

# Resource Control and Grassroots Development in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria

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## ABSTRACT

In every society, economic development is an important part of social living, especially the specific economic activities of government in ensuring the development of that society. But then integrated effort towards this development will be incomplete where cognizance of the existing resources and ways of tapping as well as equitably allocating the resources is undermined. For some time now, this has reflected in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria and the inequitable allocation of the resources especially to the areas of their derivation has led to the constraints in developmental efforts and consequently deterioration in the lives of the rural dwellers. The effects of this have been marginalization and unsavory reactions from the affected communities and these have led to national insecurity. This paper examines these issues in the context of resource control, causes of agitation for control of resources by the Niger Delta dwellers, the contending trend of uneasiness in the nation and actions that can be taken by the government to ensure grassroots development in the area, thus pulling an end to the insecurity of lives and property in that region, and the nation as a whole.

## INTRODUCTION

Arising from various concerns, agitations, claims and counter claims, quest for equal representations especially by the Niger Delta states at the national interest to ensure grassroots development, the case for resource control generated a burning debate in Nigeria. Better explained, the revenue allocation formula in Nigeria is at the edge of precipice: It is now a hydra that has generated a controversy, which is symptomatic of turning the tides of fiscal and political policies in Nigeria that had hitherto been singled out as the precursor for instability and underdevelopment. The continuous concern has been that the Niger Delta region, which is believed to generate the bulk of the nation's income, has been relegated to the background. Grassroots development in the Niger Delta, to enhance favorable competing relationship between the rural and urban sectors of the economy has also been of no concern to successive administrations. The situation has tar reaching and threatening national implications. Instability in employment and high-income insecurity among the young school leavers without the remedial effects of social protection has a negative impact on the economy and impedes development. The gross social inequality that this situation promotes has no complementary effect on the social equality profile of the country. The situation also threatens the very existence of society through its negative impact on the family. There is increasing level of poverty and inadequate basic amenities in the Niger Delta. It is rightly so because this concept straddles the ethnical, the macro-economic and the political existence of the region and does address the key question of whether Nigerians should be citizens or subjects and slaves in their own country (Egom, 2006). The general assessment is that the Niger Delta has experienced stunted growth for the greater part of the period since independence in 1960. The first half of the 1980s was particularly bad, characterized by negative growth rates that reflected the worldwide economic recession. The Nigerian economic crisis that became manifested in the-1980s (following the oil boom era of the 1970s) has been particularly severe resulting ill massive dislocations: from external disequilibria to high levels of domestic macroeconomic imbalances. This reflects in inflation, low capacity utilization, lack of capital, high unemployment, shortage of capacity inflow, and a general debase of the grassroots. Further more, the debate surrounding the issue of resource control shows that it appeals' to the heart of the Nigerian polity. But the misconception of resource control is that most agitators for resource control only refer to the petroleum oil and not other resources that are prevalent in other parts of the nation outside the Niger Delta. For instance, Akpan (1999) reported that Nigeria is endowed with not less than ninety-nine (99) mineral resources distributed unevenly among the associated thirty-six (36) states and the federal capital territory. Abuja. Of these minerals, petroleum oil and associated gas, mostly found in the Niger Deha region of the South- South geopolitical zone are the ones tapped while others are neglected. Appendix 1 shows some minerals among that could be mined and Appendix 2 shows minerals mined but proceeds not given to the states of their origin. It thus follows that the Niger Delta has, for the entire existence of the country since 1914, contributed in no mean feat to the development of Nigeria. Win then should the goose that lays the golden eggs be killed? The contextual issues in Nigeria economic philosophy is that the current formula for the distribution of the nation's wealth is unacceptable. The altitudinal change points to the direction of restructuring the economy of the Niger Delta and Nigeria at large, by letting people control their Resource Control and Grassroots Development in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria resources. Put differently, Nigeria's federal status as presently constituted should be restructured along legal framework that would grant

reasonable measure of autonomy to the states and component parts of the federation (Don Pedro, 2001). This position is succinctly strengthened by the arguments of Richard, Joseph in his book "Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria" (1999), the struggle against colonial rule, which said that: *A pressing demand was that the economic product of the territory should be directly utilized for the benefit of the indigenous producers rather than appropriated to meet the metropolitan needs of the colonial powers and the many firms (Joseph, 2001)*. The comment of Nyityo appropriately summarized this work: *The resource control movement has come to represent some kind of organized political action arising from the deep-seated dissatisfaction with the whole question of revenue sharing from the federating account. Whereas the debate on fiscal decentralization was initiated in the 1930s by H.R. Palmer, the present agitation and its main political current was organized in response to the twenty first century geopolitical alignments within the Nigerian polity. The resource control movement is in the main a nationality movement aimed at encouraging every state or region to look inwards with a view to tapping its natural and human resources in order to attain sustainable development for the people (Nyityo, 2005)*. Agreeably therefore, in Nigeria, resource control has remained a highly contentious political and economic issue, having at one point or the other, threatened the political stability of the whole nation, occasioned by the federal government suing the 36 state governors in 2002 over the interpretation of the constitution on the meaning of resource control and recently, the destruction of the gas and oil pipelines by the ongoing militants' struggle in the Niger Delta. All have been indicative of the dissatisfaction of the people over the method of sharing of the revenue by the central government. Of more serious concern has been that the developmental state or the grassroots transformation in the Niger Delta reveals a rather disappointing situation.

### **RESOURCE CONTROL: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?**

While making effort to assess what had been the trend of this national uneasiness, it becomes important to consider the meaning of resource control. Like other contending issues, several scholars have related varying opinions to its meaning. Dafinone (2001) sees resource control as "the practice of true federalism and natural law in which the federating units express their rights to primarily control the natural resources within their borders and make agreed contribution towards the maintenance of common services of the government at the center". This definition by Dafinone is deemed not to be correct in its entirety, as the success should be seen in its effects on the individuals. This fact is buttressed by the view of Chief Obafemi Awolowo who said "the benefits of resource control should accrue to the individuals and not to the state, following the principles finally expatiated upon the Adam Smith in *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776". Resource control has also been seen both as economic and political tool. As economic tool, resource control is seen to be "ground in the fact that land, labour, capital and entrepreneurships are factors of production. The price of labour is wage, capital attracts interest, and entrepreneurship is driven by profit while land attracts rent and other royalties. Rent is thus a return for the use of the original and indestructible properties of the soil. From the above, it therefore means that resource control should be effectively implemented; there must be evolved a system in which individuals and their communities are rightly entrenched in the ownership of assets and resources that are taken from their land. In another view, the governor of Edo State, Lucky Igbenidion (Tell, April 9, 2001) asserted, "Resource control is not all about crude oil. It covers all natural resources - solid minerals, cash crops, and everything". Thus individuals have the right welfare. It is therefore not out of place for the Niger Delta citizens to agitate for participation and benefit in the proceeds of their natural resources. Resource control, at other instances has been seen as political, rather than economic tool, regarding the issue of revenue allocation and derivation. From the inception, the use of sharing formula for the nation's resources had been formulated to serve the interest of whoever is at the top. According to Dafinone; *the British administered the country initially mainly from the proceeds from oil palm trade derived largely from the Eastern region. Derivation was not given any prominence. But when groundnut and tin from the North and cocoa and rubber from the West became major earners of revenue, derivation was catapulted into major criteria for the allocation, thus understanding the linkage between regional control of the political process and the dominant criteria to revenue allocation at any given time, (Dafinone, 2001)*. While still showing concern, it would also be necessary to establish the meaning of grassroots development. This is a process of economic and political transformation of the rural areas, which leads to the improvement in the standard of living of the people in the area of income, education, housing, health and other related social needs, decreasing inequality in the distribution of income, urban-rural imbalances, employment and economic and political opportunities. These are the reasons for the Niger Delta States.

### **REASONS FOR AGITATION FOR RESOURCE CONTROL**

Bisong (2001) argues, "The issue of resource control, to be or not be is firmly rooted and better understood from the concept of federalism, as well as on the federal basis of the Nigerian State. Akinsanya (1999) avers that an essential feature of federal as opposed to confederal states is the "division of political power between the federating (states) and central (federal) government with each tier of government having the final say in respect of matters assigned to it by the constitution. According to Ikharaiale (2002), "the, frustration in the

Niger Delta region comes from the fact that in the days before the oil, the nation relied on cocoa, groundnuts, palm oil and other economic crops to run the economy. This reliance is based on the allocation formula derived by the colonial authorities before and immediately after independence. This formula gave about 50% of the income from resources to the regions from where they were derived and the country did very well. With the discovery of oil in huge quantities, nobody cared about the resources anymore, especially since exploitation of oil is more reliable economically. There was rush to drill oil to stuff the coffers of the government not minding the effects of pollution caused by the oil spills on farm lands and the waters made non-conducive for marine life. Other long-term investments in other minerals and agricultural resources become less attractive. "The result of those irresponsible policies is the devastation of the fishing waters and farmlands in the oil producing areas of the country with mass poverty and hopelessness as the real gains of the people" (Ikhariaje, 2002). It is important to note that over 80% of the Nation's wealth, individually and collectively, is derived from oil and as Ikhariaje rightly observes, none of the excessively affluent individuals who follow the order of "winner takes it all" is from the oil producing areas, so the regions that have produced the top rulers take all the oil wealth while the owners watch helplessly at their detriment and risk of leaving nothing left for posterity. The period since independence and particularly during the era of the military rule has witnessed the increasing federal supremacy and authority over the states. Awa (1976) emphasizes the essence of a federal system comprising of the autonomy of the national government on one hand and the state government on the other. However, Bisong (2001) argues that Nigeria's effort at federalism from its original conceptualization and design evidently rests on the concept of administrative decentralization, for territorial decentralization is implicit rather than functional, with no reduction of central control. For instance the revenue sharing formula, which allocated (apart from the federal governments share), 25 percent to state, 20 percent to local government councils. 13 percent to derivation and 1 percent to the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) still placed as much as 4 1 percent under the control of the center. This is central-distinct to the ideals of federalism. The key question is: who owns the natural resources in a federating unit? The answer is posited by Natufe (2005) that before the intrusion of the military in Nigerian politics on January 15, 1996, derivation was based on 50%. The military regime of Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon later decreed and placed the natural resources under the exclusive jurisdiction of his government. This usurpation was subsequently inherited by succeeding military regimes (1966-1979, 1983-1999) and the federal governments of Shehu Shagari 1979-1983; and Olusegun Obasanjo. 1999 to present has refused to relinquish. This has been the cause of the current political instability vis-a-vis Niger Delta States (Ntufe, 2005). From the concept of Equity, Justice and Fair play, this is unfair to the Delta resource owners, and is a gross abuse of the power by the majority in denying the minority its rights over control of its own resources, the same rights that the majority accorded themselves in pre January 1966 Nigeria, on the basis of true federalism (Natufe, 2005). This use of majority power by the central government and supported by the Northern and South-Western majority governments, to ignore the agitations of the Delta owners for fair allocation, has caused serious frustration and made instability inevitable in these areas and Nigeria at large. We cannot however, adequately discuss the issue of revenue allocation in Nigeria without taking a recourse into the 1999 Federal Constitution, section 162 (1) which says:

1. That "the federation shall maintain special account to be called" "the federation account" into which shall be paid all revenues collected by the Government of the federation".
2. That: not less than 13% of revenue accruing to the federation account be paid directly, from any natural resources to the states.

The formula will take into account the principles of population, equality of states, internal revenue generation, landmass and terrain. The issue of derivation is added as a proviso to the sub section as follows: "Shall he formula as being not less than 3 percent of the revenue accruing to the federation account direct from am natural resources". This constitution has however not specified the nature of the natural resources, thus giving way for fraudulent application. Darah (2001) makes the presentation that the fraudulent implications of these principles are also manifest in the failure of the constitution to specify what natural resources are and that could be the reason why the derivation principle applies only in revenue from mineral resources, primarily oil and gas. Yet cattle grazing grounds, ports hydro-electric systems, clams, fisheries, timber and other forest bio-, diversity produce are as natural as minerals. On March 31, 2000, the meeting of the South-South zone governors and 48 National Assembly members from this zone in Asaba resulted in grievances some of which included "the attempt by the federal government to iv-introduce a dichotomy between on-shore and off-shore oil and gas deposits. This dichotomy first came into the Nigerian statute books through the Executive Economic.

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Zone Act of 1978 which was the military governments' way of acquiring its own exclusive oil wells, separate from the states, through its direct claims to parts of seas and ocean adjoining some oil rich states. This resulted in the following classification.

**Table 1: Distribution of Littoral State**

Lagos	Offshore - 100% On shore - 0%
Ogun	Offshore - 100% On shore - 0%
Ondo	Offshore - 97% On shore - 3%
Edo	Offshore - 90% On shore - 10%
Delta	Offshore - 25% On shore - 72
Bayelsa	Offshore - 40% On shore - 60%
Rivers	Offshore - 40% On shore - 60%
Akwa Ibom	Offshore - 90% On shore - 10%
Cross River	Offshore - 100% On shore- 0% .

Source: This Day Newspaper July 17, 2001

In 1992, the Babangida administration abrogated the dichotomy act, which had hitherto deprived the Niger Delta States of their offshore oil and gas deposits and revenue. The struggle since then has been on the littoral states filling suits against the central government in a bid to claiming back their rights and the Apex Court has always ruled in favour of the center, most likely, since it is the mouth piece of the government. This has now degenerated into the current militant struggle in the Niger Delta region and the central government, on either the improvement in the revenue control by owners or obvious infrastructure improvements in these areas that have for son long been neglected and deprived.

**Table 2: Old Formula**

Federal Government	48.5 percent
States	24 percent
Local Government	20 percent
Special Funds	7.5 percent
	100.0 percent

Source: The Punch, September 10, 2001

The old formula (Table 2 and the new formula (table 3) are still not acceptable to the authorities of the region.

**Table 3: New Formula**

Federal Government	41.5 percent
States	31 percent
Local Government	16 percent
Special Funds	7.0 percent
Others (agriculture stabilization, solid mineral, etc.)	4.5 percent
	100.0 percent

Source: The Punch, September 10, 2001

Finally, the word of the former Bayelsa State governor (Diepriye Alimeseigha) sums up the end of the resource control struggle if nothing tangible is done. The manner in which the Northern delegates reacted to the South-South position shows that Nigerians still reserve enormous hope in their co-existence al the expense of his survival. To him the people of South-South have been good enough in demanding for increased derivation revenue of 25 percent as a temporary measure (Newswatch Magazine 2005). In his opinion, it is necessary that resource control issue be resolved because it is painful to see the resource of a group of people being used lo "develop" places far removed from the massive environment disaster they were made lo live with.

## RESOURCE CONTROL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE GRASSROOTS IN NIGER-DELTA

The relationship between resource control and economic development in most parts of the world is positive. The case in point is the experience where more than 505 of the resources were used to develop International Journal of Development Studies, Volume 2, Number 3, 2007 the areas they were derived from. The regions were more developed than what obtains now.

In Uwatt (2003), Gwartney (1995) is said to have explained five (5) reasons why private ownership of property is superior to other terms of ownership. In his write up, these include:

1. It promotes responsible behaviour and efficient management. This is because private ownerships have strong incentives to undertake cost effective measures for proper improvements to reap the fruits of their investments,
2. Private ownership makes people accountable for their actions and thereby promotes general welfare,
3. Through specialization or division of labour and trade, it encourages individuals to develop and employ resources in a way that they would be advantageous to all.
4. Private ownership encourages innovation and creativity that are prerequisites for social progress,
5. It encourages wise conservation of resources with positive and beneficial implications for intergenerational equity and suitable development.

The above indicates the positive roles of private ownership and this private ownership of resources in the Niger Delta cannot achieve less.

Presently, the development of infrastructures in the Niger Delta shows that the basic facility such as roads are not provided by the central government in most of the area, especially the land logged areas such as Bayelsa and environs.

**Table 4: Length of Federal Government Roads by Geopolitical Zone as at 1988 (KM)**

Geopolitical Zone	Asphaltic Concrete	Surface Dressed	Gravel Earth	Total Length
North- West Percentage Total (%)	4,139.00 20.53	1,758.00 23.40	772.00 11.98	6,669.00 19.54
North Central Percentage Total (%)	4,011.00 19.89	1,766.00 23.50	772.00 11.98	7,742.00 22.69
North East Percentage Total (%)	3,993.00 19.80	1,451.00 19.31	2,294.00 35.59	7,738.00 22.68
South West Percentage Total (%)	3,198.00 15.86	762.00 10.14	570.00 8.84	4,529.00 13.27
South East Percentage Total (%)	1,755.00 8.70	919.00 12.23	448.00 6.95	3,122.00 9.15
South - South Percentage Total (%)	2,903.00 14.4	809.00 10.77	378.00 5.86	4,090.00 11.99
All Nigeria	20,163.00 .	7,514.00	6,446.00	34,123.00

Note: the figures except that of all Nigeria exclude the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja Source: Computed from Federal Office of Statistics (1999) Table 356 (Uwatt, 2003)

Table 4 shows that only 11.99% of total roads by the central government is in the South- South region, compared to 19.4% in the North-West, 22.69% in the North Central, 22.69% in the North-Central, 22.68% in the North-East and 13.27% in the South-West. Of these the lowest federal presence is in the South-South geopolitical Zone where 80% of Nigerian minerals are derived and 90% of Nigerian foreign trade earning comes from here. The Niger Delta region covers about 70,000 square kilometers and accounts for 7.5 percent of total landmass in Nigeria.- It also covers a coastline of 560 kilometers and about two-thirds of the entire coastline of Nigeria. These estimated population of the region is about 26 million, consisting of over forty different ethnic groups, speaking 250 different languages and consisting of about 300 communities whose predominant occupation is farming and fishing, (Fubara, 2006). This vast land has been completely rendered unproductive and their waters unproductive for farming and fishing respectively.

**Table 5: Poverty Incidence by State and Geopolitical Zone 1980-1996**

Geopolitical Zone	1980		1985		1992		1996	
	States	PI (%)	States	PI (%)	States	PI (%)	States	PI (%)
North- West Average	Kaduna	44.7	Kaduna	58.5	Jigawa	38.7	Jigawa	71.0
	Kano	37.5	Kano	55.0	Kaduna	37.9	Kaduna	67.7
	Sokoto	25.4	Sokoto	45.1	Kano	37.9	Kano	71.0
					Kastina	36.5	Kastina	67.7
					Kebbi		Kebbi	
					Sokoto		Sokoto	

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							Zamfara	83.6	83.6
								83.6	
								77.2	
North Central Average	Benue Kwara Niger Plateau	23.6	Benue Kwara Niger Plateau	42.9	Benue Kogi Kwara Niger Plateau	40.8	Benue Kogi Kwara Niger Plateau	4.2	5.5
		33.3		39.3		60.8		2.9	2.7
		34.0		61.4		60.8		4.6	
		49.5		64.2		29.9		46.0	
		32.2		50.8		50.2			
						50.8			
						46.0			
North East Average	Bauchi Borno Gongola	46.0	Bauchi Borno Gongola	68.9	Adamawa Bauchi Borno Taraba Yobe	44.1	Adamawa Bauchi Borno Taraba Yobe	44.1	68.8
		26.0		50.1		68.8		49.7	44.1
		33.4		47.2		49.7		49.7	0.1
		35.6		54.9		54.0			
South West Average	Lagos Ogun Ondo Oyo	26.4	Lagos Ogun Ondo Oyo	42.6	Lagos Ogun Ondo Oyo	48.1	Ekiti Lagos Ogun Oyo	1.6	
		20.0		56.0		36.3		3.6	
		24.9		47.3		46.6		9.9	
		7.8		28.3		40.6		1.6	
		13.4		38.6		40.7		58.7	
								8.7	
								0.9	
South East Average	Anambra Imo	12.8	Anambra Imo	37.7	Abia Anambra Enugu Imo	49.9	Abia Anambra Enugu Imo	6.2	1.0
		14.4		33.1		32.3		6.2	3.5
		12.9		30.4		32.3			
						49.9			
						41.0			
South South Average	Bendel C. River Rivers	19.8	Bendel C. River Rivers	52.4	A. Ibom C. River Delta Edo Rivers	45.5	A. Ibom C. River Delta Edo Rivers	66.9	44.3
		10.2		41.9		45.5		66.9	56.1
		7.2		44.4		33.9		56.1	77.3
		13.3		45.7		33.9		58.2	58.2
						43.4			
						40.8			
All Nigeria		28.1		46.3		42.7		65.6	

**Note:** A. Ibom = Akwa Ibom; C. River = Cross River

Source: (i) Uga (2003), Table 1; (ii) (1999) Tables 9,51,53,55 (Uwatt, 2003).

The poverty indices of the region (Table 5) stemming from deprivation and lack of jobs, reveals that most of the population of this area lives in abject poverty. According to Uwatt (2003) the poverty indices for Edo/Delta States rose from 19.8 percent in 1980 to 56.1 in 1996 while that of Cross River/Akwa Ibom rose from 10.2

percent in 1980 to 56.1 percent in 1996. The situation has not improved much now. In fact, in 1999, Akwa Ibom State with the poverty headcount of 72.3 percent was the 7<sup>th</sup> poorest of the 30 states of the federal. Also Cross River States with 61.5%, Delta with 59.3%, Edo with 53.3% and Rivers with 44.3% occupied the 17<sup>th</sup>, 18<sup>th</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, and 29 positions respectively. They author therefore indicated that 58.2 percent of the Niger Delta were living in poverty.

### **SOLUTION TO THE NIGER DELTA PROBLEM AND GRASSROOTS DEVELOPMENT**

The people of the South-South see the case of the region as a matter of equity, justice and fairness and anyone who holds a contrary opinion does not appreciate the enormity of the problems in the Niger Delta region and the importance of justice in any human setting (Ajaero. 2005). According to the governor of Rivers State. Peter Odilli, (2005) the adjustment from 13% to 17% though considered as adequate by the North, he is grossly unhappy with the arrangement especially from point of injustice, thus a suitable relationship cannot be built, he therefore said "a permanent solution to the nagging problem would be realized in Nigeria when leaders have the courage to deal with it. The issue calls for political will, a sense of justice and fear of God and God's design".

The governors of the South-South states share this position. As long as any attempt to the solution ignores the welfare of the people, it is bound to fail. Various studies on problems of peace building and conflict prevention, especially in less developed economies have most times ignored the contributions of ethnic conflicts and violence resulting from asymmetries; in the distribution of access to job, food and social security. Egom (2006) says, "it is a socio-economic truism that the more people are empowered to employ and feed themselves, the more they are fulfilled in life and at peace with themselves and their neighbours. Egom also recommended that the Nigerian government should empower individuals, especially in the Niger-Delta region to account to at least 80% of the Nigerian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and thereby make the US dollar irrelevant and more attractive. This was expressed by Uwatt (2003) in an alternative way by saying that "by empowering the federal, state and local governments as well as communities, resources control will eliminate the unhealthy fiscal competition among them. Other solutions should include:

1. **Role of Oil Companies:** The solution that could yield faster relief is for the central government to include in their agreement with the oil exploring companies the fact that most of the developmental programmes such as schools, hospitals, roads, electricity, and employment of the indigene in the companies are implemented. The activities of the oil companies in this region and their neglect to clean-up after themselves, which have fallen below internationally accepted standard, has contributed in no little measure to the dilapidation of the area, damaging the aquatic and marine life of the communities, that had sustained them for decades. The oil companies should be compelled to clean up the oil spills to make the land fit for cultivation.
2. **Provision of free health services:** The continuous pollution and flaring of gas emanating from the oil exploration has rendered the environment hazardous to health. So the residents of these areas, with pollution related diseases should be treated at no cost to them.
3. **Borehole water:** The mortality rate in this area has increased due to poor and contaminated sources of drinking water. Borehole water should be provided for the people.
4. **Provision of roads and means of transportation:** Most of the Niger Delta regions are inaccessible by road and some of the area have never seen a car. The government cannot claim not to know that these areas should be given bridges linking them with the outside world. It is surprising that in this present era, some areas of these regions are still only accessible by boat. Bridges, roads and other means of transportation should be provided for the residents of these areas.
5. **Scholarship:** One might be deceived by the fact that the oil companies award scholarships to "Nigerians". The relative number of Niger Delta beneficiaries is highly insignificant. The scholarship awards to the indigene of the Niger-Delta region should be increased and not linked to the awards to other parts of the country. In fact, not less than 80% of Niger Delta youths should benefit from the federal government or oil companies' scholarship schemes.

The solution to the problems, if to be enumerated would be endless.

### **CONCLUSION**

For decades now, resource control has received much attention in Nigeria, that one would be tempted to conclude that Nigerians are just a set of people who like cheap money, greedy and lazy. This is so because resource control is only likened to petroleum oil that yields easy dollars, at the detriment of other resources, which could be equally as economically viable. From the agitations, both by government and those who do not even have a drop of oil and from history of derivation in Nigeria in the era of the regional governments in Nigeria, it is obvious that when the oil dries up in the Niger Delta, and other resources become more viable, the region will be forgotten, being a region of the minorities. It is therefore necessary that whatever should be obtained be obtained now or never. In this paper, it has been revealed that the resource control option, if not properly implemented by granting the 25% derivation agitated for by the region could minimize conflict in the

region and increase stability and security of life and property. There is no doubt that it has become imperative for government to go back to the drawing board and reconsider issues. For the issue of resource control agitation borders on true federalism, as the present formula for revenue allocation has become necessary, as every federating unit should be able to effectively control the resources, which it produces, for over-centralization of resources is precarious, resulting in cut-throat rivalry, social tension and political instability. In the words of Egom (2006) "... Resource control is the heart of ethnics, of macroeconomics and of politics. It is all about lanting every Nigerian firmly, from the womb to the tomb, at the beginning, at the center and at the end of every aspect as Nigeria's public policy. It is indeed, all about social inclusion and giving every Nigeria his rightful place due to at all times.... Resource control is all about taking us Nigerians back to our equalitarian and communitarian roots. It is simply the bottom-to- top marked development of Nigeria". Unless this issue is properly and justly resolved, the Niger Delta and subsequently Nigeria at large will continue to be at war.

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**Appendix 1: Table 6; Key Solid Mineral Deposit in Nigeria**

Solid Mineral	Est. % Quantity-Metric tons	Price Indicator Average USD
Tale	40 million	Niger. Osun. Kogi. Kaduna
Gypsu'n	1 billion+	Nigeria
Iron Ore	3 billion+	Kogi. Enugu. Niger. FTC.
Lead/Zinc	10 million+	East Central Nigeria
Barite	8 million+	Taraba. Bauchi
Bentonite	0.7 billion	Nigeria
Gold (Alluvial & Primary)		Southwestern Nigeria
Bitumen	42 billion	Ondo
Coal	3 billion	Enugu, East Central Nigeria
Rock Salt	1.5 million+	Salt Springs: Plateau, Ebonyi. Rock Salt Benue
Gem Stones		
Sapphire ruby Aquamarine Emerald topaz Amethyst Zircon Flourapar, Tourmaline, Garnet Tourmaline		
Kaoline	3 billion	Nigeria

No available or incomplete data due to illegal mining activities.

Sources: Federal Ministry of Solid Mineral Development; Nigerian Coal Corporation, Enugu and CBN Surveys. It is safe to estimate gross under-capacity mining for each mineral in Table 7. According to this US Geological Survey Mineral Year Book 2005, part of Nigeria production of mineral commodities from 1996 to 1999 (detailed report at URL. Given below is indicated as follows:

**Appendix 2:**

**Table 7: National production of Mineral Commodities**

Mineral	1996 (metric/tons)	1997 (metric/tons)	1998 (metric/tons)	1999 (metric/tons)
Kaoline	102,078	100,000	110,000	110,000
Barite	-	4,000	5000 est.	5,000
Gypsum	-	300,000 est.	3000,000	200.000
Feldspar	-	1,000	500	500
Gold (est Kilograms)	6	6	10	-
Iron and Steel	-	-	-	-
Coal, bituminous	7,116	7,000	30,000	-
Topaz (est. Kilograms)	1,500	-	1,700	1,700
Limestone (thsd. tons)	2,095	2,000	2000	2.000
Aluminum	-	2500 est.	20,000	
Iron Ore (thsd. tons)	100	50	-	

Source: US Geological Survey Mineral Year Book 2000