The Logic of Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation

by

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Dedication

To my parents.

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I am grateful to the many people who contributed time, energy, and constructive criticism to this dissertation project. As chair of my dissertation committee, Alastair Smith showed his true colors as a comparativist. I thank Bill Clark, in particular, for being a consistent driving force behind my development as a social scientist. Mike Gilligan provided crucial insights on more than one occasion when I had run into a dead end, saving me months of fruitless labor. Jonathan Nagler carefully read every paper I ever gave to him, and has improved each draft tenfold with suggestions about matters both large and small. I am particularly grateful to Bing Powell for agreeing to be on my dissertation committee, and for his thoughtful comments and criticisms. Of all of the people in the profession, he is the ideal person to evaluate a dissertation on pre-electoral coalitions, and I am especially lucky to have benefitted from his advice.

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Abstract

Political parties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. Parties can either form a pre-electoral coalition prior to an election or they can compete independently and enter a government coalition afterwards. Although there is a vast coalition literature, there are no theoretical or empirical studies of coalitions that form prior to an election. This dissertation seeks to redress this imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by explaining the variation in electoral coalition formation.

The existing literature implicitly suggests that pre-electoral coalition formation is a simple function of electoral rules: the more disproportional the electoral system, the more likely a pre-electoral coalition is to form. I reframe the notions in the literature as testable hypotheses, using an original dataset comprising all legislative elections in 25 countries between 1946 and 2002. I find considerable support for the following hypothesis: pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in

disproportional electoral systems if there are many parties. However, this result does not explain temporal variation in pre-electoral coalition formation, and it ignores the obvious distributional consequences that must be overcome when electoral coalitions are formed.

I develop a more nuanced explanation of electoral coalition formation using a finite two-player complete-information bargaining game that generates implications concerning the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation. The plausibility of the model is examined in the context of in-depth case studies of pre-electoral coalition formation in the French Fifth Republic and in South Korea.

Finally, I test the model's hypotheses using a random-effects probit model with an original dataset containing information on potential coalition dyads in 20 industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. The results support the hypotheses derived from the model. Ideological compatibility increases the likelihood of forming an electoral coalition, as do disproportional electoral institutions. Parties are more likely to form an electoral coalition if the potential coalition size is be large (but not too large) and if the coalition members are of similar electoral size. Finally, electoral coalitions are more likely if the party system is polarized and the electoral institutions are disproportional.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

In most democracies single parties are unable to command a majority of support in the legislature. Thus political parties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to enter some form of coalition. In effect, they can either form an electoral coalition with another party (or parties) prior to election or they can compete independently and enter a government coalition afterwards. I define pre-electoral coalitions fairly broadly to include cases in which party leaders either announce to the electorate that they plan to form a government together if successful at the polls or agree to run under a single name (with joint lists or nomination agreements). The common link between these situations is that parties or party leaders never compete in elections as truly independent

entities.[1] The fact that coalition government is the norm rather than the exception across the world has encouraged a vast literature to develop in political science. The overwhelming majority of these theoretical and empirical studies focus purely on government coalitions; electoral coalitions are virtually ignored. This study seeks to redress this imbalance in our knowledge of coalitions by focusing on pre-electoral coalitions. Specifically, it aims to explain electoral coalition formation.

Understanding the formation of electoral coalitions is important for at least three reasons. First, electoral coalitions can have a significant impact on election outcomes and the types of policy that are ultimately implemented. Consider the following simple example. Imagine a legislative election with single-member districts in which there are two blocs of parties, one on the left and one on the right. The right-wing bloc has more electoral support than the left. Suppose the parties on the left form an electoral coalition and field a common candidate in each district, but that the parties on the right compete independently. The

[1]There are, of course, finer distinctions that could be made among the various types of electoral coalition. For example, one might argue that coalitions composed of parties with different geographical bases of support are different from those composed of parties that normally compete in the same districts. Given the limited research on pre-electoral coalitions, I focus here on the defining characteristic of a pre-electoral coalition - that parties do not compete independently - rather than on the various ways in which these coalitions can be disaggregated.

right would most likely lose in this situation. In this example the possibility arises that a majority of voters could vote for a group of politicians who support similar policies and that these politicians might still lose the election by failing to coordinate sufficiently.[2] The result is that the left party is elected to implement policies that a majority of the voters do not want.[3] In as much as one places a normative value on the basic principle that the candidate with the most support among the electorate should be elected, it matters whether political elites choose electoral strategies and coalitions that make them less likely to win elections.

Second, the coalition strategies employed by political parties have important implications for the representative nature of governments. Powell (2000) distinguishes between majoritarian and proportional representation versions of democratic government. In the majoritarian version, a party with a majority (or plurality) of the vote wins the election

[2]In a country with more proportional electoral rules, electoral coalitions can still play a role in determining the identity of the government. An electoral coalition may affect the choice of government *formateur*, or allow a small party that is a potential government member to surpass an electoral threshold. Control over the government policy may well go to the political parties who are most effective at coordinating electoral strategies to win a plurality of the votes.

[3]Cox (1997, 138) argues that this type of situation "ought to end in fusion, nomination agreements, or strategic voting." Either the elites on the right should coordinate on electoral strategies (fusion or nomination agreements), or voters should take the problem out of their hands by coordinating on the candidate most likely to defeat the left candidate (strategic voting).

and governs the country until the next election. In this situation the electorate knows that their votes directly influence which party exerts executive power and implements policy. In the proportional representation version this is not necessarily true. Elections in these systems "serve primarily as devices for electing representative agents in postelection bargaining processes, rather than as devices for choosing a specific executive" (Huber 1996, 185). As a result, the lines of accountability are blurred and it is unclear how well voter preferences are reflected in the government that is ultimately formed.

To some extent, the formation of pre-electoral coalitions can overcome this problem since it allows voters to know exactly what the government alternatives are. In fact, party leaders in the Netherlands, Ireland, and Germany have made this type of argument publicly in order to explain their participation in electoral coalitions and in an attempt to appeal to voters (Saalfeld 2000, Mitchell 1999, Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge 1994, De Jong & Pijnenburg 1986). One might argue that electoral coalitions increase democratic transparency and provide coalition governments with as much of a mandate as single parties in majoritarian systems (Budge & Keman 1990). Given the important implications for the representative nature of government, one might want to know the conditions under which pre-electoral coalitions form.

Third, electoral coalitions are not rare phenomena. Figure 1.1 illustrates the number of electoral coalitions per year, the average number

of parties participating in these coalitions per election, and the number of electoral coalitions that enter government per election for 19 West European democracies from 1946 to 2002. The specific countries and elections are listed in Table 1.1 in the Appendix to Chapter 1.[4]

The sharp increase in the number of pre-electoral coalitions in the late 1970s is due in part to the inclusion of Spain and Portugal in ranks of democratic countries in the mid-1970s. At any one time between 1946-2002, one could expect to see an average of over 11 electoral coalitions across these countries. The average number of parties participating in a pre-electoral coalition was 2.9. Although most electoral coalitions comprised two parties, some have many parties. For instance, the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) comprised 14 parties in the 1977 Spanish elections. Perhaps a more significant point is that of the 175 pre-electoral coalitions that formed in this period, 24% actually ended up in government.

One recent study on the types of formal government coalition agreements found in parliamentary democracies in Western Europe concluded that

[4]See the main Appendix for a detailed description of the electoral coalitions included in this analysis and of the data collection process. I present only Western European countries in Figure 1.1, as the vast majority of work on coalitions uses these countries, or a subset thereof (see below for further discussion of these studies). In addition, regional electoral coalitions are not included, which means that some of the small parties in pre-electoral coalitions are not counted here.

Figure 1.1: Pre-Electoral Coalitions (PEC) in Europe 1946-2002



when all of the coalition cabinets in the sample were considered, many had an "identifiable coalition agreement," and that more than a third were written *prior* to the election (Strom & Müller 2000). Naturally, this study did not pick up all instances of electoral coalitions. However, it does serve to emphasize the point that coalition bargaining often occurs prior to elections in a wide range of countries.

Current research on coalitions has almost nothing to say about these pre-electoral coalitions. Those formal models of coalition behavior that exist are typically used to predict which government coalition will form (Diermeier & Merlo 2001, Strom, Budge & Laver 1994, Baron 1991, Austen-Smith & Banks 1990, Laver & Shepsle 1990, Baron & Ferejohn 1989), who gets which portfolio (Warwick & Druckman 2001), how long the formation process takes (Martin & Vanberg 2003, Diermeier & van Roozendaal 1998), and how long the government coalition will last (Diermeier, Eraslan & Merlo 2003, Warwick 1999, Diermeier & Stevenson 1999, Merlo 1997, Lupia & Strom 1995). Although these models tend to focus on parties, they do occasionally incorporate voter choices and candidate entry (Shepsle 1991). For instance, Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) analyze the strategic behavior of voters in their model of government coalition formation, and some recent work combines voter behavior with post-election elite bargaining (Glasgow & Alvarez 2003, Quinn & Martin 2002).

However, none of these formal models of government coalitions ever incorporate the possibility of pre-electoral coalitions. Although these coalitions are occasionally discussed in single-country case studies, especially in countries such as France, Germany, or Ireland (Hanley 1999, Saalfeld 2000, Mitchell 1999), they are rarely the focus of systematic investigation. Many of the political scientists who do actually address electoral coalitions never seem to be primarily interested in studying

the pre-election stage of electoral competition as such (Strom, Budge & Laver 1994, Laver & Schofield 1998, Müller & Strom 2000, Strom & Müller 2000). Electoral coalitions are often treated purely as an interesting aside. One notable exception is Powell (2000, 247). In the conclusion of his recent book, Powell notes that "One area that cries out for more serious theoretical and empirical work is the appearance of announced preelectoral coalitions between political parties. We know too little about the origins of such coalitions and about the great variety of forms (shared manifestos, withdrawal of coalition partners, recommendations to voters) that they can take. But in a number of countries such coalitions unmistakably play a critical role at both electoral and legislative levels." Given the prevalence of electoral coalitions and their potential impact on government composition and policies, I believe that this represents a serious omission in our knowledge relating to coalitions. This study begins to address this oversight by examining the conditions under which electoral coalitions form.

This research objective presupposes the existence of a common underlying logic to the formation of pre-electoral coalitions. To some extent, this represents a new approach to analyzing these coalitions. As I mentioned earlier, the limited research that already exists on electoral coalitions is often country or election specific. One consequence of this is the emphasis placed on factors that are idiosyncratic to particular countries, elections or party leaders. For example, the inability of the

moderate right in France to form electoral coalitions in certain elections is frequently explained in terms of the personal animosities or plain 'stupidity' of party leaders (Bell 2000, Goldey 1999, Knapp 1999, Nay 1994). While the country-specific research is both interesting and highly informative, it does not offer us a general theory for explaining why electoral coalitions form. I seek to provide such a theory in this dissertation.

As with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among party leaders. For example, party leaders who wish to form a pre-electoral coalition must reach agreement over a joint electoral strategy and the distribution of office benefits that might accrue to them. This may involve outlining a common coalition platform, deciding which party gets to run the more powerful ministerial posts, choosing which party's candidates should step down in favor of candidates from their coalition partner(s) in particular districts, or determining which leader is to become prime minister. Clearly, any pre-electoral coalition bargaining process will involve a thorny set of distributional and ideological issues. Ultimately, party leaders must weigh the incentives to form electoral coalitions against the incentives to run independently.

Before elaborating on these incentives, it is worth noting that the pre-electoral coalition formation process is not quite the same as the government coalition formation process. First, electoral advantages that come from competing together as a coalition, particularly in countries

with disproportional electoral rules, will create incentives to form an electoral coalition that are no longer relevant in the post-election context. Put differently, forming a government coalition cannot influence the probability of electoral victory; electoral coalitions can. Second, it is possible that the ideological compatibility constraint facing potential coalitions is likely to be stronger prior to the election than afterwards. This is because voters might be unwilling to vote for electoral coalitions comprising parties with incompatible policy preferences; after the election, parties have more leeway to enter into these types of government coalitions because voters are no longer such an immediate constraint on politicians' actions.[5] My point here is only that it would be a mistake to immediately assume that the same factors which have been found to be important in the government coalition bargaining process will be the same factors that shape pre-electoral coalition formation.

The logic of electoral coalition formation that I present is based on the belief that party leaders care about winning office and policy (Müller

[5]Parties may feel constrained in their coalition choices even after the election. This is because voters would punish ideologically incompatible government coalitions at subsequent elections. Rational party leaders would look ahead and adjust their coalition behavior accordingly. Thus governments that result from pre-electoral and government coalitions might be similar in terms of their ideological compatibility. (Thanks to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita for this point.) However, if party leaders think that a particular 'incompatible' coalition is likely to be successful in office, they may gamble that voters will not punish them in the next elections.

& Strom 1999). Each party leader must compare the utility that they expect to receive if they competed independently to the utility that they expect to receive if they competed as part of an electoral coalition. Consider first the case where party i decides to run independently. In this scenario, the party may be sufficiently successful at the polls that it gets to enter government. If the party wins more than 50% of the seats it could form a government on its own. In this situation the party would obtain all of the office benefits associated with being in power and could set policy at its own ideal point. Clearly, this would be the first choice for party i. However, party i will recognize that it is relatively rare for a single party to control a majority of the seats in most parliamentary systems. If party i is to enter government, then it is much more likely to do so as part of a government coalition. In this case, party i would receive some utility from its share of the office benefits and would suffer some utility loss from having government policy set at the ideal point of the coalition rather than at its own ideal point. Naturally, the utility loss suffered by each coalition partner would be lower the more ideologically compatible the government coalition. Finally, party i will know that there is some probability that it will not get to enter government if it runs independently. If this situation arises, then it will receive no office benefits and will suffer the utility loss associated with having the government set policy at the government ideal point and not at party i's ideal point. Clearly, the lowest possible utility for party i from running

independently would occur if it was in opposition and government policy was ideologically distant from its own ideal point.

The second case is when party i decides to run as part of an electoral coalition. Note that in order to form a pre-electoral coalition it is likely that party i will need to make some concessions in terms of policy and office to its potential coalition partners. For example, it is highly unlikely that party i would get to set the coalition policy exactly at its own ideal point and/or obtain all of the office benefits if the electoral coalition entered government. These concessions are essentially the exact same concessions that parties which run independently would have to make when forming a government coalition after the election. Arguably, these concessions are more costly to make prior to an election than afterwards. This is because any concessions that must be made to other parties in terms of ministerial posts or coalition policies after an election can more easily be presented to party members as a consequence of the votes cast by the electorate; if the concessions occur before an election then they can only be blamed on the party leadership. Given this, one might reasonably wonder why parties do not simply wait until after the election to make these concessions. Indeed, in many elections this is precisely what happens.

However, the key thing to recognize about pre-electoral coalitions is that they can affect the probability that a party gets to enter government. Recognizing this, party leaders will form a pre-electoral coalition

if they think that this will increase their probability of entering government to such an extent that the expected utility from doing this is larger than the expected utility from running independently. There are several reasons why pre-electoral coalitions might be electorally advantageous.[6]

First, it may be the case that an electoral coalition would attract a higher number of votes than any of the coalition parties would win running independently. This situation might occur if voters are risk averse in regard to the policy positions of potential future governments. That is, they prefer being able to identify a government alternative to being faced with a lottery over possible government outcomes, even if the mean expected policy position in both cases is identical. The lottery over possible government outcomes is less desirable because the variance in possible policy positions is greater (Ashworth & Bueno de Mesquita 2004, Snyder & Ting 2002, Enelow & Hinich 1981). By decreasing voter uncertainty over which government coalition might form and thus which policy would get implemented, the parties that form a pre-electoral coalition can attract more votes than would otherwise be the case.

More important, probably, is the strong empirical evidence that disproportional electoral institutions provide an electoral bonus to large

[6]I do not claim that pre-electoral coalitions will always be electorally advantageous. After all, it may be the case that a coalition is composed of parties that are so ideologically incompatible that their respective electorates refuse to vote for the coalition.

parties or coalitions through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes into seats (Golder & Clark 2003*b*, Cox 1997, Lijphart 1994, Duverger 1959). Since all electoral systems are disproportional to some extent, electoral coalitions may hold out significant advantages in terms of extra legislative seats. Although we do not yet have an entirely satisfactory model of how particular distributions of legislative seats get translated into government coalitions, it seems reasonable to think that these extra legislative seats will be positively correlated with an increased probability of being in government.

The empirical study of electoral coalitions poses a particular challenge for the researcher. Unlike with government coalitions, it is almost impossible from a practical point of view to accurately know the total number of electoral coalitions that form. This is because these coalitions are rarely listed as such in official election results or on electoral ballots. This leaves the interested researcher scouring through the vast case study literature that analyzes elections and party competition. The problem is magnified when one realizes that pre-electoral coalitions have rarely been the focus of scholarly attention in these studies. These practical issues may explain why I have failed to locate a detailed database

on these coalitions and why there have been no statistical analyses examining pre-electoral coalition formation prior to this study.[7]

Assuming that one overcomes these practical difficulties, the issue of developing the correct research design for analyzing pre-electoral coalitions remains a difficult one. An implication of my theoretical model is that one should only actually observe an electoral coalition if party leaders (i) expect it to be electorally advantageous and (ii) are able to overcome the distributional conflicts associated with coordinating their electoral strategies. This means that one may fail to observe an electoral coalition in the real world for two very different reasons. On the one hand, a potential coalition may be expected to increase the vote share or seats of its members, but still fail to see the light of day because party leaders cannot agree on how to divide the spoils of office. In chapter four, I argue that this situation accurately describes the strategic dilemma faced by the moderate right parties in France throughout

[7]Powell (2000) has collected data on government majorities that were identifiable prior to elections. Although he includes pre-electoral coalitions in this analysis, they are not the main emphasis of his book. Likewise, Martin and Stevenson (2001) include pre-electoral coalitions, but only in so far as they affect the likelihood of particular governments forming. Their study includes 30 potential governments that had pre-electoral agreements. Around half of these refer to governments forming without an election, a phenomenon I do not consider here. They identify only 14 elections out of the 170 in their sample (about 8%) as having a pre-electoral coalition. In fact, I have identified that there were actually 69 elections that had pre-electoral coalitions in their sample (about 41%).

much of the past few decades. On the other hand, a potential coalition may be stillborn due to the simple fact that it would not help any parties electorally. I take account of these theoretical issues when I test the hypotheses generated by my model.

To sum up, I hope to generate a wider scholarly debate about the role played by electoral coalitions at election time. Pre-electoral coalitions are important. Not only are they commonplace, but they also have the ability to determine electoral and policy outcomes. They may even be preferable on normative grounds to government coalitions whose members begin bargaining after the election. As a result, they deserve more attention from researchers. In the chapters that follow I develop a theoretical model of coalition formation and expose the hypotheses that it generates to statistical analysis. This research represents the first attempt to formally analyze those factors that systematically influence the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions across elections and countries. The empirical analysis also represents the first time that data has been collected and analyzed on electoral coalitions across such a large number of countries.

The study proceeds in the following way: in Chapter 2 I examine the effect of electoral institutions on pre-electoral coalition formation in 25 countries between 1946 and 2002. While the literature on coalitions does not focus specifically on electoral coalitions, an implicit assumption is

often made that these types of coalitions are more likely to form in plurality, rather than proportional representation, electoral systems (Shepsle & Bonchek 1997). A testable hypothesis drawn from this assumption is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional electoral systems if there are many parties. A second hypothesis occasionally found in the case study literature is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when the identifiability of the future government is low. The results of my analysis support the former hypothesis but not the latter. I argue that the incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions are highest when there are 'surplus' parties, that is, more than we would expect given the electoral rules. However, electoral incentives do not tell us the whole story. How party leaders act in the presence of these incentives is explored in the following chapter.

In chapter 3, I develop a model of electoral coalition formation. The model is a two-stage complete information bargaining game between two party leaders who must decide whether to form an electoral alliance. I am able to derive several implications that relate the likelihood of seeing pre-electoral coalitions to variables employed in the game-theoretic model. Of the hypotheses that are generated, the most important are that electoral coalitions are more likely when (i) the potential coalition partners share similar ideological preferences, (ii) the electoral institutions generate an electoral bonus for competing as a coalition, (iii) the

coalition size is large, but not too large, and (iv) the party system is polarized and there is an electoral bonus from forming a coalition.

In the fourth chapter, I demonstrate the plausibility of the model by examining in depth the history of pre-electoral coalitions in the French 5th Republic and South Korea. Given the unusual nature of the French semi-presidential regime, the French case offers an almost unique opportunity to examine the impact of different electoral institutions, namely legislative and presidential elections, on pre-electoral strategies while holding other country characteristics constant. Moreover, the French case provides possibly the most dramatic evidence of the impact that pre-electoral strategies can have on election outcomes. The South Korean case is interesting in that it suggests that there truly is an underlying general logic of electoral coalition formation. Factors such as distributional concerns seem to play just as influential a role in determining pre-electoral strategies in South Korea as they do in the more established French democracy. These cases illustrate the underlying factors influencing pre-electoral coalition formation presented in the model.

In Chapter 5, I conduct a more rigorous test of the hypotheses generated by the model. In particular, I use a random-effects probit model with a new data set containing information on potential coalition dyads in 20 parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998.[8] The data are

[8]Though I was able to test the effects of electoral institutions on 25 democracies in Chapter 2, the lack of data on ideological positions of

organized in dyadic format in order to resemble the formal model as closely as possible. The dyadic structure also reflects the fact that 73% of the pre-electoral coalitions in the dataset used in Chapter 5 involve only two parties. The results provide strong support for all of the hypotheses generated by the bargaining model in Chapter 3. Ideological compatibility increases the likelihood of forming an electoral coalition, as do disproportional electoral institutions. Parties are more likely to form an electoral coalition if the potential coalition size is be large (but not too large) and if the coalition members are of similar electoral size. Finally, electoral coalitions are more likely if the party system is polarized and the electoral institutions are disproportional.

In the conclusion, I discuss the theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions that my study makes to our understanding of electoral coalitions. I will also address the shortcomings, both theoretical and empirical, of this analysis, before going on to discuss areas of future research.

---

parties in Israel, Greece, and Malta led me to drop them from the more extensive test of the model. The United States and Switzerland were dropped because they do not have parliamentary regimes.

Appendix to Chapter 1

Table 1.1: Countries and Elections in Figure 1.1

Country	Election years considered	Number of elections
Austria	1946-2002	16
Belgium	1946-2002	18
Denmark	1946-2002	22
Finland	1946-2002	15
France	1946-2002	15
Germany	1949-2002	15
Greece	1946-67, 1974-2002	19
Iceland	1946-2002	17
Ireland	1946-2002	17
Italy	1946-2002	14
Luxembourg	1954-2002	10
Malta	1966-2002	8
Netherlands	1946-2002	17
Norway	1946-2002	14
Portugal	1976-2002	10
Spain	1977-2002	8
Sweden	1946-2002	18
Switzerland	1946-2002	14
U.K.	1946-2002	14
Total		281

Chapter 2

Electoral Institutions

2.1 Introduction

Prior to the 2002 German legislative election, the Social Democrats and the Greens announced that they intended to form a government together if they received sufficient votes to do so and they encouraged voters to support this coalition. In many cases this meant that left-wing voters would cast their first vote for the Social Democratic candidate in their district and their second vote for the Green party list. In the French legislative elections a few months earlier, the major parties on the mainstream right were largely successful in fielding a single right-wing candidate for the first round in most electoral districts. While pre-electoral coalitions were successfully formed in these countries, this was not the case in the recent elections in the Netherlands. In fact, there was a great

deal of uncertainty as to the identity of the future coalition government immediately following the Dutch elections. These empirical observations raise the question as to why pre-electoral coalitions formed in Germany and France but not in the Netherlands? The coalition literature implicitly suggests that pre-electoral coalition formation is a simple function of electoral rules: the more disproportional the electoral system, the more likely a pre-electoral coalition is to form. Thus, pre-electoral agreements were reached in France because of the majoritarian nature of French electoral institutions and they were not reached in the Netherlands due to the highly proportional nature of Dutch electoral institutions.

The empirical analyses of coalitions that exist in the literature have focused almost exclusively on those government coalitions that form after an election (Martin & Vanberg 2003, Diermeier, Merlo & Eraslan 2002, Diermeier & Merlo 2001, Martin & Stevenson 2001, Warwick 1999, Lupia & Strom 1995); very little is known about the factors that influence pre-electoral coalition formation. I attempt to remedy this to some extent by carefully analyzing the existing claims linking the incentives created by electoral institutions with the emergence of electoral coalitions.[1] I focus on two particular hypotheses. The disproportionality hypothesis states that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional

[1]In the concluding chapter to their volume on *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition Government in Europe*, Laver and Schofield (1998, 204) note that: "One of the most obvious effects of the electoral law is to create incentives for politicians to form electoral coalitions."

electoral systems if there are many parties. The signalling hypothesis states that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when voters face high uncertainty about the identity of future governments. While the disproportionality hypothesis is predominant in the literature, the signalling hypothesis is often called upon to explain why pre-electoral coalitions form in highly proportional electoral systems.

In the next section, I outline the theoretical arguments that generate the disproportionality and signalling hypotheses. The statistical model used to test these hypotheses is presented in the third section and draws on a new dataset comprising all legislative elections in 25 countries between 1946 and 2002. In section four, I present and discuss the results. While there is considerable support for the disproportionality hypothesis, this is not the case for the signalling hypothesis.

At this point I should more clearly define what I mean by a pre-electoral coalition. A pre-electoral coalition comprises multiple parties that do not compete independently in an election either because they have publicly agreed to coordinate their campaigns, run joint candidates or joint lists, or govern together following the election. Depending on the electoral system, different steps might be required for parties to form an electoral coalition. However, the key features are (i) that the coalition must be publicly stated (since the goal is to win voter support for the

coalition) and (ii) that member parties do not compete in elections as truly independent entities.[2]

2.2 Theories of Pre-electoral Coalition Formation

While there has been little systematic investigation of pre-electoral coalitions, it would be misleading to imply that they are never mentioned in the coalition literature. In fact, if one looks carefully enough one can see that two hypotheses are implicitly made regarding pre-electoral coalitions. The first states that pre-electoral coalitions should be more common in disproportional electoral systems. In this case, electoral coalitions are formed as a means of overcoming some barrier of representation. The second hypothesis focuses on the electorate's desire to be able to identify the nature of future governments. In this case, electoral coalitions act as a signalling device, indicating the likely shape of the post-election government coalition. To date, neither hypothesis has been carefully analyzed or tested. In this section, I examine the

[2]The requirement that pre-electoral coalitions be publicly stated rules out what might be considered 'implicit' coalitions. For example, an outgoing coalition government that is expected to reconstitute itself if given the opportunity might be considered an implicit electoral coalition. The principal problem with including implicit coalitions such as this in a systematic analysis is that it relies on the subjective evaluation of the analyst as to whether the relevant parties really were coordinating their campaign strategies or not. By ruling out these 'implicit' coalitions, I am minimizing the probability of committing a Type II error when classifying pre-electoral coalitions.

theoretical underpinning of each argument in turn and generate testable hypotheses.

2.2.1 Disproportionality and Electoral Coalitions

By far the predominant argument in the literature is that disproportional electoral systems encourage pre-electoral coalition formation (Shepsle & Bonchek 1997, 190-1). Strom, Budge and Laver state that, 'Systems not based on PR lists tend to force parties to coalesce before elections in order to exploit electoral economies of scale. The more disproportional the electoral system, the greater the incentives for preelectoral alliances (1994, 316).' The argument is fairly straightforward. Electoral rules that consistently benefit larger parties should encourage party leaders to forge pre-electoral alliances. While the implicit goal of pre-electoral coalition formation in this argument appears to be to gain more seats, this need not be the main objective of party leaders. If the size of a party in terms of legislative seats is highly correlated with being part of a government coalition (or being chosen as *formateur*), then party leaders in parliamentary systems could increase their chances of being in government by joining an electoral coalition (Laver & Schofield 1998).

While this argument has a great deal of intuitive appeal, it needs to be qualified. Imagine a country with a highly disproportional electoral system in which there is only one seat being contested (or one seat per district, the extreme case being a presidential election). The argument

as stated above, and in the literature, suggests that pre-electoral coalitions should be quite common in this country. However, if there are only two parties, then there is clearly no reason to form an electoral coalition. Except for periods of war or political crisis when political elites may want to form a government of national unity, one would not expect to see electoral alliances in a two-party system. In other words, the incentives to form a pre-electoral coalition only really exist when there are more than two parties. The intuition from this example can be stated more generally: disproportionality encourages pre-electoral coalition formation, but only when the number of parties is sufficiently large. In fact, Duverger made this exact same point when he first discussed electoral coalitions in the 1950s (Duverger 1959). It is unclear why the conditional part of this hypothesis was dropped or forgotten in the literature.

A vast literature exists investigating the factors that determine the number of parties in a particular country (Duverger 1959, Lijphart 1994, Amorim Neto & Cox 1997, Golder & Clark 2003*b*). There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence that more disproportional electoral systems are associated with fewer political parties. Disproportional systems clearly advantage larger parties. It is the existence of a 'mechanical effect' in favor of large parties that creates incentives for strategic voting on the part of voters and for strategic withdrawal on the part of political entrepreneurs. The end result is that parties typically merge and coalesce so as to 'exploit electoral economies of scale' in disproportional

systems (Cox 1997). This is precisely the same argument presented in the coalition literature for why pre-electoral coalitions form in disproportional systems. Note that this raises an interesting puzzle. If the incentives to coalesce are so great in disproportional systems, then one should not actually observe pre-electoral coalitions in these countries; there simply will not be a sufficiently large number of independent parties. It is only when there are 'surplus' or 'excess' parties that choose to retain their party identity in spite of the incentives created by disproportional systems that one would expect to observe electoral coalitions.

Determining when and why some political parties will retain their separate identities rather than merge or coalesce into a larger party is a complex question and beyond the scope of this article. However, several institutions are already known to influence how likely parties are to retain their identities. One such institution is the use of fusion candidacies where multiple parties can nominate the same candidate. Fusion candidacies were employed in many US states in the nineteenth century and it is interesting to note that electoral alliances were quite common between the Democratic Party and various other parties (depending on the state) at this time. Although this practice continues in New York state, it was stopped in most other states more than a century ago. It is thought that the end of fusion candidacies contributed quite markedly to the evolution of a party system in which the Democratic and Republican parties were the only viable parties (outside New York state) (Argersinger 1980)

Majority requirements are also thought to encourage parties to retain their separate identities (Duverger 1959). Moreover, characteristics of presidential elections (whether they employ runoff procedures, their temporal proximity to legislative elections, and the number of presidential candidates) have also been found to influence the number of parties in legislative elections (Golder & Clark 2003*a*). Although various institutions obviously influence whether there will be a 'surplus' or 'excess' number of parties, these institutions are not themselves directly relevant to the analysis here. The principal point that I am trying to make is simply that the disproportionality hypothesis regarding pre-electoral coalitions must be conditional in nature:

> Disproportionality Hypothesis: Disproportionality only increases the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation when there is a sufficiently large number of parties.[3]

2.2.2 Pre-Electoral Coalitions as Signalling Devices

While the disproportionality hypothesis is predominant, a second explanation for pre-electoral coalition formation can be discerned in the literature. In this alternative argument, pre-electoral coalitions are treated as signalling devices with respect to voters. There appear to be at least

[3]Note that this is equivalent to saying that an increase in the number of parties will only increase the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional.

three separate motives behind forming an electoral coalition as a signalling device: (i) to signal that member parties can form an effective government coalition, (ii) to signal the identity of a potential future government as clearly as possible, and (iii) to signal the desire of political parties to give voters a more direct role in choosing government coalitions. These variants of the signalling argument are typically found in the case study literature dealing with coalitions. They are often used to explain what appear to be anomalous cases of electoral coalition formation in highly proportional electoral systems. As such, they tend to be case-specific and rather ad hoc.

The argument that electoral coalitions send a signal to voters that member parties can form an effective government coalition has been made in the case of Ireland, Sweden and India. Each of these countries have experienced long periods in which a single party has dominated the executive (Fianna Fail in Ireland, the Social Democrats in Sweden, the Congress Party in India). Those voters who preferred one of the smaller opposition parties in these countries risked 'wasting' their vote if they voted for this party. Opposition parties formed electoral coalitions in these countries to signal their ability to compete effectively with the ruling party and encourage the electorate to vote for them. In Sweden, the Social Democrats were dominant for decades because the various opposition parties were so ideologically distant from one another that they were not seen as a credible government alternative. Eventually, the

three "bourgeois" parties formed electoral coalitions in the 1970s as a signal to voters that their policy positions had sufficiently converged that they could offer a viable governing alternative (Hancock 1998). Likewise, the opposition parties in India managed to form an electoral coalition based on a common anti-corruption platform to bring down the long-dominant Congress Party (Andersen 1990).

The argument that electoral coalitions are a device to signal the identity of potential future government coalitions is perhaps more common. These coalitions can be used to signal both with whom member parties will try to form a government if elected and with whom they will not.[4] As a result, pre-electoral coalitions can be expected to offer benefits to risk averse voters who would rather know the identity of the post-election coalition for sure rather than wait for the lottery that occurs during a government coalition bargaining process. These benefits are likely to be quite significant in those countries where the post-election bargaining process is very uncertain. Some of the parties in Germany are quite explicit in their campaign messages about the coalition government that

[4]For example, party leaders in Germany, Austria, Norway, and the Netherlands sometimes announce the parties they will refuse to govern alongside under any circumstances, effectively ruling out certain government cabinet configurations. A recent empirical study shows that 'anti-coalition pacts' make it more unlikely that a potential government including those parties would form (Martin & Stevenson 2001). For specific country examples, see Müller (2000), Müller and Strom (2000), Narud and Strom (2000); Hillebrand and Irwin (1999), and Strom, Budge and Laver (1994).

they will form if elected. They often tell voters to support a particular coalition by splitting their votes in the constituency and party-list portions of the ballot precisely because this can affect the identity of the post-election government coalition (Roberts 1988, 317-37). Pappi and Thurner note that in 'the German system, voters recognize the realistic options for a new coalition government and the German two-vote system offers voters an opportunity to support not only their party, but also the specific coalition advocated by their party (Pappi & Thurner 2002).'

The final variant of the signalling argument is that party leaders form electoral coalitions to signal their desire to have voters play a larger role in determining government coalitions. At least, this was the public justification behind the electoral coalitions that formed in the Netherlands in the early 1970s (De Jong & Pijnenburg 1986, Andeweg 1989, Hillebrand & Irwin 1999, Rochan 1999). Coalition parties claimed that voters would feel that the future government coalition was more legitimate if they knew ahead of time what they were voting for.[5] Some analysts have argued that this motivation has been important in Germany as

[5]Some commentators analyzing Dutch politics have suggested that electoral coalitions have not been very effective in giving Dutch voters more say over the composition of their governments. For example, De Jong and Pijnenburg state that, "the making of a [government] coalition remains the crucial moment despite the efforts . . . towards more 'political clarity' and pre-electoral agreements . . . Dutch voters will never decide on the composition of their government." See De Jong and Pijnenburg (1986, 148).

well. For example, Klingemann, Hofferbert, and Budge state that the FDP and whichever of the major parties was its partner at the time benefited from forming an electoral alliance since they could claim to have a direct popular mandate once in office (Klingemann, Hofferbert & Budge 1994).

If pre-electoral coalitions are to be useful as signalling devices, it must be the case that they translate fairly accurately into the government coalitions that eventually form after elections. If this is not the case, then the electorate is unlikely to continue voting for them in the future. In other words, one would expect that public commitments to form a government coalition with another party if successful will actually be implemented. The empirical evidence seems to support this (Laver & Schofield 1998, Strom, Budge & Laver 1994, Martin & Stevenson 2001).

These variants of the signalling hypothesis have often been developed in a case-specific and ad hoc manner. As a result, it is difficult to delineate shared features and generate testable claims that can easily be evaluated across different cases. The variant of the signalling hypothesis that can most easily be generalized is the one that focuses on the identifiability of potential future governments. The basic claim is that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when the identifiability of future governments is uncertain. One only needs a measure of identifiability to be

able to test this. Although measures of 'identifiability' do exist in the literature, the creators themselves acknowledge that the measurement criteria are very 'impressionistic' (Strom 1990, Powell 2000, Shugart 2001). One alternative to these impressionistic measures is to assume that uncertainty about the identity of future governments is correlated with the number of potential governments that could form. As a result, those countries with a large number of parties should also have a high level of uncertainty as to who will be in the next government. This line of reasoning generates the following testable hypothesis:

> Signalling Hypothesis: Pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form when there is a large number of parties.

2.3 Data and Model

The dataset that is used to test these hypotheses is new and covers all legislative elections in 25 advanced industrialized democracies between 1946 and 2002.[6]

[6]The 25 advanced industrialized democracies are listed in the appendix to the Dissertation. I include the smaller European countries (such as Luxembourg) that are sometimes excluded from empirical analyses so that my dataset corresponds to the 25 countries most commonly included in coalition datasets (Mershon 2002). This gives a total of 405 elections.

Before describing the statistical model used to test the disproportionality and signalling hypotheses, it is useful to first examine the unconditional disproportionality hypothesis that is predominant in the contemporary coalition literature. Remember that this hypothesis states that electoral coalitions will be common and successful in disproportional systems such as those that employ a majoritarian electoral formula; they should be absent or infrequent in systems that employ a proportional formula (Laver & Schofield 1998, Strom, Budge & Laver 1994). In Table 2.1, I present information on the number of electoral coalitions that have formed in elections using majoritarian formulas as opposed to those that have formed in elections using some form of proportional representation.[7] I also provide information on the average number of pre-electoral coalitions, the average percentage of the vote received by these coalitions, and the average effective number of electoral parties by electoral formula.[8]

[7]For the classification of each election by electoral formula see Golder (2004). Majoritarian systems include plurality rule, absolute majority rule, the alternative vote, and the single non-transferable vote (SNTV). Although it is possible to distinguish between proportional, multi-tier, and mixed electoral systems, I do not do so here. They are all classified as proportional systems because they employ a proportional formula in at least one electoral tier. Results do not change noticeably if systems using SNTV are classified as proportional.

[8]The effective number of electoral parties is calculated as $1/\Sigma v_i^2$, where v_i is the percentage of votes won by the ith party. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979).

Table 2.1: Pre-Electoral Coalitions (PECs) by Electoral Formula

Electoral Formula	Number of Elections		Percentage of Elections with PECs	Percentage of Vote for PECs	Effective Number of Parties
	with PECs	without PECs			
Majoritarian	36	93	28%	14.9	3.0
Proportional	132	144	48%	19.4	4.3

If the unconditional hypothesis is correct, pre-electoral coalitions should be both significantly more frequent and more successful in countries that employ majoritarian systems than in those using proportional systems.

The evidence in Table 2.1 is quite clear. Pre-electoral coalitions are just as likely to form in proportional systems as in majoritarian ones. Indeed, the percentage of elections with pre-electoral coalitions is higher in proportional systems than that in majoritarian systems. Moreover, the average percentage of the vote won by pre-electoral coalitions is also higher in proportional systems than that in majoritarian systems. In sum, there is very little evidence in favor of the unconditional disproportionality hypothesis found in the literature. This is exactly as I predicted earlier. Note that the average number of effective electoral parties is significantly lower in majoritarian systems than in proportional ones. By encouraging political parties to coalesce and merge, disproportional systems have fewer parties and, hence, fewer opportunities for electoral coalitions to form. Making the disproportionality hypothesis conditional on the number of parties was motivated precisely by the need to take account of the opportunity structure facing individual parties. The question now is whether there is evidence in favor of the conditional disproportionality hypothesis.

The disproportionality and signalling hypotheses as stated in the literature are slightly ambiguous since they often refer to the likelihood

that pre-electoral coalitions will form, the electoral success of these coalitions, or the number of these coalitions. One would expect political elites to form pre-electoral coalitions precisely in those situations in which they are expected to be electorally successful. Given this, it is possible to evaluate the two hypotheses using either (i) the percentage of vote received by pre-electoral coalitions or (ii) the percentage of parties involved in a pre-electoral coalition as dependent variables. In the analysis that follows, I use both of these as dependent variables to test the disproportionality and signalling hypothesis.[9]

The disproportionality and signalling hypotheses can be tested using the following multiplicative interaction model:

$$\begin{aligned}\textbf{PEC} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\textbf{EffectiveThreshold} + \beta_2\textbf{ElectoralParties} \\ + \beta_3\textbf{EffectiveThreshold} * \textbf{ElectoralParties} + \epsilon\end{aligned}$$

where PEC is one of the two dependent variables already mentioned. *EffectiveThreshold* captures electoral system disproportionality and is measured using Lijphart's effective threshold.[10] The higher the effective threshold, the more disproportional the electoral system. An alternative

[9] I only include parties that won more than 1% of the national vote. This criterion is forced on me by the fact that official electoral statistics do not often report vote totals for parties who win fewer votes than this.

[10] The effective threshold is the mean of the threshold of representation and exclusion. It is calculated as $\frac{50\%}{M+1} + \frac{50\%}{2M}$, where M is the district magnitude. If there are legal thresholds and/or upper tier seats, the

measure of electoral system disproportionality is the district magnitude. While district magnitude has long been considered the decisive factor in determining the proportionality of an electoral system,[11] it only captures one element of it. In contrast, the effective threshold takes account of several aspects of the electoral system - the district magnitude, legal thresholds, and upper tier seats. It is for this reason that I prefer to use the effective threshold.[12] *ElectoralParties* is the effective number of electoral parties. The interaction term is required to test the conditional nature of the disproportionality hypothesis.

The signalling hypothesis predicts that the marginal effect of a one unit increase in the effective number of electoral parties ($\beta_2 + \beta_3 Effective$ $Threshold$) will always be positive irrespective of the effective threshold. This means that β_2 should be positive. Although it is not possible to make a precise prediction about β_3 given that the signalling hypothesis says nothing about the modifying effect of electoral system disproportionality, $\beta_2 + \beta_3 EffectiveThreshold$ should always be non-negative.

The disproportionality hypothesis predicts that the marginal effect of *Effective Threshold* ($\beta_1 + \beta_3 ElectoralParties$) should only be positive

calculation is slightly more complicated. See Lijphart (1994), pp. 25-30. For more information on electoral thresholds, see Taagepera (1998*a*, 1998*b*).

[11]See Horwill (1925, 53), Rae (1967, 114-25), Taagepera and Shugart (1989, 112), and Cox (1997).

[12]It turns out that qualitatively similar results to those presented here are found if the log of average district magnitude is used instead of effective thresholds. These results are available from the author on request.

when the effective number of parties is sufficiently large. Although theory does not provide us with a clear expectation as to when this will be the case, the disproportionality hypothesis will have found little support if the marginal effect of *EffectiveThreshold* is never positive and significantly different from zero. Given that the marginal effect of effective thresholds should be increasing as the number of parties grows, one would expect β_3 to be positive. β_1 indicates the marginal effect of effective thresholds when the number of electoral parties is zero. Since there are no real-world observations where this is the case, the disproportionality hypothesis does not generate a prediction as to its sign. The disproportionality hypothesis also predicts that the marginal effect of a one unit increase in the number of parties ($\beta_2 + \beta_3 \textit{EffectiveThreshold}$) will only be positive when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional (high effective threshold). Since β_2 indicates the marginal effect of electoral parties in highly proportional systems ($\textit{EffectiveThreshold}$=0), it should be zero (or negative).

Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 4.3. The percentage of vote for pre-electoral coalitions ranges from zero in elections where there were no coalitions to 99.12% in the 1976 German elections. The 1976 German elections also had the highest percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition (100%). Effective thresholds range from a low of 0.6% in Israel (1949) to a high of 35% in countries with single-member districts such as the United Kingdom. The lowest effective number of electoral parties

was 1.97 in the 1964 US elections, while the highest was 10.29 in the 1999 Belgian elections.

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Pre-Electoral Coalitions (PECs) in 25 Countries, 1946-2002

Variable	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Percentage Vote for PECs	405	17.98	27.55	0	99.12
Percentage of Parties in PECs	405	20.20	27.23	0	100
Electoral Parties	405	3.84	1.48	1.97	10.29
Electoral Threshold†	391	14.84	13.40	0.6	35

† Data on effective thresholds are missing for Austria (1994-2002), Belgium (1995-2002), and Greece (1946-1964).

2.4 Results and Interpretation

I tested the disproportionality and signalling hypotheses using a pooled analysis. To take account of panel heteroscedasticity and contemporaneously correlated errors, I employed the Beck and Katz procedure for panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz 1995). The results are shown in Table 2.3. Models 1 and 2 refer to the two dependent variables that I use (the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions and the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition respectively). The first two columns provide a direct test of the signalling hypothesis because the effective number of electoral parties is the only variable included. Since it is arguable that the signalling hypothesis only really applies to

parliamentary regimes, the second column presents results when presidential systems are excluded.[13] By including *ElectoralThreshold* without an interaction term, the third column provides another test of the unconditional disproportionality hypothesis. Finally, the last two columns provide a test of the conditional disproportionality hypothesis by presenting results from the full model outlined in (2.1).

The first two columns provide no support for the signalling hypothesis. The number of parties in a country seems to have no significant impact on pre-electoral coalitions. This is true whether one analyzes the full sample or the sample restricted to parliamentary regimes. Nor is there any evidence that an increase in the number of parties will have any effect on the vote for pre-electoral coalitions when we control for electoral system disproportionality (columns 3).

[13]This means dropping the United States and Switzerland from the analysis. I do not show the equivalent results for the case where the dependent variable is the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition because they are qualitatively similar to those already shown.

Table 2.3: Pre-Electoral Coalitions, 1946-2002

Regressor	Signalling		Unconditional Disproportionality	Conditional Disproportionality	
	Full Sample	Parliamentary			
	(Model 1)	(Model 1)	(Model 1)	(Model 1)	(Model 2)
ElectoralParties	0.54	0.02	0.82	-3.82*	-3.26*
	(0.94)	(1.04)	(1.33)	(1.67)	(1.35)
ElectoralThreshold			0.002	-1.37**	-1.26**
			(0.11)	(0.37)	(0.33)
ElectoralThreshold× ElectoralParties				0.42**	0.40**
				(0.12)	(0.10)
Constant	15.91**	20.05**	14.28*	32.40**	31.57**
	(3.50)	(4.07)	(6.46)	(7.51)	(6.11)
Observations	400	358	386	386	386
R^2	0.001	0	0.002	0.06	0.06

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed); panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses.

In Model 1 the dependent variable is the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions.
In Model 2 the dependent variable is the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition.

The results from the full model outlined in (2.1) also provide no support for the signalling hypothesis (columns 4 and 5). The marginal effect of electoral parties on both the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions and the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition is negative in highly proportional systems (when *EffectiveThreshold*=0). This is in direct contrast to the signalling hypothesis which predicts that this effect should always be positive.[14]

As expected, there is no evidence in support of the unconditional disproportionality hypothesis (column 3). An increase in the effective threshold appears to have no effect on pre-electoral coalitions. However, there is considerable support for the conditional disproportionality hypothesis (columns 4 and 5). As predicted, the interaction term *EffectiveThreshold*ElectoralParties* is positive and significant in both Model 1 and Model 2. While this is supportive of the disproportionality hypothesis, it should also be the case that the marginal effect of effective

[14]The positive sign on the interaction coefficient does indicate that this reductive effect declines as the effective threshold increases. In fact, the marginal effect of electoral parties on the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions and the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition eventually becomes positive and significant when the effective threshold is greater than 15.8% and 14% respectively. Roughly 40% of the sample falls in these ranges. Although these results do not support the signalling hypothesis, they do support the prediction made by the disproportionality hypothesis that electoral parties will only have a positive effect on the dependent variables when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional.

thresholds is positive when the number of parties is sufficiently high. Although the coefficient on *EffectiveThresholds* is negative in both models, it is important to remember that this only captures the marginal effect of effective thresholds when there are no electoral parties. As should be obvious, this coefficient is substantively meaningless and it is necessary to evaluate the marginal effect of effective thresholds at more realistic values for the number of electoral parties. This is exactly what I do in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: The Marginal Effect of Electoral Thresholds



Figure 2.1 graphically illustrates the marginal effect of effective thresholds on the percentage vote for pre-electoral coalitions (the top figure) and the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition (the bottom figure) as the effective number of electoral parties changes. The solid sloping lines indicate how the marginal effect of effective electoral threshold ($\beta_1 + \beta_3 ElectoralParties$) changes with the number of electoral parties. The two-tailed 95% confidence intervals around the lines allow us to determine the conditions under which effective thresholds have a significant effect they exert a significant effect whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence intervals are both above (or below) the zero line.

As predicted, effective thresholds only have a positive effect on pre-electoral coalitions when the number of parties is sufficiently large. Specifically, the marginal effect of effective thresholds will increase the percentage of votes for pre-electoral coalitions when the effective number of electoral parties is greater than 3.8. It will increase the percentage of parties in a pre-electoral coalition when the number of parties is greater than 3.7. This is substantively meaningful since roughly 43% of the sample fall within these ranges. Thus, the evidence clearly supports the disproportionality hypothesis that parties are more likely to be in a pre-electoral coalition and that these coalitions are more likely to be electorally-successful in disproportional electoral systems when there is a large number of parties.

2.5 Conclusion

To this point, there has been little theoretical or empirical research addressing pre-electoral coalitions. This is despite the fact that pre-electoral coalitions are quite common, have important normative implications, and can significantly influence both election and policy outcomes. This brief analysis represents the first attempt to formulate and test hypotheses relating to pre-electoral coalitions. Specifically, it tests the two hypotheses most commonly made (often implicitly) about pre-electoral coalitions in the literature — the disproportionality and signalling hypotheses. The results from a pooled analysis of pre-electoral coalitions in 25 countries from 1946-2002 clearly support the disproportionality hypothesis — pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form and be successful in countries that have a disproportional electoral system and a large number of parties. Although the number of parties in a country was taken as given in this analysis, I did indicate several institutions that might encourage political parties to retain their separate identities in disproportional electoral systems despite electoral incentives to merge or coalesce.

In contrast, there was little evidence that electoral coalitions are more likely to form when there are many parties so as to signal the identity of future governments to voters (signalling hypothesis). While the evidence in support of the disproportionality hypothesis seems clear, I believe

that one should be cautious in rejecting the signalling hypothesis on the basis of this analysis alone. As my earlier discussion indicated, there are several versions of the signalling hypothesis and only one variant was tested here. Moreover, the proxy for the identifiability of future governments used in this analysis was the effective number of electoral parties. It may simply be the case that this is not a particularly good proxy. The fact that countries such as the Netherlands and Israel do have a number of successful pre-electoral coalitions despite their highly proportional electoral institutions should make one wary of rejecting the signalling hypothesis too hastily.

The evidence presented here shows that electoral institutions play an important role in explaining pre-electoral coalition formation. Though the link between electoral rules and pre-electoral coalitions has long been suspected, this article is the first to systematically analyze and find evidence for such a relationship. Although this is an important step, the implication common in the coalition literature that pre-electoral coalitions are simply a function of electoral rules is probably too reductionist. After all, there are costs to forming pre-electoral coalitions. Just as government coalitions emerge out of a bargaining process between party leaders, so do pre-electoral coalitions. Political parties who are thinking about forming a coalition must reach an agreement as to how they would distribute office benefits if they come to power. For example,

party leaders have to decide which party will get to run the more powerful ministries and who is to become prime minister or president. They may also have to decide which party should step down in favor of the other at the district level. It is likely that these distributional issues will be hard to resolve in some circumstances. Political parties also have to reach agreement on a coalition policy that they would implement if successful at the polls. The fact that parties must make concessions on office and policy may explain why pre-electoral coalitions often fail to form when there are clear electoral incentives to do so. A more nuanced understanding of pre-electoral coalition formation must take account of the distributional costs that arise during coalition bargaining as well as the potential electoral benefits. The following chapter provides a formal model in which the electoral benefits of coalition formation are clearly weighed against the associated distributional costs. It is only under particular conditions that pre-electoral coalitions will actually form.

Chapter 3

A Theoretical Model

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I propose a theoretical model for the study of pre-electoral coalition formation. The formal analysis emphasizes that party leaders must carefully weigh the costs and benefits associated with coordinating their pre-electoral strategies when deciding whether to form an electoral coalition. The model provides clear predictions about the conditions under which electoral coalitions are more likely to form. There are two sections. In the first, I outline the basic intuition behind the assumptions and structure of the formal model. Next, I formalize this intuitive argument. I outline the basic structure of a pre-electoral coalition formation game, before deriving equilibrium outcomes and analyzing the variables that affect the likelihood of electoral coalition formation.

3.1.1 The Intuition

Given that it is often infeasible for a single party to govern alone in most democracies, party leaders are faced with a strategic choice. They can either form an electoral coalition prior to the election, or participate in government coalition bargaining afterwards. As I have already stated, the vast majority of the coalition literature in political science ignores the first possibility. However, the fact that one regularly observes electoral coalitions across a broad range of countries suggests that they must offer some form of political advantage at least some of the time. Since electoral coalitions do not always emerge, it must equally be true that there are costs associated with party leaders coordinating their pre-electoral strategies. It seems natural then to seek an explanation of electoral coalition formation in terms of its associated costs and benefits. I argue that party leaders can be expected to care about policy, office and votes when they make decisions about whether to participate in electoral coalitions (Müller & Strom 1999).

3.1.2 Office

Just as with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among party leaders. As a result, I use a bargaining model to analyze the formation of electoral coalitions (Morrow 1994, Osborne & Rubinstein 1990). The issues that concern party leaders prior to an election are likely to

be very similar to those involved in any post-election bargaining process. In particular, party elites must decide how office benefits are to be distributed if they win the election. It seems an obvious assumption to make that politicians care about winning office both for its own sake and for the ability to affect policy. Winning office allows them to enjoy the perquisites of power and to influence policy (Downs 1957, Mayhew 1974). It follows from this, though, that they also care about their place in the party or coalition hierarchy. After all, only a limited number of party members can hope to win ministerial posts. Any electoral coalition agreement must be able to overcome what can be a thorny set of distributional issues both among elites from the same party and across elites from different parties.

These distributional issues are particularly stark if there are few offices available to satisfy the party elites. For example, only one party leader can be the official presidential candidate of an electoral coalition. Legislative elections might offer party elites an easier opportunity to reach an agreement on distributional issues since there are multiple legislative seats and even ministerial portfolios to hand out. In other words, one might expect that the divisibility of office benefits would affect the ease with which pre-electoral coalition benefits are reached. As will be shown in the following chapter, it seems to be the case in French elections that parties on both the right and left find it easier to organize nomination agreements prior to the first round of voting for legislative

elections than presidential ones. However, even pre-electoral agreements in legislative elections can be problematic since they raise the possibility that some candidates will be forced to step down in favor of candidates from another party.[1] Evidence from South Korea also suggests that the divisibility of office benefits may be a crucial determinant of how easy presidential electoral coalition agreements are to reach. For example, the presence of term limits in South Korea made electoral coalitions more attractive than they would otherwise have been. This is because the leader of one party could throw his support behind a candidate of another party in presidential elections in exchange for a promise of similar support in future elections. This promise was deemed more credible due to the presence of term limits.

If nomination agreements are not used, then the issue of credibility is a relevant one in pre-electoral coalition bargaining as compared to government coalition bargaining. In a PR system, party elites might be able to reach an agreement on how to divide the spoils of office before an election occurs. However, there is no concrete guarantee that one of the parties will not renege on this agreement afterwards. A strong electoral performance by one of the coalition parties might cause it to want to

[1]In the French case, some candidates simply refuse to obey party orders to step down. If this happened on a wide scale, it might damage the bargaining position of party leaders in any future electoral coalition negotiations since they would not be able to credibly commit to enforcing pre-electoral agreements among their rank and file.

renegotiate, or even cancel, the deal. There are no third-party enforcers for these types of agreements, unless one considers the threat of voter sanctions to be great enough to deter parties from reneging. Despite this, it seems that the commitment issue is only a problem in theory. In practice, it rarely seems to be a cause of significant concern (Strom, Budge & Laver 1994). Laver and Schofield (1998, 28) note that when

> "the coalition formation strategies of electoral coalitions are publicly announced - as they must be, since a more powerful legislative bargaining bloc is precisely what electoral alliances set out to offer the electorate - then the extent to which the alliance can subsequently be abandoned is a significant empirical matter. Certainly, when two or more parties promise to go into government together if they are able, such promises tend only rarely to be broken."

It is also important to realize that political parties are engaged in repeated interactions. If a coalition partner refuses to honor the terms of an electoral agreement, then that party may find itself unable to gain electoral coalition partners in the future. Mitchell (1999) argues that, though parties could change partners between the pre-electoral and post-electoral stages, "they may risk credibility costs if they do so. In practice parties that have formed electoral coalitions and offered themselves as a government-in-waiting do tend to govern together if the numbers allow it."[2]

[2]It is important to recognize, however, that actual election results may rule out certain combinations, so that a party may reconsider its

3.1.3 Policy

While party leaders care about office benefits, it seems clear that they also bring policy concerns to the table during any electoral coalition bargaining process. The inclusion of policy in the utility function of party leaders distinguishes the bargaining model presented here from the more traditional models in which players only bargain over 'office' benefits. While policy concerns complicate the model, it seems a complication that is worth making given the compelling empirical evidence that politicians do sometimes care about policy outcomes. In the models of government coalition formation that include policy as a component of the players' utility function (Austen-Smith & Banks 1988), party leaders bargain over the policy that they will introduce as the government coalition.[3] Typically the bargaining process results in a 'coalition policy' that is some weighted average of the policy ideal points of the parties

alliance strategy afterwards. It may also be the case that voters do not clearly show their support for a particular electoral coalition. In these circumstances, party leaders can more easily justify not honoring the terms of the electoral coalition. After all, agreements over the division of government spoils do not necessarily specify appropriate behavior if the coalition loses. It is, perhaps, interesting to note that some agreements are sufficiently detailed that they take these possibilities into account and prescribe particular actions. This indicates that party leaders are clearly aware of the commitment problems associated with electoral coalitions.

[3]Given that one might eventually want to provide a model of coalition formation that encapsulates both pre- and post-electoral coalitions, this provides another reason for including policy in models addressing electoral coalitions.

in the government coalition. Such a bargaining process must obviously occur when pre-electoral agreements are made as well.

However, policy concerns take on even more significance during electoral coalition bargaining since the party leaders do not know if they will actually get to form the government. They face the possibility that an opposition party (or coalition) wins the election and implements their ideal policy. This 'opposition government' might implement moderate or extreme policies. I believe that the ideological position of the opposition may be taken into account during pre-electoral coalition bargaining. In particular, I expect that party leaders are more willing to compromise on distributional issues if they face an ideologically extreme opposition party. Recall the example in the introductory chapter of two countries in which moderate right-wing parties are considering forming an electoral coalition. In one country, the principal opposition party is on the extreme left, while in the other it is on the center left. Holding everything else constant, the parties on the right are likely to feel a greater urgency to overcome distributional conflicts in the first country compared to the second. This is because they risk increasing the possibility that policy far from their ideal point would be implemented. Right-wing parties faced by the center-left party may feel less obliged to compromise on distributional issues since policy will be fairly moderate regardless of the outcome of the election.

3.1.4 Votes

Of course, these distributional and ideological issues are moot if the pre-electoral coalition is expected to be disadvantageous from an electoral standpoint. Party leaders are unlikely to engage in electoral coalition bargaining if they can expect to do as well or better by running separately at election time. There is no guarantee that participation in an electoral alliance is going to increase the likelihood of participating parties entering government or increasing their seat or vote shares. Potential coalitions can either be superadditive, additive or subadditive.[4] Coalitions between parties with extremely disparate policy platforms may well be subadditive. Even if the party leaders were willing to form a coalition, voters might reject it because one of the members supported objectionable policies. For instance a coalition that consisted of a small party on the far right and a small party on the far left would have difficulty in winning the support of either electorate if the main policy issues of the election fell along a standard left-right issue dimension.[5] I would argue that it is a fairly safe assumption that party leaders will

[4]A superadditive coalition is one in which the coalition wins more votes (or seats) than the coalition members can expect to win running separately. A coalition that wins the same amount of seats is additive, while a coalition that wins fewer seats is subadditive. (Kaminski 2001).

[5]If the main issue for voters in a particular election was incumbent corruption, then parties at opposing extremes could potentially form an anti-incumbent, anti-corruption electoral coalition which could generate a significant amount of voter support. In fact, this is the story often told of the defeat of the Congress Party in India in 1989 (Andersen 1990).

not wish to participate in electoral coalitions if they think that it offers no significant electoral gains.[6]

The extent to which a pre-electoral coalition offers gains is likely to be a function of the electoral institutions in a given country. As the discussion in Chapter 2 suggested, disproportional electoral systems should provide larger incentives for party leaders to reach pre-electoral agreements than proportional ones. Thus, one would expect the electoral bonus associated with electoral coalition formation to be higher the more disproportional the system. This line of reasoning also holds for presidential and legislative elections. Since only one party can win the presidency, size matters. As a result, the electoral bonus associated with forming a pre-electoral coalition in presidential systems is likely to be larger than for forming a similar coalition in legislative elections. It is interesting to note at this point that it is precisely where the electoral incentives to form a coalition are highest (presidential elections), that the distributional issues that need to be overcome are the most problematic.

Party elites often invest considerable resources in various methods to measure the extent of the electoral benefits associated with possible

[6]Note that the fact that a coalition may be subadditive does not necessarily mean that it offers no significant electoral gains. It is possible for a coalition to be subadditive, but still be sufficiently large to represent the largest 'party', thereby winning itself the role of government formateur.

coalitions (Kaminski 2002). For example, party leaders sometimes employ private polling companies to carry out surveys asking voters whether they would support particular coalition arrangements (Kaminski 2001).[7] Other party leaders engage in coalition experiments at the regional level to evaluate the performance of particular combinations of parties (Downs 1998). Based on these local experiences, party leaders then decide whether these coalitions should be implemented at the national level. In many cases, politicians often go to great lengths to determine whether an electoral coalition is likely to offer significant electoral benefits.[8]

It is clear that the concerns of party leaders with office, policy and votes should be incorporated into models of pre-electoral coalition formation. The first thing to note is that party leaders will be unwilling to form a coalition if it offers no electoral advantage or if the coalition's policy would be incompatible with their party's preferences. The second is that a coalition may not see the light of day even if it offers electoral benefits. Party elites still have to overcome a whole host of distributional

[7]One problem for the empirical researcher is that these private polls are rarely made available to the public.

[8]This does not rule out the possibility that politicians still overestimate the support they would receive from running separately or forming an electoral coalition. Estimates of party or coalition support are likely to be uncertain in volatile or new party systems. Although the extent to which these estimates are inaccurate can obviously affect the range in which coalition bargains are feasible, I have not modelled this source of uncertainty explicitly.

and policy differences. Finally, the extent to which these elites are faced with a moderate or extreme opposition party may influence how willing they are to compromise on these differences. To give this intuitive argument precise meaning, I now turn to a more formal description of its structure and underlying assumptions.

3.2 The Model

The model is based on a standard two-person sequential bargaining game.

3.2.1 Structure and Payoffs

Figure 3.1 depicts the model in the form of a game tree where actors take a sequence of actions. The sequence of actions is listed more clearly in Table 3.1. The game takes place in two periods $t = \{1, 2\}$. The substantive question that motivates this analysis suggests that the bargaining process is most accurately modelled as a finite period game. This is because once elections have been called, the election date is fixed and any bargaining process must necessarily come to an end at this date. The choice of two periods is arbitrary, but as the game has finite duration, the addition of more periods would not change the conclusions with regards to whether or not a pre-electoral coalition forms. In the figure, the beginning of the second period is indicated by a horizontal dashed line. The letter beside each node indicates the player whose turn it is to

move there. Thus, the game begins at the topmost decision node where Player A must decide whether to make an electoral coalition offer or not. At this point the game takes two diverging paths depending on Player A's initial choice.

Figure 3.1: Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation Game in Extensive Form



1. If an offer is made, then Player B must decide whether to accept or reject it. If the offer is accepted, the bargaining ends and an electoral coalition forms. If the proposal is rejected, the game continues into a second period in which Player B can make a counter offer. If no counter offer is made, the game ends without the formation of an electoral coalition. On the other hand, if a counter offer is made, Player A must decide whether to accept or reject it. If the counter offer is accepted, a coalition forms and the game ends. If it is rejected, no coalition forms and the game ends.

2. If no offer is made by Player A, the game immediately moves to a second period. Player B now has the opportunity of making an electoral coalition offer to Player A. If he chooses not to propose a coalition, the game ends without a pre-electoral coalition forming. If, however, he chooses to make an offer, Player A must decide whether to accept it or not. If the offer is accepted, a coalition forms and the game ends. If the offer is rejected, no coalition forms and the game ends.

Each time a player has the opportunity to make an offer he has a continuum of choices that corresponds to the electoral coalition agreements that each player can propose. The continuum arises since each electoral

coalition offer is a particular division of an overall 'pie'.[9] The general structure of the game has now been described.

Table 3.1: Actors, Actions and Payoffs in Bargaining Game

Period	Actors	Actions	Expected Payoffs
1	A	offer electoral coalition	
		no offer	
	B	*(if A makes offer)*	
		accept offer	$P_u^1(o_A^1 - \lambda_{Apec})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_u^1)$; $P_u^1((1 - o_A^1) - \lambda_{Bpec})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_u^1)$
		reject offer	
2	B	*(if A made initial offer)*	
		offer electoral coalition	
		no offer	$P_{A_d}(s_A - \lambda_{Agov})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_{A_d})$; $P_{B_d}(s_B - \lambda_{Bgov})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_{B_d})$
	A	*(if B makes offer)*	
		accept offer	$P_u^2(o_B^2 - \lambda_{Apec})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_u^2)$; $P_u^2((1 - o_B^2) - \lambda_{Bpec})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_u^2)$

[9]The core of any bargaining game is that two players are bargaining over a 'pie'. The size of this pie is typically normalized to 1. An agreement is a pair (x_1, x_2), in which x_1 is Player A's share of the pie and x_2 Player B's share. The set of possible agreements is: $X = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \Re^2 : x_1 + x_2 = 1 \text{ and } x_i \geq 0 \text{ for } i = 1, 2\}$. It should be fairly obvious that there is always a continuum of possible offers. For further information, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).

Table 3.1: Actors, Actions and Payoffs in Bargaining Game

Period	Actors	Actions	Expected Payoffs
		reject offer	$P_{A_d}(s_A - \lambda_{Agov})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_{A_d})$; $P_{B_d}(s_B - \lambda_{Bgov})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_{B_d})$
2	B	*(if A made no offer)* offer electoral coalition	
		no offer	$P_{A_d}(s_A - \lambda_{Agov})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_{A_d})$; $P_{B_d}(s_B - \lambda_{Bgov})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_{B_d})$
	A	*(if B makes offer)*	
		accept offer	$P_u^2(o_B^2 - \lambda_{Apec})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_u^2)$; $P_u^2((1 - o_B^2) - \lambda_{Bpec})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_u^2)$
		reject offer	$P_{A_d}(s_A - \lambda_{Agov})$ $-\lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_{A_d})$; $P_{B_d}(s_B - \lambda_{Bgov})$ $-\lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_{B_d})$

The important remaining elements of the game relate to the payoffs associated with the different outcomes. I derive these payoffs analytically by discussing the consequences of each outcome. The payoffs to Player A are listed first in Table 3.1, while the payoffs to Player B come second. The payoffs to the two parties can easily be related to their concerns about policy, office and votes.

First, both parties care whether forming an electoral coalition is likely to offer any electoral advantages. This is captured in the probabilities of "winning" the election, P_u^1, P_u^2 and P_{i_d}, where i refers to the specific party. It is important to remember that "winning" the election may mean different things in parliamentary, presidential, and mixed regimes.[10] Electoral coalitions could form with the goal of controlling the presidency or the government, depending on the type of election. In the context of a parliamentary regime, P_u^1 captures the probability that a 'unified' electoral coalition that forms in the first round will win the election and form the government. Thus, $1 - P_u^1$ necessarily indicates the probability that the coalition will lose the election and not enter government. Similarly, P_u^2 is the probability that a 'unified' electoral coalition that forms in the *second* round of bargaining will win the election and form the government, and $1 - P_u^2$ is the probability that the coalition will lose the election and not enter government. In a presidential context, "winning" means controlling the presidency or the legislature; in a mixed regime, it means controlling either the presidency or the government.

[10]In a presidential regime, the chief executive is directly elected for a fixed term. In a parliamentary regime, the executive is controlled by the legislature. Under this arrangement, the parliament is directly elected and its members choose the government (cabinet). The government serves as long as it has the confidence of the legislature. A mixed regime combines elements of both. It has a directly elected president as well as a government controlled by the legislature.

I assume that $P_u^1 > P_u^2$. This allows me to incorporate a cost of delay into the game. The notion underlying this cost of delay is that forming a coalition three months before an election is preferable to forming one a few days before it (Smith 2003, Smith 2004). More time to plan and execute a coherent and coordinated campaign strategy is presumably an asset in electoral competition. In the first period of the game the electoral benefits to be gained from forming a coalition are higher than the benefits gained from forming in the second round.

Finally, P_{i_d} is the probability of being in government if the two parties do not form an electoral coalition. It follows that the opposition wins with probability $1 - P_{i_d}$ if the two parties fail to form an electoral coalition. If the pre-electoral coalition offers an electoral advantage, then $P_u^1 > P_{i_d}$ or $P_u^2 > P_{i_d}$.

Party leaders also care about office benefits. Let the total amount of office benefits available be large S. This is normalized to 1 to ease the analysis.[11] One can think of these office benefits as ministerial portfolios in a parliamentary regime, perhaps ranked hierarchically in terms of the benefits that they provide. For example, the positions of prime minister or finance minister are much more likely to be fought over by party elites than the ministerial post overseeing tourism. In a presidential regime, S refers to the office benefits associated with the presidency in presidential

[11]This does not affect the implications of the model.

elections and to the office benefits associated with being in the legislative majority (perhaps as a coalition member) in legislative elections.

Each time a party makes a coalition offer, it is in fact offering a particular division of these office benefits. These shares are indexed in Figure 3.1 by the particular period in which the offer is made. Thus, o_A^1, $1 - o_A^1$ represents the division of the office benefits (large S) being offered in period 1 by Player A, whereas o_B^2, $1 - o_B^2$ represents the division being offered by Player B in period 2. By necessity, $o_A^1 \geq 0$ and $o_B^2 \geq 0$.

If the parties do not form a pre-electoral coalition and decide to run separately, they may still end up as members of the governing coalition. The expected share of office benefits that a party receives in this case, s_A and s_B, will depend on whether the election is presidential or legislative. In legislative elections, one can think that the share of office benefits received by a party entering government after running separately will be proportional to its seat share in the governing coalition in parliamentary regime elections (Laver 1998*b*). In other words, Party A can expect to receive a share of the office benefits, $s_A = \frac{seats_A}{seats_A + seats_j}$ if it enters government with some party (or parties) j, where $seats_A$ is the number of seats won by Party A and $seats_j$ is the number of seats won by

party j.[12] Naturally, if Party A fails to enter government after running separately in legislative elections, then $s_A = 0$. This simply means that Party A will receive no office benefits. In presidential elections, the expected share of office benefits will either be $s_A = S$ or $s_A = 0$ for Party A. In practical terms, this means that if you win the presidency you gain all of the office benefits (large S); if you lose the elections, you win nothing.

Aside from office benefits, party leaders also care about policy. I make the common assumption that they each have single-peaked preferences over a unidimensional policy space. One can think of this policy space as representing the traditional left-right cleavage in most countries. Party leaders care about the policy that is implemented after the election. If they fail to win the election or enter government, then policy is determined by the opposition. I capture the utility loss associated with having the opposition set policy at its ideal point with a standard quadratic loss function $-(P_i - P_{opp})^2$, where P_i is the ideal point of party i and P_{opp} is the policy implemented by the opposition. In order to simplify the notation, I call this loss λ_{Aopp} or λ_{Bopp}. By measuring this ideological distance, I can distinguish between elections in which the

[12]The terminology is slightly different for legislative elections in presidential regimes since one might prefer to speak of legislative majority coalitions rather than governing coalitions.

opposition has a very radical policy (λ_{i_opp} is large) and those in which the opposition's policy is more moderate (λ_{i_opp} is small).

Party leaders also care about the ideological cohesion of the pre-electoral coalition. If the parties have different policy preferences, one could think of the 'coalition's preferred policy' as being some weighted average of the players' ideal points (weighted by the expected party strengths, for instance). If two parties are very close to each other in the policy space, the coalition policy will be close to each of their ideal points. On the other hand, if two parties are distant, a weighted average of their policy positions would likely yield a coalition position that is far from either's preferred policy. Thus each party leader needs to consider the utility loss associated with policy being implemented at the potential 'coalition ideal point'. I start with the distance between the two players, using the same standard quadratic loss function as was presented above, $-(P_A - P_B)^2$, where P_A is the ideal point of Player A and P_B is the policy implemented by Player B. To simplify the notation, I call this λ_{AB}. However, the players are interested not in the distance between their own ideal point and that of their coalition partner's ideal point per se. Rather, they care about the distance between their ideal point and that of the coalition. To capture this I let $s_{u_B}\lambda_{AB}$ be the utility loss for Player A associated with policy being implemented at the coalition's ideal point, where $s_{u_B} = \frac{seats_B}{seats_A + seats_B}$. Similarly, let $s_{u_A}\lambda_{AB}$ be the

utility loss for Player B associated with policy being implemented at the coalition's ideal point, where $s_{u_A} = \frac{seats_A}{seats_A + seats_B}$.[13]

3.2.2 Equilibrium Behavior

As I already stated, the game tree presented above in Figure 3.1 defines a simple sequential bargaining game. An advantage of using a formal model such as this is that it allows one to derive equilibrium strategies and pinpoint the precise assumptions that lead to them. In this section, I examine the equilibrium behavior of the party leaders. I follow common practice and solve the game through backward induction using the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium concept.[14] I then proceed to analyze the crucial parameters that affect the likelihood of one of these equilibrium

[13]To see where these terms come from, consider the following simple numerical example. Take a policy space from 0 to 100 where Player A is located at 50 and Player B is located at 60. The coalition policy would be somewhere between the two parties, and the larger of the two should exercise a stronger influence over the coalition's policy. To determine the weighted average for the coalition, use the expected seats (or votes) to be won by each player, s_{u_A} and s_{u_B}. Imagine that $s_{u_A} = .8$ and $s_{u_B} = .2$. Thus Player A has to cede 20% of the policy distance to Player B, and Player B in turn will yield 80% of the policy distance to Player A. The coalition policy would be set at 52.

[14]This equilibrium concept is a refinement on the Nash equilibrium which requires that 'each player's strategy is an optimal response to the other player's strategies' (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991). A sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium requires that the strategy combination induces a Nash equilibrium not only in the whole game, but in each of its subgames. Strategy combinations that fulfill this requirement form a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium.

outcomes, namely electoral coalition formation. This allows me to derive testable implications about the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions at election time.

In order to ease the presentation of the equilibria and proofs, I first simplify the presentation of the payoffs somewhat. First, I use the case where Player A and B have the same policy preferences. This simplifies the notation significantly, though for the discussion of comparative statics that follows I draw upon the more general model where the players may have different ideal points. In addition, I let:

- $D_A \equiv P_{A_d}(s_A - \lambda_{Agov}) - \lambda_{Aopp}(1 - P_{A_d})$ which represents Player A's payoff if running independently.
- $D_B \equiv P_{B_d}(s_B - \lambda_{Bgov}) - \lambda_{Bopp}(1 - P_{B_d})$ which represents Player B's payoff if running independently.
- $\Omega^1 \equiv P_u^1(1 - s_{uB}\lambda_{AB} - s_{uA}\lambda_{AB}) - (\lambda_{Aopp} + \lambda_{Bopp})(1 - P_u^1)$ which represents the total 'electoral coalition pie' in round 1.
- $\Omega^2 \equiv P_u^2(1 - s_{uB}\lambda_{AB} - s_{uA}\lambda_{AB}) - (\lambda_{Aopp} + \lambda_{Bopp})(1 - P_u^2)$ which represents the total 'electoral coalition pie' in round 2.

One can think of D_A and D_B as representing the 'disagreement' points for each player respectively. In other words, these are the payoffs that each player will receive if no electoral coalition agreement is reached by the end of the second period. Ω^1 and Ω^2 represent the total 'pie'

available in the game to an electoral coalition if formed in round 1 and round 2, respectively.[15]

I make one final assumption at this point.[16]

- If a player is indifferent between making an offer and not making an offer, he will choose the latter.

With these simplifications and additional assumptions in hand, I can now turn to the presentation of the equilibria and proofs.

Proposition 1: There are three possible sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in this game.

Let $(X_t,\ 1-X_t)$ be the offer made by Player A in period t, in which X_t is Player A's share. Let $W_t,\ 1-W_t$ be the offer made by Player B in period t, in which W_t is Player A's share.

1. If $D_B < \Omega^2 - D_A$, which means that the total 'electoral coalition pie' in Round 2 is larger than the sum of both players' disagreement

[15] P_u^1S and P_u^2S represent the expected utility associated with winning all of the office benefits and setting policy at the coalition ideal point. Since $S = 1$, this can be simplified to P_u^1 or P_u^2.

[16] This assumption has a substantive justification if one believes that there are costs associated with making an electoral coalition offer. This assumption is not entirely innocuous, though, since it does affect the number of sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in the game. It turns out that if I allow the players to remain indifferent between making and not making an offer, there would be an additional equilibrium. I illustrate this very clearly when providing the proofs for the game's equilibria. Although the number of equilibria is affected, the model's implications are not.

payoffs, then Player A offers $(X_1 = \Omega^1 - \Omega^2 + D_A,\ 1 - X_1 = \Omega^2 - D_A)$ in the first round and Player B accepts; and if the game were to reach the second round Player B offers $(W_2 = D_A,\ 1 - W_2 = \Omega^2 - D_A)$ and Player A accepts.

2. If $\Omega^2 - D_A \leq D_B \leq \Omega^1 - D_A$, which means that the total 'electoral coalition pie' is larger than the sum of the players' disagreement payoffs in Round 1 *but not in Round 2*, then Player A offers $(X_1 = \Omega^1 - D_B,\ 1 - X_1 = D_B)$ in Round 1 and Player B accepts; and if the game were to reach the second round Player B does not make an offer.

3. If $D_B > \Omega^1 - D_A$, which means that the total 'electoral coalition pie' is smaller than the sum of the players' disagreement payoffs in both rounds, then neither player makes an offer in either round.

Thus a coalition will form in the first round in equilibria 1 and 2. In the third equilibrium, no coalition forms. The first equilibrium involves Player A making an initial offer that is accepted by Player B. If the game had reached the second period, Player B would have made an offer that Player A found acceptable. The second equilibrium involves Player A making an initial offer that is accepted by Player B. If the game had reached the second period, Player B would not have made an offer, even though Player A would have accepted an offer. In the third equilibrium

Player A does not make an initial offer. Player B also fails to make an offer in period 2, although Player A would have accepted an offer.

Proof of Proposition 1: Given that there are no complications associated with incomplete information, I use backward induction to prove each of the sub-game perfect Nash equilibria.

Equilibrium 1: There are two diverging paths in this game tree. I focus first on the one in which Player A makes an initial offer. At the last decision node in this half of the game, Player A must decide whether to accept or reject a coalition offer made by Player B. He will only accept this offer if he receives at least as much utility as he would get from rejecting it. In other words, he accepts if he receives at least D_A. If Player B makes an offer he will want to maximize his payoff. Thus, he will offer exactly D_A to Player A and keep the rest of the 'electoral coalition pie' for himself. Player B would propose the agreement pair $(D_A; \Omega^2 - D_A)$ in the second period. It is important to note that Player B will only make this counter offer if $\Omega^2 - D_A > D_B$. If this condition does not hold, Player B will prefer to make no offer in the second period. A little substitution and algebra indicates that this is precisely the condition associated with the first sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome listed above.

Continuing with the proof, and assuming that this condition holds, Player A knows that he must give at least $\Omega^2 - D_A$ to Player B in order for him to accept a first period offer. Since Player A wants to maximize

his payoffs as well, this is all he will offer Player B. He will keep the rest, namely $\Omega^1 - \Omega^2 + D_A$. Player A will want Player B to accept the initial offer since the associated payoff is larger than if the game continued into the second period. This is immediately obvious since $\Omega^1 > \Omega^2$. Thus, if Player A does make an initial offer, then the agreement pair will be $(\Omega^1 - \Omega^2 + D_A; \Omega^2 - D_A)$ and an electoral coalition will form in the first period.

The question is whether Player A will actually make this initial offer. This will depend on the payoffs he expects to receive if he does not make an offer in period 1. This requires examining the half of the game that has so far been overlooked. The important thing to note is that the second period in this part of the game tree is identical to the one already examined. Thus, we know that if the second period is reached, then Player B will make an electoral coalition offer of $(D_A; \Omega^2 - D_A)$. This will be accepted by Player A. Since we already know that Player A can guarantee himself a payoff of $\Omega^1 - \Omega^2 + D_A$ if he makes an electoral coalition offer in period 1 (which is larger than D_A), we know that he will always make an offer in the first period. Thus, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is one in which Player A makes an initial offer that is accepted by Player B. The game never enters a second period. This equilibrium outcome assumes that the condition $D_B < \Omega^2 - D_A$ holds.

Q.E.D.

The process of backward induction used to prove equilibrium 1 is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.2. The wide black lines indicate the action taken by the players in each sub-game.

Figure 3.2: Equilibrium 1



Equilibrium 2: Given that there are two diverging paths in this game tree, I again focus first on the one in which Player A makes an initial offer. I have already shown in the previous proof that if Player B makes an offer in the second period then it will be the agreement pair $(D_A; \Omega^2 - D_A)$. However, it may be the case that Player B prefers not to make a counter offer in the second period. This will be true if $D_B \geq \Omega^2 - D_A$.

Figure 3.3: Equilibrium 2



If this condition holds, Player A knows that he only has to give D_B to Player B for him to accept an offer in the first period. Since Player A wants to maximize his payoff, he will propose the agreement pair $(\Omega^1 - D_B; D_B)$ if he wants his offer to be accepted. However, it may be the case that Player A prefers his initial offer to be rejected if his expected payoff in the second period is larger. This will be the case if $D_A > \Omega^1 - D_B$. The second sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium relies on the fact that this condition does not hold. In other words, it must be the case that if Player A makes an offer in the first period he does not want it to be rejected.

The only remaining question at this point is whether Player A prefers to make an offer that is accepted in the first period or make no offer at all. This requires examining the second half of the game tree. Again, the second period in this half of the game tree is identical to the one already examined. Thus, Player A expects that Player B will make no offer in the second period. Given the assumption that $D_A < \Omega^1 - D_B$, we know that Player A will always make an offer in the first period. Thus, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium outcome is one in which Player A makes an initial offer that is accepted by Player B. The game never enters a second period. This equilibrium assumes that $D_B \geq \Omega^2 - D_A$ and $D_A < \Omega^1 - D_B$ both hold. With a little algebra, it is clear that these conditions can be rewritten as $\Omega^2 - D_A \leq D_B \leq \Omega^1 - D_A$, which

is the condition associated with equilibrium 2 listed above.

Q.E.D.

The process of backward induction used to prove equilibrium 1 is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.3. The wide black lines indicate the action taken by the players in each sub-game.

Equilibrium 3: To a large extent, this proof is identical to the previous one. Again I focus first on the half of the game tree in which Player A makes an offer. I have already shown that if Player B makes an offer in period 2, then Player A will accept it. As in the previous proof, I now assume that Player B prefers not to make a counter offer in period 2. This will be true if $D_B \geq \Omega^2 - D_A$. I have also shown that if Player A wants his initial offer to be accepted, then he will propose the agreement pair $(\Omega^1 - D_B; D_B)$. In the previous proof, I then assumed that Player A would only make an initial offer if this was going to be accepted. In other words, his payoff from having his offer accepted was larger than that from having his offer rejected and Player B making no counter offer. The precise condition was that $D_A < \Omega^1 - D_B$. I now assume that this condition does not hold. This assumption is the only thing that distinguishes equilibrium 3 from equilibrium 2.

Figure 3.4: Equilibrium 3



The question that needs to be resolved is whether Player A would prefer to make an offer that he knows is going to be rejected or make no offer at all. This requires examining the second half of the game tree. Again, the second period in this half of the game tree is identical to the one already examined. Thus, Player A expects that Player B will make no offer in the second period. It is clear that Player A will receive D_A whether he makes no initial offer in the first period or he makes an offer that gets rejected. Player A is, therefore, indifferent between these actions. As I stated earlier, I assume that if a player is indifferent between making an offer and not making an offer, then he will choose to do the latter.[17] Thus, the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium is one in which both players fail to make an offer. This equilibrium assumes that $D_B \geq \Omega^2 - D_A$ and $D_A > \Omega^1 - D_B$ both hold. With a minor bit of algebraic manipulation it is easy to see that if the second condition holds then the first automatically does as well. The second condition can be expressed as $D_B > \Omega^1 - D_A$, which is the condition associated with the third equilibrium listed above.

Q.E.D.

[17]If this assumption is not made and the players are allowed to remain indifferent, then there is a fourth sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. The outcome is that Player A makes an initial offer which is rejected. The game enters a second period, but Player B does not make a counter offer. The end result is that no electoral coalition forms.

The process of backward induction used to prove equilibrium 3 is illustrated graphically in Figure 3.4. The wide black lines indicate the action taken by the players in each sub-game.

3.2.3 Comparative Statics

The equilibria of my model allow a certain number of insights. However, before moving on to an analysis of the comparative statics, it is worth taking a moment to first understand the intuition behind each of these equilibria.

Although the first two equilibria result in the formation of an electoral coalition, the nature of the bargain itself is very different. In the first equilibrium, the player who moves last (in this case Player B) is able to determine the nature of the bargain that is ultimately reached. This is the result of having a two-period model in which Player B can make a credible threat to reject an initial offer from Player A that is insufficiently attractive. Player B knows that if the game enters a second period, he can always make a take-it-or-leave-it offer that will be accepted. This in turn is the result of having a large enough 'electoral coalition pie' (Ω^2) to bargain over relative to the disagreement payoffs (D_A and D_B) available from running separately. Both parties benefit from forming an electoral coalition in this equilibrium. However, in the second round Player A will only ever receive D_A while Player B is always able to obtain all of the benefits from forming the electoral coalition, albeit with a smaller

'pie' than would have been the case if an agreement had been struck in period one.

The bargain reached in the second equilibrium is very different. In this case, Party A is able to obtain all of the gains from reaching a pre-electoral agreement. Party B only ever receives his disagreement payoff. This is because Party B is no longer able to credibly threaten to reject such an offer.

No electoral coalition forms in the third equilibrium. This is because there are no gains to be made from reaching a pre-electoral agreement. Both parties would have to give up so much in the bargaining process to get the other to accept, that each would be better off running alone.

Having characterized the equilibria in a more intuitive manner, I examine a number of useful insights regarding the formation process of electoral coalitions provided by Proposition 1. I focus primarily on those comparative statics that inform us about whether an electoral coalition forms. There are two possible states of the world: one in which an electoral coalition forms (equilibria 1 or 2) and one in which it does not (equilibrium 3).

The first four variables are included for the sake of any readers who would be curious about relevant signs. However, as they are just restatements of the original variables, they are of limited interest as far as empirical tests are concerned. The more important variables are the

Table 3.2: Comparative Statics

Increase in Variable	Probability of Coalition
'Electoral coalition pie' in Period 1 (Ω^1)	Increasing*
'Electoral coalition pie' in Period 1 (Ω^2)	Increasing
A's disagreement outcome (D_A)	Decreasing
B's disagreement outcome (D_B)	Decreasing
Probability first period PEC wins (P_u^1)	Increasing
Probability second period PEC wins (P_u^2)	Increasing
Probability i wins, given no PEC (P_{i_d})	Decreasing
Distance between i and PEC position ($s_{uj}\lambda_{ij}$)	Decreasing
Distance between i and opposition (λ_{i_opp})	Increasing if $P_u^t > P_{i_d}$ Decreasing if $P_u^t < P_{i_d}$
A's share of office benefits given no PEC (s_i)	Decreasing

* 'Increasing' here means non-decreasing.

remaining eight; the comparative statics on these variables will provide the hypotheses to be tested.

As Table 3.2 illustrates, a larger 'electoral coalition pie' and a higher probability of entering government as a coalition increases the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation. Pre-electoral coalitions become less likely as the expected seat shares of each party from running alone increase and as the probability of entering office after running separate electoral campaigns rises. The impact of the opposition party's (coalition's) ideological position on the likelihood of electoral coalition formation is conditional on whether the probability of entering government

as a coalition is larger than the probability of entering government after running separately. If the probability is larger as a coalition, then pre-electoral coalition formation becomes more likely as the opposition becomes more extreme. The opposite holds if the probability is larger as a separate party. Finally, as the ideological distance between the two potential coalition partners grows, they are less likely to form a pre-electoral coalition.

3.2.4 Testable Implications

There are two observable outcomes predicted by the model: either a pre-electoral coalition forms or it does not. Coalition formation is influenced by the variables presented in the model. It is made more or less likely depending on whether the variables increase or decrease, as is shown in Table 3.2. The clearest way to test the implications of the model is to operationalize the variables in question and estimate their effects using statistical techniques. The measurement of the variables will be discussed in Chapter 5.

The likelihood of a coalition forming between a party and each of the other relevant parties in a party system is the variable of interest here. To capture the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions between pairs of parties, I use dyads of parties for each election. The probability that a given coalition forms will depend on the variables shown in Table 3.2. From this table, the following hypotheses can be stated:

1. As the ideological distance between the potential coalition partners increases, the likelihood of joining a coalition decreases.

2. As the probability of entering government as a coalition increases, a party is more likely to join a coalition.

3. Pre-electoral coalitions become less likely as the expected seat shares of each party from running alone increase and as the probability of entering office after running separate electoral campaigns rises.

4. As the ideological distance between the coalition's ideal point and that of the likely opposition party increases, the likelihood of joining a coalition increases as long as the coalition is not expected to be detrimental to electoral success. If this condition does not hold, then a party is less likely to join a coalition as the ideological distance increases.

5. As the electoral bonus a party receives from joining an electoral coalition increases (that is, as P_u increases compared to P_{i_d}), a party is more likely to join an electoral coalition.

In Chapter 5, I will discuss how the implications of the model can be translated into hypotheses that can be tested with data that is readily available.

3.3 Conclusion

I conclude this chapter with a brief summary of my model. The theoretical model presented above sought to explain why, and under what circumstances, electoral coalitions form. The answer, I argue, lies in a careful analysis of the costs and benefits associated with forming a coalition prior to the election. In order to fully understand this cost-benefit analysis, I presented a game-theoretic model in which two party leaders are involved in a sequential bargaining process over whether to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies. Both party leaders get to propose an electoral coalition agreement if they wish. Any coalition offer that is proposed by either party leader can be rejected or accepted. At the end of the game, the payoffs are distributed as a function of the decisions reached in the game. I find that there are two equilibrium outcomes. Either an electoral coalition forms in the first period of the game, or no coalition forms at all.

The model generates several testable implications which will be estimated in Chapter 5. The process by which the variables in the model affect the likelihood of coalition formation will be more carefully detailed in the case studies presented in the following chapter. That is, coalitions should be more likely to form if the chance of winning executive office, or the expected share of office, increases. On the other hand, if a party's vote share when running alone increases, it will be less likely to join a

coalition. If an opposition victory would allow extremely unsatisfactory policies to be implemented, a party's likelihood of joining a coalition goes up *if* joining such a coalition makes it more likely that the opposition would be barred from office. Of course, ideological cohesion within the coalition makes it more likely that a pre-electoral coalition will form.

By formalizing these intuitions, I am able to conceptualize the puzzle in terms of the probabilities associated with electoral coalition formation and to pinpoint the factors involved. This will enable me to move on to the econometric analysis with a much clearer idea of how to test the argument than would otherwise be the case. Before doing so, however, I turn to a detailed qualitative analysis of pre-electoral coalitions in France and South Korea. These case studies allow me to show that the assumptions underlying the model as well as the predictions it generates are plausible and generate useful intuitions for thinking about the electoral strategies chosen by party elites.

Chapter 4

France and South Korea

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I use a detailed investigation of electoral coalitions in Fifth Republic France and post-1987 South Korea to illustrate the causal process of pre-electoral coalition formation. To a large extent, the selection of these specific cases is somewhat arbitrary since I believe that there is a general underlying logic of pre-electoral coalition formation that is not country specific. However, I did try to choose cases that differ on several interesting criteria. Perhaps the most obvious differences between France and South Korea relate to their geographical location and their history with democratic forms of government. France is a country in Western Europe with a well-established democratic pedigree, whereas Korea is a recently established democracy in East Asia. A less well

known difference relates to the role that ideological distinctions between parties and candidates play in these countries. While a well-entrenched left-right cleavage exists in the French Fifth Republic, ideological differences are minimal compared to the importance of regional distinctions in South Korea. Thus, South Korea offers a good opportunity to examine the formation of pre-electoral coalitions in the absence of ideological conflict.

Although the history of electoral coalitions in South Korea is informative, the French case is particularly well-suited for those interested in analyzing pre-electoral coalitions. This is partly because French electoral history offers so many clear examples of coalition success and failure on both the left and right of the political spectrum. Moreover, the ability (or inability) of political parties to form electoral coalitions often has a large impact on election outcomes in France. The result of the recent 2002 presidential elections is perhaps the clearest example of this. The unusual nature of the semi-presidential regime also offers an almost unique opportunity to evaluate the impact of different electoral institutions, namely legislative and presidential elections, on pre-electoral strategies while holding other country characteristics constant.

While differing according to several criteria, the two cases discussed below seem to suggest that similar factors influence pre-electoral coalition formation in both countries. Evidence from South Korea and France indicate that distributional issues play a significant role in determining

the ease with which electoral coalitions form. If these issues can be resolved, then even the most strident and long-held personal animosities threatening electoral coordination can be overcome. This is particularly evident in the case of South Korea. The danger of waiting too long before coordinating pre-electoral strategies and the important role played by the ideological position of opposition parties comes through clearly in the French case.

It is, perhaps, important to note at this stage that I do not intend that these cases be seen as a test of some hypothesis or as proof in favor of a particular argument. The role of the French and South Korean case studies in this project is simply to provide concrete, detailed examples of the process of electoral coalition formation. The case studies illustrate the theory which was derived theoretically in the previous chapter, and serve as a bridge to the cross-national statistical tests to follow. As I stated earlier, pre-electoral coalitions include cases in which party leaders do not compete separately; rather, they either announce to the electorate that they plan to govern together if successful at the polls or agree to run under a single name (with joint lists or nomination agreements).[1] With this definition in hand, I turn first to an investigation of the electoral coalition history in France and then to that in South Korea.

[1]If members of an electoral coalition merge to form a single party, I no longer consider the new party to be an electoral coalition.

4.2 French Fifth Republic

The outcome of the first round of the French 2002 presidential elections came as an enormous surprise to almost everyone in France, as well as to observers around the world. It had been widely expected that Jacques Chirac, the president and leader of the mainstream right, would make it through to the second round along with Lionel Jospin, the prime minister and leader of the mainstream left. The real question for months had been which of the two men would win the second round. Then, unexpectedly, the left vote was split among so many candidates that the Socialist leader came in third, behind the extreme-right politician Jean-Marie Le Pen. The French press described the event as an earthquake, and the French elections were, for a couple of weeks, the subject of world-wide speculation. Most analyses of this particular election will no doubt focus on the disturbing success of the extreme right. However, it is worth emphasizing that this political 'earthquake' had as much to do with the inability of the French Left to form a coherent pre-electoral coalition as it did with an increase in the strength of the extreme right. After all, Le Pen only enjoyed a rather moderate increase in his voteshare compared to what he had received in the previous presidential elections of 1995.[2]

[2]Le Pen received 16.86% of the vote in the 2002 presidential election compared to 15% in 1995. A rival far-right candidate, Bruno Mégret, got another 2.34% of the vote in 2002. These figures come from the *Election Politique* website at http://www.election-politique.com.

The outcome of the first round in 2002, though admittedly a surprise, is not unprecedented. The left had approached the 1969 presidential elections in such 'total disarray' that none of the left candidates made it to the second round. This enabled a little-known centrist candidate, Alain Poher, to compete in the second round against Georges Pompidou (Pierce 1980). In 1981, the unwillingness of Jacques Chirac to publicly encourage his electorate to support the remaining mainstream right candidate (Valéry Giscard d'Estaing) after he had been eliminated in the first round of the presidential elections clearly contributed to the size of the left-wing vote that brought François Mitterrand to power (Wright 1995, Ysmal 1989). The inability of the moderate right to form a cohesive electoral alliance in these elections and at the subsequent legislative elections a few weeks later enabled the first left-wing government to come to power since the Popular Front in 1936. These examples illustrate the important and often dramatic role that pre-electoral coalitions have played in determining electoral outcomes in France.

4.2.1 Electoral Institutions and Distributional Issues

The notoriously disproportional electoral system of the French Fifth Republic favors large parties for presidential and legislative elections. Thus, one might expect that pre-electoral coalitions are equally common in

both types of elections. However, this is not the case as Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show.[3]

Table 4.1: First-round Electoral Coalitions in Presidential Elections

Election year	Pre-Electoral Coalitions
1965	PCF + PS
1969	None
1974	PCF + PS
1981	None
1988	None
1995	None
2002	None

Parties: **(PCF)** Communist Party; **(PS)** Socialist Party

[3]In Table 4.2, all coalitions listed as forming in the first round also occur in the second round. Only additional coalitions are listed as forming in the second round.

Table 4.2: Electoral Coalitions in Legislative Elections

Election year	Pre-Electoral Coalitions	
	Round 1	Round 2
1958	None	None
1962	None	UNR+UDT+RI
		PCF+SFIO+RAD
1967	UNR+UDT+RI	UNR+UDT+RI+CD
	SFIO+RAD+CIR (FGDS)	FGDS+PCF+PSU
1968	UNR+RI	UNR+RI+PDM
		FGDS+PCF
1973	UDR+RI+UC	UDR+RI+UC+REF
	UGDS (PS+MRG)	PCF+UGDS+PSU
1978	CDS+PR+RI (UDF)	UDF+RPR
	PS+MRG	PS+MRG+PCF
1981	RPR+UDF	RPR+UDF
	PS+MRG	PS+MRG+PCF
1986 (PR)	RPR+UDF	(no second round)
	PS+MRG	
1988	RPR+UDF	RPR+UDF
	PS+MRG	PS+MRG+PCF
1993	RPR+UDF	RPR+UDF
		PS+PCF
	Greens+GE	Greens+GE
1997	RPR+UDF	RPR+UDF
	PS+Greens+PRG	PS+Greens+PRG+PCF
2002	UPM (RPR+UDF+DL)	UPM
	PS+Greens+PRG	PS+Greens+PRG+PCF

(**Rad**) Radicals; (**PRG**) Left Radical Party; (**UDT**) Left Gaullists; (**PSU**) Unified Socialist Party; (**UNR, UDR, RPR**) Gaullist Party; (**SFIO, PS**) Socialist Party; (**PCF**) Communist Party; (**Greens**) Green Party; (**GE**) Generation Ecology; (**UDF**) Union for French Democracy; (**RI**) Independent Republicans; (**PR**) Republicans; (**UC**) Center Union; (**CD**) Democratic Center; (**PDM**) Progress and Modern Democracy; (**Dv.D.**) Other moderate right.

While electoral coalitions are relatively frequent in legislative elections, they are quite rare in presidential contests. This is a puzzle given that the electoral systems used in both types of elections are very similar.

In this section, I illustrate that distributional conflicts among party leaders are often so great in presidential contests that pre-electoral coalitions fail to form even though they can offer significant electoral advantages. These distributional issues are easier to resolve in legislative elections since ministerial portfolios are more divisible than the presidential office. I begin by outlining the electoral systems used in the Fifth Republic before contrasting the history of electoral coalition formation in presidential and legislative elections.

Presidential and legislative elections are both characterized by two rounds of voting in which a limited number of candidates progress to the second round. If a presidential candidate wins an absolute majority of the national vote in the first round, then he or she is automatically elected president. If this is not the case, then the top two candidates go through to the second round that is held two weeks later.[4] Whoever wins the most votes in the second round becomes the president. Legislative elections are very similar. Each electoral district is a single-seat district

[4]All presidential elections have gone to the second round since the introduction of direct presidential elections in 1962.

and any candidate who passes a threshold of electoral support in the first round of voting is eligible to enter a second round two weeks later.[5]

The particular threshold that must be overcome has been changed twice since the foundation of the Fifth Republic in 1958. It was originally set at a relatively low 5% of the vote. This was subsequently increased to 10% for the 1967 election and 12.5% for the 1978 election (Cole & Campbell 1989). The plurality winner in the second round of voting becomes the elected deputy. The first-past-the-post nature of these electoral systems provides incentives for electoral coalitions to form. In fact, the right-wing president Giscard d'Estaing specifically increased the threshold that needed to be overcome to enter the second round of legislative elections to 12.5% in 1978 in order to force centrist parties and center-right parties to merge or form alliances with his own party. This move was motivated by the growing success of the socialists and communists at local elections in the mid-1970s (Duhamel 1999).

[5]The electoral system used for the 1986 elections was different. In an attempt to prevent an expected right-wing legislative majority, President Mitterrand introduced a proportional representation system similar to that used in the Fourth Republic. He hoped that this would encourage voters to support the extremist National Front and siphon off votes from the moderate right-wing parties. Although a large number of voters did support the National Front, Jacques Chirac, the leader of the moderate right, became prime minister with a legislative majority of two seats. Chirac immediately restored the traditional single-seat plurality electoral system.

Given the nature of the electoral system in France, party leaders have a range of pre-election choices for legislative and presidential elections. At one extreme, parties could refuse to form any electoral coalitions in either round of voting. This is what happened with the Left prior to 1965 and is what typically occurs now between the National Front and the moderate right-wing parties.[6] One option for party leaders is to form an electoral coalition for the second round only. In this option, parties would still get to compete against each other in the first round. This has been a common occurrence in legislative elections amongst the mainstream parties on the left and right. Another option is for parties to form electoral coalitions prior to the first round. This requires choosing a single candidate to run in each district. Although this is not as common as the previous option, Table 4.2 illustrates that it does occur with some frequency on both the left and right.[7] The last option is that parties could move beyond electoral coalitions and simply merge into a single party. The center-left parties chose this option when they merged to

[6]A small number of moderate right-wing deputies regularly call for an electoral coalition with the National Front in certain districts. However, they tend to be isolated very quickly by the party elites. When several mainstream right politicians were elected with the help of the National Front in the cantonal and regional elections of 1998, President Chirac immediately went on national television to denounce all alliances between the moderate and extreme right. The politicians were then kicked out of their parties (Martin 1999, Hecht & Mandonnet 1987).

[7]Typically, coalitions between the UDF and RPR that form in the first round have only applied to particular districts. The second round coalitions between these parties are much more comprehensive.

form the Socialist Party in 1971. The non-Gaullist parties on the right also chose this option when they formed the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) in 1978 (Massart 1999, Portelli 1994, Bell & Criddle 1984).[8]

Presidential Elections

Having provided an overview of the pre-electoral coalition options available to party leaders, it is worth considering the history of these coalition choices in presidential and legislative elections more specifically. As I stated earlier, one would expect electoral coalitions to form quite frequently in presidential elections since only two candidates can go through to the second round. Presumably, party leaders would like to avoid the outcomes of the 1969 and 2002 elections where the left vote was split among so many candidates that none of them made it into the second round. The incentive for parties to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies may be diminished if the presidency held little power. However, the importance of winning the presidency for the different parties in France is hard to overstate. One must remember that it is slightly misleading to describe the political system in France as semi-presidential. It could more accurately be considered a presidential system when the president enjoys a legislative majority (Duhamel 1999, Keeler & Schain 1996, Charlot 1994, Hayward 1993). It is only when the president lacks

[8]Something similar seems to have occurred on the moderate right following the success of the pre-electoral coalition that formed prior to the first round of the 2002 legislative elections.

a majority that the system behaves as if it were a parliamentary regime dominated by the prime minister. The presidency has been the dominant political position throughout the Fifth Republic with the exception of the three periods of 'cohabitation' between 1986-88, 1993-95 and 1997-2002.[9]

Despite the importance of the position and the incentives created by the electoral system, there are very few examples of coalitions forming in presidential elections. In fact, there are only two examples where the left or the right have coordinated their strategies so as to present a single presidential candidate for election. As the following examples will illustrate, many French specialists argue that the chief obstacle to coalition formation in presidential elections is the distributional consequences associated with nominating a single candidate.

Both times in which pre-electoral agreements have been reached in presidential elections, the Communist Party (PCF) accepted a non-communist candidate as the main standard bearer for the left. To some extent, the willingness of the Communist Party to accept a socialist candidate in 1965 and 1974 stems from the widely-held belief that a communist could never be elected president during the Cold War period. It is also important to remember that the rise of the Socialist Party as the dominant party on the left was almost unthinkable in the

[9]Cohabitation refers to a time when the presidential and prime ministerial positions are held by people from opposing parties.

1960s and early 1970s. The PCF had been the largest party in 1945 and was still the dominant party on the left by a considerable margin during the early years of the Fifth Republic. To a large extent, the PCF could only expect to benefit from supporting François Mitterrand as the single candidate of the Left in the 1965 presidential elections. The PCF hoped to gain from a show of left-wing unity without ceding any authority to the socialists. In fact, they probably did not expect Mitterrand to even make it into the second round, let alone make the election competitive (Johnson 1981).[10] It was only because a centrist candidate, Jean Lecanuet, managed to win 15.6% of the vote in the first round that a second ballot involving Mitterrand and de Gaulle was actually required. It was this unforeseen occurrence that indirectly began to establish Mitterrand's reputation as the leader of the left.

It was the socialists who were the most reluctant to consider an electoral coalition with the communists in the early years of the Fifth Republic. To some extent, this reluctance can be traced to the traditional and deep-seated hostility on the non-communist Left towards the PCF (Jackson 1990, Judt 1986). However, more important were the relative positions of the two parties among the electorate. The PCF was by far the dominant party on the left and any alliance with the communists would automatically position the socialists as minority partners. Many

[10]Mitterrand won 44.8% of the vote in the second round, compared to de Gaulle's 55.2% (Mackie & Rose 1991).

feared that the emerging left-right bipolarization of the political system threatened the very existence of the socialist party given its small size relative to the PCF. This helps to explain why one third of socialist voters refused to support the PCF in the second ballot of the 1962 legislative elections (Williams, Goldey & Harrison 1970). A national electoral coalition with the communists also threatened the socialists' ability to conclude alliances with both the center and the left.[11] Moreover, an alliance with the PCF was expected to cause problems in winning over those center-left and center-right voters who had not thrown their lot in with de Gaulle in 1962. These voters were influential since they represented the swing vote throughout the 1960s (Portelli 1994, Ysmal 1989).

The socialists ultimately accepted an electoral coalition in 1965 only after having unsuccessfully attempted to build a federation of the center-left around the presidential candidate of Gaston Deferre.[12] Deferre had wanted to build a 'grande fédération' of progressive forces, reaching rightwards to the Christian democratic movement (MRP) (Jenson 1991). Center-right voters seemed more likely to vote for the Gaullists than the

[11]For example, it threatened the socialist policy of allying with the center right in Marseilles but with the PCF in certain regions of Paris.

[12]The origins of this federation can be found in a series of discussions that took place around the presidential candidate of a mysterious 'Monsieur X'. It was only once the idea of a candidate of the center-left had been 'tested' in the weekly magazine, *L'Éxpress*, that Gaston Deferre came out and announced that he was actually Monsieur X (Chagnollaud & Quermonne 1996).

center-left, however (Hanley 2002). This center-left federation eventually fell apart at the end of 1964 due to reluctance on the part of the MRP to participate in it. It also collapsed under the pressure exerted by the communists at municipal elections, from parts of the socialist party that refused the centrist discourse and from the reappearance of the catholic school question (Jenson 1991).[13] The failure of the center-left federation left the way open for Mitterrand to run against de Gaulle in 1965. Mitterrand had organized the non-communist left under the banner of the Fédération de la Gauche Démocrate et Socialiste (FGDS) and allied it with the communists. The relative success enjoyed by his candidacy helped to cement the idea of a left-left alliance.

The events of May 1968 and the presidential elections of 1969 provided further evidence that a left-left alliance was capable of providing realistic opposition to the Gaullist right. In February 1968, the socialists and communists reached an agreement on a common electoral 'platform', thereby consolidating the initiative that had begun in the 1965 presidential elections. However, the left-wing alliance soon began to disintegrate in May 1968 after several weeks of widespread strikes and rioting by students and workers. Without consulting the leadership of the PCF or

[13]The PCF were opposed to the alliance because they did not want to be sidelined as they had been in the Fourth Republic. Since the Gaullists opposed the alliance and wanted the centrist voters for themselves, they constantly raised the religious issue to drive a wedge between the socialists and the MRP.

the FGDS, Mitterrand announced that he was willing to lead the Left in taking up its responsibilities for transition after the defeat of de Gaulle, which he argued was imminent. This appeared as a coup d'état to both the FGDS and the socialist party, and 'reeked ...of Fourth Republic centrism' to the communists (Jenson 1991).

The alliance between the FGDS and the PCF collapsed, and the FGDS itself fell apart. As a result, each party of the Left put up its own candidate and refused to form second ballot electoral pacts in the 1969 presidential elections. This meant that two right-wing candidates, Poher and de Gaulle, contested the second ballot run-off. The disastrous outcome of these elections for the Left provided further evidence that a change in electoral strategy was needed.

> 'With the Left balkanized as never before during the Fifth Republic, a number of lessons cried out to be learnt from the disasters of 1969. First, [Socialist candidate Gaston] Deferre's exclusively Centre-Left version of Socialism had been routed at the polls, securing indeed the lowest Socialist vote ever. Second, the Communist go-it-alone strategy was shown to be no way for that party to get a candidate through to the second round, despite a remarkably avuncular performance by Jacques Duclos. It had been amply demonstrated how not to play the presidential game, and the most certain long-term beneficiary of the Left's fragmentation of 1969 was Francois Mitterrand, who had shown four years earlier how far a united Left could go' (Bell & Criddle 1984).

Thus, by the end of the 1960s, it had become apparent to the Left that there were no electorally-viable alternatives to a left wing alliance.[14] In 1972 the PCF, the PS and the small left-radical MRG successfully negotiated a 'Common Program' in which they agreed upon a platform for an eventual left government as well as cooperation in future elections (Bell 2000, Frears & Parodi 1979, Johnson 1981). The left as a whole advanced in the 1973 legislative elections, drawing higher than usual vote shares. The PCF was still the leader by a small margin, with 21.3% to the Socialists' 20.4%. The PCF leadership, not yet worried about the increasing strength of the Socialist party, backed the left's most viable presidential candidate (Mitterrand) in the 1974 presidential elections. Mitterrand led the vote in the first round of balloting, before narrowly losing to the mainstream right candidate, Giscard d'Estaing.[15] Shortly thereafter, the Communist-Socialist alliance hit rocky ground because of shifts in the electoral support for the two parties.

Even though opinion polls in 1977 foreshadowed an almost certain victory for a united left in the parliamentary elections of 1978, most analyses agree that the electoral coalition collapsed under the weight of

[14]In fact, the 1969 elections did not see a dramatic fall in the total number of votes cast for the Left as a whole. However, the failure to coordinate meant that the Left lost a huge number of seats. This suggested that if the Left could only reach agreement, they might achieve electoral success.

[15]Mitterrand won 49.2% in the second round, compared to Giscard d'Estaing's 50.8% (Mackie & Rose 1991).

strong distributional conflicts on the Left (Wright 1995). The Communists had agreed to the Common Program at a time when it was the largest party on the left and could expect to dominate a coalition government. However, the Socialist Party had been the chief beneficiary of the Common Program and had displaced the PCF as the dominant party on the left. The 1977 polls indicated that the Socialists could expect to win 35% of the vote compared to 20% for the communists (Wright 1995). From this perspective, Mitterrand's claim in the early 1970s that his 'fundamental objective [was] to rebuild a great socialist party on the ground occupied by the communists in order to demonstrate that out of five million communist voters, three million can vote socialist' turned out to be remarkably prescient (Portelli 1994, Bergounioux & Grunberg 1992). The socialists could now expect to call the shots in any left-wing coalition government. As Wright (1995) states, 'To the Communist leadership, such a prospect must have seemed a worse threat than a continuation of conservative rule.' Once the Communist leadership realized that the newly-unified Socialist Party (PS) was getting nearly as much support as the PCF, they withdrew from the electoral alliance agreements in an attempt to stop the Socialist Party's growing momentum (Melchior 1993, Johnson 1981, Frears & Parodi 1979).

In the next couple of years, it was difficult to reach lasting agreements on electoral alliances and common programs. The PCF has been fighting against Socialist hegemony of the left ever since the late 1970s, and

has refused to form electoral coalitions prior to the first round. For instance, prior to the presidential election of 1981, the candidacy of the Communist Party leader Georges Marchais 'was an act of pure defiance. It was motivated by the desire to build up, as in the elections of 1978 and 1979, a Communist resistance to Socialist advance, and by a particular concern to establish a strong base from which to defend Communist positions in the municipal elections due in March 1983.' (Bell & Criddle 1984).

Unlike the Left, the parties on the right have never formed an electoral coalition in presidential elections. Until the mid-1970s, the dominance of the Gaullist party (RPR) meant that there was never a need to form a coalition.[16] In the early years of the Fifth Republic, de Gaulle had managed to sweep through the floating electorate on the right and in the center that had not been tied down by party allegiances under the Fourth Republic.[17] He picked up 50% of the CNIP vote, 30% of the MRP vote, and 30% of the Radical vote in the 1962 legislative elections, thereby almost wiping out the political center (Charlot 1971). The

[16]The Gaullist Party was originally called the UNR in 1962. It became the UDR in 1968 and the RPR in 1976.

[17]Parties of the Right during the Third and Fourth Republics had always suffered from elite fragmentation and poor organization of their mass electoral following. However, the Gaulist UNR was able to gain control over the local 'notables', and achieve a high degree of parliamentary discipline, centralization, and nationalization (Schain 1991). Naturally, this encouraged the socialists and communists to reform their own party organizations.

dominant role played by the Gaullist party only came to an end in 1974 when the party split following the death of the incumbent Gaullist president, Georges Pompidou. The majority of the party supported Jacques Chaban-Delmas in the 1974 presidential elections, while a minority followed the rising politician Jacques Chirac, who threw his support behind Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and his new party (UDF). This split initiated a power struggle for supremacy on the mainstream right that has continued until this day.

Although Giscard won the 1974 presidential elections, the Gaullists were the largest party in the legislature. As a result, Giscard relied on Gaullist support to implement his policy and was forced to appoint a Gaullist prime minister, Jacques Chirac.[18] Although Chirac was a loyal prime minister at first, he soon began to assert himself as the real leader of the mainstream right and as the only candidate capable of arresting the electoral rise of the left. By 1976, the tension between the two men became so great that Chirac resigned and positioned himself to challenge Giscard in future presidential elections (Portelli 1994). Following an acrimonious presidential campaign in 1981, first-round loser Chirac conspicuously failed to encourage his supporters to vote for Giscard in the second round (Bell 2000, Becker 1994, Ysmal 1989). The leaders

[18]Many elements in the Gaullist party were opposed to supporting a Giscard presidency. However, Chirac threw his support behind the president.

of the two parties were fighting for supremacy of the right more than they were fighting against their left opponents (Bell 2000, Martin 1993). When Chirac was unable to advance to the second round, he may well have calculated that a second presidential mandate for the UDF leader would give them too much of an advantage over his own party. Ultimately, Giscard lost the election, even though the aggregate score for the right had been higher than that of the left in the first round (Du Roy & Schneider 1982, Bréchon 1995).

It is often assumed that the ongoing lack of coordination between the right-wing parties has helped the left (Bréchon 1995, Ysmal 1989, 76-7). It is striking, in this regard, that from mid-1981 to mid-2002, the right was only able to control the government for four years. The most egregious example of conflicts on the Right helping the Left was perhaps the 1981 presidential election in which they lost control of the presidency for the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic. Since then voters have not coordinated on a single preferred mainstream-right party, and the party elites have been largely unwilling to compromise. As a result, the Left have dominated French government for the last two decades. The disagreements between the mainstream right cannot be blamed on ideological differences between the two parties since there were few, if any, policy distinctions (Golder 2000). Instead, this raises the possibility that the coordination problems could have been the result of distributional issues.

Legislative Elections

As Table 4.2 illustrates, electoral coalitions have been much more common in legislative elections. This is true whether one considers left- or right-wing parties. The majority of these coalitions occur in the second round, although there are occasional agreements to coordinate pre-electoral strategies in particular districts in the first round. The 1972 Common Program committed the socialists and communists to a policy of withdrawal in favor of the best-placed candidate on the left after the first round of voting. The RPR and UDF followed suit in June 1977 when they signed a 'Majority Pact' with a similar withdrawal policy (Jaffré 1980, Frears & Parodi 1979). The effect on the number of right-wing candidates competing in the second round was quite dramatic. Table 4.3 illustrates that there were 81 second-round contests involving 3 or more candidates in the 1973 legislative elections. Whereas the successful implementation of the left-wing electoral coalition meant that only one of these contests included more than one left-wing candidate, 78 included at least two right-wing candidates.[19] In 1978, following the signing of the 'Majority Pact', there was only *one* second round contest with more than two candidates. In fact, the UDF and RPR actually ran a single candidate from the first round in 130 of the 474 metropolitan districts in this election.

[19]In four of these contests, a left-wing candidate managed to win the seat even though the right-wing candidates won a majority of the votes.

These withdrawal policies have been implemented with varying degrees of success throughout the 1980s and 1990s (Martin 1993).[20] The mainstream right parties have made an effort to nominate a single candidate for the first round since the 1978 elections. In the 1981 legislative elections, the two parties agreed on 385 unique candidates, mainly incumbents (Bell 2000). Agreeing that sitting deputies should, by and large, be allowed to run unopposed (from fellow moderate-right politicians) seems to have been one way of resolving the distributional problems, at least in those districts where a reasonably popular deputy is seeking reelection. The UDF and RPR have also organized primaries to determine which candidate was to run uncontested from the first round. However, politicians have not always been willing to step down. These are referred to as unapproved primaries (*primaires sauvages*). For example, over 450 single candidates were designated in 1993. Many politicians who were not selected decided to run anyway, many as independents (Backman & Birenbaum 1993). The pre-electoral coalition implemented before the first round of the 2002 legislative elections was much more comprehensive than previous ones had been, and very few mainstream

[20]In the PR elections of 1986, the UDF and RPR ran joint lists in 61 of the 96 electoral districts. They ran separate lists in the remaining 35.

Table 4.3: Electoral Thresholds and Second-Round Candidates

Election Year	Threshold (% of vote)	Average number of Candidates eligible for 2nd Round	Number of 2nd Round Contests with more than 2 Candidates
1958	5	5.02	351
1962	5	4.33	140
1967	10	3.08	74
1968	10	2.76	48
1973	10	3.32	81
1978	12.5	2.93	1
1981	12.5	2.33	1
1988	12.5	2.14	9
1993	12.5	1.96	15
1997	12.5	2.19	79
2002	12.5	2.04	10

Calculated using official election results (Ministry of the Interior).

right politicians dissented.[21] This was the first time that such a comprehensive coalition had been implemented in the first round.[22]

One might argue that the sharp reduction after 1977 in the number of second round contests with more than two candidates was caused by the introduction of a larger electoral threshold (12.5%) in the 1978 elections. It is fairly obvious that rising electoral thresholds have reduced

[21]UDF leader François Bayrou, along with a small band of followers, did not join the new 'Union for a Presidential Majority' electoral coalition. He was worried that the RPR would dominate the new coalition and control the bulk of the campaign funding from the government.

[22]Pompidou was able to implement a similar coalition in the 1968 elections. However, it was not so wide-reaching or cohesive.

the average number of candidates qualifying for the second round.[23] However, Table 4.3 suggests that this does not fully explain the initial drop off in the number of second round contests with more than two candidates after 1977. In 1997, for instance, we see 79 second-round contests with more than two candidates. Of these, all but three were the result of an extreme right (FN) candidate maintaining his or her candidacy (none were elected).[24] Electoral thresholds *and* pre-electoral withdrawal agreements have both clearly helped the reduction in this type of second round contest.

The empirical evidence relating to electoral coalitions in legislative elections raises two questions. First, why do pre-electoral coalitions form more often in these elections than in presidential ones? Second, why do these coalitions form more often in the second round of legislative elections than in the first? I believe that the answer to both of these

[23]The early 5% threshold was based on the actual number of votes cast. When the threshold was raised to 10%, the method of calculating the threshold also changed. Instead of needing 10% of the votes cast, the number of votes a candidate needed to advance to the second round was equal to 10% of the *registered* voters. This method remained in place when the threshold was raised to 12.5%. Given turnout levels, a candidate often needs around 17% of the vote to qualify for the second round.

[24]In the other three cases there was one candidate on the left and two on the moderate right. In one case, the 4th district in the Maine-et-Loire department, the left candidate won with only 36.57% of the vote because the two moderate right candidates split the right-wing vote between them.

questions is related to the distributional issues that need to be overcome when forming an electoral coalition. In presidential elections there is only one position up for grabs. Thus, the benefits of office are not easily divisible. Moreover, the presidency is the most powerful political position in France under normal circumstances. It is because of this that parties on both the right and left have found it difficult to compromise and form electoral coalitions in presidential elections. As the evidence presented above suggests, no party (or party leader) wants to be reduced to a secondary role in these elections. In legislative elections, the benefits of office are much more divisible. After all, ministerial portfolios can be allocated to each of the parties participating in an electoral coalition. This has benefited parties such as the Greens who have little hope of winning executive office on their own. Although distributional issues are more easily overcome in legislative elections, they do still pose problems. This is because pre-electoral agreements often involve some candidates being forced to step down in favor of candidates from other parties. In fact, there are always a few candidates each election who refuse to step down when requested to by the party leaders (Backman & Birenbaum 1993).

The traditional explanation as to why electoral coalitions tend to form only in the second round is that the electoral institutions do not require party elites to act otherwise. It is often argued that the French two-round majority voting system solves any problem of coordination

because parties can compete in the first round and coordinate in the second (Tsebelis 1990, Massart 1999). Duverger even argues that dual-ballot systems produce no incentives to vote strategically in the first round (Cox 1997, 123-4,137). This notion of how the electoral system works fits with the popular refrain that 'in the first round, you choose; in the second round, you eliminate' (Cayrol 1971, Mény 1996).

However, I disagree with this explanation. The electoral institutions create clear incentives to form electoral coalitions in the first round. The fact that the number of parties competing in the first dual-ballot election in 1958 was half that typically found in the proportional representation elections of the Fourth Republic provides tentative evidence to suggest that party elites were already aware of these strategic incentives at this early date (Bourcek 1998, 119). The presence of electoral thresholds also creates obvious incentives for parties to form electoral coalitions. There are benefits to forming electoral coalitions even if a party knows for sure that it is going to make it into the second round. Unlike American elections in which there are often several months between party primaries and legislative elections, in French elections there are only two weeks. As Tsebelis (1990, 191) states, this means that if 'the two partners of a coalition go too far in criticizing each other in the first round, they will not have time to change their strategies in the second round and heal the wounds (even if they wish to).' Parties could avoid these difficulties if they formed an electoral coalition in the first round. Finally, it must

be remembered that the transfer of votes between rounds from one candidate to another is often far from perfect (Cole & Campbell 1989).[25] Thus, waiting until the second round before forming an electoral coalition can be a dangerous strategy.

Thus, it is easy to see why party leaders would want to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies in the first round and have a single candidate representing their camp. It seems odd, then, that analysts of French politics who agree on the need for withdrawals between rounds do not extend this logic the obvious next step. An exception is Hanley (1999), who states,

> 'If proximate parties can agree on a single candidacy on the *first* ballot, their chances are maximized even more. Voters' attention is focused on the sole real choice (assuming that not too many are put off by the withdrawal of their traditional champion), and the possibility of winning more seats at the first round increases. If *désistement* [withdrawal agreement] is one way of restricting competition, then first-ballot agreements are, potentially, an even better one. The main problem is to strike an agreement among the competitors that suits everyone.'

Striking an agreement that suits everyone is the problem. To form a coalition in the first round requires reaching an agreement on which candidates are going to step down in favor of other candidates. To some

[25] Jaffre (1986) notes that right-wing losers in the first round do not necessarily offer their full support to the politician who continues on to the second round, even when this politician is facing a left-wing opponent.

extent, these distributional problems can be overcome in those districts in which one party has a clear competitive advantage over its potential coalition partner. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is precisely what happens in those districts where electoral coalitions are formed in the first round (Hecht & Mandonnet 1987). However, it is not immediately obvious how party leaders can reach agreement in those districts where both candidates are competitive. After all, why would a candidate be willing to step down if he or she has a distinct possibility of progressing to the second round and winning? Second round coalitions allow these decisions to be made by the electorate. All the party elites have to agree to is to abide by the decision made by the voters. Thus, I suspect that electoral coalitions are relatively uncommon in the first round of legislative elections because party leaders prefer to let the electorate solve the difficult distributional conflicts for them.

4.2.2 Ideological Differences

The ideological differences that exist between coalition partners, as well as those between the coalitions themselves, also seem to affect the likelihood of electoral coalition formation in France. A coalition in which one member's ideological platform is too distant from that of the others may be rejected by the voters. In other words, ideological differences may cause a pre-electoral coalition to be subadditive. This means that widely divergent ideologies can place constraints on the effectiveness of

electoral coalitions and render their formation less likely. According to much of the secondary literature on left-wing politics in this period, it was the Communist Party's dogmatic allegiance to Stalinism through the 1960s that contributed to the Socialist Party's unwillingness to enter electoral coalition talks. Large ideological differences between opposing parties (or coalitions) may, in turn, provide increased incentives for the other side to coordinate their electoral strategies. This helps to explain why the mainstream right parties (and voters) were able to coordinate well when the Communist Party dominated the left in the 1960s and why both the moderate right and left will now occasionally agree to co-ordinate their electoral strategies to prevent a National Front victory.[26] This section begins by analyzing the impact of ideological differences within potential coalitions and then between coalitions.

Differences within Electoral Coalitions

The policies supported by the Communist Party in the early years of the Fifth Republic were not popular with much of the electorate, which probably contributed to common perceptions of it an an undesirable coalition partner. During the height of the Cold War, the close ties between the PCF and the Soviet Union were a distinct electoral liability (Hanley 2002). The well-known socialist Guy Mollet famously remarked

[26]Typically, vote transfers on the right were more effective when the left candidate is a Communist than a Socialist (Frears & Parodi 1979, Williams, Goldey & Harrison 1970).

that the French Communist Party was 'not on the left, but in the East' (Du Roy & Schneider 1982). The other parties on the left were too small and fragmented to credibly offer the electorate a more moderate policy if they were to govern with the Communists (Bell & Criddle 1984).

The Communists initially began to seek out some limited withdrawal arrangements for the second round of legislative elections following the disastrous results of 1958. The PCF leaders had little choice but to reach some kind of electoral agreement with the other parties on the Left if they were to avoid being marginalized. Although these withdrawal agreements were far from perfect, they were sufficiently effective to increase the number of seats received by the Communists from 10 in 1958 to 41 in 1962.[27] The non-Communist parties (Socialists and Radicals) also benefitted, increasing their seats from 65 to 106 (Williams, Goldey & Harrison 1970).

The reorganization of the socialist party and the revision of PCF ideology likely made it easier for left-wing parties to reach pre-electoral agreements. Although the PCF abandoned its strategy of militant autonomy in favor of left-wing alliances for the 1962 elections, this did not immediately lead to a major ideological overhaul. Only in the late 1960s

[27]Socialist voters were much less likely to vote for a Communist candidate in the second round than Communist voters were to support a Socialist candidate. The vast majority of centrist voters simply refused to vote for an electoral union of the Left led by the PCF (Hanley 2002, Bell & Criddle 1984, Johnson 1981, Alexandre 1977).

did the PCF carry out a policy of 'destalinization' and democratization. This policy derived from its desire to reenter mainstream politics, to prevent the Socialists from drifting into an alliance with the centrist parties, and to regain some of the popularity it had lost due to its 'betrayal' of the student and worker uprising in Paris in 1968 and its timid reaction to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Besides making a commitment to party pluralism, negotiated programs, and internal democratization, the Central Committee's manifesto of Champigny-sur-Marne in December 1968 acknowledged that while the revolution remained an *end* it was no longer a *means* (Gildea 1997). This revision of PCF ideology showed that the Communists had adopted a more conventional interpretation of electoral democracy and were willing to play by a set of coalitional rules that were more acceptable to its potential left-wing allies (Jenson 1991).

The reorganization of the Socialist Party also made electoral coalition formation on the Left easier. At the 1971 party congress in Épinay, various non-Communist parties on the left merged into the Socialist Party (PS). This was seen as part of a larger plan to eventually contain the PCF within a wider left-wing alliance (Melchior 1993, Bell & Criddle 1984, Johnson 1981, Frears & Parodi 1979). By this stage, the leaders of the moderate left-wing parties had accepted the conclusion

that a broad electoral coalition encompassing the entire left was a necessary prerequisite to winning national elections.[28] To some extent, this reorganization of the Socialist Party created a greater ideological affinity between the PS and the PCF. After all, the new Socialist party united three currents of the non-communist Left that each had some sort of ideological affinity with the 'reformed' Communist party. For example, the PS accepted the dogma of the necessary 'break with capitalism' and the PCF accepted that democracy would *not* be replaced by a dictatorship of the proletariat if the Left won. This made it much easier for the party elites to form a programmatic alliance in 1972.

Despite these ideological changes, it would be wrong to overstate the extent to which the PCF and PS shared similar policy objectives. This was most apparent to moderate voters on the Left who were never entirely willing to vote for the Communists (Frears & Parodi 1979, Williams, Goldey & Harrison 1970). Since Communist voters were typically willing to support Socialist candidates, the shifting electoral fortunes of the two parties is not entirely surprising. By the mid-1970s, the PS attracted more votes than the PCF did. Leaders on the Right

[28]Rivalry among the various leaders of the moderate left was intense; anecdotes of the personal nature of this rivalry are rife in the descriptive literature (Du Roy & Schneider 1982, Alexandre 1977). It is important to note that this did not prevent the merger. As a result, one should be wary of the 'personal animosity' story as an explanation for coordination failure.

still played on the electorate's fear of Communist rule, as this had always proven to be an effective campaign tactic. The rupture of the left-wing coalition prior to the 1978 legislative elections played into their hands nicely (Hanley 2002, Du Roy & Schneider 1982, Fabre 1978). The PCF actually campaigned against the Socialists, and many moderate voters seemed hesitant to support a potentially unstable PS-PCF government (Jaffré 1980). The day after the first round of the legislative elections, the Socialists and Communists reestablished their electoral alliance (Lavau & Mossuz-Lavau 1980). However, by then it was too late. By not agreeing to the electoral coalition publicly, and ahead of time, the transfer of votes was not sufficiently effective to obtain the left-wing victory that had been expected (Bell 2000). Jaffré argues that 'the incessant quarrels between the Communist party and the Socialists ... destroyed the Left's credibility as an alternative governing coalition [in 1978]. An important segment of public opinion felt that Communist participation in a Government would have a negative effect in many areas' (Jaffré 1980). The election results confirmed the Socialist Party's new dominance on the Left.[29] From this point in time on, there was little the PCF could do to prevent increasing levels of support for the Socialists. In the end, being the smaller partner of a victorious Left coalition may have seemed better than continuing with the Right's conservative policies (Johnson 1981). This helps to explain the PCF's willingness

[29]The PS received 24.4% of the vote, compared to 20.5% for the PCF.

to form cohesive second round electoral coalitions with the Socialists through the 1980s and 1990s.

While ideological differences often made electoral coalition formation difficult on the Left, this has never really been the case on the Right. There is strong evidence that the UDF and RPR electorates share similar policy preferences and are willing to support candidates from either party. At least one poll asked RPR and UDF voters in 1986 who they would vote for in the upcoming legislative election according to two different hypotheses: (i) if the UDF and RPR ran separate lists and (ii) if the UDF and RPR ran a single list. Using voter intentions and simulations, pollsters concluded that the unified list would receive 15 more seats than the two parties could expect to receive running separately. Given that the Right only had a majority of 2 seats in the 1986 elections, an extra 15 seats would have been a significant gain (Bourlanges 1986).[30] Other survey data has consistently shown that most voters on the mainstream right were in favor of a union of the two parties (Jaffré 1986, Charlot 1993, Wilson 1998, Duhamel 2000).[31]

[30]It is important to remember that the 1986 election was held under a proportional representation system. It is worth stating, though, that there is some doubt as to how many of the French voters actually realized this prior to the election. The simulation would certainly be more useful had the poll been taken during an election held under the usual two-round system.

[31]See also *Le Figaro Magazine*, 19 June 1999 and *The Economist*, 25 October 1997.

This survey data were echoed by a growing number of French political scientists and commentators[32]

The 1995 presidential election provided further evidence that the mainstream right cannot be separated into two parties with substantive policy differences. The UDF failed to present its own candidate and simply divided its support between two RPR candidates, Jacques Chirac and Edouard Balladur. Although the UDF split its support between these two candidates, there were no real policy differences between them.[33] The weight of the evidence suggests that there was little division between the 'Orleanist' UDF and the 'Bonapartist' RPR in these elections.[34] Instead, it seemed that the divisions in the UDF were related to what they expected each RPR candidate to offer them if they won. If ideological divisions among potential coalition partners were the only determinant of how easy it is to reach pre-electoral agreements, then the Right should have found it easier to form electoral coalitions than the Left.

[32]See Duhamel (1995, 319-20), Donegani & Sadoun (1992), Duverger (1996, 473), Jaffré (1986, 66), Wilson (1998, 40), and Cole & Campbell (1990, 133).

[33]See Mazey (1996, 13), Fysh (1996, 74), Goldey (1997, 56), Gaffney (1997, 78).

[34]Analysts of French politics often refer to the parties on the right using a typology developed by René Rémond, according to which the right wing has been divided since Napoleon into an Orleanist, Bonapartist, and Monarchist wing (Rémond 1982). In recent years, references to this typology have diminished. For a further discussion, see Golder (2000).

Differences between Electoral Coalitions

It seems that electoral coalitions have always been easier to form in France when parties have faced a more extreme opposition party (or coalition). For example, the Gaullists certainly benefited from the extreme ideological position taken by the Communists in the early years of the Fifth Republic. To some extent, the electoral collapse of the centrist parties (CNIP, MRP and Radicals) in 1962 can be explained in terms of the threat posed by the Communists. The PCF was the largest party on the left and moderate voters were unwilling to support center parties if this risked increasing the likelihood of a Communist government.

It is interesting to note that the non-Gaullist parties on the mainstream Right only formed their own united party (UDF) in 1978 after it had become obvious that the Socialists were now the dominant party on the Left. In other words, one could argue that it was the rise of a moderate left-wing party that enabled divisions on the Right to become more pronounced. To a large extent, these divisions have remained unresolved to this day. The moderate nature of Socialist policies in the 1980s and 1990s has not created overwhelming incentives for the Right to overcome their internal distributional conflicts. Mitterrand's experiment with nationalization, state subsidies, and minimum wage increases between 1981 and 1983 was relatively short-lived. Since then the Socialists have consistently implemented moderate neoliberal economic and

social policies (Schmidt 1996). Right-wing parties no longer have to worry about a Communist-led opposition coming to power if they fail to sufficiently coordinate their electoral strategies. There is now very little distinguishing the moderate left and the moderate right.

To some extent, the fact that the mainstream parties on the left and right are now so similar has increased the importance of distributional conflicts. Individual party leaders seem to be less willing to make compromises under these circumstances. In the recent 2002 presidential elections, there were nine candidates representing the Left.[35] These parties no longer felt obliged to support a single left-wing candidate. In fact, many of the extremist parties on the Left justified presenting their own candidates by saying that this was the only way to give the electorate a meaningful choice. Traditionally, parties on the extreme left have been inconsequential. However, they gathered so much support in the 2002 presidential elections that the Left lost its realistic chance to regain control of the presidency.[36]

The rise of the National Front (FN) has also altered the incentives French politicians have for forming electoral coalitions. Parties on the

[35] There were seven candidates representing the Right. See http://www.election-politique.com for a complete listing of candidates and results.

[36] Prior to the election, it was not clear whether the Left or Right would win the presidency. As a result, it is all the more devastating a blow to the Left that their candidate was unable to advance to the second round because so many left voters turned to parties on the extreme Left (Trotskyist and otherwise).

extreme right have typically failed to enjoy electoral success or political longevity.[37] Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front represents an exception. Since its breakthrough in the early 1980s, it has managed to consistently win over 10% of the vote in legislative elections. The overwhelming source of the National Front's electorate is the mainstream right.[38] This has put pressure on the UDF and RPR since they have been losing voters to the moderate Left and the extreme Right. The RPR and UDF have also been deeply aware that the electorate is unlikely to judge them favorably if their ongoing electoral divisions allow the National Front to win seats in the National Assembly.[39] This explains why the leaders of the moderate right have consistently made public statements denouncing local alliances with the extreme right.

These developments have increasingly forced the leaders of the mainstream right to overcome their remaining coordination problems. As I mentioned in the previous section, the two mainstream right party leaderships have attempted to coordinate on a single candidate in the first round of legislative elections since the late 1980s. In reaction to Le Pen's

[37]The Poujadists did manage to win 11.7% of the vote in 1956, but by 1958 their support had diminished to 1.2% (Mackie & Rose 1991). They did not compete in any other elections.

[38]The FN's electorate does come from both the traditional Left and Right. However, the majority of FN voters place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum.

[39]So far, the National Front has not managed to win seats in the legislature, with the exception of the 1986 proportional representation elections.

strong showing in the recent presidential elections, the Right formed the most comprehensive and cohesive pre-electoral coalition to have emerged during the Fifth Republic. Partly as a result, the FN were unable to win any seats in the 2002 legislative elections despite its strong showing in the presidential elections a few weeks earlier. The rise of the extreme right has even led to pre-electoral agreements between the Left and the Right. If the National Front appears to have a realistic chance of winning a seat, then the Left and Right occasionally form a 'Republican Front' in which the best-placed candidate from either party is given a free-run to compete against the FN candidate in the second round.[40] There clearly seems to be evidence that the ideological position of opposition parties influences the ease with which electoral coalitions form.

4.2.3 Conclusion

The French case is replete with instances where pre-electoral strategies on the Left and Right have had a significant impact on who becomes the President, which party wins a legislative majority and who gets to implement policy. It is impossible to deny that electoral coalitions matter in important substantive ways to French voters. Although electoral coalition failure is often blamed on the personal animosities or plain 'stupidity' of party leaders (Bell 2000, Goldey 1999, Knapp 1999, Nay 1994),

[40]As one might expect, these electoral agreements are often a source of conflict between the party elites and the local candidates.

the evidence presented here suggests that there are some underlying systematic factors that influence the ease with which electoral coalitions form.

Although the electoral systems in France create incentives for party leaders to coordinate pre-electoral strategies, I argue that distributional conflict has meant that electoral coalitions are much rarer in presidential elections than legislative ones. The electoral viability of particular pre-electoral coalitions is also important to party leaders. To a large extent, Deferre's attempt to create a coalition between the Left and the Center in the early 1960s failed because it did not attract sufficiently large numbers of voters. It is not always the case that forming a coalition will bring electoral success. The early reluctance on the part of the Socialists to join forces with the Communists illustrates this point since they recognized that the coalition might end up losing votes, with disgruntled voters moving towards the center and moderate right.

The French case also indicates that the timing of electoral coalition formation matters. After all, the failure of the Socialists and Communists to form a pre-electoral coalition until late in the game in 1978 clearly benefitted the Right. In contrast, the Right's early and very public announcement that they would form a coalition in the legislative elections of 2002 bore fruit with a large legislative majority. Finally, the ideological differences within coalitions and between them also seems to influence the ease with which coalitions form. While the history on the

Left suggests that the growing ideological affinity between the Socialists and Communists in the 1970s helped them agree on a Common Program, the history on the Right clearly shows that ideological affinity is not sufficient to guarantee that an electorally beneficial coalition forms. Electoral coalitions, though, do seem to form more often if opposition parties are ideologically extreme.

Having examined the French case in some detail, I now turn to examine the history of electoral coalitions in South Korea.

4.3 South Korea (6th Republic)

Although Korea is a relatively new democracy, I believe that it offers important insights into the electoral coalition formation process. In particular, it illustrates the overwhelming importance of distributional issues to party elites bargaining over possible pre-electoral coalitions. In a short span of time, the Korean case offers examples of (i) elections in which ideologically-similar pro-democracy presidential candidates preferred to compete against each rather than form a winning electoral coalition against the official candidate of the former military dictatorship and (ii) elections in which striking personal animosities did not prevent the formation of pre-electoral coalitions and mergers between feuding party leaders. In addition, this case serves as a reminder that although the bulk of the countries examined in this project are well-established

democracies located in western Europe, the general argument is applicable to any democracy.[41]

4.3.1 Coalition Failure in the Transitional Elections

South Korea has not been a democracy in much of the postwar period. It was arguably under authoritarian rule even in the 'democratic' period of Syngman Rhee between 1948-1960 (Henderson 1988). After a brief flirtation with democracy following Rhee's downfall, military rule was imposed. It was not until 16 years later in 1987 that the first direct presidential elections were held in South Korea. As one might expect, the only important cleavage in this election was between the supporters of the authoritarian regime and those of the democratic opposition. The election was to be held under simple plurality rule and it was clear that a majority of the electorate preferred the democratic opposition to General Roh Tae Woo, the official candidate of the military regime.[42]

Despite the obvious significance of this election, the pro-democracy camp was unable to put forward a unique candidate. Instead, they split their support between two leaders of the democracy movement, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung. Opinion polls prior to the election clearly indicated that if both candidates remained in the presidential

[41]The choice of West European countries as a starting point was based on my existing knowledge of these countries and issues of data collection rather than on any particular factors inherent to western Europe.

[42]General Roh was the hand-picked successor of the military dictator, President Chun Doo Hwan.

race, then the pro-democracy forces would lose (Kihl 1988*b*). However, both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung considered themselves the legitimate leader of a democratic South Korea. Both candidates were also confident of at least receiving the votes from their own native region[43] In spite of the tremendous pressure for the two candidates to form an electoral alliance, neither would yield (Nam 1989, 314). In the end, General Roh Tae Woo won the 1987 elections with 36.6% of the vote. Kim Young Sam came second with 28.0%, while Kim Dae Jung came third with 27.0%.[44] It is typically assumed that had the pro-democracy forces united behind a single candidate, they would have won these transitional elections.[45]

These elections were characterized by a wide gap between the pro-democracy policies that both opposition candidates wanted to implement and the policies that the military incumbent preferred. Thus, the incentive to form an electoral coalition was extremely high if one simply considers the policy implications of not doing so. Part of the failure of Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam to coordinate their pre-electoral strategies may be attributed to the uncertainty about the possible election outcome. After all, electoral uncertainty tends to be higher in new

[43]See Im (2000), Nam (1989, 196), Dong (1988, 181-2).

[44]Kim Jong Pil, a leader in the 1961 military coup and former prime minister during the military dictatorship, came last with 8.1% of the vote.

[45]See Oh (1999, 109-10), Han (1997, 52-5), Nam (1989, 317), Dong (1988, 170,185-6), Kihl (1988, 15).

democracies where polls are often unreliable and voters, as well as candidates, do not have previous election results on which to base their expectations. One interpretation of the 1987 pre-election coordination failure is that Kim Dae Jung thought his prospects were so 'favorable' in a four-party race that he was willing to split from Kim Young Sam and form his own opposition party (Kim 2000*b*).

However, part of the explanation for this coordination failure may also be attributed to the fact that the costs of reaching an electoral coalition agreement were too high for either candidate to pay given the realistic expectation that this coalition would have significant implications for their role in future elections. Stepping aside in this foundational election ran the risk of relinquishing all political power in the future. An electoral loss from running a separate campaign would not necessarily be considered terrible, especially if it one could increase one's bargaining power in future elections by polling a significant percentage of the vote. In many respects, this situation mirrors the competition between Jacques Chirac and Giscard d'Estaing for supremacy over the moderate right in France. In both situations, party leaders were willing to suffer the loss associated with having the opposition implement policy in order to guarantee their survival as influential political actors.

4.3.2 Office and Personal Rivalry

The Korean political scene has witnessed a whirlwind of mergers and splits since the transitional elections in 1987. To some extent, this has been aided by the fact that there is an unusual absence of policy differentiation among the various parties (Kim 2000*b*, Jaung 2000, Oh 1999, Park 1990). The issue of democracy has been absent from electoral politics since the 1987 elections and no other divisive subject other than geographical affiliation has really emerged to take its place. One might expect that political competition is characterized by personal animosity and long-standing political enmity. After all, all three of General Roh Tae Woo's competitors in the 1987 presidential elections had been arrested in 1980 by Roh's mentor and predecessor, General Chun. Kim Dae Jung had been under house arrest, in exile, in prison, or otherwise under serious official restriction for nearly 14 years. In 1971, he had barely escaped being executed by the military regime. Kim Young Sam had also been imprisoned, placed under house arrest, and expelled from the National Assembly (Oberdorfer 2001). However, these personal animosities have regularly been put to one side in the pursuit of votes and office. In 1990, Kim Young Sam, a leader of the pro-democracy forces in 1987, decided to merge his party with those of two former members of the military regime, President Roh Tae Woo and Kim Jong Pil. Kim Jong Pil became the party leader, while Kim Young Sam was rewarded

by becoming the party's next presidential candidate. As what follows will clearly demonstrate, this represents just one example among many in which personal enemies put their differences aside to form electoral coalitions. The history of these coalitions in Korea represents as compelling a case as can be made against those who would explain pre-electoral coordination failures purely in terms of the personal animosities between party leaders.

The inability of the president to run for re-election and the fact that he relies on a sympathetic majority in the legislature to implement his policy has facilitated the formation of electoral coalitions in South Korea.[46] Although the president is by far the most important position in Korea (Morriss 1996), the legislature does have the ability to hold up legislation if it is controlled by the opposition.[47] It was because he did not enjoy a majority following the 1988 legislative elections that President Roh eventually suggested merging his party with those of Kim Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil. The resulting new party that emerged in 1990 controlled a majority of the seats in the National Assembly. Both Kim

[46]According to the constitution, the president is only permitted to serve a single five-year term (Kihl 1988*a*).

[47]Although the Korean system is treated as presidential (Przeworski et al. 2000), a few additional words should be given to clarify the system since it does have a prime minister and cabinet. The president is directly elected and gets to appoint the prime minister subject to the approval of parliament. The president is not responsible to parliament and does not have the ability to dissolve it. The government of the prime minister can be brought down, though, by a vote of no confidence in the parliament.

Young Sam and Kim Jong Pil knew that Roh Tae Woo could not run again for office and would retire from politics at the end of his term. It is precisely because a president can only stay in office for a single term that the promise of stepping down in favor of one's coalition partner becomes somewhat credible. In this case, President Roh had promised to step down and support Kim Young Sam as the new party's official presidential candidate in the 1992 elections. It seems fairly clear that Kim Young Sam would have been less willing to merge his party with that of President Roh without the institutional feature of term limits.

Although the existence of term limits and the requirement of a sympathetic legislative majority make electoral coalition proposals more credible, they do not make them sacrosanct. For example, Kim Young Sam offered the role of prime minister and future presidential candidate to Kim Jong Pil in exchange for his support (and that of his electorate) in the 1992 elections. Following his successful election with 42% of the vote, President Kim changed his mind about his successor.[48] He announced in the middle of his term that he now supported a general policy of 'generational change'. This enabled him to fill most of the leadership posts with his own supporters and consolidate his grip on his party and government (Kim 2000*b*).

[48]Kim Young Sam's long-term rival, Kim Dae Jung, came second with 33.8% of the vote, while Chung Ju Yung came third with 16.3%.

In response, Kim Jong Pil left to form his own party. He was generally able to command only about 10% of the vote. Although this was certainly not enough to win an election on his own, it was sufficiently large to be useful in an electoral coalition. Kim Jong Pil eventually formed an electoral alliance with another former enemy, Kim Dae Jung, for the 1996 legislative elections. Kim Dae Jung had finished second to Kim Young Sam in 1992. His problem was that although he typically won almost all of the votes in his native Cholla region, he was unsuccessful elsewhere.[49] As a result, Kim Dae Jung was unlikely to ever win a national election on his own. The pre-electoral coalition bargain reached between these two men involved Kim Dae Jung becoming the presidential candidate for the 1997 elections and Kim Jong Pil becoming the prime minister. Given his previous experience, Kim Jong Pil was somewhat wary of his would-be coalition partner's promises. It was only after 'two years of an intense courtship' that Kim Dae Jung was able to get Kim Jong Pil to agree to his 'power sharing' plan. In exchange for

[49]Prejudice against Cholla natives is quite strong in the rest of the country. Regional antagonisms had been encouraged during Park Chung Hee's reign (Nam 1989, 279,316-7). Morriss (1996) argues that regional voting did not develop before the 1970s but has grown rapidly since then. He emphasizes that this pattern is a political construct since there are no intrinsic regional differences, and that in 'the absence of other socio-economic cleavages, regional attachments provide a way for leaders to differentiate themselves, and a basis on which to appeal to their supporters (Morriss 1996).'

withdrawing from the competition (which he was unlikely to win anyway) and supporting Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jong Pil would become prime minister and get to pick his own cabinet. Kim Dae Jung also promised to change the institutional setup and create more of a parliamentary regime in which the president would have no more than a ceremonial role (Diamond & Shin 2000, Kim 2000*b*).[50]

President Kim Young Sam was unable to run for reelection in 1997 and his party was unable to field a unique candidate against the Kim Dae Jung-Kim Jong Pil electoral alliance. Instead, two candidates, Lee Hoi Chang and Rhee In-je, competed for the votes of the president's party. Lee Hoi Chang was able to co-opt a fifth candidate, Cho Soon, into an electoral alliance. Cho agreed to merge their two parties and withdraw his candidacy in exchange for becoming leader of the new party, a position that was 'guaranteed' for two years (Kim 2000*a*). The results of the 1997 presidential election were close: Kim Dae Jung received 39.7% of the votes, Lee Hoi Chang 38.2%, and Rhee In-je 18.9% (Kim 2000*b*, 61). Kim Dae Jung clearly benefitted from the alliance with Kim Jong Pil. His support from Kim Jong Pil's Ch'ungch'ong region was 20% higher than in any previous election. Given the slim margin of victory, it seems

[50]Naturally it would be difficult to get such a measure passed in a parliament controlled by Kim Young Sam's party. As a result, this second promise was never entirely credible.

likely that the support from Kim Jong Pil's region was instrumental in finally getting Kim Dae Jung elected (Kim 2000*b*).

Pre-electoral coalitions have played a significant role in determining the outcome of the 1992 and 1997 presidential elections. Perhaps the most obvious feature of these coalitions is the willingness of party leaders to put their strong personal differences to one side in order to win office. The fact that a coalition partner could be promised a prime ministerial position and support as the official presidential candidate in future elections with some degree of credibility facilitated the formation of these electoral coalitions.[51] To some extent, one can make the case that party leaders were able to use the institutional features of the Korean political system to overcome the distributional issues that arise when forming electoral coalitions by making the presidential office 'divisible' across time.

[51]Recently two presidential candidates used opinion polls to decide which of them should withdraw from the race to avoid defeat by a third candidate in the December 2002 election. Poll results indicated that opposition leader Lee Hoi Chang would win in a three-way race but that either Roh Moo Hyun or Chung Mong Joon might beat Lee in a two-way race. The second- and third-place candidates agreed to form an electoral coalition. The question of who would withdraw from the race was decided by polling a sample of the electorate; after a televised debate between Roh and Chung, a private poll was commissioned. Roh won and Chung promptly withdrew. Chung began acting as Roh's campaign manager, and it is widely assumed that Roh had promised him significant spoils if they won the election. Shortly before the election, however, Chung abruptly ended his alliance with Roh. Roh still won the election.

4.3.3 Electoral Coalitions and Legislative Elections

Unlike in presidential elections, electoral coalitions rarely form in legislative ones. In the elections for the National Assembly, strong local networks dominate the elections at the district level, and each party typically does well in its regional stronghold and poorly elsewhere. Since the prime minister and the cabinet require parliamentary support, the identity of the parliamentary majority has a significant effect on the president's power to implement policy. After the 1997 presidential elections, for instance, the opposition-controlled parliament did not want to accept Kim Jong Pil as prime minister, and there was no chance at all that the president's proposed institutional reforms would be passed. Presidential pre-electoral coalitions seem to be used as a way to create parliamentary majorities; since the first legislative election in 1988, the president's party has never won a majority on its own (Koh 1996).

In South Korea, parties are distinguished mainly according to their regional base of support and whether they are part of the government or the opposition (Lee & Glasure 1995). Voters are loyal to the leaders from their region, and tend to support any coalition or party in which their leader takes part. Pre-electoral coalition bargains among party leaders seem driven totally by the numbers of supporters attributed to each candidate; policy and personal animosity play little, if any, discernable role. Distributional conflicts obviously matter, as was the case

in 1987 when the pro-democratic opposition split their electorate's vote and in 1997 when the vote for the incumbent party was split between two candidates. With only one main office to fight over, politicians cannot easily be bought off with important cabinet portfolios or legislative positions. Without such posts (and with no regional political positions of any importance), presidential hopefuls have no way of making themselves known to a larger public so that they can gain enough supporters to be brought into a bargain over an electoral coalition. Thus politicians have an incentive to run for the presidency even if it means splitting their party's vote. They lose very little, in fact, because there are no significant policy differences among the candidates or parties (all are conservative) so policy is not a concern.[52] As for splitting the vote and losing the election, it doesn't matter if the candidate in question didn't expect to win anyway.

4.3.4 Conclusion

The South Korean case shows the importance of office-seeking in the formation of electoral coalitions. Other than the foundational election of 1987, none of the elections have had a significant policy element to them. Thus, policy did not hinder coalitions from forming. Nor did

[52] I am not considering policies with regional distributive implications here. Implementing such policies would presumably help an incumbent maintain electoral support.

extreme ideological positions on the part of one party encourage opposing coalitions to form, as occurred in the French case. Distributional conflict was the only significant issue in the coalition formation process. Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung both preferred to fight each other instead of guaranteeing a victory for the pro-democracy forces against the incumbent military dictator. Quite possibly, this was because neither wanted to jeopardize their future role in a democratic South Korea. One factor that has facilitated electoral coalition formation is the use of presidential term limits that, in practice, enable the presidential office to be divided across time.

4.4 Conclusion

The cases presented in this chapter illustrate the most important variables influencing pre-electoral coalition formation. Politicians care about both policy and office, and it is these two goals that affect electoral coalition formation. If two party leaders are considering forming a coalition, they must have an expectation that it would make both of them better off than they would have been on their own. Expectations of the vote share the coalition would receive are crucial; the party leaders' respective electorates would have to be willing to vote for the coalition. If the policy divergence between the coalition partners is such that some of the voters will be unwilling to support the coalition, it may not be worthwhile to

form it in the first place. Parties must be sufficiently ideologically compatible that they do not drive away significant numbers of voters. For instance, the Socialists and the Communists in France were able to form electoral coalitions only after their ideological positions drew sufficiently close to each other.

Intra-coalitional policy compatibility is only part of the equation, however. Parties without significant policy differences (such as the moderate right parties in France or all of the parties in South Korea) may still have problems forming electoral coalitions in spite of expected electoral advantages that would be generated from a pre-electoral coalition. Coalition formation can be facilitated if the policy proposed by the likely opposition is far enough from that of the potential coalition members. The right-wing parties and voters in France were able to coordinate more effectively when the Communist Party was considered to be extremist and was the dominant party on the left. Likewise, all of the moderate parties, on both the left and the right, will often coordinate if a candidate from the extreme right might otherwise win an election.

In addition to policy incentives and electoral advantages, the divisibility of the office benefits matters. It is easier to agree to form an electoral coalition if the benefits of office to be divided can be shared in a manner that makes both parties better off and that reflects their relative strengths. In France, legislative elections are easier to bargain over than presidential ones. There are more than 500 offices in the legislative

elections, including government portfolios, but in presidential elections there is only one office that cannot be divided. In South Korea, electoral coalitions for presidential elections are more easily formed because each coalition partner can only occupy the office for a single term. Bargains can thus be made such that one partner gets to hold the office first. In turn, he will support the second partner's candidacy. Interestingly, the personal interactions and problems between particular candidates, which receive so much emphasis in the descriptions of campaigns and politics in particular countries, seem to play no systematic role in pre-electoral coalition formation. Indeed, the old adage that 'politics makes strange bedfellows' is perhaps the more appropriate observation.

The bargains that are reached do seem to reflect the relative electoral strength of candidates or parties.[53] When French party leaders choose unique candidates prior to the first round of national elections, the number of districts given to candidates from each party in the coalition seems largely based on the overall support estimated for each party. Thus, when the small Left Radical Party formed first-round coalitions with the larger Socialist Party, the Socialists would put candidates up in the lion's share of the districts.[54] The mainstream right parties, RPR

[53]This phenomenon is also found in government coalitions, in which the distribution of portfolios mimics the proportion of votes won by the coalition partners.

[54]Similarly, in the 1997 first-round coalition between the Socialists and the Greens, the smaller Green Party put up candidates in only 30 districts (Boy & Villalba 1999).

and UDF, were similar in size, however. When they bargain over nomination agreements each tries to get the upper hand. In some districts, neither wants to concede; instead they treat the first round as a primary and they only have to agree that the candidate with less support after the first round will withdraw from the race. Of course, parties would derive a larger electoral bonus from forming pre-electoral coalition before the first round rather than waiting for the voters to decide for them. Still, the withdrawal agreements are preferable to no coalition at all. The two rounds in the French system give party leaders a mechanism for coordinating on a single candidate because it takes the actual choice out of their hands and transfers it to the voters. There is an inherent normative appeal to this method as well, since politicians in democracies presumably, at a minimum, pay lip service to the representative nature of their role. Even without normative implications, though, routinely thwarting one's voters would likely have an adverse effect in the long run on their continued support for the parties involved.

Now that I have presented a detailed account of electoral coalition formation on both the Left and the Right in France, as well as in South Korea, I will turn to a different type of empirical analysis. In the following chapter, I compare pre-electoral coalition formation in 21 countries. Specifically, I test the theory of coalition formation presented in Chapter 3.

Chapter 5

Empirical Implications

5.1 Introduction

As I mentioned in the introduction, in most parliamentary democracies single parties are unable to command a majority of support in the legislature. Thus political parties who wish to exercise executive power typically enter some form of coalition, either an electoral coalition prior to election or a government coalition afterwards. The results from Chapter 2 showed that the incentives to form electoral coalitions are shaped by electoral rules, conditional on the effective number of parties competing in an election. As long as there is a sufficient number of parties in a country, then disproportional electoral rules might create a situation in which party leaders could increase the legislative seats they win if they coordinate their electoral strategies with those of another party or

parties. The analysis in Chapter 2 did not go much farther than the incentives created by electoral rules; the actual choice faced by party leaders, and the factors that affect that choice, were left for later chapters.

As with government coalition formation, the emergence of pre-electoral coalitions is the result of a bargaining process among party leaders. For this reason, I used a bargaining model in Chapter 3 to analyze the formation of electoral coalitions and specify the factors that enter into the decision of the potential pre-electoral coalition members. Before moving on to discuss the hypotheses generated by the model, I will briefly review the basic structure of the bargaining game and its implications.

Consider the bargaining process that occurs between two potential electoral coalition partners prior to a legislative election in a parliamentary democracy.[1] Who will get which portfolio? In particular, who gets to be prime minister? One might think that the willingness of party leaders to compromise on these distributional issues is likely to be influenced by their own ideological positions and those taken by opposition parties. For example, party leaders are likely to find it easier to reach agreement if they share similar ideological positions. In contrast, they are less likely to feel the need to compromise on distributional issues if the opposition

[1]I tell the story here in terms of parliamentary legislative elections because the data I use to test the model are from parliamentary democracies. However, the model in Chapter 3 applies to any kind of election.

parties that are likely to benefit from their failure to reach agreement are relatively close to them ideologically. Of course, these distributional and ideological issues are likely to be moot if the pre-electoral coalition is expected to be disadvantageous from an electoral standpoint. Given that party leaders care about office and policy, what are the conditions under which they will form a pre-electoral coalition?

As the reader may recall, the bargaining game involved two players and a complete-information environment. There are two possible coalition partners (Party Leader A, Party Leader B), as well as an opposition party that is not a strategic actor in this game. The two party leaders must decide whether to run separately or form an electoral coalition. To form an electoral coalition they must reach agreement on a coalition policy and a post-election distribution of offices. The two party leaders will only decide to form a pre-electoral coalition if the expected utility from this agreement is greater than the expected utility from running separately (the reservation price).

There are two periods, $t = \{1, 2\}$. In period 1, Party A makes an offer or does nothing. If an offer is made, Party B accepts or rejects it. If Party B accepts it, the bargaining ends and a pre-electoral coalition forms (PEC). If Party B rejects it, the game enters a second period in which Party B can make a counter-offer. If no counter-offer is made, the game ends without the formation of a pre-electoral coalition (No PEC).

If a counter-offer is made, Party A must decide whether to accept or reject it and the game ends with PEC or No PEC.

If no offer was made in period 1, Party B decides whether to make an offer in the second period. If no offer is made, the game ends with No PEC. If an offer is made, Party A accepts or rejects it and the game ends with PEC or No PEC. Each time a player has the opportunity to make an offer he picks from a continuum of choices that corresponds to the potential electoral coalition agreements that each player can propose. The continuum arises since each electoral coalition offer is a particular division of an overall 'pie'. The sequence of play in the game is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

The comparative statics generated by the model are quite intuitive and are listed in Table 5.1. (A more complete list of the comparative static results can be found in Table 3.2 in Chapter 3.)

It is clear that the probability of electoral coalition formation increases when:

1. the ideological distance between the potential coalition partners (λ_{AB}) decreases.

2. the probability that the coalition wins (P_u^1, P_u^2) increases.

3. the probability that the party wins after running alone (P_{i_d}) decreases.

Figure 5.1: Timeline for Bargaining Game



4. the ideological distance between the party's policy and that of the opposition (λ_{i_opp}) increases as long as the coalition is electorally beneficial ($P_u^t > P_{i_d}$).

5. the electoral bonus a party receives from joining an electoral coalition increases (that is, as P_u increases compared to P_{i_d}), a party is more likely to join an electoral coalition.

6. the party's share of office benefits (s_i) from running alone decreases.

Table 5.1: Comparative Statics

Increase in Variable	Probability of Coalition
Probability first period PEC wins (P_u^1)	Increasing*
Probability second period PEC wins (P_u^2)	Increasing
Probability i enters government given no PEC (P_{i_d})	Decreasing
Distance between i and PEC position (λ_{i_pec})	Decreasing
Distance between i and opposition (λ_{i_opp})	Increasing if $P_u^t > P_{i_d}$ Decreasing if $P_u^t < P_{i_d}$
A's share of office benefits given no PEC (s_i)	Decreasing

* 'Increasing' here means non-decreasing.

5.2 Hypotheses

The model provides clear, testable implications. The problem is that some of the variables in the model are difficult to accurately measure with real world data. For example, how would one measure P_u^t when no coalition actually forms, or P_{i_d} when one does? While it is theoretically possible to calculate these probabilities through the use of survey data asking individuals how they would vote faced with a variety of different coalition environments, this data does not exist for the elections in my dataset.[2] Because of these difficulties, it is necessary to reformulate the

[2]Kaminski (2001) has utilized a similar survey approach to the one suggested here to analyze coalition stability in Poland.

model's implications into hypotheses that can actually be tested with real world data.

The model's first implication is straightforward and can be tested directly. As is the case with government coalitions, pre-electoral coalitions should form more easily between parties with similar ideological positions (Budge & Laver 1992). This is because the utility loss associated with having policy set at the coalition's ideal point rather than one's own ideal point is minimized to the extent that the coalition members are ideologically similar. Moreover, a party's electorate, along with its rank-and-file members, should be more willing to support the pre-electoral coalition if there is no need to make significant policy concessions. Thus, the first hypothesis is:

> Hypothesis 1: Pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form as the ideological distance between potential coalition members increases.

The second implication from the model is that electoral coalitions are more likely the greater the probability that the electoral coalition is going to win. The probability that the coalition is going to be successful is clearly a function of the seat share that the coalition members eventually obtain: the larger the coalition, the greater its chance of electoral success. However, it is important to note that the coalition members may believe that they have a realistic chance of winning by running

separately if the coalition becomes sufficiently large. According to the model's third implication, parties will be less likely to form a coalition if this occurs. This means that when both parties are small, an increase in the potential electoral coalition size should make coalition formation more likely. However, at some point, further increases in potential coalition size will make coalition formation less likely since at least one of the parties will be large enough to prefer running separately. Thus, it is possible to combine the model's second and third implications in the following hypothesis:

> Hypothesis 2: The probability that an electoral coalition forms is a quadratic function of the size of the potential pre-electoral coalition. It should be increasing in the first term (size) and decreasing in the second term ($size^2$).

It is also possible to test the model's third implication separately. Hypothesis 2 suggests that electoral coalitions will be less likely to form if the coalition becomes too large because at some point at least one of the coalition parties will start to believe that it can enter government by running independently. It naturally follows from this that the point at which the electoral coalition becomes 'too large' will depend on the relative size of the coalition parties. For example, imagine two potential two-party coalitions that each expect to win 40% of the seats. In the first coalition each party expects to win the same percentage of seats

(20%). In the second coalition, one party expects to win 30% of the seats while the other expects to win only 10%. It seems obvious that the larger party in this second coalition is more likely to want to compete independently than are either of the *smaller* parties in the first potential coalition. This is the case even though the expected size of the two coalitions is the same. In other words, potential coalitions between parties that are asymmetric in size should be less likely to form when the overall coalition size becomes sufficiently large. Thus, the third hypothesis is:

> Hypothesis 3: If the expected coalition size is sufficiently large, then pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form if there is an asymmetric distribution of electoral strength among the potential coalition parties.

The fourth implication of the model suggests that when parties are faced with an opposition party that is ideologically-extreme relative to their own ideal point, they will be more likely to form an electoral coalition so long as the probability of winning is larger as a coalition than running separately. This is because not entering government and being in the opposition means receiving no utility from office benefits and suffering a utility loss from having policy implemented by the government. This loss in utility might be quite significant if the government is ideologically extreme relative to one's own ideal point. Parties will presumably want to do all that they can to keep such an 'extreme' government from coming

to power. Parties will be likely to form a pre-electoral coalition in these circumstances if the probability of entering government is larger as a coalition than from running independently. In other words, parties will be more likely to form a pre-electoral coalition if this is the best way of keeping an 'extreme' government from coming to power.

There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that disproportional electoral institutions provide an electoral bonus to large parties or coalitions through their mechanical effect on the translation of votes into seats (Golder & Clark 2003*b*). Thus the probability of entering government as an electoral coalition compared to running independently should be larger the more disproportional the electoral system. While it is not possible to know the precise identity of the potential government prior to the election, parties should expect to suffer a greater utility loss from government policy when the party system is ideologically polarized. It is possible to reformulate the model's second implication with the following two related hypotheses:

> Hypothesis 4: Party system polarization increases the likelihood of pre-electoral coalitions when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional.

> Hypothesis 5: An increase in the disproportionality of the electoral system will increase the probability of forming a

pre-electoral coalition. This positive effect should be stronger when the party system is polarized.

The model's last implication is perhaps the most obvious of all of them: the more office benefits you expect to receive running alone, the less likely you are to form a pre-electoral coalition. However, it is also the most difficult implication to actually test. This is because the counterfactual is too difficult to capture empirically. For example, one never observes the share of office benefits that a party would have obtained from running separately in those situations where it was actually a member of a coalition. Nor do we observe the share of office benefits that a party would have received if it entered government after running separately in situations where it did not actually enter the government coalition. Testing this implication would require a model that combined elite bargaining and voter behavior, as well as an instrument for estimating vote shares in the counterfactual situations. This is beyond the scope of this chapter, though the interested reader should consult Glasgow & Alvarez (2003) and Quinn & Martin (2002) for recent work along these lines.

The reader should note that although coalition analysts have suggested for years that coalitions are more likely to form between parties with similar policy preferences, three of the four hypotheses presented here have not appeared in the government coalition literature. To some

extent, this should not come as a surprise. After all, the disproportionality of the electoral rules should not affect the government coalition formation process. However, one would think that party leaders who are deciding whether to form a coalition and contemplating possibly being in opposition should take account of the ideological position of other potential governments, irrespective of whether this coalition bargaining process is occurring prior to the election or afterwards. Nevertheless, it is rare for the government coalition literature to address the ideological positions of other potential governments.

5.3 Empirics

In this section, I first describe the data and the methods employed to test the hypotheses outlined above. I then present and discuss the results.

5.3.1 Data and Methods

The dataset used in the following analysis is new and addresses electoral coalitions in 292 legislative elections in 20 advanced industrialized parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998.[3] The data are organized in dyadic format to reflect the fact that the majority of pre-electoral

[3]The countries included are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. I do not include Israel or Greece because data were not available for all of the relevant variables.

coalitions in my sample (74%) are between two parties.[4] This means that each observation is a potential two-party coalition. Using a dyadic format yields 4,445 potential two-party electoral coalitions. An example might help illustrate the data structure. In the 1983 Australian election there are three parties, and thus three dyads: Labor Party-National Party, National Party-Liberal Party, and Liberal Party-Labor party. If the two parties in a dyad formed a pre-electoral coalition (PEC), the dependent variable is coded as one; zero otherwise. If a coalition forms among more than two parties, each of the relevant dyads can be coded as part of the coalition accordingly. For instance, if a pre-electoral coalition forms among three parties on the French left, then the dyads Communist-Socialist, Communist-Greens, and Socialist-Greens would each be coded as one.

I include 'all the significant parties which are represented in the national assembly' in the dataset, where the significance of a party is defined in terms of government coalition or blackmail potential (Budge et al. 2001). In effect, no parties with less than 0.01% of the vote are included. Of the 4,445 potential two-party electoral coalitions in the dataset that could have formed, only 234 actually formed; this is roughly 5%. As is often the case with dyadic data, the phenomenon of interest occurs only rarely (King & Zeng 2001). As I noted earlier, though, the

[4]Dyadic data is also the format of choice in the international relations literature addressing coalition or alliance behavior.

more substantively interesting figure to remember is that pre-electoral coalitions competed in 44% of all elections in the dataset.

Given the dichotomous nature of my dependent variable, I use a probit model to test my hypotheses. In this model, the latent variable PEC^* measures the underlying propensity of party leaders in a dyad to form a pre-electoral coalition. The propensity to form a pre-electoral coalition PEC^* is modeled as a linear function of several independent variables:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{PEC^*} = \beta_0 & + \beta_1\mathbf{IdeologicalIncompatibility} \\
& + \beta_2\mathbf{Polarization} + \beta_3\mathbf{ElectoralThreshold} \\
& + \beta_4\mathbf{Polarization * ElectoralThreshold} \\
& + \beta_5\mathbf{CoalitionSeatLag} + \beta_6\mathbf{CoalitionSeatLag^2} \\
& + \beta_7\mathbf{Asymmetry} \\
& + \beta_8\mathbf{Asymmetry * CoalitionSeatLag} + \epsilon_i \quad (5.1)
\end{aligned}
$$

where PEC^* is a latent variable that is assumed to be less than zero when we do not observe a pre-electoral coalition and greater than zero when we do.

IdeologicalIncompatibility measures the absolute ideological distance between the parties in the dyad and is a proxy for the lack of ideological compatibility in the coalition. Data on the ideological position of each party are taken from the Manifesto Research Group, which evaluates

each party on a one-dimensional scale that ranges from -100 (extreme left) to +100 (extreme right) (Budge et al. 2001).[5]

Polarization is a measure of the ideological dispersion in the party system and is calculated as the absolute ideological distance between the largest left and right wing party in the party system.[6] The data are again taken from the Manifesto Research Group. This particular measure of party system polarization is most appropriate because of the fact that government coalitions are almost always going to contain either the main party on the left or the main party on the right. Thus, parties worried about an 'extreme' government (relative to their own ideological positions) coming to power will be concerned primarily with the ideological positions taken by these parties.

ElectoralThreshold measures the effective electoral threshold (Lijphart 1994).[7] This variable acts as a proxy for the disproportionality of the

[5]The most ideologically incompatible electoral coalition to form occurred in the Australian elections of 1954 between the Liberal Party and the National Party. Out of a possible 200-unit difference, they were 99.1 units apart.

[6]The most polarized party system in which a pre-electoral coalition formed was Sweden in 1985 (80.9 units) and the least polarized party system was Belgium in 1978 (0.79 units). An alternative measure of polarization might be the sum of the absolute ideological distances from each party in the dyad to the primary party located on the opposite side of the ideological spectrum. However, using this measure does not substantially change any of the results discussed below.

[7]The effective threshold is the mean of the threshold of representation and exclusion. It is calculated as $\frac{50\%}{M+1} + \frac{50\%}{2M}$, where M is the district magnitude. If there are legal thresholds and/or upper tier seats, the

electoral system: the higher the effective threshold, the larger the disproportionality.[8] As was the case with the analyses in Chapter 2,it turns out that qualitatively similar results to those presented here are found if the log of average district magnitude is used instead of effective thresholds. The interaction term *Polarization*ElectoralThreshold* is included to test the conditional nature of Hypotheses 4 and 5.

CoalitionSeatLag measures the percentage of the total seats won by the two parties in the dyad in the previous election. This variable is a proxy for the expected success of the potential coalition in the current

---

calculation is slightly more complicated (Taagepera 1998*a*, Taagepera 1998*b*). The effective electoral threshold ranges from a low of 0.7 in the Netherlands since 1956 to a high of 35 in countries with single-member districts such as Canada and the United Kingdom.

[8]In the preliminary empirical analyses in Chapter 2, the effective number of electoral parties was an important factor. Here, I present a more sophisticated account of pre-electoral coalition formation that incorporates the size of the potential electoral coalition (in terms of expected seats in the legislature). This measure is related to the effective number of parties, however. When the effective number of parties is small, we would expect that the size of the potential coalitions would be large. Obviously a polity with a large effective number of parties would generate many potential coalitions that are all fairly small in size. Looking at potential coalition size for each dyad of parties is a richer measure than the effective number of parties because it allows us to distinguish between different possible coalitions prior to any election, rather than having a single measure characterizing the party system.

election.[9] In order to test the quadratic nature of Hypothesis 2 it is necessary to also include $CoalitionSeatLag^2$.

Asymmetry measures the asymmetric strength of the two parties in the potential coalition dyad and ranges from 0 to 1, with larger numbers indicating a higher level of asymmetry. The interaction term *Asymmetry*CoalitionSeatLag* is included to test the conditional nature of Hypothesis 3.

The predictions from the hypotheses are shown in Table 5.2. The coefficient on *IdeologicalIncompatibility* (β_1) should be negative since the likelihood of electoral coalition formation is expected to decline as the potential coalition partners become more ideologically incompatible. The marginal effect of party system polarization is $\frac{\partial PEC^*}{\partial Polarization} = \beta_2 + \beta_4 ElectoralThreshold$. This is expected to be positive when the electoral system is sufficiently disproportional (*ElectoralThreshold* is high). This requires that β_4 be positive. The marginal effect of electoral system disproportionality is $\frac{\partial PEC^*}{\partial ElectoralThreshold} = \beta_3 + \beta_4 Polarization$. This should be positive irrespective of the level of *ElectoralThreshold*. It

[9]The largest pre-electoral coalition to form occurred in the Austrian elections of 1959 between the People's Party and the Socialist Party. Between them, the coalition members controlled 95% of the legislative seats.

follows then that β_3 should be positive. The coefficient on *Coalition-SeatLag* (β_5) is expected to be positive, while the coeficient *Coalition-SeatLag*^{2} (β_6) is expected to be negative. This is because the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation should initially increase with coalition size, and then decrease. This should be the case irrespective of the level of Asymmetry. The marginal effect of *Asymmetry* is $\frac{\partial PEC^*}{\partial Asymmetry} = \beta_7 + \beta_8 CoalitionSeatLag$. This should be negative since *Asymmetry* is expected to reduce the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation when the potential coalition size is sufficiently large (*CoalitionSeatLag* is high). This requires that β_8 be negative.

Table 5.2: Predicted Effect of Row Variables on PEC Formation

	Prediction
IdeologicalIncompatibility (β_1)	negative
ElectoralThreshold (β_3)	positive
Polarization*ElectoralThreshold (β_4)	positive
CoalitionSeatLag (β_5)	positive
CoalitionSeatLag^2 (β_6)	negative
Asymmetry*CoalitionSeatLag (β_8)	negative
$\beta_3 + \beta_4$Polarization	positive
$\beta_2 + \beta_4$ElectoralThreshold	positive when ElectoralThreshold high
$\beta_7 + \beta_8$CoalitionSeatLag	negative when CoalitionSeatLag high

5.3.2 Results and Interpretation

The results from two models are provided in Table 5.3. The first column presents results from a random effects probit model where observations are clustered by election. The second column reports results from a probit model with robust standard errors. The random effects in PROBIT1 are used to determine whether any unobserved factors specific to each election influence pre-electoral coalition formation. Random effects are similar to fixed effects in that they are both used to model unobserved heterogeneity. However, they measure unobserved heterogeneity in different ways. The fixed effects model introduces dummy variables, essentially modelling unobserved heterogeneity as an intercept shift. In contrast, a random effects estimation models unobserved heterogeneity with an additional disturbance term that is drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0. There are at least two reasons why random effects are preferable here. Theoretically, a random-effects specification is more appropriate when inferences are being made about a population on the basis of a sample as is the case here (Greene 2003, Hsiao 2003). More practically, running a fixed-effects model by election would mean that all elections in which no pre-electoral coalition formed would be dropped. This would leave me with only 35% of the observations and potentially introduces selection bias.

Table 5.3: Determinants of the Propensity to Form Pre-Electoral Coalitions (PEC^*)

Dependent Variable: Did a pre-electoral coalition form? 1 Yes, 0 No

Regressor	PROBIT1 (random effects)	PROBIT2
IdeologicalIncompatibility	-0.01**	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Polarization	0.001	-0.0004
	(0.005)	(0.002)
ElectoralThreshold	0.02	0.02***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Polarization*ElectoralThreshold	0.001**	0.0003***
	(0.0003)	(0.0001)
CoalitionSeatLag	0.03**	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)
CoalitionSeatLag^2	-0.0003***	-0.0003***
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Asymmetry	0.13	0.22
	(0.29)	(0.24)
Asymmetry*CoalitionSeatLag	-0.02*	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-2.46***	-2.23***
	(0.32)	(0.19)
N	3451	3451
Log likelihood	-594.92	-635.34

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).
Standard errors are given in parentheses (robust for PROBIT2).
Random effects clustered on each election.
Data: 4711 dyads, 20 advanced industrialized countries, 1946-1998.

The results across the two models are very similar. However, a likelihood ratio test indicates that the random-effects probit model is superior.[10] As a result, my inferences are based on this model. Note, however, that the standard probit model (with robust standard errors) shows qualitatively similar results.

The results presented in Table 5.3 indicate that all of the coefficients have the predicted signs and are statistically significant where expected. However, these results are difficult to interpret directly because of the use of multiple interaction terms and the fact that the coefficients relate to the latent propensity to form pre-electoral coalitions rather than the actual quantity of interest - the probability of forming a pre-electoral coalition (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2004, King, Tomz & Wittenberg 2000). All we can infer is that (i) electoral coalitions are less likely to form the more ideologically incompatible the potential coalition members, (ii) the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation is a quadratic function of the size of the potential coalition when *Asymmetry* is zero, (iii) higher electoral thresholds have no effect on the probability that an electoral coalition forms when party system polarization is zero (something that is

[10]The log-likelihood from the model with random effects is -594.92, while the log-likelihood from the model without random effects is -635.34. This gives a χ^2 statistic of 80.83 i.e. 2(-594.92+635.34)=80.83. The p-value of obtaining a χ^2 statistic of this magnitude or larger if the random effects are not required is less than 0.0001 with one degree of freedom. This strongly suggests that random effects should be retained.

never observed), (iv) party system polarization has no effect on the likelihood that an electoral coalition forms when the electoral threshold is zero (something that is never observed), and (v) potential coalitions that are more asymmetric have no effect on the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation when the potential coalition expects to win no seats. Much more revealing and substantively meaningful information can be obtained if we explicitly examine the marginal effect of each variable on the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation.

A good way to examine the marginal effects of variables in interaction models is graphically (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2004). Hypothesis 5 states that an increase in the disproportionality of the electoral system will increase the probability of pre-electoral coalition formation and that this positive effect should be stronger when the party system is more polarized. In Figure 5.2, I plot the marginal effect of a one unit increase in the electoral threshold on the probability that an electoral coalition forms across the observed range of party system polarization when all other variables are held at their means. The solid black line indicates how this marginal effect changes with party system polarization.

Figure 5.2: Marginal Effect of a One Unit Increase in Electoral Thresholds



The 95% confidence intervals around this line allow us to determine the conditions under which electoral thresholds have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation.[11] The marginal effect is statistically significant whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence interval are both above (or below) the zero line. Figure 5.2 clearly indicates that more disproportional electoral systems

[11]Confidence intervals are based on simulations using 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficient vector and variance-covariance matrix.

Figure 5.3: Marginal Effect of a One Unit Increase in Party System Polarization



coalition formation in a substantively meaningful portion of observed cases. In sum, Figure 5.3 provides strong support for Hypothesis 4.

Hypothesis 3 states that an increase in the asymmetric distribution of electoral strength among coalition partners should reduce the likelihood of electoral coalition formation when the potential coalition size is sufficiently large. I plot the marginal effect of a 0.01 unit increase in electoral coalition asymmetry across the possible range of coalition size in Figure 5.4. Again, all other variables are held at their means. It is

easy to see that *Asymmetry* only makes electoral coalition formation less likely when the potential coalition size is greater than 26. This is exactly as predicted and is substantively significant since potential coalition size is greater than 26 in 61% of the sample observations. Thus, Figure 5.4 provides strong support for Hypothesis 3.

Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of a 0.01 Unit Increase in Asymmetry



Hypothesis 2 states that pre-electoral coalition formation should be a quadratic function of expected coalition size the likelihood that a pre-electoral coalition forms should initially rise with expected coalition size and then fall.

Figure 5.5: Marginal Effect of a one Unit Increase in Expected Coalition Seatshare



In Figure 5.5, I plot the marginal effect of a one unit increase in expected coalition size at all possible values of coalition size, at varying levels of Asymmetry: when *Asymmetry* is one standard deviation below its mean (Figure 5.5a), when *Asymmetry* is at its mean (Figure 5.5b), and when *Asymmetry* is one standard deviation above its mean (Figure 5.5c). Consider Figure 5.5a first. If the expected size of the coalition is less than 23%, then an increase in coalition size is expected to make pre-electoral coalition formation more likely. Again, to provide some substantive meaning to this result it should be noted that one third of the observations in the sample have a potential coalition size smaller than this. In contrast, if the potential coalition is expected to win more than 51% of the seats, then increasing the coalition size any more is expected to make electoral coalitions less likely. Roughly one third of the potential coalition dyads expect to win more seats than this. Thus, Figure 5.5a provides strong evidence that an increase in coalition size will make electoral coalitions more likely when the expected size of the coalition is small but not when when it is large. While Figures 5.5b and 5.5c provide corroborating evidence for this, they also allow the reader to see how increasing the asymmetry between coalition parties conditions the effect of an increase in coalition size. The point to note is that as we increase *Asymmetry* (move from 5.5a to 5.5b to 5.5c), the coalition size at which making the coalition any larger would reduce the probability of electoral coalition formation falls. For example, increasing coalition size

makes pre-electoral coalitions less likely when the coalition is expected to win more than 51% of the seats if *Asymmetry* is one standard deviation below its mean. However, an increase in coalition size is expected to make electoral coalitions less likely when the coalition is expected to win just 37% of the seats if *Asymmetry* is one standard deviation above its mean. Overall, the evidence presented in Figure 5.5 provides strong support for both Hypothesis 2 and 3.

Thus far, I have shown that the explanatory variables affect the probability of electoral coalition formation in the predicted manner. However, it is natural to ask whether these effects are substantively significant. How much more likely is a pre-electoral coalition to form if I increase one of the variables by a standard deviation? How many more (or fewer) pre-electoral coalitions would be observed in a sample of this size if I increased one of the variables by a standard deviation? This information is presented in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 caption: The first and second columns present the predicted probability of a pre-electoral coalition forming when the row variable is either at its mean or one standard deviation higher, with all other variables held at their means (unless otherwise specified). The third and fourth columns present the difference and percentage change in the two predicted probabilities respectively. Given a sample size of 4,445, the final column indicates how many more (or fewer) electoral coalitions are expected to form if the row variable was one standard deviation above its mean. 95% confidence intervals (calculated via simulation) in parentheses.

Table 5.4: Substantive Effect of Explanatory Variables on Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation

Variable	Predicted Probability		Difference in	Percent Change	Numerical
	Mean	Plus 1 Std. Dev.	Probability	in Probability	Significance
Ideological Incompatibility	.028	.021	-.007	-25.1	-30.7
	[.017, .042]	[.011, .034]	[-.013, -.002]	[-42.2, -5.5]	[-56.6, -6.8]
Polarization	.016	.017	.001	110.4	+6.4
(Electoral Threshold at min)	[.008, .027]	[.008, .032]	[-.006, .01]	[67.9, 169.9]	[-25.2, 45.9]
Polarization	.932	.993	.061	107.7	+272.2
(Electoral Threshold at max)	[.682, .999]	[.940, 1.0]	[.0004, .291]	[100, 142.5]	[1.8, 1293.4]
Electoral Threshold	.020	.028	.008	147.3	+37.8
(Polarization at min)	[.008, .038]	[.012, .054]	[-.002, .023]	[89.6, 227.9]	-9.9, 104.4]
Electoral Threshold	.069	.192	.123	311.0	+547.8
(Polarization at max)	[.021, .152]	[.082, .343]	[.047, .228]	[164.2, 563.8]	[208.1, 1014.2]
Asymmetry	.014	.015	.001	113.8	+6.1
(Coalition Seat Lag at min)	[.005, .028]	[.006, .031]	[-.005, .009]	[70.7, 172.6]	[-24.1, 38.2]
Asymmetry	.394	.251	-.143	-38.9	-637.4
(Coalition Seat Lag at max)	[.046, .849]	[.023, .656]	[-.300, -.011]	[-65.9, -10.7]	[-1333, -48.7]

The first column in Table 5.4 indicates the predicted probability that a pre-electoral coalition forms when the row variable is at its mean and all of the variables are held at their means. Thus, the predicted probability that a coalition forms when all the variables are at their means is 0.028 with a 95% confidence interval [0.017, 0.042]. Similarly, the predicted probability when *ElectoralThreshold* is at its minimum observed value and all other variables are at their means is 0.016 [0.008, 0.027]. The second column indicates the predicted probability of pre-electoral coalition formation when the row variable increases by one standard deviation above its mean, while all other variables are held at their means. For instance, the predicted probability of electoral coalition formation is 0.021 [0.011, 0.034] when *IdeologicalIncompatibility* is one standard deviation above its mean and all other variables are at their means. The third column indicates the change in predicted probability between the first and second column. In other words, the third column captures the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the named variable on the predicted probability of electoral coalition formation. Thus, an increase of one standard deviation in the electoral threshold above its mean increases the probability that an electoral coalition forms by 0.123 [0.047, 0.228] when *Polarization* is at its maximum observed value and the other variables are at their means.

The fourth and fifth columns provide the most substantively interesting information. The fourth column indicates the percentage change

in predicted probability that arises from a one standard deviation increase in the named variable. This is often referred to as the 'relative risk'. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in *IdeologicalIncompatibility* above its mean *reduces* the probability that a pre-electoral coalition will form by 25.1% [5.5, 42.2] when all the other variables are set at their means. It should be noted that although the predicted probabilities associated with the different scenarios presented in Table 5.4 appear quite small, it is clearly the case that changes in each explanatory variable can be of significant substantive importance. As King and Zeng (2001, 711) note, 'relative risks are typically considered important in rare event studies if they are at least 10-20%' when we increase an explanatory variable from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above its mean. Note that here I am only increasing each variable by one standard deviation above its mean and yet the best estimate as to the relative risks are all higher than 20%.

Finally, the fifth column indicates how many more (or fewer) electoral coalitions there would be in a sample of this size (4,445) if the named variable increased by one standard deviation above its mean. This is calculated as the difference in predicted probability multiplied by the sample size. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in *IdeologicalIncompatibility* above its mean would lead to 30.7 [6.8, 56.6] fewer electoral coalitions when all other variables are held at their means. If the electoral threshold was increased by a standard deviation when party system

polarization is at it maximum observed value, then we would expect to see an extra 547.8 [208.1, 1014.2] electoral coalitions. Given that there were only 234 pre-electoral coalitions in the dataset, the numbers in this column represent substantial changes.

Taken together the results presented in Table 5.4 indicate that the explanatory variables not only have a statistically significant effect on pre-electoral coalition formation but that they have a substantively meaningful effect as well.

5.4 Conclusion

Given that it is often infeasible for a single party to govern alone in parliamentary democracies, party leaders are faced with a strategic choice. They can either form an electoral coalition prior to the election or participate in government coalition bargaining afterwards. Despite the fact that electoral coalitions are common in many countries, that they often affect electoral and policy outcomes, and that they influence the ability of voters to pick governments of their own choosing, the vast majority of the coalition literature has largely ignored them. The fact that one regularly observes electoral coalitions across a broad range of countries suggests that they must offer some form of political advantage - at least some of the time. Since electoral coalitions do not always emerge, it must equally be true that there are costs associated with party leaders coordinating their pre-electoral strategies.

As a result, I proposed a simple bargaining model in which the decision of party leaders to form a pre-electoral coalition depended on the associated costs and benefits. These costs and benefits were modeled in terms of preferences over policy and the division of office benefits. The hypotheses generated by this model were subjected to several tests using a new dataset I constructed containing information on potential coalition dyads in 20 industrialized parliamentary democracies from 1946 to 1998. The results indicate that ideological compatibility increases the likelihood of forming an electoral coalition, as do disproportional electoral institutions. Parties are more likely to form an electoral coalition if the potential coalition size is be large (but not too large) and if the coalition members are of similar electoral size. Finally, electoral coalitions are more likely if the party system is polarized and the electoral institutions are disproportional.

Chapter 2 opened with an empirical question: Why did pre-electoral coalitions form in the 2002 French legislative elections but not in the 2002 Dutch elections? The results from the statistical model clearly throw light on this question. While France typically had the highest predicted probabilities of coalition formation in the sample, the Netherlands consistently had the lowest. The specific coalitions that formed in each country have been influenced both by the ideological compatibility of the coalition partners and their expected seat shares. For example, the French Socialist Party only really overcame its reluctance to form

electoral alliances with the Communist Party (PCF) once the Communist Party's dogmatic allegiance to Stalinism had begun to wane in the 1970s. Prior to this, electoral coalitions between these parties had been uncommon due to the traditional and deep-seated hostility on the non-Communist left towards the PCF (Jackson 1990, Judt 1986).

The results from the statistical analysis also indicate that the proportionality of the electoral system plays a major role in the likelihood of electoral coalition formation. While the average district magnitude in France is one, the average district magnitude in the Netherlands is the largest in the sample (150). This suggests that it should not be surprising to see that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely to form in France compared to the Netherlands. The fact that party system polarization is relatively low in the Netherlands compared to France provides a further explanation for the observed variation in coalition formation in these countries. There is reason to believe that party system polarization explains the temporal variation in electoral coalition formation within countries such as France as well. For example, the French mainstream right parties were much more willing to form electoral coalitions in the 1950s and 1960s when the dominant party on the left was the Communist Party compared to later decades when the Socialist party became the main opposition party.

The theory of pre-electoral coalition formation based on the bargaining model in Chapter 3 is much richer than the implicit claims made

in the government coalition literature that served as a launching point in Chapter 2. An advantage of this richness is that it helps make sense of the temporal variation in electoral coalition formation that occurs in some countries.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

Coalitions are a fundamental part of democratic politics because democracies generally rely on legislative majorities to determine policy. In most countries, single parties do not form such a majority. Those parties who wish to exercise executive power are typically forced to form coalitions. In practice, political parties can form coalitions prior to elections or they can compete independently and try to form a government coalition afterwards. Most scholars tend to employ a simple dichotomy between single-party government (as in the ideal 'Westminster', or 'majoritarian' system) and coalition government (as in the ideal proportional system) (Lijphart 1999). The unstated assumption often made in the literature is that coordination among political actors occurs prior to elections and within parties in Westminster systems, but after elections and between parties in proportional representation systems (Bawn &

Rosenbluth 2003). This simple dichotomy is limited in its usefulness because it overlooks the fact that political parties can, and often do, form multi-party coalitions prior to elections.[1] For example, multi-party electoral coalitions are commonplace in countries such as France, Germany and Australia. In fact, electoral coalitions formed prior to 44% of the elections in the 25 countries studied here.

Despite their number, very little has been written on pre-electoral coalitions compared to government coalitions. Although scholars with particular knowledge of cases such as Germany or Ireland often mention pre-electoral agreements when explaining why certain government coalitions form, there are no systematic cross-national studies of pre-electoral coalitions. Nor are there any specific theoretical models of electoral coalition formation. Although there is some speculation in the government coalition literature as to when parties will be more likely to form electoral coalitions, these speculative hypotheses have not been subjected

[1]There are exceptions, of course. Powell (2000) makes a point of considering both single parties and pre-electoral coalitions in 'majoritarian' systems. He does so because he is interested in the identifiability of government alternatives. However, a more typical example is Laver and Schofield (1998). Although they include a nice discussion of pre-electoral coalitions in their book on multiparty government, they frame their discussion of coalition politics in the following manner: "The special forms of bargaining and negotiation that characterize the politics of coalition can be found *after* nearly every election that does not produce an unassailable 'winner' in the shape of a single party that controls a majority of the seats in the legislature" (Laver & Schofield 1998, 1). Emphasis mine.

to systematic analysis. The dearth of studies on pre-electoral coalitions is quite unusual given the fact that electoral coalitions frequently have a significant impact on the types of government that form; around a quarter of coalition governments in the parliamentary governments studied here were based on pre-electoral agreements. It is also surprising because electoral coalitions have the attractive quality of providing a strong link between the electorate and the government (Powell 2000). By providing such a link, electoral coalitions undermine the criticism of proportional representation systems that governments lack a convincing mandate from the voters and that the quality of representative democracy is diminished (Pinto-Duschinsky 1999).

This dissertation represents the first attempt to provide a theoretical model and cross-national empirical analysis of electoral coalition formation. Arguably, scholars of coalition politics would like an integrated model of coalition formation that incorporates both pre-electoral coalitions and government coalitions within a unified framework. Almost by necessity, such a model would also have to take account of the number of parties by addressing party mergers and splits. Given the state of the coalition literature and the fact that we do not even have a very satisfying model of government coalition formation, a fully integrated model is some way off in the future. In this dissertation, I undertake a narrower project analyzing the determinants of pre-electoral coalition formation. Such a partial equilibrium approach not only offers the possibility of

important insights into this stage of the coalition formation process, but also holds out the possibility that it could be combined with models of government formation at a later date. The approach taken in this dissertation explicitly recognizes that the accumulation of knowledge typically occurs in small steps (Kuhn 1962).

The analyses presented in this dissertation are based on a new dataset that I have collected comprising information on all instances of public electoral coalitions in 25 industrialized democracies. This sample includes all of the west European democracies in addition to some other established democracies commonly included in studies of advanced industrialized democracies. I find that there have been at least 232 electoral coalitions at the national level in this sample. The dataset used in this dissertation is much more comprehensive than anything that exists in the literature. More detailed information about the specific pre-electoral coalitions that have formed is available in the appendix.

Before presenting my theoretical model of pre-electoral coalition formation, I tested two speculative hypotheses from the government coalition literature in chapter 2. The first hypothesis was that electoral coalitions are more likely to form in disproportional electoral systems (Shepsle & Bonchek 1997, Strom, Budge & Laver 1994). This is because larger parties typically benefit from disproportional systems (Golder & Clark 2003*b*). In other words, electoral coalitions are beneficial because they reallocate "votes to produce a more efficient translation of votes

into seats" (Cox 1997, 67). With the exception of Duverger (1959), scholars have ignored the fact that the incentives to form electoral coalitions in disproportional systems only exist in multi-party contexts; one would not expect pre-electoral agreements if there were only two parties. Thus, I tested the hypothesis that electoral coalitions are more likely to form and be successful in disproportional systems when there are many parties (Disproportionality Hypothesis).

The government coalition literature also speculates that electoral coalitions form because party leaders wish to signal the identity of future governments to the electorate. There are several reasons why party elites might want to do this. First, they might want to signal that member parties can form an effective government coalition and thereby convince voters that they would not be wasting their votes by supporting the coalition parties. Second, they might want to signal the identity of a potential future government as clearly as possible, perhaps out of a desire to give voters a more direct role in choosing government coalitions. Third, they might simply want to signal the identity clearly because they think that there would be increased efficiency in the government coalition bargaining following the election. The second hypothesis (Signalling Hypothesis) that I tested was that pre-electoral coalitions are more likely when government identifiability is low (or the number of effective parties is high).

The results from several time-series cross-sectional analyses provide strong support for the disproportionality hypothesis. Electoral coalitions do seem to form more often and be successful in multiparty systems with disproportional electoral rules. There was no support for the hypothesis that pre-electoral coalitions form because they signal the identifiability of government alternatives. Simply increasing the number of parties in the system does not lead to an increase in electoral coalitions. As I noted when discussing the results in Chapter 2, the effective number of parties is not a particularly good proxy for the identifiability of government alternatives. As a result, it is perhaps too early to reject the hypothesis that electoral coalitions sometimes form as signalling devices.

The hypotheses implicit in the government coalition literature and examined in chapter 2 focus primarily on the incentives to form pre-electoral coalitions. They ignore the fact that electoral agreements can involve significant distributional and ideological costs. Before party leaders can benefit from any increased probability of winning office that might result from forming a coalition, they have to reach an agreement on a coalition policy and a distribution of office benefits. Party leaders may well fail to reach an agreement on these divisive issues. In chapter 3, I present a formal model where party leaders weigh up both the costs and benefits of forming a pre-electoral coalition. I using a two-round complete information bargaining game in which party leaders care about office and policy. Each leader must decide whether to form an electoral

coalition or not. Clearly, the electoral incentives outlined in chapter 2 play a significant role in this model since party leaders must take account of the probability associated with winning office from running separately and the probability from running as a coalition. Ultimately, party leaders will only agree to form a coalition if the expected utility from doing so is greater than the expected utility from running alone.

The implications of the model are quite straightforward. Increasing the expected office benefits from running as a coalition makes it more likely that the party leaders will reach a pre-electoral agreement. If the likely opposition party is ideologically extreme, then the two party leaders in the model will be more likely to form a pre-electoral coalition *so long as* the coalition is electorally beneficial. In other words, the party leaders wish to keep the opposition from coming to power. If this is best achieved by forming a coalition, this is what they do. If not, they prefer to run separately.[2] Parties that are ideologically close are more likely to form an electoral coalition than parties with incompatible policy platforms. Finally, party leaders are less likely to form a coalition as the probability of winning office running separately increases.

[2]The conditional nature of this hypothesis may well have been overlooked in a less formal approach to modelling electoral coalition formation. Additionally, the idea that parties might take the ideological positions of other potential governments into account when bargaining over government coalition formation is not one that appears in the literature on government coalitions.

I explore the plausibility of the model's assumptions and implications in chapter 4 using case studies of electoral coalitions in Fifth Republic France and South Korea. These cases are particularly interesting because they highlight that the underlying logic of pre-electoral coalition formation is quite general and not country-specific. Despite significant differences in terms of geography, culture, democratic history, and ideological divisions, the history of electoral coalitions in both countries provides significant support for my model. In two very different settings, we see that having a disproportional electoral system in which forming an electoral coalition could reasonably be expected to provide electoral advantages is not sufficient for pre-electoral agreements to be reached.[3] This is perhaps most clearly seen in the first presidential elections after the transition to democracy in South Korea. Both leaders of the democratic opposition preferred to compete separately (and lose) even though opinion polls convincingly indicated that a single democratic candidate would defeat the military incumbent.

The history of pre-electoral coalitions in France indicated that potential coalition partners must be sufficiently ideologically-compatible for a coalition to form. For example, the Socialists and Communists

[3]This implies that a cooperative game-theoretic approach where coalitions automatically form whenever they are expected to be superadditive in seats (Kaminski 2001) is less appropriate for modelling electoral coalition formation than the non-cooperative approach that I employ in this dissertation.

were willing to consider electoral coalitions only after their ideological positions drew sufficiently close to each other in the 1970s. There is also compelling evidence from the French case that coalition formation is facilitated if the policies proposed by the likely opposition are extreme. For instance, right-wing parties and voters were able to coordinate much more effectively when the Communist Party was considered the dominant party on the left. In addition to policy and electoral incentives, both cases also indicate that the divisibility of office benefits matters for the likelihood of pre-electoral coalition formation. The bargaining model suggests that it is easier to form electoral coalitions when the benefits of office can be divided in a manner that makes both parties better off. Evidence in support for this comes from the fact that electoral agreements have been much more common in legislative elections in France than in presidential ones. While the Korean case illustrates that presidential electoral coalitions can form in certain circumstances, I argue that they are made possible by the use of term limits in South Korea. Term limits are important because they provide for the temporal divisibility of the presidential office. Finally, the evidence from both case studies suggest that personal animosity and myopia on the part of party leaders, which receive so much emphasis in the description of campaigns and politics in particular countries, play no systematic role in pre-electoral coalition formation. This is particularly striking in the South Korean case.

While the case studies provide an evaluation of the model's assumptions and implications, it is hard to argue that they represent any kind of a meaningful test of these implications. As a result, I subjected the model's hypotheses to a series of statistical tests in chapter 5. The dataset that I used in chapter 2 was reconfigured into dyadic format so as to resemble the theoretical model as closely as possible. The hypotheses were tested on 4,445 potential coalition dyads from 292 elections in 20 parliamentary democracies between 1946 and 1998. The results support all of the model's predictions. Two parties are more likely to form an electoral coalition when they share similar ideological preferences. They are also more likely to form a coalition if the party system is ideologically polarized and the coalition offers an electoral bonus. Coalitions are also more likely to form when the potential coalition size is large, but not too large. In other words, party leaders prefer to join a coalition if it increases their chances of winning office. However, if the coalition becomes too large, then at least one of the parties starts to think that it can win office on its own, thereby reducing the likelihood of coalition formation. The more asymmetric the strength of the two parties, the more quickly this cut-point will be reached. The cross-national statistical analysis conducted in chapter 5 clearly supports the model of pre-electoral coalition formation that is the centerpiece of this dissertation.

This project represents the first systematic, cross-national study of pre-electoral coalitions. I hope that it will generate a wider scholarly

debate about the role that these coalitions play in elections. There is substantial room for further research on electoral coalitions. For example, one might want to locate them within broader political processes. As I mentioned earlier, the question of why parties form pre-electoral coalitions is related to the number of parties in a country and to the evolution of party systems. The evidence from chapter 2 suggests that pre-electoral coalitions form when the electoral rules give a seat bonus to larger parties and where parties want to retain their independence rather than merge. Duverger (1959, 224) notes that electoral alliances are frequently "the prelude to the extreme form, total fusion, which is the normal term of the development and is often attended by schism..." It is beyond the scope of this project to predict which electoral coalition situations are 'stable' and which are just a step on the way to a merger. Instead, I consider snapshots of a party system prior to an election and ask whether or not a pre-electoral coalition is likely to form, and if so, which parties will join. This is a necessary first step, though future work will hopefully analyze pre-electoral coalitions in a more dynamic framework.

This raises an interesting question, though. Under what circumstances will parties remain separate and form electoral coalitions rather than merge to form a larger party? The answer is not clear and little work has been done to explain this puzzle. Nevertheless, I can offer one or two speculations. If two parties have separate electoral bases of

support, they might be less likely to merge. For instance, if the electorates are geographically separate, as is the case with the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union in Germany, or the National Party and the Liberal Party in Australia, the parties in question can easily form an electoral coalition instead of merging into a single party. In some countries, national and lower-level elections are held according to different electoral rules, and the more proportional elections may give parties and voters incentives to maintain a higher number of parties than would otherwise be the case. Although legislative elections in France use single-member districts, regional (and some local) elections use proportional representation. Small parties that might otherwise have disappeared can win regional and local offices, thereby making them more viable coalition partners on the national political scene.

When the costs of forming an electoral coalition are quite low, party leaders may be unwilling to give up their independence by merging to form a larger party. For instance, some electoral systems allow voters to indicate coalition preferences. The alternative vote in Australia, the single transferable vote in Ireland and the two vote system of Germany all allow voters to show their support for more than one party in a given election. Thus party elites do not need to broker nomination agreements and force some of their own candidates to withdraw from competition. The two-round system used in France, as discussed in Chapter 4, means

that parties can let the voters determine who will be the coalition candidate in the second round if the party leaders are unable to find an easy compromise prior to the first round. Waiting until the second round is not as efficient as finding a joint candidate for the first round, but the lack of coordination is certainly not as costly as failing to coordinate in a single-member district plurality system would be.

Even in proportional systems, pre-electoral coalitions can generate more seats than the parties would win independently so long as the coalition is superadditive in votes. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 1976 bourgeois coalition in Sweden may have been superadditive in votes because voters were more apt to vote for the conservative parties once the parties had presented the electoral coalition as a signal that they were a credible government alternative. Simulations based on polls taken prior to the 1986 election in France (held under proportional representation) indicated that a coalition of the mainstream right parties would have won 15 more seats than they would have done running independently. Although the ultimate seat bonus is likely to be lower in proportional systems than in disproportional ones, we still see pre-electoral coalitions forming in proportional electoral systems.

A logical next step is to study the effects of pre-electoral coalitions. I have speculated above that coalition governments based on electoral coalitions are likely to be more ideologically cohesive, all else equal, than

coalition governments that formed after an election. This is because electoral coalitions must explicitly present themselves to the electorate. It is also possible that the added legitimacy associated with electoral coalitions could increase government duration for those governments based on pre-electoral coalitions. There is also reason to believe that pre-electoral coalitions are likely to affect other political phenomena. For example, recent work in international political economy links political uncertainty to stock market instability. It should be the case that elections with identifiable government alternatives (pre-electoral coalitions) lead to less volatility than those in which there is a high level of uncertainty surrounding the identity of future government coalitions. None of these hypotheses have been empirically tested thus far. The study of electoral coalitions obviously provides a fertile terrain for the opportunistic researcher.

Appendix

In this section, I provide detailed information on pre-electoral coalitions. Given that different sources of information concerning the coalitions sometimes conflict, I cite them in detail so that the interested reader can evaluate my coding decisions. The sources are provided in Table A.27. Vote percentages are mainly taken from Mackie & Rose (1991), the *European Journal of Political Research*, Caramani (2000), or the website *electionworld.org*.

Certain parties or coalitions are not included in the empirical analyses; this is either because a coalition is confined to a particular region or the Manifesto Research Group (MRG) dataset does not include the all of the parties (Budge et al. 2001). In the latter case, the pre-electoral coalition would be included in the empirical analysis in Chapter 2, but not in Chapter 5. The final column in the tables indicates whether or not the parties in each pre-electoral coalition are included in the MRG dataset. I also note those coalitions that were included in the Martin & Stevenson (2001) analysis.

Table A.1: Electoral Coalitions in Australia 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG?
1946	43.9	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1949	50.3	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1951	50.3	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1954	47	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1955	47.6	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1958	46.5	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
	9.4	DLP+QLP	No	No
1961	42.1	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
	8.7	DLP+QLP	No	No
1963	46.0	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1966	49.9	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1969	43.4	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1972	41.4	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1974	44.9	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1975	53.1	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1977	48.1	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1980	46.3	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1983	43.6	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1984	45.0	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1987	45.9	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1990	43.2	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1993	44.27	Lib+Nat	No	Yes
1996	47.2	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
1998	39.18	Lib+Nat	Yes	Yes
2001	42.7	Lib+Nat	Yes	No

Parties:

Lib: Liberal Party of Australia, **Nat**: National Party (formerly Country Party), **DLP**: Democratic Labor Party, **QLP**: Queensland Labor Party (DLP and QLP merged in 1962).

Table A.2: Electoral Coalitions in Austria 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949	82.74	OVP+SPO§	Yes	Yes
1953	83.37	OVP+SPO§	Yes	Yes
1956	89.01	OVP+SPO§	Yes	Yes
1959	88.98	OVP+SPO§	Yes	Yes
1962	89.43	OVP+SPO§	Yes	Yes
1966	90.91	OVP+SPO	OVP only	Yes
1970		No	No	
1971		No	No	
1975		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1983		No	No	
1986	(84.41)	SPO+OVP*	Yes	Yes
	4.82	Green Alt.	No	No
1990	74.84	SPO+OVP	Yes	Yes
1994	62.59	SPO+OVP	Yes	Yes
1995	(66.35)	SPO+OVP*	Yes	Yes
	10.32	Greens + LF	No	Yes
1999		No	No	
2002		No	No	

(*) SPO announced intention to govern with OVP.

(§) Counted as pre-electoral pacts in Martin & Stevenson (2001).

Coalition:

Green Alternative: Alternative List of Austria and United Greens of Austria.

Parties:

SPO: Socialist Party; **OVP**: People's Party; **LF**: Liberal Forum.

Table A.3: Electoral Coalitions in Belgium 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946	1.60	Lib-Soc*	No	No
1949		No	No	
1950	1.77	Lib-Soc*	No	No
1954	2.10	Lib-Soc*	No	No
1958	2.10	Lib-Soc*	No	No
1961		No	No	
1965		No	No	
1968	5.90	FDF+RW	No	Yes
1971	11.23	FDF+RW	No	Yes
1974	10.94	FDF+PLDP+RW	No	Yes
1977	4.7	FDF+RW	No	Yes
1978	7.04	FDF+RW	No	Yes
	1.40	VVP+VNP	No	No
1981	4.21	FDF+RW	No	Yes
	4.92	Eco+ Agalev	No	Yes
1985	50.20	CVP+PSC+ +VLD+PRL	Yes	Yes
1987	17.40	PSC+PRL	Yes	Yes
1991	1.5	FDF+PPW	No	No
1995	10.30	PRL+FDF	No	Yes
1999	10.14	PRL+FDF	Yes	No
	5.6	VU+ID21	No	No

(*) **Lib-Soc Cartel**: Provincial level alliance, in 4 out of the 30 districts, between the Liberal Party and the Belgian Workers' Party, 1950-1958. Not included in the empirical analyses.

Parties:

FDF: Democratic Front of French Speakers; **PLDP**: French-speaking Liberal Party; **CVP**: Christian People's Party (Flemish); **PSC**: Christian People's Party (Walloon); **VLD**: Liberals (Flemish); **PRL**: Liberals (Walloon); **RW**: Walloon Rally; **VVP**: Flemish People's Party; **VNP**: Flemish National Party (merged 1979); **Eco**: Ecologist Confederation for the Organization of New Struggles; **Agalev**: Live Differently, Greens; **PPW**: Pari pour la Wallonie; **VU**: People's Union; **ID21**: Social-Liberal Party.

Table A.4: Electoral Coalitions in Canada 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949		No	No	
1953		No	No	
1957		No	No	
1958		No	No	
1962		No	No	
1963		No	No	
1965		No	No	
1968		No	No	
1972		No	No	
1974		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1980		No	No	
1984		No	No	
1988		No	No	
1993		No	No	
1997		No	No	
2000		No	No	

Table A.5: Electoral Coalitions in Denmark 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1947		No	No	
1950		No	No	
1953 (Apr.)		No	No	
1953 (Sep.)		No	No	
1957		No	No	
1960		No	No	
1964		No	No	
1966		No	No	
1968	53.89	RL+Con+Lib§	Yes	Yes
1971		No	No	
1973	7.80	CD+SLE	No	No
1975	2.20	CD+SLE	No	No
1977*	6.40	CD+SLE	No	No
1979	25.0	Lib+Con	No	Yes
1981	25.8	Lib+Con	Yes	Yes
1984	35.52	Lib+Con	Yes	Yes
1987		No	No	
1988		No	No	
1990	1.67	CP+LSP	No	No
1994	3.15	CP+LSP	No	No
1998	2.70	CP+LSP	No	No
2001	2.40	CP+LSP	No	No

(*) Pre-electoral agreement between SD and KF, CD and CPP ('Forlig') to support the minority SD government.

(§) Counted as pre-electoral pacts in Martin & Stevenson (2001).

Parties:

Lib: Liberals; **Con**: Conservatives; **SD**: Social Democrats; **RL**: Radical Liberals; **CP**: Communist Party; **LSP**: Left Socialist Party; **ML**: Marxist-Leninists (Together, known as Red-Green Unity List); **CD**: Center Democrats (1973 splinter of Social Democrats); **SLE**: Schleswig Party (German-speaking minority).

Table A.6: Electoral Coalitions in Finland 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948		No	No	
1951		No	No	
1954		No	No	
1958		No	No	
1962		No	No	
1966		No	No	
1970	18.22	CE+CHR	No	Yes
1972		No	No	
1975		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1983	17.63	Lib+CE	Yes	Yes
1987		No	No	
1991		No	No	
1995		No	No	
1999	67.2	Purple coalition	Yes	No

Purple Coalition: Conservative Party; Left-Wing League; Swedish People's Party; Social Democratic Party; and Greens.

Parties:

Lib: Liberals; **CE**: Center Party (formerly Agrarians); **CHR**: Christian League of Finland.

Table A.7: Electoral Coalitions in France IV 1946-1957

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No	No	
1951	1.53	RR+RS	No	
	7.99	RR+RS+RGR+UDSR	No	
	0.62	UDSR+RGR+MRP	Yes	
1956	12.10	SFIO+UDSR+RS*	Yes	
	[<15.27]	MRP+Cons**	No	

(*) Republican Front, upheld in 48 districts.

(**) Upheld in 29 districts (in alliance with Radicals in 22 additional districts). The total MRP+Cons votes is 15.27%, but this overestimates the vote total for the electoral coalition because it includes all districts.

Note: These coalitions were agreed upon at the district level, and are thus not included in any of the empirical analyses.

Parties:

(**MRP**) People's Republican Movement; (**SFIO**) Socialists; (**UDSR**) Democratic and Socialist Union of Resistance; (**RS**) Social Republicans; (**RR**) Republican Radicals; (**RGR**) Rally of Republican Leftists; (**Cons**) Conservatives.

Table A.8 Electoral Coalitions in France V 1958-2002

Election Year	% vote for PEC†	PEC (Round)	Govt?	MRG
1958		No	No	
1962	31.94	UNR+UDT+RI (2)	Yes	UNR/UDR 1 party
	43.46	PCF+SFIO+ +Rad (2)	No	Yes
1967	37.73	UNR+UDT+ +RI (1)	Yes	UNR/UDR 1 party
	50.37	UNR+UDT+ RI+CD (2)	Yes	UNR/UDR 1 party
	18.96	FGDS (1)	No	SFIO+Rad only
	41.47	FGDS+PCF+ +PSU (2)	No	SFIO+Rad+ +PDF only
1968	43.65	UNR+RI (1)	Yes	Yes
	53.98	UNR+RI+ +PDM (2)	Yes	In 1968 no PDM
	36.55	FGDS+PCF (2)	No	Yes
1973	34.74	UDR+RI+UC (1)	Yes	Yes
	47.29	UDR+RI+ +UC+Ref. (2)	Yes	Yes
	19.20	UGDS (1)	No	PS only
	40.61	PCF+UGDS+ PSU (2)	No	PCF+PS only
1978	21.45	UDF (1)	Yes	1 party
	44.07	UDF+RPR (2)	Yes	Yes
	24.69	PS+MRG (1)	No	PS only
	45.24	PCF+PS+MRG (2)	No	PCF+PS only

Table A.8 Electoral Coalitions in France V 1958-2002

Election Year	% vote for PEC†	PEC (Round)	Govt?	MRG
1981	40.00	RPR+UDF (1)	No	Yes
	37.51	PS+MRG (1)	Yes	PS only
	53.68	PS+PC+MRG (2)	Yes	PS+PCF only
1986	21.40	RPR+UDF*	Yes	Yes
(PR)	32.10	PS+MRG	No	PS only
1988	37.49	RPR+UDF (1)	No	Yes
	35.87	PS+MRG (1)	Yes	PS only
	47.19	PS+PCF (2)	No	Yes
1993	25.10	RPR+UDF (1)	Yes	Yes
	17.33	PS+PCF (2)	No	Yes
	7.84	Greens+GE (1)	No	1 party
1997	29.92	RPR+UDF (1)	Yes	Yes
	30.34	PS+Greens+ +PRG (1)	No	Yes
	33.47**	PS+PCF (2)	No	Yes
2002	33.30	UPM (1)	Yes	No
	30.16	PS+Greens+ +PRG (1)	No	No
	34.98	PS+Greens+ +PRG+PCF (2)	No	No

(†) The vote percentages are taken from the first round. For scores from the second round, consult *www.election-politique.com.*

(*) The UDF and RPR ran joint lists in 61 districts, and separate ones in 35 districts. The separate lists won an additional 8.30% and 11.20% of the vote, respectively.

(**) 40.28% if score from Greens is also included.

Coalitions:

FGDS: SFIO+Rad+CIR (1967); **UGDS**: PS+MRG (1973)

UDF: CDS+PR+RI (1978); **UPM**: RPR+UDF+DL (2002).

Parties:

(**Rad**) Radicals (Split in 1972 into the Reformateurs (**REF**) and the Radical Left Movement (**MRG**)); (**PRG**) Left Radical Party; (**UDT**) Left Gaullists (Merged with the UNR after 1962 elections.); (**UNR**) Gaullist Party (Became the **UDR** in 1968, then the **RPR** in 1976.); (**SFIO**, then **PS**) Socialist Party; (**PSU**) Unified Socialist Party; (**PCF**) Communist Party; (**Greens**) Green Party; (**GE**) Generation Ecology; (**UDF**) Union for French Democracy; (**RI**) Independent Republicans; (**PR**) Republicans; (**UC**) Center Union; (**CD**) Democratic Center; (**PDM**) Progress and Modern Democracy.

Table A.9: Electoral Coalitions in Germany 1949-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949		No	No	
1953	48.38	CDU+CSU+DP	Yes	CD*
1957	53.55	CDU+CSU+DP	Yes	CD
	0.85	BP+CCP+HPP‡	No	No
1961	45.31	CDU+CSU	Yes	CD
1965	47.59	CDU+CSU	Yes	CD
1969	46.09	CDU+CSU	No	CD
	0.60	DFU+DKP‡	No	No
1972	44.86	CDU+CSU	No	CD
	54.21	SPD+FDP§	Yes	Yes
1976	48.64	CDU+CSU	No	CD
	50.48	SPD+FDP§	Yes	Yes
1980	53.48	SPD+FDP§	Yes	Yes
	44.54	CDU+CSU	No	CD
1983	55.73	CDU+CSU+FDP§	Yes	CD
1987	53.35	CDU+CSU+FDP§	Yes	CD
1990	54.85	CDU+CSU+FDP	Yes	CD
	1.20	B'90+Gr	No	No
1994	41.44	CDU+CSU	Yes	CD
1998	39.58	CDU+CSU	No	CD
2002	38.5	CDU+CSU	No	No
	47.1	SPD+Gr	Yes	No

(*) CDU/CSU treated as single party, CD.

(‡) Regional coalition only. Not included in any empirical analyses.

(§) Counted as pre-electoral pacts in Martin & Stevenson (2001). They say there was an electoral pact between the FDP and the CDU/CSU

in both 1953 and 1961, as well as a pact between the SPD and FDP in 1969.

Parties:

(**CSU**) Christian Socialist Union; (**CDU**) Christian Democratic Union; (**FDP**) Free Democrats; (**PSD**) Social Democrats; (**DP**) German Party; (**BP**) Bavarian Party; (**CCP**) Catholic Center Party; (**HPP**) Hanoverian Peasants' Party; (**DFU**) German Peace Union; (**DKP**) German Communist Party; (**B'90**) Alliance '90; (**Gr**) The Greens.

Table A.10: Electoral Coalitions in Greece 1946-66, 74-02

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946	55.1	UCNM	Yes	No
	19.3	NPU	No	No
	2.9	UNM	No	No
1950	2.6	FWR+NAPP	No	No
	16.4	EPEK	Yes	No
	9.7	DC	No	No
	8.2	PIC	No	No
	5.3	NRF	No	No
1951		No	No	
1952	34.2	UP	No	No
1956	48.2	DU	No	No
1958	2.9	UPP	No	No
	10.6	PADU	No	No
1961	33.7	CU+PP	No	No
	14.6	UDL+NAPP	No	No
1963		No	No	
1964	35.3	NRU+PP	No	No
1974	9.5	UL	No	No
	20.4	CU+NF	No	No
1977	2.7	PLWF	No	No
1981	48.1	UDL+PASOK	Yes	No
	1.4	RCPG+CPG-ML	No	No
1985	45.8	UDL+PASOK	Yes	No
	40.8	PDS+ND	No	No
1989 (June)	13.1	PLWF	No	No
1989 (Nov)	11.0	PLWF	No	No
1990	10.3	PLWF	No	No
1993		No	No	
1996		No	No	
2000		No	No	

Coalitions:

(**UCNM**) United Camp of the Nationally Minded: People's Party, Reformist Party, National Liberal Party, Royalist Party, Panhellenic National Party, Patriotic Union Party, Political Group Forward, Party of Reconstruction, Social Radical Union.

(**NPU**) National Political Union: National Unity Party, Democratic Socialists, Venizelist Liberals.

(**UNM**) Union of the Nationally Minded: Party of the Nationally Minded, People's Agrarian Party.

(**DC**) Democratic Camp: Union of Democratic Leftists, Socialist Party - Union of Popular Democracy, Party of Leftist Liberals.

(**PIC**) Politically Independent Camp: Greek Renaissance Party, Party of the Nationally Minded.

(**NRF**) National Reconstruction Front: National Unity Party, People's Progressive Party, Panhellenic Party.

(**EPEK**) National Progressive Center Union: Progressive Liberal Center Party, Democractic Progressive Party.

(**DU**) Democratic Union: United Democratic Left, Liberal Party I, National Progressives Center Union, Farmers' and Workers' Rally, Democratic Party, Liberal Democrats, People's Party.

(**UPP**) Union of the People's Parties: People's Party, People's Social Party.

(PADU) Progressive Agrarian Democratic Union: National Progressives Center Union, Farmers' and Workers' Rally, Democratic Party, Progressives Party.
(EK-ND) Center Union: Movement of New Political Forces, Social Democratic Party of Greece, Christian Democrats, Center Youth of 1961-66.
(UL) United Left: Communist Party, Communist Party-Interior, United Democratic Left Party.
(PLWF) Alliance of Progress and Left-Wing Forces: Christian Democrats, Communist Party-Interior, Socialist Initiative, Socialist March, U.D. Left.

Parties:

(FWR) Farmers' and Workers' Rally; **(NAPP)** National Agrarian Progressive Party; **(UDL)** United Democratic Left; **(PASOK)** Socialists; **(PSP)** Popular Social Party; **(NRU)** National Radical Union; **(PP)** Progressive Party; **(NF)** New Forces; **(CU)** Center Union; **(RCPG)** Revolutionary Communist Party of Greece; **(CPG-ML)** Communist Party of Greece - Marxist Leninist; **(PDS)** Party for Democratic Socialists; **(ND)** New Democracy.

Note: In Greece from 1961 to 1966, a single party faced an already high electoral threshold of 15%, but the threshold for an electoral coalition of two parties was 25%, and this threshold jumped to 40% for electoral coalitions of more than two parties. Thus only large electoral coalitions

would be likely to contest elections, and any party with less than 15% of the electorate's support would have to withdraw, merge with another party, or join an electoral coalition with a much larger party or parties (Clogg 1987).

Table A.11: Electoral Coalitions in Iceland 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No	No	
1949		No	No	
1953		No	No	
1956	19.2	SP+SDP* (PA)	Yes	Yes
1959 (Jun.)	15.2	SP+SDP* (PA)	No	Yes
1959 (Oct.)	16.0	SP+SDP* (PA)	No	Yes
1963	16.0	SP+SDP*+ +NPP (PA)	No	Yes
1967	13.9	SP+SDP*(PA)	No	Yes
1971		No	No	
1974	4.60	ULL+PP**	No	No
1978		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1983		No	No	
1987		No	No	
1991	1.8	NP+HP	No	No
1995		No	No	
1999	26.8	PA+WP+SDP+ +PM	No	No

(*) Following 1956, this electoral coalitions included the left wing of the SPD only. This electoral alliance eventually merged into a single party in 1968.

(**) Splinter only. Not included in empirical analyses.

Parties:

(**IP**) Independence Party; (**PP**) Progressive Party; (**ULL**) Union of Liberals and Leftists; (**NPP**) National Preservation Party; (**SP**) United Socialist Party; (**PA**) People's Alliance; (**WP**) Woman's Party; (**SDP**) Social Democratic Party; (**PM**) People's Movement; (**NP**) National Party; (**HP**) Humanist Party.

Table A.12: Electoral Coalitions in Ireland 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948		No	No	
1951	53.11	FG+L+ +CnP+CnT	No	Yes
1954	44.28	FG+L+CnT*	Yes	Yes
1957		No	No	
1961		No	No	
1965		No	No	
1969		No	No	
1973	48.75	FG+L	Yes	Yes
1977	42.12	FG+L	No	Yes
1981		No		
1982 (Feb.)	46.42	FG+L	No	Yes
1982 (Nov.)	48.6	FG+L	Yes	Yes
1987		No	No	
1989		No	No	
1992		No	No	
1997	40.8	FG+L+DL	No	Yes
	44.0	FF+PD	Yes	Yes
2002		No	No	

(*) With pledge of external support from Claan na Poblachta.

Parties:

(**FG**) Fine Gael; (**FF**) Fianna Fail; (**L**) Labour; (**PD**) Progressive Democrats; (**DL**) Democratic Left.

Table A.13: Electoral Coalitions in Israel 1948-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949	12.2	URF	Yes	No*
1951		No	No	No
1955	4.7	Torah Front	No	No
1959	4.7	Torah Front	No	No
1961		No	No	No
1965	21.3	Gahal	No	No
1969	21.7	Gahal	Yes	No
	46.2	Maarakh	Yes	No
1973	30.2	Likud Bloc	No	No
	39.6	Maarakh	Yes	No
	1.4	Moked	No	No
	3.8	Torah Front	No	No
1977	33.4	Likud Bloc	Yes	No
	24.6	Maarakh	No	No
	11.6	DMC	No**	No
1981	37.1	Likud Bloc	Yes	No
	36.6	Maarakh	No	No
1984	31.9	Likud Bloc	Yes	No
	34.9	Maarakh	Yes	No
	4.0	HaTehiya+ +Tsomet	Yes	No
1988	31.1	Likud Bloc	Yes	No
1992	24.9	Likud Bloc	No	No
	9.6	Meretz	Yes	No
1996	25.8	LGT	***	No
1999	14.1	Likud Bloc	***	No
	20.2	One Israel	***	No
	3.0	National Union	***	No
	3.7	Yahadut HaTorah	***	No

(*) The MRG Dataset includes these coalitions as single parties.

(**) Joined the government after four months.

(***) The Prime Minister was directly elected by the voters in 1996 and 1999.

Coalitions:

URF (United Religious Front): Mizrahi, HaPoel HaMizrahi, Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel

Torah Religious Front: Agudat Israel and Poalei Agudat Israel

Gahal: Liberal Party and Herut

Likud Bloc: Liberal Party, Herut, Free Center, Laam, Movement for a Greater Israel, State List

Maarakh (Alignment): Labor Party and Mapam

Moked: Maki and Rakah (The Communist Party of Israel was founded in 1949, and in 1965 broke into two factions, Maki and Rakah. They formed an electoral list together in 1973.)

DMC (Democratic Movement for Change): Shinui and Free Center

Meretz: Shinui, Mapam and Ratz

One Israel: Labor and Gesher and Meimad

LGT: Likud Bloc, Gesher and Tsomet

Yahadut HaTorah: Agudat Israel and Degel HaTorah

National Union: Moledet, Herut and Tekuma

Table A.14: Electoral Coalitions in Italy 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948		No	No	
1953	0.6	Community†	No	
1958		No	No	
1963		No	No	
1968		No	No	
1972		No	No	
1976		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1983		No	No	
1987		No	No	
1992		No	No	
1994*	34.3	Progressive Alliance	Yes	(1)
	15.7	Pact for Italy	Yes	Yes
	46.4	Pole of Good Government	No	(2)
1996	43.4	Olive Tree I+RC**	Yes**	(3)
	42.1	Freedom Pole	No	(4)
2001	35.0	Olive Tree II	No	No
	45.4	House of Freedom	Yes	No

(†) This was a local electoral coalition. Not included in any empirical analyses.

(*) In 1993 Electoral system changed from proportional representation to a mixed system with single-member districts and some PR. The % vote for coalition is taken from the PR results.

(**) Although the RC (Communist Refoundation) was a member of the electoral alliance, it did not enter government. However, it did support it.

(1) MRG dataset does not include Socialist Party, Social Christians, or Socialist Renewal.

(2) MRG dataset does not include Christian Democratic Center, Democratic Union of the Left, Liberal Democratic Pole.

(3) MRG dataset does not include the Prodi Group or the Sardinian Action Party.

(4) MRG dataset treats Christian Democrats as single party.

Coalitions:

Community: Peasants' Party, Sardinian Action Party.

Progressive Alliance: Party of the Democratic Left, Communist Refoundation, Greens, Network, Democratic Alliance, Socialist Party, Social Christians, Socialist Renewal.

Pact for Italy: Popular Party, Segui Pact.

Pole of Good Government: Forza Italia, National Alliance, Northern League, Panella List-Reformers, Christian Democratic Center, Democratic Union of the Left, Liberal Democratic Pole.

Freedom Pole: Forza Italia, National Alliance, Christian Democratic Center, United Christian Democrats.

Olive Tree I: Party of the Democratic Left, Prodi Group, Dini List-Renewed Italy, Green Federation.

House of Freedom: Forza Italia, National Alliance, Northern League, Union of Christian and Center Democrats (formerly the Christian Democratic Center and the United Christian Democrats), New Italian Socialist Party.

Olive Tree II: Party of Democratic Left, Italian People's Party, Democrats, Dini-List-Renewed Italy, Democratic Union for Europe, Green Federation, Italian Democratic Socialist Party, Party of Italian Communists.

Table A.15: Electoral Coalitions in Japan 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No	No	
1949		No	No	
1952		No	No	
1953		No	No	
1955		No	No	
1958		No	No	
1960		No	No	
1963		No	No	
1967		No	No	
1969		No	No	
1972		CGP+DSP†	No	
1976		CGP+JSP†	No	
1979		CGP+DSP†	No	
1980		CGP+DSP+JSP(†)	No	
1983		CGP+JSP†	No	
1986		CGP+DSP†	No	
1990		CGP+DSP+JSP†	No	
1993		No	No	
1996		No	No	
2000		No	No	

(†) Coalition formed in some districts, but not nation-wide.

Parties: Clean Government Party (**CGP**); Democratic Socialist Party (**DSP**); Japan Socialist Party (**JSP**).

Note: Parties in Japan do form electoral coalitions for some mayoral and gubernatorial elections. See Christensen (2000) and Johnson (2000) for

further discussion. In legislative elections, electoral cooperation agreements are sometimes made in some districts, but these are not national agreements and thus I have not included them in the empirical analyses. There were a number of formal agreements made between various parties in the 1996 elections, for instance, but the electoral coordination seemed to occur on a district-by-district level and was not part of a national electoral coalition (Christensen 2000, 119).

Table A.16: Electoral Coalitions in Luxembourg 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1954*		No	No	
1959		No	No	
1964		No	No	
1968	68.45	LSAP+CSV	No[§]	Yes
1974		No	No	
1979	6.64	EF+SI	No	No
1984		No	No	
1989	1.1	N. Ecol.†	No	Yes
1994	9.91	GAP+GLEI	No	1 party
1999		No	No	

The elections of 1949 and 1951 were partial legislative elections, and thus are not included.

(§) The LSAP was prevented from entering the government coalition by its trade union (the CSV did want to form the government coalition based on the electoral coalition).

(†) The Ecologists for the North were an alliance of GLEI and GAP in the North Constituency. Not included in any empirical analyses.

Parties:

(CSV) Christian Democrats; **(LSAP)** Socialists; **(GAP)** Alternative Green Party; **(GLEI)** Green Left Ecological Initiative; **(EF)** Forcibly Enrolled; **(SI)** Independent Socialists.

Table A.17: Electoral Coalitions in Malta 1964-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1966		No	No	
1971		No	No	
1976		No	No	
1981		No	No	
1987		No	No	
1992		No	No	
1996		No	No	
1998		No	No	

Table A.18: Electoral Coalitions in the Netherlands 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No	No	
1948		No	No	
1952		No	No	
1956		No	No	
1959		No	No	
1963		No	No	
1967		No	No	
1971	33.70	PvdA+D66+PPR	No	Yes
1972	36.29	PvdA+D66+PPR	Yes*	Yes
1977	31.89	ARP+CHU+KVP	Yes	1 party
	35.90	PvdA+PPR	No	Yes
1981		No	No	
1982		No	No	
1986	52.00	CDA+VVD	Yes	Yes
1989	67.19	PvdA+CDA	Yes	Yes
	4.10	CPN+PPR+EVP	No	No
1994		No	No	
1998	62.7	D66+PvdA+VVD	Yes	Yes
2002		No	No	

(*) Following caretaker government

Parties:

(**PvdA**) Social Democrats; (**D66**) Liberal Democrats; (**PPR**) Radical Party; (**CHU**) Christian Historical Union; (**ARP**) Anti-Revolutionary Party; (**KVP**) Catholic People's Party (Arp, CHU and KVP merged to form the Christian Democrat Appeal (**CDA**) in 1979.); (**VVD**) Liberals; (**CPN**) Communist Party; (**PPR**) Radical Party; (**PSP**) Pacifist

Socialist Party; **(EVP)** Evangelical People's Party (CPN, PPR, and EVP merged to form a single party in 1990.).

Table A.19: Electoral Coalitions in New Zealand 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No	No	
1949		No	No	
1951		No	No	
1954		No	No	
1957		No	No	
1960		No	No	
1963		No	No	
1966		No	No	
1969		No	No	
1972		No	No	
1975		No	No	
1978		No	No	
1981		No	No	
1984		No	No	
1987		No	No	
1990	5.2	MM+NLP	No	No
1993		No	No	
1996		No	No	
1999	46.4	AL+LAB	Yes	No
2002		No	No	

Parties:

(**MM**) Mana Motuhake; (**NLP**) New Labor Party (NLP stood in the general seats and Mana Motuhake stood in the Maori seats.); (**AL**) Alliance Party; (**LAB**) New Zealand Labour Party.

Table A.20: Electoral Coalitions in Norway 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1949		No	No	
1953		No	No	
1957		No	No	
1961		No	No	
1965	49.47	SP+H+V+KRF	Yes	Yes
1969	48.88	SP+H+V+KRF[§]	Yes	Yes
1973	11.20	CP+SPP+WIC	No	1 party
1977	45.78	H+KRF+SP	No	Yes
1981	47.77	H+KRF+SP	Yes	Yes*
1985	45.28	H+KRF+SP	Yes	Yes
1989	37.19	H+KRF+SP	Yes	Yes
1993		No	No	
1997	26.04	KRF+SP+V	Yes	Yes
2001	22.00	KRF+SP+V	No	No

([§]) Counted as pre-electoral pact in Martin & Stevenson (2001).

(*) Initially, a Conservative Party minority government formed, with parliamentary support from the Christian People's Party and the Center Party. (After the election, the three parties could not agree on abortion policy.) In 1983, all three joined the government.

Parties:

(**A**) Labor Party; (**SP**) Center Party; (**H**) Conservative Party; (**V**) Liberal Party; (**KRF**) Christian People's Party; (**CP**) Communist Party; (**SPP**) Socialist People's Party; (**WIC**) Worker's Information Committee.

Table A.21: Electoral Coalitions in Portugal 1975-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1975		No	No	
1976		No	No	
1979	46.30	SD+CDS+PMP	Yes	Yes
	19.51	PCP+MDP	No	Yes
1980	27.80	PS+UEDS+ASDI	No	Yes
	17.32	PCP+MDP	Yes	Yes
	48.30	SD+CDS+ +PMP+Ref	Yes	not Ref.
1983	18.69	PCP+MDP+ +Greens	No	Yes
1985	15.97	PCP+MDP+ +Greens	No	Yes
1987	12.46	CDU	No	Yes
1991	8.80	CDU	No	1 party
1995		No	No	
1999	8.60	CDU	No	No
	2.46	UBL	No	No
2002	7.00	CDU	No	No
	2.80	UBL	No	No

Parties:

(**PCP**) Communist Party; (**MDP**) Portuguese Democratic Movement; (**CDS**) Center Social Democrats; (**SD**) Social Democrats; (**DI**) Democratic Intervention; (**Ref.**) Reformists; (**PS**) Socialist Party; (**UEDS**) Left Social Democratic Union; (**ASDI**) Independent Social Democrats; (**PRD**) Party of Democratic Renovation; (**PMP**) Popular Monarchist Party.

Coalitions:

(CDU) Unitarian Democratic Coalition: Communist Party, Greens.

UBL United Block of the Left: Worker's Revolutionary Party; Democratic People's Union; Extreme Left (Politica XXI).

Table A.22: Electoral Coalitions in Spain 1977-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1977*	34.52	UCD	Yes	1 party
	9.35	PCE+CS	No	Yes
	4.47	PSP+FSP	No	No
	2.82	CDC+EDC†	No	No
	0.34	BL†	No	No
	0.20	UG†	No	No
	0.10	GNPB†	No	No
1979	5.97	AP+PDP+PL	No	1 party
	10.82	PCE+CS	No	Yes
	2.70	CiU†	No	No
	0.48	BL†	No	No
	0.40	GNPB†	No	No
	0.21	UG†	No	No
	0.96	HB†	No	No
1982	23.64	AP+PDP	No	Yes
	48.4	PSOE+PAD	Yes	Yes
	3.69	CiU†	No	No
	0.48	BL†	No	No
	0.20	UG†	No	No
1986	26.12	AP+PDP+PL	No	Yes
	4.63	PCE+ left	No	No
	5.04	CiU†	No	No
	0.50	BL†	No	No
	0.20	UG†	No	No
	0.10	GNPB†	No	No
1989	9.13	IU	No	No
	5.07	CiU†	No	No
	0.52	BL†	No	No

Table A.22: Electoral Coalitions in Spain 1977-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
	0.20	GNPB†	No	No
1993	9.63	IU	No	No
	4.98	CiU†	No	No
1996	4.64	CiU†	No	No
	10.64	IU	No	No
2000	39.6	PSOE+IU	No	No
	4.20	CiU†	No	No
	1.30	GNPB†	No	No

(*) Constituent Assembly and Legislative Assembly (López Pina 1985, 30).

(†) These are local or regional electoral coalitions. Not included in any empirical analyses.

Coalitions:

(**IU**) United Left Coalition: Spanish Communist Party, Communist Party of the Peoples of Spain, Catalan Unified Socialist Party, Progressive Federation, Party of Socialist Action, Unitarian Candidature of Workers, Berdak-Les Verds and Republican Left.

(**UCD**) Union of the Democratic Centre: electoral coalition of 14 center and right-wing parties that eventually merged into single party in 1978.

(AP) Popular Alliance: electoral alliance with around 7 conservative constituent parties. By 1978, the coalition had split, losing some conservative members and gaining some moderate ones.

(CiU) Convergence and Union: Democratic Convergence of Catalonia and the Democratic Union of Catalonia.

(UG) Unidade Galega: electoral coalition of small Galician parties, known as the Socialist Galega Block in 1982 and the Socialist Galega-Left Galega in 1986.)

(GNPB) Galician National Popular Block: electoral coalition in which the Marxist Unión do Pobo Galego was the dominant party.

(BL) Basque Left: electoral coalition of left-wing Basque parties.

(HB) Herri Batasuna (United People): an electoral alliance of extreme left-wing Basque parties.

Parties:

(PDP) Christian Democrats; **(PL)** Liberals; **(EDC)** Catalan Democratic Left; **(CDC)** Democratic Convergence of Catalonia; **(PCE)** Communists; **(CS)** Catalan Unified Socialist Party; **(PSOE)** Socialists; **(PAD)** Party of Democratic Action; **(CS)** Catalan Unified Socialist Party; **(PSP)** Popular Socialist Party; **(FSP)** remnant of Federation of Socialist Parties.

Table A.23: Electoral Coalitions in Sweden 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1948	47.48	CON+LIB+CE	No	Yes
1952	56.79	SD+CE	Yes	Yes
1956		No	No	
1958		No	No	
1960		No	No	
1964	1.40	CC†	No	No
	0.30	MP†	No	No
1968	1.70	Coalition '68†	No	No
	0.90	MP†	No	No
1970		No	No	
1973	48.81	CE+LIB+CON	No	Yes
	9.4*	SKP+left*	No	No
1976	50.73	CE+LIB+CON§	Yes	Yes
1979		No§	No	
1982		No	No	
1985	12.42	CE+CD	No	Yes
1988		No	No	
1991	31.05	LIB+CON	Yes	Yes
1994		No	No	
1998		No	No	
2002		No	No	

(*) Keesing's reported an alliance, but only mentioned a single party (SKP).

(†) Regional coalitions only. Not included in any empirical analyses.

§ Considered to be an electoral pact in Martin & Stevenson (2001). They say the same coalition formed prior to the 1979 election.

Parties:

(SD) Social Democrats; **(SKP)** Left Party; **(CE)** Center Party; **(LIB)** Liberal Party; **(CON)** Conservative Party; **(CD)** Christian Democratic Party; **(ND)**New Democracy Party.

Coalitions:

CC Citizens' Coalition: electoral alliance of CON, CE, and LIB in four districts; **Coalition '68**: electoral alliance of CON and LIB in four districts; **MP** Middle Parties: electoral alliance of CE and LIB in one district.

Table A.24 Electoral Coalitions in Switzerland 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1947		No	No	
1951		No	No	
1955		No	No	
1959		No	No	
1963		No	No	
1967		No	No	
1971		No	No	
1975		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1983		No	No	
1987		No	No	
1991		No	No	
1995		No	No	
1999		No	No	

Note: Parties in Switzerland often form electoral coalitions in particular cantons, but these are not nation-wide. It is true that the 'magic formula' used to determine coalition government composition means that everyone knows in advance which parties will end up in government. I do not consider this to constitute a pre-electoral coalition, as the parties in question are not coordinating their electoral strategies or campaigns.

Table A.25: Electoral Coalitions in the United Kingdom 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1950		No	No	
1951		No	No	
1955		No	No	
1959		No	No	
1964		No	No	
1966		No	No	
1970		No	No	
1974 (Feb.)		No	No	
1974 (Oct.)		No	No	
1979		No	No	
1983	25.37	Lib+SocDem	No	Yes
1987	22.57	Lib+SocDem	No	Yes
1992	0.97	Green+PC†	No	No
1997		No	No	
2001		No	No	

(†) Not included in any empirical analyses.

Parties:

(**CON**) Conservative Party; (**LAB**) Labour Party; (**Lib**) Liberals; (**SocDem**) Social Democratic Party; (**Green**) Green Party; (**PC**) Plaid Cymru.

Table A.26: Electoral Coalitions in the United States 1946-2002

Election Year	% vote for coalition	PEC	In Govt?	MRG
1946		No	No	
1948		No	No	
1950		No	No	
1952		No	No	
1954		No	No	
1956		No	No	
1958		No	No	
1960		No	No	
1962		No	No	
1964		No	No	
1966		No	No	
1968		No	No	
1970		No	No	
1972		No	No	
1974		No	No	
1976		No	No	
1978		No	No	
1980		No	No	
1982		No	No	
1984		No	No	
1986		No	No	
1988		No	No	
1990		No	No	
1992		No	No	
1994		No	No	
1996		No	No	
1998		No	No	
2000		No	No	
2002		No	No	

Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalition Data

Country	Source
Australia	Budge et al. (2001), Butler (1999) Klingemann et al. (1994) Mackie & Rose (1991), McAllister (2003) Aust. Election Commission (*www.aec.gov.au*) *http://electionworld.org*
Austria	Caramani (2000), Dreijmanis (1982) Müller (2000), Powell (2000) *Keesing's Record of World Events*
Belgium	Caramani (2000), Dewachter (1987) Dewachter & Clijsters (1982) DeWinter et al. (2000), Downs (1998) Mackie & Rose (1991), Powell (2000) *European Journal of Political Research* (var.) *http://electionworld.org*
Canada	Mackie & Rose (1991) *http://www.elections.ca/*
Denmark	Arter (1999), Caramani (2000) Damgaard (2000), Elklit (2002) Esaiasson & Heidar (2000) Fitzmaurice (1981), Mackie & Rose (1991) Nousiainen (2000), Powell (2000)
Finland	Arter (1999), Caramani (2000) Esaiasson & Heidar (2000) Mackie & Rose (1991), Powell (2000) Sundberg (2002)
France IV	Caramani (2000), Cole & Campbell (1989) Williams, Goldey & Harrison (1970)

Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalition Data

Country	Source
France V	Boy & Roche (1993), Bell & Criddle (1984) Bréchon (1995), Charlot (1994) Charlot (1980), Charlot (1971) Cayrol (1971), Cole & Campbell (1989) Jaffré (1980), Mackie & Rose (1991) Thiébault (2000) *www.election-politique.com/* *http://elections2002.sciences-po.fr/*
Germany	Caramani (2000), Conradt (1978) Helms (2004), Powell (2000), Pulzer (1983), Saalfeld (2000) Schoen (1999) *New York Times* (for 2002 election).
Greece	Caramani (2000), Clogg (1987) Mackie & Rose (1991), Papayannakis (1981) Siaroff (2000), Veremis (1981)
Iceland	Caramani (2000), Esaiasson & Heidar (2000) Grimsson (1982), Hardarson (2002) Indridason (2004), Kristjánsson (1998) Lijphart (1994), Mackie & Rose (1991) *http://electionworld.org*
Ireland	Caramani (2000), Collins (2003) Farrell & Farrell (1987), Gallagher (2003) Gallagher (1982), Garry et al. (2003) Girvin (1993), Laver (1998*a*) Mackie & Rose (1991), Mair (1999) Mair (1987), Marsh & Mitchell (1999) Mitchell (1999), Murphy (2003) Powell (2000), Sinnot (1987)

Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalition Data

Country	Source
Israel	Hazen (1999), *http://electionworld.org* *http://www.knesset.gov.il* *http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/* *Keesing's Record of World Events*
Italy	Mackie & Rose (1991), Mershon (2002) Newell (2000), Powell (2000) Rhodes (1995), Verzichelli & Cotta (2000) *http://electionworld.org*
Japan	Christensen (2000), Hrebenar (2000) Johnson (2000), Mackie & Rose (1991)
Luxembourg	Dumont & Winter (2000) Mackie & Rose (1991) *http://electionworld.org*
Malta	Mackie & Rose (1991), Siaroff (2000) *http://www.maltadata.com*
Netherlands	Caramani (2000), Daalder (1987) De Jong & Pijnenburg (1986) Irwin (1999), Kitschelt (1994) Napel (1999), Powell (2000) Timmermans & Andeweg (2000) *http://electionworld.org* *Keesing's Record of World Events*
New Zealand	Budge et al. (2001), Geddes (2004) Mackie & Rose (1991) Vowles (2002), *http://www.nzes.org* *http://electionworld.org*

Table A.27: Sources for Pre-Electoral Coalition Data

Country	Source
Norway	Arter (1999), Caramani (2000) Esaiasson & Heidar (2000), Hancock (1998) Mackie & Rose (1991), Maor (1999) Rommetvedt (1992), Shaffer (1998) Valen & Martinussen (1977) *http://electionworld.org*
Portugal	Caramani (2000), Lloyd-Jones (2002) Magone (2000), Magone (1999) Mackie & Rose (1991) *http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html*
Spain	Caramani (2000), Colomer (2001) de Esteban & López Guerra (1985) Gillespie (1995), Hopkin(1999) Laver & Schofield (1998), López Pina (1985) López-Pintor (1985*a*), López-Pintor (1985*b*) Mackie & Rose (1991) *http://electionworld.org*
Sweden	Caramani (2000), Bergman (1995) Hadenius (1990), Mackie & Rose (1991), Powell (2000), Sannerstedt & Sjölin (1992) Särlvik (2002), Särlvik (1977) *Keesing's Record of World Events*
Switzerland	Caramani (2000), Caramani (1996) Mackie & Rose (1991), Powell (2000)
United Kingdom	Caramani (2000), Kitschelt (1994) Rasmussen (1991)
United States	Mackie & Rose (1991)

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