

## Redefining Community in a Global City : Tokyo Metropolitan Government in the 21st Century

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At a time when metropolitan governments have been weakened or dismantled, Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) exemplifies the model of integrated metropolitan government. Yet, TMG is at a cross-roads. The 23 special wards (ku), administrative units of TMG, are demanding greater local autonomy. The central government seeks to devolve administrative and fiscal policy while retaining central authority. Efforts to bring about balanced growth and limit over concentration are meeting with limited success while the metropolis continues to expand outwards. As the millenium approaches, Tokyo finds itself constrained by the economic slump and associated fiscal strain.

This paper reports on a case study of changing intergovernmental relations in Tokyo.

"In approaching the problem of the efficient management of a given city the first question which arises is this: 'Does the jurisdiction or authority of the city government extend over the entire urban area it serves?'"  
Charles Beard (1923, p.26)

"Today, with the increasing centralization and concentration of power in the nation-state, a 'new politics' ... must be structured institutionally around the restoration of power by municipalities. This is not only necessary but possible even in such gigantic urban areas as New York City, Montreal, London and Paris. Such agglomerations are not, strictly speaking, cities or municipalities in the traditional senses of those terms, despite being designated as such by sociologists." Murray Bookchin (1995, pp.261-62)

### 1. Introduction

Urban expansion has not been followed by extension of city boundaries. Metropolitan government has been an elusive goal, not just in the U.S., but world-wide (see Barlow 1991, Rothblatt

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and Sancton 1993, Sharpe 1995, Savitch and Vogel 1996). Calls for metropolitan reform have usually been couched in terms of the need for unification of the central city with the surrounding suburbs (i.e., consolidation). Greater centralization is proposed as a solution to the problems facing inner cities whether fiscal, social, or economic (e.g., Rusk 1993). Of course, there has been a counter position, that of public choice, which argues that local government fragmentation (i.e., decentralization) is good, not bad and facilitates economy and efficiency in the delivery of public services. The public choice school received the endorsement of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in the 1980s (ACIR 1993). The debate over metropolitan government ebbed as consolidation efforts failed, especially in the U.S. and a number of notable cases of metropolitan government were dismantled, for example, London.

In the last few years, there has been renewed interest in metropolitan governance. Although some call for the traditional consolidation approach (Rusk 1993), more innovative solutions involved metropolitan governance arrangements linking local governments (cities, counties) and non-governmental or private actors (e.g., public-private partnerships) to create a system of metropolitan governance (see Barlow 1991, Peirce et. al 1993, Savitch and Vogel 1996; Lefèvre 1998).

There has been somewhat of a paradigm shift in the debate over metropolitan government. In the past, the issue was whether to centralize or decentralize. Today, the problem is how to both centralize and decentralize at the same time, that is to go bigger and smaller. On the one hand, it is thought that greater centralization or more properly, coordination, is needed for city-regions to compete in the global economy, cooperate on urban development and planning and share the cost of large-scale infrastructure projects. On the other hand, over-centralization can result in large bureaucracies that are too rigid to respond quickly to a rapidly changing environment and are far removed from the daily life of citizens. Thus, there has been concern with how to retain community and local control while gaining the advantages of greater coordination.

In this paper, I examine proposed changes in the governing arrangements of Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) that should lead to a more decentralized administrative structure with profound consequences for governing this large global city. These reforms are intended to turn the 23 wards that make up central Tokyo into fully autonomous municipalities. The wards will have the same status accorded other municipalities in Japan under the Local Government Act<sup>1)</sup>. These reforms are a dramatic departure from past policies in Japan where local governments have traditionally lacked a strong base<sup>2)</sup>, especially when considered alongside planned central government administrative reforms and decentralization policies that are intended to enhance local government autonomy.

Movement towards decentralization is evident though there is reason for caution until we see if real financial reform accompanies enhanced functional authority for the wards. Ironically, although Tokyo is one of the few metropolitan cities in the world, much of the urban region lies outside of the legal boundaries of TMG. Formal adjustment of the legal boundaries of TMG is unlikely. In recent times, there has been little consideration of how to build a system of metropolitan governance that encompasses the larger Tokyo metropolitan region. But the case of TMG illustrates the twin needs of going bigger (regional cooperation and coordination) and smaller (decentralization).

Professor William Robson's recommendations contained in his "Report on Tokyo Metropolitan Government" (1967) are still relevant today<sup>3</sup>. Professor Robson called for TMG's boundaries to extend as much as 50 to 110 kilometers from central Tokyo to capture the commuting population (p.11). If this was infeasible, he called for the creation of a Joint Council made up of TMG and the seven adjacent prefects which would carry out strategic planning (p.12). He saw no reason for a separate system of local government in the Tama district. He called for elimination of the existing Special Wards and the creation of a new ward system with population in each ranging from 250,000 and 500,000 persons (pp.14-15).

## 2. Tokyo — an Overview

Tokyo is one of the few global cities governed by a metropolitan government (Sharpe 1995)<sup>4</sup>. Japan is a highly centralized nation and population, industry, and finance have concentrated in the capital Tokyo. The concentration of business and finance on top of the political functions associated with being the nation's capital has led to an overconcentration in the central wards of Tokyo. Office building in the boom 1980s period crowded out residential housing and led to skyrocketing land values as speculators and builders bid up the prices<sup>5</sup>. Tokyo has also seen the influx of international organizations (ngos) associated with its emergence as a global city. As Dr. Togo, Director General of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research explains, the major difficulties facing Tokyo are how to foster balanced growth and a decentralized or multi-centered metropolis to reduce housing shortages, traffic congestion, and waste disposal problems that arise from over-concentration (1995, pp.184-201). There is also recognition that TMG is too centralized administratively leading to efforts to decentralize authority and devolve services and functions to the ward level.

What we refer to as Tokyo consists of the 23 special wards (ku) (the old city of Tokyo, after the amalgamation in 1932), the Tama district (western suburbs) containing 26 cities, five towns and





Figure 1 Tokyo Metropolis and Surrounding Prefectures



REPRODUCED FROM :

Tokyo Metropolitan Government. 1997. Tokyo : Services for Today and Challenges for Tomorrow, pp.9-10.

**Figure 2 Administrative Districts of Tokyo Metropolis**

one village, and a number of islands scattered in the Pacific Ocean (see map) (TMG, 1997, p.7)<sup>6)</sup>. The City of Tokyo and the Tokyo Prefecture were consolidated to form Tokyo Metropolitan Government in 1943. Table 1 reports the population for the 23 wards, that is the old city of Tokyo; the current metropolitan city of Tokyo that is within the boundaries of TMG; and the larger Tokyo metropolitan region including the neighboring three prefectures of Saitama, Kanagawa, and Chiba. In 1995, Tokyo had nearly 12 million people; the 23 wards account for just under 8 million or about two-thirds of the population. The Tokyo metropolitan region had a population of about 32.5 million people with Tokyo making up about one-third of the regional population. The density in the 23 special wards is 13,000 per square kilometer; in Tama the density is 3,250 per square kilometer (TMG 1997, pp.11-12).

The population of the wards varies from fewer than 40,000 to over 600,000 (see Table 2). For the last several decades, the wards have been losing population. However, the latest census figures indicate that in 1997, the wards actually gained 8,400 persons. This is likely due to cheaper land prices and less jobs outside of Tokyo related to the economic troubles (The Daily Yomiuri, March 30, 1998, p.3). These figures do not take into account commuters. In 1990, the daytime population of Tokyo was just under 14.5 million and about 11.3 million in the 23 wards (TMG 1997, pp.16-18).

### **3. TMG Administrative Structure**

In 1943, the City of Tokyo and Tokyo Prefecture were consolidated as part of the "wartime

Table 1 Changes in Population, Tokyo Region (1000 persons)

Year	Tokyo Region	Tokyo	23-ku	Tama area	Three neighboring prefectures
1960	17,860	9,680	8,310	1,370	8,180
1965	21,020	10,870	8,890	1,980	10,150
1970	24,110	11,410	8,840	2,570	12,710
1975	27,040	11,670	8,650	3,030	15,370
1980	28,700	11,620	8,350	3,270	17,080
1985	30,270	11,830	8,350	3,480	18,440
1990	31,800	11,860	8,160	3,690	19,940
1995	32,570	11,770	7,970	3,800	20,800
2000	33,520	11,730~11,810	7,800~7,900	3,910~3,930	21,790
2005	34,290	11,680~11,810	7,630~7,810	4,000~4,050	22,610
2010	34,730	11,550~11,740	7,420~7,690	4,050~4,130	23,180
2015	34,790	11,400~11,660	7,240~7,590	4,070~4,160	23,390

Reproduced from: Bureau of City Planning, Tokyo Metropolitan Government, *Urban White Paper of Tokyo Metropolis 1996* (Tokyo: author), p.14.

Table 2 Population of Wards, 1990

Ward	1990 population	Percent change from 1985
23-ku	8,163,573	-2.3
<b>Chiyoda-ku</b>	39,472	-21.8
<b>Chuo-ku</b>	68,041	-14.9
<b>Minato-ku</b>	158,499	-18.5
<b>Shinjuku-ku</b>	296,790	-10.8
<b>Bunkyo-ku</b>	181,269	-7.5
<b>Taito-ku</b>	162,969	-7.8
Sumida-ku	222,944	-3.1
Koto-ku	385,159	-1.0
Shinagawa-ku	344,611	-3.7
Meguro-ku	251,222	-6.7
Ota-ku	647,914	-2.2
Setagaya-ku	789,051	-2.7
<b>Shibuya-ku</b>	205,625	-15.2
Nakano-ku	319,687	-4.8
Suginami-ku	529,485	-1.9
Toshima-ku	261,870	-6.0
Kita-ku	354,647	-3.5
Arakawa-ku	184,809	-2.8
Itabashi-ku	518,943	2.6
Nerima-ku	618,663	5.2
Adachi-ku	631,163	1.4
Katsushika-ku	424,801	1.4
Edogawa-ku	565,939	9.9

NOTE: Wards in bold face are the seven most central wards. The three wards identified in bold and italics contain the central business district.

centralization policies." Prior to this, the city had an elected mayor and the prefecture had an appointed governor<sup>7)</sup>. The new Metropolis of Tokyo was governed by Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG). After the war ended, TMG continued to be a strong metropolitan government although election of the governor was introduced. There was no significant movement

towards decentralizing TMG until the 1974 reforms providing for direct local election of ward mayors. Prior to this, the mayors were appointed by the governor and the wards were entirely subordinate administrative units. (Shibata 1993). The 23 wards (ku), the original City of Tokyo, were considered special urban governments and unique to the Tokyo prefecture. They lack many ordinary municipal powers which are exercised by TMG on their behalf. For instance, TMG provides fire protection, water supply, sewers, and sanitation services in the 23 wards. With the exception of fire protection, these services are provided by the municipalities in the Tama area (see Shibata 1993; Togo 1995; TMG 1997).

The special wards and TMG also have unique financial arrangements. Some revenues normally collected by municipalities – resident tax, fixed asset tax, property tax – are collected by TMG inside the 23 wards and redistributed through a financial adjustment scheme<sup>8</sup>. The total tax collected from these three taxes is divided between TMG and the ward offices. The percentage split is set at 44 percent to the wards (“basic adjustment amount”) and the remaining 56 percent for TMG. Each ward calculates its revenue and expenditures needed to provide basic services. Wards with surpluses place the excess in a surplus fund that gets added to the general allocation fund. Wards with deficits receive an additional subsidy to cover the shortage. During the bubble economy, several wards had surpluses which went to the fund. For example, in 1990 Shibuya contributed ¥1,981 millions to the adjustment fund (TMG 1997, p.31; Shibata 1993). This financial adjustment equalizes resources and ensures a uniform level of services across the 23 wards making up central Tokyo.

#### **4. Proposed Reforms to Decentralize TMG**

The special ward system (Tokubetsu-ku) in Tokyo is unique in Japan. The relationship between TMG and the wards differs from that of other prefectures and ordinance-designated cities<sup>9</sup>. The division of responsibilities and financing of services between TMG and the wards also differs from that of TMG and local governments in the Tama district. TMG provides some services directly in the wards that are elsewhere considered municipal services. The special wards are administrative subdivisions of TMG. In 1974, the wards' powers were enhanced by 1) providing for direct election of ward mayors, 2) transferring health services and building control to the ward offices, and 3) abolishing the system for posting of TMG officials to ward offices (TMG 1997, p.30). The wards recovered their personnel management authority and set up an independent Personnel Commission. However, the wards still had rather limited autonomy.

In 1990, TMG and the ward offices asked the central government for reorganization of the metropolitan governing system. This resulted in the 22nd Local System Research Council report proposing “reform [that] will expand the scope of business to be conducted by the special wards and will make them more independent vis-à-vis” TMG. With this charge, TMG and the ward offices set up a Metropolis-Ward Council to study and recommend changes in the way the metropolis was governed. In 1992 an interim report was issued; in 1994 a draft final report was released, submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs and endorsed. In 1998, the wards and TMG accepted the final report and it was approved by the cabinet and passed by the Diet. The report

calls for transferring some services and revenues to the wards and greater self-governance for the wards beginning in the year 2000. When implemented, the wards will become fully autonomous municipalities and no longer have a special status as wards. However, the wards will have to act as other municipalities and be more self-reliant. TMG will no longer carry out ordinary municipal services and it will become more focused on regional problems<sup>10</sup>. A further report is due on changing the financing system between TMG and the ward offices.

According to the Tokyo Metropolis-Ward Council, two factors were propelling reform. First, national policy was promoting decentralization and local autonomy. However, efforts to decentralize TMG governance pre-date national reforms. More importantly, according to the report, there was a need for greater ward autonomy to provide better quality services, to lead to more balanced development in Tokyo, and to provide greater self-governance. Existing arrangements between TMG and the ward offices contributed to confusion about which government was responsible for services, a lack of accountability to citizens, weak local (ward) governments, and a lack of focus by TMG on regional problems, policies, and administration. To remedy this situation, basic municipal services provided by TMG will be transferred to the ward offices, the wards will gain greater fiscal control, and TMG will be reoriented as the first-tier government in a more sharply delineated two-tier metropolitan system of government. The movement towards greater ward autonomy was accelerated by the 1974 reform to directly elect ward mayors (interview).

Many issues need to be addressed by the ward offices, TMG and the central government to implement the reforms including revision of the Local Autonomy Law, the basic act setting up the framework of local governance nationally. Agreement on the general principles of reform occurred in 1990. Since then, TMG and the wards have sought to identify and recommend specific changes in policies and law and gain consensus among affected parties. Services to be transferred from TMG to the ward offices include waste management, city planning, education (offering right for assignment of teachers to schools)<sup>11</sup>, aspects of septic tank regulation and sewerage services. The aim of the reform is to convert the wards into "basic local public bodies."

## **5. Effects of Reform — a Decentralized Tokyo?**

Theoretically, these reforms should result in the wards becoming fully autonomous municipalities. However, there is doubt that the proposed reforms will be fully implemented and if implemented that they will have the desired effects. Among the obstacles is whether the wards have the institutional/technical capacity to perform all transferred services, whether sufficient financial resources will be transferred to the wards to pay for the services, and whether all services will actually be transferred given political barriers. Additionally, the current economic climate in Japan may overshadow decentralization policies. Let us explore these obstacles to successful decentralization in more detail.

### **Institutional/technical Capacity**

It is not clear that the wards have the institutional/technical capacity to accept the new

service responsibilities that will be transferred to them<sup>12)</sup>. For example, there has been little examination of cost or changes in staffing levels needed in the wards to provide expanded city planning (interview). An official responsible for planning in a smaller ward estimated off the top of his head that the ward might need an additional 50 to 60 staff members to handle added responsibilities in planning, building control, and design management (interview). It is unclear how detailed these studies of costs and impacts are<sup>13)</sup>. There is some doubt that the wards have sufficient staff, financial resources, and expertise to take over all aspects of city planning and other services amidst pressure to reduce employment. (Under central government economy measures, local governments are to make personnel reductions and each ward has been allocated a share by TMG).

### **Finances**

Devolution of authority must be accompanied by fiscal reform. The present financing system for governing the Metropolis (TMG and the wards) places the wards in a subordinate position vis-à-vis TMG. However, there is some doubt as to whether sufficient financial resources will be transferred with the services. TMG is currently facing a fiscal crisis because of the economic recession and the land bubble burst. TMG revenues are declining while committed expenditures are rising. TMG has committed to continue to transfer the basic adjustment amount (currently 44 percent of three municipal taxes collected by TMG) and the actual costs that are currently expended to provide transferred services. This would require the basic adjustment amount to increase to perhaps 50 percent to cover the approximately ¥200 billion additional service costs associated with providing transferred services (interview).

TMG is in a position to dictate the amount of money transferred and it is unknown if it will agree to transfer 50 percent of the basic adjustment amount. Thus, the wards could face added responsibilities without needed revenues and without new tax sources to hire additional staff or fund service costs. Final recommendations by the Metropolis-Ward Council to reform the fiscal system will not occur until after services are transferred in the year 2000. The fear is that administrative reforms emanating from the central government and TMG (e.g., privatization and deregulation) may lead to real cuts in services at the ward level comparable to the U.S. example of Reagan's New Federalism program turnbacks promoted as devolution but experienced as program cuts. Increased municipal autonomy on paper may not be matched by real authority. In fact, wards could be in worse shape as they will be held accountable for municipal services that they cannot reasonably provide without commensurate cuts in other service areas (interviews).

In addition, the wards would be responsible for determining any reallocation of tax money among themselves. As Table 3 reveals, the wards are heavily dependent upon the metropolis financial adjustment system which accounts for about one-fourth of all ward revenues. However, there is wide variation among the wards in how much of their local revenues are derived from this source ranging from as little as 1 or 2 percent to as much as 40 percent. This could lead to intense municipal conflict with the 23 wards set against each other. Some poorer wards might have insufficient money to provide basic services. This could be a great unanticipated consequence of metropolitan government reform. Intergovernmental relations in Japan is based

**Table 3 Allocation from Metropolis-23 ku Financial Adjustment System**

Ward	Financial Adjustment Allocation, 1989-90(¥thousands)	Percent of Ward Revenues, 1989-90	Financial Adjustment Allocation, 1995-96(¥thousands)	Percent of Ward Revenues, 1995-96
Chiyoda-ku	7,208,213	16.9	5,821,113	12.8
Chuo-ku	18,963,600	34.0	20,696,231	28.8
Minato-ku	601,345	0.8	2,167,519	2.3
Shinjuku-ku	22,674,077	18.8	20,678,855	19.7
Bunkyo-ku	12,571,278	20.7	16,681,666	20.2
Taito-ku	27,809,639	36.0	22,598,007	25.8
Sumida-ku	30,274,763	39.2	37,727,811	36.2
Koto-ku	39,556,019	41.6	41,990,978	34.6
Shinagawa-ku	28,378,427	29.5	28,936,756	26.6
Megro-ku	12,085,908	16.3	11,830,264	14.7
Ota-ku	35,403,368	23.0	40,111,124	19.2
Setagaya-ku	21,991,382	11.2	19,198,016	8.5
Shibuya-ku	1,043,185	1.6	4,092,712	5.3
Nakano-ku	24,821,361	31.2	25,346,791	26.1
Suginami-ku	21,391,544	17.4	22,335,191	16.1
Toshima-ku	35,999,739	40.6	23,441,643	26.2
Kita-ku	49,307,323	43.2	45,879,855	38.5
Arakawa-ku	29,392,932	45.1	34,043,474	39.2
Itabashi-ku	42,875,894	31.7	43,555,889	29.9
Nerima-ku	38,085,886	22.2	46,208,179	26.0
Adachi-ku	67,587,090	39.2	71,911,524	33.5
Katsushika-ku	48,027,299	40.2	51,026,666	35.6
Edogowa-ku	53,163,214	37.1	64,670,391	37.5
TOTAL	669,213,486	27.8	697,950,655	25.1

Source: Training School of Ward Offices, *Handbook of Ward Office, 1992; 1998.*

on a consensual political culture. It is likely that TMG would have to mediate disputes among the wards in how to distribute these revenues to ensure equity and harmony in relations (interview).

### Likelihood of Service Transfers

The recommended service transfers may not occur. The most politically volatile service change that would occur is the transfer of waste management to the ward offices. In Japan, waste collection and disposal are considered municipal services. However, TMG currently provides this service in the 23 wards<sup>14</sup>. Under reforms, the ward offices would take over this service by the year 2000. Each ward would be required to provide a waste disposal site; at present a number of wards including Shinjuku ward do not have such facilities. TMG would continue to provide technical and financial assistance for building facilities but the wards would be responsible for maintenance and operations. This will impose a significant burden on the wards but it is generally accepted that autonomous municipalities must provide all services normally considered municipal services<sup>15</sup>. A major obstacle has been the sanitation union concern that it will lose bargaining power and see wages and benefits depressed. Rather than one contract with TMG, there would be 23 contracts with wards and some wards may opt to contract this service

out entirely to the private sector (interview).

## 6. Creating Regional Governance for Tokyo?

Aside from bolstering ward autonomy, the reforms are intended to improve regional decision making by reducing TMG involvement in municipal services and refocusing its attention on regional problems and issues. The present reform plan does not go far enough to turn Tokyo into a truly regional government (see Robson, 1967, ch. III). The existing framework for regional cooperation rests on an annual regional summit (the Metropolitan Summit) between the governors of Tokyo and the neighboring three prefects. The secretariat of this summit rotates among the governors and each may strike items from the agenda that they do not wish considered. The regional summit has not tackled any significant issue and has not proven an effective forum for regional decision making (interview).

At this time, there is no concrete study or proposal for creating new regional institutions, adjusting TMG and ward boundaries, or eliminating the distinction between local governments in Tama and in the 23 ku area. However, there is some recognition of the need for improved regional decision making and an expectation that it will be addressed in a future study. Mr. Yuichiro Ito, an official in the Ministry of Home Affairs, indicates that a study will likely be undertaken to consider consolidation of special wards in central Tokyo and possible expansion of the 23 wards area to the Tama area as well as consideration of a better urban government system for ordinance-designated cities.

There is one issue on the horizon which could potentially galvanize cooperation at least among the four prefects with the summit serving as a base for cooperation. That is the proposed relocation of the capital away from Tokyo. The Diet has passed legislation establishing a process for designating a new capital location. Several sites have been identified and are presently being considered. Whether the national government really intends to go forward with this proposal is unclear. TMG has argued strongly against this plan. The relocation is proposed as a solution to the over-concentration in Tokyo. The high degree of concentration makes the nation very vulnerable to a devastating earthquake that could wipe out both the economic center and political center of the nation. Additionally, major infrastructure and development projects have been a cornerstone of Japan's post-war economy. Relocation would entail major new construction projects – a whole new city. Thus relocation of the capital would be the ultimate growth machine strategy (Logan and Molotch 1987). However, in the current economic climate, relocation is unlikely. Nevertheless, TMG and the neighboring three prefects are threatened by the relocation proposal, especially since the government has continued to pursue the process of relocation set up by the Diet (interview).

Regional cooperation is also impeded by the highly centralized system of local government in Japan. In the area of transportation, for example, TMG does not have sole control of transit in Tokyo which is also provided by private companies and Japan Rail (privatized national corporation). The central ministries such as the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Transportation have regional bureaus that guide and control local policy. These ministries do not coordinate

their work and undermine coherence of TMG policies as TMG (and prefects in general) organize functionally to match central government organization. To the extent that regional planning occurs, it is under the direction of the central government. Regional planning and decision making is unlikely to occur in TMG or the Summit unless the central government follows through on administrative reforms and decentralization plans thereby reducing the direction from above (interview).

More than 30 years have passed since Professor Robson's (1967) study of TMG and as we saw earlier in the paper, his major criticisms are still valid today including that there is 1) too much variation in the size of wards, 2) a lack of correspondence between TMG's boundaries and the boundaries of the Tokyo city-region, 3) little rationale for a different system of local government in Tama than the central wards, and 4) insufficient financial resources are provided to TMG from the central government (chs. 3, 14). His solution was for greater centralization under a much enlarged first-tier metropolitan government. Peter Self (1996) characterizes Professor Robson as a "democratic rationalist" who greatly shaped scholarly discourse on metropolitan government in general but whose ideas "failed in both London and Tokyo" (p.26).

Professor Self is sympathetic to Robson's call for a strong regional government. He even proposes a directly elected regional government for the larger 8 prefect capital region (p.28)<sup>16</sup>. This government should have powers over regional planning, new towns, transportation, and preservation of green space. However, this would require setting up a government for a huge population. There are over 20 million people just in the three neighboring prefects. Since it is unlikely that the central government would ever agree to such a proposal, Self suggests a "hybrid form of regional government and planning" similar to the Region d'Ile de France that links central government and Paris officials in planning decisions<sup>17</sup>. Given the remoteness of such a regional government, Self proposes a newly reconstituted City of Tokyo government made up of the 23 wards alongside the creation of such a vast regional government. Otherwise, he believes it would be unlikely that citizens would have sufficient "civic consciousness and political interest" (p.30).

## 7. Conclusion

There has been a hollowing out of the central wards in Tokyo, although overall the Tokyo metropolitan area has been growing due to in-migration (see Takahashi and Sugiura 1996). These demographic changes raise questions about the adequacy of the current governing arrangements for the metropolis. As large as TMG is, its boundaries do not cover the full metropolitan region. Although current decentralization plans for TMG will enhance local control within the 23 ku area, some wards are rather small to be fully autonomous municipalities and efficiently provide services. Chiyoda-ku for example has less than 40,000 residents. Other wards are rather large and may need to be decentralized themselves (seven wards have more than half a million residents).

Today, there is little rationale for differential treatment of the wards and Tama local governments. Under the present arrangements, the wards lack power but are rather wealthy and the

Tama cities, for the most part, are rather poor (in revenues) but have much greater municipal authority. The wards are to become like the Tama cities. However, they will still get more favorable treatment because as the site of the capital, they receive special allocations. TMG partially addresses the inequities by providing supplemental grants to Tama cities. However, the economic difficulties and related fiscal stress being experienced by TMG has resulted in large cuts in grants to Tama cities in the last two fiscal years. Rather than eliminate the fiscal equalization in the wards as is likely as decentralization reforms take place, an argument could be made that the fiscal equalization should be extended to the Tama area (see Ito, 1998). There is no doubt that the wards will have enhanced local autonomy under planned reforms. Unfortunately, the increased autonomy may be more illusory than real. Since the revenues are unlikely to match the increased responsibilities the wards will still be heavily dependent upon TMG and have difficulty meeting citizens' expectations.

The changes may have other unanticipated consequences as well. The system of intergovernmental relations in Japan is based upon a consensual political culture. The existing political structure of TMG with the wards as subordinate internal administrative units facilitates cordial and cooperative relations among and between TMG and the ward offices. The increased municipal autonomy may lead to increased conflict between TMG and the ward offices as the wards will be in a stronger position to challenge TMG priorities. This will be a much more charged political environment for Tokyo and Japan, especially if other central government decentralization policies are implemented leading to a stronger system of local government nationally.

Other important reforms to improve governance in the Tokyo region have not been considered. In particular, the metropolitan region, Tokyo and its three neighboring prefects, lack an effective forum or institutional setting to cooperate on regional transportation and development policies. Tama area local governments, especially smaller ones, are struggling to provide municipal services and may need greater assistance comparable to the wards' current relationship with TMG. And in all probability, boundaries of the wards will also have to be adjusted.

Most discussion of metropolitan government in the U.S. focuses on the need for more integrative and centralized administrative structures to bring about greater regional coordination and planning. Since metropolitan government is more the exception than the rule, this focus may be warranted. However, the case of Tokyo Metropolitan Government suggests that the boundaries of metropolitan governments will always be too small to make regional decisions. It is unlikely that the boundaries of TMG can be expanded further; in part because of political and legal difficulties. However, the real limitation to expanding TMG is one of scale. It is difficult to conceive of an efficient metropolitan government governing more than 32 million people. Insufficient attention has been paid to how to create regional cooperation among prefects.

There is an analogy for U.S. metropolitan areas which have strong municipalities with autonomy in most metropolises (what Tokyo is trying to create). However, too much weight is assigned to the relationship between the central city (cities) and county and not enough between counties. Self's suggestions may be relevant here. It probably makes more sense to have a strong municipal government(s) and larger regional governments, perhaps by consolidating counties. Counties should not be carrying out municipal services but regional ones. However, the

impediments to consolidating counties in the U.S. parallel those to consolidating prefects in Japan<sup>18</sup>.

In Japan and Tokyo, the concern is how to create more local autonomy and devolve services. Present reforms to enhance ward authority probably do not go far enough. Real decentralization will require TMG to give up its financial control over ward decisions. Clearly, more thought needs to be given to how to tie local (municipal) and regional (prefect) government together with greater emphasis on relations between prefects. The experience in the U.S. and Europe suggests that the emphasis needs to be placed on facilitating cooperative relations (since adjustment of boundaries is so difficult). However, the rhetoric concerning the benefits of "metropolitan governance without government" exceeds the record (Lefèvre 1998). In the long run, sustained cooperation needs an institutional base (i.e., formal regional institutions or government).

Until now, the debate over metropolitan government has been too narrowly focused between a public choice perspective and a consolidationist perspective. A new model of decentralized metropolitan governance is needed to better tie equity concerns with local autonomy and citizen responsiveness. Murray Bookchin (1995) calls for greater consideration of the idea of confederative schemes to bring about regional cooperation. The advantage here is that local polities are respected and civic consciousness is promoted. This idea has merit and deserves greater consideration. This might help open up the debate over metropolitan government and lead to more innovative proposals for metropolitan governance that combine the advantages of decentralization with those of centralization.

Scholars such as Charles Beard and William Robson have long argued that city government should link the city and suburbs under one over-arching metropolitan government. A more recent concern has been that this leads to large, inefficient, and unresponsive bureaucracies. The public choice school has been effective in highlighting the problems of centralization. However, decentralization based upon the public choice market philosophy leads not to improved self-governance but a dereliction of governance. Peter Self brings a more pragmatic approach to metropolitan governance recognizing the need for regional government (centralization) but questions the need for eliminating the core central city which promotes civic consciousness (decentralization). Murray Bookchin offers a more decentralist perspective seeing municipal confederation as the way to meet the need for regional cooperation but promoting a more radical decentralization. Strengthening the wards should promote greater decentralization but the lack of financial reform undermines this effort. The classic writings on these subjects by Beard and Robson are still useful for understanding urban processes and metropolitan governance. And some of their specific prescriptions are still valid today (e.g., Robson on ward sizes, need for financial reform, and elimination of distinction between ward and Tama area local governments). However, their general philosophical framework promoting integrated metropolitan governments for governing city-regions no longer fits the scale of urban society as we enter the 21st century. Today, metropolitan governments fail because of the inability to politically establish (or enlarge) them. Further, the boundaries of metropolitan governments must be too large in spatial area and population to efficiently govern. This leads to the need to consider alternative ways to promote horizontal and vertical coordination among and between governments and to enhance mechanisms for accountability to citizens. Here, the ideas of Self and Bookchin are probably

more relevant to designing a metropolitan system of governance in the next century in Tokyo and around the world.

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## Notes

- 1) For an overview of the powers of local government in Japan, see Isozaki (1997).
- 2) For an alternative perspective, see Muramatsu (1997) who argues that local governments in Japan have a great deal of local autonomy.
- 3) The First Special Administrative Reform Committee (1963) also made recommendations on reforming the administrative system of the capital city Tokyo.
- 4) On Tokyo as a global city, see Sassen 1991.
- 5) Between 1982 and 1992, office floor space went from 2219 ha to 3195 ha in the central downtown wards (Togo 1995, p.181).
- 6) About 32,000 persons live on the islands.
- 7) The prefecture is comparable to a county government in the United States. Given Tokyo's primacy, the prefect takes on added importance as the capital city and the center of finance, economy, culture. However, it should be remembered that Japan is a unitary state and that there are no states or provinces.
- 8) These three taxes account for about 40 percent of TMG's own source revenues (Shibata 1993, p.185). This has greatly bolstered TMG's revenues and made it much less dependent upon the central government. Prefectures in Japan obtain about 40 percent of their revenues from prefecture taxes, whereas TMG collects about 78 percent from its own taxes (including the municipal taxes in the 23 wards) (Shibata 1993, p.185). TMG's revenues are also higher than other prefects because of the concentration of corporate offices and professional services in Tokyo.
- 9) In Japan, there are two distinct types of urban government systems each providing a different relationship between the prefecture and the municipalities. TMG and the special wards (To-seido) have a unique arrangement found only in the capital city. The second case is that found in the 12 Designated Cities, cities with more than 500,000 persons, and their home prefectures (Osaka, Kyoto, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, Kitakyushu, Sapporo, Kawaskai, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Sendai, and Chiba) (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations, 1997, p.44).
- 10) This information is based upon a translation of sections of the Final Report on the Tokyo Ward System Reform (Draft) by Metropolitan-Ward Council, September 1994.
- 11) At the time of the 1975 reform, the ward regained personnel management rights to select their own officials, except for teachers. The current reforms extended this right to include teachers.
- 12) Related to the capacity problem is the size of some of the wards. Some observers suggest that ward boundaries themselves should be readjusted. Professor Robson called for wards to have a minimum of 250,000 people and no more than 500,000 (Robson, 1967, pp.14-15). The population of the wards varies quite a bit from less than 40,000 to more than 600,000 (see Table 2).
- 13) In several interviews, the author was told that decisions are made on principle and then the impact is considered after the decision is made. In the U.S., there seems to be greater emphasis on assessing the costs of change or at least the appearance of a fuller study of costs and benefits before reforming

institutions.

- 14) In the Tama area, the municipalities, towns, and villages provide this service.
- 15) In the U.S., collection of waste is considered a municipal service while disposal is usually thought to be a regional service best provided by a county or larger unit.
- 16) Peter Self's article, "London and Tokyo: Robson's Influence and Recent Developments in Two Great Cities" (1996) was written as a tribute to the Professor William Robson and his influence on the development of London and Tokyo and their governance systems.
- 17) Another approach is proposed by Professor Masamichi Royama (1965) who calls for a "governmental-administrative system" to consolidate and coordinate regional administrative functions in the Tokyo region.
- 18) There is debate over whether prefectural consolidation is constitutional. In many states in the U.S., consolidation of counties might require amending the state constitution as well.

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## 世界都市東京の再考：21世紀の東京都政

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世界各地で大都市政府が弱体化したり解散に追い込まれている一方で、東京都は統一自治体の典型例としての地位を保っている。だがその東京都も岐路に立たされている。たとえば都の行政単位である特別区は自治の拡大を要求しているが、国の政府は中央の権力を維持しつつも行財政は地方に移管しようと検討している。国土の均衡ある発展と一極集中防止対策の効果がさほど上がらない一方で、大都市圏の拡大は進んでいる。そして21世紀を目前にして、東京都は不況とそれに伴う財政難という問題に直面している。

政府・自治体間関係の変化という東京の問題は、アメリカの大都市地域が直面する問題でもある。確かに東京都は、単一国家でありアメリカとは文化も大きく異なる日本において行政を展開しているが、中央集権化と分権化という2つの圧力のせめぎあいという点では、アメリカの大都市地域も同じような状況にあるのである。

東京の都市部の拡大は、都市の境界線の拡張を伴うものではなかった。現在の東京都は、都市の政府としてはもはや大きすぎる。しかし都政では、依然として特別区に対する行政サービスの提供に目が向けられている。23区の重視は一方で、多摩地域の各市町村の軽視につながりかねない。これら市町村は自治体に義務づけられたサービス(東京都が23区内で提供しているもの)を提供しなければならないが、23区とは異なり、都区財政調整制度の対象からははずれている。財政逼迫のおり、都からの補助金は多摩地域の大多数の市町村にとって十分とはいえない。

同時に、大きすぎる東京都は、近隣3県を含む(首都圏8県に及ぶという説もある)真の意味での大都市圏を統治するには小さすぎるとも言える。

戦後50年間続いてきた大都市行政制度を改革しようと、区、都、自治省、内閣、国会では10年近くも調査や話し合いが続けられてきた。1998年、都区制度改革の最終報告書が関係機関等の了承を得て、関連法案が国会で可決された。改革では、現在は都が実施している清掃や都市計画などの事業が、2000年までに区に移管される。

だが改革が完全に実施されるかどうか、次のように疑問視する向きもある。1) 区の入入れ体制が十分かどうか。2) 権限委譲が財政改革を伴うものかどうか。現在都が徴収して特別区に交付している金額を大幅に引き上げる必要がある。しかし財政問題の検討は事業移管後へと先送りされており、しかも交付額を決めるのは都である。3) 事業全ての移管が可能かどうか。区によっては自区内で清掃工場が確保できない、あるいは移管は民営化の促進と組合の弱体化につながるとして、清掃組合の反発も予想される。

都区制度改革に対する批判は、次の4点である。1) より上位の政府、特に都への財政依存が続くため、特別区が完全な自治体として生まれ変わるかどうか大いに疑問である。特別区への期待が高まる一方で、財源不足からサービスの縮小という懸念もある。2) 東京都の行政区分は、もはや実際の都市圏に適合したものではない。東京都の管轄地域の人口は、首都圏一都三県の3分の1にすぎない。改革を通じて、都は市(区)へのサービス提供という重荷から解放され、広域行政に専念できるようになり、従って地域の決定権が強まるという期待もある。しかし都県の範囲を超えた地域全体について、どのような効果的

な計画や決定を打ち出せるかについての検討や研究は先送りされている。3) 改革は、特別区間、都、国との間で歳入をどう分配し、どの政策を優先させるかについての対立激化という、予想し得ない結果となりかねない。アメリカでも政府間の対立は大いに非難されているが、対立はアメリカの政治文化や、連邦政府や合衆国憲法などの制度と相容れないものではない。しかし、単一制度で、政治においても合意が重視される日本ではそうではない。4) 改革によっても、都の中における多摩地域の自治体と特別区との差は解消しない。

チャールズ・ピーアド、ウィリアム・ロブソンなどの学者は長年、1つの広域的な大都市政府のもとに都市と郊外部の双方を置くべきだと主張してきた。最近ではこれが、巨大で、非効率で、期待に応えられない官僚制度につながると懸念されている。確かに公共選択学派は、集権化の問題に焦点をあてるのに成功した。だが、公共選択市場学説に基づく分権化は、自治の拡充ではなく放棄につながる。

一方、ピーター・セルフは、地域政府（集権化）は必要だが、市民の意識を向上させる中核都市（分権化）をなくす必要はないとする、より実際的な大都市行政を提唱した。さらに分権推進派のマリー・ブクチンは、自治体連合こそが地域間協力を行う手段だとしつつ、さらに徹底的な分権を唱えている。特別区の強化は分権化を加速させるだろうが、財政改革をとまなわないとこの努力も無駄になってしまう。

この分野におけるピーアドやロブソンなどの古典的著書は、依然として都市のあり方や大都市行政を理解する上で役立つものだ。そして問題ごとの処方箋の中にはまだあてはまるものもある（ロブソンが提唱した区の規模、財政改革の必要性、特別区・市町村制度の廃止）。だが、都市圏行政のための統一大都市政府という枠組みは、21世紀を目前にした今日の都市社会にそぐわないものとなっている。今日、大都市政府が失敗するのは、政治的な存立（または拡大）基盤を持ち得ないためである。さらに大都市政府の領域は空間的に広がりすぎ、対象人口も多くなりすぎ、効率的な行政は望めなくなっている。今後は、政府・自治体の縦横のつながりを強化するような新たな別の方法を模索し、市民へのアカウントビリティを向上させるような仕組みを強化すべきだろう。その意味においては、セルフとブクチンの考え方の方が、来世紀の東京、そして世界各地の大都市の行政制度を構築する上で参考となると思われる。

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