

The Dating of Kierkegaard's *The Conflict between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars:* A New Proposal

Jon Stewart

As a young student, Kierkegaard penned a student comedy with the title, *The Conflict between the Old and the New Soap-Cellars*. This work was written in his *Journal DD*.¹ The work consists of three acts and remains unfinished. It was never published in Kierkegaard's lifetime, and there is no record of it ever being performed. This comedy is probably best known for its satire on the Hegelians in its second and third acts. It is usually understood as a part of Kierkegaard's general anti-Hegel campaign.

The dating of this work has long been disputed. The editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* have recently argued that it was written between January 27 and May 29, 1837.² Kierkegaard's posthumous editor, Hans Peter Barfod placed it among the texts written in 1838 but gave no arguments for this view.³ The later editors Peter Andreas Heiberg and Victor Kuhr, in their well-known edition of Kierkegaard's *Papirer*, followed Barfod in this, also without argument.⁴ According to Carl Roos, it was written after December 2, 1837.⁵ Emanuel Hirsch puts it sometime during the winter of 1838–39.⁶ Frithiof Brandt claims that it must have been written from the second half of 1839, arguing that one of its main sources is Henrik Hertz's novel *Stemninger og Tilstande*,⁷ which was published in July 1839.⁸ Niels Thulstrup agrees with Brandt's argumentation, claiming that the work was written "between July 1839 and the spring of 1840."⁹ Critical of Thulstrup, Henning Fenger claims that it was written in spring-summer 1838.¹⁰ Given all this, it is clear that the dating given by the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* is merely the most recent in a long tradition of research. Of all the suggested datings, it is also the earliest.

I wish to argue, instead, that the *Soap-Cellars* was written between December 26, 1837 and April 1, 1838. While I wish to suggest this as an alternative dating, this essay is not to be construed as in anyway denigrat-

ing the outstanding work of the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, who have made and continue to make an absolutely invaluable contribution to international Kierkegaard research with their painstaking philological work. By showing the reader the true context of the *Soap-Cellars* in the *Journal DD*, this edition has already made a significant advance in the general knowledge of this text. This essay is instead to be conceived as a part of an appreciative, engaged and critical dialogue with one of the results of this new edition.

I. The New Dating Presented in *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*

The main argument given by editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* for their early dating is that the work is a satirical response to Hans Lassen Martensen's (1808-84) review of Johan Ludvig Heiberg's (1791-1860) *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course*. This review appeared in the December issue of the *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur* for 1836,¹¹ which the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* claim only actually appeared at the beginning of January 1837.¹² Kierkegaard was then effronted and irritated by various aspects of the review, and so he wrote the *Soap-Cellars* immediately thereafter in part as a satirical response.

According to this argument, Kierkegaard began by reading Martensen's article, which he refers to in his *Journal BB*, in an entry from sometime between January 27 and February 4, 1837.¹³ Then, it is argued, Kierkegaard began work on the *Journal DD* with the *Soap-Cellars*, which he started at this point. When he was done, he turned the journal around, so that what was, at the start, the back now became the front, and he began to write individual entries in the journal. The first date of these is May 29, 1837. (The rest of the entries in the journal are written from the front, while this comedy is written from the back.)¹⁴ Thus, the thesis is that the *Soap-Cellars* was the very first thing written in the *Journal DD*, and all the other individual entries followed. It is argued that the work was written between the time Kierkegaard read Martensen's article around January 27 and when he began writing in the journal from the other side on May 29, 1837.

A part of the humor of the *Soap-Cellars* is found in its satirical references to Martensen's review, in which Martensen uses a number of philosophical slogans, i.e., *de omnibus dubitandum est, cogito ergo sum, δος μοι που στω*. Many of the commentaries in *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* point out these connections to Martensen's review.¹⁵ The implicit argument is that for the use of

these slogans to have a comic effect in the *Soap-Cellars*, Martensen's review must still have been fresh in the minds of the readers at the time. If too much time had passed and people had forgotten the review and the slogans it contained, then they would not be able to pick up on the allusions, and thus the comic element would be lost. Thus, it is claimed, the *Soap-Cellars* must have been written very soon after the appearance of Martensen's review.

Another argument in favor of the dating by the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* is the mock account of the history of modern philosophy which is given in the *Soap-Cellars*. This seems clearly to be a satirical allusion to Martensen's brief overview of modern philosophy in his review. Kierkegaard has his character, the philosopher, Hr. von Springgaasen run through roughly the same sequence of thinkers that Martensen does in his review. Like Martensen, Hr. von Springgaasen begins with Descartes who founded modern philosophy with his principle of universal doubt. Also in both cases brief references are given to later philosophers like Spinoza, Kant and Fichte until the story is completed with Hegel's philosophical system.

Given these striking points of similarity, it seems at first glance highly persuasive that the *Soap-Cellars* is in immediate dialogue with Martensen's review and, for this reason, was written immediately after the review was published at the beginning of 1837. However, while there can be no doubt that Kierkegaard was highly influenced by Martensen's review, these points of similarity are not, I wish to argue, sufficient to make the case for the dating of the *Soap-Cellars* claimed by the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*.

II. The Historical Context

While the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* argue that the *Soap-Cellars* was the first thing written in the *Journal DD*, I wish to claim, by contrast, that it was written a year later, midway through the journal in the first few months of 1838. In order to fully appreciate this proposed dating, one must first have some familiarity with Martensen's activities as both an author and an instructor at the University of Copenhagen at the time.

A. Martensen's Review of Heiberg's Introductory Lecture

In the fall of 1836 Martensen had just returned from an extended trip abroad with a travel grant. During this extraordinary journey, which Martensen describes in great detail in his memoirs,¹⁶ he met most of the major German thinkers of the day, including the right-Hegelian theo-

gians, Philipp Marheineke (who had recently edited and published Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*) and Karl Daub, as well as the left-Hegelian David Friedrich Strauss, not to mention Schelling and Franz von Baader.

After being inspired by so many of the great intellectual figures in Germany, he decided to finish his trip with a stay in Paris in the summer of 1836. It was there that he made the acquaintance of the Danish Hegelian, Johan Ludvig Heiberg, for the first time.¹⁷ Here they discovered their common interest in Hegel's philosophy and founded a firm friendship that would endure until Heiberg's death. Returning to Copenhagen after some two years abroad, full of new ideas from his long trip and inspired after just having met Heiberg in Paris, Martensen was ready to make his assault on the intellectual life of the capital.

Martensen began this assault with his review of Heiberg's *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course*, which, although dated 1836, appeared, as noted, at beginning of 1837.¹⁸ It is difficult today to appreciate the full significance of this short book-review without a detailed understanding of the context in which it appeared. When Martensen returned from his journey, not just Heiberg but many other educated Danes were interested to hear his experiences and impressions of the leading scholars in Prussia and the German states. His review of the *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course* appeared in the leading academic journal of the day and was thus immediately read by Danish scholars in philosophy, theology, literature and other fields. It in a sense served to announce to these scholars the position that Martensen himself had arrived at after his journey and after considering and digesting the many philosophical and theological views to which he had been exposed.

It is common to read Martensen's review as a straightforward encomium for Hegel's philosophy and a public declaration of his newly won Hegelianism. It is also thought that with this work Martensen openly allies himself with Heiberg's Hegelian program. If one were to read only the first few pages of the review then this might well be the impression one receives. This view of the matter, however, overlooks the fact that, at the end of the review, Martensen sets forth some quite serious criticisms of Hegel's thought.

In order to give his Danish readers a wider sense of perspective on Hegel's system, Martensen attempts to give an overview of the history of philosophy and then tries to interpret Hegel's significance in that context.¹⁹ He traces two main periods of philosophy, the Middle Ages and the early

modern period. What characterizes the philosophy of the Middle Ages was an unreflective faith based on images or representations. Reason played a subsidiary role to immediate intuition and representational thought. Faith in God was taken for granted without reflection. Martensen then juxtaposes the Middle Ages to what he calls “modern philosophy.” The modern world is characterized by its use of reason. Martensen casts Descartes in the role of the modern revolutionary in philosophy, who took the immediate faith of the Middle Ages and examined it with the tools of critical reason.²⁰ The principle of modern philosophy is not to take anything for granted but instead to examine critically every claim to foundational knowledge. He writes,

As is well-known, it was Descartes who appeared as the reformer of philosophy and who struggled against scholastic philosophy. Tradition, the authority of the Church, indeed every *given presupposition* was negated, for now science wanted to know the truth derived from itself. Only what could be established as irrefutable truth in the inner compelling necessity of *thought*, was permitted to count as such for man. The Cartesian phrase, “*Cogito ergo sum*,” exemplified the principle of this philosophy which was developed in the Protestant world. Instead of the free, faithful spirit’s religious knowledge, where the act of thought was also a religious act, there now entered the pure knowledge of reason, and *logical necessity* was raised upon the throne in the kingdom of science.²¹

Thus, Martensen portrays science and scholarship as in a sense displacing religion from its position of centrality in human life. Here Martensen uses the famous Latin phrase associated with Descartes as a slogan to capture the sense of autonomous reason that characterizes modern philosophy.

He goes on to add another slogan from Descartes along with this first one to designate the modern world. He writes,

Descartes indeed expressed this thought and made the demand for a presuppositionless philosophy, but a long time was needed before thought could be developed to the Concept and the expressed demand for a presuppositionless beginning was actually realized. The demand, “*de omnibus dubitandum est*,” is easier said than done, for what is required is not finite doubt, not the popular doubt about one thing or another, with which one always reserves something for oneself which cannot be called into doubt.²²

The task of modern philosophy is to find a reliable starting point which will stand the test of rational criticism. Martensen avails himself of the Latin phrase, “*de omnibus dubitandum est*,” or “one must doubt everything,” which appears at the beginning of Descartes’ method of systematic doubt in the *Principia philosophiae*.²³

As a part of his account of the history of modern philosophy, Martensen examines the question of the degree to which modern philosophers made use of Descartes’ basic principle to doubt everything and presuppose nothing. Thus, the question concerns the beginning of philosophy on rationally grounded principles alone. In this context Martensen quickly runs through some of the major philosophers after Descartes, indicating how each of them has, despite their best efforts, nonetheless still presupposed something without justification. He begins with Spinoza, who, he claims, still uncritically presupposed the external world. Kant then makes the opposite mistake. By trying to avoid all presuppositions about objects and the external world, he presupposes the human subject, or the “I think,” which must accompany all representations.²⁴ Thus, both Spinoza and Kant attempted unsuccessfully to follow the Cartesian method of doubt since each of them neglected one crucial element which remained uncritically accepted.

Martensen then turns to Hegel’s philosophy as the climax of the story he has been telling. Only Hegel, he argues, fully succeeded in meeting the challenge of Descartes and beginning his philosophical system without presuppositions.²⁵ Hegel is hailed as the one who finally discovered the genuinely presuppositionless starting point for philosophy with the category of pure being. Kierkegaard was frequently critical of this enthusiastic affirmation of Hegel’s solution to the problem of the beginning of philosophy.

Towards the end of his article, Martensen gives a promissory note about his intention to develop some of the criticisms set forth in the review in more detail.²⁶ By this he clearly has in mind his dissertation *De autonomia*, which he was working on at the time and which indeed contains an extended account of this criticism. Kierkegaard seizes on this in the *Journal BB*, where he writes,

The article by Martensen in the *Maanedsskrift* is of a very curious kind. After leap-frogging over all his predecessors he has progressed out into an indeterminate infinity. Because his position is not given—this he specifically announces—his criticism of Hegel is external and his existence is equivo-

cal, and since the article, itself not characterized by a very individualized presentation and tone, does not bear his likeness, so that one was obliged to say when it appeared, "Give to Caesar that which is Caesar's," and because of his relation to a certain learned man in Munich, his articles could be *ein fliegendes Blatt aus München*, which has now been nailed down in the *Maanedsskrift*. —(By this likeness I do not mean a facsimile of his handwriting or his features carved in stone, but rather something like a watermark in paper, which both is and is not and which brands as a liar everyone who ventures to pass it off as his own.)²⁷

Here he refers to Martensen's stay in Munich where he met Franz von Baader. This journal entry, although undated clearly stems from sometime in 1837 shortly after Martensen's review appeared. From Kierkegaard's statements here, it is clear that Martensen's journey had been a matter of curious discussion among students and scholars at the time.

This review was highly influential. It seems to be with this article that Kierkegaard's well-known animosity for Martensen began.²⁸ In his papers Kierkegaard recalls specifically this piece:

Some teach that eternity is comic, or more correctly, that in eternity a person will perceive a comic consciousness about the temporal. This wisdom we owe especially to the last three or four paragraphs of Hegel's *Aesthetics*. Here [in Denmark] it has been presented in one of the journals by Professor Martensen. Although the professor, after his return [from his trip], and since his first appearance in the *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, has invariably assured us that he has gone beyond Hegel, he certainly did not go farther in this case.²⁹

Kierkegaard frequently caricatures Martensen as an unoriginal thinker who simply exploits Hegel's ideas. This seems to be what lies behind his often repeated critique of Martensen's claims to "go beyond Hegel."³⁰

Given that all of the philosophical slogans that are mentioned in the *Soap-Cellars* appear in this review, and given that we know from other journal entries that Kierkegaard read this review and was irritated by it, it would seem at first glance that the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* are correct in their assumption that this is the main target of satire in the comedy. This would then in turn mean that their dating of the *Soap-Cellars* at the beginning of 1837 is highly plausible. However, things are not so simple.

B. Martensen's *De autonomia*

Since his return to Copenhagen in the fall of 1836 Martensen had been working diligently on his dissertation presumably in the hope of academic employment. His dissertation was written in Latin under the title, *De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta* or *On the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology*.³¹ (Kierkegaard owned a copy of this work (ASKB 648) and the Danish translation of it (ASKB 651), which appeared in 1841.³²) The oral defense of this dissertation was held on July 12, 1837.

De autonomia is divided into six fairly short chapters or sections, which are further divided into numbered paragraphs. The initial section, entitled "On the Inner Connection between Theology and Philosophy," sets forth a straightforwardly Hegelian view of the unity of the two fields. In what follows Martensen traces a brief history of philosophy and its relation to theology from the Middle Ages to the present time. The point is to show how the modern principle of autonomy arose and was developed by thinkers such as Descartes, Kant and Fichte. This discussion immediately recalls the compressed account given in his review of Heiberg's *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course*, and indeed the same Latin slogans are repeated to characterize the individual periods, e.g., *credam ut intelligam*,³³ *de omnibus dubitandum est*,³⁴ and *cogito ergo sum*.³⁵ His argument here is that the developments in German philosophy have in a sense liberated philosophy from theology and have led to the ideal of autonomous human reason as the ultimate benchmark for truth.

The final, Chapter Seven, entitled "Transition to the Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in the Form of Absolute Spirit," represents Martensen's treatment of Hegel's philosophy. With Hegel the principle of autonomy in its *objective form* appears. Martensen gives a brief criticism of this Hegelian conception of the autonomy of Absolute Spirit. He places the Hegelian view here at the end since he believes it to be superior to the foregoing ones. Nonetheless he argues the conception of the autonomy presented here is not consistent with Christianity. With the concept of Absolute Spirit, Hegel confuses human and divine autonomy. The crucial distinction seems to lie in the fact that humans can never rightly think of themselves as the creators of the universe, and thus, even though they can know the truth, this knowledge is not accompanied by the divine power of creation. Thus, the absolute knowing that Hegel talks about at the end of his system will always fall short of the autonomy of the divine or Absolute

Spirit.

This is an important text for the question of the dating of the *Soap-Cellars* since it contains all of the elements of Martensen's review of the *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course*, which was claimed to be the key text that the *Soap-Cellars* intended to satirize. However, given that all of the same philosophical slogans are also present here in *De autonomia* as is the thumbnail sketch of the history of philosophy, one could, with the same reasoning, argue that *De autonomia*, and not the review, is the true target of the satire in the *Soap-Cellars*.

C. Martensen's *Lecture Course*, "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics." After completing his dissertation, Martensen was understandably anxious to establish himself at the University of Copenhagen. In the Winter Semester of 1837-38, he thus gave a lecture course with the title, "*Prolegomena ad dogmaticam speculativam*" or "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics."³⁶ These lectures were a major event at the University. Students from all different fields of study flocked to this course, which quickly became a kind of fashion. Martensen was apparently very effective at infecting his students with his enthusiasm for his newly won knowledge of Hegel and German philosophy. Thus, these lectures mark a clear academic breakthrough for Martensen personally as well as the breakthrough of Hegelianism in Denmark generally.

Kierkegaard was in attendance at some of these lectures, and a partial record of them survives in the form of his notes, which appear in his *Notebook 4*.³⁷ These notes are dated from November 15 to December 23, 1837, and thus cover the first ten lectures of the course, which took place prior to the Christmas break.³⁸ Kierkegaard leaves no record of the second half of the course that took place at the beginning of 1838, and thus he either went and took no notes or simply stopped attending altogether.

There are a couple of rather striking things about these lectures as they appear in Kierkegaard's notes. First, the title, "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics," does not fit the actual content of the lectures very well. Only the first four lectures give an account of the idea of a speculative dogmatics.³⁹ But after discussing these preliminaries and giving an account of, among other things, the relation of philosophy to theology, Martensen begins in the fifth lecture with what amounts to a history of modern philosophy. This fifth lecture has "Kant" as its heading, but Martensen actually begins with Descartes, referring to his favorite slogans, "*cogito ergo sum*" and "*de omnibus dubitandum est*."⁴⁰ The same lecture goes on to give a brief treat-

ment of the British philosophers, Bacon, Locke and Hume.⁴¹ The account of Hume continues in the sixth lecture and constitutes the transition to Kant.⁴² From this point to the end of the lectures in Kierkegaard's notes, i.e., lecture ten, Kant's philosophy is treated. In this account Martensen seems to aim at a rather systematic overview of the different parts of Kant's philosophy and cannot be said to concentrate on Kant's philosophy of religion let alone give an account of speculative dogmatics.

Moreover, it should be noted that this general outline follows rather closely Martensen's lecture course, "The History of More Recent Philosophy from Kant to Hegel," from Winter Semester 1838-39. A set of notes to these lectures is printed in the edition of Kierkegaard's *Papirer*, although they are written in someone else's hand.⁴³ These lectures begin with Descartes and cite the same two slogans associated with him.⁴⁴ Then Martensen briefly treats British philosophy, again using Hume as a transition to Kant.⁴⁵ Thus, Martensen seems clearly to be using the age-old professorial practice of recycling his lectures; but what is interesting is that by doing so, he apparently treats the same material in two ostensibly quite different courses. The title of the lectures from 1838-39 is clearly a more accurate reflection of the material treated than the earlier title, "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics."

Further, while Martensen's first course was known for its importance in exciting the students of Copenhagen for Hegel's philosophy, there is in Kierkegaard's notes no account of Hegel, although he is mentioned a couple of times briefly with rather incidental allusions.⁴⁶ Clearly, the reason for this is that Martensen had only worked through Kant's philosophy when the Christmas break arrived in 1837, and Kierkegaard's notes break off and do not cover the time when the course resumed at the beginning of 1838, which was presumably when Martensen began his actual treatment of Hegel's philosophy. In the aforementioned course, "The History of More Recent Philosophy from Kant to Hegel," which corresponds to this course in so many other respects, Martensen goes on, after his discussion of Kant, to treat Hegel extensively⁴⁷ after some short intervening accounts of Fichte, Jacobi, de Wette, Fries, Schleiermacher, and the early Schelling. Thus, it seems a virtual certainty that Martensen treated Hegel at the beginning of 1838 and his celebrity was based primarily on this part of his lectures.

There can, however, be no doubt about the significance of Martensen's first lecture course for the Danish Hegel reception. This course created nothing less than a sensation among the students. It is remarkable that more than ten years later, in 1849, Kierkegaard still recalls this event vividly: "It is

now roughly ten years since Prof. Martensen returned home from foreign travels, bringing with him the newest German philosophy and creating quite a sensation with this novelty.”⁴⁸

In addition to these comments and notes by Kierkegaard, there survive several other contemporary accounts of these lectures including Martensen’s own. In his memoirs Martensen explains his goal with these lectures and his relation to Hegel:

I decided therefore to give a separate lecture on the more recent history of philosophy and its relation to theology from Kant to Hegel. Even before my appointment I had, in winter 1837-38, given this lecture for a mixed group, which had specially requested me to do so, and each time it was repeated, the most numerous auditors came from different faculties, indeed even men who had positions in government. It was a world of new ideas with which they became acquainted here.⁴⁹

It is interesting here that instead of referring to this lecture by its actual title, “Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics,” Martensen refers to it with regard to its contents in a way that is more in accordance with the later title. In any case he confirms here that he did in fact treat Hegel in the part of the lectures that we do not have from Kierkegaard’s notes, i.e., those that he gave in the first few months of 1838. Martensen continues to give a less than humble account of the influence of these lectures at the time:

The effect of my lectures can be designated probably without exaggeration as great and unusual. A new life and excitement appeared among the students of theology. Philosophical studies exercised their captivating power, and the students were constantly discussing the highest problems. To be sure, there were those, as is inevitable in such situations, for whom the whole thing was a matter of fashion. Hegel was, indeed, the man of the age, and when one had his stamp, one stood at the height of the age. Others took the matter with Hegel seriously and made a study of him. But of these there were those who could not accept that I was not a Hegelian. Since Hegel was for them the highest, everything had to be derived from him, and they had a tendency to regard the non-Hegelian elements in me as something accidental, which could not come into consideration. They did not have an eye for the fact that, as often as I availed myself of the Hegelian formulations, the view I was working out was very different from the Hegelian one.⁵⁰

Here Martensen seems to be quite sensitive to the suggestion that he was a Hegelian. He is anxious to note that although he was understood by some to be a Hegelian during this period, nonetheless he had a very different philosophical and theological view from Hegel.

Other contemporary reports confirm Martensen's own estimation of the sensation that his lectures created. Johannes Fibiger (1821-97) decided to study theology in the fall of 1838 and thus came to attend Martensen's lectures during the winter semester. He paints a picture in vivid colors of the influence of Hegel on the entire atmosphere of the university at the time:

One had to have lived at that time to be able to conceive of the strange being [of Hegelian philosophy], indeed, even to be able to believe in the possibility of it. Under the absolutism of German philosophy, every thinker was zealous to work on the Tower of Babel of fantasy; what we heard all around us was nothing less than that every grandiloquent speaker made it virtually his goal in life to build a tower even higher. We were told that the universe with all of its large and small secret niches had been investigated and explained in the Concept; all riddles were solved; Hegel and his host of disciples in Berlin had finished the job...One had to imitate [Hegel's philosophy] and bring it even further; one was supposed to build one's own system and go beyond Hegel and become the great man of the scholarly world. After a short time this was the only air we inhaled; the only one we heard at the university which sounded like a voice from the future was Martensen's brilliant speech, and there was not so little in it of airy stones for that kind of building.⁵¹

One can sense a degree of ambivalence in this account. Clearly, Fibiger is critical of what he regards as the arrogant dimension of Hegelian philosophy, but one can also detect that he was partially swept away by the enthusiasm of the moment. He writes with irony of the view that he and his fellow students held at the time, "We were children of a new age, and people like Sibbern and Mynster, Clausen and Grundtvig had to hide when the glare [of our glimmering armor] blinded them."⁵² This testifies to the fact that there was in the air a sense of a change in the intellectual guard at the time, by which the older established figures were replaced by the dynamic young Martensen.

Another of Martensen's students, Frederik Nielsen (1818-89), describes in detail the exciting atmosphere at the time when Martensen began to lecture:

It was a lively and moving time when I entered the university in the year 1838—perhaps the most lively and most fruitful that the university had had for a long time....With Martensen's appointment the philosophical period arrived, and his lively lectures captivated not only students of theology. It was a philosophical glossolalia, which often was on the verge of going over the line and degenerating into a hodgepodge of philosophical neologisms! Hegelian philosophy was a true child of Germany, presumptuous and arrogant on all sides. The absolute had come; there were no secrets either in heaven or on earth. But regardless of these shadowy sides, the students were seized by a theretofore unknown life, and wherever they met they discussed all sorts of [philosophical] problems; there were discussions about triads, categories, negations, mediations, immanence and transcendence, etc., and this debate was no less animated than that described by Holberg in his *Peder Paars*.⁵³

Although it is uncertain whether Nielsen entered the university in the summer semester or the winter semester, the year was in any case 1838. From this account it is not hard to imagine why some people such as Kierkegaard became alienated with this student culture of discussing philosophy and theology with Hegelian jargon. Later Nielsen writes,

At the Theological Faculty it was Martensen who, of the professors, exercised the greatest influence on the students. His animated lectures attracted groups of auditors even from outside the circle of theologians, and often they stood a long way into the corridor. At the beginning he lectured on "Speculative Dogmatics," which later, in many ways changed and modified, became "Christian Dogmatics"....He was an enthusiastic man, who knew how to get others enthused, and even his critics were captivated by his fiery lectures.⁵⁴

Here Martensen is portrayed as upstaging the other more staid professorship with his energetic lecturing.

Martensen's courses soon became the most popular the University of Copenhagen had ever seen up until that point. While it caused great excitement among the students, this success by a young scholar caused resentment and consternation among the older professors who had never witnessed anything quite like it. The theologian Henrik Nikolai Clausen (1793-1877) belonged to the older generation of professors. He had been professor of theology since 1822 and regarded the new movement initiated by Martensen with grave suspicion.⁵⁵ In his comments Clausen describes in detail the sensation that Martensen created. He writes,

As to theology, it was all the more fortunate that this delayed transplantation across our borders took place through the medium of a personality who not only possessed an uncommon intellectual refinement and keenness, but in addition was firmly anchored to a Christian standpoint. It was in the autumn of 1837 that [Martensen's lectures on] "Speculative Dogmatics"....were introduced into our university. The novelty of the subject lent support to his brilliant lectures. Indeed, no matter how great the modifications made to the Hegelian costume that emerged here, the result could after all only be that the contents of Christian revelation came to look like something hitherto unknown and unheard of, and this new form of the Gospel evoked the greatest interest among the students....But the speculative movement was transmitted to us and brought into relation to theology in such a manner that it undoubtedly incited a great number of students to think more liberally and independently, and to acquire a deeper understanding of religion....It is an obvious and readily explainable fact that in those years interest in the exegetical studies gradually diminished, while the vast majority of the students found cheap compensation in the philosophical nomenclature that played such a great part in the Hegelian movements. "The favorite philosophy of the times" soon became, to use one of Søren Kierkegaard's phrases, "the childish philosophy of the times." People found youthful pleasure in this beating of drums, and they became an object of their own admiration when they heard themselves cavorting with these hollow nuts. Or, to use Goethe's words of wisdom: "Whenever ideas are wanting, words will take their place in due time." Our mother tongue in particular groaned beneath a linguistically corrupt submersion in speculative German. This overwhelming and extremely oppressive barbarity confronted me during the courses that I held for a great number (one hundred or more) of students in those years.⁵⁶

On the whole Clausen seems highly critical of Hegelianism in general, while nonetheless having great respect for Martensen's person and abilities. Clausen recalls with apparent approval the famous play on words from *Either/Or*, where Kierkegaard indirectly criticizes Martensen's eager students.⁵⁷ One of Clausen's main complaints is the Hegelian jargon that was bandied about in Martensen's lectures. This is doubtless one of the things that the *Soap-Cellars* is intended to satirize.

Another witness to these events was the poet and pastor Jens Christian Hostrup (1818-92), who was a student at the time. Far from being critical of Martensen's Hegelianism, as Clausen was, Hostrup recalls Martensen's

lectures as being instrumental in his “intellectual awakening.”⁵⁸ He gives a sense of the profound influence Martensen exerted over an entire generation of students. Hostrup writes,

Especially after we had finished the first part of the second examination and studied for the so-called *philosophicum* [examination], there arose a recognizable commotion among the first-year students, and it happened often when Martensen was going to speak that several people came early to the university and gathered in the courtyard, which was not yet paved, which looked out towards Fiolstræde, in order to talk about what we had heard the previous times. It soon became more apparent that the new commotion had found a resonance among many people, and therefore contributed not so little to them speaking a new language. In Germany Martensen had become a warm follower of Hegel, and when he began here at home, he believed still completely and firmly that he had found a thread in Hegel’s dialectical method, which could lead him into all of life’s depths.⁵⁹

As in Clausen’s account, Hostrup makes reference to the Hegelian jargon that dominated the discussions among the students at the time.

From these accounts there can be no doubt that with his initial lecture course in 1837–38 and the one that followed in 1838–39, Martensen initiated a new period in Danish philosophy and theology. This period must be characterized by a heightened sense of awareness for and appreciation of Hegel’s philosophy. Martensen’s lectures were indelibly etched into the memories of an entire generation of students.

Given the slogans and the account of the history of philosophy given here, these lectures could also be considered a possible candidate for Kierkegaard’s satire in the *Soap-Cellars*. On these points, the review of the *Introductory Lecture*, the dissertation, *De autonomia* and now these lectures all share the same features, which are targeted for criticism in the *Soap-Cellars*. This raises a number of questions, the answers to which may help to shed some light on the dating of Kierkegaard’s drama.

III. Some Counterarguments

With this background information, let us now return to the question of the dating of the *Soap-Cellars*. I would like to suggest that the early dating of January 27 to May 29, 1837, claimed by the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, is somewhat implausible for a couple of different reasons. First and

foremost, the object of the satire is not a written text, i.e., of Martensen's review of Heiberg's *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course*. What Kierkegaard is criticizing with this work is a culture of affected Hegelian conversation that he was presumably witness to as a student at the University of Copenhagen. Specifically, the criticism is of Hegelian jargon and the academic culture among Martensen's students. In January 1837 Martensen had only published his review of Heiberg's *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course* but had not yet given his influential lectures. As has just been seen above, his lectures only began in the fall of 1837, and indeed he only began to treat Hegel in the spring of 1838. It thus seems that the spring of 1838 is the absolute earliest dating for at least that part of the work that contains the Hegel satire.

While it is true that most all of the satirical philosophical slogans (i.e., *de omnibus dubitandum est, cogito ergo sum, δοξ μοι που στω*) that Kierkegaard puts in the mouths of the characters in the *Soap-Cellars* can be found in Martensen's review of Heiberg's *Introductory Lecture*, they would only have had a humorous effect if they were recognizable repetitions of things that Martensen had said or was known to have repeated. However, they appear for the first time in his review of Heiberg's *Introductory Lecture* and are only repeated later in *De autonomia* and the lecture course, "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics" from the winter of 1837-38. Only once they had been repeated in these contexts, would they have been recognizable by Kierkegaard's potential audience as clichés associated with Martensen. But there would be nothing particularly striking or humorous about them the first time Martensen wrote them in the review.

Finally, as noted, all three things mentioned here—Martensen's review of the *Introductory Lecture to the Logic Course*, his dissertation *De autonomia* and his lecture course, "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics"—display the same elements that are exposed to satire in the *Soap-Cellars*, i.e., the philosophical slogans and the brief history of philosophy. Now if one were to put these two texts and one lecture on a par, which of these would seem to be the most natural target for Kierkegaard's satire? The review and the dissertation were important, but it was the lectures that marked the real breakthrough. It was the lectures that for the first time created a sensation for Hegel's philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. It was the lectures that constituted a common cultural experience among the students. It was in connection with the lectures that Martensen's students began speaking a Hegelian language, which excited some and irritated others. Thus, it seems plausible that this is the cultural background information that Kierkegaard

hoped to draw on in the *Soap-Cellars*. Only students who had been at Martensen's lectures and had experienced the discussions surrounding Hegel's philosophy would have fully appreciated the satire of Kierkegaard's work. This would not have been possible for someone who had just read Martensen's review of the *Introductory Lecture* and *De autonomia* but never put foot in his lecture hall.

IV. A New Proposal

I wish to argue that the *Soap-Cellars* was written midway through Kierkegaard's work on the *Journal DD*, in a place which must be regarded as an obvious gap. As noted, Kierkegaard begins the dated entries of this journal on May 29, 1837. He uses it to record various things from his readings for his studies in theology and considerations of different topics. Some of the dominant themes in the first part of the journal are aesthetics, irony, humor, etc., in short, many of the topics that have traditionally been associated with the young Kierkegaard. He writes these entries continuously until December 26, 1837.⁶⁰ It will be recalled that during some of this time he was attending Martensen's lectures, "Introduction to Speculative Dogmatics," which he took notes to in *Notebook 4*. The last date of his notes to that course is December 23, 1837.⁶¹ But up until that point in the lectures, Martensen had still not yet treated Hegel, and so it would have been impossible for there to have been discussions among the students about his philosophy in the way satirically portrayed in the *Soap-Cellars*. But Martensen did manage to treat Kant's thought and was presumably poised to begin his treatment of Hegel after the Christmas break was over and courses resumed in January 1838.

Kierkegaard's final entry for 1837 in the *Journal DD* is dated December 26.⁶² There then appears a gap of some three months, and Kierkegaard only begins writing in the journal again on April 1, 1838. From this point on the journal is considerably more sober, beginning with the report of Poul Martin Møller's death,⁶³ later followed by the report of the death of Kierkegaard's father.⁶⁴ Given the fact that the period of this gap in Kierkegaard's journal corresponds to the period of time, i.e., from January to April, when Martensen was presumably lecturing on Hegel's philosophy in his course, it would seem plausible that this was the period of the composition of the *Soap-Cellars*. Kierkegaard simply turned the journal around at some point during this period at the beginning of 1838 and wrote the comedy from the back of journal. When he was done, he turned the jour-

nal back around again at the beginning of April and resumed the entries as before.

This dating fits the evidence more plausibly than the early dating of January 1837. At that time Kierkegaard still did not have any reason to be upset with Martensen, for Martensen had yet to establish himself as a rival by ensconcing himself at the university and had yet to have his great influence on the students.

V. Some Additional Arguments

In addition to the arguments given above, there are a few scattered references which seem to point to the dating at the beginning of 1838. First, the *Soap-Cellars* contains a reference to the Medusa, which can only be seen as a satirical reference to Heiberg's *Perseus*: "it was reserved for Fichte to look this Medusa in the face in the night of criticism and abstraction."⁶⁵ Here Kierkegaard recalls the motif from Heiberg's colorful opening words to his readers in the first issue of *Perseus*,⁶⁶ where the hero Perseus must do battle with the Medusa, the bad empiricism, in order to liberate the speculative idea and thereby attain the truth. This allusion again makes the dating of February 1837 impossible since this first volume of *Perseus* only appeared in June of 1837.

A second argument also has to do with Heiberg. While the sight of Martensen's students discussing philosophy and theology in Hegelian language might well have been the original inspiration for the *Soap-Cellars*, it was perhaps Heiberg who provided the *dramatic* model for it. The Hegelian dialogue in Heiberg's drama *Fata Morgana* may well have given Kierkegaard the idea for the genre of the work. *Fata Morgana* is generally recognized as a dramatic representation of some aspects of Hegel's philosophy. In his overview of Hegelianism in Denmark from 1855, Helweg names this work explicitly as a part of Heiberg's Hegelian program and places it on equal footing with the journal, *Perseus*, and the treatise, *On the Significance of Philosophy for the Present Age*.⁶⁷

The same tone found in the absurd dialogues between Arlecchino and Pierrot in *Fata Morgana* can also be found in the *Soap-Cellars*. Moreover, the mindless zeal of these two scholars as portrayed by Heiberg, is quite similar to the zeal of, for example, Hr. von Springgaasen and Mr. Phrase. Pierrot and Arlecchino represent two of the philosophical errors, which Heiberg wishes to criticize. Arlecchino, the poet, represents abstract idealism, which strives for beauty in the absence of the empirical. Pierrot, the

natural scientist, represents crude empiricism, which believes that truth lies in the empirical world and not in ideas, but this truth is an ever closer approximation and never something ultimately attained. He ends in a skepticism. These two characters represent Hegelian opposites which sublimate one another. In the following dialogue, Heiberg portrays an absurd example of Hegelian mediation:

Arlecchino: It is a great joy that you are occupied solely with external objects, with nature, just as I solely with the internal, with my "I"; for when one now adds our different endeavors....

Pierrot: That does not work; for addition one requires a common term, but the inner and the outer are opposite terms. I cannot say that three sheep and two cows are five.

Arlecchino: I beg your pardon, you can say that it is five head of livestock. The striving towards the inner and the striving toward the outer are both forms of striving.

Pierrot: Yes, that is true, you are right.

Arlecchino: Thus, when one adds our opposite strivings, there results a sum, which is no less than the entire human striving here on earth. I represent ideality and you reality; there is no third; we two are everything, that is, when one puts us together.

Pierrot: Oh, what a proud thought! We two are everything. Let me embrace you!

Arlecchino: With pleasure! Let ideality kiss reality. Now we are the Absolute.⁶⁸

Here one finds several well-known Hegelian motifs: the notion that dialectical opposites sublimate one another, the criticism of the law of excluded middle, and not least of all the dialectical relation of the inner and the outer, which will become one of Kierkegaard's hobbyhorses in his criticism of Hegelianism. The tone of this dialogue strongly recalls that of the *Soap-Cellars*.

What is important here is the timing. We know that Kierkegaard bought *Fata Morgana* when it came out in January 1838.⁶⁹ The work had its premiere on January 29, 1838 and saw only four further performances on January 30, February 3, 15 and 21, 1838.⁷⁰ Given that Kierkegaard was an avid theatergoer, it seems probable that he attended at least one of these performances, especially given the fact that he bought a copy of the work itself. This period of time corresponds exactly to the gap in the *Journal DD*,

when, I have argued, the *Soap-Cellars* was written. It is thus highly likely that upon seeing a performance of *Fata Morgana* and inspired by dialogues like the one quoted above, Kierkegaard hit upon the idea of writing his own Hegelian satire in the form of a comedy.

A final piece of evidence comes from a reference at the beginning of the *Soap-Cellars*.⁷¹ In the margin of the first page with the list of characters one reads the following:

However, in order that this piece will be useful for something, there follows a short compendium of conversation topics arranged *belieblich zum Gebrauch für Jedermann*, and a list of the abusive words one can use without becoming liable under the Freedom of the Press Ordinance of 1799.⁷²

As one can read in the commentary to this passage,⁷³ this refers to a piece of legislation from September 27, 1799, which limited the freedom of the press by forbidding certain terms of abuse. The problem was that there remained some ambiguity about exactly which words or expressions were considered terms of abuse. Without a list of the forbidden terms, publishers had to live in fear whenever they published anything at all that contained a critical tone. This issue was taken up by the publisher Jens Finsteen Giød-wad (1811-91) in an article entitled, "A Contribution to a History of Censorship."⁷⁴ This article appeared in a series of installments in the journal *Kjøbenhavnsposten* in January and February 1838. It pointed out that even the judges were uncertain and, as a result, inconsistent in their interpretation of the law. Immediately after the passage just quoted, Kierkegaard seems to refer to exactly this article: "Since I see, however, that a writer of verbiage at the office of *Kjøbenhavnsposten* always steals a march on me, I must admit with pain that my book is entirely useless, indeed, not even suitable for hammering a nail in a wall."⁷⁵ In the commentary to this passage,⁷⁶ the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter* seem to miss the reference to Giød-wad's article. However, if the reference is to this article, then this would mean that the *Soap-Cellars* must have been written after February 11, 1838, when that article appeared. This would fit perfectly with the gap in the *Journal DD* that has been proposed for the alternative dating.

Given these arguments and an understanding of the historical context surrounding Martensen's activities in 1837 and 1838, it seems clear that the *Soap-Cellars* could not have been written as early as the beginning of 1837. However, there are many arguments which speak for it being written during the period at the beginning of 1838, where there is a gap in the entries

in the *Journal DD*. This new dating may help to make more precise our understanding of Kierkegaard's changing relation to both Martensen and Hegel himself. I hope that my friends and colleagues, the editors of *Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter*, will take this suggestion in the positive spirit in which it is intended, for, although it contradicts one small point in their critical account of the text, it builds on the outstanding philological and commentary work they they have done with the *Journal DD*.

Notes

1. SKS, vol. 17, pp. 280–297, DD:208; EPW, pp. 103–124.
2. Leon Jaurnow and Kim Ravn, “Tekstredøgørelse” to *Journalen DD* in SKS, vol. K17, p. 363.
3. H.P. Barfod (ed.), *Af Søren Kierkegaards Efterladte Papirer. 1833–1843*. Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzels Forlag 1869, pp. 166–168.
4. *Pap.* II B 1, p. 285.
5. Carl Roos, *Kierkegaard og Goethe*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag 1955, p. 131.
6. Emanuel Hirsch, *Kierkegaard-Studien*, vols. 1–2, Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann 1933, vol. 2, p. 557 (continuous pagination).
7. Henrik Hertz, *Stemninger og Tilstande*. Copenhagen 1839.
8. Frithiof Brandt, *Den unge Søren Kierkegaard*. Copenhagen: Levin & Munksgaards Forlag 1929, pp. 420ff.
9. Niels Thulstrup, *Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel*, trans. by George L. Stengren. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980, p. 193. See also his “Student Søren Kierkegaard i Rollen som Dramatiker,” *Kierkegaard-Studiet*, no. 2, April 1965, pp. 18–32.
10. Henning Fenger, *Kierkegaard: The Myths and Their Origins*, trans. by George C. Schoolfield, New Haven and London: Yale University Press 1980, pp. 141–142.
11. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indlednings-Foredrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Coursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. Af J.L. Heiberg, Lærer i Logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, 16, 1836, pp. 515–528.
12. See Leon Jaurnow and Kim Ravn, “Tekstredøgørelse” to *Journalen DD* in SKS, vol. K17, p. 363.
13. SKS, vol. 17, p. 121f., BB:32; JP, vol. 5, 5200.
14. Leon Jaurnow and Kim Ravn, “Tekstredøgørelse” to *Journalen DD* in SKS, vol. K17, pp. 358–359.
15. See, for example, SKS, vol. K17, pp. 497f., 499, 500.
16. See Hans Lassen Martensen, *Af mit Levnet*, vols. 1–3. Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1882–83, vol. 1, pp. 85–231.
17. Hans Lassen Martensen, *Af mit Levnet*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 216–231. See also Johanne Luise Heiberg, *Et liv genoplevet i erindringen*, vols. 1–4. Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1973, 5th revised edition, vol. 1, pp. 281–283. Henning Fenger, *The Heibergs*, trans. by Frederick J. Marker. New York: Twayne Publishers Inc. 1971, p. 139.
18. Hans Lassen Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Coursus paa den kongelige militaire Høiskole. Af J. L. Heiberg, Lærer i Logik og Æsthetik ved den kgl. militaire Høiskole,” *Maanedsskrift for Litteratur*, vol. 16, 1836, pp. 515–528.
19. Martensen, “Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Coursus,” op. cit., pp. 516–524.
20. See Kierkegaard's criticism of Martensen's characterization of Descartes and his role in modern philosophy. SKS, vol. 17, p. 199, CC:12; JP, vol. 5, 5181: “But when one sees how necessary it has become in a later age to begin every philosophical work with the sentence: ‘There once was a man named Descartes,’ one is tempted to compare it with the monks' well-known practice.” SKS, vol. 18, p. 10f., EE:12; JP, vol. 3, 3270: “It seems as if philosophers in their accounts of modern philosophy since Descartes have adopted a form sometimes found in the fairy story, which through a repetition of everything that went before every time a new part is added, finally develops into an inter-

- minable series: stick won't beat dog, dog won't bite cow, cow won't go home, etc." See also SKS, vol. 19, pp. 131-132, Not4:7. SKS, vol. 17, p. 199, CC:12; *EO1*, Supplement, p. 462.
21. Martensen, "Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Coursus," op. cit., p. 517f.
 22. *Ibid.*, p. 519.
 23. See *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, vols. 1-2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, vol. 1, p. 193: "It seems that the only way of freeing ourselves from these opinions [sc. prejudices] is to make the effort, once in the course of our life, to doubt everything [*de iis omnibus studeamus dubitare*] which we find to contain even the smallest suspicion of uncertainty." The subtitle to this opening paragraph reads: "The seeker after truth must, once in the course of his life, doubt everything [*de omnibus...esse dubitandum*], as far as is possible." *ibid.* See Kierkegaard, SKS, vol. 4, pp. 101-102; *FT*, p. 5f. SKS, vol. K4, pp. 583-584.
 24. Martensen, "Indledningsforedrag til det i November 1834 begyndte logiske Coursus," op. cit., p. 520.
 25. *Ibid.*, p. 521f.
 26. *Ibid.*, p. 527.
 27. SKS, vol. 17, p. 121, BB:32; *JP*, vol. 5, 5200. (Translation slightly modified.)
 28. See M. Neiiendam "Martensen, Mynster og Kierkegaard," in C.I. Scharling, *H.L. Martensen. Hans Tanker og Livssyn*. Copenhagen: P Haase & Søns Forlag 1928, pp. 94-127.
 29. *Pap. V B 60*, p. 137; *CA Supplement*, p. 207. Translation slightly modified. See also *Pap. V B 72.33*; *CA Supplement*, p. 213: "The whole wisdom of the superiority of the comic we owe to the three or four last paragraphs in Hegel's *Aesthetics*, although it has also been presented with bravura by one who long since has gone beyond Hegel; and while he astonished women and children with his discourse, he would not as much as intimate that it was Hegel's."
 30. See, for example, *Pap. XI-3 B 57*, p. 107; *JP*, vol. 6, 6947: "Professor Martensen 'goes further'—that is to be expected of Prof. M."
 31. Johannes Martensen, *De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae in theologiam dogmaticam nostri temporis introducta*. Haunia 1837.
 32. Hans Lassen Martensen, *Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie*, trans. by L.V. Petersen. Copenhagen 1841. This Danish translation has been translated into English as *The Autonomy of Human Self-Consciousness in Modern Dogmatic Theology*, in *Between Hegel and Kierkegaard: Hans L. Martensen's Philosophy of Religion*, trans. by Curtis L. Thompson and David J. Kangas, Atlanta: Scholars Press 1997, pp. 73-147 (hereafter *BHK*).
 33. Martensen, *De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae*, § 2, p. 6; *Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie*, p. 5; *BHK*, p. 78. See Johannes Fibiger, *Mit Liv og Læring som jeg selv har forstaaet det*, ed. by Karl Gjellerup, Copenhagen 1898, p. 74.
 34. Martensen, *De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae*, § 5, p. 19; *Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie*, p. 16; *BHK*, p. 85.
 35. Martensen, *De autonomia conscientiae sui humanae*, § 5, p. 19; *Den menneskelige Selvbevidstheds Autonomie*, p. 17; *BHK*, p. 85.
 36. A complete list of Martensen's lectures can be found in Skat Arildsen, *Biskop Hans Lassen Martensen. Hans Liv, Udvikling og Arbejde*. Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag 1932, pp. 156-158.
 37. SKS, vol. 19, pp. 125-143, Not4:3-12. See Niels Thulstrup, *Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel*, op. cit., p. 133.
 38. See Kim Ravn and Steen Tullberg, "Tekstredogelse" to *Notesbog 4*, in SKS, vol. K19, pp. 177-183.

39. SKS, vol. 19, pp. 125–131, Not4:3–6.
40. SKS, vol. 19, p. 131, Not4:7.
41. SKS, vol. 19, p. 132f., Not4:7.
42. SKS, vol. 19, p. 133, Not4:8.
43. *Pap. II C 25* in *Pap. XII*, pp. 281–331.
44. *Pap. II C 25* in *Pap. XII*, p. 282.
45. *Pap. II C 25* in *Pap. XII*, p. 283f.
46. SKS, vol. 19, p. 127, line 38, Not4:4. SKS, vol. 19, p. 128, lines 31–32, Not4:5. SKS, vol. 19, p. 136, line 13, Not4:9.
47. *Pap. II C 25* in *Pap. XII*, pp. 318–329.
48. SKS, vol. 22, p. 325, NB13:86; *PF*, Supplement, p. 226f. Translation slightly modified. See also *Pap. X–6 B 171*, p. 262; *JP*, vol. 6, 6748, p. 395.
49. Hans Lassen Martensen, *Af mit Levnet*, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 3f.
50. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 5f.
51. Johannes Fibiger, *Mit Liv og Levned som jeg selv har forstaaet det*, ed. by Karl Gjellerup, Copenhagen 1898, p. 73.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
53. Frederik Nielsen, *Minder. Oplevelser og Iagttagelser*. Aalborg 1881, pp. 35–36.
54. Frederik Nielsen, *Minder*, *ibid.*, p. 45f.
55. For Clausen's assessment of Hegel, see Niels Thulstrup, *Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel*, op. cit., pp. 41–42.
56. Henrik Nikolai Clausen, *Optegnelser om Mit Levned og min Tids Historie*. Copenhagen 1877, pp. 211–213. Quoted from Niels Thulstrup, "The Situation in Denmark and Kierkegaard's Reaction," in his *Commentary on Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. by Robert J. Widenmann. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984, p. 77f. (Translation slightly modified.)
57. SKS, vol. 3, p. 168; *EO2*, p. 172: "I respect scholarship, and I honor its devotees, but life, too, has its demands. And even though I, if I saw one single extraordinarily endowed intellect one-sidedly lose himself in the past, would be perplexed about how I should form a judgment, about what opinion I should have alongside the respect I would hold for his intellectual competence—I am not perplexed today when I see a host of young people, not all of whom could possibly be philosophic minds, lost in the favorite philosophy of the times, or what I am somewhat tempted to call the childish philosophy of the times." (Translation slightly modified.) The wordplay, which is lost in translation turns on the proximity of the two Danish words for "favorite" and "childish," thus the "favorite philosophy" [*Yndlings-Philosophi*] and the "childish philosophy" [*Ynglings-Philosophi*]. Kierkegaard, who was a firsthand witness to this phenomenon at the University of Copenhagen is highly critical of both Martensen, whom he regards as unoriginal and morally suspect, and Martensen's students, whom he regards as naive and blindly overzealous.
58. C. Hostrup, *Erindringer fra min Barndom og Ungdom*. Copenhagen 1891, p. 80.
59. C. Hostrup, *Erindringer*, *ibid.*, p. 82f.
60. SKS, vol. 17, p. 251, DD:94.
61. SKS, vol. 19, pp. 141–143, Not4:12.
62. SKS, vol. 17, p. 251, DD:94.
63. SKS, vol. 17, p. 252, DD:96.
64. SKS, vol. 17, p. 258, DD:126.
65. SKS, vol. 17, p. 291f., DD:208; *EPW*, p. 118.

66. Heiberg, "Til Læserne," *Perseus*, no. 1, 1837, p. xiv and f.: "The mythical hero, whose name the journal dares assume in order in it to have a model for its bold undertakings, was the son of Jupiter, who, armed with Minerva's shield and Mercury's wings, killed the Medusa—the empirical, lacking in the Idea—whose decapitated head still turned to stone anyone who lost himself in observing its countenance. The Medusa was naturally beautiful, but Minerva had changed her hair to snakes because she desecrated the temple of wisdom with meetings with Neptune, the raw natural power, with whom she was in love. From the blood of the Gorgon, the disappearing source of life of the subluted realism, sprang forth Pegasus, the poetic steed, upon whose winged back the hero freed the Idea, which had theretofore been bound and abandoned to the power of nature, under the form of Andromeda, who, chained to the rock, was destined to be swallowed up by monsters of the sea. Once she was freed, he married her. *Perseus* means in the vernacular 'the destroyer'; but his destruction was not the completely negative destruction of time or death, but the heroic destruction from which a new and more noble condition proceeded."
67. Hans Friedrich Helweg, "Hegelianismen i Danmark," *Dansk Kirkeetidende*, vol. 10, no. 51, December 16, 1855, p. 826; printed in the present volume, *Kierkegaardiana* 24, pp. 330-345; p. 331.
68. See Johan Ludvig Heiberg, *Fata Morgana. Eventyr-Comedie*, Copenhagen: Schuboths 1838, p. 49f.
69. See *Auktionsprotokol over Søren Kierkegaards Bogsamling*, ed. by H.P. Rohde. Copenhagen: The Royal Library 1967, no. 1561: "Købt hos Schubothe januar 1838."
70. See Thomas Overskou, *Den danske Skueplads i dens Historie, fra de første Spor af danske Skuespil indtil vor Tid*, vols. 1-7. Copenhagen 1854-76, vol. 5, pp. 311-312. Arthur Aumont and Edgar Collin, *Det danske Nationalteater 1748-1889*, vols. 1-5. Copenhagen 1862-64, vol. 5.1, p. 224.
71. I am grateful to my colleague Peter Tudvad for bringing this argument to my attention.
72. SKS, vol. 17, p. 281, DD:208; EPW, p. 106.
73. SKS, vol. K17, p. 492f.
74. J.F. Giødwad, "Bidrag til Censurens Historie," *Kjøbenhavnsposten*, no. 42, February 11, 1838, p. 168.
75. SKS, vol. 17, p. 281f., DD:208; EPW, p. 107.
76. SKS, vol. K17, p. 493.