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A Deweyan-Based Curriculum for Teaching Ethical Inquiry in the Language Arts

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A DEWEYAN-BASED CURRICULUM FOR
TEACHING ETHICAL INQUIRY IN THE LANGUAGE ARTS

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of
Montclair State University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Education

by

MARIA AURORA L. BUENASEDA-SALUDO

Montclair State University

Montclair, New Jersey

2012

Dissertation Chair: Dr. Maughn Gregory

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MONTCLAIR STATE UNIVERSITY

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

DISSERTATION APPROVAL

We hereby approve the Dissertation

A Deweyan-Based Curriculum for Teaching Ethical Inquiry in the Language Arts

of

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
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ABSTRACT

A DEWEYAN-BASED CURRICULUM FOR TEACHING ETHICAL INQUIRY IN THE LANGUAGE ARTS

by Maria Aurora L. Buenaseda-Saludo

Informed by Dewey's account of ethical experience and the nature of philosophical inquiry, my theory of ethical inquiry has four components: body-based reasonableness, moral imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical content. Body-based reasonableness is thinking that is critical, creative, committed, contextual, and embodied (Sprod, 2001). Exercising embodied reasonableness in aesthetic education means that we pay critical attention and seek to address the ethical and social aspects of art. We pay attention to fiction that will potentially engage students in a constant process of ethical judgment, depicting characters and situations that call for our moral evaluation. In a similar vein, exposure to certain art can sensitize us to the right reasons and objects for our emotions. Vehicles for ethical inquiry are those by which human situations can be understood and are found in the English Language Arts curriculum and the arts, such as: *The Odyssey* by Homer, *Romeo and Juliet* by Shakespeare, Prokofiev, and Tchaikovsky, *The Joy Luck Club* by Tan, and works by the artists Frida Kahlo and Kiki Smith. Highlighted are the issues of body, sexuality and gender, principal areas of ethical concern and central to adolescence. The pedagogy by which students can adequately address ethical concerns is Philosophy for Children, where characters in a narrative text exemplify discursive modes of thought and the conduct of ethical inquiry.

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To the memory of my mentor, Professor Ann Margaret Sharp,
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Introduction: Overview of a Theory of Ethical Inquiry

[T]he important thing about knowledge in its moral aspect is . . . the active desire to examine conduct in its bearing upon the general good. . . . There is always the possibility of being on the alert for opportunities to widen and deepen the meaning of existing moral ideas. . . . The need for constant revision and expansion of moral knowledge is one great reason why there is no gulf dividing non-moral knowledge from that which is truly moral. (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, pp. 311-312)

“The value of knowledge is in being ‘instrumental to the enrichment of immediate experience through the control over action that it exercises.’” (Dewey, 1934, p. 294, as cited in Shusterman, 2000, p. 18)

As a teacher of art appreciation and the language arts, I am keenly aware that moral growth occurs in the transactions that students have in their encounter with art, including that of the process of making art. Growth includes meaning, self-discovery, and a desire to contribute to the world. The focus of my research is education in ethical inquiry, that is, education that aims at preparing students to practice ethical inquiry and to make and act on sound ethical judgments. My objective is to present a pedagogical framework and novella in ethical inquiry guided by the ramifications of Dewey’s metaphor of the experiential flow in nature. My aim is in some ways more modest than that of preparing students to develop ethical character, lead ethical lives or to become moral selves. However, in that the components of ethical inquiry do not presuppose any particular model of an ethical character, life, or self, the former aim could also be said to

be broader.

This chapter begins with a brief introduction to John Dewey, in order to give a sense of the philosopher in the aspects of his thinking that bear on this project. It is followed by a discussion encapsulating the main features of his experiential aesthetic theory and his theory of knowledge, as they relate to ethics and inquiry. First, one must learn to recognize just what *an* experience is. Second, one should recognize that a non-discursive meaning is the aesthetic aspect of an experience. Third, we can improve the experience, if we are aware of its aesthetic qualities. I describe a theory of ethical inquiry comprising embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical content. The third section of this chapter relates in practical terms the role of an education in ethical inquiry. In succeeding chapters, I present arguments to support my contention that ethical inquiry is best served by a curriculum in the arts because the subject matter opens horizons of feeling and imaginative vistas that are known to shed light on the meaning of social practices and cherished values.

John Dewey was America's foremost philosopher during his lifetime and one of the twentieth century's most important thinkers (Morse, 1998). This was due in large measure to his personal qualities, prolific output, and his concern for the practical ramifications of political, ethical and educational thought (Boisvert, 1985; Martin, 2002). Of him, a fellow colleague remarked that Dewey was unpretentious and easygoing, a prodigious thinker "like Socrates" (Martin, 2002, p. 236). At age 90, he had published about a thousand essays and books (Martin, 2002). He embarked on a reconstruction of philosophy because he believed that philosophical practice had little relevance due to

fixed ethical concepts and absolutist metaphysical categories (Boisvert, 1985), he termed “the philosophic fallacy”¹ (Teehan, 2002, pp. 228). He proposed that in inquiry, attention be paid to the uniqueness of problematic situations, his aim being to bring about desirable consequences and meaning² through appropriate conduct (Teehan, 1995).

It is accordingly, relevant, to the theme of needed reconstruction to say that the adverse criticisms of philosophies of the past are not directed at these systems with respect to their connection with intellectual and moral issues of their own time and place, but with respect to their relevancy in a much changed human situation. (Dewey, 1948, p. viii)

In remapping the flawed landscape of American philosophy, Dewey was influenced by Darwin’s *Origin of Species* and neo-Hegelianism (Boisvert, 1985). Instead

¹ The “philosophic fallacy” (Dewey, 1925, p. 35) pertains to a fixed and antecedent reality (e.g. dualistic thinking) as *a priori* to inquiry. “It consists in the supposition that whatever is found true under certain conditions may forthwith be asserted universally or without limits and conditions” (Dewey, 1922, p. 175).

²“The meaning of something is (a) its relations, actual and potential, to other qualities, things, events, and experience(s)...past, present, and future” (Johnson, 2007, pp. 265 & 273); (b) the practical consequences of ideas (Connell, 1994; Garrison, 2004; Lipman, 1991; 2003); (c) the outcome of shared inquiry (Connell, 1996); (d) “find[ing] out the difference [something] makes to you and me “(Alexander, 1990, p. 327).

of dualism and separation, Dewey saw continuities, for example organism-environment and body-mind, which he attributed to Hegel. (The body-mind concept and its relevance to pedagogy and curriculum are elaborated further in Chapter Two.) He wrote in *From Absolutism to Experimentalism*: “Hegel’s synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation” (Backe, 1999; Boisvert, 1985; Dewey, 1930, as cited in: Alexander, 1987, p. 16; Bernstein, 1967, p. 167; Menand, 2001, p. 267; Garrison, 2006, p. 13). In Darwin’s principle of natural selection,³ Dewey saw a transactional relationship between living beings and the environment, a mutually constitutive relationship, of which imagination and emotion are some of its contemporaneously inherent traits. To this interchange, he gave the name experience, a term, which “might conceivably apply to the case of, say, delight in certain tones, colors or tastes” (Dewey, 1887, p. 168; 1895/2003, pp. 32-30). Rather than a class of objects, Dewey regards art as experience that is refined and intensified (Teehan, 1995; Perricone, 2006). Further to their intrinsic value, Dewey saw the arts as tools to highlight, explain, and judge lived experience (Perricone, 2006). I will return to this subject in more detail in forthcoming chapters.

³ The principle of natural selection states, “all organic adaptations are due simply to constant variation and the elimination of those variations which are harmful in the struggle for existence” (Dewey, 1910b/1997b, p.11).

Dewey's project brought to philosophy a uniquely American perspective comprising: the view that logic and philosophic inquiry are instrumental and flow from thought processes to action; a strong concern for social ills manifested in "a special empathy for the second-best, the second-class citizen, the loser in society;" (Martin, 2002, p. 236) and a principled pluralism sensitive to conflict from unexamined emotion (Stengel, 2007). Dewey was a philosopher who had immense influence as a public figure and whose embrace of society was inclusionary, rather than exclusionary. The point of the discussion that follows is to explain the process of learning how to locate the aesthetic within the experiential continuum.

Ethics as Experience, Inquiry, and Knowledge

A persistent motif in Dewey's pragmatism⁴ is that of improving ordinary experience,⁵ be it social, political, or moral. For this kind of improvement, Dewey offers

⁴ Pragmatism is a philosophical movement that gives importance to action whose meaning is a reconstruction of the actual, in light of the possible (Alexander, 1990).

⁵ Experience is a polysemic term used by Dewey and is confusing (Shusterman, 2010). For our purposes, it may help to clarify its use first, as a term for anchoring thinking to practical activity; second, as a description of the interactive nature of human existence; and third, as an integrating principle among disciplines. In many instances, confusion occurs regarding Dewey's terminology because it has not been operationalized. James, however, simplified it: "My experience is what I agree to attend to" (James, 1890/1950, p. 402; as cited in Garrison, 2005, p. 112).

a three-part model of aesthetic experience. The first component of Dewey's model is to learn to recognize what experiences qualify as aesthetic ones. In addition to encounters within art museums and concert halls, aesthetic qualities are also located in ordinary and quotidian experiences, including our daily freedoms, imaginative projects, and commonplace interests and pleasures. Dewey explained that, in fact, all experience has an aesthetic dimension described as an integrative quality that makes an experience, here referred to as "situation," coherent and meaningful:

[A] situation is a whole in virtue of its immediately pervasive quality. When we describe it from the psychological side, we have to say that the situation as a qualitative whole is sensed or *felt*. Such an expression is, however, valuable only as it is taken negatively to indicate that it is *not*, as such, an object of *discourse*.

(Dewey 1938/1991, pp. 73-74)

Dewey's (1934) aesthetics⁶ as elucidated in *Art as Experience* locate the embodied human being "recovering the continuity of esthetic experience with normal processes of living" (p. 10).⁷ Beauty, dissonance, harmony, balance, and other aesthetic qualities come

⁶ Aesthetics is from the Greek *aesthesis* meaning feeling. Every generation has its styles of feeling expressed in art objects objectifying experiences of feeling (Langer, 1962). Thus, aesthetics can be viewed as the study of art as felt experience (Auxier, 2004).

⁷ The entire statement reads: "Even to readers who are adversely inclined to what has been said, the implications of the statements that have been made may be useful in

about from – and are part of the meaning of – the vital interaction between living organism and surroundings whereby energy, action, and material are reorganized. Dewey (1934) writes: “[T]he esthetic is no intruder in experience from without[,] . . . it . . . belong(s) to every normally complete experience” (p. 46). Art is merely a focus on, and refinement of aesthetic qualities that animate ordinary experience. Its aim “is to serve the whole creature in his unified vitality,” – an end in itself. “To esthetic experience then, the philosopher must go to understand what experience is” (p. 278).

The second component of Dewey’s model is his argument that the aesthetic aspect of an experience is distinguished by a non-discursive value or meaning that is felt, as well as, inferred. Each aesthetic experience possesses a consummatory, integral, or unified quality that uniquely inheres in it, indicating that it is markedly emotional in character (Dewey, 1934).

I have spoken of the esthetic quality that rounds out an experience into completeness and unity as emotional. . . . In fact, emotions are qualities, when they are significant, of a complex experience that moves and changes. . . . All emotions are qualifications of a drama and they change as the drama develops. . . . The intimate nature of emotion is manifested in the experience of one watching a play on the stage or reading a novel. It attends the development of a plot; and a plot requires a stage, a space, wherein to develop and time in which to unfold.

defining the nature of the problem: that of recovering the continuity of esthetic experience with normal processes of living” (Dewey, 1934, p. 10).

Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it.

(Dewey, 1934, pp. 41-42)

Emotion belongs of a certainty to the self that is concerned in the movement of events toward an issue that is desired or disliked. . . . In order to become emotional, [automatic reflexes like fright] must become parts of an inclusive and enduring situation that involves concern for objects and their issues.

(Dewey, 1934, p. 42)

Emotion is the moving and cementing force. It selects what is congruous and dyes what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity to materials externally disparate and dissimilar. It thus provides unity in and through the varied parts of an experience [and] an esthetic character even though it is not, dominantly, an esthetic experience. (Dewey, 1934, p. 42)

The third component of Dewey's model provides that, if we are aware of the aesthetic qualities of an experience, we have opportunities to engage in improving that experience: elevating its beauty, meaning and value; creating order, harmony, and balance; and avoiding dullness and ugliness. The aesthetic includes our capacities to bring experiences to satisfactory fulfillment by engaging in inquiry into the meaning of the aesthetic qualities that we sense. This inquiry depends on our discernment of the cognitive aspects of our aesthetic emotions, such as "the thrill of verification" and "the feeling of surprise" (Sheffler, 1991, pp. 10 & 12, as cited in Pouivet, 2001, p. 52). In a theory of emotions where emotions are cognitive, feelings and emotions have a reflective significance that becomes evident, as a result of embodied experience. For instance, the

emotions may be painful or pleasurable to the extent that our selves are promoted and our projects supported (Solomon, 2008). Concepts are formed in the process of attending to the continuous flow of experience and extracting its distinctive qualities or patterns (Johnson, 2007). Imagination brings about new ways of making sense of experience, thereby expanding concepts and transforming meaning (Johnson, 2007). According to Dewey, making art can serve as an example of intelligent inquiry toward consummatory experience in other domains because the creative process engages humans in higher orders of thought, including the intelligent discernment of valuable qualities: “The production of a work of genuine art probably demands more intelligence than does most of the so-called thinking that goes on among those who pride themselves on being ‘intellectuals’” (p. 46).

There are many events in time that comprise the entirety of experience, yet those that are thrown into relief by their fullness and ineffable quality signify completion and fulfillment. According to Lipman (1967), one finds complete satisfaction in a consummatory experience, that “it seeks no larger sphere in which it can be placed” (p. 18). However, as Dewey envisioned it, an experience need not be joyful, pleasurable or harmonious, as it could by the same token, be tragic or disturbing. An experience then is wrought from tension and progression in a directly embodied way, and as such is marked by inexpressible feeling (Alexander, 1987).

Often such experiences remain only at an inchoate level, tacitly shaping our world and its meanings, dimly informing them, if consciously at all. So much of human

existence is shaped by such conditions it is natural that they should become the subject matter of art. (Alexander, 1987, p. 201)

One further aspect remains to be explained about Dewey's aesthetics and its connection with other dimensions of experience, including the ethical. In his aesthetics, Dewey sought to make connections between various disciplines, circumventing the many distinctions between experts, their specializations, and the public at large (Shusterman, 2000). His democratizing impulse not only extended the realm of aesthetic value beyond fine art, to encompass all endeavors imbued with aesthetic qualities (Dewey, 1934), but also made aesthetic work the model for all domains of value inquiry. For instance, in making practical judgments, the following formal characteristics are akin to aesthetic judgments: 1. The context of a person's circumstances is an incomplete situation wherein there is need for something to be acted out. 2. The judgment is meant to bring about change in the situation that is to be completed. 3. There is an object, a state of affairs that poses a problem by its incompleteness. 4. There is an end-in-view. 5. It has been determined that something can be accomplished by action adequate and relevant to the situation. 6. The action, when successful, unifies or integrates, and is consummatory (Festenstein, 1997).

After imagining practical consequences, which ones should we value and desire? Dewey's (1934/1980) argument in *Art as Experience* is his response "that we should pursue aesthetically desirable consequences; pursue outcomes that are satisfying, fulfilling, harmonious, and beautiful; and explore what makes them so" (Cherryholmes, 1999, p. 28). Because our lived world is one that is relational, an example of the

incomplete situation calling for appropriate conduct is that of coming face-to-face with people having beliefs, persuasions, and proclivities different from our own. Dewey called embodied habits (and dispositions, which he considered their subdued form) a “vital art,” viewing them as responses that can be made to become intelligent and flexible, so that they enable meaningful and enhanced relations with the world (Dewey, HNC, p. 31, as cited in Granger, 2010, p. 72). This presents itself as a task for teachers to attend to students’ growing ability to think and feel for others, be concerned about how the conduct of their dealings impacts the lives of others, and be able to interact collaboratively with them in reconstructing dispositions, attitudes, and behaviors to achieve better outcomes. Dewey enjoins teachers to nurture the ameliorative dispositions that students incipiently possess, and apply them to situations that demand what Dewey describes as a “braveness and equanimity of soul” (Dewey, LW 7:198, as cited in Fishman & McCarthy, 2010, p. 8). It would likewise be worthwhile to inquire into what makes the goal aesthetically desirable.

So far nothing has been said regarding the major influence Dewey has had on other theorists, who have followed his lead in taking aesthetic criteria to be regulative in moral, political, educational and other domains of inquiry. Drawing on *Art as Experience*, Johnson (1993) notes that the aesthetic and the ethical are inextricable from one another because the aesthetic is what gives experience the dimension of meaningful order (pp. 207-209). Similarly, Johnson has argued that, “Aesthetics is not just art theory, but rather should be regarded broadly as the study of how humans make and experience meaning” (Johnson, 2007, p. 209). He broadens the idea of aesthetic meaning, reasoning that in the

arts, the processes of embodied meaning are the same as those making linguistic meaning possible, highlighting those aesthetic aspects as “qualities, images, patterns of sensorimotor processes, and emotions” (2007, p. 1).

As for pedagogy, Louise Rosenblatt and Maxine Greene have been noteworthy. Acknowledged by many as ahead of its time, Rosenblatt’s transactional theory of learning is formulated on the basis of Dewey’s book about aesthetics, *Art as Experience* (Connell, 1994; Granger, 2006; Karolides, 1999; Innis, 2001; Rosenblatt, 1998 & 2001). According to Rosenblatt (1995), the encounter with meaning is one that is transformative, and having had personal guidance from Dewey,⁸ rather than an interaction of separate entities acting on one another, the term *transaction* should be used to designate

⁸ “I’ve become known as, you might say, a representative of the application of the pragmatist philosophy to esthetics. While I was teaching at Barnard at Columbia University in the thirties, although I never studied with him, John Dewey was still a professor of philosophy there. I did meet him and I ultimately became one of the early members of an organization called The Conference on Methods in Philosophy and the Sciences that he and other philosophers organized. In that organization I came into contact with Dewey, Horace Kallen and a number of the other leading philosophers and people in the social sciences and the humanities. The meetings dealt with problems of methodology in all of these areas. The work of Charles Sanders Peirce, as well as John Dewey and William James have been particularly important to my theory” (Rosenblatt, University of Miami Interview, 1999).

relationships between reciprocally conditioned elements. Her theory also upholds the pragmatist epistemic stance of warranted assertability (as opposed to “justified true belief”) to resolve arbitrary and invalid interpretations of meaning, requisite in determining the connection of meaning to immanent real world problems (Boyles, 2006; Connell, 1996). One is immediately aware that Rosenblatt’s frame of reference is Dewey and his notion of the organic nature of experience, as she writes about her own learning theory:

The literary work exists in a live circuit set up between reader and text: the reader infuses intellectual and emotional meanings into the pattern of verbal symbols, and those symbols channel his thoughts and feelings. Out of this complex process emerges a more or less organized imaginative experience. (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 24)

Greene’s (1995 & 2001) approach in teaching and learning, emphasizing the interplay of imagination and emotions in ethical meaning making, was guided by Dewey’s union of aesthetics and ethics, and served as the initial inspiration of this dissertation. For Greene, as with Rosenblatt, the reading experience is one of constructing meaning. Greene (1995) reasons that by studying art, one is also constructing meaning because as she encounters painting, sculpture, or architecture and participates in music, drama, film or dance, she embraces it as her own experience, thus imposing order to what she perceives and making a new context for it, as a viewer, reader, or perceiver pursuing meaning. Here, she writes:

To introduce students to the manner of such engagement is to strike a balance between helping learners to pay heed--to attend to shapes, patterns, sounds, rhythms, figures of speech, contours, and lines—and helping liberate them to achieve particular works as meaningful. (Greene, 1995, p.125)

Feminist philosophy also shares with Deweyan pragmatism the unity of aesthetics and ethics in taking exception to narrative literature, as a locus for individuals in dialogue, who likewise are implicated in moral transactions (Sorrel, 1999). Dewey himself endorsed literary texts⁹ for their potential to engage in philosophical ethics, praising the pedagogical innovation as a “discovery of a new method of thinking on moral subjects, striking out upon new paths that will open up new fields” (Dewey, 1929-30/2003, p. 399). Likewise, he praised the use of works by those who “approached the mine not as moralists but as novelists, dramatists, poets, or as reformers” (Dewey, 1929, p. 399; Seigfried, 1993). Believing that art preserved the true nature of experience, he wrote:

That rich and colored experience, never the same in two nations, in two individuals, in two moments of the same life—whose thoughts, desires, fears and

⁹ It was for the teacher-educator, Dr. Helen Edna Davis, Ph.D., that Dewey wrote his accolade in a foreword to her book. Her teaching strategy is described as that of problematizing incidents from biographical accounts of Tolstoy and Nietzsche, and highlighting intensely lived experience commonly shared by others (Seigfried, 1993, p. 6).

hopes have furnished the material for the ever-developing literature of the ages, for a Homer and a Chaucer, a Sophocles and a Shakespeare, for the unwritten comedies and tragedies of daily life—was neatly and carefully dissected, its parts labeled and stowed away in their pigeon-holes, the inventory taken, and the whole stamped with the stamp of *un fait accompli*. (Dewey, EW1:48, as cited in Alexander, 1987, p. 19)

Thus far, I have introduced the uniquely American philosopher John Dewey, conveyed that one can learn how to take advantage of the aesthetic in order to make ordinary lived experience more beautiful and satisfying, and explained that Dewey's influence continues to persist especially in the area of pedagogy. Dewey's influence, as well as those of others, will become evident in the course of this dissertation. I now turn to the meaning of a sound ethical judgment, its purpose, and fallibilistic nature.

Ethical Inquiry and Ethical Judgment

For Dewey, ethics was not a category of conceptual understanding but a dimension of experience. Ethical experience is not removed or segregated from ordinary experience but a particular dimension of its meaning, which, again, is felt as much as thought (see Gregory, 2009). Dewey suggested that the meaning of ethical precepts and concepts was to be found in experience because ethical norms function to make experience more just, more beautiful and in other ways better (Gregory, 2009).

In large measure, our conventions of moral concepts, feelings, and conduct adequately serve to help us understand and make the most of our experiences. However, Dewey and Tufts (1932) pointed out that in moments when we are confronted with

opposing tendencies regarding our conduct, for example, discerning right from wrong, and eliciting praise rather than disapproval, we experience doubt regarding the ethical or moral meaning of our experience and are faced with troubling questions of ethics and morality. Tension then arises in an affective phase colored by emotions. In Dewey's view, a moral problem or situation is an occasion for inquiry, which is the way we move "from troubled and problematic situations to ones that are more settled and less precarious" (Grange, 2004, p. 33). On this understanding, an ethical agent is one who is capable of (a) discerning ethical dimensions in experience, (b) valuing the cognitive and qualitative meanings of, e.g. compassion, justice, and friendship over, e.g. cruelty, avarice, and oppression, and (c) figuring out how to respond in ways that improve particular experiences in those dimensions. Ethical inquiry is an occasion not unlike that which Dewey identified in *How We Think* (1997), as one instigated by perplexity and ending, ideally, in a judgment that involves self-correction, sensitivity to context, and the consideration of relevant criteria (Lipman, 2003). Johnson (2007) explains: "Judgment is the fundamental act of human cognition whereby a multiplicity of sensations, images, and thoughts is brought into a single, larger, synthesis or unity of thought" (Johnson, 2007, p. 214). The immediate aim of ethical inquiry is to arrive at a sound ethical judgment, which has three important characteristics: theoretical, pragmatic, and educative. To begin with, sound ethical judgments involve a nuanced understanding of relevant moral concepts like honesty, kindness, and justice. As Dewey and Tufts (1932) have written, "The essence of morals, it is implied, is to know the reason for customary instructions; to ascertain the criterion insuring their being just[ified]" (p. 172). For Dewey, even normative concepts

and propositions are the product of ongoing, investigative, and experimental inquiry. What we draw on is the meaning of attitudes, actions, and commitments that have already brought about fruitful communal interaction (Johnson, 1993).¹⁰ Dewey's view of knowledge places the content of ethics – substantive views of what constitutes justice, care, health and other forms of goodness – on equal footing with that of other disciplines, such as the subject matter of the sciences and the arts, constantly being updated and expanded through study, research, and experimentation. In that vein, he was also careful to ward off a charge of moral relativism:

It is stupid to suppose that this signifies that all moral principles are so relative to a particular state of society that they have no binding force in any social condition. The obligation is to discover what principles are relevant to our own social estate. Since this social condition is a fact, the principles which are related to it are real and significant, even though they be not adapted to some other set and style of . . . culture . . . (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 313)

However, conceptual ethical theory and substantive moral knowledge are effective only to the extent that there can be a vital connection between them and human

¹⁰ “We are committed to noting that morality is a continuing process not a fixed achievement. Morals mean growth of conduct in meaning; at least it means that kind of expansion in meaning which is consequent upon observations of the conditions and outcome of conduct . . . [M]orals are education. It is learning the meaning of what we are about and employing that meaning in action (Johnson, 1993, p. 180).

activity (Dewey, 1916/1997c). Thus, the second characteristic of sound ethical judgments is that they successfully intervene to improve the ethically problematic situations that prompted the inquiry in the first place. Ethical judgment is judgment about what to believe, value and/or do in a particular case in order to bring about intelligent resolution of the situation, in the qualitative terms suggested above. In the face of moral confusion and the absence of clarity, we draw on resources available to us – or create new ones – in order to make our present situation more meaningful and manageable. The practical value of ethical principles and rules is their use as tools in ameliorating moral life (Fesmire, 2003). The right judgment, therefore, is one that is based not only on ethical principles, but also on scrutinizing needs, conditions, obstacles, and resources; drawing a detailed plan of action and anticipating material and qualitative consequences (Dewey & Tufts, 1932). However, no matter how principled, ethical judgments are necessarily provisional, in so far as they contribute to improvement over past results. Realistically speaking, the measure of sound ethical judgment is if it adequately addresses a moral deficiency (Dewey, 1922). As Grayling (2007) writes:

Ethical inquiry should issue in substantive suggestions for what meaning and fulfillment are; even better, it should provide practical suggestions for applying those substantive suggestions to the practice of actual life, lived in the way actual lives are lived: among ordinariness, demands, complexities, obstacles, accidents, setbacks, opportunities, good luck and bad, other people, limitations, weariness, tribulations, joys, and an existing framework of institutions and social practices

which themselves constrain part (and often much) of the possibilities that most individuals can reasonably expect to actualize (p. 23).

Third, a thoughtful judgment should be what Dewey termed an “educative experience,” in that it effects growth in the intelligent capacities – e.g. moral discernment and judgment-making – of the agent. Though in Dewey’s view inquiry and growth are open-ended, they are processes whereby fundamental dispositions are formed so that they can be expressed in the way life is carried out. When speaking of dispositions, the subject in question is the habits that are linked to a person’s character and moral formation.

Having explored the practical nature of ethical inquiry and ethical judgment, I now propose a pedagogical model for ethical inquiry guided by Rosenblatt’s Deweyan notion of experience as a matrix, “a continuing flow of sensations, feelings, attitudes, ideas, and funded or latent memories, synthesized by imagination, and from which thinking emerges” (Alexander, 1987; Connell, 2001; Rosenblatt, 1994, p. 42, as cited in Innis, 1998, p. 871).

The Components of Ethical Inquiry

The theory of ethical inquiry I propose is informed by Dewey’s account of ethical experience and the nature of philosophical (including ethical) inquiry, but incorporates elements of pedagogy and philosophy of body. My theory consists of four components: body-based or embodied reasonableness, imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical content. These components will be the topics of chapters to follow, and I outline them briefly.

The first component, embodied reasonableness is thinking that is critical, creative, committed, contextual, and embodied (Sprod, 2001). An embodied pedagogy presupposes the engagement of the entire person, including feelings, emotions, and affect (Fayne, 2010). This component derives from the work of Johnson (2006), who acknowledges the initial impetus coming from Dewey's theory of emotions (1895 & 1896). In this connection, Johnson's area of scholarship is informed by the profound role of the brain and the body in shaping what and how we think, feel, and act, including our body image and body schema, two central concepts in the context of embodiment.¹¹ It also draws on the work of Bowman (1998 & 2000), Gatens (1996), Lloyd (1996 & 1999), Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), Nussbaum (2001) and Spinoza (1955). Their contributions will be examined in light of our internal bodily states, which can be brought to our awareness by accessing our feelings and emotions, the aspects of experience that contribute to our sense of personal and social well-being. Embodied reasonableness involves corporeal logic.¹² It is a process of making our bodily experience (the source domain) become the basis for the inferences we make and the reasoning we do about a target domain.

¹¹ Body image is the picture we have of our own body or the way it appears to us (Schilder, 1950). The body schema refers to the body's dynamic organization operating without our awareness in our tacit physical movements (Johnson, 2007; Weiss, 1999).

¹² Corporeal logic is imagistic as opposed to discursive logic which is verbal (Fleckenstein, 2003).

Moral imagination, the second component, has been defined as the ability in particular circumstances to discover and evaluate possibilities, not limited by any of those circumstances, nor framed by habits, rules, or norms (Werhane, as cited in Fesmire, 2003). It permits new ways to frame situations and revise or broaden one's moral point of view. It also includes the capacity to empathize with others and discern creative possibilities for ethical action (Fesmire, 2003). Moral imagination includes the following aspects: (a) image schemata,¹³ (b) narrativity,¹⁴ as the standard unit of meaning, and (c) kinaesthetic or bodily awareness¹⁵ plans. The process of moral imagination involves such activities as forming images, resourceful problem solving, constructing counterfactuals, including alternative realities, and articulating possibilities, their consequences, and repercussions (Pardales, 2002). In a classroom setting, moral imagination would fuel emergent contexts for ethical inquiry.

¹³ Schemata are knowledge structures containing features of a person's lived experience (Reutzel & Cooter, 1996; Woolfolk, 1998).

¹⁴ Narrativity refers to the story-like quality of human life, so that a person could think about her life as a story or a number of interconnected stories. As an inherent temporal quality of experience, narrativity presents meanings that extend us simultaneously backwards and forwards in time.

¹⁵ Kinaesthesia or body awareness is a term in the field of kinaesthesiology meant to explain our proprioceptive ability to have an internal sense of physical movements when they are performed efficiently and successfully (Satina and Hultgren, 2001, p. 527).

A third component, emotions as judgments, draws on the work of Dewey and other philosophers, who have recognized that emotions are cognitive, value-laden judgments (De Souza, 1980; Lipman, 2003; Nussbaum, 2001; Oksenberg Rorty, 1980; Pardales, 2002; Pouivet, 2000; Sheffler, 1991; Solomon, 1993 & 2008). Dewey and Tufts (1932) state, “In their root and essence, moral judgments are emotional . . . a moral judgment must be at least colored with feeling if it is to influence behavior” (p. 296). Therefore, sound judgment in any domain, including the domain of ethics, is moved appropriately by relevant emotions.

We *learn* [emphasis added] to have good emotions, the ones that can have profitable consequences for knowledge and aesthetic enjoyment. To a large extent, *our education consists not only in the obtaining of knowledge, but also of emotional attitudes* [emphasis added] matching certain enjoyable activities. The same emotions are in play in both the sciences and aesthetic experience: looking for differences (distinguishing) or similarities (analogy, metaphor), organizing, rephrasing in an enlightening fashion, formalizing, and so forth. (Pouivet, 2000, p. 52)

Dewey recommends that an education of the emotions should take place at the high school level because of the adolescent’s heightened ability for higher order thinking, which he describes in this manner:

In the secondary period, there is at adolescence the awakening of the reflex and distinctly emotional consciousness. There is a basis for aesthetic analysis within

certain limits, for conscious attention to the best modes of communicating certain ideas, and of arousing certain emotions, or making a certain conscious distinction between the thought and the form of the expression and the realization of the thought proper.

The same reflective consciousness coming up on the intellectual side makes literature perhaps the unequal instrument at this time for more specific ethical instruction. Great literary classics do involve ethical problems and attempted ethical solutions, which the child, after adolescence, is likely to have an interest in, and while formal instruction in ethics would be too formal or subjective, the literary form of it, being objective, gives the student a chance to work them out. (Dewey, 1899/1966, p. 280)

The final component, ethical content corresponds with Dewey's notion that ethics is part of the unfinished meaning of our ordinary experience. Sound ethical judgment involves inquiry into such meaning. This requires intelligent discernment of the somatic and affective qualities of experience, especially those with potential ethical meaning, for example, fear, shame, and disgust. It also involves inquiry into the meaning of certain ethical concepts, such as right, duty, compassion, friendship, and person, and how such concepts both problematize and illuminate episodes of experience, which are promising or which find us ethically confused and conflicted. The pedagogical model just described will be useful in preparing instructional materials for the purpose of learning to conduct ethical inquiry, the need for which I justify in the following section.

Education in Ethical Inquiry

In the popular imagination, ethics is received morality, an edifice built on certain foundations, as in the fundamental principles of a religious or cultural tradition. Consequently, ethics education is typically authoritarian. Established practice, habit, or rule is unyielding, confirming that particular behaviors receive widespread acceptance and longstanding approval. As Dewey & Tufts (1932) have said, “Conduct is regulated through specific injunctions and prohibitions: Do this, do not do that” (p. 307). Children are expected to obey these injunctions without breach or question. This regulative work takes place in homes and religious institutions, and also in schools and classrooms. There, oftentimes, ethical beliefs are strengthened or overlain by the hidden curriculum comprising observed patterns of normative behavior, for instance, listening in silence while another is speaking to bestow value on the speaker’s ideas, restraining oneself from inflicting blows on a perceived tormentor, according elders due respect, and other habits indicative of a culturally-shared code of conduct by which young people are socialized into existing values and morals (Wynne & Ryan, 1997, p. 144). However, the meaning of “specific injunctions and prohibitions,” derives from larger domains of normative meaning. In fact, conceived most broadly, ethics is the full set of our normative concerns expressed in how life is to be lived, especially if it is to be considered a good life or if a person is to be considered a moral self. Morality is the subset of ethics issuing in behavioral codes, rules and sanctions regarding our relations with others (Grayling, 2007). Hence it is ethics, rather than morality, for which the overriding concern is educating character in thoughtfulness, insight, taste, and tolerance (Grayling, 2007).

These behaviors are inscribed in young minds as a result of an understanding habituated in experience, and invested with a store of meanings. “Learning in the proper sense, is not learning things, but the *meanings* of things” (Dewey, 1997a/1910a, p. 176). In large measure, the conventional ethics taught in schools, including the hidden curriculum, have value in regulating children’s ethical beliefs and conduct – which are not insignificant objectives. However, if ethics is taught only as rules of behavior, it becomes divorced from meaning. Left out are those aspects that can contribute to children’s growth as moral agents, including how such rules improve experience, enhance personal growth and social life. Moreover, education in ethical conventions tends to obfuscate moral conflict and uncertainty, which even children experience.

In that connection, I have developed a pedagogical framework and a novella for ethical inquiry in the classroom that incorporates the four components of sound ethical judgment just outlined. The following concepts: personhood, body, and sexuality and gender, are primary areas of ethical concern that are also central to adolescence (Kagan, 1972; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1972). Each of the next three chapters is given to explaining one of those components, and in each of these chapters I first define and explain the component, explain and justify its role in ethical inquiry, and make a number of recommendations for how education might cultivate that component.

The organization of succeeding chapters is as follows. In Chapter Two, my objective is to arrive at a method for teaching ethical inquiry whereby students undertake reconstructing bodily habits of thinking, communication, and conduct. I argue that

Dewey's conception of body-mind addresses somatophobia¹⁶ that is emblematic of the inherent tensions in body/mind dualism and an embodied reasonableness appropriately addresses that. Dewey's theory of inquiry has two important features directed at addressing the reconstructive task: sensitivity to context and ability to self-correct (Ralston, 2011). These and other criteria from Dewey's thought are everyday skills that serve as guideposts for learning how to do ethical inquiry. I make several pedagogical recommendations¹⁷ that correspond with the requirements for embodied reasonableness. In this connection, the pedagogical model for teaching practice in the language arts is described in Marzano's (1991) *Cultivating Thinking in English and the Language Arts*. Philosophy for Children (P4C) complements it well, so that the objective of teaching how to do ethical inquiry can be accomplished.

In Chapter Three, I shed light on Dewey's theory of imagination and education. Dewey singles out imagination's function as one that is significantly moral, hence the

¹⁶ Somatophobia refers to the relegation of the body's importance in relation to the idea of a superior mind; somatic disempowerment. According to Spelman (1982), it manifests itself in disdain for the body and belief in the inferiority of females, a view that has led to unequal relations and oppressive practices.

¹⁷ I analyze Philosophy for Children (P4C) as a program for ethical inquiry in light of those recommendations and throw light on specific aspects of traditional P4C practice that fulfill these recommendations, as well as some that frustrate or block them, or that may not be adequate.

notion, moral imagination. I put forth the narrative as appropriate material for learning ethical inquiry for certain reasons, one of which being that the processes of belief formation in the minds of characters taking place within the specified context of fiction lends itself to philosophical analysis (Zamir, 2007, p. 109). As an instructional tool, I propose dramatic rehearsal, both as a deliberative event and a kinaesthetic process, in order to create a fictional context for dialogic dramatic inquiry, a form of process drama whereby students attempt to reconstruct moral habits (ways of thinking, feeling and doing which are dynamic response patterns). As an inquiry-based pedagogy, it uses adult-mediated dramatic play and performance to create a sequence of imagined, but authentic, events to promote dialogue among participants (Edmiston, 2000 & 2011). I relate my pedagogical decisions to the requirements of the moral imagination component and explain how P4C corresponds with the said requirements.

In Chapter Four, I explain Dewey's theory of emotions described as a unity of thought and emotion in naturalistic functional coordination of behavior (Garrison, 2003). In this chapter, I also discuss the arts as a mechanism for educating the four components of ethical inquiry. According to Lipman (1995), educating emotions by attending to the aesthetic dimension of experience corresponds with a moral education because emotions indicate valuations (caring thinking or that we care about something), bringing about actions that embody judgments. He writes, "This is moral education in the sense that if students could perceive for themselves the inappropriateness of their judgments and their emotions, they might be less ready to act in the ways those judgments of emotions called for" (p. 8).

Relying on its deep connections to emotional life (Nussbaum, 2001), I highlight music as embodied experience and ethical encounter, exploring its pedagogical implications for ethical inquiry and its role in nurturing appropriate dispositions, tastes, and the construction of identity. According to Bowman (2000), music represents events constitutive of ethical encounters because, by imparting appropriate habits and dispositions, it nurtures character that is comfortable with and adept at responding to contingency and particularity. Second, music is fundamentally social and intersubjective, requiring mutuality, openness, and attributes like cooperation, respect, and fairness. Third, the act of investing oneself in a collective social practice has consequences for valuing that extend well beyond the musical domain. Fourth, music requires acceptance and deference to standards of excellence that are consensual, fluid, and inarticulable. Fifth, music's more important successes benefit entire collaborative communities, of those engaged in and committed to its advancement. Sixth, musical success is bound to one's character and reflects one's personal identity. Seventh, music demands active engagement in local forms of community. Finally, music raises our expectations for quality in subsequent experience. All musical experience is corporeally constituted phenomena, and for some, musical embodiment entails a commitment to healthful musical action. Shusterman (1997) asserts, "We have to stop pushing words and start moving limbs; stop talking and start dancing, in order to understand the body as the 'non-discursive other'" (p. 129, as cited in Bowman & Powell, 2007).

We can learn to listen to music and read painting and sculpture as we do literature. As Nussbaum (1990) wrote in *Love's Knowledge*, the arts afford insight for us

to be able to inquire into some central ethical questions of human life. Using music, painting, and sculpture to demonstrate the nature of emotion, I highlight the emotions of fear, disgust and shame, and relate them to philosophical/real world problems that afflict us and are related to personhood, body, sexuality and gender. I conclude the chapter with an iteration of my framework for education in ethical inquiry, which I will use to justify my novella in the next chapter.

In Chapter Five, I make the case for high school ethical inquiry to focus on concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, gender and sexuality – as some of the most important ethical dimensions of students’ lives at this age. I describe the curriculum that I have prepared with a view to strengthening students’ reasoning and judgment while learning to do ethical inquiry, engaging them in the practice of making generic, and mediating or procedural, judgments. The greater part of this chapter is devoted to explaining the concept of the gaze and the nude in specific works of the visual arts covering a lengthy period of its history in the western tradition. The naked human body, both female and male, continues to play a pivotal role in the understanding and problematizing of selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality, something Paechter (1998) has determined holds sway over our educational institutions and life in schools. The curriculum is concerned with ethical content that strives to be common to all, central to the way we make sense of experience, and contestable or problematic, i.e. something that is arguable (Sharp & Splitter, 1995). I have been guided by Lipman’s instructional model that utilizes a P4C reader, which is a trigger text described as “an inquiry-fostering environment” (Lipman, 2003, p. 156), and is meant to nurture reflection and dialogue in a

classroom community of ethical inquiry, a cooperative learning methodology comprising a group and its teacher-facilitator, who have a shared commitment to engage in inquiry (Sprod, 2001). The P4C reader, in this case, is a narrative text I have written that aims to model instances of critical judgment stipulated by Lipman (2003), as the following: first, where students are faced with discrepancies that bewilder them and are enjoined to consider their underlying principles; second, where they are faced with something made to contain an element of surprise; and third, where they are in a situation involving the discrimination of value and are required to think contextually. In a way, the fictional narrative dramatizes philosophy, and the exercises provide practice in making judgments, by sharpening and strengthening cognitive skills, and promoting precision and specificity (Lipman, 1996). Finally, I provide a novella and unit plan for ethical inquiry at the high school level, following my framework. In making my focus of research a project involving teaching young students how to do ethical inquiry, I have taken up Dewey's invitation, eloquently expressed, in the following excerpt from *Ethics*.

For in its ethical sense, love signifies completeness of devotion to the objects esteemed good. Such an interest, or love, is marked by temperance because a comprehensive interest demands a harmony that can be attained only by subordination of particular impulses and passions. It involves courage because an active and genuine interest nerves us to meet and overcome the obstacles that stand in the way of its realization. It includes wisdom or thoughtfulness because sympathy, concern for the welfare of all affected by conduct, is the surest

guarantee for the exercise of *consideration*, for examination of a proposed line of conduct in all its bearings. (Dewey, 1932, p. 285)

Chapter Two: Embodied Reasonableness in Ethical Inquiry

Prop. XIX The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected.

Proof: The human mind is the very idea or knowledge of the human body.

(Spinoza, 1956, p. 101)

Prop. XXIII. The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. (Spinoza, 1956, p. 101)

Organic body occupies a distinctive position in the hierarchy of being; it is the highest actuality of nature's physical potentialities, and it is in turn the potentiality of mind. (Dewey, 1958, p. 249)

Dewey's reconstruction of philosophy was a means for philosophy to address real world problems and to issue in harmonious coordination within lived situations. The previous chapter described how Dewey saw continuity instead of separation, as in organism-experience, where experience is a fundamental transaction mutually constitutive of live creatures and nature, human beings and their social environment. In the idea of continuity, Dewey sought to undo Cartesian dualism, writing thus: "Restoration of continuity is shown to do away with the mind-body problem" (Dewey, EN, xiv-xv; as cited in Alexander, 1987, p. 98). Body-mind is a unit grounding meaning and thought. It approaches lived experience, as a flow of imagination, emotion, and

action out of which questions of survival and flourishing emerge.

In this chapter, I argue that the most promising descriptions of the operations of the human mind relate to the operations in the human body, so it follows that the norm of reasonableness must also be embodied. The notion of the embodied mind takes into account that the body-mind is a single fundamental unit through which sentient living creatures interact with the environment. My construct of embodied reasonableness is based on a non-dualistic, body-based configuration for the thinking being. It is body-mind where reason emerges, as critical, intersubjective, outcome-oriented -- ergo, embodied reasonableness. The chapter is further organized to arrive at a method for teaching ethical inquiry whereby students undertake reconstructing bodily habits of thinking, discourse, and conduct. I make several pedagogical recommendations that correspond with the requirements for embodied reasonableness drawing on Marzano's (1991) *Cultivating Thinking in English and the Language Arts* and make reference to the pedagogy of P4C, which offers a method in ethical inquiry.

In view of the mind-body problem as germane to the subject of embodied reasonableness, I begin the chapter with an historical narrative of the body-mind concept, highlighting Dewey's contribution, acknowledging others, such as Descartes, whose dualism established mind and body as separate substances,¹⁸ Spinoza (1955), and the

¹⁸ In the definition of substance as "an existent thing which requires nothing but itself to exist," Cartesian dualism establishes that mind and body are independent and completely separate of each other (Stumpf, 1994, p. 246).

philosophers Gatens and Lloyd (1999), who are at the forefront in bringing to our attention Spinoza's unique perspective on mind as idea of the body. I conclude my account with Merleau-Ponty (1962), who in the tradition of the science of inward experience known as *sens intime*,¹⁹ linked sense perception with its object and determined the mind is embodied. My purpose in engaging in this concise genealogy of thought is to shed some light on the advancement of thinking regarding body-mind as it informs reasonableness and the remaining components of my theory of ethical inquiry, i.e. imagination, emotions as judgments, and ethical content.

In *A Quest for Certainty*, Dewey establishes that the driving force behind humanity's quest for certainty is intellectual advancement. He then points to the dualistic metaphysics that serves as our inheritance from Plato and Aristotle, which in turn formed the bedrock of the medieval Church and continues to thrive in the dualisms of the West's *weltanschauung*, the selfsame dualisms that he labored a lifetime to overcome which he refers to as the "antecedently real" below (Teehan, 1992).

Along with the elimination of myths and grosser superstitions, there were set up the ideals of science and of a life of reason. Ends which could justify themselves

¹⁹ In the language of *sens intime*, expressed as "one's immediate awareness of the presence of the body in perception" and "the simultaneity of a composite of impressions inhering in different parts of the organism, and culminating in the statement that "the soul is necessarily incarnated [sic] there is no psychology without biology" (Canguilhem, 1968, pp. 374-375, as cited in Crary, 1988, p. 8)

to reason were to take the place of custom as the guide of conduct. These two ideals form a permanent contribution to western civilization.

But with all our gratitude for these enduring gifts, we cannot forget the conditions which attended them. For they brought with them the idea of a higher realm of fixed reality . . . They glorified the invariant at the expense of change . . . It bequeathed the notion, which has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the Greeks, that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real . . .

(Dewey, 1929, p. 16)

Plato's formulation of the immateriality of the soul and the Christian metaphysical tradition played a central role in Cartesian dualism. In arguing for the separation of body and soul, Descartes submitted to Church orthodoxy and exempted God and the human mind from scientific inquiry (Toulmin & Goodfield, 1962). Never mind that Descartes himself was aware of empirical data that pointed to their unity (Copleston, 1994). What we inherited from Descartes is a way of thinking about our epistemological relation to the world. The body is for Cartesian philosophy both necessary and unacceptable, and this ambivalence drives mind and body apart.

Closer to Descartes' time²⁰ is the philosopher Spinoza (1955) in whom interest has been revived by the philosophers Gatens and Lloyd (1999). For Spinoza, human

²⁰ In 1641-1656, the Cartesian account became unacceptable to Spinoza (Gullan-Whur, 2000, p. 35). Quoting Schopenhauer, Gullan-Whur (2000) writes: "Spinoza's philosophy consists mainly in the negation of the double dualism between God and the World and

beings are part of nature (Lloyd, 1994). In his conception of the mind as the idea of the body, Spinoza (1955) brings to our attention that the mind and body are one [“mind and body are one and the same thing” (p. 131)], increasing powers of mind correspond with increasing powers of body, and that the body is capable of embodying mental acts and of exercising individual agency (Lloyd, 1996; Spinoza, 1955; Stewart, 2006). Defining emotions as modifications of the body, Spinoza (1955) attributes a cognitive function to the imagination and emotions.

The human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected. . . . The human mind is the very idea or the knowledge of the human body. (p. 101)

Thus, when men say that this or that physical action has its origin in the mind, which latter has dominion over the body, they are using words without meaning, or are confessing in specious phraseology that they are ignorant of the cause of the said action, and do not wonder at it. . . . I ask such objectors whether experience does not also teach that if the body be inactive the mind is simultaneously unfitted for thinking? For when the body is at rest in sleep, the mind simultaneously is in a state of torpor also, and has no power of thinking, such as it possesses when the body is awake. Again, I think everyone’s experience

between soul and body which his teacher [sic] Descartes had set up” (Ep. 21, Jan. 1665: S 158, as cited in, p. 156)

will confirm the statement, that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thinking on a given subject, but according as the body is more or less fitted for being stimulated by the image of this or that object, so also is the mind more or less fitted for contemplating the said object. (Spinoza, pp. 132-33)

For Spinoza, the imagination's unique strength is its imaging capability, which can impart a vivid sense of a body, even when it is absent or no longer exists. Out of the imaginative experience emerge those emotions establishing our affinities, such as yearning for faraway or deceased loved ones, and compassion for the suffering of distant others. He writes:

[T]he ideas represent external bodies as present to us, we will call the images of things . . . When the mind regards bodies in this fashion, we say that it imagines. . . If the mind, while imagining non-existent things as present to it is at the same time conscious that they do not really exist, this power of the imagination must be set down to the efficacy of its nature, and not to a fault. (Spinoza, p. 100)

According to Spinoza, the ability to make associations is embedded in experiential contexts and schema. It can be reinforced in memory by a fictional narrative and involves numerous images, so that as a result “ . . . when the mind afterwards imagines any of them, it will straightaway remember the others also” (p. 100). He explains further that associations are a function of one's experience, which he describes as “intelligibility”:

For instance, a number of unconnected words is much more difficult to remember than the same number in the form of a narration. . . . If we read, for instance, a

single romantic comedy, we shall remember it very well, . . . for it will reign alone in the memory. (p. 31)

Further, a thing is remembered more easily in proportion to its intelligibility; therefore, we cannot help remembering. (p. 32)

To a soldier, for instance, when he sees the tracks of a horse in sand, will at once pass from the thought of a horse to the thought of a horseman, and thence to the thought of war, &c.; while a countryman will proceed from the thought of a horse to the thought of a plough, a field, &c.. (p. 101)

Spinoza also claims that the mind's strength is in its capacity to learn many things and to be adaptive to nature:

Now it is clear that the mind apprehends itself better in proportion as it understands a greater number of natural objects. . . . Again, the more things the mind knows, the better does it understand its own strength and the order of nature; by increased self-knowledge, it can direct itself more easily, and lay down rules for its own guidance; and by increased knowledge of nature, it can more easily avoid what is useless. (p. 15)

Spinoza's account of imagination and emotions emphasizes awareness of the body (Lloyd, 1996). It is the awareness of our bodies that stands as warrant for imagination and which is constitutive of the mind. Imagination bestows direct contact with bodily reality and has a powerful ontological dimension, our ability for enhanced perception; as other bodies persist in being, *conatus*, is a mediating force. Spinoza's idea of *conatus* or striving to persist in being is important for the dimension it brings to our

understanding of self and the endeavors which we conduct in order to increase our powers because they are the activities we love and enhance our ultimate pursuit of happiness. Individual strivings result in affects as bodily modifications, and the experience of other bodies gives rise to a feeling for others (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999; Lloyd, 1996). In regard for the need to frame a system of right conduct, Spinoza, deems it cannot come from universal truths, but only through actual strivings, appetites and desires. In part, it is a collaborative, non-teleological morality, that admits of difference and diversity (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999).

In these aspects of his philosophy, Spinoza prefigures Dewey: his view of the essential unity of mind and body expressed in *the mind is the idea of the body* (the primacy of the body), his theory of the function of imagination and emotions, his notion of *conatus*, i.e. that bodies are in nature, striving to persist in being, and his view of narrative fiction.

In a reference to Spinoza's *conatus* Dewey (1917) argues that rather than passive, and informed by imagination and emotions, the process of adaptation as it occurs in nature is one that is active, nuanced and temporal. His emphasis is on the imaginative transformation of actual conditions, in light of the possible:

Conatus often ignore[s] all the important facts of the actual process. . . . as if self-control, self-development went on directly as a sort of unrolling push from within. But life endures only in virtue of the support of the environment. And since the environment is only incompletely enlisted in our behalf, self-preservation—or self-realization or whatever—is always indirect—always an affair of the way in

which our present activities affect the direction taken by independent changes in the surroundings. *Hindrances must be turned into means* [emphasis added].

We are also given to playing loose with the conception of adjustment, *as if that meant something fixed* [emphasis added]—a kind of accommodation once for all (ideally at least) of the organism *to* an environment. But as life requires the fitness of the environment to the organic functions, adjustment to the environment means not passive acceptance of the latter, but *acting so that the environing changes take a certain turn* [emphasis added]. (Dewey, 1917, pp. 9-10)

In the history of American philosophy, it is Peirce, who in 1880, gave a place to embodiment in epistemology when he wrote, “The connection of the mind with the nervous system is so intimate that the essential laws of the former must necessarily correspond to those of the latter” (cited in Kaag, 2007, pp. 190-1). In Europe, embodiment studies within phenomenology gained importance early in the 20th century and later, in the late 1970s, influenced cognitive science. We owe the notion of the embodied mind²¹ to the philosopher Merleau-Ponty, who is regarded somewhat as the patron saint of the body (Shusterman, 2008). In opposition to Descartes, he wrote:

The connection between essence and existence is not found in experience, but in the idea of the infinite. It is then, true in the last resort that analytical reflection

²¹ The term, embodied mind, took hold in the work of Francisco Varela (Kaag, 2007, p. 191).

entirely rests on a dogmatic idea of being, and that in this sense it does amount to an act of self-discovery. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 44)

To a Cartesian doctrine, these descriptions will never have any philosophic importance . . . The theory of phenomena, then, implies a theory of reflection and a new *cogito*. (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 50)

According to Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962), thinking is not performed separately from the body because the mind is always embodied. It emerges through corporeal relations with the world and thinking is the outcome of those relations. Furthermore, the embodied agent structures perceptions and representations in the context of transactions undertaken to survive in the natural world. As it is within the perceptual world, selfhood must be embodied. Assuming that other bodies have consciousness, a self should be perceivable to another (Mensch, 2003). Citing the instrumentalists (e.g. Dewey), Merleau-Ponty wrote: “The example of the instrumentalists shows even better how habit has its abode . . . in the body as mediator of the world” (p. 145). Merleau-Ponty has a pragmatic appeal in the stance of “I can,” rather than “I think that” (Anderson, 2003; Mensch, 2003; Shusterman, 2008). However, pragmatism obtains better prospects for “full-bodied” engagement in practical somatic awareness because Merleau-Ponty overlooks experiential self-conscious perceptions, such as distinct feelings, observations, and visualizations, and the more internal bodily senses, kinaesthetic feelings and proprioception (Shusterman, 2008). John Dewey advocated reflective body consciousness in the Alexander technique, a general educational philosophy of body-mind unity and self-improvement (Bowman, 2007; Shusterman, 2008). Many actions that individuals

now perform spontaneously were once beyond the repertoire of unreflective performance, and in order to effect this improvement, conscious critical reflection was brought to bear on the unreflective action, so that it could be apprehended and subjected to disciplined practice (Shusterman, 2008). All in all, because pragmatism is amenable to individual differences and contingencies, plurality and reconstruction, it holds more promise for somatic applications of philosophy (Shusterman, 2008).

Feminists, who have also taken exception to Cartesian dualism draw attention to its association with reason's dominance over emotion, and relatedly, cerebral man's dominance over fleshy woman (Paechter, 2004).²² It is in this respect that Dewey's conception of body-mind makes possible an embodied reasonableness, which in this chapter is dealt with at length. In turn, embodied reasonableness mediates as a countervailing force against the somatophobia that is emblematic of the inherent tensions in body/mind dualism. In general, feminist philosophers highlight the moral importance of community and caring, pay attention to the particularity of persons, and uphold the social fabric of close personal relationships (Friedman, 2000, p. 208). The personal viewpoint is regarded as the only appropriate standpoint in moral judgment because it recognizes a person's distinctive history, desires, emotions, embodiment, and network of social relations (p. 208). From the feminists we get the philosophical perspective that acknowledges emotion's role in the moral life (Friedman, 2000, p. 209),

²² This has led to the sex/gender split where currently, the view upholds biological sex as "true" and gender, socially constructed (Paechter, 2004, p. 310).

interdependencies between persons, and the interdependencies that support autonomy (p. 209). Feminist philosophers support the claim that women are more relationally oriented than individualistic (p. 209). Feminist ethics has a goal of ending the oppression of women and improving regard for female capacities and viewpoints (Friedman, 2000, pp. 210-211). To achieve this, various methodologies are associated with feminists, such as defending theories and concepts that are more in keeping with women's ways of understanding and reflecting (p. 211), disputing biases and attitudes that perpetuate women's subordination (p. 211), emphasizing that the political and personal go hand-in-hand, rejecting the public-private divide (p. 211), and developing theories and methodologies that incorporate diverse women's understanding (p. 211). Feminist ethics maintain that moral reasoning is grounded in social life and located in embodied persons (Friedman, 2000, p. 213).

In 1930, Dewey wrote "the growing freedom of women can hardly have any other outcome than the production of more realistic and humane morals," and that existing moral notions were "almost exclusively male constructions" (Dewey, [1930] 1984d, 276; as cited in Pappas, 1993, p. 78). Feminists share with Dewey the following: first, moral particularity or the attention paid to persons in particular contexts, including the importance of values like affection, care, trust, loyalty, independence and sacrifice, as they inform the lives of moral agents (Sorrel, 1999). Dewey improves on feminist particularism with a theory of generalization on the Good, Right, and Duty, which are highly abstract criteria that however, are not susceptible to charges leveled by feminists

against masculinist accounts because Dewey's recommendations were made with a view to developing integrated selves and communities (Sorrel, 1999).

Second, narrativity is another feature in which Deweyan pragmatism shares similarities because feminists exert efforts to understand particular persons and their growth as selves through time. In Dewey's view, the purposive action of agents is integrative. Of import is the agent's internal dialogue taking the form of dramatic rehearsal that in turn, can be made intelligible in a dialogic community (Sorrel, 1999).

Third, feminists believe that the dialogic relationship between persons, based on an emergent narrative, contributes to refined understanding, when they emerge from the dialogic transactions of individuals, who are actually implicated in moral situations. In this respect, Dewey shares in common with feminists the belief that it is an intrinsically dialogical process that comprises the moral life (Sorrel, 1999).

Pappas (1993) highlights feminist concern with the affective and relates that to Dewey's espousal of moral sensitivity, which is aesthetic. Dewey's picture of moral sensitivity is painted thus: "A person must feel the qualities of acts as one feels with the hands the qualities of roughness and smoothness" (Dewey [1932] 1985, 269; as cited in Pappas, 1993 p. 79). Imagination and bodily desire are also important parts of reasonableness for Dewey (Garrison, 1999). Appropriate emotions enhance the quality of embodied reasonableness which for Dewey (1922) is the interplay of a multitude of dispositions, including curiosity, experimentation, and a determination to see things through (as cited in Pappas, 1993). However, a caveat applies in instances where the preference of the emotions lies with the morally incorrect, inappropriate, or unacceptable.

In such cases, it is expected that one would work to enhance or ameliorate the quality of present experience. The determining factors taking precedence are improvement of character and that of relationships (Pappas, 1993).

The preceding historical narrative regarding the body-mind was meant to highlight Dewey's place in the development of mind as embodied and to show that philosophy has long been preoccupied with reasonableness, imagination, emotions, and ethics. It will become clear in the following that the embodied mind or body-mind is a somatic instrument of thought.

The embodied mind

Every concept of reasonableness is necessarily normative, yet it must draw on understandings of the mind that are descriptive. As my construct of embodied reasonableness depends on a non-dualistic, body-based configuration for the thinking being, it takes into account that the body-mind is the fundamental unit through which live creatures carry on transactions with the environment. Let me call your attention to the importance of body-mind; Dewey himself granted the body-mind the utmost importance in his theory of experience. Beginning with an explanation of his concept of the embodied mind. I will now describe how the body as somatic instrument of thinking has a role in inquiry.

Dewey's solution to the problem of meaning is a model of total biological coordination, the body-mind. It sets aside mind-body dualism and mutually implicates a living thing and her environment, whereby the environment supplies a range of energy for her live body to engage in its own organized pattern of activity as a means to survival

and well-being (Alexander, 1987). Body-mind's non-dualistic ontology is sustained by a principle of continuity, wherein there are no gaps between levels of complexity within an organism, because complex interactions between "lower" cognitive powers give rise to "higher order" capacities. Mind and body are parts of a single process; thinking and acting, two names for making our way in a world shot through with contingency (Menand, 2001).

It is Dewey's concept of body-mind²³ from which I draw the notion of embodied reasonableness because he pointed the way in identifying the dichotomous problem in moral theories (Dewey & Tufts, 1932; Dewey, 1944; Dewey, 1958). Dewey bemoaned the lack of a vocabulary to describe the body-mind concept and blamed it on the pervasiveness of the Cartesian idea of two separate existential realms for the body and for the mind. Body-mind is the center of lived activity, a developer of experience, and explorer of its world. As a fundamental unit, it is continually engaged in its own self-organizing activity placing one's world in an integrated order (Alexander, 1987).

Because we have unquestioningly been habituated to accept the dualism of the mind-body split, alternative notions seem counterintuitive. In this connection, Dewey wrote in critical fashion:

²³ According to Alexander (1987), body-mind, Dewey's attempt to create a model of total organic coordination, is just one of those ironic instances in Dewey's scholarly achievement where a basic model of his has been used independently by others as diverse as Merleau-Ponty, Piaget, and Langer.

When it gets beyond dualism—as many philosophies do in form—it can only be by appeal to something higher than anything found in experience, by a flight to some transcendental realm. (Dewey, 1916/1997c, p. 333-334)

The form assumed by the denial is, most frequently, that striking division into a superior true realm of being and lower illusory, insignificant or phenomenal realm which characterizes metaphysical systems as unlike as those of Plato and Democritus, St. Thomas and Spinoza, Aristotle and Kant, Descartes and Comte, Haeckel ²⁴ and Mrs. Eddy²⁵ (Dewey, 1929/1958, p. 59).

The body-mind challenges the ineluctable assumption that supports beliefs about mind as eternal substance and the mutual exclusiveness of mind and body. According to Johnson (2007), “mind” and “body” are just terms we use to make sense of experience and do not correspond to actual parts of us. Meaning is derived from our immediate experience of the world, including our perceptions, feelings, and imagination. Inquiry is our intelligent grappling with the world, and it is through the inquiring process that reason arises as the outcome of fruitful inquiry. Reason is not a preexisting capacity, but a result of our successful grappling. Johnson further explains that every function of inquiry is embodied. Imagination is our capacity to make sense of things anew. Emotions are central to our ability to conceptualize, reason, and imagine. Meaning is shaped by the bodily experience of interacting with the environment. This notion of the embodied mind gives rise to an

²⁴ Ernst Haeckel, a late 19th century eminent biologist and philosopher

²⁵ Mary Baker Eddy, founder of the Christian Science movement.

understanding of self and others (Gallagher, 2008). Indeed, our notion of personhood is radically called into question by this reconfiguration of cognition and embodiment.

We can aptly say that the body-mind is the somatic instrument of thinking (Shusterman, 2006). Embodiment is a relational concept that highlights an organism's transactions with the real world. It presupposes that a person has the ability to act and respond to situations that call for attention (Quick, Dautenham, Nehaniv, and Roberts, 2000). Dewey (1997) speaks of the initial context for inquiry as "felt difficulty" (p. 72), indicating that non-discursive thinking processes – bodily senses, imagination, feelings and emotions – are engaged in the qualitative apprehension of a problematic situation. This is the moment that prompts the response of reflective inquiry. Moreover, every thought and felt meaning occurring in inquiry has roots in an organic act of biological behavior and so there are physical names for mental acts shedding light on how we live out our lives with the kinds of bodies we have, interacting with our environments. Sometimes described as "the body is in the mind," our use of language best describes the phenomenon: "I see what you're saying."; "Do you grasp what I am saying?"; "I'm getting a feel for your argument."; "I'm tossing around some ideas" (Fesmire, 2003; Johnson, 1993, 1999, 2008). Finally, the outcome of successful inquiry is embodied reasonableness: the integration of reconstructed body-mind and the reconstructed, situated context. Having imparted a better understanding of thinking with the body, the following aims to illustrate particular instances where embodied cognition, a body schema-based ability, is involved in many non-discursive, everyday acts constitutive of judgments.

As somatic instrument the body-mind is capable of embodied cognition, a cognitive ability associated with the body schema, something we take for granted, often only coming to our awareness in occasions of bodily impairment or disability. The notion of embodied reasonableness can be attributed to developments in cognitive science regarding the body's centrality in shaping the mind.

Wilson (2002) wrote, an instance of embodied cognition indicates that "A mind needs a body to make it function" (p. 625). This means that cognition takes place where we imagine the life of our mind takes place, not only within the brain that is encased in our bony skull, but throughout our entire body's nervous system, and in fact, our entire physical being, so that even our hearts, digestion and immunity contribute to it, and are influenced by it (Siegel, 2010). The body plays an essential part in constructing perceptual and mental processes in its interaction with the environment itself (Bilda, Candy, & Edmonds, 2007).

Primary in this account are sensorimotor functions for successful interaction with the world (Wilson, 2002). A survey of philosophy of mind and cognitive science yields a number of ways in which the operations of the mind require, relate to, or reduce to operations of the body. Falling under the category of embodied cognition, it has been shown in recent research to play a central role in higher order thinking (Niedenthal, P.M., Barsalou, L.W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., et al., 2005). Embodied cognition is considered online embodiment when the perceiver interacts with actual social objects, and offline embodiment, when the perceiver represents social objects in their absence (Niedenthal et al., 2005).

Embodied cognition involves the juxtaposition of image, emotion, and bodily feeling in judgment making (Brown & Reid, 2006). This means, among other things, that the range, acuity and functionality of cognition derive from the health, exercised condition and functionality of the body. Recent empirical research in cognitive science has provided evidence for a common folk assumption, i.e. that body posture can influence thinking. For instance, a standing position facilitates biased thinking and is less susceptible to persuasion (Briñol & Petty, 2008). In physical education studies it has been found that male athletes' bodily experience can improve perceptual ability, so that a professional basketball player has an acute sense that a ball will make the basket sooner than the rest of the audience knows. A coach, on the other hand, would have median predictive ability (Grafton, 2009).

Embodied cognition occurs when the body, as a self-referential point, renders a sense of embodiment that is pervasive in all our perceptions, even if we are not fully attentive to it. We are able to monitor our own self-movement through our proprioceptive ability, i.e. our sense of our own movements, bodily positions, or bodily reactions to stimuli. As felt experiences, they can be prenoetic, i.e. underdetermined, preconceptual, immanent, nonpropositional, marginal or recessive, and constitute somatic self-consciousness. This is the aspect that allows us to respond to visceral experience, the question "How do you feel?" and establishes the bodily basis of emotions (Gallagher, 2006; Grange, 2004; Johnson, 2007; Shusterman, 2008). This conveys the human need to give expression to the qualities of life that emanate as felt experiences, paying attention to their nonlinguistic dimension.

Embodied cognition functions in our unreflective, yet skillful actions, also known as situated normativity. This involves bodily posture, stance, gesture, and other movements that are invested with cognition and judgment, but not discursive reflection – for instance, when one is “reliably engaged in a communal custom. When one stands too close to see a large painting well and is immediately compelled to step back is such an instance of situated normativity” (Rietveld, 2008, p. 973-974). Even when practicing customary social habits or procedures, there is an element of agency involved because we “allow ourselves” to observe the custom in question, such as keeping proper distance in a confined space (Rietveld, 2008, p. 977).

In many situations in our daily lives we act adequately, yet unreflectively. With certainty and fluency, we...maintain an appropriate distance from the other people in an elevator, and without deliberation we stop the pedestrian next to us, who, while about to cross the street, does not notice an oncoming car. Often we just act and normally this immediate action is adequate. It is quite amazing that even without explicit deliberation we normally act in ways that are appropriate from the point of view of sociocultural practice. (Rietveld, 2008, p. 973)

The preceding discussion has explained that embodied cognition facilitates our sense of embodiment and our bodily abilities to interact in skilful yet unthinking ways with the world. The point of what follows is that embodied cognition obtains of skilled performances in the specialized contexts of the arts, crafts, and thinking. I conclude with a brief exposition regarding the moral implications of embodied cognition in encounters with the others.

Embodied cognition also occurs in skilled motor activity, as practiced by crafts persons wherein a tool becomes a bodily extension (Sprod, 2001). For that matter, a dancer, as well as a sculptor, painter, a musical conductor, would think and solve problems in real time, with her body-mind. Craftsmanship is characterized by appreciation, appropriateness, and immediacy, spurred on by the potential of improvement, and inherent emotional appeal. Sometimes labeled intuitive, skillful behavior is know-how that is socially acquired and controlled (Rietveld, 2008). The skills involved in these instances are learned and habituated into a level of expertise (Sprod, 2001).

The intelligence that music facilitates derives from the capacity for ambiguity at the heart of embodied cognition (Bowman, 1998). In music, we think with our bodies. In the presence of music, embodied cognition is immediate. The unity of body-mind is demonstrated irrefutably in musical experience as embodied agency (Bowman & Powell, 2007). Music is experience that restores unity and wholeness to body-mind (Bowman, 2002, p. 6). Its sounds enter the body and are sensed, felt, and experienced inside it. The body entrains itself to patterns of feeling and tempi of movement, e.g. walking or running. Furthermore, phrasing generally indicates human respiration, extending the range of embodied experience (Bowman, 1998). Not only is music constructed by performers and listeners alike, it also intervenes in the broader environment where music takes place (Bowman, 1998).

The case of a deaf poet-performer is a case in point. Because of the absence of the spoken voice, the deaf artist needs to transcend the absence of vocal speech through other

ways of communicating meaning, such as acting and performing. In this manner, his is an embodied speech or *linguaging*. The processes of linguaging (rather than language), becoming (rather than being) and emotioning (rather than emotion) are activities associated with dramatic performances that are rich in embodied experiences (Wright, 2005).

Finally, embodied cognition is the ability to relate knowledge of one's own, and other people's bodies to understand oneself and others (Grafton, 2009). How we learn to think is illustrative of this. We readily recognize when someone is busy thinking. Even early on as children, we are able to infer that the entirety of someone's facial expressions, bodily posture and body language indicate thinking. The physical manifestations are part and parcel of the act of thinking itself. Thinking is learned in social settings, such as classrooms, and the accompanying behaviors are internalized as well. Sprod (2001) refers to a list of emotionally tinged behaviors conveyed by the eyes (e.g., "He understands. I can read it in his eyes." or "Plainly, he's stumped. He's got that 'deer in the headlights' look."). "Many bodily cues and dispositions are closely tied to certain types of thinking...and we build 'a theory of mind,' [the basis of which] is our ability to read embodied behaviour as implying mental states" (Sprod, 2001, p. 40).

One may feel compelled to act according to the behavioral norms of the classroom. Students may behave in a certain way, for example to act reasonably, even if one is not shown how, prompted or bound to act in such a manner because it is safe to assume that we all have experienced the feeling that "this is the way I should act, and not otherwise." Here, embodied reasonableness undergirds that feeling, both in terms of the somatic

aspects of those norms, and of emotions that function as indicators of what matters (Rietveld, 2008). Examining the ways in which embodied cognition affects skilled context-bound actions, we are now prepared to look at its meaning in our moral life

Embodied reasonableness plays a role from the beginning of life. Newborns have the innate capacity to be moved affectively by others. They respond negatively to rejection and positively to encouragement. The innate ability for interpersonal emotional engagement provides the foundation for beginning to learn; for becoming attuned to certain regularities and over time, learning to hold and move one's body in certain ways, and learning to act according to rules.

The child's experience—of listening to others, thinking in conversation, of attempting to join in, with the support of more able others, of gradually becoming able to think on their own as such 'scaffolding' is withdrawn—all takes place in context. Hence it is tied to the full context, including the physical arrangements of the participants' bodies. The child will have difficulty in separating out what is essential and what is superficial...(they) come as part of the internalized thinking package. (Sprod, 2001, p. 39)

Being aware of the subtle functions of embodied cognition, we may come to realize its role in the judgments we unthinkingly make, many of which are linked to beliefs acquired early in life that have become ingrained and require a process of self-transformation and unlearning for change to occur (Nussbaum, 2004). Nussbaum (2004) sheds light on matters of embodied difference and their moral implications. According to her, we typically think people are reasonable if they accept the standard norms of society,

yet we know that such norms must be mistaken as well as that norms change over time (Nussbaum, 2004). When we stop to think, there surely are instances when we may have been incapable of respect towards those whose embodied experience is different from ours, such as in cases of gendered otherness and bodily difference. As Garrison (1996) has written: “The reasonable act and the generous act lie close together” (p. 2).

Mackenzie and Scully (2007) have assessed that our own embodiment determines the judgments we make of others. In cases involving difference, our embodied experience constrains imagination, thus rendering it incapable of empathy. Therefore, the assumptions we make in regard to what may be necessary for the good of the Other are likely to be shaped and limited by the particulars of our own embodiment. Moral imagination is constrained by the social possibilities foreclosed or made available by an individual’s experience hence putting ourselves in another’s shoes is prone to error. We may end up reinforcing our prejudices rather than responding to the Other (Mackenzie & Scully, 2007). Furthermore, when we consider that difference covers handicaps and disabilities of all kinds, including poverty, obesity, ugliness, awkwardness, lack of skill in sports, lack of some desirable secondary sexual characteristic, a gender preference outside the dimorphic paradigm, we may come to realize that we marginalize many more persons than we can imagine (Nussbaum, 2004; Paechter, 1998).

Our attention has now been called to the possibility of moral failings in embodied cognition relative to bodily difference of one kind or other. The preceding description of the embodied mind is the basis of a concept of embodied reasonableness consisting of normative practices that enable a person to recognize problematic dimensions of

experience and make sound judgments – including, for our purposes, ethical judgments.

We now turn our attention to the role of embodied reasonableness in inquiry. I begin with an explanation of what it means for embodied reasonableness to be critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented.

Embodied Reasonableness

Dewey's pedagogical criteria provide for philosophy to be the methodology of education (Lipman, 2004). That young learners have a right to develop their thinking abilities is established. So, too have they a right to moral strengthening in order to meet life's trials with strength and resiliency. Reasonableness, as a primary trait, is a regulative ideal in character development (Lipman, 2003). Because it qualifies as inquiry, ethical inquiry necessarily requires practices of embodied reasonableness. Embodied reasonableness is an ideal of thinking, feeling, and action that manifests itself in a variety of ways all of which involve judgment. Embodied reasonableness falls under three dimensions: critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented. These dimensions have been thoroughly described by Lipman in *Thinking in Education* (2003). He writes:

Critical thinking aims at reasonableness. This means that it is not just rational, in the sense of a thinking that is rule- and criterion-governed, but that it is also a thinking that accepts the fallibility of its procedures, that engages in self-corrective practice, that takes contextual differences into account, and that is equitable, in the sense that it respects the rights of others as well as its own. Reasonableness thus entails the cultivation of multidimensional thinking. (Lipman, 2003)

The kinds of rules and criteria that Lipman suggests govern critical thinking include the truth-preserving rules of logic, such as those contained in the Table of Validities²⁶, and strategies for avoiding faulty thinking, such as the rules and standards of evidence used in courts of law, and taxonomies of informal fallacies. Critical reasonableness also involves the careful formation, critique, and reconstruction of concepts, because our ordinary, common sense understandings are only good insofar as they contribute to intelligent human endeavor. Our norms and values, including ethical ones, being subject to contingency, heterogeneity, inconsistency, and flux, call for reconstructive strategies to accommodate new conditions or to manage practices more intelligently.

Embodied reasonableness is also relational and intersubjective. We learn from our interactions with others and from the shared world we inhabit (Johnson, 2007). These interactions provide us with substantive ideas, theories, and value commitments and also influence the mental processes that our minds undertake. As the process of intersubjective discourse becomes internalized, one becomes engaged in internal dialogue, imagination, deduction, and wonderment (Splitter & Sharp). Intersubjectivity is evident in a disposition to respect others, to accommodate views and feelings different from one's own, and to invest one's thinking with new, even opposing views. Thus, reasonableness includes the ability to listen, dialogue, think communally, make good

²⁶ See Lipman, 2003, pp. 236-237. The table of validities describes common logical fallacies and the faulty reasoning behind it, e.g., *non sequitur*, putting forth an argument that is irrelevant, resulting in an invalid argument.

judgments, and act accordingly. It applies to efforts to pay attention to social and affective dimensions of discourse, to make relevant contributions to dialogue, and to facilitate the flow of dialogue, aspects that strengthen the process of inquiry (Gregory & Lavery, 2007).

In terms of outcome, Lipman (2003) suggests that thinking results in “knowledge [that] is used to bring about reasonable change” in problematic situations (p. 211). Reasonable judgment thus involves the self-correction of subjective belief, desire, and/or action and of collective knowledge and practice, and also the resolution of problems that constitute the contexts for thinking and inquiry. Judgment therefore involves sensitivity to context. According to Lekan (2003), the recognition of salient particulars in a given situation is a crucial step in resolving a problematic situation and culminates in an action plan. When tested against experience, judgments may be self-corrected accounting for the learning that occurs in critical thinking.

Intersubjectivity points both to a coherent and functional environment or situation, and to an individual mind that is integrated, and habituated to collaboration and common feeling. Thus, Siegel (2010) talks about mind as “a process that regulates the flow of energy and information” between you and me, and as a relationship we have with ourselves (p. 55). In this manner, reasonable judgment has an aesthetic dimension because it brings forth a sense of wholeness in communal interaction and in the act of doing (Grange, 2004). In this section I have provided an overview of the three criteria of embodied reasonableness, for which there are pedagogical implications. As we shall see, the fundamental unit of organic experience pervades even learning.

Pedagogical Implications of Embodied Reasonableness

In the case of humans like ourselves, it is our physical bodies with which we directly experience the world. This vital interaction of embodied beings with nature is a biological and evolutionary phenomenon whereby, our bodies, brain, and nervous system adapted in order to gain better control of action (Semin & Smith, 2008). Other beings are part of our dealings and encounters with the natural world. Our interactions with them and with our physical, natural and constructed environments form the basis of experience, knowledge, and meaning.

We begin our discussion by invoking Dewey's experiential theory and apply it to the classroom environment and the transactions that occur there. Dewey identified the process of adaptation as learning by doing (Wells, 1999). All learning is a process of meaning-making that is first encountered intercorporeally in goal-oriented striving where learners are guided to master functions for participating more effectively in a social activity, so that these functions can be translated intracorporeally (Wells, 1999). For instance, higher order thinking skills, before they became internalized, started life initially as social functions, and following a 3-step process became internalized. First, the learner is transformed –this involves a modification of internal processes, such as emotions, that changes the ways in which she perceives; second, the environment itself is changed, as its purpose is reconstructed on the basis of the learner's prior knowledge, and finally, the situation itself is changed for other learners (Wells, 1999).

Other learners are integral to the situation. They help the learner grasp the meaning of the action as a whole, assisting where she cannot yet perform independently.

This teaching role is described as being in the zone of proximal development (ZPD), an area comprising developmental processes that are stimulated in collaborative transaction (Vygotsky, 1978, 1987; as cited in Wells, 1999). In the context of education, this indicates that a collaborative community of practice is helpful in carrying out the reconstruction of creative and responsible social habits (Wells, 1999). Furthermore, Weaver (1996) provides a context for learning in the following statement:

Learning proceeds best when others provide the kinds of support that adults typically provide for young children. This includes expecting learners to succeed eventually, and treating them accordingly; recognizing that adult mastery will develop gradually as well as idiosyncratically, over several years; expecting closer and closer approximations to adult mastery, not perfection; responding positively to whatever the learner *can* do, rather than emphasizing what the learner cannot yet do; providing scaffolding (teacher or peer collaboration) for the learner, so that the individual learner can succeed in doing things that he or she would not yet be able to do alone. (Weaver, p. 155)

Embodied teaching asks that a teacher honor the implications of embodiment, i.e. that it is relational and dynamic, and be more attentive to students' affects and dispositions for cognitive apprenticeship in the discipline (Edwards & D'Arcy, 2004). It is also about building relationships between self, others, and subject matter, honoring the trust that develops from intermingling and seriously considering how to help students become knowers. It has been called "falling into trust" (MacIntyre Latta & Buck, 2008, p. 316), a heightened perceptual awareness of teaching for greater student inquiry through

meaningful insight on the body's role in pedagogy. Greene (2001), stresses that heightened perceptual awareness is made possible in “dialogical situations where persons, caring for one another, [are] able to look at one another's eyes, talk about what they are discovering together about themselves, about the world, about what is and what might be,” thus foregrounding some very important aspects for learning ethical inquiry, such as dialogue, caring, self-disclosure, knowledge, making plans, and projecting their consequences (p. 108).

Fishman (1993) has written that Dewey also meant body-mind to stand as a metaphor for learning because it is an integrated and organic unit in which parts co-evolve and self-correct in addressing changing circumstances in nature. In like manner, what the body-mind does in the complementary activity of its parts, members within a classroom community do amidst difference, in order to meet instructional objectives. Fishman is quick to point out that it is Rosenblatt's transactional theory of learning that best emulates Dewey's organic model. Connell (1996, 2000, 2001 & 2008), who has studied Rosenblatt's theory and writings, highlights those features that correspond with Dewey's experiential theory. They are pedagogically salient for learning to do ethical inquiry:

- Learning is dialogical.
- The criteria of learning are shared and flexible.
- Warranted assertability is invoked to resolve arbitrary or invalid judgments.

- Thinking emerges from a matrix of emotion.
- Meaning is connected to experience.
- Meaning is connected to belief.
- Meaning is constructed through dialogue.
- Inquiry has a sense of prescience.
- Inquiry is a process of self-correction and experimentation.
- The purpose of inquiry is to bring about active change in the world.
- The measure of learning is its impact on the conduct of students' lives.
- Feeling and imagination are concurrent in a "dynamic, fluid process" (Rosenblatt, 1998, p. 887) that is the transaction.

Concerned with fostering higher-order thinking in the language arts, Marzano proposes that teachers be guided by four principles of learning. (a) Learning must take into account the beliefs and funded experience comprising student schemata (Lipman, 1991; Marzano, 1991). This calls for personally meaningful classroom experiences. (b) An optimal standard of learning -- being pushed to exceed one's personal best and reach the upper limits of personal ability -- should be set as the transactional response (Rosenblatt, 1967; as cited in Marzano, 1991). (c) Students should engage in the complex and extended activity of inquiry in order to engage in meaningful learning. (d) Learning should foster dispositions, e.g. awareness of inner states and metacognition, conducive to

the construction of meaning. Furthermore, he identifies three transactional aspects of learning that bear on doing ethical inquiry: imagery, emotions, and value.

In regarding imagery as transactional response, students pay attention to those aspects of experience that are non-discursive, episodic, and sensory (i.e. pertaining to smell, taste, touch, kinaesthetic association, and sound). Because emotion is tied to cognition, it must be subjected to inquiry if it is to be understood. He further suggests the following procedure in using emotion as transactional response. First, acknowledge the emotional response and name it. Second, identify the concept embedded in a certain text, music, or painting that has triggered such feelings. Third, describe the physical reactions and thoughts associated with specific emotions. Fourth, discuss the meaning ascribed to emotions and the effects of such meaning on students' lives.

Another procedure Marzano (1991) suggests is similar, but instead considers value as transactional response: first, acknowledge emotional responses. Second, identify the concept embedded in a certain text, music, or painting that has triggered such feelings. Third, describe the specific value underlying the emotional response. Fourth, describe the reasoning or belief system behind the value. Fifth, give expression to an opposing value. Sixth, describe one's reason for the opposing value.

Sprod (2001) suggests engaging in philosophical inquiry, which is at the heart of making better moral judgments. It is a practice he values for its rigor and its insistence on an embodied reasonableness. It fulfills Dewey's requirement of inquiry as the process whereby practical and theoretical knowledge emerge. In order for inquiry to be

successful, it requires a keen awareness of what matters in a problematic situation; a sense of calculated daring to undertake experiments based on well-crafted hypotheses; a willingness to put a plan in action after assessing its foreseeable consequences; a readiness to deal with fallibilism and in turn, to self-correct.

For Dewey, experience has no boundaries (Jackson, 2002). In the context of learning, it allows for a great deal of possibility, which would be cause for fear or surprise, even before the actual is known. In dealing with possibilities, where none is actually known, there is an understanding that allows the reconstruction of the actual in light of the possible (Alexander, 1990). Thus, judgments are made because we have imagined desirable consequences from them. Making better judgments is a matter of survival. As there is infinite scope and diversity of human judgment, so is there a necessity that “The continual presence of possibility . . . may be discriminated by the accumulation of learning and feeling” (Buchler, 1990, p. 149). Having presented a number of instructional approaches, we now consider appropriate material and pedagogy provided by the practice known as Philosophy for Children.

In the language arts classroom, narrative fiction is used to convey through states of mind arguments that philosophical writings do in a very different way. Characters’ motives are implicit and plots can be complex but making sense of it all is usually only a matter of inference (Seamon, 2005). Readers are able to follow the story, even if there might be more than one interpretation, and in such an instance, an interpretive community helps extract meaning. Such a community can be one engaged in ethical inquiry, as conceived in the instructional program, P4C. In the communal experience,

young, inquiring minds practice philosophy in attunement with others, obtain clarification, and gain in self-understanding (Nussbaum, 1990). Students learn to live a form of moral life in the procedures and substance of their thinking, reasoning, imagining, reflecting, judging, caring, and acting (Mehta & Whitebread, 2004; Splitter & Sharp, 1999; Sprod, 2001).

We have established that the normative, embodied practices, which are the aims of education for ethical inquiry, fall under the categories: critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented. According to Lipman (2004), Philosophy for Children is his substantive response to Dewey's pedagogical criteria. For instance, P4C honors sensitivity to context and the ability to self-correct, two important features of Dewey's theory of inquiry directed at addressing the reconstructive task (Ralston, 2011). In P4C, philosophy is the method of education, narrative texts contain philosophical meaning, and deliberation takes the form of a dramatic rehearsal within a classroom community of philosophical inquiry. Students are introduced to the content and procedures of dialogical inquiry via the illustrative text. The text serves as a stimulus for developing questions that sets the agenda for discussion (Lavery, 2004). Participants come to terms with authentic ethical situations where they take into account the importance of personal interest, the imagination and emotions, and growth in habits of good ethical reasoning and judgment. A sound moral education in P4C, is also one where students are helped to understand the moral options available to them and how to assess those options (Lipman & Sharp, 1985). Paramount in P4C is a set of commitments that includes thinking well, inclusive dialogue and meaningfulness (Lavery, 2004). In thinking well, students are expected to:

- Consider alternative points of view.
- Give reasons and evaluate them.
- Identify and correct fallacious reasoning.
- Be respectful and honest in dialogue.
- Listen with attention to one another.
- Make an effort to understand one another's views
- Be prepared to participate without dominating.
- Self-correct.
- Deepen understanding for the concept and problems in question.

Many of the internal states that accompany qualitative experience come to one's awareness in the process of inquiry, part of which is represented by the process embedded in the "Philosophy Self-Assessment for Middle & High School" (Gregory, 2008, p. 73) instrument constructed by the IAPC²⁷. This serves as a potential framework for practices of embodied reasonableness. This instrument is organized under the categories of "Cognitive Dimension of Inquiry," "Social Dimension of Inquiry" and "Inquiry Outcomes" corresponding to the critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented

²⁷ Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children is at the College of Education and Human Services of Montclair State University, New Jersey.

criteria described in the section on embodied reasonableness. They have been informed by Dewey's experiential theory, his concept of body-mind, and as we shall see in subsequent chapters, his theory of imagination and theory of emotion. Each category on the instrument includes a number of criteria for evaluating the reasonableness of an in-class inquiry. I demonstrate ways in which the body may be employed in the practice of these criteria. In what follows, the criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument appear in italics.

Embodied critical reasonableness.

The criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument under the category of "Cognitive Dimension of Inquiry" are the following:

- *Were we reasoning well? (clarifying, asking for and offering reasons, making careful inferences, identifying assumptions, offering definitions, using criteria, making good distinctions, and testing hypotheses)*
- *Were we thinking creatively? (making metaphors, using images, trying out other points of view, thinking of new possibilities, extending ideas, transferring old forms to new contexts)*
- *Did our discussion open up the topic? Was it deep or superficial? Did we construct a rich, complex understanding of the texts?*
- *Is there evidence of self-correction? (accepting criticism, correcting thinking mistakes, noticing missing points of view, changing one's mind, revising one's position)*

Each of these modes and patterns has both cognitive and somatic aspects. Students engaged in deep, meaningful discussions of complex concepts, elaborate explanations, exploratory discourse, speculation, generalization, and analysis are always necessarily also engaged in gestural interaction, voice modulation, facial expression, timing of verbal response and delivery, to indicate attunement or non-attunement with situated activity. To an extent, we understand one another with our bodies, in conjunction with language and feeling, moved and informed by the argument. We are altered by the shrug, the raising of an eyebrow, a blush.

The dialogical process aims to see the advancement of argument through a variety of constructive means, such as gesture, language, and mind. According to Kennedy (1997), gesture is:

The fundamental somatic and kinaesthetic level of intersubjectivity “before” language which grounds, frames, and comments on verbal and noetic levels of interaction. Even before we open our mouths we are making meaning together . . . The gestural as a sign world is one of intense, unremitting intervisibility. We all sit facing each other at the table—we are all in each other’s view, directly or peripherally. (p. 67)

What keeps us in a state of obscure excitement as we follow the argument is the sense that what lures us is a summum bonum—a coordination of perspectives as much an emotional, gestural, and perceptual state, as a cognitive one. (p. 73)

Creative thinking in the form of new metaphors, images, hypotheses, and other ideas, derive from a plethora of non-discursive meanings or schemata that emerge from

the body's concrete interactions with its environment (Cheville, 2005; Roth & Lawless, 2002). Johnson (1987, 1993, & 2007) has explained how cognitive schemata emerge from bodily activity. For instance, a sense of containment comes from the experience of being 'in/out' and orients one to those conditions, even ideationally. He asserts: "when we actually move from one place to another, we experience ourselves as traversing a path from one bounded area to another. This experience . . . provides a basis for our understanding of negation" (Johnson, 1987, p. 39). Another instance is the embodied schema that orients one toward balance and has a profound effect not just on activity but also on cognition. In recurring experience with balance, an embodied mental structure arises that inclines one to recognize "balanced personalities, balanced views, balanced systems, balanced equations, the balance of power, the balance of justice, and so on" (1987, p. 87). This embodied account comprising perceptions, actions, and introspections is also a process of knowledge acquisition involving inference, categorization, memory, and other forms of higher order thinking. The acquired knowledge takes on some kind of conceptual representation, such as schemata, propositions, semantic frames, metaphor, and the like, that make up a kind of cognitive architecture. This is the wellspring from which one draws in creative activity. "Individuals make meaning of their bodily experiences finding common ground with others in communicating that meaning conceptually, often through the use of metaphors" (Satina, 2001, p. 523).

One way of testing a hypothesis before acting on it is the process Dewey (1922) called "dramatic rehearsal," and which comprises a "kinaesthetic plan." Dewey recommends that we attend to specific methods of inquiry and contrivance to ensure

efficacious outcomes: “Methods of inquiry to locate difficulties and evils; methods of contrivance to form plans to be used as working hypothesis in dealing with them” (Dewey, 1948, p. 170). Dewey (1908) refers to this as a dramatic rehearsal because moral deliberation is never immediate, but rather an imaginative dramatic exercise, where we inhabit a variety of dispositions and act out various courses of actions. Indeed, there will be evaluative feelings appropriate to the roles we assume and solutions we imaginatively perform. It is a method to gain information that we may consider investing in a moral judgment, an epistemic rather than merely pragmatic action (Welchman, 1995). Though conceived as a mentalistic exercise, dramatic rehearsal would be more effective as an actual, embodied performance. Hamington (2010), whose adherence to Deweyan pragmatism comes from its correspondence with feminist care ethics, has been working to enrich that aspect of feminist theory with Dewey’s notion of “dramatic rehearsal,” an effort I consider nothing short of consummatory in the Deweyan sense. Hamington (2010) asserts that body-mind has yet to inform the concept of imaginative or deliberative dramatic rehearsal. He advocates a version of dramatic rehearsal that is based on actual theatrical performance skills and views this outgrowth as a contribution to prolonging the “temporal horizon” of the feminist care ethic. Hytten (2010), in particular, endorses dramatic performance of ethical dilemmas, e.g. simultaneous dramaturgy²⁸, a bodily-

²⁸ Simultaneous dramaturgy is an acting process of the dramaturg Boal (1985), comprising a partially scripted simple plot covering a narrative’s rising action and climax. At the point of climax, the dramatic action is halted to enable the audience to

conscious approach, because it encourages participants to act differently, as though one's identity were contrary to fact. I shall return to this topic in the next chapter where I will be discussing dramatic rehearsal at length, as a tool in ethical inquiry. Students can work out scripts with staging directions for live performance, or participate in impromptu role-playing.

Embodied intersubjective reasonableness.

The criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument under the category of “Social Dimension of Inquiry” are the following:

- *Did we share control/management of the discussion, or did the teacher or a dominant clique control/manage it?*
- *Did most of us contribute to the conversation, or did a few people dominate?*
- *Did we work for inclusion—bringing in minority voices?*
- *Did we give all opinions equal intellectual consideration?*
- *Were we actively listening to each other? (looking at each other instead of the teacher, paraphrasing, asking follow-up questions, avoiding side conversations)?*
- *Were we responding to each other (rather than just taking turns speaking; relating what we say to what has been said before)?*

propose a solution to the problem which was acted out. A simple plot is one where action is continuous and there are no episodes (Aristotle, 1965).

- *Were we respectful of each other? (responding, polite tone of voice and word choice, lack of aggression, insult and dismissal, avoiding making the discussion too personal, challenging others respectfully)*
- *Were we caring of each other? (helping a timid person make his point, getting to know each other well enough to know what is important to each of us)*

The items listed above are ‘behaviors’, in other words, not just ways of thinking and talking, but ways of using the body. Philosophical inquiry is not merely shared thinking but the shared conduct of dialogic interaction, in which meaning is exchanged and transformed through talk, gesture, expression, posture, etc. Two modes of dialogue deserve attention: thematic and open. Thematic dialogue occurs when instruction centers on a set of open-ended questions provided by the teacher. Open dialogue occurs as questions are formulated by students themselves (Hubard, 2010). In both instances, but more especially in the second, which entails creative questioning, embodiment is given recognition in students’ personal investments of knowledge, thinking, and affects, as they relate to the situated classroom activity and all class participants.

Furthermore, embodiment provides for a relational pedagogy informed by the care ethic and obtaining of certain traits, such as attentiveness, responsibility, competence, and responsiveness (Bowden, 1997; Noddings, 1992; Thayer-Bacon, 2000; Tronto, 1994). According to Noddings (1988), a relational ethics informs a nurturing pedagogy that should pervade intersubjective relations in the classroom and further explains, in the following:

A relational ethic remains tightly tied to experience because all its deliberations focus on the human beings involved in the situation under consideration and their relations to each other. A relation is here construed as any aspiring or connection of individuals characterized by some affective awareness in each. It is an encounter or series of encounters in which involved parties feel something toward each other. Relations may be characterized by love or hate, anger or sorrow, admiration or envy; or, of course, they may reveal mixed affects—one party feeling, say, love, and the other revulsion. *One who is concerned with behaving ethically strives always to preserve or convert a given relation into a caring relation* [emphasis added] (p. 173).

According to Lussier-Ley (2010), non-verbal communication is very important within an embodied orientation involving interplay between the senses, kinaesthetic abilities, bodies, and situation. Embodiment can be understood as a process or construct dependent on bodily experience, a multidimensional phenomenon integrating body-mind and society, a clue to life histories, a reminder of manifestations of social inequities. We understand our world very much in non-verbal, somatic ways so that we should pay attention to how values, interests, and habit are all embodied. This requires a high level of self-awareness on the part of students, as they weigh their personal needs to express themselves in light of a sense of mutual respect and trust in the group.

Embodied outcome-oriented reasonableness.

The criteria included on the IAPC evaluation instrument under the category of “Inquiry Outcomes” are the following:

- *Did the inquiry advance? What kinds of progress were there? (new connections, distinctions, definitions)*
- *Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?*
- *What have we learned?*
- *What new questions can we now ask, that we couldn't before?*
- *Was the discussion relevant and meaningful to us?*

The first evaluation item above characterizes inquiry progress in conceptual terms, i.e. “*new connections, distinctions, definitions,*” and in being able to ask “*new questions ... that we couldn't [ask] before.*” However, attending with one's body to the process of inquiry is the somatic mode of attention imminently informing our reflective experience in making connections, questions, and practical judgments. To address this oversight in the evaluation instrument, an item should be included to accommodate the embodied nature of communal inquiry: *Did we learn in ways that will alter not only our beliefs but also our behavior?*

Shedding light on the embodied nature of judgment-making, Gregory (2006) indicates that:

Some qualitative experience is the object of our value judgment. Even ideals like justice and compassion are more often experienced as feelings of indignation and shared grief than as logical imperatives or contemplative ideals. (p. 112)

It is commonplace to lose our taste for foods, entertainments, and relationships that experience shows to be unhealthy or perpetually unsatisfying, and to acquire tastes that tend in the opposite directions. Just as ideas and belief can be corrected

in the give-and-take of inquiry, so can preferences, desires, attachments, ideals, and other instances of value judgment. (p. 112)

All of the aspects of embodied construction are happening simultaneously. In a manner of speaking, we refer to mental and physical acts, or acts with emotional meaning and aesthetic quality, when we are in fact making reference to various dimensions of the same embodied experience. Every act is a mental act and a physical act, and has emotional meaning and aesthetic quality; those are dimensions within the continuity of experience. Dialogue provides the means to navigate the process. Rather than looking at learning and knowing as intellectual things and movement, perception, emotions and the rest as other kinds of things, other “parts” of experience, for instance, we participate in dialogue where we regard our experience as a dynamic unit in which all these features are interwoven. Working with the concept of body-mind we become explicit about our abstracting of dimensions from whole, embodied experience.

Within the continuum of experience, the aesthetic dimension lies outside what we know how to articulate. It is literally true that before we can say something, we have already lived it. We embody our personal meaning in the articulation of our own movements. Therefore, if learning is to be a reconstruction of personal meaning, we would expect from the process the emergence of language that articulates and provides insight into the dimensions and meaning of experience. An important part for instance, would be being able to ask practical philosophical questions about embodiment and the relationship between quality of thought and quality of action, as in the evaluation item

above, *“Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?”* This takes the form of an action plan, a tentative script subject to revision and dramatized for evaluation.

Learning is something we can learn to do better, an aspect of which is discovering ways to describe and reflect on personal experience, bringing to the fore the means by which we engage experience. The dialogic structure provides a context for generating the kinds of experiences from which students may draw meaning and explore the embodied dimensions of their experience. Dialogue involves “not only words, but feelings, actions and meanings. Dialogue does not stand apart from life, but rather propels and channels them, often in surprising directions” (Mills, 1996, p. 134). In the self-referential process that dialogue is, a person not only learns, but also learns how to become a better learner.

Additionally, if learning is an act of reconstructing personal meaning, then the ability to incorporate awareness of how one goes about it (into the act of reconstructing in a particular situation) becomes embodied knowledge. “Learning embodies as much feeling as thought and as much action as reflection” (Mills, 1996, p. 14). It is the embodiment of dimensions of meaning in the experience of the learner, the “live creature” (Dewey, 1934, pp. 43-44). Dewey spoke of finding the “unity of mind and body in action,” asserting that the place to seek for the unity of “body-mind” is precisely in human action. That which we call metacognition includes reflections on the physical self, i.e. “the body perceived from within by first person perception” (Tarr, 2004, p. 229).

“Did we think of ways to test our hypotheses in experience?” Ethical inquiry is imminently of practical importance and students can engage in practical applications to test hypotheses.

“The important point is to retain the idea that we do not have the final truth, that we can and must continue to learn in ways that will alter not only our beliefs but also our behavior” (Putnam, 1993, p. 69). Changes are not merely internal, they are expected to be observable. Body knowledge is so often unconscious knowledge, so that the change process is subtle. Our pre-conscious image schemata can accommodate awareness of our unreflective behaviors, in concrete and detailed ways.

The final item in the IAPC evaluation instrument is, “*Was the discussion relevant and meaningful to us?*” If philosophy is to be practiced as “an art of living” (Gregory, 2007, p. 60), the outcome of philosophical judgment should aspire for meaning in action. Pierce made the innovative insight that the meaning of judgment is reconstructed, ameliorative habit. We are one step closer to that when students “learn to translate those judgments into action” (Gregory, 2006, p. 75).

The broad aim of this chapter has been to call attention to P4C as a pedagogical approach for embodied reasonableness. The preceding discussion brought to the fore those features of transactional theory that are salient in considering how ethical inquiry can be learned. In the next chapter, I single out moral imagination and its function in learning to do ethical inquiry and propose narrative and dramatic rehearsal as instructional tools for that purpose.

Chapter Three: Moral Imagination

Surely if anyone has imagined sounds, Beethoven did when he composed orchestral masterpieces in profound deafness. (Moore, 2010, p. 2)

To suffer with people who suffer differently, and to be happy with people who find happiness in ways different from our own. (Gregory, 2000, p. 448)

All persons are still more or less children--in process of learning moral distinctions. The more intense their moral interests, the more childlike, the more open, flexible, and growing are their minds. (Dewey, 1908, p. 321)

Education, if it is to fulfill its goal of enriching experience should address the moral dimension of experience, questions of human conduct, which Dewey maintained is the substance of all inquiry (Beauclair, 2008, p.15). The previous chapter described Dewey's body-mind concept as the basis for the construct of embodied reasonableness. It established that the normative, embodied practices in Philosophy for Children prepare students to practice ethical inquiry, and to make and act on sound ethical judgments. Within Philosophy for Children's practices are the dispositions or acquired traits that fulfill an educative role. As Dewey pointed out, they are "effective in producing the change of disposition which philosophy indicates as desirable, but only in the degree in

which they are educative—that is to say, in the degree in which they modify mental and moral attitudes” (Dewey, 1916/1997b, pp. 328-329).

As has been pointed out in the second chapter, certain instances find us constrained by our own embodied experience, so that putting ourselves in another’s shoes is prone to error and prejudice (Mackenzie & Scully, 2007). How we address that concern is the point of this chapter as we examine the component of moral imagination. In this chapter, I argue that moral imagination is key in making sound ethical judgments, that it is the process by which we move in the direction of “a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute” (Dewey, LW 14:230; CF. 1932 E, LW 7:350, as cited in Fesmire, 2003, loc. 1422). In support of my argument, the chapter has been organized as follows. It opens with a brief account of imagination as a concept that took shape during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, followed by a discussion on its nature, and how imagination operates in ethical inquiry and aesthetic experience. I argue that the narrative is a neurocognitive adaptation through which we understand experience, recommending its literary form as the appropriate vehicle in teaching and learning ethical inquiry. I proffer criteria serving as a guide for making appropriate selections of artistic material for ethical inquiry. As a tool in dialogic deliberation and as a “kinaesthetic plan,” I propose Dewey’s notion of the imaginative dramatic rehearsal. A kinaesthetic plan aims to remake an ethical situation the fictional context for process drama-based, dialogic

dramatic inquiry.²⁹ In process drama, there is no external audience, but rather a script in process, where the teacher-facilitator frequently takes on roles with the students or acts as a playwright (Wilhelm & Edmiston, 1997, as cited in McCambridge and Sieger, 2004, p. 19). Finally, I relate my pedagogical decisions to the requirements of the moral imagination component and explain how P4C corresponds with those requirements.

Dewey's theory of imagination and education highlight the imaginative function as preeminently moral, hence moral imagination (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 99-107). I analyze the nature of imagination in terms of the following three aspects: (a) image schemata,³⁰ (b) narrativity, and (c) kinaesthetic plans. Here is a brief account of the imagination, as it relates to the transactive claims nature makes on living creatures and human beings.

²⁹ Dialogic dramatic inquiry is the dramatic enactment of the imaginative ideas that inquiry generates. When carried out as actions, they serve as possible solutions to a morally problematic situation (B. Edmiston, Carmen posting, June 21, 2007).

³⁰ Schema theory and the terms schema/schemas, schemata (pl.) were conceived as constructs from the functional adaptations arising in the transaction of creatures with their lived environments. The early use of the term highlighted the transactive nature of sense making within a culturally and socially mediated experience (Bartlett, 1932/1995, pp. 200 & 202, as cited by Mcvee et al., 2005, p. 535).

What is Imagination?

Imagination has had a history of being difficult to define (Engell, 1981; Kaag, 2008). It evolved in the 18th century as an idea to address problems stemming from Cartesian dualism. In large measure, it was Samuel Taylor Coleridge, the romantic poet and philosopher, who conceived of imagination as an organic and harmonious process, one that is vital and lifelike, thereby abolishing the partition between the senses and reason, fusing in a stream of sensation, ideas, reflection, and language. In Coleridge's conception, imagination, as both active and passive, integrates mind by providing "continuous feedback" (BL, I, 189, as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 339). This integrative process is two-phased, "a never-ending coalescence of opposites" (Engell, 1981, p. 347). In its first phase, imagination forms various images encountered in nature. The immediate and unreflective phase (p. 359) is constitutive of learning, instinctively forming knowledge of nature, an acquaintance with phenomena, and with sense experience (p. 343). According to Coleridge (1907), "this self-education begins at birth and operates in every human mind by 'the spontaneous consciousness natural to all reflecting [sic] beings'" (as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 343). The second phase, exercising choice and judgment (Engell, 1981, p. 359), reconstructs those images, "translat[ing] all mental activity into images or symbols, . . . produc[ing] language that contains the whole . . . mind" (Engell, 1981, p. 339). This vital process of the imagination (Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, Chapter XIII, as cited in Warnock, 1976, p. 90) has its roots in ordinary experience (Engell, 1981, p. 344). Imagination is transformative, so while it

perceives nature's development, it generates a similar process in the self (Engell, 1981, p. 347).

Because the mind images in itself the natural world, in the process of integrating mind, imagination unites the "world of self and the world of nature" (Engell, 1981, p. 345). The idea of imagination becomes crucial in explaining the process of sense making,³¹ i.e. how the mind makes sense of nature and how nature shapes the mind through the senses, reconciling the two in a single process. Coleridge (1884, 1895) wrote:

I have read of two rivers passing through the same lake, yet all the way preserving their streams visibly distinct—if I mistake not, the Rhone and the Adar, through the Lake of Geneva. In a far finer distinction, yet in a subtler union . . . are the streams of knowing and being. The lake is formed by the two streams in man and nature as it exists in and for man; and up this lake the philosopher sails on the junction-line of the constituent streams. (p. 70, pp. 261-262, as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 330)

As you will increasingly find in the course of this chapter, "imagination is 'the laboratory in which thought[s] [are] elaborate[d] into existence'" (CN, III, 4398; cf. AP,

³¹ Sense making in schema theory refers to building a schematic model for judgment-making by putting together informative pieces and associating them with social expectations, one's emotions, personal goals, and projected outcomes, keeping the body as the self-referential point in learning (Brock, Vert, Kligyte, Waples, et al., 2008, p. 451).

p. 186, as cited in Engell, 1981, p. 348). An artist, such as a poet, would use language to give imagination concrete form in poetry because the poet has the ability to select the images he wishes to associate with one another, and then to determine how ideas, images, and feelings can be reconstructed in lively, unexpected ways (Engell, 1981, p. 331).³² Also, because the artist can exercise the spiritual freedom to create, preferring particular ends or goals to others, the artist is generally a moral agent with an ethical purpose in her poetry and art (Engell, 1981, p. 331 & 344). Even if art itself does not dictate or establish the moral life, Coleridge's belief is that art issues in a genuine concern for human welfare, and thus assumes a moral responsibility (Engell, 1981, p. 359). As it turns out, the American pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce also explored the nature of thought as a continuum.

Peirce prefigured the neuroscientific finding that imagination is a nonlinear, recursive, and complex neuronal process. In problematic situations, it mediates between acting spontaneously and reactivating past adaptations, synthesizing and schematizing human experience (Kaag, 2008, p. 14; 2010, p. 371). In *The Law of Mind*,³³ Peirce (1893)

³² We also refer to personal creativity as imagination. The wilful control of imaginative power is elevated in the creative act (Engell, 1981, p. 144).

³³ Peirce gave this section in *The Law of Mind* great importance as evidenced by: “. . . the existence of five subsequent documents, all written on ruled paper carrying a blind stamp of the ‘Aetna Life Insurance Company’ in the top left corner, in which Peirce grapples with that theme almost exclusively. They are all titled *Law of Mind* as though Peirce

wrote about the continuity of human thought: “logical analysis applied to mental phenomena shows that there is but one law of mind, namely that ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain other ideas which stand to them in a particular relation of affectability” (§104, as cited in Kaag, 2008, p. 14). In that connection, Peirce (1893) asked “What can it mean to say that ideas wholly past are thought of at all any longer? . . . How can a past idea be present? (§107, as cited in Kaag, 2008, p. 14)” He was referring to imagination, which allows us to “grasp” and “handle” difference, make abductive inferences,³⁴ and generalize from partial cases (Kaag, 2008, p. 13). According to Kaag (2008), an apt analogy to illustrate the recursion within imagination’s neuronal processes is that of successful improvisation within a jazz ensemble. The analogy of musical improvisation should shed light on novelty and continuity, the defining marks of jazz ensemble improvisation. In performance, jazz musicians, who are embodied beings, throughout the process engage in imaginative embodied cognition.

Imagine a jazz quartet in which each player responds to ongoing cues of her own playing, but also the cues and tempo of her accompanying players. No sheet

thought the question so significant that it deserved to be treated head-on without preamble” (Peirce Edition Project, 2010, p. 580).

³⁴ Abductive reasoning involves the creative use of imagination (Alexander, 1990, p. 329). It is an envisioning process that is part inference, part insight, and is a particularly good guess established in the nexus between the individual and the larger community (Kaag, 2007, p. 97).

music is used, and in the opening moments of the first movement the styles and tempos are organized around a general theme. Over time, a more specific beat and theme are established as the musicians begin to correlate, or “get in time.” If the musicians have been playing together for many years, certain musical signals seem to instantaneously connect the four musicians, causing a deepening of the correlation and resonance of sound. Each new signal causes a wave of novel sounds that, in the midst of novelty, maintains harmony with past forms. “Such integration would lead to a kind of mutually coherent music that each one acting alone could not produce.” (Edelman & Tononi, 1987, p. 49, as cited in Kaag, 2008, p. 15)

The music ensemble analogy also serves to illustrate Dewey’s view of ethical deliberation as imaginative, and a joint creative act. He believed that enriching “the fund of germane possibilities and further refining one’s imagination increase the reliability of one’s valuations” (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 978-81). Dewey was primarily concerned with bringing to the fore of moral judgments the aesthetic dimension of experience, “the art of life is the goal behind Dewey’s ethics, his philosophy of democracy, and his theory of education” (Alexander, quoted in Teehan, 1992, p. 171). As a shared undertaking, ethical inquiry offers students growth in the imaginative and creative aspects of reason. If meaningfulness is the outcome of making rich and imaginative associations, a dramatic rehearsal will be more fruitful when we arrive at a judgment that is novel because it

enlarges the moral circle,³⁵ making our relations more inclusive, fair, just, and equitable. Dewey (1908) wrote: “We have reached the conclusion that disposition as manifest in endeavor is the seat of moral worth, and that this worth itself consists in a readiness to regard the general happiness even against contrary promptings of personal comfort and gain” (p. 364).

We can now consider Peirce’s community of inquirers as a place where imagination is crucial in the work of interpretation because of pragmatism’s sensitivity to the aesthetic, the temporal, and the experimental dimensions of experience. As a philosophical stance, pragmatism is predisposed to upholding the meaning of action based on reinterpreting and reconstructing the actual in light of the possible (Alexander, 1990, pp. 325-328). Fellow thinkers aware of the felt, aesthetic dimensions of acting and learning in the world, exercise embodied reasonableness and intersubjectivity towards the emergence of meaning in shared activity which is the community of inquiry. As pragmatists, participants regard meaning as the practical consequences of an act or a resulting difference in habits of behavior (Gregory, 2000, p. 446) in a community of co-inquirers laboring for an ultimate description of reality for its own sake, while

³⁵ The moral circle refers to Singer’s (1981) notion of the moral circle of altruism which includes those to whom we accord sympathy, protection, and respect, i.e. living creatures and persons that are inside the circle. Beyond the invisible perimeter we have drawn as a partition are those outside the moral circle and who thus elicit our indifference (p. 120, as cited in Pinker, 2002, p. 167).

downplaying the peculiarities of its individual members (Alexander, 1990, p. 328).

According to Gregory (2000), it is moral imagining that helps us exercise reason and good will in the face of those peculiarities, thereby withholding judgment by observing mindfulness of how our conduct affects others³⁶ (Gregory, 2000, p. 450).

In Dewey's thought, all imagination is regarded as moral imagination in a broad sense. One strives to achieve the aesthetic ideal in the moral life through the dramatic use of imagination (Alexander, 1990, p. 328), as an embodied mental act imbued with intentionality rather than disinterest (Casey, 2000; Granger, 2006, p. 168). To shape an image and make it materialize is an exercise in intelligence, skill, and productivity, and may be applied to a task, such as wielding a golf club, drawing a sketch, or executing a habit of ethical thinking, such as conscientiousness (Cabot, 1906, p. viii). The image is a sensation or a feeling transformed for an end-in-view (Chambliss, 1991, p. 47) "It is the definite statement of . . . [moving the experience forward in a definite way] . . . bringing to bear one's past experience or habits" (Dewey, 1898, p. 64, as cited in Chambliss, 1991, p. 47). The image serves as a restraint. As Dewey (1900-01) wrote: "The ultimate value of the image is the control it gives over actions (Dewey, p. 123, as cited in Chambliss, 1991, p. 47). He further elaborates: "The ideal (which is in a sense the ethical counterpart of the image), while it relates to something future, is itself a present, existent fact. It is an

³⁶ Mindfulness of others is attention to the ways in which our conduct affects others. It varies in degrees of intensity depending on the closeness of our relations and acquaintance with them (Gregory, 2000, p. 448).

activity which has its significance through standing for some other activity not as yet realized” (Dewey, 1900-01, p. 179, as cited in Chambliss, 1991, p. 47). The shaping and execution of the image comprise a continuum. Imagining and making a thing happen are conjoint initiatives in the flow of feeling and experience.

Chambliss (1991) gives us three insights regarding Dewey's conception of the role of imagination in experiential reconstruction. First, the image must reveal itself in conduct, so there exudes a bodily manifestation, as in an act or action. The second is the intrinsic value of imagination in ethical matters. Therefore, transformative experiences, such as those that have ethical implications, are no different from creative ones involving artistry, where something envisaged, materializes. Accordingly, the third insight is the ethical nature of the transformative or reconstructive experience. As with artistic creations, our experiences are felt, meant to be shared, and to convey meaning. Thus, it is imperative for imagination to work in the context of living. In *Art as Experience* (1934), Dewey wrote that works of art are one-of-a-kind and serve as our best evidence of imagination's true nature (p. 268). By extrapolation, we ourselves as unique beings are susceptible to the artistry of imaginative visions for us. Dewey (1893) introduced the notion of the self as a work of art - in progress; therefore, the realization of selfhood serves as the highest moral end-in-view. In *Self-realization as the moral ideal* (1893), he wrote:

I desire to discuss the question of realization, rather than the question of the ideal and to *emphasize the notion of a working or practical self* against that of a fixed or presupposed self. (p. 654) . . . [the] child is possessed of an artistic capacity (p.

658). . . . To realize capacity does not mean, therefore, to act so as to fill up some presupposed ideal self. It means to act at the height of action, to realize its full meaning (p. 659). . . conceived as a working, practical self, carrying within the rhythm of its own process both ‘realized’ and ‘ideal’ self. (p. 664)

The stage has been set with the historical significance of imagination as the backdrop for our project. I now discuss the nature of imagination, its content, its functions, and its purposes.

Imagination is not a discrete faculty or power, but rather a contextual orientation towards schemes capable of disclosing alternatives to present conditions (Granger, 2006, p. 168) and bringing new realities into existence (Chambliss, 1991, p. 43). Dewey (1896) wrote: “All building up of experience takes place through the image. . . . All learning is carried on through the medium of imagery” (pp. 136 & p. 324, as cited in Chambliss, 1991, p. 44). The content of imaginative activity is always *imaging* in one or more of the five sensory modalities, i.e. visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or tactile “images,” and/or in emotive modalities, e.g. shock or sadness. Imagery is the representation of a percept that resembles the original (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000, p. 110). These images occur in the imagination as “schema” that are shaped, individuated, and related to one another according to culturally mediated patterns. Image schemata come from our sensorimotor transactions with the world and a continuous flow of experience and feeling (Gibbs, 2008, p. 231). Their function is to organize experience and help in meaning making (Beauclair, 2008, p. 150). Some are direct representations, in imagination, of qualities experienced materially; some are imaginative reconfigurations of those qualities.

In either case, image schemata are the *a priori* material of the imagination and mediate between our empirical experience and the concepts we form as a result of that experience (Rundell, 1994, pp. 93-94). Image schemata may also be complex patterns of sensory and emotive images that comprise entities such as “characters, settings, sequences of events, causal connections, goals, and so forth ...” (Johnson, 1987, p. 19). Image schemata are central to embodied reasonableness because they are kinaesthetic and they organize experience. As Johnson (1987) writes, “The schema is a pattern of action as well as a plan for action” (p. 21).

Schematic sensory and emotive images and image constructs are always involved in imagination’s two broad functions: in *imagining-that* something is the case – a situation or state of affairs – and in *imagining-how* to reach a goal or to construct something, by imaginative prefiguring or dramatic rehearsal (Dewey & Tufts, 1932, p. 303; Dewey, 1957, pp. 179-180). In each of these functions, imagination works not merely to entrain images, but to relate them together meaningfully. Meaning is a function of association. Things are meaningful because of connections we make among qualities, images, emotions, sensations, image schemata and concepts, and the greater the number of meaningful connections we make with various dimensions of experience the more significant is growth in meaning. Imagination enables novel connections of meaning to be made among schematized segments of actual experience, as well as among schematized images that may be only possible. This *possibilizing* aspect of imagination is what gives us an array of threads to weave into the fabric of reflective thinking. The pragmatic theory of experience admits of imagination and supposition as intrinsic,

making possible the marriage of theory and practice in dramatic rehearsal.³⁷ In addition to dramatic rehearsals in imagination, possibilizing includes hypothesizing and pretending (Casey, 2000, p. 115 & 231). In Dewey's (1934) words, imagination,

... is a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It is the large and generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes in contact with the world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new is created, the far and the strange become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination. (p. 267)

However, not all connections are equally meaningful, in terms of being fruitful or satisfying. Some are only potentially meaningful, some lead nowhere, some preclude or stunt growth depending on our purposes. The determination of which connections are most meaningful, in *imagining-that* and in *imagining-how*, is the work of inquiry in imagination. Therefore, the paramount features of inquiry are suspension of belief; ability to doubt in the absence of evidence; willingness to follow an argument where it leads;

³⁷ A dramatic rehearsal in imagination is the metaphor Dewey suggested to depict one phase or function of the deliberative process. In this phase of moral deliberation, the person crystallizes possibilities and transforms them into hypotheses, expressed as action plans. As an essential stage in the process, the term "dramatic rehearsal" however has been used synonymously with deliberation (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 962-70).

upholding the tentative status of hypotheses; and entertaining new areas of inquiry (Dewey, FC/LW 13:166, as cited in Fesmire 2003, loc. 481). The work of inquiry serves each of the three broad purposes of imagination: to construct knowledge, to guide appropriate action, and to engage in imaginative activity for its own sake, i.e. imaginative play. Ricoeur (1976/1994) suggests that to exercise a sense of imaginative play is to draw up a schema of a network of ends and means, what he terms “the schema of the *pragma*” (p. 126), *pragma* being the thing one has to do. He further describes the schema as having the organization of a narrative structure and a milieu in which it is to take place:

It is, in fact, in the anticipatory imagining of the action that I ‘try out’ different possible courses of action and that I ‘play’ – in the literal sense of the word – with practical possibilities. It is here that pragmatic ‘play’ overlaps with the narrative ‘play’; the function of the project, turned towards the future, and the function of the narrative, turned towards the past, exchange schemata and frameworks, the project borrowing the story’s structuring capacity and the story receiving the project’s capacity for looking ahead. Next, the imagination shares something of the motivational process as well. It is the imagination that gives the milieu, “the luminous clearing in which we can compare and contrast motives as different as desires and ethical demands, which in turn can change from professional rules to social customs or to strictly personal values. This form of the practical imaginary has its linguistic equivalent in expressions such as: I could do this or that, if I wanted. Finally, it is in the realm of the imaginary that I try out my capacity to do something, that I take the measure of ‘I can.’ I can ascribe my own capacity to

myself – as the agent of my own action – only by picturing it to myself in terms of imaginative variations on the theme of ‘I could.’ (pp. 126-127)

Engaged in one of these purposes, we are active agents in an imaginary state of affairs. We can imagine with relative ease and bring it to fulfillment. We can be told to imagine, and imagining happens instantaneously; in fact, it can occasionally surprise us with a proliferation of images. More often than not, we can exercise a sense of control over imagining, such as being able to initiate imaginative activity, and being able to direct these imaginings in whatever way we like. We can also terminate imaginative activity or replace one imaginative experience with an altogether different one. In fact, there seems to be no limit on the possibility of success for any imaginative project. We succeed in imagining just what we intend. Nevertheless, there is always some aspect that is vague in imagining, such as where something may begin and end, or where this is located. Furthermore, there are certain things that cannot be imagined, such as objects formed from contradictory concepts. Having said that, our imaginative powers differ from one person to another, and are educable. Therefore, we can train our imaginative capacities through disciplined exercise (Casey, 2000, pp. 33-36).

For instance in the context of obtaining instruction in ethical inquiry, Teehan (1992) suggests that students form a “moral image” of the self to give themselves a sense of direction in making moral judgments. Although our aim as stated in the first chapter is more modest than that of preparing students to develop ethical character, lead ethical lives or become moral selves, students could still be encouraged to shape a “moral

image” focusing on the person one wants to be or a schema of the means to achieve certain ethical goals (Putnam, 1993, p. 71) similarly suggested by Ricoeur (1976/1994).

A moral image, in the sense in which I am using the term, is not a declaration that this or that is a virtue, or that this or that is what one ought to do; it is rather a picture of how our virtues and ideals hang together with one another and of what they have to do with the position we are in. It may be as vague as the notions of ‘sisterhood and brotherhood;’ indeed, millions of human beings have found in those metaphors moral images that could organize their moral lives. (Putnam, 1987, p. 81, as cited in Johnson, 1993, p. 65)

Having described imagination’s contextual orientation and the manner in which it engages, we are now prepared for a discussion of its role in ethical inquiry.

Moral Imagination: The Role of Imagination in Ethical Inquiry

Pappas (1993) has written that in Dewey’s model of moral inquiry there are three predominant stages, i.e. doubt, moral deliberation, and judgment (p. 79). First, (1) we discern the ethical dimensions of experience, i.e. the qualitative/cognitive meanings of, e.g. compassion, justice, and friendship over e.g. cruelty, avarice, and oppression, that occur in experience, and recognize these qualities as problematic, as beset with problems and opportunities. (2) We inquire into what threatens, hinders, or diminishes those qualities we value; determine what might enhance, strengthen, diversify, unify, stabilize, or otherwise improve them; as well as, figure out what accounts for actual and possible negative qualities; how they might be avoided, reduced, or mitigated; and (3) we arrive at

the condition of reflective ethical equilibrium.³⁸ We have identified three uses or purposes of the imagination – to play, to construct knowledge, and to guide action – and we have explained that in each of these purposes, imagination involves sensory and/or emotive images following a process of inquiry. Each of the stages of ethical inquiry requires the use of imagination in arriving at the most satisfactory conclusion.

Let us discuss this in greater detail. In the first stage of ethical inquiry, we discern the ethical dimensions of experience distinguished by a non-discursive value or meaning that is felt, but which can also be cognized, and related to other meanings in thought. As felt meaning, even automatic reflexes like fright become part of an inclusive situation that involves concern for objects and their issues (Dewey, 1934, p. 42). Dewey (1938) argued that not only people but also concrete situations are often “disturbed, troubled, ambiguous, confused, full of conflicting tendencies, obscure, etc. It is the *situation* that has these traits” (p. 105). Situations with ethical dimensions may involve an individual in transaction with her environment, as well as, transactions that are interpersonal or social. In any case, what makes certain dimensions of a situation “ethical” has to do with the actual and potential well-being of the agents involved in the situation. As Splitter and Sharp (1995) explain,

³⁸ Reflective equilibrium is the condition inquiry seeks to attain. It includes reasonable justification of considered judgments, taking into account the kind of world we live in, and the kind of creatures we are, always allowing for the possibility of reconstruction to admit of the new.

...issues relating to what counts as good, fair, reasonable, decent, and right; issues to do with violence and conflict, relationships, self-knowledge, desires versus obligations, reciprocity (retaliation, revenge), friendship, love, and respect;... are elaborations of major themes concerning such fundamental questions as what it means to live well, and how the world might be transformed and improved. (p. 176)

There is an element of imaginative play in empathizing with others, which is necessary to comprehend the full ethical meaning of each situation. We pretend,³⁹ assuming the attitudes of others, sorting through their concerns, plans, and predilections as though they were our own (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 901). However, the ethical meaning of a situation is not always obvious. It consists not only in qualities immediately given, but also in qualities that are only potential. Ethical discernment, therefore, includes sensitivity to what is given, as well as the imaginative ability to understand the directional flow of experience, i.e. from where things have come and where they might lead.

The second stage of ethical inquiry, inquiry into the causes and effects of ethical qualities, involves the imagination in constructing knowledge through such activities as categorizing qualities of similar kind, relating parts of experience in cause/effect narratives, forming images, constructing counterfactuals, considering alternative realities, and articulating possibilities, their consequences, and repercussions (Pardales, 2002).

³⁹ Students with autism despite having a normal IQ will not be able to pretend (Baron-Cohen, 1995, as cited in Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 9).

Through its possibilizing aspect, imagination permits new ways to frame situations necessitated by particular circumstances and mental habits, but not determined by conventional rules, and norms. In the process, we also reconstruct past understandings to engender new meanings in ideas that have lost their currency or do not contribute to growth. The ability to take in the full measure of a situation, all that it implies and signifies, and be able to bring forth something new is similar to abductive reasoning and accounts for the production of novel elements in inquiry (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 902-8; Kaag, 2007, p. 80).

The aim of the second stage of ethical inquiry is to figure out how to and what might enhance, strengthen, diversify, unify, or stabilize or improve ethical meanings in experience. The work involves the imagination in generating and testing hypotheses, i.e. ways to improve the ethical dimension of an experience. This aspect of the moral imagination is familiar to us through our abilities for insight, making inferences, creating hypotheses, and envisioning a plan of action. As insight, one imagines possible competing hypotheses and determines the fit of a given suggestion. Fittingness is informed by environmental and contextual factors, together with the inquirer's active determination of the situation. It is measured in terms of the foreseeable consequences of provisional hypotheses or action plans (Kaag, 2007, pp. 97-9). As Dewey wrote: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole" (LW 12:108, as cited in Beauclair 2008, p. 61).

Finally, ethical inquiry seeks to arrive at its third stage, the condition of reflective ethical equilibrium, which is an instance of reasonableness in ends and means, in light of one another and the system as a whole, and also reasonable in light of prior obligations about the problem at hand (Elgin, 1996, pp. 13 & 107). Reflective ethical equilibrium has two components: existential and cognitive, the existential component being the ethical amelioration of the problematic situation in terms of felt ethical qualities of experience. At this stage we have arrived at a satisfactory resolution of experience. That resolution will involve a reconstructed habit of interaction by the agent and her natural and/or social environment, and in all likelihood, a reconstructed environment. Moral imagination consummates in artful conduct, as our very own experiences serve as our original artistic medium (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 89-96; Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 25).

The cognitive component of reflective ethical equilibrium is the reconstructed ethical understanding and sensitivity of the actor. We work out possibilities, making them feasible and available as options for action (A.O. Rorty, 1988, p. 340). From this new perspective, we also continue to look for new projects and possibilities for action within the hard stuff of worldly experience exercising a firm foothold in the actual, but in light of the possible. In the sense that Dewey explained, the experience of ethical inquiry is thus “educative” because it prepares us to be more curious, discerning, responsive, purposeful, or skilled in future experience (just as other experiences might make us callous, careless, repetitive, or scattered, which Dewey called “mis-educative”) (1938; 1967, p. 25). He had argued that immediate meanings cannot be captured in linguistic description because the meaning *is* the undergoing (Mitchell, 1989, p. 481). In *Breathing*

Curiously: Queering the Curriculum Body, Sanders (2007) sheds light on our embodied experience of things that we have yet to commit to language. He explains that they are expressive of encounters with the Other, with the invisible, and with phenomena at the margins of social experience. “How we recognize and communicate these experiences is a social and political challenge, and one that demands the development of new pedagogical theories” (p. 220). This can best come about through reflective and dialogical communal inquiry (Fesmire, loc. p. 931).

In the sections that follow, I discuss two methods of educating the moral imagination: narrative fiction and dramatic rehearsal, both of which rely on reflective and dialogical inquiry to achieve their goal. Fictional narratives frame real-life elements in ways that can highlight ethical meanings and furnish opportunities for inquiry into those meanings. They also serve as models in framing episodes of real life as ethical narratives. A dramatic rehearsal involves authoring a kinaesthetic plan and engaging in an enacted narrative. Through a dramatic encounter, students can claim authority for a moral perspective and the thoughts, feelings and actions that are expressive of it (Bouchard, 2002, p. 410).

Educating the Moral Imagination through Fictional Narrative

We are distinct from other species in our approach to contingently true information because our knowledge is widely inferenced and our behavior highly improvised (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 19). Other living creatures, possessed of naïve realism, are not faced with the need to piece together belief systems nor grapple with their fairness, and when to discard them (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 19). Narrative as a primary mode of

thinking and a dynamic perspective on experience relates to Dewey's naturalistic philosophy, a discourse of processes natural to doing & happening, actions, and intentions (Bruner, 1986, as cited in Wells, 1999, p. 144). In studying the mind and brain, evolutionary psychologists, who draw from evolutionary biology, cognitive science, anthropology, and neuroscience, assert that the functional components of the brain's neural architecture are behavioral adaptations which came about through natural selection in the process of solving problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000, p. 91). On this view, it is believed that much of our mental content is not derived from experience, but only elicited by it (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, cited in Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 22). For instance, when we are at the edge of a precipice like the Grand Canyon Skywalk, we might be gripped by a fear of falling, even with both our feet planted firmly on its transparent surface of tempered glass (see Bloom, 2010, p. 169). Neuropsychologists hypothesize that the narrative form is itself a cognitive adaptation (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001) and that responses to how things seem or "alief," as in the Grand Canyon Skywalk incident, are its primitive state (Bloom, 2010, p. 169). Unsurprisingly, stories are precisely organized within image schemata for the purpose of deriving meaning from experience (Abbott, 2000, as cited in Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 24). In that regard, literature and the arts are considered evolutionary attempts to achieve coherence and sanity amidst radical uncertainty within nature (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 19). The meaning of aesthetics in day-to-day life becomes clearer as we examine our relationship with fiction.

Mind is a function of what the brain does. The human mind has a special affinity

for the narrative because despite its fictional nature, it exercises a powerful organizing influence on neurocognitive adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides, 2000, p. 21).

Understanding, valuing, feeling, perceiving, knowing, believing, and acting come into play when a narrative provides opportunities for problem solving, for making suppositions and reasoning counterfactually, for thinking inferentially and accommodating fallibilism (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 20). Aesthetic experience in literature, music, and the visual arts allows minds to become more fully realized, thereby strengthening cognitive adaptations. According to Bloom (2010) this occurs because imaginative fiction intensifies experience. No one we know has killed his father and married his mother, yet this has happened in the imaginary world of Oedipus with psychic intensity and intimate knowledge (p. 175). Furthermore, by abbreviating time, fictional events reach a satisfying resolution, at best an infrequent occurrence in real life (Bloom, 2010, p. 175). If we wish to give students an opportunity to identify experientially salient features, we might enhance learning experiences in the manner of events in fictional narratives (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 22).

Tooby and Cosmides (2001) delve further into our inner worlds to suggest the meaning of aesthetics in lived experience. They propose that every neurocognitive adaptation of ours, including the process of belief formation, has an aesthetic aspect, whose purpose is to motivate and enhance an individual's sense of participation in experience. The aesthetic aspect organizes the psychological⁴⁰ adaptation so that it

⁴⁰ An objection to Philosophy for Children has been raised against its psychological

becomes increasingly developed, calibrated, and fine-tuned in the appropriate neurocognitive system. For example, as learning progresses, a child's babbling becomes more organized in the language faculty and the auditory system, so that in time, the language system becomes more effective at communication (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 16). Moreover, Tooby and Cosmides (2001) hypothesize that aesthetic motivations may be a necessary "guidance system" for the development of each adaptation, i.e. they motivate us so that we are able to detect, seek, and experience certain aspects of the world, thus further organizing psychological adaptations to reach their mature form. The aesthetic motivation carries out a developmental role in constructing adaptive brain circuitry by furnishing mind with the feelings, valuations, and objects it needs to act appropriately (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000a; 2000b; Steen & Owens, 2001, cited in Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 16). In a very real sense, embodied reasonableness relies on image schemata, the neurocognitive adaptations, which function as psychological inputs.

For this reason, we expect that children should live according to behaviorally imperative aesthetic sensibilities in an aesthetics-drenched world, although their standards of the fun and the beautiful will be somewhat different from ours. Beauty, awe, fascination, horror, and so on are terms that refer to aspects of an evolved

aspect. The program's instrument, highlighted in Chapter 1, is said to describe outcomes that are strongly psychological (Biesta, 2009, p. 4). In light of the neurocognitive findings just described, this might actually be beneficial, if not productive.

psychology of aesthetics. (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 17)

To explain the psychology of aesthetics, Tooby and Cosmides (2001) describe contrastive aesthetics, in the aesthetics of fear and conversely, the aesthetics of beauty. The insidiously harmful situation that conceals adversaries or predators frequently appears in fiction to sustain our interest (p. 18). Fear as an aesthetic component motivates us by grabbing our attention and forcing us into reconstruction because it is vital to monitor unexpectedly threatening situations and to act with immediacy. In contrast, beauty calls attention as the moment unfolds and we find that it is to our advantage to seek out such an experience prolonging our encounter with it. Fear pertains to the compulsion brought about by a potentially perilous situation that initially presents itself as safe or advantageous, requiring extremely sharp attention to make the distinction, i.e. mediate knowledge⁴¹ that can be learned in ethical inquiry. An understanding of the underpinnings of imagination helps us appreciate its essential role in our day-to-day lives.

People enjoy stories. As infants and children, we access cultural meaning via stories, lullabies, games, expressions of feeling, social interaction, religion, education, and art (Alexander, 1987, p. 120). In the absence of a narrative structure, textbooks filled with factual information are seldom read for pleasure. We prefer accounts peopled with

⁴¹ Mediate knowledge is that whereby we learn to find out what is important to know about situations “in order to secure, rectify and avoid being and having them. That of knowing so that we can have them in more meaningful and secure ways” (Dewey, EN, 379, cited in Garrison, 1985, p. 553).

characters whose perspectives provide a vicarious and intelligible experience of unfolding events brought about by their actions (Tooby & Cosmides, 2001, p. 24). While Homer's Penelope in *The Odyssey* weaves and unravels Laertes' shroud, we weave and unravel in imagination possible narratives for action (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 1075-77). We make sense of our lives as narratives, often as in the *Odyssey*, seeing ourselves thrust into ongoing action *in medias res* (Taylor, 1989, p. 47). The form and content of the narrative provide meaning to both written work – especially fiction and history – and to actual human lives and life episodes that can be constructed as story. Working with the meaning of fictional narratives enables a person to find and construct similar meanings in her own life. The narrative provides the most comprehensive structure for grasping the temporal dimension of our moral selfhood and action (Johnson, 1993, pp. 152-153; MacIntyre, 1984, p. 205; Ricoeur, 1994, p. 149). Indeed, it is true that we are caught up in the gripping narrative that is life.

Narrative can also engage the moral imagination. As ideal resources for education in ethical inquiry, fictional narratives engage the moral imagination in three ways, the first of which is to provide boundary and shape to an experience or set of experiences – fictional, historical or lived. Very often, the narrative arc follows the arc of inquiry for resolving problematic situations great or small. Indeed, there is a Jamesian view that regards reasoning and reflective inquiry as an irreducibly aesthetic activity, as story-structured, i.e. a narrative structure, concluding with the resolution of discord (Fesmire, 2003, loc. 724). In Dewey's terms,

Imagination is primarily dramatic...whether it takes the form of a play enacted on the stage, of the told story, or silent soliloquy. The constant presence of instability and trouble gives depth and poignancy to the situations in which are pictured their subordination to final issues possessed of calm and certainty. (1958, p. 89)

In this regard, Nussbaum (1986) explains narrative in fiction and other art forms as a vehicle of moral development, due to its capacity for:

The history of a complex pattern of deliberation, showing its roots in a way of life and looking forward to its consequences in that life. As it does all this, it lays open to view the complexity, the indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty of actual human deliberation . . . it does not display the dilemmas of its characters as pre-articulated; it shows them searching for the morally salient; and it forces us, as interpreters, to be similarly active. (p. 14, as cited in Johnson 1993, p. 196)

It is narrative structure that makes a situation morally intelligible. In fact, narrative is always in relationship to a particular moral perspective (Bouchard, 2002, p. 409). In learning to discern the narrative arc in a fictional text (whatever the genre and medium), students learn to regard – i.e. imagine – episodes of their own life experience in narrative terms, e.g. as ethical set pieces with determinate beginnings or causes, a cast of characters finite enough to make sense of, and a finite number of dramatic (including ethical) issues to be resolved. The cognitive skill of narrative reasoning “‘establishes not truth but verisimilitude’ and lifelikeness” (Bruner, 1986, p. 11, as cited in Worth, 2008, p. 49). The underdetermined causal relationships depicted in a story present an internal logic and an opportunity for developing an analytic stance. With practiced attention, one should be

able to discern both linear and non-linear ways of ordering experience. Understanding the schema of narrative reasoning means encouraging a make-believe attitude, which develops the analytic stance (Worth, 2008). Even though the characters, the conflicts, and the causal contingencies of one's life are real, it is the work of the moral imagination to relate them together in a narrative of ethical choice and consequence. Needless to say, each such episode may be meaningfully related to past and future narratives.

The second way that narrative engages the moral imagination is to foreground ethical qualities, problems and opportunities in episodes of fiction, history, and lived experience, typically by highlighting – i.e., drawing close attention to – dramatic conflict among humans, and between humans and natural, or historical forces. An engaging narrative stirs imagination, offering opportunities to vivify ethical understandings and intuitions (Vasterling, 2007, p. 81). We are moved emotionally by conflicts and contrasts among characters and contingent events. Moreover, a narrative text can dramatize social, political, and ethical principles, as instrumentalities rather than conceptual absolutes (see Caspary 1991, p. 184). It also delivers “physical, biological, and historic knowledge placed in a human context where it will illuminate and guide the activities of men” (Dewey 1930, p. 296, as cited in Caspary, 1991, p. 183). As Nussbaum (1990) explains, “stories cultivate our ability to see and care for particulars, not as representations of a law but as what they themselves are; to respond vigorously with senses and emotions before the new” (p. 184, as cited in Johnson 1993, p. 197). The aesthetic elements of well-structured narratives are characters and situations that are clearly defined and fully contextualized, giving us a sense of them inside-out:

Likewise, typical narratives possess conventions that allow us to enter the minds of agents—whether fictional characters or real historical actors. These conventions involve penetrating the minds of agents, quoting their thoughts directly or displaying their perceptions (point-of-view shots), or telling us what characters are thinking, feeling, seeing, hearing, planning, intending, and so on. Thus, narrative possesses the means to exhibit both the inside and outside of virtues and vices. (Carroll, 2010, p. 382)

Narrativity, the story-like quality of human life, engages two primary activities: observing and judging (Phelan 2007, p. 7, as cited in Sklar 2008, pp. 483-4). In this respect, a fictional narrative can function as an ‘ethics lab’ where moral cognition is tested following a method whereby we exercise skills of judgment making, grapple with ambiguity, reflect on emotional experience, and gauge the relevance of our ethical notions to lived experience (Stroud, 2008, p. 26; Vasterling, 2007, p. 82 & 84). Narrative fiction, good narrative journalism (Voparil, 2009, p. 100), and the embodied experience of personal testimony (Chinnery, 2010, p. 402) obtain currency when they meet the condition of enabling reflective thinking about some facet of life, present an opportunity to talk about something new, and offer a picture of how someone can conduct herself in the world (Stroud, 2008, p. 21). It is the narrative’s aesthetic properties that provide uncommon experience in accessible form to help us sidestep our own experiential and perspectival shortcomings. We thereby gain subjective knowledge that increases our base of experience. It is this feature of drawing close attention to particular aspects of a situation, which explains the proverbial power of narrative to elicit empathy (see Sklar,

2008, p. 481). As Rorty (1989) explained,

Solidarity is not discovered by reflection but created. It is created by increasing our sensitivity to the particular details of the pain and humiliation of other, unfamiliar sorts of people. Such increased sensitivity makes it more difficult to marginalize people different from ourselves by thinking, “They do not feel it as *we* would,” or “There must always be suffering, so why not let *them* suffer?” (p. xvi)

Nevertheless, not all fictional works draw attention to the ethical dimension of situations, or are equally provocative of ethical inquiry. Even when they do, we want to discourage what James (1907) called “the sentimentalist fallacy”, i.e. the tendency “to shed tears over abstract justice and generosity, beauty, etc., and never to know these qualities when you meet them in the street because the circumstances make them vulgar” (p. 229) and similarly prevent the “rationalist’s fallacy” on which James (1907) heaps scorn:

Justice is ideal, solely ideal. Reason conceives that it ought to exist, but experience shows that it can not. . . . Truth which ought to be, can not be. . . . Reason is deformed by experience. As soon as reason enters experience it becomes contrary to reason. (p. 230)

The ethics educator should therefore select works, according to the following three criteria. First, select a literary narrative because its transactive claim is its status as a work of art, “a mode of prediction not found in charts and statistics, . . . it insinuates possibilities of human relations not to be found in rule and precept, admonition and administration” (Dewey, LW 10: pp. 351-2, as cited in Garrison, 2004, p. 3). Second, identify a work that makes a transactive claim for ethical reflection because it requires a

capacity to live with the unknown, the underpinning of which is the belief that if we do not seek in the stranger some version of ourselves, we might be able to examine our complicity in systems of oppression (Chinnery, 2006, p. 335). *The Joy Luck Club*, for example, has been criticized for “the considerable interpretive task the novel presents to its readers,” (Souris, 1994, p. 121) and is appropriate. It is hard work “to unravel the literary tropes and [we will] do whatever it takes to conquer the text” (Chinnery, 2008, p. 45). Third, select a work of fiction whose transactive claim is that it conveys the illusion of the “unfinalizable” self and where there is a multiplicity of perspectives engaged in deep intersubjectivity, characters perceiving their own initiating gestures to be mirrored in others’ responding movement or enunciation. “Attending consciousnesses perceive and misperceive embodiments in one another” (Butte, 2009, p. 130). Such processes problematized in inquiry allow students to exercise a theory of mind (Zunshine, 2007). Neurocognitive adaptations are expressed as mental states in fiction, thereby putting our own into play and pushing ours beyond their comfort zones when facing the Other (Zunshine, 2007, p. 276). This also opens up opportunities to examine the ways in which relationships lead to belief and moral judgment-making, being that the processes of belief formation in the minds of characters lends itself to philosophical analysis (Zamir, 2002, pp. 332). According to Zunshine (2007), Shakespeare waxed deeply intersubjective much earlier than his novel-writing counterparts (pp. 287), hence the topical choice of *Romeo and Juliet* in the curriculum I have prepared (Chapter Five).

Understanding the structure and content of certain narrative works enables us to make situations in our own lives morally intelligible and prods us toward meaning

making (Carroll, 2010, p. 378, 381). Meaning making begins with simulation in imagination, i.e. appraisals of truthfulness or applicability of the text for one's own purposes (Currie & Ravenscroft, 2002, p. 49; Stroud, 2008). Gregory (2008) has pointed out that adolescents are particularly susceptible to existential questions for it is the unfinished nature of their life experience that commands attention. In the adolescent's personal growth is the activity of taking on the attitudes of those in her immediate social environment and responding to others in similar fashion. Part of the young person's learning experience is developing the ability to accommodate another's standpoint, an imaginative act informed by affective thought or emotion (Lipman, 1967). Adolescents, 14-16 years old, have made the cognitive transition from immersion in story worlds as though they were true to having the capacity to reflect on stories as constructs (Applebee 1978, pp.108–109, as cited in Sklar, 2008, pp. 492-493). Therefore, the child's notion of 'what is' is replaced with a sense of 'what might be.'

Engaging students in the ethical inquiries raised in fictional works requires a philosophical, open-ended, and problem-posing pedagogy that engages the kinds of critical, intersubjective, and outcome-oriented reasoning elaborated in the previous chapter. That pedagogy must strike a balance between eliciting the students' own interests and concerns, and focusing their attention on the ethical meanings dramatized in the text. In each case, from one moment to the next there is indeterminateness in inquiry requiring that we reconstruct our understandings. We are moved to self-correct our habits, urges, purposes, needs, and beliefs until we can envision something that may restore equilibrium. Also, because our internalized social habits impinge on how we are

swayed by the demands of narrative situations (Fesmire, 1995, pp. 569-570), ethics pedagogy must include communal inquiry, specifically dialogue, to problematize those responses and fully explore the meaning of narrative texts (Stroud, 2008, p. 30). The arc of inquiry from the encounter of problematic ethical meanings to a reflective equilibrium, the interest and the flow of intelligent discourse, the balancing of personal and textual inquiry agendas, and the dissonances and harmonies of intersubjective concerns and propositions – if artfully managed by the classroom teacher – become elements of aesthetic form in the experience of the dialogue on the text:

It is the business of the educator to see in what way the experience is heading. . . .

Failure to take the moving force of the experience into account as to judge and direct it on the grounds of what it is moving into means disloyalty to the principle of the experience itself. (Dewey LW 13: EE, 21, as cited in Kosnoski 2005, p. 666)

Conversation can motivate participation in the face of such uncertainty and frustration if it manifests particular formal, aesthetic characteristics. (Kosnoski, 2005, p. 655)

Adequate as the narrative may be within the context of ethical inquiry, a pragmatist-naturalist approach to learning warrants another type of transaction, i.e. a self-directed activity expressive of human “thought, imagination, and emotion” (Lekan, 2003, p. 85). To seek what is valuable in thought, feeling and action, Lekan (2003) suggests that we:

Include explanation of the ways in which genuine human needs are satisfied through expressive activity. Such genuine needs might include the need to express

one's identity in a social environment or the need to play and exercise imagination. . . . Like other kinds of general knowledge, knowledge of human needs would not deductively entail conclusions about what action plans to adopt. Rather, such knowledge would serve a useful instrumental purpose in framing action plans. (p. 85)

According to Rosenblatt (1978), "The benefits of literature can emerge only from creative activity on the part of the reader [her]self" (p. 276, as cited in Wilhelm & Edmiston, 1998, p. 33). It goes without saying that we want our students engaged in critical inquiry regarding their values and cherished beliefs, forging new ethical understandings in dialogue, rather than merely reinforcing the ethical assumptions they bring to class. In that regard, a lingering concern noted by Lawrence-Lightfoot (2010) continues to manifest. In the 30 years since Gilligan's seminal gender study *In a Different Voice*,⁴² notions of sexual identity have become more nuanced but her framework of gender differences persists in the cultural imagination (pp. 145-146).

Enlightened sexism . . . [whose] components are anxiety about female achievement; a renewed and amplified objectification of young women's bodies and faces; the dual exploitation and punishment of female sexuality; the dividing of women

⁴² Gilligan does not view the different voices she describes as essentially or only related to gender. The chief aim in her book, as she described it, is to highlight the distinction between two modes of thought that have been culturally reproduced along (but not only) gender lines (Bordo, 1993, p. 336).

against each other by age, race and class; rampant branding and consumerism.

(Douglas, 2010, p. 10), [thereby rendering] [f]eminists . . . as man-hating, child-loathing, hairy, shrill, humorless, deliberately unattractive Ninjas from Hades.

(Valenti, 2007, as cited in Douglas, 2010, p. 11)

I would like to stress that making sound ethical judgments in the context of sexuality involves deliberative inquiry into issues of sexuality, e.g. options to heteronormativity, freedom, power, responsibility, trust, care, physical and mental health, and respect for others (Sharp & Splitter, 1995, p. 192). Sensitive questions are susceptible to exploration in the kinaesthetic plan of a dramatic rehearsal. Drama as a creative activity offers students a chance to take action as if they have been transformed into other people (Edmiston, 1998, p. 60). In identifying the ethical dimension of a situation, not only can students engage in ethical inquiry and make plans about what to do, but they can to some extent take action and open up powerful dialogic spaces to make their moral understandings “more multifaceted interwoven, and complex” (Edmiston, 1998, p. 61). In fact, “semblance can catalyse a change of heart. . . . can, in some cases, change inner states” (Sherman, 2005, p. 277).

Educating the Moral Imagination through Dramatic Rehearsal

Invested with an understanding of embodied reasonableness, the notion of the “kinaesthetic plan” comes from a particular method of ethical inquiry prescribed by Dewey (1922) as that of a dramatic rehearsal. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, he wrote:

We begin with a summary assertion that deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of competing possible lines of action. . . . Deliberation is an experiment

in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like. It is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. But the trial is in imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which do not affect physical facts outside the body. Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes. . . ” (p. 190)

The concept of the dramatic rehearsal provides a theoretical underpinning (Caspary, 1991, p. 177) for students preparing a kinaesthetic plan, an action plan for use in dialogic dramatic inquiry. In this manner, using the body becomes an important part of learning through drama (Wilhelm, 1998, p. 42). A kinaesthetic plan is an extemporaneous improvisation putting an event, story, or other narrative into a dramatic scenario, constructed and acted out together by students and a teacher-facilitator (Winston, 1999, p. 460). As process drama, participants use imagination to create a shared fictive world, one that does not replace the everyday classroom world, but runs parallel to it. Teacher and students interact in both worlds, the teacher speaking from the position of any character in the story and structuring the work from within the drama world (Edmiston & Wilhelm, 1998, p. 19). As the teacher in the following example sequences tasks and shapes the drama, the classroom community members are all being engaged in the same enterprise (Wilhelm & Edmiston, 1997, as cited McCambridge & Sieger, 2004, p. 19).

As a teacher, I want to establish a *laboratory atmosphere* [emphasis added] in which processes are learned as products are created, in which students’ interests are harnessed and extended, and in which knowledge and viewpoints of texts and

people are explored and juxtaposed to foster growth of students' understandings.

(Edmiston & Wilhelm, 1998, p. 14)

The fictional context created with students is the imagined world of the literary narratives. Edmiston & Wilhelm (1998) write "Connections are made among the lives of the students and . . . histories, viewpoints, and cultures . . . separated from the classroom by time and space" (p. 14). Known as "performing at the edges of text," it involves the whole or parts of, in this case, *Romeo and Juliet* and *The Joy Luck Club*, as a "narrative prop," around which emerge the pertinent questions and imagined scenarios (Heath and Branscombe, 1986, as cited in Wolf, Edmiston, & Enciso, 1997, p. 494).

The focal point is a disturbing problem – in this case, one involving ethical issues – which can provide insight unavailable through other means, by engaging the moral imagination (Probst, 2004, p. 98; Shusterman, 2001, p. 368). The situation, meant to activate students' "background schemata" (Wilhelm, 1998, p. 31), skills and understanding, provides an initial dramatic frame – delineating the scenario, elevating its significance, and giving it a context – which the students may extend or reconstruct. Framed dramatic inquiry requires a classroom community with an experienced teacher-facilitator, who structures learning in support of the dramatic and ethical context, including personal journal writing on the learning experience, historical research, interviews, press conferences, literary letters, and symbolic story representation (McCambridge & Sieger, 2004, pp. 19-20).

The ideal scenario is one susceptible of being developed through multiple, "possible lines of action" (Caspary, 1991, p. 178), which the students must explore

through imaginative inquiry, considering the context, their inclination to act, possible moves, objectives, and outcomes. This method provides students opportunities to engage and develop authorship, expressing their perspectives by means of artistic language and gesture (Bouchard, 2002, p. 410). The activity combines the spirit of play, as “the unfolding of a subject of its own account,” (Dewey, 1997a/1910a, p. 219) with responsibility and commitment to a dramatic encounter.

Unlike classic dramaturgy where we are accustomed to scripts assigning participants’ lines and roles, a kinaesthetic plan permits a student to take a position where she decides on her relationship to an unfolding narrative (Davies & Harré, 1990, pp. 12-13). In the language of social psychology, Davies and Harré (1990) suggest the term *position* rather than role, to convey selfhood as fluid and multivocal.⁴³ In exercising positionality, dramatic rehearsal can help a young person in identity formation by affirming a positive and empowering sense of self, especially when one is marginalized by class, race, gender, and sexual orientation (Carlson & Apple, 1998, p. 17). Immanent

⁴³ In the literature of critical pedagogy, histories of subjugation, marginalization, and oppression are located along a continuum ranging from positions of extreme visibility through invisibility (Cooks, 2003, p. 247). Laying bare a power differential, one can speak in relation to that continuum from a hegemonic position of power or the marginalized position of “other.” In so doing, education opens up for itself an emancipatory function, i.e. to create conditions of resistance and empowerment in opposition to hierarchy and privilege (McLaren, 1998, p.175).

as it is, “language exists only as concrete occasions of language in use” (Davis & Harré, 1990, p. 1). Within discourse, an utterance yields a constitutive force rendering a radical discontinuity in being (Deutsch, 1992) or a continuity of multiple selves (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 5). Nevertheless, because an interpretation of one’s world is invested with previously formed beliefs, understandings, and justifications, the student can still locate herself within a prevailing social structure. In role, “a subject position incorporates both a conceptual repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that use that repertoire,” (Davis & Harré, 1990, p. 5). As a diversely positioned self, she will be able to invoke alternative ways of being in relation to others.

Improvisation requires each actor to pay attention to minute details of the emerging plotline, to character traits, and the interaction of personalities, to actions taken and their foreseeable consequences. Each one must also exercise imagination in order to anticipate how others may respond to the scenario, and how she may respond herself. Students’ interpretation and creation of texts emerge from the improvised encounter, enabling them to explore the ambiguities and possibilities of the developing narrative (Wolf, Edmiston, & Enciso, 1997, p. 494). In the course of the improvisation, students are likely to come upon novel points – from fellow students and from themselves (Wolf, Edmiston, & Enciso, 1997, p. 493). As Dewey explained, in the course of dramatic rehearsal, “There is a continual appraising of both data and ideas. . . . Evolution of conceptions thus goes on simultaneously with determination of the facts; one possible meaning after another is held before the mind, considered in relation to the data” (Dewey, 1933, pp. 124-125, as cited in Caspary 1991, p. 185). A student’s values and beliefs

emerge while she is making meaning, and upon subsequent reflection is faced with the ethical implications of her utterances (Gee, 1993b, as cited in Gee, 1996, p. 101). The problematized scenario supplies the material for reflective thinking regarding a more compassionate and respectful stance towards the oppressed or marginalized.

One further aspect remains to be dealt with and that is the power of acting enlivening events from life, in large part because it makes the actors keenly aware of their own feelings. For Dewey, a dramatic rehearsal requires us “to discover the personal factors that now influence us unconsciously” (Dewey, 1916, p. 327, as cited in Caspary 1991, p. 180). In order to respond intelligently to an improvised situation – in role play or in life – we must pay close attention to the emotional, somatic and other felt qualities it evokes, as clues about how to respond in order to lead the situation toward a consummatory outcome, representing the satisfaction of a number of needs in aesthetic – and in this case, ethical – equilibrium.

After the improvisation, students are invited to reflect together about how it unfolded, and the outcome reached. The experience becomes meaningful from a process of careful intersubjective interpretation in community (Kaag, 2009 p. 67). As Edmiston shares, “Reflection is dialogic when students evaluate actions from the point of view of the person affected” (p. 60). This dialogical phase of the activity has essentially the same features as those of communal inquiry into the meaning of narrative texts. In this case, however, the text is the dramatic improvisation created by the students. On the one hand, this dialogue is an extension of the drama, in that the interactions among the participants constitute role-playing, or “philosophical dramaturgy,” (Cossutta, 2003, p. 70). On the

other hand, the dialogue serves the important function of conceptualizing meanings that may have only been felt or bodily enacted, bringing those meanings into what Shusterman (2003) terms the “discursive critical [which can] make our experiences more effectively communicable, durable and powerful by grounding them in socially legitimated practices” (p. 406). The goal of the dialogue, however, is to arrive at a reflective equilibrium on the ethical issues encountered, that is both cognitive and affective, a cognized and “felt harmony in a particular situation, [which can be] communicated and evaluated by a community of inquirers” (Peirce, 1958, p. 473, as cited in Kaag, 2007, p. 129).

Educating the Moral Imagination in Philosophy for Children

While we offer students the opportunity to identify experientially salient features in moral judgment making through the fictional narrative and kinaesthetic plan, the ideal framework for dialogical inquiry into the contestable and problematic in lived experience is that of Philosophy for Children. Regarding their conception, Lipman & Sharp (1978) wrote:

Ethical inquiry involves logical considerations such as consistency and identity, metaphysical considerations such as the concept of a person or a community, aesthetic considerations such as part-whole relationships [that can be appropriately addressed in Philosophy for Children]. . . . [The] moral imagination may be fired by tales, but if we are going to expect them to engage in moral conduct in a reflective and responsible fashion key concepts of ethics can no more be grasped by the [adolescent] without the assistance of philosophical interpretation than they can be

grasped at the adult level. (p. 90)

We become susceptible to the artistry of imaginative visions in the classroom community of philosophical inquiry because it is the locus of the self-realization stipulated by Dewey as the highest moral end-in-view. There our incompleteness and foreignness to ourselves is foregrounded by our desire to connect with others. It has the character of a story-in-the-making (Kennedy, 1999, p. 347). Indeed, we co-create meaning and co-create ourselves in the communal experience because we are drawn out of our habitual, unreflective nature (Garrison, 2004, p. 4). Kennedy (2004) has written that P4C in the dynamics of the classroom community of philosophical inquiry allows students to explore the implications and assumptions informing concrete experiences and connect it with others', their assumptions, implications, and disparate differences, thereby constructing meaning. These experiences have made a transactive claim on one's self and incorporate the puzzling and new, strange and mysterious, with the claims of other participants (p. 751). With its emphasis on learning to think for oneself (Kennedy 1999b, as cited in Kennedy, 2004, p. 747), characterized by the questioning of fundamental beliefs and assumptions and continual self-correction of one's process of judgment construction (p. 748), the processes of communication and cooperation are strengthened (Vansieleghem & Kennedy, 2011, p. 177). As a result, students come to understand that selfhood is always under reconstruction in relation to others (Kennedy, 2004, p. 748).

This chapter has called attention to moral imagination and its role in ethical inquiry and aesthetic experience. While its creative influence was first acknowledged during the eighteenth century Enlightenment, imagination continues to be appreciated in

the ethical amelioration of problematic situations. Through the work of neurocognitive scientists, we have come to understand it as the aesthetic aspect of our inner worlds.

Imagination plays a pivotal role in permitting new ways to frame situations and is advantageous to learning, especially in its literary form which serves as an appropriate instructional tool in ethical inquiry. In dramatic dialogic inquiry, the kinaesthetic plan comprising insight, inference, and hypotheses exercises students' ability to envision a plan of action in moral deliberation. The importance of the moral imagination in belief formation cannot be underestimated because its increasing development, calibration, and attunement as a psychological adaptation also enriches the aesthetic dimension in our day-to-day lives. In the chapter that follows, I shed light on emotions as judgments, a component in the theory of ethical inquiry.

Chapter Four: Emotions as Moral Judgments

To be a poet is to have a soul so quick to discern, that no shade of quality escapes it, and so quick to feel, that discernment is but a hand playing with finely ordered variety on the chords of emotion – a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowledge. One may have that condition by fits only. (George Eliot, 1871-2/1994, p. 256)

The function of the artist is to express reality as felt. (Robert Motherwell, n.d., n.p., as cited in Innis, 2010, p. 198)

The spectator's imaginative capacities are deployed in their possibilizing power in experiencing works of art. (Casey, 2000, p. 206)

As self-realization⁴⁴ is the highest moral end-in-view, the educative purpose of

⁴⁴ Self-realization in Dewey's early writings on ethics (1894) is consistent with his work of doing away with dualisms, the supernatural, and the transcendental (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 204). In his later, early 20th century output, the major unifying idea of growth appears in his writings, as the inclusive moral end and human good (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 401). In my understanding, there is no great overriding difference in the concepts. The same could be said in respect of growth and self-realization in moral deliberation because there the overriding concern is selfhood making itself. (Rockefeller, 1991, p. 412).

our project comes into sharper focus. This chapter is about the epistemic advantage that the emotions offer in serving as an evaluative medium in lived experience. Every single emotion relies on a narrative structure rendering it understandable through an “emotion-history” (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 236). “Pictorial imaginings, musical imaginings, the kinetic forms of imagining in the dance, and others,” bring inner worlds to our attention (Nussbaum, 2001, pp. 65-66)⁴⁵. It has also been described as [the] “deep self expressing itself in the work of art, which is epitomized by the work’s affective quality” (Dufrenne, 1953/1973, p. 480). In *Narrative Emotions* (2004a), Deslandes sheds light on the embodied experience of emotions and their narrative structure. She explains the *raison d’être* of emotions as being a form of intersubjective knowledge and that the hidden world of emotions pertains to the world of the impenetrable other (Deslandes, 2004b, p. 367; Deslandes, 2004a, pp. 69-70). In the theory of ethical inquiry I have proposed, I have been able to describe two of four components, i.e. embodied reasonableness and moral imagination, accounting for Dewey’s influence and other Deweyan-inspired approaches to learning, such as Rosenblatt’s transactional theory, Greene’s aesthetic theory, and Lipman’s pedagogical model of philosophical inquiry, i.e. Philosophy for Children (P4C). Embodied reasonableness as critical, intersubjective, and outcome-

⁴⁵ Cognitive appraisals need not be objects of reflexive self-awareness nor will emotions at all times register as felt experience (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 126).

oriented thinking, emerges from body-mind⁴⁶ when cultivated through the dynamics of the classroom community of philosophical inquiry. P4C can provide the means for students to be able to reconstruct bodily habits of thinking, communication, and conduct. In terms of the second component in the Language Arts, the typical instructional tools, i.e. the narrative and dramatic rehearsal, engage the moral imagination. Habituation in thinking dispositions, such as sensitivity to context in confronting the ethical questions raised in fictional works, requires a philosophical, open-ended, and problem-posing pedagogy. As we are swayed by the demands of narrative situations (Fesmire, 1995, p. 569-70), it is the ethics pedagogy in P4C providing the means for exploring the implications of literature and for problematizing deeply held beliefs and values, in the procedures of communal inquiry and dialogue. The ethics educator should therefore select works of art, for their potential in ethical reflection and philosophical analysis (Zamir, 2002, pp. 332).

In this chapter, I claim that in making sound moral, as well as, practical judgments, we rely on our emotions. However, we cannot always count on the soundness and appropriateness of our emotions in the face of the unfamiliar and unusual. In respect of our emotions, as in art and artfulness, there are levels of sophistication in rectitude

⁴⁶ Dewey's neologism, body-mind, points to the human organism as whole, the left hand term (body) making reference to an evolutionary process continuous with nature, carried forward as habit in the present, and the right hand term (mind) pointing to ongoing and forthcoming evolutionary growth (Hickman, 2004, p. 162).

(Nussbaum, 2001, p. 79). I argue that educating the emotions by incorporating narrative fiction and the arts in a process of ethical inquiry, serves pragmatic instrumentalism (Hamblen, 1993, pp. 27-33, as cited in Logsdon, 2011, p. 29) by: 1. Addressing the abiding human interest in enriching lived experience, 2. Enhancing growth by serving as preparation for a more satisfactory⁴⁷ life, 3. Informing subsequent learning by providing provisional conclusions for future inquiries (Logsdon, 2011, pp. 65 & 92), 4. Making substantive connections across arts and non-arts domains (Logsdon, 2010, pp. 30-31), 5.

⁴⁷ In *A Quest for Certainty* (1929), Dewey made a distinction between that which is satisfying as opposed to satisfactory, i.e. satisfying being a static quality and satisfactory pertaining to judgment as the outcome of inquiry (p. 272).

Promoting equity in educational opportunity,⁴⁸ 6. Constructing understandings on which self-realization depends⁴⁹ (Logsdon, 2010, p. 92), and 7. Promoting the integrative goal of body-mind. I reconceptualize ethical inquiry as aesthetic and also avail of a range of youthful human expressiveness. As has been stated in *Mind the Gap* (2010), that goal is possible “through a conception of ‘the human person as a mind-body system. . . produced

⁴⁸ In terms of educational equity, in particular apportioning knowledge in classical music, while many of its young patrons belong to affluent households, there are intellectual and emotional dimensions in the musical experience that constant exposure and familiarity to classical music would address (Szabo, 2001, p. 22), e.g. developing new perspectives on music through the inner world of feeling (Swanwick, 1994, p. 20, as cited in Szabo, 2001, p. 30), developing neural pathways for processing music, and developing the ability to discern structure and form leading to the formation of taste (Levitin, 2006, p. 194). The implication, therefore, is that the benefits of listening to classical music should be made widely available to all students, as even the untrained know more than they can express about it (Szabo, 2001, p. 29). It is an immediate, visceral reaction that music brings about, so that students will stop to listen and wonder about classical music precisely because it is unfamiliar.

⁴⁹ In the case of musical talent dependent on genetic structures, the following factors should be considered of paramount importance in self-realization: early and timely identification by trained personnel, the application of criteria predicting if one is likely to excel, and provision for early training of talent (Levitin, 2006, pp. 195).

by evolution”” (Slingerland, 2008, p. 13, as cited in Heywood, Garcia, and Wilson, 2010, p. 508).

An integration . . . in which humanists start taking seriously discoveries about human cognition being provided by neuroscientists and psychologists, which have a constraining function to play in the formulation of humanistic theories... and as natural scientists begin poking their noses into areas traditionally studied by the humanities—the nature of ethics, literature, consciousness, emotions, or aesthetics—they are sorely in need of humanistic expertise if they are to effectively decide what sort of questions to ask, how to frame these questions, and what sorts of stories to tell in interpreting their data. (Slingerland, 2008, p. 9, as cited in Heywood, Garcia, and Wilson, 2010, p. 508)

In support of my argument, Chapter Four has been organized to give an overview of how the emotions came to be regarded as judgments of value, beginning with the Stoics. Then, I explain Dewey’s theory of emotions and how he undermined the James-Lange concept of stimulus-response psychology (Dewey, 1896, p. 360). The arts are invaluable in educating emotions, so that a moral education could only be one that is primarily aesthetic. In due course, I explain why it is so.

Emotion as Judgment

The Stoic model of a unified soul is one in which emotion is collapsed into judgment, so that emotions are regarded as judgments (James, 1997, n.p., as cited in Lloyd, 2000, p. 142). Stoics view emotions as cognitive (i.e. descriptive and evaluative)

and give philosophy a therapeutic role comprising a discursive method punctuated by self-watchfulness and comprehensive belief reform, with a view to obtaining well reasoned (*eulogon*) or enlightened *eupatheia* (good feeling⁵⁰) (Sherman, 1997, pp. 55, 99-100, 105 and 108), of which there are only three:

They say there are three good feelings, joy [*chara*], watchfulness⁵¹ [*eulabeia*], wishing [*boulēsis*]. Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned [*eulogon*] swelling [elation]; and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, consisting in well-reasoned shrinking. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will be watchful. They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in well-reasoned stretching [*orexis* – desire]. Just as certain passions fall under the primary ones, so too with the primary good feelings. Under wishing: kindness, generosity, warmth, affection. Under watchfulness: respect, cleanliness. Under joy: delight, sociability, cheerfulness. [Diogenes Laertes 7.1116 (SVF 3.431), as cited in Sherman, 1997, p. 117]

As such, ethical inquiry is a practical matter involving philosophical analysis of beliefs both *sincerely lived by* and merely *entertained* (Sherman, 1997, p. 99). The cognitive element is important in identifying or forming a construal of the emotion and carries significant import for moral education because in this view, cognition is invested with a developmental dimension allowing reconstruction by reasonableness, rather than through

⁵⁰ *Eupatheia* is a wholesome state marked neither by total inertia nor emotional surges (Sherman, 1997, p. 112).

⁵¹ The terms mindfulness and watchfulness [*eulabeia*] are used interchangeably.

the exercise of mere strength of character or sheer willpower. This is in keeping with the neo-Stoic view espoused by Nussbaum (2001), wherein self-correction can effect a change in belief, (p. 232). The ethical cultivation of the emotions is the preserve of the young and is undertaken by engaging cognitive capacities in habituation, learning by doing, responding through reciprocal interaction in play, and fostering mutually strong friendships, instead of solely in self-reflection, discourse, persuasion, and argumentation (Sherman, 1997, p. 85-86). However, cognition and emotion are under the powerful influence of schema (see Chapter One) and any prognostication on the likelihood of success should be measured and should take this into account (Dattilio, 2011, p. 223).

In the Stoic view, reason is the exclusive ground of morals (Sherman, 1997, p. 99). We rely on emotions in deliberating particulars because affects can indicate urgency and moral salience. Emotions perform certain useful functions in moral life, such as a revelatory function in coming to know ourselves (Sherman, 1997, p. 45), assigning value to what matters, communicating those valuing to others, providing motivational force for action, and being valued for their own sake as meaningful experiences. On the other hand, emotions can also be problematic because they make us vulnerable, seizing on certain features of life to make them stand out, communicating questionable value, or expressing attitudes (Sherman, 1997, p. 50). In this connection, emotions can be excessive, capricious and unreliable; in determining salience, emotions may be partial, selective, restrictive, and wrong; involuntary emotions can overwhelm and spin out of control; and finally, when emotions attach value to objects and events over which we have no control, we are rendered hostage to fortune (Sherman, 1997, pp. 29-30). The

wise Stoic is concerned with how living emotionally could deprive one of *eudaimonia*, i.e. human flourishing, and will avail of Stoic emotional therapy or philosophical deliberation to perfect one's nature.

In like manner, Stoic therapy is ultimately grounded in reason. As bootstrapping, behavioral coping strategies are undergirded by philosophical instruction in what is of real and enduring value in the world, so that the deeper philosophical revision that occurs involves the foundational principle that the objects to which the passions attach have no worth and therefore, bring about suffering (Sherman, 1997, p. 111). In Stoic therapy, the patient is introduced to philosophical theory in the admonition that the responsibility for one's condition and well-being lies in one's hands. To this end, one must undertake the following measures: (1) Ward away false projections by observing mindfulness; (2) Undertake reflective meditation at each day's end; (3) End each day with an apt question, e.g. "What bad habit have I relinquished today?" (4) Invoke a maxim, e.g. "Nothing is so difficult that it cannot be overcome by human intelligence;" (5) Ward against the rise of anger in your breast; (6) Choose friends who are placid and the mood will prevail; (6) Remember that nature is unpredictable and because anything can happen, have no fear; and (7) Strive for deeper understanding and redescribe emotional experience. It is an induced practical indifference culminating in deep character change that Stoic therapy envisions.

In this regard, Sherman (1997) recommends Buddhism, as therapy, because like Stoicism, it views wisdom as a state of calm removed from desire. Its meditative practice engages the student in an attitude of detachment in order to still the mind and to distance

the self from goods of no inherent worth (pp. 114-115). In *Meditation and the Brain: Attention, Control and Emotion*, Mograbi (2011) suggests “one-pointed concentration,” involving concentration on one’s breath without hindrance from extraneous factors, feelings, and one’s own inner voice. It constitutes a healthful practice contributing to self-control, attentiveness, and improved lifestyle (Mograbi, 2011, p. 281). This is one strategy to counter shortcomings equated with imperfect reasoning abilities that wax and wane in the course of a lifetime (Sherman, 1997, p. 115). The subject of meditation as a practical matter will be raised again in the next chapter.

In an Aristotelian vein, cultivating emotions through music and tragedy has as its goal the development of strength and sensitivity in situations calling for generosity, kindness, fear, or pity. It involves habituation over time, in accordance with what is reasonable, developmentally appropriate, and can culminate in good judgment. Musical modes were understood to be expressive of character and evocative of corresponding emotion (e.g. the Dorian mode signified restraint, the Phrygian enthusiasm, and the Mixolydian seriousness). Aristotle writes:

Rhythm and melody supply imitations of anger and gentleness, and also of courage and temperance, and of all the qualities contrary to these, and of the other qualities of character, . . . as we know from our own experience, for in listening to such strains our souls undergo a change . . . Even in mere melodies there is an imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently affected by each . . . The same applies to rhythms. (Aristotle, *Pol.* 1340a19ff., as cited in Sherman, 1997, pp. 89-90)

As instructional material in the education of emotions, the music one finds pleasure in listening is invested with personal identity because it reflects and communicates to herself something about who she is and the values she cherishes (Sloboda, 2010, p. 510). Furthermore, it is now being confirmed in neurocognitive studies that emotional stimulation from music yields growth in cognitive capacities (Sacks and Lockwood, 2009). The narrative structure of music (Kapilow, 2008, p. 10; Sherman, 1997, p. 91) involves emotional engagement with themes and objects representing cognitive gains (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Herewith is an illustration of what I have just stated:

Take the opening of *The Art of the Fugue*—Johann Sebastian Bach's . . . Though this theme does have some narrative drive . . . Its meaning lies not in what it is, but in what it will become. . . . Beginnings like these, in which the meaning of an opening becomes clear only over time, often over the entire piece, take extraordinary compositional courage and a deep belief in an audience's intelligence. They ask the listener to do something that is almost inconceivable in today's fast-paced, hyperkinetic world: they ask the listener to wait. . . . how central it is to so much of classical music. . . . [to] assume that the meaning of an idea is almost never immediately apparent. Only after a theme has been developed . . . can we begin to grasp its sense. . . . [A]sk the listener to wait for their full meanings to be understood [in] the ongoing narrative of the piece. (Kapilow, 2008, p. 19)

Heraclitus said, “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.” Who we are is not who we were, nor who we will become. And so it is with a musical idea. . . . Meaning must be pieced together [from moment to] moment. (Kapilow, 2008, p. 65)

Aristotle’s interest in tragedy lies in the appropriate evocation of fear and pity and what it signifies for moral development (Aristotle, 1965, p. 48; Penwell, 2010, p. 10). Tragedy has the ability to expand our emotional resources for confronting chaos as it imposes order to situations where emotional conflict is paramount (Penwell, 2009, p. 25). In so doing, we are led to engender a fitting response, rehearsing in imagination how we might bring our intelligence to bear on a convergence of highly emotional events. It is the doing and undergoing within the narrative plot that calls our attention and serves to heighten a requirement to be brave and merciful. Such is the call of the epic, *The Odyssey*, which is drenched in longing, the joys of home and family life, and reunion. Like muscles that are strengthened with regular exercise, emotions that are purposefully stimulated by such art forms, are strengthened and habituated, their purposes internalized (Penwell, 2009, p. 13). Because many of our feelings and emotions are habits internalized precognitively (Penwell, 2009, p. 14), art that encourages problematizing as social criticism can lead to meaningful self-understanding and reconstruction. For instance, in *Romeo and Juliet* conflicts are brought on by the absence of a sense of proportion, poor judgment, and ill luck, and bring to our attention legitimate concerns such as emotional dishonesty (Moisan, 2000, p. 47; Zamir, 2007, pp. 116-117), gender roles and relations (Moisan, 2000, p. 47; Radel, 2000, p. 92) and the commodification of the body (Deats,

2000, p. 114). “The arts by generating pleasure in connection with acts of subversion and cultural reflection, produce an enduring and even attractive dialogue with the prejudices of the past,” writes Nussbaum (2010, p. 110), supporting moral education through the cultivation of emotion and imagination (p. 105). She is also intent on drawing attention to the following aspects of moral education, some of which I address in Chapter Five, describing Philosophy for Children pedagogy nurturing students as “active questioning beings whose capacity to probe and inspire [is] respected and further developed . . . in actively pondering the big questions of life . . . [paying] attention to logical structure . . . [and] countering ill-informed prejudices and stereotypes” (pp. 73-74).

- Develop students’ capacity to see the world from the viewpoint of other people, particularly those whom their society tends to portray as lesser, as “mere objects”
- Teach attitudes toward human weakness and helplessness that suggest that weakness is not shameful and the need for others not unmanly; teach children not to be ashamed of need and incompleteness but to see these as occasions for cooperation and reciprocity
- Develop the capacity for genuine concern for others, both near and distant
- Undermine the tendency to shrink from minorities of various kinds in disgust, thinking of them as “lower” and “contaminating”
- Teach real and true things about other groups (racial, religious, and sexual minorities; people with disabilities), so as to counter stereotypes and the disgust that often goes with them
- Promote accountability by treating each child as a responsible agent

- Vigorously promote critical thinking, the skill and courage it requires to raise a dissenting voice. (Nussbaum, 2010, pp. 45-46)

The aforementioned proposed modes of conduct take into account that as social beings, morally problematic situations arise as a result of associated living. When difference leads to conflict, inclusive processes are disrupted and parties must work out a solution that all can agreeably partake of (Gouinlock, 1978, p. 225). Dewey himself stated:

To cooperate by giving differences a chance to show themselves because of the belief that the expression of difference is not only a right of the other persons but is a means of enriching one's own life-experience, is inherent in the democratic personal way of life. (Dewey, 1939/1988, p. 228)

With its emphasis on awareness of the body, the story of emotion as judgment is incomplete without the account of emotion from Spinoza's *Ethics*. It is that all emotion is grounded in bodily imaginings, and good and evil constructed from joy and sorrow—from the satisfaction of, or frustration from longing. Emotions and imagination interact so that if, for instance, we imagine someone like us emotionally affected in certain ways, we are likewise emotionally influenced. To Spinoza, this translates as a concern for others because we wish for ourselves joy rather than sadness and the absence of pain and suffering, and we do the same for others, foremost among them, our loved ones (Lloyd, 1996, p. 76). Emotions contribute to understanding and because the body exists in interconnectedness to other bodies, it is in our conative-affective engagement with other bodies that we find our affects supporting reason, leading to judgment, and exercising a role in collaborative morality. When we suspend judgment, Spinoza explains that we do

“not perceive the thing adequately,” (Spinoza, *Ethics*, IIP49SIIB(ii), as cited in Lloyd, 1996, p. 69) i.e. “our position [is] a part of Nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself, without the others” (Spinoza, *Ethics*, IIP3S, as cited in Lloyd, 1996, p. 73). Being in the midst of other bodies striving to persist in being, their corporeal traces (bodily modifications including imaginings and emotions) contribute to our having adequate ideas and our ability to act.

Prop. X *So long as we are not assailed by emotions contrary to our nature, we have the power of arranging and associating the modifications of our body according to the intellectual order.* (Spinoza, 1955, p. 252)

An emotion is only bad or hurtful in so far as it hinders the mind from being able to think. (Spinoza, 1955, p. 250)

According to Lloyd (1996), like the Stoics, Spinoza acknowledges the rational emotions. However, in his account, as irrational judgments they can be transformed through understanding, into *active embodied reasonableness* [emphasis added]. Unlike the Stoics, for whom they must be relinquished in order to obtain reason, for Spinoza, the passions “are themselves the subject matter for the transformative power of understanding” (Lloyd, 1996, p. 73). *Conatus*, our human strivings to persist in being are, for Spinoza, the very essence of humanity (Lloyd, 1996, p. 74). Therefore, our ideas of the good are constructed from what we have determined promote our strivings to exist in nature. Dewey’s naturalistic treatment of the emotions resonates with the preceding discussion of Spinoza.

Emotions arise in our sentient bodies concomitant with our continual striving to exist in unstable environments. “We *feel* the world with and through our bodies,” (Grange, 2004, p. 31). In Dewey’s theory of emotions, there is an organic unity of thought and emotion in the coordination of behavior, that only has meaning when we reflect on action (Stengel, 2010, p. 530), making reference to the reflex arc, a virtual sensorimotor circuit (Creighton, 1896, p. 649) which shares its contour with emotions. Dewey’s argument is in the conjoint essay *The Theory of Emotion: I. Emotional Attitudes* (1894) and II. *The Significance of Emotions* (1895), his reconstruction of Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1886) and the stimulus-response model in the James-Lange theory of emotion (1922/1967). It precedes *The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology* (1896), widely reputed as “the single most important paper for understanding his entire system of thought” (Garrison, 2003, p. 405). A transaction between the live creature and the environment always results in a mediation of cognition, emotion, and action on the side of the creature, many qualities of which are underdetermined, i.e. “they can be ‘sensed,’ ‘felt,’ or ‘had’ but not always thought or expressed definitively in words” (Gregory, 2006, p. 107). The cognitive and emotive merge with the sensorimotor in the live creature’s transactions, as in a functional coordination. Discussing the various dimensions of experience, Dewey gave emotion a special role in consummatory experience, that which warrants being named *an* experience. In the case of humans like us, “it takes possession of us altogether, and passes over into the aesthetic” (Dewey, 1894, p. 558). Therefore, consummation or fulfillment is

preceded by anticipation, preparation or premonition, a condition fraught with tension in light of indeterminate consequences.

But does anyone suppose that, *apart from our interpretation of values*, there is one process in itself intellectual, and another process itself emotional? I cannot even frame an idea of what is meant. (Dewey, 1895, p. 21)

The reality, the coordination of these partial activities, is that whole activity which may be described equally well as ‘that terrible bear,’ or ‘Oh, how frightened I am.’ It is precisely and identically the same actual concrete experience . . . (Dewey 1895, p. 20-21)

In fact, rather than merely reactive or passive, Dewey stipulated a functionalist model of observable behavior where the live organism selected and conditioned its own stimuli in interactive relationship with the environment (Hickman, 2004, p. 157).

Sensory stimulus, central connections and motor responses shall be viewed, not as separate and complete entities in themselves, but as divisions of labor, functioning factors, within the single concrete whole, now designated the reflex arc. (Dewey, 1896, p. 358)

Emotions are among the functional adaptations accompanying human attempts to render nature, including its constraints and its facilities, more stable and dependable (Hickman, 2004, p. 161). In the course of evolution, humans accumulated a growing repertory of adaptations to address ecology and demographics. In turn, even as human manipulative power increased, it rendered the human environment ever more precarious, variable, and complex (J. Carroll, 2006, p. 39). In his attention to emotion, Dewey the moral

philosopher was pursuing a lifelong commitment to assist human beings in enriching lived experience.

In Dewey's educational thought, emotion has a significant place. In *Democracy and Education* (1916), Dewey's elaboration on the process of education is one involving the interplay of affect and emotion (Stengel, 2010, p. 531). In *How We Think* (1910a/1997a), he describes the cognitive function of reflective thought stimulated by affect. Citing "a felt difficulty" (p. 72), he echoes the proprioceptive⁵² aspect of emotion essentialized by James, an idea for which he has been recognized as progenitor.⁵³ The reflex arc concept furnishes us with Dewey's account of learning behavior, to which the supplement is the theory of emotions and its analysis of the role of emotion and expression in experience (Alexander, 1987, p. 137). In *The Theory of Emotion ii. The Significance of Emotion* (1894), Dewey identifies emotion as a disposition (p.16) with intellectual content and value distinctions indicative of "aesthetic appreciation," its implications primarily ethical

⁵² Counterintuitive as it may seem, in this view the physical expression of the emotion is the emotion itself (Richardson, 2006, p. 42). Even so, naming the emotion might not be a simple matter (Sherman, 1997, p. 54).

⁵³ Having trained as a painter and physician, James takes inspiration from Bell's (1806) *Essays on the Anatomy of Expression in Painting*, meant to explain the process painters undertake to portray body language. Bell throws light on how emotion manifests as bodily changes: eyes widen when horrified, nostrils flare, mouth opens, fingers spread, head is thrown back, and back straightens (Richardson, 2006, p. 243).

(p. 17). As a synthetic process, emotion includes non-sequential features of cognition and disposition, conveying the sense of emotion as it takes hold of a person as “emotional seizure.” It is accompanied by an emotional surge, a felt process signifying the realization of ideas (p. 15) and a readiness to act in a particular manner (p. 17). Finally, as feeling, emotion has purpose, i.e. to represent a subjective evaluation or judgment. In so doing, Dewey’s theory is one that is balanced, clearly affirmative of the essential cognitive dimension in emotion and fully integrative of both cognitive and physiological phases in the larger behavioral unit (Shusterman, 2008, p.182). Emotions have a cognitive function which is the point of what follows.

The ascription of reasonableness to emotions presumes the cognitive function of emotion (De Sousa, 1980, p. 149). Damasio (1994) reports that in patients simultaneously experiencing cognitive deficits and emotional impairment, cognition and emotion appear to be interrelated (pp. 44-51, 69-70, 175, and 200-201, as cited in Furtak, 2010, p. 53). Understanding emotion as cognitive also highlights the embodied nature of emotions as thoughtful modes of intentional experience. Having the immediate felt quality of sense perception and somatic excitation, emotions reveal how the world appears to a particular subject. Nussbaum (2001) espouses a cognitivist view where emotions are judgments of value containing eudaimonistic import and being quick, inarticulable, and hard to control (p. 77). In situations where our welfare, interests, or projects are thwarted, the metaphor “upheavals of thought” captures the cognitive function of emotions, inducing reflective thought and corresponding action (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 4). In summary, the cognitive and the bodily are bound together as two aspects of a single, unified experience,

foregrounding Dewey's concept of the reflex arc, the full circuit of perception and action (Buermeier, 1975, p. 16).

From the standpoint of ethical valuation, the cognitive function of emotions allows for changes in the way we cope with the world. In the continuous ebb and flow of problematic experiences, cognitive and emotive sensitivity to the intricacies of ethical quandaries and potential outcomes is as necessary to sound ethical judgment as sensitivity to the material details of a situation is necessary to prudent practical judgment – and equally hypothetical and fallible. To Peirce (1900), this sensitivity inherent in emotions makes us vulnerable to the minds of others, willing to embrace the strange and new, and welcoming it with the warmest of emotions, love. Peirce writes:

Reasonableness consists in association, assimilation, generalization, the bringing of items together into an organic whole—which are so many ways of regarding what is essentially the same thing. In the emotional sphere this tendency towards union appears as Love; so that the Law of Love, and the Law of Reason are quite at one (p. 621; as cited in Nubiola, 2009, p. 132).

Unlike our sensory perception of a situation, which, through the formation of schemata indicates the material and cause-effect dimensions, our emotional response indicates its meaning, especially in terms of potential benefit and harm. Part of this meaning – that which pertains to benefits such as compassion and fairness, and harms such as cruelty and addiction – is moral. As appraisals of salience or value regarding various aspects of the world, Dewey draws an analogy for the role of emotions in the creative act of artistic composition and synthesis: “Emotion is the moving and cementing force. It selects what

is congruous and dyes what is selected with its color, thereby giving qualitative unity to materials externally disparate and dissimilar (1934, p. 42). In the following section, I argue that educating emotions is an aesthetic undertaking both akin to, and a necessary component of ethical inquiry.

Educating Emotion

Emotions play a key function in the intelligent awareness of current, ongoing, events and surrounding conditions. Our emotions indicate sensitivity, especially in problematic, i.e. potentially beneficial or harmful situations. They keep us alert and attuned. Emotions are part of a repertoire of affective appraisals, value judgments (including moral judgments), materializing in embodied acts, which are purposeful, intentional, and directed towards an object (Goldie, 2000; Nussbaum, 2001; Robinson, 2005, p. 74; Sherman, 1997; Solomon, 1993, 2001, and 2008).

As an aspect of moral imagination (see Chapter Two), image schemata have a crucial part in our experience of emotions, affecting our immediate reactions to things in our path. This understanding of emotion fits Palencik's (2008) treatment of schemata as hypotheses for the way the world operates. Let us say your image schema for being at the beach includes an uncrowded stretch of beach, dazzlingly bright sun, miles of white sand, crystalline blue waters, a cool breeze, chilled drinks, and friends. Everything is right, both in terms of what your previous schema had led you to anticipate, and experienced as valuable, in part by positive emotional responses. Then, the ground underneath you trembles, and you cannot manage to stay upright. (*This is a schema mismatch: an event invested with ambiguity; a search for meaning; an instance of problem-solving.*) You

have not once in your life experienced an earthquake, which is what everyone else is saying is happening, but the conceptual meaning of that term is now imbued with dramatic somatic feeling and emotional response. When the ground is once again stable, you are relieved. There is froth as the ocean pulls back, far, far away from the shoreline, making for absolute calm. Once again, reclining on the sand, you look at the sky above, concerned about the recent upheaval from the ground up. (*Revise schema.*) Then, barely a moment later, the tide rushes back in. “Tsunami!” There is absolutely nothing in the world that has prepared you for this event! (*Your evaluation of relative peace fails to match expectations, i.e. another schema mismatch.*) You run as fast as your legs can carry you, in fear, and with scant hope for escape. In those precise moments, there are no words to describe the terror you feel, as you flee toward uncertain safety. (*How to escape imminent death is a moral problem.*) The meaning of the terms ‘earthquake’ and ‘tsunami,’ are now inseparable from this horrifying experience.

The jump of fright becomes emotional fear when there is found or thought to exist a threatening object that must be dealt with or escaped from. (Dewey, 1934, p. 42)

Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it.

(Dewey, 1934, p. 42)

The outcome of this coordination of activities constitutes, for the first time, the object with such and such an import—terrible, delightful, etc.—or constitutes an emotion referring to such and such an object. For...the frightful object and the emotion of fear are two names for the same experience. (Dewey, EW, p. 176, quoted in Garrison, 2003, p. 420)

As has been amply illustrated above, there is much automaticity in human emotional response. We execute emotional judgment effortlessly, most of the time instantaneously and in the absence of appreciable thought. Emotions such as fear and anxiety, and their underlying embodied processes, are not always available for us to consciously monitor. Nevertheless, the storing of non-conscious emotional memory about a threatening situation is critical for survival (Glannon, 2002, p. 266). Organisms of sufficient complexity, amongst them human beings, evidently receive through emotion very powerful feedback regarding events in the environment. They color our understanding of what is going on around us, our interpretation of the motives of people with whom we interact, and responses we deem to be appropriate. To us humans, emotion reveals what is important when words fail, and therefore have a communicative function (Nussbaum 2001; Sherman, 1997). Recent research indicates that emotions course through us in a continuum and are ever present, even if largely imperceptible, and even those that crystallize as defining moments are relatively infrequent and far between (Dattilio, 2010, p. 225). Like nature, our emotional life is always in flux, recalibrating assessments, forming adaptations and altering bodily conditions. As felt intelligence, emotions are self-referential and by directing our thinking and action, can play a judgmental role in maintaining well-being. Regarding felt intelligence, Dewey argued that our judgments, however well reasoned, must be colored with personal feeling for them to be practicable. As we envision things to come, a “sense of peace, of fulfillment,⁵⁴” would suggest

⁵⁴ “Shall we then say that the feeling of rationality is constituted merely by the absence

equilibrium (Dewey, 1908, pp. 323-4; 1932, pp. 302-303). In this way, emotions are vital to human learning and development (Levykh, 2008).

Because each emotion is experienced not only in the brain, but also throughout the organism, the interconnectedness of cognition and emotion blurs the two suggesting that memory processes could be emotion-driven (Cohen, 2005, Drevets & Raichle, 1998, and Pessoa, 2008, as cited in Dattilio, 2010, p. 226). At the deepest and most fundamental level of cognition, schemata are now generally regarded as memory structures comprising our underlying assumptions (Dattilio, 2010, p. 222). The patterns constructed from, and imposed back on experience by image schemata, are instantaneously imbued with emotional responses, psychosomatic judgments about the quality and value of the experience, thereby manifesting kinaesthetically through our bodies the judgmental nature of emotions. Evidence from classrooms worldwide highlights students' symbolic gestures as embodying schemata indicative of concept formation (Roth & Lawless, 2002, p. 337). When they are established as maladaptive early in childhood, they can be resistive to change. This supports a previous statement in Chapter Two relating to awareness of the subtle functions of embodied cognition and its role in the judgments we unthinkingly make. When they are deeply entrenched, effecting change requires relentless effort in order to achieve sustained self-transformation and continued unlearning.

of any feeling of irrationality?" (James, 1905, p. 317).

As functional adaptations, emotions may be described as “associated habits” of two kinds: the first kind is our evolutionary genetic inheritance comprising bodily modifications (i.e. instinctive or hardwired) and the second kind we have learned socially, i.e. habitual and recently evolved, including those reconstructed (Garrison, 2003, p. 413; Filipic, 2001, p. 1). Dewey regarded all habits as affections, which would incline us to certain dispositions, biases, behaviors, and other judgments. “All habit-forming involves the beginning of an intellectual specialization which if unchecked ends in thoughtless action. Significantly enough this full blown result is called absentmindedness” (Dewey, 1922, p. 173). That suggests two parallel fields of intelligence: one relatively unconscious, including autonomic patterns of psycho-emotive-motor response, and one of intervening critical reflection. A principle danger of the former field of unreflective, intelligent response is that it may become habitual, i.e. developing inertia and momentum irrespective of changing circumstances. Given the contingency of our interactions with the natural, social, and technological environment, inertia of habitual response may render us flatfooted, unprepared to do what is required. Unsurprisingly, “the blush becomes the emotion of shame when a person connects, in thought, an action he has performed with an unfavorable reaction to himself or some other person” (Dewey, 1934, p. 42). It is patterns of habitual response that call for reconstruction through critical inquiry. In *Human Nature and Conduct*, Dewey singled out fear, focusing on its influence in social relations. He analyzed fear as marked by “contractions, withdrawals, evasions, [and] concealments,” and later the “organic shrinkage, gestures of hesitation and retreat in the context of actions toward particular

persons or things” (Stengel, 2010, p. 533). A reappraisal is required in this instance for reconstructed habits to come about, and for new understandings of problematic situations to emerge. What is it to be completely convinced that there is no reason to be afraid? If I am afraid, then I must find the world threatening in some respect. Without fear there would be no need for bravery (Wise, 2009, p. 201) rendering adequate a theory of emotion that assigns a cognitive role and intentional content for emotions (Furtak, 2010, p. 56). On closer examination, emotions fulfill that role.

Evolutionary psychologists Tooby & Cosmides (2001) have determined what emotions do: 1. Rank our goals and motives 2. Attend our procedures of inference and verification. 3. Bring about construals of the world, 4. Heighten or hinder perception, 5. Stimulate memory and imagination, 6. Assign attention, 7. Manifest physiologically (e.g. shortness of breath) or make themselves felt (e.g. exhilaration), 8. Become expressions conveying meaning to others (e.g. giggles), and 9. Regulate learning. Tooby and Cosmides (2006) also provide for a class of recalibrational emotions, comprising guilt, shame, disgust, envy, and anger (p. 109), including stress or emotional strain. The recalibrational emotions are those susceptible to reconstruction, as they are as yet not recalcitrant (Dattilio, 2010). The “cool” system modulates phobic, anxious, fearful, and other primitive-dysfunctional “hot” system emotions and its development continues throughout middle and late childhood (Metcalf and Jacobs, 2009, p. 101). Emotions have heat and urgency because they concern the most important transactions we have in nature (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 77). The hot cognition-cool cognition framework provides lenses through which the interaction of emotion and cognition can be better understood.

Two central constructs clarify the hot system: passions and fears; it is impulsive, rigid, simple, and fast. If unconstrained the hot system can give rise to an inability to delay gratification and to have an explosive temper. The contrasting cool system is cognitive, reflective, integrative, flexible, strategic, and offers a constraint to the hot system. In learning, the cool system influences metacognition, semantic processing, comprehension, problem-solving, and higher-level thinking. Excessive stress can disrupt either system. Maintaining balance between hot and cool systems is a function of a number of factors including, but not limited to, developmental level, stress-regulation, self-care, and learning. Both systems are necessary in enhancing a person's vitality, well-being, and engagement with life. Students can learn to be aware of the emotions and their functions, including the hot cognition-cool cognition framework with a view to the education of emotion (see, Metcalfe and Jacobs, 2009, pp. 101, 207-208).

Learning to become aware of our emotions is a refined skill that begins in childhood and persists throughout our lives. We initially learn to pay attention to the flow of our emotions in the form of attention paid to us by adults, until we come into knowing our own minds. Without this, life becomes devoid of the meaning shaped by appraisals, a continuous processing of experience as worthless or worthwhile. It is important to become receptive to the textured sense of significance that is monitored in our inner world by the feeling of meaning that only occurs when we are able to observe, objectify, and articulate the bases of our judgments (Siegel, 2010, pp. 129-130). "Words themselves are abstract representations that emerge like islands from a sea of associated meanings" (Siegel, 2010, p. 130). For example, the meaning of "mother" brings up the elements of

meaning in a wash of feelings cascading as associations, beliefs, concepts, developmental issues, and emotions, flooding mind and intruding into personal relationships. Schema as the “architecture of our feelings” (Siegel, 2010, p. 131) reveals a perfect alignment of beliefs and feelings. By exposing beliefs to the light of day, one begins the first of many steps in deconstructing a prejudicial emotion-cognition framework, thereby decreasing the belief’s potency (Wise, 2009, p. 181). Consider the case of latent homophobia, in which unexamined beliefs are perfectly aligned with feelings. Within our understanding of schema as underlying assumption and our emotion-cognition framework, it will come as no surprise that a person’s unacknowledged homophobic beliefs, when verbalized, expose claims that the same person may well reject upon examination.

Educating our emotions rests on an embodied understanding, including being able to read one’s own body for instance when it gets a rise, identifying the belief or assumption which brings it on, its attendant communicative import and potential to influence others. We need to be able to learn how to experience emotions, both ours, as well as others’ in appropriate ways. Retrospection, the examination of one’s own bodily feelings, allows us to objectify and report on specific mental events immediately just passed yet fresh in memory, helping us understand those motives of which we are clearly unconscious (Shusterman, 2008, p. 59). One important outcome of this exercise is the embodied cognition of common space and inclusiveness, an aspect of the human organism’s environment, the society of other humans. James (1912/1976) described the conative-affective function accordingly:

When I see your body, I focus on a place and object that is also the focus of your experience, even though *your* experience of your body is from a different perspective. In the same way, bodies provide a common place for the meeting of minds, whose intentions, beliefs, desires, feelings are expressed in bodily demeanor and behavior. (RE, 38, 41, as cited in Shusterman, 2008, p. 145)

Unreliable as retrospection might be, it is precious in the context of embodied cognition and social inclusion. Attention being a bodily disposition, it can be strengthened as muscularity of thought, projecting outward because greater somatic self-consciousness helps us monitor those bodily movements which are unnecessary, inelegant, or otherwise maladaptive. Insofar as clothing is concerned James ranks it highly, thereby implying that the sartorial aesthetic may be more important than body image. A person has as many social selves as there are people who know her and carry her image in imagination (e.g., the athletic spouse, the modish parent, the savvy banker, the green thumb, &c.) making the ability to project varying body images significant in supporting versatile social life (Shusterman, 2008, p. 146). Improved bodily awareness is a tool in recognizing emotions and in facilitating deliberation because it highlights some options and eliminates those that hinder embodied reasonableness. The following are some practical suggestions:

1. Note that compared to the sharp throb of a toothache or a pin prick which are substantive and can be named, there are the subtly perceived sensations like a slight tilt of my head, a faint air of expectancy, a relaxed hip, adjustment in facial muscle tone.

2. Note that focusing is difficult to do in the context of “the beating of heart and arteries, breathing, and pervasive body pains,” and it may be impossible to single out “the contraction of the diaphragm, expansion of the lungs, shortening of certain muscles, and rotation of certain joints.”
 - a. Develop attention, discrimination, and perception by applying the key principles of change and interest. Change is best explained in the paradoxical instruction that in order to remain transfixed on an object of thought, change a factor, e.g. vantage point. Interest is applied by selecting an object of focus that can sustain one’s attention. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 160)
 - b. *Sustained attention*. Ask a variety of “new questions about the object”; “roll it over and over incessantly and consider different aspects and relations of it in turn.” Take breathing⁵⁵ as an example.
 - i. Is the breath deep or shallow, quick or slow?
 - ii. Is the breath felt more in the chest or diaphragm?

⁵⁵ Breathing is a process linking the automatic and reflective parts of the brain and resulting in stress reduction. Inhaling activates the sympathetic nervous system and exhaling the parasympathetic, the latter accompanied by a decelerated heart rate inversely proportionate to parasympathetic activity. Rule of thumb: Increasing parasympathetic activity lowers one’s overall level of stress (Wise, 2009, p. 178).

iii. What does it feel like from the mouth or through the nostrils?

iv. Is breathing easier from the mouth or through the nostrils?

Extend time period on subsequent occasion. Make finer discriminations each time. (Shusterman, 2008, pp. 161-2)

- c. *Body scan*. Systematically scan the body by subdividing it in awareness, directing the focused attention to one part first before shifting attention to another. Proprioceptively get a sense of ourselves as we stay still, typically with eyes shut or partially shut, breathing⁵⁶. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 162)
- d. *Preperception* Prepare to discriminate a feeling by imagining where on one's body the perception of it is situated. Even if the feeling may be nameless, the perception of it can stand improvement. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 164)
- e. *Linguistic tag*. This stands for making a very vague feeling less difficult to distinguish by selecting a word with which to link it. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 164)

The sensitive engagement described in the examples above highlights the

⁵⁶ Interoception is meant “to open one's self up to emotion,” tapping into one's somatic sense to render the self vulnerable by turning the scan inward onto the perception of internal body organs and internal bodily state. One gets better at this with practice (Siegel, 2010, p. 112).

transactive aspect of the body and the contribution of sensorimotor schemata to concept formation, embodied cognition, and proprioception. Beautiful thinking potentially comes about by educating our attentiveness to the nature of an embodied experience (Stokas, 2010, p. 36). In the context of teaching and learning, Macintyre Latta and Buck (2008) describe a mindful embodiment and a receptivity oriented towards interpersonal and intrapersonal transactions involving teacher, student, and inquiry, to bring about becoming more receptive, and thereby gaining awareness and access to the student's thinking (i.e. inner attention). "A teacher seeks ways to draw students into the depth and complexity of subject matter. . . [is sensitive to] the movement of thinking, the interplay of students' thoughts, images, emotions, and focuses on recognizing pre-determined results and ways of responding" (Dewey, 1904, as cited in Macintyre Latta & Buck, 2008, p. 325). Further putting this in context, Satina and Hultgren (2001) propose that embodiment become the central concern in inquiry. Knowledge of one's body must be foregrounded for the self to be a successful learner.

One of the areas of ethical inquiry in which such embodied pedagogy is particularly important is inquiry into gender. A pedagogy of embodiment means, among other things, learning to accept one's own body; yet, defying gendered assumptions that are iconic can be a formidable challenge for the teacher when they are usually deeply embedded in the culture. Like art and music, gender can be ambiguous because it is not a stable identity but rather "a stylized representation of acts" (Butler, 1990a, p. 140, as cited in Sullivan, 2000, p. 31) How can we reinvent our gendered habits for new ones? Promoting positive, holistic, and meaningful experiences of bodily development includes

having students lift the veil from lived experience. This requires students to have opportunities for critical reflection about the culturally embedded ways gender proscribes certain projects. One method of doing is “autobiographical writing,” in which the body of the young person, “who says ‘I’ [is] a site and source of written subjectivity, investing that individual body with the shifting ethics of a political, racial, and sexual consciousness” (Perrault, 1995, p. 2, as cited in Satina and Hultgren, 2001, p.532). As supplement to autobiographical writing, Fleckenstein (2003) specifies the body biography, an approach to somatic literacy comprising life-sized outlines of the human figure populated with images and words representing students’ perceptions of, in this case, autobiography (Fleckenstien, 2003, p. 113; Smagorinsky, 2008, p. 196). It is an immersive strategy to access personal experience. Originally conceived as a multimedia application of Rosenblatt’s transactive approach, it utilizes polyscopic⁵⁷ literacy and spatial geographies⁵⁸ in conjunction with lateral literacy, the latter comprising splintered narratives that disrupt notions of linear autobiography and gendered identity to bring

⁵⁷ From polyscope, an image multiplying device made of glass. Polyscopic literacy exposes the limits of our perceptions and offers multiple alternatives by accessing worldviews that are not universally shared (Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 84)

⁵⁸ Spatial geography pertains to the mapping out of surveillance, hierarchy, gender, and other variables impinging on differentiation and marginalization within the confines of a given locale (Gordon & Lahelma, 1996).

about transformation (Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 113). Students problematize aspects of differentiation and marginalization, carry out their inquiry on outsize sheets of paper, and subsequently put them up in the manner of an art gallery to display, critique, and discuss (see novella).

Using the Arts to Educate and to Utilize the Emotions in Ethical Inquiry

As beings that must thrive in the social environment where emotions are constructed, critical inquiry is our way to address its inherent instability. Inquiry as a recursive process mimics the experiential flow. It tests our cognitive and emotive abilities in being perceptive and sensitive to the uniqueness of situations and their ramifications. Just as thinking may be directed upon itself in critical and reconstructive metacognitive reflection, so too, in a process of inquiry, many autonomic and habitual emotional responses become the object of cognitive appraisal and reconstruction. Indeed, emotions of frustration or yearning are often the first indications that other, non-adaptive habits of emotional response have become inhibited by an incompatible situation, such that the regular rhythm of emotion is disturbed. To speak of “educating the emotions,” is to draw attention to the human capacity for emotional appraisal of the meaning of situations, and to exercise that capacity in ways that make it more sensitive, more nuanced, less biased, less given to schematic inertia, and a guide to more intelligent behavior – intelligent, meaning conducive of that which has been critically evaluated as valuable.

Because it is from the ability of humans to reach exceptional emotional heights and depths that literature, music, and the arts are created (Zeki, 2009, p.2) one of the most effective pedagogical strategies for educating the emotions is encountering art. Painting

and sculpture, music, and film provide us with an important means to understand our lived experience, by holding up a mirror to ourselves, engaging emotion, and refining the judgments we make, “by critically representing [our] image or action” (Shusterman, 2000, p. 163). Our emotional response to art enlivens our moral imagination by exercising reason, sympathy, and solidarity in virtual relationships with those who are at the periphery of our lives. “Works of art are means by which we enter, through imagination and the emotions they evoke, into other forms of relationship and participation than our own” (Dewey, 1934, p. 333). Espoused by Greene (see Chapter Two), painting, literature, and music have an innate ambiguity making them ideal for inquiry because the work of art is a world of its own making and initial encounters can be ineffable, making one feel some discomfort. Moments profoundly felt, cherished, and understood to be formative in a person’s experience of growth are those that are often kept private and have the nature of what we term aesthetic (De Bolla, 2001, p. 14). Dewey pointed out that the intimate nature of emotion is manifested when we attend to the unfolding of a plot (1934, p. 42). We experience it privately, yet it bears a binding force between my community and me (De Bolla, 2001, p. 15). The emotional responses are typically muted compared with the real thing, but at every level—physiological, neurological, psychological—the emotions are real, not pretend (Bloom, 2010). The safety garnered from our powers of control over art promotes reflection on the experiences themselves, providing cognitive pleasures from learning about our own emotional capacities. Furthermore, our ability to endure certain emotional extremes leads to an empowering self-knowledge regarding those capacities. For many of us, our richest

aesthetic experiences come from encounters with painful art since one is seldom as fully engaged intellectually, perceptually, and affectively as when experiencing unsettling emotional responses to art. Few, if any, pleasurable experiences match the intensity of our reactions to perturbing art. Hence, paradoxical sounding as it may be, it is not hard to see suffering as its own reward. Having said that, the reasons we feed imagination with painful experiences are complex, but that we would rather have them in response to art rather than real life makes sense (Smuts, 2005, p.72). Art makes our emotions available and intelligible to us and in the process, puts moral imagination and reason to work, directing our feelings accordingly. The profound significance of art as moral enterprise is especially cogent when it acquaints and familiarizes us with the Other, the socially marginalized, and invisible. It should in turn move us to act towards them with love and compassion when we encounter persons like them in the flesh. The ambiguity of meaning in works of art and the human ability to self-fictionalize recommend the use of art in ethical inquiry. Fictionalizing ourselves when we enter an imagined world, we experience emotions for others in the fictional world. We allow our emotions to mediate a change within us. In an empirical study, Djikic, Oatley, Zoeterman, & Petersen (2009) collected evidence that simulation, identification, and self-implication with narrative fiction influences cognitive and emotional re-schematization on a variety of social ability measures, including those relating to one's self. They conclude "it seems reasonable to assume that this process can casually lead to a gradual change of oneself toward a better understanding of others as well" (p. 28).

Inquiry can accommodate a level of experimentation because it deals with evolving parts of experience, such as habits, interests, and desires where ends can be defined provisionally. Because we live forward in time, we must address changing circumstances if we are to act intelligently, exercising foresight and experimental problem solving in order to continue to flourish as human beings (Hickman, 1999, p. 235). For example, the Victorian novelist George Eliot justified her experimental approach to life and her faith in humanity by affirming that her accomplishments and aspirations were grounded in experience and the nature of humans as relational beings, a requirement of which is to put aside self-centeredness; to free ourselves of religion, and to regulate the emotions and imagination by thought and fellow feeling (Gatens, 2009, p. 81).

Dewey's view of the arts as instruments of good derives from his belief in their moral potency "resid[ing] in its imaginative vision of new possibilities *transcending existing customs and moral traditions* [emphasis added]" (Dewey, LW 10:349-51, as cited in Rockefeller, 1991, p. 415). However, art like philosophy requires the assistance of philosophical explanation to be understood (see Chapter Three). About art's impenetrability, Danto (2003) has written the following:

People have to be brought to understand the work, and then they will see the way in which it is excellent. . . . For it makes clear that artistic goodness often requires explanation if it is to be appreciated, something that Hume understood completely. "In many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts," Hume writes in Section One of his *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, "it is

requisite to employ *reasoning in order to feel the proper sentiment*; and a false relish may frequently be corrected *by argument and reflection*” [emphasis added]. (p. 35).

Danto also repudiates any facile connection between goodness and beauty in a work of art precisely because there is a category of artistic representations that, in its avowed repulsiveness and egregiousness, makes a play for the French taste / disgust binary (*gout/dégoût*) (p. 52). Take as an example one of the several self-portraits by Frida Kahlo, *The Broken Column* (Lomas, 1993, plate 4), or Kiki Smith’s sculpture *Tale* (Engberg, 2005, figure 47). Rather than beautiful, each is an example of *sublime* art, an assault on imagination with an impact directly proportional to the sublimity of the experience (Nead, 1992, p. 28). The perception of pain and fear these works compel forces recognition of the limits of reason (Nead, 1992, p. 26) and meaning is called into question and challenged (Nead, 1992, p. 32). “In its focus on the viewing subject, the discourse of the sublime can be seen, more generally, as a discourse on the subject and what is at stake in the sublime is precisely the ‘*loss of power of human agency*’” [emphasis added] (De Bolla, 1989 p. 37, as cited in Nead, 1992, p. 29). In its excess, the art is literally *obscene*, “a disturbing category, for in its promise of form without limit it shatters the form/matter duality and reminds us of the social nature of all categories and boundaries. Our goal is to trigger aversion to misogynistic, homophobic, xenophobic, and

racist norms (Nelson, 2011, loc. 220-223).⁵⁹ The postmodern sublime (see Nead, 1993, p. 29) is an aesthetic category for which meaning---however provisional---can be constructed because we establish an appreciation for a work of art when it has yielded insights on things whose meaning for us was previously non-existent or out of reach. We exercise a Deweyan orientation regarding art objects as part and parcel with ordinary experience, appreciating art even as it transforms life, when we are able to consider “what the product does with and in experience,” and take into account “the experiential conditions of their origin and the consequences of their appreciation, [so as to obtain] their general significance. (Dewey, AE, 1934, LW 10:9, as cited in Westbrook, 1991, p. 390). In doing so, we must invest imaginative insight and prior experience into our appreciation of a work of art, reaching back into personal history (Greene, 2001, p. 38). Furthermore, we must share experiences, worlds, beliefs, and differences relevant to the

⁵⁹ Browne and Hamilton-Giachritsis (2005) report in a meta-analysis on the effects of media violence, indicating that among younger boys, media violence increases the likelihood of antisocial, aggressive, or fearful behavior. The contemporary Buddhist figure, Thich Nhat Hanh, is against any exposure whatsoever to cruelty and violence, the reason being that “meditating” on violence and cruelty does not stir compassion, but has rather the opposite effect on arousal, thoughts, and emotions (Nelson, 2011, loc. 175-78). In fact, the tendency to indifference, rather than feelings of outrage and objection to injustice, has been described as “troubling” (Sokol, 2005). In Sokol’s words: “A viewer’s moral compass may be deranged by each pointless stab in the head” (p. 2).

aesthetic experience with others (De Bolla, 2001, p. 15). On the one hand, the effort necessary to derive significant meaning from a significant work of art is no less than that of the artist herself (Westbrook, 1991, p. 395). Yet, on the other hand, that process of deriving meaning is the same we employ in working to understand and negotiate our everyday, ordinary experience.

Among the kinds of meaning we derive from learning to appreciate art is insight into the destructive ways in which the body avenges itself on us in retaliation for our neglect of it. Even if suffering and cruelty are confined to the page or the gallery wall, they typify experiences of moral complexity and should help us make inroads into understanding what motivates us to cause suffering to others and to ourselves. (Nelson, 2011, loc. 238-241/pp. 12-13). Why are we at turns denying ourselves food (inhibition), then gorging on it (compulsion), or fragmenting our bodies (idealization), and in other instances, inviting servitude (sadism) (Copjec, 2000, pp. 35-6)? When do our life-giving pursuits of sex and food become invidious activities? The replenishment activities of ingesting food (Nussbaum, 1986, p. 150) are, like dancing, singing, and music making, ways that “settle into the inner contours and recesses of our bodies—a secret topography folded away and hidden even from ourselves” (Krueger, 2008, p. 608). This makes it imperative, for purposes of ethical inquiry, to find ways of becoming aware of these hidden experiences; and learning to understand certain art objects can help to broaden, reinvent, demolish, or signal such hidden aspects of reality to us (Nelson, 2011, loc. 478-

85/p. 28)⁶⁰. In appreciating art we are learning “to cultivate intuitive experience: to increase our susceptibility to, and awareness of sensory, erotic, emotive and other pre-rational experiences (Gregory, 2001, p. 30). This is exceedingly important because moral complexity “more often is found by . . . getting intimate with discomfort, and developing an appetite for nuance (Nelson, 2011, loc. 265-72/p. 13).

In this regard, the uses of art in ethical inquiry are not limited to artistic works with representational or narrative structure. For instance, we have emotional stirrings when we listen to music in a number of ways: in the manner that music mimics our pre-reflective sensorimotor transactions with nature (Johnson, 2007, p. 247); by association with prior musical experience and in perceiving the metrical organization of sound and the sense of expectation its patterns create (Levitin, 2006, pp. 108 & 192). Walton (1994) suggests that we approach the worlds that are in music and permit ourselves to be induced to imagine and feel. We can also follow the progressions in a musical plot and bear in mind that like experience, the meanings we derive are provisional and subject to change (Kapilow, 2008, pp. 2 & 70). Critical reflection on our experiences with music can make us more fluent in discourse about other kinds of pre-conceptual meaning, such as the natural ties we have with other humans predisposing us to learn and understand what other humans have to say to us, irrespective of the usual differences in language, culture, and history.

Music listening is a contemplative and receptive process, yet, like the perception of visual arts, it also involves active meaning construction that is jointly cognitive-

⁶⁰ A case in point being our understanding of the *gaze*.

affective, the very nature of musical engagement (Elliott, 2005, pp. 95). Whatever intelligence music is capable of facilitating derives from the remarkable "genius for ambiguity" at the heart of embodied cognition (Bowman, 2004, p. 12). Like philosophical writing, a musical composition can bear meaning beyond itself. Musical engagement admits of little distraction, is corporeally and socially implicated in the worlds we inhabit as humans, and bears consequences for lived experience (Bowman, 2007, p. 18). Music education is extensively concerned with body management, the creation of appropriate dispositions and "tastes" (Bowman, 2004), and the construction of identity. Recognizing music as a potent means of individual and social influence and control has far reaching implications for ethics education, for embodied musical experience generates its *own* form of agency in terms of identity—whether such identity is racial, ethnic, gendered, or aesthetically related to musicianship (Bowman, 2007, p. 20).

The preeminent task fulfilled by music education is that of the educating emotion (Reimer, 2004, p. 27). "A wide neglect of artistic education is a neglect in the education of feeling...the music we hear--actually form our emotive experience" (Langer, 1962, pp. 81-82). Langer's key claim is that the aesthetic qualities of the musical world capture and represent the general forms of human feelings (Elliott, 1995, p. 28). Music is also representational because it describes many topics, including people, places, and things. Mindful embodiment, a keen sense of the "doing and undergoing," is crucial in this project whose objective is instilling better judgment in ethical inquiry. Because of our encounters with the "feeling content of music," we are transformed from one music listening event to the next; in "learning" emotions, body-mind is changed (Reimer, 2004,

pp. 23 and 25). Music listening is a rich source of self-growth, self-knowledge, and enjoyment as it spirals upward in relation to the cognitive challenges inherent in a musical work (Elliott, 1995, p. 123). It is an exercise in carrying our emotions to the threshold of knowledge by giving expression to our process of self-realization. “To foster musical learning is to become more discriminative, widely situated, or musically intelligent (Reimer, 2004, p. 25). As meaningful feeling, music has the unparalleled capacity to engage us in significant affective experience. To become a competent listener, one must develop a refined emotional sense and feel for what is artistically significant in the music one listens to. Impressionistic musical knowledge requires cognitive emotions, including educated feelings for the original and appropriate in music (Elliott, 1995 p. 98). This occurs because musical performers are able to communicate emotions to listeners through a traditional acoustical code guiding musical performance and retaining influences of both nature and culture (Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 225). Musical performers encode emotions by associating cues, such as variations of tempo, volume, and timbre, with extramusical aspects, such as motion and body language, through analogies. In turn, listeners *decode* (i.e. recognize) the emotions using the same *probabilistic* and *redundant* cues in order to infer meaning. Each cue is neither necessary nor sufficient, but the larger the number of cues used, the more reliable the communication⁶¹ (Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 226). An important detail is obtaining a performer’s insight into a method of cue utilization because in fact, some performers

⁶¹ Perfect accuracy of communication is not assured (Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 227).

imagine themselves being embraced by particular emotions in performance. For instance, the violist Yuri Bashmet has been quoted suggesting: “Identify with the emotions and the notes—fearful as they are—will look after themselves” (Seckerson, 1991, p. 26, as cited in Juslin and Persson, 2002, p. 224).

Teachers ought to bestow centrality on music and its potential for emotionally laden listening experiences.⁶² Students can attend to the unfolding musical work as an emotional/pictorial/ literary narrative and (a) establish its sense of musical stability, (b) appreciate how stability is disturbed by means of various musical devices, and (c) reverse the process in reconstructing musical stability. Such ‘narrative’ composing and listening has unending possibilities (Elliott, 2001, p. 97). As a heuristic process, teachers and music students should keep in mind that there is not a single way to listen for all music everywhere. Drawing attention to instances of musical expressiveness provides opportunities for action projects developing awareness, ability, and sensitivity. Regular demonstrations of emotionally vibrant music-making and using ‘emotion words’ and emotional analogies helps to focus students’ attention to the emotion-laden aspects of patterns in music.

⁶² An unfortunate legacy of dualistic thinking has been the false belief that to possess musical knowledge, one must be able to verbalize innumerable pieces of information on music (Elliott, 1995, p. 75).

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the emotions are central to the process of inquiry and judgment making in general, and in particular are central to the process of *ethical* inquiry and judgment making – i.e. about matters of moral significance. Because emotions indicate valuations, attending to the affective dimension of experience is necessary to achieve embodied ethical judgments. I have also argued that it is both possible and important to educate the emotions so that they can play a more intelligent role in ethical inquiry. This can be done as a part of ethical inquiry – much like critical thinking is a tool of ethical inquiry that gets sharpened by its use in episodes of inquiry.

I have argued further that because the narrative, visual and musical arts are such powerful means of encountering, studying, experimenting with, transforming and otherwise educating emotions, therefore, appreciative inquiry into art should be a central part of the pedagogy of ethics education. In Chapter 5 I will present a high school curriculum in which students encounter works of art in the process of conducting ethical inquiry into concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality, some of the most important ethical dimensions of students' lives at this age.

Chapter Five: A Curriculum for Ethical Inquiry

The Americans then have not [sic] required to extract their philosophical method from books; they have found it in themselves. (De Tocqueville, 1835/2002, p. 513)

Let us, however, follow the pragmatic rule, and in order to discover the meaning of the idea ask for its consequences. (Dewey, 1948, p. 162)

Great leaps forward occur only when some imaginative genius puts a new interpretation on familiar facts. Only the imagination can break through the crust of convention. (Rorty, 2007, p. 923)

The Adolescent Body

In preceding chapters, I have described a theory of ethical inquiry comprising embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, and emotions as judgments. In line with my proposal are arguments for an aesthetic education because the epistemic advantage offered by the narrative structure of emotion commends the arts as evaluative media in lived experience. Embodied reasonableness emerges from body-mind when cultivated through the dynamics of the classroom community of philosophical inquiry. Therefore, I believe that Philosophy for Children provides an important means for students to be able to reconstruct bodily habits of thinking, communication, and conduct. In the context of the Language Arts, I have chosen to be guided by learning theories previously described as operationalizing Dewey's experiential philosophy. They are Rosenblatt's transactional theory of learning, Greene's aesthetic theory, and Lipman's pedagogical model of philosophical inquiry, i.e. Philosophy for Children (P4C). The blending of their features

ought to provide the means for flexible habituation in thinking dispositions, including sensitivity to context and interrogating values and beliefs, for which learning to make good ethical judgments is our objective.

In this chapter, I present the theoretical underpinnings for a high school curriculum in ethical inquiry through encounters with works of art. In the process, students grapple with concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality -- some of the most important ethical dimensions of students' lives at this age and which bear import for the future conduct of their lives. Some historical background is in order because sexual and other bodily experiences and practices have been -- and continue to be -- subjected to scientific, moral, and religious problematizing, and categorized in relation to illness and sin. Public health concerns and Darwin's theories of evolution and natural selection have contributed to sex becoming a scientific interest in medicine and the social sciences. Sexual behavior has been conceptualized throughout the 18th and 19th centuries as the outcome of natural, biological drives associated with the fulfillment of essential human reproductive instincts, determining sexual normalcy and deviancy (Mottier, 2008, p. 32). An important feature of this biological model was the biologization of gender difference, a departure from the 'one-sex model' with femaleness as inferior derivation of maleness. Henceforth, females and males have come to be viewed as biologically different creatures justifying their assignment to different social roles, sexual behavior, and needs (Mottier, 2008, p. 34). The biological model of sexuality includes the assumption that only heterosexual acts and desires constitute 'natural' sexual behavior, thus lending heterosexuality normativity. The term

‘heterosexual’s’ earliest known appearance is recorded in the 1892-published medical journal defining as perverse any form of sexual activity for recreational rather than procreative purposes. In the biological model, homosexuals are neither sinners nor criminals, but rather invalids in need of a cure (Mottier, 2008, p. 39). Challenges to the biological model are traced most prominently to Foucault’s watershed *History of Sexuality: an Introduction*, urging a view of gender and sexuality as historically and culturally situated domains of experience, under the influence of power in social relations. In line with this view, sexuality and sexual identities are social and political constructs (Mottier, 2008, p. 47).

The collective influence of such cultural activity makes the study of art a potentially powerful way to make adolescents better aware of cultural meanings associated with the body and sexuality. Cornell (1995) rightly describes sex as the “emotionally fraught sphere of life” (p. 3):

Sex is so basic to who we are that when we imagine ourselves, sex is always already in the picture. . . . Sex and sexuality are unique and formative to human personality and should be treated as such. . . . (p. 6) Sex is the internalized identity (p. 7).

In her defense of the private and the imaginary (e.g. self-image), Cornell argues from the standpoint of equality in public life and politics. Asserting that sex, sexuality, and gender are areas in which feminists have worked hard to garner adequate attention and serious consideration in law and in political philosophy, Cornell explains that despite making significant inroads, legal analysis of gender equality is often understood as gender

hierarchy. In fact, men, as well as women, have been harassed and violated.⁶³ Therefore, sex, gender, and sexual difference are necessarily implicated in any construction of right and wrong, as it is perfectly possible for a [young] woman to take up the place of the masculine, and conversely, a [young] man to be placed on the side of the feminine (Cornell, 1995, p. 25). As virtually every adolescent has experienced first-hand, devaluation of one's gender curtails freedom by imposing standards of behavior not in accord with the recognition of equal personhood (p. 172). She writes:

To make the argument that the primary good of self-respect should be understood as part of the imaginary domain, we need to develop . . . insight into the tragic toll of the imposition of shame on person hood, and to . . . foreground self-respect as formative to the equivalent chance to become a person. I will also defend the proposition that we should give standing to gays and lesbians who suffer sex discrimination and sexual harassment. (Cornell, 1995, p. 172)

Sexuality and its understanding is a long process beginning at age three (Ryan and Futterman, 1998, n.p., as cited in Huegel, 2011, p. 16), progressing to differentiation throughout childhood and adolescence. Entering puberty happens at least two years earlier than the previous generation, meaning youths are physically ready for sex earlier, but not emotionally nor cognitively (Ponton, 2000, p. 3). Visually with emerging

⁶³ Cornell claims that “gender” as the legal term of analysis rather than sex, has “put gays and lesbians outside the reach of discrimination law” (p. 6).

sexuality, we witness the rise of extreme stereotypes: waiflike females, hypermasculine males, and androgynous teens (Ponton, 2000, p. 3).

Among GLBTQ youth, homosexual attraction for males likely occurs at age 9 and for females age 10, culminating in self-identification at 16 (Ryan and Futterman, 1998, n.p., as cited in Huegel, 2011, p. 17). Self-identification occurs in the following stages: (1) sensitization, i.e. pervasiveness of feelings of difference and isolation, (2) bewilderment, i.e. conflictual feelings of same-sex attraction in opposition to hetero-normative beliefs, (3) equilibrium, i.e. accepting oneself as GLBTQ, and (4) self-affirmation, a seamless transformation wherein sexual identity permeates every part of one's life. One can only begin to imagine the turbulence of feeling "scared, isolated, depressed, angry, or just plain worn out" (Huegel, 2011, p. 35) accompanying the lifelong process.

As previously noted, feeling⁶⁴ is a matrix of ideas from whence flows the fusion of meaning and knowledge we have come to know as experience (Alexander, 1987, p. 29). Emotion in its synoptic phase of intense feeling gives rise to the creative imagination (Alexander, 1987, p. 35). In Dewey's theory of emotion, the role of feeling is one that is expository (Alexander, 1987, p. 37) hence discursive meaning is obtained through a sense or tacit awareness of context (Alexander, 1987, pp. 136-137). In my introduction, *Overview of a Theory of Ethical Inquiry*, I set out to draw attention to the adolescent's heightened ability for higher order thinking as "a basis for aesthetic analysis *within*

⁶⁴ Including the erotic and sexual.

certain limits, for conscious attention to the best modes of communicating certain ideas, and of arousing certain emotions . . . [emphasis added]”.⁶⁵ (Dewey, 1899/1966, p. 280)

Adolescence is the time of life in which our bodies become fully capable of sexual feeling, and our personhood becomes invested with sexual meaning. The intense, seemingly exaggerated emotional lives of adolescents are too often taken to be obstacles to their learning; however, in the context of embodied reasonableness, episodes of intense emotion characteristic of this time of life are utilized as rich resources for meaning and for judgment.

Pedagogies like Rosenblatt’s reader response, Greene’s espousal of wide-awakeness, and Lipman’s instilment of problematizing, enlist the critical participation of student-viewer and student-listener. This kind of learning can be transformational because they are premised on an “ethics of attention,”⁶⁶ in which the works of art or music issue invitations to participate in a conative-affective way with the human strivings represented in them. Hence, the work of art in question must necessarily elicit a strong emotional response in order to help us negotiate the changed landscape of aesthetic appreciation, a landscape of “the exaggerated and distorted human form” (Kandel, 2012, pp. 107-108).

⁶⁵ See Introduction, p. 25

⁶⁶ The ethics of attention are portrayed in Klimt’s *Schubert at the Piano*. See Kandel, 2012, p. 107.

Components of an Aesthetic Pedagogy

As I have argued in earlier chapters, reaching sound judgment brings confused circumstances into harmonious or efficacious reconstruction and is a lived experience of the body-mind, one following a narrative process where the power of the arts can be influential both in the process of awakening young people to morally salient dimensions of their own experiences, and also in practicing judgment making. According to Thiele (2006), exercising good judgment is a difficult task, it is in great demand, and it is invested with a narrative structure (pp. viii-x). This is partly because human judgment takes place bodily below the threshold of awareness, while attending to facts, a coherent narrative, and meaningful patterns (Thiele, 2006, p. x). Harking back to forms that are aesthetic and consummatory, Dewey (1993) writes that judgment is “a sense of respective or proportionate values,” (p. 106, as cited in Thiele, 2006, p. 36), the practical ability to transform the disharmonious to harmony, move thought to action, and against which there is no higher ideal. It is the linchpin of Dewey’s pedagogy:

The child cannot get power of judgment excepting as he is continually exercised in forming and testing judgment. He must have an opportunity to select for himself, and then to attempt to put his own selections into execution that he may submit them to the only final test, that of action. (Dewey, 1993, p. 108, as cited in Thiele, 2006, p. 37)

Judgment does not result from instruction, but rather is the outcome of learning how to think and how to feel, additionally enriched by insight into the teacher’s embodied pedagogy (Thiele, 2006, p. 107). Therefore, the primary considerations in

respect of teaching ethical inquiry can be reiterated under the criterion of embodied reasonableness, a point made by Dewey himself in *The Resurrection of the Body*, his introduction to a book by F.M. Alexander (Alexander, 1995, p. 174).⁶⁷ Dewey states that the serious neglect of our sensorimotor awareness is due in large measure to the absence of criteria by which an appropriate educational plan might be judged, of which only two are of concern here: 1) concern for a curriculum that addresses mind and body as a unity and 2) concern for the reeducation of the whole person, a process of continuous striving towards ontological unity and harmony (Shusterman, 2008, p. 185). There is perhaps no other discipline that combines sensorimotor awareness with the exercise of critical inquiry, and additionally, the awareness of concepts and issues of deep human meaning, as intricately as the discipline of aesthetics. This makes aesthetics an ideal vehicle for a pedagogy of ethical inquiry.

One important component of a pedagogy that utilizes aesthetic experience is that students not only understand the meaning of embodiment encapsulated in Dewey's term, body-mind, but that they experience their own minds-in-their-bodies and bodies-in-their-

⁶⁷ The widely known Alexander Technique is an embodied educational practice and body therapeutic, originating in close collaborative work between its progenitor, F.M. Alexander and John Dewey. Central to it is the inseparability of posture, attitude, and movement; of thought, feeling, and gesture for pre-discursive corporeal development requisite to aesthetic experience (De Alcantara, 1997, p. 275, as cited in Bowman, 2007, p. 11; Jay, 2002, p. 57).

minds. Turp (2000) has written that “bodymind unity implies that physical and verbal phenomena are simply coexisting facets of the one thinking, feeling, imagining embodied whole person” (p. 210, as cited in Lussier-Ley, 2010, p. 203). As teachers we should be encouraging attention and development of all the senses, representing the full measure of embodiment, one that is aesthetically pleasing and vital to growth in associated living. Reasonableness, on Dewey’s account is “in fact a quality of an effective relationship among desires rather than a thing opposed to desire. It signifies the order, perspective, and proportion achieved during deliberation” (Dewey, 1922/1983, p. 135, as cited in Garrison, 1997, p. 64). This experience may be prompted by inviting students to closely examine a work of visual art. Rather than just focusing on symbolic aspects of the piece, characteristic of the disembodied, iconographic, or disinterested approach⁶⁸, the embodied aesthetic approach to art appreciation involves multi-sensory and subliminal responses. Seeing is a transaction, a “mating with form,” involving a unified engagement undertaken by body-mind, making aesthetic experience, one that is consummatory.

Suppose that all forms are, while they are perceived as pure form by the mind-body, simultaneously perceived and enjoyed as images by the body-mind. . . I do not mean that the body translates form, abstractly perceived, into pictures; rather, that all form addresses itself no less to the body than the mind, the

⁶⁸ Maclagen (2001) gives the origins of the disembodied view as the Platonic conflict between intellectual and sensuous apprehension, the embodied view as Merleau-Ponty’s (p. 37).

former perceiving it by virtue of its own formalizing tendencies and uniting with it. *The body mates with forms no less than the mind does* [emphasis added].

(Sewell, 1971, p. 38, as cited in Maclagen, 2001, p. 38)

In the history of art in the sixteenth century Renaissance, embodied seeing in painting comes about through the method of geometric or artificial perspective providing for the inclusion of a corporeal subject in the visual field, and thereby enabling the spectator to position himself within the frame (Crary, 1987, p. 1). In regard to having a certain perspective, consider the difference between viewing a landscape on canvas and seeing the actual place, which is its basis. Inherent in the artwork is concision invested with meaning. The concepts we form from aesthetic experience are potentially deeper and more textured. When our bodily nature informs our perception of a work of art and its aesthetic qualities, we gain insight through embodied reasonableness.

In the following example, we find a description of two works of art⁶⁹ accounting for the embodied experience of the artist in recreating several female subjects' counterpart experience. Note the body-based semantics constituting an instance of constructive and transformative thinking.

Lived dailiness as well as lived bodiliness – everyday social/public life and private bodily/emotional life – constitute the reality of (the artist) Segal's

⁶⁹ For better understanding and appreciation, the art referenced in the example provided i.e. *Nude on Couch (on her back)* and *Rush Hour*, may be viewed in the George Segal Collection, Montclair State University, New Jersey.

memorable figures. In some works, such as *Nude on Couch (on her back)*, 1985, the privately lived body is exposed. Clothes are cast off as beside the erotic point. The figure is literally in touch with her body ego. More frequently, the clothed body appears. But sometimes its nakedness is suggested, particularly in the case of women, proverbially more in touch with their bodies than men. Thus, in *Rush Hour*, the full breast of one of the women presses through her coat, suggesting her private reality – and the fullness of her being. She is no longer just another person rushing to work – a sort of animated robot moving briskly along – but unexpectedly vital: an organic body pressing for expression, her breast emotionally communicative as her clothing and silence – . . . however unwittingly, as participant observers of the sculpture. Segal's acute awareness of the "underlying" reality of the body, threatening to break through the boundary of clothing that separates secretive private from every day public existence, confirms his awareness of human complexity. One senses the animal body beneath the social façade of his figures, an ironical reminder of Aristotle's idea that human beings are social animals. Segal invariably evokes the unknown private person inhabiting a body while describing known public/social reality, which is more readily observed. . . . Segal's figures bridge the difference between being and behaving, making their reality unusually *consummate*⁷⁰ [emphasis added].

(Kuspit, 2008, p. 5)

⁷⁰ The use of the word consummate coincides with Dewey's consummatory meaning.

We seem to be feeling our way in the labyrinth of a preconscious and unconscious world of feelings. It is a highly ambivalent sensation, at once all too chaotic and exalted for Enlightenment reason. There is an *underdetermined aspect*⁷¹

[emphasis added]. (Kuspit, 1993, p. 117, as cited in Maclagen, 2001, pp. 37-40)

Inviting adolescent students to experience and to inquire into such responses is an important aspect of any aesthetic pedagogy, but it has particular importance for an aesthetic pedagogy focused on ethical issues related to sexuality and other kinds of embodied experience. For that purpose, works of art must be selected for the ethical meanings they may convey – both cultural-historical and radical-possible – relevant to those issues. This is another vital component of this pedagogy. A work of art conveys conceptual and somatic meaning in a triadic process of aesthetic symbiosis. In *Cezanne's Doubt*, Merleau-Ponty (1948/1964) beautifully wrote that the relationship is one that affects and bestows benefits, effecting change in all that partake of the work of art:

It is not enough for a painter like Cezanne, an artist, or a philosopher, to create and express an idea; they must also awaken the experiences which will make their idea take root in the consciousness of others. If a work is successful, it has the strange power of being self-teaching. The reader or spectator, by following the clues of the book or painting, by establishing the concurring points of internal evidence and being brought up short when straying too far to the left or right, guided by the confused clarity of style, will in the end find what was intended to be

⁷¹ This metaphor stands for the aesthetic, the felt sense, or meaning.

communicated. The painter can do no more than construct an image; he must wait for this image to come to life for other people. When it does, the work of art will have united these separate lives; it will no longer exist in only one of them like a stubborn dream or a persistent delirium, nor will it exist only in space as a colored piece of canvas. It will dwell undivided in several minds, with a claim on every possible mind like a perennial acquisition. (Merleau-Ponty, 1948/1964, pp. 19-20)

One of the most important – both culturally and personally significant – kinds of meaning students will encounter in works of art related to the human body is the ‘gaze’ – the perspective from which one is “invited” to observe a work of art, typically that of the artist. According to Paechter (1998), the concept of the ‘gaze’ in art is particularly important in the construction and objectification of the Other, as it lays bare a power differential whose asymmetry is internalized as a constraining force (pp. 9-10). It indicates “the triple bind,” a situation confronting contemporary young women [and young men] requiring them “to please . . . , to succeed . . . , and to make it all seem effortless . . . or to be perpetually hot and sexually available . . . creat[ing] panic and depression . . . and[/or] tragedy” (Hinshaw, 2009, p. 90). Females and males need not do it all. Rather, they should seek to be in charge of what to choose to do and not be made to feel embarrassed or ashamed by being different (Shaffer & Gordon, 2005, p. 127).

The gaze enforces culture’s prescriptions for the appropriate body and wields a far-reaching power. Holding as true a certain worldview provides a context for meaningfulness and self-worth. Thinness for females is only one manifestation of a worldview where standards are extreme, unattainable, and narrowly defined, leading to

shame and self-loathing. Primarily as artistic concept, the gaze in paintings by Degas has been described as intrusive, erotic, and voyeuristic (Massey, 1994, n.p., as cited in Paechter, 1998, p. 10). On the other hand, Cassatt's paintings have "none of the voyeuristic gaze of those women washing themselves made by Degas" (Pollock, 1998, pp. 88-89, as cited in Paechter, 1998, p. 10). According to Paechter (1998), who endorses the study of past artistic tradition's depiction of the human body, "The construction of women both as embodied, non-rational beings and as objects of the supposedly dispassionate power-relation of the gaze has important ramifications for the way girls and women [and boys and men] are able to function in educational institutions (Paechter, 1998, p. 11).⁷²

As aesthetic symbiosis, music listening is another form of constructive and transformative thinking and thus a third important component of aesthetic pedagogy. Additionally, it can be regarded as a mode of action because it sometimes requires our active participation in the processes of interpreting and constructing auditory input against the background of our set of perceptions and insight. Kapilow (2008) believes that music is a story told in notes. When we perceive musical performance, we are simultaneously experiencing a multidimensional thought generator. Higher order thinking, such as concept-formation and inquiry, is analogous to the mental acts and states that comprise listening to music. Aesthetic properties are respondent-dependent. They may inhere in the musical work, but they must be experienced as sound, in order to attain meaning. There is dialogue occurring between the listener, who is engaged with the

⁷² See Paechter, 1998.

music as it plays out, demanding judgment, measurement, discrimination, and memory (Morrison, p. 78 & p. 86). In this regard, Lipman's (2000) characterization of the complexity of higher-order thinking could be used to describe higher-order listening, substituting "listening" for "thinking" as the following description demonstrates:

Some thinking [listening] is criterion-governed and some is governed by values that flood the entire context in which the thinking [listening] takes place. Some thinking [listening] moves smoothly and routinely . . .; some ranges at will . . .with the result that we see one kind of thinking [listening] as linear and explicative and the other as inventive and expansive. Some thinking [listening] seems to be purely computational; some seems conjectural, hypothetical, and imaginative. Some thinking [listening] is a mere collection of thoughts that are pressed together mechanically. . .; in other cases, the thoughts are related to one another organically, each assuming a distinctive role but cooperating with the others in the overall division of labor to give us a more complete picture. Some thinking [listening] is quantitative, some qualitative; some expository, some narrative. (pp. 195-196, as cited in Morrison, 2009, pp. 87).

The input of a student's personal experience is paramount in transactional learning. However, in this formulation we issue one caveat and that is for the reader-student to exercise a responsibility in honoring the narrative and its authorial agency, as outgrowths of personhood, and not mere constructs (Flynn, 2007, p. 55). Believing firmly that literary texts are tools in improving students' lives, we follow Rosenblatt in her directive to name and question our values "because the implied moral attitudes and unvoiced

systems of social values are reinforced by the persuasiveness of art, [therefore] the teacher should bring them out into the open for careful scrutiny...How often have *they* [students, emphasis added] critically considered the ethical criteria implicit in their judgments on literature—and incidentally, on life?” (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 8).

Furthermore, Rosenblatt espouses reflective thinking with a view to appreciating and understanding one’s emotional responses. Habituation in certain habits of mind cultivates skills in literary judgment. These mental habits, she argues contribute to well-grounded insight into lived experience (Rosenblatt, 1995, p. 216). Rosenblatt has been especially concerned with adolescence and with the fact that through literature young persons could harness imaginative experimentation with lived experience, and emotional engagement with one’s growing self. Rosenblatt (2005) has written:

Should not this process of reflection deal with such questions as: What happened, not simply in the story, but rather within me as I read the story? What things struck me forcibly? What were the “clues” in the story that “added up” to a meaning for me? What puzzled me? What meanings did others see in it—my classmates, my teacher, perhaps critics in published comments? Do they defend their interpretations by pointing to things in the story that I overlooked? Does this help me to see my blind spots? Or did they overlook some things that make my interpretation at least equally possible? How can I make this reflection the means of arriving at a more complete response to this and other works?

Raising such questions will inevitably lead to analysis of the work, but the basic question will be: What in this book, *and in me*, caused this response? . . . The

primary concern, after all, should not be the counting of different kinds of images in Keats' poem, but the savoring of a particular way of thinking and feeling evoked by it. (Rosenblatt, 2005, p. 70)

Influenced by Dewey, James, and Peirce, who highlighted the transactional nature of our relations with people and ethical choices, Rosenblatt's theory has been recognized as a successful response to Dewey's educational theory based on the organic nature of experience. To reiterate, her method begins in the student's personal experience in a process of meaning making (Connell, 2008, p. 104; Flynn, 2007, p. 53).

Having summarized the theoretical underpinnings of arts-based curricula in ethical inquiry, I will present a detailed description of the kinds of works of art – including several specific pieces – that may be used in the curriculum I have designed for ethical inquiry. My purpose in describing these works in such detail is to highlight the rich philosophical meaning that may become accessible to students in a classroom devoted to embodied thinking, and to demonstrate how that meaning is relevant to the broad ethical issues that constitute the themes of my curriculum.

Art, the Body, and Ethical Meaning

In order to highlight embodied reasonableness, I have proposed a form of aesthetic education that is transformative because it pays critical attention to, and seeks to address the ethical and social aspects of experience highlighted in specific, notable works of art. In the acquisition of insightful propositions about moral life that we consider education to be, the capacity for finer perceptual discrimination, the imagination, and emotions are better served by fiction, visual art, music, and dance engaging students in a

constant process of ethical judgment and helping to habituate our skills in ethical judgment. As a primary objective, we are presenting the measure of our ethical concerns to shape more aesthetically pleasing lives, the aesthetic being the desired ethical ideal. In the private realm, this conveys itself in composing, creating, or shaping one's life with a view to growth, self-realization, and fulfillment, and in public, the aspiration of an aesthetically satisfying life for all persons in society (Shusterman, 2000, pp. 237-238)⁷³.

Even if conceptions of body have changed over time, the task still remains for us – and for our students - to question both current and longstanding assumptions of how persons are viewed and regarded, how we as persons are to be in the world, and how seemingly distant others enter into our purview. Djikstra (1986) is concerned that “We can dialogue . . . but [not with] those works whose narrative content we privilege or try to ignore because they have become cultural icons [and] are allowed to continue to disseminate, without serious challenge, their often quite inhumane proposals concerning

⁷³ Shusterman (2000) notes:

Kant saw beauty as a symbol of morality; Schiller saw an aesthetic education as a means to morality; and Kierkegaard saw an aesthetic attitude to life as an inferior alternative to the ethical life. Postmodernism's ethics of taste is perhaps distinctive only in its attempt at really merging the two spheres. . . , so that the aesthetic is neither a symbol of, means to or surrogate for an ethic, but rather the constitutive substance of one. (p. 330)

the nature of human interaction” (p. ix). The key concepts in the following discussion are: the nude, body image, and objectification of persons.

One important function of art in relation to ethics and the human body is that artists in nearly every time and place have constructed idealized representations of the body that have both reflected and informed social constructions. In conjecturing how such aesthetic standards came about, Clark (1956), in *The Nude* quotes the poet William Blake:

“All forms are Perfect in the Poet’s Mind but these are not abstracted or compounded from Nature, but are from the Imagination” . . . [making reference to] . . . that peculiar physical type developed in Greece between the years 480 and 440 B.C., which in varying degrees of intensity and consciousness furnished the mind of Western man with a pattern of perfection from the Renaissance until the present century. (p. 14)

It is impossible to exaggerate what this simple-looking proposition meant to the men of the Renaissance. To them it was more than a convenient rule: it was the foundation of a whole philosophy. (p. 15)

The muscular male body has had a long aesthetic history marked with the exemplifications of adolescent male beauty at its peak, known as *puer aeternus*, in the sculptural figures of *kouroi*, c. 615-590 B.C.E., (see Fleming, *Arts and Ideas*, 1974; Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 18 & 22). Nude, the *kouros* is openly displayed in public for all to admire, legs in mid-step, mouth slightly agape, radiating *kallos* (beauty) and *charis* (grace). Arousing desire and yearning for a place where such beauty reigns, the *kouroi*

are esteemed as *agalmata*, “objects that through their high quality and craftsmanship inspire delight in the viewer” (Steiner, 2001, p. 116, as cited in Voss, 2006, pp. 8-9). The suggestion of male homosexuality in the *Odyssey* by Homer, as from 630 B.C.E., leads one to believe that in the period there is no condemnation of intimacy between males nor is there any reservation among males to comment on one another’s bodily loveliness⁷⁴ (Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 18). This notion is often shocking to contemporary adolescent males who consume media that idolizes the hyper-masculine body while, at the same time, eschewing any suggestions of homoeroticism.

A one-sex ideal of the human body emerges from historical records of the Greeks⁷⁵ through the Renaissance with both men and women in possession of strong erotic impulses and vital heat, though less in women, so that an important project of male sexual activity is raising feminine levels of pleasure, which is believed to be a contributing factor in conception. It is this less intense vital heat in women that contributes to the concealed nature of women’s sexual organs. Male bodies are closer to perfection as evidenced by clearly visible sexual organs, the result of a very high level of

⁷⁴ The Homeric ideal of male beauty tends to be ephebophilic or focused on the love of young men. Note also that there are no exclusive homosexuals that appear in any Greek epic or myth (Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 20).

⁷⁵ The mutually shared level of erotic desire is illustrated by the metaphor of the thrush appearing on the occasion of the hanging of twelve unfaithful servant girls, who sleep with Penelope’s suitors, as Odysseus’ return is awaited (Fulkerson, 2002, p. 335, p. 339).

vital heat. Right through Shakespeare's time, women were believed to have indiscernible, inverted penises, accounting for the transvestite theater, female cross-dressing in Shakespeare's comedies, and homoerotic desire of the period (Belsey, 1993, p. 128). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus is met on Circe's island by the god Hermes, who is described as *ephebe*, "in the likeness of a young man with the first down upon his lip, in whom the charm of youth is fairest (*Od.*, 10.276ff., Trans. A.T. Murray, as cited in Armstrong Percy, 2005, p. 19). As Bordo (1999) suggests,

[We] need a course in art history. It's true that in classical art, the naked human body was often presented as a messenger of spiritual themes But the male bodies sculpted by the Greeks and Michelangelo were not exactly non-erotic. . . . (p. 180)⁷⁶

⁷⁶ "Calvin Klein had his epiphany, according to one biography. . . : ' [Klein] realized that what he was watching was the freedom of a new generation, unashamed, *in-the-flesh* embodiments of Calvin's ideals: straight-looking, masculine men, with chiseled bodies, *young Greek gods come to life* [emphasis added] (Gaines and Churcher, 1994, n.p.). In America . . . only gay culture unashamedly sexualized the lean, fit body that everyone, gay and straight, now aspires to. . . Klein knew just the kind of clothing to show that body off in too . . .' Calvin sent his assistants out for several pairs of jeans, including the five-button Levi's, and cut them apart to see how they were made. Then he cut the 'rise,' or area from the waistband to under the groin, much shorter to accentuate the crotch and pull the seam up between the buttocks, giving the behind more shape and prominence. The

Understanding contemporary culture's unhappy obsession with oppressive norms of attractive external body appearance (Shusterman, 2009, p. 8.) as deriving, at least in part, from origins in the classical world and the oppressed status of the Greek female would be an important achievement of adolescent ethical inquiry. Dewey himself made plain his reservations about Platonic metaphysics and epistemology that could only have emerged from oppression (Garrison, 1997, p. 14) and a culture where masculinity serves as the wellspring of absolute beauty (Singer, 1984, p. 77, as cited in Garrison, 1997 p. 13). Envisioning in due course a reversal for philosophy, Dewey (1919/1982) writes: "But when women who are not mere students of other persons' philosophy set out to write it, we cannot conceive that it will be the same viewpoint or tenor as that composed from the standpoint of the different masculine experience of things" (p. 45, as cited in Garrison, 1997, p. 14).

Another function of art in relation to ethics is that many works of art convey the notion that selfhood is inextricably body-bound. Brooks (1993) finds this notion prevalent in the *Odyssey*, as when Odysseus, disguised, executes his Ithaka homebound plan of attack on Penelope's hordes, but first nanny Eurykleia recognizes him based on the body itself:

But the Lord Odysseus

Whirled suddenly from the fire to face the dark.

result was instant sex appeal—and a look that Calvin just knew was going to sell."

(Gaines and Churcher, 1994, n.p. as cited in Bordo, p. 180-181).

The sacred he had forgotten that. She must not
 Handle his scarred thigh, or the game was up.
 But when he bared her lord's leg, bending near,
 She knew the groove at once⁷⁷. . . .
 This was the scar the old nurse recognized;
 She traced it under her spread hands, then let go,
 And into the basin fell the lower leg
 Making the bronze clang, sloshing the water out.
 Then joy and anguish seized her heart; her eyes
 Filled up with tears; her throat closed, and she whispered,
 With hand held out to touch his chin:

“Oh yes!

You are Odysseus! Ah dear child! I could not
 See you until now – not till I knew
 My master's very body with my hands!”

The moment of recognition is a melodramatic climax, inclusive of a hidden identity and latent possibility, a coming out. Recognition in a bodily sign facilitates narrativity of the

⁷⁷ There is a break of a hundred lines, a narrative retelling of Odysseus' wound inflicted on his youthful body by a boar's tusk and healed into a decades-old scar to serve as a reminder of that special relationship of protective care from nanny Eurykleia. Afterwards, we are flung back to the present ongoing action.

body itself (Brooks, 1997, p. 8). Many adolescents tell the story of their bodies, marking signs such as scars and muscles; and many take active part in that story by marking their own bodies with piercings and tattoos. These narrations individuate the self and facilitate creative possibilities at the same time they make the body the most significant aspect of selfhood – both of which are consequences calling for ethical inquiry.

A third function of art in relation to bodily ethics moves in a direction opposite to the second: that many works of art reflect the decline of the body from a prelapsarian state when bodily functions, sexuality, and death are natural to life, to a state of problematicity, in which one's own body is regarded as foreign and strange. Concomitant with Cartesian dualism--a thinking essence distinct from corporeality—the body is now theorized as our foreign body. According to Brooks (1993),

The body appears alien to the very constructs derived from it. However much it may belong to the process of socialization, and preside at the birth of intellectual curiosity, it nonetheless often appears to be on the far side of the divide between nature and culture, where culture ultimately has no control. (Brooks, 1993, p. 8)

Narrative in which the body becomes a central preoccupation can be especially revelatory of the effort to . . . dramatize ways in which the body . . . how, we might say, it embodies meaning. (Brooks, 1993, p. 8)

Vitruvian man, drawn by Leonardo Da Vinci, is perhaps the best-known illustration of the foreignness-to-ourselves concept (see Nead, 1992, plate 4). In it, Greek faith in harmonious numbers and geometrical forms, the square and the circle, form the basis of ideal human proportions. In an obscure statement embedded in rules for building

sacred edifices, Vitruvius states that these buildings should have the proportions of man. Clark (1956) asserts that even if this and other aesthetic concepts were invented for the male figure, a greater and lasting impact has been on the representation of the female body (p. 71, as cited in Nead, 1992, p. 20). In either case, the body in art and architecture has lost its individual corporeality and is contained in ideal form, thereby making our phenomenal bodies its replicas (Perniola, 1989, p. 239). The depiction of the female naked figure symbolizes the transformation of nature's base matter into culture's elevated forms: "the classical forms of art perform a kind of magical regulation of the female body, containing it and momentarily repairing the orifices and tears" (Nead, 1992, p. 7), making it a proper subject for contemplative viewing worthy of aesthetic discourse.

The foreignness of the body is intensified and complicated by the phemonemon of inter-corporeality, as explained by Paul Schilder (1950):

A body-image is in some way always the sum of the body images of the community according to the various relations in the community. Relations to the body images of others are determined by the factor of nearness and farness and by the factor of emotional nearness and farness. (p. 302)

Weiss (1999) points out that notions of "the body" and "the body image" are problematic insofar as the expressions seem to imply discrete phenomena that can be studied independently from the existences to which they are intrinsic. Weiss espouses the notion of a multiplicity of unstable body images co-present in individuals and constructed through corporeal exchanges. The notion of corporeal exchange, as previously established in Chapter Three, is at work in the Spinozistic notion of imagination:

“Imagination involves awareness of other bodies at the same time as our own. Our bodies retain traces of the changes brought about in them by the impinging of other bodies” (Gatens & Lloyd, 1999, p. 23).

Our embodied imaginings involving our own and the bodies of others bear on emotion and the conduct of caring relations with others. It begins in our ability to recognize another body to be sufficiently like ourselves. Thus, it is involved in judgments about how the Other should be treated and can be adversely present in relations of reciprocity involving someone who is Other. Shaping our perception and imagination of the Other, especially in regard to her corporeality, is a fourth function of art related to ethics and the body.

Nussbaum’s (1999) extensive scholarship on the objectification of persons also informs this discussion. In this view, persons are treated as objects based on instrumentality (The person is treated like a tool.); denial of autonomy (The person is treated as lacking in autonomy and self-determination.); inertness (The person is treated as lacking in agency and activity.); fungibility (The person is treated as interchangeable with other objects of another, or the same, type.); violability (The person is treated as lacking in boundary integrity, able to be broken up or into, or crushed.); ownership (The person is treated as though one can be bought, owned, or sold); denial of subjectivity (The person is treated as someone whose experience and feelings need not be taken into account). These notions will have some bearing on the ensuing discussion, as I attempt to identify meanings with which the nude is imbued. Of the paintings I describe herein (Chapter Five) only a handful are intended for presentation to 9th grade students.

Selected works, in fact, from the oeuvre of Kahlo and Smith find themselves in the novella (see Appendix). Rather than the idealized interpretations and objectified depictions of the nude, the works by Kahlo and Smith are noteworthy for presenting the human body amidst the rawness of lived experience.

In Chapter Four, I located our mutual conative-affective function in embodied cognition within shared common space. This selfsame force prevails in our practices of customary social habits or procedures. Despite the apparent automaticity of bodily gestures in Chapter Two, I duly noted Rietveld's (2008) recognition of the element of agency in custom and ritual observance, such that in the given example, keeping proper distance in a confined space is a judgment call when we have come up against the Other. Among the bodies comprising a space of inclusivity is that of the stranger. According to Springgay (2008), "A stranger is somebody we recognize as strange. . . as not belonging, as being out of place" (p. 26), i.e. a figure so painfully familiar in their strangerliness. It is the moment we sense the need to enforce boundaries. Springgay (2008) believes that "Bodied encounters in and through touch, produce intercorporeal understandings and in doing so imagine an intimate curriculum premised on difference" (p. 25), hence her curriculum has body image conceived as emotion, rather than representation (p. 50). A transformative curriculum in ethical inquiry, such as I propose, would be concerned in engendering embodied reasonableness regarding how to live, act, and think through the concrete habits and practices comprising our systems of oppression. An aesthetic experience – particularly with works of art related to the human body – gives us opportunities to reflect on our reactions to the body as both intimate and strange.

Encountering art gives adolescent students a unique opportunity to engage not only their discursive thinking but also their senses, their emotions, and their (moral) imaginations in specific issues relating the ethics of Otherness. The precursors of current discourses regarding homophobia,⁷⁸ misogyny, xenophobia, and racism, to name a few, appear to be present in the work of Manet, Degas, Gauguin, and have been taken up in retaliation for the most part, by women artists (in this case, Frida Kahlo and Kiki Smith).

Manet's *Déjeuner sur L'herbe* (1863) was rejected from Paris' official salon in 1863 because of its contemporaneous subject, a nude in the forest staring at her viewer outside the picture frame, whilst in the company of two fully clothed men, while a second scantily dressed woman washes in a pool behind (see Forty, 1998, p. 345). The remains of a picnic are strewn in the foreground, the woman's clothes are scattered amidst food, and partly underneath her buttocks, a flask lies on its side empty. Horrors! Her body is unflatteringly depicted as creased and flabby. Manet's depiction is atypical. More in keeping with the times is the idealized, Cabanel's *Birth of Venus*, a voluptuously smooth Venus atop a wave, surrounded by putti (see Brooks, 1993, plate 4)⁷⁹. In 1865, Manet's *Olympia* is yet another scandal. From atop a disheveled bed with her shawl underneath her, a naked woman again looks directly out the canvas, while a bouquet of flowers is

⁷⁸ In my novella, I include a raw videoclip depicting homophobia wherein a Senior Cambridge University academic instantaneously descends in his young students' esteem as he reveals to them during an 'in class' lesson that he is gay.

presented to her by a black servant (see Brooks, 1993, plate 12), its prototype, Titian's *Venus of Urbino* (see Brooks, 1993, plate 34). Both nudes are noteworthy for their countenance as their gaze deliberately engages the viewer. Over and above the nude, what also disturb are the settings Manet has chosen: the forest far away from civilized society, and the courtesan's heretofore undisclosed bedroom. The nudes in Manet's work are thought to be symbols of females who are violable, fungible, and chattel.

Contrast the Manet paintings with the following group of "wanting" women, whom Dijkstra (1986) in *Idols of Perversity* classifies in his iconography of misogyny, as the nymph with the broken back, woman in supine position of erotic abandonment, pleading to be raped, e.g. Cabanel's *Venus* (mentioned in the previous paragraph) which was the most celebrated painting (*succes de scandale*) in the 1863 Salon that rejected *Dejeuner sur l'herbe*, *Spring* (see Dijkstra, 1986, plate IV, 26), and *Autumn* (see Dijkstra, 1986, plate IV, 27), the last two following a fashion set by Cabanel's tremendous success (p. 105). Take these pictures side-by-side with Kahlo's broken spine depicting human suffering and the contrast in context and meanings is stark. A second popular subject of the time is woman-as-nature, e.g. depictions of Daphne and Phyllis, who in their helplessness turn into trees, such as John William Waterhouse's *Phyllis and Demophoon*⁸⁰ (see Dijkstra, 1986, plate IV, 18). In Segantini's *The Evil Mothers* (see Adler & Pointon, 1993, plate 26), the woman-as-nature is one who refuses to bear children in order to indulge in lascivious pleasure. These, I believe, sufficiently illustrate

⁸⁰ See Kiki Smith, *Daphne* (see Engberg, 2005, figure 3).

the belief in negativity borne by woman's body, which according to Bordo (1993) is interpreted as "distraction from Knowledge, seduction away from God, capitulation to sexual desire, violence or aggression, failure of will or even death" (p. 5). It has been my experience, working with adolescents, that many of them initially resist the suggestion that such negativity has shaped any of their own experiences, until their study of particular works of art opens up feelings and narratives associated with this negativity, that they then admit it is familiar.

Objecthood marks the nudes in Degas' *Woman Drying Herself* (see Forty, 1998, p. 414), *The Bather* (see Armstrong, 1985 & 1986, figure 4), and *The Tub* (see Dijkstra, 1986, plate V, 7). Engaged in reflexive activity (drying oneself and bathing oneself) the nudes are different from previous examples in the denial of their subjectivity. They are objects of a gaze, presumably masculine, and they do not return the gaze. The gaze of the bather is in fact covered by herself, as she is the object of a voyeuristic scopophilic gaze⁸¹ (Armstrong, 1986, p. 240). Thus far, the examples of the nude in art have all shown woman's body as a site for man's domination and women's subordination. In this regard, a certain perfectionist-idealist notion of female body has enjoyed visibility leaving out much of woman's lived experience. Turning our attention to women artists closer to our own time, we see firstly a blurring of the public-private distinction, an approach to self-healing, and the objectification of pain, altogether the emergence of distinctive images of the nude in art. Nead (1992) asserts that: "Historically, there has been a powerful

alliance between the discourses of art and medicine in the definition of femininity which has continued to exercise power within contemporary society.” Two female artists in whose work the nude in medical contexts figures prominently are Frida Kahlo and Kiki Smith.

Lomas (1993) has interpreted the bath water of *What the Water Gave Me* to stand for amniotic fluid. *Henry Ford Hospital* and *My Birth* are about miscarriage; in the first we see the nude Kahlo grieving as she lies on a hospital bed, soiled linen underneath her, with six umbilical cord-like attachments connecting her to symbols of the pelvic bone, a slug, a fetus, and an anatomical model of the pelvic organs. An industrial city lines the horizon. *My Birth* shows the head of the adult Kahlo emanating from the birth canal of a shrouded nude on a bed, a picture of the Mater Dolorosa against the adjacent wall. Kahlo paints this after her mother’s death, and it may be that the two incidents: the miscarriage and her mother’s passing have contributed to a kind of death for Kahlo herself, hence the depiction. Physical pain, according to Elaine Scarry (1985), in *The Body in Pain* is:

Unlike any other state of consciousness-has no referential content. It is not *of* or *for* anything. It is precisely because it takes no object that it, more than any other phenomenon, resists objectification in language . . .the human attempt to reverse the de-objectifying work of pain by forcing pain itself into avenues of objectification is a project laden with practical and ethical consequence.

Because the person in pain is ordinarily so bereft of the resources of speech, it is not surprising that the language for pain should sometimes be brought into being

by those who are not themselves in pain but who speak *on behalf of* those who are. (pp. 5-6)

Viewing and discussing works of art like these provide an opportunity in Philosophy for Children to educate in a manner that not only allows us to question existing practices and underlying philosophies pertaining to body, but also how we can care more and respect our bodies, others, and distant others (e.g. female genital mutilation victims and child abuse victims). In her work, Kiki Smith raises a concern for technological procedures that alter the body. Among young people in East Asia, there is a burgeoning demand for cosmetic surgery to “westernize” one’s looks, particularly to widen eyes, emphasize brows, raise noses, and sculpt lips, a demand that must be examined for its grounding and consequences. While in this country, there has been an uptick in bariatric surgery to slenderize. Philosophy being the particular discipline that educates in thinking and judgment, I believe that it is also the specific discipline that educates for ethically guided, well-explained, articulate, and precise communication. In the community of inquiry, we are able to reexamine prevailing and unquestioned beliefs about the body -- ours, and others’. We might learn not only to stand for ourselves, but to advocate for others who may be in unjust situations or in great pain. One way by which we can prevent child abuse and other kinds of physical abuse inflicted on young females is to understand care as it relates to body and intercorporeality (i.e. Schiller’s notion of body image in community). In my curriculum, I explore cultivating bodily beauty, sensory acuity, and experiential awareness through philosophy in a classroom community of ethical inquiry. In such a community, philosophy is embodied practice. Thus, care for

another's welfare and well-being would emanate from personal self-knowledge and active self-care, extending into the conduct of our lives.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have explained and defended key components of a pedagogical approach to an arts-based curriculum for ethical inquiry. The greater part of Chapter Five has been devoted to explaining the concept of the gaze and the nude in specific works of the visual arts covering a lengthy period of its history in the western tradition. I have also provided art theory in such detail, even if only a handful of the art works find their way to my novella in order to justify depicting the human body as generally disturbing and painful to look at, rather than beautiful and picture perfect. I have made the case for high school ethical inquiry to focus on concepts and issues involving selfhood, body, and gender and sexuality with a view to strengthening students' reasoning and judgment while learning to do ethical inquiry. As the naked human body, both female and male, continues to play a pivotal role in the understanding and problematizing of selfhood, body, gender, and sexuality, I have developed a pedagogical framework and a novella for ethical inquiry in the classroom (see Appendix) that incorporates the four components of sound ethical judgment: embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, emotion as judgment, and ethical content throwing light on those primary areas of ethical concern already described as being central to adolescence (Kagan, 1972; Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1972).

My outline of an arts-based curriculum in ethical inquiry relies on the arguments I made in the previous chapters. In Chapter Two I argued that Dewey's conception of

body-mind addresses the inherent tensions in body/mind dualism. I proposed applying Dewey's theory of inquiry in particular, its sensitivity to context and ability to self-correct (Ralston, 2011) because they are everyday skills serving as guideposts for learning how to do ethical inquiry. I made several pedagogical recommendations highlighting in particular, Philosophy for Children (P4C) with a view to reaching the objective of teaching how to do ethical inquiry. In Chapter Three, I shed light on Dewey's theory of moral imagination and education. As an instructional tool, I proposed dramatic rehearsal, both as a deliberative event and a kinaesthetic process, in order to create a fictional context for dialogic dramatic inquiry, adult-mediated dramatic play to promote dialogue among participants (Edmiston, 2000 & 2011).

In Chapter Four, I explained Dewey's theory of emotions and why the arts are appropriate in educating for the four components of ethical inquiry. I have been guided by Lipman's (1995) concept that educating emotions by attending to the aesthetic dimension of experience corresponds with a moral education, as emotions indicate valuations bringing about actions that embody judgments. "This is moral education in the sense that if students could perceive for themselves the inappropriateness of their judgments and their emotions, they might be less ready to act in the ways those judgments of emotions called for" (Lipman, 1995, p. 8). Relying on its deep connections to emotional life (Nussbaum, 2001), I highlighted music as embodied experience and ethical encounter, a means by which appropriate habits and dispositions are imparted, nurturing character for contingency and particularity on one hand, and on the other, fostering mutuality, openness, and attributes, such as cooperation, respect, and fairness.

Using music, painting, and sculpture to demonstrate the nature of emotion, I highlighted the emotions of fear, disgust and shame, and related them to philosophical/real world problems that afflict us and are related to personhood, body, sexuality and gender. This is in keeping with my belief that the act of investing oneself in collective social practices has positive consequences extending well beyond the classroom community of philosophical inquiry.

The curriculum that follows is concerned, as I have previously stated, with ethical content that strives to be common to all, central to the way we make sense of experience, and contestable or problematic, i.e. something that is arguable (Sharp & Splitter, 1995). I have been guided by Lipman's instructional model that utilizes a P4C reader, which is a trigger text described as "an inquiry-fostering environment" (Lipman, 2003, p. 156), and is meant to nurture reflection and dialogue in a classroom community of ethical inquiry, a cooperative learning methodology comprising a group and its teacher-facilitator, who have a shared commitment to engage in inquiry (Sprod, 2001). The P4C reader, in this case, is a narrative text that aims to model in a very modest way, instances where students are faced with discrepancies that bewilder them and are enjoined to consider their underlying principles. The fictional narrative is meant to dramatize attempts at doing philosophy. The exercises provide practice in making judgments. This pedagogical approach incorporating works of art is in the Appendix of the dissertation. As will be obvious to those familiar with Philosophy for Children, the model of instruction in my curriculum is based on that program for teaching philosophical inquiry to students in K-12. The program's principal parts are the classroom community of inquiry, an

instructional narrative where students model the discursive patterns of philosophical inquiry, i.e. posing questions, offering arguments and counter-arguments, making logical inferences, giving reasons, making analogies, identifying and justifying assumptions, offering evidence, generalizing and evaluating, and a teacher-facilitator.

I invite educators and philosophers to apply this curriculum and modify it for particular classroom communities of philosophical inquiry. Make it useful, productive, and meaningful in particular contexts, sensitizing for the right reasons and objects of our emotions. Furthermore, it is my hope that it will encourage other teachers to be committed to engage in creative and imaginative projects in the midst of ongoing ethical inquiry. Perhaps one day, the creative and moral imagination will have gained as much importance as that of critical and analytical thinking, the focus of the greater part of the high school language arts classroom. I hope students will be encouraged to express their feelings in dramatic rehearsal and to personalize their work with thick descriptions, elaborate plots, complex character developments, and extended dialogue. I would like teachers to become comfortable as teacher-facilitators encouraging dialogue that is imbued with embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, emotion as judgment, and ethical content.

Curriculum should develop out of the interaction of students with one another and with their teacher because it helps in creating a well knit classroom community, one that embraces broad diversity and a wider range of abilities. Students bringing different strengths and talents will have come together to advance the group's educational objectives because "[b]ehind Dewey's ideology and his approach to education is a view

of human nature starkly different from the one often shared by both right- and left-wing theorists. . . primarily self-interested, rational agents, acting to maximize personal advantage” (Fishman & McCarthy, 1998, p. 221). Rather, his approach stresses cooperation as the satisfaction of a deep seated human need “to give out, to do, and to serve” (Dewey, 1897/1964, p. 55; Dewey, 1938/1963, p. 55, as cited in Fishman & McCarthy, 1997, p. 221). Therefore, in this classroom community of philosophical inquiry in the language arts, I urge teacher-facilitators to keep close watch over the multidimensional developmental progress of students, so that individual needs are met in that communal setting (Freedman, 1994, p. 104). Learning to practice ethical inquiry while encountering art, and to make and to act on sound ethical judgments, is an experience in growth: transforming meaning, engaging in self-discovery, and making a contribution to the world.

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Appendix: *Reimagining Ourselves: A Curriculum for Ethical Inquiry*

Introduction

Presumably you are a 9th grade Language Arts teacher about to conduct philosophical inquiry in connection with literary themes that resonate with your students' everyday lives. *Reimagining Ourselves* is a curriculum designed for facilitating ethical inquiry with adolescent students in a community of philosophical inquiry. The aim of this course is to encourage students to consider and reflect on their moral values in the branch of philosophy attempting to understand moral conduct or Ethics. The approach to ethical inquiry espoused in this curriculum patterned after IAPC curricula (including philosophical exercises) features the arts and literature because their subject matter opens horizons of feeling and imaginative vistas that are known to shed light on the meaning of social practices and cherished values. It is also designed to make inroads to some of the ethical concerns of normal adolescence: negotiating the changes in one's body, emerging and sometimes overwhelming feelings of sexuality, changes in self-identity and relationships, academic demands, uncertainty about the future, and stresses in family life⁸². Reimagining ourselves is an apt metaphor encapsulating the tasks we have set for ourselves in this curriculum, i.e. engaging students through appropriate ethical content with a view to refining their inherent skills of embodied reasonableness, moral imagination, and emotions as judgments. In this regard, we invest our imaginings of

⁸² Siegel, 2010, p. 87.

ourselves presciently, as romantic partners, parents, political activists, travelers, spiritual adepts, and true friends⁸³.

How to use this curriculum

1. Exercises in Bodily Awareness

Improved bodily awareness is a tool in recognizing emotions and in enhancing embodied reasonableness. The following exercises are designed to develop attention, discrimination, and perception by applying the key principles of change and interest to the observation of an object. Please engage in one exercise of choice from among the following specifically introduced in this curriculum, prior to a class session.

a. Sustained attention. Remain transfixed on an object of thought for five minutes.

Ask a variety of “new questions about the object”; “roll it over and over incessantly and consider different aspects and relations of it in turn.” Take breathing⁸⁴ as an example.

- i. Is the breath deep or shallow, quick or slow?

⁸³ M.R. Gregory (personal communication, January 13, 2012)

⁸⁴ Breathing can lead to stress reduction because inhaling activates the sympathetic nervous system and exhaling the parasympathetic, the latter accompanied by a decelerated heart rate inversely proportionate to parasympathetic activity. Rule of thumb:

- ii. Is the breath felt more in the chest or diaphragm?
- iii. What does it feel like from the mouth or through the nostrils?
- iv. Is breathing easier from the mouth or through the nostrils?

Extend time period on subsequent occasions. Make finer discriminations each time. (Shusterman, 2008, 161-2)

b. Body scan. Systematically scan the body by subdividing it in awareness, directing the focused attention to one part first before shifting attention to another. Proprioceptively get a sense of ourselves as we stay still, typically with eyes shut or partially shut, breathing⁸⁵ (Shusterman, 2008, p. 162). Note that focusing is difficult to do in the context of “the beating of heart and arteries, breathing, and pervasive body pains,” and it may be impossible to single out “the contraction of the diaphragm, expansion of the lungs, shortening of certain muscles, and rotation of certain joints.”

- i. *Linguistic tag.* Make vague feelings less difficult to distinguish by selecting a word with which to link it. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 164)
- ii. *Preperception.* Prepare to discriminate a feeling by imagining where on one’s body the perception of it is situated. Even if the feeling may be

Exhale more.

nameless, the perception of it can stand improvement. (Shusterman, 2008, p. 164)

2. Guidelines for An Art Viewing⁸⁶.

In the novella and activities that follow, there are several works of art for students to study. Help them to inquire into their experiences with these pieces applying the following guidelines.

- a. Think with your body --- Identify and make known to all of us the layers of detail in the art object by engaging in sustained interaction with it.
- b. Let us know the feeling of meaning – Experience the art object through a keenness of senses and emotion and make it bodily known to us, as in saying/telling, singing, moving, or making something to convey our meaning (what are we getting out of it?) to us.
- c. Do a Schema Formation – Throughout the process of doing and undergoing in which we are engaged, tag your observations with the queries “Why?” and “What if?”

⁸⁶ Liu & Noppe Brandon, 2009, pp. 37-38

- d. Say, Who cares? – This is about making associations and grouping. What you do when you have determined relationships among details is group them into patterns.
- e. Make the Web of Meaning – Draw linkages between what you and the community already know beforehand (prior knowledge), personal experience, and what is currently unfolding.
- f. Say, do I care? – How do you/I/we know that you have an understanding of the experiences and beliefs of others and articulate an explication of the level of respect you may have for them and the beliefs and values you know they hold dear.
- g. Make Meaning – Blend the different perspectives we encounter and create an interpretative synthesis of them.
- h. Take action – Involve ourselves in a project that activates our learning.
- i. Backward Glance – Ask ourselves what struggles remain and ways to learn anew.

3. Reading, Discussion and Philosophical Exercises

Drawn on the model of the IAPC curricula, *Reimagining Ourselves* is a novella with corresponding philosophical exercises. The Community of Inquiry should read the text one episode at a time. Students should then be encouraged to write out their own questions and discuss, as is the practice in Philosophy for Children. In between discussion sessions, the teacher-facilitator is urged to look at the corresponding philosophical exercises for that episode, select, and/or adapt one that she believes will

help the students deepen or advance their inquiry.

4. Teacher Self-Evaluation

Periodically (at least every few weeks), take a few minutes to reflect on your own practice of facilitating the students' ethical inquiry, using the following questions⁸⁷ as guides:

- Are my students expressing their *own* ideas in poetry, prose, dance, or art?
- Does each of my students understand part-whole relationships?
- Are my students more open with each other? With me?
- Do my students understand what is meant by time relationships and space relationships?
- Does each of my students appear to be drawing correct inferences from what is being said by each and one another?
- Do my students understand analogies? How do I know that?
- Am I monopolizing the class with my teacher talk?
- Am I becoming better in the practice of the *method of inquiry*?

⁸⁷ Adapted from Lipman & Sharp, 1984, p.160.

Reimagining Ourselves: Novella and Exercises

Prologue

The teachers were on their way to a film screening. “This is philosophical inquiry not poetry,” Mrs. Robson, the senior teacher said. “Just read the cheat sheet⁸⁸, will you.” Mr. Kendall looked at the sheet he was holding and silently read:

Philosophy is distinguished from other sorts of inquiry by particular kinds of goals, emphases, and strategies. Philosophers weave thought patterns using several kinds of threads, among which are the following:

- Philosophical inquiry is typically concerned with the “big picture.”
- Philosophers tackle the reasons and methods for formulating claims and beliefs.

In so doing, they attempt to clarify past and present understandings and to find ways of integrating knowledge acquired in different fields.

- Philosophers develop methods of logical argument to make new connections, expose false assumptions, and refine specific problems over time. The products of good philosophizing are new perspectives on the assumptions, beliefs, meanings, and definitions that inhabit our thoughts and actions.
- Philosophers demonstrate the inadequacy of previous discussions by exposing the flaws in a thinker’s basic assumptions; locating logical weaknesses in structured arguments; explaining a theory’s omissions, oversights, or lack of comprehensiveness; and finding unjustified lapses in common sense.

⁸⁸ Adapted from Elliott, 1995, p. 8.

Herewith is an excerpt of the film they saw:

Videoclip: The beginnings of gendered roles (*Jamie's dream school* / *David Starkey on Henry VIII and Katherine of Aragon*)(2011)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bX3p9D9B1rc&feature=youtu.be>

Prologue⁸⁹: Exercises

1. Perception

- Learning Objective: Students will challenge their own perceptions and reflect on the nature of perception and its relationship to thinking.

This exercise is designed to help students look beyond the distractions of content and to uncover deeper meanings. Looking at optical illusions can help students understand how something can exist without their being able to see it immediately.

Project some examples of double-image illusions (a picture that contains more than one image, such as the famous "Two faces and a vase" illusion). (Some optical illusions are available on-line at <http://www.michaelbach.de/ot/>.) Students will describe what they see. They should help each other to see what others have not. After perhaps ten minutes of observation, stop the projection and ask the students to discuss the experience, using questions such as:

⁸⁹ Adapted from Media Education Foundation, 2010.

- What does this activity tell you about our perceptions of images?
- Did both images exist before you could see them?
- Which image was the *real* image? The one you saw first or the one that it took some help to see?
- If you needed someone else to show you the second image, do you think they created the image? Or did it always exist?
- How might this apply to symbolism and literature? Poetry and subtext? Advertising and underlying messages?

2. What does it mean to be male or female?

Learning Objectives:

- Students will develop and refine their ability to write narratives.
- Students will encounter the diversity of narratives about females and males in our culture.
- Students will recognize that they have the ability to conceptualize and frame their own stories about femaleness and maleness and what it means to be female or male.
- Students will begin to think about the power stories have to shape our perceptions of reality.

This multi-day exercise encourages students first to think critically about the different stories told in our culture about female and male, then to invent their own.

When students are encouraged to look around, and listen, they are likely to find a wide variety of stories told in our culture about what it means to be a female or male. They are likely to find stories of limitation, repression, and shame, but also stories of liberation, power, and strength. Before looking with them at the specific stories media and advertising tell, this assignment asks that students answer with their own stories the general question: What does it mean to be female or a male?

1. Read some examples from stories or novels answering the question, *What does it mean to be a female or a male?*
2. Then have students bring in a published story or section of a novel answering the same question: *What does it mean to be female or a male?* The story need not answer the question directly or completely; rather it should provide a window into the experience of being female or male, and how female or male experience is constructed.
3. Students will share the stories they selected with the class.
4. After discussing the major ideas and themes, students will write a journal entry in response to the following: Based on the stories you heard in class, how would you answer the question, *What does it mean to be female or male in our culture?*
5. Assignment: Students will write a story of their own, inspired by the question, *What does it mean to be a female or a male?* The story should be short and concise and should make use of figurative language and narrative voice. It doesn't

have to be true to their personal experience (although it can be), but it should be realistic.

6. Students will share their stories with their classmates, either in small groups or as a whole class.
7. Finally, revisit your earlier discussions. Now that they have read the stories of others, and considered the diversity of possibilities, ask them to think again about what it means to be a woman or a man in our culture

Episode One: Planning

The Language Arts-Philosophy Planning Team teachers had been making instructional decisions about *Romeo & Juliet*, body image, and gender. Mrs. Robson, looked up from the sheaf of papers she was marking, and said “So, is it settled; we’ll have a listening exercise featuring Tchaikovsky’s symphonic poem *Romeo and Juliet*?”

Mr. Parker replied, “Here’s the Prokofiev ballet excerpt. Use that as a pre-lesson warm-up because I think it is lovely. Let’s just be clear on this. Why, in addition, Prokofiev’s ballet? With it we can touch on the subject of the body image of female ballet dancers and the gender of male dancers.”

“Telling the kids how to listen to this music is key; remember,” added Mrs. Robson.

Making sure he got his idea across, Mr. Parker added: “The key is letting students know that all grownup female roles in ballet and theater were originally played by an all-male cast. . . and young male roles played by females in what are known as “trouser” roles. Here’s an excerpt from *Stage Beauty* (2005). Let them chew on that. It’s your choice:”

Annoyed, Mt. Kendall said, “You digress.”

“I imagine there might be several in your classes with strong musical upbringing, who would be able to talk about the music or have a passing interest in classical music, but not having either experience comprises the majority. Therefore, one learner outcome is that by the end of the lesson, students can appreciate and speak about the classical

music surrounding Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet*. I've outlined a sample activity and I show an attempt to draw parallels between Russian classical music and current popular music (and there are parallels!)" laughed Mrs. Robson.

Eagerly, Mr. Kendall added, "I agree. Any opportunity for students to see how music of a century past influenced what is popular today makes this worthwhile."

Picking up the thread, Mrs. Robson suggested, "Bobby, ask students to bring something to discuss in the form of a one-and-a-half to two-page research paper. Can you please provide possible topics for the students to research for this paper and bring to the class?"

Instantly, Mr. Parker suggested, "I'd like you to consider the following research topics⁹⁰: The Petersburg conservatory, the Bolshoi Ballet, Tchaikovsky's marriage, and his relationship with his teacher Nicholas Rubinstein, and the ideal balletic body. (Distributes handout.) Here's preparatory material on the composer's life and *Romeo and Juliet*. If you can locate a videoclip, so much the better. I couldn't. They read in silence:

In late 1869, Piotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky attended the opera *Romeo and Juliet* with his brother. Immediately, he fell hopelessly in love with the Belgian soprano Désirée Artôt, who played Desdemona. (This was before he realized he was homosexual.) His hot infatuation was the quintessential romantic response, having nothing whatsoever to do with reality. The star-crossed lovers of Shakespeare's play were perfect subjects for Tchaikovsky's emotional catharsis. His consistent advisor on the musical score was the composer Mily Balakirev (who had suggested

⁹⁰ Adapted from Kuyper, 2005, pp. 19-30.

the idea of a musical rendition of the story to him in 1869), and the young Tchaikovsky was grateful for this attention and help. On October 6, 1869, Balakirev not only wrote about literary points of the story, but dictated four measures of music to open the work. The idea gestated for 10 years. When completed, Tchaikovsky incorporated many of Balakirev's ideas, of course, making Balakirev admire the music. The writing was not easy. At one point, Tchaikovsky wrote, "I am beginning to fear that my muse has flown off."

Romeo and Juliet premiered on March 16, 1870. It was not met with wild acclaim, and Tchaikovsky rewrote the original. His new version, which was performed in February 1872, now boasted a chorale theme and greater emphasis on the fighting families, more sharply delineated with rushing strings and percussive interruptions. In 1880, *Romeo and Juliet* was still on the composer's mind and he rewrote the ending. This ultimately became his first masterpiece.

The Overture highlights selected major themes and literary sections. Capulets and Montagues (the two families) fight in chaotic music; Friar Laurence [sic] is depicted by church-like music; the potency and determinism of love overarches everything in a breathtaking theme. To be sure, outstanding elements are described before the "love theme," but eventually this pervades the whole Overture. It appears in different areas of the orchestra and is presented in varying styles. After hearing this theme, Balakirev wrote, "I play it often, and I want very much to kiss you for it." Tchaikovsky teases us by delaying its fullest articulation. The tune begins

modestly in muted violas and English horn, but quickly vanishes. Sometimes the theme emerges in the winds, sometimes in the strings, sometimes it is partially drawn out and only suggested. Finally, all delay aside, Tchaikovsky gratifies us with a climactic letting-go as all of the strings surge with a complete opulent statement. The Overture ends with a coda citing major elements of the Overture, and it includes the famous death music of *Romeo and Juliet*. His death is marked by a sharp, loud chord, hers by a vicious roll in the timpani. At the close, the love theme is sounded one last time, but it has become pitiful and small, moving quietly over a dark, chromatic bass before four sharp chords nail the coffins shut.

Most of us would agree with the reviewer Kern Holomon, who wrote: “It (the overture) is quite simply, the best love music there is.” The metaphorical climax, lush sensuality, and shameless, extravagant sentimentality make for an excessive, unforgettable, powerful experience.⁹¹ Tchaikovsky is the composer most noted for his sense of “pull-out-all-the-stops” Romanticism.

“Some find his style moving, while others find it too obvious and forced; it would be interesting to see which side our students fall on,” said Mrs. Robson.

Mr. Kendall told them “Let’s add another research assignment, shall we? Bring in a piece of modern popular music that you feel “goes for broke” with emotion. I’m thinking of harder rock (metal), or pop songs that really pull at the heartstrings. Is this effective music on you? What do you like or not like about it?”

⁹¹ Data Instant Encore, 2010

Episode One: Exercises

A. Discussion Plan: Imagination⁹²

1. Can you imagine “in general,” or must you imagine some particular thing?
2. Can you imagine at the same time that you perceive?
3. Is it easier to imagine something real that is really not present (like imagining a gecko on your desk right now), or something not real (like imagining a dragon on your desk right now)?
4. When is your imagination likely to be most active, when you have everything you want, or when you have few things you want?
5. Can you imagine whatever it is you want to?
6. Is it possible for people to predict what they will imagine next?
7. Can you imagine a round square if you try hard enough?
8. Do you have to imagine something before you can write a poem or a story about it?

⁹² Lipman & Sharp, 1980, p. 39.

Episode Two: Experience (Poetry)

Belle reads aloud from her book, “Poems are not read like novels. Poems are physical, sensual, textural, tactile meaning you find pleasure in feeling the sounds of poetry evolve on your lips, tongue, teeth, and vocal chords. Past poetry requires knowing Greek mythology, Christian liturgy or classic literature, other poets, science, or philosophy.”⁹³

“Would you know the source of this poem? I’ve found a torso sculpture and it could be it. What do you think?” Belle asked Anica.

Archaic Torso of Apollo⁹⁴

We cannot know his legendary head
with eyes like ripening fruit.

And yet his torso is still suffused
with brilliance from inside, like a
lamp, in which his gaze, now turned
to low gleams in all its power.

Otherwise the curved breast could

⁹³ Commentary on poetry has been excerpted &/or adapted from Fry, 2005.

⁹⁴ Source: Voss, 2006; see illustration.

not dazzle you so, nor could a smile
run through the placid hips and
thighs to that dark center where
procreation flared.

Otherwise this stone would seem
defaced beneath the translucent
cascade of the shoulders and would
not glisten like a wild beast's fur:

would not, from all the borders of
itself, burst like a star: for here there
is no place that does not see you.

You must change your life.

Rainer Maria Rilke

She looks over to her friend, Anica. “The assignment includes writing one open-ended question to bring to class, Anica.”

“Are there body parts that are “placid” like hips?” Anica said uncertainly. “Or for that matter: Are hips placid?”

“Not yours, you wiggly worm, keep still. Anica, listen to me. Supposedly the head has ‘ripening fruit-like’ eyes.”

“Oh, I think I get it,” Anica continued, “even without the head, the torso has a life shining from within and makes the poet imagine ‘translucent cascade of the shoulders’ . . . long, lovely golden hair? Sorry, just making my imagination work overtime here.”

“Ok, I know, my question: ‘What is life-changing?’”, Belle said confidently.

Anica was quick. “Mine is, ‘Is this male or female?’ It’s not an open-ended question, but it’s a valid one.”

“Come on, the torso has a flat chest and that’s obviously a penis,” Belle was adamant.

“Yeah-uh, but the statue could be male or female. It’s not really all there, you know. Can we interpret the statue the way we wish?” Anica asked.

Belle demanded, “You’d better make a list of questions because—enough already--the second part of the assignment is to write a short, original poem.”

“You can’t make me write a poem!” Anica screamed indignantly. She couldn’t understand why she couldn’t do it now, when it seemed so easy last year. She wished she could remember the different patterns Mrs. Longbottom taught her.

Belle continued: “What then is the solution? Greeting-card verse? Pastiche? For some the answer lies in the street poetry of rap, hip-hop, reggae, and other musically derived discourses, what may suit one’s upbringing, talents, and temperament, or cultural heritage and linguistic taste. Between lazy indiscipline and frozen traditionalism, between the authentic and the fraudulent, lies a thrilling space. Since human beings first sang, recited and wrote, they have been developing ways of structuring and presenting their verse. Most readers of poetry, whether they are aware of it or not, are instinctively familiar with its basic forms.”

“You can’t make me draw then!” Belle loved looking at art. “I love art!” she told herself in silence. “I love watching my aunt paint. It seems so easy! But I was so embarrassed when Ms. Marcello raised my drawing in front of class, and I only heard the last words ‘and so, you shouldn’t try to do it this way’.”

“I fully expected her to say something good, you know, Anica. and my mind had drifted away, thinking: ‘She liked my abstract still life because it’s different...’”

“Uh-m, so you were shocked to hear us all laughing at you, when Sunny’s perfect still life was put side by side on the chalkboard rail...I’m so sorry. I hadn’t meant to hurt your feelings, but why did you have to do something so-o-o-o different???”

“Oh, I don’t know. You know me . . . who’s to say what possessed me?, Belle replied.

Suddenly, Anica uttered: “That’s what friends are for.”

Surprised, Belle queried: “Where did that come from?”

Anica reads her notes, “Three-part Form: thesis, antithesis, synthesis; OR proposal, counterproposal and vote; OR prosecution, defense, verdict; OR presentation, exploration and return. This is the pattern, as in a dialectic structure in philosophy, although this is poetic form we are talking about. The assignment is to ‘subvert’ it. That’s why I did something different.”

Belle retorts, “Why? What’s the difference between philosophy and poetry?”

Anica replies, “Okay, many people think in ways they never bother to examine. A philosophically minded person takes belief x and asks, ‘What grounds are there for holding this belief?’”

“Thanks, can friends argue? If we could, what would we argue about? I know. I can’t write poetry and you can’t draw...and you encourage me and I scream. You can’t draw, although, you l-o-v-e pictures. How you l-o-v-e p-i-c-t-u-r-e-s! We don’t even have an Art subject, and you keep magazine cuttings of paintings, cover your books with them, paste them on cards, blow them up on photocopies, and...”

In turn, Belle’s right hand now moved over to Anica’s mouth.

“Ah!,” she gasped. “Can’t breathe” Anica muttered with great difficulty. Belle’s right hand moved to cover Anica’s mouth.

“I thought we were going to talk about what friends are for?” Belle said, keeping Anica’s mouth covered. “Ok, enough,” removing her hand.

“You’re so impatient! All I wanted to say is that we can tell each other stuff that might hurt other people’s feelings ‘cause they aren’t friends. But because we’re friends, I understand perfectly what you’re saying.” Rapping her own kind of rhythm, “Often, we

don't even need words. That's how we pull things off. So quickly. Not a word. Rustle, rustle. Twitch here. Nudge there. Kick, kick. Wink, wink. You're it. We're home! We got it! You get what I mean, don't you, Belle?"

Exasperated, Belle retorted: "And you say you can't write poetry. But you are sounding like a poem! The point, Anica, is that I have got to pass this art class, and I can't draw!"

"I can't go back into sewing because I've had seven years' experience sewing, and I certainly know from experience that I can't do any sewing! I struggle with needle and thread. My fingers are constantly pricked. It's tough!"

"And don't encourage me, okay?" she added, raising both palms.

"Ok, friend," giving each other a "high five". Unable to control herself, Anica resumed, "but obviously, you just need a little experience. This is our first art class, our first drawing, surely you'll get better with practice."

"Maybe, I just don't have this crafty-ness in me...", Belle said in resignation. "What's the good of experience anyway, if it's only to find out after seven years that I'm not good at it. And, in the first place, why do we have to learn sewing? Nothing is sewn by hand these days anymore, and there are people paid to repair things. This is so... backward."

"Hey, just because YOU aren't good at sewing. I love sewing. I wouldn't have left the sewing class, if it weren't for you needing company in the art class," was Anica's response.

“Yeah, but you’ll agree with me, won’t you? That’s a pit of vipers in there! The meanest, toughest girls in school. I can’t get past the volleyball court without getting my ponytail pulled or my skirt tugged, never mind the gym. Remember how I was hurled into the pool fully clothed when I passed by and those girls heard I couldn’t swim?”

“Oh, you poor thing. You caught the flu from that incident didn’t you? You must have been very thirsty when you were dunked.”

“You’re being unkind. The girls who aren’t good at sewing are so not like me! What to do!!!, Belle pulled her hair in frustration. “I am so weird.”

Anica agreed. “Yeah, you bet you are! That’s why you’re my best friend!”

“Listen, but sewing’s old fashioned. It’s a girl thing, not like drawing. I hate girly stuff. I won’t need to sew when I go to work,” Belle mused unconvincingly.

Irritated, Anica said, “You are so bizarre. You’re so sure about what you’re going to be!”

“Well, can you imagine yourself being a housewife, staying at home, waiting for your husband’s phone call at lunchtime, planting a kiss on your husband’s cheek, and so on and so forth? Huh?” she emphatically inquired.

Feeling exceedingly aggravated, Anica remarked, “Ok, now, that’s really ‘in your face’ sort of!”

“Well...?”, Belle said, awaiting some response.

Timidly Anica answered: “Oh, is that why we’ve been taught how to sew? To prepare us for marriage? Is that so bad? We’ll fall in love one day,” she said tentatively.

“And it will happen to us. The real thing. We’ll fall in love,” this time with some

conviction. “We’ll get married, and have children...and we’ll still be friends...good friends.”

And, Belle, suddenly added, “And I’ll talk to you from across the fence with a mouthful of laundry pins as you and I hang out sheets and nappies to dry.”

“Fat Chance! In fact, no one does that anymore,” they yelled in resounding unison.

Wisely, Belle declared, “Ok, so let’s review that! What sort of experience do we need to have?”

“Well, that’s why we’re in college prep, right? We’re not sewing anymore. We’re drawing! We’re not cooking. We’re doing Chemistry, Trigonometry, and Philosophy!”

“But, why can’t we just do as we please?” Belle ended, imploringly.

Episode Two: Exercises

Note To Teacher: The following is an introductory video clip about how one female artist incorporates sewing in her art: <http://youtu.be/J5ENzbfYIDo> (*Kiki Smith Sewing*).

1. Homework: Read the poem below with another person (ideally, pairs should be male and female). Read the poem reflectively. Allow it to evoke feelings and images of past experience. As you reminisce, make an effort to recall the experience as completely as you can. Then, write briefly about it.

Pockets

The point of clothes was line,
 A shallow fall of cotton over childish hips most amazing things
 Or a coat rules sharply, shoulder to hem,

But that line was marred by hands
 And all the most amazing things
 That traveled in them to one's pockets
 Goitering the shape of grace with gifts

A puffball only slightly burst
 Five links of watch chain passed secretly in class
 A scrap of fur almost as soft as one's own skin.

Offended at my pouching of her Singer stitch
 My mother sewed my pockets up
 With an overcast tight as her mouth
 Forbidding all but the line.

I've lived for years in her seams—
 Falls of fabric smooth as slide rules

My hands exposed and folded from all the gifts.

And it is only recently, with raw fingers

Which still recall the warmth and texture of presents,

That I've plucked out stitches sharp as urchin spines

To find both hands and pockets empty.

Karen Swenson⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Swenson, 1999, p. 88.

Episode Three: Reimagining Ourselves

Anica and Belle each grabbed a seat to join their community of inquiry when they got to Mrs. Longbottom's class. "Phew! Barely made it." Both of them said, each with an audible sigh of relief.

Already in the circle were Andrew, Millie, Peter Faithfull, Tyrone, John, Samantha, Cristina, Antonio, Mei-ling, and Roshan. Anica and Belle had to catch up and quickly pulled out their journals to do a "quick-write," On the board, Mrs. Longbottom had written:

Reimagining

Ourselves

It took only five minutes and then everyone looked up from their journals and put their pencils down. After glancing around, Roshan spoke, "Can I start?" Picking up his journal, he said, "Well, I think that (reading from his journal) 'Reimagining ourselves' refers to concepts of what we want to become."

"That's what I wrote, too," Andrew chimed in. Other hands went up.

"But, I don't completely agree," Millie retorted, "because sometimes when I think of what I want to be, I can't help being afraid of not becoming what I want to be."

"It's also possible that you can become someone you don't want to become," John said doubtfully.

“There are times when I am filled with hope, when I see that I’ve done well writing a poem that I’ve worked on very hard.”

“Can you explain what you mean by ‘filled with hope,’ Samantha,” urged Mrs. Longbottom.

“Well, you know how one can never be sure if one will succeed after so much trial and error. I never thought I could ever write a poem, but then we all did. Some of our stuff was really good, and I was encouraged when my work was put up on the board and some of you said it was quite outstanding. Before that I was afraid of what all of you would say.”

Many others nodded in agreement and shifted in their seats.

“I believe ‘filled with hope’ means that we can do better things, and Samantha, correct me if I am wrong,” Peter added. “I think being afraid and being hopeful are feelings that are part of becoming what you want to . . . be. Perhaps, it’s like this: you set a goal for yourself and you really, truly want to reach that goal, but because you’ve never done the thing before, you’re not too sure, even afraid . . . apprehensive . . . you won’t reach it.”

“In my case, writing a poem wasn’t anything new to me,” Andrew said almost angrily. “But in all the lower grades, I wrote only one really brilliant poem in kindergarten published in the school magazine. After that, it was downhill. All the poems I wrote were no good, and I’ve been going through school with this baggage of bad

poems I've written and brought home to my mom over the years. Frankly, I didn't even want to try this time around, but you were all into it, and I didn't want to make a fuss."

"Oh, Andrew, that's really nice of you to say," Mei-ling remarked, "I didn't realize that you and I share that in common. I never thought I could write anything, until I got to this class. In fact, after I realized I could write well, uh, with some effort I thought that (reading from her journal) 'we see what we can possibly be and our success becomes an incentive. That the right word, Mrs. Longbottom?'" (Mrs. Longbottom silently agreed: "... for doing well in future."

"Listen, sometimes, you can try your best, but if everyone thinks that your work is generally lousy, you'll never get a good grade," Antonio commented. "I think that's what happened to me, and I think that's what Andrew meant. Because I hardly spoke in class and my handwriting was really poor, even if I read well and had good vocabulary, I never got good marks. You know, constant failure can become a threat to what you want to be. Like you said, Andrew, all your bad poems become a lot of baggage."

"That's a great metaphor," Mrs Longbottom remarked. "How did you arrive at calling your bad poems 'baggage'?"

Andrew replied, "I was imagining what it was I was carrying around with me to all my writing classes. I developed a reputation for being a 'one-shot' poet, you know when I was in kindergarten, and I was carrying that reputation around with me all through grade school. I wanted to get rid of it, but it was just like this backpack that got heavier over the years."

“There are so many things we are expected to be even now, that I can’t say ‘possible self’ is accurate. I say we are ‘works of art in progress.’ That’s my idea, my metaphor, of possible selves because there are so many parts to us, child, student, older sibling, younger sibling, best friend, team leader, club member. Everyday, I think we are growing in each of those parts, don’t you think?” Belle queried.

“But, if we can go back to the previous subject, you don’t mind – or do you, Belle?” She did not look pleased.

“How do you rid people of assumptions they have made about you, that baggage, you and Andrew just described?” John asked. “There’s the saying, ‘If you can dream it, you can become it.’ How true is that? We read biographies of people whose dreams of being somebody famous and important are true. What about stories of those who didn’t?”

Mrs. Longbottom stepped in: “Let me read to you an excerpt written by Amy Tan, the author of *The Joy Luck Club* (1989).

I enjoy the challenge of disproving assumptions made about me. I became an English major my first year in college after being enrolled as pre-med. I started writing non-fiction as a freelancer the week after I was told by my boss at the time that writing was my worst skill and I should hone my talents toward account management.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ Tan, 2003, p. 278.

Mei-ling was so excited to say something she was literally falling off her seat. “She’s talking about the Asian stereotype, who is good with numbers. Not all of us are good with numbers.”

“Shush!”

Mrs. Longbottom continued reading:

Around this time, I discovered a book at home that was useful to me. It was a medical textbook . . . that concerned medical anomalies, and on its pages were descriptions and photographs of people with . . . deformities that vied with *Ripley’s Believe it or not*. I tried to imagine the lives of those people, how they felt, their thoughts as they stared back at me through photographs. I imagined them before they had their disease. I imagined them cured. I imagined my taking them to school . . . I imagined I might become like them, plagued and miserable, but soon to be transformed into someone else. These people are my imaginary playmates. Their consciousness, I believed was mine. And these notions were among the first stories I made up for myself.⁹⁷

Amy Tan-Writing from Personal Experience (2008):

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QishhWj5S10&feature=youtu.be>

⁹⁷ Tan, 2003, p. 341.

Episode Three: Exercises

A. Discussion Plan: Feelings⁹⁸

After viewing the videoclip, allow students to express their feelings.

Tsunami scene from *Tsunami the Aftermath* (2007)

1. Which of the following words refer to feelings, and which don't?
sadness.happiness.calmness.moodiness.heaviness.gracefulness.toughness.melancholy.
gentleness.despair.joy.pleasure.disgust.distaste.freedom.wildness.satisfaction.dryness.
green.hope
2. What are the most *dreadful* words you know? The most *magnificent*? The *happiest*?
The most *sincere*?
3. Can you feel rich and poor at the same time?
4. Are there good feelings and bad feelings?
5. Can you be both sad and happy at the same time?
6. Are there good feelings and bad feelings?
7. Are there right feelings and wrong feelings?
8. Are good feelings also right, and bad feelings wrong?
9. When your feelings change, do your thoughts change?

⁹⁸ Lipman & Sharp, 1980, p. 29.

10. When your thoughts change, do your feelings change?
11. Are there ways you can think by which you can control what you feel?
12. Are there times when you trust your feelings more than you do your thoughts?
13. Is it possible for you and someone else to share the same feeling?
14. Can you tell how people feel by looking at them?
15. Can you tell how people feel by listening to them?
16. Can you tell how someone feels by reading what he has written?
17. Is it possible that you really don't know how you feel sometimes?
18. Is it possible that you may only find out how you feel by trying to express it in words?

Episode Four: Why Shakespeare Matters

Anica (reading): “‘About English, it is such a flexible language...more than just a situation where a thousand more words are available to us. It also involves numberless styles, modes, jargons and slangs we have recourse to. If by poetry we mean something more than the decorative, noble, and refined, then English is a perfect language for poetry. So be alert to it at all times.’⁹⁹”

In the library, Anica approached Belle, who was looking through art books. “Hey, Belle. Take a look at this poem. Think I can write one like it? Have a look.”

“Sudden change of heart? I thought you’d given up. We’re not doing poetry in Lit or Comp class! Why bother? Why don’t you just help me look for a painting that I can copy?!?! Everything I’ve looked at is so complicated, if it’s realistic. The only things I can copy are abstract. And Marcello-jello hates abstract work. C’mon, help me!” she said plaintively.

“Please, Belle,” pleaded Anica, “just have a look. This time, I really need to learn how to write something. Don just sent me a poem, and I want to send him one, too.

“Oh, it’s Don, then. It’s not just a poem. Okay, my friend. Let’s have a look,” Belle complied.

⁹⁹ Fry, 2005, p. 319

A Mystery

People say, ‘What are you doing these days? What are
you working on?’”

I think for a moment or two.

The question interests me. What am I doing these
days?

How odd that I haven’t a clue.

Right now, of course, I’m working on this poem,
With just a few more lines to go.

But tomorrow someone will ask me “What are you up
to these days? What are you working on?”

And I still won’t know.

Wendy Cope¹⁰⁰

¹⁰⁰ Cope, 2001, p. 24

Episode Four: Exercises

A. Discussion Plan: What makes you think?¹⁰¹

1. Do your thoughts come very slowly sometimes, while at other times they tumble over one another?
2. Do you sometimes allow your thoughts to go where they like, but at other times you try to steer or control them?
3. Do you think only when you're asked questions?
4. Do you think only when you have a problem?
5. Are there times when you seem to be very happy, and you wonder if you're happy?
6. Are there times when you seem to be miserable, and you wonder if in fact you're really happy?
7. Do you think a lot about your moods and feelings?
8. Do you think a lot about people?
9. Do you think a lot about places?
10. Do you think a lot about food?
11. Do you think a lot about clothes?
12. Do you think more about what you have or about what you want?
13. Do you think more about things you've done or things you want to do?
14. Do you think more about things you did to other people, or about things other people did to you?

¹⁰¹ Lipman & Sharp, 1980, p. 36.

15. Do you think more about how bad you have it or about how good you have it?
16. Does thinking make you want to write?
17. Does writing make you think?
18. Does the hardest thinking you do come when you're trying to write?

Episode Five: Ethical Inquiry

“Well,” Anica diffidently waited. “What do you think, Belle?”

“It certainly is a different sort of poem. I should say, very different. So?” Belle sat impatiently.

“When we were discussing Act II, Scene 2 of *Romeo and Juliet*, remember how Juliet says...Look here, it’s that part where Romeo says “O, wilt thou leave me so unsatisfied?”

“Yeah? I know you liked that line...it’s bizarre!”

“But, Romeo is impulsive and is shifting to high gear. He wants Juliet more than anything now. Remember how madly in love, supposedly, he was with Rosaline? And then, when he saw Juliet, how quickly he put Rosaline aside, and Juliet took her place in his heart? That’s Romeo, he falls in love fast, and hard”, opined Anica.

Stage Beauty (2005) Videoclip: When males played female roles.

“He needs experience. Or should I say he wants experience. He wants to experience love. Romantic love. That’s what we concluded in class: that just like there are different kinds of talk...Discourse..., Ms. Longbottom called it”

“Such as monologue, friendly chat, conversation, dialogue, and lover’s talk...,” added Anica, looking into her notebook.

“And, silly Juliet, says something about after giving him love, the more love she has for him? Isn’t she hot?!?!” screams Belle, repulsed. “And nothing has even happened between them. How can she sound so knowing? It must be that nurse of hers kicking

things up a notch. ‘One sphere in which Shakespeare’s women are perfectly equal to men is their capacity to experience sexual desire,’¹⁰²” she reads from her notebook. “No wonder, they married early back then. And now, pay attention,” as Belle begins reading from her copy of Shakespeare’s *Romeo and Juliet*.

Capulet: But saying o’er what I have said before:

My child is yet a stranger in the world,

She hath not seen the change of fourteen years;

Let two more summers wither in their pride

Ere we may think her ripe to be a bride.

Paris: Younger than she are happy mothers made.

Capulet: And too soon marred are those so early made’

1.2.7-13

At least, you know things haven’t really changed. Early marriage is NOT a good thing!”

Anica opened another notebook and said, “You know, Belle, what I told you about falling in love and all that ‘stuff’. I always wanted to fall in love. I mean, Really. I don’t think I’m like you, just a bit, but not entirely. And I’ve been with Don now six months and we’re getting...., uhm, you..., y’know,... pretty heavy,... kind of deep... so here’s my poem,” she hurriedly thrust the open notebook under Belle’s chin.

Enigma

By Anica Mendez

¹⁰² Belsey, 1993, p. 127

I wish you would ask “Why are you feeling this way? Why are you complicating life?

My body can’t take it.

The question should concern you. “Why am I feeling this way?”

Strange, I can’t explain.

This may not look like a love poem, but it is.

Trust me.

Later, when you see me, I still hope you’ll ask me “Why are you feeling this way? Why are you complicating life?”

Even if I can’t say why.

“What made you choose the first poem, Anica?” worriedly asked Belle. “It seems to me you had a poem in mind already, and you just found it convenient to fit it into the pattern of that poem which you found, *A Mystery*, by Wendy Cope.”

“No, not really, it’s this poem from Don, which I can’t show you. That’s what started it all. He sent me a poem about kissing. *Three Degrees*, it’s called. You know how I like being kissed,” Anica confided.

“Not *Three strikes, you’re out?*”, Belle quipped.

“Stop it.”

“Well, you said, you wanted lots of kissing experience : love bites, french-ing, and what-have-you.”

“Quite enviable, I should say,” Belle added.

“Everyone but me was out yesterday afternoon because of my dad’s car accident which turned out to be minor, but I was alone. So, I asked Don to come over and we had more than just a few kisses, stopping short of what you and I said we wouldn’t do, because you and I just couldn’t face the consequences...remember? Our discussion?” Anica tried to refresh Belle’s memory.

“But, Anica,” Belle wanted to clarify, “why did you do that? Didn’t you go over in your mind and try to imagine what would happen? You wouldn’t be able to run away from your feelings, would you? Wasn’t this what we talked about before?”

“Yeah, but what is love, Belle? Don and I never fight. We love being in each other’s company. I know what he likes and so does he know what I like. We’ve had a lot of experiences together. My parents have met his, and they seem to like each other. He cares about me, and so do I care about him. Why do we have to abstain?”

“Is it a political campaign or a religious thing, Anica? Don’t you think it’s a body issue? It’s your body, and... maybe, you should try to take care of your self, and understand your self. Isn’t that what your poem is about?” Belle demanded.

“It’s really not about abstinence per se. You can make love, but must you?” questioned Belle.

“You know, I found a poem here. Just for you. I’m so mad at you this moment, but you’re my best friend. But I tell you, when I marry, my husband will be my best friend!” Anica declared abruptly and walked away.

The Sorrow of Socks

Some socks are loners –

They can't live in pairs.

On washdays they've shown us

They want to be loners.

They puzzle their owners,

They hide in dark lairs.

Some socks are loners-

They won't live in pairs.

Wendy Cope¹⁰³

Returning to her art books, Belle asked herself: "Why can't I be original?"

Videoclip *Jamie's Dream School: Simon Callow On Death and Love in Shakespeare*

(2011)

<http://youtu.be/RDACbsRPMwA>

"Let's summarize. Which lines have we read in Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet* that indicate gender roles?" asked Mrs. Longbottom.

Going round the circle of the community of inquiry,

¹⁰³ Cope, 2001, p. 38

Samantha read:

Capulet: But saying o'er what I have said before:

My child is yet a stranger in the world,

She hath not seen the change of fourteen years;

Let two more summers wither in their pride

Ere we may think her ripe to be a bride.

Paris: Younger than she are happy mothers made.

Capulet: And too soon marred are those so early made'

1.2,7-13

She explained: "Capulet is being protective of his daughter, Juliet, who, he thinks, is too young to be married. He asks Paris, her suitor, to wait a couple of years when Juliet would be more mature—which I don't agree with. I think she would still be too young, and Capulet does, too in the last line because he thinks that they're 'marred' which implies that something goes wrong. Maybe, having to face responsibility sooner, they age faster. But Paris disagrees. I think that there must be a lot of pressure on both sides for Paris to prove his manhood, start a family, and have children. We read in the historical background that childbirth was risky and was a major cause of death. It was believed that to bear children when young was less of a risk. Also, for a daughter to be engaged early relieved the pressure to see her married well—an obligation that parents had.

Andrew spoke. "Speaking of proving manhood, Friar Lawrence tells Romeo:

Art thou a man? Thy form cries out thou art:

Thy tears are womanish, thy wild acts denote

The unreasonable fury of a beast.
 Unseemly woman in a seeming man!
 And ill-beseeming beast in seeming both!
 Thou hast amazed me. By my holy order,
 I thought thy disposition better tempered.

3.3 109-15

He explained: “Friar Lawrence questions Romeo’s masculinity. His form is male, but he cries like a female. Romeo acts wildly like an animal which Friar Lawrence equates with being female. In other words, females aren’t always able to exercise self-control. Romeo is acting like a female and like an animal—twice beast-like, according to Friar Lawrence.”

“May I say something?” Belle could not contain herself. “That’s really sexist. So, the implication is that Romeo is behaving badly just like a woman. It’s just like describing woman as hysterical, and saying that men don’t get hysterical.”

“Well, there was a time that hysteria was a mental disorder exclusively associated with females,” Antonio knowingly informed the class. “and besides, ‘hysterical’ is one particular word that isn’t used to describe males.”

“As I was saying,” Belle would not be deterred. “It’s species-ist. Specie-ism makes one look down on animals just because we’re human. In this case, is he saying that women are lesser persons because they lose control? Does that make women objects? How would you know that? What if you were the one involved? But, all the young

Montague and the Capulet men lose control much more often, and their violence, as we saw in the film is truly animal-like, savage even.”

Videoclip : *Jamie's Dream School / Simon Callow on Stage Fighting Choreography*
(2011)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EZYU91OI3zA&feature=youtu.be>

“But all these happened during another time, not our own, and long ago. They didn’t have the scientific knowledge and advancement we have now.” Roshan emphasized.

Videoclip: *Jamie's Dream School / Simon Callow on Why Does Shakespeare Matter?*
(2011)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hC1YLvUyKv8&feature=youtu.be>

“So, why do we then still study Shakespeare?” Belle asked. Is it only in earlier times that sexism occurred? Or is only in other societies and cultures, not our own, as in *The Joy Luck Club*, that women can be devalued?

“Talking about beastly behavior,” Roshan read, redeeming himself, here is a passage where women are spoken of rudely, as sex objects, I believe:

And here is a passage where, I believe, Romeo is ambivalent about the change in his character that love has brought about

O sweet Juliet,

Thy beauty hath made me effeminate

And in my temper softened valor’s steel.

Note To Teacher:

Videoclip: Juliet and Paris dance, an aspect of the love story that has a less significant part in the stage play offers an aesthetic contrast for students to examine and critique.

Episode Five: Exercises**A. Discussion Plan: Sex and Romance**¹⁰⁴

1. Sex is a matter of the body, originating in the flesh and motivated by it.
2. People deceive themselves with fantasies about romance.
3. Love is a marriage of true minds. Sex is (or ought to be) the bodily expression of this ideal relationship.
4. Our models of love take for granted a dualist account of what it is to be a person, a mind on the one hand, and a body on the other, one of them privileged, the two either in harmony or in conflict.
5. In practice, desire deconstructs the opposition between mind and body.
6. Desire generates songs and poetry and stories.
7. Talking about desire is pleasurable.
8. Desire palpably inhabits the flesh and seeks satisfaction there.
9. Desire undoes the dualism common sense seems so often to take for granted.
10. The human body is subject to the imperatives of nature, but at the same time it does not exist outside culture.
11. *Romeo and Juliet* is a play about desire.

¹⁰⁴ Adapted from Belsey, 1993.

12. Romeo and Juliet's account of love displays a longing to escape the constraints of the symbolic order and reveals in practice precisely the degree to which it is culture that enables love to make sense.
13. In *Romeo and Juliet* desire imagines a metaphysical (supernatural) body that cannot be realized.
14. Juliet breaks the convention that women should appear aloof in order to intensify male desire when she declares her love at her window. She alludes to the proprieties of female behaviour: Fain would I dwell on form, fain, fain deny/ What I have spoke, but farewell compliment (II.2.88-89)
15. Juliet who speaks most eloquently and urgently to define, perhaps on behalf of both lovers, the desire experienced in the secret life of the body:

Gallop apace, you fiery-footed steeds,

Towards Phoebus'

lodging; such a waggoner

As Phaeton would

whip you to the west,

And bring in cloudy night immediately.

Episode Six: Dramatic Rehearsal and Body Mapping

Trigger Videoclip: Dramatic Rehearsal (*Discovering Voice: Mantle of the Expert and Stranger in Role*) (2011) – <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y5E6D-S6Q68&feature=youtu.be>¹⁰⁵

In the teachers' staff room, Melinda, a Junior Teacher confers with her mentor, "I found out that one of the reasons *The Joy Luck Club* is quite a teachable text is that it matches the reading styles of many students and is ideally suited to a reading installment plan. The novel's sixteen interlocking narrative framework is divided into four sections, each with four stories and prefaced with a short fable. The emotional structure is plain; the sixteen stories are linked by a small fable.¹⁰⁶ We have unpacked the emotional structure in each and reinforced learning with our dialectic journals¹⁰⁷ and students have problematized every situation representing a moral or ethical problem that can be dramatized."

¹⁰⁵ Note to teacher: View in conjunction with Edmiston (2011), *Shakespeare, rehearsal approaches, and dramatic inquiry: Literacy education for life English in Education*.

¹⁰⁶ Tan, 2003, p. 304, as cited in Shea and Wilchek, 2005, p. 20.

¹⁰⁷ Shea and Wilchek, 2005, p. 26

“Let’s go over your plan for your exercise on moral deliberation as dramatic rehearsal,”¹⁰⁸ Edward, her mentor teacher continued.

“In philosophical terms, here is our set of procedural guidelines: First, we discern the ethical dimensions of experience. Compassion, justice, and friendship are a few things will need to consider here. In opposition, you’ll have: cruelty, avarice, and oppression, qualities anyone will recognize in experience as problematic, and opportunities to turn them around.”

“May I suggest, you get a bunch of smooth stone tchotchkes carved with the exact words in contrastive colors. Put them on your desk. If you have a bonsai plant¹⁰⁹, or a healthy tree-like indoor plant; nothing messy, say an aerophyte¹¹⁰, surround it with those pebbles/stones. See what happens when the kids notice how those concepts relate to our philosophical concept of flourishing.”

“Secondly, we inquire into what threatens, hinders, or diminishes those qualities we value; determine what might enhance, strengthen, diversify, unify, stabilize, or otherwise improve them; as well as, figure out what accounts for actual and possible negative qualities; how they might be avoided, reduced, or mitigated; and thirdly, we arrive at the condition of reflective ethical equilibrium or the condition inquiry seeks to attain. At this point in the lesson, interject the notion of moral deliberation as dramatic

¹⁰⁸ Shea and Wilchek, 2005, p. 29

¹⁰⁹ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tillandsialog800pix.jpg>

¹¹⁰ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tillandsia_tower_arp.jpg

rehearsal. Have your students refer to their dialectic journals. You want them to focus on the questions that are the problematized versions of those moments the narrative conveys a sense of imbalance, i.e. a feeling that something or someone is/was missing.¹¹¹”

Have this sign in your class clearly displayed:

REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM

...involves the imagination in constructing knowledge

- categorizing qualities of similar kind
- relating parts of experience in cause/effect narratives
- forming images
- constructing counterfactuals
- considering alternative realities
- articulating
 - possibilities
 - consequences
 - repercussions¹¹²
- take in the full measure of a situation
 - what it implies
 - what it signifies

¹¹¹ Tan, 2003, p. 301.

¹¹² Pardales, 2002.

- bring forth something new

Melinda glanced at her trusty notebook: “(Insight + Inferences) (hypotheses)/

Moral imagination = Plan of Action.”

Episode Six: Exercises

A. Dramatic Rehearsal

1. Use one of the assigned stories in *The Joy Luck Club* (such as *Scar*, *The Red Candle*, *Two Kinds*, *Rules of the Game*, &c.).
2. Work in small groups on one story. Draft a dramatic script (a collaborative effort) that captures the moral or ethical problem that you think can be resolved in your dramatic rehearsal. You may need to condense the story, but stay true to the characters and their relationships to one another. You can add a narrator if you need to, but be sure to include enough characters to keep the entire group involved. Remember that your central characters will need to consider the following questions: Who am I? How am I supposed to act? What do I want?
3. After completing your script, get your acting troupe ready. Prepare to present your moral deliberation in dramatic rehearsal to your classmates. Plan and practice entrances, exits, and positions. Think about how characters will deliver their lines and how the relationships among them unfold as you bring your dramatic rehearsal of moral deliberation to life. Add any props or costumes that you think will bring the drama to life. Your presentation should be ten to fifteen minutes.

4. After staging your production, be prepared to answer any questions the audience may have about your dramatic rendering, the moral and ethical problems, &/or the judgment itself.

B. Supplementary Video

Here's what Amy Tan and some of her friends have done:

The Journey of the Bonesetter's Daughter (2011)

<http://www.itvs.org/films/journey-of-the-bonesetters-daughter>

http://youtu.be/g6QDnMMuK_c

C. Exercise: Body Maps¹¹³

Body maps are a type of personal portrait, the cursive equivalent of which would be the autobiography. Each student draws a life size outline of her body on an outsize sheet of paper.

A body map must contain the following:

- A review of significant happenings in one's life story, visual symbols, an original text, three most important lines from one's life story.
- Placement: Carefully choose the placement of your text and artwork.
- Spine: Actors often discuss a character's spine. This is your objective/s within your life story.

¹¹³ Fleckenstein, 2003, p. 113; See Smagorinsky, 2008 pp. 196-197.

- Goods and bads: Goods are the best things about you; bads are those parts that need working on.
- Color Scheme: A color scheme can signify harmony. Work in a color scheme and what it means in your life story.
- Symbols: Like colors, draw in your favorite objects because they carry special meaning for you.
- Formula Poem: Include a haiku, cinquian, diamante, or pattern poem to reveal something about your character.
- Mirror, mirror. . . : Consider how you appear to others and what your inner self is.
- Changes: Is there anything different about you now than, say last year?
- An alternative is the body image map. In this activity, a student will work with a partner to draw the outline of one another's body as they lie on the outsize paper¹¹⁴.
- Describe your body map, then take a bow, & exit.

2. Gendered Spatial Geography:¹¹⁵ With your students, map out a geography of your school's use of space according to gendered embodiment. First, draw up a few survey questions to gather information for the project, as in the following:

¹¹⁴ Menassa, 2004, p. 51. As a supplementary activity, their body image maps can be compared to those of Miss Universe, 1952 and 1960.

www.pageant.com/universe97/index.html

- A. Draw up a list of gendered spaces in school.
- B. As a female/male, which spaces in school do you feel most comfortable entering, spending time at, &/or alone/with a friend/in a group? State your reasons.
- C. Do you feel the need to act, look, or dress a certain way to be in these places? Explain your answers.

1. Gender Bender Party¹¹⁶ Organize a gender bender party and instruct all your students to dress as a caricature of his or her own gender. Ask them to describe the ongoing experience.

¹¹⁵ Gordon & Lahelma, 1996.

¹¹⁶ See Bordo, 1999, p. 103.

Episode Seven: Feeling

“I like the way we are encouraged to examine our feelings.” “Let’s see what pictures you brought,” Tyrone eagerly demanded.

“I tried hard to look for pictures that said something about our roles as young men and women.” Antonio replied. “And I found a lot of it in the form of advertising.”

“Let’s lay what we have on our desks, suggested Mrs. Longbottom, “and examine what you brought. Remember the assignment was to bring a combination of five pictures and/or articles on the topic.”

“I found an article on females continuing to shy away from careers in science and mathematics,” Belle said helpfully. “The rest of the pictures I have are advertisements that show females in different careers. Here’s one of a teacher, a soldier, and a homemaker. I also have one on sportswear, and another on make-up. I chose the article because I am interested in breaking out of the ‘Juliet’ mold. It was common in Juliet’s time for girls like her to marry early, have children, and raise families, but if you’re not wealthy or educated, it’s no less a practice today. I selected the advertisements because they are about female career choices. The ones on sportswear and make-up, I think, are still about what are expected of females: to be attractive and fit.”

“I found an article on gay marriage.” Samantha contributed. “I also selected advertisements on toys for boys, and toys for girls. I believe they suggest roles that are suitable for males and females. Here’s a pertinent news item.”

Forty years ago, tired of the constraints of sexism and stereotypes, the Bems, a couple of married psychologists determined they wanted to raise their young son and daughter in a gender neutral way, at least until they were old enough to be able to make relevant valuations. They removed from their children's immediate environment everything that might indicate the dimorphic gender paradigm, including every single item that might convey information of a gendered nature. That covered mannerisms, attitudes, habits, jobs, pastimes, smells, and sounds. They were careful to show their children male and female workers performing cross-gender occupations. They doctored picture books to remove all information that referred to the sexes. Though, they went as far as feigning ignorance regarding a person's sex and saying that because someone was clothed there was no way to tell, they reinforced the concept that anatomical features and reproductive functions distinguished one sex from another. Most children by the age of four are advanced gender theorists and know that female is Other. When boys and girls at that age are asked to show a martian what people are like, females pick a combination of girl and boy items, whereas boys select mostly boy items. The son of the Bems picked a pair of hairclips to wear and was told that he must be a girl. Frustrated, he pulled down his pants to make his point. The other child simply retorted: "Everyone has a penis; only girls wear clips in their

hair.”¹¹⁷ By the time children are in high school, they have a very complicated relationship with their bodies complicated by the messages in visual culture.¹¹⁸

As this illustration conveys, the body has cultural and social significance where values and ideals, similarity and difference are inscribed.¹¹⁹

“Here is an advertisement that presents bodies of males and females. I am not sure what its message is. I also brought ads of exercise programs and diet products.” John added. “They carry messages, too, about body image, and ideal male and female bodies, don’t they?”

“I’ve got an idea. I’ll make a body map¹²⁰ showing what all these ads and articles target. I think we’ll get a picture of what this material portrays as the ideal male or female,” volunteered Antonio.

¹¹⁷ Fine, 2010, pp. 214-225.

¹¹⁸ Visual culture comprises the fine arts, tribal arts, advertising, popular film and video, folk art, television and other performance, housing and apparel design, computer game and toy design, and other forms of visual production and communication (Freedman, 2003, p. 1).

¹¹⁹ Fine, 2010, pp. 214-215.

¹²⁰ Note to teacher: The first instance in which a body map may be introduced as an instructional strategy would be as an illustration of Odysseus’ journey of selfhood. Refer to an explanation of the selfhood concept: Lowery (1970), *The Odyssey as Archetype*. Invest yourself in making a body map to serve as a model, its purpose initially being that

On the whiteboard remained the discussion plan drawn up earlier in class.

A. Modifying the Body¹²¹

1. Why would someone want to have an operation to have smaller breasts? (Anica)
2. Why would someone want to have an operation to change one's nose? (Mei-ling)
3. Why would someone want to have an operation to change the shape of one's eyes? (Andrew)
4. Why would someone want to wear a piece of jewelry in her lip? (Samantha)
5. Why would someone want to wear an earring in his right ear? (Peter)
6. Why would someone like to wear a piece of jewelry on her ankle? (Roshan)
7. Why would someone like to have his hair shaved off completely? (Antonio)
8. Why would someone like to wear a mask? (Roshan)
9. Why would someone like to change the color of his eyes? (Belle)
10. Why would someone like to wear a mustache? A beard? (Tyrone)

“We had great questions. I’ll make a collage to illustrate our summative responses to one of the questions.”

“Right, I think I want to do that, too.”

as a principal character map for Odysseus in *The Odyssey*. It can subsequently be used as a body image map.

¹²¹ Sharp, *Hannah* (unpublished manuscript).

“In fact, why don’t we all do that? I have an ad about deodorant, a diet product, hair gel, mouthwash, and lipstick. I’ve also have the article about women choosing not to enter scientific and mathematical careers. I think, for now, I’ll give my body map the title *Do I look like a mathematician?* What I’ll do is identify the body parts that the ads are targeting. Then, I’ll indicate both the positive and negative messages,” added Anica.

“Do you mean by ‘positive and negative’ messages...like if the ad is about deodorant, you’ll put next to the armpits *Tells us: To be attractive we must smell clean (positive) and B.O. keeps potential friends away (negative)?*” queried Cristina.

“Maybe,” replied Anica, “but I was thinking for the negative, I would put I’m too ashamed to mix with people when I smell this bad.”

Hygiene

I’m filthy

On the outside I stink.

But,

There are people

So cleansed of dirt it makes you think

Unhygienic

Thoughts

Of them. I’d much rather

Stay filthy.

Their lather

Can’t reach where they reel

Suds

Can't Soap inside.

All hosed, scrubbed and oilily sleek

They're still deep dyed

They

Can stand all day and drench

They still stench¹²².

"Oh, Anica!" Belle responded sympathetically and gave her a hug. "Can an ad make anyone feel so bad about herself?"

"In the last novel we read, *The Joy Luck Club*, one of the younger characters, Lena St. Clair, confided that at 13, she became an anorexic, to become fashionably thin. Is anorexia an ailment that plagues females exclusively?" Anica added.

"You mean, like hysteria was exclusively female?" Mei-ling asked.

"Maybe an ad won't make anyone feel so bad but, I guess, you can feel bad enough about your body to... to... become sick." Millie spoke suddenly, "my neighbors from New Zealand had to leave because their daughter became anorexic while she was here. Her parents didn't understand what was going on. She just ate less and less, and became so thin. She even stopped having periods. Seriously, I think they were afraid she was slowly approaching death. During the summer break, the whole family had to go back home because they couldn't cope with her illness here, and thought that it would be

¹²² Fry, 2005, pp. 117-118

better there where all their relatives were and they could get support from friends as well. It raised a lot of questions for me about how we feel about ourselves, our bodies, feelings in general and their power to influence our judgments...oh!"

"Some of us aren't overweight, yet in our body schema we perceive ourselves as fat. That's known as BIDS—Body Image Distortion Syndrome. Do you think there's any evidence out there that advertising pushes some people to diet to the point of illness?" asked Cristina.

Videoclip: *Thin*

(2006)¹²³ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IS4dMX65ZF0&feature=youtu.be>

Anorexic¹²⁴

Flesh is heretic.

My body is a witch.

I am burning it.

¹²³ *Thin* is the centerpiece of a multi-faceted campaign designed to explore issues surrounding body image and eating disorders, including a companion book, traveling exhibition of Greenfield's work and a website.

¹²⁴ Boland, 2008. pp.75-76.

Yes I am torching

her curves and paps and wiles.

They scorch in my self denials.

How she meshed my head

in the half-truths

of her fevers

till I renounced

milk and honey

and the taste of lunch.

I vomited her hungers.

Now the bitch is burning.

I am starved and curveless.

I am skin and bone.

She has learned her lesson.

Thin as a rib

I turn in sleep.

My dreams probe

a claustrophobia

a sensuous enclosure.

How warm it was and wide

once by a warm drum,

once by the song of his breath

and in his sleeping side.

Only a little more,

only a few more days

sinless, foodless.

I will slip

back into him again

as if I had never been away.

Caged so

I will grow

angular and holy

past pain,

keeping his heart

company

as will make me forget

in a small space

the fall

into forked dark,

into python needs

heaving to hips and breasts

and lips and heat

and sweat and fat and greed.

Eavan Boland

Mrs. Longbottom comments, “This is an age-old problem, one that plagued even St. Augustine, who wrote in his *Confessions* that food is more of a temptation for him than sex”: “In the midst of these temptations I struggle daily against greed for food and drink. This is not an evil I can decide once and for all to repudiate and never embrace again, as I was able to do with fornication¹²⁵.”

“Food temptations, let’s name the times and places,” then, Andrew says.

In circle, Peter speaks, “Cider doughnuts. When they’re fresh and hot.”

“Going to Seventh and Federal and picking up a hot pretzel,” Tyrone mentions.

“My turn, says Belle, “I’m having a dialogue with myself and one part of me is trying to fool the other part. What I mean is Ok, I’m having a conversation with myself ‘Gee, I really could go for some ice cream. No, it’s not good for you. It’s just a short-term thing, a short-term pleasure’. Two minutes later, I am saying to myself, ‘I really want some damn ice cream,’ End of conversation.”

¹²⁵ Kolata, 2007, pp. 127-129

“May I say something, Belle?” Anica retorts. “It is one thing to resist Krispy Kreme doughnuts while you are losing weight, or to tell yourself that celery—*celery*—is a snack. But how can I live this way for the rest of my life?”

John talks, “This is what I don’t get about weight loss and dieting. How do you get the reasons why you want to lose weight to be important enough to maintain that self-control forever?”

Andrew follows up, “It’s a paradox. I know from my own experience that it’s impossible to refuse food, to be totally uninterested in it, for religious reasons. But not for reasons of staying thin. Ours is a kosher home, and you can put the most delicious-looking lobster and crab cakes on the table and I’m not going to eat them. It’s because I don’t eat that food.”

“I just stop that internal dialogue and go get the food I crave.” Belle admits. “I can go for a walk, call Anica, or get out of the house to take my mind off food, but they don’t make much difference. What I want is food, and for whatever reason, I’ll eat.”

Andrew confesses, “I promised myself on our family’s last winter cruise that this is the last time in my life I won’t be eating kosher. I had lobster and escargot both of which are forbidden on kosher diets. After that, that kind of food lost its appeal, no matter how hungry I was. Then, I went to an uncle’s house to sit shiva and he had catered food. I was able to spend three hours there, and there was never a doubt in my mind that I was not going to eat that food.”

“I can’t make myself not want snacks that I know are forbidden on my diet. Last night, I was watching TV and I wanted chips. I could not resist the urge. The more I tried not to think about it or tell myself that my goal was to be thin, the more I had to have it. Finally, I just caved in and ate through the bag,” Mei-ling finally opens up.

“The reasons I want to lose weight are not powerful enough.”

“Eating without thinking—That’s my habit.”

“Look up! These women in *Big Beautiful Women* are really fat. No amount of pretending that they are fine is going to let them pass in our society.” Anica raises a magazine. “You know what? In some societies, obesity is considered a sign of wealth and good health.”

“Oh, yeah? We don’t live there.”

Everyone had their eyes on the exercise written on the board.

A. **Exercise:** Indicate whether you think you can control the following¹²⁶:

1. Your dreams
2. Your digestions
3. Your hunger
4. Your fears
5. Your circulation
6. Your hates
7. Your jealousy

¹²⁶ Sharp, *Hannah*, n.p.

8. Your decisions
 9. Your resentment
 10. Your sadness
 11. Your energy
 12. Your dislikes
- “Which one do we pick?”

B. Discussion Plan: Objectification¹²⁷

Seven Ways to Treat a Person as a Thing

- Instrumentality. The objectifier treats the object as a tool of his or her purposes.
- Denial of Autonomy. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in autonomy and self-determination.
- Inertness. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in agency, and perhaps also in activity.
- Fungibility. The objectifier treats the object as interchangeable (a) with other objects of the same type and/or (b) with objects of other types.
- Violability. The objectifier treats the object as lacking in boundary integrity, as something that is permissible to break up, smash, break into

¹²⁷ Nussbaum, 1999.

- Ownership. The objectifier treats the object as something that is owned by another, can be bought or sold, etc.
- Denial of subjectivity. The objectifier treats the object as something whose experience and feelings (if any) need not be taken into account.

C. EXERCISE: Women as Objects

Learning Objective: Students will critically engage the argument that women's bodies are turned into objects in order to sell products, and will discuss the potential consequences of objectification in advertising.

Below are two advertisements that turn women's bodies into objects. (Handouts)

1. Look through popular magazines (*Cosmopolitan, Mademoiselle, Elle, Marie Claire, RedBook, Jane, Seventeen, Shape, SELF, Vogue, Vanity Fair, Maxim, etc.*) and see if you can find advertisements that objectify women in order to sell a product.

2. Discussion Plan

- What effect(s), if any, do you think the objectification of women's bodies has on the culture?
- Some people would argue that depicting a woman's body as an object is a form of art. What is your opinion of this point of view? Explain your reasoning.

- Why do you think that women are objectified more often than men are?

D. Exercise: The Dismembering of Women

Look through popular fashion magazines and find images that dismember women, that focus on only one body part. Create a woman made of the different body parts you've found.

E. Journal Entry:

Look at the collage of images you have just created.

How do you feel when you look at it?

Were you able to create a sense of the woman's subjectivity, her humanity? Why or why not?

What are your thoughts on dismembering women in advertising?

F. Exercise: The Obsession With Thinness

Trigger Text: "...the omnipresent media consistently portrays desirable women as thin....even as real women grow heavier, models and beautiful women are portrayed as thinner. In the last two decades we have developed a national cult of thinness. What is considered beautiful has become slimmer and slimmer. For example, in 1950 the White

Rock mineral water girl was 5 feet 4 inches tall and weighed 140 pounds. Today she is 5 feet 10 inches and weighs 110 pounds. Girls compare their own bodies to our cultural ideals and find them wanting. Dieting and dissatisfaction with bodies have become normal reactions to puberty. Girls developed eating disorders when our culture developed a standard of beauty that they couldn't obtain by being healthy. When unnatural thinness became attractive, girls did unnatural things to be thin."

– Mary Pipher, *Reviving Ophelia*

G. Exercise: Advertising & Body Image

Learning Objective: Students will recognize that the standard of thinness presented by the media is unrealistic and potentially harmful.

Encouraging the media to present more diverse and real images of people with positive messages about health and self-esteem may not eliminate eating disorders entirely, but it will help reduce the pressures many people feel to make their bodies conform to one ideal, and in the process, reduce feelings of body dissatisfaction and ultimately decrease the potential for eating disorders¹²⁸.

1. Watch an hour of prime-time television and record what commercials, music videos, or shows come on. As you watch, count (and record) how many thin and non-thin women you see. In addition, make a chart of the clothes worn and roles played by the thin women versus the non-thin women. (You could also do this activity by looking through fashion

¹²⁸ E.D.A.P. website (<http://www.edap.org>)

magazines.) Then go to a public place (a mall, a grocery store, a coffee shop, etc.) and count the number of thin and non-thin women you see.

1. How do the numbers compare? Compare and contrast the world on television versus the world you live in every day. Do you see evidence that the world on television influences the way people act in their own lives? Explain.
2. What did you notice about the differences between how thin women were portrayed on television versus the way non-thin women were portrayed? Who was more likeable – the thin women or the non-thin women? What effect might this have on the way that young girls and women see themselves and others? The way that young boys and men see girls and women?
3. Eating disorder specialists cite the influence of the media as one influential factor in the development of eating disorders in young women. In what ways do you think the media supports eating-disordered attitudes and behaviors?

Episode Eight: Painting and Musicing¹²⁹ to Reimagine Selves

On the board: No art worth the striving is without its complexities – Stephen Fry

Videoclip: *Kiki Smith (excerpt, ART/new york no. 40)* (2009)

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5cVn6YzOuGE&feature=youtu.be>

Art Work: *Kiki Smith: Prints, Books, and Things* (2003)

<http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2003/kikismith/>

Kiki Smith Artist Interview: *One on 1: Kiki Smith Displays Artistic Discipline* (2010)

http://www.ny1.com/content/features/one_on_1_archives_qz/129380/one-on-1--kiki-smith-displays-artistic-discipline

“From what we’ve seen, artists have a treasure trove of images,” Belle began.

¹²⁹ Elliott, 1995.

Samantha, slightly puzzled, asked, “I thought artists were original and creative. What you are implying now is that all along, they have a great store of images or a store of great images. Now, I am confused.”

“Perhaps, I can help,” Mei-ling joined in. “Remember our activity in guided imagery. We came up with wonderful images as we went on an imaginary flight?¹³⁰ Tyrone, you traveled to a land where tribal life was real, and you learned a new language. Belle, you imagined the destruction of a building, and Samantha, you focused on the beauty of autumn leaves in the fall. Would you say that your work was original?”

“Yes, it was,” responded Mrs. Longbottom.

“Well, yes and no,” Belle said hesitantly.

“Yes, because I had never really been to such a place, and yes, because I had never written about such a place,” added Tyrone, “but I’ve read of tribes and always wondered what it would be like to ‘discover’ and live with a tribe, as an anthropologist might. I used those thoughts and then, tried to construct a story.”

“So, you actually were onto ‘a new world’ of your own?” Antonio queried.

“Yes, definitely,” Tyrone asserted. “Like you did. We certainly didn’t discuss with each other what we would be writing about beforehand. We worked independently. I invented a world with people and I narrated a story.”

“Your story really was quite a surprise, Tyrone,” praised Roshan.

¹³⁰ Hicks, Davis, & Pugh, 1997, pp. 54-55

“Also, I think we were experimenting. After reading what Amy Tan had said about where she took material for her first stories, we tried to approximate what she said she had done, digging up old memories and the feelings associated with them,” Roshan explained.

“You can imagine yourself travelling through life, and you can imagine yourself in all sorts of situations. You can also imagine yourself making good and bad judgments as you travel through life. One of the ways you have expressed this ability of yours is through writing. What if you could not write about what you imagined? What if you could not speak about what you felt?

There was a pregnant silence.

“What do you mean, Ms. Marcello?” Tyrone asked. “Is what you’re talking about not having hands to write?”

“I imagine if I didn’t have hands and couldn’t write, I’d use one of my feet to write?”

Samantha said uncertainly.

Ms. Marcello joined in the discussion. “Let’s examine a few examples of artists in their imaginings and how they and others appear in those imaginings. Take one of the several self-portraits by Frida Kahlo, *The Broken Column* (Lomas, 1993, p. 15), or Kiki Smith’s sculpture *Tale*.”

Kiki Smith’s visual language similarly contains much medical imagery apparently brought about by lived experience. Her father, sculptor Tony Smith, says Kiki kept “‘dead things in the dead parts of the house,’ including the skeletons her father kept for

anatomical drawings”¹³¹. She also trained as an emergency medical technician. She admits that some of her work is done for self-healing, as during the period after the death of her father, and then her sister’s premature death from AIDS.

The more interesting aspect of her work is that she consciously addresses body and related issues. She has long been fascinated by human anatomy and what she sees as the physical, social, spiritual, and even political significance of the human body. But the origin of this intrigue is a bit more pedestrian. "I had a boyfriend who was a book buyer at the strand and he brought home *Gray's Anatomy* for me one day. And so it was really simple. Before that I was painting his guitar," Smith says.

She says: “Your body is like Everyman, where all these things are played out and you’re like a hemophiliac just trying to keep your blood in while all these external forces, these vampires, are trying to get at it (Smith, 1991). A work called "Tale" was described by the then director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, as "disgusting." She has said the work was about shame and humiliation. In a way, art is always trying to kick out space. So, that you have to be inside yourself," Smith explains.¹³²

In the early 1990s, she began producing images of nature—from insects, birds, and animals to the cosmos. Smith also discovered that the delicate line attainable with the

¹³¹ Posner, 1998, p. 11

¹³² NY1, 2010.

etching¹³³ medium was particularly evocative of feathers and fur. She sketched from specimens in natural history museums. I'm trying to think about this relationship between Nature and human nature, their different objects”¹³⁴.

The selected works include themes such as the abject body, where the nude defecates on her hands and knees legitimating a hitherto unrepresentable topic; internal organs (*Male and Female Uro-genital Systems*, see Engberg, 2005, figure 12); woman-as-nature (*Daphne*, see Engberg, 2005, figure 3; *Untitled-Roses*, see Engberg, 2005, p. 30), a contemporary rendering of an age-old theme previously discussed, now to be taken in light of woman's fertility; birth (*Through a Hole*)¹³⁵, and body (*Mother/Child* ¹³⁶, *Milky Way* [see Engberg, 2005, figure 14], and *Virgin*)¹³⁷. The installation *Mother/Child* has a nude female sucking her breast and nude male sucking his penis, indicating a sad situation where there is no one for whom the milk or the sperm will serve a life-sustaining purpose. *Milky Way* is a nude from whose breasts spring stars/milk. *Virgin* is

¹³³ Etching is a technique of printmaking where a design is cut, carved, or scratched onto a metal surface, whereupon corrosion is induced to expose the design, so that multiple impressions can be made of it in paper.

¹³⁴ Weitman & Smith, 2003.

¹³⁵

http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_9sHp3UvWwtI/S8veSniBaXI/AAAAAAAAABag/m6IZDsx39ec/s1600/Kiki+Smith+the+Hole.jpg

¹³⁶ http://images.artnet.com/images_US/magazine/features/saltz/saltz4-6-10-5.jpg

¹³⁷ <http://www.artseensoho.com/Art/SEANKELLY/corpus98/corpusGIFS/smith1.jpeg>

an enshrouded body whose eyes and labia are exposed

In her nudes, Frida Kahlo depicts herself and her experience of pain, e.g. *What the Water Gave Me* (see Lomas, 1993, plate 1) *Henry Ford Hospital* (see Lomas, 1993, plate 2) *My Birth* (see Lomas, 1993, plate 3) and *The Broken Column*. Kahlo had wanted to become a medical doctor before her crippling accident rendered her incapable of carrying a pregnancy to term. These two facts in her life are the main concern of the paintings in which she is the nude subject. Her iconography is mainly religious, medical, and biographical. Her anatomical knowledge studiously acquired from reading Ramsbotham's obstetrics text appears in recurring symbols of the fetus, pelvis and spine attesting to that. Kahlo has developed her own pictorial language to express the physical pain never leaving her throughout her life. *What the Water Gave Me* shows her toes peeking out of the bath water on which float images from her life, among which are: a dress, plant, and animal symbols in place of her genitals, her parents, and a skyscraper from Diego Rivera's work. Constant, excruciating pain is visibly present in *The Broken Column*. Kahlo's naked torso is torn and split in the middle where her spine is and through its length is visible a broken column propping her neck. Her body is pinned with many nails, the torso in a brace, and a cloth partly held by nails covers her hips and pelvic region.

"Hey, but what if you didn't have all your limbs? I've seen a veteran painting by holding a paintbrush between his lips, and he was pretty good at it!" Peter added.

I went to a concert where a blind college student played on the recorder. After the concert, he spoke to us about his experiences as a blind person. He said that because that he couldn't see, it didn't mean that he couldn't imagine or have feelings. He also said that music made him feel things he never felt before." Andrew contributed.

"Of course, the beat and lyrics make you feel a lot of things." Roshan said.

"No, he meant without lyrics. He said that he hoped we could imagine or feel something in his music-making."

"When I feel extremely elated, I like to dance. I don't much like writing," Tyrone added.

"I can't imagine what it would be like if I couldn't sing," Cristina complained, but "I could. . . . if you know what I mean. That's why I've remained silent all this time." "What you're all saying, it seems, is that you can express yourself in some form of art. Right?" concluded Millie.

"It was certainly a better piece of writing than I had ever done before!" Mei-ling proudly said. "And I do write a lot not just for our class, and I keep a notebook of poetry."

"Well, I really owe Mrs. Longbottom a lot. She guided me through the poem writing process, encouraging me along the way, making sure that my 'baby' survived the 'birthing process'," Anica explained.

"I have Mrs. Longbottom to thank, too," echoed Andrew and Samantha.

"She pointed up a problem in my life, and encouraged me to explore it in poetry!" Anica elaborated.

“I really liked your poem, Anica,” Belle emerged from her silence. “I think that what you had to say and how you wrote it in a poem was very thoughtful and touched me. Remember how we were talking about music affecting us by their rhythm and lyrics?”

“And what about music without words? Can we be moved by rhythm and melody alone? Does that kind of music have meaning?,” Tyrone continued.

“Can you appreciate other kinds of music?” Mrs. Longbottom asked.

“I’ve been playing the piano since I was five years old,” Roshan confided, “and my piano teacher, Mr. Rabinowitz, encourages me to play with feeling. At first, I didn’t understand him. Frequently, he wrote in pencil on the page ‘faster’, or ‘not so loud’ or ‘slower’ or ‘careful, DON’T run over the notes and KILL them! He wasn’t just talking about tempo or speed. So, my teacher played the music to demonstrate how he would try to communicate emotion in music. Mei-ling, can you help me out?”

“I play the violin. There are directions such as *allegro* which is cheerful and *andante* which is ‘in the manner of walking’ which indicate emotions that a musician tries to communicate as he plays certain musical pieces. In *The Joy Luck Club*, for example, Jing-mei learns a piece by Schumann from his *Scenes from Childhood*. In fact, my sister in the 12th grade who accompanies me, knows much more about emotions in music. Would you like me to ask her to come next week to tell us more about it?

“Well, what kind of music do you two play?” asked Tyrone.

“Classical music,” they intoned.

The following week, Mei-ling's elder sister, Soo-ching, came to class. She had just finished playing a video of five pianists performing Wagner's *The Ride of the Valkyries*, and was now reading various comments on the music that the group had written.

Piano Extravaganza-Walkürenritt (Ride of the Valkyries)(2004):

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EQd2pse-psU&feature=youtu.be>

“Well, listening to classical music and being able to understand the emotions in the music, I believe, takes as much practice for the listener as for the performer. For example, the piano piece known as the *Funeral March* by Chopin¹³⁸ (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8LEqRw_9hwc), which we can listen to later, is so familiar to you that you almost naturally feel sad, or that it has something to do with death. Da-da-da-da-and-the-dead-will-pray-for-you.

“Or ghosts!,” Samantha added.

“That’s classical, you say, by Chopin???” Millie was skeptical.

“That’s what’s so amazing,” Roshan added, “there is so little classical music that we listen to, but there is so much of it, really, that has become part of the fabric of our lives. We never question where that tune originated or try to find out who was the first one who used it in the context of death.”

¹³⁸ Sonata No. 2, Op. 35 in B-flat Minor: Marche funebre - Lento

“To get back to what we were talking about. We all need to listen more to the music if we want to be familiar with the cues for different emotions,” Soo-ching explained.

“Cues, as in a stage play?,” Anica, who was active in the school’s Drama Guild questioned.

Soo-ching continued, “Exactly. I prepared a chart which illustrates five emotions that are commonly expressed in music.”

“Only five?” Antonio asked.

“There are 44 that have been scientifically measured, according to my piano teacher. They were identified by a pair of researchers in 2001, and I believe, the study was just a part of an ongoing bigger project.” Soo-ching explained. “But, there is enough here to get us started.”

Table¹³⁹

EMOTION	CUE
Happiness	Fast tempo, small tempo variability, staccato articulation, high sound level, bright timbre, fast tone attacks, small timing variations, increased durational contrasts between long notes and short notes, small vibrato extent
Sadness	Very slow tempo, <i>legato</i> articulation, small articulation variability, low sound level, dull timbre, large timing variations, reduced durational contrasts between long and short notes, slow tone attacks, flat or falling microintonation, slow vibrato, final <i>ritardando</i> , phase <i>decelerando</i>
Anger	High sound level, sharp timbre, spectral noise, fast tempo, staccato articulation, abrupt tone attacks, increased durational contrasts between long and short notes, no

¹³⁹ Juslin, 2001, p. 221; Sloboda, 2010, p. 500.

	<i>ritardando</i> , sudden accents on tonally unstable notes, crescendo, phase <i>accelerando</i> , large vibrato extent
Tenderness	Slow tempo, slow tone attacks, low sound level, small sound-level variability, legato articulations, soft timbre, moderate timing variations, intense vibrato,
Fear	Irregular, low, mostly legato

“I’m handing out these! Guys, when you attend a concert, better leave your bodies outside the concert hall. Just bring in your selves. Welcome, ghosts in *mac-hines* (she said McHeinz).

The Ten Commandments for Concert Goers¹⁴⁰

I

Thou shalt hearken unto the music with all thy heart, with all thy soul, and all thy mind, to aid thee in thy endeavor. Study thou thy programme notes and hereby be sore fully prepared to garner the blessings of the inspired melodies which are about to be sounded.

¹⁴⁰ Goehr, G., 1992, p. x

II

Thou shalt not arrive late, for the stir of thy coming disturbeth those who did come in due season; neither shalt thou rush forth as a great wind at intermission time or before the end of the programme; nor shalt thou trample to thy left nor thy right the ushers or the doormen or the multitudes that are about thee.

III

Thou shalt keep in check thy coughings and thy sneezings for they are an abomination, and they shall bring forth evil execrations upon thee and upon thy household, even unto the third and fourth generations.

IV

Thou shalt not rustle thy programme, for the noise thereof is not as the murmur of the leaves of the forest but brash and raucous and soothest not.

V

Thou shalt not yahoo unto thy relatives, nor unto thy friends, nor unto any member of thy club or of thine household, nor unto any of thy neighbours.

VI

Thou shalt not whisper, for thy mouthings, howsoever hushed they may be, bring discord to the ear of those who sit about thee.

VII

Thou shalt not chew with great show of sound or motion. Remember that thou art not as the kine of the meadow who do chew the cud in the pastoral serenity which is vouchsafed

them.

VIII

Thou shalt not direct thy index finger at persons of public note and say unto thy neighbour, “Yonder goeth so and so,” but reflect that some day thou shalt perchance be a celebrity, and thou shalt be in great discomfort when thou art pointed at and thou shalt not be pleased one jot or tittle thereby.

IX

Thou shalt not slumber, for in thy stupor thou hast ears and heareth not; peradventure thou possesseth a rumbling obbligato when thou sleepeth and, verily, the rabble may be aroused thereby to do thee grievous harm.

X

Thou shalt not become a self-ordained music critic and with booming voice comment garrulously about the players or the playing; neither shalt thou hum, or tap thine foot; for thou hast come as a listener and a lover of music, not as a critic nor as a performer, and remember that none among the multitudes has paid to hear thy hummings or thy tappings or to listen unto thine opinions

“This one’s better. I got you a poem. Natch!”

Concert Etiquette

Thou Shalt Not:

Talk...

Hum, Sing, or Tap Fingers or Feet...

Rustle Thy Program...

Crack Thy Gum in Thy Neighbor's Ears...

Wear Loud-Ticking Watches or Jangle Thy Jewelry...

Open Cellophane-Wrapped Candies...

Snap Open and Close Thy Purse...

Sigh With Boredom...

Read

Arrive Late or Leave Early...

-Byron Belt¹⁴¹

1. Exercise: Guided Imagery

Take your notebook and paper to your local art gallery - or call in at a gallery while you are holidaying. Sit quietly in front of a painting that you find yourself drawn to and permit yourself to become a part of the scene. Do some relaxation exercises to warm up and to get yourself into the mood. Then permit yourself to be transported to the world of the artist. Wait until words rise from deep within. Only then begin to write.

Do not stop to think. Just write about where you are and what happens. Please identify the imagery you have chosen if you do this.

¹⁴¹ <http://www.texasflutesociety.org/CONCERTETIQUETTE.htm>

2. Exercise: Listenership

Have two groups in class, i.e. the Tchaikovsky and the Prokofiev. Determine with the students corresponding research topics of relevance. Acquaint them with the audience culture of such performances.¹⁴²

- What do I hear? (Focus on the music, especially the move from harmonic unity or equilibrium to disharmony or disequilibrium.)
- What do I see/feel/think? (Focus on response to the music. Listen for how the music unfolds and for how we are feeling as it is restored to harmony or equilibrium)
- So what? (What do I think about the music?)

¹⁴² Hanley, 1997, p. 37