

USES OF SINOLOGY IN MODERN JAPAN

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Over the past millenium and a half the Japanese study of China has come to constitute one of the most fruitful and distinguished bodies of scholarship that one country has accumulated about another. To Japan and its scholars, China – its history, its culture, and its institutions – regularly served as the unrivalled source of models. It provided the ideal for state-building and often a supreme talisman for cultural legitimacy; it created many durable models for social organization and exported both productive and prestigious goods to copy. In short, it was a comparative “other” an educated Japanese could, and did, call upon to criticize, change, or confirm his Japanese present.

Chinese models, of course, were never universally admired or accepted. But the breakdown of general Japanese admiration for them came only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries due to the twin pressures of the indigenous National Learning during the late Edo period and the Western impact on many aspects of East Asian life. How then did modern Japanese students of China and its history come to view Japan’s past and present relation to Chinese culture? What did the Chinese past, ancient or recent, have to teach Japanese intent on learning from the West?

In discussing these questions I would like to focus on two pre-war Japanese Sinologists, Kuwabara Jitsuzō and Nakae Ushikichi. Their lives and writings merit our attention if only because they exemplify much of this development of modern Japanese Sinology. Both graduated from Tokyo University, both spent much of their adult life engaged in detailed textual research on China, and both made extensive use of Western scholarship in this research.

Otherwise, they were strikingly different, and it is these differences – in family background, professional career, research interests, views of China and its relation to China, and self-identity as a Japanese – that will concern us here. If Kuwabara's contribution to the academic and institutional growth of pre-war Sinology was unquestionably the greater, the sharply altered circumstances of post-war Japan and its Sinology would lead to a reassessment of these scholars' overall contributions. Nakae's belief that the basic problems of modern China were relevant, even analogous, to those of modern Japan would gain favor from a generation made aware that earlier studies of China had too often denigrated China's past and present so as to honor modern Japan's path to empire.

The contrast between these two scholars may seem too glaring and the judgments too sharp to hold for all pre-war Sinologists in Japan. Such reservations are partly justified, if only because several colleagues of Kuwabara at Kyoto University fall into neither category. But, the choice of Kuwabara and Nakae for this introductory overview of pre-war Japanese Sinology is meant to highlight two radically different traditions in the uses of Sinology in Japan both before and after the war. It will serve, I hope, to provide a reliable context for the later studies that need to be made of the highly learned world of pre-war Japanese Sinology.

In the early Meiji period many Japanese students of China maintained their commitment to Chinese culture. In rejecting the claims of Western learning some considered any compromise as unsuitable, unnecessary or immoral. By the century's end, however, Western scholarly techniques were accommodated, notably in the grafting, after some tension, of Rankean empiricism onto the tradition of Edo textual studies. And by the 1920's and 1930's the earlier generation's professed veneration of Chinese values seemed often to have been muffled by a professional commitment to footnotes, all thought to be "scientific" and "value-free."⁽¹⁾

At Kyoto University the commitment to this type of Sinology was most staunchly advocated by Kuwabara Jitsuzō (1870-1931). "Histori-

cal research," Kuwabara was fond of asserting, "is the ascertainment of facts."⁽²⁾ His scholarship set out to prove it in landmark accounts of Chinese relations with Central Asia, Buddhism, the different historical development of North and South China, and the history of filial piety in China. These studies have yet to receive the attention they deserve from Western historians, perhaps because their author's affection for footnotes surpassed Pelliot's. For instance, he devoted 18 pages of text to a study of P'u Shou-keng, the Sung official of Arab extraction who surrendered Ch'üanchou to the Mongols in 1277, and backed them up with 223 pages of addenda, many of them detailed essays in their own right. This study's explicit avoidance of interpretative analysis, if not its choice of topic, would seem to exemplify Kuwabara's tenet that the "ascertainment of facts" through the scientific method essentially required only a thorough, disengaged examination of historical texts.⁽³⁾ Analytical interpretation and emotional involvement were actively discouraged lest Japanese Sinologists lose the objectivity considered essential for the scientific discovery of facts. Thus were teutonic tomes of Sinology compiled, seemingly unrelated to Japanese doings in China this century.

The scientific study of history, conceived and conducted in so naive and narrow a manner, nonetheless had many uses for Kuwabara. Proud of his ability at mathematics — to him the queen of the sciences — Kuwabara thought such a "scientific method" was his "natural partner."⁽⁴⁾ But he especially appreciated the aid it gave him and his Japanese colleagues in their intense scholarly competition with Western Sinologists. Only by using Western scholarly methods could Japanese Sinologists outdo their French, German, American, and English rivals and win Japanese Sinology and thus Japan the accolades both so richly deserved.⁽⁵⁾ By the 1920s and 1930s most Japanese Sinologists were convinced that their Sinology was foremost in the world, an assessment that was confirmed by some Chinese scholars.⁽⁶⁾

Another use of Western learning for Kuwabara and many other Japanese Sinologists was the impetus it gave to the creation of a new sphere of learning, *Tōyōshi* (Oriental History). In 1894 during the first

Sino-Japanese War Kuwabara's mentor, Naka Michiyo (1851-1908), issued a clarion call for educational reform that his own teacher Fukuzawa Yukichi would have been proud of. To an assembly of teachers ostensibly summoned to discuss curriculum changes for the middle and upper-middle schools Naka proposed that the history of foreign countries be henceforth treated as Western or Oriental (*Tōyō*) history at all levels of education. The focus of *Tōyōshi* would be China but, as a major innovation, Korea as well as the Manchus, Mongols, Khitans, and other northern nomadic tribes would also be studied. The unifying theme would be the rise and fall of all these states, not just China. So unanimously positive was the assembly's response that Naka had Kuwabara write the middle school book for *Tōyōshi*, a text that remained the officially approved work for Japanese middle schoolers from 1898 until the mid-1920s.⁽⁷⁾

In theory, Naka's proposal had much merit. It introduced questions of China's relations with nomadic states and led to many important findings about Chinese, Korean, and Japanese history. Its non-academic message, however, demands our attention. For if our suspicions about the implications of this educational reform for Japan's relations with China are aroused by the timing of Naka's proposal during the first Sino-Japanese War, then they are confirmed by a reading of Kuwabara's text. Kuwabara divides East Asian history into four periods — the rise of the Han race, its superiority in the *Tōyō* area, the flourishing of the Mongol race, and the eastward push of the Europeans. The second period, China's hegemony, ends in the late T'ang, allowing Kuwabara to devote the remaining millenium of Chinese history to Mongols, Manchus, Khitan, and Westerners. Not a word is mentioned of the Sung economic, social, cultural, or political changes, and the Ming and Ch'ing are passed off as culturally and economically stagnant and politically decadent. Kuwabara nonetheless finds a way to end the book in the 1870s with a decidedly upbeat message. He describes, in a very one-sided manner, Japan's involvement in Korea and leaves one with the impression that this step would and should presage Japan's future dealings with the stagnant *Tōyō* and the encroaching West.⁽⁸⁾

“Objective science” had relegated China to an inferior position.

China, or Shina as Japanese came to call it to the displeasure of the Chinese, was stagnant. For centuries if not millenia it had undergone no basic change. It could boast of no science, no technology of note, no logic, no geometry, no democracy, no analytical political thought, and no sense of progress. Viewed through such "Hegelian lenses" and Japanese eyes, China became the symbol of everything superstitious, irrational, and backward that Japan had left behind in its drive to modernize.⁹¹

Such a commitment to progress, of course, implied to these Sinologists no rejection of their imperial past. Shiratori Kurakichi (1865-1942), the founder of modern Sinology at Tokyo University and Kuwabara's teacher there, published seminal studies which marshalled strict logic to demonstrate that Yao and Shun, the ancient Chinese sages, were mythical figures. Yet, he believed without question that the Japanese had descended from the Sun God Amaterasu and that the Japanese imperial line could be traced back to Jimmu Tennō in B.C. 660. Shiratori's pupil, the eminent economic historian of China Katō Shigeshi, would continue the comparison by arguing that Japan could boast of an unbroken imperial line, China of only a rude succession of chaotic dynasties.⁹²

Kuwabara held similar views on these issues, but this agreement did not resolve the dilemma of what China meant personally to him and other scholars of his generation. This problem supposedly did not need to exist, but Kuwabara's newspaper and journal articles in the 1910s and 1920s disclose his usually silent feelings on this issue. He admits that Japan was partly responsible for its troubles with China but reprimands Chinese critics for their one-sided critiques of Japan. In fact, the roots of the problem were certain inherent and inveterate flaws of the Chinese race.⁹³ With the aid of his extensive learning — something that always distinguishes Kuwabara from Cold War warriors and others with a similar penchant for psychoanalyzing a billion people from a foreign study — he charged the Chinese with jealousy, suspicion, impracticality, conservatism, and a fondness for compromise. If China wanted to have peace with Japan, what was needed was Chinese self-reflection and self-

discipline to enable them to see the error of their ways. Like most Japanese fond of this remark, Kuwabara was not optimistic.⁶²

What most pains us today about these charges is not that they were made. Kuwabara could have found many modern Chinese, most notably Lu Hsün, with similarly trenchant views of their countrymen. The source of our pain is rather the inescapable sense that Kuwabara brings to these articles little human concern for the people he has spent his life studying and a shallow historical perspective on why these people acted so. To him these flaws are another set of facts, solid and impregnable; perhaps it is asking too much of him to expect much sympathy for a people he has depersonalized and made "objective."

Ironically, Kuwabara's criticisms of inveterate Chinese characteristics are often triggered by vivid evidence that China and its people were changing. Kuwabara's distaste for Chinese nationalism and revolution was shared by nearly all Japanese Sinologists as they denounced Chinese students and intellectuals for abandoning their traditional values for a hodgepodge of Western slogans.⁶³ But Kuwabara excels in the quality of his rancour. The 1911 Revolution prompts from him a pedantic critique of the revolutionaries' factual errors in their denunciation of the Manchus. Far more explicit was his criticism of student demonstrations against Japan in the May 4th Movement.⁶⁴

But Kuwabara's most notorious anti-Chinese diatribe was his authoritative account of Chinese cannibalism. Prompted by his reading of a newspaper article about some Chinese executed in Petrograd for selling human flesh and probably further provoked by anti-Japanese May 4th demonstrations in China, this fifty page history of cannibalism in China represented the fruit of five years research. The Chinese, he concluded, had practiced this primitive barbarism throughout their history, sometimes even because they were enamoured of the taste of human flesh. Understandably fearing criticism for this research, Kuwabara justifies this objective scholarship with the claim that it provides another view of the Chinese race.⁶⁵ Kuwabara in fact seems to have become so obsessed with this topic that according to his son he would frequently pepper his dining table conversation with talk of Chinese cannibalism.⁶⁶

Opposition to cannibalism and a dislike of jealousy and suspicion do not add up to positive moral statements. For this statement from Kuwabara we have to wait until the final years of his life, when, casting objectivity aside, he wrote his justly famous history of filial piety in China. Unlike Katō Shigeshi who advocated absolute loyalty to the state along lines favored by the fervid nationalist Minota Muneki, Kuwabara preferred a more familial Confucian virtue. Filial piety he defines as one's submission to a superior, to a parent, ruler, or husband: "I think one is not far wrong in saying that the morality of the Orient is this morality of submission which at the same time is the morality of peace."⁶⁷ Worried that filial piety was weakening particularly in China, he concludes with the assertion that the promotion of filial piety is "not only necessary in Oriental countries like Japan and China but good for Western countries as well."⁶⁸ Perhaps we are fortunate that his research was so objective.

After World War II much of this kind of research would be renounced. Hatada Tadashi would label it history without thought and people, recalling how "liberated" he had felt upon leaving the bastion of such Sinology at Tokyo University to enter the Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway.⁶⁹ The great legal historian Niida Noboru would confess to over-immersion in his recomposition of T'ang dynasty laws during the dark years of the 1930's: once, when a Tokyo streetcar conductor asked him at what stop he would get off, he had replied with a quote from the T'ang statutes. In reaction to such academicism, Niida and many other Sinologists after the war would often engage in extended debates, at the heart of which was their common concern over Japan's affliction with social and political problems similar to China's. Niida would argue that Japan was indeed part of the "Orient," as it knew all too well its variety of political oppression. When invited in 1953 to lecture at the palace, he chose to read to the emperor two pieces by Lu Hsün, *Ah Q cheng-chuan* and one concerned with Sino-Japanese friendship, *T'eng-yeh hsien-sheng* — a decision which represented the feelings of a large portion of the post-war generation of Sinologists.⁷⁰

This transformation of values can be traced back to certain pre-war

Japanese Sinologists whose experiences in China had led them to a stance markedly different from that of academic Sinologists like Kuwabara back in Japan. Noteworthy in this small and disparate group of Japanese profoundly opposed to Japanese militarism was Nakae Ushikichi (1889-1942), a scholar of ancient Chinese political thought and the son of the noted Meiji liberal, Nakae Chōmin. Known only to few Sinologists before the war, he became for many post-war Sinologists and intellectuals in Japan a model of serious scholarship and moral commitment.

This commitment was all the more impressive since it did not come easily. During his early years in China Nakae gave every indication of his dependence on and approval of the growing military and diplomatic power of Japan in China. Upon graduation from the Department of Law of Tokyo University in 1914 he started to work in Dairen for the South Manchuria Railway. A month later, however, he secured the far more desirable and lucrative appointment of private secretary to Ariga Nagao, himself a personal secretary to the Chinese prime minister Yüan Shin-k'ai. The next year Nakae chose not to extend his contract with Ariga in order to return to Japan to plea, in vain, for his family's approval of the betrothal to a Japanese geisha he had come to know in Beijing. Upon his return to China, he married this woman and found work as a political commentator for foreign language newspapers in China through his connections with Col. Banzai Rihachirō, the top Japanese adviser to the new Chinese premier Tuan Ch'i-jui.²⁰

Nakae's deep involvement in this network of Sino-Japanese relations was most evident not in his work but in his informal friendship with Ts'ao Ju-lin. After his days as a student lodger in the Nakae home in Tokyo, Ts'ao had returned to Beijing and gained great influence advocating Japan's interests and presenting its latest secret demands to the Chinese government. Ts'ao was not one to forget his friends: it was he, who had recommended Nakae to be the private secretary of Ariga Nagao and who along with two other former residents of the Nakae lodge, Chang Tsung-hsiang and Ting Shih-yüan, welcomed Nakae into the lively political life of Beijing.²¹

With the outbreak of the May 4th Movement in 1919, this easy

world of cosy collaboration came to an end for Japan, and for Nakae. The upsurge of Chinese nationalism in the cities made a pro-Japanese stance increasingly dangerous for any Chinese official. Nakae himself attracted great public attention, when he risked his life and suffered injury in rescuing Ts'ao and Chang, then China's Minister to Japan, from crowds of threatening May 4th student demonstrators in Beijing.²³ But soon afterwards he was to retreat forever from the public eye and what he would later disparage as his years of "license and abandon." Henceforth, he would devote himself fully to research on early Chinese political thought.

This decision, probably the most important in his life, seems to have arisen from personal and political concerns. Already in 1918 Nakae had begun to devote time to scholarly research, and at the start of the following year he recorded his determination to continue such reading.²⁴ If then his wish to become a scholar predated his involvement in the May 4th Movement, his subsequent withdrawal from public life without commenting on this landmark event in modern Chinese history may well be due to certain misgivings he had about Japanese activities in China at that time. Certainly, his silence contrasts sharply with the strident anti-Chinese critiques this movement aroused from Kuwabara and other Sinologists back in Japan. Further suggestions of discontent with Japan's China policy are evident in his purchase and reading at this time of several Western works known for their sharp criticism of Japanese imperialism. In March 1921, for instance, he repeatedly marked off anti-Japanese passages in his copy of T.W. Overlach's, *Foreign Financial Control in China*. In the margin of one page he pencilled the comment that the South Manchuria Railway was "a fine example of capitalism with imperialism at its core."²⁵

Any study of Nakae's political stance at this time is also obliged, due to lack of alternative evidence, to examine the other books he was reading in the early 1920's. Here too we notice an awareness of his increasing alienation from the mores of his native society. This change in consciousness stems perhaps from the growing maturity of an expatriate gifted with an objective eye for judging his countrymen. But

it comes at a time when such perception would have been stimulated if not aroused by his country's involvement in Chinese affairs, and I think it not far from the mark to trace his preference for the seclusion of scholarship to his already bitter distaste for Japanese political machinations in China. He had come to China with his politics untried and his ideals untested. He was to retire with his innocence lost, but ultimately not at the expense of his ideals.

His growing awareness of a critical self is evident in his well-annotated copy of R.M. MacIver's *Community, A Sociological Study*. As an advocate of English liberalism, MacIver argued for the basic divergence of society from community and for the essential inviolability of ethical individualism. These views apparently struck a profound chord of approval from Nakae during his reading of this text in 1925. Passage after passage — more than in any other surviving volume in his collection — is underlined, sometimes with special marks for attention in the adjoining margin. The chapter, "Unity of the Individual Life", received the greatest attention from him, particularly such passages by MacIver as the following:

In a word, it is always "conscience" — or whatever the inner principle of action be called — that is the ultimate court of appeal, even though it err. Because conscience is essentially individual, always, however, clarified, a particular perspective of the universal. . . .

The inward character of ethical action obviously renders possible an opposition between the claim of the State as a whole and the sense of obligation constraining some of its members. . . . On the other hand, it is obvious that cases must arise where the motives inspiring such obedience cease to bear, where particular conceptions of the public good refuse to coincide with the State-conception. . . . perhaps the strongest argument in support of the claim of each to obey his conscience is based on the developing, progressive character of society. As a community advances on its way it must move from one conception of the end to another. But the recognition of the broader, or the altered, end does not come as a revelation to a whole community at once. The way of change is from the smaller to the greater, the recognition moves from a single individual to a whole society. . . . We dare not condemn the adherence to profound conviction of the "passive resister" of the "conscientious objector" of to-day any more

than we condemn the great witness of those who in the past through faith subdued kingdoms.

In realizing the most intimate society, finally in realizing ourselves, we are most realizing humanity.²⁶

Such moral and political concerns were evident from the start in his research on ancient Chinese political thought. This choice of topic, he would later confide, was made a full year before the May 4th Movement, when he read Georg Jellinek's *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, a work that was destined to exert considerable influence on the political thought of constitutional liberals in Japan during the Taishō and early Shōwa periods. In contrast to the logical formalism that made up German (and Japanese) administrative law, Jellinek stressed the historical and evolutionary nature of all political institutions and the necessary role of the individual and social groups in bringing about these changes through their claims on the state and its bureaucracy.²⁷

Nakae's notes on this seminal work of Jellinek show him at times on the lookout for similarities and differences between the European and East Asian political traditions. His subsequent concern with the nature of Chinese imperial power, the urban setting of early Chinese states, the link between politics and religion in ancient China, and the nature of its despotism are all questions that derive from, or at least were stimulated by, his careful reading of this pivotal text in modern Japanese political thought. These concerns also were probably inherited from his father. For Chōmin, despite his preference for the French Enlightenment over English liberalism, shared with Jellinek a concern with the popular basis of public sovereignty in opposition to the legal orthodoxy of their countries' political establishment.

These readings were part of a daily pattern of life Nakae set in the early 1920's and continued right up to his final days in Peking in 1942. Rising at 4 A.M., he would devote the next eight hours to study in the small house Ts'ao Ju-lin loaned him in the backstreets of the busy Tung-tan quarter in eastern Beijing. Since his study was funded first by Ts'ao and the relatively liberal genrō Prince Saionji and later in part by the South Manchuria Railway, Nakae had the afternoon free for leisurely

walks with his beloved dog Huang in the southeastern quarter of the city. Afterwards there would be visitors at home, billiards at the Japan Club, and dinner — in the manner of a Ch'ing dynasty genre sketch — in the evening courtyard with Huang. In his later years he sometimes indulged in long walks across Beijing to its far western reaches, where under the shadow of the city wall he would enjoy the desolate loneliness of T'ai-p'ing Lake. Rarely did he step beyond the border of the wall itself, even to the Western Hills. Never, despite his later reputation as a "China expert," did he explore other areas of China. Beijing, that beehive of a city with walls within walls, would consume and enclose all his daily life for the next twenty years. On only four brief occasions would he return to Japan, the later visits arousing feelings of disgust normally not associated with homecomings.⁶⁸

These decades of scholarship were thus a time of solitude, a physical and emotional expatriation that was doubtless intensified in 1927 by his separation (and later divorce) from his wife for reasons unexplained.⁶⁹ In his letters he repeatedly expresses an affection for the quiet routine of his daily life, pervaded though it is by an inescapable sense of melancholy of the sort one might expect from a monk secluded in his study.

Many conventional Japanese in Beijing not surprisingly considered him their local eccentric, a solipsist who had "gone native."⁷⁰ But, they were ignorant not only of his aims but also of important changes that occurred to Nakae and his scholarship from the mid-1920's on, especially after he became close friends with Suzue Gen'ichi in 1924-25. This highly unusual Japanese who became deeply involved in the Chinese Communist Party in the 1920's and 1930's introduced Nakae to many communists and other "outsiders" formerly alien to his courtyard world.⁷¹ Nakae's Beijing residence soon became a temporary hideout for Sano Manabu, Katayama Sen, Chang Yu-yu, and other communist contacts of Suzue's in flight from warlords and police.⁷² The initiation of his close personal association with Suzue also coincided with a noticeable shift in his reading interests to Marxist writings, beginning with *Das Kapital* in 1926 and Lenin's *On Imperialism* in 1927-28.⁷³ Nakae would never join the Communist party and would regularly cast scorn on

Japanese Marxists for pedantry and hypocrisy. When told that Sano had “converted” (*tenkō*) to the Imperial Way, he answered, “It would have been better if he had died in prison.”⁶⁴ And yet, Katayama recalls Nakae telling him in the 1920’s that if he had returned to Japan, he would have joined the communist party and that his own view of history had changed due to his relationship with Suzue.⁶⁵

In the 1930’s, as his fame as a “China expert” grew by word of mouth, there would come from Japan an increasing flow of visitors — politicians, army men, businessmen, officials, bankers, teachers, writers, critics, religious spokesmen, artisans, students, right-wing chauvinists, left-wing refugees, *sumō* wrestlers, and of course Sinologists. All were anxious to hear his talk on China and Japan, past and present.⁶⁶ Ozaki Hotsumi, the intellectual later executed by the Japanese police for his involvement in the Sorge spy case, would admiringly comment that in his conversation with Nakae he could say things he would never dare say to others, particularly back in Tokyo.⁶⁷ As the war heated up and Nakae finished his final Sinological article in 1935, his life seemed to change. His conversation continued to range from sports to Confucius, but he spoke increasingly of Marx, Hegel, fascism, and communism. His guests became noticeably younger, less Sinological, and often members of the Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway introduced by its head and close friend, Itō Takeo.⁶⁸ In fact, many influential left-wing intellectuals of post-war Japan forged lasting friendships with him in Beijing during these years of increasing Japanese involvement in China.

What these visitors admired was in part Nakae’s political insight, especially his prescience about the outcome of major events. Japan’s forthcoming war with England he forecast in 1931, after the Manchurian Incident.⁶⁹ The coming of another world war he foresaw in 1936, before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.⁷⁰ Later on, after the war broke out full-scale in China and Europe, he spoke of Japan’s inevitable defeat, Hitler’s impending collapse in Russia (while German tanks were besieging Stalingrad), and even China’s central role in world politics during the second half of the twentieth century. His judgments of political leaders were also unconventional and scathing: Hitler, for one, was seen as a

man incapable of making any permanent effect on his time.⁴⁰

But his friends would remember him best for his refusal to conceal his intense dislike of Japanese militarism during the 1930s, a time when such dissent regularly led to torture and a long jail sentence. The Japanese army he castigated as a bunch of *arriviste* country bumpkins raping Japan, China, and their peoples in the manner of the Mongols and the Saracens.⁴¹ Sharp words were also accorded a noted Tokyo professor of law, when he informed Nakae that the Chinese, since they were barbarians regardless of how educated they were, should be extinguished for the sake of "culture."⁴² In 1937 he had the *Asahi Shimbun* journalist, Sugiyama Heisuke, shown unceremoniously to the door for advocating arch-nationalist views.⁴³ And, he urged Ts'ao Ju-lin and Ting Shih-yüan, then the Ambassador to Japan from Manshūkoku, to steer clear of all Japanese entanglements.⁴⁴

Not surprisingly, the Japanese police kept an eye on his mail and his activities. Spies were sent to his house to ferret out more of his treasonous views. A Japanese general in Beijing threateningly accused him of being "a malcontent who lives behind house walls ignoring the Holy War." And, some old friends no longer dropped by.⁴⁵

Such criticism and pressure neither silenced nor subdued Nakae. Right up to his departure from Beijing to die in a Kyushu hospital in 1942, he carried on a frank and moving correspondence on the war with his childhood friend, Corporal Imada Shintarō. In 1937 he urged Imada to oppose any expansion of the war, "lest Japan make Chiang K'ai-shek into another Ming T'ai-tsu," the fourteenth century peasant rebel who drove the Mongols out of China to establish his own despotic dynasty, the Ming.⁴⁶ As the war progressed, and as men increasingly fell at his doorstep to die overnight of starvation, Nakae kept on sending Imada despairing appeals for its end. Imada, by 1941 the head for strategic planning in Japan's push west in North China, seems to have been moved by these letters, and his opposition to Tōjō's China policy would eventually cause his demotion and exile.⁴⁸

Nakae's personal opposition to the war went beyond words to affect his personal activities during the Japanese occupation of Beijing. Small

and defensive though it was, his resistance at this time reveals a remarkable consistency in personal integrity matched by few of his countrymen. He refused to enter the local neighborhood group (*tonarigumi*) set up by the Japanese government of Beijing for mutual surveillance.⁴⁹ He adamantly refused to eat out in restaurants during the war and to rewind his watch to the new Tokyo-time imposed on Beijing by the Japanese.⁵⁰ Others he said should find their own way of giving only superficial compliance to government dictates, while preserving their energy to defend their personal integrity, at whatever cost, on two or three key matters. Such matters, he suggested, might entail refusal to kill a war captive, post notices advocating the "New East Asian Order," and quiet one's own views.⁵¹ In 1939 and 1940 Prince Konoe and Japanese military authorities twice put him to the test: they offered him influential government and academic posts. All of these he flatly rejected.⁵² When invited to lecture on East Asian politics at a government institution along with a noted right-wing nationalist, he ripped the letter into pieces and threw them into a spittoon.⁵³

At this point one senses that the legend of Nakae the dissident may be overtaking the more complex reality of Nakae the man. Reminiscences repeatedly stress the same personal virtues of integrity and compassion, as if they alone made up the man. Rarely is a dissonant note sounded in the chorus of anecdotes devoted to the already settled conviction that this man was uncommonly good. Two-dimensional anecdotes, however, are no substitute for analysis, and we are forced to recall Orwell's wily warning, "Saints should always be judged guilty until they are proved innocent."

To be specific, in reading about Nakae's life in Beijing questions often arise but remain unanswered in the more conventional accounts. What type of Chinese friends did Nakae have other than Ts'ao, Chang, and other supporters of Japanese militarism in North China? What was his attitude to the Chinese Communists, particularly after they had settled in Yen-an? Why was his resistance to Japanese militarism mainly verbal and never aired even in the Chinese press? To what extent did he oppose all forms of Japanese militarism in China? What were the replies

or rejoinders of his visitors, particularly his friends, to his critiques of Japan's China policy in conversation or in correspondence? What were his views on the Pacific War? And, last but not least, to what degree is the view others had of him predetermined by political allegiances and personal ties dating often from mid and late Meiji times when Nakae's father was a powerful voice in anti-government circles?

Until these and similar questions are answered, we cannot claim to have understood Nakae the man. But to stress these doubts and the foibles of Japanese hagiography is to blame him for the faults of his admirers. Despite his father's efforts he was not heir to a great intellectual tradition of political dissent. Vocal public resistance to state policy has had its friends in modern Japan, but its failures have been more notable than its successes. Moreover, rigid doubt forgets too readily the crucial fact that as Japanese intellectual life in the late 1940s emerged from the moral wasteland of the war years, Nakae seemed to stand out for the virtually unrivalled courage and common sense he had manifested in Beijing. On the key issue of his time — Japan's war with China — he was judged candid, critical, and correct, three virtues the post-war generation found wanting in virtually all of its teachers. Thus, although he had been dead for eight years by the time his scholarly writings were first published in 1950, his reputation — and in a deep sense, he himself — survived the war more intact than that of the chorus of leftists who had converted to the rightness of the Imperial Way or the phalanxes of writers who had accepted or celebrated the righteousness of Japan's "China Incident."⁵⁰

Yet, the respect for him from Sinologists after the war was also respect for a certain kind of scholarly commitment he had demonstrated. He had drawn upon political and moral values, coming out of Japan's modern experience, to shape questions and propose answers about the past which he and other scholars could use to find meaning in the present and future. Learning, he said, "is dead — if not poisonous — learning when it suppresses aspirations to deepen our centuries-old sense of humanity."⁵¹ The search for learning, he insisted, was the search for the way (*tao*), a moral quest that involved the scholar in issues of relevance

to the past, present, and future.⁶⁰ What this quest required, in addition to high scholarship, was a sense of humanity, what one scholar of Nakae's father has aptly called "a particularly acute form of moral sensibility . . . , a sensitivity that might even be likened to a moral sense of pain."⁶¹ In scholarship it would function as a heightened moral imagination that helped one to locate key questions and to broaden one's sympathy.

To Nakae's non-Sinological contemporaries the nature and aim of his studies were a mystery. When his communist friend Katayama Sen and his cousin Yoshida Shigeru, then Japanese consul in Tianjin, saw his highly detailed studies of early Chinese thought, such as his essays on the *Classic of Documents* and on the *Kung-yang Commentary*, they expressed amazement that he could study such ancient and useless topics.⁶² And to many scholars today his highly detailed textual scholarship would seem strikingly similar to the fact-laden work of Kuwabara.

His response to such criticism, written in 1934 as a preface to his final Sinological article, is a profession of scholarly moral and political commitment such as is found in the writings of no other pre-war Japanese Sinologist. Its sardonic self-effacement masks an assertion of the explicit relevance of his Sinology to the problems facing the politician Yoshida and the revolutionary Katayama:

How much more so in the⁽⁶³⁾ extraordinary Japan" of today is it that writings such as mine do not play the role of even a scrap of aluminum or a drop of heavy oil. However, it is easy to imagine that when the classics still stood as the "universal learning" in Chinese society, any Chinese who wrote such things as mine would have probably lost his head suddenly for the crime of heresy and heterodoxy. Although my writings are presently viewed as but scraps of wood or strips of bamboo, I am most grateful that I can write to my heart's content.

The academic world of today holds that the student of the Chinese classics should be satisfied if he ends up with a shady plot of rocky soil and little yield and that if he is dissatisfied with this, he should change his field. But so long as he moves a hoe, he can expect at least a small harvest. Such a crop, of course, I would never say could feed the general populace. But writings like mine cannot be considered, in Kant's words, "completely unrelated to the basic nature of man," since they are inevitably the product of the functioning of

a human consciousness. It would be different of course if we could imagine a non-human life, something completely different from what we have experienced up to now. But I promptly assure you that even I, unemployed and lonely as I am, have no time for an interest in work said to be "imagination for the sake of imagination."⁵⁹

Nakae found the link between the past and present in the dominant role of state Confucianism as the political and intellectual orthodoxy of China and Japan. Far from being a dead dogma, Confucianism had so penetrated the worlds of power and learning that it seemed to Nakae to be at the root of the political and social turmoil in his East Asian world. His work thus represents a prolonged examination and ultimately a critique of this Confucian orthodoxy.

To understand this heritage and its modern dilemma demanded detailed textual criticism of the classics. Building on the findings of numerous *k'ao-cheng* scholars of Ch'ing times, he made novel and important findings about the origins, compilation, and use of the *Classic of Documents* and the *Kung-yang Commentary*. For example, whereas Naitō had held that the *Classic of Documents* had been compiled over time by different groups of Confucians anxious to insert their own ideas into their political tradition's oldest text, Nakae found the textual problems far more complex. Instead of these scholars' inserting new chapters *in toto*, they had inserted sections within the various chapters at various times in ancient China for various political reasons.⁶⁰

The understanding of a revised text next demanded analysis and assessment. Nakae thereby attempted to view ancient China as part of world history, comparing it explicitly with Greek, Roman, Aztec, and Mayan civilizations. In addition — and here is where he veers away from many pre-war Sinologists like Kuwabara — he argues that the analysis and assessment of the ancient Chinese political thought can be seen most instructively through a comparison of these texts with the ancient and modern political writings of Western thinkers. Using Morgan, Jellinek, Fraser, Le Bon, Hegel, Weber, Marx, Aristotle, Plato, Madgyar, and many other ancient and modern Western thinkers, he tries to show how and why Chinese civilization differed from and resembled other civilizations.

China, he wrote in 1929, was an Asiatic society. Ever since the clan-

state of the Chou had given way to the imperial autocracy of the Ch'in, the basic structure of Chinese government and society had not altered. Following the lead of the Marxist L. Madgyar he found that the four key features of such a stagnant and Asiatic society were the state's responsibility for construction work; the independence of villages and all other settlements (but for a few big cities) from one another and at times imperial rule; village, local, or central government responsibility for irrigation works needed for agriculture; and the state as the largest landholder in its empire. Only with the arrival of Western capitalists in the nineteenth century, did this system of government and society, according to Nakae, begin to collapse. Even in 1929, he asserts, elements of this system remained strong in villages throughout the empire.⁶⁰

As essentially an intellectual historian, Nakae seeks to locate the philosophical underpinnings of this society, and he finds them in the outcome of the struggle between the Old and New Text Schools of the Han Dynasty. As late as 1950 Nakae's painstakingly detailed study of the transmission of a key New Text School work, the *Kung-yang Commentary* to the *Spring and Autumn Annals*, was judged by a learned acquaintance of his, the noted Kyoto Sinologist Kimura Eiichi, as the foremost examination of a Chinese text in terms of its textual criticism, breadth of knowledge, and depth of interpretation.⁶² Diverging from the continuing consensus of Japanese classical scholars (who still relegate this commentary to a minor status), Nakae takes pains to show the significance of its origins and reception in the late Chou and Han. He finds that originally the principal theme of the *Kung-yang Commentary* was the revival of an idealized kingly way (*ōdō*, *wang-tao*). The true king was to be a sage who regulated human ethics, revered ritual, opposed war, respected moral worthies, appointed them to government positions, and enforced a policy of "the rectification of names." This ideal, which had arisen out of conflicting calls for the veneration of the king and the repulsion of foreigners, did not derive from a specific social order of the past. It looked instead to the future. And, in the Han it would be transformed. Tung Chung-shu in the Former Han read into it the legitimacy of the establishment of the Han order and of the power of the

imperial system. In the Latter Han Ho Hsiu interpreted it even more freely, to glorify the Han order and its rule as the reign of "Heavenly Peace" supposedly predicted by Confucius himself. What had begun as an appeal for moral and social renewal through political revolution ended up as a solid defense of a social order about to collapse.⁶³

Nakae's reliance on the concept of an Asiatic society is disappointing, and his ignorance of Naitō's already published periodization of Chinese history along roughly western lines is surprising from a scholar with so many close contacts with Kyoto Sinologists. Yet, for us to focus on these flaws alone would lead to the neglect of certain key insights and analyses he has contributed to our understanding of the twists and turns of the *Kung-yang's* textual history. Change — change of values and institutions — is his abiding concern, even though we have seen that he accepts the tenets of the "stagnation theory." He is constantly seeking to see how man consciously shapes his thought to handle social and political dilemmas. He stresses the eclectic nature of the sources tapped for the creation of an imperial ideology, and he repeatedly shows the crucial role of both scholars and the state in the interpretation and manipulation of the past for the present. The readers in his tale thus become creators of a living tradition, confirming what we have seen him elsewhere designate as "the product of the functioning of a human consciousness."

The import of these views for any student of modern Japanese politics (as well as Sinology) is obvious, so obvious that one is surprised to see that early commentators on Nakae's scholarship have failed to note this essay's inherent critique of the fate of the Meiji Restoration and its political program. Nakae, it should be added, takes care to point out differences between the original and modern meanings of common terms like *ōdō* and *sonnō jōi*. He certainly does not take the outlandish view that the fate of modern Japan's first century repeats the Chou and Han experience of the Chinese. But the questions he asks, the concerns he demonstrates, and the analysis he richly provides all were bound to raise serious doubts about the wisdom and fate of any Japanese efforts to re-establish a kingly way in China or Japan in this or any other century.

The skepticism his friends encountered in Beijing deeply informed his treatment of the Chinese classics and, by implication, their use in Japan.

Some of Nakae's other views on early China — the nature of the city, the development of a theocracy, the role of a feudal order, and even attitudes to life and death — proved more readily understandable and applicable to pre-war and post-war Sinological studies. For instance, Nakae rejected the facile comparison common then and sometimes even today between the pre-imperial Chinese city and the medieval European city. His stress on the urban and kinship base of early Chinese government, its domination of the market and the four classes as well as the absence of any concept of citizenry or political rights initiated an unending Japanese debate on the nature of the early Chinese city. After the war certain scholars of traditional China at Tokyo University like Nishijima Sadao explored these ideas with brilliant analyses of the city and royal, or imperial, power in early China. But even before the war historians of a different persuasion at Kyoto University admired Nakae's work. Professor Ojima Sukema expressed an expert's appreciation of the importance of Nakae's demanding textual studies,⁶⁰ and the eminent Sinologist Kaizuka Shigeki admitted his astonishment at Nakae's originality and his debt to ideas of Nakae he would later often oppose.⁶¹

Yet, Nakae's work definitely does not assure him of the academic stature of a Naitō, Niida, or even Kanō Naoki. His research, though learned and original, was usually too detailed or too textual to influence greatly the academic discourse of Sinology either before or after the war. His social analysis also relied on concepts which to most students of Chinese history represented precisely the pitfalls that inevitably await the uncritical use of Western thought in research on China. Such an assessment may undervalue the high level of textual analysis in some of his articles, but it enables us to locate the attraction of Nakae to post-war Sinologists. He was thought to have bridged those divides of historical research and humanistic values, of textual criticism and critical commitment, which other scholars like Kuwabara were judged to have ignored or misused. His repeated stress on the key role of "humanité" in social development evoked memories of Confucian-inspired calls for

greater social justice, as professed by his father and house-tutor, Kōtoku Shūsui.⁶⁶ But placed in the broader contexts of East Asian and world history as written by him and some post-war Sinologists this belief in “humanité” was intended to direct others — the politicians, the revolutionaries, and even the Sinologists — to find in the study of China the means to transform themselves and Japanese society.

This moral and political evaluation of Nakae rightly noted that his own assessment of Chinese political thought was profoundly influenced by Marx’s writings. Four times he read through *Das Kapital* with all the textual skills he had devoted to the Confucian classics.⁶⁷ “The head of one who has not read *Das Kapital* is the head of a child,” he was fond of saying,⁶⁸ and his writings on early China, like his analyses of twentieth century politics, reflect his debt to Marxism as “the highest product of man’s thought, since it is the most human.”⁶⁹

Nevertheless, neither Nakae nor his friends ever considered himself a Marxist, and Nakae’s opposition to the authoritarian strains of Confucianism ultimately draws its strength not simply from the liberalism of his father but even more from Hegel and other German idealists.⁷⁰ China and other Asiatic societies, he learned from these writings, were trapped by their own cultural and philosophical heritage, and Japan despite its distinct feudal experience and modernization efforts retained a pervasive Confucian tradition that ensured that it too would suffer a political malaise. In fact, Nakae often remarked that one had no choice but to be a physician to Japan’s illness.⁷¹ Only a transformation of human values — in Japan’s case, through defeat in war — would provide China with the escape it needed.⁷² If Nakae then takes a negative stance towards much of the basic Chinese political tradition, he nonetheless views this culture and its national character not as fixed psychological attributes in the manner of Kuwabara but as human values shaped by history and thus with an inherent potential for change.

Sinology, its values, and its uses also could undergo change. Japanese Sinologists from the late Meiji to the 1940s employed Western critical research methods, first to dethrone Sinophilic Chinese learning, and eventually to define and preserve “East Asian” values. The Central

Kingdom, they learned from their studies, had become the central culture. Deracinated of its foreign origins, this culture readily became the preserve of Japanese national and self-identification. Dehistoricized, it was deemed to possess permanent truths which might be ignored only at the risk of social disorder, a lesson Chinese history itself, be it in the present century or since the Yüan, was thought to signify. Depersonalized, these truths were found in ancient classics detached from their original society. By divorcing Chinese culture from China, from the nation and its people, they persuaded themselves, if not the Chinese, that they were the heirs to that high culture. And yet, the "China problem" so often mentioned in the 1920s and 1930s was found in the mainland alone.

For Nakae and most post-war Sinologists China was no longer the central culture. It had yielded that place in human, and Japanese, history, to the vague but dynamic entity known as the West. Yet, China remained somehow central to their intellectual and moral lives, if only as a problem. Nakae identified that problem in the political values and institutions the two cultures had long shared. His stress on the common dilemmas, on the place of both cultures in world history, and on the impact of political values and institutions in shaping a common heritage would win approval from the post-war generation of scholars despite their greater interest in the economic features of the common past. The history of China, many of these men determined, would henceforth be used to criticize, not flatter, the ways of modern Japan.

Several decades of such criticism have come and gone, and by now its appeal has abated. It retains its staunch spokesmen, some in elevated places, if only because of their stance towards politics and personal relations inside Japan. But its inadequacies are increasingly noticeable, refuted less by scholarly tomes than by China's ongoing volte-faces and Japan's rapid economic growth and resultant self-satisfaction. Japan, it would seem, has more to teach than to learn. Moreover, compared to the shared research agenda of earlier generations, the research of younger Japanese Sinologists shows today greater variety but less focus and innovation in understanding China's relation to their nation's past.

But, if there is any immediate insight we can extract from the writings of Kuwabara and Nakae, it is that this scenario is surely not the end of the story. The state and politics in East Asia, past or present, are not going to wither away. Batches of economic statistics cannot undo the tragic conflicts in modern Sino-Japanese relations. Amnesia about this platitude may prove popular in Japan, especially as the two Japans represented by Kuwabara and Nakae pass away. But the rest of East Asia, particularly what is now being designated "the Confucian cultural sphere," will certainly prove less forgetful. The resulting tension between Japan's self-image and its neighbors' perception of Japan thus promises to keep alive the terms of the Sinological debate about China and Japan we have discussed here. If this continuing argument is informed by new sets of critical and self-critical questions, Sinology then, fortunately or otherwise, will have retained its uses as a thorn in the side of modern Japan.

Footnotes

- (1) Endymion Wilkinson, "Japanese Studies of Chinese History," *Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i*, II, 10 (Nov. 1973): 29-47. A fine brief introduction to modern Japanese Sinology, especially as practiced at Tokyo University, is Kao Ming-shih, "Jih-pen tung-yang shih-hsüeh ti ch'eng-li yu fa-jan," *Shih-huo yüeh-k'an*, fu k'an, 7.10 (Jan. 1978): 493-99. Also, cf. Aoki Tomitarō, *Tōyō gaku no seiritsu to sono hatten* (Tokyo, 1940). I wish to express here my gratitude to Professors Sasagawa Norikatsu, Linda Grove, and William Schipper for their advice on some points in this essay.
- (2) Miyazaki Ichisada. *Chūgoku ni manabu* (Tokyo, 1971): 270. Unlike some of his Kyoto University colleagues, Kuwabara disparaged any sign of infatuation with Chinese culture; as a rule he wrote no Chinese poetry and perhaps no Chinese prose as well (Yoshikawa Kōjiro, et al., ed., *Tōyōgaku no sōshishatachi* (Tokyo, 1976): 236; and, Kuwabara Takeo, *Kuwabara Takeo zenshū* (Tokyo, 1971), IV: 273.
- (3) These works can be found in the *Kuwabara Jitsuzō zenshū* (Tokyo, 1968), I, II, and III (henceforth KJZ).
- (4) Yoshikawa: 228-30. Kuwabara was fond of informing others that his school grades in mathematics had been higher than those of a

- classmate, Hayashi Tsuruichi, who went on to become an eminent Japanese mathematician (Ibid.: 229; Kuwabara Takeo, IV: 480).
- (5) Yoshikawa: 245-6, 252-4. He is said to have accused Pelliot of plagiarism from Japanese research (Ibid.: Ishide Mikinosuke, "Kuwabara sensei no gakufū, sono hoka." KJZ, I, geppo 1:2b).
 - (6) Aoki: 186, 188-89; and, Yoshikawa: 254. The Chinese scholars Liu I-cheng and Miao Feng-lin praised Japanese Sinology in their Nanjing-based journal *Shih-hsüeh tsa-chih*. When Kuwabara read in a Chinese magazine a Chinese scholar's judgment that however much one opposed Japanese imperialism in China, one could not deny the achievements of Shiga Naoya in literature and Kuwabara in historical studies, Kuwabara had his son go out and buy Shiga's collected works. Even though he could not understand Shiga's writings, he ever afterwards paid respect to Shiga's name (Kuwabara Takeo, IV: 483). Cf., also, Donald Keene, "The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Japanese Culture," *Landscapes and Portraits: Appreciations of Japanese Culture* (Palo Alto, 1971): 259-99.
 - (7) KJZ, IV:3, in Naka's preface to this text *Chūto Tōyōshi*; Miyazaki: 267; Hatada: 218; and Katō Shigeshi, *Shina keizaishi no kaitaku* (Tokyo, 1948): 50. To distinguish himself from the *kangakusha* tradition, Kuwabara insisted that his profession was Tōyōshi, not Shinagaku (Miyazaki: 270).
 - (8) *Chūto Tōyōshi*: 270-74, in KJZ, XII. Many other school texts on history were revised at this time. Also, cf., Harry Wray, "China in Japanese Textbooks," in Alvin D. Coox and Hilary Conroy, eds., *China and Japan, A Search for Balance Since World War I* (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1978): 113-31, for a discussion of primary school textbooks dealing with China.
 - (9) Hatada Tadashi, "Nihon ni okeru Tōyōshigaku no dentō," *Rekishizō saikōsei no kadai* (Tokyo, 1966): 217-23; and, Ogura Yoshihiko, *Ware Ryūmon ni ari* (Tokyo, 1974), for a set of stimulating essays on modern Japanese Sinology.
 - (10) Goi Naohiro, *Kindai Nihon to Tōyōshi gaku* (Tokyo, 1976): 97-104, 108-15. Shiratori's own skepticism extended even to the historical validity of the oracle bones and Chinese archeological discoveries (Goi: 104-06); he rarely mentioned Chinese scholars' research in his lectures (Mishima Hajime, *Chūgoku to Nihon* (Tokyo, 1977): 222-23). Katō reveals his views in his essay, "Shina to buke kaikyū," *Shigaku zasshi*, 50 (1939), a highly laudatory assessment of samurai influence in Japanese history.
 - (11) KJZ, I: 85-97. Kuwabara criticized Chinese scholars for being stupid and making no indices (Yoshikawa: 240; Miyazaki: 270).
 - (12) Ibid., I: 97-111, 470-91, 492-504. Similar remarks were made

- by Yoshida Shigeru, then Japanese consul in Tianjin and later MacArthur's pick for Prime Minister (John Dower, *Empire and Aftermath* (Cambridge, Mass., 1979): 179).
- (13) Mishima: 228; Kaizuka Shigeki, "Naitō Konan," *Nihon no shisōka* II (Tokyo, new ed., 1975): 197; and, Katō Shigeshi, *Shinagaku zassō* (Tokyo, 1944): 291-92. Studies of Naitō Konan have been particularly informative on these points, especially Joshua Fogel, *Politics and Sinology: The Case of Naitō Konan (1866-1934)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), and, Tam Yue-him, "An Intellectual's Response to Western Intrusion: Naitō Konan's View of Republican China," in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese, Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions* (Princeton, 1980): 161-83.
- (14) KJZ, I: 11-21, 61-62.
- (15) *Ibid.*, I: 454-59; II: 153-205.
- (16) Yoshikawa: 240.
- (17) Kuwabara Jitsuzō, *Shina ni okeru kōdō* (Tokyo, 1927): 100; and, Mishima: 228.
- (18) Kuwabara, *Shina*: 96, 98, 103. Kuwabara's only son Takeo admits that his decision to study French literature upset his father's wish to turn Sinology into a family tradition. Ironically, as time passed and Takeo forgot his father's talk of Chinese conservatism, cannibalism, and corruption, he became fond of those aspects of Chinese culture, art, and literature his father had scorned. (He even would do research on Nakae Ushikichi's father, Nakae Chōmin.) Takeo's portrait of his father as a warm, unpretentious man, aware that he was something of a country-bumpkin (*yabo*), has an engaging frankness that softens our impression of Kuwabara the scholar; the Kuwabara home life would seem not to have always measured up to the strict standards set in its head's pious work on filial piety (Kuwabara Takeo, IV: 273-82; cf. *Ibid.*, VI: 487, for an amusing anecdote on the father's encounter with a geisha).
- (19) Hatada: 210-11, 216.
- (20) Niida Noboru, *Tōyō to wa nani ka?* (Tokyo, 1968): 6, 234, 324.
- (21) Suzue Gen'ichi, Itō Takeo, and Katō Koretaka, ed., *Nakae Ushikichi shokanshū* (hereafter *Shokanshū*) (Tokyo, 1964): 426-28.
- (22) *Ibid.*: 427-28; Ts'ao Ju-lin, *I-sheng chih hui-i* (Hong Kong, 1966): 31; and, Madeline Chi, "Ts'ao Ju-lin (1876-1966): His Japanese Connections," Iriye: 140-60.
- (23) Ts'ao Ju-lin: 198-99; and, *Shokanshū*: 429.
- (24) *Ibid.*: 428; Sakatani Yoshinao, ed., *Nakae Ushikichi to iu hito* (hereafter *Hito*): 56. Nakae, due to his dislike of publicity, would not be mentioned again in the Japanese press until his death (*Ibid.*: 107).
- (25) T.W. Overlach, *Foreign Financial Control in China* (New York,

1919): 171. Other books with views critical of Japan number 261, 264, 266, and 267 in the official list of Nakae's Western-language book collection. I wish to express my gratitude to the staff at the Jimbun Kagaku Kenkyūjo for letting me examine the books in the Nakae bunko under their care.

- (26) R.M. MacIver, *Community, A Sociological Study* (London, 1924): 324, 326-27, 333.
- (27) *Shokanshū* : 428; Frank O. Miller, *Minobe Tatsukichi, Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan* (Berkeley, Calif., 1965): 9-14, 43-44, 201-02; and, Georg Jellinek, *Allgemeine Staatslehre* (Berlin, 1920): 311-13. This edition of Jellinek's work clearly postdates Nakae's first reading of this text; the present whereabouts of the edition Nakae read in 1918 is unknown to me.
- (28) *Shokanshū* : 58,133,273-74, 429, 432; and Sakatani Yoshinao and Suzuki Tadashi, ed., *Nakae Ushikichi no ningenzō* (hereafter *Ningenzō*) (Tokyo, 3rd ed., 1980): 20, 41. Saionji's support, an extension of his past patronage for Nakae's father, lasted until at least 1934, when he consented to Nakae's use of some of the grant for "social movements" (*shakai undō*), provided Nakae did not divulge Saionji's name. When the 1930s saw the depression close down some of Ts'ao's enterprises, Nakae would rely for financial aid on a unique contract with the Research Bureau of the South Manchuria Railway. Its later head, Itō Takeo, was a close friend of Nakae's, and in 1932 he arranged with Ishimoto Kenji, then the Bureau's manager and formerly a schoolmate of Nakae's, for the Bureau to fund Nakae's research. Nakae agreed on the condition that his sole obligation was to present the Bureau with the fruits of his research on topics of his own choosing. No report, to my knowledge, was ever presented; at least none survives. And as if to assert his independence from this and all other Japanese institutions, he henceforth rejected all salary increases, including those that were his due (*Ibid.*; *Shokanshū* : 20, 220).
- (29) *Ibid.*: 432-33. For some years thereafter Nakae sent 100 yen a month to his wife in Tokyo (*Hito*: 36), presumably until she remarried in the 1930's (*Shokanshū* : 33).
- (30) *Ibid.*: 63, 65, 94; *Ningenzō* : 37; and, *Hito*: 268.
- (31) Etō Shinkichi and Hsu Shu-chen, *Suzue Gen'ichi den, Chūgoku Kakumei ni kaketa ichi Nihonjin* (Tokyo, 1984): 91-92. After an unsettled childhood brought on by his father's bankruptcy flight, and death, Suzue started work as a rickshawman to finance his studies at Meiji University in 1917. In 1919 he quit both job and school to take up a job as a journalist for a Japanese newspaper in Beijing. There he quickly made the acquaintance of Li Ta-chao and

many other early Chinese communists. He secretly participated in their illegal meetings and activities, wrote important pioneering studies in Japanese of the Chinese working class and Sun Yat-sen, and helped to shelter many Chinese and Japanese leftists in flight from the police. Later on, with Nakae's aid he would receive a Ministry of Education study grant and also do research for the South Manchuria Railway. His friendship with Nakae led to an immersion in elite Chinese culture, rare for a Japanese in his time and particularly unusual for one of his political persuasion. He would learn to write T'ang regulated verse, brush literati sketches, become friends with Ch'i Pai-shih, and at times don a scholar's gown. Confined to a Manchurian jail for eight months, he passed his time reading *Chuang-tzu* and other Chinese classics. He would die in Beijing in 1945 shortly before the end of the war (Ibid.; *Shokanshū*: 429-47).

- (32) Ibid.: 431; Nakamura Shintarō, *Sombun kara Ozaki Hotsumi e* (Tokyo, 1975): 137-49; and, *Hito*: 197-200. In 1928 Nakae himself seems to have considered going to Russia (*Shokanshū*: 433).
- (33) Ibid.: 432, and, copy of *On Imperialism* in Nakae bunko.
- (34) *Hito*: 230.
- (35) Etō: 101.
- (36) *Hito*: 26; *Ningenzō*: 34, 82; and, *Shokanshū*: 441. One right-wing acquaintance of his (and a friend of his father's) was Tōyama Mitsuru; at their last meeting Nakae had trouble talking to him (*Ningenzō*: 28-29).
- (37) *Shokanshū*: 284. Ozaki later wrote from jail to his daughter that he greatly respected Nakae (*Hito*: 223).
- (38) *Ningenzō*: 268; *Shokanshū*: 438.
- (39) Ibid.: 434.
- (40) Ibid.: 439.
- (41) Ibid.: 186, 230, 439; *Hito*: 19, 105; and, *Ningenzō*: 33.
- (42) Ibid.: 82, 215.
- (43) Ibid.: 249.
- (44) *Shokanshū*: 439.
- (45) Ibid.: 437-38, 445; and, *Ningenzō*: 80-81. Only the remnant feelings of old friendship kept Nakae from directly expressing his contempt for Chang Tsung-hsiang and his self-serving traitorship (*Shokanshū*: 239-41).
- (46) Ibid.: 202, 443; *Hito*: 225; and, *Ningenzō*: 97.
- (47) *Shokanshū*: 348.
- (48) Ibid.: 162, 439.
- (49) *Ningenzō*: 82.
- (50) Ibid.: 88.

- (51) *Ibid.*; and, *Hito*: 225.
- (52) *Ibid.*: 225; *Ningenzō*: 87; and, *Shokanshū*: 442. Konoe also wanted to meet Nakae to "hear his opinions"; Nakae never replied (*Ningenzō*: 312).
- (53) *Ibid.*: 87. Cf. also, the rude treatment accorded the representative of the education section of the Hsing-ya-yüan who came to Nakae in 1939 to learn his opinion of certain popular music intended to "improve Sino-Japanese friendship" (*Shokanshū*: 157).
- (54) We should also note that Nakae planned to write "A Report to the Japanese People" so critical of the Japanese government that it was bound to land him in jail. But illness interfered and death kept him from this book as well as another he tentatively entitled *History and the Individual* (*Ningenzō*: 313; *Shokanshū*: 442). Moriya Norio says that in 1937-38 Nakae claimed that the Japanese had no choice but to win the war in East Asia if they were to survive as a race (*Hito*: 212). He attributed this belief to Nakae's patriotism. If his recall is accurate, then I would attribute this statement more to Nakae's deep pessimism about the course of war the Japanese government had undertaken than to any patriotic sentiment. Furthermore, the significance of this one expression is very limited in light of the wealth of evidence demonstrating Nakae's strong antagonism to the war.
- (55) *Ningenzō*: 220.
- (56) *Ibid.* In part we are dealing with the issue of *shutaisei* (identity or subjective being), so essential a theme in post-war Japanese historiography (Noriko Kamachi, "Historical Consciousness and Identity: Debate of Japanese China Specialists over American Research Funds," *Journal of Asian Studies*, XXXIV, 4 (Aug. 1975): 993-4).
- (57) Matsumoto Sannosuke, "Nakae Chōmin and Confucianism," in Peter Nosco, ed., *Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture* (Princeton, 1984): 263.
- (58) *Ningenzō*: 27-28.
- (59) Nakae Ushikichi, *Chūgoku kodai seiji shisō* (Tokyo, 1950): 448. This book, reissued in 1975, contains all of Nakae's so far published studies of ancient China. As virtually all of them were printed separately in very limited private editions before the war, very few scholars were acquainted with his research before 1950.
- (60) Nakae: 447-662.
- (61) *Ibid.*: 233-82. This 1930 essay is the sole work of Nakae's published in a journal during his lifetime. For a detailed account of Madgyar's views on Chinese history, cf. Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937* (Berkeley, Calif., 1978): 191-96. As Dirlik shows, Chinese historians generally

paid little attention to Madgyar's and other foreigners' interpretation of China as an "Asiatic society."

- (62) Kimura Eiichi, "Nakae Ushikichi icho, *Chūgoku kodai seiji shisō* ni tsuite," *Tōhō gaku* 19 (1950): 157-66; and, Nakae: 327-444.
 Prof. Ojima Sukema wanted Nakae to submit this study to Kyoto University for its doctorate, but Nakae refused (*Ningenzō*: 307). However, he ended up donating his library to Kyoto University. An interesting account of its safe passage back to Kyoto can be found in Uchida Tomoo, "Wakakihi no honyaku no omoide (5), shi Ojima Sukema no tsuioku to tomo ni," *Sōbun* 274 (1987): 24-29.
- (63) Nakae: 70-115, 126-31.
- (64) *Shokanshū*: 439. Interestingly, Ojima, who was Nakae's main academic Sinological friend, disapproved of the views of his Kyoto University colleague Kuwabara Jitsuzō (Miyazaki: 277).
- (65) *Hito*: 118.
- (66) Matsumoto: *passim*.
- (67) *Shokanshū*: 432, 434, 440-42.
- (68) *Ningenzō*: 236.
- (69) *Ibid.*: 31, 52.
- (70) *Ibid.*: 31, 232-33, 248, 293.
- (71) *Shokanshū*: 440-41.
- (72) *Ningenzō*: 216.