

Towards Containing Terrorism in North East Nigeria: A Befitting Strategy for a Protracted War

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Abstract

This paper discusses the application of the containment strategy in combating terrorism in North East Nigeria. To achieve this aim, secondary data in the form of written texts, journal articles, newspaper reports and internet webpages are utilized. This research is pertinent for the Nigerian Armed Forces is yet to discover a befitting strategy at quelling terrorism in the north east region. Also, the retrogressing effects of the current strategy adopted by the Nigerian government makes the findings of this work a compelling alternative to the existing strategy. A detailed hypothesis on how the containment strategy can be applied in the north east region has been attempted in this work. There is, however, a necessity for further needs analysis and more specific and elaborate study by strategists and tacticians of the Nigerian armed forces to weigh the potency, strength, weakness, the opportunity cost and the threats of this idea in regard to the general and peculiar Boko Haram conflict context.

Keywords: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Radicalization, Boko Haram, Containment Strategy, Deradicalization, Indoctrination, Radical Islamism, Ideology

1.0 Introduction: Terrorism in Nigeria and the Boko Haram Escapades, 1995-2017¹

Terrorism in Nigeria, it appears, is not novel as the Boko Haram menace has made it appear. Indeed, there are traces and actions in the past of which “fear” was utilized for religio-political gains. Terrorism in Africa as well as Nigeria dates back to the era of slavery where violence was employed in the efforts to exploit human resources from the 15th to the 19th century by European capitalists². Slavery and the means through which slaves were acquired were brutal phenomena. This trade culminated in several deaths, arson, extinction of communities and settlements, internecine wars, banditry, kidnappings, torturing and other violent crimes.

The second wave of terrorism in Nigeria was a product of the illegal clamp down on Nigeria’s empires, kingdoms and chiefdoms by colonialists. What is popularly termed “gunboat diplomacy” in contemporary literatures is nothing other than a premeditated terror strategy by the colonial overlords aimed at instilling fears and exploiting such scenario for their selfish political gains. As observed by Paul Omeje, not less than 30,000 persons were killed in an onslaught by the British at Sokoto in 1903³. The terrifying naval vessels and the epitome of terror – the Maxim Guns, were more often than not, used against Nigerian belligerents armed with bow and arrow. One wonders what could be more terrific and what political motive could be more conspicuous than colonialism.

The third wave of terrorism was still perpetrated by the colonial masters. As observed by Bukola Oyeniyi, colonial rule in Nigeria, dragged down by the need for legitimacy and acceptability, depended on the use of force and the deployment of terror to enforce its policies⁴. For instance, 18 and 31 unarmed women at Utu Etim Ekpo and Ikot Abasi (both in present Akwa Ibom State) respectively, were murdered by colonial overlords in 1929 for resisting alien taxation⁵. This was nothing but a premeditated horror inflicted as a choreography of deterrence against further uprisings. Similarly, when the socio-cultural group *Oku-Ogun* resisted colonial taxation, mandatory building of pit latrines and imposed *Alaafin* suzerainty, the colonial government engaged the

¹This subhead borrows from the paper the author presented at 1stNAHISS Conference held at the Faculty of Arts Auditorium University of Calabar, Calabar - Nigeria, September, 2016; titled “Between Counterterrorism, Human Rights and National Security: The Nigeria’s Government Dilemma”.

²Abubakar Yahaya, “Analysis of the Economics of Terrorism in Nigeria: Boko Haram and Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta in Perspective”. Unpublished MA thesis, Institute of Graduate Studies and Research, East Mediterranean University, (2015).p.30.

³Paul U. Omeje, “Nationalism and Indigenous Resistance to Alien Rules in West Africa”. In Paul U. Omeje & U. U. Okonkwo (eds) *New Perspective in West African History*. (Enugu: Madonna University Press, 2013).p.370.

⁴Bukola A. Oyeniyi, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”. In Wafula Okumu & Anneli Botha (eds) *Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Human Security*.(Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007).p.43.

⁵Monday E. Noah, “The Role, Status and Influence of Women in Traditional Times: The Example of Ibibio of South Eastern Nigeria”. *Nigerian Magazine*, (Vol.53, No.4, 1985).p.28.

local people in a 3 year orgy of violence that cost 10,000 lives. Surprised attacks, guerilla-style bush actions and unprecedented terror were unleashed to break the resistance; “today’s Nigerian domestic terrorism is rooted in the sanctioned terrorism of its colonial powers”¹.

Among the socio-cultural groups that survived pre-colonial Nigeria, *Awopa* and *Ogboni* (Osugbo), continued clandestine and extraneous deviant behaviours. During the colonial era and well into the independence period, the *Ogboni* and other groups, like *Awopa*, became famous for killings, lootings armed robbery, pervasion of justice and so on. *Awopa* is known to have rained terror on Lagos and other suburban centres during the first republic and later independence².

The year 1986 marked a watershed on the history of violent and terror related crimes in Nigeria. The killing of Mr. Dele Giwa by a “Letter Bomb” in October, 1986 marked the beginning of violent killing and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Nigeria. Subsequently, the Movement for the Advancement of Democracy (MAD) hijacked a Nigerian Airways aircraft in October, 1993, and just a year later, a vicious bomb blast ripped Shed 6 of Ilorin Stadium³.

Moreso, the economic downturn and rising inflation rate during the Ibrahim Babangida’s regime made crime and criminal activities rampant. As police were either overwhelmed, or culpable to abating crime, ethnic militias such as *O’odua People’s Congress* (OPC), *Arewa Youth Consultative Forum* (AYCF), *Movement for the Actualization of Sovereign State of Biafra* (MASSOB), *Anambra State Vigilante Service*, *Niger Delta Volunteer Force* (NDVF), *Ogoni Youth*, *Ijaw Youth*, *Bakassi Boys*, *Egbesu Boys*, *Onitsha Traders Organization*, *Mambilla Militia Group* etc. were formed. These groups which started as vigilante groups ended up being nightmare and menace to the localities they operated. Between 1999 and 2005, OPC was responsible for about 3,635 deaths; Bakassi Boys were responsible for over 14,000 deaths; AYCF was responsible for about 1,680 deaths; Mambilla was blamed for over 709 deaths; NDVF had questions to answer over 2,080 deaths; Egbesu Boys were responsible for 2,163 deaths; while MASSOB was responsible for some 1,179 deaths. These groups together facilitated the deaths of over 25,000 persons during this period⁴.

Trends of terrorism in Nigeria with religious undertone could be traced back to 14th century arrival of Islam to the country’s empire of Borno and its attainment of legitimacy under Idris Aloma (1571-1603). Radicalization came in 1804, when Usman Dan Fodio waged a Fulani “so called Jihad” against the Hausa kingdoms with their syncretistic beliefs and *infidel* customs⁵. As a member of the *Qadiriyya* order, Dan Fodio’s version of Islam was still very far from purism of the *Wahabiyya*, the Saudi sect that kick-started international political Islamism in its well known current fundamentalist form. The latter permeated Nigeria only in the 1960s through the effort of Abubakar Gummi, Grand Kadi of northern Nigeria, friend and ally of Saudi Arabia, aided by the famous northern Nigerian politician, the Sarduna of Sokoto, Sir Ahmadu Bello⁶.

In retrospect, *Sharia* was almost entirely done away with in northern Nigeria by the early 1960s as part of the “1960 Settlement” – a concession for a united independent Nigeria. However, Sir Ahmadu Bello (Son of Usman Dan Fodio) reneged on the north’s agreement by leading a contingent who aspired a return to *Sharia* as the legal basis for Muslims, and even Nigerian societies⁷. The resultant nostalgia culminated in the birth of *Jama’at Izalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al-Sunnah* (Society for the Eradication of Evil Innovations and the Reestablishment of the Sunnah), better known as the Izala Movement; a group whose raison d’être was religious revival and much public and political role for Islam. It was joined by several other religious movements, including the Muslim Student’s Society of Nigeria (MSS), widely regarded as a platform for young radical preachers, and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a more radical offshoot of the MSS better known as the Muslim Brotherhood, or Zakzaky, after its leader⁸.

¹Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.44.

²Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.45.

³Don John O. Omale, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy”. *Canadian Social Sciences*, (Vol.9, No.3, 2013).pp.96-103.

⁴Oyeniye, “A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria”.p.48.

⁵Janos Besenyo & Adam Mayer, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”. *Defense Against Terrorism Review*, (Vol.7, No.1, 2015).p.50.

⁶Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization’s Root in Nigeria’s Social History”.p.50.

⁷Blessing Tangban, “Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria”. Unpublished MA Thesis, Southern University, New Orleans, (2014).p.26.

⁸“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. *Crisis Group Africa Report*, (N^o216, 2014).p.8.

Table 1: Groups and Casualty Rate, 1999-2005

Group	Region	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	Total No. of Deaths
OPC	South West	1,800	620	350	420	230	110	105	3,635
Bakassi Boys (Anambra)	South East	900	820	920	450	620	910	805	5,425
Bakassi Boys (Abia)	South East	800	900	960	833	800	920	400	5,613
Bakassi Boys (Imo)	South East	600	680	520	624	350	250	190	3,232
Arewa Youth Consultative Forum	Northern Nigeria	120	700	320	110	125	180	125	1,680
Mambilla	Middle Belt	80	210	78	96	102	89	54	709
NDVF	Niger Delta	200	350	500	350	200	180	300	2,080
Ijaw Youth	Niger Delta	300	700	560	183	230	120	70	2,163
MASSOB	Eastern Nigeria	50	300	230	180	217	80	122	1,179
Total		4,850	5,280	4,438	3,264	2,874	2,839	2,171	25,716

Source: Bukola A. Oyeniyee, "A Historical Overview of Domestic Terrorism in Nigeria". In Wafula Okumu & Anneli Botha (eds) *Domestic Terrorism in Africa: Defining, Addressing and Understanding its Impact on Human Security*. (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2007).p.84

The 1979 success of the Shiite militants in toppling the Iranian government was also a motivating factor for Muslim fanatics such as Zakzaky who introduced a militant pro-Iranian Shiite version of Islam into northern Nigeria in the 1980s¹. Subsequently, characters like Mohammed Marwa emerged in the 1980s with radical and bizarre sermons against western culture and its popularity in Nigeria. Marwa was so violent that he became known as *Maitatsine* (the one who damns). Marwa's exploits culminated in the 1982 brutal onslaughts that claimed 4,000 lives including that of *Maitatsine* himself². His followers regrouped and rose against the government again same year in Bulumkutu and 3,300 persons were killed. In 1984, it rose again in Gongola State and 1,000 persons suffered casualty. Hundreds more were killed in 1985 in yet, another uprising in Bauchi³.

In 1999, Nigeria's status as a secular country came into a state of limbo when the constitution opened an avenue for the "imposition of Sharia by granting significant powers to the states and creating a system of appellate courts to hear appeals from Sharia trial courts"⁴. Members of the northern elites reacted swiftly and

¹Mike Omilusi, "From Child Wandering to Guerilla-Warriors: Islamic Extremism and the Boko Haram Recruitment in Northern Nigeria". *International Journal of Research in Social Sciences and Humanities*, (Vol.5, No.IV, 2015).p.98.

²Tangban, "Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria".p.24.

³Tangban, "Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria".p.25.

⁴Tangban, "Boko Haram: A Theoretical and Historical Analysis of Insurgency in Nigeria".Pp.28.

introduced Sharia in Nigerian states (first in Zamfara back in 1999 and later in every other northern state except Adamawa)¹.

That single mistake of rejuvenating the *Sharia* system has lived to hunt the Nigerian state. Nigeria is now wrestling its sovereignty and territorial integrity with a dreaded *Sharia* inspired group which quotes the Quran and Sunnah before wrecking havoc and terror.

The Boko Haram sect is reported to have surfaced under a different number of appellations including *Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization*, *Ahlulsunna wal' Jama'ah hijra*, *Yusufiyya*, *Hijra Ummah*, *Jamaatul Takfur Wal Hydra Ahlus Sunna*, *Khawaarji*, and *Nigerian Taliban*. These cognomens have been accorded them in the years 1995, 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2003².

The word “boko” is popularly used to denote the formal educational system in Nigeria, but its specific meaning is disputed. According to some, “boko” in classical Hausa language literally means “deception” or “deceits”. It is used to describe the formal educational system because in the colonial period, this system was associated with Christian missionaries and seen as a disguise for evangelism and western beliefs. Others consider the word “boko” as a corruption of the English word “book” which is also associated with western education and culture. The word “haram” is adopted from Arabic, and usually means sins or forbidden³.

As observed by Olaide Aro, element of Boko Haram has been in existence right from the 1960s⁴. However, conspicuous activities by the group began in 1995 as *Shabaab* under the leadership of Lawan Abubakar, who later left for Saudi Arabia to further his Islamic studies⁵. The absence of Lawan Abubakar culminated in the emergence of Muhammed Yusuf who was recognized by the Shakyhs Committee as its leader in 1999⁶.

Yusuf, a new leader of the group, had a previous history of activism within the Islamist movement known as *Jama'at Tajdid al-Islam* (JTI), a protest movement that had been active in the late military era⁷. Yusuf himself was inspired by a Saudi scholar Sheikh bin Abdullah Abu Zayd who in his book *Westernization of Education in the Land of Islam* condemned western education⁸. As a non-conformist, Muhammed Yusuf preached against practicing Islam with complacency and assiduously called for the return to orthodox Islam through the implementation of Sharia. Yusuf's Philosophy was archaic and anti western. During an interview with the BBC, Yusuf berated that:

there are prominent Islamic teachers who have seen and understood that the present western-style education is mixed with issues that run contrary to our beliefs in Islam...Like rain, we believe it is the creation of God rather than evaporation caused by the sun that condenses and become rain. Like saying the world is sphere; if it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah, we reject it. We also reject the theory of Darwinism⁹.

Yusuf's radicalism fetched him over 280,000 followers across Nigeria, Chad and Niger Republic¹⁰.

Between the years 2000 and 2002, Osama bin Laden is reported to have issued two audio messages calling on Nigerian Muslims to wage a Jihad and establish an Islamic state. Laden's interest in Nigeria dates from his 1992-1996 stay in Sudan where he reportedly met one Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian from Maiduguri studying at the Islamic University in Khartoum who became his disciple and was trained in Afghanistan. Accordingly, bin Laden asked him to organize a cell in Nigeria with a ₦300 million budget. Ali returned home

¹Besenyó, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization's Root in Nigeria's Social History”.Pp.50.

²Samuel Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror”. *Defense and Security Analysis*, (Vol.29. No.3, 2013).Pp.255.

³Emilie Oftedal, “Boko Haram – an Overview” *FFI-rapport*, (2013/01680, 2013)Pp.13.

⁴Olaide I. Aro, “Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way forwards towards Avoidance of Future Insurgency”. *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications*, (Vol.3, No.11, 2013).p.1.

⁵Abdulmajeed H. Bello, “Boko Haram: The Greatest Security Threat to the Sovereignty of Nigeria”. *International Journal of Management and Social Science Research*, (Vol.2, No.2, 2013).p.67.

⁶Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror”.p.255.

⁷Andrea Brigaglia, “The Volatility of Salafi Political Theology, the War on Terror and the Genesis of Boko Haram”. *Diritto e questioni Pubbliche*, (Vol.15, No.2, 2015).p.180.

⁸Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, “Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis”. *CHATHAM HOUSE*, (2014).p.6-7.

⁹Joe Boyle “Nigeria's ‘Taliban’ Enigma”. *BBC News*, (2009). Available [at] www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/ni/africa/8172270.stm. Accessed 22/07/2016.

¹⁰Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror”.p.255.

in 2002 and began funding religious activities of Salafi groups that were unaware of the plan¹. Mohammed Yusuf allegedly benefited from this programme².

Coincidentally, Yusuf in 2002 established a religious complex with a mosque and an Islamic boarding school in Maiduguri in Borno State. This, according to Besenyo & Mayer, marked the commencement of the Boko Haram sect³. Up to July, 2009, Boko Haram had no official name for itself. It referred to itself as *dawah*, identified its mission as a return to the *Ahlus Sunnah wal Jam'a* (Adherents to the Sunnah and the Community of Muslims) and referred to its members as "brothers". The first reference to its current preferred name of *Ahlus Sunnah liddawa'ati wal Jihad* came in the aftermath of the Bauchi prison break in September⁴, 2010.

However, Boko Haram violent confrontation and threat against national security dates back to 2003. At Zagi-Biriri, Yanusari local government, in Yobe State, sect members beat up a pregnant woman who had challenged their fishing rights in local ponds. This and other criminal attacks provoked reprisal actions from the police forcing the sect to relocate to Kanama where it used as a base for their resurgent and subsequent razing of police station, local government secretariats, lodges, and residents of local government chairman and divisional police officer (DPO) in December, 2003⁵. Towards the end of 2004, activities of Boko Haram attained a shift in paradigm as there was a swift movement from direct confrontation to covert actions.

The threat posed by Boko Haram on Nigeria's security matured in 2006 when Nigerian security forces noticed that Boko Haram members were training in the Sahel alongside Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), with its emir Abdelmalek Droukdel confirming that his group had Nigerian elements in its midst in 2008⁶. By 2009, Boko Haram sect became very radical and called for Sharia law for the entire Nigeria, pushed for ethnic cleansing and demanded that Igbos and other Christian elements that populate the *Sabon Gari* of each northern town leave, and never return⁷. The sect became ultra-violent when its members refused to adhere to a new law in 2009 which required people to wear helmet when riding a motorcycle⁸. Over 1,000 persons were violently murdered in the ensuing chaos across the northern states of Bauchi, Borno, Katsina and Yobe⁹.

After the motorcycle clash with Borno state police, Muhammed Yusuf became angered and wrote his famous tirade entitled *An Open Letter to the Federal Government* which he threatened the government and urged them to respond within forty days, with a view to a resolution between the government and the group, if not, the Jihad operation will begin in the country which only Allah can stop it¹⁰. The Nigerian army reportedly launched an offensive attack on the Boko Haram leader Muhammed Yusuf's compound which claimed more than 1,000 lives on both sides with over 700 persons killed in Maiduguri¹¹. At this time, scores of Boko Haram leaders as well as prominent financial backers such as Al-haji Buji Foi, a former commissioner for religious affairs in Borno State, were killed¹². In what appeared to be a bizarre and preposterous action, Yusuf, along with his father-in-law Baa Fugu and other sect members were publicly executed on July 30, 2009 outside the police station in Maiduguri¹³.

The death of Yusuf, and the mass killings and arrests culminated in the sect retreating and re-strategizing in two different ways – first was the adoption of Yusuf's hard-line deputy, Abu-Muhammed Abubakar Ibn Muhammed al-Shakwi (Abubakar Shekau), alias *Darul Tawheed* as its new spiritual leader.

¹“Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. *Crisis Group Africa Report*,p.23.

²Ryan Mauro, “Boko Haram: Nigerian Islamist Group”. *Special Report*, The Clarion Project, (n.d).p.2.

³Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization's Root in Nigeria's Social History”.p.48.

⁴Kyari Mohammed, “The Message and Methods of Boko Haram”. In Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos (ed) *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State of Nigeria*. (Leiden: African Studies Centre, 2014).pp.13-14.

⁵Oyewole, “Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror”.p.256.

⁶Olivier Guitta & Robin Simox, *Terrorism in Nigeria: The Threat From Boko Haram and Ansura*. (London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2014).p.6.

⁷Besenyo, “Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization's Root in Nigeria's Social History”.Pp.54.

⁸Brian De Smet, “Dealing With Boko Haram”. Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, (2014).p.5.

⁹Freedom C. Onuoha, “(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria”. *Report*, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, (2012).p.4.

¹⁰Salisu S. Shuaibu & Mohd A. Salleh, “A Historical Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Causes and Solutions”. International Conference on Empowering Islamic Civilization in the 21st Century, (2015).p.219.

¹¹Shuaibu, “A Historical Evolution of Boko Haram in Nigeria: Causes and Solutions”.p.219.

¹²Abdi O. Shuriye & Shittu Huud, “Global Challenge of Mutual Suspicion: Boko Haram Uprising in Nigeria”. *American International Journal of Contemporary Research*, (Vol.3, No.5, 2013).p.109.

¹³Konye O. Ori, “Conceptualizing Boko Haram Victimage, Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism”. Unpublished MA thesis, Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University, (2013).p.3.

Second was the redefinition of its tactics, which involved perfecting its traditional hit-and-run tactics, such as placement of improvised explosive devices (IEDS), targeted assassination, drive-by shooting and suicide bombings¹.

In 2010, the Boko Haram sect set hundreds of prisoners free from a prison in Bauchi. In December, they detonated bombs that killed 80 people in Jos. On the New Year's Eve of 2010, they attacked targets at Abuja for the first time. From 2010 onwards, they turned Maiduguri into veritable battle fields. When President Jonathan was reelected in 2011, they attacked churches, markets, Igbo owned shops, bars, beauty parlours and conference halls in Yobe and Borno States². On June, 2011, the sect mounted the first ever suicide bombing at the police headquarters in Abuja. On April 26, 2011, another suicide bomber attacked the UN building in Abuja, killing 23 people³. By January, 2012, the Nigerian media started talking about the new civil war. Seemingly, there were kidnappings and murder of westerners, prison mutinies, and suicide bombings at churches. In October, 41 university students were butchered in Mubi. In 2012 alone, Boko Haram killed about 1,200 people. By May, 2013, the cumulative number of people killed by Boko Haram had already exceeded 4,000. Boko Haram sect also developed its foreign policy stands and its international linkages⁴.

The strength of the dreaded Boko Haram sect grew from 4,000 members in 2009 to between 6,000 and 8,000 in 2014 against 15,000 soldiers deployed⁵. The sect also became audacious to place posters at key road intersections in some states in Nigeria, cautioning the general public to refrain from siding with the Nigerian government⁶. Again, the sect pulled down the Nigerian flag and raised that of Afghanistan in one of the states' building it occupied⁷. By 2014, the female populations were incorporated into suicide bombings. In the next 16 months, 90 female bombers killed over 500 people and injured over 700 more⁸. The situation was deteriorating as a woman apprehended in 2014, confessed that Boko Haram had unleashed 50 female bombers with plans to kill 100,000 by the end of 2014⁹.

From May, 2011 through December, 2014, Boko Haram killed more than 8,400 persons; another 7,900 were killed in fighting between the sect and Nigeria's security forces¹⁰. There were about 330 attacks between January and June, 2014 with 4,483 fatalities¹¹. While Augustine Eneanya¹² places the total casualty from terror and suicide attack at the total number of 4,066, Onuoha & Temilola¹³ situates the death toll at 13,674 with a record 7,711 deaths in 2014 alone. Thousands have also been kidnapped and sold with the Chibok School Girls reportedly sold to Boko Haram militants for as little as \$12 each¹⁴. Borno State has been worst hit with 3,422 assassination cases between 2002 and 2014¹⁵.

¹Onuoha, "(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria".p.2.

²Besenyio, "Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization's Root in Nigeria's Social History".p.54.

³Onuoha, "(Un)Willing to Die: Boko Haram and Suicide Terrorism in Nigeria".p.5.

⁴Besenyio, "Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization's Root in Nigeria's Social History".p.55.

⁵Marc-Antoine Perouse de Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis".p.15.

⁶Benjamin Maiangwa, "State Fragility and the Reign of Terror in Nigeria: A Case Study of Boko Haram Terrorism". MA thesis, Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies, University of KwaZulu-Natal, (2012),p.96.

⁷James J. F. Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria". Florida: *JSOU Report* (12-5, 2012).pp.58-59.

⁸Elizabeth Pearson, "Boko Haram and Nigeria's Female Bombers". *Nigerian Security*, (Vol.35, No.5, 2015).p.19.

⁹Pearson, "Boko Haram and Nigeria's Female Bombers".p.20.

¹⁰"Nigeria" *USCIRF Annual Report*, (2015).p.103.

¹¹John Stevenson, "Boko Haram, ISIS and Al-Shabaab in Comparative Perspectives". A Presentation at Nigeria Security Exhibition and Conference, (2015).p.36.

¹²Augustine N. Eneanya, "Terrorism and Global Domestic Insurgency Nexus: A Case of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria". *Journal of Public Management & Social Policy*, (Vol.21, No.1, 2015).p.86.

¹³Freedom C. Onuoha & Temilola O. George, "Boko Haram's Use of the Female Suicide Bombing in Nigeria". *Report*, Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, (2015).p.3.

¹⁴Gail Commandeur, "An Analysis of the Sexual Exploitation of Yazidi Women by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Christian Women by Boko Haram: Spoils of War, Holy War, or Instrumental Gains?". Special Dissertations, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, (2015).p.17.

¹⁵Charas M. Tella, "Insecurity in Northern Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Resolutions". *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, (Vol.2, No.4, 2015).p.33.

Table 2: Summary of Insecurity in Borno State

Year	Theft	Armed Robbery	Kidnapping	Assassinations	Fraud
2002	9127	81	27	124	243
2003	6796	95	34	210	349
2004	5231	121	91	214	337
2006	3124	134	95	313	410
2007	7289	114	53	225	349
2008	6111	171	58	320	298
2009	1901	243	34	221	349
2010	1082	273	53	318	343
2011	3927	339	62	320	289
2012	3702	289	76	417	319
2013	9774	212	77	319	332
2014	2254	210	84	421	298
Total	64,045	2,282	744	3,422	3,916

Sources: Charas M. Tella, “Insecurity in Northern Nigeria: Causes, Consequences and Resolutions” *International Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies*, (Vol.2, No.4, 2015).p.33.

As observed by Lauren P. Blanchard, the area affected by Boko Haram is home to an estimated 30 million people. Aside from the wanton killings, the violence has caused a humanitarian emergency around Lake Chad, displacing more than 2.8 million and cutting off humanitarian access to roughly 3 million others. More than 5.6 million people in the region are in need of emergency food aid. Nearly 1.6 million displaced Nigerians have fled Borno. The violence has also forced more than 2,000 schools to close thereby, disrupting education. More than 15,000 people have been killed by the group since 2009 – including more than 6,500 in 2015 alone¹.

¹Lauren P. Blanchard, “Nigeria’s Boko Haram: Frequently Asked Questions”. *Congressional Research Service*, (2016).pp.4-5.

The devastation caused and the sophistication of this group cannot be overemphasized. At a particular scenario, Nigerian “soldiers had complained that the insurgents outgun them as a result of more sophisticated weapons used by the sect members”¹. Aside from claiming territories in the Nigerian States of Borno and Adamawa, the power assault of the sect was powerful enough to force about 500 Nigerian soldiers and refugees to take refuge in Cameroon. Nearly 300,000 people in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe – 70% of them women and children have fled their homes since early 2013. From the UN statistics, there are more than 650,000 IDPs. 60,000 Nigerians have sought refuge in neighbouring countries since May, 2013. There are 40,000 Nigerian refugees in Niger Republic and about 28,000 in Cameroon². The affected border communities have been rendered exceedingly porous with Nigeria losing its place in the League of ECOWAS states³.

Boko Haram successes have made the security agents look inept and have also culminated in citizens feeling unsafe, even amid security forces⁴. In Judit Barna’s own words, “the crisis in the north has starkly revealed the weakness of the Nigerian army, long regarded as one of the most powerful in the continent”⁵. It has threatened “democratic practice and sustainable development”⁶. Evidently, there has been a massive decline of foreign direct investment (FDI) as figures from 2010 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) annual report shows a steep 78.1% decline in FDI⁷.

2.0 Understanding the Nexus between the Causal and Facilitative Factors of Terrorism in North Eastern Nigeria

Nigerians are divided on the actual causes of terrorism in northeast Nigeria. According to the survey conducted by Centre for Research and Development (CRPD), 28.5% respondents from the north, 44.7% from the central and 63.0% from the south blames terrorism on religious fanaticism. Seemingly, 46.6% of the north, 38.0% of the central and 20.8% of the southern respondents blame the scourge on unemployment; while, 9.7%, 5.5% and 4.6% of the north, central and south respectively blame the plague on injustice. Along ethnic lines, 15.4% Hausa-Fulani, 43.4% of Yoruba and 70.7% of Igbo blame the menace on religion. 56.4% Hausa-Fulani, 32.8% Yoruba, and 17.3% Igbo, blame terrorism on unemployment. On religious affiliated assessment, 56.5% Muslim respondent blame the outbreak of terrorism on unemployment while 66.2% Christian respondents blame it on religious fanaticism⁸. This divulges the ethnic, religious and regional perceptions on the nature and essence of Boko Haram.

In light of the above, four schools of thought – religion, poverty, unemployment and conspiracy theory schools are prevalent. The religion school posits that Boko Haram is a product of Islamic teachings of Salafism, purity, perfecting the Sharia system and waging a Jihad against compromised “brethrens” and infidels. References are always made by the members of this school to the Muhammedian jihad (622 AD), Dan Fodio’s jihad (1804), Maitatsine Uprising (1980s), with Yusuf’s Boko Haram regarded as a prototype nurtured and motivated by the nostalgia of its predecessors. The position of this school is made more germane by the manifesto and demands of Boko Haram to eradicate western culture and impose Sharia on Nigeria’s northern states. It was based on the above presuppositions that one of the proponents of this school Austin O. Omonia appealed that “adherents of all religions should see beyond their narrow/parochial spheres as they embrace the spirit of dialogue”⁹.

¹Salisu S. Shuaibu, Mohd A. Salleh & Abdullahi Y. Shehu, “The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency on Nigerian National Security. *International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Science*, (Vol.5, No.6, 2015).p.259.

²Freedom C. Onuoha, *A Danger not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram’s Transnational Reach and Regional Response*. (Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2014).pp.7-8.

³Onuoha, *A Danger not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram’s Transnational Reach and Regional Response*.p.9.

⁴Emmanuel M. Ome & Ani Casimir, “Re-Examining Religious Insecurity in Africa State: The Menace and Security Challenges of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. *Open Journal of Political Science*, (Vol.5, 2015).p.97.

⁵Judit Barna, “Insecurity in Context: The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. *DG EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_113*. (2014).p.13.

⁶Mashud L. A. Salawu & Ezekiel O. Adeoti, “Terrorism and Nigerian Democracy: Implications for Sustainable Development”. *European Journal of Globalization and Development Research*, (Vol.11, No.2, 2015).p.654.

⁷I. C. Achumba, O. S. Ighomereho, & M. O. M. Akpor-Robaro, “Security Challenges in Nigeria and the Implications for Business Activities and Sustainable Development”. *Journal of Economic and Sustainable Development*, (Vol.4, No.2, 2013).p.88.

⁸Arnim Langer; Amelie Godefroidt & Bart Meuleman, “Laying Bare Fault Lines: An Analysis of Student Perceptions of the Boko Haram Crisis in Nigeria” *Centre for Research and Development (CRPD)*, Working Paper (No.50, 2016).p11.

⁹Austin O. Omonia, “Religious Fanaticism and “Boko Haram” Insurgency in Nigeria: Implication for National Security”. *Journal of Advocacy, Research and Education*,(Vol.2, No.1, 2015).p.71.

Another school of thought, the unemployment school blames the emergence of terrorism in northeast Nigeria to unemployment. Apostles of this school blame poverty as the primary instigator of insurgency in the north east region. They recognize that poverty rate in Nigeria increased from 54.7% in 2004 to 60% of the population in 2010 and that 69% of Nigerians are defined as poor¹. They also sight the statistics that 8 of the poorest states in Nigeria are in the northeastern region with Jigawa State topping the list with 95% of its citizens classified as living in poverty; followed by Kebbi State with 89.7%; Kogi State with 88.6%, and Bauchi State with 86.3%. Kwara State is given a score card of 85.2%, Yobe State 83.3%, and Zamfara State 80.9%. Also, Gombe State ranks 8th with 77% while Sokoto and Adamawa States follow with 76.8% and 71.7% respectively². Citations are also made to the fact that 34.5% of children are malnourished in the northeast region³. Poverty, they argue, trigger corruption and unemployment⁴. One of the adherents of the employment school, Akani, terms terrorism as “an offshoot of unemployment”⁵, claiming that frustration of unemployed youths fuels insurgency and terrorism⁶. The idleness of the youths, contend these proponents, is consequential on the *Almajiric* system which serves as “a social laboratory for [terrorist] recruits”⁷. It is also their opinion, and rightly so, that the Boko Haram conflict is being “sustained by [these] masses of unemployed youth”⁸.

Corroborating the “poverty” and “unemployment” views, Abdi Shuriye & Huud submit that:

poverty and unemployment have therefore served recipe' for the emergence of Boko Haram insurgence because this has left the hopeless poor people to be used as mercenary fighters. What this means theoretically is that poverty and unemployment increase the number of people who are prepared to kill or be killed (suicide bombers) for a given course [sic] at token benefit⁹.

The political conspiracy school blames the outbreak of terrorism in northeast Nigeria on some shadow parties who intended to use the insurgency group to destabilize, discredit or incriminate other people, party and region. Ibrahim El-Zakzaky and Professor Aliyu Muhammed Bunza insinuate that Boko Haram is nothing but an American and Western creation with the sole motive of subjecting and ridiculing Islam¹⁰. Others such as Dr. Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu (former Governor of Niger State (2007-2015)), Sheikh Gumi (a renowned Islamic cleric) and Nasir El-Rufai (Presently the Governor of Kaduna State), on the basis of the sophisticated nature of their bombings, see Boko Haram as a creation to discredit the north¹¹. Some proponents such as General Azazi (former NSA (2010-2012)), Sadiq Abubakar Yar'Adua (a former Lawmaker from Katsina Central), and General Muhammadu Buhari blame the emergence of Boko Haram on the former ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). They blame the PDP for either marginalizing the northern region of facilitating systemic corruption that have bred poverty and unemployment in the region¹². To others such as Chief John Odigie-Oyegun (Chairman of the then opposition All Progressive Congress (APC)) Boko Haram sponsors “are friends of President Jonathan”¹³. The above opinion line is captured by Besenyo, when he averred that Jonathan's winning of the 2011 elections;

¹Ojochenemi J. David; Lucky E. Asuelime & Raquel A. Adekoye, “Is Boko Haram Poverty Driven”. *African Renaissance*, (Vol.12, No.1, 2015).p.131.

²David, et al “Is Boko Haram Poverty Driven”.p.133.

³David, et al “Is Boko Haram Poverty Driven”.p.135.

⁴Samuel Zemve; Margaret Ingyoroko & Isaac I. Akuva, “Terrorism in Contemporary Nigeria: A Latent Function of Official Corruption and State Neglect”. *European Scientific Journal*, (Vol.9, No.8, 2013).pp.136-137.

⁵A. A. Akani, “History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria”. *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, (Vol.7, No.3, 2014).p.65.

⁶Akani, “History of Terrorism, Youth Psychology and Unemployment in Nigeria”.p.74.

⁷Omilusi, “From Child Wandering to Guerilla-Warriors: Islamic Extremism and the Boko Haram Recruitment in Northern Nigeria”.pp.98-99.

⁸Patricio Asfura-Heim & Julia McQuaid, “Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflict: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria”. *CAN Analysis & Solutions*, (2015).p.V.

⁹Shuriye, “Global Challenge of Mutual Suspicion: Boko Haram Uprising in Nigeria”.p.110.

¹⁰See details in Lucky Asuelime & Raquel Adekoye, “Perception of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the 2015 Presidential Election”. *African Insight*, (Vol.45, No.2, 2015).p.3.

¹¹Asuelime & Adekoye, “Perception of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the 2015 Presidential Election”.pp.3-4.

¹²Asuelime & Adekoye, “Perception of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria and the 2015 Presidential Election”.pp.4-5.

¹³ *VanguardNgr*, 09/02/2014. <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/09/boko-haram-sponsors-friends-president-jonathan-says-Chief-john-odigie-oyegun/> Retrieved 10/11/2016.

alienated the north, where it was believed that after Obasanjo's long reign, a northern (Muslim) president was their right...(with) a tacit agreement with the ruling PDP to that effect. This has created unease and irritation with the federal government in northern circles. So much so that even after thousands had been murdered by BH, northern political leaders urged Jonathan to issue an amnesty to BH's fighters¹.

Former president, Goodluck Jonathan himself perceived Boko Haram as a conspiracy by some aggrieved elements against his government. Jonathan once declared that he "knew those behind this" and later avouched that Boko Haram members have infiltrated "all the arms of government" including his cabinet².

For some complexities, anomalies and the opportunities availed Boko Haram to select its theatres, as well as the vacillating and capricious methods through which the sect chooses its targets, a thin line has come to demarcate the causative and facilitative realms of insurgency in the north east region of Nigeria. In fact, little or no attention has been granted the "cause" and "facilitative" dimensions of terrorism in north east. The "cause" is more often than not lumped with the "facilitator" and is generally christened "causes". Though both are not mutually exclusive and as a matter of fact manifest on the same milieu of trajectory, attempt at dissociating the former from the later will go a long way to justify the thesis statement of this discourse. It will also endear readers and policymakers to the position that the Boko Haram menace is more of an ideological fight which of course, is bound to be, and is already protracted – hence, a befitting strategy.

What then is a "cause"? According the Merriam Webster Dictionary, the word "cause" in our perspective is defined as "to make (something) happen or exist", "to make (someone) feel, have to do something". It is synonymous with words such as "beget", "breed", "bring about", "create", "effectuate", "engender", "generate", "induce", "invoke", "prompt", "instigate", "provoke", "foment" etc. In the words of William of Ockham, "something could be construed as an immediate cause when the effect it produces occurs in its presence and all other things being equal fails to occur in its absence"³. A causal factor or causality of a particular event or action lies not just in the foundation, but also in the most primordial of its antecedents. These primordial antecedents serve more as the root upon which the source or trigger is identified. On such level of analysis, David Hume is of the opinion that cause is "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedence and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter"⁴. That is to say C causes E if and only if [i] C is contiguous to E [ii] C occurs before E [iii] All C-type events (i.e all events that are similar to C) are followed by E-type events (i.e events that are similar to E) [iv] upon the observation of C we experience a feeling of anticipating E⁵. A "cause" could reawake a dormant idea or better still, ignite it into motion. It could also present a factoid or basis why an abandoned "cause" must be resurrected. This is why David Hume further, on ideological purview, defined "cause" as "an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of one determines the mine to form the idea of the other"⁶. Aptly put it, "cause" can cause or awake a "cause" or another. This is more so as "causes" on unique ideological lines run on a common grid. Though there could be an interruption or puncture in sequence of manifestation in time, place and space, the basis of justification is explicit of a common and unique foundation. R. G. Collingwood has rightly observed that there are three sense of the word "cause", of which Sense I is historically the earliest of the three, Sense II a development from it, and Sense III a development from Sense II⁷. Of course the Senses could, in my opinion keep replicating and regenerating in perpetuity based on prevailing social conditions. On this level of analysis, "causes" are cognitive in sepulchers that might be redundant or dormant but could be exhumed and even re-exhumed. This is best summarized by Aristotle as "Material cause" which he defines as the material constitution of the entity, providing the passive receptacle on which the remaining causes act⁸. For as Hume as observed, "...if the first object had not been, the second never had existed"⁹.

A facilitator on the other hand helps "to make (something) easier" and helps "(something) run more smoothly and effectively". It greases a cause and makes it easier and less strenuous than supposed. It assists and accelerates the progress of a cause. Just as enzymes catalyze biochemical reactions, facilitators in this perspective enhance the rate, pace and level of proficiency upon which a cause is advanced. Facilitators are

¹Besenyó, "Boko Haram in Context: The Terrorist Organization's Root in Nigeria's Social History".p.53.

²Oyewole, "Boko Haram and the Challenges of Nigeria's War on Terror".p.258.

³Peter A. White, "Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology" *Psychological Bulletin*, (Vol.8, No.1, 1990). p.4.

⁴White, "Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology" p.4

⁵Julian Reiss, Causation: An Opinioted Introduction. Department of Philosophy, Erasmus University , Nethelands, (2007). p13.

⁶White, "Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology" p.4.

⁷White, "Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology" p.7.

⁸White, "Ideas About Causation in Philosophy and Psychology" p.3.

⁹David Lewis, "Causation" *Journal of Philosophy*, (Vol.70, No.17, October 11, 1973). p.556.

stimulants and boosters which energize, support and sustain an idea or a movement. It is always in synergy with the environment – the political, social, cultural, economic, psychological, physical and metaphysical environments. The nature, logic, credence, soundness and legitimacy of a cause, an idea or a movement is never universal but is condemned to, and measured by the fluidity of the intercourse between it and the environment.

Each facets of the environment as indicated above might harbour it distinct influence on the central fabric but only in a microcosm. This is because they are all a product of a common historical process where that which happens in the foundation, has influence on the superstructure as well as the metaphysical. A cause, idea or movement therefore which exploits any of the compatibles in any of this microcosmic environment, attracts empathy from the others. The compatible here is in the areas of abandoned culture, defunct political structure, lag in religious order, and nostalgia which on the basis of present contradictions, warrants a clement desire for its revival by a handful of individuals, but empathy from a larger majority. Thus, a cause, idea or movement which is designed in this manner garners its legitimacy because it exploits on a common past but lacks the required pool of apologists for it is spearheaded by a handful of proponents. Since the larger population in lethargic, apathetic and at best, lackadaisical over the movement or ideas, the adherents capitalizes on the contradictions to win more “souls” since a common environmental antecedents had made them apologetic to the cause.

In clear terms, the instigator or the “cause” of the present movement is clearly the nostalgia of the past reinvigorated by the few. What facilitates or what will facilitate the movement is the present contradictions which provide a basis for sophistries which at the realm of ideas, appeal to a segment of the apologetic population in a slow, haphazard but perpetual formula. Such movements for the resuscitation of the past would not have existed had a few [instigators/cause] not revisited the receptacles of the past [dormant cause] and the movement would not survive if it is not being favoured by the present contradictions [facilitators] which makes the gullible subscribe to the utopia of betterment through restoration of the old order. The continued conversion of the apathetic to the gullible population supports, sustains and enlivens the movement but the mirage of resurrecting a utopian order remains the foundation or the root upon which the movement derives legitimacy. Succinctly, causal and facilitative factors exist and mingle in the same milieu but have meeting and departing points which is very important in our analysis of situations in, as well as profession of solutions to terrorism in north east Nigeria.

What then can be said to be the “cause” of terrorism in north east Nigeria? What is that thing in which it absence *ceteris paribus*, terrorism would not manifest in the region? What are those precedence and contiguity to present terror menace that resembles the later? What are the preceding ideas that are contiguous and united to the current terror ideology in the north east? What are the two Senses of which the current Sense III develops from? The answer is not farfetched! That cause is religion. The holy book of the Islamic religion sanctions a holy war known as *Jihad*. This;

Jihad is a religious duty prescribed by the Qur'an and endorsed by the *Sunna*, or received tradition of the Prophet...It is the duty of every Muslim to summon the unbelievers to embrace Islam; if they accept the invitation then they become members of the Muslim community...if they refuse then they should be fought against¹.

It was based on the above premise that a Fulani, Usman Dan Fodio introduced political Islamism to northern Nigeria and through violent disposition and insidious indoctrination, polluted the “secular” political climate of the region from 1804. Having declared himself the Messiah, with the claim that “he received a vision instructing him to ‘unsheath the sword of truth’...”, began to preach that the preparation of arms is a *Sunna* – a recommended practice, sanctioned by the prophet’s usage². Subsequently, “he began urging his followers to arm themselves”³. What were they to do with the arms? Be indoctrinated with what Falola et al call a “powerful weapon” and “propaganda” on the juicy and amorous advantages which accompanies brutality for the sake of faith. The indoctrination was quite viscous that “the cause for which they fought was quite clear and for those of them who were religiously inclined, their longing for martyrdom made them fight ferociously”⁴.

The religious revolution by Usman Dan Fodio set precedence, became contiguous, left the region volatile, and became a prototype and reference point upon which the justification or legitimacy of every radical Islamism in the region is based. The rebirth of the caliphate which Fodio established from his revolutionary escapades as well as the Sharia law which he helped enshrine has remained the foundation upon which series of religious related terrors have been perpetrated and perpetuated in the northern region. What would assume the

¹J. O. Hunwick, “The Nineteenth Century Jihads” In Joseph C. Anene & Godfrey N. Brown (eds) *Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1966). p.292.

²Hunwick, “The Nineteenth Century Jihads” p.295.

³Toyin Falola, et al, *History of Nigeria (Vol.2): Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century*. (Ikeja: Longman Nigeria Plc., 1991). p8.

⁴Falola, et al, *History of Nigeria*, p.14.

posture of Collingwood's Sense II paradigm surfaced in the 1980s when Muhammed Marwa, based on Fodio's antecedents, instigated another era of radical Islamism with the objective of enforcing Sharia on the Nigerian polity. Of course, it is no coincidence that the objective or ideological basis of every succeeding militant Muslim group right from the days of Lawan Abubakar, Muhammed Yusuf, to Abubakar Shakau, seek the return to the glorious days of the old where Sharia was the basis for jurisprudence.

Islam thus, provides that passive receptacle upon which Dan Fodio Islamism and its prototypes act. Here, it provides an ideology which is "an articulation of the group's vision of the future, a vision which its adherents believe cannot be achieved without the use of violence"¹. With this idea, they are configured into believing that;

the superiority of God rules provides them with a feeling of justification for violating man-made rules against violent atrocities. Doing the bidding of a higher power demands sacrifice but also means fewer limits on violence. It's easier to kill if you think you are doing God's will; violent is seen as necessary in order to save oneself, one's family or even the world².

Indoctrinating such eschatology becomes the most potent weapon which of course is directly repercussive and reflective of the Boko Haram's group objectives. Boko Haram thus, as recounted earlier in the work has a vision and objective of restoring the old order with terror strategy. The cardinal essence of the sect is that of full implementation of the Sharia; and that such restructuring requires regime change because a democratic and secular constitution contravenes and is an anathema to the law of God. Thus, amid "whatever mix of inspiration, Boko Haram is a sectarian movement"³. It is at a bilinear string of antagonisms with the government and Christianity/non-pious Muslims and its leadership is not in any way economical in declaring such vituperations. Abubakar Shakau (current leader of the sect) in Youtube video uploaded on January 15, 2012 avouched thus;

we hardly touch anybody except security personnel and Christians...Everyone knows what Christians did to Muslims, not once or twice...You Christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God...the religion you are practicing is not a religion of God – it is paganism...You Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh like cannibals⁴.

For this reason, "all Muslims in this part of the world" should obey the clarion call and "fight for the restoration of the caliphate of Usman Dan Fodio". Such is the philosophy of Boko Haram and it reflects nostalgia and contiguity with the past. The level of indoctrination is even more tenacious but is explicit of the past. In a Youtube video uploaded in April 22, 2012, Boko Haram leadership reiterated that;

by the grace of Allah, our main aim remains that we are killed and made martyrs in the duty of Allah, so we may gain the fruits of Allah's promises to his servants as written in His Book, the holy Qur'an⁵.

Thus, the eschatology of radical Islamism was, and remains the prime mover and ultimate motivator of the Boko Haram Sect.

However, "causes" are a product of, and of course, manifest in an environment. The level of acceptability and legitimacy of Boko Haram Islamism among the local population is not unconnected to the prevailing contradictions which we have labeled "facilitators". These facilitators as recounted earlier include, but not limited to poverty, corruption, identity/regional politics, bad governance, perceived marginalization, illiteracy and lack of basic infrastructures, basic services and injustice. With those contradictions, "Individuals like Muhammed Yusuf were able to seize the opportunity to seek relevance by preaching an alternative platform for disenchanting, vulnerable youths and consequently radicalize them to attack the system which, they believe, is largely responsible for their situation"⁶.

¹Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria". p.10.

²Forest, "Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria". p.14.

³Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis".p.8.

⁴See Konye O. Ori's "Conceptualizing Boko Haram Victimage, Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism". Unpublished MA thesis, Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University, (2013) for series of translated videos and texts from Boko Haram press releases.

⁵Ori, "Conceptualizing Boko Haram Victimage, Ritual and the Construction of Islamic Fundamentalism" p.26.

⁶Abeeb Salaam, "The Psychological Make-up of 'Muhammad Yusuf'" In Ioannis Mantzikos (ed) *Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis*. (Bristol: e-International Relations, 2013). p.50.

We premise these contradictions to be facilitators for just as in the past, it was not, and is still not a peculiarity of the northern Nigeria. A juxtaposition of these ‘facilitators’ in northern Nigeria with its surrounding counterparts will make a travesty, and in fact raise issues in the treatise of those who refer to them as “causes”. If we are to analyze the poverty factor for instance, it would be obvious that it is not a prime factor. Muhammed Yusuf himself was of the middle class who was opulent enough to purchase a visa for his studies abroad. He even displayed his munificence and ostentation by building Qur’anic schools and hostels that would aid in the propagation of the faith. This welfare system attracted the poor and Yusuf “would often arrange cheap marriages for his followers in otherwise very costly environment”. Therefore, Yusuf was not wretched; hence, poverty could not have “caused” him to seek the return to the old order. If poverty, as it is wrongly argued, spurred up terrorism in the northern region, why has other wretched regions and neighbouring countries not terrorized themselves as a means to that recourse? It is interesting to note that the neighbouring region of Ditta in the Republic of Niger is much poorer, though better governed. As Montclos observes,

there is no evidence that Boko Haram has particular support from the poor or is fighting for economic justice...within Boko Haram and its splinter groups, some elements went to university, including the British-born Nigerian army deserter, Aminu Sadiq Ogwuche, allegedly involved in the 2014 bombings at Nyanya, Abuja¹.

Such could be denoted of other contradictions or grievances such as corruption, perceived marginalization, poor governance and absence of basic facilities. By the ranking of Transparency International 2016 Global Corruption Index report, Nigeria notches 137 and is superior to Chad Republic, Cameroon and most of its neighbouring countries but Niger Republic. Why is the protest strategy in most of the other countries and regions in Nigeria not based on religiously defined terror? It should be noted that corruption, and every other governance malfeasances are repercussive on all the regions in Nigeria. The militant in Niger Delta and every other region express their grievances in the praxis of economic pragmatism than religiosity. From governmental representations to distribution of national wealth, the north has been fairly treated better. Tujadeen Akanji has noted that 83 percent of the nation’s oil wells are in the hands of a few northern elites². The northern region has produced occupants of lucrative political positions (including presidents) than any other region. Thus, if it were to be on the basis of contradictions, the Niger Delta and the South East should have been the epicenter of political terrorism.

More so, how do we explain a scenario where a suicide bomber detonates an explosive, shattering his/herself and hundred others in the process? In the strict sense of it, it could be borne of frustration, but, ethnographic data available have demonstrated that the push factor behind such brevity is not the desire to push for the correction of socio-political anomalies but that based on carefully designed religious ideological indoctrination. It is logical and of course incontrovertible that pauperized Nigerians are enticed into the Boko Haram group with peanuts; the question left unanswered is what they hope to achieve and how they intend to become affluent through suicide killings. Obviously, there is a cause that is feasting on the political malfeasances – that cause being radical Islamism. The situation illuminates a milieu in which if radical Islamism is fumigated in the northern region, Boko Haram as an entity loses its basis, and is strangled.

In a conspectus, the point here is that radical Islamism (religion) is the “cause” of terrorism in north east Nigeria. However, there are “arrays of environmental conditions and grievances among members of the population that facilitate opportunities for Boko Haram to muster support and orchestrate acts of political violence”³. Without the instrumentality of religion, terrorism would not have manifested. Without a favourable or contradictions infested environment, radical Islamism would have been bereft of apologists – that is the meeting point.

3.0 The Impending Security Dent and the Succeeding Government’s Sanctimonious Rhetoric

Threatened by conundrum and instability engineered by the Boko Haram terrorists, the Nigerian government under former President, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan (2010-2015) reacted swiftly by promulgating a law which defined and proscribed terrorist act of any kind. In that regard, the *2011 Terrorist Act* gave a direction by defining what it interdicts as;

an act which is deliberately done with malice, afterthought and which, is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or to abstain from performing an act seriously to

¹Montclos, “Nigeria’s Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis”.p.9.

²Tajudeen Akanji., “Insecurity in Nigeria: The Boko Haram Dimension”. *KAS International Report*, (Vol.7., 2013). p.88.

³Forest, “Confronting the Terrorism of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. p.16.

intimidate a population; involves or causes, as the case may be may cause serious bodily harm or death, kidnapping of a person, destruction of government or public utility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system...¹.

With subsequent amendments in 2013, loopholes and legal bottlenecks were fixed and legal framework for combating terrorism was thus in place². Part of the government's response has been the declaration of a state of emergency in some northern states where the insurgency is thought to be most active and setting up Joint Task Force to end the impunity of insurgents and terrorists³.

Since 2012, the government has struggled to address the challenge on multiple tracts by especially increasing the defense budget from ₦100 billion (\$625 million) in 2010 to ₦927 billion (\$6 billion) in 2011 and ₦1 trillion (\$6.25 billion), in 2012, 2013 and 2014⁴. On June, 2013, the government proscribed Boko Haram and Ansaru, describing their activities as terrorism, and warned that any person associated with the two groups was liable to prosecution. Consequently, eleven (11) convictions were obtained in 2013. Also, more emphasis was placed by the government on retraining personnel in urban warfare, counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Personnel management was also being prioritized as well as equipment for close quarter combat, intelligence and amphibious operations, demolition and explosive breaching, tactical communication and civil-military relations⁵.

Attempts were also made at exploring the dialogue option with the insurgents. On August 2, 2011, the government set up eight-member committee led by Usman Galtimari, its former envoy to Chad, to study the Boko Haram security challenge and advise on the best approach to ending the crisis. The Committee recommended talks and amnesty for sect members who renounce violence. On 16 September, 2011, the former president Olusegun Obasanjo held talks in Maiduguri with Boko Haram members who laid out conditions for ceasefire. On 17 April, 2013, a Twenty-six Member Amnesty Committee headed by special duty minister Kabiru Taminu Turaki was formed⁶. Amnesty was eventually offered but without any positive result⁷.

From the early 2011, the government deployed some 3,600 personnel to Maiduguri and other major northeast towns as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF); a special formation of military, police and State Security Service (SSS) units. They were supplemented by small contingents from Chad and Niger members of Joint Multi National Task Force (JMNTF). Additional 2,000 troops were deployed in 2013 and further increased to 10,000 in 2015. In August, 2014, Regional Intelligence Fusion Unit was formed in Abuja to increase intelligence sharing between Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad and Benin. To counter radicalization and violent extremism, Nigeria through Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) launched a programme in 2014 to perfect the human rights and security of *almajiri* children, reinforce peace building and conflict transformation, and develop youth leadership and civic engagement in northern Nigeria through English language training⁸.

The JTF has been accused of utilizing unnecessary lethal force, "gross human right violations, mass murder, extra-judicial killing, physical abuse, secret detentions, extortion, burning houses, and stealing money during raids"⁹. It has even been speculated that "the deployed forces operated with less than \$100 million a year which pales against the \$2 billion central allocation of the armed forces"¹⁰. Confronted with issues bordering war crimes, arm acquisition challenges, lack of support and hostile public opinion by affected communities, inability to define the root of cause of terrorism, the Chibok School Girls saga and the general politicization of the war against terror, President Jonathan left the scene in 2015 at the lowest ebb.

The emergence of the All Progressives Congress (APC) led Muhammadu Buhari's government in 2015 hawed a fresh breath, relaxed the tensions and enlivened the longing for the much desired victory against insurgency in the north east region. This was more so as the bane of the Jonathan's administration was insecurity and corruption. The personality of President Buhari as a retired army general positioned him as the right man for the job. Prior to his election as the president, Gen Buhari had granted an interview in Abuja on February 6, 2015,

¹Christian Akani, "2011 Terrorism Act in Nigeria: Prospect and Problems". *Online International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, (Vol.2, No.8, 2013).p.221

²For details, See Mu'azu A. Saulawa & Babagana Karumi, "Terrorism in Nigeria: An Overview of Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2013, Amended". *International of Business, Economics and Law*, (Vol.8, No.4, 2015).p.12.

³Muhammed Sulemana, "Centenary of Failure? Boko Haram, Jihad and the Nigerian Reality". *The Australasian Review of African Studies*, (Vol.35, No.2, 2014).pp.70-71

⁴"Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. *Crisis Group Africa Report*, p.30.

⁵"Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. *Crisis Group Africa Report*, p.31.

⁶"Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency. *Crisis Group Africa Report*, p.23.

⁷Aro, "Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Its Implication and Way forwards towards Avoidance of Future Insurgency" p.1.

⁸"Country Reports on Terrorism 2014". Bureau of Counterterrorism, *United States Department of State*, (2015). pp.44-45.

⁹Osumah Oarhe, "Responses of the Nigerian Defense and Intelligence Establishments to the Challenge of Boko Haram" In Ioannis Mantzikod (ed) *Boko Haram: Anatomy of a Crisis*. p.66.

¹⁰Montclos, "Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency? Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis". p.17

vituperating that “our soldiers have neither received the necessary support nor the required incentive to tackle this problem. If I’m elected president...we will improve intelligence gathering...we will be tough on terrorists and tough on its root causes...in the affected areas”. In fact, he vowed to “lead from the front in the fight against Boko Haram”¹.

Upon assuming office in May 29, 2015, President Buhari had declared his intention to end every form of terrorism in the north east by December, 2015. In his early days in office, he consolidated on the late victories of his predecessors and reclaimed a chunk of territory from Boko Haram militants. As a Fulani, an ‘insider’ and a onetime Boko Haram preferred assignee in a proposed negotiation with the federal government, Nigerians did not just consider the deadline feasible but also began to exhibit lines of serenades in anticipation for a job well done. Consequently, President Buhari (with a continuum in strategy) in December, 2015, informed the *BBC* that Nigeria has “technically won the war” against Boko Haram. That “the militant group could no longer mount conventional attacks against security forces or population centres. It has been reduced to fighting with improvised explosives devices (IED) and remained a force only in its heartland of Borno State”².

From the figures and analysis advanced by *NewWeek*, the dreaded group in an attempt to nullify the submission of the president killed about 2,306 persons in the first quarter of 2016. The group was still vibrant and agile enough to pillage the village of Dalori, setting ablaze livestock and decimating over 80 peoples³. As Max Siollun observes, “the military successes changed Boko Haram’s threat, but didn’t eliminate it”⁴.

The above opinion and observations notwithstanding, President Buhari again in December 24, 2016, reiterated his grounds and “commend[ed] the determination, courage and resilience of troops of *Operation Lafiya Dole* at finally entering and crushing the remnants of the Boko Haram insurgents at “Camp Zero”, which is located deep within the heart of Sambisa forest”. The President revealed that “the terrorists are on the run, and no longer have a place to hide” hence, the soldiers should “maintain the tempo by pursuing them and bring them to justice”⁵. The media frenzy climaxed with the presentation of a captured flag and Qur’an purportedly belonging to Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shakau to President Buhari by the Nigerian army at the Guards Brigade Regimental Dinner Night at the Guard Brigade Scorpion Mess, Abuja, on 30th December, 2016.

Henceforth, major encounters and defeats of the Islamist group became politicized and shredded in secrecy. The word “remnants” invaded the strategic lexicon of the nation’s defense’ press releases. Every encounter with Boko Haram, irrespective of how fierce it is, is ulteriorly masked since the major threat was defeated hence, less attention to its “remnants”. Since the expectation of the masses on the area of security is very high, the government is now on a spree of dishing out propaganda to modulate public opinion. It is also in a habit of discrediting the previous regime while sentimentalizing its present “infallible” strategy which has “paid off” in the fight against insurgency.

Yet, weeks after the superficial victory against Boko Haram, security situations deteriorated. In the first week of January, 2017, 15 hunters were decapitated by militants in Borno. Few days later, a military location in Damaturu, the Yobe State capital was attacked, culminating in the deaths of 5 soldiers. In January 8, two female suicide bombers struck the Kaleri area of Mafa local government of Borno State, killing 2 others. Same day, another 8 persons were killed and scores injured when multiple explosions hit Maiduguri, the Borno State capital. By Thursday January 12, Abubakar Shakau, in a video, claimed responsibility for the bomb blast that killed 4 persons and injured 17 others at University of Maiduguri, Borno State. The killing spree continued in January 13, when three bombs exploded in Madagali town of Adamawa State killing many. Same day, a suicide bomber detonated and killed another two persons. In mid-January, the convoy of 2nd Lt. Amajouritse was hit by a bomb, resulting in his and others’ deaths. Reports filtered in on January 17 of Nigerian air force “accidental” bombing of an IDP camp in Rann, killing more than 230 persons. Just days after, eyewitness report spoke of soldiers battling for hours to repel more than 100 Boko Haram militants who attacked the nuked IDP camp with death toll not below 15. In January 24, a patrol vehicle in Biu local government area of Borno State was ambushed and a police officer slaughtered. A few days later, Boko Haram attacked a military base at Sasawa

¹ “Nigeria’s Buhari vows to ‘lead from the front’ against Boko Haram” *DailyMail*, (Feb. 25, 2015). <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2970267/Nigerias-Buhari-vows-lead-against-Boko-Haram.html>. Accessed 31/07/2017.

² “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants ‘technically defeated’ – Buhari, *BBC News*, (December 24, 2015). <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-35173618>. Accessed 01/08/2017.

³ Conor Gaffey, “Nigeria’s President Says Boko Haram is Finished as a Fighting Force”, *NewsWeek*, (July 12, 2016). <http://www.newsweek.com/has-nigerias-buhari-finished-boko-haram-529309>. Accessed 01/08/2017.

⁴ Max Siollun, “Can Boko Haram be Defeated?” *The New York Times*, (May 18, 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/opinion/can-boko-haram-be-defeated.html>. Accessed 01/08/2017.

⁵ Goodwill Message from President Muhammadu Buhari to Troops of Operation Lafiya Dole on the Successful Capture of Boko Haram Enclave in Sambisa Forest – Available at <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/218799-breaking-buhari-declears-boko-harams-final-crushing-says-last-sambisa-stronghold-fallen.html>. Accessed 01/08/2017.

town near Damaturu and burnt it down. In the ensuing counter attack, 3 soldiers lost their lives. The last of the major attacks in January was a suicide attack on Dalori Quarters Mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State.

In about 14:00 local time of February 1, Boko Haram attacked a UN technical team working along the Nigeria-Cameroon border, killing five persons and injuring several others. In the night of February 17, scores were feared death as Boko Haram detonated explosives and engaged the Nigerian army in a fierce combat that lasted more than an hour in an IDP camp at Mafa, Maiduguri. The Nigerian army in February 10 confirmed Boko Haram attacks on its troops, admitting the loss of 7 soldiers. In February 17, a suicide bomber killed self and destroyed 13 vehicles in one detonation. On Sunday February 26, terrorists' explosion rocked Kontagora in Niger State, killing 3 and injuring 4.

In March 14, Boko Haram released a video, showing the execution of three men the group accused of spying for the Nigerian military. Reports permeated the news environment on March 15 about the terrorists' grand assault on the entirety of Magumeri town of Borno, forcing residents to flee to Maiduguri. On March 18, three suicide bombers attacked Mulai community in Jere local government of Borno, leading to the death of 5, and injury of 8 persons.

On April 7, *Terrormonitor.org* broadcast the video released by Boko Haram, showing their attacks on African forces and equipment seized from them. Same day, news carried that Boko Haram jihadists killed 4 soldiers in an ambush near Gubdori village, Maiduguri, just a day after killing 7 civilians; in the attack, 5 soldiers were injured while another 4 were declared missing. In April 20, *Premiumtimesng* reported that Boko Haram militants have sacked an army battalion, killing 8 soldiers; wounded 11 others and carted away several arms and ammunitions at Sabon Gari Base, Borno State. On Thursday 27th April, about five soldiers were killed and 40 injured when Boko Haram's explosive-laden pickup truck rammed into a military convoy at Manguzum, Borno State.

On May 4, 7 persons were confirmed dead as two female suicide bombers attacked Mandarari ward in Konduga local government of Borno. Within hours, Abubakar Shakau released a video to dismiss claims by the Nigerian air force that he was injured in a recent aerial bombardment. Amidst this height of tension, aggression and confrontation, Boko Haram released about 82 of the kidnapped Chibok School girls in May 6. In May 13, Shuaibu Moni, one of the Boko Haram generals swapped for the Chibok schoolgirls, in a new video, threatened to bomb Abuja. On the 20th day of May, a *BBC* source¹ disclosed that the Chibok girls were exchanged for "five senior Boko Haram militants" and "two million Euros in cash". On the same day, the Islamic militants beheaded 4 IDPs at Dalori I camp of Maiduguri. By May 24, there was a bomb blast in Amaranmati village, Maiduguri, leaving scores dead.

In June 3, the Nigerian army announced the surrendering of a wanton figure of 700 Boko Haram insurgents. But in June 18, multiple suicide blast hit Kofa, Borno, killing 16 and injuring 11 others. On June 20, supply convoy was ambushed, resulting in the death of 3 and kidnap of 16 women. On June 26, the militant group released a video, showing the kidnapped distraught policewomen.

By July 24, strings of attacks at Jekete village in Konduga local government area of Borno State culminated in the death of about 15 people and scores more missing. On the 28th of same month, a suicide bomber sneaked into an estate accommodating returning IDPs in Dikwa, and detonated explosives leading to the death of 14 with 24 others sustaining injuries. Generally, University of Maiduguri by 2016 had become a tourist attraction to terrorists' suicide bombers, who have rained series of attacks with intensity increasing from January, 2017. The ambushing of the NNPC oil workers remains the latest escapade of the dreaded group.

The above feat is too glorious for a remnant of a trounced group to achieve. Obviously, the Buhari government has failed to be sincere to itself and the general public. Scoring of political points as well as political correctness has been prioritized. The genuine intention to exterminate terrorism is defeated by the intentions of presenting the administration as a more trustworthy, reliable and that committed to the cause of ending insurgency. It does not matter if the citizens are misinformed or not, the physiognomy of the administration is paramount. Recently (the last week of July, 2017), there was an attack in the Magumeri area of Borno State on a convoy of specialists from Nigerian National Petroleum Commission (NNPC). A day after the attack, the army claimed they had rescued the oil workers. Four days after, following the release of a video showing three of the abducted members of the oil exploration team by Boko Haram, the army released another statement, regretting the earlier propaganda of a statement. This is just one of the hundreds of stratagems to endear public opinion than put an end to insurgency in the north east region. The fight now is on three fronts: main fight against terror, fight against negative public opinion, and fight to discredit the previous administration. Unfortunately, the first doesn't appear to be the priority compared to the second. For instance, trading million of dollars and incarcerated Boko Haram generals for a "few Chibok girls" was not a move at mitigating the security situation but that of proving a political point and cementing an endearing public opinion. Analysts have blamed the reinvigoration

¹See the hyperlink http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idE-sh/chibok_girls Accessed 01/08/2017.

and revived confidence of the dreaded sect on that gesture. The reality is that, for a few girls, hundreds have been sacrificed. Rhetorically asking, which amongst the two is a lesser evil?

Generally, both the previous administration and the present Buhari led administration appear to be lackadaisical to both the “causes” and “facilitators” of insurgency in the north east region. Like Jonathan, Buhari administration’s approach has been majorly confrontational and aggressive. Declaring victory over Boko Haram simply because they no longer held territories is not just ridiculous but reflects the ignorance of the Nigerian defense council on the nature and character of the Boko Haram struggle. Even bandits with no ideology are capable of reassembling and inflicting damages upon being scattered by a superior force. What then about a value based insurgent group? When President Buhari during his campaign promised to be “tough on terrorists and tough on its root causes”, one would have expected to see an overhaul of this obsolete strategy for no army can engage in a conventional strategy and triumph in an irregular warfare. Very little has been done so far on the area of deradicalization, curbing of poverty and illiteracy, and the legitimacy combat which this phase of the war defines. The proposed, passed and withdrawn “North East Development Commission Bill” which was designed to address the “facilitators” has been condemned to politicking, hence, left redundant. Who would have believed that up to this date, the Buhari led administration is yet to design a grand strategy at curbing insurgency in the north east? Of the hundreds of scholarly recommendations earlier made, we emphasize the containment strategy.

4.0 What is the Containment Strategy?

The Soviet Union on the eve of World War II, had absorbed the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. She had also expanded to eastern and central Europe and began to impose its control upon Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, even before the end of the war¹. Kremlin was also active in Greece while pressurizing Iran and Turkey for territorial cession and naval bases in the Bosphorus. All these moves were aggressive expansion of Soviet’s communist ideology and influence with the sole motive of subverting capitalism for “when a revolutionary crisis develops in America, that will be the beginning of the end of world capitalism as a whole”². According to NSC 20,20/1,20/2 &20/3 and CIA Report, ORE 60-48, the Soviet were “waging political, economic, and psychological warfare against all elements resistant to communist purposes, and in particular, attempting to prevent or retard the recovery of a cooperation among western European countries”³. The United States of America, reacting to this ‘potential’ threat designed the prestigious containment strategy.

Historically, containment strategy could be traced to the aftermath of the 1917 Russian Revolution where there were calls for western leaders to isolate the Bolshevik government. While the French Premier Georges Clemenceau called for a *cordon sanitaire* or ring of non-communist states to isolate the Soviet Union, Woodrow Wilson called for a “quarantine”⁴ as communism was perceived as a communicable disease.

The philosophical basis for the formulation of the containment strategy was contained in George Kennan’s 1947 article titled “Sources of Soviet Conduct”. Kennan perceived Soviet despise of capitalism and its long term strategy of subverting it as a threat; a threat to be ‘contained’ through a long-term psychological, diplomatic, military and political means. Kennan, observing Soviet’s intransigence submitted that:

...[these Soviet policies] on one hand [make it] more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power. On the other hand, it cannot be easily defeated or discouraged by a single victory on the parts of its opponent. And the patience persistence by which it is animated means that it can be effectively countered not by sporadic acts...but only by intelligent long range policies on the part of Russia’s adversaries... In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any United States policy towards the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patience but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies⁵.

¹John Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*. (Florida: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1988), p. 24.

²Joseph Stalin, “A Speech Addressing the American Commission of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on May 6, 1929, In Chesly Manly, *The Twenty Year Revolution from Roosevelt to Eisenhower*. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1954), p. 5.

³S. Nelson Drew (ed), *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*. (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1994). p.25.

⁴“Containment” *Wikipedia* Online Free Encyclopedia (<http://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/containment>) Retrieved October 9, 2015.

⁵George F. Kennan, “Sources of Soviet Conduct” In Richard L. Watson Jr. (ed) *The United States in the Contemporary World, 1945 – 1962*, (New York: The Free Press, 1965). pp.56-57.

Such policy Kennan advised should have “nothing to do with threats or blustering or superfluous gestures of outward “toughness” but:

the United States has it in its power to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power¹.

In a swift reaction, President Harry Truman in March 12, 1947 appeared before the US Congress with the “Truman Doctrine” seeking \$400,000,000 as aids to Greece and Turkey for “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”². Truman thus “proposed in effect, that America police Russia’s every borders”. The doctrine was to be a “declaration of economic and financial pressures” on Russia³. Another package was advanced by George C. Marshall to “provide a cure rather than a mere palliative” to ailing economies along Soviet cordon⁴. This cure, aside the \$597,000,000 for immediate emergency relief, asked to “enter into a 4-year contract to furnish some \$20,000,000,000 or more in money and supplies to implement the Marshall plan...the money was to worth \$50,000,000,000 in a few years”⁵.

The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were crucial and historic for they signified the adoption of George Kennan’s containment policy. By 1947, the Congress had passed the National Security Act, which established the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; provided for an Air force independence from the army; and created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). By 1948, the Marshall Plan was passed by the Senate. In an effort to alienate and circumvent Soviet Union, Germany and Japan were assisted on economic revitalization while military alliances such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), Middle East Treaty Organization (METO), Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) etc. were formed. Both the 38th parallel and the 17th parallel were designated as international boundary between free (capitalist) and totalitarian (communist) worlds.

Containment strategy in effect was “a policy of calculated and gradual coercion”⁶. It was aimed at “the psychological malaise in countries bordering on the Russian sphere of influence that made them, and hence the overall balance of power vulnerable to Soviet expansive tendencies”⁷. Containment meant, refusing to bring on a full scale war with the Soviet and China, but restraining them from occupying new territory such as South Korea or Taiwan. The doctrine was premise on a prudent patience and would at times take bold resolve to deter expansion. The argument was that “so long totalitarianism was contained, in the long run it would prove to have more internal contradictions than liberal market democracies. In the long run, contained totalitarianism is likely to self-destruct than contained democracy”⁸.

Containment strategy aimed to avoid both appeasement of the USSR and a direct military confrontation, and thus involved the judicious use of “economic sticks and carrots, fostering competition within the world communist movement, engaging in diplomacy, promoting the health and vigour of capitalist democracies and ensuring that our attempts to combat the Soviets would not make us become more like them”, while waiting for communism to exhaust itself beneath the weight of its own internal contradictions⁹. The containment strategy was designed to “reduce the power and influence of the USSR to limits which no longer constitute a threat to the

¹ George Kennan, “The Source of Soviet Conduct”. *Foreign Affairs*, (July, 1947. Accessed from <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19470701feassay25403/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct.html>. March, 2016).

² Harry S. Truman, “Truman Doctrine” Address which he delivered to Congress on March 12, 1947. (Available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/doctrine/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-08-12&documentid=31&studycollectionsid=TDoctrine&pagenumber=1>. Accessed March, 2016)

³ Henry A. Wallace, Speech on the Truman Doctrine, March 27th, 1947. (<http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/index.asp?document=852>. Retrieved March, 2016)

⁴George C. Marshall, Speech gave to the Graduating Class of 1947 at Harvard University, June 15, 1947. (Available at <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study-collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?documentdate=1947-06-15&documentid=mp&pagenumber=1>. Accessed March, 2016)

⁵ Charles W. Vursell, Speech on the Marshall Plan, December 4, 1947. (<http://www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=855>. Accessed March, 2016).

⁶Drew (ed), *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*, pp.54-55.

⁷John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategy of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security Policy*. Oxford, 1982. Qtd in Andreas M. Bock, “Containment Revived: An Alternative Way to Cope with Terrorism”. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, (Vol.2, No.1, 2009). p.35.

⁸John Braithwaite, “Pre-empting Terrorism”. *Current Issues in Criminal Justice*, (Vol.17, No.1, 2005). p.102.

⁹Lee Jones, Review of Ian Shapiro’s *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror* (2007). Available at <http://www.culturewars.org.uk/2007-03/shapiro.htm>. Accessed 20/08/2016.

peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations”. It was to “encourage and promote gradual retraction of undue Russian power and influence from the present parameter area around traditional Russian boundaries and the emergence of satellite countries as entities independent of the USSR”¹.

The containment strategy was highly successful. It pressurized and frustrated the USSR into submission in 1989.

4.1 Containing Terrorism in North Eastern Nigeria

It is a fact of history, political science, sociology and even strategic studies that value based conflict of ideological wars are more often than not protracted. The cold war here is just an example out of a hundred. The containment strategy is remodeled here to fit the war situation and conditions in north east Nigeria. Nigeria just like the US (during the Cold War) is at the verge of losing not just its territory, influence, loyal citizens and statehood to terrorists who through indoctrination have won a large number of “zombified” elements to its radical Islamist cause. Western ideologies, secularism and religious tolerance are anathema to these militants’ teachings. Boko Haram has also raised armies, seized territories and advanced economic packages to infiltrate the communities they operate and thus, gain their support. Thus, what would look like the Truman Doctrine (in the form of physical presence), Marshall Plan (in the form of welfare and economic packages) and a strong intelligence network become pertinent here too to frustrate and starve the terrorists of both empathetic and active fan-base.

4.2.1 Physical/Geographical Containment

Just like what Harry Truman did in the popular Truman Doctrine when he consented to physical US armed forces presence in the fragile European and strategic south eastern European states, the physical/geographical containment entails physical presence of Nigerian armed forces across strategic positions in north east Nigeria as defined in this work. It should be recalled that US armed forces presence at these strategic points was a part of the containment strategy which was a grand plan against further soviet expansion. It was an epitome of a well defined fortress aimed at frustrating the proliferation of the Soviet’s epidemic ideology; deter direct aggression, while counteracting subversion through military intelligence networks.




Fig.1 Map Showing the Geographical Features of North Eastern Nigeria

In redefining this strategy for its utilization in combating terrorism in north east Nigeria, geography will play a very crucial role. In the troubled areas, are varieties of vegetations such as Guinea, the Montane, the Sahel and the Sudan savannahs. Also worthy of note are the Mambilla highlands, the Lake Chad as well as the rich topography of the Sambisa reserve. Very importantly, natural defense endowments between ‘persistently hit areas’ and perceived base or safe haven of Boko Haram is to be mapped out with a corresponding threat diameter defined. With this, a tentative parameter for tactical conjectures can be drawn. Engagements here, as would be

¹Drew (ed), *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment*. p.30.

discussed later, are not to be confrontational or aggressive but in synchronous of timely mobilization and sorties, based on concrete intelligence.

Presently, the Nigerian intelligence is yet to assertively define the base or safe haven of this insurgent group. This to a great extent will limit this plan since the definition of the base will determine the periphery where an encircled cordon or parameter can be established. This notwithstanding, this work hypothesizes three bases of Boko Haram operation – the North East Nigeria Area, the Borno-Yobe Area and the Sambisa Area. Based on these three surmised bases, befitting plans are defined in relations to containing further spread of terrorist networks, ideology, attacks, supplies, community support, fan base, recruit and apologists.




Fig.2 Showing Formula for Physical Containment

Consequently, freedom of movement in and outside terrorist bases, affected areas and freed/liberated territories is to be curtailed, monitored and regulated. As earlier mentioned, the truncation of movement to and outside troubled areas will checkmate further proliferation of attacks as well as starve the terrorists of supplies. It will also interrupt direct contact and communication between terrorist’s base and its subsidiary satellites in the north east region (if any). In such a milieu, reprisals should be expected since the sect would not just suffocate in passivity. However, such attacks against the cordons are likely to be weak and uncoordinated since it is borne of frustration and anger. Through preemptive actions and intelligence gathering, checkmating attacks against cordons and checkpoints, and on counterterrorist forces, would be less strenuous.

Demarcated openings or entrance routes (checkpoints) to affected areas are to be heavily manned and armed by counterterrorist’s contingents. In a situation whereby remnants of sect members launch attacks from the periphery or affected area, such attack shall definitely be overpowered by counterterrorist forces and the fleeing sect members easily tracked down since they cannot readily retreat to their central base or safe haven.




Fig. 3 Showing Formula Demonstrating the Wall Cordon System

As illustrated by the above figures (2 & 3) and analyses, three options are available for the erection/establishment of a cordon: **Option one** - the physical armed surveillance/circumscription by the armed forced; **Option two** - the landmines confines; and **Option three** - concrete wall encirclement. Upon determining

the circumference of the affected area, any of these cordon options could be adopted with special attention to prevailing geographical situation and conditions.

Option one (i.e. physical circumscription) would only be worth considering if the defined base measures a few kilometers. Even so, prevailing environmental and geographical features as indicated in the map above might be hazardous for a consistent presence or camping, hence, the first option is subject not just to the size of insurgent's base but also, prevailing geographical and climatic conditions. That is to say, option two and three are the most feasible, reliable and strategically potent for an encircled parameter.

The landmine cordon (Option two) system is a preferable option for arid areas and areas with rare settlements. Mines here, rather than physical army presence, are utilized in defining the bound between free/liberated areas and contained areas. For a minimal collateral damage, the mines are to be installed in a clearly defined and "classified" formula, properly mopped-up with up-to-date military equipment and gadgets. The mine technology should be that which only the echelon of counterterrorist forces possesses the technical know-how of defusing them. In situations whereby terrorists deploy decoys to detonate the mines, their trail would be easily tracked while a dispatch of counterterrorist forces at the nearest checkpoint replaces the exploded mines based on its original formula. Since a myriad of the Boko Haram militants (the suicide bombers), due to high level of indoctrination, would naturally wish to defy the mines by braving them, the breadth of the cordon lines as well as the swiftness of reaction to any detonation by units at the checkpoints should be designed and made to commensurate such circumstance. To ensure that innocent civilians do not step on these mines, large scale sensitization and awareness programmes should be conducted in affected communities with warning signs erected (with all languages of communication) along visible proximities. Civilians should also be encouraged to pass through their nearest checkpoint to their legitimate businesses; these roles will be championed by the community policemen who shall play a major role in this grand strategy.




Fig. 4 Demonstrating Land mine formula

The wall cordon (Option three) is recommended for cordon along the international borders, the forest areas and maybe on the highland and waterlogged areas. The thickness or breath of the wall should be such that missiles and artillery shells cannot easily fall. The wall system should include the use of "multiple layers of interdependent systems which include CCTV, surveillance, security guards, [and] protective barriers,". There should be a distribution of guard towers (mounted with AK47 and rocket launchers), security lights, alarm system, motion sensor, and drone controlled cameras.

Based on the preferred cordon option adopted and the total area to be covered, a decision could then be reached on the number of checkpoints to be established per stipulated square kilometers. In cases where geostrategic complications arise from geographic or climatic factors, the three cordon options could be utilized to attain the grand aim of containing terrorism. Practical suggestion of the physical containment (based on limited information) is attempted below based on our three hypothesized epicenters.

4.2.1a North Eastern Nigeria Area

The north east Nigeria comprises the Nigerian states of Taraba (60,278 km²), Adamawa (34,532 km²), Bauchi (49,001 km²), Gombe (18,199 km²), Yobe (45,481 km²) and Borno (71,496 km²). The entire north east Nigeria covers a total land area of about 278,978km². Geographically, the entire area possesses about five distinct ecological zones which may necessitate the adoption of two cordon options. The landmine option is very

suitable for the fortification of arid and semi-arid peripheries while the wall system is a perfect option for shrubs and vegetation manifested areas. Shrubs and vegetations growing on mines in vegetative zones could complicate formula deciphering while shrub roots could also detonate mines overtime.




Fig. 5 Map showing the Total Land Area of North Eastern Nigeria

Due to the largeness of the entire north east area, checkpoint will form a cluster in areas with thick population settlements while spatially distributed but heavily manned across less inhabited areas. With increasing porosity of the international borders bordering the north east region, the wall cordon is recommended across these borders since these neighbouring governments have proven their inefficiency or unwillingness at containing terrorist spread into their territories and curbing the proliferation of arms and supplies to terrorist bases via their borders.

4.2.1b The Borno-Yobe Area

When the radicalization of the Boko Haram activities peaked in 2009, almost all the states in the north east region had one time suffered a hit. However, concerted effort by the government (especially on the eve of the 2015 general elections) had compelled the terrorist actors to retreat to the outskirts of Borno and Yobe hence, the inclusion of this area in the hypothesized epicenters. Aside being the 'holy-land' of the extremists, Borno remains very relevant since it was from there that the radicalization process proliferated to other states of the north east. Seemingly, Borno is also a home town to one of the leaders of the Boko Haram sect, Muhammed Yusuf. Borno (and Yobe) remains the most hit, most targeted and most affected of all the states in the region.

Aside the broad based community support, terror actors in Borno and Yobe benefit from some geographical currencies with the most important being the porous borders of Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic. Borno and Yobe area as it stands, cover an area of about 116,977km² and is relatively diverse in ecological features. The northern region of the Borno-Yobe area is arid while the north east and eastern regions support vegetation courtesy, the Chad Basin. Proliferation of terrorist network down Adamawa is greatly discouraged by the terrain and some natural fortresses Adamawa possesses.




Fig. 6 Map Showing the Yobe-Borno Area

Nevertheless, in defining a parameter for containing terrorist movement along this hypothesized epicenter, geography still plays a crucial role. Since the northern fringes of this hypothesized cordon are arid, the landmine cordon system is a perfect option. However, both the wall and mine cordon system could still be utilized to checkmate the high porosity of the northern international boundaries. At the north eastern half of the region where Lake Chad is situated, the naval presence there should be strengthened to police the river as an extension of other cordon options. The southeastern fringes of this hypothesized base harbour some natural defense features. In this case, a cluster of checkpoints is to be established along these natural defense fortresses to filter penetrations and exits. Generally, an estimated checkpoint of about 3900 is expected to be established on the formula of maybe one per 3.2km².

4.2.1c *The Sambisa Area*

The Sambisa area is very popular in the perturbing atmosphere of terrorist miasma in north east Nigeria. It is generally believed that this hypothesized epicenter is the most viable of the surmised bases of the Boko Haram sect. It is also assumed that it is from this forest that the terrorist actors launch their attacks. The popular public opinion also holds that it is in this forest that the kidnapped Chibok school girls are hid. It is also assumed that the Sambisa base connects the Boko Haram sects with other transnational terrorist actors. The Sambisa area is also believed to be one of the most vibrant supply routes of the Boko Haram sect.

Though the Sambisa area covers a large area, including the popular Sambisa Reserve, its infested lands cover an area of about 2,671km². Considering its sizable land area, applying physical containment here will be less strenuous. Option one would have been perfect here but for hostile ecological, climatic and geographical factors. By the virtue of its vegetative ecology and the porosity of the neighbouring Cameroon border, the 'wall cordon' formula is recommended. Importantly, the checkpoint formula should be in cluster and heavily manned and fortified. The Sambisa area is very strategic and deserves maximum attention.

In general terms, it should be noted that part of the physical containment shall include consistent policing of the air space of these regions by the Nigerian air force to keep surveillance and counter attempts at directly airlifting supplies to the terrorists by their shadow relations. Aviation control agencies shall also focus their satellite on identified epicenter, detect, identify, warn and shutdown unauthorized flight or drones movements around cordoned area.

As earlier stated, the aim of physical containment is not aggression but to filter movements into and out of 'troubled' areas. In this process of filtering, weapons and other personal effects terrorists need for sustained assault and coordinated attacks are trapped. This in a short while, if properly executed will starve the terrorists out of supplies, thereby forcing them into submission.



Fig. 7 Map Showing the Sambisa Area

However, in the case of emergency and attack within the cordoned area, a contingent from the nearest checkpoint is to be dispatched to quickly annihilate the remnant of the terrorists whose uncoordinated attack by now will be borne out of frustration and desperation for survival. In-camp arrangements and secret billeting is also a good option within cordoned areas. As stated earlier, upon intelligence, preemptive raids, strikes, arrests and covert actions can be launched to foreclose and neutralize terrorist threats within a cordoned areas.

4.2.2 Economic/Ideological Containment

During the Cold War days, billions of dollars were pumped into the western European economies by the US to stabilize their economies, boost their GDP and GNP, empower the private sectors and revitalize the destroyed economies. This attempt was to ensure that an enabling environment was created for capitalism to flourish thereby, dissuading the masses of the need for a socialist revolution. It is imperative to note that aside its economic significance, the Marshall Plan had an added psychological impetus on the US anti-communist struggle and facilitated a pro-US public opinion in the countries which the Plan was advanced. It instigated the feelings, emotions and sentiments of ‘love’ expressed by a capitalist giant, hence preference of capitalism; while escalating the hatred for the authoritative, repulsive, repressive, and rigid Soviet Union cum communism. It was therefore easy for America to manipulate and garner domestic support from these ‘frontier’ states they showed ‘love’ to. The assumption is that without the economic intervention, the masses would not have been successfully alienated from the Soviet’s ‘pathological’ ideology.

The situation in north east Nigeria is by far worse than the post-world war II economic situation in Western Europe. Poverty and unemployment rate is at an astronomical level. Majority cannot afford a square meal while chunks of the population survive by begging along the major streets. Mortality rate is very high; diseases and malnutrition have led thousands of children to their early sepulcher and life expectancy rate is very low. Wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few while the teeming majority wallow in abject poverty. The above situation is compounded by the fact that a good number of the populations are illiterates. This situation has culminated in shallow, parochial and untamed mindsets, desperateness; and has facilitated an enabling environment for self-declared jihadists to radicalize and recruit a good number for their selfish agenda. This limbo and dent in governance generates a picturesque of “collective grievance” for the radicals to point accusing fingers at the government. The government thus is presented as the “culprit” while terror is seen as “morally justifiable as well as efficient tool for redressing the grievances”. With this “collective grievance” culminates an ideology articulated by a charismatic vanguard which provides a “logical” external cause (being the government) for the members dissatisfaction and frustration. This helps promote “us versus them” social psychology hence, fluidity in recruitment.

Thus, upon defining an area for physical containment, a welfare package should be introduced into the cordoned area to service infrastructures, advance loans, aids and grants for small and medium enterprises, mortgages, workshops and programmes on entrepreneurship advancement, free and compulsory education to university level, agricultural grants and trainings on new technologies and breeds; and a close relationship

between the governors and the governed. The Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) centers should be transformed to talent and skills hunting centres where displaced people with outstanding skills are assisted to rehabilitate themselves. This gesture will garner loyalty and support for the Nigerian state while alienating the people from the terrorists' cause. Even some terrorists who joined based on these arrested grievances would have cause to switch loyalty. This feeling of 'love' expressed by the government towards the people in the cordoned region shall incur a spillover effect of massive alienation of the terrorists' cause by their hitherto apologists overtime. Immediately the terrorist actors cease commanding full support from communities it operates, the seed of their destruction is sown for intelligence will ram in like tsunami. Similarly, prevailing utterances such as "the government do not care", "they have forgotten us", "we are left to suffer and die", "our religion/region is marginalized", "this infidel state system is not working", "this kind of injustice cannot prevail in a caliphate", etc. will die a natural death. Seemingly, once individual disaffections are ameliorated, it will reduce people's readiness to buy into terror warranting ideologies. For as observed by Kruglanski et. al., uncritical adoption of war only "may temporarily hamper terrorists' ability to launch attacks without substantially altering their motivation to do so"¹. Enough force has been displayed already; what is needed now is authority. For as Freeman observes, "sole preoccupation with force misses the opportunities of authority"; for "force may for a moment provide complete control but the instability of such control requires that either it is renewed continuously or else transformed, through the strategist's art, into authority"². That is exactly what this subheading represents. War can therefore disrupt terrorists' capacity but not their intent. A little of "carrot" and "stick" can however disrupt both the terrorist capacity and intent to terrorize. Therefore, this "irregular warfare"³ in the cordon area is a war for loyalty, influence, legitimacy and relevance over the cordoned population. However, conflict sensitive development planning should be consummated to ensure that bounties do not fall into the wrong hands as that would culminate in a vicious circle strategic boomerang of intentions.

4.2.3 Deradicalization, Intelligence Gathering and Community Policing

Deradicalization, community policing and domestic intelligence gathering play eminent role in the attainment of the aims of this grand strategy. Deradicalization has to do with the adoption of various means and techniques to derail, curtail or moderate a person or persons who hold extreme political, social or religious views. Boko Haram terrorist actors are radicals and extremists who crave for an Islamic state where pious Muslim practices will be enforced and every forms of western influence suppressed. This had been the position of Boko Haram leaders such as Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shakau.

Deradicalization thus, is an integral part of this grand strategy. In the cordoned area, efforts are to be made at employing the services of itinerant Muslim psychologists who are vested in Koranic knowledge to convince "faithfuls" on the need for tolerance, moderation and adjustment with time. Koranic verses that encourage violence should be countered with those verses that preach peace, love, brotherhood, tolerance and moderation. After all, Islamic scholars such as John Eposito has insisted that the "sword verses" used in justifying jihadism "is not found in the Quran, or in major prophetic traditions" but rather, "a later interpretation of the Quran and Islamic law, developed by late eighth/ early ninth century religious scholars..."⁴. Progressive *Imams* should also be encouraged to propagate the message of peace and the fact that "Allah is all powerful" and does not need anyone to fight on his behalf. Radical and intransigent *Imams* should be surreptitiously watched and covertly "retired" by the infiltrating intelligence networks. The assumption, believe and "perception that war on terror is a war against Islam as is currently perceived by many in the Muslim world should be reoriented"⁵ in cordoned areas. The most driver of radicalization – a search for glory and thrills should also be tactically devalued: "terrorist acts must be stripped of glory and reduced to common criminality"⁶. As part of the deradicalization process, arrested or decimated terrorist should not be publicized or tagged "major victory". Extolling arrested or slain terrorists decorate them as "heroes" and "martyrs" of the "revolution". The effect is that such arrested or slain terrorist may be revered as role model by undecided apologists.

¹Arie W. Kruglanski et al, "What should this Fight be called? Metaphors of Counterterrorism and their Implications. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest* (Vol.8, No.3, 2008). p.97.

²Lawrence Freeman, "Strategic Studies and the Problem of Power". In Thomas G. Mahnken & Joseph A. Maiolo (eds) *Strategic Studies: A Reader*. (Oxon: Routledge, 2008).p3.

³"Irregular warfare is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations... It favours indirect and a symmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will" See Samuel L. Ashley, "Irregular Warfare as a Containment Strategy – Afghanistan" (Civilian Research Project, US Army War College, Pennsylvania, 2012).

⁴John I. Eposito, "Islam and Political Violence", *Religions*, (vol. 6, 2015). p.1070.

⁵Lora S. Aggour, *The Strategy of Containment in Fighting Terrorism*. (California: Centre for Contemporary Conflict, n.d). p.4

⁶Marc Sageman & Richard A. Clarke, "A Strategy for Fighting Islamist Terrorists". *The American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (618, Annals 223, 2008). p.5.

Promising youths from cordoned areas should be recruited into the police and intelligence units and allowed the prerogative of gathering intelligence and policing their communities. Their frequency, familiarity and knowledge of their enclave is indicative of the advantage they possess pertaining to when and where to amass intelligence. This category of police and intelligence officers shall play prominent role in the infiltration of Mosques and *Madrasahs*. Also, “repented” terrorists upon confirmation of deradicalization can be used either as baits or mole to infiltrate innermost core of terrorist camps. Their confessions and cooperation can be vital in decrypting hitherto puzzles. Arrested sect members could also be systematically bug with tracking and transmitting device and “allowed” to escape. Through this means, infiltration of terrorist camps is made easier. Moreover, suspected phone lines in the cordoned area are to be constantly monitored, diverted and intercepted when necessary.




Fig. 8 Demonstrating the Grand Containment Strategy

With physical containment checkmating aggression and movements in and out of cordoned area; economic and welfare package boosting loyalty and support to the government; and the intelligence frustrating terrorist choreography in the cordoned area, terrorism in a few years shall be a thing of the past. Yes, few years! As long as Boko Haram’s sponsors remain top secret and the ideological theme neglected, the war against insurgency will be and has already become a protracted one.

4.3 Why Containment?

It has become glaring that the struggle between the Nigerian government and terrorist actors in the north east region has become a protracted one. The war has matured from a mere fight against bandits to a war of ideology, war for loyalty, struggle for influence, public opinion control and war of legitimacy. It doesn’t matter again how many terrorists are decimated daily but how many vectors of radical Islamists are freed or won from indoctrination. Suicide bombing has quadrupled in 2017 with clear indications that more are ready to lay down their lives for the values and ideals they uphold.

Terrorists ideology, argued Hardin & Higgins is “based on a set of wider cultural values that they are expressing in practice. These are the values of radical Islamist ideology that has been growing in popularity over the last several decades and that generates a continuing supply of recruits to terrorism, including suicide terrorism...”¹. Hence, the retrogressive strategies adopted by the federal government at different stages of the conflict has created many “widows”, “widowers”, “orphans” etc. Frustrations of losing loved ones had aggravated the “collective grievance” which had garnered a pool of supporters and sympathizers to the terrorists’ cause.

In light of the above, outright usage of force (as practiced by the Nigerian government) will be highly superfluous and retrogressive overtime. Force will only truncate terrorist’s capacity to wreck terror, not its intentions to do. Exclusive force will also swell the pool of terrorist supporters and sympathizers. Naked force is

¹C. D. Hardin & E. T. Higgins, “Shared Reality: How Social Verification Makes the Subjective Objective”. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (eds) *Handbook of Motivation and Cognition*. (New York: Guilford Press, 1996). pp.28-84.

neither a solution to the “causes” nor the “facilitators” of terrorism in the north east region. Thus, attention needs to be granted the root (which is ideological indoctrination) as well as the facilitators (which are the grievances) in a direct and simultaneous proportion. This is actually what this containment strategy stands for. The war, as earlier mentioned, has become a protracted one with a concomitant psychological repercussion. It is now the time for the Nigerian government to instill the level of trust and patriotism that will be strong enough to induce citizens into dying for it too in affected areas. This work has outlined how that can be achieved through a coordinated grand strategy. Therefore, to stamp out terrorism from its root, the grievances facilitating the proliferation of its ideology, fan-base and recruitments, justification for attacks and acceptability/legitimacy in the communities terrorists operate, must be looked into.

5.0 Concluding Remarks

The Nigerian government has failed to quell terrorism in the north eastern region simply because it has failed to identify or acknowledge the potency or role of ideological indoctrination as the key factor that has escalated and sustained the bewildering situation in north east. The average argument is that terrorism in the north east region is a product of government’s failure in upholding its part of the social contract it entered with the north easterners. This position is partly true. Government’s failure in the region is not the cause of terrorism but rather, its facilitator. This position has been discussed earlier in this work. Nevertheless, this work does not in anywhere, seek to downplay the place of the “facilitators” in the perturbing Boko Haram escapades. In fact, they are inevitable for the continued recruitment and sustenance of the terror group activities. However, just like a tree, the “facilitators” create a livewire and source of energy to the mainstream tree. Hence, attacking the facilitators only (which the government has not) is like pruning a branch whereas, other branches exist for the tree to tap energy through. Thus attention must be given to the root (which in this case is the ideology) as well as the leaves (which in this case are the grievances) in synchronism. The strategy needed here is that which will not just address grievances, but deactivate ‘activated’ adherents.

This work thus remodels the defunct containment strategy for the Nigerian armed forces to adopt at the tactical level. This strategy as designed in the work envisages the war against terror in north east Nigeria to be a protracted, ideological and irregular warfare. The model, rather than being aggressive and confrontational is proactive and reactionary and is a combination of calculated force, welfare, intelligence and deradicalization in a cordoned/troubled area. The idea of the strategy is to circumvent terrorists, deprive them of fan base, community support, supplies, communication, and readily apologetic populations for outright recruitments. The strategy is also designed to limit direct confrontations while the terrorists are starved out or frustrated to giving up on their evil agenda. The combo of encirclement, welfarism and deradicalization is expected to augment a psychological spillover of increased loyalty to the government and direct alienation of terrorist cause by peoples of affected communities. This strategy is inevitable as outright direct confrontation (as practiced presently by the Nigerian armed forces) only incapacitate the terrorists, but not their intent to terrorize. We therefore recommend that the postulations of this work be given priority by the Nigerian government.