

2000

Full Issue, Number 9, Summer 2000

The Congregational and Synodical Mission Unit, The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America

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INTERSECTIONS

faith + life + learning

NUMBER NINE

SUMMER, 2000



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INTERSECTIONS

SUMMER 2000

Published by : The Division for Higher Education & Schools
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
Published at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio USA 43209

Arne Selbyg, *Publisher*

Tom Christenson, *Editor*

Marisa Cull & Lori Drummer, *Student Assistants*

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Editorial Board: Timothy A. Bennett, Wittenburg Univ.; Karla Bohmbach, Susquehanna Univ.;
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Cover: Zoè Christenson

Purpose Statement

This publication is by and largely for the academic communities of the twenty-eight colleges and universities of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Division for Higher Education and Schools of the ELCA. The publication presently has its home at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio which has generously offered leadership, physical and financial support as an institutional sponsor for the inauguration of the publication.

The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators which have addressed the church – college/university partnership. Recently the ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College Conference. The primary purpose of *INTERSECTIONS* is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so by:

- Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
- Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
- Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning and teaching
- Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives and learning priorities
- Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
- Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
- Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
- Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their institutions, realizing a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.

From the Publisher

The Division for Higher Education and Schools of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America sees it as a central part of its mission to stimulate discussion about the characteristics that Lutheran higher education have or should have. We were very glad to see the results of the recent research called “Reclaiming Lutheran Students.” The study was made by the Lutheran Education Conference of North America (LECNA), partly funded by a generous grant by the Aid Association for Lutherans. The research showed that on a number of indicators and measures the alumni of Lutheran colleges and universities were much more satisfied with the quality of education that they had received while in college than were the alumni of flagship public universities.

A much higher percentage of the graduates of Lutheran colleges and universities expressed high satisfaction with the overall quality of their college education, and believe that when they graduated they were well prepared for graduate school and their first job, and a much higher percentage of them had finished their college degree in four years. Our colleges and universities stood out as places where the students were much more likely to benefit from good teaching and a personalized learning experience. More than eighty percent of the Lutheran college graduates said they had benefitted from opportunities for spiritual development while in college, and from courses with an emphasis on personal values and ethics, while eighty percent reported that their college had been effective in helping them develop moral principles to guide their actions. Many of us were surprised that the integration of faith and values into the college experience and the development of a strong sense of community in the Lutheran colleges were reported as being just as common by graduates from recent years as by the graduates from earlier decades, surprised because we often hear complaints that the Lutheran colleges are not as faith centered as they used to be.

But the research also showed that parents of Lutheran high school students were not aware of the magnitude of financial aid that our colleges provide in order to make Lutheran college education affordable, and that many of the parents were not aware that in many ways our colleges provide much better education than the flagship public universities. So our colleges have done a better job in providing good education than in marketing themselves to the parents of Lutheran high school students.

This journal, *INTERSECTIONS*, is probably of little direct help in that marketing. But we hope that because of the journal and the conference, "The Vocation of a Lutheran College," on which the journal is based, many college and university faculty and staff members can speak with confidence to prospective students and their parents about the nature of Lutheran higher education. We are grateful to the Lutheran Brotherhood Foundation for the generous grant support which it has provided, which makes it possible for us to continue the journal and the "Vocation" conferences.

June 2000

Arne Selbyg

Director for ELCA Colleges and Universities

From the Editor

This issue of *INTERSECTIONS* contains a greater variety of offerings than is usually the case. That variety has made it fun to put this issue together. The Von Dohlen / Ratke discussion should provoke some interesting responses. Von Dohlen challenges Lutherans use of Luther's "two kingdoms" idea. Surely someone will be offended. As Diogenes the Cynic long ago said, "Of what use is a philosopher who doesn't piss anybody off?" Certainly someone will take issue with Ratke's attempt to explain what Luther really meant. Several years ago I suggested that Lutheran theologians declare a moratorium on "two kingdoms" rhetoric until we could figure out what we wanted it to mean and what practices were (and were not) justified by it. Now I think that a genuine discussion with an important dose of humor will serve us better.

The talk by Rachel Hammond included here is, I think, a real gem. It demonstrates so many things: ways in which people are called, what it's like to understand one's education as a gift and a responsibility, what it's like to suffer alienation and to find oneself in the process. I recommend copying this and sharing it with students. That's what I intend to do. Anyone who is moved to contribute to the orphanage Rachel worked at may send a check to Rachel's home congregation. They will forward all contributions to the Home for Perpetual Hope. Make checks payable to: First Baptist Church, 44 Lorain St., Oberlin, OH 44074.

The essay by Church Huff illustrates well the effect that liberal learning and teaching have on the way we conceive of and pursue our disciplines. I hope we get many more reflections like this one, written from a disciplinary viewpoint, yet engaging issues of a larger and deeper sort.

John Reumann's essay tells the interesting life story of a scholar whose work is done not only to meet the highest standards of criticism within a discipline (biblical scholarship) but also to meet the needs of the church. Though Reumann's essay was not selected with this in mind, it serves very well as an example of the issues argued in the Von Dohlen / Ratke discussion. Reumann begins by talking about the art of teaching as "a balancing act." Reading that line made me pay attention in a new way to the drawing my eight year old daughter had completed after a recent trip to the circus. As a result she became the cover artist for this issue.

Tom Christenson
Capital University

A Fifth Teat on a Cow:
The Irrelevance of the Lutheran Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms for Academic Life
A response to Hughes, LaHurd, Ratke et al.

Richard VonDohlen

Two Kingdoms: A Universal Condition for Faith Communities both Sacred and Secular

All Christians live in two communities and struggle with the sometimes-conflicting allegiances to those communities. Augustine in his *City of God* argues that the City of God and the City of Man are not identical (even when the City of Man formally affirms its character to be Christian). Thus, the sacking of Rome in 410 AD (approximately 30 years after the declaration of the Roman Empire as officially Christian) does not constitute a defeat of the City of God. It is a defeat of only one of the manifestations of the City of Man. Furthermore in the event of conflict, the ultimate commitment of the Christian must be to the City of God. Augustine was not, of course, the first to articulate a cultural conflict between two kingdoms or realms. Jewish reflection on the Babylonian captivity as embodied in the books of Esther and Daniel deals with problem of dual allegiances. One is definitely temporal and pagan. The other is the true community of faith with a transcendent ground. Analogous themes are dealt with in all of the great religions of the world. Furthermore, Marxism is an example of a secular religion that posits a temporally transcendent vision (the classless society where conflict, exploitation, alienation and history as we know it are no more) over against the normal history of mankind grounded in class conflict. Thus, the conflict between two kingdoms is not a uniquely Lutheran, uniquely Christian, uniquely Western or even uniquely non-secular theme. Many recent discussions of the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms have concentrated on the relationship of the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms to Lutheran higher education. This is perfectly appropriate but these discussions have failed to place this dialogue in the much larger context that adequate discussion requires. The two-kingdom doctrine and Lutheran higher education is more narrow even than a discussion of the two-kingdom doctrine and Lutheran faith and social policy. It is an important piece of this issue but not the entire issue.

The Two Kingdom Doctrine and Recent Discussions in Lutheran Higher Education

Is there a new orthodoxy for Lutheran colleges regarding the issue of faith and the academic disciplines? Philip Nordquist ("From Pietism to Paradox: The Development of a Lutheran Philosophy of Education," *INTERSECTIONS*, **Richard VonDohlen is a professor of philosophy at Lenoir-Rhyne College in Hickory, North Carolina.**

Winter, 2000) does not use these words but speaks as if there is such an orthodoxy. Nordquist applauds the victory of Lutheran dialectical theology and the doctrine of two kingdoms among ELCA colleges:

"It is, however, now the view being expressed by the Division for Higher Education and Schools of the Evangelical Lutheran church in America (ELCA). It has been basic to these Vocation of A Lutheran College conferences, and it is was clearly and effectively summarized by Richard Hughes at the conference held at Carthage College in 1997" (p. 14).

Nordquist affirms clearly that "Dialectical—or two-kingdoms—theology is an indispensable foundation for the educational activity of Lutheran colleges and universities" (p. 15). He also refers to Richard Hughes' article ("Our Place in Church Related Higher Education," *INTERSECTIONS*, Winter 1998). Hughes address republished in *INTERSECTIONS* was given at the 1997 conference on "Vocation of a Lutheran College." Prior to that, a similar presentation had been given by Hughes to the Lutheran Presidents. A copy of that presentation was used in at least one faculty retreat (Lenoir-Rhyne College, May 1997) as a point of discussion. Consistent with Nordquist, Hughes emphasizes the strength of the Lutheran vision for higher education in its affirmation of the paradox of the two kingdoms. Because of this paradoxical affirmation, Lutherans are not called to transform the secular world into the Kingdom of God (p. 8). There is for Lutherans a Christian worldview but there is no need to impose that worldview on others nor to "integrate faith and learning around that perspective" pp.8-9).

It is not entirely clear to me what "dialectical" and "paradoxical" mean in the context of these essays. A paradox appears to be something more than a difficult, confusing or ambiguous situation, problem or concept. Paradoxes seem in principle to be rationally incomprehensible or in the case of a particular problem incapable of resolution. Dialectical in this context is not the Hegelian or Marxian sense of dialectic. For Hegel or Marx the dialectical poles are overcome in a rationally comprehensive synthesis. For Lutherans it seems that our understanding and our concrete existential situation in both the spiritual kingdom on the right and our secular kingdom on the left must remain forever unreconciled. The genius of the Lutheran position and its ability to support the life of the mind lies in its ability to affirm these intellectual and

existential poles without attempting to reconcile them. Thus each kingdom is affirmed. In academic life each discipline is affirmed. Theology is affirmed as a legitimate academic reflection on spiritual reality. The other academic disciplines have their own rational autonomous foundation and are capable of development independent of special revelation or special spiritual insight.

The above description suggests that here is at least one right-handed discipline (theology but perhaps also hermeneutics, church history, etc.) And numerous left-handed disciplines (mathematics, physics, biology, chemistry, economics, sociology, psychology, etc.). Thus, my colleague, David Ratke writes "To be a theologian is presumably to serve in the realm of God's right hand, that is in the spiritual realm and inculcate and further God's word."¹ Ratke following David Kelsey, distinguishes between the Athens model for education which is concerned with the cultivation of the soul and the Berlin model (named after the University of Berlin formed in 1810) which is concerned with specialized cultivation of knowledge in the distinct disciplines. Schools of the Church, Ratke affirms, are perhaps more consistent with the Athens model. Ratke also suggests that Luther affirmed that there are distinct sociological realms governed by different epistemological standards. Paraphrasing Luther, he writes: "The secular realm is the realm where reason prevails. One does not need the gospel to serve in this realm." In this context he quotes Luther to the effect that government is clearly in the secular realm and is to be governed by reason (p. 294-5).

Ryan LaHurd ("Of Imaginary Cows and White Toy Sheep," *INTERSECTIONS*, Winter, 1999) distinguishes between the "real" and the "imagined" college. The "real" college is associated with the business of the college and with the kingdom on the left. This college is not free. The "imagined" (ideal?) college is associated with the kingdom on the right and presumably is free. LaHurd who is the President of Lenoir-Rhyne does not believe that he has the same freedom as president that he formerly did as a professor of English at another Lutheran college.

"As I go about cultivating this potential donor, do I have the freedom to tell him that the mission of my college is to convince students that materialism is one of the idols of our time?" (P. 15)

He answers in the negative. He believes, however, that it would be useful to distinguish between two kinds of economy—the "gift economy" (kingdom on the right) and the "commodity economy" (kingdom on the left). LaHurd's paper raises interesting questions about the role of the Christian college and roles within the Christian college. He

fails to deal with a number of interesting questions that his article suggests. What specifically are the left-handed functions within the college and how does one know when one is performing one or the other. Are there right-handed disciplines (like English and philosophy)? Are there left-handed disciplines (like business)? If so, what about business ethics (which I teach in our MBA program)? If I critique materialism in my class is this a subversive activity, knowledge about which he should not share with a wealthy donor? How will we deal with this when the word gets out?²

Furthermore, faculty in small colleges like ours perform various functions that are administrative or quasi-administrative. They are department chairs, sit on tenure and promotion committees, personnel committees that hear grievances, propose salary schedules and make other policy proposals. They sit on admissions committees that determine who will be allowed to study at our institutions. They sit on academic standing committees and disciplinary committees that throw students out of our institutions. Are these all left-handed functions and what is the significance of calling them left-handed or right-handed? Are they governed by different ethical standards than the right-handed functions? Does the spiritual realm have anything to say to these functions?

The above is not an adequate summary or critical review of any of the addresses and articles mentioned. It is perhaps sufficient to indicate the variety of issues raised and provide a context for the critical remarks that follow. As I indicate below, my impressions of the meaning and use of the Lutheran two-kingdom doctrine is also informed by my nearly thirty years of teaching, dialoguing and attending conferences on the Lutheran perspective on faith, culture and the academic disciplines. The remarks that follow will, I hope, clarify the perspective of one who has for a long time been in the Lutheran world if never fully of it.

Critical Summary of the Lutheran Doctrine of Two Kingdoms

To put it in its briefest and boldest form, advocates of the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms seem to be committed either explicitly or implicitly to the proposition that there are two distinct sociological realms with distinct epistemological foundations and distinct ethical demands. Christians live in both these realms.

They are at one and the same time citizens of the kingdom on the right--subject to the demands of the gospel; and the kingdom on the left--subject to the demands of reason. As subjects of the kingdom on the right they have special knowledge and a special calling. As subjects in the kingdom

on the left they also have a calling from God but no insight that is not also available to the non-Christian. Nor do they need any such insight. This dual existence is paradoxical and the life of the Christian is thus in a fundamental sense a life lived in a paradoxical state.

When this paradigm is applied to academe, it seems to come out that Christians (unless they are theologians) must be subject to the demands of reason when practicing the investigation related to their disciplines. Here, however, they do not have special insight from the scriptures or theology that non-believers do not have. Furthermore, they don't need any special insight. If this living in two realms generates paradox, it also provides protection for academic freedom. Lutheranism above all other Christian perspectives is in a position to protect academic freedom from Christian theological encroachment. Above all other perspectives, it is able to make its peace with what Ratke referred to in his paper as the Berlin model of University education. This model stresses the autonomy of the separate disciplines, each subject only to the norms of rational scientific investigation.

My reservations can be stated bluntly. This doctrine of the two kingdoms is typically interpreted in ways that are sociologically meaningless. It is based on a description of intellectual history that, if it was ever true, has not been true for centuries, and is totally at odds with current postmodernist trends. It is anti-intellectual in its effect by encouraging specialists within disciplines to ignore--or at least giving them an excuse for ignoring--the epistemological and anthropological assumptions that are deeply imbedded in the paradigms that define the nature of their disciplines. Rather than providing a basis for interdisciplinary dialogue, it discourages it or at best gives no intellectual basis for supporting it. Likewise, it gives no intellectual basis for defending the liberal arts or the relationship of the liberal arts to the professions. It is a potential disaster for social ethics, particularly Christian social ethics which by definition rests on the premise that the Gospel does have implications for the ethical decisions that we make in society and the institutional frameworks within which those decisions are made. By walling off theology from the disciplines, it impoverishes the disciplines but is a virtual disaster for theology as a living developing enterprise. This is because the logical implication of affirming that theology does not have epistemological implications for the other disciplines, is that the other disciplines do not have epistemological implications for theology. This will protect theology from the predations of modern scholarship by making it totally irrelevant. **Like a fifth teat on a cow!** Finally, Lutherans defend their doctrine of the two kingdoms by two questionable strategies. On the one hand, they engage in a

promiscuous use of the concept of "paradox" which often appears to be a catchall for all that is unclear. On the other hand, they like to affirm that $2+2=4$ which is offered as paradigm for all that is clear. Their use of "paradox" tends to define as irrational that which can in fact be clarified. Their use of mathematics tends to treat as clear that which in fact is complex and ambiguous.

I wish to start by apologizing to those who may be put off by the syrupy tone and excessive subtlety of my attack. I could say more but perhaps this articulation of my reservations about the Lutheran doctrine of two kingdoms is enough to get us started. I will proceed to give my understanding of the typical Lutheran or at least a very typical Lutheran understanding of the two-kingdom doctrine. This doctrine sounds so rational, so charitable and so sophisticated that I am certainly obligated to explain why I find it to be complete nonsense. Furthermore, I must give an account that would at least attempt to explain how I, who have fed at the table of a Lutheran college for nearly thirty years, should be so lacking in charity and common civility as to **say** what I think. After all, academic freedom means that one is **allowed** to give harsh judgments when they are properly within the province of one's discipline. It does not mean that one is always **compelled** to give those judgments. In the next page or two, I will do my best.

A Faulty Sociology

First, I will begin with what I see as the faulty sociology. I will do so by way of a personal illustration. I currently serve on the Ethics Committee of Catawba Valley Hospice. What is dying, especially dying under the care of hospice? It is clearly a biological event (left-handed stuff)? Is it also a spiritual event? Surely! Why does our local hospice have an ethics committee? Well, you say, they want to be ethical. It's not quite that simple. Hospice organizations are not required to be accredited by JCAHO (Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations) but they can be. Furthermore, hospice care is funded by a combination of charitable giving (right-handed stuff), Medicare and Medicaid (that's political and obviously left-handed stuff) and health insurance (business-read left-handed stuff again). The local hospice believes that at some point accreditation is going to be necessary to get governmental and insurance funding. JCAHO requires an ethics program (this usually means a committee) to be accredited. And you thought they needed lectures on J.S. Mill and Immanuel Kant in order for them to know how to be ethical!

The point here is that dying is not just a biological and spiritual event. It turns out to be a political and economic event as well. But there is more. Hospice generally does not serve very many AIDS patients. Why? Because a patient

needs to have six months or less to live in order to use the type of funding available to hospice. Just as federal agencies monitor our Lutheran colleges to see that we are not giving federal money to students who do not graduate on time, they monitor hospice organizations to see that they are not giving money to clients who do not die on time. Hospice organizations like the rest of us must live within the law. Dying is a juridical act as well. But it is also a social/psychological event. To come under the care of hospice, the patient and the caregivers of the patient (frequently family--family, isn't that right-handed stuff?) Must make a commitment to dying. Patients can be hospitalized—but only for palliative care. If they request and receive clearly curative care they can be dropped from the program. Making a commitment to die--is that a social/psychological event that can be analyzed by the science of psychology apart from its spiritual implications? Let us count the institutional structures that potentially come into play here. The church, the synagogue or the mosque, hospice, the hospital, perhaps a nursing home (independent or church sponsored--there is federal and private business insurance money involved either way) the federal government, private business. Oh! I almost forgot the funeral home. Educational structures are also involved. Hospice care is palliative care. We are getting better but studies have shown that medical schools have not historically done a good job teaching their medical students how to care for the dying. The young docs in training don't treat dying patients! They don't get adequate training in medication appropriate for palliative care versus medication necessary for curative care, etc. Aren't there some important cultural issues here?

I have chosen one example. I could have chosen others. The point I wish to make is that we live in what sociologists refer to as a **highly structurally differentiated society**. We all play many roles and live in many institutional structures or if you prefer realms. Each of these structures has its own **autonomy**, so to speak but they are all **interdependent** in exceedingly complex ways. Luther's sociology may have been appropriate for Luther's time. It won't work for ours. Some Lutherans may look at the example given above and see paradox. I think this is not only unhelpful, it is destructive. Life is hellishly complex, frustratingly complicated, governed by legal and ethical norms that do not always appear compatible and indeed, are not always compatible. Furthermore, our life in the world has many evils that are intractable. I believe that a theology informed by a sociology (or a psychology, economics, politics, jurisprudence, etc.) which in turn is informed by theology will better enable us to understand and attack some of the problems and alleviate them. But to alleviate these problems we must avoid an over-hasty retreat whenever we encounter issues that are complex and difficult. This over-hasty retreat

is what Robert Benne argues against.

"Thus, in some areas of inquiry, a Lutheran college will recognize paradox, ambiguity and irresolvability. But this recognition takes place at the end of a creative process of engagement, not at the beginning, where some of the proponents of "paradox" would like to put it. These proponents then simply avoid real engagement by declaring "paradox" at the very beginning, essentially allowing everyone to go their own way and do their own thing." ("Integration and Fragmentation: Can the Lutheran Center Hold?" *INTERSECTIONS*, Winter, 2000, p. 8).

I applaud Benne's warning against putting the concept of "paradox" at the front of any discussion rather than at the end. The only useful function I can see for this ploy is to end all dialogue before it gets started and this is not useful at all. But I am not sure that "paradox" is generally useful at **any stage** in the dialogue. It is certainly useful to recognize ambiguity and irresolvability. It is certainly useful to avoid premature and superficial closure on academic debates by giving supposedly rationally coherent solutions that are neither rational nor coherent. It is also wise, however, to avoid claiming that a problem is ultimately irresolvable because it is a "paradox." What cannot be resolved in this decade, in this culture, in this age, with present intellectual and cultural resources may be resolvable in another time and place with different insights and intellectual resources. I do not say that here are not paradoxes--the trinity, the incarnation, how the German Lutherans, the Swedish Lutherans and the Norwegian Lutherans are three and yet only one are instances that come to mind. But it seems best to me to keep a long list of presently unresolved problems and a short list of "paradoxes."

Epistemological and Anthropological Pluralism and the Two-Kingdom Doctrine

The Lutheran two-kingdom doctrine assumes an academic culture characterized by epistemological monism that is neutral with respect to anthropological assumptions. **In fact, academic culture is characterized by pluralism (some would say relativism)**. This is evident in the social sciences. Sociology, political science, psychology, anthropology, and economics do not have a single paradigm to which they all adhere. They do not even have single paradigms that define the nature of the particular discipline. The same may be said of the humanities. If history is part of the humanities (and historians disagree whether it is part of the humanities or part of the social sciences) there is certainly no single view of history to which all historians guided by a single view of reason subscribe. The same may be said of literature. Is there a single literary theory to which every competent Ph.D. in literature guided by a neutral

reason must subscribe? Furthermore, the various candidates for paradigms within the disciplines make assumptions about the nature of ultimate reality, the nature of the knowing process and human nature that are deeply embedded within the paradigms. Some of these assumptions are theological in the narrow sense—cf. Freud's *Civilization and Its Discontents* or Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* or the works of Marx or Spencer. Others make assumptions that are at least broadly religious or make affirmations about the relationship of religion to various spheres of life—cf. Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, Alasdair MacIntyre's *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* has a title that is a rhetorical statement not meant to affirm relativism as an ontological and epistemological reality but meant to be a descriptive statement that characterizes where we are in the last half of the twentieth century. MacIntyre affirms that relativism and its twin, emotivism, are false as philosophical positions. He also affirms that it is correct to describe our culture as characterized by emotivism. He affirms that we have many competing views of reason and many competing views of the nature of ethical truth and do not have cultural agreement on standards by which to resolve our differences.

According to MacIntyre, Rational ethical discourse in our culture has become increasingly impossible. Maybe Luther could appeal to a single view of reason to which everyone whatever their religious persuasion could subscribe. As Robert Benne, has observed we, however, certainly cannot make any such assumption (Benne, pp. 8-9). Similar things may be said with respect to the field of business and more specifically business management. From Frederick Taylor, to Elton Mayo to Douglas McGregor to Peter Drucker, theories of business management make assumptions about human nature and the nature of human interaction, the value of wealth and the meaning of work that are profoundly religious.³ Theology simply does have something to say to these issues and these perspectives have something to say to theology. To fail to recognize this is to sin against theology. It is even something more serious than that. I am a professional philosopher and not a theologian. **The Lutheran two-kingdom doctrine sins against epistemology.** Any doctrine that discourages epistemological reflection on the nature of the various disciplines or seeks uncritically to impose a particular epistemology on an entire institution or denomination is not the preserver of the integrity of academe. It is anti-intellectual in a most fundamental way.

Personal and Institutional Vocation and the Lutheran College

Richard Hughes, who has had a tremendous influence on recent discussions among Lutherans on the vocation of

Lutheran colleges, begins an important address on this topic by telling something of his spiritual journey and explaining that although he is not formally a Lutheran that he is spiritually a Lutheran. In brief, Lutheran theology was the means of his rescue from a brand of fundamentalism that stressed a very destructive form of works righteousness. I too affirm what I regard as the essence of Lutheran soteriology — the doctrine of justification not by works but by faith. My spiritual journey, however, differs somewhat from his journey. Like Hughes I grew up in a fundamentalist denomination but not one that stressed works righteousness. Salvation was by grace! I read Bainton's *Here I Stand* for a high school paper on "The Causes and Effects of the Reformation." I rejoiced in reading about Luther but not because he rescued me from guilt-ridden struggle with works righteousness but because he confirmed what I already believed. As a teenager I had intellectual interests that included reading Plato, Freud, Dewey and Marx. My problem with my religious heritage was not with soteriology but with a dispensational eschatology that placed social ethics and responsibility entirely in a future millennial kingdom. Robert Merton's distinction between manifest and latent functions is helpful here. The manifest function of the preoccupation with eschatology was to emphasize a cardinal doctrine of the Christian faith — the Second Coming. But there was a **latent function** of structuring the doctrine in this way with what I regarded as an almost exclusive preoccupation with soteriology and eschatology. It was to develop a rationale for avoiding the life of the mind as well as critical reflection on the basis for the Christian's responsibility in and for the world. It was both anti-intellectual and socially irresponsible. In college and seminary I was introduced to the full richness of the Reformed perspective especially in the Dutch Reformed tradition. I read widely in the classical tradition of sociological theory and wrote a dissertation in the philosophy of the social sciences. After five years teaching at Boston University in a sophomore humanities program built around utopian literature and the problems of constructing an ideal society, I came to Lenoir-Rhyne and had my first sustained encounter with Lutherans. I also had my first encounter with people who took the Lutheran version of the two-kingdom doctrine seriously.⁴ They sometimes stressed the experience of tension that Christians have if they try to take both their faith and the world of academe seriously. I couldn't agree more. They sometimes talked as if there was a separate sociological realm with distinct institutional structures and ethical norms that had no direct bearing on the gospel. There was a corresponding distinct sociological realm to which faith did apply. This was surely nonsense. They sometimes talked as if we were living in an age where there was cultural consensus about the nature of truth and justice. This too was patently false. Lutherans sometimes talk as if there are functions within

our colleges that are right-handed business (like firing faculty and staff and cutting departments that we can't afford). This made me nervous. I hope the president knows that I am a **tenured** right-handed faculty member in a right-handed discipline and despite my occasional criticism that my heart is in the right place.

The Presumed Value Neutrality of Mathematical Knowing

When pushed, Lutherans often respond that $2+2=4$ regardless of one's faith commitment. This they seem to regard as the definitive refutation of the Reformed perspective and the conclusive proof of the two-kingdom perspective. Now it is true that Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, J.S. Mill and A.J. Ayer all agree that $2+2=4$ or to use the equation that has become commonplace that $7+5=12$. So did the Pythagoreans. But they differed radically about the "meaning" of this phenomenon. Is mathematical knowing the penultimate step in understanding the nature of ultimate reality? Is it an integral part of the knowing structure of all rational human beings? Is it simply a cultural creation that has turned out to be useful in manipulating our physical reality but that gives no insight into any higher reality? Can robots think? Do they have souls? Are we fundamentally rational creatures (with mathematical knowing the paradigm for rationality) or are we feeling creatures? If the twentieth century is the century of physics and the twenty-first the century of biology, what is the relationship of biology to physics and of physics to math? Are the "real" sciences those that can be reduced to mathematical models? What of God? Was Spinoza right when he reasoned that God could not love his creatures? He argued that God was perfect and that a perfect being must think perfectly. To think perfectly is to think clearly and distinctly (his model was mathematical thinking). Emotions are confused thoughts. Confused thoughts are imperfect. Love is an emotion. If God loved he would be imperfect. God is not imperfect. Therefore, he cannot love.

How science and mathematics relate to the meaning of life in the modern world is simply not a settled matter. The relationship of science, business, ecological responsibility, our responsibility to generations yet to come and to our God who created the universe are not settled questions either.

The Latent Function of the Lutheran Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms

I have perhaps said enough to indicate at least how I regarded the two-kingdom doctrine when I first encountered it. Merton encourages us to look for latent functions. We should especially do this when we encounter a cultural phenomenon that seems otherwise incoherent and

dysfunctional. I have suggested that the manifest function of the fundamentalist exclusive preoccupation with soteriology and eschatology was to proclaim the Gospel. This is not an argument against the study and proclamation of soteriology and eschatology. Although I don't agree with dispensational theology, it is not an argument against a particular treatment of apocalyptic literature. The fundamentalists were right, in my opinion, to reject a view of human nature and social progress that didn't take seriously the problem of human evil and the necessity of grace. Christianity should not be reduced to social reform. Neither should it be reduced to or confused with a philosophical system. What I maintain, however, is that the latent function of the eschatology of fundamentalism was to enable its adherents to avoid facing intellectual problems and responsibility to transform the world. **When I first confronted the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, it seemed to me and it still seems to me an apparently sophisticated way of avoiding the responsibility of honest intellectual effort and social reform.** Why would otherwise intelligent and well meaning people adopt a position that is both sociologically and epistemologically incoherent? It has some latent functions. It keeps theology in its place. It allows us to hire and tenure faculty who whether Christian or not have little or no interest in interdisciplinary dialogue. It allows us as individuals in various disciplines to avoid examining the assumptions in our own areas. It allows us to avoid the rich, full and difficult implications of our faith. These are not just or primarily intellectual problems. They are profoundly spiritual ones. Except for keeping theology in its place (something dear to the sinful heart of a philosopher) they are goals we should not pursue. **We should want, however, to dialogue with theologians as equal partners in articulating the faith not to marginalize them and render them and their discipline irrelevant.**

Some Concluding Remarks and An Outline for Further Dialogue

Lutherans have been ambivalent (as well they might be) about the two-kingdom doctrine. The social statement of the ELCA Department for Studies of the Division for Church and Society "Sufficient, Sustainable Livelihood for All" is an excellent example of the kind of interdisciplinary statement and work that I think our colleges should participate in. In fact my own college did participate, largely through the efforts of Professor of Economics William Mauney, in the preparation of this document. Had it only been the work of theologians or only the work of economists or only the work of political scientists, it would have been a less valuable document.

There are numerous examples that could be cited of Lutherans confronting the world with the resources of the

Lutheran tradition in a constructive and faithful manner that is spiritually enriching, sociologically insightful and epistemologically responsible. I do not want to deny the value of this rich tradition or to belittle these accomplishments. I applaud them. But similar things may be said of the fundamentalists to which I have compared my Lutheran brethren. They have gone out into the world and founded schools and hospitals. They have fed the hungry. They have ministered to substance abusers. They have preached the gospel of salvation by grace through faith. They have, because of their faith, been honest in their dealings with their fellow citizens. But they have also withdrawn from public life and responsible intellectual work in the name of Jesus. They have been irrelevant when and where the relevance of Christian faith was needed. When they sought to be relevant after years of withdrawal, they entered the fray in an unsophisticated, clumsy, unhelpful and frequently destructive manner. To revisit my metaphor, five-teated cows are capable of giving a great deal of milk but only because farmers have the good sense to work around useless appendages. A farmer who concluded that the fifth teat was the most productive one and concentrated exclusively on that appendage would soon be out of business. I write this essay to protest the efforts of those who seem intent on turning our ELCA colleges into a barn full of fifth-teated cows. To the extent that this effort is successful we will succeed in sending our students, Lutheran and non-Lutheran, into the world theologically, sociologically and epistemologically unprepared. Naked Lutherans in the public square—it will not be a pretty sight.

How might Lutherans respond to the criticisms I have leveled here? First, they should continue dialogue regarding the two realms or kingdoms not because it is essentially Lutheran but because it is essentially Christian. There are, however, many things that need clarification, defense and modification. What is meant by “paradox?” What are the criteria for designating something as a “paradox?” What is the “pietism” that the ELCA colleges have presumably rejected? Was the real Luther a “dialectical theologian?” If so, are Lutherans prepared to articulate what this means to those who are neither theologians nor Lutherans? Lutherans frequently appear to be making sociological claims that are founded on dialectical theology. Do the proponents of this interpretation of Lutheran higher education mean to propose a uniquely Lutheran sociology? I rather doubt it but what do they mean? Lutherans frequently talk as though the distinct academic disciplines are founded on a single paradigm that makes unified anthropological, epistemological and metaphysical claims or avoids making such claims altogether. This appears on the face of it to be a descriptive claim that is absolutely false. If this is not what they mean, they need to make this clear. If this is what they mean, it is an assertion that needs defense. Lutherans appear to talk as

though some Enlightenment version of knowledge is both true and unchallenged. There are presumably autonomous disciplines founded on autonomous reason. Lutherans do not have to agree with the various postmodernist critiques but they can neither uncritically accept postmodernism nor speak as if it is not a part of the contemporary intellectual scene.⁵ Is the Lutheran philosophy of higher education wed to a dialectical theology on the one hand and some Enlightenment view regarding autonomous reason on the other? If so fine! We should recognize, however, that we send our students out into a world where these assumptions will be vigorously challenged. Furthermore, we are and will be recruiting the Lutheran faculties of the future from graduate schools that not only reject these assumptions but also do not even take them seriously. Finally, there are both within our faculties and outside them those like myself who are not Lutherans. Many of us would aspire, nevertheless, to do more than to criticize the Lutheran program or to carry on subversive intellectual activity within our Lutheran colleges. We would like to assist in building a rich and full-blooded intellectual response to the crises of our times and to faithfully equip our students to live in the modern or postmodern world. For this to be possible we will need to develop a dialogue that is intellectually ecumenical. What this could mean needs to be developed in another article. At the very least, however, it requires non-Lutherans who are willing to take Lutheranism seriously and Lutherans who are willing to take non-Lutheran paradigms seriously. This will not always be easy. It will require a willingness to give and take criticism. If we can pull it off, however, our faculties, our institutions and our students will be the better for it. So will the two kingdoms in which we are called to serve.

NOTES

1. Ratke, David, “To Be in the World, But Not of the World”: *The Relevance of Luther's Two Realms Doctrine for Academic Life* in *Theology at the Beginning of the 3rd Millennium in a Global Context-Retrospect and Perspectives* (Peter Lang: Bern, 1999). Pp. 293-307. Ratke has just finished his first year as a professor of theology at Lenoir-Rhyne. The article cited here was previously published but was delivered at a theology colloquium held at Lenoir-Rhyne. Ratke has not been in attendance at any of the Vocation of a Lutheran College Conferences. He is, however, obviously a reflective and informed participant in the broader dialogue that is represented at those conferences. An earlier version of my paper was delivered the following month.

2. Almost every standard text written from a secular viewpoint deals with the moral issues associated with the justification of capitalism. A responsible business ethics course would at least have to raise this issue. The only question is really whether faith considerations should be

introduced as part of this discussion.

3. Compare Lee Hardy, *The Fabric of This World: Inquiries into Calling, Career Choice, and the Design of Human Work* (William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1990) pp. 124-185.

4. My first encounter with Lutherans like most of my encounters over the years was very positive on the intellectual and personal level. Dr. James Unglaube was the young dean who hired me and who encouraged interdisciplinary study (which included theology), epistemological reflection and a reflection on the nature of

Christian higher education. Unglaube, as most of my readers will know, went on to the LCA and later ELCA Division of Higher Education where he vigorously encouraged the kind of dialogue I have been proposing ought to take place.

5. Robert Benne is critical of what he perceives as a shift from an Enlightenment view of the autonomy of reason to a postmodernist relativism. See Benne p. 8. It may be that the Lutheran two-kingdom is compatible with some version of both the Enlightenment and postmodernism. For this to be demonstrated, however, requires articulation and defense.

Tat for Teat: Ratke Responds¹

David C. Ratke

When I first read Richard Von Dohlen's critique of the doctrine of the two kingdoms (which I prefer to think of as "two realms") I wondered if I wrote what I had meant. Certainly it did not seem as if Von Dohlen had read what I had written. As I read further I realized that Von Dohlen and I use different languages which arise partly, I think, from different academic disciplines and partly from different theological traditions. I'll begin by saying that I agree with much of what Von Dohlen says although I think he misunderstands me, Luther, and Luther's doctrine of the two realms.

Von Dohlen argues that "it is a potential disaster for social ethics, particularly Christian social ethics which by definition rests on the premise that the Gospel does have implications for the ethical decisions that we make in society and the institutional frameworks with which those decisions are made" (p.1). I agree. Moreover, Luther agrees. It is for this reason that he responded to rulers who asked him how they might exercise their powers and **David Ratke is an assistant professor of religion at Lenoir-Rhyne College in Hickory, North Carolina.**

authority as Christians. It is for this reason that he wrote "Whether Soldiers, Too, Can be Saved." His charge to princes and rulers in *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, his *On the Freedom of a Christian*, and *Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed*

are all attempts to combat the prevailing notion that to be secular was to be godless and somehow less than Christian. These writings were attempts to combat the prevailing notion that, for example, the pope had an authority (and holiness) higher and better than that of secular rulers. Von Dohlen, although not using Luther, makes Luther's point well.

Von Dohlen, by way of a personal illustration, makes the point "that we live in what sociologists refer to as a highly structurally differentiated society. We all play many roles and live in many institutional structures or, if you prefer, realm. Each of these structures has its own autonomy, so to speak but they are all interdependent in exceedingly complex ways" (p.2). Luther, I suggest, was aware that he was living in a society that was, or at least becoming,

“structurally differentiated.” I won’t try to argue that it was “highly differentiated”; nonetheless it was differentiated and increasingly so. Can a man whose father began life as the son of a peasant farmer and then moved to a new town to become a miner, and then the owner of a mine as well as a councilor in the city government really be unaware—of the differentiation in society? I think not.

Von Dohlen states that “Luther’s sociology may have been appropriate for Luther’s time” (p.2). I’m not sure what Von Dohlen means when he speaks of “Luther’s sociology” so I’ll leave it to him to tell me what that might be. For insight as to the question of Luther’s sociology, I’m tempted to turn to Luther’s response to Assa von Kram, a professional soldier. Here Luther affirms the legitimacy of the soldiering vocation.⁶ It can be abused to be sure, but this misuse does not invalidate it any more than the misuse of the professorial office invalidates that vocation. Indeed the soldiering profession, Luther goes on to explain (borrowing Von Dohlen’s words), is “hellishly complex [and] frustratingly complicated.” Can killing—even in the name of peace and freedom—be justified? If a ruler is wicked and evil ought a soldier serve that ruler? Ought a soldier serve in a war that is apparently unjustifiable? These are the questions which Luther struggles to address. To me these are hellish and frustrating questions; in any case they certainly are not easy. Luther concludes that a soldier must take his faith seriously enough to question authority.⁷ At the same time a soldier’s trust and confidence are ultimately in God: “When the battle begins ... [soldiers] should simply commend themselves to God’s grace and adopt a Christian attitude.” The soldier should then pray: In “faith I will live and die, fight, and do everything else.”⁸ Luther does not seek to evade the questions, nor does he even counsel others to evade hellish and frustratingly complex questions. He does however say, that at the end of the day when one has struggled with such questions, our trust and our confidence are not in our faculties of reason but in the One who has given us these faculties.

It is precisely for this reason that Luther would likely agree with Von Dohlen in saying, “I believe that a theology informed by a sociology (or a psychology, economics, politics, jurisprudence, etc.) which in turn is informed by theology will better enable us to understand and attack some of the problems and alleviate them” (p. 1). It is precisely for this reason that Luther tells Christians that they ought to support schools and educate their children. Luther encourages parents to send their children to schools to be educated so that they can be proud of how their child “maintains and helps to further the whole worldly government. ... It ought to be a matter of great honor and satisfaction for you to see your son an angel in

the empire and an apostle of the emperor, a cornerstone and bulwark of temporal peace on earth, knowing for a certainty that God so regards it and that it is really true. For although such works do not make men righteous before God or save them, nevertheless, it is a joy and comfort to know that their works please God so very much—and the more so when such a man is a believer and is in the kingdom of Christ.”⁹

Faith or theology is important; also important is that faith and reason are in conversation and dialogue with each other. Faith ought to impel the believer to godly service in society.

Von Dohlen charges that “the Lutheran two-kingdom doctrine assumes an academic culture characterized by epistemological monism that is neutral with respect to anthropological assumptions” (p.2). I was raised on small words so I’m not exactly sure what Von Dohlen means. If he means that Lutherans or at least the two kingdoms doctrine thinks that academic culture is neutral or that it is neutral about its assumptions about humanity and God, about nature and the cosmos, then I think that I and others have misled Von Dohlen. Luther is pretty clear in his “Heidelberg Disputation” about his reservations concerning the neutrality of reason. Reason can accomplish some things, but it can seriously mislead. For this reason Luther says that what we can say about God always has to be said in light of the cross.

Luther, as near as I can determine, makes no claims about epistemology with respect to a Christian’s role in (secular) society. He merely argues that a Christian lives in the world, the world is good because God created it, and therefore a Christian ought to contribute to the welfare of God’s good creation by participating with God in fighting against the forces which threaten to upset good order and peace. If anything Luther acknowledges the plurality of epistemologies and the possibility of a single view of reason: “Both reason and natural law belong to God’s creation and therefore are not separated from God’s will.”¹⁰ Luther’s point in writings like *On Temporal Authority*, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate*, and *The Freedom of a Christian* is that there is more than one valid and legitimate epistemology. Each discipline has its own legitimate epistemology. The Christian’s task if anything is to ask “what is the gospel?” and “how *might* it be proclaimed?” No more!

Von Dohlen rightly condemns the oft heard argument from some Lutherans that “there were a separate sociological realm with distinct institutional structures and ethical norms that had no direct bearing on the gospel. This was surely nonsense. They sometimes talked as if we were living in an age where there was cultural consensus about the nature of

truth and justice. This too was patently false" (p.3). It's hard to know what to say in response. I agree with Von Dohlen. Luther's doctrine of the two realms has too often been misunderstood by both its proponents and its opponents. The gospel does not have a bearing on other "other" sociological realms and vice versa. To bifurcate in this way is to introduce an unnecessary dualistic element. This is what occasions Luther's thinking on two realms. Christians have a two-fold existence. Both the secular and the sacred make legitimate claims on the Christian's earthly existence.

The point of the two realms doctrine is to firstly acknowledge the duality of our earthly existence and secondly the ambiguity of earthly phenomena and knowledge. What is the meaning of " $2+2=4$ " or $7+5=12$ "? Christians are called within their individual vocations to wrestle with the significance of these truths; and, as Christians, they are called to wrestle with the "gospel" within these truths. Both facets of our existence are important; neither can be abandoned without imperiling the identity of the individual who is created uniquely in God's image.

Lutherans like Granger Westberg have been instrumental in the establishment and management of institutions like the Parkridge Center for Health, Faith and Ethics because they take seriously their dual identity or citizenship. Our identity is not as either Christian or academic, but as Christian *and* scholar. To assume otherwise and to understand Luther differently is to bifurcate something which was intended to combat a bifurcated dualism. Von Dohlen in his advocacy for a wholistic understanding of the human and of scholarship is to be commended. On the basis of Luther's understanding of the two realms, I gladly and willingly volunteer to combat those forces which

attempt to bifurcate.

NOTES

1. The title of the copy of the Von Dohlen paper I originally received was "A Fifth Tit on a Cow: The Irrelevance of the Lutheran Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms for Academic Life." I found out that there was a discussion among my colleagues as to whether it ought to be a "teat" or a "tit" (the slang variation of the same term). Happily I missed that discussion.
2. There is no doubt that the military profession is in itself a legitimate and godly calling and occupation" (LW 46:100).
3. In response to the question of whether a soldier ought to go to war when his lord is wrong Luther says, "if you know for sure that he is wrong, then you should fear God rather than men ... and you should neither fight nor serve, for you cannot have a good conscience before God." (LW 46:130)
4. LW 46:135-6
5. "A Sermon on Keeping Children in School." in LW 46:240-1
6. Walther von Loewenich, *Martin Luther: The Man and his Work*, trans. Lawrence W. Denef (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1982), 239. Von Loewenich sets up this assertion by noting that both the secular and sacred authorities "have their unity in God's decree" and that "the kingdom of Christ could not endure in this world without temporal authority—without defense against evil and efforts made toward earthly peace. On the other hand, spiritual authority assists temporal authority by proclaiming God's will to government and to all classes...God rules in both kingdoms (through both authorities) ... It is possible for love to be operating through the harsh realities of justice, punishment, the death penalty, 'wrath', and the 'sword' ... God must at times carry out his 'proper work' only under the form of his 'alien work'—his love under wrath, his grace under judgment" (237-9).

Calling and Learning: On Losing and Then Finding Myself

Rachel Hammond

I bet there are a lot of things on your mind right now. We are so close to being done with this year, one more year down, one less to go. What are you thinking about? Probably exams, parties, good-byes, maybe where you are going to live. A bunch of you are probably getting ready to leave Cap and take a step into the real world, the big scary one outside of the Learning Center and Batelle Hall, where we have to put four years of theory into practice. You are thinking about jobs for the summer, or about how you can't wait to go home or how you dread going home. Your mind is filled with absorbing your last minutes here after a year of your life that you will never do again.

I want you to know that I come before you as one of you. I come to you as a college student, as confused and excited about my future as you are. I am a junior International Studies and Spanish double major and have been here at Cap for almost three years. I went to freshman orientation, I lived in a dorm, I have been involved in homecoming, played tennis, and served in student government. I am a sister of Chi Theta Pi sorority. I have moved in and out of the dorms. I have gone home on the weekends and I have stayed on campus. I have studied hard, I have partied, I have had to fight my way into classes and I have arranged my schedule so I didn't have to get up before noon. I am one of you. I have one more short year left, then my world will no longer be filled with classes and studies and Banana Joe's and weekend house parties. All of a sudden my world will expand into something larger than I have ever imagined. I am scared; I can't wait, and as I look around, I see faces that have become intricate parts of my life. I remember the nights of Euchre in the dorm...it should be illegal for time to pass by as fast as it has. I am one of you.

Yet I don't know exactly how to fit in here at Capital anymore. Why? Because two semesters of my career at Capital have been spent outside of this cozy campus, this state, this country, this continent, and the developed world. I was away from everything I have ever known. I dove into a new world, scary yet intoxicating; a new reality in Ecuador. I came into a world that was unlike anything I had ever known. It was a world of boiled water because the tap water was dirty; a world of poverty, because there weren't food banks or homeless shelters. It was a world of children on the streets, shining shoes, selling ice cream or candies on buses; a world of children working all hours of the day just to feed themselves and their families.

Rachel Hammond is a senior at Capital. She is majoring in both Spanish and International Studies.

I came into a world of incredible beauty, of dazzling mountains and a majestic ocean. Yet it was also a world of undrivable roads, because El Nino--the phenomenon that meant that we had a few extra months of sun a couple of summers ago--meant something different for Ecuador. In Ecuador El Nino meant shattered highways, dead banana crops, and houses that couldn't stand the rain and the storms. Our extended summer meant an increase in malaria, a disease carried by mosquitoes that thrives in wet, humid environments. El Nino was devastating to Ecuador, yet analysts report that the world overall ended up making more money than it lost, due to extended growing seasons elsewhere in the world. But in Ecuador the roads still aren't fixed. Two years later, there is still no money for repairs. In Ecuador, I encountered a whole different concept of life; different morals, different ideals, different languages, and different ways of doing things.

I don't want you to get a bad impression of Ecuador. I love Ecuador. I crave it. I miss it when I am not there. The people of Ecuador have a love in their hearts that I haven't found here. They are beautiful and have a beautiful country, full of nature's richness. They own the Galapagos Islands, where Charles Darwin founded his theory of evolution. It is a GREAT tourist area. The international surfing championships are held at a breathtaking beach on the Ecuadorian coast, and traveling is inexpensive. Because of Ecuador's small size, (it is the size of Nevada), traveling is also extremely easy. It is possible to go from the mountains to the beaches in a day. That is what the tourists who spend a couple of weeks in Ecuador see.

Maybe some of you may have had this experience on Spring Break trips to Cancun, Mexico or Jamaica. Mexico and Jamaica are two countries that embody a lot more than beaches and resorts, than tans and Corona.

Ecuador can be fun on the tourist circuit. According to the tour books, visitors should stay away from Guayaquil, the city where I lived. Why? The books say that it is too hot and too crowded. People are too poor; the roads are too bad, and there is nothing to do. There is no reason to go there. Tourist guides urge visitors to go to the beaches, go to the mountains, see the waterfalls. But trust me, there is a lot more outside of those resorts, outside of the tequila and the parties. There are people who live only minutes away who work 20 hours a day to feed their families. Yet they don't put that part of the country in the tour books, along with the jungle trips and scuba diving. No one really wants to see that poverty.

Ecuador is a developing country. There are a lot of things that we have that Ecuador doesn't have yet, things like Perkins Loans, clean water, safe roads, subsidized medical care, free HIV testings, homeless shelters, and food banks. That is what happens when a country just doesn't have the money to get everything done. There are not a whole lot of frills in real life Ecuador. It is a painful but eye-opening experience that I will never forget to see a mother sending her two year old who can hardly walk out to beg for money. Even though I was surrounded by it, I never quite got used to it, and I hope that I never do. It wasn't just one two year old or one family. It was the countless number of faces, of lives, of individuals that probably will live their whole lives just seeking their basic nutrition. I will never forget the things I saw.

Do me a favor, please. Close your eyes. Close them and try to form a picture in your mind of the words I am saying. You are walking down the street with your best friend in downtown Guayaquil, with cars and buses everywhere. It is a hot, sticky day, and you are hungry. You dodge all the people walking around. You block out the vendors trying to sell you lottery tickets or anything that will earn them a little bit of money. And as you and your friend search for a vegetarian restaurant, your friend pulls out her apple and starts to munch on it. You feel someone touch you, someone tug your shirt, and you know it is a beggar. There stands a little girl, with a dirty face and no shoes, looking at you. So you start to sift through your backpack. Looking for spare change, you stop as her eyes hungrily focus on the apple and she beckons for it. She doesn't want your money, she wants the half eaten apple. Of course you give it to her, and you watch her devour it, seeds and all, as a smile that whispers, "Thank you" lights up her face.

Then there is one cold, frigid night in Quito. You are coming back from dinner, drinking your bottle of clean water. A little boy toddles up to you on his unsteady legs, and once again, you reach in your pockets but he grasps the half-drunken bottle of clean water you are holding. Suddenly, everything else disappears--the American's desires for the new and the colorful and the different and the name brand. You realize that while you have been trying to pick out the perfect jeans, children and babies are begging for clean water and half eaten fruits. You always buy bread or cookies, bigger ones, because you know that you aren't going to finish them. Someone will come asking, their eyes lock into your food, and they don't have to say a word. Cookies are easy to give away, and besides, kids like cookies.

I grew up in a country that teaches us to buy and that more is better. It teaches us that we can never have enough.

Here in the U.S. there is no such thing as too much stuff. Then if you have too much stuff, it is the wrong brand and you need stuff from the new brand. No one wears Tommy anymore, it is Abercrombie and Fitch! If you have a computer, it doesn't copy CD's. So you need a new one. If you have a car, you need power windows. Then how are you going to drive without your CD player? We grew up in a country that tells us that our success is measured by what we have, and someday everyone will know how good we are at our job if we can come to the job in the new BMW. We grew up in a country that instills in us an insatiable craving for more, better, bigger, newer, smaller, lighter. There are those of you who probably argue that is why we are where we are today, on the top of the world. We are a consumer society. We buy things, all the time, we spend our money, which gives people jobs. Then they can take care of their families and buy more stuff that gives people more jobs.

I come from this world, from this reality. Suddenly, I am there walking through the craziness of the middle of Guayaquil. I turn my face and see a little six year old boy, with no shoes and a torn shirt, sitting on the dirty ground. He has his treasure chest, his little box that holds his materials to shine shoes. This is not a strange sight at all. There are hundreds of little shoe shining boys. Yet this boy is sitting on the ground, his legs spread open, using both hands to shine a designer shoe. He is shining the shoes--the designer shoes--of a man sitting on a chair above him. This man is wearing a three piece suit and is talking on his cell phone. I stop, I freeze, and I watch. I really see this world, maybe for the first time. I see this world in an image of two human beings, one with and one without.

I continue to watch; this little boy's expert hands polish the black until it shines. I wonder what the boy and his customer were thinking. I wonder if the little boy is angry that he is given this role in the world. I wondered if he resents the designer shoes that he has to polish so that he can eat. I wonder if I make him upset, the American who comes to stand on the Equator and see the beaches, to party in the clubs and work on a tan. Yet I don't think he is mad. Maybe neither of them give it a second thought, but that moment changes me. I realize that I am the one with the cell phone and the designer shoes.

I didn't know how to respond to all of this. Maybe one of the most frustrating experiences of my life was to see all of this and wonder how to answer. How do you answer to these needs? Sure, I shared my food and I gave change. That didn't seem to appease me. It didn't take away the feeling that I really should be doing something there. I couldn't just be in Ecuador. I couldn't simply be there and

watch and feel bad and cry and then do nothing. So I worked with girls in an orphanage during my first semester there and returned to the United States around Christmas.

Before my second trip to Ecuador, I raised money for the girls. I knew that the girls weren't going to have much of a Christmas. There would be no presents from Santa. I wanted them to each have a little gift. After all, they were children. I sat down with one of the nuns in charge of the orphanage and I asked about their needs after I returned. I told them I had brought money to help them, for Christmas. Every girl needs toys. I wanted to know what else they needed. Madre Anita told me, "Well, the girls really need some more food. We don't have money for food. The girls aren't eating enough or aren't eating food that is nutritious, so they don't sleep or study very well. They get sick a lot."

The orphanage had been borrowing money from anyone who would loan them money to buy food to feed these girls. The orphanage brought in no money and the money from the government never came. Money was too tight in Ecuador for Ecuadorians to have money to spare and there were so many needs there. So I went home that night and cried, cried for the country, cried for the past and the future, cried for the reality of this world.

It would take me several hours to tell you about everything that I did in Ecuador. In my five months there, I had the blessing or curse--depends on how you look at it--to see a country practically fall apart. I arrived in Ecuador in September, and was trading my dollars at 10,500 sucres per dollar. In January, I was trading my dollars for as high as 29,000 sucres.

What does this mean in reality? By analogy, it means that first semester at Capital costs you \$8,000, which is equivalent to 84 million sucres. Second semester runs you 232 million sucres. Where do those extra 148 million sucres come from, that extra \$5,000? All of the sudden, second semester costs you three times what first semester did. There was no warning about the tuition hike. You aren't earning any more money at your job. Your parents aren't making any more money. There are no more loans to be taken out, and if there were, you can't pay them back. You can't get another job because no one is hiring. Besides, working at McDonalds pays you 8,000 sucres an hour, about 35 cents....so that is an extra 18,500 hours of work. If you work 40 hours a week, that is 462 weeks, almost 9 years. (Buy the way, that is true. McDonalds does pay 32 cents an hour to workers in Ecuador, 40 cents if you are closing. I have a friend that works there.) Those with jobs are envied, because there is no one hiring. No

one has money to pay for extra help. Yet not only has the price of your education increased. Everything has, from rice to oil changes, from movies to clothes, from books to paper. Everything.

Did you have any say, any control, over this? No. Simply, you just got screwed. By whom? No one knows. It could have been investor speculation. Maybe it was a bad rumor about the central bank. But the reality is that you can no longer study. In the worst cases, your little brothers and sisters can no longer go to school. Why? They need to work; someone needs to make money to put food on the table. It has to be a family effort. It is a devastating equation--people earning less plus things costing more plus no jobs available. All of this probably has a lot to do with why I saw the military and the people overthrow the president. How can a government let such poverty attack its own people? How can a government watch while a currency is destroyed? I don't know. Was it President Jamil Mahuad's fault? I don't know. Was the president in trouble to begin with? Maybe. I don't know if anyone would have survived a presidency with the conditions he faced. He inherited a country devastated by El Nino and ready to fight a war with Peru over a fifty year old territorial dispute. He inherited a country that needed to be fixed. Oil, Ecuador's number one export, was priced at a 20 year low. (We all remember the 95 cent/gallon gasoline a couple of years ago. It was great for us, but there is a whole other side to that). The president had a treaty signed with Peru. At least there was no longer a threat of a border war that would cost lives of brothers and fathers, and cost money that Ecuador couldn't afford to spend.

Then 1999 came. Rough 1998 was finally over. The country still didn't have the money to fix the damage done to the infrastructure by El Nino. Then came the bad week in March of 1999, when the sucre started to go crazy. Everyone's money was losing value in front of their eyes, so the president announced the increase of gasoline prices, which were much lower than those on the world market. To people who study economics, this made sense. The government needed more revenue, and the state owned oil company brought in a lot of funds. Besides, gasoline prices were artificially low on the world market, even though those living in Ecuador could barely afford it. So what resulted from this solution that looked so neat on paper? Strikes. The taxi drivers and the bus drivers went on strike, and they didn't march with signs. They took their buses and parked them across the intersections, so business was halted. Nothing moved; no exports left the country. The president backed down, but not without freezing the bank accounts of anyone who had saved more than \$4000. If you had \$4000 in the banks, sorry. It would be 7-10 years until you can use that money. Businesses

went bankrupt. How were they going to pay their staff and buy supplies? Futures disappeared.

Then, things got worse. A volcano threatened to erupt, evacuating a town of 20,000 people. This town was also one of the biggest tourist spot in the country. What should these 20,000 people do, where should they go? Hopefully some of them had relatives elsewhere in the country. Others were left to fend for themselves. I read an article about people who were shot at by the military, trying to return to their town. Why? Banos wasn't safe. No one knew when the volcano would erupt. The soldiers were trying to protect the citizens of Banos. "You can't go back home," they said, "The volcano could destroy this whole town in minutes." But these people persisted, because they were starving, and left everything in Banos. They had to get back to their animals, back to their farms. Besides, they said, they would rather die in a volcano, at their home, than slowly starve to death.

What did I see that was new? I left Ecuador on December 17, 1998 and went back there on September 10, 1999. Eight short months, but A LOT had happened. I know that I just used a lot of technical language and a lot of big words, but what did I see? I didn't remember SO MANY children on the streets. In 1998 there were children, but not THAT many. I didn't see so many elderly people on the streets. I saw more faces, more futures being snuffed out by economics. I saw worried and distrustful faces, because no one knew what was going to happen. I saw a lot of people buying the dollars that I had simply brought with me from the United States. No one knew if next week it would cost 15,000 sucres to buy a dollar instead of 10,000 sucres.

So I watched Ecuador fall apart. I watched her break. I watched the news as the people climbed the walls of the presidential palace, the people who had nothing to lose because they had already lost everything. I read the newspapers the next day as the entire world condemned the rupture of democracy. They frowned on the lack of respect for the constitution. I wondered if all of the people shouting and screaming and pointing their fingers were doing so from their air-conditioned offices with leather chairs and their degrees on the walls that somehow made them experts. I wondered if they have watched their money disappear and their country fall apart. I wondered if they have had to take their children out of college or have had to send their three year old daughter to beg for food money.

Maybe, Ecuador's critics have an education that makes them experts on world poverty. They understand concepts of world poverty learned in the Learning Center, in the

classrooms with the televisions and desks. The only poor people they see and the only images of developing countries they see are in the \$80 textbooks. Have they watched a child ask them for half eaten fruit, or heard a nun running an orphanage plea for money for nutritious food? I got my education on world poverty from poor people, an education that no book could ever provide.

I came back to life at Capital as a different person, and I didn't know how to fit in here. I kept reminding myself that I am a college student. I am a sorority sister. I am almost 21. I am an athlete, and that this is where I belong--on my university's campus. I came back here, to this place that I have spent two years of my life. I was shocked at how I felt towards everything, wondering how I ever lived here in the first place. My soul had changed. My world had changed. What I knew had changed and I could no longer see things the same way.

It is different with you. It isn't your fault. You haven't seen what I saw. You didn't have children asking you for what they asked me for. You didn't have trouble sleeping as you wondered about the future of the girls who have become like sisters to you in an orphanage with no money. I did. I will never be the same. Sometimes I wish I could be like you, that I could go to the bars again and just enjoy the craziness, without the faces of the children sleeping in the hot sticky night, on cardboard boxes.

I am not asking you all to give up what you have. I am not asking for all of us to go home and feel really guilty about who we are and what we do. The fact is that I was here too, before this all happened. Leaving Cap didn't change anything for me. The only thing that changed was that now I knew. My leaving Cap didn't suddenly create world poverty. Returning won't stop it. It has been going on forever, since before I was born. It just took me a long time to figure that out.

I know that everyone in the world doesn't have what we have here. I know that an opportunity to educate myself is a privilege, not a right. I can't tell you how many Ecuadorians dream of studying in the States, of the opportunity to obtain a college education from this country. I know that thousands of people die every year trying to get into this country where I was born. Sometimes when I say that, it still doesn't make sense. I still can't grasp that fact.

People leave their homes and families and countries and cultures so they can work here to take care of their children, doing anything that will make a few dollars. They risk their lives. I did nothing at all to earn my passport. I just got my passport photo taken, sent in my

\$65 and it was a done deal. I did nothing at all. I just got lucky. I was born here like most of you. I didn't do anything, didn't win anything, I just got it. I know that maybe if I had been born in another person's shoes, I might be devouring half eaten apples.

We are blessed by our education. What we learn here matters, and one day we are going into a very big world with some very big problems. We are tomorrow. We have to take the reigns and make things how they should be. We need doctors and nurses and accountants and teachers and lawyers and coaches and dreamers to make this world into what it should become. That is us. You and me. We have the responsibility because we can do this. We have the ability. We have the influence. We can have the voice.

"We should not let our classes get in the way of our drinking," some people think. We didn't come to college to drink; we came to college to learn. Does that mean I hate alcohol? No. But did I come here to study, and take this education outside of the Learning Center and Battelle? Yes. What did you come here for? Think about that, think about that hard.

We are needed, desperately needed, in this world. It is up to you to decide who you want to be in the future, where you want to pledge your allegiance. You need to decide if money is really what makes you happy, if that is really what you ache for.

What do I want from you? I want to see you fulfill your potential. I want you to know that there is a whole other world where names like Abercrombie and Fitch don't exist. There is a world where children don't get any education. Parents don't get food stamps to feed their children. Children are abandoned simply because their parents don't have the financial ability to care for them. Just remember that we are blessed, and, to quote the Bible, "To whom much is given, much is expected."

Where do we go from here? Maybe some of you--If I did my job, all of you--are pondering in your heads, in your minds and in your hearts, what do I do now? What do I do know? You see that things change when you KNOW, that you can no longer be who you were before, that you can't continue your life in the same way. Maybe that is a little bit extreme--maybe that is the words of a girl who lived in another country for months, who saw what she needed to see for months, and then came back to her country. She realized that she couldn't simply have the same priorities, the same goals and dreams. She came back from seeing a poverty that she really didn't want to know existed. That was me. But whether or not you know it, it does. It does. Now you know. Elie Weisel, a famous author and a

holocaust survivor, said this, "I think the greatest source of evil and danger in this world, to the world, is indifference. I'll always believe that the opposite of love is not hate--but indifference. Indifference is the enemy." A man who watched thousands die at the hands of the Nazi's declares the enemy of humankind, our biggest fault, our biggest sin--indifference. He continues on by saying, "To most people it was normal that I should be among the first to raise my voice, because when I needed people to speak for me, there were no such people. When we needed people to speak for us, there were no such people. Therefore, I feel that now we must speak for other people."

I don't want anyone to think that I am trying to make what the people of Ecuador struggle through every day of their lives into a Holocaust experience. We need to remember that all of the people who lived through the Holocaust taught us a crucial lesson, one that we are obliged to never forget--that we JUST CAN'T BE IGNORANT, we can't ignore the world around us. Like the Germans living in Germany during the Holocaust, we will be judged by ourselves, our children, our God and future generations about our actions or lack thereof. The biggest question about the Holocaust was HOW on earth could something like that happen, how could so many people just watch, while millions were exterminated, a race of people was practically wiped off the earth? My question has different faces, different names and different issues, but the essence, the point, rings loud and clear, No one has come for the Communists, or the Jews or the Catholics, but are we not going to speak up because we are not poor, or are not hungry, or are not homeless, or are not cold at night? The question is, "How can we know, and just watch? How can we be indifferent?" How can I know, how can I see what I saw, and simply pack up, and return to my life here at the university? How can I come back to a world of studies and classes and parties, sit in the classroom, and return to a life where what I saw exists only in theory, on the black and white pages of my \$80 textbook? I CAN'T. I can't and I won't forget the faces. LOOK at the faces again, pick up your sheet of paper and look into them. Look into their eyes. Their futures are unwritten. No one knows what is going to happen.

I invite you to help me. I invite you to answer to God's call, to humanity's call, to the call of your conscience. I have with me forms to share for those who want them, a donation form for money to be sent to these girls in Ecuador, money for food. Every single cent of every single dollar will go directly to the needs of these girls. I will not let these children be hungry. I invite you to take some of these forms and share them with those people you know, your parents, churches or groups, or even look them over yourself. Did I tell you that the orphanage only needs

\$6.81 to feed a child for a month?

My soul, my heart, my mind and my God call me to educate myself for them, for the shoe shining boys, for the toddlers spending their days seeking food for the girls at the orphanage. And remember this lesson from Matthew, "Jesus said, "I was hungry and you fed me, thirsty and you gave me a drink; I was a stranger and you clothed me, I was sick and you took care of me, in prison and you

visited me." The righteous will then answer, "When Lord, when did we ever see you hungry and feed you, thirsty and give you a drink? When did we ever see you a stranger and welcome you in our homes, or naked and clothe you? When did we ever see you sick or in prison, and visit you?" The King will then reply, "I tell you, whenever you did this for one of the least important of my brothers and sisters, you did it for me."

Modeling Virtue

In Which a Social Psychologist Decides He Can Do Good Without Freely Choosing It

Chuck Huff

And now here is my secret, a very simple secret;
It is only with the heart that one can see rightly;
what is essential is invisible to the eye
-from *The Little Prince* by Antoine De Saint-Exupery

I want to measure those essential, ephemeral things;
things seen only with the heart.
And the measurement is true if the heart sees my data
and thereby sharpens its vision.
-Chuck Huff

As a sophomore in South Georgia in 1975, I was stunned by the barrenness of my introduction to psychology. It was, no doubt, both current and correct; precise and clean. So clean, said my heart, that it was sterile. It stripped the psychological world of wonder.

I sat in a bolted down chair in rows of 20 students each, and watched like you might in a surgery auditorium while the professor dissected my wonder. I was told I should replace soul, meaning, the self, altruism, and evil with negative and positive reinforcement, punishment, control structures, and other such steely and scientifically pristine constructions. Like Danny Saunders in Chaim Potok's *The Chosen* I wanted to know "What does experimental psychology have to do with the human mind?" We got rats instead, in clean aluminum boxes with levers and a drinking bottle.

After lectures outlined on a rolling overhead, viewed from the silent ranking of seats, every day I escaped to watch ants run in and out of a small hole in the red Georgia clay. Watching REAL animals, doing real things seemed wonderful. It was a small ant hill; a conical mountain on their barren landscape, several feet from any thing deserving the name of grass. But they fascinated and comforted me with the scurrying, mysterious purpose they displayed. Here was real behavior, enflashed in meaning and history. I was disappointed in the sterile picture my class gave me of these animals, and, when I got up the courage, I was astonished. The class was a success in at least one sense: I was convinced that psychology was a science, but I was also convinced that psychology was irretrievably boring.

I'd like to take this opportunity to revise that picture of psychology. Psychology is surely scientific, but it is far from boring, and it asks, or at least hints at, some of the **Chuck Huff is a professor of psychology at St. Olaf College in Northfield, Minnesota.**

enduring questions of the liberal arts. I want to deal with two main reasons for rejecting a scientific psychology as relevant to the concerns of the liberal arts: the claim that it denies human meaning and the claim that it eliminates personal choice and responsibility. These were certainly my complaints about my introduction to psychology. It was barren of human meaning. Tragedy and joy both evaporated into epiphenomena. It left us all looking like machines rather than people with souls. In humans, there was no room for soul, free will, personal choice, or responsibility.

As a sophomore, I was most disillusioned by the denial of meaning. It was not until I became a senior psychology major that the issue of choice and free will seemed central to me. My reaction to the scientific claims of psychology about free will eventually drove me into the arms of philosophy, as I tried to discover why psychologists like B. F. Skinner felt they had to say the odd things they did. I now think much of what Skinner said was not odd, though it was couched in a now-outmoded philosophy of science that required the dismissal of all mental states, and thereby all personal meaning. And I now agree with Skinner that the importance of free will is overrated, though I am still undecided on the question of whether it exists or not.

Modeling and Meaning

The first objection, that psychology denies human meaning, can be stated in a variety of ways. One claim is that psychology takes no regard for the meaning of the individual human life - for the particular cares, concerns, and values of the individual. That its statistical and mathematical formulae obscure the nuance of personal motivation and meaning.

Psychology must plead guilty to this charge. Psychologists do have a peculiar way of understanding the behavior of organisms. It involves making models of how they behave, think, and feel. This is a standard scientific approach, ranging from the precise mathematical models in Physics to models in Sociology that look more like traditional metaphors. In fact a metaphor is a useful model, if you will, of what a model is.

A scientist who builds a model does so by creating a description of the phenomenon that is suited to the purpose and that makes allusions to other descriptions. The purpose is finding patterns in how organisms behave, think, and feel. There is nothing essential about the patterns or metaphors that makes them scientific models, except what scientists do

with them. We compare these patterns to data, and when the patterns can no longer be stretched to fit our understanding of the data, we modify the patterns. Making, testing, and modifying these models is what psychological science is about.

And since the patterns refer to the behavior, thoughts, and feelings of people within a particular context, the odd motivations or meanings of a single individual facing that context are usually passed over. When they are not passed over, it is because they suggest something about the model that does not fit people of that "type" or people with a particular motivation--and this is then incorporated into the model and tested against data collected from people of that type or with that motivation. In summary, since psychological science is about modifying models, it overlooks the individual motivation or meaning except when looking might help modify the model.

So you do not despair at the arrogance of psychologists, I hurry to mention that there is a therapeutic endeavor also called psychology that is based both in the science and in the concrete details and meaning of the individual life. Psychologists who do therapy, or case work, or applications in industry often care deeply about the individual meanings people bring with them. These people do biography with their clients in addition to using the scientific models of psychology. And this work with individuals or groups could not be done well without careful attention to the individual meanings and motivations. So here you have a second hedge in my answer that psychology ignores individual meaning.

But there is another way to put this complaint about individual meaning. My most personal reaction to my first class in psychology was that it stripped my world of meaning. It seemed not to care about the meaning in my life, nor to offer the help I expected in finding that meaning. I had hoped to find out about the deepest motivations of humans, about religious rapture, about evil and the struggle against it, about the nature of the human spirit and why I couldn't get a date. In short, the problem was that psychology didn't even attempt to ask the real questions about life.

I'm afraid my answer to this charge will be disappointing to you. Science doesn't attempt to find out things like the meaning of life, or the true nature of evil. It doesn't attempt this because it would undoubtedly fail. These questions are often about what a thing "really" is "in its essence." If you think back about what I have said about models, you can get a hint that these are questions we can't get scientific answers for. We can improve our models about the psychological processes that lead to behavior we call evil or altruistic. We

can specify the situational pressures that are likely to modify these processes. We can call attention to the systematic individual differences in reaction to the pressures. But none of this allows us to conclude what evil or altruism "really" is. Most psychologists avoid those questions and attempt to get on with the process of modifying our models by systematic data collection.

We are right, I think, to keep our heads down and collect data when these sorts of questions come up. But we also over-generalize this reaction and remain silent when, instead, we ought to speak. With some notable exceptions, we usually shy away from important questions that involve thinking about values, ethics, and what might be called the "human condition."

Sometimes psychologists have had the temerity to speak on human issues, and the upshot of that effort has been, in fact, to confirm people's suspicions of us. In our arrogance at those times, we reduced the complexity of the individual and social world to a few principles and mechanistic causes, denying the richness of people's own awareness of their motivations and desires and ignoring the complexity of society and culture. The best excuse I can bring to bear for this arrogance is that we thought it was required of us. Sigmund Freud and B. F. Skinner are the two greatest transgressors in this arena, but some cognitive and evolutionary psychologists today are in danger of committing the same errors. The common assumption among these psychologists is that their theories, developed from a narrow domain, are ready for the totalitarian takeover of all human experience. This exuberance is usually the result of a narrow reductionism that really is willing to say that human behavior is "nothing but" disguised sexuality, or contingencies of reinforcement, or schema driven processing, or kin selection. There is much of value in the work of the folks I have just mentioned that we should keep. But we should reject the tendency to theoretical totalitarianism. It makes for bad models, and it either denies or distorts our place in the liberal arts.

Fortunately, we have fine examples of humility in theory construction in the work that has been going on down in the trenches of psychological research. Much of psychology now has broken down into mini-theories that attempt to deal with small bits of the immense complexity in a single area. These theories about pieces of the human experience keep a multitude of psychologists busy collecting data and off their soapboxes. For an example of a totalitarian theory and its demise into mini-theories, let's look at Lawrence Kohlberg and his theory of cognitive development in moral reasoning.

According to this approach, as children age and become

more cognitively complex, they are able to think more complexly about moral issues too. And this complexity follows a clear set of stages from early childhood into the adult life, starting with concrete reasoning about punishment and gain, and ending, for the select few, in careful reasoning based on principled stands. It may surprise you to hear that this theoretical approach has been almost entirely dismantled by the legions of psychologists working in this area. Among the many things we have found out are that moral development does not flow smoothly across all domains of reasoning, nor is individual progress in moral reasoning or behavior necessarily based on cognitive development, nor are principled stands about justice and fairness the only basis on which complex moral thinkers make their decisions. The response to this data-rich wave of complexity has been the building of mini-theories in the area: theories about the effect of peers on altruism or aggression, about the development of understanding of intention in harmful and helpful acts, about the role of empathy in helping, about the distancing methods used to deny responsibility, about the relation of childhood temperament to the moral emotions, and about a host of other things all in this one area.

This recourse to mini-theories has occurred all across psychology and, in addition to providing a bracing reconsideration of old theories it has brought with it some modicum of humility. This retreat to mini-theories explains in part why psychologists are mostly keeping their heads down in the trenches these days, and also why psychology may seem a bit boring.

The proximate task of a psychological science is not to confirm or enlighten personal meaning, but to modify and test models of behavior, models of thought and feeling, and even models of how people find personal meaning. Scientific psychology is not biography or personal therapy and we should not hold it to those standards.

Psychology Denies Free Will

The second complaint about psychology that I want to discuss is that it denies free will, and thus undermines personal responsibility. This accusation has been made variously and on several levels, but there are two that I want to deal with here. First, the complaint that psychology makes all our choices out to be predetermined by our prior physical and psychological states. And secondly that this assumption of determinism reduces personal responsibility by making it plain we could not have done anything other than what we in fact did—that in short our choices were not real choices—they were determined and we can be excused from responsibility for them.

There is one thing we need to have clarity on: psychology

does indeed assume determinism. It would be an odd science that did not. As a psychologist, I try to construct models of biological, psychological, social, and cultural processes that are empirically testable and that explain the particular psychological phenomenon I care about. Explanation is about discovering these processes, and this analysis does not stop at a decision or a choice by an individual. It looks beyond that decision to see its determinants.

Perhaps an example here will help. During WWII a variety of people risked their lives in a sometimes successful attempt to rescue European Jews from the Nazis' mass murder. The most celebrated of these has become the village of Le Chambon in France. But there were small groups of people all over Europe who participated in similar heroics. In my social psychology class, I ask my students to write an essay explaining the social and psychological processes that resulted in these heroic enterprises.

Two answers I often get are "They were courageous people" or "God gave them courage." I do not doubt these descriptions of the matter. In fact, I believe them in many cases to be true. But as a psychologist I must then ask the students how these people *became* courageous or *how* God gave them courage. And why did these people help and not some others, often equally brave? How did they get started helping? How did they choose the particular folks they helped or the way in which they helped? Why did they continue to help (if they did)? These are social psychological questions that go beyond and behind the decision of the person and attempt to explain that decision in terms borrowed from scientific models of conformity, social cognition, moral development, persuasion, cognitive dissonance, stereotyping and prejudice, attraction, and a host of other influences.

The crucial question is whether by explaining these people's decisions and choices in this manner we have explained their courage away, or simply made their courage more intelligible. What might we be explaining away? One thing we might be explaining away is the peculiar stories of each individual helper, and the meanings this had both for that person and for those who helped. These are important, even crucial, but scientific psychology does not do biography on this minute scale. Nor does it deny the importance of the biography to the individual. It simply insists that the social and psychological process are still there, intertwined with the details of the individual story. I hope that by now I have convinced you that this is not an explaining away but is making models of behavior and choice on a level that ignores some of the individual detail.

Another thing we might be explaining away is the soul or

the psyche or the self that makes these choices. This self or soul is conceived by many to be independent of the social and psychological processes, and to insert itself into the these processes with a decision to help. It is this self that we often call courageous or cowardly. Since it remains calm at the center of the psychological storm, its courage or cowardice is unsullied by any of the psychological processes I have been mentioning, and so the individual, or God, can truly claim the credit or take the blame. This self, not subject to our scientific models, contains the true springs of action. I readily admit that psychological science is interested in explaining away this part of what we value in our description of action.

On this account, the self or soul is crucial to the decision, is inseparable from the decision, and makes its decision "freely," that is, without influence from all the various influences on moral development I have been describing. And it is this "free decision" that makes it possible to say it is the person's decision rather than a decision that has happened to the person.

This free self or soul is the center of the moral hero we find in many fairy tales, newspapers, and biographies, and in much moral advice today. She acts alone, and it is strength of will and courage that allow her to do good. Often she must act in the face of social disapproval of her good deeds or even threat of harm, and these threats are described in a way that makes it clear that they should constrain her decision, but her strength of will and moral integrity overcome them. We praise her both for the good she does and for the strength of will and courage she shows.

And here is the danger we sense in explaining her courage in the causal language of moral development. We fear that if there is no courageous self or soul standing outside these explanations, then neither the courage, nor the strength of will, nor even the good are really hers. The courage happened to her, the strength of will is merely a habit or temperament, perhaps inherited, and the good is simply behavior that we call good. And so, without the courageous self that stands outside of psychological explanation, we feel we lose the morality along with the hero. Some claim we lose the ability to praise people for the good they do or to blame them for their evil. We will have undermined the motivation to do the good, and perhaps even the possibility to do anything we would recognize as "good."

Let's stop here for a moment and take a data break. When I discover myself in the midst of heavy philosophical slogging (particularly of this slippery slope kind), I often find it useful to look up from my armchair and ask "Could we possibly collect some data that might help clear the air here?" In this case I think some developmental

psychologists have done so.

William Damon and Anne Colby are developmental psychologists who have spent a good deal of their time doing research on how we develop our moral stances. They too have been pursuing the question of why people are moral, and of how they become that sort of person. In a recent study they did in depth interviews with a set of what they call "moral exemplars" in order to find out how they became respected leaders in virtue. For this study to make sense, I will have to give you some background, so please bear with me.

Colby & Damon's first step in their study was to compile a set of criteria that would identify moral exemplars. They did several-hour interviews with a panel of 22 moral philosophers, theologians, ethicists, historians, and social scientists to help them refine a set of criteria that might identify moral exemplars. This resulted in the following list of criteria:

1. A sustained commitment to moral ideals or principles that include a generalized respect for humanity, or a sustained evidence of moral virtue.
2. A disposition to act in accord with ones moral ideals or principles, implying also a consistency between one's actions and intentions and between the means and ends of one's actions.
3. A willingness to risk one's self interest for the sake of one's moral values.
4. A tendency to be inspiring to others and thereby to move them to moral action.
5. A sense of realistic humility about one's own importance relative to the world at large, implying a relative lack of concern for one's own ego.

Then, beginning with their panel and moving out, they solicited nominations for people who excelled at these criteria. After a few rounds of nominations, they ended up with 84 nominees, a number too large to allow in depth interviews with all of them. Their final group of interviewees consisted of 23 individuals from all political spectra, ranging in age from 35 to 86, equally split among the genders, of varying or no religious background, and with formal education ranging from 8th grade to PhD. and MD. The main thing these people had in common were remarkable stories of lives of moral commitment. Their causes were various, though chief among them were poverty, peace, and health care (particularly for the poor or for children).

They then did extensive interviews with each of these, and used independent sources to check, as well as they could, biographical details revealed in these interviews. The

resulting book contains in depth stories of 5 of these people, and the tentative theoretical conclusions Colby & Damon draw from the interviews. For my purposes here I would like to highlight some of the commonalities they found among their sample of moral exemplars.

1. A self concept that was closely aligned with their vision of the good, so much so that there was no choice between the self and the good, but instead a unity.
2. A constant examination of the self and its goals and an openness to change in these, influenced heavily by the communities in which they were embedded.
3. A clear feeling that they could not have done otherwise than they did.

I am not surprised that these conclusions match in many respects those of psychologists who have studied people who helped rescue Jews during the Holocaust. I am particularly taken with the final point, that these moral exemplars often felt that they had become the kind of people who could not have done other than to help in the way they did. Their choices were constrained by their own, publicly made commitments, by the communities of caring in which they were embedded, by their own clear sense of what the good was, by their close identification of who they were with that good, and by their past history of following that sense of the good. To have done something other than help would have been not to be who-they-were in that situation. This feeling of constraint is often echoed by those who helped Jews during the Holocaust.

Now, let's trek back to the issue of free will, the self, and our moral hero. These real life moral exemplars do not sound much like the moral hero. The moral hero acts alone, while our moral exemplars are embedded in communities of concern. The moral hero makes a decision to do the moral thing, and it is this decision for which we praise her. Our moral exemplars live in a way that they feel constrained to do the moral thing-so that their moral action flows from their life and the demands of their surroundings.

It is possible that Colby and Damon, in their search for moral exemplars, missed the real moral heroes out there. Perhaps the sampling strategy missed them. Perhaps the interview situation required self-deprecating comments about constraint. We will, of course, want to do more research. But perhaps too we have rediscovered something about virtue that Aristotle mentioned when he said that virtue was a learned habit and that one role of real friendships was to support the friends in their endeavors to be good. The friendship our moral exemplars found in community enabled them to practice and extend the other virtues they held dear. They did not always see the good, but when their friends pointed it out, they looked carefully, and

took the advice seriously. Their openness to expanding their conception of the good over their lifetimes was an index both of their commitment to the good and to the seriousness with which they took their friends.

The free will that we so desperately desire can be found in this account of moral development, but it is not central. I, frankly, do not miss it. Our moral exemplars were constantly reexamining their understandings of the good, and constantly revising their behavior to accommodate their understanding. And so they were choosing, but they were choosing their constraints. To the extent that we are creatures whose self-examination, based on our friendships, causes us to redirect our thoughts, goals, and behaviors then we can say there is some choice or free will here. But it is an odd sort of free will, not really like our moral hero, and based on choice among constraints. Its exercise makes possible, real, genuine, human, and humane goodness, with all its shortsightedness and folly, and with all its glory.

The moral exemplars in Colby and Damon's study did not reach their lofty ethical heights in a flash of willpower, but by constant small choices. They took a path that often seemed the only one available, given their personal and situational constraints. Sometimes on the journey they found they had gotten up a path it was impossible to back down. But given their understanding of the good, given the communities they found themselves in, given their empathy for suffering, it was better to go on than to pause. They had chosen some of their constraints (the villagers of LeChambon chose their pastor knowing what he would preach). Other constraints were thrust upon them.

If this sounds restrictive and difficult, if it feels oppressive, remember the long Christian tradition of the "slave for Christ." Freedom, in this tradition, consists of perfect obedience to the constraints imposed by Christ's love for us and for others. Jewish and Muslim traditions also include this idea. This context is perhaps the right place to mention two other characteristics of the moral exemplars Colby and Damon studied.

4. Most, though not all, were grounded in some religious belief and community.
5. All, without exception, were optimistic about their life and genuinely happy.

None that these are people who feel they could not have done other than what they did, and they seem genuinely happy about it. A Benedictine nun I know says that her practice is built out of doing the next thing. The goals are not lofty, the will is not central, what is central is "these people now who need help" or "this phone call I must make." If the constraints are correctly chosen, and if one has both luck and some skill, doing good is within our capacity regardless of our level of heroism.

And so my conclusion about free will is to doubt its centrality to moral reasoning and action. Our picture of real moral exemplars suggests we need only an odd form of free will, based on the choice of constraints, to be recognizably moral. More central to our moral exemplars is constraint in the form of self-image, community influence, situational demands, past history, and public commitment. We should worry less about free will and more about appropriate constraint. In this picture of the moral exemplar, choice is not at center stage. Moral development is the main story, guided by community influence, situational constraint, self image, and occasional and often limited personal choice.

Bringing the lesson home to the academy

In the epigram at the beginning of this paper, I provide a scientist's reply to Saint-Exupery's insistence that only the heart can see the essential things: psychological science, with its measurements and models, can help sharpen the heart's vision by providing maps and pointing at the places of interest. The model of the moral exemplars I have laid out in this paper has done just that. It suggests that a focus on morality as choice (with all the free will baggage this implies) will not help us understand the moral development of real moral exemplars. Instead, we need to understand the moral exemplar as someone who cultivates moral virtue within a community of commitment.

Those who read the maps, clinical psychologists, reporters, consultants, humanists, should not complain, as I did as a sophomore, that the map is not the landscape. It requires detachment to read (and certainly to construct) a map. But we should not mistake that methodological detachment for a lack of concern about the real world. Indeed, the reason I collect data and make models is because of a passionate belief that these will help us understand humans and human concerns. It was a human concern with encouraging morality that led me to the scientific study of morality. This suggests that a scientific psychology can, despite my sophomore objections, lead us to talk about deeply meaningful issues in a way that is respectful of our humanity.

What does this excursion into scientific psychology suggest about how I might now teach my sophomores? First, I know my early resistance to psychology as a science

informs my presentation of it today. I help students struggle with the detachment that is required to do a scientific psychology. I cannot help them get a date, but I can help them understand the attraction process and some basic patterns of mate selection. The proper use of a map requires stepping back from the particular and getting a larger picture. This is hard when this Friday night stretches out in endless isolation. But it should be attempted. Some discussion about what a scientific psychology can and cannot do for us is a helpful way to begin the attempt.

Second, instead of submerging my students in the minutia of the science, I make sure to point out the larger features of the landscape, and especially those that connect to our concerns in the liberal arts. A scientific psychology can give us a different perspective on truth, beauty, and goodness. It cannot answer the question of what they really are, but it can contribute to the discussion about how we might attain them.

One byproduct of the argument in this paper is a complication of C.P Snow's claim that there are two cultures: one of science and one of humanism. This is an issue less of how I treat my students and more of how I treat my colleagues. As I hope this paper shows, there is nothing in the nature of the two endeavors that makes this split necessary. We can at least talk across the divide. And perhaps even make friends.

*. This paper was originally the Fall, 1998 Mellby Lecture delivered to the faculty of St. Olaf College, in honor of Carl Mellby, a great soul and polymath on the faculty. For those who care about such things, I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to: the works of Daniel Dennett and Ted Honderich on the free will problem; to John Darley and Kelly Shaver for imparting an abiding interest in moral reasoning and behavior; to Ed Langerak for insisting that I defend my notion that I could do well (and even do good) without free will; to L. DeAne Lagerquist for taking my forays into religious studies with the appropriate amount of seriousness and patience; and to Teresa Tillson for her constant intellectual companionship and her steadfast interest in virtue. DeAne Lagerquist, Matt Rohn, Doug Schuurman, Gordon Marino, Rick Fairbanks, Ed Langerak, and Carol Scholz provided much needed feedback on the lecture version of this paper.

Serving two Masters: Teaching and Writing Between Academy and Church

John Reumann

The art of teaching always involves a balancing act. We have concern for our disciplines, whether English, history, chemistry, music, or business administration. We have personal standards and perhaps a desire to write something. There are students, whose needs are to be met. There are parents and family who may help pay their way into our classrooms and labs and libraries. There is "the administration" of a department, school, or university, and behind them an often shadowy Board of Trustees. And in a church-related college, some denomination like the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, with its confessional tradition. All around us is society and the world. At one time or another, I've played most of these roles, tuition-paying parent, dean, acting President of a Seminary, Board member at Muhlenberg College, churchman, part of secular society, but mostly learner and, still, teacher. How to put it all together in today's world?

Jesus' saying (Matt. 6:24; Luke 16:13) haunts us, "No one can serve two masters; for either a person will hate the one and love the other, or will be devoted to the one and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon." At times, especially the mammon part. In concentrating here on "the academy" and "the church"--- the Sorbonne and l'Eglise, as a French savant put it--I will reflect my own experiences in biblical studies. But much of what follows could apply if you substitute the American Chemical Society or Modern Languages Association, the Roman Catholic Church or the United Church of Christ, for my own professional societies and the ELCA.

How to begin? One way is to focus on what will eventually be a major illustration for our topic: writing a commentary for both the world of the academy and usage in the churches. Commentaries are a genre for expounding texts of some importance, like a Platonic dialogue, or a key to James Joyce's *Finnigan's Wake*. The form varies with the work to be discussed, whether Principles of Mathematics or a Hindu epic. Commentary series, especially on the Bible, have, each, their own aims and format.

When volumes of the Anchor Bible began to appear in 1964 from Doubleday and Company, the goal was a fresh translation of the Bible, interfaith, by Protestants, Catholics, and Jews. The translation was to be accompanied by brief comments, a translation to be completed, it was hoped, "before man set foot on the moon." Such a translation endeavor would inevitably reflect a variety of English

John Reumann is professor emeritus at the Lutheran Theology Seminary at Philadelphia.

styles, by Scandinavian scholars in Europe and professors at Israeli universities, occasionally a British voice, and someone like my graduate school teacher, E. A. Speiser, who spoke Polish in his early years before learning English. When this endeavor began, Professor Krister Stendahl, of Harvard Divinity School, was assigned two volumes to treat Paul's letters to the Romans and Galatians. This was later expanded to include Thessalonians, Philippians, and Corinthians. A little later Professor Stendahl returned from a sabbatical in Sweden and announced it was no longer possible to write commentaries, at least for him. With that, we were deprived a more definitive work from his pen on Matthew's Gospel (promised for a German series). The Pauline epistles for the Anchor Bible were assigned to others, including Philippians to me. To this judgment of Krister Stendahl about writing commentaries we shall return later.

Academy and Learned Societies

A second way to begin is with experiences in the academy, especially for me the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis (the last two words were later dropped). I first attended an SBLE meeting over fifty years ago when Charles Muhlenberg Cooper, a seminary professor under whom I majored, later President of Pacific Lutheran Theological Seminary, took me to sessions. In those days the Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis regularly met at Union Theological Seminary, New York, with the Old Testament section in Room 205 and New Testament in 207. One could easily move from one area to the other. Henry Cadbury, Amos Wilder, and my *Doktorvater*, Morton S. Enslin, usually sat side by side in the second row, a forbidding threesome for young scholars. You might meet the archeologist, W. F. Albright, from Johns Hopkins, holding forth at the next table in a hole-in-the-wall restaurant on Amsterdam Avenue. I began to go annually to meetings. It was assumed at our house that I'd be "with the scholars" between Christmas and New Year's. My first paper was presented in 1957. Kendrick Grobel, the translator of Bultmann's *New Testament Theology*, encouraged publication and, I suspect, was instrumental in getting it printed in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*.

Occasionally the growing Society ventured outside of New York, as in 1961, when it was hosted by Concordia Seminary, St. Louis. Opinions never heard before in its hallowed classrooms were voiced in debate over the (New Quest for) the Historical Jesus, then a "hot" topic, as it is again today.

My involvement in SBL led to appointment as Associate Editor of its *Journal of Biblical Literature* in 1961. I might have succeeded Dr. Enslin as editor if he had not been unceremoniously dumped at the Toronto meeting by the young Turks who were remaking the Society. I remark in passing that people whose theological stance one may applaud often prove ruthless in personal relationships with others deemed to stand in their way. But revolutions often have a way of devouring their children, and for all the contributions of Robert Funk and others to SBL, there were dramatic and ironic movements later, as at the 100th Anniversary Awards, when Funk "did a Jane Fonda" and James Robinson had to stand in for him to receive a plaque; the day was saved only by the impromptu oratory of Harry Orlinsky--- than whom there are few people I would rather have called upon when the game is on the line. (Harry always appreciated a sports metaphor.) For Professor Orlinsky told of how he got into formal Hebrew studies when he took an 8 a. m. class from a *goy*, no less, at the University of Toronto--- in part because that early hour assured him a place at his favorite pool table. But that's another story.

My career with SBL did include a year as editor of its Journal at a time in 1971 when the previous editor would not talk with the new regime, and the future editor, Joseph Fitzmyer, S. J., was not available to take over, as yet. I was the middle man with whom all would talk, who had to unclog the pipeline of articles.

In 1972, for almost the first time, I did not go to an Annual Meeting, even though it was to so-called "international" one in Los Angeles. This was in part because our family was on the way to India, during a sabbatical, to teach at Bangalore. In this way I learned that I could live without so much involvement in SBL. There are, of course, other learned societies, like the international *Societas Novi Testamenti Studiorum* and the more focused and manageable Catholic Biblical Association. All of us who worked on the ecumenical studies *Peter in the New Testament* (1973) and *Mary in the New Testament* (1978) found such activity far more satisfying than many programs in the learned societies, because it involved something beyond scholarship, the Church or, more specifically, several churches in dialogue, relishing careful, corporate scholarship.

Thus for me a love-hate relationship with the academy has evolved. Intense involvement at times, and a willingness to let go--- an experience that probably many faculty have shared, to one degree or another.

Church and Churches

What, then, shall we say about the Church? For me at least,

something of the same love-hate relationship exists here as well, and I suspect for many others in church-related faculties. Of course I must make a distinction between the one, holy, catholic, and apostolic Church and its expression in the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod or the ELCA. "Church" is local too, and I assume one's being rooted in a local parish, in a specific worshiping, preaching, teaching, pastoral community of some sort. And perhaps some involvement in a denomination's wider work, ecumenism, or interreligious affairs. But I've found at times, after, for example, an intense week of "Word-and-Witness" workshops, that you may want to get away, for a few days at least, from everything "churchy"; that you can and must let go at times, as I did in the late 1970s with a college board and other church commitments. Neither church nor academia saves us from burnout.

Over the years I've been a member of three differently named Lutheran bodies, without ever moving out of southeastern Pennsylvania. I've known the bright vision of Lutheran unity in the 1950s and '60s, and saw us fall apart in the 1970s. Ecumenism has achieved some notable successes, most recently with the "Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification" between the Roman Catholic Church and many Lutheran churches throughout the world. But unity must always be balanced with truth, and I know of few areas in the church that have left more participants bruised and disgruntled than ecumenics. In all this, I've never known, or expected, a perfect church, nor do I find such an *ekklesia* somewhere else in Christendom or in some other religion. The ecclesial arenas can exhibit some of the same arrogance, inability to listen, power struggles, and disparagement of others that we find in academia.

The bottom line? Let me use figures from the system in Greek for accenting words. The academy, much as I love it, is an antepenultimate--- sometimes accented but three syllables from the end. The current ELCA, of which I am a part, and even the Church with a capital C, which I love, is penultimate, often to receive the stress but not the be-all and end-all. The ultima or final syllable, the ultimate, belongs to God, to Christ and the gospel, to be loved and served. Such a prioritizing has for me been helpful in navigating both academy and church in life. And mixed through all of this are people in whom academia and church and gospel take shape, as a part of God's creation and our societies.

Some Illustrations on Academy and Church

How do church and academy work out for each of us? For me, in the specifics of Bible and theological, religious studies. Perhaps it is easier in a "sheltered" denominational seminary or church-related college than in a public

university. Yet all the trends that affect society and the academy appear to one degree or another, sooner or later, in our institutions. Like others, we are prone to that arrested development that canonizes the graduate school influences of our prior experiences. There is some truth in the old adage that "Bad German philosophy goes to Oxford when it dies." (Fill in your own disciples and places). I suspect that it may be a special temptation for the church's schools to want to show we are "with it" - either with the politically and culturally correct currents of the day or with the ecclesially traditional "faith once delivered to the saints." Sometimes both! How, then, shall we be properly critical of both academy and church, when we live within one or both, as their denizens and participants?

If I were ever to write an autobiography, it might be titled, *Within the Structures*, for that's where I've worked. But it might also at times reflect a streak for which "Rebel" is too strong a word, but "Critic" may be in order, making judgments about both academy and church, about the foibles and the achievements of each, sometimes from the vantage point of the other. In chairing an ELCA Task Force on Ministry to agreement on a host of issues (and Churchwide Assembly approval for most all of the proposals), I at one point argued publicly against a particular conclusion that seemed to me unjustified and ecumenically harmful. Critical independence does not always endear you to bishops or church staff or academy structures, but seems to me a part of the important task of "discernment" for which most of us have been trained. One may have to swim against the stream. Yet, in my experience, with awareness that the person with whom I vigorously disagree on one point may be the one with whom I want to ally myself on the next issue before the house.

To return to our first starting-point, how does all this work out in specific cases? It is possible to illustrate from something so basic as Bible translation. I spent many days between 1978 and 1987 on the Revision Committee for the Roman Catholic "New American Bible New Testament." There one learned what bishops really mean in some churches. Conclusions to which grammar, philology, and exegesis led us as scholars had to satisfy a committee of bishops whose members may or may not have had a charism for textual criticism or interpretation. How shall one navigate at 1 Cor. 6:9 between technical terms like "catamites and sodomites" (which the translator would like to have used, even if it stretches modern readers) and the view that church teaching called for "homosexual perverts"? (A wise Benedictine led the argument for "boy prostitutes" and "practicing homosexuals," later changed to "sodomites.") The decision at Phil. 1:1 to render *episkopois kai diakonois* as "the overseers and ministers," not "bishops and deacons," required a careful note to acquaint the faithful

with recent results of scholarship.

Writing Commentaries, Scholarly and Churchly

In more detail, I turn to the genre of "the commentary," something of which many of us are consumers. Besides current work on Philippians (in a German series as well as the Anchor Bible), I've written on *Colossians* for the Augsburg Commentary on the New Testament (1985), and Romans for *Commentary 2000* (forthcoming).

Some general observations. Most commentary series evolve. There are excellent and weak volumes in every series. A word in defense of the early volumes in the Anchor Bible by Scandinavian Lutherans, Bo Reicke on *James, Peter, and Jude* (1964) and Johannes Munck on *Acts* (1967). If these seem elementary in comparison with later tomes in AB (and are now being replaced), it must be noted that they conform with what the series originally envisioned. A turning point came with Raymond Brown's two volumes on *John* (1966, 1970). In the Augsburg series, my *Colossians* manuscript was completed in the early 1980s, in the barebones style of the series, but by the time the publisher was ready with a satisfactory treatment of *Ephesians* (to go in the same volume), I was encouraged to add some footnotes. Even within a series format, one explores until an appropriate approach for a given biblical book emerges.

For Philippians I laid out my plans so as to include a treatment of the founding mission in Acts 16:11-40 and Paul's later contact with the city in Acts 20:6. Do, for example, the persons mentioned there, like the Lydian woman and the Roman jailer, relate to the *dramatis personae* in Paul's letter, such as Euodia and Syntyche and Clement at 4:2-3?

Such matters had, of course, even in the 1970s, been part of the challenge in writing a commentary about Paul and Philippi, good reason for Krister Stendhal to reach the judgment already cited about the task. But I suspect he also saw some of the greater changes coming. If I had finished my commentary by 1980, it would have been much simpler than what is "state of the art" today. As with most disciplines, biblical studies have grown enormously more complex in recent years. (Yet publishers often want fewer and fewer pages.) Who can master all the new subdisciplines?

Proliferating Subdisciplines

This is probably the place to inject the remark that, as in other areas, some U.S. investigators have hailed with great glee the claim that "the cutting edge of research" has

shifted from Europe (often, read "Germany") to the United States. Intellectual jingoism can appear in academia as well as in churches and politics. At times true, the claim is also at times blind to the international nature of academic research.

Among the trends affecting New Testament letters, in the U.S. and internationally, have been epistolary research and "rhetorical criticism," a part of all education in the Greco-Roman world. Rhetoric continued, indeed, down to the nineteenth century as an emphasis, and has again come to the fore as the "new rhetoric." I find rhetorical criticism important, but report the experience of one younger scholar at a Lutheran seminary, whose attention to rhetoric was not affirmed by colleagues. Why should Lutherans bother with it? To which one answer is the example in Philip Melancthon's use of classical rhetoric as he wrote and commented on Scripture.

There has also been increased interest in the social world of Paul's day, including analysis through categories from modern sociologists. Feminist concerns in recent decades have had predecessors with regard to Philippi in occasional articles over the last century. They had titles like, "Did Euodia and Syntyche Quarrel?" (1893-94 *Expository Times* 5:179-80) or "The Brave Women of Philippi" (F. X. Malinowski, *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 15 [1985] 60-64). Lilian Portefaix's volume, *Sisters Rejoice*, reflects both the social world of female existence and the "reception theory" of W. Iser and H. R. Janss applied to how Philippian women received Paul's letter. To this sequence of new approaches one may add "discourse analysis," a text-linguistic and rhetorical approach to texts, as in a book by Jeffrey T. Reed (1997).

All these waves of interpretation have come upon us while I have been at work on Philippians, each often hailed as "the solution" to old questions. They complicate the task of the conscientious commentator. Maybe Prof. Stendahl was right, you cannot master all the literature and techniques, the way one used to be able to say some Roman Catholic priests did: they could read everything ever written on the theme because they had no distractions like wife or children! Now we are all inundated by "die Literatur." Not to mention the internet. The challenge is to try to bring together all that matters!

Issues for a Commentator in the Study of Philippians

Running through the interpretation of canonical Philippians have long been questions of integrity and unity for the four-chapter canonical document, and its place of origin. Some scholars have applied the so-called new methods to bolster traditional conclusions about Philippians as a single

unified letter. Others, exploring non-traditional positions opened up over the years by scholarly criticism, have offer new vistas on old problems. From the church fathers on, a canonically embedded single letter to Philippi was read as stemming from Paul's imprisonment in Rome. But then what of the "rival preachers" mentioned at 1:14-18, who, Paul allows, really do preach the gospel, but do so out of "envy and rivalry"(1:15)? It horrified some that such could exist *in Rome*. To place the site of Paul's cell *in Ephesus* enabled Collange in his French commentary to suggest that the "envy and rivalry" against Paul had nothing to do with doctrine but stemmed from a different opinion among some Ephesian Christians over whether Paul should have invoked his Roman citizenship to gain release from prison. Christians in the very Roman city of Philippi would like have understood Paul's step, but not all Christians in pluralistic Ephesus approved Paul's use of privileges with Caesar. How are we to relate church and state? Philippians poses an early example of whether or not to use for a good cause privileges one may have. The great champion of an imprisonment *in Caesarea*, Ernst Lohmeyer, could never have guessed at such a solution, for Lohmeyer oriented everything in his reading of Philippians to the theme of martyrdom. Paul sought martyrdom, and could therefore not possibly, for Lohmeyer, have used his citizenship to gain freedom. Besides, on Caesarean or Roman scenarios, Paul had already made appeal to Caesar (Acts 25:10-11); that's why he was in custody. Only in Ephesus, on an earlier chronology, could use of his rights as citizen make sense as the object of envy by other Christians and a rival attitude toward Rome. (Ironically, Lohmeyer was martyred, while rector of the University at Greifswald, during the Russian occupation in 1946.)

Another example concerns the noun *koinonia* which occurs three times in Philippians (1:5; 2:1; 3:10), plus the related verb at 4:15, and compounds about "sharing" at 1:7 and 4:14. Out of these references have come efforts to see *koinonia* as the central theme of the entire epistle and, in ecumenical circles, a "*koinonia ecclesiology*." But in what sense of this many-faceted Greek word?

In 1977 H. Paul Sampley proposed that Paul, as a Roman citizen, familiar with Roman law, employed here a legal concept. Not a business partnership with Lydia in the purple-goods business, a *koinonia* which the apostle was said by some to be dissolving at 4:18. But, according to Sampley, a mutual *societas* with the Philippian church, a "partnership" in the gospel (1:5) involving financial aid for Paul as their missionary (4:15-16). This "business" reading was soon augmented or replaced with a broader interpretation of Paul's relationship with the Philippians, under "friendship" (*philia*, a particular and specific Greek understanding). Here reciprocity and a patron-client

relationship of benefaction were involved. It fits well for a Roman *colonia* like Philippi which was under the patronage of the Julian-Claudian Principate. Now the key to Philippians became "friendship." Perhaps a high-water mark of this line of interpretation appeared in John T. Fitzgerald's article on "Philippians" in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (1992, 5:318-26) where the very genre becomes "a letter of friendship." But this notion has had "a checkered history" in scholarship on Philippians, as I noted in a paper published in 1996. I think Paul was going only part way with ideas current in Philippi about friendship. He accepts aspects of it, but also critiques the theme on the basis of God, Christ, and gospel. This encounter between Paul and Greco-Roman friendship is to be seen most prominently in Phil 4:10-20, the so-called "thankless thanks." The apostle follows the convention that friends never need to say thanks to each other, but he also asserts his independence--- and dependence on God. On some issues I thus differ from the more enthusiastic endorsement of the theme by Ben Witherington III (1994; see my 1997 review). The age-old question continues, which friendship at Philippi poses: how shall we relate to cultural norms? Totally affirming, totally negatively, or with discernment?

From Academy to Church and Back Again

Now some examples where in my experience the interplay has moved from academy to church. No treatment of Philippians can neglect the reference to *episkopoi* and *diakonoi* at 1:1. It is the earliest written New Testament reference to "bishops," but in the plural, and without, as holds true in all other acknowledged Pauline letters, any use of the term *presbyteroi* (in Acts either "synagogue elders" or "church presbyters"). Even the translation of 1:1 is a matter of dispute in English, as noted above from the New American Bible Revised New Testament. No one can claim that the verse involves what later ages read into the office of bishop (or also "deacons"). A lot of nonsense has subsequently been voiced, in print or public television, like Barbara Thiering's attempt to connect *episkopoi* in Philippi with Qumran (let alone her idea that Jesus married Lydia after his marriage to Mary Magdalene ended), for we are dealing with a Hellenistic city without enough Jews to have a synagogue (Acts 16:13, only a "place for prayer" of proselytes) and a letter that never overtly quotes the Old Testament. A solid case exists for the origin of Philippian *episkopoi* and *diakonoi* to lie in Greco-Roman civil and societal usages.

The biggest change in considering ecclesiology and leadership in early Christianity has come, in my opinion, with the rediscovery of the "house church." Back in 1939, an article by Floyd V. Filson (*JBL* 58:105-12), called attention to groups gathered in the house (*oikos*) of this

convert or that, as nuclear, extended-family cells that made up the *ekklesia* in any place. This phenomenon continued down to the time of Constantine. In Philippi that meant house assemblies *chez* Lydia and at the house of the Roman jailer (Acts 16); perhaps in the homes of Euodia and Syntyche (Phil. 4:2), maybe Clement (4:3), likely Epaphroditus (2:25). How different these groups must have been! No wonder Paul had to emphasize unity! It is, in my considered judgment, likely that the *episkopoi* in Philippi were the patron-benefactors, the heads of the household, in each house church. And, yes, some of them were women, in Paul's day. Such personal research did *not* obtrude into the reports of the ELCA Study of Ministry, for treatment there drew on presentations to the Task Force by other New Testament scholars and on works in print. But there is reflection in the Report of Section II at the Faith and Order Conference at Santiago de Compostella, Spain, in 1993. The draft (not mine; credit Wolfhart Pannenberg and others) spoke of how "Some argue that, historically, the emergence of bishops in the early church ... arose from a transfer of the function of the leader of a house church," citing Philemon and Phil. 1:1 (*On the Way to Fuller Koinonia*, Faith & Order Paper No.166, 1994, p. 242). When this was challenged in discussion, I made a point of quoting only Roman Catholic scholars who have reached such conclusions. The sentence stood. The academy's research can affect the church. Or is it also that church people, academically able, are contributing to both worlds?

One final example has to do with work on "justification by faith," notably in the volume that Joseph Fitzmyer, Jerome Quinn, and I did on "*Righteousness*" in the NT (1982) as part of the U. S. Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogue. It corrected views in both our churches from the past, but was also addressed to academia. Many of the findings have been taken into my articles on "Righteousness" in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary*. It also aided in drafting the international Lutheran-Roman Catholic "Joint Declaration" on justification in 1999.

Wirkungsgeschichte of the Text for Academy and Church

How do texts play out in subsequent history? What is their "working history"? Currently it is being asked by some, Did Paul plan to *commit suicide* as he wrote 1:21, "To die is gain"? Arthur Droge has argued this in learned and popular journals, against a background of Greek practice, among Stoics in particular. But Paul goes on to speak, as Cicero did (in a letter to his brother Quintus, *Q. Fr.* 1.3) when discussing suicide, of an obligation to stay on; for Paul, in the service of the Philippians and even that he will come to them again (1:25-26; 2:24). All this makes suicide very unlikely in Paul's plans. Paul cannot be patron saint for Jack

Kevorkian.

In working through Philippians I have again and again been surprised by twists and turns in the history of exegesis. 1:21 provides an example of a sense widely found among German and other interpreters, yet rarely heard in the Anglo-Saxon world. We have long been accustomed to take *Christos* as predicate, "to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain," as in the King James Version. But John Chrysostom, Luther, and many others have taken "Christ" as subject. This interpretation exercised enormous influence through hymns like "Christus der ist mein Leben, Sterben ist mein Gewinn" (1609); Ernst Homburg, in Catherine Winkworth's translation, "Christ the Life of all the living" (*Service Book and Hymnal* 79), and in the spiritual, "In the morning when I rise, ... O when I die..., Give me Jesus" (*With One Voice* 777). The Roman Catholic Einheitsübersetzung of the Bible (1980) has adopted it ("Denn für mich ist Christus das Leben und Sterben Gewinn"). But from commentators in English one would scarcely guess this grammatical option exists.

Amid the currents of Christian history and theology and of ongoing academia, a commentator's task must be to give a consistent reading of a document, respectable in wissenschaftlich circles (where book reviews are usually written) and helpful in church circles (where preachers account for a considerable portion of commentary sales).

In an article in *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* (60 [1995] 57-88), Markus Bockmuehl has urged attention to what he calls the "effective history" of Philippians as part of a commentator's work. That means for me attention to significant voices over the centuries, like Chrysostom, Aquinas, Calvin, Bengel, and Karl Barth, as well as reporting something about sermons and homiletical treatment in the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of Paul's letter, not to mention reflections in popular culture.

Working Conclusions

I would not want to be without the welter of voices to be heard in both academy and church, whether I am writing a commentary, teaching, or instructing myself. Penultimates and antepenultimates and even some otherwise unaccented syllables all play a part. Ultimately the One whom James Moffatt called "The Eternal" matters most--- in Paul's experience, God, expressed through Christ, as good news, progressing deep into human lives at Philippi and geographically from the house churches there spreading to wider regions, a *Wirkungsgeschichte* then and now.

Without academia we can easily delude ourselves, as it was once said about a German professor, "He believes he thinks,

and thinks he believes; neither is quite true." Without church, I lack a full *raison d'être*. I find it fruitful to try to labor pro bono [for the public good, including academia], *pro ecclesia*, and *pro Deo*.

Long ago I learned what a professor in religion ought to be when a group of us, during an institute at Maywood Seminary, went one evening to a performance by Chicago's "Second City" theater troop. As part of the improvisation, the audience was urged to call out someone to be the subject of a skit. The pastors pointed to me, yelling "theological professor." One of the actors astutely asked, "Theological professor or professor of some theology?"

In his book, *Required Reading: Why Our American Classics Matter Now*, Andrew Delbanco has written in his conclusion that we need teachers of literature to be "professors in the old religious sense of that word: believers, testifiers, witnesses." Philip Melancthon once said of exegetes, We are "first grammarians, then dialecticians [logicians, systematicians], then witnesses." I find the possibilities intriguing, in and for both academy and church, and doxologically--- as the university sermons at Cambridge, England, ended, "Now to the only God, our Savior, through Jesus Christ our Lord, be glory, majesty, power, and authority, before all time and now and forever" (Jude 25). Let the scholars of God say Amen, in word and praxis.

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