled after Sunday school would generate little. Murray condemned his senior colleagues for another type of orthodoxy, in which they only recognized their own empirical research as making a contribution to psychology. Like Hall, Murray expressed disapproval – but in a deliberately bombastic, take-no-prisoners style of assault on classic laboratory psychology. While Hall condemned those who saw no value in science, Murray felt that as social scientists, good psychologists should not limit their data collection in any way. For Murray, “wheat” (a favored term of his), denoting informative mental content, could come from a variety of assessments and interviews.

Murray's passion can be misleading; when he condemned empiricism in psychology, one must understand the context. He used his own money and applied for individual grants to allow the HPC to continue his research from the 1920s until he and many of his colleagues went to war in 1941. During that time, he had serious arguments with his department head, Edwin G. Boring. Boring wanted to dismiss him and close or restructure the HPC, regardless of how it was funded. In turn, Murray used harsh words, refused to come to the campus, and even tried to debunk Boring's research. Murray had the intelligence to know that alternative projects could have value, but professional rivalry and power struggles guided the debate – not a genuine criticism of science in psychology.

Other Approaches to Consciousness and Self

Although William Bradford Titchener was not connected to Harvard, his work influenced Murray and other faculty members. This brilliant British-born psychologist, Oxford-educated in philosophy and physiology, studied with Wundt before immigrating to the US. He taught at Cornell for over 30 years, and is best known as one of the leading

proponents of structuralism, and for his pioneering approach to testing motivation (Hilgard, 1987; Pillsbury, 1928). Structuralism basically refers to the attempt to discover the links between psychological processes and brain physiology, with attention paid to the contents of mental structures, rather than how they work (Reber, 1995).

In 1898, Titchener argued his cause in an article, "The Postulates of a Structural Psychology." He adopted a biological approach to psychology, and encouraged psychologists to consider how morphology advanced biology. Morphology, the study of the forms of living things, exposed him to the power of basic structure. Titchener did not discount functionalism out of hand, but stressed that a careful examination of mental structures of the whole personality could be just as productive a research endeavor as investigating a single function. He essentially defended structuralism in three ways: first, for its research value; secondly, for its close ties to biology; and as a means to unify psychology (Titchener, 1898/1948).

Titchener (1898/1948) plainly stated that structuralism fit with the ultimate goal of experimental psychology. He wrote, "The primary aim of the experimental psychologist has been to analyze the structure of mind; to ravel out the elemental processes from the tangle of consciousness, or (if we may change the metaphor) to isolate the constituents in the given conscious formation" (p. 367). Titchener questioned some contemporary experimental psychologists for being overly concerned about data gathering, and measuring every variable without a context, without a research model, and never reaching a conclusion or describing significance. He condemned those projects for not being scientific enough. In his tribute to Titchener, Pillsbury (1928) wrote that he

believed “that mind was an open book, to be studied directly by the method of introspection” (p. 97).

Titchener (1898/1948) regarded biology as the gold standard of science. He said that when functional psychology focused on the organic – reflexes and perception – it stayed within the scientific fold, but the structural approach, with its ties to morphology, had an added rigor. Titchener noted that by “...employing the same principle of division, we can represent modern psychology as the exact counterpart of modern biology” (p. 366).

Titchener (1898/1948) and his followers maintained that structuralism could serve as a unifying force for psychology. He admitted that structure and function were often close, and that one was easily mistaken for the other. He advised colleagues and students that many functions could likely be rooted in mental structures, so it would be wise to treat structuralism as an umbrella for the field. In addition to being psychology's overriding doctrine, structuralism had the further advantage of parsimony. Titchener alluded to opponents perhaps being “disappoint[ed]” by the breakdown of structures into “mental elements” that were basic and simple (p. 367). He said that not all structures needed to be complicated to be effective, and that their very simplicity was significant !

Titchener illustrated this point with consciousness as an example. Although far from simple, consciousness offered an example of evolution at work in human mental development. He never indicated whether he regarded consciousness as William James – reaching its zenith after it divided into three aspects – or as a basic epiphany from pontifical neurons, but he believed that it needed to be studied for its contents, rather than attempt to track its functions (Titchener, 1898/1948).

Titchener joined the discussion about the nature of self and the contents of consciousness. In his *A Beginner's Psychology*, Titchener (1915/1923) described the academic value of the concept of "self," and its superiority over the term "mind." He defined mind as a "complete psychological world, ...with man left in" (p. 307). Man's participation in his mental life "reduces to a functional nervous system," which fails to account for any of the mental content. Titchener asserted that the concept of self made psychology a unique science, since biology did not have anything similar. Like James, Titchener found various uses for the self, and wrote that it could replace consciousness and the subconscious, two key words of psychoanalysis. In keeping with Jamesian psychology, Titchener proposed a self that had three aspects, which he distinguished as "philosophical, practical, and scientific" (p. 308).

In its philosophic form, Titchener's self addresses the continuous nature of human function. Though Titchener did not elaborate on any of these aspects, presumably he referred to the fact that psychologically, a personality exists over a relatively long period of time, compared with a mood. The philosophic self has value for everyone on a social level, in that to know someone suggests having a concept of that person's identity, a fairly complicated entity. Titchener believed that the self provided the most basic and easily understood psychological unit. The scientific use of self would be the form most likely used by psychologists. Titchener denoted it to mean a description of an individual's psychological *Gestalt*, although he did not use that particular term. He found it important that the psychological self includes the individual's recognition of his or her own existence. Self in its practical use was described as having "common-sense" value,

and Titchener made use of language, and the ways people use “self” or “yourself” in speaking and writing (Titchener, 1915/1923).

Titchener (1915/1923) also used the term “selfhood,” and he apparently viewed it as something beyond collected traits (the scientific self) and more of the individual’s disposition. He called it the “supreme determining tendency,” and he implied that selfhood defined personal boundaries (p. 311). He appreciated the concept of self for its continuity, but he also addressed the seeming contradiction of having a self, but not paying attention to it. Titchener resorted to the common semantics of his day, as when people complain “of not feeling like themselves,” or use similar language. He also noted how average people may behave dramatically different in varying circumstances. He described a man who may be tender with his children, but a tough judge and a serious sportsman. He went on to discuss the possible contradiction of a man who is smooth at work, but crude with his family. Paradoxes such as those would later fuel Murray’s (1940) argument for using the principles of psychoanalysis in mainstream psychology.

Like Murray, Titchener adopted a biological approach to his theory of structuralism, as well as in his exploration of the self. Both found value in Darwinian themes (Titchener, 1898/1948). Titchener (1915/1923) noted the potential for an individual’s varying responses to life, comparing them to biological “mutations” (p. 314). He presumed that changes in the individual’s external environment, such as becoming poor or having a relationship sour, could cause these seemingly “out of character” behaviors. Titchener tried to explain the role of self in interpreting experience, and while he could elaborate on environmental changes, his discussion of experience becomes somewhat more difficult to understand. As an experience becomes a subjective entity,

Titchener maintained that psychologists needed to consider how the self was manifested in the reported experience. He failed to define any of the potential manifestations, but introduced special terminology: self-meaning, self-perception and self-idea (p. 316).

Titchener (1915/1923) regarded any self-experience as a “continuous” entity, but without an elaboration, he left his readers to consider that implication (p. 316). By definition, an experience can be either a short-term event (being caught in a riot, for example), or without the article, it becomes a body of past episodes (40 years of teaching). Titchener likely meant the latter meaning, but that experience becomes a changing structure. He did write that self-experience requires some level of awareness, but that would vary considerably. Titchener seemed troubled by sensation, which he categorized as a form of self-experience, but even within *A Beginner's Psychology*, he acknowledged that the continuity of sensation was not agreed upon. He said that people usually know when they do not feel well, but what would be the feeling for wellness ? Can the absence of an ache or pain be a sensation ? Beyond the sensory, he claimed that the general “feeling of self” should last longer than a mood.

Titchener (1915/1923) attempted to identify the self in terms of its values, but here he relied on the individual's perceptions, with little means of assigning value. As with his conception of experience, he returned to the fact that people do not exhibit a consistent self-awareness. This obviously did not describe the value of self, but he implied that the monitoring of the self serves a purpose. This could be regarded as an evolutionary development, that led to improvement in the human animal.

These beliefs, innocuous as they seem in the 21st century, divided American psychology in the late 1800s. Among those who responded most strongly were James

Rowland Angell and James Mark Baldwin. Angell's father was president of the University of Michigan, and he studied philosophy under Dewey there. Dewey introduced the works of William James to his students. While a graduate student, Angell spent one year at Harvard, and James actually taught him. Angell would eventually hold two Master of Arts degrees, but he never went into a doctoral program in the US. He went to Germany, taking coursework as a freelance graduate student, but he never finished his dissertation after he was given the chance to teach at the University of Minnesota. His career really began in 1894 at the University of Chicago. Today, Angell is better remembered as an administrator rather than for any particular theory, since he led Chicago, Yale and the American Psychological Association (Hilgard, 1987).

Angell's University of Chicago became the high church for the theory of functionalism. In contrast to structuralism, functionalism looks more at the process of mental activity, rather than the content. From Angell's point of view, psychology could better address how man survives in his world, including its natural and social aspects, and how well does man know what may likely happen because of his behavior. Angell defended functionalism as being more evolutionary than structuralism, in that most functions could be shown to change in order to meet environmental needs. Functionalists did not discount modifications in physical structures over time, but focused on change within the individual, possibly within a relatively short period (Reber, 1995). Angell (1907/1948), writing an article for the *Psychological Review*, openly rebelled against structuralism, and declared war on Titchener's way of thinking. Maintaining that no one had yet done for functionalism what Titchener had done for his philosophy, Angell saw

functionalism as originating with Aristotle. Angell emphasized that functionalism was later adopted by Darwinists. He offered three means for assessing mental activity:

1. What happens to the mind as the individual goes through various experiences?
2. How does mental activity fit in with biology ? Angell pointed out psychology should be as closely tied to evolution as general biology. His logic ran on semantics; if biology was the science of life, then psychology would be the science of living.
3. What function does a mental activity, such as will, serve the individual ?

A War of Ideas...but not for Murray

Angell (1907/1948) analyzed the impact of experience very carefully, and devoted more attention to it than Titchener. Functionalists were more concerned with how the mind works, rather than what people thought about. Angell used neuroscience as an example. Early researchers studied sensations and perceptions closely, and categorized the data. Like Titchener, Angell and his followers saw value in classifying aspects of mental life (Angell, 1912/1915). A functionalist would be more interested in the *act* of sensing and how man uses his mind. He stated that in his own time, functionalism was breaking away from the rest of psychology, and that he and his colleagues had been evolving a model. In what appeared to be a gross and unexplained contradiction, Angell claimed a separation between affect, will and intellect, but then went on to clarify his position. He said that functionalists did not question the existence of structures, but indicated that structures should not be the issue, because once one has established relationships, pulling them apart becomes “irrelevant” (Angell, 1907/1948, p. 441). He later went on to write that while research would focus on further classifications,

it would ultimately lead to only “determining the simplest forms of mind,” which he referred to as “elements” (Angell, 1912/1915, p. 11). While offering no potentially more effective and original research model, he seemed to both endorse and condemn contemporary investigations, saying on the next page, “The mind has been regarded too exclusively on the analogy of the chemical compound which is to be resolved into its elements, and too little as an expression of life to be studied in its activities” (p. 12)

The will in particular became a source of obvious turmoil for Angell. He was uncomfortable concluding that the mind was merely a collection of materials, and he could not find a specific “*element*” for the will (Angell, 1912/1915, p. 17).

Naturally, some structuralists attacked functional psychology, according to Angell (1907/1948), by calling this theory “a bastard offspring of the faculty psychology masquerading in biological plumage” (p. 441). This hardly sounded like a remark from the less-colorful Titchener, who, in fact, maintained that “functionalists [were] ... much nearer his point of view” (Pillsbury, 1928, p. 106).

Angell (1907/1948) raised more salient points to defend functionalism. Explorations of attention and reasoning, as well as the most complex mental activities, seemed to be less structural and based on functions. Angell also questioned those who studied consciousness quantitatively, who recorded what subjects thought about at a given point of time. He countered by arguing that functionalists would not fall for the structuralist trap of assuming there are qualities in a mental activity that are *not* there. Angell's caveat not to overestimate has face value, but he did not explain how it was more likely to be the flaw in the structuralist camp. Titchener expressed concern that functionalists might misread the mental states they do observe (Pillsbury, 1928). It

would seem just as possible for Angell's followers to divide a phenomenon into any number of serial events. Angell (1907/1948) failed to address this, but maintained his purple prose, by accusing the structuralist school of proposing "*pate de foie gras* psychology" (p. 442).

Since an experience is only a temporary phenomenon in Angell's (1907/1948) philosophy, he questioned how there could be structures. As our mental activities repeat either voluntarily or involuntarily, these activities do not always work exactly the same way. Murray (1938) explained this very issue at length, but again, decades later. With his tendency toward the eclectic, Murray might have had more difficulties than Titchener or Angell in choosing a side. Murray incorporated structures, but each had major associated processes. He also introduced external factors into the equation, with the ultimate goal of determining the reason for a given mental phenomenon.

Unlike Titchener, Murray began with the concepts of Freudian analysis, and he kept the ego as the core of the psychological realm. For Murray, the issue was where mental activity originated. He favored analogies to diving and exploration, reflecting his interest in accessing subconscious material (Morgan & Murray, 1935; Murray, 1938, 1940). That did not mean he downplayed the process; part of his eclecticism was in making both structure and function as central to mental activity.

Murray (1938) had a dichotomy of functions within his system of personology. What some psychologists might call an "activity," Murray described as "regnancy," with the brain producing thoughts, emotions and, eventually, behaviors, as if it were a gland. In *Explorations in Personality*, Murray expressed his concern with the internal process, but added the environment as a factor. While Angell accused all those who disagreed

with him of turning psychology into chopped liver, Murray condemned the research of the 1920s and '30s for being limited to regnancies, without considering the environment. He still kept the process, and even revisited the mind-body debate, supporting Cartesian interactionism. Murray concluded that even physical systems were mentally influenced, with the brain impacting the other organs, but those organs could also eventually alter how the brain functions. Eighty years later, Murray's ideas have shown to be accurate. Physicians and psychologists have seen how hypertension, diabetes, multiple sclerosis and cancer may impair cognitive skills significantly on standardized tests (Merrill Hiscock, personal communication, September 2001; Francisco Perez, personal communication, September 2007). Psychiatrist James Morrison (1997) has written a useful clinical guide to the range of potential mental pathology that organic diseases can trigger in patients. New York University's Joseph LeDoux (1998) and Antonio Damasio (2003) of the University of Southern California have addressed the fluidity between the physical and mental conditions.

Murray (1938) equated "need" with the drive from psychoanalysis. He essentially viewed needs as the drivers of the body, involved in physiological activities, as well as mental life. Instead of putting value on either the structure or the function, as did his predecessors, Murray pursued needs as the key to accounting for all behaviors and emotions. Knowing the reason for a feeling or action reflected a deeper psychology, unshared by Angell and Titchener.

The stucturalist camp acknowledged outside influences, which Murray valued, but both structuralists and functionalists shared a line of reasoning that Murray wholeheartedly supported. Angell (1907/1948) and Titchener (1898/1948) declared that

no body of scientific thought could ignore Darwinian biology. The more outspoken Angell regarded evolutionary biologists as kinsmen, since 20th century biology was based on process more than structure, and Darwin illustrated how evolution refined behavior, leading to success at living. Genetic psychology, a new field at the beginning of the last century, and now called developmental psychology, had already documented the mental changes that occur over time. This longitudinal model would become the basis of Murray's work.

Titchener certainly invoked Darwin's theories when he described the importance of morphology and how environmental influences could change the basic concepts of a human mind, but that did not save him from criticism from Angell. Structuralists, according to Angell (1907), did not adequately incorporate Darwinism into their version of psychology, leaving their interpretations less robust. The functionalist camp seemed to offer more to clinicians, with its implications for mental illness. Angell remained frustratingly vague about psychopathology, but he apparently did not believe that it was an organic entity, but due to "peculiar ambitions" (p. 446). That phrase appears to have little meaning, but if one puts it in the context of will or motivation, those "peculiar ambitions" could be thwarted, unfulfilled or unacceptable drives. When Murray began with needs, he borrowed from Freud, and he thought needs would account for much of the subconscious material he intended to study. Murray (1938) began his research with the hypothesis that "...every conscious process is the subjective aspect of some regnant brain process, but that not every regnant process has a conscious correlate" (p. 134). Much of the subconscious material would either be memories or needs, and both would draw energy from the individual. Angell's "peculiar ambitions" are needs, but Murray

seemed to disagree here. In *Explorations*, he adopted a secondary hypothesis; people do not vary in their needs, but the manifestations can and do vary.

Murray did relatively little clinical work, so he rarely addressed mental illness specifically (Robinson, 1992). As personology emerged as a school of psychological thought and methodology, Murray accounted for human actions as based on needs and outside pressures, which he called “press” (Murray, 1938). As he began his teaching and research at Harvard, he also felt that psychology lacked the tools to address the more intimate human issues. He valued psychoanalysis for the very reason that those practitioners had regular exposure to the problems of their patients. Murray associated psychologists with scholarly work rather than diagnosis, therapy and the interpretation of revealed material. Those activities fell in the bailiwick of the psychoanalysts (Murray, 1940).

Consciousness and Will

In the early years of American psychology, consciousness presented numerous challenges. Angell (1907/1948) believed that it existed in some basic form throughout all types of living things. He supported those who conceived of consciousness as independent of experience. Titchener did not consider consciousness as anything distinct from the self, and for him, it remained deeply associated with experience (1915/1923). Northwestern University's W. Caldwell (1898) maintained that the concept of the self or consciousness required the will, which Titchener's theory lacked. Caldwell further debated Titchener's conceptualization for confusing motivation for volition. Caldwell's main problem with Titchener was that he ultimately did not have a concept of self or

consciousness, but a litany of *brain activities*. For Caldwell, the *Gestalt* in Titchener's work was missing, although he never used that word.

Those who disputed Titchener did not view consciousness as the mere total of the myriad process of a functioning mind, but required the individual to know that he or she functioned in the world (Caldwell, 1898). Calkins (1908) designated the will as different from other mental activity, and related it to the conscious act of knowing that one has a relationship with the environment.

Angell (1907/1948) regarded the will as the capstone of his model of functionalism – but never clearly conceptualized it. He wrote that if conation (exerting one's will) were truly understood, it could explain how many psychological and organic functions developed in all creatures. He broadly regarded conation as thinking that leads to a behavior. Behavior meant movement here, and behavior also preceded emotions. Angell's theory fit well with James, or more specifically, the James-Lange theory of emotion. This late 19th century variation on an old theme reopened a debate in psychology – did the physiological reaction guide the emotion or something else. Quite simply, James and a Danish psychologist did not work together but concurrently stated that that the individual's apperception of what was happening in his or her body created the emotion (Hunt, 1994; James, 1884/1948, 1894/1994).

In many ways, Angell's conceptualization could be adapted to the thinking of Murray and one of his mentors, the biologist-philosopher Lawrence J. Henderson. Henderson, who will be discussed in Chapter 7, can be regarded as the source of the many biological aspects in Murray's personology, but Angell, who is not treated as one who influenced Murray, perhaps deserves credit.

Both Murray, and surprisingly, Angell, showed structuralist overtones, or at least moved from orthodox functionalism in their views on the existence of consciousness and the will. Angell insisted that consciousness was not an epiphany of the brain, which Titchener (1898/1948) was willing to consider. Angell certainly believed that thinking took place in the brain, but in denying that consciousness was an epiphany was to endorse Cartesian interactionism. This hypothesis from René Descartes placed the powers of consciousness and the organic aspects of the brain on an equal and lateral plane. Those who maintained that consciousness had been a byproduct of the brain focused strictly on its biological origins, and treated it as something natural, rather than the soul of religious thinking. Calkins joined the functionalist camp, but Angell took her to task for not recognizing the interactionist aspects of the mind-body issue. He accused her of not acknowledging that the self and the workings of the human organism had a Cartesian relationship. Still, Calkins offered a consciousness that intersected with the minds of others, while she condemned Titchener for limiting his definition to the biochemistry of the brain (Angell, 1907; Calkins, 1908; Merrill Hiscock, personal communication, September 2001).

The “New Psychology”

As Dewey defined it in 1884, the New Psychology was a revolutionary approach to the field. Although he never explicitly renounced psychology's roots in philosophy, he viewed it as more of a science. Hall (1885) phrased it more generally, describing psychology as an *extension* of, rather than a complete break from, philosophy.

Stratton (1943) also described the New Psychology as a revolution, but added that it would blend the best aspects from both areas. The generation already established

within the university system, including such luminaries as James, Hall and Dewey, had that firm grounding in classical philosophy, and imparted that method of analytical thinking to budding psychology. The newer generation brought experimental results into the discussion. Stratton credits Wundt's laboratory as the driving force behind the New Psychology, and aptly pointed out that it met with some displeasure from certain quarters. He further argued that even those who criticized the New Psychology or Wundt's influence became indirect promoters of empiricism by discussing it in the journals.

Stratton (1943) praised Wundt for his professorial skills, and for his broad involvement in psychology. He also referred to a little-known interest in social psychology. Stratton wrote, "[Wundt] ...never excluded from psychology's field of research our inner experience, nor from its methods of research a critical self-observation" (p. 69). That statement could easily have been an assessment of Murray's work, although the later advocates of scientific psychology damned Murray and thought they adhered to Wundt. Some of those outside Wundt's fold lacked philosophical refinement in their interpretations of his values, and in the way they applied his lessons. Wilhelm Wundt never doubted psychology as a scientific endeavor, and Stratton noted that Wundt's closest students never adopted a narrow view of the field. Psychology did not have to be neuroscience, although reaction times and perceptual data could, of course, be quantified.

Hall (1885) conceptualized the New Psychology as linked to experimentation, an endeavor that could not be applied to philosophy. He also described it in terms of neuroscience, again reflecting the line of research started in Wundt's laboratory. James (1879) criticized those who relied too heavily on neuroscience to explain behavior. A

deeply personal criticism of physiological psychology would later become Murray's banner cry, as he felt that Harvard's version of it prevented the understanding of the most humanistic aspects of it. Despite Hall's emphasis on experimentation, Murray would have likely agreed with his contention that psychology's ultimate purpose is to find origins. Unlike Murray, Hall examined the history of the field. Murray (1938) rarely took that approach, although *Explorations in Psychology* had extensive citations of early literature. Murray wanted to find beginnings. As an embryologist, he watched life itself through a microscope. Later, he wanted to discover how thoughts and feelings began, and hoped that psychology and psychoanalysis would offer the world some answers.

Both James (1879) and Hall (1885) respected consciousness, since it addressed the fundamental *philosophical* question of what is the role of the individual in the world. James regarded a consciousness as needed for any advanced life form, since it added something to the raw human brain – a collection of neurons and processes at that cellular level. Dewey (1884) reminded psychologists that consciousness and other mental phenomena remained biological entities, and that developments in physiology drove advances in psychology. Dewey could see the limits of biology. Like Murray, he appreciated the deep mental life of human beings, and he wrote that ordinary biology or neuroscience would not make that aspect fully known, nor could physiology explain social roles.

American psychology certainly did not begin with Henry Murray, but as he was growing up and preparing for a lifetime of research, he became exposed to the arguments described in this chapter. The late 19th and early 20th centuries saw a renaissance in psychology in the US, which came to be known as the New Psychology. Dewey

enthusiastically wrote of this period as a revolution in the field, mainly for its brave break from classical philosophy and its willingness to adopt the rigors of laboratory science to questions of mental activity. Most of those who brought about this New Psychology trained under Wundt in Leipzig, and returned to the US determined to answer those questions with the clarity of quantitative studies.

The exactness of science did not prevent serious dissent, particularly among those trying to clarify what constituted the nature of mind. Further arguments raged between the structuralists and functionalists. Structuralism came first but seemed to give way to functionalism, but perhaps the most important lesson would be the level of borrowing and agreement from both sides.

Unfortunately, strong personalities and emotional posturing divided the psychology faculty at Harvard for decades. Henry Murray helped keep the hostilities going, and found himself the victim of ongoing resentment. He responded to this alienation by severing the Clinic from the rest of the department as best he could. He also flaunted an anti-empiricist stand that he really did not support, and this hurt personology. Murray trained in hard science, and its methods were always part of his regimen. *Explorations in Personality* developed from a methodical project, and science would later inform Murray's work with military intelligence. Still, Murray devoted too much energy condemning the work of others, while incorporating so much into personology. Murray's endeavors would go beyond psychology, and that only further isolated him from his peers. Literature, particularly the novels of Herman Melville, seemed to draw on the complexities of personality and human interaction. To Murray, lab studies, elegant as they might have been, paled in comparison to the dramatic

descriptions of Ahab's behavior. One might have expected him to turn to literature. He nearly did, but found the community of critics pleasing but too narrow for his interests.

Shortly after reading *Moby-Dick*, Murray discovered the writings of psychoanalysis. Here was something that went far deeper than psychology, and had the aura of mystery as well. Psychoanalysis did not fit with most university psychology departments, and Murray joined the Harvard faculty hoping to base a career on an eclectic mix that certainly included Jungian analysis.

Chapter VI

Whitehead and the Meanings of Events

Henry Murray drew together the varied roots of personology, but he did not always make it clear where they originated. In Chapter 5, psychology's origins in philosophy were explored. In this chapter and the next, very specific philosophies relating to mathematics, science and medicine will further shape personology. Murray obviously took a broad approach to psychology. He developed personology from a core of Jungian analysis and ideas he shared with Morgan, along with a search for themes that he discovered in *Moby-Dick* and *Pierre*.

Significantly, Murray did not limit his system to Melville, Jung and Morgan. Always both enthusiastic and quick to discard, Murray benefitted from the intellectual stability and support of Jung and Morgan. Neither his mentor nor his mistress minded this eclecticism; both encouraged him to pursue any areas that could further illuminate the psyche. Murray continually revised personology as he encountered new ideas, either from reading or actual meetings. According to Murray, static ideas destroyed all that psychology could offer. Perhaps too often, he expressed the opinion that the static element in psychology was best represented by most of his Harvard colleagues. In a line that obviously delighted his admiring students, Murray (1967) actually complained that too many of them "militantly engaged in a competitive endeavor to mould psychology in the image of physics..." (p. 293).

A more accurate portrayal of Murray should reflect that while he participated in many fields, he never fully committed to the philosophy of one. In Murray's world, new ideas came flooding in, and that stimulated him. While another man might have felt

overwhelmed, Murray constantly expanded personology whenever possible. His use of Whitehead's philosophy regarding events added to Murray's growing concept of the personality. Whitehead also wrote of the permanence of identity, which might have deepened Murray's ideas, yet strangely, Murray never adapted this to personology to any extent. Psychologists such as Gordon Allport conceptualized personality by its traits, and that suggested an internal structure, rather than behavioral or learning theory. Murray took this aspect of Allport's thinking and compared traits to Freudian complexes (Murray, n.d., "Complexes, a Discussion"). Murray generally accepted the internal drives of psychoanalysis, but not in the precise Freudian mold. Murray viewed drives as existing in a state of tension with the environment. Like the trait theorists, Murray believed that personality suggested consistency, a challenge to those who thought situations generated behavior.

Through a special friendship with the mathematician-philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, Murray began to understand the significance of permanence and change. For psychologists, Whitehead posed the question of how one recognizes something over time, and how the individual expects an object to change or remain stable. In 1959, Murray noted the importance of Whitehead's "*momentary process*," in that anything that is real exists only in the present tense (*italics Murray's*). He wrote that Whitehead influenced him to appreciate that an event becomes significant through the human processes of sensation, apperception and interpretation. In terms of personality, Murray gradually understood that his system needed to address how the individual forms and maintains relationships. Murray looked for these patterns, which incorporated Freudian objects and drives, and he found that Whitehead's philosophy would accept them (Murray, 1959a).

In his "Murr" sketch, Murray (1967) went so far as to credit Whitehead for giving him the idea of developing a system of psychology.

Whitehead

Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) was already in his 60s and a distinguished academic in his native Great Britain when he came to Harvard in the 1920s. The Cambridge-educated mathematician-philosopher emerged as an original thinker, and particularly wanted "... if possible to prove, ...that *mathematics is a part of logic* ... [and] a separate 'philosophy of mathematics' simply does not exist..." (Whittaker, 1948, p. 283). Ultimately, Whitehead went against conventional wisdom and wanted "to reduce logic to be a branch of mathematics" (p. 284). The issue of which field incorporated the other was central to Whitehead's interest in classification. Through classification, Whitehead hoped to find the origins of things, a Murray-esque goal.

Whitehead's scholarship has relevance to psychology for three major reasons. Whitehead hypothesized about the scientific basis of organization, events, and the continuity of identity. Like Murray, Whitehead frequently waxed philosophical, and considered broad topics such as education and religion (DeBurgh, 1939; Hocking, 1961; Johnson, 1943). Religion and its role in the 20th century particularly bedeviled Murray. Whitehead's foray into psychology, admittedly from the perspective of a mathematician, would be more applicable to perception than personality. Whitehead regarded the concept of experience as something entirely within the senses. For example, if one sees a white rose at the top of a bouquet, then turns away for five minutes, will the flower still be there? Can five minutes change the rose's existence, or, focusing on the perceiver, will the *experience* of the rose differ, and if so, how?

In his more poetic moments, Whitehead spoke of the “thread of identity,” meaning how an object retains its identity over time. Originally, he applied his ideas to objects rather than personalities. At his broadest, he wrote of the “eternal object,” which was anything that existed apart from everything else man knew. He used numbers as examples, but he meant that the quality of separateness – not lasting forever – made it “eternal” (Whittaker, 1948, p. 291). Whitehead could see more in numbers than Murray, but Murray, too, looked for eternal objects. In a sense, the themes in TAT stories theoretically existed apart from the stimulus plates and directed an individual’s life.

Whitehead’s scholarship may seem far from psychology until one considers that he wrote of “linear objective reals,” an adaptation of Michael Faraday’s “lines of force” (Whittaker, 1948, p. 285). Kurt Lewin (1890-1947) applied fields to psychology as a model to explain the way an individual acts on another, or exerts influence on the objects around him or her (Berscheid, 2003; Mey, 1972). This is more than a semantic similarity; both Lewin and Whitehead attempted to define and categorize mental phenomena. Lewin, like Murray, found studying people directly to be extraordinarily useful, and also like Murray, he found himself at odds with behaviorists and neuroscientists. Lewin theorized that manifested behaviors resulted from the confirmation of intrapersonal and environmental factors (Lewin, 1936). Berscheid (2003) described the environmental components as the literal place and the activities of other people. Faraday tried to explain how matter behaved from the standpoint of physics, and Whitehead wanted to elaborate on that philosophically. If human behavior could be predicted or calculated, the individual’s personality and the situation guided it, not instincts or a stimulus-response reaction.

Murray synthesized the works of Whitehead and Lewin into personology, but he was personally closer to Whitehead, and Whitehead encouraged Murray to apply his theory about matter to groups of people. Murray (1959a) wrote of them, "I owe much to the incomparable Alfred North Whitehead and the incomparable Kurt Lewin, nothing less than the conviction that concrete reality is to be found only in the momentary" (p. 21)

Lewin remained a lifelong psychologist, while Whitehead and Murray explored beyond the confines of any academic area. Inspiration for Murray frequently came in indirect ways, yet still moved him. The concluding section of this chapter will draw attention to the implications for changing culture that Murray traced to the ideas of Whitehead. Robinson (1992) described their relationship, and particularly the closeness that Whitehead and his wife enjoyed with Christiana Morgan.

As yet, Murray's archival sources that reflect Whitehead's thinking and his influence on personology have not been explored, but will be here. Murray developed personology using the ideas of both Whitehead and Lewin. How a personality remains intact over time was at least partially conceptualized with Whitehead's organism theory; additionally, Whitehead helped shape Murray's views about apperception. In an article based on an informal experiment Murray conducted, he reminded his peers, without citing other psychologists, that Whitehead taught that an individual responds to the outside world via his or her senses, and then has an emotional response (Murray, 1933). There, Murray applied Whitehead's philosophy to a specific study. In "Preparations for a Comprehensive System," Murray (1959a) wrote that Whitehead showed him how an entity, human or otherwise, processes an external event, such as encountering an object.

The events or experiences become building blocks for relationships. Everything in nature is related.

Whitehead's Theory of Organism

During the 1920s, the academic community tended to view man and nature as mechanistic. As it applied to the natural world, scientists wanted to be able to study it by breaking it down into processes (Henderson, 1926). People, volcanoes and cactuses were merely the sums of their processes, and the integration of it all was not as important as understanding the small operations. The most complicated aspects of biology would eventually be known and conceptualized as something entirely predictable. The mental functioning of humans and animals would be explained away in terms of instincts or, more germane to psychology, stimulus-response. In the second chapter of *Explorations*, Murray (1938) stated that neither Whitehead nor he felt comfortable conceptualizing mental functions so mechanistically. Psychologists would continue to use the term "mechanism," although Whitehead scoffed that no one had a meaningful definition applicable to the mind.

Whitehead began developing his theoretical system by questioning the basic premise that man could only understand the world by sensations and perceptions. Like Murray, he realized that what someone perceived could be distorted by individual subjective processes. Both considered the natural world as a series of patterns, and the patterns interacted with each other to create the environment. Rather than focus on the most predictable aspects of the world, as a zoologist might, Whitehead preferred to study how humans received and interpreted that information (Broad, 1948; DeBurgh, 1939).

Although he did not use the word, Whitehead seemed to be talking about apperception in his 1937 "Remarks," when he said, "Nor can I discern any reason, apart from dogmatic assumption, why any factor in the universe should not be manifest in some flash of human consciousness" (Whitehead, 1937, p. 181). Apperception means the perception and interpretation of a stimulus. More than just sensing something – that would be perception – apperception suggests a cognitive act of creating an internalized concept of what has been experienced. The internalized concept would naturally vary between individuals, and it may not be an accurate reflection of the external entity. This likely reinforced Murray's use of the TAT as a way to access that process (Murray, n.d., "Notes on TAT," "Observations on TAT").

If one accepts Whitehead, then the problem of what is true becomes a troubling issue. As Lawrence J. Henderson (1926) described it, Whitehead believed that "organization [is] the most concrete reality of nature" (p. 289). The biochemist Henderson viewed his colleague as more of a biological thinker than a mathematician, and, like Murray, Whitehead found it useful to trace the origins of scientific theories. That enabled Whitehead to challenge them. Lowe (1948) summed up Whitehead's organization or organism theory as when form and process become ongoing, or when a "pattern evolve[s]" (p. 227). As most living things share the same elements, only the unique patterns generate the widely varying forms. Ultimately, Whitehead would theorize about the relationship between atoms and human groups (Mittel, 1968). Whitehead considered and revised some of the theories of chemist Robert Boyle and philosopher John Locke, and applied them to organized bodies. Mittel (1968) noted that in Whitehead's theory, "objects" might be created by, and consist of "processes" rather

than inert matter (p. 325). How the groups became functional would be the important consideration. The German word *Gestalt* refers to this wholeness. Whitehead wrote of “organism,” but still allowed for the interaction between external objects and the individual perceiving them. The Harvard philosopher William Ernest Hocking (1961), a friend to both Whitehead and Murray, remembered Whitehead saying in 1924, “Mind is inside its images, not its images inside the mind” (p. 515).

In undated notes, Murray explored why a subject produces a cohesive story when exposed to a projective test. First, Murray always hoped that the story would be organized and complete. He suggested that emotional factors, as well as cognitive functioning, enabled the mind to create something intact from a single scene presumably taken out of any context. That would be the TAT, of course. Murray proposed that the affective parts of the mind guided that story, but the important issue was that the subject took a small, individual experience, namely seeing a picture, and responded with something unique and whole (Murray, n.d., “Chapter 1”).

Organism became important to personology for two reasons. First, Murray applied it to the process of apperception, meaning an integration of an experience with the outside world. In two chapters, “Research Planning: A Few Proposals” and “Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System,” Murray (1944, 1959a) credited Whitehead for giving him a hypothesis to guide his personality research. Whitehead also reinforced the biological aspects that Murray had already incorporated into his personology. This becomes obvious in the “Preparations” piece, in which he briefly described cellular physiology as a well-integrated activity.

Whitehead on Events. Earlier in his career, Whitehead had fallen in with those who admired the work of modern French philosopher Henri Bergson, who believed that the source of all knowledge was found in change (Whittaker, 1948). “[C]hange is the *primary reality*” became the capstone of the Bergsonians (p. 286). Whitehead refined this, claiming that change should be treated as a series of “*events*” (p. 286). This powerful aspect of Whitehead’s philosophy can be reduced to defining reality and events. C.D. Broad (1948), a fellow scholar who wrote Whitehead’s obituary, said that he wanted to develop a theory of reality that would unify the concepts of religion, sensations and perceptions. At one point, he divided all knowledge into physical qualities, perceptions and movement, but he needed to revise his system as his beliefs advanced (Whittaker, 1948). By considering the experience of the external world as a collection of events, Whitehead achieved a certain unity. This fits elegantly with his emphasis on organization, since a series of internal events create the individual’s experience. Later, as Whitehead began to consider how people interact, he applied organism to groups, noting the ways in which social activities became identifiable events. A successful series of events led to cohesive, healthy groups that functioned as a kind of organism or system (DeBurgh, 1939; Lowe, 1948; Mittel, 1968; Seaman, 1955.)

In keeping with his emphasis on change, Whitehead conceptualized all psychological activity in terms of discrete events. In his philosophy, process and events drove the natural world as well, and they became part of his organistic theory (Henderson, 1926; Whittaker, 1948). In the same chapter fragment cited above, Murray described the role of apperception in the formation of life themes in an individual. He briefly described “complementary projection,” which he defined as a subject’s response

to some external object, and that object's influence dominates the interpretation, rather than the subject's internal material. Here, Murray discussed an event – the stimulus and an individual responding to it – that has the potential of changing that individual, and actually adding something to that person's very personality (Murray, n.d., Chapter 1, p. 6). In notes informally titled "Human Nature Personology," he briefly traced the development of desire, both a blessing and a flaw in human nature. Murray inferred that desire was born out the realization that something was not available. Again, an outside stimulus generated an internal event that changed people (Murray, n.d., "Human Nature Personology").

In *Explorations*, Murray (1938) introduced terminology that suggested internal functioning that enabled humans to cope with their environments. "Actones," the most basic of these, meant a set action response, while "verbones" were established speech patterns. Murray seemed to be finding Whitehead's complex pattern types within behavior. Whitehead would likely have regarded these phenomena as repeated events.

More broadly, Murray found the concept of events useful to his system because like Heraclitus, Whitehead acknowledged that all life is based on change. Through his friend, Murray learned that an event, the temporary interaction between at least two entities, becomes one of life's fundamental units. Murray added an aspect of physics to Whitehead's idea, in that Murray (1959a) also considered the length of time for the interaction and if it had a major or minor impact on the existence of either entity. Here, Murray revised Whitehead's events to include "submicro" events for those most short-lived and with limited changing power, to a "macro" event that would be highly significant and last longer. One must also remember that by definition, an interaction

suggests some action, which Murray also included in the event as a natural part of human behavior. He compared a response based on emotional activity to the workings of a cell, in that it was equally a biological process. Murray maintained that this conceptualization exceeded mechanism for its clarity and effectiveness in addressing the complexities of human behavior, such as creativity (Murray, 1938, 1959b/1981). Unlike the vagaries of mechanism, Murray's (1959b/1981) adaptation of Whitehead's organism and events accounted for higher functioning. Murray used events as observable, discrete processes, and placed them in a biological context.

Whitehead and the Continuity of Identity. Whitehead is best remembered today as one who considered the issue of identity, and the stability of such a concept. Developmental psychologists have traditionally given this more attention than personality specialists, but Murray incorporated some of Whitehead's views into his own school. Lowe (1948) noted that according to Whitehead, all human life becomes part of history. This certainly fit with what James (1879, 1890/1918) had written a generation before, but it was a lesson worth reinterpreting. The academic climate of mechanism had pushed aside James. Whitehead approached the issue with logic far different from James's.

Ever the mathematician, Whitehead relied on the example of numbers to show that the continuity of identity existed in the natural world. He would apply identity to all objects, living and nonliving, in that world. This was an integral part of Whitehead's theory. He hoped that this enhanced identity could be applied to man's relationship with his environment and, ultimately, how groups relate to outsiders (Johnson, 1943; Lowe, 1948). Murray (n.d.) certainly taught a similar lesson to his classes, according to his notes on "Human Nature Personology." Applying a more psychodynamic approach to

identity formation, he discussed the foundations of personality in another set of notes, titled "Complexes, a Discussion." Here, Murray found that early traumas and psychological issues became the core of an individual's identity and functioning (Murray, n.d., Complexes, a Discussion). Murray (1960b/1981) fleshed this out in a published piece, titled, "Two Versions of Man." This article also featured something unique, how both Whitehead and Murray viewed religion and identity. Murray relied on his mentor here, and agreed that faith ultimately makes individuals better people.

An honest evaluation of the extent to which continuity of identity influenced Murray arouses skepticism. With this concept, Whitehead came closest to grappling with a major psychological issue, and Murray appeared to make relatively little use of it. In "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System," Murray (1959a) suggested that some of Whitehead's work fell outside his grasp, but he still found much in Whitehead that reinforced what he believed about emotions and behavior. Still, this aspect was never fully incorporated into personology.

Psychologists today generally do not refer to Whitehead, and yet continuity of identity answers a fundamental question: how do we *know* another person? What would cue us that someone was a dear friend named Althea, and yet she no longer looked like the Althea we knew? Psychologists now live in a world where face transplants have been accomplished with reasonable success, so Whitehead's ideas should have renewed interest.

Harvard psychologist Daniel L. Schacter (1996) did not mention Whitehead by name, but alluded to something similar to the continuity of identity when he described the role of memory in recognizing another person. Far beyond face recognition (which is

based on other brain circuitry), having some familiarity with another saves us from having to rediscover the beliefs, temperament and typical behavior of that person. For the individual with reasonably intact memory functioning, a specific engram activates and an internal dossier becomes available and put to use. The engram lasts over time. Schacter described continuity of identity.

Whitehead's Lines of Thought. William Ernest Hocking (1961), Whitehead's colleague at Harvard, said that Whitehead reminded him that philosophy needed to be connected to the way people function. That required novel ways of researching and teaching. Whitehead often complained to Hocking, enabling the latter to compare a British student to a pioneer such as William James. Had James been from Britain, he would most certainly have found himself in either Oxford or Cambridge, and both institutions provided medical education. Hocking and Whitehead could not imagine a British physician moving from medicine to philosophy and psychology. This assessment also foreshadows the turn in Murray's career.

At Harvard, Josiah Royce influenced Whitehead to take a broad view of science. Soon, Whitehead considered the theories of Charles Peirce, John Dewey and James (Hocking, 1961; Malik, 1948). In fact, in a symposium given toward the end of his career, Whitehead thanked James and Dewey for serving and popularizing philosophy (Whitehead, 1937). Following Royce's example, other professors included or addressed other fields, such as mathematics and biology, with their philosophy. Hocking (1961) put it succinctly, writing that they "duly fused and [sought] joint philosophical expression" (p. 509).

Religion did not appear to be a strong initial feature of Whitehead's philosophy, but one of his former students, United Nations official and ambassador, Charles Malik (1948), wrote that religion played a role in his teachings. Malik recalled St. Augustine when he described his lectures on good and evil. Whittaker (1948), too, mentioned the Christian and Greek influences in his philosophy. He said that Whitehead saw godly power in man, and used the example of Plato. Plato said that mere mortals acted godlike when they created something, or made choices. Whitehead believed that Plato's thinking fit with Christianity.

Whitehead considered reality in terms of man and his interactions with nature. For human beings, knowledge of nature came through movement and whatever sensory systems delivered to the cognitive areas of the brain. Whittaker (1948) disagreed somewhat with Broad (1948), who wrote that Whitehead eventually questioned that man only understands the world via sensations and perceptions. Broad said that he tried to bring yet another type of unity to the human mind by joining what the brain perceives with the idiosyncratic psychological process of an individual. Here Whitehead included a role for "events" or experiences that shape an individual (p. 143).

Whitehead certainly brought human cognition to the center of the real world, well in keeping with his religious upbringing and humanism. W.G. DeBurgh (1939) described his comparison of psychological energy to that of physics. Here, the reality was man acting on the natural world, which suggested that human action could not be separated from nature. Nature gets a voice by what the body craves, how organs function, and how the person acts. Murray obviously concurred with this, particularly in his concept of

biological, or viscerogenic, needs. Murray would use biological and psychological needs to replace traditional Freudian drives in his personology.

According to Victor Lowe (1948), Whitehead incorporated form and process into reality. With form and process, reality becomes ongoing when a “pattern evolve[s]” (p. 227). Refining DeBurgh, Lowe elaborates on the issue of patterns in nature. Patterns have become part of reality, since animals, vegetables and minerals all share the same chemical elements. In a tribute to Whitehead, Lowe wrote that the pattern is the only real difference between a frog and a mountain. Patterns change from one entity to the next. He maintained that Whitehead and many other philosophers borrowed from Newton's theories of physics. They described something as real if it had permanence and could be distinguished from its environment. Lowe wittily said that comic strip figure Daddy Warbucks had a reality, using Whitehead's standard.

Lawrence J. Henderson (1926) felt that Whitehead's view of nature essentially redefined nature and introduced a new form of philosophy. In the 1920s, a mechanistic, materialistic trend had long been in vogue in the American academic community. Whitehead proposed organism, meaning “organization as the most concrete reality of nature” (p. 289). Henderson said that the key for his esteemed colleague was the realization that “the beginning of modern science as an anti-intellectualist movement [arose] from the perception that nature is more subtle than the human reason” (p. 290). Whitehead could be mystical (Malik, 1948), but he did not intend that in this instance. Nature played the major role in reality, and evolution had profoundly changed both nature and its most godlike species. He treated evolution as pattern development, which did not fit with the prevailing mechanism. Whitehead still understood mechanism's

attractiveness to intellectuals, and could see that it made a certain degree of intuitive sense, if one did not consider "events."

For Whitehead, natural and human events served as life's basic units. People had experiences, which might include passive events, such as sensing an external stimulus. He offered this new category as an auxiliary part of organistic theory, and a further effort to erode mechanism. He argued that differing perceptions and other experiences certainly measured change, and had the further advantage of relating it to human involvement (Broad, 1948; Lowe, 1948).

Whitehead and later, Murray, actually put mental activity in a biological hierarchy. Whitehead said that psychological functions dominated all other systems. Seaman (1955) contradicted his emphasis on human cognitive activity. Seaman reinterpreted Whitehead, reminding the academic community of Whitehead's original views about events that focused on matter at the molecular level and not experiences. Whitehead described the movement of particles not as a single event, but "a series of occasions, or an 'historic route'" (p. 223). This paralleled what Tolman and Murray said about vectors. In personology, vectors show the direction of the behaviors generated by needs. When a need existed, the perception of an appropriate stimulus elicited a directed response. Murray, too, might have described a behavior as following a historic route. Whitehead gave a philosophical grounding for traits, an ingrained way of processing and acting on external factors.

Organism and Psychology

Whitehead's contemporaries understood that he wanted the field of philosophy, and by extension, psychology, to appreciate mental activities beyond what was taken in

by the senses. Returning to his faith, he thought of God as part of the private lives of people (DeBurgh, 1939; Murray, 1949/1962/1981). Whittaker (1948) suggested that as he aged and considered his own mortality, Whitehead changed his views about the way people remembered key events in their lives. Whitehead echoed William James in his affinity for phrasing such as a “drop of experience,” suggesting that both thinkers gave every moment of life integrity by attending to them (Lowe, 1948, p. 228).

In 1968, more than two decades after Whitehead's death, N.S. Mittel explained how his philosophy related to the field of psychiatry. Mittel (1968) wrote of the problematic “ethnocentrism of scientific commitment” (p. 321). Whitehead's career spanned the era of many great psychological theorists, including Ivan Pavlov, John B. Watson, Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung. His attitude toward the empiricist movement within psychology differed little from Henderson's (1926) assessment of his “anti-intellectualist” criticism of science in general (p. 290). Whitehead (1937) told a group that “Nor can I discern any reason, apart from dogmatic assumption, why any factor in the universe should not be manifest in some flash of human consciousness” (p. 181).

Mittel (1968) began his article by criticizing Whitehead for not fully considering Freud in his analysis of human existence. Even mental phenomena came under his organistic theory, in that mental phenomena were likely to be made up of energy as all aspects of nature. In Whitehead's relatively few references to psychology, it became apparent that organism reflected his overarching mathematical-physics model that included social sciences, showing that his theory might be widely applied to other fields. Mittel indicated that Whitehead “regard[ed] nature as a system of events” (p. 322).

Whitehead kept an aspect of mystery in his views about mental phenomena, and assumed multiple causes for them. Freud allowed for multiple causes as well, but Mittel makes a stronger comparison between Whitehead's theory and the mathematical aspects of Lewin. Lewin, in turn, said that in the 1930s, he applied vectors, or directionality, as a way to explain psychoanalytic concepts (Lewin & Gold, 1937/1999).

Whitehead had a greater appreciation for the affective aspects of perception, rather than Pavlovian conditioning or the basic stimulus-response dyad. Mittel appreciated his criticism of the neuroscience of his day, writing that Whitehead blamed "...the physiology of perception [for being] partly responsible for our faulty, oversimplified impression of reality..." (p. 325). Mittel did not explain this statement, but he was likely referring to the limits of our sensory systems, and the need for a model that addressed how the human brain conceptualizes and organizes the bits of information passed on by our senses.

For Whitehead (1937) and Murray (1959a), cognition had no bounds, but could still be understood. Whitehead wrote "There is an implicit philosophical tradition that there are set limitations for human experience, to be discovered in a blue-print preserved in some Institute of Technology. In the long ancestry of humans, from oysters to apes, and from apes to modern man, we can discern no trace of such set limitation" (p. 181).

In the Broadest Sense

Whitehead and Murray shared certain interests and asked certain philosophical questions. Whitehead, the older man, came to Harvard when Murray was still a biochemical researcher. Both studied how scientific systems worked, particularly physiology, and both knew that animal physiology followed a teleological rule.

Teleology suggests that something follows a directional design. Whitehead, never a bench scientist, relied on his powers of introspection, found strong endorsement in Murray. Organismic science could overcome rigid science.

Murray's research on poultry embryos led him to conclude that life did not follow the set patterns of mechanism, but employed processes that could change along evolutionary lines. Differing systems within a single organism worked collaboratively (Robinson, 1992). Whitehead had already said that reality and change were basically the same thing, and that the 19th century Romantic biologists deserved vindication. Animal and plant life followed Darwinian principles, which gave them the power to change. Not everything out there had *consciousness*, but assuming that everything behaved passively was incorrect, too.

Both soon applied biological ideas to human behavior, but ultimately found them inadequate. Murray regarded social interactions as events that formed patterns, and likely because of Murray's interest, Whitehead considered the ultimate role of creativity. Whitehead concluded that it was yet another endocrinal function, and behaved "metabolic[ally]" (Robinson, 1992, p. 345). Murray (1938) said something quite similar in *Explorations*. He tried to describe most mental phenomena in the language of physiology – actones, verbones and motones (movement processing). Whitehead further concluded that the mind served as the true watch jewel that animated nature. Murray adapted organism to include political behavior, in which oppression, elections and governments all developed from events.

The inadequacy of Whitehead's original organism theory came from liberating human behavior from the laws of mechanism, and, at times, even Darwin. The teleology

here gave even the day-to-day activities of people a higher calling. People had the choice to follow morality and ethics or not. The two great wars of the last century showed both men that history or even life itself could be shattered by their final acts. Robinson (1992) stated the case nicely: "In the broader social and political frame of reference, Whitehead's emphasis on process was the analogue to an enhanced respect for the inherent worth and purpose of human activity. The retreat from mechanism had its parallel in a rejection of Social Darwinism and the tendency, most pronounced in the decades just before and after the turn of the century, to regard human beings as so many units in the grinding mechanism of evolution" (p. 88)

Almost thirty years earlier, HPC veteran Silvan Tomkins (1963/2006) praised both Whitehead and his former professor, Murray, when he wrote, "The revolutionary is like a child with an arrow in his hand, who brings his society to the brink of its destruction, but without whom that society would perish" (p. 399).

Of course, American psychology offered far less than a united front or academic orthodoxy. As in Europe, America's pioneering psychologists vigorously debated the truth of their various schools, creating a fractious atmosphere long before Murray decided to enter the field. He always viewed personology as an open system, and, as he said in "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System," "In my philosophy there are no absolute or inevitable laws, no enduring certainties: every observation, every inference, every explanation, and every prediction is a matter of less or greater probability" (Murray, 1959a, p. 50).

Could Murray have reached his conclusions about personology without Alfred North Whitehead? Perhaps the better question is what could Whitehead offer him that

his peers in psychology could not? The mathematician-philosopher indirectly contributed to Murray's ideas about personality. Many psychologists in Whitehead's time conducted highly empirical research on stimulus-response patterns, but they actually measured perceptual ability or reflex time. Personality or social functioning could not be conceptualized in those mechanistic terms. Organism allowed for evolutionary development, which explained why individuals showed certain dominant needs – those that enabled coping with press, or external demands – and why other needs became submerged.

Whitehead proposed that viable patterns would last, and Murray developed this in his future work on traits and motivation. A Murray scholar appreciates his goal of finding the foundations of personality, and Whitehead gave Murray the logic to claim the significance of need-press. Whitehead also gave him a need-press free from the mechanistic allusions of Freudian structures.

Chapter VII

On the Origins of a Thesis

Henry Murray searched for ultimate truths, but approached the world as a physician. He studied pathology in individuals, but worried more about social ills at a global level. In a medical career that lasted as long as his surgical residency and a biological research career that did not extend beyond writing his dissertation, he developed a respect for the teleology of life forms. Plants, animals and people all had complex physiological systems that could adjust to environmental needs. Everything had its purpose, or ceased to exist. The workings of disease and the natural resistance shown by organisms to combat germs and injuries brought Murray and many other scientists to Charles Darwin's door. The concepts of evolution, natural selection and genetic differences were nearly 60 years old when Murray received his medical education. His first choice of research, the development of chicken embryos, showed him the elegance of natural growth. The biological changes that he recorded all furthered the embryo becoming a hatchling. Never before had Murray come this close to finding life's beginnings, and he told Robinson (1992) that the experience amazed him.

At Columbia's College of Physicians and Surgeons and the Rockefeller Institute of Medical Research, Darwinian theory informed research and instruction. Two influential professors, Lawrence J. Henderson, of Harvard's biochemistry department, and Columbia's George Draper, brought Darwin's work into their teaching, and applied it in highly original ways.

Henderson, who served on Murray's Ph.D. committee, was also responsible for bringing Alfred North Whitehead to Harvard, where he remained for the rest of his life.

Henderson related natural selection and evolutionary adaptation to environments. This extraordinary step beyond Darwin jarred some of the basic ideas of biochemistry. Not all scientist at the time supported him, but Murray, of course, found him inspiring.

Henderson and Murray found biological underpinnings in the complicated mental and social lives of human beings. Murray eventually included Henderson's theory in personology. If an environment had an active biologically-based relationship to life forms, Murray could conceptualize environments acting on people psychologically.

Draper viewed disease from the perspective of individual differences. This pioneer of psychosomatic medicine taught that some people would be prone to illness due to their psychological makeup. Attempting to prove such a thesis through empirical research posed challenges, but Draper collaborated on projects in the 1920s and 30s that used highly selective physical traits and correlated them to medical conditions. These studies will be covered below, but here it suffices to say that Draper hoped to build up a bank of identifiable markers for disease. Murray would do something similar when he began cataloging needs, thema situations and motivators. Murray also bridged Draper's ideas to dynamic psychology and modern epigenetics.

Murray became the link between Henderson and Draper. As part of his eclecticism, Murray brought the tenets of biology into psychology. His approach made him different from others who considered themselves in the field of "biological psychology." That term is frequently associated with neuroscientists, particularly those who conducted animal research and based their models accordingly. Murray began his laboratory work with chicken eggs and he followed the physiological changes that took place with the developing chick. The dynamic mental action that drives individuals and

societies also resembled physiological processes, and this realization soon became the core of Murray's work. Murray and his mentors might not have moved in these intriguing directions had it not been for the work of Charles Darwin.

Beginning with Darwin

Charles Darwin (1809-1882) was one of the most important intellectual figures in modern times. He became a naturalist after his Cambridge education. Scientific education in pre-Victorian times meant producing mathematicians or medical doctors, which did not appeal to him. He joined the crew of a research vessel called the *Beagle* when he was in his early 20s, and so began a lifetime of collecting, drawing and analyzing biological specimens, mainly from Latin America, the Pacific and Indian Oceans (Darwin, 1845/2006; Gopnik, 2009).

Biological variations had yet to be part of university coursework, but Darwin came from a family and community that had an interesting scientific tradition. Charles's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), was a physician and scientific thinker who was a product of the Enlightenment (Elliot, 2003; "Erasmus Darwin," n.d.). Elliot (2003) described the Darwin family's hometown of Derby as an intellectual, as well as a manufacturing center in the English Midlands. Erasmus, and later Charles, associated with religious scholars, amateur paleontologists and local historians, all in an atmosphere that accepted Erasmus's views about change, creation and the violent advancement of life. Unlike the pastoral imagery shared by the ministers in their sermons, Erasmus told his followers that life could not survive if the lion lay with the lamb. Fighting and death prevailed, but "[r]eproduction triumphed over decay..." (p. 8). Given the turmoil that Darwinian views generated in the US (and continue to do so), it may be surprising that

much of what Erasmus and later, Charles theorized fit with 18th and 19th century Britain's mood of challenging government, religious thought and even the old ways of educating physicians.

While Erasmus based his ideas primarily from Derbyshire fossils dug up by collectors, Charles Darwin had the benefit of studying exotic flora and fauna, particularly from the Galapagos Islands and the volcanic, isolated region of Chile known as Tierra del Fuego, or the Land of Fire. Many have compared both areas to prehistoric worlds, with primitive and unique life forms. By "primitive," I refer to animals that literally survived as modern dinosaurs. The giant tortoises and iguanas struck Darwin as they do intrepid tourists today. The variety of related species inspired Darwin. His concept of natural selection developed from the observation that local finches had differing bills that enabled them to eat different foods. The birds found their niches and no longer competed with each other. The finch population and the environment balanced. The island iguanas were unusual marine reptiles that ate aquatic plants and shellfish. Most common iguanas found in Central and South America are arboreal and eat fruit (Darwin, 1845/2006), 1859/2006).

Darwin (1859/2006) described the process this way: "As many more individuals of each species are born than can possibly survive; and as, consequently, there is a frequently recurring struggle for existence, it follows that any being, if it vary however slightly in any manner profitable to itself, under the complex and sometimes varying conditions of life, will have a better chance of surviving, and thus be *naturally selected*. From the strong principle of inheritance, any selected variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form" (p. 451).

In his article on Erasmus Darwin, Elliott (2003) considered the influence of evolutionary theory on psychology. Biology as well as culture could explain the mental life of human beings, and Elliott alluded to the active role of environments.

Psychological functioning had natural advantages for people. As predators, humans did not have the most powerful physical attributes, so adapting to food gathering and, later, farming, helped our species.

Elliott (2003) did not mention Darwin's impact on Henderson or Draper, but the concept of a dynamic environment seemed to parallel Henderson's theory. Erasmus Darwin would likely have found an eager student in Henderson or Murray. Darwin believed that all human reactions grew out of four cognitive-affective "faculties," which were "irritability, sensibility, volition, and associability" (p. 9). The first obviously referred to anger, and the second could have meant intelligent decision-making. Volition is another word for the will. The last faculty could have a variety of applications, but Elliott concluded that Darwin had a very specific use. He wrote that, "Association explained the relationship between traits of character and life habits and the propensity for certain diseases, with the transmission of traits underpinning the broader developmental worldview" (p. 9).

Draper devoted his career to illustrating how psychological factors predicted the chances for developing diseases, while Murray considered how genetics shaped psychological makeup. Murray's *Explorations in Personality* (1938) tied mental activity to physiological processes, or at least *conceptualized* them in that way. He also believed that social development followed evolutionary channels. As a guest columnist for Edward R. Murrow's *This I Believe* series, Murray (1954/1981) suggested that having

relationships served individual and broader goals. Addressing a group of Phi Beta Kappa members in 1959, Murray (1960a/1981) discussed international polarization, and, as he and his audience lived through the Second World War, they could understand the existence of evil. Calling his speech "Beyond Yesterday's Idealisms," Murray acknowledged that Freud's theory and Melville's fiction gave evil its place in modern thinking. As in his Murrow piece, Murray again challenged contemporary Americans to find a means to find world peace and social justice.

Murray sketched this theme in undated notes on personology theory. He instructed his students on the role of the self, insisting that the goal of the self was "[t]o acquire many roles" (Murray, n.d., Personology "Theory" abbreviations, p. 2). Murray showed that the self had a personal agenda to fulfill, but it had multiple social roles. Again, relationships become salvation in a dangerous world, but one needs to read between those handwritten lines. Murray had high hopes for mankind, particularly Americans.

The Biomedical Origins of Personology

Murray's theory of psychology had its roots in Columbia University's medical school and the Rockefeller Institute of Medical Research. He became George Draper's student during his medical training from 1915 to 1919, while Lawrence Henderson became his mentor while he worked on his Master's in biology (1920), and his doctorate in biochemistry and embryology (1924-1927). As mentioned earlier, while his Ph.D was awarded by Cambridge University, Murray did the laboratory work at the Rockefeller Institute, under Henderson's supervision. Philosophically speaking, embryology fit with his search for truth. Beyond that, he used that biological determinism as a model for

needs in his later theory of psychology. The development of a need often began in childhood and would become entrenched over time. Press, those external pressures, often enhanced needs. As an organism reacted to environmental difficulties in order to survive, a need frequently drove it to behave in certain ways. This model addresses the functioning of simple protozoans, whose only needs may be food and water of certain salinity.

The emotional needs of people are far more complex, but they parallel the basics of biology. Murray's personology will be elaborated on in the previous chapters, but it is important to note that Murray's relatively brief period as a medical student and researcher enabled him to meet a community of scholars who influenced his intellectual development. George Draper and Lawrence J. Henderson would be the chief midwives of personology, and neither was a psychologist.

George Draper and the Theory of Constitution

In the years that Murray studied to become a physician (1915-1919), he had the opportunity to study with outstanding physician-educators. The caliber of his training and his growing reputation opened unique doors. Harvey Cushing (1869-1939), Harvard's innovative brain surgeon, invited Murray to intern on his unit. Forrest Robinson (1992) noted this without much comment, but I wonder why Cushing considered an intern with a visual impairment. Robinson said that Murray's athletic past made him a celebrity alumnus and desirable to Cushing. In a chapter on Cushing, British neurosurgeon Sir Geoffrey Jefferson (1985) described Cushing's relationship to Yale, where he had been a student and eventually returned to teach. Waxing nostalgic about

his student life, Cushing described what “impressed him most was the time idled away sitting on the fence and playing baseball...” (p. 52).

Murray planned a career in less applied areas of research than Cushing, although the two apparently kept in touch (Robinson, 1992). Murray obviously appreciated the encouragement from this American pioneer. Murray found his closest mentors after medical school, but one of his teachers made an impact that guided both his embryology and psychology projects. His lessons were simple; good doctors need only good senses and sharp minds.

George Draper (1880-1959) taught at Columbia when Murray attended medical school (College of Physicians and Surgeons Obituary Database, n.d.). Draper's name has been gradually forgotten, but he affected Murray and indirectly contributed to Murray's development as a psychologist. Draper promoted an alternative approach to clinical medicine, based on an individual's “constitution.” Medicine in Draper's day was taught with the goal of maximizing content. Students struggled to absorb textbook knowledge, rather than develop the means to stay abreast in a changing field. Medical education consisted of learning lists of diseases, parts of organs and other tasks (Cushing, 1940; Flexner & Flexner, 1941; Weber, 2009). Draper would have been a lone voice against this trend. In a letter to Murray sent when he was about to begin medical school, Draper (1915) wrote, “Variety of academic method is always illuminating” (p. 1).

Physicians naturally acted on the assumption that anyone in the examination room had something wrong. Canadian-born physician and philosopher Sir William Osler (1849-1919) addressed this, writing, “The student starts ... as an observer of disordered machines ...” (Camac, 1908, p. 146; Reid, 1931).

Since training directed doctors to find pathology, mental illness confounded them. Modern times moved mainstream society away from the idea of demonic possession, but that did not mean that people had better understanding than their Dark Age ancestors. Physicians since ancient times recognized that insults to gross neuroanatomy, such as tumors and combat injuries, could affect psychological functioning. Likewise, past civilizations made use of local substances with psychotropic qualities. When individuals showed signs that could not be explained by organic causes, the healers had little to go on. When Draper received his training, doctors blamed most mental disorders on heredity, and assumed little could be done. In the early 1900s, America's mental hygiene movement changed prevailing opinion from viewing mental illness as hopeless to the adoption of a social functioning-restored-through-rehabilitation model (Pressman, 1998). Both the genetic and adjustment models stressed pathology within the individual, but proponents of the adjustment model believed that physical treatments could change patients.

Beginning with fever therapy, in which psychotic patients were purposefully inoculated with malaria to calm symptoms, medical practitioners (not always psychiatrists or neurologists) used seizure-inducing drugs, insulin, surgery and electric shocks to relieve patients and make them easier to maintain in hospitals. Somatic treatments reached their zenith in the 1930s, and most declined with the discovery of antipsychotic medications in the 1950s. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) still remains in the medical armamentarium to combat major depression (Getz, 2009). The age of somatic treatments covered both Draper and Murray's careers, but neither endorsed them. Draper and Murray viewed signs and symptoms as manifestations of the patient's

constitution or personality, so those therapies that only worked on signs and symptoms would have seemed crude and missing the true problem.

Some of the more psychologically-minded in the medical profession never subscribed to physical approaches and treating mental patients as if they “caught” depression. Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) introduced psychoanalytic theory and a method for treating what he called neuroses. Freud incorporated some aspects of mechanism; he described repressed material as exerting pressure from the unconscious. A neurosis resulted from occult emotional memories impinging on the functioning at the conscious level. Freudians believed that dysfunction originated not with chromosomes, but with flawed parenting that caused an individual to use defenses.

George Draper, in his important article, “Science, Art, and the Patient,” urged readers to reconsider the health profession’s focus on what went wrong, and instead consider how an organism, in this case, a human, deals with an environmental challenge (Draper, 1927). He wrote, “Inside each sick man is an exquisitely sensitive, frightened, quite individual, living organism; but round about him hangs a smoke screen, an overwhelming array of physical, chemical, and psychical phenomena which fixes everyone’s attention” (p. 427).

Individuality took an important role in Draper’s (1927) conceptualization of health and disease, and particularly, how individual differences applied to sickness. Draper insisted that the patient served as an environment for disease, and germs would be at risk without human hosts. As suggested above, medicine itself followed a mechanical model – a given disease caused a given pathology – and few of Draper’s peers ever considered the human factor in this. Draper did not conceptualize this as resistance, but

something psychogenic. He used the term "constitution," and it *was synonymous* with personality (p. 429). In an almost revolutionary move, Columbia enabled Draper to create a Constitutional Clinic at Presbyterian Hospital.

Rather than concentrating on learning a body of material to pass a course or comprehensive examinations, Draper taught the importance of an open mind and observational skills. He appreciated that medical students could be taught basic psychology, and he promoted this at a time when teaching physicians had begun to take medical anthropology seriously. This area of anthropology bridged physical anthropology with cultural studies, as well as ecology. Scholars in the field described how lifestyles and living conditions impacted a community's chances of health or illness (McElroy & Townsend, 1979). Draper's approach of considering an individual's mental makeup had its origins in Classical Greece, where some of the world's first physicians recognized the importance of observation (Alexander & Selesnick, 1966). Some wrote texts that are still discussed today, but these early healers relied on their hands, eyes and intuitions to treat their neighbors, not the available literature. Draper (1927) put it aptly, writing "It has been said of Hippocrates that he was a doctor who thought like a naturalist. The modern physician is striving to be a doctor who thinks like a physicist and chemist in terms of fixed mathematical formulae" (p. 431).

Perhaps more than Hippocrates, Draper (1927) celebrated the doctor's sensory powers over what he already knew, and said that when the presenting evidence did not fit with medical knowledge, he should act on his intuition. He said that the more often people, especially doctors, depended on thinking, the less value they placed on the helpful powers of impact and other natural processes. Osler said something quite similar

but more directly, imploring medical school professor to "...take [the student] from the lecture-room, and take him from the amphitheatre – put him in the out-patient department, put him in the wards" (Camac, 1908, p. 145).

Draper (1927) criticized medical professionals for being too empirical in their approach, and recommended that they cultivate their creative faculties to assist patients. Draper compared physicians with artists, particularly painters, and suggested that the latter trust raw sensory input. Draper's artists found perfection only in what they observed, and regarded their intellectual skills as flawed.

Here, the great lesson of art is that the creative mind best understands man as a social being. If one had a better idea of how man interacts with the environment, it would likely be easier to determine the individual differences relating to disease (Draper, 1927). Draper seemed to be moving in a similar direction with the medical anthropologists, but he conceptualized diseases as being closely tied to psychological factors. In Draper's writings, humans were less at the mercy of their environments, in terms of keeping their health. Draper wrote that since one's personality or constitution could determine illness or wellbeing, doctors needed to understand the psychological functioning of their patients. The presenting complaint only introduced the patient. Draper wrote, "...these signs and symptoms bear the subtle stamp of the patient's personality" (p. 427).

At times, Draper could be confusing, in that he wavered between constitution strictly being personality or more biological factors. In an article for *Science*, Draper (1925) leaned toward medical anthropology, and viewed disease as an "environmental force" (p. 525). While he frequently revisited Hippocrates, he also considered Darwin,

Mendel and the role of genetics in disease. He used a Japanese folding screen analogy in that a human's existence, like the screen, was usually divided into three or four parts. When viewed together, one could appreciate the full vista or story. For Draper, that full story or view would be the analogy for the constitution. He wrote that a good clinician would know that certain trait combinations would be observed more frequently. Draper wanted to know how the patient's personality related to "anatomy (morphology), physiology, psychology and immunity" (p. 526). He specified a close relationship between the "...constitution and the glands," binding psychology with endocrinology. Many of his important journal articles described the rates of endocrine diseases among certain personalities.

Surprisingly, Draper (1925) credited phrenologists and physiognomists with being among the first to discover that psychological traits could have physical manifestations. While serious neuroscientists moved their old phrenology models to the curio cabinets, the eugenicists revived certain antiquated ideas about traits. The theory of eugenics mixed racism and biology to promote such social policies as limiting immigration and the forced sterilization of the mentally ill or intellectually challenged. Eugenics began in the 19th century and carried into the decades before World War II (Black, 2003; Spiro, 2009).

Draper (1925) gave the examples of Polish, Italian and White Anglo-Saxon Protestant patients and their likely personality differences and differing chances of having certain conditions. He compared these individual differences as similar to the certain traits that lead to occupational choices. He clarified this in his later article, in which he discussed a female patient of Irish descent. Draper (1927) described her as irritable because she was Irish and added that she had the appearance of someone of that ethnicity.

The line between constitution and ordinary prejudice seemed blurred. Reading Draper's work in 2010, it seems silly, but in the 1920s, many Americans, including the highly educated, held negative attitudes toward virtually all immigrant groups.

Perhaps some even closer to Draper's day might have ridiculed him. His assessment of the sad or anxious East European immigrant contrasts with the writing of Rebecca West (1940/1982), a prominent British author. In the mid-1930s, she and her husband traveled throughout Yugoslavia, resulting in her landmark book, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*, which was first published in 1940. She visited a tuberculosis hospital in Croatia, and the behavior of the patients and staff shocked her. She found the patients out of bed, chatting and generally acting like stereotypical Europeans at a spa.

West (1940/1982) came from a time when TB was rampant, and most of her contemporaries were familiar with both the illness and the disruption of a lengthy stay in a sanatorium. She opened her book with a hospital scene, in which she needed surgery. British, and, for that matter, American patients become submissive, frightened and childlike on the wards. Yugoslavian patients openly argued with the doctors and ordered the nuns as if they were chambermaids. West reported the doctors being pleased that the group found two patients becoming amorous; they said that love could help combat TB. The staff only banned political conversations; in a nation as ethnically divided as Yugoslavia, even a regional hospital likely had the fiery mix of Croats, Serbs, Dalmatians and others. West and her husband ate a dinner in the staff room that would have stunned the British on Christmas Night; the doctors said the patients ate the same meal and drank the same local brandy.

The author appeared to be referring to constitutional medicine when she compared East and West. The British medical community focused on destroying the disease and maintained an attitude of negativism – eliminating the disease while limiting the patients' diets and freedoms. The Croatian physicians followed the Slavic belief in promoting comforts and allowing their patients to feel as well as possible under the circumstances. Tuberculosis might be drowned in goodness (West, 1940/1982). Perhaps Draper's Slavic patients – strangers in Manhattan, without the English language and feeling ill – had their problems compounded by a doctor who wanted to restrict them.

Not all of Draper's (1925) work concentrated on ethnic traits. He found links between diseases and certain body types. He investigated pernicious anemia, a blood disease that is caused by a severe deficiency of vitamin B₁₂ associated with a gastric disorder (Dirckx, 2001). In 1927 Draper and Alvan L. Barach published their study on experimentally-induced anemia in distressed rabbits. Draper and Barach (1927a) injected a sample of rabbits with an intestinal bacteria that could cause pernicious anemia. In all cases the animals died, but not necessarily from their guts ceasing to function. They hypothesized that that the animals that did not develop the related blood complications *had some immunity* to that bacteria. The second stage of Draper and Barach's (1927b) study involved using fecal solutions from humans with pernicious anemia, and inoculating test rabbits. As with the previous experiment, some animals showed resistance that the investigators assumed was genetic. Barach directed the third stage of the project, in which he and Draper discussed those rabbits that survived the anemia and infection (Barach & Draper, 1927). They speculated that immunity to the bacteria led to remission.

Draper (1925) had numerous theories about pernicious anemia in humans. It appears in males and females, but he noted that both had a certain body type. Draper suspected that the bodies of anemia patients were not fully mature sexually. He compared these patients to eunuchs and said they could also have troubles with their ovaries or testes. He also found that asexual appearances could be linked to gall bladder and kidney conditions.

George Draper and C. Wesley Dupertuis (1939a) considered polio (at the time called infantile paralysis) and individual traits. They worded the goal of their study a bit more quaintly: "the evaluation of the personal identity or constitutional characters of the paralyzed child or adult" (p. 87). They went on to write that "...Human Disease represents a conflict between a living individual and some specifically adverse element of its environment..." (p. 87).

Draper and Dupertuis (1939a) analyzed the ways in which people responded to a germ in their environments. They considered cases in which certain individuals did not develop the disease, even when neighbors and even their families caught it. They noted that not all people became sick in equal ways. They also acknowledged that not all physicians and researchers agreed with the constitutional theory, but they mentioned an important body of supporting literature, some dating to about 1800. Material from the early 19th century actually predated knowledge of how polio spread, but these first investigators focused on individual differences and identified certain body types linked to the disease. The sources used by Draper and Dupertuis indicated that the healthiest-looking children were most at risk, and convinced them that heredity played a significant role in susceptibility.

Draper and Dupertuis investigated available data on hundreds of subjects from America and Scandinavia, and found a number of notable physical traits associated with the polio infection. They reported patients had large heads, more moles than average and large freckles (Draper & Dupertuis, 1939a). They identified some specifically inherited traits, such as enlarged incisors, commonly called “buck teeth,” and having excessive birthmarks, as increasing a child’s chances of having more symptoms if they had the disease (Draper & Dupertuis, 1939b). Draper revisited another concern, asexuality, or in this case, underdevelopment. Draper and Dupertuis (1939a) described children with faces of “fetal” appearance and small genitals (p. 91).

In one of his later research projects, Draper, along with Helen J. Ramsey and Dupertuis, explored his theory at the cellular level. Draper already proposed that individual differences applied to animals and he assumed in humans, but he had not determined if cells could show trait variations. They vaguely wrote of cellular “behavior,” and said that blood cells were likely to have “constitutional characters” (Draper, Ramsey & Dupertuis, 1944, p. 864). They looked at polio, peptic ulcers, and diseases of the heart and gall bladder. Draper and his colleagues did not run a strictly empirical study, particularly by today’s standards, since there was no control group of healthy subjects. They took cell cultures from diagnosed patients. An interesting aspect of their discussion addressed the issue of individual differences only manifesting themselves with the addition of a disease. They proposed that good health might not have caused a trait to show up. The authors said that in future work they might find a factor other than blood that could explain these presumably constitutional differences.

A reviewer identified only as H.W.M. (1931), in a piece on Draper's book *Disease and the Man*, said that Draper encouraged medical staff to consider patients as whole individuals, not medleys of pathology. The holistic approach to practice had significance to George Draper, but that did not convey the full picture of constitutional medicine. Draper urged doctors to be creative, and to understand that medical knowledge can be in error. Draper conceptualized disease as working in the unknown, in much the same way that Henry Murray described the human psyche as having "depth." Draper described work with patients in an explorer's mode of thinking, in which he prepared himself for any encounter. Murray, always the more exuberant speaker and writer compared to any of his teachers, often used the lingo of exploration or diving to describe psychology. In one of the tamer lines from "The Case of Murr," Murray (1967) wrote of his passion for the "enticing, primitive, mysterious, and unsurveyed regions of the psyche" (p. 301).

Alvan L. Barach (1895-1977), Draper's collaborator in the 1927 polio research, knew Murray in medical school, and they remained close afterward. Barach had an independent and highly celebrated medical career. When aviator Floyd Bennett was dying of pneumonia in April 1928, Canadian authorities arranged for Barach to try to save his life. Despite Barach's efforts and serum flown in by Charles Lindberg, the patient died ("Medicine: Pneumonia Flight," 1928). As physician to W. Averell Harriman, Barach found himself advising British doctors by telephone in March 1942. Harriman, then serving as President Franklin Roosevelt's envoy, developed a serious food-related illness while in Ulster. Officials feared that the envoy's food had been

deliberately poisoned, and there was also a debate over either a salmonella or paratyphoid diagnosis (Hedley-Whyte & Milamed, 2008).

The medical community remembers Alvan Barach today for developing inhalation therapy for chronic respiratory patients. The Barach materials in the Murray Papers include a photograph of the mobile oxygen equipment that he invented. Barach considered homeostasis, or the body's attempts to balance itself. The concept of homeostasis is not new in medicine, but Barach built on it by describing it as an "adaptive" function. There he applied Draper's individual differences to the basic process, since not every patient could adjust to pathology. He sent Murray a 1971 letter to the editor from the *Journal of the American Medical Association*, pertaining to kidney complications in patients with lung disease. Barach scrawled "Harry, note I'm still (egoistically) pitching. My *adaptive* homeostasis 1931 was philosophical, too," and "Just being accepted" (Petty & Neff, 1971). One of the authors personally sent the page to Barach.

More than four decades after being Draper's students, Barach and presumably Murray could apply his lesson to contemporary research. Murray's friend continued with adaptive homeostasis. In one of his frequent missives, Barach (1973a) confessed that his latest work had "a *tiny* original slant," but that Goethe himself once said "Who writes an original..." (p. 2). More than two months later, Barach (1973b) regarded "psychological homeostasis" as only "an idea, a venture."

Draper, of course, had an active correspondence with Murray. By the early 1930s, Draper complained to Murray that "There is no doubt that the 'wish' etiology of somatic disease is the most difficult one of all to 'prove,'" but hoped that an article on

peptic ulcers would further his point (Draper, 1932?, p. 1). On page two of his letter, Draper insisted that the chance to have a disease depended on the “constitutional capacity” of the would-be patient. Murray obviously responded to his old professor, since in an undated letter fragment Draper praised “the rising tide of proconstitution [sic] thought” (Draper, n.d.).

The approach to medicine first propounded by Draper and completely adopted by Barach would have appealed to Murray. Murray's (1938) personology included bodily organs responding to drives that could vary by the individual. Certainly, environmental press could have a range of effects, and this is where Murray began to consider motivations. It followed that psychological traits had adaptive capabilities as much as the physical ones, so Murray paid close attention to expressed motivations, particularly on projective tests. The motivations could tell him how the individual adjusted to internal pressures and environmental stresses (Murray, n.d., “Chapter 1,” n.d., “Projection”).

Perhaps the most interesting aspect here was that Murray, Draper and Barach formed the intersection of personology, clinical medicine and psychosomatic medicine. They all addressed common ground, but in highly different language. Murray never wanted to fully wear the psychoanalytic mantle, but only because he found it too limiting. Still, in one of his most famous case histories, “American Icarus,” Murray (1955/1981) described a neurotic student who was sexually attracted to the allegedly abusive family housekeeper. This young man reported being a fairly active child who enjoyed sports, but an unspecified illness stopped him during puberty. In the analysis of the student he identified as “Grove,” Murray relied on almost pure Freudian theory to show him as

sexually repressed, angry and resorting to physical symptoms, along with a need to achieve, as a cover for the neurotic material.

Professionally, Draper and Barach addressed medical issues rather than psychopathology, but both, particularly Draper, believed that mental components related to illness. This is psychosomatic medicine, but it lacked Freudian symbolism. Draper used peptic ulcers as the model for his belief system, but the fact that abdominal pain was the primary symptom did not tell him much about the nature of a patient's psychology. Grope became sick when he began his sexual development and already had an object close by, suggesting that his problem had an affective origin. Not all people in the same family or who ate a similar diet developed ulcers, and Draper speculated on the personality or constitution of those who did.

The Small Worlds of Lawrence Henderson

Lawrence J. Henderson (1878-1942) synthesized much of what Whitehead theorized and applied it to biology. He had a much larger role in Murray's life, and encouraged him to think in terms of how biological entities function in their environments, along with the role of individual differences. Henderson mentored Murray, and he recommended him for his first post at Harvard. In 1924, Murray had not yet found psychology when he began his Ph.D. program, but he did some work in Harvard's biology department, where Henderson was a senior professor of what was then called biological chemistry (Mayer, 1968; Robinson, 1992).

Henderson pursued an unusual line of research, one that amalgamated basic Darwinian evolution with Whitehead's organism. Henderson said that an environment existed within the bodies of living things. "Adaptability," a term often raised by

biologists, had multiple dimensions in Henderson's theory, with creatures changing according to the demands of their living conditions, but also providing living systems within their bodies. Henderson regarded blood as a sea, and a cell as a minute land mass, with a nucleus and mitochondria existing as independent living things, too. Henderson (1913) credited Darwin without hesitation, and illustrated how he built on Darwin's theory when he wrote, "Darwinian fitness is compounded of a mutual relationship between the organism and the environment. Of this, fitness of environment is quite as essential a component as the fitness which arises in the process of organic evolution; and in fundamental characteristics the actual environment is the fittest possible abode of life" (p. 105).

In his writings, Henderson promoted the work of a Canadian scientist, Archibald Macallum, who actually experimented with seawater transfusions decades earlier. Macallum believed that early life forms such as protozoans lacked blood, but the water they lived in substituted it. Speaking at a Harvard symposium directed at the public, Henderson (1922) said, "It has been suggested by Professor MacCallum (sic) that our blood is, so to speak, descended from sea water, that in the course of evolution somehow or other the fluids of the body originated as sea water" (p. 409). Henderson (1940) clarified this in a tribute to Macallum, writing, "Observing that the blood of marine invertebrates resembles sea water as it is found today, while the body fluids of vertebrates differ widely in respect of their inorganic constituents, he suggested the hypothesis that the present composition of the fluids of vertebrates corresponds to that of sea water of the Cambrian or Silurian ocean" (p. 143).

Simon Baruch (1908) promoted the use of baths and enemas for a variety of illnesses in the 19th century. Like Macallum and Henderson, he believed that as a natural compound, it had healing qualities for any irritation. Plain water often worked, but saline solutions could be especially effective, because of life evolving from a marine environment.

Henderson (1913) believed that his environmental theory was the natural extension of Darwin's logic, Whitehead's theory, as well as from chemistry and physics. Whitehead, who came to Harvard at Henderson's invitation, had used mathematics and physics to establish the idea of set patterns as a potential measurement in biology and psychology. Henderson questioned how matter could exist, if not by established patterns, which he called "laws." Evolution depended on this model, and evidence for evolution was evident. Henderson described one pattern as mutuality; life forms need predictable environments, and actually follow environmental patterns (Creighton, 1918).

The earth itself became an important consideration. Henderson (1914, 1922) noted that hydrogen, carbon and oxygen were, of course, key elements, and that water and carbonic acid were life's fundamental chemicals. Henderson (1913) wrote of the special properties of water and carbon dioxide that enabled them to create a "stable environment" (p. 108). The mutuality became quite clear when he explained that any form of life "must carry on an active exchange of matter and energy with that environment" (p. 108; also see Henderson, 1916b). Henderson (1916a) prepared the philosophical groundwork for Alvan Barach's homeostais, using the volume of urine as a benchmark. Unlike Barach, Henderson regarded the role of urinating as a means of returning water to the environment.

Henderson often speculated about the uniqueness of the earth's organic compounds. For Henderson (1916b, 1920), the properties of hydrogen, carbon and oxygen became extraordinarily enhanced when combined. He speculated about the different elements and resulting compounds, but believed that other chemicals could produce different life forms from what already existed. He proposed that any system could be productive, in response to those who criticized him for having a selection bias. It had become quite easy for those who disagreed with his views to stress that Henderson used the successful example of earth to prove the point that chemicals become life generating. Henderson claimed that he studied the entire periodic table. One sees close adherence to Whitehead's thought when Henderson asserted that mechanism, a set pattern observed in the "behavior" of matter, exists in nature.

This, too, was somewhat controversial at the time. Henderson (1920) claimed that he could not find a more effective model than mechanism to explain how elements reacted. He could understand how some critics levied their objections. In "Mechanism, from the Standpoint of Physical Science," Henderson (1918) wrote that mechanism held the dominant view in science, but, still adhering to Whitehead, he clarified the point that mechanism could not explain how matter and living things organized themselves. "The best available explanation of the pattern of organization is natural selection. But natural selection is at present not stated in mechanistic terms, ..." (p. 572).

Henderson (1918) reminded his contemporaries that patterns of life had been a source of debate for biologists and philosophers both. He expected the arguments to rage on, especially since pattern-formation was not an easy construct to apply to an experiment. He mentioned that leading geneticists of the day did not regard studying

patterns as part of basic science. For those who could not accept mechanism, its opposite, vitalism, could apply. Henderson emphasized a higher force in science, what he called the “directing agent” (p. 573). This 1918 article showed a contradictory vein in his logic. While Henderson first said that mechanism fit with natural selection, he also suggested that it could not explain the unusual well enough for a biological theory. The unusual, sometimes labeled “sports” or mutations have always been the basis for natural selection.

Henderson (1916c) understood that some scientists felt uncomfortable explaining evolution, since much of the empirical language did not seem applicable. Henderson said that a scientific appraisal of Darwin began with research on life and environments. He wrote that “at bottom is a physical and chemical problem” (p. 265). He then speculated that evolution worked on environments, with hydrogen, carbon, oxygen, water and carbonic acid driving weather and other earthly cycles. These cycles apparently distributed those key elements, insuring that most of the planet had supportive environments. Henderson, more than Murray, saw the variety of plant and animal species and wrote that earth was an especially wonderful place to generate life because of those chemicals. Henderson considered evolution here – Darwinian theory applied directly to the planet itself. He perceived a pattern and deliberateness to the emergence of environments. He described evolution as “trial and error,” but there was a driving force that led to successful environments (p. 267). At a time when Murray pondered the origins of life behind the shell of a chicken egg, Henderson urged biologists to seriously consider dirt and water for their Darwinian properties.

Henderson (1916c) noted the highly specific nature of the mutual adaptability of organism to environment. He wrote, "...the possibility is negligible that conditions equally favorable to the production of diversity in the course of evolution should arise without cause" (p. 271). This enabled him to speculate that had the earth been different chemically, or behaved to different laws of physics, evolution might not have taken hold. This contradicts his reply to his critics.

As Murray would eventually find a schism in his own thinking about psychology, when he tried to adhere to Jungian analysis but found himself drawn to trait theorists, Henderson addressed mechanism, vitalism and gave a teleological explanation for life on earth. Teleology simply means a purposeful design for a certain aspect, such as an architect drawing up the blueprints for a building or nature producing dull gold scales on a carp. As Henderson used the terms, teleology and vitalism seemed close. He used a teleological argument to conclude that elements have certain aspects that foster evolution (Henderson, 1916c). For Henderson (1918, 1920) mechanism needed to be debated, since many of his peers strongly believed in it.

The Henderson letters in Harvard's Murray collection reflect a highly sensitive Henry Murray. They suggest that Murray worried about his relationship with his mentor. When Murray investigated blood levels of calcium, some aspect of the project troubled him and Henderson guided him. Murray also worried about the timing of his residency. Henderson (1919a) said, "...I think the best advice that I can give you is to follow your own convenience and instinct. It is rare for an older man's advice to be as valuable as the judgment of a younger man of superior intelligence, which, from what I have heard, I believe you to be" (p. 2).

This author found nothing in that letter that could have upset Murray, but some message from Henderson, presumably about the calcium study, distressed the young researcher. Less than a month later, Henderson (1919b) reassured him with “You are altogether mistaken in the conclusions which lead you to feel mortified, and I am extremely sorry that a casual way of putting some things may have produced such impressions in your mind.” Henderson praised him, invited him for a personal discussion and discussed blood calcium.

The Murray who required reassurance about his work from Henderson contrasts dramatically from what one saw in his letters to Erik Erikson, a better-known scholar. Erikson received a letter from Murray in 1952, in which Murray casually mentioned the difficulties finding a time for a visit (Murray, 1952). Erikson (1952) later contacted Murray, who apparently joked about an overpayment for a piece of writing. It could be debated that Erikson had already established a reputation that overshadowed Murray's. Erikson has been ranked 12th in Haggbloom et al.'s (2002) list of “The 100 Most Eminent Psychologists;” Murray did not place. Murray still felt comfortable enough with Erikson (1960) to complain about departmental funding and the need for graduate assistants.

One could argue that Murray and Erikson's other Harvard colleagues supported Erikson, who came to the US as a German immigrant with a limited academic background. Murray was an older man then and may not have felt daunted by the more widely-known scholar; and Erikson had never been his teacher. In his 2009 interview with me, Robert R. Holt painted a portrait of Murray as exuding “bonhomie” and happiest when hosting others.

Influences on Murray

Scholars such as Forrest Robinson (1992) have described Murray as a nonpareil, a multi-faceted thinker who would have fit comfortably in the Renaissance Age. Seventy years after he first met Murray, Robert R. Holt said of him, "Murray was an amazing presence in the [Harvard Psychological Clinic]." Holt later added, "...[he] somehow had this great ability to develop new ideas and to go charging off on new enthusiasm, ..." (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009). In different ways, both conveyed a picture of Murray as a brilliant academic, drawn to novel ideas and new possibilities. One of his closest colleagues, the late Edwin Shneidman (1981) compared him to a gem in an editorial passage for *Endeavors in Psychology*.

A more important point needs to be made here. Murray had a private research agenda, to find the origins of life. At Harvard, as he moved from Henderson's biochemistry laboratory to the psychology faculty, that high goal would metamorphose into a quest to find the basis for personality. For Murray, personality became a stand-in for life.

Having a scientific background, Murray found kindred spirits in the company of Draper and Henderson. They took a creative approach to medicine and biochemistry. Murray found that they discovered new ways to explain how life developed and thrived. While Murray (1967) only briefly mentioned in the "Murr" chapter how Henderson helped him get his post at the HPC, he wrote that at Columbia, he had been "astonished, stimulated, and instructed by Dr. George Draper's pinpoint observations and brilliant intuitive diagnoses of patients with what was later to be called psychosomatic illness" (p. 288). Murray went on to call him his "most uniquely influential teacher" (p. 288)

Draper adopted Darwin's theory, but found its subtleties only on the wards and laboratories of New York's Presbyterian Hospital. Constitution could explain both individual differences and the relationships between psychological functioning and health. At a time when mental pathology was left to asylum doctors, Draper, who was not a psychiatrist, advocated that clinicians explore such a soft area as personality. Murray studied under him as he prepared to become a surgeon, and perhaps found him more relevant as he considered embryological research. Murray always respected – no, found genuine pleasure – in any approach that focused on origins and reflected the broadest examples.

Draper, like Murray, was a bench scientist who considered the individual differences between similar cells. Draper intended to address psychological functioning with his theory of constitutional medicine, and its application to physiology and pathology resonated with Murray. Murray frequently described the brain as a “gland” which took in oxygen, sugar and other nutrients, and then exuded chemicals that could cause certain behaviors. While Draper looked for individual differences in appearance as signs of potential illness (e.g., moles or freckles), Murray wrote of the biology behind the development of “vicerogenic” (physical) or “psychogenic” needs (Murray, n.d., “Personology theory,” n.d., “Rules and scoring,” n.d., “Rules: For testing,” 1938, p. 74)

Henderson, like Draper, viewed living things as environments, and the outside world as a planned entity – almost an organism itself. While Henderson's work seemed closer to Draper's, there were strong ties to Whitehead. Henderson noticed the unique and life-generating patterns of certain compounds, as when a pair of hydrogen atoms

bonds with an atom of oxygen. That pattern supports life and is one of the most common compounds on this planet.

In Lawrence Henderson, Murray found someone who searched for the biological counterpart of press. Henderson found environments far more than the sums of their chemical compositions, but actually the dynamic supporters of life. Henderson believed that environments generated something intentional, a vital force, to be attractive to life. Murray's personology incorporated an outside or environmental force, called press. Murray conceptualized press in psychoanalytic terms, but he showed some Hendersonian influence. Both Henderson and Murray saw the environment as having volition. In the biology of Henderson, the earth itself evolved to support life. Press made men, women and children behave, often defensively.

Draper and Henderson, along with Whitehead, actually influenced Murray's work as a psychologist, although Robinson (1992) and others who have written biographical sketches have downplayed their relationships or ignored them. A review of Henderson in particular seems an odd enterprise in 2012. One may or may not accept Darwinian theory, but the idea of an almost animal *intent* in an environment seems to be too odd a break with prevailing biology. Whitehead and his inspiration, the mathematics of George Boole, have been applied to computer languages, while Draper's theory relates to psychosomatic illness. Robinson told Murray's story as Murray shared it with him, and perhaps Murray himself presented them as three of many whom he knew or worked with over a long career. Reading Robinson's excellent book, one realizes that Murray wished to credit Carl Jung, Herman Melville, and Murray's greatest love, Christiana Morgan, for shaping him.

What becomes clear is that Murray found a bridge between biology and psychology from his exposure to Henderson and Draper. By the mid-1920s, he turned to the task of developing a theory of personality. Unlike many theorists in psychology, Murray was open to the lessons of physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics. Murray could never accept consciousness as a proxy for the soul, which James advocated. Psychology, as it was taught at Harvard in the 1920s, tended to emphasize behavioral studies or neuroscience. For Murray, these areas were far afield of his goal of defining a model of personality.

Chapter VIII

Conclusion

Forrest Robinson (1992) ended *Love's Story Told* with a charming but effective sentence, “[Murray] looks on, as we do, absorbed, admiring, warmly acquiescent in the bright face he bends to the world” (p. 389). It leaves his readers with the optimistic impression that after nearly 100 years of life, Henry A. Murray, this American scholar who accomplished so much yet lived a life that might have unsettled most of us, was pleased. We need to allow that infirmities set in by age 70, and he frequently worried that his mental powers failed him, but still, he found his happiness. Much of Robinson's book explored Murray's private life; Murray, Nina Murray and Councilman, Morgan's son, all gave interviews, and discussed his drive toward joy. A reader easily gets the impression that Murray treated Robinson like an “as-told-to” biographer. Murray stipulated that none of this story should be made public until after his death, and Robinson adhered to that. Robinson's relationship with Murray established the premise as stated by the book's title. Murray thought his life was the archetype of Love. His relationship with Christiana Morgan provided him with the oxygen to go “deep diving” into his own psyche.

It needs to be said that he loved Morgan more deeply than any other woman, and that she served as the ultimate anima, or feminine being, in his life. Their affair lasted for decades and with their spouses, children, friends and colleagues in full knowledge. Calling both Murray and Morgan “complicated” would be an understatement, as would describing Morgan as “troubled.” She obviously shared his myriad interests, and seemed to guide him more than his own spouse. Morgan only seemed to balk at anything that

took him away from her, either physically or emotionally. Her possessiveness would have been more expected from a wife, but Jo certainly did not act that way, nor did Morgan make such demands on Will. Morgan resented Murray's research or writing interests that she felt had no relationship to *their relationship*. She did not want him to contemplate society at large or world politics, and she voiced her objections to Harvard's administrative demands on his time. Morgan and Murray viewed their lives together as something so pure, raw, emotional and new that they became the chief actors in the archetypal love story. Jung wrote about such things first, and he, too, had a mistress and a wife, but at least in Murray's mind, the true dyad consisted of Henry Murray and Christiana Morgan. They went deep diving further than Jung, but they owed him credit for being Love's prophet. According to Murray, that was Love's story.

Robinson had the choice of being the neutral biographer in the telling, or to befriend his subject, and be his voice. Had Murray been a film star, Robinson's book might have had an "as told to" somewhere on the title page. It certainly does not. Harvard University Press published *Love's Story Told* and it has extensive citations and all the benchmarks one expects of an academic book. Robinson made use of the written record of the time, including archival, but most of his book came from interviews with Murray and his circle. The premise seemed to come from Murray himself. One of the most interesting questions raised by the study was why Murray never penned his own life or love story. "Preparations for the Scaffold of a Comprehensive System" (1959a) and "The Case of Murr" (1967) were chapter-length attempts to both provide brief autobiographies and declare his commitment to an alternative psychology. The 1959 piece also provided a short course in personology.

To his credit, Robinson did not befriend Murray to the point at which he failed to be critical. He took Murray to task for not openly addressing the dyad in these or any other published works. Murray never objected to socializing with Morgan and having her as an HPC staff member. They traveled as a couple, and friends might ask for Christiana or Jo in their letters to Murray. I have seen archival evidence of both. In that climate of openness, it surprises those who follow Murray's life and work that Murray only alluded to the dyad in his writings. Robinson (1992) described Morgan as "the most important single 'influence' on his development" (pp. 342-343). Still, he speculated that Murray showed "disenchantment with the dyad, ...symptomatic of what ailed him as a theorist" (p. 343). One could easily conclude that basic Freudian denial raised its head before such a progressive individual. I could take this a step further and assert that like his contemporary, sexologist Alfred C. Kinsey (1894-1956), it is one thing to promote personal and social freedom, but acting on it becomes something very different. Kinsey (Jones, 1997) and Murray made some startling clinical pronouncements in their day, and their private lives moved in similar directions.

The Midwestern Kinsey and Manhattanite Murray each shared a religious upbringing, each rebelled, and each found themselves at odds with their self-imposed lifestyles. The churchgoing Murrays sent their sons to Groton, and the Reverend Endicott Peabody taught the Scriptures but was modern enough to launch a successful private school at the height of the Gilded Age (Ashburn, 1934). Peabody challenged Henry Murray, and the youth responded by questioning the power of an authority granted by people, yet supposedly communicating God's Word. Murray considered any morality that unreasonably restricted him as slowing down Modern Man. Even as a teenager,

Murray understood that rules had to be imposed, but he expected them to have an obvious value in furthering society. He scoffed at Hawthorne-like figures, beginning with Peabody, his own mother and even his sister, who was actually more bossy than religious. Christiana Morgan liberated him from Puritanical tortures that survived into contemporary times, and yet he never dared to make her part of *his* official record. Yes, the first article on the TAT put her as first author, and she received co-authorship on a number of HPC projects (Morgan & Murray, 1935). Murray could never write her name in anything he planned to publish about himself. He omitted her from anything autobiographical. He promoted salvation in basic relationships, and yet this woman who supposedly fulfilled his need for an anima more than either of his wives could not be identified in print.

The hypocrisy of the Morgan-Murray affair was not lost on Robinson or myself; if everyone already knew about them, why not write about the relationship? His behavior suggested guilt. Robinson believed this, and it certainly seemed plausible that ultimately, Murray could not escape his own upbringing and essential character.

Conrad Aiken (1889-1973), Georgia's Poet Laureate, was a dear friend of Murray's (Killorin, n.d.). On Morgan's death in 1967, Aiken consoled him with special poetry readings ("Christiana," 1967). More direct than the poet, Morgan's son, Councilman, wrote to Murray, thanking him for the service he arranged. "... just what I believe Mum would have wished. You did a magnificent thing," (C. Morgan, 1967). As a historian, I leaf through the old program, held together by a ribbon. I read Morgan's words more than 40 years after he wrote them, and see the poignancy of the situation. I appreciate the rarity of being given a glimpse into the private grief of others. Christiana

Morgan left no widower to mourn her, although Murray immediately began telling others that they had been engaged. He even wrote to his future wife, Nina Fish, of such plans (Murray, 1967a).

The records suggest that while Murray did not want to be forced to wear a scarlet letter, he had ties to normalcy and conventionality. That was the great schism of his life. I never intended to write Murray's biography, and again, I refer people to Robinson should they desire to read one. My interest in Murray's life centered on how it influenced the development of personology. His life and the school of psychology he taught appeared to be closely bound, even if ultimately, he could not fully live up to its potential to free the individual. Murray made a search for personality his private and public journey. He referred to it as a type of exploration beneath the ocean.

His fascination with the marine world could not be separated from his attachment to Herman Melville (1819-1891) (Kirsch, 1958; Rosenzweig, 2004). Murray should be regarded as one of the scholars who brought the 1851 novel *Moby-Dick* to the attention of a modern intellectual audience (Kirsch, 1958; Robinson, 1992). The ocean has always been the deep world below us, and became the scene of Ahab's demise. Murray saw in Ahab a figure of myth and passion, as well as the dichotomy of Eros and Thanatos. For Ahab, sailing into destruction showed that Death prevails. And yet, the character of Ishmael shared the experience but not his captain's passion, and survived to narrate the story. Obviously, the works of Herman Melville meant a great deal to Murray, particularly the characters of Ahab and Pierre, from the novel *Pierre, or the Ambiguities*. Ahab appealed to Murray for his dark drive that fueled destruction. Pierre was a troubled young man who was torn between his mother, fiancé and half-sister. *Pierre* never

became as well-known as *Moby-Dick*, but Murray regarded it as an extraordinary book which revealed much about Melville's later emotional decline. In an introduction to a 1949 edition of the rarely-published book, Murray wrote that readers should treat *Pierre* as a cautionary tale, and that he believed Melville needed to explore the blackest areas of his psyche to pen it (Murray, 1949/1962/1981). Herman Melville, in Murray's view, never recovered from his self-analysis. Jung (1949) praised the introductory chapter, calling it a "[c]lear and well-balanced presentation of Melville's case."

Robinson (1992) concluded that Murray's self-doubts kept him from writing a long-planned biography of the American author. Murray feared that fully confronting Melville would have forced him to face certain aspects of his own life, especially his affair with Morgan. One of the questions I most wanted to pose to Robert Holt was if Melville's writings became the backdrop for HPC activities. Holt denied this outright (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009). As mentioned earlier, he secretly read part of the unfinished manuscript, but otherwise, psychology was the business of the HPC. In an autobiographical sketch, Saul Rosenzweig (2004), made light of Murray's interest in Melville. Rosenzweig, one of his protégés, wrote, "[Murray] was not averse to being recognized as having identified himself, proudly if perversely, with the satanic Captain Ahab. Harry was rather justified in that self-evaluation but not always for the reasons that he allowed himself to admit. On the other hand, Captain Ahab had no dark-eyed hostess to adorn his table." (p. 261). Rosenzweig was referring to Christiana Morgan in that last line.

Murray would have preferred that Morgan be treated as one of the antecedents of personology, but archival and other evidence suggests otherwise. Murray told his

biographer that Morgan's understanding of psychology placed her on a par with Jung, but one has to consider that opinion in a certain context. Rosenzweig (2004) mistakenly called her "Christina," and yet he received his training in psychology during the heyday of the HPC ! I asked Holt about her. Perhaps he knew her better than his colleague, and he remembered her clearly. After thinking for a few moments, Holt said, "She was beautiful, cool, distant, very ladylike, ...glamorous, ...quite bright, and ...a lot of the guys sort of had crushes on her" (Robert R. Holt, personal communication, August 19, 2009). Holt did not believe that Morgan was an especially original thinker, but remembered her as "an incisive clinician and an insightful person." Holt recalled that, "she ... took part in discussions. I didn't ever get the feeling that she participated particularly in theoretical discussions fruitfully."

While Murray wanted to elevate Morgan's position, his students and future colleagues remember a different story. With two key figures denying that she inspired or coauthored personology, one is left with Murray's infatuation with her, and his guilt over mistreating both his wife and her. Neither woman died happy, and he seemed to blame himself for their situations. Jo Murray should be considered here, since Murray needed to convince himself that Morgan was essential to his work. If Christiana Morgan did not give birth to a new school of psychology, what he shared with her would have been nothing more than a tawdry and embarrassing affair. Jung (1956) appreciated their relationship, but also treated the Morgan-Murray dyad as if Christiana were Mrs. Murray. In the Murray Papers, one runs across the occasional letter addressed to "Dr. Henry Morgan." It is not unusual for people to assume that a man and woman who are close, or

even work together, as married, but Jung knew the truth. All of this could explain the role Morgan played here.

Given the way Murray presented what he did in published materials, conference presentations and correspondence, all sources need to be evaluated carefully. The raw evidence of Murray's work – the primary sources – hopefully revealed where Murray drew upon his version of psychology. I found that personology had the distinct marks of more than Melville, Jung and Morgan. Murray introduced the ideas of Lawrence Henderson and George Draper into personology, firming it with a strong grounding in biology. Perhaps it is most conservative to conclude that while he was extremely close to Alfred North Whitehead, the mathematician's organism theory had less of a direct influence. Murray, often at odds with others in the Department of Philosophy and Psychology (after 1936, called the Department of Psychology, and after 1946, the Department of Social Relations), likely needed people who supported his theories (Pattullo, n.d.). Often Murray turned to those outside the department. Anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn collaborated with him, for example (Murray, 1952). It should follow that a philosopher-mathematician, a biochemist and physician, all with highly untraditional theories, would nurture Murray. Murray's published work tended to obscure this, but his raw notes and certain correspondence showed his closeness to these figures.

Wherever possible, I used primary sources for this study. The Henry A. Murray Papers in the Harvard University Archives proved to be a treasure of letters, teaching notes, drafts and even Murray-related ephemera. The materials not only added depth to what Murray published, but a certain historical flavor that I might otherwise have missed.

A letter from Percival M. Symonds (1945), a fellow developer of projective instruments, laconically mentioned that publication of his book was likely to be delayed due to paper shortages. Rationing was a common inconvenience for all sides during the Second World War, but one might not consider that paper was affected, and even as hostilities ceased, everyday commodities could still be difficult for the publishing industry.

I was impressed with the consistency in Murray's notes on the Thematic Apperception Test and personology; the concepts he introduced in *Explorations in Personality* would be kept in his system, and he applied the fundamentals to related areas, as when he interpreted Freudian fantasy stories. Notes titled "Claustral Aggression Fantasies" are filed near materials that Murray or an associate collected from a psychiatric facility. The mystery of "Claustral Aggression Fantasies" was that this small collection was undated and essentially has no context at this time. It is obvious that Murray worked on them, although they are not mentioned in any published source (Murray, n.d., "Claustral"). Other notes in Murray's own handwriting show how he tried to apply his psychological ideas to world events. His jottings addressed China's Premier Mao Zedong and the arms race. Those notes prove that the Cold War was at least on his mind; how much he feared the potential of an East-West clash or if politicians frustrated him remains for speculation only (Murray, n.d., "A Personologist's Abstract").

The earliest materials in the Murray Papers date back to the 1910s. These were the waning years of the Gilded Age and a time of a great war that would eventually be known as World War I. A few of these were used in Chapter 4, which dealt with Murray's family and childhood. Murray and his fellow Grotonians all came from wealthy families, and many had urban upbringings. These favored sons of America did

not suffer the struggles and indignities of immigrant children, but that did not mean that they had no family or social obligations. Social roles forced certain paths on the descendants of Puritans and Colonial American figures. Privilege came with the responsibility to promote the American values of religious faith, physical and moral fitness, democracy and capitalism. As beneficiaries of American society, they had no reason to resent it or try to overturn it. One should understand that “reform” was not a blasphemous word to the people listed on the Social Register. They instilled in their children, especially their sons, the value of meeting one’s potential *and* serving others.

About Empiricism

Generally, Murray’s primary sources raise questions about his declared enmity toward “science.” Here the published record can be misleading. In a number of his writings, particularly “Psychology and the University,” Murray (1935/1981) attacked the mission statement of the typical psychology department in a liberal arts institution. Of course, he meant Harvard. He basically argued that the stress on empiricism and highly circumscribed experiments cost psychologists and their students what their field could offer. Murray wrote that as late as the 1930s, psychology lacked any working theory, and, in an obvious barb for his critics, said that it also lacked valid methods for study. Murray charged universities with developing concepts and beginning valid research, a break with what they had been doing. He expected the American academic community to launch the field, in much the same way that psychoanalysis began as a Mittel-European endeavor. He added that by its very nature, psychology would have ties to other subjects, including education, criminology and even economics. In a subtle nod to Draper, Murray declared that medicine would inform psychology – and vice versa. This

brief manifesto, published three years before *Explorations in Personality*, gave Murray the chance to tell his colleagues that “The truth which the informed are hesitant to reveal and the uninformed are amazed to discover is that academic psychology has contributed practically nothing to the knowledge of human nature” (p. 339).

To those like Karl Lashley (1890-1958) and Edwin G. Boring (1886-1968), who felt that Murray wasted time, money and resources hunting evidence for concepts that could never be proven or even defined, Murray (1935/1981) responded that psychologists had become invested in trivia. Empiricists, and he mentioned Wundt by name, incorrectly viewed humans as machines, and creating a psychology that was stagnant less than a century after its birth. Murray praised professionals that he referred to as “medical psychologists” – really psychoanalysts – for hearing their patients, and making human issues the core of their investigations. Too much personal animosity between Murray and other faculty members obscured his respect for science, and the need for science in psychology. Murray came from a medical background, and knew that Boring’s work on visual perception and optical illusions had value (Cerullo, 1988; Hilgard, 1986). Boring did not work on the psychology of personality, but his research had obvious applications to military science, aviation, architecture and the aesthetics that Murray adored. Lashley is remembered today for his controversial theory of Mass Action, which means that most brain cells in the cortex are unspecialized, and the neurons in the executive area of the brain work simultaneously. Lashley developed his theory with rodent studies, which Murray must have realized had the potential for understanding learning and human pathology (H., 1959; Kandel, 2006).

Murray misinformed Robinson and anyone else who would listen that he found insight for psychology almost always from non-psychologists, and accused some of his peers of not being true to what he defined as the goals of psychology: to build a superior working vocabulary, provide better definitions in published studies, and correct the situation of basing experiments on weak hypotheses (Murray, 1944/1981). Archival sources show a closeness to science and its methods that Murray preferred to distance himself from in some of his writings. In four undated pieces called "Chapter 1" "Personology 'Theory' Abbreviations," "A Personologist's Abstract of Human Nature," and "Projection," Murray reiterated some of the terminology and ideas he used in *Explorations*. More than just the wording, these notes showed that personology involved science, including physiology, and the brain's role in regulating the body.

Henry Murray will likely be remembered more for the TAT than any of his other work. That would have dampened his spirits, since the cards were only meant to be one approach to studying personality. Murray made personology his life's work, and cultivated students who adopted some of his research approaches in their own careers. Robert R. Holt, who eventually moved to New York University, Edwin Shneidman from the University of Southern California, and David C. McClelland, who remained at Harvard, clearly illustrate my point. A glance at the title page of *Explorations in Personality* lists Murray's collaborators. A young B.F. Skinner, who furthered behaviorism in his lengthy career, had joined Murray at the HPC. The psychologist who developed the Skinner box, the ultimate instrument of behavioral techniques, actually developed a projective technique for Murray. Of the many exercises used to study research subjects, one involved allowing them to play with a miniature theatre and toy

figures. Skinner himself believed that something could be learned by watching adults indulge in classic child's play (Murray, 1936/1981)

Murray's network of psychologists, like his actual scientific rigor, may have been lost in his bluff and bluster during his long wars with Harvard. He likely enjoyed the role of maverick, but he was really in charge of a fairly large and floating research team at the university. Murray always had control over his team. Holt told me that. Rosenzweig (2004) off-handedly compared him to Ahab for that reason. In an unpublished comment that he submitted to *Endeavors in Psychology*, Erik Erikson (1981) said "one of my most decisive encounters was with the intellectual hospitality of Harry Murray and his Harvard Psychological Clinic *which was pervaded by the integrative power of his personology.*" (italics mine). He had enough wealth to run a small private enterprise, but chose not to. He received regular funding from the Rockefeller Foundation and remained on the Harvard faculty. His research was certainly "different," but Murray functioned like many other gifted academics.

Ultimately, Murray's great gift to psychology may not have been a set of cards that can provoke an interesting story, but a system of psychology that embraced biology and medicine, along with psychoanalysis. Murray wanted to tell the world that literature – especially Melville's novels – held the secrets, but that was probably not true. In his own mind, Murray remembered Christiana Morgan as a fountainhead of insight, the designated successor to Jung. Murray loved Morgan, and while she had certain insights into Jungian beliefs, she did not create a school of psychology. Murray did.

At the end of the day, one can see that Murray drew together multiple threads and created something novel. Personology did not evolve as something completely new, but

the result of a synthesis. The antecedents came from the ideas of Henderson and Draper, who used Darwinian theories to explain the importance of life-supporting environments. Henderson found value in Whitehead's ideas about the integrity of patterns, and for that reason, Murray began to consider his works. Draper enlisted a mix of Darwin and eugenics to show how organisms either fostered or blocked pathogens. From these three thinkers, Murray began to adapt psychoanalysis along the lines of biology. Vicerogenic needs were not that far from psychogenic ones. Environments posed challenges. Like individuals who either resist or succumb to a disease, Murray's subjects dealt with a variety of psychological stresses that influenced the stories of their lives.

THE ORIGINS OF HENRY A. MURRAY'S PERSONOLOGY

Epilogue

The late West Coast-based psychologist and scholar M. Brewster Smith (1990) reminisced about his basic psychology course at Harvard, and using Murray's *Explorations* as a text. Like Robert Holt (personal communication, August 19, 2009), Smith saw Murray infrequently, but Smith remained captivated by that book. Even the jacket design, apparently Christiana Morgan's doodle, remained with Smith. Morgan drew a sperm whale happily encountering a swordfish and an octopus larger than the other creatures. The slogan on the design extolled explorations and told students that they would be astounded forever. Again, how many texts make such an impression ?

As Henry Murray encouraged his students and like-minded colleagues to seek the truth about people, Murray's own life and theory deserve scholarly consideration. Here was one of America's most prominent intellectuals of his day, who has slowly been forgotten in the nearly 25 years since his death. A colorful career and unconventional lifestyle may be quite interesting, but those alone would not constitute grounds for serious study.

Murray pieced personology together, almost like a New England quilt, from a series of disparate sources. His life was frustrated by red herrings, rabbit holes and all the euphemisms for false leads and abandoned projects. Personality psychologists can still review Murray's work, particularly *Explorations*, for insights into conceptualizing key factors and handling large amounts of qualitative data. Murray's students and others have adapted his research design for their studies. Motivation specialists still look to Murray's needs, and even if they prefer instruments other than projective tests, they find relevance in the "Big Three" needs (n Achievement, n Power and n Affiliation/Intimacy).

Psychologists today understand that some needs may be more biologically based, while others drive higher mental activities. Murray, with his exposure to Freudian and Jungian theory, still reminds modern psychologists that needs and press may be either known to the subject, or working at the stronger unconscious level. This reliance on need, press and themas became central to Murray's thinking, and he never added to or altered the importance of these concepts. For these reasons, examining the roots of personology becomes a worthy endeavor.

The problems with untangling those roots became apparent from the beginning. Murray moved in multiple directions, and yet published relatively little for a professor with a career that lasted more than forty years. He tended to attribute his inspiration to a number of people and sources, and this can be either challenging or frustrating to a researcher. Murray personally favored Jung over Freud, but that had more to do with his friendship with the former. His writings, especially unpublished pieces, suggested someone well-informed about Freud. In his most introspective work, "The Case of Murr," Murray (1967) said that his medical education not only made him a student for the first time in his life, but also taught him invaluable lessons about human thinking and behavior. In most of his published work, he said that novelist Herman Melville made him conscious of the hidden world of psychology. Of course, he told his biographer, Forrest Robinson (1992) and others that Christiana Morgan provided the inspiration he so needed.

What becomes apparent if one considers more than works published by Murray and others is that beyond Melville, Morgan and psychoanalysis, and behind those legendary rows with other Harvard psychologists over empiricism, was that Murray never

strayed far from science. He postured himself as having an almost artistic or literary sensibility, and being victimized by his faculty because of it. The reality was that even while working as a psychologist, Murray remained the physician and embryologist. He sought the Darwinian underpinnings of man's personality. The influence of George Draper, Lawrence Henderson and Alfred North Whitehead helped him apply evolutionary theory to his version of psychology. Draper's constitution became personality itself, and played a role in physical health. Henderson found everything in the natural world adapting to a greater environment, and Murray applied that to needs and press. Whitehead believed in ongoing patterns creating identity, and he offered Murray the "eternal object," a mystery waiting to be discovered and known. Murray realized that apperception – the process of interpreting the world, and discovering one's themas – would make the eternal something known and a part of life.

Given these conflicting accounts, the Murray Papers in Harvard's Archives shed some light on the mysteries of personology. This has been one of the few studies of Murray's theory to make use of his papers, and these surviving documents call into question some of the prevailing views. This becomes interesting, since many of those views originated with Murray himself. Murray did not write many letters, but his friends and associates did share their thoughts with him, and even if a response could take months, Murray cared enough to save them. He likely constantly jotted down thoughts and ideas, even after he typed the piece. These may have been potential articles or lecture notes. Some have titles suggesting instructions to his research team. What is important here is that they have not been referenced in previously published works.

Robert R. Holt left Harvard for New York University, and he obviously shared what he learned from Murray with his students and other scholars interested in this area. This dissertation benefitted from a rather lengthy 2009 interview. Holt told the story of the Harvard Psychological Clinic in the late 1930s and early '40s. He remembers Murray and Morgan, and he is a treasure trove of anecdotes. His experience alone makes him an excellent source of oral history. He respected Morgan and acknowledged her as an able and charming colleague, but he questioned her role as a *founder* of personology. This opinion raises questions about what Murray said and the prevailing views about personology.

One of the goals of any writer is to create a cohesive, expressive manuscript. He or she expects that each chapter stands worthy, or the weak part should be revised or scrapped. Having said that, *On the Mind's Foreign Shores* has a chapter of note. Chapter 2, the "Biographical Sketch," may be of particular value to those who would like to have a brief review of Murray's biography. That chapter covers Murray's life, education and career in relatively few pages. It hopefully offers more than an encyclopedia article, and may be more manageable than a whole book.

Fin

THE ORIGINS OF HENRY A. MURRAY'S PERSONOLOGY

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