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
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The Proceedings of GREAT Day 2009

A day-long, college-wide celebration of student
creativity, research , and scholarship.

april 21, 2009



The State University of New York at Geneseo

The Proceedings of the Third Annual Great Day

Geneseo Recognizing Excellence, Achievement & Talent Day is a college-wide symposium celebrating the creative and scholarly endeavors of our students. In addition to recognizing the achievements of our students, the purpose of GREAT Day is to help foster academic excellence, encourage professional development, and build connections within the community.

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Associate Professor of Foreign Languages and Literatures

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Resiliency and Intervention for Children

Alice Brunet

Faculty Sponsor: Ganie DeHart, Psychology

The presentation will be a general summary of an independent psychological review on resiliency and intervention. The primary basis of the literature review will be developing programs that promote resilient skills in children. The beginning of the presentation will be an overview of the extensive literature on resilient children and the skills they acquire during difficult times. Then, the most common skills that resilient children use will be the basis of looking at different intervention programs that are specifically designed for children. At the end of the presentation, an analysis of each intervention program will be made and future intervention programs that promote resiliency will be suggested.

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Faculty Sponsor: Maria Helena Lima, English

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Chelsea Rives

A close reading of Jennifer Finney Boylan's *She's Not There*, a transition from male to female memoir, makes the author question every perception of gender differences held until that moment: Why are some people born into the "wrong" body? What causes gender "dysphoria" [for lack of a better name]? Can we recreate ourselves? What exactly happens during a sex change procedure? What does it mean to BE a woman?

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"Sexualizing Black Women in America"

Lindsey Wiltse

In current media depictions of African-American women, including rap music, they are most likely described as overly sexual, flaunting shapely bodies to men who are willing to be pleased by women who have no other function than pleasing them. Since the Biblical creation story, in the official reading, Eve sets a precedent for all women to be sexual temptresses, regardless of race or class. When and why have black women alone begun to bear the brunt of a hyper sexualized culture on their bodies?

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The Provinces of Central France: A Study in Geography, History, Industry, and Culture

Erinn Kehoe

Faculty Sponsor: E.R. VanVliet, Foreign Languages & Literatures

This paper examines the distinctive quality and characteristics of the central provinces of France. This area is unique in its diversity: a mix of scenic mountains and fertile valleys, agriculture and industry, contemporary life and ancient customs, rural countryside and modern cities. Although the population density of this region is lower than in other parts of France, the culture and industry of these provinces have a strong impact on the rest of the country. This area also holds an important place in the history of France, beginning with the influence of the Romans and continuing through the modern day. An examination of the diverse geography, industry, and culture of the central provinces presents a view of life in France as a whole.

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Un Voyage en France

Amy Lafleur

Faculty Sponsor: E.R. VanVliet, Foreign Languages & Literatures

This presentation (in French) will describe cultural and historical facts about France, in the form of a tour. The tour is the second half of a hypothetical voyage to France. It leaves from Montpellier and explores Provence and the French Riviera. It then continues north through Burgundy and Alsace-Lorraine, then progresses west to Normandy, while stopping in many notable sites on the way.

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The Arhuacos: The Struggle

Alice Brunet

Faculty Sponsor: Cristina Rowley, Foreign Languages & Literatures

The Arhuaco people are descendants of the Tairona, who like the Inca and the Aztec, had a highly developed civilization. Some aspects of Tairona civilization included development of advanced irrigation systems, impressive architectural knowledge, and commerce with other native peoples over great distances. Their culture also had a strong connection to the earth and nature which was an integral component of their beliefs, customs and traditions. The Tairona inhabited what is today northern Colombia well before the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors. They resisted and fought against the Spanish conquest, but in the end the few remaining survivors had to retreat to the mountains, where they lived in isolation and developed

what is known today as the Arhuaco culture. Ever since then, the Arhuaco have continued to resist an outside world that demands they integrate themselves into modern Colombian society at the cost of their own culture and beliefs. This presentation will describe the culture, beliefs, and traditions that the Arhuaco people are fighting to preserve. It will also detail their struggle to protect and foment their culture among their youth, who are more susceptible to the influence of the outside world.

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Relief du Sol et Climat

Stephanie Murdock

Faculty Sponsor: Richard VanVliet, Foreign Languages & Literatures

A 15 minute presentation, in French, on the climate and geography of continental France.

Session 2-G • English Shakespeare

Session Chair: Daniel Carroll

Faculty Sponsor: Eugene Stelzig, English

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Looks Can Be Deceiving: Angelo's Intentions in MEASURE FOR MEASURE

Michael Langen

Angelo's Intentions in Measure for Measure Reputations are important, especially for those in positions of power. In Shakespeare's Measure for Measure, some readers see Angelo as deserving the reputation of a moral man who is earnestly trying to clean up Vienna, but happens to take things too far in his strict treatment of Claudio's case. They believe that, by the play's end, Angelo truly repents for succumbing to the temptation of Isabella. Other readers, however, see Angelo as a power-hungry tyrant who is hypocritical in his preaching of strict morality, and view him as being ill-intentioned all along, pursuing his selfish agenda at the expense of Isabella and others. I will argue that while Angelo tries to dupe others into seeing him as a well-intentioned, just, and pious leader, the truth is that he is ill-intentioned, selfish, and unjust.

Session 4-I • Political Science & International Relations State Responses to Terrorism

Session Chair and Faculty Sponsor: Victoria Farmer, Political Science & International Relations

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POWs in the War on Terror

Andrew Petracca

The mistreatment of prisoners in U.S. custody between September 11, 2001, and January 2009, including indefinite detentions, unfair trials, the use of interrogation techniques amounting to torture, and the deporta-

tion of prisoners to other countries for the purpose of torture, constitute violations of international law. Contrary to what the Bush administration and its supporters have argued, these policies are illegal and have not been more effective at protecting the United States than legal methods. In fact, by reducing the moral standing of the country and alienating individuals throughout the world, especially Muslims, they have strengthened anti-American extremism and increased the danger of terrorist attacks against the United States.

Pages 110-132

Imposing Democracy: State Building and the War on Terror

James Maxfield Duhe

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US foreign policy. In this environment, the Bush administration crafted what came to be known as the "Bush Doctrine." Though a precise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains contested, definitions typically include the idea that the US may preemptively attack countries harboring terrorists and that the US should support the spread of democracy. But, after eight years, the United States is still not safe. This paper analyzes democratization as an element of the Bush Doctrine through case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. US attempts to democratize these countries have angered local inhabitants, locked the United States into situations where withdrawal is difficult, and damaged relations between the United States and other countries. Overall, the Bush administration's efforts to impose democracy in these countries have been ineffectual and counterproductive at combating terrorism. I conclude with policy prescriptions for the Obama Administration; namely, America must remove itself from the political processes of Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuild ties with the international community, and develop a strategy for complete US withdrawal from these areas.

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State Capacity, Social Mobility, and Terrorist Groups in Thailand and the Philippines

Sarah McDonald

Thailand and the Philippines face similar security issues; including separatist violence in their Southern provinces. However, the developmental paths of the two countries and the governments' reactions to the minority ethno-religious separatist movements, the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government's desire to create a singular national identity from mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds has created periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued colonial policies of economic and political oppression of the Moro but created the institutions necessary for social pluralism. The differing policies of the Thai and Filipino governments have shaped the orientation of the separatist movements within the countries.

Currently, the size and power of MILF in the Philippines has forced the government to attempt peace talks with the group. However, in Thailand the reclusive nature of the BRN C remains hinders communications with the Thai government. This paper demonstrates that the actions taken by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines have fostered current separatist and terrorist movements. Addressing these problems will require state policies that reflect pluralism and institutions that support social aspirations.

**Session 1-J • Honors
Honors Capstone II:
From Places Apart**

Session Chair: Olympia Nicodemi

Faculty Sponsor: Olympia Nicodemi, Mathematics

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**Sir Thomas Roe at the Mughal Court:
Seventeenth Century and English
Cultural Assumptions**

Katherine Schwartz

Faculty Mentor: Joseph Cope, History

This paper seeks to explore how, although in reality the inferior partner in trade, the English in India thought of themselves as superior. To do this, I will analyze the journal of Sir Thomas Roe, the first official English ambassador to the Mughal Court, in light of English and Mughal history, English cultural constructions, and the works of contemporaries such as Edward Terry and the Emperor Jahangir. This paper will show that Roe judges the people of the Mughal court by English cultural standards, and uses these assumptions to claim English superiority. Furthermore, the paper will show that, while not intentionally written with imperialist aims, Roe's journal does demonstrate that the basic attitudes of the later imperialist

Pages 171-204

**Front and Center: As Anthropological
Analysis of Drag Queens in
American Culture**

Seth Palmer

Faculty Mentor: Rose-Marie Chierici, Anthropology

Judith Butler's concept of gender performativity revolutionized the way that academics conceive of gender, and has subsequently become a critical perspective for feminist and queer analyses in a variety of disciplines. The new anthropology of genders and sexualities uses this theoretical framework and focuses specifically on "institutions of ambiguity" that challenge gender dichotomies across the globe. Such institutions highlight the importance of understanding gendered and sexualized categorizations as cultural constructions embedded in a specific historical, spatial and cultural context. Continuing in that tradition, this paper is an examination of drag queens in contemporary American culture, with a specific focus on the politics

of drag performance. With historical roots that can be traced back to Shakespearian theater, the practice of drag performance in the United States has evolved over time, yet it continues to challenge traditional notions of masculinity and femininity in American culture. Data collected from literature, fieldwork experiences, interviews, film, and social networking and video sharing websites will be utilized to examine the meaning of drag and the lives of those who perform in it.

**Session 1-M • Political Science &
International Relations
International Security Policy
in the 21st Century**

*Session Chair and Faculty Sponsor: Jeremy Grace,
Political Science & International Relations*

Pages 205-247

**Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy in
Latin America**

Lucy Coates

Strengthened by increased revenues from the oil boom of the 2000s, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has pursued a much more extensive foreign policy than his predecessors, cultivating relations with numerous countries throughout Latin America and the world. Analysis of Chávez's Latin American foreign policy reveals that he, like the petro-state decision-makers before him, has used petrodollars to fund large, long-term projects and agreements intended to further his goals of promoting a leftist agenda, minimizing foreign dependence, and increasing Venezuelan influence in the region. However as the oil boom ends, Chávez is likely to fall into a petro-state trap by overextending Venezuela's oil revenues, rendering him unable to sustain his capital-intensive projects. This paper will begin by analyzing Chávez's regional foreign policy, its effectiveness in accomplishing his goals, and the implications that his policy has had throughout the region. In the context of the ending oil boom, this analysis can be used to predict the effects of the failure of Chávez's foreign policy in Latin America. Analysis of Chávez's foreign policy and his reaction to the decrease in the value of oil should serve as an example when analyzing the foreign policy decisions made by other petro-states.

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Session 2-M • Political Science & International Relations Politics and Policy in American Government

Session Chair: Marilyn Klotz, Political Science & International Relations

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Political Process as Envisioned by the West Wing

David Lombardo

Faculty Sponsor: Marilyn Klotz, Political Science & International Relations

The challenge of illuminating people about the political process, how we elect our leaders and how they govern, is tackled by The West Wing. During its tenure it educated people bored with C-Span, unable to appreciate George Will, and possessing a fetish for snappy dialogue. The main critique of the show was that it presented an idealistic version of a world that is generally grimmer and less eventful. Regardless, the show used story lines straight from real life and even foretold events that later occurred. The show dealt with issues in a manner unfamiliar to a casual political observer, pulling aside a curtain that hindered full comprehension of events, and therefore provided an accurate picture of how politics is played. For my presentation I will address certain issues dealt with on The West Wing, which have traditionally been out of reach to the public, and assess how accurately the show portrays the developments compared to their unfolding in reality. Specifically, I will touch on the Presidential election process, which becomes the major focus of the last two seasons, the art of crafting a public message, and a general look at the legislative process, with a focus on political gamesmanship.

Session 1-P • School of Education The Denial of Universal Human Rights: An Exploration of Examples and Justification

Session Chair: Lwam Tecleab

Faculty Sponsor: Jane Fowler-Morse, Ella Cline Shear School of Education

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Tomorrow Will Shine

Geoff Griffiths

Student Commentator: Lwam Tecleab,

Prophets are those people who speak up against injustice and call for social change. This paper examines the Prophets Hosea, Amos, and Jonah from the 8th Century BC and how they speak out against corruption in their time period. They argue for an end to misfortunes and injustices. It will also argue that Martin Luther King Jr. is a modern prophet. In his "Letter from Birmingham Jail," King calls for an end of the suppression of civil and natural rights. King asserts that,

"Injustice anywhere is a threat to Justice Everywhere." This is the calling of prophets to speak up for those that may not be able to speak up for themselves. With their help, tomorrow holds a brighter future for everyone.

Teaching & Learning Center and Leadership Education Development & Training

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The Ghana Project

Jesse Parent, Rejoyce Owusu, Ben DeGeorge, Hannah Schmidt, and Clark Driscoll

Faculty Sponsors: David Parfitt, Teaching & Learning Center, and Tom Matthews, Leadership Education, Development & Training

The Ghana Project is a civic engagement and service learning project. This poster presentation will be about the happenings of the project, which is in its first year, starting last semester (it is to be a long term project). Born out of GOLD's civic engagement efforts, The Ghana Project was created with two main goals: the first being to share Ghanaian culture, help educate others on life in Ghana, and share experiences with another country; the second, long term goal, is to raise money to help build a school in Ghana. The first year of The Ghana Project has been one of getting people used to Ghana, introducing them to the blossoming African country. The poster will review the events of the Project – such as the educational model of last semester, and the cultural events & speakers of this year – as well as discuss the nature of the project itself. It will also talk about the fundraising efforts of the Project, and relate them to the goal of assisting development in Ghana by means of building a school. Finally, there will be mention of the future plans of the Project, continuing into next year. (See Dance Performance at 5:30pm.)

A Literature Review of Resiliency and Intervention for Children

Submitted by Alice Brunet



This paper was completed as part of an independent directed study mentored by Dr. Ganie DeHart.

Abstract

There have been many psychological studies that sought to explore the specific skills that resilient children develop in adverse situations. This literature review is an attempt to provide an overview of the results of previous resilience research that focuses on children. From these results a general theory of resiliency will be discussed. Next, different types of implemented intervention programs that aim to promote resilient skills in children will be reviewed and analyzed. Lastly, suggestions for future resilience research studies and intervention prevention programs will be made.

General observations of children in potentially at-risk situations have suggested to researchers that there are a group of highly at-risk children who seem to be less negatively affected by their adverse situation and sometimes may even demonstrate positive effects. From these observations, researchers have sought to understand why certain children in adverse situations are more capable of overcoming and prospering than their peers in similar situations. Even though there has been no definite answer, resilience research has indicated a general trend of skills that these thriving children develop in order to overcome their situation. Furthermore, research has also attempted to promote these certain skills in intervention programs in an attempt to assist children

through potentially adverse situations. The focus of this paper will be to provide an overview of the resilience research and its results, discuss a potential theory, review and analyze current intervention programs, and then suggest future research studies and intervention prevention programs.

It is important to note that the term resiliency was not always used to define children who thrived through adverse situations. Initially, researchers classified these children as “invulnerable” (Anthony, 1974) or as “stress-resistant” (Garmezy, Masten, & Tellegen, 1984). It was thought that these children had a unique quality that other children did not possess to help them endure their adverse situation. Further research on these children indicated that this unique quality turned out to be something more developmentally mundane. For example, Garmezy, Masten, and Tellegen (1984) initially researched children who were potentially vulnerable to develop schizophrenia. This research provided data on the development of children born to schizophrenic mothers over a 12-year period of time. The primary purpose of the research was to observe if children who had schizophrenic mothers were at-risk to have developmental deficits, which also could potentially contribute to the development of schizophrenia. Despite the initial focus of the research, results of the study indicated that there was a group of at-risk children who were grouped into a “stress-resistant” category. These stress-resistant children were defined as children who were exposed to stressful situations, but were still able to maintain a normal if

not higher developmental level of competence. Conversely, their at-risk peers who were not classified as stress-resistant tended to have more developmental problems. Many variables were used to measure the child's development level to determine if an at-risk child was developmentally comparable to their peers not in an at-risk situation. Results indicated that IQ was the highest and most significant predictor of achievement scores, even when controlling for socio-economic status. Also, a significant interaction was found that indicated when children had high achievement, stress had little effect on their IQ score; however if children had low achievement, low stress did not significantly influence their IQ scores, but high stress correlated with a significant drop in IQ score. This interaction suggests that even though children may have achievement, a stressful environment may have the potential to hinder their performance and development.

These results suggest that children who have high achievement are more focused on obtaining a goal and not letting their stress level influence their performance. Further research was conducted on competence in children to better understand how competence can predict future success. For example, Masten, Coatsworth, Neeman, Gest, Tellegen, and Garnezy (1995) observed 191 children in a longitudinal study that focused on competence across childhood and adolescence. Competence was examined because it is a long term, complex developmental process that has direct observable behaviors. Throughout the study there was a focus on academic competence, conduct competence, and peer and social competence. For only the adolescents, there was also a focus on job competence and romantic competence. Results indicated that childhood academic success predicted adolescent academic attainment and job success.

Also, childhood conduct competence strongly predicted later conduct competence and also predicted job and academic success. Furthermore, childhood social competence predicted both social and romantic competence. In general, the relationship between academic conduct and social competence from childhood to adolescence was mediated by the consistent stability of academic conduct and social competence across childhood to adolescence. These results suggest that it is important for children to have a stable environment throughout adolescence in order to develop proper competence levels that have the potential to predict future success.

A similar study was then conducted to examine if serious adversities can affect the development of competence in children. Therefore, Masten, Hubbard, Gest, Tellegen, Garnezy, and Ramirez (1999) observed how adversities may threaten the development of competence. Differences were examined between resilient adolescents and their maladaptive peers who had not successfully developed in the face of adversities. Resilient children were also compared to their competent peers who had developed successfully but had not experienced any serious adversities. Resilient children in this study were defined as children who were developmentally sound even though they were facing long-term adversities that had great potential to disrupt regular development. This study focused on competence in relation to adversity by examining academic competence, conduct competence, and peer and social competence. A longitudinal study was conducted using 189 children from two urban schools. Measures were taken when the children were eight to twelve years old, fourteen to nineteen years old, and seventeen to twenty-three years old.

Overall, results indicated that the development of competence is related to the availability of psychosocial resources, children facing adversities are not as likely to

have as many available resources. The results also indicated that if children in adverse situations do have access to reasonably good resources then they are more likely to have generally good outcomes even in the face of adversity, and maladaptive adolescents tend to be stress-reactive and have a history of adversity, low resources, and problems with the development of a broad range of competencies. Furthermore, the combination of low IQ and high adversity was also related to conduct problems that were evident in childhood and worsened over time. Interestingly, resilient adolescents' intellectual functioning had no significant differences when compared to their competent peers. Also, all competent adolescents regardless of adversity level reported similar levels of availability to resources and psychological well-being. In general, few differences were found between competent and resilient individuals other than adversity level. These findings suggest that resources, such as cognitive skills, are general advantages for development that can possibly assist children in succeeding in both adverse and non-adverse situations.

Research has indicated that developing competence can predict future success in many different domains. Furthermore, research has also indicated that resilient children, unlike their peers who are also facing adverse situations, are able to adapt and be developmentally comparable to their competent peers. Therefore, this research suggests that one way that resilient children adapt and succeed is by having sufficient resources, such as cognitive skills, as a way to buffer against their adversity. However, the previous studies mentioned are unclear as to what specific resources or skills resilient children use to assist them through their adverse situation.

Other longitudinal studies in the resilience literature have been conducted that

focus more specifically on the potential skills and resources that resilient children may use, as well as noting overall general trends. For example, Werner (1994) conducted a 30-year longitudinal study on the entire birth cohort of 698 children in the year 1955 on the island of Kauai. Approximately one-third of the children in this cohort (n=201) were designated as high-risk because they were either born into poverty, had experienced moderate to severe degrees of prenatal stress, and/or lived in a family environment troubled by chronic discord, parental alcoholism, or mental illness. From this high-risk cohort, approximately two-thirds (n=129) of these children did develop serious learning or behavior problems by age ten that continued to worsen by the age of eighteen. These children also had significantly higher rates of developing mental health problems, having a delinquency record, and/or being directly involved in a teenage pregnancy.

However, one-third of these high-risk children (n=72) did develop into competent and successful young adults. Furthermore, no one in the resilient group developed any serious learning or behavior problems in childhood or adolescence. In this study, they were categorized as resilient because they had successful outcomes despite their adverse situation, sustained normal competence levels under stress and successfully recovered from trauma. These observations are important to the resilience literature because they provide support of resiliency using unobtrusive measures in a naturalistic setting.

Interestingly, in this study there was evidence of a genetic predisposition for these resilient children to be able to successfully overcome their situation. For example, as infants, these children elicited positive attention, were very active, and expressed fewer negative habits. Furthermore, pediatricians and psychologists who examined

them as toddlers noted their alertness, autonomy, their tendency to seek out novel experiences, and their positive social orientation. Developmentally, in concurrence with previous research, these resilient toddlers were more advanced than other non-resilient children and were on the same developmental path as their peers not facing adverse situations. In elementary schools, their teachers reported that the resilient children were socially accepted among their peers. In high school they were observed to be nurturing, responsible, achievement-oriented, assertive and independent.

These resilient children were also noted of developing specific skills and becoming involved with certain activities that fostered their resilient nature. By the end of high school, resilient adolescents had developed a positive self-concept and an internal locus of control and had found emotional support outside of their own family; also, their self-esteem and self-efficacy increased when they participated in a responsible position such as a job. They tended to participate in extracurricular activities that were enjoyable to them and also acted as a place of refuge when things were bad at home. They were also noted to participate in volunteer work that was focused on preventing others from going through their current adverse situation. In a way, these resilient children had a specific disposition that led them to have stability over development and the desire to seek environments that promoted positive outcomes and reinforced their resilient nature. Even though resilient children may have some biological factors that influence them to become resilient, these findings may also suggest that there are certain skills that resilient children develop, such as positive self-concept, internal locus of control, and the ability to find social support groups, to help them through their adverse situation.

These results were further supported

by Cowen, Work, Wyman, Parker, Wannan, and Gribble (1992) in a study conducted on 10- to 12-year-old urban children who were classified as either stress-affected or stress-resilient. To qualify for either of these two groups, the child needed to have at least four stress-related events that were reported by their parents using the "Life Events Checklist". Furthermore, to classify as stress-affected, the child had to score in the bottom one-third on at least two of the three adjustment measures used in the study and score no better than the middle one third on the third measure. To classify as stress-resilient the child had to place in the top one third on two of the three adjustment measures and no worse than the middle one third on the third measure. These three adjustment measures were based on three different evaluations indicated by their parent, former teacher, and current teacher. Overall, the stress-resilient children exceeded the stress-affected children on all measures of adjustment. A non-classified group was also included in this study that was demographically matched to the other two groups, but did not have four or more stress related events reported by their parents. The non-classified group had consistently higher scores on all adjustment measures than the stress-affected group, but lower scores than the stress-resilient group. The purpose of the study was to compare the stress-affected, the stress-resilient and the non-classified groups on a variety of levels using data that were collected over two years.

Results of the study indicated that there was a tendency for the stress-resilient group and the non-classified group to significantly exceed the stress-affected group on test scores, but they tended not to differ from each other. Also, for measures of obeying rules and reading and math achievement, the stress-resistant group significantly exceeded the non-classified group and the non-classified group significantly exceeded the

stress-affected group. Overall, stress-resilient children reported significantly higher levels than the stress-affected group on all competence and esteem measures except athletic competence, five of six self-rated adjustment scores, all empathy scores, problem-solving strategy measures, and both internal and realistic control expectations. These results are consistent with previous research, suggesting that even though resilient children are going through an adverse situation, developmentally they are comparable to their peers who are not currently dealing with an adverse situation.

The results of the study were replicated by Hoyt-Meyers, Cowen, Work, and Wyman (1995) in a similar study conducted on 7- to 8-year-olds. The methodology of this study was identical to the previous study on stress-affected and stress-resilient children; however, some factors of the study were adjusted to compensate for the participants' younger age. Results indicated that IQ scores were significantly higher for stress-resilient children than for stress-affected children. Overall, results of the study supported previous research; however, the results were less robust. These findings are important because they support findings of previous research that resilient individuals are consistently at a significantly higher competence level than their non-resilient peers in similar adverse situations at different stages of development.

The resilience literature indicates that there is a significant difference between resilient children and their non-resilient peers who are also in adverse situations. Even though it is hard to define resiliency based upon each individual situation, the culmination of research indicates that there is a general trend that resilient children follow in order to cope and succeed through their adverse situation. According to Masten (2001), even though there is some indication in the

research that resilient children may have a specific genetic disposition, resilience is primarily a common phenomenon that results from normal development being put to the test in extreme situations. In order to be resilient, children need to first face a significantly adverse situation that tests their development and adaptational resources. Therefore, it is suggested that non-resilient children who are also in adverse situations are not fully developed and do not have sufficient adaptational resources. Their developmental impairments are exposed and prolonged because of their stressful adverse situation. It is suggested then that if these non-resilient children had comparable access to resources and the opportunity to develop the necessary resilient skills, they would also have the ability to become resilient in their adverse situation. Furthermore, if children not currently in an adverse situation were also equipped with resilient skills and had access to resources, then potentially it would help them through future adverse situations.

In order to successfully promote resilience skills in children, intervention programs need to first consider promoting some of the skills that resilient children use. Some of these resilience skills include: self-regulation, self-esteem, self-efficacy, internal locus of control, emotional intelligence and resourcefulness (Luthar 2005). In general, the adaptation skills that resilient children use are potentially universally helpful for different adverse situations. Therefore, interventions need to be able to be specific enough to focus on individual problems but also be broad enough to cover a wide range of adaptation skills that work in different adverse situations. Also, according to Sale, Bellamy, Springer, and Want (2008) it is also important that the intervention instructors are carefully selected. Results indicated that participants who perceived higher levels of trust, mutuality and empathy in their instructors had significantly greater

improvements in their social skills.

Furthermore, it is important for future research to explore what stage of development is the prime time for an intervention teaching adaptation skills. According to Simmons, Burgeson, Carlton-Ford and Blyth (1987), the transition between 6th and 7th grades is difficult for children because of personal life changes and school transitions (e.g., moving into junior high, going through puberty, dating). Results of the study indicated that from 6th to 7th grade there was a significant drop in GPA and extracurricular participation. Therefore, it may be important to equip children with resilient skills before 7th grade in order to prepare them for their potential life changes.

Some interventions that currently exist are focused on helping the high-risk population of children to teach them how to cope and introduce them to resilient skills. For example, the Penn Resiliency Program focuses on children who are at risk of developing depression and/or anxiety through internalization of their emotions. The main purpose of this program is to reduce internalization of problems in high-risk children to avoid future potential negative consequences. This is accomplished by teaching the children how to use more accurate cognitive styles, problem-solving skills, and how to seek out positive, supportive relationships.

This cognitive-behavioral intervention is primarily designed for adolescence. The program is conducted in 12 90-minute sessions by school counselors and teachers who have been trained in the intervention program and are supervised while conducting the program. There is an emphasis in the program to help students use specific skill sets to improve their problem solving skills and enhance their ability to cope with daily stressors in life, as well as preparing them to deal with and overcome future major set-

backs. The primary skills that are taught in this program are: emotional regulation, impulse control, causal analysis, realistic optimism, self-efficacy, empathy, and the ability to reach out to others for help. Participants learn how to recognize their personal thoughts and reactions in certain situations and how to change their reaction to something more positive and optimistic by taking the time to analyze their situation before reacting.

A longitudinal study was conducted to analyze the effectiveness of this program. The intervention group was compared with a control group of randomly assigned young adolescents who did not receive the intervention. Results indicated that participants in the intervention condition significantly improved their explanatory styles, which was still significant even after a three year follow-up. Furthermore, after three years of follow-up the intervention group also reported lower levels of depressive symptoms and were less likely to report moderate to severe levels of depressive symptoms when compared with the control group (Reivich, Gillham, Chaplin, & Seligman, 2005). These results indicate that providing at-risk children with resilient skills may potentially help them succeed through their adverse situation.

Another intervention program that was developed with a focus on high-risk youth is the Resolving Conflict Creatively Program. The program was founded in 1985 in New York City with a focus of reducing the high levels of violence found within the school systems. Prior to the intervention, teachers who were going to be the instructors for the intervention received a 25-hour course to introduce them to concepts and skills in social and emotional learning and how to teach using an interactive approach. Teachers were also given regular classroom coaching by staff developers. Regular instruction was used to teach at least one

lesson from the curriculum with duration and content varying depending on the age of the children. The primary techniques taught within the intervention were emotion identification, active listening, assertiveness, emotional regulation, negotiation, mediation, empathy development, active listening, conflict resolution skills, and understanding and respecting inter-cultural differences.

Because the primary focus of implementing this intervention was to reduce the high levels of violence in the New York City school system, the Resolving Conflict Creatively Program was not evaluated until close to ten years after implementation. When an evaluation was finally conducted, a quasi-experimental design was used to test the effectiveness. However, it is difficult to completely assess this program due to the varying types of programs used based on adjustments made during the intervention for age appropriateness. Results did indicate that high rates of instruction in this intervention across two years were significantly related to positive changes in children's academic achievement and social and emotional developmental trajectories. Furthermore, results also indicated that there was a significant decrease of violence within the targeted schools by using the intervention model. Therefore, it can be inferred that the Resolving Conflict Creatively Program was successful in its primary goal of reducing violence in the targeted school system by teaching children resilient skills (Brown, Roderick, Lantieri, & Aber, 2004). This gives further support that it may be possible to influence resiliency in children by helping them develop the necessary skills.

Another school based intervention program that promotes similar skills that resilient children have been noted to use is the Penn Optimism Program. The program is a 12-week, school-based intervention that is

facilitated by a trained leader for groups of 8 - to 12-year-old children. The intervention is based upon cognitive-behavioral therapies that allow participants not to only learn about new skills, but also to participate and engage in hypothetical situations using these new skills. It is hypothesized that if the children have practice in hypothetical settings using these new skills, then they will be more likely to continue using them in their everyday life. Participants in the intervention are children in fifth and sixth grade who were selected because of their self-reports to be at risk for depression and their perception of family conflict and cohesion at home. The intervention is divided into three separate phases. During weeks 1-5 children learn about cognitive base strategies such as having a more optimistic outlook, being able to problem solve, and understanding emotions by how they develop and are expressed. During weeks 6-9 the children are taught more behaviorally-oriented skills such as assertiveness, negotiation, relaxation, coping strategies, dealing with procrastination, enhancing social skills and decision making. In weeks 10-11 there is a focus primarily on different aspects of problem solving. Finally, in week 12 there is a review of everything that the participants have learned during the intervention.

In one empirical study to test the effectiveness of the program, children were randomly assigned to either an intervention or a control condition. After the intervention was completed, every six months for two years all participants completed a questionnaire that assessed what they had learned from the intervention. Results indicated that participants in the intervention condition experienced significantly fewer symptoms of depression and were more optimistic than the control group across the two-year evaluation period. These results suggest that the intervention promoted a sense of hope, which buffered against developing an

increased risk for depression (Shatte, Gillham, & Reivich, 2000).

The three aforementioned interventions that promoted skills similar to those of resilient children were successful in helping at-risk populations to overcome and/or succeed through their adversity. However, research has also indicated that these intervention-based programs are also useful for all children. For example, Greenberg, Kusche, and Riggs (2004) investigated the effectiveness of PATHS (Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies) which has existed for over 20 years. Under this program it is believed that schools should include emotional and social development in their curricula; furthermore, teachers need to be better educated as to how to improve children's emotional and social development. The program is designed to be taught by elementary school teachers from kindergarten through 5th grade through a curriculum that includes lessons that promote both cognitive-academic and social-emotional development. Some skills included in the program are self-regulation, practicing self-control, self-talk, emotional regulation, behavior control, emotional identification, and proper emotional expression. The schools implementing this program also promote a supportive and nurturing school environment. Lessons are designed to be flexible in different situations but still have the ability to teach specific skills and/or lessons.

Effectiveness of the PATHS program was evaluated for both the regular education curriculum and for the fast track program. The regular education study was conducted on second and third graders participating in the PATHS program and also a control school not implementing the PATHS program; schools were randomly assigned to conditions. There were no significant differences between the groups on outcome meas-

ures at the beginning of the intervention. At the end of the intervention, results indicated that the intervention group demonstrated significant improvements in social problem solving skills and emotional understanding. Furthermore, intervention participants were also significantly less likely to provide aggressive solutions, were more likely to be prosocial, and had lower rates of conduct problems, anxiety and depression.

The PATHS fast track program was a large, randomized intervention used to reduce serious aggression and conduct problems in schools. The program was conducted in four different American location; in each location approximately fourteen schools were randomized equally to either intervention or control conditions. The main purpose of the program was to integrate a set of prevention programs that served the entire school as well as selective programs that targeted children entering first grade with high-risk behavior. The study was conducted in three successive years with three different cohorts of first graders. Results indicated that schools in the intervention condition had a significant improvement in social adaptation with lower peer ratings of aggression and disruptive behaviors, lower teacher ratings of disruptive behavior, and improved classroom atmosphere as assessed by an observer.

Both the normal PATHS intervention and the fast-track program had significant positive results when implementing interventions that promote resilient skills in all children. This possibly suggests that by providing an environment that promotes these skills, children will be able to develop the necessary age-appropriate skills to overcome adversities. Furthermore, this may suggest that current school systems may eventually need to implement similar programs in which children learn about more than just scholastic competence, but also about emotional and social competence.

Another school-based intervention program that promotes similar skills that resilient children use is the Seattle Social Development Project. The program combines three primary components of improving the teachers' classroom management and instructional practices, introducing an instructional program teaching self-control and social competencies using cognitive behavioral methods of instruction, and providing school-based workshops for parents of participating students. The purpose to the program is to promote positive social development through a prosocial pathway by strengthening the child's bonds to both school and family in order to prevent adolescent health and behavior problems.

Beginning in 1985, 18 elementary schools in Seattle participated in the study. Participants were interviewed nine times through the age of 21. Four different types of interventions were implemented to observe which type of intervention would have the most long-term effects. The different interventions were: *full intervention*, which received the full intervention from first through sixth grade; *late intervention*, which received the full intervention but only from fifth to sixth grade; *parent-training only intervention*, in which only the parent portion of the intervention was conducted from fifth to sixth grade, and a control that received no intervention.

Teachers in the assigned intervention classrooms completed a five-day training course on proactive classroom management, effective direct instruction strategies, and promoting cooperative learning. The main purpose of the teacher training was to create a classroom environment that is conducive to learning with minimal disruption to classroom activities and promoting prosocial behaviors (e.g., problem solving, emotional identification, conflict resolution). Parents who had with children in the full and late

intervention condition or who participated in the parent-only intervention were offered courses to learn about child behavior management skills (offered first through second grade), skills on how to support their child's academics (second through third grade), and skills on how to reduce their children's risk of drug use (fifth through sixth grade). Only the parents with children in the full intervention participated in the courses when their children were in first through sixth grades; parents in all other interventions, except for the control group, only participated in the course when their children were in fifth through sixth grade.

Results of all interventions indicated a significant positive improvement in social behavior after the intervention was completed; however, after conducting follow-ups when the participants were ages 18 and 21, only the full intervention participants had significant positive life changes when compared to the control group. For example, the follow-up at age eighteen indicated that only the participants in the full intervention were significantly more attached and committed to school, had significantly better grades and achievement, and had less misbehavior when compared to the control group. Furthermore, significantly fewer participants in the full intervention condition reported using violent behavior, heavy use of alcohol, sexual activity, and having multiple sex partners when compared to the controls. The late intervention participants also reported positive outcomes after completion of the intervention program; however results were not as robust or consistently significant when compared to the controls. Furthermore, at age 21 follow-up participants in the full intervention were significantly more likely than the controls to have graduated from high school, to have completed two or more years of college, and to have been employed in the past month; they were also more committed to their present jobs. Self-reports of emotional health

at age 21 were also significantly better for the full intervention participants, who reported better emotion regulation, fewer social phobia symptoms, and fewer suicidal thoughts (Hawkins, Smith, Hill, Kosterman, & Catalano, 2007).

The results of this study are important because it suggests that interventions may need to start at an earlier age, for example first grade, and continue for a few years in order to have any successful long-term resilience effects. The previous studies mentioned did not have more than a two-year follow-up after the intervention was complete. It would be interesting to study if these interventions have any long-term effects in predicting the success of individuals who participated in the intervention. It is important to this body of research that follow-ups are included until at least the end of adolescence to indicate long-term effects. Without these results, it will be hard to determine if the intervention is useful in providing resilient life skills for the child for more than a few years. Even though the aforementioned interventions are not necessarily focused on promoting resilience in children, the skills they are promoting are very similar to the skills that resilient children develop. Adding long-term follow-up studies to these interventions will help us understand if it is possible to promote resilience by simply equipping children with the necessary tools and skills. It will also help to understand which specific resilient skills and tools that are promoted in the study demonstrate significant, long-term effects.

Another noted skill that resilient children develop is to seek out healthy, supportive relationships. One intervention that promotes the development of healthy peer relationships is the Youth Relations Project. Early adolescence is the beginning stages of dating, and because these teens have no previous experience of healthy dating relation-

ships, this may become a time of self-exploration and experimentation with their romantic identity. During this time, it is hypothesized that adolescents who are in an adverse situation and have no understanding of a positive and intimate relationship because of childhood maltreatment are at high risk for becoming involved in violent and abusive dating relationships. Furthermore, peer pressure may encourage adolescents to get involved in dating relationships even though they may not necessarily feel ready, which could also potentially result in a violent and abusive dating relationships.

The purpose of the Youth Relations Project was to give direction during this experimental time with the potential that this learning will have long-term effects of helping adolescents seek out positive and healthy intimate relationships. This prevention-based program was targeted at both males and females ages fourteen through sixteen who were considered to be at-risk of developing abusive relationships due to their own history of maltreatment. The program was conducted in 18 sessions that focused both on preventing abusive behavior and on promoting healthy and non-violent relationships by equipping adolescents with necessary tools to make informed choices and enhance relationship competence. The program is based on aspects of attachment theory and social learning theory and includes feminist explanations of relationship violence. Some of the things that adolescents are taught within the program are the differences between a healthy and abusive relationship, how to get access to useful resources, examples of good and bad dating patterns, proper emotional expression, and how to actively listen, have empathy, and problem solve.

Results indicated that when compared to controls who did not participate in the intervention, adolescents who were randomly assigned to the intervention demonstrated a significant decrease in all forms

of victimization and physical and emotional abuse perpetration. Furthermore, a two-year follow-up indicated that the intervention participants were significantly less abusive toward their dating partners and reported less, physical, emotional, and threatening forms of abuse by their partners. These results suggest that the intervention was successful in providing the necessary tools for adolescents to avoid becoming involved in unhealthy and abusive relationships (Riley, & Masten, 2005). However, it would be interesting if the study also examined whether the quality of the participants' intimate relationships was significantly better than the controls and whether these skills were also used to seek out an intimate relationship with a mentor. This would help to understand if this intervention promoted the development of relationships similar to the kind that resilient individuals find that are healthy and supportive through difficult situations.

Overall, the research on resilient children has indicated that even though they may be experiencing different adverse situations, resilient children generally use similar skills and resources to overcome and succeed. Furthermore, it is theorized that these children are resilient because they are fully developed for their age and are simply using their developmental skills in extreme situations. Therefore, it is suggested that non-resilient children, whether they are currently in an adverse situation or not, are also capable of becoming resilient if they are equipped with the proper developmental skills and resources. Interventions that promote resilient skills for both at-risk and not at-risk children support this idea in that there were significant positive changes for participants in the intervention condition of all of the studies. This suggests that with the correct intervention program, children may be able to learn how to better adapt to their ad-

verse situations or to be prepared for future adverse situations.

However, before the proper intervention is developed, more research needs to be conducted on how to promote resiliency in children. Current interventions need to include long-term follow-up studies to better understand if the intervention program has long-term effects. This will help to determine what age is the best time to start the intervention, how long it should last, what specific skills to promote, and how to implement the program most effectively. It may be useful to first use an experimental design to better control for and test what specifically will contribute to a successful intervention program. One way this could be accomplished would be to design a study that includes two or more separate controlled workshops that have identical curriculum and comparable environments. However, in the intervention workshops, things such as teaching specific resilient skills and different intervention methods would also be included within the curriculum. After the workshops are completed, evaluations of the intervention workshops can be made by comparing results to the control workshops.

Finally, it is important that research continues to search for the most effective way to promote resiliency in children. It may be possible to develop a program in which children learn about these resilient skills and resources as a part of everyday life. Previous research has suggested that it may be possible to incorporate these skills into classroom instruction by equipping teachers with the necessary tools and guidance. Based upon previous research, further research on this topic may indicate that an intervention to promote resilient skills may just mean incorporating emotional and social learning into a school's curriculum. Providing these children with constant exposure and practice to resilient skills in a supportive atmosphere may assist all children to become resilient

in the face of any adversity.

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Creating Womanhood

Submitted by Chelsea Rives



What does it mean to be a woman? Why are some people born into the right body, while others aren't? What is the cause for this? Do we create ourselves? Endless questions run through my mind as I reread She's Not There. For every question answered, another is formed. Jennifer Boylan's transition from male to female has, without a doubt, forever changed my perspective on womanhood.

I. Out of the Closet and Into the Spotlight

Jennifer Finney Boylan, author of She's Not There, is one of the most inspirational women I have ever come across. I can honestly say that while researching her for this paper, I fell in love with her. Jennifer's raw honesty and bravery is a goal all women should strive to reach. Jenny was fortunate enough to have the resources, namely the love and support of her family and friends, as well as the money necessary to undergo the transition from male to female. She was also blessed to be born in the era that she was. The end of the century was a wonderful time for the trans-community. As Riki Wilchins reminds us, the 1990s saw gender advocacy reaching new heights (Wilchins 21). We can thank Virginia Prince for this. In 1960 Virginia held the first convention for cross-dressers in a discreet hotel room. This convention was an anonymous way for people to express themselves in a shame-free environment (Wilchins 22). Since then a vast social network has been forming, making it possible for cross-dressers, transgendered and transsexual people alike to enter the realm

of visibility. By 1996 trans issues started to be covered by the gay media (Wilchins 26). Recognition is spreading as each year passes, with the help of people like Jennifer Boylan willing to step into the spotlight. Jenny volunteers her private life to the public in order to further understanding and acceptance. As she tells Christopher Muther, "I think most people are surprised that we don't sit around talking about sex changes all day. We talk about homework and practicing trumpet, radical and revolutionary things like that. We're changing the world by living a quiet, normal life" (Muther). Just today, while flipping through the channels, I saw an ad for a new television series on WE entitled "Sex Change Hospital." It's these seemingly small steps that will change the world.

II. Let's Talk About Sex(ual Reassignment Surgery)

In 2000 Jennifer began her transition. Although it would have been possible to transition prior to the new millennium, it would have been significantly more difficult. According to Alison Oram, the first documented sex change was performed in Germany of 1930. The patient was Lili Elbe. The most publicized sexual reassignment surgery is the former US soldier Christine Jorgenson in 1952 (Oram 278). As hospitals began shying away from sex change procedures, private doctors took over, this shift made sex-reassignment surgeries much easier to access, as well as more affordable (Wilchins 23).

While reading of Jennifer's transition my curiosity was peaked.

What exactly happens during a sex change procedure? Reluctantly I put down *She's Not There* and ventured over to my computer. After about ten minutes I found a website that looked legitimate. Dr. Chettawut Tulayaphanich is a doctor in Thailand who performs sexual reassignment surgeries. The standard procedure costs nine thousand American dollars. Dr. Tulayaphanich requires his patients to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a psychiatrist, or someone equally qualified. The patient must have lived exclusively in the opposite sex role, as well as take hormones, for the six months prior to surgery (Dr. Tulayaphanich). According to Richard Wassersug, hormone treatment has two main physiological aims. The first being to eliminate the secondary sex characteristics as much as possible. The other, to induce the secondary sex characteristics of the desired sex. This is done through various combinations of estrogen and anti-androgen (Wassersug 102). The results include fat redistribution, the diminishing and softening of body hair, breast development, nipple sensitivity, softening (and typically the drying) of skin, and occasionally the loss of energy and vitality (Wassersug 103).

Dr. Tulayaphanich replicates the vagina in its entirety, from the clitoris to the vestibule of the vulva. The scrotal skin is the most favorable material for the vaginal wall, although tissue from the anus can also be used. If this is used the procedure is typically more expensive. After surgery the most important thing for a patient to do is vaginal dilation. This is done under the supervision of a nurse until the patient is deemed ready to proceed on her own. Using vaginal stents of varying sizes, the goal is to gain and maintain maximum depth, which is approximately six inches. This will be done for the rest of the patient's life under a set

schedule. Two months after surgery the patient can have intercourse; the majority of Dr. Tulayaphanich's patients are able to reach orgasm within a year (Dr. Tulayaphanich).

III. Biting Your Own Teeth

"And part of it is – ready for this? – still learning what it means to be a woman, and feeling content, even excited by what I learn and feel" (Boylan, home page). Now fifty, Jennifer is still learning about what it means to be a woman. I'd like to argue that this is not because she used to be a man, because she never was a man. "I always had to choose to be James. Being Jenny, though, isn't like that. I just am" (Boylan, *She's Not There* 162). Yes, she once had the body of a man, but it is important to remember that a body is nothing more than a vessel. Jennifer, like so many others, is still finding herself. After all, human beings are nothing more than ever changing, ever evolving works of art. We are born blank canvases that are continuously painted and repainted until the day we die. (And who knows, maybe long after.) As a young child Jenny would play "girl planet." Walking through the woods pretending she was stranded on a planet whose atmosphere transformed her into a girl, Jennifer always knew she was truly female. "Remember when you woke up this morning – I'd say to my female friends – and you knew you were female? *That's* how it feels. *That's* how I knew" (Boylan, *She's Not There* 22).

The Merriam-Webster dictionary has numerous definitions for woman. The first being "an adult female person" and another being "of a distinctively feminine nature" (Merriam-Webster). Following the first definition, to be a woman she would have to possess the female reproductive organs. But following the second, she would simply need to act and feel like a woman. So what is it that makes us who we are? Why was I

born into the “right” body, while Jenny was not? It’s clearly not biological, so then is it psychological? Some have argued that gender is a social construct. Up to this very moment, as I type these very words, I have whole-heartedly agreed. But under that argument, how would you explain transsexuals? They are quote obviously not socially geared towards being females. If this was the case, then there would be no such thing as transsexuals, or only a handful. We have ruled out biology and psychology/society. So, my dear reader, what is left? What makes us, all of us, who we are? Why are some people female and some male, and still others are another sex that language, and far too many people, have ignored? Is there some force out there decided what game we will play? I believe gender is too complex for one answer. Maybe it is part social construction, part biological; maybe it’s another factor that we haven’t even dreamt of yet. We are young, and we know little, no matter what many would like to believe. Maybe we’ll never have an answer to this mind-boggling question, but it’s certainly worth the thought. As Alan Watt’s has declared “trying to define yourself is like trying to bite your own teeth” (Moncur).

IV. “This is nothing we can fix.”

Now let us look at the initial journey – maybe you can find the answers that evade me. As I mentioned earlier, Jenny knew from a very young age that she was not a he. “Although my understanding of exactly how much trouble I was in grew more specific over time, as a child I surely understood enough about my condition to know it was something I’d better keep private.” Early on, she was faced with this incalculable burden, a frightened child knowing that there was something seriously amiss, knowing that it *must* be kept a secret. “By intuition I was certain that the thing I knew to be true

was something others would find both impossible and hilarious” (Boylan, *She’s Not There* 21). Imagine, if you will, a toddler clutching a safety blanket. Look into that child’s eyes. Do you see fear? Do you see sadness? Most would assume these emotions are caused by something trivial, such as a thunderstorm or a strange face. Would you even think of the possibility that this child was thinking, in a toddler’s limited language, that she was not in the right body? Imagine the confusion Jenny must have felt. Imagine the turmoil. How could a parent know? And if that child expressed her thoughts, how would the news be taken? Would it be shrugged off as a child’s game?

It isn’t uncommon for a transwoman to now at a young age. Take Hanna Rosin’s article about Brandon for example. “Brandon, God made you a boy for a special reason,” his mother Tina told him one night. “God made a mistake,” he replied. From toddlerhood he gravitated towards “girly” activities, such as playing with Barbies and dressing up in his mother’s heels. In fact, his first full sentence was “I like your heels.” Never having heard the word transgender until Brandon was eight, Tina was lost. She believed Brandon was the only boy who dealt with these issues. But eventually she connected with an internet community of parents of transgendered children. Shortly after this she brought Brandon, his stepfather Bill, and her two other children to the Trans-Health Conference in Philadelphia. Here Tina found the support she needed, and became convinced that Brandon’s issues were real. “This is nothing we can fix. In his brain, in his *mind*, Brandon’s a girl.” This realization was emphasized by the conversation Brandon, who was then introducing himself as Bridget, unbeknownst to his parents, had with a fellow child. “Are you transgender?” asked his friend. “What’s that?” replied Brandon. “A boy who wants to be a girl.” “Yeah. Can I see your

balloon?” The stark simplicity of this dialogue says it all. To Bridget, there is no question. She is a girl. Rosin explains that “before they have much time to be shaped by experience, before they know their sexual orientation, even in defiance of their bodies, children can know their gender” (Rosin 1).

It is vital that these communities and conventions exist. Without them, countless numbers would be floundering, drowning in their own troubles. Thousands would feel even more isolated than they already do. And this doesn't only go for the transsexuals themselves, but their friends and families as well. These outlets help people accept the truth that transsexualism is not a choice that can be reversed, and that steps can be taken to help those who suffer. Now, if only there were more awareness campaigns centered on this issue. In good time? Maybe, but I'd rather not wait.

V. Maddy Wasn't Cured

Years pass, the toddler matures into a preteen. Jennifer, then James, is now ten. “The first time I remember trying to come up with some sort of solution to the *being alive problem* was about 1968” (Boylan, *She's Not There* 22). James goes for a long, solitary walk, and contemplates his life. How many ten year olds delve into such heavy, philosophical questions such as this? “And then I thought, *Maybe you could be cured by love*” (Boylan, *She's Not There* 23). Fast forward, James is in graduate school, and is living his private life as a female, feeling afraid and secluded. “I was sitting on top of a mountain of secrets so high that it was impossible to see the earth anymore” (Boylan, *She's Not There* 70). Her struggles would have been greatly lessened if she had the support of a trans-community, if acceptance was something she could have fathomed. Later, while liv-

ing in Baltimore, James, like so many others, gathers all the girls clothing he has, including makeup and accessories, and throws them away (Boylan, *She's Not There* 83). He has been seeing Grace, and is falling in love with her. But he is not cured by love. Nor is he cured by marriage and a family.

“I often woke up and lay there in the dark...I'm the wrong person, I thought, I'm living the wrong life, in the wrong body” (Boylan, *She's Not There* 102). At age forty two she realizes that the time for self acceptance has come. The time to speak to Grace has come. “The burden that had been mine alone for all these years was now Grace's, and in the weeks that followed she walked through her days broken and crushed” (Boylan, *She's Not There* 127). Jennifer is an extraordinarily lucky woman. Grace, after a long journey of her own, never leaves Jenny. She sticks with Jenny, and is with her to this very day (Harkavy). The parents tell their two young boys, and Jennifer is dubbed “Maddy,” a combination of mom and daddy (Boylan, *She's Not There* 159). Jennifer tells her friends, some in person, some through a letter, and begins her transition. She is shown an amazing amount of love and support from all. Of course there are questions and confusion, all of which she handles very well, and with much humor.

Has Jennifer's journey been made any easier because she is a writer and professor of literature? Was it any easier for her to imagine her life in a different body? Maybe it was easier to imagine herself in the correct body, but I don't think there is any way to ease such a journey. I don't believe Jenny ever had a choice. Yes, getting the surgery was a choice, but being a woman wasn't. Some factor other than her own desire made that a non-choice. What was that factor? I haven't the slightest idea. I have no idea what makes us who we are. Society plays a major role, of course, but how big of a role

when it comes to what sex you are? Dear reader, I regret that I cannot give you a set answer. What I have presented is a pallet, quite like She's Not There, a base work to identify questions for you to answer.

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Sexualizing Black Women in America

Submitted by Lindsey Wiltse



*Girl, what makes you wanna fuck with me now?
I've been wantin' to fuck wit' you for quite a while
Is the money makin' you wanna fuck with me?
Whoa...if money's gonna make me slam these
hoes...then alright.*

"Fuck Dat Bitch" by 50 Cent

"God damn lil' buddy take off your clothes and let me see that apple bottom and that brown booty," croons Crime Mob in their song "Rock Her Hips." Being an obvious jab at black female sexuality, "apple bottom" is modern slang for a large, shapely rear end, calling out the "brown" aspect of her behind. In current media depictions of African American women, and specifically rap music, they are most likely described as overly sexual, flaunting shapely bodies to men who are all too willing to be pleased by women eager to please them. I have noticed advertisements for clothing where white women are being suggestive, showing a bit of skin or biting their lips for a come-hither-and-you-will-see look, while black women are more likely to be half-clothed, legs open, and laying on a bed, inviting the viewer to her body. I have noticed that African American women are indeed more likely to be sexualized in American society. In the Biblical creation stories, revered in our culture, Eve, when eating the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, sets a precedent for all women to be sexual temptresses, regardless of race or class. When did black women bear the brunt of a hyper sexualized culture

on their bodies, and why are they picked out over others?

Born in the eighties and early nineties, this generation has grown up in something referred to as "hip hop culture." Hip hop culture, as I have learned, was started by black and Latino youths in the Bronx and consist of four distinct elements: rapping, deejaying, break-dancing, and graffiti. The culture evolved in response to white supremacy in American society. Following the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement, minorities were looking to successfully migrate into mainstream white society. Moving away from a perceived lack of individuality in New York City at that historical moment, hip hop allowed men to make a significant name for themselves in their communities. In the time since it hit the mainstream airwaves in 1979, hip hop culture has grown to dominate the media. Rappers and the lifestyles they promote bring in an enormous amount of money to producers, fashion designers, artists, and the executives in charge of television, radio and advertising. As a significant creative force in modern society, hip hop continues to positively reinvent itself. According to rapper KRS-ONE, "creativity is seen as feminine. In these single families that many of us grew up in, we didn't have any fathers, so we were missing the analytical sides of ourselves. Instead, we are creative and

intelligent, and this comes from our mothers. There is creativity in graffiti, in b-boying” (qtd. in Goldblum). Many lower-income families, the ones directly impacted by hip hop, are mother-led, single parent households, according to KRS-ONE. He admits that hip hop is based on a feminine creativity experienced by these men without fathers in their lives. If the very thing that causes their individuality and expression is a feminine characteristic, one attributed to their own mothers, then the exploitation of women prevalent within the culture is difficult to explain.

MySistah’s contributor Ayanna begins to offer an explanation as to the role and status of women in hip hop culture. She states:

All women, but mostly black women in particular are seen in popular hip-hop culture as sex objects. Almost every hip-hop video that is regularly run today shows many dancing women (usually surrounding one or two men) wearing not much more than bikinis, with the cameras focusing on their body parts. These images are shown to go along with a lot of the explicit lyrics that commonly contain name calling to suggest that women are not worth anything more than money, if that. Women are described as being only good for sexual relations by rappers who describe their life as being that of a pimp. In many popular rap songs men glorify the life of pimps, refer to all women as they think a pimp would to a prostitute, and promote violence against women for

'disobeying.' (1)

Within this interpretation, the ideals of creativity lauded by KRS-ONE that are passed through the mother become lost in chauvinism. While it started out as a way to relieve frustrations and stake an identity within a white supremacist society, hip hop culture in the twenty first century has shifted slightly from its original goals. Instead, what I see are rappers obsessed with sex, women, masculinity, and capitalism. Since the emergence of so-called “gangsta rap,” mainstream hip hop culture promotes a lifestyle of money hungry men and women which, seen just in its media portrayals, leads to stereotyping of black women as insatiable sexual creatures. The images of voluptuous, gyrating women, circling their rear on a man’s groin does not convey creativity, but instead, objectifies African American women.

Significantly, the origins of the South Bronx inspired music and lifestyle found markets in the suburbs of the same city it emerged in. The mostly white populations that moved out of the city after World War II enjoyed this form of art and music enough that the appeal to white audiences influenced the corporate white interests. In fact, without the large numbers of suburban and rural audiences, the lasting power of hip hop music would not exist. In 2008, without getting into too much detail, I will say that through product endorsements and corporate funding, hip hop is largely fueled by white CEOs. In this capitalist and patriarchal nation, the people in power provide capital to the rap artists and their record companies to produce a particular image. This same image appeals to the audiences

who see mainstream rap on television. While I am not saying that African American men do not have any role in the production, I am willing to note the strong hand of white influence that goes into the making of rap music. The hypermasculinity associated with hip hop culture would not exist if it were not for the hypersexualization of black women. Key historical aspects that cause white producers of music to encourage, consume, and portray African American women in such a manner need to be identified. Since there is this influence, the images projected of African American women in this culture are manipulated by not only those who endorse it (white men) but also those who consume it (a largely white population). Kobena Mercer believes that “certain types of imagery are responsible for causing actual violence and abuse in society at large” (133), stating that “music is a key site in everyday life where men and women reflect on their gendered and sexual identities” (141). I will focus on the role white America plays in the oversexualization of black women currently manifested in a popular music form and lifestyle that exists today.

Bell hooks states that “white supremacist ideology insisted that black people, being more animal than human, lacked the capacity to feel and therefore could not engage the finer sensibilities that were the breeding ground for art” (67). If African Americans cannot, under white supremacist ideology, connect with a white aesthetic appeal, then what they produce in their view is not “art.” What their music is, then, is something outside of art, some sense of “otherness.” This suggests the reasoning

behind a white push behind a hip hop market and the portrayal of the women within it. Not only are African Americans made into a social other in regards to artistic creation, but African American women, specifically in hip hop culture, are placed on a different spectrum of “other.” Women, as a gender, are perceived as closer to nature due to our ability to birth children and men are seen as closer to civilization since they are seen as the ones making buildings and government systems. Since women as a whole are perceived as closer to nature, black women in particular are even more so. Black slave women were brought over from Africa, where they were seemingly taken from the jungle. By living in a “natural” setting instead of a civilized world, they were not ranked on par with white women, who lived in “civilization.” They would be more natural, and unbridled sexuality is not a trait associated with the whiter, Western world, but more seen with the darker people overtaken by colonialism. Under a white system, black women in hip hop culture are contrasted to white women; black individuals are ranked more deviant than white individuals. Black women, being seen as an Other, are inherently different than white women, therefore allowing her to be depicted as more sexual than others.

In the strand of thought that linked black women with animalistic, unbridled sexuality comes the Jezebel stereotype created in Antebellum American society. Rupe Simms suggests that the “preeminent features of the dominant ideology that justified their exploitation of female slaves... that contributed substantially to the social construction of African women’s

gender” (880). The supremacist ideology maintained that slave women were able to be sexually exploited, thereby leading to numerous African American women being raped and treated solely as sexual objects by their white masters. Simms defines the Jezebel stereotype:

The sex-starved woman, who was childishly promiscuous and consumed by lustful passions. Her sexual aggression, fertility, and libidinous self-expression were considered limitless. The Jezebel image concretized Black female subordination, justifying the rape of African women by white men. According to this portrayal, the African woman truly enjoyed being ravaged by her master...so that abusing her was simply satisfying her natural desires...the Jezebel image sustained the domination of white men. (882)

The Jezebel image allowed for white men to relate to black women in a more primitive manner than they would their white counterparts. If slave women loved being ravaged, then indeed they differed from the white women whose bodies were not used for pleasure. This relates to the images seen in hip hop videos. While using different intentions, the dozens half naked women allowing men to place dollar bills underneath their thong underwear for a good look at their rear end allude to this antediluvian stereotype; black women are rendered in this image of limitless libido by a continually supremacist society. Again, this compares to the black women as a socialized Other because it places her as differing from

white women. Black women only want sex, according to the Jezebel stereotype, and in such a framework, white women are defined as not wanting sex. Hip hop portrayals of women as a Jezebel type figure identify to the white consumer base that African American women are inherently more sexual than white women.

Rape, as noted by Edward Shorter, is not only a way for men to prove their sexual dominion over women but for all men to keep all women in a state of fear in order to triumph over them. In this manner, the women are seen as a dispensable sex object and remain protective over their genitals at all time. Simms suggests that the Jezebel image, beginning in the nineteenth century, sustained the domination of white men over black women. The Jezebel imagery described by Simms directly relates to Shorter’s definition of rape. When black women are accused of being insatiable sex creatures, then indeed the power structure is maintained; white men remain in control over the bodies of women, and most especially, black women. In the antebellum south, “no law existed to forbid the rape of female slaves by their masters. The rape of an enslaved woman by someone other than her master was considered trespass, a property crime against the slave owner” (Sitomer 10). What this rape without consequence attitude does is relegate black women to a status of property, to be used as how their white owner saw fit. Although there is no legalized ownership of black bodies anymore, there is the objectification of black bodies. If they are being portrayed in a sexualized manner, then it invites a voyeurism of their sexuality by

consumers. If their consumers are mostly young, suburban, white males, then their bodies are being controlled by these same men that influence their media portrayal, which will coincide with eventual negative and consequential stereotypes.

Mercer is sure to pronounce that “patriarchal culture constantly redefines and adjusts the balance of male power and privilege, and the prevailing system of gender roles, through a variety of material, economic, social and political structures” (137). Slavery is one such institution where sexual power, due socioeconomic and political influence, can cause an individual to become a body instead of a person. A capitalistic, racist and patriarchal culture can lead to the imagery seen in the lyrics and videos of mainstream hip hop artists to be pervasive and influential. Before the Civil War, black women were often forced into polygamy and polyandry, with black men mating with other black women as decreed by a slave master in order to produce children with traits the slaveholder desired. In polygamous systems, one man would be made to mate with a variety of women or one woman would mate with a few males. Now, multiple women dance upon, lick their lips and shake their hips at the one man, usually the man rapping into the microphone. In Kristen Gentry’s “Hip Hop Culture and Contemporary American Literature” class, we have spoken of a few clips shown of documentaries where many of the men speak of them and their friends either trying to get physical with one girl, or having pride that they all have gotten physical with her. In polygamous situations, the woman will

be seen as wanting sex, and desiring all of these men to have her, or willing to compete with other sexual women for one man by putting herself out there more than they have. Although there is a significant difference between forced sexual intercourse and the willingness of girls to submit to this viewing of their bodies, the images in mainstream media bring up an idea reminiscent of polygamous situations. This stereotype reaching back to Antebellum America is not something that should continue over a hundred years later.

Magnus Hirschfeld, in his 1932 article entitled “Racism” explains sexualizing a group of people in a way that sums up, in an obvious manner, any predilection anyone may have to stereotype, as is done with African American women. He says, “sexual peculiarities... are so equally distributed among the nations and among every stratum of the population that there can be no excuse for assigning what are merely individual characteristics to groups or races, and to parties or the advocates of specified opinions” (230). An objection would be to say that the women who are portrayed in these videos and the media know what they are getting into when they sign on to appear scantily clad or overly sexual. That would be a fair argument, but what is not fair is when the millions of women who do not make a conscious decision to appear in this manner in mass media are assigned the characteristics and behavior of the few who do. It becomes an issue when certain people in power make the decisions of who and what will appear in what form, while in doing so, harm a plethora of women who should remain unaffected. It is not the

women who are grinding in bikinis that become the problem, but the fundamental flaw is when hypersexualization is attributed to all African American women, not solely the ones who profit from making themselves out to appear so.

White Americans, and most specifically white men, have a fascination with the bodies of women, especially black women. Instead of the use of African American women's bodies through forced rape during slave times, the hypersexualization of women through hip hop culture allows for a white gaze on black female sexual bodies. bell hooks later writes that "consumer capitalism has not been able to completely destroy artistic production in underclass black communities" (67). In opposition to what is seen on television, there is a huge underground rap and hip hop scene where hypersexualization of women does not occur. This is where hip hop is created without white influence, and calls to its roots in jazz and reggae, both black art forms. It is the mainstream attitude of black women being more sexual than white woman is hammered into the minds of the American public through the media. To me, this is a peculiar social phenomenon. This is a continuation of slavery mindset in the twenty-first century that is being perpetuated not only by black rappers, but many of the white audiences who fuel the consumer base. There is nothing inherently sexual about black women, but instead, there is a sexuality placed upon their bodies, first by colonizers, then by the slaveholders, and now by the popular media. I think there needs to be an understanding on the meaning placed on the

space of other people. With this meaning, these perceptions and stereotypes can be overturned and African American women would not be unnecessarily targeted for consumption in today's society.

France: Chapitre V- Provinces du Centre

Submitted by Erinn Kehoe



Les provinces centrales de la France sont une région intéressante et variée qui s'étend à couvrir une bonne partie de la superficie de ce pays. Ces provinces, qui incluent la Touraine, l'Orléanais, le Berry, le Nivernais, Le Bourbonnais, l'Auvergne, la Marche, et le Limousin, offrent un peu de tout. Quant aux éléments géographiques, on y trouve des montagnes, des plateaux, des fleuves, et des vallées – même des volcans éteints. Il y a des industries variées et de l'agriculture de beaucoup de genres, du monde contemporain mélangé avec la vie du passé, de la plus rurale campagne et de la ville moderne. On rencontre dans cette région des gens de tous les parcours de la vie, et une étude des provinces diverses du Centre donne une petite vue de la vie en France.

Aujourd'hui, les provinces du Centre font partie des régions modernes du Centre, du Limousin, et de l'Auvergne. La plupart de cette région est sur le grand Plateau Central, mais un peu (partie de la Touraine, le Berry, et l'Orléanais) fait partie du Bassin Parisien¹ et l'Auvergne et le Limousin appartient au Massif Central (Evans 134). L'élévation augmente du nord-ouest au sud-est;² l'Orléanais et la Touraine sont les plus basses, tandis que l'Auvergne est la plus montagneuse (la plus haute élévation de cette région se trouve en Auvergne à Mont Dore qui arrive à 6188 pieds [Evans 133]). Ce territoire est arrosé par plusieurs fleuves

(comme la Loire et le Rhône) et par des rivières (comme le Cher, l'Indre, la Vienne, la Saône, et l'Allier) (Evans 105, 134). On y trouve beaucoup de terres qui sont bonnes pour l'agriculture, mais aussi avec beaucoup de brandes et de forêts de châtaigniers en abondance (Evans 135). A cause de la difficulté de traverser ce pays et de communiquer aux époques d'autrefois il n'y a pas de grand centre de commerce et d'industrie dans ce local ; au lieu d'un seul, plusieurs centres ont développé (Evans 135). Ces centres se trouvent souvent à un lieu qui leur permet de relier les gens des montagnes et les gens de la basse terre.

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La Touraine est une assez petite province à l'est de cette région, connue comme « le jardin de la France » (Evans 104-5). La Loire, le fleuve qui coule de l'est à l'ouest à travers la province, est le plus long et le moins navigable de la France³ Tours, une ville industrielle et commerciale, est la capitale de la Touraine et se trouve au bord de la Loire. On y trouve une école préparatoire de médecine et de pharmacie. Près de Tours, il y a beaucoup de châteaux construits pendant la Renaissance dans la vallée de la Loire qui sont maintenant de grandes attractions touristiques (Denoeu 268). Par exemple, le château de Chambord qui se trouve à 40 kilomètres au sud-est d'Orléans était bâti pour François 1^{er} par l'architecte Pierre Neveu (Denoeu 268). Ce château, qui était le préféré de Louis XIV, est le plus vaste des châteaux de la Loire (Denoeu 269). Il y a d'autres châteaux qui sont plus petits que Chambord, comme Blois, qui n'est pas loin de Chambord (Denoeu 269) et qui était le préféré de Catherine de Médicis et de Louis XII (Denoeu 270-1), et Amboise, qui est perché sur une falaise au-dessus de la Loire et est connu comme le lieu de la mort de

Léonardo da Vinci en 1519 (Denoeu 272). Chenonceau, un des plus célèbres châteaux de la région, est connu comme « le château des dames » parce que c'était la résidence de la maîtresse d'Henri II, Diane de Poitiers, et de sa femme, Catherine de Médicis (mais à temps distincts, bien sûr) (Denoeu 272). Pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale plus de 2000 blessés français y étaient soignés (Denoeu 272). Maintenant ce château appartient à Menier, le chocolatier célèbre (Denoeu 272). Ce n'est pas pour rien que la Touraine est souvent appelée « le pays des châteaux » (Denoeu 272).

Un autre surnom commun pour la Touraine est « le jardin de la France » (Denoeu 272), à cause de la grande productivité de la région. Cette fertilité est à cause de la proximité de la Loire et du bon sol que le fleuve y dépose quand il y a des inondations fréquentes (Evans 104). Cet endroit est renommé pour ses produits agricoles, comme les vins, les eaux-de-vie, et les fruits secs. Un vin célèbre qui vient de cette région est le vouvray, une boisson légère et pétillante produite à Vouvray (Denoeu 32). La Touraine produit aussi des rillettes de Tours, un produit alimentaire spécial. On y trouve aussi la production des tissus comme des soieries, des lingeries, et des tapis. Cette région a des industries comme l'imprimerie, la fonderie, et la production de produits chimiques et de meubles. On y exploite les ressources minières comme le tuffeau, une pierre blanche qui était utilisé pour construire les châteaux de la Loire (Denoeu 46). En plus de toutes ces industries et tous ces produits la Touraine est connue comme la patrie de nombreux peintres comme Clouet, Fouquet, de Boucicaut,

et Destouches. Un autre fils important de cette région est l'écrivain Honoré de Balzac, écrivain des romans, des essais, des critiques littéraires, et des articles journalistiques. Cet auteur, qui est un des plus célèbres de la France, a écrit les romans comme Eugénie Grandet, Le Père Goriot, et d'autres. La Touraine est divisée en trois départements aujourd'hui : l'Indre-et-Loire, le Loir-et-Cher, et l'Indre.⁴

L'Orléanais est la province la plus au nord du Centre ; elle se trouve au nord-est de la Touraine. Le capitale de l'Orléanais est Orléans. Cette ville a été fondée par les Romains sur la Loire et appelée *Cenabum Aureliani* (Evans 100). Les sièges de cette ville par les Anglais en 1423 et 1429 restent célèbres, et c'était à Orléans que Jeanne d'Arc a inauguré sa mission merveilleuse qui devait sauver la France de la domination anglaise. Aujourd'hui, Orléans est sur une grande route importante et est connue comme un important marché central à cause de son déplacement dans le tournant de la Loire ; elle ne se trouve pas trop loin du plus grand centre d'affaires et de culture de la France, Paris (Evans 100). Chartres est une autre ville importante dans l'Orléanais, connue pour sa cathédrale ancienne qui a été construite à l'époque gothique. Les produits de l'Orléanais incluent des vinaigreries, du chocolat, des pépinières (Denoeu 38), des fruits, des grappes de raisin, et des légumes (« Provinces »). Ce pays a aussi de l'industrie dans le domaine des constructions mécaniques. Aujourd'hui, l'Orléanais est divisé en plusieurs départements modernes : le Loiret, le Loir-et-Cher, l'Eure-et-Loir, et

une partie de l'Essonne et de la Sarthe (« Provinces »).

La province du Berry est au sud de l'Orléanais et à l'est de la Touraine. La capitale de cette région est Bourges, connue pour une magnifique cathédrale gothique du XIIIe siècle. Cette cathédrale célèbre a des détails exaltants, comme cinq grandes portes de façade et des vitraux complexes (Denoeu 263). Autrefois, le Berry était un grand corridor entre la Bourgogne et l'Aquitaine, mais quand les modes de transport ont changé son emploi s'est réduit aussi (Evans 104). Ce pays est renommé pour ces produits agricoles, comme le blé, les moutons, les vins, et le fromage, et pour la gastronomie berrichonne (Evans 104). Le Berry a de l'industrie dans les domaines de la lingerie et de la confection et il produit aussi de l'houille et du fer, qui est utilisé dans la fonderie de canons (Denoeu 47). Cet endroit est la patrie de George Sand, l'auteur de nombreux romans, contes, et pièces de théâtre. Elle a raconté des histoires de la vie rustique de son pays natal dans les romans comme La Mare au Diable, François le Champi, et Les Maîtres Sonneurs (Denoeu 218). Maintenant, le Berry est divisée en quelques départements ; les deux principaux sont l'Indre et le Cher (« Provinces »).

Si on continue vers l'est du Berry, on trouve la province du Nivernais. La capitale, Nevers, se trouve sur la Loire et est connue pour son palais ducal et pour sa ferronnerie (Evans 139). En 1429 Jeanne d'Arc a pris cette ville du contrôle des Anglais envahissants (Denoeu 22). Cette région, qui est assez rurale et très boisée, a servi comme route entre Lyon et Limoges et entre la Bourgogne et le sud-est de la France, mais

aujourd'hui ses routes de communication et de voyage ne sont pas si importantes qu'autrefois (Evans 139). Les célèbres produits du Nivernais sont des vins et des faïences. Cette province est aujourd'hui connue comme le département moderne du Nièvre (« Provinces »).

Une autre province du Centre est le Bourbonnais, qui se trouve au sud du Berry et du Nivernais. La capitale de cette région se trouve sur l'Allier et s'appelle Moulins. Le Bourbonnais est connu comme le siège de la maison des Bourbon, qui a pris son nom du château qui se trouve près de Moulins, le Château Bourbon (« Provinces »). Plusieurs membres de la dynastie des Bourbon étaient des rois de la France du XVI^e siècle au XIX^e siècle, quand la monarchie a été abolie en France (« Provinces »). Cette province est un pays de bocage ; elle est assez pastorale et rustique (Evans 139). Le Bourbonnais fait des produits dans les industries de la confection et du cuir. Aujourd'hui, la région du Bourbonnais est le département moderne de l'Allier (« Provinces »).

L'Auvergne se trouve le plus au sud des provinces du Centre. La capitale, Clermont-Ferrand, est un centre important pour tout le plateau central ; les activités agricoles de cette région se situent autour de la ville (Evans 138). Une des plus célèbres cathédrales de la France, Notre-Dame-du-Port, est à Clermont-Ferrand (Denoeu 256) ; aussi, une des plus importantes universités de ce pays s'y trouve (Denoeu 336). Cette capitale est un centre de fabrication de pneus (les usines de Michelin s'y trouvent) (Denoeu 43) et de la construction de voitures (Evans 138). La géographie de ce lieu

est intéressante et variée. L'Auvergne comprend la région de la France qui s'appelle « le Massif Central », qui est une chaîne de volcans éteints (Evans 134). Ces montagnes étaient faites quand, à l'époque tertiaire, des laves noires ont coulé des fissures dans le plateau central à cause des convulsions de la terre (Denoeu 6). Les volcans éteints sont appelés « puys », duquel le plus haut (à 4800 pieds) s'appelle le Puy-de-Dôme (Evans 138). La Limagne, une grande plaine du Massif Central, fait partie de l'Auvergne. Cet élément géographique est le fond d'un ancien lac et fait maintenant partie de la vallée de l'Allier (Evans 138). La grande et fertile plaine, arrosée par l'Allier, est un bon lieu pour cultiver des céréales, des betteraves à sucre, et des fruits ; on y trouve aussi des vignobles (Evans 138) et l'élevage du bétail est y répandu (« Provinces »). Avec toute cette fertilité, ce n'est pas étonnant que l'Auvergne soit connue pour ses produits alimentaires, comme le chocolat de Royat, les pâtes-alimentaires, les fruits confits et les fromages (« Provinces »). L'élevage de brebis est idéal dans les montagnes rocheuses de la région, et le fromage qui s'appelle « le roquefort » y est fait du lait de ces brebis.⁵ Le lait est ramassé, chauffé, mis en moules, et ensemencé avec le *penicillium roqueforti*. Puis, le fromage est séché et vieilli dans les caves célèbres de Roquefort-sous-Soulzon (« Fabrication »). Beaucoup de gens de cette région travaillent dans cette industrie importante (« Fabrication »). Il y a aussi de l'industrie dans les secteurs des pneus, de la métallurgie, et de la houille blanche (Denoeu 47).

L'Auvergne est une célèbre région touristique. Une grande attraction est ses

nombreuses stations thermales, comme celles à Royat, à la Bouboule, et à Mont-Dore. Les sources chaudes des stations thermales viennent du volcanisme de la région (Evans 138).

L'Auvergne est aussi distinguée pour être la patrie de Blaise Pascal. Ce physicien, philosophe, et écrivain est mort avant d'avoir achevé son apologie de la religion chrétienne dont les fragments ont été publiés posthumes sous le titre de « Pensées ». On rappelle souvent une de ses phrases célèbres à propos de l'homme : « L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c'est un roseau pensant ». Aujourd'hui, la province de l'Auvergne est divisée entre les départements de l'Allier, du Cantal, de la Haute-Loire, et du Puy-de-Dôme (« Provinces »).

Le Limousin et la Marche sont les provinces au sud-ouest de la région centrale de la France. La Marche, qui est quelquefois considérée comme faisant partie du Limousin, a sa capitale à Guéret. Cette région produit des bijoux et du granit. Le Limousin, au sud de la Marche et considéré comme une partie du Massif Central, résonne encore avec l'impact de ses habitants d'autrefois. Par exemple, la province était nommée d'après les « Limovaces », une tribu gaulle qui y habitait avant que les Romains aient envahi. Limoges, la capitale du Limousin, a été fondé comme « *Augustoritum* » par les Romains, d'après le gué à Limoges sur la Vienne (« *ritum* » qui veut dire « gué » en latin) (Evans 137). Au fil des années, Limoges est devenu un grand centre chrétien et a attiré beaucoup de pèlerins (Evans 137). Un bâtiment célèbre à Limoges est la cathédrale de Sainte Étienne, édifice gothique construit

entre 1273 et 1520 (« Provinces »). Deux autres établissements importants sont un musée des céramiques et l'Université de Limoges (« Provinces »). La capitale est connue pour la littérature des troubadours en plus de ses bâtiments romains diverses (Evans 137). Limoges est actif dans plusieurs industries, y compris la fabrication d'émail, de l'équipement électrique, des pièces d'auto, du papier, et des chausseurs (« Provinces »).

Le Limousin en général est connu pour l'agriculture et la production de cuir. L'élevage de bétail est répandu dans toute cette région (Denoeu 38) ; les bœufs des boucheries de Limousin sont célèbres (« Provinces »). Les fermiers élèvent aussi des chevaux et des volailles et ils cultivent des châtaigneraies pour le bois et pour les fruits (Evans 136-7). Du seigle, du sarrasin, et des pommes de terre sont des récoltes communes du Limousin. On y trouve des distilleries et des fabricants de porcelaines fines et des chaussures. Le Limousin a une industrie du lainage (Evans 137) et il produit des tissus et des tapisseries (« Provinces »). Aujourd'hui, cette région est divisée entre les départements actuels du Corrèze, de la Creuse, et de la Haute-Vienne (« Provinces »).

Les provinces du Centre sont vraiment intéressantes et variées. Il y a un grand contraste entre les hauts puits de l'Auvergne et les rivières aux vallées de la Touraine et entre la vie agitée et moderne de la ville de Clermont-Ferrand et la vie rurale et calme du Berry. On trouve toutes sortes d'industries dans ces provinces : vins, soieries, lingerie, imprimerie, fonderie, produits chimiques, chaussures, meubles, cuirs, pneus, et

d'avantage, tous de la région centrale de la France. C'est aussi un bon lieu pour la production des produits agricoles, avec ses sols riches et ses nombreux fleuves et rivières. L'influence des Romains est forte dans ces régions, et il y a beaucoup de beaux bâtiments et d'impressionnantes constructions d'autrefois. Les provinces du Centre sont importantes dans l'histoire et la culture de la France, et elles continuent de l'être jusqu'à nos jours.

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Un Voyage en France: Deuxième Moitié

Submitted by Amy Lafleur



Nous recommençons notre tour de la France à Montpellier et nous partons de cette ville. Nous continuons vers l'est et vers la Côte d'Azur. Notre premier arrêt est à Arles. Nous restons dans cette ancienne ville avec son histoire romaine et sa culture artistique. C'était la résidence de Vincent Van Gogh. Bien que Van Gogh ait été néerlandais, il a passé beaucoup d'années de sa vie en France. Il a ajouté beaucoup au mouvement artistique en France, parce qu'il a peint les paysages de la France. À Arles, on peut voir quelques scènes des tableaux de Van Gogh. Par exemple, on peut voir le café dans lequel Van Gogh a peint « Café du Soir ». En réalité, ce café a été remodelé pour avoir l'air d'être comme celui dans la peinture.¹ Une autre caractéristique importante d'Arles est sa riche histoire. À Arles, il faut jeter un coup d'œil aux vestiges de l'Empire Romain.

D'Arles, nous faisons des excursions à d'autres sites importants. Nous allons vers l'ouest au Pont du Gard. Cet ancien pont était un aqueduc qui a été bâti par les Romains. Cette région australe de la France a été conquise par les Romains au deuxième siècle av. J.-C. et elle faisait ensuite partie de l'Empire Romain. Après avoir vu cet aqueduc célèbre, nous retournons à Arles. Le jour suivant, nous allons faire une autre excursion, cette fois-ci à Avignon.

Avignon était très important dans

l'histoire européenne et l'histoire française, toutes les deux. Au quatorzième siècle, de 1309 à 1377, les papes habitaient à Avignon. C'était « l'exil babylonien ».² De nos jours, nous pouvons voir le Palais des Papes à Avignon. À Avignon, il y a un autre pont célèbre. C'est le Pont St.-Bénézet qui est plus connu comme le Pont d'Avignon de la chanson pour les enfants.³ Ce pont est très vieux, mais la moitié du pont existe seulement de nos jours. L'autre moitié du pont a été détruite en 1668.⁴

Nous finissons notre séjour à Avignon et nous continuons le long de la Côte d'Azur. Notre point d'intérêt prochain est Marseille. Pour aller à Marseille, nous traversons le Rhône. Ce fleuve vient de la Suisse et du nord et elle se jette dans la mer Méditerranée. Sur la rive orientale du Rhône est la province de Provence. La Provence a une histoire très longue. Les Romains ont conquis cette partie de la France. Plus tard, beaucoup d'artistes et écrivains habitaient en Provence, par exemple, ce sont les peintres : Paul Cézanne, Vincent Van Gogh, Pablo Picasso et Henri Matisse qui ont tous choisi d'habiter en Provence.

La Provence est une belle province à côté de la mer Méditerranée. Cette région est connue pour ses plages et son histoire, et aussi pour son architecture. Plusieurs maisons en Provence, particulièrement à la campagne, sont faites en pierre. Les toits

en général ont des tuiles romaines rondes.⁵ Les maisons sont bâties pour les protéger contre le mistral.⁶ Ce vent froid et sec est très violent et il se passe souvent en hiver.⁷

Nous arrivons à Marseille. Marseille est la deuxième ville de la France et c'est aussi un port important.⁸ Cette ville a été fondée par les Grecs qui l'appelaient « Massalia ». C'est une vieille ville. À Marseille, nous pouvons voir le Château d'If, le site de la prison du Comte de Monte Cristo et l'Homme du Masque de Fer dans les romans d'Alexandre Dumas père, située dans une île qui n'est pas loin de la côte de Marseille. Cette prison est célèbre à cause du livre Le Comte de Monte Cristo par Alexandre Dumas, dans lequel le protagoniste a été emprisonné au Château d'If.

Un autre point d'arrêt est Nice. Cette ville sur la Côte d'Azur est très connue pour ses plages. Nice était située en Italie jusqu'en 1792 quand les Français l'ont saisie.⁹ Nice est restée une partie de la France jusqu'en 1814. De 1814 à 1860, Nice appartenait à l'Italie.¹⁰ Puis la France a regagné le contrôle de Nice en 1860 et Nice continue à être une ville française en ce moment. C'était la résidence de deux peintres importants : Henri Matisse et Marc Chagall.¹¹

Nous voyageons de Nice à Monaco. Monaco est une principauté autonome qui est située à l'intérieur des frontières de la France. C'est une principauté francophone. Monaco est peut-être connue aux États-Unis à cause de l'actrice américaine Grace Kelly, actrice célèbre des années 50 qui s'est mariée avec le prince Rainier de Monaco ; et ainsi elle est devenue princesse. La Principauté de Monaco est aussi connue pour le

Grand Prix de Monaco et Le Rallye de Monte Carlo, seule ville de Monaco.¹² À Monaco il y a de bons exemples d'architecture de la Belle Époque. Par exemple, il y a l'Opéra de Monte Carlo et le Grand Casino de Monte Carlo qui est mondialement connu.¹³ Tous les deux ont été conçus par Charles Gagnier, architecte français, célèbre pour avoir fait l'Opéra Paris, le Palais Gagnier.¹⁴ Après avoir vu Monaco, nous retournons à Nice et nous y resterons la nuit.

Le jour suivant, nous voyageons de Nice à Lyon. Lyon est une ville qui est située à la convergence du Rhône et de la Saône. À Lyon, le Rhône change de direction et il coule vers le sud vers la mer Méditerranée. Lyon est aussi située dans la région du Rhône-Alpes. À Lyon, nous voyons beaucoup d'histoire. Il y a des bâtiments qui datent de la Renaissance à Lyon.¹⁵ Surtout important, nous pouvons voir les traboules sous la cité. Ces tunnels ont été utilisés tout au long de l'histoire, originellement pour la livraison plus vite de la marchandise en soie, puis, plusieurs années plus tard ces traboules ont été utilisées par la Résistance française pendant l'occupation allemande.¹⁶ Ayant exploré la ville de Lyon, nous goûtons la cuisine lyonnaise, mondialement connue. Nous goûtons des plats du porc et de la tripe.¹⁷ Les personnes aventureuses peuvent goûter le sabodet, une saucisse qui est faite de la tête de cochon ou aussi un autre plat : la tête de veau. Ce sont des spécialités de la cuisine lyonnaise. Nous pouvons aussi goûter du vin lyonnais comme le vin du Beaujolais.¹⁸ Après deux jours à Lyons, nous continuons à Dijon en Bourgogne.

La Bourgogne est une région très importante. Il y a de bons vins et

des fromages qui viennent de la Bourgogne, et il y a des sites importants de la civilisation mondiale en Bourgogne. À Dijon, nous pouvons goûter la cuisine bourguignonne, comme les escargots, spécialité de la Bourgogne.¹⁹ La Bourgogne, en particulier Dijon, offre le jambon avec persil.²⁰ Dijon est aussi connue pour la moutarde.²¹ De Dijon, nous faisons des excursions à la campagne bourguignonne pour aller à Autun, à Vézelay, et à Cluny, tous sites religieux très anciens.

La première excursion est faite à Autun, connue pour sa cathédrale de Saint-Lazaire. Cette cathédrale, qui a été bâtie de 1120 à 1146, était faite par un artiste qui s'appellait Gislebertus.²² Elle est notée pour son architecture, parce que Gislebertus a signé son travail,²³ et en plus Gislebertus a sculpté toute la cathédrale.²⁴ Nous admirons la cathédrale, mais puis nous voyageons à Cluny. À Cluny, nous voyons l'ancienne abbaye qui date du dixième siècle au Moyen Âge.²⁵ L'abbaye est tombée en ruine mais ces vestiges démontrent la grandeur de l'Église au X^e siècle.²⁶ Cluny a aussi servi comme modèle architectural pour d'autres lieux religieux comme St. Pierre à Rome.²⁷ Ensuite, nous retournons à Dijon pour y rester la nuit.

Le lendemain, nous voyageons à Vézelay où nous visitons la Basilique Ste.-Madeleine. Cette basilique était très importante dans l'histoire parce que beaucoup de pèlerins y ont voyagé pour visiter les reliques de St. Marie de Magdalen.²⁸ L'architecture remarquable de Vézelay est aussi à noter et c'est un bon exemple du changement du style romanesque au style gothique.²⁹ Puis, nous retournons à Dijon pour passer la nuit.

Au matin, nous quittons Dijon et nous voyageons à Strasbourg.

En continuant vers le nord-est, nous nous trouvons en Alsace et plus tard en Lorraine. Cette région de la France était très importante dans l'histoire de la France. Les Français et les Allemands se sont battus pendant longtemps pour obtenir le contrôle des deux provinces. L'Alsace et la Lorraine sont connues pour ces changements de contrôle franco-allemands et pour l'influence allemande dans ces provinces. La proximité de l'Allemagne influence la culture de l'Alsace et celle du nord de la Lorraine. Quand on pense à la choucroute, on pense à Allemagne, mais en Alsace et en Lorraine cette nourriture est aussi une spécialité. En Alsace, qui est plus près de l'Allemagne, on mange de la choucroute avec du jambon, mais en Lorraine, on mange de la choucroute avec du poivre noir et avec du genièvre.³⁰ L'Alsace et la Lorraine sont aussi connues pour leur foie gras qui est dans des pâtés et dans des terrines.³¹ Une autre nourriture que les deux régions préparent est la quiche, une tarte avec des œufs, du lait, et de la crème.³² On peut y ajouter d'autres ingrédients pour créer des variétés de quiche. Vous connaissez probablement la quiche lorraine qui ajoute du jambon. Il faut goûter ces nourritures particulières de ces régions.

Nous entrons premièrement en Alsace, la région plus près de l'Allemagne. Elle partage une frontière avec l'Allemagne. Un fleuve qui s'appelle le Rhin sépare les deux pays. Notre point d'arrêt suivant est Strasbourg, ville française située près du Rhin et près de la frontière allemande. Strasbourg est une ville très importante à la France et à

l'Europe. C'est la capitale de l'Europe dans laquelle le parlement européen se situe.

Nous finissons notre séjour à Strasbourg et nous voyageons vers l'ouest en Lorraine. Nous visitons à Metz, ville en Lorraine. La Lorraine est connue pour une fille paysanne qui entendait les voix des saints qui lui ont dit qu'elle devait sauver la France. Cette fille était Jeanne d'Arc et bien qu'elle ait été « la Pucelle d'Orléans », elle est originaire de la Lorraine. Jeanne d'Arc est née à Domrémy (connue maintenant comme Domrémy-la-Pucelle). Nous restons la nuit à Metz et nous faisons une excursion le jour suivant à Domrémy-la-Pucelle, lieu de naissance de cette héroïne française. Domrémy-la-Pucelle est situé à peu près quatre-vingts kilomètres au sud de Metz, sur la rivière La Meuse.³³ Dans le village, on peut voir la maison natale de Jeanne d'Arc et la vieille Église de Domrémy-la-Pucelle.³⁴ Nous explorons la campagne lorraine dans laquelle Domrémy-la-Pucelle est situé. Puis nous restons la nuit dans une petite auberge qui est à côté de l'église.³⁵

Le matin suivant, nous retournons à Metz et nous prenons le train pour Reims que nous trouvons dans la province de la Champagne. Cette province est peut-être le plus connu pour sa boisson qui prend son nom de la province. C'est le champagne ! Cette boisson est un vin mousseux, gazeux et pétillant.³⁶ C'est une caractéristique importante de la Champagne, mais c'est n'est pas la seule caractéristique à noter de la Champagne. En Champagne, nous trouvons un point d'intérêt : Reims.

À Reims il y a la cathédrale dans

laquelle les rois de la France ont été couronnés. Cette cathédrale importante s'appelle la Cathédrale de Notre-Dame.³⁷ C'était dans cette cathédrale qui est pleine de grandeur que tous les rois français ont été sacrés depuis Clovis. La tradition a continué jusqu'en 1825.³⁸ Notamment, nous nous souvenons que Jeanne d'Arc avait dû emmener le dauphin à Reims pour qu'il puisse recevoir sa couronne. Nous visitons la cathédrale et nous apprenons tout au sujet de la production du champagne. À Reims, nous pouvons aussi voir le chef-d'œuvre de Jacques-Louis David qui démontre la mort de Marat dans sa baignoire. Cette peinture, célèbre et importante, est dans le Musée des Beaux-Arts de Reims.

Le jour suivant nous continuons notre tour de la France. Nous traversons une autre région, la Picardie, en chemin pour Rouen. Rouen est une ville qui est située en Normandie. La Normandie est connue pour sa proximité de la mer, La Manche ; Guillaume le Conquérant et pour le débarquement de la deuxième guerre mondiale des alliés le 6 juin 1944.

La Normandie est aussi connue pour ses nourritures. En particulier, la Normandie est connue pour son fromage. Le camembert, un fromage doux, à pâte molle de vache, vient de la Normandie.³⁹ La Normandie est aussi connue pour ses pommes et son cidre.⁴⁰ Nous goûtons tous les deux.

Notre premier arrêt en Normandie est à Rouen. Dans cette ville-ci, nous apprenons davantage du sujet de la vie de Jeanne d'Arc. C'était dans cette ville que Jeanne d'Arc a été brûlée vive en 1431. Les Bourguignons qui l'avaient capturée, l'avaient vendue aux Anglais. L'Église,

sous de l'influence des Anglais, a trouvée Jeanne d'Arc coupable de l'hérésie et l'a condamnée à la mort. Plusieurs années après la mort de Jeanne d'Arc, on l'a trouvée innocente et elle est devenue sainte de l'église catholique en 1920. Aux années 70, l'Église de Jeanne d'Arc a été bâtie au même endroit où Jeanne d'Arc a été brûlée vive. Nous visitons aussi la tour dans laquelle Jeanne d'Arc a été emprisonnée. Cette tour est en ce moment un musée dédié à Jeanne d'Arc.⁴¹

Nous quittons Rouen et en continuant vers l'ouest, le long de la côte, nous voyageons à Caen. Nous quittons la Haute Normandie dans laquelle Rouen est située et nous entrons dans la Basse Normandie, dont la capitale est Caen.⁴² Guillaume le Conquérant venait de Caen. Avant de conquérir l'Angleterre, Guillaume le Conquérant était chef de la région.⁴³ Nous visitons l'Abbaye aux Hommes, bâtie par Guillaume le Conquérant au onzième siècle. Le jour suivant, à Caen nous pouvons aussi apprendre tout au sujet de la deuxième guerre mondiale. Il y a eu une grande bataille à Caen en 1944 dans laquelle la plupart de la ville a été détruite à cause d'un feu qui a duré onze jours.⁴⁴ La bataille de Caen et les horreurs de la deuxième guerre mondiale ont été commémorés dans un monument qui sert aussi de musée.⁴⁵ Après avoir vu le mémorial, cette visite, nous voyageons à Bayeux.

Bayeux était la première ville à être libérée pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale.⁴⁶ Néanmoins, elle est très connue pour la Tapisserie de la Reine Mathilde, la femme de Guillaume le Conquérant, et on croit que la reine et ses dames d'honneurs l'ont faite.⁴⁷ Cette grande tapisserie célèbre dé-

montre la conquête d'Angleterre par Guillaume le Conquérant. Nous visitons le musée et nous voyons cette tapisserie remarquable. Après avoir vu la tapisserie et après avoir appris tout au sujet de Guillaume le Conquérant, nous faisons une petite excursion aux plages de Normandie. Ce n'est pas une excursion de loisir à la plage ; au contraire c'est une excursion pendant laquelle nous apprenons tout au sujet de la deuxième guerre mondiale, et en particulier, au sujet du débarquement des alliés en Normandie. Nous voyageons à la plage Omaha qui est probablement la plus connue des plages du débarquement allié en Normandie. C'est près de Bayeux. Le 6 juin 1944, les soldats alliés ont essayé de saisir la batterie de la Pointe du Hoc, qui était située entre la plage Utah et la plage Omaha.⁴⁸ C'était une bataille très violente. Plusieurs soldats sont morts avant la prise de la batterie. À la plage, nous avons un moment de recueillement de ce qui s'était passé. Il y a plus de soixante ans et nous pensons surtout au courage des soldats. Après avoir vu les plages du débarquement normand, nous retournons à Bayeux pour y rester la nuit.

Le jour suivant nous voyageons à d'autres plages du débarquement de la Normandie. Nous visitons les musées qui sont situés le long de la côte pour apprendre tout au sujet des événements du 6 juin 1944.⁴⁹ Nous visitons les cimetières qui sont aussi situés le long de la côte près des plages.⁵⁰ Puis nous retournons à Bayeux pour y rester la nuit.

Au matin, nous voyageons de Bayeux à Mont St. Michel, une île située au large de la côte de la Basse Normandie. De la côte, nous pouvons traverser le sable

aller à Mont St. Michel. Il faut suivre le ou la guide car les marées sont très dangereuses.⁵¹ Nous traversons le sable et nous visitons l'abbaye de l'île historique du Mont St. Michel.⁵² Nous y restons la nuit.⁵³ Au matin, nous partons de l'île et nous prenons le train pour Paris. Nous passons nos derniers jours de vacances à Paris en se détendant avant de partir de la belle France.

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The Arhuacos

Submitted by Alice Brunet



Today, the indigenous societies of Latin America are not very well known in the modern world. However, there are many lessons that these indigenous societies can offer to help improve all societies. One indigenous society that is very interesting and still exists today is the Arhuacos. This group has a great deal of knowledge of nature and they believed that they know how to maintain the equilibrium of the world. In general, the lessons that can be learned from the Arhuacos have the potential to improve many different areas of daily life.

The Arhuacos were decedents of the nomadic tribe called the Chibchas, which, because of their size, later divided into two groups, the “Musicas” and the “Taironas”. The Taironas are the direct ancestors of the Arhuacos. In fact, the survival of the Tairona society was threatened when the conquistadores arrived in South America. In order to preserve their knowledge and beliefs, survivors from the Tairona society fled up the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, Colombia, the highest coastal mountains in the world (“Arhuacos”). It was important to the Taironas that their society continued to exist in order to maintain the balance of the world. Even though it was impossible for the surviving Taironas to reconstruct their original society, they developed four new societies based on their belief system: the Kogis, the Kankuamos, the Wiwas, and the

Arhuacos (“Tairona”). Fortunately, the Spanish never colonized this land and these four indigenous societies still exist today (Ereira 142). However, these societies, including the Arhuacos, continue to fight in order to protect their cultural identity from the influence of outside cultures and to maintain the balance of the world.

The Arhuacos continue to live like their ancestors in the Sierra Nevada located in Santa Marta, Colombia. Because of their isolated location high up in the coastal mountains, the area is very biologically diverse (“Arhuacos”). It is not surprising with this great biological diversity that the Arhuacos are very interconnected with nature. According to the Arhuacos, Santa Marta is the center of the world and contains all the knowledge of the world. They believe that it is still important to continue maintaining the balance of the world in order to preserve the knowledge of the mountains (“We Live”).

Like the Taironas, the Arhuacos have leaders within their society called “mamos”. The mamos have the responsibility to keep order and balance within the society and with nature; the mamos are the priests, the unbiased judges, the elected politicians, and the chiefs of their society. Furthermore, the mamos preserve the knowledge of their history, culture and wisdom that gets passed on to each new

generation. It is determined at birth if a boy is to become a mamo and if he is chosen, he goes through an extensive training to learn all of the knowledge that has been learned throughout the centuries (Lizarralde 43).

Even though the Arhuacos live in an isolated area because of their location in the mountains, between 1870 and 1880 colonizers and priests started to invade their land and purposely tried to change their culture ("The Thought"). This was the beginning of a continuous battle to preserve their culture that the Arhuacos still face today. Luckily, in 1890 a law was passed in Colombia that allowed the Arhuacos to participate in the national government. Because of this, the Arhuacos had the opportunity to learn about the economic, political, and social aspects of the Colombian government. To this day, the Arhuacos continue to be very politically savvy and involved in modern day politics. Although it has not been easy for the Arhuacos to gain governmental support, their consistent and respectful persistence has promoted some positive changes for their culture (Lizarralde 45).

An example of the Arhuacos' struggle to protect their culture and land is when the Capuchin mission was established in 1908. This was a mission established by Christians who wanted to domesticate the indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada. The Christians believed that the indigenous tribes were savages and they needed to be Christianized. In order to achieve this goal, the Christians constructed churches on their land and began to teach the Arhuacos the Spanish language and the teachings of Catholicism. The Arhuacos were very respectful to the

Christians even though the Arhuacos did not want them on their land, but were stubborn about changing their belief system. This made it impossible to convert the indigenous population. Because of this, the Christians decided to concentrate on converting the Arhuaco children. In order to do this, the outsiders would kidnap the Arhuaco children and place them in an orphanage where they would teach them their ways ("The Thought"). When the Arhuaco children arrived at the orphanage, they did not have access to the world outside of the orphanage walls. The Christians prohibited the Arhuaco children in the orphanage to speak their native language, cut their hair, and dressed them in modern day clothing (Lizarralde 46).

In order to avoid the invasion of outside groups like the Capuchin mission and repair the damages caused to their society by these outside influences, the Arhuacos in 1930 decided to have the highest mamos talk with the Colombian government. After much persistence, the Arhuacos eventually convinced the Colombian government to give the Arhuacos complete rights to their land, but this did not last long. In 1962 the Arhuacos had to fight for their land again because, against the request of the Arhuacos, the government constructed a public road in order to facilitate military observation of the land (Lizarralde 46-47). The Arhuacos were very mad about this because these new military bases were located on Arhuaco sacred land. This made it impossible for the Arhuacos to continue their ancient tradition of having sacred rituals that preserved nature and the balance of life.

The Arhuacos had to once again

fight for their land because the Colombian government claimed that they did not have proper documentation for the land rights of the indigenous people. It is believed that Simon Bolivar approved the decision to give exclusive possession of the Sierra Nevada to the indigenous group. Even though the mamos had kept documentation of this decree, the Colombian government did not recognize their records as appropriate documentation of their rights to the land. To fight against this, the Arhuacos decided to rally with other indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada. For many decades the battle continued, fighting against the missionaries and the government, and fighting for their rights to the land. Finally on March 14th, 1984 the Arhuacos territory was proclaimed a reservation (“The Thought”).

Despite their success, the Arhuacos continue to have problems with the missionaries who are trying to convert them and influence their culture. One reason why this is still occurring is because the Arhuacos believe that everything and everyone in the world is free and cannot be controlled. The Arhuacos also believe that everything in the world is equal and there is no hierarchy of power. Because of this, it is very difficult for the Arhuacos to assert any authority over others, including over the missionaries (“The Thought”). Interestingly, the Arhuacos today do not desire any reparations for any of the negative events that have occurred because of the influences of outside groups such as the missionaries. The Arhuacos only desire that these groups leave their land. Furthermore, the Arhuacos state that they are willing to put behind them these negative

experiences if these outside groups would simply respect the Arhuaco culture (“We Can”).

Because of the Arhuacos respectful mentality to outside groups, there have been many changes to their traditional lifestyle due to these outside influences. One example of this is evident in the Arhuacos' education system. The Arhuacos believe that all school subjects, like science, cannot simply be taught through a structured system (“The Thought”). Instead, they believe that everything in nature has significance and can teach the most important life lessons (“Our Family Tree”). Before the arrival of outsiders, none of the Arhuacos had the ability to read and they did not have a modern system of education. However, during this time the Arhuacos believe that there was more organization, more respect for everything, and more harmony with nature (“We Suffer”). When the missionaries arrived, they constructed their own schools and forced the Arhuacos to learn their language and religion in their structured system. Furthermore, if the Arhuacos did not obey and if they did not learn their lessons, the Arhuacos were punished.

These new schools hindered the Arhuacos' ability to preserve their culture and wisdom. Therefore, the Arhuacos needed to develop a more organized system of education in order to continue teaching within their society their native language and culture (Lizarralde 45). Now, in order to preserve their culture, a dictionary of their language has been written and their oral stories that have been passed down from generations also have been written down. Furthermore, today the majority of the Arhuacos

can speak their native language because in all of the twenty-eight Arhuaco towns, the Arhuaco children are learning their native language in schools (“Arhuacos”). Despite these new-age changes, the mamos still do not like using a structured school setting. The mamos question if the children are really paying attention and learning. The mamos desire to continue teaching in a more traditional way, but they realize that the threats of outside influences must be met with this new structure in teaching (“We Suffer”).

Another problem that the Arhuacos have due to the influence of the western world is with illegal drugs, specifically as it relates to coca. For the Arhuacos coca is called “ayu” and it is their most sacred plant because it facilitates a connection with nature. Furthermore, coca is an essential part of their sacred rituals and also of their daily life in general (“We Can”). For example, the Arhuacos maintain friendships by exchanging coca with each other. Because the coca plant is very sacred to the Arhuaco society, there are many restrictions related to the use on this plant. For instances, selling coca for money is not allowed, only the mamos know how to properly cultivate coca, and permission from the mamos is needed in order to be able to use coca (“Ayu and Crisis”). Typically, when an Arhuaco man turns twenty years old it is then allowed for him to have coca in his possession at any time (“We Can”). It is important to note that the Arhuacos do not use the coca plant as a narcotic; they chew the plant in order to minimize fatigue and hunger, improve their memory and increase their energy (Elsass 51).

According to Colombian laws, only indigenous groups are permitted to cultivate coca for personal use. For the rest of the Colombian population, the cultivation of coca is considered to be illegal (“We Can”). Nonetheless problems with the Colombian drug trade, especially with cocaine and marijuana, have persisted since 1982. That same year all non-indigenous groups were supposed to leave the Sierra Nevada because the land was decreed a reservation under Colombian law. However some of the missionaries and colonizers continued to live on the land. With the help of some mestizos, the missionaries and colonizers who stayed started to grow illegal plants (“We Live”). The Arhuacos knew that these illegal coca plantations were used to produce and sell cocaine. Not only was this a grave violation of this sacred plant, but these illegal plantations also created many problems for the Arhuacos (“Ayu and Crisis”). In order to prevent the production of these illegal plants the Colombian government, with the help of the United States, had planes spray herbicides and pesticides on these lands (“We Can”). These chemicals also destroyed the Arhuacos' crops and contaminated their water, and as a result the Arhuacos started to become increasingly sick. The Arhuacos also suffered because their most important and most sacred plant no longer received the respect for its great quality to connect the Arhuacos with nature (“Ayu and Crisis”).

In general, the Arhuacos continue to have many problems that are caused by the influence from other cultures. Tourism to the Sierra Nevada is destroying the natural life and is negatively influencing the daily life of the Arhuacos (“Pagmentos’ and

Balance”). Now, some Arhuacos are wearing baseball caps, expensive watches, driving Jeeps, drinking excessive amounts of alcohol, and listening to modern music. What is most important is that this contact with the outside world has negatively effected the younger generation of the Arhuacos because they no longer desire to live as traditional Arhuaco and want to be a part of the modern world (“Arhuacos”). Also, the tourism industry has been promoting a more commercialized system in the Sierra Nevada to attract more tourism. For example, Arhuaco women are encouraged to sell their hand-crafted bags and clothes (“We Head Towards”). In order to fight against this outside pressure to modernize their society, the mamos organized the “Gonavindua Tairona” in 1987 (“Arhuacos”).

However, the only way in which the Arhuacos will be able to completely protect their culture is with the help of the Colombian government. Because of this, the Arhuacos and especially the mamos, continue to educate themselves on the Colombian government system and frequently go to Bogotá in order to fight for their rights. The Arhuacos have also contacted ministers, foreign ambassadors and philanthropic groups that fight for human rights to help assist them in gaining their rights. At this point, the Arhuacos want more than anything to be able to declare the Sierra Nevada a reservation where only indigenous groups can live and where they will be able to preserve their society and their natural environment (“Arhuacos”). The Arhuacos have had some success in achieving this with the help of political groups, but it has not been enough

to completely gain back their land.

And, even though the Arhuacos have received some political help and have improved their situation, the Arhuacos have had to be stubborn and persistent because sometimes the government only creates more problems. One example is when the army established military bases on the Arhuaco territory (“Pagmentos’ and Balance”). Furthermore, the government does not always try to resolve the problems that the Arhuacos are trying to address. For example, when the Arhuacos tried to reclaim their land as a reservation, the government instead focused on creating health and education programs and promoting Christian teachings. Disappointingly, instead of helping the Arhuacos, sometimes the government only focuses on modernizing the Arhuacos (“Regaining the Land”). It is almost impossible for the Arhuacos to defend themselves and each year their territory is becoming smaller because the government is continuously dividing their land (“The Thought”).

Unfortunately the Arhuacos have also become innocent victims of the violence in Colombia. For example, according to eyewitness testimonies, on November 29, 1990 heavily armed men in national uniforms forced three mamos traveling to Bogotá off the bus. Later, on December 13, the same three bodies were found dead with many indications that the men had been tortured (“Three”). Another example occurred in 2003 when two Arhuacos were found beheaded (“Indians Beheaded”). It has become a constant battle for all of the indigenous groups of the Sierra Nevada to avoid these unjust persecutions.

Interestingly, it was agreed amongst the Arhuacos that none of them would fight in Colombia's internal war or be associated with any of the guerrilla groups. Even though the Arhuacos know it is a dangerous time not to defend themselves, they have decided to solely focus on preserving the natural environment and maintaining the equilibrium of the world ("We Live"). In reality, the Arhuacos realize that this war has the potential to completely destroy their society. It has become more and more common that members of FARC, a guerrilla group of Colombia, force the indigenous people to become soldiers. If they refuse, the guerrilla group kills them. Many of the indigenous groups that lived near the Arhuacos needed to flee into the jungle in order to survive. The Arhuacos are very fearful that their society will soon end in a mass genocide if no drastic changes are made. But the Arhuacos do not desire to fight. They only want to continue living their sacred way of life (Forero). There are many groups, like Amnesty International, Survival International, and Tairona Heritage Trust, that are trying to preserve the indigenous tribes of the Sierra Nevada, but their efforts have not brought enough change to protect the Arhuacos from the negative consequences of this internal war.

The Arhuacos have tried to improve their situation during this crisis, but the authority of even the highest mamo in the modern government is no longer as powerful as it was in the past. Despite this fact, the Arhuacos have decided that they will no longer negotiate with the government. They want all of their demands met. The Arhuacos realize that a stronger centralized govern-

ment is needed to be able to improve their situation and because of this, the Arhuacos have become very stubborn in order to survive, protect the natural environment and preserve the balance of life in their region ("We Suffer"). It is very interesting that even today the Arhuacos continue to be very loyal to nature, just like their ancestors.

Sadly, only 25 percent of the Arhuaco sacred forest has been preserved ("We Live"). The forest has been destroyed by a multitude of causes such as: contamination from herbicides and pesticides, deforestation, overpopulation, pollution, a decrease of the cultivation of traditional crops, and the increase of illegal plantations. There is no longer enough forest to maintain the biological diversity of the Sierra Nevada. Because of this, the Arhuacos believe that very few people in the modern world respect nature as well as they should or take enough responsibility in protecting nature ("Our Family Tree"). Just like the modern population needs to pay for electricity in their house, the Arhuacos believe that they also need to respect nature in order to protect their planet ("Ayu and Crisis").

The connection that the Arhuacos have with nature has allowed them to see the negative changes that are currently occurring within nature. For example, they have observed that plants are flowering prematurely, bees are disappearing and are no longer pollinating plants, birds and butterflies are changing their migration patterns, the snow on the mountain peaks are melting, there is a decrease in humidity, the rainfall pattern is changing, and the rivers are drying before they connect to the sea. Even though the Arhuacos are not familiar with the phrase

“global warming”, they are well aware that the flora and fauna are being effected by the lack of focus on preserving the environment. The Arhuacos know, without the help of modern day sciences, that the average temperature of the world has increased and that it is a negative result of practices within modern societies (Cycon).

If these problems are not resolved soon, the Arhuacos believe that there could be an increase in sicknesses worldwide and plagues of insects that will cause much destruction (“We Live”). In general, there has been an increase in developing preservation programs in order to improve the current situation. However the Arhuacos could be a key asset in assisting this cause since they have many centuries of experience and the desire and will to protect the natural environment (“We Suffer”). An important start, according to the Arhuacos, should start with their land. They believe that the Colombian government should buy all the territory in the Sierra Nevada that is currently owned by non-indigenous people and give it back to the Arhuacos. In their opinion, this is the best solution to improve the environmental balance of the territory and would also provide the Arhuacos with the opportunity to preserve their society (“We Live”).

The Arhuacos have survived for more that twenty-five centuries and have consequently acquired a substantial amount of knowledge. There are many lessons, including how to preserve nature, which we all can learn from the Arhuacos. Other important lessons can be learned from the Arhuacos’ daily life and general philosophy. For instance, the Arhuacos do not grow more

food than they need; instead, all of the crops in the Arhuaco territory are for all of the Arhuacos. Each family has many crops, but if an Arhuaco needs a plant that they do not have in their own crop, they simply can walk to another Arhuaco crop and take the plants they need (Elsass 47). The Arhuacos have a lifestyle that is very communal and non-materialistic. It is a society where neighbors freely share all of their possessions and knowledge.

However, the Arhuacos are competitive with regard to acquiring knowledge. They will constantly challenge each other to determine who is the most knowledgeable person. It is a very friendly competition and it does promote the acquisition of information (Elsass 49-50). The Arhuacos have realized that an obsession with acquiring products or being materialistic in general does not promote happiness. Materialism is something very important in modern society, but recent psychological studies tend to agree with the Arhuacos that this lifestyle does not promote happiness. One thing that does promote happiness is obtaining more knowledge. Even when the conquistadores were settling in the Americas in search of power and gold, the Arhuacos had the mentality to live a simple, non-materialistic and purposeful life. It is possible that modern day objects are distracting the world from the most important things in life and thus preventing a simple, but very purposeful life.

The Arhuacos also know how to maintain the balance of power within their society thanks to the mamo leaders. The Arhuacos always need to obtain advice from the mamos and receive permission for anything that is not part of the traditional

lifestyle (Elsass 47). Furthermore, when the mamos help other Arhuacos, the mamos are required to be unbiased (Elsass 48). The mamos have essentially all of the power within the society. However the mamos do not have any special privileges for having this role. They need to be a model of how to obey the sacred laws and because of this, the mamos are very respected within the community. It is very interesting that the Arhuacos have had a successful society with impartial and effective leaders and have survived for many centuries. In general, the mamos have a very important role because they also have the responsibility of learning, remembering, and passing on the history, knowledge and wisdom that have been compiled for many centuries.

The modern world has much to learn from the Arhuacos' model of society, from their desire to acquire knowledge, their respect for one another, and the unbiased leadership of the mamos.

The attitude of the Arhuacos toward tradition has led them to become opponents of the dominant society's development ideology, which regards the Indians as poor people who need to develop and take in new things. The Indians have often rejected development experts who come in to the area, because they do not believe they need to be developed. On the contrary they have stressed that Indian culture is a prerequisite for white civilization. (Elsass 63)

In a way, the Arhuacos are the oldest ecologists in the world because of their intimate relationship with nature ("We Live"). The modern world can learn a lot from the Arhuacos' persistent and respectful nature

that has lasted more than twenty-five centuries. Especially important is how to live in harmony with both nature and each other.

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Relief de Sol et Climat de la France

Submitted by Stephanie Murdock



Résumé

Après avoir lu, on devrait être capable de localiser la France précisément sur la carte du monde, remarquer quelque chose à propos de ses frontières et leurs effets sur l'histoire de la France, de généraliser le relief de la France et identifier ses traits importants suivants.

Où se trouve la France?

France est un pays en forme d'un hexagone qui se trouve dans la partie ouest du continent européen. Elle est au sud de la Grande Bretagne (avec qui elle ne partage aucune frontière) et nord de l'Italie et l'Espagne. Elle couvre la superficie entre le mer Méditerranée et la Manche de sud à nord, et entre le Rhin jusqu'à la mer atlantique de l'ouest à l'est. Elle n'est pas vraiment isolée comme une île, mais aussi n'est pas vraiment continental. Comme M. Michaud décrit, "Elle apparaît plutôt comme un isthme fortement rattaché au continent."¹

La France est située entre le 40° et le 50° parallèle nord, et entre le 5° méridien ouest et le 8° méridien est (Michaud 8). Pour orienter un sens de ces faits, on peut imaginer une ligne de latitude que traverse l'océan Atlantique entre l'Europe et les Amériques. La France se trouve presque exactement à l'est de la frontière entre les Etats Unis et Canada, vers 3,000 miles loin de NY. La frontière septentrionale de la France partage la même latitude que la Baie

d'Hudson. Au sud, elle est sur la même ligne que Détroit. Mais, à cause du Gulf Stream, qui réchauffe les littoraux de France, le climat est bien différent des villes aux mêmes latitudes aux Etats Unis.

Malgré les obstacles à ses frontières, la situation de la France sur la carte du monde a fait que la France est un endroit important pour l'échange des idées et aussi pour le commerce (Michaud 9). Elle est comme un carrefour pour l'Europe, avec un lien à l'est avec le continent d'Europe et aussi un front avec l'océan Atlantique et la Méditerranée.

Avec une superficie de 551,670 kilomètres carrés², la France est le plus grand pays d'Europe, sauf la Russie. Pour un sens de ces chiffres, la France est quatre-vingtièmes la taille de Texas.³ Si on multiplie l'état de New York quatre fois, le résultat est à peu près la taille de la France (Denoeu 4).

Les Frontières

La France partage une frontière avec les huit pays suivants; la Belgique, l'Allemagne, la Suisse, l'Italie, l'Espagne, le Luxembourg, l'Andorre et Monaco. La plupart de ses frontières sont naturelles, sauf la frontière du nord-est avec la Belgique et le Luxembourg. (On y trouve le forêt des Ardennes dont quelques-uns rappellent une frontière naturelle, mais, historiquement, elle n'est pas bien pour protéger la France).

Trois du six frontières sont maritimes. A cause de ses littoraux plutôt naturels, au cours des siècles du développement, la France a eu moins de difficulté de unifier ses peuples sous une compréhension commune de leur nationalité, pas comme autres pays (l'Allemagne, la Tchécoslovaquie, etc.).

Les frontières naturelles de la France sont ses montagnes et ses littoraux. Au nord-ouest, (et un petite peu, vers l'est - près de Belgique - le Mer de Nord et) la Manche protège la France. Trouvant le même littoral plus au sud, autour de la Bretagne, on trouve la frontière avec l'océan Atlantique. A la frontière espagnol-française, il y a les Pyrénées. Au sud-est, en Provence et au Languedoc, la mer Méditerranée crée une frontière naturelle (et en plus des plages magnifiques). Plus vers l'est, on trouve les Alpes, la frontière naturelle avec l'Italie. Les Alpes sont bien connues autour du monde, parce que ce sont les montagnes plus hautes de l'Europe. Pour plus de détail sur les Alpes, voir la section "*Montagnes*".

La France a 5.200 kilomètres de bordures, de ce chiffre 3.100 kilomètres sont des côtes littérales (Denoeu 16). En comparaison, 3.100 kilomètres sont deux-cinquièmes de la taille du littoral des Etats Unis (Denoeu 16). Donc, c'est un chiffre vraiment impressionnant étant donné la taille relatif de chaque pays. La France touche trois (certaines affirment quatre) étendues ; l'océan Atlantique, la Mer Méditerranée, la Manche et la Mer du Nord. La Manche est un canal qui se trouve entre la France et l'Angleterre. Elle limite la France au nord-ouest. Un peu plus loin à l'est se trouve la

Mer du Nord, qui aussi touche une petite partie de la France au nord-ouest. A la frontière de l'ouest, la France baigne dans l'océan Atlantique. Et au sud, entre la France et l'Afrique, on a le littoral célèbre de la Méditerranée. On trouve des plages magnifiques et célèbres sur toutes les côtes, de la Mer Méditerranée, la Manche et l'océan Atlantique.

La seule frontière artificielle française se trouve au nord-est de la France, avec la Belgique, le Luxembourg et l'Allemagne. Elle est toujours le point la plus vulnérable d'attaque. Depuis les Gaulois et jusqu'au 19ème siècle (l'invasion d'Allemagne pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale) c'était ici ou la plupart des envahisseurs sont entrés dans la France. Pendant l'époque entre-deux-guerres la ligne Maginot, une ligne de fortifications, y a été créée comme une tente de protection de la France d'invasion.⁴

Le tunnel sous la Manche a été fini en 1994, donc depuis la France est aussi connectée à Angleterre. Il est important pour le transport des produits et aussi pour les voyageurs. Mais ce n'est pas une vraie frontière géographique.

Relief du Sol

Le relief de la France est composé des montagnes, de collines, de fleuves et de gorges. En bref, Michaud décrit le relief de la France ainsi, "l'aspect d'un théâtre antique, dont la scène serait le bassin de Paris et dont les gradins s'élèveraient progressivement du nord à l'ouest et au sud à l'est"(11). Si nous faisons une ligne entre le nord-est de la France, près de Belgique, jusqu'au sud-ouest de la France, et nous coupons en deux le pays, nous trouvons deux parties

distinctes. A gauche, au nord-est de la France, on trouve un relief plutôt plat, sauf quelques collines. En Bretagne on trouve ces collines, mais elles n'ont pas plus de quatre cents mètres en hauteur (Deneou 5). Dans l'autre partie, à droite, le sud-est de la France, on se trouve de vraies montagnes : les Pyrénées, le Massif Central, les Vosges, le Jura et les Alpes. Elles se trouvent, pour la plupart, aux frontières à l'exception du Massif Central qui (comme il se nomme) se trouve vers le milieu de la France.

Montages

Les Alpes est les plus célèbres de montages d'Europe, comme ce sont les montages les plus hautes en Europe. Elles sont aussi les montagnes plus jeunes de la France (Deneou 11). Elles sont situées dans le sud-est de la France, à la frontière entre la France et l'Italie. Dans les Alpes, on trouve Mont Blanc, le point le plus haut d'Europe avec 4.087 mètres, ou 15.781 pieds (Deneou 11). Le versant des Alpes francophones est moins raide que l'autre, donc elle est plus navigable. Les Alpes sont aussi connues pour leur beauté. M. Deneou raconte, "Citions...les Alpes de Savoie où Saint François de Sales, évêque de Genève au début du dix-septième siècle, s'y disait plus près de Dieu que partout ailleurs"(11). Cette citation illustre la magnificence des Alpes à travers les siècles. Un fait intéressant sur les Alpes, c'est l'histoire du son nom. Le mot 'alpe' signifie à l'origine, "pâturage de altitude haute" (Deneou 11). Dans les pentes les plus hautes des Alpes, on trouve du feuillage. En conséquence, les Alpes sont se nomment telles qu'elles le sont.

Le Massif Central est un grand

plateau qui se trouve au centre de la France. M. Deneou a remarqué qu'il "est le plus vaste et plus varié des massifs montagneux français" (6). Il illustre son point avec le fait que le Massif Central, "occupe le septième de la superficie de la France" (6). Il a le sobriquet du Plateau Central.

Un peu moins connues, mais quand même une chaîne de montagnes célèbres sont **les Pyrénées** qui sont situées à la frontière franco-espagnol. Deneou dit que, "Leur arêtes sont vives et nues ; leurs crêtes sont aigües, en dents de scie et fort élevées"(10). Le point le plus haut des Pyrénées se trouve en Espagne, le pic d'Aneto avec 3.400 mètres en hauteur, ou 11.000 pieds (Deneou 10). En contraste des Alpes, le versant français des Pyrénées est plus raide que la côte espagnole (Deneou 10). Ce fait est intéressant pour son influence sur le cours du fleuve la Garonne. L'histoire des Pyrénées est riche et fameuse. C'était au col de Roncevaux, où Roland a été tué en 778 après J.-C. "avec toute l'arrière-garde de l'armée de Charlemagne" (Deneou 10). Cet événement est devenu célèbre à cause de la "Chanson de Roland" (qui a été écrit sur le sujet) et est la plus vieille œuvre de littérature française qui survie jusqu'à nos jours. Une autre histoire intéressante s'est passé dans les Pyrénées pendant le mi-19eme siècle, au Lourdes (au bord nord des Pyrénées). C'est là, on croit que le Vierge Maire a apparu à Bernadette Soubirous, et encore aujourd'hui cette grotte est un lieu de pèlerinage (Deneou 10).

Entre les Alpes et les Vosges, à la frontière de l'est (avec l'Allemagne et la Suisse) se trouve **le Jura**. Son sommet atteint 1.723 mètres (5,600 pieds), une figure

à 160 mètres moins que la hauteur du puy de Sancy dans le Massif Central (Denoeu 10).

Encore au nord des Alpes et du Jura, et toujours sur la frontière de l'est, sont **les Vosges**, qui se trouvent en Alsace-Lorraine, à la frontière avec Allemagne. Son sommet est le ballon de Guebwiller, avec plus de 1400 mètres (Denoeu 8).

Fleuves

Il y a cinq fleuves importants en France : la Seine, le Rhône, la Loire, le Rhin et la Garonne. Ils traversent la France et sont des sources d'eaux importantes à l'intérieur de la France. Les peuples anciens s'ont installés près de l'eau, donc même aujourd'hui on trouve beaucoup de villes sur ces fleuves.

La Seine est le fleuve le plus célèbre de France, parce qu'elle traverse Paris, la ville la plus célèbre de France. Elle coupe Paris en deux parties, la rive gauche de la Seine (partie sud) et la rive droite (partie nord). C'est le plus lent des cinq grands fleuves et aussi c'est le plus régulier (Denoeu 20). Sans la Seine, la Paris que nous connaissons, n'existerait aujourd'hui. Elle est très navigable, un trait important pour l'histoire de Paris à propos des invasions et du commerce. Sa source se trouve sur le plateau de la Cote d'Or, et elle se jette à la Manche, au Havre (Denoeu 20). La Seine vide l'eau de la cuvette de la région de Paris. Le nom 'la Seine' est dérivé du nom d'une divinité d'eau celtique, *Sequana* (Denoeu 20). Le Havre, l'embouchure de la Seine, est une autre grande ville sur la Seine (Hendrix et Walter, 13-14). Elle coule vers le nord et au Havre se jette dans la Manche.

La Rhône est située au sud-est de

la France. Elle coule de sa source dans les Alpes Suisses, traverse la Lac de Genève, et entre la France. Puis, près de Lyon, elle tourne vers le sud et coule dans cette direction jusqu'à elle se jette dans la mer Méditerranée (Hendrix et Walter, 20).

Le plus long des fleuves français à 1.000 kilomètres (620 milles) de longueur, un quart de la longueur de la Mississipi, c'est **la Loire** (Denoeu 22). La Loire est un fleuve très irrégulier. Elle grandit en printemps, et "souvent déborde malgré les hautes digues qui la langent, surtout à partir d'Orléans" (Denoeu 22). En été, le niveau d'eau diminue et dans beaucoup d'endroits on peut la traverser sans perdre pied (Denoeu, 23). Son estuaire est très important pour le commerce. Sa source est dans la Massif Central, dans les Cévennes, et elle coule vers le nord jusqu'à Orléans, où elle tourne (avant le Bassin parisien) vers l'ouest. Elle se jette dans l'Atlantique à Saint-Nazaire, près de Nantes. Entre Nantes et Orléans se situe Tours, une autre ville importante développée à cause de sa proximité du fleuve.

Le Rhin constitue une partie de la frontière qui sépare la France de l'Allemagne. On peut l'appeler une frontière naturelle, mais celle qui est plus difficile à défendre car les fleuves sont plus faciles à traverser que les montagnes. Le Rhin a une importance dans le domaine du commerce (Hendrix et Walter, 10). C'est un fleuve grand et profond (Hendrix et Walter, 10).

La Garonne est la plus courte des cinq fleuves, avec 12km de largeur et 30 mètres de profondeur, mais elle est très vite (Denoeu 24). Sa vitesse de débit est égale à la somme de la vitesse de la Seine et la

la Loire ensemble (Deneou 23). Sa source se trouve dans les Pyrénées espagnoles et elle coule vers le nord-ouest dans la direction de la France.

Car le versant française des Pyrénées est très raide, “elle descend en torrent” (Deneou 23). Elle passe des villes célèbres comme Toulouse, Agen et Bordeaux. Près de Bordeaux, la Garonne rejoint son estuaire, la Gironde, qui coule vers le nord et se jette dans l’océan Atlantique (Hendrix et Walter, 20).

Les Régions Bas

Le Bassin Parisien est au nord de la France. Au fond de cette cuvette se trouve Paris. La partie extérieure du Bassin est composée de la falaise de Champagne et à l’ouest les collines de Normandie (Deneou,12).

Les Gorges Verdon sont la deuxième plus grande gorge du monde. Avec 50 kilomètres en longueur et jusqu’à 700 mètres profondeur, c’est reconnu comme étant le plus haut canyon d’Europe. Elles se trouvent au sud de la France, près de Nice.

Climat

On ne peut pas généraliser le climat en France. Bien que tempère en général, toutes les régions ont des différences de climat distinctes. On peut diviser le climat de France en quatre parties ; le climat maritime, le climat continental, le climat montagnard et le climat méditerranéen (Michaud 12).

Dans les régions près de l’océan Atlantique, (compris le nord, le Bassin parisien, la Normandie, la Bretagne, l’ouest et le sud-ouest) le Gulf Stream règle le **climat maritime**. Le Gulf Stream est un courant qui port d’air chaud des tropiques aux par-

ties à l’ouest du hémisphère. Donc, il sert à réchauffer ces régions et à modérer le climat. Le climat maritime n’est ni trop froid, ni trop chaud. Les mêmes régions sont habituées aux pluies, mais elles ne durent pas trop longtemps ni versent en grande quantité.

Trop loin à l’est pour être effectué par les effets modérant du Gulf Stream, on trouve le **climat continental**. Au Massif Central, le Jura et les Alpes, on a les hivers plus froids et plus rudes, et les étés chauds, “avec des pluies d’orages” (Deneou 14). Mais, malgré les températures basses en hiver, cette région est populaire avec les gens qui aiment faisant du ski.

Le climat montagnard est semblable à celui du climat continental. Il se trouve dans les Alpes, le Jura, les Vosges et le Plateau Central. Ce climat est caractérisé par trois points, “hivers longs et rudes, étés court et pluvieux, [et] pluies et neiges en toutes saisons” (Michaud 12).

Le climat méditerranéen (bien sûr, dans la zone méditerranéenne au sud de la France) est célèbre et connu surtout au monde. Là, le climat est souvent très favorable, et en conséquent, c’est une région très populaire avec les touristes. La région méditerranée est caractérisée par des étés chauds et secs, et des hivers tempérés (Deneou 14). En automne, on a des pluies, souvent à torrents. Ce climat est aussi connu pour ses vents forts, le plus célèbre d’entre eux c’est le mistral, un vent sec qui a des effets positifs et d’autres négatifs. On croit qu’à cause du mistral, l’air et la lumière de cette région est très claire. (Il faut se souvenir que cette région est aussi connue pour ses artistes importants, qui ont été attirés à cette région

la beauté de la lumière). Mais de l'autre côté, le mistral produit des incendies de temps en temps.

Comme capitale et ville célèbre, on va parler un peu plus en détail du climat de Paris. Il se trouve dans la région du climat continental, donc avec des hivers froids et des étés chauds. La température moyenne en janvier à Paris est 2 degrés celsius, ou 36 fahrenheit, selon une étude de 1993.⁵ M. Deneou présente un exemple qui illustre le climat de l'hiver du Paris, "Les Parisiens ne peuvent patiner sur les lacs et étangs... que quelques jours par an" (14). En juillet, la température moyenne de Paris est 18 degrés celsius, ou 36 degrés fahrenheit (Noin).

DOM-TOM

Il faut mentionner un peu les DOM-TOMS (les départements et les territoires d'outre-mer) qui aussi constituent une partie de la géographie de la France. Ce sont la Corse, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, Saint Martin, Saint Barthélemy, la Guadeloupe, la Martinique, la Guyane Française, la Polynésie Française, la Mayotte, la Réunion et la Nouvelle Calédonie. Leurs reliefs du sol et leurs climats sont bien variés selon leurs emplacements sur le globe et leurs traits physiques.

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Looks Can Be Deceiving: Angelo's Intentions in *Measure for Measure* Submitted by Michael Langen



In Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, there are two common interpretations for Angelo's character. The first interpretation sees Angelo as a moral man, who is earnestly trying to clean up Vienna, but happens to take things too far in his strict treatment of Claudio's case. He succumbs to the temptation of Isabella—a temptation he had never known before—but he repents for it by the play's end. The second interpretation sees Angelo as power-hungry, and hypocritical in his preaching of strict morality. He is ill-intentioned and pursues his selfish agenda at the expense of others. Angelo tries to dupe the other characters into interpreting him the first way, but in truth, the second interpretation is more accurate.

Angelo appears modest when he, at first, refuses the Duke's offering of the ruling position. He says: "Let there be some more test made of my mettle / Before so noble and so great a figure / Be stamped upon it" (*Measure* 1.2.49-51). Despite his humble appearance, Angelo is actually quite excited about receiving such a position of power. The way he uses the power given to him proves this. He immediately begins using his power to enforce the law to an unprecedented extreme; he sentences Claudio to death for sleeping with Juliet out of wedlock, even though Claudio was engaged to marry her. Angelo is told to clean up the city, but he takes it too far. His steadfastness

in sticking to extremes demonstrates his love of power, and his refusal to give any of it up. Angelo even refuses the advice of the more experienced Escalus, who advises Angelo that he might regret being so strict (2.2.10-13). Angelo ignores him, asserting that he is the only one who will have any say in the matter.

One could argue that Angelo is not power-hungry, and must be well-intentioned, since the Duke trusts him with his position upon his leave. There is evidence, however, that the Duke does not actually trust Angelo to do a good job, and that he knows that Angelo is going to be corrupt. After the Duke gives up his power, he does, after all, stick around in disguise to keep an eye on things. The fact that he does not let Angelo rule on his own, without being secretly monitored, suggests that he does not trust Angelo with power. When speaking to Friar Thomas, the Duke explains that "Lord Angelo is precise, / Stands at a guard with envy, scarce confesses / That his blood flows or that his appetite / Is more to bread than stone. Hence shall we see, / If power change purpose, what our seemers be" (*Measure* 1.3.50-54). The Duke suspects that Angelo is more corrupt than he seems to be, and he is interested in seeing if giving him power will expose his corrupt nature. At the end of the play, the Duke tells Isabella to plead her case to Angelo, telling

her: “Here is Lord Angelo shall give you justice. / Reveal yourself to him” (5.1.28-29). The Duke knows that Angelo will not give her justice, yet he seems to test him, like he does at the beginning of the play when he gives him power. The Duke’s words cannot be taken at face value, as he bears another face for most of the play. His true self does not consider Angelo to be a trustworthy leader any more than he thinks that Angelo will give Isabella justice at the end of the play. David Bevington agrees that “the Duke obviously expects Angelo to fall” (415).

Angelo lives up to, or perhaps down to, the Duke’s expectations and fails as a leader. He abuses his power, and his motivation is selfish, not moral. Angelo does not have ethical reasons behind his strict punishing of Claudio. He claims that he is using Claudio as an example in an effort to clean up the city and bolster respect for the law, but he proves to be uninterested in respecting the law when he propositions Isabella. One could argue that he was merely tempted by sexual lust on that one occasion, and that his motivation for punishing Claudio is still that he wants to set an example so that the law will be respected and justice will be pursued. This, however, cannot be true, because he claims that he will pardon Claudio if Isabella sleeps with him. If Angelo pardons Claudio, then he discredits his stance that Claudio must be used as an example. He prioritizes selfish desires over what he claims Vienna needs. Personal motivation clearly influences his decision more than an honorable pursuit of justice does. His selfish motivations are further exposed when he threatens that, unless Isabella sleeps with

him, he won’t only have Claudio killed, he’ll have Claudio tortured. He is clearly not chiefly concerned with justice, but in using his power to fulfill his own selfish desires, even at the expense of others.

Angelo’s treatment of Claudio cannot be defended as just in any way. His intentions are not to punish Claudio for unethical behavior, nor to make an example out of him. He states that “He should have lived, / Save that his riotous youth, / with dangerous sense, / Might in the times to come have ta’en revenge” (*Measure* 4.4.28-30). It is out of fear of revenge that Angelo upholds Claudio’s death sentence, not out of concern for justice. Angelo values himself and his power over any of the lofty ideals that he claims to stand for. John Simmons notices that it is “only when [Angelo] infers that there is some personal gain to be realized that he adjusts any judicial decision” (283). Angelo explicitly states that he uses his power, not to uphold justice, but to promote his own personal pleasure. He admits to Isabella: “I give my sensual race the rein” (*Measure* 2.4.161). He also admits to being cruel. When Isabella refuses to sleep with him to save her brother, Angelo asks her: “Were not you then as cruel as the sentence / That you have slandered so?” (2.4.110-111). Ruling with cruelty and prioritizing the fulfillment of personal wishes over justice are not the actions of good-intentioned leader.

If someone is power-hungry then he will not make a good ruler. His decisions will be clouded by the goal of attaining and retaining power, instead of making decisions based on what is best for the people. Angelo is a bad and dangerous leader

because of his “excessive appetite for power” (Simmons 284). At face value, he seems to be standing up for justice, claiming that he “must not make a scarecrow of the law” (*Measure* 2.1.1). This is a noble goal, and it makes sense to enforce the law, but it would be wise to remove the laws that are unfair and unreasonable so that the law can be enforced with dignity and respect. Angelo does not, however, do away with nonsensical laws like the one that punishes Claudio for sleeping with his fiancée. Doing so would reduce Angelo’s power. Instead, he enforces that law to its full extent and sentences Claudio to death. Simmons recognizes that Angelo “administers justice in its most severe form in order to establish himself as the hardnosed stand-in ruler he wishes to appear to be” (283). If Angelo were more interested in public service instead of power, he might realize that by killing Claudio, he would be responsible for the very thing that he claimed to be trying stop in the first place—the creation of a fatherless child. This does not seem to bother Angelo, though. Instead, he seems only to be interested in doing things his way, and using his power to the maximum extent possible. And what greater show of power could there be than to suppress basic human instincts?

Angelo can only suppress others’ instincts because he is too weak, hypocritical, and corrupt to apply the same standards to his own behavior. Simmons recognizes Angelo as “a power seeker, unable to curb the very libidinous desires he so severely judges in others. He serves as a classic example of hypocritical behavior” (284). Angelo claims that he would want the same

treatment if he were he to commit the crime, as he says: “Let mine own judgment pattern out my death / And nothing come in partial” (2.1.30-31). However, when it comes to the test, he does not stand by this noble-sounding declaration. At the end of the play, when Isabella brings forth her case against him, he does not admit to his crime, but instead tries to get out of it by trying to discredit Isabella, saying that “she will speak most bitterly and strange” (5.1.38). Rosalind Miles observes that “Angelo desperately (and hypocritically) shores up his self-image in the eyes of the world, and of the Duke” (207).

At first, in the final act, Angelo tries to protect his image instead of accepting the punishment that, earlier in the play, he said he would deserve and accept. It is only after the Duke reveals himself, and Angelo knows that he is caught, that he kneels and begs for the death sentence (*Measure* 5.1.374-382). I disagree with M.C. Bradbrook, who contests that “in this alone Angelo is not a seemer; he has the consistency to sentence himself” (394). I see Angelo’s plea as a final, desperate attempt to avoid punishment. He does not actually hope to be killed in the name of justice. Instead, I think that he hopes to appear as if he has learned his lesson, and therefore does not need to be punished. The Duke may be the one in disguise for most of the play, but Angelo is just as much a seemer, and deserves to be punished for it. I agree with Samuel Johnson, who believes that “every reader feels some indignation when he finds [Angelo] spared” (qtd. in Geckle 72).

One who argues that Angelo is an essentially good-intentioned person who

happens to fall victim to temptation could point to the evidence that Angelo struggles with his lust for Isabella. Miles points to Angelo's "amazement, disgust, and grief expressed in the soliloquies of 2.2 and 2.4," stating that they "almost invariably elicit an unconditionally sympathetic response from the audience" (199). I am one of the variants who do not feel sympathy for Angelo upon seeing his self-examination. Just because Angelo is surprised by his lust for Isabella does not mean that he is a good-intentioned ruler. One can abuse authority and still feel surprised at feeling sexual lust if one has never felt that before. His surprise over his sexual lust does not excuse his other corruptions, and by acting on that lust, he only adds to his moral corruptness. As Miles points out, "He is undoubtedly suffering as he wrestles with his conscience, but he is still using his every means to save himself from exposure... the establishing of this blind and destructive self-interest is hardly to be regarded as a sympathetic stroke of characterization" (211).

If one were to still argue that Angelo is ultimately good-intentioned, but falls victim to temptation, one could point to the fact that Lucio instructs Isabella to charm Angelo into changing his mind. He says that when women "weep and kneel, / All [men's] petitions are as freely theirs / As they themselves would owe them" (*Measure* 1.4.81-83). In addition, Lucio tells her to "touch him" (2.2.75) in an attempt to persuade him into giving in to her. Further, one could point out that Angelo is not the only one tempted by Isabella, as she also charms the Duke when she kneels and begs him not

to give Angelo the death sentence. The Duke suggests that Isabella has seductive power because he grants her wishes and pardons Angelo from death, and then he expresses his love for her by proposing marriage. This evidence alone certainly makes Isabella seem, in some way, seductive, and Angelo seem like a victim of manipulative flirting—but Angelo quickly shows that it is Isabella, not he, that is the victim. Angelo exploits his power and propositions Isabella because he thinks that he can get away with it. If she were to try to expose him, nobody would believe her word over his, due to his high status. William Lawrence points out that "[Angelo's] readiness not only to put Isabella in her dreadful predicament in order to satisfy his lust, but also to break faith with her and to kill her brother, do not point to native virtue" (113). If one still tried to claim that Angelo is originally good-intentioned, and only falls to evil measures due to his temptation for Isabella, I would refer to Lawrence's statement: "One further piece of evidence seems to point to Angelo's native baseness: his flat refusal to temper justice with mercy, and spare Claudio, long before the dishonorable proposal is made to Isabella" (114).

It is surprising that Angelo is not more merciful toward Claudio, since he recognizes that "we are all frail" (*Measure* 2.4.122). Angelo says: "Blood, thou art blood" (2.4.15). Bevington explains that Angelo is saying that "no position of authority or birth, no matter how lofty, can protect a person from the instinctual power of desire" (431). I would expect Angelo to have more sympathy for Claudio's situation, since he, too, acted on lust. But instead of

showing Claudio mercy, Angelo asserts that one cannot write “‘good angel’ on the devil’s horn” (*Measure* 2.4.16). Angelo does not actually serve justice, though, because he punishes Claudio for personal, not ethical, reasons. Simmons points out that Angelo “does not apply the law in any consistent manner. In his application of the laws, people suffer unequally depending on his arbitrary, biased perceptions of them” (283).

One could still argue that Angelo must have been good-intentioned, though, or else Isabella would not have begged the Duke to pardon him. Isabella claims that she partly thought that “A due sincerity governed his deeds, / Till he did look on me” (*Measure* 5.1.454-455). It is important for one to remember, though, that Isabella only asks for him to be pardoned after Mariana begs her to do so, so that she won’t be left without a husband. Isabella, being the devout Christian that she is, is of course willing to forgive Angelo, especially at the request of poor Mariana, whom Angelo quickly left when she lost her dowry in a shipwreck. The fact that Isabella has sympathy for Mariana and forgives Angelo does not relieve him of the guilt that he has acquired from his selfish, menacing dealings.

While Angelo appears pious by punishing lechery, he forgets that his God is merciful. Angelo certainly does not engender this quality. Through his treatment of Claudio, Isabella, and Mariana, Angelo demonstrates that his own selfish interests are more important to him than anyone else. Angelo is greedy, power-hungry, and unjust. He abuses his authority and takes advantage of other people. From the beginning

of the play on, his intentions are solely to gain and demonstrate power, and to look out for his own interests, at the expense of others if necessary. If one is tempted to interpret Angelo as good-intentioned, one should consider that his selfish, hypocritical, and corrupt ruling pushes Isabella to run to the Duke, begging for “justice, justice, justice, justice!” (*Measure* 5.1.26).

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Mistreatment of Detainees in the War on Terror:
How the Bush Administration's Policies Have
Violated International Law and Hurt America

Submitted by Andrew Petracca



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Table of Abbreviations

CAT - Convention against Torture
CIA - U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
DOD - U.S. Department of Defense
DOS - U.S. Department of State
GC III - Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
GC IV - Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
ICC - International Criminal Court
ICCPR - International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
MI - Military Intelligence Corps of the U.S. Army
MP - Military Police Corps of the U.S. Army
OGA - Other Government Agency (military slang for anonymous personnel thought to be CIA)
OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLC - Office of Legal Counsel

I. Introduction

The foundation of civil liberty in modern democratic societies is the due process of law, the guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his or her freedom without a just cause, nor receive any punishment not duly and legally prescribed, nor suffer any punishment that would be inhumane or destructive of dignity. In the United States equal justice for all people before the law, during times of peace and war, is enshrined not only in the Constitution but also in the international laws that bind us and connect us with the rest of the world. The promise of fair and equal justice is one of the principles our country was founded upon and an ideal that should earn us the respect and admiration of the world. It is, however, an ideal, one that Americans and citizens of other free nations have done too little to make an everyday reality. Arbitrary arrests, unfair trials, torture and degrading treatment are not remnants of the distant past, and neither are they the sole province of oppressed countries controlled by strongman dictators. For democratic societies they are not entirely new, either. In the United States, for example, the use of torture in correctional facilities and by police officers throughout the country has not been uncommon in the last several decades (Conroy 33). The torture of captured enemies during wartime by American soldiers occurred as well, during the Vietnam War (Greer 372).

These violations, however shameful, do not approach the scope or scale of the most recent assault against the principle of due process in the United States. Beginning during the immediate the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001,

and ending only with its departure from power in January 2009, the administration of President George W. Bush placed suspected terrorists under arrest for indefinite periods of time in a manner contrary to the laws of war, denied those prisoners fair trials, authorized the use interrogation techniques, such as stress positions and simulated drowning (also called “waterboarding”) that are torturous or degrading to human dignity, and sent suspected terrorists overseas for the purpose of interrogations where torture had a high likelihood of occurring (the so-called “extraordinary renditions”). The Bush administration asserted that these acts are legally justified by presidential military authority and beyond the ability of any law to prevent (Greer 384). One effect of these actions was to reduce the importance of obeying international law and respecting the humanity of prisoners in the minds of American personnel, leading to situations where abusive behavior went beyond the original intent of the administration, such as the infamous abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib Prison in Iraq by American military police (Gourevitch 103).

It is tempting, in times of great national crisis, to act with less restraint than the principles of justice would otherwise allow. Let it not be said that Al Qaeda is not a serious threat, because it does pose a grave danger, and in a way that the United States is not used to fighting against. It is true that international terrorist networks cannot be defeated with conventional military doctrine, but that doesn’t mean that Americans have to abandon these principles, especially not for the sake of measures which may seem

very effective and “tough” but are actually counterproductive. The closest historical analog to the behavior of the Bush administration towards prisoners is the internment of Japanese-American citizens during the Second World War, supposedly to prevent sabotage, a decision which was ordered by President Roosevelt and backed by the Supreme Court. It is well-known today that the danger of sabotage was very small and the internment is considered one of the great shames of the United States’ history. The mistreatment of detainees and disregard for international law over the past several years has not only been unnecessary but may have actually strengthened our enemies, and there is little doubt that the attempts to institutionalize and legally justify the use of torture will also go down as one of the most shameful parts of American history.

Other countries that have tried to circumvent the rule of law during times of war or national crisis have suffered for it. The experimental tactics used by the United Kingdom against Irish Catholics only exacerbated the threat of the Irish Republican Army and left a black mark on British history. The Israeli government’s attempts to institute legal coercive interrogations in a limited manner led to a spiraling pattern of systemic abuse. Both cases illuminate different ways that ignoring international law can and has harmed the interests of the United States.

The indefinite detention of so-called “unlawful enemy combatants,” denying such persons access to impartial courts when they are in custody, and the use of certain interrogation techniques amounting to torture and degrading treatment are all violations of

multiple instruments of international law. They have also hurt the interests of the United States by damaging its reputation and moral authority abroad and encouraging ordinary people of foreign nations to take up arms against us. It will benefit the United States to observe international law in all future endeavors.

II. Overview of International Law Regarding Prisoners

1. Introduction

International law comes in many forms; unlike municipal (i.e., domestic) law, there is not an orderly hierarchy of official law-making bodies in international politics, and for that reason international law arises from the consensus of states. Treaties are written agreements among two or more states, and in modern times they are probably the most important type of international law (Shaw 89).¹ A large number of treaties that regulate state behavior towards prisoners are binding on the United States, many of which reflect broader principles and ideals. For that reason, it will be sufficient to focus on treaties in an analysis of what international laws regulate how the United States must treat detainees in the war on terror.

There are two major types of international law that affect how states must treat those in their power: humanitarian law and human rights law. International humanitarian law, more formally known as *jus in bello*, regulates state practice in times of war; it prescribes how states must treat prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territories, among other things (Shaw 1055). International human rights law regulates the way states treat people in their power in gen-

eral; in many cases such law explicitly forbids the derogation of certain rights even during wars or emergencies (256). Treaties representing both types of law are binding on the United States and thus are relevant to its conduct in the war against terrorism.

2. Categories of protected persons

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols are the core of international humanitarian law, and are universally recognized as law (ICRC). They prescribe legal protections for any imaginable class of person who may come under the control of a belligerent power in the course of an armed conflict. The Third 1949 Geneva Convention (hereafter GC III) protects prisoners of war. Its provisions apply during any period of international armed conflict, regardless of the existence of an official declaration of war or recognition of a state of war by any party to the fighting. GC III defines "prisoners of war" to include regular soldiers of a party to the conflict, duly authorized civilian crews, laborers, correspondents, and mechanics that accompany military units, and members of the merchant marine. Also included are members of militias or resistance movements that follow certain rules: having a clear command structure; wearing a distinctive mark that can be distinguished from a distance; carrying arms openly; and obeying the laws and customs of warfare. Also included are soldiers of a government not recognized by a Detaining Power, which don't necessarily need to meet all the same conditions as militias to qualify for POW treatment. Furthermore, belligerent captives whose status under GC III are in doubt must be treated as if they qualify as prisoners of war until a "competent

tribunal” can determine otherwise.

The Fourth Geneva Convention (hereafter GC IV) protects civilians not otherwise protected by the other three conventions and who are in the power of a foreign state during a war or occupation, if they are nationals of a state belligerent to the conflict. Persons that participate in a conflict without qualifying for protection under GC III would, if they are nationals of a state party to the conflict, be entitled to the protections of GC IV (Dormann 50). The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (hereafter AP I) provides additional rules for the conduct of international conflicts. It has not been ratified by the United States, but some of its provisions, notably Article 75, are commonly regarded as reflecting customary international law and are thus binding regardless (Sands 150). Article 75 describes “Fundamental Guarantees,” the basic rights accorded to anyone in the power of state party to a conflict who is not otherwise protected by another provision of AP I or any of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. Civilian nationals of a state that is not a party to a given conflict, for example, would not qualify for protected person status under the Conventions and would therefore fall under Article 75’s protection. Article 75 (or more precisely the customary law it reflects, in the case of the United States) thus makes it impossible for anyone to be in the power of a state without having some guarantee of protection under international humanitarian law (Dormann 73).

In the early days of the United Nations two legal instruments were created which were vital to the later development of

major human rights treaties. The first is the UN Charter itself, which states that the UN should support universal observance of human rights in Article 55. The second is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, which proclaimed a universal standard of rights that should be observed and protected. At the time these were not enforceable in any meaningful way, although they may have become binding to an extent since. Their chief importance lies in the road they paved toward more concrete legal instruments later on (Shaw 261).

The major human rights treaties which regulate state behavior towards detainees are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR) and the United Nations Convention Against Torture, both of which the United States has ratified (OHCR). According to General Comment 31 of the Human Rights Committee, states parties to the ICCPR have an obligation to ensure the rights of all people in their jurisdiction or effective control, even if they are outside said state’s territory. Article 5 of the Torture Convention likewise enjoins all state parties to outlaw torture in any territories under their jurisdiction.

3. *General rights and treatment*

Part II of GC III describes in general terms the rights of POWs, in that they are to be treated humanely, given appropriate medical care, and treated without undue discrimination. Part III, which includes Articles 17-107, describes POW rights in greater detail. Prisoners of war are only required to provide accurate information about their identities, including, name, rank, and social security number or equivalent. Their quarters must be as good as those of

soldiers of the Detaining Power in the same area, particularly regarding space and bedding allowed, and must not be deleterious to the health of prisoners, and are not to be located in a place that is especially close to combat zones. Food and water must be provided sufficiently to keep the prisoners healthy and prevent weight loss, and clothing suitable for the local climate must be given to the prisoners and repaired or replaced as is necessary. Camps must be clean and sanitary, and have necessary facilities for the medical treatment and monthly inspection of prisoners. All prisoners must be allowed to practice their religion, and if there is no clerical official to provide appropriate services among the prisoners then one must be provided by the Detaining Power. Discrimination based on race, religion, nationality, or language is prohibited. Prisoners must be able to write letters to their families informing them of their situations whenever they are captured, transferred to another camp, or hospitalized, and they must be allowed to receive letters and send at least two letters of their own per month, barring difficulties in procuring translators and censors.

GC IV allows for the internment of persons protected by its provisions only if necessary to military security, and guarantees internees largely the same set of rights that prisoners of war have under GC III. It states in Article 5 that, unlike GC III, a protected person engaged in or definitely suspected of hostile activities may be detained without being entitled to certain rights otherwise guaranteed if they would be harmful to the security of the occupying power, such as the right to communication, although full

protection must be restored as soon as possible.

Part III of the ICCPR, covering Articles 6-27, guarantees the right to life, protection against degrading treatment, discrimination, and slavery, the right to freedom and practice of religion, the right to recognition as a person under the law, and the right human treatment and respect for their dignity to everyone under the jurisdiction of a state party to the Convention. According to Article 4 certain derogations may be made from the Convention only if required by an emergency situation; Article 4 also states that such derogations can not be applied toward the rights to freedom from torture and discrimination, or the right to free exercise of religion.

4. Fair trial rights

GC III provides that prisoners of war who are accused of crimes must have fair trials in regularly constituted, independent, and impartial courts, by the same procedures under which soldiers of the detaining power would be tried. Proceedings must be held as quickly as possible, and if it is necessary to confine a prisoner before said proceedings such confinement must last no longer than three months. POWs on trial have the right to a qualified advocate, meet said advocate in private, call witnesses in their defense, and appeal decisions. POWs convicted of crimes must have their sentences served in the same facilities and in the same manner as soldiers of the Detaining Power in equivalent situations. Persons who are protected by GC IV have largely the same trial rights as prisoners of war, and if convicted should be kept separate from other detainees. Article 75 of AP I prohibits any sentence or

punishment from being carried out “except pursuant to a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure...”

Article 9 of the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary detention, mandates that anyone charged with a crime be “entitled to a trial within a reasonable time...,” and states that anyone under arrest has the right to have a court review the lawfulness of the arrest and order him freed if it is illegal. Article 14 guarantees the rights of all persons facing criminal charges to a legally established, independent, impartial court, to be presumed innocent before being found guilty, to summon witnesses in his defense, and to examine witnesses against him.

5. Prohibitions against torture and other degrading treatment

GC III prohibits the use of torture as an interrogation method in Article 17 and as a method of punishment in Article 87, and in Article 130 lists torture as a “grave breach” of the Conventions requiring state parties to find and bring to trial anyone accused of committing it. Article 32 of GC IV prohibits causing physical suffering of protected persons, including torture, and like GC III lists torture as a “grave breach” in Article 147. Article 75 of AP I prohibits torture and degrading treatment under any circumstances whatsoever. Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture and degrading treatment, and Article 4 lists this as a right that may *not* be derogated in a time of national crisis or emergency.

The Convention against Torture, as might be expected, goes into much greater

depth on this issue than other relevant treaties. It defines torture in Article 1 as:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.

Article 2 requires state parties to take effective measures to ban torture and states that nothing whatsoever, even a public emergency, can justify torture. Article 3 bans sending a person to another country where there is a real danger of that person being tortured. Article 5 declares that the illegality of torture must extend to all territories under the jurisdiction of the state parties or onboard ships and aircraft registered to the state parties. Article 10 states that anyone involved in the treatment of detainees should be educated on the prohibition of torture, and Article 11 requires state parties to review rules and practices of detention and interrogation with an eye toward preventing torture. Article 16 additionally requires state parties to prevent “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1” from being committed by public

officials in territories under their jurisdiction.

6. *Execution and enforcement*

a. The Red Cross

The International Committee of the Red Cross (hereafter ICRC or Red Cross) is an international non-governmental organization that has provided assistance to prisoners and the wounded in times of war for since the mid-nineteenth century. It has been closely involved with the creation, implementation, execution, and enforcement of most instruments of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their predecessors (Shaw 1163).

International law provides the ICRC a special legal mandate to perform humanitarian functions during times of international armed conflict. GC III guarantees the ability of the ICRC to act as a neutral protecting power during a conflict; this entails the authority to ensure the shipments of mail and relief to and from places of internment, receive reports about the labor conditions of prisoners, and propose the creation of a Central POW Information Agency, among others. Article 125 of GC III commits state parties to assist charitable organizations, especially the ICRC, deliver relief to POWs. Article 126 states that ICRC delegates must have the ability to visit any place where prisoners of war are held, employed, or transported without restriction and to hold interviews with prisoners in private. These liberties are not contingent on the ICRC being recognized as a protecting power by the detaining power in question. GC IV provides similar powers to the Red Cross regarding inspections, relief, and insurance of shipments to and from places where persons

under its protection are detained.

Unfortunately, the ICRC is limited in its ability to publicly protest against violations that it observes because of its traditional stance on confidentiality. It maintains neutrality in order to more fully guarantee its access to prisoners, refugees, and other persons that may require its help, so the ICRC has very rarely made public its knowledge of transgressions against international humanitarian law (Shaw 1079).

b. Prescriptions for domestic enforcement

The Geneva Conventions also place certain responsibilities on state parties with respect to their enforcement. Both GC III and IV require the dissemination of the text of the conventions in both peace and war, as well as the inclusion of their study in courses of military and civil instruction. Personnel that have responsibility for protected persons must have access to copies of the conventions at all times and receive special instruction as to their provisions. State parties are also required to provide effective legal sanctions against committing grave breaches,² bring any person accused of a grave breach to trial regardless of nationality,³ and to otherwise suppress all acts contrary to the Conventions that are not grave breaches.

The ICCPR requires state parties to protect each right guaranteed by its provisions by the force of domestic law. Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention against Torture require state parties make torture illegal under domestic law and do whatever is necessary to establish jurisdiction over torture in any territory under is control. Articles 6 and 7 mandate that states parties must arrest any person alleged to have violated the

convention and either extradite that person or put the case to its own authorities for the purpose of prosecution.⁴

c. Treaty mechanisms

Since there was no pre-existing organization like the ICRC to manage issues of human rights law, the ICCPR and the Torture Convention both set up special committees with enforcement duties. Part IV of the ICCPR, comprising Articles 28-45, mandates the creation of a Human Rights Committee, whose members are elected by and from the states parties to the Covenant. State Parties are required to submit reports on their efforts to guarantee the rights listed in the CCPR one year after it enters into force, and the Committee has the power to request further reports at any time afterwards. The Committee may also receive complaints from one state party about another's alleged failure to fulfill its obligations under the CCPR and attempt to solve any such dispute by mediating negotiations between the parties involved if it decides that all domestic remedies have been exhausted or unreasonably delayed.⁵ In cases where the Committee is unable to resolve and issue it may appoint an ad hoc Commission to further attempt to create an amicable solution. The Committee also has the responsibility to submit an annual report of its activities to the General Assembly of the United Nations. The Committee can issue General Comments that explain and interpret the Covenant's provisions; General Comment 31, mentioned above, is an example of such a comment.

Article 17 of the Convention against Torture prescribes the creation of the Com-

mittee against Torture, a body consciously modeled on the Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR (Nowak 586). State parties must submit reports to this Committee not just one year after the Convention enters into force for them but every four years thereafter as well, in addition to whatever other reports the Committee requests. In cases where well-founded evidence indicates the possibility of torture being carried the Committee can invite the state party concerned to cooperate in examining the evidence and making observations based upon it. If it is warranted, the Committee may also make a confidential inquiry into the matter, which may involve visiting the territory of the state party in question. It has similar powers to the Human Rights Committee regarding the power to mediate disputes between state parties if domestic remedies have been exhausted, and it may also receive communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of the Convention if a state party with jurisdiction over said individuals recognizes the competence of the Committee to do so.

d. UN organizations

There are also other organizations that are outside of the specific framework of the relevant treaties, which are important to monitoring and investigating the way prisoners and detainees are treated throughout the world, including official bodies of the United Nations. One such organization is the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (hereafter OHCHR), which is the primary executive body of the United Nations responsible for human rights. It coordinates and organizes the efforts of all the UN groups with some responsibility for

human rights (Forsythe 4).

The Human Rights Council, a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly, was created in 2006 in order to more effectively address human rights violations throughout the world. It took over the task from its predecessor, the Human Rights Commission, which came under intense criticism for the poor human rights record of some of its members. The institution of the Council, a body with largely similar powers, intended to ameliorate that problem by having its members elected by the General Assembly (76). It is tasked with performing "Universal Periodic Review," a process that entails the cooperative examination of human rights situations in all member states of the United Nations. The Council may also receive and discuss credible communications regarding "consistent patterns of gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms occurring in any part of the world and under any circumstances," if domestic remedies have been exhausted. The Human Rights Council also has the power, inherited from the Commission, to establish "special procedures," which are mandates that empower their holders (who are usually expert individuals) to investigate, advise, and make public reports on specific areas of their expertise. Such mandates may be assigned either to specific countries or to thematic issues relating to human rights (Shaw 283).

There is such a mandate regarding torture; the title of the person holding that mandate is "Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." According to the official web page on the OHCHR's web site, the Special Rapporteur has the responsibility to transmit appeals and other communications regarding

torture to state governments, perform fact-finding missions, and make annual reports to the Council and the UN General Assembly. He or she can act with far more independence than most other legally established human rights entities, including the Human Rights Council itself, because he or she is *not* bound by the constraints of the usual exhaustion of domestic remedies rule (Weissbrodt 693).⁶

e. NGOs

There are, of course, many important organizations dedicated to protecting human rights and investigating breaches of international law that are not affiliated with the United Nations or any government at all. Two of the most important non-governmental organizations (or NGOs) that concern themselves with the treatment of prisoners and detainees are Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.

Human Rights Watch has a relatively small membership, made up of about 230 experienced and influential professionals. It works to promote human rights by conducting investigations into alleged abuses of all sorts throughout the world, publishing their findings publicly (unlike the Red Cross) in order to shame and embarrass abusers through media attention, and encouraging them to make reforms (Korey 309). Through its fact-finding and lobbying it also seeks to influence governments and international organizations throughout the world, especially the United States government (344).

Amnesty International, by contrast, is a mass-movement organization that draws its influence from large grassroots membership. Amnesty International performs many activities draws its influence from large grassroots membership. Amnesty International performs many activities

similar to those of Human Rights Watch, such as fact-finding, observation, appealing to governments and reporting its findings publicly and widely; it also mobilizes its large numbers for other tasks, such as large-scale demonstrations, petitions, letter-writing campaigns, and protests against policies that infringe on human rights (Clark 9). Amnesty International focuses special attention on prisoners that have been illegally detained or abused while in custody, although it deals with other human rights issues as well (12).

f. *Legal prosecutions and punishments* All of the aforementioned executive bodies, committees, and NGOs perform vital tasks such as fact-finding, publishing, and engaging with abusive actors to change their policies. Let it not be said that what they do is unimportant; their operations are necessary to uncovering and preventing illegal abuses of detainees. None of them, however, have the responsibility or the power to enforce international law the way “enforcement” is commonly thought of in domestic law: arresting, charging, trying, and punishing individuals that make transgressions against the law. Historically, that task has fallen, for better or for worse, to state governments.

If an individual commits or orders to be committed an act of abuse against a prisoner of war, then obviously the government of the state to which he is a national has the right and duty to put that individual on trial for the crime. If the abuse is ordered or condoned at the highest levels of government then, of course, there is little chance of such a prosecution actually taking place. There is no universally applicable system of sanction and punishment in international law as exists in domestic law (Shaw 4). Therefore, in such situations the responsibility for capturing and

prosecuting alleged abusers has usually fallen to some other state or group of states, according either to the principle of prosecuting offenses committed against themselves or the principle of universal jurisdiction.

Two of the most important examples of the former principle at work are the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials of German and Japanese leaders and soldiers after the Second World War.⁷ That a state has a legitimate right to prosecute those who are alleged to have committed war crimes against them or their nationals, so long as fair trial standards are applied, is a longstanding principle of international law appealed to by the Allies to justify the trials. The “victors’ justice” challenge, the assertion that a court is illegitimate because it has been created by the winners of a war to judge the defeated, was presented by the defendants at Nuremberg, Tokyo, and other *ad hoc* international courts throughout history, but never with any success (Boister 32). The claim that the Allies were legally unable to combine their jurisdiction and form a single court, which was presented by the defendants at the beginning of the Tokyo trials, was unanimously dismissed out of hand by the court (178).

State governments clearly have a legal right to prosecute alleged war criminals, including POW abusers,⁸ and may combine their jurisdictions into a single court. These rights were exercised in the post-World War II trials. The manner in which those rights were used, however, left much to be desired regarding fairness. The trials were conducted as military tribunals, even if they were of an international character, and therefore would probably not pass the requirements for a fair and independent court required by the ICCPR and the Geneva Conventions. The charters which established the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals allowed them to ignore “technical rules of

evidence” and admit anything they deemed to have relevance to the case in Articles 19 and 13, respectively.⁹ The Tokyo Tribunal in particular suffered from a host of problems, including *inter alia* political and ethnic bias on the part of the judges, the disproportionately high rejection rate of the defense’s evidence, the abnormal length of the trial, and the relative lack of time and resources available to the defense. It did not come close to meeting fair trial standards, even at the time when it took place (Boister 89-114). Regardless of the importance of these trials to the development of modern international law, as a model for carrying out that law today they are sorely lacking.

The latter half of the twentieth century has seen the increasing adoption of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, which holds that certain crimes are so heinous that any court may charge, try and convict an offender regardless of the territorial limits of its jurisdiction. War crimes, including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, have fallen under universal jurisdiction since 1945 (Shaw 595). Article 7 of the Convention against Torture arguably gives states parties the authority to prosecute alleged torturers even when they are not nationals and the alleged crimes are claimed to have occurred outside the territory state in question. During the famous Pinochet extradition hearings, British judge Lord Millet even claimed that the prohibition of torture by custom afforded extraterritorial jurisdiction to national courts even without taking into account treaty law (599). The application of this principle relies on alleged offenders being within the territorial jurisdiction of a

state government that is willing to prosecute them, and some governments are more supportive of the doctrine than others. Belgium, for example, has made universal jurisdiction an explicit part of its national law. Several world leaders accused of crimes against humanity have been charged by its courts, including Yasir Arafat, Ariel Sharon and Paul Kagame, and Belgian courts have convicted several Rwandans of participating in genocide (Macedo 3). The United States government, on the other hand, has been generally hostile toward the concept. Some influential political and legal experts argue, not without some merit, that universal jurisdiction could be abused by state governments in order to threaten or punish foreign political opponents that would otherwise be protected by state sovereignty (6). Many state governments will probably refuse to endorse universal jurisdiction because of such concerns, and so as a solution to the problem of punishing transgressors against international law the doctrine will be, by itself, inadequate.

In 2002 an institution was created that seeks, if not to solve, then at least to ameliorate some of the problems involved in enforcing international law by providing the services of a permanent and independent tribunal, namely the International Criminal Court (hereafter ICC). According to Article 5 of the Rome Statute, the international legal instrument which created the ICC, it has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and war crimes. Article 6 defines “crimes against humanity” to include torture, murder, rape, and imprisonment in violation of international law, while Article 7 defines “war crimes” to include grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.

Unfortunately, the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute, arguing that the independent prosecutor may bring politicized charges against Americans who, since the United States is so heavily involved in world affairs, are more exposed than citizens of other countries (Elias 7). Since 2002 the U.S. government has actively opposed the ICC in a number of ways. Congress has passed an act that prevents federal agencies from cooperating with the ICC and prevents U.S. participation in peacekeeping missions where there is any danger that American personnel will be prosecuted by the ICC (11). Therefore, it is unlikely to be involved in the resolution of the issue of detainees in the war against terrorism.

7. Conclusion

Between the Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, and the aforementioned human rights treaties, there is no person, of any category, at any time, in any situation, anywhere in the world, during war or peace, who is not protected to some degree by international law. There can be no detainees or prisoners outside the law as far as the treaty obligations of the United States are concerned, regardless of their status as terrorists or criminals, and no matter whether they are held within or outside of U.S. territory.

III. Violations Committed by the Bush

Administration

1. Introduction

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, President Bush has authorized a series of military and intelligence operations known collectively as “the war against terrorism.” In the course of this war mem-

bers of the United States military and intelligence services have continuously, willfully, and systematically violated the rights of thousands of prisoners under both humanitarian law and human rights law, under the orders and condoning of top officials including generals, members of the Cabinet, and the President.

American personnel have consistently failed to perform adequate background checks needed to accurately determine whether detainees are POWs, criminals, or innocent civilians who were arrested by mistake or falsely implicated in military or terrorist activity. The rights of habeas corpus and access to regularly established courts have been denied to prisoners in Iraq and Guantanamo Bay based on specious legal reasoning, and hundreds of innocent people have been detained for years before being released without charges. Conditions in prisons run by Americans throughout the world have been inhumanely unhygienic and dangerous, sometime through neglect and sometimes as part of a deliberate plan to weaken the morale of prisoners prior to interrogation. Detainees have been subject to torture and inhuman, degrading treatment by Americans in the course of both interrogations and disciplinary actions. Some prisoners have also been subject to so-called “extraordinary renditions,” where they have been transported to other countries for the purpose of being interrogated and tortured by non-Americans. In some cases American forces have extra-judicially killed prisoners or allowed them to be killed by allied forces. All of these actions are both morally outrageous and strictly prohibited by international law.

2. Arrest without just cause

a. Afghanistan

Even during the initial combat operations in Afghanistan during 2001 there were significant problems with the identification and processing of prisoners. A major element of these difficulties was the U.S.'s reliance on the Northern Alliance, a group of anti-Taliban militias. The Alliance provided the bulk of the ground troops during this period so that large numbers of American soldiers would not have to be committed, even though their forces had a history of brutality that rivaled their foes in the Taliban (Worthington Guantanamo Files 5). In the chaos and confusion of the war, a number of people were captured by Northern Alliance soldiers and then turned over to the Americans for interrogation who had very little or no connection at all with the Taliban or Al Qaeda, including travelers, relief workers, low-ranking foot soldiers, refugees, and religious teachers (30-38).

Pakistan was another nominal ally of the United States in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Pakistani soldiers and government officials proved themselves just as haphazard and careless in rounding up prisoners to be turned over to the United States as the Northern Alliance forces. Thousands of refugees fled across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border during the course of the war, and Pakistani soldiers arrested hundreds of them, mainly foreigners, and turned them over to the Americans on extremely spurious grounds. As with the prisoners captured by the Northern Alliance, there were few people of any real intelligence value among these prisoners, only a diverse mix of foot

soldiers, religious scholars, and civilian refugees (49).

The unreliability of American allies to adequately screen prisoners was exacerbated by the United States' own policy of offering bounties for alleged members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Numerous prisoners have testified that they were falsely accused of working with or for terrorist groups and then "sold" to the Americans (46). For example, one Saudi Arabian explained that he crossed into Pakistan and was denied access to the Saudi embassy by Pakistani soldiers until they handed him over to the United States in exchange for money (Sebaili 45-46). There is also evidence that Afghani warlords from the Northern Alliance have earned money for transferring suspected terrorists and low-ranking Taliban fighters into American custody (Raman).

American personnel also made their own blunders when it came to identifying and capturing suspected terrorists in Afghanistan, the most incomprehensible being the arrest of five political prisoners that had previously been held by the Taliban. Because these men were foreigners, the Northern Alliance forced them to remain in prison even after the Taliban had been driven off, supposedly for their own safety. Even though they had been imprisoned by the Taliban for being suspected anti-fundamentalist spies, American agents later took them prisoner and sent them to the Guantanamo Bay Prison (Worthington Guantanamo Files 114).

Given the chaotic nature of war in general, the especially disorganized nature of Afghanistan, and the obvious risks that unlawful and unwarranted arrests would

arise from offering these bounties, the United States should have been extremely careful in examining the backgrounds of prisoners and checking the stories of those who claimed innocence. In fact, American officials were incredibly lax in this regard, assuming as a matter of course that most or all of the detainees in U.S.-run prisons in Afghanistan were guilty of committing or conspiring to commit acts of terrorism. The tribunals mandated by GC III to determine whether a belligerent belonged to a protected category of persons were completely absent at this point in time (90). Without any legally-prescribed mechanisms for determining who belonged in prison, the United States has held hundreds of people prisoner without any legally justifiable reason for unacceptably long periods of time before discovering or deciding that they are not threats and subsequently releasing them without charge.

An example of the stubborn refusal of United States government officials to consider that a prisoner might not be a terrorist during this time is the case of Mohammed Sadiq. He was a civilian who was over 80 years old when he was arrested by American soldiers, apparently because one of his family members was suspected of working for the Taliban. Even he, as obviously harmless as he was, spent several months under arrest before the United States released him (Raman). Many others whose innocence could have been determined by a brief investigation immediately after their capture were held prisoner in Afghanistan and Cuba for *years* before being released without charge. There was, for example, Khalid al Morghi, the son of a senior Saudi Arabian military

officer, who took a leave of absence from his white-collar job to perform charitable aid work in Afghanistan – hardly the portrait of a hardcore terrorist, or any sort of combatant at all. He was still held, first in Afghanistan and later in Guantanamo Bay, for over four years before being released (Worthington Guantanamo Files 54).

The “competent tribunals” required by GC III to determine the eligibility of prisoners for protection under humanitarian law did not appear until years after the war began, and even then they were too little, too late. The Combatant Status Review Tribunals that were announced in July 2004 suffered from tremendous difficulties for a several reasons. First, the prisoners were denied access to lawyers during the tribunals. Second, the court was allowed to hear secret evidence to which the prisoners had no access. Third, the tribunals were held far away from the battlefield and a long time after the persons in question had been captured, making it very difficult for the defendants to call witnesses who might have known them to testify on their behalf. Finally, even when prisoners did provide addresses or telephone numbers for people that might have testified for them, the court apparently made no effort whatsoever to find them (267).

To sum up, the United States exhibited extreme negligence and willful disregard for international law in the way it processed alleged terrorists and criminals during the early part of the fighting in Afghanistan. The shocking thoughtlessness with which prisoners were initially assumed to be guilty and subsequently held in custody for months or years without an investigation was in direct contravention of international

humanitarian and human rights law¹⁰ and also offensive to common moral sensibilities. The Bush administration and U.S. military and government officials should have anticipated the possibility of wrongful arrests during a confusing and complicated war, but instead displayed an attitude of unwarranted confidence that anyone under arrest must have done something to deserve it, an attitude which it would carry into its handling of the long-term detention, trial procedures, and treatment of prisoners outside of Afghanistan.

b. Iraq

The Abu Ghraib prison facility was taken over by the United States in 2003, initially as part of the creation of a new Iraqi criminal justice system; most of the other prisons in the country had been ransacked beyond salvation by looters, and there were few other options available. It was not intended, at first, to be used for detention operations by the American military (Gourevitch 19).

The increasing frequency of insurgent attacks in Baghdad caused American authorities to change that policy. Iraqis arrested by American soldiers on patrol were put into Abu Ghraib because there was literally nowhere else for them to go, even though the prison's location in a hostile area meant it came under mortar attack frequently. GC III provides that POW camps or other internment areas should not be located in especially dangerous places, and the Red Cross determined that American personnel had not taken sufficient measures to offer protection from shelling to the prisoners (Greenberg 403). Military prisoners and civilian prisoners were supposed to be han-

dled separately from each other, and officially there was an attempt to do that, with a temporary tent encampment meant specifically for the civilians. However, the distinction between the two types of prisoners became less and less meaningful to the guards and administrators as the number of prisoners continued to increase beyond what they had been prepared to handle (Gourevitch 23).

Many prisoners were arrested on little evidence and were held long after they should have been released. In 2003 Red Cross inspectors were told by intelligence officers that they believed well over half the prison population of Iraq was kept there mistakenly (Greenberg 388). It was not uncommon for American soldiers on patrol to arrest anyone and everyone who was around during the aftermath of an attack. Firing weapons in celebration was a fairly common practice in Iraq, and according to a member of the Justice Department's Iraq rebuilding team, people were arrested for doing it (Gourevitch 23). The biggest problem was that it was difficult for these people to get released from Abu Ghraib even after it was fairly apparent that they did not belong. Even when judges and lawyers arranged for a prisoner to be released, the military would sometimes prevent it from happening. Some of the delays were probably just the result of bureaucratic errors, but the increasing demand for useful intelligence about insurgents also started to contribute as well; often prisoners that would otherwise have been released were kept in the prison because of supposed "intelligence value," assessments that the top on-site civilian administrator put little stock in (24).

The system of notification and information dissemination in Iraq was extremely flawed in 2003 as well. It was rare for those making arrests to properly inform suspects or their families of why they were being arrested or where they were taken, and the military usually failed to notify the families of suspects detained while away from their homes that they had been arrested at all. The ICRC, which otherwise would have helped notify families as quickly as possible, often received no or improperly completed paperwork from the United States military, resulting in unnecessary delays (Greenberg 389).

Among all the prisoners at Abu Ghraib, the ones that arguably least deserved to be there were the mentally ill ones, of which there may have been as many as ten. Many were delusional or schizophrenic, engaging in violent and unhygienic behavior that was unsafe for other prisoners, the guards, and themselves. These people should have been in a mental hospital instead of a military prison, or at least under the care of qualified mental health professionals. There were none at Abu Ghraib, and even though many potentially helpful drugs were available at the facility, without doctors to prescribe them guards just gave the mentally ill prisoners Benadryl and tried to deal with their behavior as best as they could (Gourevitch 145).

Many prisoners who were not obviously innocent civilians, including insurgents and some former members of Saddam Hussein's Iraqi military, which had been officially disbanded after the capture of Baghdad, were held by the United States officially as non-POWs because they were not members of a

military force of a State Party to the Geneva Conventions. According to one interrogator, a senior intelligence official reported that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had told him that insurgents were not protected by the Geneva Conventions and all interrogation techniques were usable, including dogs (211). Rather, their detentions were justified as the necessary imprisonment of those suspected of spying, sabotage, or other hostilities. Article 5 of GC IV does allow such detentions, but the ICRC has always held that its provisions should only be applied to exceptional cases and on an individual basis (33). Applying it to the detention of thousands of prisoners at the same time may, arguably, have been within the letter of the law, but it was most certainly in violation of its spirit.

The American soldiers in Baghdad can be excused for being aggressive with initial arrests; however, that people with no apparent connection to insurgents or terrorists were kept imprisoned instead of released quickly is unacceptable. Especially in a war zone with a shortage of space for prisoners, there seems little rationale for detaining more people than absolutely necessary. The same overly confident attitude from Afghanistan, the idea that anyone who was put in jail by an American must have done something wrong, was combined with the chaotic state of the country, its new justice system, and the American command structure to create a situation where many innocent civilians were put in prison for far longer than they should have been.

3. Indefinite Detention and Unfair Trials

The prison at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba, has held over 750 prisoners since it opened in January 2002 (CBC).

None of them had a fair trial or easy access to an impartial court while they were there, a situation that has famously been called a “legal black hole” (Steyn). The legal basis for their imprisonment was President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001, which stated that any non-citizens of the United States could be detained, without any specified time limit, if the President believed they were involved in terrorism or if it was in the interests of the United States that they be detained (Greenberg 26).

The Bush administration chose Guantanamo Bay as the location of the prison specifically to prevent the detainees from ever having access to an independent court in which they could challenge their detentions, complain about their treatment, or have a fair trial. A memorandum submitted to the General Counsel of the Department of Defense on 28 December 2001, written by John Yoo and Patrick Philbin, who were both Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals at the time, demonstrates that quite clearly. The memo argued that federal courts should not and probably would not find that they could exercise jurisdiction over an alien detained in Guantanamo Bay, and that chances were small that a judge would decide to grant a habeas corpus hearing in response to a petition filed by such a person (37).

Why was the administration so intent on preventing federal courts from having access to the detention camp? Apparently, top officials had already decided that all of the prisoners were guilty, and they didn’t need or want any independent court to get involved and potentially challenge their decisions. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, for

example, stated publicly in January 2002 that the Guantanamo prisoners were “committed terrorists,” and later that same month said that the prisoners were among the worst, most violent criminals in the world. American generals gave statements to similar effect about the prisoners as well (Worthington Guantanamo Files 127). These statements were being made about people who had never appeared in a court of law, much less been convicted in a fair trial.

The simplest solution to preventing the detainees from filing for habeas corpus or otherwise justifying their release would have been to classify them as prisoners of war, which Secretary of State Powell indeed argued should have been done (Greenberg 123). However, for reasons which will be explained below, the administration decided to classify them as “unlawful combatants” in an attempt to prevent the Geneva Conventions from applying to them (Worthington Guantanamo Files 128). The government was trying to have it both ways: locking up prisoners indefinitely and without putting them on trial as if they were POWs, but otherwise behaving as if they were criminals.

The administration wasn’t entirely opposed to the idea of trials, but it wanted those trials on its terms and more or less under its control. The same Military Order that President Bush issued to justify the detention of suspected terrorists also provided for military tribunals to determine whether suspected terrorists were guilty of war crimes, and that the danger to the United States posed by such persons necessitated that the rules of law and evidence in normal cases could not be applied. According to the order, appointments to said commissions

would be made by the Secretary of Defense, and either he or the President could review and decide on the conviction or sentencing of a trial. Furthermore, any person subject to such a tribunal would be unable to appeal the decision in any American, foreign, or international court (Greenberg 25-28). Because the judges would be military officers who take orders from the President they could never be truly independent of executive authority (Koh “The Case Against Military Commissions” 339). Military tribunals as prescribed by the President’s Military Order would almost certainly never meet the fairness and independence requirements of either the Geneva Conventions or the ICCPR.

One need not turn to hypothetical situations to see how unfair a trial by military commission would be, of course. The first military trial of an “unlawful combatant” to be successfully concluded (in July 2008, more than six years after the Guantanamo prison opened) was the trial of Salim Hamdan, a man accused of working as a driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden. (It was, in fact, because of his exclusion from parts of an earlier trial that the Supreme Court decided that military commissions violated the Geneva Conventions in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld*.) The trial was riddled with problems, including the hearing of secret testimony behind closed doors, the acceptance of hearsay evidence of highly dubious validity, and the presentation of pointless, prejudicial evidence, supposedly meant to inform the jurors about the nature of Al Qaeda, but which served only as terrifying propaganda (Worthington “A critical overview”).

What’s worse, the court’s sentence seems to have no relationship with the reality of Hamdan’s detention. A Pentagon spokesman has stated that even when Hamdan is finished serving his sentence,¹¹ he may still be subject to potentially indefinite detention as an “enemy combatant” (CNN). This is nothing less than a mockery of justice and a demonstration of the paradoxical reasoning of the Bush administration. Hamdan was deprived of prisoner of war rights for allegedly violating the laws of war, but even after he has been convicted and punished according to what passes for justice in Guantanamo, the administration wants to hold him indefinitely as something other than a POW anyway. This, at least as much as anything else, should prove that President Bush and his advisors did not care about justice or the rule of law, whether international or domestic, when it comes to the detainee victims of the war against terrorism.

4. Torture

a. Overview

Torture and activity degrading to human dignity have been used during the war on terror by the United States, at first, as interrogation methods, in spite of the unequivocal ban on such techniques by international law. The use of such techniques was authorized at the highest levels of the civilian and military command structure (Greenberg 360).

b. Torture by American personnel

i. Afghanistan

The use of torture and degrading treatment began early on during military operations in Afghanistan, even before the official opening of any permanent prison sites. Notably, in December 2001 John Walker

Lindh, known colloquially in the U.S. media as “the American Taliban,” was made to pose for humiliating photographs, threatened with death, taped to a stretcher while naked during interrogations, and denied medical treatment for his injuries, including a bullet wound in his leg, for several days (Worthington Guantanamo Files 82). The office of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who was monitoring the interrogation closely, authorized the military interrogators in charge of Lindh to “take the gloves off” during the process (Roth and Worden 165). Another detainee who, like Lindh, immediately received extra attention from American soldiers and interrogators because of his race and nationality, was David Hicks, an Australian who fought for the Taliban. Hicks has claimed in an official affidavit that shortly after he was handed over to American authorities he had guns pointed at him and was threatened with death, and that later he was imprisoned onboard a naval ship where he was not given sufficient quantities of food. He also stated that he was transported to unknown locations and forced to kneel in uncomfortable positions for hours at a time while being struck by guards before being transported to the Kandahar prison (Bonner).

A permanent prison in Kandahar opened in January 2002, and for the first time a large number of prisoners were entered into the interrogation system. At first the interrogators tried to hew to the rules of behavior set by the Geneva Conventions and military regulations, but as the demand for useful intelligence increased they became more violent. Many prisoners were physically beaten, restrained, had their fingers broken,

or had hard objects thrown at their heads during interrogations. Even these methods, brutal as they were, are relatively tame compared to the most extreme techniques used by some interrogators outside the usual Military Intelligence chain of command, including Special Forces soldiers and agents of the CIA and FBI. These extreme techniques included burning prisoners with scalding liquids and cigarettes, sexual violations, and application of electrical shocks. Many prisoners asserted that these actions were often photographed and that those photographs were used in later interrogations to threaten prisoners (Worthington Guantanamo Files 94-98).

The behavior of the prison guards was, if anything, even worse. The relaxation of Geneva Convention standards, combined with the general spirit of taking vengeance for the September 11 terrorist attacks, made the American guards especially prone to violent overreactions and arbitrary abuses. American soldiers were told that their prisoners were “nobodies,” and at least one believed that if the Geneva Conventions had been applied and the prisoners labeled as “soldiers” then they would have been treated with more respect (Jehl). Beatings were common responses to rule violations, and prisoners were often denied adequate amounts of sleep because of “inspections” during the night that forced them to stand outside in the cold. Even harsher exposure to extreme cold was not unheard of at Kandahar, either, as many prisoners stated that they were exposed to the cold while naked, and at least one had cold water thrown on his body during the night. “Stress positions,” the binding of prisoners in a way meant to cause them

physical pain, was also fairly common.

Psychological abuses also occurred, often in tandem with the physical ones. Prisoners were often forced to go naked while they were abused and were mocked and photographed in the process. Many had their beards, which are important to maintain for Muslims, shaved against their wills. Although each detainee was given his own copy of the Koran, some guards damaged and desecrated the holy books in order to taunt them; yelling insulting profanities about Islam and the Prophet Mohammed were fairly common as well (Worthington Guantanamo Files 88).

The Kandahar facility was the main U.S.-run prison in Afghanistan for only a few months, and in the spring of 2002 many detainees were transferred from that location to the prison at Bagram Air Force Base, which has served as the central United States military prison in the country ever since. As a prison camp Bagram left much to be desired, with hastily thrown together cells and pens made from wood and barbed wire, and windows boarded up with rusty sheets of iron (Worthington Guantanamo Files 170).

The abuse from guards and interrogators did not improve during the transition from Kandahar, either. Stress positions and sleep deprivation were incorporated into interrogation routines as pressure to obtain intelligence grew stronger. Even the most well-trained and ethical military interrogators went farther than they had before the move, keeping prisoners awake in long sessions for as long as the interrogators themselves could stay up, a process informally called "monsterring." The name reflected that these

early interrogators considered it the worst, cruelest technique that they were willing to use. When new, less experienced interrogators were sent to work at Bagram they increased the upper limit of sleep deprivation to 36 hours, ordered increased amounts of isolation and handcuffing outside of interrogation rooms, and generally allowed themselves to use other coercive techniques with greater frequency as time went by (Mackey 471). Unwarranted violence from the guards was as bad as it had ever been in Kandahar, if not worse, and the litany of beatings, humiliations, religious insults, death threats, rapes, and electrical torture continued unabated (Worthington Guantanamo Files 170).

The perhaps inevitable result of this culture of abuse was death; at least two Bagram inmates have died as a result of physical abuse from guards. Both confirmed deaths were largely caused by reservists untrained in detention using powerful blows to the legs as disciplinary measures. Mullah Habibullah was shackled in a holding cell and struck in the legs repeatedly over several days before he succumbed to his injuries and died (Worthington Guantanamo Files 188). The second man, known only as Dilawar, was chained and beaten repeatedly for apparent non-compliance during an interrogation, and died after five days. Official press releases ascribed the deaths only to heart attacks, but documentation from army doctors indicates that the damage to the legs was the most important factor (McCoy 126). Two of the soldiers directly involved in the deaths were convicted of criminal abuse in 2005 and sentenced to only a few months imprisonment; no officers were prosecuted at all (BBC

News).

ii. Guantanamo Bay

During most of the first year of its existence, interrogations at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility were fairly mild. During this time mistreatment involved general conditions, like open-air cages for living quarters and insufficient amounts of food, an atmosphere of uncertainty leading to intense fear, and large amounts of verbal abuse from the guards (Worthington Guantanamo Files 132). The worst, most violent transgressions were committed by the Extreme Reaction Force, or ERF, a squad of soldiers in riot gear who would respond to minor or nonexistent misbehavior with incredible savagery. Tarak Dergoul, a Guantanamo detainee that was frequently targeted by the ERF because he organized prisoner strikes, was so traumatized by his experiences that he needed psychological counseling after his release (Rose).

Conditions in Guantanamo became much worse in October 2002 when, due to frustrations from the lack of good intelligence, Major General Geoffrey Miller was appointed as the new commander of the base. His predecessor was considered “soft” for allowing detainees to keep their Korans and criticizing guards for committing verbal abuse (Goldenberg). It was Miller that decided that the best way to obtain results was to coordinate the activities of the Military Police guards and the Military Intelligence interrogators - as he put it, to “set the conditions.” This meant that every aspect of the lives of the detainees was geared toward making them “break” under interrogation. In practice, this meant more beatings of

“uncooperative” prisoners by guards, including, the continued use of the ERF teams, and the institution of new interrogation routines involving prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures and sleep deprivation (Worthington Guantanamo Files 193).

Miller’s appointment roughly coincided with high-level decisions to explicitly authorize more violent forms of interrogation. In November 2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld responded positively to a request for new interrogation methods, explicitly allowing such techniques as stress positions, sensory and sleep deprivation, removing religious paraphernalia, the forced shaving of facial hair, and the use of dogs to frighten detainees. Rumsfeld rescinded his authorization several weeks later (Greenberg 237-239). According to an official log that was leaked to *Time* magazine, during that interim the harsh techniques were used against Mohammed al-Qahtani, infamously known as the “twentieth hijacker” of the September 11th attacks, including sleep deprivation and stress positions. Additionally, female interrogators would frequently invade his personal space in order to humiliate him.¹² Recently, the top legal military official in Guantanamo Bay has stated that she will not refer al-Qahtani to prosecution because the treatment he suffered amounts to torture (Woodward).

The administration was apparently pleased with the changes that General Miller had brought to Guantanamo Bay. In September 2003, he was sent to Iraq in order to provide a similar overhaul to the interrogation operations at the Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, where the same practice of using the guards to constantly maintain an

environment supposedly conducive to successful interrogations was instituted and mentioned in the Army's internal investigation of abuse (Goldenberg).

iii. Iraq

An ICRC report released in 2004 and based on data gathered between February and November 2003 indicates that during that period in Iraq some level of brutality on the part of United States military personnel was present in every step of the detention process. At the time of arrest soldiers would often threaten or strike suspects who had their hands cuffed behind their backs. During transfers to prisons the treatment was even worse, as several severe beatings were reported, many resulting in serious injuries and a least one resulting in death. At least two cases of major burns caused by forced contact with hot metal surfaces were also reported (Greenberg 390). The very worst documented instances of mistreatment, which rose to the level of torture according to the Red Cross, occurred during interrogations performed by members of the US Army's Military Intelligence Corps.

The most common technique used by Military Intelligence (or MI) interrogators at Abu Ghraib was the solitary confinement of interrogation subjects in completely empty, totally dark rooms, for days at a time, while naked; cooperation with interrogators merited "rewards" such as beds, clothing, and light. Other abusive methods observed by the Red Cross included sleep deprivation, binding of the hands in a manner that caused wrist wounds, and being forced to walk through the facility's hallways while naked. The ICRC medical inspector discovered that

several detainees had psychological problems, such as poor memory and suicidal tendencies, which were judged to have resulted from the physical and mental stress of their interrogations (Greenberg 393).

Oddly enough, the report stated that the worst sorts of abuse mostly did not occur to detainees that were being held in regular prison facilities run by military police. It noted that guards sometimes slapped or shoved detainees, and that one disciplinary measure used against detainees was forced exposure to the sun while handcuffed for as many as four hours, in addition to the more ordinary measures of temporary solitary confinement and withholding of cigarette rations (Greenberg 397). That raises the question: Why was it that most of the soldiers charged and convicted with crimes in regard to the Abu Ghraib scandal were members of the Military Police Corps, and not MI personnel, when their behavior was relatively benign by comparison?

Part of the answer is that some MP guards were committing serious abuses that the ICRC apparently did not observe or collect information about. In accordance with General Miller's transplanted Guantanamo policy the MPs took orders regarding prisoner treatment from interrogators, who consisted mostly of MI personnel, but also anonymous officials thought to be working for the FBI or CIA, called OGA (for "other government agencies") by the guards. The MPs were responsible for maintaining the sleep deprivation of certain prisoners with yelling, door slamming, or loud music and taking away clothes from certain detainees and providing only women's underwear for them to wear, in order to humiliate them.

Often the MPs were instructed to “soften up” detainees prior to interrogations; how exactly was left to their discretion, but the most common method was forcing them to exercise for several minutes (Gourevitch 98). This behavior had psychological repercussions, not only for the prisoners but for the guards as well. One MP guard described how the process had numbed him to the point where he was no longer shocked or repulsed by what he was asked to do. Torturing prisoners at the behest of interrogators had become a normal experience for him (104). Given the deleterious effects on the moral sensibilities of the MPs, it is not surprising that they displayed unwarranted violence towards prisoners on their own later.

The best-known image of abuse from Abu Ghraib is a photograph of a man wearing a poncho and hood, standing on a box with wires attached to his hands. On November 3rd, 2003, the MPs had been told that this prisoner was lying about his identity and were instructed to make him to confess his real name. At first his treatment was typical - sleep deprivation, yelling, stress positions, forced exercise. Then, inactive electrical wires were tied to his fingers, and the prisoner was told he would be electrocuted if he fell off of the box he was standing on (177). It looks bad, and it *is* bad, but for all of the photograph’s infamy it doesn’t come close to being the worst abuse at the prison, even by the Military Police.

The most egregious acts carried out by MPs on their own initiative and not at the behest of interrogators took place a few days later. A group of seven prisoners thought to have instigated riots out in the tents were

transferred to the MI cells, and for several hours before the guards brought them to their cells they were stripped naked, beaten about the hands, feet, face and chest, verbally assaulted, forced to form a “pyramid” or “dog-pile” while being photographed, and put in positions simulating sex and masturbation. The MPs had never committed abuse on that scale before, and they never did again (196). It was unusual enough that several guards felt the need to report the incident to superior officers, but none of them seemed to make much of it (200).

Because of reports of prisoner abuse, lax discipline, and prisoner escapes at Abu Ghraib, an investigation was launched. The result was an Army document referred to as the “Taguba Report” after the general in charge of the investigation. The report found that abuse of prisoners by guards had occurred; in addition to the aforementioned examples, improper use of military dogs, threatening detainees with rape and death by gunshot, and pouring phosphoric substances from chemical lights onto detainees were also described in the report. Of the thirteen people named as suspects, two were civilian contractors, one was an MI sergeant, and the rest were all members of the Military Police, none above the rank of Staff Sergeant (Greenberg 417). General Taguba also found that the guards at Abu Ghraib had insufficient training in detention operations and the rules of international humanitarian law, and that copies of the Geneva Conventions were not provided in sufficient numbers to American personnel or the prisoners, and that prison commander General Karpinski had done too little to disseminate information and prevent abuse. He

recommended an overhaul of operating procedures, training in detention and the laws of war for all personnel involved with prisons, and an inquiry into MI interrogators regarding their role in prison abuse (420).

When the shocking photographs of the abuse at Abu Ghraib taken by soldiers were leaked to the press and shown on national television some sort of action was necessary. Several Military Police and a few Military Intelligence soldiers were court-martialed and convicted of crimes such as assault, conspiracy, or dereliction of duty. Only one commissioned officer, who was found innocent, was court-martialed. A few others faced fines and administrative reprimands, and Brigadier General Karpinski was demoted one rank and relieved of her command. No one was charged with torture or war crimes. No OGA or civilian interrogators were ever brought to trial. Brigadier General Jane Karpinski, the MP commander, was demoted one rank. General Miller was never brought to account for his recommendations, and senior officials were not held responsible for allowing the situation to deteriorate to such a level in the first place (270). Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, who had authorized the use of extreme psychological torture techniques that had been developed by the CIA without telling the MP commander or officers, faced no official consequences either (McCoy 134). What the guards did in Abu Ghraib was wrong, and they should have been punished for it; using orders from a superior as a justification for war crimes has been a non-starter since the Nuremberg trials. However, that doesn't mean that those who gave the orders,

and those who created conditions where such orders could conceivably be given and carried out, do not bear any responsibility either.

iv. Secret prisons

In addition to the major prisons in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Cuba, smaller prisons officially known as "black sites" that were operated by the Central Intelligence Agency existed in those countries and other places throughout the world, including Thailand and Eastern Europe. These black sites were used for the purpose of detaining and interrogating prisoners thought to possess especially important information about Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations without any official oversight or acknowledgment of their existence. The so-called "ghost" prisoners were held secretly, without access to lawyers, agents of the press, or representatives of the Red Cross, and their CIA interrogators were allowed to subject them to the same types of degrading and torturous methods that had been used in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo (Priest "CIA Holds Terror Suspects").

Several "enhanced" interrogation techniques were also officially authorized for use at the black sites in addition to what was standard elsewhere, including a severe form of stress positions that could be used on a prisoner for over forty hours at a time, constantly dousing naked prisoners with cold water while locked in a cold cell, severe sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation and bombardment and, most infamously, waterboarding. This latter method involves binding a prisoner, covering his mouth, and pouring water onto his face in order to cause the same physiological and mental

sensations as drowning. These procedures were used against about a dozen prisoners believed to be senior members of Al Qaeda who possessed important information, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed (or “KSM”), who is regarded as the primary planner of the September 11th attacks (Ross). Waterboarding was used on three of these prisoners; KSM, Abu Zubaydah, and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri (Bradbury “Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture” 6). Zubaydah was waterboarded 83 times in August 2002, and KSM suffered it 183 times in March 2003, averaging out to approximately 3 and 6 waterboarding sessions per day, respectively (37).

The other ghost prisoners, while not subjected to the most extreme “enhanced” techniques, still suffered a great deal, especially the ones being held in the black sites of Afghanistan. Several prisoners who have been released from the secret prisons in that country reported multiple forms of torture and abuse, including sleep deprivation, starvation, and exposure to extreme cold weather. One unidentified inmate of a secret prison in Afghanistan that was codenamed the “Salt Pit” had his clothing removed on the orders of a CIA interrogator and subsequently died of hypothermia in his cell during the night (Priest “CIA Avoids Scrutiny”).

The black sites represent the very worst excesses of the Bush Administration’s detainee policy. The level of torture, the secrecy and lack of accountability, and the total subversion of due process and international law went beyond even the Guantanamo Bay camp. Fortunately, much like

Guantanamo the black sites were ordered closed by an executive order of President Obama shortly after his inauguration. Unfortunately, the fact that these senior Al Qaeda members, including Khalid Sheik Mohammed, underwent waterboarding and other forms of torture and degrading treatment will immensely complicate their future trials.

c. Extraordinary renditions

The term “extraordinary rendition” refers to the practice of secretly transporting a prisoner to another country, generally the same one where the prisoner in question was born, and giving him into the custody of that country’s security forces in order to be interrogated and potentially prosecuted. In itself the idea is not necessarily illegal, but since 2001 the Bush administration has turned over many prisoners to foreign countries when there has been a high probability, or even an expectation, that they would be tortured while in their custody, contravening Article 3 of the Convention against Torture.

Renditions were practiced on a limited basis during the 1990s, exclusively for individuals with standing arrest warrants or *in absentia* convictions in foreign countries (usually Egypt), with safeguards to protect innocent people from rendition and some sort of assurance that torture would not take place, although even back then those assurances were generally not worth much (Mayer). As bad as the program was in the 1990s, the flaws of the rendition program were magnified as its use was expanded after September 2001.

Under the Bush administration the CIA has renditioned several people only suspected of terrorism, and in many cases the

evidence connecting these persons with terrorist organizations was very weak. For example, Maher Arar is a Canadian citizen who was born in Syria. He was arrested in an airport because he knew (vaguely) another man suspected of terrorism. On that flimsy basis Arar was transported to Syria, where he was held for a year and tortured by security personnel before being released without charges; the Syrians had apparently not found any connection between him and any terrorist organization in that time (Mayer).

In addition to Egypt and Syria, prisoners were also renditioned to other countries where torture and prisoner abuse are known to be fairly common, including Uzbekistan and (to a lesser extent) Jordan. CIA officials not only suspected that these countries were torturing the prisoners that they were receiving from the United States but expected it; the senior CIA operative in the Uzbek capital told the British ambassador that he knew that the Uzbek government was torturing prisoners for information (Grey). At least one man was transported from Pakistan to Morocco expressly because the Moroccans were willing to use methods that the Pakistanis weren't, including the infliction of small cuts all over the body over a long period of time (Worthington Guantanamo Files 230).

It is impossible to imagine that the threat of prisoners being tortured once sent into the custody of these countries is not substantial enough to qualify for Article 3 of the Convention against Torture. In carrying out extraordinary renditions government agents not only neglected their responsibilities under

the Convention against Torture but actively sought to violate its requirements.

IV. Legal Justifications

Members of the Bush administration have presented a number of legal arguments, both internally and externally, which justify or excuse the abusive treatment of detainees suspected of involvement in terrorist activities and direct responsibility for committing the most unpalatable abuses away from top officials. These arguments are severely lacking in a number of respects, although not to the point of being frivolous. It is therefore necessary to examine them in some detail in order to present thorough counterarguments.

1. Inapplicability of International Law

Starting in the early years of the war on terrorism, several legal advisors within the White House advanced arguments to the effect that the Geneva Conventions could be interpreted to not apply to prisoners suspected of terrorist activity. They also asserted that other elements of international humanitarian and human rights law could not restrict the decisions of the President regarding the matter of detainees who posed a potential security threat to the United States.

Deputy Assistant John Yoo drafted a memorandum for the United States Department of Defense in January 2002 that put forth three reasons why members of Al Qaeda would not be protected by the Geneva Conventions if they were captured in Afghanistan: Al Qaeda is not a State Party to the Geneva Conventions; the war in Afghanistan is neither a war between states nor a civil war, and therefore is not under the purview of the Conventions; and Al Qaeda members do not obey the laws of war as

required by GC III Article 4(a)(2), such as carrying arms openly and wearing uniforms or visible symbols to distinguish themselves from civilians (Greenberg 49).

This memo also argued that members of the Taliban would not need to be afforded protections under the Conventions even though Afghanistan is a State Party because Afghanistan was a failed state while the Taliban controlled it, and because the Taliban was connected so closely with Al Qaeda that the two organizations could not be legally distinguished from each other (50). Even if international humanitarian law applied in Afghanistan, the memo argued, Taliban members would still not be protected by GC III because of their failure to meet the Article 4(a)(2) requirements, and that competent tribunals required by Article 5 would be unnecessary if the President determined that all Taliban members failed to meet those requirements, thus supposedly removing “doubt” as to their legal status and obviating the need for the tribunals to eliminate it (110). It stated that even if the substance of the Geneva Conventions or other instruments of international humanitarian law were a part of customary international law, it would not matter because customary law is not the federal law of the United States and therefore is incapable of binding the powers of the President (112).

Shortly after receiving the memorandum described above, Alberto Gonzales sent his own memo to President Bush, advising him of the positive and negative ramifications of disregarding the Geneva Conventions in the Afghanistan war.¹³ In his arguments against the likelihood of the negative outcomes hap-

pening, Gonzales asserted that the Bush’s official orders to treat prisoners “humanely” would prevent severe backlashes from other countries and the undermining of American military culture (119-121). On 7 February 2002, President Bush gave orders to the effect that GC III did not apply to Al Qaeda and that all Taliban detainees were to be considered unlawful combatants instead of POWs, but that they should be treated humanely anyway “[a]s a matter of policy” but not a matter of law (135).

An internal report on detainee interrogation was largely informed by these Justice Department opinions, and also asserted that the United States has held that the ICCPR does not apply to international military operations (243).

2. *Redefining Torture*

Lawyers working in the Bush administration advanced extremely restrictive municipal and international legal definitions of the word “torture” in a pair of controversial memos, both of which were dated 1 August 2002 and were sent to Alberto Gonzales. The first, written by Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee of the Office of Legal Counsel, concerned the application of domestic legal prohibitions of torture. The second, by Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, was about international law and what it would allow in interrogations of Al Qaeda members.

The Bybee memo referred to the definition of torture that is found in the United States Code Section 2340, the operative words being “severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” It attempted to refine that definition further, by showing that the phrase “severe pain” as used in other

American statutes meant an indicator of dangerous and permanent physical damage. Bybee argued that this phrase meant the same thing in the legal definition of torture, and that therefore pain

...must rise to a similarly high level - the level that would ordinarily be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ failure, or serious impairment of body functions - in order to constitute torture. (Greenberg 176)

Section 2340 further defines "severe mental pain of suffering" as "prolonged mental harm" caused by certain intentional acts, such as the infliction of pain, administration of drugs, or threats to do the same. Bybee focused on the word "prolonged" in interpreting the statute, arguing that the strain from long interrogation would probably not qualify, whereas actions resulting in post-traumatic stress disorder or depression possibly could. The memo also argued that any potential defendant must have intended to cause this prolonged mental harm in order to be guilty under the terms of Section 2340; if he acted with some other purpose in good faith with the belief that his actions would not result in that kind of mental damage, that should provide a sufficient defense against prosecution regardless of the actual outcome of his actions, according to this argument (178).

Regarding cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, the memo notes that the Convention against Torture calls only for state parties to "prevent" such acts from being carried out in areas under their jurisdiction. This is interpreted to mean that the CAT

does not require such acts to be criminalized, further demonstrating that "torture" is at the farthest, most extreme end of the spectrum of methods of inflicting pain (185).

Ultimately, the Bybee memo concluded that the word "torture" legally referred to only the most extreme actions of inflicting physical and mental pain, and that there were many acts which would be cruel and degrading without actually being on the same level as torture (214).

The John Yoo memo noted that when the United States acceded to the Convention against Torture, the administration of the first President Bush included a reservation to the treaty to the effect that it understood "torture" as relating to the Convention to have the same definition as found in Section 2340, and that it was ratified with this meaning in mind. Because treaties cannot affect a state without its consent, the memo argued, it is by this definition of torture that the United States is bound by the CAT (220). Taken together with the Bybee memo sent to Alberto Gonzales on the same day, this means that the same very narrow and extreme definition of what constitutes torture also applies to the treaty obligations of the United States under the CAT.

Additionally, legal opinions regarding the legality of specific interrogation methods were also issued by the Justice Department. One was sent to the CIA's General Counsel by Jay Bybee on 1 August 2002, the same day the memos regarding the general definition of torture were officially transmitted. This memo regarded techniques the CIA wanted to use in the interrogation of suspected Al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah, including forced standing, stress positions,

physical blows, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding (Bybee 2). It ultimately concluded that all of the techniques failed to qualify as “torture” under the international legal obligations of the United States (18). Another memo concerning techniques that could be used on “a High Value al Qaeda Detainee” during CIA interrogations was issued in May 2005, covering a greater number of methods (including force nudity and dousing with cold water) that still encompassed stress positions and waterboarding (Bradbury “Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. 18 § § 2340-2340A” 7-13). As with the previous memo, the conclusions was that all the techniques were legal so long as they were monitored to prevent serious threats to the safety of the detainees (45).

3. Shifting responsibility down the chain of command

The scandal regarding the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib required, to a much greater extent than any other aspect of the Bush administration’s detainee policy, a public response and the punishment of the parties responsible. At first the entirety of the blame was laid squarely at the feet of the individual soldiers who had personally committed the abuses seen in the publicly available photographs. Later on, public reports and investigations forced some top officials to take some responsibility, at least verbally; as noted above, no one higher-ranking than a non-commissioned officer was ever convicted in a court of law for the Abu Ghraib abuses, and no one at the White House or the Pentagon was fired or forced to resign immediately.

In May 2004, shortly after the photographs of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib were shown to the public, both Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush attempted to limit the blame to the relatively few American personnel seen in them. In a press briefing, Rumsfeld decried the actions of those people and referred to their actions as “exceptional and isolated” (DefenseLink). Rumsfeld stated that he took responsibility for what had happened in Abu Ghraib during Congressional hearings a few days later, but considering that he did not resign and was not investigated his words seem to have little meaning (Shanker).

President Bush went on Arab television in early May to claim that he was appalled by the scandal, that it would be thoroughly investigated, and that all responsible would be brought to justice (Stevenson). On 24 May Bush called the abuses the actions of “a few” soldiers in an address that was televised in the United States (Roth and Worden 146).

The investigations which followed were damning to upper-level military and civilian leaders, but not to the point where any sort of punishment was recommended or implemented. One panel, which was led by former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger and appointed by Rumsfeld to investigate the scandal, released a report in August 2004 which blamed failures of leadership on the part of top officials at Central Command and the Pentagon for creating a climate and culture that was conducive to allowing abuses. It also accused them of having missed several warning signs about what was happening at Abu Ghraib. However, it also held that the scenes in the photographs were not

the result of direct orders and were merely excesses of the prison “night shift” out of control. Critically, the panel did not recommend that Secretary Rumsfeld or any other senior civilian or military leader resign or face some other punishment (Watson). Other internal military investigations came to similar conclusions; that general policy errors had contributed to what had happened in Abu Ghraib, but that top policy makers should not be held accountable the way the actual guards were. In spite of the involvement of Central Intelligence Agency interrogators at Abu Ghraib and their actions toward detainees there, no one recommended investigating CIA leaders (Roth and Worden 153).

V. Refuting the Bush administration’s arguments

1. Why international law is applicable

a. Reasons why Geneva should be applied to Afghanistan

The argument that Afghanistan was a failed state, that the Taliban was therefore not its legitimate government, and that it therefore was not a State Party to the Geneva Conventions, might have been valid had it been consistent with the practice of the United States and other countries. In fact, however, although the Taliban had not been recognized as the *de jure* leaders of Afghanistan the international community, including the United States, had treated it as having obligations under Afghanistan’s treaties, including the Geneva Conventions, as then Secretary of State Powell stated in a memo to Alberto Gonzales advocating the application of international humanitarian law in Afghanistan (Greenberg 124). In fact, the term “failed state” carries no weight in interna-

tional law, and Afghanistan’s legal rights remained intact even through years of divisive warfare (de Nevers 385). The decision to treat Afghanistan as a failed state unable to live up to its treaty obligations was therefore not a reasoned decision based on the facts, but rather a loophole that the administration tried to use in order to carry out its favored detention policies with less resistance from the international community.

Legal advisers from the Department of State agreed with Powell that the Geneva Conventions should have been applied in Afghanistan. The United States had always recognized them whenever it brought its forces into conflicts in the past, which was a legacy the DOS was reluctant to break with. The UN Security Council had called on all parties to the conflict in Afghanistan to adhere to humanitarian law in a resolution from 1998, and not recognizing the application of those laws would be inconsistent on the part of the United States. Furthermore, the DOS legal department held that it would not be possible to apply the Conventions to the Taliban but not to Al Qaeda; either everyone involved in the Afghanistan conflict was protected by law, or none of them were (Greenberg 129).

Other individuals and organizations, including the ICRC and the Secretary General of the United Nations, have also criticized the rationale for not applying the Geneva Conventions to the conflict in Afghanistan. They have argued that any prisoner must automatically be treated as a POW unless and until a court removes any doubt that he or she does not qualify for such protections. These critics have also argued that Taliban soldiers qualify as members of military

forces loyal to “an authority not recognized by a the Detaining Power” as described under Article 4 (a)(3) of GC III. Such fighters would thus need to be treated as prisoners-of-war regardless of their obedience to the laws and customs of war as described in 4 (a)(2) (Greenberg 587).

b. Need for competent tribunals

The legal argument that the President of the United States can decide that all members of a fighting militia fail to meet the requirements of GC III Article 4 (2) is weak for a number of reasons. It ignores the possibility, however remote, that any units or individual members of that militia might meet the requirements for prisoner of war status in spite of general trends within the organization towards noncompliance. Also, giving the executive branch the power to unilaterally decide that thousands of fighters are, essentially, in violation of the laws and customs of war, circumvents traditional standards of due process for accusations of criminal behavior. Classifying thousands of people as criminals, or even alleged criminals, without the involvement of a single impartial judge violates the need for fairness in legal proceedings required by international humanitarian and human rights law; an independent court is needed to ensure that justice is carried out correctly, even when dealing with potential war criminals captured on the battlefield.

Even accepting for the sake of argument that every single member of an armed militia can be classified as a war criminal at once, the need for tribunals to hear the cases of captured prisoners would still not be eliminated. Even without legal doubt that any

member of a certain organization fails to meet the legal standards required by GC III, doubt may still remain whether a given individual is, in fact, a member of said organization. It has been shown that civilians were arrested by United States military and intelligence personnel in Afghanistan and Pakistan under the mistaken assumption that they were members of the Taliban or Al Qaeda, and that many of them were imprisoned either in Afghanistan or Guantanamo Bay for months or years afterward. These errors would almost certainly have been reduced in frequency and duration if tribunals had existed to swiftly review the cases of detainees claiming to have been wrongly arrested.

c. AP I Minimum Standards

The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions has not been ratified by the United States; however, Article 75, which guarantees certain rights for prisoners involved in armed conflicts regardless of their status, is widely regarded as having entered or become customary international law regarding this matter (Sands 150). John Yoo dismissed the importance of customary international law in his January 2002 memo, however, thereby attempting to negate AP I and other elements of the Geneva Conventions that may have entered into custom.

It is true that customary law is not approved by the United States Congress; however, that does not mean that it should be ignored so flippantly. That would overlook the historical and continued importance of custom to the development of international and domestic law throughout the world. Declaring that it has no power and can be safely ignored is disingenuous and self-serving. Moreover, it overlooks the fact

that United States courts have accepted the validity of customary international law regarding torture and degrading treatment (Greenberg 600),

d. Human Rights Treaties

The prohibitions against torture in the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture apply wherever the States Party to them have jurisdiction. The CAT specifically requires its prohibitions against torture and degrading treatment to be a part of the rules and duties of any government officials of a State Party involved in the detention or interrogation of prisoners anywhere in the world. The UN Committee against Torture has found that several methods used by American interrogators constitute torture or degrading treatment under the terms of the CAT, including frequent beating, excessive binding of limbs, exposure to low temperatures, long periods of sleep deprivation, and sensory bombardment (Greenberg 568). More specifically, the Committee against Torture found that the patterns of physical abuse and indefinite detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay violated the Convention and called on the United States to close the prison (McCoy 219).

The prohibitions against torture and degrading treatment found in Article 7 of the ICCPR are absolute and do not countenance any exceptions for national security or any other purpose. The Human Rights Committee has found in the past that methods including sleep deprivation, hooding, and others that have been used by American forces violate Article 7 regardless of how or why they are used (Greenberg 592),

2. *Why some techniques used by the U.S. are torture*

Jay Bybee's August 2002 memo went very far in asserting that the term "torture" could be legally applied only to an extremely narrow set of practices and that forms of interrogation that might be considered objectionable were legal under domestic and international law. The memo was fought by certain Justice Department lawyers, generated a powerful backlash from legal experts after it became publicly available, and was also inconsistent with the practices of the United States regarding interrogation methods in foreign countries. Its definition of "torture" has been rejected, and many lawyers, politicians, and NGOs have since applied that word to American practices.

a. Legal arguments

After its public release the arguments of the Bybee memo were roundly criticized by legal experts. For example, in testimony given before the Senate Judiciary Committee in January 2005, the Dean of Yale Law School Harold Koh called the opinion "clearly erroneous." He stated that the narrow definition of "torture" contained within it contradicted the ordinary and commonly understood meaning of the word, and that it would exclude many of the heinous actions carried out by Saddam Hussein's security forces. Dean Koh also argued that the memo's interpretation of the Convention Against Torture to legally permit the use of cruel, degrading, and inhuman treatment risked giving officials working for the executive branch license to abuse people in their custody.

Even lawyers who were working at the Justice Department objected to the reasoning of the Bybee memo. Jack Goldsmith, who

became the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in October 2003, decided that this torture and interrogation policy was legally problematic shortly afterward. He worked with other OLC lawyers to have that policy overturned and the opinion withdrawn – which had almost never happened over the course of a single administration before – until he resigned in July 2004 (Klaidman). The OLC prepared a new opinion to replace the Bybee memo which was officially released in December 2004; this new opinion contained less restrictive definitions of “torture” and “physical and mental suffering” (Levin).

b. U.S. government practices

The Department of State issues an annual report on the state of human rights practices in every other country throughout the world. It is generally written without undue partisan political input, and the 2003 report condemned as torture the use of interrogation methods in foreign countries. Unfortunately, the United States itself had been using these techniques against suspected terrorists held in its custody.

The types of techniques used by the United States which the State Department criticized foreign countries for using include, but are not limited to, stress positions, exposure to extreme temperatures, sleep deprivation, and waterboarding (Roth and Worden 143). Now, it would certainly be possible to make a serious argument that some of those methods are not, depending on how they are used, severe enough to constitute torture; the State Department isn’t an absolute authority on such things, after all. However, that the DOS was willing to criticize these methods

so strongly in an official, publicly available document means that these methods are legally and morally objectionable, at least to the point where they rise to the level of cruel, degrading, or inhuman treatment. Even saying for the sake of argument that the State Department is in the wrong and that some of the above techniques do not rise to the level of torture does not make them acceptable. The use of such techniques by anyone, regardless of their exact legal classifications, should never be tolerated.

c. Severity of techniques

There are, on the other hand, certain interrogation methods which unquestionably constitute torture according to the plain meaning of the word, the definition found in the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture, and even by the unreasonably severe definitions of the Bybee memo. International human rights organizations have unequivocally denounced them, and their victims have been left with permanent physical injuries and disabilities, as well as dangerous and long-lasting mental illnesses as a result of their treatment.

Several prisoners held at Guantanamo were driven to suicidal behavior by the conditions of fear, uncertainty, and constant abuse at the prison camp. During the first eighteen months of the camp’s operation there were twenty-eight officially recognized suicide attempts and over three hundred instances of prisoners acting in a self-abusive manner. A mass suicide attempt in 2003 involving twenty-three prisoners led to only two attempts being officially reported, while the others were classified as merely “self-injurious.” It seems that the use of that classification in Guantanamo should be

with some suspicion (Worthington Guantanamo Files 271). Less severe instances of mental illness have also been disproportionately common among the Guantanamo prisoners, as a group of British citizens released in 2004 reported that a fifth of the prisoners were taking anti-depressant medications and approximately a hundred had other clearly visible forms of mental illness (280).

Interrogations and abuse by American personnel in Iraq have also been known to cause severe mental and physical harm. Red Cross doctors that were part of the delegation visiting Abu Ghraib concluded that certain prisoners they interviewed at the prison displayed signs of mental illness including memory loss, anxiety, problems speaking or the inability to speak, and suicidal tendencies as a result of their interrogations by MI personnel (Greenberg 393). Official United States military documents that had been suppressed but later released also revealed that several Iraqi prisoners died while in custody at Abu Ghraib and secret CIA facilities; a dozen of these deaths were ruled either homicides or “unexplained” on death certificates. For example, an Iraqi air force general who surrendered to American troops in November 2003 died several days later as a result of beatings from CIA and MI interrogators at a makeshift facility in the desert (McCoy 144).

The “enhanced interrogation techniques” used by the CIA at its secret locations have come under particularly harsh criticism by humanitarian organizations throughout the world, as most of them clearly constitute torture or extremely cruel and degrading treatment. A leaked internal document from

the International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, labeled these techniques “torture” based on interviews with prisoners who had experienced them. Many prisoners reported that stress positions and forced standing were the most physically painful methods (Shane, “Book Cites Secret Red Cross Report”). Severe sleep deprivation also qualifies as one of the approved “enhanced” methods that unquestionably qualifies as torture; the late Menachim Begin, who experienced such methods while he lived in the Soviet Union, even wrote that the desire for uninterrupted sleep can feel even worse than hunger or thirst (Conroy 34).

One method that has been the particular focus of controversy and debate is “waterboarding,” the “enhanced technique” that has been used on the smallest number of prisoners and arguably the most severe. “Waterboarding” can refer to variety of means for cutting off the victim’s air supply with water, all of which produce physical and mental sensations similar to drowning. The question of whether waterboarding constitutes torture has been in the national consciousness ever since its use on prisoners suspected of being high-ranking Al Qaeda members was first revealed; the past three Attorney Generals of the United States have been asked at their Senate confirmation hearings whether they believe the technique is illegal torture. Neither Alberto Gonzales nor Robert Mukasey were willing to categorically and unequivocally answer the question, which is disconcerting when one considers the painful and debilitating nature of the technique.

Waterboarding is undoubtedly torture, by any standard, even Jay Bybee's "death or organ failure" criteria, because of the extremely painful and terrifying feelings it elicits and because it does indeed feel very similar to death by drowning. It has been known to cause long-lasting psychological damage¹⁴ resulting in years of anxiety and panic attacks, thus fulfilling even the strict criteria for "mental suffering" found in the Bybee memo. American courts have even convicted Japanese soldiers of war crimes because they waterboarded prisoners during the Second World War (Amnesty International).

Other legal experts also consider it torture. Daniel Levin, for example, served as an Assistant Attorney General in 2004 and wrote the more moderate legal opinion on the legality of interrogation methods which replaced the Bybee memo. After volunteering to undergo waterboarding personally, he concluded that it would constitute torture unless done in a very restricted way, and that the Bush administration had not provided effective protocols for its application. Levin was fired, perhaps unsurprisingly, after Alberto Gonzales became Attorney General (Greenburg and de Vogue). The current Attorney General of the United States, Eric Holder, declared unequivocally that waterboarding is torture during his own Senate confirmation hearing, an indication of a fortunate reversal in interrogation policies from the Bush administration (Montanaro).

3. Why abuse was systemic and a result of top-down authorization

From all the abuses that have been described above it should be fairly clear that

torture carried out by American personnel is far more wide-ranging than the mere presence of a few poorly supervised "bad apples" could account for. The memos and orders regarding the lack of Geneva Convention rights for detainees, the authorization of indefinite detention and extreme methods of coercive interrogation, and legal justifications for permitting acts of torture and degrading treatment all draw a line of causality and responsibility between decisions made in the White House and mistreatment of prisoners throughout the world.

Because torture has been universally regarded as morally abhorrent for the past few hundred years, orders to commit it in the recent past have often been couched in euphemisms and permissive messages instead of plain language. Official declarations from top American civilian and military leaders, including the application of the term "enemy combatants" by President Bush and statements from military leaders calling detainees "very dangerous" or "like dogs" served to dehumanize them and sent signals that inhumane treatment for them would be acceptable (Roth and Worden 162-164). The President, the Secretary of Defense, or other leaders may not have given direct orders to, for example, the "night shift" at Abu Ghraib to beat, threaten, and humiliate the prisoners there, but their actions and words did create a tolerant environment that allowed them and many of their fellow service members throughout the world to consider such behavior acceptable. They are responsible, at the very least, for not doing nearly enough to prevent these abuses, and possibly for the deliberate creation of a pro-torture atmosphere (170).

There are also cases of torture and inhumane treatment by Americans that were approved and ordered by high-ranking American officials, like the aforementioned “take the gloves off” authorization from Rumsfeld to John Walker Lindh’s interrogators (165). He also personally signed off on the use of stress positions and forced nudity on detainees at Guantanamo Bay (Greenberg 237). Waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and stress positions were legally validated for use on Abu Zubaydah by an official Justice Department opinion of which White House and CIA leaders were undoubtedly aware (Bybee 18). The specifics of the CIA’s “enhanced” methods were chosen and initially approved by select members of the National Security Council, including Vice President Cheney, Attorney General John Ashcroft, and National Security Advisor Rice. Further requests for permission to use the techniques in specific cases were consistently approved by this group (Greenburg, Rosenberg and de Vogue).

Prisoner abuse occurred in every theater of operations where the “War on Terror” was waged, and not because of a small number of soldiers who didn’t know any better. The most senior Bush administration leaders specifically condoned the use of illegal methods in several cases and fostered an atmosphere of disrespect for the rule of law and the human dignity of detainees that led to many other abuses.

VI. Why Enforcing and Respecting International Law is in the Best Interest of the United States

Obeying international law isn’t a pointless endeavor which restricts our actions

without generating any benefits. On the contrary, adhering to the law would increase the standing of the United States throughout the world, discredit our enemies, protect our soldiers, and convince people all over the world to be more cooperative.

1. Comparative Analysis

In discussing the effects of indefinite detention, torture, and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment on a state’s ability to fight a war, especially one with a heavy focus on counterinsurgency operations, it will be useful to briefly examine two other cases of torture sponsored by democratic states in similar situations. They are: first, the arrest of hundreds of Northern Irish Catholics and experimental torture of about fourteen of them by the United Kingdom in 1971; and second, the time from 1987-1999 where Israeli security forces were legally allowed to use limited levels of coercive interrogation techniques against Palestinian detainees.

a. The United Kingdom and Northern Ireland, 1971

In the early 1970s the violent unrest among Catholics in Northern Ireland was rapidly escalating, and the British government felt that it had to take drastic measures to prevent further deterioration, starting with “internment,” indefinite detention with no need for evidence or courts. Hundreds of Catholics suspected of membership or sympathy with the Irish Republican Army were rounded up and “interned” in August 1971 (Conroy 4). The operation was poorly implemented, and several internees were arrested because of outdated intelligence or mistaken identity. Beatings with clubs were standard for all the internees (Melaugh). Fourteen men were taken from the regular

prison camps to secret locations where a course of experimental coercive interrogation techniques focusing on sensory deprivation¹⁵ was applied to them over the course of eight days.

The men were forced to stand against a wall in a painfully uncomfortable position while hooded, beaten severely whenever they collapsed from this standing position, exposed to cold temperatures, deprived of sufficient amounts of food and sleep, and subjected to overwhelming sound recordings that prevented anything else from being heard. After the end of this ordeal the prisoners were moved back to the regular internment camps (McGuffin 57-60). During the course of these abuses many men suffered from both visual and audio hallucinations such as music, religious sermons, and fantasies of escape and suicide (73). In 1978 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the five techniques did not rise to the level of torture but did constitute inhuman, degrading, and illegal treatment, contrary to the opinion of the Republic of Ireland and Amnesty International. No British soldiers or officials were prosecuted for their roles in the affair (Conroy 187).

Rather than improving the security situation in Ireland, the internment and torture caused a marked downturn. Nonviolent Irish nationalists refused to participate in Northern Ireland's government out of protest, and Catholics gave more support to the Irish Republican Army, which stepped up its own level of violent action (Melaugh).

The parallels with the United States are striking. In both cases, a government resorted to extreme, extralegal and illegal methods of imprisonment and interrogation

in order to eliminate a threat posed by a terrorist group. Also in both cases, the "tough" methods did relatively little to impede the actual extremists and instead hurt mostly innocent people, infuriating local populations and encouraging them to support the terrorists' cause.

b. Israel during the Landau Commission era, 1987-1999

Israel has had well-known, chronic problems with its military and security forces mistreating Palestinian civilians for years, even up to the present day (B'Tselem "Absolute Prohibition"). The problem of torture being used on prisoners was especially acute, however, during a twelve-year period when coercive interrogation methods were formally legalized.

After a pair of scandals concerning the lack of transparency and use of violence in Israel's security forces, a commission headed by Justice Moshe Landau was appointed to investigate the matter. The Landau Commission concluded in 1987 that the security forces should be provided with legal guidelines for the use of a "moderate" amount of force during interrogations, so that they could be effective without having to hide their actions from public scrutiny (Conroy 213). The Commission's proposal attempted to limit both the intensity of coercive methods used through official regulations and the number of suspects to which they could be applied by limiting their use only to prisoners who had knowledge of imminent attacks (the "ticking time bomb" scenario) on civilians. Both attempts failed completely.

The methods used by the Israelis routinely exceed the limits set in the Landau

Commission's guidelines rose to the level of torture, and included sleep deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures, stress positions, sensory bombardment, and violent shaking. At least one Palestinian prisoner died from being shaken too much (Roth and Worden 36-37). Security forces also arrested, harassed, and abused the wives of men being interrogated in order to force out confessions of wrongdoing or otherwise pressure the husbands (B'Tselem "Detention and Interrogation"). The security services also claimed far too many cases of detainees having vital information necessitating coercion. Activists, religious leaders, Islamic charity workers, and others – nearly every Palestinian interrogated by Israel during this time – was tortured by Israeli security during this time period, justified by the specter of the "ticking time bomb" (Roth and Worden 40). The Israeli justice system did not check these abuses until the High Court of Justice banned all the coercive techniques of the security services for violating domestic and international law in 1999.

The possibility of torture being legally allowable in a limited fashion is shown false by Israel's example. Without absolute legal and ethical prohibitions against torture, the torturers become desensitized to it and practice it routinely. As in the United States, allowing limited amounts of violent coercion, even with guidelines and requirements for authorization, caused a culture of abuse to spread throughout the system, leading to widespread violations of international law (41-42).

2. The importance of Geneva Convention protections for American soldiers

Many military and legal experts have called upon the United States government to respect the Geneva Conventions, not out of love for esoteric, abstract legal principles, but for the simple fact that the Conventions make our troops safer. International humanitarian law often protects American soldiers when they are captured, and even when we are faced with enemies that do not respect the law they should not be allowed to bring us to their level. By placing conflicts in which we participate under the auspices of the Geneva Conventions and following the law we would make it easier to bring justice to those who would abuse captured Americans. Treating our enemies better than they treat us demonstrates American integrity, improves our moral standing, and makes it more likely that others will follow our example in the future (De Nevers 387).

John Hutson, who is the President of the Franklin Pierce Law Center and a former admiral of the United States Navy, articulated very clearly in Congressional hearings the importance of the Geneva Conventions to the safety of American troops. He argued that war needs to be conducted in a way that will allow for peace, that the Geneva Conventions lay out a way to accomplish that goal, and that only by complying with those laws itself will the United State be able to compel others to follow them too. The primary concern of all the U.S. policymakers who adhered to GC III after 1949 was the well-being of Americans, and by deriding its requirements we would be removing safeguards from our soldiers and rejecting the community of nations. Admiral Hutson points out that, as the United States has more soldiers deployed abroad than every other

nation in the world combined, we should rightfully be the most concerned about maintaining the integrity of international humanitarian law (Hutson).

No less an expert on prisoner of war abuse than Senator John McCain has also called on the American people to respect international law in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal. Cautioning against the view that the ICRC were mere “do-gooders” and that obeying the law hinders our soldiers, Senator McCain argued that the Red Cross and the Geneva Conventions protect our soldiers, and that those who committed abuses increased the danger for American troops in this and future wars by undermining those safeguards. He also asserted that the United States should seek to maintain its integrity and standing as a nation governed by the rule of law which meets universal standards of fair treatment towards prisoners (McCain).

Military veterans and legal experts alike believe that international humanitarian law is vital to the well-being of American soldiers abroad. Those who sacrifice to protect us need and deserve the protections of the Geneva Conventions.

3. The ineffectiveness of coercive interrogation

The reasoning behind the acceptance of violent, coercive interrogation methods amounting to cruel, humiliating, inhuman treatment or torture relies on necessity and expediency. Such methods may be thought necessary in order to obtain vital, life-saving information from recalcitrant terrorists, or at least to obtain it quickly enough to prevent an attack or effectively disrupt a terrorist network. While this dilemma between com-

mitting universally reviled acts of brutality and possibly allowing thousands of civilians to be killed poses an interesting philosophical question, in actual practice no such dilemma exists. There is no evidence that violently coercive interrogation yields accurate information, whereas there is much evidence that legal, non-violent techniques have produced good results even when used against modern terrorists.

A study of the effectiveness of interrogation methods was published by the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research in December 2006. This study crucially found that there was no rigorous research on whether coercive interrogation methods used in the fashion that American personnel had been applying them were effective, but that the majority of anecdotal information suggested that such techniques were not effective. It specifically concluded that the application of pain to an uncooperative interrogation subject would be more likely to reduce compliance than increase it, and that the use of stress-inducing methods impair the cognitive functions of the brain of those subjected to them, thus potentially reducing the accuracy of subsequently acquired information (Fein 35).

Academic researchers are not the only ones who have claimed that torture does not reliably yield accurate information; American military interrogators who have operated on both fronts hold the same opinion. One MI officer who served in Afghanistan, for example, wrote that degradation such as what took place in Abu Ghraib does not facilitate intelligence gathering, and that all the successes he and his unit achieved were accomplished without threats,

beatings, or humiliation (Mackey xxv).

Colonel Steven Kleinman, an intelligence and interrogation specialist of the United States Air Force, denounced the coercive interrogation as ineffective while testifying before Congress. He argued that the perceived effectiveness of such techniques skewed the public debate over torture and that extreme physical or emotional stress should not be viewed as necessary for gathering information or appropriate for punishing terrorists. He stressed that properly conducted interrogations induce *cooperation* between prisoners and interrogators, whereas coercive methods can only force *compliance* from a prisoner; communist interrogators often forced confessions of war crimes from American prisoners-of-war during the Korean and Vietnam wars, for example, but these were mostly false and therefore useless from an intelligence standpoint. Colonel Kleinman also noted, much like the aforementioned CSIR study, the “natural fragility of memory,” and that coercive methods would not only make it more likely for prisoners to be unable to recall specific information, but also for them to unintentionally give out misinformation. He concluded that coercive interrogation fails to extract information from prisoners fully or accurately.

The specific methods chosen as the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” repertoire do not have a history of eliciting accurate information. They were based on methods that some members of the United States militarily voluntarily undergo in a limited fashion during Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (or SERE) training

courses. The reason these personnel are trained to resist the SERE techniques is that they were used against American POWs by the Chinese during the Korean War, a fact that high-level government officials who approved the enhanced interrogation methods were unaware of. The Chinese used them mostly to extract false confessions of war crimes; a study of their effects published in 1956 stated that the Chinese methods led to suggestibility and memory loss, not truth (Shane and Mazzetti). The SERE methods which became the “enhanced interrogation techniques” are more useful for making people say what they are supposed to say than they are for acquiring accurate intelligence.

Debates are ongoing as to what information exactly has been gained from using coercive interrogation methods on Al Qaeda members. Mohammed al-Qahtani, who was tortured at Guantanamo Bay, accused many other prisoners there of affiliation with Al Qaeda during his interrogations only to recant, claiming he had lied to stop his suffering (Zagorin). It is unclear exactly what intelligence was extracted from KSM and Zubaydah during the time when they were subjected to waterboarding. Former CIA officials and Bush administration leaders have claimed that the use of the technique led to the acquisition of vital intelligence, whereas others (such as FBI Director Robert Mueller) have claimed that coercive interrogations did not yield intelligence that directly prevented a terrorist attack. There are conflicting reports about when and under what circumstances Zubaydah and KSM revealed information (Shane “Interrogations? Effectiveness May Prove Elusive”). Even if these torturous methods had been necessary

to acquire the information these Al Qaeda leaders gave up, the high cost of using them¹⁶ probably negated the benefits of it. In all likelihood, however, all the intelligence gained from the high value Al Qaeda detainees probably could have been elicited through legal, non-coercive methods.

The effectiveness of nonviolent interrogation methods has been borne out not just historically, but even during the current war against terrorists in Iraq. Following the media exposure of the Abu Ghraib abuses, military interrogators deliberately set out to use different methods, ones that wouldn't debase or degrade prisoners and shock the consciences of American citizens. These techniques involved respecting prisoners, their circumstances and their beliefs, establishing connections and incentives for cooperation, and compliance with the standards set by GC III (Alexander "How to Break a Terrorist" 6).

Treating prisoners humanely lead to significant intelligence coups in Iraq, where obtaining information about the operations and command structure of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia was of paramount importance in preventing suicide bomb attacks and other disruptive, violent attacks. By establishing relationships with prisoners and offering them (often false) hopes for solving the problems that had driven them to violence in the first place, military interrogators were able to extract vital details about safe houses and relationships between important figures (136). On at least one occasion a prisoner offered an explanation for why and how he had been mistakenly arrested, and the interrogators made an effort to verify his story

instead of continuing to assume he was lying, the sort of effort that would have kept a lot of innocent people of Guantanamo Bay if it had been consistently applied by American personnel in Afghanistan earlier in the war (166).

4. Effect torture and indefinite detentions have had had on international perceptions of the United States

The standing of the United States as a leader in morality, ethics, and upholding the rule of law has suffered tremendously because of the Bush administration's illegal policies. Negative reactions to indefinite detention and torture have been especially strong among Middle Eastern Muslims; many of them have been convinced to join extremist organizations and fight against the United States because of these policies.

Global perceptions of the United States declined significantly during the Bush administration, especially among predominantly Muslim countries but in Europe as well. How much of that is because of American policies regarding detainees would be difficult to pin down exactly, with other factors such as support for Israel or the unilateral invasion of and continued American presence in Iraq contributing as well. Regardless, positive views of the United States declined in over two-thirds of the countries where data was available (Pew Global Attitudes Project).

Images of the prison at Guantanamo Bay and its orange-suited inmates have become iconic in predominately Muslim countries. Stories of disrespect, abuse, and torture have spread through the media and the personal accounts of those who have been released and returned to their homes. The sexual

humiliation and abuse of detainees, as well as stories of American soldiers demeaning the religious traditions of Muslims, such as beards and the sacredness of the Quran, have strengthened the idea that the war against terrorism is just a front or disguise for a war on Islam itself (Sengupta). This is important because research has shown that Muslims who believe that the United States is waging a war on Islam are more likely to support violence against American soldiers and civilians (Weber 1).

The severe worsening of violent attacks in Iraq in 2004 and 2005 after the Abu Ghraib scandal bears this out. One veteran went so far as to blame half the casualties in Iraq on fighters who joined terrorist groups because of America's torture policies, and that those policies led to the deaths of about as many people killed in the September 11th terrorist attacks (Alexander "I'm Still Tortured").

VII. Conclusions

The illegal and counterproductive methods of the past must be completely eliminated in order for there to be a chance for the United States to restore its reputation, repair the damage done to our ability to lead, and prevent lawlessness from taking over the country. The Geneva Conventions should be applied to the all military operations against terrorists, and all military operations of the future in general, as both a matter of policy and law. Torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, and any other sort of coercive interrogation method must be banned absolutely for all U.S. personnel, who should be required to use nonviolent interrogation techniques instead. The Guan-

tanamo Bay prison and the black sites should be closed, and all prisoners either treated as prisoners of war as GC III demands, charged as criminals in a normal American court or released. Those responsible for torture should be investigated and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

Fortunately, many of these policies are already being carried out by the new President of the United States, Barack Obama. He has ordered the closing of the CIA black sites, banned waterboarding and other torture methods, and ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base closed and the prisoners' files re-reviewed, a process which reportedly will take about a year.

Unfortunately, the new policies aren't perfect. Obama's Justice Department has continued to try to deny prisoners at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan the right to challenge their detentions (Savage). President Obama has also stated that he doesn't want the government to investigate people responsible for torture as the CAT requires it to, although Congressional Democrats may press on with that issue regardless. Additionally, there will probably be difficulties finding places to put many of the released prisoners from Guantanamo. The case of the Uighur prisoners, who face difficulties finding new homes because of pressure from the Chinese, is probably the most extreme case of such problems (Spiegel and Demick). Despite this, the new administration represents a real possibility for redemption from this sordid affair.

Endnotes

¹International law can also come from custom, which is based on traditions of state practice. It is the oldest form of international law, but it can be hard to define where customary law exists and exactly what its provisions are (Shaw 69). Treaties may codify or reflect preexisting customary law, of course, and it is possible for treaty provisions to create customary law, depending on how widely adopted they are and other considerations (Shaw 90).

²Article 130 of GC III defines grave breaches as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention.” And Article 147 of GC IV defines them as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.

³See discussion of universal jurisdiction, below.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵The “exhaustion of domestic remedies rule” flows from the legal principle of state sovereignty; most human rights treaties explicitly include it as a provision (Shaw 254).

⁶The current Special Rapporteur for torture is Manfred Nowak, an Austrian lawyer specializing in human rights, according to his official biography on the OHCHR website.

⁷The 1949 Geneva Conventions, obviously, did not operate during the war. However, the 1929 Geneva Convention afforded a largely similar set of rights to prisoners of war; that particular Convention definitely bound the German government, and the Japanese government made an agreement with the Allies near the opening of hostilities to observe the Convention. A majority of judges at the Tokyo trial later decided this agreement was legally binding on Japan (Boister 184).

⁸The Trial of Major War Criminals in Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo both included prisoner of war abuse among the war crimes with which they charged the leaders of Germany and Japan (North) (Boister 196). Other trials which followed focused on lower-ranking war criminals and also included alleged POW abusers from both Germany and Japan (Truman Library) (Kerr 296).

⁹The Charter of the International Military Tribunal established the rules and procedure for the Nuremberg Trials, and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East did the same for the Tokyo Trials.

¹⁰Specifically, Article 42 of GC IV and Article 75, paragraph 3 of AP I state that protected persons must not be held for longer than is necessary, and Article 9, paragraph 3 states that anyone who is arrested with criminal charges must be brought before a judge and given a trial within a reasonable time frame

¹¹Hamdan was sentenced to five and half years of imprisonment, with time already spent in Guantanamo Bay counting toward it; his sentence will be up in January 2009.

¹²This was part of a general pattern of attacking men who practiced Islam by targeting their religious beliefs. In addition to the aforementioned invasion of space by females and forced shaving of facial hair, the ICRC also gathered credible testimony from detainees at Guantanamo indicating that guards had physically disrespected the Quran, the holy book of Islam (Labott).

¹³It was in the discussion of the positives of ignoring Geneva that Gonzales made the infamous comment about the nature of the war on terror making parts of GC III “obsolete” and “quaint.”

¹⁴Because it simulates death by drowning, waterboarding is arguably a form of mock execution. One study of the effects of tor-

ture found that psychological problems were significantly higher among victims who had experienced a mock execution (Conroy 180).

¹⁵Specifically, a combination of sleep deprivation, starvation, forced standing, hooding, and bombardment with white noise, later referred to as “the five techniques” (Conroy 6).

¹⁶See section on international perception of the United States, below.

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Imposing Democracy: State Building and the War on Terror

Submitted by James M. Duhe



Abstract

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 fundamentally reprioritized US foreign policy. In this environment the Bush administration crafted what came to be known as the Bush Doctrine. Though a precise definition of the Bush Doctrine remains contested, definitions typically include the idea that the United States may preemptively attack countries harboring terrorists, and that the US should support the spread of democracy. But, after eight years, the United States is not safer. This paper analyzes democratization as a theory and as an element of the Bush Doctrine through case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan. By tying the notion of victory in the War on Terror to democratization, the United States has angered many Afghans and Iraqis, wasted an enormous amount of resources, and damaged its relations with other countries. Overall, efforts by the Bush administration to impose democracy in these countries have counterproductive at combating terrorism. I conclude with policy prescriptions for the Obama administration, namely that America must remove itself from the political processes of Iraq and Afghanistan, rebuild ties with the international community, and develop a strategy for complete American withdrawal from these areas.

Since September 11, 2001 terrorism has been a chief concern of American national security. The days of US protection from foreign threats because of its geography are long gone. Al Qaeda displayed not only its ability to attack the United States, but that it was capable of doing so from American soil. From lone snipers to anthrax delivered through the mail, Americans became acutely aware of the potential for additional terrorist attacks. Fortunately, many experts agree that terrorists generally lack the logistical capabilities necessary to inflict mass casualties. Unfortunately, terrorists are constantly working to overcome these obstacles. Instead of conducting grandiose attacks, terrorists may use smaller, inexpensive strikes that require low levels of technical expertise and training. Regrettably, states (especially liberal democracies like the United States) have great difficulty countering this approach toward violence. States are bound by international norms and laws. Democracies like the United States are further constrained in the application of violence and surveillance in counterterrorism by popular consent. Given the ability of terrorist organizations to adapt and overcome state defenses, alternative methods are needed for states to preserve their national security from terrorist attacks.

In this environment, the Bush administration crafted what would later

become known as the Bush Doctrine. Although the precise definition of the Bush Doctrine is still in dispute, definitions typically include legitimizing preemptive strikes against perceived aggressors and using United States—supported democratization as a weapon in the “War on Terror” (for example, see Monten 2005). American backed democratization is a particularly interesting element of the War on Terror because it was a subtle tool capable of changing both government and citizenry. However, despite attempts by the Bush administration to use democratization to further its foreign policy agenda of eliminating terrorism, democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan has proved disastrous. In this paper, I will show how despite rational theoretical backing, problems resulting from the pledge to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan have greatly diminished America’s capability to wage the War on Terror.

Definitions and Terms

For this study, it is important that the language used be as clear as possible. Thus, for the purpose of this essay, I must define several words. Essential to my argument is democratization. For this term, I borrow a definition from Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder’s book *Electing to Fight*. To democratize is to, “try to create favorable institutional conditions in the sequence most likely to foster successful, peaceful democratic transitions” (2007, 16). This definition is exceptional because it identifies the essence of democracy (governance with popular sovereignty rested in the will of the people); but, does not necessitate a successful transition to democracy. This is important be-

cause, despite best intentions, there is no guarantee that democratization will actually result in the formation of a democratic state. This is very logical. Since it is impossible to predict the future, how can a reasonable definition of democratization be contingent on the emergence of a democratic state? Additionally, within the span of human history, no state is eternal. While the United States has been a relatively stable democracy for over the past 150 years, there is no guarantee that autocracy will not prevail in 100 years. It would be unfair to discount the long history of American democracy because of the potential emergence of an autocratic state in the future. The central argument of this paper regards the problems associated with continued American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, to understand the motivations for continuous American involvement in these two countries, it is vital to perceive democratization as a process rather than a result.

War on Terror is the next important term to define. War on Terrorism, Global War on Terrorism, War on Terror, and terrorist are terms that were widely used by the Bush administration to describe and define its counterterrorist activities since 9-11. One of the largest obstacles to any serious study of US policy since this time has been the disambiguation of such confusing language. Discouragingly, the Bush administration made no effort to clarify its terms. In fact, in the case of prisoner detentions at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush administration intentionally obfuscated these terms to provide leeway in gathering intelligence (Hersh 2004, 264). Thus, since the Bush administration has not identified

precise definitions, we must therefore look towards a practical usage. For this paper, I adapt Bruce Hoffman's definition and define terrorism as any attack conducted by a substate actor with the intent to cause fear in a given population achieve as an end (Hoffman 2006, 33). A "terrorist" is any person who commits an act of terrorism. Finally, terror is an emotion that can be evoked through acts of terrorism.

The decision to limit terrorism to the attacks of substate actors is very intentional. Admittedly, this is a hotly debated topic in the field of counterterrorism. Many argue some states have intentionally attacked civilians with the intention of instilling fear just like a substate actor would. Proponents of this belief might argue that actions by Nazis in concentration camps during the Holocaust should be considered terrorism just like the actions of the 9-11 hijackers; all human suffering caused by terrorism is equal. Thus, some might perceive separation between state-sponsored terrorism and substate terrorism, as unnecessary, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of counterterrorism at combating human suffering. However, allowing state sponsored terrorism into this discussion will becloud the topic at hand. The states of interest in my investigation are Afghanistan and Iraq. Prior to the American invasion in these countries, governments were brutally authoritarian. Both states would frequently commit horrible acts against citizens with the intent of inciting fear. Thus, the two groups must be separated if only to distinguish the actions of the former Iraqi and Afghani regimes from the actions of current substate groups currently in these countries.

Obviously Global War on Terrorism, and the War on Terrorism do not conote the same thing. Furthermore, neither of these terms actually describes American counterterrorist policy since September 11, 2001. To be at war with terrorism is to be at war with an action. In this sense, an analogous policy to the War on Terrorism is the equally ineptly named American War on Illegal Immigration. Both illegal immigration and terrorism are abstract concepts. Although one might be able to identify a perpetrator of terrorism just as one may be able to identify an illegal immigrant, it is impossible to single out illegal immigration or terrorism. Because it is intangible, terrorism cannot be fought on a battlefield. One could attack terrorism insofar as the causes of terrorism could be eliminated, but attacking terrorism itself does not really mean anything. Because of this, neither of these terms will be used in my paper.

It is worth mentioning that another problem with the phrase Global War on Terrorism is that it alludes to US counterterrorist activity on a scale that is much larger than reality. America has made no great effort to eliminate terrorist movements that do not threaten US interests. For example, US activity to destroy the PKK or the Tamil Tigers has been notoriously absent from the War. Some may argue that this absence is actually a tactic in itself (Byman 2009, 472). By not going to war against all terrorism everywhere, the United States is less likely to draw the ire of terrorist groups that might otherwise have left America alone. Really, the War on Terror is with the terrorists who seek to harm to the United States. For all these reasons, Global War on Terror is an

inappropriate term to describe U.S. policy since 9-11.

I argue that War on Terror is the most suitable term to describe current US action. First, War on terror eliminates ambiguity in distinguishing between a terrorist and a freedom fighter who employs terrorism. It treats both of these groups the same. So long as a person uses terror to advance his agenda he is a terrorist and may be attacked by the United States. Furthermore, war on terror does not imply intent to eliminate terrorism itself. This is a necessary element in any description of current US counterterrorist policy since terrorism, as was just discussed, is virtually impossible to eliminate.

I would be remiss to ignore the recent change in recent policy changes made by the Obama administration regarding terminology. In March 2009, the Obama administration stated it was removing the term Global War on Terrorism and all similar terms from the lexicon of United States foreign policy (Baker 2009). Interestingly, the phrase chosen to replace War on Terror is Overseas Contingency Operation. Such a gesture was certainly intended to eliminate the implication that the United States is at war with Islam, and to break from the unending dedication of American resources to counterterrorism. As will be discussed later, I can certainly agree with these goals. However, the new term the Obama administration has chosen is not particularly good either. Breaking down the phrase, the first word is rather misleading. While it may be true that many of the fronts in the War on Terror are across the ocean, this is certainly not always the case. The idea to form the

Department of Homeland Security, was created immediately following 9-11, and was intended to “create a comprehensive and shared” national vision for the purpose of “defeating terrorism” (Office of Homeland Security 2002, i). The Bush administration correctly viewed the need for both domestic and international efforts to eliminate terrorism. By renaming the War on Terror as an overseas activity, appreciation for the utility of a two-pronged approach to fighting terrorists may be forgotten. The word “Contingency” is mystifying. For what activity is the exercise of American might strength a contingency? Diplomacy against terrorist is not an option. As stated, substate actors are less susceptible to the sticks and carrots of traditional diplomacy. The only word that accurately describes U.S. policy is Operation, which is really a meaningless term on its own. Since this term does a very poor job at actually describing American policy, I believe it would be best to continue using the term War on Terror.

American Motivations

Let us now turn to the reasons for US democratization. After all, there must have been some purpose to the efforts that have now cost the United States almost \$864 billion (United States Congress Congressional Research Service, 16). A historical approach is best for understanding current motives. Realpolitick has typically guided American efforts at regime change (Pie Minxin, Amin Samia, and Garz Seth 2006, 64). “Only [since the early twentieth century has America’s political ideals and its need to sustain domestic support for] nation-building compelled it to try to establish democratic rule in target nations.” (Pie et al.

2006, 65) To look beyond such gross simplifications of US policy as, “blood for oil,” the Bush administration’s motives for invading and democratizing Iraq and Afghanistan certainly included security. Afghanistan had been the safe haven for al Qaeda under the Taliban. In fact, al Qaeda underwent much of its organizational development in Afghanistan during the 1980s while fighting the Soviets. In what turned out to be a tragic irony, much of al Qaeda’s development occurred as a direct result of American armament and training of mujahedeen during the Soviet Invasion (Bhutto 2008, 112-114). As al Qaeda was discovered to be the principal organizer of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, it was no surprise that the United States saw Afghanistan as a major battleground in the War on Terror.

The case of Iraq was a bit more complicated. Initially, the United States claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) it had acquired through a covert weapons development program (Galbraith 2006, 70). Had this been the case, Iraq would have been in violation of numerous international laws; notably, United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687, 678 and 1441 which all explicitly forbade Iraq from possessing or developing WMDs after the 1991 Gulf War. This breach of international law is obviously serious, but even if Iraq had possessed such weapons, it lacked the delivery system necessary to attack the U.S. such as intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Nevertheless, the Bush administration argues that the Iraqi government under Saddam Hussein had the potential for selling

or distributing WMDs to enemies of America. Admittedly, this was rather unlikely. The secular Arab-nationalist Ba’ath Party (Iraq’s governing party) would have been a strange bedfellow for the Sunni Islamist al Qaeda. An example of this disconnect is exemplified by Osama bin Laden’s offer to Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz al Saud of the use of al Qaeda forces to defend Saudi Arabia from Iraq during the first Gulf War. Although the offer was not accepted, it underscores the acrimonious relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the Bush administration argued that an Iraqi alliance with al Qaeda against the United States was possible, thereby exacerbating American fear of terrorism. Given the stakes in nuclear conflicts, the fear created by the Bush administration was strong enough to cull dissent, even from many Democrats in Congress (Althaus and Largio 2006, 4). No American wanted to be responsible for opposing regime change in Iraq if the connection between the two groups were true.

In both cases, United States policy was to effect regime change. The Taliban was deposed because of the asylum it granted to al Qaeda operative. Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, the President of a country the United States believed was in contravention of international law and conspiring with terrorists, was removed from power as well. But once the dust settled after the invasions, new governments were needed for the two countries. To strengthen its national security, the United States needed to ensure that any successor government would be friendlier towards the United States than its predecessor. One possibility was for American instillation of a

dictatorship (as had been the hallmark of US foreign policy throughout the Cold War). However, American officials likely realized the danger in empowering dictators in already unstable countries particularly given the nature of terrorism. Arguably, support of dictatorships and authoritarianism was what led to the conditions in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first place. Instead, the Bush administration turned to democratization as the answer to its security dilemma.

Forging a Democratic Peace

In his essay “Perpetual Peace” written in 1795, the political philosopher Immanuel Kant outlined what he believed would be necessary to stop states from going to war with one another. Although the terminology differs slightly between Kant’s time and today, he essentially argued for three things: that all countries to democratize, that the depth and number of involvements of states in Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) increase, and that international trade increase (Kant [1795] 1970, 93-98). Kant reasoned that democracies only tend to go to war in self defense (Kant [1795] 1970, 98). Thus, if all countries were democracies, there would be no war.

A democratic Iraq and Afghanistan would certainly not have been the end to all war everywhere. Nevertheless, the Bush administration reasoned that if these countries became democratic, they would absorb democratic ideals, and be likely to attack, or support attacks perpetrated against, the United States (Gause III, 2005). Of course, changing the “hearts and minds” of potential terrorist was an important goal. A strictly

state-focused approach would not necessarily have influenced subgovernmental terrorist groups. Theoretically however, encouraging democracy would also help diminish the potential for terrorism. The diminished potential would be through the growth of robust civil societies. The London School of Economics provides an excellent definition of civil society as, “the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values. Civil society is theoretically divorced from activities of the state, though in practice, this relationship may be negotiated” (London School of Economics, 2004). This concept is certainly familiar to Americans. From local religious groups to political action groups, Americans participate in many different manifestations of civil society. Important to this discussion is that many groups in civil society seek to effect change. Civil society provides a medium through which citizens can express discontent with the status quo without resorting to violence. Furthermore, to extrapolate from the theories of Ashtoush Varshney, the associations created by civil society might even help prevent the emergence of violence amongst Iraqis. This was an important consideration because of the deconstructed power relationship during the former Hussein regime between ruling Sunni and the demographically dominant Shi’a (not to mention the Kurds in Northern Iraq. Thus, in the aftermath of the Iraq and Afghanistan invasions, the United States began reestablishing the two countries as democracies.

To their credit, the Bush administration realized some of the serious roadblocks to democracy in these two states, and did attempt to remove them. Immediately after

the invasions, the Bush administration lifted many of its trade barriers with Iraq and Afghanistan. Theoretically, this enabled more international trade for the two countries. Furthermore, the United States brought in the Army Corps of Engineers and hired over 180,000 independent contractors to assist in the reconstruction of state infrastructure. As of August 2008 this has cost the United States Government over \$100 billion for Iraq alone (United States Congress. Congressional Budget Office 2008, 16). Ironically much of the infrastructure had been destroyed either as a direct result of American attacks during the invasion or by indigenous pillaging immediately following them. Assisting in infrastructure projects supported the development of business, in turn, promoting international trade. Furthermore, by providing Iraqis with basic amenities, the United States was clearly reaching out to the Iraqi polity in the hopes that a future elected government would not be explicitly anti-American.

The situation in Afghanistan was even worse than the situation in Iraq. Larry Goodson explains, “After conflict or regime change, societies usually require some degree of reconstruction... but the destruction in Afghanistan in late 2001 was far beyond what is usually encountered in such disrupted societies” (2006, 153). Because of this major issue, the United States relied on anti-Taliban groups to establish a process for transitioning sovereignty of Afghanistan to a freely-elected Afghan government rather than a US led coalition force (Goodson 2006, 157). This process, as laid out in the Bonn Accords, was obviously a pivotal step

in establishing democracy in Afghanistan. Democratic governance is impossible without a democratically elected government. By relying on local Afghans to establish democracy, the United States – specifically the military – was free to fighting Taliban forces in the Afghan countryside. However, the lack of benchmarks for successful democratization combined with the inability of the United States to eradicate the Taliban from Afghanistan has prolonged the American presence without any end in sight.

Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) may have been a feasible solution for stopping terrorism, so long as it was executed properly. Although invasion and subsequent democratization are inherently state-level actions, the Bush administration believed these methods better than the alternative of trying to root out specific terrorist organizations. To a degree, they were correct. It is very difficult to completely destroy a terrorist group. First, simply finding a group may prove problematic. Obviously, as a subgovernmental group, there is no terrorist “state.” Nor is there necessarily a need for one. With the advent of high-speed internet and the pervasiveness of telecommunications, terrorists can live virtually anywhere. Nevertheless, terrorist groups are attracted to weak and failed states such as Afghanistan or post-invasion Iraq (Gvosdev and Takeyh. 2009, 80). Weak and failed states may either be too weak to eliminate terrorists, or may even collude with certain organizations. This relationship provides terrorists with official documentation such as visas for travel, and provides a safe haven during the counterterrorist offensives of other countries. This was certainly the case for Afghanistan

which, under the Taliban, had worked with al Qaeda to train the Afghan military from 1997-2001 (Wright 2006, 355). For countries like the United States, the protection afforded to terrorist groups in weak and failed states from international norms respect state sovereignty can seriously infringe on effective counterterrorist campaigns (Patrick 2009, 102).

Another problem for most counterterrorist activity is identifying the organizational structure of terrorist organizations. Unlike the hierarchical style of “old terrorism,” “new terrorism” is characterized by its nodal quality. Cells operate independently, and there is no direct links up or down a chain of command. Lacking the ability to link one terrorist to another, it is almost impossible to determine the size and leadership of a terrorist group. Furthermore, since the cells operate independently, “leadership” may even be an antiquated concept in the organizational structure of terrorist groups. When the United States attacked Afghanistan, and killed or capture many of who it believed to be top al Qaeda leaders, the movement did not die. In fact, as of this writing, Taliban forces have conquered much of the Swat region, just over the border in Pakistan. Even with Osama bin Laden in hiding, branches of al Qaeda live on and continue to fight and recruit. This resiliency combined with other qualities of new terrorism such as religious motivations and a desire to maximize casualties calls for a non-state focused response (Howard 2009, 113). Since terrorists do not control states, they cannot be dealt with through coercion or tribute. To them, victory is zero-sum. Ad-

mitedly, the very notion of a “new” terrorism versus and “old” terrorism is debated. However, the characteristics of the terrorists fought in the War on Terror resemble “new terrorists” rather than “old terrorists.” This is why I distinguish between the two groups.

It was not entirely unreasonable for the Bush administration to believe that its attempts to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq should have been successful. Since WWII America has successfully democratized two states: Japan and West Germany. Both of these democracies emerged from war-ravaged countries after having been previously ruled by authoritarian governments. Democratization occurred in both places despite a recent cult-of-personality surrounding the former leader as well (particularly salient for Iraqi reconstruction). Furthermore, since these countries democratized, neither had been involved in an international conflict. In fact, since WWII, Japan has not developed an official offensive military (albeit, this tradition sprang from provisions established in a Constitution drawn up by American military officials (Ike 1950, 24)). If the United States could harness the characteristics of successful democratization in Japan and West Germany, perhaps it would be possible to turn Afghanistan and Iraq into democracies as well.

Taken at face value, the reasons for, the Bush administration’s invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan are fairly reasonable. States, unlike amorphous terrorist groups, are easily identifiable and targetable by the military. The services these states provided to al Qaeda could be reduced or eliminated entirely through regime change. Democratization, had it been carried out properly,

could have further reduced the potential for terrorism.

The Shortcomings of Democratization

With such a theoretically sound theory for democratization, why has democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan been a hindrance to the War on Terror? The answer lies in how democratization has been shaped by political elites to define success in the two countries. In Afghanistan, after the initial invasion, the United States spent most of its time fighting against Taliban in the hills of Afghanistan. The United States correctly believed that by creating a secure environment in Afghanistan, it would be more likely that a democratic government could flourish (Fukuyama 2006, 234). However, neither the safe environment nor democracy ever emerged. To this day that United States military continues to fight against Taliban and al Qaeda forces throughout Afghanistan. The fighting is so intense that in late March 2009, President Barak Obama ordered an additional 17,000 troops to Afghanistan to “partner with Afghan security forces and go after insurgents along the border” (Obama 2009). Because of this instability, the Afghan national government has yet to gain control over the whole country. Facing internal insurrection, a burgeoning illegal drug trade, and a lack of infrastructure, Afghanistan has been unable to develop into the democracy necessary for DPT to take effect. Democracy has become the single criteria for victory in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, it has proven elusive.

As discussed earlier, before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the United States used the

presence of WMDs and the association of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden as a *casus belli*. So certain was the United States that it would encounter weapons of mass destruction during the invasion that media personnel were imbedded into American military squadrons (Galbraith 2006, 86—87). However, after the invasion, in an international investigation by members of the Coalition of the Willing to determine if Saddam Hussein possessed WMDs at the time of the invasion. The report came back negative (Duelfer 2004). Internationally embarrassed and responsible for a failed state, the United States began to democratize Iraq. Admittedly, Iraq needed reconstruction independent of the presence or absence of weapons of mass destruction. However, for lack of any other legitimate reason for the invasion, the U.S. turned to democratization as the criteria for success. Thus, democratization, while a theoretically sound means of encouraging peace, has become an excuse for a continued American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is this continued presence that has caused serious damage to the ability of the United States to wage the War on Terror.

The Problems of Continued United States Presence

Angry Afghanistan, Infuriated Iraq

One of the most obvious problems resulting from a continued U.S. presence based on democratization has been the anger aroused in Iraqi and Afghani citizens. Instead of being greeted, as Vice President Richard Cheney predicted, as “liberators,” Coalition troops have been met with intense and overt hostility. It is far outside the

scope of this essay to discuss the legitimacy of this anger. However, suffice to say that it exists, and it has a significant impact on how Iraq and Afghanistan have undergone democratic changes. It should be noted that anger is not necessarily just a negative element in state building. In fact, history has shown that anger can be used as a catalyst for regime change. However, anger, particularly when anger causes violence, makes the emergence of democratic institutions much less likely (*Electing to Fight*). As the United States continues its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan on the grounds that a democratic state will eventually emerge, this anger is counterproductive for achieving American objectives.

The emergence of religiously motivated political parties and ethnic separatist movements must be considered regarding their impact on democratization. Rather than address the specific goals of particular organizations, it is most useful to group them together when analyzing their impact on democratization efforts. For example, while one group may want an Iraqi Sunni state while another may desire a free Kurdish state, the most important aspect of these groups is that they all inhibit the ability of the US to engage in state-building, and have damaged Iraqi or Afghani conceptions of national unity.

Although the amount of money and manpower spent on private contractors to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan has been immense, by far the United States military has played the largest role in reconstruction. Not only has the American military engaged in civil reconstruction, but its efforts to pro-

vide security to the two countries are indispensable for the emergence of democratic states. Although there is no clear, universal answer as to precisely what is needed and in what order conditions need to emerge to create democracy. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder (from whom my definition for democratization was taken) have written extensively since 1995 regarding the ordering of democratic institutions necessary for democracy to emerge. These two scholars argue in their book *Electing to Fight* that without the development of democratic institutions there can be no security, and thus, democracy, much less DPT, will not function. Others may claim that without security there can be no democratic institutions, obviously inhibiting democracy (Forman 2006, 196). No matter which side of this chicken—egg debate the reader falls, suffice to say that security is an crucial element important part to the state building process.

Unfortunately, as mentioned earlier in this essay, terrorist attack methodology is remarkable for its simplicity, destructive capability and inability to be detected. Thus, despite its superior weaponry and training, one of the greatest threats to the American military in Iraq and Afghanistan has been terrorist attacks. Roadside bombs and small arms fire are a constant problem for the American military, and the costs of carrying out these attacks as opposed to preventing them seriously favors the attacker over the victim (Howard 2009, 113). Thus, while the United States has pegged victory in the War on Terror on the emergence of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is attempting to create democracy in an environment extremely hostile to the American presence.

Now consider how all of this within the context of the emergence of religiously motivated political organizations and separatist movements on democratization. These two types of organizations are considered linked in this essay because they share an important characteristic: they both tend to reject US involvement in state development. In Iraq, separatist movements cannot support US efforts because, at present, the US is not attempting to break up the Iraqi state. Admittedly, this is not always the case. Until 2006, prior to the Bush administration's troop "surge" in which an additional 30,000 troops were deployed to Iraq, the idea of a three state system was very possible. This is exemplified by the January 2005 referendum in which Iraqis in the Northern Kurdish region voted for their independence from the rest of Iraq. (Galbraith 2006, 193) Even though the Kurds in Northern Iraq had been an invaluable asset to the United States during the 2003 invasion, allowing the region to secede from the Iraqi state was an untenable solution for the Bush administration and the Maliki government. To allow a portion of Iraq to remove itself from the negotiating table regarding Iraqi reconstruction could have opened the floodgates for secession by other groups.

Afghanistan is in a different situation, but one no less hindered by separatist organizations. To fully grasp the difference, it should be recognized that the American invasion in 2001 was done with significant assistance by native Afghans. The United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UFI, and known to Western media as the "Northern Alliance") had worked exten-

sively with the United States and Great Britain during the 2001 invasion. Immediately following the capture of Kabul, the UFI packed government positions with its cadres (Weinbaum 2006, 127). However, the ethnic composition of the North Alliance was such that it was dominated by Tajiks, Panjshiris, and Uzbeks; all relative minorities in Afghanistan. Absent from the alliance, and thus, the new government, were Pashtuns and Shia Muslim Hazaras which were the largest groups in Afghanistan, but whose members resided in eastern and southern parts of the country. As the Afghan bureaucracy became occupied by Northern Alliance loyalists, warlords from southern and eastern Afghanistan began to see perceive the newly formed Afghan government as illegitimate (Weinbaum 2006, 129). Thus, while the United States concerned itself with security in Afghanistan, the Afghan national government proved ineffective at governing in areas much beyond Kabul.

As for the specific dangers posed to democratization by religiously motivated political parties, distrust among Sunni and Shiites in Iraq almost caused a breakup of the state (Galbraith, 2006, 181-208). Iraqis Shiites, the majority Muslim faction in Iraq, had been the dominant force in drafting the Iraqi Constitution. Of course, Shiite dominance of the constitutional process was unacceptable to Sunni Iraqis who, with the De-Baathification of the Iraqi government, had already begun to see democratization as a not-so-subtle effort to remove Sunnis from the governing process. Furthermore, attempts by the Sunnis to take control of the government through democratic reform

were viewed by many former Ba'athists as a threat to their power. This caused Sunni representatives to object to "nearly everything that was proposed," (Galbraith 2006, 194) Subsequent attempts by the United States by the United States to pacify Sunni dissent ostracized the Shiite majority who felt that America was not really interested in forming a genuine democracy. Religious political parties were the logical outcome. They acted a the perfect venue for Sunnis to extend their political control over the process. As a minority group, political power was at a premium of importance.

With power concentrated in a few groups, and with the groups competing for power, sectarian violence erupted on a horrific scale. Sunni groups attacked Shiia groups and vice versa. With each attack came retaliations. Bigger attacks yielded bigger retaliation. The massive upswing in sectarian violence after the 2006 bombing of the al Askari Mosque is an excellent example of the blood feud that consumed Iraq. Retaliations were common. It is believed that the bombing was the immediate cause of as many as 165 deaths, and most likely contributed to the upswing in violence that occurred for the months after the attack where average deaths per day rose from 11 to 34. (Galbraith 2006, 246) The violence was so prominent, a US intelligence reports released as late as August 2007 noted the disturbing frequency of sectarian violence as a major obstacle in establishing peace in Iraq.

Essentially, the political motivated religious groups and the separatist movements were fulfilling the gap in civil society generated by the destruction of the old re-

gimes. Civil society is the lifeblood of democracy. Ashutosh Varshney, a scholar on ethnic conflict and civic life, defines civil society as "the part of our life that exists between the state on one hand and families on the other that allows people to come together on a variety of issues (2002, 4). Without the connections made through civil society, Varshney posits that the potential for violence in communities will increase. Although Varshney wrote these words of wisdom regarding the relationships between Hindus and Muslims in India, the same statement could easily be applied to Sunnis, Shi'a and Kurds in Iraq, or Tajiks and Pashuns in Afghanistan. Without civil society there is violence, and as violence increases, the likelihood of democratization decreases.

The Poppy Production Dilemma

The inability to administer governance on the part of the Afghan national government has enabled a massive upswing in the production of poppy in parts of Afghanistan. Afghanistan possess little arable land. Rocky, dry, and lacking even basic infrastructures in some regions, it is very difficult for Afghan farmers to scratch out a living. Because of the inhospitable climate, Afghanistan's main agricultural products are limited essentially to the few things that can grow easily. Among these are certain types of nuts, figs, and poppy. Poppy, a plant from which opium can be extracted, is used in the production of many types of narcotics such as heroin and morphine. These drugs are intensely lucrative, and their production poses a serious concern for the fledgling Afghani government. Lawlessness and poor infrastructure makes the logistics of curtailing the production of poppy very difficult.

Nevertheless, the unmitigated production of these goods can be very harmful. Drugs production and sale are a problem for any government, particularly those with poor domestic support facilities (rehabilitation centers, public health care clinics, etc.). Furthermore, the sale of poppy has been linked to narco-terrorism, and is a chief element in terrorist funding (Weinbaum 2006, 133). Ironically, during the reign of the Taliban, poppy production had been outlawed. However, after the Northern Alliance came to power, and certainly after the Northern alliance lost the ability to administer government across Afghanistan, poppy production has reached an all-time high (Weinbaum 2006, 126). Thus, the United States and the newly formed Afghan government finds itself in the tenuous position of both needing to stop the production of a crop that can be synthesized into a controlled substance, and the need for farmers to subsist. The United States has placed itself in a no—win situation regarding poppy production. If the United States destroys poppy crops to discourage narco-terrorism, it harms the wellbeing of Afghan farmers thereby decreasing the likelihood of the emergence of a middle class and harming democratization (Moore 1966, xxii). If the United States allows the poppy crops to grow, previous efforts to stabilize Afghanistan are undermined. No matter what it does, America is hemorrhages resources. A continued American presence based on the emergence of a democratic state will only prolong the bleeding.

Unending Investment

The central theme of this paper is how continued American presence in Iraq

and Afghanistan in the name of democratization has reduced the ability of the United States to wage the War on Terror. A strained and previously engaged military, damaged American confidence in political leadership, and the accumulation of massive debt from invasion and reconstruction all reduced the ability of the United States to respond to future dangers. In this section, I will explore how and why these costs have accumulated.

Speaking in fiscal terms, the war has cost Americans a phenomenal sum of money. In a Congressional report released October 15, 2008, Congress admitted to allocating almost one trillion dollars to fighting the War on Terror (including all invasion and reconstruction activity in Afghanistan and Iraq) (United State Congress Congressional Report Service 2008, 16). This number is incredible. It is almost one thirteenth of average annual American GDP (Purchasing Power Parity) in 2007 (World Bank, 2007). Some critics of the War on Terror even claim this number is deflated. Joseph E. Stiglitz, a Nobel—prize winning economist, claims the costs of the war could actually be as high as \$4 trillion (HERSZENHORN, 2008) To appreciate these numbers, think of how this money was not used. Even if the money was still only used to reduce the threat of terrorism, there were certainly other, better, uses for it. By comparison, between 2003 and 2007, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) received appropriations from Congress in the amount of \$5 billion dollars (United States Congress. Congressional Budget Office 2008, 3). This is not to suggest that economic development is a

suitable alternative from democratization in the War on Terror. However, by providing humanitarian assistance, the United States might at least have reduced the animosity many in Iraq and Afghanistan feel towards the United States. Had Iraq and Afghanistan turned into model democracies, these costs may have been bearable. However, this has not been the case.

The United States military has also suffered as a result of its democratization efforts. The U.S. military is engaged in tasks for which it was not designed. American soldiers predominantly trained for combat environments, not the sort of peacekeeping missions necessary for state building and reconstruction (Dobbins 2006, 223). As mentioned earlier, the US military did possess a few resources that would be helpful for democratization such as the Army Corps of Engineers for assistance in creating civil infrastructure. However, these efforts have obviously proven insufficient. The sheer quantity of money that has been spent on private contractors and by Nongovernmental organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan is a testament to this deficiency.

The credibility of American political elites has also suffered immensely because of the continued American presence in these two countries. In the immediate aftermath of 9-11, President George Bush experienced record approval ratings; what many considered to be a manifestation of the “rally ‘round the flag” effect (Muller 2005, 47). In the run up to the war in Iraq, the Bush administration received another spike in approval. However, as the conflicts dragged on, as American expenses and casualties

mounted, and as the amount of time necessary for successful democratization became clearer, American public opinion waned. A poll conducted by CBS asked 844 American adults nationwide, "Do you think the result of the war with Iraq was worth the loss of American life and other costs of attacking Iraq, or not?" In August 2003, 46% of those surveyed said that they believed the costs were worth the results while 45% thought the costs were not worth it with 9% unsure (CBS News Poll, 2009). In March of 2008, CBS polled the same group and discovered that according to their survey, support had gone down significantly. In March 2008, only 29% of those surveyed thought the costs were worth it while those who believed the results were not worth the costs rose to 64% of those surveyed with 7% unsure. This negative sentiment was directly reflected in American views of President Bush. In a Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research Associates International asked 1,003 adults nationwide, “. . . Do you approve or disapprove of the way Bush is handling the situation in Iraq?" In May 2003, less than one month after the initial invasion of Iraq, 69% of Americans said that they approved of the Bush administration’s handling, while only 26% disapproved with 5% not sure. In August 2005, over two years later, American views had obviously changed. Again, Princeton Survey Research Associates International conducted the poll. This time, 34% of Americans approved, 61% disapproved, and 5% were unsure. At the end of the second Bush term, the same poll found 68% of Americans disapproved of Bush’s handling of Iraq (Newsweek Poll conducted by Princeton Survey Research

Associates International, 2009).

One popularly cited reason for why Americans stopped favoring the war and supporting American military leadership is “casualty phobia” (Feaver Gelpi and Reifler 2009, 8). This argument states that there may be initial support for the use of force, but the support evaporates rapidly and irrevocably at the sight of body bags.” (Feaver Gelpi and Reifler 2009, 8). This certainly seems logical. As the criteria for American victory in Iraq and Afghanistan was made unattainable, each life lost in the conflicts became more deplorable. Obviously, as the United States prolongs its stay in Iraq and Afghanistan for the sake of democratization, it is likely that the credibility of political elites may suffer further damage.

But what has enabled the hemorrhaging of American dollars, lives, and domestic credibility in the name of democratization? The answer lies in the epistemological ambiguity of important terms in the War on Terror. Few American politicians stood against the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. To do so would have been political suicide in a democratic society. Similarly, in the weeks leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, few politicians stood against the Bush administration. The stakes for being wrong were simply perceived as too high by most politicians (Ravi 2005, 55). Because of this uniform political support, the Bush administration introduced a number of terms into the discussion of the War on Terror. Two of the most important terms for this discussion were “victory” and “democracy.” On May 2, 2003, U.S. President George Bush landed in full fighter regalia on the deck of the

U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln. The purpose of President Bush’s visit to the Abraham Lincoln was to declare as the banner behind him said, Iraq was “Mission Accomplished.” As is now known all too well, the mission was not yet finished. Nevertheless, the Bush administration made winning military campaigns against Iraq seem like the only criteria for a successful invasion (Ravi 2005, 45). However, when weapons inspectors concluded Iraq never possessed a WMD program, the Bush administration changed “victory” again. This time, victory took the current definition of a fully democratic Iraq. Of course, there no explanation was ever provided about exactly what a fully democratic Iraq meant. Internationally accepted free and fair elections? High voter registration and participation? The Bush administration never explained. Despite this ambiguity, in a November 30, 2005 address where he discussed strategy for the war in Iraq, George Bush used the term “victory” 15 times, and even posed a sign that said, “Plan for Victory” next to his podium (Berinsky Drukman, 2007, 128) Even though the definition for victory had changed, it was clear that the Bush administration still expected it. On a similar note, the Bush administration remained steadfast against the use of timetables for withdrawal from the two countries, and because of its precarious position, was unable to ensure the developing Iraqi government reached Washington-approved checkpoints. When Afghanistan’s parliamentary elections were postponed from 2004 until 2005, the United States could only watch (United Nations Information Service 2005). Removing support for the nascent Afghani national

government would not have yielded faster democratization. All that the United States could do was keep promoting security in Afghanistan and hope for better election conditions in 2005.

Unfriendly Friends

The Bush administration did a spectacular job of alienating U.S. allies throughout the War on Terror. Immediately following 9-11, nations around the world flocked to America's support. From long time allies like Britain to countries with which the U.S. has had cooler relations such as Iran and Libya, international solidarity against the hijackings was astounding. Immediately after the attack, the nineteen members of NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stating, that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all." The members of NATO went even further by pledging action including the "use of armed force." (Gordon 2002, 5) However, two and a half years later, in the weeks leading up to the United States invasion of Iraq, relations between the United States and its allies soured.

Prior to the war, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), had been investigating Iraq. These organizations are international bodies charged with investigating countries possessing nuclear technology for their compliance with international law. In the case of Iraq the IAEA and UNMOVIC were responsible for investigating Iraqi compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.

Resolution 1441 offered Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to have Iraq comply with previous United Nations Security Council resolutions restricting Iraq's possession of both a nuclear material and certain prohibited armament in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War (The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441, 2009). However, the investigation of Iraq was not fast enough for the Bush administration. Citing Iraqi unwillingness to allow inspectors into certain areas, the Bush administration claimed that Iraq was not fully disclosing its weapons program and was therefore in contravention of Resolution 1441 (Galbraith 2006, 102). The Resolution contained no specific triggers for military action. Nevertheless, U.S. representative to the United Nations John Negroponte did comment that, "If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq, or to enforce relevant UN resolutions and protect world peace security." It was Negroponte's caveat that would later be used by the Bush administration as a justification for the Iraq invasion.

The international community was not supportive of U.S. military action in Iraq. Particularly after IAEA and UNMOVIC investigators presented evidence for Iraqi compliance to Resolution 1441, the international community saw U.S. militarism as disconcerting (Wall, 125). Although the United States would claim that it assembled a "Coalition of the Willing" to support it during a war with Iraq, the coalition was strongly influenced by bribes and coercion by the United States (Anderson Bennis and

Cavanagh 2003, 8—10). Those countries that were not part of the “Coalition” were ostracized, in many cases by the American public itself.

France in particular experienced American rancor through boycotts of French products, jokes focusing on French military cowardice, and even childish renaming of items that contained the word “French” (i.e. “french fries” became “freedom fries”). None of this is good for utilizing the international goodwill created after 9-11. For their part, “The French see a new aggressive strain of messianic universalism in U.S. policy, a willingness to impose democracy by use of the U.S. military.” which they see as deeply troubling (Wall 2004, 126). As the United States continues its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan because of a dedication to the emergence of democracy, this view is unlikely to change.

Policy Prescriptions

Given these grotesque realities, what steps should the Obama administration take to correct America’s course in fighting the War on Terror? The answer to this is in three parts. First, the United States must extricate itself from the politics of Iraq and Afghanistan as much as possible. Secondly, the US must reducing instances of overt hostility towards Muslims within US military practices. Finally, the Obama administration needs to work to heal relationships between the US and the international community while convincing the international community to share the burden of state building when necessary. These three tactics will address the major obstacles to the War on Terror that have arisen as a result of attempts by

the United States to democratize Iraq and Afghanistan. These recommendations are a start. Had the Bush administration undertaken these policies in the early days of the two invasions, it is unlikely that conditions would have degenerated as seriously as they have. Thus, the impacts of these actions are likely to carry repercussions that may not have necessarily have occurred if implemented sooner. The above prescriptions are likely to encounter serious problems in implementation. However, “obstacles on the ground” must be addressed one way or another if the United States seeks to correct its mistakes

It is important to mention that as of this writing, the Obama administration has taken several significant steps towards many of these goals. However, much more work is needed before the ill—effects of attempts to democratize Afghanistan and Iraq can be eradicated. As President, Barack Hussein Obama (a Democrat, America’s first black President, and a man with Muslim family) is in a unique position to shape how the United States fights the War on Terror. Now, the only question that remains is if he is up to the challenge.

American removal from Iraqi and Afghani governance is critical. Without this, all other measures to fix the problems generated by these democratizations may be fruitless. At a basic level, governments must concern themselves with two things: legitimacy and sovereignty. Lacking either of these things will result in the devolution of society into lawlessness. Without sovereignty, governments are unable to control citizens. Without legitimacy, constant internal power struggles will make a unified

government impossible. While its presence in Iraq and Afghanistan may assist in governmental sovereignty (the United States military has extensively trained local Afghans and Iraqis in combat and security measures (Obama, 2009)) it has hindered governmental legitimacy in the process. With separatist groups and religiously motivated political groups jockeying for power, such chinks in legitimacy of the new governments with weak civil societies may be fatal.

While it may not be feasible for the United States to quickly and completely divorce itself from Iraq and Afghanistan, it can certainly start by removing itself from much of the politics of the two countries. The Obama administration must develop a list of objectives the United States will pursue in these countries, and fulfill them at the discretion of the host governments. Furthermore, these goals need to be apolitical and object goods for all Iraqis and Afghans. A good example of this is security. Simultaneously, the United States must create a list of goals and it expects the Iraqi and Afghani governments to accomplish. These goals must be reasonable and they also must be accompanied by reasonable timetables. Despite its weaknesses in fighting terrorism, the United States military is certainly more capable of upholding security than the infant governments. Furthermore, if the United States enforces security everywhere equally, not just in areas that are friendly toward America, the potential for harming the legitimacy of indigenous governments may diminish. However, the Iraqi and Afghani governments must work diligently towards democracy for American efforts to be fruitful.

Interestingly, if this policy is undertaken, it is likely that American objectives and Iraqi and Afghani objectives may sync on a number of key issues. Both the Iraq and United States governments want al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) agents apprehended. Working with the Iraqi government may be the best way to achieve this, while simultaneously making it more difficult for AQI to gain supporters who are against the US presence. By creating delineating responsibilities and goals, the United States will be providing strong support to democratization, but in such a way that it will more likely result in a full democracy.

A serious blunder of the Bush administration was the impact of American counterterrorist activity on the perceptions of Muslims around the world. The problem was so significant that one of the major focuses of President Obama's first trip abroad was to assure the "Muslim world" that the United States, "is not and will never be at war with Islam" (Cooper, 2009). Of course, soundbites from President Obama may not be sufficient to outweigh Muslim antipathy. Overt targeting of Islam and Muslims in the War on Terror have scarred American relations with many Muslims (Pew Global Attitudes Project, Pew Research Center, 2009). To correct its course, the United States must not allow further cause to those who think the United States is at war with Islam. Obama has made significant strides in this regard. Closing the infamous American military base and prisoner detention center at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba is an excellent first step. As discussed, intentionally removing the phrase "War on terror" from the lexicon of American foreign policy is another step

in the right direction. These efforts must be continued if the United States is ever to win back the public opinion of Muslims around the world.

Finally, the United States must work to reintegrate the international community into the War on Terror. America had widespread international support after 9-11. However, the costs of involvement to America combined with American pomposity have made it unlikely for other countries to volunteer in the War on Terror. Contributing to this unease is the knowledge that Tony Blair, Prime Minister of Britain and chief supporter of the United States during the Iraqi Invasion, received so much domestic backlash that he lost his position as PM. Similarly, politicians in countries like Australia and Spain came to power with promises that they would remove their country from the Coalition. This is obviously a problem for the United States which already supplies the majority of resources for the two conflicts. President Obama's charge will thus be twofold for reintegrating the international community into the War on Terror. First, he will need to convince politicians that they will not necessarily lose popular support just by assisting in the War. Second (although related), President Obama needs to impress upon the international community that fighting terrorists must be a concern of every country. If Barack Obama can get more countries in the world invested in the notion of preventing terrorist attacks, then proving that politicians will not lose domestic support will come naturally. Without the international involvement in the War on Terror, costs to Americans will be much higher, and the likelihood for success will be

much lower.

Conclusion

In this essay I have shown how democratization has harmed the ability of the United States to wage the War on Terror. Theoretically, democratization may have been the solution for rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan after the United States invaded. However, poor planning, and insufficient resources have stymied the emergence of democratic institutions in these two states. Despite this slowness in democratization, political elites have defined victory in these two countries as the emergence of fully democratic governments. This decision has angered many indigenous Iraqis and Afghans, necessitated enormous and continual resource investment from the United States, and has tarnished U.S. image internationally. Despite these issues, American policy can be corrected. The Obama administration must work to differentiate the War on Terror from what many Muslims perceive as a "War on Islam." Furthermore, the Obama administration must develop concrete criteria for victory and abide by those criteria for committing a judicious withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. Finally, the Obama administration must involve other countries in the War on Terror. This is important both because it will enable the United States to defer some of the expenses of the War on other countries, but also because the goals of the War on Terror are beneficial to all states. These tasks will be difficult to achieve, but not impossible. By halting America's tireless commitment to democratization in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the long run, the United States will be in a much better position to wage the War on Terror.

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State Capacity, Social Mobility, and Terrorist Groups In Thailand and the Philippines

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Abstract

Thailand and the Philippines face similar security issues, including separatist violence in their southern provinces. However, the developmental paths of the two countries and the governments' reactions to the minority ethno-religious separatist movements, the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines, have varied greatly. In Thailand, the government's desire to create a singular national identity from mixed ethnic and religious backgrounds has created periods of forced assimilation tempered by attempts at conciliation. Conversely, the Philippines continued colonial policies of economic and political oppression of the Moro but created the institutions necessary for social pluralism. The differing policies of the Thai and Filipino governments have shaped the orientation of the separatist movements within the countries. Currently, the size and power of the MILF in the Philippines has forced the government to attempt peace talks with the group. However, in Thailand the reclusive nature of the BRN-C remains hinders communications with the Thai government. This paper demonstrates that the actions taken by the governments of Thailand and the Philippines have fostered current separatist and terrorist movements. Addressing these problems will require state policies that reflect pluralism

and institutions that support social aspirations.

Glossary

ARMM – Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
Berastu – Unity, separatist group in Thailand
BNPP - Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani
BRN – Barisan Revolusi Nasional (National Revolutionary Front)
CPP – Communist Party of the Philippines
CPT – Communist Party of Thailand
Malay – ethnic minority group in Thailand
MIM – Moro Islamic Movement formerly the Moro Independence Movement
THE MNLF - Moro National Liberation Front
MILF - Moro Islamic Liberation Front
Moro - ethnic minority group in the Philippines
OIC – Organization of the Islamic Conference
PAO - Provincial Administrative Organizations (Thailand)
PULO - Patani United Liberation Organization
SBPAC – Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre
SPCPD – Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development

	Thailand	Philippines
Education	Regulation of curriculum in punohs Forced assimilation	Secularization of schools
Reaction from government	Relied on military rather than political action to deal with violence	Peace agreements and ceasefires Direct political action
Separatist groups	BRN and BRN-C Goals murky at best, leaders hide in countryside	MNLF and MILF Well known leaders and goals
Size of groups	Exact numbers unknown, estimated at times as low as 300 to 500 active members	At peak 30,000 estimated members
Focus of groups/ conflict	Focus of group unknown. The conflict is both religiously and ethnically based	MILF aimed for a broader political goal based on the ethnic/religious identity of the Moro
Class issues	Low overall country output/wages until industrial revolution in late 1980s	Government reallocation of ancestral Moro land to Christians (cycle of poverty)
Regional affect	Malay have appealed to Malaysian government for aid in crisis	Connection with Muslim community in Sabah and Borneo
Outside funding	Some claim Jamaa Islamiya connection to the BRN but the BRN and scholars deny these claims	Malaysian government (weapons, transport, etc.) Aid from Libya under Kadaffi
Organization of separatist group	Top down structure in the BRN-C, with a military and political wing	Loosely knit with some infrastructure including a central committee and the BMA (Bangsa Moro Army)
Religious demographics	94% Buddhist 5% Muslim <1% Christian, Hindu, Sikh, or Jewish	90% Christian 5% Muslim <1% Buddhist, Sikh, or animist

Introduction

Thailand and the Philippines are currently experiencing similar security concerns, including separatist violence in their southern provinces.

The violence stems from minority ethno-religious groups, namely the Malay in Thailand and the Moro in the Philippines. Despite largely similar histories, the developmental paths of the separatist movements and governmental responses of the two countries have greatly affected their reactions and level of success with the separatist movements. The focus in Thailand on identity issues, and the government's inability to create lasting and stable institutions through which to mediate identity issues, has left the Malay with few official avenues through which to express their problems. Due to this, some Malay have begun to work outside of the system in separatist groups. However, in the Philippines the government's economic oppression has been tempered by a political readiness to mitigate societal issues. That has enabled separatist groups to be open about their leadership and aims, which has led to negotiations and attempted peace treaties with the government.

History before the Modern States

The creation of Thailand and the Philippines as unified states only occurred in the early twentieth century. Prior to this, Thailand was a series of provinces ruled by local leaders and the Philippines was a colony of Spain. Even after the Philippines became a unified state, it was a colony of the United States until 1946. However, the history of the Malay and Moro date back much further than the creation of Thailand and the Philippines, which has had an impact on the

current separatist movements.

Thailand

The beginnings of modern Thai history can be traced to the eleventh through thirteenth centuries when the ethnic group, the Thai, began migrating south from China and controlling regions in China as well as in the Northern provinces of modern-day Thailand (Wyatt 2003, 30). However, prior to the Thai arrival, three ethnic groups, the Mon, Khmer, and the Malay, resided in the area of Thailand and controlled independent provinces. Of these three ethnic groups, only the Malay in the south were animists, and the Mon and Khmer, sometimes placed together as the Mon-Khmer, were Buddhist (Wyatt 2003, 20). The Thai created local leadership similar to that already existing in the provinces. In time, the Mon and Khmer assimilated with the Thai, as they shared a common faith and Chinese heritage. Meanwhile, the southern provinces of Thailand, Pattani, Narathiwat, and Satun were controlled under the local area of Malacca until 1511 (Harish 2006, 50). At this point, the Portuguese had overtaken Malacca and all of the provinces were placed under the watch of the Kingdom of Siam (Thai government). This new arrangement included the payments of tribute to the king, but the provinces were allowed to retain local leadership, often called rajas or kings (Harish 2006, 50). Around this same time, trade boomed in the southern provinces and with it brought the Islamic religion (Islam 1998, 443). It quickly became the dominant faith in the south by the late fifteenth century, and being Malay and being Muslim became synonymous. For the next two centuries, the three southern provinces would continue to

govern themselves, occasionally engaging in skirmishes with the Siam government but never being under direct control.

In 1785, after numerous rebellions and refusals to pay tribute, the King of Siam overthrew the raja of the provinces and placed them under direct Siam control (Islam 1998, 443). Despite being under the control of the Thai government, the raja retained some local status and could be influential in the southern provinces. This would end when in 1901, when under pressure from the British government the Siamese government created an official administrative body to rule the “area of the seven provinces” (Harish 2006, 51). In essence this created a “unified” Thailand (than called Siam), so that the king had official control over all of the provinces of Thailand – thus finally ending the power of local southern leaders.

From this point until 1932, with the marginalization of the king and the creation of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay had virtually no representation in the government. With the establishment of a democracy in Thailand, the Malay won some minimal spots in the National Assembly and Parliament (Harish 2006, 52). It would seem that Thailand was beginning a promising new government, including plurality in and representation from all provinces. However, in 1938, the fledgling democracy was deposed in a coup and Thailand was forced under the control of the military (composed mainly of Thai Buddhists). This would drastically change the quality of life for the Malay in the south and affect relations between the Thai Buddhists and the Malay throughout the twentieth century.

The Philippines

The Philippines faced a similar early historical path to that of Thailand. The islands that compose the Philippines were inhabited by many ethnic groups, collectively termed Malayo-Polynesian (Islam 1998, 444). They were governed by local leaders, often termed sultans. The Moro resided largely in the southern province of Mindanao. No unified state of the Philippines existed and outside influences from Malaysia remained a force in political life. Similarly to Thailand, Islam was introduced in the southern provinces in the early fourteenth century through trade (Islam 1998, 444). Soon it too became the dominant religion, most closely associated with the Moro. Shortly after Islam was introduced in the Philippines, the Spanish gained control of the southern provinces of Mindanao and Sulu (predominately Moro in composition) in 1565 (Islam 1998, 444). The Spanish never officially gained a mandate over these provinces but governed them as a colony anyway. This is exemplified most predominately in the attempts by the Spanish to convert the Moro to Catholicism. Their efforts were largely unsuccessful so the Spanish began to “reallocate” Moro land to Spanish Catholics (and those they are able to convert) in an attempt to forcibly change the religious and ethnic composition of the southern provinces.

Despite the fact that the Philippines were never officially a Spanish territory, and that Spanish control was maintained largely only in the southern provinces of Mindanao and Sulu, the Spanish relinquished control of the Philippines to the United States in 1899 as part of the Bates Treaty that ended the

Spanish-American War. The Philippines would not gain independence until 1946, until that time the United States created the Manila Government to rule over the Philippines. During American rule in the Philippines, there was occasional conflict between the government and the Moro. This led to the creation of the Moro Province, encompassing the provinces of Sulu and Mindanao, a special administrative area created to preemptively quell any growing dissidence (Magdalena 1977, 300). The Manila Government claimed that it was actively trying to redistribute land back to the Moro people, whose land was stripped from them under the Spanish and were working as tenant farmers on the land. However, in reality little ancestral land was given back to the Moro and tenant farming remained the predominant practice until the 1960s, and not until the late 1980s did any significant land redistribution take place (Noble 1976a, 406). This created a system under which the Moro differed religiously, ethnically, geographically, and financially from the majority of Filipinos.

Beginnings of Separatist Movements

Separatist tensions in both Thailand and the Philippines began to emerge in the late 1940s and early 1950s, as a reaction to government policies. In Thailand, the military coup in 1938 created an unstable political atmosphere in which the pattern of attempted forced assimilation by the government on the Malay became an increasing issue. This included the eradication of the Malay language in schools, regulated curriculum in punohs (religious schools), and government pressure for Malays to take Thai

names (Harish 2006, 52). Haji Sulong became the leader of the first separatist movement in Thailand, the Islamic Council of the Pattani Province, sending a list of demands to the Thai government in April 1947 (Christie 1996, 183). Among the demands were a separate court that would recognize the Islamic faith for the basis of the law, for money derived from the southern provinces to be utilized in those provinces, and for the restoration of the Malay language in schools as well as for it to be the official language of the three southern provinces (Islam 1998, 444). Sulong and some of his supporters were arrested in 1948 for treason, resulting in a steady stream of violence for the remainder of the year ending with the declaration of a state of emergency in the southern provinces that would last for a decade. In 1959, as the emergency was ending, the BNPP (Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani) was being formed by Tengku Abdul Jalal, a follower of Haji Sulong's in the 1940s (Islam 1998, 446). The BNPP was the precursor to the current separatist groups the BRN and the PULO, its aims included an independent Islamic state (Islam 1998, 446).

In the Philippines, the Magsaysay administration continued the policy of stripping the Moro of their ancestral lands by hastening migration of northern Filipinos and Catholics into the southern regions (Noble 1976a, 406). The government claimed to undertake this movement to increase production in the southern provinces, which were producing below capacity, and thus solve the problems that were arising from an increasing population and low productivity levels (Noble 1976a, 406). However, this had a negative effect on the

Moros, as the Catholics and northern Filipinos soon became the majority in the south. A combination of Catholics and non-Moro northerners thus gained control of the local government positions and wealth in the region – and often over Moro land, as few of the Moros who lived and worked on their ancestral lands had legal documents to prove ownership (Noble 1976a, 407). This resulted in their land being taken by the Catholics and wealthier Filipinos who effectively controlled the legal system in the south. The first coordinated separatist group formed as a reaction to the Corregidor Incident in 1968. In March 1968, the Filipino government was planning an attack on Sabah, Malaysia. Sabah was a popular trading port that the government believed to be a smuggling area for Moros. In order to undertake the attack, the government constructed an all-Moro military unit. However, as the Moro were actively engaged in trade in Sabah and many Moro had relatives there, the Moro soldiers refused their orders. The Thai officials claimed that the soldiers staged an uprising in which thirty Moro soldiers were killed. However, the incident was interpreted differently by the Moro, who believed that the government murdered the soldiers and purposefully attempted to send an all-Moro unit to Sabah (Noble 1976a, 408). Following the incident, Udtog Matalam formed the first organized separatist movement, MIM (Muslim Independence Movement), which the government disbanded in 1970 (Noble 1976a, 408). However, MIM was an important precursor to a currently active separatist group, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front).

The movements took different paths after this point in time. In Thailand, periodic uprisings were undertaken by various groups, but there was not consistent separatist violence from one group until a larger undertaking in the 1980s and later the most recent violence occurring since 2004. Conversely, in the Philippines in the 1960s several separatist groups emerged and became staples in the conflict until the present.

Modern Separatist Groups in Thailand

The two main separatist groups that currently operate in Thailand are the BRN (National Revolutionary Front) and the PULO (Patani United Liberation Organization). The BRN retained the religious underpinnings of the BNPP, as well as responding to economic issues developing in the southern provinces. The decline in the rubber market in the 1960s disproportionately affected the southern provinces and thus disproportionately impoverished Muslims as compared to the rest of Thailand (Islam 1998, 447). The BRN remains a largely secretive group, the leaders are unknown and the group rarely discussed its goals until recently, when it declared that it is attempting to create an independent state through revolution. The PULO, unlike the BRN, is secular in nature but still aims to create an independent Pattani state. The group was formed by college graduates who had received their degrees abroad, only to come back to Thailand and be unable to work as no one would hire them (Tan-Mullins 2006, 146). This has caused some graduates to leave Thailand, and a marked absence of educated Malay in leadership positions in the Thai government.

Modern Separatist Groups in the Philippines

Almost directly after the disbanding of MIM, the MNLF, the youth branch of MIM, came to the forefront. It directly outlined its political goals as well as the reasons for the formation of the group. Openness and clarity would remain a characteristic of the MNLF, as the leaders of the group are well known and have throughout the struggle been in periodic discussions with the government. While the Moro identify based on religion as well as culture, the MNLF focused on broader shared goals, including economic disparities in the southern provinces and government failures to respond to inequality. In doing so, the MNLF created a larger scope and support base for their cause than did Thai separatist groups. As a result, when the government declared martial law in October 1972, the MNLF had support not only in the Philippines but also in Malaysia which actively funded the group in the 1970s and 1980s (Noble 1976a, 411).

Differences in Separatist Movements

The separatist movements in Thailand and the Philippines share some similar qualities, including a minority Muslim ethnic group, movements originating at approximately the same time, and semi-defined goals for independent states/regions. However, the orientation of the modern dominant groups in each country has affected the nature of the conflict within the country. The BRN retains a pure Islamic message, which has limited its membership (i.e. the PULO). Additionally, the relative silence and secrecy of the group has hindered the possibility of communication with the government. This has created an atmosphere of suspicion in

the southern provinces of Thailand, where even Malays living in the southern provinces often remark that they are unsure of who is or is not a member of the BRN (Tan-Mullins 2006, 145). Conversely, membership in the MNLF has exceeded the tens of thousands at its peak, with the names and faces of top leaders well known throughout the country. The broader message of the MNLF has allowed for compromise, as seen in the recent peace talks with the government that resulted in the signing of a peace treaty. Despite the Filipino courts' failure to approve the treaty and subsequent relapse of violence in August 2008, the leaders of the MNLF were willing and able to meet with and compromise on issues of importance to the Moro, Muslims, and people of the southern provinces. It is evident that the nature of the separatist organizations has influenced the level of success or failure the movements will have diplomatically; however, it has been the governments' responses to the separatist movements that have influenced the severity of the groups and the violence that stems from them.

Government Action in Thailand and the Philippines

Action taken in part by the governments in Thailand and the Philippines has fueled separatist groups. In Thailand, the government's relentless pursuit of a national identity has caused the Malay to react by fighting relentlessly to maintain their cultural traditions. In the Philippines, the government's misappropriation of land left the Moro underrepresented politically and devastated financially. However, it is the capacity of the government to manage these issues that has most directly affected the ability of the

government to mitigate separatist violence.

Initial Government Responses to Separatist Movements

In the Philippines, major separatist organization began after the Corregidor Incident of 1968 and the subsequent consolidation of President Marcos power in 1972. One of Marcos's first actions as president was to declare martial law in the southern provinces. This included a massive reassignment of troops, with over 70 percent stationed in the southern provinces. Additionally, from 1972 through 1978 Marcos consolidated and strengthened his power as president. This included the firing of over 2000 government positions, a referendum that allowed him to appoint local officials, and Marcos holding both the positions of president and prime minister (Noble 1976b, 180). Despite the increased power of Marcos, he chose to negotiate with the MNLF leaders. A ceasefire was quickly established and maintained. Beginning in 1975, the MNLF leaders presented their goals to the Islamic Conference in Jeddah (OIC). The MNLF wanted a politically autonomous region, which would be comprised of thirteen southern provinces including all of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago (Noble 1976b, 181). President Marcos responded by offering autonomy but not full independence; instead, four regions would be constructed from the thirteen provinces. Each region would have a commissioner that would be directly under his (Marcos's) authority as well as the placement of Muslims in additional government positions focused on economic and social development (Noble 1976b, 181). The general terms were ac-

cepted by both the MNLF and Marcos. However, as the fine details of the peace agreement were being negotiated, the MNLF called for full autonomy and the implementation of Muslim leaders and law in the southern provinces. The government refused to accept these terms since in some of the thirteen proposed regions Muslims did not constitute the majority. The reason that Muslims did not constitute a majority in all of the southern provinces was a result of the Catholic "land reallocation" pursued by the government during Spanish colonization. Following a vote, only ten of the thirteen regions voted for autonomy and the Tripoli peace agreement subsequently fell apart. Hence, colonial policies continued to not only affect Filipino society but also hinder peaceful coexistence.

Despite the failure to complete a peace agreement between the MNLF and the Filipino government, an important precedent was set by the Marcos administration. Even though Marcos governed the Philippines in an authoritarian manner and amassed exorbitant control by undemocratic means, the government was willing to negotiate with the separatist groups in order to attempt to create peace in the Philippines. Working through the OIC created a positive dialogue between the government and the separatist leaders. Marcos was successful in establishing a five-year period of relative peace, especially following the 1976 ceasefire. This precedent allowed future negotiations and discussions between the government and main separatist groups in the Philippines, which has contributed to peace talks between the government and the MNLF for the last three decades. The value that Marcos

placed on negotiations became informally institutionalized in a sense, carrying through to future administrations and creating what would become a mechanism for separatist groups to air their grievances and communicate their goals; in essence, this created additional political avenues for separatists as opposed to using purely violent means to communicate with the government.

Thailand, instead of responding both diplomatically and militarily as the Philippines did, chose only military means to respond to separatism. This resulted in a markedly different outcome. With aid from the United States, Thailand began counterinsurgency efforts including the reassignment of troops to the southern provinces. In 1974, the ISOC (Internal Security Operational Command) was formed as a subdivision of the military to directly combat separatist action; which continues to operate in Thailand and the southern provinces. During this time, Thailand was politically unstable; student organization was squashed by the military followed by a military coup in 1976 (Morell and Samudavanija 1979, 319-20). This, along with increasing tensions between the military and the CPT (Communist Party of Thailand), created a government unable and unwilling to negotiate with separatist groups. In response, separatist violence increased throughout the 1970s, particularly among the PULO. Unlike in the Philippines, in which separatist leaders openly communicated with the government and their names and positions were well known throughout the country, in Thailand an environment of secrecy abounded. This was evident not only in the main separatist groups, the PULO and

the BRN, but also in other politically motivated groups such as the CPT. Both the separatist groups and the CPT retreated into the hills of southern Thailand. Just as the peace talks with Marcos placed value on open communication, so too did the actions of the Thai military in the 1970s; however, the Thai government created an environment in which identifying, let alone negotiating with, separatist groups became elusive.

Government Responses to Separatist Movements in the 1980s

After the failed peace negotiations in the Philippines of the early 1970s, violence once again began to increase throughout the early 1980s particularly as corruption increased in the Marcos administration and economic and social issues went unresolved. However, in 1986 Marcos was ousted during the four-day February Revolution, also referred to as the EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) Revolution (Villegas 1987, 194). The end of the revolution was accomplished through the resignation of Marcos and a new democratically elected government coming to power under President Corazon Aquino (Villegas 1987, 195). Aquino established a platform based on economic growth and an end to the insurgency; she began to recreate the stability necessary for these two goals to be accomplished. This included the reinstatement of civil liberties such as the writ of habeas corpus, freeing of political prisoners, and face-to-face meetings with the leaders of the MNLF (Villegas 1987, 196-97). Additionally, Aquino made efforts to renegotiate the peace agreement originally proposed under Marcos. The Republic Act 6734 put the original peace agreement back up for vote in a referendum

in 1989; however, only four of the provinces voted for the act (Rabasa and Chalk 2001, 92). Despite only four of the thirteen provinces voting in favor of the referendum, the ARMM (Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao) was created in 1990. The ARMM operates as an autonomous government; the governments of the four provinces that voted in favor of inclusion are under the ARMM (Bertrand 2000, 40). It may appear as if the MNLF had reached its goal of an autonomous Mindanao and would subsequently no longer act as a separatist group. However, the group deemed the inclusion of only four of the thirteen provinces unacceptable and it continued to exist and communicate with the government.

The new policies of the Filipino government in the 1980s focused on tempering the insurgency through means other than martial law or direct military involvement. Instead Aquino focused on issues of stability throughout the country that were necessary for a functioning democracy, including greater institutional capacity after the centralized power under Marcos. Within a year of the revolution, the economy in the Philippines had improved and Aquino actively worked to improve the Philippines' image abroad as well as to reduce the Philippines' external debt (Villegas 1987, 201). This policy was overall effective in reducing the amount of widespread violence from separatist groups. While some violent outbreaks continued in the southern provinces, there was a clear reduction in the amount and severity of attacks.

During the 1980s, a secondary separatist group came to the forefront in the Phil-

ippines, when the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), an offshoot of the MNLF gained a following. This later complicated communication with the government, as the government was accustomed to negotiating with the MNLF and on several occasions failed to include the MILF in the discussions, which only aided in fueling violence from the MILF.

There was a significant decrease in violence in Thailand in the 1980s. This was due in part to the actions of General Prem Tinsulanonda as prime minister (1980 to 1988) to liberalize and create institutionalized changes in Thailand (Melvin 2007, 34). These changes were facilitated by an expanding economy and rapid industrialization in Thailand. Prior to the 1980s Thailand had relied on the export of agricultural products, resulting in Thailand having some of the lowest wages in the region and widespread poverty (Hussey 1993, 14). While the Southern Malay Provinces remained largely engaged in agriculture, the significant gains Thailand made beginning in 1985, led it to be dubbed "Asia's fifth tiger" (Hussey 1993, 14). With expanding economic power came an increase in educational funding and political awareness, which had begun to become evident in the 1970s during the October Revolution, with the increase in student political activity and the creation of the CPT (Paribatra 1993, 882). The media became freer to operate independently of the government, political parties grew and expanded, and there was the creation of a middle class in Thailand (Paribatra 1993, 883). These represent positive changes in Thailand, in which legitimate institutions existed through which Thai citizens could express their

political beliefs. The freedom of the press is crucial in creating accountability and transparency in a government. Additionally, increased political activity and political options (more political parties) allowed for a plurality not yet seen in Thai politics.

In addition to political and social changes, changes were implemented to address separatist concerns in the southern provinces as well. A military-civilian court was established to allow Malay citizens to report crimes that occurred during the military reign in the 1970s (Macan-Markar 2006). This was done in an attempt to reconcile the egregious crimes committed during military rule including the “disappearance” of many Malay activists, the military imprisonment of large groups of civilians, and the killing of suspected separatist sympathizers. The goal was to foster greater understanding between Thai Buddhists and Malays regarding the political situation in the south. The creation of a court to address the problems of the Malay signified the changing role of the government in Thailand. The government began to take political steps to institutionalize the role of the southern provinces within the Thai government.

Prime Minister Tinsulanonda created CPM 43, a new security taskforce. Unlike the security forces present in the south in the past, CPM 43 was subject to the constitution of Thailand and therefore could not hold civilians against Thai law (Melvin 2007, 13). Not only had the manner in which the government ensured security in the south changed, but also the administration of the southern provinces was changed in 1981. In conjunction with CPM 43, the Southern Bor-

der Provinces Administration Centre, (SBPAC) was formed (Melvin 2007, 13). This allowed greater control of the southern provinces by local officials and established amnesty for former separatists. This was part of the new government push for political participation and legitimate institutions rather than focusing directly on the eradication of separatist groups. This was a clear sign of the increasing capacity of the government. The Thai government had the capability not only to create institutions but also to ensure their success through nonmilitary means, a crucial aspect missing in state response prior to and after the 1980s. This had not been possible prior to this point in Thai history. However, the fragility of the emerging democracy was challenged in the early 1990s, when the plummeting economy in Thailand and a lack of full transparency by the government reversed the progress of the 1980s.

Government Action in the 1990s

In 1988, Prem Tinsulanonda stepped down as prime minister and [Chatichai Choonhavan](#) became the first prime minister to be an elected member of Parliament (Neher 1992, 595). It appeared as if the democratic transition in Thailand would occur effectively and peacefully. However these prospects were set back in 1991 when a military coup overthrew the elected Thai government. The coup was unexpected and surprised Thai government officials as well as the international community. There were several reasons why the coup occurred. With the increase in political parties and plurality in the 1980s came widespread factionalism in Thai politics. No one political party could hold a majority in parliament,

so coalitions were necessary. However, coalition alliances changed quickly and the past problems of corruption still haunted Thailand. With the freedom of the press instituted under Tinsulanonda, the corruption was reported on an almost daily basis. This, combined with the frustration of the Thai public with the incapability/unwillingness of the government to institute policies to decrease the gap between the wealthy elites and the poor majority, led to discontent in the country. Thus, when the military coup occurred in 1991, there were no immediate protests to the overthrow of the elected government (Neher 1992, 596).

The military coup was led by a group that called itself the National Peace Keeping Council, which appointed Anand Panyarachun as interim prime minister (Paribatra 1993, 887). Panyarachun worked on creating a Thai constitution (which became effective in 1997) and economic reforms. Elections were scheduled for March 1992. The elections resulted in the appointment of General Suchinda Kraprayoon (a member of the National Peace Keeping Council) as prime minister. Tensions quickly flared as Kraprayoon was not an elected member of Parliament. The Prime Minister attempted to relieve tensions by claiming that he would support an amendment to the constitution that Panyarachun had begun work on, that would make it necessary for the prime minister to be a member of Parliament. The coalition majority supported the proposed amendment but stipulated that Kraprayoon should remain prime minister for the duration of his term. This resulted in what came to be known as Black May in Thailand (Paribatra 1993,

888). Black May began on May 17, 1992 and continued until May 20. Hundreds of thousands of Thai citizens protested the premiership of Kraprayoon. The military initially responded by trying to violently suppress the protesters, resulting in approximately fifty deaths and hundreds of arrests. Under clear public scrutiny the coalition decided to enact the amendment that would stipulate that the prime minister had to be an elected member of Parliament, thus, ending Kraprayoon's term as Prime Minister (Shenon 1992). Anand Panyarachun, the interim prime minister from the military coup, reinstated himself as prime minister. The military leaders of the Kraprayoon administration were removed from their positions, and relative peace returned to Thailand for a time (Paribatra 1993, 890). However, the problems that reigned during Choonhavan's premiership continued, namely widespread poverty in the southern provinces, which continued to be ignored due to the political instability in the central government.

Thailand faced a severe economic downturn in the late 1990s, along with many other Asian countries. The growth that had begun in the late 1980s and early 1990s was created largely through foreign investments and loans. When the bubble on growth "burst" in the late 1990s, investors pulled out of Thailand and the government owed large amounts of money to outside investors (Pempel 1999, 149-150). In addition, the gap between the elite and the poor in Thailand was never adequately addressed during Thailand's economic growth; as such the poorest in Thailand were most effected by the downturn. During this time separatist violence in Thailand was almost

nonexistent, leading some to believe that the groups were no longer active. However, despite the signing of the new constitution in 1997, democratic initiatives in Thailand were overturned with the premiership of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2001.

Similarly to Thailand, the early 1990s represented a time of relatively little separatist violence in the Philippines. After the February or People Power Revolution in 1986, the subsequent administrations were considered to be legitimate by both the general public in the Philippines as well as by the main separatist movements (the MNLF and the MILF) (Bertrand 2000, 38). Coinciding with the precedent set by Marcos, the Ramos government attempted to reconvene peace talks with the MNLF. Despite the creation of the ARMM, the MNLF wanted more provinces to be included in the administrative region. Unlike Marcos's administration, the new Filipino government was truly democratic and as such a lasting agreement seemed possible. Both the Filipino government and the MNLF had confidence that the other would uphold their end of the peace talks. The Ramos government had shown that democracy was becoming entrenched in the Philippines and the MNLF gained legitimacy through their backing by the OIC (Bertrand 2000, 39). These were the conditions under which the 1996 Peace Agreement was signed.

The agreement was largely based off of the initial Tripoli Agreement set out by Marcos. An administrative council, the SPCPD was placed in charge of the execution of the agreement. The implementation of the agreement took place over a three-

year period in which members of the MNLF were given positions in the military as well as the police, in addition to top spots in the SPCPD. Then, after the establishment of the SPCPD, a consolidation of the SPCPD and the ARMM created one administrative body for the fourteen then-independent provinces, after a vote by the fourteen provinces (Bertrand 2000, 42). In theory, the creation of these administrative bodies would create lasting institutions and a political framework through which separatist leaders could engage politically.

Problems began to emerge within the ARMM and the SPCPD shortly after their creation. Both have been plagued by mismanagement (in particular with regards to the budget), and the SPCPD had an uncertain role. The SPCPD was set up to be a transitory organization; it was not created to remain a part of the administration of the ARMM. As such the SPCPD holds little real power; its function instead is to convene to make suggestions to the Filipino government (Bertrand 2000, 47). The ARMM has been accused of acting as the "implementing arm of the government" (Bertrand 2000, 48) as opposed to an administrative body that represents the interests of the local communities.

There were several problems stemming from the peace agreement that made the possibility of a lasting peace settlement unlikely. First, the MNLF has been steadily losing power in the southern provinces. With the relative peace of the 1990s and a legitimate government, membership decreased. Additionally, the breakaway of the MILF (the military branch of the MNLF) left the MNLF with decreased military power as

well as influence (due to decreased numbers). This made the MNLF eager to sign a peace agreement. Second, only four provinces voted to join the ARMM in 1989 and the likelihood of the remaining provinces voting to join only a few years later was slim especially due to the decrease in separatist supporters. This limited participation made the creation of an actual autonomous region difficult. Also, the widespread corruption and inefficiency of the ARMM and the SPCPD made their success unlikely. These two factors together, a weakened MNLF and the limited number of provinces willing to join the ARMM, set the agreement up for failure. To complicate matters further, the MILF opposed the signing of the Peace Agreement. This was because the MILF claimed that the agreement failed to address the problem of the loss of Moro ancestral lands. Also, while they agree that it may have solved the problems of the MNLF, they believed that it did not address the true problems of the Moro people (which the MILF claimed to represent) (Bauzon 1999, 264).

The Current State of Separatist

Movements

Amid the fallout of the problems of the 1996 Peace Agreement, the 1998 elections were a large loss for the MNLF and a new president was elected, former Vice President Joseph Estrada. Estrada's presidency set the backdrop for the rising tensions in the Philippines. Estrada stepped down as president in 2000, facing allegations of payoffs from illegal gambling. A resurgence in violence followed, with an increase in violence and kidnappings in 2000. After Estrada stepped down as president, Vice President Gloria

Arroyo became president of the Philippines (Montesano 2004, 94). Separatist violence continued to grow during Arroyo's first term, with other political issues prohibiting the government from addressing separatist groups. The government was plagued with problems, including attacks by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on military bases and continuing accusations of political corruption (Montesano 2004, 95-96). This corresponded with bombings by the MILF, the now more violent and powerful separatist group (Montesano 2004, 96).

Once again, peace talks were initiated to try to put an end to the violence in the southern provinces. In late 2003 Arroyo met with the MILF, and not the MNLF, along with the OIC to attempt to put into place a ceasefire and initiate peace talks (Montesano 2004, 97). The peace talks resulted in yet another peace agreement in the Philippines. In keeping with the pattern in the Philippines, in January 2005 the MILF fighters attacked government troops and the ceasefire was broken, resulting in another three years of violence (Montlake 2008). The most recent action in the Philippines maintains this pattern as well. In August 2008, the Filipino government and the MILF leaders reached an agreement to expand the size of the ARMM. This would have solidified a "homeland" for the Moro. However the Filipino Supreme Court issued a ruling to block the signing of the agreement, as it was seen as possibly unconstitutional and called for a hearing in which both the government and the separatist leaders would speak (Montlake 2008). This action by the Supreme Court was deemed unacceptable by the MILF leaders and violence has once

again marred the southern provinces. Hundred of thousands of people have been displaced and hundreds killed in the ensuing violence that continues as Filipino security forces attempt to hunt down the MILF leaders.

Despite relative peace in the 1980s and 1990s in Thailand, the turn of the twenty-first century saw a renewal of violence that had been dormant for thirty years. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin wanted to appear as if separatist violence had ended in Thailand as the United States announced a war on terror. Clearly, this was due to a fear of a U.S. invasion in Thailand as part of this war on terror. Thaksin attempted to eradicate indications of past separatism within Thailand (Storey 2008, 36). This included the dismantling of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, some of the only successful political institutions related to separatist violence Thailand had been able to create and maintain. Thaksin then installed local provincial leaders who would respond directly to him (Storey 2008, 37). These actions taken by Thaksin undermined the positive democratic changes that had taken place in Thailand and created instability with the removal of key institutions (i.e. CPM 43 and the SBPAC). Thaksin returned to the Thai tradition of centralized democracy, in an attempt to increase the power of his political party Thai Rak Thai, which had received little support from the south in the previous elections (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). Renewed violence emerged in the south in January 2004, including daily assassinations and kidnappings. Thaksin responded by declaring martial law in the southern provinces.

Thaksin quickly lost support as violence continued to wreak havoc on the country and in 2006 he was replaced in a military coup (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). An interim prime minister was appointed and the SBPAC and CPM 43 were reinstalled. The Thai government attempted peace talks with separatist leaders for the first time. However, the government still does not know who the leaders or members of the BRN (BRN-C) and the PULO are, so secondary leaders of disbanded groups were consulted. Due to this, the peace talks did not occur with current members of separatist groups, and as such the peace talks were not effective in resolving the current separatist violence. Violence continued and worsened in the southern provinces, peaking in 2007. There have been over 1,500 casualties since the fighting began again in 2004. Martial law continued in the southern provinces, with the military having full control of the region (Bajoria and Zissis 2008). This is a clear violation of the SPBAC, which is supposed to be in control of security in the south and has to follow Thai laws. Under martial law, the military does not have to comply with Thai laws and historically has not, instead committing heinous acts against the local Malay population. The most recent protests, in April 2009, exhibit the weakness of the Thai government. Thousands of protestors marched on the capital, Bangkok, disrupting the New Year festivities and inciting violence from the police. The protestors are not separatist members, but citizens frustrated by the corruption and political instability in Thailand. The attention now focused on the protests once again distracts the government from focusing on separatist violence. As

government attempts to control the protests, violence mars the southern provinces.

In Thailand, where institutions have been largely incapable of keeping up with the demand for response from the public, when attempts to institute policies that would aid the Malay were tried they have failed. This is evident historically, as no lasting political institutions were created in the sixty years since separatist violence began with the exception of CPM 43 and the SBPAC, and even they were dismantled for a period of time. A more recent example can be seen in the period following martial law in 2004, when the government held elections for Tambon councils (local administrative bodies) as well as PAOs (Provincial Administrative Organizations). In theory, this would have created power at the local level and representation for differing viewpoints (i.e. the Malay). Additionally, as 35 percent of budgets must be approved by the PAO, it would have allowed for Malay representation on financial matters (Albritton 2005, 170). However, by the end of the year the results had still not been confirmed by the government (Albritton 2005, 171). This pattern of government repression followed by attempts at reconciliation, each time too weak to reach demands, had repeated itself throughout the twentieth century and continued into the twenty-first century, each time eliciting an angered and violent response from the BRN.

Conversely in the Philippines, institutions were in place to address the grievances of the people. For example, beginning in the 1950s the Filipino government passed a series of Land Reform Acts that were

aimed at ending the cycle of tenant farming that was impoverishing the Moro. The original Land Reform Acts called for the tenant farmer to pay the taxes on the land in order to regain the land; however, the amount of the taxes owed per parcel of land was an unattainable amount for the Moro, and as such the acts as they stood aided fewer than 50,000 people within the first thirty years of its passing. However, due to the strong institutions present in the Philippines there were committees and councils through which the Moro could explain their concerns. Recent Land Reform Acts, in the last decade, have been more successful as share tenancy has been outlawed and institutions such as the Department of Agrarian Reform were established to monitor progress and work toward greater social justice.

Analysis

After chronicling the development of the separatist movements and the government responses to them, it is important to analyze how government action has affected separatist violence. There are two components upon which the case studies will be analyzed: state capacity and crisis vs. non-crisis transitions (a theory about democratic transitions). State capacity will be used to explain government action in Thailand and the Philippines from the 1940s to the 1970s, while crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used to explain government action in the 1980s and early 1990s (post-democratic transition), and both capacity and crisis vs. noncrisis theory will be used to explain the current separatist situation in each country.

State capacity refers to the governments' ability to enact change, create institutions and infrastructure, and maintain

political stability within the country. The crisis vs. noncrisis transition theory, as proposed by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, will be applied not to the democratic transitions within Thailand and the Philippines (though they both fit the model), but instead as a guideline through which to characterize government responses to separatist violence.

State Capacity

Before their democratic transitions, Thailand and the Philippines represented different levels of state capacity. Thailand had low state capacity, was politically unstable (frequent military coups) and lacked the ability to create meaningful and lasting institutions. However, the Philippines had high state capacity, with routine peace negotiations occurring between the President of the Philippines and the leaders of the MNLF beginning in 1975. Additionally, the Philippines began land reform acts in the 1960s and 1970s to restore the ancestral lands of the Moro.

Thailand suffered from issues surrounding low state capacity, which can be compared to theories that were presented in Samuel Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Huntington stated that as political consciousness increases, as a result of increased literacy, education, and industrialization, so too will political demands and participation. If a state, in this example Thailand, were to be unable to meet those expanding political demands, then the state's ability to create new institutions as well as the integrity of the current political institutions would be greatly undermined (Huntington 2006, 5). This can be seen in Thailand from the beginning of the govern-

ment's reaction to the separatist movement. As an attempt at conciliation, the Thai government passed the Patronage of Islam Act in 1945. The Act was aimed at addressing the complaints of the southern provinces, namely the Thai government's attempts at forced assimilation. The act created a position within the Thai government for an Islamic advisor, the *chularajamontri*, to the Thai king (Marshall 2008, 4). Additionally, shortly after the passing of the Patronage of Islam Act, the Thai government allowed Islamic law to be used in four of the southern provinces on issues related to heritage and family affairs. However, the Malay people did not respond as the Thai government expected. The Patronage Act incited anger among the Malay, as many thought the creation of an advisor on Islamic affairs to the king was yet another way for the government to monitor and undermine the Malay. Additionally, the *chularajamontri* did not come from the southern provinces; instead often the *chularajamontri* came from the Bangkok area (Marshall 2008, 4). As the *chularajamontri* was in control of the local leaders in the southern provinces and was their liaison to the central government, this only confirmed the Malay suspicion that the *chularajamontri* was not created in order to represent their interests, but instead another mechanism through which Thai control could be established over the Malay.

Low state capacity prohibited the government of Thailand from being able to make progress in reducing separatist violence. What action the government took seemed to only further the cause of the separatist groups. Due to its low capacity and ineffective government action, Thailand

largely relied on the military to control the terrorist actions of the separatist groups. This is evident by the decade-long emergency called in response to the formation of the first separatist groups in 1949. Additionally, the relative strength of the military in Thai society (seven military coups since the beginning of separatist violence) made the military the only lasting governmental force capable of dealing with separatist violence. When government action failed and Thailand faced political instability in the 1970s (a military coup in 1976 as well as violence stemming from the CPT), the government created the ISOC to manage separatist violence. Numerous problems emerged from the government's decision to allow the military to handle the separatist movements. The military did not have to follow Thai laws; this obviously resulted in widespread abuse in the southern provinces. Individuals were held without charges, people went missing, and executions would occur without trials. This type of military response did not temper separatist groups; it only helped to further their cause with the Malay people. Additionally, the military abuses undermined the legitimacy of the Thai government and failed to encourage political action over separatist violence.

In the Philippines, high state capacity worked to foster peace negotiations between the government and separatist leaders. As stated earlier, President Marcos first met with separatist leaders in order to engage in peace negotiations and a ceasefire in 1976. The ability for a government to effectively communicate and negotiate with a terrorist group is a large accomplishment. With the

OIC acting as a mediator, the government of the Philippines was able to communicate its goals and stance to the separatist leaders and vice versa. This form of open dialogue created a mechanism through which both parties could air their grievances. Additionally, it institutionalized a political mechanism through which separatist leaders' voices were heard by top government officials. This would establish the beginnings of political participation necessary for leaders from the MNLF to make the transition to local leaders in the ARMM.

Peace negotiations and ceasefires were helpful tools in creating temporary peace in the Philippines. However, there has yet to be lasting peace as the separatist groups, namely the MNLF and the MILF more recently, periodically renew violent outbursts. This is often done in response to an unfavorable result in a referendum or because the Filipino government fails to act fast enough to their demands. The causes of this reaction will be discussed in the analysis of "moral hazard" as well as the crisis vs. noncrisis theory.

Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory

Crisis vs. Noncrisis Theory, as designed by Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman, is used to explain democratic transitions. The theory states that economic and social conditions that are present in a country during its democratic transition will shape whether it responds in a crisis or noncrisis manner. There are several characteristics that are said to be emblematic of crisis and noncrisis transitions. In a crisis transition, the government will act quickly, the opposition powers gain greater influence in political decisions, and the military and

communist party are weakened. According to the theory, a noncrisis response looks almost the opposite of a crisis response. The government reacts slowly to threats and power remains with authoritarian figures, the opposition has little role in government, and the military and communist parties are strong within the country (Haggard and Kaufman 1997, 269). The theory presented is based on governments in transition responding to economic crisis. Haggard and Kaufman use Thailand and the Philippines as examples of noncrisis and crisis transitions, respectively, within their theory (270). However, these characteristics can also be used to explain the Thai and Filipino governments' responses to separatist violence after their democratic transitions.

The Philippines represents a crisis transition. This is evident in the government's action toward separatist groups. The first criterion of a crisis transition is quick government response to an issue. This is evident in the Philippines in the government's repeated negotiations with separatist leaders. Shortly after violence begins, the president of the Philippines reengages in negotiations with the MNLF leaders in order to successfully create a ceasefire and peace agreement. There have been over six peace agreements since Marcos's initial dealings with the MNLF leaders in 1976. The second criterion of a crisis response is increased influence given to the opposition power. This is arguably the Philippines largest problem in fighting separatist violence. The government's patterned response of going to the separatist leaders in order to create peace agreements has given disproportionate power to leaders

of the MNLF and the MILF. The government has already created the ARMM and created government positions for separatist leaders, and the separatist groups continue to demand more from the government. This has led to the breakdown of peace in the south as the separatist groups seek greater power and influence in the country. It appears as if the government's capacity to create peace agreements and ceasefires backfired due to the power that it has given the separatist leaders. The leaders of the MNLF and the MILF are aware that if they seek more from the Filipino government, all they have to do is create a violent backlash and the government will return with another peace agreement, including further provisions to meet their demands. As such there is no incentive for the separatist groups to uphold the peace agreements they enter into, as greater results can be garnered through violence. The last two criteria, a weak military and communist party, are characteristic of the Philippines. Additionally, the weakness of these two groups has enabled the government to focus on the issue of separatist violence, unlike in Thailand where political instability due to the power of the military and communist party has crippled the government's ability to act.

Thailand is an example of a noncrisis response. The government has been slow to respond to terrorists. This is for two reasons, the government's inability to act and subsequent reliance on the military, and the government's focus on other issues including violence from the communist party and political instability. Because of this, little political action was taken to temper separatist groups. The power in the Thai government

has remained with the central government due to its noncrisis response. The leaders of the BRN/BRN-C and the PULO are not known in Thailand and because of the government's lack of political action, there was no attempt to negotiate with them in the twentieth century. When recent attempts at peace negotiations were facilitated by the Thai government, the government was so unaware of who the separatist leaders were that officials met with a secondary separatist leader from a group that has long since been disbanded. Additionally, the current low capacity of the government has allowed for a resurgence in violence as actions taken in part by the government cannot be enforced (i.e. the re-installation of CPM 43 and the SBPAC). The separatist groups' secrecy was fueled by the government action taken against the communist party (as both groups retreated into the hills of the southern provinces) as well as by brutal military action. This has in part reduced membership in the group, as it is difficult for the groups to recruit new members due to their secretive nature and secluded locations. The last two criteria have been shown through government action, and the military's power is evident in its task of controlling the southern provinces. The CPT clearly exhibited a great deal of power, as the threat of the CPT was seen as greater than the threat of the BRN or the BRN-C by the Thai government. This is evident by the government focusing its attentions on the CPT as opposed to the separatist groups. While the Thai government's noncrisis response has effectively managed tensions (with the exception of periodic violence) and limited the size and scope of

separatist membership, it has not been able to mediate separatist violence when it does occur. The military has only been able to suppress the violence, not stop it. Once separatist violence begins, the Thai government does not have the mechanisms and institutions in place to arbitrate the conflict.

Issues for Future Peace in Thailand and the Philippines

Both Thailand and the Philippines will need to alter their policies toward separatist movements, for either country to be successful in ending separatist violence. In Thailand, the historically weak central government has resulted in the use of military responses to separatist violence and at times full military control of the south. In the Philippines, the strength of the central government coupled with international support from the OIC has led to multiple peace negotiations and ceasefires. However, the government's failure to impose strict consequences for violations of the peace agreements has created a pattern of violence, through which the separatist groups have gained greater power over the central government.

Issues in Thailand: Stability and Diplomacy

As noted previously, the central government of Thailand continues to struggle to establish political stability. Currently, protests rage in the capital in response to the recent elections. Until the government can create lasting stability, including open and free elections, the government will remain unable to respond diplomatically to separatist threats. The Thai government's historical reliance on the military to control separatist violence has led to widespread military

abuses and has left separatist members with no political avenues through which to express their grievances.

Even if the current government of Thailand were to sign a peace agreement with separatist leaders (providing the government could effectively find the leaders of the main separatist groups, the BRN and the PULO), the agreements may be of little consequence as the government's legitimacy is in question. Also, the ability of the government to follow through on any agreement would be unlikely. For Thailand to establish political stability, greater transparency and institutions that are viewed as legitimate by the public will need to be put into place. The beginning of this was seen in the 1980s and 1990s in Thailand, when there was increased political participation and political awareness. It is not uncommon for a country undergoing a democratic transition to experience increased violence and instability, as has been the case in Thailand. If Thailand could reestablish the level of progress it possessed in the 1980s and 1990s, then steps toward reducing separatist violence could be taken. This occurred briefly with the creation of the SBPAC and CPM 43 in 1981. Without diplomatic action, the abuses that occur under full military control will only help to further the separatist cause. Additionally, as is occurring presently in Thailand, when there is dissatisfaction in the country (protestors as well as separatist violence), the government will not have the mechanisms in place with which to diffuse the conflict.

Issues in the Philippines: Moral Hazard

The concept of moral hazard applies

to the peace negotiations between the Philippines and the MNLF, and more recently the MILF. As earlier stated, the separatist groups have violated several peace agreements and ceasefires in the last three decades. The reason for this can be explained through moral hazard. Moral hazard can be applied to any agreement between two parties; it functions on the principle that parties will behave according to costs and benefits. When entering into an agreement, if the benefits of not following the contract outweigh the costs of breaking the agreement, then the party may intentionally act in a way that violates moral norms or the contract itself (Mirrlees 1999).

In the case of the Filipino separatist groups, the first peace agreement, the Tripoli Agreement signed in December of 1976, there were no provisions put in place that would give the MNLF incentives to abide by the agreement. There is no mention of repercussions for not following the peace agreement or for breaking the ceasefire. The agreement outlines the concessions to be made by the Central Government to the MNLF, including the creation of an autonomous region in the southern provinces, separate Sharia courts, guaranteed representation for Muslims in the central government as well as in all Filipino courts, and amnesty for political prisoners and separatist group members for crimes committed in the southern provinces (Government of the Republic of the Philippines 1976). Concessions to be made by the MNLF included only certain areas not to be included in the autonomous region and a percentage of profits from mining. This agreement conceded to the MNLF one of its largest goals, the creation of a

separate autonomous region in the south to be governed by Muslims according to Islamic law. However, as stated, not all of the southern provinces were to be included in the autonomous region. The MNLF used this as a reason to break the agreement and, without penalties for breaking the agreement, incited further violence in the southern provinces. This led the Central Government to engage in further peace negotiations (and concessions) with the MNLF and gave the MNLF the power and influence it wanted in the Philippines.

This is obviously problematic for the Philippines, despite the government's ability to successfully negotiate with separatist leaders; the negotiations are not effective if the separatists have no intention or incentive to follow the stipulations of the ceasefire. In order to create lasting ceasefires that could result in an end to separatist violence, the government needs to enact stringent penalties for breaking a ceasefire or peace agreement. Furthermore, these repercussions need to be written into the peace agreements so that they are not merely threats, but legal ramifications for failure to uphold a contract. Additionally, if the MNLF or the MILF does break the peace agreement/ceasefire, the consequences laid out by the government must be enforced in the fullest capacity. Without these consequences, the violence in the Philippines will continue to escalate as the separatists seek greater power and influence in the country.

The only attempt to take such action by the Filipino government was with the signing of the "Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Trip-

oli Agreement of Peace of 2001" (Government of the Republic of the Philippines 2001). The guidelines established actions taken by the MNLF or the MILF that would constitute criminal actions and violations of the agreements established with the Filipino government. This was a step forward by the Filipino government in asserting its authority over the separatist groups and establishing actions that would not be tolerated by the government. Additionally, the presence of U.S. military troops in the southern Philippines temporarily maintained peace in the region. However, the government failed to follow through on the guidelines set forth, as within two years the government was once again engaging in peace negotiations with the separatist groups, despite the failure of the separatist groups to uphold the guidelines. Additionally, the government has recently attempted to sign a peace agreement that would expand the size of the ARMM. This only reaffirms the process the separatist groups create, creating greater violence to gain greater rewards from the government.

There are several different ways to deal with the problem of moral hazard in the Filipino case. The government could simply place an ultimatum on the separatist groups, that if they do not comply with future peace agreements than the government will no longer negotiate with them. However, considering the track record of the Filipino government separatist groups may not take the ultimatum seriously. Additionally, if the government were to diplomatically cut off the separatist leaders, then it would only serve to force the separatist groups outside of the political system and most likely

increase the violence in the southern provinces. It is a benefit to the government that the separatist leaders have been able to marginally integrate into the political spectrum; it would be a mistake to alienate the leaders of these movements.

The government could continue with the status quo, in which it is able to procure relative peace for a short period of time. However, the pattern that has been created by the government has already given disproportionate power to the separatist leaders and the current position of the government does not provide for long-term solutions to the problem of separatist violence. The third option available to the government is to take a multifaceted approach to the separatists. This would include both internal diplomacy, international support, and a military response to noncooperation. The government should continue to meet with separatist leaders; it is its direct link to the motivations and demands of the separatist groups. However, this does not mean that the government has to necessarily continue to sign peace agreements and give concessions to the separatist leaders. Due to the creation of the ARMM, separatist leaders hold political positions through which they can participate in government. The Filipino government should encourage participation through governmental as opposed to extra-political means. International support is necessary due to the international support that the MNLF and the MILF hold. Presently, international support has been behind the MNLF and the MILF; this has put the Filipino government in a defensive position that has only worsened the interests of the Philippines in peace negotia-

tions. With the proper international backing, the Filipino government can present a stronger front at negotiations and have international backing if military force is necessary against the separatist groups. This can also act as a preventative measure, so that the separatist groups understand that the Filipino government is serious about the consequences for breaking a peace agreement or ceasefire. The last component, military force, may be necessary if the separatist groups continue to be combative. As earlier stated, it would be a mistake to cut off the separatist groups diplomatically because of its important link to the groups' goals and motivations. By setting out specific military consequences to not abiding by peace agreements and ceasefires, separatists will have a clear understanding of the repercussions of violating the agreements. This is more effective than the current military action, because the government has not set guidelines for the military initiatives. Instead the military is sent to "hunt" down leaders responsible for certain events, which turns into several raids and deaths, but soon the government is once again negotiating with separatist leaders. There needs to be a clear plan and goal of a military initiative, not simply letting troops loose in the southern provinces, which does not gain separatist compliance. This last option seems the most viable for long-term peace. It addresses not only the immediate problems of violent outbreaks with military intervention, but also the long-term problems of separatist noncompliance. This is not to say that this plan will create immediate peace. It is likely that any new initiative the government takes against separatist violence will, in the short run at least, increase

separatist violence. This is because the separatists are quite content with the status quo, as it benefits them and their goals. However, if the government can mitigate the short-term violent response and continue with a plan toward long-term peace, then the Philippines will be able to temper and hopefully eliminate separatist violence.

Conclusions and Prescriptions

The case studies of Thailand and the Philippines exemplify differing government responses to terrorism. Both Thailand and the Philippines experience separatist violence stemming from minority Muslim ethnic groups in the southern regions of the countries. However, the governments' responses to these separatist threats have shaped the current security situations in the countries. In Thailand, the country's low capacity forced a reliance on the military to control separatist violence. Without restraints on the military, few legal implementations were used in detaining or executing prisoners. This abuse contributed to ongoing separatist violence. In the Philippines, the government's high capacity allowed for negotiations with top separatist leaders. However, without restraints placed on the separatist groups to ensure their upholding of the peace agreement, the MNLF and the MILF continue to wreak havoc on the southern provinces in order to gain greater control of the region.

In this sense, Thailand used only military means through which to subdue separatist violence due to the inability of the government to use diplomatic means; whereas in the Philippines, the focus of government action has been through diplomatic

means (though increased military initiatives have been taken recently), but the lack of follow-through by the government to impose strict and meaningful repercussions for violating peace agreements has resulted in a cycle of violence.

In order for lasting peace to be achieved by Thailand and the Philippines changes, will need to be enacted. In Thailand, the first step toward reduced violence is strengthening and legitimizing the central government. Separatist groups in Thailand were largely dormant in the 1980s and 1990s, when the government was at its peak effectiveness. It seems that the separatist are willing to accept positive change in the country, whether it is political, economic, or social. When the government focused on domestic issues and not military intervention in the south, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, separatist violence was at its lowest point, since its beginnings in the 1940s.

In the Philippines, the government needs to create one clear message on how it will handle separatist violence. As it stands, the government has historically allowed separatists to break peace agreements, resort to violence, and then gain concessions from the government. Only recently has the government expressed what actions would violate peace agreements. Even after the "guidelines" were presented, the Filipino government met again with separatist leaders two more times, to offer an expansion of provinces in the ARMM. These mixed messages offer no incentive for separatist to cooperate with the government. Even when the government threatens military repercussions, the separatist have been willing to deal with the military for a short period, knowing

the government will soon offer new incentives and peace agreements, as in the 2003 and 2008 peace agreements. The Filipino government needs to not only set repercussions for not following peace agreements, but to follow through with these consequences. Otherwise, the current cycle of violence and then negotiations, with the separatist leaders welding the power, will continue to plague the country.

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Sir Thomas Roe at the Mughal Court: Seventeenth Century English Cultural Assumptions

Submitted by Katherine Schwartz



Throughout his time at Emperor Jahangir's court, Sir Thomas Roe, the first official English ambassador to the Mughal Empire in India, complained about the Mughal people, saying that "my toil with barbarous unjust people is beyond patience," and that "we live in a Barbarous unfaithful place."¹ This type of writing is consistent with later characterizations of English superiority and of the Indian people under British control in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, from 1615 to 1619, when Roe was stationed in the Mughal court, England had little value in trade and no political or military power in the Mughal Empire. That Roe writes of the inferiority of the Mughal people from such a strong conviction of English supremacy tells us something important: that English culture even in pre-imperial times contained those elements and assumptions necessary for the later rise of Imperialism.

When Sir Thomas Roe was presented to the Emperor Jahangir, the Mughal Empire had been a major power on the Indian subcontinent for almost a century and controlled an enormous area of land.² Except for a fifteen year period where control was taken by Afghan nobles, the Mughal dynasty ruled on the Indian subcontinent

continuously, if only nominally, from 1526 until 1756.³ The Emperor Jahangir ruled from 1605 until 1627, and while he was not "a great general, a great organizer, or a great builder" as his predecessors had been, his reign saw expansion through conquest and he was a great patron of the arts, particularly painting and architecture.⁴

By the time the first part of what would become the Mughal Empire had been conquered, European traders, particularly the Portuguese, had been active in the Indian Ocean for twenty-eight years. However, the English did not establish official presence in the Indian Ocean until 1601, and it would take seven more years until they made contact with the Mughal Empire.

On December thirty-first in the year 1600, a royal charter was granted to "The Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies."⁵ The most important reasons traditionally given for this were the simultaneous feelings that England deserved a role in international trade and concern that England would be barred from participation in this lucrative commerce. Worries that Dutch presence in the East Indies would cut off England's participation in this profitable trade spurred the creation of the English East India Company and the subsequent

English voyages to the East Indies themselves. At first, the Company's voyages were short-term and experimental, but after the success of several fleets, the Company turned to joint-stock ownership, a more long-term, communal source of capital. The Company was active in some fashion from 1600, when it received its original charter, up until the 1620's.

On October fourth in the year 1614, during the debate on "sending an ambassador to the Grand Magore's court," Sir Thomas Roe's name was proposed.⁶ Apparently a man of "pregnant understanding, well spoken, learned, industrious, of a comely personage, and one of whom there are great hopes that he may work much good for the Company," Roe was also appointed official ambassador by King James I, indicating his mission's dual purposes of securing trade and privileges for the Company and strengthening Britain's position overseas.⁷ Sir Thomas Roe is by himself a fascinating character, and as the first royally appointed representative of England in the Mughal court, who also managed to leave behind a comprehensive journal, Roe looms large in the history of the English in India.

Sir Thomas Roe left England with a fleet led by Captain William Keeling on March sixth, 1615, and arrived after almost eight months at Swalley Hole near the modern city of Surat, on the northwest coast of the Indian subcontinent. Determined that his arrival to the Mughal Empire should be "an occasion of dignity and splendor," Roe did not leave the ship for a full week, mainly due to arguments over customs searches.⁸ Although he was told multiple

times that "it was the Custom of this Country that nothing could pass but by the Custom house, and there had to be searched," Roe refused to submit, saying that he "had thought that they had understood that free kings and their Ambassadors had been above ordinary customs" and he would by no means submit to this "Common and barbarous usage."⁹ After disembarking in late September 1615, Roe remained in Surat for approximately five weeks, finally making the journey to Ajmir, the current location of the court, where he was presented to the Emperor Jahangir on January tenth, 1616. Roe lived in the Mughal Empire until February seventeenth, 1619, during which time he followed Jahangir's court as it moved from place to place. Throughout the period, he labored to improve England's reputation among Mughal officials and tried desperately to obtain a royal farman, or contract, for permanent trade. Roe's efforts at the Mughal court are documented in a journal which he kept from 1615, when he left England, to 1619, when he departed the Mughal Empire. While it is a rich historical source, Roe's journal does present some problems. Roe's journal was intended to be an account of his expenses for his employers and, consequently, Roe tries to present himself and his actions in the best possible light. This paper focuses mainly on the subconscious cultural attitudes expressed in the journal, but Roe's work at the Mughal court is also reflected in the documents of the Calendar of State Papers, the works of Edward Terry, William Keeling, William Hawkins, and Thomas Mun, not to mention a broad range of histories about the Mughal Empire and the English East India

Company.

Roe's journal documenting his time in the Mughal court is a fantastic resource not only for the factual details it divulges but also because of the cultural assumptions that it reveals.

It has been documented by historians such as Michael Brown and Colin Mitchell that Roe was not writing with Imperialist aims in mind. Despite this lack of conscious intention, Roe's journal exposes elements of Roe's society, namely feelings about English superiority and the inferiority of exotic others, that became later in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries integral parts of English Imperialist culture. These ideas, though, and the broader ideology that Edward Said terms Orientalism, are incongruous in a time where England was not a world power and really had very little overseas influence.

The English factors in the Mughal Empire in Roe's time were completely dependent on the emperor's favor. While England in the early seventeenth century possessed capable naval power, the English military was small, even by European standards, and inefficient and ill-equipped. However, Roe came to the Mughal court convinced that England was at least as powerful, if not more so, than the Mughal Empire. He claimed that he would restore the "King's Honor" by improving the general opinion of and respect given to the English or "lay my life and fortune both in the ground" in trying.¹⁰ To this end, Roe insisted on receiving the courtesy he thought he was due, based upon European treatment of ambassadors, even in the face of "the Custom of this Country," for example using

his own forms of reverence when meeting with Emperor Jahangir.¹¹ In his journal, Roe comes off as demanding, obstinate, and disrespectful of the emperor, the princes, and Mughal officials. In both formal communications with the Emperor as well as his daily interactions with the court, Roe tried very hard to assert England's prestige, repeatedly saying that he was the ambassador of a "Mighty Prince in league with him [Jahangir]."¹² Even after spending almost two years in the Mughal court, Roe asserted in a letter to James I that the English would "at last by our force teach them to know your Majesty is Lord of all the Seas and can Compel that by your power, which you have sought with Courtesy, which this King cannot yet see for swelling."¹³

At the same time that Roe exaggerated England's power and prestige, he denigrated the Mughal court for various perceived moral faults, one of these being excessive pride. When describing the Mughal court in a letter to George Abbott, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Roe claimed that "their Pride endures no terms of equality" and that they are characterized by "barbarous pride and Customs" and "dull ignorance."¹⁴ Near the end of his tenure in the Mughal court, Roe likewise bemoaned "the pride and falsehood of these people, that attended only advantage and were governed by private interest and appetite."¹⁵ Roe's negative evaluation of the pride of the Mughal people is connected with his conception of them as heathens. In their supposed arrogance they refuse to accept Christianity, in Roe's eyes the one true religion.¹⁶ Roe begrudged any "admiration of such a virtue in a heathen Prince," and complained

that “with envy and sorrow...we having the true vine should bring forth Crabs, and a bastard stock grapes.”¹⁷

Another facet of Mughal political life that Roe often complained about was court intrigue. As Roe wrote, “all the Policy and wicked craft of the Devil is not practiced alone in Europe; here is enough to be learned, or to be despised.”¹⁸ Roe stated as well that “all Cunning that the Devil can teach is frequent, even in the court, where is wanting no art nor wicked subtlety to be or do evil.”¹⁹ Roe recorded time and again instances of Mughal officials offering him verbal promises and not acting on them, which Roe takes as a sign of falseness. This continued, according to Roe, except for those times when he had presents to offer. Other forms of deception that Roe noted have to do with the Portuguese or their Mughal allies talking badly of the English in order to force them from the Emperor’s favor.

Roe complained strenuously about the practice of gift-giving within Mughal diplomacy. In Roe’s mind, this was yet one more manifestation of the Mughal people’s contemptible vanity and desire for wealth in the form of jewels and novelties. Roe’s thoughts about presents were established early on in his time in the Mughal Empire, as when he told the Governor of Surat that he “must not expect any [presents] from me in that kind: presents were for suitors.”²⁰ Two years later, Roe had occasion to lament how “Asaph Khan [an important Mughal official], for a sordid hope only of buying some toys, was so reconciled as to betray his son, and to me obsequious, even to flat-

tery; for the ground of all this friendship was that he might buy the Gold taken in the prize.”²¹ Asaph Khan’s greed, Roe concluded, consumes him to the point that he is willing to give up his honor, in Roe’s mind his very manhood, for a bauble. No Mughal official seems unaffected by such greed, even the Emperor Jahangir, whom Roe said “never takes any request to heart except it Come accompanied [by presents] and will in plain terms demand it.”²²

Roe’s actual position within the Mughal court is a striking foil to his sense of self-worth and national pride. In the eyes of the emperor, and also the Mughal officials, Roe was a subject of Jahangir, not an independent man with the powers of a king. Instead of being lavishly hosted by the Mughal emperor, for example, Roe was allowed nothing by Jahangir “but a house of Mud, which I was enforced to build half.”²³ Roe’s journal, when read carefully, reveals the extent to which his Mughal hosts viewed him as a subject. On October twelfth, 1617, Roe explained how he was taken by Asaph Khan, one of Jahangir’s primary advisors, to see Prince Khurram, the future emperor, about the treatment of English merchants at Surat. While trying to put Khurram at ease, Asaph Khan mentioned that the English “were his Subjects.”²⁴ This might appear to be a trivial incident, as Roe interpreted this as a phrase Asaph Khan “must use” when speaking with the prince, but it becomes more significant in light of Mughal diplomatic practices.²⁵ Men such as Roe were incorporated into the “rank and file of [Mughal] nobility,” and those who were “staying any length of time were expected to express an oath of loyalty to the emperor;

an envoy, in effect, served two masters while in a foreign court.”²⁶ These diplomats were regularly granted rank in the Mughal government and were rewarded with lands and titles if they enjoyed the emperor’s favor.²⁷ The ambassador’s subsequent duties included following the rules of reverence due to the emperor, which Roe tried to avoid doing, and also offering small, personal presents to the ruler “to formalize the oath of loyalty,” which Roe did, though perhaps with different intentions.²⁸ In all, these worked to underscore the foreigner’s subordinate status.

That Roe was considered a subject of the Emperor Jahangir, and thus of the Mughal Empire, can be seen elsewhere in his journal. As was custom among the Mughal emperors, Jahangir established what was essentially a personal cult based on devotion to the imperial throne. On August seventeenth, 1616, Sir Thomas Roe was inducted into this group, receiving a “medal of gold as big as sixpence” from Jahangir to signify his position as client of the emperor. This outwardly simple gift marked him as a member of the circle of nobles completely and utterly loyal to the emperor. Although Jahangir most likely knew that Roe would remain loyal to the English king, this ceremony and the social position that went with it signified that Jahangir expected Roe to be, at least outwardly, loyal and subordinate. Roe did not comprehend the significance of this gift but acknowledged its value in the eyes of the Mughal court, asserting “none may [wear the king’s Image] but to whom it is given.”²⁹

Roe’s journal also made it clear that

English trade was uncertain and devalued by the Mughal elite. Roe admitted on several occasions that the quality of English trading goods and presents were inferior, even recounting a story about how Jahangir, upon receiving gifts from Roe asked a Jesuit “whether the King of England were a great King that sent presents of so small value.”³⁰ Roe’s fears that England did not have the requisite goods to be seen as a valuable trading partner are validated by the fact that there is almost no mention of the English in writings by members of the Mughal court. Even Emperor Jahangir, in his personal journal, made not a single mention of the English as a group or Roe as an individual, despite Roe’s protestation that “[Jahangir] appointed me a place above all other men” and that the emperor “more esteemed me than ever any Frank [a general term for a European].”³¹

Roe’s belief in English superiority seems, in matters of trade, to equate to a feeling that England deserved to be given treaties securing permanent trading rights, fair treatment, and other similar indulgences. Initially, this was manifested in an immediate insistence that Mughal officials sign a farman guaranteeing what Roe considered to be reasonable treatment for the English. Roe’s idea of reasonable handling, though, included demands that could not be granted, such as freedom from customs searches. As early as October ninth, 1615, barely two weeks after landing at Swalley Hole, Roe was already complaining that “so base are our Conditions in this Port and subject to so many slaveries, such as no free heart can endure, that I do resolve either to establish a trade on free Conditions

or to do my best to dissolve it.”³² Roe’s trade negotiations demonstrate a sense that the English should be exempt from customary Mughal rules and procedures. On March twenty-sixth, 1616, Roe submitted a set of “Articles to his Majesty’s Consideration.”³³

On April third, Roe received notice from Asaph Khan that his demands had been found to be unreasonable, and he immediately jumped to the conclusion that this was merely a bluff, and that “the king had not seen them, or else” the message from Asaph Khan was only a “bribe, to which, even to base and sordidness, he is most open.”³⁴ Roe automatically assumed that, had they been seen by the emperor, he, as a just and noble person, would have agreed to them; the idea that the Mughal court did not value English trade enough to grant them special privileges did not enter Roe’s thoughts. Roe refused to compromise on any significant matter, even late in his embassy, and he accordingly failed in one of the main purposes of his embassy as his determined adherence to a treaty favoring England prevented him from obtaining any permanent agreement on trade. Roe’s long years of work in the Mughal Empire amounted to very little, financially speaking, and English trade was just as uncertain in 1619 as it was in 1615 when Roe first landed at Swalley Hole.

Roe’s journal reveals a fundamental loathing of the land, climate, and food of the Mughal Empire as well as of its people. Throughout, Roe complained that he endured nearly unbearable circumstances, being “every way afflicted- fires, smokes,

floods, storms, heat, dust, flies, and no temperate or quiet season,” and also being subject to illness.³⁵ When making his initial journey from Surat to the emperor’s court, Roe claimed that he was “so sick as at night I was past sense and given over for dead,” and that five other men were ill.³⁶ Only divine intervention saved him as “God raised [him]” from the brink of death.³⁷ In addition to mentioning instances of European illness, Roe also recorded epidemics among the Mughal people, including one in Agra that lasted for several months in 1616.³⁸

Roe frequently complained about the condition of Mughal territories while traveling. On his journey to Agra, Roe described “Brampore,” the home of Prince Parwiz, as “a miserable and Barren Country, the towns and villages all built of Mud, so that there is not a house for a man to rest in.”³⁹ On December twenty-sixth, 1616, while following Jahangir’s court, Roe noted that “we passed through woods and over Mountains, torn with bushes, tired with the incommodities of an impassible way, where many Camels perished... the king rested two days” during which time “thousands of Coaches, Carts and Camels lying in the woody Mountains without meat and water.”⁴⁰ Roe disapproved not only of the conditions of the road but also of the way the journey was handled, saying that “there was not a misery nor punishment which either the want of Government or the natural disposition of the Clime gave us not.”⁴¹ In sum, Roe claimed that the Mughal Empire “is the dullest, basest place that ever I saw, and makes me weary of speaking of it.”⁴²

Roe explains the cultural defects he perceives in the Mughal people by

retreating into the language of barbarism. To him, the Mughal people and their culture were uncivilized, crude, backwards, and brutal. That Roe equates barbarism with both brutality and with lack of culture is seen in his other writings. In a letter to King James I, he wrote:

Fame has done much for the Glory of this place... But the Government so uncertain, without written law, without Policy, the Customs mingled with barbarism, religions infinite, the buildings of mud (except the King's houses and some few others): that even this greatness and wealth that I admired in England (reserving due reverence to the Persons of Kings) is here, where I see it, almost contemptible...⁴³

Many of Roe's records of Mughal barbarism are of violence and physical savagery.

Early on, Roe noted that convicted criminals were sometimes put to death by being trampled by elephants, and that Jahangir "sometimes sees with too much delight in blood the execution done by his Elephants."⁴⁴ Instances of cruelty also provide convenient occasions for Roe to explicitly state the superiority of English customs. On March twenty-third, 1616, Roe wrote that Jahangir had "Condemned a Mogull on suspicion of felony... [and] sent him to me... for a Slave, or to dispose of him at my pleasure."⁴⁵ Roe replied that, though this was "esteemed a high favor... in England we had no slaves, neither was it lawful to make the Image of God fellow to a Beast" and so he would "use him as a servant, and if his good behavior merited it, would give him liberty."⁴⁶ Later

that same year Roe recounted another story of how Jahangir had condemned a group of thieves, and "there was no way to save their lives, but to sell them for slaves."⁴⁷ As in the earlier situation, Roe replied that he "would not buy them as slaves, only pay their ransom and free them" and in doing so would make sure that the Jahangir "should not be ignorant I had more mercy than he, and that a Christian esteemed the life of a Moore above money."⁴⁸ Interestingly, most of Roe's broadly disapproving comments concern the emperor Jahangir himself. Many of these focus on gender, presenting Jahangir as effeminate. Roe claimed, for example, that Jahangir was "gentle [and] soft" and repeatedly asserted that real power at court rested with Nur Jahan, Jahangir's consort, to the extent that the emperor had "yielded himself into the hands of a woman [Nur Jahan]" and so could not even control his family, let alone his country.⁴⁹

The views that Roe expresses, both directly and indirectly, are also seen in the writings of other Englishmen. Similar sentiments about English superiority can be found in the journals of contemporary Company employees, such as those of Edward Terry, William Hawkins, William Keeling, and Thomas Bonner, as well as in the descriptive and business writings of Company members like Thomas Mun, whose essay "A Discourse of Trade, from England unto the East Indies" is particularly peppered with expressions of religious prejudices.⁵⁰

In part, Roe's observations seem to have been colored by a set of assumptions about Asiatic regimes, an outlook that Edward Said has termed Orientalism. Although Sir Thomas Roe lived long before the Raj

and the height of the British Empire in India, his evaluation of the people of the Mughal Empire fits nicely into the “‘Oriental’ ideas” that Said suggests were integral to European stereotypes about Asia.⁵¹ Throughout his journal, and particularly in the letters he wrote to employers and acquaintances in England, Roe’s descriptions of the people he meets and the activities he observes display elements of “Oriental despotism, Oriental splendor, cruelty, [and] sensuality.”⁵² Roe frequently lamented, for example, the fact that the Mughal Empire is run with “no written Law. The King by his own word rules, and his Governors of Provinces by that authority.”⁵³ He also made sure to note, disapprovingly, the emperor’s sexual appetites, as when he mentioned that Jahangir had four wives and also that during festivals entertainment was provided by “whores” who “did sing and dance.”⁵⁴

In discussing such things as England’s prestige, his place in the Mughal court, the climate of the Empire, religion, greed, lasciviousness, despotism, and intrigue, Roe clearly positioned England and England’s civilization as superior to the Mughal Empire and its society. In stressing English superiority in his writings, Roe illustrates the fact that the key cultural ideas that allowed Orientalism and English Imperialism to flourish, and which kept it so powerful, were present in the English cultural mind even in the early seventeenth century. It is important to uncover these ideas in the time before English Imperialism became a real institution because these pre-existing attitudes informed how England interacted with and acted towards colonized

populations all over the world, even into the twentieth century.

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¹Sir Thomas Roe, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe to the Court of the Great Mogul, 1615-1619: As Narrated in His Journal and Correspondence*, Vol. 1 (London: Hakluyt Society, 1899), 460, 490.

²*Ibid.*, 106.

³*Ibid.*, 282.

⁴*Ibid.*, 100.

⁵John Keay, *The Honourable Company: A History of the English East India Company* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991), 9.

⁶“1-5 October 1614 (770)”, *CSPC: East Indies, China and Japan, Volume 2: 1513-1616*, 324-331.

⁷*Ibid.*, “1-20 September 1614”, 317-324; and *Ibid.*, “17-18 January 1615 (879)”, 363-376.

⁸Michael Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador: The Life of Sir Thomas Roe* (Lexington: The University press of Kentucky, 1970), 38.

⁹Roe, *The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe*, 44, 48.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 46.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 44.

¹²*Ibid.*, 53.

¹³*Ibid.*, 497.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 310, 496.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 508.

¹⁶Roe was a very active Protestant, championing a pan-national Protestant Alliance. See: Brown, *Itinerant Ambassador*, 198-208; and also John Drury, *A Summary Discourse Concerning the Work of Peace Ecclesiasticall* (Cambridge: Printed by Roger Daniel, 1641).

¹⁷Ibid., 367.
¹⁸Ibid., 358.
¹⁹ibid., note 1
²⁰Ibid., 63.
²¹Ibid. The prize is presumably a pearl of high value, as mentioned on page 426.
²²Ibid., 201, 183.
²³Ibid., 134.
²⁴Ibid., 435.
²⁵Ibid.
²⁶Mitchell, *Sir Thomas Roe and the Mughal Empire*, 165.
²⁷William Hawkins was granted a rank of 400 zat in 1611, and, as Mitchell says, “in some instances, demarcating a visiting ambassador from the rest of the Mughal nobility is difficult.” Mitchell, *Sir Thomas Roe and the Mughal Empire*, 163, 165.
²⁸Ibid.
²⁹Roe, 244.
³⁰Ibid., 119.
³¹Ibid., 115, 257. The journal referenced is: Jahangir, *The Jahangirnama: memoirs of Jahangir, Emperor of India*, trans., ed., and annotated by Wheeler M. Thackston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Similarly, there is virtually no reference of any European in contemporary court histories, for example: Kami Shirazi and W.H. Siddiqi, *Waqa-i-uz-zaman: fath nama-I Nur Jahan Begam: a Contemporary Account of Jahangir* (Rampur: Rampur Raza Library, 2003).
³²Ibid., 68.
³³Ibid., 150.
³⁴Ibid., 156.
³⁵Ibid., 248. While Roe only makes a few references to the fact that the emperor had servants specifically to shoe the flies away, Edward Terry, his chaplain, Edward Terry,

his chaplain, states that the flies would “cover our meat as soon as it was placed on the table.” (Edward Terry, *A Voyage to East-India; Wherein Some Things are taken Notice of, in our Passage Thither...* (London: Printed for J. Wilkie, 1777), 117.

³⁶Ibid., 100, 86.

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸ For a discussion of the diseases that afflict the Mughal people, see Terry, 225-231.

³⁹Ibid., 89.

⁴⁰Ibid., 368.

⁴¹Ibid., 393.

⁴²Ibid., 113.

⁴³Ibid., 120.

⁴⁴Ibid., 108.

⁴⁵Ibid., 150.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid., 305.

⁴⁸Ibid., 306.

⁴⁹Ibid., 293, 362.

⁵⁰Thomas Mun, “A Discourse of Trade, from England unto the East Indies, in *East Indian Trade: Selected Works, 17th Century: A Collection of Five Rare Works Republished from Originals in the Goldsmith’s Library of Economic Literature, The University of London* (Farnborough, Gregg, 1968).

⁵¹Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), 4.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Roe, 110.

⁵⁴Ibid., 145.

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Front and Center: An Anthropological Analysis of Drag Queens in American Culture Submitted by Seth Palmer



*In imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself – as well as its contingency. Indeed, part of the pleasure, the giddiness of the performance is in the recognition of a radical contingency in the relation between sex and gender in the face of cultural configurations of casual unities that are regularly **assumed to be natural and necessary** (*Gender Trouble*, 187).*

*The idea of society is a powerful image. It is potent in its own right to control or to stir men to action. This image has form; it has external boundaries, margins, internal structure. Its outlines contain power to reward conformity and repulse attack. **There is energy in its margins and unstructured areas** (Douglass, 137).*

As the discipline has been institutionalized, anthropology within the academy has traditionally focused on the study of what “the West” considers to be the exotic, the strange, the weird, and the odd. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, anthropologists were interested mainly in claiming “a people” (often considered primitive) from which they could develop a professional career and academic prestige; for Malinowski it was the Trobriand Islanders, for Boas it was the Kwakiutl, and for Lewis Henry Morgan it was the Iroquois. Such attitudes today are highly criticized within

the discipline for being paternalistic, if not blatantly racist. The process of creating the “other,” however, continues today both inside and outside of the university, creating a need for scholars to deconstruct the very categories that are meant to define and constrain individuals within specific cultural groups.

In my research on drag queens in contemporary American culture, I have been interested in finding a language with which to deconstruct the institutionalized gendered and sexualized categories imposed on individuals in American society. I have been largely unsuccessful in this endeavor. Rupp and Taylor had the same struggle in their research on drag queens in Key West: “Although we argue that drag queens and drag performances break down the boundaries between woman and man, gay and straight, we continue to use these categories, however flawed they might be to identify people. In part, the language gives us no choice” (*Drag Queens*, 5). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, developed by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, speaks to the fact that as individuals whose cognitive categories are influenced by a specific language, anthropologists themselves have difficulty in discussing concepts that exist beyond the bounds of their own culture. How can I, as a native English speaker, examine concepts of gender that go beyond “male” and

“female?” Despite the difficulty of the task, new linguistic terminologies will have to be created to discuss diverse gendered and sexualized identities given the genderqueer and androgynous identity movement within the queer community today. Because of such movements, it becomes increasingly apparent that standard conceptions of gender and sexuality no longer have complete control over the contemporary American populace.

My study of drag queens in American culture has been made increasingly relevant over the past few months as queer voices have continued to contest the oppressive sexist and homophobic structures of American society. The following are just a few of the issues that have challenged the normative gendered and sexualized structures in the United States. Most obviously, the November 2008 elections led to many important political decisions for the LGBTIQ community across the country. Proposition 8 in California passed this November, prohibiting gay marriage in the state. Similar measures were passed in Florida and Arizona. Act 1, which passed in Arkansas, prevents gay and lesbian parents (or even unmarried heterosexual couples) from adopting children. Similar measures are already in place in Utah and Mississippi, for example. During the 2008 Presidential campaign, the celebrated (and reviled) political candidates Sarah Palin and Hillary Clinton both fought for the seats of the Vice President and President, respectively. The film *Milk*, describing the politician and community organizer Harvey Milk’s rise to power and assassination won two Academy

Awards. Katy Perry’s hit single “I Kissed a Girl” topped the Billboard Top 100 chart last summer, and was nominated for Favorite Song at the 2009 Kid’s Choice Awards. Ironically, Perry’s mother, an Evangelical Christian Preacher told the press that: “I hate the song. It clearly promotes homosexuality and its message is shameful and disgusting...I can’t even listen to that song...when it comes on the radio I bow my head and pray” (Lyons, 1). The LGBTIQ community was further angered by the selection of Reverend Rick Warren to give the benediction at President Obama’s inauguration: “In a recent interview with the Web site Beliefnet, Mr. Warren said that allowing same-sex couples to marry was no different from allowing a brother and sister to marry” (Zeleny, 1). More locally, on September 30th an anti-gay demonstration on the College Green at the State University of Geneseo, approved by Campus Scheduling, made people again question the limits of the First Amendment. The approval of a gender-neutral housing option on-campus at the State University of New York at Geneseo represents the gendered revolution that is taking place on college campuses nationwide. An article in the *Lamron*, Geneseo’s college newspaper, recognizes that: “The current housing form, which requires all incoming freshmen, even those who may not match a socially-defined gender or biological distinction, to identify themselves as ‘male’ or ‘female.’ The new housing project will attempt to resolve that issue” (Cioffi, 1). Even the debate over the curriculum at the State University of New York at Geneseo is in part concerned with the representation of women and sexual minorities. In his letter

to the Curriculum Review Task Force, concerning the debate over the Western Humanities course, Professor Walter Soffer argues that: “the humanities is the study of the great books left behind by the greatest minds” (1). Similarly, Professor Larry Blackman writes: “The required works in Western Humanities I and II are not considered great because they were written by white males. They are great books that happen to have been written mostly by white males” (2). In other words, it is just coincidence that all of the best works of literature, philosophy and history were written by male-bodied persons. These learned individuals fail to recognize the social structure in which these “great minds” were writing; they do not ask how it came to be that such males acquired the resources needed to be able to freely philosophize day and night. Who washed their dishes? Who scrubbed their floors? Who cooked their meals? Even in the setting of the university, often considered to be one of the most liberal institutions in the United States, a male-dominated, heteronormative discourse can run uncontested. Underneath all of these issues, of course, lies the problematic status of biological women and sexual minorities in the American political sphere. Is a woman capable of being the President or Vice President of the United States? Should it be legal for two men to be married and thus be privy to the same rights afforded to married heterosexual couples? Are two mothers, two fathers, or even an unmarried heterosexual couple capable of raising foster children? What these questions do not address, of course, are the arbitrary gendered and sexualized categories that

the American populace uses from which to base their opinions. Such conceptions of “male” and “female,” then become important signifiers in political decisions in the United States. The performances of drag queens speak directly to these socially-constructed categories, and have important literal and symbolic relevance in the larger arena of American politics.

Throughout this paper, the term “queer” will be used to encompass the whole LGBTIQ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Intersex, and Queer) community. The word “queer” in academia and popular culture is used to reclaim a term that was once used against the community. The term is not accepted by all members within or outside of the community, and its use continues to be controversial. I use the term as a way to find unity amongst a highly diverse group of individuals that have many important shared experiences; the term is not being used in a derogatory sense.

In studying drag performance in American culture, I have been careful to contextualize the experiences of people who perform in drag as an extremely diverse group of individuals who are beyond the limits of any single anthropological interpretation. As my informant Champagne stated: “People try to put you in a box, and I don’t like to be in a box – I’m claustrophobic.” Additionally, my analysis not only acknowledges, but heavily emphasizes, the power structure that attempts to control the lives of those individuals who defy culturally-acceptable gender practices. Indeed, given the history of queer peoples living in the United States, drag should be seen partly as an act of resistance to social norms,

although this by itself would be a very simplified explanation.

In this paper, data collected from literature, fieldwork experiences, interviews, film, and social networking and video sharing websites will be utilized to examine the meaning of drag and the lives of those who perform in it. Literature read and analyzed for this study included the cultural history of drag performance, contemporary gender theory, and the anthropological literature on drag and queer communities in the United States. Fieldwork was conducted by watching drag performances at a small gay bar in Rochester, NY; interviews were conducted with a few select drag queens, and a focus group discussion on drag was held with a group of young queer college students. Additionally, I studied representations of drag queens in popular American culture to gain an understanding of how the perception of drag queens has, and has not, changed over time. Finally, I reviewed the personal pages of drag queens on video sharing websites (such as www.youtube.com) and social networking websites (such as www.facebook.com and www.myspace.com). This paper is a multi-disciplinary piece that attempts to contextualize the experiences of drag performers in the United States, and most importantly, celebrates them as a people worthy of study.

Recently, representations of drag performances have entered into mainstream American culture through the cinema, including such films as Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, Torch Song Trilogy, Tootsie, Victor/Victoria, Birdcage, Mrs. Doubtfire, The Crying Game, Connie and Carla, and To Wong Foo, Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar.

Such representations of drag performance in popular culture have changed dramatically over time, with one of the most iconic, yet highly problematic, representations of drag appearing in the 1959 film Some Like it Hot. Many older films that portray characters in drag, such as Some Like it Hot, feature heterosexuals who cross-dress in order to hide their identity and/or enter spaces that they would otherwise be barred from. In newer films, characters identified as “drag queens” are at times used as an exotic feature to draw in the audience’s interest; in other cases, however, they are painted as multi-dimensional characters, as seen in Torch Song Trilogy. Overall, representation of drag performances in film often appear as one of two extremes, either in the form of light-hearted comedies or violent thrillers, typically involving the police force.

This winter, LOGO (an American cable channel with programming that targets the LGBTIQ community) began airing RuPaul’s Drag Race, a reality TV show in which drag queens compete to be reigned in as the ultimate diva. With LOGO being available in an estimated 35 million American homes, the concept of the drag queen is no longer relegated to liberal, urban, industrialized environments on the American landscape. Increasingly, Americans outside of the LGBTIQ community are being confronted with drag performances through print media, television, film, and cyberspace. Additionally, as members of the queer community continue to feel more comfortable challenging gender norms in the public sphere, American society will be forced to address those individuals who, while previously confined to the margins, are now

fighting for inclusion in the center.

Theoretical Orientation

The new anthropology of genders and sexualities is a dynamic sub-discipline that integrates theory from the interdisciplinary fields of queer and performance studies, and in part focuses on what anthropologist Rosalind Morris defines as “institutions of ambiguity.” Such institutions highlight the importance of understanding gendered and sexualized categorizations as cultural constructions embedded in a specific historical, spatial and cultural context. The primary theoretical perspective used in this study was Judith Butler’s concept of *gender performativity*. By linking performance studies to the existing literature on the anthropology of genders and sexualities, one can critique the gender binary as a social construction that is performed, and more importantly, one can understand “normative genders and sexualities” as performances in and of themselves. Morris recognizes the fecundity of a performative analysis of genders and sexualities in the house of anthropology:

The anthropology of gender is emerging under the influence of performance theory resists such connotations, however. Instead, it is concerned with the relationships and dissonance between the exclusive categories of normative sex/gender systems and the actuality of ambiguity, multiplicity, abjection, and resistance within these same systems. Oscillating between a desire to unseat the hegemony of sexual dichotomies in the modern West through exemplary counter-example and a

yearning to locate resistant practices in non-Western systems, much of the new anthropology of gender seeks... examples of “institutional transvestism” such as the *berdache* of North America, the *hijra* of India, or the *kathoey* of Thailand (570).

By studying the gendered performances of drag queens, therefore, one can understand the gendered performances that all people in all cultures enact on a daily basis. Gender, then becomes something very fluid: “Butler argues that gender is not a fact or an essence, but a set of acts that produce the effect or appearance of a coherent substance... Butler goes further than this when she argues that, although gender is a set of acts, it works and derives its compulsive force from the fact that people mistake the acts for the essence and, in the process, come to believe that they are mandatory” (Morris, 572-573).

My analysis of drag performance in American culture has led me to recognize that all gendered performance is inherently a drag performance in and of itself. This theoretical conclusion is by no means original. Other gender theorists have been drawn to this conclusion as well. Morris comments on this perspective:

When theorists of gender performativity say that all gender is a form of drag, they mean that, like drag, the Western system of compulsory heterosexuality is a set of limitations. What is being imitated is the ideal of binary difference, a difference that only prescribes social roles but also is supposed to determine sexual desires... In this context, cases of third genders and/or institutionalized

travestism can be treated as framed examples of the performativity that underlies the entire logic of binary sexuality (580).

In fact, in the documentary *Judith Butler: Philosophical Encounters of the Third Kind*, Butler notes that the strict male and female gender norms of Hollywood in the 1950s and 1960s prompted her to write *Gender Trouble* in order to make sense of these exaggerations (Zadjermann). Through recognition of the fact all gendered performance is drag, one can create a dialogue that does not relegate such examinations to a queer, or often “othered” population. Veritably, the power of an analysis of drag performance comes not only from the fact that it is part of a queer sub-culture, but that such performances critique all gendered spectacles as institutionalized acts with little biological import.

It is also important to note that within queer performances one is always in a state of *performing*; that is to say, one is always being critiqued, analyzed, and judged for the gendered and sexualized performances that they are producing on the stage and in the street. In an interview for a documentary on Judith Butler, Butler herself notes that while Simone de Beauvoir argued that one is not born a woman, but becomes a woman, she believes that one is always *becoming* a woman (Zadjermann). Thus, she emphasizes the continued performative nature of gender as something that continues throughout one’s lifetime and does not end when the curtains fall. The anthropologist, however, must try to interpret such performances from both the perspective of the audience member and of the performer, both of which are highly diverse groups within themselves. Analyzing both the audience

and the performer allows the anthropologist to understand how space, behaviors, and ideologies are negotiated on and around the stage. Audience members come to drag performances primarily for entertainment, while drag queens perform primarily for economic reasons. However, the interactions and relations between performer and audience member are far more diverse and dynamic than this generalization.

Historical Roots of Drag Queens

Historical particularists, who set the foundation for American anthropology in the early 20th century, believed that cultural anthropologists should study each culture as its own entity, with its own particular history and developmental trajectory. Following in this tradition, I believe that it is important to study the history of drag from its beginning in Great Britain to its current form in the United States in order to understand contemporary drag queen performance in American culture. It is clear that contemporary drag performance has borrowed from cultures other than those that existed in Great Britain (or continental Europe); however, the history of drag performance is mainly rooted in gendered performance on the European stage. Contemporary drag culture in the United States has only more recently been influenced by the diverse ethnic groups that make-up the American social landscape.

From a European perspective, cross-dressing was essential in British theater because of a restriction against biological women from acting on the stage. Because of this social fact, certain actors would consistently play the role of women onstage and would work to perfect their own gender performance. Baker notes that these actors were usually young boys who “would be expected to lead a strange and somewhat

dubious life. He would be trained to dress up daily as a fascinating young woman and parade before the rowdy populace in the dangerous and insalubrious atmosphere of the public playhouse” (66-67). After Charles II introduced women onto the stage in England, it became less popular for men to play the role of women:

For this is what ultimately happened to the last of the female impersonators. They ceased to impersonate on the refined, serious level that derived from the Elizabethan period and began to burlesque their female roles. As they became less in demand, so their parts got shorter and they tended to make them comic. One, a man called Lacy, became famous for his burlesque of female characters and here we may discern the beginnings of the pantomime dame tradition as we see it today (Baker, 103).

While the sexual orientation of these early female impersonators is not entirely clear, Baker notes that “two of the most famous were widely known to be homosexual. They were Ernest Boulton and Frederick William Park and both are dealt with quite fully in a collection of essays called The Sins of the Cities of the Plain, a survey of homosexuality in London published in 1881” (123).

Throughout the 19th Century in the United States, male-bodied drag performances were enacted by men who were perceived to be heterosexual. Their performances were purely comedic, and not meant to address political concerns or alternative genders or sexualities. Later it entered into the theatrical arenas of burlesque and vaudeville at the turn of the twentieth century. Such performances were sexually-suggestive, and

had an important comic element to them as well: “as the nineteenth century began, men in women’s clothes on the professional stage were, with rare exceptions, dame comedians” (Chauncey, 295).

It is not until the rise of American industrial urban environments that a visible gay culture emerges. George Chauncey, a scholar of gay and lesbian histories in the United States, notes how the presence of a visible queer culture on the American landscape only became possible after a period of urbanization:

In his hometown he had needed to conform at all times to the social conventions of the community, for he had been subjected to the constant...surveillance of his family and neighbors. But in the city it was possible for him to move between social worlds and lead a double life: by day to hold a respectable job that any queer would have been denied, and by night to lead the life of a fairy on Bowery...The complexity of the city’s social and spatial organization made it possible for gay men to construct the multiple public identities necessary for them to participate in the gay world without losing the privileges of the straight: assuming one identity at work, another in leisure; one identity before biological kin, another with gay friends (133).

Writing in 1972, the anthropologist Esther Newton similarly noted that: “Homosexual communities are entirely urban and suburban phenomena. They depend on the anonymity and segmentation of metropolitan life” (21). Chauncey also highlights the experiences of biological men who perform as women in certain social environments

during the turn of the 20th century. Such environments included, but were not limited to, public parks, streets, bars, and prisons. Such men were labeled fairies, and “were the most famous symbols of gay life, and the impression of that life they conveyed was reinforced by the countless other effeminate men who were visible in the streets of the city’s working-class and amusement districts in the early decades of the century” (Chauncey, 47). Such men could be identified by “a limp wrist or an exaggerated, swivel-hipped, mincing walk – known as ‘swishing’ in the gay world [something that] was regularly caricatured on the vaudeville stage and occasionally seen on the street as a sign of the ‘true’ fairy” (Chauncey, 55). Like contemporary drag queens, “The fairies reaffirmed the conventions of gender even as they violated them: they behaved as not man should, but as any man might wish a woman would” (Chauncey, 57). The Bowery, a small neighborhood in Manhattan, was an important geographic space for the developing gay culture in New York City. According to Chauncey,

The ‘female impersonators’ on display at the Bowery resorts were the most famous symbols of gay life, and the impression of that life they conveyed was reinforced by the countless other effeminate men who were visible in the streets of the city’s working-class and amusement district in the early decades of the century (47).

While the fairies may have been marginally accepted in very specific urban spaces such as the Bowery, they were first and foremost defined by their pathology. Up until 1973, homosexuality was considered a psychologi-

cal disorder in the United States. Sexologists, beginning around the second-half of the nineteenth century, created an understanding of homosexuals as “inverts,” meaning that male homosexuals had a feminine spirit, thus explaining why they could be attracted to men. Likewise, female homosexuals had a masculine spirit, thus explaining why they were attracted to other women. In other words, the medical community reinforced compulsory heterosexuality because biological men could only be attracted to other biological men because one of them was internally a woman (in male-male sexual encounters at this time, men taking the active role were not perceived of as homosexuals, but as “perverts” who were conventionally masculine men with a “perverted” sex drive). During this time period, the male homosexual was a marked individual. According to Foucault, he “became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality” (43). Gay men, then, would often perform in a “feminine” manner to identify themselves as homosexual to others. As Chauncey notes: “gay men pursued a variety of strategies as they negotiated their presence in the city’s restaurants, cafeterias and speakeasies. Some of them boldly claimed their right to gather in public, speaking loudly about gay matters, dancing with their friends, even putting on a ‘show’ for the other customers of them” (176). This gendered performance would be an important step in the development of a drag queen identity.

After the turn of the twentieth century, however, male-bodied drag performances became increasingly common in

urban areas dominated by gay culture. Particularly during the Prohibition Era in the 1920s, drag balls and performances by female impersonators became increasingly visible within the gay world of New York City. The Pansy Craze, which hit New York City just prior to the Prohibition era, embodied this cultural movement. Upper-class heterosexual residents of New York went “slumming” during this time period in American history to listen to African-American jazz performances; they would also go to watch male homosexual performances on stage. Chauncey notes the connection between these two voyeuristic pursuits:

“The efforts of nightclub impresarios to cultivate and respond to the growing fascination of white middle-class club goers with African-American jazz and performance is the best-known aspect of this phenomenon, and in many ways the ‘Negro Vogue’ of the mid-twenties set the stage for the pansy craze that soon followed it...If whites were intrigued by the ‘primitivism’ of black culture, heterosexuals were equally intrigued by the ‘perversity’ of gay culture” (309).

Pansy acts were performances given by highly effeminate homosexual men who performed their sexual orientation on stage, again often to heterosexual audiences. Sometimes, however, such performers identified as heterosexual. Chauncey these performances to blackface, characterizing them as “straight actors putting on drag or stereotypical mannerisms to mimic and ridicule gay men, to the hoots and jeers of an anti-gay audience. This buffoonery became a standard feature in the burlesque and high-

class cabaret venues alike, which reinforced the dominant public image of homosexuals” (310). They were incredibly popular, and embodied the daring sense of rebelliousness that accompanied the illegal consumption of alcohol. Performers such as Gene Malin became famous for their pansy acts in New York City.

After the stock market crashed in 1929 and the Great Depression Era loomed over American society, drag performances, and gay and lesbians and cultures in general, fell under increasingly heightened scrutiny: “The revulsion against gay life in the early 1930s was part of a larger reaction to the perceived “excesses” of the Prohibition years and the blurring of the boundaries between acceptable and unacceptable public solidarity” (Chauncey, 353). Gay and lesbian bars were routinely raided by the police; if an individual should be arrested not only would they serve a sentence, but their names would be placed in the newspaper, often leading to loss of employment or familial ties. In fact, by 1931 “several of the city’s newspapers began a campaign against clubs featuring female impersonators...on the night of January 28, 1931, they [the police] raided the Pansy Club on West Forty-Eighth Street and the Club Calais at 125 West Fifty-First Street.” The next day, Police Commissioner Edward Mulrooney announced: “There will be a shake-up in the night clubs, especially of those which feature female impersonators” (Chauncey, 331). Laws were passed across the country that required individuals to wear at least five articles of clothing that matched their biological sex. According to Senelick, even in New York and San Francisco in the 1960s, drag remained illegal (384). Such actions were a way of reinforcing the very hegemonic structure that prevented drag performances

from entering mainstream culture: “Prohibition culture had allowed gay visibility to move into the center of New York’s most prestigious entertainment district, but in the early thirties, the authorities were determined to return it to the city’s periphery” (Chauncey, 333). Ironically, however, police attempts to restrict gay and lesbian cultures forced them to perform as homosexuals themselves: “Since the cops often went over on the ferries posing as homosexuals, the ferry owners always knew when raids were coming, said Ken Stein; the cops absurdly wore perfume and dressed inappropriately” (Cherry Grove, 193). In 1939, the Jewel Box Revue opened in Miami. This would soon become the most famous drag venue in the United States. However, “although it originated in a gay bar and was managed and staffed entirely by homosexuals, the Jewel Box Revue was geared for straight audiences, aiming to win acceptance through comedy (Senelick, 380). As the first interracial drag club, the Jewel Box Revue broke ground for future performances to challenge restrictive legislative policies, and to create a more open (although still closeted) dialogue about pluralism in American culture.

Following the larger trends of drag queen performance in the United States, performances prior to the disco era were usually meant to impersonate famous female figures, or they were completely comic in nature. Teri Warren, a drag queen who performed on Fire Island, told Esther Newton that: “when I first arrived out here, drag was not drag per se. Drag was a hairy chest, hairy arms, moustache... which is commonly known now as ‘gender fucking’... and I was-

n’t into that form of drag, so I stood in the background” (Cherry Grove, 174). With the disco era came the concept of glamour drag that differed from previous drag queen performances: “In most glamour drag the performer simply mouthed, or ‘lip-synced’ to the words of a recorded female vocalist. When they did comic drag, working-class men tended toward broad and vulgar sight gags and very explicit sexual suggestions which offended conservative Grovers” (Cherry Grove, 174). Newton asserts that drag played an important role in allowing residents, particularly gay men, to claim a territory as their own: “After 1950, witty repartee, parody, double-entendre, and gender reversal were used ever more openly and boldly to create a ‘gay reality’ – not only an escape from heterosexual domination on the mainland, but an evolving subculture in which camp was the norm” (Cherry Grove, 75). Due to constant police raids and the physical dangers of performing in drag in a public space, gay men would often restrict such performances to private spaces. House parties, and particularly tea parties, were a popular venue for such performances: “Besides theatrical productions... theme parties were the most important venues of camp representations” (Cherry Grove, 77). Thus, drag performances were (and are) enacted in private spaces to create social solidarity amongst members of the queer community.

The cultural mosaic that makes up the United States is not restricted to a European past, despite what much scholarship may suggest. While it is not completely clear what impact Native Americans, African Americans, Latino Americans, and

Asian Americans have had on the historical evolution of the “drag queen” in the United States, it is obvious the concept of the “drag queen” has been appropriated and altered within communities of color. Another section of this paper will be devoted to how drag queen performances are “racialized” on the stage.

Drag Queens as “Other”

As individuals with an unconventional gender performance, drag queens face stigma both outside of and within their own sub-culture. Representations of drag in film often reflect this stigmatization. In The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of the Desert, for example, one queen, Tick, faces a difficult struggle of revealing his real identity to his son. Another drag queen, Bernadette, faces heckling from the other queens because she identifies as transgender. The three drag queens face violent, homophobic attacks in the Australian outback, and struggle to survive in a hate-filled social environment (The Adventures). In To Wong Foo, Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar, three drag queens must go on the run in order to escape the grasp of an angry, homophobic local law enforcement official (To Wong Foo). Even today, some drag queens continue to have an uneasy relationship with the police force. Champagne, a drag queen from Schenectady, New York, noted that she was pulled over by a police officer while she was riding in her friend’s car in drag. Her friend driving the car, David, was also dressed in drag. Champagne stated that when David stuck his head out to talk to the cop she thought: “we’re all going to jail.” After being pulled over, the officer made

them wait in their car for an extended period of time while other police cars drove past and flashed their spotlights in the car. Finally, the policeman came back to the vehicle and said “okay, you can go now” while laughing at David, Champagne, and their friends. In response to these kinds of interactions with the police, Champagne said “you let it roll off your back and move on.” Narratives on drag queens in American culture often focus on their marginalization, and the inability of society to accept them for who they are.

Oppressed groups often feel quite free to oppress others, and the same is true within the queer community in the United States. David Valentine, an anthropologist who specializes in transgender studies, notes how many queer rights organizations have mainstreamed their goals “at the expense of representing non-‘respectable’ gay men and lesbians – drag queens, butch women, effeminate men, and the leather community – implicitly marking ‘gay’ as white, middle class, and gender normative” (227). Rupp and Taylor concur, stating: “From the assimilationist ‘We’re just like you’ tendency of gay and lesbian activism, from the homophile movement of the 1950’s to the present, drag queens have been an embarrassment” (Drag Queens, 185). Like drag queens today, certain gay American men in the first half of the 20th century felt angry towards fairies for embodying the stereotypes that society placed on male homosexuals. Chauncey notes that:

The resentment many gay men felt toward the fairies, though, may have resulted as much from the affinity they felt with them as from the

affinity they felt with them as from the difference in their styles. The fact that many men referred to ‘flaming faggots’ or ‘swishes’ as ‘obvious types’ or ‘extreme homosexuals’ suggests the extent to which they saw themselves as part of a continuum linking them to the public stereotype, a continuum on which they represented merely a ‘less extreme’ form of the fairy (104).

In her research on drag culture in the 1960s, Esther Newton also found that drag queens were stigmatized within the community: “For instance, female impersonators are considered by most homosexuals to be too overt. They are consistently placed on the low end of the continuum of stigmatization, and one of the first things that female impersonators must learn is not to recognize anyone on the street or in any other public place unless they are recognized first” (*Mother Camp*, 25). Newton goes on to note that:

The drag queen symbolizes all that homosexuals say they fear the most in themselves, all that they say they feel guilty about; he symbolizes, in fact, the stigma. In this way, the term ‘drag queen’ is comparable to ‘nigger.’ And like that word, it may be all right in an in-group context but not in an out-group one. Those who do not want to think of themselves or be identified as drag queens under any circumstances attempt to disassociate themselves from ‘drag’ completely. These homosexuals deplore drag shows and profess total lack of interest in them.

Their attitude toward drag queens is one of condemnation combined with the expression of vast social distance between themselves and the drag queen. Other homosexuals enjoy being queens among themselves, but do not want to be stigmatized by the heterosexual culture. These homosexuals admire drag and drag queens in homosexual contexts, but deplore female impersonators and street fairies for ‘giving us a bad name’ or ‘projecting the wrong image’ to the heterosexual culture. The drag queen is definitely a marked man in the subculture (*Mother Camp*, 104).

During this same time period on Fire Island, Newton notes that the social stigma of being a drag queen made it difficult for them to support themselves economically: “The poorest and least accomplished as performers or those with drug habits turned to hustling, which compounded their stigmatization; many of the more ambitious and talented became hairdressers as the only legitimate employment that would allow them to supplement their incomes from female impersonation” (*Cherry Grove*, 133). One of *Cherry Grove*’s star drag queens, Dick Addison, “understood that the gay movement was hostile toward drag because ‘they don’t want homosexuality laughed at’” (*Cherry Grove*, 241). Chauncey also suggests that the antagonism between masculine gay men and fairies was really a kind of class antagonism, as the majority of fairies were a part of the working class, and the majority masculine gay men were a part of the middle-class (106). Even today, antagonism between mainstream gay men and drag queens

persists. Champagne, whom I interviewed, stated how a former boyfriend asserted: “no boyfriend of mine is going to be a drag queen.” In his anthropological study of drag queens in Atlanta, Georgia McNeal noted that: “Likewise, there is an internal social hierarchy within the gay community in which drag queens literally embody the stigma of male homosexuality as effeminacy and therefore occupy a lower, more stigmatized position within the gay community as a whole” (355). Thus, when one begins to analyze the political import of drag performances, one must also recognize the double stigma that drag queens embody. Berkowitz similarly notes that:

Drag queens comprise a community that is not only labeled as deviant by mainstream society, but is also separated from the stigmatized groups of non-cross-dressing gay men and heterosexual transvestites. The drag queen is part of a subgroup that consists of the outcasts of two stigmatized groups, gay men and heterosexual cross dressers, and thus endures the effects of multiple negative identities. Furthermore, the relatively small number of drag queens increases the likelihood that this behavior is perceived as unusual and bizarre (13).

In their performances, then, drag queens must resist both heterosexual and conservative homosexual agendas that restrict their often sexually-explicit critiques of the gender dichotomy.

Subversive Politics: Drag as a Political Act

The subversive power of drag performances in queer communities in the United States has been well-documented; drag performances reveal the socially-constructed nature of gender and critique the binary. Anthropologist Rosalind Morris agrees, noting that “By making gender so fabulously artificial, these performances are said to show up the artifice of gender” (583). Drag performances are also linked to the *politics of the body* because: “In such protests, the body of the performer highlights the social basis of gender and sexuality and becomes a weapon to contest the dominant heterosexual gender codes” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 116). In other words, by confusing categories of “man” and “woman,” drag queens are disrupting one of the most important organizing principles in all human societies: gender. Pandora Boxx, who performs in Rochester, believes that drag shows can reveal the socially-constructed nature of gender: “It is we as human beings who dictated how each sex should look when it comes to hairstyle, makeup, [and] clothes. We are not born that way. It’s a learned behavior. If you look back at history some of what men wore as regular clothes would be considered drag now. Drag makes us question our stereotypes and our gender role assignments.” Not all anthropologists believe that such rituals of inversion subvert cultural norms; some have even argued that they are “intended to preserve and even...strengthen the established order.” From his analysis of African rituals of inversion, Max Gluckman argues that: “the lifting of the normal taboos and restraints obviously serves to emphasize them” and “by allowing people to behave

normally prohibited ways, gave expression, in a reverse form, to the normal rightness of a particular kind of social order” (115-116). It is, then “the acceptance of the established order as right and good, and even sacred, [which] seems to allow unbridled license, very rituals of rebellion, for the order itself keeps this rebellion within bounds” (Gluckman, 125). While this perspective has some validity, it does not recognize the dynamic quality of cultural systems. Through time and space, the very “established order” to which Gluckman refers will evolve, changing what is and what is not considered acceptable behavior.

The practice of drag performance in the United States has certainly evolved over time, yet it continues to challenge traditional notions of “masculinity” and “femininity” in American culture. Drag queens, who can appear to be particularly convincing women, speak in low baritone voices. They also make comments about their feminine bodies; Ambrosia Salad, a drag queen in Rochester informed that audience one night that: “I think I just lactated.” Butler goes even further, arguing that audience members assume the actor’s “true” biological gender before they interpret the performance: “It would be a mistake to take it as the paradigm of subversive action or, indeed, as a model for political agency. The point is rather different. If one thinks that one sees a man dressed as a woman or a woman dressed as a man, then one takes the first term of each of those perceptions as the “reality” of gender” (Gender Trouble, xxiii). In sum, drag performances are not artistic performances for art’s sake. Taylor and Rupp agree: “We suggest that

drag as performed at the 801 [Cabaret] should be understood not only as commercial performance but as a political event in which identity is used to contest conventional thinking about gender and sexuality” (Drag Queens, 2). Pandora Boxx, who performs in Rochester, definitely believes that her performances are political:

Anything that goes against the norm becomes political at some point. I think because drag queens are often more visible is does poise drag to become more political and outspoken. American politics are drag in a way too. Drag is all about putting on the appearance of someone else. How many politicians put on their own version of a drag face and go out and smile to the people while they are dealing with the devil behind the scenes?

Judith Butler emphasizes that the artistic, the performative, and the cultural have always been political for queer communities in the U.S. Indeed, the theatrical aspect of gay and lesbian activism in the United States, particularly during the outbreak of AIDS in the gay male community was crucial to furthering a gay and lesbian agenda:

“To oppose the theatrical to the political within contemporary queer politics is, I would argue, an impossibility: the hyperbolic “performance” of death in the practice of “die-ins” and the theatrical “outness” by which queer activism has disrupted the closeting distinction between public and private space have proliferated sites of politicization and AIDS awareness

throughout the public realm.

Indeed, an important set of histories might be told in which the increasing politicization of theatricality for queers is at stake... Such a history might include traditions of cross-dressing, drag balls, street walking, butch-femme spectacles, the sliding between the march (New York City) and the parade (San Francisco); die-ins by ACT UP, kiss-ins by Queer Nation; drag performance benefits for AIDS... the convergence of theatrical work with theatrical activism; performing excessive lesbian sexuality and iconography that effectively counters the de-sexualization of the lesbian; tactical interruptions of public forums by lesbian and gay activists in favor of drawing public attention and outrage to the failure of government funding of AIDS research and outreach" (Bodies That Matter, 233).

An example of performative resistance within the gay and lesbian community *out of drag* was documented by Newton on Fire Island. Heterosexual tourists would regularly spy on gays and lesbians in their homes during the 1970s. Amelia Migliaccio noted that one time "a group of women, with husbands standing behind [said] 'Oh, how cute, they're eating!' Whereupon Babe jumped up and said, 'Come on in, your daughter's here!'... And another time she took a can of Raid and went outside and just started to spray. That was terrible. But that was the attitude... 'Oh, look, they're eating.' You know, I mean like just a zoo" (Cherry Grove, 247). Champagne, a drag performer

from Upstate New York, noted the important role that drag queens have played within the larger gay and lesbian movement, particularly during the Stonewall Riot: "it wasn't a bunch of gay men and lesbians, it was drag queens who were pulled out and arrested... if it wasn't for stonewall, a lot of gay rights wouldn't be where they are today." The importance of drag queens in the larger gay and lesbian movement was not lost on Taylor and Rupp, who noted: "their resistance has also been important to the organized gay and lesbian movement. From Jose Sarria, drag queen and political candidate, to the drag queen chorus line challenging the police the night of the raid at the Stonewall Inn in 1969, drag queens, however ambivalently viewed by the movement, have been there" (Drag Queens, 186). Drag queens have used their persona to enact particularly powerful performances of resistance. For example, Gene Malin, who performed as a pansy (not a drag queen) in New York City during the early 20th Century, was not afraid to stand up for himself:

After winning a prize for being the 'best dressed woman' at a Greenwich Village drag ball, he had wandered into a cafeteria without having bothered to change his clothes... when a part of four rough looking birds tossed a pitcher of hot water at him as he danced by, he pitched into them. After beating three of them into insensibility, the fight went into the street, with two taxi drivers coming to the assistance of the surviving member of the original foursome (Chauncey, 316).

Champagne also discussed how drag queens reacted to the introduction of HIV/AIDS in the early 1980s: “when AIDS and HIV first came out it was the drag queens who were going out and doing benefits, giving money when it first was the gay cancer...trying to get people aware of what this was.” This history is not lost on Champagne, who raises money for children and families affected by HIV/AIDS through the annual Snowball Benefit, which she spearheads. It is a personal issue for Champagne, who acknowledges that a lot of drag queens are no longer performing because they have “died of AIDS.” Champagne says that as a drag queen performing in her benefit “you want to update them [the audience], you want to make them aware of what’s going on, you want to be politically aware and you know responsible...a lot of people don’t fucking know because it’s kinda like really blasé now – it’s [referring to HIV/AIDS] still here people, it still exists, we still need money, they are still looking for a cure.”

An important ritual of drag performance in American culture is the Invasion of the Pines. It began when Teri Warren, an Italian-American drag queen went to the Pines (a primarily upper-class, conservative, gay community on Fire Island) in drag to get dinner, but was not served because he was “not properly attired.” After the incident, a group of gay men (and at least two lesbians) dressed in drag and marched to the Pines in protest. Between eight and fourteen people, wearing “the most ridiculous drag” participated, and as they marched they sang “God Bless America.” Amelia, a participant, remembers:

So...people ...started to look and say, ‘what the hell is that?’ ... Well, we got out of the boat and Nick is carrying this big sign. It says, “Pines people are plastic’ or, ‘Pines people don’t know how to live.’ And I’m saying, ‘We’re gonna die, I know we’re gonna die here. They’re gonna kill us.’...But what happened was everybody started to laugh, I mean they thought it was really funny. And we just walked around and we went into the Blue Whale [the restaurant that Teri Warren was kicked out of] and they were so ecstatic that we were there they bought us a drink (Cherry Grove, 269-270).

This protest became a tradition, and “by the late 1980s it took the largest double-decker ferry to carry all the invaders to the Pines, and the crowd awaiting them there could be numbered in the thousands” (Cherry Grove, 270). Newton argues that the ritual “insists on kinship and commonality...bridges invidious class and generational distinctions and reasserts gay nationalism” (Cherry Grove, 271).

A particularly poignant moment in my fieldwork was when I witnessed a drag queen perform as Sarah Palin. The emcee of the show, Ambrosia Salad, asked the audience: “How many are following politics? A loud set of applause then erupted out of the audience. “We have a special treat for you...she was just debating against Biden... she can see Irondequoit [location near Rochester, NY] from her house.” Miss Darienne Lake then came out onto the stage wearing glasses, a wig and a wardrobe similar to that worn by Sarah Palin. In the performance

. she sang Meredith Brooks' song "Bitch," which emphasizes the multi-faceted roles and personalities that women sport. Her performance was highly sexualized; she used a lot of tongue action and revealed a large bosom. After the performance, Ambrosia Salad said "she's very folksy tonight" in reference to political commentators' opinions that Sarah Palin's ability to speak to the common American was her greatest asset. This ethnographic moment was heavily steeped in meaning; it can be read as political commentary, gender critique, and the history of American conservatism and the queer community. As a social conservative, Sarah Palin sparked fear in the queer community, and represented the socially-conservative segment of the Republican Party that former President George Bush supported during his two terms in office. Miss Darienne Lake's representation of Sarah Palin, however, was highly sexualized; in a way this counters her socially-conservative façade and plays with the notion of Sarah Palin as a sexual being. In fact, after her performance the emcee, Ambrosia Salad said: "She's a cock-sucking mom who loses her lipstick." While this representation is clearly problematic from a feminist perspective, it does point out the hypocrisy of a politician who supports abstinence-only education. All human beings, even socially-conservative politicians, such as Sarah Palin, are sexual, and this is a theme that drag queens try to bring to their audiences.

Often, overtly political statements are made as side-bar commentary in drag performances. In Key West, Rupp and Taylor observed drag queens "talk about the gay

and lesbian movement, AIDS, gay marriage, and discrimination" (*Drag Queens*, 143). I observed such statements during my fieldwork as well; when introducing a visiting performer from Florida, Ambrosia Salad cried out: "You know the state with the hanging chads... maybe this is too long ago for some of you... You know, back when Gore was supposed to win."

Young queers as a whole seem do not seem to be as embarrassed by drag performances as some older members of the community are. In fact, it is the radical and rebellious nature of the performance that makes it so intriguing to young, queer Americans. In a focus group discussion among queer college students and allies at the State University of New York at Geneseo, the Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence were brought up in the conversation. The international organization consists of drag performers who wear the traditional attire of Catholic nuns. Their highly visible performances are clearly political in nature, and are of course a parody on the strict social conservatism present in the Roman Catholic Faith. As Senelick notes: "By 1981 the order contained fifteen sisters and two novices, including Sister Missionary Position, Sister Homo Fellatio, Sister Hysterectoria, and Sister Searching for Men. The following year, Sister Boom Boom... ran for a post on the Board of Supervisors, San Francisco's governing body" (466). Their political activism included:

reciting litanies and antiphonies at public events, for example, 'From the prejudice of Ronald Regan/Let us protect ourselves.' They

protested the Pope's visit to the city by canonizing the late Harvey Milk; exorcised Jerry Falwell and Phyllis Schlafly; gave public readings of The Satanic Verses, and conferred sainthood on such fellow-travelers as Harvey Feinstein, Lily Tomlin, and Shirley MacLaine. They made frequent television appearances to debate political issues and gay rights. By the time they celebrated their Decade of Decadence in 1989 with a formal ADIS benefit there were thirty sisters, several of them female and/or heterosexual (468).

One student noted that: "they [Sisters of Perpetual Indulgence] are everywhere in the world, they are all over the place." Immediately, another student interrupted saying: "they're doing missionary work." After a period of collective laughter, a third student asserted: "they're recruiters," playing off the assertion in mainstream heterosexual culture that gay men and lesbians have to "prey" on youth to try to convert them to a homosexual lifestyle.

While drag queens emphasize the differences between audience members in their performances (in terms of gender and sexual orientation specifically), they also seem to emphasize the unity that all human beings share. As Champagne emphasized, "we're all people...we breath the same...we think the same...we go through the same shit." In my fieldwork in Rochester, I have found that drag performances are always lead by an emcee who welcomes the audience as a whole, and throughout the performance tries to create a sense of unity

amongst everyone in the bar. In their study of drag queens in Key West, Rupp and Taylor have also noted how drag queens try to emphasize the humanity of all peoples through their performances on the stage.

Not all drag queens see their performances as inherently political. Champagne asserted that aside from a few political jokes, her performances are not necessarily political. Part of the difficulty in determining whether queens view their performances political or not is the very term "political" itself, and it is often only read in its most formal sense (in reference to party politics, judicial systems, etc). Additionally, one must acknowledge that drag queens, as individuals often living outside of the academic community, are often unexposed to the language and concepts explored in gender and queer theory. Thus, one cannot expect them to understand their performances within the framework of gender theory, which is often relegated to the ivory tower of the academy. Rupp and Taylor agree: "the drag queens and their audiences, as we have seen, are unlikely to talk 'cultural repertoires' or 'counter-hegemonic gender and sexual meanings' or even 'collective identity,' but that does not make their performances of protest any less confrontational, intentional, solidarity-building, or indeed, any less compelling" (*Drag Queens*, 22). Whose interpretation, then wins out, the anthropologist's or the performer's? Numerous anthropologists, particularly those examining ritual studies, have noted the etic/emic paradox that exists in the discipline. Victor Turner posits this same question: "How, then, can a social anthropologist justify his claim to be able to interpret a society's

ritual symbols more deeply and comprehensively than the actors themselves?" (*Forest of Symbols*, 26). Turner thinks that the anthropologist can and should interpret the symbolic meaning of a performance: "he [Turner assumes that all anthropologists are male] can place this ritual in its significant field setting and describe the structures and properties of that field" (*Forest of Symbols*, 26-27). At the same time, he acknowledges that the anthropologist is embedded within her/his own "structural perspective." By this he means that the anthropologist's "own vision is circumscribed by his particular position, or even a set of situationally conflicting positions, both in the persisting structure of his society, and also in the role structure of the given ritual" (*Forest of Symbols*, 27). As a self-identified gay man, I think that my position makes me well-suited for interpreting the meaning behind drag performance. In the end, I think it is important to find a balance between these two perspectives. Of course, the lives of LGBTIQ individuals are inherently political; their very existence is made political in a society where they are treated and represented as second-class citizens. However, the way that the anthropologist and the performer define a "political performance" may be vastly different. Overall, drag queens are not afraid to address the discrimination faced by queer Americans with their sassy, dynamic, and feisty personalities. When discussing legacy of George Bush's presidency, Champagne chimed in with: "it's like you're trying to tell us who we can and cannot love and who we can and cannot marry...who the fuck are they...you are supposed to represent your

entire country."

Problematic Performances: Racism and Misogyny in Drag

Within some feminist circles, drag queens are seen as perpetuating negative images of American women; in fact some compare the performances of drag queens to racist blackface performances. With their hyper-femininity, drag queens represent a certain type of woman on the stage. This woman is often represented as white, blonde, very attractive, highly sexualized, with large breasts. Perhaps one of the greatest theoretical hurdles that one must confront when studying drag queen performances in the United States is the often sexist representations that they support. Morris describes the central theoretical issue that has made studies of drag problematic for scholars:

Indeed, the theory of performativity has turned to drag for its metaphors, its exemplary instances, and its structural models. The literature on this topic is divided between works that treat transvestite and transgendered performances as subversive of the dominant sex/gender system and those that see them as an element buttressing and reconfirming binary opposition through an instructive but ultimately resolved blurring (582-583).

One need only look at the critiques surrounding Jennie Livingston's documentary *Paris is Burning* to understand how divisive this issue is amongst gender theorists (*Paris is Burning*). bell hooks in particular has been critical of drag performances for perpetuating misogynistic, racist themes (hooks, 214).

Other critics have noted incidents of misogyny in drag performances. Morris recounts an incident that Esther Newton describes in her ethnography of Fire Island in which men performing in drag prevented lesbians from participating in the experience:

“Newton has done just that with her description of a conflict that arose in Cherry Grove, New York, when lesbians attempted to enter a drag show and gay men rejected their right to masquerade in the feminine. Somewhat soberingly, accounts like these indicate that, even when self-consciously addressed to the matter of gender, drag can reinscribe dominant ideology – not because it provides an exemplary resolution but because the subject of conscious manipulation can never fully enter into the realm of the unconscious” (584).

The debate centering on drag performances as anti-feminist is rooted in issues of identity, identity politics, and internalized homophobia. McNeal, perhaps the only gay male anthropologist to have studied drag queen performances in the United States, notes painfully that

We should remain ever cognizant of how individuals and groups may exacerbate and even intensify certain oppressions at the same time that they attempt to reclaim and rectify others... Drag highlights the performative aspects of gender, and it is subversive and parodic by turns. But it is important that as observing analysts we do not foreclose upon any final interpretation of drag because

in many ways it re-instantiates the hegemonic system of binary gender and buttresses the status quo as much as it subverts it. It is much too simplistic to pose drag performance as either subversive or reaffirming of dominant cultural models of gender and sexuality... It is sobering and disheartening to observe attempts at assertiveness, empowerment, and transcendence through the marginal play of drag that resorts to re-stigmatization and sexism (360).

From my fieldwork experiences, I have seen several examples of drag queen performances that can be read as misogynistic. I observed one performance in Rochester, NY that was particularly troubling. In the performance, Miss Darienne Lake performed as Rihanna, a popular female musical artist who had just recently been in the news for having suffered from domestic abuse. Miss Darienne Lake came out on stage wearing make-up to simulate a bruised body (with a particularly dark black eye), and was punched, kicked and scratched on stage by another performer. Later, Miss Aggy Dune performed as M.I.A., the pregnant Sri Lankan female rapper. The drag queen wore an outfit similar to the one M.I.A. wore at the Grammys – it was made of black fabric, and had a black-and-white polka dot pattern fabric on the breasts and stomach (a fake pregnant stomach was hidden under the clothes. At the end of the show, the drag queen used a coat hanger (handed to her from backstage) on stage to simulate an abortion. Then, Miss Darienne Lake, who was still dressed as Rhianna, came out on stage and proceeded to punch

Miss Aggy Dune repeatedly in her stomach. Certainly such a performance can be read as being misogynistic. During another fieldwork visit, a special drag contest was being held for amateurs. One of the categories was lawn attire, meaning that they had to dress in a lawn ornament theme. One performer wore a black burqa, and carried on stage plastic flowers and a flamingo whirligig and lay on the floor to imitate a lawn. The same performer came out in the same black burqa in the “recession gown” (cheap attire) category and revealed a short skirt underneath made from newspaper. The emcee, Pandora Box, exclaimed: “code orange, code orange!” and the performer ran off stage. The audience found both performances extremely comedic, if not the most comedic of all the performances. Such representations of women, however, “play” with the oppression of women. Butler, who finds a way to mediate from both sides of the debate, asserts that: “The feminist analysis [of drag] thus makes male homosexuality about women and one might argue that at its extreme, this kind of analysis is in fact a colonization in reverse, a way for feminist women to make themselves into the center of male/male homosexual activity (and thus to reinscribe the heterosexual matrix, paradoxically, at the heart of the radical feminist position) (Bodies That Matter, 127). Coming from a lesbian perspective, Newton is able to look at male-bodied drag performances through both a heterosexual and misogynistic lens. She notes how feminist critiques of drag queen performances can be very limiting. Using the perspective of psychological anthropology, McNeal (who self-identifies as a gay male)

tries to understand how sexist representations of women emerge in drag queen performances. In part, gay men embrace performing as women because “For these few moments, the ‘femininity’ attributed to gay men is not stigmatized and ashamed, but in control and assertive, retaliating against a hegemonic straight world” (346-347). Thus, through representing women on the stage, performing as drag queens is an act of resistance: “the symbolic inversion of the drag show provides catharsis for those gay men present who enjoy and laugh as the personification of their own stigma takes undisputed control over the court” (348). Gay men are able to control, and indeed, reappropriate the femininity that has been placed upon them by mainstream society through these performances. Therefore, “Gay men have responded to this situation not only by poking fun at the world, but also by poking fun at themselves and women who occupy a similar, though not equivalent, psycho-cultural position in relation to men concerning matters of desire” (347). This is supported by drag queens who assert that they are celebrating, not demeaning women in their performances. Indeed, Champagne sees drag performance as “an homage” to women. Pandora Boxx does not believe that drag queens’ performances are inherently sexist:

I certainly understand where that comes from but I think it’s ridiculous. You can’t portray something so amazingly if you view it in a negative light. If drag queens truly hated women or anything like that they would not be able to go out on stage and celebrate the image of a

woman. If anything drag pokes fun at the image of what we have deemed women should look like and be like. I don't know if you would ever find a drag queen who says, I dress up like a woman because I hate women. Dressing up like a woman comes from a place of love. Love of the image of a woman, love of the powerful woman, love of our own mothers, love of femininity. It's all about love.

Similarly, Milla, a drag queen in Key West exclaimed: "Yes, ladies and gentlemen, women are power. You wouldn't be here if it wasn't for them...And that's why we spend all of our time being effeminate and looking up to women and thinking that they are all that they are" (*Drag Queens*, 144). In the documentary *Wigstock*, two African-American drag queens discussed their opinions on the issue. One argued that: "I think of myself as a butch drag queen – I'm paying homage to strong black women." The other agreed, stating; "Women are a lot stronger than men generally anyway because since they've been oppressed so long...they are more emotionally strong, they're more in touch with their spirituality" (Silvers). Finally, McNeal acknowledges that many drag queen performances are indeed sexist, despite any psychological explanation. However, one way to make sense of these sexist representations is that such "misogyny...is deeply tied to gay men's internalized homophobia and culturally learned shame" (348). Thus, until gay men are able to fight their own internalized homophobia, drag queen performances are likely to continue to have many misogynistic themes.

Additionally, the argument has been made within the queer community that contemporary drag queens are not impersonating women; instead they are performing as drag queens, a unique category of individuals unto itself. As Champagne notes, "it's really not about portraying a woman." Instead, they perform as drag queens, which tend to represent an extreme femininity. Because drag queens have formed their own unique subculture within the United States, drag performances tend to have particular similarities in different regions of the country. Such performances have their own established norms and rules, which amateurs must accept. As Goffman notes, "When an actor takes on an established social role, usually he finds that a particular front has already been established for it. Whether his acquisition of the role was primarily motivated by a desire to perform the given task or by a desire to maintain the corresponding front, the actor will find that he must do both" (27). In other words, drag queens cannot be said to perform as women; instead, in order to perform in professional venues, they must perform as drag queens.

Performances of drag queens have also always been "raced" as much as they have been "gendered." Some contemporary drag queen performers actually do don blackface. One student in a PRIDE meeting focus group at the State University of New York at Geneseo noted how she had heard about: "a blackface drag queen...the character is a three hundred pound welfare queen who has nineteen kids and drives a Cadillac." The student was troubled by this character, which clearly played off painful stereotypes of black femininity in American

culture. This character was not a myth, however. Chuck Knipp, a white gay male, performs in blackface under the persona Shirley Q. Liquor, an obese African-American woman on welfare who has nineteen children. He is well-known within drag queen circles, and has videos featured on YouTube (McCullom, 1). Champagne stated that she has seen drag queens perform in blackface, and asserted that “I didn’t even recognize him until he walked up to me – I was like you look fabulous as a black woman!”

On an episode of RuPaul’s Drag Race, a reality show competition for drag queens that aired in the spring of 2009, had an episode in which contestants were asked to make a drag persona inspired by Oprah Winfrey. At least one of the contestants, Jade, took this instruction literally, and tried to darken his complexion for the role (“Queens of All Media”). Champagne noted that she has seen some performers in blackface and said that sometimes it can be very realistic looking. As troubling as the history of blackface is, drag performances in America have always required performers to experiment with new identities. The ritualistic role reversal in drag performances makes it an appropriate cultural space for actors to “play” with the concept of racial and/or ethnic identity.

Sexualizing Drag Performance

An important function of drag is to highlight the sexualized experiences of Americans; indeed, drag performances can be read as a critique of the puritanical nature of American culture. Sexuality is in itself, of course, a metaphor for power, and thus it is rational for drag queens to use sexual per-

formances, jokes, metaphors, acts, and innuendos in their shows to combat an oppressive power structure. Rupp and Taylor explain the power of bringing sexuality to the forefront of drag queen performances:

“the sex talk and the public nudity and the groping serve as an extension of the way the girls challenge conventional understandings of male and female, straight and gay. In their public talk about sex and the slang words for body parts and sex acts that they bring into regular use, the drag queens practice what might be called a politics of vulgarity... In the same way that they blur the boundaries of gender and sexual categories and violate traditional distinctions between public and private, they cross the line between the respectable and the vulgar. Their bawdy talk about sex acts shocks the audience, creating an opening for the introduction of ideas about gender and sexuality that are shocking in a different sense” (Drag Queens, 140).

Indeed, an important part of the drag performance is its “shock factor.” In “On top of all this is the fact that drag queens make sex, which is usually far more private, a very public affair... The language the drag queens use about sex and their constant talk about sex acts contribute to an environment in which anything goes and nothing is shocking” (Drag Queens, 138). During their fieldwork, Taylor and Rupp observed Sushi, a drag queen, remind the audience that: “we are drag queens! We do have dicks and two balls!” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 114). In the field I also noticed many different

performative acts that were meant to shock the audience. Such acts would range from drag queens suddenly speaking in a very low, masculine voice, to placing the hands of audience members on their genitalia. In an interview with Champagne she noted that the point of the show is not to sexually arouse the audience, however, “if you do get aroused...meet me after the show.” Champagne’s statement exemplifies drag performances; it combines comedy with an openly sexual discourse. Even student members of the Pride Alliance at the State University of New York at Geneseo recognized the importance of sexuality in drag performances; one student noted how “drag is very sexualized in so many ways.” Drag queens perfect their gender performance by learning how to move their bodies in a sexual manner.

When asked how she moves when she performs, Pandora Boxx stated: “Well, I try to dance. I’m no professional dancer by any means. I watch other entertainers like Madonna, Britney Spears, Pink and such to try and take little moves here and there and make them my own. There is usually a lot of sexuality to my moves on stage.” On the eve before Valentine’s Day, a drag performance in Rochester, NY was highly sexualized; this was especially fitting given the date of the show. The emcee of the drag show, called the Salad Bar Review, stated: “we’ll do a little demonstration right here, no that’s all extra ladies and gentlemen, that’s the after hours show – once the bar closes down we lock the door and that’s when the real Salad Bar Review starts.”

Some audience members are not always comfortable with the highly sexualized

nature of drag queen performances. Champagne “in case you haven’t guessed, you are at a drag show if someone comes over to you and sits on your lap...its all in fun...we are here to entertain you...if you can’t handle that then here is the door and I can refund your ticket money.” Some people have even pushed her away when she approached audience members during the show; when asked about who pushed her away, she said: “I’ve had lesbians do that, I’ve had straight men do that.” The anxiety that drag performances can elicit is not restricted to any one “category” of people. However, it does seem that straight audiences, who may be less comfortable with drag queens, show higher levels of anxiety. In her ethnographic research, Esther Newton observed the different ways that gay and straight audiences interacted with drag queens:

In Chicago, one very popular performer came down off the stage as part of his act and held out his hands to the gay audience sitting along the bar. The people in the audience virtually climbed all over each other to touch him. In Kansas City, I saw the same performer come down into the straight audience, and the people at the tables as he walked among them visibly shrank back. At one point he accidentally touched a woman, and she actually screamed ‘Get it away from me.’ At this point another woman jumped up yelling, ‘I’ll touch it,’ and pulled his wig. Since the wigs are usually glued on fairly firmly, it did not come off. The second woman then screamed louder than the first, ‘It’s its own hair!’ and

jumped back (66).

Milla, a drag performer in Key West similarly asserted: "If you don't like the show, there's an escalator right there. If it's not turned on, just tell me, I'll help you down the stairs" (Drag Queens, 113). By making such statements, drag queens claim their space on the stage, and assert their dominance over audience members who may not be comfortable challenging traditional notions of gender and sexuality.

In addition, drag queens subvert traditional definitions of sexual identity by achieving the sexual arousal of heterosexual men in their performances. Champagne provided a specific example of when she was able to sexually arouse a heterosexual man at the request of his girlfriend: "I got down on my hands and knees...put the zipper in my mouth and got right up in his crotch and he was turning his head...he started to get hard...the girlfriend was taking pictures and laughing...it's fun because they [heterosexual men] get kinda embarrassed." Although not performing in drag at the time of this incident, Champagne also noted a time when she resisted male heteronormative culture when being bullied in high school: "the kid came out in the hallway and started saying shit to me...and I said what's wrong? You're girlfriend ain't blowing you the right way? You drop your fucking pants and I'll show you how to suck a cock...his mouth was gaped open and he couldn't say anything...I blew him kisses the rest of the day." During a show in Rochester, Samantha Vegas harassed a young heterosexual man celebrating a bachelor party by saying: "I bet you're

Irish...Oh, well does the top match the bottom [in reference to his red hair]?" Samantha then proceeded to call him "Ben-Gay" and asked him to "Ben-Dover." The other men in the bachelor party were very nervous to approach the drag queen. However, Samantha Vegas told Ben that if he took off his shirt she would show him her breasts. She then preceded to hand him one of her fake breasts and put it under his shirt. In doing so, she confused the gender identity of the male, heterosexual audience member. Joe, another heterosexual male member of the party was reluctant to approach the stage when called upon. Samantha Vegas then cried out: "I bet you take it like a man but scream like a woman." At one point in the performance, the bachelor's friends told him to "just back down." Samantha Vegas then questioned why his friends didn't want him to get married: "Do you have a crush on him? I bet you're so far in the closet that you can't even find the door." She then picked out one of the party members who was hiding in a corner and asked him to come and stage and dance to the music. Surprisingly, when on stage he took off his shirt, danced, and thrust his behind at Joe; he proceeded to take off his pants and lowered his boxers, and even received tips. Rupp and Taylor also observed that drag queens in Key West badger straight male audience members: "Although the drag queens appreciate their straight audiences, Kylie also says, 'straight people don't know how much gay people love to see us make fun of them.' The gay men in the audience enjoy, as one said the drag queens 'get some guy up there trying to take his shorts off and things like that. Especially because they always get

the straight boys up there to do that.’ Another gay man commented, ‘I mean, I love it when they hassle straight men’ (Drag Queens, 191). A specific ethnographic event highlighted for Rupp and Taylor the centrality of fighting male heteronormative structures in their performances: “Kylie pours right from the bottle into volunteers’ mouths, making comparisons to fellatio. When the straight man gags, Kylie gives him grief: ‘God. And I bet you beg her to suck it until you come. Maybe now you understand why she doesn’t want to swallow.’ In this way, they express anti-male sentiments and critique male domination of women. There’s a lot of hostility in the show directed at straight men” (Drag Queens, 134). Esther Newton argues that by celebrating their “gayness,” drag queens can invert the traditional social structure in which something that is “so gay” becomes something positive, not negative:

The drag queen symbolizes an open declaration, even celebration, of homosexuality. The drag queen says for his gay audience, who cannot say it, ‘I’m gay, I don’t care who knows it; the straight world be damned.’ ‘Live’ impersonators whom I saw working in gay bars almost invariably ‘put down’ any obvious heterosexuals who happened in, to the great satisfaction of the gay audience (Mother Camp, 64).

In fact, drag queens can use their skills as comediennes to oppose dominant heterosexual systems. In her fieldwork, Newton observed this first-hand:

The performer was attempting to talk

to a lady in the audience whom I could not see, and referred to her date as ‘that fat man you’re with.’ The man shot back, ‘We’d get along a lot better if you’d address me as sir.’ This obviously angered Tris [drag queen], who retorted, ‘You paid a dollar to come in here and watch me; you’d better believe I wouldn’t pay a dime to watch you roast in hell.’ The man wouldn’t give up, but repeated his demand, where upon Tris replied with elaborate sarcasm in his voice, ‘Sir...?’ I’m more sir than you’ll ever be, and twice the broad you’ll ever pick up.’ This drew a laugh from the audience and silenced the man (Mother Camp, 66).

Drag queens also harass heterosexual women in many of their performances. McNeal notes that one reason for this is that drag queens, who are most often gay men, are often perceived as vying for the sexual attention of masculine men, as are heterosexual women. He also asserts that: “If the drag queen – or male homosexual – manages to beat women at the glamour game, then s/he has at least momentarily outwitted one aspect of the cultural model of compulsory heterosexuality” (359). During fieldwork, there were several times when drag queens would bring heterosexual female audience members into their performances. During one drag performance in Rochester, I witnessed two separate heterosexual women both turning fifty years old on the same night. One of the women was asked by a drag queen to “de-boxer” a “straight” young man in the bathroom. She was followed

into the bathroom with this young man, where she proceeded to take off his pants. The other woman, highly intoxicated, was brought on stage where she danced provocatively with the drag queen. On another date two heterosexual female audience members were harassed by the drag queen emcee who asked if this was their first time attending a drag performance. Upon confirmation, the drag queen asked the woman why they were holding on to their jackets and purses, and if they were too afraid [of a queer space] to bring them to coat check.

In general, drag performances confuse the sexualized identities of audience members themselves because they often combine “sex acts that are outside their category of gender and sexual preference” (*Drag Queens*, 136). For example, in Rupp and Taylor’s study, both lesbians and heterosexual women were sexually attracted to the drag queens in their study: “obviously, people have different responses to the girls, but it is noticeable that women, both straight and lesbian, tended to talk about their attraction to those... who look most like women in drag” (*Drag Queens*, 193).

Theatricality of Drag

The performative aspect of drag shows begs for an anthropological analysis; indeed, it too is bounded by specific norms and rules that determine when and who can perform on stage. From my fieldwork experience, specific lighting and musical signs are used to cue the audience that a show is about to begin. Curtains and doors block off the “sacred” space in which the performers transform into queens and the “profane” space of the bar and dance floor. McNeal

describes the sacred space as a “circumscribed arena that provides a privileged window into the psychic realities of gay men, even though they are – for dynamically defensive reasons – unaware of the conflicts and ambivalences expressed in that forum” (366). One must note that the stage is only sacred during the drag performances; between or before and after acts the stage can be used as a space for resting, dancing, or occasionally, stripping. Thus the conception of a sacred or profane space is not simply limited to place, but time as well.

Drag queens inhabit a liminal space in their performances; they are, in the words of Victor Turner, “betwixt and between.” Turner argues: “liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arranged by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial. As such, their ambiguous and indeterminate attributes are expressed by a rich variety of symbols in the many societies that ritualize social and cultural transitions. Thus, liminality is frequently likened to death, to being in the womb, to invisibility, to darkness, to bisexuality, to the wilderness, and to an eclipse of the sun or moon” (*Ritual Process*, 95). Drag queens are not necessarily “male,” nor are they “female.” Similarly, they inhabit a space in which individuals are allowed to explore, and challenge the confines of their gender. This is both a powerful place and a dangerous place. It is within this space that they challenge the status quo.

In her ethnography *Mother Camp*, Esther Newton notes that: “In fact the distinguishing characteristic of drag... is its group character; all drag, whether formal, informal, or professional, as a theatrical structure

style. There is no drag without an actor and his audience, and there is no drag without drama (or theatricality)" (37). As an artistic endeavor, drag performances require queens to have a solid command of the stage, and by extension, of the audience. In their article, Rupp and Taylor note the affinity that many drag queens have to the theater: "Being a drag queen also means embracing a theatrical identity, and many of them have background in theater. Scabola has been involved in theater since elementary school and always loved it... Although for Milla being a drag queen is more profound, she also identifies as a performer. She, too, was in theater groups from a young age. What she loves is being able to use her feelings, to evoke the pain and anger and love that audience members have felt in their own lives... R.V. had been in professional summer stock theater as a boy... Inga has been in the theater since she was ten, and she, too, loves performing." ("Chicks with Dicks", 123). In my interview with Rob (who performs as Champagne in Schenectady, New York), he made it clear that his experience with the theater in high school made him more comfortable performing on stage in drag: "with acting in high school and everything we had to do classes in watching people and studying their mannerisms." Champagne also stated that "I was involved in drama in high school and I looked at it as an acting role... Rob was always the shy person where if I was Champagne I could say anything I want to." Experience within the theater allows drag queens to get into and develop a persona, a topic that will be examined in the following section. Taylor and Rupp found

that the majority of the drag queens that they studied in Key West also had familiarity with the theater: "With their theatrical experience, the drag queens engage in street theater – both in the cabaret and literally on the streets - in a way that brings their work into alignment with their identity politics" ("Chicks with Dicks", 125). In their ethnography, Taylor and Rupp also note that many drag queens became familiar with using makeup through their theater experience (*Drag Queens*, 13). One student in the PRIDE focus group noted that the collectivity found among a group of drag queens is to be expected, as it mirrors the experience of many who are a part of a theatrical cast: "any performance, any group that you're seeing everyday you're going to have that sisterhood." Drag queens tend to be very critical of their work. After all, for most of them performing is an economic activity, and better performances mean better tips. Champagne noted that: "I'll like have a videotape and come back home that night and I'll watch the show... I've very critical of my own performances" and stated that she treated drag "like a career."

By attending amateur drag performances in Rochester, I learned to appreciate the artistic and performative talent of professional drag queens. Often amateurs are not self-confident enough to act as professionals, and will occasionally forget to or mess-up their lip-synching. Berkowitz notes that "amateur drag queens have limited status and are the ones subject to the most overt discrimination by their gay peers. Although it was at this amateur bar that we witnessed the most interactions between the drag queens and mainstream gay men, much of

this contact was characterized by disrespect and vulgarity, rather than appreciation” (29).

There are specific theatrical performances that are common throughout different drag queen performances in the United States. From my fieldwork, I have noticed that a common line for drag queens to use to start a show is “the more you drink the prettier we look.” Ambrosia Salad, an emcee drag queen at a gay bar in Rochester called this the “rule number one.” Champagne said that she used the same saying: “I made the announcement: ‘the more you drink the prettier we look’ so of course everyone is running up to that bar.”

Forging A New Persona

Drag queens create persona(s) from which to express themselves as female-bodied. Professional performers cling to a specific persona as a way of making themselves identifiable to returning audience members. Indeed, Pandora Boxx argues that “If you don’t have some sort of personae, then you are not an entertainer.” The line between the drag queen’s everyday self and their drag persona, however, often becomes blurred. Roger claims that his persona, Champagne, was very different from him. Champagne was confident, whereas he was shy; Champagne was bold, whereas he was calm. However, with time he has found that both sides of his life (Roger and Champagne) have learned from one another, and have in many ways merged into one being: “Rob and Champagne have slowly morphed or learned from one another.” Taylor and Rupp recorded similar experiences in Key West: “This theatrical identity involves, just as in traditional theater, taking on a new per-

sona. ‘Sushi is different than Gary,’ says Sushi. Even Margo, who became a drag queen late in life, describes David as ‘an entirely different person’ from Margo, although ‘now they are coming together more and more’ (“Chicks with Dicks”, 124). Drag personas are highly dramatized, and are representative of an extremely sexually-charged female body. In his analysis of gay male culture in New York City just after the turn of the 20th Century, Chauncey notes that the self-identified “fairies” would speak, move, and gesture like prostitutes, whether they were selling themselves or not. Similarly, Taylor and Rupp note that the drag queens they observed in Key West like to “hassle the straight men.” “If some of this behavior sounds masculine, they view it more as ‘acting like hookers,’ deploying the kind of sexual aggressiveness of female prostitutes” (“Chicks with Dicks”, 124).

The creation of a persona can have a very real psychological effect upon a performer. Champagne noted a shy male friend who went out in drag on Halloween (which is, of course, a holiday during which all Americans play with new roles and personas), and “as soon as he had the body suit on...he was like a totally different person... you would never know that it was him inside that costume.” Indeed, many drag queens note how their performances can be, in Champagne’s words: “kind of liberating... there’s a sense of freedom...you’re still the same person but you have a sense of freedom.” Pandora Boxx has also found drag performance to be a positive experience: “Drag can give you a sense of empowerment. All eyes are on you for the brief moment on stage and to see that you’ve

affected people, even in a small way, can really be truly powerful.” Champagne also asserted that her persona has taught her: “not to take any crap from anybody...if you can’t love yourself, how are you gonna love somebody else?”

Drag queen personas, it then seems, have the ability to increase self-confidence and self-respect in ways perhaps unattainable for gay men living in a homophobic world. Analyzing the human mind however, is not what anthropological analysis is best-suited for, and I would leave this interpretation up to the psychologists, even given their problematic relationship with the queer community in America.

Globalizing Identities and Drag Culture

Ted Lewellen, among many other contemporary cultural anthropologists, stresses the importance of understanding processes related to globalization in order to contextualize ethnographic studies. He states: “The subjects of anthropological globalization studies are less likely to be communities or cultures than translocalities, border zones, migrations, diasporas, commodity chains, transnational corporations, foreign aid agencies, tourists, refugees, cyberspace, the influences of television and other communications media, the international processes of science or commercialized art” (57). One of the most important conclusions that can be drawn from globalization studies is that individual actors are not simply helpless victims of Westernization, but interact with technological processes to achieve personal agency. Drag performers are no different, and with the growing importance of video-sharing websites such as www.youtube.com

and social networking websites such as www.facebook.com and www.myspace.com, it is clear that they are creating identities that exist as mutable beings in cyberspace.

As professional drag queens, these performers use the internet to advertise their personas and exhibit their work. On the video sharing website YouTube, this can be easily done by creating a username profile that holds videos of a single performer to be linked to one another. Drag performances from a specific contest, such as Miss Syracuse or Miss Rochester are also posted online and threaded to one another on the related videos link. This allows viewers to go from one drag video to another, shifting between performers or looking at the varied performances of a single performer. Most of the drag queens that I observed in Rochester had pages on Myspace, although I was unable to find their pages on Facebook. Champagne asserts that Myspace is “better in some aspects.” The drag queens on Myspace featured images of them with audience members and fellow queens. Their pages were also quite political, with at least one drag queen posting an image used in Barack Obama’s presidential campaign that featured a rainbow with the words “Obama Pride.” Miss Darienne Lake featured her picture dressed as Sarah Palin as her profile picture. Myspace pages can also be used to legitimize the person who performs in drag as a “normal,” educated American. For example, Samantha Vegas notes that she holds a Master’s degree in biomedical engineering from the University of Massachusetts – Boston, and both Ambrosia Salad and Pandora Boxx define themselves as a “college graduate.”

Facebook has several groups devoted to drag queens, including “Drag Queens Rock My Socks Off,” through which I met my informant, Champagne. The group, as of May 12, 2009 has 953 members, with 12 different discussion topics, 145 wall posts, 497 posted pictures, and six posted videos.

As cyberspace continues to become an increasingly important aspect of American culture in particular, drag queens will probably continue to use the internet to sell their personas and showcase their work. Any dynamic, contemporary study of drag queens, or any other identity group that transcends political boundaries, is incomplete then without an analysis of this performance space as well.

Conclusion

The very nature of drag performance is one of illusion. Indeed, on some level all male-bodied drag queens do attempt to make the audience believe that they are biologically female. As Goffman asserts: “When an individual plays a part he implicitly requests his observers to take seriously the impression that is fostered before them” (28). Drag queens do just that. In addition, drag queens tend to portray American women in a highly exaggerated manner, in part as a way of critiquing the clearly defined gender roles in American culture. It is important to note, however, that the performances of drag queens are very ambiguous within themselves; without soliciting information from the performer, one can never be sure if the individual is truly male-bodied or female-bodied. In fact, the power of the performance rests upon the fact that the audience may not be able to definitively identify the

biological facts of the performers. Certainly in this new technological age where body modification, including gender reassignment surgery, is not unknown, it becomes difficult to define what exactly is “male-bodied” and what is “female-bodied” in the first place. These elements of illusion, parody, satire and ambiguity, make it very difficult to draw any concrete conclusions from my study of drag queens in contemporary American culture. Yes, drag queens challenge gender norms and act as agents of resistance by putting forth a new kind of *public transcript*; at the same time, however, a paradox remains in that they often reproduce the same stereotypical performances of women that American society has formed. Gluckman would argue that by showing an extreme femininity on stage, drag queens reinforce, not subvert, the gender dichotomy. Such arguments do not acknowledge the fact that drag queens are themselves, a particular category, and community, of individuals who create their own social norms, and therefore impose boundaries on their own members’ performances.

What does the future hold for drag queens in American culture? Without prompt, Champagne stated: “I don’t think that drag queens’ or drag kings’ history are quite yet done because their still gonna play an important part in the future – what future? I don’t know yet but I think that it’s going to be part of our society.” Rupp and Taylor share an optimistic perspective by suggesting that “drag can serve as a catalyst for changes in values, ideas, and identities in twenty-first century American society” (*Drag Queens*, 6). With new identities evolving in the LGBTIQ community such

as “genderqueer” and “androgynous,” as well as practices such as “genderfucking,” drag performances highlight the importance of gender-bending in queer communities in American culture. Overall, however, drag queens reveal the hidden truth that all Americans, especially those who identify as heterosexual and “gender normative,” are putting on a gendered performance at all times and in all spaces. Indeed, we are all performing in drag.

Reflections

As a queer student of anthropology, my study of drag queens in American culture has given me the opportunity to act as a native anthropologist and study those within my own community. Unlike queer anthropologists who study in “mainstream” cultures or focus on non-queer topics, such as many of those described in the groundbreaking text *Out in the Field* (edited by Ellen Lewin and William Leap), I easily maneuvered between the queer, or native community and academic anthropological community, both of which have their own culture, and thus their own norms, values, and beliefs.

From this unique vantage point, I have attempted to interpret drag queen performances from the objective, analytical perspective of an anthropologist **and** from the subjective, emotional perspective of a queer American. The harmony of these two perspectives has deepened this experience, and if nothing else, calls out for more native anthropology to be conducted. Unfortunately, many within the discipline see native anthropologists as “trapped” within their own community, making them unable to impartially

analyze it. I ask, with both membership in a community and “objective” training in anthropological theory and methodology, who is better suited to represent a culture than a native anthropologist? Given the postmodern concern that all anthropologists are simply bias-filled outside observers, caught in their own, often Western, worldview, native anthropologists can mediate between these two positions and provide new insights into the paradox of the emic and the etic views within the discipline.

More broadly, native anthropologists call into question many of the central dilemmas of the discipline: Who has the right, or the privilege, to speak for a given community or describe a given culture? Who should speak for whom? Whose interpretation is correct, or at least considered more authoritative, the anthropologist’s or the native’s? Or more critically, given the fluid nature of identities, what makes one a “native” and one an “anthropologist” in the first place? My study of drag queens on the American landscape reveals, if nothing else, that native anthropologists occupy a critical and unique space in anthropological inquiry.

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Petro-State Policy-Making and the Oil Curse: A Case Study of Hugo Chávez's Latin American Foreign Policy throughout the Oil Boom and Bust of the 2000s

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Introduction:

Possession of abundant oil reserves is often referred to as a “trap” or even a “curse” for developing countries.¹ Despite oil being one of the most valuable commodities in the world today, very few petro-states have been able to successfully convert large oil revenues into long-term national development. In studying why so many oil-rich countries have been unable to bring about much needed economic and social development through large oil revenues, analysts noticed a pattern known as the petro-state curse that oil-rich countries are prone to follow. Historically, numerous petro-states have fallen into this oil trap, including Iran in the 1970s², Nigeria in the 1980s, and Venezuela in the late 1980s³ and early 1990s.⁴ Large oil revenues are easily mismanaged and often lead to the two main components of the oil curse: “Dutch disease” and the “absorption” problem. Dutch disease refers to a common problem of resource-rich countries wherein a sudden increase in the value of a resource causes the value of the exporting country’s currency to increase in relation to other countries’ currencies.⁵ Consequently, other sectors become less profitable as non-oil exports become less competitive in global markets and as increased oil revenues bring in more imported goods. The result of Dutch disease is, therefore, increased de-

pendency on oil and a significant decrease in economic diversification. The “absorption” problem refers to the initial effect of an oil boom when large increases in revenue give petro-state administrations the impression that they can afford to fund multiple, capital-intensive policies and projects, such as large-scale development projects, military upgrades, social programs, and job creation.⁶ In addition, increased oil revenues often fuel corruption amongst government officials. However, this grandiose spending limits the development of non-oil sectors of the economy while creating an overly large non-tradable sector. Furthermore, the absorption problem leads petro-states to spend too much money to fund immediate projects and policies rather than saving or investing it in sustainable development, such as improving oil infrastructure, thereby leaving them financially ill-equipped to adapt to a sudden price drop.

Unfortunately, under the leadership of President Hugo Chávez, it looks as though Venezuela is once again headed toward suffering from economic and political instability as a result of his heavy spending throughout the oil boom of the 2000s. Chávez won the 1998 presidential election by appealing to Venezuela’s impoverished masses and by promising to replace the flawed Punto Fijo system with a new government and constitution based upon his

leftist ideology of equality.⁷ When he came into office in 1999, oil prices were low as each barrel sold for only about \$10 per barrel (see Figure 1). Furthermore, during his first year as president, Venezuela's economy was weak as a result of mismanagement of finances under the Punto Fijo system. Therefore, Chávez maintained good relations with the United States and other western powers to encourage investment in Venezuelan oil and continue the flow of foreign money into the economy.

However, oil prices soon began to rise and Chávez used that opportunity to consolidate control over Venezuela's national oil company, *Petróleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anónima (PdVSA)*, and to push foreign investors out so that the government could collect more revenues from the Venezuelan oil industry. Chávez took several steps toward taking over PdVSA by replacing company employees with individuals who were loyal to him, most notably in 2002 when he fired the then-president of PdVSA and attempted to change the company's board of directors.⁸ His actions resulted in the temporary overthrow of Chávez in an April 2002 coup d'état attempt, as well as a strike at PdVSA, beginning in 2002 and ending in 2003, which led to a decrease in Venezuela's oil output that has yet to be restored.⁹ However, Chávez used this opportunity to permanently install his supporters into essential PdVSA positions, thus consolidating his administration's control over the company.

With complete control over PdVSA, Chávez has also gained control over its revenues, which he has used to fund an array of

costly, large-scale policies and projects. Throughout the recent oil boom, he has committed billions of dollars, not only to domestic development, but also to a series of expensive foreign policy initiatives throughout Latin America. Analysis of Chávez's regional foreign policy reveals that it is wasteful in that these expensive initiatives fail to achieve his goals. However, with unusually large oil revenues coming into Venezuela throughout this oil boom, Chávez was able to continue to fund his policies despite inefficiencies. Now that oil prices have decreased dramatically and suddenly, the flaws and the wasteful nature of Chávez's foreign policy are likely to be exposed, once again leaving Venezuela susceptible to the petro-state curse. As a current example of a petro-state that spent heavily throughout an oil boom and must now adjust to the subsequent oil bust, Venezuela under the leadership of Chávez serves as an interesting case study to test the effects of the petro-state curse and to predict what can be done to prevent economic collapse in Venezuela.

This paper will analyze Chávez's use of Venezuelan oil revenues to fund his foreign policy in Latin America and the effects that the end of the oil boom is likely to have on his efforts. The first section of the paper will discuss Chávez's various initiatives in Latin America and analyze their success in accomplishing his main goals of establishing Venezuela as a strong regional power and diminishing western influence in the region. The next section will examine the implications that Chávez's foreign policy has had in Latin America as his initiatives have contributed to both political and economic instability in the region. The third section of the

paper relates Chávez's expensive foreign policy to the theory of the oil curse in order to determine whether his heavy spending is likely to lead Venezuela's economy to fall victim to "Dutch disease" and the "absorption" problem or whether Chávez will be able to overcome these symptoms and navigate his country through the oil bust. I predict that due to Chávez's focus on funding costly agreements and projects rather than save high percentages of Venezuelan oil revenues, Venezuela will only be able to avoid economic collapse for a short period of time unless oil prices rebound, thereby forcing Chávez to alter and eliminate many of his regional policies and programs. Finally, the conclusion builds upon the analysis of Chávez's Latin American foreign policy to extract lessons from Chávez's decisions and to establish general guidelines that should be kept in mind by petro-state leaders as they decide how to allocate oil revenues, particularly during oil booms when leaders are prone to a misleading sense of economic security.

Foreign Policy in Latin America:

Chávez's foreign policy in Latin America can best be described as a counter-dependent foreign policy. This type of foreign policy is exercised by leaders, like Chávez, who are fed up with their country's dependence on other countries and, thus, want to minimize that dependence.¹⁰ To achieve his foreign policy goals, Chávez has used a combination of hard power, most often through the use of economic means to strongly influence the decisions of foreign governments, as well as soft power by pro-

moting his Bolivarian ideology throughout Latin America in order to attract support.¹¹ Using these tools, Venezuelan foreign policy throughout Chávez's presidency has focused largely on providing development assistance and on fostering a sense of solidarity throughout the countries of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean. Chávez has developed numerous bilateral and multistate initiatives in Latin America aimed toward goals such as economic development and energy security. In recent years, promising billions of dollars in aid each year, Venezuela has surpassed the United States in the amount of direct aid provided throughout Latin America.¹² By spending large amounts on development efforts throughout Latin America and establishing trade agreements on preferential terms with countries in the region, Chávez seeks to fulfill two main goals: to strengthen Venezuela's position in Latin America through the creation of alliances in the region and to minimize Latin American dependence on the West.

Strengthening Venezuela's Position in Latin America:

One of Chávez's major goals is to establish Venezuela as an influential regional power in Latin America. Chávez seeks to spearhead the spread of "twenty-first century socialism" that he feels is an improved, more sustainable leftist agenda that will encourage equality in the region, though it is, thus far, an ill-defined concept.¹³ As such, in order to gain crucial support for his radical policies and ambitions in the region, Chávez has dedicated large portions of Venezuelan oil revenues to his efforts to form alliances with neighboring countries in Latin America. In

In addition to trying to gain the support of Latin American leaders, he tries to win over the support of Latin Americans through the use of public diplomacy, which can be defined as “a government’s diplomatic efforts that target citizens, the press, and other constituencies in other countries rather than their governments.”¹⁴ His economic and oil incentives have earned him some support in Latin America for his regional ambitions, however he has only had limited success in achieving his goal of broadening his influence in Latin America.

Chávez has used oil and its revenues to strengthen important alliances in the region, most notably with former Cuban President Fidel Castro and Bolivian President Evo Morales. Cuba has arguably been Venezuela’s most important ally throughout Chávez’s presidency. According to Max Azicri, the strong relationship that Chávez has cultivated between Venezuela and Cuba operates on three levels: Chávez and Castro have established a personal friendship, they have arranged for the exchange of goods and services, and they have joined together in the pursuit of common goals for Latin America in the name of the Bolivarian Revolution.¹⁵ The personal friendship between the two leaders is very evident as it is often highlighted in the media. However, it is the latter two exchanges that are of great interest to analysis of Chávez’s regional foreign policy.

First of all, each country is able to fill a void for the other, as Cuba needs to import about 100,000 barrels of oil daily and Venezuela requires individuals with specialized skills and services to fulfill Chávez’s plans for domestic social growth, which in-

clude educating Venezuela’s population and providing medical care to impoverished areas of the country.¹⁶ Therefore, in many ways, Venezuela receives immediate benefit through the Cuban-Venezuelan alliance that has been cultivated under Chávez. Since Chávez came into power, there have been numerous exchanges between Venezuela and Cuba, beginning with the Cuban-Venezuelan Petroleum Pact signed on October 30, 2000 stating that Venezuela would provide Cuba with 53,000 barrels of oil daily on preferential terms, and in turn receive services from Cuban doctors, sports trainers, and experts in a range of industries.¹⁷ The agreement also allowed Venezuelans to travel to Cuba to receive training to become doctors or to receive free medical treatment. The Barrio Adentro mission, a social program initiated by Chávez in April 2003, builds upon this exchange of Cuban health professionals and medical supplies by extending free health care services to about seventeen million Venezuelans, many of whom had never received medical care prior to this program.¹⁸ By 2005, over twenty thousand Cuban doctors and health experts had relocated to Venezuela where they provided basic and even specialized health care to poor populations in needy neighborhoods.¹⁹ In addition to medical exchanges, Venezuela and Cuba have reached a number of agreements throughout Chávez’s presidency, including forty-nine agreements in 2005 alone ranging from lowering tariffs to “the creation or improvement of rail infrastructure in both countries.”²⁰

In addition to the immediate benefit derived from close ties between Venezuela and Cuba, Chávez connects with Castro on

an ideological level. According to Michael J. Bustamante and Julia E. Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations, Castro has served as a role model and a mentor to Chávez, as the two share similar socialist and anti-hegemonic views. On one hand, due to his ability to hold onto power despite Cold War pressures, numerous United States-backed assassination attempts, and years of economic sanctions, Castro is in many ways symbolic of defiance against the United States, and Chávez is certainly well-aware that his alliance with Cuba contributes to unease amongst United States policymakers.²¹ On the other hand, Castro, like Chávez, has focused much of Cuba's foreign policy on public diplomacy, most notably by sending Cuban doctors and health professionals to developing nations around the globe. Bustamante and Sweig claim that Castro has better mastered the ability to gain international legitimacy through actions of public diplomacy.²²

If Bustamante and Sweig's claim were accurate, then having the support of Castro could help Chávez gain the support and trust of some countries where he might otherwise have difficulties. However, Chávez's and Castro's public diplomacy campaigns have not succeeded in winning over public support in Latin America. Latinobarómetro polls, which were conducted every year between 2005 and 2008, show that both Castro and Chávez are among the least popular world leaders as evaluated by pollsters in eighteen Latin American countries and Castro is, in fact, regarded more negatively than his Venezuelan counterpart (See Table 1). Table 1 shows that not only

were Castro and Chávez ranked similar to American President George W. Bush, as the three leaders comprise the bottom three world leaders every year except for 2008, but support for both Castro and Chávez has declined since Latinobarómetro began asking pollsters to evaluate a list of world leaders. Therefore, although Venezuela's alliance with Cuba may give Chávez legitimacy in some leftist countries, it is not helping him gain legitimacy and may even be hurting his image in Latin America.

Chávez has also established close ties with Bolivia's current president, Evo Morales. Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president, is a leftist leader who also holds anti-neoliberal and anti-United States views quite similar to those of Chávez. During a visit Morales paid to Venezuela in 2006, Chávez "offered \$30 million in assistance for social programs and pledged to supply Bolivia with 150,000 barrels of diesel fuel in exchange for agricultural products."²³ Furthermore, Chávez promised to contribute \$1.5 million to a Bolivian social project that will broadcast a literacy program to rural areas via the radio, thereby promoting literacy among Bolivia's poor indigenous population.²⁴ Morales has demonstrated his willingness to stand by Chávez on many of his actions. For example, in 2006, Morales joined the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an agreement which will be discussed later, which was originally signed by Chávez and Castro in December 2004.²⁵ The three leaders began calling their pact the "Axis of Good."²⁶

However, Bolivia may also be viewed as one example of how counterproductive Chávez's anti-Western policy can

be. Bolivia relies much more on foreign aid than Venezuela does, despite its large reserves of valuable natural gas. Morales' actions have consequently been somewhat more reserved than Chávez's when it comes to attacking the United States. Yet, in recent years, Morales has appeared to grow more confident in his alliance with Chávez and his commitment to extend aid and agreements to Bolivia. For example, in 2006, Colombia was considering a free trade agreement with the United States that would have affected its importation of Bolivian soy. Morales assured Bolivian soy producers that Venezuela would purchase their soy, despite the fact that the Venezuelan market probably lacked the economic strength to import as much soy as Colombia did.²⁷ With this increased confidence, Morales has taken more of Chávez's advice and adhered to his proposed policies, for example, by nationalizing the hydrocarbon industry in Bolivia. This decision alienated one of Bolivia's most important trade partners, Brazil, which imported about \$700 million worth of Bolivian products at the time.²⁸ It also impeded foreign investment which could have made Bolivia's hydrocarbon industry more productive and more profitable. Therefore, in the case of Bolivian nationalization of the hydrocarbon industry, Chávez's advice hurt Bolivia which is rich in resources like natural gas, yet still lacks the means to maximize its economic return for these resources without foreign investment.

Chávez can usually count on support from his close "Axis of Good" allies who have proven useful to an extent. For example, Morales stood alongside Chávez in

threatening to withdraw from the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) if any of the other three Petroandina countries signed a free trade agreement with the United States.²⁹ Yet the support of Chávez's allies is often not enough to persuade neighboring countries to accept his proposed policies. Despite their threat, all three of the countries continued free trade talks with the United States with both Peru and Colombia signing free trade agreements with the United States in 2006.³⁰ Chávez did follow through with his threat by withdrawing from CAN, however Bolivia, which is in a less secure financial position than Venezuela, remains a member of the organization.³¹

In 2006, Rafael Correa, a leftist who received his Ph. D in Economics in the United States, was elected president of Ecuador. In many ways, his win represented a win for Chávez as well. When Correa won the election, Chávez sent him a replica of Simon Bolívar's sword as a sign of solidarity and friendship. Chávez also attended Correa's swearing-in ceremony in January 2007 where the new Ecuadorian president stated that his government was Bolivarian and he announced his support for Chávez's notion of "twenty-first century socialism."³² Correa has taken several actions that reflect some of Chávez's moves when he came into office. For example, similar to Chávez who passed a referendum to approve his Bolivarian Constitution in Venezuela, Correa passed a referendum shortly after being sworn in as president that proposed the creation of a national assembly to draft a new constitution in Ecuador.³³ Furthermore, he opted not to renew an agreement with the United States that grants its forces the

to use Ecuador's Manta air base in the American war on drugs, similar to Chávez who denied the United States use of Venezuelan territory for the same war.³⁴ The two leaders have had a friendly relationship and they have seen eye to eye with each other on many issues. Since Correa came to power, Venezuela and Ecuador even negotiated a joint agreement to build a large refinery in Ecuador.³⁵

However, Correa is not as close an ally to Chávez as Cuba and Bolivia are as he has been much less radical in his actions. For example, although he set up an "excess profit tax" for foreign oil companies in Ecuador, he does not intend to nationalize the Ecuadorian oil industry as Chávez and Bolivia did with their hydrocarbon industries.³⁶ Furthermore, as will be discussed later, Chávez put Correa in an uncomfortable situation in 2008 after Colombia sent military troops to attack a FARC camp on Ecuadorian territory. In response to the action, Chávez sent Venezuelan troops to the border of Colombia, however his inflated response to the event that did not even occur in Venezuela placed pressure on Correa to have a large response since the incursion had been onto his country's territory. As such, Correa also ordered Ecuadorian troops to go to the border of Colombia before all of the countries settled the dispute diplomatically.³⁷ Though he supports some of Chávez's policies and ideas, Correa attempts to balance Ecuador's relations with both Venezuela and the United States as many Latin American leaders choose to do.

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has also cooperated with Vene-

zuela quite a bit under Chávez. When Lula won the 2002 presidential election in Brazil, Chávez hoped that the new president would work with him to resist neoliberalism in Latin America. Chávez publicly expressed his support for Lula, extending his congratulations as well as a replica of Simón Bolívar's sword.³⁸ Shortly after Lula's victory in Brazil, Chávez requested that Lula send oil experts to Venezuela to assist in resuming oil production during the 2003 lock-out of PdVSA, a request which Lula agreed to. Lula's decision to send Petrobrás specialists to Venezuela reflects not only Brazil's dependence at the time on Venezuelan oil imports to fulfill its national energy needs, but also Lula's interest in Chávez's idea of "regional energy self-sufficiency."³⁹ Since then, in addition to building and improving refineries together, the two countries have explored for oil near the coast of Venezuela. Chávez has offered about \$273 million toward funding the paving of a major highway and building a sports complex and civic center in Brazil.⁴⁰

Despite Lula's cooperation on several issues and projects, the Brazilian president has not stood unequivocally alongside Chávez. For example, in 2004 after Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide was ousted from office, Chávez refused to officially recognize the newly-instated regime, whereas Lula sent troops to Haiti to protect the new administration.⁴¹ Lula's decision to recognize and protect the new government in Port-au-Prince reflects Brazil's desire to maintain good relations with the United States, which is a known opponent of Aristide and is often accused of involvement in the Haitian coup d'état. Furthermore, the major discovery of

the Tupi oil field in Brazil in 2007 may affect relations between Lula and Chávez. The oil field is estimated to carry between five billion and eight billion barrels of oil which is enough to render Brazil self-sufficient in terms of energy. Furthermore, Petrobrás believes it has discovered three more deep-water wells which, if proven to possess significant amounts of oil, could make Petrobrás an “oil giant,” comparable to PdVSA.⁴² These oil discoveries decrease Brazil’s dependence on Venezuela compared to 2003 when Venezuelan oil imports were filling the gap in Brazilian energy needs. As such, Lula has more autonomy to challenge Chávez’s policies and actions.

The Caribbean is of particular interest to Chávez in his quest for increased regional influence as the countries that comprise the region carry particular weight in the Organization of American States (OAS). A 2007 article analyzing Venezuelan policy in the Caribbean notes the strategic importance of the region to Chávez:

[Chávez] recognizes that Caricom countries represent almost half of the 34 votes in the OAS, where debates on the hemispheric political situation are played out; and they are a solid bloc in the Latin American and Caribbean group at the UN. If he could get them on his side, his policies could influence significantly the discourse of these bodies.⁴³

Indeed, when Chávez was seeking to win a United Nations Security Council seat for Venezuela in 2006, the Caricom nations, which comprise the majority of Petrocaribe

(an agreement which will be discussed later), publicly lent their support to Venezuela.⁴⁴ On some levels, then, Chávez’s foreign policy has been successful in gaining support for his ambitions as demonstrated by his ability to gain the support of the Caribbean in his bid for a Security Council seat. However, Venezuela did not win the seat, which suggests that even where Chávez’s foreign policy decisions earn him some support, he is still unable to win over the support of crucial majorities to achieve many of his ambitions.

Chávez seeks to acquire allies and rally support throughout Latin America in order to further his leftist goals and policies in the region. Chávez is in pursuit of allies who share his ideologies and will implement policies similar to his, along with new trade partners to diversify Venezuelan markets. He has also mentioned the possibility of military alliances within Latin America. To attract allies, Chávez has exploited Venezuela’s large supply of oil and high revenues from the recent oil boom to carry out an extensive and very costly foreign policy that focuses on providing oil, money, and funding for development projects in neighboring countries. Through his foreign policy, he has been able to earn conditional support from some countries and leaders in Latin America, however analysis shows that his efforts have been counterproductive in some countries in the region.

Chávez has also attempted to gain regional allies by publicly supporting political candidates in national elections in neighboring countries. Throughout Chávez’s presidency, there have been many accusations of him funding foreign

elections. For example, he has been accused of financially backing Morales when he was a candidate in the 2002 Bolivian presidential election.⁴⁵ Chávez actively supported Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega in the Nicaraguan presidential election of 2006 by providing subsidized oil to Sandinista politicians to distribute throughout Nicaragua to help Ortega gain support.⁴⁶ Whether or not Chávez's oil shipments had an effect on the election outcome, Ortega, who Chávez so clearly supported, won the presidential election and took office in 2007.

Yet Chávez's efforts have not always been successful in influencing foreign elections in his favor. In the 2006 Peruvian election, for example, his fervent support for leftist candidate Ollanta Humala, who many expected to win the election based on polls taken before the election, proved to be counterproductive.⁴⁷ A win for Humala would have been a key victory for Chávez because it would have given Venezuela strong influence in the Andean region. Though he did not fulfill his rhetoric through action, Chávez went so far as to threaten to end Venezuela's diplomatic ties with Peru if Alan Garcia became president. Yet this threat did not stop the Peruvian population from electing Garcia as their new president.⁴⁸ In fact, many argue that support for Humala declined as a result of Chávez's support, making Humala's defeat a loss for Chávez as well.⁴⁹ Therefore, it is clear that Chávez's support for political candidates abroad has met with only limited success.

Decreasing Dependence on the West:
With hopes of challenging the current hegemonic global structure, Chávez's foreign

policy throughout Latin America has focused largely on aid and agreements that are meant to minimize countries' dependence on the West and on western-based international financial institutions (IFI). Venezuela managed to pay off its IFI debts five years early, completing the last of its debt payments to the World Bank in April 2007 and having already paid off its debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).⁵⁰ However, Latin America is not yet free from debt to western-based IFIs as these institutions are still providing loans to countries in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean (see Figure 2). Furthermore, in light of the global financial crisis, IFI loans taken out by Latin American countries increased, particularly loans from western-based institutions like the World Bank, and IFI lending to the region is expected to continue to increase (see Figure 2).⁵¹

In addition to debt, these countries often import resources and goods that they could potentially produce themselves given the vast natural resources that are found throughout Latin America. This is largely because agricultural subsidies in western countries make western imports cheaper than domestic products. As imports become cheaper than domestic products, a cycle is created that hurts Latin America: the development of potential productive sectors is limited in Latin American countries because imports outcompete domestic products, causing dependence on the West. However, if the price of imports increases, the sectors that could have produced the product are less equipped to fulfill the country's needs, thereby forcing them to continue importing goods and perpetuating western

dependence. Noting these two trends, one of the major goals Chávez seeks to address through his foreign policy in the region is to diminish dependence on the West and to make Latin America as self-sufficient as possible.

One of the ways Chávez has used increased oil revenues is by providing countries with the economic means to pay off part of their IFI debts. Although estimates vary as to the exact amount Chávez has spent offering loans to and purchasing bonds from Latin American countries to permit them to settle their IFI debts, he has doubtlessly spent billions of dollars on these efforts. According to Terry Gibbs, Venezuela extended loans of \$300 million to Ecuador and \$500 million to Argentina to be used to pay back part of their IFI loans.⁵² In a more recent article, Michael Dodson and Manochehr Dorraj state that Chávez bought \$3.5 billion worth of bonds that permitted Argentina to finish payments on its debt to the IMF.⁵³ Amongst other countries to which Chávez has offered loans to pay back IFI debts is his close ally, Bolivia, to which he extended an offer of \$1.5 billion.⁵⁴ Offering this much money to pay these high IFI debts is extremely costly, however Chávez's efforts have significantly limited the IMF's presence in Latin America. In February 2007, *Bloomberg* reported that "IMF lending in the area has fallen to \$50 million, or less than 1 percent of its global portfolio, compared with 80 percent in 2005."⁵⁵ In this way, Chávez's policy has succeeded in diminishing Latin American dependence on western-based IFIs and, consequently, in limiting the ability of IFIs to exert influence over gov-

ernment policies in the region. However, his policy does not eliminate debt. By offering loans to Latin American countries to pay off their IFI debts essentially, Chávez is merely redirecting their indebtedness from multi-state IFIs to one nation, Venezuela. This redirection of debt may create new, and riskier, dependence for impoverished Latin American countries, an issue which will be discussed in the following section.

One of the major goals that Chávez stresses in his Bolivarian Revolution is the solidarity of Latin America in order to promote self-sufficiency in the region and to challenge Western dominance. Chávez has come up with numerous ideas for integrating Latin America economically. For example, one ambitious suggestion of Chávez's is to create a Bank of the South that could provide loans to Latin American countries who need money rather than taking out a loan with the IMF and being forced to abide by its conditions.⁵⁶ This proposal has yet to come to fruition, however Chávez has made some steps toward regional integration and self-sufficiency.

The Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) was proposed by Chávez as an alternative to neoliberalism that is based, instead, upon regional integration and unity. Chávez feels that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was heavily encouraged by the Bush administration, would continue to serve the interests of multinational corporations, while doing little to promote national development and growth in the poorer countries of the hemisphere.⁵⁷ ALBA, on the other hand, is a multistate agreement intended to integrate Latin America by establishing a Compensatory Fund

that will be used to develop the poorer nations of the region in order to lessen economic disparity and strengthen the region.⁵⁸ According to Chávez, this agreement encourages Latin American countries to "...integrate with an eye toward solving the problems we have in common... Together we can do so much more than anyone can do alone."⁵⁹ ALBA, thus, focuses on region-wide issues such as combating poverty and marginalization, endogenous development, and ending dependence on western-based institutions.⁶⁰ However, with one of the key premises of the proposal being a redistribution of wealth to the more impoverished countries of Latin America, it is of little surprise that the only countries that have shown enthusiastic support for the proposal are Chávez's close allies and poor, leftist countries, most notably Cuba, Bolivia, and Nicaragua.⁶¹ Although very few countries have signed onto ALBA thus far, Chávez bases much of Venezuela's foreign policy on ALBA principles and he hopes that others will join his cause.

With large oil and gas reserves in Venezuela and several other Latin American countries possessing natural energy resources, Chávez has seen more success in sparking cooperation between states through the promotion of regional energy integration. Between 2004 and 2005, Chávez signed three regional oil cooperation agreements: Petrosur, Petrocaribe, and Petroandina. The most important of these agreements is Petrocaribe, which was signed in June 2005 by fourteen Caribbean countries, including Cuba.⁶² With most of the countries in the Caribbean lacking oil reserves of their own, Chávez has committed Venezuela to provide

the region with 198,000 barrels of oil daily.⁶³ Petrocaribe aims to provide Caribbean countries with natural energy resources so that leaders can pursue development policies geared toward the needs of their population. Petrocaribe countries do not receive subsidized oil, but rather the agreement offers them a type of loan wherein countries receiving oil shipments must pay sixty percent of the bill within three months. Then the remaining cost is to be paid over a period of approximately twenty years at an interest rate of one percent, or two percent if the price of oil falls below \$50 per barrel.⁶⁴ Oil shipments received through Petrocaribe can be exchanged for goods and services if countries are unable to pay with money.⁶⁵ Unlike the other two regional agreements, Petrocaribe set up a collection of savings meant to finance development programs and projects in the Petrocaribe states, known as the ALBA Caribe Fund. According to the PdVSA website, Venezuela has donated \$100 million to the ALBA Caribe Fund and nine Petrocaribe countries have already been able to draw from the fund to finance development projects.⁶⁶ Although PdVSA may be exaggerating the success of the ALBA Caribe Fund, there is no doubt that Petrocaribe is the most elaborate and successful energy integration agreement that Chávez has established.

Petrosur and Petroandina are currently less developed than Petrocaribe and they have taken little meaningful action. Petrosur, developed in late 2004, was the first regional oil integration agreement to be signed in Latin America and it was signed by Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay.⁶⁷ The Petroandina agreement was

signed in July 2005 by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.⁶⁸ The goal of these agreements is to ensure that the signatories meet their energy needs by minimizing extra costs, extending preferential financing options, and permitting countries to pay for oil shipments through goods and services.⁶⁹ Thus far, the result of Petrosur and Petroandina has mostly been the discussion of potential projects rather than taking the necessary action to begin them. For example, through Petroandina, Ecuador is working on negotiations to send some of its crude oil to be refined in Venezuela, an arrangement that could save the country part of the \$1 billion it spends annually on importing fuel, but the project has yet to begin.⁷⁰

Chávez hopes that one day these three regional energy cooperation agreements will merge into one large entity known as PetroAmérica. Firstly, Chávez envisions that this agreement will include the distribution of energy as the three regional agreements already aim to achieve. Secondly, he hopes that PetroAmérica will facilitate large-scale infrastructure projects such as a gas pipeline that would run more than half the length of South America from Venezuela's northern coast to Argentina.⁷¹ Finally, Chávez hopes that this integration agreement will make Latin America self-sufficient with more resources than just energy. For example, he wants Venezuela and Colombia to produce wood pulp regionally to make paper rather than being forced to spend the extra money to import wood pulp from abroad.⁷² The implementation of this agreement would help to shift the global structure away from the current hegemonic

global structure, making Latin America a largely self-sufficient region and, consequently, limiting the amount of influence western powers could exert over regional affairs. However, with the oil boom over and global recession setting in, it is doubtful that Chávez will have the resources to set up and gain support for PetroAmérica in the near future.

Even if Chávez were able to successfully set up PetroAmerica, it is unlikely that the agreement would be able to succeed in the long-term. First of all, the construction of pipelines and other equipment would be extremely expensive just to launch this continent-wide energy integration. It could very quickly drain Latin American resources and drive countries in the region further into debt. Furthermore, leaving oil fields open to foreign investment would be wiser than establishing government control over all of Latin America's hydrocarbons, as experienced foreign oil companies have proven to be most able to keep oil production at its maximum level. After Chávez consolidated government control of PdVSA following the 2003 strike, oil production in Venezuela has decreased significantly from about 3.5 million barrels per day in 1997 to about 2.7 million barrels in 2007 (see Figure 3). Finally, trying to become a self-sufficient continent would severely limit the system's long-term sustainability. International trade allows countries to specialize in the production of certain products and then trade with other countries to obtain any other goods that they require. Limiting trade to Latin America would decrease efficiency in the region since other countries may be able to produce goods at a lower cost, making products

cheaper for Latin American consumers. It would also throw off the market balance, as regional demand is likely to be limited for a given product, but internationally there will probably be large, profitable markets with high demand.

Effectiveness of Chávez's Policies in Achieving his Goals:

Although counterdependent foreign policies may meet with success in some instances, they often fail to achieve their goals as these strategies often anger more powerful states and, consequently, alienate the country.⁷³ Furthermore, much of Chávez's foreign policy is based on economic incentives which sometimes produce a desired outcome, however they are a "less precise instrument" for state leaders.⁷⁴ In other words, the recipient of economic incentives does not always take the action that the provider of economic incentives wants them to take. As such, analysis of Chávez's policies reveals that his regional foreign policy has been unsuccessful in reaching his goals of establishing Venezuela as a major regional power and minimizing Latin American dependence on the West.

First of all, he has been unsuccessful in his attempt to strengthen Venezuela's position in Latin America, largely due to his inability to establish strong alliances in the region.⁷⁵ His strong relationship with Cuba brings some direct benefit to Venezuelans in the form of quality medical care, but this exchange of medical services for oil is very costly and arguably brings more benefit to Cuba than to Venezuela. Most other Latin American leaders, such as Lula, are pursuing a delicate balance between relations with

Venezuela and with the United States. Even countries with left-wing leaders such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua lack the financial strength to stand unflinchingly with Chávez in all of his policies. Some of Chávez's attempts to gain allies in the region have outright backfired as in the case of Humala's defeat in the Peruvian election. As such, Chávez's attempts to build alliances have brought him only conditional support as most Latin American leaders prefer to weigh the benefits and the risks of supporting Chávez.

This lack of reliable support has largely inhibited Chávez from spreading his policies and furthering his goal of making Venezuela a major regional power. Although he has won the support of some countries on certain issues, he has still had trouble gaining enough support to achieve his many ambitions, such as winning a United Nations Security Council seat. Furthermore, Chávez is not well-received by Latin Americans who do not hold positions of power as demonstrated by the fact that he was ranked one of the worst world leaders according to a Latinobarómetro poll taken in 2008 (see Table 1). There is little doubt that Chávez's involvement in the domestic affairs of other countries is a major factor in this aversion to Chávez. Failing to receive widespread support from both Latin American government officials and Latin Americans, many of Chávez's policies have been ineffective or counterproductive. Therefore, by involving himself in other countries' affairs and by offering countries incentives, Chávez has failed to make his country a respected and influential power in Latin America.

Furthermore, he has not succeeded in ending Latin American dependence on the West. Although he may have minimized some individual countries' debts to western-based IFIs, he has not eliminated Latin America's dependence on the West. The West, particularly the United States, maintains a strong presence in the region and even though the country is not popular amongst Latin Americans (see Table 1), they are forced to accept their need for Western-based assistance programs. As such, most countries in the region are not even interested in ending relations with the United States. In addition, two of the three regional energy agreements that Venezuela has signed have prompted very little action. Latin America is, therefore, still dependent on the western governments, non-governmental organizations, and western-based multi-state organizations such as the IMF.

As Chávez's goals of strengthening Venezuela and minimizing western influence in Latin America have had only limited success, there are now two separate forces working in Latin America. On one hand, the neoliberal model is promoted by numerous Latin American countries, such as Mexico, and also by the United States which maintains a strong presence in the region. On the other hand, Chávez encourages the adoption of his Bolivarian model by his Latin American neighbors. These two clashing models have led to much controversy throughout Latin America as support for neoliberal and socialist models varies as leaders support policies that they expect to be in their best interest at the time. The next section will, thus, analyze the conflicts and the instability

that has arisen as a result of Chávez's policies in the region.

Implications of Chávez's Policy throughout Latin America:

Analysis of Chávez's foreign policy decisions and their effects throughout Latin America shows that his policies are not in the best interest of countries in the region or of Latin America as a whole. As discussed in the previous section, Chávez has had only limited success in accomplishing his goals of strengthening Venezuela's role in the region and minimizing regional dependence on the West. First of all, many countries are beginning to distance themselves from Chávez due to waning support for him in the region and a pragmatic understanding of the continued necessity to cooperate with the West.⁷⁶ Chávez's strong attitudes and rhetoric are even contributing to conflict in the region, despite increased economic and technological cooperation. Furthermore, the similarities of Chávez's development policies to Latin America's failed experiment of import-substituting industrialization (ISI) pose a great threat to the stability of the region. Chávez's foreign policies, therefore, are not unifying Latin America meaningfully, but rather they are contributing both to political and economic instability in the region.

Political Instability Resulting from Chávez's Foreign Policy:

Chávez has become a controversial figure both regionally and internationally. This is largely due to his aggressive rhetoric against those who disagree with him, combined with the hasty decisions he has been known to make and retract. As Table 1 shows, Latin American opinions of Chávez

between 2005 and 2008 decreased more overall than any other world leader that Latinobarómetro polled individuals about, with the exception of George W. Bush. These statistics suggest that Chávez is not the highly esteemed leader that he hopes to be in Latin America. As Chávez and Bush became two of the most negatively perceived leaders according to Latin Americans and two of the most prominent figures in the region, there emerged a major divide in Latin America over their policies and influence. As such, Chávez's policies have not been well received across all of Latin America and policy differences have led to political conflicts within the region rather than facilitating the regional integration and cooperation that Chávez wishes to see.

First of all, support for Chávez has, in many ways, become a "liability for politicians in Latin America," meaning that politicians who have connections to Chávez may now run the risk of losing the support of their populace.⁷⁷ Indeed, as previously discussed, this was the case in the 2006 Peruvian elections when Chávez publicly backed Humala who then lost the election, in part as a result of Chávez's support. Despite the economic catastrophe that Alan Garcia was remembered for from his first presidential term between 1985 and 1990, his slogan of "Peru or Chávez" attracted many in the population who were against Chávez's involvement in Peruvian affairs.⁷⁸ In other Latin American countries, exposing and accusing politicians of having ties to Chávez has become a tactic used by candidates to defeat the opposition in elections. In the Nicaraguan election of 2006, although Or-

tega ultimately won the election, his opponent used Chávez's shipments of oil to Sandinista leaders as a tactic to criticize Ortega's supporters.⁷⁹ Even in Mexico's 2006 election, presidential candidate Felipe Calderón accused his opponent Andrés Manuel López Obrador of having ties to Chávez, an accusation that Obrador denied.⁸⁰ Following Calderón's ad campaign, Obrador lost his lead in the polls and Calderón won the election by a margin of less than one percent.⁸¹

Chávez's involvement in numerous national elections in 2006 may help to explain why approval ratings among Latin Americans suddenly dropped from an average of 4.9 on a scale of 10 to 4.5, as shown in Table 1. The trend in both Peru and Mexico of support for the leftist candidate shifting to their opponent following accusations of political ties to Chávez clearly demonstrates that significant percentages of the Latin American population are against Chávez's involvement in domestic affairs. For support of leading candidates to decline so definitively following Chávez's backing for leftist candidates, the threat of his influence must have been perceived as a more important concern for a significant portion of voters than other domestic issues that were guiding their decision in earlier polls. It is very likely, then, that Chávez's interference in the domestic affairs of other countries contributed to this large drop in Latin American opinion of the Venezuelan president.

In addition, tensions arose in Latin America as a result of Morales' 2006 decision to nationalize the hydrocarbon industry in Bolivia, and frustration was once again felt toward Chávez who supported Morales'

decision and offered him advice on carrying it out.⁸² Argentine-Spanish company Repsol YPF and Brazil's state oil company Petrobrás were both heavily invested in Bolivia's hydrocarbon industry and, therefore, were negatively impacted by the nationalization of Bolivia's hydrocarbon industry. Argentina, which imported significantly less oil than Brazil, was able to strike a deal with Bolivia rather quickly by agreeing in 2006 to pay \$5 per billion BTU as compared to the \$3.18 it paid before Bolivian nationalization.⁸³ Brazil, on the other hand, was much more invested in the Bolivian hydrocarbon industry with more than 50% of Brazilian gas and 75% of gas consumption in São Paulo being imported from Bolivia.⁸⁴ Lula spoke very diplomatically of Morales' decision to nationalize Bolivia's gas reserves, however he refused to meet with Morales to negotiate augmented gas prices. It was not until October 28, 2006, after Lula developed a firmer stance in favor of Brazilian national interest, that Brazil and Bolivia reached a deal that would allow Petrobrás to continue its operations in two Bolivian gas fields.⁸⁵

Although Lula has remained diplomatic in his relations with Venezuela, some analysts believe that Brazil began loosening its ties to Chávez in light of Bolivian nationalization of gas reserves which was encouraged by Chávez. It is important to note that, as discussed in the previous section, Lula was never an absolute supporter of Chávez's policies. That being said, Brazil's support for some of Chávez's policies that it had once supported has waned even more in recent years. For example, following the hydrocarbon conflict, Petrobrás officials

sounded less enthusiastic about plans to build the \$20 billion pipeline that Chávez envisions and that would begin in Venezuela, traverse Brazil, and end in Argentina.⁸⁶ More explicitly, the Brazilian press criticized Chávez for his involvement in encouraging and assisting Bolivia to nationalize its hydrocarbon industry.

One country with which Chávez has had particularly rocky relations is its neighbor to the west, Colombia, though Chávez has periodically shown signs of wanting to cooperate with its neighbor. Prior to Chávez's taking office, Colombia and Venezuela, under the administrations of former presidents Carlos Andrés Pérez and Rafael Caldera, followed a policy of "degulfisation," meaning that the two countries focused on pursuing trade relations and downplayed political tensions, such as territorial disputes.⁸⁷ However, throughout Chávez's presidency, relations with Colombia (which is known to have close ties to the United States) have been dynamic, alternating between pragmatic cooperation between the two countries and Chávez's use of aggressive rhetoric and actions toward Colombia.

When Chávez first came to power in 1999, he experienced good relations with then-Colombian President Andrés Pastrana as the two leaders worked together to address issues surrounding the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a leftist guerilla group in Colombia to which Chávez is sympathetic.⁸⁸ However, their relations quickly worsened, particularly after Pastrana adopted Plan Colombia, a plan wherein Colombia receives \$1.3 billion from the United States to train its military to eliminate drug

trafficking.⁸⁹ Chávez opposes Plan Colombia, believing that this drug eradication plan wrongfully targets the livelihood of Latin American coca farmers rather than Western drug abusers. In 2002, having recently been restored to power following the short-lived coup d'état that temporarily ousted the Venezuelan president, Chávez showed a more cooperative attitude toward Colombia as its current President Álvaro Uribe Vélez took office. However, relations between the two countries worsened, once again, and have remained poor due to policy differences.

Relations between Venezuela and Colombia came closest to a military confrontation in 2007 when Uribe ordered Colombian military troops to attack a FARC camp on Ecuadorean territory. Chávez responded to this by “closing the Venezuelan embassy in Bogotá, expelling the Colombian ambassador in Caracas, sending 10 battalions of troops to the border with Colombia and threatening to deploy Russian fighter bombers.”⁹⁰ As previously mentioned, Chávez’s exaggerated response to the incursion into Ecuador pressured Correa into sending troops of his own to the Colombian border. Chávez’s response was criticized regionally and internationally. Even Castro and Lula, who have enjoyed good relations with Chávez in many situations, discouraged the prospect of war between Colombia and Venezuela. Chávez quickly called back Venezuelan troops, however his rash decision to mobilize his troops over an incident that did not even occur on Venezuelan territory demonstrates how Chávez’s actions often create controversy and could even lead

to military conflicts. Although Chávez and Uribe agreed to meet to reestablish diplomatic ties following the conflict, tensions between Venezuela and Colombia remain.⁹¹

Another major political concern within Latin America is that Chávez may be starting a regional arms race. In 2006, Venezuela struck a major arms deal with Russia by purchasing assault rifles, fighter jets, and helicopters for the price of nearly \$3 billion.⁹² Since then, Chávez has struck even more weapons deals with Russia, as well as with Brazil, Belarus, China, and Spain. Chávez maintains that these purchases are merely intended to update Venezuela’s outdated arsenal, however there have been implications that these arms deals were a response to the United States’ arming Colombia through Plan Colombia and the subsequent Patriot Plan.⁹³ Since then, several other Latin American countries have begun to significantly increase military spending. Lula, for example, requested that the Brazilian Congress set aside about \$5.6 billion toward the country’s 2008 military budget.⁹⁴ Chile’s military expenditures are also noteworthy, spending about 3.8 percent of its GDP on national defense.⁹⁵ Some countries have expressed concern over these increases in military spending throughout the region, for example, Peru feels threatened by Chile’s heavy investment in its military due to a border dispute between the two countries.⁹⁶ As more Latin American leaders feel threatened by the level of military spending in surrounding countries, it is very plausible an arms race will escalate in the region, thereby causing more instability and divide in Latin America.

The Path to Economic Instability: Chávez wants integration of Latin America to occur under his terms and according to his Bolivarian ideology, however his plan for the economic integration of Latin America resembles the failed policy of import-substituting industrialization (ISI). ISI is a policy that provides an alternative to capitalism and was tested in Latin America beginning in 1930 and ultimately failing by the early 1980s.⁹⁷ The book *Modern Latin America* describes the theory behind ISI growth:

In contrast to the largely laissez-faire policies of nineteenth-century England and the United States, Latin American governments actively promoted industrial growth. They did so in various ways: erecting tariff barriers and raising the price of imported goods to the point where local industrial firms could successfully compete in the marketplace; creating demand by favoring local producers in government contracts (involving, for example, purchases for the military); and, most important, establishing government-run companies and investing directly in industrial firms. Through protection and participation, the state in Latin America furnished critical impetus for the regions industrial growth.⁹⁸

ISI failed during this period in Latin America due to three key shortcomings. First of all, it failed to eliminate foreign dependence in Latin American countries. Latin American countries hoped to become self-sufficient through industrialization and

manufacturing their own goods. However, rather than make Latin America self-sufficient, it made these countries dependent on the West for expensive goods, such as machinery to manufacture products, rather than the finished products themselves.⁹⁹ Next, ISI limited local demand for manufactured products as they were manufacturing industrial goods, such as refrigerators. Many locals could not afford such goods and, given the nature of the products, those who could afford them did not need large quantities. Furthermore, there was little trade between countries so companies were forced to accept market demand within their country.¹⁰⁰ Finally, the use of advanced technologies limited job production as they replaced much manual labor. With machines performing tasks that could have otherwise been done by humans, unemployment rates increased and few people could afford to buy the finished products.¹⁰¹

Chávez is encouraging Latin America to become self-sufficient by promoting the integration and solidarity of the region. Chávez's policy of regional integration resembles ISI in that it encourages national development by giving preference to local products over foreign imports.¹⁰² However, Chávez claims that the key difference between ISI and his policy is that the latter focuses on sovereignty and the individual needs of a specific country.¹⁰³ His policy of endogenous development is not intended to stop all trade as Chávez relies on oil revenues to carry out his domestic and foreign policies. Yet as previously discussed, he wants Latin American dependence on the West to be as minimal as possible. Despite Chávez's belief that Latin American

integration and endogenous growth will promote sustainable development in the region, analysis of Chávez's foreign policy suggest that countries that become too closely entwined in Chávez's economic and development plans will be susceptible to one of the shortcomings of Latin America's twentieth-century experiment with ISI, which is its failure to eliminate dependence on the West.

As mentioned in the previous section, Chávez's attempts to minimize Latin American dependence on the West only redirect Latin America's foreign dependence. One major problem with ISI growth in twentieth century Latin America is that in order to industrialize, these countries had to purchase products such as technology and industrial equipment from the West, thereby altering the goods that Latin America was dependent on importing.¹⁰⁴ As Chávez has flexed his power in Latin America through oil diplomacy, he has already begun to make Latin American countries dependent on Venezuela. For example, in recent years, Morales has shown signs of "drifting away from Washington's orbit" as his close relations with Chávez have provided Bolivia with aid and support from Venezuela. However, if Chávez cannot afford to continue to help Bolivia financially, Bolivia will be in a precarious situation. The Petrocaribe countries would be particularly susceptible to instability if Chávez were forced to abandon his foreign policy in the region as Venezuela is now the primary energy supplier in the Caribbean. Prior to Petrocaribe, Trinidad and Tobago was the primary provider of energy in the Caribbean, however they allowed for Venezuela to step into that role. Despite

the decision to permit Venezuela to replace Trinidad and Tobago as primary energy supplier of the region, Prime Minister Patrick Manning has made it clear that his country would sell their oil in new markets and be unable to fill the regional energy void if for any reason there were to be a disruption in oil supply.¹⁰⁵ If decreasing oil revenues and rising debt force Venezuela to alter its policy, the Petrocaribe nations will have few back-up options.

The new dependence that Chávez's foreign policy creates is potentially more worrisome than dependence on IFIs because rather than multiple countries contributing to loans, Venezuela is the sole country responsible for many of the loans Chávez has provided in recent years. First of all, this creates dependence on Chávez's decision to continue any agreements that are reached for Latin American countries that accept Chávez's loan and trade offers. Chávez can use loans that Venezuela provides unilaterally as a form of hard power to coerce loan recipients to abide by certain conditions. Chávez has persistently criticized IFIs for using loans as a means of hard power to coerce developing world governments to adopt mandatory conditions in order to receive loans. However, there is a good chance that Chávez will use Venezuelan loans in this way if he believes it will further his goals. Furthermore, Chávez's foreign policy in the region renders Latin American countries dependent upon his ability to perpetuate the numerous and costly agreements that he has reached. IFIs like the IMF and the World Bank are institutions that draw funds from multiple states, therefore if one contributing state runs into financial trouble, money will

still be available due to the financial contributions of other states.

With Venezuela as the sole lender, loan recipients become dependent on the economic and political stability of Venezuela. This dependence is particularly problematic for many Latin American countries because oil prices vary greatly and are unpredictable, as illustrated in Figure 1.

The biggest danger for Latin America is the fact that all of the agreements and projects that Chávez has committed to are dependent on high revenues from one natural resource, oil, of which the value is difficult to predict. Figure 1 shows that throughout most of Chávez's presidency, he has benefited from significant increases in the price of oil, with prices rising from as low as \$8.85 per barrel in December 1998 to a peak of \$137.98 per barrel in July 2008. Since then, prices fell as low as \$32.06 per barrel on December 26, 2008 and, in recent weeks, they have been hovering at about \$50 per barrel.¹⁰⁶ With so much of Venezuela's oil revenues going toward advancing Chávez's political agenda as opposed to investment in Venezuelan oil infrastructure, PdVSA's oil production is not as high as it could be (see Figure 3) and the addition of decreased demand in the context of the global crisis will drive Venezuela toward unsustainable debt. With the oil boom ending and global recession setting in, Chávez will be forced to make many changes to his policies throughout the region, which is likely to have negative effects that will be felt throughout Latin America.

The Effects of Falling Oil Prices on Chávez's Foreign Policy:

Although Chávez has, thus far, been able to use high oil revenues to fund his foreign policy, analysis of his policies and programs reveals that, with Venezuelan oil prices hovering at about \$40 per barrel, he, too, may be headed toward the downward slope of the petro-state trap. However, despite his strong rhetoric, he has proven throughout his presidency to be a rational politician and to have a pragmatic side in making his decisions. In January 2009, in light of the decrease in oil prices, Chávez allowed Western oil companies to make bids on Venezuelan oil fields.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, in March 2009, he announced plans to revise Venezuela's 2009 budget, basing it upon oil prices of \$40 per barrel rather than the \$60 per barrel that it was originally figured around.¹⁰⁸ By taking the proper actions to adjust to decreased oil prices and by managing Venezuela's international reserve savings of \$42.2 billion wisely, Chávez may be able to resist Venezuela's succumbing to the oil curse this year. However, if oil prices do not continue to rise, budget cuts will be necessary that are likely to have negative ramifications both for Venezuela and for neighboring countries in Latin America.¹⁰⁹

Venezuela, Chávez, and the Oil Curse:

When analyzing how Chávez's policies are being affected by the oil bust, it is helpful to consider the policy weaknesses of the Punto Fijo system or *puntifijismo*, which was the political system that preceded Chávez. The Pact of Punto Fijo was a power-sharing agreement signed in 1958 which was said to protect democracy in Venezuela by respecting elections.¹¹⁰

Elected officials were to work with members of the other political parties that signed the pact and consider differing viewpoints in forming government policy. In practice, this agreement limited political power to the two main political parties of Venezuela, Acción Democrática (AD) and COPEI, intentionally shutting the Communist Party out of the political system.¹¹¹ The system was strong in Venezuela for about thirty years until economic and political instability ensued in the 1980s, largely as a result of the end of the oil boom. *Puntofijismo* officially ended in 1999 when Chávez took power and created his Bolivarian Constitution.¹¹²

The downfall of the Punto Fijo system can be primarily attributed to the effects of the oil curse. For about a quarter of a century, oil wealth masked many of the flaws of *puntofijismo*, however when oil prices plunged in the 1980s, the trends of the oil curse began to appear, thereby exposing the weaknesses of the system and paving the way for political instability.¹¹³ Chávez took advantage of this instability by rallying support among the poor and working classes and promising to overturn the Punto Fijo system, which ultimately led him to win the 1998 Venezuelan election.¹¹⁴ Yet, despite Chávez's rhetoric about creating a better political system in Venezuela, analysis of his economic policy reveals that he, too, may be headed toward the two main destabilizing trends of the petro-state curse by replicating several fundamental weaknesses of the Punto Fijo system. To prevent an economic collapse through this indefinite period of decreased oil value, Chávez must attempt to diversify his government's sources of reve-

nue and cut down on unnecessary expenditures.

First of all, as a major oil exporter, Dutch disease has been a constant concern for Venezuela. Under the Punto Fijo system, Venezuela enjoyed two oil booms between 1960 and 1980 that contributed to rapid economic growth, a higher quality of life compared to the rest of Latin America (as measured by health, education, and wages), and, consequently, political stability.¹¹⁵ The government was dependent on oil revenues as the high value of the Venezuelan bolívar with relation to other countries suppressed non-oil production sectors within Venezuela. As such, when oil prices plunged in the 1980s, the Venezuelan government could not fall back upon other sources of export revenue, forcing it to take out foreign loans and artificially control its currency, which ultimately caused the progress that had been made during the oil booms to regress.¹¹⁶

Dutch disease has continued to have an adverse effect on the non-oil sector under Chávez's leadership as his policies also rely almost entirely on oil revenues to finance his policies. As was the case under *puntofijismo*, Venezuela's non-oil sectors have been unable to develop because large oil revenues strengthened the value of the bolívar with relation to other currencies, making imports cheaper and lowering the competitiveness of Venezuelan products. Analysis of the export and import rows in Table 2 illustrates the escalating problem of Dutch disease in Venezuela between 1998 and 2007. As oil revenues increased following the end of the 2003 PdVSA strike, the value of goods being imported into Venezuela skyrocketed,

reaching an unprecedented \$29.5 billion.¹¹⁷ On the other hand, while oil revenues rose consistently following the 2003 oil strike, the amount of money gained through non-oil exports decreased between 2005 and 2006.¹¹⁸

Data compiled in 2009 shows that Venezuela's non-oil sector continued in this downward trend, shrinking by about 5 percent annually over the past three years.¹¹⁹

With the value of oil being less than one-third of its value at the peak of the oil boom, Dutch Disease stands out as a particular threat to stability in Venezuela. Similar to problems faced by administrations under *puntofijismo*, Chávez has been unable to provide Venezuelans with sustainable jobs.¹²⁰ Chávez's *Vuelvan Caras* mission attempts to create jobs and expand the non-oil sector by assisting Venezuelans in setting up cooperatives. However, this mission is not enough to create long-term jobs and notably expand the non-oil sector as many cooperatives fail shortly after the government stops providing them with resources.¹²¹ Furthermore, Chávez's decision to set an overvalued fixed exchange rate of 2.15 bolívars to the dollar has contributed to high inflation in recent years, reinforcing Dutch disease trends by making imports artificially cheap while exports become more expensive and less competitive in global markets.¹²²

To stave off the effects of Dutch disease, Chávez must find a way to broaden his government's sources of revenue so that it is less dependent on oil revenues which could be done by increasing non-oil taxes. According to Venezuela expert Terry Lynn Karl, ever since the Hydrocarbons Law of 1943, which increased taxes on oil compa-

nies so that profits would be split "fifty-fifty" between the companies and the government, there has been "a permanent temptation to cut into the profits of foreign companies as a means of sustaining oil-subsidized activities while avoiding the taxation of domestic groups."¹²³ Failure to adequately collect non-oil taxes proved to be a major downfall of the *Punto Fijo* system which, between 1977 and 1979, was receiving 70.3 percent of Venezuelan tax revenues from corporate income taxes, primarily from oil companies.¹²⁴ Chávez appears to recognize that this was a major weakness of *puntofijismo* and he, consequently, announced along with his 2009 budget cuts his plan to increase sales taxes in Venezuela as well.¹²⁵ The increase will allow Chávez to diversify his sources of government revenue so that it may be less dependent on unpredictable oil revenues.

The fall of *puntofijismo* was also due in large part to ill handling of the absorption problem by Venezuelan presidents during the oil booms between 1960 and 1980. Under this system, oil revenues were spent irresponsibly as military loyalty was largely purchased through incentives, corrupt leaders mismanaged funds, and the government spent a significant amount of money on social programs, whether or not they proved to be effective.¹²⁶ The Venezuelan government, thus, spent large amounts of money to fund its policies during this period, yet it was relying primarily on oil revenues to do so. When the second oil boom ended in the 1980s, rather than implement more taxes in Venezuela, presidents opted to borrow money internationally and artificially control the bolívar's exchange rate, causing debt to

accumulate and reinforcing symptoms of Dutch disease.¹²⁷

Chávez's foreign policy is a testament to his unwise use of government funds to finance often ineffective policies and, as he spends that money, he is replicating many of the mistakes made under the Punto Fijo system. Similar to presidents under the Punto Fijo system who purchased new arms as incentives for the military, Chávez has committed billions of dollars to upgrading Venezuela's military. As previously discussed, Chávez has made multiple major weapons purchases from several countries, agreeing to buy over \$4.4 billion worth of weapons from Russia alone.¹²⁸ Furthermore, as discussed throughout the first section, Chávez has also spent billions of dollars on aid and development projects throughout Latin America, despite evidence that his regional foreign policy has had only limited success in achieving his goals. Chávez has spent billions of dollars on capital-intensive programs and projects that depend on oil revenues, including an estimated \$12 billion on "oil assistance handouts" last year alone.¹²⁹ The fact that Chávez has committed such large sums of Venezuelan money to fund various policies around Latin America shows that, like other petro-states, the high revenues from oil exports have given him a sense of economic stability, and even infallibility. Empowered by the influx of oil revenues, he has pursued a variety of costly policies to further several goals that were only indirectly related to benefiting Venezuela's population, such as encouraging Latin American countries to break away from western-based IFIs.

Furthermore, Chávez's missions,

which are comparable to social programs implemented during the Punto Fijo era, have been one of his largest expenditures, requiring billions of dollars to finance, yet their success has been debatable. As previously mentioned, the Vuelvan Caras mission has only had limited success in creating successful cooperatives and sustainable jobs in Venezuela. It is doubtful that the Robinson mission (which aims to educate Venezuela's rural population) actually succeeded in teaching 1.5 million Venezuelan adults to read and write as Chávez claims it did, however even if they did reach this goal, it came at a high price as the government spent \$50 million to fund the mission.¹³⁰ This equates to about \$536 per adult that successfully became literate through this program, a very high cost when compared to the average per pupil cost of \$47 in Sub-Saharan Africa, \$30 in Asia, and \$61 in Latin America.¹³¹ The Barrio Adentro mission, which was previously discussed, is also very costly for Venezuela, as in addition to supplying Cuba with fuel, it involves transporting patients to and from Cuba if medical treatments are not available in Venezuela. The operating budget for this mission is \$5 billion each year.¹³² These are only three of Chávez's missions, yet as we can see, they are very expensive social programs with only a limited rate of success.

The fact that Chávez has borrowed money in recent years to help fund his policies could be somewhat alarming for Venezuela now that the oil prices have decreased so much. Taking out loans during an oil boom can be particularly troublesome for petro-states. As long as oil prices remain high, banks are willing to lend these states money, however when the value of oil

decreases, banks become unwilling to continue lending and petro-states must quickly pay back their loans at a time when less oil revenues are coming in. Nigeria became an infamous example of a petro-state failing as a result of this pattern as it borrowed large amounts of money during a 1980s oil boom to fund expensive, wasteful projects, and then found itself in debt and unable to adjust to the sudden plunge of oil prices in 1986.¹³³ Loans also deepened the financial troubles of Venezuela under the Punto Fijo system as the later administrations, reluctant to raise non-oil taxes, took out loans which led the country further into debt.¹³⁴

Throughout Chávez's presidency, Venezuela's external debt rose from about \$27.9 billion when he was elected in 1998 to a peak about \$47.1 billion in the second half of 2005 (see Table 2). Following this peak, Venezuelan debt steadily decreased, however the *C.I.A. World Factbook* reports that in 2008, external debt increased to nearly \$48 billion as Chávez has taken out several new loans.¹³⁵ For example, in February 2008, China agreed to furnish Venezuela with a \$4 billion loan which Venezuela is to pay back in shipments of refined oil, rather than in cash.¹³⁶ In September 2008, Russia also agreed to loan Venezuela \$1 billion to help Chávez fund his massive arms purchases.¹³⁷ Yet, despite the fifty percent increase from the 1998 figure in dollar amounts, at its current rate, debt is unlikely to cause economic instability in Venezuela as it did in Nigeria because it represents only 14.7 percent of Venezuela's GDP, a manageable percentage, particularly when compared to other countries.¹³⁸ Although oil prices are currently at

about \$48 per barrel, unlike Nigeria and the Punto Fijo administrations, Chávez has a significant amount of money saved in international reserves to temporarily supplement the oil revenue that Venezuela is able to generate during this oil bust.¹³⁹

Analysis of Chávez's mismanagement of oil revenues with relation to the common trends of the petro-state curse raises the question of how long Venezuela can sustain itself through this oil bust. This analysis shows that his economic policies have replicated several common weaknesses that have led other petro-states to the point of economic collapse. Norway has been one of the most successful petro-states, in large part due to its Government Pension Fund—Global (formerly the Government Petroleum Fund) which is a stabilization fund established in 1990 to help offset the effects of future declines in the value of oil.¹⁴⁰ Venezuela also has a stabilization fund, known as the Fund for Macroeconomic Stabilization, though it is only valued at about \$800 million compared with Norway's fund which is worth about \$326 billion.¹⁴¹ Venezuela's international reserve savings may insulate the country from some of the effects of the oil price drop, however these reserves can only prevent the economic decline for a limited amount of time. Chávez will need to make wise adjustments to his budget in order to avert complete destabilization in Venezuela as a result of the petro-state curse.

To prevent the absorption problem from rapidly destabilizing Venezuela's economy without squandering its savings, Chávez must look carefully at each of his policies, evaluate their effectiveness, then improve the efficiency of those that are

crucial and eliminate those that are not absolutely necessary. As revealed through analysis in the first two sections of the paper, Chávez's policies throughout the region have only earned him conditional support for his ambitions and they have not achieved his intended goals. For example, Chávez's missions need to be reconsidered too as their effectiveness has been severely limited as demonstrated by the Vuelvan Caras, Barrio Adentro, and Robinson missions. These types of ineffective policies and programs must be changed or eliminated so that Chávez is not squandering Venezuelan funds.

By expanding the government's sources of non-oil revenue and altering or eliminating ineffective policies, Chávez will be able to forestall economic collapse in Venezuela, however he will not be able to prevent economic decline completely. With regards to Venezuela's current situation, Karl stated, "Regardless of intentions no [previous] regime has been able to manage these booms to overcome poverty. The end result is the shortages, inflation and slowing of economic growth that we're seeing now."¹⁴² Venezuela is likely to face balance of payment problems with its high imports and lower revenues. Its inflation rate is currently the highest in Latin America at 30.7 percent, and economic growth has slowed significantly.¹⁴³ Indeed, if oil prices do not continue to rise as they have been since the middle of February (see Figure 1), then Venezuela could be slated for economic instability within several months. However, throughout 2009, Venezuela is likely to forestall economic collapse as long as Chávez

handles government funds responsibly. Unfortunately, Venezuela does not have adequate funds to avoid economic decline if the oil bust lasts several years and any policy changes that are made may come at the expense of some of Latin America's most impoverished countries.

Changes to Chávez's Latin American Foreign Policy:

The threat of economic and political instability resulting from decreased oil revenues will force Chávez to focus on improving conditions within Venezuela, especially after his referendum to eliminate limits on the number of terms that elected officials can serve passed in February of this year.¹⁴⁴ In making foreign policy decisions, leaders are always involved in a "two-level game" meaning that their policies must "satisfy simultaneously both their domestic audience and their counterparts in other countries."¹⁴⁵ Seeking to win the 2012 presidential election in Venezuela and serve a fourth presidential term (including his brief first term before his reelection under the Bolivarian Constitution), Chávez cannot risk alienating his supporters by allowing the oil bust to exacerbate Venezuela's domestic problems. As a rational leader, Chávez will be forced to reevaluate his policies and programs in Latin America to ensure that his political actions are effective and directly benefit Venezuela, resulting in a turn away from Chávez's current ideological influence and goals in the region.

First of all, many of Chávez's programs and agreements that offer cheap loans, credit, and oil to countries around the region will be among those policies that he will have to alter or eliminate. Given the

cost of maintaining such programs compared with their effectiveness in achieving his goals, Chávez will have to make budget cuts and improvements to these agreements to keep from overspending Venezuela's limited revenue. In January of this year, Chávez already altered Petrocaribe, which is one of the most important agreements he has reached in Latin America. When the agreement was first signed in 2005, countries purchasing oil through Petrocaribe only had to pay for forty percent of the oil up front, and then pay the difference over the next 25 years at an interest rate of one percent. With significantly lower oil prices, the conditions of the agreement now require that countries pay fifty percent of the cost of oil up front.¹⁴⁶ Chávez will inevitably have to make many similar adjustments to his policies around the region, for example by limiting funding for development in other countries.

Furthermore, Chávez's large-scale energy integration plans will have to be put on hold as long as the price of oil remains low. With oil worth less than one-third of its value at the peak of the price boom and Chávez needing to keep his Venezuelan constituency content to win the 2012 election, he will be unable to fund the numerous large-scale projects, such as refineries and pipelines, that he has promised to help build in neighboring countries. As of January 2009, Chávez was already reconsidering his country's ability to fund the development of oil refineries that had been planned for Nicaragua and Ecuador.¹⁴⁷ Although he has attempted to give the impression that such projects will still be carried out as promised, Venezuela currently lacks the extra funds

that are necessary to fulfill Chávez's promises. Therefore, it is unlikely that much progress will be made toward the completion of these large-scale energy infrastructure projects throughout Latin America because the oil bust will force Chávez to prioritize Venezuela's domestic affairs.

The result of these budget adjustments will be a reverse of Chávez's foreign policy goals of establishing Venezuela as a strong regional power and minimizing western influence in Latin America. Throughout Chávez's presidency, most Latin American leaders have attempted to balance their relations between Venezuela and the United States. However, with Venezuela's economy lacking the strength to continue the very policies that have won Chávez conditional support throughout the region, Latin American leaders are likely to move closer to the United States and other western countries which tend to be more stable than developing countries like Venezuela. Figure 2 shows that the amount of IFI loans being taken in Latin America increased significantly in 2008 when the global financial crisis began and this trend is likely to continue through 2009 as the crisis worsens. Latin American countries including Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Colombia, and Mexico are all beginning to take out new IFI loans in light of the economic crisis.¹⁴⁸ Ecuador, too, which maintains good relations with Chávez, is looking to take out \$2.6 billion in credits which Correa would prefer to receive from regional multilateral lenders including the Inter-American Development Bank, the Andean Development Corporation, and the Latin American Reserve Fund.¹⁴⁹ Given the fragile state of the world economy, even

countries that maintain amicable relations with Chávez are likely to pursue policies that improve their relations with the West in order to encourage foreign investment along with other incentives that could come from maintaining good relations, such as aid.

Chávez's foreign policy budget cuts will most hurt the impoverished Latin American countries that have become dependent on Chávez's policies, pushing many of them closer to the West as well. For example, the ten percent increase of money Petrocaribe countries must pay up front for oil may affect the amount of oil that some of the poorer Caribbean countries can afford to buy and it is very possible that Chávez will be forced to alter the agreement even more. Although it is likely that Chávez will continue Petrocaribe, the countries of the Caribbean will continue to maintain strong relations with the United States as it provides them with necessary aid. Cuba and Bolivia have become particularly dependent on Chávez's assistance to their countries. Chávez is likely to continue the oil for medical care exchange that is set up by the Barrio Adentro mission between Cuba and Venezuela because it brings direct benefit to Venezuelans in the form of health care. However, Chávez still may be forced to limit the amount of oil sent to Cuba and the free medical services that Venezuelans are provided if Venezuela's economy becomes too weak. Bolivia, on the other hand, is likely to suffer heavily from budget cuts that Chávez will be forced to make as the country is already extremely dependent on foreign assistance and Morales has opted to receive aid and loans from Venezuela over the West

when he could. As a result, he has accumulated over \$100 million in debt to Venezuela that Bolivia will be unable to pay back in the near future if Chávez finds that he needs those funds.¹⁵⁰ With the global economic situation worsening, if Venezuela loses the financial strength to continue its aid and programs in the country, then Morales will be forced to pursue policies that are in accordance with western interests because Bolivia is dependent on foreign aid that industrialized western countries will most likely be able to provide.

Given Venezuela's economic fragility due to the oil bust, Chávez himself may be forced to pursue improved relations with the United States. Similar to Chávez's first year in office when financial mismanagement under the Punto Fijo system left Venezuela's economy weak, the oil bust has led Venezuela to once again face many of the same economic problems today that it faced then, including "recession, confronted inflation, capital flight, and low oil prices."¹⁵¹ In a move that reflects his recognition of the fragile state of Venezuela's economy in this post-oil boom period, Chávez invited western oil companies to make oil bids on Venezuela's oil reserves in January of this year.¹⁵² This suggests that Chávez will once again pursue better relations with the West, including the United States, in order to attract foreign revenue.

Although increased foreign investment in Venezuela's oil industry would be beneficial in maximizing its oil production, the necessity to improve relations with the United States would limit Chávez's ability to act definitively against American interests and to influence neighboring countries to

do the same. Furthermore, it is very likely that western companies will be wary of investing in Venezuela given his actions to remove foreign investors from Venezuela's oil industry and consolidate government control over PdVSA. Foreign investors may fear that when oil prices rise, Chávez will once again attempt to regain control over their oil fields. Due to concern over Chávez's past actions, foreign oil companies may look toward other oil fields to invest in, such as those that were recently discovered in Brazil. As such, inviting foreign investment in Venezuela's oil industry would greatly limit Chávez's freedom to pursue his policies, especially as he will need to find a way to regain the trust of foreign investors so that they feel that Venezuelan oil is a worthwhile investment.

Conclusion:

As we have seen, Chávez has fallen into the same petro-state trap that led to the downfall of *puntofijismo* and other petro-state administrations around the world by attempting to capitalize off of an oil boom by using the money to fund lavish and wasteful policies throughout Latin America. Despite saving \$42.2 billion in international reserves, his management of Venezuela's oil wealth shows little foresight for the price plunge that inevitably followed the sudden oil boom. Oil prices are constantly fluctuating, therefore large oil booms are always accompanied by price busts that history shows can have devastating effects on a petro-state if the government does not adequately plan for such market changes. The oil bust of 2008 was particularly sudden and drastic, however petro-states must do their

best to prepare for such sudden changes in oil prices. Analysis of Hugo Chávez's foreign policy throughout the boom-and-bust cycle of oil prices offers many lessons that should be noted by other petro-state leaders who face the challenges that accompany natural resource management, particularly when that resource is the country's primary source of revenue.

First of all, petro-state leaders must understand that increased revenues from an oil boom do not make an oil-dependent country rich, because oil prices can plunge as quickly as they rise. Chávez's foreign policy serves as an example of what petro-state leaders should avoid in managing their budget during an oil boom. Chávez spent much of Venezuela's oil revenues on costly programs throughout Latin America that did not directly benefit Venezuela in the long-term and, furthermore, were ineffective in accomplishing the goals that they set out to achieve. This is not to say that petro-states must completely neglect foreign policy, but rather they should prioritize domestic affairs and pursue only policies that will further the primary goals of their country. For example, Chávez's Barrio Adentro mission provides Venezuelans with health care, an important service that was lacking for most Venezuelans prior to the mission's creation, therefore it is a program worth pursuing through Venezuelan foreign policy. However, the program is currently expensive and inefficient due to the large oil shipments and the range of medical treatments that are offered to Venezuelans. As such, it is likely to undergo changes, for example, by decreasing the amount of oil that is shipped and offering fewer medical services, which would

make the program more efficient and economically sustainable. As long as such policies and programs are cost-effective, efficient, and geared toward the direct, long-term benefit of the public (for example, through coupling such a program with an educational exchange program to train domestic workers), then they may be worth pursuing by petro-state governments.

Furthermore, petro-states must not chase away foreign investment in the oil industry as large, experienced oil companies have proven to be most effective in ensuring peak oil production. Chávez's decision to consolidate government control over PdVSA in 2003 proved to be one of the greatest mistakes of his presidency as Venezuelan oil production dropped by about 800,000 barrels of oil per day (see Figure 3). Venezuela has undoubtedly lost billions of dollars in potential oil revenues that could have provided Venezuela with more money and jobs throughout the oil boom. Furthermore, if oil production were at its peak in Venezuela, then the country would be bringing in more revenues now that oil prices are low. For petro-state leaders, the easiest policy option may appear to be heavy taxation of the oil industry, or even complete control of it to increase the government's budget, and low taxation of other sectors to please the population.¹⁵³ However, foreign investment is key to maintaining the upkeep of a country's oil infrastructure and keeping its oil industry at peak production. Petro-states must, therefore, allow at least some foreign investment in their oil industry and also diversify their sources of revenue by promoting and taxing non-oil sectors of the economy.


Finally, it is essential that petro-state leaders exercise great prudence by saving large amounts of money to offset the detrimental effects of future oil busts. The \$42.2 billion that Chávez managed to save may help Venezuela get through this year, however it is little compared to the \$326 billion that Norway has saved in its Government Pension Fund.¹⁵⁴ Due to resource depletion, petro-states must maintain very high rates of savings and investment throughout oil booms to generate real wealth and to secure economic stability in the event of an oil bust.¹⁵⁵ Norway has been one of the most stable petro-states in the world due to responsible management of its revenues. As such, other petro-states should follow Norway's lead in establishing a strong stabilization fund that is not to be touched unless their economic situation requires it. Many petro-states are beginning to set aside large portions of their resource revenues to create stabilization funds, including Russia, Brazil, and even Libya.¹⁵⁶ Chávez, on the other hand, has not invested heavily in Venezuela's stabilization fund, choosing instead to squander large amounts of oil revenues through his costly foreign policy. Other petro-state leaders can, thus, learn from his mistake.

Unfortunately, in the case of Venezuela, Chávez's management of oil revenues throughout the oil boom-and-bust cycle has made his country susceptible to economic decline as a result of the oil curse. If oil prices remain low or drop even further, Venezuela's economy will quickly destabilize due to Chávez's decision to spend more money immediately and to save less for an emergency. Furthermore, his wasteful spending will negatively impact poor Latin American

countries that have come to depend on his foreign policy. However, through the combination of wise adjustments to Venezuela's budget and luck in the form of rising oil prices, Chávez may have the chance to learn from his mistakes and prepare Venezuela to be secure in the event of a future oil bust. It is important, then, that he and other petro-state leaders, both present and future, understand the mistakes that allowed Venezuela to quickly transform from an economically secure country that was purchasing allies and regional influence into a country that runs the great risk of suffering from economic instability. In order to promote the economic security of their countries throughout the duration of the oil boom-and-bust cycle, petro-state leaders must refrain from wastefully spending oil revenues on immediate projects, and instead encourage foreign investment and a diversified source of revenue, and save large amounts of money to ensure economic security despite the unpredictable nature of market prices.

Appendices

Figure 1: Weekly Prices of Venezuelan Crude Oil, 1978-2009




This graph shows the weekly prices of Venezuelan crude oil between January 1978 and March 2009. Prices from the recent oil boom hit their peak in July 2008 at a price of \$137.98 per barrel and they have declined dramatically since then. U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Weekly Venezuela Tia Juana Light Spot Price FOB,” *Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government* (Washington D.C.: April 29, 2009).

Table 1: Evaluation of Leaders, 2005-2008

	2005	2006	2007	2008
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	5.8	5.6	5.6	5.9
King Juan Carlos I	5.8	5.9	5.9	5.7
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero	5.5	5.6	5.6	5.5
Michelle Bachelet		5.4	5.4	5.5
Fernando Lugo				5.5
Álvaro Uribe		4.9	4.9	5.2
Rafael Correa			4.7	5.0
Felipe Calderón			5.0	5.0
Tabaré Vázquez		4.6	4.6	5.0
Evo Morales		4.9	4.9	4.8
Cristina Kirchner				4.7
Alan García		4.6	4.6	4.3
Hugo Chávez	4.9	4.5	4.5	4.3
Fidel Castro	4.4	4.3	4.3	4.2
George W. Bush	4.9	4.7	4.5	4.2
Daniel Ortega				4.1

Q92ST. I'm going to list a number of foreign leaders. I want you to evaluate them on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means a “very bad” evaluation and 10 means “very good”. Or do you not know enough to give an opinion?
Source: Latinobarómetro 2008

Figure 2: IFI Lending to Latin America and the Caribbean, 1997-2008




This graph shows the amount of money being loaned to Latin America and the Caribbean by the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) each year between 1997 and 2008. The amount of loans furnished by the western-based IFIs, the World Bank and the IDB, was down significantly until about 2006 from their peak in the late 1990s, while the amount of loans from the CAF was increasing since 1999. However, as illustrated in the graph, between 2007 and 2008, loans from all three IFIs increased significantly.

Source: Center for International Policy

Vince McElhiny, "Global Crisis is Good News for IFIs in Latin America," *Americas Program Report*. (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, January 27, 2009).

Figure 3: Venezuela's Oil Production and Consumption, 1987-2007



This graph illustrates the varying trends of Venezuela's oil production and consumption between 1987 and 2007. In 2007, Venezuela only produced about 2.7 million barrels of oil, significantly down from the approximately 3.5 million barrels of oil that the country was producing around 1997. U.S. Energy Information Administration, "Venezuela: Oil," *Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. Government* (Washington D.C.: January 2009).

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The West Wing

Submitted by David Lombardo



For me *The West Wing* will be primarily remembered as compelling entertainment, but the experiences from this class have proven that a political education can be gleaned from the episodes. Although extracting that knowledge is not an easy task, and is one that requires further study as the DVDS of this show could be a useful supplement to any political science program.

In terms of educating a student *The West Wing* should either be used as a base from which to build or it should be a final capstone in a curriculum so that students can see theories and concepts applied in a meaningful and relatable way. My experience has essentially been a combination of the two approaches, as I began watching the show in high school and have rewatched every episode in the second half of my final year at SUNY Geneseo.

The first approach, using the show as a foundation for a political education is promising but would seem to have drawbacks. The main drawback is that it presents an idealistic and optimistic world that isn't always indicative of reality, and would instill a sort of naiveté in a young student who doesn't know anything beyond what he's learned from television. But while the show may present unrealistic outcomes, the scenarios and challenges they lay out to politicking and governing are very real, and are of a relevant interest to anyone with a desire

for a well rounded political education.

Many of the lessons that can be learned from *The West Wing* come in a very elementary fashion, so that if this was the primer for an education it would be adequate. Aaron Sorkin was writing for a general audience, and as such, many of the characters go to great lengths to explain what they're dealing with, the history of the issue, and present all sides of the issue. The history and various viewpoints that are presented are the most compelling reasons why this show could be extremely useful at a rudimentary level. At points you feel like you're in a classroom when you watch the show, as they delve into statistical sampling, explain Senate procedural rules, and debate the role of the media.

These conversations serve as an excellent starting point for any political education, and for me they made my textbooks much more comprehensible. I was able to imagine pocket vetoes in terms that didn't seem so abstract or have an added appreciation for how hard reforming social security actually is.

Beyond added comprehension from the show was an inspired love of politics that might have been equally as important as any quantifiable knowledge gained. The fact that the show was entertaining, and that it presented the political realm in a worthwhile light made the whole adventure

appealing to me, which is why I became more involved in politics and eventually sought a B.A. in political science. Thus, while the romanticism of the show may take away from its grounding in fact, it serves an ulterior purpose by driving people, like me, to explore the issue further and hopefully reaching their own understanding of issues and events. It's this drive that is instilled in people that makes *The West Wing* a very useful starting tool, as if it was an energy bar before a big race. It keeps you motivated, intrigued, and aware of the fact that there is a world outside of lectures and sometimes inaccessible books.

The second way to utilize *The West Wing*, as a culmination of theories and history, would most likely not have the same effects as if the show was used for a starting point. It's most useful capacity in terms of cementing an education would be as a frame of reference from which to debate things, probably in a manner similar to our Thursday discussions. The idea would be for a 300 level class of upper classmen to view how certain issues are covered and prepare to debate the validity of how things play out on *The West Wing*. Presumably they would be able to utilize their earlier knowledge from other classes to ensure an informed debate that would arise over how the show deals with issues like funding legislation, campaigning, and polling.

An upper level class most likely would be able to have a higher appreciation for the show than a general audience, and

would benefit from the political professionals that worked on the show. The list of contributors with respectable political credentials includes George Stephanopoulos, Dee Dee Meyers, and Lawrence O'Donnell. Their role on the show, of providing their own stories and creating new storylines, gives the show a high level of legitimacy. The new storylines they create could serve as test cases for students to debate, as they could muse about events that haven't come to fruition and could espouse their own predictions compared to the happenings on *The West Wing*.

It would also serve as a way to compare similar events from the show to history, and contemplate why they turned out differently. Two good examples would be the shutdown of the Federal Government in season five and the Presidential election in season four. The former would be applied to the standoff between Gingrich and Clinton, while the latter would be comparable to the Presidential election of 2000. With regards to both elections you can analyze the public strategies utilized by both campaigns, which in terms of the 2000 election would present itself as an interesting opportunity to assess Gore's terrible strategy and execution.

There is no downside to this approach of using *The West Wing* for upper level students, which is why I would recommend it. I think a class full of engaged students could really benefit from certain episodes and certain clips, cut in a fashion similar to the way I presented my GREAT Day video.

If I had to choose between the two approaches I would say that the latter is more effective and realistic. My own experience with *The West Wing*, in which it served as the base for my education, is probably impossible to reproduce in a classroom setting since I had the time to watch every single episode. With that understanding though, I would still recommend utilizing *The West Wing* for lower level classes as well as upper level classes.

I would recommend using the show in conjunction with both classes because it can work for a general audience or a more specific crowd. In terms of a general audience, which is what you have in an American Government class (110), there are specific episodes that could make certain themes more accessible and that's why I think those clips could be shown intermittently through lecture. The difficulty that arises is in understanding the fictitious world and its characters, but mandating they watch the first episode would provide enough understanding that no one would be lost after that.

That first episode could also be used in the higher level class to debate the role of the religious right in politics, as the White House contemplates appeasing the religious right over a perceived slight. Ideally a more specific audience, consisting of upper level students, would appreciate this dilemma for the White House, and it would serve as fresh way to approach politics.

Finally, the accessibility of *The West Wing* is derived from the fact that it is entertaining. I know academics don't like to think that a video can do their job or that entertainment has a role in a rigorous academic

life, but I think there's no reason artificial borders should be placed that would prohibit this show from educating students.

Frankly, I think it would be easier for students to learn if they were entertained with the source material. Since *The West Wing* is entertaining while remaining informative it should be used as a tool to supplement a political education, in terms of cultivating an interest and knowledge amongst beginners and honing the ideas of more seasoned students.

Tomorrow Will Shine

Submitted by Geoffrey Griffiths



Martin Luther King Jr.'s "Letter from a Birmingham Jail" shares remarkable similarities with the books *Hosea*, *Jonah*, and *Amos* from the Old Testament. By comparing these writings, we discover not only what makes a prophet and why they arise, but we also discover the general pattern that prophets follow in their efforts to bring about change. The prophets of old, such as Hosea, Jonah, and Amos were the messengers of God, and were usually "outsiders" with an innate calling to reform social and moral injustice. At first, the prophets of old appeared reluctant because they were undertaking a dangerous journey; however, with the help of God, they brought the message that all people could earn forgiveness and salvation if they changed their ways. Martin Luther King Jr. can be seen as a modern prophet, and perhaps he recognized this because he likens himself to the prophets of old. King reminds us that prophets are still needed to fix the injustices and immorality of contemporary society.

Humans have inhabited the Earth for millions of years, and, unfortunately, universal human rights are still not guaranteed to all people. Freedom is not "ringing" everywhere, not even in modern times. Within the past century, the world has witnessed some of the worst dehumanizing events, including the repression of women, the oppression of African Americans, and the vic-

timization of people during the Holocaust. In 1948, the United Nations introduced the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" in an attempt to create a standard, whereby all human beings can be treated with respect and dignity (1). Yet, human rights violations still occur today. This can change. The answer is in speaking out against discrimination and cruelty. Conditions cannot change, if people remain silent. Ultimately, human rights and human flourishing come through the tireless efforts of people willing to put their lives on the line to combat injustice. These people are prophets. They are people, like Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Henry David Thoreau, and Martin Luther King Jr.—people who exercised their freedom of speech to rise above injustice. They appear in the eighth century B.C., and they still appear today.

Marvin Perry, author of Western Civilization: A Brief History, conveys that prophets are "outsiders" that bring messages of social change and "attack oppression, cruelty, greed, and exploitation" (29). In other words, prophets are "outside" of the corrupt, immoral, and faithless population—whether it is because they come in from a foreign area or because they are not taking part in the sins or violations of the majority. Perry asserts that prophets, "often emerge in times of social distress and moral confusion" and "plea for a return to the covenant

and law” (29). Prophets are needed when things are not going well or when people have strayed from morality. The prophets of old emerged, when people sinned against God by disobeying the Ten Commandments. It was the job of the prophets of old to educate people about their sins and to bring an end to decadence. In contemporary society, to follow God’s way is analogous to being morally good in thought and action. No religion is required to do what is not only good for you, but also to do what will benefit others. To borrow an idea from the philosopher, Immanuel Kant, we should “treat everyone as an end in themselves, and not a means to an end.” More simply, all people should be treated with respect.

Hosea, Jonah, and Amos are three of the prophets of old, and they represent some of the earliest human and civil rights activists. The prophet Hosea comes from the north and entered the southern population of Israel because the people have been showing “no faithfulness or kindness and no knowledge of God in the land; there was swearing, lying, killing, stealing, and committing adultery” (Revised Standard Version, Hos. 4.2). Hosea used an analogy of his personal life to convey the message of God. Hosea’s wife, Gomer, has committed adultery and has “played the harlot,” just as the people of Israel have “left their God to play the harlot” (Hos. 1.2). A second prophet, Jonah, also represents an “outsider,” when he is commanded by God to “go to Nineveh that great city and cry against it, for their wickedness has come up before me” (Jon. 1.2). Jonah tried to escape on a ship, but God “hurled a great wind

upon the sea” to prevent him. This reminds us that the prophets of old were doing the work of God and that God remained in control as the ultimate moral judge of humans (Jon. 1.15). More universally, no person has the authority over anyone else. People must act responsibly, and must consider the consequences to other people before acting.

Amos, a shepherd from Judea, brought the sins to the attention of the people of the different villages of Israel. He relayed God’s message to Damascus, Gaza, Tyre, Judah, and several other villages that, “God will not revoke the punishment” for their “transgressions” (Amos 1.3). Amos declared that the people have forsaken their humbleness before God and have adopted a life of self-indulgence. They have become people who “oppress the poor, who crush the needy” in favor of materialistic needs, such as alcohol and wealth (Amos 4.1). This criticism originates from the transition from tribal society to settled civilizations that occurred in Israel during the Eighth Century B.C. The transition resulted in class distinctions. With this development, the wealthy Hebrew Kings began to mistreat the poor (Perry 29). For the prophets, this type of “national misfortune was an opportunity for penitence and reform” (Perry 29).

Prophets have an innate calling—whether from God or within themselves—to undertake the dangerous job of being the “gadfly” according to Socrates, and to speak out against injustice. According to Perry, prophets are people who “felt compelled to act as God’s messengers” (29). The prophets sought something beyond the law, they sought “a deeper spiritual insight or a zeal for morality in daily life” (Perry 30). Hosea

loved Israel and felt compelled to carry the word of God throughout the land to deliver the land that he loved so much from the “deep corruption” (Hos. 9.3). Hosea was “the watchman of Ephraim [Israel]” (Hos. 9.8). As the “watchman,” it was his job to prevent corruption from sweeping across Israel. It was his job to cry out against injustice, and to stand in the way of the oppressors of the weak.

Similarly, God called upon Jonah to “proclaim the message that I tell you” to the city of Nineveh on several occasions (Jon. 3.2). However, Jonah illustrates that prophets may not be fully prepared to carry out their calling; they need the guidance of God, or some other moral judge. After the first call of God, Jonah set sail on a ship and ignored his calling, which caused God to send a treacherous storm to remind Jonah of his purpose (Jon. 1.13). Along the journey, prophets can stray from their noble cause, and adopt a selfish lifestyle, leading to the emergence of false prophets. True prophets are altruistic, and seek the betterment of humankind, not just themselves. Just as Jonah was “thrown into” being a prophet, he was thrown into the sea, swallowed by a fish, and delivered to Nineveh to continue his role (Jon. 1). The prophet Amos also felt a moral obligation to relay God’s message to the people of Israel. In chapter three, Amos called for the people to “hear this word that the Lord has spoken against you.” It was his duty to warn the people that their sinful lifestyles and mistreatment of the poor would result in punishments from God unless they changed their ways (Jon. 3.5).

Being a prophet is a dangerous job.

In the Eighth century B.C., Hosea, Jonah, and Amos faced persecution, imprisonment, ostracism, and other atrocities for speaking out against the sins of the majority. In other words, they spoke out against human rights violations. What if people did not embrace the messages of the prophets? Would God protect the prophets and punish the people as was described? These questions may never be fully answered; yet, in many cases the prophets did face persecution. Hosea, Jonah, and Amos may have remained relatively unscathed in the end; however, others may not have been so fortunate. Prophets fulfill their role no matter what the consequences are—perhaps it is because they are “caught up by the *Zeitgeist*,” or the spirit of the time, especially during times of crisis as Martin Luther King Jr. illustrates (King 5).

Prophets bring a message of forgiveness, salvation, and hope for the future. If the people follow the message of the prophets, then God will have mercy on them. According to Perry, the prophets believed that, “life on earth could be improved, that poverty and injustice need not be accepted as part of an unalterable natural order, and that the individual was capable of elevating himself or herself morally and could respect the dignity of others” (Perry 30). The denial of human rights can be reversed, the mistreatment of people can be stopped, and the conditions of society can change with some effort. In *Hosea*, God revealed that he “would heal their faithlessness” if the people repented (Hos. 14.5). Hosea conveyed that God “would be as the dew to Israel; he shall blossom as the lily, he shall strike root as the poplar” (Hos. 14.6). In *Jonah*, after the people repented and had “turned from their

evil way,” God did not punish them, and instead commended them on their actions (Jon. 3.10). Amos also related that, “as the shepherd rescued from the mouth of the lion two legs, or a piece of an ear, so shall the people of Israel who dwell in Samaria be rescued” (Amos 3.12). In other words, Hosea, Jonah, and Amos illustrate that change can occur and that good behavior will be rewarded.

Similar to the prophets of the Old Testament, Martin Luther King Jr. represents the “outsider” bringing messages to a sinful population when he travels to Birmingham and throughout the entire South. James A. Colaiaco relates that, “King [actually] compares himself to the prophets of the Old and New Testaments of the Bible” (4). In the third paragraph of the “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” King states that he is “in Birmingham because injustice is here. Just as the prophets of the eighth century B.C. left their villages and carried their ‘thus saith the Lord’ far beyond the boundaries of their home towns” (King, 1). Although, Martin Luther King Jr. may be called an “outsider” to Birmingham, he is “in Birmingham by affiliation and by invitation” with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to “participate in nonviolent efforts to secure equal rights for blacks” (Colaiaco 4). King may not live in Birmingham, but he belongs there because Birmingham is the center of injustice, and it is his calling to end it.

Martin Luther King Jr. is a prophet who is responding to racial injustice and the mistreatment of African Americans, as well as all people of color. King calls for an end

to the immoral practices of segregation. In fact, King’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail” was written in response to a document published by “Alabama clergymen charging that the recent direct actions in the city had been ‘unwise and untimely’” (Colaiaco 2). The Alabama clergymen refer to the recent “anti-segregation” demonstrations and boycotts led by Martin Luther King Jr. and other civil rights activists (Colaiaco 1). King and others were left with few options except to undertake a nonviolent campaign to combat the segregation, brutality, and “grossly unjust treatment in courts” of African Americans (King 1). Civil disobedience, similar to that of Mahatma Gandhi, was the best option because a violent campaign would only escalate the problems. Perhaps, the only right that should be denied to people is the right to harm others. Treating others with brutality because of their appearance or beliefs benefits no one.

Martin Luther King Jr. adamantly pronounces his moral calling to rise up against justice when he writes that, “there comes a time when the cup of endurance runs over, and men [and women] are no longer willing to be plunged into the abyss of despair” (King 3). King asserts that the injustices occurring in Birmingham have continued far too long and believes that it is his duty, as well as the duty of everyone affected by racial discrimination to speak up against it. Colaiaco supports King’s assertions when he writes, “As long as blacks throughout the nation were denied justice and equality, the dream embodied in America’s Declaration of Independence and the Constitution would remain unfulfilled” (3).

In addition to the civil laws of a society, there are “higher laws” that apply to every community, religion, and government. They are the moral laws, such as treating people equally. That is why “segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and awful” (King 3). King’s calling extends far beyond any law or written rule and it delves into a moral obligation. As is written in the “Declaration of the Independence of the United States of America,” everyone in western society is given certain “inalienable rights” for “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” and everyone in western society is protected by natural laws against mistreatment, discrimination, and enslavement. These are the very rights being denied in Birmingham through the practice of segregation. Martin Luther King Jr. “cannot sit idly by in Atlanta,” while this is occurring because “injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere” (King 1). Injustice in Birmingham stands in the way of justice in other places. The oppressors in Birmingham must be dealt with, otherwise oppression will continue indefinitely. As Immanuel Kant writes in *Perpetual Peace*, “A transgression in one place is felt everywhere” (119). Mistreatment and denial of rights of people based on race, color, gender, ethnic background, or appearance is felt by all people.

The role of a prophet is a struggle, but change often “comes through the tireless efforts of men [and women] willing to be coworkers with God” (King 5). Martin Luther King Jr. and many of his contemporaries during the Civil Rights Movement faced

unimaginable horrors during their nonviolent campaigns and acts of civil disobedience (Colaiaco 6). Homes of African Americans and white sympathizers were burned to the ground, prominent Civil Rights leaders were shot down, and families were torn apart. During some of the “freedom rides,” many men and women “suffered savage beatings” (Colaiaco 6). Even King was jailed about a dozen times for bringing the message of peace and demanding an end to suffering, just as the prophets before him had done.

Although immediate results may not be seen, positive change likely prevails with the efforts of prophets. Tragically, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated on April 4, 1968, before he could see the full result of his efforts. King eventually was victorious in Birmingham, and his efforts represent a “turning point in the battle for civil rights, after which the forces of segregation in the South began to crumble” (Colaiaco 1). In 1964, the Civil Rights Act came into fruition and outlawed segregation. Then, in 1965, the Voting Rights Act outlawed discrimination in voting. We can only imagine the smile that would have spread across King’s face after Barack Obama was elected President of the United States of America this year, and we can only guess at King’s satisfaction of seeing the diversity of the candidates running for the 2008 election. Times have changed and conditions have improved from the effort of people, such as Martin Luther King Jr. However, in King’s attempt at creating unity among people, many of the human rights violations not in the public spotlight were forgotten and many of the struggles of people in poor

neighborhoods were ignored. Many of these problems persist today.

As Socrates would argue, society is always in need of the “gadfly,” or dissenter, but prophets are much more than dissenters; they speak up against injustice and serve as messengers of morality for the people (*The Apology*). Through the efforts of prophets, great changes are made. Evil can be converted to Good, immorality can be changed to morality, and injustice can be restored to justice. Martin Luther King Jr. emerged in a time of racial injustice and applied the same practices of Hosea, Jonah, and Amos from thousands of years ago. Martin Luther King Jr. helped end segregation in the United States, but he was not the only one. Thousands of other civil and human rights activists did their part too. Society needs prophets to expose the injustices of society, but prophets would not be successful, unless they received the support of their peers.

Today, we are closer than we were before to guaranteeing universal human rights; however, more work must be done. For example, why did the Apartheid segregation in South Africa endure into the early 1990s? In the United States, *Brown v. Board of Education* (1954) outlawed segregation, but segregation in America’s education systems still exists today, as Jonathan Kozol argues in his book, *The Shame of the Nation*. This is something that King did not get a chance to combat, and it is something that another modern prophet, Jonathan Kozol, brings to our attention. Perhaps, society will always need prophets to speak up for the oppressed. Who will be the Hoseas, Jonahs, Gandhis, and Kings of the future? Whoever they may be, tomorrow will shine with their help.

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Diamond Certificate Report: The Ghana Project

Submitted by Jesse Parent, Rejoyce
Owusu, and Ben DeGeorge



The report is the pinnacle of the Diamond certificate. Please answer the following questions in your report:

Name: Jesse Parent, Rejoyce Owusu, and Ben DeGeorge

Title of Project: The Ghana Project

Dates of Project from beginning to completion or still in progress

The project began September 20, 2008 and it is an on gain service learning project under the center of community at SUNY Geneseo. The Ghana Project originally started off as a service learning/civic engagement/ volunteering project through the GOLD department. The Ghana Project is focused on spreading Ghanaian culture through cross culture dialogue amongst students that have studies abroad in Ghana and students that are thinking about service learning opportunities on campus.

Through the efforts of SUNY Geneseo students we want to create global awareness on campus. Specifically, we want to create awareness and establish a connection with a University in Ghana. We have successfully had educational programming, community partnerships, fundraising efforts and a GREAT Day presentation every year on campus.

Our main goals for this semester were the cultural dinner, T-shirt advertisement, the 5K race and our Great day performance. All these events were fantastic.

Inspiration: What was your inspiration for doing your project?

The Ghana Project was created in Fall 2008; it was born out of GOLD's "Diamond Civic Engagement" certificate. GOLD Mentor Rejoyce Owusu developed the idea as a way to share her homeland of Ghana. Joined by fellow GOLD Mentors Jesse Parent and Ben DeGeorge, the founding members The Ghana Project began working together to establish a group based on civic engagement and service learning, focusing on Ghana and its culture and increasing global awareness. A major long term goal of the project is helping to build or establish a school in Ghana. While the first year of the Project has been about establishing and creating awareness, already raised significant funding and made valuable connections to help in pursuing this goal.

Funding: Did your project require funding? How did you go about acquiring these funds?

Major fundraising for The Ghana Project has been sponsored T-Shirts. Thanks to a combined effort with SUNY Geneseo's Educational Department groups – Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), Elementary and Secondary Educational Association (ESEA), and The Young Children's Council (YCC) – The Ghana Project has been able to raise over \$1,000 in one week's time.

Upcoming fundraisers also include a Walkathon / 5K race in mid-April. “Geneseo Moves for Ghana” will be another means to raise funding for the long term goal of building a school in Ghana. The Ghana Project has received wide recognition, support, and great publicity. It has appeared in the student-run newspaper, The Lamron, frequently over the course of it’s short existence.

Community Contacts, Collaborators & Partners: Names of organizations and individuals who you worked with in the community and/or on campus to make your project a reality? Please include contact information for future reference.

Since the launch of the Ghana Project in the Fall of 2008, we have collaborated with multiple student groups on campus that also concentrate on bringing awareness to the issues in Africa and created a committee to ensure that we are working together and sharing the resources on campus. The amount of people that have been reached through the project is simply amazing. We have a growing facebook group of over 720 people, a mailing list of over 100 people, and we have a partnership with students in the Brockport, Robert Wesleyan, Cornell, Buffalo, and Syracuse campus.

In November ‘08, the Project held its first major event, an educational model about Ghana. Speakers included Dr. Osman Alawiye, Dean of School of Education, Dr. Dennis Showers. Guests from SUNY Brockport shared their stories. March ‘09 was the first ever Ghana Gala. The event included a traditional Ghanaian dinner, dancing, modeling Ghanaian clothing, and other activities. Speakers included Dr. Osman Alawiye,

Prof. Wes Kennison, (International Studies) and Prof. Owusu-Dapaa, from Nkrumah Technical University, Ghana. Special thanks to Wyoming Hall for hosing the event, especially Area Coordinator of Wyoming and Putnam hall, Yolany Gonell.

The Ghana project has had individuals that has help sponsor the project such as Tom Matthews, Leadership Education, Development & Training and David Parfitt, Teaching & Learning Center, Dean of the School of Education, Yolany Gonell, Mark Scott Director of Campus A Services, and all other supporters including GOLD, Res-Life, CAS, CEC, YCC, and ESEA.

On April 21, 2009 The Ghana Project conducted a dance performance in the Union Ballroom Stage introduced by President Christopher Dahl. Our dance was a three and half minute long dance - a combination of African hip hop music. The lyrics of the song are African-French, and the moves will be exciting and energetic. It will be a celebration of African culture. We will be wearing traditional Ghanaian clothing. The members of the team include: Abigail Boateng, Dalia Calix, Deon Edwards, Heather Ford, Kerisha Hawthorne, Theona Hudson, Rejoyce Owusu, Jesse Parent, and Angela Snook

Timeline: What were the different steps to completing your project?

The heart and soul of The Ghana Project is sharing Ghanaian culture. From teaching group members the Ghanaian handshake to working on major culture events, the Project seeks to welcome others into warm Ghanaian culture. The project was introduce to the community through educational programming and educating students about our

cause and getting students excited about joining the cause.

Last semester the Ghana Project held an informational program in Wayne Hall and we were happy to have Wes Kennison from the International Studies department, Dr. Alawiye, Dean of Education, and study abroad student Ben De'George present on their experience in Ghana. Members of the Brockport Ghana Project were in attendance along with various community members that had an interest in Ghana.

Recently, the Ghana Project sponsored a Ghana Gala in Wyoming Hall. At the Gala we had Wes Kennison, present on the customs of the Ghanaian people during his visit to Ghana. Dr. Alawiye, and Professor Owusu-Dappa, who teaches in the Faculty of Law at the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology in Kumasi, Ghana were both in attendance and shared some words with the audience about the issues in Ghana. Overall, the Ghana Gala was a fantastic success, with traditional Ghanaian food, music, dancing, clothing, modeling and other decorative display of information of various tribes in Africa. To say the least, the event had full capacity attendance, and many people spoke highly about it. We were even featured in the student newspaper, *The Lamron*.

Challenges: What challenges did you foresee in executing your project? What challenges did you actually encounter?

We have encountered many challenges dealing with the direction of the project and combining all three Gold mentors' leadership styles. We also had to deal with working with the college policies, especially in

regards to fundraising at the college. We had to be aware of the student association rules and be careful not to break these since we were not a campus organization. One of the major problems we encounter was the miscommunication between other organizations on campus. We have learned that through a large civic engagement project such as this managing every detail aspect of the project is very important. We had to inform all college officials on campus so the communication was smooth because everyone on campus is concern with activities taking place on campus. Another important thing we learn was learning how to delegate responsibilities to influences students to take upon themselves roles they thought they could have done.

Benefits: What are the short-term and long-term societal benefits to your project?

The long term benefit of the project is to establish a partnership in Ghana and to contribute a school building in Ghana. We also hope students would be citizen diplomats across the world and gain more experiences through civic engagement project such as the Ghana Project. We also want to continue to encourage students to try something new and challenge their leadership skill on a different level. We hope that through the GOLD program we could bring enough awareness of the issues in Ghana to build a school in Ghana and have students from Geneseo continue to conduct their internship there.

Future: How could this project be replicated in the future?

In the future, we hope this project will be an ongoing service project that students

will be passionate about and continue to expand their knowledge through other countries. This project hopefully will help Geneseo network with the global world and connect students with various internship opportunities. This project can be replicated in many different ways through forming connections with other countries and working towards the goal of doing that nation a service.
