

Estimating Legislative Effectiveness in Nigeria¹

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Abstract

The study estimates the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria using the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) approach proposed by Volden and Wiseman. The study deviates from the often controversial issue of astronomical remuneration of the legislators' - to assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of the individual legislators. The findings show that on average, legislators with experience sponsored approximately 2.58 bills per head in the reviewed period, while those without legislative experience sponsored approximately 2.32 bills per head. This supports the views in the literature that longer serving members of the legislature tend to be more effective. Also, the LES ranking showed that out of the top 10 senators, eight were of the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) while two were of the now defunct All Nigeria's Peoples Party. This also supports the unanimous findings in the literature that members of the dominant party tend to be more successful than members of the minority or opposition parties. With respect to individual senators effectiveness, Senator Victor Ndoma Egba, with legislative experience, and of the ruling PDP, was the most effective senator in the period reviewed.

Keywords: Legislature, Legislative Effectiveness, Bill, Score

1. Introduction

Since Nigeria returned to democratic system of government in 1999 after years of military rule, the operations of the legislature have often been in the spotlight for various reasons. Expectedly, the question of the cost of maintaining the two chambers of the National Assembly where there are 109 Senators and 360 House of Representatives members has often overshadowed other pertinent issues such as the assessment of the effectiveness of the legislators. Specifically, the perceived high remuneration of the Nigerian lawmakers which is believed to be enormous even when compared to the earnings of lawmakers in advanced democracies is often a matter of debate.

However, this study deviates from this path and focuses on providing an insight into the performance of the legislature. Particularly, the emphasis is to examine the effectiveness of the individual legislators with a view to shedding light on their ability to provide appropriate representation for their respective constituencies. Following from this objective, the sole research question that this study seeks to answer is - *How effective are Nigerian legislators?*

The remaining part of this study proceeds as follows: section two explains some legislative theories as well as some empirical results. Section three explains the methodology of this study while section four presents its results. Section five summarizes and concludes the study.

2. Legislative Theories and Empirical Evidence

2.1 Legislative Theories

A number of theories have been put forward in explaining the operations of the legislature. These include the synoptic policy-phases theory, the agenda building theory, elite ideology theory, bureau-political theory, positive political theory, informational (chamber-dominated) theory, distributive committee theory and party-dominated committee theory. These theories are explained briefly with the goal of using them as a basis for providing an insight into the research question that this study aims to answer.

The procedure of lawmaking according to the *synoptic policy-phases theory* is one of a well-ordered and well-directed process of decision-making that gives direction to a country under the sponsorship of political bodies. Conversely, the proposition of the *agenda building theory* is that the process of lawmaking is not a well-organized and direct process, but rather as the outcome of a societal process in which different parties with different ideas and interests clash. In particular, the agenda-building theory clarifies that lawmaking is a long and complex transformation-process upon which many different actors and factors can have an impact. The *elite*

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ideology theory postulates that in most developing countries political elites try to transform their less developed societies through new ambitious legislations drafted without people's participation. However, due to conflicting interests among the elite politicians, there are usually conflicts and stagnation in the legislative process.

The *bureau-political theory* conceives lawmaking as a struggle between different sections (bureaus) within the government. For example, conflicts between developmental goals of economic growth and environmental protection may reflect in competition between the responsible ministries. The *positive political theory* describes law-making as a bargaining process where legislators negotiate with one another in order to facilitate their individual goals. To accomplish their aims, legislators often act within coalitions, thus the theory emphasizes the structure of legislative decision-making, the building of legislative coalitions and the strategies of legislative communication of statutory meaning.

The *informational (chamber-dominated) theory* emphasizes the role of committees in the legislative process. Because the parent chamber depends on its committees to research about the potential impact of a particular legislation, information theorists conclude that the parent chamber has good grounds to make committees with a distribution of preferences similar to its own. The *distributive committee theory* holds that legislators self-select themselves into committees where the committee jurisdiction coincides with their constituency preferences. In this way, a legislator's primary interest lies within the issues handled by the committees to which he belongs. For example, members from rural areas may tend to join an agriculture related committee. The *party-dominated committee theory* holds that legislative power lies with the political parties which inform and constrain committee members' decisions through the party leadership. Therefore, a party's delegation on committees will be representative of its delegation in the parent chamber so as to enhance the collective control of power by the party.

2.2 Empirical Evidence

Following the review of legislative theories in the previous section, this part of the study provides some empirical evidence on legislative effectiveness. The goal here is twofold: First, reviewing previous studies will provide the source for the methodology used in assessing the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria. Second, reviewing previous studies will provide the basis for comparing the results in this study with findings from other studies.

The unanimous view in the literature on legislative effectiveness is that the effectiveness of a legislator may be measured in different ways, including but not limited to the number of bills sponsored by the legislator, whether the bills see any action, whether the bills are reported from committee, whether they pass the chamber, the proportion of the bills sponsored that succeed, and whether bills sponsored by different members possessing similar characteristics are more likely to succeed.

These indicators of measuring the effectiveness of legislators have been examined by different studies. Cox and McCubbins (1993) posit that bills sponsored by mainstream legislators are more likely to be successful either because the sponsor's ideology sends a signal that a proposal reflects the preferences of the entire legislature or party median. The study also highlights that the role of the sponsor's ideology may differ depending on the stage of the bill because parties play a central role in setting the floor agenda. This position lends credence to the *party-dominated committee theory* which holds that legislative power lies with the political parties. The study by Hall (1996) highlights that committee leaders tend to possess attributes and resources that contribute to their effectiveness in crafting and advancing policy proposals that are more likely to win the support of other legislators. This supports the *informational (chamber-dominated) theory* which stresses the role of committees in the legislative process. The importance of co-sponsoring of bills was examined by Wilson and Young (1997), arguing that the number of co-sponsors is one indicator of legislative effectiveness and that a long list of cosponsors is a clear indication that a bill has broad support across ideological and/or partisan lines. This view is closely linked with the *positive political theory* of legislature which sees law-making as a bargaining process where legislators bargain and form coalitions in order to facilitate their individual goals.

The issue of longevity was stressed by Wawro (2000), stressing that longer serving members possess better information about the preferences and priorities of other members as well as better understanding of the legislative operations. Therefore, these should make them more effective. Also, the study argued that greater electoral pressures may suggest that junior members may be unusually active and possibly more success on matters of particular relevance to their constituencies. The study by Adler and Wilkerson (2005) emphasized the importance of bill contents and therefore suggested that bills be distinguished by their scope and urgency of required action. On his part, Krutz (2005) explained why some members' bills are more likely to progress

through the legislative process than those of others, with members of the majority party tending to be more successful. Adler *et al.* (2005) noted that bills sponsored by legislators who are deemed to be experts in an issue area, whether by virtue of their roles as committee members, their seniority, and/or their prior profession, should be more successful. In ranking members of the US House of Representatives in terms of their effectiveness at moving bills, Volden and Wiseman (2009) categorized bills into commemorative/symbolic bill, (C), substantive bill (S) and substantively significant (SS) bill and calculated the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES). They argued and showed that at the foundations of legislative effectiveness are the three concepts of innate ability, acquired skill, and institutional positioning. Specifically, their results show high effectiveness of majority party members, women, and committee chairs.

3. Methodology

To examine the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria, our starting point is to rely on the proposition of the agenda-building theory which says that the legislative process is a long and complex process upon which many different actors and factors can have an impact. Therefore, we measure the effectiveness of Nigerian legislators in terms of how individually, they are able to introduce bills and push such bills through the complex legislative process of the Nigerian parliament.

Specifically, we focus on the performance of senators between 2007 and 2008 for the simple reason that the early years of the return to democracy, that is the 4th National Assembly (1999-2003) and 5th National Assembly (2003-2007), were characterized by issues such as impeachments and other matters not promoting effective lawmaking. Our view is that by 2007 and 2008, there was relative stability in the legislature, thereby providing the much needed environment for effective lawmaking activities. In addition, difficulty with getting up to date data limited the time frame to 2008.


Therefore, to measure the effectiveness of the senators in the chosen period, we apply the method proposed by Volden and Wiseman (2009) which they used to rank members of the US House of Representatives in terms of their effectiveness at moving bills through the legislative process. They categorized bills into commemorative/symbolic bill, (C), substantive bill (S) and substantively significant (SS) bill and calculated the Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) as shown in equation 1;

$$LES_{it} = \left[\begin{aligned} & \left(\frac{\alpha BILL_{it}^C + \beta BILL_{it}^S + \gamma BILL_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N RII.I_{jt}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N RII.I_{jt}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N RII.I_{jt}^{SS}} \right) \\ & + \left(\frac{\alpha AIC_{it}^C + \beta AIC_{it}^S + \gamma AIC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{jt}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{jt}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{jt}^{SS}} \right) \\ & + \left(\frac{\alpha ABC_{it}^C + \beta ABC_{it}^S + \gamma ABC_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{jt}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{jt}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{jt}^{SS}} \right) \\ & + \left(\frac{\alpha PASS_{it}^C + \beta PASS_{it}^S + \gamma PASS_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{jt}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{jt}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{jt}^{SS}} \right) \\ & + \left(\frac{\alpha LAW_{it}^C + \beta LAW_{it}^S + \gamma LAW_{it}^{SS}}{\alpha \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{jt}^C + \beta \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{jt}^S + \gamma \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{jt}^{SS}} \right) \end{aligned} \right] \quad \left[\begin{array}{c} N \\ 5 \end{array} \right] \quad (1)$$

Where BILL is the number of bills that each member sponsored, AIC is the number of those bills that received action in committee, ABC is the number of the bills that receive action beyond committee, PASS is number of the bills subsequently passed, LAW is number of the bills that eventually became law and N is the total number of legislators. Within each of the five terms, commemorative bills are weighted by α , substantive bills by β , and substantively significant by γ . In the analysis, Volden and Wiseman (2009) assigned $\alpha = 1$, $\beta = 5$ and $\gamma = 10$ in order to show that significant legislation exerts ten times the weight on the LES as commemorative legislation and twice as much as normal substantive legislation. The weights were chosen to reflect the view that passing a substantively significant bill is a stronger indicator of legislative effectiveness than passing general substantive legislation; and likewise, that passing substantive legislation is a stronger indicator of legislative effectiveness than passing commemorative/symbolic legislation.

Given that bills in the Nigerian legislature are not classified into commemorative, substantive and substantively significant bills, we design a legislative effectiveness framework as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Framework for Legislative Effectiveness



Source: Authors

From Figure 1 above, based on the party-dominated theory that holds that legislative power lies with the political parties which inform and constrain its members' decisions through party influence, we first establish the legislator's party affiliation. Volden and Wiseman (2009) also posit that several theories have conceived different mechanisms of partisan influence with implications for the prospects of party members' legislative effectiveness. Furthermore, we seek to know if the senator has legislative experience or not, as this may play an important role in the level of effectiveness. The essence of emphasizing legislative experience is because empirical findings suggest that as legislators spend more time in the parliament, they are expected to become better and more effective at lawmaking (Fiorina 1997, Mayhew 1974)¹. Also, this is in line with Wawro (2000) who argued that longer serving members usually possess better information about the preferences and priorities of other members as well as better understanding of the legislative operations and are therefore expected to be more effective. In addition, legislators who served at the State level legislature before ascending to the national parliament are believed to have acquired some experience that will aid their performance at the national level (Peterson, 1995)².

Consequently, we modify the LES approach by Volden and Wiseman (2009) as shown in equation 2;

$$LES_{it} \left[\left(\frac{\alpha_1 BILL_{it} + \alpha_2 AIC_{it} + \alpha_3 ABC_{it} + \alpha_4 PASS_{it} + \alpha_5 LAW_{it}}{\alpha_1 \sum_{j=1}^N BILL_{jt} + \alpha_2 \sum_{j=1}^N AIC_{jt} + \alpha_3 \sum_{j=1}^N ABC_{jt} + \alpha_4 \sum_{j=1}^N PASS_{jt} + \alpha_5 \sum_{j=1}^N LAW_{jt}} \right) \right] \left[\frac{N}{5} \right] \quad (2)$$

Where BILL, AIC, ABC, PASS, LAW and N are as defined earlier. To differentiate the importance of each stage of the legislative process, we assign weights as

¹ Cited in Volden and Wiseman (2009:23)

² Cited in Volden and Wiseman (2009:24)

follows; $\alpha_1 = 1$; $\alpha_2 = 2$; $\alpha_3 = 3$; $\alpha_4 = 4$; $\alpha_5 = 5$. The weights were chosen to reflect the effectiveness of a senator from when he/she sponsors a bill to when the bill is eventually passed. In other words, a weight of two means that a bill that the senate recommends for further scrutiny in a committee is more important than a bill that was introduced but does not get past that stage. The importance of sending a bill to the committee is in line with the postulation of the information theory of legislative organization that the parent chamber relies on its committees to research about the potential impact of legislation.

Similarly, a weight of three implies that a bill that passes out of the committee is more important than the one that did not get beyond the committee stage. Also, a weight of four means that the bill that the committee recommends for debate or received attention in the senate is more important than a bill that did not get positive recommendation by the committee. Finally, the weight of five means that the bill that get passed into law is more important than the bill that was debated but not passed.

Results

4.1 Legislative Experience and Ability to Sponsor Bills

Table 1 juxtaposes the number of bills sponsored by senators with their legislative experience or lack thereof. Of the 109 senators, only 43 or 39.5 percent sponsored bills in the period under review, with 24 or 56 percent of the 43 senators that sponsored bills having legislative experience, that is, they were either returning senators or were legislators at the State level before ascending to the National Assembly. The remaining 19 senators or 44 percent of the 43 senators that sponsored bills in the period did not have any legislative experience. Therefore, of the 106 bills sponsored between 2007 and 2008, 62 or 58 percent were sponsored by senators with legislative experience while 44 or 42 percent of the total bills were sponsored by senators without legislative experience. The implication of this is that legislators with experience sponsored approximately 2.58 bills per head in the period while those without legislative experience sponsored about 2.32 bills per head. This confirms the finding of Wawro (2000) that longer serving members of the legislature tend to be more effective.

Table 1: Legislative Experience and Ability to Sponsor Bills

	No. of Senators	No. of Bills Sponsored	No. of Bills Sponsored Per Head
Legislative Experience	24	62	2.58
No Legislative Experience	19	44	2.32
	43	106	

Source: Authors' Compilation

4.2 Legislative Effectiveness Score

In the period 2007 and 2008, a total of 137 bills were sponsored in the senate, of which 106 or 77 percent were sponsored by senators while the remaining bills were sponsored by the executive arm of government. The bills sponsored by the senators were at different stages and we use these to calculate the LES of the individual senators. As stated earlier, the period 2007 to 2008 is the preferred period because the early phase of the democratic experience was considered as a learning process. Also, party intrigues as well as individual interests led to constant impeachments while the core business of lawmaking was relegated to the background.

Table 2 shows the number of bills sponsored by senators and the different stages of such bills. Senator Victor Ndoma Egba sponsored 12 or approximately 11 percent of the 106 bills put forward in the period. Of these bills, four were at the committee stage, seven at first reading and one got to the third reading stage. Senator Sylvester N. Anyanwu who sponsored six bills had all of them at the first reading stage while four of the six bills sponsored by Gbemi Ruqayyah Saraki were at first reading and two at the committee stage.

Senators Iyabo Obasanjo, Grace Folashade Bent and Ike Ekweremadu all sponsored five bills in the period. However, while Iyabo Obasanjo and Grace Folashade Bent had four of their bills at the first reading stage and one at the committee level, Senator Ike Ekweremadu had two of the bills at the committee stage and three at the first reading stage. At the rear of the log are 18 senators who all sponsored one bill each in the period, but while

13 of them saw their bills getting to the first reading stage, five of them had their bills sent to the different committees.

Table 2: Bills Sponsored by Senators and Stages

	Senator	No. of Bills Sponsored	Committee Stage	First Reading	Second Reading	Third Reading
1	Victor Ndoma Egba	12	4	7	0	1
2	Sylvester N. Anyanwu	6	0	6	0	0
3	Gbemi R. Saraki	6	2	4	0	0
4	Iyabo Obasanjo	5	1	4	0	0
5	Grace Folashade Bent	5	1	4	0	0
6	Ike Ekweremadu	5	2	3	0	0
7	Folarin T. Kolawole	4	1	3	0	0
8	Abubakar Umar Gada	4	2	2	0	0
9	Bassey Ewa Henshaw	3	1	2	0	0
10	Anyogu Eze	3	1	2	0	0
11	Felix K. Bajomo	3	1	2	0	0
12	Ganiyu O. Solomon	3	1	2	0	0
13	Agbo A. Ooduma	3	1	2	0	0
14	Uche Chukwumerije	3	2	1	0	0
15	Chris Anyanwu	3	2	1	0	0
16	Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan	2	0	2	0	0
17	Mohammed. A. Bello	2	0	2	0	0
18	Bode Olajumoje	2	0	2	0	0
19	Aloysius A. Etok	2	0	2	0	0
20	Ehigie E. Uzamere	2	0	2	0	0
21	Lokpobiri Heineken	2	0	2	0	0
22	Eme Ufot Ekaette	2	1	1	0	0
23	Osita B. Izunaso	2	1	1	0	0
24	Manzo G. Anthony	2	1	1	0	0
25	Joel D. Ikenya	2	2	0	0	0
26	Nkechi J. Nwaogu	1	0	1	0	0
27	Sahabi Alhaji Ya'u	1	0	1	0	0
28	Hosea O. Ehinlawo	1	0	1	0	0
29	Zaynab A. Kure	1	0	1	0	0
30	George T. Sekibo	1	0	1	0	0
31	Umar Dahiru	1	0	1	0	0
32	Joy I. Emodi	1	0	1	0	0
33	Abubakar A. Bagudu	1	0	1	0	0
34	Mohammed K. Jibril	1	0	1	0	0
35	Omar A. Hambagda	1	0	1	0	0
36	Ramoni O. Mustapha	1	0	1	0	0
37	Abubakar Sodangi	1	0	1	0	0
38	Gbenga Ogunniya	1	0	1	0	0
39	Simeon O. Oduoye	1	1	0	0	0
40	Garba Yakubu Lado	1	1	0	0	0
41	Joseph I. Akaagerger	1	1	0	0	0
42	Festus Bode Ola	1	1	0	0	0
43	John N. Shagaya	1	1	0	0	0

Source: Compiled from <http://www.nigeriansenate.org/> at different times in the month of July 2012.

Table 3 shows the results of the LES with Senator Victor Ndoma Egba the most effective having the highest LES of 2.8776. He was followed by Senator Sylvester Anyanwu who scored 2.2748 and Gbemi R. Saraki 1.4407. Senators Iyabo Obasanjo and Grace Folashade Bent were joint 4th with LES of 1.3270 each, while Senator Ike Ekweremadu followed with LES of 1.1374. In sum, of the top 10 senators, eight were of the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party while two were of the opposition All Nigeria's Peoples Party (now defunct). When the top 20 senators are considered, 16 were of the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party while four were of the opposition political parties. This confirms results in the literature such as Krutz 2005 where members of the majority party tend to be more successful.

With respect to legislative experience or lack thereof, of the top 10 most effective senators, five of them had legislative experience while the other five did not have legislative experience. This supports the result of Volden and Wiseman (2009) who found that in the 98th Congress of the US, three of the top six legislators had legislative experience while the other three did not have experience. The implication of this is that while legislative experience is necessary, it may not be sufficient since other factors such as innate ability, party influence, cultivation of skill set and institutional position are important

Table 3: Legislative Effectiveness Score

	Senator	Political Party*	Legislative Experience	Legislative Effectiveness Score
1	Victor Ndoma Egba	PDP	Yes	2.8776
2	Sylvester N. Anyanwu	PDP	No	2.2748
3	Gbemi R. Saraki	PDP	Yes	1.4407
4	Iyabo Obasanjo	PDP	No	1.3270
5	Grace Folashade Bent	PDP	No	1.3270
6	Ike Ekweremadu	PDP	Yes	1.1374
7	Folarin T. Kolawole	PDP	Yes	1.0237
8	Abubakar Umar Gada	PDP	No	0.8341
9	Ahmed Ibrahim Lawan	ANPP	Yes	0.7583
10	Mohammed. A. Bello	ANPP	No	0.7583
11	Bode Olajumoje	PDP	No	0.7583
12	Aloysius A. Etok	PDP	No	0.7583
13	Ehigie E. Uzamere	PDP	n/a	0.7583
14	Lokpobiri Heineken	PDP	Yes	0.7583
15	Bassey Ewa Henshaw	PDP	Yes	0.7203
16	Anyogu Eze	PDP	No	0.7203
17	Felix K. Bajomo	PDP	No	0.7203
18	Ganiyu O. Solomon	AC	Yes	0.7203
19	Agbo A. Ooduma	PDP	Yes	0.7203
20	Uche Chukwumerije	PPA	Yes	0.5308
21	Chris Anyanwu	PDP	n/a	0.5308
22	Eme Ufot Ekaette	PDP	No	0.4170
23	Osita B. Izunaso	PDP	Yes	0.4170
24	Manzo G. Anthony	PDP	n/a	0.4170
25	Nkechi J. Nwaogu	PDP	Yes	0.3791
26	Sahabi Alhaji Ya'u	PDP	n/a	0.3791
27	Hosea O. Ehinlawo	PDP	Yes	0.3791
28	Zaynab A. Kure	PDP	No	0.3791
29	George T. Sekibo	PDP	Yes	0.3791
30	Umar Dahiru	PDP	Yes	0.3791
31	Joy I. Emodi	PDP	Yes	0.3791
32	Abubakar A. Bagudu	PDP	No	0.3791
33	Mohammed K. Jibril	PDP	No	0.3791
34	Omar A. Hambagda	ANPP	Yes	0.3791
35	Ramoni O. Mustapha	PDP	Yes	0.3791
36	Abubakar Sodangi	PDP	Yes	0.3791
37	Gbenga Ogunniya	PDP	Yes	0.3791
38	Joel D. Ikenya	PDP	Yes	0.2275
39	Simeon O. Oduoye	PDP	No	0.1137
40	Garba Yakubu Lado	PDP	Yes	0.1137
41	Joseph I. Akaagerger	PDP	No	0.1137
42	Festus Bode Ola	AC	No	0.1137
43	John N. Shagaya	PDP	No	0.1137

Source: Authors

*The ANPP (All Nigeria's Peoples Party) and the AC (Action Congress) are now defunct

5. Summary, Conclusions and Limitations of the Study

Using the Volden-Wise Legislative Effectiveness Score (LES) approach, the study examines the effectiveness of individual legislators in Nigeria, with focus on senators between 2007 and 2008. The results show that of the 109 senators, only 43 or 39.5 percent sponsored bills in the period while of the top 10 senators, eight were of the ruling Peoples' Democratic Party while two were of the defunct All Nigeria's Peoples Party. If the top 20 senators are considered, 16 were of the ruling party and four of the opposition parties. When legislative experience or lack thereof is considered, five of the top 10 legislators had legislative experience while the remaining five did not have legislative experience. With respect to individual senators, the LES ranking showed that Senator Victor Ndoma Egba, with legislative experience and of the Peoples Democratic Party was the most effective senator in the period.

Based on the findings, a number of conclusions can be made: First, the study has been able to provide an insight into measuring the effectiveness of legislators in Nigeria. Second, the results support outcomes of studies reviewed in the literature, implying that legislative attributes in the Nigerian senate bears semblance with other countries. Third, if less than half of the senators were actively involved in sponsoring of bills in the reviewed period, then there is need for drastic improvement in senators' performances in this regard.

The study is however characterized by a number of limitations. First, in measuring legislative effectiveness, we only considered the bills sponsored by senators. However, other factors such as ability to move motions, contribution to debates, performance in committees and oversight functions, etc., are also valid means of ascertaining the effectiveness of legislators. Also, for a legislator occupying leadership position, for example the Senate president or Speaker of the House of Representatives, using the sponsoring of bills as the sole indicator of measuring performance may not be reflective of the effectiveness of such a legislator. Second, upcoming studies may devote attention to the contents of the bills sponsored by legislators in line with the view of Adler and Wilkerson (2005). Third, there is need to use more recent data in prospective studies.

These limitations notwithstanding, the study has attempted to provide an insight into the effectiveness of individual senators in Nigeria. Future studies may therefore endeavor to address some or all of the identified shortcomings.

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