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Consciousness Matters

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Consciousness Matters

Sondra Fraleigh

What is essential in phenomenology does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement' ('Richtung'). Higher than actuality stands possibility (1).

Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time

Phenomenology is a method for studying experience. I employ this method in my research because it provides a first-person voice for the dancer, the choreographer, and the teacher/therapist in me. Oddly enough, the critic in all of us already uses a first-person voice when describing and interpreting the dance from our immediate experience of it, and telling others what we think about it. Written criticism formalizes the critic's sensate proximity to the dance. But what about the voice of the dancer in valuing the experience of dance, and the consciousness of the choreographer in making the dance? Where are they accounted for in the formulas for dance research and writing? The objective third-person voice necessary to a particular historical or social angle is more common. Phenomenology has given me a method for intuitive and theoretical reflections on dance from multiple perspectives. Eventually, I contextualize these within the larger framework of phenomenology as a branch of modern philosophy.

I began to write using the tools of phenomenology in 1970 when I became aware that aesthetic discourse on dance was distanced from the actual experience, and that the writers in dance aesthetics, with the notable exception of Susanne Langer, were mostly men. I wanted to use an embodied voice and to see if a woman in dance might add to the field of phenomenology. My interests eventually led me to developmental psychology, a field that has much in common with phenomenology (2). Maxine Sheets-Johnstone had already broken the ice in *The Phenomenology of Dance*, but she had written more analytically than descriptively, clarifying the formative (creative) basis of dance with values intrinsically located in the moving self (3). I built upon this, but I wanted to weave the intuitive voice of the dancer into a descriptive aesthetics, slipping from the first-person experiential voice to analytical third-person theory, as phenomenology does. These were the goals of my descriptive aesthetics: *Dance and the Lived Body* (1987) (4). Later I began to explain phenomenology as a research method for dance in my article for *Dance Research Journal*, "A Vulnerable Glance: Seeing Dance Through Phenomenology" (1991); and in "Witnessing the Frog Pond" (1999), I developed this more explicitly (5).

My recent work-in-progress, *When We Dance*, is influenced by the philosophy of phenomenologists who are opening up new vistas of organic being, mapping our way back to our body, our body back into the natural world. These include Bruce Wilshire's *Wild Hunger* (1998), which probes the primal roots of modern addictions, demonstrating the necessity of joy in the body; *The Imperative* (1998), by Alphonso Lingis, whose new phenomenology of perception illuminates the exquisite order of the world around

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and within us and the compelling imperative in our relationship to nature; and David Abram's *Spell of the Sensuous* (1996), which revises dualist thinking about the place of humans in the world and generates a lyrical humanism for the 21st century (6). Like these authors, my work seeks to heal our bodily rupture with nature and revalue the darkness mythically associated with nature and woman but through the voices and workings of dancers.

Today phenomenology has a more confident reach into consciousness than ever before as it extends into cognitive science, neuroscience, and developmental psychology with new understandings of how science and philosophy can blend (7). Linguistic and political concerns (8), and the artificial intelligence of cyberspace, also influence new applications of phenomenology. Sheets Johnstone articulates her feminist/phenomenological critique in *The Roots of Power*; in *The Primacy of Movement* she produces a comprehensive phenomenology of movement and natural history (9). Recent scientific advances in the research of Candace Pert and others are demonstrating the biomolecular basis for human emotion, proving that traditional divisions of body/mind are false, as has been the nondualistic basis of phenomenology in its concept of "the lived body" (10). Similarly, the neuroscience of Antonio Damasio is validating accounts of consciousness that relate body, self, mind, and emotion, also refuting traditional dualisms. He links his work to philosophy through Susanne Langer (a disciple of Alfred North Whitehead) and to developmental psychology through Daniel Stern (11).

I am concerned for the future of our field that dance research not be dictated solely by objective distance and quantification. Dance is not a scientific field even if it does employ various sciences to many good purposes. We should not lose the mystery and magic of dance, the anima mundi of our body in its continuity with nature, culture, and community. Phenomenology seeks the intangible obvious, that which lies before our eyes and in our hearts however obscured through habit, even as its existential conscience (a form of intelligence newly defined by Howard Gardner) reminds us that innocence, the river of our body's memory, is not naïveté.

To arouse the study of experience, from the innocence of spontaneous dancing to the most complicated choreographies imaginable, I suggest three related possibilities for developing phenomenology in the dance research of the future:

- *The validation of personal and shared experiences*, as we learn how to voice the dance and somatosensory experience from what Damasio calls "the feeling of what happens." I provide some examples in the next section of this essay.
- *Dancing as a way of knowing* that brackets body-mind integrity as the descriptive essence of phenomenology provides a basis for self understanding. Here it will be important to keep current on studies that extend our understanding of consciousness, cognition, and kinesthetics.
- *How our human consciousness links us to the nonhuman world*, as we seek to mend the destructive nature/culture split. The neurological studies of Damasio on consciousness (not exclusively human, as he holds); the extensive work of Sheets-Johnstone on the primacy of movement in the life-world; and the body ecology of Abram, Wilshire, and Lingis open up these possibilities.

Phenomenology connects with hermeneutics in its concerns for linguistic interpretation, as made clear by Paul Ricoeur in his work on sign, symbolization, metaphor, and text (12). As cognate fields, they both aim toward a creative interaction between the reader and the text (or the audience, the dance, and the dancer). I give an example of how hermeneutics enters into phenomenology in the last section of this essay.

I should clarify that phenomenology, even as it encourages the intuitive embodied voice, does not circumvent the problems of linguistics, aesthetics, history, and politics. Researchers and practitioners who continue to develop this method have an obligation to situate the experiential voice, accounting for what Edward Said has called "discrepant experiences," and in utilizing such conterpoint, to avoid essentializing views that are closed to the possibility of community (13). It would be possible, for instance, to

essentialize and isolate the voices of women (or ethnicities, or nations), without promoting the fuller knowledge they provide in overlapping other voices (even competing ones) in building community. Differentiation is important and so is integration; the first entails the ability to free oneself from social and genetic determinism, the second implies the individual's rapport with otherness, ancestry, nature, and communal variance. Phenomenology does not rest on the uniqueness of experience. Its mission is to find the irreducibles of subjectivity, those affective connections humans have with each other and non-human nature as well. In the language of phenomenology, this is "intersubjectivity," our transcendence of self toward others and the world. I believe that the arts mark this transcendental core.

I continue to shape my phenomenology through the many voices of dance and related voices of somatic movement practices. It can be read on various levels and has implications for researchers and critics as well as teachers and practitioners. In the short study below, I provide an example of how I use phenomenology to research the intersection of dance with somatic/perceptual experience and to illustrate how language and movement can come together to express consciousness. Phenomenology has the task of studying embodied experience; thus my own first person voice enters into my own work. When I study classroom situations, I also incorporate the voices of students and ask them to describe their experience in writing—quickly and intuitively—not listening to their internal critics. As shown, I include their voices and interpret them much as I would my own. At this point phenomenology becomes a hermeneutic and shared exploration. It validates the personal voice, but in eliciting other voices, it works outward toward comparative knowledge, tangibly about the bodyself. The phenomenological method respects the identities that emerge through descriptive processes. Its notion of truth accommodates discordant voices, not seeking to level differences, looping through individuality toward similarity. My thumbnail sketch in three parts moves first into a phenomenological process, then weaves in descriptive examples, and finally extrapolates the hermeneutics that underlie the whole. The latter project owes a debt to "Dance in the Hermeneutic Circle," by Joann McNamara (14). I ask the reader to enter my investigations through a dream.

I. Dancing the Dreambody

My body lies over the ocean, my body lies over the sea....

When I began the Feldenkrais training program, I had an airplane dream. The plane was airborne, and I was not in my seat. Rather I was up and about, engaged in a most curious activity—putting bodies in overhead bins. Now these were not dead bodies; they were fellow passengers, and it wasn't easy. I had to lift them up and stuff them in, then close the bins. I had no clue as to the meaning of this dream, but it was very vivid, and I remembered this part of it the next day while I was being given a functional integration lesson by one of the assistant teachers in my training program. As I lay on my side on the bodywork table, the teacher began to contact the pattern of my breath with her hands; this increased my comfort, immediately propelling me into a deep state of relaxed awareness. Finally I was aware of the soft rolling of my head in the teacher's hands, its finely tuned articulations with the vertebra of my neck, and how the clavicle and shoulders carried the nuanced intentions of the head-rolling into my arms and hands.

The bodies, and the dream, came back to me as the teacher brought me up off the table. My eyes filled with tears, and I suddenly realized that the bodies I was putting in bins were my own selves in several guises. I had been "putting myself on a shelf" so to speak; waiting—so it seemed—for something (maybe the future); tucking my body, myself, away that I might later take it down from the shelf for something more important, more deserved. For free unfettered time after the real tasks of my endless jobs were complete? For retirement? How, I wondered, as I realized this deferential relationship my body had developed with my mind (mind over baggage), could I give myself the

attention I deserved, the pleasure of being present to myself that I realized through the meaning of my dream? Somatic explorations through touch to facilitate functional, elegant, and spacious movement can bring us back to our bodies—our bodies back to our minds (15).

It is significant that the dualism this journey suggests is both metaphysical and phenomenological; that is, there is no justification for thinking of the body and mind as separate or separable entities in the first place, as Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* (16) and subsequent body-mind philosophy have shown. But we also recognize an experienced duality that commonly arises when we objectify the body as a thing, ignoring our subjective flesh, whether lively and sportive or profoundly in absentia. We can and we do objectify the body as material substance with physical characteristics, but we know even as we do this that mind has a physical, bodily basis. Our body thinks, and it thinks as it moves (17). In other words, our moving, living body is intelligent, and our thinking arises through material physical sources as surely as it may seem to move beyond them. When we trust our innate intelligence, it speaks, or brings us images and feelings in unpredictable ways. This is furthermore a healing intelligence. Another name for it is "subconscious mind," the intelligence that Carl Jung calls our dreambody, the inexhaustible resource that can move us toward our larger mind in lines of least resistance. It can solve problems that our limited mind in its habitual patterns cannot; the dreambody can bring our larger mind to the surface and make it available to consciousness. This can happen when we quiet the will and relax the mind in somatically focused bodywork and dance improvisations. Following Damasio's work on the relationship between core consciousness and extended consciousness (18), I believe that dancing (along with healing) originates at an intrinsic level of somatosensory awareness (core consciousness), and when facilitated in a supportive environment, movement images and aesthetic appreciation can grow from there, as we learn how to pay attention to our body-self at subtle levels and eventually express our knowledge in various verbal and nonverbal forms (or as "extended consciousness").

Carson (I will call him), a student in one of my somatics classes, wrote about his somatosensory awareness, and he has given me permission to quote him (as have other students whose descriptions are represented later):

When we did our first sensory awareness exploration, I had the sensation that my body was floating. It was a strange feeling; it seemed as if my skin had melted away and I was floating without an outer covering.

As class work progressed over the semester, Carson became more adept at moving his consciousness through various bodily states, even exploring the painful lumbar region of his spine and identifying places that were numb to his awareness. Eventually he read about sensorimotor amnesia in long-term stress conditions in the work of Thomas Hanna (19). Carson learned how to use gentle movement patterns performed without stress and goal orientation (motivated by somatically conceived yoga, the Feldenkrais Method, and the Alexander Technique) to ease the pain of his back and pelvis. He reported in his journal that he learned how to release the tension and to ease the memories held in the pain. Bringing body to mind, he describes aspects of his somatic/perceptual awareness:

I discover a gateway to my inner self, peeling away the layers of outer skin and physical boundaries, but I do not feel naked. I become one with myself and the human soma, self-regulating as well as self-sensing. My perception of my outer body is quite different from my inward body. It seems as if my body is an unexplored, uninhabited island, and I am exploring it for the first time.

Carson's response does not necessarily mean that there are two bodies—an inner and an outer. Dualism is a matter of consciousness. On the sensory level, our body-self is organically whole, a participatory landscape of unwritten languages waiting to speak our stories in the quiet air of dreams and dancing. Carson, who had been a professional dancer, was going behind his habitual body to discover a source for new options in dance and to heal.

Through dancing and somatic bodywork, I have also experienced the surfacing of this healing landscape, that aspect of my core self that I have come to trust as mythic and creative. Many times it has been a source of solace and insight, as I have moved behind the technical patterns of dance to explore spontaneously arising movement, to let the dance happen in its own way and its own time. When I reach optimal points in dancing, or as I move with others therapeutically, I feel connected to the natural world in a special way. No words are needed to communicate, but at the same time when they come, they are welcome. Articulating an experience, painting it, or somehow putting it in another medium can reinforce the experience. Nothing serves to replace it, however, the experience itself is intrinsically valuable. The therapeutic does not lie in the interpretation, rather it exists in tangible changes: laughter, tears, a fuller breath, more self-confidence, improved alignment, a smoother walk, a more complete body image, less pain, feelings of peace and wholeness, dancing better.

II. Intrinsic Dance: Body-for-self

Intrinsic dance is the pleasure we feel in our bodies when we are in our own flow of being (20), moving for the dance and not to please others (or lose weight), a matter of consciousness. I explore this phenomenon descriptively in the dance of walking:

I love to walk when the sun is high and hot and there is just enough breeze to ruffle my coiled sarong, soft against my legs, just enough to stir the chartreuse leaves in metallic music against the sky. Walking arouses a gratitude in me, for the kid practicing his saxophone as I pass by, for the gathering experience of the day passing brightly, for those whose radiance I have never doubted.

If I pay attention to the poetry of my body, it brings home with insight the desire to take care of myself and take responsibility:

I love to twist my spine. As a vertebrate, I respect the diamond chain of it, how it bends and extends exquisitely, even in the poverty of my illnesses, and how its nebulous brilliance writhes as I move—its crystal being bone-white and right, not so winding, then suddenly dodging everywhere, its intelligence round rocks in the river.

“Today,” a student wrote in her somatics journal, “I experienced something wonderful!” Her description of the experience develops an explanatory phenomenology:

We spent a great deal of time working on each other's movement, guiding it with our hands, especially in the area of the scapula, clavicle, and shoulder. I could feel small things occurring in my body as my partner guided me through subtle movement in a gentle manner. When my partner directed her energies in a lift up through the back of my neck, I immediately felt a great release in the muscles. As I began to walk, I felt taller than I have ever felt in recent memory, and the tallness was something my body had just done on its own without me trying to make it happen. It took only a slight suggestion of movement for this to occur, but my body had been prepared. It seemed to know how to go there.

“My body used to live somewhere else in the mirror,” a dance student wrote of her growing awareness of her body-self:

I lived in the response to my body from others, detached in the clouds, in the physicality I was so shy of. Now my body lives within me, I have called it to me. My body is beautiful.

Another student describes a somatics partnering session:

Alice was working with me. We were slowly walking around the room and she was watching me from behind. As she gently and silently entered my personal space, I began to feel a warm, enfolding sense of security and support. I instantly began to cry because this is the feeling that is constantly missing from my life. For the first time, I truly realized how much the physical can affect thought and feeling.

III. Theoretical Framework

Now, I frame the foregoing matters of consciousness on two philosophical levels: the first concerns the structure of consciousness inherent in phenomenological descriptions, and the second, their hermeneutic function as constituting the second level of phenomenology—the attempt to come to an understanding that bridges the “sense” level of description with the fuller context of our “being-in-the-world.” Both levels can inform researchers as they study their own experience and that of others, and also teachers who automatically engage hermeneutics when they interpret the experiential accounts of their students. Dance processes can be explained on these philosophical levels, as well. I interpret and situate my experiences and those of my students in the context of particular studies where they provide concrete examples of the theory I am trying to bring to life. As a teacher, I can also use the intuitively derived descriptions of students to help them make a link between their sense of themselves as movers with their ability to make or perform a dance.

Level I. Descriptive Structures: Intuitive description is the first level of the phenomenological method. It seeks what lies behind mimesis in its various functions. Consciousness is asked to speak directly and not to mirror itself, mime, or perform. A performance is consciousness of another sort, lived twice. That is: there is the original utterance or movement (as in dance improvisation), and then there is the performance of that utterance or movement (conscious replication as we represent choreographically the spontaneous movement). Here skill enters in; recall, repetition, and reformulation help to reinforce the original phenomenon as it sediments in consciousness.

The descriptions of consciousness that come and go in this short study stem from attempts toward original naming of essences—that which appears most immediately to consciousness. As an aspect of this phenomenon, we see that consciousness also taps into subliminal matters (21). The reader will notice that however much the descriptions differ in context and style, they do function as accounts of consciousness, more particularly “what matters” in the moment of the description, as the writer draws up (as from a well) striking aspects of an experience.

Level II. Hermeneutics: At the interpretive level, phenomenology moves toward hermeneutics. This movement (of consciousness) is apparent in the foregoing study where we are coming to understand what has been discovered through the descriptive process—what the experience itself has uncovered. Thus, the original sense, which is improvisatory, informs the evolution of interpretation, a rendering of meaning derived from the lived experience. This cycle can be further formulated and expressed in many modes: through narrative, poetry, visual art, in music, or in theater and dance as matters of consciousness are made visible, audible, and kinesthetically explicit. This happens in

research, where new meaning is discovered through textual connections, and in the translations of dancing, as movement is made meaningful. Here I am explaining how interpretation is based in experience, just as it is the task of hermeneutics to do this.

Phenomenological description aims toward original, intuitive description of sense experience, the body-mind axis of our lived experience. It precedes and interacts with interpretation like the translation of sense into meaningful form in the arts, and it also informs philosophical theory, as in the present case. Meaning (as in “I understand what this experience means”) can be derived rather quickly and intuitively, just as we see meaning emerge in the foregoing experiential descriptions, ranging from snapshots to short story accounts of consciousness. Supporting a theory involves analysis and takes more time. Phenomenological descriptions embody two levels of intuition then: sense and meaning. They may also support theory as data for the study of consciousness. It is of significance to the various fields of movement studies that we can make the leap from sense to meaning through movement, whether conceived through somatic explorations or in the various processes of dancing.

For me, as for many phenomenologists, there is a poetics involved in hermeneutics, but straightforward explanations of sense impressions also inform understanding. Poetics and explanatory demonstrations (verbal and nonverbal) introduce second-level descriptions: they perform sense impressions as they re-present them through assimilation. Poetic and explanatory demonstrations of experiential affective phenomena bring to our attention the connections they have assimilated by representing in an intelligible form the original intuition, what Heidegger called the “leap” or “*ursprung*,” and in his full system, “the origin of the work of art” (22). This poiesis (the poetic-demonstrative process) provides the very possibility of human history, to extend Heidegger’s aesthetic system and return to his definition of phenomenology quoted at the beginning of this essay.

At the intrinsic experiential level, somatic movement explorations and dance are related: This is what the heart of my analysis has taught me. I have also discovered a tangential matter that will lead me to future investigations: Dance improvisation is a first-level sense descriptive where possibility transfigures action in the expansiveness of present time; choreography then involves us in the hermeneutic circle of the second level of the dance phenomenon. Bringing this possibility to words and sentences creates the context for narrative and poetry; risking ourselves in movement permits the dawning of a second sight—from the personal-therapeutic intrinsic dance to the aesthetic-cultural projections of theater dance. Matters of consciousness bridging descriptive language and movement can be made legible; this is the theory I have tried to demonstrate in this study. Intuition has guided my thought—and the blind faith that I might be able to show that consciousness matters.

Notes

1. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), “the preliminary conception of phenomenology,” introduction #7, pp.62-63.
2. Sondra Fraleigh “Good Intentions and Dancing Moments: Agency, Freedom, and Self-knowledge in Dance,” in *The Perceived Self*, ed. Ulric Neisser (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.102-111.
3. Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Phenomenology of Dance* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966).
4. Sondra Fraleigh, *Dance and the Lived Body: A Descriptive Aesthetics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987).

5. Sondra Fraleigh, "A Vulnerable Glimpse: Seeing Dance Through Phenomenology," *Dance Research Journal* 23, no. 1 (1991): 11-16; "Witnessing the Frog Pond," in *Researching Dance: Evolving Modes of Inquiry*, eds. Fraleigh and Penelope Hanstein (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999), pp. 188-224.
6. Bruce W. Wilshire, *Wild Hunger: The Primal Roots of Modern Addiction* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Alphonso Lingis, *The Imperative* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998); David Abram, *The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1997).
7. Phenomenology today is often subsumed in contexts of cognitive science, movement studies, ethnomethodology, sex/gender studies, and feminist critique. See Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, *The Embodied Mind: Cognitive Science and Human Experience* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991); Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Primacy of Movement* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 1999); David Sudnow, *Ways of the Hand: The Organization of Improvised Conduct* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978); Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York and London: Routledge, 1993).
8. For a phenomenology of linguistics in relation to politics, see Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997).
9. See Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, *The Roots of Power: Animate Form and Gendered Bodies* (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing, 1994); also "What is it like to Be a Brain," in *The Primacy of Movement*, pp. 451-482. She studies how matters of fact having to do with neuron firing show clearly that to be a brain is to do brain types of things (neuron firing), not person or creaturely kinds of things (p. 469). She demonstrates that mental powers cannot be explained in materialist terms, and may not be exclusively human.
10. Candace B. Pert, *Molecules of Emotion: The Science Behind Mind-Body Medicine* (New York: Touchstone Books/Simon & Schuster, 1997).
11. Antonio Damasio, *The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness* (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999), p. 287. See also his book, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1994), p. 12.
12. Paul Ricoeur, "On Interpretation," in *Philosophy in France Today*, ed. Alan Montefiore (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
13. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1993), pp. 31-43.
14. For an exposition of the relationships between phenomenology and hermeneutics, see Joann McNamara, "Dance in the Hermeneutic Circle," in *Researching Dance: Evolving Modes of Inquiry*, pp. 162-187.
15. I use the terms "movement facilitation" and "contact facilitation" to distinguish somatic education and therapy from massage—rubbing, tapping, etc. Contact facilitation employs a full spectrum of body contact, not suggested by the term "hands-on": back-to-back contact, for instance, matching a gait in walking alongside, stabilizing a stance through foot contact, etc.
16. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).
17. Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1963), pp. 12-43.
18. Damasio defines the relationship of core consciousness and extended consciousness throughout his book *The Feeling of What Happens* (1999). Extended consciousness as articulated in language and other forms of expression depends on core consciousness, our bodymind axis.

19. Thomas Hanna. "What is Somatics," in *Bone, Breath & Gesture: Practices of Embodiment*, ed. Don Hanlon Johnson (Berkeley, Calif.: North Atlantic Books, 1995), pp. 339-52.

20. In *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi takes up the topic of intrinsic pleasure. His is a phenomenological psychology that uses a model of consciousness based on information theory that he says deals directly with events as we experience and interpret them. He finally moves from the descriptive to the prescriptive, providing steps toward enhancing the quality of life.

21. Subliminal consciousness arises semantically through the mind/spirit/soul nexus encoded in our word "psyche." For a discussion of the linkage of these words through the Greek word psyche, particularly in the work of Plato, see Huntington Cairns, introduction to *Collected Dialogues of Plato*, pp. xx-xxi.

22. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), pp. 15-88.