

Kierkegaard and Logic

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Kierkegaard is certainly one of the most prolific thinkers of the nineteenth century. And he bids fair to becoming also one of the most influential. Though there are numerous testimonies to his persuasive powers, especially among religiously sympathetic readers but also among many of his intimate critics, there are to date relatively few studies of his dialectical powers and the implementation of these in his writings. This statement is not made simply to draw attention to the lack of critical philosophical studies – there is such a lack despite the plentitude of secondary works – but also to highlight those factors in Kierkegaard's authorship which gave validity and intellectual form, this independently of one's persuasion or proclivity, religious or otherwise. Kierkegaard was also a philosopher and, furthermore, was so acute intellectually and more particularly logically, that he articulated his writings with their enormous persuasive content with an apparatus, simple and chaste, for which any contemporary analytical and anti-metaphysical philosopher would be justly proud. This is not to say that he was an analytical thinker in the contemporary Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian senses of the term – he was too many-sided to be a member of any school – but by the canons of even today's rigorous philosophical movements he was certainly a philosopher. He may have had too many strings in his bow for modern readers but it hardly seems plausible to accuse him for a richness of personality that most of the rest of us are but the poorer without.

Without the support of the environment and by efforts that intellectually considered must have been prodigious, Kierkegaard defined his position against the most formidable philosophical positions of the day. Not only did this demand courage, but in his case there was more involved.

He had to forge the weapons for his attack in virtue of his own understanding. That he did this in two different directions is sometimes forgotten. On the one side, he opposed the Church of Denmark, though his polemic is aimed, of course, at features of organized Christianity everywhere, with an extremely well articulated view concerning the meaning of Christian belief and practice; on the other side, he opposed the metaphysical philosophies, and especially Hegel's, with humor and wit, precision and exactness, all of these held together by severe views concerning the limits and validity of human speech. The neglect by his readers of this latter feature is perhaps to be explained by the fact that the religious interest is both so obvious and so attractive that little else is expected. But Kierkegaard's writings are here deceptive. What is apparent on the surface, the give and take of the literary creation, is analogous to the parts of the iceberg above the water level. Seven-eighths are below the surface and make possible the portion which is apparent. So too with Kierkegaard's literature. The logical and epistemological views which make his writings so effective as argument, which make his issues conceivable, are usually hidden but are not, for this reason, either irrelevant or unimportant.

An attack upon another's philosophy is not in itself unusual. But it is the mode of Kierkegaard's attack which marks him as a philosopher and thinker of first rank. He does not quarrel with particular factual claims within a philosopher's writings nor does he do as rival metaphysicians frequently have done, namely, show that all of the facts can be accounted for by another metaphysical hypothesis. He chooses instead to level his attack at the possibility, the logicity, of the metaphysical factual claims. The possible is his philosophical domain. He leaves the factually real to the scientists and scholars. The sallies addressed to the metaphysicians are directed to the logic of their discourse as well as the ethical and religious inadequacies inherent in taking such extravagant claims seriously. Detailed considerations of the limits of validity, of coherence, of non-contradiction, of system and sundry other logical values, are replete in his papers and incidental remarks. That all of this impinges upon religious and ethical considerations which admittedly were of paramount concern to Kierkegaard goes without saying; but, it is likewise true that if any of his remarks

on the most abstract issues have validity, they have validity independently of Kierkegaard's literature too.

In what follows I am intentionally trying to sketch the features of that seven-eighths which is hidden to view. I am admittedly dependent here upon the casual remarks, the jottings and notes of the *Papirer*, the footnotes within the literature proper. But still I admit to constructing logical views, systematic structures, where they do not obviously obtain. The references given in the notes at the end are intended to give only an approximate clue to the important materials, enough, however to indicate why I believe the views herein articulated are congruent with the Kierkegaard literature.

I shall here address myself to three questions whereby Kierkegaard's philosophical and logical positions can be illumined: What is logic? Is Kierkegaard a logician or logical? What are his specific insights?

I

Logic is for Kierkegaard the disciplined inquiry into the meaning structure and principles of knowledge. Unlike modern logicians who might say as much, Kierkegaard does not exercise himself greatly on questions concerning the methods of knowledge, partly, one suspects, because the climate of opinion was not very rich on this topic in his Denmark. Logic is, by him, not conceived to be immediately methodological nor a biological weapon. Throughout his literature he seems to make clear, too, that logic is a spectator's science, it is broadly descriptive. But the question is – of what? It is surely not ontological description; for this is the almost constant criticism made in the *Postscript*, and every other occasion permitting in the literature, of the Hegelian philosophy.

Kierkegaard is a singular 'via media' thinker. Denying that logic is ontological, or a science about being, does not entail the affirmation that logic is an arbitrary invention, or simply conventional, or only rules like those governing a parlor game. He seems to be insisting that logic is a descriptive science, but descriptive principally of the structures implicit in the meaningful use of language. Logic describes the idealities, rules and norms, principles and criteria, in virtue of which meanings are communicable.

It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard always roots the prescriptive functions of language in the subjectivity of the user and hearer of the language. Unlike many post-Hegelian philosophers who disparaged both human subjectivity as the locus of anything important and the tendency to make all language descriptive, Kierkegaard did not posit two realms, one of fact and another of value. He did not suggest that logic, esthetics and ethics were prescriptive because their objective correlates were values; instead he explored the character of subjectivity and came to the conclusion that it was not completely arbitrary, nor was it formless and to be discounted. His authorship therefore vindicates, subjectivity by the contention that ethically it ought to be each man's concern and, intellectually, by insisting that it had formal and regular features and was subject to categorization.

Thus, on logical matters he can admit that there is a facticity to the meaning structure of language which acquires its prescriptive power, its oughtness, in the general interest (a subjective factor to be sure) that we all have in making language meaningful. Without the wish on the part of would-be knowers, logic is only a descriptive science. Just so, too, can Kierkegaard's views on ethics be described. From one standpoint, everything he says about ethics can be couched also in a disinterested form appropriate to ethical theory. But, admitting a personal responsibility for stirring the reader to new ethical enthusiasms, Kierkegaard used every literary device available to keep the reader from reading him dispassionately. However, he was under no illusion, for he continually asserts that the ethical exists as an ought only in virtue of a movement within the man. So too, we might say on matters of logic. It is a tool to everyone with the wish and interest to be meaningful and therewith logic has immediately – as immediately as the wish is present – a prescriptive character.

For Kierkegaard, then, it is meaning which is the vehicle of knowledge. Obviously enough, meaning is a possible vehicle of other functions too. That structures of various kinds are involved in meanings seems to be a major burden of the long history of logic. Thus, concepts, judgments, propositions, inference, categories, etc., are all names for parts of the structure of meaning. But how these structures could possibly refer to a real world

and things outside of discourse has been a tempting question that has continually strained philosophers' intellectual modesty. That the relation between meanings and the world was also a meaning structure, that it was itself logical, has been a kind of secular piety overarching vast difficulties not otherwise amenable to intelligent discourse. It is relatively recently that criticisms of such brave pieties have become fashionable. Kierkegaard's criticisms of Hegel are directed to this very issue. He denies that the relation between discourse and the world discoursed about is itself a logical relation. Meanings are logically inter-related, but not meanings and the world. Likewise, and here he may seem to be out of step with modernity, the position which says that there are no meanings in knowledge, is inadmissible, not least because it denies the genuinely descriptive character of logic.

Logicians formulate principles which become in virtue of their usage, laws. This is what is meant by saying that certain ideal values are implied in different kinds of meaning. Order, truth, consistency, system, simplicity, definibility, etc., are seemingly the conditions of meaningfulness. To describe these is a major responsibility of anyone who studies the meaning structure of knowledge. Such 'values' are different than methods, either special or general, relevant to the sciences. Knowledge, Kierkegaard insists, is a synthesis of logical and a-logical factors. Human experiencing is individuated and cannot be communicated in its original forms. But, knowledge which is a synthesis of experience and logical factors is communicable. The meaning structure of a language is the vehicle of the communicable. Thus, logic is the science of that in a language which makes it communicable and cognitive. To say that logic makes knowledge meaningful or even language meaningful is again to invert the order of discovery and to play Zeus all over again to the order of reflection. Logic is the description of what is involved in knowledge. Logic does not then invent nor impose. It becomes normative only if the meaningfulness thus described is desired.

This, in brief, is what Kierkegaard's views on logic add up to. That persons are logical without knowing the subject matter of the logicians is a fact. But this is only to report 'via' persons what one would expect if a meaning structure is implicit in knowledge. Persons do know about the

world and themselves without first recognizing logical forms. They have knowledge without possessing knowledge about that knowledge. But, the reason for stating this position here is principally to draw the reader's attention to a facet of Kierkegaard's thought and writings which is almost completely neglected. For, the position here described is the position from which Kierkegaard attacks the pretensions of idealistic logic. Some of the reasons for saying this will be noted in the ensuing sections. If the above account is correctly to be attributed to Kierkegaard, then we can say that he is one with contemporaries in denying that logic is a description of ontological structures, but, that against both the ontological logicians and the contemporaries, he asserts that *logic is descriptive* of knowledge and hence is neither metaphysical nor purely formal (except when considered in abstraction from knowledge).

II

There is certainly a difference between a logician and being logical. The logician, I take it, is one who makes his subject of inquiry what for the other man are the tools of reflection. The logical man may also be a logician, but, properly, we mean by a logical man one who uses the tools of reflection correctly, so that the meaning of his language is apparent. He may or may not reflect upon logic but certainly he uses it. The question is therefore appropriate: Was Kierkegaard a logician or was he logical?

In respect to the first question it seems clear enough that Kierkegaard was not a logician in any of the usual senses. He did not, for example, write a treatise on logic nor did he suggest at length any new logical theory. The appearances seem to be against him in this respect. But, on the other hand, if we ask whether he was logical, the answer is certainly in the affirmative. He is not irrational nor illogical in any wide sense of either term. With almost maddening regularity Kierkegaard too escapes all neat summary remarks. His logicity is not simply inadvertent nor is it as fortuitous as one might assume from the literature by and about him. For, despite the lack of what one might call strictly technical and detached works such as might qualify for the label, 'works on logic', Kierkegaard

did provide a whole series of judgments about his own writings. He did what in the modern idiom is called, provide a language about his own language. More strictly, he provided a literature about his pseudonymous literature.

In an older philosophical language, probably a little more appropriately expressive for Kierkegaard's accomplishments, Kierkegaard wrote with a high degree of self-consciousness. Hence his logicity is not accidental or haphazard. When you read him at any length you acquire the strange feeling that this man has just about exhausted in his own person the possible vantage points from which his works could be viewed and judged. And a logical and detached standpoint from which the norm and validity of specific works as well as the entire authorship can be understood is never very far from the reader's grasp as he reads Kierkegaard's books, principally because this standpoint is so frequently invoked, though not expounded, by the author himself in his running commentary which his footnotes, his accounts of his books, his journals and papers, yes, and even his letters, give in such abundance.

Kierkegaard's books are many in number and are ostensibly possessed of two kinds of meaning; one kind of meaning is intrinsic to each work, the other extrinsic to each work and provided by the role of each book in the entire authorship. Kierkegaard's sweep was a very broad one and his literature taxed his own ingenuity as well as his readers. Just what all of the pseudonymous works were aiming to do and how they hung together with all of the religious works was not immediately clear. Whether one must assume that Kierkegaard's literature was too complex to let his plan stand clearly forth is a moot point for the literary critics, but, what Kierkegaard did do is obvious enough, he supplied a written explanation. Whether his *Point of View for His Work as an Author* is correct in its factual judgments about the earlier works is again an issue for the critics but that this book provides another standpoint outside of the kind given in the earlier works is the interesting point to note for any philosophical reader. For, here one does have in fact discourse about his earlier writing. True, it is a language that provides a kind of 'telos' for other books; but even this admission does not negate the significance of there being also a

standpoint from which the author could comment upon esthetic, ethical, and religious standpoints. The latter tripartite division is said to be an exhaustive classification of ways of living one's life (i. e., if one admits the Christian to be a variant on the religious). If there is another point of view from which all of them can be described and written about, what is this point of view? Certainly it is not another way of living one's life. But, it would seem that such a disinterested standpoint is exactly what Kierkegaard would have called a logical standpoint.

This standpoint is compatible also with the standpoint which permits Kierkegaard's critiques of other logicians in the *Fragments* and *Postscript*. Also, it seems to be identical with that which permits the incidental remarks, sometimes in footnote form (notably in *The Concept of Dread*), which are frequently and specifically on questions of logic and even logical theory. And, if one adds to these still somewhat casual appearing sources, all of the remarks on logic and epistemology to be found in the *Papirer*, then one has an imposing array of testimony for the existence of another standpoint, a logical and disinterested standpoint, from which Kierkegaard could write and could construe (albeit only logically!) the life views within his literature as well as all else which were his as a most richly talented poet-dialectician.

It behooves Kierkegaard's reader to distinguish carefully therefore between his anti-intellectualism and what might seem to be an anti-logicality. Because the metaphysicians of the idealistic variety invariably use logic to define the real and because they claim that the categories of the real are the categories of logic, Kierkegaard's criticisms of this position are easily construed as criticisms of all logical reasoning. They in fact are not this at all. He is protesting against those philosophical rationalisms which purport to find that intellectual categories, or more particularly, logical categories are descriptive of something more than the meaning structure of knowledge. For Kierkegaard the objectivity, and in a limited sense, the real, to which logic stands related, is knowledge. His cross-fire is directed to those who wish to make categories descriptive of the world, of history, of God, or of anything else metaphysical or empirical. That there may be knowledge about any or all of these, he grants. But, logic

and rationality in Kierkegaard's sense (somewhat analogous to Kant's), has as its subject for analysis, meaningful discourse and not the world. An intellectualism which seeks to mitigate the differences between categorization and facticity, between the non-logical and the logical, is a confusion for Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard finds no logical or epistemological ground for identifying logical categories and those of reality. He does admit however plenty of extra-logical grounds. The admission of the latter, however, is fatal for the intellectualist's claim, for this is to admit that non-intellectualistic interests or non-logical motives are essential for intellectualistic systems.

None of this is to say however that Kierkegaard is anti-logical. He is not 'anti' system, order, or precision. For, if the categories of logic are not the intimate definers of reality, they may still be the intimate definers of knowledge. And knowledge may in turn be about almost anything you please, even fictional entities and/or God, and still be logical. The extra-mental reference of knowledge is another issue altogether which logic cannot construe nor explain. Readers of Kierkegaard's literature well know the importance of 'the leap' in this regard. While remembering that Kierkegaard did not write in 'extenso' about logical matters it is not difficult to construct something of his logical theory from his many criticisms of the kind of intellectualism represented by Hegel and the Hegelians of his own day. For purposes of brevity I enumerate a few of his criticisms:

A) He protests first and always against giving logical categories immediate empirical and factual content. He denies that they are historical, theological, metaphysical, etc. But, he does not deny that there is historical knowledge, knowledge of nature, and with serious reservations which demand special attention, a kind of religious knowledge called theology.

B) He rejects any understanding of an implicative relation or a logical conclusion which imputes ethical or religious significance to the logical consequent. The neutrality of logic is as relevant to the premisses and the conclusion as it is to the inferential transition and nowhere within logical discourse is it possible to slip from the neutral and the logical to the non-neutral and the ethical or the religious.

C) He deprecates also the identification of validity and truth. Though he distinguishes sharply between the truth of sentences and religious and ethical truth, he distinguishes equally sharply between both of these and the kind of claim usually described by the word 'validity' which a logical conclusion possesses.

D) He strikes out too against the extension of other logical values, most clearly perhaps 'system', to non-cognitive issues. What he has to say about the passions in respect to esthetics and religion bear immediately upon this problem. Here he wishes to free the passions from the artificial and restricting formality which an inappropriate logical categorization imposes. That there may be knowledge about esthetics and about religion again may be the case but then logic would describe properly the meaning structure of esthetic and religious discourse. It would not, should not, predispose esthetic creativity or appreciation nor a religious decision.

E) He protests too against the extension of the truth which is the logicians to analyze, viz., truth as a quality of a sentence or 'propositional truth', to all other enterprises and especially ethics and religion. Kierkegaard denies categorically that any kind of propositional truth is of direct and immediate religious and ethical importance. The assent to cognitive truth is not a religious act. This is the point made indirectly by the insistence that religious and ethical truth is a matter of subjectivity.

F) All of this can perhaps be summarized under Kierkegaard's general repudiation of an identity between the logical and the real. But to say the latter within the appropriate context is Kierkegaard's merit. For he does not deny the possibility of knowledge of the real – he is not like Bergson, supposing that conceptualizing is 'ipso facto' a deception – but he does again deny only that logic and reality are co-extensive.

When drawing distinctions between 'logician' and 'logicality', between 'anti-intellectualism' and 'anti-logicality' and especially in reference to Kierkegaard, it is well to remember that he was throughout his career af author a polemicist. He was delightfully argumentative. One of the ways to most clearly describe his ideas is to determine what he was against. In contemporary theological language he was a »dialectical' thinker. Again in contradistinction to the idealistic tradition, Kierkegaard decried the pan-

logical efforts to include even ethics and religion within logical sequences. He proposed that there was an existential dialectic, a qualitative dialectic, separate in kind from a logical dialectic. The first was non-logical and had to do with the life of passion and interest – it was dialectical only in the sense of being descriptive of the opposition, the give and take, of the inner life; the logical dialectic is that which gives anything about which we can have knowledge its argumentative and structural form. As dialectician, Kierkegaard is logical about non-logical matters and this is what makes his polemic so biting and gives irony to his entire endeavor. But he is not inconsistent. In order to draw the distinction between an existential and a logical dialectic and in order to make this distinction stick against opposition who deny the distinction, he uses a logical form in which to state his case for the passions. He uses poetic and passionate forms too – he does in truth have many strings in his bow – but to the extent that he would have created only interesting poetical works, to that very extent he would not have been the polemicist and dialectician that he was. He was at once poetically creative and a logical thinker who used his own creativity for reasons which his intelligence commanded. This is why we can argue that his logical dialectic includes the expressions of the existential dialectic and the poetic content within its own scope. But, if what he has said about the life of passions is true, then it is also relevant to note that the existential dialectic, the life of passions and the conflict of passions, is itself not the logical dialectic. The oppositions within logic are contrariety and contradictoriness and these are essential to the understanding of the relations between anything conceived. That the confrontations within the life of the passions are something quite different than logical oppositions, this is, of course, the burden of much of the Danish Socrates' literature.

As will be subsequently noted Kierkegaard was acutely aware of the fact that his own literature was both a poetic achievement and yet an argument. As an argument it was informed by principles of logical reasoning. This can also be said about the bitter fight against the Church and the surprisingly bombastic literature produced during 1854–55. If Kierkegaard is correct on the delineation of what logic is, then it is appropriate to draw the distinction already noted between validity and truth and I believe it

becomes possible to draw a distinction between the validity and the truth of Kierkegaard's attack upon the Church. His argument is valid if his premisses are correct. His premisses are discussed and discussed again in the earlier literature. To say this is not to say that they are true. However, this is to draw attention to the fact that it is invidious and logically fallacious to accuse him of logical faults when one ought to criticize the truth of his premisses. But the latter is not easy. It is altogether too simple for most readers to read the earlier writings, even to praise them, and then to explain away the later attack upon the Church as if it were not integral to the earlier. This from the logical standpoint is a major fault. Kierkegaard's systematic acuity was not wasted – his literature whatever else one might say and feel about it is an expression of a masterful polemicist who kept his argument always to the point. If he has faults they are not logical in kind.

III

But with all of this it behooves us to turn to the consideration of Kierkegaard's specific logical achievements. One must note always that his literature is logically unified. It is internally consistent; it focuses diverse materials upon the same issues; it provides a description of the life of subjectivity but does it also in the spirit of objectivity and detachment. The literature is about the problems of existing but is ordered and articulated by a logicity which remains almost hidden but which helps to press all of the books to purposes which are Christian in intention and 'edifying' in Kierkegaard's special use of this term. Because it is meaningful and because the literature is discourse containing an argument, logic is a necessary instrumentality for both writing and understanding its structure and purposiveness. The complete account of Kierkegaard's intellectual prowess could not be written without a very detailed examination of the internal consistency and logicity of the literature adjudged as a unit.

But again an indirection must be noted. The literature includes discussions about many topics, many of them of great interest to philosophers. Logic is not treated at the same length as some of the rest of these. For example, music, language, the Bible, duty, passion, system, truth, sin, faith,

speculation, etc., are all discussed and in surprising detail. Supposing for the moment that Kierkegaard occupied a kind of vantage point while writing about all of these other topics, then it should be possible to discern this vantage point or at least to approximate to its description in virtue of (a) identical (and self-identical) characteristics in all of his judgments about different things which characteristics are formal properties not identical with any described by the literature, and, (b) the fact that his descriptions of other topics give us the outlines when pieced together of logic itself. One of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors gives us precedence for this latter use of the literature when he tells us that by going to the »utmost boundaries« of the »kingdom« best known to him, namely language, he can then discover also the boundaries of the neighboring kingdom, music. By describing with precision so many other spheres of intellectual interest, it is almost as if Kierkegaard has circumscribed the sphere of logic without ever quite entering it.

And, we are not without his direct comment on these issues either. Repeatedly, Kierkegaard defines his logical ground (albeit briefly most of the time and in 'extenso' only once and then in a polemical situation where other issues are of paramount concern). Nonetheless, putting all of these sources together, we can state a number of theses which seem in fact to state Kierkegaard's logical position. These are sufficient in number and rich enough in quality to occasion a revision in judgment about his status as a thinker. Granted that he is not a logician in the ordinary senses, still he shows the diagnostic and analytical powers of the greatest of them. He seems actually to have anticipated privately what are some of today's public logical modernities. Therefore, despite what has been said, he begins to loom as a logician and a very good one.

In what follows I shall list some of the theses which seem to me to give a clue to Kierkegaard's logical theory. These are not in any order of importance. These are, in most instances, constructed and constituted in their present form, from contexts in which other issues are discussed. But I point each thesis toward a logical consideration, and this intentionally. I shall in each instance state first a thesis and then add only sufficient comment to relate each thesis to others.

1. The logical standpoint is one of disinterestedness. Disinterestedness and logicity cannot perhaps be completely identified. The Stoics talked about 'apathy' and gave this psychological state of personality ethical and even religious significance. Kierkegaard's esthetic pseudonyms do the same. Kierkegaard believes that the state of disinterestedness is the 'sine qua non' of logicity, but to make such disinterestedness a life-view, was to impute more significance than it could ever contain.

2. Ethical and religious standpoints are instances of interestedness. There are qualities and kinds of interest and therefore there are kinds of ethical and religious positions and ways of life. These are described in Kierkegaard's own literature. There is, however, noly one logical standpoint, if pure disinterestedness is attained. Logic is centripetal.

3. Logicity is the necessary condition for all knowing, including the knowing about ethics and religion. Logic does not describe the necessary conditions for being ethical or being religious. Logic therefore describes the conditions permitting intelligible discourse even about passional matters. Disinterestedness is the necessary condition for 'discussing' and 'knowing' about interestedness.

4. Interestedness is the necessary condition for being human. To substitute a state of logical disinterestedness for a form of interestedness is to confuse a noetic condition with a moral condition. The logical standpoint is neutral and properly a-moral; to impute moral qualities to it is to negate its neutrality.

5. Identity describes the condition under which knowledge can be remembered (i. e., known by the same person in different moments of time and in different psychological complexes or states of mind) and communicated (i. e., known by different persons). Logical connections and the acts of inference are between identities in different complexes of things, of thoughts, of meanings. The law of identity in *logic*, therefore, describes a minimal condition for knowledge and communication.

6. Tautology is the highest logical principle. The identity between premise and conclusion is the guarantee of validity. That there is nothing new in the conclusion describes the paucity of logical discourse but from

the point of view of disinterestedness this paucity is the token of certainty and validity.

7. There is no proof for logical laws or principles. Insofar as logic describes the meaning structure of knowledge it is 'descriptively' either true or false. But insofar as logical laws are true and therefore 'ought' to be obeyed, it becomes ridiculous to assert their truth. They describe only the conditions for valid inference; they do not provide logical grounds for being logical. Logic is not its own proof.

8. There is a necessity described by logic which is implicative necessity. There is a necessity which is 'for' logic which is not described by logic. The first is logical necessity; the second is a pragmatic and psychological necessity. There is no logic mediating between persons and logic or being logical. The only proof for logic – or better the ground for being logical – is the demonstration of the pragmatic need or the absurdity of being illogical.

9. Logic and non-logical (existence, e. g.) are not logically related. But, reflection secures a homogeneity between all things by first converting them into possibles. Logic provides a homogeneity in possibility, in knowledge, only by disregarding through abstraction the actuality. Existing things as conceived are logically amenable. That the world is an »existing (not as conceived) logical homogeneity«, Kierkegaard finds to be a gratuitous and unwarranted assumption. To assert that this is true 'sub specie aeternitatis' is to pretend to a standpoint that is not the logical standpoint.

10. The heterogeneousness of 'existence' is an expression for the differences between passions and thought and also for the difference between the thought of a thing and the existence of the thing. Reflection translates actuals into possibles and thus secures homogeneity within possibility, which homogeneity logic then describes. A contrary and non-logical effort is to convert possibles into actuals, out of homogeneity and out of possibility into the heterogeneity of existence.

11. All necessity is implicative, not causal. It is a metaphysical leap to impute to natural events and history the necessity characteristic of natural and historical knowledge. The necessity describing logical relations

and any and all possibles does not describe nonlogical relations. Logic describes the necessity within the meaning structures of knowledge, not tures of knowledge, not the world.

12. Logical movement, from premisses to conclusions, is a necessary movement. It is sharply differentiated from 'kinesis' or change in nature and from qualitative changes within human subjects. Logical movement is between possibles; 'kinesis' or motion is (from the logical standpoint) the transition from a possibility to actuality; ethical and religious change, conversion, repentance, a new life, etc., is to deny one kind of actuality in favor of another, which is at present only a possible. It is to '*become*' a possible.

13. Knowledge is a synthesis of the real and the ideal. Logic describes the duality but does not explain it. Metaphysical logic purports to describe and/or explain nature and history as a duality. A non-metaphysical and non-ontological logic describes only knowledge. It does not nor can it explain or construe the duality that the world and knowledge is.

14. That ethical-religious truth is 'subjectivity' is from a logical point of view a sentence purporting to be true about an objective state of affairs. Kierkegaard's logical theory permits the objective and logical and disinterested understanding of this assertion without mitigation of the religious and ethical standpoint on the one hand or the logical on the other.

15. That 'ethical-religious truth is subjectivity' is itself of logical and empirical significance:

- a) As a sentence it stands within a systematically related group of sentences which detail the limits and validity of cognitive meaning structures. This sentence has therefore validity within Kierkegaard's delineations of the logic of meaningful sentences.
- b) The sentence purports to be true about matters of ethical and religious fact. Whether it is or not, is another question. In principle, the assertion can be treated as an empirical hypothesis.

16. Logic permits of a high degree of certainty. The certainty about knowledge which is what logic provides is of a different order than the certainties within or of knowledge. The certainties of knowledge about

knowledge are greatest where only the ideal meaning structure is described; knowledge about knowledge becomes hypothetical also to the extent that the duality that knowledge is must be described. Logic is most certain because it seeks to describe that which is self-identical (not as some contemporaries say because it is all a matter of staying consistent with one's original definitions).

From all these, and there could be listed many more, it becomes clear that Kierkegaard's logical reflections describe a 'via media' position in logical theory. He was a formalist in logic but with significant differences from most contemporaries. He did not believe that logic or reflection stood logically or reflectively related to any content. He believed the meaning structures commanded by reflection were in truth empty of content and by themselves without existential and metaphysical significance. His case against the ontological logicians makes this quite clear. But, on the other hand, he does not make the logical forms simply inventions either. He believes them to be discovered within the knowledge enterprise which again did not wait for logicians or the logical forms before beginning. Once discovered and isolated it is clear enough that a reference to a non-logical content is not itself a logical matter. The content of the logical forms (which is what knowledge is) is gained only by extra-logical and intentional acts. But again to speak of logical forms as if they were pre-existent is a mistake. They are abstracted from knowledge and have separate existence only to the thought which abstracts them.

Kierkegaard refuses all of the extreme resolutions of the problem that can be raised respecting the relation of the logical and the real. He refuses to translate the homogeneity of essences to the realm of existence as do all the intellectualists of human history. This is his case against Hegel finally and, most particularly, against the Eleatic philosophers of the ancient world. But, against the other extreme he is equally opposed. He refuses to translate the heterogeneity of existence and the inner life to logic and the realm of essences. This is his point in denying so candidly the Hegelian effort to introduce movement ('kinesis') into logic. His position keeps him a kind of dualist. All of the unities are logical; the differences and the

clefts between people, between people and thoughts, between thoughts and things, he accepts to be what they are. Philosophy, and certainly not logic, is no legerdemain by which to discover their underlying unity. No metaphysics heals the breaches, no ontology gives any understanding of the duality. Kierkegaard has no philosophical instrument to make the world different than it appears.

Kierkegaard's understanding of logic secures his intellectual modesty. To re-trace his thought on metaphysics is a refreshing and novel mode of seeing how his understanding of the province of validity tempered his hopes and his conjectures about what may or may not be the truth about nature and history.

A NOTE CONCERNING SOURCES

I should like to suggest that the principle sources for the remarks here offered are Kierkegaard's *Concept of Dread, Fragments, Postscripts*, and volume II of *Either/Or; Samlede Værker*, II (2. Del, *Enten-Eller*), IV (*Philosophiske Smuler og Begrebet Angest*), VII (*Afsluttende Uvidenskabelig Efterskrift*). Numerous places in the *Papirer* are important too, of which I list only a few: Vol. I A, 317; II A (entire section), C 20; III B, 177; IV A, 68; IV B, 118; IV C, 62, 63, 66, 79; V B, 5-8, 49; VI A, 335; VI B, 88; X 2 A, 195, 328, 439. Also, the incomplete »De Omnibus Dubitandum est«, Vol. IV, is appropriate as are the lengthy ruminations about logical problems, indirect communication, etc., which were parts of projected books included in the *Papirer*.

V. Kuhr's *Modsigelsens Grundsætning* (Kierkegaard Studier, Vol. II, København, 1915) is an able work on these matters and D. F. Swenson's essay, »The Anti-Intellectualism of Søren Kierkegaard« (included in *Something About Kierkegaard* Minneapolis, 1945) is a penetrating endeavor by a student of modern logic to show what Kierkegaard's criticisms of intellectualism actually meant. To both of these, and a host of others, I am, of course, greatly indebted.