

Kobe, Cars and Korea: Current US-Japan Relations, 1995.

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My title is a tease. What is really on offer is more historical and less topical than merely a discussion of the issues currently bedeviling the Pacific relationship. The justification for looking rather cursorily at the state of play of the political story (Kobe), the economic problems (cars) and the wider regional context (Korea) is two-fold. First, it is patently impossible to compete with CNN and, secondly, gaining evidence that might satisfy an academic audience is likely to prove impossible. All I can attempt is a rapid survey of the present, followed by a lengthier review of the past half century of US-Japan relations, and then finally another quick spurt on the medium-term future of the alliance. The paper is therefore an undrinkable cocktail of one part newspaper headlines, one part conventional history and a dash of astrology. Recalling Eric Hobsbawm's recent warnings in his *Age of Extremes* that contemporary historians are not racing tipsters and that the 'only horse-races they can claim to report and analyse are those already won or lost', the last section breaks all the rules of my trade union.

Defining the present even is probably beyond my professional competence. As I write, the latest edition of the *International Herald Tribune* tells me that the Clinton administration's policies for east Asia have been 'dominated by a coalition of standpatters: macroeconomic policy makers terrified that a vigorous trade policy would spook the financial markets and depress the dollar further, and national security officials convinced that maintaining America's 50-year-old Asian military alliances is the key to defending U.S. national security and burgeoning U.S. economic interests in the region'.¹ Everything, we are encouraged to believe, is wrong. The United States is apparently a paper tiger still living in the mental worlds of the Cold War era; the best forward, therefore, in the unpleasant 1990s is to strengthen American eco-

conomic power and downplay its security posture, which seemingly lacks credibility within the region and at home. For Alan Tonelson at least, 'Asians may doubt America's military credibility, but they still urgently need American capital, technology and, above all, markets. The writer proposes, therefore, 'tightly regulating Asian access to these assets' in order for the United States to gain better 'access to Asian markets and helping to shape Asia's future'.² It is a message that is certain to be heard increasingly on the stump as the Republicans concentrate on regaining the presidency - an office that they firmly believe to be theirs by right.

Yet if the critics risk exaggerating the issues, the defenders of the status quo provide no greater sustenance. Take, for example, a full-page report from the English-language press in Tokyo, which appeared the day before Tonelson's article. Instead of errors, we get nothing but good news. The president of Itochu and the vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan spoke at length on US-Japan collaboration throughout the Asian-Pacific region.³ There was, of course, no mention of the Kobe fiasco, nothing but applause for the security connections, nothing on the Korean problem and great stress on the fact that Clinton administration had successfully reached 10 trade and finance agreements with Japan, but barely a word on the car issue.⁴

In the face of considerable difficulties in 1995 it is the intention of both the Clinton administration and the Murayama coalition cabinet to accentuate the positive. Both sides wish to downplay their specific disagreements by arguing that the overall health of the relationship is not seriously impaired by local problems. Since in the changing international environment, the Japanese government has more to lose in any weakening of the alliance it is, therefore, particularly at pains to stress its reliability as an ally and its willingness to cooperate with Washington - irritants excepted. Unfortunately, the disagreements are more serious than some in Tokyo appear willing to recognize and the greatest danger to the US-Japan relationship is that a continuing series of disputes may over time drain the alliance of its lifeblood. It is

not that any one issue is likely to kill off the partnership but rather that it risks gradually losing its importance through endless, intractable disputes. It is more likely to be death by a thousand cuts than a single, highly publicised fatal crisis. The 1990s will clearly not provide a rerun of 1960.

The Kobe - cars - Korea litany matters because it may have an accumulative effect. The damage is unfortunately harder to measure and harder to correct than a major, mind-concentrating security crisis. Indeed, I have long taken the view that US-Japan relations almost require a periodic clash to remind both sides of their importance to each other. From the beginnings of the US-Japan partnership there have been regular earthquakes that in their aftershock at least have encouraged greater attention and sensitivity on both sides. It is far from clear that the difficulties of the 1990s can be fitted into this earlier crisis: reconciliation cycle. We are not going to get the calm that followed 1960 or the perhaps somewhat complacent academic conclusions of Destler and Sato to the economic frictions of 1977 - 1981 that: 'In the end, things seemed to work themselves out'.⁵

By the summer of 1995 audiences on both sides of the Pacific have come to accept that there will always be political, economic and international disputes between their nations, though whether there would always be a US-Japan alliance was far less widely considered. The last months have seen plenty of acrimony but little willingness to ask if alternatives exist. The most recent Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Bluebook echoed the sentiments of earlier volumes in noting that the intensity of the relationship was bound to cause a degree of friction.⁶ It was as if deterioration could be programmed into the relationship without any particular fears that the mould might ever break.⁷ The danger of overcomplacency provoking critics to call for the scrapping of the relationship was rarely considered.

Standing uncomfortably between the two camps, events from January to June this year ought to have knocked some of the props away from the booster club's position. The damage done by the refusal of Prime Minister Murayama to accept US

offers of immediate assistance in the wake of the Kobe disaster suggests that there is a shallowness to the relationship that stands in contrast to a great deal of the rhetoric. Japanese public opinion has little idea of the illwill that the highly public and extraordinarily shortsighted rejection of overseas aid generated -and continues to do so. Attempts by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to repair the publicity damage were generally unsuccessful, since the arguments that Japan could cope and that foreign medical and rescue teams would only get in the way were hardly borne out by the scenes on television. The fact that the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff happened to be in Tokyo for military discussions when the Kobe earthquake struck and that trained personnel and the necessary helicopters and aircraft carriers were available at short notice only underlines the mishandling of the tragedy. The fact that in the aftermath of the Kobe disaster many observers within Japan were so quick to urge an American-style coordinated emergency service on the government in Tokyo only underlines the omissions of the present and the need to learn from the experiences of others but still, seemingly, through unilateral action.

America and indeed virtually the entire international community was surprised by the determination of the Japanese state - at the national, regional and local levels - to rebuff foreign offers of assistance, civilian and military, first world and third world. Of course, some of these well-meaning gestures from outsiders were inappropriate or irrelevant but to so abruptly and openly reject emergency aid from Japan's closest - indeed only, formal ally - requires explanation.

National sensitivities are obviously part of the answer but perhaps it was also a reflection of Tokyo's views of the limited nature of the entire US-Japan relationship. From its inception in the days of John Foster Dulles and Yoshida Shigeru, Japanese perceptions of the links to the United States have been narrower and less enthusiastic than the professions of friendship and cooperation voiced by successive American administrations and their attendant bureaucracies. National memories of

the extensive and thorough transformation of post-surrender Japan during the occupation years remain quite divorced and the inequalities of the San Francisco peace settlements are easily recalled by Japan when required. (Much as in trade disputes in May 1995, Japanese commentators would invariably tell mass audiences that the United States has been too unfair and too tough on their small nation and editorial writers would invoke yet again the image of Commodore Perry's "black ships" about to cause mischief on an unsuspecting Asian society.)

The conventional Japanese assessment of its obligations to the US is to point to the provision by Tokyo of military bases throughout the archipelago and to stress the considerable financial burden that Japan has underwritten in what is termed its "sympathy budget" to support US facilities from Okinawa - especially Okinawa - to Hokkaido. The relative lack of success that the United States, Britain and Japan's other friends have had in persuading Tokyo to play a larger international role can be seen in the U.S. government's bland description of the 1994 framework agreement with North Korea as having 'the strong support of Japan and South Korea - key allies whose security is directly at stake and who will provide most of the financing for its implementation...'⁸ In language rarely heard from Christopher, he stated bluntly that: 'For many years, the world has known that North Korea had an active nuclear weapons programme. Last fall, this administration ended it.'⁹

An important litmus test for US-Japan relations in the northeast Asian context is the extent of Tokyo's cooperation over US policies towards the Korean peninsula. The evidence to date suggests that successive Japanese governments would much prefer to keep out of the spotlight. The domestic difficulties that would be raised by either or both (i) the imposition of economic sanctions on Pyongyang and (ii) military assistance to American forces in the event of direct confrontation would be immense. The past temptation for the Japanese state to say all the right things but to find reasons for limiting itself to cosmetic acts would surely persist.

When the possibility of economic and financial sanctions last was last aired in 1984 the response from the Japanese sides was highly cautious. The fact that Korean residents in Japan are split into two groups, supporting the North and South Korean states respectively, must act as a barrier of sorts for Tokyo. This, however, is a long established reality and it remains doubtful whether this ought to rule out the sending of any clear signals to North Korea. Yet, hesitation to deny even temporarily the dispatch of foreign exchange to North Korean family members from their relatives in Japan and the apparent limitations on what exactly the Japanese Self Defence Forces could do to assist US military activities suggests that in any future crisis the political problems might resemble earlier confusions over the middle east.

It would, perhaps, be in everyone's interest to clarify the degree of Japanese flexibility towards North Korea. Evidence that some efforts are being made has emerged recently but the imprecision and delays on altering the SDF role in providing refuelling and logistical support to the US military apparently remains an unfortunate fact. Verbal and written assurances, even granted that they can be obtained through US-Japan negotiations, have, of course, to be reassessed in the light of the circumstances prevailing, if and when the US embassy in Tokyo were to approach the Japanese government. This imprecision hardly suggests that the two nations are likely to be in step or even guarantees that they might be in the same battalion.

Concern over Korean developments is far from new. But recently the United States has been able to persuade the Japanese cabinet that an international approach towards supplying North Korea with safer nuclear power facilities is necessary and in that sense Japan is in 1995 far less of an observer and far more of an active participant. The KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) consortium, comprising Japan, the United States and South Korea, is an indication that the Murayama coalition cabinet has been able to act responsibly, despite domestic objections that include the unease of one small party within his government. The agreement assumes that Japanese technological and financial assistance will be forthcoming.

ing to promote greater cooperation on the peninsula and that the gaining of Pyongyang's confidence might lead to the eventual reunification of Korea.

Tokyo would seem to prefer working in a multilateral group than having to take separate action by itself to further multilateral objectives. The "clothing", as it were, of an international grouping probably fits Japan better - or, to be more cynical, it is the least uncomfortable way forward in the light of both North Korean nuclear dangers and the unease of some within Japan to going it alone. Any progress either with its regional partners or independently leads, of course, to the issue of how Japan would then cope with a potentially stronger Korea. It may be optimistic to argue that, 'while historical animosities between Korea and Japan will continue to simmer, the overwhelming need for Japanese capital in underwriting unification may force Koreans to disassociate nationalism and anti-Japaneseism, and elevate this relationship to a mature and less acrimonious level.' Victor Cha of Stanford continues: 'This confluence of factors may therefore prompt Korea to consolidate ties with Japan and view China as the new proximate threat'.¹⁰ Any suspicion of a reunited Korea "leaning" on Tokyo would presumably be avoided strenuously by Japanese diplomats since it would hardly wish to be caught between the PRC and a united Korea. (There are already plenty of academic critics within Japan who fear that Washington is already pressing Tokyo relentlessly to cooperate against North Korea's nuclear capabilities. These individuals would be watching closely for any indications of a further diplomatic "tilting" in northeast Asia.) Unvoiced public concern over the future economic strengths of a united Korea would also tend to reduce any sizable Japanese role in assisting too liberally in what rightly or wrongly is widely perceived to be either a challenge or "threat". Korean economists writing for Western audiences also play on this theme by instinctively reaching for comparisons between their nation and the economic advance of postwar Japan.¹¹

Conclusion

It has become a commonplace to note the domestic problems facing all political entities in the 1990s. The very brief sense of at least relief, if not euphoria, that followed the ending of the Cold War in Europe has been followed by economic and financial dislocation and by no evident clarity in international relations. Within the important context of US-Japan relations we have a situation where both states are conscious of their own domestic failings and yet proclaim a wish simultaneously to revise and improve their partnership to better fit the Washington-Tokyo alliance for newer and wider responsibilities in Asia, and possibly beyond. Two probably contradictory processes appear to be at work: attention to one's own back garden and a fear that without a radical overhaul the US-Japan relationship could decline or even expire. What is missing is not any lack of awareness of the problem but much evidence of concerted political will to actually resuscitate the patient. Japan's efforts to put flesh on its promises seems to me at least to be halfhearted; while the United States' handling of Japan can also be criticised. Both states profess a willingness to act responsibly and to do more cooperatively but the distance from speech to action remains as lengthy as before. A generation ago the US-Japan relationship was said to be clothed in excuses for what had not occurred - either by Japan in failing to reduce its surpluses or increase its security posture or from the United States in failing to improve its economic situation or consult more widely with Tokyo on security matters - today we risk drowning in good intentions. The rhetoric is splendid but the deed is not done.

Revitalization would require inevitably greater vision and supervision from both nations' political elites. There is little likelihood of this occurring until after the next US presidential election and the process of party political realignment has worked itself out in Japan. For the next 18 months to two years we may have to tread water. Perhaps after this interlude there may be greater grounds for hope. For now it is

necessary for those defending the relationship to soak up some punishing blows. Part of the damage will, of course, come from their opponents but part will also be self-inflicted. Remarks by Japanese cabinet ministers on the 'enslavement' of their nation by the United States¹² are already taking place and the 50th anniversary of the ending of the Pacific War is guaranteed to ruffle feathers. There is no escaping critical surveys of the last half century; the view that Washington was too benevolent and caring of Japan will be given a full hearing and the Japanese perception that it is sour grapes from Detroit and the rust belt that explains all of the American charges against Tokyo and Nagoya is everready ammunition for repelling borderers. If only those idle Americans would try a bit harder opinions are never far from the surface at the best of times and are guaranteed to find a receptive audience when the going gets rough.

What is likely to be lacking, unfortunately, is any closely argued, balanced restatement of what has gone right in the past two generations for the Pacific alliance.¹³ Vulnerable leaders are unlikely to jeopardize what reserves of good will they possess at home on the complicated and controversial subject of strengthening ties with what will be bound to be a season of harsh memories and sad newsreels. After the war stories are once again behind us - surely August 1995 will be the final parade for the veterans - and the election season is also over, then perhaps we can start again.

My conclusion then is, once again, to go against the historian's fictitious trade union. The resilience and longevity of the US-Japan relationship should not be seen as a permanent safety net; it could be false comfort to maintain that whatever the trade dispute¹⁴ or security quarrel it will be alright on the night. It may be better to recognize that continuing acrimony plus regional uncertainties suggest reason for caution. The history of the Washington-Tokyo axis should not be interpreted as a crutch. Dangerous times require fresh thinking and more leadership than is presently on display. Political scientists and international historians early in the next century may find themselves debating when it was that the Pacific alliance shifted its ground

for good from private squabbles among friends to public rows among ex-allies. Or to put this in academic terms: how much longer can we afford to wait for the answer to the demand first put by Edwin Reischauer in 1960 and more recently by Gerald Curtis in 1989 - 'Wanted: A Coherent Strategy in US-Japan Relations'? It may be tempting fate to persist with either the old rhetoric or the new silence. To rely on the automatic pilot is to court danger.¹⁵

The political, economic and regional debates presently on the table are far from new. The car question goes back nearly two decades and the security issue to the first days of the alliance in the early 1950s. Indeed the continuities in US-Japan relations are extraordinary, but what appears to be changing in the mid-1990s is the determinations of Washington to press Japan harder to gain outcomes more to the liking of the United States now that the strategic imperatives of the past are less compelling. Unfortunately for the Americans these efforts to wrestle with Japan have not always fully recognized the strength and confidence of Tokyo, even when its political system is in near-confusion and it has to confront the financial troubles of an overvalued currency and a banking system crippled with what is coyly termed "unperforming loans". The alacrity with which some US economic diplomats have approached the car talks suggests that not all of them may have known the bruising, exhausting battles of yesteryear.

For the near and medium terms the alliance will surely continue, despite the frequent mauling - or what sections of the US press like to describe as going "head to head" on the mat. Its long-term future, as in the past, will be conditioned by changes in the power relationships of the Asia-Pacific region. Until there is radical shift, it is difficult yet to see much alteration of the past pattern of US pressure and Japanese concessions. It would take significant evidence of US military retreat from northeast Asia and security threats to Japan from its neighbours, particularly with regard to the PRC and to a lesser extent on the Korean peninsula, to alter the strategic premises of Japanese foreign policy. Only if the US pulled back to the Guam-Hawaii-California

perimeter *and* Japan saw itself facing military challenges that might curtail free passage on the sealanes from the Malacca straits to Yokohama would there be a diplomatic revolution scrapping the US-Japan alliance and prompting substantial Japanese remilitarization through improved offensive capabilities. Neither item is likely for the next decade - what is perhaps more foreseeable is a gradual loosening of ties, while as in the past American and Japanese leaders continue to profess their attachment to the Pacific alliance. What we might have would be an increasingly strained relationship, sufficiently impaired over time to make the final caesura considerably easier to be accepted by both parties, should the circumstances above materialize. The remainder of this decade could be a "softening up" operation for eventual separation. The Kantor - Hashimoto talks would then have an importance to historians that is not necessarily the case if the negotiations are seen largely as spawned by domestic constituencies and having a theatrical soft core that endangers no one in the longterm.

Suggestions on how the relationship might be improved are the regular dividend of academic conference and public symposia. Any very obvious list might begin with perhaps some greater knowledge of the history of the alliance. I have been struck in conversations with US embassy officials in Tokyo this spring how (i) diplomats appear almost eager for a contest with Japan over the automobile case without (ii) any apparent thought on the interminable, wearing clashes of past trade questions. Since a former US embassy negotiator felt privately that there had been only one successful outcome in the year that he had been involved in such market opening measures (pharmaceuticals) I remain sceptical of any satisfactory conclusion. The years of bruising rounds of inconclusive talks looks set to be repeated. The timescale for the automobile negotiations is in itself so lengthy that it is hard to imagine that the United States, Japan or the unfortunate World Trade Organization can anticipate anything but strains.¹⁶ The earliest date for a ruling by the WTO's dispute settlement body (DSB) may be the spring of 1996 and appeals and final judgements could coin-

cide with next autumn's US presidential campaign.

Perhaps the best way forward in cases of economic questions is to limit the negotiations to a manageable area.¹⁷ To debate whether the Japanese keiretsu system is by definition "unfair" and inherently discriminatory may lead nowhere. It should also be noted that the stance of the US side is far from as innocent as some suggest. American newspapers insist that the car market in Japan is closed but European manufacturers have made significant progress recently and would most certainly challenge the blanket claim that 'foreign producers either cannot get into Japan or their prices are kept artificially high'.¹⁸ It is also known that while the US calls for deregulation of the Japanese economy, its diplomats have a substantial interest in trusting that the infamous car inspection system (*shaken*) is maintained, since this permits more foreign-made components to be bought in Japan.

If the record of the last generation over US-Japan trade negotiations might serve as a reminder of the inconclusiveness of the outcomes - one former British ambassador to Tokyo has argued that European (and by extension the USA as well) efforts were needed essentially to prevent even worse disasters for domestic manufacturers - what can be said of the manner in which the talks are held? Again, the obvious conclusion has to be that the more public and frenetic the discussions, the less the likelihood that compromises could be easily obtained. To give one example from this Spring: It serves little purpose for Mr. Hashimoto to joke that 'Mr. Kantor is more scary than my wife when I come home under the influence of alcohol', which led, of course, to equally sour remarks in turn from Mr. Kantor.¹⁹ When the two key trade negotiators have this kind of personal relationship then it is difficult to imagine much prospect for any immediate solution that might satisfy both parties.²⁰ The unfortunate confrontational approach is by now too deeply imbedded into the trade talks by both governments and the respective media of each nation for this to be easily correctable. Although, it might certainly help if newspapers and television reports were less subjective, this again is most unlikely in the near future. The two

publics receive largely opposed greater involvement in UN peacekeeping operations - its disconcerting to discover that virtually the only Japanese in the Balkans is Mr. Akashi and that the war in the region receives only the slightest of attention from the Japanese television networks obsessed as they are with urban terrorism to the exclusion of virtually everything else in the world - and that another Cambodian-style operation could earn Japan the credit that it needs to regain the lost momentum over its campaign for permanent membership of the UN security council.

The most compelling recent assessment of the changes required in Japanese foreign policy to assist its national interest and reassure its neighbours and American ally was made (most bravely) in Tokyo by Robert McNamara in February this year.²¹ His attempts to encourage Japan to consider taking 'its rightful place among the great powers' and at the very least to cooperate more publicly in the region and beyond gained, as Mr. McNamara must have realized, only the mildest of polite applause. The minimalism and immobilism continues. Even to make suggestions that might see Japan offering greater contributions to safeguarding human rights abroad or assisting refugees, where, of course, Mrs. Ogata is very much in the limelight as UNHCR, is unlikely to be regarded as anything but another unwelcome chore.²² The opinion of McNamara and many others that 'the world needs Japan' is likely to remain unheeded other than in the important areas of international trade, finance and the funding of development programmes to what is politely termed the developing world.²³

Adopting a synoptic view of the entire US-Japan relationship in 1995 suggests that (i) the economic disputes, of which the automobile issue is the most pressing, are a continuing reality as long as the trade imbalance remains at or near current levels and portions of the American public and their Congress perceive Japanese markets to be "closed"; and that (ii) the ending of the Cold War's strategic imperatives poses the new danger to the Pacific alliance of political and security issues becoming closely linked to the longstanding economic and financial differences. To prevent any further deterioration it might therefore make sense if (iii) the Japanese

state could be persuaded to more openly demonstrate a sense of international responsibility over issues that are within the provisions of its constitution, have sizable public support and are known to be in areas of proven Japanese competency. This so-called "burden sharing" - it would surely help if a more positive phrase could be found to replace what sounds all too uncomfortably to Japanese ears as something that is destined to be a costly foreign imposition in terms of life and exchequer - might then serve to help prevent any worsening of the trade disputes. What is required is something more substantial than the rather grudging efforts to date by Japan to demonstrate that it can assume regional and global tasks. The present combination of "chequebook diplomacy" but limited human involvement at the governmental, corporate and citizen levels wins few new friends and influences only the already converted.

Obviously the Japanese government alone can determine what is politically acceptable at home when making its international bid. Perhaps at a minimum it ought to consider presentations of the issues under discussion.²⁴ It would be foolhardy to imagine much change in the American view that only managed trade can pry open Japanese markets and the Japanese argument that the culprit is the US government for turning its back on free trade and the American manufacturers for inadequate attention to the Japanese market.

Clearly this continuing hesitancy in foreign policy, coupled with fresh American doubts over its economic dealings with Japan, leaves Tokyo in difficulties. Its ties to the United States form the foundations of its postwar resurgence and any substantial reduction in the value of the security treaty by Washington would have dramatic consequences for Japan and the entire regional picture. To ensure that this prospect can be avoided future Japanese governments in the post-Murayama era must explain, expand and lead. The present indecisiveness in gaining a more dynamic and responsible international role that better reflects its economic strengths can only worsen Japan's standing with those in the United States who are exasperated by Tokyo's

trading behaviour. (There would also have to be major readjustments by the United States to accommodate a more assertive Japan but that for the moment is an issue whose time has not yet come.)

It is certainly premature to start discussing any permanent breakdown in US-Japan ties but it is surely appropriate to ask whether the accumulation of strains may not risk damaging the relationship in such a manner as to leave it increasingly less effective. Even the Pentagon's recent survey of the region could not do much better than admit: 'Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of US security in Asia. We must not allow trade friction to undermine our security alliance, but if public support for the relationship is to be maintained over the long term, progress must continue to be made by both sides in addressing fundamental economic issues'.²⁵ After the trade disputes of 1995, it is certain that new areas of dissatisfaction will appear. The rapidity of Japan's economic rise and the dislocations that this has created for the United States guarantees continuing readjustments. The balancing act between maintaining the close defense ties, while constantly negotiating on the trade front can only become harder. It will prove a formidable challenge into the next century.²⁶ Without more constructive political links it is no longer merely scare-mongering to envisage a "Who Lost Japan?" debate after 2010. Corrective action to forestall such a possibility had better start soon.

Notes

1. Alan Tonelson 'For a Successful Asia Policy, America Needs More Economic Clout', *International Herald Tribune*, 28 April 1995.
2. *Ibid.*
3. 'Two experts look at robust Asia', *The Japan Times*, 27 April 1995.
4. The 'experts' were Minoru Murofushi, president of Itochu, and Glen Fukushima, vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan. A more helpful article by Fukushima is entitled 'Understanding Trade Negotiations', *Tokyo Business Today*, March 1994. It was clearly based on his experiences as the former director for Japanese Affairs, Office of the

United States Trade Representative.

5. I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato, *Coping with US-Japanese Economic Conflicts* (Lexington, Mass.) 1982, p. 271. Among the chapters are examinations of steel, cars, citrus fruit and telecommunications. For Sato's & Destler's latest study see *Beyond the Framework Talks* (Maryland, November 1994).
6. *The Japan Times*, 29 April 1995.
7. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Diplomatic Bluebook, 1992* (Tokyo, 1993), p.28 and p. 226. The ministry could note both 'the importance for Japan of the Japan-US Security Arrangements remains unchanged in spite of the changing international situation' and later that 'public opinion in both countries became more critical of the other'. For a sober assessment of recent developments both bilaterally and within the wider regional context see Japan's Research Institute for Peace and Security, *Asian Security, 1994-95* (London, 1994). The narrow concentration on economic diplomacy throughout the Clinton years was noted and also Japan's 'delayed reconstructing of the economy'.
8. Warren Christopher 'America's Leadership, America's Opportunity', *Foreign Policy* (Spring, 1995).
9. *Ibid.* Christopher took the credit for his nation, while noting that the 'framework safeguards the security of our allies and friends in the region and maintains the vital integrity of the NPT'. For a recent analysis of developments see Kim, Hakjoon, 'North Korea after Kim Il-song and the Future of North-South Korean Relations', *Security Dialogue* (March 1995). The text of the US-DPRK agreement of 21 October 1994 is in the same journal.
10. Victor D. Cha in his review of Aidan Foster-Carter *Korea's Coming Reunification: Another East Asian Superpower?* in *The Journal of Asian Studies*, November, 1994.
11. See, for example, Byung-Nak Song *The Rise of the Korean Economy* (Oxford, 1990). Prof. Sung asks 'Will Korea become another advanced country, like Japan, with a non-Western cultural background?' and notes that because 'Korea's experience has paralleled Japan's in many respects, discussion of the rise and transformation of the Korean economy is often cast in relation to the Japanese case'.
12. The US embassy in Tokyo was careful to avoid adding to the controversy. At the heart of the issue was the extent to which the US administration had encouraged the rapid appreciation of the Yen by permitting the fall of the Dollar and failing to propose any international

- mechanism to stabilize foreign exchange markets. It has been frequently pointed out in recent months that no central bank has the resources to do more than marginally influence dealing rooms.
13. See Buckley *US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 1945-1990* (Cambridge, 1992).
 14. See Buckley 'Japan-Bashing and Japanese Stonewalling: Japan, the United States and the Politics of International Trade, January-July 1985', *Bulletin of the Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan*, No.4, December 1985.
 15. Edwin Reischauer 'The Broken Dialogue with Japan', *Foreign Affairs*, October 1960. Gerald Curtis US-Japan Economic Agenda, February 1989. For a more recent attempt to redefine the US-Japan relationship see James W. Morley 'A New Partnership for a New Age', *IHJ Bulletin*, Tokyo, Spring 1995.
 16. See 'WTO's dispute rules face baptism of fire', *Financial Times*, 12 May 1995. The possible intervention of the European Union into the issue if its interests are seen to be at risk could further delay the outcome.
 17. Those within the US who wish to encourage macroeconomic issues must first be prepared to defend the severe problems that their nation continues to face over its federal deficits, its low savings rates and the dollar: yen exchange rate, before criticizing Japan's lack of consumption, its limited attempts at deregulation and its trade surpluses. See Edward J. Lincoln *Japan: Facing Economic Maturity* (Washington D.C., 1988) and *Japan's New Global Role* (Washington D.C., 1993). Also Stephen D. Krasner 'Japan and the United States: Prospects for Stability in Takashi Inoguchi & Daniel I. Okimoto (eds) *The Political Economy of Japan*, vol 2 (Stanford, CA, 1988).
 18. Robert Kuttner 'Bringing Balance to US-Japan Trade', *International Herald Tribune*, 13-14 May 1995.
 19. See *Asahi Evening News*, 15 May 1995.
 20. The suggestions of Ellen Frost in the late 1980s look largely unrealizable a decade later. Her hopes of 'warm personal ties' at the apex of the relationship are hardly in evidence, the links between US and Japanese private sectors still require strengthening and her 'coalition strategy' is not yet in place. See Ellen L. Frost *For Richer, for Poorer; The New US-Japan Relationship* (Tokyo, 1988), pp.152-163.
 21. See Buckley *IHT*, 20 February 1995.

22. Robert S. McNamara *Japan's Role in Global Policy Research*, 13 February 1995. McNamara proposed that Tokyo be more involved in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, play a bigger role in the World Bank and IMF, assist in the transformation of Russia, eastern Europe and Africa and tackle global environmental issues.
23. Veiled disappointment was expressed by Mr. Akashi over Japanese unwillingness to do more to prepare for future international PKO duties. See Yasushi Akashi 'Lessons from Cambodia', *UN University*, 20 January 1995.
24. Recent research on the media in both the US and Japan has been conducted by the Mansfield Centre at the University of Montana. See commentary on Stanley Budner's work in Bruce Stronach *Beyond the Rising Sun: Nationalism in Contemporary Japan* (Westport, CT, 1995), p.52. Within Japan the Japan-US Center at the International University of Japan has long been monitoring US-Japan reportage. Budner found considerable evidence of Japanese papers turning criticism of Japanese trading behaviour on its head and suggesting that "Japan bashing" was at the root of many unfair attacks.
25. 'US Security Strategy for the East-Asia-Pacific Region', excerpt in *The Daily Yomiuri*, 28 February 1995.
26. See Chalmers Johnson 'History Restarted: Japanese-American Relations at the End of the Century' in Johnson *Japan: Who Governs?* (New York, 1995). For positive assessments of the future direction of the Japanese economy see the essays by Yoshikazu Kano, Yukio Noguchi and Seiichiro Saito in *The Japanese Economy in the 1990s: Problems and Prognoses* (Tokyo, 1993). Japanese assessments tend to be perhaps more equivocal, calling for both a strengthening of the US-Japan alliance and yet searching for regional and global consultative means that might better incorporate all of the main actors within northeast Asia. See Tsuneo Akaha 'Japan's security agenda in the post-cold war era', *The Pacific Review* (Vol. 8, No. 1, 1995). For another somewhat inconclusive essay see Takashi Inoguchi 'Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future' in his *Japan's International Relations* (London, 1991).

(Earlier versions of this paper were given to The Japan Society of London and to the Japan seminar at St. Antony's Oxford.)

神戸・自動車・北朝鮮

<要 約>

ロジャー・バックレイ

この論文は現在の日米関係における諸問題を考察し、悪化しつつある2国間関係を改善する為の提案を試みるものである。

本文では1995年に日米官界同盟が抱える問題（神戸・自動車・北朝鮮）を取り上げ、歴史的枠組の中に位置づけている。

結論として深まりつつある日米間の溝を埋め予想される将来の緊張を緩和する為は今、多大な努力が必要である。