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PROJECT CAMELOT AND MILITARY SPONSORSHIP
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH:
A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

A Dissertation

Submitted to the McAnulty College
and Graduate School of Liberal Arts

Duquesne University

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

Ryan Hunt

November, 2007

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Ryan Hunt

2007

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A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

By

Ryan Hunt

Approved November, 2007

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ABSTRACT

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November, 2007

Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Leswin Laubscher

No. of Pages in Text: 395

“Project Camelot” was an ambitious social science research project conceived and funded by the U.S. Army, one whose scope and level of funding was unprecedented as of its inception in 1964. Its stated purpose was to examine the potential for “internal war” and insurgency in the “developing countries,” and to identify actions that the U.S and its allies could take to prevent or suppress such insurgencies. Historians have described the Project as an event of particular importance in the history of American social science, and have argued that it portended significant changes in their structure and function.

Despite the Project’s grand scale and the equally grand terms in which historians have cast it, there has been a paucity of attention directed at the Project itself from within the social sciences. Furthermore, most such attention has focused primarily on issues such as the feasibility and advisability of the Project or its potential adverse effect on future foreign area-based social science research. There have been no significant analytic or interpretive studies of the Project.

The present study intends to fill this gap, both because the Project is illuminating in its own right and also because it is useful in developing a fuller understanding of social scientists' current involvement in the "War on Terror," involvement which ranges from developing new theories on insurgency to supporting interrogation work in Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib.

This study utilizes Critical Discourse Analysis, rooted in the work of Foucault, to explicate some of the discursive objects, subjects, and formations underlying Camelot, to show how this discourse works to shape and constrain social scientists' understanding of (and the nature of their involvement in) this military-directed work, and to trace discursive connections to the current issues highlighted above. Major discursive formations identified and analyzed include a pervasive attention to terminology selection in order to maximize its propaganda value, the use of medical and psychotherapeutic discursive tropes such as "illness," "prevention," "cure," and "symptom," and the repeated portrayal of social scientists by the military as "engineers" and "contributors" not free to negotiate the terms of their work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

First, I would like to thank the faculty, staff, and students of the Duquesne University psychology department, who have opened my eyes to the range of possibilities that exist within psychological work, and have restored my faith in the transformative power of this work. Many of those who work and study in this program have sacrificed some measure of the opportunities offered within the “mainstream” in order to have the freedom to follow their passion and articulate their vision without the associated mainstream limitations and discursive constraints. Thank you all for helping me toward finding my voice through your fearless use of yours! I could not and would not have completed my doctoral studies anywhere else.

I also must thank a group that somewhat overlaps with the above group (in membership and in spirit)—the staff of Counseling and Psychological Services at Carnegie Mellon University, who have fostered the professional development of so many Duquesne clinical trainees over the years, and whose warmth, humanity, clinical acumen, and sheer enjoyment of their work have helped me to continue to believe in the craft of psychotherapy. Thank you for that and also for accommodating my completion of and defense of this dissertation during my time there.

Thanks also to my committee, Drs. Laubscher, Peña, and Richer, for their patience and support throughout this process. More specifically, thank you to my director, Dr. Leswin Laubscher, for the encouragement and support he has offered me, starting early in my graduate career. In his balance of humor and seriousness, creativity and rigor, and his consistent emphasis on thorough and sustained critical thought and analysis, Dr. Laubscher continues to serve as an example of what a socially-engaged

critical psychologist *is* and *does*, which is no small matter. I am further indebted to Dr. Laubscher for his enthusiasm for and belief in this project from its early stages, and for the tremendous care he took in his many rounds of close and careful editing of the text, which benefited greatly from his meticulous attention.

I could not have so much as begun my graduate studies, let alone completed them, without the consistent support of my parents and sister, my “Big House” family, the Zen Group of Pittsburgh, and my wider Pittsburgh community, all of whom helped me to believe in myself, and who showed me very concretely *why* to ask critical questions rather than simply to accept received wisdom.

My deepest debt of gratitude is to my wife and son, Morgan and Sebastian, whose unconditional love is both a reason to venture out into the world and a refuge from it when I need one most. Thank you for sustaining me (and for putting up with me!) through all the vicissitudes of this process. I continue to learn from and be inspired by both of you, and I hope that I can fulfill my obligations to you and continue to learn from you for years to come. You are my compass and orient the work I do, the man I am, and the man I hope to be.

Finally, a last thank you is due to all those who have stood up to injustice and inhumanity on scales great and small, protested, and fought for change, often at great cost; to those who continue to give the rest of us courage, faith, and a reason to believe that something else, something better, is possible. It is to your efforts, past, present, and future, that this work is dedicated.

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Chapter 1

Project Camelot and its Historical Context

1.1 Introduction: The Fascell Committee and “The Need for More Research”

On Thursday, March 28, 1963, the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives began a series of hearings that ultimately would last over three years. The topic was “Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive.” Congressman Dante Fascell (D-FL) chaired the Subcommittee at the time and convened the hearings in order to explore “the U.S. effort to win the cold war on the battleground of ideas” (House of Representatives, 1964, p. 1). One of his initial goals was an increased U.S. propaganda effort:

In the fight to enlarge the horizons of freedom, and to meet the challenge which confronts us, words and ideas are as important as bread and guns. We cannot hope to achieve our foreign policy goals through military and economic programs alone. In my opinion, the struggle which goes on in the world today will be resolved, ultimately, in the minds of men. And I am convinced that we can, we should, and we must win that contest. (p. 1)

Fascell emphasized his concern regarding the advance in recent years of “Communist psychological warfare” and “Communist ‘wordmanship’,” (p. 1) and asked what the U.S. was currently doing to counter these challenges and what it could do in the future.

The hearings had a sweeping scope, encompassing “governmental and private endeavors relating to the conduct of our diplomacy, to our oversea information programs, to our psychological warfare activities, to our foreign exchange programs, and to related

activities” (p. 1). The Subcommittee planned such a lengthy series of hearings in order to cover the full range of all U.S. nonmilitary and noneconomic foreign relations-related activities. It planned to draw upon the insights of “government officials, on specialists in the field of communications, on leaders in business, in labor, in the academic field, and knowledgeable persons in other walks of life,” (House of Representatives, 1964, p. 2) in order to paint this comprehensive picture. These hearings also took on added significance as they led to the development of ambitious new research programs that eventually would create lasting changes both in the social sciences and in the U.S. military.

The Subcommittee’s first interview was with the distinguished broadcaster-turned-U.S. Information Agency (USIA) Director, Edward R. Murrow, who briefed them on his agency’s activities and the need for expansion of these activities in the future. Murrow was happy to volunteer his agency’s services in the struggle for the minds of men: “in the worldwide ideological conflict, which this committee is now studying, there is much that the U.S. Information Agency can do and is doing to further the cause of freedom and our national interests” (p. 2). Indeed, he recognized a mandate to do just this in his explicit reference to the Jackson Committee’s work ten years earlier regarding the U.S.’s worldwide information program, in which that Committee stated unequivocally that “any program supported by Government funds can only be justified to the extent that it assists in the achievement of national objectives” (p. 2).

When asked by Rep. Fascell how the USIA could fulfill what Murrow had described as its need “to know much more about the people we are seeking to reach, their

hopes, their fears, their prejudices, their thinking processes” (p. 7), Mr. Murrow responded:

Through research, Mr. Chairman, through attempting to measure the effectiveness of the programs...an effort to determine particularly in the newer countries the symbols, indeed, the very language to which they respond. We need to measure more accurately than we have in the past the effect of cultural exhibitions sent abroad.... We do not know as much as we should know about their effect or their relative potency in terms of influencing opinion. (House of Representatives, 1964, p. 7)

One of the many other experts invited to testify before the Subcommittee was a psychologist, Dr. Theodore Vallance. It was protocol for experts to present their qualifications before their testimony, and to this end Dr. Vallance made the following autobiographical remarks on September 13, 1963:

I am a psychologist, a social psychologist by specialty. At the present time I am director of the special operations research office (SORO) of American University, which conducts an organized continuing program of research on psychological operations and cross-cultural relationships which the Army maintains with many countries around the world where the Army is deployed. Prior to joining [SORO], I was deputy director of the human resources research office [HumRRO] of George Washington University, directing research in military training programs, including leadership and motivation. Prior to that I did some leadership research with the Navy, and before that I was an associate professor of psychology at the University of Massachusetts. During the war I served with the aviation psychology program for 4 years. (p. 674)

Dr. Vallance’s testimony underscored what he saw as the vital importance of research, particularly social science research, in guiding the national propaganda effort then being undertaken by Murrow and others (as, no doubt, did his long and varied career applying psychological means to military ends). In his prepared statement, he states that, “Mr. Murrow, I am sure, will agree with the general tenor of what I have to say, and you might consider my remarks as an extension of his general assertion in earlier testimony before

this committee, that there is indeed a need for more and better research to help in the guidance of our various and complex programs which make up the U.S. ideological offensive” (p. 677).

Vallance’s testimony in this regard, as he himself agrees, is not unique or even unusual. Many of the public figures invited to testify in the hearings concurred that more research was needed, as well as more coordination and organization of that research, particularly in the behavioral sciences. Vallance is an important figure in these hearings, however, because hot on the heels of his testimony (in July 1964, to be exact), his organization, SORO, was tapped to receive what at that time was the largest social science research contract in U.S. History (Herman, 1995). The project was dubbed “Project Camelot” and was financed by the Department of Defense at the previously unheard of level of one to one and a half million dollars annually over a projected three to four year span (Beals, 1969). Indeed, its scale was such that some within the social science community referred to it as the “Manhattan Project for the behavioral sciences” (Herman, 1995, p. 156). However, unlike the Manhattan Project, Camelot was fated to be cancelled before it formally began. Its cancellation, though, should not be taken as any indication of change of heart among its sponsors or of the project’s lack of lasting significance or influence.

¹ Regarding the origin of the name “Project Camelot,” Vallance offers the following illuminating commentary in his testimony before the Fascell Committee on July 8, 1965. In response to a question from Rep. Rosenthal (D-NY) about the “background and significance” of the name “Camelot,” Vallance explains: “We discussed this at some length and rejected a number of labels which we thought might be offensive. The label ‘Camelot’ simply emerged from the basic intent of the story which is relayed in the play and in White’s book, that is, the development of a stable society with domestic tranquility and peace and justice for all. This is an objective that seemed to, if we were going to have a code label, connote the right sort of things” (House of Representatives, 1965, p. 20). The reference here is to T.H. White’s (1958/1987) retelling of the Arthurian legends, published as *The Once and Future King*, and subsequently adapted in plays, films, and a musical. Worth noting here is that White himself was a conscientious objector to WWII, and his antiwar sentiments, along with themes of the transition from feudalism to centralized state power, were woven into his retelling of the legend.

The sociologist Irving Horowitz (editor of *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot*, a comprehensive collection of essays and documents pertaining to Camelot) describes Camelot, and specifically its premature cancellation, as “an event of special meaning and particular consequences for the social science industry,” (1967b, p. 4) and speculates that “Camelot’s fate may prove to be the harbinger of vast changes in the structure and function of the social sciences” (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 4). Horowitz (1967a) also states that the essays in his volume primarily deal with the historical facts at hand, rather than attempting to interpret or analyze these facts, and emphasizes his wish that “a set of papers of this...type might be organized at a later date,” adding that he hopes his volume “can serve as reference for precisely such wider-ranging examinations” (p. vii). I agree with Horowitz that such an analysis of this “harbinger of vast changes in the...social sciences” is necessary not only in order to understand Project Camelot itself in its proper context but also to grasp more fully the vast changes which Camelot portended, changes which we continue to see unfolding today and whose effects we continue to feel.

1.2 Rationale for and Outline of This Study

At this point, with the initial horizon of our topic beginning to take shape, it may be useful to step back for a moment and render more explicit the purview of the present study. An immediate goal arises rather clearly from Horowitz’ wish in the previous section, namely to supplement his excellent collection of papers on Camelot with one focused explicitly, as per his stated hope, on the analysis and interpretation of some of the “historical facts at hand.” As already stated, I concur with Horowitz that Project Camelot represents an episode in the history of American social science that is of the utmost

significance, particularly in terms of the changes it portends in their “structure and function.” This study, then, will aim at elucidating the nature of this significance and of these changes.

Such a study is needed because, since Horowitz’ initial exploration of the topic in 1967, the analytic and interpretative studies he called for have yet to appear. In addition, this necessity is augmented by the increased relevance of the topic of Camelot specifically, and of military sponsorship of social science more generally, in an age in which Camelot buzzwords such as “insurgency” and “nation-building” are again on the lips of the nation, population and policy-makers alike, due to the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. These wars follow the contours of Cold War conflicts as outlined in the documents below: they are “limited wars” waged in “developing countries” and their successful prosecution necessitates the shaping of attitudes in the indigenous populations of those countries in order to foster the development of order and stability and to forestall “insurgency” (much more detailed discussion of these terms will be forthcoming in future chapters).

Evidence of this renewed relevance of Camelot and of the issue of military sponsorship of social science in light of these wars and their larger context, the “War on Terror,” can be seen in a 2005 article from the *Military Review* by anthropologist and military consultant, Montgomery McFate. In her article, McFate notes that “in November 2004, the Office of Naval Research and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored the Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security Conference, the first major DOD conference on the social sciences since 1962” (McFate, 2005a, p. 24). (In fact, the minutes of the 1962 conference alluded to here will

form part of the data set of the present study.) McFate bluntly states that our current “cultural knowledge gap” (p. 24) in the military has resulted in our inability to overcome the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and further that the simple and singular cause of this unfortunate impasse is “the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment” since Vietnam, despite its once-exalted status as “the ‘handmaiden of colonialism’” (p. 24). Where, then, are the anthropologists? McFate tackles this question in another article also published in 2005, this time in the military journal *Joint Force Quarterly*: “So where are the anthropologists now that the Government needs them? Although the discipline’s roots are deeply entwined with the military, few anthropologists are interested in national security. Their suspicion of military activity stems from a question of ethics,” (2005b, p. 48) and “this conclusion was based on a number of defense projects that sought to use anthropological tools in potentially harmful ways,” (p. 48) chief among which, McFate observes, was Project Camelot. This renewed relevance of Camelot in light of the U.S.-led military counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan will be explored at more length in the Discussion chapter (Chapter 6), and is only briefly outlined here primarily to provide context for the relevance and timeliness of the current study.

Additionally, further evidence of the renewed relevance of military sponsorship of the social sciences, and particularly psychology, is demonstrated by the recent controversy within the American Psychological Association (APA) over the involvement of psychologists in the interrogation of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, an issue which will also be explored in more detail in the Discussion. The renewed calls to social scientists to re-engage in assisting the military and, by extension, their country

during a time of war, so closely echo those issued during the run-up to Camelot that one would be hard pressed to fail to observe the similarity. What, then, can we learn from Camelot that can inform our understanding of the current “War on Terror” and the role within it being played by social science?

As already noted above, Camelot grew out of a strong and consistent Cold War emphasis on social science research applied to military ends, particularly research focused on propaganda and on improving the effectiveness of the “ideological offensive.” This offensive is concerned with the use and manipulation of words and ideas in order to control and shape understanding (the Free World’s, the Communists’, and any unaligned parties’) of the nature of the struggle at hand: to win control of “hearts and minds” and to prevent the Communists from doing the same. The present study, consequently, will focus specifically on the *language* of Camelot in order to understand the manner in which this language shaped and was shaped by the ends it sought to facilitate, ends such as the establishment of “order” and “stability” in, and the forestalling of “insurgency” in, the “developing countries.” In addition, the study will also pay attention to language for the effects it exerts within the various academic disciplines and government agencies responsible for its production, effects at least partially visible in terms of institutional changes, reorganizations, and shifts in the flow of funding.

After presenting, in the remainder of this chapter, a historical sketch of the progressive intertwining of government and military interests with those of social science over the course of the latter two thirds of the twentieth century as a larger historical context for Camelot and its language, I discuss the present study’s method in more detail in the following two chapters. This method, known as Critical Discourse Analysis

(CDA), is based in part on the work of French philosopher, historian of thought, and social critic, Michel Foucault. Consequently, Chapter 2 involves an exploration of Foucault's theory of discourse as a theoretical foundation for the present study's method. Chapter 3 describes the method of CDA, its history, relation to other schools of thought, and, finally, my particular adaptation of it for this work.

Proceeding from the articulation of theory and method to data and analysis, the first obstacle one must contend with is that, in fact, there *was* no Project Camelot. Due to its premature cancellation, Camelot does not have the vast array of documents, data, and other records one might have access to, had it actually been carried out. In their place are a scant handful of brief official letters written by SORO to various groups. Two of these letters will be taken as part of the data set for this study. The first of these letters makes mention of other documents which form part of the background literature for Camelot: "Of considerable relevance here is a series of recent reports dealing with the problems of national security and the potential contributions that social science might make to solving these problems" (SORO, 1964a, p. 49). These "reports" are two volumes, the first a series of articles by prominent social scientists commissioned by the Office of Naval Research through the Smithsonian Institution and entitled *Social Science Research and National Security* (Pool, ed., 1963), and the second the minutes of a SORO-sponsored symposium (the same symposium cited by McFate [2005a] above) entitled *Proceedings of the Symposium "The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research"* (Lybrand, ed., 1962). Portions of these two volumes will comprise the bulk of the data set, augmented by the two SORO letters mentioned above and also by an article written by Theodore Vallance and one of his SORO colleagues for the *American Psychologist* on

the need for more Camelot-style research. Details as to how this data was collected and analyzed are provided in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

Finally, after enumerating the major discursive themes from these Camelot-era documents and discussing how they function together to achieve their desired effects, Chapter 6 explores these discursive themes in terms of their relation to current issues such as the APA interrogation controversy and the renewed interest in military-sponsored social science research on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and “cultural factors” in the context of Iraq and Afghanistan, as briefly alluded to above. These contemporary echoes and aftereffects of Camelot will be the true measure of its continued relevance today. Throughout, this work will be guided by a consistent focus on the central issue of how the U.S. military, through the various means of direct and indirect influence at its disposal, was able to bring about significant changes in the structure and function of social science research always with concomitant changes in social science discourse, and the ways in which these changes impacted the development of the social sciences, the military itself, the production of subsequent discourse, and even subsequent world events. For now, though, we return to our exploration of some of the historical antecedents of, and context for, Camelot.

1.3 The Social Science Research Council: Social Science and Social Control

Between 1966 and 1968, the National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council² (NAS-NRC) commissioned a comprehensive book-length survey exploring the

² The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was created in 1863 during the Lincoln administration. It was conceived as an independent body of scientists (*not* a government program or agency) which would render

“use and support of social and behavioral science research by agencies of the federal government” (Lyons, 1969, p. ix). The NAS-NRC commissioned this survey largely due to the perceived need to investigate and assess the fallout from the cancellation of Camelot and possible detrimental effects its cancellation might have on social science research, and also in order to “provide an historical record and perspective against which to examine current issues of social science in the federal government” (p. xi). The “current issues” at that time centered on “suspicions about the role of research under government auspices,” (p. ix) suspicions largely fueled by the public relations fiasco that followed Camelot’s demise. Collecting and publishing the results was the primary responsibility of the Executive Secretary of the Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences, Gene Lyons (this Committee itself was formed by the NAS-NRC in order to look into Camelot and its potential adverse effects on military sponsorship of social scientific research).

Responding to the questions and issues so raised, Lyons (1969) begins by noting that the basic questions asked by social science have also long been asked in an applied context by the U.S. government. However, prior to the early twentieth century, these two groups were asking these similar questions quite separately from one another. Obstacles to government usage of social science research stemmed from a perceived lack of methodological rigor and the seemingly inescapable vagueness of its data and objects of

advice to the Federal government in scientific matters. The most urgent matters, early on, took the form of military issues during the Civil War. However, the Academy also gave input on a variety of other issues. The National Research Council (NRC) was created by the NAS as a subsidiary group during WWI, in part to oversee the coordination of scientific research directed toward wartime needs, the demand for which greatly increased during the war years. Once the war ended, however, instead of being decommissioned, the NRC was kept on, and was even made a permanent part of the NAS in 1950 under the guidance of then-president of the NAS, Dr. Detlev Bronk, essentially institutionalizing the group’s role as a privately-funded provider of scientifically based advice (much of it still military-oriented) to the government. (Cochrane, 1978)

study. This was particularly apparent in comparison to the “hard” physical sciences, which were already receiving generous federal funding, haven already proven themselves to be great assets both in military and civilian work by the 1920s. For instance, Lyons (1969) cites Walter Lippman, who observes that the social scientist at the turn of the last century “has little inner certainty about his own work...only half believes it...his data are uncertain, his means of verification lacking,” (Lippmann, 1922/2007, pp. 279-280)

whereas:

the physical scientists achieved their freedom from clericalism by working out a method that produced conclusions of a sort that could not be suppressed or ignored. They convinced themselves and acquired dignity, and knew what they were fighting for. The social scientist will acquire his dignity and his strength when he has worked out his method. He will do that by turning to opportunity the need among directing men of the Great Society for instruments and analysis. (Lippmann, 1922/2007, p. 280)

Lyons goes on to observe, “indeed, the Social Science Research Council [SSRC], founded in the early 1920’s as a source of intellectual and financial support for social scientists in universities, had as a major objective the encouragement of increasingly rigorous methods of research,” (1969, p. 8) which would help make their results more useful to the government. Another impetus for the SSRC was to serve as a counterbalance to the “trend toward specialization and isolation,” (p. 42) which was then increasing in university-based social science, and to foster more interdisciplinary work.

The SSRC began its work in December 1923, under the guidance and stewardship of Charles E. Merriam, an early political scientist from the University of Chicago and past President of the American Political Science Association (Lyons, 1969). Merriam was interested in “the study of ‘systematic politics’,” (p. 43) and “the relationship of scientific knowledge to political power” (p. 43). He founded the SSRC to pursue these

interests; to make social science relevant to state concerns; to “extend the application of empirical and inductive methods to the full range of social science; to elicit greater university support for research in the social sciences; and to found an institution comparable to the National Research Council which represented the physical and biological sciences” (p. 44) to the government.

The SSRC received the bulk of its early funding from the Rockefeller foundation, specifically the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial, which (due in large part to the efforts of its director, social scientist Beardsley Rumel) granted over \$40 million to the development of the social sciences between 1922 and 1929, at which point the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial formally became the Rockefeller Foundation’s Division of Social Science (Berman, 1983). Although the SSRC benefited greatly from the Rockefeller foundation, however, it also set its sights on other foundation support, and on the bountiful reserves of the federal government.

Merriam soon found an opportunity to pursue this funding when, in 1929, President Hoover established his Research Committee on Social Trends, appointing Merriam as Vice Chairman. The Committee’s Chairman, Wesley Mitchell, was a friend of Merriam’s, a fellow social scientist, and, incidentally, was also a close friend of Hoover’s. The Committee’s resultant two-volume report, *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, was released in 1932, at the very end of Hoover’s administration and immediately before the incoming administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt took office (Lyons, 1969). The report “included a sweeping but penetrating analysis of almost every aspect of American life with each section written by a leading scholar” (Lyons, 1969, p. 47). The report’s creation coincided with the onset of the Great Depression and, as such,

the report cautioned its readers (policy-makers, almost exclusively) about the dangers of widespread social instability to established power structures. It emphasizes “a need for ‘conscious control,’” and states that “‘the means of social control’ were only to be found in ‘social discovery and the wider adoption of new knowledge’” (p. 48). Indeed, the report, perhaps predictably, recommends that such control and the knowledge on which to base it are likely to come from none other than the social scientist, and that the policy-maker would do well to listen to what the scientist has to say:

The report on social trends openly broached the issue of the role of social science research in government. The nature of social change called for planning at every level of society and for a more active role for government in the national life. What was required was a “willingness and determination to undertake important and integral changes in the reorganization of social life...[and] recognition of the role science must play in such [a process].” (Lyons, 1969, p. 48)

Roosevelt, like Hoover before him, felt it both necessary and expedient to heed the admonitions cited above (in no small part, perhaps, because of the temporal confluence of the SSRC *Recent Trends* report with the Depression and resultant New Deal programs). So did others in positions of power, a number of whom felt their hold on that power to be threatened.

Edward Berman (1983), documenting the history of major foundation influence on American foreign and domestic policy, cites Raymond Fosdick, then president of the Rockefeller foundation, opining to a friend, “...in a chaotic world like this, have the social sciences a contribution to make to the problem of human control? If so, what is it, and how do the social sciences propose to go about it?” (Berman, 1983, p. 106). Similarly, John Van Sickle, then associate director of the foundation’s newly renamed Division of Social Science gave the following cautionary assessment of the situation:

Existing insecurity and catastrophic decline in standards with mass unemployment constitutes a serious threat to the existing system.... There can be no question that the very existence of the social order is at stake. Unless a satisfactory solution can be found soon, men and women will demand a change. (Berman, 1983, p. 106)

As a result, Berman argues, the major foundations greatly increased support for “academics who had the promise of elaborating social science theories that would contribute to social stability” (p. 106). These themes of stability and social control will recur in the Camelot documents in the context of the “developing countries,” and Berman (1983) also mentions their relevance in the development of the social sciences and in international development: “Funding from the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller foundations played central roles in encouraging certain trends within these disciplines, which in turn were important in the subsequent formulation of developmental theory for Third-World nations” (p. 106). Of course, we are getting ahead of ourselves here somewhat.

What could not be doubted in the wake of the *Recent Trends* report was that “the New Deal made permanent a place for social scientists in government that had been gaining acceptance since the turn of the century” (Lyons, 1969, p. 52). Indeed, “many social scientists came to serve as policy advisers and as political appointees, roles traditionally assigned to lawyers and businessmen” (p. 52). Thus, in Lyons’ analysis, the movement of the social sciences (as represented by the SSRC) toward a scientific methodology based on the objectivity, empiricism and methodology of the natural sciences, was in large part a movement in search of the vital federal funding that would help to insure their future growth and development. In short, the social sciences became viable to the government to the extent that they adopted methods from the physical

sciences and directed their research toward problems and perspectives which would benefit government interests. To the extent that they did this, they reaped the benefits of their new relevance to government in terms of federal funding and foundation grants. Thus, from the beginning this “development” of the social sciences was a *motivated* and *directed* one and not some naturally occurring aspect of the “evolution” of the field (indeed, we will return to this notion of the “development” of the social sciences in Chapter 5). What, then, did the social sciences do with their newfound objectivity, empiricism, and governmental relevance? They traded on it.

1.4 Psychology’s Heroic Homecoming

The history of government sponsorship of, and utilization of social science research, as noted above, goes back to the 1920’s and the New Deal (and in some cases even earlier), but the relationship really took off during World War II. Psychology in particular showed itself to be of immense importance to the U.S. military establishment in a variety of areas including intelligence testing and effective utilization of new enlistees (Gould, 1981; Herman, 1995); psychological warfare, propaganda, and domestic troop morale and cohesiveness (Herman, 1995; Lerner, 1971); and man-machine interfaces and ergonomics (Bray, 1948; Lanier, 1949). Psychologists even lent their expertise to the design, construction, and operating of the Japanese internment camps which would eventually house over 112,000 Japanese Americans living on the Pacific coast (Herman, 1995).

Herman (1995), for instance, notes that, “before the United States had been in the war for a year, a full 25 percent of all Americans holding graduate degrees in psychology

were at work on various aspects of the military crisis, most employed full-time by the federal government” (p. 18). She adds that, “the war ended amid a loud chorus of self-congratulation such as the following: ‘the application of psychology in selecting and training men, and in guiding the design of weapons so they would fit men, did more to help win this war than any other single intellectual activity’” (p. 19). This high praise was spoken by Captain Lybrand Palmer Smith, the Navy representative to the National Defense Resource Council.

Herman (1995) goes on to point out that “the reputation of psychological experts had risen from one of lowly technicians to one of wise consultants and managers whose wartime accomplishments, especially in the military, deserved a generous payoff in public appreciation and government funds. In retrospect, it seemed clear that the war had given psychology its biggest boost ever,” (p. 19) and as a result, between 1920 and 1946, “American Psychological Association membership had grown more than elevenfold...from 393 to 4,427. At the close of World War II, around 1,700 psychologists,” (a number equivalent to 38 percent of the APA membership at the time), “worked directly for the World War II military” (p. 20). Furthermore, psychology “would experience a historically unprecedented postwar growth curve, far outstripping general population growth or even the spectacular growth of the health-related professions,” (p. 20) both of which mushroomed during the baby boom years.

1.5 The Cold War, Project TROY, and CENIS

In fact, post-war government sponsorship of psychological- and social scientific research didn’t taper off, as it had done after World War I, but actually increased, largely

due to the more intractable and less militarily addressable concerns of the Cold War. Indeed, the Cold War, with its immense, varied, and seemingly insatiable demands for propaganda and psychological warfare research, proved to be a great boon for the already-thriving postwar field of psychology and, more broadly, social science. One project which typifies this Cold War demand for social science research (and which provides an illuminating prelude to, and early context for, Project Camelot) is Project TROY. Historian Allan Needell (1993) provides the following summary of the project:

Named after the legendary city brought low by a wooden horse, Project TROY was funded by the State Department and organized under a contract with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It convened in October 1950 at the State Department's request, bringing together for a period of almost three months a group of twenty-one distinguished scientists, social scientists, and historians, most of whom were academics.

Project TROY was conceived as a way to "bring together the best brains in the country" to solve or point the way toward solution of the vexing problem of "getting the truth behind the Iron Curtain."....

Project TROY marked the formal extension of an already extensive network of government associations with academic and industrial scientists and engineers that the U.S. military had carefully nurtured during and after World War II.... [But] it was the first of these enterprises to include a significant number of university-based social scientists among its working members. (pp. 399-400)

Needell also situates this project in terms of a "long-simmering discontent within the State Department over the way the military and the CIA kept tight control over their own intelligence and research activities," (1993, p. 403) and the "profound struggle for influence and for access to experts among the various military and civilian agencies of the executive branch" (p. 403). These conflicts and struggles between Defense and State are important not only because they prefigure those that would erupt in the aftermath of Camelot, but also because they propel the two departments down similar research paths,

each vying for the larger share of experts and funding, and each jealously guarding its own research and results.

For instance, Needell notes that, “in March 1950 the President approved a National Security Council report (NSC-59) that called once again for increasing psychological warfare planning and for placing the responsibility for coordinating such activities squarely on the secretary of state,” (Needell, 1993, p. 404) including the organization of “a symposium on propaganda and political warfare” in April of that year. In the meantime, however, “the military continued to pursue its own interests in political warfare. In May 1950 the Joint Chiefs of Staff formally requested....Donald Marquis, a University of Michigan psychologist...to call together a conference of academic experts....which took place from 10-11 August [and] covered much of the same ground that the State Department symposium had in April” (pp. 404-405). Ultimately, the research contract for TROY was coordinated between the State Department and James Killian, then-president of MIT, although the Defense research into “political warfare” was still ongoing.

Initially, Killian was cautious about working with State, partially due to “Senator Joseph R. McCarthy’s (R-WI) extended attack on Acheson and other employees of the State Department,” (p. 406) and wanted to involve Defense in the project in some capacity. Ultimately, though, his enthusiasm for the project outweighed any political reservations he might have had about adverse publicity. In an appeal to Harvard provost Paul Buck for staffing help, Killian enthusiastically characterizes TROY as follows:

An exceedingly important project on ways of getting information behind the iron curtain. This involves difficult and complex technical problems, particularly an effort to find ways of preventing jamming operations of the Russians. It involves the broad problems of information theory,

psychology, and other aspects having to do with the effectiveness of the kind of information we transmit. The project will also have great importance to the National Defense Establishment and the progress towards the objectives set up by the State Department could yield important military benefits.... The problem posed by the State Department is an exceedingly important one, perhaps one of the most important in our total national defense planning. I believe, too, that this kind of project may provide a pilot program for the study and review of many different kinds of important problems in government. (Needell, 1993, p. 406)

Perhaps, if one were so inclined, one might read a bit of excitement over future government research contracts into Killian's remarks above. There may also have been similar excitement in the Project TROY team's report that, "social science research, if supported in the manner technical research had been supported by the military since World War II, would eventually pay powerful dividends" (p. 411). Needell adds the following:

perhaps the most fruitful of all the Project TROY recommendations...especially given that bureaucratic infighting over psychological warfare continued almost unabated...were those on recruiting competent researchers. In one of the annexes to the main report, five of TROY's social scientists and historians wrote that "careful planning of basic research requirements carried out jointly by policy makers, government research officers, and university scholars implemented by a flexible policy of contractual grants to university centers can be of immense help in assuring a backlog of vital basic research." The group added that it was "desirable that as much research as possible be allocated by contract to private research centers and universities in order that a wide array of talent outside of the Government may be brought to bear on the critical problems of political warfare."... The group also proposed that a new kind of research institute be created on university campuses. "These institutes could carry out government research programs in the field of political warfare utilizing university personnel...which would permit university specialists to remain in their "home atmospheres" during leaves of absence from university duties. (1993, p. 415).

These recommendations were apparently so convincing to those in power that a “second phase” of Project TROY was launched even before the final report of the first phase was completed. The fourth of the four components of this second phase was, according to Needell, “the establishment at MIT of a permanent model research institute of the sort described in the original TROY report [above].... [It] led directly to the creation of the present-day MIT Center for International Studies (CENIS). In January 1952, after serving with the CIA [as assistant to the director], [MIT economist] Max Millikan returned to MIT, established CENIS, and became its first director,” (pp. 416-417). CENIS was funded jointly by the Ford Foundation and the CIA (Herman, 1995) and served, as the original TROY team had hoped, as a model for similar programs at other universities, programs such as SORO at American University, which would come to oversee the development of Project Camelot.

CENIS would eventually become a lightning rod for student protests on the MIT campus during widespread demonstrations against the Vietnam War, and against universities’ support of that war in 1969 and 1970 (Nelkin, 1972). However, an air of secrecy surrounded much of the CENIS work, and this secrecy was only increased by the “classified” nature of much of the work there (and in other similar social science research labs):

the high level of classification and obvious international and domestic sensitivity of political warfare made security a fact of life for the social science programs as well. Consequently, there was no open discussion of the academic community’s growing commitment to serve the needs of the state. Government support of research quickly began to move beyond the sciences and engineering to include the academic disciplines of anthropology, economics, psychology, sociology, political science, and history, yet the potential impact of such support—direct or indirect—on the quality and independence of research and on the teaching of these subjects remained largely unevaluated. (Needell, 1993, p. 418)

Needell goes on to observe that the subsequent student demonstrations and widespread disillusionment with CENIS and government-sponsored research in general among students was somewhat ironic because the TROY report had warned specifically against such potential negative consequences of government sponsorship, particularly in a context of secrecy. Writing in one of the annexes to the first TROY report, MIT historian Elting Morison cautioned that government:

authority to control large sections of the environment presents at least a threat to some of the historic qualities that we have heretofore assumed to be an inherent part of our way of life.... The single purpose of the garrison state tends, naturally, to absorb the attention of all intelligences—whether in industry, government, or university. This concentration on a single problem or set of problems will tend to reduce not only the variety of intellectual work, but will tend also to reduce...the American bump of curiosity.... There is pause in the thought...that universities are, in this society, one of the great wellsprings of ideas and that the source of supply for these springs is the unobstructed flow of information and ideas. (Needell, 1993, pp. 418-419)

His recommendations to forestall the drying up of the flow of ideas and the absorption of attention by the single purpose of government included research on the impact of the Cold War on American society and on methods for minimizing its negative effects. He urges in the Annex report, “a research program that will pool the energy and wisdom of historians, anthropologists, economists and psychologists to analyze the possible effects of prolonged preparedness upon this society and to provide us with a basis for dealing intelligently with the life that lies immediately before us” (Needell, 1993, p. 419).

Commenting on this notion, Needell offers the following: “although the acute sense of emergency that pervaded the winter of 1950-1951 would pass, many of the institutions, habits, and relationships born in crisis would long endure. What Morison could not have

known was that, emergency or not, the nation would remain at war (sometimes cold, sometimes hot) for upward of forty years” (Needell, 1993, p. 419).

With regard to Project Camelot, then, the links between it and Project TROY are many and anything but indirect. As much as Camelot represented a new direction and a new magnitude for military-oriented social science research under government auspices, it was also drawing on a long tradition of such work that had gone before, much of that work motivated by similar (cold and hot) wartime concerns of dissemination of propaganda, attitude formation, and social control, some of it even conducted in the same university departments and laboratories such as SORO, HumRRO, CENIS, and others. Also, members of CENIS comprised a significant portion of the social scientists contributing their work to the Smithsonian study (Pool, ed., 1963) and the SORO-sponsored symposium (Lybrand, ed., 1962), both of which—the reader will recall—were as central to Camelot’s conception then, as they are to an understanding thereof in the present.

1.6 The Emergence of SORO

Lyons (1969) observes that during the time period encompassing the development of CENIS, and after the conclusion of Project TROY, the ongoing demands of the Cold War continued to influence military demands for social science research, such that:

in 1956, to support its overseas operations, the Army had set up the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) under arrangements with the American University. In the beginning the work of SORO was limited to preparing handbooks and manuals for troops overseas and materials for the instruction of units being trained for overseas duty. With the development of the counter-insurgency mission in the early 1960’s, however, the SORO program was expanded to include studies of insurrection, instructions in guerrilla warfare for the newly organized U.S.

Special Forces, and broadly conceived studies of social change such as Project Camelot. (pp. 193-194)

Lyons links the expansion of responsibilities of SORO with the results of the “Draper report,” a report issued by the presidential committee headed by William H. Draper and assigned to study the American foreign aid program in response to criticisms of its heavily military orientation. The Draper report came back with a strong defense of military-guided foreign aid:

In its conclusions, the Draper committee saw nothing wrong with the balance between military and economic assistance. On the contrary, it asserted: “the Military Assistance Program has provided the mortar giving cohesion, strength and credibility to our collective security arrangements.” It thus related the program to the policy of deterrence: “Our accepted strategy of collective security has been, and is dependent on effective local deterrent forces as well as on the global deterrent provided by our nuclear strategic forces....” [The report] pointed out that the military training program, then involving “more than 10,000 foreign nationals a year...[could] do far more than merely teach recipients to use military equipment and materials.” The program could be broadened to meet the “serious shortage of trained people with the broad range of skills which are needed,” and would be especially effective because, “in some of the less developed countries, a large proportion of the managerial and executive skills that exist are in [the] armed forces. (Lyons, 1969, p. 192)

Lyons asserts that this report’s strong advocacy of the continuing increase of support for militaries in the developing countries, along with the “counter-insurgency mission that was specifically assigned to the military by the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960’s,” (1969, pp. 190-191) led to the increasing responsibilities assigned to the Army in general, and to SORO in particular.

It also led to the formation of yet another special study group, this one established in 1961 through the Smithsonian Institution and under the chairmanship of Ithiel de Sola Pool, himself then at MIT’s CENIS program:

Included in the studies sponsored by the group were analyses of the role of social science research with regard to internal war, military development in the new countries [encouraged by the Draper report], and population issues, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the world.... the Pool group made no recommendations for a broad research program. Instead, its report consisted of a series of papers on selected areas of national security; the authors reviewed the state of social science research in the field and suggested the kind of work they thought should be supported. In his introduction, Pool...noted that “a major step forward in the development of a body of knowledge of security relevance can be achieved by the defense establishment if it chooses to put an adequate level of consistent and long-term support behind such social researchers as are willing to turn their attention to its problems.” (Lyons, 1969, pp. 194-195)

The articles generated by the “Pool group” were published in March, 1963 by the Smithsonian Institution under the collective title *Social Science Research and National Security*, and selected articles from that volume will comprise a significant portion of the data I will analyze in this study. Furthermore, as mentioned above, that document, along with another consisting of the minutes of a March 1962 Army symposium sponsored by SORO and hosted by the American University, were cited by SORO in its first written description of Project Camelot as “of considerable relevance” (SORO, 1964a, p.49) to Camelot’s stated purposes.

1.7 The Creation of Camelot

At this point, Dr. Theodore Vallance, then-director of SORO, armed with congressional approval after his recent testimony before the Fascell Committee and with no less than a Presidential mandate represented by President Kennedy’s recent assigning to the Army of a significant new “counterinsurgency mission” discussed above, set to work on the project that would realize the goals of these various parties: Project Camelot.

Outside of the government offices and hearings discussed above, the first people to hear about Camelot were the social scientists (“a select list of scholars around the world,” as Horowitz [1967b, p. 4] described them) who were contacted by the Office of the Director of SORO, Dr. Theodore Vallance, through a letter dated December 4, 1964. The letter invited them to participate in the project and also in a four-week planning meeting to be held at a country house in Virginia in August, 1965. This letter is interesting because it represents the first (semi-) public presentation of Camelot by an agency already obviously attuned to the importance of presentation and propaganda. The letter begins:

Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations in the world. Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are:

First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies;

Second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and

Finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information for doing the above two things. (SORO, 1964a, pp. 47-48)

Additionally, one day later, another document was issued by SORO, this one a “working paper” intended primarily for a military audience, and it delves in some greater detail into the particular understandings of such terms as “insurgency,” “counterinsurgency,” “limited-war,” and so forth that would be employed in the study. These two documents will be reviewed in more detail below, as they also represent part of the data set for the present study.

1.8 Cancellation of Camelot

One of the social scientists invited by SORO to participate in the June 1965 planning retreat was Dr. Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist from the University of Oslo. Dr. Galtung was then working in Chile with the Latin American Faculty of Social Science (FLACSO) and regarded as an expert in South American sociology. He was initially intended by SORO to be one of the lead scientists in Camelot (the December 4 letter, described above, notes that each scientist participating in the June 1965 summer planning conference would have a role in determining the shape that the Camelot research eventually took). However, Dr. Galtung wrote a reply on April 22, 1965 to Dr. Rex Hopper, Camelot's director, indicating that he could not accept the invitation for several reasons. He could not accept, in Horowitz' words, "the notion of the Army as an agency of development," (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 12) rather than one which manages or even promotes conflict. He could not accept what he described as the "imperialist features," (pp. 12-13) of the research design, nor could he accept "the asymmetry of the project," (p. 13) in terms of its one-sided focus on U.S. intervention in Latin America always from the perspective of U.S. interests, and its constant, tacit assumption that suppressing insurgencies would always contribute to greater national security and stability in Latin America.

Not only did Galtung take issue with the design and the intent of Camelot, but, as Horowitz notes:

Obviously and openly, Dr. Galtung had spoken to others in Oslo, Santiago, and throughout Latin America about the project. He had clearly shown the memorandum of December 4th to many of his colleagues, and

presumably it was from his copy of the memorandum that a Spanish language version was fashioned and circulated. (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 13)

At the same time that Dr. Galtung was in Chile corresponding with Dr. Hopper and circulating the December 4th letter, another figure associated (albeit more loosely) with Camelot was also making connections in Chile. He was Dr. Hugo Nuttini, Assistant Professor of Anthropology at the University of Pittsburgh. He was a native Chilean but at the time a U.S. citizen. Nuttini strongly desired to be a part of Camelot, as no doubt did many American social scientists at the time. He pled his case to Camelot director Rex Hopper, but was never made a formal member of the Camelot team. However, because of his perseverance and his connections in Chilean social science circles, he was paid a nominal fee and asked “to report on the possibilities of gaining the cooperation of professional personnel” (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 12) within Latin America and specifically Chile. Hopper insisted that this work not be formally aligned with Camelot. Nonetheless, as Horowitz notes, “Nuttini somehow managed to convey the impression of being a direct official of Project Camelot and of having the authority to make proposals to prospective Chilean participants” (p. 12). This is even more curious considering that at that time Chile was not one of the countries designated as part of the Camelot study.

On the very same date that Galtung had fired off his angry missive to Hopper indicting the project on the grounds outlined above, Nuttini met with the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Chile for the purpose of inviting that University to consider future involvement in the project. As Nuttini made his rounds as a self-styled Camelot ambassador, Herman (1995) states that he repeatedly “tried to promote the plan among Chilean scholars by lying to them about its fiscal sponsors; he told them it was funded by

the National Science Foundation (NSF),” (p. 157) when in fact it was funded through the Army and thus ultimately through the Department of Defense (DOD) and, what’s more, the source of funding had never been classified and was open knowledge to all who cared to inquire. In what may very well have been a trap crafted to catch Nuttini, the Vice-Chancellor also invited another professor, Professor Fuenzalida from the University of Chile, to attend the session with Nuttini that day. As Horowitz recounts, “after half an hour’s exposition, Professor Fuenzalida...asked Nuttini point-blank to specify the ultimate aims of the project, its sponsors, and its political implications. Before an answer was forthcoming, Professor Fuenzalida, apparently with considerable drama, pulled a copy of the December 4th circular letter from his briefcase and read a prepared Spanish translation” (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 13). This translation was no doubt received either directly or indirectly from Dr. Galtung.

From there, the matter was turned over to the Chilean Senate and the left-wing Chilean press, which “blazed forth with banner headlines and with such terms as ‘intervention,’ ‘imperialism,’ and the ‘scandal of Project Camelot’” (p. 13). This heated and widespread denunciation of Camelot within the Chilean press pressured the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Ralph Dungan, to send his own protest to Washington, which “asked for an unconditional cancellation of Project Camelot’s Chilean activities,” (p. 13) activities which, he pointed out, were being undertaken without his knowledge. The opposition in the Chilean press continued to spread, even hinting that Camelot was part of a U.S. plan “to determine the possibility of an anti-democratic coup” (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 14) in Chile.

This last objection is quite interesting, since one of the projects spawned from Camelot's ashes was concerned with exactly such a question and eventually helped speed events toward the assassination of Chilean President Salvador Allende. The project relied on a computer model of Chilean society. Dubbed "Politica," the computer program "was first loaded with data about hundreds of social psychological variables...degree of group cohesiveness, levels of self-esteem, attitudes toward authority, and so on.... In the case of Chile...the game's results eventually gave the green light to policy-makers who favored murdering Allende in the plan to topple Chile's leftist government. Politica had predicted that Chile would remain stable even after a military takeover and the president's death" (Herman, 1995, p. 170). Another, perhaps even more salient, connection between Camelot and Politica comes through social scientist and defense consultant Clark Abt, whose consulting firm Abt Associates received the DOD's Advanced Research Projects Agency's (ARPA) 1965 contract to design Politica. Only several months previously, Abt had been a consultant on Project Camelot (Herman, 1995, p. 169). Obviously Camelot's cancellation didn't hurt Abt's career in military work.

Eventually, "under the pressure of State Department officials and the parallel pressure of Congressional reaction Project Camelot was halted in midstream, or more precisely, before it ever really got under way" (Horowitz, 1967b, p. 14). As Herman (1995) states:

Finally, the whole project was cancelled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara on 8 July 1965 because of all the unfavorable publicity. A subsequent memo from President Johnson, dated 2 August 1965, ordered that all future foreign area research be cleared by a new review agency, the Foreign Affairs Research Council, located in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. (p. 157)

One of the key aspects of this memo is that it places future foreign area research squarely under Department of State (DOS) supervision. One of the chronic disputes that dogged Camelot during its short life was its DOD sponsorship and the concern among DOS personnel, both domestic- and foreign-based, and among government officials more widely, that this would convey the wrong sort of image abroad and that such research should be conducted through proper diplomatic channels, meaning through the DOS and foreign embassies.

1.9 Aftermath of Camelot

Given the tremendous amount of bad press, both nationally and internationally, generated by Camelot (and in light of its roots in the Fascell Committee's intense concern over "winning hearts and minds"—a concern reflected even in the title of "Project Camelot" itself, insofar as SORO chose the name to "connote the right sort of things"), one might reasonably expect the project's sponsors to be somewhat upset that Camelot ended up working exactly counter to the interests and aims of the committee. And, in fact, on the very day of Camelot's cancellation by Robert McNamara, Dr. Vallance found himself back in front of Rep. Fascell and his Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, this time having to account for Camelot's premature and disgraceful demise. One might also reasonably expect that in addition to Dr. Vallance and SORO, some of the blame for this distressing state of affairs might fall on the social scientists involved, particularly Mr. Nuttini as the precipitating agent of its demise and perhaps also Dr. Rex Hopper the project's director, and on military sponsorship of social

science research more generally. As Robert Nisbet noted, “for American social scientists...Camelot was dynamite that might easily spell disaster for future foreign-area research everywhere” (1967, p. 315). However, this was not the case.

Nisbet, again, observes about Camelot that “nothing in Camelot’s life was as fertile to the social sciences, as pregnant with issue, as its corpse; the corpse that was ordered exhumed for Congressional autopsy almost before its last breath” (1967, p. 315). Regarding the transcript of the Fascal Committee hearings on Camelot’s demise, he adds:

I can think of nothing more edifying for social scientists than a reading of this two-hundred page document; edifying and flattering....Let it be trumpeted far and wide: The federal government, starting with the subcommittee whose job it was to look into Camelot’s coffin, and going all the way across town to Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, love the behavioral sciences; love them not despite but, apparently, because of their sins.

In fact, one discovers, as he reads through the text of the Report, the behavioral sciences are miraculously found free of sin.... Far from caricature or hostility, there is only respect, courtesy, and seriousness of interest in the contributions of the behavioral sciences and in their proper status in the federal government.... The behavioral sciences [are] characterized as “one of the vital tools in the arsenal of the free societies,” and a concluding recommendation [is] made that funds for their subvention be greatly increased and their official status honored by inclusion in the Executive Office of the President as well as in a national foundation. (Nisbett, 1967, pp. 315-317)

As Horowitz explains, the project’s termination “does not entail the end of [SORO] nor does it imply an end to research designs that are similar in character to Project Camelot. In fact, the termination of the contract does not even imply an intellectual change of heart on the part of the originating sponsors or key figures of the project” (1967b, p. 17) (evidence for this notion comes from such other projects as Politica, mentioned above, which were developed either shortly after or even during Camelot, and from repeated

Subcommittee calls for “more research”). Horowitz adds, in keeping with Nisbet’s analysis above, that “the project was criticized and attacked far more in terms of extrinsic issues of strategies and timing than on intrinsic issues of research design. The mystique of social science seemed to have been taken for granted by friends and foes of the Project alike” (1967b, p. 17).

Certainly, whatever one’s opinion about the ethics and merits of government sponsorship of social science research, this hardly sounds like the outcome one would expect from the huge public relations fiasco that Camelot became. One of the results of Camelot’s cancellation which might have been reasonably expected, however, pertained to long-standing conflicts between the departments of State and Defense, in this case over supervision of foreign-area social science research.

In a summary report on Camelot written by Rep. Fascell for his committee’s investigation into its cancellation, entitled “Behavioral Sciences and the National Security,” Fascell acknowledges the dangers of military sponsorship of foreign affairs research but qualifies this with criticism of the DOS:

It is not entirely surprising...that the U.S. Army’s sponsorship of Project Camelot aroused some concern. What is more to the point, however, is that others who have more central responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs and who are directly involved in the task of promoting economic and social progress in the developing countries, had not initiated this type of research themselves.... At present, the bulk of research on subjects relating to U.S. foreign policy continues to be conducted or sponsored by our Military Establishment. Secretary [of State] Rusk testified that approximately \$30 million is spent each year by the U.S. Government on research in the behavioral and social sciences and that the Department of State accounts for less than 1 percent of this annual outlay. (House of Representatives, 1965, p. 6R)

To help alleviate this imbalance, the committee recommended such measures as the establishment of an Office of the Behavioral Sciences Adviser to the President, a White House Conference on Behavioral Sciences, the creation of a National Social Science Foundation independent of the pre-existing National Science Foundation, etc. These particular recommendations were not ultimately acted upon, but the underlying concerns which gave rise to them, particularly the lack of DOS sponsorship of research and the lack of overarching coordination of such research, were repeated throughout the 1965 hearings. For instance, Rep. Fraser, in questioning Dr. Vallance, observes:

The fact that this kind of basic research is being undertaken on behalf of the military I don't find to be a discredit to the military. I find it to be an indication of a lack on the part of our Government of someone else who should have more central responsibility for this kind of research.... This suggests to me there is something wrong. Not on your part because you are doing a job, but in terms of the assignment or allocation of responsibilities within our Government.... Ultimately, our goal for these nations is the development of mature economic systems predicated on their own sovereignty. When we are working with these nations to help them, it seems to me it ought not to be the military that is providing the main thrust for this, and the research that is involved ought not to be flowing from the military. (House of Representatives, 1965, pp. 17-18)

Horowitz attributes some of this role confusion between DOS and DOD to the changing nature of U.S. policies and political conflicts in the cold war: "in some sense too, the divisions between Defense and State are outcomes of the rise of ambiguous politicomilitary conflicts such as Korea and Vietnam, in contrast to the more precise and diplomatically controlled 'classical' wars. What are the lines dividing political policy from military posture?" (1967b, p. 19).

1.10 Reactions to Camelot

As was mentioned previously (and is demonstrated by the passages cited above), the initial criticism of Camelot voiced both by the academic community and by the military and government agencies connected to it had more to do with issues of diplomacy, tact, and appearances than with any substantive concerns about the nature of the research, the methodology, or the wider issue of military sponsorship of social science studies. As Horowitz (1967b, p. 17) notes, “The project was criticized and attacked far more in terms of extrinsic issues of strategies and timing than on intrinsic issues of research design. The mystique of social science seemed to have been taken for granted by friends and foes of the Project alike.” Horowitz, in the same article, adds that “serious critical analysis of Project Camelot remains at the private level or at the denunciatory stage. These comments usually concern the way in which the sponsors of Camelot went about their work rather than the contents of their outlook” (1967b, p. 23). Furthermore, such critical analysis was made even more difficult for U.S. social scientists because of the obvious fact that “many ‘giants of the field’ are involved in government contract work in one capacity or another. And few souls are in a position to tamper with the gods” (Horowitz, 1967b, pp. 22-23). Anthropologist Ralph Beals, for instance, in his *Politics of Social Research* (a volume commissioned by the American Anthropological Association to assess that discipline’s role in Camelot and the subsequent impact the scandal might have on anthropological field work) begins by observing coolly that, “social scientists have a responsibility to government even if they do not agree with government practices. They must face the implications of involvement with

governments, evaluate their responsibilities to governments...and act effectively” (Beals, 1969, p. 4).

The immediate response to Camelot by *American Psychologist*, the organ of the American Psychological Association, is informative in this regard. The “introductory note” to the May 1966 issue contains the following statements about Camelot:

If psychological testing had not caused so much public controversy over the past year, it is very likely that, at least in Washington and among behavioral scientists, 1965 would be remembered as the year of “Project Camelot.”... Without accepting or rejecting the basic merits of the research design, one can at least say that Camelot had enlisted at the outset the interest of some extraordinary talent. If Camelot had been brought to fruition, it would have been a most unusual expenditure of talent and money in an attempt to learn about important attitudes of people of other countries. (Amrine, 1966, p. 401)

This represents, to say the least, a measured and restrained reaction to the huge public relations fiasco that Camelot represented for psychology and the social sciences generally. Far from being condemning of the project, its military sponsors, their goals, or the position in which they placed social scientists, the response paints the project as “important” if a somewhat “unusual expenditure,” one involving “extraordinary talent,” and one which can be discussed “without accepting or rejecting” the basics of its research design. Moreover, the characterization of Camelot as “an attempt to learn about important attitudes of people of other countries,” is at once a gross oversimplification and profoundly misleading, as it omits any mention of the central issue: prediction, control, and suppression of insurgency in the Third World. Perhaps a fuller and more accurate description of the project and its goals would not be suitable for the *American Psychologist* readership.

Later in the same issue of the journal, John Walsh (1966), a representative of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, describes the new oversight procedures being developed for “foreign affairs research” within the Department of State. He also notes, in a more critical vein than the introductory comment cited above, that:

In recent months the Camelot affair seems also to have markedly increased communal soul-searching among social and behavioral scientists on the ethical implications of their growing involvement in Government-sponsored research. Camelot has also prodded the same scholars toward coming to terms with the results of the swarming of social scientists into certain underdeveloped but no longer academically neglected nations. (p. 438)

However, immediately afterward he tempers his description of “communal soul-searching” among social scientists by adding that, after informal meetings between social scientists and the government officials responsible for setting the new guidelines, “the academic grapevine carried the word that as a result of remonstrances from scholars the published regulations are considerably less comprehensive and restrictive than those first proposed” (Walsh, 1966, p. 438). This should be welcome relief, says Walsh, for “those who feared that the regulations would mean a clamping down of a bureaucratic censorship on research in the field of foreign affairs” (p. 438).

In general, historians of psychology and of the social sciences have been more willing to tackle the difficult questions posed by the “Camelot affair” than have those located within these disciplines. However, they generally draw their own conclusions from Camelot, conclusions which apply to their own historical theses, and thus tend to look at Camelot more broadly in terms of larger issues and trends in the social sciences rather than digging into the particulars of Camelot. For instance, historian of psychology Ellen Herman, in her assessment of Camelot, observes that “one of Camelot’s lessons

was that even a significant international scandal, which in an earlier period might have elicited much debate about the proper relationship between knowledge and power, did not noticeably interrupt psychology's political progress" (1995, p. 171). Indeed, another historian of the social sciences, Mark Solovey (2001), draws even larger conclusions from Camelot. He argues against the view that "'strictly academic' considerations" gave rise to the "epistemological revolution that began in the 1960s," (p. 171) and swept through all of the social sciences. He instead claims that in fact it was Project Camelot itself which led to this challenge to scientific objectivity. Whatever the individual merits of such claims, they tend to view Camelot as symptomatic of the problems of an era and as representative of larger trends and changes, either within a particular discipline or within society as a whole.

Personally, I fully believe that Camelot is quite symptomatic of such larger trends and changes, as does Horowitz in his reference to it as a "harbinger of vast changes" in the social sciences. However, my concern as a psychologist also relates to the specific discourses which appear in Camelot and the various documents related to it and what these discourses represent in terms of changes in understandings and shifts in research focuses within the field at the time. An examination of these shifts and changes will undoubtedly raise questions relating to the themes explored by Herman and Solovey of the relationship between power and knowledge and the status of claims to scientific objectivity, but these questions will be in the context of a psychological discourse rather than solely historical theses concerning psychology. Specifically, how does the language of the psychological experts involved in Camelot serve to legitimate Camelot's aims at the same time that it alters those of psychology? In order to address this question

concerning the discourse of Camelot, it is necessary first to articulate a method by which we might approach the various strands of such a discourse, as well as to make explicit the philosophical and epistemological assumptions underlying this method.

Chapter 2

Foucault and the Analysis of Discourse

2.1 Introduction

Analyzing the Camelot-era discourse of social science experts implies a method—an analytic procedure—and the choice of method will, in turn, imply certain theoretical and epistemological assumptions which, inevitably, will come to bear on our analysis. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the method used here will be Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), a method or approach to the data informed and guided in largest part by the theoretical work of Michel Foucault, with specific and privileged emphasis on his text *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972). In this text much attention is paid to method and methodological issues. Yet, as will become clearer in the following chapter, but needs mention here already, there is no singular or monolithic and universally agreed-upon CDA; instead, authors appropriate different procedures and draw different methodological and research assumptions from Foucault's theory. It is consequently necessary to orient the reader not only to Foucauldian theory in general, but also to the specific research and analytic uses to which we will apply Foucault's theories in the present discourse analysis.

Therefore, in the present chapter I will introduce core Foucauldian concepts and insights, with particular attention to the notion of “discourse.” After laying the foundation for a discussion of Foucault's thought, and then providing the reader with an

overview of his thought as it pertains to discourse analysis, we will turn in Chapter 3 to an exploration of CDA and, finally, to its specific application and adaptation for the current study.

2.2 What is Discourse?

In their seminal work on discourse analysis in the social sciences, *Discourse and Social Psychology* (1987), psychologists Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell note that the term “discourse” has had many varied meanings and contexts of use, and that this variation has the potential to create confusion when undertaking “discourse analysis.”

They observe that:

The term ‘discourse’ itself has been used in many varying ways. Some researchers take ‘discourse’ to mean all forms of talk and writing, others take the term to apply only to the way talk is meshed together. While at the other extreme, some continental discourse analysts such as Foucault take ‘discourse’ to refer to much broader, historically developing, linguistic practices.... It is important, then, to clarify what we mean when we use these terms. We will use ‘discourse’ in its most open sense, following Gilbert and Mulkay, to cover all forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written texts of all kinds. (pp. 6-7)

This initial gloss on the concept of discourse already demonstrates that it can refer directly to talk, text, and communication, or more broadly to the historically developing contexts in which such communicative practices take shape and in which their meaning is rooted. Insofar as we are following Foucault, we will be attending to this historically developing face of discourse, but this does not mean a turning away from discourse’s communicative and productive effects. Rather, as we will see, it implies a focus on the conditions of possibility of such communication, and on the way in which such

communication takes different forms and produces different effects in different historical contexts.

In their description of discourse, Potter and Wetherell (1987) go on to observe that:

Our concern is not purely with discourse per se; that is, we are not linguists.... We are social psychologists expecting to gain a better understanding of social life and social interaction from our study of social texts. [Therefore] we have excluded three main areas of work. First, we have avoided research concerned with the interface between discourse and cognition.... Second, we have avoided research which is mainly concerned with what we see as primarily linguistic questions.... Finally, we have not covered socio-linguistic work concerned with the study of variations in the language use of different social groups. (Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 7)

In the current study as well, the more linguistic side of discourse analysis is eschewed in favor of an analysis that more closely ties discourse to other social practices and social institutions. This is not to say that the more linguistic sort of analysis is not also valuable, but simply that it doesn't offer us the kind of access to the social side of discourse that we seek. This distinction is similar to that made at the outset of the first passage from Potter and Wetherell cited above, and in terms of that passage, we again find ourselves more on the Foucauldian than the linguistic side of the discourse analytic spectrum (see pp. 59-60 for a discussion of Foucault's understanding of discourse as a "practice" and as "productive," and why it is, for him, more than simply a collection of signs, signifiers, talk, or language). With this admittedly rough and ready definition of discourse, we can now move on to an exploration of Foucault's theory and method and, ultimately, an understanding of how it informs our method for this study and what its implications are for us here. One final note in terms of discourse is that, as stated in the

previous chapter, the data for this study are taken exclusively from written texts, and are all of a “formal” nature (written by academic or military authors, usually for an academic or military audience, as opposed to “informal” texts in everyday usage such as letters, journals, grocery lists, and so forth), and this will further prescribe the kind of analysis we will conduct. It will also provide yet another link with Foucauldian theory since, as we will see below, Foucault holds a special place in his own analyses for the discourse of the social sciences.

2.3 Foucault as Historian of Knowledge

In seeking initial access to the often-challenging theoretical work of Michel Foucault and to the themes and problems that concern him, we will turn to the introduction to his thought contained in Paul Rabinow’s *Foucault Reader* (1984). To accomplish this introduction, Rabinow sets up an opposition between cognitive linguist Noam Chomsky on the one hand, and Foucault on the other, in order to explain the very different approaches taken by these two seminal thinkers. For instance, Chomsky believes in an essential human nature, and in the progressive development of science, but “Michel Foucault rejects Chomsky’s view of both human nature and science. In a methodologically typical fashion, Foucault avoids the question: Does human nature exist?, and asks instead: How has the concept of human nature functioned in our society?” (Rabinow, 1984, pp. 3-4). Rabinow goes on, noting that:

Foucault is highly suspicious of claims to universal truths. He doesn’t refute them; instead, his consistent response is to historicize grand abstractions.... For Foucault, there is no external position of certainty, no universal understanding that is beyond history and society.... His main tactic is to historicize such supposedly universal categories as human nature each time he encounters them. Foucault’s aim is to understand the

plurality of roles that reason, for example, has taken as a social practice in our civilization not to use it as a yardstick against which these practices can be measured.... There is a consistent imperative, played out with varying emphases, which runs through Foucault's historical studies: to discover the relations of specific scientific disciplines and particular social practices. (Rabinow, 1984, pp. 4-5)

This tactic, this imperative, holds for Foucault in regard to other themes as well.

For instance, in terms of politics, Foucault seems more pragmatic than Chomsky:

For Chomsky, we must struggle against the injustices of our current society in the name of a higher goal—justice. Surely, Chomsky argues, unless we have a guiding principle, we will have no way of judging the actions of others.... Unless we have some fixed and rational standard for judging what constitutes a better society, we will be lost.... Foucault disagrees.... He is not saying that the idea of justice should never be invoked in a political struggle. But...the point of engaging in political struggles—and Foucault thinks we are engaged in them all the time...is to alter power relations. For Foucault, knowledge of all sorts is thoroughly enmeshed in the clash of petty dominations, as well as in the larger battles which constitute our world. Knowledge is not external to these fights; it does not constitute a way out of, or above, the fray the way Chomsky views it. Rather, for Foucault, the “will to knowledge” in our culture is simultaneously part of the danger and a tool to combat that danger. (Rabinow, 1984, pp. 6-7)

2.4 Foucault and Epistemology

Let us now pause briefly to unpack some of the important assumptions contained in the above passages, as they are vital to an understanding of Foucauldian theory. First, and related to the notion of discourse presented in the previous section, again we see Foucault emphasizing “historicity” and issuing a call “to historicize grand abstractions” and “universal categories.” We also see him taking a stand against the kind of automatic, natural affirmation usually accorded to such concepts as “human nature,” “science,” “rationality,” “knowledge,” and “justice,” and shifting his focus to how such concepts change and evolve over time and the specific functions they can fulfill in specific contexts.

For Foucault, if we are able to identify changes across time and across place in how such supposedly universal concepts are understood, articulated, and put into practice, then we can make the claim that they are not, after all, as universal as all that. If this is the case, then, instead of interrogating the various discourses on such topics for what they reveal about the “true nature” of these universals, we can ask questions about how the discourses themselves shape our understanding of these supposedly universal concepts. Then, rather than being universal, these concepts are not only tied to our particular context and the discourse we produce about them, but they also produce particular effects both *on discourse itself* and *on us* as producers and consumers of discourse.

For example, our understanding of “human nature” in our current social and historical context is shaped by all of the discourse that is created about human nature, whether it is of a religious, scientific, popular, or philosophical nature. One of the ways it is most profoundly shaped, in fact, is through the assigning to certain of these discourses the status of “expert discourse” on the subject. At the same time, though, that this discourse is constructing our understanding of human nature, the discourse itself is also shaped by the process, such that not just any discourse from any source can be properly recognized to produce expert knowledge on human nature. There is thus a dual process of facilitation and constraint at work: certain discourse is defined as expert discourse and thus carries added weight and clout in defining terms and parameters and shaping understanding, while other discourse might be construed as ill-informed, illegitimate, coming from a “crackpot,” and so forth. Obviously, crackpots cannot produce expert discourse and, what’s more, if a recognized expert were to start speaking like a crackpot,

he might be forced to relinquish his status as expert. (More on all of this in subsequent sections below.) For now, let's return to our exploration of the passages above.

In the second passage on Foucault and Chomsky above, we see a special focus on “knowledge,” “domination,” and “power relations.” In contrast to Chomsky, who sees the pursuit of knowledge as moving ever closer to truth and, hopefully, to justice as well, Rabinow argues that Foucault is far more skeptical of the status of knowledge, seeing it as a possible solution to some problems, but also as “part of the danger.” Why would knowledge pose such a threat?

In the traditional view, which we might broadly characterize as “logical positivism,” knowledge is derived from a process of rational inquiry and a process of theoretical refinement which brings us ever closer to the underlying truth of the matter. This truth is neither historically dependent, discursively dependent, nor is it dependent on our process of inquiry. This is the perspective traditionally ascribed to natural science, and still widely adhered to in some circles. In contrast, Foucault argues here that what passes for “truth,” “knowledge,” or even “rationality,” is, at every step, tied to the historical and cultural perspective from which it is viewed and, what's more, is tied to the discourse(s) used to articulate it. This notion has profound ramifications in terms of epistemology (the status of knowledge and what can be known with certainty), subjectivity (the status of the “subject,” traditionally viewed as the active agent “at the center of things”), and, as will be seen, power hierarchies and domination.

We have already seen some of these implications in terms of epistemology: namely, that knowledge, even (and especially) expert knowledge, is rendered historically contingent, and thus no longer, in any meaningful sense, objective or universal. With

regard to knowledge, then, what is at issue isn't determining what *is* and *isn't* knowledge for all time, but rather *how* and *what* we, in a particular historical context, try to know; what counts as knowledge *in our age* and how that differs from previous ages; to whom we grant expert status to determine what constitutes knowledge for us; and what all of this says about us and, more radically, what it *does to us*. What, then, does Foucault say about what discourse "does to us?" What, specifically, does he say about our subjectivity?

2.5 Foucault and Subjectivity

In the passage above, Foucault's overarching concern in terms of the danger represented by the "will to knowledge" is his concern with "subjectivity." By subjectivity, Foucault means "the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects" (Foucault, 1984, p. 208). We can already see here that in his language, Foucault is turning the pre-existing philosophical notion of the subject on its head, as it goes from being solely an agent of power at the center of things (e.g., as the subject of a sentence) to one that is also marginalized and "subjected" to the machinations of power (e.g., as the subject of a king): we don't simply *exist* as subjects, but instead are *made* into subjects. For Foucault, the modern subject simultaneously fills both of these roles, is both subject and object, and is both the source of power and the one who is subject to its effects.

Notice here also that if we can refer to a "modern subject" and, implicitly, other incarnations of the subject in other historical eras, then the subject (as with what passes for "science," "rationality," "knowledge," and so forth, discussed above) can be said to

change over time, and thus is also historically contingent. Again, Foucault is interested not in establishing trans-historical universals regarding the subject, but in highlighting these changes in order to problematize our very notion of the naturalness and universality of subjectivity, as well as to bring to the fore what is unique and new in subjectivity as it is given in our modern era.

As can be seen in the passage above, one of the central arguments that Foucault makes is that the modern subject has lost the primary, central position of active agent, and has also emerged as the object as well. It is decentered and divided into both subject and object. The subject is able to wield power through the production of discourse, in a sense taking a hand in shaping our collective discursive landscape and, by extension, our shared social conception of reality. At the same time, the subject is “subjected” to the effects of power insofar as this discourse can also be *about* the human subject *as object*, specifying new techniques by which to shape and mold subjectivity to fit certain needs (more on what and whose these needs might be later).

Thus, rather than simply being the generators of or the victims of power (being *only* subject or *only* object), the modern subject exists at both poles simultaneously. As such, power flows *through* the subject, shaping her inescapably through her participation in socially prescribed and shared systems of knowledge and discourse. What’s more, for Foucault, the greater her level of participation, the greater the limits imposed on her. This should make intuitive sense in terms of what we have discussed thus far about historicity, epistemology, and subjectivity. If a crazy man on the street starts to rant about human nature, it is likely that no one imagines that he is trying to produce expert discourse on the topic, and thus they are more likely to ignore him than to feel threatened

by him or try to silence him. However, if an expert on the topic begins to articulate heretical or threatening views (or simply starts “sounding crazy”) *while speaking as an expert* (for instance by publishing these views in a professional journal), then the expert might very well be silenced by his professional peers, by the larger expert community that assigns to itself the task of monitoring the discourse to ensure that it speaks the right words. This represents a process of constraint operating in the production of discourse and in subjectivity, and it is clearly more important that an expert speak “the right way” than that a crazy person do so. If, however, our expert’s article is deemed by his peers to use the right words, he might be rewarded and encouraged with professional recognition, a grant, a promotion, further speaking engagements, and so on. This represents a process of facilitation of discourse. Facilitation and constraint work in tandem such that a professional organization or an institution can exert powerful effects in the shaping of discourse. This brings us back to the question touched on earlier: once we recognize that both subjectivity and discourse are subject to this dual process of facilitation and constraint (i.e. subject to the machinations of power), then we are inclined to ask *how* and *by whom* this dual process is directed.

2.6 The Rise of the Social Sciences

For Foucault, this process operates in a decentralized fashion, and is not motivated and directed either by an individual or by a single, identifiable cadre or group. Rather, it can only be fully understood in reference to the kinds of scientific knowledge that render the process both possible and seemingly inexorable and inescapable. For instance, Rabinow (1984) identifies one of Foucault’s major concerns as “the formation

and increasingly sophisticated elaboration of the social sciences; the historical relationship of these modes of classification, control, and containment to a distinctive tradition of humanitarian rhetoric on reform and progress; the increasingly efficient and diverse applications of these combined procedures of power and knowledge mainly, although not exclusively, to dominated groups” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 8). Similarly, in his work on “scientific classification,” Foucault is concerned with “the discourses of life, labor, and language,” and how they “were structured into disciplines” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 9). He shows a gradual, continuous process through which these seemingly natural categories were in fact discursively constructed, and also how “these disciplines of life, labor, and language—which we tend to view as dealing with universals of human social life and as therefore progressing logically and refining themselves in the course of history (as in the natural sciences)—changed abruptly at several junctures, displaying a conceptual discontinuity from the disciplines that had immediately preceded them” (Rabinow, 1984, p. 9).

However, although there is no single, discrete cadre behind this process of discursive facilitation and constraint which is tied in our age to the rise of the social sciences, Foucault does argue that this process is intimately tied to the increasing consolidation of and efficiency of state power, as will be seen below. Thus, these sciences and their rise (the historically unfolding process through which they were “structured into disciplines”) are linked by Foucault to the unique status of modern “subjectivity” (in which the human subject is also the “object” proper to these disciplines); to a new “humanitarian” discourse emphasizing “reform and progress” while simultaneously furthering the ends of “classification, control, and containment;” to the

establishment of a new body of discourse (tied, remember, to both power and knowledge); and to the increasingly efficient exercising of state power, particularly in regard to “dominated groups.” These themes will all return in our analysis of the Camelot-era discourse in Chapters 5 and 6.

In these passages, we can catch an initial glimpse of some of the themes and problematics that occupy much of Foucault’s work—for instance, his consistent concern with the relationship between increasingly effective and subtle techniques of social control and the increasing development and sophistication of the social and human sciences, and particularly the discourses produced by those sciences. Also noteworthy in this regard is that, even as this control is being refined and ratcheted up, this process is accompanied by an apparent increase in humanitarian reforms and freedoms—through, in part, an increase in the production of discourse on such themes.

Another central theme for Foucault, related to that above, is the specific manner in which the *power* employed by these discursive systems (exercised in terms of constraints on our subjectivity) is intimately tied to their production of *knowledge*. His work on this theme tends to break down the distinctions between power and knowledge to such an extent that he developed a single term, “*pouvoir/savoir*” (in English, “power/knowledge”), to indicate their intimately intertwined nature (Foucault, 1980).

A final theme worth noting in the above passages is the contrast between continuity and discontinuity and how this contrast can be interpreted—the light that it sheds on the discursive construction of objects we often take to be naturally occurring. To this end, Rabinow notes that “the sharp lines of discursive discontinuity in the human sciences and the longer lines of continuity in non-discursive practices provide Foucault

with a powerful and flexible grid of interpretation with which to approach relations of knowledge and power” (1984, p. 9). Thus, although many erroneously describe him as a “philosopher of discontinuity,” (p. 9) Foucault does not glorify or privilege discontinuity for its own sake, but rather employs it for very specific ends in his analyses, as we will see further in our exploration of his *Archaeology of Knowledge* below.

Such discontinuities give the lie to the predominant view of the gradual, progressive evolution of natural science, social science, and society, and their movement toward increasing humanitarianism, all of which is based on a tacit belief in a transcendental, ahistorical rationality. Highlighting moments in which such discontinuities can be perceived across discourses, disciplines, and aspects of social life serves to show the profound extent to which discourses, disciplines, and even our very understanding of society itself are all historically specific (the specific construction that we take as natural and *a priori* can be seen to be tied to our particular time) and, what’s more, that this historically specific construction operates most centrally and significantly *through discourse*. We can therefore speak of much of our received, socially shared understanding about society, shared values and beliefs, scientific concepts and theories, science itself, the subject and many other topics as *discursively constructed*. Discursive construction emphasizes the central importance of discourse in Foucault’s thought as the *via regia* for developing an understanding of the techniques of control and “subjectivity” employed in a given age.

In this brief summary, some of the major themes that recur in Foucault’s work throughout his career have already become visible. These themes include a focus on discourse (particularly expert discourse), subjectivity, epistemology, radical historicity,

the particular relevance of the social sciences and their ties to subjectivity, social control and the rhetoric of progress, the power/knowledge connection, and the juxtaposition of historical and discursive continuity and discontinuity as of particular analytic and interpretive value. We should keep these themes in mind, because they will serve as a theoretical foundation for our CDA methodology, described below. Hopefully, this initial encounter with these themes will suffice to prepare us for delving in more depth into Foucault's major methodological treatise, his *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972), to which we will now turn our attention.

2.7 *The Archaeology of Knowledge*

As stated above, Foucault's work consistently focuses on discourse. However, it focuses not just on any discourse, but on that produced by experts when they speak *as experts*, as well as the ways in which the experts' role and status serve as guarantors of the truth and seriousness of their discourse. For instance, in his *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972), Foucault observes (with regard to the discourse of medical doctors) that, "medical statements cannot come from anybody; their value, efficacy, even their therapeutic powers, and, generally speaking, their existence as medical statements cannot be dissociated from the statutorily defined person who has the right to make them, and to claim for them the power to overcome suffering and death" (p. 51). Not only does Foucault's work serve to focus attention on the unique function of "expert discourse," it also, as stated above, highlights moments of discontinuous changes and shifts in this functioning. For instance, with regard to the "medical statements" mentioned above, Foucault observes that "we also know that this status in western civilization was

profoundly modified at the end of the eighteenth century when the health of the population became one of the economic norms required by industrial societies” (p. 51).

This focus on a “profound modification” in which the state apparatus in industrial societies becomes increasingly concerned with “the health of the population” is crucial to Foucault’s work and to the application of his work to topics such as Project Camelot, as will be discussed in greater detail below. It is also significant because it highlights Foucault’s consistent concern with themes of discontinuity and rupture. He begins his *Archaeology of Knowledge* with this characterization of the traditional “search for continuity:”

For many years now historians have preferred to turn their attention to long periods, as if, beneath the shifts and changes of political events, they were trying to reveal the stable, almost indestructible system of checks and balances, the irreversible processes...the movements of accumulation and slow saturation, the great silent motionless bases that traditional history has covered with a thick layer of events. (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 3)

However, he claims that this traditional emphasis and preoccupation with continuity is giving way to a new focus on *discontinuity*:

The old questions of the traditional analysis (What link should be made between disparate events? How can a causal succession be established between them? What continuity or overall significance do they possess? Is it possible to define a totality, or must one be content with reconstituting connexions?) are now being replaced by questions of another type: which strata should be isolated from others? What types of series should be established? What criteria of periodizations should be adopted for each of them? (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 4)

Despite the increasing focus on discontinuity, though, Foucault claims that the “traditional analysis” of history responds to this focus by reinscribing these discontinuous shifts within a larger continuity, so the whole “original foundation” (p. 13) remains intact.

This foundation, Foucault claims, “would make rationality the *telos* of mankind, and link the whole history of thought to the preservation of this rationality, to the maintenance of this teleology, and to the ever necessary return to this foundation” (p. 13). Thus, this ahistorical rationality serves as a foundation upon which the continuous development of history can rest. However, if the ahistorical nature of rationality is itself critiqued, we can open up a new level of analysis, directed at small discontinuities and ruptures that function as cracks through which we can see another kind of historical event or function.

Foucault’s project, then, is to interrogate this expert discourse in various disciplines in order to dig beneath the surface of apparent continuity flowing from a distant and receding origin (and founded on an unchanging, ahistorical rationality) which such discourses present, and to render contingent this apparent continuity by highlighting moments of “discontinuity, rupture, threshold, limit, series, and transformation” (1969/1972, p. 21). He issues a call to action along with a new way of looking:

We must question those ready-made syntheses, those groupings that we normally accept before any examination, those links whose validity is recognized from the outset; we must oust those forms and obscure forces by which we usually link the discourse of one man with that of another; they must be driven out from the darkness in which they reign.... As soon as one questions that unity, it loses its self-evidence; it indicates itself, constructs itself, only on the basis of a complex field of discourse.... These pre-existing forms of discontinuity, all these syntheses that are accepted without question, must remain in suspense. They must not be rejected definitively of course, but the tranquility with which they are accepted must be disturbed; we must show that they do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justification of which must be scrutinized.... I shall accept the groupings that history suggests only to subject them at once to interrogation; to break them up and then to see whether they can be legitimately reformed; or whether other groupings should be made; to replace them in a more general space which, while dissipating their apparent familiarity, makes it possible to construct a theory of them. (pp. 22-26)

In the passage above, Foucault cautions against a simple, immediate, and outright *rejection* of the truth claims of a discourse in favor of setting aside the whole notion of discursive truth itself in order to engage with the discourse directly and without judgment. This move is quite similar to Husserl's (1913/1983) "phenomenological reduction," which allows him to study human perception and experience more closely by "bracketing" (setting aside) all notions of pre-existing objects and turning his attention to the pure perceptual experience itself, apart from any recourse to postulating a more fundamental and *a priori* existence of the object. This does not mean that Husserl denies the existence of external objects, simply that he temporarily "brackets" his "natural" and habitual belief in them for the purposes of methodological expedience. In the same manner, Foucault advocates bracketing the truth claims of discourse in order to understand more fully and in more detail *how* both the discourses themselves and the truth claims made on their behalf function to delimit the parameters of our understanding of the topics at issue.

Such bracketing is also necessary in order to avoid evaluating these expert discourses with reference to their own systems of internal self-regulation: "In the examination of language, one must suspend not only the point of view of the 'signified' ... but also that of the 'signifier'" (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 111). (See the following chapter for a discussion of the terms "signified" and "signifier" as they relate to Saussurean theory.) This is to say that our bracketing must be so thorough that we set aside not only our rather natural assumption that these discourses simply point to certain, discrete real-world referents but also our assumption that the internal coherence of such discourses might legitimate their truth claims. Indeed, these very systems of discursive

self-regulation (recall the dual process of facilitation and constraint in the production of discourse, discussed above) are themselves part of the object of Foucault's study, and we cannot catch sight of them in operation as long as we persist in treating them as transparently natural. We must bracket our naturally held belief in order to perceive the specific ways in which "disciplines constitute a system of control in the production of discourse, fixing its limits through the action of an identity taking the form of a permanent reactivation of the rules" (1969/1972, p. 224). These disciplines exert this control through the manner in which they collect, categorize, and "describe" their objects of study and analysis. For instance, with regard to the clinical discourse on "mental illness," Foucault observes that:

Mental illness was constituted by all that was said in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its developments, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating, in its name, discourses that were taken as its own. (1969/1972, p. 32)

In analyzing discourse, then, we must bracket the truth claims of discourse. Moreover, in the words of Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), "studying discursive formations requires a double reduction. Not only must the investigator bracket the *truth* claims of the serious speech acts he is investigating—Husserl's phenomenological reduction—he must also bracket the *meaning* claims of the speech acts he studies," (p. 49) as well. Let us pause briefly here and unpack these statements somewhat.

This "double reduction" corresponds to Foucault's admonition to suspend both the point of view of the "signified" and the "signifier." The latter term, signifier, here indicates a specific term within a discourse used to represent a particular object (roughly corresponding to a name). We must suspend the truth claims of these signifiers or names,

(for instance, claims that they function properly *as names*, and therefore accurately point to the correct object, or portray it truly as it is). Such claims may be made implicitly in the “correctness” with which expert discourse, such as a scientific theory, hangs together and seems naturally self-evident because it does so. Furthermore, such claims may also be made explicitly, through such forms as theorems, mathematical proofs, and logical argumentation, and we must suspend our affirmation of the truth of all of these discursive structures as well. The former term, “signified,” corresponds to the referent, the object that the signifier or name is ostensibly pointing to. We must also bracket our naturally held belief that such referents exist and, more importantly, that they exist in precisely the way in which the discourse portrays them. Ultimately, then, what is set aside is “the whole notion of serious meaning” (p. 49). Serious speech acts are interpreted not in terms of the meaning they hold within their own internal systems of logic and order (in terms of their various signifiers and signifieds) but rather in terms of their conditions of possibility.

As Foucault explains, “there can be no question of interpreting discourse with a view to writing a history of the referent” (1969/1972, p. 47). His point here is that our analysis of discourse isn’t the work of accumulating all of the different ways that a particular object has been talked about in different discourses, disciplines, or different historical contexts, for such a perspective still treats the object itself, the signified, as a constant. Such a history is not radical enough for Foucault. Instead, we must suspend our affirmation of the “referent” as well as the truth claims of the discourse about it. All this leaves us with, then, is discourse, discourse which is neither truthful nor meaningful in itself. The meaning we bring to it in Foucault’s analysis, the interpretation to which

we subject this discourse, primarily has to do with its conditions of formation. *How* and *why* does a certain discourse appear at a certain time?

A related and very important point made by Foucault is that his task in conducting an archaeology of knowledge, or of discourse, is “a task that consists of not—of no longer—treating discourses as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (1969/1972, p. 49). In this vitally important passage, Foucault shifts the status of discourse within his analysis from its usual status as simply *language* (a group of signs whose function is purely *descriptive*) to a new, more particular status as a *practice* (a fundamentally social and *active* function). This points to Foucault’s notion of discursive construction of objects, discussed above. Thus, once we have bracketed our automatic assumptions as to the reality and unity of the object or referent of discourse, the signified, we come to recognize that our only means of access to this object has always been *through discourse*, and therefore, the discourse itself is what ultimately shapes and creates the objects which it purports merely to describe or point to.

However, this notion of the shaping, through discourse, of the objects of these discourses creates a potential problem for us. If these objects, “madness” for instance, to take Foucault’s example, are created and structured through the very discourses which purport simply to describe them, to what extent can we speak of a single, discrete discourse object such as “madness,” or of a single, cohesive discourse concerning madness at all? Indeed, Foucault himself affirms with regard to the discourse on madness, for instance, “this group of statements is far from referring to a single object, formed once and for all.... One might, perhaps one should, conclude from this

multiplicity of objects that it is not possible to accept, as a valid unity forming a group of statements, a ‘discourse, concerning madness’” (1969/1972, p. 32).

Foucault engages with this potential difficulty by noting that, if one were to confine oneself to an analysis of some smaller aspect of madness such as melancholia or neurosis, “one would soon realize that each of these discourses in turn constituted its object and worked it to the point of transforming it altogether” (p. 32). Given this transformation, then, “the problem arises of knowing whether the unity of a discourse is based not so much on the permanence and uniqueness of an object, as on the space in which various objects emerge and are continuously transformed” (p. 32). This problem suggests to Foucault that:

The unity of discourses on madness would not be based upon the existence of the object ‘madness’, or the constitution of a single horizon of objectivity; it would be the interplay of the rules that make possible the appearance of objects during a given period of time: objects that are differentiated in daily practice, in law, in religious casuistry, in medical diagnosis, objects that are manifested in pathological descriptions, objects that are circumscribed by medical codes, practices, treatment, and care. Moreover, the unity of the discourses on madness would be the interplay of the rules that define the transformations of these different objects, their non-identity through time, the break produced in them, the internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence. Paradoxically, to define a group of statements in terms of its individuality would be to define the dispersion of these objects, to grasp all the interstices that separate them, to measure the distances that reign between them—in other words, to formulate their law of division. (pp. 32-33)

This, then, brings Foucault to the point of defining one of his major theoretical constructs used throughout his discourse work with the archaeological method: the *discursive formation*. He states that “whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and

functionings, transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we are dealing with a *discursive formation*” (p.38). He next adds another related concept, *rules of formation*, which are “the conditions to which elements of this division...are subjected,” (p. 38) or, alternately, “conditions of existence...in a given discursive formation” (p. 38).

Therefore, since Foucault is determined to confine his analysis to the discursive level, he is able to sidestep the issue of the objective reality of the purported objects of the discourse he is studying. Also, as to the issue of how to establish the unity and identity of a discourse and to define its bounds and limits, he does this by focusing his analysis on the discourse’s “conditions of existence,” the *rules of formation* which govern the emergence and coalescence of a particular *discursive formation* at a particular point and time in history. This focus on rules underlying the production of discourse and the assigning of statements to membership in particular discursive formations allows Foucault to continue his archaeological explorations while remaining at the level of discourse and while continually returning to the historical and contextual aspects of that discourse; in other words, to the conditions of possibility for the existence of particular discursive formations. It also highlights the way in which the always-historical coalescing of statements into discursive formations, and their appropriation of objects proper to them, is not naturally occurring or a byproduct of vague social forces or historical changes, but is always the result of motivated action on the part of those responsible for the production of the statements involved. Furthermore, this motivated action is taken against a background and within a context of “relations...between institutions, economic and social processes, behavioral patterns, systems of norms,

techniques, types of classification, modes of characterization,” (Foucault, 1969/1972, p. 45) and the changes which are produced in these relations are also a dimension of the discursive formation which is open to analysis. This brings Foucault’s analysis of discourse back to the power/knowledge dynamic described above. The ability to create expert discourse is the ability to create knowledge. This ability is itself the exercising of power, but, again, according to Foucault’s dual understanding of subjectivity, the individual, the expert, (in some cases, the scientist) entrusted with this power is himself also *subjected* to it insofar as he must operate within the context of pre-existing discursive formations and rules of formation. If he goes too far afield from these limits, he may find the very same power turned against him. This is the dynamic Foucault describes as “discursive self-regulation.”

In order to gain access to a wider context in which to analyze discursive formations and the rules which govern their formation, Foucault needs a concept which will serve to provide access to this context but from a discursive level. For this reason, he elaborates his notion of the *episteme*:

The analysis of discursive formations, of positivities, and knowledge in their relations with epistemological figures and with the sciences is what has been called, to distinguish it from other possible forms of the history of the sciences, the analysis of the *episteme*. This episteme may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape.... The episteme is not a form of knowledge (*connaissance*) or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyzes them at the level of discursive regularities. (p. 191)

These notions of *discursive formation*, the *rules of formation* proper to such formations, and *epistemes* will be helpful in theoretically situating the critical discourse analysis method which will be employed in the present study. Before turning to a further elaboration of this method, however, a few more theoretical concepts from Foucault's later work will also be helpful for us here.

2.8 Social Science Discourse and State Power

Returning briefly to Rabinow's introduction to Foucault's thought, we see him articulating one of Foucault's major concerns as "the problem of government" (1984, p. 14). Specifically, a shift Foucault identifies as occurring in the sixteenth century and relates to the introduction of the discursive formation of "the state." Rabinow asserts that, for Foucault, "the first major shift...is from a concern with the nature of the state and then the prince and his concerns per se, to a broader and more detailed consideration of how to introduce economy and order (i.e., government) from the top of the state down through all aspects of social life.... Once one grasps Foucault's conceptualization of this shift, many seemingly mundane statements by minor administrators take on a new significance" (1984, p. 15).

Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982), in their joint work on Foucault, also emphasize this direction of his thought, in which Foucault applies his theories to the workings of state governments: "the history, geography, climate, and demography of a particular country became more than mere curiosities. They were crucial elements in a new complex of power and knowledge. The government...needed knowledge that was concrete, specific, and measurable in order to operate effectively," and this new complex of power was

“therefore connected with the nascent empirical human sciences” (p. 137). Particularly relevant in terms of Camelot is Dreyfus and Rabinow’s assertion that:

it follows that the administrators [of a state] would need such detailed knowledge not only about their own state, but about other states as well.... Since these populations were nothing more or less than what the ‘state cares for for its own sake,’ the state was entitled to relocate them or to slaughter them, if it served the state’s interest to do so.... In his analysis of this new type of political rationality, Foucault isolates a new relationship between politics and history. A wise legislator could no longer bring together and relate all the elements of the state to create a situation of perfect harmony. Instead he must continually oversee a set of changing forces that are periodically strengthened or weakened by the political choices a regime makes.... Power...is capable, at least in principle, of unbounded expansion. (1982, p. 138)

The connection of these Foucauldian themes (of power/knowledge and of the concern of the state with demographics—the root of the word “statistics” is *state*, after all—and their use in the maintenance of social order, and the turn to social scientists to ensure the efficient application of techniques from their disciplines to do so) to those outlined in the above discussion of Project Camelot should already be somewhat visible. For instance, the repeated and universally agreed-upon emphasis on the *need* for more data and research, both by scientists and by government officials, takes on a new meaning once we realize the connection between such empirical knowledge and the efficient exercising of state power, both nationally and internationally. Also, for another example, the rise of U.S. social science through the SSRC and the *Recent Trends* report, both of which had at their core the rendering of social science knowledge, techniques, and discourse into tools useful to policymakers and state officials in the maintenance of an order which they deemed best in securing their own interests. Now, with this initial understanding of discourse and Foucauldian theory to draw from, we can turn our attention to CDA and how it has been shaped by but also moved beyond these theories.

Chapter 3

Critical Discourse Analysis

3.1 From Foucault to Discourse Analysis

The work of Michel Foucault, as summarized in the previous chapter, provides an important set of theoretical assumptions regarding the epistemological status of expert discourse, the interconnection of power and knowledge, the discursive construction of knowledge, and the particularities of the increased importance of the social sciences, all of which serve to situate the present study rather fundamentally and foundationally. However, in the years since Foucault developed his theories and methodology, subsequent theorists and researchers have adapted, appropriated, refined, and extended his work on discourse. Such attempts have become known collectively as “critical discourse analysis” (or CDA).

Before moving on to a more detailed examination of CDA, however, it may be helpful to begin with an initial exploration of its wider context, “discourse analysis,” how this latter approach has developed within the social sciences, what (if any) relation it has with the Foucauldian theories outlined in Chapter 2, and how it serves as a foundation for CDA.

3.2 Discourse Analysis in Psychology

In their seminal *Discourse and Social Psychology* (1987), psychologists Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell explore the influence of discourse analysis within the field of social psychology in particular. They note an increasing interest in language among psychologists, reversing a history marked by inattention to language prior to the “Chomskian revolution” (1987, p. 9) of the 1950s and 1960s and the advent of Austin’s (1962) “speech act theory.” According to Potter and Wetherell, “the fundamental tenet of Austin’s theory is that *all* utterances state things *and* do things,” (p. 17) and this recasts the status of language from the one previously given within the framework of logical positivism:

His [Austin’s] main target was the logical positivist view that sentences which cannot be verified, that is sentences for which there is no way of checking whether they are true or false, should simply be treated as meaningless.... In addition, Austin’s argument was directed at a wide swathe of views of language which take it to be an *abstract system* whose central function is the description of states of affairs. What Austin set out to do was to undermine the notion that an understanding of ‘truth conditions’, states of truth and falsity, is central to an understanding of language, and in doing this he produced a model with far-reaching consequences. (pp. 14-15)

Potter and Wetherell (1987) also identify Saussure’s (1972/1983) theory of semiology as being an important and influential precursor to the discursive theory they are formulating. Regarding this theory, Potter and Wetherell (1987) observe that, “Saussure suggests that there is no *natural* relation between the signifier and the signified.... the radical consequence of this [theory] is that using a language cannot be seen as a naming process, using a list of words each corresponding to the thing that it names. Instead it is always dependent...on a system of relationships” (p. 25). These insights adopted from Austin

(1962) and Saussure (1972/1983) are crucial for the development of the method of discourse analysis, because they present language as a fundamentally active, engaged and social process; one which, as in Foucault's work, both constitutes and is constituted by the objects it is directed toward.

Potter and Wetherell (1987) focus on the work of Austin, Chomsky, Saussure and others in order to chart the increasingly prominent place occupied by the study of language and discourse within social psychology, specifically during the latter half of the twentieth century. In charting this increasing focus on language, they are also documenting what they see as larger, more fundamental shifts not just in topic choice, but also in scientists' *ways of looking* at their objects of study. For instance, they observe:

As the 1980's progress, it has become more and more difficult to turn a blind eye to the radical changes occurring in our understanding of the way science operates. We have to thank philosophers, historians and sociologists of science for this new view, or, more precisely, this new collage of views which has crystallized in the last few decades.... The traditional, and fundamental, distinction between observations, or data statements, and theoretical statements has been thrown into doubt by people such as Hesse, Kuhn, and Popper. It is now taken for granted that any observation of the physical or social world is imbued with theoretical interpretation. It has been demonstrated that even the simplest scientific description is dependent on a whole variety of theoretical assumptions. Without the distinction between fact and theory or observation and conceptual framework the simple-minded positivist view of science developing as a steady accumulation of simple 'unvarnished facts' ceases to be tenable.... Psychologists have been particularly prone to the trap of comparing their discipline to mythical versions of the natural sciences. They have tended to see the natural sciences as data driven, guided by experiment and almost exclusively concerned with the production of general laws. (Potter and Wetherell, 1987, pp. 158-159)

In the passage above, Potter and Wetherell trace the development of the epistemological and methodological transformation that swept through both the natural and the social sciences during the second half of the twentieth century (changes, recall from the

introduction, that Solovey [2001], rightly or wrongly, attributed ultimately to Project Camelot itself). Moreover, in the last two sentences Potter and Wetherell (1987) highlight the curious position adopted by psychology, and by the social sciences more generally, in light of this transformation. They claim that psychology has attempted to adopt the epistemological and methodological “rigor” of the natural sciences in spite of the growing recognition within the natural sciences that this rigor itself is ultimately not tenable. This tenuous position adopted by psychology and the social sciences is evident in the history briefly outlined in Chapter 1, in which prominent psychologists and social scientists aligned themselves with government through the formation of groups such as SSRC and SORO in an attempt to follow in the footsteps of government-sponsored natural science. This is extremely pertinent to our present analysis of Project Camelot, insofar as the discourse data drawn from Camelot itself shows the Camelot social scientists’ (and their military sponsors’) concern with adopting methods, attitudes, and especially that hard-nosed, empirical “rigor” of the physical sciences, and then applying them in a social science context to military problems.

3.3 Discourse Analysis Becomes Critical

Discourse analyst Ian Parker (1994) reaffirms a connection between the social sciences and other social institutions, and even argues that this connection has been instrumental in the development of discourse analysis itself:

the recent history of discourse analysis is woven into the history of transformations inside and outside psychology, which started in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Inside psychology, the ‘turn-to-language’ that followed the paradigm ‘crisis’...opened the way for what we now recognize to be a ‘turn-to-discourse’.... The debates that prompted the turn to language were crucial for the development of qualitative research

in psychology, for they permitted psychologists to break from a positivist fetish for figures to an exploration of meaning. (pp. 92-93)

Parker also notes that an additional aspect of this “turn to language” or “turn to discourse” involves a movement away from the emphasis on certainty and consistency which characterized past positivist approaches. He states that “rather than fetishize ‘consistency’, researchers into language should focus on variation,” (p. 94) and should maintain an “emphasis on variability, construction, and function” (p. 94) of language—note the similarity to Foucault’s admonitions cited in Chapter 2. However, this notion of variability is mirrored in the methodological variations between different discourse analytic approaches.

Recall Scollon and Scollon’s (2001) distinction between different schools of discourse analysis based upon whether they grew out of the post-structuralist and Foucauldian-inspired *social* analysis using language, or the more linguistically-rooted strands which have approached discourse analysis from the opposite direction, from the *inside* as opposed to the *outside*, one might say. The methodological distinction between these two approaches or groups of approaches involves the degree of focus and attention given to the text itself, the degree to which the analysis is “text-immanent.” Fairclough (2003) makes a similar distinction within the broader field of discourse analysis:

There are many versions of discourse analysis. One major division is between approaches which include detailed analysis of texts, and approaches which don’t. I have used the term ‘textually oriented discourse analysis’ to distinguish the former from the latter. Discourse analysis in social sciences is often strongly influenced by the work of Foucault. Social scientists working in this tradition generally pay little close attention to the linguistic features of texts. My own approach to discourse analysis has been to try to transcend the division between work inspired by social theory...and work which focuses upon the language of texts but tends not to engage with social theoretical issues....

So...discourse analysis is not merely the linguistic analysis of texts. I see discourse analysis as 'oscillating' between a focus on specific texts and a focus on what I call the 'order of discourse', the relatively durable social structuring of language which is itself one element of the relatively durable structuring and networking of social practices. Critical discourse analysis is concerned with continuity and change at this more abstract, more structural, level, as well as with what happens in particular texts. The link between these two is made through the way in which texts are analyzed. (Fairclough, 2003, pp. 2-3)

As in Foucault's work, CDA "takes a particular interest in the relation between language and power," (Wodak, 2001a, p. 2) and it "specifically considers institutional, political, gender and media discourses (in the broadest sense) which testify to more or less overt relations of struggle and conflict" (p. 2). Also as in Foucault, there is a refusal by CDA practitioners to be pinned down or pigeonholed into one method or definition of their discipline. In the *Archaeology*, after defining his goals negatively in terms of what he is *not* seeking to do, Foucault demands, "do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write" (Foucault, 1972, p. 17). Teun van Dijk, in answer to the question "what is CDA?" responds:

Let me begin [by] spelling out what CDA is not. CDA is not a direction of research among others...nor a subdiscipline of discourse analysis. Rather, CDA is a—critical—perspective on doing scholarship: it is, so to speak, discourse analysis "with an attitude." It focuses on social problems, and especially on the role of discourse in the production and reproduction of power abuse or domination.... CDA does not deny but explicitly defines and defends its own sociopolitical position. (2001, p. 96).

He goes on to state that, "CDA does not provide a ready-made, how-to-do approach to social analysis, but emphasizes that for each study a thorough theoretical analysis of a

social issue must be made, so as to be able to select which discourse and social structures to analyze and to relate” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 98).

Similarly, Ruth Wodak, another pioneer of the CDA approach, states that:

The complexities of modern societies in our fast changing world...can only be grasped by a model of multicausal, mutual influences between different groups of persons.... Causal models do not fit this complexity.... I endorse a more pragmatically oriented theoretical approach.... Such a pragmatic approach to theory would not seek to provide a catalogue of context-less propositions and generalizations, but rather to relate questions of theory formation and conceptualization closely to the specific problems that are to be investigated. In this sense, the first question...is...“What conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this and that context?” (Wodak, 2001b, p. 64)

From this beginning, she goes on to lay out an approach she terms “the discourse-historical approach.” She states that this approach consists of three dimensions. The first is text- or discourse-immanent critique, which examines the text in itself. The second is the socio-diagnostic critique, in which the analyst “makes use of her or his background and contextual knowledge and embeds the communicative or interactional structures of a discursive event in a wider frame of social and political relations” (p. 65). The third is the prognostic critique, which aims at transformation of the discourse by intervening to alter it or enact pragmatic, practical social changes.

Wodak maintains, in keeping with Foucault, that “CDA is not concerned with evaluating what is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’” (2001b, p. 65) within a discourse itself, but instead focuses on integrating “a large quantity of available knowledge about the historical sources and the background of the social and political fields in which discursive ‘events’ are embedded,” (p. 65) in order to highlight “the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to

diachronic change” (p. 65). This approach owes much to Foucault’s emphasis on the historical dimension of discourse and his notion of shifts, ruptures, or discontinuities as being points in a discourse of particular relevance for the discourse analyst. Certainly, with respect to Camelot, the argument that it represents a set of historical discontinuities and shifts both within psychological and military discourses, and within the institutions of the social sciences and the military and the detailed examination of these shifts will be central to the present study.

3.4 Power/Knowledge and the Critical Perspective

Again in keeping with Foucault, Wodak emphasizes “a dialectical relationship between particular discursive practices and the specific fields of action (including situations, institutional frames and social structures), in which they are embedded” (2001b, p. 66). This statement draws from and reinforces Foucault’s work on the power/knowledge nexus, and relates it specifically to discourse, in that “institutional and social settings shape and affect discourses, and...discourses influence discursive as well as non-discursive social and political processes and actions” (p. 66). In other words, discourses don’t just exist in some isolated academic or institutional context, but have direct and observable effects both on other discursive practices and on real-world social and political processes, events, and even on the institutions that themselves generated the discourses. From here, Wodak goes on to clarify what she understands as “discourse” and to draw an important distinction between “discourse” and “text:”

‘Discourse’ can...be understood as a complex bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within and across social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic

types, that is genres.... The most salient feature of the definition of a 'discourse' is the macro-topic, like 'unemployment'.... [which] allows for many sub-topics.... Discourses are open and hybrid and not closed systems at all; new sub-topics can be created, and intertextuality and interdiscursivity allow for new fields of action. Discourses are realized in both genres and texts. (Wodak, 2001b, p. 66)

What, then, does it mean to study discourse "critically?" Wodak argues that "a fully 'critical' account of discourse would...require a theorization and description of both the social processes and structures which give rise to the production of a text, and of the social structures and processes within which individuals or groups as social, historical subjects, create meanings in their interactions with texts" (2001a, pp. 2-3). Similarly, Fairclough (1995) distinguishes between critical and descriptive goals within discourse analysis, and argues that "adopting critical goals means aiming to elucidate [assumed] background knowledge, and more generally to make clear social determinations and effects of discourse which are characteristically opaque to participants" (p. 28). He goes on to state that, "the critical approach has its theoretical underpinnings in views of the relationship between 'micro' events (including verbal events) and 'macro' structures which see the latter as both the conditions for and the products of the former, and which therefore reject rigid barriers between the study of the 'micro' (of which the study of discourse is a part) and the study of the 'macro'" (p. 28). This argument also reflects Wodak's (2001b) emphasis above on the dialectical relationship between social and political actions and practices (macro) on the one hand and individual texts or discourses on the other (micro).

This dialectical interaction between text and discourse on the one hand and social structures and practices on the other is an assumption that is crucial to the uniquely critical approach of CDA. More specifically, Fairclough (1995) explains it this way:

Verbal interaction is a mode of social action, and...like other modes of social action it presupposes a range of what I shall loosely call 'structures'—which are reflected in the 'knowledge base'—including social structures, situational types, language codes, norms of language use.... These structures are not only presupposed by, and necessary conditions for, action, but are also the *products* of action; or in a different terminology, actions *reproduce* structures.... The significance of [this] assumption is that 'micro' actions or events, including verbal interaction, can in no sense be regarded as of merely 'local' significance to the situations in which they occur, for any and every action contributes to the reproduction of 'macro' structures....a view which is in accordance with one formulation in Saussure's *Cours*: 'Language and speaking are thus interdependent; the former is both the instrument and the product of the latter.'... My concern here, however, is with the reproduction of social structures in discourse.... It makes little sense to study [discourse] as if [it] were unconnected with social structures. (p. 35)

Furthermore, for Fairclough, applying critical goals to discourse analysis also serves to specify particular areas of focus for research. Specifically, he calls for “focusing attention upon the ‘social institution’ and upon discourses which are clearly associable with particular institutions, rather than on casual conversation, as has been the fashion” (1995, p. 37) within discourse analysis in the past. By “social institutions,” he refers to institutions which occupy a kind of intermediary position between the “social formation” (by which Fairclough means “a particular society at a particular time and stage of development,” [1995, p. 53]—the generic term “society” being too vague) on the one hand and individual social actions or events on the other. He states that “social actions tend very much to cluster in terms of institutions; when we witness a social event...we normally have no difficulty identifying it in institutional terms, i.e. as

appertaining to the family, the school, the workplace, church, the courts, some department of government, or some other institution” (p. 37).

Focusing CDA research on social institutions is important because they function “as a ‘pivot’ between the highest level of social structuring, that of the ‘social formation,’ and the most concrete level, that of the particular social event or action” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 37). Moreover, focusing research on social institutions is important because, “a social institution is (amongst other things) an apparatus of verbal interaction, or an ‘order of discourse’,” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 38) and each institution has its own discursive norms, its own criteria for defining local “experts” and expert knowledge and discourse, and its own accumulation of taken-for-granted background knowledge and shared perspective. In keeping with Foucault, Fairclough describes these institutions as having a dual role relating to discourse: “it is, I suggest, necessary to see the institution as simultaneously facilitating and constraining social action...of its members: it provides them with a frame for action, without which they could not act, but it thereby constrains them to act within the frame” (1995, p. 38).

3.5 Ideological-Discursive Formations

This dual process of facilitation and constraint referenced by Fairclough (1995) above, works not only to create a certain normative climate among members of a given institution, but, more radically, he insists (as does Foucault), that “institutions construct their ideological and discursal subjects; they construct them in the sense that they impose ideological and discursal constraints on them to act as subjects. For instance, to become a teacher...one must learn to talk like a teacher and ‘see things’ like a teacher”

(Fairclough, 1995, p. 39). He goes on to assert that, “this means that in the process of acquiring the ways of talking which are normatively associated with a subject position, one necessarily acquires also its ways of seeing, or ideological norms. And just as one is typically unaware of one’s ways of talking...so also is one typically unaware of what ways of seeing, what ideological representations, underlie one’s talk” (Fairclough, 1995, pp. 39-40). So, the acquisition of an “expert” discourse goes hand in hand with the creation of one’s identity as an “expert” in a given field or institution, and, what’s more, with the development of an “expert” worldview.

As such, in the passages quoted above, it should be clear that for Fairclough there is a direct connection between one’s “ways of seeing,” which he refers to, following Althusser (1968/1971), as “ideological formations,” and one’s “ways of speaking,” or “discursive formations,” a term he uses in reference to Foucault, although perhaps with a somewhat different emphasis. In fact, Fairclough then states that in his work he prefers to make the connection more direct and explicit by referring simply to “‘ideological-discursive formations’ (IDFs for short), in accordance with what I have said above about the inseparability of ‘ways of talking’ and ‘ways of seeing’ . In so doing, I shall make the simplifying assumption, which further work may well challenge, that there is a one-to-one relationship between ideological formations and discursive formations” (1995, p. 40).

Furthermore, instead of thinking of institutions themselves as creating subjects ideologically and discursively, Fairclough finds it be more effective to think of the IDF itself rather than the institution that rests on it as having the role of constituting subjects: “it is the IDF that positions subjects in relation to its own sets of speech events, participants, settings, topics, goals and, simultaneously, ideological representations”

(Fairclough, 1995, p. 41). Even if multiple IDFs are active within a given institution, they are not usually independently and pluralistically coexisting, but are rather ordered relative to one another in terms of dominance and power differentials. Therefore, “it is when the dominance of an IDF is unchallenged to all intents and purposes (i.e. when whatever challenges there are do not constitute any threat), that the norms of the IDF will become most naturalized, and most opaque, and may come to be seen as the norms of the institution itself” (p. 41). The power to maintain one clearly dominant IDF is a kind of power which Fairclough asserts is roughly correlated with the degree of economic and political power of an institution. In cases where there is only one operative IDF or where one has clear and powerful dominance, Fairclough expects subjects within that institution to be more or less unaware of the (taken for granted) ideological dimensions of the subject positions which they occupy, a situation which closely parallels Gramsci’s (1949/1971) notion of hegemony. “This means of course that they are in no reasonable sense ‘committed’ to them, and it underlines the point that ideologies are not to be equated with views or beliefs. It is quite possible for a social subject to occupy institutional subject positions which are ideologically incompatible, or to occupy a subject position which is incompatible with his or her overt political or social beliefs and affiliations, without being aware of any contradiction” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 42).

Summing up, Fairclough explains:

The approach I have adopted is based upon a three-dimensional conception of discourse, and correspondingly a three-dimensional method of discourse analysis. Discourse, and any specific instance of discursive practice, is seen as simultaneously (i) a language text, spoken or written, (ii) discourse practice (text production and text interpretation), (iii) sociocultural practice. Furthermore, a piece of discourse is embedded within sociocultural practice at a number of levels; in the immediate situation, in the wider institution or organization, and at a societal level....

The method of discourse analysis includes linguistic *description* of the language text, *interpretation* of the relationship between the (productive and interpretative) discursive processes and the text, and *explanation* of the relationship between the discursive processes and the social processes. (Fairclough, 1995, p. 97)

3.6 Procedure for the Current Study

The current study will employ many aspects of the critical discourse analytic approach outlined above, but it may be helpful at this point to clarify exactly which aspects and how they will be employed. First, I will not be employing the more linguistically-oriented, text-immanent methods, but will be situating my approach within the Foucauldian tradition of discourse analysis which emphasizes relating discourse analysis to social analysis and sees these two levels as mutually supportive. The reason for this choice is that I believe that the discourse of Camelot as gathered in my data set cannot be most meaningfully interpreted in a purely text-immanent fashion. Rather, in order to be understood fully in terms of all of its social and institutional implications, it must be analyzed in terms of its connections with important institutions (such as the Department of Defense, psychology and the social sciences, the governments of the “developing countries,” and so forth) that are called forth and implicated (and let us not forget, in keeping with Foucault, “constructed” and shaped) through the discourse.

Second, I will also employ Fairclough’s notion of the ideological-discursive formation (IDF) described above, as it is closely connected to Foucault’s notion of the discursive formation discussed in Chapter 2. Particularly relevant for the present study is Fairclough’s notion that IDFs operate through discourse to create subjects and fix them in certain subject positions as a prerequisite for their entering into and producing discourse.

I will attempt to identify the significant IDFs operating in the texts analyzed here, and will explore their relations with the relevant “social formations.”

The steps of my method will be drawn from Parker (1994), who lays out a fairly explicit and detailed discourse analytic procedure. Due to the nature of the texts I am analyzing here, his method won't be appropriate to apply in its entirety, but will have to be modified somewhat. Nonetheless, the basic structure of his method will be useful and will be reviewed below. Also, where necessary, I will supplement Parker's method with that of other discourse analysts, particularly Wood and Kroger (2000).

Parker's first step involves an initial reading of the texts to be used (this step is also Wood and Kroger's). Although seemingly obvious, this first step bears mentioning because both Parker and Wood and Kroger advocate a much closer reading than might usually be done in other contexts. Wood and Kroger (2000) describe the process as follows: “the analyst begins by listening to...the data (for spoken discourse) and reading over the transcript several times, by getting a feel for what is there. The number and closeness of the readings may vary depending upon the purpose of the research, the type of data involved, the amount of discourse to be analyzed, and the type and extent of analysis that has been planned” (p. 87). In this case, my initial reading of the documents will be presented in the “Data” section (Chapter 4). I will write up a brief summary of each document as I understand it, including quotes of the passages I deem to be most relevant to the Camelot themes. The recording of this “first approach” to my data will allow readers, if they so desire, to compare my response to the articles to their own and determine the degree of correspondence or difference between the two. The next step I will take with the data will be to extract all of the quotations that struck me initially as

being most relevant and present them outside of the context either of the original articles or of my written first reactions to them. The data represented by these quotations will be presented in Appendix 1 and grouped by article for readers to review as necessary.

The next step draws from Parker (1994) again: “if we are to consider the ways in which discourses, as Foucault puts it, ‘systematically form the objects’ that are referred to in any text, we should now, as researchers, systematically itemize ‘objects’ that appear in this text. A useful rule to follow here is to look for nouns. Where are they, and what could they signify?” (p. 97). In the present study, I identified eighteen objects which recurred with remarkable frequency and regularity throughout the texts and which seemed particularly relevant to the Camelot themes. These objects will be analyzed individually in Chapter 5.

The next step involves grouping the selected quotations across authors and articles by object and, within each of these groups of quotations, identifying common discursive themes. This step is in keeping with Wood and Kroger’s (2000) admonition that “the overall goal of the analysis is to explain what is being done in the discourse and how this is accomplished, that is, how the discourse is structured or organized to perform various functions and achieve various effects or consequences. It requires the identification and interpretation of patterns in the discourse, that is, of systematic variability or similarity in content and structure” (p. 95). The resultant themes will also be listed in an appendix, Appendix 2, along with the quotations belonging to each so that the reader can check her perspective against my own. Once the data have been thus transformed, we can begin to identify the different IDFs at play, through, in the words of Parker (1994), “identifying contrasts between ways of speaking, and identifying points

where these ways of speaking overlap” (p. 100). From here, we can examine how the different IDFs present in the texts interact and how they influence both the production and consumption of the discourses and texts in question, and also the mutual influences at work between the IDFs and the relevant professional and social institutions and formations. In terms of presenting my analysis to the reader, I found it most illuminating to structure the presentation in terms of the eighteen discourse objects, giving each discourse object its own section and, as I analyze them progressively, referring to the analyses of other objects as necessary. Obviously, due to the high degree of interconnection between the texts, discourse objects, and themes, presenting the analysis in a strictly linear fashion is quite difficult and may even run somewhat counter to the spirit of such an analysis. For this reason, I encourage the reader to read the Data and Analysis sections and their related appendices in a more open-ended fashion, flipping back and forth between sections as desired. In fact, the analysis of the four IDFs at the end of the Analysis chapter represents the heart of the analysis, and as such, an initial perusal of this section can be helpful even before reading the individual object analyses. Each method of reading, whether linear or nonlinear, will serve to reveal different aspects of the data and their interconnections.

My final step in the analysis is, again following Parker (1994), to “systematically itemize the ‘subjects’ (the categories of person) who appear in this text, and reconstruct, as a device to explore differential rights to speak within discourse, what each type of person may say within the framework of rules presupposed by the text” (p. 98). In his method, as in my own, the list of subjects is a subset of the list of objects. Parker also notes that “one of the functions of the text, as of any text, is to bring to life (again, for us

now as researchers) a network of relationships, and as we move on to link this network together around the objects the text refers to so we can start to map the different versions of the social world which coexist in the text” (1994, p. 99). Therefore, my last step in my analysis is to identify four major, recurring themes, themes which might be taken, following Fairclough, as IDFs. For each of these themes, I explore how they constitute the various discourse subjects and how they position them relative to one another. Perhaps unsurprisingly, patterns recur with great regularity in this respect, as we shall see. At this point, let us turn to the data and to our initial encounter with them, presented in the following chapter.

Chapter 4

Data

4.1 Introduction

Before delving into the data contained in this chapter, it makes sense to orient the reader briefly as to what the data set is comprised of, where the relevant documents were drawn from, and why, as well as how this data will be organized and presented here. For clarity, it may be helpful to start with a list of the documents themselves and their corresponding section numbers:

- 4.2 The *Social Science Research and National Security* documents, a series of articles published in 1963 through the Smithsonian Institution
- 4.3 Proceedings of the symposium hosted by SORO, entitled “The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research” (March 26th through 28th of 1962 in Washington D.C.)
- 4.4 “The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology,” an article published in the *American Psychologist* in February 1964, authored by Drs. Charles Windle and Theodore Vallance, then both employed at SORO
- 4.5 The two “Camelot planning letters” issued by SORO in December 1964

I have limited my analysis to primary documents that were directly connected to Camelot and its creators: SORO, the Army, and the social scientists involved. Of these, the most directly connected to Camelot (although last chronologically) are the two letters (4.5) collected in Horowitz’s 1967 volume and first issued by SORO on December 4 and 5, 1964. These are the only publicly available documents to be issued directly from Project Camelot itself. The remaining documents I will analyze here are drawn primarily from two volumes (4.2 and 4.3) which are mentioned in the first letter as “a series of

recent reports” which are “of considerable relevance” and which address “the problems of national security and the potential contributions that social science might make to solving these problems” (SORO, 1964a, p. 49). These two collections of documents were described briefly in Chapter 1 above, and each of them will be introduced in more detail as they are presented below. As will be seen, they involve many of the same social scientists and military personnel who were involved in Camelot’s formulation, and both have SORO connections or representation. The final document to be included in the data set is a February 1964 article (4.4) taken from *American Psychologist*, the official organ of the APA. The article is entitled “The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology,” and was written by Drs. Vallance and Windle, both then employed by SORO and both psychologists. It is significant for our data set because it represents SORO’s initial presentation (although the article itself was not officially tied to SORO) of its contemplated Camelot work to the wider psychological community months before the first letter was issued by SORO in December of that year, and because it presents the possibilities of greatly expanding psychology’s role in the military, as will be seen.

These documents—the two letters, two volumes, and one journal article—will be presented below in terms of the chronological order of their composition, with the “Pool group’s” articles (4.2) coming first, as they were composed beginning in 1961, followed by the minutes of the symposium (4.3) from 1962, then the Windle and Vallance article (4.4) from February, 1964, and finally the two SORO-issued letters about Camelot (4.5) from December, 1964. The articles from the “Pool group” will be referenced by author, using the publication date of the whole volume, 1963, throughout. The symposium minutes will be referenced by speaker, using the publication date 1962 (the conference

was held in March and the minutes published in June of that year). For both of these volumes, if the author or speaker is not clear, as in the case of biographical notes, for instance, the reference will be to the editor of the document, Pool in the case of the “Pool group” and Lybrand in the case of the symposium. The SORO-issued Camelot letters will be credited to SORO as author, and the date of their issue, 1964, as the publication year. With regard to headings, I will employ sub-headings which are underlined for individual articles or speakers within the two collected volumes, giving the last name of the author or speaker, followed by the title of the article or the title given to their presentation in the minutes. All of these subheadings will be ordered numerically within each section (so, for instance, the first article from the “Pool group” will be found under subheading 4.2.1). One final note up front to spare its repetition later is that all underlining or italicizing is present in the original texts unless otherwise noted. There is a good bit of this in the documents. I feel it is relevant to the data, and wish to emphasize that it is not my addition. Also, each document or collection will be preceded by a brief contextualizing introduction, and each new author will likewise be given a brief biographical sketch when possible, drawn directly from the documents themselves.

4.2 *Social Science Research and National Security*

In March 1963, the Research Group in Psychology and the Social Sciences of the Smithsonian Institution, under an Office of Naval Research contract, produced a collection of articles entitled *Social Science Research and National Security*. The articles were composed in the years 1961 to 1962, and gathered and published in 1963 upon commission by the group’s sponsor, the Office of Naval Research. The introduction to

the volume was composed by the research group's chairman, who was also charged with organizing and editing the volume. This was Ithiel De Sola Pool, also a professor of political science at MIT and a member of its Center for International Studies (CENIS), a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, the Advisory Board of the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake, Chairman of the Research Board of Simulmatics Corp. of New York, and a former member of the Advisory Panel on Psychology and the Social Sciences of the Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of the Army (Pool, ed., 1963, p. 1). His credentials listed above demonstrate the unique combination of top-flight academic, military, and private-sector connections common to many of the participants in the research group as well as to other similar groups organized around the same time, and discussed elsewhere in the paper.

Of the nine chapters/articles in *Social Science Research and National Security*, only four were included in the present data set. These selections were made for several reasons. First, it was necessary to keep the data set to an (at least somewhat) manageable size. Second, articles were selected for inclusion based on their closeness to the central aims and topics of Project Camelot (particularly as these aims and topics are spelled out in the December 4, 1964 letter, the most succinct presentation of these aims available and also the one most directly connected to the Project itself). Dr. Pool's introductory chapter is included for analysis because it represents an orienting introduction to the volume as a whole and also because it clearly articulates the aims of the volume and their connection to Camelot themes, as will be seen. Dr. Knorr's article on "intelligence" is included due to the central importance of the topic of "intelligence" to Camelot's aims, insofar as "intelligence" gathering is framed throughout the data set as being a function essentially

boiling down to scientific research and common to both the military and the social sciences. The article by Dr. Eckstein on “internal war” is included because the central aim of the Project as articulated in the December 4 letter is “to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies” (SORO, 1964a, p. 47). Finally, the article on “military development” by Dr. Pye is included because of the connection of this topic to the “Draper Report” discussed in Chapter 1, and the relation of this Report and this topic to the overall evolution of the Army’s “counterinsurgency mission” and its new role as “nation-builder,” themes which are again central to Camelot and its goals and vision.

Excluded from the data set are the following articles: “Alliances” by W. Phillips Davison, “Impact of Military Postures in Peacetime,” by Wilbur Schramm, “Population Research and the National Interest,” by Ansley Coale, “Gaming as a Military Research Procedure,” by Vincent McRae,” and finally “Arms Control,” by Thomas Schelling. Arguments could be made for the inclusion of any or all of these documents in the data set. They were excluded here for the simple reason that they were deemed less directly relevant to the central Camelot themes of internal war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, development, and nation-building. Nonetheless, they are all recommended to the interested reader, and certainly provide a still fuller context for understanding the Project and its genesis.

4.2.1 Pool: “Some Implications of the Volume”

In the introduction, Dr. Pool lays out the broad mission of the papers to follow. He states: “the objective of this book is to consider what social science can contribute to

more effective conduct of the free world's defense effort" (1963, p. 1). He states that this work will skip over the more traditional and proven military applications for social science such as personnel selection and training, man/machine systems design, persuasion and motivation, and so forth (aspects largely focused on the military's internal functioning), and instead concentrate on "an entirely different domain of Defense Department problems," namely, "the operations of the Defense Department in relation to the external world" (p. 2). He cites a past history of "neglect of potential social science contributions to the substantive tasks of the Defense Department," (p. 3), and argues that this neglect is largely due to the wariness that the "manager" has traditionally had of the outside "expert." He argues that social science concepts have influenced military minds "for centuries," but that the military also has a history of jealously guarding those aspects of its operations that constitute "the crux of military planning and operations," (p. 4) perhaps to its own detriment. He also suggests, however, that this state of affairs with regard to the military may be changing and that military planners may be more receptive than in the past to social science contributions to military issues such as "strategic planning, weapon system selection, intelligence, guerilla warfare, and such external relations of the defense establishment as civil-military relations, military government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the social sciences as they now exist might provide contributions" (p. 5).

In analyzing how this change in military attitudes has come about, Pool cites two major factors: "the technological revolution in weapons," (the advent of nuclear weapons) and "the change in their primary purpose from use to deterrence," which "both

increase the demands upon social science” (p. 7). For Pool, all that remains to be seen, given the increased military need and demand for social science research is “whether the social sciences will contribute in proportion to the need” (p. 10). To this end, he cites traditional reservations from both camps. He notes that “the weakness of military-oriented social science may be attributed to an unmilitary and even anti-military sentiment among some social scientists,” who tend to be “personally liberal in ideology,” and hold to a “certain ivory tower viewpoint,” due to which they have “shied away from helping solve the problems of industry, defense, or civilian branches of government” (p. 10). However, he also cites a “much more important reason,” for the lack of research, namely a “lack of demand by the military establishment. Had they been urged, many social scientists would have responded” (p. 10).

Thus, the central problem for Pool boils down to this:

How can a branch of social science be produced which takes upon itself a responsible concern for national security matters, and how can talented individuals from within social science be drawn into this area. That this is feasible and deserves to be attempted is a thesis underlying the efforts of the committee that produced this volume.... Implicit in our effort was the assumption that organizational and fiscal measures can have some effect and that the direction of movement of a science can in part, even if only in part, be influenced by provision of financial support. (pp. 10-11)

To this end, he notes that “Princes, educational institutions, governments throughout the centuries have by provision of funds and facilities often determined the direction of scientific growth” (p. 12). Later, he similarly argues that “clearly the military constitute an applied profession which can be the client for satellite scientific disciplines” (p. 16). However:

this has not yet happened much in the social sciences.... But this state of affairs need not prevail. The defense establishment can make itself a

client, stimulating the behavioral sciences and using them—to mutual advantage.... In effect, what we have been saying is that social science needs a kind of engineering to go with it.... As the social sciences become more effectively linked to the policy process, whether in the area of defense or in other areas, they are producing a cadre with a new professional role like that of the engineers who work side by side with the more theoretical social scientists.... Almost all social scientists, both inside and outside of university life, are fulfilling the new role. But a proud image of that role does not exist. Few social scientists would be happy to admit to being problem-solvers rather than scientific discoverers. What is needed is a prouder image of the role and along with that a great increase in numbers, improvement of morale, and clarity of purpose of the cadre fulfilling it. (pp. 16-17)

In order to achieve these ends, however, he holds that some changes are needed:

The defense establishment is in a position to stimulate a significant burst of social science creativity which could prove most useful to it [but first].... It must provide social science training for a substantial number of its officers. It should include more fundamental social science in the curricula of its military academies.... The Defense Department also needs to maintain and strengthen social science in its in-house laboratories to provide transmission belts between the outside scientists and the military planners. Also important...is the role of the Defense Department as a major supplier of funds, for research.... There are also things social scientists can do to change their ways toward greater usefulness.... The social scientist who would be responsible must recognize in military problems some of the most important issues, perhaps even the most important issues of our time.... The social scientist who faces the problems with sobriety and who does not indulge himself in the luxury of mere condemnation and pontification will soon find that he is called on to calculate the answers to concrete policy decisions.... Social scientists must abandon the ivory tower...and must strive to contribute to engineering calculations which can help achieve security in a world of risks. (pp. 23-24)

4.2.2 Knorr: “The Intelligence Function”

One of the articles following Dr. Pool’s introduction deals specifically with the issue of military intelligence. It was composed by Dr. Klaus Knorr, a German emigré

who was then a professor of economics at Princeton University and serving as Director of that university's Center of International Studies (not to be confused with MIT's CENIS program). In addition, he served as a consultant to the DOS Committee for Economic Development, and also to the DOD, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the RAND Corporation (Pool, ed., 1963, p. 75). As such, his pedigree and its mix of academic, government, and military connections is noteworthy in itself and also in terms of its similarity to Dr. Pool's.

Dr. Knorr begins his article by characterizing intelligence as “an operation for procuring and processing information about the external environment in which an organization—in our case, the Government of the United States—wants to maximize the net achievement of its various goals” (Knorr, 1963, p. 75). If this should sound suspiciously like basic scientific research, Dr. Knorr enthusiastically affirms this connection, noting that:

The development of modern intelligence in the United States can be said to have begun with the establishment in 1941 of the research and intelligence branch of the Office of Strategic Services headed by William J. Donovan. It was Donovan's conception that the rigorous training that social scientists and historians had received in the handling of evidence made them indispensable in estimating capabilities and trends in enemy countries. And the academic contribution of research techniques was indeed so crucial to the success of this branch of OSS that, impressed by OSS competition, the intelligence organizations of the armed services began forthwith to recruit academic talent. (p. 77)

He adds later on that “as now practiced, intelligence is inconceivable without the social sciences” (p. 78). Also, that above and beyond the production of mere information which might be of use to the intelligence community, “it is social science methods of gathering data, of deducing data from other data, and of establishing the validity of data that are of

particular value” (p. 80). In light of this past help and the hope of further assistance in the future, Knorr argues that “a strong case can be made for appreciable financial support of social science research on the part of federal agencies.... It is difficult to doubt that progress in the physical sciences has been accelerated by the availability of relatively large funds—notably federal funds. I am convinced that larger funds, properly administered, would also accelerate progress in the social sciences” (p. 94).

In turning next to the question of what *kinds* of research might be helpful for the intelligence community, Knorr states that:

Obviously, a sophisticated science of social change would be a most valuable input for intelligence work.... Somewhat more specifically, one might single out the study of ‘internal war,’ that is, of the resort to political violence within communities, a phenomenon which is occurring with extraordinary frequency, with which the intelligence community is deeply involved, and about which the social science literature is far from rich. (p. 94).

4.2.3 Eckstein: “Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation”

The following article, entitled “Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation,” was composed by Dr. Harry Eckstein, and addresses precisely the concern identified by Knorr in the last passage above. Like Knorr, Eckstein was also a German emigré, and also held a Ph.D., in this case from Harvard. Interestingly, at the time of the article’s composition, Eckstein worked with Knorr at the Center of International Studies at Princeton, where he was also a professor of political science. Dr. Eckstein served from 1943 to 1946 in the U.S. Army, where he worked in intelligence (Pool, ed., 1963, p. 102). Any statement on the similarity of the authors’ pedigree and background at this point seems superfluous.

Dr. Eckstein begins his examination of internal war with a definition: “the term ‘internal war’ denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, government, or policies” (Eckstein, 1963, p. 102). He adds that internal war denotes the genus of which terms such as “revolution, civil war, revolt, rebellion, guerrilla warfare, coup d’état, terrorism, or insurrection,” (p. 102) are species. He then spends several pages of his text describing different historical systems of classification and differentiation among the various subtypes of internal wars, broken down along a variety of criteria, observing almost in frustration that “for few phenomena do social science, history, and conventional language offer so various and vague a vocabulary” (p. 103). However, at the end of this exploration, he concludes that “it can do no harm to consider internal wars as all of a piece at the beginning of inquiry and to make distinctions only as they become necessary or advisable” (p. 104). Having thus largely bypassed the thorny problem of contextualizing internal war and its various species, Eckstein next moves to the issue of justification for its study.

He observes that “it ought not to be necessary to urge the study of internal wars upon anyone, social scientist or policy-maker. One would expect social scientists to be interested in them simply because they are a common, indeed astonishingly common, facet of human experience” (p. 104). However, he opines that “modern social scientists have in fact shamefully neglected the subject” (p. 104). He offers one hypothesis as to why this might be: “contemporary social science has been predicated far too much upon perspectives which regard violence, a la Hobbes, as the very negation of the social condition...and place heavy emphasis on the ideas of equilibrium, integration, and systematic inter-relation” (p. 105). He explains that “one does tend to think of political

violence as something unnatural to societies much as one thinks of illness as abnormal to the condition of individuals usually enjoying good health,” (p. 104) but quickly adds that this view can scarcely be justified due to the prevalence of internal wars. Eckstein also offers several other reasons for encouraging the study of internal war at this point. The reasons he suggests are simply glossed over at this point, as he intends to return to them in more depth later in his article:

There is another reason for making a special plea on behalf of the study of internal wars at this time.... We have reason to think they will remain commonplace in the future—and even more intimately connected with policy.... While internal wars have always been extensions of domestic politics, there are good reasons to believe that they will become especially important in our age as extensions of international politics.... Internal war is closely connected with social change.... [Therefore] one should expect internal political violence to persist, perhaps to increase, in a period when major social change continues to be so widespread and so widely wanted.... Moreover, the likelihood of internal war seems to be increased at least in some degree by the shrinking probabilities of international war in the age of “overkill.”... Many internal wars are extensions of diplomacy today, and it is clear that in the future they may become even more significant as “diplomatic” means. (pp. 105-106)

In scanning the above passage, one can scarcely miss the several references to the Clausewitzian notion of war as the “continuation of diplomacy by other means.” In this case, then, it seems that Eckstein is characterizing internal war in the same manner but one degree removed: internal war is the continuation of international war by other means. Furthermore, this is particularly so in an age in which, as most of the authors cited thus far have noted, conventional international warfare (The U.S.’s strength) is to a large degree obviated by the advent of the nuclear arms race.

Eckstein next includes a Cold War caution regarding the communist threat: “it is particularly likely today that the communist states will use internal wars as tools of

international politics. They have already done so frequently in the postwar period and are likely to do so frequently in the future” (p. 106). He also notes the “militant messianic creed” of these “expansionist zealots” bent on “exporting their utopia” which “justifies and glorifies violence,” and the advantage they have due to their “lack of scruples” (pp. 106-107). Furthermore, “they are immeasurably farther ahead of us in revolutionary theory,” and have “crucial advantages” including “much local support,” “much desperate discontent,” “many sublime and frustrated hopes, and much anachronistic hatred of non-communist western systems” (p. 107) among nations prone to internal wars. For these reasons, Eckstein argues, “we need a general study of internal war even more than a study of the operational aspects of irregular warfare,” particularly since “it is we who are likely to be on the defensive and because in no other field is prevention so much more effective than cure.... The most probable kinds of internal war, once started, are difficult, if not impossible, to win by those on the defensive” (p. 107).

Elaborating on the theme of “prevention” versus “cure” and the arguments in favor of the former, Eckstein states:

Not only is cure unlikely once guerrilla fighting has occurred under favorable conditions [for the guerrillas], it is also immensely costly.... A tremendous preponderance of men and resources is required by the defensive side.... The fighting is likely to be prolonged and vicious... One must pay great moral and psychological costs as well. For example, we know that the central problem in defense against guerrilla warfare is intelligence: knowing what an infinitely elusive enemy is really up to. We also know that against competent guerrillas and their enthusiastic civilian supporters, adequate intelligence seems to require brutal methods such as torture and terroristic intimidations.... The stakes are too high and the chances of failure too great for pretty manners to be observed. Guerrilla warfare thus breeds savagery even in the best-intentioned defenders. It makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them. (p. 108)

(As an aside, it is interesting to note here that Eckstein gives primary emphasis to the “appearance” of corruption among the defenders as opposed to their *actual* corruption, again emphasizing the primary importance of image and appearance in these situations.) In light of these high stakes and potential dangers, Eckstein argues that “detecting in advance the instability of regimes and knowing how to shore them up with fair chances of success are among the most urgent imperatives of the military as well as the political arts” (p. 109). In the next section of the paper, therefore, he turns his attention to the causes of internal war.

In examining the causes of internal war, Eckstein argues for systematic comparative studies of past internal wars and their outcomes. He also argues for a focus on preconditions rather than merely on precipitants of internal war, and he defines these two terms as follows: “a ‘precipitant’ of internal war is an event which actually starts the war.... ‘Preconditions’ of internal war, on the other hand, are those circumstances which make it possible for the precipitants to bring about political violence” (p. 112). This distinction, he states, serves “to shift attention from aspects of internal war which defy analysis to those which are amenable to systematic inquiry” (p. 113). It is also important because many apparent causes of internal war might also, in other circumstances, work to prevent internal war. Thus, many of the traditional hypotheses regarding causes might better be understood as “preconditions” within a given context, argues Eckstein.

Another crucial distinction and methodological choice made by Eckstein centers on the issue of whether to focus one’s analysis on “insurgents” or “incumbents.” He states that the preponderance of the existing literature focuses on the insurgents, which he feels is not surprising, because “after all, it is the rebels who rebel,” (p. 118) and thus

have the more obviously active role. However, he also cites Pareto's argument that "no elite which had preserved its capacity for timely and effective violence, or for effective manipulation, could be successfully assailed, or perhaps assailed at all" (p. 118). Furthermore, he notes that according to Brinton, "revolutions...follow the loss of common values, of internal cohesion, of an unquestioned sense of destiny and superiority in elites" (p. 118). Additionally, "examples of the instability that ensues from the estrangement of an elite are furnished in profusion by the Westernized elites of many currently underdeveloped areas" (p. 120). Furthermore, two additional reasons for arguing for an analysis of the role of elites include the facts that, according to Eckstein's survey of the historical literature, "internal wars are almost invariably preceded by important functional failures on the part of elites," and that "insurgent groups seem rarely to come even to the point of fighting without some support from alienated members of incumbent elites" (p. 121). For all of these reasons, Eckstein argues for a focus almost exclusively on the role of elite groups in fomenting or preventing internal war.

In addition to a focus on elites, Eckstein also argues for focusing on behavioral factors rather than structural factors, although, he notes, the existing literature tends to focus primarily on the latter. In support of this choice, he states that "one...argument derives from the general experience of modern social science. Purely structural theories have generally been found difficult to sustain wherever they have been applied" (p. 122) (although he doesn't go into any detail as to what he means here). Later, he states "the most obvious case for behavioral theories of internal war derives from the very fact that so many objective social conditions seem to be associated with it" (p. 123). Thus, what is at issue for Eckstein is not "particular social conditions," but rather "the ways in which

various social conditions may be perceived” (p. 123). Again, this is in line with his emphasis on the “appearance of corruption” on the part of defenders over their actual corruption, mentioned above.

Another shift he makes is to focus on general social processes rather than on particular conditions. He again breaks with the traditional literature in arguing that “broad formulations about social processes and balances, which can comprehend a large variety of particular conditions, should be stressed,” (124) as opposed to those particular conditions themselves.

He summarizes his arguments thus far as follows:

So far I have tried to make two related points. The first is that one is most likely to gain an understanding of the forces impelling societies toward internal war if one avoids one kind of analysis and emphasizes three others. One should avoid preoccupation with the more visible precipitants of internal wars, including conspiracies, and direct one’s efforts to the analysis of three aspects of their much less manifest preconditions: the nature of incumbent elites, “behavioral” characteristics of society, and the analysis of general social processes. The second point is, of course, the converse of these positions: that our understanding of the etiology of internal wars is dangerously inadequate precisely because studies have so far concentrated on precipitants rather than preconditions, insurgents rather than incumbents, and objective social conditions rather than social orientations and social processes. (p. 124)

Essentially, what seems to be happening in Eckstein’s arguments for structuring the proposed analysis in this way is that he is shifting the analysis away from variables that might help one to understand the development of internal war from the insurgent or indigenous point of view (visible precipitating factors, focus on insurgents, objectives social conditions, or social structures and processes) and toward variables that will make it more intelligible from the incumbent point of view (broader “preconditions,” focus on incumbent elites, emphasis on “behavioral” factors and “broad formulations”). This shift

on Eckstein's part has several implications here. First, it implies that our national interest is almost exclusively aligned with the incumbents in these struggles, which Eckstein affirms elsewhere in his article when he discusses the great difficulties posed by being "on the defensive" in internal wars and how this often requires one to jettison "pretty manners." Second, it implies that we are not attempting here to explore the problem as essentially a "human" level problem of wants and needs of the local population. Rather, the country is viewed as a system or set of systems similar to the organs in the body in medical science. Insurgent activities are posited as representing a sort of virus or pathogen infecting the body which must be removed without excessive damage to the "good" parts of the body. Alternately, the local population is formulated as something of an unruly child who must be controlled for his own good as well as ours, and the problem of controlling him here becomes essentially a technical one involving social science methodology, military tactics, and attitude formation and control. This is also evident in Eckstein's statement in the long passage cited above: he is in search of the "forces impelling societies toward internal war" and not the human motivations, wants, needs, and concerns which might be shared by classes, groups, and nations. Again, the "forces" at work are those of a "system," and should be viewed in this more dehumanized way in order to make the system and its forces more amenable to analysis with our social science toolbox. Obviously, then, this renders dubious any claim that this might be an objective or basic study of the phenomenon in question, and it becomes much more directly useful as a certain way of formulating a problem for a certain audience, in this case the U.S. Military as "client."

Eckstein then moves from these considerations of emphases within his analysis of causes of internal war to an examination of obstacles to internal war, or factors which might prevent it or render it less likely. In this regard, he claims that, “the study of internal peace...should therefore be part and parcel of the study of internal war” (p. 125). However, his notion of “peace” might differ somewhat from the generally understood notion, and these differences will become clearer as we explore this section of his paper.

For instance, the first obstacle to internal war which Eckstein takes up in his analysis is repression. He states, “the most obvious obstacle to internal war is, of course, the incumbent regime. It goes almost without saying that by using repression the established authorities can lessen the chances of violent attack upon themselves” (p. 125). Adding that “actual cases of internal war generally have...some structure for forming political will and acting upon decisions.... And anything with a structure can of course be detected and repressed, though not always very easily” (p. 125), Eckstein also offers the following caveat: “Repression can be a two-edged sword. Unless it is based on extremely good intelligence and unless its application is sensible, ruthless, and continuous, its effects may be quite opposite to those intended” (p. 125). It seems clear, then, that what Eckstein intends by the term “peace” is somewhat removed from the generally understood implications of the term insofar as it requires “ruthless and continuous” application of repression as its first component.

The next aspect of “internal peace” for Eckstein involves “diversionary mechanisms” and “concessions.” The former refers to “all those social patterns and practices which channel psychic energies away from revolutionary objectives...[and] which provide other outlets for aggressions or otherwise absorb emotional tensions” (p.

126). He offers several illuminating examples of diversions. The first is starting foreign wars, of which he claims, “indeed, diverting popular attention from domestic troubles by starting foreign wars is one of the most venerable dodges of statecraft” (p. 127). However, another caution: “military adventures are excellent diversions...but military failure, on the evidence, can hardly fail to hasten revolution in such cases” (p. 127). Needless to say, it is a rather cynical view of “internal peace” and also of “statecraft” that predicates them on diverting the attention of the local populace by engaging them in the killing of members of a foreign nation. He also lists further examples of diversions including “orgiastic excitements—like festivals and dances, parades and circuses” (p. 127) and “massive sports programs...to absorb the energies of the young and the interest of the not-so-young” (p. 127). Regarding “concessions,” he simply notes that, as in nineteenth-century England, the elites should have “enjoined on them philanthropy as a sacred duty,” and should be “educated...in the trusteeship theory of wealth,” in order to make “the masses extraordinarily willing to suffer their burdens in peace” (p. 127). This usage of the term peace here as essentially synonymous with silence and passivity doubtless comes closer to the notion of “internal peace” he was advocating above. Also interesting is the implicit corollary here, namely that “internal war” would then be a situation in which the masses are no longer “extraordinarily willing to suffer their burdens in peace,” and the U.S. military role advocated here is one of assisting the local governmental elites in finding ways to convince the unruly masses that it is after all in their best interest to continue to do so.

The final obstacle to internal war cited by Eckstein is also the “surest obstacle...apart from orgiastic diversions,” namely one which “affect[s] the capacities of

alienated groups to use violence at all, or, more often in real life, to use it with fair prospects of success” (p. 128). This includes controlling aspects such as terrain and communications facilities. Of the latter, he notes that:

Marx, among many others, seems to have realized this when he argued that urbanization increases the likelihood of revolution, if only in that it makes men accessible to one another and thus makes revolutionary organization easier to achieve.... There may be nothing more mysterious to the celebrated peacability of peasants, as compared to city dwellers, than the physical difficulty in rural life, especially if fairly primitive, to form a “collective revolutionary mentality.” (p. 128).

Another obstacle to internal war affecting the capacity of alienated groups for violence involves what Eckstein terms the incumbent regime’s “instruments of violence.” He states, “internal wars seem rarely to occur, even if other conditions favor them, if a regime’s instruments of violence remain loyal. This applies above all to the armed forces. Trotsky for one, and Lenin for another, considered the attitude of the army absolutely decisive for any revolution” (p. 128).

Yet another is “elite cohesion,” of which he states “internal wars are unlikely wherever cohesion of an elite is intact for the simple reason that insurgent formations require leadership and other skills and are unlikely to obtain them on a large scale without some significant break in the ranks of an elite” (p. 129). However, the final obstacle he notes is “perhaps the greatest of all,” namely “lack of popular support for rebellion” (p. 128). He claims that:

it is the chief dogma of modern revolutionaries that without great popular support the insurgents in an internal war can hardly hope to win—unless by means of a coup—and that with such support they are hardly likely to lose. So vital is this factor that some writers think that the distinctive characteristic of internal war is the combination of violent techniques with psychological warfare, the latter designed, of course, to win the active support of the noncombatants.... To be sure, psychological warfare

occurs nowadays also in international wars. Its role in these, however, is not nearly so crucial as in internal wars; it is incidental in international war but...seems to be decisive in internal war," (p. 129).

He then offers a somewhat shocking addendum to this claim: "rebels who can count on popular support can lose themselves in the population, rely on the population for secrecy (in wars in which intelligence, as I have pointed out, is practically the whole art of defense) and...they can be practically certain of victory, short of a resort to genocide by the incumbents" (p. 129). Resorting to genocide seems to be getting fairly far afield even from Eckstein's conception of "internal peace."

So, after establishing the parameters of his analysis of internal wars and running down all of the factors which seem to increase and decrease the probability of such wars, Eckstein next turns to the ways in which social science might make a contribution. He states that "calculations about popular loyalties normally play a role in the decision to resort to political violence. The calculations may be mistaken, but they are almost always made; sometimes as in the case of the Algerian nationalist struggle, they are made in ways approaching the survey research of social science" (p. 130). Indeed, this somewhat detached, calculating, and clinical perspective of the "expert" is exactly what Eckstein deems essential in analyzing such wars, and he advocates developing a comprehensive "paradigm" based on the factors he has just described. In fact, he even reduces those factors to a mathematical formula in his text. It is not necessary to reproduce the formula and his lengthy explanation of it here, but simply to note that this is the direction his thoughts are tending and the way in which he feels we can best understand this complex and ambiguous phenomenon. The formula is full of references to "potentials," "rates of change," "imbalancing mechanisms," (p. 130) and other terms which make it sound much

more like a description of gas laws or similar physical principles than a description of a social and political phenomenon on a national and international scale, and in fact it looks like any formula drawn from a physics or chemistry textbook.

The final section in Eckstein's work deals with potential future research on the topic. He begins by stating exuberantly that "there is practically no limit to the research that can be, and ought to be, undertaken on the subject of internal war" (p. 132). He breaks the proposed studies down into two categories: those projects dealing with "knowledge urgently needed for policy purposes" in the short term on the one hand and those "which can be carried out well only by means not normally available to social scientists working in their usual ways, either because of lack of money, or personnel, or apparatus, or access to information which government departments (presumably) possess," (p. 132) on the other. Interestingly, neither of these categories is necessarily "basic" research; they are merely the immediately necessary and necessarily limited applied research or the more wide-ranging and lavishly funded applied research. He adds that "the hope is that government, with its large and unusual resources, will see fit to supplement normal social science research with support for just such projects," (p. 132) by which he means the latter of the two kinds. This is particularly to be hoped for since, "the very nature and urgency of the subject makes it particularly desirable that the inevitably harassed, hurried, anxious and case-bound appraisals of government officials should be supplemented by the more dispassionate, more systematic, larger appraisals of social scientists" (p. 133). If these scientists might find such work distasteful, it can hardly be helped and they will have to overcome their "pretty manners" in light of the immediacy of the Cold War threat posed by insurgencies and "wars of national

liberation.” Indeed, Eckstein notes, “studies of the techniques by which internal wars can be molded and channeled are therefore of the utmost importance. The Machiavellian overtones, the apparent cynicism, may make such studies repellent, but that cannot be helped” (p. 133).

To be examined first are “countries in which internal war might imperil our fundamental international designs” (p. 134). These studies should inquire “very broadly into what might be called ‘symptoms’ (or ‘indicators’) of internal war potential” (p. 134). This is both useful because it makes the problem more amenable to social scientific analysis, and also because “if one confines discussion at an early stage of inquiry to questions of symptomatology, one can avoid complicated questions of human motivation...and concentrate on problems requiring more modest theoretical equipment and techniques” (p. 135). Although we must be modest, according to Eckstein, in our “theoretical equipment and techniques” to such an extent that we must rule out any consideration of “complicated questions of human motivation,” we need not be similarly modest in the scope and scale of the proposed studies. Indeed, he states that “the utility of an inquiry of this type will be small if it is not carried out on a very large scale...and...with resources not normally available in the social sciences” (p. 137). He goes on to state: “Rightly conducted, a general inquiry into prerevolutionary conditions could produce an urgently needed generalized resource for internal war studies: a large library of well-codified materials (perhaps on IBM cards) which could be used for comparative studies of every description relating to internal war” (p. 137). He concludes his article with the cautionary statement that “if my analysis is correct, the incidence of

internal wars and the urgency of the problems it poses will increase rather than diminish” (p. 138).

4.2.4 Pye: “Military Development in the New Countries”

Like Dr. Pool, Dr. Lucian Pye was, at the time these articles were published, employed as Professor of Political Science and member of the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT. He was born in China, and his research focused on that country as well as the wider area of Southeast Asia, specifically on the topic of “political behavior in transitional societies,” (Pool, ed., 1963, p. 148). At that time, he was also a member of the Advisory Committee to the Director of the Agency for International Development (AID) and a frequent lecturer at the War Colleges (Pool, ed., 1963).

Dr. Pye’s contribution to the volume is entitled “Military development in the new countries,” and he begins it by emphasizing the centrality of these “newly emerging” countries to “every phase of American foreign policy-making” (Pye, 1963, p. 148). However, left unexplored and unexplained at the outset is what it means to speak of a “new country,” a “newly emerging country,” a “developing area,” or a “backward country,” (pp. 148-149) terms Dr. Pye seems to use interchangeably and almost casually. He does give a passing reference to the fact that they are located in “Asia and Africa” (p. 148), but aside from this, his focus at the outset of the article is primarily on emphasizing the centrality of these countries to U.S. foreign policy and political interests.

He notes that our attitude toward these unfortunate “backward countries” has been “colored by our sensitivity to [their] problems,” but that we in the U.S. “have yet to achieve a clear appreciation,” (p. 147) of their true significance for us and our strategic

plans. He admits that it is somewhat confusing that we should have to be concerned about them in the first place, given that “according to the conventional military calculus...countries with such low potential for organizing the instruments of violence would be insignificant” (p. 147). However, he notes “that in an age when the revolution in weapons technology has reduced the number of super-powers to only two, those countries which...are of the least military significance have become the source of increasingly difficult problems” (p. 148). But what, exactly, are these problems posed by the “new countries?” Pye intimates that the answer to this question is contained in his allusion above to Cold War tensions between the superpowers when he states that “our initial adventures in military assistance were primarily in response to civil conflicts in which we sought to strengthen the anti-communist forces, as in our aid to Greece and Nationalist China” (p. 149). He adds that our strategy of “containment” of communism led us to provide “military reinforcements to weak countries adjacent to the communist bloc,” “toward providing internal security against guerilla and irregular forces,” in Korea and elsewhere, and also “to eliminate the power vacuums which the new countries represent by building up their defense forces” (p. 149). This military support, he points out, also has the benefit of strengthening our diplomatic ties with these countries as well.

Pye notes that there has been a recent shift in the philosophy underlying “aid” and “development” efforts by the U.S.:

In the early days of our foreign assistance efforts, Congressmen tended to favor “military” aid over “economic” aid because the former seemed to be more directly linked to our national interest. In more recent years economic development has been viewed [sic] as more acceptable and constructive by Congress. (p. 149)

He adds that this shift and the lack of clarity underlying it has hampered the military assistance effort. Furthermore, he argues that the distinction made in the passage above between military and economic assistance has been rendered largely obsolete by current world affairs, but that it has been maintained by “advocates of limited programs,” (by which he means those within the U.S. who advocate for purely economic aid and development) who “have felt it politically expedient to suggest that there is a substantial difference between the two categories of aid” (p. 150). He further characterizes these “champions of developmental aid on the basis of strictly economic criteria” as those who charge that “American military aid has created abnormal situations in the recipient underdeveloped countries and has forced their governments to make grossly uneconomic allocations of their resources” (p. 150). He also paints them in somewhat dovish terms: “most of the critics...have felt little sense of urgency about possible military threats to the underdeveloped countries,” and “have increasingly contended that the communist threat in the underdeveloped countries is not military but arises almost entirely from domestic social and economic conditions” (p. 150).

Pye claims that despite these critics of military aid and military development, the threat posed by “internal wars in underdeveloped nations,” and the resultant “gradually emerging American doctrine on counter-subversion,” (p. 150) has led to the continuation of military aid programs and even to the incorporation within these programs of certain of the policies advocated by their critics. He states: “the military problems of maintaining law and order and of insuring civilian cooperation in case of war justify the expenditure of resources to reduce social and economic discontent,” (p. 150) and that this is an

indication of the lack of usefulness of the distinction between military and economic aid in the first place.

However, for Pye, the distinction is not useful because he sees military aid and military development as being more fundamental than its purely economic equivalents and, in fact, as subsuming them. For instance, he observes that “in pressing the case for the potentially constructive role military aid can have for economic development, some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that the military in many underdeveloped countries are more competent than civilians in performing certain crucial functions in furthering economic development” (p. 151). He also advocates focused study of the issue: “There is a need for systematic research into the potentialities of military establishments for guiding economic development and assisting in the administration of national policies” (p. 152).

Pye has even more ideas as to why military development might be more relevant and useful than economic development for the “new countries.” For instance, he states that:

If the process of national development is viewed in broad terms and as involving far more than just economic development, it becomes apparent that the developmental function of the military can encompass far more than just providing support for civilian economic developments.... In fact...the military has a most fundamental role to play in the developmental process.... This role is essentially psychological. It involves giving to a people a sense of identity and of national pride. One of the basic obstacles to development in most former colonial territories is the existence, particularly among the national leadership, of a constellation of insecurities and inhibitions. The sense of inferiority and the lack of assertiveness of a people who have once been dominated by foreigners cannot be easily eradicated.... The need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm seems to be an essential prerequisite for national development. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the

earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial development. (p. 152)

Here Pye is painting a very psychologically-oriented picture of national development, and using terms borrowed from psychology and specifically psychotherapy to paint military development as an essentially therapeutic process for a nation, one which can help it to heal the wounds of colonization (the first specific suggestion in this article that the term “new countries” may indicate countries newly emerging from colonial rule). Pye employs phrases and concepts such as overcoming “feelings of insecurity and frustration,” receiving “compensations for earlier humiliations,” and finding “their basic sense of identity,” (p. 152) to characterize the process of military development as one of healing, growth, and orderly progression, akin to psychoanalytic notions of development such as Erikson’s (1959/1980). Indeed, “a sense of adequacy in the military realm” is an all-important marker for development, “an essential prerequisite” without which “a traditional society” simply cannot advance “into the early stages of industrial development” (p. 152). Again, the usage here of terms such as “adequacy,” “prerequisite,” and “advancing,” implies a linear concept of development, in which one stage must be mastered before the next can be undertaken, and in which “advancement” is unquestionably a positive and beneficial movement for all involved.

This language borrowed from clinical and developmental psychology continues to be evident in Pye’s analysis, as he explains that:

a very fundamental function of the military in the national developmental process is to assist a people to gain a sense of self-respect and dignity so that they can fulfill demanding and protracted community tasks. In nearly all cultures...manhood is closely associated with the warrior and the military arts. Military development may thus be crucial in assisting

former colonial peoples to overcome their profound sense of inferiority.... At a more fundamental level, the military sphere appears to be a peculiarly sensitive one psychologically because it touches upon the source of national humiliation of former colonial people.... To regain a sense of equality in their own eyes it thus becomes necessary for these former subjugated peoples to feel that they have now redeemed themselves in the field of their initial greatest weakness. The fact that a deep sense of military inferiority was a part of these peoples' first reaction to the modern world seems in many cases to have colored their capacity at present to modernize their societies. The leaders often have profound psychological inhibitions... (p. 153)

Thus, according to Pye's psychology-based arguments, military development, rather than having detrimental effects often attributed to it by advocates of economic and social aid, becomes the indispensable *sine qua non* of development in the "new countries." This is due to the unique ability of military development to boost their national self-esteem and help them to overcome their "deep sense of military inferiority." In fact, Pye goes even further when he argues that to withhold military aid could be interpreted by those countries as the West standing in the way of their development:

For the West even to appear to oppose military development in the new countries can be easily interpreted by the people, given these psychological considerations, to be an indication that the West persists in wanting to keep them in a subordinate and less than fully sovereign position.... A new country feels that the real test of when it has gained its full independence is passed when those who were its former rulers are willing to share with them the weapons and the means of violence which once were the monopoly of the Europeans. (p. 154)

By this somewhat odd logic, if the former colonial rulers share with the new ruling class of their former colonies their "means of violence" in order to keep the increasing demands of the general population in check, then this new ruling class can be assured of the West's benign intentions toward them and of their own independence and emancipation from colonial rule. Furthermore, in suppressing their own population

through the use or threat of military force, and thus assisting the West in its goal of Communist “containment,” these new rulers will “regain a sense of equality in their own eyes,” and will “overcome their profound sense of inferiority.” They will “redeem themselves” and overcome their “psychological inhibitions.” For Pye, steps such as these are unquestionably indicators of healthy development and, as discussed above, are in fact necessary for fostering economic, military, and political independence in these “new countries.” The only question that remains, then, is by what means we can most efficiently bring about these noble ends. Thus he turns to the question of research, and enumerates what he regards as the “research needs” (p. 154).

Pye lists three main points of view from which he feels it is essential to view the problem of military development in the new countries. First, and presumably most important, is in terms of “the considerations relating to the world situation and American grand strategy” (p. 154). Specifically, this point of view raises questions such as “What in a military sense do the underdeveloped areas represent in the currently divided world? What kinds of war are most likely to be fought in these areas? And what types of military forces should we seek to encourage these countries to build up?” (p. 154). The second point of view from which we must examine this issue is one which sees “the role of armies in the underdeveloped areas as a powerful source for assisting, and even guiding and stimulating, basic economic development,” (p. 154) which raises questions such as “what are the advantages of armies in being agents of modernization?” (p. 154). The third point of view or approach to the research involves “the psychological role of armies in assisting a people in finding their sense of national identity and full autonomy” (p. 154).

Pye argues that “social science research should be able to make significant contributions with respect to all three approaches” (p. 154). He notes that there has thus far been little relevant social science research on these issues, but that “in the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among social scientists in the problems of guerrilla warfare and counter-subversion.... This is because the problems posed by such forms of warfare and violence are intimately related to questions about the social structure, culture, and behavior patterns of the populations involved” (p. 155). According to this curious argument, then, we can be assured of “growing interest among social scientists” on these issues *in the next few years* simply because the subject matter includes variables to which their methods of analysis may be applied. He notes that, “without question, social science research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces” in the new countries, and that “the task of developing free world techniques for coping with subversives and guerrilla warfare will call for substantial research efforts” (p. 155). Again, though, this begs the question of why Pye sees such an automatic link between the *possibility* of social scientists developing “knowledge” in this area and the *inevitability* of their doing so over the next few years. Unless, of course, he knows something more than he is mentioning here regarding issues raised in companion articles in this volume concerning plans for “provision of financial support” by the military in order to “stimulate the behavioral sciences,” and thus influence “the direction of movement of [those sciences].”

In any event, he continues to emphasize what he sees as the *goodness of fit* of social science research to the problem at hand, and argues that this “suggests a natural area for cooperation among military specialists, social scientists, and creative engineers

of new weapon systems” (p. 155). With regard to the third issue of psychological benefits accruing from military development, Pye states:

It would...seem possible for social psychologists to analyze the extent to which it is possible to find functional equivalents to war as a means for giving a people a sense of national identity and self-respect. It would be of great value to have studies made of how people in transitional societies at various stages of development tend to perceive and emotionally and intellectually respond to their nation’s military forces. We need to know more about the extent to which the army may be a fundamental institution in providing national pride and a national political consensus. (p. 156)

Additionally, he calls for research in mitigating any potential negative consequences of accelerated military development: “the problem for research which is of prime interest to us is the probable consequences for national development whenever as significant differential emerges between military development and the development of the other institutions of the society” (p. 157). To this end, he laments that “in most of the new countries in which armies have come to power, the build-up of the military has not been related to international wars and a process of national mobilization.... Since the process of military build-up was not related to a popular war effort, armies which gain dominance under such conditions usually do not have effective ties with the masses of the population” (p. 157). Lacking these ties, “such armies may find that their supremacy over civilian institutions does not carry with it the capacity to gain the popular support needed for effectively ruling a country” (p. 157). Pye calls for specific research focused on ways in which an indigenous military force can be assisted in maintaining and consolidating such supremacy. Elsewhere, he also advocates further research into the indigenous army’s potential role in modernizing the societies in the new countries. To this end, he notes that:

Induction into military life can...be one of the most economic and rational ways of inducting tradition-bound people into the environment of modern organizational life.... In many transitional societies...the army does constitute a vehicle for bringing people into modern life with a minimum of social and psychological strain. Recruits are expected to change their ways of life and their habits of thought, and the process of becoming a modernized soldier is not too dissimilar to that of becoming a useful citizen in a modernizing society.... Finally it should be noted that military development can be a powerful instrument for producing a politically loyal citizenry. (p. 159)

This marks the end of the presentation of the *Social Science Research an National Security* documents to be included in our data set. We will now turn to the other group of documents referenced in SORO's December 4 letter, the proceedings of the SORO-hosted symposium on limited war. We will begin again, as with the previous volume, with a brief introduction to the document and the context of its creation, followed by a brief statement as to which speakers were included in the data set, which were excluded, and why.

4.3 Proceedings of the Symposium: "The United States Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research"

While the articles from the "Pool group" discussed above were being prepared (and one year before they were published), a symposium was convened on essentially the same range of topics by SORO, a U.S. Army research contractor. The symposium was entitled "The U.S. Army's Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research" and it met on March 26th through 28th of 1962 in Washington D.C. Over 300 people attended the program, with 50 actively participating. Attendees included "high ranking officers and civilian executives of the Departments of Defense, Navy (including the Marine Corps),

and Air Force, as well as the Department of the Army. Leading behavioral and social scientists of Army research activities, of other government agencies, and of university research centers, participated and attended” (Lybrand, 1962, p. xiv). The symposium was sponsored by the Chief of Research and Development, Department of the Army, Lieutenant General Arthur Trudeau, and was hosted by the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of American University. Shortly after the initial formulation of the symposium, Lt. Gen. Trudeau specially invited six “leading social scientists to form an Army Symposium Advisory Group,” which “provided continual advice and counsel on the planning and conduct of the symposium” (Lybrand, 1962, p. xvi). Included in these six were Drs. Knorr, Pool, and Davison, who had also been part of the Smithsonian’s Research Group and had written articles included in that volume (those by the first two authors were discussed above). Dr. William Lybrand, then director of SORO, edited the proceedings of the symposium, served as its executive secretary, and also composed the foreword to the published volume, just as Dr. Pool had done for the previous volume.

The symposium was organized into six sessions, a morning and afternoon session for each of the three days, with the structure as follows: “On the first day, Army officers presented authoritative statements of the Army mission and general requirements for behavioral and social science knowledge. On the second day, leading behavioral and social scientists presented papers describing some past and ongoing research and the relevance it has to Army problems. The third day was devoted to papers describing relevant research programs and activities of various government agencies, including the Department of the Army” (Lybrand, 1962, p. xiv). Unfortunately, “a number of the papers presented at the symposium were classified CONFIDENTIAL,” (Lybrand, p. xv)

and these were either altered, abridged, or redacted entirely in the publication. When this is an issue below, I have noted it. As a final note, all parenthetical references in this section without dates attached will be to the 1962 document and attributed to the speaker listed in the section heading, unless otherwise noted.

As with the previous volume, again with the symposium I made the choice to include certain speakers and presentations in the data set and to exclude others. The choices were made along the same criteria as with the previous volume: relevance to the central themes of both the symposium itself and of Project Camelot as spelled out in the December 4 SORO letter as weighed against a need to keep the data set within workable size limits. I will present briefly below the excluded speakers and the titles of their presentations, before turning to the symposium data. This list is provided both to give the reader a sense of what was left out, to provide a fuller picture of the symposium as a whole, and also to offer possibilities for further study to the interested reader. They are, in chronological order: “An Army View of Limited-War in the Future,” by Lt. Col. George Casey, “Waging Remote Area Warfare,” by Lt. Col. John Little, “Sources of Turbulence in the New Nations,” by Dr. Guy Pauker, “Gaining and Keeping Good Working Relationships Among People in the Developing Nations,” by Dr. Harley Preston, and “Political Factors: Modernization and Related Problems in Developing Nations,” by Dr. Fred Greene. Not included in the list above were remarks from panel and roundtable discussions, as well as a “seventh session,” devoted to a review of ongoing and proposed research activities.

Certainly, the case could be made for the inclusion of many of the presentations listed above and not included in the data set. As can be seen from the titles above, many

are also quite closely connected to the central themes of the symposium and of Camelot. They were excluded in most cases simply because they came after a similar presentation and covered much the same ground and thus their exclusion is an attempt to avoid excessive redundancy in the data set—as will be seen, there is already considerable repetition and redundancy throughout the data (which is itself an aspect of the data that is not without significance), but it was necessary to circumscribe the list at some point to keep the data set and the study as a whole manageable. Now, let us turn to the data.

4.3.1 Lybrand: “Foreword”

It might be useful here to begin once again by briefly reviewing the foreword and the language contained in it, as a preliminary to our examination of the more detailed presentations and discussions that follow. Lybrand begins with a general introduction, stating that the symposium is concerned with “the military establishment’s limited-war mission,” and defining this last term as “forms of conflict short of all-out nuclear war and general conventional war, with stress on ‘wars of subversion and covert aggression’ and the ‘Cold War’” (Lybrand, 1962, p. iii). He adds that within this topic, there will be a special focus on “the military counterinsurgency mission” (p. iii). He states that social science research will be relevant to this topic, and defines those sciences broadly as “the disciplines which study human behavior systematically including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, economics, and international relations” (p. iii).

He states that the conference was necessitated by changes in the global political situation. Specifically, he notes “the increased importance of military counterinsurgency capabilities,” and links this increased importance to two factors: “(1) The emergence of

many developing nations, newly independent, which are inviting targets of subversion and covert aggression,” and “(2) The overwhelming destructive potential of all-out nuclear warfare,” (p. iv). The interplay of these two factors should sound familiar as they were also emphasized by Dr. Eckstein in his article on internal wars from the previous volume discussed above, and are also similar to Dr. Pool’s two stated reasons for shifts in military policy outlined above. Lybrand states that these two factors highlight the interconnected military functions of “military deterrence and military counterinsurgency,” (p. iv) and reiterates that they have long been part of the military’s arsenal but have received renewed emphasis due to the two factors discussed above.

Lybrand then launches into a discussion and analysis of what he refers to as the “Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System,” (p. iv) perhaps a slightly misleading title due to the absence of what we might traditionally consider to be weapons. As he notes, due to the lack of a traditional military adversary when operating in these newly developing nations, the military must rely on the non-combat aspects of this weapon system, which include “psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice” (p. v). Again, in this regard, he reiterates that “success in the counterinsurgency mission is as much dependent on political, social, economic, and psychological factors as upon purely military factors, and sometimes more so” (p. vi).

Regarding the issues raised for the military by “internal war,” he notes that “the ‘battle’ situation is primarily an internal conflict within another nation—although our major antagonist may have incited the conflict, or may be exploiting it.... The immediate targets are insurgent or other indigenous groups, and the underlying social and political conditions which contain the sources of internal conflict. Instead of clearly defined

enemy personnel, our forces face a mixture of friendly, unfriendly, and neutral...indigenous persons” (pp. vi-vii). He continues:

in the past, the primary sources of enemy strength...could be destroyed physically. In the counterinsurgency situation, the primary sources of insurgent strength are...the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves. Rather than destructive, our aims are constructive—to create internal conditions and encourage political, social, and economic systems which remove hunger, disease, poverty, oppression, and other sources of discontent. In this sense, our military establishment is a direct, positive instrument for human progress in directions that are compatible with the U.S. national interest. (p. vii)

It is interesting to note already here the contrast in language within a matter of paragraphs between Lybrand’s characterization of the military’s counterinsurgency efforts as the “Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System,” followed closely by his description of it as a “direct, positive instrument for human progress.” This certainly sounds like a unique weapon system!

This mission is made even more difficult for the U.S. military due to the fact that not only are they operating outside of their traditional comfort zone of direct combat, but also “the primary instruments of action...are not U.S. troops.... Rather, they are the friendly indigenous groups the United States is supporting” (pp. vii-viii). Furthermore, specific U.S. military actions must be accomplished “through indirect influence of one type or another. This is not limited to verbal persuasion alone, but includes all techniques of influencing the behavior of another person short of physical coercion,” they are operating “in a strange cultural environment,” there “is a longer timelag between execution of an action and its impact,” and lastly and regrettably, “the end result of an action frequently does not have the degree of finality and irrevocability that physical destruction does” (p. viii).

The fact that the successful completion of this mission is so vital (and yet the mission itself so open-ended) and that the methods of influence are much less physical in nature and more cognitive and behavioral motivates the Army to invite social science experts into the planning process in a way they never had before. They recognize new research requirements including “the understanding and prediction of human behavior at the individual, political and social group, and society levels” (p. x). Lybrand also states that:

In the same sense that a new emphasis on the counterinsurgency mission has resulted in new requirements on the military, a new emphasis is required within the behavioral and social sciences. In addition to the acquisition of relevant knowledge in the classical scientific sense, scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems. (p. xi).

This passage reiterates statements from the articles from the “Pool group” above to the effect that the research requested by the Army is in no way basic research, in the sense of open inquiry into a phenomenon or process, but is consistently applied research. It is at every step of the way to be guided by its appropriateness to the necessary military applications in the context of their Counterinsurgency Weapon System, insofar as “scientists must explicitly define the linkage...to specific operational problems.” It also echoes Dr. Pool’s call for an entirely new branch or new direction in social science research and theory into which existing talent could be drawn and which could directly serve the Army’s newly emerging needs for such research, one which would essentially serve as an “engineering application” for the military of more basic social science research.

The symposium was broken up into six sessions spanning three days. They were structured as follows:

On the first day, Army officers presented authoritative statements of the Army mission and general requirements for behavioral and social science knowledge. On the second day, leading behavioral and social scientists presented papers describing some past and ongoing research and the relevance it has to Army problems. The third day was devoted to papers describing relevant research programs and activities of various government agencies, including the Department of the Army. (p. xiv)

Therefore, it makes sense for our summary of the discourse of the symposium to follow the same structure. However, in the published text of the symposium, there is one alteration to its chronological ordering, specifically the placement of an “invited address” at the beginning of the document, although the address itself actually took place after dinner on the second day of the symposium. It seems appropriate to accord this address the same status here because it provides such an excellent introduction to the discursive terms and issues elsewhere in the symposium. It was given by the Honorable Elvis J. Stahr, Jr., Secretary of the Army, and its title was the same as that of the symposium itself.

4.3.2 Stahr: “Invited Address: The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research”

Mr. Stahr begins by thanking the attendees and the organizers and emphasizing what he sees as the critical importance of the symposium in identifying “the most effective means of eradicating the insidious, creeping menace of Communist guerrilla aggression and phony ‘wars of liberation’” (p. 3). He follows several of the previous authors, including Dr. Lybrand in his foreword to this symposium, in noting a connection

between the Army's limited-war mission and the advent of nuclear weapons. Specifically, he observes that the possibility of nuclear attack and of the use of nuclear weapons has diverted the "national attention" from "the actuality of overt aggression being carried on at a much lower level of intensity—but, nevertheless, fraught with comparable danger in the long run to our country and all it stands for" (p. 4).

He emphasizes, however, that he does not advocate any decrease in our national nuclear capabilities, which should surely "be inviting catastrophe," (p. 4) but adds that:

we would likewise be inviting eventual catastrophe if we failed to create and maintain the capability to deter or defeat nonnuclear aggression at any level, for all Communist effort is shrewdly and determinedly directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction. In other words, if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor Communist successes, in the long run they would, like the proverbial 'little drops of water,' make an ocean which could engulf us. (pp. 4-5)

Lest there be any doubt about the Communist determination in this area, Stahr states that "Premier Khrushchev has made it perfectly clear that this is the sort of warfare the Sino-Soviet bloc intends to continue to wage against the Free World—or, at the very least, to encourage and subsidize—throughout the foreseeable future. In Khrushchev's dialectic, such wars are 'wars of liberation' and he has proclaimed them not only 'admirable but inevitable'" (p. 5). Kennedy, he adds, has met this threat by doubling Special Forces and by assigning new responsibilities to the Army in the areas of counterinsurgency and special warfare. Stahr states that this expanded role has fallen "naturally" on the Army "because the Army...is...the repository of an invaluable store of practical 'know how' in the field of Guerrilla Warfare—'know how' based on experience extending back to early Colonial days and on through the Indian Wars, and expanded and

sharpened in combat operations in the Pacific areas and elsewhere during World War II” (pp. 5-6).

He also makes the first mention of Vietnam in the documents thus far reviewed, when he claims that “today the Army is again performing yeoman service in defense of the Free World by furnishing expert training and technical assistance, as well as extensive aviation support for troop transport, observation, and resupply, to the hard-pressed Vietnamese in their jungle war against the infiltrating Viet Cong forces” (p. 6). He adds, though, that the Army’s ability to put down insurgencies and guerrilla aggression is not “nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the deterrence or defeat of guerrilla aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct” (p. 6).

He concludes his address by noting that “the Army is fully aware of its grave responsibilities in the Cold War, perhaps the gravest it has ever borne” (p. 7) but that it cannot succeed alone. This is “a national task which demands a national response. It demands the enlistment in the cause of all elements of the American community represented at this symposium—enlistment, as the phrase goes, ‘for the duration’” (pp. 6-7). In order to be properly prepared to execute these tasks for which the Army bears responsibility, “we need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs.... Therefore we look to research organizations such as the Special Operations Research Office and our civilian educational institutions. Almost exclusive emphasis has been laid over the years on the development of the physical sciences as primary factors in our national defense. We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the social sciences” (p. 8). If we

have “a real team effort by the Army and the research organizations of our civilian educational institutions—we can disrupt Mr. Khrushchev’s plan of world conquest” (p. 8).

4.3.3 Trudeau: “Welcoming Address”

After the invocation prayer by Reverend Dr. Edward Bauman of the Wesley Theological Seminary at American University, the first speaker of the first day of the symposium was its sponsor, Lieutenant General Arthur Trudeau. After welcoming and thanking the participants, he began with the dramatic assertion:

I want to say right here and now—and I know that my statement will be reinforced by the able speakers who will appear before you—that our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in this world that would destroy all that we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery—which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this Communist cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences.... Yet, in this age of great change, the development of the social sciences—the sciences dealing with human nature—have not, in my opinion, kept pace. (pp. 11-13)

He stresses that the social sciences are necessary not only to help eradicate the “Communist cancer,” but also so that “we may realize to full advantage the great benefits brought to society by this new age of science, technology, and change” (p. 13). He adds that “our greatest achievements will result where we succeed in getting the social and physical scientists together early in the project,” and that “if we can succeed in applying such a concept of sustained cooperation, we can more closely integrate our swiftly changing scientific processes with the policy processes which govern our national life”

(p. 14). Dr. Trudeau cites the symposium's host, SORO, as an example of the positive effects of such cooperation. He notes that "SORO exists because we and our academic partners recognize that refinements and sophistication of hardware are fruitless without concurrent improved understanding of peoples and their societies, particularly in the underdeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America" (pp. 14-15).

He also attempts yet another broad characterization of the current world climate and global political struggle, observing that:

Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of guerrillas, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional Communist challenge—in paramilitary warfare, in psychological warfare, and in conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force. (p. 15)

Despite the broad "spectrum of force" necessary for combating the Communists, the symposium is specifically focused on that part of the spectrum "short of all-out nuclear devastation....commonly referred to as 'limited-war'," and "popularly referred to as within the province of 'Special Forces'" (p. 15). He notes some of the same terminological confusion described by Eckstein above in his discussion of limited war: "there are many terms in vogue which cover parts of the mission, and you are familiar with them; such expressions as 'sublimited-war,' 'subbelligerent war,' 'unconventional warfare,' 'cold war,' 'paramilitary war,' and 'proxy war'" (p. 15).

In concluding, Dr. Trudeau provides a statement of purpose for the whole symposium:

I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of

guerrillas and indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities by psychological operations under varying conditions of cold warfare...

I think the purposes of this symposium are as important as they are clear:

First, to improve your understanding of the Army's limited-war mission;

Next, to recruit the country's best social science talents for research and development in support of that mission; and

Last, to obtain recommendations for you for continuing coordinated scientific support.... The challenge to you is simple and clear: what can you contribute to Army Research and Development in this field?... We need and solicit your ideas—the more, the better. (pp. 16-17)

4.3.4 Eddleman: "Limited-War and International Conflict"

Following Dr. Trudeau's "welcoming address" is a statement on the symposium purpose and plan by another Army man, Colonel George Bayerle, Jr. This statement is largely a repetition of the plan outlined earlier by Dr. Trudeau and Mr. Stahr, and will therefore be passed over, as it will not add anything new to our data set. After this statement comes the keynote address, delivered by General Clyde D. Eddleman, then Vice-Chief of Staff of the Army. The topic is limited war and international conflict.

At the outset of his discussion on the Army's role in limited war and cold war, General Eddleman identifies "four factors which determine in large measure the role of our Nation and our Armed Forces in the world conflict" (p. 26). First is that "our country has arrived at the pinnacle of world power," albeit "reluctantly," (p. 26) and we cannot relinquish this mantle of world leadership even if we should like to. "The non-Communist world must look to us and to us alone for leadership" (p. 26). Second is the increased scale of this struggle from simply international to global and the fact that it

“encompasses the entire range of national power resources in both hot and cold war” (p. 26). Third is “the emergence of cold war as a form of world conflict equal to nuclear or conventional war,” and its “threat to our survival” (p. 27). In response to this third factor, Eddleman notes that President Kennedy has “established a Special Group for Counterinsurgency,” to integrate the military response and has instructed his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that ““the effort devoted to this challenge should be comparable in importance to preparations for conventional warfare”” (p. 27). The fourth and final factor, and the one that Eddleman specifies as being the only one not newly emerging since WWII is “the Army’s preeminent capability for the types of military operations required in cold war” (p. 27). To this end, he notes that “Cold war is essentially a battle for the land and its peoples,” and that the tasks required for such a battle “are very similar to those performed by the Army from the early frontier days of our Nation’s history,” (p. 27). Thus, although the Cold War and its issues of nuclear deterrence and psychological warfare are new, Eddleman argues that they boil down to the same scenario which allowed us to wrest control of the New World from its indigenous inhabitants. (He also echoes Mr. Stahr before him in making this connection between the Army’s past services in suppressing Native American “insurgencies” through a host of violent techniques, and the similar services it is again prepared to render its country in the present Cold War conflict.)

After spelling out these four factors, Eddleman tries to define the term “cold war” more clearly. He states that the Army defines the term as “the use of political, economic, technological, sociological, and military measures—short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces—to achieve national objectives” (p. 28). He adds that

“it is low-intensity conflict that is complex, extensive, subtle, and persistent” (p. 28).

Next he provides a very illuminating reason for clarifying these terms:

I emphasize this definition to insure that we have a common understanding of terms. Under it, what we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be limited-war from the viewpoint of the non-Communist nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The Communists term these conflicts “wars of liberation.” We call them “wars of subversion or covert aggression.”... I suggest that you may wish to employ the definition of cold war which I have given for uniformity, at least in your initial deliberations. (pp. 28-29)

Colonel Eddleman then identifies four characteristics of cold war as waged by the Communists. First, the “level of provocation is kept low and ambiguous,” in order to “force the opposing side into a gradual withdrawal” (p. 29). Second, “the major Communist powers seek to avoid participation by their own regular forces,” utilizing indigenous forces trained by Communist military “advisors and technicians” (p. 29). (Eddleman doesn’t make the following point explicitly, but it is clear from his remarks that his description of Communist strategy regarding this second point mirrors his and others’ characterization of U.S. strategy as well. Perhaps *this* is another salient aspect of Cold War!) Third, he recognizes an “ever-present capability to raise the conflict to progressively higher levels” (p. 29). Again, this parallels Dr. Trudeau’s and others’ calls for the U.S. to be prepared for any application of any level of force across the whole military spectrum “from zero to infinity” in the cold war arena. Fourth and finally, for the Communists, Eddleman states that cold war is “a conflict of determination and will,” with the ever-present threat of “nuclear holocaust” (p. 29) if either side over- or underestimates the other.

He states that cold war is also complicated by other factors including the fact that “the entire world is a cold war battleground,” (p. 29) and, as already stated, “the war is waged at varying levels of intensity” (p. 30). Despite the global reach of the cold war front, according to Eddleman, “as President Kennedy emphasized, the key Cold War areas are principally in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are particularly fertile areas for conflict. Here, new nations are emerging from colonial status and free people—impatient with slow reforms—are struggling for dramatic and immediate economic and political growth” (pp. 30-31). Furthermore, “in order to satisfy the basic needs of the people in the underdeveloped areas, and to orient them away from communism, social and economic assistance will be required on a long-term basis.... Therefore, we must gain the initiative through positive measures which will enable us to anticipate, as well as to counter and defeat, Communist cold war pressures” (p. 31).

In conducting its cold war mission, Eddleman states that the Army’s “long-term goal in each country must be to achieve the clearly defined cold war objectives of the Free World. To accomplish this, there must be created a secure and stable environment for political, social, and economic growth,” which will necessitate helping our allies to “arrest Communist expansion,” “gain and maintain internal security,” and “foster economic and social growth and political stability” (p. 34).

These changes “must be achieved through orderly, evolutionary processes,” and we must emphasize to the host countries that “these are their programs, with U.S. support, and not U.S. programs” (p. 35). The “programs” in question here are primarily military assistance and civic action programs such as establishing “field-type communications between isolated villages and districts,” opening “medical treatment

clinics,” teaching “first aid and field sanitation,” starting “water development and land reclamation projects,” (p. 36) and building small dams, minor roads, trails, and bridges. This is all assuming that the area in question is not one of “higher intensity,” (p. 36) meaning one with an ongoing active insurgency. In a case like this, “such as Vietnam...civic action programs alone would be inadequate.... In such areas, emphasis must be placed on creating and training local counterinsurgency forces and on providing them with operational and logistical assistance and increased technical training” (p. 36).

Eddleman concludes by stating that:

The Army recognizes that our success depends in large part on our ability to understand and to enlist the loyalties of the people in whose areas the Cold War is being waged. In order to accomplish this, we need the best information and advice which social scientists can provide. I hope that this is only the first of many such meetings in which social scientists and military leaders can work together to solve the challenging problems which confront us. (p. 39)

4.3.5 Kinard: “The New Dimensions of Special Warfare”

The next presentation to be included in our data set occurred during the afternoon session of the first day, which was devoted entirely to an examination of limited war. This presentation was given by Colonel William Kinard, Jr., the Director of Special Warfare for the Army, and was focused on the new dimensions of special warfare. He begins by noting that “the term special warfare itself is relatively new, having been adopted by the Army as recently as 1956,” (p. 56) but adding that its basic principles are as old as human struggle and conflict.

Focusing specifically on guerrilla warfare, he observes that “historically, guerrilla warfare has proved its effectiveness throughout the spectrum of conflict—in revolutions,

in varying forms of insurgency, in public wars” (p. 57). He provides examples including Albania in 1942, Malaya, the Algerian struggle for independence, and contemporary Vietnam, in all of which guerrilla forces managed to sustain a military struggle with their opponents’ much larger conventional armies while outnumbered anywhere from 12 to one to 24 to one (p. 57).

Kinard argues that special warfare, and specifically insurgent and guerrilla movements, have become increasingly effective and increasingly common in recent years, although he doesn’t spell out any hypotheses as to why at this point. However, he does note that the term “special warfare” has recently been broadened to account for this change:

Today, both unconventional and psychological warfare, which together have until recently comprised what we call Special Warfare, have become the conscious concern of governments.... The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to psychological warfare and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of counterinsurgency. (p. 58).

He also observes that the U.S. military has even gotten involved in trying to foment insurgencies to further U.S. policy objectives: “in 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group, Airborne, was activated...to infiltrate into denied areas by land, sea, or air for the purpose of organizing the indigenous guerrilla potential and conducting unconventional warfare operations against the enemy” (p. 59). In addition, the Army’s role has also expanded to include training friendly foreign militaries in conducting counterinsurgency operations.

Kinard cites President Kennedy as being particularly influential regarding some of these changes in the Army’s special warfare program. He quotes Kennedy from his State of the Union address on May 25, 1961: “I am directing the Secretary of Defense to

expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sublimated or unconventional wars,” which will be “necessary to counter Communist-sponsored guerrillas or insurgents” (p. 62).

In addition to beefing up the Army’s counterinsurgency capabilities, Kinard also notes another change in the Army in terms of its international role: “the Army has also carried its role of nation-builder beyond the borders of the United States, wherever our national security interests have taken our Armed Forces” (p. 64). Indeed, “in underdeveloped areas of the Free World, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure” (p. 65). Thus the Army’s counterinsurgency responsibilities involve both building and supporting stable nations and governments in these critical underdeveloped areas, and this effort hinges on the support of the local populace. For instance, Kinard notes, “we are today in a period of international conflict where the advantage may more often lie with those who are successful in obtaining the support of the people” (p. 65). Indeed, this is one of the reasons Kinard advocates military assistance and civic action as being particularly applicable to such projects, because they often involve U.S. forces working in an advisory capacity with indigenous forces, and “it is the armed forces themselves, and the army in particular, in these underdeveloped nations that in many cases offer the best hope in gaining the support of the people” (p. 66).

Colonel Kinard closes by observing soberly that:

The size of the tasks that face us in the lower spectrum of war are enormous. The implications that those tasks hold for Special Warfare operations are likewise enormous. So, too, are the implications for

research and development in the fields of social science and human factors.... We need to know the strengths and the weaknesses in all aspects of the societal structure of our allies and of our opponents. We need to know their vulnerabilities.... We need to know many things.... And I think this is your job as well as mine. (pp. 66-67)

4.3.6 Slover: “Civic Actions in Developing Nations”

After Col. Kinard’s presentation, which emphasized the importance of civic action in counterinsurgency efforts, Colonel Robert Slover gave a presentation entitled “Civic Actions in Developing Nations” which reinforced this point in more detail. In the presentation, Colonel Slover begins by observing that:

In the less developed countries, economically, sociologically, and sometimes politically, we are seeing today the desire on the part of the people for a better way of life. These are areas where a type of social revolution is under way. These are the battlegrounds of the Cold War.... The side that wins support of the people will win the battle. (p. 70)

He then continues, citing Dr. Franklin Lindsay, “one of the members of the Gaither Committee which studied National Security policy” (p. 70):

“Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare.” I submit to you for consideration in this symposium that civic action is an important and valuable way of gaining that necessary control of populations. When government forces identify themselves with the well-being of the populace by military activities...the people tend to reciprocate. They deny assistance to the dissidents, are less receptive to enemy propaganda. (pp. 70-71)

Following this passage, he offers a concise definition of civic action: “by civic action we mean using indigenous forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health,

sanitation, and others helpful to economic development” (p. 71). Subsequently, he gives the seemingly unusual appraisal that “civic action should be looked on as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of guerrilla warfare” (p. 72).

He also reiterates Colonel Kinard’s call for more research and more knowledge as being fundamental to the Army’s cold war mission:

We need to know more about what are the most effective programs or projects in given circumstances that will have the greatest impact on the population. Which projects will best win the population to the side of the military forces and keep them there?... We need to know more about the people of an area—how they live, their customs, their social structure, their needs. (p. 77)

4.3.7 Linebarger: “Roundtable Discussion”

After Colonel Slover’s presentation on civic action comes a brief roundtable panel discussion. From the perspective of discourse analysis, one of the most interesting moments of this discussion is offered by its moderator, Dr. Linebarger, in his examination of Communist and Free World cold war terminology:

One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the Free World not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the Communists have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity. For instance, it is unnecessary to go to the extravagant lengths which the Communists carry their terminology, but there is surely a middle ground in which easy and common sense reform is practicable. Some of the terms particularly affected are the following:
Special Warfare is not a self-explanatory term in standard English. It is difficult for a man to explain to his family that he is undertaking a noble crusade or a particularly patriotic and hazardous venture if he admits he has joined a Special Warfare unit.

Other terms such as irregular warfare, anti-intruder warfare, or immediate warfare might be worth considering. But it is entirely possible that the best solutions for a new name for Special Warfare may come from the officers and enlisted men themselves if they were queried for a description of their present assignments.

Another key concept is psychological operations, which has now reached a level of almost total incomprehensibility to the ordinary newspaper reader, to the intelligence officer who is not a specialist in the field, or to the high school graduate enlisted man. Psychological warfare with all of its disadvantages in the old days nevertheless showed the culmination of attempting to combine psychology and war. The present term leaves the issue entirely neutral.

Combat propaganda is of course plain English but it has political handicaps within the U.S. domestic scene which make administrators wary of it. In a more serious vein it can be pointed out that insurgency is much too flattering a word to be applied to the terrorism and banditry which the Communists use. Counterinsurgency is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the Free World and an unconscious assist to the Communists.

Counterinsurgency and insurgency might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the Free World.

Social science is of course a fantastic misnomer for a wide variety of disciplines which go beyond the academically recognized disciplines into the humanities and sometimes into philosophy and religion themselves. It would be too much to seek a solution at this single meeting for the renaming of an entire field. The standards for defining new terms should be: first, that these become clear to our own staff and leaders; second, that they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men; and third, that by their own semantic force they provide a certain degree of deterrence to our antagonists. (pp. 90-92)

4.3.8 Altman: "Mainstreams of Research"

This roundtable discussion ends the first day of the symposium. The second day is comprised of representatives from various social science fields and disciplines presenting to the group the state of their work and its present and potential future military applications. The first presentation on the second day was given by Dr. Irwin Altman, Chief of Psychological Operations Research at SORO.

Dr. Altman's presentation is primarily geared toward providing background for a comprehensive bibliography he compiled of references relevant to limited war research. He groups the references into four categories, and these divisions, he states, stem from "some basic premises. One is that the job of social science is to make inputs to the military who are faced with the problem of deciding on courses of action" (p. 116). He adds that there are "two types of inputs that social scientists can make.... The first is on building background information" (p. 116). This is necessary to answer some basic questions that the military might have, but "such knowledge is not enough, however, for the planner or operator. He also needs ideas on how to act given his own and others' resources.... What is the best way to combat a particular guerrilla operation? What communication and propaganda techniques should be used to help win over some dissident minority? These are questions that depend on background information, but they also require the fusing of all this information and the development of action programs" (pp. 116-117). He also provides a further qualification and reminder at this point: "please note that I am not suggesting that social scientists become decision-makers; what I am saying is that social scientists have a unique input to make to military decision-makers at all levels, beyond general background information" (p. 117). This passage also mirrors arguments from the previous volume in advocating an expanded role for social science research in the military, and particularly in terms of the Army's newly emerging international role regarding insurgencies, civic action, and the "new countries," while at the same time emphasizing that this expanded role for research in no way implies access to policy formulation or even the ability to raise policy-related questions on the part of the researchers. This is truly to be an engineering application of social science research!

4.3.9 Riley: “Remarks in Panel Discussion”

One of the following speakers, Dr. John Riley, Jr., was second vice-president and director of social research for the Equitable Life Insurance Company, and also had a military background serving in WWII. Dr. Riley’s remarks were quite brief, but he emphasized the need for reciprocity in the social science community: “there has never been, at least to my knowledge, an example in which the military have rolled out such a massive welcome mat for the professors as they have at this meeting.... Well, one can only hope that the academic community of scholars, in turn, will be able to respond in some equally massive way to the military’s invitation” (pp. 155-156).

4.3.10 Davison: “Forces for Stability and Instability in Developing Nations”

The afternoon session of the second day of the symposium was chaired by Dr. Phillips Davison, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, formerly in the Social Science Department at RAND Corp., past editor of *Public Opinion Quarterly*, and consultant to ORO (SORO’s predecessor) and the DOD (Pool, ed., 1963, p. 26). (Dr. Davison also authored a chapter on alliances in the previous volume edited by Dr. Pool.) The afternoon session focuses on “Forces for Stability and Instability in Developing Nations” (Davison, 1962, p. 157). Dr. Davison notes that “the developing nations...make up the largest portion of the world,” and also that “the stability of these areas is extremely important for the United States when it comes to safeguarding its own

peace and freedom, and it is here that Communist forces are trying as hard as they can to promote instability” (p. 158).

4.3.11 Pye: “The Role of the Military in Political Development”

The first speaker in the afternoon session is Dr. Lucian Pye from MIT’s CENIS. Dr. Pye was also the author of the chapter on military development and the “new countries” in the previous volume, and his biographical sketch was introduced when that article was examined. He examines similar themes in this symposium, and his presentation is entitled “The Role of the Military in Political Development” (p. 159). He begins by noting, with a noticeable degree of understatement, that:

We in the social sciences have in our turn gained much from our associations over the years with the research branches of the military. Let me hasten to add that I do not have in mind just the fact that we have benefited from the funds and other resources of the military; I would however be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that in some small measure such materialistic considerations probably play their part in the relationship we are speaking about between scholars and soldiers.... The association between these two communities has been remarkably fruitful in the past, and...we have each benefited in our separate ways as well as in our common interests.... Let us all hope that in the years to come we can work out increasingly firm foundations for this mutual relationship. (p. 160)

After this rather fawning opening, Pye turns to the subject at hand, noting that “the Army has gradually become increasingly involved in matters relating to political and social development,” (p. 161). He states that “immediately after World War II, the Army had almost no concern with the underdeveloped areas,” and “only gradually as we developed a worldwide strategy did we become aware of the possible significance of the underdeveloped areas,” (p. 161). (As a side note, it is interesting to observe how readily

and fully Dr. Pye aligns himself with military needs and perspectives, evidenced in his use of the pronoun “we” when referring to the military, even though he does not have any formal connection with the Army beyond serving as an advisor and consultant. Alternately, the “we” here could refer to the U.S. generally, but this still implies a collective interest which includes both social science and the military, with no significant differences noted.) He states that concerns regarding “possible aggression” in these areas and an increasing concern over limited-war led the Army to look more deeply into the “problems of the new countries” (p. 162). However, he doesn’t spell out specifically here who is exhibiting the aggression or waging the internal war against whom.

He states that now, however, “the U.S. Army in one form or another has become more and more deeply involved in the problems of bringing order and progress to underdeveloped countries,” and adds that, “I predict that in the next few years this interest will increase at an exponential rate” (p. 162). Despite what has been said elsewhere by Pye and other champions of development of the new countries, Pye opines here that “this will be an exasperating experience in many ways. We already sense this” (p. 163). Part of this potential for exasperation has to do with what Pye recognizes as a central flaw in U.S. Army preparedness for these civic actions: “the disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about nation building. In the past the social scientists have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine” (p. 163). This certainly places the blame squarely on the shoulders of the social science community!

Pye’s central thesis as to why social science has let the Army down is that social science research approaches and methodology have focused on explaining “the realities

of the current situation,” on “the American scene and elsewhere,” and in a “statically oriented” way, with the emphasis “on continuity rather than on change” (pp. 163-164).

Due to these shortcomings, Pye complains, “we are not well-prepared for dealing with the question ‘How do you go about creating a modern nation-state?’” (p. 164).

Nevertheless, “as the military becomes more concerned with the range of problems which you now identify as counterinsurgency you are in fact going to be coming across the problems of how to build institutions and how to build the most complex of all social institutions or organizations: the modern nation-state” (p. 164). As an historical precedent for this brave new role for the Army, Pye cites the “complex” roles played by the Army Corps of Engineers and also the “role the military played in terms of the opening of the West” (p. 165). Certainly, as Pye seems to argue here (echoing, at this point, several previous speakers), this proven aptitude for violent suppression of indigenous resistance does seem an appropriate accomplishment to point to when considering the proposed ventures.

The following statement is also illustrative of Pye’s approach to the problem:

In the last few years we have become sensitive to the way the military can perform some quasi-civil functions. We see this in the teams of the military as they took over political authority in Southeast Asia and Africa and the Middle East. There is a sense here that the military can perform certain types of functions more effectively, maybe, than can civilian institutions. We need to know why this is the case. What are the peculiar advantages? (p. 165)

Certainly, framing the issue in such a way that it is already a given that the military is an agent promoting national development and then simply asking the question “why?” or “how better?” allows one to pass over questions as to whether this is really the most advisable course of action, questions posed on the grounds of economics, politics, short-

term versus long-term gains, or even morality. It also reinforces the sense throughout these documents that the social scientists, although their scientific objectivity, methodology, and knowledge base are obviously so valued and sought after, are in no way intended to apply any of these to basic questions at the policy level. Rather, their expertise is to be used for “engineering calculations” in the words of Dr. Pool’s introduction to the first volume cited above, calculations which will keep them well clear of thorny questions such as whether the U.S. Army belongs in the role of “nation-building” in the “new countries” in the first place, whether it is truly in our best interest or in that of the countries concerned. Instead, the scientists, Army men, and all involved are to take all of this on faith, since “we have created certain ideologies and certain feelings that the military might be helpful. There is an instinctive feeling that when the military comes to power in any of these countries a step is taken favorable to American policy” (p. 166).

Next, Pye returns to his familiar themes from his article in the previous volume concerning the way in which “the military...may in fact be the only force that can give people who have suffered under foreign domination a sense of self-respect and self-assurance,” because “the civil bureaucracy is much too closely tied to a tradition of foreign control,” whereas “the politicians...are much too closely related to the nationalist phase of opposing the foreign rule” (p. 167).

Pye concludes by reiterating the noble call to action thrust upon the U.S. Army here, “that they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in limited-war, that involves an understanding of how a modern society can be built” (p. 168). He also reiterates that “the most important thing that we as

social scientists can do” is “to recognize we have limited knowledge as do the military, but what we are prepared to do with the military is to try to ask these questions in an orderly, rational way and bear the consequences of whatever we discover” (p. 169).

4.3.12 Berger: “Remarks in Panel Discussion”

After Pye’s address, there was a panel discussion during which some remarks were given by Dr. Morroe Berger of the Department of Sociology of Princeton University which are worth noting here. Dr. Berger begins by stating that “from the standpoint of those interested in peace, this must be a very heartening symposium, for the Army seems to feel it necessary to supplement its military mission with a peaceful one” (p. 180). (One wonders here, with all the talk of a “military counterinsurgency weapon system” and so on if he is thinking of the same kind of “internal peace” advocated by Dr. Eckstein above.)

He qualifies his approbation later, however, when he notes that “in the Middle East at least...I find it very difficult to see that the native armies can become or be viewed as benevolent big brothers, beloved by the people. This picture presented here yesterday seems like nothing that I see in the Middle East. If this is true of the native armies in the Middle East, how much more true would it be of foreign armies there?” (p. 182). This question seems all the more pertinent in terms of the currently extremely dim view taken by Iraqis both of their own national army and of the Coalition forces currently providing them with “peace.”

He concludes with three remarks:

First, if the Army wants to use social science, it may find that it has to direct social science towards its own problems and interests. Second, if it does use social science, I think the Army ought, even for its own interest, to take a broad view of what social science is and may become. Third, if the Army believes that it must go into civic action in underdeveloped areas, it ought to do so, I think, without encumbering illusions about making military regimes palatable to the people they control and without dubious analogies to the American Frontier. Political problems are tough. So we like to avoid them. But I think we shall find that engineering projects are not a substitute for political education. (pp. 183-184)

This admonition, and its implicit criticism of Hon. Stahr's, Gen. Eddleman's, and others' characterization of the Army as well-suited for its counterinsurgency mission due to its history of successfully suppressing the Native American "insurgency," cautions military planners to focus on the political aspects of their involvement with underdeveloped areas rather than simply approaching problems from an "engineering" perspective of trying to build what they want from scratch, either through the molding of public opinion or through the more extreme forms of "nation-building." It is quite relevant as it is one of the few cautions or calls for another perspective evident anywhere in these documents.

4.3.13 Johnstone: "Remarks in Panel Discussion"

The final speaker we will focus on from the second day of the symposium is Dr. William Johnstone from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He was also a past Dean of the School of Government at George Washington University, Chief of the Office of Public Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in India, and held several other distinguished governmental and private sector posts (Davison, p. 184). Dr. Johnstone advocates educating the American populace about the issues facing the

American military in the developing areas so that they will be more supportive of the kinds of projects discussed and proposed at the symposium. He states:

I would contend that most of the so-called “developing countries”—well, as a matter of fact, the majority of them—are ex-colonial countries, and that the period of colonialism is a vast area of ignorance among Americans. We have not studied colonialism, hardly, at all. We are beset by the special pleaders, the apologists for the colonial regimes and by the nationalists who attack the colonial regimes.... We need to know a lot more about what happened during the colonial period. We need to know particularly more about what the attitudes of people were, what concepts of political behavior were injected into the stream of the educated, politically sophisticated people of these colonial territories, most of whom are still participating in their independent governments. (pp. 186-187)

Not only are the American people dangerously ignorant about the history of European colonialism, Johnstone argues, but they are also in danger of replicating some of its mistakes unless they learn from them first. One of his primary concerns in this regard centers on the fact that:

The problem which most of these countries have is a problem of their own making in part in that most ex-colonial countries have adopted the form of government of the metropole power. The Burmese adopted a British-type system. The French colonies have followed the same pattern to some extent. And this has been adopted usually in a hurry and without too much previous experience and usually has proved rather unsatisfactory. How do you get in a newly developing country or ex-colonial country a strong executive which can manage the economy and engage in economic planning, develop economic and social progress on a countrywide basis, at the same time have any kind of what we would call democratic rights or representative type of government? (pp. 188-189)

Related to the first issue above of ignorance on the part of the American populace, which is often responsible, Johnstone claims, for their failure to support beneficial reforms in the developing areas, Johnstone also identifies ignorance and oversight in academia as well. He states:

There is a lot of brain power, in my opinion, in the colleges and universities that is being wasted in terms of the mission of the Army or the mission of the United States overseas in the present situation. This brain power is being wasted not because of lack of good will, not because of the fact that professors who direct research or who themselves get involved in research are not interested in digging into the problems that are of importance and practical usefulness. It is primarily, I think, the problem of communication. I would hope this could be solved because this is not an insoluble problem at all. (p. 191)

4.3.14 Yu: “Images, Ideology, and Identity in Asian Politics and Communication”

The third day of the symposium, focusing on relevant research programs and activities, was begun by the chairman of the fifth session (the first for that day), none other than Dr. Ithiel de Sola Pool, the editor of the Smithsonian volume and member of the special working group that helped to coordinate this symposium. Dr. Pool introduced the panelists for the fifth session, as well as the first speaker for that morning, Dr. Frederick Yu. Dr. Yu was at the time Associate Professor at the School of Journalism at Montana State University. Prior to that post, he had been a researcher at the Human Resources Research Institute of the Air Force at USC, where he had studied propaganda and communications in Communist China. He was also a past Ford Fellow at Harvard and a past member of Pool’s own CENIS team at MIT (Pool, 1962, p. 201).

Dr. Yu’s talk concerns “Images, Ideology, and Identity in Asian Politics and Communication” (p. 202). More specifically, he is interested in the formation of a national and international identity in Asia and the degree of identification with that identity on the part of the populace. To this end, he did quite a bit of research in the form of interviews with Asian citizens from a variety of walks of life and a range of nations during his extensive travels in the area. His curiosity led him to ask the question: “Do

Asians care about Asia?” (p. 203) and his research led him to conclude that “I doubt seriously that they do. My interviews suggest that, instead of generating any sense of Asian affinity, the word ‘Asia’ has acquired some repellent qualities” (p. 203). He attributes this conclusion to the fact that “the whole concept of Asia, while loudly pronounced by Asian politicians for Western listeners, is generally meaningless to Asians,” and therefore, “a solidifying Asian ideology simply does not exist” (p. 206).

This state of affairs might be due, Dr. Yu suggests, to the situation in which Asia finds itself:

The new states in Asia are trying to achieve the double end of becoming like the West with respect to their political, economic, and social life, and at the same time remaining themselves with respect to their own traditions and culture. They want to Westernize; they want to maintain their own cultural identity.... To maintain the cultural identity, an Asian country must derive some special sense of uniqueness and superiority of its traditional heritage. In other words, it seeks to distinguish itself from the rest of Asia, not to identify itself with any particular culture of civilization. In either of the two expressed aims of Asian countries, therefore, there is not much room for an interest in Asia. (p. 207)

Not only are Asian nations not interested in the concept of Asia as a whole, but Dr. Yu suggests that the concept itself might be as new to them as it is to us. With regard to India for instance, Dr. Yu cites an Indian journalist who states that “not until the British [colonial] era did the consciousness of India and of being Indian grow. In that sense, the concept of India is really a British creation” (p. 207) and, what’s more, is part of a legacy of colonialism that these nations are trying to get past.

Dr. Yu argues that his research is directly relevant to the U.S. Army’s limited-war mission because the problem of national and regional identity:

Is a problem which involves the whole question of man, society, and ideas and it requires explorations in territories that are not normally included in the maps for students of political affairs or military science. And I venture to suggest that if we tackle this problem vigorously, wisely, and successfully, we may gain a body of totally new knowledge which we do not yet possess about the developing countries, open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior, and, conceivably, offer significant clues to our planning of limited-war. (p. 212)

However, he cites Hadley Cantril's injunction that, in order to reap the benefits of this new knowledge,

Americans must find out from people in other countries in their own terms what they are, what they are trying to do, what they are trying to become. This can never be done if the primary concern of Americans is to tell other people what they should be doing in order to be more like us. (p. 213)

Dr. Yu notes that while the Communists resort to "telling the developing countries what they should want and what they should do," this is not the American way and "this we cannot do. This we should not do. To be blunt, we do not have all the answers" (p. 214). Indeed, he notes that we are still caught up in asking these same questions ourselves about our own country and national identity. Rather, we should take up a position somewhat similar to a Socratic interlocutor in order "to help the people in developing countries find the answers," on their own even though "the answers are not readily available," and "remain to be developed" (p. 213). In this process, "people in developing countries are undergoing unparalleled rapid changes," and "they are constantly confronted with the problem of trying to decide on the right ideas to have, the right things to believe, the right courses to take" (pp. 213-214). He states that these people "must find their way in the ideological maze they are in," and must "resolve an endless array of identity crises" (p. 214).

In a sense, their situation is “like our young Americans in their late adolescent years,” insofar as “people in the developing countries do not really know what they want to be. They are in the process of growing up. They are searching frantically for a purpose in life and a reason in the things they do, believe, and want. But they do not really know what they should do or want, except that, in a very vague way, they want to be strong, successful, great, happy, and prosperous” (p. 214). He does not state this explicitly, but implies that our situation, continuing the analogy, is like the parents of these young Americans, insofar as “our responsibility is to help them grow, help them see and understand the meaning of things they wonder about. In short, to help them discover themselves” (p. 215). Of course, “we may hope that they eventually will discover, understand, and appreciate the properties of a healthy democracy and the ingredients of progress and happiness,” just as we have, but we must stop short of applying any directive or coercive measures to achieve this, since that is the approach of the Communists and not of the “Free World.” The relevance to limited-war is again spelled out: “it is not enough to teach the Vietnamese, Laotians, or Koreans how to fight communism. An equally important task is why they should fight it” (p. 215).

However, of course:

This is not a task that we can hope to accomplish with clever posters, catchy slogans, entertaining films, or even convincing publications. Those who fight on our side in this limited-war must undergo a set of vigorous mental gymnastics or ideological exercises to discover for themselves the purpose of this conflict as well as their role in it. I must hasten to point out that I am not intimating anything that is remotely similar to the Communist concept of indoctrination or their scheme of propaganda, both obviously distasteful to us. (pp. 216-217)

Instead of applying these coercive measures as do the Communists, Dr. Yu maintains that we should instead provide an opportunity for the developing nations to “do the searching themselves, and that our best hope in a limited-war lies in the success of their search” (p. 217).

Dr. Yu is encouraged by the fact that, in his opinion, “research possibilities in this area are virtually limitless” (p. 217). This is fortuitous since the successful completion of the search he described above on the part of the developing countries “is one of the few possibilities that are available to us as a democracy” (p. 217) for winning the Cold War. He affirms the vital and immediate need for this research, stating that “we need plans to mobilize all the people in the developing countries, particularly the intellectuals, to ponder on the questions which we have discussed” (p. 217). We also need to produce more “theoretical work,” “studies,” “serious thinking,” and “all the data we can get on the ideas and images that people in the developing countries have about themselves” (p. 217).

Commenting on Dr. Yu’s presentation during the panel discussion, Dr. Gerard Mangone of the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University states:

It reminds me of the doctrine of nonintervention. The United States is not intervening in other people’s affairs. All we do is give them billions of dollars to transform their economic system, send abroad missionaries of one kind or another, give them technical assistance that will change their mores, political advice, obtain military bases, use all the propaganda mechanisms at our disposal; but our policy is nonintervention in the affairs of other people. What does the United States believe? What does the United States offer? We always retreat into the slogan that we can’t do things the way the Communists do them.... We somehow have to help foreign peoples “discover themselves.”... Are we really performing our task adequately or retreating into myths about the views of people abroad?

Are we hypocritical in what we are trying to achieve overseas?
(Mangone, pp. 238-239)

This passage highlights some important potential contradictions in Dr. Yu's presentation. Returning for a moment to Yu's analogy between the relationship between the U.S. and developing nations and that between parents and children, is it really reasonable to claim that a parent can eschew all coercion in performing her tasks, or that she could assist her child in coming to know himself without in any way guiding that development, that she is totally disinterested? Also, is it reasonable or desirable for either party for the U.S. to adopt such a parental role relative to the developing nations? These are questions which are not addressed in Dr. Yu's presentation.

4.3.15 Eckstein: "Internal Wars"

In the afternoon session of the third day of the symposium, the chair was Dr. Klaus Knorr, who will be remembered from his article on intelligence in the Smithsonian volume and also because of his membership in the steering committee for this symposium. The first presenter, Dr. Harry Eckstein, was also published in the Smithsonian volume, and is presenting here on the same topic, internal war, and specifically on the prevention of what he refers to as "the disease," (p. 252) of such wars, continuing his physical health metaphor from his previous article.

He begins by noting that "internal wars are as grave a threat to us today as all-out nuclear war or other forms of international war," and cautions against "the belief...that internal wars can be adequately coped with by certain kinds of novel military operations, by fighting operations," a belief which "is extremely unfortunate" (p. 253). He employs

further medical metaphors, observing that “in no field of human conflict is prevention so much more important than cure and cure such a very weak substitute for prevention as in internal war” (p. 253).

Eckstein then makes what appears to be a rather bold statement in the context of the symposium:

I think that civic action is....not just a useful supplementary technique to counterrevolutionary warfare, but the key to the whole problem. I, myself, would conclude from this that counterinsurgency is consequently the primary responsibility of civilian authorities and not of the Army, however important a stake the Army has in the matter and however much it can be used by others to reduce internal war potential. (p. 254)

Eckstein goes on to explain his reasons for believing that “military techniques are not likely to be very helpful” (p. 254). The first reason he offers is that, “it is extremely difficult to win many kinds of internal wars for those on the defensive, and we are on the whole more likely to be on the defensive than the offensive in such conflicts” (p. 254). He suggests this is particularly true of guerrilla wars in which the guerrilla’s have better knowledge of the terrain, the support of the civilian population, and where the counter guerrilla forces have less “savage enthusiasm” (pp. 254-255) for their task. He cites the revolutions in the French colonies, Cuba, and Malaya as examples of these principles.

Eckstein also makes the related point that established governments cannot rely on guerrilla tactics to combat an insurgency, because “an established government which has to maintain normal order in a society cannot disappear into the mountains or into cellars in guerrilla fashion” (p. 255). He adds that “one can learn something about

counterguerrilla warfare from guerrilla warfare, but essentially the two operations are different. Also, counterguerrilla warfare is much more difficult” (p. 255).

Eckstein provides several reasons why he feels that military operational measures are ill-suited for addressing internal war situations. The first, as he already mentioned, is that “cure is unlikely, once fighting, particularly guerrilla fighting, has begun” (p. 256). The second reason is that if such military measures are to succeed, “the costs of such warfare are enormous,” and that “the costs may far exceed any conceivable benefit that can be derived from defense in revolutionary warfare” (p. 256). These costs take many forms, including obvious ones such as material and physical costs but also “less well-understood and much more important” costs, such as “the intangible costs of revolutionary warfare, the moral, psychological, and political costs” (p. 256). Eckstein then spells out his understanding of these “more important” costs in detail.

The moral costs, he claims, arise because “counterinsurgency often compels much more brutal methods of fighting than other kinds of warfare. I do not mean more destructive methods, but more debasing, dehumanizing methods” (p. 256). He then provides a specific example of the kinds of methods to which he is referring:

Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. We all know, since we were told yesterday, that the essential problem in guerrilla warfare is intelligence—how to find out what the enemy is up to and how to keep him from finding out what you are up to. We also know that were guerrillas have the enthusiastic support of much of the population and where it is not feasible to protect antiguerrilla civilians against reprisals, obtaining intelligence requires what one gentleman on the platform here called “unusual” methods. Not to mince words about it, it often requires methods like the French used in Algeria, torture and counterterrorism. For this reason, among many others, counterinsurgent warfare tends to brutalize even the best-intentioned of defenders. It corrupts them. And the men whom it corrupts, supreme irony of all, are likely to become the nucleus of extremist movements directed against the very state in whose

service they were corrupted. Once men have tortured and terrorized other people, once their veneer of civilization has come off, it is very difficult for them to return easily to humdrum civilized life. They may consequently become an insurrectionary danger against the state themselves. That is the moral cost of counterinsurgency. (pp. 256-257)

Turning next to the psychological costs, Eckstein states that they arise from “the need to fight a kind of war more elusive, ambiguous, and less resolvable than any other kind of war,” because “you often do not know who your enemy is, where he is, what he is going to do,” and “decisive battles are rarely fought” (p. 257). The political costs, on the other hand, arise from the moral costs: “Because of the brutal method one often has to use in counterinsurgent warfare...one will forfeit a great deal of goodwill in other countries.... If such methods are used, one is likely also to forfeit the support of much of one’s own civilian population, as indeed happened in France.... The Algerian war not only cost France Algeria, but also her own government” (pp. 257-258). However, one also runs a risk if one is not adequately brutal with one’s methods, because “if one does not use them sufficiently one is likely to aggressively frustrate the army” (p. 258). In such cases, Eckstein states unequivocally that “in militarily countering internal wars you may often be compelled to do things which simply create potential for more internal wars. In that case, the cost of counterinsurgency certainly exceeds the benefit. The costs are great, and the benefits are zero” (p. 258).

Even if an internal war is “won,” apparently meaning that the colonial power successfully suppresses the insurgency, “the matter is not finished,” (p. 258) according to Eckstein. This is because “internal wars tend to scar and to unsettle societies for very long periods, no matter who wins them” (p. 258). For instance, “it is never over when the enemy has been defeated,” for “there remains the problem, which may never be solved at

all, of restoring truly legitimate authority, of making loyal subjects out of defeated enemies” (p. 258).

After this rather grim prognosis for those on the defensive in internal war, Eckstein turns to what he sees to be the only viable and indispensable solution for those on the defensive side in such conflicts: the right kinds of knowledge to head off insurgencies before they become full-blown. He lists six such kinds of knowledge in inverse order of importance. The first kind of knowledge he lists, and therefore the least vital for preventing insurgencies, is what he has been discussing thus far, traditional military operational counterinsurgency knowledge. He points out that “nothing I have said so far is meant to suggest that we dispense with military knowledge of counterinsurgency,” but simply that “such knowledge is grossly insufficient” (p. 259).

The second kind of knowledge identified by Eckstein is “knowledge of how to turn revolutionary forces to our own account, how to use revolutionary ferment” (p. 259). He feels that “there has been too much talk at the symposium about counterinsurgency and too little about the fine art of insurgency or conspiracy” (p. 259). After all, if the defensive side in such wars is nearly impossible to win, then why not take the offensive? In Eckstein’s words, “if internal wars are all that have to be coped with, maybe we should learn to shape them instead of always surrendering one of the most volatile forces in human life to the other side” (p. 259). Furthermore, Eckstein holds that, contrary to popular belief, revolutions are not “always made by tightly knit conspiracies” (p. 259). Rather, “in their initial stages most serious internal wars are quite inchoate. They are formless matter waiting to be shaped—unallocated political resources.... The Communists are particularly good at them,” (p. 259) but why couldn’t we also throw our

hat in as well and “try to exploit the arts of conspiracy, if I may put it that baldly,” (p. 260) to our own advantage?

The third kind of knowledge Eckstein identifies is how to reestablish legitimate authority and turn one’s enemies into loyal subjects,” (p. 260) a difficulty identified above. This, in essence, comes down to the issue of how to best stabilize a country after you have successfully suppressed an insurgency. The fourth kind of knowledge is “knowledge of how to prevent internal wars, how to reduce internal war potential” (p. 260). This may involve “civic action...repression or conciliation of dissident elements,” and as such raises the question, “to what extent should one follow a hard or soft line or a combination of the two?” (p. 260).

The fifth kind of knowledge called for by Eckstein is “knowledge of how to measure internal war potential, much as a thermometer measures the intensity of some diseases, since the policy one uses before internal wars break out depends to a very large extent on the extent of internal war potential” (p. 262). Note both the further disease metaphor and also the assumption here that what is doubtlessly a very complex and dynamic phenomenon can be reduced to something approaching a single numerical “temperature” reading. This is in keeping with his mathematical formula from his “Pool group” article.

The final kind of knowledge Eckstein advocates, and therefore the most vital for avoiding insurgencies, is “knowledge of the causes of revolutionary ferment in order to be able to repress it at its source, or for that matter to induce it at the source” (p. 262). He reiterates that “I have listed the kinds of knowledge required both in inverse order of their

difficulty and of their importance,” with the implication of the ordering therefore that “it is better to prevent internal war than to win it” (p. 262).

He concludes rather soberly by observing that:

If all this is true, it seems to follow that the problems of counterinsurgency are primarily social science problems and civilian problems. I do not think I say this with a social scientist’s conceit, because having said it I must immediately confess that, at present, social scientists have very little to contribute on any of the required areas of knowledge, and I have very little hope for the future. (p. 262)

4.3.16 Speier: “Remarks in Panel Discussion”

The final speaker of the symposium was Dr. Hans Speier, a sociologist by training, who at the time was Chief of the Social Science Division at RAND, as well as Chairman of the RAND Research Council. He is regarded as an expert on propaganda and psychological warfare (Knorr, introductory remarks, p. 289).

Dr. Speier advocates the use of social science expertise in avoiding as much as possible the political, psychological, and moral morass described by Dr. Eckstein above as often attending internal war:

I propose that a qualified social scientist is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain intelligence. But this must be done in the field, because attention must be given to the special circumstances and conditions at a given time and place. (p. 292).

This passage is noteworthy insofar as it anticipates the controversial role played by psychologists during the Iraq war in interrogations to produce intelligence in the context of just such an insurgency situation as is being described above.

This ends our presentation of the SORO symposium discourse data.

4.4 Windle and Vallance: “The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology”

The next data which will be included in our analysis of Camelot-era documents come from an article published in the pages of *American Psychologist* in February 1964 and written by Drs. Charles Windle and Theodore Vallance, then both employed at SORO. (Dr. Vallance will be remembered from his role as director of SORO at the time of Camelot’s inception, a mere five months after this article’s publication, and from his testimony before the Fascell Committee, quoted in the introduction.) This article is entitled “The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology,” (Windle & Vallance, 1964, p. 119) and it is addressed to professional psychologists as an entreaty to reconsider the traditional roles open to psychology within the U.S. military establishment.

The authors begin by noting that “it can be argued that the development of sciences is shaped by societal needs. This relationship is especially close for those parts of a science which are tied to a particular application, as in military psychology,” (p. 119) followed by their assertion that “activity in this field can be measured fairly exactly by the amount of federal money spent on defense” (p. 119). They chart the rises and falls in psychology’s fortunes in the military through WWI, the post-war period, WWII, and the Cold War. They cite an increased role for psychologists toward the end of WWII: “later in the war and during the cold war years, psychologists became involved in varying degrees with many more elements in the personnel management system...and, most

important of all, the interaction of these elements in integrated systems” (p. 120). They note that:

Most military psychologists have predicted continuations of present trends in military activities and, consequently, in military psychology.... Accepting the premise that the military establishment will continue to increase its capabilities to fight general and limited wars, these predictions seem reasonable. However, a broader context of national objectives suggests that increase in traditional military power may no longer have the relatively high priority accorded to it in recent years. (p. 120)

Indeed, the authors are concerned that:

there is considerable evidence that societal needs may be changing, thus making an extrapolation of continued military developments inappropriate. One basis for this prediction is the instability, as well as the generally recognized undesirability, of an arms race.... A less emotional argument stems from indications that generally the means for countering threats to mutual security are changing from conventional or nuclear military capabilities to unconventional warfare and political and economic conflict. (p. 120)

If these passages should sound remarkably similar to those from multiple authors in the preceding documents, the similarities only increase as Windle and Vallance continue to make their case for changes in the military and psychology during the Cold War, and to relate these changes to multiple themes seen elsewhere above, such as the increasing significance of “developing nations:” “Current events strongly suggest that the major arena of Communist-Free World conflict has shifted from military struggle in Europe to economic and political rivalry in the many underdeveloped parts of the world” (p. 120). They then continue by elaborating on the nature of this new struggle in terms very reminiscent of Pye, Davison, and others cited above:

The gap between the rising aspirations of the peoples of underdeveloped countries and their level of living is being employed as an increasingly long lever with which a small Communist force can unseat governments backed with Western military power. The most effective defense against

this insurgent mode of Communist aggression appears to be to prevent the development of this lever of popular discontent—to provide non-Communist solutions to political and economic problems. (pp. 120-121)

To this end, they cite the injunction issued by Kennedy to the military, as did authors from the previous volumes as well: “The new functions of the military were greatly broadened by President Kennedy in his emphasis upon countering insurgency in underdeveloped nations and the consequent build-up of Special Forces strength” (p. 121). The authors then continue by offering a definition of “counterinsurgency:” “Generally, counterinsurgency, the currently most popular term for the Army cold war effort, involves three types of functions: counter guerrilla warfare, psychological operations, and civic actions.... In particular military operations, these functions must be coordinated, thus integrating military, economic, psychological, political, and social considerations” (p. 121).

From here, they elaborate on the three “functions” belonging to counterinsurgency, enumerated above, beginning with “counter guerrilla warfare:” “The general characteristic of counter guerrilla warfare is the use or threat of use of force against guerrillas, those who apply force against the local government or occupying force. However...the crucial role of the general populace in supporting guerrillas requires special tactics and consideration of the psychological impact of actions upon the populace” (p. 121). Despite concerns for the “hearts and minds” of the populace, however, necessary and harsh measures sometimes cannot be avoided: “To counter political control by terrorism, police operations must be strengthened and the organizations conducting the terrorism identified and exterminated” (p. 121).

The second function of counterinsurgency, “psychological operations,” is defined as follows:

Psychological operations include, of course, the relatively traditional use of mass media. In the cold war these operations are directed toward friendly and neutral as well as enemy countries. In addition, there is growing recognition of the possibility and desirability of using other means such as military movements, policy statements, economic transactions, and developmental assistance for psychological impact. This reorientation is implicit in the broadened title of Department of the Army Field Manual 33-5 which was changed from ‘Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations’ in 1949, to ‘Psychological Warfare Operations’ in 1955, to ‘Psychological Operations’ in 1962. (p. 121)

The third and final aspect of counterinsurgency, “civic action,” is dealt with here in more detail. It is first defined: “Civic action consists of military programs, usually by indigenous forces and often aided by United States materiel and advice, to promote economic and social development and civilian good will in order to achieve political stability or a more favorable environment for the military forces. This is technical assistance by military forces for relatively immediate security objectives” (p. 121). Following the definition, the authors issue several caveats concerning civic action. First, “civic action is, perhaps, the most fringelike of the new Army functions” (p. 121). Second, “the overlap with the Agency for International Development’s mission is apparent and the break with our traditional separation of the military from activities which smack of politics is sharp” (p. 121). They elaborate on the definition offered above, by adding that “these programs have consisted of the use of troops to do such low-cost developmental actions as building roads and schools, or to improve community relations by projects such as organizing youth activities, giving free entertainment or medical aid to civilians” (p. 121). They close their discussion of civic action with the

usual prediction of increased need: “The potential of foreign military forces for modernization may be increasingly tapped as the tide of expectations in developing nations continues to rise” (p. 121).

After this exploration of the new vistas opened up to psychology by the increasing salience of counterinsurgency to the government and the military specifically, Windle and Vallance turn their attention to the reality of dwindling federal support for traditional psychological research, in contrast to the increasing support of social science research more generally. They begin by citing the SORO-sponsored symposium “The United States Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research,” discussed in detail above, as evidence of government’s increasing interest in cold war applications of social science:

Army recognition that these cold war missions require social science support is seen in a recent symposium conducted by the Special Operations Research Office of American University. Research on cold war problems is being increasingly supported by the several military services and also by the Department of Defense. (pp. 121-122)

Despite these trends toward increased support of social science research, however, “National Science Foundation estimates of federal obligations for psychological research indicate a decrease, absolutely as well as proportionately, in Department of Defense sponsorship,” (p. 122) and “The Department of State is listed as having no psychological research” (p. 122).

They then turn to interpreting these changes: “These figures suggest several lines of thought: The first is...that psychologists have now been displaced from their previous prominence in the behavioral sciences by other professions...or, more likely, while psychologists have been responsive to military needs, others have been or are expected to

be responsive to State Department needs” (p. 122). Despite these changes, Windle and Vallance are optimistic about the future of federal military sponsorship of psychological research, noting that “the kinds of problems involved in nation building are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other social scientists, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit. What role psychologists can or will play in this enterprise will be determined in part by how well they conceptualize the applications of their science in technical development” (p. 122).

They add that psychology’s past history of military-sponsored work will stand it in good stead in the future: “Probably psychologists’ contributions to the social need for more economic, social, and political development will consist largely of an attempt to apply techniques built up in military research” (p. 122). Existing psychological research will also help to augment this new research needed on nation-building: “We would predict that increasing salience of problems in nation building will act primarily to increase interest in certain areas of psychology which have been in existence for some time. The types of areas which may receive more attention include: persuasive communication... diffusion of innovations.... [and] cultural factors in organization design” (p. 125-127).

These “contributions” from psychology to the military will also help increase the interdisciplinarity of psychological research, and continue to spur the development of new trends and directions in this research. For instance, “in the area of national development, psychology should attend the more challenging problems of what needs to be done. This...will of necessity cut across the lines of scientific disciplines, and should go far to remedy a major deficiency of current-day social science, the weakness of interdisciplinary research” (p. 123). Then, later, the authors add that “we share Tyler’s

view that interdisciplinary research is on the increase. This crossing of disciplinary lines is most likely when a multifaceted issue is engaged, forcing those who would understand to encompass broader viewpoints. The issues within national development seem sufficiently broad to produce much integration of sciences” (p. 125). This new research can help to restore psychology to a prominent place in terms of military funding: “military psychologists have played a prominent role in the design of man-machine systems. It would be surprising if they could not also play a role in the design of social systems. Such research would serve as the underpinnings for policy formulations” (p. 123).

Not only can psychologists help the military by offering their research services, but they can also offer new and useful theoretical perspectives as well. For example, the authors cite “Wolf, an economist,” who “has suggested a model for allocating foreign aid which is based in part on such psychological variables as ‘expectations’ and ‘aspirations.’ In brief, Wolf argues that our foreign aid is aimed at reducing political vulnerability to extremism, which is a product of disparity between aspirations and perceptions of reality” (p. 124).

In terms of applying the theoretical perspectives of psychology to the “psychological variables” within issues such as “development” and “foreign aid,” the authors echo the claims made above by Drs. Yu, Pye, and others when they suggest that “psychologists should be able to apply some of their experience from child and clinical psychology to increase understanding of psychological conditions in developing nations—and perhaps suggest therapeutic measures which more developed nations might take” (p. 124). This statement certainly seems to imply that the people of the

“developing nations” can usefully be viewed the same way that psychology views children or clinical populations, and that perhaps the discourse from the latter can be applied to the former as well. Additionally, other perspectives, discourses, and theoretical models may also be usefully ported over to the study of “development.” For instance, “Kunkel, a sociologist, has illustrated the applicability of operant conditioning principles to description of the relationship between the individual and the social environment in transitional societies. If this effort is to be useful, psychologists should take advantage of the suggestions of measurable relationships which such a behavioristic perspective affords to identify and confirm concrete steps by which desired behaviors can be reinforced” (pp. 124-125).

Psychological expertise can be of further use in studying the effects of intervention in the “developing nations:” “The high incidence of military intervention in politics in underdeveloped countries indicates the importance of this problem of role interpretation. Psychologists might contribute toward a better understanding by use of such techniques as Guetzkow’s simulation of international rivalry applied to the institutions of a particular nation” (p. 125).

Other issues that the authors argue are open to (and in need of) examination through psychological research include the effects of “giving” on the recipient when the developing nations receive economic aid:

It is often said that giving begets expectations of more gifts, arouses resentment, and encourages sloth. These statements are used to attack economic aid (as well as domestic welfare) programs. On so important an issue it would be desirable to see experimentation, or at least some delineation of the conditions which may affect recipients in ways pertinent to the goals of the donors. If aid acts as reinforcement, we might at least see what behaviors we are reinforcing. (p. 125)

They also include studies of propaganda techniques, particularly in light of the increased salience of propaganda in the current cold war situation:

The personal ethic of aristocratic internationalism has given way, as governmental officials became recruited from and supported by the population of a nation, to a nationalism wherein each nation establishes its own ethical system with presumed universality. This new moral force of nationalistic universalism makes propaganda, or the use and creation of intellectual convictions, moral valuations, and emotional preferences, an important arm of foreign policy. Accordingly a major part of the battle for men's minds is being fought with words as weapons. (p. 126)

In particular, with regard to propaganda, the authors urge Americans to be aware of their audience, although such awareness has not traditionally been their strong suit: "Western affluence and concentration upon liberty and the pursuit of happiness may lead us to overlook the widespread material needs which condition the receptivity of the peoples we wish to influence" (p. 126). Thus, we must overcome our traditional blindness to factors that "condition the receptivity" of our audience, and employ these factors through propaganda techniques subtly: "Advisors must discover, call forth and refine felt needs and positive ideas within individuals and groups in such a manner that the individuals and groups feel that the ideas are their own creation" (p. 126). For these and other reasons, we must be able to change with the times. For instance, "Kissinger has stressed the primacy of the need for political development over economic development, thus suggesting a reversal of priorities in our aid program during the last decade" (p. 127).

In summarizing their work in this article, Windle and Vallance state that psychology has seen its fortunes dim somewhat since the end of WWII in terms of military sponsorship. Nonetheless, they note that psychology still has an important role

to play in the current Cold War situation, particularly given the new military emphasis on counterinsurgency techniques, particularly if psychologists can successfully shift their discipline into a position in which it is poised to capitalize on these forecasted trends:

Although the presence of psychologists working in, on, and for our military institutions will continue indefinitely, the shifting currents of foreign policy and the Clausewitzian uses of the military arm as an extension thereof will lead to interesting revisions in objectives, methods, and conceptual content of their research. We are forecasting a trend away from emphases on human components for hardware systems toward emphasis on human components of social systems, and an increase in the study of human interaction and communication across cultural boundaries. (p. 128)

4.5 SORO: “Camelot Planning Letters”

The final two documents from which excerpts will be taken to form the data set for the present discourse analysis will be the “planning letters” released by SORO itself during the creation of Camelot. The first letter is the December 4, 1964 letter of invitation sent to scholars who “were presumed interested in internal war potential,” (Horowitz, 1967, p. 47) and was discussed briefly in Chapter 1. The second letter was also mentioned in Chapter 1, and is a “working paper” released the following day, December 5, 1964, and directed primarily toward a military audience, essentially briefing them on the Project and its aims. Each of the letters will be given its own subheading below. For each, SORO is listed as author. The reference date for citations from the December 4 article will be 1964a, and for the December 5 article will be 1964b.

4.5.1 SORO: “December 4, 1964”

The December 4 letter begins with a brief overview of the Camelot objectives: “Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world” (1964a, p. 47). It then re-examines these objectives in more detail:

Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are:

First, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies;

Second, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; and

Finally, to assess the feasibility of prescribing characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things. (pp. 47-48)

The letter describes the unusually high level of planned funding for the project, although it does not mention this funding as being unusual: “The project is conceived as a three to four-year effort to be funded at around one and one-half million dollars annually. It is supported by the Army and the Department of Defense, and will be conducted with the cooperation of other agencies of the government” (p. 48). It also describes the planned location of the study: “At this writing, it seems probable that the geographic orientation of the research will be toward Latin American countries. Present plans call for a field office in that region” (p. 48).

The letter describes some of the “factors and forces” which gave rise to the project. Unsurprisingly, they are quite similar to the factors identified in some of the documents above, for instance in the article by Windle and Vallance, who were undoubtedly also involved in the drafting of this letter: “Project CAMELOT is an

outgrowth of the interplay of many factors and forces. Among these is the assignment in recent years of much additional emphasis to the U.S. Army's role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the less developed countries in the world" (p. 48). The letter then spells out this new role more explicitly, again with an awareness of the importance of terminology which pervades many of these documents: "The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of counterinsurgency (some pronounceable term standing for insurgency prophylaxis would be better)" (p. 48). The letter also follows Windle and Vallance, above, in linking this counterinsurgency mission with "development" and, more specifically, "nation-building:" "This places great importance on positive actions designed to reduce the sources of disaffection which often give rise to more conspicuous and violent activities disruptive in nature. The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation building as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active insurgency problems" (p. 48).

The letter observes that the U.S. Army recognizes that it "needs" the expert knowledge held by social scientists, and that the Army is prepared to work with these scientists:

Another major factor is the recognition at the highest levels of the defense establishment of the fact that relatively little is known, with a high degree of surety, about the social processes which must be understood in order to deal effectively with problems of insurgency. Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the over-all counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Government. (pp. 48-49)

The authors then shift from a discussion of the need for the project to planning issues. They begin by discussing the interdisciplinary nature of the project: “Project CAMELOT will be a multidisciplinary effort. It will be conducted both within the SORO organization and in close collaboration with universities and other research institutions within the United States and overseas” (p. 49). Finally, they offer increased input to those scholars willing to sign on early in the process and to take on planning responsibilities:

Early participants in the project will thus have an unusual opportunity to contribute to the shaping of the research program and also to take part in a seminar planned for the summer of 1965. The seminar, to be attended by leading behavioral scientists of the country, will be concerned with reviewing plans for the immediate future and further analyzing the long-run goals and plans for the project. (p. 49)

4.5.2 SORO: “December 5, 1964”

The second letter, sent the following day (December 5, 1964) to various military officers who might be interested in the project, dives right into the objectives of the project in the second sentence, describing Camelot’s aims as:

1. Measurement of internal war potential: a means for identifying, measuring and forecasting the potential for internal war.
2. Estimation of reaction effects: a means for estimating the relative effectiveness of various military and quasi-military postures, practices, and levels of military involvement over a wide range of environmental conditions.
3. Information collection and handling systems: means and procedures for rapid collection, storage and retrieval of data on internal war potential and effects of governmental action, with appropriate consideration of existing and likely future facilities for processing and analysis. (pp. 50-51)

As in the letter to scholars above, this letter also makes note of the Army’s new “counterinsurgency mission:” “The U.S. Army counterinsurgency mission places broad

responsibilities on the Army for planning and conducting operations involving a wide spectrum of sociopolitical problems which are integral parts of counterinsurgency operations” (p. 51). Again, as above, a link is made between this mission and the Army’s “positive and constructive” role as an agent of development in the “underdeveloped countries:”

The problem of insurgency is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the developing countries and their transition toward modernization. Some of these countries are just emerging into a new era of economic and social development; some are ruled or controlled by oligarchies which, in order to maintain their own favored positions, resist popular social and political movements toward economic or social betterment and removal of frustrations; still other have only recently obtained political independence. (p. 51)

This letter strongly advocates for the Army as an agent of development: “In the present framework of modernization...the indicated approach is to try to obviate the need for insurgency through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological development” (p. 51).

With regard to “counterinsurgency,” the letter notes that this is primarily the responsibility of the country in which the insurgency is taking place, and not of the U.S. Army: “Responsibility for conducting counterinsurgency operations must rest with the indigenous government. Carefully applied assistance and advice by U.S. governmental agencies can, however, materially influence the outcome” (p. 51). One way in which the U.S. can assist is through the kind of analyses made possible with social science expertise: “The most fruitful efforts would be those designed to achieve early detection and prevention of the predisposing conditions” (p. 52).

The letter next turns to a more detailed examination of counterinsurgency and what it involves. It first lays out the goals of counterinsurgency: “Counterinsurgency operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will promote orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals” (p. 52). This is expedient for the U.S. military, because “it is far more effective and economical to avoid insurgency through essentially constructive efforts than to counter it after it has grown into a full-scale movement requiring drastically greater effort” (p. 52). Nonetheless, the sound scientific knowledge on which to base such efforts is lacking: “Although U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine during the past few years has stressed preventive measures, the scientific knowledge on which to base such doctrine has been weak” (p. 52). The authors of the letter, however, do not blame social scientists for this weakness, but to those responsible for “mobilizing” it: “That there is a poverty of knowledge in this area is understandable. Social science resources have not yet been adequately mobilized to study social conflict and control” (p. 52).

The letter becomes quite specific about the perspective that must be adopted toward insurgency and counterinsurgency: “If the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of counterinsurgency it must recognize that insurgency represents a breakdown of social order and that the social processes involved must be understood. Conversely, the processes which produce a stable society must also be understood” (p. 53). Furthermore, it even ties the correct understanding of these concepts to the success or failure of the Army’s “counterinsurgency mission.” Also, a “systems” perspective will be employed: “Throughout, the work of Project Camelot will be characterized by an orientation which views a country and its problems as a complex social system” (p. 53).

The document closes by spelling out the correct understanding and perspective on insurgency:

When groups fail to function so as to provide for the needs of the people that make up these groups, there is a tendency for them to break down and for their symbols to change meaning or lose value. People then tend to become involved in other lines of action which they perceive to be leading to a change for the better. Such actions may include sabotage, wildcat strikes, shootings and other acts of violence which, when continued, lead to a breakdown of law and order, to an inability of the economy to provide regularly for minimum essential needs and services, and to a further discrediting of the holders of political power. Much of this action comes under the label of insurgency. (p. 53)

Now that the data set has been established, we can turn our attention to the analysis of this discursive data. Please recall that, at any time, the reader can view the data set directly, without my added commentary and summary of the articles from which it has been extracted, in Appendix 1. In fact, a brief perusal of the data in this form can be quite helpful in getting the “flavor” of the data as pure discourse, abstracted from their situation in the texts or as presented above, in both of which they are embedded in larger rhetorical and argumentative structures.

Chapter 5

Analysis

5.1 Introduction

After the initial reading of the texts presented in the preceding chapter, the next step, as outlined in the method, is to identify the “objects” in the texts. The reader is reminded that these “objects” are crucial for their mutually constitutive relationship to discourse. The reader is also reminded of Parker’s (1994) methodological suggestion to itemize such objects by paying close attention to nouns and their significations. In order to arrive at the final list of 18 discourse objects, I first examined the SORO-issued “Camelot Planning Letters” (again, these letters are taken to represent most closely the goals and structuring of Camelot as envisioned by the SORO scientists) for key terms. From this examination, I developed the following list: “Social Sciences,” “Defense Department,” “Insurgency,” “Counterinsurgency,” “Internal War,” “Development,” “Developing Countries, etc,” and “Nation-Building.” “Social Sciences” implies “Social Scientists,” so that term was added. “Limited War” was added due to its prominent place in the title (and text) of the SORO-sponsored symposium, and also due to its centrality to the changing U.S. Cold War strategy. The terms “Free World” and “Communism” were added due to their omnipresence throughout the discourse data and also due to their profound structuring and polarizing influence on the discourse. (These two terms seemed to be the two poles around which the whole Camelot discourse—and in fact the larger Cold War discourse of which Camelot is a part— orbited.) “Deterrence” was added due

to its frequent connection to counterinsurgency, insofar as the shift to deterrence because of the nuclear arms race necessitated a shift away from conventional war and toward Cold War and thus counterinsurgency. “Intelligence” was added due to its repeated usage in the “Pool group” and SORO symposium documents, and also due to its connection to counterinsurgency. The remaining four terms, “Guerrilla Warfare,” “Civic Action,” “Psychological Warfare,” and “Special Operations,” also clustered around the other two poles of insurgency/counterinsurgency and illuminated various aspects of these two struggles or efforts, and were therefore included as well.

In the course of perusing the data in the previous chapter or the analysis in the present chapter, the reader may be led to speculate about the inclusion or exclusion of various terms from my list. As with the decisions described in the previous chapter in terms of developing the data set, the decisions I have made with regard to the “discourse object” list also reflect the dual necessities of fully and faithfully reflecting the spirit of the data set, while also remaining brief enough to be effective and functional. Undoubtedly, other terms could have been included, or alternately some included terms could have been omitted. The final list is the result of my own interaction with the data, and is in no way meant to be taken as the correct or only possible list. The eighteen chosen discourse objects are itemized below, along with their respective subsection numbers and page numbers, for ease of reference.

Their ordering is intended to simplify their presentation by presenting first the terms that serve a larger, overarching and structuring function within the discourse. These objects (first, the two Cold War “poles” of “Free World” and “Communists,” followed by the Cold War-specific “deterrence,” “developing countries,” “limited war,”

and “internal war”) are centrally relevant to what is new in military discourse and its terminological changes in terms of the Cold War, and they “set the stage” for the subsequent discourse objects by highlighting the overarching issues to which the discourse is, allegedly, responding. The next set of terms presents the Free World agents assigned the task of carrying out the missions of “deterrence” and “counterinsurgency.” They are the related terms “social science” and “social scientists,” and also the (United States) “Defense Department.” Subsequently, the other polar pair of discursive objects is presented: these are “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency.” After “insurgency,” comes “guerrilla warfare,” as this object is identified in the data as the key technique or tactic of insurgency. After “counterinsurgency” comes a set of objects which, like guerrilla warfare for insurgency, represent key techniques or tactics for counterinsurgency. These include “intelligence,” “civic action,” “psychological warfare,” “special operations,” “development,” and finally, “nation-building.” Here, then, is the list, with subsections and page numbers:

5.2.1	Free World	178
5.2.2	Communists	180
5.2.3	Developing Countries.	182
5.2.4	Deterrence	185
5.2.5	Limited War	187
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5.2.13	Intelligence	209
5.2.14	Civic Action	212
5.2.15	Psychological Warfare	213
5.2.16	Special Operations	215
5.2.17	Development	216
5.2.18	Nation-Building	221

In our initial exploration of these discourse objects, it is necessary to bear several caveats in mind. The first is that insofar as this is a discourse analysis, we are not to take these “objects” as directly pointing to pre-existing entities. Instead, we will focus our attention on the particularities of how these objects are presented to us and thus “constructed” through the discourse alone. Later, in the discussion, we will focus on how this discourse interfaces with social formations and institutions, some of which may in fact seem to correspond directly to the discourse objects identified below. Nonetheless, we will restrain ourselves from making this assumption, no matter how natural it may seem. To take an extreme case as an example, we will not assume that the discourse object “Department of Defense” will necessarily directly represent the actual Department of Defense of the United States government. Instead, we will focus on how each (the discourse object and the social institution) constructs and constrains our understanding of the other, as well as the real-world effects produced by each and by their interaction. For the summary of the discourse relating to each object, I will first present some “highlights” of the text data for each object, and then present some of the most significant and common themes from the various texts relating to each object, with that object in boldface wherever it occurs. These “highlighted” discourse selections will be presented without reference to their specific author or the document from which they are drawn. This will help to focus our attention on the discursive order during our analysis. For the full collection of data and discursive themes for each object or if the reader would like to link the selections presented below to the authors or documents from which they have been drawn, please see the appropriate appendices (Appendix 1 presents all of the

discourse data listed by author and document, and Appendix 2 presents the data broken down by discursive “themes”). Please note that many of these discourse objects have terminological variants or synonyms which I have grouped together. However, for ease of reading, I have only listed a single term in the list above. The subsection headings will contain all terms that I employed in my search.

After the discourse objects are analyzed individually, I will identify the relevant discourse subjects, and then present four overarching themes, or IDFs, which tie the various subjects and objects together into meaningful (and powerful!) discursive formations. It will be in these IDFs that we begin to see the discourse functioning to shape and constrain the various objects and subjects involved, and ultimately to fit them into a cohesive *episteme* of Camelot-era Cold War military-sponsored social science.

5.2 Discourse Objects

5.2.1 Free World

- *“Current events strongly suggest that the major arena of Communist-**Free world** conflict has shifted from military struggle in Europe to economic and political rivalry in the many underdeveloped parts of the world.”*
- *“Premier Khrushchev has made it perfectly clear that this is the sort of warfare the Sino-Soviet bloc intends to continue to wage against the **Free world**—or, at the very least, to encourage and subsidize—throughout the foreseeable future.”*
- *“In underdeveloped areas of the **Free world**, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure.”*
- *“The task of developing **free world** techniques for coping with subversives and guerrilla warfare will call for substantial research efforts.”*
- *“Social science can contribute to more effective conduct of the **free world’s** defense effort.”*
- *“One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the **Free world** not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the Communists have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity.”*
- *“Counterinsurgency is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the **Free world** and an unconscious assist to the Communists.”*

The discourse data constructs the object “Free world” as an entity opposed to the “Communists” in a global struggle, an entity against whom the Communists are waging war (the Free World itself is not “waging” the war; the war is being “waged against” the Free World by the Communists, necessitating a “defense effort” on the part of the Free World). The Communists wage this war using “subversion” and “aggression” in “underdeveloped areas.” These two entities, the Free World and the Communists, struggled in the past in a more traditional military manner in Europe and other developed areas, but now the “conflict has shifted,” both in its nature and in its geographical locus. It has become less military and more “economic” and “politically” based, and has shifted to the “underdeveloped areas” of the world, also referred to in the present data and elsewhere as the “third world.”

Interestingly, in the data sample presented above, these “underdeveloped areas” are referred to in two seemingly contradictory ways. On the one hand, these areas are outside of the dominion of either the “Free world” or the “Communists” and are the prize over which the two are competing. On the other hand, however, these areas are referred to as already a part of the “Free world” itself, albeit one in which the Communists are trying to exercise “subversion” and “aggression” against which the Free world must defend itself. In either case, the Free World must “cope” with these threats through measures such as “building stable nations,” measures requiring “substantial research efforts” to which the social sciences can and should contribute.

One other dimension of the discourse concerning the Free World involves “nomenclatural reform.” The Free World has thus far unnecessarily “handicapped” itself

by using unhelpful, even counterproductive terminology, whereas the Communists use terms that have an inherent “motivational force.” Consistent with the understanding developed by Austin, Foucault, and others that words don’t just *describe* things, but also *do* things, (the Army also understands this principle!) the discourse analyzed here advocates intentionally selecting terms not to describe the Cold War conflict as accurately as possible, but rather to provide the necessary motivational force to the Free World, as the Communists are supposedly already doing. This also relates directly to the concern about “Communist wordmanship” and their advantage over the Free World in this area described by the Fascell Committee and mentioned above in the introduction, and thus touches on some of the deepest motivating factors behind the genesis of Camelot.

5.2.2 Communism / Communist

- *Communists are a “militant messianic creed” of “expansionist zealots” bent on “exporting their utopia” which “justifies and glorifies violence,” and they have an advantage due to their “lack of scruples.”*
- *“The most effective means of eradicating the insidious, creeping menace of **Communist** guerrilla aggression and phony ‘wars of liberation’.”*
- *“All **Communist** effort is shrewdly and determinedly directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction.”*
- *“Our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in this world that would destroy all that we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery—which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this **Communist** cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences.”*
- *“What we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be limited-war from the viewpoint of the non-**Communist** nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The **Communists** term these conflicts “wars of liberation.” We call them “wars of subversion or covert aggression.”*
- *“One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the Free World not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the **Communists** have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity.”*

- *“It is particularly likely today that the **communist** states will use internal wars as tools of international politics. They have already done so frequently in the postwar period and are likely to do so frequently in the future.”*

Examining the discourse on Communism presented here, the first feature that stands out is the extremely charged, hyperbolic language repeatedly used to characterize it. This language portrays the Cold War struggle as one in which “civilization” hangs in the balance. For examples, see the first four of the selected passages above. Related to this polarizing Cold War language is another theme in the discourse, one in which Communism is repeatedly compared to a malignant cancer intent on taking over the Free World and spreading and propagating itself endlessly. This discursive theme relating Communism to cancer also dovetails nicely with another discursive formation (to be discussed in several of the subsequent discourse object sections below as well as in IDF 3) in which developing countries are compared to the human body in medical discourse and U.S. military and social science experts are compared to doctors trying to restore the body to health by suppressing insurgencies, which themselves are compared to diseases threatening the body.

Another feature of the discourse on Communism is the repeated connection made between the global struggle of the Free World against Communism, described above, and the Communists’ “exploitation” of internal wars in the developing countries for their own gain. Communists are described as being “particularly likely” to use “internal wars as tools of international politics.” In the discourse, Communists reportedly refer to these wars as “wars of national liberation,” while the Free World prefers to call them “wars of subversion or covert aggression.” This aspect of the discourse ties it in to many of the

other key terms discussed below, including “insurgency,” “counterinsurgency,” “internal war,” “limited war,” and others.

One final aspect of the discourse on Communism is, once again, a keen awareness of the importance of word choice and terminology, and the portrayal of language as a key front of the Cold War struggle. For instance, one author notes that “one of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the Free World not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the Communists have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity.” This theme, as will be seen, will recur with great regularity in our examination of subsequent discourse objects. It is also evident in the example given above regarding internal wars: note the discursive contrast between “wars of national liberation” on the one hand, and “wars of subversion or covert aggression” on the other.

5.2.3 Underdeveloped (Areas/Countries/Nations) / Backward Countries / Newly Emerging Countries / New (States/Countries/Nations) / Developing (Countries/Areas/Nations) / Less Developed Countries / Ex-Colonial Countries

- *“In **underdeveloped areas** of the Free World, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure.”*
- *“The **developing nations**...make up the largest portion of the world,” and “the stability of these areas is extremely important for the United States when it comes to safeguarding its own peace and freedom.”*
- *“Immediately after World War II, the Army had almost no concern with the **underdeveloped areas**,” and “only gradually as we developed a worldwide strategy did we become aware of the possible significance of the **underdeveloped areas**.”*
- *“The U.S. Army in one form or another has become more and more deeply involved in the problems of bringing order and progress to **underdeveloped countries**,” and “I predict that in the next few years this interest will increase at an exponential rate.”*
- *“Project CAMELOT is an outgrowth of the interplay of many factors and forces. Among these is the assignment in recent years of much additional emphasis to the U.S. Army’s role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the **less developed countries** in the world.”*

- *“People in the **developing countries** do not really know what they want to be. They are in the process of growing up. They are searching frantically for a purpose in life and a reason in the things they do, believe, and want. But they do not really know what they should do or want, except that, in a very vague way, they want to be strong, successful, great, happy, and prosperous.”*
- *A “new country,” a “newly emerging country,” a “developing area,” or a “backward country.”*
- *“I would contend that most of the so-called ‘**developing countries**’—well, as a matter of fact, the majority of them—are **ex-colonial countries**, and that the period of colonialism is a vast area of ignorance among Americans. We have not studied colonialism, hardly, at all.”*

The first point to note regarding the discourse on the “developing countries,” is the bewildering array of seemingly differing terms utilized throughout the various texts to refer to these countries. All of the different terms listed in the heading to the section are employed at least once in the texts to refer to this same set of countries, although sometimes with variations in emphasis or tone. Also, one might speculate as to what purpose is served by this constantly shifting terminology, particularly given what we know from the preceding sections of the authors’ high levels of awareness of the importance of selecting appropriate terminology, and how to utilize specific terminology to achieve specific ends.

The next point worth noting is the acknowledgement of a history of ignorance and indifference toward these countries on the part of the West, particularly the U.S., coupled with a more recently developing sense of the increasing centrality of these countries to U.S. foreign policy. Although these countries “make up the largest portion of the world,” before WWII, “the Army had almost no concern with the underdeveloped areas,” and “only gradually as we developed a worldwide strategy did we become aware of the possible significance of the underdeveloped areas.” Americans as a whole have also long been ignorant of these countries because “most of the so-called ‘developing countries’—well, as a matter of fact, the majority of them—are ex-colonial countries, and that the

period of colonialism is a vast area of ignorance among Americans.” However, despite this history of ignorance and indifference toward “the largest portion of the world,” the U.S., and more specifically its military, is now becoming increasingly aware of the significance of these countries to its “worldwide strategy,” as well as of the threat posed by Communist influence in these areas, also discussed above.

Other discursive themes present here also overlap with those from other discourse object sections. These include the divide between advocates of “military aid” and “economic aid” for the developing countries. Also repeated here are calls for increased social science research to be applied to the developing countries, and urgent admonitions regarding the vital importance of such research, particularly in terms of helping the U.S. and indigenous military forces in winning the support of local populations in these countries, and thus preventing Communist influence and such associated factors as the development of insurgent movements.

Finally, one aspect of the discourse here which is new in terms of our analysis is the analogy made between the population in a developing country and an adolescent (specifically a U.S. adolescent) going through a period of searching for an identity, direction, and purpose in life. The following passage is quite illuminating in this context: “People in the developing countries do not really know what they want to be. They are in the process of growing up. They are searching frantically for a purpose in life and a reason in the things they do, believe, and want. But they do not really know what they should do or want, except that, in a very vague way, they want to be strong, successful, great, happy, and prosperous.” If these populations are in the process of “growing up,” then undoubtedly they need the same kind of support that a parent usually provides to

such an adolescent. Furthermore, they are not yet qualified to find their way alone and unsupervised, and for the U.S. to allow them to do so would be irresponsible and even negligent. Thus, although we must employ social science to learn about these people's aspirations and opinions, we should not simply and uncritically help them in achieving these aspirations as they see them. Rather, we should ensure that their process of "development" occurs in a healthy way, one in which "order and stability" are maintained throughout. The assumption, of course, is that this process will and should be guided by us (as benevolent and protecting parent) so that it unfolds in a manner conducive to U.S. "worldwide strategy." This mapping onto the discourse on national development of another discourse, in this case from developmental psychology, is greatly facilitated by the support lent by experts from within psychology and the social sciences, both the tacit imprimatur and seal granted by their mere participation and also their active support through their contributions to the research and to the discourse.

5.2.4 Deterrence

- *"The technological revolution in weapons," and "the change in their primary purpose from use to **deterrence** both increase the demands upon social science."*
- *"We would likewise be inviting eventual catastrophe if we failed to create and maintain the capability to **deter** or defeat nonnuclear aggression at any level, for all Communist effort is shrewdly and determinedly directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction. In other words, if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor Communist successes, in the long run they would, like the proverbial 'little drops of water,' make an ocean which could engulf us."*
- *Traditional counter guerrilla measures are not "nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the **deterrence** or defeat of guerrilla aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct."*
- *"The standards for defining new terms should be: first, that these become clear to our own staff and leaders; second, that they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men; and third, that by their own semantic force they provide a certain degree of **deterrence** to our antagonists."*

“Deterrence” is a central theme in the military discourse of the Cold War era, where it denoted a broad strategy employed by the Free World to contain Communist expansion and international influence. It was generally stated, and is reiterated here in this particular discourse, that nuclear weapons and the “arms race” functioned as deterrents to such expansion. In the first passage above, it is stated that the function of nuclear weapons has shifted from “use” to “deterrence,” and also that this shift has led to increasing “demands upon” social science. Deterrence is also related, both in the wider Cold War discourse and more specifically here, to the “domino theory,” or the notion that “if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor Communist successes, in the long run they would, like the proverbial ‘little drops of water,’ make an ocean which could engulf us.” This attitude requires a posture of constant military vigilance on the part of the Free World.

The final two elements incorporated here in the discourse on deterrence will also be seen elsewhere in the present analysis. The first is the connection made here between deterrence as a strategy and the Army’s “deterrence” of “guerrilla aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct.” This passage ties deterrence to the Army’s new “positive and constructive” mission in counterinsurgency and nation-building. The second element is, again, an explicit awareness of the central importance of terminology and word choice in framing issues in ways which are helpful to U.S. interests. For instance, it is stated above that “the standard for defining new terms” requires that “by their semantic force they provide a certain degree of deterrence to our antagonists,” and also that “they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men.” These last two

passages again reflect a thorough understanding on the part of the U.S. military of Austin's dictum that words *do things*! What's more, they also reflect an understanding of how to apply this dictum in a military setting to achieve desired ends. Not only can words do things in the intuitive sense of a direct action, but they can also "do" by preventing or deterring an action.

5.2.5 Limited War

- *"**Limited-war**" includes "forms of conflict short of all-out nuclear war and general conventional war, with stress on 'wars of subversion and covert aggression' and the 'Cold War'."*
- *"There are many terms in vogue which cover parts of the mission, and you are familiar with them; such expressions as '**sublimited-war**,' 'subbelligerent war,' 'unconventional warfare,' 'cold war,' 'paramilitary war,' and 'proxy war'."*
- *"I emphasize this definition to insure that we have a common understanding of terms. Under it, what we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be **limited-war** from the viewpoint of the non-Communist nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The Communists term these conflicts "wars of liberation." We call them "wars of subversion or covert aggression."... I suggest that you may wish to employ the definition of cold war which I have given for uniformity, at least in your initial deliberations."*
- *"That they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in **limited-war**, that involves an understanding of how a modern society can be built."*
- *"And I venture to suggest that if we tackle this problem vigorously, wisely, and successfully, we may gain a body of totally new knowledge which we do not yet possess about the developing countries, open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior, and, conceivably, offer significant clues to our planning of **limited-war**."*
- *"Those who fight on our side in this **limited-war** must undergo a set of vigorous mental gymnastics or ideological exercises to discover for themselves the purpose of this conflict as well as their role in it. I must hasten to point out that I am not intimating anything that is remotely similar to the Communist concept of indoctrination or their scheme of propaganda, both obviously distasteful to us."*

"Limited war" is described here as a type of warfare "short of all-out...warfare," either of the conventional military or of the nuclear type. It is "limited" in terms of its use of military force, which may be employed, but is employed in a manner short of its full potential in such cases. Such limitations might be intentionally employed by the U.S.

military due to the dual considerations of the threat of nuclear retaliation and also the “emergence” of the “developing nations.” The support of the populations in those nations is seen as being critical to counterinsurgency operations (as is explained in the “counterinsurgency” section), and this support might be jeopardized if excessive force were used in struggles in those areas.

Again, as has been seen in several sections above, a clear and consistent focus on the central importance of the particular terminology employed is evident here in the discussion of “limited war,” particularly in the second and third quotes listed above. The military understands that its choice of terms directly affects how all of the parties involved understand these complex issues and their places in them. The military is positioned as the sole agent authorized to select and define these important terms, in most cases in advance of the involvement of other concerned parties such as American social scientists, indigenous governments, or general populations.

Finally, in the passages above, it is evident that the military’s “limited war mission” is related to its “counterinsurgency mission,” and also to its new “positive and constructive” role as a “nation-builder.” Social science support in this mission is solicited, with the inducement that helpful scientists could expect to develop exciting, relevant, and “totally new knowledge” that “goes beyond” existing understanding and techniques and that can open up important “new vistas.” This will be knowledge “that involves an understanding of how a modern society can be built.”

5.2.6 Internal War

- “Somewhat more specifically, one might single out the study of ‘**internal war**,’ that is, of the resort to political violence within communities, a phenomenon which is occurring with extraordinary frequency, with which the intelligence community is deeply involved, and about which the social science literature is far from rich.”
- “The term ‘**internal war**’ denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, government, or policies.”
- “There is another reason for making a special plea on behalf of the study of **internal wars** at this time.... We have reason to think they will remain commonplace in the future—and even more intimately connected with policy.”
- “It is particularly likely today that the communist states will use **internal wars** as tools of international politics. They have already done so frequently in the postwar period and are likely to do so frequently in the future.”
- “In no field of human conflict is prevention so much more important than cure and cure such a very weak substitute for prevention as in **internal war**.”
- “It is better to prevent **internal war** than to win it.”
- “It is extremely difficult to win many kinds of **internal wars** for those on the defensive, and we are on the whole more likely to be on the defensive than the offensive in such conflicts.”
- “In their initial stages most serious **internal wars** are quite inchoate. They are formless matter waiting to be shaped—unallocated political resources.... The Communists are particularly good at them.”
- “There is practically no limit to the research that can be, and ought to be, undertaken on the subject of internal war.”
- “Studies of the techniques by which **internal wars** can be molded and channeled are therefore of the utmost importance. The Machiavellian overtones, the apparent cynicism, may make such studies repellent, but that cannot be helped.”
- “If **internal wars** are all that have to be coped with, maybe we should learn to shape them instead of always surrendering one of the most volatile forces in human life to the other side.”
- “Knowledge of how to measure **internal war** potential, much as a thermometer measures the intensity of some diseases, since the policy one uses before **internal wars** break out depends to a very large extent on the extent of **internal war** potential.”

“Internal war” is defined in the data as the “resort to political violence” by members of a “community” (the term “internal war” is almost always used in these documents in reference to the “developing countries”) in order to affect a change in the “constitution, government, or policies” of that group. The term “political violence” here is quite interesting and potentially informative. It seems to refer to violence directed not at individuals, groups, or the general population of the country, but rather at the political system itself—at the governmental institutions and their perceived legitimacy. If this is the case, then an “internal war” might not necessarily be reducible simply to a “civil war”

or “revolution;” it might not hinge on the usual sort of physical violence perpetrated with guns and bombs, but rather to a kind of “violent” imposition of a disenfranchised group’s will on political and state systems of control, presumably with corresponding effects on the public perception of such systems among the general indigenous population. As such, then, this “political violence” is a violence whose immediate “victim,” in the logic of this discourse, might be indigenous “hearts and minds,” the all-important popular sentiment in the developing countries, and whose less immediate victim might be the indigenous government and, by extension, the U.S. efforts to support and buttress the perceived authority and legitimacy of these governments.

The term “internal war” is used throughout the documents with a great deal of urgency, and there is a pervasive sense that internal wars are of special significance to the United States, particularly in terms of “countries in which internal war might imperil our fundamental international designs.” (Again, this is meant to indicate the “developing countries.”) The military makes a “special plea” to social scientists to direct their studies toward internal wars, despite the fact that “it ought not to be necessary to urge the study of internal wars upon anyone, social scientist or policy-maker. One would expect social scientists to be interested in them simply because they are a common, indeed astonishingly common, facet of human experience,” although it is noted that, on this topic, “the social science literature is far from rich.”

In the data, it is also evident that the various authors are keenly aware that the significance of “internal wars” for the U.S. military will only increase in a Cold War context, and also that such wars will be “even more intimately connected with policy.” Furthermore, “it is particularly likely today that the communist states will use internal

wars as tools of international politics,” and that “the communists are particularly good at them.” One other reason to be concerned about communist involvement in internal wars is that the U.S. is often on the side of the elites, the incumbents, the power-holders in the indigenous governments, the groups against whom the insurgents struggle in these internal wars. For instance, one author states that “it is extremely difficult to win many kinds of internal wars for those on the defensive, and we are on the whole more likely to be on the defensive than the offensive in such conflicts.” For this reason, the authors repeatedly urge that these wars should be avoided when possible, and even that “it is better to prevent internal war than to win it.”

This brings up one of the most salient aspects of the discourse on “internal war” examined here. It is the repeated use of terms such as “cure,” “symptom,” “prevention,” and others, which are borrowed from medicine or psychotherapy and applied here to the description of internal war conditions. For instance, one passage states that “in no field of human conflict is prevention so much more important than cure and cure such a very weak substitute for prevention as in internal war,” and that we need “knowledge of how to measure internal war potential, much as a thermometer measures the intensity of some diseases.” Still later, another adds that studies should inquire “very broadly into what might be called ‘symptoms’ (or ‘indicators’) of internal war potential.” This way of speaking about insurgency as a “disease” which must be “cured” through “development” accomplishes several things. First, it links “insurgents” with the spread of the malignant “Communist cancer” discussed above in the “Communism” section, insofar as both are part of the same disease or syndrome attacking otherwise healthy developing nations. Second, it places U.S. military and social science efforts in this region squarely in the role

of the medical or mental health professional attempting to restore order and health to the threatened body or psyche of the developing nation. This discursive structure will reemerge below in our exploration of “development,” “nation-building,” “developing nations,” and some of the other terms as well. Third, if the implicit assumptions underlying this way of structuring the discourse on “internal war” and “insurgency” are not challenged, and they are never challenged anywhere in these documents except in isolated rhetorical instances, then they become part of the taken-for-granted worldview or *episteme* employed by the military officers and social scientists working in this field. This allows the future use of discursive tropes borrowed from the health sciences and the associated tone of benevolent paternalism whenever they seem relevant or expedient.

With regard to specific social science research on this topic, the U.S. military makes it clear that it desires very broad, far-reaching studies into the measurement of internal war potential as well as the best methods for prevention. However, in addition to these efforts aimed at assessment and symptom reduction, there is another dimension to the military’s research plan: the “shaping” of internal wars. One social scientist comments in the SORO symposium on limited war that “if internal wars are all that have to be coped with, maybe we should learn to shape them instead of always surrendering one of the most volatile forces in human life to the other side.” The same author, in his article in the Smithsonian study group’s collection, reiterates that “studies of the techniques by which internal wars can be molded and channeled are therefore of the utmost importance. The Machiavellian overtones, the apparent cynicism, may make such studies repellent, but that cannot be helped.” Taking the medical science analogy one step further, it seems difficult to imagine a physician advocating “cure” or “symptom

reduction” one moment and then in the next breath recommending “shaping,” “channeling” or “molding” a patient’s illness, somehow for her benefit, instead of curing her. These seemingly contradictory aims are quite similar to those espoused by Eckstein in his advocacy of a study of “internal peace” (discussed in his “Pool group” article in the Data chapter above), which can be achieved through such mechanisms as “diversions,” “concessions,” and “repression.”

One final point that must be made about this discourse on “internal war” stems again from Eckstein’s article from the “Pool group” papers. This is the same article just mentioned as addressing “internal peace.” In this article, he also specifies in great detail how internal war has been studied in the past and why some of these methods have been unhelpful but can be remedied in the present context. As discussed in the Data chapter above, Eckstein advocates a series of re-orientations in perspective, for instance shifting analysis away from insurgents and toward incumbents and away from immediately precipitating factors of internal wars and toward factors seen as indexes of internal war “potential.” This re-orientation, in each case, serves to shift analysis of internal war away from factors involving the interests of the frustrated and disenfranchised elements of the populations in these countries and toward factors relating to failures or possibilities pertaining to elite and incumbent groups. It is *these* groups of whom a better and fuller understanding is needed to help us reduce internal war potential. Insurgent groups are to be dealt with, but need not be understood. This trend in the discourse is paralleled in the knowledge requested from social scientists for the understanding of “counterinsurgency,” and the development of better techniques for implementing it, combined with the complete lack of mention of social scientists in the discourse on “insurgency,” which will

be discussed below. Obviously it is in the former area that “more research” is needed and thus will be beneficial, and not in the latter. Again, returning to the medical analogy, what is the utility for a physician of detailed study of the treatment if the study of the disease itself is completely overlooked? Finally, as a last brief note here, in his advocacy of examining “preconditions” instead of “precipitating factors,” Eckstein uses the term “prerevolutionary conditions” as a synonym for “preconditions.” This is the only indication anywhere in these documents that the phenomenon consistently labeled as “internal war” has also, and for much longer, been referred to variously as “revolutionary war” or “civil war.” Doubtlessly, the tacit elision of such terms from the discourse is one more method employed to achieve the correct understanding of “internal war” here. Imagine the different impact all of the text samples above would have if the term “revolution” were substituted for “internal war” in each instance! Of course, for the authors of these texts, revolution is far too noble a goal to ascribe to “insurgents” who are essentially just “terrorists” and “bandits.”

5.2.7 Social Science

- *“The objective of this book is to consider what **social science** can contribute to more effective conduct of the free world’s defense effort.”*
- *“Without question, **social science** research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces.”*
- *“**Social science** needs a kind of engineering to go with it.”*
- *“How can a branch of **social science** be produced which takes upon itself a responsible concern for national security matters, and how can talented individuals from within **social science** be drawn into this area?”*
- *“The defense establishment is in a position to stimulate a significant burst of **social science** creativity which could prove most useful to it.”*
- *“I am convinced that larger funds, properly administered, would also accelerate progress in the **social sciences**.”*
- *“The weakness of military-oriented **social science** may be attributed to an unmilitary and even anti-military sentiment among some social scientists.”*
- *“...whether the **social sciences** will contribute in proportion to the need.”*

The discourse on social science represented in the texts indicates a pervasive sense of significant changes, challenges, and opportunities facing social science and also its chief sponsor and “client” represented here, the defense establishment. However, the overall structuring of this challenge is noteworthy. The challenge is already fully perceived and understood by the military, which has a strong “need” for social science research and expertise. This need, though, is spelled out clearly in advance. It simply remains to be seen whether the social sciences will “contribute” their knowledge to the military in order to fulfill their patriotic wartime duty, and thereby reap the benefits of “larger funds, properly administered,” which would “accelerate” their development.

This way of structuring the relationship between the military and social science and of the “challenge” presented to both of them is noteworthy in several respects. First, although social science is frequently portrayed as being in a “strong position” and possessing vital knowledge and methodological techniques from which the military and, by extension, the nation and the Free World, can benefit, it is not asked to provide independent, objective, and scientific consultation (arguably the very characterization of its *modus operandi*); instead, it is asked to “contribute” the needed knowledge. In fact, social science, in this instance, seems less asked than “required” to “contribute” its expertise. It remains to be seen only if the social sciences can overcome their “anti-military” attitudes and other barriers, such as a lack of interdisciplinarity, in order to do so. In fact, it seems that the social sciences are being “recruited” by the U.S. military, much as a prospective cadet or officer might be.

What is needed, more specifically, is a kind of “social science engineering,” which the military suggests that it might “develop” into a whole new “branch” of social science. The military can use its “large and unusual resources,” in the form of significant funding increases, to help “accelerate progress” in the social sciences in a way which would help to foster the development of such an engineering branch. Noteworthy here is both the passive position allocated to social science and also the implicit parallel between social science and the “underdeveloped countries,” both of which need to be “developed” by the U.S. government. These parties cannot accomplish this “development” or change themselves, but must look to the U.S. defense establishment and its financial largesse to assist them, with the implicit acknowledgement that it, as a wise parent, knows what is best for them and will help them to grow healthily and beneficially (see the “development” and “nation-building” sections for further elaboration of these themes).

It is somewhat ironic and paradoxical here that the same social science that is looked to in order to provide the “expert knowledge” (knowledge which the military, as it itself asserts, does not possess) to facilitate the process of development for these “underdeveloped” countries must first itself *be developed* appropriately by the military. There are also a host of “weaknesses” noted in the texts pertaining to the social sciences, which such “development” would help to address and put right. These include misguided attitudes toward violence and the U.S. military, lack of interdisciplinarity, and lack of a research focus on the issue of “social conflict and control.”

Thus, the social sciences as presented here are being simultaneously solicited, recruited, and developed by the military. They are simultaneously portrayed as “strong” and “in need” of military help. There are significant financial and professional

inducements, both individual and collective, presented, along with admonitions based upon Cold War national service and the imperative of patriotism. At the same time, the military is looking to create its own new “social science engineering branch” of the social sciences, and to recruit existing talent into this new branch as part of this “development.” If successful, such an effort might presumably allow the military to bypass the perhaps unpleasant task of having to appeal to and cajole social scientists to turn their attention to military issues by establishing a permanent cadre of and knowledge-base for military-oriented social scientists.

5.2.8 Social Scientists

- *“There are also things **social scientists** can do to change their ways toward greater usefulness.... The **social scientist** who would be responsible must recognize in military problems some of the most important issues, perhaps even the most important issues of our time.”*
- *“**Social scientists** must abandon the ivory tower...and must strive to contribute to engineering calculations which can help achieve security in a world of risks.”*
- *“Few **social scientists** would be happy to admit to being problem-solvers rather than scientific discoverers. What is needed is a prouder image of the role and along with that a great increase in numbers, improvement of morale, and clarity of purpose of the cadre fulfilling it.”*
- *“The kinds of problems involved in nation building are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other **social scientists**, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit.”*
- *“The disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about nation building. In the past the **social scientists** have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine.”*
- *“...suggests a natural area for cooperation among military specialists, **social scientists**, and creative engineers of new weapon systems.”*
- *“In the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among **social scientists** in the problems of guerrilla warfare and counter-subversion.”*

In the passages above, as well as the full data collection presented in the appendix, it is clear that the general outline of the discourse on social scientists closely follows the contours of the discourse on the social sciences described above, involving cautions and admonitions coupled with financial and status-based inducements. The

application of social science means to military ends is portrayed as “natural,” necessary, and noble, and social scientists are entreated to “change their ways” toward greater “usefulness” to the military. If they do so, then they will “receive the recognition that their contributions merit.” They are also portrayed as having, in the past, “not provided all the information necessary” to the military about key issues such as nation-building, implying perhaps that they have been either lazy, reticent, or “holding out” on the military. Nonetheless, it is predicted in the data that this situation will change, and that “in the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among social scientists” in problems related to nation-building and the military’s counterinsurgency mission. However, if they do indeed desire to “change their ways,” then social scientists must recognize the problems posed to them by the U.S. military to be “the most important issues of our time,” and must “strive to contribute to engineering calculations” in order to solve these issues, particularly issues such as “nation-building,” “guerrilla warfare,” and “counter-subversion.” Furthermore, the successful exploration of these new avenues of research on the part of social scientists is portrayed as being pivotal to the maintenance of “security” for the “Free World.” Evidence for this can be seen even in the very title of the “Pool group’s” published work: *Social Science Research and National Security*. Certainly, this is a big job for social scientists (even if it does involve a demotion from independent scientific researcher and discoverer to a provider of “input,” “contributions,” “engineering,” and “problem-solving”) and such a big job might well eventually yield a big payout, as social scientists had seen in the past.

Although social scientists might not appreciate this new role as it is conceived of by the military, insofar as it entails their being “problem-solvers” rather than “scientific

discoverers,” social scientists are urged to “abandon the ivory tower” and their above-mentioned “anti-military” attitudes, and to assist the military in creating a “proud image” of their prospective “new role” such that their peers might be happier to engage in further military work. Success in this image makeover will result in “improved morale,” among scientists, greater “clarity of purpose,” and also a “great increase in numbers” for this new “cadre” directing their efforts toward military issues.

5.2.9 Defense Department / Defense Establishment / Military Establishment

- *Social science can assist with “an entirely different domain of **Defense department** problems,” namely “the operations of the **Defense department** in relation to the external world.”*
- *“Strategic planning, weapon system selection, intelligence, guerilla warfare, and such external relations of the **defense establishment** as civil-military relations, military government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the social sciences as they now exist might provide contributions.”*
- *“The **Defense department** also needs to maintain and strengthen social science in its in-house laboratories.”*
- *“The **defense establishment** can make itself a client, stimulating the behavioral sciences and using them—to mutual advantage.”*
- *“Rather than destructive, our aims are constructive—to create internal conditions and encourage political, social, and economic systems which remove hunger, disease, poverty, oppression, and other sources of discontent. In this sense, our **military establishment** is a direct, positive instrument for human progress in directions that are compatible with the U.S. national interest.”*

The discourse here reveals many elements that cover very similar ground to that of the previous two sections above on “social science” and “social scientists.” Indeed, inasmuch as it is the relational other side of the coin, so to speak, to the “social sciences” and “social scientists,” the “Defense Department” as discourse object and its associated discourse articulate in greater detail precisely the way in which the social sciences are to make “contributions” to the defense establishment, while the latter “develops” and “stimulates growth” in the former. This stimulation of growth is to be accomplished

through provision of funds, especially, but also through the very invitation to work together in a changed world with new demands and needs. Some additional elements to this discourse revealed in these passages include a new “domain” of military problems open to analysis by the social sciences, namely “operations of the Defense department in relation to the external world,” as opposed to strictly internal, managerial and personnel selection issues to which the military-oriented social scientists had been confined in the past.

It is, consequently, in the defense department’s venturing into these “external world” issues in which an opening is created for a relationship with the social sciences—one in which the social sciences are able to offer assistance with “strategic planning, weapon system selection, intelligence...military assistance,” as well as with other issues, as will be seen below.

In addition to issues relating specifically to the social sciences and changes in their relationship with the military, there is another strand in this discourse, representative of changes in the military. Specifically, the last passage above begins to articulate a new vision of the U.S. military establishment as a “constructive” instead of a merely “destructive” force in the world. Its new mission is “to create internal conditions and encourage political, social, and economic systems which remove hunger, disease, poverty, oppression, and other sources of discontent” in the “developing countries.” In this way, the military can be “a direct, positive instrument for human progress in directions that are compatible with the U.S. national interest.”

5.2.10 Insurgent / Insurgency

- *“It is the chief dogma of modern revolutionaries that without great popular support the **insurgents** in an internal war can hardly hope to win—unless by means of a coup—and that with such support they are hardly likely to lose.”*
- *“The primary sources of **insurgent** strength are...the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves.”*
- *“The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation building as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active **insurgency** problems.”*
- *“The problem of **insurgency** is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the developing countries and their transition toward modernization.”*
- *“In the present framework of modernization...the indicated approach is to try to obviate the need for **insurgency** through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological development.”*
- *“If the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of counterinsurgency it must recognize that **insurgency** represents a breakdown of social order and that the social processes involved must be understood. Conversely, the processes which produce a stable society must also be understood.”*
- *“In a more serious vein it can be pointed out that **insurgency** is much too flattering a word to be applied to the terrorism and banditry which the Communists use.... Counterinsurgency and **insurgency** might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the Free World.”*

The discourse presented in the discourse sample above, as well as in the full data set in the appendix, suggests that the U.S. military (as opposed to social science) is already operating from a clear, cohesive, and seemingly unambiguous understanding of the signifying meaning of “insurgency” and “insurgent,” namely as “a breakdown of social order.”

For the most part, however, the meaning of this discourse object is articulated by the military establishment, and only occasionally by the social scientific fraternity – and on the singular occasion when “social science” does reference insurgency, it is abundantly clear that it is less the discipline (social science, as it is), than individuals (social scientists, advocating a social science that is not yet) that are utilizing the signifying meaning of insurgency as the military does. Hence, despite the repeatedly stated need for social science expertise in coping with insurgency and its frequently-

employed technique of guerrilla warfare, it is not acknowledged anywhere that social scientists might already have an understanding of their own regarding the meanings of these terms, that they might be free to develop alternative understandings, meanings, or contexts for them, or that they might be able to open up a dialogue with the military regarding its pre-existing understanding. In fact, nowhere in any of the data discussing “insurgency” are social science or social scientists mentioned at all, even in passing!

This military understanding of the meaning of “insurgency”, namely as “a breakdown of social order”, is predicated, as well, on the very duty and responsibility given to it by President Kennedy himself. As such, and by extension, social scientists who are willing to fulfill the demand issued by the military for social science expertise in addressing insurgency “must recognize” this meaning as well. Not only does insurgency represent a breakdown of social order, but such a breakdown can create “problems” for “friendly governments,” so we have to be ready to come to their aid “through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological development” and, ultimately, “the positive and constructive aspects of nation building.” The insurgents, who are actually “terrorists” and “bandits,” rely on “the sources of discontent of the people within the nation,” and thus insurgencies actually represent struggles for the hearts, minds, and loyalty of the people in the “developing countries” in which they break out. Insurgency is the “target” in internal war situations. In such situations, U.S. military forces may intervene, not in a traditional military manner but in a new “positive and constructive” way, to help the “friendly governments” win the struggle for the support of the population. If the U.S. succeeds in this, it can both defeat the insurgency and “obviate” the need for any traditional military measures.

There is also a focus on issues of terminology within the discourse on insurgency similar to that seen in the discourse on the “Free World” above. Specifically, the term “insurgency” is seen as being “too flattering,” and potentially “misleading,” and it is recommended that replacements be sought.

5.2.11 Guerrilla / Guerrilla Warfare

- *“Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of **guerrillas**, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional Communist challenge—in paramilitary warfare, in psychological warfare, and in conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force.”*
- *“I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of **guerrillas** and indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities by psychological operations under varying conditions of cold warfare.”*
- *“In the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among social scientists in the problems of **guerrilla warfare** and counter-subversion.... This is because the problems posed by such forms of warfare and violence are intimately related to questions about the social structure, culture, and behavior patterns of the populations involved.”*
- *“Without question, social science research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces” in the new countries, and that “the task of developing free world techniques for coping with subversives and **guerrilla warfare** will call for substantial research efforts.”*
- *“The Army...is...the repository of an invaluable store of practical ‘know how’ in the field of **guerrilla warfare**—‘know how’ based on experience extending back to early Colonial days and on through the Indian Wars, and expanded and sharpened in combat operations in the Pacific areas and elsewhere during World War II.”*
- *Counter guerrilla warfare is not “nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the deterrence or defeat of **guerrilla** aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct.”*
- *“Civic action should be looked on as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of **guerrilla warfare**.”*
- *“Generally, counterinsurgency, the currently most popular term for the Army cold war effort, involves three types of functions: counter**guerrilla warfare**, psychological operations, and civic actions.... In particular military operations, these functions must be coordinated, thus integrating military, economic, psychological, political, and social considerations.”*
- *“The general characteristic of counter**guerrilla warfare** is the use or threat of use of force against **guerrillas**, those who apply force against the local government or occupying force. However...the crucial role of the general populace in supporting*

guerrillas require special tactics and consideration of the psychological impact of actions upon the populace.”

The first aspect of the discourse on “guerrilla warfare” that stands out is its usage of the highly polarized and skewed Cold War discourse relating to the “Free World” and “Communists,” discussed above in the sections on those two terms. This discourse is polarized insofar as it portrays the global Cold War struggle as an all-or-nothing, us-against-them struggle and insofar as it employs extremely charged and loaded language to do so, ensuring that there is no neutral middle ground between these two parties, and that the differences between them are as great and as stark as possible. It is skewed in its radically different and asymmetrical portrayals of the “Free World” and the “Communists,” and their respective roles in this struggle: for instance, the “Free World” is described as being comprised of “free men and peaceful nations” who find themselves “under unremitting attack” today by the Communists, who utilize “assassins, bands of guerrillas, and full battalions” to achieve their objectives. The “Free World” does not instigate the struggle, but simply responds defensively to Communist aggression.

However, Communist forces and guerrilla fighters can also be subjected to “organization and control” by the indigenous governments and their U.S. military supporters, against whom the guerrillas are struggling. In this way, the Free World may be able to achieve the “exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities.” This framework is laid out beforehand and, according to the discourse, provides the necessary foundation for the correct understanding of guerrilla warfare.

Another significant aspect of the discourse on guerrilla warfare is its strong emphasis on the centrality of social science research to the effective combating and control of such warfare. This is quite similar to the repeated emphasis on the necessity of

this research elsewhere in other discourse object data such as that on “intelligence,” “counterinsurgency,” “internal war,” and so on. Social science research is described as being in a “strong position” to “contribute useful knowledge” regarding “designing and developing internal security forces.” This description unites several discursive elements, again all seen in the discourse in previous terms explored above. For instance, there seems to be a discrepancy between the “strong” position of the social sciences on the one hand and their role as “contributors” on the other. Also, their role in “designing and developing internal security forces” for the U.S. military to combat and put down insurgencies and guerrilla uprisings in developing countries is very much different from anything such scientists had done in the past. However, this change is presented as a “challenge” and a great “new possibility” both for the social sciences and for the U.S. military, and the appropriateness of this new role is never questioned by either party here.

Also above, it is predicted that, in the next several years, “there will be a growing interest” among social scientists in these issues. This is not portrayed as due to an increase in military funding of research or because of increased military demands for such research, although both of these reasons are extensively documented in the data set, but simply because these issues are “related to questions about the social structure, culture, and behavior patterns of the populations involved,” and thus fall within the social science purview. Needless to say, it is curious for the military to advocate strenuously for such research, to emphasize the dire need for it, to discuss repeatedly the provision of increased funding for it, and then to suggest, almost casually, that they expect “growing interest” in the topic on the part of social scientists, simply because it falls within their purview. Such reasoning, in this case, might be suspected of presenting only part of the

story, and, what's more, a part that is almost inevitably misleading and an oversimplification of the situation.

One final aspect of this discourse which merits attention is the new role assigned to the Army by President Kennedy, complementing the new role for the social sciences just discussed above. This new role for the Army revolves around combating insurgency, but it enjoins the Army to do so in new ways. Specifically, this new role is “the role the Army is equipped to play in the deterrence or defeat of guerrilla aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct,” and it relates to the Army's new “positive and constructive” role, discussed above. The army will need to utilize “civic action,” “military assistance,” and other new techniques and tactics to accomplish this mission, as well as the advice and “contributions” of concerned social scientists. Despite the Army's need for social science support, it is particularly well-suited for this new mission due to its status as “an invaluable store of practical ‘know how’ in the field of guerrilla warfare—‘know how’ based on experience extending back to early Colonial days and on through the Indian Wars.” Again, as above in “internal war,” the particular importance of the “general population” of the developing countries is emphasized, specifically their role in supporting insurgents and guerrillas and the need for the U.S. forces to win the favor and support of the population if they are to combat such uprisings through their new “positive and constructive” methods as described above.

5.2.12 Counterinsurgent / Counterinsurgency

- *“The increased importance of military **counterinsurgency** capabilities is a matter of common knowledge.... Two factors are primarily responsible for this increased emphasis: (1) The emergence of many developing nations, newly independent, which*

are inviting targets of subversion and covert aggression,” and “(2) The overwhelming destructive potential of all-out nuclear warfare.”

- *“Military **Counterinsurgency** Weapon System” includes “psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, [and] military aid and advice.”*
- *“In the past, the primary sources of enemy strength...could be destroyed physically. In the **counterinsurgency** situation, the primary sources of insurgent strength are...the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves.”*
- *“In the same sense that a new emphasis on the **counterinsurgency** mission has resulted in new requirements on the military, a new emphasis is required within the behavioral and social sciences.”*
- *“Although U.S. **counterinsurgency** doctrine during the past few years has stressed preventive measures, the scientific knowledge on which to base such doctrine has been weak.”*
- *In areas “such as Vietnam...civic action programs alone would be inadequate.... In such areas, emphasis must be placed on creating and training local **counterinsurgency** forces and on providing them with operational and logistical assistance and increased technical training.”*
- *“**Counterinsurgency** often compels much more brutal methods of fighting than other kinds of warfare. I do not mean more destructive methods, but more debasing, dehumanizing methods.”*
- *“Because of the brutal method one often has to use in **counterinsurgent** warfare...one will forfeit a great deal of goodwill in other countries.”*

The discourse on “counterinsurgency” in the documents studied closely mirrors that on “insurgency,” which perhaps is not surprising, given the relational closeness of these discourse objects. The documents explain that counterinsurgency has become much more important to the U.S. military in the present Cold War context due to two factors. First is the emergence of “newly independent developing nations” from colonial rule. (In these countries, instability may give rise to insurgent subversion which mandates countermeasures.) The second factor is the advent of nuclear warfare and its use as a deterrent by its sheer destructive force, which however leaves open insurgent possibilities, and once again, mandates attention to counterinsurgent processes, dynamics, and operations. Indeed, the new “counterinsurgency mission” is authorized, credentialed, and assigned to the U.S. Army by no less than the Commander in Chief, President Kennedy himself. Responding to this mission and duty involves the development of a

U.S. “Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System,” that includes “psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, [and] military aid and advice.”

As might be expected from the list of aspects of the weapon system, social science is again described as vitally important to the military, and a “new emphasis” is “required,” both in the military and in social science in order to meet these challenges. In the past, the “scientific knowledge” on counterinsurgency “has been weak,” so it is of particular importance now that social scientists step up and “contribute” their knowledge and expertise, in line with the required “new emphasis,” in order to help meet the military’s urgent needs.

As above in the section on “insurgency,” the discourse here reiterates that the insurgents’ strength is drawn primarily from the support of the local, indigenous population, and that this support stems from their frustrations and dissatisfactions with the incumbent regime. Therefore, this strength cannot be “destroyed physically,” but must be challenged through “positive, constructive” developmental efforts aimed at alleviating this dissatisfaction through “psychological operations,” “civic action,” and ultimately through “nation-building.” If these actions are not enough to forestall the development of an insurgency, and traditional military measures are deemed unavoidable, which the data states is a possibility, then we should be prepared for “more brutal methods of fighting” than in a traditional war situation. Specifically, these methods will be “more debasing” and “dehumanizing,” and the danger here is that these brutal methods will force the U.S. to “forfeit a great deal of goodwill,” both in the country in which the insurgency is being fought, and potentially domestically and elsewhere abroad as well. The military is prepared to undertake this course of action if necessary, but it hopes that

the social sciences will assist in the “counterinsurgency mission” as they are being “required” to do by the U.S. military, and their expertise can help to render such action unnecessary.

The final aspect of the discourse on counterinsurgency again concerns the need for terminological and discursive reform. Counterinsurgency is described as a “misleading label” and one military officer even states that “counterinsurgency is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the Free World and an unconscious assist to the Communists.”

5.2.13 Intelligence

- ***Intelligence** is “an operation for procuring and processing information about the external environment in which an organization—in our case, the Government of the United States—wants to maximize the net achievement of its various goals.”*
- *“The development of modern **intelligence** in the United States can be said to have begun with the establishment in 1941 of the research and **intelligence** branch of the Office of Strategic Services headed by William J. Donovan. It was Donovan’s conception that the rigorous training that social scientists and historians had received in the handling of evidence made them indispensable in estimating capabilities and trends in enemy countries.”*
- *“As now practiced, **intelligence** is inconceivable without the social sciences.”*
- *“Obviously, a sophisticated science of social change would be a most valuable input for **intelligence** work.... Somewhat more specifically, one might single out the study of ‘internal war,’ that is, of the resort to political violence within communities, a phenomenon which is occurring with extraordinary frequency, with which the **intelligence** community is deeply involved, and about which the social science literature is far from rich.”*
- *“We know that the central problem in defense against guerrilla warfare is **intelligence**: knowing what an infinitely elusive enemy is really up to. We also know that against competent guerrillas and their enthusiastic civilian supporters, adequate **intelligence** seems to require brutal methods such as torture and terroristic intimidations.... The stakes are too high and the chances of failure too great for pretty manners to be observed. Guerrilla warfare thus breeds savagery even in the best-intentioned defenders. It makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them.”*
- *“Repression can be a two-edged sword. Unless it is based on extremely good **intelligence** and unless its application is sensible, ruthless, and continuous, its effects may be quite opposite to those intended.”*
- *“Obtaining **intelligence** requires what one gentleman on the platform here called “unusual” methods. Not to mince words about it, it often requires methods like the French used in Algeria, torture and counterterrorism. For this reason, among many*

others, counterinsurgent warfare tends to brutalize even the best-intentioned of defenders. It corrupts them.”

- *“I propose that a qualified social scientist is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain intelligence.”*

As can be seen above in the first of the selected passages, “intelligence” is defined and used in a way which is not—at first glance—all that different from scientific research, also an “operation” of sorts that “procures and processes information about the external environment.” There is, though, also a nuanced difference—at least in the emphasis of the definition here, which sees this intelligence operation in an explicitly applied nature for the manner in which it serves an organization (compare, for illustrative purposes, the ingrained notion of science serving “truth”, a rather abstract, ideal, and intangible master without reference or address). Intelligence is described as “an operation for procuring and processing information about the external environment,” constrained only by the requirement that the information obtained be useful to the U.S. government in the achievement of its “various goals.”

The second aspect of this discourse which is noteworthy is that it consistently emphasizes that the social sciences are essential for the gathering and effective utilization of intelligence. In fact, this is put very strongly and clearly in the data: “intelligence is inconceivable without the social sciences.” Yet, having noted that the social sciences are indispensable to intelligence, they have not thus far delivered to their fullest potential, and certainly have not been of much use specifically with respect to aspects such as internal war. Consequently, as much as their importance is repeatedly noted and acknowledged, the social sciences are as firmly entreated to extend their support for intelligence work from the simple gathering and processing which they had done in the

past to the formulation of an ambitious new “sophisticated science of social change,” focused specifically on “the study of ‘internal war’... with which the intelligence community is deeply involved, and about which the social science literature is far from rich.” This strand in the discourse ties intelligence work inextricably both to the social sciences and to internal war, and thus to the discourse on both of these terms explored above.

Another important aspect of the discourse on intelligence here has to do with the central importance of intelligence in combating insurgency and its primary tactic of “guerrilla warfare.” The authors note that intelligence is vital for suppressing such guerrilla warfare, but that acquiring such intelligence often “seems to require brutal methods such as torture and terroristic intimidations.... The stakes are too high and the chances of failure too great for pretty manners to be observed. Guerrilla warfare thus breeds savagery even in the best-intentioned defenders. It makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them.” This passage and the following two highlighted in the selected passages above serve to underscore both the central role of intelligence in suppressing insurgency and also the frequent necessity of utilizing “brutal” methods to gather the intelligence with which to do so. These “brutal” methods are not to be shied away from, however, because the intelligence is so desperately needed. Nonetheless, such methods can have adverse effects even on the U.S. and foreign troops used to conduct them, and these adverse effects should be monitored and mitigated as much as possible, both to maintain the loyalty of the various armies involved and also to maintain the right sort of appearance for the U.S. and its representatives.

5.2.14 Civic Action

- *“By **civic action** we mean using indigenous forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development.”*
- *“**Civic action** consists of military programs, usually by indigenous forces and often aided by United States materiel and advice, to promote economic and social development and civilian good will in order to achieve political stability or a more favorable environment for the military forces. This is technical assistance by military forces for relatively immediate security objectives.”*
- *“‘Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare.’ I submit to you for consideration in this symposium that **civic action** is an important and valuable way of gaining that necessary control of populations. When government forces identify themselves with the well-being of the populace by military activities...the people tend to reciprocate. They deny assistance to the dissidents, are less receptive to enemy propaganda.”*
- *“**Civic action** should be looked on as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of guerrilla warfare.”*
- *“The essential question here, apart from the large unresolved issue of **civic action**, concerns the role to assign to repression or conciliation of dissident elements in a pre-revolutionary situation” and as such raises the question, “to what extent should one follow a hard or soft line or a combination of the two?”*
- *“**Civic action** is, perhaps, the most fringelike of the new Army functions.”*

The term “civic action” was used frequently alongside, or in relation to, the discourse on “guerrilla warfare”, examined in a preceding section. There, it was tied to the Army’s new counterinsurgency mission and its new “positive and constructive” approach to carrying out this mission. Civic action is defined here as undertaking “projects useful to the populace at all levels,” and utilizing “indigenous forces” to do so, often with “United States materiel and advice.” It is recognized in the discourse here, as in that of the “guerrilla warfare” section and elsewhere, that this kind of effort is extremely pivotal in the Army’s counterinsurgency mission, insofar as this mission is geared toward winning and maintaining support of the indigenous populations in developing countries, support that is seen as the single most important factor in internal war situations.

In fact, not only does the discourse here link civic action to maintaining “civilian good will” in the developing countries, but it goes beyond this to advocate for “control of the population,” which is a “prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare,” and which can best be accomplished through civic action. According to the discourse here, establishing and maintaining the “well-being of the populace” is fundamentally tied to “control” of the same population, thus essentially equating the well-being of the population with their being “controlled” by the “Free world” and its proxies, instead of by the Communists. Civic action is not just a method of “control” and maintenance of “good will” and “well-being,” however. It is also useful to “prevent deterioration” in a country, a way of framing the issue which again invokes the systems perspective and the medico-therapeutic discourse discussed elsewhere in this chapter.

Civic action is also framed in terms of the larger military issue of whether to utilize “hard” or “soft” methods in dealing with “dissident elements” in a “prerevolutionary situation.” Specifically, should “repression” or “conciliation,” be advocated, or a mixture of the two? Despite civic action’s “fringelike” status, it can help to address this conundrum by avoiding it entirely through a forestalling of the forces which give rise to such situations. The most important of those forces, of course, is “popular discontent.”

5.2.15 Psychological Operations / Psychological Warfare

- *“Today, both unconventional and **psychological warfare**, which together have until recently comprised what we call Special Warfare, have become the conscious concern of governments.... The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to **psychological warfare** and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of counterinsurgency.”*

- “Another key concept is **psychological operations**, which has now reached a level of almost total incomprehensibility to the ordinary newspaper reader, to the intelligence officer who is not a specialist in the field, or to the high school graduate enlisted man. **Psychological warfare** with all of its disadvantages in the old days nevertheless showed the culmination of attempting to combine psychology and war. The present term leaves the issue entirely neutral.”
- “**Psychological operations** include, of course, the relatively traditional use of mass media. In the cold war these operations are directed toward friendly and neutral as well as enemy countries. In addition, there is growing recognition of the possibility and desirability of using other means such as military movements, policy statements, economic transactions, and developmental assistance for psychological impact. This reorientation is implicit in the broadened title of Department of the Army Field Manual 33-5 which was changed from ‘**Psychological warfare in Combat Operations**’ in 1949, to ‘**Psychological warfare Operations**’ in 1955, to ‘**Psychological operations**’ in 1962.”
- “The distinctive characteristic of internal war is the combination of violent techniques with **psychological warfare**, the latter designed, of course, to win the active support of the noncombatants.”
- “Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System,” (p. iv) includes “**psychological operations**, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice.”

One of the central features of the discourse here on “psychological operations” is by now a familiar one: the very explicit focus on terminology, terminological changes, and the effects of such changes on the understanding and effectiveness of the concepts in question. In this case, the passages above indicate a progressive changing of terms from “psychological warfare in combat operations” to “psychological warfare” to “psychological operations,” which clearly demonstrates a movement away from terms indicative of violence and conflict, such as “warfare” and “combat” and toward the more neutral and context-free “operations.”

The term “psychological operations” is related explicitly to counterinsurgency, and, more specifically, to all military efforts which are “designed...to win the active support of the noncombatants.” However, although psychological operations traditionally have employed such techniques as the “relatively traditional use of mass media,” they are recently being expanded and combined with other techniques and “other means such as military movements, policy statements, economic transactions, and

developmental assistance for psychological impact.” Furthermore, in combat situations, nonviolent psychological operations are also used in conjunction with and coordinated explicitly with violent tactics to such an extent that one author claims that “the distinctive characteristic of internal war is the combination of violent techniques with psychological warfare.”

5.2.16 Special Operations / Special Warfare / Special Forces

- “The term ***special warfare*** itself is relatively new, having been adopted by the Army as recently as 1956.”
- “***Special warfare*** is not a self-explanatory term in standard English. It is difficult for a man to explain to his family that he is undertaking a noble crusade or a particularly patriotic and hazardous venture if he admits he has joined a ***special warfare*** unit.”
- “Other terms such as ***irregular warfare***, ***anti-intruder warfare***, or ***immediate warfare*** might be worth considering. But it is entirely possible that the best solutions for a new name for ***special warfare*** may come from the officers and enlisted men themselves if they were queried for a description of their present assignments.”
- “Limited war is “short of all-out nuclear devastation....commonly referred to as ‘limited-war’,” and “popularly referred to as within the province of ‘***Special forces***’.”
- “Today, both unconventional and psychological warfare, which together have until recently comprised what we call ***special warfare***, have become the conscious concern of governments.”
- “The new functions of the military were greatly broadened by President Kennedy in his emphasis upon countering insurgency in underdeveloped nations and the consequent build-up of ***special forces*** strength.”
- “The size of the tasks that face us in the lower spectrum of war are enormous. The implications that those tasks hold for ***special warfare*** operations are likewise enormous. So, too, are the implications for research and development in the fields of social science and human factors.... We need to know the strengths and the weaknesses in all aspects of the societal structure of our allies and of our opponents. We need to know their vulnerabilities.... We need to know many things.... And I think this is your job as well as mine.”
- “Army recognition that these cold war missions require social science support is seen in a recent symposium conducted by the ***Special Operations*** Research Office of American University.”

Once again, the discourse in this section reveals a profound and encompassing concern with terminology, expressed here through repeated statements that the terms “special operations” and “special warfare” are not clear enough and do not effectively

communicate what they should to Americans or to populations of developing countries. Aside from this concern, and associated calls for terminological reform, other significant aspects of the discourse here include a connection explicitly drawn between special warfare on the one hand and limited war and counterinsurgency on the other. It is repeatedly emphasized that these new Army responsibilities in the Cold War era will involve special forces support, as well as the support offered by social science research and analysis. The central problems here are first arriving at an understanding of attitudes, opinions, and goals of the populations of developing countries, particularly those which might be susceptible to insurgencies, and second arriving at appropriate techniques for controlling or shaping these attitudes in directions more conducive to U.S. interests. The Special Forces and the social sciences can both contribute vital support to this effort.

5.2.17 Development

- *“We need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs.... Therefore we look to research organizations such as the Special Operations Research Office and our civilian educational institutions. Almost exclusive emphasis has been laid over the years on the **development** of the physical sciences as primary factors in our national defense. We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the social sciences.”*
- *“You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this Communist cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences.... Yet, in this age of great change, the **development** of the social sciences—the sciences dealing with human nature—has not, in my opinion, kept pace.”*
- *“It can be argued that the **development** of sciences is shaped by societal needs. This relationship is especially close for those parts of a science which are tied to a particular application, as in military psychology.”*
- *“If the process of national **development** is viewed in broad terms and as involving far more than just economic **development**, it becomes apparent that the **developmental** function of the military can encompass far more than just providing support for civilian economic **developments**.... In fact...the military has a most fundamental role to play in the **developmental** process.... This role is essentially psychological. It involves giving to a people a sense of identity and of national pride. One of the basic obstacles to **development** in most former colonial territories is the existence, particularly among the national leadership, of a constellation of insecurities and inhibitions. The sense of inferiority and the lack of assertiveness of a people who have once been dominated by foreigners cannot be easily eradicated....*

*The need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm seems to be an essential prerequisite for national **development**. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial **development**.”*

- *“For the West even to appear to oppose military **development** in the new countries can be easily interpreted by the people, given these psychological considerations, to be an indication that the West persists in wanting to keep them in a subordinate and less than fully sovereign position.... A new country feels that the real test of when it has gained its full independence is passed when those who were its former rulers are willing to share with them the weapons and the means of violence which once were the monopoly of the Europeans.”*
- *“The Army has gradually become increasingly involved in matters relating to political and social **development**.”*
- *“The problem for research which is of prime interest to us is the probable consequences for national **development** whenever a significant differential emerges between military **development** and the **development** of the other institutions of the society.”*
- *“Probably psychologists’ contributions to the social need for more economic, social, and political **development** will consist largely of an attempt to apply techniques built up in military research.”*
- *“In the area of national **development**, psychology should attend the more challenging problems of what needs to be done. This...will of necessity cut across the lines of scientific disciplines, and should go far to remedy a major deficiency of current-day social science, the weakness of interdisciplinary research.”*
- *“The gap between the rising aspirations of the peoples of underdeveloped countries and their level of living is being employed as an increasingly long lever with which a small Communist force can unseat governments backed with Western military power. The most effective defense against this insurgent mode of Communist aggression appears to be to prevent the **development** of this lever of popular discontent—to provide non-Communist solutions to political and economic problems.”*

The discourse on “development” in the selected texts, samples of which are provided above, is very illuminating in terms of the larger themes of Camelot relating to the place of the social sciences in the U.S. military’s Cold War efforts. This is the case for several reasons. First, the discourse here lays out a similar relationship between the U.S. military and social science that was described above in the “social science” section. Specifically, the social sciences have not “kept pace” with the physical sciences in terms of their development. In the past, the physical sciences have received “almost exclusive emphasis” and have made great contributions to the military. Interestingly, however, one of the physical sciences’ chief contributions, nuclear weaponry, has brought about a shift in emphasis within the military from force to deterrence and an accompanying shift in

research priorities toward the social sciences. Given the assumption that changes in the sciences are and should be influenced by “societal needs,” or in this case military needs, then the military must, as a “client,” act to guide the development of the social sciences until these sciences are able to provide the research that the military needs to complete its Cold War mission. Thus, although the social sciences are needed by the military to provide expert knowledge on the process of “development,” they are not yet prepared to do so, and must themselves first be “developed” by the military. This discourse, if examined closely, can be seen to combine two subtly different notions of “development.” The first, taken from the life sciences and from developmental psychology, involves an understanding of “develop” as an intransitive verb describing a natural, often gradual and organic process of change and transformation which an organism, individual, or system might undergo. For example, an individual can be said to go through various stages of “development” throughout the life cycle. The second understanding of “develop” is as a transitive verb describing actions taken by individuals or groups to affect desired changes in an outside object. For instance, one can “develop” a lesson plan, a housing subdivision, or a theory. The understanding of “development” articulated in the discourse samples above, both by the military and by social scientists, involves a conflation of these two notions so they come to be overlaid on one another as parts of the same process. Thus, for the “developing countries,” their “development” is a natural process of growth and transformation as they mature, but this process can and should be accelerated and guided by the military as it works to “develop” these countries and their economic, social, and military systems, providing oversight to ensure that the process remains orderly and stable throughout. Again, as mentioned above, the same dual

process of development, of acceleration and intentional guiding of an otherwise “natural” process, is needed in the social sciences before they can make the “contributions” so needed by the U.S. military establishment.

The fourth and fifth passages in the sample above point to one of the advantages of military development of the social sciences for use in studying the process of national “development.” Specifically, the advantage for the military is that it is able to employ discourses from the social sciences in reference to the national development process with the implicit authority of the appropriate “experts” in those disciplines to back them up and give a stamp of approval to their use of the discourses. For instance, the two passages just mentioned, employ the discourse of developmental, social, and clinical psychology to buttress the military’s claims for the appropriateness and advantageousness of military development over strictly “economic development” in the developing countries. Military development can help the developing countries, as “former colonial territories,” to overcome their “insecurities and inhibitions.... inferiority and lack of assertiveness” by sharing with them the “weapons and the means of violence which were once the monopoly of the Europeans.” Obviously, the usage of such patently psychological terminology to justify military over economic development is quite expedient for the military. However, it would sound very different if it were spoken only by military officers without the added clout of psychologists backing them up and implicitly saying “this is so.”

One final aspect of the discourse on development presented here merits our attention. In the last passage selected above, the author expresses concern about “the gap between the rising aspirations of the peoples of underdeveloped countries and their level

of living.” Specifically, he fears that this “gap” may be employed by the Communists to foment the formation of insurgent movements and to undermine or even “unseat governments backed with Western military power.” In order to prevent this, the author advocates taking measures to minimize this gap, and thus to prevent the development of this “lever of popular discontent.” This is in keeping with the concern expressed in the first passage above regarding the “need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs.” However, it is seemingly at odds with another articulation of the “central problem” of military development, namely that: “the problem for research which is of prime interest to us is the probable consequences for national development whenever a significant differential emerges between military development and the development of the other institutions of the society.” In the preceding passage, the author is concerned with understanding the consequences of a “significant differential” between the level of development of the military and of “other institutions,” which would presumably include institutions of the type traditionally concerned with domestic social and economic conditions. Thus, there is an apparent contradiction in the discourse here on development: on the one hand, military development is advocated, at least partially on the grounds that it is the most effective agent of psychological, economic, and social development, but on the other hand it is acknowledged that such military development may create a “differential” between the military and “other institutions” in the society, a situation which could undermine the entire developmental effort by increasing social discontent. However, this contradiction could be avoided if we hypothesize that the purpose of knowledge of the nature of the “aspirations of the peoples” is not to help them achieve these aspirations more effectively, but simply to help

the U.S. and indigenous military forces to control and shape their attitudes (as suggested in the “civic action” section above) more effectively. This possibility makes more sense if we accept the premise implicit in the discourse in several of the sections above that a country can be viewed as a complex set of social systems, and that the “population” of a country is not the country itself, but simply one variable or aspect of the country, one which must be understood in order to be effectively managed and controlled during the process of “development” so that it doesn’t interfere in the process and possibly jeopardize the stability and orderliness of the process.

5.2.18 Nation-Building

- *“The Army has also carried its role of **nation-builder** beyond the borders of the United States, wherever our national security interests have taken our Armed Forces.”*
- *“In underdeveloped areas of the Free World, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to **build** stable **nations**, and people are the key to success or failure.”*
- *“As the military becomes more concerned with the range of problems which you now identify as counterinsurgency you are in fact going to be coming across the problems of how to build institutions and how to **build** the most complex of all social institutions or organizations: the modern **nation-state**.”*
- *“That they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in limited-war, that involves an understanding of how **a modern society can be built**.”*
- *“The disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about **nation building**. In the past the social scientists have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine.”*
- *“We are not well-prepared for dealing with the question ‘How do you go about **creating a modern nation-state**?’”*
- *“The kinds of problems involved in **nation building** are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other social scientists, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit. What role psychologists can or will play in this enterprise will be determined in part by how well they conceptualize the applications of their science in technical development.”*
- *“We would predict that increasing salience of problems in **nation building** will act primarily to increase interest in certain areas of psychology which have been in existence for some time. The types of areas which may receive more attention include: persuasive communication.... diffusion of innovations.... [and] cultural factors in organization design.”*

The term “nation-building” takes the U.S. military agenda in the developing countries one step further than simple “development.” In the discourse on this term and the samples above, one can see the connections made between the notion of “nation-building” and the Army’s counterinsurgency mission. Thus, the discourse here is tied to that on counterinsurgency, the developing countries, and the Cold War struggle between the Free World and the Communists. Given that counterinsurgency doctrine, as described above in that section, relies upon an orderly and stable process of development as well as on cultivating and maintaining the support and allegiance of the general populations in the developing countries, the discourse here describes “nation-building” as a natural extension of that process.

Another aspect of the discourse on “nation-building” is that it involves extensive social science support, support which has been lacking in the past: “In the past the social scientists have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine.” Despite this past lack of support, the U.S. military has a strong need for social science knowledge and methods for this project. For example, one author notes that “the kinds of problems involved in nation building are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other social scientists, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit.” It is predicted with confidence that “increasing salience of problems in nation building will act primarily to increase interest in certain areas of psychology,” a prediction very similar to that made in the “guerrilla warfare” section above. In both of these sections, the military first calls for increased social science research and support, then states an intention or desire to increase funding for such research, and subsequently “predicts” that social scientists will demonstrate increasing

interest in the topic at hand. In this context, it hardly seems that social scientists are freely coming to this research due to open-ended scientific inquiry, but are being both required and encouraged to do so by the constraints and inducements of military sponsorship. Also, once again, since the terms and the proper understanding of them are laid out in advance before the social scientists have made their “contribution,” they are not free to arrive at their own understanding of “nation-building” or to open up a dialogue with the military about such a prospective role.

This concludes our analysis of discourse objects. At this point, we will turn to an analysis of the various subjects portrayed/constructed in the discourse, and also of the overarching discursive formations which form a foundation for and govern the creation of this discourse, as well as how the various discourse subjects are positioned within it relative to one another.

5.3 Discourse Subjects and Ideological-Discursive Formations

In keeping with Parker’s (1994) methodological recommendations described in Chapter 3, we now turn to an examination of our discourse objects enumerated above to determine which of them are also discourse subjects, agents capable of generating and acting upon the discursive data examined here. A quick scan of the eighteen discourse objects reveals nine that could also qualify as discourse subjects. They are presented here as follows, with subjects comprised of multiple terms being identified here only by a single term for purposes of simplicity: the “Free World,” “Communists,” “social scientists,” “Defense Department,” “insurgents,” “guerrillas,” “counterinsurgents,”

“Special Forces,” and “developing countries.” The first two terms, although particularly significant because they represent the two poles around which the overarching Cold War discourse is constructed, are not included here as discourse subjects for the following reasons. This Cold War discourse pervaded the entire time period during which the texts now under examination were composed and during which the changes they described were unfolding. Indeed, Cold War concerns had already intersected with social science and the U.S. military in such previous projects as Project TROY, discussed above in Chapter 1. Also, these two terms do not function primarily here as discourse subjects, because the producers of the discourse examined here do not do so directly as representatives of the “Free World” or of “Communists,” but of other more specific groups. Nonetheless, these two poles form a structure within which the discourse becomes intelligible and without which it cannot be adequately understood. Also, of the remaining subjects, two pairs occupy such close discursive space that they could be said, for reasons of expedience, to be roughly synonymous within the data. The two pairs of terms taken here to be equivalent are first “insurgents” and “guerrillas,” (since guerrilla warfare is generally portrayed in the data as the primary technique by which insurgency is conducted, we will use the term “insurgents” to represent both groups) and second “counterinsurgents” and “Special Forces” (since the latter are forces primarily responsible for conducting counterinsurgency, they can be collapsed into the former). This leaves us with the following list of five discourse subjects: social scientists, the Defense Department, insurgents, counterinsurgents, and developing countries.

The power relationships and discursive connections between these subject terms will now be explored in relation to four overarching discursive themes which recur

regularly throughout the eighteen discourse object sections above, and which should already seem quite familiar at this stage. These themes can be taken to be “discursive formations” in Foucault’s terms, as they correspond to rules of formation for the future discourse which would presumably be created through Project Camelot and other similar projects which would carry out the research and development called for in these documents. They can also be understood as the discursive dimension of Fairclough’s “ideological-discursive formations,” or “IDFs,” forming parts of the taken-for-granted shared background understanding which makes possible the emergence of any particular expert discourse.

5.3.1 IDF 1: Concern with Terminology and Propaganda

Perhaps the most pervasive theme throughout the data examined here is a concern with the proper use of words to achieve desired effects. This concern is evident in fully half of the discourse objects discussed above, and in no less than ten separate discourse themes in Appendix 2. It is almost always discussed on behalf of the U.S. military establishment and the Defense Department. For instance, there is the insistence by Rep. Fascell, discussed at the very start of the Introduction section above, that the U.S., and specifically its military, must increase its “propaganda effort” in order to keep up with advances in “Communist wordmanship.” Even the title of those hearings demonstrates this concern, in its explicit linkage of winning the Cold War with the U.S. “ideological offensive.”

There is also the strong admonition by Dr. Linebarger in the first day’s roundtable discussion in the SORO-sponsored symposium on limited war, in which he advocates

widespread terminological reforms in order to keep up with the Communists, including such measures as renaming the entire field of “social science,” which he describes as a “fantastic misnomer.” He states that “the standards for defining new terms should be: first, that these become clear to our own staff and leaders; second, that they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men; and third, that by their own semantic force they provide a certain degree of deterrence to our antagonists” (1962, p. 92). Such calls for terminological changes indicate a clear and pervasive awareness on the part of the U.S. military of Austin’s dictum, discussed above, that *words do things*. Specifically, here, the useful things that words can do for the Free World include “detering our antagonists” and motivating “energetic action” on the part of our civilian and military populations. These goals for our terminology also form one aspect of the “rules of formation” governing the development of future discourse.

This concern for terminology is most often expressed by or on behalf of the U.S. military, but it also incorporates social science in several important respects. First of all, social science is entreated to change some of its terminology to help with the “ideological offensive” being conducted by the military. For instance, regarding social science’s past study of the phenomenon of “internal war,” Eckstein notes in the Smithsonian study that “for few phenomena do social science, history, and conventional language offer so various and vague a vocabulary” (1963, p. 103). Second, as mentioned above, the term “social science” itself is described as being a “fantastic misnomer” by Dr. Linebarger, and he advocates changing it to something more effective. Thus, both terms descriptive of social science itself as well as those it employs can be beneficially changed to assist in accomplishing military Cold War objectives. In addition to these issues, social science

can also assist the military by lending its “expertise” to create new research, and thus new discourse, relating to the issues of development, counterinsurgency, limited-war, nation-building, and so on.

This new discourse will serve as “expert discourse” of the sort discussed by Foucault above, and as such it will serve as a knowledge base for the military for use both in policy formation and in communication internally within the military and externally to the U.S. population and those of the developing countries and other audiences abroad in order to “explain” its policies and programs to these groups. As mentioned, the military already has its own understanding of these issues, how it wants to frame them, and the terminology it wants to use, but it does not have the scientific authority to create such expert knowledge directly by itself. Also, in many cases, the understanding the military has already developed employs theories and concepts drawn directly from the social sciences, as in the case of the references to counterinsurgency as a “therapy” discussed below. For these reasons, knowledge articulated first by social scientists, particularly those regarded as experts or leaders in their fields, will serve to legitimize this knowledge and render it appropriate for military usage. It will also help it to appear more objective and “scientific” if it comes from an external source such as SORO, even if that source is ultimately funded by the military. This concern with appearances is consistent with the military’s emphasis on appearance throughout the data presented here, insofar as the central issue is with influencing and controlling perceptions and opinions in the context of the larger Cold War propaganda struggle described above.

With regard to the five discourse subjects identified above, it is clear that the concern with terminology and prospective changes to it is consistently voiced by the U.S.

military, and not by any other subject group. The other four groups, insurgents, counterinsurgents, developing countries, and social scientists represent nothing more than groups about which the proper understanding and terminology must be developed. The only exception to this rule is the social scientists who, in addition to representing a group about whom a change in understanding and terminology is needed, are also a group who can be enlisted in this process. Even in this case, the process of word change and word choice itself is to be guided at every stage by military requirements, for instance requirements such as those outlined above in Dr. Linebarger's statement.

5.3.2 IDF 2: Social Science as "Contributor"

The second major theme to recur with great regularity throughout the various discourse objects examined above is a preoccupation with social science, its "strong position" within the Free World's Cold War effort, and the "contributions" that it can make to this effort. As stated in the seventh and eighth discourse object analyses above, those dealing with "social science" and "social scientists," there is a contradiction present throughout this discourse between the repeated appeals to social science for "more research" and the glowing descriptions of the "strong" position occupied by social science on the one hand, and its military role as one of "engineer" and "contributor" on the other. A perusal of the relevant discursive themes from Appendix 2 and their associated discourse data in the appendix should be very illuminating in this regard.

This role as "contributor" has several ramifications for social science. First, it requires putting in abeyance the assumed independence of scientific investigations and inquiries. Such inquiries, in this Cold War context and with the proposed U.S. military

sponsorship, cannot (and, from the perspective of the military, should not) be fully independent. Nowhere in the discourse is there any indication on the part of the military that it has any interest in the development of expert knowledge on the topics at hand that would require the military to re-think and re-examine its pre-existing understanding of or its policies on these issues.

Second, since social scientists are required to yield their usual stance of scientific objectivity and independence, they are required to operate within the pre-understanding of the terms and issues involved provided to them by the U.S. military. As repeatedly stated in the discourse, this is a new area of study for social science, and rapid expansion of social scientific investigations into such issues as counterinsurgency, development, and nation-building is both expected and repeatedly demanded, by military and social scientists alike. Given the newness of these issues for social scientists, and the large scale of the demand for research, one would expect comprehensive literature reviews, including reviews of literature on these concepts from other disciplines and from other historical periods, but such reviews are not conducted, called for, or even suggested or mentioned in the discourse here (except when they are cited only in order to be rejected subsequently, as in the case of Eckstein's work on "internal war"). Instead, what is presented is a comprehensive and cohesive perspective developed by the military and already replete with social science concepts and terms, which social scientists are expected to adopt directly, without any opportunity to critically evaluate its appropriateness.

Indeed, not only are social scientists confined within the discourse to making "contributions" and "inputs" to the U.S. military, in some cases, according to the present

data, they are not even fully prepared to do so. This is for several reasons, one of which is due to an “unfortunate” history of misguided attitudes among social scientists toward the military and toward violence as antisocial behavior. Another reason is social science’s past long-standing lack of rigorous, quantitative methodologies and a parallel lack of interdisciplinary research. The discourse paints these sciences as being locked in an “ivory tower” mentality, and the prospect of military involvement could thus have beneficial effects on them. These could include fostering increased interdisciplinarity, the development of even more rigorous and natural science-derived methods, such as the systems analysis perspective repeatedly employed and advocated in the documents examined here, and the expansion of social science into new areas, resulting in “new vistas” of research.

With regard to this last possibility, the language adopted in some of the articles studied here departs from mere speculation and advocates the active “development” of the social sciences in order to create a whole new branch of study within them directed specifically toward military needs, specifically the pressing Cold War needs primarily revolving around counterinsurgency operations in the developing countries. This would be accomplished through the provision of much additional funding for the social sciences utilizing the military’s “unusual resources” and also through the recruiting of many of the best existing social scientists into this new field. As stated above, this “development” of the social sciences closely parallels the process of development to be applied by the U.S. to the developing countries, and places the social sciences in the same needy and passive position as these countries relative to U.S. power. This is yet one more reason why the

social sciences as depicted in the discourse here are not able to meet the U.S. military on equal footing and in a position of independence.

One final significant aspect of the discourse on social science here relates to the previous theme of terminology and propaganda just discussed above. Dr. Pool notes in his introduction to the Smithsonian group study that, despite the lack of any objections by any social scientists in that study, some social scientists might not appreciate the blow to their independence and objectivity represented by their being “contributors” and “making inputs” to the military. Dr. Pool states that “few social scientists would be happy to admit to being problem-solvers rather than scientific discoverers. What is needed is a prouder image of the role and along with that a great increase in numbers, improvement of morale, and clarity of purpose of the cadre fulfilling it” (1963, pp. 16-17). In order to combat this potential pitfall, then, the military will turn to the same propaganda and opinion-shaping means that they apply abroad in other Cold War arenas. They argue that a “prouder image” is needed to accompany this new role for the social scientist as military engineer. This new image should join together the powerful incentive of Cold War national service and patriotism with the other powerful incentive of money and power represented by greatly increased military funding, grants, positions in think-tanks such as SORO, CENIS, and others, and even the possibility of making policy inputs as well. Ultimately, then, one aspect of the new propaganda effort is the production of propaganda *by* social scientists which will be well-suited and specifically tailored to use *on* social scientists, in order to secure their participation in and correct understanding of the work at hand.

In terms of the various discourse subjects, the discourse examined here on social science and social scientists portrays these scientists as free to either accept or reject the military's offer as it stands, although, as stated above, there are strong incentives and pressures at work as well. The military needs social science research and support, which are vital to its mission, which, in turn, is vital to the survival of the Free World. The needed research will focus on counterinsurgents, the developing countries (viewed as systems), and, to a much lesser extent, insurgents (see below for a discussion of this discrepancy between degree of study called for on counterinsurgency and insurgency). Of course, first the military must "develop" social science until it is ready to undertake these substantial and vitally important tasks. Thus, these three groups are merely objects of study within this discourse. Social scientists are presented as objects of military "development" but also as free agents, free either to work for the military under the terms specified in the discourse, or to refuse to do so, undoubtedly with some consequences. Unfortunately, this is the limit of their freedom. Again, as in the previous section above, the military is the only discourse subject positioned here to define terms and determine how and when they are employed.

5.3.3 IDF 3: Medical/Therapeutic Discourse

This discursive theme is present in several of the discourse object analyses above, but most prevalent in the "internal war" section. It is utilized most frequently by Dr. Eckstein in his writings on internal war in both his Smithsonian group article and in his presentation to the SORO symposium, both of which cover similar ground. I will not quote all of the relevant passages here, as they can be examined in the Data section, in the

appendix, or in the relevant object analyses above. Instead, I will discuss the theme itself in more detail and its implications in terms of understanding internal war and insurgency, and I will also compare it to some similar themes employed, for example, by Dr. Yu in his work on the developing countries and Dr. Pye in his work on military development in those countries.

The first thing to be noticed about this theme is that it relates directly to the two other themes just discussed above. Specifically, these authors employ tropes from clinical, developmental, and social psychology and from medicine in order to frame the issues of internal war and development in the developing countries in a particular way. This manner of framing these issues hews very closely to that specified by the military. For example, there is the statement in the second SORO letter that, “if the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of counterinsurgency it must recognize that insurgency represents a breakdown of social order and that the social processes involved must be understood” (SORO, 1964b, p. 53). Taking these discursive structures from the social and medical sciences and simply porting them over directly to application in the context of insurgency and national development in the developing countries is not something that is intuitively appropriate and justifiable simply because it *can* be done. This is particularly so if it is the military itself that is doing the application. As explained in the exploration of discourse on social science above, one of the major benefits in terms of discourse for the military of its solicitation of social science support is that these scientists can speak with “scientific professional authority” about these military issues (even though these issues had been, until recently, outside the traditional bounds of their

work) and, in so doing, generate legitimacy for this new discourse even as they help to produce it.

Indeed, not only do the contributions by social science “experts” here serve to legitimate the military’s desired framing of issues such as national development and counterinsurgency, they also allow for the usage of relevant terms and concepts from the social sciences themselves in describing these issues. For instance, as noted above, Dr. Eckstein employs frequent themes and tropes from therapeutic and health discourses in his analysis of internal war. His analysis starts by viewing any given “developing country” as a “system” comprised of various elements. The system, when functioning well, is analogous to a healthy body or psyche, with all its various elements or components fulfilling their prescribed functions in harmonious service of the greater order. However, in cases such as insurgent situations, there is a “breakdown” of this order analogous to a physical or mental illness, accompanied by various symptoms. Essentially, Eckstein’s argument is that an insurgency is an indicator of a sickness in a nation, and the U.S. military must be ready to intervene in a role analogous to the medical or mental health professional. In such cases, then, if the U.S. were not to intervene, it could be construed by these countries or the international community as neglect or malpractice. Therefore, professional ethical responsibilities mandate a response, not to mention the Cold War imperatives of patriotic duty and defense against the Communist “malignant cancer,” (yet another dimension of the discourse on health employed in these documents). Eckstein both advocates this framing of the issue, and also furthers it by his repeated use of such terms as “prevention,” “cure,” “symptom,” “illness,” and “health” in describing insurgent situations.

Another social scientist enlisted in the U.S. military's effort, Dr. Lucian Pye, continues in the same vein as Dr. Eckstein, in this case applying psychological terminology to the issue of military development in the developing countries. Dr. Pye advocates military over economic development and justifies this advocacy using terms borrowed from clinical and developmental psychology. As described in the Data section above, these terms include "self-respect," "inferiority," "identity," "insecurity," "inhibitions," and so on, and they are used to prescribe military development in order to help the ruling class of the developing countries to overcome past humiliations and feelings of inferiority and insecurity through a build-up of their military strength.

Again, this way of framing of the issue is fully in line with the military's desired understanding, as is evidenced by Pye's dictum that the first concern in assessing military development approaches must be the degree to which they further "American grand strategy." Furthermore, it also serves to legitimate this perspective both through Pye's "expert" status and also through the implicit "rightness" and healthiness of psychological development.

The use of concepts from developmental psychology in the service of the U.S. military's limited-war and counterinsurgency mission is also evident in the work of Dr. Yu on the development of Asian identity among Asians. Dr. Yu, in his presentation at the Army's symposium, draws a parallel between the populations of the developing countries in Asia and U.S. adolescents, insofar as both groups are "in the process of growing up," "are searching frantically for a purpose in life," and "do not really know what they should do or want." Fortunately, we in the U.S. can help them. Although we cannot answer these questions for them directly, we have a "responsibility" toward them,

specifically to “help them grow” and ultimately “to help them discover themselves,” much as a parent might guide a searching adolescent. Needless to say, this discourse in which the people of developing countries are viewed as children or adolescents in need of support, guidance, and supervision has roots as old as colonialism itself. However, in its current incarnation, it has the implicit backing of social science knowledge and expertise, and thus goes from a simple discursive formation or structure governing understanding and discussion of the issue to the creation of an “expert discourse” on national identity and, as such, is extremely helpful to the military in legitimating its own perspectives and aims in these countries. Again, here and in the examples from Drs. Pye and Eckstein above, there is not just a particular understanding put forth by experts but one accompanied by an implicit moral and professional injunction on the U.S. military to act on behalf of the developing countries.

With regard to the five discourse subjects listed above, this discursive formation ported over from clinical and developmental psychology and medicine is similar to the previous two discursive themes in the way it positions the five subjects relative to one another. The Defense Department is the subject whose needs motivate the present and proposed future social science work. Social scientists are in this case the creators of the discourse in which they apply past discursive structures from psychology and the social sciences and medicine to the military problem of insurgency. The developing countries, insurgents, and counterinsurgents are, in this discourse, objects representing respectively the individual’s body or psyche, the illness, and the curative mechanism or function. Certainly, these three parties are not free to influence the discourse or their representations therein. As for social scientists, they can take on an active subject

position and take a leadership role in the creation of the proposed discourse to the extent that they are willing to work within the constraints issued by the U.S. military, for example the passage from the first SORO letter quoted above in which the proper pre-understanding of insurgency is put forth.

5.3.4 IDF 4: Asymmetry of Discourse

The final discursive formation evident throughout multiple discourse objects above is an asymmetry of focus and emphasis with regard to many of the objects. For instance, although the discourse on counterinsurgency is replete with references to social science and the benefits it can offer to the U.S. military efforts in the developing countries, the discourse on insurgency (which one might assume would closely mirror that on counterinsurgency, and indeed does in some key respects) never mentions social science or social scientists once. What are we to make of this discrepancy? Presumably, as social scientists are repeatedly requested by the military to provide them with “more research” and more knowledge on various topics, then counterinsurgency is one of the topics on which more research will materially assist the military in its counterinsurgency and limited-war mission, but more research on insurgency will apparently be of little or no benefit. Indeed, several of the other discourse objects also relate directly to the military’s counterinsurgency mission: intelligence, civic action, deterrence, development, psychological operations, Special Forces, and nation-building are all described in the data as pertaining to this mission. Thus, a significant degree of attention is given and advocated throughout these documents to counterinsurgency, but the direct application of social science research and understanding to insurgents is not similarly advocated.

However, this hypothesis that a greatly increased understanding of counterinsurgency is sought through these documents, along with many of the various dimensions relating to the counterinsurgency mission just listed, whereas no further understanding of insurgency is requested from social scientists, is somewhat counterintuitive and in fact runs counter to some specific statements in the documents. For instance, it is recognized several times in the discourse that guerrilla warfare represents the primary technique and tactic of insurgents, and guerrilla warfare is an area where social science expertise is, in fact, sought. Furthermore, it is recognized that guerrilla warfare relates directly to many of the aspects of counterinsurgency listed above, such as civic action, development, nation-building, and so on. Why the seeming discrepancy?

For further illumination of this discursive asymmetry, let us turn again to Dr. Eckstein's examination of internal war. First, however, it is necessary to recall that the fundamental impetus for and goal of Project Camelot itself was to find ways to assess internal war potential, find actions governments could take to reduce this potential, and find ways for the U.S. military to gather, collect, analyze, and utilize the information to achieve these ends and to support these governments in reducing internal war potential. In assessing this potential (like a "thermometer," remember), Eckstein argues that we must shift our analysis of internal wars away from such past foci as precipitants of internal war, insurgents, and objective social conditions and toward such new areas as preconditions of internal wars, elite and incumbent groups, and behavioral characteristics of societies. This shift, for Eckstein, is important because it is a shift toward aspects of internal war potential that are more amenable both to systems analysis and to direct

influence by the U.S. military. However, as mentioned above in the Data section, this shift has the added meaning of shifting the proposed analysis away from factors that would make the insurgents' perspective more understandable and toward factors that emphasize the incumbents' perspective. Presumably, given the systems perspective and the characterization of insurgents as an illness affecting the body of the developing country, insurgents are deemed not to be a group deserving of analysis or understanding or for which it is necessary for the military to develop an understanding. After all, they are "terrorists" and "bandits" who attempt to create and to take advantage of social instability to further their own agenda, often with Communist support and thus also in the service of furthering *their* agenda as well. Thus, however irrational it may seem, the ability to assess and reduce internal war potential is best achieved if we turn our attention away from insurgents and the factors which immediately precipitate and give rise to such wars, and toward the incumbents and the perceptions of them within the general population. Presumably, the insurgents' aims and motivations are already adequately understood insofar as they impact the "system" of the "developing country" in question, and insofar as their aims and motivations are those of an actual, discrete social group, they can be discounted as those of "terrorists" and "bandits."

Although it is widely recognized and repeatedly stated throughout these documents that insurgents derive crucial and material support from the wider population of the developing countries, specifically the frustration arising from lack of resources and alienation from the political sphere, insurgents and the guerrilla warfare they undertake are not seen as directly arising from and representing this wider population, but simply as

a kind of outside invader (a virus or pathogen) infecting this population and feeding on its dissatisfaction to its detriment.

In fact, in a systems analytic context, even the populations of these countries themselves are reduced to one aspect of a system, to a set of demographics, and are not seen as a collection of human beings with shared experiences and interests and whom it could be useful to understand as humans, whether individually or collectively. Interestingly, if the population of a country is seen as one aspect of the “country as system,” then the population is not itself the country, and actions can be taken which might potentially be detrimental to the population but which would be “healthy” for the country in terms of promoting order and stability. This can be seen again in Dr. Eckstein’s work, discussed above. For instance, in his discussion of “internal peace,” and how to foster it in developing countries, Dr. Eckstein advocates the judicious use of repression, distraction, and even outright control of and suppression of these populations in order to foster “internal peace.” Dr. Eckstein and other authors in these documents see the attitudes, beliefs, loyalties, and behaviors of these populations as being critical to their mission. For instance, Dr. Eckstein cautions that U.S. efforts to gather intelligence in order to put down guerrillas can have adverse effects on “defenders.” Specifically, it “makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them.” This emphasis on appearance over actuality is consistent with the pervasive emphasis on assessing and controlling the attitudes and behaviors of the populations of developing countries, rather than treating them as an independent group whose needs and desires could be discerned and taken into consideration by the U.S. military.

This, then, brings us back to the asymmetry apparent in the documents with regard to insurgency and counterinsurgency. Counterinsurgency is given the preponderance of the attention in these documents because it is undertaken by the U.S. military and its indigenous representatives in the developing countries and because it addresses the all-important issue of the attitudes and loyalties of the general population of these countries. In contrast, insurgents are regarded as a rogue element, attempting to assert undue influence on this process from the outside, often with direct or indirect Communist support, and are portrayed as akin to a disease infecting the otherwise healthy social body—and attacking it *from the outside*. We need to know how to counter guerrilla warfare once it has broken out and, more importantly, how to predict and forestall insurgent movements within developing countries, but this effort is not aided by understanding of or direct dialogue with these populations or the insurgents. Rather, it can be materially aided by an understanding of how to assess, measure, and then influence the attitudes and perceptions of these populations. If this can be accomplished, then any understanding of insurgents beyond the degree and nature of threat they represent to the system is rendered irrelevant.

This approach is described by Dr. Eckstein as a shift in emphasis and a break with the traditional military approach to understanding insurgency, which in the past was based on a focus on insurgent groups and particular precipitants of internal war. It is consistent with the military's emphasis on a systems perspective and on their dehumanization of not only Communists (and groups assumed to represent them or be associated with them, such as insurgents), but also of the populations of developing countries as well. It is consistent with the apparent contradiction between "internal

peace” as characterized by Dr. Eckstein and anything approaching the commonly held understanding of “peace.” Finally, it is also consistent with the pervasive asymmetry in the discourse discussed above. This discursive formation, then, renders out of bounds any attempt to engage with the problem of insurgency in terms of the actual alleviation of the causes of discontent and frustration of the populations of developing countries. Although lip service may be paid to this goal through such concepts as “development” and “nation-building” and their associated noble and humanitarian possibilities, what is emphasized throughout the discourse is achieving the appropriate change in the *perceptions* of these populations regarding their own social conditions, as well as their being rendered passive and compliant (i.e. “peaceful”). This asymmetry, then, rules out insurgency and insurgents as discursive subjects and, in fact, as discourse object as well, except insofar as insurgents represent problems for the U.S. military with regard to the developing countries, Communists, and other groups. With regard to other discourse subjects, the past relationships identified in the above three discursive formations again hold here. The U.S. military is again the chief architect of the discursive formations, as they request the production of certain strands of discourse and inhibit and discourage other strands. Social scientists are once again entreated to adopt a “powerful” role as discourse subject if and only if they agree to adopt the military’s pre-understanding and perspective regarding these issues. In this case, the developing countries as discourse subjects are given attention in terms of their attitudes and the formation and shaping of these attitudes, and are viewed as complex social systems. However, these countries and their populations are not entreated to enter into the shared production of this discourse in any manner. In this regard, their role is more significant as discourse object than as

subject. Finally, counterinsurgents are seen as vitally important. Of particular importance is that they have the benefit of the best social science research and knowledge on which to base their work, which is crucial to the Cold War effort and thus ultimately to the fate of the Free World.

Now that our analysis of the various discourse objects, discourse subjects, and IDFs in the data, as well as their various connections, is complete, we can turn our attention in the following Discussion chapter to the overarching *episteme* created through the discourse and its aftereffects for the U.S. military, the “developing nations,” the social sciences (and specifically psychology) and also its renewed relevance, post-Cold War, in terms of the “War on Terror.” As mentioned at the outset of this study, these aftereffects are the true measure of the significance of Camelot and its discourse.

Chapter 6

Discussion

6.1 The Cold War *Episteme*

After our review of the four operant IDFs (concern with terminology and propaganda, social science as “contributor,” medical/therapeutic discourse, and asymmetry of discourse) governing the production of the Camelot discourse, it remains to articulate the overarching *episteme* within which these IDFs operate and within which the resultant discourse emerges and creates its effects. Recall from Chapter 2, and specifically the discussion of *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969/1972) presented there, that an *episteme*, for Foucault, “may be suspected of being something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period cannot escape....” (p. 191). Later in that same passage, Foucault further clarifies that an *episteme* is not a form of knowledge, but is rather the “totality of relations” (p. 191) between the various scientific disciplines, in terms of discursive regularities.

Just as the *episteme* must not be taken as a “form of knowledge,” neither should it be regarded as being of a discursive nature, although it might perhaps be expressible through discourse (and, further, it may exert effects upon the production and consumption of discourse). Rather, it is a set of relations that serves to structure, organize, and to provide a foundation for the various forms of knowledge and discourse that emerge from

the sciences over a particular period of time. This “set of relations” carries with it, in the very specificity of the kinds of relations it implies, a “way of looking” at the world, at science and what is proper to it, at other social institutions and their relations with science and with each other, and at human beings as objects of study. In the case of the Camelot-era discourse presented and analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5, then, what are the “norms and postulates” being “imposed” on the various “branches of knowledge” involved in the production of this discourse? What aspects of their shared “world-view” and “slice of history” and “structures of thought” are most salient in terms of establishing and shaping the “totality of relations” that link these branches of knowledge? What are the themes and trends in the discourse that serve to weave together the various discourse objects, discourse subjects, and IDFs into a cohesive, meaningful, and productive whole?

As stated in the last two chapters, this Camelot-era discourse cannot be adequately or fully understood except in the context of the Cold War struggle between the “Free World” and the “Communists.” This Cold War and its dual features of the threat of nuclear war (and the associated tactic of nuclear deterrence) and the shift in focus from struggle in Europe to the developing countries, carries with it much that is *new* and also much that is *urgent*. These dual characteristics of urgency and novelty are emphasized throughout the discourse, as is the corollary proposition that the new aspects of this struggle require corresponding adjustments on the part of the Free World, and those who fight on its behalf, specifically the U.S. Defense Department and the U.S. academic community, working in tandem.

The urgency of the Cold War is most often portrayed in terms of the “Communist menace,” or the Communist “malignant cancer,” intent on propagating itself throughout

the world and bent on our destruction, coupled with the appearance on the scene of nuclear weapons capable of wreaking devastation and havoc on a heretofore inconceivable scale, and, what's more, potentially utilizable by almost any despot or rogue state with whom the Communists might choose to share them—groups previously deemed by the Free World to be irrelevant in the international arena. This Communist cancer armed with nuclear weapons elicits and demands a posture (both on the part of the populations and the governments of the Free World) of sustained vigilance and wariness—the threat could come from anywhere, and at any moment!

Related to this sustained vigilance is the inherent slipperiness and mutability of the category “Communist,” as represented by the investigations led by Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-WI) and, separately, the House Committee on Un-American Activities. In these investigations, the term “Communist” functions as a loose and shifting signifier used to designate, separate, and mark for sanction or punishment any person or group whose activities or views might be deemed to jeopardize, question, or critique the Cold War mission of the Free World and its representatives.

Thus, along with their being much that is *new* and much that is *urgent* in this Cold War *episteme*, these tropes of newness and urgency, along with shifting signifiers such as “Communist,” serve to push the Free World thought and discourse toward increasing condensation and homogenization, an increasing truncation of the bounds of acceptable public opinion, speech, and action. Although, this might be perceived by the public as an undue imposition on the public sphere, and certainly was perceived as such in some instances, it was also often accepted as necessary that the public yield some privileges in return for protection from the faceless, shifting, ever-present but ever-changing

Communist threat. In short, the rules of the game had changed suddenly and profoundly, and one denied this at one's own peril. Implicit in all of this is the tacit assumption that, given the vague and shifting nature of the Communist threat (anyone could potentially be a Communist or at least a sympathizer or fellow traveler), some abridgements of the usual democratic processes within the Free World might be advisable in a Cold War context—in other words, it might be best to leave the plotting of a course of action not to the ill-informed public, given the confusing and new Cold War dynamics and the high stakes involved, but to experts who were more fully able to comprehend and articulate these dynamics and the appropriate policy responses for the Free World.

However, one of the hallmarks of this Cold War *episteme* which underlies the Camelot discourse is that it turns on its head the previous relationship between the social sciences and the U.S. government which had been developing since the initial formation of the SSRC. Recall that during that time, amid the chaos and uncertainty attending the Great Depression, government and foundation heads expressed distress, confusion, and a strong desire to solicit social science expertise to help restore stability and order and to protect the status quo. However, by the time of TROY and Camelot, the picture looks somewhat different. The social sciences are again solicited, but this time their help is needed not in order to arrive at the proper understanding of the true nature of the threat to order and stability; rather, this threat is already adequately and fully perceived and understood by the U.S. Department of Defense, and the social sciences' support is solicited in order to “contribute” their expertise in an “engineering” capacity. Although the Communist threat is both *new* and *urgent*, and although the social sciences are regarded by the U.S. military as having “expertise” that is necessary to cope with this

threat, these scientists are not solicited by the military to apply their expertise with scientific independence and objectivity to develop a full understanding and articulation of the new threat and the appropriate response. Instead, these scientists must first be “brought up to speed” by the military, given access to its pre-understanding of the situation, and then only subsequently can they engage in the sorts of social science “calculations” that will yield the appropriate “inputs” for the military. These themes should, by now, be quite familiar as they have been touched on in the analyses of the various discourse objects and IDFs.

Recall that one of the functions of an *episteme*, for Foucault, is that it specifies certain kinds of relations between disciplines and institutions. In the context of this Cold War *episteme*, then, this reversal of status with regard to the relationship between social scientists and the U.S. government finds its full expression in new institutional formations which emerged during the Cold War era and which gave concrete form and expression, a kind of institutional crystallization, to this epistemic shift. These new institutional formations were exemplified by groups such as HumRRO, CENIS, and SORO, discussed in Chapter 1, 4, and 5. These groups were collectively referred to as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), and later became colloquially referred to as “think tanks.” The FFRDCs gave concrete expression to this new relationship between government and social science as they accomplished the essential aspects both of the TROY group’s and of Ithiel de Sola Pool’s (1963) wishes: they created a permanent home for government-sponsored social scientists doing government-directed research, usually with an explicitly military or Cold War political focus, while remaining in their university-based “home atmospheres.” These were the

best and brightest in their fields, doing *new* and *urgently needed* work, in new and dramatic settings, often in a context of intense secrecy and confidentiality, all of which undoubtedly looked exciting to the scientists and the public—when, that is, they could catch sight of it through the dense layers of confidentiality and secrecy that usually accompanied the work. Again, in the context of Cold War urgency and omnipresent danger, some aspects of scientific work in these FFRDCs might have to be curtailed, aspects such as the gathering of detailed background research and the careful and patient articulation *by the scientists themselves* of all of the pertinent aspects of these often complicated and multifaceted projects. Instead, the military would “brief” the scientists, through symposia such as the military-sponsored, SORO-hosted symposium on limited war examined in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. Only once the scientists had been shown the proper way to think about and frame the pertinent issues could they then be turned loose to do their work.

As mentioned in Chapter 1 and 5, there is a whole complex of motivations and inducements presented to these scientists to engage in this FFRDC work, a complex which closely parallels that presented to the wider American populace in the framing of the Communist threat and the nature of the Cold War struggle: patriotic duty, fear, noble struggle based on exalted ideals, financial and power-based inducements if successful, the pressure toward truncation of the bounds of expressible opinion, and a host of other inducements and pressures as well, all operated in tandem to drastically limit the available courses of action.

As the Cold War proved to be a surprisingly long-lasting struggle, its associated discursive and epistemic tropes had a large window of opportunity within which to

embed themselves in institutional and professional structures as well as the popular mindset. The Cold War and its *episteme* offered a surprisingly durable and powerfully effective Manichean worldview, which, as stated above, served to polarize participants and gave them something (the “Communist threat”) with lasting ideological and discursive solidity *against which* to define themselves. In this context, FFRDCs and their discursive products (such as the discourse represented in this study by the Camelot data set itself) flourished and proliferated.

The eventual crumbling of the Soviet empire and the transition from a bipolar to a unipolar or a multipolar world could have represented something of a threat to those who saw their interests as being tied to the Cold War *episteme* and its associated discourses and institutional formations. Among these parties were professionals such as those social scientists and military men who created the discourse in the present data set. Presumably, the end of the Cold War might have represented either an end to the usefulness of that *episteme* or, at the very least, an occasion which would result in significant changes and modifications to it. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1 above, in the wake of the September 11 attacks and the ensuing “War on Terror,” many of the discursive tropes that were most strongly and centrally tied to the Cold War *episteme* and its discursive and institutional formations have suddenly returned, and with them a worldview centered again on a Manichean struggle between “us” and “them,” in which the “them,” no longer “Communists” but “terrorists,” has become, if anything, even more vague and shifting, as these actors no longer represent a particular nation or group of nations, or even a particular ideology, but simply an opposition at all costs to “us,” represented in such discursive tropes as “they hate our freedom.” Thus, in the context of the current “War on

Terror,” everything old is new again, and previously obsolete Cold War discursive formations are being dusted off and put back in circulation. As stated at the outset of this study, this current re-invocation of Cold War discourse with all of its by-now-familiar themes, represents a more urgent reason for the re-examination of this discourse (and the place made within it for social science experts) than a purely academic interest or curiosity. If it is in fact the case that our current *episteme* in the age of the “War on Terror,” and its associated discursive formations and discourse objects and subjects do, in significant ways, hark back to the Cold War structures described above, then we should be able to see much that is old and familiar in this new discourse, and we should also be wary of ways in which our current world situation must be distorted or forced to fit, in Procrustean fashion, into these pre-existing discursive formations and structures.

6.2 The “Cold War,” The “War on Terror,” and Discursive Similarity

As stated above, Project Camelot and its associated social science discourse on counterinsurgency operations, nation-building, and so on, represent an important precursor to the current U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and their larger context, the “War on Terror.” Many academics, intellectuals, journalists, and policy-makers, whether they are for or against current U.S. policies, have also noted these discursive similarities between these two “long wars” (Brand, 2005; Greider, 2004; McFate, 2005a; McFate, 2005b).

Dr. Laurie Brand’s presidential address, delivered at the 2004 conference of the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), provides an illustrative example. Dr. Brand teaches in the School of International Relations of the University of Southern California,

was, at the time of the address, president of MESA, has received four Fulbright Fellowships, and been a consultant to the United States Information Agency (USIA), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the State Department. In her address, Dr. Brand makes the claim that the U.S. is pursuing an imperialist foreign policy in the Middle East, and that “imperial expansion is justified based on the exigencies of prosecuting a war against terrorism, a battle that is portrayed as existential in nature and global in scope. The attacks of September 11, 2001 provided those sectors of government and industry nostalgic for the Manichean simplicity and lucrative military contracts of the Cold War a convenient ideological replacement” (Brand, 2005, p. 3). Brand goes on to examine briefly the record of military sponsorship of social science research in such areas as counterinsurgency and development studies, citing Projects TROY, Camelot, and others, and concluding:

In reviewing the record of the academy and the government during the Cold War, one cannot but be struck by the similarities with today’s atmosphere. No longer is it the Cold War, but the war on terrorism. No longer is the enemy a nation state—the Soviet Union—but rather a political tactic—terrorism—one whose practitioners are decentralized and dispersed. One is no longer fighting communists, the definition of which was expansive enough in the 1950s and 1960s to include third world nationalists, but rather terrorists, the definition of whom is also sufficiently and eerily elastic as to include virtually anyone willing to take up arms against US policies. A renewed desire for area knowledge has also come as a response to the attacks of 9/11 and their Afghanistan and Iraqi aftermath. The security state of the Cold War is far from in retreat; indeed, with the US at war, we find ourselves in a renewed state of emergency, subject to an Orwellianly named “Patriot Act.” (Brand, 2005, p. 7)

Dr. Brand specifically cites Project Camelot, provides a brief history of it, and then stresses the necessity that American scholars “bring the lessons of the academy’s experiences during the Cold War to bear on our current situation. The Cold War has

ended, the respite was short, and we are now again, according to state discourse and practice, a country/an empire at war, with many of the same implications for which questions are given priority, how the terms of the debate are set, and why certain voices are empowered while others are marginalized” (Brand, 2005, p. 7). In the long passage cited above, Brand points out the “elasticity” of the term “terrorist,” and its similarity in its function to the Cold War term “Communist,” insofar as both are shifting signifiers capable of being deployed as needed to marginalize, silence, and punish dissident elements deemed dangerous to the fulfillment of the Free World’s mission.

In another example, Brand cites the provision of government and foundation grants to universities to develop “Homeland Security Centers” which will serve “to anticipate, prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks,” (Brand, 2005, p. 7) and “will also provide a locus to attract and retain the Nation’s best and brightest academic scholars in pursuit of homeland security related disciplines” (p. 7). Certainly, the stress on anticipation and prevention of a phenomenon as broad and vague as “terrorist attacks,” combined with the emphasis on recruiting top-flight academics to create what amounts to a new discipline or body of knowledge by attracting the best existing scholars for the accomplishment of this pre-defined goal is extremely reminiscent of the structuring of Camelot and its goals. Additionally, these “Homeland Security Centers” represent the modern institutional counterpart of the FFRDCs. Thus, contained in this call for the development of these “Security Centers” is a call for the return of these previous institutional formations from the Cold War era, such as HumRRO, CENIS, and SORO.

And, sensitized as we are now to the discursive formations that animated Camelot, we cannot but notice, in the current “invitation” to academics, the similar hallmarks of the bending of academic scholarship to fit into the predefined needs and agendas of military programs and policies while bypassing the usual freedom of academic inquiry and criticism. Brand confirms this recurring similarity, and notes:

In many cases, those whose ideas do not fit the policymakers’ categories are simply excluded. The most obvious and perhaps now banal, but also lethal, example is that of terrorism and terrorist. Either one accepts the language and participates in using it, or there is no place at the table. This is not just a question of a discrepancy over definition or desire to divide political actors into a small set of manageable categories. An initial drive for simplification may derive from the cognitive exigencies of the policymaking process, but it has become increasingly clear today that it is ideological, rather than cognitive, exigencies that drive such framing.... There is a handful of highly visible academics who do enjoy access and influence. However, in keeping with the empire’s approach to “knowledge and science,” it is precisely because of their ideological orientation that these academics’ participation is embraced.... Advice is sought, not from a range of experts, but rather from the likeminded, so as to reinforce the argumentation or rationale for a policy line already selected. (Brand, 2005, p. 14)

Certainly, whereas claims such as those made above by Brand can be, and have been, argued for or against, the detailed examination of the discourse data presented in Chapters 4 and 5 above serves to buttress her claims in terms of Camelot-era discourse, insofar as it was repeatedly demonstrated that nowhere in that discourse is there any mention that social scientists could or should develop their own understandings of concepts such as insurgency and counterinsurgency, and nowhere is it advocated that the military’s understanding of such concepts be critiqued or questioned.

All of these themes mentioned above—themes of the extreme *urgency* and *newness* underlying the proposed research and programs and their direct connection to the fate of the “Free World,” themes of the necessary curtailing and abridging of

academic freedom of inquiry for the sake of such a noble cause, themes of “prediction” and “control” of aspects of foreign populations and pre-emptive intervention in foreign countries for the purposes of “nation-building,” themes relating to the fundamental importance of terminology and word choice in this effort, and themes relating to the necessity of social science and foreign-area research—function collectively to make up the *episteme*, or implicit discursive world-view, of the Camelot-era authors and, according to Dr. Brand, of those who advocate similar measures in the “War on Terror.”

Perhaps flashing forward to contemporary discourse, which has shifted from the Cold War to the War on Terror and from insurgency to terrorism, could help us to understand further the linkages between the discourses from these two “wars” (or, more accurately, these two sets of limited wars) as well as relevant similarities and differences in the role played by social science. Of course, an exploration of the current discourse also merits an entire study of its own, and can only be presented here in a somewhat abbreviated form. However, even such a brief glimpse into the current state of military-oriented social science discourse, although by no means exhaustive, should be both enlightening and sufficient for its stated purpose. We will begin, appropriately, with an exploration of the contemporary discourse on insurgency produced by one of the “handful” of social science experts employed by the U.S. military and given their implicit imprimatur to “reinforce” their “already selected” policies, in Brand’s words.

6.3 Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the “War on Terror”

Stephen Metz (2004, 2006, 2007) has written numerous articles on insurgency and counterinsurgency operations and theory as they apply to the Iraq War. Employed by

the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the U.S. Army War College, and a graduate of Johns Hopkins University, Dr. Metz's credentials include "Chairman of the Regional Strategy and Planning Department and Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute;...faculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities;...advisor to political campaigns and elements of the intelligence community;...served on many national security policy task forces; testified in both houses of Congress; and spoken on military and security issues around the world" (SSI, 2007).

In an article written in 2004, Metz characterizes insurgencies as being conducted by "rebels, guerrillas, and terrorists," (Metz, 2004, p. 25) essentially conflating these three groups. He also notes that insurgencies are often erroneously regarded as "isolated rather than a symptom of a deeper pathology" (p. 25), and indeed, "like cancers, insurgencies are seldom accorded the seriousness they deserve precisely at the time they are most vulnerable, early in their development" (p. 25). This is supposedly the case in Iraq, but despite the high costs, "the United States must continue to pursue its strategic objective in Iraq but must do so in a way that limits the long-term damage to the United States and to the fragile, new Iraqi society" (p. 26). Although "calls for a speedy withdrawal will increase as the conflict drags on...departing early would guarantee that strategic objectives are not met and...force re-intervention.... Only a carefully designed and cautious counterinsurgency strategy can forestall this" (p. 26).

Noteworthy already in these first pages is the prominent usage of the same Camelot-era medical metaphors of cancer, pathology, and symptomatology for understanding insurgency, as well as the continued conflation of insurgents with

terrorists, a trope present in the Camelot documents but whose meanings and connotations are far more loaded in the context of a War on Terror and the current omnipresence and overdetermination of the term “terrorist” in our media and mass culture.

Metz continues his analysis of the U.S. efforts in Iraq in the following, perhaps excessively sunny, vein: “by no stretch of the imagination has the U.S. occupation of Iraq been brutal or repressive, but it has had its miscalculations,” (p. 26). (One wonders whether, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal that was exposed a matter of months after this article was published, Metz would recast this statement, or whether he would regard the torture of prisoners there as simply another “miscalculation.”) These miscalculations, according to Metz, include an “underestimation of the work needed to secure, stabilize, and reconstruct Iraq,” (p. 27), “the expectation that international peacekeepers would plug the gaps” (p. 27) in Iraqi security, the overestimation of “the ability of Iraqis to govern themselves,” (p. 27) and the overestimation of “the honeymoon period of universal welcome for coalition forces” (p. 28).

Metz observes that “U.S. strategists have treated the Iraqi insurgency as the death throes of the old regime,” and thus have assumed that “most Iraqis do not support it” (p. 32). However, he contends that the reality is somewhat different: “the insurgency’s foundation...is based on a broader resentment of foreign occupation by a people promised liberation,” and therefore, “only a comprehensive and coherent counterinsurgency strategy that weaves together the collective resources of the U.S. government can effectively stifle this threat” (p. 32). To this end, he recommends the following measures: “admit the extent of the problem frankly,” (p. 32) “integrate the

strategy within the U.S. bureaucracy and with its coalition partners,” (p. 33), “focus on two key battlespaces: intelligence and Iraqi perception,” (p. 33) “break the linkages between Iraqi insurgents and affiliated or allied groups,” (p. 34) “design a larger regional and strategic context,” (p. 35) and “remind the American public vigorously and continuously of what is at stake in Iraq” (p. 35).

Metz states that the U.S. faces an “intractable dilemma” in Iraq and “in effect, it is damned if it does, damned if it doesn’t,” that even “comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, focusing on the key nodes for success outlined [above], is unlikely to eradicate the violent opposition to the coalition fully but should at least sufficiently weaken the violent opposition and ensure that the new Iraqi regime is not born...with a massive internal security threat on its hands” (pp. 35-36). He closes by observing somberly that:

The idea that open government is a universal model has long served as the essence of U.S. foreign policy strategy. For better or worse, Iraq has been chosen as the place to prove this point. Thus, failure in Iraq would undercut the very foundation of U.S. global strategy.... U.S. policymakers are dangerously close to underestimating the nature of the challenge in Iraq. Overoptimistic assumptions...led to the current situation. (p. 36)

Only “comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy” can now set things right for the U.S., the coalition, and the current Iraqi government.

In the passages cited above, there are many similarities with the Camelot-era discourse on insurgency. For instance, there is the repeated emphasis that counterinsurgency operations must focus on “Iraqi public perception;” a pessimism about the utility of such operations that is very reminiscent of Eckstein (1962, 1963); a recognition of the importance to counterinsurgency of simultaneously focusing on American popular perception of the war (they must be “reminded...vigorously and

continuously” of what is at stake); within public perception, the need to frame the conflict as part of a larger, ideological struggle: “design a larger regional and strategic conflict;” a focus on intelligence as being critical and fundamental to success; and, finally, the recognition of a need to drive a wedge between the insurgency and the indigenous population that ostensibly supports them. In all of these ways, and others, the discourse harks directly back to the Camelot-era discourse on insurgency and counterinsurgency.

In another article, composed two years after the previous one (Metz, 2006), and thus with the benefit of far more comprehensive information about the nature and extent of the U.S. military failures in Iraq, Metz notes that, upon first invading Iraq, the U.S. did not expect to get drawn into counterinsurgency operations, and that preparedness for such operations was greatly diminished following the end of the Cold War:

After the Cold War, though, the military assumed that it would not undertake protracted counterinsurgency and did little to develop its capabilities for this type of conflict. Then the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, forced President George W. Bush and his top advisers to reevaluate the global security environment and American strategy. The new strategy required the United States to replace regimes which support terrorism or help bring ungoverned areas which terrorists might use as sanctuary under control. Under some circumstances, such actions could involve counterinsurgency. Iraq was a case in point. It has forced the U.S. military to relearn counterinsurgency on the fly. (Metz, 2006, p. v)

The above passage is quite significant, insofar as it ties 9/11 to a renewed interest in “nation-building,” and augments this interest with a doctrine of preemptive intervention. (This basing of a new foreign doctrine on such ideologically charged and polarizing recent events is reminiscent of the similar bold plans for “nation-building” and foreign intervention made in the Camelot documents due to similar concerns regarding Cold War struggle with the Soviets, the advent of nuclear weapons, and the shift in their purpose

from use to deterrence.) Also, the reference to “ungoverned areas” parallels the Camelot-era discourse in which the “developing countries” are portrayed as neutral ground fought over by the Free World and the Communists. Presumably the precise understanding of “under control” in this case is left up to the discretion of policymakers, but it does echo the Camelot discourse on “orderly” and “controlled” development of the developing regions. Also similar here is the framing of the U.S. and the “coalition” (the modern counterpart to the “Free World” in the Cold War) as in a passive position, reluctant to get involved in foreign areas, and only doing so defensively: President Bush was “forced” by 9/11 to reevaluate his policies, and the U.S. is “required” to replace regimes that support terror. This is similar to the way in which the Camelot data portrays the Free World as being reluctantly drawn into conflict, and only taking part defensively and in response to Communist threat and aggression.

Metz goes on to observe that “most policymakers, military leaders, and defense analysts...believe that American involvement in counterinsurgency is inevitable as the ‘long war’ against jihadism unfolds” (p. vi). This passage is noteworthy because it positions the War on Terror as a “long war” comprised of a set of smaller limited wars and akin in this way to the Cold War, and also because it seems to use “jihadism” as a synonym for “terrorism,” thus making it clear that there is something unique and special about Islam in particular that this “long war” is concerned with. Metz also notes here that this renewed counterinsurgency effort must be “intelligence-centric,” “fully interagency and...multinational,” “capable of rapid response,” “capable of sustained, high-level involvement,” “capable of seamless integration with partners,” “culturally and psychologically adept,” and “capable of...adjustment ‘on the fly’” (pp. vi-vii). These

characteristics again tie such a counterinsurgency effort to intelligence, cultural knowledge, and psychological knowledge in a way very similar to the Camelot discourse and also to McFate's (2005a) admonitions cited in Chapter 1.

Metz claims that, "in the early months of the insurgency, American commanders struggled to find the most effective balance between the 'mailed fist' and the 'velvet glove.' They adjusted tactics to place greater emphasis on intelligence gathering, winning public support, 'friendly persuasion,' and limited civilian casualties and destruction," (p. 30-31) but that these efforts were not always successful, particularly as fatigue and frustration increased within the U.S. military as the campaign dragged on. He also notes that one unfortunate side effect of the war is that "Iraq has reinvigorated the Vietnam-era idea that the United States simply should not undertake counterinsurgency" (p. 59). Undoubtedly this is exactly the wrong belief for the U.S. public to hold if the military is contemplating a "long war" based primarily on counterinsurgency tactics, and this belief represents a new challenge for social science techniques of shaping and controlling attitudes and opinions.

A third article (Metz, 2007) seems to attempt a move beyond the previous two, which were rooted in an analysis of the particulars of the Iraq War in terms of identifying what kinds of counterinsurgency tactics could be most beneficial if undertaken by the U.S. military, as well as what mistaken assumptions led to the insurgency in the first place. In this third article, Metz attempts a more profound re-thinking of insurgency, presumably one that will be useful as a new model going forward within the context of the contemplated "long war" on terror. To this end, he begins by observing that "while insurgency's essence persists, its nature changes" (2007, p. 2).

Reiterating a theme from his past articles and from McFate (2005a, 2005b), Metz (2007) asserts that the U.S. military dropped its emphasis on counterinsurgency training after the Cold War ended, and was thus ill-equipped to pick it up again suddenly as it was called to do in the wake of 9/11. He also notes other obstacles to effective counterinsurgency strategy, including the previously-mentioned “Vietnam syndrome:”

During the 1970s, American national security strategy was shaped by what became known as the “Vietnam syndrome.” The disastrous outcome of the war in Southeast Asia made Americans reluctant to intervene in Third World conflicts. Americans, it seemed, were ill-suited for participation in morally ambiguous, complex, and protracted armed struggles, particularly outside the nation’s traditional geographic area of concern. (pp. 2-3)

This “Vietnam syndrome” had a dual effect. First, it shifted public opinion decisively away from the support of the kinds of limited war that involve protracted counterinsurgency operations, just the sort that Metz forecasts as making up the “long war.” (Also, the term “syndrome” is interesting here, insofar as a syndrome is a medical term for a group of symptoms which are frequently observed as co-occurring. In this case, presumably the symptoms are indicative of some sort of illness in American public opinion, perhaps the sort that could be put right by benevolent social scientific intervention in the form of propaganda and attitude formation.) The second effect of this unfortunate “Vietnam syndrome” is that it predisposed the military to view future insurgencies as replicas of those it faced in Vietnam and other Cold War-era conflicts, and “the Viet Cong were treated as the archetypical insurgency” (p. 3). Obviously, for Metz, both aspects of the “Vietnam syndrome” had deleterious consequences.

From here, Metz (2007) lays out in more detail the dynamics and rationale behind the Cold War conceptualization of insurgency and counterinsurgency, with which we are by now quite familiar. He then contrasts it with the new model, as follows: “the strategic

context for 20th century insurgency was the political mobilization of excluded groups, rising nationalism, and proxy conflict between the superpowers. The strategic context of contemporary insurgency is the collapse of old methods of order and identity leading to systemic weakness and pathology” (p. 10). Thus, although the context within which we must view insurgency has changed, and this leads to a reformulation of some of its key aspects and meanings, it is still fundamental to the “correct” view that it be regarded as a “systematic weakness” and as a “pathology.”

Metz argues that this weakness, in its contemporary incarnation, is still tied to the inability of state institutions to meet rising demands of the population at large for social and economic reforms and improvements. He claims that:

There are several reasons that states—particularly in Latin America, Africa, and Asia—cannot meet the demands of their citizens. In part, it [sic] flows from the artificiality of many of today’s national borders. Many do not reflect political, economic, or social distinctions on the ground. Artificial and increasingly fragile states are pummeled by globalization, interconnectedness, and the profusion of information. (p. 10)

These claims are noteworthy in several respects. First, with regard to the “artificiality” of today’s borders, Metz fails to mention that these borders were drawn largely by imperial powers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (when the “new countries” became “new” in the first place!), and that these borders had far more to do with the effective management of the imperial powers’ own assets and interests than with the interests of the populations involved. These redrawn borders often encapsulated groups that had few common interests (other than opposition to the same empire) and in fact were sometimes historical enemies. Metz also cites “globalization,” “interconnectedness,” and “information profusion” as contributors to instability. Certainly, a concern with the free

spread of information (and, more specifically, how to limit it) has figured prominently in counterinsurgency theory since the Camelot era and before. Recall, in this regard, Eckstein's reference to the "celebrated peacability of peasants," (1963, p. 128) in reference to Marx's dictum that developing a "collective revolutionary mentality" is greatly facilitated by the kind of open communication usually associated with urban areas. Notably absent from his analysis of destabilizing factors is any mention of the predatory lending practices of agencies such as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, or, indeed, the ever-growing chasm between the richest and poorest countries.

This mention of economic factors is interesting, however, because it touches on the central thesis underlying Metz's reconceptualization of insurgency using the metaphor of the market:

Because of globalization, the decline of overt state sponsorship of insurgency, the continuing importance of informal outside sponsorship, and the nesting of insurgency within complex conflicts associated with state weakness or failure, the dynamics of contemporary insurgency are more like a violent and competitive market than war in the traditional sense where clear and discrete combatants seek strategic victory. Thinking of insurgency in this way not only offers valuable insights into how it works, but also suggests a very different approach to counterinsurgency. In economic markets, participants might dream of strategic "victory"—outright control of the market such as that exercised by Standard Oil prior to 1911—but many factors, especially competition and regulation, prevent it. The best they can hope for is to attain and sustain some degree of market domination. Most have even more limited objectives—survival and profitability. This also describes many insurgencies, particularly 21st century ones. (p. 43)

This is the crux of Metz's argument here, and in the following paragraph of his paper, he even makes the more radical claim that in addition to functioning as a metaphor, market forces often cross over into the literal formation of insurgency (and counterinsurgency)

operations. He cautions that both sides can gradually slip from their initial aims and motivations into more economic and profit-driven ones, and thus both sides can end up having a stake in the perpetuation of the very conflict they are ostensibly trying to win and to end, if they perceive its continuation to be economically profitable for them in the short term.

In his 2007 article, although Metz cites some changes in insurgency as it manifests in the new millennium, many of the discursive structures he employs are ported directly from Cold War discourse and from the Camelot-era documents explored above. For instance, the collapsing of the two terms “terrorist” and “insurgent” into one discursive entity was evident in the Camelot documents and in Metz’s previous work as well, as was the consistent characterization of insurgency as a pathology or cancer that needs to be eradicated by U.S. intervention in the name of health. Although Metz spends more time analyzing insurgency than Eckstein recommends in his Camelot-era work, he still does so from the Eckstein-approved point of view involving an emphasis on shaping perceptions and attitudes of indigenous and American populations, essentially counterinsurgency operations, and his analysis of insurgency is only offered to further this goal. Additionally, the urgency attached to both discourses is quite similar, as is the justification this urgency provides for foreign intervention in the form of “nation-building,” (specifically, building up indigenous military forces), and the threats of impending ominous consequences if this urgent action is not taken or is not fully effective.

Interestingly, Metz’s documents do not contain calls for large increases in federally funded social science research, as can be seen throughout the Camelot

documents. Indeed, other modern military analysts working on insurgency, such as McFate (2005a), do call for such a return to social science research, but Metz does not make this a central tenet of his arguments. He does, however, advocate a new understanding of insurgency as essentially a market-driven phenomenon, and this shifts the discourse on insurgency from primarily a psychologically-based one in the Camelot era (recall Pye's [1963] work linking military development both to countering insurgency and also to developing national self-esteem, and also Yu's [1962] work comparing developing nations to adolescents searching for an identity) to a more economically-based one, perhaps with future associated demands for the production of yet more new discourse, this time fusing military and economic concerns.

Along with these similarities and differences listed above, there is still, throughout Metz's writings, the traditional emphasis given to "intelligence," and its effective gathering and utilization, as being fundamental to effective counterinsurgency. In the first document reviewed above, he lists the following as one of the essential elements of the Iraqi counterinsurgency campaign: "focus on two key battlespaces: intelligence and Iraqi perception" (2004, p. 33). This focus is necessary in order to "break the linkages between Iraqi insurgents and affiliated or allied groups," (2004, p. 34) although perhaps it might be more accurate for him to refer instead to the linkages between Iraqi insurgents and the larger Iraqi population. One other population that must be kept in check lest it try to exert undue influence on these counterinsurgency operations is the American population, as per another of Metz's stated goals: "remind the American public vigorously and continuously of what is at stake in Iraq," (2004, p. 35) lest the dreaded "Vietnam syndrome" were again to rear its ugly head.

6.4 Intelligence and Interrogations in the “War on Terror”

In the second document above, Metz (2006) again emphasizes the centrality of intelligence, as he describes the need for the new counterinsurgency program to be “intelligence-centric,” and he also stresses psychological knowledge, in his admonition that it must also be “culturally and psychologically adept” (pp. vi-vii). He notes that U.S. military commanders, early on in the program, “struggled to find the most effective balance between the ‘mailed fist’ and the ‘velvet glove,’” (p. 30) a trope quite similar to Eckstein’s (1963) and others’ emphasis on the need to balance “conciliation” with “repression” in counterinsurgency. In seeking that balance, Metz (2006) argues that the commanders “adjusted tactics” after the “mailed fist” began to seem ineffective, and began “to place greater emphasis on intelligence gathering, winning public support, ‘friendly persuasion,’ and limited civilian casualties and destruction” (p. 30-31).

This stress on the dual factors of intelligence gathering and on psychology in helping both with that gathering and with the utilization of the resulting intelligence to shape U.S. and Iraqi public opinion is significant because it recalls much of the Camelot discourse on counterinsurgency, but it takes on further significance as it relates directly to a scandal currently sweeping through the American Psychological Association involving the participation of American psychologists in the planning and conducting of interrogations at the Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib prisons. This represents another of the significant echoes and aftereffects of Camelot discussed above, and certainly merits an exploration, both in terms of its discursive similarities with Camelot and its Cold War

discourse, and also in terms of the deleterious consequences of placing social scientists in ethically and scientifically compromised positions.

This story was first broken by Salon.com's Mark Benjamin in his July 26, 2006 article entitled "Psychological warfare" (Benjamin, 2006a). In this article, Benjamin calls attention to the APA's "year-old policy that condones the participation of psychologists in the interrogations of prisoners during the Bush administration's 'war on terror'," (2006a) and more specifically to a "controversial task-force report" which puts forth "new ethical principles" regarding this participation. This report was composed by "a task force of 10 psychologists, who were selected by the organization's leadership" (2006a). Of these ten, fully six had close ties to the military, including four who "were involved with the handling of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, or served with the military in Afghanistan—all environments where serious cases of abuse have been documented" (2006a). This information regarding the composition of the task force was not made public by the APA at the time the task force report was issued. According to Benjamin, APA president Gerald Koocher stated that "the psychologists' military and national-security backgrounds did not raise conflict of interest or broader questions about the task force and its report. He defended choosing psychologists with such backgrounds, saying 'they had special knowledge to contribute'" (2006a). Certainly, the picture of social scientists working at the intersection of their fields and national security who are recruited because they have "special knowledge" to "contribute" is quite reminiscent of Camelot!

Benjamin (2006a) cites psychologist and senior member of Columbia's International Trauma Studies Program, Steven Reisner, who states unequivocally that "I

do not believe that psychologists should be involved in interrogations which are intrinsically coercive and inherently harmful to the person being interrogated,” and also past APA president Philip Zimbardo who cautions against “unquestioned support for ideological banners of ‘national security’.”

Benjamin (2006a) also offers some details about the backgrounds of some of the individual task force members. For instance, “Col. Larry James was the chief psychologist for the intelligence group at Guantánamo in 2003. In 2004, James was at Abu Ghraib working as the director of the behavioral sciences group in the interrogation unit there” (2006a). Benjamin describes another task force member:

Col. Morgan Banks spent four months during the winter of 2001 and 2002 “supporting combat operations” at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, where serious abuses have been reported. Banks told Jane Mayer of the *New Yorker* last summer he had also “consulted generally” on Guantánamo interrogations....Banks’ biography lists him as one of the founders and the senior psychologist at the Army’s secretive Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) program at Fort Bragg, N.C., where the military trains elite soldiers to resist torture in case of capture. The techniques used to harden those soldiers against torture—sleep deprivation, isolation, sexual humiliation, bags on the head, long exercise—have been used on detainees in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. (Salon reported last month on a military document showing that SERE instructors taught their techniques to interrogators at Guantánamo.) (2006a)

The final task force member he describes is “Capt. Bryce Lefever,” who “was assigned to the Navy’s SERE school in the early 1990s and deployed with Special Forces to Afghanistan in 2002, ‘where he lectured to interrogators and was consulted on various interrogation techniques,’ according to his bio” (2006a). Of the remaining three, “two other members of the task force worked for the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field Activity, which coordinates Pentagon security efforts. One of

them, R. Scott Shumate, was in charge of a team of psychologists who ‘engaged in risk assessments of the Guantánamo Bay detainees’ (2006a).

Regarding the members of the task force (Benjamin describes them as “handpicked” by APA president Koocher and past president Ronald Levant), Benjamin cites Steven Reisner again: “The military seemed to be very well represented on that committee....This issue, which is never spoken about, is the relationship between the American Psychological Association and the military. This has been in the back of my mind throughout the whole debate.” The relationship became even more direct when “the Pentagon effectively embraced the psychologists’ interrogation guidelines” (2006a).

On the June 1 installment of her independent radio news program *Democracy Now!* Amy Goodman (2007) devotes her whole program to the issue, and interviews two of the non-military task force members, as well as a SERE alumnus-turned-psychoanalyst and finally the Executive Director of Physicians for Human Rights. In the program, Goodman (2007) notes that:

The Pentagon has just declassified a report from their Inspector General looking at the various investigations they conducted into repeated claims of prisoner abuse by the US military.... Perhaps the most important information in the report is that it provides further documentation that psychologists played a role in the military interrogations. In particular, the Pentagon Inspector General provides concrete evidence that techniques developed by the US military for withstanding torture are being used against the prisoners at Guantánamo. After 9/11, the Pentagon began using so-called behavioral science consultants [BSCT], or “biscuit” teams, to advise the military on how to “break” prisoners to make them more cooperative. The biscuit teams were advised by psychologists and medical staff versed in techniques employed at a Pentagon-funded program known as SERE, or Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape. The interrogation techniques devised at Guantánamo with the help of the biscuit teams eventually migrated to Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi prisons. (Goodman, 2007)

Goodman's (2007) first interview of the hour is with Dr. Jean Maria Arriago, who was one of the three voting task force members without military connections. Dr. Arriago states:

I'm especially interested in the method of the task force, the process which I think was flawed. And my opinion is that because of these flaws, the task force report should actually be annulled. But the major conclusion of the task force, from a practical perspective, was that military psychologists do have a role in interrogations and that they are obliged to follow US law, rather than international law, concerning interrogations, concerning definition of torture. And since US law at that time included waterboarding, for instance, as a practice that was not considered torture, in contrast to international law, we were essentially permitting psychologists to participate in interrogations, at some level, OK, that involved torture. (Goodman, 2007)

After speaking with Dr. Arriago regarding her frustrations with the task force methods (she was told explicitly that no note-taking was allowed, for instance, and that all information in their deliberations, including documents and data, must remain strictly confidential), Goodman turns to Dr. Leonard Rubenstein of Physicians for Human Rights. He discusses the issue of the dual, potentially conflicting allegiances of the six psychologists with military ties, particularly the two with direct SERE connections:

There is an obligation of psychologists to do no harm. It's no different than the obligations physicians have. And what happened, I think, is that these individuals saw themselves as behavioral scientists, not as clinicians, not subject to those kinds of ethical constraints. And the irony, of course, the paradox, is there was nothing scientific about what happened in SERE at all. There was no scientific basis for the idea that these techniques could get good information, even putting aside the fact that it amounts to torture. But there was no science behind it. So this idea that we have behavioral science teams and these were scientists helping the military do their jobs, that was kind of the veneer that the intelligence and military psychologists used to essentially justify torture. (Goodman, 2007)

Benjamin (2006a) cites psychiatrist Robert Jay Lifton, who echoes the same sentiment regarding psychologists' responsibilities in the matter: "Even though they do

not take the Hippocratic oath, they are in the healing profession.” In the following sentence, Benjamin (2006a) cites APA president Koocher, who counters, again in a repetition of Dr. Rubenstein’s statements above, that “many psychologists are behavioral scientists, and as such aren’t caregivers.” In a later article, Benjamin (2006b) notes that Koocher “invited Lt. Gen. Kevin C. Kiley, the surgeon general of the Army, to address the APA leadership at the New Orleans [1996 annual APA] convention. At the same time, Koocher refused a request to invite Leonard Rubenstein...to speak as a counterweight.” Benjamin (2006a) also mentions another task force member, Michael Wessels, who resigned from the task force early in 2006 because, in his words, “at the highest levels, the APA has not made a strong, concerted, comprehensive, public and internal response of the kind warranted by the severe human rights violations at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay,” adding that “I felt more than a little exploited.” Given all of the hard feelings, animosity, and confusion surrounding this issue, it might be helpful to turn to the text of the task force report itself, both in order to get some clarity on these matters, as well as to search for further discursive similarities and connections with Camelot-era discourse and the Cold War *episteme*.

“The Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security (PENS) met in response to the Board of Directors’ February 2005 charge, that the Task Force ‘examine whether our current Ethics Code adequately addresses [the ethical dimensions of psychologists’ involvement in national-security related activities]...and whether APA should develop policy to address the role of psychologists and psychology in investigations related to national security” (PENS, 2005, p. 1). (In the preceding passage, the bracketed section appears to represent the Task Force’s paraphrasing of the

APA Board of Directors' "charge.") The first aspect of this passage that should jump out at us here based on the discussion by Goodman (2007) and Benjamin (2006a, 2006b) above is the complete avoidance of the term "interrogation" and the use in its stead of the vague phrase "investigations related to national security."

The report mentions "the ethical complexity of this work, which takes place in unique settings" (PENS, 2005, p. 1) and then later, "the ethical challenges facing psychologists whose work involves national security-related activities" (p. 2). Again, framing the issue as "ethical complexity" and "ethical challenges" confronting this work in "unique settings" requires so much sanitization of the language as to render it almost devoid of meaning.

Interestingly, the report cites the APA's own Bylaws by way of providing direction for psychologists lost in this maze of "ethical challenges." These bylaws state that the goal of the APA is "to advance psychology as a science and a profession...by the...improvement of the qualifications and usefulness of psychologists" (PENS, 2005, p. 2). Since many psychologists work "in our nation's service," (p. 2) it is the responsibility of the APA to support them in that noble mission. Certainly, enhancing psychologists' "usefulness" to the military, as we have seen, has long been a goal of at least some aspects of the discipline.

Returning to the issue of "ethical challenges," the PENS report runs counter to the argument by then-APA President Koocher (cited in Benjamin, 2006a) that psychologists are not bound by their professional ethical code when not working as caregivers. The report instead states that whenever psychologists serve in a position by virtue of their training and expertise, the ethics code applies. However, the Task Force does not

conclude from this that psychologists should be ethically barred from assisting in interrogations. For instance, Principle B of the Ethics Code, they note, emphasizes that psychologists must be “aware of their professional and scientific responsibilities to society,” (PENS, 2005, p. 2) and it seems likely that the Task Force interprets the above passage to mean “American society,” although this is not made explicit, and therefore that a prisoner (who, thanks to some quick discursive sleight of hand, is really just a “detainee,” and who is probably an “insurgent,” and therefore no more than a “terrorist” and “bandit,” an individual cell of the pathogen threatening to infect the body of Iraqi or Afghani society) is not owed the same responsibilities. The report goes on: “Psychologists have a valuable and ethical role to assist in protecting our nation, other nations, and innocent civilians from harm, which will at times entail gathering information that can be used in our nation’s and other nations’ defense. The Task Force believes that a central role for psychologists...is to assist in ensuring that processes are safe, legal, and ethical for all participants” (PENS, 2005, p. 2).

This sentence confirms some of our suspicions from the previous one, namely that psychologists’ responsibilities are not necessarily to protect the “detainee” in these interrogations, but are primarily to “our nation, other nations, and innocent civilians” who must be “protected from harm” which will “at times entail gathering information” to defend these nations and civilians. Obviously, if psychologists have an ethical obligation to protect their nation and other nations (in this case, presumably, Iraq and Afghanistan, and, more specifically, the U.S.-installed regimes in those countries) and “innocent civilians” (perhaps a euphemism for Iraqi and Afghan public opinion, “hearts and minds”) from “harm,” and their work in supporting interrogations is “gathering

information” to protect these groups, then it must be the detainee and his allies that represent that harm or threat. Once that is accepted, then they are ruled out of bounds of these ethical protections. Presumably the notion of “innocent until proven guilty” does not apply to detainees who are presumed insurgents and therefore part of a larger pathological structure and thus perhaps not even human in the first place. One final note on the above discourse is that psychologists have a “central role” in ensuring that these “national-security related investigations” are “safe, legal, and ethical.” If this is the case, therefore if psychologists participate in these “investigations” and do not report anything as being specifically unsafe, illegal or unethical, then they are implicitly giving their professional, expert, ethically-bound seal of approval that everything is on the up-and-up.

The Task Force endorses several past APA resolutions against “torture,” and then explicitly “emphasizes that the Board of Directors’ charge did not include an investigative or adjudicatory role and so the Task Force does not render any judgment concerning events that may or may not have occurred in national-security related settings” (PENS, 2005, p. 4). These words, perhaps because they seem *so* carefully chosen, almost scream out what they attempt to gloss over. The Task Force, in the same breath, issues an “absolute statement against torture,” (p. 4) and states unequivocally that it refuses to “render any judgment” regarding “events which may or may not have occurred.”

The next interesting discursive wrinkle in the report presents itself when the Task Force emphasizes psychologists’ ethical obligation to report any “acts of torture” or other “degrading treatment” to the “appropriate authorities” (p. 4). It cautions against failure to do this, insofar as “inappropriate or premature public dissemination can expose

psychologists to a risk of harm outside of established and appropriate legal and adjudicatory processes” (p. 4). Very simply, does the following interpretation seem unwarranted? If psychologists observe torture or what they think might constitute torture or abuse during interrogations in which they are involved, they should report it to the “appropriate channels,” which, in a military context, would be somewhere up the military chain of command as opposed to any outside civilians, media, or other psychologists. If nothing is done about the torture or abuse after such a report is made, the psychologist then has no other recourse. To go outside of the “appropriate channels” would put the psychologist herself in harm’s way, and therefore, professionally obligated to “do no harm,” her own Ethics Code prevents her from any attempt at “whistleblowing.” Also, the only “legal and adjudicatory” process which should be brought to bear on psychologists who have been “exposed” are the “established and appropriate” ones, again presumably the military ones which will undoubtedly be more forgiving of “events that may or may not have occurred” than any civilian criminal court would be, whether Iraqi, Afghani, or American: another reason to avoid “inappropriate or premature” exposure of torture.

Later, the Task Force notes that “psychologists involved in national security-related activities follow all applicable rules and regulations that govern their roles. Over the course of the recent United States military presence in locations such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Cuba, such rules and regulations have been significantly developed and refined” (p. 5). We know from our CDA of the Camelot data that, in a military context like this, the term “development” (although it connotes a positive and beneficial change or growth) often implies an intentional process of change applied to an object to transform it into

something more conducive to military interests. This was the case for the “developing countries,” and it was also the case for the social sciences, which needed to be “developed” themselves. So, what are we to assume is meant when we hear that “rules and regulations” governing the roles of psychologists in interrogations have been “significantly developed and refined?” The next passage is related, and quite important in terms of the larger implications of the document as a whole, and as such merits a close reading:

The Task Force notes that certain rules and regulations incorporate texts that are fundamental to the treatment of individuals whose liberty has been curtailed, such as the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Task Force notes that psychologists sometimes encounter conflicts between ethics and law. When such conflicts arise, psychologists make known their commitment to the APA Ethics Code and attempt to resolve the conflict in a responsible manner. If the conflict cannot be resolved in this manner, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law.” (PENS, 2005, p. 5)

If psychologists are working in a “national security-related setting,” say, in which the “rules and regulations” that govern their role have been “developed and refined,” in such a way that their actions bring them into conflict with their own Ethics Code, they are obligated to “make known their commitment” to the Code. (Maybe they can go and shout from a rooftop: “I am committed to the Code!”) If this “making known their commitment” does not suddenly resolve the dilemma, then they “may adhere to the requirements of the law,” “developed and refined” though it may be.

And then there is this, in the following paragraph:

The Task Force noted that psychologists acting in the role of consultant to national security issues most often work closely with other professionals

from various disciplines. As a consequence, psychologists rarely act alone or independently, but rather as a part of a group of professionals who bring together a variety of skills and experiences in order to provide an ethically appropriate service. (PENS, 2005, p. 5)

Now, military interrogators have become “professionals from other disciplines,” and interrogation itself has become “an ethically appropriate service.” It must be enough to make a psychologist involved in such a “role of consultant” relieved that, in such settings, “psychologists rarely act alone or independently.” Perhaps the Task Force could have added “think” and “speak” behind “act” in the above clause for a fuller picture of the position in which they are placing such psychologists!

Further on in the document, we come to another enlightening passage:

“psychologists clarify for themselves the identity of their client and retain ethical obligations to individuals who are not their clients” (p. 7). Another way of saying “clarify for yourself the identity of your client” is: “don’t forget who you’re working for!”

Two final excerpts from the report will suffice for our present exploration. First, “psychologists should encourage and engage in further research to evaluate and enhance the efficacy and effectiveness of the application of psychological science to issues, concerns and operations relevant to national security. One focus of a broad program of research is to examine the efficacy and effectiveness of information-gathering techniques, with an emphasis on the quality of information obtained....Also valuable will be research on cultural differences in the psychological impact of particular information-gathering methods” (p. 8). Needless to say, this passage is quite reminiscent of the repeated Camelot-era calls for “more research” and reflects the wider notion, carrying through from the SSRC to the present day, that social scientists can lend their expertise to

government and military objectives to ensure efficiency and control and even to improve the quality of outcomes. Also, this passage moves well beyond the initial issue of whether or not psychologists can ethically rationalize their participation in interrogations. Now, their support is unquestioned, and is being greatly broadened to include research as to how the process could be made more effective, the information more reliable, and even how it could make better use of “cultural differences,” a phenomenon which was widely seen in the culturally-specific methods of abuse and torture employed at Abu Ghraib.

The final passage is as follows: “the Task Force noted a potential area of tension between conducting research that is classified or whose success could be compromised if the research purpose and/or methodology become known and ethical standards that require debriefing after participation in a study as a research subject” (pp. 8-9). Now, interrogation has become “research,” and the specific techniques used to extract intelligence have become “methodology.” Such discursive substitutions clearly show some of the discursive benefits for the military of enlisting psychologists for interrogations—they can share in the psychological jargon and suddenly the whole interrogation process looks far less cruel and torture-bound and far more neutral and scientific, simply the gathering of information. Also, for psychologists, the meaning of this last passage could be interpreted as follows based on the preceding injunctions—if you feel any “tension” between your ethical standards and your “methodology,” do not do anything that would “compromise the success” of your “research.” If you feel squeamish, and that your professional psychological training in school did not adequately prepare you for the harsh realities of such “research” and its accompanying “methodologies,” report it to your C.O. and, if nothing happens, take solace in the fact

that, after all, you are, after all, only a “consultant,” and in such “national security-related settings,” psychologists “rarely act alone or independently” anyway.

Of course, psychology’s abdicating of scientific and ethical independence is not contemporaneous with this report and this current scandal, but has a history that stretches back to Project Camelot and further. Also illuminating in terms of the interrogation issue is a consideration of the Camelot-era discourse regarding the “brutal methods” which intelligence-gathering often requires, but the extremely high value placed on such “research” in a counterinsurgency situation. Additionally, other parallels include the valuable “contributions” that psychologists can make, provided that they fit themselves neatly and seamlessly into the military’s pre-existing values and understanding of the situation and refrain from re-interpreting the objects of their military work independently; the calls for “more research;” the emphasis on public perception; and the fundamental asymmetry underlying the operant understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency, an asymmetry that, at its extremity, leads to a complete dehumanization of anyone who falls into the category of “insurgent.” Given all of these discursive similarities to Camelot, as well as the similar roles allotted to the military and social science in terms of relative power (the other side, remember, of the knowledge/power dynamic), one need not conclude that Camelot was somehow directly or singularly responsible for this current interrogation scandal or for our modern discourse on insurgency in order to affirm that it was an important, perhaps singularly so, episode in psychology’s journey to its current status as “handmaiden to U.S. military imperialism,” to alter McFate’s (2005a) phrase.

For psychologists who find this status troubling, it is not enough simply to condemn it. We must also remind ourselves of our own history, and critically examine that history in order to understand how we have arrived at this present state, with this status, and how we can most effectively critically engage with both the established discourse and established institutional power structures and dominant ideologies in order to transform these, and in doing so, change our situation and our status.

6.5 Conclusion

In the discourse on insurgency and counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, as represented by Metz (2004, 2006, 2007), and also in the discourse in the PENS report (PENS, 2005), as well as the wider discourse surrounding the resulting “interrogation scandal,” (Benjamin, 2006a, 2006b; Goodman, 2007), many of the central concerns represented in the Camelot-era IDFs are clearly visible. For instance, in the discourse from Metz and PENS, concern with terminology and its intentional selection to provide the appropriate motivational force and propaganda effects are again evident, in much the same way as can be seen in the Camelot data. There is Metz’s assertion that the U.S. public should be “reminded vigorously and continuously” of what is at stake in Iraq and of the correct way to think about this war and our involvement in it, lest we have a recurrence of the “Vietnam syndrome.” There is also the selection of terminology in the PENS report that makes the interrogation process sound much closer to the process of gathering data in scientific research, just as did Knorr’s (1963) discourse in the data set with regard to military intelligence gathering and analysis.

In addition to the continued relevance of this IDF, the social sciences are again portrayed as a valuable “contributor” and “consultant” in the PENS document, and the medical/therapeutic discourse from the Camelot-era can again be found, both in the portrayal by Metz of insurgency as an illness or disease needing a counterinsurgency “cure,” and also in the claims in the PENS document that psychologists’ participation in interrogations makes them less harmful and more humanitarian, and that these professionals can help to provide detainees with an “ethically appropriate service.”

Finally, the past asymmetry in the Camelot documents is again apparent, both in the discourse of Metz and of the PENS Task Force. The latter consistently regards the “client” in the interrogation situation to be the U.S. Military, and it is therefore the military who should dictate the terms of the contract and the standards of conduct that should guide the psychological “consultants” in their work, as opposed to international laws, treaties, and standards such as the Geneva Conventions. In Metz’ articles, he consistently portrays “insurgents” in a manner very similar to the Camelot documents, conflating terms such as “terrorist” and “insurgent,” and emphasizing the many “needs” and “demands” that must be met for a counterinsurgency campaign to be successful.

Given this tremendous discursive and ideological similarity between the discursive formations and the underlying *epistemes* of the Cold War and the War on Terror, as well as the similar roles advocated for and assigned to social scientists within each, what can we as social scientists who are concerned about maintaining our ethical, scientific, intellectual, and discursive independence *do* to strive to address this situation? Clearly, the first step is for us to learn and explore our own history, so that we can understand how we have come to find ourselves in our current situation. Furthermore,

this historical re-telling must be a critical one, because the established and “official” histories within the social sciences too often take collusion with state values, policies, ideologies, and discourse to be a given. They are unable to see this relationship, close and intimate as it is, because this situation is itself a taken-for-granted part of their (and, ultimately, our) *episteme* and worldview. A critical historical re-telling of the process through which this collusion came to be will, in line with Foucault’s values as outlined in Chapter 2, serve to highlight what is historically contingent and changing across time in this process, rather than casting it as universal, unchanging, and natural.

As social scientists come to know and understand their own histories, and specifically the historical unfolding of their disciplines’ increasing collusion with state power, they can be increasingly aware of how to challenge and transform this situation in order to reclaim their scientific and ethical independence. Clearly, one of the first arenas in which such a challenge can be put forth is within expert discourse itself. In creating or expanding on a body of historical and current study devoted to critical examination and analysis of the aligning of social scientific and state interests, these scientists can begin to issue such a challenge and also a new body of expert knowledge. One of the desirable effects of this new knowledge might be its power to affect state policies, as well as policies within the various social sciences.

As this new body of critical study and its associated programmatic and policy-advocating aspects begin to proliferate and flourish, one could imagine the effects moving outward to the general populations, both of the U.S. and of the “developing countries” in which we are still so widely and so deeply (and so *militarily*) engaged. However, this will also involve shifts in our assumptions regarding epistemology and

subjectivity, as a critical perspective may well dictate that these wider population groups be given more direct access to the process of knowledge creation and dissemination and policy formation than they have had thus far.

Undoubtedly such changes and shifts would have beneficial effects both within U.S. and global society at large and within the social sciences as well. For instance, within psychology, if such a critical perspective within the field were to gain wider acceptance, resistance to incidents such as the “interrogation scandal” would no longer be confined to the margins of professional conventions and the “radical fringe” of professional societies. Instead, it would be incumbent on the mainstream of psychologists to critically examine such activities as well, if only because of the profound degree to which they impinge on scientific and ethical independence, and the result would be a revitalizing of professional debate and discourse throughout all aspects of the field, as well as the opening up of new avenues of more critically- and socially-engaged research and practice. Until such time, however, as psychology and the social sciences more broadly undergo such a much-needed and overdue paradigm shift and begin to call into question the degree to which government and military interests have thus far shaped their fields (and, indeed, continue to do so), often to the detriment of all involved, principled protest and the advocacy of critical perspectives will continue to be marginalized or punished, and therefore avoided by most mainstream professionals.

In the history of Camelot presented in Chapter 1, for instance, the only figure who issued strong and principled opposition to Camelot in terms of the threat it presented to the “developing countries” and the parallel threat to the fundamental independence, openness, and transparency necessary for proper scientific inquiry (the dual threat of

“development”) was Dr. Johan Galtung from Norway. Undoubtedly, he and like-minded scientists paid (and continue to pay) a price for such opposition, even if only exclusion from the opportunities for professional support and advancement offered within the sheltered confines of the mainstream. Any wider opposition to Camelot at that time, as already noted elsewhere in this paper, was nonexistent, except in terms of issues of its timing, tact, or adverse impact on future similar research.

Similarly, current opposition to social science support of the military counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and the more specific issue of the APA’s support of interrogations is again almost nonexistent. At best, it is represented by a small contingent of professionals who withhold their APA dues and advocate for change within the discipline and, more specifically, within the APA by forming groups such as “Psychologists for an Ethical APA” (Psychologists for an Ethical APA, 2007). They are the heirs of Dr. Galtung, and undoubtedly there have been many such voices throughout the history of psychology. However, as long as strong, clear, and principled opposition to issues such as this remain relegated to a few psychologists (easily labeled and perceived as “radicals” and therefore tacitly excluded from shaping mainstream professional discourse), events such as those at this summer’s APA conference will continue to unfold. At this recent conference, Psychologists for an Ethical APA and other likeminded professionals lobbied vigorously for the APA to formally alter its policy to prohibit psychologists from participating in interrogations under any circumstances. Instead, a more softly-worded resolution was passed, prohibiting psychologists’ participation in certain interrogation techniques, but not their participation in the overall interrogation process and related work in these prisons (Benjamin, 2007).

As we can see from a look at Camelot and its discourse, such current issues as the APA scandal have a long history and deep roots, and it is incumbent upon all psychologists, whatever their political affiliations and personal beliefs, to know their own history, not simply the sanitized and officially-sanctioned story, but the untold stories as well. As clinicians working with trauma have long noted, the stories most in need of telling and hearing are often the least easily told or heard. Can professional psychologists in this country, then, summon the courage and resolve necessary to take a long, hard, critical and historical look at the trauma that their field has been (and in some cases continues to be) complicit in perpetuating, as well as the associated traumatic effects such support has had (and continues to have) upon *them* as well? Can they accept their discipline's sometimes less-than-noble motivations, in contrast to its proud and noble public face? Can they, in short, do the difficult and laborious work of remembering, connecting, understanding, and working through that they so regularly, in the professional role of psychotherapist, demand of their patients?

In his work "Dilemma of the Black Intellectual," Cornel West (1991) advocates what he terms the "insurgency model" (p. 143) of intellectual life. He suggests this model is founded on organic and critical intellectual engagement, and on collective, socially-engaged work rather than individual, isolated, abstract theorizing. I believe that the above analysis of Camelot indicates that such an "insurgency model" is both deeply needed and long overdue in psychology, insofar as psychology continues to be far too ready and willing to be "developed" by the military. As it continues to help to suppress insurgencies and internal wars abroad, U.S. psychology continues to stand in dire need of an insurgency and internal war (in other words, a revolution!) at home.

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Appendix 1

Discourse Data

1.1 Introduction

This appendix will present the raw discursive data taken from the various sources mentioned in Chapters 1 and 4, without any accompanying text of my own. This is in contrast to Chapter 4, in which the same data are presented “set” in my own text in order to introduce and contextualize them, and to provide a sense of the individual articles’ internal structures, themes, and arguments. However, looking at the data in their “raw” form has its own benefits, and will undoubtedly illuminate different aspects of the discourse. A few notes regarding formatting: in order to highlight and emphasize the “discourse objects” that I identify and work with in Chapter 5, I will place them in boldface wherever they occur in the data. This boldface does not occur in the original texts and is in every instance my own addition. Second, I will break this appendix up by document, with those with earlier dates *of composition* taking precedence, as is the case in Chapter 4 above. For the two large volumes, I will break them up by author and/or article as well. This presentation will follow the same structuring as Chapter 4 for consistency. Here are the page numbers for the various sections:

1.2	<i>Social Science Research and National Security</i>	296
1.3	Proceedings of the Symposium: “The United States Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research”	307
1.4	“The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology” . . .	325
1.5	“Camelot Planning Letters”	330

1.2 *Social Science Research and National Security*

1.2.1 Pool: "Some Implications of the Volume" (pp. 1-25)

"the objective of this book is to consider what **social science** can contribute to more effective conduct of the **Free World's** defense effort," (p. 1)

"an entirely different domain of **Defense Department** problems," namely "the operations of the **Defense Department** in relation to the external world," (p. 2)

"neglect of potential **social science** contributions to the substantive tasks of the **Defense Department**," (p. 2)

"strategic planning, weapon system selection, **intelligence, guerrilla warfare**, and such external relations of the **defense establishment** as civil-military relations, military government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the **social sciences** as they now exist might provide contributions," (p. 5)

"the technological revolution in weapons," and "the change in their primary purpose from use to **deterrence** both increase the demands upon **social science**," (p. 7)

"whether the **social sciences** will contribute in proportion to the need," (p. 10)

"the weakness of military-oriented **social science** may be attributed to an unmilitary and even anti-military sentiment among some **social scientists**," who tend to be "personally liberal in ideology," and hold to a "certain ivory tower viewpoint," due to which they have "shied away from helping solve the problems of industry, defense, or civilian branches of government," (p. 10)

a "much more important reason," for the lack of research, namely a "lack of demand by the **military establishment**. Had they been urged, many **social scientists** would have responded," (p. 10)

"How can a branch of **social science** be produced which takes upon itself a responsible concern for national security matters, and how can talented individuals from within **social science** be drawn into this area. That this is feasible and deserves to be attempted is a thesis underlying the efforts of the committee that produced this volume.... Implicit in our effort was the assumption that organizational and fiscal measures can have some effect and that the direction of movement of a science can in part, even if only in part, be influenced by provision of financial support," (pp. 10-11)

"Princes, educational institutions, governments throughout the centuries have by provision of funds and facilities often determined the direction of scientific growth," (p. 12)

“clearly the military constitute an applied profession which can be the client for satellite scientific disciplines,” (p. 16)

“this has not yet happened much in the **social sciences**. . . . But this state of affairs need not prevail. The **defense establishment** can make itself a client, stimulating the behavioral sciences and using them—to mutual advantage. . . . In effect, what we have been saying is that **social science** needs a kind of engineering to go with it. . . . As the **social sciences** become more effectively linked to the policy process, whether in the area of defense or in other areas, they are producing a cadre with a new professional role like that of the engineers who work side by side with the more theoretical **social scientists**. . . . Almost all **social scientists**, both inside and outside of university life, are fulfilling the new role. But a proud image of that role does not exist. Few **social scientists** would be happy to admit to being problem-solvers rather than scientific discoverers. What is needed is a prouder image of the role and along with that a great increase in numbers, improvement of morale, and clarity of purpose of the cadre fulfilling it,” (pp. 16-17)

“The **defense establishment** is in a position to stimulate a significant burst of **social science** creativity which could prove most useful to it [but first]. . . . It must provide **social science** training for a substantial number of its officers. It should include more fundamental **social science** in the curricula of its military academies. . . . The **Defense Department** also needs to maintain and strengthen **social science** in its in-house laboratories to provide transmission belts between the outside scientists and the military planners. Also important. . . is the role of the **Defense Department** as a major supplier of funds, for research. . . . There are also things **social scientists** can do to change their ways toward greater usefulness. . . . The **social scientist** who would be responsible must recognize in military problems some of the most important issues, perhaps even the most important issues of our time. . . . The **social scientist** who faces the problems with sobriety and who does not indulge himself in the luxury of mere condemnation and pontification will soon find that he is called on to calculate the answers to concrete policy decisions. . . . **Social scientists** must abandon the ivory tower. . . and must strive to contribute to engineering calculations which can help achieve security in a world of risks,” (pp. 23-24)

1.2.2 Knorr: “The Intelligence Function” (pp. 75-101)

“**Intelligence** is an operation for procuring and processing information about the external environment in which an organization—in our case, the Government of the United States—wants to maximize the net achievement of its various goals,” (p. 75)

“The **development** of modern **intelligence** in the United States can be said to have begun with the establishment in 1941 of the research and **intelligence** branch of the Office of Strategic Services headed by William J. Donovan. It was Donovan’s conception that the rigorous training that **social scientists** and historians had received in the handling of

evidence made them indispensable in estimating capabilities and trends in enemy countries. And the academic contribution of research techniques was indeed so crucial to the success of this branch of OSS that, impressed by OSS competition, the **intelligence** organizations of the armed services began forthwith to recruit academic talent,” (p. 77)

“as now practiced, **intelligence** is inconceivable without the **social sciences**,” (p. 78)

“it is **social science methods** of gathering data, of deducing data from other data, and of establishing the validity of data that are of particular value,” (p. 80)

“a strong case can be made for appreciable financial support of **social science** research on the part of federal agencies.... It is difficult to doubt that progress in the physical sciences has been accelerated by the availability of relatively large funds—notably federal funds. I am convinced that larger funds, properly administered, would also accelerate progress in the **social sciences**,” (p. 94)

“Obviously, a sophisticated science of social change would be a most valuable input for **intelligence** work.... Somewhat more specifically, one might single out the study of ‘**internal war**,’ that is, of the resort to political violence within communities, a phenomenon which is occurring with extraordinary frequency, with which the **intelligence** community is deeply involved, and about which the **social science** literature is far from rich.” (p. 94)

1.2.3 Eckstein: “Internal War: The Problem of Anticipation” (pp. 102-147)

“the term ‘**internal war**’ denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, government, or policies,” (p. 102)

“for few phenomena do **social science**, history, and conventional language offer so various and vague a vocabulary,” (p. 103)

“it can do no harm to consider **internal wars** as all of a piece at the beginning of inquiry and to make distinctions only as they become necessary or advisable,” (p. 104)

“it ought not to be necessary to urge the study of **internal wars** upon anyone, **social scientist** or policy-maker. One would expect **social scientists** to be interested in them simply because they are a common, indeed astonishingly common, facet of human experience,” (p. 104)

“modern **social scientists** have in fact shamefully neglected the subject,” (p. 104)

“contemporary **social science** has been predicated far too much upon perspectives which regard violence, a la Hobbes, as the very negation of the social condition...and place

heavy emphasis on the ideas of equilibrium, integration, and systematic inter-relation,” (p. 105)

“one does tend to think of political violence as something unnatural to societies much as one thinks of illness as abnormal to the condition of individuals usually enjoying good health,” (p. 104)

“There is another reason for making a special plea on behalf of the study of **internal wars** at this time.... We have reason to think they will remain commonplace in the future—and even more intimately connected with policy.... While **internal wars** have always been extensions of domestic politics, there are good reasons to believe that they will become especially important in our age as extensions of international politics.... **Internal war** is closely connected with social change.... [Therefore] one should expect internal political violence to persist, perhaps to increase, in a period when major social change continues to be so widespread and so widely wanted.... Moreover, the likelihood of **internal war** seems to be increased at least in some degree by the shrinking probabilities of international war in the age of “overkill.”... Many **internal wars** are extensions of diplomacy today, and it is clear that in the future they may become even more significant as “diplomatic” means.” (pp. 105-106)

“it is particularly likely today that the **Communist** states will use **internal wars** as tools of international politics. They have already done so frequently in the postwar period and are likely to do so frequently in the future,” (p. 106)

the “militant messianic creed” of these “expansionist zealots” bent on “exporting their utopia” which “justifies and glorifies violence,” and the advantage they have due to their “lack of scruples,” (pp. 106-107)

“they are immeasurably farther ahead of us in revolutionary theory,” and have “crucial advantages” including “much local support,” “much desperate discontent,” “many sublime and frustrated hopes, and much anachronistic hatred of non-**Communist** western systems,” (p. 107)

“we need a general study of **internal war** even more than a study of the operational aspects of irregular warfare,” particularly since “it is we who are likely to be on the defensive and because in no other field is prevention so much more effective than cure.... The most probable kinds of **internal war**, once started, are difficult, if not impossible, to win by those on the defensive,” (p. 107)

“Not only is cure unlikely once **guerrilla** fighting has occurred under favorable conditions [for the **guerrillas**], it is also immensely costly.... A tremendous preponderance of men and resources is required by the defensive side.... The fighting is likely to be prolonged and vicious... One must pay great moral and psychological costs as well. For example, we know that the central problem in defense against **guerrilla warfare** is **intelligence**: knowing what an infinitely elusive enemy is really up to. We also know that against competent **guerrillas** and their enthusiastic civilian supporters,

adequate **intelligence** seems to require brutal methods such as torture and terroristic intimidations.... The stakes are too high and the chances of failure too great for pretty manners to be observed. **Guerrilla warfare** thus breeds savagery even in the best-intentioned defenders. It makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them.” (p. 108)

“detecting in advance the instability of regimes and knowing how to shore them up with fair chances of success are among the most urgent imperatives of the military as well as the political arts,” (p. 109)

“a ‘precipitant’ of **internal war** is an event which actually starts the war.... ‘Preconditions’ of **internal war**, on the other hand, are those circumstances which make it possible for the precipitants to bring about political violence,” (p. 112)

“to shift attention from aspects of **internal war** which defy analysis to those which are amenable to systematic inquiry,” (p. 113)

“after all, it is the rebels who rebel,” (p. 118)

“no **elite** which had preserved its capacity for timely and effective violence, or for effective manipulation, could be successfully assailed, or perhaps assailed at all,” (p. 118)

“revolutions...follow the loss of common values, of internal cohesion, of an unquestioned sense of destiny and superiority in **elites**,” (p. 118)

“examples of the instability that ensues from the estrangement of an **elite** are furnished in profusion by the Westernized **elites** of many currently **underdeveloped areas**,” (p. 120)

“**internal wars** are almost invariably preceded by important functional failures on the part of **elites**,” (p. 121)

“**insurgent** groups seem rarely to come even to the point of fighting without some support from alienated members of incumbent **elites**,” (p. 121)

“one...argument derives from the general experience of modern **social science**. Purely structural theories have generally been found difficult to sustain wherever they have been applied,” (p. 122)

“the most obvious case for behavioral theories of **internal war** derives from the very fact that so many objective social conditions seem to be associated with it,” (p. 123)

not “particular social conditions,” but rather “the ways in which various social conditions may be perceived,” (p. 123)

“broad formulations about social processes and balances, which can comprehend a large variety of particular conditions, should be stressed,” (124)

“So far I have tried to make two related points. The first is that one is most likely to gain an understanding of the forces impelling societies toward **internal war** if one avoids one kind of analysis and emphasizes three others. One should avoid preoccupation with the more visible precipitants of **internal wars**, including conspiracies, and direct one’s efforts to the analysis of three aspects of their much less manifest preconditions: the nature of incumbent **elites**, “behavioral” characteristics of society, and the analysis of general social processes. The second point is, of course, the converse of these positions: that our understanding of the etiology of **internal wars** is dangerously inadequate precisely because studies have so far concentrated on precipitants rather than preconditions, **insurgents** rather than incumbents, and objective social conditions rather than social orientations and social processes.” (p. 124)

“the study of internal peace...should therefore be part and parcel of the study of **internal war**,” (p. 125)

“the most obvious obstacle to **internal war** is, of course, the incumbent regime. It goes almost without saying that by using repression the established authorities can lessen the chances of violent attack upon themselves,” (p. 125)

“actual cases of **internal war** generally have...some structure for forming political will and acting upon decisions.... And anything with a structure can of course be detected and repressed, though not always very easily,” (p. 125)

“Repression can be a two-edged sword. Unless it is based on extremely good **intelligence** and unless its application is sensible, ruthless, and continuous, its effects may be quite opposite to those intended,” (p. 125)

“diversionary mechanisms” are “all those social patterns and practices which channel psychic energies away from revolutionary objectives...[and] which provide other outlets for aggressions or otherwise absorb emotional tensions,” (p. 126)

“indeed, diverting popular attention from domestic troubles by starting foreign wars is one of the most venerable dodges of statecraft,” (p. 127)

“military adventures are excellent diversions...but military failure, on the evidence, can hardly fail to hasten revolution in such cases,” (p. 127)

“orgiastic excitements—like festivals and dances, parades and circuses,” (p. 127) and “massive sports programs...to absorb the energies of the young and the interest of the not-so-young,” (p. 127)

Regarding “concessions,” **elites** should have “enjoined on them philanthropy as a sacred duty,” and should be “educated...in the trusteeship theory of wealth,” in order to make “the masses extraordinarily willing to suffer their burdens in peace,” (p. 127)

the “surest obstacle...apart from orgiastic diversions,” one which “affect[s] the capacities of alienated groups to use violence at all, or, more often in real life, to use it with fair prospects of success,” (p. 128)

“Marx, among many others, seems to have realized this when he argued that urbanization increases the likelihood of revolution, if only in that it makes men accessible to one another and thus makes revolutionary organization easier to achieve.... There may be nothing more mysterious to the celebrated peacability of peasants, as compared to city dwellers, than the physical difficulty in rural life, especially if fairly primitive, to form a ‘collective revolutionary mentality’.” (p. 128)

“**internal wars** seem rarely to occur, even if other conditions favor them, if a regime’s instruments of violence remain loyal. This applies above all to the armed forces. Trotsky for one, and Lenin for another, considered the attitude of the army absolutely decisive for any revolution,” (p. 128)

“**internal wars** are unlikely wherever cohesion of an **elite** is intact for the simple reason that **insurgent** formations require leadership and other skills and are unlikely to obtain them on a large scale without some significant break in the ranks of an **elite**,” (p. 129)

“It is the chief dogma of modern revolutionaries that without great popular support the **insurgents** in an **internal war** can hardly hope to win—unless by means of a coup—and that with such support they are hardly likely to lose. So vital is this factor that some writers think that the distinctive characteristic of **internal war** is the combination of violent techniques with **Psychological Warfare**, the latter designed, of course, to win the active support of the noncombatants.... To be sure, **Psychological Warfare** occurs nowadays also in international wars. Its role in these, however, is not nearly so crucial as in **internal wars**; it is incidental in international war but...seems to be decisive in **internal war**.” (p. 129)

“rebels who can count on popular support can lose themselves in the population, rely on the population for secrecy (in wars in which **intelligence**, as I have pointed out, is practically the whole art of defense) and...they can be practically certain of victory, short of a resort to genocide by the incumbents,” (p. 129)

“calculations about popular loyalties normally play a role in the decision to resort to political violence. The calculations may be mistaken, but they are almost always made; sometimes as in the case of the Algerian nationalist struggle, they are made in ways approaching the survey research of **social science**,” (p. 130)

“there is practically no limit to the research that can be, and ought to be, undertaken on the subject of **internal war**,” (p. 132)

“the hope is that government, with its large and unusual resources, will see fit to supplement normal **social science** research with support for just such projects,” (p. 132)

“the very nature and urgency of the subject makes it particularly desirable that the inevitably harrassed, hurried, anxious and case-bound appraisals of government officials should be supplemented by the more dispassionate, more systematic, larger appraisals of **social scientists**,” (p. 133)

“studies of the techniques by which **internal wars** can be molded and channeled are therefore of the utmost importance. The Machiavellian overtones, the apparent cynicism, may make such studies repellent, but that cannot be helped,” (p. 133)

“countries in which **internal war** might imperil our fundamental international designs,” (p. 134)

studies should inquire “very broadly into what might be called ‘symptoms’ (or ‘indicators’) of **internal war** potential,” (p. 134)

“if one confines discussion at an early stage of inquiry to questions of symptomatology, one can avoid complicated questions of human motivation...and concentrate on problems requiring more modest theoretical equipment and techniques,” (p. 135)

“the utility of an inquiry of this type will be small if it is not carried out on a very large scale...and...with resources not normally available in the **social sciences**,” (p. 137)

“Rightly conducted, a general inquiry into prerevolutionary conditions could produce an urgently needed generalized resource for **internal war** studies: a large library of well-codified materials (perhaps on IBM cards) which could be used for comparative studies of every description relating to **internal war**,” (p. 137)

“if my analysis is correct, the incidence of **internal wars** and the urgency of the problems it poses will increase rather than diminish,” (p. 138)

the centrality of these “**newly emerging**” **countries** to “every phase of American foreign policy-making,” (p. 148)

“**new country**,” a “**newly emerging country**,” a “**developing area**,” or a “**backward country**,” (pp. 148-149)

our attitude toward these unfortunate “**backward countries**” has been “colored by our sensitivity to [their] problems,” but we in the U.S. “have yet to achieve a clear appreciation,” (p. 147)

“according to the conventional military calculus...countries with such low potential for organizing the instruments of violence would be insignificant,” (p. 147)

1.2.4 Pye: “Military Development in the New Countries” (pp. 148-166)

“that in an age when the revolution in weapons technology has reduced the number of super-powers to only two, those countries which...are of the least military significance have become the source of increasingly difficult problems,” (p. 148)

“our initial adventures in military assistance were primarily in response to civil conflicts in which we sought to strengthen the anti-**Communist** forces, as in our aid to Greece and Nationalist China,” (p. 149)

our strategy of “containment” of **Communism** led us to provide “military reinforcements to weak countries adjacent to the **Communist** bloc,” “toward providing internal security against **guerrilla** and irregular forces,” in Korea and elsewhere, and also “to eliminate the power vacuums which the **new countries** represent by building up their defense forces,” (p. 149)

“In the early days of our foreign assistance efforts, Congressmen tended to favor ‘military’ aid over ‘economic’ aid because the former seemed to be more directly linked to our national interest. In more recent years economic **development** has been viewed [sic] as more acceptable and constructive by Congress,” (p. 149)

“advocates of limited programs have felt it politically expedient to suggest that there is a substantial difference between the two categories of aid,” (p. 150)

“champions of **developmental** aid on the basis of strictly economic criteria” charge that “American military aid has created abnormal situations in the recipient **underdeveloped countries** and has forced their governments to make grossly uneconomic allocations of their resources,” (p. 150)

“most of the critics...have felt little sense of urgency about possible military threats to the **underdeveloped countries**,” and “have increasingly contended that the **Communist** threat in the **underdeveloped countries** is not military but arises almost entirely from domestic social and economic conditions,” (p. 150)

“the military problems of maintaining law and order and of insuring civilian cooperation in case of war justify the expenditure of resources to reduce social and economic discontent,” (p. 150)

“in pressing the case for the potentially constructive role military aid can have for economic **development**, some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that the military in many **underdeveloped countries** are more competent than civilians in performing certain crucial functions in furthering economic **development**,” (p. 151)

“There is a need for systematic research into the potentialities of **military establishments** for guiding economic **development** and assisting in the administration of national policies,” (p. 152)

“If the process of national **development** is viewed in broad terms and as involving far more than just economic **development**, it becomes apparent that the **developmental** function of the military can encompass far more than just providing support for civilian economic **developments**.... In fact...the military has a most fundamental role to play in the **developmental** process.... This role is essentially psychological. It involves giving to a people a sense of identity and of national pride. One of the basic obstacles to **development** in most former colonial territories is the existence, particularly among the national leadership, of a constellation of insecurities and inhibitions. The sense of inferiority and the lack of assertiveness of a people who have once been dominated by foreigners cannot be easily eradicated.... The need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm seems to be an essential prerequisite for national **development**. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial **development**.” (p. 152)

“the need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm seems to be an essential prerequisite for national **development**. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial **development**,” (p. 152)

“A very fundamental function of the military in the national **developmental** process is to assist a people to gain a sense of self-respect and dignity so that they can fulfill demanding and protracted community tasks. In nearly all cultures...manhood is closely associated with the warrior and the military arts. Military **development** may thus be crucial in assisting former colonial peoples to overcome their profound sense of inferiority.... At a more fundamental level, the military sphere appears to be a peculiarly sensitive one psychologically because it touches upon the source of national humiliation of former colonial people.... To regain a sense of equality in their own eyes it thus becomes necessary for these former subjugated peoples to feel that they have now redeemed themselves in the field of their initial greatest weakness. The fact that a deep sense of military inferiority was a part of these peoples’ first reaction to the modern world seems in many cases to have colored their capacity at present to modernize their societies. The leaders often have profound psychological inhibitions...” (p. 153)

“For the West even to appear to oppose military **development** in the **new countries** can be easily interpreted by the people, given these psychological considerations, to be an indication that the West persists in wanting to keep them in a subordinate and less than fully sovereign position.... A **new country** feels that the real test of when it has gained its full independence is passed when those who were its former rulers are willing to share with them the weapons and the means of violence which once were the monopoly of the Europeans.” (p. 154)

“the considerations relating to the world situation and American grand strategy,” (p. 154)

“What in a military sense do the **underdeveloped areas** represent in the currently divided world? What kinds of war are most likely to be fought in these areas? And what

types of military forces should we seek to encourage these countries to build up?" (p. 154)

"the role of armies in the **underdeveloped areas** as a powerful source for assisting, and even guiding and stimulating, basic economic **development**," (p. 154)

"what are the advantages of armies in being agents of modernization?" (p. 154)

"the psychological role of armies in assisting a people in finding their sense of national identity and full autonomy," (p. 154)

"**social science** research should be able to make significant contributions with respect to all three approaches," (p. 154)

"in the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among **social scientists** in the problems of **guerrilla warfare** and counter-subversion.... This is because the problems posed by such forms of warfare and violence are intimately related to questions about the social structure, culture, and behavior patterns of the populations involved," (p. 155)

"without question, **social science** research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces" in the **new countries**, and that "the task of developing **Free World** techniques for coping with subversives and **guerrilla warfare** will call for substantial research efforts," (p. 155)

"suggests a natural area for cooperation among military specialists, **social scientists**, and creative engineers of new weapon systems," (p. 155)

"It would...seem possible for social psychologists to analyze the extent to which it is possible to find functional equivalents to war as a means for giving a people a sense of national identity and self-respect. It would be of great value to have studies made of how people in transitional societies at various stages of **development** tend to perceive and emotionally and intellectually respond to their nation's military forces. We need to know more about the extent to which the army may be a fundamental institution in providing national pride and a national political consensus." (p. 156)

"the problem for research which is of prime interest to us is the probable consequences for national **development** whenever as significant differential emerges between military **development** and the **development** of the other institutions of the society," (p. 157)

"in most of the **new countries** in which armies have come to power, the build-up of the military has not been related to international wars and a process of national mobilization.... Since the process of military build-up was not related to a popular war effort, armies which gain dominance under such conditions usually do not have effective ties with the masses of the population," (p. 157)

“such armies may find that their supremacy over civilian institutions does not carry with it the capacity to gain the popular support needed for effectively ruling a country,” (p. 157)

“Induction into military life can...be one of the most economic and rational ways of inducting tradition-bound people into the environment of modern organizational life.... In many transitional societies...the army does constitute a vehicle for bringing people into modern life with a minimum of social and psychological strain. Recruits are expected to change their ways of life and their habits of thought, and the process of becoming a modernized soldier is not too dissimilar to that of becoming a useful citizen in a modernizing society.... Finally it should be noted that military **development** can be a powerful instrument for producing a politically loyal citizenry.” (p. 159)

1.3 Proceedings of the Symposium: “The United States Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research”

1.3.1 Lybrand: “Foreword”(pp. iii-xvii)

six “leading **social scientists** to form an Army Symposium Advisory Group,” which “provided continual advice and counsel on the planning and conduct of the symposium,” (p. xvi)

the symposium is concerned with “the **military establishment’s limited-war mission**,” defining this last term as “forms of conflict short of all-out nuclear war and general conventional war, with stress on ‘wars of subversion and covert aggression’ and the ‘Cold War’,” (p. iii)

there will be a special focus on “the military counterinsurgency mission,” (p. iii)

“the disciplines which study human behavior systematically including psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science, history, economics, and international relations,” (p. iii)

“the increased importance of military **counterinsurgency** capabilities,” and links this increased importance to two factors: “(1) The emergence of many **developing nations**, newly independent, which are inviting targets of subversion and covert aggression,” and “(2) The overwhelming destructive potential of all-out nuclear warfare,” (p. iv)

“Military **Counterinsurgency** Weapon System,” (p. iv) includes “Psychological Operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice,” (p. v)

“success in the **counterinsurgency** mission is as much dependent on political, social, economic, and psychological factors as upon purely military factors, and sometimes more so,” (p. vi)

In “**internal war**...the ‘battle’ situation is primarily an internal conflict within another nation—although our major antagonist may have incited the conflict, or may be exploiting it.... The immediate targets are **insurgent** or other indigenous groups, and the underlying social and political conditions which contain the sources of internal conflict. Instead of clearly defined enemy personnel, our forces face a mixture of friendly, unfriendly, and neutral...indigenous persons,” (pp. vi-vii)

“In the past, the primary sources of enemy strength...could be destroyed physically. In the **counterinsurgency** situation, the primary sources of **insurgent** strength are...the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves. Rather than destructive, our aims are constructive—to create internal conditions and encourage political, social, and economic systems which remove hunger, disease, poverty, oppression, and other sources of discontent. In this sense, our **military establishment** is a direct, positive instrument for human progress in directions that are compatible with the U.S. national interest.” (p. vii)

“the primary instruments of action...are not U.S. troops.... Rather, they are the friendly indigenous groups the United States is supporting,” (pp. vii-viii)

“through indirect influence of one type or another. This is not limited to verbal persuasion alone, but includes all techniques of influencing the behavior of another person short of physical coercion,” they are operating “in a strange cultural environment,” there “is a longer timelag between execution of an action and its impact,” and lastly and regrettably, “the end result of an action frequently does not have the degree of finality and irrevocability that physical destruction does,” (p. viii)

“the understanding and prediction of human behavior at the individual, political and social group, and society levels,” (p. x)

“In the same sense that a new emphasis on the **counterinsurgency** mission has resulted in new requirements on the military, a new emphasis is required within the behavioral and **social sciences**. In addition to the acquisition of relevant knowledge in the classical scientific sense, scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems.” (p. xi)

Attendees included “high ranking officers and civilian executives of the Departments of Defense, Navy (including the Marine Corps), and Air Force, as well as the Department of the Army. Leading behavioral and **social scientists** of Army research activities, of other government agencies, and of university research centers, participated and attended,” (p. xiv)

“On the first day, Army officers presented authoritative statements of the Army mission and general requirements for behavioral and **social science** knowledge. On the second day, leading behavioral and **social scientists** presented papers describing some past and ongoing research and the relevance it has to Army problems. The third day was devoted to papers describing relevant research programs and activities of various government agencies, including the Department of the Army.” (p. xiv)

1.3.2 Stahr: Invited Address: “The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research” (pp. 3-8)

“the most effective means of eradicating the insidious, creeping menace of **Communist guerrilla** aggression and phony ‘wars of liberation’,” (p. 3)

the use of nuclear weapons has diverted the “national attention” from “the actuality of overt aggression being carried on at a much lower level of intensity—but, nevertheless, fraught with comparable danger in the long run to our country and all it stands for,” (p. 4)

Decreasing our nuclear capabilities would surely “be inviting catastrophe,” (p. 4)

“we would likewise be inviting eventual catastrophe if we failed to create and maintain the capability to **deter** or defeat nonnuclear aggression at any level, for all **Communist** effort is shrewdly and **determinedly** directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction. In other words, if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor **Communist** successes, in the long run they would, like the proverbial ‘little drops of water,’ make an ocean which could engulf us,” (pp. 4-5)

“Premier Khrushchev has made it perfectly clear that this is the sort of warfare the Sino-Soviet bloc intends to continue to wage against the **Free World**—or, at the very least, to encourage and subsidize—throughout the foreseeable future. In Khrushchev’s dialectic, such wars are ‘wars of liberation’ and he has proclaimed them not only ‘admirable but inevitable’,” (p. 5)

“the Army...is...the repository of an invaluable store of practical ‘know how’ in the field of **Guerrilla warfare**—‘know how’ based on experience extending back to early Colonial days and on through the Indian Wars, and expanded and sharpened in combat operations in the Pacific areas and elsewhere during World War II,” (pp. 5-6)

“today the Army is again performing yeoman service in defense of the **Free World** by furnishing expert training and technical assistance, as well as extensive aviation support for troop transport, observation, and resupply, to the hard-pressed Vietnamese in their jungle war against the infiltrating Viet Cong forces,” (p. 6)

not “nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the **deterrence** or defeat of **guerrilla** aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct,” (p. 6)

“the Army is fully aware of its grave responsibilities in the Cold War, perhaps the gravest it has ever borne,” (p. 7)

This is “a national task which demands a national response. It demands the enlistment in the cause of all elements of the American community represented at this symposium—enlistment, as the phrase goes, ‘for the duration’,” (pp. 6-7)

“we need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs.... Therefore we look to research organizations such as the **Special Operations** Research Office and our civilian educational institutions. Almost exclusive emphasis has been laid over the years on the **development** of the physical sciences as primary factors in our national defense. We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the **social sciences**,” (p. 8)

If we have “a real team effort by the Army and the research organizations of our civilian educational institutions—we can disrupt Mr. Khrushchev’s plan of world conquest,” (p. 8)

1.3.3 Trudeau: “Welcoming Address” (pp. 11-17)

“I want to say right here and now—and I know that my statement will be reinforced by the able speakers who will appear before you—that our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in this world that would destroy all that we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery—which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this **Communist** cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences.... Yet, in this age of great change, the **development** of the **social sciences**—the sciences dealing with human nature—has not, in my opinion, kept pace.” (pp. 11-13)

“we may realize to full advantage the great benefits brought to society by this new age of science, technology, and change,” (p. 13)

“our greatest achievements will result where we succeed in getting the social and physical scientists together early in the project,” and that “if we can succeed in applying such a concept of sustained cooperation, we can more closely integrate our swiftly changing scientific processes with the policy processes which govern our national life,” (p. 14)

“SORO exists because we and our academic partners recognize that refinements and sophistication of hardware are fruitless without concurrent improved understanding of peoples and their societies, particularly in the **underdeveloped areas** of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America,” (pp. 14-15)

“Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of **guerrillas**, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional **Communist** challenge—in paramilitary warfare, in **Psychological Warfare**, and in conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force.” (p. 15)

Limited war is “short of all-out nuclear devastation...commonly referred to as ‘**limited-war**,’” and “popularly referred to as within the province of ‘**Special Forces**,’” (p. 15)

“there are many terms in vogue which cover parts of the mission, and you are familiar with them; such expressions as ‘**sublimited-war**,’ ‘subbelligerent war,’ ‘unconventional warfare,’ ‘cold war,’ ‘paramilitary war,’ and ‘proxy war,’” (p. 15)

“I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of **guerrillas** and indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of **Communist** vulnerabilities by **Psychological Operations** under varying conditions of cold warfare... I think the purposes of this symposium are as important as they are clear: First, to improve your understanding of the Army’s **limited-war** mission; Next, to recruit the country’s best **social science** talents for research and **development** in support of that mission; and Last, to obtain recommendations for you for continuing coordinated scientific support.... The challenge to you is simple and clear: what can you contribute to Army Research and **Development** in this field?... We need and solicit your ideas—the more, the better.” (pp. 16-17)

1.3.4 Eddleman: Keynote Address: “Limited War and International Conflict” (pp. 25-39)

“four factors which **determine** in large measure the role of our Nation and our Armed Forces in the world conflict,” (p. 26)

First is that “our country has arrived at the pinnacle of world power,” albeit “reluctantly,” (p. 26). “The non-**Communist** world must look to us and to us alone for leadership,” (p. 26)

Second is that it “encompasses the entire range of national power resources in both hot and cold war,” (p. 26)

Third is “the emergence of cold war as a form of world conflict equal to nuclear or conventional war,” and its “threat to our survival,” (p. 27)

The fourth factor is “the Army’s preeminent capability for the types of military operations required in cold war,” (p. 27)

President Kennedy has “established a Special Group for **Counterinsurgency**,” to integrate the military response and has instructed his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara that ““the effort devoted to this challenge should be comparable in importance to preparations for conventional warfare’,” (p. 27)

“Cold war is essentially a battle for the land and its peoples,” and that the tasks required for such a battle “are very similar to those performed by the Army from the early frontier days of our Nation’s history,” (p. 27)

Cold War: “the use of political, economic, technological, sociological, and military measures—short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces—to achieve national objectives,” (p. 28)

“it is low-intensity conflict that is complex, extensive, subtle, and persistent,” (p. 28)
I emphasize this definition to insure that we have a common understanding of terms. Under it, what we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be **limited-war** from the viewpoint of the non-**Communist** nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The **Communists** term these conflicts “wars of liberation.” We call them “wars of subversion or covert aggression.”... I suggest that you may wish to employ the definition of cold war which I have given for uniformity, at least in your initial deliberations. (pp. 28-29)

Four characteristics of cold war as waged by the **Communists**. First, the “level of provocation is kept low and ambiguous,” in order to “force the opposing side into a gradual withdrawal,” (p. 29)

Second, “the major **Communist** powers seek to avoid participation by their own regular forces,” utilizing indigenous forces trained by **Communist** military “advisors and technicians,” (p. 29)

Third, he recognizes an “ever-present capability to raise the conflict to progressively higher levels,” (p. 29)

Fourth cold war is “a conflict of **determination** and will,” with the ever-present threat of “nuclear holocaust” (p. 29)

“the entire world is a cold war battleground,” (p. 29)

“the war is waged at varying levels of intensity,” (p. 30)

“as President Kennedy emphasized, the key Cold War areas are principally in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are particularly fertile areas for conflict. Here, **new nations** are emerging from colonial status and free people—impatient with slow reforms—are struggling for dramatic and immediate economic and political growth,” (pp. 30-31)

“in order to satisfy the basic needs of the people in the **underdeveloped areas**, and to orient them away from **Communism**, social and economic assistance will be required on a long-term basis.... Therefore, we must gain the initiative through positive measures which will enable us to anticipate, as well as to counter and defeat, **Communist** cold war pressures,” (p. 31)

“long-term goal in each country must be to achieve the clearly defined cold war objectives of the **Free World**. To accomplish this, there must be created a secure and stable environment for political, social, and economic growth,” which will necessitate helping our allies to “arrest **Communist** expansion,” “gain and maintain internal security,” and “foster economic and social growth and political stability,” (p. 34)

“must be achieved through orderly, evolutionary processes,” and we must emphasize to the host countries that “these are their programs, with U.S. support, and not U.S. programs,” (p. 35)

The “programs” are “field-type communications between isolated villages and districts,” opening “medical treatment clinics,” teaching “first aid and field sanitation,” starting “water **development** and land reclamation projects,” (p. 36)

“such as Vietnam...**civic action** programs alone would be inadequate.... In such areas, emphasis must be placed on creating and training local **counterinsurgency** forces and on providing them with operational and logistical assistance and increased technical training,” (p. 36)

“The Army recognizes that our success depends in large part on our ability to understand and to enlist the loyalties of the people in whose areas the Cold War is being waged. In order to accomplish this, we need the best information and advice which **social scientists** can provide. I hope that this is only the first of many such meetings in which **social scientists** and military leaders can work together to solve the challenging problems which confront us.” (p. 39)

1.3.5 Kinard: “The New Dimensions of Special Warfare” (pp. 56-67)

“the term **Special Warfare** itself is relatively new, having been adopted by the Army as recently as 1956,” (p. 56)

“historically, **guerrilla warfare** has proved its effectiveness throughout the spectrum of conflict—in revolutions, in varying forms of **insurgency**, in public wars,” (p. 57)

“Today, both unconventional and **Psychological Warfare**, which together have until recently comprised what we call **Special Warfare**, have become the conscious concern of governments.... The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to **Psychological Warfare** and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of **counterinsurgency**.” (p. 58)

“in 1952, the 10th **Special Forces** Group, Airborne, was activated...to infiltrate into denied areas by land, sea, or air for the purpose of organizing the indigenous **guerrilla** potential and conducting unconventional warfare operations against the enemy,” (p. 59)

“I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sublimated or unconventional wars,” which will be “necessary to counter **Communist-sponsored guerrillas or insurgents**,” (p. 62)

“the Army has also carried its role of nation-builder beyond the borders of the United States, wherever our national security interests have taken our Armed Forces,” (p. 64)

“in **underdeveloped areas** of the **Free World**, where **Communist** subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure,” (p. 65)

“we are today in a period of international conflict where the advantage may more often lie with those who are successful in obtaining the support of the people,” (p. 65)

“it is the armed forces themselves, and the army in particular, in these **underdeveloped nations** that in many cases offer the best hope in gaining the support of the people,” (p. 66)

“The size of the tasks that face us in the lower spectrum of war are enormous. The implications that those tasks hold for **Special Warfare** operations are likewise enormous. So, too, are the implications for research and **development** in the fields of **social science** and human factors.... We need to know the strengths and the weaknesses in all aspects of the societal structure of our allies and of our opponents. We need to know their vulnerabilities.... We need to know many things.... And I think this is your job as well as mine.” (pp. 66-67)

1.3.6 Slover: “Civic Actions in Developing Nations” (pp. 69-78)

“In the **less developed countries**, economically, sociologically, and sometimes politically, we are seeing today the desire on the part of the people for a better way of

life. These are areas where a type of social revolution is under way. These are the battlegrounds of the Cold War.... The side that wins support of the people will win the battle.” (p. 70)

“Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare. I submit to you for consideration in this symposium that **civic action** is an important and valuable way of gaining that necessary control of populations. When government forces identify themselves with the well-being of the populace by military activities...the people tend to reciprocate. They deny assistance to the dissidents, are less receptive to enemy propaganda.” (pp. 70-71)

“by **civic action** we mean using indigenous forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic **development**,” (p. 71)

“**civic action** should be looked on as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent **deterioration** in a country, and also as a technique of **guerrilla warfare**,” (p. 72)

“We need to know more about what are the most effective programs or projects in given circumstances that will have the greatest impact on the population. Which projects will best win the population to the side of the military forces and keep them there?... We need to know more about the people of an area—how they live, their customs, their social structure, their needs.” (p. 77)

1.3.7 Linebarger: “Remarks in Panel Discussion” (pp. 90-92)

“One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the **Free World** not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the **Communists** have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity. For instance, it is unnecessary to go to the extravagant lengths which the **Communists** carry their terminology, but there is surely a middle ground in which easy and common sense reform is practicable. Some of the terms particularly affected are the following:

Special Warfare is not a self-explanatory term in standard English. It is difficult for a man to explain to his family that he is undertaking a noble crusade or a particularly patriotic and hazardous venture if he admits he has joined a **Special Warfare** unit. Other terms such as irregular warfare, anti-intruder warfare, or immediate warfare might be worth considering. But it is entirely possible that the best solutions for a new name for **Special Warfare** may come from the officers and enlisted men themselves if they were queried for a description of their present assignments.

Another key concept is **Psychological Operations**, which has now reached a level of almost total incomprehensibility to the ordinary newspaper reader, to the **intelligence** officer who is not a specialist in the field, or to the high school graduate enlisted man.

Psychological Warfare with all of its disadvantages in the old days nevertheless showed the culmination of attempting to combine psychology and war. The present term leaves the issue entirely neutral.

Combat propaganda is of course plain English but it has political handicaps within the U.S. domestic scene which make administrators wary of it. In a more serious vein it can be pointed out that **insurgency** is much too flattering a word to be applied to the terrorism and banditry which the **Communists** use. **Counterinsurgency** is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the **Free World** and an unconscious assist to the **Communists**.

Counterinsurgency and **insurgency** might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the **Free World**.

Social science is of course a fantastic misnomer for a wide variety of disciplines which go beyond the academically recognized disciplines into the humanities and sometimes into philosophy and religion themselves. It would be too much to seek a solution at this single meeting for the renaming of an entire field. The standards for defining new terms should be: first, that these become clear to our own staff and leaders; second, that they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men; and third, that by their own semantic force they provide a certain degree of **deterrence** to our antagonists.” (pp. 90-92)

1.3.8 Altman: “Mainstreams of Research” (pp. 115-124)

“some basic premises. One is that the job of **social science** is to make inputs to the military who are faced with the problem of deciding on courses of action,” (p. 116)

“two types of inputs that **social scientists** can make.... The first is on building background information,” (p. 116)

“such knowledge is not enough, however, for the planner or operator. He also needs ideas on how to act given his own and others’ resources.... What is the best way to combat a particular **guerrilla** operation? What communication and propaganda techniques should be used to help win over some dissident minority? These are questions that depend on background information, but they also require the fusing of all this information and the development of action programs,” (pp. 116-117)

“please note that I am not suggesting that **social scientists** become decision-makers; what I am saying is that **social scientists** have a unique input to make to military decision-makers at all levels, beyond general background information,” (p. 117)

1.3.9 Riley: “Remarks in Panel Discussion” (pp. 151-156)

“there has never been, at least to my knowledge, an example in which the military have rolled out such a massive welcome mat for the professors as they have at this meeting... Well, one can only hope that the academic community of scholars, in turn, will be able to respond in some equally massive way to the military’s invitation,” (pp. 155-156)

1.3.10 Davison: “Forces for Stability and Instability in Developing Nations” (pp. 157-159)

“the **developing nations**...make up the largest portion of the world,” and also that “the stability of these areas is extremely important for the United States when it comes to safeguarding its own peace and freedom, and it is here that **Communist** forces are trying as hard as they can to promote instability,” (p. 158)

1.3.11 Pye: “The Role of the Military in Political Development” (pp. 159-170)

“We in the **social sciences** have in our turn gained much from our associations over the years with the research branches of the military. Let me hasten to add that I do not have in mind just the fact that we have benefitted from the funds and other resources of the military; I would however be less than candid if I did not acknowledge that in some small measure such materialistic considerations probably play their part in the relationship we are speaking about between scholars and soldiers.... The association between these two communities has been remarkably fruitful in the past, and...we have each benefitted in our separate ways as well as in our common interests.... Let us all hope that in the years to come we can work out increasingly firm foundations for this mutual relationship.” (p. 160)

“the Army has gradually become increasingly involved in matters relating to political and social **development**,” (p. 161)

“immediately after World War II, the Army had almost no concern with the **underdeveloped areas**,” and “only gradually as we developed a worldwide strategy did we become aware of the possible significance of the **underdeveloped areas**,” (p. 161)

“the U.S. Army in one form or another has become more and more deeply involved in the problems of bringing order and progress to **underdeveloped countries**,” and adds that, “I predict that in the next few years this interest will increase at an exponential rate,” (p. 162)

“this will be an exasperating experience in many ways. We already sense this,” (p. 163)

“the disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about nation building. In the past the **social scientists** have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine,” (p. 163)

social science research approaches and methodology have focused on explaining “the realities of the current situation,” on “the American scene and elsewhere,” and in a “statically oriented” way, with the emphasis “on continuity rather than on change,” (pp. 163-164)

“we are not well-prepared for dealing with the question ‘How do you go about creating a modern nation-state?’” (p. 164)

“as the military becomes more concerned with the range of problems which you now identify as **counterinsurgency** you are in fact going to be coming across the problems of how to build institutions and how to build the most complex of all social institutions or organizations: the modern nation-state,” (p. 164)

As an historical precedent for this brave new role for the Army, Pye cites the “complex” roles played by the Army Corps of Engineers and also the “role the military played in terms of the opening of the West,” (p. 165)

“In the last few years we have become sensitive to the way the military can perform some quasi-civil functions. We see this in the teams of the military as they took over political authority in Southeast Asia and Africa and the Middle East. There is a sense here that the military can perform certain types of functions more effectively, maybe, than can civilian institutions. We need to know why this is the case. What are the peculiar advantages?” (p. 165)

“we have created certain ideologies and certain feelings that the military might be helpful. There is an instinctive feeling that when the military comes to power in any of these countries a step is taken favorable to American policy,” (p. 166)

“the military...may in fact be the only force that can give people who have suffered under foreign domination a sense of self-respect and self-assurance,” because “the civil bureaucracy is much too closely tied to a tradition of foreign control,” whereas “the politicians...are much too closely related to the nationalist phase of opposing the foreign rule,” (p. 167)

“that they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in **limited-war**, that involves an understanding of how a modern society can be built,” (p. 168)

“the most important thing that we as **social scientists** can do” is “to recognize we have limited knowledge as do the military, but what we are prepared to do with the military is to try to ask these questions in an orderly, rational way and bear the consequences of whatever we discover,” (p. 169)

1.3.12 Berger: “Remarks in Panel Discussion” (pp. 180-184)

“from the standpoint of those interested in peace, this must be a very heartening symposium, for the Army seems to feel it necessary to supplement its military mission with a peaceful one,” (p. 180)

“in the Middle East at least...I find it very difficult to see that the native armies can become or be viewed as benevolent big brothers, beloved by the people. This picture presented here yesterday seems like nothing that I see in the Middle East. If this is true of the native armies in the Middle East, how much more true would it be of foreign armies there?” (p. 182)

“First, if the Army wants to use **social science**, it may find that it has to direct **social science** towards its own problems and interests. Second, if it does use **social science**, I think the Army ought, even for its own interest, to take a broad view of what **social science** is and may become. Third, if the Army believes that it must go into **civic action** in **underdeveloped areas**, it ought to do so, I think, without encumbering illusions about making military regimes palatable to the people they control and without dubious analogies to the American Frontier. Political problems are tough. So we like to avoid them. But I think we shall find that engineering projects are not a substitute for political education.” (pp. 183-184)

1.3.13 Johnstone: “Remarks in Panel Discussion” (pp. 185-192)

“I would contend that most of the so-called ‘**developing countries**’—well, as a matter of fact, the majority of them—are **ex-colonial countries**, and that the period of colonialism is a vast area of ignorance among Americans. We have not studied colonialism, hardly, at all. We are beset by the special pleaders, the apologists for the colonial regimes and by the nationalists who attack the colonial regimes.... We need to know a lot more about what happened during the colonial period. We need to know particularly more about what the attitudes of people were, what concepts of political behavior were injected into the stream of the educated, politically sophisticated people of these colonial territories, most of whom are still participating in their independent governments.” (pp. 186-187)

“The problem which most of these countries have is a problem of their own making in part in that most **ex-colonial countries** have adopted the form of government of the metropole power. The Burmese adopted a British-type system. The French colonies have followed the same pattern to some extent. And this has been adopted usually in a hurry and without too much previous experience and usually has proved rather unsatisfactory. How do you get in a newly **developing country** or **ex-colonial country** a strong executive which can manage the economy and engage in economic planning, develop economic and social progress on a countrywide basis, at the same time have any kind of what we would call democratic rights or representative type of government?” (pp. 188-189)

“There is a lot of brain power, in my opinion, in the colleges and universities that is being wasted in terms of the mission of the Army or the mission of the United States overseas in the present situation. This brain power is being wasted not because of lack of good will, not because of the fact that professors who direct research or who themselves get involved in research are not interested in digging into the problems that are of importance and practical usefulness. It is primarily, I think, the problem of communication. I would hope this could be solved because this is not an insoluble problem at all.” (p. 191)

1.3.14 Yu: “Images, Ideology, and Identity in Asian Politics and Communications”
(pp. 202-220)

“The **new states** in Asia are trying to achieve the double end of becoming like the West with respect to their political, economic, and social life, and at the same time remaining themselves with respect to their own traditions and culture. They want to Westernize; they want to maintain their own cultural identity.... To maintain the cultural identity, an Asian country must derive some special sense of uniqueness and superiority of its traditional heritage. In other words, it seeks to distinguish itself from the rest of Asia, not to identify itself with any particular culture of civilization. In either of the two expressed aims of Asian countries, therefore, there is not much room for an interest in Asia.” (p. 207)

“not until the British [colonial] era did the consciousness of India and of being Indian grow. In that sense, the concept of India is really a British creation,” (p. 207)

“Is a problem which involves the whole question of man, society, and ideas and it requires explorations in territories that are not normally included in the maps for students of political affairs or military science. And I venture to suggest that if we tackle this problem vigorously, wisely, and successfully, we may gain a body of totally new knowledge which we do not yet possess about the **developing countries**, open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior, and, conceivably, offer significant clues to our planning of **limited-war**.” (p. 212)

“Americans must find out from people in other countries in their own terms what they are, what they are trying to do, what they are trying to become. This can never be done if the primary concern of Americans is to tell other people what they should be doing in order to be more like us.” (p. 213)

“telling the **developing countries** what they should want and what they should do,” this is not the American way and “this we cannot do. This we should not do. To be blunt, we do not have all the answers,” (p. 214)

“to help the people in **developing countries** find the answers,” on their own even though “the answers are not readily available,” and “remain to be developed,” (p. 213)

“people in **developing countries** are undergoing unparalleled rapid changes,” and “they are constantly confronted with the problem of trying to decide on the right ideas to have, the right things to believe, the right courses to take,” (pp. 213-214)

these people “must find their way in the ideological maze they are in,” and must “resolve an endless array of identity crises,” (p. 214)

“people in the **developing countries** do not really know what they want to be. They are in the process of growing up. They are searching frantically for a purpose in life and a reason in the things they do, believe, and want. But they do not really know what they should do or want, except that, in a very vague way, they want to be strong, successful, great, happy, and prosperous,” (p. 214)

“our responsibility is to help them grow, help them see and understand the meaning of things they wonder about. In short, to help them discover themselves,” (p. 215)

“we may hope that they eventually will discover, understand, and appreciate the properties of a healthy democracy and the ingredients of progress and happiness,” (p. 215) just as we have.

“it is not enough to teach the Vietnamese, Laotians, or Koreans how to fight **Communism**. An equally important task is why they should fight it,” (p. 215)

“This is not a task that we can hope to accomplish with clever posters, catchy slogans, entertaining films, or even convincing publications. Those who fight on our side in this **limited-war** must undergo a set of vigorous mental gymnastics or ideological exercises to discover for themselves the purpose of this conflict as well as their role in it. I must hasten to point out that I am not intimating anything that is remotely similar to the **Communist** concept of indoctrination or their scheme of propaganda, both obviously distasteful to us.” (pp. 216-217)

we should provide an opportunity for the **developing nations** to “do the searching themselves, and that our best hope in a **limited-war** lies in the success of their search,” (p. 217)

“research possibilities in this area are virtually limitless,” (p. 217)

“we need plans to mobilize all the people in the **developing countries**, particularly the intellectuals, to ponder on the questions which we have discussed,” (p. 217)

We also need to produce more “theoretical work,” “studies,” “serious thinking,” and “all the data we can get on the ideas and images that people in the **developing countries** have about themselves,” (p. 217)

1.3.15 Eckstein: “Internal Wars” (pp. 250-262)

“It reminds me of the doctrine of nonintervention. The United States is not intervening in other people’s affairs. All we do is give them billions of dollars to transform their economic system, send abroad missionaries of one kind or another, give them technical assistance that will change their mores, political advice, obtain military bases, use all the propaganda mechanisms at our disposal; but our policy is nonintervention in the affairs of other people. What does the United States believe? What does the United States offer? We always retreat into the slogan that we can’t do things the way the **Communists** do them.... We somehow have to help foreign peoples ‘discover themselves.’... Are we really performing our task adequately or retreating into myths about the views of people abroad? Are we hypocritical in what we are trying to achieve overseas?” (pp. 238-239)

“**internal wars** are as grave a threat to us today as all-out nuclear war or other forms of international war,” and cautions against “the belief...that **internal wars** can be adequately coped with by certain kinds of novel military operations, by fighting operations,” a belief which “is extremely unfortunate,” (p. 253)

“in no field of human conflict is prevention so much more important than cure and cure such a very weak substitute for prevention as in **internal war**,” (p. 253).

“I think that **civic action** is....not just a useful supplementary technique to counterrevolutionary warfare, but the key to the whole problem. I, myself, would conclude from this that **counterinsurgency** is consequently the primary responsibility of civilian authorities and not of the Army, however important a stake the Army has in the matter and however much it can be used by others to reduce **internal war** potential.” (p. 254)

“military techniques are not likely to be very helpful,” (p. 254)

“it is extremely difficult to win many kinds of **internal wars** for those on the defensive, and we are on the whole more likely to be on the defensive than the offensive in such conflicts,” (p. 254)

“an established government which has to maintain normal order in a society cannot disappear into the mountains or into cellars in **guerrilla** fashion,” (p. 255)

“one can learn something about counter**guerrilla warfare** from **guerrilla warfare**, but essentially the two operations are different. Also, counter**guerrilla warfare** is much more difficult,” (p. 255)

“cure is unlikely, once fighting, particularly **guerrilla** fighting, has begun,” (p. 256)

“the costs of such warfare are enormous,” and that “the costs may far exceed any conceivable benefit that can be derived from defense in revolutionary warfare,” (p. 256)

“less well-understood and much more important” costs, such as “the intangible costs of revolutionary warfare, the moral, psychological, and political costs,” (p. 256)

“**counterinsurgency** often compels much more brutal methods of fighting than other kinds of warfare. I do not mean more destructive methods, but more debasing, dehumanizing methods,” (p. 256)

“Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. We all know, since we were told yesterday, that the essential problem in **guerrilla warfare** is **intelligence**—how to find out what the enemy is up to and how to keep him from finding out what you are up to. We also know that were **guerrillas** have the enthusiastic support of much of the population and where it is not feasible to protect anti**guerrilla** civilians against reprisals, obtaining **intelligence** requires what one gentleman on the platform here called “unusual” methods. Not to mince words about it, it often requires methods like the French used in Algeria, torture and counterterrorism. For this reason, among many others, **counterinsurgent** warfare tends to brutalize even the best-intentioned of defenders. It corrupts them. And the men whom it corrupts, supreme irony of all, are likely to become the nucleus of extremist movements directed against the very state in whose service they were corrupted. Once men have tortured and terrorized other people, once their veneer of civilization has come off, it is very difficult for them to return easily to humdrum civilized life. They may consequently become an insurrectionary danger against the state themselves. That is the moral cost of **counterinsurgency**.” (pp. 256-257)

“the need to fight a kind of war more elusive, ambiguous, and less resolvable than any other kind of war,” because “you often do not know who your enemy is, where he is, what he is going to do,” and “decisive battles are rarely fought,” (p. 257)

“Because of the brutal method one often has to use in **counterinsurgent** warfare...one will forfeit a great deal of goodwill in other countries.... If such methods are used, one is likely also to forfeit the support of much of one’s own civilian population, as indeed happened in France.... The Algerian war not only cost France Algeria, but also her own government” (pp. 257-258)

“if one does not use them sufficiently one is likely to aggressively frustrate the army,” (p. 258)

“in militarily countering **internal wars** you may often be compelled to do things which simply create potential for more **internal wars**. In that case, the cost of **counterinsurgency** certainly exceeds the benefit. The costs are great, and the benefits are zero,” (p. 258)

“**internal wars** tend to scar and to unsettle societies for very long periods, no matter who wins them,” (p. 258)

“it is never over when the enemy has been defeated,” for “there remains the problem, which may never be solved at all, of restoring truly legitimate authority, of making loyal subjects out of defeated enemies,” (p. 258)

“nothing I have said so far is meant to suggest that we dispense with military knowledge of **counterinsurgency**,” but simply that “such knowledge is grossly insufficient,” (p. 259)

“knowledge of how to turn revolutionary forces to our own account, how to use revolutionary ferment,” (p. 259)

“there has been too much talk at the symposium about **counterinsurgency** and too little about the fine art of **insurgency** or conspiracy,” (p. 259)

“if **internal wars** are all that have to be coped with, maybe we should learn to shape them instead of always surrendering one of the most volatile forces in human life to the other side,” (p. 259)

revolutions are not “always made by tightly knit conspiracies,” (p. 259). Rather, “in their initial stages most serious **internal wars** are quite inchoate. They are formless matter waiting to be shaped—unallocated political resources.... The **Communists** are particularly good at them,” (p. 259)

“try to exploit the arts of conspiracy, if I may put it that baldly,” (p. 260)

“how to reestablish legitimate authority and turn one’s enemies into loyal subjects,” (p. 260)

“knowledge of how to prevent **internal wars**, how to reduce **internal war** potential,” (p. 260)

“**civic action**...repression or conciliation of dissident elements,” and as such raises the question, “to what extent should one follow a hard or soft line or a combination of the two?” (p. 260)

“knowledge of how to measure **internal war** potential, much as a thermometer measures the intensity of some diseases, since the policy one uses before **internal wars** break out depends to a very large extent on the extent of **internal war** potential,” (p. 262)

“knowledge of the causes of revolutionary ferment in order to be able to repress it at its source, or for that matter to induce it at the source,” (p. 262)

“it is better to prevent **internal war** than to win it,” (p. 262)

“If all this is true, it seems to follow that the problems of **counterinsurgency** are primarily **social science** problems and civilian problems. I do not think I say this with a

social scientist's conceit, because having said it I must immediately confess that, at present, **social scientists** have very little to contribute on any of the required areas of knowledge, and I have very little hope for the future." (p. 262)

1.3.16 Speier: "Remarks in Panel Discussion" (pp. 290-295)

"I propose that a qualified **social scientist** is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain **intelligence**. But this must be done in the field, because attention must be given to the special circumstances and conditions at a given time and place." (p. 292)

1.4 Windle and Vallance: "The Future of Military Psychology: Paramilitary Psychology"

"It can be argued that the **development** of sciences is shaped by societal needs. This relationship is especially close for those parts of a science which are tied to a particular application, as in military psychology," (p. 119)

"Activity in this field can be measured fairly exactly by the amount of federal money spent on defense," (p. 119)

"Later in the war and during the cold war years, psychologists became involved in varying degrees with many more elements in the personnel management system...and, most important of all, the interaction of these elements in integrated systems," (p. 120)

"Most military psychologists have predicted continuations of present trends in military activities and, consequently, in military psychology.... Accepting the premise that the **military establishment** will continue to increase its capabilities to fight general and **limited wars**, these predictions seem reasonable. However, a broader context of national objectives suggests that increase in traditional military power may no longer have the relatively high priority accorded to it in recent years," (p. 120)

"There is considerable evidence that societal needs may be changing, thus making an extrapolation of continued military **developments** inappropriate. One basis for this prediction is the instability, as well as the generally recognized undesirability, of an arms race.... A less emotional argument stems from indications that generally the means for countering threats to mutual security are changing from conventional or nuclear military capabilities to unconventional warfare and political and economic conflict," (p. 120)

“Current events strongly suggest that the major arena of **Communist-Free World** conflict has shifted from military struggle in Europe to economic and political rivalry in the many underdeveloped parts of the world,” (p. 120)

“The gap between the rising aspirations of the peoples of **underdeveloped countries** and their level of living is being employed as an increasingly long lever with which a small **Communist** force can unseat governments backed with Western military power. The most effective defense against this **insurgent** mode of **Communist** aggression appears to be to prevent the **development** of this lever of popular discontent—to provide non-**Communist** solutions to political and economic problems,” (pp. 120-121)

“The new functions of the military were greatly broadened by President Kennedy in his emphasis upon countering **insurgency** in **underdeveloped nations** and the consequent build-up of **Special Forces** strength,” (p. 121)

“Generally, **counterinsurgency**, the currently most popular term for the Army cold war effort, involves three types of functions: **counterguerrilla warfare**, **Psychological Operations**, and **civic actions**.... In particular military operations, these functions must be coordinated, thus integrating military, economic, psychological, political, and social considerations,” (p. 121)

“To counter political control by terrorism, police operations must be strengthened and the organizations conducting the terrorism identified and exterminated,” (p. 121)

“The general characteristic of **counterguerrilla warfare** is the use or threat of use of force against **guerrillas**, those who apply force against the local government or occupying force. However...the crucial role of the general populace in supporting **guerrillas** require special tactics and consideration of the psychological impact of actions upon the populace,” (p. 121)

“**Psychological Operations** include, of course, the relatively traditional use of mass media. In the cold war these operations are directed toward friendly and neutral as well as enemy countries. In addition, there is growing recognition of the possibility and desirability of using other means such as military movements, policy statements, economic transactions, and **developmental** assistance for psychological impact. This reorientation is implicit in the broadened title of Department of the Army Field Manual 33-5 which was changed from ‘**Psychological Warfare** in Combat Operations’ in 1949, to ‘**Psychological Warfare** Operations’ in 1955, to ‘**Psychological Operations**’ in 1962,” (p. 121)

“**Civic action** is, perhaps, the most fringelike of the new Army functions,” (p. 121)

“The overlap with the Agency for International **Development**’s mission is apparent and the break with our traditional separation of the military from activities which smack of politics is sharp,” (p. 121)

“**Civic action** consists of military programs, usually by indigenous forces and often aided by United States materiel and advice, to promote economic and social **development** and civilian good will in order to achieve political stability or a more favorable environment for the military forces. This is technical assistance by military forces for relatively immediate security objectives,” (p. 121)

“These programs have consisted of the use of troops to do such low-cost **developmental** actions as building roads and schools, or to improve community relations by projects such as organizing youth activities, giving free entertainment or medical aid to civilians,” (p. 121)

“The potential of foreign military forces for modernization may be increasingly tapped as the tide of expectations in **developing nations** continues to rise,” (p. 121)

“Army recognition that these cold war missions require **social science** support is seen in a recent symposium conducted by the **Special Operations** Research Office of American University. Research on cold war problems is being increasingly supported by the several military services and also by the Department of Defense,” (pp. 121-122)

“This shift in values within the **Defense Department** also appears in alterations in research expenditures among federal agencies, which in themselves probably account for about a quarter of the funds spent on **social science** research in the United States,” (p. 122)

“National Science Foundation estimates of federal obligations for psychological research indicate a decrease, absolutely as well as proportionately, in Department of Defense sponsorship,” (p. 122)

“The Department of State is listed as having no psychological research,” (p. 122)

“These figures suggest several lines of thought: The first is...that psychologists have now been displaced from their previous prominence in the behavioral sciences by other professions,” (p. 122)

“Or, more likely, while psychologists have been responsive to military needs, others have been or are expected to be responsive to State Department needs,” (p. 122)

“The kinds of problems involved in nation building are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other **social scientists**, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit. What role psychologists can or will play in this enterprise will be determined in part by how well they conceptualize the applications of their science in technical **development**,” (p. 122)

“Probably psychologists’ contributions to the social need for more economic, social, and political **development** will consist largely of an attempt to apply techniques built up in military research,” (p. 122)

“In the area of national **development**, psychology should attend the more challenging problems of what needs to be done. This...will of necessity cut across the lines of scientific disciplines, and should go far to remedy a major deficiency of current-day **social science**, the weakness of interdisciplinary research,” (p. 123)

“Military psychologists have played a prominent role in the design of man-machine systems. It would be surprising if they could not also play a role in the design of social systems. Such research would serve as the underpinnings for policy formulations,” (p. 123)

“Wolf, an economist, has suggested a model for allocating foreign aid which is based in part on such psychological variables as ‘expectations’ and ‘aspirations.’ In brief, Wolf argues that our foreign aid is aimed at reducing political vulnerability to extremism, which is a product of disparity between aspirations and perceptions of reality,” (p. 124)

“The equivalence of these demographic indices to attitudes and the possibility of establishing the relation between personal attitudes and societal impact are problems that psychologists should try to answer,” (p. 124)

“Psychologists should be able to apply some of their experience from child and clinical psychology to increase understanding of psychological conditions in **developing nations**—and perhaps suggest therapeutic measures which more developed nations might take,” (p. 124)

“Kunkel, a sociologist, has illustrated the applicability of operant conditioning principles to description of the relationship between the individual and the social environment in transitional societies. If this effort is to be useful, psychologists should take advantage of the suggestions of measurable relationships which such a behavioristic perspective affords to identify and confirm concrete steps by which desired behaviors can be reinforced,” (pp. 124-125)

“The high incidence of military intervention in politics in **underdeveloped countries** indicates the importance of this problem of role interpretation. Psychologists might contribute toward a better understanding by use of such techniques as Guetzkow’s simulation of international rivalry applied to the institutions of a particular nation,” (p. 125)

“It is often said that giving begets expectations of more gifts, arouses resentment, and encourages sloth. These statements are used to attack economic aid (as well as domestic welfare) programs. On so important an issue it would be desirable to see experimentation, or at least some delineation of the conditions which may affect recipients in ways pertinent to the goals of the donors. If aid acts as reinforcement, we might at least see what behaviors we are reinforcing,” (p. 125)

“We share Tyler’s view that interdisciplinary research is on the increase. This crossing of disciplinary lines is most likely when a multifaceted issue is engaged, forcing those

who would understand to encompass broader viewpoints. The issues within national **development** seem sufficiently broad to produce much integration of sciences,” (p. 125)

“We would predict that increasing salience of problems in nation building will act primarily to increase interest in certain areas of psychology which have been in existence for some time. The types of areas which may receive more attention include: persuasive communication.... diffusion of innovations.... [and] cultural factors in organization design,” (pp. 125-127)

“The personal ethic of aristocratic internationalism has given way, as governmental officials became recruited from and supported by the population of a nation, to a nationalism wherein each nation establishes its own ethical system with presumed universality. This new moral force of nationalistic universalism makes propaganda, or the use and creation of intellectual convictions, moral valuations, and emotional preferences, an important arm of foreign policy. Accordingly a major part of the battle for men’s minds is being fought with words as weapons,” (p. 126)

“Western affluence and concentration upon liberty and the pursuit of happiness may lead us to overlook the widespread material needs which condition the receptivity of the peoples we wish to influence,” (p. 126)

“Advisors must discover, call forth and refine felt needs and positive ideas within individuals and groups in such a manner that the individuals and groups feel that the ideas are their own creation,” (p. 126)

“Westerners tend to be relatively naïve concerning both political theory and practice, probably because of the success of the pragmatic approach, our long history of isolation, and our relative ‘equality of condition’,” (p. 127)

“Kissinger has stressed the primacy of the need for political **development** over economic **development**, thus suggesting a reversal of priorities in our aid program during the last decade,” (p. 127)

“Although the presence of psychologists working in, on, and for our military institutions will continue indefinitely, the shifting currents of foreign policy and the Clauswitzian uses of the military arm as an extension thereof will lead to interesting revisions in objectives, methods, and conceptual content of their research. We are forecasting a trend away from emphases on human components for hardware systems toward emphasis on human components of social systems, and an increase in the study of human interaction and communication across cultural boundaries,” (p. 128)

1.5 SORO: “Camelot Planning Letters”

1.5.1 SORO: “December 4, 1964” (Horowitz, ed., 1967, pp. 47-49)

“Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the **developing nations** of the world,” (p. 47)

“Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are: *First*, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for **internal war** within national societies; *Second*, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for **internal war**; and *Finally*, to assess the feasibility of prescribing characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things,” (pp. 47-48)

“The project is conceived as a three to four-year effort to be funded at around one and one-half million dollars annually. It is supported by the Army and the Department of Defense, and will be conducted with the cooperation of other agencies of the government,” (p. 48)

“At this writing, it seems probable that the geographic orientation of the research will be toward Latin American countries. Present plans call for a field office in that region,” (p. 48)

“Project CAMELOT is an outgrowth of the interplay of many factors and forces. Among these is the assignment in recent years of much additional emphasis to the U.S. Army’s role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the **less developed countries** in the world,” (p. 48)

“The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of **counterinsurgency** (some pronounceable term standing for **insurgency** prophylaxis would be better),” (p. 48)

“This places great importance on positive actions designed to reduce the sources of disaffection which often give rise to more conspicuous and violent activities disruptive in nature. The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of **nation building** as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active **insurgency** problems,” (p. 48)

“Another major factor is the recognition at the highest levels of the **defense establishment** of the fact that relatively little is known, with a high degree of surety, about the social processes which must be understood in order to deal effectively with problems of **insurgency**. Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army

is to discharge its responsibilities in the over-all **counterinsurgency** program of the U.S. Government,” (pp. 48-49)

“Project CAMELOT will be a multidisciplinary effort. It will be conducted both within the SORO organization and in close collaboration with universities and other research institutions within the United States and overseas,” (p. 49)

“Early participants in the project will thus have an unusual opportunity to contribute to the shaping of the research program and also to take part in a seminar planned for the summer of 1965. The seminar, to be attended by leading behavioral scientists of the country, will be concerned with reviewing plans for the immediate future and further analyzing the long-run goals and plans for the project,” (p. 49)

1.5.2 SORO: “December 5, 1964” (Horowitz, ed., 1967, pp. 50-55)

“1. Measurement of **internal war** potential: a means for identifying, measuring and forecasting the potential for **internal war**. 2. Estimation of reaction effects: a means for estimating the relative effectiveness of various military and quasi-military postures, practices, and levels of military involvement over a wide range of environmental conditions. 3. Information collection and handling systems: means and procedures for rapid collection, storage and retrieval of data on **internal war** potential and effects of governmental action, with appropriate consideration of existing and likely future facilities for processing and analysis,” (pp. 50-51)

“The U.S. Army **counterinsurgency** mission places broad responsibilities on the Army for planning and conducting operations involving a wide spectrum of sociopolitical problems which are integral parts of **counterinsurgency** operations,” (p. 51)

“The problem of **insurgency** is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the **developing countries** and their transition toward modernization. Some of these countries are just emerging into a new era of economic and social **development**; some are ruled or controlled by oligarchies which, in order to maintain their own favored positions, resist popular social and political movements toward economic or social betterment and removal of frustrations; still other have only recently obtained political independence,” (p. 51)

“In the present framework of modernization...the indicated approach is to try to obviate the need for **insurgency** through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological **development**,” (p. 51)

“Responsibility for conducting **counterinsurgency** operations must rest with the indigenous government. Carefully applied assistance and advice by U.S. governmental agencies can, however, materially influence the outcome,” (p. 51)

“The most fruitful efforts would be those designed to achieve early detection and prevention of the predisposing conditions,” (p. 52)

“**Counterinsurgency** operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will promote orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals,” (p. 52)

“It is far more effective and economical to avoid **insurgency** through essentially constructive efforts than to counter it after it has grown into a full-scale movement requiring drastically greater effort,” (p. 52)

“Although U.S. **counterinsurgency** doctrine during the past few years has stressed preventive measures, the scientific knowledge on which to base such doctrine has been weak,” (p. 52)

“That there is a poverty of knowledge in this area is understandable. **Social science** resources have not yet been adequately mobilized to study social conflict and control,” (p. 52)

“If the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of **counterinsurgency** it must recognize that **insurgency** represents a breakdown of social order and that the social processes involved must be understood. Conversely, the processes which produce a stable society must also be understood,” (p. 53)

“Throughout, the work of Project Camelot will be characterized by an orientation which views a country and its problems as a complex social system,” (p. 53)

“When groups fail to function so as to provide for the needs of the people that make up these groups, there is a tendency for them to break down and for their symbols to change meaning or lose value. People then tend to become involved in other lines of action which they perceive to be leading to a change for the better. Such actions may include sabotage, wildcat strikes, shootings and other acts of violence which, when continued, lead to a breakdown of law and order, to an inability of the economy to provide regularly for minimum essential needs and services, and to a further discrediting of the holders of political power. Much of this action comes under the label of **insurgency**.” (p. 53)

Appendix 2

Discursive Themes Listed by Discourse Object

In this appendix, I will present the data from Appendix 1 grouped by discourse object and, within each object, by “discourse theme.” The “discourse theme” does not correspond directly to the *discursive formation*, but seems closer to a sub-unit of the discursive formation. I grouped the data by themes within each discourse object group simply as an intermediate step in the analysis, and as an aid in writing the analysis for each discourse object and for the IDFs. Essentially, I gathered all of the data from Appendix 1 according to discourse object and then, within each discourse object group, I tried to group all of the selections into common thematic categories and, subsequently, to write a brief description that seemed to capture the essence of their commonality as well as any important particularities that were evident. I used my own words to do this, but tried to remain as close as possible to the language and spirit of the discourse data, rather than pulling out aspects that I thought might have been implicit in the data at this point.

One final note about abbreviations used here. In order to keep straight which quotes come from which authors and articles/texts, I have preceded each passage by its author and an acronym for the appropriate text as follows: *Social Science Research and National Security*, (the “Pool group” articles) is abbreviated SSRNS, the SORO-hosted symposium entitled *Proceedings of the Symposium “The U.S. Army’s Limited-War Mission and Social Science Research”* is abbreviated USALWMSSR, the Windle and Vallance *American Psychologist* article entitled “The Future of Military Psychology:

Paramilitary Psychology” is abbreviated simply FMP, and the two SORO-issued “Camelot planning letters” are credited to SORO and are called “Document Number 1” for the December 4, 1964 letter and “Document Number 2” for the December 5, 1964 letter (these are the titles that Horowitz [1967] gives them in his collection. All of the themes are numbered continuously throughout for ease of reference, and the relevant discourse objects are presented in boldface when they occur in the data. The discourse objects are presented in the same order as they are in Chapter 4. Here are the page numbers:

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2.1 Free World

1. *The Free World is “threatened” by the Communists and needs to “cope with” and “defend” itself against this threat, a task to which social science can contribute through research.*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “social science can contribute to more effective conduct of the **free world’s** defense effort,” (p. 1)

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “the task of developing **free world** techniques for coping with subversives and guerrilla warfare will call for substantial research efforts,” (p. 155)

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Premier Khrushchev has made it perfectly clear that this is the sort of warfare the Sino-Soviet bloc intends to continue to wage against the **Free world**—or, at the very least, to encourage and subsidize—throughout the foreseeable future,” (p. 5)

2. *The above-mentioned “defense of the Free World” is linked to supporting “underdeveloped” countries in staving off Communist influence and subversion, and this is done through increasing these countries’ “stability.”*

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “today the Army is again performing yeoman service in defense of the **Free world** by furnishing expert training and technical assistance, as well as extensive aviation support for troop transport, observation, and resupply, to the hard-pressed Vietnamese in their jungle war against the infiltrating Viet Cong forces,” (p. 6)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “long-term goal in each country must be to achieve the clearly defined cold war objectives of the **Free world**,” (p. 34)

William Kinard, Jr., *USALWMSSR*:

- “in underdeveloped areas of the **Free world**, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure,” (p. 65)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Current events strongly suggest that the major arena of Communist-**Free world** conflict has shifted from military struggle in Europe to economic and political rivalry in the many underdeveloped parts of the world,” (p. 120)

3. *The Free World has “handicapped” itself through the use of “incomprehensible” terminology such as “insurgency” and “counterinsurgency” in describing its defense objectives. These terms actually aid the Communists by not adequately describing the help offered to the Free World by the U.S. Army. Therefore, the Free World should engage in “nomenclatural reform.”*

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the **Free world** not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the Communists have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity,” (p. 90)
- “Counterinsurgency is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the **Free world** and an unconscious assist to the Communists,” (p. 91)
- “Counterinsurgency and insurgency might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the **Free world**,” (p. 91)

2.2 Communism / Communist(s)

4. *Communism is described as being analogous to a “malignant cancer” that seeks constant expansion regardless of situations or circumstances. It is portrayed as a “force” rather than an ideology or political system. Its adherents are not regarded as individuals, but rather as a “militant messianic creed” of “expansionist zealots.”*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- the “militant messianic creed” of these “expansionist zealots” bent on “exporting their utopia” which “justifies and glorifies violence,” and the advantage they have due to their “lack of scruples,” (pp. 106-107). Furthermore “they are immeasurably farther ahead of us in revolutionary theory,” and have “crucial advantages” including “much local support,” “much desperate discontent,” “many sublime and frustrated hopes, and much anachronistic hatred of non-**communist** western systems” (p. 107)

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the most effective means of eradicating the insidious, creeping menace of **Communist** guerrilla aggression and phony ‘wars of liberation’,” (p. 3)
- “we would likewise be inviting eventual catastrophe if we failed to create and maintain the capability to deter or defeat nonnuclear aggression at any level, for all **Communist** effort is shrewdly and determinedly directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction. In other words, if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor **Communist** successes, in the long run they would, like the proverbial ‘little drops of water,’ make an ocean which could engulf us,” (pp. 4-5)

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I want to say right here and now—and I know that my statement will be reinforced by the able speakers who will appear before you—that our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in this world that would destroy all that we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery—which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this **Communist** cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences.... Yet, in this age of great change, the development of the social sciences—the sciences dealing with human nature—has not, in my opinion, kept pace.” (pp. 11-13)

5. *There is an awareness that in the struggle for “hearts and minds,” propaganda is an important weapon both for the Free World and for the Communists. Thus, we must choose our words carefully as they are no doubt doing the same. We can also benefit from studying their communication methods and adjusting our own, lest we use terms that create a “handicap to the Free World and an unconscious assist to the Communists.”*

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of guerrillas and indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of **Communist** vulnerabilities by psychological operations under varying conditions of cold warfare.” (pp. 16-17)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I emphasize this definition to insure that we have a common understanding of terms. Under it, what we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be limited-war from the viewpoint of the non-**Communist** nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The **Communists** term these conflicts “wars of liberation.” We call them “wars of subversion or covert aggression.”... I suggest that you may wish to employ the definition of cold war which I have given for uniformity, at least in your initial deliberations.” (pp. 28-29)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “in underdeveloped areas of the Free World, where **Communist** subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure,” (p. 65)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “One of the major requirements faced in this field is that of nomenclatural reform. It is necessary that the Free World not handicap itself by adopting neutral or incomprehensible terms when the **Communists** have terms which in themselves provide a motivational force for the counterpart activity. For instance, it is

unnecessary to go to the extravagant lengths which the **Communists** carry their terminology, but there is surely a middle ground in which easy and common sense reform is practicable....

Combat propaganda is of course plain English but it has political handicaps within the U.S. domestic scene which make administrators wary of it. In a more serious vein it can be pointed out that insurgency is much too flattering a word to be applied to the terrorism and banditry which the **Communists** use. Counterinsurgency is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the Free World and an unconscious assist to the **Communists**.” (pp. 90-91)

6. *Communists attempt to further their international Cold War aims through their support of what they call “wars of liberation” (which the Free World call “wars of subversion or covert aggression”) in the developing countries of the world. Through these efforts, they hope to win the support of the masses of the population in these areas. We must prevent them from winning both the wars and the indigenous support in order to protect the Free World. Furthermore, we must win the support of these populations ourselves through our own psychological operations and also through assisting in social and economic development and through “military assistance” and “civic action.”*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “it is particularly likely today that the **communist** states will use internal wars as tools of international politics. They have already done so frequently in the postwar period and are likely to do so frequently in the future,” (p. 106)

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “our initial adventures in military assistance were primarily in response to civil conflicts in which we sought to strengthen the anti-**communist** forces, as in our aid to Greece and Nationalist China,” (p. 149)
- our strategy of “containment” of **communism** led us to provide “military reinforcements to weak countries adjacent to the **communist** bloc,” “toward providing internal security against guerrilla and irregular forces,” in Korea and elsewhere, and also “to eliminate the power vacuums which the new countries represent by building up their defense forces,” (p. 149)
- “most of the critics...have felt little sense of urgency about possible military threats to the underdeveloped countries,” and “have increasingly contended that the **communist** threat in the underdeveloped countries is not military but arises almost entirely from domestic social and economic conditions,” (p. 150)

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of guerrillas, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional **Communist** challenge—in

paramilitary warfare, in psychological warfare, and in conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force.” (p. 15)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- First is that “our country has arrived at the pinnacle of world power,” albeit “reluctantly,” (p. 26). “The non-**Communist** world must look to us and to us alone for leadership,” (p. 26)
- Four characteristics of cold war as waged by the **Communists**. First, the “level of provocation is kept low and ambiguous,” in order to “force the opposing side into a gradual withdrawal,” (p. 29)
- Second, “the major **Communist** powers seek to avoid participation by their own regular forces,” utilizing indigenous forces trained by **Communist** military “advisors and technicians,” (p. 29)
- “in order to satisfy the basic needs of the people in the underdeveloped areas, and to orient them away from **communism**, social and economic assistance will be required on a long-term basis.... Therefore, we must gain the initiative through positive measures which will enable us to anticipate, as well as to counter and defeat, **Communist** cold war pressures,” (p. 31)
- “long-term goal in each country must be to achieve the clearly defined cold war objectives of the Free World. To accomplish this, there must be created a secure and stable environment for political, social, and economic growth,” which will necessitate helping our allies to “arrest **Communist** expansion,” “gain and maintain internal security,” and “foster economic and social growth and political stability,” (p. 34)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sublimated or unconventional wars,” which will be “necessary to counter **Communist**-sponsored guerrillas or insurgents,” (p. 62)

Phillips Davison, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the developing nations...make up the largest portion of the world,” and also that “the stability of these areas is extremely important for the United States when it comes to safeguarding its own peace and freedom, and it is here that **Communist** forces are trying as hard as they can to promote instability,” (p. 158)

Frederick Yu, *USALWMSSR*:

- “it is not enough to teach the Vietnamese, Laotians, or Koreans how to fight **communism**. An equally important task is why they should fight it,” (p. 215)
- “This is not a task that we can hope to accomplish with clever posters, catchy slogans, entertaining films, or even convincing publications. Those who fight on our side in this limited-war must undergo a set of vigorous mental gymnastics or ideological exercises to discover for themselves the purpose of this conflict as well as their role in it. I must hasten to point out that I am not intimating anything that is remotely similar to the **Communist** concept of indoctrination or their scheme of propaganda, both obviously distasteful to us.” (pp. 216-217)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Most of us think are always made by tightly knit conspiracies,” (p. 259). However, “in their initial stages most serious internal wars are quite inchoate. They are formless matter waiting to be shaped—unallocated political resources.... The **Communists** are particularly good at them,” (p. 259)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Current events strongly suggest that the major arena of **Communist**-Free World conflict has shifted from military struggle in Europe to economic and political rivalry in the many underdeveloped parts of the world,” (p. 120)
- “The gap between the rising aspirations of the peoples of underdeveloped countries and their level of living is being employed as an increasingly long lever with which a small **Communist** force can unseat governments backed with Western military power. The most effective defense against this insurgent mode of **Communist** aggression appears to be to prevent the development of this lever of popular discontent—to provide non-**Communist** solutions to political and economic problems,” (pp. 120-121)

7. *Concerns that the U.S. might appear to be “hypocritical” if it provides “billions of dollars” for economic and social development, propaganda and military measures, while at the same time maintaining a doctrine of “nonintervention.”*

Gerard Mangone, *USALWMSSR*:

- “It reminds me of the doctrine of nonintervention. The United States is not intervening in other people’s affairs. All we do is give them billions of dollars to transform their economic system, send abroad missionaries of one kind or another, give them technical assistance that will change their mores, political advice, obtain military bases, use all the propaganda mechanisms at our disposal; but our policy is nonintervention in the affairs of other people. What does the United States believe? What does the United States offer? We always retreat into the slogan that we can’t do things the way the **Communists** do them.... We somehow have to help foreign peoples “discover themselves.”... Are we really performing our task adequately or retreating into myths about the views of people abroad? Are we hypocritical in what we are trying to achieve overseas?” (pp. 238-239)

2.3 Underdeveloped (Areas/Countries/Nations) / Backward Countries / Newly Emerging Countries / New (States/Countries/Nations) / Developing (Countries/Areas/Nations) / Less Developed Countries / Ex-Colonial Countries

8. *The “developing nations” in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America are becoming increasingly important to American foreign policy as we continue to develop an increasingly global strategy and outlook. In these areas, Communists are*

trying “as hard as they can” to “promote instability” which could threaten our own “peace and freedom.” In order to counter this threat, we must “bring order” to these areas, and this responsibility rests at least initially with the U.S. Military.

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- our attitude toward these unfortunate “**backward countries**” has been “colored by our sensitivity to [their] problems,” but that we in the U.S. “have yet to achieve a clear appreciation,” of their significance (p. 147)
- the centrality of these “**newly emerging**” **countries** to “every phase of American foreign policy-making,” (p. 148)

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “SORO exists because we and our academic partners recognize that refinements and sophistication of hardware are fruitless without concurrent improved understanding of peoples and their societies, particularly in the **underdeveloped areas** of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South America,” (pp. 14-15)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “in **underdeveloped areas** of the Free World, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to build stable nations, and people are the key to success or failure,” (p. 65)

Phillips Davison, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the **developing nations**...make up the largest portion of the world,” and “the stability of these areas is extremely important for the United States when it comes to safeguarding its own peace and freedom, and it is here that Communist forces are trying as hard as they can to promote instability,” (p. 158)

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “immediately after World War II, the Army had almost no concern with the **underdeveloped areas**,” and “only gradually as we developed a worldwide strategy did we become aware of the possible significance of the **underdeveloped areas**,” (p. 161)
- “the U.S. Army in one form or another has become more and more deeply involved in the problems of bringing order and progress to **underdeveloped countries**,” and “I predict that in the next few years this interest will increase at an exponential rate,” (p. 162)

SORO, “Document Number 1”:

- “Project CAMELOT is an outgrowth of the interplay of many factors and forces. Among these is the assignment in recent years of much additional emphasis to the U.S. Army’s role in the over-all U.S. policy of encouraging steady growth and change in the **less developed countries** in the world,” (p. 48)

9. *The “developing countries” are also ex-colonial countries which are newly experiencing independence and whose people are hungry for social, economic, and political improvements which they had been denied under their past colonial regimes. The U.S. must enact programs to at least minimally address these demands lest these people choose instead to cast their lots with the Communists. Ultimately the struggle in these developing countries, which represents a significant front in the Cold War, is one for the loyalty (the “hearts and minds”) of the people in these countries.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “examples of the instability that ensues from the estrangement of an elite are furnished in profusion by the Westernized elites of many currently **underdeveloped areas**,” (p. 120)

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “most of the critics...have felt little sense of urgency about possible military threats to the **underdeveloped countries**,” and “have increasingly contended that the communist threat in the **underdeveloped countries** is not military but arises almost entirely from domestic social and economic conditions,” (p. 150)
- “in most of the **new countries** in which armies have come to power, the build-up of the military has not been related to international wars and a process of national mobilization.... Since the process of military build-up was not related to a popular war effort, armies which gain dominance under such conditions usually do not have effective ties with the masses of the population,” (p. 157)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the increased importance of military counterinsurgency capabilities,” involves two factors: “(1) The emergence of many **developing nations**, newly independent, which are inviting targets of subversion and covert aggression,” and “(2) The overwhelming destructive potential of all-out nuclear warfare,” (p. iv)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “as President Kennedy emphasized, the key Cold War areas are principally in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are particularly fertile areas for conflict. Here, **new nations** are emerging from colonial status and free people—impatient with slow reforms—are struggling for dramatic and immediate economic and political growth,” (pp. 30-31)
- “in order to satisfy the basic needs of the people in the **underdeveloped areas**, and to orient them away from communism, social and economic assistance will be required on a long-term basis.... Therefore, we must gain the initiative through positive measures which will enable us to anticipate, as well as to counter and defeat, Communist cold war pressures,” (p. 31)

Robert Slover, *USALWMSSR*:

- “In the **less developed countries**, economically, sociologically, and sometimes politically, we are seeing today the desire on the part of the people for a better way of life. These are areas where a type of social revolution is under way. These are the

battlegrounds of the Cold War.... The side that wins support of the people will win the battle.” (p. 70)

10. *As we confront the challenges represented by the “developing nations” in the Cold War, there is a difference of opinion within the U.S. government between those who advocate a military agenda and those who advocate one based on economic and social aid. Some who advocate the former, however, maintain that it can also be a positive force for economic and social development, and can inculcate the “correct” values among these peoples. Additionally, the U.S. military can directly inhibit the formation of insurgent movements through assistance in the development of the indigenous military forces in these countries, and this will have the added benefit of providing these people with an increased sense of autonomy, strong national identity, and self-respect. Thus the work of “development” can also be understood as a kind of counterinsurgency operation.*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- our strategy of “containment” of communism led us to provide “military reinforcements to weak countries adjacent to the communist bloc,” “toward providing internal security against guerrilla and irregular forces,” in Korea and elsewhere, and also “to eliminate the power vacuums which the **new countries** represent by building up their defense forces,” (p. 149)
- “champions of developmental aid on the basis of strictly economic criteria” charge that “American military aid has created abnormal situations in the recipient **underdeveloped countries** and has forced their governments to make grossly uneconomic allocations of their resources,” (p. 150)
- “in pressing the case for the potentially constructive role military aid can have for economic development, some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that the military in many **underdeveloped countries** are more competent than civilians in performing certain crucial functions in furthering economic development,” (p. 151)
- “For the West even to appear to oppose military development in the **new countries** can be easily interpreted by the people, given these psychological considerations, to be an indication that the West persists in wanting to keep them in a subordinate and less than fully sovereign position.... A **new country** feels that the real test of when it has gained its full independence is passed when those who were its former rulers are willing to share with them the weapons and the means of violence which once were the monopoly of the Europeans.” (p. 154)
- “What in a military sense do the **underdeveloped areas** represent in the currently divided world? What kinds of war are most likely to be fought in these areas? And what types of military forces should we seek to encourage these countries to build up?” (p. 154)
- “the role of armies in the **underdeveloped areas** as a powerful source for assisting, and even guiding and stimulating, basic economic development,” (p. 154)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “it is the armed forces themselves, and the army in particular, in these **underdeveloped nations** that in many cases offer the best hope in gaining the support of the people,” (p. 66)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “The problem of insurgency is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the **developing countries** and their transition toward modernization. Some of these countries are just emerging into a new era of economic and social development; some are ruled or controlled by oligarchies which, in order to maintain their own favored positions, resist popular social and political movements toward economic or social betterment and removal of frustrations; still other have only recently obtained political independence,” (p. 51)

11. The social sciences are pivotally significant for the U.S. Military as it confronts the challenges represented by the “developing nations.” These challenges are complex and require a sophisticated understanding of the many different factors involved. Achieving an understanding that takes into account all of these factors can be greatly aided by the usage of social science methodology, research, and knowledge. The U.S. Military has a “need to know” this information in order to carry out the counterinsurgency mission assigned to it, and it needs the help of the social sciences to collate and analyze the necessary information and to accomplish the mission. Thus, the social sciences are in a “strong position” to assist in the Cold War effort.

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “without question, social science research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces” in the **new countries**, and “the task of developing free world techniques for coping with subversives and guerrilla warfare will call for substantial research efforts,” (p. 155)

Morroe Berger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “First, if the Army wants to use social science, it may find that it has to direct social science towards its own problems and interests. Second, if it does use social science, I think the Army ought, even for its own interest, to take a broad view of what social science is and may become. Third, if the Army believes that it must go into civic action in **underdeveloped areas**, it ought to do so, I think, without encumbering illusions about making military regimes palatable to the people they control and without dubious analogies to the American Frontier. Political problems are tough. So we like to avoid them. But I think we shall find that engineering projects are not a substitute for political education.” (pp. 183-184)

William Johnstone, *USALWMSSR*:

- “The problem which most of these countries have is a problem of their own making in part in that most **ex-colonial countries** have adopted the form of government of the metropole power. The Burmese adopted a British-type system. The French colonies

have followed the same pattern to some extent. And this has been adopted usually in a hurry and without too much previous experience and usually has proved rather unsatisfactory. How do you get in a newly **developing country** or **ex-colonial country** a strong executive which can manage the economy and engage in economic planning, develop economic and social progress on a countrywide basis, at the same time have any kind of what we would call democratic rights or representative type of government?" (pp. 188-189)

Frederick Yu, *USALWMSSR*:

- This "is a problem which involves the whole question of man, society, and ideas and it requires explorations in territories that are not normally included in the maps for students of political affairs or military science. And I venture to suggest that if we tackle this problem vigorously, wisely, and successfully, we may gain a body of totally new knowledge which we do not yet possess about the **developing countries**, open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior, and, conceivably, offer significant clues to our planning of limited-war." (p. 212)
- "we need plans to mobilize all the people in the **developing countries**, particularly the intellectuals, to ponder on the questions which we have discussed," (p. 217)
- We also need to produce more "theoretical work," "studies," "serious thinking," and "all the data we can get on the ideas and images that people in the **developing countries** have about themselves," (p. 217)

SORO, "Document Number 1":

- "Project CAMELOT is a study whose objective is to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the **developing nations** of the world," (p. 47)

12. *The people of the "developing nations" can be understood as analogous to adolescents who "are in the process of growing up" and "do not really know what they want to be." They are also struggling to balance their "traditional" cultural identities with their desire to "Westernize" and "modernize" their culture. It is the job of the U.S. to act as a kind of parent, not to tell them the answers, but to provide tools which will be helpful in their search.*

Frederick Yu, *USALWMSSR*:

- "The **new states** in Asia are trying to achieve the double end of becoming like the West with respect to their political, economic, and social life, and at the same time remaining themselves with respect to their own traditions and culture. They want to Westernize; they want to maintain their own cultural identity.... To maintain the cultural identity, an Asian country must derive some special sense of uniqueness and superiority of its traditional heritage. In other words, it seeks to distinguish itself from the rest of Asia, not to identify itself with any particular culture of civilization. In either of the two expressed aims of Asian countries, therefore, there is not much room for an interest in Asia." (p. 207)

- “to help the people in **developing countries** find the answers,” on their own even though “the answers are not readily available,” and “remain to be developed,” (p. 213)
- “people in **developing countries** are undergoing unparalleled rapid changes,” and “they are constantly confronted with the problem of trying to decide on the right ideas to have, the right things to believe, the right courses to take,” (pp. 213-214)
- “telling the **developing countries** what they should want and what they should do,” this is not the American way and “this we cannot do. This we should not do. To be blunt, we do not have all the answers,” (p. 214)
- “people in the **developing countries** do not really know what they want to be. They are in the process of growing up. They are searching frantically for a purpose in life and a reason in the things they do, believe, and want. But they do not really know what they should do or want, except that, in a very vague way, they want to be strong, successful, great, happy, and prosperous,” (p. 214)

13. *A multitude of different terms are used to designate the “developing nations,” coupled with a paternalism, an ignorance of the history of colonialism, and even a degree of contempt or hostility indicated by such terms as “backward country.”*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “**new country**,” a “**newly emerging country**,” a “**developing area**,” or a “**backward country**,” (pp. 148-149)

William Johnstone, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I would contend that most of the so-called “**developing countries**”—well, as a matter of fact, the majority of them—are **ex-colonial countries**, and that the period of colonialism is a vast area of ignorance among Americans. We have not studied colonialism, hardly, at all. We are beset by the special pleaders, the apologists for the colonial regimes and by the nationalists who attack the colonial regimes.... We need to know a lot more about what happened during the colonial period. We need to know particularly more about what the attitudes of people were, what concepts of political behavior were injected into the stream of the educated, politically sophisticated people of these colonial territories, most of whom are still participating in their independent governments.” (pp. 186-187)

2.4 Deterrence

14. *The advent of nuclear weapons and the related fact that the dangers of their use shift the nature of military struggles away from international and “total” war and toward intranational “limited” or “internal” war likewise shifts the Free World-Communist struggle away from overt military struggle and toward strategies of “containment” or “deterrence.” Deterrence is useful both in staving off successions of small Communist victories which might erode Free World control, particularly in “developing” areas (where control by either side can be tenuous) and also in*

countering guerrilla aggression. In such cases, deterrence can be accomplished through nonviolent means such as civic action or military aid or even through the sheer semantic force of the terms we use in our communication and propaganda efforts.

Ithiel de Sola Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “the technological revolution in weapons,” and “the change in their primary purpose from use to **deterrence** both increase the demands upon social science,” (p. 7)

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “we would likewise be inviting eventual catastrophe if we failed to create and maintain the capability to **deter** or defeat nonnuclear aggression at any level, for all Communist effort is shrewdly and determinedly directed toward one goal—our ultimate destruction. In other words, if we were unable to prevent a succession of what might individually appear to be relatively minor Communist successes, in the long run they would, like the proverbial ‘little drops of water,’ make an ocean which could engulf us,” (pp. 4-5)
- not “nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the **deterrence** or defeat of guerrilla aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct,” (p. 6)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “The standards for defining new terms should be: first, that these become clear to our own staff and leaders; second, that they provide motivational reasons for energetic action by our citizens and our enlisted men; and third, that by their own semantic force they provide a certain degree of **deterrence** to our antagonists,” (pp. 90-92)

2.5 Limited War(s) / Limited-War(s)

15. Limited war is defined as a form of warfare short of nuclear war or a use of all available conventional forces and is often geared toward smaller strategic or tactical objectives. Also, it is necessary to clarify distinctions among subcategories of limited war or between limited war and similar terms and to be very clear in our use of specific terms and how and why we use them.

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the symposium is concerned with “the military establishment’s **limited-war** mission,” and defining this last term as “forms of conflict short of all-out nuclear war and general conventional war, with stress on ‘wars of subversion and covert aggression’ and the ‘Cold War’,” (p. iii)

General Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- **Limited war** is “short of all-out nuclear devastation...commonly referred to as ‘**limited-war**’,” and “popularly referred to as within the province of ‘Special Forces’,” (p. 15)

- “there are many terms in vogue which cover parts of the mission, and you are familiar with them; such expressions as ‘**sublimited-war**,’ ‘subbelligerent war,’ ‘unconventional warfare,’ ‘cold war,’ ‘paramilitary war,’ and ‘proxy war,’” (p. 15)
- “I think the purposes of this symposium are as important as they are clear: First, to improve your understanding of the Army’s **limited-war** mission; next, to recruit the country’s best social science talents for research and development in support of that mission; and last, to obtain recommendations for you for continuing coordinated scientific support,” (pp. 16-17)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I emphasize this definition to insure that we have a common understanding of terms. Under it, what we term cold war—because U.S. combat troops are not overtly engaged—may well be **limited-war** from the viewpoint of the non-Communist nation in whose homeland this conflict is being fought. The Communists term these conflicts “wars of liberation.” We call them “wars of subversion or covert aggression.”... I suggest that you may wish to employ the definition of cold war which I have given for uniformity, at least in your initial deliberations,” (pp. 28-29)

16. *The U.S. military’s limited war mission offers an opportunity to develop “totally new knowledge” and to “open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior.” It will also necessitate a focus on “development” and “nation-building” and possibly a move away from traditional military force in addressing limited war objectives.*

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “that they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in **limited-war**, that involves an understanding of how a modern society can be built,” (p. 168)

Frederick Yu, *USALWMSSR*:

- “And I venture to suggest that if we tackle this problem vigorously, wisely, and successfully, we may gain a body of totally new knowledge which we do not yet possess about the developing countries, open up new vistas in our understanding of human behavior, and, conceivably, offer significant clues to our planning of **limited-war**,” (p. 212)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Accepting the premise that the military establishment will continue to increase its capabilities to fight general and **limited wars**, these predictions seem reasonable. However, a broader context of national objectives suggests that increase in traditional military power may no longer have the relatively high priority accorded to it in recent years,” (p. 120)

17. *Those who “fight on our side,” in limited wars, the indigenous populations of “developing countries,” must independently arrive at their own reasons for doing so,*

rather than being subjected to propaganda by the Free World as the Communists would do.

Frederick Yu, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Those who fight on our side in this **limited-war** must undergo a set of vigorous mental gymnastics or ideological exercises to discover for themselves the purpose of this conflict as well as their role in it. I must hasten to point out that I am not intimating anything that is remotely similar to the Communist concept of indoctrination or their scheme of propaganda, both obviously distasteful to us,” (pp. 216-217)
- we should provide an opportunity for the developing nations to “do the searching themselves, and that our best hope in a **limited-war** lies in the success of their search,” (p. 217)

2.6 Internal War(s)

18. *Internal war is defined as the “resort to violence” or “political violence” within a “political order” in order to change “constitution, government, or policies.” It is increasingly common and increasingly important relative to U.S. interests, particularly when it occurs in countries that are important to our international plans.*

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- “Somewhat more specifically, one might single out the study of ‘**internal war**,’ that is, of the resort to political violence within communities, a phenomenon which is occurring with extraordinary frequency, with which the intelligence community is deeply involved, and about which the social science literature is far from rich,” (p. 94)

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “the term ‘**internal war**’ denotes any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution, government, or policies,” (p. 102)
- “it can do no harm to consider **internal wars** as all of a piece at the beginning of inquiry and to make distinctions only as they become necessary or advisable,” (p. 104)
- “it ought not to be necessary to urge the study of **internal wars** upon anyone, social scientist or policy-maker. One would expect social scientists to be interested in them simply because they are a common, indeed astonishingly common, facet of human experience,” (p. 104)
- “There is another reason for making a special plea on behalf of the study of **internal wars** at this time.... We have reason to think they will remain commonplace in the future—and even more intimately connected with policy.... While **internal wars** have always been extensions of domestic politics, there are good reasons to believe that they will become especially important in our age as extensions of international politics.... **Internal war** is closely connected with social change.... [Therefore] one should expect internal political violence to persist, perhaps to increase, in a period

when major social change continues to be so widespread and so widely wanted.... Moreover, the likelihood of **internal war** seems to be increased at least in some degree by the shrinking probabilities of international war in the age of “overkill.”... Many **internal wars** are extensions of diplomacy today, and it is clear that in the future they may become even more significant as “diplomatic” means,” (pp. 105-106)

- “countries in which **internal war** might imperil our fundamental international designs,” (p. 134)
- “if my analysis is correct, the incidence of **internal wars** and the urgency of the problems it poses will increase rather than diminish,” (p. 138)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “**internal wars** are as grave a threat to us today as all-out nuclear war or other forms of international war,” (p. 253)

19. Internal wars can be manipulated by the Communists in order to achieve their own ends. In such circumstances, the Free World is generally forced to take on a “defensive” role, which is viewed as being the more difficult position. Given this, preventing such wars before they occur is preferable to having to fight them.

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “it is particularly likely today that the communist states will use **internal wars** as tools of international politics. They have already done so frequently in the postwar period and are likely to do so frequently in the future,” (p. 106)
- “we need a general study of **internal war** even more than a study of the operational aspects of irregular warfare,” particularly since “it is we who are likely to be on the defensive and because in no other field is prevention so much more effective than cure.... The most probable kinds of **internal war**, once started, are difficult, if not impossible, to win by those on the defensive,” (p. 107)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- In “**internal war**...the ‘battle’ situation is primarily an internal conflict within another nation—although our major antagonist may have incited the conflict, or may be exploiting it,” (p. vi)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “in no field of human conflict is prevention so much more important than cure and cure such a very weak substitute for prevention as in **internal war**,” (p. 253).
- “it is extremely difficult to win many kinds of **internal wars** for those on the defensive, and we are on the whole more likely to be on the defensive than the offensive in such conflicts,” (p. 254)
- “in their initial stages most serious **internal wars** are quite inchoate. They are formless matter waiting to be shaped—unallocated political resources.... The Communists are particularly good at them,” (p. 259)
- “it is better to prevent **internal war** than to win it,” (p. 262)

20. *Internal war should be studied using the techniques available to the social sciences. These studies should be wide-ranging and systematic and should include developing the ability to identify and assess factors giving rise to internal wars, and developing the ability to identify actions the indigenous government might take to alleviate these factors. This process includes developing a vocabulary with which to discuss aspects of internal war and to make these aspects more amenable to analysis.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “a ‘precipitant’ of **internal war** is an event which actually starts the war.... ‘Preconditions’ of **internal war**, on the other hand, are those circumstances which make it possible for the precipitants to bring about political violence,” (p. 112)
- “to shift attention from aspects of **internal war** which defy analysis to those which are amenable to systematic inquiry,” (p. 113)
- “the most obvious case for behavioral theories of **internal war** derives from the very fact that so many objective social conditions seem to be associated with it,” (p. 123)
- “So far I have tried to make two related points. The first is that one is most likely to gain an understanding of the forces impelling societies toward **internal war** if one avoids one kind of analysis and emphasizes three others. One should avoid preoccupation with the more visible precipitants of **internal wars**, including conspiracies, and direct one’s efforts to the analysis of three aspects of their much less manifest preconditions: the nature of incumbent elites, “behavioral” characteristics of society, and the analysis of general social processes. The second point is, of course, the converse of these positions: that our understanding of the etiology of **internal wars** is dangerously inadequate precisely because studies have so far concentrated on precipitants rather than preconditions, insurgents rather than incumbents, and objective social conditions rather than social orientations and social processes,” (p. 124)
- “actual cases of **internal war** generally have...some structure for forming political will and acting upon decisions.... And anything with a structure can of course be detected and repressed, though not always very easily,” (p. 125)
- “the study of internal peace...should therefore be part and parcel of the study of **internal war**,” (p. 125)
- “there is practically no limit to the research that can be, and ought to be, undertaken on the subject of **internal war**,” (p. 132)
- “studies of the techniques by which **internal wars** can be molded and channeled are therefore of the utmost importance. The Machiavellian overtones, the apparent cynicism, may make such studies repellent, but that cannot be helped,” (p. 133)
- studies should inquire “very broadly into what might be called ‘symptoms’ (or ‘indicators’) of **internal war** potential,” (p. 134)
- “Rightly conducted, a general inquiry into prerevolutionary conditions could produce an urgently needed generalized resource for **internal war** studies: a large library of well-codified materials (perhaps on IBM cards) which could be used for comparative studies of every description relating to **internal war**,” (p. 137)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “if **internal wars** are all that have to be coped with, maybe we should learn to shape them instead of always surrendering one of the most volatile forces in human life to the other side,” (p. 259)
- We need “knowledge of how to prevent **internal wars**, how to reduce **internal war** potential,” (p. 260)
- “knowledge of how to measure **internal war** potential, much as a thermometer measures the intensity of some diseases, since the policy one uses before **internal wars** break out depends to a very large extent on the extent of **internal war** potential,” (p. 262)

SORO, “Document Number 1”:

- “Somewhat more specifically, its objectives are: *First*, to devise procedures for assessing the potential for **internal war** within national societies; *Second*, to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for **internal war**; and *Finally*, to assess the feasibility of prescribing characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things,” (pp. 47-48)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “1. Measurement of **internal war** potential: a means for identifying, measuring and forecasting the potential for **internal war**. 2. Estimation of reaction effects: a means for estimating the relative effectiveness of various military and quasi-military postures, practices, and levels of military involvement over a wide range of environmental conditions. 3. Information collection and handling systems: means and procedures for rapid collection, storage and retrieval of data on **internal war** potential and effects of governmental action, with appropriate consideration of existing and likely future facilities for processing and analysis,” (pp. 50-51)

21. *Internal wars can be understood as arising from failures or lack of cohesion on the part of the indigenous elite. They are also vitally sustained by the support of the local population.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “**internal wars** are almost invariably preceded by important functional failures on the part of elites,” (p. 121)
- “the most obvious obstacle to **internal war** is, of course, the incumbent regime. It goes almost without saying that by using repression the established authorities can lessen the chances of violent attack upon themselves,” (p. 125)
- “**internal wars** seem rarely to occur, even if other conditions favor them, if a regime’s instruments of violence remain loyal,” (p. 128)
- “**internal wars** are unlikely wherever cohesion of an elite is intact for the simple reason that insurgent formations require leadership and other skills and are unlikely to

obtain them on a large scale without some significant break in the ranks of an elite,” (p. 129)

- “it is the chief dogma of modern revolutionaries that without great popular support the insurgents in an **internal war** can hardly hope to win—unless by means of a coup—and that with such support they are hardly likely to lose. So vital is this factor that some writers think that the distinctive characteristic of **internal war** is the combination of violent techniques with psychological warfare, the latter designed, of course, to win the active support of the noncombatants.... To be sure, psychological warfare occurs nowadays also in international wars. Its role in these, however, is not nearly so crucial as in **internal wars**; it is incidental in international war but...seems to be decisive in **internal war**,” (p. 129)

22. *Internal wars are damaging to the societies in which they occur. Addressing them with conventional military means often only exacerbates that damage. Although we may have a stake in the outcome of such wars, they are primarily the responsibility of the indigenous government and military.*

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the belief...that **internal wars** can be adequately coped with by certain kinds of novel military operations, by fighting operations...is extremely unfortunate,” (p. 253)
- “counterinsurgency is consequently the primary responsibility of civilian authorities and not of the Army, however important a stake the Army has in the matter and however much it can be used by others to reduce **internal war** potential,” (p. 254)
- “in militarily countering **internal wars** you may often be compelled to do things which simply create potential for more **internal wars**. In that case, the cost of counterinsurgency certainly exceeds the benefit. The costs are great, and the benefits are zero,” (p. 258)
- “**internal wars** tend to scar and to unsettle societies for very long periods, no matter who wins them,” (p. 258)

2.7 Social Science(s)

23. *Social Science “can contribute” its “knowledge” to military issues (and should do so!). “Demands” are increasingly placed upon it due both to advances in military technology and to Cold War policy changes. These “demands” are specified in advance by the military according to its own perceived needs. This “contribution” is not to be determined by the scientists, but rather by the military, according to their “requirements.”*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “the objective of this book is to consider what **social science** can contribute to more effective conduct of the free world’s defense effort,” (p. 1)
- “strategic planning, weapon system selection, intelligence, guerilla warfare, and such external relations of the defense establishment as civil-military relations, military

government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the **social sciences** as they now exist might provide contributions,” (p. 5)

- “the technological revolution in weapons,” and “the change in their primary purpose from use to deterrence both increase the demands upon **social science**,” (p. 7)
- “whether the **social sciences** will contribute in proportion to the need,” (p. 10)

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “**social science** research should be able to make significant contributions with respect to all three approaches,” (p. 154)
- “without question, **social science** research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces” (p. 155)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- “In the same sense that a new emphasis on the counterinsurgency mission has resulted in new requirements on the military, a new emphasis is required within the behavioral and **social sciences**,” (p. xi)
- “On the first day, Army officers presented authoritative statements of the Army mission and general requirements for behavioral and **social science** knowledge,” (p. xiv)

Hon. Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the **social sciences**,” (p. 8)

24. *Social Science is “most useful” to the military. The military must use it both for research in “in-house laboratories” and for training purposes, especially for officers. It is of particular value and relevance for its methods of data analysis and of particular use in studying “limited-war.” Recognition of this utility is seen in USALWMSSR.*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “The defense establishment is in a position to stimulate a significant burst of **social science** creativity which could prove most useful to it,” (p. 23)
- “[The DOD] must provide **social science** training for a substantial number of its officers,” (p. 23)
- “[The DOD] should include more fundamental **social science** in the curricula of its military academies,” (p. 23)
- “The Defense Department also needs to maintain and strengthen **social science** in its in-house laboratories,” (p. 23)

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- “as now practiced, intelligence is inconceivable without the **social sciences**,” (p. 78)
- “it is **social science methods** of gathering data, of deducing data from other data, and of establishing the validity of data that are of particular value,” (p. 80)

General Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- Purpose of symposium: “to recruit the country’s best **social science** talents for research and development in support of [the limited-war] mission,” (pp. 16-17)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Army recognition that these cold war missions require **social science** support is seen in a recent symposium conducted by the Special Operations Research Office of American University. Research on cold war problems is being increasingly supported by the several military services and also by the Department of Defense,” (pp. 121-122)

25. *The military can and should influence the direction of development of the social sciences through funding toward an effective linking with “the policy process,” up to and including the creation of a whole new branch of social science focused around a “responsible concern for national security matters” and the recruitment into this branch of “talented individuals.” Increase of funding is advocated in order to “accelerate progress” in (or “develop”) the social sciences using government’s “large and unusual resources.” Along with a new branch goes a new “cadre” with “a new professional role,” equivalent to social science “engineers.” (“Engineering” here involves a focus on applied research and research oriented toward military applications and away from asking basic-research questions or questions concerning the more fundamental aspects of policy.) Particular areas of importance are “limited-war” and issues of “social conflict and control.”*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “How can a branch of **social science** be produced which takes upon itself a responsible concern for national security matters, and how can talented individuals from within **social science** be drawn into this area,” (pp. 10-11)
- “As the **social sciences** become more effectively linked to the policy process, whether in the area of defense or in other areas, they are producing a cadre with a new professional role like that of the engineers,” (pp. 16-17)
- “The defense establishment is in a position to stimulate a significant burst of **social science** creativity which could prove most useful to it,” (p. 23)

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- “a strong case can be made for appreciable financial support of **social science** research on the part of federal agencies,” (p. 94)
- “I am convinced that larger funds, properly administered, would also accelerate progress in the **social sciences**,” (p. 94)

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “the hope is that government, with its large and unusual resources, will see fit to supplement normal **social science** research with support for just such projects,” (p. 132)

- “the utility of an inquiry of this type will be small if it is not carried out on a very large scale...and...with resources not normally available in the **social sciences**,” (p. 137)

William Kinard, Jr., *USALWMSSR*:

- “the implications [of limited-war] for research and development in the fields of **social science** and human factors [are enormous],” (p. 66)

Morroe Berger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “First, if the Army wants to use **social science**, it may find that it has to direct **social science** towards its own problems and interests. Second, if it does use **social science**, I think the Army ought, even for its own interest, to take a broad view of what **social science** is and may become,” (pp. 183-184)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “**Social science** resources have not yet been adequately mobilized to study social conflict and control,” (p. 52)

26. *There is currently a “weakness” in “military-oriented social science,” which is primarily attributable to negative attitudes among social scientists, but also to lack of solicitude by the military. Social science’s “development” is lagging (see theme 3). Also, social science literature is particularly lacking in the area of “internal war,” for which it provides a “various and vague...vocabulary.” It is lacking in interdisciplinarity, “not yet adequately mobilized for studying military issues,” and holds too firmly to a view of violence as being antisocial.*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “the weakness of military-oriented **social science** may be attributed to an unmilitary and even anti-military sentiment among some social scientists,” (p. 10)
- “**social science** needs a kind of engineering to go with it,” (p. 16)

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- “one might single out the study of ‘internal war’ ... about which the **social science** literature is far from rich,” (p. 94)

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- Internal War: “for few phenomena do **social science**, history, and conventional language offer so various and vague a vocabulary,” (p. 103)
- “contemporary **social science** has been predicated far too much upon perspectives which regard violence, a la Hobbes, as the very negation of the social condition,” (p. 105)

General Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Yet, in this age of great change, the development of the **social sciences**—the sciences dealing with human nature—has not, in my opinion, kept pace,” (pp. 11-13)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “**Social science** is of course a fantastic misnomer for a wide variety of disciplines which go beyond the academically recognized disciplines into the humanities and sometimes into philosophy and religion themselves,” (p. 91)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “**Social science** resources have not yet been adequately mobilized to study social conflict and control,” (p. 52)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “This...will of necessity cut across the lines of scientific disciplines, and should go far to remedy a major deficiency of current-day **social science**, the weakness of interdisciplinary research,” (p. 123)

2.8 Social Scientist(s)

27. *Social scientists’ attitudes: personally liberal, “ivory tower viewpoint,” anti-military, but can “change their ways” to the extent that they do not “indulge...in the luxury of mere condemnation,” and agree to “calculate the answers to concrete policy decisions,” and “contribute to engineering calculations,” to help achieve security. If they do this, then they “would be responsible” and are “fac[ing] the problems with sobriety.”*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “the weakness of military-oriented social science may be attributed to an unmilitary and even anti-military sentiment among some **social scientists**,” who tend to be “personally liberal in ideology,” and hold to a “certain ivory tower viewpoint,” due to which they have “shied away from helping solve the problems of industry, defense, or civilian branches of government,” (p. 10)
- “There are also things **social scientists** can do to change their ways toward greater usefulness.... The **social scientist** who would be responsible must recognize in military problems some of the most important issues, perhaps even the most important issues of our time.... The **social scientist** who faces the problems with sobriety and who does not indulge himself in the luxury of mere condemnation and pontification will soon find that he is called on to calculate the answers to concrete policy decisions.... **Social scientists** must abandon the ivory tower...and must strive to contribute to engineering calculations which can help achieve security in a world of risks.” (pp. 23-24)

28. *Social scientists’ role is “making inputs” and military’s role is to set policy and set requirements for social scientists. Few social scientists would be naturally inclined to appreciate being “problem-solvers rather than scientific discoverers,” so a “prouder image” of this new role is needed as well as greater “clarity of purpose” if*

we are to achieve a “great increase in numbers.” If they “rise to the challenge” and use the “principles of their discipline” to military advantage, they “will receive the recognition their contributions merit.”

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- a “much more important reason,” for the lack of research, namely a “lack of demand by the military establishment. Had they been urged, many **social scientists** would have responded,” (p. 10)
- “Almost all **social scientists**, both inside and outside of university life, are fulfilling the new role. But a proud image of that role does not exist. Few **social scientists** would be happy to admit to being problem-solvers rather than scientific discoverers. What is needed is a prouder image of the role and along with that a great increase in numbers, improvement of morale, and clarity of purpose of the cadre fulfilling it.” (pp. 16-17)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- six “leading **social scientists** to form an Army Symposium Advisory Group,” which “provided continual advice and counsel on the planning and conduct of the symposium,” (p. xvi)
- “On the second day, leading behavioral and **social scientists** presented papers describing some past and ongoing research and the relevance it has to Army problems,” (p. xiv)

Irwin Altman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “two types of inputs that **social scientists** can make.... The first is on building background information,” (p. 116)
- “please note that I am not suggesting that **social scientists** become decision-makers; what I am saying is that **social scientists** have a unique input to make to military decision-makers at all levels, beyond general background information,” (p. 117)

Hans Speier, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I propose that a qualified **social scientist** is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain intelligence,” (p. 292)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “The kinds of problems involved in nation building are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other **social scientists**, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit. What role psychologists can or will play in this enterprise will be determined in part by how well they conceptualize the applications of their science in technical development,” (p. 122)

29. *Social scientists have unique and natural contributions to make to the military. Their “handling of evidence” is particularly important, as are their “dispassionate,*

systematic, large appraisals.” It is predicted that there will be a growing interest among social scientists in “guerrilla warfare and counter-subversion,” and that this growing together of military science and social science is a “natural” process.

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- “It was Donovan’s conception that the rigorous training that **social scientists** and historians had received in the handling of evidence made them indispensable in estimating capabilities and trends in enemy countries,” (p. 77)

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “the very nature and urgency of the subject makes it particularly desirable that the inevitably harrassed, hurried, anxious and case-bound appraisals of government officials should be supplemented by the more dispassionate, more systematic, larger appraisals of **social scientists**,” (p. 133)

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “suggests a natural area for cooperation among military specialists, **social scientists**, and creative engineers of new weapon systems,” (p. 155)
- “in the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among **social scientists** in the problems of guerrilla warfare and counter-subversion,” (p. 155)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “The Army recognizes that our success depends in large part on our ability to understand and to enlist the loyalties of the people in whose areas the Cold War is being waged. In order to accomplish this, we need the best information and advice which **social scientists** can provide. I hope that this is only the first of many such meetings in which **social scientists** and military leaders can work together to solve the challenging problems which confront us,” (p. 39)

Hans Speier, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I propose that a qualified **social scientist** is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain intelligence,” (p. 292)

30. *Limitations / Critiques of social scientists: Social scientists have “shamefully neglected” topics related to limited war, “have not provided all the information necessary” for the military to do its work, and need to recognize that they “have limited knowledge.” Nonetheless, although social scientists might have “very little to contribute,” the “problems of counterinsurgency” are primarily social science problems for better or worse.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “modern **social scientists** have in fact shamefully neglected the subject,” (p. 104)

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about nation building. In the past the **social scientists** have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine,” (p. 163)
- “the most important thing that we as **social scientists** can do” is “to recognize we have limited knowledge as do the military, but what we are prepared to do with the military is to try to ask these questions in an orderly, rational way and bear the consequences of whatever we discover,” (p. 169)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “If all this is true, it seems to follow that the problems of counterinsurgency are primarily social science problems and civilian problems. I do not think I say this with a **social scientist**’s conceit, because having said it I must immediately confess that, at present, **social scientists** have very little to contribute on any of the required areas of knowledge, and I have very little hope for the future,” (p. 262)

2.9 Defense Department / Defense Establishment / Military Establishment

31. Social science “contributions” to DOD tasks have been “neglected” in the past but are now being sought out by the military, and in new domains as well.

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- Social science can assist with “an entirely different domain of **Defense department** problems,” namely “the operations of the **Defense department** in relation to the external world,” (p. 2)
- “neglect of potential social science contributions to the substantive tasks of the **Defense department**,” (p. 3)
- “strategic planning, weapon system selection, intelligence, guerilla warfare, and such external relations of the **defense establishment** as civil-military relations, military government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the social sciences as they now exist might provide contributions,” (p. 5)
- a “much more important reason,” for the lack of research, namely a “lack of demand by the **military establishment**. Had they been urged, many social scientists would have responded,” (p. 10)
- “[The **DOD**] must provide social science training for a substantial number of its officers,” (p. 23)
- “[The **DOD**] should include more fundamental social science in the curricula of its military academies,” (p. 23)
- “The **Defense department** also needs to maintain and strengthen social science in its in-house laboratories,” (p. 23)

32. *The “defense establishment” can and should stimulate growth in the social sciences.*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “The **defense establishment** can make itself a client, stimulating the behavioral sciences and using them—to mutual advantage,” (p. 16)
- “The **defense establishment** is in a position to stimulate a significant burst of social science creativity which could prove most useful to it,” (p. 23)

33. *The U.S. military establishment and those of other nations can and should be constructive “instruments for human progress” through guiding economic development, administering national policies, and removing sources of social discontent.*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “There is a need for systematic research into the potentialities of **military establishments** for guiding economic development and assisting in the administration of national policies,” (p. 152)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Rather than destructive, our aims are constructive—to create internal conditions and encourage political, social, and economic systems which remove hunger, disease, poverty, oppression, and other sources of discontent. In this sense, our **military establishment** is a direct, positive instrument for human progress in directions that are compatible with the U.S. national interest,” (p. vii)

2.10 Insurgency / Insurgent(s)

34. *Insurgent groups derive crucial advantage from the alienation, marginalization, or breakdown of the indigenous elite.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “**insurgent** groups seem rarely to come even to the point of fighting without some support from alienated members of incumbent elites,” (p. 121)
- “internal wars are unlikely wherever cohesion of an elite is intact for the simple reason that **insurgent** formations require leadership and other skills and are unlikely to obtain them on a large scale without some significant break in the ranks of an elite,” (p. 129)

SORO, “Document Number 2:”

- “When groups fail to function so as to provide for the needs of the people that make up these groups, there is a tendency for them to break down and for their symbols to change meaning or lose value. People then tend to become involved in other lines of action which they perceive to be leading to a change for the better. Such actions may include sabotage, wildcat strikes, shootings and other acts of violence which, when

continued, lead to a breakdown of law and order, to an inability of the economy to provide regularly for minimum essential needs and services, and to a further discrediting of the holders of political power. Much of this action comes under the label of **insurgency**” (p. 53)

35. *Insurgent groups also derive a crucial advantage from the support of the indigenous population, and the degree of this support is related to the population’s degree of dissatisfaction with internal social, political, and economic conditions. Alleviating this dissatisfaction through “nation building,” “development,” and “civic action” can therefore combat insurgency. The problem of insurgency is, in fact, an essential one in terms of the “developing nations” as such efforts are a fundamental part of insuring their orderly transition toward modernization.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “it is the chief dogma of modern revolutionaries that without great popular support the **insurgents** in an internal war can hardly hope to win—unless by means of a coup—and that with such support they are hardly likely to lose,” (p. 129)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- In “internal war...the ‘battle’ situation is primarily an internal conflict within another nation—although our major antagonist may have incited the conflict, or may be exploiting it.... The immediate targets are **insurgent** or other indigenous groups, and the underlying social and political conditions which contain the sources of internal conflict. Instead of clearly defined enemy personnel, our forces face a mixture of friendly, unfriendly, and neutral...indigenous persons,” (pp. vi-vii)
- “the primary sources of **insurgent** strength are...the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves,” (p. vii)

SORO, “Document Number 1:”

- “The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of nation building as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active **insurgency** problems,” (p. 48)

SORO, “Document Number 2:”

- “The problem of **insurgency** is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the developing countries and their transition toward modernization,” (p. 51)
- “In the present framework of modernization...the indicated approach is to try to obviate the need for **insurgency** through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological development,” (p. 51)
- “It is far more effective and economical to avoid **insurgency** through essentially constructive efforts than to counter it after it has grown into a full-scale movement requiring drastically greater effort,” (p. 52)
- “If the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of counterinsurgency it must recognize that **insurgency** represents a breakdown of

social order and that the social processes involved must be understood. Conversely, the processes which produce a stable society must also be understood,” (p. 53)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “The most effective defense against this **insurgent** mode of Communist aggression appears to be to prevent the development of this lever of popular discontent—to provide non-Communist solutions to political and economic problems,” (pp. 120-121)

36. *The terminology we use to describe “insurgency” is lacking, as is the way we have focused on it and understood it, and this could be altered to aid our understanding of it and to help the military to combat it more effectively.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “our understanding of the etiology of internal wars is dangerously inadequate precisely because studies have so far concentrated on precipitants rather than preconditions, **insurgents** rather than incumbents, and objective social conditions rather than social orientations and social processes,” (p. 124)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “In a more serious vein it can be pointed out that **insurgency** is much too flattering a word to be applied to the terrorism and banditry which the Communists use.... **Counterinsurgency** and **insurgency** might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the Free World,” (p. 91)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “there has been too much talk at the symposium about counterinsurgency and too little about the fine art of **insurgency** or conspiracy,” (p. 259)

SORO, “Document Number 1:”

- “The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of counterinsurgency (some pronounceable term standing for **insurgency** prophylaxis would be better),” (p. 48)
- “Another major factor is the recognition at the highest levels of the defense establishment of the fact that relatively little is known, with a high degree of surety, about the social processes which must be understood in order to deal effectively with problems of **insurgency**,” (p. 48)

37. *Insurgency is mainly fought using guerrilla warfare as a technique, and as such, President Kennedy authorized an increase in training in understanding and combating guerrilla warfare.*

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “historically, guerrilla warfare has proved its effectiveness throughout the spectrum of conflict—in revolutions, in varying forms of **insurgency**, in public wars,” (p. 57)
- (citing President Kennedy): “I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sublimited or unconventional wars,” which will be “necessary to counter Communist-sponsored **guerrillas** or **insurgents**,” (p. 62)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “The new functions of the military were greatly broadened by President Kennedy in his emphasis upon countering **insurgency** in underdeveloped nations and the consequent build-up of Special Forces strength,” (p. 121)

2.11 Guerrilla / Guerrilla Warfare

38. *Guerrilla warfare is a “problem” for the whole Free World as well as specifically for the U.S. military and is connected up with the Communist strategy to exploit internal wars in developing countries for their own international political gain.*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- our strategy of “containment” of communism led us to provide “military reinforcements to weak countries adjacent to the communist bloc,” “toward providing internal security against **guerrilla** and irregular forces,” in Korea and elsewhere, and also “to eliminate the power vacuums which the new countries represent by building up their defense forces,” (p. 149)

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the most effective means of eradicating the insidious, creeping menace of Communist **guerrilla** aggression and phony ‘wars of liberation’,” (p. 3)

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of **guerrillas**, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional Communist challenge—in paramilitary warfare, in psychological warfare, and in conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force.” (p. 15)
- “I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of **guerrillas** and indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities by psychological operations under varying conditions of cold warfare...” (p. 16)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “historically, **guerrilla warfare** has proved its effectiveness throughout the spectrum of conflict—in revolutions, in varying forms of insurgency, in public wars,” (p. 57)
- “I am directing the Secretary of Defense to expand rapidly and substantially the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of nonnuclear war, paramilitary operations, and sublimated or unconventional wars,” which will be “necessary to counter Communist-sponsored **guerrillas** or insurgents,” (p. 62)

39. *Social science is in a “strong position” to contribute useful research and knowledge to the topic of guerrilla warfare, particularly in terms of studying how to evaluate and alleviate social problems which are seen as giving rise to guerrilla warfare, but also in terms of compiling and analyzing intelligence which is also seen as a key aspect in the struggle.*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “strategic planning, weapon system selection, intelligence, **guerrilla warfare**, and such external relations of the defense establishment as civil-military relations, military government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the social sciences as they now exist might provide contributions,” (p. 5)

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “in the next few years it can be expected that there will be a growing interest among social scientists in the problems of **guerrilla warfare** and counter-subversion.... This is because the problems posed by such forms of warfare and violence are intimately related to questions about the social structure, culture, and behavior patterns of the populations involved,” (p. 155)
- “without question, social science research is in a strong position to contribute useful knowledge in designing and developing internal security forces” in the new countries, and that “the task of developing free world techniques for coping with subversives and **guerrilla warfare** will call for substantial research efforts,” (p. 155)

Irwin Altman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “such knowledge is not enough, however, for the planner or operator. He also needs ideas on how to act given his own and others’ resources.... What is the best way to combat a particular **guerrilla** operation? What communication and propaganda techniques should be used to help win over some dissident minority? These are questions that depend on background information, but they also require the fusing of all this information and the development of action programs,” (pp. 116-117)

40. *The U.S. military and the Free World more broadly are generally “on the defensive” in guerrilla struggles, which is seen as being the more difficult position. Such counter guerrilla warfare is conducted using traditional military tactics supplemented by “civic action,” and “development” efforts which are geared toward winning over*

the support of the civilian population whose backing is critical for either the guerrillas or the counter guerrilla forces. Such struggles, however, particularly their military aspects, are difficult and costly and involve “brutal methods” to gather intelligence, methods which might end up damaging public opinion of the counter guerrilla forces and their supporters and thus ultimately becoming counterproductive. The army is seen as being especially suited for such missions due to its “long history” of fighting against guerrilla forces.

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “Not only is cure unlikely once **guerrilla** fighting has occurred under favorable conditions [for the **guerrillas**], it is also immensely costly.... A tremendous preponderance of men and resources is required by the defensive side.... The fighting is likely to be prolonged and vicious... One must pay great moral and psychological costs as well. For example, we know that the central problem in defense against **guerrilla warfare** is intelligence: knowing what an infinitely elusive enemy is really up to. We also know that against competent **guerrillas** and their enthusiastic civilian supporters, adequate intelligence seems to require brutal methods such as torture and terroristic intimidations.... The stakes are too high and the chances of failure too great for pretty manners to be observed. **Guerrilla warfare** thus breeds savagery even in the best-intentioned defenders. It makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them.” (p. 108)

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the Army...is...the repository of an invaluable store of practical ‘know how’ in the field of **Guerrilla warfare**—‘know how’ based on experience extending back to early Colonial days and on through the Indian Wars, and expanded and sharpened in combat operations in the Pacific areas and elsewhere during World War II,” (pp. 5-6)
- not “nearly as important in the long run as the role the Army is equipped to play in the deterrence or defeat of **guerrilla** aggression by helping to change the basic conditions which are essential to [its] successful conduct,” (p. 6)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “in 1952, the 10th Special Forces Group, Airborne, was activated...to infiltrate into denied areas by land, sea, or air for the purpose of organizing the indigenous **guerrilla** potential and conducting unconventional warfare operations against the enemy,” (p. 59)

Robert Slover, *USALWMSSR*:

- “civic action should be looked on as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of **guerrilla warfare**,” (p. 72)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “an established government which has to maintain normal order in a society cannot disappear into the mountains or into cellars in **guerrilla** fashion,” (p. 255)

- “one can learn something about counter**guerrilla warfare** from **guerrilla warfare**, but essentially the two operations are different. Also, counter**guerrilla warfare** is much more difficult,” (p. 255)
- “cure is unlikely, once fighting, particularly **guerrilla** fighting, has begun,” (p. 256)
- “Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. We all know, since we were told yesterday, that the essential problem in **guerrilla warfare** is intelligence—how to find out what the enemy is up to and how to keep him from finding out what you are up to. We also know that were **guerrillas** have the enthusiastic support of much of the population and where it is not feasible to protect anti**guerrilla** civilians against reprisals, obtaining intelligence requires what one gentleman on the platform here called “unusual” methods. Not to mince words about it, it often requires methods like the French used in Algeria, torture and counterterrorism. For this reason, among many others, counterinsurgent warfare tends to brutalize even the best-intentioned of defenders. It corrupts them. And the men whom it corrupts, supreme irony of all, are likely to become the nucleus of extremist movements directed against the very state in whose service they were corrupted. Once men have tortured and terrorized other people, once their veneer of civilization has come off, it is very difficult for them to return easily to humdrum civilized life. They may consequently become an insurrectionary danger against the state themselves. That is the moral cost of counterinsurgency.” (pp. 256-257)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Generally, counterinsurgency, the currently most popular term for the Army cold war effort, involves three types of functions: counter**guerrilla warfare**, psychological operations, and civic actions.... In particular military operations, these functions must be coordinated, thus integrating military, economic, psychological, political, and social considerations,” (p. 121)
- “The general characteristic of counter**guerrilla warfare** is the use or threat of use of force against **guerrillas**, those who apply force against the local government or occupying force. However...the crucial role of the general populace in supporting **guerrillas** require special tactics and consideration of the psychological impact of actions upon the populace,” (p. 121)

2.12 Counterinsurgency / Counterinsurgent(s)

41. *The U.S. military has a special “counterinsurgency mission” which has taken on increasing importance in recent years due to the threat of nuclear war and the “emergence of the developing nations.” Although this is a military mission, it is a new kind of mission, and hinges on non-military factors, factors which are more suited to analysis by social science. Indeed, social science techniques, knowledge and insights comprise a significant aspect of the “military counterinsurgency weapon system,” and it is suggested that this mission will involve new requirements and emphases both within the military and social science.*

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- there will be a special focus on “the military **counterinsurgency mission**.” (p. iii)
- “the increased importance of military **counterinsurgency** capabilities is a matter of common knowledge.... Two factors are primarily responsible for this increased emphasis: (1) The emergence of many developing nations, newly independent, which are inviting targets of subversion and covert aggression,” and “(2) The overwhelming destructive potential of all-out nuclear warfare,” (p. iv)
- “Military **Counterinsurgency** Weapon System,” (p. iv) includes “psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice,” (p. v)
- “success in the **counterinsurgency** mission is as much dependent on political, social, economic, and psychological factors as upon purely military factors, and sometimes more so,” (p. vi)
- “in the past, the primary sources of enemy strength...could be destroyed physically. In the **counterinsurgency** situation, the primary sources of insurgent strength are...the sources of discontent of the people within the nation, and thus, the people themselves,” (p. vii)
- “In the same sense that a new emphasis on the **counterinsurgency** mission has resulted in new requirements on the military, a new emphasis is required within the behavioral and social sciences,” (p. xi)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- President Kennedy has “established a Special Group for **Counterinsurgency**,” (p. 27)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Today, both unconventional and psychological warfare, which together have until recently comprised what we call Special Warfare, have become the conscious concern of governments.... The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to psychological warfare and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of **counterinsurgency**,” (p. 58)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “The U.S. Army **counterinsurgency** mission places broad responsibilities on the Army for planning and conducting operations involving a wide spectrum of sociopolitical problems which are integral parts of **counterinsurgency** operations,” (p. 51)

42. *Insofar as the military’s “counterinsurgency mission” involves an explicit focus on the indigenous populations of the countries concerned and on identifying and alleviating sources of discontent of these populations, this mission can be seen as one aspect of the “development” of these areas, particularly if the forces giving rise to insurgent movements can be forestalled by positive social measures before they gain a foothold. Military measures alone are inadequate to achieve this end.*

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “as the military becomes more concerned with the range of problems which you now identify as **counterinsurgency** you are in fact going to be coming across the problems of how to build institutions and how to build the most complex of all social institutions or organizations: the modern nation-state,” (p. 164)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “nothing I have said so far is meant to suggest that we dispense with military knowledge of **counterinsurgency**,” but simply that “such knowledge is grossly insufficient,” (p. 259)
- “If all this is true, it seems to follow that the problems of **counterinsurgency** are primarily social science problems and civilian problems,” (p. 262)

SORO, “Document Number 1”:

- “Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the over-all **counterinsurgency** program of the U.S. Government,” (pp. 48-49)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “**Counterinsurgency** operations seek to create an environment of security and popular trust which will promote orderly progress toward achieving national and popular goals,” (p. 52)
- “Although U.S. **counterinsurgency** doctrine during the past few years has stressed preventive measures, the scientific knowledge on which to base such doctrine has been weak,” (p. 52)
- “If the U.S. Army is to perform effectively its part in the U.S. mission of **counterinsurgency** it must recognize that insurgency represents a breakdown of social order and that the social processes involved must be understood. Conversely, the processes which produce a stable society must also be understood,” (p. 53)

43. If insurgencies are not able to be forestalled before gaining a foothold and popular support, and thus need to be put down by military measures (or if civic action and developmental measures are not adequate) then “brutal” and “dehumanizing methods” may be required. These measures will have a negative impact both on the U.S. and indigenous military personnel and on the U.S. and indigenous general populations and thus should be avoided if possible, but should not be shied away from if they are deemed necessary.

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- In areas “such as Vietnam...civic action programs alone would be inadequate.... In such areas, emphasis must be placed on creating and training local **counterinsurgency** forces and on providing them with operational and logistical assistance and increased technical training,” (p. 36)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “**counterinsurgency** often compels much more brutal methods of fighting than other kinds of warfare. I do not mean more destructive methods, but more debasing, dehumanizing methods,” (p. 256)
- “counterinsurgent warfare tends to brutalize even the best-intentioned of defenders. It corrupts them. And the men whom it corrupts, supreme irony of all, are likely to become the nucleus of extremist movements directed against the very state in whose service they were corrupted. Once men have tortured and terrorized other people, once their veneer of civilization has come off, it is very difficult for them to return easily to humdrum civilized life. They may consequently become an insurrectionary danger against the state themselves. That is the moral cost of **counterinsurgency**,” (pp. 256-257)
- “Because of the brutal method one often has to use in **counterinsurgent** warfare...one will forfeit a great deal of goodwill in other countries,” (p. 257)
- “in militarily countering internal wars you may often be compelled to do things which simply create potential for more internal wars. In that case, the cost of **counterinsurgency** certainly exceeds the benefit. The costs are great, and the benefits are zero,” (p. 258)

44. *Counterinsurgency is primarily the responsibility of the indigenous military and government, and should not be conducted primarily by the U.S. military, although they can offer crucial support and guidance.*

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I, myself, would conclude from this that **counterinsurgency** is consequently the primary responsibility of civilian authorities and not of the Army, however important a stake the Army has in the matter and however much it can be used by others to reduce internal war potential,” (p. 254)

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “Responsibility for conducting **counterinsurgency** operations must rest with the indigenous government. Carefully applied assistance and advice by U.S. governmental agencies can, however, materially influence the outcome,” (p. 51)

45. *Terminological problems surrounding the “counterinsurgency mission” can create problems for the U.S. military in conducting this mission, and can provide support for the Communists.*

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “**Counterinsurgency** is almost as bad as counterpatriotic efforts, and the use of this term itself constitutes a handicap to the Free World and an unconscious assist to the Communists. **Counterinsurgency** and insurgency might both be replaced by some term more happily descriptive of the services which the Army can render the Free World,” (p. 91)

SORO, “Document Number 1”:

- “The many programs of the U.S. Government directed toward this objective are often grouped under the sometimes misleading label of **counterinsurgency** (some pronounceable term standing for insurgency prophylaxis would be better),” (p. 48)

2.13 Intelligence

46. *Military “intelligence” is defined in a way which brings it very close to traditional scientific research practices, as both are based on “procuring and processing information about the external environment.” Indeed, modern social science research is seen as being the foundation for modern military intelligence theories and practices, and social science continues to be looked to for advances in such theories and practices.*

Ithiel Pool, *SSRNS*:

- “strategic planning, weapon system selection, **intelligence**, guerilla warfare, and such external relations of the defense establishment as civil-military relations, military government, military assistance, and interallied relations. It was in these broad areas that we looked for problems to which the social sciences as they now exist might provide contributions,” (p. 5)

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- **intelligence** as “an operation for procuring and processing information about the external environment in which an organization—in our case, the Government of the United States—wants to maximize the net achievement of its various goals,” (p. 75)
- “The development of modern **intelligence** in the United States can be said to have begun with the establishment in 1941 of the research and **intelligence** branch of the Office of Strategic Services headed by William J. Donovan. It was Donovan’s conception that the rigorous training that social scientists and historians had received in the handling of evidence made them indispensable in estimating capabilities and trends in enemy countries. And the academic contribution of research techniques was indeed so crucial to the success of this branch of OSS that, impressed by OSS competition, the **intelligence** organizations of the armed services began forthwith to recruit academic talent.” (p. 77)
- “as now practiced, **intelligence** is inconceivable without the social sciences,” (p. 78)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Another key concept is psychological operations, which has now reached a level of almost total incomprehensibility to the ordinary newspaper reader, to the **intelligence** officer who is not a specialist in the field, or to the high school graduate enlisted man. Psychological warfare with all of its disadvantages in the old days nevertheless showed the culmination of attempting to combine psychology and war. The present term leaves the issue entirely neutral.” (p. 91)

47. *Intelligence is particularly linked to “internal war” and “guerrilla fighting” which are both seen as areas in which intelligence acquisition and application are vital to military success, although such acquisition often requires “brutal methods” in the field including “torture” and “counterterrorism.” Also, the development of a broader “science of social change” is called for to supplement such efforts. Qualified social scientists can help the military “in the field” by utilizing their special training in “persuasion” and “conversion.”*

Klaus Knorr, *SSRNS*:

- “Obviously, a sophisticated science of social change would be a most valuable input for **intelligence** work.... Somewhat more specifically, one might single out the study of ‘internal war,’ that is, of the resort to political violence within communities, a phenomenon which is occurring with extraordinary frequency, with which the **intelligence** community is deeply involved, and about which the social science literature is far from rich.” (p. 94)
- “Not only is cure unlikely once guerrilla fighting has occurred under favorable conditions [for the guerrillas], it is also immensely costly.... A tremendous preponderance of men and resources is required by the defensive side.... The fighting is likely to be prolonged and vicious... One must pay great moral and psychological costs as well. For example, we know that the central problem in defense against guerrilla warfare is **intelligence**: knowing what an infinitely elusive enemy is really up to. We also know that against competent guerrillas and their enthusiastic civilian supporters, adequate **intelligence** seems to require brutal methods such as torture and terroristic intimidations.... The stakes are too high and the chances of failure too great for pretty manners to be observed. Guerrilla warfare thus breeds savagery even in the best-intentioned defenders. It makes them appear corrupt and it corrupts them.” (p. 108)
- “Repression can be a two-edged sword. Unless it is based on extremely good **intelligence** and unless its application is sensible, ruthless, and continuous, its effects may be quite opposite to those intended,” (p. 125)
- “rebels who can count on popular support can lose themselves in the population, rely on the population for secrecy (in wars in which **intelligence**, as I have pointed out, is practically the whole art of defense) and...they can be practically certain of victory, short of a resort to genocide by the incumbents,” (p. 129)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Let me give you an example of what I have in mind. We all know, since we were told yesterday, that the essential problem in guerrilla warfare is **intelligence**—how to find out what the enemy is up to and how to keep him from finding out what you are up to. We also know that were guerrillas have the enthusiastic support of much of the population and where it is not feasible to protect antiguerrilla civilians against reprisals, obtaining **intelligence** requires what one gentleman on the platform here called “unusual” methods. Not to mince words about it, it often requires methods like the French used in Algeria, torture and counterterrorism. For this reason, among many others, counterinsurgent warfare tends to brutalize even the best-intentioned of

defenders. It corrupts them. And the men whom it corrupts, supreme irony of all, are likely to become the nucleus of extremist movements directed against the very state in whose service they were corrupted. Once men have tortured and terrorized other people, once their veneer of civilization has come off, it is very difficult for them to return easily to humdrum civilized life. They may consequently become an insurrectionary danger against the state themselves. That is the moral cost of counterinsurgency.” (pp. 256-257)

Hans Speier, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I propose that a qualified social scientist is able to turn certain principles of his discipline—his general knowledge of human nature, of persuasion, of conversion, etc.—to good account in any given environment and thus help the military to obtain **intelligence**. But this must be done in the field, because attention must be given to the special circumstances and conditions at a given time and place.” (p. 292)

2.14 Civic Action

48. *Civic action involves engaging indigenous military forces in civic development projects beneficial to the local population in order to win the support of that population and thus make them more easily “controlled,” as well as to discourage them from giving support to “dissidents.” It also promotes “political stability” and social and economic “development.”*

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “by **civic action** we mean using indigenous forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development,” (p. 71)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “**Civic action** consists of military programs, usually by indigenous forces and often aided by United States materiel and advice, to promote economic and social development and civilian good will in order to achieve political stability or a more favorable environment for the military forces. This is technical assistance by military forces for relatively immediate security objectives,” (p. 121)

Robert Slover, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Just as control of the air has become a prerequisite for successful frontal warfare, so control of the population is a prerequisite for successful unconventional warfare.” I submit to you for consideration in this symposium that **civic action** is an important and valuable way of gaining that necessary control of populations. When government forces identify themselves with the well-being of the populace by military activities...the people tend to reciprocate. They deny assistance to the dissidents, are less receptive to enemy propaganda. (pp. 70-71)

49. *Civic action, along with psychological warfare and military aid, can be viewed as an aspect of counterinsurgency operations, and thus of the U.S. Military's "counterinsurgency mission." As such, it can be understood as a technique to counter guerrilla warfare and the conditions that give rise to it.*

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- "Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System," (p. iv) includes "psychological operations, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice," (p. v)

Robert Slover, *USALWMSSR*:

- "**civic action** should be looked on as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of guerrilla warfare," (p. 72)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- "Generally, counterinsurgency, the currently most popular term for the Army cold war effort, involves three types of functions: counterinsurgency warfare, psychological operations, and **civic actions**.... In particular military operations, these functions must be coordinated, thus integrating military, economic, psychological, political, and social considerations," (p. 121)

50. *Despite the "fringelike" status of civic action, it is very central to counterinsurgency operations as a whole. It involves the issue of how to mix "repressive" and "conciliatory" approaches toward indigenous populations, with civic action representing the latter approach. Despite its central importance in counterinsurgency situations, it is not appropriate in every situation, and if the Army does get involved in such programs, it should not harbor illusions as to civic action being sufficient or totally effective for making the indigenous "military regimes" palatable to the population which they "control."*

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- "such as Vietnam...**civic action** programs alone would be inadequate.... In such areas, emphasis must be placed on creating and training local counterinsurgency forces and on providing them with operational and logistical assistance and increased technical training," (p. 36)

Morroee Berger, *USALWMSSR*:

- "First, if the Army wants to use social science, it may find that it has to direct social science towards its own problems and interests. Second, if it does use social science, I think the Army ought, even for its own interest, to take a broad view of what social science is and may become. Third, if the Army believes that it must go into **civic action** in underdeveloped areas, it ought to do so, I think, without encumbering illusions about making military regimes palatable to the people they control and without dubious analogies to the American Frontier. Political problems are tough.

So we like to avoid them. But I think we shall find that engineering projects are not a substitute for political education.” (pp. 183-184)

Harry Eckstein, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I think that **civic action** is....not just a useful supplementary technique to counterrevolutionary warfare, but the key to the whole problem. I, myself, would conclude from this that counterinsurgency is consequently the primary responsibility of civilian authorities and not of the Army, however important a stake the Army has in the matter and however much it can be used by others to reduce internal war potential.” (p. 254)
- “The essential question here, apart from the large unresolved issue of **civic action**, concerns the role to assign to repression or conciliation of dissident elements in a prerevolutionary situation” and as such raises the question, “to what extent should one follow a hard or soft line or a combination of the two?” (p. 260)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “**Civic action** is, perhaps, the most fringelike of the new Army functions,” (p. 121)

2.15 Psychological Operation(s) / Psychological Warfare

51. *“Psychological Operations” as a phrase replacing the previously used “psychological warfare operations” and “psychological warfare in combat operations” is much less descriptive of the phenomena at issue than its predecessors, resulting in “almost total incomprehensibility.” This is unfortunate because the term itself refers to using traditional media and other communications means to influence opinion and shape understanding, both within the U.S. Military and foreign and indigenous groups and populations, often in Cold War counterinsurgency situations. It is also part of the larger umbrella term of “special warfare.”*

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Today, both unconventional and **psychological warfare**, which together have until recently comprised what we call Special Warfare, have become the conscious concern of governments.... The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to **psychological warfare** and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of counterinsurgency.” (p. 58)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Another key concept is **psychological operations**, which has now reached a level of almost total incomprehensibility to the ordinary newspaper reader, to the intelligence officer who is not a specialist in the field, or to the high school graduate enlisted man. **Psychological warfare** with all of its disadvantages in the old days nevertheless showed the culmination of attempting to combine psychology and war. The present term leaves the issue entirely neutral.” (p. 91)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “**Psychological operations** include, of course, the relatively traditional use of mass media. In the cold war these operations are directed toward friendly and neutral as well as enemy countries. In addition, there is growing recognition of the possibility and desirability of using other means such as military movements, policy statements, economic transactions, and developmental assistance for psychological impact. This reorientation is implicit in the broadened title of Department of the Army Field Manual 33-5 which was changed from ‘**Psychological warfare** in Combat Operations’ in 1949, to ‘**Psychological warfare** Operations’ in 1955, to ‘**Psychological operations**’ in 1962,” (p. 121)

52. *Psychological warfare is increasingly significant and “decisive” in “internal wars” which are becoming increasingly prevalent. It is an aspect of the Military’s “Counterinsurgency Weapon System,” and concerns ways to “exploit Communist vulnerabilities” and maintain “control of guerillas and indigenous peoples” in Cold War and also in insurgency situations. Specifically, it seeks “to win the active support of the noncombatants,” (to win “hearts and minds”) and is combined with “violent techniques” directed toward insurgents and guerrillas and civic action projects to benefit the general population.*

Harry Eckstein, *SSRNS*:

- “it is the chief dogma of modern revolutionaries that without great popular support the insurgents in an internal war can hardly hope to win—unless by means of a coup—and that with such support they are hardly likely to lose. So vital is this factor that some writers think that the distinctive characteristic of internal war is the combination of violent techniques with **psychological warfare**, the latter designed, of course, to win the active support of the noncombatants.... To be sure, **psychological warfare** occurs nowadays also in international wars. Its role in these, however, is not nearly so crucial as in internal wars; it is incidental in international war but...seems to be decisive in internal war.” (p. 129)

William Lybrand, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Military Counterinsurgency Weapon System,” (p. iv) includes “**psychological operations**, unconventional warfare, civic actions, military aid and advice,” (p. v)

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Free men and peaceful nations throughout the world are under unremitting attack today, not only in the military realm by assassins, bands of guerrillas, and full battalions, but in the economic realm, and even in the psychological. Clearly the Cold War today involves meeting a multidimensional Communist challenge—in paramilitary warfare, in **psychological warfare**, and in conventional and nuclear fields—in short, from zero to infinity across the military spectrum of force.” (p. 15)
- “I am concerned about the sociopsychological factors basic to concepts and techniques to be developed for successful organization and control of guerrillas and

indigenous peoples by external friendly forces; also, about methods of exploitation of Communist vulnerabilities by **psychological operations** under varying conditions of cold warfare.” (p. 16)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Generally, counterinsurgency, the currently most popular term for the Army cold war effort, involves three types of functions: counter guerrilla warfare, **psychological operations**, and civic actions.... In particular military operations, these functions must be coordinated, thus integrating military, economic, psychological, political, and social considerations,” (p. 121)

2.16 Special Operations / Special Warfare / Special Forces

53. “*Special Warfare*” is a relatively new term, adopted in 1956, but is unfortunately “not a self-explanatory term” and is “difficult” as it stands. Alternatives might be considered and they might arise from suggestions from officers and enlisted men.

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the term **special warfare** itself is relatively new, having been adopted by the Army as recently as 1956,” (p. 56)

Paul Linebarger, *USALWMSSR*:

- “**Special warfare** is not a self-explanatory term in standard English. It is difficult for a man to explain to his family that he is undertaking a noble crusade or a particularly patriotic and hazardous venture if he admits he has joined a **special warfare** unit. Other terms such as irregular warfare, anti-intruder warfare, or immediate warfare might be worth considering. But it is entirely possible that the best solutions for a new name for **special warfare** may come from the officers and enlisted men themselves if they were queried for a description of their present assignments.” (pp. 90-91)

54. “*Special Warfare*” has, in the past, designated “psychological warfare” and “unconventional warfare,” but has recently been expanded to include “the entire range and scope of counterinsurgency.” This expansion in scope represents what Kennedy understands to be the “new functions of the military” in “countering insurgency in underdeveloped nations.” In this way, it overlaps with other terms such as “limited war,” which are also regarded as “within the province of ‘Special forces’.”

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- Limited war is “short of all-out nuclear devastation....commonly referred to as ‘limited-war’,” and “popularly referred to as within the province of ‘**Special forces**’,” (p. 15)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “Today, both unconventional and psychological warfare, which together have until recently comprised what we call **special warfare**, have become the conscious concern of governments.... The term today is used to embrace all the military and paramilitary measures and activities related not only to psychological warfare and unconventional warfare but to the entire range and scope of counterinsurgency.” (p. 58)
- “in 1952, the 10th **Special Forces** Group, Airborne, was activated...to infiltrate into denied areas by land, sea, or air for the purpose of organizing the indigenous guerrilla potential and conducting unconventional warfare operations against the enemy,” (p. 59)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “The new functions of the military were greatly broadened by President Kennedy in his emphasis upon countering insurgency in underdeveloped nations and the consequent build-up of **special forces** strength,” (p. 121)

55. *The recent expansion of the Army’s responsibilities for “special warfare” and counterinsurgency and the commonly understood increasing importance of these “enormous” tasks necessitate a concomitant increase in social science research and the sponsorship of such research, both in the military and civilian institutions. The military “needs to know” information which the social sciences are seen as possessing and which will help them accomplish their tasks in the area of counterinsurgency, and the social sciences will therefore be “increasingly supported.”*

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “we need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs.... Therefore we look to research organizations such as the **Special Operations** Research Office and our civilian educational institutions. Almost exclusive emphasis has been laid over the years on the development of the physical sciences as primary factors in our national defense. We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the social sciences,” (p. 8)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “The size of the tasks that face us in the lower spectrum of war are enormous. The implications that those tasks hold for **special warfare** operations are likewise enormous. So, too, are the implications for research and development in the fields of social science and human factors.... We need to know the strengths and the weaknesses in all aspects of the societal structure of our allies and of our opponents. We need to know their vulnerabilities.... We need to know many things.... And I think this is your job as well as mine.” (pp. 66-67)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Army recognition that these cold war missions require social science support is seen in a recent symposium conducted by the **Special Operations** Research Office of American University. Research on cold war problems is being increasingly supported by the several military services and also by the Department of Defense,” (pp. 121-122)

2.17 Development

56. *Just as we can study and influence the “development” of a nation, so we can and should strive to understand and then appropriately influence the “development” of the social sciences. Their development has thus far lagged behind that of the physical sciences, whose ability to contribute to the military effort in staving off the “malignant organism” that is Communism has already been proven. If the social sciences’ development isn’t accelerated and brought up to speed with the growing needs of the military for the information and methods of analysis which they can provide, then the “world society” will suffer for it.*

Elvis Stahr, *USALWMSSR*:

- “we need to know intimately the people and their habits of mind, the language, the customs.... Therefore we look to research organizations such as the Special Operations Research Office and our civilian educational institutions. Almost exclusive emphasis has been laid over the years on the **development** of the physical sciences as primary factors in our national defense. We have now entered an era in which greater and greater demands will be placed on the social sciences,” (p. 8)

Arthur Trudeau, *USALWMSSR*:

- “I want to say right here and now—and I know that my statement will be reinforced by the able speakers who will appear before you—that our whole civilization is on trial today. Forces are loose in this world that would destroy all that we hold dear. These forces stem from a malignant organism that grows and thrives on human misery—which reaches out its long tendrils in every field of human endeavor, seeking to strangle and destroy. You know as well as I that in our efforts to remove this Communist cancer from the world society we have relied principally on our superior advantages in the physical sciences.... Yet, in this age of great change, the **development** of the social sciences—the sciences dealing with human nature—has not, in my opinion, kept pace.” (pp. 11-13)

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “The size of the tasks that face us in the lower spectrum of war are enormous. The implications that those tasks hold for Special Warfare operations are likewise enormous. So, too, are the implications for research and **development** in the fields of social science and human factors.... We need to know the strengths and the weaknesses in all aspects of the societal structure of our allies and of our opponents.

We need to know their vulnerabilities.... We need to know many things.... And I think this is your job as well as mine.” (pp. 66-67)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “It can be argued that the **development** of sciences is shaped by societal needs. This relationship is especially close for those parts of a science which are tied to a particular application, as in military psychology,” (p. 119)
- “The kinds of problems involved in nation building are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other social scientists, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit. What role psychologists can or will play in this enterprise will be determined in part by how well they conceptualize the applications of their science in technical **development**,” (p. 122)
- “We share Tyler’s view that interdisciplinary research is on the increase. This crossing of disciplinary lines is most likely when a multifaceted issue is engaged, forcing those who would understand to encompass broader viewpoints. The issues within national **development** seem sufficiently broad to produce much integration of sciences,” (p. 125)

57. *Among advocates of aid to developing nations, there has long been a divide between those advocating “economic” aid and those advocating “military” aid. The former have viewed the latter as hampering the development of these countries in order to create situations which are amenable to short-term U.S. foreign interests. Advocates of “military aid” counter that such aid can be more effectively used to further economic development than can strictly economic aid. They argue that the military can administer such aid more efficiently and can even be used to administrate national policies directly.*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- In the early days of our foreign assistance efforts, Congressmen tended to favor “military” aid over “economic” aid because the former seemed to be more directly linked to our national interest. In more recent years economic **development** has been viewed [sic] as more acceptable and constructive by Congress. (p. 149)
- “champions of **developmental** aid on the basis of strictly economic criteria” charge that “American military aid has created abnormal situations in the recipient underdeveloped countries and has forced their governments to make grossly uneconomic allocations of their resources,” (p. 150)
- “in pressing the case for the potentially constructive role military aid can have for economic **development**, some advocates have gone so far as to suggest that the military in many underdeveloped countries are more competent than civilians in performing certain crucial functions in furthering economic **development**,” (p. 151)
- “There is a need for systematic research into the potentialities of military establishments for guiding economic **development** and assisting in the administration of national policies,” (p. 152)
- “the role of armies in the underdeveloped areas as a powerful source for assisting, and even guiding and stimulating, basic economic **development**,” (p. 154)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Kissinger has stressed the primacy of the need for political **development** over economic **development**, thus suggesting a reversal of priorities in our aid program during the last decade,” (p. 127)

58. *Military development can have psychological as well as economic benefits. These psychological benefits include enhancing a people's national pride and sense of identity and overcoming insecurities and inferiority. If the West were to oppose such development, it could be interpreted as a desire to keep the people of the developing world in a subservient and inferior position.*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “If the process of national **development** is viewed in broad terms and as involving far more than just economic **development**, it becomes apparent that the **developmental** function of the military can encompass far more than just providing support for civilian economic **developments**. . . . In fact...the military has a most fundamental role to play in the **developmental** process. . . . This role is essentially psychological. It involves giving to a people a sense of identity and of national pride. One of the basic obstacles to **development** in most former colonial territories is the existence, particularly among the national leadership, of a constellation of insecurities and inhibitions. The sense of inferiority and the lack of assertiveness of a people who have once been dominated by foreigners cannot be easily eradicated. . . . The need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm seems to be an essential prerequisite for national **development**. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial **development**.” (p. 152)
- “the need to achieve a sense of adequacy in the military realm seems to be an essential prerequisite for national **development**. Indeed, competence in the military arts has been one of the earliest indicators that a traditional society may be advancing into the early stages of industrial **development**,” (p. 152)
- “a very fundamental function of the military in the national **developmental** process is to assist a people to gain a sense of self-respect and dignity so that they can fulfill demanding and protracted community tasks. In nearly all cultures...manhood is closely associated with the warrior and the military arts. Military **development** may thus be crucial in assisting former colonial peoples to overcome their profound sense of inferiority.... At a more fundamental level, the military sphere appears to be a peculiarly sensitive one psychologically because it touches upon the source of national humiliation of former colonial people.... To regain a sense of equality in their own eyes it thus becomes necessary for these former subjugated peoples to feel that they have now redeemed themselves in the field of their initial greatest weakness. The fact that a deep sense of military inferiority was a part of these peoples' first reaction to the modern world seems in many cases to have colored their capacity at present to modernize their societies. The leaders often have profound psychological inhibitions...” (p. 153)

- “For the West even to appear to oppose military **development** in the new countries can be easily interpreted by the people, given these psychological considerations, to be an indication that the West persists in wanting to keep them in a subordinate and less than fully sovereign position.... A new country feels that the real test of when it has gained its full independence is passed when those who were its former rulers are willing to share with them the weapons and the means of violence which once were the monopoly of the Europeans.” (p. 154)
- “Induction into military life can...be one of the most economic and rational ways of inducting tradition-bound people into the environment of modern organizational life.... In many transitional societies...the army does constitute a vehicle for bringing people into modern life with a minimum of social and psychological strain. Recruits are expected to change their ways of life and their habits of thought, and the process of becoming a modernized soldier is not too dissimilar to that of becoming a useful citizen in a modernizing society.... Finally it should be noted that military **development** can be a powerful instrument for producing a politically loyal citizenry.” (p. 159)

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the Army has gradually become increasingly involved in matters relating to political and social **development**,” (p. 161)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Psychological operations include, of course, the relatively traditional use of mass media. In the cold war these operations are directed toward friendly and neutral as well as enemy countries. In addition, there is growing recognition of the possibility and desirability of using other means such as military movements, policy statements, economic transactions, and **developmental** assistance for psychological impact. This reorientation is implicit in the broadened title of Department of the Army Field Manual 33-5 which was changed from ‘Psychological Warfare in Combat Operations’ in 1949, to ‘Psychological Warfare Operations’ in 1955, to ‘Psychological Operations’ in 1962,” (p. 121)
- “The overlap with the Agency for International **Development**’s mission is apparent and the break with our traditional separation of the military from activities which smack of politics is sharp,” (p. 121)

59. *In terms of military and national development in the developing countries, the U.S. military has specific requirements and requests for psychology and social science. These include an examination of equivalents to war as a means of enhancing national identity and cohesion, examination of possible detrimental effects of discrepancies between military development and development of other sectors of society, techniques for combating guerrilla operations using civic action and communications, and also searching out new directions and developments in interdisciplinary research. Most of these areas in which research is requested touch on the issue of promoting political and social stability in the developing nations and, related to this, ensuring that their process of development is orderly and stable.*

Lucian Pye, *SSRNS*:

- “It would...seem possible for social psychologists to analyze the extent to which it is possible to find functional equivalents to war as a means for giving a people a sense of national identity and self-respect. It would be of great value to have studies made of how people in transitional societies at various stages of **development** tend to perceive and emotionally and intellectually respond to their nation’s military forces. We need to know more about the extent to which the army may be a fundamental institution in providing national pride and a national political consensus.” (p. 156)
- “the problem for research which is of prime interest to us is the probable consequences for national **development** whenever a significant differential emerges between military **development** and the **development** of the other institutions of the society,” (p. 157)

Clyde Eddleman, *USALWMSSR*:

- The “programs” are “field-type communications between isolated villages and districts,” opening “medical treatment clinics,” teaching “first aid and field sanitation,” starting “water **development** and land reclamation projects,” (p. 36)

Robert Slover, *USALWMSSR*:

- “by civic action we mean using indigenous forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic **development**,” (p. 71)

Irwin Altman, *USALWMSSR*:

- “such knowledge is not enough, however, for the planner or operator. He also needs ideas on how to act given his own and others’ resources.... What is the best way to combat a particular guerrilla operation? What communication and propaganda techniques should be used to help win over some dissident minority? These are questions that depend on background information, but they also require the fusing of all this information and the **development** of action programs,” (pp. 116-117)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “Civic action consists of military programs, usually by indigenous forces and often aided by United States materiel and advice, to promote economic and social **development** and civilian good will in order to achieve political stability or a more favorable environment for the military forces. This is technical assistance by military forces for relatively immediate security objectives,” (p. 121)
- “These programs have consisted of the use of troops to do such low-cost **developmental** actions as building roads and schools, or to improve community relations by projects such as organizing youth activities, giving free entertainment or medical aid to civilians,” (p. 121)
- “Probably psychologists’ contributions to the social need for more economic, social, and political **development** will consist largely of an attempt to apply techniques built up in military research,” (p. 122)

- “In the area of national **development**, psychology should attend the more challenging problems of what needs to be done. This...will of necessity cut across the lines of scientific disciplines, and should go far to remedy a major deficiency of current-day social science, the weakness of interdisciplinary research,” (p. 123)

60. *The discussions of “development” presented here relate closely to the issue of insurgency, insofar as it represents a breakdown of social order and thus a failure to ensure that the process of development unfolds in a stable manner. Therefore, programs which promote and ensure “stable” and “orderly” development will also “obviate the need for insurgency” in these societies and will also thus deprive the Communists of an “increasingly long lever” with which to counteract “Western military power.”*

SORO, “Document Number 2”:

- “The problem of insurgency is an integral part of the larger problem of the emergence of the developing countries and their transition toward modernization. Some of these countries are just emerging into a new era of economic and social **development**; some are ruled or controlled by oligarchies which, in order to maintain their own favored positions, resist popular social and political movements toward economic or social betterment and removal of frustrations; still other have only recently obtained political independence,” (p. 51)
- “In the present framework of modernization...the indicated approach is to try to obviate the need for insurgency through programs for political, economic, social, and psychological **development**,” (p. 51)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “There is considerable evidence that societal needs may be changing, thus making an extrapolation of continued military **developments** inappropriate. One basis for this prediction is the instability, as well as the generally recognized undesirability, of an arms race.... A less emotional argument stems from indications that generally the means for countering threats to mutual security are changing from conventional or nuclear military capabilities to unconventional warfare and political and economic conflict,” (p. 120)
- “The gap between the rising aspirations of the peoples of underdeveloped countries and their level of living is being employed as an increasingly long lever with which a small Communist force can unseat governments backed with Western military power. The most effective defense against this insurgent mode of Communist aggression appears to be to prevent the **development** of this lever of popular discontent—to provide non-Communist solutions to political and economic problems,” (pp. 120-121)

2.18 Nation-Building / Nation Building

61. *The Cold War environment and the increasing importance given to counterinsurgency operations by the U.S. military pave the way for a new role for the U.S. Army as a “nation-builder” by creating stable governments and political systems in the developing countries.*

William Kinard, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the Army has also carried its role of **nation-builder** beyond the borders of the United States, wherever our national security interests have taken our Armed Forces,” (p. 64)
- “in underdeveloped areas of the Free World, where Communist subversion and aggression have not yet attained a foothold, the need is to **build** stable **nations**, and people are the key to success or failure,” (p. 65)

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “as the military becomes more concerned with the range of problems which you now identify as counterinsurgency you are in fact going to be coming across the problems of how to build institutions and how to **build** the most complex of all social institutions or organizations: the modern **nation-state**,” (p. 164)
- “that they have a chance to do something that goes just beyond civilizing, goes beyond technical training in limited-war, that involves an understanding of how a **modern society** can be **built**,” (p. 168)

SORO, “Document Number 1”:

- “This places great importance on positive actions designed to reduce the sources of disaffection which often give rise to more conspicuous and violent activities disruptive in nature. The U.S. Army has an important mission in the positive and constructive aspects of **nation building** as well as a responsibility to assist friendly governments in dealing with active insurgency problems,” (p. 48)

62. *The military does not have all the knowledge it needs for developing its nation-building “doctrine.” It must turn to social science in order to gather this knowledge. Various branches of social science including psychology will hopefully “soon rise to the challenge” of assisting the military in its mission and therefore “receive the recognition their contributions merit.”*

Lucian Pye, *USALWMSSR*:

- “the disturbing truth is that we lack a doctrine about how to go about **nation building**. In the past the social scientists have not provided all the information necessary for such a doctrine,” (p. 163)
- “we are not well-prepared for dealing with the question ‘How do you go about **creating a modern nation-state?**’” (p. 164)

Windle & Vallance, *FMP*:

- “The kinds of problems involved in **nation building** are pertinent to psychologists as well as to other social scientists, and...psychologists will soon rise to the challenge and receive the recognition their contributions merit. What role psychologists can or will play in this enterprise will be determined in part by how well they conceptualize the applications of their science in technical development,” (p. 122)
- “We would predict that increasing salience of problems in **nation building** will act primarily to increase interest in certain areas of psychology which have been in existence for some time. The types of areas which may receive more attention include: persuasive communication.... diffusion of innovations.... [and] cultural factors in organization design,” (pp. 125-127)