

New Directions

Volume 11 | Issue 4

Article 8

10-1-1984

U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada

Linus A. Hoskins

Follow this and additional works at: <http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections>

Recommended Citation

Hoskins, Linus A. (1984) "U.S.-Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada," *New Directions*: Vol. 11: Iss. 4, Article 8.
Available at: <http://dh.howard.edu/newdirections/vol11/iss4/8>

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Howard @ Howard University. It has been accepted for inclusion in New Directions by an authorized administrator of Digital Howard @ Howard University. For more information, please contact lopez.matthews@howard.edu.

U.S.- Caribbean Relations: Before and After Grenada

By Linus A. Hoskins



In 1823 the Monroe Doctrine justified "U. S. interference in any and everything not be her liking in either the North or the South of the continent." Such interventionist policy has since become a permanent feature of U. S. policy toward the Caribbean and the Western hemisphere.

The Caribbean has always been regarded as an American backyard and, *ipso facto*, within the U. S. sphere of influence. Respect for the national sovereignty and integrity of the Caribbean nations and their people has been regarded as of minor importance.

Indeed recent events have shown that the United States pursued a "big stick" policy of destructive engagement toward specific Caribbean countries. This policy has been carried out in collusion with other selected Caribbean governments.

The Carter Policy

When the Carter administration came to power, one of its first pronouncements would be priority attention to the Caribbean. This was supposed to mark "a new era of friendship and cooperation between Washington and a one-time American lake sprinkled with emerging new ministates determined not only to be independent but to act independently."¹

In August 1977, Rosalyn Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, and U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young, visited the Caribbean on goodwill missions "of atonement of United States transgressions in the region" as part of the Carter administration's objective to "spin a new policy web around a region long neglected

by Washington power brokers obsessed with East-West relations."²

Ambassador Young indicated that the purpose of the Caribbean tour was to convince Caribbean leaders that the Carter administration meant to pay more attention to what they said and what they wanted for their countries and to meddle less in how they and their people choose to run their affairs, especially Guyana and Jamaica, the latter then under the stewardship of Prime Minister Michael Manley. He stressed that the Carter administration did not look with hostility at their choice of Socialism and did not see a threat in their friendly ties with President Fidel Castro of Cuba.³ He also expressed the idea of "an integrated Caribbean partnership as being in the interest of the United States and its neighbors."⁴

Former Ambassador Terence Todman put the Carter policy toward the Caribbean this way:

U.S. official involvement with the English-speaking Caribbean was extremely limited while our substantial involvement in the affairs of the Spanish-speaking Caribbean was, . . . often aimed in the wrong direction. In the past, security interests have been the overriding concern of the U.S. government in its dealing with the Caribbean, . . . what we seek in the Caribbean today is not domination, disproportionate influence, or the right to intervene in other nations' internal affairs. We seek instead a mature, healthy relationship with all states in the region, founded on respect for sovereignty, recognition of

*common interests and consultation on matters of mutual concern . . .*⁵

President Carter also reaffirmed the "vital interest" of the Caribbean to the United States and America's firm commitment to human rights, democratization, significant support for economic development, acceptance and respect for ideological pluralism, unequivocal respect for national sovereignty, strong encouragement of regional cooperation, an active Caribbean role in world affairs and non-intervention in the Caribbean because America saw herself "as part of the Caribbean community" — a position which was quite unpopular and suspect among many Caribbean peoples.

Perplexed by rapid turnovers of governments in the Eastern Caribbean (a coup in Grenada, the downfall of Patrick John's administration in Dominica, the electoral defeat of John Compton in St. Lucia, and the rising tide of discontent in Guyana and Antigua), then Secretary of State Vance dispatched State Department specialist Philip Habib "to test the Caribbean pulse, perhaps to help the Carter administration make some adjustments in the 'bright-spot' — 'trouble-spot' evaluation."⁶

It is noteworthy that Habib selectively excluded Grenada from his itinerary. He visited St. Lucia and Antigua, where anti-Cuban sentiments were very strong, but ignored St. Vincent. A subsequent Habib report urged an increase in the regional aid program which totaled about \$155 million in fiscal 1979 to stem the tide against an apparent Cuban Communist influence and aggression.

The Carter administration then established the Caribbean Task Force at Key West, Florida, as one component of the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command. Consisting of a staff of 75 persons, the Task Force's mission was to monitor developments in the Caribbean, conduct training exercises, and devise contingency plans for the use of U.S. forces, as a means of combating Cuban Communist infiltration into the island nations in the area. Under the plan, the United States, Britain, and Canada would provide coast guard-type training in Barbados and possibly sell patrol boats to that country and others.

Barbados took the lead in forming a coast guard and in return for its pro-Western efforts received \$5 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and \$84,000 in International Military and Education

Training (IMET) funds. The proposed coordinated patrol force also included, in addition to Barbados, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica.

Caribbean leaders, however, were much less alarmed at the spread of Cuban influence than was the Carter administration. They have argued that acceptance of Cuban help did not signify embrace of Communist doctrine, but rather admiration for those parts of the Cuban system — education, health and social organization — that worked in the very conditions that stymied progress in other Caribbean islands.

"Grenada . . . angered the United States by voting along with Cuba against the United Nations General Assembly resolution . . . that strongly condemned Soviet aggression in Afghanistan."

Yet the Carter administration was obsessed with the spectre of Soviet domination of the Caribbean as supposedly evidenced by the Soviet Union trying to secure its base in Cuba by surrounding it with friendly nations, by "totalitarian Marxist's" control of Grenada, and Cuban advisers training guerrillas in Grenada for subversive action in Trinidad, and by Fidel Castro's grand design to forge a Marxist axis running across the Caribbean from Grenada to Jamaica to Havana. As Abraham Lowenthal surmises:

*. . . the preoccupation of the State Department and the White House with Fidel Castro (did) not sit well with most Caribbean leaders who perceive(d) Castro as only one of the many Caribbean actors rather than as a Cold War instrument . . .*⁷

The Cuban Furor

The Carter administration's concern about the restlessness and revolutionary mood sweeping through the Caribbean resulted from several factors: the first was the March 13, 1979, overthrow of the Eric Gairy government in Grenada by the

New Jewel Movement led by Maurice Bishop. The United States publicly accused Cuba of instigating and assisting in the overthrow. However, a confidential CIA report dismissed the accusation and concluded that "as far as we can tell, the coup occurred . . . from local circumstances. The Soviets had nothing to do with it or the Cubans either."⁸

In addition, the development of extremely close ties between Cuba and Grenada also worried the Carter administration to the extent that when Grenada and Cuba established diplomatic relations on April 16, 1979, Frank Ortiz, the United States ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean stationed in Barbados, delivered a note to Prime Minister Bishop in which the Carter administration indicated that the United States government would view with "grave concern and displeasure" any tendency on the part of Grenada to develop military ties with Cuba.⁹ As a riposte, Prime Minister Bishop in a radio broadcast denounced the United States hegemonism as follows:

*. . . No one, no matter how mighty and powerful they are will be permitted to dictate to the government of Grenada who we can be friendly with and what kind of friendly relations we must have with other countries . . .*¹⁰

Grenada also angered the United States by voting along with Cuba against the United Nations General Assembly resolution in January 1980 which strongly condemned Soviet aggression in Afghanistan; by its support for the Sandinistas in the Nicaraguan revolution; by its solidarity with the popular struggle against the military dictatorship in El Salvador (which the United States supports); and by its support for the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) which the United States only recognizes as a "terrorist organization."

The second factor of concern to the United States was the election of leaders in St. Lucia, who vowed to limit foreign investment and were especially friendly toward Cuba; the third was the presence of 450 Cuban personnel in Jamaica, including alleged high-ranking Cuban intelligence officers (DGI), some of whom had Soviet (KGB) connections; the fourth was the presence of 100 Cubans in Guyana, 350 in Grenada, and 15 in St. Lucia.

As is evident from Prime Minister

Bishop's statement, his government always opposed United States hegemonic policy toward the Caribbean and interference in Grenada's internal affairs. However, Grenada had always sought "normal and friendly relations" with the United States and insisted that "countries must have the right to pursue their own process." The government of Grenada also viewed the decision of President Carter to increase United States military presence in the Caribbean as "unjustified" and a "very serious threat" that was not only designed to contribute to tension in the region but also to serve as a counter-productive force against "progressive change" in the region. One retaliatory measure the PRG took was to organize a "popular army and a people's militia" to defend its sovereignty.

In addition, in May 1979 the government of Grenada accused the CIA of having drawn up a pyramid-shaped plan to destabilize Grenada. The plan called for, inter alia, instigating and organizing strikes throughout the island, planting false reports about Grenada in [the media], and encouraging prominent persons, organizations, and governments in the region to attack the Grenadian revolution.

The government also accused the United States of complicity in a June 19, 1980 bomb explosion directly under the platform from which the Prime Minister was addressing a mass rally. [He] was not hurt but two persons were killed and several others were severely wounded. And in November 1980, the security forces defused an attempt to overthrow the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada (PRG). Again direct United States involvement was evidenced by the seizure of documents which proved that three American ships from Miami were to arrive at three strategic coastal locations in Grenada, viz, Gouyave, Grenville and Westerhall, to deliver arms and about 100 mercenaries.

The reasons for the United States attempts to destabilize Grenada have already been outlined. What needs to be emphasized here is that the United States government did not care much about what the Grenadian revolution was doing for the masses of Grenadian people. What was important was the so-called security interest of the United States.

The United States was well aware that the poverty stricken Caribbean region

was in ferment. It also saw a revolution in Grenada coming on top of the earlier Cuban revolution. It was therefore worried about a revolutionary virus spreading throughout the region. Even though Grenada is a small country, any revolution there was significant to the United States due to the fact that it could serve as a paradigm to other Caribbean islands that are experiencing similar conditions.

The Reagan Policy

When the [Reagan] administration came to power, its primary foreign policy goal was to stem the tide against perceived

"The administration sees the Caribbean 'as an area of opportunity for the U.S.'"

worldwide Soviet aggression in general and to "draw the line" against supposed Cuban Communist adventurism in the Caribbean and Latin America, in particular.

There is no hesitation on the part of the Reagan administration as to what U.S. policy should be toward the Caribbean. The administration sees the Caribbean "as an area of opportunity for the U.S." This immutable policy stance differs drastically from that of the Carter administration, which has been accused of pursuing a regional policy of failure and inability. For example, the Carter administration is accused of being unable to determine just what the Cubans and the Soviets were up to in the region, how visible the U.S. should be in the Caribbean, and whether and how it should compete with the ubiquitous Cubans.

In comparing the two administrations' policy objectives/positions toward the Cubans, one State Department official is reported to have said:

. . . The Carter administration got involved with the region out of a sense of well-intentioned but vaguely focused

*altruism. The Reagan people are motivated primarily by fear that the Cubans and behind them the Russians, will be coming across our southern borders if we don't involve ourselves aggressively in the area . . .*¹¹

President Reagan himself has stated that the Carter administration was "woefully lacking" in its response to alleged Soviet-backed subversion in the Caribbean and Communist activity in Central America. The President has interpreted his 1980 political mandate as "the restoration of the nation's power and prestige in response to a heightened neglected Soviet threat." This interpretation refers to the so-called Reagan Doctrine which means the "subordination of all major policies to revitalizing the containment of Soviet expansion."¹²

The Reagan administration has rejected the "strategic passivity" of the Carter administration and is convinced that the Carter administration's reaction to the "most brazen imperial drive in history" by the Soviet Union and its ally, Cuba, had been too little and too late.

There are three major components of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Caribbean:

(i) Support for free elections and broadly based democratic institutions as the best way for each country to pursue its development according to the wishes of its people;

(ii) The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to help Basin economies overcome structural underdevelopment. This proposed integrated program of trade, investment, and financial assistance has as its centerpiece a U.S. offer of one-way free trade to the region's smaller countries. It also seeks authority to offer U.S. firms significant tax incentives for new investment and to increase direct financial assistance for both urgent balance-of-payments problems and longer term structural imbalances;

(iii) Collective security efforts and security assistance to help democratically-oriented governments resist violent, externally supported insurgents who would impose totalitarian regimes hostile to the United States.

It is interesting to note that the administration's Caribbean policy also has implications beyond the Caribbean. As a result of its determination to counter perceived growing Cuban and Soviet intru-

sion into the region, the administration has mistakenly placed Caribbean issues within a Cold War, East-West confrontational matrix. *Ipsa facto*, it has annihilated President Carter's policy of respect for national sovereignty and "ideological pluralism" in the Caribbean.

While Caribbean governments regard the area as a "zone of peace," the Reagan administration regards the area a "battle-ground in the global confrontation with the Soviet Union."

26 The Reagan administration came into office loudly expressing its determination to turn back the Cuban Communist tide sweeping the Caribbean. As a result, Cuba's activities abroad became the "focal point" of the administration's attention and it sounded the warning signal that alleged Cuban adventurism abroad as reflected by the deployment of 40,000 to 50,000 Cuban soldiers was not only a "serious problem" but also a "threat to peace and stability around the world." In the perception of the administration, Cuba symbolizes Soviet influence in the area and acting as a "stooge for the Soviet Union," Cuba is attempting to turn the Caribbean into a "Red Lake." According to President Reagan:

... If we do not act promptly and decisively in defense of freedom, new Cubas will arise from the ruins of today's conflicts. Make no mistake, the well-being and security of our neighbors in this region are in our own vital interests . . .

Administration officials have publicly stipulated the following terms for improvement in relations with Cuba, viz., Cuba should:

- (i) withdraw its internationalist forces from Africa and Nicaragua
- (ii) abandon its program of supporting leftist guerrillas in Central America and "wars of liberation" in Africa and
- (iii) accept the return of 2,555 Mariel boatlift criminals who are being held in U.S. jails.

The administration's warning of an impending Cuban Communist encirclement, as contained in a State Department release, "Cuba's Renewed Support for Violence in Latin America," was that "first in Africa and now in Latin America and the Caribbean," Cuba's policy has again shifted to re-emphasize the Caribbean. In another release, "Strategic Situation in

Central America and the Caribbean," the administration has described the following development "as a state of danger in the Caribbean Basin," viz, the fact that there is a:

... new Cuban strategy for uniting the left in the countries of the region, committing it to violence, arming it, training it in warfare, and attempting to use it for the destruction of existing governments . . .

The administration's charge is that

"It took the United States almost 26 years to normalize relations and to deal with Chairman Mao's China. History may well repeat itself . . ."

Cuba's President Fidel Castro is capitalizing on "targets of opportunity" in the Caribbean to facilitate Soviet control over an area the administration views as vital to the national security interests of the United States. More specifically, the administration has accused Cuba of receiving a massive flow of Soviet arms which not only ossifies Cuba's ability to project military power outside its own territory but also represents a tremendous strategic gain for the Soviet Union in terms of its global and hemispheric aims.

The administration is also concerned that now Cuba is the strongest power in Latin America, and that the Cubans, with continuing Soviet assistance, will have considerable success in their determination "to exploit the situation (in the Caribbean and Central America) in ways that pose a potential threat to U.S. security interests." The security threat that concerned the administration was the triangle between Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada.

In terms of the "massive" flow of Soviet arms into Cuba, the administration has estimated their value at over \$1 billion in 1982, exceeding the \$600 million worth of weapons in 1981. The Soviet arms include "Turya" hydrofoil torpedo boats, M124 "Hind" assault helicopters, a squadron of supersonic MiG23 fighter aircraft in an air force of 200 modern planes, naval vessels and 140 SAM-3 missiles.

It seems simplistic for the administration to assume that Cuba will "crumble under tough talk." The administration's policy toward Cuba consisting of threats, pressures, and the confrontational approach has not worked. And it will never work. Sooner or later the United States must deal with Cuba.

It took the United States almost 25 years to normalize relations and to deal with Chairman Mao's Communist China. History may well repeat itself if the U.S. continues to pursue its hostile policy toward Cuba in view of the fact that diplomatic relations were broken in 1961. It is hoped also that future U.S. administrations will accept "the policy of gradual engagement" — toward Cuba — a policy that would not produce "miracles" overnight, but one that will start a dialogue, a constructive process.

Since the United States recognizes and conducts business with Communist countries like the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet bloc, the question that now arises is why wouldn't the U.S. normalize relations with Cuba, a country that can hardly be regarded as a serious threat to the national security interest of a superpower like the United States?

This same historical irony of U.S. policy toward the Caribbean is nowhere more evident than on the small island of Grenada. With a population of 110,000, an area of 133 square miles, and nutmeg as its major export, it is not the most likely threat to (any) world power.

Nevertheless, ever since the New Jewel Movement ousted the dictatorial and repressive government of Eric Gairy in a coup on March 13, 1979, U.S.-Grenada relations had been icy and rocky at best. U.S. officials were convinced that under Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada "seem(ed) to be on the road to becoming another Cuba." They were further convinced that Cuba was bent on developing Grenada as a "first bridgehead for exporting socialist revolutions to the English-speaking Caribbean and a base for Cuban intervention in South America, Southern Africa and U.S. shipping lines." Reagan administration officials also publicly denounced the denial of human rights in Grenada, lack of freedom of the press, the detention of political prisoners, and the non-scheduling of general elections.

In addition, U.S. officials said that most Cubans in Grenada were "military ad-

visers, some of whom infiltrate the government to the extent of participating in top-level decisions in almost every government ministry." This conclusion has led the administration to believe that Grenada's 250 to 2,000-member army and several thousand-member militia "could pose a threat to Grenada's neighbors."

Grenada's foreign policy actions also disturbed the administration. Grenada's establishment of close diplomatic ties with Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet Union and countries in the Eastern Bloc had caused deep strategic concern for the administration. According to Defense Secretary Weinberger, in his fiscal 1983 report to Congress:

... in Grenada, Cuban influence has reached such a high level that Grenada can be considered a Cuban satellite ...

As a result of these beliefs and convictions, the administration tried to isolate and undermine the popular Grenadian revolutionary progress by undertaking a series of action to:

- destabilize and overthrow the government;
- dissuade the European Economic Community (EEC) from funding the \$71 million airport at Point Salines;
- undermine the government's rule through selective military and economic exclusion, particularly exclusion from participation in the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI); and
- deny diplomatic recognition to PRG's representatives in Washington.

Invasion of Grenada

On October 25, 1983 [following events which led to Maurice Bishop's murder], the United States invaded the sovereign nation of Grenada. As a result of the presidential invasion order signed at 6:00 p.m. on October 24, 1983, "Operation Urgent Fury" was set up in motion. The military operation consisted of a disproportionately overpowering contingent of 1,900 Marines, 5,000 paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division, a war fleet of 20 ships, and several units of Rangers, together with about 300 troops from Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua and St. Vincent.

President Reagan has stated that his decision to invade Grenada was dictated by an "urgent, formal request" on Oc-

tober 23, 1983 from five members of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)¹³ for the United States "to assist in a joint effort to restore order and democracy on the island of Grenada." Both Barbados and Jamaica joined the OECS members in that request. The request was made in accordance with Article 8 of the June 1981 OECS Treaty of Association.

In a White House statement on October 26, 1983 President Reagan gave the following reasons for his "decisive action" against Grenada:

"The primary goal . . . is to transform the new Grenada into a showcase for Reaganomics and democracy."

First, and of overriding importance to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans, whose personal safety is, of course, my paramount concern. Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to assist in the restoration of conditions of law and order and of governmental institutions to the island of Grenada . . .

And in a nationally televised broadcast on October 27, 1983 President Reagan elucidated these reasons by indicating that U.S. forces discovered a "complete (Cuban) base with weapons and communications equipment" which implied that Cuba was planning to occupy the island. According to the President, "weapons and ammunition (were) stacked almost to the ceiling enough to supply thousands of terrorists." The weapons included small arms, assault rifles, machine guns, mortars and an "extremely lethal" anti-aircraft battery. President Reagan warned further that Grenada was "a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy." The President concluded his broadcast by assuring the American people that "we got there just in time."

The evidence the administration has offered to prove its case that the military buildup in Grenada was indeed a serious threat to the security of the Caribbean and by extension to American security,

consisted of intelligence reports which warned that since September 1983 the Soviet Union's activities had signaled its "determination to move into the Western Hemisphere as an imperial power and to stay."

According to U.S. intelligence calculation, the appointment of four-star General Gennadiy I. Sazhenov as Moscow's official ambassador to Grenada, signaled the Soviet Union's intention to use Grenada as "a Soviet new world arsenal as well as an air, sea and communications base." In addition, the administration has stated that it captured a "treasure trove of documents" which have shown that there were agreements for the Soviet Union, Cuba and North Korea to supply weapons to Grenada under the Bishop government. The documents included five military assistance treaties for arms deliveries from 1980 through 1985, including 3,050 used and re-conditioned Soviet AK 47 assault rifles from the Soviet Union, 1,000 AK 47s from North Korea, 2,500 used Soviet carbines, 7,000 mines, 15,000 grenades, 1,050 pistols, 293 sniper rifles and 74 rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Another supply agreement with the Soviet Union called for the delivery of 12,600 military uniforms, 25,200 pairs of socks and 6,300 belts, helmets and pairs of boots.

Under these five military treaties, Grenada was also to receive \$25.8 million in aid from the Soviet Union and \$12 million from North Korea. And as a final effort to prove that the Grenada invasion was "right," the administration publicly displayed the 451 tons of captured munitions at Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland on Veterans Day, November 11, 1983. Some of the items from Grenada included 5.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition; 86,332 rounds of 23mm antiaircraft ammunition; 1,200 sticks of dynamite; 1,626 Soviet AK 47 rifles; 180 Soviet M1945 submachine guns; ten 82mm mortars; 1,824 grenades; and eight 73mm SPG9 recoilless guns.

The Reagan administration, therefore, concluded that, based on the huge volume of weapons and the captured munitions, Grenada was "building a military force out of proportion to the island's size or military needs." Or in the words of Vice President Bush: "I guess everything we heard is true. This . . . awesome display of arms . . . doesn't look like a friendly type of an arsenal to promote

tourism somehow," alluding to slain Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's oft repeated reference to the PRG's program to promote tourism.¹⁴

Needless to say, the administration received much public fulcrum for its action. For example, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, the Atlantic Commander-in-chief who ran the military operation, has stated that the President was justified in invading Grenada because of the Cuban military build-up on the island between October 6-18, 1983; the impersonation as construction workers by Cuban soldiers; and the existence of a terrorist training base.

Also, a *Newsweek* Poll on Intervention published November 7, 1983 indicated that 53% of the respondents approved the invasion of Grenada, 69% agreed with the President that his action was necessary "to protect the lives of Americans on the island and assist those who want to leave," while 48% agreed that the invasion was justified in order "to replace the Marxist revolutionaries who had seized power."

Not to be outdone, certain members of the OECS came out in their support of the invasion. According to Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia, the Cuban "military build-up" was the main reason that the OECS sought U.S. help. "The United States came to our aid because we thought the military build-up was threatening the whole of the southern Caribbean," he said.

Dominica's Prime Minister Eugenia Charles, who once described the modus operandi of the PRG as an "aberration," suggested that: "It is not a matter of an invasion. It is a matter of preventing this thing (Marxist revolution) from spreading to the islands." The administration also received support from right wing-Grenadians in the United States. Francis Paul, vice president of the Grenada Democratic Movement, for example, indicated: "I don't consider the event as an invasion; I consider it a liberating force."

Postmortem

By November 3, 1983, the administration was convinced that hostilities had ended in Grenada so that the troops (described by President Reagan as "heroes of freedom") could be withdrawn. However, the White House had decided that 2,300 troops would remain in Grenada to be withdrawn by December 23, 1983, thus falling within the initial 60-day period that

allowed the President, under the 1973 War Powers Resolution [WPR], to introduce troops in a hostile area before triggering the resolution's restrictive provisions.

It was also decided that another 2,000 "non-combat" troops would remain for an indefinite period. The casualty toll from the invasion was high; provisional figures as of mid-November indicated that for Cuba there were 57 wounded, 634 captured as prisoners and 71 dead; for Grenada, there were 160 killed, 111 wounded, and 68 captured; the casualty figures for the United States were 18 killed, and 113 wounded with none missing.

As a post-mortem to the invasion, the Reagan administration announced that the Agency for International Development (AID) would carry out a \$3.5 million disaster assistance program in Grenada. The program allocated \$750,000 for drinking water-related equipment, \$1.5 million for roads, \$250,000 for "mobilization of social and community organizations" and \$500,000 for health programs.

The overall \$3.5 million assistance package was in addition to the \$475,000 in emergency aid already given to Grenada. In addition, Congress has earmarked "up to \$15 million" for development assistance to Grenada over the next 11 months, while the Pentagon has agreed to pay the costs of the 300-member Caribbean police force to the tune of \$6 million.

The administration also sent an "inter-agency private sector team" to Grenada to ascertain to what extent the American business community (capitalists) can assist in the economic re-vitalization of Grenada. The primary goal here of course is to transform the *new* Grenada into a showcase for Reaganomics and democracy. This strategy is analogous to the 24-member blue-chip private sector group that President Reagan set up for Jamaica, which culminated in the joint Jamaica-American Private Sector Committee.¹⁵

The administration's policy toward Grenada indeed sends a clear signal to other Caribbean nations that President Reagan is determined that no Caribbean country would be allowed to become a camp from which a leftist/progressive revolutionary "virus"/process can be exported to other neighboring Caribbean states. The administration's policy is to install right-wing, conservative govern-

ments, at least in the English-speaking Caribbean, so as to protect "perceived" American security interests . . .

The unknown variable in this geo-political equation is: Which Caribbean nation is next in line for an invasion? □

Linus A. Hoskins, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the International Studies Program, School of Human Ecology, Howard University. The above was excerpted from his 95-page study on "U.S.-Caribbean-Grenada Relations: Before and After Bishop."

REFERENCE

¹ Don Bohning, "How the U.S. Has Faltered in Caribbean." *The Miami Herald*. (October 14, 1979)

² *Ibid.*

³ Kathleen Teltsch, "Young Spearheading A Good-Will Mission." *The New York Times*. (August 14, 1977), p. 12.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Quoted in Bohning, *op. cit.*

⁶ "U.S. Habib's Caribbean Assignment," *Caribbean Contact*. (September 1979), p. 11.

⁷ Abraham Lowenthal, "The Caribbean." *The Wilson Quarterly*. (Spring 1982), p. 137.

⁸ Jack Anderson, "Storm Warnings at our Doorstep." *Parade*. (September 21, 1980), p. 18.

⁹ "Grenada Leader Says United States Applied Pressure." *The Washington Post*. (April 16, 1979), p. A.28.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ John M. Goshko, "Reagan Developing a 'Caribbean Basin' Policy." *The Washington Post*. (May 25, 1981), p. A.8.

¹² Robert E. Osgood, "The Revitalizing of Containment." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 60 No. 3. (Fall 1982).

¹³ The membership of the OECS consists of Antigua, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Montserrat.

¹⁴ John M. Goshko, "Captured Documents' Contents Outlined." *The Washington Post* (October 31, 1983), p. A.1. Patrick E. Tyler, "Seized Grenada Papers Show Disarray." *The Washington Post* (November 5, 1983, p. A.1.; and Rick Atkinson, "Bush Views 'Awesome' Captured Arms Displayed." *The Washington Post*, (November 11, 1983), p. A.1.

¹⁵ Toward the end of November, the administration allocated another \$15 million for a military training program for Grenada and the eastern Caribbean nations because such defensive precautions are "urgently required to train, equip, supply and provide logistical support" for the Caribbean Peace-Keeping Force. This is just one link in the long chain of increased U.S. militarization of the Caribbean to protect U.S. interests and those governments friendly to those interests. Moreover, the White House appointed inter-agency team has recommended that the interim government "consider revising tax codes, investment codes and ease other restriction placed by the previous Marxist government." In addition, The White House has secretly urged private business executives to invest in Grenada, especially for tourism, now that the administration has ensured that "they won't have to worry about a leftist government seizing their property." These actions indeed support the contention that Grenada will be transformed into a showcase for Reaganomics.