

Contested Models of Democratic Virtues: Towards Global Norms for Universal Citizenship?

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I would like to begin this article by evoking eminent American and former President Woodrow Wilson's words during the formation of the League of Nations. Wilson referred to world peace as "the democratic relationship of states". I will expand on this idea by suggesting that peace also depends on the democratic relationship between individuals, or citizens, within an egalitarian and free society. This article is theoretical: it explores the connection between the principles of democratic governance, and those of global governance, within the broader framework of ethical or normative universalism, from the point of view of contemporary theories of democracy, citizenship and globalisation. I identify three models of democratic citizenship and their associated understandings of democratic virtues, civil society, and pluralism. These are (1) cosmopolitan citizenship, (2) discursive citizenship, and (3) regional citizenship. The cosmopolitan model of citizenship assumes the possibility of an international ethical society, composed of both states and a global civil society. The discursive model of citizenship presupposes a civil society which reflects decision-making and policy-making procedures based on public dialogue and moral deliberation – what the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas calls "communicational ethics". The regional model of citizenship expresses the virtue of collective responsibility through the quest for consensus on certain legal, political and ethical norms, such as the ones contained in international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law. These three models of citizenship, democratic virtues and civil society provide

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an excellent resource to formulate a model of universal citizenship based on a human-centered approach to political belonging and participation. In this article, I further suggest that a normative, universal model of citizenship which finds its roots in democratic wisdom can make a significant contribution to the field of peace and conflict studies. Contemporary democratic theories of citizenship such as the ones discussed here may further elucidate the potential connections between the practice of citizenship, and peace-building and conflict resolution.

1. Cosmopolitan citizenship

Andrew Linklater's approach to cosmopolitan citizenship provides a useful starting point. As Linklater comments, cosmopolitan virtues originate from the two main Western democratic traditions, namely the republican tradition emphasizing solidarity and unity, and the liberal tradition accentuating diversity and individualism.⁽¹⁾ In an attempt to provide a synthesis of these two traditions, Linklater defines democratic citizenship as "the right of political participation, duties to other citizens and the responsibility for the welfare of the community as a whole."⁽²⁾ Linklater thus chooses to include the idea that responsibility for the welfare of the community as a whole constitutes a primary democratic virtue, in addition to the rights of political participation. With the aim of global peace, this definition can be extended to cosmopolitan citizenship, as a descriptive account of international belonging, which contains a prescriptive ethical dimension in its universal claims. In its contemporary form, the cosmopolitan concept of citizenship structures political, social and moral identity around the idea of universal belonging, or belonging to humanity.

Kant first formulated the idea that republican citizenship combines the universal norms of equality, the rule of law, and the freedom of all, and is an integral component of world peace, in his 1795 essay *Towards Perpetual Peace*. In this essay, he says of the Republican constitution, that it "is established, firstly, by principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as persons) secondly, by principles of the dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects) and, thirdly, by the law of their equality (as citizens)."⁽³⁾

This original definition of cosmopolitan citizenship has broadened to include competing liberal and republican accounts of rights-based, versus virtue-based, participatory approaches to citizenship. While the liberal approach to cosmopolitanism emphasizes the importance of human rights and global norms, the virtuous approach to cosmopolitan citizenship takes this claim even further, arguing that the international society is an “ethical” one only when the needs of global justice are met through the vigilance and engagement of individuals in civil society. In this framework, the virtues of solidarity and compassion hold an important place. Indeed republican cosmopolitan altruism suggests that citizens of one country may take upon themselves the burden of addressing issues that do not directly concern them. This notion of cosmopolitan altruism, informed by republican ideas of civic virtue and participation, is at the basis of a global civil society constituted of transnational networks of solidarity and activism.⁽⁴⁾

In both liberal and republican versions of cosmopolitanism, the following idea has clearly emerged with regard to the international society: cosmopolitan citizenship requires that citizens of one country overcome their local attachments to embrace universal moral values, even if the former clash with the latter. Correspondingly, cosmopolitan notions of global civil society typically assume transnational relationships of solidarity. These are structured around interest movements articulating goals of political, social and economic justice through the rules of international law. They are effectively extended beyond the nation state to an international framework of cooperation between citizens of different countries, and beyond traditional loyalties to national and cultural belonging. As Richard Falk suggests, cosmopolitan consciousness spontaneously arises from a transnational militant activism motivated by the awareness of the global realities of injustice and inequity. Falk further argues that today, transnational citizenship operates in the context of a globalized but still politicized world characterized by “beneficiaries and victims, inclusion and exclusion.”⁽⁵⁾ Falk would thus like to see in cosmopolitan citizenship and transnational activism an instrument of contestation as a democratic virtue, since cosmopolitan citizenship is “in its essence, an expression of the spirit of ‘democracy without frontiers’.”⁽⁶⁾

At the time when Kant was writing *Perpetual Peace*, the primary concern of theoreticians was to formulate the collective shift in political consciousness heralded from events such as the French Revolution. In this context, citizenship expressed a new normative framework for individuals and their participation in political society. From being unequal subjects of the sovereign to being republican citizens equal before the law marked an important transition towards the simultaneous experience of rights and responsibility.⁽⁷⁾ Today's transition is comparable in that democratic citizens of national states are now required to assume a new civic, and, arguably, democratic status in a globalized world regulated by international norms and global governance. This should in turn be accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the practice and responsibility of citizens in the ongoing construction of a normative society based on human rights and human security. An inclusive defence of cosmopolitanism such as the one proposed by Andrew Linklater integrates both republican and liberal components of citizenship but remains constructivist in essence. As Linklater has argued elsewhere, cosmopolitanism is both founded on, and further develops, "the recognition of an universal moral dimension."⁽⁸⁾ I would further argue for a pedagogic approach to citizenship, and suggest, as French historian Marcel Gauchet has shown with regard to the construction of the citizen at the time of the French Revolution, that such development calls for the "moral development" of the political subject.⁽⁹⁾

One of the main contributions of the cosmopolitan notion of civil society and citizenship is that it challenges notions of nationalist loyalty, and reconnects democracy with normative solidarity on issues of human security and human rights. By embracing the interests of distant others, a peaceful consciousness of a global community is created which also meets the requirements of social justice. This in turn acknowledges the importance of the need to address structural violence, such as poverty and inequality, and it emphasizes that the role of citizens is to hold their governments accountable in the fulfillment of this requirement, and makes democratic cosmopolitanism an essential component of a model of universal citizenship for peace. An alternative cognitive experience

of civic subjectivity, which includes the active loyalty to abstract moral ideas, can thus become in itself a form of normative civic identity. When citizenship is structured around ethical norms such as the pursuit of equity, human security and well-being, it questions the idea that the connection between democracy and nationalism and/or patriotism is self-evident. In this way, the cosmopolitan model of citizenship can become a model of active engagement with normative learning which complements cosmopolitanism's implicit requirement to overcome national and cultural attachment. In favoring a new kind of experience of universal moral belonging, cosmopolitan citizenship can become a vital component of a concept of universal citizenship for an ethical community which not only prioritizes peaceful norms, but also provides an attractive alternative to substantial attachments such as those to nationalist and/or patriotic values.

II. Discursive citizenship

One of the main challenges directed at cosmopolitanism comes from the communitarian critique of liberalism. This critique suggests that it is "asking too much" of citizens to relinquish their local cultural attachments in favor of cosmopolitan norms and values.⁽¹⁰⁾ As I have just argued however, a cosmopolitan view of citizenship need not be based on such a sacrificial view of identity. The discursive approach to democratic ethics can further contribute to an account of normative citizenship which emphasizes its role in peace-building and relativizes claims around identity. The discursive approach's main contribution to the debate on cosmopolitanism lies in its timely discussion of pluralism. The liberal perspective on pluralism traditionally associated with democratic norms of governance articulates ethical relationships based on tolerance for equal rights and diversity. However, as I will argue, it is only when the inherently political nature of diversity and inequity is acknowledged that the notion of a cosmopolitan democratic engagement which respects difference while at the same time seeking commonality and reciprocity can be realistically addressed. Indeed the liberal idea of a mere celebration of cultural diversity is naïve because it minimizes the complexity of expressions of value in conflictual

contexts involving multiple negotiations around demands for recognition. Yet it is precisely those conflictual contexts around both values and resources that make the practice of a norm-based, universal citizenship relevant for all concerned. Any notion of cosmopolitan, or universal citizenship must therefore include a more realistic relationship to the potentially divisive effects of both cultural diversity and conflicts of values, especially if and when they overlap with conflict over resources.

Amartya Sen writes in his recent book, *The Argumentative Indian*, that “a broader understanding of democracy – going well beyond the freedom of elections and ballots – has emerged powerfully.”⁽¹¹⁾ For Amartya Sen, “public argument”, or “public reasoning” is essential, since “in addition to the fact that open discussions on important public decisions can vastly enhance information about society and about our priorities, they can also provide the opportunity for revising the chosen priorities in response to public discussion.”⁽¹²⁾ Sen’s argument is inspired by the Indian tradition of public argumentation, where “public discussion applies not merely to the public expression of values, but also to the *interactive formation of values*.”⁽¹³⁾ Seyla Benhabib, another theorist in the field of democratic communicational ethics,⁽¹⁴⁾ argues equally powerfully for the constructive practice of discursive citizenship within a pluralist context. Indeed Benhabib’s argument innovates within the transcendental tradition of discursive ethics, in acknowledging the historical and cultural dimension of the citizens which she factors into her analysis. Benhabib refers to the potential participants of moral conversations within the free space of democracies not as abstract, isolated entities, but as situated “in different communities of conversation,” and constituted by “the intersecting axes of interests, projects, and life situations.”⁽¹⁵⁾ Perhaps unwittingly invoking the democratic virtue of solidarity, and invoking a form of civic compassion, she describes the individual as essentially “an embodied, finite, suffering and emotive being”, and refers to the “development of the moral person out of a network of dependencies.”⁽¹⁶⁾

The advantage of this discursive model of citizenship is that it humanizes an otherwise unrealistic model of deliberative ethics in which only highly

competent subjects can participate, as in the Enlightenment model of discursive ethics on which European theorists such as Jürgen Habermas often rely. Benhabib in my view is thus correct in pointing out that culture is a historical product which is in constant flux and the result of complex interactions with other cultures. I would also agree with her contention that while cultural identity potentially fragments, it also enriches the abstract democratic individual by recognizing the multiple origins of the self and the multi-layered nature of democratic existence. Benhabib recognizes, correctly in my view, that culture is not an abstract entity but is continually redefined collectively through citizens who are claiming their democratic rights. Finally, Benhabib's contention that discursive ethics constitute a "pragmatic imperative to understand each other and to enter into a cross-cultural dialogue"⁽¹⁷⁾ is promising. Indeed this expresses a view of virtuous and even compassionate citizenship in which citizens actively display their "capacity for representative thinking and exercise of contextual judgment, by actually listening to all involved or by representing to [themselves] imaginatively the many perspectives of those involved."⁽¹⁸⁾ However, Benhabib's idea of discursive democratic ethics remains idealistic. Her idea of a moral conversation is regulated by dutiful citizens who actively participate in global dialogues on common ethical norms, without encountering any conflict. Benhabib thus rather optimistically argues for "a pluralistically enlightened ethical universalism on a global scale."⁽¹⁹⁾

In pluralist democracies, citizens learn to relate to their own internal moral conflicts as they emerge from their encounter with difference. Citizens need compassionate skills for the establishment of reconciliation processes in the context of radical difference. This confrontational experience necessarily constitutes a new moment in the conception of the requirement of citizens to engage with difference. Deliberative ethics can be construed not only as a pragmatic imperative, but as a practical antidote to violence, when the requirement for the engagement in rational discourse and moral dialogue about contested values is supplemented with the *intention* to find common ground. Processes of conflict resolution in this way provide a substantive alternative to

isolation and confrontational postures between clearly defined identities. Such pragmatic skills are grounded in the ethical requirement to resolve conflict, find common ground, and achieve peace, yet they go beyond transcendental accounts of rationality and moral conversations in theoretical accounts of the confrontation with cultural differences. They recognize that conflict is not just an inevitable, but also a vital part of the life of pluralist democracies as well as the condition for their ongoing renewal.

In an interdependent world, we are all engaged in processes of interpretation of different cultures, traditions, systems of knowledge, social modes of being, and ways of life – these are the cultural hermeneutics to which Benhabib refers. I would further argue that the universal capacity of individuals to claim their political, social, economic and even cultural rights, rather than merely transcending cultural difference, or naively celebrating it, empowers members of communities to question and negotiate the more constraining aspects of culture, thus reconnecting them to broader issues of social justice and uniting them on different grounds. By accepting differing views about cultural heritage, and making critical discussion about cultural heritage public, conflict is recognized as originating in contested interpretations of culture, and the impediment that culture sometimes poses to the quest for both justice and consensus is recognized. Cultural and social hermeneutics are the foundation of a civic consciousness which understands the role of conflict, yet also acknowledges the need to move towards the synthesis of identities. This type of hermeneutics also enshrines the democratic requirement for all to actively participate in public processes of conflict resolution around inherited values, their interpretation, and their application to everyday problems.

III. European citizenship

The European Community was originally conceived after the second World War as an economic path to peaceful integration. Today, division and conflict in Europe often stem from the complex consequences of economic development and globalisation, for example in the structural inequalities induced by migration

flows and their generational consequences. What can we learn from the regional conception of citizenship to further develop the normative component of universal citizenship? Etienne Balibar, a French political philosopher, argues for a view of European citizenship which challenges the association of citizenship with national belonging, and integrates it instead to a post-national civic framework. Balibar points out the difficulties of creating a European citizenship, as democratic citizenship in Europe is still very much tied to an ideological heritage which sees in citizenship the expression *par excellence* of a nationalist and ethnic conception of political identity. In contrast, Balibar suggests the democratization of Europe should promote a new form of political consciousness and social solidarity which primarily relies on the recognition of international human rights and refugee law. In other words, for a European citizenship to exist, a unified normative conception of the European people based on the collective defence of human rights must underpin it. A regional model of normative citizenship is specifically designed to implement principles of social justice based on the universal moral imperative of human rights. This must include the recognition of the essential interdependence between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic and social rights, on the other. Such a conception of citizenship requires that a core component of European citizenship be the universal applicability – including to asylum seekers and migrants – of principles of human rights and social justice, in return for the recognition of the rights and entitlements of established Europeans.⁽²⁰⁾

To underscore his argument, Balibar elaborates on the notion of pluralism, arguing that the recognition of pluralism and diversity paradoxically calls for the restoration of a new ethical imperative within political and economic development.⁽²¹⁾ In this view, pluralist ethics must be revised from a perspective which prioritizes the quest for peace through the reduction of violence and the elaboration of complex norms of civility to counteract the politics of identity. For Balibar as for Benhabib, identity is not a product, or a package, but an ambiguous process of multiple identifications. However Balibar, unlike Benhabib, is of the opinion that some form of violence always accompanies the

constitution of identity in a context of radical difference. Balibar thus readily acknowledges the violence of identities, which Benhabib idealistically fails to do. Balibar's corresponding view of civil society is best encapsulated by his notion of civility, which, as in Linklater's post-Marxist interpretation of "moral development", is elaborated from a careful rereading of Marxist writings.⁽²²⁾ This conception stems from the acknowledgement of the new shapes of conflict structured through complex and inevitable processes of globalisation such as migration. Civility addresses the new constraints placed on the pursuit of human rights by renewed conflicts of identity and values leading to irrational violence, as "a way of characterizing the politics which takes as its object the very violence of identities."⁽²³⁾ Civility, for Balibar, is simply the establishment of a principle of radical non-violence within a pluralist context.

Civility is similar to other classical political virtues such as tolerance or harmony. However, it specifically innovates within the contemporary context of alleged clashes of values and ways of life. Two crucial components of civility emerge for the purpose of a normative conception of a universal citizenship for peace. First, the concept of civility places limits on the internal excesses that emerge from the politics of both autonomy and identity. If identity has fragmented social bonds of solidarity, the aim of civility is to unify under a common purpose and social project. Thus, civility is best expressed in the affirmation of the importance of international law and standard setting for the expression of areas of common interest for humanity. Secondly, and most importantly, the primary goal of civility is to *delegitimize violence*. Civility in this way extends the mere expression of a virtue to become a radical ethical principle. It asserts the civic responsibility of individuals and of groups to limit the violent consequences of the assertion of identity. Thirdly, civility asserts the *historicity* of violence against its universality or inevitability. The aim of public debate on human rights norms is thus to "create[s] a public space ... and enable[s] violence itself to be historicised."⁽²⁴⁾ To summarize, while identity is reinforced through exclusion, civility affirms the fundamental universal principles of encounter and inclusion, establishing a new type of civil space

which acknowledges, historicizes, and delegitimizes violence.

Ultimately, civility also calls for an ethical response to some of the consequences of political action, by enshrining a universal political responsibility to prevent violence. Indeed, civility must prioritize the *mediation* rather than the assertion of identities and conflicting values. Civility as radical nonviolence thus successfully combines with communicational ethics and cosmopolitan belonging to generate a universal understanding of citizenship. This in turn can be integrated into a behavioral model of individual and communal action, for the benefit of a variety of peace making, conflict prevention, and peace building processes.⁽²⁵⁾ As a set of ethical standards, the public norms of civility may be integrated into various public, political and institutional discourses and practices in which both government and civil society agencies operate and coordinate their efforts for peace. Furthermore, as a philosophical model for the mediation between historically conceived identities, civility provides an invaluable philosophical and practical model for the pre-emption of the escalation of conflict, notably by affirming the priority of the more lengthy, and profoundly historical processes of conflict resolution, over the recourse to violence. The expression of civility through a practical concept of global citizenship and responsibility can also be applied to peace-making processes such as diplomacy, treaty making and conflict mediation. Finally, civility may also form the basic principles of peace restoration/peace enforcement processes. Indeed, in a post-colonial environment in which identities play an important role, critical awareness of both the power and historicity of identity is crucial.

Conclusion

The idea of global or universal citizenship can be further enhanced by integrating and building on some crucial elements of various models of democratic civic virtues. The different pragmatic and moral imperatives of citizenship discussed above all concur in the requirement for an ongoing renewal of a public sphere constituted by public norms. I have further argued that the prioritizing of civic norms and virtues for the resolution of conflict

and the promotion of sustainable concepts of peace is needed to supplement a contemporary understanding of democratic citizenship. To be truly oriented towards comprehensive peace-building, universal norms must initially be developed within a context that acknowledges two types of pluralism, namely, (1) the pluralism of cultures, histories, civilizations, and values, and (2) the pluralism of socio-economic conditions, including social inequalities. The goal of universal citizenship thus becomes the achievement of a multi-dimensional or “positive” socio-economic, cultural and political view of peace expressed in the recognition of the importance of international normative frameworks such as international law, diplomacy, and cooperation, as well as the democratic role of civil society in its demands for peace, development and justice.

Correspondingly, a common public and civic space must be conceived as a space of responsibility, humility, rationality, and moderation in order to achieve the following goals of sustainable peace. These goals are 1) to continue to delegitimize violence in all its forms, including state based, 2) to continue to assume, assert and practice the idea that shared norms on a planetary scale for a positive concept of peace is possible, 3) to actively pursue public dialogue for the preservation *and* the expansion of the consensus on universal norms including notions of human rights, human development and human security, and 4) to further develop the notion of collective responsibility to protect those who are the most vulnerable within the international community.⁽²⁶⁾ These norms continue to be debated by an enlightened and empowered citizenry which recognizes its rights to freedom, justice and equality, but also believes in its responsibility to defend, uphold and practice those values. A model of universal citizenship can become the underlying framework for all national citizenships and the means to the peaceful integration of nations, cultures and civilizations in a truly global ethical society articulated around the priority of peace, human security and human rights.

Notes

- (1) Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community. Ethical Foundations for a Post-Westphalian Era* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), 206-207. See also Andrew Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship," in Kimberley Hutchings and Roland Dannreuther, eds., *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 35-59.
- (2) See Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism. Critical Theory and International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 6.
- (3) Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch*, 1795, Section II, "Containing the Definitive Articles for Perpetual Peace Among States", First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace, "The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican".
- (4) See Richard A. Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship" in *Global Visions. Beyond the New World Order*, (Montreal/New York/London: Black Rose Books, 1993) 40. Richard Falk's main ideas about global citizenship were developed in his "The Making of Global Citizenship," in Jeremy Brecher, John Brown Childs, and Jill Cutler, eds., *Global Visions. Beyond the New World Order* (Montreal/New York/London: Black Rose Books, 1993), 39-50; *Explorations at the Edge of Time: The Prospects for World Order* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992); and in *Human Rights Horizons. The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World* (London/New York: Routledge, 2000).
- (5) See Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship" in *Global Visions. Beyond the New World Order*, 40.
- (6) Falk, "The Making of Global Citizenship", 40.
- (7) See Marcel Gauchet, *La Révolution des droits de l'homme* (Paris: PUF, 1989).
- (8) Andrew Linklater, *Beyond Realism and Marxism*, 7. Linklater is referring in this context to "the significance of moral development" to explain "the main advances in the evolution of universal moral norms."
- (9) See Marcel Gauchet, *La Révolution des droits de l'homme*.
- (10) See for instance the section "Critiques of cosmopolitanism and global citizenship," in April Carter, *The Political Theory of Global Citizenship* (London: Routledge, 2001), 167-170. See also Martha Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," in Martha C. Nussbaum *et al.*, Joshua Cohen, ed., *For Love of Country* (Boston: Beacon Press 1996), 3-17.
- (11) Amartya Sen, *The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History, Culture and Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 2005), 14.
- (12) Sen, *The Argumentative Indian*, 14.
- (13) Sen, *The Argumentative Indian*, 14.
- (14) See for instance Jürgen Habermas, "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification," in Benhabib and Dallmayr (eds), *The Communicative Ethics Controversy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), 60-110, and Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib (eds), *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

- (15) See Seyla Benhabib, "Afterword", in *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*, 356. See also Seyla Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture. Equality and Diversity in the Global Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
- (16) See Benhabib, *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*, 356.
- (17) Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, 36.
- (18) Benhabib, *The Communicative Ethics Controversy*, 363.
- (19) Benhabib, *The Claims of Culture*, 33.
- (20) See Etienne Balibar, *We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship*, trans. James Swenson (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). See also Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, nation, classe. Les identités ambiguës* (Paris: La Découverte, 1997). The English version is Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, (London/New York: Verso, 1992)
- (21) See Etienne Balibar, *Politics of the Other Scene* (London/New York: Verso, 2002), 31.
- (22) For a detailed explanation of post-Marxist thinking in contemporary French political philosophy, and in Balibar in particular, see Geneviève Souillac, *Human Rights in Crisis. The Sacred and the Secular in Contemporary French Thought* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Press, 2005).
- (23) Balibar, *Politics of the Other Scene*, 23.
- (24) Balibar, *Politics of the Other Scene*, 29-30.
- (25) See Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds), *Peacebuilding as Politics. Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2001).
- (26) See the groundbreaking report *The Responsibility to Protect*, Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001.

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<Summary>

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This article explores the relationship between democratic governance and global governance from the point of view of universal citizenship. Three models of democratic citizenship and their associated understandings of democratic virtues are discussed with a view to formulating an approach to citizenship which incorporates the requirements of conflict resolution, non violence, and peace building. Notions of civil society, pluralism, dialogue and responsibility are analyzed in the three models of (1) cosmopolitan citizenship, (2) discursive citizenship, and (3) regional citizenship. The cosmopolitan model of citizenship assumes the possibility of an international ethical society composed not only of states but also of a participatory civil society. The discursive model of citizenship presupposes a civil society in which decision-making and policy-making procedures are derived from public dialogue and moral deliberation. The regional model of citizenship expresses the virtue of collective responsibility and the quest for consensus on legal, political and ethical norms, such as the ones contained in international human rights law, international refugee law, and international humanitarian law. The three models of citizenship, with their respective accounts of democratic virtues and of civil society, provide the basis from which to formulate a model of universal citizenship with a human-centered approach to political belonging and participation.

The article argues that a normative model of citizenship with roots in

democratic wisdom can make a significant contribution to the field of peace and conflict studies. Contemporary democratic theories of citizenship elucidate the potential connections between the practice of citizenship, peace-building and conflict resolution. Conversely, the prioritization of civic norms and virtues for the resolution of conflict and the promotion of sustainable concepts of peace supplements a contemporary understanding of democratic citizenship. The goal of universal citizenship is the achievement of a multi-dimensional or “positive” socio-economic, cultural and political view of peace expressed in the recognition of the importance of international normative frameworks such as international law, diplomacy, and cooperation, as well as of civil society and its demands for peace, development, and justice. The moral imperatives of citizenship discussed in this article concur in the requirement for an ongoing renewal of a public sphere constituted by public norms. To be truly oriented towards comprehensive peace-building however, universal norms must be developed within a context that acknowledges both the pluralism of cultures, histories, civilizations, and values, and the pluralism of socio-economic conditions, including social inequalities. Most importantly, the article suggests that a democratically conceived public and civic space must aim towards the achievement of the following goals of sustainable peace: 1) to continue to delegitimize violence in all its forms, including state based, 2) to continue to assume, assert and practice the idea that shared norms on a planetary scale for a positive concept of peace is possible, 3) to actively pursue public dialogue for the preservation and the expansion of the consensus on universal norms including notions of human rights, human development and human security, and 4) to further develop the notion of collective responsibility to protect those who are the most vulnerable within the international community. In this way, universal citizenship becomes the underlying framework for all national citizenships and the means to the peaceful integration of nations, cultures and civilizations in a truly global ethical society articulated around the priority of human security and human rights.