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DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY

THE SCHOLARSHIP AND PRAXIS OF COMMUNICATION ETHICS:
RHETORICAL INTERRUPTIONS IN HISTORICAL NARRATIVES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNICATION & RHETORICAL STUDIES
MCANULTY COLLEGE AND GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LIBERAL ARTS
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

MELISSA A. COOK

PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

CONVOCATION DECEMBER 2005

The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics

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Melissa A. Cook

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The Scholarship and Praxis of Communication Ethics

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Abstract

Creating a *praxis* model for performing communication ethics scholarship is important in Postmodernity, as a multiplicity of narratives requires knowledgeable life-long learners who are willing to understand historicity and one's place within traditions. This study relies on Alasdair MacIntyre's seminal work, A Short History of Ethics, as it provides an historical lineage of Western philosophers who wrote about ethics within the time span from ancient Greece, to modern day. Major metaphors are extracted from the works of these philosophers as guiding hermeneutical entrances into historical and temporally bound narratives, used as the *praxis* portion of this work. Narratives, epics and poetry, including Homer's Odyssey, Dante's Inferno, Voltaire's Candide, and Albert Camus's The Plague, are used as *praxis* examples for communication ethics. Through the works of these scholars, authors, and poets, a philosophical discussion ensues on communication ethics bound within the historicity of Ancient Greece, Medieval Christianity, the Enlightenment and Modernity. This work identifies various rhetorical interruptions experienced by those societies within Western thought and the effect on communities, religious institutions, and governments.

Throughout this work, historicity is understood through the use of novels as they relate to the philosophy of communication ethics set within historical traditions. Through stories, one can find the ground on which to stand in the 21st century, and ethically communicate with others in Postmodernity. MacIntyre suggests that the exercise of virtues will allow one to join in a tradition or continue within a tradition in which one is already embedded. Communication ethics is part of the dialogue that develops within societies and needs to be understood within the stories and narratives of Postmodernity.

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Chapter One: A Short History of Ethcis and Rhetorical Interuptions

In our society the acids of individualism have for four centuries eaten into our moral structures, for both good and ill. But not only this: we live with the inheritance of not only one, but of a number of well-integrated moralities. Aristotelianism, primitive Christian simplicity, the puritan ethic, the aristocratic ethic of consumption, and the traditions of democracy and socialism have all left their mark upon our moral vocabulary. [. . .]

It follows that we are liable to find two kinds of people in our society: those who speak from within one of these surviving moralities, and those who stand outside all of them. Between the adherents of rival moralities and between the adherents of one morality and the adherents of none there exists no court of appeal, no impersonal neutral standard. For those who speak from within a given morality, the connection between fact and valuation is established in virtue of the meanings of the words they use. To those who speak from without, those who speak from within appear merely to be uttering imperatives which express their own liking and their private choices. The controversy between emotivism and prescriptivism on the one hand and their critics on the other thus express the fundamental moral situation of our own society. (MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics 266)

Once time passes we can reflect back upon various influential decisions and changes that were made on matters concerning anything from family to community, from church to politics, from country to international affairs, and suggest that a rhetorical interruption may have occurred within that specific setting. These rhetorical interruptions are times in our lives, or in history, when standard ideas, stories and narratives that we had come to agree upon and live our lives within, begin to be questioned and changes are made. Michael Hyde reminds us “the call of conscience is itself a rhetorical interruption” (78). An announced disparity in social norms and general feelings of what is appropriate for a particular society or community from one time period to the next may be recognized.

A form of historical conscience moved those within a particular time period and a particular society from one historical period to another. Examining the communicative call of conscience birthed through rhetorical interruptions visible by examining historical transformations can help one focus on communication ethics in a way that is helpful in understanding the role of communication ethics. This constructive examination of communication ethics can take place through the vehicle of an historical novel.

Alasdair MacIntyre, a preeminent philosopher who is currently a permanent Senior Research Fellow for the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, is internationally known for his work in ethics. His text A Short History of Ethics, originally published in 1966, traces a history of philosophical ethics from the ancient Greeks through to modern times, ending in the mid-twentieth century. MacIntyre also wrote an account of the morality of the philosophers Aristotle, Saints Augustine and Aquinas, and David Hume in his 1988 work Whose Justice? Which Rationality? These

philosophers espoused what MacIntyre considers traditions that he repeatedly uses to discuss the historical changes to moral thinking: the Platonic/Aristotelian (Greek) tradition; the Augustine/Aquinas (Christian) tradition; and the Hobbesian (Enlightenment tradition) that all led to modern liberalism (Whose Justice? 11, Short History 148).

MacIntyre suggests in both texts the importance of retelling history, because in order to have an understanding of rationality as it relates to tradition, it is necessary to retell history (Whose Justice? 8-9).

This work will review Alasdair MacIntyre's discussion of A Short History of Ethics and focus on major philosophies found within the time periods designated as Ancient Greece, Medieval Society, the Enlightenment and Modernity by engaging the metaphors that are embedded in the theories of prominent philosophers of the time. The metaphors will then be a springboard for discussion of rhetorical interruptions found within historical novels the Odyssey by Homer, the Inferno as part of the Divine Comedy by Dante Alighieri, Candide by Voltaire and The Plague by Albert Camus. These novels offer a dialogue for communication ethics to be discussed in terms of their historical importance as well as the historicity they offer in discussion of postmodern day issues. David Carr defines historicity as "a term used in the phenomenological and hermeneutic tradition [. . .] to indicate an essential feature of human existence" (673). Historicity is not a linear looking back upon, but rather, it is past and present affecting future possibilities.

Introduction—*The Problem and the Status of the Problem*

Outlining Alasdair MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics and the connection to communication ethics, this first chapter explains the need for a *praxis* orientation to

communication ethics and the reason for the choices of the periods and novels outlined in Chapters Two through Five of this work. A discussion of communication ethics scholarship and the *praxis* of communication ethics will be highlighted throughout these chapters. In this work, a *praxis* application of philosophical theory is important for the student of communication ethics, in trying to put the theory into practical application in real-world situations.

This work interprets historical narratives in relation to the philosophical thinking of particular historical periods. Ancient Greece offers the obvious—the beginning of written philosophical thought for the West through the work of Homer. Medieval Society and the Christian perspective will be discussed in terms of St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas and Dante Alighieri, the great author of the epic, the Divine Comedy, from which the Inferno is the first part. The Enlightenment and the work of scholars who ushered the West into Modernity, including Immanuel Kant, will be discussed alongside Voltaire's classic comedy Candide. Finally, Modernity will be represented through the works of ethical philosophers such as G.E. Moore, John Stewart Mill and Henry Sidgwick in connection to Albert Camus' post-World War II novel The Plague.

This interpretation of narratives will assist with the discussion of communication ethics. The first part of Chapters Two through Five examines the ethical philosophy of scholars as noted by Alasdair MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics, in conjunction with this evolutionary sense of historical change. The second part of Chapters Two through Five will concentrate on a specific novel from each of the announced historical periods. The novel discussion will illuminate communication metaphors that are given birth within the novels and then these metaphors will be connected to the ethical philosophy of

the historical moment. This work will add to the small amount of scholarship on the pedagogy of communication ethics, especially for higher education at the undergraduate level. This work engages in a discussion of communication ethics scholarship and *praxis* as it relates to historical novels written during evolutionary societal changes, integrated with prominent philosophers writing about ethics during those specified eras.

The schema for Chapters Two through Five includes the following: First, there will be an introduction to the period discussed in the chapter. A discussion of each philosopher will follow, as outlined by Alasdair MacIntyre, and will include major metaphors that emerge from the work of the philosophers outlined, work that has significance for communication ethics. Third, the ongoing conversation will be illuminated to include the modern day scholarship alongside a discussion of the rhetorical interruption. Next, a discussion of historicity as it relates to the author of the novel will be discussed. Fifth, a discussion of the historical engagement of the novel will offer readers a summary glimpse into the narrative. Finally, philosophical and rhetorical implications of the metaphors from the novel in concert with the philosophers of the day will be discussed. Each chapter will conclude with a summary explaining the rhetorical interruptions that informed communication ethics of each of the periods discussed in the novels.

In performing a database search of refereed scholarly journal articles via PROQUEST on the topic of “communication ethics,” there were 30 articles identified from 1990–2004. However, 16 of those were book reviews and another five did not relate to the topic of philosophical communication ethics (a few involved health care and a few the environment). When the search was performed for “communication ethics and

pedagogy,” only one article in the past 24 years was identified (Arnett, “Freire’s” 150-171). A search performed through the Communication Institute for Online Scholarship (CIOS) “ComIndex” database delivered more abundant results. A search of article titles dating from 1900-2004 yielded 103 references for the key words “communication ethics.” The majority of the results, however, were journal articles discussing media and ethics. There were also many articles on virtue ethics and Aristotelian theory.

A few modern-day journal articles will be useful in constructing the discussion to be found in Chapter Five in regard to Modernity and communication ethics. However, questions remain as to how to usefully define, discuss and attempt to construct practical scholarship and discussions about communication ethics for postmodern-day students in relation to the history that proceeded Postmodernity. Therefore, this work is an effort to increase the discussion of communication ethics as being historically understood.

Research Approach:

MacIntyre’s illumination of philosophers in conjunction with novels

Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics will be used as a framework for this work, as his acclaimed scholarship provides an outline of philosophers who are crucial to the study of ethics. MacIntyre delineates various time periods and philosophers who wrote during those eras, throughout A Short History of Ethics that make for useful parameters when discussing natural demarcations in history and philosophical thought. MacIntyre refers to “Greek Ethics” (Short History 18, 83-109, and specifically 89), the “Middle Ages” (119-124, 157) and “Christianity” (Short History 110-120). He also refers to the “Enlightenment” within the discussion of the French Enlightenment (Short History 181-183) and “Kant” (Short History 181-183, 190) but he discusses in great detail the

“British & French 18th century arguments” (Short History 157-189). Finally, MacIntyre refers to “Modern Moral Philosophy” at the end of Short History of Ethics (249-269). Central issues important to the Greek, Christian (Middle Ages/Medieval), Enlightenment and Modern societies, then, will be delineated in the chapters of this work. By discussing these time periods and various ethical philosophies emerging during these eras, major metaphors and themes that reflect the societies’ outlooks and beliefs during those times will surface.

For students of communication ethics, this work engages the conversational invitation of *the novel* as a practical application of the announced ethical theories during the time periods listed. The goal of this work is to consider the contemporary significance of the rhetorical interruption found in the movement from Greek ethics to Medieval Christian ethics to Enlightenment ethics and, finally, to Modern ethics and determine if, by reading these novels, the authors allude to what that “call of conscience” might have been during the various “interruptions.” Examining the rhetorical interruptions and the historically situated questions that the rhetorical interruptions announced will be beneficial for the study of communication ethics looking to the decisions made during those periods that changed the culture and the communities forever.

The core of this work includes six chapters. This chapter, Chapter One is the introductory chapter, discussing Alasdair MacIntyre’s A Short History of Ethics and the argument for the need for communication ethics pedagogy. Chapter Two discusses Greek Ethics and the Odyssey. Chapter Three focuses on Christian Ethics and the Middle Ages, and the Inferno. Chapter Four includes a discussion on various Renaissance and Enlightenment philosophers and Candide. Chapter Five delineates modern philosophies

and focuses on The Plague. Finally, Chapter Six concludes the work with a discussion of implications for history and historicity—why the examination of historical novels and the various rhetorical interruptions is crucial for a postmodern discussion of communication ethics and how this will assist in the understanding of the historical implications of the study of communication ethics.

Alasdair MacIntyre

Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that virtues will lead to the unity of a human life if grounded within a tradition (After Virtue 204-225). In defining the pre-modern concept of virtues, it is necessary to say something about the accompanying “concept of selfhood, a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 205).

MacIntyre suggests that virtues should be situated within the concept of finding “the good life for man and not only in relation to practices” (After Virtue 220)

Through communication we can realize our ethical selves. In modern times, our behavior is somewhat controlled by the social situations in which we find ourselves. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests it is through a narrative that one finds him/herself emerged within a rule-bound community. He explains, “behavior is only characterized adequately when we know what the longer and longest term intentions involved are and how the short term intentions are related to the longer. Therefore, we are writing a narrative history.” (After Virtue 208). Communication ethics, then, is the *praxis* of the philosophy of the Ancients to the Moderns, as MacIntyre explains, a type of “intelligibility” for which we can be held accountable for which only we (humans) are the authors (After Virtue 209). Therefore, speech becomes intelligible in a narrative and the purpose and

speech acts require context (MacIntyre, After Virtue 210) within which intelligibility will become obvious and make sense and the intelligibility will be “the conceptual connecting link between the notion of action and that of narrative” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 214).

When Alasdair MacIntyre discusses narratives in After Virtue, he does so to suggest that one is always coauthors of his or her own story, but one is also under certain constraints. “A central thesis begins to emerge: man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. [. . .] through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth” (216). MacIntyre explains how the individual is the subject of the narrative in that the narratives are concepts of selfhood (After Virtue 217), where “I am the subject of a history that is my own and no one else’s, that has its own peculiar meaning” and second, correlatively “I am not only accountable, but I can ask others for an account, I am part of their story, they are part of mine.” (After Virtue 218).

Along with narratives, Alasdair MacIntyre points to traditions as holding families and communities together. A person is part of a family who will inherit a “moral starting point” (220). The thought of one’s past influencing one’s morals is contrasted with Modernism’s individualistic thinking, “I am what I choose to be.” Exercises of virtue strengthen traditions and keep those traditions from disappearing, whereas a lack of virtues corrupts traditions (MacIntyre, After Virtue 223). Our practices are embedded in history, “the history of a practice in our time is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer history of the tradition through which the practice in its present form was conveyed to us [. . .]” (After Virtue 222). Jack Russell Weinstein explains the importance of the connection between ethics and the traditions in which one is not only raised, but continues to live within:

MacIntyre convinces his readers that morality is inseparable from cultural heritage, and that different ways of reasoning—different ways of thinking—are in constant conflict. He describes a world in which rival moral systems struggle to survive and to overshadow their competitors, and one in which beliefs can only be defended by appealing to important texts, sacred scriptures, and lengthy histories. (On MacIntyre, *iv*)

This connection of communication ethics, history, culture and reasoning is investigated in this work because of the movement found within postmodernity to understand multiple narratives working within our world.

Communication Ethics

Over the past 60 years, scholars have engaged in the differentiation of communication ethics from ethics. Richard L. Johannesen wrote an extensive and incredibly useful compilation work on communication ethics in his highly revered text on Ethics in Human Communication. In this text, Johannesen investigates human communication and ethics and provides a categorical outline and discussion of communication ethics from various perspectives as well as presenting case studies at the end of the 5th edition. Johannesen explains his main contention in relating communication and ethics by suggesting that:

Potential ethical issues are inherent in any instance of communication between humans to the degree that the communication can be judged on a right-wrong dimension, that it involves possible significance on humans, and that the communicator consciously chooses specific ends sought and communicative means to achieve those ends. (2)

Communication ethics involves choices, duty, obligation, right and wrong, how one makes a decision and then articulates it to another.

On a micro-level, these are significant components found within interpersonal relationships that must be identified and understood to effect relationships in a positive way. On a macro-level, decision-making affects societies in total. Therefore, communication ethics needs to move from a theoretical discussion to a practical application in order for dialogue and language to be used in communication.

Because, “[L]anguage is a tool that can be used in better or worse ways to achieve human goals” Sharon L. Bracci and Clifford G. Christians see communication ethicists and moral theorists working in tandem, both groups considering methods to “evaluate the use of language” in order to explain *why to evaluate* means used to achieve certain ends (1). “While moral philosophers speculate broadly about the nature and grounds of being a good person, communication ethicists focus on the ethical person in and through language” (Bracci and Christians 2). Our field has continued to expand, as Ronald C. Arnett outlined in his review of communication ethics scholarship in communication journals over a 50-year period of the twentieth century.

In Ronald C. Arnett’s description and analysis of the scholarly works in the field of communication ethics, he explained that the main perspective outlined by theorists and contributors to communication ethics texts, is “choice making” (“Status” 56). When we make an ethical decision, the fact that we *have a choice to make* is what turns us from the theoretical to the practical. Aristotle explained his use of the word *phronesis*, as Arnett outlined, the “focus on deliberative choice via practical discourse [can be] found in

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics" (Arnett, "Status" 56). Aristotle's work points toward communication ethics as forms of *phronesis* and decision-making.

Similar to Ronald C. Arnett's article on the status of communication ethics scholarship, Richard L. Johannesen wrote of the trends in the field of communication ethics as well as pointed toward what those trends recommend for future research agendas in his article "Communication Ethics: Centrality, Trends and Controversies" (201-235). Johannesen explained that when viewing the self, it should not be as an emotivistic, modern self, but rather as a "situated, embedded, socially constructed self," perhaps located within an organization ("Communication Ethics: Centrality" 227). This article is an excellent bibliographic source, as Johannesen offers detailed analysis of the writings on communication ethics in the past two decades and suggests trends that include media, organizational, individual and social ethics, freedom and responsibility, ethic of care, and virtue or character ethics (205-216).

As Johannesen consistently explains in his analysis of the literature on communication ethics, consideration needs to be given to communication ethics in a postmodern world. This can be a challenge, but a welcomed challenge as diversity, culture and technology all influence how we act and react within our separate, yet technologically related cultures. Situating communication ethics within the real world is a necessity that scholars realize in writing about the need for a *praxis* orientation.

Communication ethics is ethics in action. This work specifically looks at the philosophies that informed a given community during the critical periods in history. This work then identifies the rhetorical turns and the reasons behind those choices, and seeks to understand the ethical communicative actions brought about in specific historical

moments. Uprisings and revolts that revolved around hunger, slavery, war, land ownerships and civil rights all have created rhetorical turns in various civilizations around the world. This work seeks to understand the reasoning behind decisions made in various historical periods and, hence, extrapolate the information and make it useful for ethical decision-making in Postmodernity. A crucial component of communication ethics is investigating how society communicates and the methods and media used.

Communication ethics scholar Kenneth E. Anderson considers the need to look at how history and the medium (technology) used for communication affected the practices and the communicative theories of the day. For example, Greek communication was oral, the printing press enacted the shift during the Enlightenment to written, and now, cyber/computer mediated-technology has affected modernity (Anderson 4-5). Throughout this work, various types of “media” will be reviewed, from basic narrative, to poetry, to fictitious novel, to historical biographies, so that an interpretive narrative can be utilized to bring forth the communication ethic of the various time periods discussed.

Ethics will continue to be discussed as society changes. There is not a right or wrong answer when deciding on ethical decisions and outcomes as “ethical considerations form an integral part of human existence and are constantly disputed. Human beings argue about ethics partly because it is so central to their lives” (Machan 5). Because those within society are in constant dialogue with each other, those involved in the dialogue will be questioned as well as perform the questioning as to what ought to be done. Every corner turned, whether done consciously or not, one can ask questions that have ethical communicative considerations on a daily basis. In today’s postmodern

culture, differences need to be recognized with society inviting dialogue, not just with people, but also with changing historical conditions (Makau & Arnett *x*).

Ethics

Ethics has a long history of people engaging questions as to what is the appropriate decision, what ought to be done (Jensen *xi*), how *should* the search be conducted for the morally and ethically correct answer (Andersen 13)? These central questions propel the writing of what is considered the hallmark of ethical theory, Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, through to the Modern-day listing of Henry Sidgwick's engagement of the contemporary conversation of ethics in his The Methods of Ethics. These ethical questions become communication action metaphors in communication ethics, guiding the way for a discussion of the practical maneuvers toward, and consequences for, communication ethics. Therefore, this work will proceed to distinguish ethics from communication ethics in an effort to enlighten discussion around the *actions* of ethics woven throughout our communicative efforts during engagement with other community members (civil, political, religious, familial societies).

Richard L. Johannesen's Ethics in Human Communication is useful in understanding various types of communicative ethical thought. However, the historical perspective, following works from Ancient Greece to Modern times, is not illuminated by Johannesen. In terms of *gestalt* theory, offering a basis by which to understand our own current-day history in terms of what came before and the actions that follow (backgrounding and foregrounding), would be beneficial for logically defining why decisions were made as well as analyzing implications of those decisions. Identifying

rhetorical interruptions from previous societies may assist us with recognizing current-day struggles in our own postmodern lives.

Studying the theory of communication ethics will be useful from a historical point of view, working back to ancient Greece, forward to early Christianity, toward the Renaissance/Enlightenment and, finally Modern scholars, by following the lineage of Alasdair MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics. In conjunction with this theory, a discussion of novels/comedies written about or during these announced time periods will be useful resources in attempting to outline the theories of the day in regard to ethical communicative practices.

A Short History of Ethics and Contemporary Relevance

Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue, a scholarly exposition that followed Short History of Ethics by 25 years, explained his vision of the danger of ignoring *praxis* and the connection between theory and action, suggests the Enlightenment was a failed project, and that we have lost our teleological compass. Therefore, we find competing narratives in Postmodernity, each having its own compass. MacIntyre explains that "emotivism," a practical and philosophical plight, is used to explain decision-making centered on one's "preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character" (After Virtue 12). Emotivism turns us away from thoughtful, grounded, knowing, action. Therefore, examining practical applications of ethics is crucial for contemporary students.

Robert Bellah engaged in such a work in Habits of the Heart, an elongated sociological explanation of what happens "after virtue" (*xii*). Bellah et al. discuss problems that occur when the focus is on individuals themselves, thus limiting us in

formation of bonded communities (*xii*, 302). Bellah discusses *praxis* of human community and how, in terms of emotivism, individualism is problematic. Therefore, this work performs a move similar to Bellah's move, but this work will follow Alasdair MacIntyre even more exactly.

Alasdair MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics is used as the guiding outline for investigating communication ethics in an historical fashion within this work. In his well-respected survey and analysis, MacIntyre looks at the communicative aspects of the community based on philosophers who were writing during those time periods. MacIntyre suggests that history is an important part/piece of moral concepts (Short History 2-3). This work follows the historical progression of MacIntyre in his A Short History of Ethics and provides a companion to MacIntyre in examining *communication* ethics. This intellectual alignment is unusual but reliance on MacIntyre is not without precedent.

What might be seen as "missing" in this work is a theoretical discussion on Postmodernity, as well as a novel to represent postmodern times. However, since MacIntyre published A Short History of Ethics in 1966, he ends his discussion with Modernity and this work will do the same, recognizing that a glimpse into the theory of Postmodernity could encompass its own project. However, in Chapter Six, this work offers a discussion on why Postmodernity was inevitable based on the philosophical discussion that occurs in the previous chapters of the work to that point (in addition to what this historical exposition means for communication ethics in postmodern times).

Communication ethics becomes the *praxis* (theory informed action) of philosophical ethics. This work will move from MacIntyre's theory into implementation

in practical, every-day interactions. This work is not engaging, nor working within a relativistic posture, nor being anachronistic. This work will engage questions within a *given* historical moment in order to enlighten *this* historical moment of Postmodernity.

Alasdair MacIntyre is known throughout the world for his work in ethics, and Jack Russell Weinstein argues that MacIntyre's connection of history to philosophy is important to study in tandem with morality. "MacIntyre convinces his readers that morality is inseparable from cultural heritage, and that different ways of reasoning—different ways of thinking—are in constant conflict" (Weinstein *iv*). It is MacIntyre's use of *praxis* that will inform communication ethics, as communication is a form of *praxis* for ethics.

Another point that needs to be made regarding parameters around this work includes the realization that there is, indeed, a lack of insight into vernacular voices found in the writing of Alasdair MacIntyre's work on the history of ethics. MacIntyre focuses his work on, and in the West, beginning A Short History of Ethics with the ancient Greeks and concluding with continental and a few American scholars. MacIntyre does not enter his work through Egypt, India, Asia, nor Islamic or Jewish religions (Short History xi). MacIntyre set his own parameters and worked within them, as he noted in his preface to the second edition of A Short History of Ethics. There is obviously room and a need for investigation of ethics in the east, and feminist ethics, but this work will stay true to the work of MacIntyre as a guiding focal point.

Though he uses MacIntyre's work on ethics to elucidate his work on Coordinated Management of Meaning theory, Vernon E. Cronen critiques MacIntyre's limiting of his work on traditions to that of Western traditions. "The effect of this was to lose sight of

the fact that Western traditions are held together by diverse and widely known set of cultural practices. [. . .] By losing track of the broader conception, culture, MacIntyre failed to see the diversity of resources by which one tradition may encounter another” (33). MacIntyre responded to his critiques in the *Preface* of the second edition of the A Short History of Ethics, published in 1997 by acknowledging some of the philosophers he did not include in the first edition, as well as suggesting that his work was the “short” history of *Western* ethics and, therefore, the book should be read as such (*vii-xix*).

There are, indeed, modern-day scholars writing on universal ethics and third-world countries, all of which are valid and important. Gerald A. Larue offers an insightful explanation of ethics in ancient Mesopotamia and suggests that once writing was developed stories were written about,

[. . .] heroes who exemplified virtues most admired, legal codes that defined acceptable and non-acceptable conduct and instructional formulations, all of which inform us about the nature of ethics as it first developed into something sufficiently explicit to be the subject of reflection and discussion. [. . .] Western ethics has its roots in these ancient approaches to the problems of regulating a settled society. (29)

Another view from a non-Western tradition explained by Purusottama Bilimoria discusses Indian ethics. Bilimoria explains:

In India it was recognized that ethics is the ‘soul’ of the complex spiritual and moral aspirations of the people, co-mingled with social and political structures forged over a vast period of time. And this is a recurrent

leitmotif in the culture's profuse wisdom literature, legends, epics, liturgical texts, legal and political treaties. (43)

So, it is not that these important societies are being ignored, but rather, this work notes that the West did not have the sole key that unlocked the doors to the house of ethics. An interesting fact in Bilimoria's explanation is that ethics can be found in the small narratives of literature as well as legal documents; texts that identify—both implicitly and explicitly the communication that occurred within a culture regarding the overarching agreements found within an ethical community. However, for brevity and to continue to use MacIntyre's work as a backdrop to this work's discussion, this work will continue to be exclusive to MacIntyre's focus on scholars focused on Western philosophy, as described and expanded upon in Short History of Ethics, as well as After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?

Rhetorical Interruptions

Communicative disparity that characterizes fluctuations from one time period to the other—the movement from ancient Greece to the Christianity of the Middle Ages, to the Enlightenment, to Modernity, (and then to Postmodernity) can be viewed as “rhetorical interruptions” (Hyde 78). Michael Hyde describes and expands on Martin Heidegger's notion of “historical call,” and the changes that occur in our lives because of this call from one person to another. A sense of transformation occurs when one realizes that things are not as they once were.

Hyde suggests, “that the call of conscience is itself a rhetorical interruption” (78). Discussing the interruptions and the outcome upon human communication and the ethical implications of choice making will assist the student of ethics in determining what

worked in the past and, potentially, how to make decisions in the future. Therefore, this work seeks to understand history through the contemporary significance of ideas, figures and events. Time lies not only behind, but also beside and in front of us.

Explaining the importance of the historical moment and how rhetorical interruptions allow those moments to come alive, Ronald C. Arnett suggests that the moment speak to those listening:

It is a moment that calls clearly. Communication does not rest with us alone; the historical moment speaks. It is our response that furthers the conversation. History is marked by public points of memory. Awareness of the significance of a given historical moment begins with a rhetorical interruption, calling us from the routine of everyday life into response, into what both Bonhoeffer and Levinas would call responsibility.

(Dialogic Confession 5)

The significance of this work is that it will provide a historical connection to communication ethics so that the study of communication ethics can be united with premier contemporary philosophers and engage communication ethics from a *praxis* orientation.

Communication ethics cannot be studied in the abstract. As Postmodernity moves forward, it is important to view communication ethics from a historical perspective, and then attempt to determine the questions that are being asked during specific time periods. Using novels will assist in understanding the motives behind the decisions that were made in the various time periods.

In the West, the metaphor of progress was thrown away, and the teleological path was lost. In Postmodernity, reflection has become problematic and, yet, it is a necessity. The visualization of each chapter finds life in explication of a given novel appropriate to the historical moment that each of the chapters analyze. The following is an outline of the chapters that will explore the philosophical theory of communication ethics in the time periods announced. Once the theory is delineated, attention is turned toward a practical side of communication ethics, attempting to outline the theory put into action in each of these historical time periods through the various novels that could be used in communication ethics pedagogy.

Historicity and Novels

Two questions are answered in this first chapter. First, why have these time periods been chosen for review? Second, why use novels as a *praxis* orientation to viewing communication ethics? First, Alasdair MacIntyre points to “Greek society” (Short History 5) and the philosophers who were the first to give us ethics in a written and systematic manner: “[. . .] there came in the fifth century B.C. a new class of teachers and a new class of pupils. Books on moral philosophy commonly concentrated on the teachers, the sophists, whom we see mainly through the antagonistic eyes of Plato” (Short History 11). The writings of the ancient Greek philosophers offer a framework for interpreting and understanding the first written system of ethics and how life changed once travel and other worldviews became apparent via the sophists.

The rhetorical interruption Homer offers begins Chapter Two of this work. Then, a rhetorical turn can be found in Christianity during Medieval time that is the focus of Chapter Three. This is the first system to allow for *everyone* to be involved in the

discussion, not just free men, since the Sophistic period, as explained by MacIntyre (Short History 115; Whose Justice? 117). The founding and exaltation of science could be viewed as the rhetorical interruption of Christianity and religion that brought the West into the age of the Enlightenment, which is the focus of Chapter Four. Finally, Modernity, which makes science and technology and the progress they author, the god terms (Burke 33, Weaver 212) of a new age is the focus of Chapter Five.

Second, presenting an invitational story, along with the engagement of theory, is an approach that allows these novels to be given life. Communication ethics can be interpreted within a narrative approach via the practical outlet of a novel and readers are able to view philosophy and history in congruence with each other. This work seeks to understand history through the contemporary significance of ideas, figures and events. Each novel will be viewed as a story that explains the time period surveyed. Within each of these novels, various forms of communication can be explained in relation to the ethical norms of the period in question.

Roy Porter explains in his bibliographic text, The Enlightenment that stories of “fiction became available during the Enlightenment” and were “vehicles for exploring the implications of Enlightenment ideas” (59). These novels will allow a case study of sorts by which to view the communication ethic(s) of the day in action and offer a canvas for understanding; a backdrop by which to convey meaning.

The significance of the whole of this work is threefold. First, it provides a historical connection to communication ethics. Second, it unites the study of communication ethics with a premier philosopher of ethics (Alasdair MacIntyre) with communication ethics in action (the novels). Third and finally, novels will be used as

historical case studies for communication ethics as a practical effort to draw correlations between theory and *praxis*. The following section of this first chapter is a description of the five chapters to follow in this work, describing the ethical theory and practice discussed as they relate to human communication.

Chapter Two: Greek Ethics & The Odyssey

Chapter Two of this work recognizes that the study of Greek philosophy and literature substantiates the documented changes that occurred in Athens during the age of Antiquity. Alasdair MacIntyre explains “Social changes had not only made certain types of conduct, once socially accepted, problematic, but had also rendered problematic the concepts which had defined the moral framework of an earlier world” (Short History 5). To the postmodern observer, it seems as if MacIntyre could be explaining the changes we are witnessing from Modernity to Postmodernity (as well as the earlier shifts from medieval to the Enlightenment and the Enlightenment to Modernity—the rhetorical interruptions that will also be discussed in subsequent chapters). A discussion of Homer (*circa* 800 BC, novel is from the 540 BC version), Plato, Aristotle and Sophistic writings begin Chapter Two, followed by a response from modern scholars and ending with the discussion of the *praxis* of The Odyssey for communication ethics.

Alasdair MacIntyre discusses the breakdown of social forms within ancient Greece (Short History 10). Rules no longer held true for all citizens. Because of travel, and the Sophists’ interaction with other cultures, rules were questioned. “The society reflected in the Homeric poems is one in which the most important judgments that can be passed upon a man concern the way in which he discharges his allotted social function” (Short History 5). What became problematic in Athenian society is that these functions

were questioned once the Sophists began to travel as well as the customs of the warring Persians who had entered the city. Ken Anderson explains the history of communication ethics from the standpoint that one must consider the community and culture within which communication is taking place (3-20). It is this Greek culture, this time period, and the disruptions occurring within this community that this work attempts to understand.

Alasdair MacIntyre illuminates the classical period of ethics by addressing such metaphors as judgment, courage, justice and im/morality (Short History 1-83, After Virtue 121-129). These metaphors speak to Athenian as well as modern-day life. Other Greek metaphors that will be viewed through both the lens of MacIntyre as well as other modern day scholars include good, hero, knowledge, duty and responsibility. An understanding of these metaphors will allow one to recognize the communicative efforts made by the citizens of the day and specifically those found immortalized in the Homeric story of the Odyssey.

Chapter Three: Medieval Christian Ethics & The Inferno

Christianity offered an alternative to the elite as Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that it was the first major philosophical system interested in the poor since Stoicism (Short History 115; Whose Justice? 117). There was a new type of concern about the “disenfranchised” and a move from theism to monotheism. Previously, philosophical systems were for the upper class; so, the Christians were the first to bring religion and philosophy to the common people as “Christianity introduced even more strongly than the Stoics did the concept of every man as somehow equal before God” (MacIntyre, Short History 114-115). Because Medieval times stretch over a thousand years by most accounts, Christianity is the foremost overarching narrative construct viewed as the major

theme of medieval times. Aurelius Augustinus, known as Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo (354-430) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) are the two central theological and philosophical figures outlined by MacIntyre (Short History 110-120; Whose Justice? 146-240). For this chapter, it will be critical to ascertain whom Augustine and Aquinas were writing for and what perspectives they brought to the discussion of Christianity as well as the whole of medieval society.

A characterization of the time period with an explanation of the major Christian metaphors, including confession and sin, natural law, obedience, justice, hierarchy and rule (MacIntyre, Short History 111-117) is discussed in Chapter Three of this work. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that religion helped medieval citizens find answers to the mysteries of various questions raised by both slave and free (Short History 109). Chapter Three will conclude with an examination of how Dante's Inferno adds to the conversation on communication ethics. "The Divine Comedy is in outline—but only in outline—a summation of the Medieval world view and is heavily indebted to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas" (Cantor and Klein 8). Dante's sarcasm and humor is specifically suited for this type of poetry. Specific focus on how Dante responded to, and/or was influenced by the Christian Church of the thirteenth century of which he was a part is discussed in Chapter Three.

Norman F. Cantor and Peter L. Klein explain the significance of medieval writers on the Renaissance:

Dante is the exponent of the early Renaissance thought that marks the transition from the church and group-centered medieval world to the state and individual-centered Renaissance culture. Machiavelli is the great

theorist of the High (or full) Renaissance in which the potentialities of statism and humanism are carried to their ultimate conclusion and presented in forms that helped to shape modern European civilizations.

(Renaissance 3)

Both of these great political and poetic philosophers worked as “political exiles from Florence” (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance 4). Chapter Three will focus on medieval metaphors outlined above and will be reviewed in terms of communication ethics as they relate to the history of the Medieval period and MacIntyre’s discussion of both Augustine and Aquinas and the work of Dante, specifically found in the Inferno.

Chapter Four: Enlightenment Ethics & Candide

The Enlightenment was, as we have seen in the turn from the Homeric age to the Sophistic movement, and again with the end of the Greek reign and the beginning of Christianity, a time of narrative disruption. Science was king and Christianity was being questioned for what seemed to be the first time in over a thousand years. In Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant asked if God can be proven, and if so, did it need to be done?

The discussion in Chapter Four focuses on the communicative turn that is exemplified at the end of medieval times and ushered philosophers, such as Kant, into the Enlightenment. Europe seemed to know it was in a state of flux, that change was on the horizon, that life as they knew it was never going to be the same. Some have argued that the American Revolution, as much as the French and Scottish Enlightenment and eventual French Revolution, marked the rhetorical interruption. So, what was Kant’s

stance? Alasdair MacIntyre turns toward Kant for a description of ethics during the Enlightenment (Short History 190-98).

Immanuel Kant attempted to establish the fact that God did not need to be proven. Humanity simply needed to have faith; a faith in a metaphysical world that was being challenged by the scientific method of the day. Reason and science were valid only within a certain field and not faith. Not only was metaphysics the most esteemed of sciences being challenged, but also experience and the source of knowledge were being challenged as well (Dixon *vii*).

In Chapter Four, a discussion of the philosophers discussed by Alasdair MacIntyre who wrote during the British and French 18th century thought is offered along with metaphors embedded within their work, including, property rights, the individual and freedom. Focus is given to Kantian metaphors outlined by MacIntyre, including reason, intuition (*a priori*), the transcendental and, finally, the categorical imperative as it relates to universal morality (Short History 190-99). Two key Kantian texts are reviewed in Chapter Four, including Lectures on Ethics and Critique of Pure Reason due to their import to Kant's work and view on ethics and reason. With the guidance of these Enlightenment metaphors and, specifically, the metaphors emerging from the work of Immanuel Kant, Chapter Four turns toward the writing of Voltaire and his volatile and incredibly telling text Candide.

Candide is a short text written in the middle of the eighteenth century, that allowed Voltaire to anonymously announce his political disrespect for theology and the theory that God will make sure all things come out for the best in the end. Candide is a response to the philosophy of the day as Voltaire used Candide as his counter to the

theodicy and philosophy of the rationalist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (Brooks 158-165). This chapter also explores Kantian ethics as they relate to Voltaire's work in Candide.

Voltaire connects various characters with incredible flaws, on a journey of life. They all have something to offer toward the moral of the story. Major metaphors found within Candide include pessimism, the categorical imperative, (an almost perverse) optimism, and unwavering faith in God vs. evil. These metaphors are compared and contrasted to Alasdair MacIntyre's view of the Enlightenment and in relation to communication ethics and the rhetorical interruptions that were occurring as medieval life came to an end as described in Chapter Four of this work.

Chapter Five: Modern Ethics and The Plague

The movement from Enlightenment thinking to Modernity is the focus of Chapter Five along with a discussion of Albert Camus' The Plague, written at the end of World War II. Having lived through Nazi Germany's attempt to rule Europe, and as a supporter of the French resistance, (Lottman 249) Camus was writing on the cusp of yet another rhetorical shift. Camus wrote during a time when institutions were questioned and the world was becoming more global. The beginning of the end of acceptance and acknowledgement of metanarratives (Lyotard *xxiii-xxv*), postmodern philosophy marked an end to Modernity. Lyotard suggests the postmodern "transition" begun with the end of reconstruction in Europe by the end of the 1950s and Ian Hamilton Grant, who wrote Postmodern Thought suggests postmodern times begins with the 1960s (36-40).

Chapter Five explores a few philosophies of modern thought as explained by Alasdair MacIntyre. In A Short History of Ethics, MacIntyre discusses Modernity in reference to scholars, such as John Stuart Mill a Utilitarian intellectual who studied

Bentham from an early age, thanks to his own father's influence (235, 251); as well as Mills' "critics," including G.E. Moore.

Other Alasdair MacIntyre pieces are also referenced and examined for the fifth chapter of this work, including After Virtue, and Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? Specifically, MacIntyre discusses "emotivism" throughout After Virtue and describes the concept as a type of individualism that is problematic in modern times, as making decisions based on one's own attitude and beliefs (xx). Stephen Darwall further explains emotivism and gives a non-cognitive definition. "Emotivism can explain the intimate connection that many philosophers think exists between ethical judgment and *motivation*" (72). John G. Messerly, in his An Introduction to Ethical Theories, also explains the origins of emotivism (24). Individualism and emotivism are important metaphors discussed in Chapter Five, as they relate to the Modern philosophy coming out of a rhetorical shift occurring in the Enlightenment and culminating at the end of Modernity.

For the praxis portion of Chapter Five, this work uses Albert Camus's The Plague, which offers a glimpse into the world during and after World War II. Camus lived through Nazi Germany's assault on innocent Jews of various descents. Through the vehicle of The Plague, Camus showed his audience the mundaneness of the lives of those living in the onslaught of a life-taking plague. From the opening of the novel, we meet the characters who live in Oran, a "large French port on the Algerian coast, headquarters of the Prefect of a French Department" (Camus 3). The plague comes to town and infects anyone and everyone at the beginning of the novel. There is not a systematic reason

available that is able to predict who will be the next victim of the plague. The plague simply claims its prisoners without notice.

Narrated by the fictitious Doctor Rieux, The Plague is a novel that explains how Rieux cares for the plague's victims and the narrator describes what happens within the confines of the city walls from beginning to possible end of the plague. Another character, Joseph Grand, who did not contract the disease, became a statistician for the government early in the novel. Grand was very proud of the accurate recordkeeping. The improved order of burying the dead at the cemetery, according to the Prefect, was very systematic and impressive, "and though the burials are much the same, we keep careful records of them. That, you will agree, is progress" (Camus 158). Progress is a key metaphor for Alasdair MacIntyre, which is explored as it relates to Modernity throughout Chapter Five.

Chapter Six: The Rhetoric of Story-laden Communication Ethics

This final chapter views and reviews communication ethics as a story-laden *praxis*. The major metaphors that were outlined in Chapters Two through Five are reviewed in order to discuss their centrality to communication ethics. The metaphors emerge from both the philosophical writers outlined by Alasdair MacIntyre and the novels themselves. The chapter includes a discussion on the implications of teaching communication ethics through the use of novels.

The focus of Chapter Six is the discussion on Postmodernity and communication ethics and why Postmodernity was inevitable. The discussion is in terms of rhetoric and story-laden communication ethics through the work of Paul Ricoeur's Time and Narrative Volumes 1 through 3.

As the concluding chapter, Chapter Six reviews the significance of this entire work. This work seeks to provide an historical connection to communication ethics, uniting the study of communication ethics with premier philosophers of ethics, engaging communication ethics in terms of *praxis* in order to *experience* communication ethics in action, and using novels as historical case studies for communication ethics as a practical effort to draw correlations between theory and *praxis*. First, the discussion begins with Ancient Greece in the time from Homer and the *Odyssey* through to Aristotle.

This work seeks to identify the traditions and major metaphors of the various periods discussed in the following chapters, including the *polis* being most important as the publicly announced forum for citizenship and ethical communication in the Ancient Greek world. The medieval world saw traditions, especially the Church, as the forum in which communicative action could find an ethical home. During the Enlightenment, contention within the tradition and the home of the Catholic Church was disrupted by the offerings of other Christian institutions, as well as science and the need for proof in the academy. In modernity, traditions were dismissed with turning inward to the self. Finally, in postmodernity, a resurrection of traditions gives people ground upon which to stand and a multiplicity of communication ethics to offer traditions and narratives for the good that Aristotle was searching for 2,500 years ago.

Chapter Two: Greek Ethics and the Odyssey

The question of what constitutes a good reason for action is thrust upon them only when they are already confronted by alternatives, and characteristically the first uses of practical reasoning will be to justify the pursuit of some good not to be achieved by following the customary routines of the normal day, month, and year. It is only later when these routines have more largely and more radically been disrupted that the question of whether it was not in fact better to follow the older ways unreflectively can be raised, and when the conservative offers his contemporaries good reasons for returning to an earlier relatively unreflective mode of social life, his very modes of advocacy provides evidence that what he recommends is no longer possible. (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality 54)

While one is, as they say, “in the moment” it is difficult to see the forest for the trees. In Homer’s time, it was a matter of form that people were virtuous because they followed their duties which were manifested in their actions. How do we know this? Twenty-eight hundred years later, through the content and poetry of Homeric myths, including Homer’s Odyssey, one can appreciate the “chief means of moral education” in these heroic “stories” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 121). A discussion of Homer’s poetry follows in this second chapter as a form of *praxis* in attempting to determine the communication ethic of Ancient Greece.

Myths can open up the question for a discussion about the rhetorical interruptions of the time period. What was changing in ancient Greek society to cause such interruptions? Before the Sophistic period, and the various wars that brought invaders to Greece, there was an agreed upon story of the Greek city-state, (the *polis*). There was a type of universal understanding where a delineation of roles were common and expectations and duties of individuals for the good of that *polis* were understood and second nature. Did the universal form of the understanding of the *polis* fade away and lead the community to decisions based on the particular? What led to the difference of the order of the universal versus the particular?

Alasdair MacIntyre claims there was a “radically different social order” in the years between Homer and the Sophists (Short History 10). Why and how this difference manifested itself will be considered in this second chapter as the rhetorical interruption of the age, as well as how a communication ethic manifested itself in this ancient civilization.

Within the Homeric texts, Alasdair MacIntyre recognizes a utopian form of society, which carried a pre-supposed social order (Short History 8). But, MacIntyre further clarifies that there are other historical documents which explain that in ancient Greece, between the launching of Homeric culture and the engagement of scholarly travel by the sophists, “there is no longer a single and unified society in which evaluation can depend on established criteria” (Short History 9). The rhetorical interruption based on travel and the newness of other lands and other people, as well as peoples from invading armies, created changes in social orders.

Within Homer, a single, fundamental order with agreed upon social practices gave meaning to discordance. Therefore, a person would know where to ‘stand’ if they found themselves within certain conflicts. A reading of the poetry of Homer will assist in the understanding of the heroic society as described in the Odyssey that will allow for the study of theory in relation to practice. The Odyssey was of central importance to the Greeks as epics such as this were forms of understanding, listings of what was commonly held as acceptable community practices, and types of “sacred writings,” no less (MacIntyre, Short History 10).

These poems offered the Athenians a guide on how to live courageously, bravely and be a good person in order for the *polis* to be successful. The *polis* was the foundational structure of the Athenian city-state that offered standards for how to judge various practices (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 34). From Homer to the Sophists, and from Socrates and Plato to Aristotle, there was a significant change in the way of “doing,” and the opening up of their world brought change upon the *polis* as to what was courageous, just and noble. Though ‘doing’ is not a philosophically sophisticated metaphor, it explains the effort of daily living. The rhetorical interruption of the induction of other cultures upon the original Greek culture allowed for a change in philosophy, culture and tradition that had not been seen in Homer’s time.

Introduction

From the opening of A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre posits the idea that words no longer held the same meaning in ancient Greek Society as they had hundreds of years earlier. The Greeks of Plato’s (427-347 BC) and Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) time began to question morals. Qualifying, descriptive words no longer held the

same meaning as they had been used in Homeric myths (MacIntyre, Short History 5). Homer began a description of Greek life and morality, Plato attempted to reveal reality, and Aristotle allowed for a generative form of agency and utilized *phronesis*, the ability to use practical wisdom and creatively engage philosophical theories. War and travel away from the *polis* created a time of change and uncertainty where the universal Greek understandings of roles and duties were questioned and eventually no longer recognized.

Based upon A Short History of Ethics, After Virtue, and Whose Justice Which Rationality? this chapter examines Alasdair MacIntyre's understanding of ethics and virtues of Ancient Greece. In illuminating the characterization of this ancient time period, MacIntyre explains that there had been an order of living that was basic and fundamental, in that, "to be *dikaios* (just) is to conduct one's actions and affairs in accordance with this order" (Whose Justice? 14). The Greeks were in agreement with this overarching narrative of how to act within the Athenian state. Courage and justice were virtues that were understood and stable in Homer's narratives of Greece. This narrative was contested once travel, war and trade escalated within and outside of Greece, as is evident in the works of the sophists (MacIntyre, Short History 10-11). Socrates lived during a period that was on the cusp of Homeric life and the beginning of sophistry.

As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, Socrates offered definitions and syllogisms to help explain his own ideas of morality (Short History 14-21). Plato offered the *a priori* of forms that would give order to life and Aristotle offered how members of the *polis* might work toward the good via use of the mean, within the confines of the Platonic philosophy (MacIntyre, Short History 57-83). Starting from the 'beginning' then, this work moves through the philosophy of these men, starting with Homer and ending with Aristotle.

Homer: Heroic Society

Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that Homer's poetry was a pragmatic effort that eventually became known as a type of revered ideal for later philosophers. Homer described in his poetry the forms of life that he witnessed in the society around him. Homer did not know he was practicing the antecedent to Greek philosophy. Plato followed and then Aristotle, who later used Homer's work as a basis of his own philosophical ethics. These men were attempting to determine an understanding of how humans work together in community, as well as individually. What was the essence of human life? The ancient Greek writers who eventually became the first recorded philosophers attempted to answer this question via their myths, orally conveyed traditions and eventual writings. These myths all had characters that followed roles that were evident in a private and public setting.

There was a hierarchy of roles within Homeric society that outlined how one was to be judged based on how they performed their duties (MacIntyre, Short History 5-8). The appraisal of a man's actions was predetermined by the title/role given to them and the class structure in which they were all embedded. Thus, there was an agreement as to how to view and represent justice. Therefore, to be virtuous was to act according to a predetermined set of publicly agreed upon social practices which would lead one in living an ethical life. For instance, one could experience shame because the entire community understood what was expected of each other. Unfortunately, hospitality became as important as retribution. Being hospitable to strangers was the courteous and just way to act, as was killing a murderer of a family member in retribution. It was one's duty to

avenge the death of a kinsman. These types of virtues were universally understood within the *polis*.

Homer wrote on the cusp of a rhetorical interruption that Alasdair MacIntyre suggests is evidenced in the writings of Theognis of Megara (Short History 9). MacIntyre points to the difference in moral vocabulary from the time of Homer to the Theognid corpus through to the writings of the traveling philosophers, known as the Sophists (Short History 5). In explaining the change from Homeric time to Theognis, which may have been about two to three centuries in time, MacIntyre posits, “There is no longer a single and unified society in which evaluation can depend on established criteria” (Short History 9). This would explain the difference between the work of Plato and Aristotle another two centuries later.

Four hundred years seems like a long time, and one would assume change was an eventual happening. However, that is a postmodern view looking back upon a classical time period where time moved much more slowly as communication was not as easily accessible. Communities were very insular until the travel of the sophists. Colonization and travel revealed other ways of life and living (MacIntyre, Short History 10). Therefore, the transformation over those 400 years was important and life altering.

Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that Homer was a/the pre-philosophical writer who offered the philosophers that followed him a guide for understanding social practices. Homer’s writings had offered a mythological, sacred writing upon which judgments of actions had been based. However, Plato was committed to a transcendental metaphysics, and Aristotle contradicted him by suggesting that practices should be embedded in social

institutions. Hierarchical formations were beginning to change by the time Plato and Aristotle were writing.

Between Homer and writers five centuries later there is a great change in Greek myths about the order in the universe. The Homeric myth does reflect, though with much distortion, the workings of an actual society in which a close form of functional organizations is presupposed by the moral and evaluative forms of appraisal which are in use. The later assertions of order in the universe reflect not a structure that is, but one that was, or one that is struggling to survive. They are conservative protests against the disintegration of the older forms and the transition to the city-state. The myths themselves cannot but open up the question of the difference between the order of the universe and the order of society. But above all, this question is sharpened by a widening awareness of radically different social orders. (MacIntyre, Short History 10)

Deciding what constitutes a good man was no longer an obvious decision as travel brought the world of the inside out, and invaders brought the outside in. The Greeks had stumbled upon a “discovery of rival social orders” (MacIntyre, Short History 11).

Alasdair MacIntyre also explains the difference between Homeric poems and later, philosophical reasoning concerning practical reasoning. In his text After Virtue, MacIntyre posits, “All practical reasoning arises from someone asking the question, ‘What am I to do?’” (24). So a person would understand their role and duty in Homeric poetry because “the characters already know independently of their reasoning what action it is that they are required to perform” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 19). Because of the

historicity of the heroic age and the fact that subsequent cultures passed stories on through an oral tradition over many centuries, various discussions about the ethics of these cultures is conveyed and debated today as MacIntyre explained in After Virtue (121-129).

The narrative structure and moral education of the Greek “heroic age” is accounted in stories (MacIntyre, After Virtue 121). Discussions about the heroic age may not be historically (chronologically) accurate, however, they provided moral background to contemporary debate in classical societies. The idea of a man’s role and status is also detailed in Homeric society. A man’s determined status outlined his rights and privileges (MacIntyre, After Virtue 121). *Aretê* is excellence of any kind usually translated to mean virtue, and the notion of courage-sustained households, because if one was courageous, one was considered a good friend. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that there is an important connection between being courageous and the concepts of “friendship [. . .] fate and death [. . .]” (After Virtue 122). Therefore, in Homer’s heroic society, morality and social structure are one in the same (MacIntyre, After Virtue 123).

Fate is an accepted, social reality in Homeric society. Death is obvious, so the man, “who does what he ought moves steadily toward his fate and death” since, for the ancient Greeks, “human life has a determinate form” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 124). The outcome of war was prosperity, but the paradox of this situation was that the definition of war *is* death. Winning then becomes a form of losing, in the form of loss of life (MacIntyre, After Virtue 128).

According to Alasdair MacIntyre, there are three central interrelated elements in a unitary framework found within heroic poetry. First, there is a conception of what is

required by the social role which each individual inhabits. Second, there is a conception of excellence or virtues in these qualities that enable an individual to do what his or her role required. Finally, there is a conception of the human condition as fragile and vulnerable to destiny and to death, such that to be virtuous is not to avoid vulnerability and death, but rather to accord them their due (MacIntyre, After Virtue 128-9).

Alasdair MacIntyre refers to this ancient Greek world as a heroic society and suggests that members of heroic societies cannot withdraw from community. Only on the outside is one a stranger because one's "identity in heroic society involves particularity and accountability" (After Virtue 126). MacIntyre pointedly asks, if we no longer have that social structure (of the heroic society), what can be learned from Homer? First, morality is always tied to the socially local and particular, and second, one can only possess virtues in a tradition in which one inherits them (MacIntyre, After Virtue 126).

The ancients' history was such that hierarchy was all they knew, and society was built upon the reliance upon slavery and having women stay at home. It was not a perfect world, but the philosophy was and is still useful in their historical moment, as well as the current. For hundreds of years, Homer offered those who read his poetry, or heard it via the oral tradition, a way of life that was familiar and one within which they all agreed to live. These traditions were ethically understood within their communicative offerings. However, it was the writings and teachings of the Sophists that began changing the tides and the notions of ethics began to shift.

The Sophists and Socrates: Rhetorical Teaching Methods

Depending on the location, the people and the culture, various forms of what is "just right and fitting" were found to govern Greek societies, cities or states (MacIntyre,

Short History 14). Therefore, it was the sophist's duty (the rhetorician who traveled from state to state in order to teach the young men) to learn and understand the customs of the local peoples in order to teach throughout the land. "Thus the criteria of justice are held to differ from state to state" in ancient Greece (MacIntyre, Short History 15). What was right and just in one city might not have been so in another. Coming out of Homeric times, where everyone was in agreement with the terms and conditions of justice, this change in Greek culture was problematic in that ethics became relative to the people and the culture. This was the fifth century BC in ancient Greece, and the sophists were paid for their knowledge and teachings of rhetoric, sometimes for better or for worse.

As a teacher, Socrates' (469-399 BC) lived and worked during, as well as following the time period of the Sophists. Socrates was known to be aggravating to those who he was supposed to be offering moral counseling. Socrates never gave an answer, instead, he wanted his pupils to think and arrive at their own conclusions based on his question-and-answer style of reasoning (thus we now have the Socratic Method). He taught through a method of constant questioning of his pupils, and it was Plato who wrote of Socrates' teachings.

Alasdair MacIntyre explains Socrates through the eyes of Aristotle's comments about his predecessor. "We see him use what Aristotle calls inductive arguments (arguments which invoke examples and generalize from them), and we see him syllogizing (that is, drawing conclusions deductively from various premises)" (Short History 21). MacIntyre continues that it was smart of Socrates to cause his pupils to become so exasperated that they found the lesson only in not being able to answer the question. The interlocutors then understood that Socrates' arguments "derive

contradictory or otherwise absurd consequences from admissions secured from his interlocutor, and induce the interlocutor to retract” (MacIntyre, Short History 20). Through the contradiction in which he found himself bound, this type of argument engaged Socrates’ pupils and they would eventually understand his point. “So the discovery of one’s own ignorance survives as the one well-founded moral aim” (MacIntyre, Short History 21). Socrates believed that he was asking the right questions about ethics.

Socrates wondered by which criteria one should make decisions. However, Alasdair MacIntyre explains that the philosophers that followed him were able to consider, even more precisely, at a micro-level, how to define the moral vocabulary used to even consider *those* criteria because during Socrates’ time “moral usage has ceased to be clear and consistent” (Short History 24). Plato then shadowed his mentor’s writing by offering a universal order tied to a “social order” (MacIntyre, Short History 25).

Plato: The *a priori* and Forms

“Plato set most of his central problems in ethics” as he wrote his dialogues with Socrates as the “mouthpiece” for Plato (MacIntyre, Short History 26). Two of Plato’s works included the Gorgias and the Republic, in which he explored rhetoric and the ethical (or unethical) nature of persuasion. Within the Gorgias, Plato suggested that the sophists taught a rhetoric that could be used in unethical ways because the students were taught to be able to persuade others without the particular knowledge necessary on a particular topic. Therefore, rhetoric could be used for good or bad, dependent on the desired outcome. However the idea of responsibility comes forward as being necessary in the actions of the speaker. It was then in the Rhetoric that Plato suggested the purposeful

life should be lived within a certain type of community where the recognition of good would occur.

Plato believed that philosopher kings should be the leaders of the community, as only a select, elite few would have the intelligence or would have been bred with an education to advise others in such a capacity. He was still looking for justice defined, including what type of actions could lead a man to be just (MacIntyre, Short History 33). Plato suggested that philosophers could be educated to make decisions based on Forms that would allow for understanding of various predicates in a dialectical argument (MacIntyre, Short History 42). The argument would then be rational with a goal toward the good that was transcendental in nature. In the Meno, Plato wrote about a boy that was quickly taught geometry by Socrates. But, Socrates made the point that the child simply memorized the geometric theorems, he did not *learn* them.

To Menon, Socrates asks: “But to get knowledge out of yourself is to remember, isn’t it?” (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 50). Socrates suggested that knowledge is in one’s soul. Referring back to the young boy, Socrates explained that the young man had an *opinion* of what was true. Wondering if virtue could be taught, Socrates questioned Menon, asking him if he knew any teachers of virtue (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 55). Since the answer was no, Socrates suggested “virtue cannot be taught” (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 61). Virtue, then, was *a priori* for Socrates, as knowledge already exists, and therefore, one would have to learn to recollect/reconnect. Socrates explained to Menon, “Virtue is seen as coming neither by nature nor by teaching; but by divine allotment incomprehensibly” (Plato, Dialogues: Meno 67). That knowledge and virtue can only be

found in the transcendental is what had put Plato on a different path than his student, Aristotle.

In addition to the assumption that Plato made, suggesting that there are “forms and that knowledge of them” can only be known by the educated elite, Plato also assumed justification of conduct is one-in-the-same for all, a form of the universal (MacIntyre, Short History 49). The problem with this justification system is that it only related to the elite who were concerned with the Forms. Alasdair MacIntyre questions, then, how could one who is not a philosopher king be able to make decisions that are for the good of all, if they are not privy to the sophisticated knowledge of the Forms? Aristotle criticizes Plato in regard to this very question (MacIntyre, Short History 50).

Aristotle: The Good and the Mean

Plato and Aristotle both lived and wrote during a time that assumed that there was agreement on action and proper living of the good life. However, this assumption excluded slaves and women—of course, as well as the laborers who were on the bottom of the hierarchy. MacIntyre also suggests they were fooling themselves into the belief that the universal of Homer’s age still existed (Short History 97). However, turning toward Aristotle’s understanding of ethics is useful for this work in that an understanding of what he felt was a practical ethic is available in the form of his Nicomachean Ethics, in addition to Aristotle’s other writings.

Though Aristotle considered his writings on ethics, including the Politics, to be grounded in the need for political education,

Both are concerned with the practical science of human happiness in which we study what happiness is, what activities it consists in, and how

to become happy. The Ethics shows us what form and style of life are necessary to happiness, the Politics what particular form of constitution, what set of institutions, are necessary to make this form of life possible and to safeguard it. (MacIntyre, Short History 57)

Alasdair MacIntyre is quick to point out that what Aristotle meant by *political* also included the notion of the “social” (57). Aristotle wanted his theory to be practical, as practical wisdom, *phronesis*, (Arnett and Arneson 46) is Aristotle’s legacy that can continue to be used in today’s postmodern world.

Aristotle suggested that all people be moved to action for the desire of *the good* because there is a teleological destiny toward which to strive. Aristotle asked one to consider what activity he or she be involved with to achieve the good life. In seeking that good, one would use the *mean* (the middle between extremes) in decision-making in order to arrive at the good. For instance, one should choose between the two extremes of courage and cowardice in order to act properly in various tactical situations. What is valid in one situation may not be in the next. For Aristotle, then, *phronesis* becomes important throughout daily living, using responsible knowledge to choose which virtue and at what intensity to attain the good in life, fitting for an individual within the *polis*.

In summary of the work on ethics from these early Greek philosophers and the metaphors that are found within their works, it is evident that Homer wrote about the universal values attributed to the roles people engaged in with their families and communities for the good of the Athenian city-state. With courage and a sense of the just, Homer showed a tradition of Greek life that was understood and accepted until a rhetorical interruption occurred during the sophistic period in Greece. Socrates followed

by offering a dialectical argument for finding the good and Plato continued in this tradition by writing about the Forms that were necessary in order to guide a virtuous life that was just. Aristotle agreed, for the most part, with his mentor Plato, but felt the philosophy he offered could not be relegated to just the elite and a few philosopher kings but to all people who could use virtues for the good life to be attained by all Greek peoples.

The Ongoing Conversation

This work now turns to the communicative implications of the ethics these men espoused in their myths and philosophical teachings, based on the current-day conversations of modern scholars. Homeric myths advocated a heroic society based on actions within predefined roles. How men interacted with each other and within the *polis* was paramount. Plato suggested a utopian form of relationships between educators and those beneath them in the social hierarchy. Plato would have it that the philosopher kings teach that good “is only used properly when it is used as the name of a transcendent entity or when it is used to express the relation of other things to that entity” which enabled a “class division” to persist (MacIntyre, Short History 43-44). Aristotle attempted to explicate the ethical theories of Plato for daily living.

In regard to ethics, Christopher Rowe suggests that the focus of ancient Greek writers, specifically Plato and Aristotle, revolved around the two themes of *eudaimonia* and *arête*, with the closest translations to English being “happiness and virtue” (122). The primary Greek virtues that would then be regarded in ethical terms would have included “wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation, with ‘piety’, which relates to right behavior

towards the gods” (Rowe 123). The Greeks were concerned with these virtues on both a civic and personal (familial) level.

What would be good for the *polis*, acting just and brave, choosing the mean—without excess or deficiency, and in a way pleasing to the gods, would be good for a man and his family. How one communicated within those groups, or dyads, is important for ethical consideration. If one acts with wisdom, he or she is mentoring others via communication. If one is acting pious, it may be through non-verbal communication, by offering a guest something to eat or gifts. It would be through communicative actions that a person acted with virtue.

In explaining his relevance for today, Christopher Lyle Johnstone offers Aristotle in terms of historicity for the contemporary world (16-34). Johnstone explains that Aristotle recognized the need for putting virtues into daily living:

His is an ethical theory that grounds moral value in the realization of our human potential for thinking and reasoning, that recognizes the need to adapt ethical judgment to an individual’s particular character and to the situation in which one finds oneself, that features the application of intelligence to ethical problems, and that gives primacy to communication and rhetoric in the processes of practical reasoning and moral judgment. (Johnstone 18)

The primacy of communication ethics is what is crucial to this work, as it is within communicating with ourselves, others, groups, families and communities, that we find ethics come alive. Decision-making is not performed in a vacuum, and Christopher Lyle Johnstone and Aristotle realized the need for moving the philosophy of the elites to the

masses to envision a society where competing goods can be discussed and debated in a story that is formed within a narrative construction based on the history of the larger mass.

To bring communication ethics into our daily lives and engage in communicative *praxis* a question needs to be brought to the period: What happened to enact the rhetorical interruption? What were the changes that occurred between the time of Homer and the Sophistic movement, and how did those changes affect communication and the ethical climate within the Athenian city-state? The Greeks explain a corporately agreed upon narrative through the stories of the heroic voyagers. Should Odysseus return to his home and be a mere mortal, or stay on the island and be remembered as the immortal God? There is an eventual shift between the time of Homer's writing and the Sophistic movement, where opinion, not truth, became sacred.

What was right for one did not mean right for all in the sophistic period. Men traveled to other cities, teaching young men about rhetoric and had to follow the societal rules in which they found themselves. Travel opened up a new world for the Greeks, as well as did the Peloponnesian War, which found the Spartans invading on and off for 40 years, during the time of Plato and right before the birth of Aristotle.

Homer describes the arrangement of Athenian life in terms of bravery and how heroes act within their stories. There is a connection within these myths between morality and social practice. Within the *Odyssey*, Homer creates memorable human portraits that allow the reader to see the face of the actors fighting for heroic glory (Taplin 54-69). In his definition of ethics, Tibor R. Machan explains that people are constantly judging each other's actions, paying attention to how people behave and the

resulting consequences (6). In the confines of ethical decision making, reflection is crucial because people do not want to act improperly or live in a society where people irrationally make decisions or without contemplation choose the (in)appropriate actions with (un)fortunate consequences (Machan 6).

Homer described what he saw within the home and *polis* of Ancient Greece. Plato was searching for what already was which needed to be made visible. Aristotle was searching for what was necessary in a given historical moment. The Sophists were engaged in a return to rhetoric suggesting that people should beware of both of these endeavors as attempted by Plato and Aristotle, as they were both true yet limiting.

This work continues then with a discussion of the communication questions and consequences of the rhetorical turn or turns made from the time of Homer through to the Sophistic period. Paul Ricoeur's discussion of Harald Weinrich's third notion of the communication axis "putting into relief" can be used to allow for historicity to be understood in terms of the Odyssey and the ancient Greek historical moment (Time Vol. II 67-74).

Historicity—Homer

Within the poetry of Homer, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that a man's social role offers an opportunity for judgment of that man, based on how he carries out his specified role (Short History 5). Since these roles were questioned in Greek Society, MacIntyre believes that social changes can be viewed within the framework of Greek poetry, such as that of Homer, because Homer's poetry was full of the daily life of a Greek warrior and how he attained and accomplished those roles and the consequences of his actions.

Homer explained Athenian life in terms of bravery, and Plato/Socrates explained through The Republic that the democracy was in its final stages of decline. Plato wanted to reclaim the common good. Aristotle moved from his mentor's transcendental to a universal philosophy with embedded social practices by connecting ethics to the Athenian narrative code. Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics gives us a detailed and well-analyzed description of how Aristotle defined happiness and what was good for the *polis*. For Aristotle, the focus of Athenians' actions and speech should have been in support of their teleological goal, which would be *the good* for the individual as Aristotle would have it relate to the *polis*.

Aristotle explicated the values explained in Homer and adds a philosophical nature to them. He attempted to discover via social practices how the citizens enacted their moral obligations to the city-state, as well as to friends and family. Role, duty and doing are major metaphors for Aristotle. The Sophists began to question the universality of Athens during their travels and educating the youth of foreign lands. As they began to work in these lands, they realized that the criteria for justice varied from place to place. With the invasion of Greece by the Spartans, travel, colonization and the beginning of the sophistic journeys to foreign lands, different sets and types of moral order were found (MacIntyre, Short History 10). It is within the ancient myth of the Odyssey one can visualize the time before narrative disruption. Life for the city-state beginning to come under siege is what Homer describes in his epic, the Odyssey.

Historical Engagement—the Odyssey

Homer's Odyssey explains to the postmodern reader the consequences of a heroic culture. Through this narrative, organized meaning (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 3-90) was

offered to the community that passed this oral tradition through the generations. The Odyssey begins in the middle of the story of the great warrior, Odysseus, who is lost at sea and presumed dead by his family, including his wife, Penelope, and son, Telemachos. From the outset of the novel, the audience understands that the story begins in the middle of the events.

Book 1: After leaving Ithaka to fight the Trojan War, Odysseus never returned home to his wife and child. While the other men returned 10 years later, nobody knew where Odysseus was. Therefore, he was presumed dead by most people. The reader finds out that Odysseus was on an island, being held captive by the goddess Calypso. His family did not know he was alive but they continued to hope and carried on with their lives as best they could. However, Odysseus' wife, Penelope, did not want to accept other suitors, as she felt there was a possibility that her husband was yet alive.

The problem was that the suitors continued to stay at her great palace and lived off her wealth. These men were constantly working toward winning her hand in marriage with their goal of becoming King of Ithaka. Penelope kept them at bay by explaining that she could not consider suitors because she was working on Odysseus' father's (Laertes) funeral shroud, for he was a great man and she wanted to have it ready for a death that had yet to come.

The goddess Athene, "guardian spirit of the family," begged her father, Zeus, the most powerful god of the gods, for Odysseus to be sent home and returned to his family (Lattimore 6). Zeus explained that Poseidon was the only god who was not appreciative of Odysseus, and therefore, Poseidon was out for revenge. The reader comes to understand that Odysseus killed Poseidon's son, Cyclops. Back at the palace, Telemachos

was distressed about the suitors taking advantage of not only his mother's wealth but her kindness as well. The goddess Athene visited Telemachos to instruct him.

Athene arrived at the palace disguised as an old friend of Odysseus and offered that Telemachos' father may still be alive and encouraged the son to travel and search for his father, perhaps in Sparta to see if he had survived the war and sea travel. Athene encouraged Telemachos, suggesting that he should be brave and have courage in attempting to find his father.

Book 2: Telemachos asked the suitors to stop taking advantage of his mother Penelope. Though moved by his passion, they still considered Telemachos young and immature and did not give him credit. The suitors suggested to Penelope that she needed to choose one man, as she was leading them on. Penelope retorted that she could not choose a new husband until the funeral shroud that she was sewing was completed. However, Penelope was taking too long to complete the shroud because in the evening she disassembled what she sewed that day. Telemachos secretly deployed for the sea in search of his father.

Book 3: Still disguised as Mentor, the goddess Athene traveled with Telemachos and arrived in Pylos, where Nestor was king. The old king told a lengthy tale of his family's war effort and explained the various murders committed by his family in retribution for other murders against his family. The king offered the accompaniment of his son, Peisistratus, and they left the next day for Sparta.

Book 4: Now on Sparta, the group arrived at the palace of Menelaus and his wife, Helen, who the battle of Troy was fought over. Menelaus explained the great escapades of the warrior Odysseus and how he fooled the Trojans with the wooden horse. Back in

Ithaca, the suitors realized Telemachos was gone and would probably mature by his return and could be much wiser and stronger. Therefore, they fashioned a plot to kill Telemachos upon his return.

Book 5: Athene requested from the gods that Odysseus be released. The gods agreed to send Hermes, the messenger god, (hermeneutics in action). Odysseus set sail, but Poseidon sent a great storm on the sea, casting Odysseus shipwrecked. Thanks to Athene, who stopped the storm, Odysseus survived and then arrived on the shore of Phaeacia.

Book 6: After an eloquent speech begging some young ladies playing in the fields for oils with which to bathe, and a change of clothes, Odysseus went to the palace with the princess to meet the King and Queen of Phaeacia.

Book 7: Odysseus did not tell the king who he was, but the king invited him to marry his daughter. Odysseus declined but asked for safe passage home instead. They held a feast in Odysseus' honor and promised to assist him on his journey home.

Book 8: During the feast, Odysseus was challenged to an athletic game and won the contest. Music and stories filled the evening's highlights, one of which was how the great Odysseus won the Trojan War. Odysseus cried upon hearing the beautiful music and story about him. The king asked Odysseus to tell more about him, but he only revealed what happened with the Cyclops and how he landed on Calypso's island. However, Odysseus did not tell them his full story of the war, nor reveal his identity.

Books 9 through 12: Odysseus explained his exploits with his men and being lost in the land of the Cyclops, a one-eyed creature and son of Poseidon. After eating some of Odysseus's men, the Cyclops imprisoned the rest of the crew. Odysseus persuaded the

monster to drink of his wine and sleep, and then Odysseus blinded the Cyclops and escaped with his men.

Odysseus further described the ordeals he and his crew faced during the first seven years of their odyssey. Odysseus even described how he traveled to the underworld of Hades to consult a prophet for advice on how to return to his home of Ithaka. Through their journeys, the men came upon various women and female spirits that would tempt and seduce them. One such time when their boat passed the Island of the Sirens, the spirits attempted to lure the men with their singing. In line with this theme of the distrust of women, Odysseus was warned during his trip through hell that when he does return to his home island, Odysseus should arrive in disguise, as “There is no trusting in women” (Homer 180). He received other advice about his travels that lay ahead and then left Hades with wisdom to set forth on his journey home.

Odysseus ended his story to the Phaiakians by explaining how his men ate from the cattle that grazed on another island, even after Odysseus had told them not to take the peoples’ cattle. After they had set sail for home, everyone but Odysseus had died in a storm. Odysseus became shipwrecked, and he alone landed on Calypso’s island of Ogygia. The Phaiakians shower Odysseus with gifts, as they were always giving to others, and Odysseus then left for his home of Ithaka.

Books 13 and 14: When Odysseus arrived quietly on Ithaka, he met the goddess Athene who assisted him in concealing himself and disguised Odysseus as an old man. His own former swineherd, Eumaeus, who showered Odysseus with hospitality, though he did not recognize him, invited Odysseus inside his home.

Book 15: Turning the tale toward Odysseus' son, Homer switched the story to the whereabouts of Telemachos. Athene informed Telemachos to head back home because his mother was about to wed Eurachus. The goddess warned Telemachos of the plot to kill him upon his return.

Book 16: Telemachos journeyed to the home of Eumaeus, where Odysseus was staying, and Eumaeus explained that Telemachos must run and tell Penelope of his return to the island. Once Eumaeus was gone, Athene assisted Odysseus in revealing his identity to his own son. Now reunited, father and son agreed on a plot to kill the suitors. Odysseus sent Telemachos to their palace to remove all of the weapons, except for enough for the two of them to fight the suitors.

Book 17: Telemachos returned home and told his mother about his travels, but that he had not found his father. For the time being, Telemachos kept the secret of Odysseus' arrival home from her. Odysseus and Eumaeus proceeded to the palace and were embattled by insults along the way, as nobody recognized the great Odysseus. When they arrive at the palace, the suitors were cruel to both strangers, but Penelope called them to her side to inquire as to who they were.

Book 18: Upon fighting a beggar who challenged him to a fight, Odysseus won the challenge. Penelope then announced that she would finally choose a suitor, because her son was reaching adulthood and that was what Odysseus had asked her to do before he left for war.

Book 19: Odysseus continued to be taunted by the suitors, but Penelope asked Odysseus to come and tell her his story. A maidservant was told to wash Odysseus' feet, and his true identity was exposed then, as she saw an old scar on Odysseus' knee. The

maid was asked to keep his secret, which she did. Penelope decided to have the suitors compete for her by stringing Odysseus' bow and shooting it through the holes of a dozen axes, as her husband was known to do when he was home.

Books 20 through 22: Penelope was so sad that she would rather die than continue to live and even asked someone in the palace to kill her. Zeus sent a favorable sign in the form of thunder and the contests for the suitors was announced. Odysseus demanded an attempt at the contest, though the other suitors balked, because they failed in their attempts to string the bow and shoot through the axe handles. After winning the contest by shooting through all of the axe holes, Odysseus and Telemachos armed themselves against the suitors. Father and son slaughtered some of the suitors and even killed Penelope's disloyal female servants.

Book 23: Finally, Penelope recognized Odysseus, but leery that he could be a god in disguise, she asked Odysseus to prove his identity by describing their bridal bed that Odysseus constructed, built around an olive tree as the bedpost. The two retired to bed and told each other the stories of the previous years.

Book 24: Odysseus woke and visited Laertes, his father, but they were first taken to the gates of Hades, and met some of the suitors who were killed the day before. Then, Odysseus revealed himself to his grateful father and told some of his story of the day before. Other men then arrived at Laertes' home to avenge the deaths of their sons (the suitors). Athene, disguised as Mentor, gave a speech that the men should not continue to murder each other, and instead, live together peacefully.

Homer's classic, the Odyssey, offers a glimpse into the ancient Greek world where tradition is important and universally understood. Courage, patience, wisdom and heroic measures are immensely appreciated and expected of the men of the communities.

Following the suggestion of Christopher Rowe as discussed earlier, the main virtues found in the works of Plato and Aristotle include wisdom, justice, courage and moderation as well as piety—specifically relating to the actions toward and from the gods. These virtues can be witnessed in the writings of Homer. The virtues herald a discussion for communication ethics as to how these virtues were announced and witnessed within the *polis*, as well as within the homes of the ancient Greeks.

Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors

There are many metaphors that can be obtained through the reading of Homer's poetry, as he had many lessons to teach. The metaphors of the philosophers from antiquity are also the metaphors found in the Odyssey. Expectations of young men included courage and wisdom because warriors were constantly fighting for the protection of their homeland or colonization over seas and foreign lands. The heroic culture was populated by men who had the wisdom to choose the mean from between Aristotle's extremes. Justice was served when people did not follow the rules of the land, of the culture, of the society. Kindness, generosity and hospitality were crucial to the social life of the Athenians, as they were pious in their actions toward each other, in hopes of favorable impressions upon their gods. Finally, it was only through memory of the past and the stories that were told between generations that the young grew to understand the culture into which they were born. They were to act nobly, with a just heart and a strong sword.

Courage and Wisdom

Odysseus' actions consistently showed how courageous he was to continue to fight even without his men. Odysseus was incredibly brave and wise and had the cunning wisdom to accomplish the various missions he set out to complete. He was even able to persuade the gods to send him home. The same held true for Telemachos, who, as a young man was not yet mature to the ways of the world. But he left his mother and his home to search for his father without any guidance except for the name of a destination.

Odysseus fought a giant, by blinding him in the only eye that he had, and thinking ahead as to how to strategize for the escape of his men. The men secured themselves to the underbelly of the sheep so that even a blinded monster could not feel for them with his hands. The men were able to leave without Cyclops knowing they were getting away. Odysseus showed his skill through his cunning knowledge. He was wise and able to keep quiet when necessary (when he constantly hides his identity from various kings and/or enemies), and he spoke in a brave language when he showed his true self, as the former ruler of Ithaka.

Odysseus was a smart and very wise man. This is probably why the goddess Athene, goddess of wisdom, was fond of him and wanted him safely returned home. Odysseus had the cunning wisdom to think his way through a problem. It was not that he had the strength, as Achilles did, to fight and be a noble warrior. He was a cunning man, who was smart enough to know when to stay quiet and when to act. Odysseus exercised the very *mean* that Aristotle wrote about. He had the knowledge and ability to act when necessary and had the resolve to wait and be patient when it too was necessary.

Heroes were important to Homeric society, as Alasdair MacIntyre explains, and men were concerned with being honored while still alive and being respected as well, when dead (Whose Justice? 41). The question was—is it better to be known as a dead, yet courageous warrior, or stay alive and only be known to your immediate family? Calypso offered Odysseus the type of infamy that comes with being notorious, but he just wanted to get back home. Based on the roles they knew they had to follow, it was not a question of whether or not they should act one way (brave) or another (fearful), instead, it was a decision as to when and how should the *mean* be employed? Telemachos was nervous about leaving his mother, but he knew it was time to act more mature, be a man, and leave his home to find his father.

Justice

Justice is served to Odysseus' men as he had told them not to slaughter the cattle of the Phaiakians, but they did not listen. Because they were hungry, the men desired the food too much to listen to their leader, and they eventually ate the cattle. When the crew left the island, the gods were not happy, and all of his men perished in a storm on the sea, except for Odysseus. This incident created by the gods was a form of retribution for not listening to prudence or to orders.

This type of retribution is familiar to the Greeks, as it was legitimate to kill the family of the killer of one's own family.

So classical Greeks, like Greeks of the archaic period, for the most part understood the forms and structures of their communities as exemplifying the order of *dikē* (justice); and what gave literary expression to that

understanding above all else was the recitation and the hearing and the reading of the Homeric poems. (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 25)

In Book 3, King Nestor described a form of retribution he paid on another family for the murders of his kinsmen. This type of justice would continue for generations. Loss of life was a type of justice that was common in the ancient, classical and medieval periods.

Justice as explained by the Sophists varied “state to state” and characteristics of justice were different depending on the land within which one was situated (MacIntyre, Short History 15). For Socrates, justice was not associated with the lower end of the hierarchy, including slaves. MacIntyre tells the story about Euthyphro who had to prosecute his own father for the murder of a slave, where Socrates “was more shocked at a man’s prosecuting his father than they are at allowing a slave to be murdered” (Short History 20-21). For Plato, justice referred to the understanding of each person’s place within the *polis*. He held that there were three levels of participants within society—the artisans and the laborers to produce the goods for the society; the soldiers to defend that society; and the rulers to lead (MacIntyre, Short History 36). Justice, then, was “everyone knowing his place” (MacIntyre, Short History 39). Thus, justice was a functional endeavor for Plato. Justice was an important virtue in Athenian society, and so too was piety.

The Habit of Kindness to Strangers/Piety

Kindness was shown to strangers in Ancient Greek culture because hospitable behavior was assumed to be appreciated by the gods. The kings of all of the lands, which Odysseus visited, showered him with gifts before he left their land, and not because Odysseus had revealed himself as a king himself. The gods and goddesses would change

identities so a Homeric character would not know if they were dismissing a beggar or a god with rudeness. This type of action is indicative to the piety of the civilization. There was great concern about the behavior of the people in relation to the opinion of the gods. The community members acted kindly toward each other because it was good to do so, and the gods would approve of the piety shown to each other.

In defining the various roles within a culture, Paul Ricoeur suggested that one could not understand those roles without the setting and the “situatedness” of the characters within the plot (Time, Vol. 2 chapter 2). The social role expected within a heroic culture included men who would leave to bravely fight in wars far from home. Within the role of warrior, kindness was still expected, as Odysseus constantly remembered to be thankful to his hosts, even though he was trying to fight his way back home. He never overstayed his welcome, yet it was the custom to offer strangers lengthy stays/visits if necessary.

In Book 17, as Odysseus, the former hero of Ithaka, made his way to his own palace, he was disguised as an old man and was accompanied by his old Swineherd. Therefore, nobody recognized him, and many strangers acted cruelly to both men. This was a horrible act of hostility that was not typical of Greek culture, yet it shows a disregard for people lower in status. Once Odysseus arrived at his palace, the suitors were even more rude and hostile.

Zeus was a protector of strangers, so the god of gods was to be concerned for the “Other,” which is important for ethical communication. There was universal agreement as to how to act concerning treating strangers, treating each other. It was traditional and understood throughout various cities. That is why the type of cruelty shown Odysseus,

even though he is dressed as a stranger, exemplifies the a-typical type of communication that normally is not shown to anyone, including a stranger.

The action of hospitality is a habit learned in Athenian society. Plato would suggest that people act because of a habit; they have been taught to do so, but they do not understand why they are acting so. Only an elite few truly comprehend the why to their actions. Therefore, for Plato, people within the *polis* would act with piety because it was the only way they knew how to act; it had been the universal of their society.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle wrote about the various types of friendships available to be had (192-224). He explained that one would be more cognizant of their relationships to close friends, than with various acquaintances or with strangers. Aristotle explained various types of friendships and compared these forms of friendships to corresponding types of government. From oligarchy to democracy to monarchy, friendships are explained as to the type of equality and reciprocity shown to each other. For instance, he compares a monarchy to a father-son relationship and a timocracy to a brotherly friendship (Aristotle 209-210). The last metaphor to be discussed regarding Homer is time as it relates to one's communicative relationship to others within the *polis*.

Memory (time)

Odysseus saw time—his past and future-when he went to Hades. He saw those who had died, as well as anticipation of his future. Events shape history. The story of the Trojan War tied one to the history of that society as it defined the characters and explicated the morals of the story as well as the people.

Though Odysseus was gone for 20 years, the community still remembered him. Though the events are not chronological, the reader still understands those events

(Lattimore 2-3). History is tied to events and a story. An epic like the Odyssey keeps that history alive. Therefore, the tradition is maintained and passed through the generations for all to remember and understand the virtues that the philosophers were teaching in the academy. As the Greeks recognized the importance of time, so too did St. Augustine of Hippo (who will be discussed in the next chapter), as he was concerned with time before time. Did god exist first, or did the earth?

A summary discussion follows to explain the communication ethics questions raised within this second chapter and how the identified metaphors can be brought into “relief” and establish modern day significance for Homer’s work in terms of communication ethics (Ricoeur Time, Vol. 2 67-74).

Summary

Immediately recognizing that these great writers and philosophers, from Homer’s world to Aristotle’s a few hundred years later, formed the work students now read from ancient Greece, is of great significance. The ideal of the community, the *polis*, what all men strive to make good while maintaining and achieving happiness is paramount in ancient Greece. However, also immediately recognized is the lack of participation by all people. Slaves and women were not given any place in the communicative opportunities of their cities. They were not part of the plan for Aristotle, though Plato has been known to say if a woman is useful, use her. However, their work is still useful and illuminating, but the exclusion of the majority of people is duly noted.

Explaining the difference in communication between people from ancient to modern day, Ken Andersen notes that “Classical theorists” (Greeks and Romans) did not discuss the importance of communication between family members, a type of modern-

day interpersonal communication. Instead, what was focused upon was the meta-communication of the *polis*. “Classical writers developed theories which tied communication ethics to communication activity designed to serve maximally the interests of the community (state), taking account only of the shared public functions of communication” (Andersen 10-11). This difference is important to realize, for modern theories now take into account the heavy reliance on interpersonal communication ethics between two people or a small group communication ethic.

This type of interpersonal communication is how much of modern day communication is communicated. In the home, amongst family members, important communication occurs between parents, children and siblings; in the work place—between employers and employees, customers and staff. Ken Andersen ends his point by suggesting that what has occurred has been an “evolution” of communication theories, the “democratization” of communication that has allowed a glimpse into the relationships of all people, not just rulers, men or the wealthy (11).

The strength of the men that are discussed, the courage necessary to win wars and keep their families safe, is important to recognize because it is that courage that paved the way for colonization, scientific inquiry, political science and rhetorical theory. These were not easy tasks to achieve, especially without the technology to which modern-day soldiers, scientists and academicians are accustomed.

The rhetorical interruption for this classical time period occurred after the Homeric poems were disseminated through a mostly oral tradition. These poems were understood to reflect the current day standpoint. It was only immediately after, during the Sophistic period, when colonization, travel and warring armies brought change into

Athens. Seeing how other people lived and worked with each other, definitions for action and decision-making were no longer universally understood.

Attempting to determine whose justice, and through what thought processes, have been questions philosophers have worked through for thousands of years. “Athenian thought and Athenian practice were, among other things, dialogues with Homeric voices” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 24). The work of Homer is practical for postmodern readers as one attempts to understand the movement from a more universal notion of communication ethics to a culturally and socially bound form of virtues and ethical communication traditions in the 21st century.

Chapter Three will look toward the end of antiquity as the rise of Christianity and the writings of Augustine, Bishop of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas brought forth a new way of considering society and the inclusion of all people. It was no longer a philosophy for just the elite and well educated of the community—Christianity was for the poor, the slaves and free person. The Medieval world was home to this Christian form of openness where politics and religion came crashing down on each other by the end of the thousand years that are considered to be the Middle Ages, from the fifth to the fourteenth centuries.

Chapter Three: Medieval Christian Ethics and the Inferno

The need in the thirteenth century for those confronted by the claims of the Aristotelian and the Augustinian traditions to move in the direction in which Aquinas did in fact move is thus in retrospect plain. Aquinas' new account of truth challenged what had been the prevailing Augustinian view, so that it is not surprising that it was only Aquinas who at the time understood how to elaborate the conceptions which philosophy and theology alike required. (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 170)

Coming out of ancient Greece, there was a defined order of society found within the narrative of the *polis*. Within the Greek city-state, there was a hierarchical structure in which the elite ruled, the slaves worked, the artisans and laborers provided the goods and the soldiers defended the *polis*. Once the proselytizing of the Christian tradition began to occur at the beginning of the new century, a rhetorical shift is now recognizable in hindsight. The Christianity of the medieval period offered an equalizing stability to society.

Christianity was different from other societies as well as religions in previous periods because it had not been since the time of the Stoics that the common person was offered equality (MacIntyre, Short History 115; Whose Justice 117). Alasdair MacIntyre explains that with the rise of Christianity, slaves, as well as the poor were offered a place of equality before God (Short History 115). No longer were the poor ignored, but instead they were welcomed to the table. Therefore, a “community” was announced where all are equal in God’s eyes.

However, in order to achieve this type of harmony, equality had to be available in the every day social life, as well as in the religious and the after-world. During the time that Augustine, eventual Bishop of Hippo (354-430) wrote and preached the spread of Christianity in the fourth and fifth centuries began to grow quickly, but had difficulty in the “conversion of educated pagans” (Cantor and Klein, Medieval Thought 1). Fast forward 700 years to the time of Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), to witness the ruling monarchies and the papacy that had the strength to establish laws and stable churches so that aristocratic men could study Aristotle again in the comfort of countryside monasteries (Cantor and Klein, Medieval Thought 2). It was only in the sixteenth century that Christianity was threatened and diminished with the posting of Martin Luther’s 95 *Thesis* on a German church door.

Recognizing his minimal discussion of Christianity in A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre explains his lack of attention to Christianity by pointing to the problematic paradox that Christianity offers to medieval society regarding morality. Since St. Paul and Jesus both preached an ethic of living a good life *until* the second coming of the Messianic kingdom (which Medieval Christians believed was to occur imminently), these prophets and preachers of the day did not offer much in the way of how to live life in this world *now*. “We cannot, therefore, expect to find in what they say a basis for life in a continuing society” (MacIntyre, Short History 115). Because of this seeming deficit in ethical Christian theory, MacIntyre explains that Christianity had to find, establish and use a “conceptual framework” for daily living from somewhere else, and he explains “three main examples of this” (Short History 116), including the feudal society, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas.

The example for living an ethical life, found in the writings of Augustine and Aquinas, will be the focus of this chapter. The first surrounds the communitarian ethics of the feudal society. The second and third focus on the philosophical communication ethics of Christian Platonism of St. Augustine's work and the Aristotelianism of St. Thomas Aquinas's writings. The question for these theologians was how to engage the faith. The theoretical metaphors illuminated in the works of Augustine and Aquinas, whose ministries bracket antiquity and the medieval periods, will be compared to the metaphors delineated from a reading of Dante Alighieri's Inferno from his novel, the Divine Comedy.

The Inferno will be discussed in order to establish a conversation regarding communication ethics from the medieval period, an era considered for this work to be the fifth through the fourteenth centuries. As the opening book of Dante's Divine Comedy, the Inferno looks back as well as forward, as the Roman poet Virgil, who leaves the Pilgrim at the gates of Purgatorio, guides the "Pilgrim" through hell. A reading of Dante provides a glimpse into the effect the combination of politics and religion had on society by the end of the Middle Ages.

Introduction

Alasdair MacIntyre offers a short reading of the illumination of Christianity and ethics and gives minimal space to the ethical philosophy of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas in A Short History of Ethics. What MacIntyre does offer in his ethics text, however, will be explained in this chapter in addition to an analysis and discussion of the writings of these two theologians which appear in MacIntyre's Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre explains in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? how Augustine

and Aquinas relate and modify within their own writings the teachings of Plato and Aristotle. Therefore, there will be a continuity of ideas from the Greek to the medieval teachings of Christianity that will be related to Dante's work in the Inferno.

Because of the medieval belief in the "six ages of man," which ran from adolescence through late adulthood, there was a feeling that the earth had similar stages, and its last stage was at hand. Therefore, there was a pessimistic feel to the period of the Middle Ages (Le Goff Medieval 167), as it was imagined and still thought that Christ's second coming would be where one would enjoy life and live peacefully.

The disconnect between the ancient world and the Medieval world includes theology, of course, but the addition of Christianity meant that the characteristics of the virtues would be weighed within a religious vocabulary. As Alasdair MacIntyre explains, "When in the ancient world justice was extended beyond the boundaries of the *polis*, it was always as a requirement of theology" (Whose Justice 146). Augustine was concerned with justice, but based on love of neighbor as God would want, not based on hospitality found in ancient Greece. Augustine chronicles his exploits as a young man in his biographical text Confessions, where he discussed his confusion with interpretation of the Bible and his longing for his new God after his conversion in the garden.

Augustine, Bishop of Hippo: Time, Confession, Discovery

Alasdair MacIntyre explains Augustine as the Christianization of Plato in that "the world of sense perceptions" is replaced by humans' earthly desires and the "realm of Forms" is replaced by the "realm of divine order" (Short History 117). MacIntyre explains that Augustine talked about his natural desires because of the woman he was in love with at a younger age, and who Augustine frequently discussed in his writings—

constantly worrying about his carnal knowledge of her and how it would effect his religious contemplation. For Augustine, it was God that illuminated the good for Christians, not the Platonic Forms, because it should be heaven that humans desire in the after life.

In his text Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Alasdair MacIntyre offers a more in-depth explanation as to how Augustine arrived at what is just and how justice is conceived for a Christian world, as this thinking is different from what Augustine learned from Platonic philosophy, as well as Cicero's form of hierarchical government (153-154). Augustine used what he learned from these men, as well as St. Paul, when Augustine suggested that it is through a love directed at man because of a higher love of God that one acts justly, "When our love is directed toward a life which perfectly embodies that form in its actions, the life of Jesus Christ" (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 154). This love of others is due in part to the actions a person's will voluntarily allow him/her to take.

In contrast to the pagan world, Augustine suggested that the vice of pride was what led people to act, especially in combat and wars. Acting out of pride, and not love of man or god, was against Augustinian thinking. Therefore, Augustine felt justice was not part of the Roman world but only found in what he termed "the city of God" (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 155). The most important virtue for Augustine was humility, and when compared to the most fundamental vice-pride, one can see how Augustine came to his idea of justice. Humility must inform justice for an ethical, responsive action.

Augustine's Confessions is outlined below because this short work offers a poetic and powerful glimpse into Augustine's internal struggles and a view of his life before and immediately after his conversion to Christianity. Many scholars place Augustine in the

Platonic tradition or suggest that Augustine Christianized Aristotle. MacIntyre says, “The Platonic dichotomy between the world of sense perception and the realm of Forms is Christianized by St. Augustine” (Short History 117). However, Calvin L. Troup suggests in Temporality, Eternity and Wisdom: The Rhetoric of Augustine’s Confessions that Augustine’s writings are more in the line with Ciceronian thought (1-2, 73-75). Augustine combined the use of rhetoric and philosophy, a Ciceronian like effort of “an integration of both, which he called Wisdom” (Troup 73). Augustine’s influence on many centuries of thought, especially for early Christians is important for many reasons, including ethics, was informed by both the Ancient Greek and classical Roman worlds that preceded him.

Augustine’s Confessions

Through his prayer, Augustine made his confession to his God and was constantly struggling to understand his faith and more specifically, creation. He attempted to find the answers in prayer. As a young man, Augustine searched for answers to his own personal, religious and philosophical questions, and he was introduced to Catholic Christianity as an answer. Augustine abandoned his search for God in his youth but, in retrospect, he knew that God was always with him (25, 34). Then, as a follower of the Manichean religion, regarding the men with whom he practiced his faith, Augustine admitted “their heart was empty of truth” (40). Augustine continued to search for answers via prayer. This prayerful dialogue between he and his God is fascinating to read because he is so truthful in his doubt and his self-reflection.

The entire work of Confessions is a long-form confession to God. Beginning with a sort of biographical sketch of his childhood and young adult life, Augustine wrote about

his mother's love for him and how she prayed for his conversion, as well as his struggle to know God—this is his confession to God (83). Though he studied the liberal arts, Augustine felt he was still a slave to evil. In Book VII, Augustine investigated corruption, the forces of evil—and where this corruption and evil begins.

Augustine was searching for clarity as he wrote the Confessions. He could not find answers to his religious questions in the form of the Manichean religion, of which he was a member in the early years of his life. He converted in the middle of his life to the religion of Catholic Christianity. Within the work of his Confessions, Augustine confessed to his God that he had faults, but in that confession, he also praised God. He did this confessing via prayer—a deep thought process where he was very particular in his choice of words. Augustine called upon his God, searching and questioning, “Have mercy so that I may find words” (5). He searched and found his place within the context of the Christian Church.

After being introduced to the faith by Ambrose in Milan as described in Book V of the Confessions, Augustine began to read the Christian scriptures. Augustine felt he was blinded, walking through darkness (90, 148). Augustine attempted to situate himself in a story of the people, a narrative of the group of the Christian faith. Augustine longed for knowledge of creation—of both himself and the earth as explained in Books XII & XIII. He searched for his faith and questioned what part he was to play within that faith. Searching for the faith, his story—his situatedness and other questions guided Augustine's inquiry of the Catholic faith.

Throughout the Confessions, Augustine continually searches in this book—looking for the answers to his questions through the vehicle of prayer. Calling upon God,

Augustine asked for mercy, hoping to find the appropriate words to both praise and thank God. As a child and young man, he was eager to fulfill manly desires. Augustine repeatedly asked God to forgive him for his sins of the flesh (24). In the early part of the first millennium, religious priests (men) were celibate and Augustine felt that his want for women was distracting to his prayer life. Augustine was also very concerned with exegesis of the Bible.

Augustine questioned the vast amount of interpretations of the books of the Bible and wondered which one(s), if any, were accurate. He was a good critic, one who listened to other interpretations and did not dismiss them. Augustine discussed exegesis in the Confessions and commented on the multitude of interpretations of various types of literature, especially the Bible. Augustine felt that those involved in their faith would always have questions, and one needed to interpret the Bible for one's self. At one point, Augustine contemplated if men cannot all (all of the critics) be right to some point?

Because of Augustine's use of Plotinus' (a Neo-Platonist and Bishop of Sirmium) teachings, as well as his own knowledge of the Bible and St. Paul, he explained creation from both a Platonic and Christian point of view, especially regarding how the earth and heavens were formed. In interpreting the book of Genesis, Augustine admitted his confusion in deciding if his exegesis or those of other critics were correct, and he eventually questioned can't all of these interpretations be truth if the believer so believes? Augustine wondered about the multiplicity and "diversity of truths" (271). Augustine suggested that there was "no single right interpretation" of the books of the Bible, or God's word (259). He often prayed to God asking for some answers, hoping not to mislead others.

Augustine deplored those who disliked the “scriptures” and he also discussed the various versions of others’ interpretations. In Jewish and Christian tradition, Moses is said to be the author of the first five books of the Bible (the Pentateuch). Augustine explained others’ attempts to describe Moses’ intentions in Genesis in regard to the phrase ‘in the beginning God made heaven and earth.’ Augustine then illustrated in the Ten Axioms the multitude of variations on the interpretation of this line from Genesis (261). The point of this exercise was to show that there are so many versions, who can claim which was the correct or accurate explanation? Within these interpretations, can they all be the truth?

Augustine was very concerned about deception and did not want to lecture to his flock with an incorrect understanding of the Bible. Yet, he understood, as stated earlier, that there were a multitude of understandings, especially with his first-hand knowledge of the Manichean faith and how they critiqued the Bible. Therefore, his self-doubt about the exegesis of the Bible shows Augustine’s humbleness. He knew there were many interpretations, yet, he was scared to offer what could be the wrong one. When reading Augustine, if you did not know whom the author was, you might think you were reading a contemporary text, as he describes the multiplicity of interpretations of author’s intentions. He is concerned with the various levels of meaning.

Augustine suggested that the ability for Christians to understand their God and their faith was available to them because the metaphorical door was open. “Knock and the door will open,” a reference to the biblical verse in Matthew 7:7, suggested that it is more difficult to ask than for a person to give (Augustine 246), which is an echo of Cicero. Augustine was also curious about not only finding answers, but also in attempting

to understand the form in which one would perform this search. Time and form were very curious to Augustine, as he wrote extensively on these concepts.

When he spoke of heaven and form—as in the forms that heaven and earth take, Augustine did not use time in an empirical sense, but as an extension of the mind (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 15). Time is a phenomenological event for Augustine. Paul Ricoeur explained, “Augustine alone dares to allow that one might speak of a span of time—a day, an hour—without a cosmological reference” (Time, Vol. 1 15). Time is an extension of the mind. Augustine struggled to understand time, and time before time—knowing these were phenomenological questions that were not answerable in the scientific sense.

Augustine ends Book XII by saying that to seek God, and call upon God, is to believe God. God is there for anyone to claim. He also ends Book XIII, saying one can seek God, by searching for God’s door and God can open it. Augustine is searching for God in this confession, beginning and ending his text with the suggestion that God is there for anyone to find, and that God will open the door if asked to do so. The door is there for all, as God was there for Augustine, waiting. Once people are involved in the faith, they are going to have questions. However, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer suggested in the same vein as Augustine, “No question can penetrate behind God creating because it is impossible to go behind the beginning” (Creation and Fall 16). As Augustine questioned where to find God, he also questioned where to find the ethic within God.

To perform an act with moral intention in the name of God is considered Augustine’s ethic (Book XIII). Augustine also discussed St. Paul and his communiqué with the Philippians. Paul was not concerned with seeking a gift but bearing a fruit—by

having the Philippians act well. If one acts in the appropriate manner, to one's self and one's neighbor, and "our heart is in it" then our treasure awaits us in heaven (Augustine 287). Augustine spoke of justice and injustices against other humans who should be shown mercy. Augustine was concerned with serving those oppressed and destitute.

In explaining the trinity, Augustine said the father, son and Holy Spirit are above the earth, "borne above the waters" (277). Augustine referred to Acts 2:38, when the Holy Spirit is said to be a gift from God. "In your gift we find our rest. There are you our Joy. Our rest is our peace" (Augustine 278). Augustine discussed the trinity as analogous to three aspects of the self, "being, knowing, willing" (279). Augustine wrote of the Trinity, explaining that, "These three are inseparable yet distinct; they are one life, one mind and one essence" (279). The Holy Spirit, in particular for Augustine, was above (symbolically) so that his followers could metaphorically raise their hearts to God.

This ability to give of one's self to God is a gift from God—it is an option for all people. If one acts against injustice, treasure awaits that person in heaven. This is the Christian ethic for Augustine—to act morally in God's name. By the outward signs God has given all to declare their faith (the bible, baptism, the ability to procreate) all can publicly, yet humbly, announce that they are, indeed, Christians. Therefore, what Augustine began eight centuries earlier, writing about his feelings found within a Christian world, Thomas Aquinas continued, but in an Aristotelian manner.

Thomas Aquinas: Interpretation

Thomas Aquinas, a native of Naples, Italy, was well educated and a nobleman. However, against his parents' wishes, Aquinas became a friar in the Order of St. Dominic. "St. Thomas Aquinas synthesized Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and Christianity to

give the natural law its classic formulation” (Messerly 37). Alasdair MacIntyre explains the difference between Augustine and Aquinas in regard to God and avoiding earthly desires. Aquinas was concerned with how to live this life, now, and use those desires in a positive fashion for “moral ends” (MacIntyre, Short History 117). For Aquinas, it was the influence of Aristotle, and not Plato—as with Augustine, that spurred Aquinas’ work within Christianity. Aquinas was interested in the interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy for the Medieval Christian world.

Natural law was Aquinas’ focus and his belief in original sin is a point where he was, obviously, differentiated from Aristotle. Aquinas believed in humanity “as it *is*,” not as it “*ought* to be” (MacIntyre, Short History 118). Aquinas looked for the good to be the natural end of achievement. In his text Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, as well as After Virtue, MacIntyre discusses the import of Thomas Aquinas in more detail than he does in Short History of Ethics.

In chapter 13 of After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre explains that the problem in medieval society was, “how to educate and civilize human nature in a culture in which human life was in danger of being torn apart by the conflict of too many ideals, too many ways of life” (165). MacIntyre explains that contrary to the universal feel given to the Middle Ages, life was a mix of many differing cultures, based throughout the West. Therefore, twelfth-century life was concerned with the question as to how to combine Christian living within one’s daily life, using the virtues.

Medieval thinking [. . .] marked a genuine advance in the tradition of moral theory and practice [. . .] the medieval stage in that tradition was in a strong sense Aristotelian, and not only in its Christian versions. When

Maimonides encountered the question as to why God in the Torah had instituted so many holidays, he replied that it was because holidays provide opportunities for the making and growth of friendship and that Aristotle has pointed out that the virtue of friendship is the bond of human community. It is this linking of a biblical historical perspective with an Aristotelian one in the treatment of the virtues which is the unique achievement of the Middle Ages in Jewish and Islamic terms as well as in Christian. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 180)

The philosophy of Homer, Plato and Aristotle received a new academic vigor and there was a renewal of their teachings in the Middle Ages, from the time of Augustine through to Aquinas.

The transition from heroic to what became known as Medieval Society was witness to the Christianization of ancient Greek stories. So, for example, a “pagan warrior” was now a “Christian Knight” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 166). There was a definite relationship between pagan and Christian virtues around the beginning of the thirteenth century. Virtues that had been the basis of medieval life, justice being one of them, were being replaced with Christian virtues. What had been a necessity in Homeric terms—loyalty and courage to fight the aggressors, were embraced again in this medieval world.

For the Middle Ages, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that the “arena” of morality was the will, and character was simply a component of deciding what may or may not influence that will (After Virtue 168). With Christianity’s recognition of sin, decisions were made based on whether or not one was concerned about breaking or not breaking a

commandment of God. Did one have the will not to break the law? Was one too weak and not able to turn away from sin? The question then for daily living was how this Christianity, and the morality found within it, affected the politics of the society. Institutions that would eventually teach this philosophy were yet to be created. MacIntyre explains that there was a lot of “behavior” to be put in a little bit of “culture” (After Virtue 171). It was within the conflict between the religious and the public that MacIntyre suggests morality would take on its meaning in the Middle Ages.

The question of how to live in this world remained for the Christians, before one went to the next (after) life. They were concerned with the doing of life. Roles were important within the community and family. The difference between the ancient and the medieval life was that Christians saw their role as being used by members of this world and a heavenly body as well, an “eternal community in which I also have a role” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 172). Another way of living within the context of a Christian life included the act of charity.

Because of the act of forgiveness and reconciliation in the culture of the Bible, there was a new conception of love even for those who sin. The difference in 800 years, MacIntyre suggests, was that Aristotle did not know charity in this way (After Virtue 173-4). Having written many texts, the choice of Aquinas’ investigation of Aristotle’s work in the Nicomachean Ethics will be valuable to this work, as it combines Aristotle’s view on ethics with a Christian bias brought to the work of the ancient philosopher by Aquinas.

Aquinas wrote a Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in which Aquinas worked line-by-line and commented on the original Aristotelian text on ethics.

Aquinas created a table of virtues in “an exhaustive and classificatory scheme” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 178). The following is a short description of how Aquinas interpreted the metaphors found within Aristotle’s ethical system for his modern day Christian way of life.

Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Writing in the thirteenth century, Thomas Aquinas wrote a Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. The Scholastic writers and scholars, as they were known in the late Middle Ages, discussed theology in terms of philosophical ethics and Aristotelianism. In discussing Aristotelianism, Aquinas agreed that happiness is the ultimate good for all people. Happiness could be attained in this life, via activities and the arts. Happiness is an “activity flowing from virtue,” the “supreme human good” (Aquinas 15). Though people desire honor to prove to themselves their capabilities, one cannot find happiness in honor; and happiness is not honor (Aquinas 22). The good sought by people varies by activity and/or art (Aquinas 36). In all activities, people seek a good that Aquinas described as “This ultimate end of man is called that human good which is happiness” (36). This end must be “perfect” and “self sufficient” (Aquinas 36). This type of happiness can only be defined for this life, because for Aquinas, happiness in the afterlife is “beyond investigation” (Aquinas 38).

Aquinas explained that the persistent desire to continuously search to do good is what is important to Aristotle (43). One act of goodness does not fulfill the search; it is a continuous process, as Aquinas explained, “The sight of a single swallow or one clear day does not prove that spring is here, so a single good deed is not enough to make a man happy” (Aquinas 43). Happiness is a “virtue-oriented activity proper to man in a

complete life” (Aquinas 43). Happiness is divine and sent to us by God (Aquinas 56). Because happiness is the teleological reward for virtue, Aquinas suggested that man should aim to be happy because it would please God.

Thomas Aquinas explained that “moral philosophy is divided into three parts”: individual (monastic) ethics, which would be considered one’s own personal ethics; domestic ethics that are concerned with family relationships, for instance; and political science which are ethics ascribed to the community, such as civic ethics (3). Aristotle suggested that political science is the most important science, as it is the most architectonic and concerned with systematizing (Aquinas 9). Within political science, systems can be developed. Political science is concerned with virtue attainment (Aquinas 74). Therefore, all other skills fall under political science, “strategy, domestic economy and rhetoric” (Aquinas 10).

For Aquinas, there were two principles of human acts. The first principle was intellect/reason—sciences that included both speculative intellect, such as teaching science and practical intellect, like art. The second principle was appetite, including choices made and how they are executed. All of this is concerned with a good as the *telos*, “for truth is the end of speculation” (Aquinas 3). These ends could be either a product or an activity (for example, medicine leads to health (product) where practicing gymnastics leads to a performance (activity)). Aquinas explained a teleological end for humans, in that “human life or activity has some good end which is supreme” (7). Aquinas further explained the importance of theology for the ethical man: “The study of the ultimate end of the whole universe is considered in theology” and is contemplated in political science (10).

Aristotle taught that youth need maturity before they can speak on a topic, for example, to a crowd. Aristotle discussed a young student's need for maturity while studying because a young man will have more emotion and less experience than his instructor will. One can study ethics, but that student must live a life before understanding political science (Aquinas 11). Young men and women need to recognize that they may be guided by their passions instead of the wisdom that can be learned through years of education and witnessing of their elders.

Aquinas goes on to explain that passions can take over in the man searching for knowledge but will unfortunately “study this science in vain” (Aquinas 13; see also 18). Therefore, the student needs to act. Studying is not the end, but action is—that is action without faltering toward passions. Usually the young person does not realize this. In the pursuit of happiness, young men and women need to listen and learn from the wisdom of their mature teachers. There are many goods that can be pursued, one of which can be truthful dialogue within a relationship. For humans, relationships are incredibly important to the work of communication ethics because it is within relationships that one finds the quality of life that can lead to happiness.

Aquinas explained that Aristotle discussed the need for truth over friendships because, in the end, “he is the greater friend for whom we ought to have the greater consideration” (Aquinas 25). Though Aristotle agreed with Plato that truth is the higher friend, he disagreed with Plato about there being one “common idea of good” (Aquinas 25). Aquinas said, “Truth is a divine thing, for it is found first and chiefly in God” (25). So being truthful, though it may harm the friendship, is more appreciated than lying to save a friendship for Aquinas.

In discussing moral virtue in general, Aquinas explained that a virtue should be chosen from the mean as recommended by Aristotle, (not in excess or deficit) and accomplished through action. Eventually, through habit, actions become virtues. For Aristotle, there were two kinds of virtues. First, there are intellectual virtues that are learned from teaching, rather than discovery. Aquinas said, “More people can know the truth by learning from others than by ascertaining it themselves” (84). Second, there are moral virtues that can become habitual through practice, from “customary activity” (Aquinas 84).

However, Aquinas cautioned that these habits are not produced from nature (85). The principle act of virtue is choice (Aquinas 108). Aristotle speaks of virtues in Lecture VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics in terms of applicability and not just as universals. Aquinas explained why the need for applying these virtues is an effective activity, by suggesting that, “particulars are understood to the extent that the universal is verified in them” (111-2).

For Aristotle, Aquinas explained that the “concerns” within political science and other public activities are either pleasurable or sorrowful and the person who “uses these well” will be virtuous, but if he uses them “badly he will be evil” (94). Based on the passions, activities become habits for people, both good and evil habits, however. Aristotle’s golden mean is famous and commonly known, as it explains that when activities are done in “excess or deficit,” a bad habit may be established, but “if done with moderation” then one will have done well (Aquinas 101). Aquinas explained that one is seen as good if one acts virtuous, evil if one succumbs to vices (101). Virtue need to be

found from among the mean then, not in excess or deficit and “the mean is not the same for all” (Aquinas 105). However, means are relative.

Aquinas explained that it is difficult to find a mean, yet easy to deviate from it (124). Aquinas amplified the example given by Aristotle, that only a person who is an expert, or knows the answer can find a center of a circle. Aquinas explained that a geometry expert can find the center of a circle, but it is very easy for others to deviate from that center. Aquinas gave an excellent example of how difficult it is to find the middle. Many can be easily swayed one way or the other, and sometimes, in excess either way. It is not natural to be virtuous, but rather, acting virtuous needs to be placed into practice and become habitual. Therefore, what one aims for is not the natural, and is difficult to attain. If it were easy to be virtuous, more would be so.

In his discussion on voluntary actions, fortitude and temperance, Aristotle suggested that one needs to have the right *reasons* for action. Aquinas explained that how we choose to act, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, is based on our *knowledge*. We can be brave and have fortitude or we can choose to act with intemperance. Aquinas explained why Aristotle worked with involuntary actions before voluntary: “The involuntary proceeds from a simple cause, as ignorance alone, or violence alone, but the voluntary has to take place by the concurrence of many factors. [. . .] It is a privation of the voluntary” (Aquinas 128). Therefore, it is difficult to act voluntarily and easier to act upon impulse and ignore the right reasoning.

An action can be involuntary in two ways—first, because of violence, the good cannot be seen, and the appetite is not encouraged to power. Second, because of “ignorance” mental awareness is excluded (Aquinas 28). Aquinas suggested that a person

should not be blamed for acting out of ignorance (135). Repentance should be associated with this type of behavior (Aquinas 39). Voluntary actions are actions that occur out of knowledge of the agent (Aquinas 140). One makes a choice as to the appropriate voluntary course of action to take, based on what is within his or her grasp/reach. Choices can occur without passion but they should occur by reason (Aquinas 145). People can use counsel and receive advice from others in determining appropriate choice. Counsel should be used wisely, however, and not be used in obvious situations, but rather when one is confused about how to determine a decision (Aquinas 153).

Aristotle taught much about refraining from unnecessary actions, which can include learning to avoid unnecessary speech actions. His was a guiding wisdom, a practical wisdom that is very useful in rhetoric and communication. To stay the course and choose the mean is excellent advice for modern-day communication ethics.

Augustine established his dialogue with his God in the form of a confession. He was searching for an understanding of how to lead the people of his Church who were also trying to follow the same God. Through a love of God, Augustine taught that one could act justly and only within the city of God could the city of the faithful survive. Attempting to find God, while here on earth, would allow for action within a faith story. For Medieval Christianity, the notion of where people are looking for the good of antiquity shifted from the *polis* to the Church. The way that good was being engaged was now different.

Aquinas was concerned with the education of youth so they would act only once they were mature enough to know the difference between the virtues and the vices. Thinking before acting, voluntarily acting based on counsel, is what Aquinas taught as

the ethical action, the *praxis* of doing. Teaching at the end of medieval times, Aquinas was on the cusp of a rhetorical interruption that would end the dominance of the Christian worldview in the West. Aquinas believed, as did Aristotle, that study had to be done in tandem with action and be guided with wisdom. His was a faith question that Aquinas found answers to by exploring the virtuous person acting toward a notion of the good within the Christian Church.

The Ongoing Conversation

In addition to Alasdair MacIntyre, other modern scholars have suggested that Augustine and Aquinas are two notable religious philosophers of the long history of the Medieval period to be reviewed. Jacques Le Goff and John Herman Randall, Jr. both suggest that Augustine and Aquinas are important contributors to the conversation of the Middle Ages. Known for writing about the history of mentalities (Le Goff 3), Le Goff suggests that Aquinas was the most “celebrated Dominican” (Medieval 87). Randall, Jr. who writes on the history of ideas (5), posits that the Middle Ages, “within the limits of the West was able to rise to the ideal of a united Christendom, and bring all mankind within the scope of its aim” (102-103). There was little differentiation over the vastness of Europe, as most states had the same culture, agriculture and the Church, a very uniform way of life (Randall, Jr. 103), but, they all had different languages. One of the more critical issues for uniting such a large region was the commonality of the Latin text since most villages had their own dialects and no national language. As long as people could communicate, there was an understanding amongst vast regions of land.

In understanding the mentality of the culture and education during these long years of Christianity, John Haldane points to the issue of who was teaching the

philosophy of the times. Much of the education after the fall of Rome was pushed from the cities and into the outskirts of the countryside, where monasteries were located, to educate the men of various religious orders, including Franciscans and Dominicans, such as Thomas Aquinas. Haldane exerts that the education was very concerned with “preserving the culture of the past” (139). For hundreds of years, then, the writings of Plato, Aristotle and Augustine, among others, continued to prevail, but within the confines of monastic life.

In the introduction to their edited edition of Aquinas’ On Law, Morality, and Politics, William P. Baumgarth and Richard J. Regan, S.J. suggest that Aquinas was controversial in his day, attempting to emphasize Neo-Aristotelianism within his own philosophy. Baumgarth and Regan also agree that it is imperative to understand the questions brought forth during the time of Aquinas’ writing, in order to appreciate the “debate in light of the philosophical and theological traditions that informed his thinking” (xiii). They further explain that until Aquinas began teaching, Christians had accepted the Neo-Platonic context in which to view their theology, “Aristotle presented to Western Christians a view which, unlike that of the Neo-Platonists, fully accepted the reality of the visible world and sought to understand it as such” (Baumgarth and Regan xv).

Aquinas brought Aristotle to the Christians in a new and dynamic way.

In regard to Aquinas, John G. Messerly explains action and reason: “For Thomas, action in accordance with human nature fulfills God’s eternal plan and Scripture’s commandments; thus, the natural law is God’s law known to human reason” (37).

Following the commandments is not the law of the land, but the law of the heavens for

those on earth—the heaven where Christians are taught they will spend their lives eternally.

The natural law that Aquinas discusses has its roots in the Ten Commandments, but is developed through one's conscience that Augustine wrote about at the beginning of the Middle Ages.

This is the idea of moral purification as resulting in a 'flight of the soul' away from the world. [. . .] According to Augustine, God endows each man with a conscience whereby he may know the moral law. However, this knowledge is not sufficient for virtue, which requires that the will should also be turned towards the good. [. . .] love draws a soul to God. [. . .] so the movement effected by grace becomes a flight of the soul away from the world. (Haldane 135-136).

Augustine set God in heaven above the earth, so Christians were expected to strive for that ultimate goal in heaven, a space above and not of this earth. However, Aquinas' view of rational thought was based in logical thinking, using reasoning to conduct daily living (Haldane 141).

Jack Russell Weinstein explains how the dominant narrative of Christianity in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries excluded others from the discussion, as the religious doctrine was so dominant, but,

This is not to say that Classical philosophy was ignored completely. St. Augustine of Hippo, in the late fourth and the fifth centuries, based his philosophical systems on a Platonic interpretation of Christianity and [. . .] in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Aquinas, filtered Christianity

through Aristotle's work. Nevertheless, European intellectual inquiry was limited to the most orthodox of Christian presuppositions. (18-19)

Within the late Middle Ages, one could find cloisters of men living a monastic life in the countryside, where it was difficult to spread the word of Christianity. However, the conventional philosophers were able to lecture to the Christians through the Churches.

Both Augustine and Aquinas ministered to the people of God and taught them and or lectured to them about their common faith. Ken Andersen explains the prevalence of homiletics during the Medieval period as it relates to ethical communication:

Writers on homiletics assumed, not only a moral character, but also a knowledge of the good by the preacher. Hence, ethical knowledge and practice were assumed for the most part. Speaking in the name of, and inspired by, God removed many of the burdens of developing an extended treatment of ethical communication. (8-9)

Deference was given to the clergy during this time period, due to the universal opinion that the clergy was blessed by God to preach to the community. Therefore, the setting was particular and local, as the clergy worked within communities of believers.

The rhetorical interruption that birthed a Christian Augustine was the rise of the teachings of the traditions of the Christians after the death of Jesus Christ. St. Paul and the New Testament were now sources of knowledge that the Christians had in their hands to teach the masses. Therefore, the turn began around the third and fourth centuries A.D.

The fragmented social life of the Christians of the West was incredible during the time immediately following Augustine's death through to the thirteenth century, as various invaders came into the Roman Empire from all fronts. This rhetorical interruption

saw a type of education that was contained in encyclopedias and summaries of knowledge. It was not until the end of the Middle Ages that there were scholars educated enough to critique Augustine and the other founders of the Church. It was not until the thirteenth century that a work of this magnitude, such was that of Thomas Aquinas, was able to be as prolific and accepted as Augustine's writings and work.

A new addition to the Christian religious rhetoric was in the form and conception of the devil, which Jacques Le Goff suggests was a creation of the Middle Ages and really asserted itself in the ninth century (Medieval 160). The devil was to be the opposite of the "Good God" and the "struggle between them served to explain all the detail of events to medieval man" (Le Goff, Medieval 160). The devil was shown in two outward appearances, one as a seducer and the other as persecutor (Le Goff, Medieval 161). It was Dante who used the image of the devil and hell to posit his idea of the after life for those who did not follow the rules of the Church.

On the cusp of the thirteenth century, Dante was witness to many political changes in the papacy of which he was mortified. In the previous hundred years, there had been a constant struggle between the leadership of the Pope and the monarchs throughout Europe. The divisiveness came to a culmination of force when Pope Boniface claimed to be the superior leader of Christendom and that included dominance over civil leaders who, the Pope suggested, had to respect papal authority as the ultimate authority. Dante was incredulous at this move by the Pope and "perceived that the events at Anagni were a momentous turning point in the history of civilization," for it was at Anagni that the Pope prepared the paperwork for the excommunication of the King of France (Cantor,

The Civilization 496). Dante was in favor of a combined rule of civil and religious leaders, not one dominating over the other.

The King of France was so infuriated that he had the Pope taken into custody. Boniface's family was able to retrieve him from France, but he died shortly thereafter. The French cardinals had taken on greater influence in the Church and were able to elect a French archbishop as the next Pope who took the name Clement V. The shocking issue was that Clement decided to live outside of Rome, in Avignon, where the papacy stayed for the next 70 years (Cantor, The Civilization 495-496).

Compared to the beginning of Christian evangelization, the other end of the rhetorical interruption spectrum held the finale of Christianity's dominance when Martin Luther hung his 95 Theses on the door of a German church. "This marked the end of Catholic exclusivity and the beginning of the Protestant Reformation" (Weinstein 19). This occurred almost 300 years after the death of Thomas Aquinas, but it also followed more than 1,000 years of Christian dominance. John Herman Randall, Jr., explains the significance of both the Reformation and the Renaissance on the Medieval world. He suggests that though these time periods were important for the demise of the Middle Ages, and explains that science and "the growth of the economic base of European society" had even a more fundamental role in ushering in the end of these dark times (163-164).

Augustine's relevance for today is his form of critique. It was not dogmatic or deconstructive but incredibly constructive as he listened to what others had to say in a humble and respectful manner. Not to patronize the speaker/critic, Augustine was searching for clarity. He could not find answers to his religious questions in the form of

the Manichean religion. In the middle of his life, Augustine was converted to Christianity. Through prayer, Augustine confessed to his God that he had faults, but he also, in that confession, praised God. His prayer was a deep thought process in which he was very particular in his choice of words. He searched and found his place within the context of the Christian Church. Calvin L. Troup explains Augustine's import for today: "If interdisciplinary study is not merely postmodernist fashion, but rather has become a necessity for negotiating the realities of postmodern life, I trust that Augustine might become as essential a guide [. . .]" (xi).

Aquinas illuminated Aristotelian virtues that can be used in today's postmodern world. Edward A. Synan's edited edition of the lectures of Ignatius Eschmann, a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto in the mid-twentieth century, provides a critique of Aquinas' work concerning his Christian ethics. Synan explains as the editor of these lectures how Eschmann lectured on the "moral doctrine, proposed by Saint Thomas in the thirteenth century that can be read with penetration and profit as the twentieth century gives way to the twenty-first" (vii). Aquinas agreed with Aristotle that a teleological pursuit of the good is necessary for the virtuous life. Aquinas discussed choice making that is as relevant today as it was 800 years ago. Making choices work for current day is important, as the faith is lived out in daily doing.

But, what would a non-virtuous life look like? How would that person be judged? How would a virtuous person spend eternity? What would ultimate damnation look like compared to a heavenly reward? Dante Alighieri attempted to answer those questions through the form of his epic poem explaining a detailed experience of a trip to hell, purgatory and heaven, in the Divine Comedy.

Historicity—Dante

The Divine Comedy is a novel/comedy/poem written by Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) that offers a glimpse into the history of late medieval times, specifically in Italy, focusing on the papal leadership. Born in Florence to a family of “modest social standing,” Dante was able to pursue an education and enter the life of poetry and politics in a thriving city (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 7). For over two centuries, the city blossomed as it served as the middle merchant area, especially known for the textile industry, between east and west (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 2-7). Dante served the city as *priorate* but war was looming. Because Dante was accused of “graft, embezzlement, opposition to the Pope and disturbance of the peace of Florence” he was exiled from the city he loved (Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 8). It was while spending that time in exile that Dante composed the Divine Comedy. Dante’s works acted as a summation of the Medieval time period as Europe entered the time now known as the early Renaissance.

Another of Dante’s political written works is De Monarchia, an explanation of why the Pope and the emperor should be two separate men/positions of authority. For Dante, the authority to rule the empire derives directly from Christ, and not from the papacy (De Monarchia as found in Cantor and Klein, Renaissance Thought 89-105). Joseph A. Mazzeo explains that Dante’s Divine Comedy should be read from a historical point of view. “We must come to the poem with our awareness heightened by a study of Medieval culture, [. . .]. The Architecture of the poem is not governed by exclusively literary theories of allegory, but by principles of medieval scholastic realism which state a real analogy between God and His creatures” (6-7). Understanding the landscape of the

Middle Ages is important for a comprehension of the metaphors found in the world of Dante.

Etienne Gilson suggests that through the Divine Comedy, Dante asked the various leaders of the Church and empire to act justly and to cooperate, as justice is the highest virtue (192-193). Betrayal is what Dante considered the gravest of sins. Whether a man betray the emperor or the Pope betray the Church, *leadership* itself is betrayed and the betrayal is considered a traitorous action. Therefore, loyalty is what Dante espoused most (Gilson 194). Dante wrote in the Italian vernacular, and not the common and universal Latin of the Church, another metaphor for his spiteful ill will toward the Church and the political regimes of his Medieval world.

Historical Engagement—Inferno

Dante's *Divine Comedy* is considered an epic poem, for many reasons, including its literary content as well as the fluidity with which it is able to be read. It is an epic in grand proportion because it speaks in a poetic fashion, on the Christian as well as political community of the high Middle Ages.

For, to a greater or lesser extent, the term epic refers to a quality the poem creates that it is in some way exploring or celebrating something much larger than the particular characters and places it describes: it is bringing before us, to put the matter very simply, a world view, a sense of cultural completeness, so that as we move through the work, we experience the exploration of some big questions about individual and social purpose, about a system of belief, often about the past traditions and future prospects, about the major things which we use to define a culture. The

breadth of the epic brings before us a comprehensive picture of an entire culture in a way that an ordinary narrative, no matter how exciting, does not. (Johnston 1)

Johnston explains the importance of an epic and that after hundreds of years, the reading of Dante's Divine Comedy continues to be part of most canons of English or Rhetoric, a testament to its import.

The Divine Comedy is a poem divided into three equal books, the Inferno, Purgatorio and Paradisio. Because of the length and magnitude of the Divine Comedy, the idea of Paul Ricoeur's "part" and "whole" (Time, Vol. 3 29, 153) will be used in that the theme of the book as a whole will be quickly explained, but, this chapter will specifically focus on the individual part of the Inferno. This significant ingredient of the Divine Comedy represents not only Dante's work, but also his response to Medieval Europe, the politics and the religion that surrounded him daily. While Dante was in exile from Florence, he wrote the Divine Comedy, and set the Inferno in the year 1300 (N. Pinsky 306). Dante was exiled because of his writings against the political establishment.

The opening of the Divine Comedy begins with the first book, the Inferno, which leads the narrator, "the Pilgrim," who is Dante, the writer, into hell. The Pilgrim's leader throughout his visit is the poet Virgil. Unfortunately for Virgil, he is banished to hell because he was born and died precisely before the coming of Jesus Christ, and thus is found in the first circle with the other non-Christians. Throughout the following discussion of all of the *cantos*, metaphors will emerge, which will be discussed at the end of this outline of all 34 *cantos*.

Canto I: Beastly animals met The Pilgrim, keeping him out of hell, scaring him backward. The Pilgrim came upon Virgil, the classical Latin poet born in Rome. Once the Pilgrim realized who Virgil was, he offered Virgil praise and wondered aloud why Virgil was there in hell. Virgil pointed all around him and stated that those surrounding him were “tormented spirits” (Dante 7). The Pilgrim asked Virgil to assist him on his path through hell. In her notes to the novel, Nicole Pinsky suggests that Dante chooses Virgil as the guide because he is the premier poet and “an embodiment of art and human reason, exemplifying the best that can be attained without the benefit of Christian revelation” (307). Dante questioned from the beginning how Virgil could be in hell when his poetry and his life were exemplary, just because his fate was to live before Jesus Christ came to earth.

Canto II: The Pilgrim asked Virgil how he knew the Pilgrim needed his assistance. Virgil explained that Beatrice had sent him. From the beginning, and throughout, Beatrice is always described as beautiful. Beatrice was watching over the Pilgrim from Heaven. Virgil explained to the Pilgrim’s relief that Beatrice “cannot feel what you suffer” (Dante 15). It is well known that in real life Dante was in love with a young woman who was his neighbor, named Beatrice. Beatrice had died at the age of 24. The Pilgrim pointed out at the end of this *canto* that he would allow Virgil to guide him and be his mentor and thus, “share one will” (Dante 17). The will of man is a reoccurring theme throughout the Inferno.

Canto III: The Pilgrim read the famous sign at the entry of hell, suggesting those who enter should “Abandon all hope” (Dante 19). The inscription at the entrance confused the Pilgrim, and Virgil explained that the Pilgrim should leave his fears behind,

as Virgil would guide them through. The first types of sinners they come upon were cowards. Men and women who were damned to not being able to make up their minds were those who wavered in their decision making while on earth. In this *canto*, the reader sees the first forms of retribution, a type of eternal penance these souls had to face in hell. The punishment is always an exaggerated form of their sin or an endless recreation or reenactment of their sinful earthly action.

Canto IV: The reader is introduced to the first of the nine concentric, funnel-like circles that comprised hell. Non-Christians were sent to this first circle if they had lived and died before the coming of Jesus Christ. It was explained that upon the rising of Christ, he did come down to hell and called upon the prophets, such as Moses, as well as philosophers, such as Homer and Plato, to join him in heaven. Such was the Christian doctrine of the thirteenth century, which taught that Jesus Christ did descend to hell to retrieve the prophets.

Canto V: In this second circle of hell, people were banished here who had fallen victim to the desire of “carnal things” while alive on earth. These were people who loved when societal rules told them they should not (such as lovers who were married to others). Ancient figures, such as Cleopatra and Helen of Troy, were in this circle. The Pilgrim asked those in this circle how this happened to them, and their reply was that they had read Lancelot. In his explanation of the Inferno, John Freccero explains the story of the lovers, suggesting that they were not seduced by love, but by the “book and author” (313).

Canto VI: Entering the third circle, the Pilgrim met Ciaccio who explained about the division of the city, which Nicole Pinsky suggests is representative of Florence

warring between two political factions, of which Dante was on the losing side and why he was exiled from Florence (315).

Canto VII: This *canto* explained the fourth circle where those who squandered or hoarded money while on earth were sent to their eternal damnation. These people were forced to constantly strike each other and bang into each other's heads, with "fist closed," representing their tight hold on their money (Dante 55).

Canto VIII: In the fifth circle, the Pilgrim and Virgil were aboard a boat, attempting to pass, but the wrathful did not allow them admittance. Dante names an adversary in this *canto*, suggesting that Filippo Argenti was found in this circle.

Cantos IX and X: These *cantos* discussed the sixth circle, where a new man opened the gate for them, but he was a heretic. The Greek mythical character Medusa was there, who could kill with her looks. Virgil warned the Pilgrim to cover his eyes. There were rows of sepulchers with bodies in them. Heretics were located on the edge of the city. The Pilgrim referred to the heretics as Epicureans, who, in Medieval times, believed that the soul died with the body. During the Middle Ages, the sin of heresy was thought to be a sin of reason, not of will (Freccero 319).

Canto XI: Still in the sixth circle, Virgil and the Pilgrim could smell a putrid stench and took a break to get used to the odor. While resting, Virgil took the moment to explain that there were three rings within this seventh circle ahead. First, there was violence/sin on neighbor; second, sin on self; and third, violence on deity or nature. The less wrathful was the first, and therefore, different sins were accorded distinctive and various punishments.

Canto XII: Throughout the seventh circle that the poets had entered, Virgil and the Pilgrim came upon various rulers (real life names) that Dante knew during the fourteenth century. These men, now in hell, had killed members of their own family to obtain power (N. Pinsky 324). Therefore, crime against one's neighbor was the sin.

Canto XIII & XIV: In *Canto XII*, Dante explained that the travelers saw people who committed suicide, a sin on the self. Dante and Virgil were in the seventh circle and found themselves talking to dead tree branches and bushes, whose limbs (branches) bled if broken. These people committed suicide on earth, and in doing so, destroyed their souls as well. Between the second and third rings of the seventh circle, water came down from the real world to form rain. Those who were "violent to God" resided in this ring (N. Pinsky 326).

Cantos XV & XVI: The Pilgrim spoke with Bruentto Latini, who in real life was a mentor to Dante. In hell, Latini was in the section with the sodomites. Nicole Pinsky explains that Latini may have been a homosexual in real life, thus the oddity of Dante suggesting his own mentor was such (329). Pinsky points to the irony of Dante, using the name of his mentor as a sodomite, yet the Pilgrim has great pity for Latini and wishes above all else for Latini to be free from hell. It is also noted that there are clerics and other religious men in hell for this Medieval Christian sin of sodomy. The Pilgrim began to look down into the eighth circle, a long drop below.

Canto XVII & XVIII: In this *canto*, the Pilgrim explains the decorations of the shades he saw. They had colorful purses, some adorned with crests upon their necks. These people committed usury and fraud while on earth. The Pilgrim and Virgil then climbed on the shoulders of a monster with a human man's face and flew a terrifying

flight down to the eighth circle. The Pilgrim notices people who committed fraud and those who seduced others.

Canto XIX: The Pilgrim came upon people who committed the sin of simony, “which derives its name from Simon Magus: they used the Church and its offices fraudulently, for money and power” (N. Pinsky 332). Therefore, the Pilgrim finds three Popes in this *canto*; all men who Dante felt betrayed the Church and used the Church for their own advantage, including Boniface VIII, Nicolas III and Clement V, all Popes from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

Cantos XX: The Pilgrim was shocked to see shades whose bodies were so grotesque because their heads were turned around backwards so that their backs were now their chests. He wept at the look of them, but the Pilgrim determined that it was because these people attempted to look forward and interpret the future. They had been women who were fortunetellers or men who were astrologers, and they were given the punishment of looking backward forever.

Cantos XXI and XXII: These *cantos* have the Pilgrim meeting the damned who had used their political positions while alive on earth and sold other public offices. Robert Pinsky explains that this particular crime of the “barraters” is one of the accusations that faced Dante when he was exiled from Florence in the late thirteenth century (335).

Canto XXIII: The Pilgrim and Virgil come upon a few different men of various religious orders, including Franciscan Friars, Benedictines and Jovial Friars, who were in thirteenth century Europe, the “Knights of the Blessed Virgin Mary.” Nicole Pinsky explains that even though their mission was to help women and children who were

orphaned they were known as jovial for living lives of luxury (337-338). These are the hypocrites that lived in the eighth circle, having committed the sins of fraud.

Canto XXIV: Thieves were found in this *canto*, having to live naked, with arms tied behind their backs and with no way to escape the serpents at their feet. The thieves included Vanni Fucci, who the Pilgrim meets in this *canto*. Fucci explained that another man was accused of the crime, but the Pilgrim should have pity on Fucci, as he was the thief. Nicole Pinsky explains that in the thirteenth century another man was wrongly accused and sentenced to death before Fucci was convicted, but Fucci had escaped in real life (338-339).

Canto XXV: This *canto* is an erotic, grotesque explanation of a horrible mutating monster that Robert Pinsky compares to those poets before Dante, as *Canto XXV* is a “blend of sexual transformation, quasi-scientific detail and subjective moral corruption associated with Horror. Dante’s difference from his classical predecessors seems to be related, as he implies, to Christian ideas of form, nature and substance” (340). The detail in this *canto* is indeed, horrific and shows these people—the sinners in hell—are truly the monsters they become. Dante also creates characters for a few real-life thieves, not hiding them behind character names, but instead using their actual names. This type of public shame is in addition to the punishment they already received.

Canto XXVI and XXVII: The Pilgrim and Virgil came upon Ulysses, (the ancient Homeric character, who was actually Odysseus in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*) and asked him how he came to his death. Ulysses explained that he was not saved at sea (as Homer would have had his readers believe about Odysseus), but met his death in the raging waters. John Freccero suggests that Dante changed the “happy” ending because

“no one could survive such a journey on one’s own” (342). Freccero goes on to explain the different types of rhetorical styles in comparing and contrasting the ancient Greeks’ style, and Virgil’s writing style versus Dante’s.

John Freccero explains how Virgil’s dialogue in *Canto XXVI* is different from that of Dante, as the men speak in an ancient style that was suitable for such superior discussions, where Dante used the rhetorical style of the Christians:

This is a matter not of language but of the rhetoric, the ancients considered appropriate for the discussion of lofty themes. In the Gospels, Christ established a new Christian rhetoric by speaking of the loftiest matters in the humblest idiom. When Dante speaks of Virgil’s poem as tragedy and his own as comedy, he means that his poem is written in the humble speech of sacred Scripture. (342)

Dante wrote for his time, the Scholasticism of the Italian Theistic society. In *Canto XXVII*, Virgil and the Pilgrim had politically charged discussions with Ulysses and families who had committed usury. These people charged more than the legal or usual amount of interest on loaned money, and therefore, abused their status or official business standing within the society.

Canto XXVIII: In this *canto*, retribution was visualized in excruciatingly horrific detail. Those men who took part in or encouraged schisms from the Christian Church while alive were now in hell, cut in half (schism!) from head to toe. While the men were mourning and suffering from their wounds, they walked along a circle and they were again cut in half by the devil. The retribution was an attempt to punish in type, form and meaning of the crime committed.

Canto XXIX and XXX: Entering the ninth and final circle, Virgil asked the Pilgrim why he stayed so long in the last ring (the last *canto*, he stayed watching those who committed heresy). The Pilgrim replied that he thought he saw somebody he knew, which was a family member of his who had been murdered in real life. The sinners in these two cantos were “falsifiers” and in the ninth circle, the Pilgrim met men who had committed the sin of false chemistry (alchemy), trying to sell falsified gold and cures to increase years of life on earth. In *Canto XXX*, the travelers met counterfeiters who had burned at the stake for their sins on earth. Dante named various mythological characters who were fraudulent liars, as well as Italians, known to forge money that should have been made of gold.

Cantos XXXI through XXXIV: As the travelers were taken to the last circle of hell, they saw a frozen lake at the floor. These *cantos* told the story of those who transgressed against their own family, betrayed their country and benefactors. Dante identified men who were fraudulent on earth, including two brothers who killed each other in an attempt to obtain their father’s inheritance and traitors who turned on their own compatriots in the heat of battle (N. Pinsky 351). It is in the final *canto*, XXXIV, that the Pilgrim meets the worst of the sinners, at the lowest depths of hell, Judas, betrayer of Jesus and Brutus and Cassius, the men who conspired to kill Caesar. The *Inferno* ends with Virgil and Dante riding up to the top of hell very quickly, on the back of Lucifer’s body. Thus ends the first book of the *Divine Comedy*, as the Pilgrim moves forward to Purgatory and then finally to Paradise.

Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors

Throughout these *cantos*, metaphors can be introduced to assist in the discussion on communication ethics in terms of the Middle Ages and Christianity as well as in terms of historicity for use in Postmodernity. There are many allegories throughout the Divine Comedy, but for purposes of this work, attention is given to the metaphors that have consistency with the metaphors of the works of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.

Justice (*contrabass*)

Dante described hell in detail suggesting the sins of the will—crimes that people decide to perform with great thought—received the worst of the punishment. Dante weighted the sins, suggesting that sins of weakness were not as horrendous as sins of the will. Punishments were exaggerated forms of the crimes that were committed. The sinners suffered horrible fates, for eternity, in the pits of hell.

That hell would have sections of sinners, where one would actually be rated least to worst based on the sins committed while alive, is haunting. It is bad enough that one would be damned to hell, let alone have a segregated hell where some suffer more, longer, or different from others. “The very point of having a system of punishments in the *Inferno* is that we are thereby called upon to consider moral evil as something graded and hence understandable as a complex interweaving of wrath and negation. [. . .] Sin is thus for Dante not merely a matter of degree but also a matter of kind” (Mazzeo 5). Therefore, Judas had to live in the furthest pit of hell where the punishment, then, equaled the enormity of the sin, known as *contrapasso*.

In *Canto XX*, the fortunetellers who usually looked to the future, had to suffer in hell with their heads backwards. These sinners are even further down in hell compared to

murderers because Dante considered them as perpetrating fraud and placed them almost as low as Judas, the traitor. In *Canto XXVIII*, the men who encouraged schisms within the Catholic Church were brutally cut down the middle of their bodies. The metaphor of cut was not lost on the reader.

It was noted earlier that Augustine believed that humility should inform justice for an ethical, responsive action. This type of *contrapasso*, punishment that somehow equals the crime or the severity of the crime, would serve as justice to the people of the Medieval world. Justice was one of the highest virtues in the classical world. A person receiving his or her just deserts was just as important as acting justly in the world of the Medieval Christians.

Confessing

Dante was very angry with the men who exiled him and the politics of his time. He was sent away because of what he believed in and what he wrote, publicly. There were men who were cruel, who stole from others, who cheated, and they were all still in the city Dante called home. Through the vehicle of the Inferno, Dante points to many men by name, civil and religious leaders, who were criminals, actually naming them directly, or giving them obvious pseudonyms. This type of calling out, naming the men that Dante felt were sinners, is his type of confession. Though they were forced confessions as Dante proclaimed who he thought were sinners and what he thought was a sin.

Confessing is communication ethics in action. Baring one's soul in an open and public forum is not an easy or a comfortable task. Confessing to one's self, a form of intrapersonal communication could be considered ethical as well. However, Augustine

publicly proclaimed his rhetoric to his family and his Church. He told his mother how much love he felt toward his God that the Manichean religion was not what he had hoped. Calvin L. Troup suggests that in Augustine's writings, "rhetoric intersects with history, philosophy, society, and faith, and has presented a premodern paradigm for rhetoric as *the* intersection and integrator that enables him to negotiate our interdisciplinary boundaries so deftly" (xi). Augustine is an excellent example of communication ethics announced in monologue (dialogue if you will).

Augustine offered Christianity to those who were not perfect, for those who were not privileged. Through the Confessions, Augustine offered his own demons for the world to read. Most Christians would simply offer a confession in the innermost recesses of their own minds, praying to God. Augustine published them!

The Divine Comedy continues in the next book to proceed to Purgatory and then to Paradise. Joseph A. Mazzeo explains the change in the type and character of the writing from the Inferno and Purgatorio, where both explained virtue and were psychological in nature, to the approach taken in the Paradisio. In the Paradisio, Dante examined and outlined how "the ethical realm and the life of conflict and choice prepare the way for a life of ideal emotional and intellectual activities" (Mazzeo 195). Mazzeo also explains the symbols of light, love beauty and knowledge used by Dante in the Paradisio (196-201).

Summary

Dante was searching, perhaps for a way to make sense of his world. Through the words of his poetry, he was attempting to find justice and petition to the political process to have the Pope and a monarch act as leaders of the land, in peace and harmony. As

utopian as it sounds, that is what Dante wrote in DeMonarchia as explained by John Herman Randall, Jr. (104-107). Dante hypothesized a future Europe with a papacy that would teach based on “revelation” and a monarch that would lead with the use of “philosophic instruction” (in DeMonarchia Bk. III ch. 16 as noted in Randall Jr. 105-107). This did not materialize during his time, but Dante wrote about it in comedic and poetic form, nonetheless.

A span of more than 800 years was a large time frame to consider for this chapter. How could 30 pages cover a millennium? The goal of this chapter was not to *span* ethical thought from Augustine’s work that was birthed at the beginning of the Middle Ages and ending at the twilight of the Medieval period with Augustine’s work, but rather to delineate, and possibly compare, the two types of thought at either end of the spectrum. Alasdair MacIntyre explains the vastness of modern society and the various religions that ensued:

In such religions (those that last) we find built up a set of beliefs and ways of behaving which become relatively independent of particular, specific forms of social life. For this very reason, we shall expect to find built into such religions enormous flexibility and adaptability with regard to behavior. We shall expect to discover a great capacity for coming to terms with quite different sets of moral standards in different times and places.

(Short History 110-111)

This is why an investigation of medieval ethics is of import now in Postmodernity. Recognizing various problems that occurred in history might be the problems one is facing in modern day that can be helpful in terms of the decision-making process.

Communication ethics is having an understanding that there is a world around us, and we are not decision makers in a vacuum, but rather of a community of various types. Within the community of the Christian Church, Medieval society attempted to understand the good as a means toward happiness in terms of life on this earth. However, life on this earth is temporal, as the after life was where they would receive their reward, according to Christ's teachings.

The comparison and contrast of the two scholars, along with the work of Dante in the Inferno, presented ethics in light of a society that was beginning to include all people—not just the wealthy—into a receptive organization, that of Christianity. The Middle Ages or Christian Medieval society have only begun to receive more scholarly activity in the past 20 to 30 years (Haldane 133), but it has been very fruitful in understanding what led to the Renaissance and then eventually, the Enlightenment that so many have critiqued.

Chapter Four: Enlightenment Ethics and Candide

Practical reason, according to Kant, employs no criterion external to itself. It appeals to no content derived from experience; hence Kant's independent arguments against the use of happiness or the invocation of God's revealed will merely reinforce a position already entailed by the Kantian view of reason's functions and powers. It is of the essence of reason that it lays down principles which are universal, categorical and internally consistent. Hence a rational morality will lay down principles which both can and ought to be held by all men, independent of circumstances and conditions, and which could consistently be obeyed by every rational agent on every occasion. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 45)

Following his chapter on Christianity, Alasdair MacIntyre shifts his focus from the end of medieval times to the beginning of the Enlightenment. He does this by examining the philosophy surrounding the social, economic and religious situation that surrounded the work of "Enlightened" *philosophes*, a term used for the philosophers and their work during that time. From the *polis* to the Church and now to the individual landowner, the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment offered their thoughts within a growing economic system that would change everything known to former land workers. This discussion will offer a practical guide to ethics that can then be transcended into communication ethics.

A few of the philosophers that MacIntyre considers includes the work of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) a precursor to enlightened thinking. Hobbes was interested in the

relationships between the ruler and those ruled and suggested that rights and justice were based on one's need to avoid punishment by a ruler. Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677) was a proponent of mathematics and specifically geometry and suggested that it was not a god, but passions and desires that lead one to make decisions. John Locke (1632-1704) was concerned with sovereignty and the rights of the citizens to rebel, as he felt land ownership was a natural right. David Hume (1711-1776) also felt it a necessity for the citizenry to have property rights, and he was an important figure of the Scottish Enlightenment (Short History 130-189).

But, it is Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) who was validated and acknowledged by Alasdair MacIntyre for the modern definition of morality (Short History 190), as Kant's thinking and published works encapsulates the "enlightened" of his time (Short History 190-198). MacIntyre posits Kant's influence in the "majority" of philosophical writing that appears in Modernity since "ethics is defined as a subject in Kantian terms" (Short History 190).

Peter Gay explains the import of the scholarly work of these men, as they were not philosophers who looked down upon history and explained what they saw, but, instead, were men who were "intimately involved in the life of their age" ("Introduction" 23). This chapter will review the lineage of philosophical ethics outlined by Alasdair MacIntyre in A Short History of Ethics for the periods of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the majority of the discussion focusing on Immanuel Kant. An explanation of two of Immanuel Kant's major works on knowledge, reason and ethics, Critique of Pure Reason and Lectures on Ethics, will allow for a discussion of the *praxis* of ethics found within the philosophy of the eighteenth century. An explanation of this

praxis will occur at the end of this chapter, with a delineation of the major metaphors that are illuminated within the work of Voltaire in his witty and satirical fictional novel, Candide. Voltaire was a prolific and well-known writer and philosopher during the Enlightenment. Through the works of these scholars and poet, this work offers a discussion on communication ethics bound within the historicity of the Enlightenment in terms of the rhetorical interruptions experienced in these two centuries within the modern European and American landscapes.

Introduction

In retrospect, perhaps, Alasdair MacIntyre understands that the idea of a universal moral understanding was and is not possible because social orders are not constant; they are ever changing experiences (Short History *xvi-xvii*). In Platonic fashion, Immanuel Kant wanted to consider the *a priori* of moral life (Critique 4) but MacIntyre explains that it was not possible, for a community needs to connect ethical standards to daily living and historical understanding (Short History 1). However, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries still need to be investigated alongside Kantian and Enlightenment thinking in order to recognize it not only for its historicity and historical value but also as a comparison to the current, postmodern state. As MacIntyre would suggest in regard to history and the background against which one is entrenched, we need to first understand the philosophies working within the community in order to then appreciate the dialogue that ensued around the decisions that were made.

In identifying the time period to be studied in this chapter, the Enlightenment as a whole is an obvious choice for discussion within this larger work, as seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe was a time of what Dorinda Outram calls “‘flash-points’[. . .]

or of ‘pockets’ where projects of intellectual expansion impacted upon and changed the nature of developments in society and government on a world wide basis” (3).

Developments occurring on a worldwide basis from the 1600’s through to the end of the 1700’s have included revolutions within governments, science and religious institutions. These changes took place with emergent modifications of not only the landscape of the European continent, but also the new America. It was a time of “critical consciousness” (Dupre *xii-xiii*). The Enlightenment was a time of rationality “validated by science” where ideas were no longer channeled from religion (Outram 3). Roy Porter concurs with the discussion on the “break” from the reliance on religion and the Bible as a “framework for understanding man, society and nature” (65).

Peter Gay considers the actual time-frame for the Enlightenment by offering the parameters of counting a period that lasts one hundred years, 1689-1789, beginning with the triumph of the English Revolution and the “birth of Montesquieu” and ending with the “French Revolution and the death of Holbach” (“Introduction” 20). Dorinda Outram complains that Gay’s account of the Enlightenment excludes female thinkers. Outram also mentions A. Owen Aldridge’s critique of Gay’s work for *not* focusing on colonial worlds and the impact they had on the Enlightenment (6). As noted in Chapter One, this work also recognizes Alasdair MacIntyre’s lack of explaining vernacular voices within his historical writing regarding morality and the West. However, this work moves forward in light of the omission, noting the continued import of the effect of the European tradition.

It also should be noted that recent (post-1970) work by historians and philosophers suggest the Enlightenment was the beginning of the work of Modernity, and

does not “cut off” the time period at the outbreak of the French Revolution (Outram 4-8). This work considers the fact that Alasdair MacIntyre wrote the first edition of A Short History of Ethics in 1966 prior to the scholarship surrounding the concluding years of the Enlightenment and before the discussion on the import of Eastern and American cultures, women’s issues on Enlightenment thinking and postmodern philosophy.

Philosophers such as Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984) suggested the Enlightenment as the beginning of Modern times, where universal theories found within narrative structures and progress reigned supreme (Carr 673). The traditional historically written Christian approach to the “sacred man” was being recreated as the scientific history of the “natural man” (Porter 16). Progress was privileged during the Enlightenment. The human intellect was no longer believed to be received *a priori*. Instead, John Locke suggested that humans had *tabula rosa*, a blank slate, and then knowledge acquisition would allow intellect to grow based on constant learning, not innate predetermined knowledge (Porter 18). Power over disease and economic expansion also paved the way for a belief in change that was positively defined as progress.

The Enlightenment was a time of science reigning supreme as a substitution for religion and revolutions being fought in both Europe and the Americas for rights of the non-landed as well as freedom from royal leaders. Roy Porter, however, suggests that the progress of the Enlightenment could simply be viewed as a time when philosophers were replacing one myth for the other. The scientific myth replaced the religious, because there still had to be a *belief* in the progress to come as it was not guaranteed (Porter 19).

This chapter discusses the philosophers listed above in relation to Alasdair MacIntyre's work in his text A Short History of Ethics as well as the metaphors that are illuminated by the work of each of these philosophers that personify the spirit of the Enlightenment. The metaphors will also be discussed in relation to Voltaire's novel Candide. Based on A Short History of Ethics, the metaphors of rights, justice, freedom, reason, property rights, passions, duty, reason and ethics as they relate to Immanuel Kant's form of universal morality will be considered in relation to Enlightenment thinking. These philosophical/enlightenment metaphors will also be compared and contrasted to the *praxis* metaphors found within Candide including optimism/pessimism, exile, universalism and God/religion.

André Maurois suggested in his appreciation at the beginning of the novel of Candide that the various characteristics of the eighteenth century "was most fully reflected in the person of Voltaire" (13). The *praxis* that will illuminate the communicative ethics of the day is found in the work of Voltaire's Candide, as the novel is a response to the social, economic, political, and religious structures of the eighteenth century. Turning to Alasdair MacIntyre's reading of the philosophers of the Enlightenment then, this chapter begins with Thomas Hobbes and his work on justice and the rights of individuals within the framework of a state.

Thomas Hobbes: Rights and Justice

Alasdair MacIntyre discusses Thomas Hobbes work and in particular, Hobbes' text, Leviathan published in the early seventeenth century. Leviathan is considered one of the precursors to Enlightenment thinking. MacIntyre explains that Hobbes rejected late Aristotelianism, which viewed Aristotle's work during the Scholastic period of which

Aquinas was a part. But, Hobbes was interested in “the notions of right, justice, sovereignty, and power” (MacIntyre, Short History 130). Hobbes was concerned with the new types of state/crown rights as compared to those of its subjects—especially the relationship between the two (MacIntyre, Short History 131).

Because he was impressed with the work of Galileo, Thomas Hobbes was interested in systems and how individuals within those systems handle their own “self preservation” (MacIntyre, Short History 132). Finally, MacIntyre explains the impetus for individuals’ decisions. According to Hobbes, decisions are based on two guiding principles—domination of the ruler and avoiding death (for those ruled). MacIntyre disagrees with Hobbes premise, suggesting that people are not concerned with authority itself, but rather,

what Hobbes failed to see was that the acceptance of an authority is in fact the acceptance of rules which give others and ourselves the right to act in certain ways or the duty to act in certain ways, and that to have right is not to have power, while to have a duty is not to act from fear of the power of others. (Short History 137-138)

MacIntyre, however, does give credit to Hobbes because of what he established in regard to the connection of the theory of human nature and morality (139).

Again, Alasdair MacIntyre continues to espouse the need for viewing morality in terms of the social implications which underlie human decision-making. MacIntyre then explains through his lineage of scholars that the only philosopher who can be compared to Hobbes’ work and be considered a philosophical peer to Hobbes at the time was that of Benedict de Spinoza. But, Spinoza stood in direct contrast to Hobbes (Short History 140).

Benedict de Spinoza: Freedom, Passions and Reason

Benedict de Spinoza was known as a rationalist who was influenced by Thomas Hobbes and was concerned with the concepts of “freedom, reason and happiness” though Alasdair MacIntyre explains that Spinoza could have been considered an “atheist” in Judeo-Christian terms (Short History 142). Spinoza was convinced of the facts presented in the seventeenth century regarding mathematical geometry and therefore could not agree with a god who stood above the world which was created via miracles. Instead, Spinoza attempted to reason his way through the passions, which he linked to man’s decision-making process:

The role of reason is simply to note facts, to calculate, and to understand; reason cannot move to action. For Spinoza this is a perfectly good description of man in his ordinary, unenlightened state. [. . .] In pursuing pleasure and pain we are therefore being affected by causes outside rational knowledge and control [. . .]. (MacIntyre, Short History 142-143)

With this type of rationality, then, a person would be unaware of what was happening to them in their state of deliberation.

However, Spinoza suggested that if a person were to recognize this state that he/she found themselves in, he/she would see that individuals themselves are part of a system of necessity. People would then recognize a form of freedom in their choice making. Because of the recognition of this system, an individual would gain knowledge and thus be free to choose certain paths in the future. Therefore, “Genuine virtue is simply the realization of this state in which knowledge, freedom and happiness are combined (MacIntyre, Short History 144). Though MacIntyre disagrees with Spinoza’s

idea of freedom (he does not believe it is simply knowledge that allows one to be free), he appreciates the ideas of Spinoza that explain the passions and desires. For Spinoza, the passions can be changed based on one's own education of the self and learning to avoid extreme passions or desires. Then, one would be free in choice making in regard to emotions that can be changed in the future.

At this point in the discussion of Chapter 11 in A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre breaks from his examination of his historical portrait of particular philosophers and their methods of ethics, and turns to the questions the philosophers raised in terms of morality. It is a critical juncture which MacIntyre notes in explaining that in the written history of man, three different types of morality have been offered from ancient Greece through to the 18th century.

Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that the first type of morality denoted in history includes answers to moral questions that were based on the pursuit of the good and happiness for man. These ideas were formulated within Platonic & Aristotelian thinking. Second, decisions were based on punishment and reward in the Christian sense during medieval times. Third, and finally, MacIntyre suggests that Sophistic and Hobbesian thinking led individuals to choose actions based on achieving the most of their immediate needs (Short History 148). MacIntyre's point suggests that the historical situation that surrounded philosophical ideas on morality during these times have to be considered in congruence with each other, as the history cannot be "detached" from the theoretical underpinnings of ethics (Short History 149).

It is in this "New Values" chapter that Alasdair MacIntyre also discusses the beginnings of the rise of individualism as seen in the novel Robinson Crusoe (Short

History 151). Alexis de Tocqueville coined the metaphor of individualism when he visited America in the early nineteenth century. Tocqueville asserted that *individualism* keeps the individual away from joining the community because of concern for self-interest (482-484). Within the framework of individualism, the individual does remain within one's own immediate family and associate with friends, but, that person does not participate in the community as a whole. This individualism has been linked to the rise of modern times (Porter 59).

Between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the Enlightenment, Alasdair MacIntyre points to two scholars who influenced religion and politics (Short History 121-129). At the end of the Renaissance (fourteenth and sixteenth centuries), Martin Luther (1483-1546) began the Catholic reformation by posting his *95 Theses* in 1517 on a German church door. Coming out of medieval times, the Reformation was the beginning of the end of Catholicism as it had been known for a thousand years. MacIntyre suggests the import of Martin Luther's consideration of the agent as responsible for his/her moral decisions (Short History 121-127).

This type of reliance on the individual within a religious context gave rise to the public/secular form of agency when Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) began working within governmental systems. Power for the individual was of great importance for Machiavelli and, "Moral rules are technical rules about the means to these ends" (MacIntyre Short History 127). Therefore, with the seventeenth century coming to a close, MacIntyre explains the philosophies that bridge the Enlightenment's two centuries, from the end of the seventeenth to the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. One such scholar, John Locke, suggested that those individuals that Martin Luther and Machiavelli

had concentrated on within society should own property, because it was their natural right.

John Locke: Property Rights

The beginning of the Enlightenment was upon Europe as John Locke, an empiricist, wrote An Essay Concerning Human Understanding after the revolution in England in 1688. His text discussed the rights of sovereign authority and the rights of the people to rebel, both Hobbesian-type considerations according to Alasdair MacIntyre (Short History 157). Locke sought to explain that authority of a ruling regime should be given to a particular sovereign in order to protect the natural rights of the people. This, to Locke, included the right to property ownership as the most significant of these natural rights.

Alasdair MacIntyre specifies a problem with John Locke's thought, explaining that the majority of people in England were beggars and paupers and did not own land, nor did they have the capability. However, MacIntyre kindly asserts that Locke wanted a majority vote to determine the laws of the land. Thus, MacIntyre gives Locke the notoriety of the beginning of modern democracy and popular consent from the majority (Short History 158-159). Locke's natural rights theory suggested that one is aware of moral law due to reasoning (MacIntyre, Short History 160). Locke was a Christian who felt that the "thinking man must be a believer" because Christianity was a rational religion (Porter 33), compared to David Hume, a non-believer, who openly disavowed the connection of faith to property rights.

David Hume: The Passions

David Hume, also an empiricist, was a Scotsman who denounced the “ways” of his homeland and attempted to act and be more like an Englishman in his younger years (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 283). Hume was never accepted by the English and he eventually moved back to Scotland to live and ultimately took the integrationist position on the England and Scotland issue. Alasdair MacIntyre explains, “Hume began under Hutcheson’s influence, but while he follows Hutcheson in his rejection of rationalist ethics, the arguments with which he develops his own position are original and far more powerful than anything in Hutcheson” (Short History 169).

As philosophers, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume differed in their opinion of Cicero’s *De Officiis* (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 287-89). Hume looked to Roman law, not Scottish, for his view of justice. Hume learned from Hutcheson that, “reason is practically inert” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 285). Hume cataloged the passions and divided moral judgments into, “those prior to all reasoning [. . .] and those which tell us what the law of nature is” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 285).

David Hume considered human nature as universal and uniform. Hume deemed the passions, not reason as the impetus for moving people to action (MacIntyre, Short History 169). Hume believed that people acted based on love or hatred as well as pride or humility and what the Scottish were most proud of was property. Hume explained that, “Property was a right and justice was to serve the ends of property” (MacIntyre, Whose Justice 293-295). Therefore, Hume deviated from Aristotle when he suggested that society acts as individual property owners for rank and pride, where, of course, Aristotle suggested one acts as a good citizen for the benefit of the *polis* (MacIntyre, Whose

Justice? 211-212). Because of either utility or sympathy, Hume believed a person would act virtuously (MacIntyre, Short History 174). “Hume treats moral rules as given, partly because he treats human nature as given” (MacIntyre, Short History 175). The problem that Alasdair MacIntyre has with Hume is his lack of critique of, and his reliance upon the passions.

Alasdair MacIntyre compares David Hume to Adam Smith in explaining that Smith, “like Hume, appeals to sympathy as the basis of morals” (Short History 176). However, Smith’s work differs with Hume’s utility, and suggested a person acts on an event because it is “fitting and proper” (MacIntyre, Short History 176). The final two philosophers that MacIntyre discusses as Enlightenment thinkers include Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), with the suggestion that Montesquieu’s work is the complete opposite of Hume’s thinking.

Montesquieu wrote on political matters, having worked within the government of France for over a decade. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that Montesquieu was concerned with political science and felt that politics and morality could not be separated. Montesquieu deplored despotism and instead believed in a monarchy or republic system (Short History 179). Since he was a relativist, Montesquieu believed that rules could change from society to society. Then, within these societies different types of rule (despot, monarch, republic) may be appropriate, thus the relativism characteristic assigned by MacIntyre (Short History 180-181). Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau both took their ideas on liberty from the English Revolution (MacIntyre, Short History

183). Like Montesquieu, Rousseau believed that politics could not be removed from morals (MacIntyre, Short History 187).

With a strong belief in the natural-man, Jean-Jacques Rousseau did not share his contemporaries' desires for private land ownership by the people because of what he viewed as an eventual inequality between the landed and those that did not own land (MacIntyre, Short History 184-185). According to Alasdair MacIntyre, for Rousseau, "The task of a social reformer, therefore, is to construct institutions in which the primitive regard for the needs of others will be restored in the form of a regard for the common good. Men have to learn how in advanced communities they can act not as private individuals, as men, but rather as citizens" (Short History 187). Thus, Rousseau foreshadowed the concerns of Marx that espoused communal land ownership for the good of the whole. Rousseau believed in a conscience that is able to be consulted in moral issues.

In summary, as medieval times ended, the precursor to the Enlightenment found itself in period of the Reformation, as Martin Luther and Niccolò Machiavelli both worked from the same premise of agency and the importance of the individual, but from a religious versus political viewpoint. Then, the sixteenth century offered Thomas Hobbes' suggestion that decisions are based on the authority shown to people and their fear of that ruler. Benedict de Spinoza disagreed with Hobbes, suggesting it was the freedom offered within reason that brings one to have a passion regarding his/her decision making. John Locke's theory suggested that land ownership was a natural right and Hume suggested that instead, it was the passions, such as pride, that moved people to desire such rights as land ownership. The Baron Charles Montesquieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau both agreed

that politics and morality worked together to bring about the common good. They just got there in different ways regarding land ownership.

These men were all working toward the protection of people, from an individual viewpoint as well as a community. But, it was Immanuel Kant who looked to offer the answers found within an *a priori*. Alasdair MacIntyre turns to the preeminent philosopher Kant by explaining his extreme import to the Enlightenment. It is Kant's work which helped to define the Enlightenment by offering a transcendental universal.

Immanuel Kant: Reason, Ethics and the Universal

Alasdair MacIntyre considers Immanuel Kant to be the epitome of 'Enlightened' thinking, as Kant is recognized as a major figure in philosophy who wrote on reasoning, ethics and morals toward the end of the Enlightenment period. As a German philosopher, Kant was profoundly influenced by, "Newton's physics and the empiricism of Helvétius and Hume" (MacIntyre, Short History 190). Though he hardly traveled, and lived a relatively secluded lifestyle, Kant spent his career as an educator and writer, and produced the first of his books considered below, Critique of Pure Reason. This text is the first of the three texts usually referred to as the *Critiques*. Because Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is considered one of his most important works, it will be beneficial to consider this text as it illuminates Kant's bias and explanation of his theoretical philosophy of knowledge *a priori* that is then complimentary to his practical philosophy of value and formalist ethics.

The other Kantian text to be considered in this work is his Lectures on Ethics, a compilation of lectures offered to his students in Germany in the mid eighteenth century. The lectures were transcribed in the early twentieth century and are useful to this work

since it is a very specific piece on ethics. These two texts will be reviewed below for their import on the topics of knowledge, ethics and the Enlightenment.

To experience, Immanuel Kant believed that one must reach out and seize understanding based on the categories already composed through one's education (MacIntyre, Short History 190-191). Kant would disagree with Locke's idea of *tabula rosa*, however, as Kant argued that humans still brought beliefs to the occurrence. The questions then, that surrounded Kant, included how knowledge was acquired, and God's existence as creator of a natural world where morality either is or is not found. The term critique does not mean criticism or denote a negative connotation. Instead, for Kant, the type of critique he performed, as well as the *philosophes* of the time, was a complete investigation of ideas to determine structure and parameters within philosophies on ethics, for example.

Immanuel Kant suggested that there may have been a creator but that morality lies outside of nature. Kant's theory was explained by Alasdair MacIntyre, "morals must be independent of how the world goes, for how the world goes is nonmoral" (Short History 191). Kant looked to inclination, which one is born with, and duty which is the reason for one to act. For Kant, decision-making was based in a universal categorical imperative. Therefore, when one asks the question, 'ought I to do this?' it should be looked upon as asking, 'ought this be done in all situations?' According to the categorical imperative, a precept accepted by one person must be universally accepted as right for others in order to be accepted as ethical.

In his philosophy of morality, Immanuel Kant offered parameters by which to live one's life—not a list of what can be done, but instead, categorical imperatives of what

one ought *not do*, such as lie or cheat. These categorical imperatives do not prescribe how to live, but, instead, offer a “test” by which to measure decisions (MacIntyre, Short History 197). Imperatives reside in the agent, which was different than what had been expressed prior, since the mandates of a higher power throughout Medieval times was the authority.

A university faculty member with a Pietistic faith born and raised in Königsberg, East Prussia, Immanuel Kant worked in response to a formal Christian rationalism, specifically in the Lutheran faith (Randall, Jr. 405). John Herman Randall, Jr. also suggests that Pietism deliberately turned its back upon science and reason, and clung to faith. Kant was attempting to reach the intellectual class and prove conclusively that reason and science were valid only within a certain field, and that outside this field, faith—Kant called it “practical reason”—could still establish the tenets of natural religion, God, freedom and immortality (Randall, Jr. 304). It is freedom that Kant suggested as allowing one to be enlightened. For as long as a man can think for himself and has the freedom to express his ideas, his will, there will be the age of enlightenment (“What is Enlightenment?” 3-10).

Alasdair MacIntyre explains that for Immanuel Kant, inclination that is predetermined brings forth the duty that one might recognize when an action needs to be accomplished (Short History 193). Because of the autonomy of the individual, even if one believes in a supreme being, it is not divine intervention, but the individual who is still his/her own “moral authority” that houses the inclinations within themselves (MacIntyre, Short History 195). However, significant emphasis has been given to Kant’s “autonomy,” and scholars such as Habermas reject Kantian ethics, Pat J. Gehrke suggests

that autonomy is just half of Kant's philosophy and that a community ethic can indeed be found in Kant (1). It is with this understanding of a useful communicative ethic that this work reviews two of Kant's texts that specifically delineate knowledge and ethics, the Critique of Pure Reason and Lectures on Ethics.

Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781)

In his "special introduction" to Immanuel Kant's 1943 edition of Critique of Pure Reason, (his first of the three *Critiques*), Brandt V.B. Dixon noted that Kant should be studied in conjunction with the period of the day. Dixon realizes that Kant was writing in response to the "transition from the *mediaeval* to the modern view of the world involved a profound change in the fundamental conviction or assumption which men held in regard to experience and the sources of knowledge" (*vii*). In general, people questioned Christian and traditional authority while scientific investigation was preeminent in knowledge acquisition. Kant suggested that knowledge was manufactured and according to Dixon, Kant's goal was to systematize the "*a priori* forms, or synthetic processes of reason" (*xii*). Kant was looking for the "resources of reason for the construction of experience" (Dixon *xiii*). Kant strove to understand and define knowledge and value within his writings (Seung *ix*).

Brandt V.B. Dixon explains Immanuel Kant's question for his inquiry in Critique of Pure Reason, as to "How is synthetic knowledge *a priori* possible?" (*xiii*). Kant explained knowledge as *a priori*, something that is known prior to the experience (Critique 1). Kant's aim was to inquire into the transcendental character of the aesthetic, analytic and dialectic (Dixon *xiv*). Kant suggested that science was not everything. This *Critique* analyzed the presuppositions of the Newtonian conception of nature (Beck, On

History xxi). God's existence and a metaphysical world could not be proven. Morally, however, Kant wanted the enlightened to feel a "religious reverence for something in the world greater than ourselves, we do and must respond to a beauty in things that cannot be scientifically explained" (Randall 412). This was Kant's inquiry throughout most of his academic life.

In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas suggested, "reason was valid within limits" (Randall Jr., 411) and then after those limits, Kant wanted to explain the reaction of religion and faith upon science. Metaphysics was formerly the most esteemed of sciences, one that was not challenged. With the rise of scientific inquiry, metaphysics had been usurped. In examining reason, Kant intended to use certitude, as opinion was not an option, and therefore, he employed "objective deduction" and clearness (Critique xxii). Kant wanted to determine reason without the aid of experience.

For Immanuel Kant, metaphysics was a science that investigated the problems of pure reason, "God, Freedom (of will) and Immortality" (Critique 5). Kant suggested that, "Philosophy stands in need of a Science which shall determine the possibility, principles, and extent of Human Knowledge *a priori*" (Critique 4). All of human kind is looking for an understanding of knowledge, and answers that cannot be gained via "empirical application" of reason (Kant, Critique 13). Kant posited in the Critique of Pure Reasons that metaphysics needed to prove itself indestructible as a science; it was not simply to be dogmatic. Kant needed to have metaphysics show how one arrives at conceptions *a priori* (Critique 14).

Immanuel Kant searched for *a priori* knowledge that strictly conformed to universal rules (Critique 3). "The human intellect, even in an unphilosophical state, is in

possession of certain cognitions *a priori*” compared to empirical knowledge which is knowledge that comes *a posteriori*, “through experience” (Kant, Critique 2). Kant was attempting to recognize that scientific knowledge had to be learned, but that other knowledge, such as the intuition of knowing what is right, is inherent in humans and requires judgment.

In order to understand reasoning and decision making within ethics, judgment needs to be explored. Immanuel Kant explained his delineation of types of judgments by suggesting that there are two types: analytical and synthetical judgments. “Analytical judgments” are explicative, as they analyze and explain whereas “synthetical judgments” are “augmentative” and “add” to knowledge (Kant, Critique 7). Synthetical are also judgments of experience such as mathematical judgments, “In all theoretical sciences of reason, synthetical judgments *a priori* are contained as principles” (Kant, Critique 9). Kant also suggested that metaphysics contains “synthetical propositions *a priori*” (Critique 12).

One of the more important metaphors for Kant’s work revolves around reason because it is, “The faculty which furnishes us with the principles of knowledge *a priori*” (Critique 15). Kant engaged in a critique of pure reason not because he was concerned with “enlarging” conception, as he would if he was defining a doctrine, but instead he was interested in the, “correction and guidance of our knowledge” (Critique 16). Kant wanted this guidance to be explained within a transcendental theory.

Immanuel Kant discussed the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements in the Critique of Pure Reason where he attempted to find a transcendental experience that is not inflexible. For Kant, then, the transcendental aesthetic was a, “Science of all the

principles of sensibility *a priori*” (Critique 22, 45). The transcendental aesthetic only contains the elements of space and time (Kant, Critique 35). Therefore, experience is necessary to view change. Kant wondered if “time and space are real existences? Or are they relations or determinations of things?” (Critique 23). Kant’s answer suggested that space is where external “phenomena” can occur, it is infinite, and it is an intuition (Critique 24). The objects recognized in space are, according to Kant, “representations of our sensibility” (Critique 28). However, Kant then explained time in contrast/connection to space and explained that time is not “empirical” (Critique 28), but, time is “a subjective condition of our (human) intuition” (Critique 31). Within time and space, then, Kant finds knowledge (Critique 33).

Immanuel Kant explained that logic is the, “Science of the laws of the understanding” and that logic is either general or particular (Critique 45). The general is universal and it is either pure (one’s senses, imagination, memory, habits) or applied (empirical) (Kant, Critique 45-6). On the other hand, there is the particular—correct thinking about a particular class of objects. Logic is concerned with *a priori* relation to objects (Kant, Critique 48). In attempting to find and define truth, one can use analytic logic, “the negative test of truth” (Kant, Critique 50).

When Kant explained the dialectic, in terms of its Greek origins, he suggested it was a logic of illusion (Kant, Critique 50). Kant felt the dialectic lowered the dignity of philosophy. He then divided transcendental logic into transcendental analytic and dialectic. Transcendental analytic is a “clue to the discovery of all pure conceptions of the understanding” (Kant, Critique 53), where understanding is the faculty of judging (Kant,

Critique 55). Therefore, the analytic is subjective and non-empirical, and why Kant was different for his day.

Kant investigated the transcendental aesthetic and reduces it to 1) empirical, 2) pure and 3) sensuous intuition (Kant, Critique 22-3). “There are two pure forms of sensuous intuition, as principles of knowledge *a priori* these two *a priori* institutions are then namely space and time” (Kant, Critique 23). Through intuition, we consciously put items into categories (Kant, Critique 83). Categories allow us to arrange and connect our perceptions which are, “representations accompanied with sensation” (Kant, Critique 85). Categories also allow empirical cognition—an experience. They are “conceptions which prescribe laws *a priori* to phenomena” (Kant, Critique 93).

Immanuel Kant’s goal was to offer a type of plan for a system of principles of pure reason. This architectonic plan was an attempt to explain pure reason as *a priori* to experience, and anything one would know absolutely. What makes this reason pure is when it is not associated with anything empirical.

Kant’s Lectures on Ethics

In his Lectures on Ethics, suggested to have been written and offered from 1775-1780, Immanuel Kant explained that the world needed to unite and form a more universal understanding of each country and each other instead of forming individual pockets of statehood, armed and ready for defense as well as offensive colonization (252). Kant suggested that each country move toward perfection and thus a morally perfect world.

This type of Platonic perfection is what most people know of Kant, the utopian thinking of an isolated philosopher, locked away from the world. But the Lectures invite

readers to connect education to morality. Kant suggested that if education is used in an appropriate manner, children will grow in a more moral world:

Wherein lies our hope? In education, and in nothing else. Education must be adapted to all the ends of nature, both civil and domestic. Our present education, both in the home and at school, is still very faulty, in respect of discipline, doctrine and the cultivation of talent as much as in respect of the building of character in accordance with moral principles” Kant’s lectures are not as utopian as his formal texts. Upon first read the Lectures seem like they come from a different scholar than the one who wrote the various *Critiques*, however, reading the ideas, they become recognizable to Kant. (Lectures 252-253)

It is this type of perfection of human nature that Kant tried to find on God’s earth. However, as mentioned above, this is where Kant’s work is critiqued—for its reliance on perfection. However, in his “Forward” to the Lectures on Ethics, Lewis White Beck suggests that if one reads Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason without the background of Kant’s work in ethics, and the accessibility of the Lectures as well as Metaphysics of Morals, then one cannot justifiably take away the part from the whole and complain of Kant’s “unearthly” account of ethics (*xii*). The Lectures explain divine will and authority.

In accounting for divine will, Immanuel Kant suggested that one should not presume that they have received good fortune because God demanded that it be so, for that one individual. Rather, God has the whole universe in mind and one should do as he or she ought and try to the best of one’s ability to live a good life, and God will take care of the rest (Kant, Lectures 94-95). Kant explained that ethics is a “practical philosophy”

and suggested that living this life is possible, not unattainable (Lectures 71). It is difficult however, to reach this perfection, as for Kant, ethics should aspire to include the “highest perfection of social morality” (Lectures 74).

In summary of the metaphors that rise out of the works of these Enlightenment philosophers, as explained by Alasdair MacIntyre, rights and justice can be viewed in terms of their import to a burgeoning society that was on the cusp of an economic explosion of different models of ownership and enterprise. Freedom, reason, property rights, passions, duty, and reason all revolve around the same notion of individual rights versus the ruling classes or bodies. Immanuel Kant suggested it was through education that ethics would be grasped in this changing world that now held on to the sciences because of the proofs they afforded decision making. Turning now toward a modern day discussion of these *philosophes* will be important for the understanding of these metaphors in terms of postmodernity and communication ethics.

The Ongoing Conversation

In their acclaimed text Communication Ethics: Methods of Analysis offering pedagogical case studies for the classroom, James A. Jaksa and Michael S. Pritchard provide a quick read on Kant’s *categorical imperative* and how it relates to deontological thinking in regard to decision making. They explain the differences between the categorical imperative and utilitarianism. Jaksa and Pritchard suggested that Utilitarians consider alternatives, opposed to the categorical imperative, which considers a decision at a universal level, questioning if the decision could be applicable to all (70-95).

As a precursor to the *Critiques*, Immanuel Kant wrote extensively on ethics and morals. Stephen Darwall clarifies Kant’s work on the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of

Morals by explaining how the *categorical imperative* works within ethics. It was Kant's hope that all moral actions would be based on, "principles we can will all to act on and treating rational personality always as an end in itself" (Darwall 145). If one can universally ask all to act as he/she would act within a certain situation, then it is a moral action. All rational beings would act in an ethical way because of the *a priori* of the categorical imperative as being the supreme reason for action. For Kant, Darwall concludes that the most "fundamental moral convictions" a person can have must be "known *a priori*" and that this reasoning comes from a "rational agent" (147). Therefore, communication would need to be between two rational agents who both have a strong moral "character" (Darwall 148) that controls the dialogue and whose actions are based in duty and good will.

Stephen Darwall further explains the difference between Immanuel Kant's type of deontological thought compared to the Utilitarians that followed him toward the end of the Enlightenment and beginning of modern times (see Chapter Five of this work on J.S. Mill, in particular). Darwall explains that Kant put the emphasis on the agent where Mill would have considered emphasizing an action based on the happiness (Darwall 168) found within what Peter Byrne would consider the *teleological* result (86). Byrne further explains that Kant did not base his morality in the form of the authority of a higher power, but in the authority of the agent (153-154). This type of individual autonomy will be considered at length in Chapter Five, as it is considered the root of individualism.

The rhetorical interruption that attacked the scholars of the Enlightened period include science (and math/geometry) and all that Isaac Newton brought to the table. Proof was necessary for any discussion that involved truths. The beginning of the individual as

having a freedom that included an economic basis of protection was on the horizon as land ownership became possible for more than the elite did. Immanuel Kant's views of ethics are used to discuss Voltaire's Candide for the *praxis* portion of Chapter Four.

Historicity—Voltaire

Compared to other philosophers of the Enlightenment, Peter Gay suggests that Voltaire and his writing were steeped in a passion different from others. Gay is of the opinion that Voltaire wrote in defense of others, “words in behalf of a humane code, in defense of victims of legal injustice, in criticism of cruelty, bellicosity, and superstition...” (“Introduction” 16). Voltaire's writing was a critique of the social, religious and economic society that surrounded him in eighteenth century Europe. Voltaire's Candide is a classic novel offering a cynical and satirical view of Enlightenment thinking allowing for a discussion of communication ethics of the history of the eighteenth century as well as today.

Candide is a short text written at the end of the eighteenth century, that allowed Voltaire to anonymously announce his political disrespect for theology and the theory that God will make sure all things come out for the best—in the end. Richard A. Brooks elucidates the connection of the writing of Candide with the philosophical views of 18th century Germany/Europe:

The biting satire of Candide marked the death knell of the German rationalist philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in the popular mind.

The devastating ridicule to which Voltaire subjected Leibniz's philosophy as well as the bitterness evident in Voltaire's fictional masterpiece suggest the personal importance of the controversy for the French *philosophe*. More

significantly, however, the sharp difference in point of view between these two great thinkers may be seen as part of a broad movement of opinion in eighteenth-century thought involving changing religious and social values. Their dispute reexamined a dilemma traditional not only to Christianity but to all monotheisms. (158)

Leibniz was a respected rationalist of the early Enlightenment and a very well known philosopher whose work was eventually used and then critiqued by Immanuel Kant. Voltaire wrote Candide in direct opposition to Leibniz's philosophy.

Andre Maurois explained in his "appreciation" published in the Lowell Bair version of Candide that Voltaire was troubled by the intense optimism of many modern scholars, especially Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (see Candide Translated by Lowell Bair 1-14). Voltaire had seen his share of abuse, war, unjust governmental practices and even banishment from his homeland because of his own personal views. He anonymously authored some of his pamphlets and other works, as "A royal decree of 1757 had restored the death penalty for writers and publishers convicted of attacking religion" (Bottiglia 107). Therefore, Voltaire could not write these views publicly, but under a pseudonym.

For Voltaire, a benevolent god that considered a certain sect his "chosen", and others "not", could not possibly exist. Voltaire wrote about the life that surrounded him in the mid eighteenth century within the text of Candide, as explained by William F. Bottiglia, "His (Voltaire's) central problem is that of human conduct in relation to the somber mystery of physical and social evil" (88). He explicated these nuances of the eighteenth century in his writings of both pamphlets and novels.

The historical background, however, the “external” as Bottiglia refers to it, that affected the writing of Voltaire, were the changes that surrounded Voltaire including:

[. . .] the consequent sense of homelessness or exile; various literary and philosophic quarrels (Maupertuis, Rousseau, etc.); the Seven Years’ War; the Lisbon disaster [. . .]. Metaphysics had become the unknowable. [. . .] Free will had been reluctantly abandoned in favor of determinism; yet optimistic fatalism was dispiriting and repugnant to one who could confront social evil only with programs of reform based on faith in man’s progressive possibilities. (101)

Throughout Candide, the reader will find reference to these issues, especially with the metaphor of exile. Extreme fatalism is obvious from the beginning through to the end of the book, when Candide almost exasperated, capitulated and accepted his fate that they all needed to tend their garden. It is because of the way that Peter Gay refers to Voltaire, as the “representative *philosophe*” for the Enlightenment, that this work considers Voltaire’s novel, Candide to be a model for a discussion of communication ethics within the confines of the historicity of the Enlightenment (The Party 3). One way Voltaire questioned the social, economic, political and religious order around him, was within the dialogue of the novel, Candide.

Different from the prior two chapters of this work, the next two chapters will not delineate an idea outline of the novels based on a chronological explanation. Rather, an explanation of the story will be apparent as a few metaphors found within the texts are illuminated. Because the prior two novels, the Odyssey and the Inferno both had major delineation points (books, or *cantos*) it was more practical to outline the book, and then

discuss the metaphors. However, within these next two novels, Candide and The Plague in Chapter Five, a discussion of the progression of the stories will be intertwined with the discussion of the metaphors that announce themselves as important to the conversation on communication ethics and the rhetorical interruptions of the Enlightenment and Modernity.

Historical Engagement—Candide

The reader is introduced to a young Candide at the beginning of the novel, as he was found to be secretly engaged in a liaison with Lady Cunegonde, who was to become the passion of his life. The problem was that Cunegonde was also the daughter of the Baron who had been kind enough to allow Candide to live in his home. Therefore, Candide was quickly banished by the enraged Baron, for this unscrupulous attempt to seduce the Baron's own daughter. Candide was considered by the Baron to be beneath the Baron's family according to their hierarchical pedigree. Upon his banishment, Candide began a laughable, horrible, outrageous journey that exiled him from his love and his mentor, the forever-optimistic Pangloss who stayed behind (Voltaire 15-16).

Throughout the short comedic novel, frequent and incredibly outrageous mishaps engaged Candide that afforded him the opportunity to question his optimistic teacher as well as meet a pessimistic friend, Martin. The various people Candide befriended turned on him and became enemies or died in the most horrid of ways. When Pangloss, Candide's professor, re-emerged on the canvas, disfigured from syphilis, he told Candide that his beautiful Cunégonde had been raped and murdered during a battle. Candide was of course, horrified, but within a few chapters, Candide heard that, in fact, his love Cunégonde was miraculously alive.

Candide wavered back and forth, on whether all was good in the world or not, as now he was on a mission to find his love, Cunegonde, whose whereabouts were unknown. On his continued travels to find Cunegonde, Candide ran into formidable obstacles, including the fact that Cunegonde had not only been raped, but was betrothed to the governor of Buenos Aires (Voltaire 51). Candide's odd and ironic troubles continued as Candide finally found his one true love but discovered that she is not only being held as a slave, but as a sex slave!

The novel continues to bring its readers on a journey of separation, fate and love. Finally, the characters all arrived together again—old friends and new, to live together as a small community. Though Cunegonde was older and physically deteriorated and had grown “ugly”, Candide still agreed to marry her and live with her forever. The friends grew bored and fought until they fatefully met the “Turk”, a farmer who lead an incredibly normal and dull life, (by a former baron's standards), but all noticed his happiness, as well as the happiness of the family that surrounded the farmer (Voltaire 112). This led Candide to the grand conclusion that all must, indeed, tend to their garden. This novel represents a satiric look at life in the eighteenth century. A few metaphors can be discussed to help explain the changes occurring in the society as well as exemplify the communication ethic of the day.

Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors

Major metaphors found within Candide include discrimination, pessimism, (an almost perverse) optimism, exile, universalism, and an unwavering faith in god vs. evil. Voltaire expanded upon problems and questions raised during the Enlightenment including evil, and how to account for it; religious misconduct (especially by clerics,

themselves), and that god created the best possible world (how could he not?) There are numerous scenes in the book that are gory, yet full of Voltaire's comedic cynicism.

Voltaire had Candide observe the evil experienced by all types of people and watched how those people come to terms with evil in their everyday life. Candide could not imagine how one continued to walk through daily life when faced with such struggles. This is a question of communication ethics.

Discrimination

There is vicious discrimination in the text, especially concerning Cunegonde's brother, Baron Thunder-ten-tronckh. Candide thought that the baron was dead, but miraculously found him masquerading as a Jesuit priest. The two exchanged excitement over finding one another and Candide told the baron that his sister, Cunegonde, was indeed alive. Of course the baron was relieved and excited to hear such news. However, when Candide told the baron he intended on marrying his sister, the baron was absolutely shocked, horrified and outraged.

Even at this stage of the game, after all of the trials and tribulations their family and both men had been through, instead of being happy that his sister would marry a man who was deeply in love with her, the baron was concerned that Candide was of lower status than his family. The baron argued with Candide by exclaiming, "How impudent of you even to think of marrying my sister, who has seventy-two generations of nobility behind her! You ought to be ashamed of yourself for daring to mention such an audacious scheme to me!" (Voltaire 52). Candide countered with the explanation that he saved Cunegonde and his own mentor, Pangloss had always taught him, "that all men are equal,

and I will certainly marry her” (Voltaire 53). They continued to argue and the baron attacked Candide, who, in horror, killed Cunegonde’s brother in self defense.

The differences between the nobility and the commoners were great in the eighteenth century, and it would have been unthinkable for members from two different groups to marry. Candide showed his naiveté when he was shocked by the baron’s disgust and anger. He is a character that did not see the differences in society that were so obvious to everyone else. Candide was that inexperienced character, who wanted to see the good in all, and not believe that the world could have such faults as that horrendous type of bigotry that he was witness to throughout the novel. For instance, the women who were prejudiced toward Jesuits surprised Candide (Voltaire 57).

Another type of oddity was the constant change between a perverse optimism showed by some of the characters (especially the religious) and a very sad pessimism. This dichotomy is now discussed in terms of the various characters who exemplified such notions and how they came to terms with each other.

Optimism/Pessimism

Throughout the novel, Candide often became depressed and pessimistic. However, his mentor Pangloss offered his standard chestnut of wisdom to his pupil, “all is for the best” (Voltaire 16, 19, 27, 82, 87, 101, 106). Though the reader knows that all is not for the best, sometimes bad things happen to good people, the reader can view the novel as outsiders and see that the optimistic Pangloss is there to educate Candide and mentor him to continue through his struggles. Through the character of Pangloss, Voltaire is sarcastic toward the optimistic work of the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, ““I still hold my original opinions,” replied Pangloss, ‘because, after all, I’m a

philosopher, and it wouldn't be proper for me to recant, since Leibniz cannot be wrong..." (107-108).

If one were to be simply pessimistic, it would be easy to give up the fight. However, Pangloss felt it was his duty to move on, and at the same time, move his student forward on life's journey. Therefore, this education continued and within that education and the travels of *Candide*, the reader can find pessimism and optimism fighting each other for supremacy.

As *Candide* went through these various ordeals, in his travels to reach Cunegonde again, as he continued to lose her throughout the novel, *Candide* met Martin, a poor scholar whom *Candide* befriended and asked to join him on a trip to find Cunegonde. To counter-act the optimism of Pangloss, the reader has the character of Martin who gave *Candide* his most pessimistic temperament yet (Voltaire 73, 75, 82). It was during their travels that Martin showed himself to be a pessimist, the antagonist to Pangloss. Martin believed God had abandoned the world.

When *Candide* asks his new friend Martin if there was good in the world, Martin responded, "perhaps so, but I haven't seen it" (Voltaire 73). Martin traveled alongside *Candide*, acting as the foil to *Candide*'s optimism. Even to the bitter end, once the troop of odd friends was finally safe and together, Martin was sure that the world was against mankind and that he just had to be patient (Voltaire 110).

Even with the various forms of pessimism and optimism that *Candide* faced, and listened to, he still suggested at the end of the novel that all they could hope to care for is indeed, their own garden. The idea being that the only way to handle the craziness of the world was by tending to one's own work, and paying attention to only what each person

can themselves control. Because there is so much that is out of one's own control, one should do his/her own part to perform work to the best of their ability, because that is all that can be controlled. Throughout the novel Candide was faced with banishment and that often turned him despondent. However, he always recovered his optimism, and moved forward to his next adventure. He was always in the search for his Cunegonde.

Exile

From the beginning of the novel Candide is immediately exposed to being exiled from the place he knew as home (Voltaire 17). The baron threw Candide out of his home because he caught Candide having a sexual liaison with his daughter, Cunegonde. The baron could not accept Candide as a suitor for his daughter and expelled him from his land. With nowhere to go, Candide found himself in the middle of the Bulgars—men who savagely beat Candide. Again, with sarcastic wit, Voltaire explained the King of the Bulgars saved Candide when he rode to the scene on his horse and inquired as to why the Bulgars were beating Candide. After hearing the story, the king suggested that Candide must be a metaphysician and did not know the way of the world, and could not, therefore, be held accountable for his words or actions (Voltaire 19-20).

Another crazy incident involving Candide and Pangloss occurred when their ship sank on the way to find Cunegonde. They were the only ones, along with a sailor, who had survived, and they safely swam to the shore of Lisbon. Once they were on Lisbon, there was an earthquake (which occurred in actuality), and 30,000 people died. Pangloss wondered out loud to his friend, curious as to what the reasoning would be behind this event (Voltaire 26-27). As with his age of Enlightenment, Pangloss was looking for a reason for such an atrocity. Pangloss attempted to suggest that another

earthquake that happened recently must have been related, and that made him feel as if he was answering his own question. Science could give them an answer in the eighteenth century, where events were constantly questioned.

Once Candide and Cunegonde arrived in South America, the governor wanted to marry Cunegonde and sent Candide off to Paraguay. Once there, he found Cunegonde's brother, Baron Thunder-ten-tronckh, and as mentioned previously, Candide killed her brother in self defense when he became enraged at Candide for still loving his sister. Because of the murder, Candide had to flee. Again, he was in exile, and traveled by land and river to find, in the end, a very rich land, where children threw gold into the streets (Voltaire 58-61). It was in this new land that Candide was faced with what could be called a form of Kantian universalism.

Universalism

During his trip to this new land of Eldorado, a land of Spanish-speaking natives, Candide was accompanied by a guide named Cacambo, who was able to translate and communicate with the natives. Candide requested that Cacambo ask the leader of the elders if they practiced a religion. The leader was shocked by the questions, asking if Candide thought they were "ingrates" to not have a religion. The leader was confused; questioning Candide as to if there was more than one god (Voltaire 62).

Candide also lent an ear to listen to the tales the leaders of Eldorado were telling about their great land, where there was no need for prayer, because the inhabitants of this land had everything then wanted. Instead, they constantly thanked god for what had been provided to them. Candide responded that all should travel, the way he had been able to do recently, in order to learn about all of these different ways of life (Voltaire 63).

Candide also referred to the strangeness of other lands, but stated that it was because he never left his hometown before, and this was the only way he could refer to these new endeavors—only as “strange” (Voltaire 39).

This recognition of difference and desire to travel to learn about other cultures is reminiscent of a sophistic way of thinking in ancient Greece, realizing that ideas are relative to various cultures and values, which is what Alasdair MacIntyre alluded to (as stated above) when he suggested the Enlightenment was influenced by sophistic and Hobbesian thinking. Belief in god and various types of religions were also confusing in the West, ever since the Reformation brought Protestant thinking into the mix with Christianity. Voltaire also used Candide as a vehicle for his discussion on religion of the eighteenth century.

God/religion

Voltaire uses various forms of religious men as characters or disguised characters throughout the novel in interesting and sarcastic ways. There were a few disguised men including Candide disguising himself as a Jesuit priest in order to flee a country after a murder (Voltaire 53). However, once Candide came upon people who could help and feed him, it was only after he took off his robe and explained that he was not a Jesuit that they were willing to offer him assistance (Voltaire 57). This showed that the men changed suits based on their needs as well as on the intolerance of those around them.

Voltaire had other characters finding themselves in trouble including the “old woman” who was the daughter of a pope, yet she lived through horrifying turmoil, including being raped (43). There was also a Franciscan Friar who was blamed in the

seduction of a young woman (Voltaire 89), and Candide was cheated by men, who are only identified as “the Jews” (Voltaire 110). Obviously, Voltaire was mocking the religious and religion of the eighteenth century, as there were many scandals within religious institutions in those years.

The way that Pangloss’ optimism is expressed, the teachings he offered Candide and that he internalized, seems to be a form of religious expectations that God will take care of all— “all is for the best” (Voltaire 16, 27, 101). They also believed the earthquake at Lisbon sprang from an angry god and attempted to sacrifice humans for the sake of the angered god, of which Candide and Pangloss were victims (but, of course, neither died, as they seem to each have the seven lives of a cat). Kant explained in his Lectures on Ethics:

There are people who ascribe each individual occurrence to God’s special providence and say that God has showered benefits and happiness upon them, thinking themselves in this to be God-fearing. They believe that this is to be religious. They believe that respect for God consists in assuming that each and every thing has been individually, specially and directly ordained by Him. ... We must do what is in our power; we must do what we ought; the rest we should leave to God. That is true submission to the divine will. (95)

Though Kant believed in a Supreme Being, a God, he suggested one must not be ostentatious enough to assume that things happen for them because God wanted those actions to occur specifically for that individual. One should submit one’s self, as Pangloss did, to say, ‘things just happen’ and find a happy medium between optimism and

pessimism, a form of “meliorism” (Bottiglia 101), suggesting that individual effort is necessary for an enhanced civilization.

So, the metaphors of optimism and pessimism, exile, universalism and evil/religion and how they are engaged within Candide offer a glimpse into Enlightened thinking, for good or bad, that was engrossed in the scientific and economic battles of a new era. In terms of communication ethics and standpoint theory, depending on where one stands within a community, whether a social group, a family or a religious community, effects how communication is offered from one person to another, as well as to the group. Having Pangloss, for instance, act as the eternal optimist was indicative of his philosophical background and religious training. Julia Wood explains:

Standpoint theory contributes to our understanding of diversity by highlighting how social locations and the conditions, opportunities, and understanding entailed in them shape individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and communication. Although not denying individuality, standpoint theory insists that membership in socially defined groups substantially constrains ways of knowing and acting in the world. (11)

Wood also explains that there is a benefit that comes from diversity, and that is what was found in the Enlightened era, a multiplicity of voices, from the scientific, religious and economic communities that affected the communication of people finding themselves within unfamiliar groups.

The hero, Candide, continued to trust in his teacher and mentor, Pangloss, who was always suggesting that things (sometimes-evil things) happen for a reason, because God deemed it so. Therefore, Candide should have accepted the outcome with a light

heart and move on with his life. Candide continued to be lectured by various characters in the book, who explained that daily happiness as well as misfortunes was all God's doing, and therefore, all would be well with the world. This type of optimism that Voltaire criticized is visible in Immanuel Kant's Lectures on Ethics.

In his Lectures, Kant asked what we should do, based on our duty. (Critique of Pure Reason). Voltaire would also agree, as Bottiglia explains, through his emphasis on how Voltaire ends Candide and how we can interpret the metaphor of the garden. Candide recommended to his group of friends, with varying degrees of expertise in varying fields, that they should move to "cultivate *our* garden" (Voltaire 113). Thus, the goal for Candide was to form a collaborative effort that was for the good of the community (Bottiglia 104). Could it be suggested that this is a type of categorical imperative? What is good for all is the teleological end? Voltaire's words can be seen to be a response to Gottfried W. Leibniz, who, as T.K. Seung explains, refers to God suggesting that, "He creates the best of all possible worlds" (2). The metaphysical optimism of many philosophers was what Voltaire's words responded to throughout most of the text of Candide.

Alasdair MacIntyre understands the utopian nature of Kantian ethics and is concerned that decisions were separated from the background of the "social order" surrounding the moral code of the day (Short History 198). However, Kant's ethics are still useful today, as they allow one to use personal judgment in the face of daily living. It is not a god who banishes people. Instead, people banish people. It is not a god who sends an earthquake; it is the natural environment of our earth. How the community handles the consequences of that earthquake is what makes people a community.

Summary

Enlightenment philosophy and issues need to be discussed in order to observe the contemporary significance of the issues profoundly delineated by Kant and fancifully exposed by Voltaire. Ethics matters, of course, but, whose ethics and are they bound by a supreme being? Both Voltaire and Kant would consider the explanation that morals and ethics need to come from within the individual, themselves. Some of the characters in Candide believed that the various atrocities and evil that surrounded them (war, death brought on by earthquake, poverty...) were results of people's actions upsetting their god.

Susan Neiman's timely book, Evil in Modern Thought ends with a chapter dedicated to the discussion of America's fateful September 11th, "Where failure to get to work becomes a way of saving one's life, our sense of powerlessness becomes overwhelming" (282). Originally drawn to Neiman's work because of her discussion of Hanna Arendt's Banality of Evil, it was an equally interesting surprise to also read her comparison of the earthquake in Lisbon (that Voltaire wrote about in Candide), to Auschwitz and 9/11 (Neiman 281-288). Neiman suggests that just as the people of Lisbon were unprepared and caught by complete and total surprise, so were those who lost their lives in the World Trade Center, Pentagon & Shanksville, PA on the morning of September 11, 2001 in the United States. Sometimes there is not an answer, but the enlightened *philosophes* wanted one!

William A. Galston explains that Kant understood Enlightenment thinking, but wanted to counter those thoughts by explicating that it is only through human effort that evil will be quieted (73). In explaining Kant's position on evil, Galston explained that it is through "improving ourselves" that we can counter evil (74). In Postmodernity, we

love to blame everyone but ourselves. Dialogic communication is necessary in order to attempt to live life to the best of one's knowledge and abilities and then only can one seek to deter evil in other's lives or various areas of the world.

Alasdair MacIntyre is still concerned that Kantian thinking is not prudent for today's social structure as it does not afford the ability to live within a social order:

But the consequences of his doctrines, in German history at least, suggest that the attempt to find a moral standpoint completely independent of the social order may be a quest for an illusion, a quest that renders one a mere conformist servant of the social order much more than does the morality of those who recognize the impossibility of a code which does not to some extent at least express the wants and needs of men in particular social circumstances. (Short History 198)

The rhetorical interruption—that of science usurping religion, turned ideas upside down and people's way of thinking inside out during the Enlightenment. Tradition was being questioned. Those finding themselves struggling with questions of faith and ethics during the Enlightenment had scholars such as Voltaire and Immanuel Kant explaining in poetic and analytic fashions, how best to continue to live their lives. This is where modern scholars begin, coming out of the throws of scientific theories and in the beginning of a capitalistic world.

Chapter Five: Modern Ethics and The Plague

In what does the unity of an individual life consist? The answer is that its unity is the unity of a narrative embodied in a single life. To ask 'What is the good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out that unity and bring it to completion. To ask 'What is the good for man?' is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in common. [. . .] The unity of a human life is the unity of a narrative quest. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 218-219)

The world had changed. Capitalism began to see the light of day in the United States, World Wars I and II were on the horizon and the industrial revolution changed the west in ways that are more revolutionary than revolutions themselves. Science had proven itself, but, now, people wanted more—more for themselves. Ethics were discussed in terms of how to determine the good for the individual rather than the community or other institutions. Alasdair MacIntyre explains that there was no longer a universal where ethics resided (Short History 268) but instead, a world of individuals with their own view of a moral way of life:

Eighteen-century English moralists and nineteenth-century Utilitarians write from within a society in which individualism has conquered. Hence they present the social order not as a framework within which the individual has to live out his moral life, but as the mere sum of individual wills and interests. (267)

An implication of the lack of universal ethics, MacIntyre cautions, is that Modernity has made it a necessity to be attentive to who and what ideas one includes within their circle of influence. Not only do we have to choose the people, we also have to choose the tenets by which we will live our lives and by which we judge ourselves and others, as these characteristics and tenets are no longer considered pre-determined nor are they universal to all groups.

Introduction

In discussing modern moral philosophy, Alasdair MacIntyre explained that, among others, John Stewart Mill, Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, and John Dewey pondered the understanding of the good and the definition of knowledge, “We are thus brought to ask what states of affairs are good, what kind of things ought to exist for their own sake” (Short History 249). Yet another rhetorical shift had occurred, as the Enlightenment had ended, and questions were surfacing again in what is now termed the Modern age. Not that there are specific dates of demarcation that specifically define these various periods, however, it is this period, the end of Enlightenment philosophy and the beginning of Modernity, that will be examined in this chapter. The end of the eighteenth and nineteenth century way of thinking and the beginning of the twentieth century demarcated the end of the Enlightenment and the beginning of Modernity.

In describing the end of Enlightenment thinking as it related to universal morals, Clifford G. Christians explains:

The Enlightenment version of common morality has been preeminent in the European and North American context since the 18th century. Determined to remove all external authority except human reason, the

Enlightenment celebrated advances in science and politics founded on rational consent. But now, the curtain is coming down on 300 years of Enlightenment modernity. The foundations on which universal norms were built have eroded. (“The Ethics” 4)

The beginning of individualism led the way toward agency and choice-making being emotivistic in nature. The Western tale of Modernity offered a choice between a moral vocabulary that dates back 4,000 years to Aristotelianism or a rival individualistic ethical stance that was conceived as a response to the Enlightenment and came to define Modernity.

This chapter will attend to the historical moment of the end of the Enlightenment and the beginning of Modernity, discuss the scholars/philosophers that Alasdair MacIntyre wrote about in Short History of Ethics in terms of modern thinking, and address the metaphors that emerge from their work that speak to the period. These metaphors include duty, obligation, happiness, intuitionism, Utilitarianism, hedonism, good, and emotivism. The chapter will end with a discussion of the novel The Plague by Albert Camus, as a useful form of communication ethics *praxis*.

John Herman Randall, Jr., suggests that Immanuel Kant allowed the thinking of modern times to go forward on its own, without the need for scientific evaluation:

We do and must act from a sense of moral obligation, we do and must feel a religious reverence for something in the world greater than ourselves, and we do and must respond to a beauty in things that cannot be scientifically explained. Hence, since we can neither prove nor disprove by the methods of science that we must choose the right rather than the

wrong, that we are free so to choose, and that the universe is governed somehow by a moral law. [. . .] Where science can neither prove nor disprove, we are justified in having faith. (413)

Therefore, the end of the scientific mode and the beginning of the individual who has faith either in him/herself, in religion, or both is now apparent! Turning now to Alasdair MacIntyre's discussion of those writers and thinkers who authored the bridge from the Enlightenment to Modernity the way of writing can be viewed as the philosophy regarding the cusp of the Enlightenment that led the assault into modern times.

Alasdair MacIntyre follows a true lineage of scholars in his final three chapters of A Short History of Ethics, discussing the Utilitarians, the Reformists and the Idealists up through modern day scholars (early twentieth century) including John Stewart Mill, Henry Sidgwick G.E. Moore and John Dewey. Though the twentieth century brought countries around the globe into world war conflicts, MacIntyre only traces the modern turn through its zenith in the early and middle twentieth century and does not discuss ethics and morality past the 1930's in A Short History of Ethics. However, MacIntyre explains the beginning of emotivism and its influence on modern thinking, "Perhaps in some such reaction to Moore lies one of the seeds of emotivism. Moore himself staked everything on the appeal to objectivity" (Short History 257). MacIntyre explains the lineage of thinking and aligns each scholar within a context of the categories suggested above. MacIntyre begins the discussion on Mill by explaining Mill's following of Jeremy Bentham's philosophy of Utilitarianism.

John Stewart Mill: Happiness, Institutions

From a young age, and because of his father's persistence and insistence, John Stewart Mill (1806-1873) was a Utilitarian scholar. Mill's father was a student and follower of the work of Jeremy Bentham who is especially known for his philosophy of Utilitarianism. Bentham suggested that choices are made by individuals because of two guiding principles, pleasure and pain. Thus, Bentham's hedonistic thinking as related to an, "individual as exhibiting a natural, rational self-interest--a psychological egoism" (Sweet 2001) was purely emotivistic in nature. Vernon E. Cronen explains in communication ethics literature that with the measurement of one's pleasure or pain, Bentham would conclude that,

Policy could be assessed by calculating its consequences, not for society as an organic whole, but as a kind of arithmetic in which increments of pleasure and pain are calculated for each individual and then summed across individuals, thus 'privileging' the individual. (25)

Bentham, then, would quantify the good or bad that came from the pleasure or pain so that individuals could make decisions based on those outcomes.

John Stewart Mill became a prolific writer in the support of the liberty of the individual. MacIntyre explains Mill's philosophy of Utilitarianism, for which Mill is most famous, "He, like Bentham, treats pleasure as a unitary concept" (Short History 236). Mill became known as a Utilitarian who suggested that happiness was the end to which all action strove. According to Alasdair MacIntyre, using the original work of Jeremy Bentham, Mill advanced the idea of the greatest pleasure and happiness for the public good, especially in publicly sponsored institutional settings (Short History 237).

However, MacIntyre points out that using happiness as a criterion for decision making could be “morally dangerous” because it is a slippery slope to traverse since people can make many a pleasure seem to be for the good of the whole when, in fact, it does not endure itself to any standards of proof. Consideration should also be given to who or what characteristics are used to determine standards, against which to compare competing claims, for offering the greatest good for the greatest number.

In A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre explains some of the problems with J.S. Mill’s proof and use of happiness as a criterion for the greatest good. He also suggests that one of Mill’s main critics was G.E. Moore who disagreed with the premise that one would know that pleasure is in fact desired by the public. However, for MacIntyre, it is understandable why the Utilitarian criterion was useful in Modernity as, “The individualism of modern society and the increasingly rapid and disruptive rate of social change brings about a situation in which for increasing numbers there is no over-all shape to the moral life but only a set of apparently arbitrary principles inherited from a variety of sources” (Short History 243). So, the Utilitarian way of life made sense for a society where the individual was paramount and decision-making resided in the self, based on what is good for the self and made the self happiest.

J.S. Mill was also an advocate for women, as he brought a Women’s Reform Bill of 1867 to the British House of Commons (IEP “Mill”). This was at the end of his career and a few years before his death. He believed that women had the right to hold property and not give away her rights because of marriage. In terms of ethics, Mill suggested that men made up the rules and that women were forced to be subservient and that there was no other ethical reason for women not to have the same rights as men. Mill was in favor

of women's right to vote and having equal rights within a marriage. Writing around the same time as J.S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick was also considered a Utilitarian with a hedonistic tendency.

Henry Sidgwick: Egoism, Hedonism and Intuitionism

Though Alasdair MacIntyre does not dwell on the work of Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900), MacIntyre does suggest that Sidgwick's writings "haunt" the writings of those who come after him (Short History 244). Writing in a time of incredible change, in his 1874 tome Methods of Ethics, Sidgwick offered a unique position on moral concepts, looking specifically at the three conceptions of egoism, hedonism and intuitionism (Rawls v-vi). Alasdair MacIntyre explains that Sidgwick was effected by his own rejection of the Christian faith which he had once embraced (Short History 243).

In John Rawls' forward to the seventh edition of The Methods of Ethics he suggests that Sidgwick gives us the first academic work of moral philosophy investigating moral conceptions (vi). Sidgwick has an "important place" in the utilitarian tradition/doctrine which holds that, "the ultimate moral end of social and individual action is the greatest net sum of the happiness of all sentient beings" (Rawls v). Sidgwick's method of ethics included "...any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought'—or what it is 'right' for them—to do, or to seek to realize by voluntary action." (1). Therefore, if happiness is what people are striving to achieve, being self indulgent and egoistic is a way to make sure one is fulfilled, but not concerned with others' happiness. Sidgwick also offered a prescriptive and rhetorical approach to ethics, seeking to persuade people to follow his method of oughts.

For Henry Sidgwick, the two methods which take happiness as the ultimate end included “egoistic hedonism (egoism)” and “universalistic hedonism” (11, 411). When given a situation with a choice of two items, an egoist will choose the one that offers a greater pleasure over pain (Sidgwick 121). For Sidgwick, these pleasures and pains are quantitatively measured (123). Sidgwick suggested that Bentham taught universalistic hedonism as “Utilitarianism” (11) which takes into account everyone who will be affected by the happiness afforded by the hedonistic act(s) (411). Therefore, the Utilitarian has the duty to ensure the improvement of the moral order (Sidgwick 476). In this sense, it seems that Sidgwick could have been considering the happiness of a group instead of just the individual, as that duty he discusses is not just duty to oneself, but duty to be concerned for the moral order of all.

Alasdair MacIntyre explains that a few nineteenth century philosophers such as T.H. Green and F.H. Bradley considered “good” in terms of the society in which one lives, but they used a form of metaphysics that allowed them to ask these questions, and Green and Bradley were in the minority as far as this type of thinking was concerned (Short History 244-248). But, looking at the beginning of the twentieth century and the early cusp of modern times, the successors of the philosophies of Green and Bradley, “were to write as if morality and with it, moral philosophy existed apart from all specific social forms” (MacIntyre, Short History 248). Thus, this work turns to what is agreed upon as modern moral philosophy and specifically, the work of G.E. Moore.

G.E. Moore: Good

Alasdair MacIntyre asks questions about the kind of things that ought to exist for their own sake. G.E. Moore (1873-1958) would suggest that the goods that should indeed

exist should be those which are “intrinsically good.” However, there is a problem in attempting to understand what good means as Moore considered good “indefinable” and he also suggested that good “cannot be the name of any complex whole” (MacIntyre, Short History 249, 250). Moore explained in Principia Ethica that good is not causal and therefore is indeed “indefinable” (22). This would seemingly go against what Henry Sidgwick suggested, since Sidgwick believed that goods are quantifiable (123). Moore’s work contested the work of hedonists, and criticized the work of J.S. Mill (MacIntyre, Short History 251).

Within his seminal text Principia Ethica, G.E. Moore disagreed with J.S. Mill’s naturalistic argument for hedonism (70-74), and criticizes Mill’s philosophy found within Utilitarianism (108) explaining, “Egoism, as a form of hedonism, is the doctrine which holds that we ought, each of us, to pursue our own greatest happiness as our ultimate end” (96). Therefore, Moore views Mill’s utility as a form of hedonism that, though quantifiable, was not a form of ethics that was intrinsic in nature, as Moore felt a person would understand ethics intuitively.

According to G.E. Moore, ethics investigated assertions about that property of things which is denoted by the term ‘good,’ and the converse property denoted by the term ‘bad’ (36). Moore suggested “[. . .] the fundamental principles of Ethics must be synthetic propositions, declaring what things, and in what degree, possess a simple and unanalysable property which may be called ‘intrinsic value’ or ‘goodness.’” (58). Moore criticized naturalistic ethics, “theories which owe their prevalence to the supposition that good can be defined by reference to a *natural object*. [. . .] no intrinsic value is to be found except in the possession of some one natural property, other than pleasure [. . .]”

(39). He also criticized evolutionary ethics, as proposed by Herbert Spencer. “Evolution could hardly have been supposed to have any important bearing upon ethics” as Moore argued, “The influence of the fallacious opinion that to be ‘better’ *means* to be ‘more evolved’” (58).

Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that G.E. Moore had two kinds of followers: those who were intuitionists and those who were occupied with identifying what was definable as inherently good. Moore explained that the highest value can be placed on the pleasure found in human intercourse and beautiful objects (MacIntyre, Short History 256). MacIntyre criticizes the homogenous nature of those who followed Moore—the intuitionists, as they were a group of like men who already agreed on the premises. Then what they announced as good, would be agreed upon quite easily (MacIntyre, Short History 257). MacIntyre also suggests that Moore’s values subscribed to the private rather than public form of life and, “exclude all the values connected with intellectual inquiry and with work. Moore’s values are those of a protected leisure, though it is in what he excludes rather than in what he does value that the parochial and classbound character of his attitudes appears” (MacIntyre, Short History 256).

Alasdair MacIntyre suggests in both Short History of Ethics (257) and After Virtue (his follow up to A Short History of Ethics), that Moore’s work was a precursor to emotivism, which MacIntyre attributes to Moore’s pupil, C.L. Stevens (After Virtue 12, 17). MacIntyre posits that Moore’s philosophy is incredibly defective, due in most part to Moore’s premise that good is indefinable. MacIntyre disagrees and considers Moore’s treatment of ethics “faulty” (After Virtue 16). Perhaps one fault of good’s indefinable

character is connected to the question of what good excludes and its private rather than public character.

Emotivism is defined by Alasdair MacIntyre as the “doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are *nothing but* expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character” (After Virtue 12). This sense of individualism enabling one to make judgments based on the good for oneself is what MacIntyre believes to be the downfall of modern moral philosophy. MacIntyre laments the loss of good for society and the focus on the individual in Modernity. Though, by the end of After Virtue, MacIntyre does explain that he has hope for the future as all virtues are not lost in Modernity. However, MacIntyre emphasizes that we are indeed at a “turning point” and can maintain our civility (After Virtue 263).

Alasdair MacIntyre briefly mentions John Dewey in A Short History of Ethics and simply notes that Dewey is as far away from G.E. Moore as he can be on the subjects of means and ends when it comes to satisfying one’s purpose(s). Dewey did not separate means and ends, but believed they were interrelated. “Dewey concentrates on the agent, while Moore concentrates on the spectator. Dewey almost obliterates the distinction between fact and value, between *is* and *ought*, while Moore emphasizes it” (MacIntyre, Short History 253). In generalizing and explaining the philosophers that followed Moore, MacIntyre suggests that these men were intuitionists who carried on “the philosophical appeal to what we all are alleged to recognize in moral matters” (Short History 256). As stated above, MacIntyre does not see the philosophy of the intuitionists as helpful, since,

conceivably, one should already know how to act, and therefore, ethical behavior should simply be inherent to one's decision making process.

Intuitionists

Alasdair MacIntyre continues his chapter on modern moral philosophy by explaining the scholarly lineage of philosophers who worked with the same type of material as G.E. Moore did. However, MacIntyre is quick to point out that they worked with the philosophies independently of Moore. These scholars all considered the “treatment of *good, right, duty, obligatory*, and the rest of the moral vocabulary as though it was a coinage of permanently fixed values and simple scrutiny” (MacIntyre, Short History 254). However, MacIntyre further challenges the problem with the thinking of intuitionists, by explaining that they “suffer from one difficulty: they are, on their own view, telling us only about what we all know already” (Short History 254).

E.F. Carritt and H.A. Pritchard both followed the work of G.E. Moore and are considered intuitionist thinkers. Carritt was a “critic of utilitarianism” and his work was noted in a paper by H.A. Pritchard in 1912 (MacIntyre, Short History 254). Pritchard suggested that duty should not be treated analytically, but rather, duty should just be something that is not questioned. Therefore, duty cannot “be supported by reasons” (MacIntyre, Short History 254). Alasdair MacIntyre points out that both men had critics in A.J. Ayer and R.G. Collingwood in that they attacked Carritt and Pritchard, “for their lack of historical sense, for their tendency to treat Plato, Kant, and themselves as contributors to a single discussion with a single subject matter and a permanent and unchanging vocabulary” (Short History 255). As the Enlightenment was left in the

shadows of modern times, it can be seen that the vocabulary was changing to be more individualistic. Thus the modern dilemma.

The Ongoing Conversation

Vernon E. Cronen offers his theory for communication ethics in his book chapter entitled, “Coordinated Management of Meaning Theory and Postenlightenment Ethics” where he discusses his work as it relates to the phrase used by Alasdair MacIntyre, the *Enlightenment project*. Cronen gives credence to communication in the process of ethical development as he suggests that “a rational basis for the critique of moral orders can be developed from the perspective of communication as the primary social process” (24).

The questions addressed during Modernity concerned the individual in response to science and modern society. Coming out of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, where God and religion were taken out of the equation to the point of accepting only what could be proven via scientific inquiry, Modernity was left with the individual and the loss of,

[. . .] social dominance. We know that there were important socioeconomic developments contributing to the new sense of individuality too. Probably these developments started with the reopening of commerce in the 12th century and the later rise of the bourgeoisie; a new class was not defined by its relationship to a place on the land or to a place in the socioreligious hierarchy. (Cronen 25)

Cronen does point out that there were some philosophers who did not agree with the prominence given to agency, including Kierkegaard. But, Cronen further explains that this new group of intellects allowed for a new class of people that were not visible in

early times. The new economic life of the Post-Enlightenment period also had an impact on the precedence given to individuals and individualism, “Concurrently, economic changes seemed to require liberating the ‘new’ persons, giving them the power to come and go and do business, powers not granted by the feudal political system” (Cronen 26).

In his synthesis of communication ethics scholarship over a 50-year period during the twentieth century, Ronald C. Arnett suggests that there are five main themes running through these works. Three of the themes he considers to be in the public realm, (“democratic, universal/humanitarian, and codes”) and one in the private realm (“contextual) (Arnett, “Scholarship” 58). Therefore, Arnett suggests only one theme, that of a “narrative ethic attempts to go beyond this public/private dialectic with a creative synthesis” (“Scholarship” 58). Counter to what G.E. Moore purported about private versus public values, Arnett would suggest that a communication ethic can only be manifested when contrived within a socially agreed upon narrative that has communal impact and support. Rhetorically, this type of agreement is powerful and binding, in that all are in agreement and it is difficult to change. But, it is still, indeed, fluid and can change over time as stories change.

According to Samuel M. Edelman the story of the Jewish *refugee* held high rhetorical significance in the middle to late twentieth century (165-173). Edelman explains the use of the face of the refugee as a metaphor for loss of homeland, as the Israelis who were prisoners themselves and/or lost their home during the war were hoping to be reunited with a home, post-World War II. The imagery of a refugee as suggested by Edelman is a valid segue to enter into the world of Albert Camus’s The

Plague, as this work suggests that those who were spurned by the plague became exiled, for many reasons which will be explained in the following pages.

Just as Edelman's Jewish refugee was ravaged by World War II, Albert Camus witnessed the same peoples devastated by a regime that was uncontrollable for many years in the mid-twentieth century. The Plague is a valid entry into communication ethics of the modern era, as Camus explores the relationships of people within a common narrative of a community whose world was turned upside down. There is a connection between refugees and those scarred by the plague of Modernity who become shallow and homeless themselves, as the metaphors of Camus' book demonstrates.

Historicity—Camus

Looking at the novel by Albert Camus, The Plague represents a world that had fragments of its population experiencing deprivation, while other fragments of the community were waiting to experience the worst they could imagine. A metaphor for the Nazi's war on humanity, The Plague was written on the cusp of World War II. Camus penned The Plague during and while he witnessed Nazi Germany's attempts to deprive the Jews of not only their homeland, but, their lives. Camus himself was exiled, having to flee Paris since he was a member of the underground resistance (Lottman 237-240). Camus knew what it felt like to be different, as characters that lived in Oran were different once the plague descended upon their town.

Historical Engagement—The Plague

The narrator in The Plague offered the reader a bird's eyes view of the deprivation the people of Oran, a French port in Algeria, experienced during a plague that descends upon their town in the year 194_ (Camus 3). The plague appeared slowly, over a course

of a few weeks, sickening and eventually killing various townspeople. Once the news was spread, and the medical establishment decided to announce that it was indeed *a plague* that had befallen Oran, the town deteriorated into a sheltered, almost forgotten city of citizens walking through life in a daze. The unfortunate and ironic issue for the people of Oran was that once the plague settled and the issues of the plague became a part of everyday life, the townspeople eventually went about their business just as they had before the plague. The death that hovered over the city did not change the drab nature of the town's being as it was before the plague came to town. However, the plague did reveal some tendencies that may otherwise not have been realized.

From the beginning of the novel, the reader is not aware of the identity of the narrator, as he or she is not named or announced until the end. However, Dr. Bernard Rieux seems the likely candidate, as he would have had the information at his disposal to be the narrator (Camus 6). But, the reader is not sure until he identified himself in the end. Dr. Rieux was at odds with so many issues throughout the text, that it is interesting to view the events in Oran from his point of view. He was the doctor who first diagnosed the possibility of the outbreak of the plague and encouraged the town's Prefect to declare the plague. Tarraou, a character who wrote a journal throughout the ordeal noted in his writings that the narrator used a form of historical dialogue. This is why the novel, The Plague, offered a glimpse into not only the time and place setting within Oran, but what the people were feeling, and discussing during their most hideous of days during the plague.

The narrator explained that rats rose up from their normal dwellings underground, beneath the shadows, and began to be noticed—dead in the streets. Within days, Dr.

Bernard Rieux realized that a few of his patients, formerly dying from causes unknown, were really dying from a form of plague. It was incredibly difficult for the government officials to come to consensus and finally declared that a plague had indeed been identified. Such an announcement, as one could imagine, would bring dreadful consequences for the city. The Prefect of the community begged to know from Dr. Rieux if the doctor really and truly thought the plague had descended upon the town. Finally, after thirty deaths per day were being reported, the Prefect closed the town gates (Camus 59).

The scene at the gates showed the townspeople shocked into the realization that it was the beginning of the end for the town. They were about to enter a time warp or sorts. They were being held in a community where nobody could come nor go, where no communication could be exchanged with the outside world. Going forward in Chapter Five, then, the novel will be explained through the window of major metaphors that emerge from the novel offering connections to communication ethics and the philosophy of the scholars of the day.

Philosophical and Rhetorical Implications of Metaphors

Deprivation that leads to hedonism

When the gates are closed and the townspeople are incredibly troubled by the fact that not only could they not exit or re-enter, their communication with others had found the same fate. One of the major metaphors Albert Camus raised in The Plague is that of deprivation. The reader can see a communication deficiency in many forms, including the deprivation felt because of the closing of the gates and the townspeople being “cut off” from the outside world.

The people of Oran lost touch with the outside world. A few hours before the plague was announced the sentries closed the gates of the city to prepare for the onslaught of people requesting to leave for various reasons (Camus 62). Letters were not even allowed to be written and sent to the outside, for fear of spreading the disease. The narrator explained that the townspeople were reduced to writing short telegrams with predetermined phrases.

In addition to facing such a horrible, untreatable disease, the people of Oran lost the ability to communicate with loved ones or friends and acquaintances. This type of everyday communication is something one might take for granted as an ethic of communicative reciprocity. In modern times, one expects to be able to contact friends and vice versa, without much interference, if any at all. When this normal ability to communicate is taken away, by force (as with the law in Oran) or by one's own neglect of "keeping in touch," a noticeable void can be felt.

If it is an unconscious decision to stop the contact, perhaps because of laziness or lack of caring, the sting of the decline or loss of the friendship does not seem to hurt as much. Or, there may be a personal, intentional and deliberately conscious decision to end a friendship, which can be very difficult on the psyche! It is fun and exciting to begin a friendship, but, to make the decision to end a friendship, or maybe even more difficult, a love affair, could affect the very core of one's being. But, at least the individual is making the decision; whereas in Oran, the townspeople had lost the opportunity to converse and keep in touch because of a plague for which they did not ask. It was not their decision to be deprived of communication to those outside of Oran.

The narrator suggested that the deprivation enacted by the plague led to suffering that was twofold. The first was the suffering of the victims themselves, trapped inside the city walls, and the second being the families left behind, outside of the city (Camus 64). Not only did the plague affect the citizens who made their homes in Oran, but, also the travelers to Oran were deprived of their homes (Camus 67). Even if a member of the community was not a victim of the plague in terms of the physical—mentally, all were victims. Those caught behind the city walls before the announcement of the closing of the borders were victims, whether citizens, visitors, or not.

Therefore, we find Rambert, a journalist who had the bad luck and misfortune to be in town on assignment, for another, unrelated story. He was trapped when the gates were closed. Thus Rambert became a witness to a completely different story—the story of the plague. Rambert could not return home to the woman he loved and Albert Camus showed us how this young man handled his absence away from his beloved as Rambert began to create a new life for himself amongst his new found acquaintances that included Joseph Grand, Jean Tarrou and Dr. Rieux.

This deprivation led to a type of hedonism, as it seemed as if the townspeople wanted to laugh in the face of evil, daring the plague to strike them directly. The people would head out to the cafes to eat and drink as Tarrou explained in his description of a day in the life of Oran, “Most of them seemed determined to counteract the plague by a lavish display of luxury. Daily, about eleven, you see a sort of dress parade of youths and girls, who make you realize the frantic desire for life that thrives in the heart of every great calamity” (Camus 110). The people are not worried about spending, either, as they buy lavishly, including wines at lunch and great meals.

Tarrou also noted that, “once these people realized their instant peril, they gave their thoughts to pleasure. And all the hideous fears that stamp their faces in the daytime are transformed in the fiery, dusty nightfall into a sort of hectic exaltation, an unkempt freedom fevering their blood” (Camus 111). The narrator does not discuss if this hedonistic tendency was or was not apparent before the plague, however, it seems that the actions of the townspeople were different. The possibility of eminent death can play with how one acts in both public and private. The sense of deprivation was intense at the beginning of the plague, but dwindled with each passing day.

Numbers

One of the quirkiest characters in the novel was Joseph Grand. Because of his idiosyncratic desire to have words and numbers perfectly correct, and because of his professional and then volunteer work with the government, Grand was always anxious about the numbers related to the plague. Grand worked as a clerk in the Municipal Office for the local government, but volunteered for Dr. Rieux and the plague “staff” to keep track of these numbers, spending his personal, free hours in the evening, pouring over the figures, ensuring their accuracy. Grand’s infatuation with the numbers (number dead, number with the disease, number quarantined), is quite like the Nazis and their incredible penchant for orderliness and keeping of lists (Wiesel 43, 68).

This list making can keep one from thinking about the real death that surrounded them; mindless tasks that allowed one to look like he or she is really doing something, and not being ordered to put others to death (Nazis) or sitting around waiting for death to occur (a plague). Hannah Arendt described Adolf Eichmann’s banality of evil in this way. At the beginning of the rise of the *judenrein*—to have the Reich not inhabited by

Jews, or to be rid of the Jews (48)—Eichmann was stationed in Vienna, Austria. Eichmann's contention was that he was simply involved in a form of the "political solution" (41). Since the Zionists with whom he worked were interested in having the Jews return to Israel as their homeland (American-Israeli Cooperative Initiative, 2002), from Eichmann's personal view, he was assisting the Jews in their desires while also serving the German state. Therefore, he was a helpful government official!

By 1938, however, it was decreed that the Jews had (no more hopes for assimilation and therefore had) to leave Austria, and Eichmann was incredibly successful in the orderliness of this campaign. He was happy with his results, even devising an easier format for completing less paperwork during the deportation process. It was absolutely shocking to Hannah Arendt that Eichmann was so "unrepentant" (52), but she also understood his point of view, as he was part of the "aura of systematic mendacity that had constituted the general and generally accepted atmosphere of the Third Reich" (52). They used numbers to forget.

Hannah Arendt explains that those in the bureaucratic offices of the Nazi party deluded themselves with the thoughts that sending the Jews to the concentration camps was an *administrative* or *economic* duty. This detachment from emotional discussions and feelings allowed the men to unceasingly continue with their work. Arendt suggested that Adolf Eichmann and the like were not demons, but men who were proud of their work and had strong feelings for their German statehood.

It is easier for the government worker, the military man or the doctor to be absorbed by the importance of 'the numbers' as long as the names of those with the disease, those on the extermination list, or those already dead from the plague, were not

names recognized by these professionals. Dr. Rieux even explained that he only felt a bit uneasy about the early deaths. When one deals with death and disease on a daily basis, it is easier to not have feelings about the dead.

In explaining the history of plagues and the possible number dead in the thirty plagues throughout written history, Dr. Rieux suggested to his friends the reason behind his lack of empathy, “But what are a hundred million deaths? When one has served in a war, one hardly knows what a dead man is, after a while. And since a dead man has no substance unless one has actually seen him dead, a hundred million corpses broadcast though history are no more than a puff of smoke in the imagination” (Camus 35). So, does teaching history have an effect on students of war? Of plague? How do these numbers affect the reader? Is the doctor correct in suggesting that history will continue to play itself out, and people will not change their patterns of behavior or communicative ways because of a calamity? It seems that men and women will make it possible to continue on in light of a struggle, and find ways of coping, both publicly and privately. They will find ways to ‘go on’ as many people suggest after a death in the family or a crisis. One must continue to live and cannot give up hope; that would be against the human condition.

The radio stopped announcing weekly totals, and simply began reading daily numbers of those who had succumbed to the plague. Tarrou guessed that it was because “‘they fancy they’re scoring off it because a hundred and thirty is a smaller figure than nine hundred and ten’” (Camus 104). People teased themselves into believing what they want, if the numbers make sense. The unconscious heard the 130 figure, which did not sound as bad as 910. One can fool oneself by believing what they want to believe and

only listen to what they want to hear. Through rhetoric, one can persuade the public to believe numbers that in one way, or another, are more or less important than they truly are. This type of persuasion can be seen as governmental propaganda, which is controversial in any age.

An incredibly ironic comment came from Dr. Rieux, and the reader cannot tell if it was said sarcastically or if he was serious, and his sympathy for the dead had really gone by the wayside. The discussion centered on the manner in which the corpses were being handled. The narrator explained that they had run out of coffins, and were reduced to re-using the same five coffins over and over again. After depositing the dead in the cemetery, the sanitary squad would return to the hospital for more bodies. The narrator suggested that “This system worked excellently and won the approval of the Prefect” to which Dr. Rieux replied, “Yes...And though the burials are much the same, we keep careful records of them. That, you will agree, is progress.” (Camus 158). Progress! This is what the gentle doctor is reduced to! Forgetting that he is talking about dead bodies that just a few short days prior were live bodies.

The victims of the plague did not ask for that type of death; they did nothing wrong to deserve that death. Yet, the doctor that treated them was thinking of the progress of taking care of their dead bodies instead of hoping for a cure! What the Nazis considered progress, and what the Allies considered progress were obviously two different consequences. Grand, Dr. Rieux and the Nazis were factual, they were counting, and ethically, they were performing their job. They took orders, and they fulfilled them. Can they, therefore, be held accountable for their actions? How they treated people in their daily communicative interactions was normal, they thought, but, was it ethical?

Within their own stories and broader community narratives, they were ethical. However, these systems were obviously competing systems of ought. Where then, does evil come from, if both sides think they are acting ethically?

The narrator took on the role of philosopher when he suggested that evil comes from ignorance:

[. . .] and good intentions may do as much harm as malevolence, if they lack understanding. On the whole, men are more good than bad; that, however, isn't the real point. But they are more or less ignorant, and it is this that we call vice or virtue; the most incorrigible vice being that of an ignorance that fancies it knows everything and therefore claims for itself the right to kill. The soul of the murderer is blind; and there can be no true goodness nor true love without the utmost clear-sightedness. (Camus 120-121)

As Hannah Arendt attributed Adolf Eichmann's actions to that of a banal mind, so to does the narrator of The Plague when he suggested that a murderer's ignorance comes from thinking he or she knows everything, including having the right to kill, as Hitler felt he and the Nazis were doing right. Justification of murder was done by an ignorant form of logic.

Another way to view the metaphor of numbers is within the world of our tragic hero, Grand. The number of days, weeks and years that Grand spent on the writing of his book was staggering, and he never got very far in his accomplishment of finishing the opening sentence, let alone the whole book itself. Grand explained to his new friends, that he has been writing and working on his book for many years. However, the tragedy

of his character is that Grand only worked on his opening sentence by constantly changing the wording, trying to get it just right. Not only could he not write well, though he so wished he could, but in everyday life Grand could not find the right words to speak within normal conversations.

The real tragedy was that Grand could not write within his “leisure” (Camus 41-42). Many people try to reach a goal or attain certain achievements, but it is how one goes about obtaining that goal that can be considered ethical. What made Grand happy was his work. But, he was incredibly frustrated, because the paths that he chose, government work and literary writing, were not suitable to his talents.

In terms of numbers, one never knew who was “next” to catch the dreaded disease and have his or her life cut short by the plague. In addition, even if a citizen of Oran was not currently sick, they could be a carrier of the disease, so suspicion was prevalent. Therefore, they felt the need to quarantine victims’ families. A native of Oran, Tarrou was a shadowy character who knew the comings and goings of all the townspeople, and knew where to find assistance for those willing to “pay,” for escape, he was looked upon with suspicion because of his connections and unethical uses of those connections. Tarrou constantly questioned if the plague was not, in fact, around them always, not just now. He suggested that the suspicion aimed at him was itself akin to a plague, a blight that was inescapable.

A citizen of Oran would never know if they were next to fall physical victim to the plague and be dead within the week. One did not know if their brother, sister, mother, neighbor was carrying the disease and would possibly spread the disease unknowingly. Explaining the situation in the town’s jail, the narrator told how living in a community, in

close quarters, such as those living in jails or monasteries had a higher chance of catching the death sentence.

But, it did not matter who you were, “The plague was no respecter of persons and under its despotic rule everyone, from the warden down to the humblest delinquent, was under sentence and, perhaps for the first time, impartial justice reigned in the prison” (Camus 153). This sentiment can be traced as an analogy to war-torn Europe and how Albert Camus viewed the Nazis. The Nazis kept their prisoners in camps that were eerily similar to those described in The Plague. There was not any justice found in the concentration campus, just as it was unjust when a victim fell to the plague. There was no rhyme or reason as to why the plague attacked a healthy person.

Loss of sympathy and habits

The narrator commented on the congeniality of the neighborhoods before and after the outbreak of the plague. Before the plague, neighbors were friendly and talkative as they sat on doorsteps and visited with each other. Once the plague was forced upon them, everyone stayed indoors, as the narrator discussed the hardship of reacting with sympathy to the groans of those affected by the disease. If one should start to turn from their neighbor, the citizen’s heart could become cold—but, what else could they do?

It is difficult to be empathetic or even sympathetic, because the distraught one may feel can be overwhelming. So, a citizen of Oran would grow cold to their neighbor because it hurt to feel that sympathy. “But under the prolonged strain it seemed that hearts had toughened; people lived beside those groans or walked past them as though they had become the normal speech of men” (Camus 103). The narrator discussed how defeated the people of Oran became when they could no longer remember the faces of

their loved ones. Their memories were starting to fade, and they forgot the face of the other, “Not that they had forgotten the face itself, but—what came to the same thing—it had lost freshly substance and they no longer saw it in memory’s mirror” (Camus 164). It began to become difficult to even talk about their own family members, the pain was so real. They had forgotten the face of their loved-ones and their memories were fading. This can lead to more despair than the plague itself. When a family member dies, one longs to remember their face. The narrator explained in The Plague that the townspeople were losing so many, so quickly, it was difficult to remember the faces of those who passed before them.

As the plague continued on, the citizens of Oran became more and more quiet. They did not even bother to tell their neighbor about their pain of separation, or their loss, since all were involved. It was useless. There was no consoling the other, since they were all (pre-)occupied in the same horrific dream. There was no empathy to be dispatched. They fell into a habit of not feeling, “this precisely was the most disheartening thing: that the habit of despair is worse than despair itself” (Camus 164). The deprivation of the townspeople took on many forms and caused great loss and, eventually, exile, another major metaphor Albert Camus uses in The Plague.

Exile

The townspeople felt exiled in their own homes, for a few reasons. One, for fear of going outside and possibly contracting the disease and second, if they had a family member who had the disease, the rest of the family stayed inside so as not to spread the disease. Being an exile in one’s own home is oxymoronic and incredibly difficult to maneuver. Being exiled among friends and family, when a group decides it is going to

ostracize an original member of the group—that feeling of being ‘left out’ and not with the crowd, is a disastrous feeling of exile.

Eventually, the city could no longer handle its sick and dead in the hospitals and morgues. Oran also needed to house its quarantined citizens—those whose family members were diagnosed with the plague—in one convenient and large enough place so that others might not be infected. Therefore, bodies were sent to a crematorium as the town could no longer handle individual burials. If a family member was infected with the plague, the rest of the family was forced to stay at the stadium where a makeshift community home was established, as a form of shelter, in order to keep family members in quarantine. The people ordered to live in the stadium found themselves in this form of exile, suffering a (mentally) painful death themselves, as they were isolated from the rest of the world (Camus 217). Their only sin—being related to a victim of the plague. “Thus the first thing that plague brought to our town was exile” (Camus 65).

Though there was plenty of time for those quarantined to mourn the loss of their loved ones to the plague, Tarrou suggested that those in exile decided to think about how to escape the stadium instead. It was easier to think of these plots instead of the plots in which their family members were buried. The scenes described by the narrator at the stadium and crematorium were horrifically reminiscent of the death camps organized by the Nazis during World War II. The stadium can be envisioned as the death camps where living souls discussed amongst themselves the plans for escape and the concern for when the next batch of deaths in the crematoriums would occur.

And thus there was always something missing in their lives. Hostile to the past, impatient of the present, and cheated of the future, we were much

like those whom men's justice, or hatred, forces to live behind prison bars.

Thus the only way of escaping from that intolerable leisure was to set the trains running again in one's imagination and in filling the silence with the fancied tinkle of a doorbell, in practice obstinately mute. (Camus 67)

With this quote in mind, one could almost imagine that that narrator, Dr. Rieux (Camus) is speaking of the Jews and others imprisoned by the Nazis during their stays at the concentration camps. How would they talk with each other and sustain their spirits? They had each other, and nothing else. Therefore, how they communicated was imperative to the sustenance of their relationships with each other.

In one of his sermons during the early part of the outbreak, Fr. Paneloux said that the plague came as punishment for sins that Oran somehow "deserved" the descending of the plague upon their community (Camus 87-91). Throughout history, this has been a problem with organized religion, trying to explain-away a terrible tragedy. The thought that somehow, the adoring god, who gave the earth to its inhabitants given life, would rip it away with a contagious plague as a form of penance.

The priest's sermon in The Plague is reminiscent of what happened post-September 11th in America. On a nationally syndicated television show in September 2001, Jerry Falwell, with Pat Robertson concurring, suggested on the *700 Club* that the perpetrators attacked the United States because of gays and the abortionists "helped make this happen" as a form of penance for those sins (*700 Club* transcript). Death does grab people by the subconscious and makes one question and wonder how to continue on with living, for those left behind, life is different. But, to suggest that a benevolent god would strike down a community is unconscionable. Though religious leaders have their place in

times of calamity, blaming does not offer a communicative ethic to allow the followers to change their actions in the future.

A form of hedonism, trying to be happy for your own sake, no matter what the cost to others, was seen a few different ways during the plague in Oran. First, the people who were trying to make it out of the city, no matter what the cost, were only concerned for themselves. They wanted out, at any price, whether to escape the plague, or to get back home if they were not originally a citizen of Oran. Second, those in exile easily fell into hedonistic tendencies. Many visited the cafes as explained above. The reader, then, can see some hedonistic tendencies of the doomed people of Oran, within their communicative practices, especially with the way they acted with and toward each other. Those who still went to the restaurants and bars in the evenings could be considered hedonistic.

However, some would say that sanctioned people, such as the citizens of Oran, needed to continue on with how they normally lived, so that they did not go crazy—from boredom or from worry. It is often discussed in the media or even in one's personal life, about families who say events should go on soon after a death in the family, because that is "the way" the deceased family member "would want it" . . .to continue on with life. Others worked for the good of the *polis*, such as the sanitary group who assisted with the removal of bodies from their homes/hospitals to be taken to the cemetery. But, many in Oran were concerned with themselves.

So, was it emotivistic tendencies that led to the deprivation felt by the people of Oran, which then eventually led to hedonistic actions? Or, are people who are faced with such a demonizing agony allowed to find happiness any way possible and not be fed by

individualism? The philosophers outlined in this chapter, Moore, Mill, Sidgwick and Dewey work toward happiness as a good. The people of Oran wanted to continue with their lives as they had been, before the plague. They were happy, at least they thought so!

Knowing intuitively that a decision is ultimately going to produce happiness and be a good, does not seem to represent how the people of Oran pre-and post-plague acted. They did act by the numbers, however, being rational in their thinking and understanding. They enacted a type of utilitarianism that allowed for their hedonistic actions. However, it is the metaphor of the person in exile that most exemplifies the modern period, both philosophically and practically.

Summary

The scholars of the modern world were experiencing a new type of progress at an incredibly fast pace that effected social, political, and economic life. In delineating the major metaphors that come from the final few chapters of A Short History of Ethics, this fifth chapter outlined the moral vocabulary of duty, obligation, utility, emotivism, hedonism, happiness, and good. These metaphors resonate with scholars of the late nineteenth century and very early twentieth century outlined above. There are many communicative implications for these metaphors as they relate to communication ethics.

Because Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that virtues have to be understood in terms of the life that surrounds oneself, the modern person finds him/herself left with an individualism that does not have an understanding of a “social life which the tradition of the virtues requires, a kind of understanding very different from those dominant in the culture of bureaucratic individualism.” (After Virtue 225). Therefore, communication can be set outside the standard if one does not situate oneself within a tradition.

Communication could then be met with hostility and misunderstanding if one, or neither side, is rooted within a framework where they can go for understanding.

What does this mean for modern communication ethics? “All this of course does not entail that the traditional moral vocabulary cannot still be used. It does entail that we cannot expect to find in our society a single set of moral concepts, a shared interpretation of the vocabulary” (MacIntyre, Short History 268). Alasdair MacIntyre wants his readers to understand that it is not useful if members of modern society continues to act individualistic and emotivistic and expect to be understood by the other. Therefore, the groups that find themselves bound to a tradition need to be open and listen to others and work toward the understanding of the others’ traditions. This can happen via ethical communication through stories told based on the narrative within which people work and live.

Chapter Six: The Rhetoric of Story-Laden Communication Ethics

Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted anxious stutterers in their actions as in their words. Hence there is no way to give us an understanding of any society, including our own, except through the stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. (MacIntyre, After Virtue 216)

Until one is turned away from the past, and rounds the corner to the present, it is difficult to recognize differences within a current historical moment in which one is co-present. Once there is distance from the moment, then the discordance can be recognized based on the anticipation of the concordance that was no longer apparent (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 21). Therefore, only now can we look back upon these various periods to discuss what the rhetorical interruptions were. Some of the philosophers discussed in the previous chapters were able to see the discordance within a close time frame of the concordant acts, but, it still required a ‘looking back upon’ to determine that a shift was occurring or had occurred. For instance, Immanuel Kant’s work was based on the realization that science was indeed going to be the new eighteenth century “god term”(to borrow Richard Weaver’s term for progress in Modernity) (212), and Kant’s philosophical work on reason went forward knowing that he needed to recognize science as the first principle of his day.

Alasdair MacIntyre understood this difficulty of reading the current moment in time when he said, “When I speak of a historical narrative I mean one in which the latter part is unintelligible until the former is supplied, and in which we have not understood

the former until we see that what followed it was a possible sequel to what had gone before” (Short History 91). Therefore, it is with the understanding of historicity that this work looks back at the embedded metaphors of communication ethics found within historical novels in the present of that particular period (Ancient, Medieval, Enlightenment and Modern) with an eye on the anticipated future. As Postmodernity continues, communication ethics can be informed by the philosophies coming from these historical periods. Communication ethics can effect, as well as be found within, the story of a group in Postmodernity.

Introduction

Jacques Le Goff criticizes the periodization of the Renaissance, suggesting the Middle Ages “endured from the third century until the middle of the nineteenth century” (The Medieval Imagination 10). His point is to suggest that some historians will separate dates to define periods for various reasons, including economic disturbances, civil unrest and religious revolutions. Le Goff posits that these termed periods are more “illuminating than others” but, they are useful, none the less, for defining certain time frames for points of discussion. Realizing that these time frames are not perfect, this work has delineated four time periods based on Alasdair MacIntyre’s philosophical communication text A Short History of Ethics.

The four periods discussed in the proceeding chapters included Ancient Greek ethics, Christian ethics during the Medieval period, Enlightenment ethics and Modern ethics. Each of these chapters is summarized below with a discussion of their import to the study of communication ethics in a postmodern historical moment. These periods all have something in common; a rhetorical interruption that occurred and shaped a period of

change and confusion, if not frustration. This work reviewed those interruptions to determine where communication ethics fits into the equation and how these ethical theories and practices are used to inform communication. Virtue contention and the dismissing of tradition brought the West into the postmodern world.

Alasdair MacIntyre follows an Aristotelian path in his work that suggests virtue is integral to a good life. Ronald C. Arnett points out that though MacIntyre was concerned that our postmodern sense is experiencing a virtue crisis, previous periods have also dealt with these issues, and ours is not the first. “In chronological terms, this is a new chronological moment in history, but the historicity of virtue contention is not novel” (Arnett, “Freire’s” 163). These shifts in the narrative fabric of living life occurred many times in the past and this work reviewed four of those times, in attempting to discuss how “we address virtue contention in this historical moment?” (Arnett, “Freire’s” 163). Times exist side by side and one can learn from history.

Synthesis: First Five Chapters

Based on the preceding chapters, witnessing a “call of conscience” (Hyde 78) throughout history can offer lessons in communication ethics when the rhetorical interruptions become apparent. In retrospect it can be realized that something became dramatically different within the society that once existed. It is difficult to recognize such a shift while one is in the middle of a narrative disruption (i.e. science’s challenge to Christianity/transcendental reasoning in eighteenth century West), but, there was discordance that surrounded these various narratives.

Because of the need for a call of conscience in time of narrative disruption, one would use rhetoric to call the ‘Other’ and interrupt. The communicative interruption has

to be ethical if one is going to call on another and have them trust the caller. A communicative turning to the Other then occurs as a response. Hyde suggests that it takes courage to respond (77-78), because the dissonance could make one uneasy for fear of what is ahead.

In ancient Greece, the vocabulary of morality was tied to justice, and the role one played within the stories to which they belonged created a sense of tradition. In the Christianity of the Middle Ages, the vocabulary was tied to the Gospels, both Old and New Testaments, and how one could serve God and his commandments. In the Middle Ages, there was also a rhetorical shift as to the recognition of the composition of the audience, which found Christians working to include the poor and disenfranchised. During the Enlightenment the vocabulary of morality shifted to science since God's existence was in question. In Modernity, the movement from the universal to the individual began to offer a new moral consciousness to the average person. The individual then became the hallmark of morality. What was good for the needs of one man, the self, became crucial in ethical deliberation. Traditions were dismissed and agency became central. Within the historical moment of Postmodernity, one needs to determine the type of moral vocabulary that he/she will use. Therefore, the vocabulary should be tied to a story within a narrative that makes sense for the ground upon which one stands. Traditions are being revisited and again embraced.

Chapter One

At the beginning of this work, Chapter One explained the various periods that were going to be used in order to discuss temporal philosophies in the West. The concept of using novels for a *praxis* orientation for communication ethics was also explained, and

the next four chapters were used in exemplifying the import that fiction can indeed have on the education of communication ethics within a historical moment. By deciphering and explaining rhetorical interruption within the historical context of these periods, communication ethics can be announced and discussed as one is surrounded by temporal glimpses into the historicity of the various eras.

The idea of a quest for a unity of life is explained by Alasdair MacIntyre as the “unity of a narrative quest.” (After Virtue 219) One may fail or succeed on this quest, but, the only way to know if a life is a failure or a success is by attempting such a quest. Key features of a conception of quest include two ingredients. First, the need for a conception of a *telos* (a variety of ends or goals) to begin a quest is necessary. Second, in the course of a quest, one may encounter dangers and harms but these episodes provide the goal of the quest. “A quest is always an education, both as to the character of that which is sought and in self-knowledge.” (MacIntyre, After Virtue 219) For the novels discussed in this work, each main character was on a quest, trying to answer question for living the good life. Chapter One, then, explained what was to follow in Chapters Two through Five, a discussion of rhetorical interruptions found within historical narratives and the quests in which the main characters found themselves.

Homer had Odysseus working toward his ultimate goal of returning home. After a long battle and being lost Odysseus wanted to see his wife and son again and rule his kingdom of Ithaka. In Dante’s Inferno, the Pilgrim wanted to understand the after life. He took a terrifying journey through hell so that he could go back and understand how to live the good life within a Christian presupposition of God. Voltaire’s *Candide* was constantly trying to find his love, Cunegonde, even after many ordeals and mishaps. Once *Candide*

found her and decided to spend his life with her and his new friends, Candide suggested they all tend to their garden. Finally, Camus's Dr. Rieux was trying to take care of his sick patients, dying of the plague. The doctor/narrator was searching for not only a cure, because there did not seem to be one, but, a cure for how to live during, as well as after, their travesty was over. Chapter One paved the outline for chapters Two through Five, Two beginning with the ethics of Ancient Greece.

Chapter Two

In discussing the Heroic society of Ancient Greece, Chapter Two began with what Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as the "pre-philosophy" of Homeric poetry and the understanding of the roles to be held by men within their families and society for the good of the *polis* (Short History 5-13) The discussion moved to Sophistic rhetoric and then to Socrates and Plato who offered a universal *a priori* for the notion of the good. Then this work proceeded to Aristotle's view of the virtues and justice when he offered an understanding of the good for the *polis*. Homer's Odyssey was then discussed as a form of *praxis* for communication ethics. How families passed oral and written traditions through the generations was important for values to be understood from one family, town, and culture, to the next.

Throughout the Odyssey there was a view of a universal understanding, where there was an agreed upon narrative by which all could share and live together. There was a communicative ethic where everyone was in agreement on the offering of hospitality to strangers. To be a good host was virtuous, because one was being kind to those who were in need. For Plato, only philosopher kings were able to understand the higher level of knowledge and be able to teach the young. But, for Aristotle, acting just to achieve the

good life, via wisdom and courage, was a teleological idea that was practical in daily living. Aristotle was able to use Plato's philosophy of ethics in a more humble manner for use by all people, not just the educated and wealthy.

The Odyssey discussed the effort Odysseus put forth in order to return to his home, and his wife and son. This ethical poem reflects the time before the rhetorical shift and changes in Athenian society. It was only after the Sophistic period and the looking back upon history that Plato performed in his philosophy, that the discordance was recognized against the concordance of Homeric life. The rhetorical interruption, then, was the relativity of the implications of travel and the non-Athenian ways of living life. The ancient Greek philosophy Alasdair MacIntyre discussed in A Short History of Ethics then proceeded to the works of Christian thinkers and writers including Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. The traditions of the Church replaced the tradition of the *polis*.

Chapter Three

The discussion of Medieval Christianity in Chapter Three offered a glimpse into the beginning and end of the long period of history often referred to as the Middle Ages. This chapter offered a sense of understanding about the history of the time when Christianity began to rise, and then eventually fall at the end of those 800-plus years. Saint Augustine of Hippo offered the postmodern reader an opportunity to witness confessing as a form of communication ethics, a rhetoric that was, "the temporal lifeblood of the proclamation of God's Word through preaching" (Troup 2). Augustine's concern in the Confessions about not wanting to interpret the Bible incorrectly, or lead his flock astray was a serious worry for him, as he did not want to mislead them. Augustine was converting and preaching to a people who he described as, "[. . .] proud.

They have no knowledge of Moses' opinion at all, but love their own opinion not because it is true, but because it is their own" (Confessions 264). Augustine was worried about the truth and being truthful in his communication to his followers within the Christian Church.

Over 800 years later, St. Thomas Aquinas opened up the Aristotelian tradition to a European Christianity on the verge of schism, as just a few hundred years later in 1517 Martin Luther posted his *95 Thesis* that led to the creation of the Protestant religion. Aquinas Christianized Aristotle by adding the idea of sin and disobedience to Aristotle's original theories. Sin was an action that violated the Ten Commandments and was considered a form of disobedience. Alasdair MacIntyre explains Aquinas' thoughts on disobedience based on Aquinas' writings in his *Summa Theologiae* "Each particular act of disobedience is a consequence either of a corruption of reason by the force of some passion or of bad habit or of some undisciplined natural tendency" (Whose Justice? 181 [from S.T. I-IIae, 94,4]).

The decision to be disobedient comes from the choice of the will to be evil or do good. It is only through "divine grace" that one can reach for that good and this is where Alasdair MacIntyre argues that Aquinas integrated the teachings of Paul with "Augustine's psychology" alongside Aristotle's (Whose Justice? 181). Within the next few decades, Dante wrote from within the same Christian tradition as Aquinas when he penned his famous epic, the Divine Comedy.

Dante wrote the Divine Comedy while in exile from his home in Florence, Italy, at the beginning of the fourteenth century. Scholars believe this poetic epic was written sometime between the years 1307-1321 (Schwartz 1). Dante wrote the book in Italian,

not the Latin of the day, and therefore, the book was not taken as seriously as it would normally have been at the outset of its writing. Chapter Three of this work focused on the first of the three books within the Divine Comedy, that of the Inferno. The metaphors found within the Inferno that have relevance to communication ethics include justice and confession.

Chapter Four

Though Alasdair MacIntyre discusses at length some of the philosophers who wrote at the cusp of the Middle Ages and throughout the time now known as the Renaissance, it was the philosophers of the Enlightenment during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and Immanuel Kant who is given the esteem by MacIntyre. Kant's philosophical account of ethics, among other transcendental philosophies is still discussed today in the form of his categorical imperative. The categorical imperative was Kant's suggested test by which to measure decisions, in an effort to universalize ethical action (MacIntyre, Short History 197).

The philosophy as well as the scientific reasoning of the Enlightenment offered the capability to those who wanted to take away the power from the Church, with the assumption that humans could engage in moral judgment separate from a narrative. Therefore, the importance of the individual is apparent as the Enlightenment led toward modern thinking. "Because of their problematic consequences in our own time, many now reject the assumptions of the Enlightenment" (Dupré, Introduction *xiii*). The traditions of the *polis* and the Church were now questioned and eventually dismissed in modern times.

Metaphors that were illuminated within the work of Thomas Hobbes, Benedict de Spinoza, John Locke and David Hume included freedom, passions and property rights. Following the Reformation, these men were involved in a shift of power from the Church, to the state, to individual landowners. What the individual wanted was beginning to become paramount and how people communicated with their sovereigns became the impetus to revolutions in Europe and the new America. Political pamphlets were distributed in mass, and salons began to offer the elite thinkers, Voltaire being one of them, an opportunity to discuss and plan future forms of resistance to their governments.

Voltaire's satirical short comedy, Candide, was written near the end of the eighteenth century. Candide was a commentary on what Voltaire witnessed in the form of a perverse optimism by the religious as well as the corruption of the government. Other metaphors that shed light on the time period included the universal and exile. Voltaire's work was on the heels of another rhetorical shift that occurred with the change in economic structures and the wave of individualism that began to take over the West.

Chapter Five

Chapter Four offered a modern view of communication ethics by explaining the major philosophers that came out of Kantian Enlightenment thinking which led to the beginning of modern thinking. Men such as the Utilitarian John Stewart Mill wrote on the greatest happiness as the means to the end of a good. Henry Sidgwick's ethics forged an understanding of hedonism and egoism. G.E. Moore's Principia Ethica suggested that one should attempt to obtain the good but, he did not define the good, as for Moore it was, "indefinable" (MacIntyre, Short History 249). These philosophers all wrote at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, prior to the great wars that were

witnessed by Albert Camus, the author of the novel The Plague that is discussed at the end of the fifth chapter.

Albert Camus offered a first-hand account of what it is like to be exiled both figuratively and metaphorically. The world had experienced a war as they had never known, on a grand and massive scale. Camus wrote during this time and immediately after World War II. Even before the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Plague still had significance as our world is trying to deal with various types of genocide on an international level. The current relevance of this novel is fascinating, considering the United States is two years into a war that continues to carry with it an uncertainty about its impetus for invading Iraq, as well as the overall goals of the military campaign. How we discuss the war and the war effort is an interesting facet for today's student of communication ethics as they find themselves in the potentially limitless confines of a Postmodern world.

Consequences for Rhetoric of Story-laden Communication Ethics in Postmodernity

Because of the multiplicity of narratives found not just within the West, but also the world, rhetoric is a persuasive communicative effort that should be ethical in nature, especially in Postmodern society. In order to better understand various standpoints and communicate across cultures, it is imperative that ethical communication be considered in all rhetorical ventures. Whether political, social or religious, economic or familial, situations need to be textured with the history that surrounds the moment.

Therefore, historicity is important, so that an event is not carved out in chronological order, but put into relief (Ricoeur Time, Vol. 2 61-99). Paul Ricoeur would

suggest that one needs to respond to a multiplicity of emplotments (Time, Vol. 2 73) and Ronald C. Arnett would suggest one needs to respond to the agreed-upon historical moment (Dialogic Confession 29). Therefore, rhetoric and story-laden communication ethics have significant importance for our current postmodern moment.

This work contributes to the scholarship of communication ethics in a postmodern moment because the postmodern narrative is a multiplicity of narratives that must be understood within an ethical climate. The novels outlined in the previous chapters offer the postmodern student an understanding of the implications of communication ethics through a story by which to understand the historical moment within which the narratives were written. Ronald C. Arnett explains Paulo Freire's work in using story-centered communication ethics in teaching literacy to the illiterate people of Brazil and Chile ("Freire's" 489-490). By linking a "communication style that shapes his story-centered communication ethic," Arnett explained Freire's significant contribution to pedagogy of literacy (491). Because of postmodern "contention over virtue and power disparity," (Arnett "Freire's" 492-493) communication ethics that are story-centered are important for mutual understanding.

Finally, communication ethics scholars have the opportunity to associate their work within a broad range of material with communication departments sitting in the middle of an interdisciplinary mix of course work and programs. There is also an opportunity for collaboration with other academic departments in current day colleges and universities. This diverse academic opportunity will benefit the work of the academician as they work toward assisting students in comprehending and appreciating the theoretical underpinnings of communication ethics.

The teaching of communication ethics in higher education has been on the rise since Thomas R. Nilsen first published Ethics of Speech Communication in 1966. Clifford G. Christians and Edmund B. Lambeth researched the “status of ethics instruction in communication departments” in 1996 (236). Almost 40% of communication study programs were teaching communication ethics. As this teaching proliferates, scholars have an obligation to discuss, for instance, how rhetoric enables one to persuade within ethical dialogue, and how ethical communication on an interpersonal as well as mass media level is imperative.

Rhetoric

Philosophers of communication ethics should not separate communicative, philosophical nor ethical theory from the *praxis*. This work has suggested the use of historical novels as opportunities for the teaching and understanding of an historical viewpoint and the type of dialogue and metaphors that emerged within these various periods. These metaphors can assist in examining this postmodern period and in assessing the communication ethics that need attended to now. “In abstracting certain characteristics of the [historical] sequence, and thus lending it an ideal character, we acquire a method for noting similar sequences embedded in quite different historical processes. And in noting similarity we may also note differences” (MacIntyre, Short History 93). It is differences that were discussed in the preceding chapters—the rhetorical interruptions, the discordant.

As Paul Ricoeur consistently explained throughout Time and Narrative Volume 1, one can only recognize the discordant if very aware of the concordant (21, 31, 70-73). The differences assist in the understanding of the changes within a community, as well as

understanding of judgments made. Ricoeur explained St. Augustine's concept of the present, "he [Augustine] sees discordance emerge again and again out of the very concordance of the intentions of expectation, attention, and memory" (Time, Vol. 1 21). Therefore, ethical rhetoric is necessary to debate where the future is headed, as well as how and where the future could or should turn. For Ricoeur, attentiveness is action specific, within the historical moment. The expectation of action has a teleological component and memory is based within a community where an opportunity for change is always present.

Within Aristotle's text Rhetoric, Paul Ricoeur noted the difference between Aristotle's notions of probability and acceptance. For rhetoric, one can find the "acceptable" within the concordance of the persuasive speech (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 9). To do this, one has to tell a story that is probable and acceptable and has a sense of completeness to the story.

In discussing ancient Greek society and the effect of rhetoric on the *polis*, Alasdair MacIntyre explains how politics worked during the times from Homer to Aristotle. Rhetoric had to be employed ethically in convincing the populace of what was right and wrong, but it was easier in Homeric society when roles were understood and duty was carried out in order to fulfill those roles. Ethical rhetoric is crucial for Postmodernity as conflicts on an international as well as personal level surface. Understanding the other is crucial in a persuasive campaign. Both interlocutors are responsible to the other for communicating, both verbal and nonverbal forms. The rhetoric of postmodern communication needs to have multiple ethics for multiple stories corporately agreed upon and find their way into an overarching, perhaps petite, narrative.

Story-laden Communication Ethics

By reviewing historical theories and novels, this work discussed the *praxis* orientation of communication ethics. This work offers the one looking back upon history an opportunity to determine if ‘doing that’ again makes sense or not. The question brought to these texts includes determining what the rhetorical interruption was during that period. What was changing, from one society to the next can be viewed through the eyes of these novels, which were written at the beginning or end of the four eras discussed in the preceding chapters. By reviewing historically based novels, written during the period, about that moment in time, one can see a civilization that explains its culture via how it speaks, acts and reacts to each other.

The Greeks thought the gods were responsible for what happened in their lives. If evil existed, it was because the gods deemed it so. The Christians felt there was an after-life and therefore, they had to live the good life as a means to that heavenly end. Because of science and an emerging reliance on property rights, the Enlightenment questioned god and believed everything happened because nature intended it to, scientifically speaking. The modern man was an individual who was able to decide his own fate and future, independent of the stories and narratives around him.

It is interesting to observe that many great epics—and Homer’s and Dante’s (not to mention Virgil’s) are excellent examples of this point—often appear very late in the cultural moment that they hold up for our examination. There’s often a sense that what the poem is most celebrating is under a certain strain, under threat, and that the forces which will overthrow it are already gathering strength. [. . .] This phenomenon has led

to a saying to the effect that the greatness of a particular culture finds its most eloquent expression at the moment of its passing away. (Johnston 1)

Paul Ricoeur considered Augustine's rhetoric a rhetoric of disruption, as Augustine was always searching for the discordant in life (Time, Vol.1 3) and the element of disruption. Conversely, Aristotle's was a rhetoric of agreement, as he was situated within a greater sense of order within the *polis*. Ricoeur's discussion on narrative is crucial for the final section of this work, because he values the worth of metaphors that open the horizon of significance for an idea and narratives that organize meaning.

Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and story

Paul Ricoeur is an important philosopher to turn toward in the final chapter of this work, as his Time and Narrative Volumes 1, 2 and 3 focused on the two ideas of narrative and metaphor. Both of these concepts were relied upon throughout this work and Ricoeur explained their import as two concepts woven together to elucidate how events are pieced together to form a plot that tells a story that makes sense to its audience. A narrative organizes, and for Ricoeur, ethics places subjects before actions. Therefore, for one to speak ethically, the language must be thought about first. Consideration is crucial for ethical communication.

Ricoeur used the philosophy and philosophical theology of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas as a guiding principle throughout his work in Time and Narrative Volume 1. Ricoeur wove together Aristotle's sense of emplotment and Augustine's sense of time (Time, Vol. 1 5-51). The discordance discussed above in relation to Augustine and his rhetoric of disruption is used by Ricoeur throughout Time and Narrative, Volume 1 to explain his work on narrative. Ricoeur suggested that concordance encourages a

sense of completeness where discordance is only recognized because one knows something is missing from the normal concordance to which one becomes accustomed.

Without narratives in Postmodernity, one would live in a highly individualistic world. This does not mean the narrative has to be an overarching universal. Our world has come to realize in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, that a universal or universals are no longer possible in a world of multiple narratives, as well as first principles. First principles assist in explanation as they take one back prior to the issue, and help set the agenda. Stories within a narrative present the “followability” for a narrative (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 149). Narratives provide the structure within which ethical communication can flow and provide meaning to life.

In the past few chapters, this work discussed the “doing” of *praxis*, the doing of communication ethics. How does one do communication ethics in a postmodern world? For Paul Ricoeur, the “doing” involves a narrative with a plot where characters are involved in events surrounded by a historical moment (Time, Vol. 2 48-55). Following this system makes narratives understandable and intelligible to others. In Postmodernity, one can engage the good by engaging the plot of a story one is either a member of, or within which one wishes to become a participant.

For Paul Ricoeur there are multiple rights, but there are still things that are wrong within stories and narratives (Time, Vol. 1 95-120). “A story describes a sequence of actions and experiences done or undergone by a certain number of people, whether real or imaginary” (Time, Vol. 1 150). He equates this description of story to that of emplotment. These stories direct us toward a teleological completion (Ricoeur, Time, Vol. 1 150). Finally, Ricoeur considers history a narrative of the looking back upon,

“This is why, in spite of their critical relation to traditional narrative, histories that deal with the unification or the disintegration of an empire, with the rise or fall of a class, a social movement, a religious sect, or a literary style are narratives” (Time, Vol. 1 151). Therefore, stories about groups of people and communities are written about in epics, as agency cannot drive a narrative. In Postmodernity, agency can no longer be the guiding principle, but stories of individuals gathered within communities connected to “*petit*” narratives (Lyotard 60).

For Ian Watt who wrote Myths of Modern Individualism, he suggests that the eighteenth century was a time of developing agency. He explored the metaphor of individualism by looking at the myth, among others, Robinson Crusoe. “Robinson Crusoe can be seen as an articulate spokesman of the new economic, religious, and social attitudes that succeeded the Counter-Reformation [. . .] (xv). This individualism was a product of the Enlightenment and survived through Modernity, that has led to the inevitability of Postmodernity, as one man on an island was not how the world evolved. Ours is a world with many nations, many narratives and many people trying to communicate within those boundaries.

Why Postmodernity was Inevitable

In A Short History of Ethics, Alasdair MacIntyre explains why he values the historical philosophy of the ancient societies mentioned throughout this work. He does not want to separate the philosophy from the history, because that would separate the “philosophical theory” from the “problems to which it is intended to be a solution” (MacIntyre, Short History 92). Therefore, MacIntyre offers a sequential historical view of philosophical ethics throughout this text, beginning with the ancient Greeks and

culminating with the ending of the Enlightenment at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of Modernity at the dawn of the twentieth century. Since MacIntyre wrote the book in the mid-twentieth century, he does not discuss Postmodernity. However, this work attempts to look at why Postmodernity was inevitable in terms of communication ethics and universal versus temporal bound narratives.

Postmodernity is not an era but rather a recognition of a multiplicity of eras. In a communication framework, postmodern ethics recognize a multiplicity of standpoints. Within a story, agents and ideas are embedded within given frameworks and these stories can stand side by side. Postmodernity is defined by Jean-François Lyotard as “part of the modern,” where rules are no longer what they once were (79-81). The rules are only being established once the artifact is produced

In his foreword of Jean-François Lyotard’s seminal text The Postmodern Condition, Fredric Jameson explains the import of Lyotard’s position on narrative:

What is even more striking in his methodological perspective, however—indeed, to my knowledge he is one of the few professional philosophers of stature anywhere *formally* to have (although Paul Ricoeur and Alasdair MacIntyre also come to mind) drawn this momentous consequence—is the way in which narrative is affirmed, not merely as a significant new field of research, but well beyond that as a central instance of the human mind and a mode of thinking fully as legitimate as that of abstract knowledge. (xi)

In Postmodernity, agency is embedded and no longer autonomous. Petite narratives exist where people can find their homes and agree to establish their roots, if they are not already planted.

Over these 2,500 years of written history, there has been a movement from virtues rooted within societal habits announced and corporately agreed upon narratives, to that of the individual whose decisions whether virtuous or not, can be emotive in nature. Now in Postmodernity, there seems to be a rhetorically based interruption that is leading us back into narratives with virtuous roots, which will allow for a place for individuals within certain stories to join and agree with those narratives.

Throughout history, and especially in the period between Medieval times and the Enlightenment, there was a change in equating man's role with his calling, and vocation, and therefore, how he acted. Men were called by trade or role, *farmer, father, ruler, landowner*, and his actions were evaluated accordingly (MacIntyre, Short History 94). With the rise of the individual, and as Alexis de Tocqueville explained, a form of *individualism*, the meaning of roles was lost (482-484). "The use of evaluative words was lost, so we can imagine a society in which traditional roles no longer exist" (MacIntyre, Short History 91). The growth of the state as well as market economies could only lead one to the import of the individual (MacIntyre, Whose Justice? 210). Finding a tradition that has a history to it, that offers advice, good or bad, for the postmodern moment, is where history now stands.

In After Virtue, Alasdair MacIntyre explains "modern individualism" as not being concerned with tradition (219). The idea of determining for oneself the courses and actions taken in one's own life is a modern one. Tradition and historicity would not be understood for the modern person. However, from a narrative standpoint, the view of being detached from one's family would not be thought of, because one is embedded within a family's history. "What I am, therefore, is in key part what I inherit, a specific

past that is present to some degree in my present. I find myself part of a history and that is generally to say, whether I like it or not, whether I recognize it or not, one of the bearers of a tradition” (After Virtue 220). As Postmodernity goes forward, a narrative understanding, especially petite narratives (Lyotard 60), of accepting what has come before, recognizes the value created from working within a tradition (MacIntyre, After Virtue 222-223).

In speaking on the postmodern moment, Ken Anderson explains that we are in a world where the individual takes precedence in communicative efforts:

The changes in society and technological resources have markedly reshaped communication theory and practice. Individual rather than societal goals are now a far more dominant focus of communication. This evolution makes the task of developing a consensus on appropriate ethical standards exceedingly complex and difficult. (Andersen 12)

As the narratives and stories around us change in Postmodernity, or, as people begin to agree upon stories that create a corporately agreed upon narrative, the ground one stands upon, marking one’s territory in the sand, will shift. What we consider to be appropriate communication will change as the ground we stand upon is modified. What we consider to be ethical will change as our ground changes. One needs to be cognizant of this postmodern opportunity to listen to others, to learn from others, to be open to others’ cultures, views and opinions, on ethical communication.

In this postmodern moment, there are many opportunities for communicative action to come alive, “where constant learning guides knowledge of one’s own stance and that of another” (Arnett, Dialogic Confession 2). Aristotle’s notion of *phronesis*, practical

wisdom, can be used in Postmodernity, even if one presupposes known social practices. The wisdom of the discourse for communication ethics comes in listening and learning about others' practices in order to come to an understanding about the Other. Narratives are fluid and have an opportunity for change when there is agreement on those changes that comes from the stories themselves.

In explaining the significance of the work of the German Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer, who died at the hand of the Nazis at the end of World War II, to this historical moment, Ronald C. Arnett explains, "Bonhoeffer details what happens in a moral crisis; he, like Alasdair MacIntyre today, understood the pragmatic need for ethics to rest on narrative ground, not the whim of an 'emotive' self" (Dialogic Confession 1). Communication ethics need to be intertwined within stories that inform narratives where one can find a postmodern home.

In a postmodern world, answers to societal, religious and political questions need to be attempted in a rhetorical fashion while discerning appropriate first principles. Two people questioning each other, while attempting to understand the ground upon which each other stands, an answer can be attempted that can work in Postmodernity. In Postmodernity, one cannot be imperialistic and impose a framework on others.

Agreeing to live within a narrative framework in Postmodernity does not mean that one has to stay placed firmly rooted in a certain narrative. Over time, stories can eventually be woven to change within the framework of a corporately agreed upon narrative.

Narrative provides the interpretive context for understanding metaphorical significance of communication concepts and action. Numerous narratives

compete for connection to the historical moment. In addition, the same metaphor can be used by different narratives to guide communicative action—which is why dialogue is necessary to understand the other in our postmodern age. (Arnett and Arneson 300)

Choice is obvious in Postmodernity, but what is being reclaimed is one's stake in a tradition. Choosing to stay within a tradition in which one was raised, or choosing to join another, and learn from the culture of the group, is what Postmodernity offers to the individual looking to strengthen their home or seeking another. Ethics will emerge through communication with those people found within traditions.

Summary

The goal of this work was to create a use of a *praxis* model of performing communication ethics scholarship through the readings of historical novels combined with philosophical theories on ethics and communication ethics. The thesis suggests that historicity would be understood using novels as they relate to the philosophy of communication ethics set within historical traditions. Postmodern societies can use a *praxis* model to inform decision-making and the challenging problems people face in the twenty-first century.

Through his seminal work *A Short History of Ethics*, Alasdair MacIntyre provides a historical lineage of Western philosophers who studied and wrote about ethics within the time span from Homer in ancient Greece to modern day scholars such as G.E. Moore. By adding the communicative component of a novel as the *praxis* portion of the scholarship, this work explained the usefulness of the narratives in explicating the rhetorical interruptions that occurred in and around the periods written about in these

various novels. The rhetorical interruptions created a new way of life for each of these periods that effected communities, religious institutions, and governments.

Communication ethics is part of the dialogue that ensues within dyads as well as larger groups found in these historical societies.

This work viewed communication ethics through the lens of historical periods including Ancient Greek ethics, Christian ethics during the Medieval period, Enlightenment ethics and Modern ethics in order to illuminate rhetorical interruptions that occurred within the various societies. The import of the *polis* and the Church, and traditions found within Greek and Christian societies, allowed people to have a common understanding and narrative by which to live their lives and interpret communication between and amongst their various groups. Then, the contention of traditions found during the Enlightenment with science demanding fact over religious belief, was the beginning of a belief in what could be proven. Modernity ushered in a belief in the individual who was willing to dismiss tradition and have faith in one's self.

There is now, in Postmodernity, a resurrection of tradition, giving people ground upon which to stand. Communication ethics bound within a tradition or a story where multiple narratives have surfaced is a positive step in the communicative process. Listening to others' stories and determining the narrative by which they live their lives, will unveil a tradition. Communication is always the carrier that unveils the ground on which we stand. Communication ethics was and can continue to be part of the dialogue of society.

The change—the evolution is what is important for today. That communication ethics is being discussed in terms of the poor and disenfranchised, as well as mediated

communication is a step in the right direction, “One aspect of this move toward more inclusive theories of communication is identification of the role communication plays in balancing individual and collective interests” (Andersen 11). Communication affects individuals and societies at one in the same time.

Through stories one can find the ground on which to stand and ethically communicate with others in Postmodernity. Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that the exercise of virtues will allow one to join or continue in a tradition in which one wants to be or is already embedded, “[. . .] the history of each of our own lives is generally and characteristically embedded in and made intelligible in terms of the larger and longer histories of a number of traditions” (After Virtue 222). Those traditions are there and some are waiting to be created; if we knock the door will be open.

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