
An Analytical Interpretation of Kierkegaard as Moral Philosopher

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I

To speak about “the ethics of Kierkegaard” or more generally about “Kierkegaard as a Moral Philosopher” is a problematic enterprise. First of all it is a question of interpretation as to whether he has any ethics or moral philosophy at all. Without doubt many ethical issues are discussed in his work, but is this discussion to be looked upon as a philosophical one? And what is the connection between this debate and Kierkegaard’s own point of view? To avoid questions like these at the beginning, or more precisely: to get to a point where we have a kind of background and a language that will make it possible for us to ask questions like these, I will in this paper basically limit myself to Judge Wilhelm’s position in the letter called “Equilibrium between the Aesthetic and the Ethical in Developing the Personality”. I do not claim that the Judge’s position and Kierkegaard’s are identical. On the contrary, I am sure that as early as 1843 Kierkegaard looked upon any non-Christian position as despair. It is, I think, obvious that Kierkegaard in his later work – and especially in the *Journals* – uses another concept of ethics qua ethics than the one advocated by the Judge. But even if one accepts this, the Judge still has some basic moral philosophical assumptions about ethics qua ethics, which are also to be found in the later writings. It is obvious, too, that Judge Wilhelm’s letter is not merely a piece of moral philosophy, but as far as it is moral philosophy, I will try to reformulate it in the more modern language of analytical philosophy, thereby trying to put at least some part of Kierkegaard’s work in relation to one of the most important trends in contemporary philosophical thought. In doing this I will read the letter more from a systematic than from a historical point of view, and I will raise questions which often go beyond the horizon of the Judge’s own understanding. But that of course is the very heart of any systematic interpretation.

II

I will start by looking at some of the *meta-ethical* assumptions of the letter. More precisely I want to ask whether the Judge has a *cognitivist* or a *noncognitivist* idea of ethics? Is it or is it not possible, according to the Judge, for ethical expressions or sentences to have a truth-value? The

way I put this systematic question is of course influenced by the debate in the analytical campus since the thirties of our century, but basically I claim that also the Judge (and more generally Kierkegaard) was deeply involved in a problem very similar to this question,¹ and what is more important: the Judge has an answer, one which Kierkegaard never gave up.

It is a common feature of most modern noncognitivist analytic philosophers, that they base their position upon a criticism of different philosophic attempts to justify ethical sentences like: “Don’t lie”, “Stealing is wrong” and “You ought to marry”. Any argument that tries to deduce such normative sentences from purely empirical premises is rejected as committing *the naturalistic fallacy*. A similar criticism is brought against people like Foot and Searle, when they try to give a conceptual argument for the truth of ethical sentences, or against Apel and Habermas, when they involve themselves in a transcendental – a priori reasoning. *Nonnaturalistic*, cognitivist orientated philosophers like Hartmann, Husserl, Moore, Roos and Scheler are blamed for introducing a mystical moral “intuition” that is epistemologically without any value. Given this criticism, the noncognitivist draws his conclusion: If you have no way whatsoever of proving or disproving the truth of an ethical expression, this expression cannot have any truth-value, and we have to look upon the expression in another way. The noncognitivists will then start to discuss the more specific function of an ethical expression in language, given it has no truth-value. Are we going to be *decisionists*, *emotivists* (like Ayer and Stevenson), *prescriptivists* (like here), or should we advocate some kind of *multifunctionalism*, claiming that ethical expressions have many different functions in our language? My question is then, how does the Judge fit into this debate in our century? I think he fits in very well, and I think he has a very extraordinary position too.

First of all the Judge is a strong enemy of *the naturalistic fallacy*. Of course, the Judge is not occupied with the question whether or not we can deduce *normative* sentences from purely *empirical* premises, but his criticism of what he calls “the modern philosophy”, especially Hegel, shows that he will oppose any attempt to justify norms in any other way than by using other norms. In Hegel’s *Logic* one starts in the first book with being,² and in the third book one gets the idea of the good.³ In more modern language it means that one cannot refer in any way to any entity without assuming the existence of a world that can be truly described as good or bad. It is exactly this *a priori* variant of the naturalistic fallacy that the Judge rejects, talking about *the absolute choice*. The choice is not primarily a choice between good and evil, but concerns whether or not you choose good and evil as such.⁴ In more modern language it means that you have to *choose* whether or not you will look upon the actual world and your actual life as being within the scope of the conceptual distinction between good and evil. You have to *choose* whether or not the

conceptual distinction between good and evil has any application in this world or not – you cannot *know* it. In maintaining this, the Judge is not only attacking Hegel, he is also in opposition to the general trend in the Danish philosophy of his time. Not only Hegelians like Heiberg⁵ would disagree with him on this point, but also men like Sibbern⁶ and even Poul Møller⁷ try to deduce norms from nonnormative premises. Yet not the Judge. Unlike his contemporaries he is against any *naturalistic, cognitivistic metaethics*. In my understanding of Kierkegaard he follows the Judge on this point.

It also seems relatively clear that the Judge – as well as Kierkegaard – would reject *the nonnaturalistic cognitivistic* attempts to justify ethical sentences by means of some *ethical intuition*. It is true that the Judge speaks about despair as the way through which you will find yourself in your eternal validity (“evige Gyldighed”),⁸ and one might interpret this “finding” (“... finder ...”) as some kind of intuition. But on reading a little further in the text it becomes clear that this despair already presupposes the choice of oneself in one’s eternal validity.⁹ One does not choose to despair and by despairing find (or get an intuition of) oneself in one’s eternal validity. To choose to despair is already to choose oneself in one’s eternal validity, i. e. to choose to look upon oneself from the viewpoint of good and evil. There is no eternal intuition outside the choice of good and evil to tell us whether or not the concepts of good and evil have any application in our world. If this is right, it becomes obvious that the Judge is no *nonnaturalistic, cognitivistic intuitionist*.

But if the Judge is neither a naturalistic nor an intuitionistic, non-naturalistic cognitivist, it seems to follow that he has to be a *noncognitivist*! That is the argument used by classical noncognitivists of our own century like Ayer, and it is an argument which would be accepted by even the most modern opponents of noncognitivism. The latest attempts in the eighties in British analytical philosophy using Dummett’s anti-realistic semantics¹⁰ as a weapon against ethical noncognitivism would thus demand some proof-procedure as a condition for ascribing a truth-value to an ethical sentence. But according to the Judge there is no such procedure. He therefore seems to commit himself to noncognitivism.

However, such a classification of the Judge would, according to my interpretation, be a blunder. The Judge – and Kierkegaard – are most certainly *metaethical cognitivists*. When the Judge speaks about “the self in its eternal validity”¹¹ or “the absolute self”¹² or “God”¹³, he speaks about something that endows the ethical sentences with a truth-value quite apart from our ability to prove or disprove the truth of such sentences. Also his idea of a man living in despair without knowing it¹⁴ seems to presuppose a cognitivistic metaethics. And so it does. The Judge is both a sharp *critic* of any attempt to prove or disprove the truth of ethical sentences and an *adherent* of a *cognitivistic metaethics*! This combination of an *epistemological skepticism* and a *semantic cognitivism* shows that the Judge is a *semantic realist* in the sense of Dummett. And he is a very ra-

dical and extraordinary one too. The Judge not only rejects the possibility of proving or disproving the truth of a *specific ethical sentence*, he also rejects the possibility of proving or disproving the truth of *cognitivist metaethics*! For the Judge it is a logical possibility that noncognitivism is true – and the aesthete is right. But the Judge himself chooses to believe in cognitivism! The choice of good and evil is a *choice of cognitivism* and therefore also an acceptance of *the applicability of the conceptual distinction between good and evil in our world*. It is not the other way round. Logically, one could – like e.g. Sartre – choose to look upon life from the viewpoint of a conceptual distinction between good and evil and still be a noncognitivist. The Judge does not discuss this possibility, and it is certainly not his position. Instead he chooses cognitivism – and thereby the applicability of the concepts of good and evil.

III

Against the background of this *metaethical, nonnaturalistic, cognitivist, semantic realism* the Judge presents us with some parts of his *normative ethics*. I think it is reasonable to summarize his position in the following way:¹⁵

According to the Judge a person acts in an *ethically correct way*, if and only if:

1. Whatever the person chooses, he has to choose it seriously, i.e. *inwardly* (he has to act out of “Inderlighted”).¹⁶
2. The person has chosen to *advocate cognitivism*, i.e., he believes that our actions and lives can be truly described as good or evil independent of our own opinions.
3. The person has *chosen to do what he is actually doing*, i.e., he is not just making a behavioral response to a situation.¹⁷
4. The person’s actions are based upon some *duties* that have a *deontological legitimation*.¹⁸
5. The person’s actions are in accordance with *rules*.
6. The rules are *universal*, i.e., the rules are valid for everyone in the society.¹⁹
7. The rules have a *content* that is *generally accepted* in the person’s own society.
8. The person is acting within *a society of such a kind* that makes it *possible* for the person to act in accordance with the rule.²⁰

IV

This characterization of the Judge’s moral philosophy makes it possible for us to compare his position with common viewpoints in – especially analytical – modern metaethics and normative ethics. Yet something important is missing. We still have to ask *why* anyone should act in an ethically correct manner? And especially, *why* should anyone act exactly in accordance with principles 1–8? If the Judge could *prove* the truth of

his cognitivism, and if he could *prove* the truth of the principles in normative ethics, I could still hesitate to act in accordance with those principles, but my *knowledge* of good and evil would at least give me a *motive* (1) to be serious, (2) to advocate cognitivism, (3) to choose what I am doing, (4) to base my action upon a deontological demand, and (5–6) to act in accordance with universal rules that are (7) generally accepted and (8) possible to follow in my own society. But the Judge has no proof. He therefore has to *motivate* us in another manner. That is exactly what he does.

He assumes as his starting point, that man wants to avoid *despair* (“Fortvivelse”). At the outset it is an open question how this despair is more precisely to be described. Especially, it is not decided whether despair is to be looked upon as a psychological state of a melancholic nature, or whether one has to look upon despair in a more radical manner. The Judge then tries to prove (or at least give good reasons) that the aesthetic life is of necessity a life in despair. He defines the aesthetical in man as that by which man immediately is what he is (“det Æsthetiske i et Menneske er det, hvorved han umiddelbar er det, han er”²¹). To live in an immediate or spontaneous way is to let one’s life depend on conditions inside or outside oneself, which are basically outside one’s own control.²² One might be happy in this way, but it is not a life in freedom, and therefore it is basically in the mode of despair. The Judge tries to show this by discussing seven different forms of the aesthetic life.²³ The different forms have a common *teleological* structure. At all the aesthetic levels man seeks to obtain some goal that does not essentially belong to him, so that it is never totally under his own control. Man may look for (1) health or beauty²⁴, (2) wealth, honor, nobility²⁵ or (3) a special talent.²⁶ He may (4) live for his pleasure,²⁷ or he may (5) live for enjoying himself²⁸ or even (6) live for enjoying himself, continuously throwing the conditions away.²⁹ If man gets what he wants, he is happy. If he loses it, he despairs (in a psychological manner). Therefore, the Judge concludes, the aesthetic life is always in despair!³⁰ This is probably the central argument of the whole letter – and of Kierkegaard’s philosophy too.³¹ If you have a goal in your life that can be missed, and if you look upon this goal as an absolute goal, as a *conditio sine qua non* for the fulfillment of your life, then you are living in despair regardless of your being a success or the opposite. In this way the aesthetic life is a life in desperation, even if (7) the aesthete has realized that all possible aesthetical goals are cases of vanity.³² To avoid this despair the Judge offers the ethical approach to life.

By virtue of this argument the concept of despair becomes qualified. At the beginning it was an open question as to whether man’s despair should be looked upon as a purely psychological state or disposition among other mental possibilities, or whether we should interpret the phenomenon in another way. At the end of the argument we get a new and more specific concept of despair, according to which *the very possi-*

bility of despair in the psychological sense is referred to as despair. The strategy of the argument has then the following structure. Firstly, the Judge tries to motivate us to transfer our original aversion against despair in the unqualified sense to despair in the new and more specific sense. Secondly, he tries to recommend ethics as a remedy for despair. Thirdly, he develops his idea of ethics in such a manner that ethics can actually function as such a remedy – given certain anthropological assumptions about man’s nature.

It is further interesting to see that even when the Judge cannot *prove the truth* of his metaethics or normative ethics, he nevertheless has an argument that tries to *motivate* you towards the ethical way of life. The choice of the ethical stage is not based upon a *knowledge* of its truth – but it is most certainly *motivated*. It is not a leap based upon throwing dice. It is a motivated choice based upon what I will refer to as *the argument from despair*.

V

On the basis of this argument from despair we begin to understand the inner structure of the Judge’s normative ethics (compare section III). If we – for the sake of the argument – assume the Judge’s conclusion, that the aesthetic life is reasonably described as a life in despair, because it has a goal outside the person’s total control, it is obvious to look for a goal within the person’s control. According to the Judge the ethical way of life is such a goal. Of course this life has to be (1) *serious* (inward or committed). Whereas most modern analytical philosophers would characterize an act without commitment as morally correct, if only it fitted into a certain scheme of normative ethics, it is the central point for the Judge that the ethicist ceases to act unseriously. If we are motivated to act in an ethical way by our longing for a life without despair, and if every life that we do not basically control is in despair, we have to commit ourselves to seriousness, because only serious acts can be fully within our own control and therefore free from despair. Ethics have to be serious, because without being serious they cannot fulfill their basic task: To free man from despair.

The ethicist is also (2) committed to *cognitivism*. Unlike the aesthete, who is not concerned with the truth or falseness of his accidental goals – as long as he reaches them – the ethicist has to believe that some goals are truly better than others. He has to believe that the true goals are those that make it possible to avoid despair, and that despair is an evil state of existence – even when the person in despair does not recognize it himself. To be ethical means both that you judge your *actual* life, and that you evaluate your *possible* (counterfactual) life. To be able to do that, you need a cognitivistic interpretation of your own judgement. On the basis of this cognitivism the ethicist hereafter condemns his former despair as something *evil*. At the outset he could not use this phrase about his own despair, because it was an open question whether one should look upon

the world from the point of view of good and evil. At the beginning the Judge could only say that he disliked his own despair and that he wanted to overcome this despair. But at this level he did not have the ethical distinction between good and evil at his disposal. After his choice of the ethical stage and its cognitivism, the situation has radically changed. He is now capable of reinterpreting his former life within the framework of good and evil. Because he is a cognitivist, he is capable of referring to his former life as a life of total despair and evilness. He thereby reaches the essential *existential concept of despair*, according to which despair is a *normative* concept, referring to a way of life that has the *possibility* of despair in the *psychological* sense, and which is therefore judged as an *evil* life that *ought to be changed*.

It also follows that the ethicist has to (3) *choose* what he is actually doing. Whereas it is without importance for the aesthetic life whether it reaches its goals by choosing to act in a certain way or by pure luck, it is important for the ethicist that his life is a function of his own decisions. Every important part of his life, i. e., every part which could lead to despair if something goes wrong, has to be within the domain of his own choice and not that of pure coincidence.

The Judge's normative ethics have therefore to be (4) of a *deontological* kind. If one has a *teleological* ethics, the ethical value of one's actions will depend upon some non-ethical value that will be more or less outside one's own control. Because of this, it has always been a problem to calculate within the framework of e. g. *utilitarianism*. Therefore, utilitarianism and the other well-known teleological normative ethical possibilities would no doubt be classified as principles of the aesthetic life by the Judge! Bentham, Stuart Mill, and all their modern followers are living in despair, because they have the conditions of the good life outside their total control. A purely deontological ethics with pure duties hand all the responsibility over to the man who acts, and that is what the Judge needs. The important thing is to have a *duty* and *fulfil* it, whereas the content of the duty is of less interest to the Judge. He gives very few examples of concrete duties, and some of them are from any normal teleological point of view quite crazy. Just think of the example from the Judge's childhood, where it was his duty to learn ten lines of Balle's catechism by heart.³³ This attitude to duty also explains why the Judge is very little concerned with other people in his letter. Basically the duties are not there to protect other people, instead they function as a means of attaining one's own salvation from despair! I want to stress this point. If I am right in my interpretation of the Judge, according to which the normal ethical, *deontological* principles such as "don't lie" and "you ought to marry" function as means of attaining one's personal salvation from despair, it seems that the Judge in the end presupposes a *teleological* "first order" normative level as the motivation basis for his "second order" normative ethics expressed in the eight principles above (see section III).³⁴ This "second order" ethics is then the basis for the "third

order” ethics of ordinary life containing duties like “don’t lie” and “you ought to marry”. Without doubt there is some truth in this description of the Judge’s position, but it has to be qualified a bit to avoid misunderstandings. First of all we have to do with a “first order” normative level of a very special teleological kind. It has only one value: *Despair is something mean*. Secondly, the “first order” teleology is of a *previsory* kind. As long as man’s longing for a life without despair is looked upon as a *motive* for becoming ethical, we rightly have to do with a normative thinking of a teleological kind. But as soon as man has actually chosen to live in an ethical way, everything changes. It is now a *duty* to avoid despair, so that the original “first order” teleological evaluations of man’s actions is replaced by the “second order” deontological evaluation. I. e., when the ethical way of life is chosen, we are not only introducing *cognitivism* and the distinction between *good* and *bad* (instead of a metaethical *agnosticism* about the truth-value of normative sentences and a normative nonethical distinction between something *desirable* and something *mean*), we also change from a *teleological* to a *deontological* evaluation of man’s actions. That this is possible, has – thirdly – to do with the extraordinary connection between man’s actions and the goal of the “first order” normative level. Normally, when we have to do with a teleological justification of some action, man has a problem of calculation, because the goal is outside his total control. For that reason the Judge’s normative ethics at the “second” and the “third order” could not be of a teleological kind. But at the “first order” level the Judge presupposes that man has no radical problem in reaching the goal (of avoiding despair), and therefore in this case we have no problem of calculation. If man really wants to, he is capable of overcoming his despair. By virtue of good will – and remorse (“Anger”)³⁵ – man will succeed in his battle with despair. There is no radical evil (“radikalt Onde”)³⁶ according to the Judge. The rest of ethics is built on the basis of this assumption – or thrown away, if there is a clash with the original goal at the “first order” level. And that is also why Kierkegaard’s other pseudonyms give up the ethical stage of the Judge and choose another way of life when they cease to believe that man is capable of overcoming his own despair.

Leaving this problem aside we may return to the ethical person, who has to act in accordance with a *rule* (5). Again, this normative principle is motivated by man’s attempt to avoid despair. To live in despair is to have some part of your past, present or future life outside your own control. To have one’s past, present and future life within one’s control is to have *continuity*³⁷ or *eternity*³⁸ in life. The aesthete has no continuity in life. He is therefore living in the moment.³⁹ His life disintegrates itself into interesting details.⁴⁰ To avoid this despair of the moment and to establish a continuity in life the ethicist chooses to live in accordance with rules. In following a rule all actions that can be subsumed under the rule will be of the same kind and thereby contribute to the essential qualitative identity between the different parts of his life. And this essen-

tial qualitative identity in a man's life is the *continuity* or *eternity* of this life.

That it has to be a *universal rule* (6) is motivated by the idea that the ethical action should be possible for every man at every moment of his life and not just for a specially gifted man. If the rule was not universal, there would be a difference between men in the ethical sphere, which would contradict the basically ethical idea that we are all equal. Why is this idea so important? It is important, because the opposite idea boils down to looking upon the ethical capacity as some *talent*, i.e. as something one could lose. But if the ethical capacity was a talent, man could lose, the ethicist would have the same *risk of despair* as the aesthete. He would therefore by virtue of the very possibility of despair already be in despair. But if the ethical capacity is not a talent that man can lose, it has to be a part of man's nature that he has got this capacity. And if the capacity is a part of man's nature, it is eo ipso something that every man has and not a talent that separates men. From an ethical point of view all men therefore have to be equal, which means that the ethical content, i.e. the ethical principles or rules, must have a universal structure.

As regards the last two principles of the Judge's normative ethics, (7) that the rule's *content* has to be generally accepted, and (8) that the society has to be of such a kind that it is *possible* for the person to act in accordance with the rule, they most certainly represent the weakest points in his whole position. The Judge is here certainly presupposing something that is not totally within the individual's own control. It seems that the Judge tries to reconcile man to his life in a certain society by giving the common norms of the age an ethical significance. But it is clearly a weak point in the whole argument. It is also these two last principles that become more and more problematic for Kierkegaard to defend after 1848. That the rule has to have a content that is accepted in one's own society, and that the society is of such a kind that man can act in accordance with the rule, presupposes that we live in a basically well-ordered society. According to the Judge we do have such a society: every man has a *mission* ("et Kald"), which is an expression of *the reasonable structure of the world* ("... der er en fornuftig Tingenes Orden...").⁴¹ All differences aside, the Judge – and Kierkegaard follows the Judge up to 1848 and even longer in his basic understanding of ethics qua ethics – agrees with Hegel, that there is a certain "Sittlichkeit", which we can take for granted, when we speak about ethics. With the breakdown of the absolute monarchy Kierkegaard begins to question this premise. As especially Deuser⁴² and Nordentoft⁴³ have shown, this introduces in the fifties – especially in Kierkegaard's Journals – a new discussion of the concept of ethics. It is not my intention to go further into this discussion. I only want on the one hand to mention this change in Kierkegaard's concept of the ethical stage and on the other, to stress that the change has no influence on the first six principles. In his whole work Kierkegaard continues to look upon the first six principles as necessary conditions for

a correct ethical life. And what is more important: Those six principles are so basic that we can use them to draw a borderline between the ethical stage and the other stages in such a way that we get a distinction valid for Kierkegaard's whole work. The first four principles – (1) to be *serious*, (2) to advocate *cognitivism*, (3) to *choose* what you are doing and (4) to base your actions upon *deontological demands* – are both necessary and sufficient to distinguish between the aesthetic stage and the other stages. If a person is a serious cognitivist who chooses his actions on the basis of deontological principles, he ceases to live aesthetically. The next question is to ask whether his life is ethical or belongs to some other non-aesthetical way of life. The religious man is also a cognitivist, one who has made up his mind within a deontological framework of demands, but his actions need not be in accordance with any rule (5) and certainly not a universal rule (6). The religious man establishes his continuity or eternity in life through a relation to God, which does not presuppose rule-following actions. That Kierkegaard looks upon this as a possible construction shows most strongly that *the motivating basis* for choosing an ethical or a non-ethical way of life is *outside* what I have called the eight “second order” normative principles. The basic “first order” motivation-level has a teleological structure that in the end makes it possible to give up the normal universal ethical rules of the second order. And that is exactly what happens when man transcends the ethical sphere and becomes religious. But that is another story.

1. It is obvious that Kierkegaard did not focus upon actually expressed ethical sentences, but talked about ethical existence and ethical actions. Nonetheless the problem of cognitivism/noncognitivism arises again when we take into account that the ethical man has a self-understanding which qua understanding has a certain semantic meaning corresponding to the semantic meaning of outspoken sentences. We may therefore ask whether man's self-evaluations have truth-values or not.
2. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Erster Teil, p. 66, Felix Meiner-edition, Hamburg 1934.
3. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Erster Teil, pp. 477 ff, Felix Meiner-edition, Hamburg 1934.
4. Søren Kierkegaard, *Samlede Værker* 1–14, Copenhagen 1901–1906. SV 2, p. 153.
5. E.g. Heiberg, *Prosaiske Skrifter* vol. 1, pp. 369 ff, Copenhagen 1861.
6. E.g. Sibbern, *Om Erkjendelse og Granskning*, p. 7, Copenhagen 1822.
7. Poul Møller, *Efterladte Skrifter* vol. 5, p. 141, Copenhagen 1849.
8. SV. 2, p. 188.
9. SV. 2, p. 189.
10. Dummelt, *Frege*, London 1973.
11. SV. 2, pp. 170, 188, 189, 193, 196.
12. SV. 2, pp. 191–192.
13. SV. 2, pp. 152, 171, 194.
14. SV. 2, p. 173; compare SV. 4, pp. 363–366 and SV. 11, p. 155.
15. Compare H. Ofstad and Å. Löfgren, “Morality, Choice and Inwardness. Judge William's Distinction between the Aesthetical and the Ethical Way of Life”, *Inquiry* 8, pp. 33–73, Oslo 1965.
16. E.g. SV. 2, p. 152.
17. E.g. SV. 2, p. 201.
18. E.g. SV. 2, p. 228 ff.
19. E.g. SV. 2, p. Compare SV 4, p. 383.
20. E.g. SV. 2, p. 262.
21. SV. 2, p. 161. Compare pp. 163, 172.
22. SV. 2, p. 163.
23. SV. 2, pp. 164–185.
24. SV. 2, pp. 164–165.
25. SV. 2, pp. 165.
26. SV. 2, pp. 165–166.
27. SV. 2, pp. 166–172.
28. SV. 2, pp. 172.
29. SV. 2, pp. 172.
30. SV. 2, pp. 173.
31. Compare e.g. SV. 9, p. 43.
32. SV. 2, pp. 175 ff.
33. SV. 2, pp. 239–240.
34. This idea is already hinted at in Ofstad's and Löfgren's article, “Morality, Choice and

Inwardness”, *Inquiry* 8, pp. 33–73, Oslo 1965. It is fully developed in Wilfried Greve, *Kierkegaards maieutische Ethik*, Frankfurt am Main 1990.

35. SV. 2, pp. 194, 201.

36. SV. 2, pp. 157, 159.

37. SV. 2, pp. 176, 179, 195, 206.

38. Compare my analysis in “Kierkegaards Zeitverständnis in seinem Verhältnis zu Hegel”, *Text & Kontext*, pp. 84–111, Copenhagen/München 1980.

39. SV. 2, pp. 162, 181, 206.

40. SV. 2, p. 10.

41. SV. 2, p. 262.

42. Herman Deuser, *Sören Kierkegaard. Die paradoxe Dialektik des politischen Christen*, München 1974.

43. Kresten Nordentoft, “Hvad siger brandmajoren?” – *Kierkegaards opgør med sin samtid*, Copenhagen 1973.

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