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The Emotional Logic of Participation in Intergroup Violence

by

Christopher Bruce Phillips Claassen

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Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
of Washington University in
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requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy

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Acknowledgments

To the people of Alexandra—regardless of national origin.

ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

The Emotional Logic of Participation in Intergroup Violence

by

Christopher Claassen

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Washington University in St. Louis, 2013

James L. Gibson, Chair

Existing theories of intergroup violence focus on the motives of group or leaders. But why do thousands of people choose to take part given the dangers and risks? This dissertation develops a model, the entitlement-blame-anger model, to explain participation in intergroup violence. According to this model, participation is motivated by emotional reactions of intergroup anger. Anger is useful in this respect because it shapes both the preference for confrontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part. Intergroup anger, in turn, is triggered by appraisals that the outgroup are to blame for some harm suffered by the ingroup. Blame and anger are then rooted in evaluations of group endowments and group entitlements. These are widely-shared beliefs concerning who gets what and who deserves what in a given society. Thus, when group endowments and group entitlements are incongruent, either because the outgroup are enjoying resources to which they are not entitled, or the ingroup getting less than their share, the outgroup is blamed, anger is experienced and large numbers of ingroup members may become willing to take part in violence directed at that group.

The theoretical model is tested using an original survey dataset collected from a representative sample of 497 residents of of Alexandra, in Johannesburg, South Africa, where a national wave of attacks against immigrants began in 2008, and where intergroup tensions remain. Analysis of the survey data shows that each of the links in the model—from group

entitlement violations to blame, blame to anger, and anger to participation intentions—is supported, even controlling for possible confounds such as previous participation in violence, the influence of peers and leaders, and exposure to material competition with the outgroup.

A few other factors also emerge as important determinants of participation in intergroup violence. Support for violence increases both the desire to participate and the intensity of intergroup anger. There is also some evidence of an instrumental pathway to participation: street traders, who compete with foreign traders for customers, show an increased likelihood of taking part in future violence, but only when they are also exposed to the social pressures produced by attendance at community policing meetings. Hearing friends and acquaintances blame the outgroup increases an individual's own level of outgroup blame. Hearing leaders blame the outgroup, in contrast, increases the level of intergroup anger. Finally, authoritarian values also result in greater blame of the outgroup, but only when coupled with perceived violations of group entitlements.

"Reason is … the slave of the passions."

– David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*

Introduction

VIOLENCE across ethnic, religious, national, and communal lines continues to plague many parts of the world. In late 2012, for example, a campaign of brutal attacks on the Rohingya minority clouded Burma's democratic dawn. Earlier, in August, Bengalis in Assam state in India were the targets of violence. The year did not begin peacefully either, with episodes of intergroup violence taking place in Macedonia, Egypt, Pakistan, and South Sudan.

Despite being widespread and pervasive, we are still uncertain about why intergroup violence occurs, and why it occurs where and when it does. One reason is probably its tumultuous, protean nature. But another reason is that most scholars of intergroup violence take a "top-down" approach and ignore the question of why thousands of people take part.[1] In contrast to other forms of collective violence, such as civil war, intergroup violence comprises attacks of civilians by civilians; it is thus defined by mass participation. As such, the question of why ordinary people take part looms as especially important in understanding intergroup violence.

It is also the question I attempt to answer in this dissertation. Although I examine a number of different explanations, my focus is on developing and testing a psychological theory of participation in intergroup violence. I call this theory the entitlement-blame-anger

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[1]Horowitz (1985, 185) also makes this point.

model. According to this model, the most immediate determinant of an individual's decision to join an attack against another group is the emotion of intergroup anger—anger felt on behalf of one's group and directed against some other group (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). The attraction of an emotional explanation for participation in violence is threefold. First, anger is a powerful mechanism for producing aggression because it shapes both the preference for confrontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2001). Second, emotions have a compulsive quality—they override our will and influence our capacity for reasoning (Frijda 2008)—and are thus ideal for explaining behavior that is risky and without much material benefit. Third, emotions are produced by appraisals of situations and group goals (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Smith and Ellsworth 1985), allowing an individual-level process of decision-making to be embedded in a broader social context.

The entitlement-blame-anger model makes use of this latter feature of emotion by embedding angry reactions in shared beliefs about the ingroup and outgroup. Building off the large body of research on anger (Averill 1982; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989; Lazarus 1991; van Zomeren et al. 2004), I argue that the immediate trigger of intergroup anger is a perception that the outgroup is to blame for some harms—unemployment, lack of housing, low status—suffered by the ingroup. And linking these psychological findings back to macrolevel political science research, I argue that the antecedent of blame, and the ultimate cause of intergroup anger, is beliefs about group entitlement (Horowitz 1985). These are historically-developed understandings concerning the position and privileges deserved by each group in a society (Blumer 1958). Thus, when one group perceives that another has violated these group entitlements—by accessing jobs or housing thought to belong to the ingroup, for example—the outgroup is blamed, anger is experienced, and large numbers of ingroup members may become willing to take part in violence directed at that group.

Existing studies of anger and intergroup aggression have used student samples and

artificial laboratory situations (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004). Instead, I test the entitlement-blame-anger model with the aid of an original survey of 497 residents of Alexandra, an urban slum in South Africa, where a national wave of violence between locals and African immigrants began. By using a sample for whom intergroup violence is a realistic phenomenon, my data thus add external and construct validity to existing studies.

The main contribution of this dissertation is to explain why people participate in intergroup violence. There are, however, three further implications of this research. First, because mass participation is so necessary for intergroup violence, it helps sheds light on why it occurs at all. Second, it extends the study of emotions in political science from the attitudes and voting behavior of the American public (e.g. Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Brader 2006) to a non-Western setting, and to a more contentious form of political behavior. Third, political scientists have long made use of concepts such as legitimacy, justice, and fairness (e.g. Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Mutz and Mondak 1997). This dissertation outlines a mechanism by which such normative considerations translate into mass behavior: perceptions of illegitimacy, injustice, and unfairness trigger anger, and anger increases the desire for confrontation and helps overcome the dilemmas of collective action.

The dissertation proceeds as follows. The second chapter begins with a definition of intergroup violence, before reviewing existing research on the topic. I then turn to a description of the events of the 2008 anti-immigrant attacks in South Africa and a discussion of the existing explanations that have been offered. The chapter concludes by presenting the case for examining participation in intergroup violence, and for focusing on an emotional pathway to participation.

The third chapter develops this theoretical model. It begins with a review of research on emotions in psychology, American politics, and conflict studies, with a particular focus

on the cognitive-appraisal model that is now dominant in psychology. I then explicate the entitlement-blame-anger model of participation. There are three components: intergroup anger as the motivation for participation; outgroup blame as the trigger of anger; and group entitlement violations as the roots of blame. I also consider a number of alternative explanations for each of these three outcomes.

The fourth chapter outlines the methods used to collect and code the data. I begin this chapter with a consideration of various research designs and methods and an explanation of why a public opinion survey of Alexandra is preferred. I then describe the survey procedures in detail. I pay particular attention to explicating the sampling of respondents and the measurement of key variables such as participation and anger.

The fifth chapter tests the theoretical model using the survey data. The model has a stepwise nature, with three dependent variables, participation, anger, and blame. Each is tested in turn. I find support for each of the links—from group entitlement violations to blame, blame to anger, and anger to participation intentions—even controlling for possible confounds such as previous participation in violence, the influence of peers and leaders, and exposure to material competition with the outgroup. The final chapter concludes.

Intergroup Violence

2.1. Introduction

2.1.1. Definitions

What is "intergroup violence," and indeed, what counts as a "group?" Before examining existing research on the prevalence, consequences, and etiology of intergroup violence, I need to define these terms.

Groups are social categories resulting from a cleavage (1) that produces a sense of identification among the individuals so categorized; (2) that is fairly enduring over time; and (3) is recognized, by most individuals within a society, as a meaningful way of cutting up the social world. The first criterion is necessary to ensure that groups are psychologically salient to individuals. As Tajfel (1970) showed, however, even minimal groups can produce some identification. The second and third criteria are thus included to limit our focus to major groups that are of social or political importance.

This definition excludes groups that may produce a deep sense of identification, but are not widespread social classifications, such as gangs and supporters of particular sports teams. It includes ethnic groups, and thus—according to Horowitz's (1985) widely used definition—also national, linguistic, racial, religious, and sectarian groups. It also includes social categories that are usually considered non-ethnic, such as caste and class—should

these be meaningful and widely-shared ways of discussing the social world in a given society. In some societies, this definition of groups will also include social categories that divide people based upon their ideological beliefs or partisan affiliation.[1] In sum, the concept of group that will be used in this dissertation is thus somewhat more inclusive than the concept of ethnicity as used in comparative politics; while all ethnic groups are considered to be groups, not all groups are ethnicities.

Having a definition of groups, we can now move on to defining "intergroup violence." There are three necessary features. First, the violence is collective, meaning that perpetrators number in the dozens, hundreds, or thousands. This criterion permits the separation of political from criminal violence (Brubaker and Laitin 1998).[2] Second, the targets are chosen largely because of their presumed membership in a group (Horowitz 2001). This distinguishes intergroup violence from violent protests (Muller 1979) where violence is either indiscriminate or directed at the authorities. This condition also excludes "race-riots" in Britain and the United States (Lieberson and Silverman 1965). These often take the form of violent protest, and are labelled according to the group membership of the protagonists rather than the targets. Third, both the victims and perpetrators of intergroup violence are civilians, although the state may tacitly back one side. This excludes civil wars, insurgencies, and rebellions (Blattman and Miguel 2010) from the definition, because these are forms of violence that are carried out by regular or irregular soldiers. It also excludes mass killings and genocide. With the partial exception of the Rwandan genocide, the perpetrators of such atrocities are members of armed forces (Valentino 2004).

Intergroup violence thus encompasses lynchings (Brundage 1997), ethnic riots and

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[1]Ellis and Stimson (2012) argue, for example, that ideology in the United States has both symbolic and operational meanings: it is a set of identities and a way of summarizing policy preferences. American liberals and conservatives are thus groups by my definition.

[2]On collective violence, see Tilly (2003); on violence, see Collins (2008).

pogroms (Horowitz 2001), electoral violence (Snyder 2000), and violence against immigrants (Dancygier 2010). On the whole, it is a more spontaneous form of violence than civil war or terrorism, although planning and leadership may well be in place (see Horowitz 2001, 227–57). It tends to erupt quite quickly and dissipate after a few weeks or months, while civil wars can drag on for years.

2.1.2. Prevalence

Intergroup violence is surprisingly common and widespread. I began this dissertation with a list of conflicts that occurred over the 12 months from January to December of 2012. Looking back over the preceding few years, incidents of intergroup violence that are significant enough to have be widely reported in newspapers in the United States include the attacks between Christians and Muslims in Egypt in 2011, and Nigeria in 2010, between Kyrgyz and Uzbek in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, also in 2010, and between Chinese and Uyghur in Ürümqi, China in 2009. Casting our view back over the twentieth century, Horowitz's encyclopedic *The Deadly Ethic Riot* (2001) documents major episodes of intergroup violence in Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Congo, Chad, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Fiji, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. In some of these countries intergroup violence is endemic—Brass, for example, claims that "hardly a month passes in India in which a Hindu-Muslim riot does not occur that is large enough to be noted in the press" (2003, 6). Intergroup violence used to occur regularly in western, developed countries too. Olzak (1990, 1992) shows, for example, that intergroup violence was common in the United States in the period between the middle of the nineteenth century until the Second World War.

2.1.3. Political Consequences

Being an essentially intergroup phenomenon, intergroup violence may appear to be of peripheral concern to political science. But this view would be mistaken, for a number of reasons. First, incidents of intergroup violence typically result in significant loss of life and human rights violations. The range is large: while some episodes produce no human casualties, and may go unnoticed outside the country of occurrence, others lead to thousands of deaths. The India-Pakistan partition riots, for example, were estimated to have caused more than 100,000 fatalities (Horowitz 2001, 11).

Intergroup violence may also be a harbinger of more severe political conflict. Rwanda, Burundi, and Turkey experienced intergroup violence before being plunged into their respective genocides (Horowitz 2001), while the Sri Lankan civil war was directly preceded by the riots of 1983 (Brass 1997). While an attack on another group represents a visceral expression of animosity against that group, it also stands as a challenge to state authority (Landau 2012).

Finally, intergroup violence threatens the spread and stability of democracy. Violence against other groups is more likely in new and partially democratic systems, where leaders compete for power among electorates whose ethnic and religious loyalties may trump all other interests (Goldstone et al. 2010; Horowitz 1985; Rabushka and Shepsle 1972). Ethnic riots in India, for example, are intimately linked to electoral competition (Wilkinson 2004). If communal violence becomes an entrenched electoral strategy in a new democracy, the consequences for the consolidation of democracy are dire.

The next section discusses the case of intergroup violence that forms the backdrop for this dissertation: the wave of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa in 2008. This section begins by describing how this violence unfolded and then outlines existing research that has sought to explain why the attacks took place. The chapter then continues by returning

to the literature on intergroup violence more generally. I describe how much of this body of research takes an ecological-level approach and focuses on the interests of groups and leaders. I conclude the chapter by making the case for a micro-level study of participation in intergroup violence.

2.2. Anti-Immigrant Violence in South Africa

Conflict between ethnic and racial groups has marked and defined the history of South Africa. The two main groups of European settlers, English and Afrikaans, ended up on the opposite sides of a brutal civil war. Both groups clashed with the African inhabitants of the land they settled. By the middle of the 20th century, this faultline between white and black had deepened and hardened into the oppressive racial system of apartheid.

In the 1990s, just as the institutions and laws of apartheid were crumbling, a new frontline of intergroup tension began to emerge between native South Africans and foreign nationals from neighboring African countries, particularly Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Waller 2006). At the time, Mozambique was emerging from a quarter century of civil war as one of the poorest countries in the world (United Nations Development Programme 1994). Zimbabwe was initially more prosperous, but entered a political and economic crisis after the fraudulent 2000 election, from which it is yet to emerge. There are no reliable figures on the extent of immigration to South Africa, but it is likely that millions of Mozambicans and Zimbabweans have crossed the South African border since 1994 in search of a better life.[3]

South Africans have not welcomed these newcomers with open arms. Data from the 1995 World Values Survey show that South Africans are the most xenophobic nation of

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[3]Estimates vary from 500,000 to 12 million (Waller 2006). One of the more sophisticated studies concludes that around 500,000 foreign nationals reside in the city of Johannesburg alone (Center for Development and Enterprise 2008).

any included in the sample (Mattes et al. 1999). Another survey from 1997 found that 21% of South Africans wanted foreign nationals, regardless of their legal status, to be deported (Mattes et al. 1999). One manifestation of this xenophobia has been a high level of hate crimes committed against foreign nationals, often taking the form of rough justice meted out by a crowd (Harris 2004).

2.2.1. The 2008 Attacks

One such incident of anti-immigrant violence occurred on the evening of May 11th 2008 in Alexandra, a densely populated township[4] near the heart of Johannesburg.[5] A mob in the largely Zulu-speaking "Beirut" area of Alexandra gathered and began toyi-toying[6] and chanting anti-immigrant slogans such as "phansi amakwerekwere"—Zulu for "down with foreigners" (Nyar 2010, 17). Several smaller groups split off and went door to door searching for foreigners. Anyone who could not pass their test, to provide the Zulu word for "elbow," was beaten. Two were killed that first night.

In contrast to previous incidents, the violence only intensified over the following days. By the 14th of May, Alexandra was in uproar, with thousands of residents toyi-toying, attacking anyone believed to be foreign, and clashing with police. Looting, violence, and the

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[4]Township has two meanings in South Africa. The first meaning is technical, is used in town-planning, and refers to a unit of area. The second meaning is popular, and refers to a residential area that was reserved for non-whites under South Africa's apartheid policy. Although townships may contain shacks or even entire informal settlements, many also have areas of formal houses that resemble suburbs in all respects. Despite the demise of apartheid, the term, along with analogues such as "location" or "kasi," is in widespread use in South Africa.

[5]This brief account draws heavily on the more detailed discussion in Monson and Arian (2012).

[6]The toyi-toyi is a protest dance, often accompanied by singing or chanting and frequently seen at political rallies and gatherings.

destruction of property also began to occur in other townships in and around Johannesburg, including Diepsloot, Tembisa, and Thokoza. By the following week, the violence had spread to downtown Johannesburg and parts of Cape Town. Finally, after three weeks, a measure of calm returned, leaving 62 people dead, 670 wounded, and 100,000 displaced (Misago et al. 2010).

Aside from the attacks in downtown Johannesburg, the violence was confined to townships populated largely by black South Africans. The targets were foreign nationals who lived in these same areas. Zimbabweans were particularly well-represented among the victims (UN News Service 2008), but Mozambicans, Malawians, and—at least in the Cape Town area—Somalis were also attacked (Misago et al. 2010). Forty-one of the dead were foreign nationals, with the other twenty-one being South African.[7]

2.2.2. Research on the Causes of the 2008 Attacks

The "xenophobic attacks," as they were quickly dubbed by the South African press, shocked the nation and spurred much discussion among the commentariat. A number of more rigorous pieces of research were also produced. The most important finding from this literature is the role of informal community leaders in organizing the attacks (Misago et al. 2010; Misago 2012). In Alexandra, these individuals were either the leaders who served as community

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[7]It is unclear how the South Africans were killed, although three possibilities stand out. First, foreigners in some affected areas appear to have fought back (Dube 2010). Shopkeepers, in particular, may have been armed (Misago et al. 2010, 159). Second, as the Marikana massacre of September 2012 tragically showed, the South African police tend to act in a very heavy-handed and indiscriminate manner when faced with a violent crowd. Third, smaller ethnic groups such as Ndebele and Shangaan overlap the borders that separate South Africa from its neighbors. South Africans of these ethnic groups may be been misperceived by other locals as being foreign.

representatives in particular community policing districts or were part of the old *induna*[8] leadership that still holds some authority in the hostels in Johannesburg.

The induna leadership system was introduced during the apartheid era to help manage the hostels, which were built in townships around Johannesburg to serve as labor reservoirs for domestic and industrial employment. Community policing districts (or "community policing fora") have quite a different history. They emerged out of the nested system of yard, block, and street committees that were set up, in Alexandra and other South African townships, in the 1980s as a means of defending and mobilizing the community in the face of increasingly harsh repression from the apartheid state (Bonner and Nieftagodien 2008, 292).

After the fall of apartheid, the state tried to use these informal structures to rebuild community trust and confidence in the South African police (Steinberg 2008*b*). Police conduct joint patrols with the leaders of community policing fora. They also liaise with these leaders and the indunas when investigating crimes (Misago et al. 2010). These tactics have bolstered the legitimacy of the police, but have also had the unintended consequence of handing over tremendous authority to the informal leaders in townships like Alexandra.

As one might expect, authority without accountability has corrupted at least some of these community leaders. Their dealings with police grants these leaders an influence over policing that can be monetized. Some leaders have also cast themselves as gateways to government services, charging residents of their areas for services that should be free (Misago et al. 2010). Despite the hostels having been abandoned by the city, for example, their indunas still collect rent from residents (Vearey 2010). Misago et al. (2010) report that, unsurprisingly, there is competition to become an induna or leader of a community policing forum.

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[8]Induna is Zulu for "chief."

Informal leaders thus appear to have organized anti-immigrant violence in 2008 to consolidate their positions of authority. Given the high levels of anti-immigrant prejudice in South African townships (Southern African Migration Project 2008), an attack on African immigrants could increase community support for leaders, and would allow leaders to flex their muscles and demonstrate their ability to "get things done." Targeting foreigners may also have been judged as likely to avoid arousing much police interest, given reports of tacit signals of support from police (Misago et al. 2010) and more generally, widespread xeno-phobia within the police (Newham, Masuku, and Dlamini 2006).

A second strand of research on the 2008 attacks emphasizes the motives of groups, rather than community leaders. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) and Steinberg (2008*a*) argue that the 2008 attacks were triggered by competition between locals and foreigners over the scarce resources of jobs and public housing. Research does indicate that African immi-grants in Johannesburg are more likely to be working than black South Africans. Despite the difficulties of obtaining a representative sample of this group, one study find that 44% of foreign nationals are self-employed, with another 36% employed by someone else (Center for Development and Enterprise 2008). This same study finds that locals believe that foreign nationals are willing to work for lower wages.[9]

There are several ways in which locals compete with foreigners for public housing. Although the sale of these homes is not legally permitted, Steinberg (2008*a*) claims that some residents sell to foreigners to earn money. The Alexandra residents who were interviewed by (Misago et al. 2010) allege, furthermore, that foreign nationals bribe officials or fraudulently obtain South African identity documents so as to obtain government housing. Alexandra has also always been marked by tensions over housing. The township was initially one of the few areas in urban South African where black South Africans could legally own a plot of

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[9]Misago et al. (2010) report hearing similar sentiments in their interviews.

land (Bonner and Nieftagodien 2008). These rights were stripped away during the apartheid era, leaving residents of the area without legal tenure. This legal uncertainty over ownership of land and houses in Alexandra has yet to be resolved (Alexandra Renewal Project ND).

A third strand of research on the 2008 attacks links the outbreak of violence to symbolic motives shaped by the history of Alexandra and South Africa. Residents' lack of legal tenure, for example, has resulted in great sensitivity to any hint that newcomers, such as foreign immigrants, may be "jumping the queue" for public housing (Bonner and Nieftagodien 2008). Nieftagodien (2012) argues that this insider-outsider divide extends beyond conflict over housing and, indeed, shapes beliefs about who has the right to even claim residence in townships like Alexandra. Such insider-outsider frames of reference are particularly likely to be utilized by South Africans because as Landau (2012) points out, the the central feature of the apartheid project was a definition of black South Africans as aliens in the land of their birth. These authors thus link the 2008 attacks to historically-shaped and collectively-held beliefs about who deserves what in Alexandra.

In sum, existing research on the 2008 anti-immigrant violence in South Africa focuses on of the causal roles of leadership, intergroup resource competition, and shared beliefs about the rights and privileges deserved by locals and foreigners. Yet these researchers' use of convenience samples, qualitative interviews, and blunt district-level indicators suggests that caution is warranted in accepting their conclusions. Moreover, to anticipate a paradox that emerges from the broader literature on intergroup violence: while groups or leaders may have stood to benefit from an attack on immigrants, why did thousands of people join in? As I will argue in the final section of this chapter, understanding the 2008 attacks—and intergroup violence more generally—requires an analysis from "below" as well as "above:" from the perspectives of participants as well as the more familiar perspectives of leaders or groups. First, however, I will examine the large body of existing research on intergroup violence

2.3. The Causes of Intergroup Violence

A large and diverse literature examines intergroup and political violence.[10] But there are a few main theories and approaches that recur throughout. Most notably, the predominant approach taken by scholars is "top-down:" violence is characterized as an event, and various macro-level factors and processes are proposed as causes. Within this literature, a major distinction can then be made between studies that see groups as the key actors driving ethnic violence, and those that focus on leaders. Each of these strands of the literature will be examined in turn.

2.3.1. The Motives of Groups

A natural approach when investigating the question of why groups are locked in conflict is to ask what the groups want; in other words, to search for group-level motives. A large number of authors take just this approach. There are two quite distinct sets of group motives that have been proposed by scholars: first, realistic group interests such as jobs, houses, welfare, safety, and security; and second, symbolic group concerns such as group esteem, status, position, and entitlement.

The first theory proposing that intergroup conflict results from clashing group interests is the social psychological theory of realistic group conflict (Campbell 1965). It holds that competition between groups over scarce resources increases tension and conflict. This theory is most closely associated with the work of Muzafer Sherif, who, in the famous "Robber's Cave" experiments, manipulated features of a boys' summer camp to show that variations in intergroup animosity follow closely from the degree to which groups are pitted in competition or required to cooperate (Sherif 1966).

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[10]Broad overviews include Brubaker and Laitin (1998) and Horowitz (1985).

Both political scientists and sociologists have offered similar explanations for ethnic conflict. Robert Bates (1974; 1983), for example, argues that ethnic groups in post-colonial African states were a handy means of forming political coalitions because ingroup members share a language and culture. Ethnic groups then became vehicles for competition over power and access to state resources. In sociology, Olzak (1992) shows that violence against blacks and immigrants in the United States over the period from 1877 to 1914 was caused by labor market competition. This competition for jobs was produced, in turn, by the desegregation of labor markets and inflows of immigrant workers. Posen (1993) imports the concept of the security dilemma from international relations and applies it to intrastate ethnic conflict. When state authority is weakened, he claims, any attempt by one group to bolster their security may be interpreted by another group as a signal of an aggressive intention. Each group's desire for security produces a spiral of increasing mutual threat and conflict.[11] These theories of group competition rest on the assumption that groups act to secure their collective security or material welfare. Intergroup conflict thus results when these realistic group preferences collide.

Other scholars have linked intergroup conflict to more symbolic group concerns. Petersen's (2002) "resentment" model of ethnic violence posits that subordinate groups tend to feel resentment and a concomitant desire to raise their group status. Such groups may attack higher status groups if an opportunity, such as a weakening of state authority, is provided. In *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Horowitz (1985) makes a related argument. Individuals, he says, desire to belong to groups that are seen as worthy. Group worth is only defined relative to other groups, however, producing intergroup tension.

While these symbolic theories hold that intergroup violence is motivated by the

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[11]Steinberg (2008*a*) uses the same logic to explain why the violence took place in South African in 2008, arguing that the attacks were triggered by competition between locals and foreigners over jobs and housing.

perceived injustice of one group's subordination, Horowitz (1985) also argues that inter-group violence may be caused by one group believing in the rightfulness of their dominance. Weiner (1978) notes that such asymmetrical beliefs about group entitlement result when the outgroup are migrants, or are perceived to be migrants. In these situations, the indigenes or "sons of the soil" believe that their group should be top of the pecking order, with the "foreigners" subordinate. Fearon and Laitin (2011) have recently resuscitated this idea and posited that it may be an neglected cause of many civil wars. There is also a close parallel between these group entitlements theories, and the arguments advanced by Nieftagodien (2012) and Landau (2012), which explain South Africa's 2008 violence as driven by beliefs that foreign nationals are not entitled to the same rights as South Africans.

2.3.2. The Interests of Leaders

Another tradition of research argues that intergroup conflict may be the result of leaders competing for power. One of the first examples of this tradition is a classic book by Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) on democracy in ethnically divided societies. The authors argue that when voters vote according to ethnicity rather than policy or ideology, there is no incentive for leaders to appeal to the center. Indeed, no center may even exist. Leaders thus compete to "out-bid" one other using chauvinistic appeals and denigrations of the outgroup, while attempts at moderation are countered with accusations of treachery. Violence between groups then occurs as a by-product of the interaction between the primacy of ethnic identity and democratic competition.

Snyder (2000) presents a similar model to account for nationalist violence. In newly democratized countries, he argues, elites use nationalism to rule "in the name of the people" without having to cede actual power and rule "by the people." The masses are persuaded to accept nationalist myths through elite control of the media. Given that groups are mobilized using competing and exclusionary national visions, fear and antipathy follow, with violent

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conflict not far behind.

Perhaps the most prominent thread of this elite influence theory has been developed to account for ethnic riots in India. Brass (1997, 2003) describes how a nexus of actors benefit from Hindu-Muslim riots: local politicians who stand to improve their position, merchants who are in competition with Muslims, criminals who profit from looting behind the smokescreen of chaos. In concert, these actors produce an "institutionalized riot system" that operates in certain Indian cities to keep intergroup tensions high.

Wilkinson (2004) develops a more falsifiable account that also clarifies the role of leaders. He argues that the degree of electoral competition and whether or not Muslims are in the majority coalition determines whether state-level politicians have an incentive to respond if local instigators try to set up a religious riot. Incumbents who draw some support from Muslims, who are in coalition with other parties that do so, or who anticipate requiring Muslim support in future, are more likely to prevent riots. Incumbents who rely only on Hindu votes may see an electoral benefit from a Hindu-Muslim riot because such violence increases the salience of the ethnic dimension of politics at the expense of the policy dimension.

Varshney (2002) agrees with this story but adds a twist: the electoral benefit of Hindu-Muslim violence is contingent on the nature of civil society in a city. Where social networks cut across communal lines, he argues, voters will punish Hindu nationalist parties for instigating violence, and intergroup relations remain largely peaceful. In cities where such interethnic ties are not present, however, the electorate is more likely to favor Hindu nationalist parties in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim violence.

Finally, Dancygier (2010) presents a synthesis of these group-driven and leader-driven approaches that takes both the interests of leaders and groups into account. She examines violence committed by locals against immigrants in the United Kingdom. When economic conditions are poor, competition over resources—especially housing—intensifies.

Immigrants that are mobilized and geographically clustered in significant voting blocs are able to attract the attentions of politicians, and thus obtain housing resources from the state. Locals then attempt to influence the provision of housing by voting for anti-immigrant parties or by directly attempting to deter immigrants through violence.[12]

Thus, in sum, a large body of research examines the causes of intergroup violence. Much of this literature is situated at the ecological level of analysis, and views intergroup violence through the lenses of groups or leaders. In the latter perspective, intergroup violence is typically regarded as a means by which leaders pursue power or wealth, while from the perspective of groups, intergroup violence is believed to be driven by competition over resources, whether material or symbolic.

2.4. Conclusion: The Paradox of Participation

In addition to considering the role of leaders and the grievances of groups, a full understanding of intergroup violence requires that we also examine why people participate in intergroup violence. An account of participation, in other words, appears necessary, if not sufficient, for a full explanation of intergroup violence.

It is necessary because mass participation constitutes intergroup violence. Without significant levels of participation, an incident of intergroup violence would amount to little more than the criminal behavior of a gang of thugs. Moreover, without the smokescreen of mass participation, leaders and initial participants would be more visible and thus more reluctant to get involved.

Yet both the leader-focused and group-focused theories of intergroup violence cannot account for participation. Indeed, the theories I have described in the previous section

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[12]Misago and colleagues' (2012) account, which emphasizes the role played by community leaders in the 2008 violence in South Africa, is another example of this leader-interest tradition of research.

result in a number of paradoxes when extended to the level of individuals and the question of mass participation.

Beginning with the leader-focused theories of intergroup violence; even if one agrees that leaders stand to benefit from orchestrating communal violence, it is unclear how they get large numbers of participants to do their bidding (Horowitz 1985; Petersen 2002; Varshney 2007). The theories presented in the previous section are largely silent when it comes to the micro-level mechanisms linking the interests of leaders and mass participation in violence. An obvious extension of the leader-interest model is for leaders, who stand to benefit from violence, to pay for a mob to carry out an attack. But there is no evidence that this occurs. The community leaders who are believed to have organized the attacks in the South African violence of 2008 control few resources and thus clearly did not pay participants.[13]

Participation in intergroup violence is also dangerous and non-normative. Participants may encounter resistance from the state or a targeted ethnic group (Horowitz 2001). Retribution may follow. Most people are also strongly averse to physically attacking others (Collins 2008)—a feature of human nature that is largely ignored in studies of intergroup violence. Existing theories of leader-instigated intergroup violence tell us little about why any individual would face these costs of taking part.

A related problem exists for the group interest models. While ingroup members may well believe that the outgroup are threatening their access to resources, it remains unexplained why such individuals would participate in risky violence for the possible provision of work opportunities and housing that could just as easily be taken up by non-participants. Public housing and jobs are public goods and are thus non-excludable: even those who do not take part can access these goods. They are also typically supplied by the state or market,

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[13]Only 1.3 percent of my survey respondents stated, in their answers to a question on this issue, that "some" or "many" participants had been paid. Despite oversampling participants, Scacco (2010) only finds five individuals who admit to being paid to take part in the 2001 Nigerian riots.

and thus not controlled by the organizers of intergroup violence.

The problem exists, moreover, whether one regards the nature of group interests as primarily material or largely symbolic. One may desire a higher status for one's group, but also desire not to be injured or arrested because of participation in an attack on a higher-status group. Discourses that characterize the outgroup as outsiders or interlopers are, moreover, shared by all members of a community, and thus cannot account for why some individuals take part in violence against this outgroup, while others do not.

Understanding participation is thus necessary for understanding intergroup violence. But why is it not sufficient? One might think that if participation were so important, we could then ignore leaders. We cannot, because leaders are almost certainly also necessary for violence to occur. The reason is that, regardless of the numbers of people who are willing to attack another group, intergroup violence requires coordination and thus some measure of organization. At a minimum, there has to be some focal point, such as the announcement of election results, or the judgement of a prominent trial, that permits the coordination of behavior. In most cases, a focal point has to be supplied by individuals who have both an interest in violence occurring and have the authority to be heard by large numbers of their fellow group members.[14] In these cases, leaders are necessary.[15]

Fortunately, there is a substantial body of research, reviewed earlier in this chapter, on the motivations and methods of leaders in situations of intergroup violence. The task of this dissertation is to complement this understanding by investigating the forgotten side of intergroup violence: mass participation. In the next chapter, I begin this task by presenting a model that explains why individuals are motivated to take part in such risky acts of

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[14]Community policing meetings, for example, were used as the focal points for organizing the violence of 2008 in South Africa (Misago et al. 2010), and 2001 in Nigeria (Scacco 2010).

[15]Note that this explanation of the role of leadership allows for endogenous leaders, who arise only at moments of conflict, before disappearing back into the masses (see Horowitz 2001, 224–226).

intergroup aggression.

Participation in Intergroup Violence

3.1. Introduction

3.1.1. Emotion in Psychology

Classical thinkers recognized that human behavior has diverse motivations. There is a long-standing dichotomy in Western philosophy, for example, between the interests and the passions as spurs of behavior (Elster 1994). Despite such early prominence, emotion fell out of favor for long periods in the social sciences.

When the behaviorist paradigm reigned supreme in early twentieth century psychology, emotion was regarded as a descriptive rather than an explanatory concept. External, observable factors were preferred (Smith and Lazarus 1990). In the 1980s however, emotions re-entered mainstream psychology. Somewhat surprisingly, this was in part due to the cognitive revolution, whose focus on information processing required both that we peer inside the black box of the human mind and allowed us to do so (Lazarus 1991).[1] The cognitive revolution also offered a powerful and durable theoretical framework for understanding

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[1] "Cognition" is not synonymous with conscious, deliberative reflection, which is but one type of cognition. The definition of cognition in the American Psychological Association's *Glossary of Psychological Terms*, for example is: "processes of knowing, including attending, remembering, and reasoning; also the content of the processes, such as concepts and memories" (American Psychological Association ND).

how emotions work, appraisal theory (Roseman and Smith 2001).

Before describing the appraisal theory of emotions, which explains how emotions work, I will first describe how emotions are categorized. As it turns out, one of the central problems in the study of emotions is simply to count them.

An influential paradigm, although now in decline, boils emotional variation down to one or two dimensions. Different researchers have different labels for these dimensions: valence versus arousal (Russell 1980), positivity versus negativity (Watson and Tellegen 1985), or anxiety versus enthusiasm (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). In these theories, specific emotions, such as anger and fear, are considered less important than their underlying dimensions.

Another approach treats emotions as discrete entities. Such researchers focus on around half a dozen "core" or "basic" emotions, typically: anger, fear, sadness, happiness and, possibly, contempt and shame (Darwin 1872; Ekman 1972; Ekman, Levenson, and Friesen 1983; Izard 1992; Shaver et al. 1987). These emotions can readily be recognized in photographs of faces, and have been shown to consistently recur across cultures (Ekman 1972, 1992). Panksepp (1998) argues that neuroscientific evidence on emotional systems in the brain also corroborates this view of a small number of core emotions.

Quite aside from ontological debates on the nature of the emotions, this core emotions model has an additional benefit for the task at hand. Unlike the dimensional approach, it permits a conceptual separation between anger and other negative emotions, like fear. To anticipate my theory a little, participation in violence requires an emotion that produces a tendency to approach the eliciting event or actor, and anger is the only negative emotion that produces this behavioral tendency. Indeed, as Lerner and Keltner (2001) and Huddy et al. (2005) show, anger and fear have quite distinct behavioral consequences in this respect: while anger results in approach, fear produces avoidance. The distinction between anger and other negative emotions is thus very important for explaining participation in

intergroup violence.

While the core emotions model tells us how emotions can be categorized, the cognitive appraisal model describes the triggers of each of these core emotions (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Roseman 1984; Roseman and Smith 2001; Scherer 1999). Appraisals, which are evaluations of situations and events (Roseman 1984), are the causes of emotional reactions.[2] They may be fleeting impressions (feeling threatened by the sudden sound of footsteps in a dark street) or more conscious considerations (reminding yourself that an unfortunate event was not your fault to assuage your guilt). On the whole, appraisals are are relatively automatic evaluations, but are accessible to consciousness upon some reflection.

Appraisal theorists argue that specific emotions are reactions to particular patterns of appraisal. Although researchers differ on the details, they tend to agree that there are between five and ten dimensions of appraisal that are important in distinguishing which emotion, if any, is triggered (Lazarus 1991; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1990; Roseman 1984; Smith and Ellsworth 1985). One of the major dimensions is goal congruence (Lazarus 1991). Events that are perceived to be congruent with one's goals tend to produce positive emotions such as happiness and pride, while those that are incongruent often result in negative emotions like guilt, anger, and fear. Another important dimension is agency (Roseman 1984)—the actor to which an individual attributes responsibility for some event. Perceiving that the self is responsible is linked to pride, but also guilt and shame; other-responsibility is associated most prominently with anger; while believing that no actor is responsible—that,

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[2]The reason for emphasizing evaluations of situations, rather than the objective situations themselves, relates to the evolutionary origins of emotion. The objective factors that might have threatened the well being of our ancestors—crocodiles, a drop in one's social status, an approaching group of strange people—are numerous, perhaps intractably so (Smith and Lazarus 1990). But this infinite variety of threats (or opportunities) can be greatly reduced in number if only the essential features of any situation are encoded using the mind's perceptual apparatus.

for example, the event is merely an accident of fate—can lead to emotions like fear or sadness.[3]

Appraisal theory not only explains the determinants of specific emotion, but also describes their behavioral consequences. Each emotion produces a particular "action tendency" (Frijda 1986), which is a set of cognitions and judgments that orient the body toward particular behaviors. Anxiety, for example, focuses attention on sources of threat (Mogg et al. 1990), heightens sensitivity to risk, and produces a shift toward risk aversion (Lerner and Keltner 2001). Emotions are not reflexes, so they do not produce behavior in a deterministic fashion. But emotions do make particular behavioral patterns more likely: they lead to "states of action readiness," in the words of Nico Frijda (2008, 72). The anxious individual will be more likely to scan the environment for information and detect, fixate upon, and move away from any perceived threats.

Thus, according to the appraisal model, each emotion is triggered by a particular set of situational appraisals, and is associated with a particular behavioral tendency. There is a functionalist logic to this theory because behavioral responses are tailored to situations, via appraisals and emotions (Keltner and Gross 1999). Given this functionalism, it is no surprise that the appraisal model is consistent with evolutionary accounts of emotion. Tooby and Cosmides (2008), for example, describe emotions as superordinate control mechanisms that evolved to produce adaptive behavioral responses in the presence of fitness threats and opportunities.

This is appealing for explaining participation in intergroup violence, for two reasons.

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[3]The appraisal model is a culturally-invariant, universal theory of emotion. Some scholars, particularly anthropologists (see Lutz and White 1986) and sociologists (see Thoits 1989), take a relativistic approach and argue that emotions are culturally specific. However, studies of emotion experience and appraisal, using samples from 37 countries, have found that while the objects of appraisal (goals, etc.) vary across cultures, the processes (incongruence, agency, etc.) remain much the same (Scherer 1999).

First, the emotion-behavior link is strong. Indeed, emotions frequently have a compulsive quality: their most familiar phenomenological feature is the sense that they override our will in some way (Frijda 2008).[4] In David Hume's (1888) memorable words, "reason is … the slave of the passions."[5] This emotion-behavior link would appear to be just the mechanism needed to explain why people take part in the risky and non-normative behavior we observe in episodes of intergroup violence.

The second reason that emotions are appealing for explaining participation is that they permit a link between individual behavior and the broader situations in which intergroup violence occurs. The reason is that appraisals—the determinants of emotions—are evaluations of situations. A large amount of research on intergroup violence emphasizes the importance of various contextual or situational factors such as labor market competition (Olzak 1992), the relative status of two groups (Petersen 2002), and ethnic heterogeneity within civic organizations (Varshney 2002). The appraisal model of emotion thus permits an emotional explanation of participation that can be linked to findings from the body of macro-level research on intergroup violence.

Appraisal theory thus offers a powerful and useful theory of emotion for explaining behavior. Indeed, political scientists are increasingly turning to emotions to provide new or updated theories of political behavior. Surprisingly, however, fewer political scientists use

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[4]The experience of being angry, for example, is frequently described in the English language using metaphors such as "blowing up," "red mist," and "blind rage." These all imply a diminution of vision or a loss of control of one's will.

[5]Roseman and Smith (2001) point out that this feature of emotion is a function of the automatic nature of many appraisals. Emotion is triggered before conscious considerations can intervene. Evolutionary theorists would additionally argue that the compulsiveness of emotional experience is a feature designed to enable behaviors that, although adaptive in the long run, may not be favored by one's immediate conscious preferences (Frank 1988; Tooby and Cosmides 2008).

emotion to understand collective and intergroup violence. In the next section I outline the existing literature on emotions and political behavior and emotions and conflict.

3.1.2. Emotions and Politics

Perhaps because of the influence of economics since Anthony Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), political scientists have been somewhat slower to embrace emotional explanations compared to psychologists. Although Lasswell's (1930) study of personality and the behavior of political leaders made use of emotion back in the 1930s, the concept only really entered mainstream political science in the new millenium.[6]

Nowadays, research on emotions and politics thrives in the subfield of American political behavior. One of the most important applications has been in the area of voting behavior. Marcus (1988), for example, investigates how emotional reactions to presidential candidates shape vote choice, while Brader (2006) examines how emotional cues are used in campaign advertisements to influence voters. Valentino et al. (2011) foreshadow some of the themes of this dissertation by going beyond candidate choice and showing that the emotion of anger influences whether voters actually participate in elections.

Other researchers have examined the role that emotion plays in political cognition. Lodge and Taber (1998) and Nadeau, Niemi, and Amato (1995), for example, show that emotion influences both how and what people learn about politics, while Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen (2000) argue that aversive emotions (anger, disgust, and hatred) result in partisan patterns of cognition while anxiety produces a more deliberative style of information processing.

Of particular relevance for this dissertation, research on intergroup attitudes has also made fruitful use of emotional mechanisms. One of the early forays was a paper by Kuk-

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[6]See Marcus (2000) for a review of the literature on emotions and politics before this point.

linski et al. (1991), which argued that political tolerance is shaped in larger part by emotions than by more conscious considerations. A later paper by Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009) confirms this finding, and adds that hatred is the emotion most closely associated with intolerance in Israel. Banks and Valentino (2012) shows that racial prejudice is underpinned by the emotion of anger while Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008) find that anti-immigrant prejudice is a response to anxiety. Researchers have also examined the effects of emotion on support for state aggression. Huddy et al. (2005) finds that anxiety reduces support for military action against terrorists, while Halperin et al. (2011) show that anger moderates the effect of hatred on Israeli support for compromise with Palestinians.

This research shows that emotion intersect in important and sometimes unexpected ways with political attitudes and behavior. In particular, anger has been linked to antipathy to outgroups and a greater likelihood of political participation. The next section examines the few examples where political scientists have employed emotion to understand intergroup violence.

3.1.3. Emotions and Intergroup Violence

Emotion is even less common in the subfield of comparative politics than in American politics. This is surprising when one considers that contentious collective behavior such as riots, protests, and revolutions—"passionate politics," as sociologists Goodwin, Jasper, and Poletta (2001) put it—are commonplace in world politics. And while emotion has proven invaluable in explaining the more reasonable aspects of politics, such as choosing a presidential candidate, it should be even more useful for understanding conflict and collective violence.

The most prominent work in this surprisingly small political science literature on emotions and conflict is *Understanding Ethnic Violence* by Roger Petersen (2002). Petersen develops four models of ethnic violence; each is associated with one of four emotions—fear, hatred, rage, and resentment. The approach is macro-level and historical, so each emotion

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is conceived as a collective experience that is triggered by particular events in multi-ethnic societies. The fear model closely resembles the logic of the security dilemma: when state authority breaks down, groups come to fear the threat that each poses to the other. Intergroup hatred is experienced when two groups have a long history of previous attacks, while resentment is felt by lower status groups toward higher status groups. Fear, hatred, or resentment of another group make aggression against that group more likely. The final model of rage is similar to frustration-aggression theory (Berkowitz 1962): frustrated group ambitions produce aggression, which is displaced onto another group.

Despite the use of emotional mechanisms linking situations and conflict, Petersen's models of conflict are situated at the level of the group and thus do not speak directly to the question of who participates. His evidence is, moreover, historical, and thus cannot be used to separate participants from non-participants—nor, indeed, those who experience resentment or rage from those who do not. Nevertheless, Petersen's use of emotion as a mediator between intergroup situations and intergroup violence is a powerful theoretical framework that informs the model of participation that I will present later in this chapter. His model of resentment also resonates with my theory in its focus on thwarted group entitlement and the resulting confrontational, negative emotion.

Another prominent example of research that uses emotion to understand conflict is Elisabeth Jean Wood's (2001; 2003) research on the Salvadorian civil war. Unlike Petersen, Wood explicitly focuses on civilian participation. She argues that insurgents were motivated, in part, by the emotional benefits of "moral outrage" and "the pleasure of protest." Wood's focus on understanding participation in conflict and her consideration of emotional motivations marks her research as a important contribution in the literature on political violence.

However, the nature of the conflict that Wood examines—an insurgency against a state—raises the question of how her results generalize to violence that occurs between two groups. In addition, Wood's findings are based on open-ended interviews with participants.

It is possible that her conclusions are colored by the human tendency to view one's own behavior in a self-serving fashion (Trivers 2011; von Hippel and Trivers 2011). It would be very unlikely, for example, for her interviewees to admit that they took part simply because they were afraid (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), whether or not this was their true motive. It also is questionable whether people's motivations for some past behavior are readily accessible given a brief period of conscious reflection some years after the event.

The two best examples of existing research that develop emotional accounts of political violence—the books by Petersen (2002) and Wood (2003)—leave much unanswered. Petersen does not use micro-level data; while Wood does, her interview methods are not ideal for testing hypotheses about emotional mechanisms. Both Wood's "moral outrage" and Petersen's "resentment" are also somewhat unusual emotions. They are, however, closely related to one of the emotions regarded as a universal, core emotion. This emotion is anger, and it forms the motivation for the theory of participation in intergroup violence I propose in this dissertation. I now turn to developing and explicating this theory of participation in intergroup violence.

3.2. The Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model of Participation

The entitlement-blame-anger model (see Figure 3.1) takes an appraisal theory view of emotion and adapts it to a situation of intergroup conflict. Moving from right to left in Figure 3.1, from the more immediate hypothesized causes of participation to the more distant but also more foundational: the emotion of interest is intergroup anger; this provides the motivation for participation in violence against the other group. Anger is primarily triggered by appraisals of blame, so this is the next link in the causal chain. I then embed appraisals of blame in historically shaped beliefs about the status and welfare thought to be deserved by each group; when these group entitlement beliefs are violated, I hypothesize, blame follows.

Figure 3.1. The Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model Model of Participation in Intergroup Violence

| Violations of group entitlement | → | Outgroup blame | → | Intergroup anger | → | Participation in intergroup violence |

The components of the proposed model of participation and their hypothesized causal links.

The stepwise nature of this model means that it can be broken up into its three constituent links and analyzed link by link. There are thus three outcomes of interest, and three dependent variables: participation in intergroup violence, intergroup anger, and outgroup blame. This section will proceed firstly by explaining the theory and evidence supporting each of these links. Once the rationale for the model is in place, I will move to consider eight alternative models. Some of these, such as realistic group conflict theory, are expected to have an impact on all three outcome variables. Others, such as authoritarianism-threat theory, are only hypothesized to play a role in one (in this case, attributions of outgroup blame).

Given the large number of models, variables, and hypotheses that will be presented, it is perhaps wise to begin with a roadmap. Table 3.1 serves this function. The nine theoretical models are distributed across the rows of the table, and their names are listed in the leftmost column, with the entitlement-blame-anger model first. The next three columns list each of the endogenous variables used in this model; these will be the dependent variables when it comes to the data analysis. The cells of the table list the variables, from each model, that will be hypothesized to have an effect on the dependent variable of interest. Hypothesis numbers are in parentheses.

Table 3.1. Summary of Dependent Variables, Models, and Explanatory Variables

Models	Dependent Variables		
	Participation Intentions	Intergroup Anger	Blame
Entitlement-Blame-Anger	Anger (H1.1)	Blame (H2.1)	Group entitlement violations (H3.1)
Selective Incentives	Opportunities for looting (H1.2)		
Social Influence	Meeting attendance (H1.3)		Blame from peers (H3.2)
Elite Mobilization			Blame from leaders (H3.3)
Realistic Group Competition	Unemployed × meeting attendance (H1.4)	Unemployed (H2.2)	Unemployed (H3.4)
	Trader × meeting attendance (H1.5)	Trader (H2.3)	Trader (H3.5)
	Low quality housing × meeting attendance (H1.6)	Low quality housing (H2.4)	Low quality housing (H3.6)
Frustration-Aggression	Poverty (H1.7)	Poverty (H2.5)	Poverty (H3.7)
	Supports opposition party (H1.8)	Supports opposition party (H2.6)	Supports opposition party (H3.8)
A Culture of Violence	Support for violence (H1.9)	Support for violence (H2.7)	
Authoritarianism-Threat			Authoritarianism × Group entitlement violations (H3.9)
Psychoanalytic Projection			Aversive emotions to 2008 (H3.10)

The three dependent variables are listed at the head of each column. Explanatory models are listed in the leftmost column. Explanatory variables are listed in the cells of the table; hypothesis numbers follow in parentheses.

3.2.1. Anger: The Motivation for Participation in Violence

Anger is the emotion that most people would associate with aggressive behavior, an intuition confirmed by survey and experiment research (Averill 1982; Berkowitz 1993; Panksepp 1998; Tedeschi and Felston 1994).[7] As the appraisal model of emotions predicts, the effect of anger on aggressive behavior is mediated by a number of cognitive mechanisms. Most notably, anger is marked by an aggressive behavioral tendency; it produces a desire, in other words, for confrontation (Averill 1982; Kulik and Brown 1979; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004). Anger thus influences the perceived benefits of aggression, but it shapes the perceived costs of aggressing too. Anger results in reduced perceptions of risk (Huddy et al. 2005) and diminishes the importance of risk in decision-making (Lerner and Keltner 2001). It leads to judgments that are more superficial and stereotypical (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer 1994) and "allows a person to maintain an aggressive intention over time" by focusing attention on the perceived triggers of the emotion and thus establishing more robust memories of these triggering events (Anderson and Bushman 2002, 45).

Anger is typically conceived as an emotion that is directed at other individuals. In-

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[7]Existing research, particularly by Petersen (2011) and Halperin Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, and Hirsch-Hoefler (2009); Halperin et al. (2011) might appear to suggest that emotions other than anger may be linked with participation in violence. Petersen outlines four emotional models of ethnic conflict: fear, resentment, rage, and hatred. Research on categorization of emotions based on facial expressions (Ekman 1972), the statistical clustering of emotion words (Shaver et al. 1987), and emotional structures in the brain Panksepp (1998) suggest that resentment, rage, and possibly hatred are varieties of a core emotion, anger. I thus regard these terms as varieties of the basic anger experience. Fear, along with correlates such as anxiety, is indeed a separate basic emotion. But, as Lerner and Keltner (2001) and Huddy et al. (2005) show, fear and anxiety produce contemplation, risk aversion, and withdrawal. They are thus unlikely to be associated with participation in intergroup violence.

tergroup violence, however, is a form of collective action that is directed at other groups. Explaining participation in such violence requires that anger be extended from interpersonal situations to the intergroup. Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) argue that such an interpersonal–intergroup mapping can be accomplished using the well-known process of social identification. When social groups are salient, a large body of evidence shows that individuals categorize themselves into one of the available groups, identify with their group, see themselves as group members rather than as individuals, and take the goals and values of the group as their own (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Turner et al. 1987). This social identification allows us to think about groups as agents. In situations where social groups are relevant and salient, it is thus meaningful to speak of feelings of intergroup anger.

Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) also test whether intergroup anger has the behavioral effects that we might expect from the literature on interpersonal anger. They assign subjects to groups based on self-reported beliefs on various controversial topics, and find that experimentally manipulated intergroup anger produces a desire to confront a group of people who subscribe to differing views. van Zomeren et al. (2004) provide a further test: they find that students who have been manipulated to feel intergroup anger at university administration are more likely to desire collective action against the administration.

While intergroup anger has not been used to explain aggressive behavior—or even behavioral intentions—outside of the laboratory, it seem likely that it would increase the likelihood of participation in intergroup violence. My first hypothesis is thus:

Hypothesis 1.1. *Intergroup anger increases an individual's intention to participate in intergroup violence.*

3.2.2. Outgroup Blame: The Trigger of Anger

The previous section discussed the effects of anger on behavior, action tendencies, and decision-making. Social psychologists have also researched the appraisals that cause angry responses. Three emerge as particularly important. First, those who perceive that some event is incongruent with an important personal goal typically experience anger (Lazarus 1991). Anger, in other words, requires a negative trigger—a harm or a threat of some kind. Second, anger results when another agent (as opposed to either the self or the situation) is seen as the cause of the negative trigger (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Anger is thus likely to be produced when an individual perceives that she has been harmed, and that another party is responsible (Averill 1982; Betancourt and Blair 1992; Frijda 1986; Ortony, Clore, and Collins 1990).

While these two appraisals are often thought to be sufficient for anger, an angry response is particularly likely when the harm is tinged with a sense of unfairness: when it violates expectations of what ought to be (Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989; Kulik and Brown 1979; van Zomeren et al. 2004; Weiss, Suckow, and Cropanzano 1989). Disrespect, for example, is a common everyday trigger of anger (Bettencourt and Miller 1996; Cohen et al. 1996; Ferguson and Rule 1983), while, in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Ginges et al. (2007) show that violations of ingroup taboos result in greater anger and support for violence against the outgroup. A third appraisal linked to angry reactions is thus an evaluation that the other actor behaved in an unfair or illegitimate fashion.

This set of appraisals—a evaluation of harm, an attribution of responsibility, a perception of unfairness—is closely related to the concept of blame. Shaver (1985), for example, argues that blame is composed of three components: an attribution of causation, an attribution of responsibility (knowingly having caused the harm), and an attribution of blameworthiness (acting without justification). Ferguson and Rule (1983) suggest a four-step pro-

cess involving inferences of causality, avoidability, intentionality, and motive acceptability. These models all argue that blame is deeply intertwined with normative evaluations of the fairness of the other actor's behavior.[8] Blame thus involves an attribution of responsibility for some negative event, with an additional evaluation that the event itself or the action of the blamed party is unfair in some way.

Although laboratory research has linked blame to both anger and violence (Betancourt and Blair 1992), Debra Javeline (2003b; 2003a) is one of the few researchers to have investigated the role that blame plays in collective political action.[9] Javeline distinguishes between specific blame, which is directed at a single target, and diffuse blame, which is distributed among several. Specific, but not diffuse, blame is linked to participation in protests during a Russian wage arrears crisis of 1998. Although Javeline does not measure anger, it is quite plausible that Russians who blame particular actors are more likely to participate in collective action because they are angry.

Hypothesis 2.1. *Blame of the outgroup for some harm experienced by the ingroup produces higher levels of intergroup anger.*

3.2.3. Group Entitlements: The Roots of Blame

Although he restricts his analysis to the macrolevel, Petersen's (2002) emotional models of ethnic violence offer a means of linking emotions (and thus blame) to situations. He argues

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[8]Causal attributions and fairness judgements are intertwined because perceiving that an unfair act has occurred leads to a search for the cause, or for someone to blame. And whether an act is seen as unfair or illegitimate is partly contingent on who caused it: being questioned by the police, for example, may be taken to be a legitimate action, whereas an interrogation by another civilian would not be.

[9]Political scientists have explored other topics related to blame, including the considerations that people use when blaming political actors (Gibson and Gouws 1999; Malhotra and Kuo 2007), and the impact of partisan blame on vote choice (Marsh and Tilley 2010).

that contextual and historical factors such as previous conflicts or status differentials produce collective emotions, and thus violence. Petersen's (2002) resentment model also suggests a particular way to embed blame and anger in contexts: he argues that resentment follows when a group believes that it both occupies a lower status than some other group, and that this lower status is unfair.

Figure 3.2. Psychological Comparisons in Theories of Conflict

There is a long tradition of research on intergroup comparisons and conflict. This research in conceptually summarized in Figure 3.2. Each of the four panels depicts one model of conflict. Within each panel, there are four possible group evaluations: (1) the actual level of symbolic and material resources enjoyed the the ingroup—which I call "ingroup endowments"—and (2) that enjoyed by the outgroup (outgroup endowments); (3) the level

of resources deserved by the ingroup (ingroup entitlements); and (4) by the outgroup (outgroup entitlements).[10]

The top left panel indicates the hypothesis that inequality—a comparison of the endowments enjoyed by the ingroup and some outgroup—leads to conflict. The first author to state this hypothesis was Aristotle, who suggested that inequality causes "revolutionary sentiment." The inequality-conflict link has been tested, examined, and reformulated by numerous researchers (for a review, see Lichbach 1989). Some authors find evidence supporting the hypothesis (Russett 1964), others find against the hypothesis (Mitchell 1968), and yet others find a more complex relationship between inequality and conflict (Nagel 1974; Muller 1985).

Another venerable hypothesis, advanced first by Tocqueville (1955), is that rebellion occurs when a period of improving welfare is followed by a sharp decline. The psychological underpinnings are a comparison between the welfare that a group are expecting and the welfare they actually end up enjoying (see the top right panel of Figure 3.2). Davies (1962) used a similar dynamic in his "J-curve" theory of revolution.

While the inequality-conflict hypothesis holds that conflict is rooted in a comparison of the endowments of groups, the J-curve hypothesis claims that conflict is determined by a comparison between endowments and entitlements, relative deprivation theory combines these two sets of comparisons. Gurr (1970), for example, argued that "men rebel" when they compare what they have and what they believe should have—and they form beliefs about what they should have by observing what others have (depicted in the bottom left panel of

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[10]Some of the theories I will survey here focus only on material resources, while others focus on symbolic resources (such as group status and respect). There is evidence that both matter for intergroup conflict—on symbolic, see Sears, Hensler, and Speer (1979) and Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004); on material, see Bobo (1983) and Olzak (1990). I thus include both material and symbolic resources in the concepts of group endowments and group entitlements.

Figure 3.2). This theory of relative deprivation has, however, received mixed empirical support (Muller 1972; Snyder and Tilly 1972). One particular problem is that evaluations of personal well-being tend to have weak relationships with many political outcomes, including vote choice (Alvarez and Nagler 1995; Kiewiet 1983), intergroup prejudice (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004), and support for redistribution (Gibson 2010).

Runciman (1966) addresses this issue by scaling relative deprivation theory up from interpersonal comparisons to intergroup comparisons. His "fraternal relative deprivation" theory rests on comparisons between three main evaluations: the resources enjoyed by the ingroup and some outgroup, as well as the resources believed to be deserved by the ingroup (Crosby 1976).

Yet despite Runciman's inclusion of group-level comparisons, relative deprivation theory still appears deficient as an explanation for intergroup violence because it fails to account for why individuals mobilize around an ingroup and attack an outgroup. Relative deprivation theory was originally formulated as an explanation for violence against the state—protest, rebellion, and revolution. And violence against another group, according to my argument, requires feelings of anger, and attributions of blame of that outgroup. Blame, in turn, is composed of evaluations that the ingroup has been harmed, the harm is unfair, and the outgroup is responsible. This attribution of responsibility and sense of unfairness would seem, however, to require an fourth intergroup evaluation to be added to the relative deprivation model: the level of symbolic and material resources that the outgroup deserves. Without this fourth evaluation, it is not clear how blame is attributed to the other group; without blame, participation in intergroup violence seems unlikely.

The resulting model, the lower right panel in Figure 3.2, is consistent with a number of similar theories of intergroup conflict and violence. One of the most prominent is Herbert Blumer's (1958) classic notion of "group position." Group position theory focuses on the degree to which a particular group views both their and some other group's situations

as fair or deserved.[11] As Bobo and Hutchings (1996, 955) interpret the theory, "[f]eelings of competition and hostility emerge from historically and collectively developed judgments about the positions in the social order that in-group members should rightfully occupy relative to members of an out-group."

A related idea is offered by Horowitz (1985), although he calls the evaluation "group entitlement," a practice that I will follow here. Horowitz notes that a recurring phenomenon, in situations of intergroup violence, is for the attacking group to make claims about their greater entitlement than the target group, often because the former believe that the latter are migrants who arrived decades or even centuries ago. The targets are interlopers, in other words, while the attackers are "sons of the soil," to use Weiner's (1978) memorable phrase. Fearon and Laitin (2011) have resuscitated these ideas about group entitlement and outlined a "sons of the soil" theory of ethnic civil war, albeit one that has yet to be tested.

Petersen (2002) also echoes these theories with his resentment model, which I introduced earlier. This model claims that a group with a lower status than another group, who also see this subordinate position as illegitimate, will be more likely to attack the higher status group. Petersen's focus on group status illustrates that group comparison models do not have to be restricted to comparisons of material welfare; symbolic goods may be just as important.

These theories, from sociologists and political scientists, offer support for group entitlement violations as a cause of intergroup violence. I thus hypothesize that perceived violations of group entitlements beliefs underpin appraisals of blame and feelings of anger directed at outgroups. These violations of group entitlements require the comparison of four separate intergroup evaluations: ingroup and outgroup endowments, and ingroup and outgroup entitlements (see the bottom right panel of Figure 3.2). There are thus two means

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[11]See also Mutz and Mondak's (1997) concept of "sociotropic fairness."

by which group entitlements can be violated. First, when the outgroup is believed to have "risen above their rank" and obtained resources they do not deserve; and second, when the ingroup's endowments are incongruent with the more lofty position that they believe they deserve.

Hypothesis 3.1. *Perceived violations of group entitlements result in increased blame of the outgroup.*

While this literature on fraternal relative deprivation, group position, and group entitlement supports this hypothesis, there is a another, quite different line of reasoning that can be used to support the link between violations of group entitlement, on the one hand, and blame and anger, on the other. This line of reasoning has to do with the role that these four intergroup evaluations played in the evolution of human social cognition.

A number of authors, from disciplinary backgrounds as divergent as biology, psychology, and political science, have argued that the evolutionary roots of anger lie in supporting the norms that regulate social life (Fessler 2010; Ostrom 2000; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009; Trivers 1971). While norms are generally a powerful method of fostering cooperating in systems of social exchange, they need to be policed to guard against cheating (Axelrod 1986). Confronting non-cooperators imposes substantial fitness costs, however, with the result that it is not in the immediate interests of any individuals to defend social norms given the private cost of doing so. Anger provides a means for resolving such normative conflicts, because as Frank (1988) argues, it provides a credible deterrent against norm violation. Anger is a credible deterrent precisely because it (1) increases the desire for aggression, (2) reduces the perceived risk of confrontation, and (3) others know that anger is associated with (1) and (2).

This evolutionary argument links anger to violations of general social norms. But other evidence suggests that the evolution of anger can also be traced back to violations of

norms of position. Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides (2009) argue that anger evolved to resolve normative disputes over position in dominance hierarchies. Dominance hierarchies have a good claim to be the original social norms (Cummins 1999, 2005) because they regulate the lives of many social animals, particularly primates (Barkow 1975; de Waal 1982). Like any social norms, dominance hierarchies stipulate what individuals ought to do; in this case, the resources that each individual is permitted according to their position on the hierarchy (Ellis 1995).

Dominance hierarchies, moreover, require a particular cognitive architecture: a mind that is able to track the interpersonal allocations of resources, and compare these to the interpersonal allocation of resources that ought to exist. This, however, is exactly the logic of group entitlement comparisons (lower right panel in Figure 3.2). There is thus a striking resemblance between the cognitive computations required for dominance hierarchies, and the psychological underpinnings of the group entitlement–blame–anger–conflict theory I have just presented.

Group entitlement violations are the final, most fundamental component of the entitlement-blame-anger model (Figure 3.1). These violations of group entitlements—the outgroup getting more than they deserve, or the ingroup, less—produce blame, anger, and an increased desire for aggression against the offending group. If outgroup blame and intergroup anger is widespread, the conditions are fertile for political entrepreneurs to organize a collective event—a march, a meeting, etc.—that may boil over into violence. The cognitive and behavioral correlates of anger suggest that it is the angry who are more likely to participate in any such collective action, and to strike the first blows should violence occur.

I have discussed several quite distinct lines of evidence that point toward this role that group entitlements play in blame, anger, and participation in intergroup violence. This role is suggested by a large literature on the causes of revolution, rebellion, ethnic violence, and prejudice; it is also consistent with a very different literature on the cognitive and emo-

tional adaptations necessary for human ancestors to operate in an environment governed by social norms.

There is one final reason, however, why group entitlements are attractive as the underpinnings of a theory of participation in intergroup violence. As Bobo and Hutchings (1996, 955) put it, they are "historically and collectively developed judgments." They thus allow us to link the individually-experienced and somewhat transient emotion of anger to the more enduring and contextually-embedded beliefs and normative expectations about the position and privileges which each group in a society is thought to be entitled. While our ability to track and remember group entitlement cognitions is probably hard-wired, the form that these cognitions take—especially the entitlements of the in- and outgroups—are shaped by shared beliefs that are rooted in time, place, and culture.

This concludes my description of, and argument for, the entitlement-blame-anger model of participation. As a secondary task, I will also test eight other models that are extracted from existing research on intergroup relations, conflict, and violence. These models, and their accompanying hypotheses, are described in the next section.

3.3. Alternative Models

My focus on an emotional pathway to intergroup violence does not rule out the possibility that other factors could also be important. Different individuals may have diverging motivations for the same observed behavior. This section thus examines eight alternative models for participation in intergroup violence, and states hypotheses that will be tested in Chapter 5. Table 3.1 lists these eight models in the rows of the table; some are hypothesized to have effects on all the dependent variables of participation, anger, and blame; others on only one or two.

3.3.1. Selective Incentives

The classic theory of collective action posits selective incentives as one of the primary methods by which groups and leaders are able to generate significant levels of participation (Lichbach 1995; Olson 1965). The problem is that the outcome of collective action is typically a public good that can be enjoyed by all group members, whether or not they took part in its production. Selective incentives deter free-riding by selectively directing rewards to participants.

Recent research on the motivations of participants in civil wars finds that private incentives such as payments play a prominent role in decisions about whether or not to fight (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Payments of participants are more likely when violence is backed or organized by powerful leaders, for the simple reason that these leaders are more likely to have material resources to reward participants. This is not the case in many instances of intergroup violence however: community policing leaders in Alexandra and other South African townships have low incomes.[12] In addition, the chaos and confusion of intergroup violence means that it would be very difficult for leaders to monitor the behavior of those they have paid. Paying people is therefore a poor method of organizing participation.

It is not surprising that only one percent of my survey respondents believed that "some" or "many" people were paid during the 2008 riots. This finding echoes Scacco's (2010) research in Nigeria, where, despite heavily oversampling rioters, she only found five individuals who admitted to having been paid to take part in the 2001 riots. Both theory and evidence thus suggest that selective payments are not an important factor in motivating

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[12]One indication of their level of income comes from Misago et al. (2010). They report that, in the days after the 2008 attacks, community leaders were charging foreigners R20 (about $2.50) to visit their friends and family in Alexandra.

participation in intergroup violence.

One selective incentive does stand out as a plausible explanations for why people take part. Some researchers emphasize looting as a reason for participation in urban riots in the United States (Banfield 1970; DiPasquale and Glaeser 1998). Such riots are directed at the authorities, to the extent that any target exists, while intergroup violence is directed against another social group. But both forms feature mob-based mass violence, suggesting that looting may also play a role in participation in intergroup violence. In this view, participants are not motivated by antipathy to the outgroup, but only by the possibility of grabbing some spoils of war.

Hypothesis 1.2. *Beliefs that participation yields opportunities for looting are associated with greater intentions of participating in intergroup violence.*

3.3.2. Social Influence

A large literature on social influence shows that people's behaviors, attitudes, and perceptions are affected by those around them (Turner 1991). There are two main types of social influence. The more famous of the two is conformity, when an individual changes her attitudes or behavior to fit in with a group, illustrated most vividly in Solomon Asch's classic line-length experiments (Asch 1956). The other type of social influence is compliance, where an individual change her behavior in acquiescence to a request (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). A memorable illustration of compliance is the behavior of the experimental participants in Stanley Milgram's studies of obedience (Milgram 1964).

While compliance can be seen as a public display of obedience, conformity may may be either public or private (Festinger 1954). Public conformity involves conformist behavior or speech, while private conformity is associated with changes in personal attitudes and

beliefs.[13]

The public-private distinction maps onto two different mechanisms of influence: normative and informational (Deutsch and Gerard 1955). The behavior and speech of others exerts informational influence when it supplies information about the distribution of beliefs and preferences among a relevant population, and it exerts normative influence when it produces social pressure to act in a certain way.

Informational influence is thought to be based on a desire to have accurate information about the world. It is especially likely to operate when information is limited or when a situation is ambiguous or complex (Festinger 1954). This characterizes many social situations, particularly the issue of who is to blame for the hardships faced by the ingroup. Informational influence results in conformity in private attitudes, which, in turn, may then produce public, behavioral conformity.

Normative influence operates out of a desire to be accepted by others, particularly those within one's reference group. The real or perceived expectations of these other group members creates social pressure that leads to behavioral conformity, and perhaps also compliance. This pressure has been shown to have such effects even when the behavior is privately opposed by individuals (Kuran 1995).

Social influence is hypothesized to have two distinct effects on participation in intergroup violence. The first is a direct effect on participation itself; the second is an indirect effect that is mediated by beliefs that the outgroup is to blame for some harm to the ingroup. Each of these hypothesized effects will be discussed in turn, beginning with the direct effect.

A number of scholars have noted the importance of social context and social influence in producing mass participation in rebellion, revolution, and genocide. Taylor (1988), for example, argues that communities that participated in rebellions in Europe and China

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[13]Private conformity is also known as acceptance or internalization.

tended to exhibit two organizational features. First, they showed webs of overlapping horizontal ties, where each individual regularly interacted with numerous other members of the community. Second, these communities were governed by strong norms of generalized reciprocity, which demand that all community members help each other without an expectation of immediate reward.

Other scholars of rebellion and collective violence have confirmed the importance of one or both of these factors. Scott (1976) argues that Vietnamese villages with stronger norms of reciprocity had a greater capacity for collective action and were more likely to rebel when their welfare was threatened. Petersen (2001) exploits the same argument to explain why certain communities supported the anti-Soviet resistance in Lithuania while others did not. Using survey data from Liberia, Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) show that the number of ties to other participants in the civil war increases a respondent's likelihood of also being a rebel. Fuji (2009) uses the same model to account for participation in the Rwandan genocide, as does McDoom (2011), although he uses a unique geospatial dataset on the location of perpetrators' and victims' houses in one village in Rwanda.

A related set of findings can be found in research on participation in what McAdam calls "high risk activism." McAdam (1986) argues that while ideological ideological identification with the civil rights movement "pushed" individuals toward participation, membership in activist groups was required to "pull" people into the 1964 Freedom Summer project. Similarly, Finkel and Muller find that membership in an activist movement is a key factor shaping participation in "unconventional" protest in 1980s West Germany (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Finkel and Muller 1998).

Returning to the psychological literature on social influence, it seems likely that communities, organizations, or institutions featuring numerous horizontal ties and practices of generalized reciprocity are also able to exert considerable normative influence on their members. When individuals interact with many others in a particular community—and

have expectations of future interactions—each of its members cares a great deal about how they are viewed by others. This normative influence is likely to produce a significant degree of social pressure to conform to the behavior of others and comply with requests to take part in collective action.

While organizers and other participants may plausibly exert normative influence on others, they can also threaten to harm individuals who refuse to take part. In situations of intergroup violence, there is thus a third mechanism that should be added to the normative and informational mechanisms already identified: coercive influence. Given that the group intends to use violence on its targets, a threat to use it on a recalcitrant group member is credible. Individuals who are members of community organizations will also be known by other members and, as a consequence, they will be identifiable and prone to intimidation should they choose to not participate in collective action.

Applying this theory to intergroup violence in South Africa, the contexts where individuals would be most exposed to norms of generalized reciprocity and embedded in webs of horizontal interactions are the community policing meetings. As noted in the previous chapter, these informal institutions grew out of the street and block committees that emerged in the 1980s as a means of resisting apartheid. They have a history of producing collective action. Attendance in these community meetings will thus expose individuals to normative and coercive pressure to participate in future violence, which, in turn, is expected to produce behavioral compliance.

Hypothesis 1.3. *Attendance in community meetings results in greater intentions to take part in future intergroup violence.*

The group is also expected to exert an indirect effect on participation in intergroup violence by shaping individual beliefs about the degree of blame to attribute to the outgroup.

A wide variety of studies have shown the effects of social influence on political and

social opinions. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954), for example, claim that preferences for parties or candidates are contagious, while Mutz (1998) argues that "impersonal influence"—perceptions of the opinions of others—shapes individual's own political opinions. Political scientists have been particularly interested in the effects of people's discussion networks. Huckfeldt and Sprague (1987) argue that these networks constrain opportunities for interaction and the delimit the information one hears from peers; Mutz shows that the heterogeneity of discussion networks increases political tolerance (2002*b*), but decreases participation (2002*a*); and Druckman and Nelson (2003) argues that heterogeneity mitigates the effects of of elite framing.

In sum, there is considerable evidence that people's attitudes are affected by the opinions and behavior of others, particularly those with whom they interact. Such attitudes are private (or at least shared only with an interviewer) and thus shaped more by informational, than by normative, influence. In other words, people take heed of the opinions of their family, friends, and others within their reference group when forming their own attitudes about political phenomena.

Consequently, there is reason to believe that a similar process operates when it comes to blame of an outgroup. To the extent that an individual hears many of her fellow group members blaming the outgroup for the woes of the ingroup, she will be more likely to regard these allegations of blame as reliable information. This informational influence is expected to result in attitudinal conformity, such that the individual becomes more likely to blame the outgroup herself. To the extent that this effect materializes, and blame is additionally linked to participation in intergroup violence, then this effect forms a second pathway between social influence and participation, one that manifests indirectly.

Hypothesis 3.2. *Greater exposure to expressions of outgroup blame by an individual's peers produces increased blame, by that individual, of the outgroup.*

3.3.3. Elite Mobilization

There is a widespread popular belief that political leaders are not only capable of "fomenting," "instigating," or "provoking" intergroup violence, but that they regularly exercise this capability too (e.g. Reeves 2010; Kirkpatrick 2011). More systematic research does indeed argue that leaders can benefit financially and politically from intergroup violence (Misago 2012; Olzak 1990; Wilkinson 2004). Leaders are useful for intergroup violence because they may be in a position to provide a focal point, such as a march or a meeting, around which people can coordinate an attack on another group. In addition to this organizational role, some researchers argue that leaders also play an informational role in shaping mass participation. In other words, leaders may attempt to persuade members of their group to blame the outgroup (DeFigueiredo and Weingast 1999; Glick 2005).[14]

A number of scholars claim that leaders have successfully blamed outgroups in historical examples of genocide or ethnic war. Historians, for example, argue that the Nazi party was able to convince Germans that Jews were to blame for their woes (e.g. Staub 1989). In Rwanda, the International Criminal Tribunal concluded that the radio station Radio Télévision Libre des Mille mobilized thousands of ordinary people to take part in the genocide (ICTR 2003). In the case of Yugoslavia, DeFigueiredo and Weingast (1999) claim that Milosevic manipulated ordinary Serbs' uncertainty about the motives of Croat leaders, thus increasing Serbian fear and his support. More generally, Snyder (2000) argues that leaders are able to sell exclusionary nationalistic myths to the public through their control of the media and the "marketplace of ideas," paving the way for ethno-nationalist war.

Other scholars are less convinced about the influence that leaders have on public beliefs and opinions. Gibson and Howard (2007) presents an interesting case from late 1990s

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[14]Another informational role that is possibly played by leaders is to signal to the public that violence enjoys support from the authorities (Horowitz 2001; Yanagizawa-Drott 2012).

Russia, where elite attempts to blame Jews did not succeed. Yanagizawa-Drott (2012) argues that radio in Rwanda signaled authoritative support for violence rather than shaped mass perceptions of blame. In a reconciliation field experiment using a radio drama in Rwanda, Paluck (2009) furthermore finds that media messages are able to change perceived social norms, but not personal beliefs (such as blame).

The large body of research on "elite influence" in American politics may be able to reconcile these divergent claims. This literature shows that leaders do have some effect, but that citizens moderate elite messages in various ways. One particularly important moderator is the effect of framing; research shows that leaders may pick the considerations used by the public to evaluate an issue, but are not able to change attitudes on that issue more directly (Chong and Druckman 2007). An example in the area of intergroup relations is supplied by Kinder and Sanders (1990), who find that varying the framing of affirmative action affects the role that "racial resentment" plays in public opinion about this issue. In sum, although elite messages are by no means decisive, and may be attenuated or moderated by the public, it remains plausible that scapegoating by leaders has an effect on mass beliefs.

Hypothesis 3.3. *Greater exposure to expressions of outgroup blame by community leaders produces increased blame, by individuals, of the outgroup.*

3.3.4. Realistic Group Conflict

One of the most prominent theories of intergroup violence is realistic group conflict theory. In the previous chapter, I discussed some examples of macro-level research that has used this theory to account for the occurrence of violence between groups (e.g. Bates 1974; Olzak 1992). It can also be utilized, however, to explain why some people participate while others do not.

Groups may compete over various resources. Existing research (Steinberg 2008*a*;

Misago et al. 2010; Nyar 2010) suggests that three resources are particularly important in stoking intergroup tensions in Alexandra: jobs, public housing, and customers for street traders.[15] Locals who are unemployed, live in low quality housing, or make their living selling goods in the streets of Alexandra, are thus particularly likely to compete with foreigners for access to resources.

Moreover, such individuals could stand to benefit should an attack on foreigners be carried out, because one consequence of such attacks is that large numbers of the targeted group flee the area, producing a shift in the degree of competition over resources. These individuals can thus be said to face collective incentives for violence (Klandermans 1984). Collective incentives therefore motivate participation in intergroup violence because violence holds the possibility of reducing competition over resources

This reduction in competition is, however, a public good, and as discussed earlier, public goods are non-excludable—they can be enjoyed by all group members, regardless of who took part in their provision. As such, the group faces the classic collective action dilemma: all its members would prefer to free ride on the efforts of others rather than participate themselves (Olson 1965). Although collective incentives may account for one group's motivation to attack another, the translation of this motivation into collective action requires that sufficient individuals actually be willing to take part in violence. Collective incentives are thus necessary but not sufficient for participation. A means of monitoring the participation of individual group members, and applying pressure to those who might prefer to not take part, is also required.

These monitoring and mobilizing functions can be performed by informal institutions with their repeated face-to-face interactions and norms of ingroup reciprocity. Alexan-

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[15]Labor market and housing competition have also been identified as a determinant of intergroup violence in other settings (Dancygier 2010; Olzak 1992).

dra Scacco's (2010) research in Nigeria, which I mentioned in the previous chapter, utilizes just such a model. She finds that poorer residents of Jos and Kaduna participated in the 2001 Nigerian riots to defend their neighborhoods, but only if they were also active members of neighborhood security organizations. Poorer residents had a collective incentive to participate, she argues, because their homes were likely to be destroyed if not defended. Wealthier residents had more secure homes and thus did not need to mobilize to protect their property. Poverty thus provided the motive for conflict with another group, and the mobilizing ability of social networks provides the means by which this motive could be transformed into collective action.

While Scacco's model may generalize to other examples of intergroup violence, including local-foreigner conflict in Alexandra, the particular collective incentives she assumes are not a factor in South Africa. Foreigners, who were the targets of the South African attacks, were far outnumbered and either fled or fought for their lives, rather than gathering to defend their homes. To the extent that locals were motivated by collective incentives, defense of their homes was not one of these.[16] Rather, as I have argued, the unemployed, those living in low quality housing, and street traders are the social categories who are most likely to face collective incentives for participation. In Alexandra, the mobilizing institutions are the community policing fora where the 2008 attacks began. The requirement that individuals both be motivated via a collective incentive, and be mobilized by community networks then implies a conditional relationship between the three measures of exposure to material competition with the outgroup and attendance at community policing meetings. The hypotheses are as follows:

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[16]The particular collective incentive proposed by Scacco also appears to not be sufficient for participation in intergroup violence. It would seem that at least some rioters with more aggressive, violent, and destructive intentions are required, or else no defense would be needed in the first place.

Hypothesis 1.4. *Unemployment and attendance at community meetings jointly produce greater intentions to participate in intergroup violence.*

Hypothesis 1.5. *Living in low quality housing and attendance at community meetings jointly produce greater intentions to participate in intergroup violence.*

Hypothesis 1.6. *Making a living as an informal trader and attendance at community meetings jointly produce greater intentions to participate in intergroup violence.*

Exposure to material competition with the outgroup is also expected to result in anger and blame of that group. Because these are individually-held attitudes and emotions, rather than collective action, there is no expectation that they require the mobilizing power of community social networks. There is thus no conditional relationship; competing with the outgroup over jobs, houses, or customers should be sufficient for elevated levels of anger or blame. The anger hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 2.2. *Unemployment produces higher levels of anger at the outgroup.*

Hypothesis 2.3. *Living in low quality housing produces higher levels of anger at the outgroup.*

Hypothesis 2.4. *Making a living as an informal trader produces higher levels of anger at the outgroup.*

Finally, the realistic group conflict hypotheses for blame:

Hypothesis 3.4. *Unemployment produces increased blame of the outgroup.*

Hypothesis 3.5. *Living in low quality housing produces increased blame of the outgroup.*

Hypothesis 3.6. *Making a living as an informal trader increased blame of the outgroup.*

3.3.5. Frustration-Aggression.

The longest-standing psychological theory of violent collective action is frustration-aggression theory, which dates back to the study by Dollard et al. (1939). A more contemporary reinterpretation of frustration-aggression theory by Berkowitz (1989) describes frustrations as "aversive events."[17] The model is then straightforward: frustrations increases the likelihood of aggressive behavior.

There is a clear resemblance to appraisal theories, which argue that goal incongruence triggers anger.[18] Frustration-aggression theory remains useful, however, because it permits an explanation of displaced aggression, where aggression is directed at a target other than the source of the frustration (Berkowitz 1962).[19] In contrast, the appraisal model of anger predicts that anger will be directed at the same actor who is believed to have caused the triggering harm.

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[17]These are objective, not subjective conditions.

[18]Indeed, the appraisal theory of anger can be seen as a development and refinement of frustration-aggression theory. Even Leonard Berkowitz, who has championed frustration-aggression theory since the 1960s, appears to admit this: "my position regarding appraisals should be clear from the start: I have no doubt that people's evaluations of situations greatly determine what emotions they will experience" (Berkowitz 2010, 210).

[19]Displacement of aggression is closely related to the phenomenon of scapegoating. Scapegoating, in intergroup contexts, is when "an out-group is unfairly blamed for having intentionally caused an in-group's misfortune" (Glick 2005, 244). Positing that an outgroup has been scapegoated implies that they have been unfairly blamed by the ingroup. As I described in the previous chapter, research on the employment and housing situations of foreigners in Alexandra is quite limited. But it does appear plausible that immigrants take up jobs and houses that locals might otherwise enjoy. Moreover, current international norms restrict employment and public housing to citizens. It is thus not completely clear, in this case, that outgroup blame is unfair. I thus avoid using the term "scapegoating," and stick to "blame." I do not take a stand on whether this blame is unfair or not.

In Alexandra, two aversive conditions stand out as potential frustrations. First, the daily grind of poverty would provide a sustained aversive experience that might produce aggression. Scholars have linked poverty to participation in both civil war (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008) and ethnic riots (Brass 1997).

Hypothesis 1.7. *Poverty results in greater intentions of participation in intergroup violence.*

The second potential source of frustration is support for an opposition political party. Since 2004, all local electoral wards in Alexandra have been held by ANC candidates. The party has also controlled the balance of power in the city of Johannesburg, the province of Gauteng, and the National Assembly since the first elections of the democratic era in 1994. While individuals who do not support any party may be disengaged or alienated from politics, those who support opposition parties are more likely to be frustrated with the continued unemployment, lack of housing, and poverty of townships like Alexandra.

Hypothesis 1.8. *Support for an opposition party results in greater intentions of participation in intergroup violence.*

Frustrations may also produce intergroup anger as well as participation in violence. The original frustration-aggression model of Dollard et al. (1939) was situated within a behaviorist psychology and thus ignored the emotions. Berkowitz's (1989; 1990) "cognitive-neoassociationist" reinterpretation, however, remedies this oversight by arguing that aversive events produce negative emotions—particularly anger—which then result in aggression. Following the discussion in the previous section, being poor and supporting an opposition party are hypothesized to be frustrations that result in intergroup anger.

Hypothesis 2.5. *Poverty is expected to result in greater levels of intergroup anger.*

Hypothesis 2.6. *Support for an opposition party is expected to result in greater levels of intergroup anger.*

Finally, the fact that frustration-aggression theory can, in principle, account for scapegoating means that it could also provide an explanation for why outgroups are blamed for hardships and harms suffered by the ingroup. Frustrations, in other words, may produce a displacement of blame as well as a displacement of aggression. Poverty and support for opposition parties is expected to be associated with greater blame of the outgroup.

Hypothesis 3.7. *Poverty is expected to result in increased blame of the outgroup.*

Hypothesis 3.8. *Support for an opposition party is expected to result in increased blame of the outgroup.*

3.3.6. A Culture of Violence

A large interdisciplinary literature argues that variations in violence, particularly homicide, are produced by variations in norms regarding the appropriate use of violence. In pre-state societies, where there is no overarching authority to supply impartial justice, it is necessary to cultivate a reputation for formidability to deter predation from others (McCullough 2008; Pinker 2011). This need for deterrence produces tit-for-tat norms of behavior (Axelrod 1986), and systems of revenge (McCullough 2008) and honor (Cohen et al. 1996). Chagnon (1988), for example, estimates that 30% of mortality he observed amongst the Yanomamö of the Amazon basin was due to revenge killings. Where state authority is imposed, however, such tit-for-tat norms are no longer useful and tend to be replaced by norms of civility (Elias 1969), which proscribe rather than recommend violence. This process of norm change may be quite slow: Gastil (1971) argues that the high regional variation in homicide levels in the United States is the product of a persistent "culture of violence" that remains in the South.

A number of authors have claimed that South African townships are similarly gripped by a culture of violence (Hamber 2000; Kynoch 2005). Despite townships falling under the

aegis of the apartheid state, this state was not a neutral arbiter of justice. Indeed, by the 1980s the townships had become the frontlines of an insurgency, with the police being far more interested in repression than law enforcement Steinberg (2008b). In response, as I stated in the previous chapter, township activists set up the informal institutions of street and block committees to defend against police incursions and root out informants. Under such threatening and anarchic conditions, it seems likely that violence gained some normative approval.

Despite the advent of democracy in 1994, it still took an additional five years before the community of Alexandra came to tolerate police patrols of their area Steinberg (2008b). Normative support for violence no doubt also lingers in Alexandra. Individuals who subscribe to norms approving of violence are expected to be more likely to participate in intergroup violence.

Hypothesis 1.9. *Normative support for violence is associated with a greater likelihood of participation in intergroup violence.*

Normative support for violence is also expected to be associated with increased anger, quite aside from the effect on participation in intergroup violence. The reason is that appraisal theorists sometimes argue that the costs of aggression are one of the appraisals that produce anger (Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). When aggression is costly, the argument goes, anger is less likely to be experienced, while fear or sadness become more likely.[20] Thus, to the extent that individuals regard violence as proscribed, they will be more likely to view aggression as costly, and less likely to experience anger.

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[20]The use of this appraisal may appear to suggest that anger is the outcome of a cost-benefit calculus where it is "chosen" only when the costs are not prohibitive. There is indeed a resemblance to models of instrumental choice. But this resemblance comes about because anger is an adaption; it provides a credible deterrent against predation by other individuals (Frank 1988; Trivers 1971). Part of this evolutionary logic is that anger becomes counterproductive when an opponent is too formidable (Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009): it would be better

Hypothesis 2.7. *Normative support for violence is associated with lower levels of intergroup anger.*

3.3.7. Authoritarianism and Threat

A large body of research has linked authoritarian values with intolerance of, prejudice toward, and support for aggression against, other groups . An initially psychoanalytic theory (Adorno et al. 1950; Fromm 1941), Feldman (2003) has provided a contemporary revision. He argues that authoritarianism is a psychological orientation or value dimension, which balances the individual need for autonomy with the group need for order. The authoritarian pole of this orientation emphasizes social conformity, respect for authority, and a disapproval of difference.

Feldman and Stenner (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005) offer a compelling account of the mechanics behind the authoritarianism–intolerance effect. Authoritarian dispositions, they argue, are activated by threatening contexts. Only when activated do these dispositions produce authoritarian attitudes and behavior. There is a social-functionalist logic to their theory: under benign conditions of peace and prosperity, authoritarian values remain abstract, but when conditions deteriorate and group welfare is threatened, authoritarian values cohere, and begin to exert a greater control over behavior and political attitudes (Feldman 2003). It is thus neither solely individual predispositions nor solely sit-

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to give in and sacrifice some resources than stumble into a one-sided battle. While instrumental models of "rational choice" focus on rationality at the individual level, this evolutionary story about anger focuses on rational at the genetic level (or, as (Dawkins 1976) put it, "selfish genes"). There is no necessary correspondence between these levels. Moreover, anger is (or was) adaptive only over long periods of time and on average across populations of individuals. Although there may still be contemporary situations in which it is advantageous (and thus "rational") to get angry, there are also many situations where anger is disadvantageous. Anger is thus not a choice in the everyday sense of the word (Elster 1998).

uational threats that produce behavioral expressions of authoritarianism, but authoritarian predispositions and situational threats working in tandem. Some have disputed this interactive authoritarian-threat dynamic (Hetherington and Suhay 2011), but the experimental evidence does provide support (Stenner 2005; Lavine et al. 2002; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005).

Authoritarian values, coupled with perceptions of group threats, appear promising as an explanation for outgroup blame (Gibson and Howard 2007), for two reasons. First, one of the main effects of this authoritarian-threat dynamic is a decrease in tolerance for difference, and outgroups are usually different to the ingroup in important ways. Second, the authoritarian-threat dynamic produces a pattern of cognition that can be described as self-deception. Lavine et al. (2002); Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas (2005), for example, experimentally induce threat and show that authoritarians are more likely to engage in motivated reasoning, and thus more likely to search for information that confirms their existing beliefs. Blaming outgroups, which may take the form of scapegoating, or "unfair blame" (Glick 2005), appears particularly likely if individuals engage in motivated reasoning.

Hypothesis 3.9. *Authoritarian values and perceptions of threat to the ingroup jointly produce increased blame of the outgroup.*

3.3.8. Psychoanalytic Projection

An early, psychodynamic model of blame and aggression is the theory of projection. This theory holds that unpleasant and aversive thoughts, emotions, and memories are repressed or redirected in some way (Freud 1918; Glick 2005). Feelings of guilt and anxiety are particularly likely to be projected on to another target (Gollwitzer 2004). Using the concept of intergroup emotions, this theory can be tailored to fit intergroup situations. Another group is blamed when an individual experiences unacceptable or disagreeable feelings about her

own group. In Alexandra, the obvious source for these emotions is the 2008 attacks against immigrants. According to the psychoanalytic theory of scapegoating, blame of the outgroup may be a projection of ingroup members' negative emotions about their group's role in the violence.

Hypothesis 3.10. *Negative emotions about the 2008 attacks are associated with increased blame of the outgroup.*

3.4. Conclusion

This chapter has explicated the entitlement-blame-anger model of participation in intergroup violence. There are three dependent variables: participation in intergroup violence, intergroup anger, and outgroup blame. The entitlement-blame-anger model hypothesizes that anger is the cause of participation; blame, the trigger of anger; and group entitlement violations, the roots of blame. This chapter has also outlined a large number of hypotheses that could potentially offer alternative explanations for one or more of these dependent variables (All the hypotheses are summarized in Table 3.1). This concludes the theoretical section of the dissertation. The next chapter considers issues of research design and measurement.

Data and Methods

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. Researching Participation in Intergroup Violence

This dissertation examines the question of why people take part in intergroup violence. An answer requires individual-level data with variation in levels of participation. In other words, we need observations both of individuals both taking part and individuals demurring to do so. There are two methods that can be used to collect such data: experimental and observational. The first requires that the researcher simulate the key features of intergroup violence in a laboratory and, after manipulating the hypothesized triggers of participation, record whether subjects take part or not. The second method utilizes the behavioral variation that found in a sample of people who live in an area where intergroup violence has recently occurred.

Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. The experimental method is constrained by research ethics. Actual violence is, of course, unacceptable, so researchers have turned to behavioral measures that are believed to be related to aggression and violence. Such measures include observing whether experimental participants fine those belonging to other groups (Abbink, Masclet, and Mirza 2009), or force them to listen to unpleasant sounds (Gubler 2011). Given that these behaviors are sanctioned by the authority

figure of the experimenter (Tedeschi and Quigley 1996), a gap in realism emerges between these laboratory measures and the behavior of interest. Intergroup violence involves gruesome face-to-face attacks on unarmed civilians, so this gap in realism may be quite large. The construct validity of behavioral measures of participation in violence is thus fairly weak (Tedeschi and Quigley 1996).

Research ethics constrain laboratory experiments on intergroup violence in other ways. Even if a researcher was to stick to one of the safe measures of aggressive behavior described above, it would still be unwise to manipulate the triggers of intergroup violence using subjects from real groups that are at risk of attacking one another. Whether debriefed or not, one cannot be sure that subjects will return to their community no more prejudiced than when they arrived in the lab. Researchers often resolve this problem by using artificial groups, or groups such as students and university administration that are psychologically salient but not likely to attack one another (e.g. van Zomeren et al. 2004). The unfortunate consequence of this solution is that it weakens the external validity of the study (Druckman and Kam 2011).

In addition, the causal effect of intergroup anger on intentions to confront an outgroup has already been confirmed using laboratory experiments (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004). This emotional pathway to violence has never been tested in the context of intergroup violence, however, either with a sample of people from a community that is prone to intergroup violence, or using a dependent variable that measures participation in violence.

These existing laboratory results, coupled with the limitations of the experimental approach to research on participation in violence, point toward the second method of research—collecting observational data from a violence-prone context—as being potentially more fruitful. To gather data to test the entitlement-blame-anger model, I thus use a public opinion survey.

4.1.2. Research Site: Alexandra

I chose the urban slum of Alexandra, in Johannesburg, South Africa as the site for my survey. The 2008 violence between local South Africans and foreigners began in Alexandra, and intergroup tensions remain (Quintal 2011).

Alexandra is a propitious site to research participation in intergroup violence, for four reasons. First, although the area previously experienced partisan violence in the early 1990s (Bonner and Nieftagodien 2008), the 2008 attacks were the first episode of violence that targeted immigrants. Thus, Alexandra would seem to lack the "institutionalized riot systems" and "riot specialists" that authors such as Brass (2003) identify in Indian cities. Nor were the participants in Alexandra influenced by contagion of violence from other places because the 2008 riots began in Alexandra. Without specialists in violence, organizational infrastructure, or bandwagon effects, participation in the ethnic riot in Alexandra is a more difficult case to explain, and thus a sterner test for any account of individual participation.

Second, the 2008 attacks occurred only three years before the fieldwork. Although residents of the affected areas like Alexandra were unlikely to forget this nation-wide wave of violence, this relatively short gap suggests that memories of the violence should be quite vivid for respondents.[1] Indeed, none of the respondents reported ignorance about the 2008 attacks. Moreover, the occurrence of anti-immigrant violence in 2008 did not change the tense relationship between locals and foreigners in South African townships. Indeed, there have been sporadic warnings that violence may recur (see Quintal 2011).

Given the recent occurrence of intergroup violence in Alexandra and the continued salience of the ingroup-outgroup divide, asking a sample of residents about participation in future intergroup violence is a meaningful exercise. Alexandra residents are likely to

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[1]This is in contrast to the methodology of Scacco (2010), for example, who gathered survey data on riot participation seven years after the 2001 Nigerian riots took place.

remember the previous attacks, and can therefore imagine what it means to take part. Continued tensions suggest also that a future attack on immigrants remains all too possible. A public opinion survey in Alexandra on intergroup attitudes, emotions, and aggressive intentions should thus yield valid measures.

In addition, such survey data on participation in intergroup violence is likely to avoid the floor effects that would be caused by sampling from a population where few are disposed to attack another group. It also avoids the ceiling effect of sampling from a population where most people are likely to riot, because only a minority of the ingroup typically take part in these episodes of intergroup violence.[2]

In sum, the novelty of the 2008 violence, its recent occurrence, the presence of continued tensions between locals and immigrants, and the existence of behavioral and attitudinal variation together suggest that a sample drawn from Alexandra would provide valid and useful data for testing hypotheses regarding participation in intergroup violence.

In the next section I discuss how the survey was conducted before turning to an explication of the wording of the survey items, and the measurement of the variables.

4.2. Conducting the Survey

4.2.1. Initial Preparations

I began the fieldwork with some qualitative pilot research. In August 2010, I conducted 19 face-to-face interviews as well a number of more informal discussions with residents of

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[2]Scacco (2010) for example, finds that only 19% of adult males actually took part in the 2001 riots in Jos and Kaduna in Nigeria. She argues that virtually no women took part, producing an estimate that around 10% of the adult population participated.

Alexandra.[3] This preliminary research provided several insights that helped inform the later survey.

First, I noticed the widespread incidence of negative beliefs about, and grievances toward, African immigrants. The content of these largely centered on immigrants undercutting wages, taking jobs, and living in government houses (see also Steinberg 2008*a*; Misago et al. 2010). Second, while anti-foreigner sentiments were commonly encountered, I also found significant variation in attitudes and beliefs. Third, a few respondents showed signs of anger when talking about foreigners taking jobs, etc., which instilled some confidence in the key causal mechanism of the proposed model. Fourth, respondents did not show much hesitance in discussing immigrants and the violence of 2008, indicating that the threat of social desirability bias was not as severe as one might imagine.[4]

I returned to Alexandra in April and May 2011 to conduct the public opinion survey. I demarcated the research site using the traditional boundaries of "Old Alexandra."[5]

Interviewers were recruited from a local survey firm (Social Surveys Africa), who were happy to provide work for some of their freelance fieldworkers. Four interviewers were hired; all were all black South Africans who lived in Johannesburg (none resided in

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[3]I worked with a prominent local resident to gain access to community leaders and the community itself. Researchers who have conducted fieldwork in Alexandra advised me that it would be desirable to seek the permission of informal leaders to avoid misperceptions and misunderstandings regarding my intentions (as well as the intentions of my interviewers when it came to conducting the survey). Permission was granted in all instances.

[4]Horowitz (2001) notes that lack of regret is common among perpetrator groups after ethnic riots.

[5]Old Alexandra is bounded by Wynberg Road in the south, Vasco Da Gama Street in the north, 1st Street in the west, and the Jukskei river in the east. These boundaries are marked on the map in Figure 4.1. Some sources, such as census data, include additional areas to the north, east, and west. These wealthier suburbs and industrial areas have little to do with Alexandra.

Figure 4.1. Satellite Photograph of Alexandra

The boundaries of Alexandra are outlined in black. The two hostels are the hexagonal structures outlined in grey; areas of apartment buildings are outlined in white. The remainder of Alexandra consists of houses and shacks, as well as sports fields, schools, and administrative buildings that are excluded from the sampling frame.

Alexandra); three were male and one female; and each had at least three years' experience.

4.2.2.   Translation

Alexandra is a linguistically diverse township.[6] Fortunately, the African languages spoken in South Africa fall into four internally homogenous groups, where the speakers of a language within one group are typically able to understand speakers of another language within

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[6]Indeed, respondents reported ten different first languages.

the same group (Lewis 2009). Moreover, two of the language groups—the Nguni group featuring Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, and Swazi, and the Sotho group featuring Sotho, Pedi, and Tswana—are very large.[7]

The survey instrument was thus translated into two languages: one from the Nguni group (Zulu) and one from the Sotho group (Tswana). Existing survey data[8] show that Zulu is the most popular language in Alexandra. More importantly, it is the lingua franca in Johannesburg townships.[9] Tswana was chosen because it was the language from the Sotho group that the interviewers were most comfortable with.[10]

I began the process of translation during the pre-fieldwork training period. I used the method of decentering (Werner and Campbell 1970), where changes are made between the original and target languages until all versions are satisfactory. The questions were read aloud in Zulu and Tswana. Translations were recorded. Ambiguities and disagreements were discussed, and if necessary, the original English wording was adjusted. Special attention was paid to important concepts such as emotion words. Working off the notes made during this training period, the instrument was translated into Zulu and Tswana by teams of two interviewers chosen according to their fluency with the target language.

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[7]A large majority of Alexandra residents (89%) reported speaking a language from one of these groups as a first language.

[8]See Table 4.1 for further details.

[9]Recall that during the 2008 riots, attackers asked suspected foreigners to give the Zulu word for "elbow."

[10]Two of the interviewers were native Tswana speakers and thus adept with Sotho and Pedi. They also had a good command of Zulu. The other two were Zulu-speakers who were comfortable with using the Tswana instrument.

4.2.3. Sampling Respondents

Drawing a representative sample in a South African township such as Alexandra is challenging. There is no official list of residents, households, or dwellings, few people have fixed-line telephones, and even fewer have access to the internet. This challenge was overcome using a two-step strategy. First, the sample was stratified by housing type. Within each housing type, population density does not vary much across space. Second, randomly selected starting points were chosen within each housing type using satellite photographs.[11] This method ensures that, within each housing type, all dwellings have an equal chance of being selected into the sample. The Alexandra Benchmark Survey[12] also provides estimates of the proportion of Alexandra residents living in each of these three housing types. Weights were then constructed to ensure that residents of one housing type are not overrepresented when analyzing the data.

Three housing types were used as strata. The first is the fairly regular mixture of small single-story houses, shacks, and backyard rooms that constitutes the vast majority of Alexandra's housing stock. There are also two other smaller, but distinct housing types: government apartments, and the hostels.[13] The sample was also stratified by gender at the point of respondent selection to guard against undersampling men. Population data for

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[11]These photographs were obtained using Google Earth software. The photograph in Figure 4.1 is an example.

[12]The Alexandra Benchmark Survey is a large ($N = 2,496$) 2005 survey of Alexandra households, commissioned by The Alexandra Renewal Project, an agency in the Gauteng Province Department of Housing. It was designed to provide estimates of development and quality of life indicators for policymakers (Alexandra Renewal Project ND). See Table 4.1 for a comparison with my results.

[13]Government apartments are outlined in white in Figure 4.1; hostels are the hexagonal structures outlined in grey. The remainder of Alexandra—aside from public facilities, the police station, schools, and the like—is the mix of houses and shacks used as the first strata.

gender was obtained from the Alexandra Benchmark Survey.

Starting points, or more formally, clusters, were selected by dividing each housing type into equal-sized chunks using a satellite photograph of Alexandra—a task that was made substantially easier by the grid street pattern of the area (clearly seen in Figure 4.1). There were two hostel clusters, three apartment clusters and 80 house-and-shack clusters. The Alexandra Benchmark Survey estimated that 92% of residents live in the area of houses and shacks. Eighteen out the 20 clusters were therefore selected from this area, with only one each from the hostels and apartments. Selection was done by numbering the clusters and using a random number generator.

This stratified, clustered design permits the random selection of dwelling units—individual houses, shacks, apartments, and hostel rooms. Households and respondents are then selected within these dwelling units.[14] The following method was used. Every day in the field corresponded with a particular cluster. Each interviewer attempted to contact nine respondents per day / cluster, producing a targeted sample of 720. A typical procedure was for each cluster to be divided in four, with one interviewer assigned to each segment. Interviewers first sampled dwelling units (house, shack, apartment, or hostel room) by walking in a given direction and using a sampling interval that varied between three and seven. Upon making contact with someone in a selected dwelling, interviewers asked for the number of households sharing that house (and its yard), shack, apartment, or hostel room. The household was selected using the same sampling interval used to choose dwellings. Within each household, interviewers selected a South African[15] aged eighteen years old to serve as a re-

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[14]A household was defined for respondents as all the individuals who regularly eat from the same pot. This technique is used in the Afrobarometer survey project (Afrobarometer Network 2007). One house was found to be occupied by 20 households, both inside, and outside in backyard shacks and rooms.

[15]If the household consisted only of foreign nationals, the interviewer apologized and counted this household as not eligible for the sample.

spondent. A random number table was used.[16] The sample was also stratified by gender at this stage, with interviewers alternatively seeking men and women to interview. The survey instrument was administered by interviewers using a face-to-face method. Respondents' answers were recorded by interviewers on paper questionnaires.

One call-back was required for non-contact at the level of dwelling units, household, or respondent, and no substitutions were permitted. Interviews were completed for 497 respondents. There were 83 instances of non-cooperation at the level of dwelling unit and household and a further 23 at the respondent level, 90 cases of non-contact at the level of dwelling or household and another four at the respondent level, 16 cases where non-contact occurred for other reasons, and six cases of non-contact due to safety concerns in one cluster.[17] The response rate (AAPOR #3) for this survey is thus 69.2%. This is a similar response rate to high-quality face-to-face surveys conducted these days in the United States such as the American National Election Study and the General Social Survey (Dixon and Tucker 2010). The achievement of such a response rate despite the small number of callbacks and the lack of respondent incentives can be attributed to two factors. First, a marked willingness to be interviewed among residents of the area.[18] Second, 14 of the 21 days of fieldwork took place on public holidays or weekends. This reduced the level of non-contact due to

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[16]This table featured rows for the date of interview and columns for the number of people of the appropriate gender living in the household. The number, n, in the relevant cell of the table gave the n-th oldest man/woman to be selected as a respondent.

[17]A group of men began aggressively questioning the intentions of one interviewer in the "Beirut" area (the lower left corner of Alexandra in Figure 4.1), previously the site of partisan violence between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and the African National Congress (ANC). The team left the area immediately.

[18]This willingness to participate in the survey produced an unforeseen problem: one interviewer reported that several individuals who were not selected into the sample nevertheless demanded to be interviewed. He conducted brief interviews to assuage their curiosity, and then moved on.

people being at work.

Table 4.1. Coverage of the Sample

	2005 Survey Estimates	2011 Survey Estimates	
	(%)	(%)	(S.E.)
Gender			
Male	52.8	52.9	(3.0)
Female	47.2	47.1	(3.0)
Housing type			
Apartments	2.5	2.5	(1.7)
Hostels	5.4	5.3	(3.9)
Houses and shacks	92.2	92.1	(4.1)
Employment Status			
Employed	50.0	43.4	(3.2)
Not in the labor force	19.5	11.4	(1.5)
Unemployed	30.5	45.2	(2.6)
Age			
18-24	20.0	19.2	(1.6)
25-34	32.3	33.2	(2.0)
35-49	27.7	30.9	(2.4)
50+	20.0	16.7	(2.1)
Language			
Zulu	32.0	36.7	(4.0)
Pedi	25.0	21.1	(2.5)
Sotho	9.0	11.1	(1.5)
Tswana	13.0	10.8	(1.7)
Xhosa	7.0	9.4	(1.6)
Tsonga	7.0	5.6	(1.2)
Venda	5.0	4.0	(0.9)
Other	2.0	1.3	(0.4)

2005 survey estimates are from the 2005 Alexandra Benchmark Survey (Alexandra Renewal Project ND). Both the 2005 and 2011 estimates are weighted. Standard errors (in parentheses) are design-based.

Table 4.1 compares the marginals of my survey to those from the Alexandra Benchmark Survey (ABS).[19] A comparison of the two sets of marginals permits a check of the ade-

[19]The latter results were not released with uncertainty estimates. Formal tests of difference of proportions are thus not possible. These results are useful however, because, firstly they are more up-to-date than the most recently available census data, which was gathered in 2001; secondly, the ABS results offer survey marginals for gender, housing type, employment status, age, and language within the area of Old Alexandra—the same population I sampled.

quacy of my sampling frame and sampling procedure.[20] The 2011 response distributions for age and language group correspond quite closely to those from the ABS. The marginals for employment status are not as concordant. My estimates of the proportion of people who are unemployed and not in the labor force are larger than those obtained by the ABS. There are a number of possible reasons for these differences. First, the ABS may have produced a more accurate sample than mine, especially when it came to tracking down students and people with outside employment, who would leave Alexandra during the day. However, given that two-thirds of my fieldwork days were weekends or public holidays, and that the two surveys used a similar number of call-backs[21] this cannot be assumed. Second, these differences may also reflect the effects of different question wording. People who work in the informal economy, or who hold part-time employment,[22] may be looking for work despite being employed. Finally, levels of employment and unemployment are fairly fluid. Unemployment may have increased from 2005 to 2011. In sum, although it is possible that students and the employed were under-sampled, my sample appears quite representative of adult South African residents of Alexandra.

4.3. Measurement

4.3.1. Dependent Variable: Participation in Intergroup Violence

I have argued that the observational method of conducting research on participation in intergroup violence has several advantages over the experimental method. As such, I use a

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[20]Both sets of results are weighted. The results from my survey are weighted to adjust for the differential probabilities of respondent selection due to household size and the stratification by housing type and gender. No post-stratification is used.

[21]The ABS used two call-backs; I used one.

[22]Thirty-seven percent of the employed were self-employed or working part-time.

public opinion survey to gather measurements of emotions and participation. This methodological decision leads to another fork in the road, however. There are two quite different ways that one could use a survey to measure participation in violence. On the one hand, some researchers ask respondents to report whether they participated in previous incidents of violence (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Scacco 2010). Other researchers ask respondents whether they will take part should an opportunity present itself in future (e.g. Muller 1979). The first technique thus relies on self-reported memories of participation; the second on self-reported intentions. Either of these measures is potentially more valid than a simulated laboratory behavior. Both involve asking people to report their recollections of participation or intentions to participate in collective behaviors that are salient and realistic for people living in these areas.

However, if one uses recollections of previous participation in violence as the dependent variable, then, to avoid confounding the data analysis, all other variables must similarly be measured by asking subjects to think back to the time when violence took place. Unfortunately, this strategy cannot be used for independent variables that are psychological in nature, such as the questions on intergroup emotions and perceptions needed for this study. Attitudes and emotions cannot be measured with any validity by asking subjects to think back to how they felt three years ago; they have to be measured in the here and now. Given that the independent variables for this study are required to be measured in the present, the dependent variable has to be situated in the future: as a participation intention. After all, a strategy of evoking and measuring emotions and perceptions in 2011 to explain recollections of behavior carried out in 2008 would be prone to the criticism that the latter cause the former. In this study, I thus situate the measure of participation in the future: I ask respondents whether they would take part in a future attack on foreigners in Alexandra.

Similar intentional measures of behavior have been used by scholars studying the determinants of voter turnout (Ansolabehere, Iyengar, and Simon 1999), choice of electoral

candidate (Hillygus and Jackman 2003), protest participation (Finkel, Muller, and Opp 1989; Muller 1979), the political consequences of ethnic cleavages (Posner 2004), and the effects of intergroup anger (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004). The most important disadvantage of this technique is that a measure of actual behavior is replaced with a measure of intended behavior, introducing error. Meta-analyses of the intention-behavior link show that behavioral intentions do have a causal relationship with behavior. Sheeran (2002) finds that the average correlation, across 422 studies, is .53, while Webb and Sheeran (2006) find a "small to modest" causal effect of intentions on behavior (Cohen's $d = .36$) in a meta-analysis of experimental tests.[23]

However, this measurement error could be systematic rather than random. The measure of participation intentions might, in other words, consistently under- or over-estimate the probabilities that certain people would take part in future. Some individuals may profess an intention to participate without any real likelihood of doing so. Others might deny any intention to take part in future but are, in fact, likely to be mobilized because of their social networks (Fuji 2009; McAdam 1986; Taylor 1988). In the former case, respondents underestimate the costs of participation; in the latter, they underestimate the situational determinants. To address both of these concerns, the survey also includes measurements of actual participation in the 2008 attacks and attendance at the community meetings where these attacks were organized. Respondents who participated in the previous episode of violence are likely to fully understand the costs and dangers of taking part, and thus less likely to overestimate their probability of participation. Respondents who attend meetings, on the other hand, are embedded in community social networks, and thus more likely to be mobilized by their peers should violence recur. In the next chapter I will use these two additional

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[23]The biserial correlation between having participated in any way in 2008 and the variable measuring the intention to participate in future is .41; the correlation between any extreme form of participation (assault, destruction of property, and intimidation of others) and participation intentions is .50.

variables to provide a robustness check of the anger-participation intentions link.

I also attempted to ensure respondents were realistically considering the costs and situational determinants of participation in intergroup violence when asking about their intentions. I first checked that all were familiar with the 2008 riots,[24] and then asked questions about their participation in this previous episode of violence.[25] Because the 2008 attacks in Alexandra grew out of an anti-foreigner toyi-toyi, I then asked respondents to imagine that "a group of South Africans was marching through Alex, toyi-toying and demanding that the foreigners leave."

Once this context had been primed, I moved to questions regarding intentions to take part should violence recur. Participation intentions is conceived as a latent variable that varies from a desire to engage in physical aggression against the target group—at the more aggressive end of the variable—to more passive behaviors such as refusing to help victims.[26] Respondents' intentions regarding four potential behaviors were measured using survey questions. These behaviors were chosen to provide variance across the latent dimen-

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[24]All respondents were familiar, even the 8% who reported not being in Alexandra at the time of the attacks.

[25]Details on these items will be discussed below.

[26]My initial interviews, conducted in Alexandra in June 2010, and other interview research by Steinberg (2008a) and Misago et al. (2010) convinced me that social desirability issues would not present a major problem when asking people about their intentions to participate in future intergroup violence. Misago (2012), in particular, found that people were willing to speak openly about the violence of 2008, and their participation therein, even in focus group situations. Despite clearly being an outsider to the area, my initial investigations also yielded several individuals who expressed aggressive intentions regarding immigrants. My survey fieldworkers were also quite experienced at asking sensitive questions (their previous project had involved asking about attitudes to homosexuality in South African townships: a far more delicate topic than anti-immigrant attitudes and intentions). Being black South African residents of Johannesburg, they were also part of the ingroup, and quite likely to be trusted by respondents. More generally, Horowitz (2001, 366–373) notes the absence of remorse characterizing communities that perpetrate deadly ethnic riots.

sion of intergroup aggression. I first asked respondents if they would simply join up with a mob that was toyi-toying and singing anti-foreigner songs, if someone asked them to. Then, at the more aggressive end of the participation continuum, respondents were asked if they would assault someone if other people were doing so and destroy shacks if others were doing so.[27] Finally, to obtain variance at the more pacific end of the scale, respondents were asked if they would help (or refuse to help) a victim hide from the mob.[28] There were four response options for these questions: "would definitely / probably / might do this" and "would not do this."

Table 4.2. Participation Intentions: Item Wording, Coding, Don't Know Responses and Missing Values

Items and Coding	% Don't Know	% Missing
Now I would like to ask you some questions about what you would do if there was another group who wanted to chase the foreigners away, like in 2008. Imagine that a group of South Africans was marching through Alex, toyi-toying and demanding that the foreigners leave.		
(1) Would you join in the toyi-toying if people that you know asked you to join in?	0.4	0.4
I would definitely do this = 3. Probably do this, Might do this, Don't know = 2. Would not do this = 1.		
(2) Would you help any foreigners hide from the crowd?	1.4	0.4
I would definitely do this = 1. Probably do this, Might do this, Don't know = 2. Would not do this = 3.		
(3) If other people began hitting the foreigners, would you also hit them?	0.6	0.6
I would definitely do this = 3. Probably do this, Might do this, Don't know = 2. Would not do this = 1.		
(4) If other people began destroying the foreigners' shacks, would you also do this?	0.8	0.8
I would definitely do this = 3. Probably do this, Might do this, Don't know = 2. Would not do this = 1.		

Figure 4.2 shows the response distributions for these four items. Each of the four

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[27]Reports on the 2008 violence indicated that the destruction of foreigners' shacks was a common behavior (Misago et al. 2010).

[28]See Table 4.2 for the exact wording of these questions.

plots corresponds to one of the items used to measure participation intentions, with the vertical bars showing the weighted percentage of the sample choosing each response category. The percentage expressing a definite intention to participate in a form of anti-immigrant aggression varied considerably across the questions. Twelve percent of respondents said they would definitely assault someone, 15% said that they would destroy property, 35% expressed an intention to join in with a group that was toyi-toying, while 60% claimed that they would definitely not help any victims.[29]

These differing proportions follow from the measurement strategy of asking about behaviors that vary in their degree of aggression. To use the language of measurement theory, each item has a different level of "difficulty" given a respondent's overall level of intention to participate in future. The most aggressive respondents will find the question on not helping victims to be very "easy," while slightly more pacific respondents will find the item regarding their intention to assault someone to be "difficult." In other words, the thresholds between say, intending to "probably" and intending to "definitely" perform a behavior, vary across items. This information about the location of item thresholds is lost when creating an additive scale, even if one weighs the sum by, for example, factor loadings. To measure the underlying latent variable of participation intentions, I use an item response theory (IRT) model that explicitly uses this information on item difficulty or thresholds in addition to information on item-scale correspondence ("item discrimination").

IRT permits model-based measurements of latent variables using information about responses and items.[30] The probability of a respondent responding a particular way to any

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[29]The "help" item is reverse-coded for the purposes of scale construction. Don't know responses were recoded to the response category "might do this;" missing data were imputed using multiple imputation. See Table 4.2 for further details on the extent of missingness and don't know's; see the final section in this chapter for further details on the multiple imputation method.

[30]See Embretson and Reise (2000) for an overview, and Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) for an early political

Figure 4.2. Response Distributions of Participation Intention Items

The grey bars indicate the percentage of respondents who chose each response category across each of the four participation intention survey items; the numbers below each bar show the weighted number of respondents choosing each category. Note that the scale for the "help" item is reflected when constructing the participation intentions measure. Total $N = 497$.

given item—say, choosing a response of "would definitely" to the "destroy" item—is modeled in IRT using a logistic or cumulative normal curve. The slope of the curve is determined by item discrimination parameters, which are comparable to the factor loadings or corrected item-total correlations from classical test theory. The intercept of each curve is usually the point on the latent variable where the curve crosses the 50% threshold for the probability of observing a given response, and is measured using item difficulty or threshold parameters.

Respondent scores on the latent variable are then measured as a function of both item difficulty and item discrimination parameters. Each unique combination of response patterns across all items corresponds to a unique score on the latent variable. For example, all respondents selecting "definitely" to the four items in the participation intentions scale constitute one response pattern, while the set of respondents choosing "definitely" for the toyi-toyi item and "definitely not" for the other three form another response pattern, and so on.

Figure 4.2 shows, however that respondents tended to offer definitive intentions to either take part or abstain from the behavior in question. Few professed uncertainty regarding their intentions by choosing either the "might do this" or "would probably do this" response options. This bifurcation of responses is perhaps to be expected when asking people about salient but contentious issues such as intended participation in violence. This sparseness of data in the intermediate categories does, however, present an obstacle to scale construction. On the one hand, there is little information to estimate the thresholds between the "might" and "probably" categories. On the other hand, additional analyses show that a simple additive scale composed of the items does not increase monotonically across the intermediate categories of the "assault" and "destroy homes" items.

When faced with sparsely populated and non-monotonic response categories, Bond

science application.

and Fox (2001) suggest collapsing some categories of the response set to create indicators with better measurement properties. Recoding the "assault" and "destroy" items as trichotomous—by collapsing the two intermediate categories into one—resolves both these difficulties. It is also recommended to recode all items that share response sets in the same fashion, so trichotomous measures were created for the other two items as well.[31]

An IRT model for ordinal data, the graded response model (Samejima 1969), is then used to estimate the latent variable of participation intentions. This model requires that the latent variable be unidimensional, which can be verified by the pattern of eigenvalues of the tetrachoric correlation matrix of items. In this case, only the first eigenvalue is greater than one (See Table 4.3), supporting unidimensionality. The graded response model estimates a score on the latent variable for each respondent using both item thresholds and item discrimination parameters. A χ^2 test shows that the model is a good fit for the data.[32]

The parameter estimates are presented in Table 4.3. As expected, the item tapping respondents' intentions regarding help for victims is located at a lower, more pacific level on the latent scale than the other three indicators. This points to the utility of this item in distinguishing respondents who are extremely unlikely to take part in future violence from those who are merely unlikely. The other three items all have higher item thresholds, showing that they provide information on the more violent end of the scale. The discrimination parameter (here labeled the factor loading) for the helping item is, however, much weaker than the corresponding parameter for the other three items, indicating that this item does not add as much information to the overall scale. The helping item, in other words, has a

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[31]Note that this recoding does not increase measurement error in the overall scale. Cronbach's alpha remains at a level of .87 whether the additive scale is constructed using the three or four-point polytomous indicators.

[32]$\chi^2 = 1.36$, d.f. $= 2, p = .51$. The null hypothesis of this test, which cannot be rejected, is that the model fits.

Table 4.3. Measurement Model of Participation Intentions

Items	Item Thresholds		Factor Loadings
	1st	2nd	
Intend to hit	.69	.74	.94
Intend to destroy	.65	.70	.94
Intend to toyi-toyi	.43	.50	.82
Intend to help (reversed)	.13	.30	.43
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix	2.93	.70	
Cronbach's alpha			.87

Parameter estimates from a 2-parameter IRT model for ordinal data obtained using a design-based robust weighted least squares estimator. Factor loadings are standardized. Item thresholds correspond to the [0,1] scale of the underlying latent variable. Polychoric correlation matrices are used to estimate eigenvalues and Cronbach's alpha. Test of model fit: $\chi^2 = 1.36$ (d.f. $= 2$, $p = .51$).

lower item-scale correlation. Nevertheless, this item is retained for constructing the scale because of its utility in adding information about the less aggressive respondents.

The measure of participation intentions is then recoded so that it takes a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of one.[33] The distribution of this variable is plotted in Figure 4.3. It is clear that the distribution is characterized by a few peaks, corresponding to the particularly common response patterns observed in respondents' answers.[34] The distribution is also positively skewed.[35] A logged version of this dependent variable is thus also calculated (displayed in the second plot of Figure 4.3) to ensure that any statistical results

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[33]Note that this scale correlates at .97 with an additive scale of the original four-point items.

[34]The most frequent response pattern, seen at a level of roughly 0.2 in plot 1, obtains from respondents who said that they would not do any of the behaviors, including refusing to help victims. The second most frequent pattern can be seen at a value of 0 in the latent variable measure; these respondents would not do any of the aggressive behaviors but would definitely help victims. Note that there are 34 different response patterns in total.

[35]Skewness $= .67$. 95% confidence interval $= [.53 : .81]$.

Figure 4.3. Distribution of the Participation Intentions Variable

The first plot shows the weighted distribution of the participation intention variable, which is calculated using a kernel density estimator. The second plot shows the probability distribution when the variable, y_1, is transformed using the formula $y_2 = \log(y_1 + 1)$.

are not driven by correlations induced by skewness.[36]

I now move on the measurement of the other major independent variables, beginning with blame.

4.3.2. Blame

Psychological research identifies two major components of the concept of blame. Attributions of responsibility for some harm are required, but so is a sense that the harm is also unfair (Ferguson and Rule 1983; Shaver 1985). I thus sought to measure two scales: one asking respondents whether they attribute responsibility to foreigners for various harms suffered by their group; the other, whether respondents regard various harms as unfair. Because both are necessary conditions for blame, the concept of outgroup blame is ultimately measured

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[36]The skewness statistic of the logged variable is .21. (95% confidence interval $= [.08 : .33]$).

Table 4.4. Descriptive and Measurement Statistics for All Variables

Models	Variables	No. of Items	Eigenvalues of Correl. Matrix		Cronbach's alpha	No. of Categories	Mean	Std. Dev.
			1st	2nd				
	Participation intentions	4	2.93	.70	.87	Contin	.37	.31
	Intergroup anger	6	2.92	.77	.79	Contin	.30	.26
	Blame	9				Contin	.43	.25
Entitlement-blame-anger	Attributions of responsibility	6	2.74	.88	.75	Contin	.60	.20
	Unfairness	3	1.98	.57	.74	Contin	.68	.25
	Group entitlement violations	4				Contin	.60	.14
	Violations of ingroup entitlement	2				Contin	.65	.13
	Violations of outgroup entitlement	2				Contin	.59	.19
Selective incentives	Perceived opportunities for looting	1				4	.69	.27
Social influence	Meeting attendance	1				5	.16	.28
	Blame from peers	3	2.62	.28	.93	Contin	.51	.32
Elite mobilization	Blame from leaders	3	2.87	.10	.98	4	.10	.28
Realistic group conflict	Employment: Not in the labor force	1				2	.11	.31
	Employment: Unemployed	1				2	.45	.50
	Employment: Trader	1				2	.03	.16
	Lives in low quality housing	1				2	.62	.49
Frustration-aggression	Poverty	6	3.64	.82	.87	Contin	.59	.22
	Party support: opposition party	1				2	.14	.35
	Party support: no party	1				2	.34	.47
Culture of violence	Support for violence	2			.82	Contin	.18	.21
Authoritarianism-threat	Authoritarianism	2			.62	5	.64	.33
Psychoanalytic projection	Aversive emotions about 2008 riots	1				2	.23	.42
Control variables	Age	1				Contin	.30	.21
	Education	1				4	.49	.26
	Gender: Male	1				2	.53	.50
	National identity	3	1.62	.80	.57	Contin	.79	.21
	Participation in 2008 riots	5				2	.08	.28
	Years lived in Alexandra	1				Contin	.25	.16

Eigenvalues and Cronbach's alpha are calculated using polychoric correlation matrices. All variables are rescaled to the [0,1] interval. "Contin" is a continuous variable, for which there are more than seven ordered categories. Means and standard deviations are weighted.

as the product of the responsibility and unfairness scales.

Rather than ask about attributions of responsibility and unfairness in the abstract, I sought to contextualize the survey items using various sources of harm that would be realistic and meaningful to Alexandra residents. There are no shortage of harms in Alexandra. AIDS, unemployment, and crime are rife.[37] Any of these might be perceived by individuals to be a serious harm facing their group. When it comes to blame of immigrants in South Africa, however, two types of ingroup harm stand out as particularly important in existing studies (Misago et al. 2010; Steinberg 2008*a*): unemployment and lack of housing. Respondents were thus asked about unfairness and attributions of responsibility in the contexts of these two ingroup harms. Unfairness was also asked following the measurement of group endowments and entitlements, while attributions of responsibility were also measured in the contexts of three additional harms: crime, government corruption, and lack of respect for people in Alexandra. Given that these survey questions are realistic to respondents, questions about emotional and attitudinal responses to these stimuli therefore ought to produce valid measures. I will proceed by discussing the measurement of the unfairness scale, followed by the attributions of responsibility scale.

Unfairness was measured at three different points in the survey, after short vignettes about foreigners working in Johannesburg and living in government houses in Alexandra, and again after the intergroup endowment and entitlement comparisons.[38] On each occasion I invited respondents to consider the unfairness of each of these situations by presenting

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[37]On AIDS: 26% of adults aged 15–49, and living in urban informal areas, were HIV positive in 2005 Shisana et al. (2008, 40); unemployment: 45% of the weighted sample of my survey reported being unemployed and looking for work; crime: 80% of African respondents in the Institute for Security Studies 2007 National Victims of Crime Survey did not feel safe walking around their areas at night, compared with 73% of white respondents (Pharoah 2008).

[38]See the measurement of group entitlements violations, below, for more details on these items.

short arguments why one might think each fair or, alternatively, unfair. Thus, following the vignette about foreigners "working as gardeners at houses" in Johannesburg, I presented a reason why this may be considered fair: "some people say that foreigners are prepared to do that hard work, so it is fair if they have those jobs;" and then a reason why this may considered unfair: "others say that they are taking those jobs from South Africans, so it is not fair."[39] Respondents were then asked to choose a response from a five-point response set ranging from "very fair" to "very unfair".

Questions measuring attributions of outgroup responsibility for harms suffered by the ingroup were posed in the contexts of five harms suffered by the ingroup. Respondents were asked whether foreigners take locals' jobs and housing, engage in criminal activity, and illegally obtain South African identification documents.[40] In addition to these largely material concerns, respondents were also asked whether they blamed foreigners for the symbolic harm of disrespecting locals (the exact wording of the items is presented in Table 4.5).

The four material blame items are presented in a forced choice format, where respondents chose between blaming foreigners, not blaming foreigners, or expressing uncertainty or ambivalence. Given the prevalence of narratives blaming immigrants in Alexandra, the measurement strategy here was to force respondents to at least consider alternative evaluations. The two symbolic blame items then asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed, using a five-point response set, to statements that foreigners "think they are better than South Africans" and "are respectful to South Africans."

The response distributions for both the unfairness and attribution of responsibility items are presented in Figure 4.4. Most respondents found the situations posed to them in

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[39]See Table 4.5 for exact wording of all blame items.

[40]These were all common allegations heard from Alexandra residents during preliminary research (see also Misago et al. 2010).

Table 4.5. Blame: Item Wording, Coding, and Percent Don't Know or Missing

Items	% Don't Know	% Miss-ing
Unfairness		
(1) Around here, there are some foreigners who do jobs like working as gardeners at houses in Joburg. Some people say that foreigners are prepared to do that hard work, so it is fair if they have those jobs. Others say that they are taking those jobs from South Africans, so it is not fair. What do you think? How fair is it for these foreigners to have those jobs?	0.2	0.6
It is very fair = 1. Mostly fair = 2. Uncertain or mixed, Don't know = 3. Mostly unfair = 4. Very unfair = 5.		
(2) Around here, there are some foreigners who live in RDP houses near Alex. Some people say that foreigners must have saved some money from their jobs to buy those houses, so it is fair if they live there. Other people say that this is not their country so they should never be allowed to get those houses. What do you think? How fair is it for these foreigners to live in those houses?	0.0	0.6
(3) OK, so you said [referring to the group entitlement and endowment questions that had just been asked] that: South Africans are higher than foreigners OR foreigners are higher than South Africans OR foreigners and South Africans are at the same level. How fair are these positions on the ladder of South Africans and the foreigners?	2.2	1.0
Attributions of Responsibility		
(1) Do the foreigners usually do jobs that South Africans do not want (= 1), or do the foreigners take jobs that South Africans want (= 3)? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don't know = 2).	0.0	0.4
(2) Do most of the foreigners get identity books illegally (= 3), or do most of the foreigners follow the law (= 1)? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don't know = 2).	0.0	2.0
(3) Do most of the foreigners live in shacks and backyard rooms (= 1), or do most of the foreigners live in RDP houses that are meant for South Africans (= 3)? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don't know = 2).	0.0	0.4
(4) Are most of the foreigners criminals (= 3) , or are most of the foreigners not criminals (= 1)? (Uncertain or ambivalent, Don't know = 2).	0.0	1.4
(5) Do you agree or disagree that most of the foreigners think they are better than South Africans?	1.4	0.0
Strongly agree = 5. Agree = 4. Uncertain, don't know = 3. Disagree = 2. Strongly disagree = 1.		
(6) Do you agree or disagree that most of the foreigners are respectful to South Africans?	1.8	0.2
Strongly agree = 1. Agree = 2. Uncertain, don't know = 3. Disagree = 4, Strongly disagree = 5.		

Figure 4.4. Response Distributions of Outgroup Blame Items

The grey bars indicate the percentage of respondents who chose each response category, across each of the nine outgroup blame survey items; the numbers below each bar show the weighted number of respondents choosing each category. Total $N = 497$.

the survey—foreigners working in Johannesburg, living in government houses, and ingroup-outgroup endowment comparisons—to be quite unfair: 90%, for example thought it "unfair" or "very unfair" for foreigners to live in government houses. Perhaps more surprisingly, given the previous anti-immigrant violence in Alexandra, is that 17% of the sample viewed foreigners working in Johannesburg as "fair" or "very fair." The responsibility items show even more mixed results. While majorities blame foreigners for taking jobs from South Africans and committing crime, and a huge majority of 90% blame foreigners for illegally obtaining South African identity documents, only around a third believe that foreigners compete with South Africans for government housing. The two items measuring attributions of responsibility for symbolic harm also show relatively few extreme responses. In sum, these descriptive results confirm existing interview research by showing that foreigners are blamed for several sources of harm to locals. And although there is not a large constituency of locals who are prepared to vigorously defend the rights of immigrants, there is some variation in levels of outgroup blame.

Both the attributions of responsibility and unfairness scales are unidimensional, as only the first eigenvalue of their respective correlation matrices is greater than one. They also form reliable scales.[41] These two variables are then measured using two separate IRT models. The parameter estimates can be seen in Table 4.6.[42] χ^2 tests for both models show that we cannot reject the null hypotheses of both models fitting the data.[43]

Given that attributions of responsibility and unfairness are both necessary compo-

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[41]Cronbach's alpha = .75 and .75, respectively.

[42]To permit model identification, unfairness is estimated using a graded response model with item discrimination parameters constrained to be equal. A factor analysis of the polychoric correlation matrix shows, however, that these three items all load highly on the first factor (housing: .66; jobs: .79; entitlement: .66). The graded response model for attributions of responsibility allows all discrimination parameters to vary.

[43]Attributions of responsibility: $\chi^2 = 12.16$, d.f. $= 9$, $p = .20$. Unfairness: $\chi^2 = 3.15$, d.f. $= 2$, $p = .21$.

Table 4.6. Measurement Models of Attributions of Responsibility and Unfairness

Items	Item Thresholds				Factor Loadings
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	
Attributions of responsibility					
Responsible: lack respect	.08	.47	.64	.89	.74
Responsible: superior	.10	.40	.64	.95	.64
Responsible: crime	.31	.49			.75
Responsible: jobs	.47	.74			.62
Responsible: housing	.44	.54			.44
Responsible: illegal documents	.00	.19			.47
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix	2.74	.88			
Cronbach's alpha					.75
Unfairness					
Fairness: housing	.01	.18	.27	.49	.67
Fairness: jobs	.18	.38	.49	.77	.67
Fairness: entitlement	.20	.43	.56	.74	.67
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix	1.98	.57			
Cronbach's alpha					.74

Attributions of responsibility and unfairness are measured using IRT models for ordinal data, which are estimated using a design-based robust weighted least squares estimator. The discrimination parameters (factor loadings) for the unfairness model are constrained to be equal. Factor loadings are standardized. Item thresholds correspond to the [0,1] scale of the underlying latent variable. Polychoric correlation matrices are used to estimate eigenvalues and Cronbach's alpha.

nents of blame, the final variable of outgroup blame is calculated as the product of these two components.[44] Individual with high scores on this variable thus both attribute responsibility to the outgroup for harms suffered by their ingroup, and regard this outgroup behavior as unfair.

This measure of blame is rescaled to have a minimum of zero and a maximum of one. As can be seen in the the first plot of Figure 4.5, the variable is positively skewed.[45] A log transformation is used to reduce this skewness.[46] Both variables will be used in subsequent

[44]Note that the two components have a correlation of .57.

[45]Skewness $= .42$. 95% confidence interval $= [.30 : .54]$.

[46]Skewness after transformation $= .13$ (95% confidence interval $= [-.00 : .25]$).

Figure 4.5. Distribution of the Blame Variable

The first plot shows the weighted distribution of the blame variable, which is calculated using a kernel density estimator. The second plot shows the probability distribution when the variable, y_1, is transformed using the formula $y_2 = \log(y_1 + 1)$.

statistical analyses.

4.3.3. Anger

Anger is conceived in this dissertation as one of the half dozen or so core emotions, mapping onto such everyday English words as "angry," "cross," "irritated," "annoyed," and "furious." As such, following the example of Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000), the emotion words "angry" and "irritated" were chosen to measure the concept of anger.

Intergroup anger, furthermore, is an angry emotional reaction that is felt on behalf of one's group and directed at some other group. Respondents were therefore primed about the local-foreigner distinction before intergroup emotions were measured. To ensure that responses were based on actual emotions, respondents were further primed about salient ingroup-outgroup issues. The emotion items were situated immediately following the two short vignettes describing foreigners working in Johannesburg and living in government

houses.[47] Emotional reactions were also gathered following the the group endowment and group entitlement items (see the next section).

In each of these three situations, respondents were presented with a list of nine emotion words[48] followed by three questions. The first asked respondents to choose the word that "best describes how you feel, as a South African" about the situation just described. The second question then asked respondents how intensely they felt their chosen emotion, using a four-point response set ranging from "not strong at all" to "very strongly." The final question in each situation asked respondents to choose another emotion from the list that "next best" described how they felt.[49]

There are thus three emotion questions in each of three survey contexts: foreigners working, living in government houses, and the group endowment comparisons. As detailed

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[47]These vignettes are described above, in the section on blame. The exact wording can be found in Table 4.5.

[48]Aside from anger and irritation, the other seven words were jealousy, happiness, pride, worry, sadness, shame, and no feeling. Anger and irritation were listed third and fourth on the response set.

[49]This method of asking respondents to choose emotions from a categorical response set most likely produces more random measurement error than an alternative technique of using a Likert scale response set for each possible emotional reaction (asking, in other words, how angry, irritated, etc. respondents feel). However, I believe that the categorical response set method is less likely to produce measurement error that is correlated with the dependent variable than the Likert scale response set method. By burying the emotion words of interest—anger and irritation—within a larger list, the categorical response set technique ensures that respondents remained naïve regarding my central hypotheses, thus avoiding demand characteristics. In addition, the number of emotion questions one can reliably ask is constrained because emotions are diminished by their measurement; the intensity of experienced emotion, in other words, is reduced by asking people to report the emotions they are feeling (Keltner, Locke, and Audrain 1993; Schwartz and Clore 1983). The Likert scale method, which requires one question for each emotion, would thus produce weak measures of whichever emotions were measured later in the battery. The categorical response set method avoids this problem by allowing various emotional reactions to be measured using a single question.

Table 4.7. Anger: Item Wording, Coding, and Percent Don't Know or Missing

Items and Coding	% Don't Know	% Missing
(1a) Please tell me which of these feelings best describes how you feel, as a South African, about these foreigners having jobs in Joburg?	0.0	0.4
Angry, irritated = 1. Happy, proud, jealous, worried, ashamed, disappointed, no feeling or neutral, don't know = 0.		
(1b) How strongly do you feel this emotion?	1.2	0.8
Very strongly = 2. Quite strong, a little strong, don't know = 1. Not strong at all = 0.		
Anger measure (1) = (1a) × (1b)		
(2a) Please tell me which of these feelings best describes how you feel, as a South African, about these foreigners living in RDP houses in Alex?	0.0	0.2
(2b) How strongly do you feel this emotion?	0.4	0.4
Anger measure (2) = (2a) × (2b)		
(3a) Please tell me which of these feelings best describes how you feel, as a South African, about the position in society of the foreigners and the position in society of South African people living in Alex?	2.2	1.2
(3b) How strongly do you feel this emotion?	3.4	1.2
Anger measure (3) = (3a) × (3b)		
(4) Please tell me which of these feelings next best describes how you feel, as a South African, about these foreigners having jobs in Joburg?	2.8	0.8
(5) Please tell me which of these feelings next best describes how you feel, as a South African, about these foreigners living in RDP houses in Alex?	0.4	0.8
(6) Please tell me which of these feelings next best describes how you feel, as a South African, about the position in society of the foreigners and the position in society of South African people living in Alex?	3.8	0.8

in Table 4.7, the first indicator for intergroup anger is whether the respondent chose "angry" or "irritated" as the best description of how he or she felt in each of the three contexts. These dummy variables are then multiplied by the second set of emotion questions—the degree to which the chosen emotion is experienced—to produce three polytomous measures. Three additional dummy variables, for whether "angry" or "irritated" were chosen as the next best emotion descriptions, are also calculated. In total then, there are six measures of intergroup anger; within each survey context, there is one polytomous measure of whether and to what degree intergroup anger is experienced, and one dichotomous measure of whether inter-

group anger is experienced as a secondary emotion.

Figure 4.6. Response Distributions of Anger Items

The grey bars indicate the percentage of respondents who chose each response category, across each of the six intergroup anger survey items. The three measures on the top row combine an indicator for whether anger or irritation is mentioned as the first emotional reaction with a subsequent question regarding the degree to which the emotion is felt. The three items on the bottom row are indicators for whether anger or irritation is mentioned as a second emotional reaction. The numbers below each bar show the weighted number of respondents choosing each category. Total $N = 497$.

The distributions of these six anger items are depicted in Figure 4.6. Thirty-six percent of respondents mentioned "angry" or "irritated" as their first emotional reaction, and 26% mentioned one of these as their second emotional reaction, following the foreigner

working in Johannesburg vignette.[50] The percentages for the housing vignette situation are 38% and 33%; for the group endowment comparison situation, 20% and 18%.[51] As the top row in Figure 4.6 shows, very few respondents indicated feeling "a little" anger or irritation as a first reaction to the three questions. These responses were collapsed with the those who reported feeling "quite" angry or irritated. The result is three trichotomous indicators for respondents' first emotional reactions to the three situations presented in the survey, as well as the other three dichotomous indicators for respondents' second emotional reactions.

Table 4.8. Measurement Model of Anger

Items	Item Thresholds		Factor Loadings
	1st	2nd	
Jobs, 1st mention & degree	.41	.51	.58
Housing, 1st mention & degree	.39	.49	.55
Entitlement, 1st mention & degree	.53	.60	.56
Jobs, 2nd mention	.47		.86
Housing, 2nd mention	.43		.62
Entitlement, 2nd mention	.54		.51
Eigenvalues of correlation matrix	2.92	.77	
Cronbach's alpha			.79

Parameters from a 2-parameter IRT model for ordinal data, which is estimated using a design-based robust weighted least squares estimator. Factor loadings are standardized. Item thresholds correspond to the [0,1] scale of the underlying latent variable. Polychoric correlation matrices are used to estimate eigenvalues and Cronbach's alpha. Test of model fit: $\chi^2 = 12.46$, d.f. = 9, $p = .19$.

The latent variable of intergroup anger is measured using an item response measurement model based on these six observed indicators.[52] The location and discrimination

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[50]Don't know responses were recoded as responses of "no feeling" on the emotion word choice items, and as responses of "a little" on the intensity of emotion items. See Table 4.7 for details.

[51]Twenty-nine percent of respondents never mentioned anger or irritation, 21% chose one of these words only once, while one percent chose these words the maximum of six times.

[52]A graded response model is used. This model requires that the latent variable be unidimensional. Preliminary analysis of the polychoric correlation matrix reveals that only the first eigenvalue is greater than one,

(factor loading) parameter estimates can be found in Table 4.8. A χ^2 test shows that the model fits well.[53]

Finally, the intergroup anger variables is rescaled to have a minimum of zero and a maximum of one; the distribution is shown in the first plot of Figure 4.7. Although the latent variable takes on 119 discrete values, one can see that the modal response is zero. This response is chosen by the 29% of respondents who never described their emotional reactions as either "angry" or "irritated." As such, the variable is positively skewed.[54] A log transformation goes some way to reducing the skewness.[55] Both variables will be used in subsequent statistical analyses.

4.3.4. Group Entitlement Violations

The concept of group entitlement violations is based upon four intergroup evaluations: the actual positions (or endowments) enjoyed by the in- and outgroups, and the positions each are believed to deserve (or entitlements). These four perceptions are measured using a version of Cantril's (1965) ladder scale. This ladder was described to respondents as representing the position that a group held in society and the respect that they got from others. Respondents were shown a graphic of a ladder with seven rungs, numbered from one to seven. Higher rungs thus implied a higher level of group endowment or entitlement. The rung chosen by the respondent was recorded as the response for each question.[56]

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supporting an interpretation of unidimensionality (see Table 4.8). In addition, these six items form a reliable scale (Cronbach's alpha = .79).

[53] $\chi^2 = 12.46$, d.f. $= 9, p = .19$.

[54] Skewness $= .50$ (95% confidence interval $= [.37 : .63]$).

[55] Skewness after transformation $= .21$ (95% confidence interval $= [.08 : .33]$).

[56] "Don't know's" were recoded as missing because there is no suitable intermediate category that corresponds to the uncertainty of such responses. Note that over nine percent of the responses for the outgroup

Figure 4.7. Distribution of the Intergroup Anger Variable

The first plot shows the weighted distribution of the intergroup anger variable, which is calculated using a kernel density estimator. The second plot shows the probability distribution when the variable, y_1, is transformed using the formula $y_2 = \log(y_1 + 1)$.

Table 4.9. Group Entitlement Violations: Item Wording, Coding, and Percent Don't Know or Missing

Items and Coding	% Don't Know	% Missing
Imagine that society is a ladder like on this card. Some people have a high position in society and get lots of respect from others. We can say that these people are at the top of the ladder. Other people have a low position and get little or no respect from others. We can say that these people are at the bottom of the ladder.		
(1) Where do you think South Africans living in Alex are on the ladder these days?	0.8	0.8
1–7 Ladder scale. 1 = Bottom. 7 = Top. Don't know = missing.		
(2) Where do you think South Africans living in Alex should be on the ladder?	1.6	0.6
(3) And now what about the foreigners? Where do you think the foreigners living in Alex are on the ladder these days?	2.4	0.6
(4) Where do you think the foreigners living in Alex should be on the ladder?	9.1	1.2

Figure 4.8. Distribution of Responses Group Endowment and Group Entitlement Items

Each plot displays the distribution of responses for each of the four seven-point indicators used to construct the group entitlement violation variable. The highest value, here six, is described to respondents as representing a high social position, with zero being low. $N = 497$.

The distributions of responses for each of these items are displayed in Figure 4.8.[57] The items referring to the actual and entitled position of locals are on the left (plots 1 and 2), while the items referring to foreigners on the right (plots 3 and 4). Respondents tend to place their group slightly below the midpoint of scale when it comes to actual position or endowments (mean = 2.3). The outgroup are appraised as only slightly higher on the scale (mean = 2.9), and still in a middling position overall.[58]

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entitlement item were "don't know's," possibly due to the abstract nature of this question. See the final section of this chapter for a discussion of how missing data were treated. Table 4.9 contains the exact wording and percentage of missing data for each item.

[57]The vertical axis for these plots is the ladder scale that was presented to respondents. It has been rescaled to the [0,6] interval here to makes this figure more readily comparable with Figure 4.9.

[58]These relative positions are consistent with research that describes immigrants in South African town-

Figure 4.9. Distribution of Ingroup, Outgroup, and Group Entitlement Violation

The first plot displays perceived violation of ingroup entitlement—or ingroup entitlements (plot 2 in Figure 4.8) minus ingroup endowments. The second plot shows perceived violation of outgroup entitlement, which is measured as outgroup endowments minus outgroup entitlements. The third plot displays the main variable, group entitlement violations, which is simply the sum of the two previous measures. $N = 497$.

The situation is markedly different when comparing ingroup and outgroup entitlements (plots 2 and 4). Residents of Alexandra believe that locals deserve a high position—a majority choose the top two rungs of the ladder (mean = 4.8). In contrast, they feel that foreigners are not entitled to very much at all—a majority choose the lowest two rungs on the ladder for this item (mean = 1.4). This figure thus shows that while the sample does not perceive much inequality in Alexandra, they believe that there should be inequality, with locals on top.

Figure 4.9 then continues this analysis by plotting the distributions of three vari-

ships as slightly more likely to be employed or self-employed than locals, but by no means wealthy (Center for Development and Enterprise 2008).

ables calculated using the four intergroup evaluations. Ingroup violations of entitlement is displayed in the first plot. This measure is simply the difference between ingroup entitlements and ingroup endowments, or the gap between what the ingroup have and what they believe they deserve.[59] A large majority (93%) receive a positive score for this variable, indicating that they feel the ingroup is getting less than entitled. The second plot displays outgroup violations of entitlement: the degree to which the outgroup are exceeding their entitlement (outgroup endowments – outgroup entitlements). Although distributed more broadly across the possible scale than the ingroup measure, 73% of respondents still believe the outgroup are getting more than they deserve. The 3rd plot, displays the distribution of violations of group entitlement, the main variable of interest in this section. This is simply the sum of the two previous measures of ingroup and outgroup violation of entitlement. Another way of thinking about this variable is that it measures the cumulative number of rungs on the ladder that both the in- and out-groups must move to get from the current intergroup situation to the one that a respondent regards as normatively desirable. The average respondent feels that the in- and outgroup must move a total of 2.5 rungs on the ladder, while 90% of respondents believe that group endowments are incongruent with group entitlements in Alexandra. These descriptive results suggest a broadly-held grievance among South African residents of Alexandra.

The variables discussed thus far—participation intentions, blame, intergroup anger, and group entitlement violations—are the main measures from my theoretical model. Variables measuring concepts from alternative hypotheses and control variables will be discussed next.

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[59]As such, there is a close correspondence between this measure and the Davies' (1962) "J-curve" version of relative deprivation.

4.3.5. Variables From Other Hypothesized Models

Table 3.1 refers to a number of additional variables that are required to test alternative models for participation in intergroup violence. These measurement of these variables will be discussed in this section, and will proceed according to model.

In the previous chapter, I argued that the most likely source of selective incentives that could motivate participants in intergroup violence is looting. I sought to measure opportunities for looting indirectly, to avoid social desirability biases. As such, I asked respondents how many people, in their view, had looted in the previous anti-immigrant attacks.[60] My assumption was that these beliefs about what happened in 2008 would play a major role in shaping beliefs about the likelihood of opportunities to loot in future.[61] I refer to this variable as *perceived opportunities for looting*.

There are two variables required for the social influence model. Research shows the importance of social networks and horizontal ties in mobilizing participants in collective action (McAdam 1986; Taylor 1988). In Alexandra, individuals who attend community policing meetings are likely to be bound up in these webs of reciprocity and, moreover, known by their peers. These meetings were also the sites where the violence of 2008 was organized (Misago 2012). Individuals who attend these meetings are thus likely to be mobilized into participation, should the violence recur. As such, I asked respondents about their *attendance at community meetings* in 2011.[62] Thirty-one percent of the sample reported at-

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[60]The response set has four options: "no-one;" "just a few people;" "some people;" and "many people."

[61]The exact wording of the question and response set is described in Table 4.10 in the Appendix to this chapter.

[62]A few respondents indicated that they had attended twenty meetings—more than double the meetings of everyone else. To reduce the effect of these outliers, the responses are coded into five categories: none, one, two or three, four or five, and six or more.

tending at least one meeting by the time of the survey in April; with 8% attending four or more.

The effects of social influence on outgroup blame will be tested using a measure of exposure to *blame from peers*. This variable is measured by adding the responses for three items, which asked respondents how often they had heard other people blaming foreigners (1) for taking jobs; (2) taking houses meant for South Africans; and (3) acting like they are better than locals.[63] Seventy percent of respondents claim to have heard other people blaming foreigners for taking jobs, "all of the time" or "quite often;" the corresponding responses for the houses and superiority questions are 71% and 39%.

The influence of leaders is hypothesized to play a role in outgroup blame. *Blame from leaders* is, like blame from peers, also measured using three items, which asked respondents if they heard leaders blaming immigrants for (1) for taking jobs; (2) taking houses meant for South Africans; and (3) acting like they are better than locals.[64] Most respondents had no experience of hearing leaders blame the outgroup: 89% claimed to have never heard leaders blame foreigners for taking jobs, with the "never" responses for the houses and superiority questions being 87% and 93%. Given these highly skewed responses, the items were coded as dichotomous and added together to form a four-point scale.[65]

The realistic group conflict model requires measures of *unemployment*, *working as an informal trader*, and *living in low quality housing*. As I argued in the previous chapter, each of these is a plausible source of a collective incentive to take part in an attack on foreigners.

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[63]The response sets have four categories, ranging from "all of the time" to "never." See Table 4.10 in the Appendix to this chapter for further details. The scale is also reliable (Cronbach's alpha = .93) and unidimensional. See Table 4.4 for the measurement properties of all other variables measured using two more items.

[64]The response sets again have four categories, ranging from "all of the time" to "never."

[65]"Never" responses were coded as zero, otherwise one.

Unemployment is coded as working full or part-time, whether self-employed or not.[66] A dummy variable for working as an informal trader is created out of an open-ended question asking respondents what job they have.[67] Low quality housing is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the respondent lives in a shack (in a yard, or free-standing), an outside room built in someone's yard, or a hostel room.[68]

The frustration-aggression model suggests that aversive conditions may produce aggression targeted at other parties, such as foreigners in Alexandra. *Poverty* and *support for an opposition party* are two measures of these aversive conditions.[69] Poverty is measured using the technique of Gibson (2004): respondents are asked which goods, from a list of six, are owned by their household: refrigerator, microwave, television, computer, car, and cellular telephone. These items were chosen because they were expected to vary in their

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[66]An additional dummy variable for those not in the labor force—students, the retired, etc.—will also be included in subsequent statistical analyses. This permits a cleaner contrast to be drawn between those looking for a job, and those with a job. The response distribution is provided in Table 4.1.

[67]The following answers were taken to be indicators of being an informal trader: "vendor," "street vendor," "tuck shop," "spaza shop." Less than three percent ($N = 17$) of respondents reported working as an informal trader.

[68]The omitted category thus includes respondents living in government apartments or formal houses. Thiry-six percent of respondents lived in formal houses, 32% in rooms in yards, 21% in shacks in yards, 6% in hostel rooms, 4% in free-standing shacks, and 2% in apartments.

[69]These factors might appear to be weak measures of frustration with low levels of construct validity. Recall, however, that Berkowitz's (1989) reconceptualization of frustration-aggression theory breaks with previous conceptualizations of frustration as a subjective state (Dollard et al. 1939; Gurr 1970). Frustration is instead viewed as an aversive event, trigger, or experience: an objective condition that is unpleasant to an individual who is affected. Being poor and supporting an opposition party in a context where all levels of government are controlled by the ANC both fit this definition.

prevalence across the sample.[70] This allows the scale to distinguish between respondents of average material status and those who are much worse, or much better, off. A two-parameter logistic IRT model, with both item threshold and item discrimination parameters is used to measure the latent variable of poverty.[71]

Party support is measured by asking respondents which party they preferred. Due to the small number of respondents who expressed support for a party other than the African National Congress (ANC), this variable was collapsed into three categories: supports ANC, supports an opposition party, and does not support any party.[72]

The culture of violence model posits that individuals who accept social norms supporting violence are more likely to take part in collective violence, but also more likely to experience intergroup anger. This *support for violence* is measured using two survey items, which ask respondents (1) whether it is acceptable for the community to use violence and (2) whether talking is the best way to resolve intergroup conflicts.[73] An additive scale was calculated from the two items.[74]

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[70]They do vary: 95% own a television; 93% a cellular telephone; 88% a refrigerator; 50% a microwave; 18% a car; and 15% a computer.

[71]The six items tap a unidimensional construct because only the first eigenvalue of the tetrachoric correlation matrix is greater than one. The scale is also reliable: Cronbach's alpha = .87.

[72]The original distribution of responses is as follows: ANC, 52%; no party, 34%; Democratic Alliance, 5%; Inkatha Freedom Party, 4%; other, 4%. There were a fairly high number of missing responses (9.5%), as well as a few "don't know" responses (1.2%), no doubt due to the history of partisan violence in Alexandra. For this variable, "don't know's" are recoded as support for no party. Missing values for all variables were imputed using the method of multiple imputation. See the end of this chapter for more details.

[73]Five-point agree-disagree response sets were used. Eighty-five percent agreed or strongly agreed with the first question; 87% disagreed or strongly disagreed with the second.

[74]The scale is reliable: Cronbach's alpha = .82.

The authoritarian-threat model argues that authoritarian predispositions are activated by threats to ingroup cohesion and welfare, producing intolerance (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005). Following Feldman (2003), *authoritarianism* is conceived as a set of beliefs lying on a social conformity versus individual freedom dimension. The concept is measured using two two forced choice items adapted from Feldman's battery: respondents were asked whether (1) freedom allows people to reach their potential or produces disorder; and (2) whether people should be guided by their feelings or by the rules.[75] An additive scale was calculated from these two items.[76]

The final model considered in this dissertation is the psychoanalytic theory of projection. It holds that an individual may transfer blame onto another group to avoid aversive feelings of guilt and fear about the individual's own group. This concept is measured by asking respondents about their emotional reactions to the 2008 attacks in Alexandra. The same list of nine emotion words was presented as a response set; *aversive emotions toward the 2008 riots* were coded as one for respondents choosing responses of "worried" or "ashamed."[77]

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[75]Thirty-nine percent of respondents chose the authoritarian option for the first question, freedom produces disorder; 82% chose the authoritarian option for the second, that people should be guided by the rules. Respondents were also presented with an intermediate response option of uncertain or ambiguous. See Table 4.10 for exact wording and coding.

[76]The reliability is quite poor but adequate for a two-item scale: Cronbach's alpha = .62.

[77]The original theory focuses on guilt rather than shame and fear rather than anxiety. Researchers such as Lazarus (1991), however, regard guilt and shame, on the one hand, and anxiety and fear, on the other, as manifestations of the same core emotions. Fifteen percent of respondents expressed anxiety and 9% expressed shame.

4.3.6. Control Variables

Finally, there are several additional variables that will be included in multivariate statistical analyses. These will be used to control for any possible confounding factors that might be thought to explain, for example, both blame and participation intentions.

Identification as South African (versus some other nationality) is necessary to experience intergroup anger directed at foreigners. Care was taken to ensure that this local-foreigner divide was foremost in the minds of respondents while the survey was conducted. As such, one of the initial questions asked respondents to self-identify as South African (when offered a choice between South African and foreign).[78] While the direction of social identity is necessary for the questions on intergroup anger to be meaningful, the intensity of this social identity might also play a role in participation intentions, intergroup anger, and blame. In particular, those respondents with weaker attachments to the South African identity might feel less anger on behalf of this group. As such, strength of *national identity* is used as a precision covariate.

The national identity items were located near the beginning of the survey. Three items, adapted from Gibson (2006) and Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior (2004) were then asked: the importance of the South African identity to the respondent, how different the respondent felt to other South Africans, and whether respondent would take an insult directed against their group personally.[79] An additive scale is created from these three items.[80]

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[78]The interview was terminated with those who identified as foreign. See the section on sampling respondents, in this chapter, for more details.

[79]The first two items used four-point response sets that ranged from "very important/different" to "not important/different at all." The third item used a five-point agree-disagree response set.

[80]The responses to the national identity items were heavily skewed towards strong identification: 69% of respondents said the identity was very important to them; 74% said there was no difference at all between

Although the dependent variable is intentions to participate in future violence, self reports of participation in the previous attacks of 2008 were also collected during the survey. Bem (1972) argues that people may infer their own attitudes from the behaviors they have chosen. It may be the case, in other words, that respondents' self-reported emotions to the outgroup are influenced by whether they participated in the 2008 violence. *Participation in the 2008 attacks* will be used to control for the possibility that previous intergroup behavior determines current intergroup attitudes and emotions.

The biggest challenge in asking people about their participation in violence are social desirability and fear of disclosure effects. To reduce these effects as much as possible, I used the method that Scacco (2010) adapted from the Gallup secret ballot technique for the purposes of asking Nigerians about their participation in the Jos and Kaduna riots. For each of the five participation questions, respondents were given a separate card and asked to circle the letter corresponding to the correct answer. They were then instructed to seal the card in an envelope and return it to the interviewer. The interviewer thus never saw the answers to these questions.[81] The response set also included a "forgiving phrase" (Weisberg 2005, 86)—"I did this, and regret it now"—to make it easier for respondents to give a truthful answer.[82]

Respondents were asked whether, during the attacks of 2008, they had (1) joined

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them and other South Africans; and 41% strongly agreed that they would take an insult against their nation personally. As such, the reliability of the scale is poor: Cronbach's alpha = .56.

[81]Scacco (2010) randomly assigned her respondents to be asked about participation either using a conventional question posed by interviewers, or using this method; she finds significantly higher levels of participation using the secret ballot technique. Note that there were also only two respondents who refused to take part in this section of the survey. Indeed my interviewers reported that several respondents questioned the need for the privacy measures.

[82]The other possible responses were: "I did not perform the behavior" and "I did this, and do not regret it."

in the toyi-toyi, (2) threatened or intimidated anyone, (3) looted, (4) physically harmed anyone, or (5) destroyed any shacks.[83] An indicator was created that received a value of one if a respondent reported "I did this" for any of the five questions, and a value of zero otherwise.[84]

Respondent's *level of education*, *age*, *years lived in Alexandra*,[85] and *gender* are also collected and used as control variables.

The survey also included several open-ended questions. One asked respondents for their views on why the violence of 2008 occurred. A second was asked immediately following each participation intention item, and asked respondents to explain their stated intentions. These will be used to provide illustrations when presenting statistical results.

4.4. Preparing to Analyze the Data

4.4.1. Missing Data

As is often the case, some respondents refused to provide answers for certain questions, or responded with "don't know." Wherever possible, "don't know" answers were recoded as some appropriate level on the response scale.[86] Refusals resulted in missing values.

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[83]8.4% ($N = 44$) of the adult South African population of Alexandra reported performing at least one of the behaviors in the 2008 riots; 7.3% ($N = 40$) reported that they went no further than joining in the toyi-toyi; and 3.4% ($N = 17$) claimed to have physically assaulted someone.

[84]The five items form a reliable scale: Cronbach's alpha = .87.

[85]Some authors note that a tension in Alexandra between "insiders," who have been in the area longer, and newcomers (Nieftagodien 2012).

[86]The only exception was the group entitlement and endowment items, where there was no suitable point on the ladder scale for "don't know's;" these responses ($N = 4$–45) were recoded as missing. Details on the extent of missingness by item and the treatment of "don't know's" are provided in Tables 4.2, 4.7, 4.9, 4.5, as

Missing values were handled using the method of multiple imputation. This procedure uses an algorithm to impute missing data based on the values of observed data (see Rubin 1987; King et al. 2001). A small number of complete datasets is created. Five is adequate for a sample of this size where most variables show less than 3% of their values missing (Rubin 1996). The algorithm is stochastic, such that each of the imputed datasets differs slightly from the others.

Statistical analyses are then conducted on all data-sets before the results are combined. The additional uncertainty generated through the use of estimated data is reflected in the variance of the five imputed values for each missing datum, and ultimately in the variance of the parameter estimates in any model using multiply-imputed datasets.

An important distinction is whether missing values are ignorable or non-ignorable. They are ignorable when the missing values are uncorrelated with the observed values; otherwise, non-ignorable. If wealthier respondents are more likely to refuse to answer a question on income, for example, then such missing data would be non-ignorable. When missing data are non-ignorable, multiple imputation does not provide an unbiased solution—but neither does single imputation or listwise deletion (King et al. 2001). When data are ignorable however, multiple imputation generates unbiased estimates of the true values, and is more efficient than listwise deletion because no observations are lost.

In only two of my survey items were a significant percentage (greater than 5%) of the data missing: outgroup entitlement and party support. Missing data for the first item is largely due to "don't know" answers. It thus appears to be attributable to unfamiliarity with the abstract ladder scale rather than respondents censoring their views of outgroup entitlement.[87] These missing data can thus be regarded as ignorable.

well as 4.10, in the appendix to this chapter.

[87]Indeed, the survey featured much more contentious questions about the outgroup such as intentions to

The situation is not as clear for the question on party support. Given the history of partisan violence in Alexandra, it is not surprising that almost 10% of respondents refused to offer an answer to this question. Further analyses reveals that refusing to offer an answer to this question is driven more by where respondents live than by the demographic correlates of particular parties.[88] It thus seems likely that missing data on this question are also ignorable and amenable to multiple imputation.

4.4.2. Empirical Strategy

The entitlement-blame-anger model is a recursive model: the effects flow in one direction from the foundational variable of group entitlement violations, to the dependent variable of intended participation. Recursive models require that each antecedent variable be exogenous to the next in the causal chain. A recursive system of equations can be estimated in an unbiased fashion by running separate regressions on each of the endogenous variables in turn while including all exogenous variables and controls. Separate regressions will thus be used to test the determinants of participation intentions, intergroup anger, and blame.

As I argued in the previous chapter, this assumption appears justified for the effects of anger on participation intentions, and the effects of group entitlement violations on blame. In the case of the relationship between anger and blame, however, existing research suggests

participate in future violence against this group. Only around 1–2% of the responses for these questions were missing and/or "don't know's".

[88]A dummy variable for refusals for the party support question is correlated (tetrachoric correlation) with both being Zulu (.24) and living in Sector 2 (.30). Being Zulu in Alexandra is associated with being a supporter of a particular party, the IFP, while Sector 2 is where partisan violence occurred in the early 1990s. A logistic regression of the refusals dummy, however, finds that being Zulu is no longer a significant independent variable when living in Sector 2 is included in the equation. It is thus location, rather than ethnicity, which determines hesitance to answer the party support question.

that this assumption of exogeneity may be incorrect. Blame may produce anger and vice versa. I will thus also consider a non-recursive model that includes a feedback loop between blame and anger. Such non-recursive system of equations cannot be estimated piecemeal using separate regressions. Instead, a simultaneous equation model will be used to examine whether anger and blame are both endogenous to the other.

The data have two other features that require special attention, whether using a regression or simultaneous equation framework. First, the sample, while representative of adult South African residents of Alexandra, is not a simple random sample. Instead, the survey utilizes a complex sampling design.[89] Second, each statistical result reported here is a combination of estimates conducted on the five datasets created through multiple imputation.[90]

The method I will use to analyze the data under the assumption of a recursive model is a survey regression with design-based coefficient estimates and standard errors.[91] The regression coefficients are identical to those obtained with weighted least-squares, but the estimates of uncertainty are design-based. Using this method, each of the steps of the theoretical

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[89]The correct point estimates of quantities of interest such as means and regression coefficients can be calculated from such survey data by conducting weighted analyses. Design-based estimates of uncertainty, which take the stratification and clustering of the sampling into account, are also required however (see Weisberg 2005). In some cases these are twice as large as ordinary standard errors based on the assumption of a simple random sample—although this design effect varies.

[90]Point estimates, such as means and regression coefficients are simple to calculate from multiply imputed data. They are simply the average of the five separate the point estimates across the five imputed datasets. Standard errors, however, require a combination of both the average within-dataset variance, as well as the across-dataset variance. See King et al. (2001)

[91]I use the `svyglm` and `Mitools` functions from the `survey` library for R (Lumley 2010). The former uses a pseudo-maximum likelihood to estimate parameters and standard errors; the latter combines these models across imputed datasets.

model will be tested in turn, with participation intentions being the dependent variable in the first step, followed by intergroup anger and normative blame.

Non-recursive relationships will be tested using simultaneous equation models for complex survey data and imputed datasets.[92]

Finally, because the previous attacks appear to have been organized in community policing meetings, and the level of violence varied across community policing districts, I include fixed effects for these districts to capture the effects of any unobserved district-level characteristics. I also include fixed effects for the language of the interview to control for differences in translation.

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[92]I use the `Mplus` program (Muthén and Muthén 2011). `Mplus` uses a maximum-likelihood estimator with design-based standard errors that are robust to non-normality. When a recursive structure is specified, this program produces identical results to the `svyglm` function in `R`.

Appendix

Table 4.10. Other Variables: Item Wording, Coding, and Percent Don't Know or Missing

Items and Coding	% Don't Know	% Missing
Authoritarianism		
Now I want to ask you some questions about how you think that people should behave in life.		
(1) Do you think that giving people more freedom will just mean more disorder (= 3), or will allow people to reach their full potential (= 1)? (Uncertain / ambivalent, Don't know = 2).	0.2	0.6
(2) Do you think that people should be guided mostly by their feelings (= 1), or people should be guided mostly by society's rules (= 3)? (Uncertain / ambivalent, Don't know = 2).	0.2	1.2
Aversive emotions about 2008 riots		
Please tell me which of these feelings best describes how you feel about the attacks on the foreigners of 2008?	0.0	0.4
Worried, ashamed = 1. Happy, proud, angry, irritated, jealous, disappointed, no feeling or neutral, don't know = 0).		
Blame by leaders		
At these meetings, did you hear the CPF leaders or the izinduna …		
(1) blaming foreign people from other African countries for taking jobs from South Africans?	0.4	0.4
Yes a lot, quite a bit, a little = 1. No, don't know = 0)		
(2) blaming foreign people from other African countries for taking houses that are meant for South Africans?	0.2	0.2
(3) saying that foreigners act like they are better than South Africans?	2.0	0.2
Blame by peers		
Since the beginning of the year, how often have you heard other people …		
(1) blaming the foreigners for taking jobs from South Africans?	0.2	0.2
All of the time = 4. Quite often = 3. Rarely = 2. Never, don't know = 1.		
(2) blaming the foreigners for taking houses that are meant for South Africans?	0.2	0.4
(3) saying that foreigners act like they are better than South Africans?	4.8	0.6
Education		
What is the highest level of education you have personally achieved?	1.2	0.8
Primary school = 1. Some high school but no matric (high school diploma) = 2. Finished matric, artisan's certificate = 3. University degree, Teacher's college diploma, Technikon diploma, Some other post-matric diploma = 4.		
Employment status		

Which one of these statements best describes your working life?   0.0   0.4

Working full-time, part-time, for myself = Working. Not working–housewife, student, retired, Unemployed–not looking for work = Not in the labor force. Unemployed–looking for work = Unemployed.

Informal trader

What is the job that you have now or used to have?   0.0   0.0

"vendor", "street vendor", "tuck shop", "spaza shop" = 1

Lives in low quality housing

What type of housing does the respondent live in?   0.0   0.0

Shack in shack area, hostel room, backyard shack, backyard room or garage = 1. Flat, formal house = 0.

Meeting attendance

There are sometimes community meetings in Alex that are held by leaders such as the people from the community policing forum or the izinduna. So far this year, how many of these meetings in Alex have you attended?   0.0   0.2

0, don't know = 0. 1 = 1. 2-3 = 2. 4-5 = 3. 6+ = 4.

National identity

(1) How important is it to you that you are a South African?   0.6   2.4

Very important = 4. Quite important = 3. A little bit important, don't know = 2. not important at all = 1.

(2) How different do you feel from most other South Africans living in Alex?   0.6   0.4

Very different = 1. Quite different = 2. A little bit different, don't know = 3. Not different at all = 4.

(3) Would you agree or disagree that if someone says bad things about South Africans, it feels like they are insulting you personally?   3.0   0.2

Strongly agree = 5. Agree = 4. Uncertain, Don't know = 3. Disagree = 2. Strongly disagree = 1.

Support for violence

(1) Do you agree or disagree that sometimes it is acceptable for the community to use violence to achieve its goals?   0.2   0.0

Strongly agree = 5. Agree = 4. Uncertain, don't know = 3. Disagree = 2. Strongly disagree = 1.

(2) Do you agree or disagree that talking is usually the best way to resolve conflicts between groups of people?   0.2   0.0

Strongly agree = 1. Agree = 2. Uncertain, don't know = 3. Disagree = 4. Strongly disagree = 5.

Party support

Which of these political parties do you like the most?   1.2   9.5

DA, IFP, COPE, UDM, PAC, other = Other. I don't like any party, don't know = None. ANC = ANC.

Perceived opportunities for looting

How many people stole things from the foreigners' shacks in the attacks of 2008?   6.6   0.2

No people = 1. Just a few people, Don't know = 2. Some people = 3. Many people = 4.

Poverty

Do you or anyone else in your household own a …

(1) TV?	0.0	0.8

No = 1. Don't know = missing. Yes = 0.

(2) cell-phone?	0.0	1.6
(3) fridge?	0.0	0.8
(4) microwave?	0.0	0.6
(5) computer?	0.0	2.6
(6) car?	0.0	0.6

Previous participation

For the next few questions, you will be filling in your own answers on a separate card to ensure your privacy. When I read out each question, you must mark your answers yourself on your card. For each question, you must make a cross. So if the 1st answer I read is the right one for you, then make a cross on 'A'. If the 2nd answer is the right one for you, make a cross on 'B'. If the 3rd answer is the right one, make a cross on 'C'. Many people from Alex were involved in the attacks on foreigners in 2008. Can you tell me if any of the following things happened during those attacks?

(1) Did you join in the toyi-toyi-ing and singing?	0.0	0.6

I did this and feel that it was the right thing to do, I did this and regret it now = 1. I did not do this, not living in Alexandra at the time = 0.

(2) Did you threaten or intimidate anyone into joining in?	0.0	0.6
(3) Did you steal any things from a foreigner's shack?	0.0	0.6
(4) Did you physically harm any foreigners?	0.0	0.6
(5) Did you destroy anyone's shack?	0.0	0.6

Figure 4.10. Location of Alexandra within Johannesburg

<div style="text-align: center;">CHAPTER 5</div>

Results

5.1. Introduction

This chapter uses the survey data to test the entitlement-blame-anger model of participation in intergroup violence. Given the recursive nature of the model, I examine each of the components in turn. I begin with participation intentions, verifying whether the data offer support for the entitlement-blame-anger model, or perhaps any of the alternative models that were proposed in Chapter 3. I then turn to the determinants of anger and blame.

Before discussing these multivariate analyses, however, I begin with some simpler bivariate analyses of the data. The first is a correlation matrix of all the variables.[1]

A few of these correlations are worth pointing out. First, the bivariate relationships among participation intentions, anger, blame, and group entitlement violations are all strong (for survey data): the correlations between these variables range from .31 for participation intentions-group entitlement violations to .57 for blame-anger. This pattern of correlations is consistent with the entitlement-blame-anger model.

Second, measures of exposure to material competition (being unemployed, working

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[1]The table lists three kinds of correlations. Pearson's correlations are used when both variables are continuous; polychoric correlations, when both variables are polytomous (or dichotomous); and polyserial correlations when one variable is continuous and the other polytomous. Continuous variables are defined as those with more than seven ordered categories. See Table 4.4 for a complete categorization.

Table 5.1. Correlation Matrix of Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Participation intent.												
2. Anger	.48											
3. Blame	.54	.57										
4. Responsibility	.49	.50	.86									
5. Unfairness	.45	.49	.86	.53								
6. Group entit. violat.	.31	.32	.54	.43	.54							
7. Support violence	.27	.15	.10	.13	.06	.00						
8. Peer blame	.18	.23	.29	.21	.23	.05	.09					
9. Leader blame	.14	.17	.14	.14	.09	.19	.02	.14				
10. Authoritarianism	−.01	.16	.16	.03	.19	−.11	.04	.40	−.12			
11. National identity	−.01	.13	.14	.06	.18	.16	−.31	−.13	.01	.02		
12. Participation 2008	.41	.33	.42	.34	.31	.25	.38	.27	.37	.03	−.20	
13. Meeting attend.	.06	.09	.17	.19	.12	.15	.06	.09	.76	−.07	.01	.27
14. Poverty	.13	.08	.16	.10	.17	.14	.14	.05	−.03	−.01	−.04	.11
15. Opportun. to loot	−.26	−.28	−.16	−.23	−.06	.05	−.21	−.15	−.01	−.14	.23	−.06
16. Avers. emot. 2008	−.13	−.08	−.04	−.03	.05	.08	−.11	−.40	−.11	−.32	.07	−.27
17. Unemployed	.08	.10	.10	.04	.11	.17	.03	−.07	.13	−.05	.14	.15
18. Trader	−.04	−.01	−.08	−.08	−.02	−.10	−.05	.07	−.71	.07	−.03	−.43
19. Low qual. housing	.03	.00	.05	.04	.05	.10	.08	.10	.13	−.04	−.14	.23
20. Support opp. party	.23	.15	.10	.11	.10	.07	.16	.10	.11	.03	−.12	.35
21. Male	.22	.09	.04	.09	.01	−.16	.11	−.03	.06	.00	−.12	.19
22. Education	−.14	−.09	−.12	−.12	−.09	−.04	−.13	−.11	.08	.04	.06	.01
23. Age	−.06	−.02	.04	.08	.01	.02	−.06	.12	.16	.07	−.04	−.13

Pearson's correlations used between two continuous variables; polychoric correlations, between two ordinal variables; and polyserial correlations, between a continuous and an ordinal variable. $N = 497$.

as a trader, and living in low quality housing) are very weakly correlated ($-.04$ to $.08$) with participation intentions. The aversive conditions of poverty and support for opposition parties show stronger correlations ($.13$ and $.23$) but these are still lower than the correlations for blame and anger. The correlation between perceived opportunities to loot and intentions to participate in future are negative, which suggests that looting does not act as a selective incentive motivating participation.

Third, I have already noted that previous participation and intentions to participate in future are fairly strongly correlated: $.41$. But the relationships between anger, blame and group entitlement violations are moderate to strong, with the correlations ranging from $.33$ to $.42$. The main independent variables are thus correlated with both intentions to participate in future and actual participation in the past. This lends further weight to the entitlement-blame-anger model. If the model is correct, we would expect that anger and blame be correlated both with intentions to participate in future as well as actual participation in the past.

I now turn to a closer analysis of the relationship between intergroup emotions and intentions to participate in future violence. Figure 5.1 shows the average participation intentions score across each of the nine possible emotional reactions to the other group.[2] These average levels of participation intention are broken down further by each of the three situations in the survey in which emotional reactions were measured—competition over jobs and houses, and the group endowment and entitlement comparisons.

The figure shows that respondents who report feeling angry or irritated show higher propensities to participate in future violence.[3] Respondents feeling proud, happy, or no feel-

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[2]"Anger" and "irritation" are disaggregated solely for the purposes of this figure. In all analyses that follow, intergroup anger is measured using both terms.

[3]The average participation intentions score for those feeling either anger or irritation is $.51$. The weighted mean for the sample is $.37$.

Figure 5.1. Bivariate Relationships Between Intergroup Emotions and Participation Intentions

Each bar shows the average level of participation intentions for respondents who chose the each of the nine possible emotion words, as either their first or second choice, in each of the three contexts in the survey. Vertical lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.

ing report the lowest levels of participation intentions (.15–.18), with the worried, ashamed, and disappointed showing moderate levels of participation intentions (.35–.36).[4] These results are consistent with expectations about the effects of intergroup emotions on intergroup behavior: intergroup anger produces a desire for confrontation with the other group; other negative emotions, such as anxiety, result in a more cautious response; and pride and happiness produce an intention to act in a positive fashion toward the outgroup, by, for example,

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[4]Few respondents chose the word "jealous," but those that did also had quite high scores on the participation intention scale (.40). Note that feeling jealous at the other group is not included as an indicator of intergroup anger by Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) (see also van Zomeren et al. 2004). I follow these authors' leads in excluding it.

helping them.

Second, the effect of emotions on participation is fairly consistent across the jobs, housing, and endowment comparison situations. Respondents who chose "anger" as their emotional reaction to the vignette about a foreigner working in Johannesburg have an average score on the participation intentions scale of .49. The corresponding scores for those choosing "angry" in the housing and group endowment situations are .48 and .51. If we can conceive of the three survey situations as arenas of intergroup competition or types of threat, then the variance in participation intentions is largely accounted for by emotions, rather than these arenas of competition. Emotional variation thus clearly matters more for participation intentions than variation in type of intergroup competition.

Correlation is not causation, however, so we need to move to a multivariate analysis to see if these relationships between anger and participation hold up even after accounting for possible confounds. This will be the task of the rest of this chapter. It is structured as follows. I consider each of the dependent variables of participation intentions, anger, and blame in turn. Within each of these sections I will evaluate the effects of the hypotheses and models summarized in Table 3.1 beginning with the entitlement-blame-anger model. First, what are the determinants of intentions to participate in future violence?

5.2. Explaining Participation Intentions

5.2.1. Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model

Tables 5.2 presents the results of four survey regression models of participation intentions on various explanatory and control variables. The first model, Model 5.2.1, includes the main effects of all variables hypothesized to have an effect on participation;[5] Model 5.2.2 includes

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[5] All variables are scaled to fit the [0,1] interval.

the same variables, but participation intentions, anger, and blame are log-transformed to reduce skewness. Model 5.2.3 includes an interaction between working as a trader and meeting attendance, but is otherwise the same as Model 5.2.1. Model 5.2.4 then adds an additional control variable: participation in the previous episode of violence in 2008.

I will first consider the effects of anger on participation intentions. In all models, the effect is significant and positive. Because these models control for the variables that are antecedent in the entitlement-blame-anger model, the coefficient of anger here is the estimated direct effect (corresponding to the right-most arrow in Figure 3.1). The standardized effect is .22. Although much reduced from the bivariate correlation of .48, this result controls for confounds that might be thought to produce both anger and participation intentions, such as exposure to material competition with the outgroup, the mobilizing effect of attending community meetings, the frustrations of poverty, and even participation in the previous anti-immigrant attacks.[6]

The observed relationship between anger and participation intentions thus does not appear to be a spurious correlation produced by the effect of material threat from the outgroup, for example. Measures of this and other confounds are included in the regressions. It still remains possible, however, that the association between anger and participation intentions can be interpreted using a reversal of the causal process, where the intention to participate in future causes anger.

In this reverse causal story, anger is an expressed rationalization for an intention to take part in violence that has other motives. The data at hand do not permit a test of this hypothesis. But existing research on anger, and the nature of the emotional experience suggest that it is very unlikely. A large body of research shows that the causes of anger lie in

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[6]The association between previous participation and participation intentions is virtually zero when controlling for anger, blame, and the other covariates. Recall that the bivariate correlation is .41. This pattern of results is consistent with participation in the 2008 attacks also being explained by anger and blame.

Table 5.2. Determinants of Intentions to Participate in Future Intergroup Violence

	5.2.1	5.2.2	5.2.3	5.2.4
Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model				
Intergroup anger	.26 (.08)**	.20 (.07)**	.26 (.08)**	.25 (.08)**
Blame	.38 (.06)***	.43 (.07)***	.38 (.06)***	.37 (.07)***
Group entitlement violations	.17 (.12)	.20 (.12)	.17 (.12)	.17 (.12)
Alternative Explanations				
Support for violence	.25 (.06)***	.24 (.06)***	.25 (.06)***	.25 (.07)***
Employment: not in the labor force	−.09 (.04)*	−.09 (.04)*	−.09 (.04)*	−.09 (.04)*
Employment: unemployed	−.04 (.03)	−.04 (.03)	−.04 (.03)	−.04 (.03)
Informal trader	.01 (.06)	−.01 (.06)	−.02 (.06)	−.02 (.06)
Low quality housing	−.04 (.03)	−.05 (.03)	−.04 (.03)	−.05 (.03)
Meetings attended	−.05 (.06)	−.07 (.06)	−.06 (.06)	−.06 (.06)
Trader × meetings			.58 (.22)**	.58 (.22)**
Perceived opportunities for looting	−.11 (.05)*	−.11 (.05)*	−.10 (.05)*	−.11 (.05)*
Poverty	.06 (.08)	.06 (.08)	.06 (.08)	.07 (.08)
Party support: none	.03 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.03 (.03)	.03 (.03)
Party support: opposition	.07 (.05)	.08 (.04)	.07 (.05)	.06 (.05)
Control Variables				
Blame from peers	.02 (.03)	.01 (.03)	.02 (.03)	.01 (.04)
Blame from leaders	.09 (.07)	.09 (.07)	.09 (.07)	.09 (.08)
National identity	−.01 (.07)	−.03 (.07)	−.01 (.07)	−.01 (.07)
Age	−.17 (.09)	−.15 (.10)	−.16 (.09)	−.16 (.09)
Years in Alexandra	.16 (.12)	.17 (.13)	.16 (.12)	.16 (.12)
Gender: Male	.09 (.03)**	.08 (.03)**	.08 (.03)**	.08 (.03)**
Education	−.06 (.06)	−.05 (.06)	−.06 (.06)	−.07 (.06)
Previous participation				.04 (.04)
Adjusted R^2	.44	.43	.44	.44
Fixed effects: sectors and interview language	✓	✓	✓	✓
Log of intentions, anger, and blame		✓		

Survey linear regressions. Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. Design-based standard errors in parentheses. $N = 497$. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

perceptions of blame of some other party and the attendant sense of injustice. While there is some evidence that discomfort and pain can result in anger (Berkowitz 1990), there is no evidence that anger can be called upon to mask one's more self-interested motives. Indeed, according to Frank (1988), the evolutionary utility of social emotions, such as anger, rests on their ability to produce behavior that may not be in one's immediate interest.

Nor is it very likely that respondents falsely expressed anger during the survey to mask their more venal motives. The questions on participation and intentions to participate were asked at the end of the survey, after all the items measuring the independent variables. Moreover, the anger questions were not posed in the abstract, but were instead asked in reference to fairly detailed vignettes designed to prompt realistic emotional reactions in respondents. It thus seems very unlikely that the effect of anger that I have reported can be interpreted as respondents expressing feelings of anger, either as an effect of their intentions to participate in future violence, or to mask their true motivations. Rather, all the evidence supports the causal process advanced in the model: anger at another group increases the intention to take part in violence against that group.

A final concern that one might have with these results is the link between participation intentions and actual participation. Even if anger is associated with greater intentions to take part, would it also be associated with a greater likelihood of participation, should an opportunity present itself?

The measure of participation intentions might consistently under- or over-estimate the probabilities that certain people would take part in future. Some individuals may profess an intention to participate without any real likelihood of doing so. Others might deny any intention to take part in future but are, in fact, likely to be mobilized because of their social networks (Fuji 2009; McAdam 1986; Taylor 1988). In the former case, respondents underestimate the costs of participation; in the latter, they underestimate the situational determinants. To address both of these concerns, interaction terms between anger and par-

ticipation in the 2008 attacks, on the one hand, and attendance at the community meetings, on the other, are included. The former model permits a consideration of whether anger explains participation intentions among the subsample who participated in 2008, who fully understand the costs and dangers of taking part. The latter model verifies whether anger has a diminished effect among the subsample who are embedded in community social networks, and thus more likely to be mobilized by their peers should violence actually recur. Neither of these interaction effects is significant.[7] The reported effect of anger is thus probably not driven by individuals who either underestimate or overestimate the likelihood that they will take part in future.

Moving from anger to blame, Table 5.2 shows that blame of the outgroup also has a significant and substantial regression coefficient. This effect was not predicted by the theoretical model. It represents the direct effect of blame on participation intentions aside from the indirect effect that is mediated by anger. The size of this direct effect is large, with a standardized coefficient of .31 (Model 5.2.1). Blaming the outgroup for unfairly harming one's own group thus also results in an increased desire to participate in future violence. If anger represents the "hot" pathway to participation, this direct effect of blame suggests that there is also a "cooler," non-emotional channel.[8]

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[7]Anger-participation in 2008 interaction term: Coef. $= -.12$, S.E. $= .14$, $p = .19$. Anger-meeting attendance interaction term: Coef. $= -.6$, S.E. $= .19$, $p = .38$.

[8]A comparison of the standardized effects of anger and blame might suggest that blame is the more important variable. This conclusion may be justified. But note that anger is a more difficult variable to measure than blame. Respondents who are not engaged in the interview may not experience any emotional reaction to the vignettes, even if they blame foreigners in the abstract. Moreover, as I mentioned before, the intensity of experienced emotion is reduced by asking people to report their emotional reactions (Keltner, Locke, and Audrain 1993; Schwartz and Clore 1983). To the extent that anger is less well-measured than blame, its regression coefficient will be more attenuated.

The most distal variable in the entitlement-blame-anger model, violations of group entitlements, does not show any direct effect on participation intentions. Later in the chapter I will examine whether it has direct effects on anger, or as hypothesized, on blame.

In sum, the evidence presented thus far supports the entitlement-blame-anger model. Anger has a significant effect on participation intentions, and one that is robust to the inclusion of numerous control variables. The model may require some revision however, because blame also appears to result in an increased intention to attack the other group, independently of the emotion of anger. The remainder of this section will consider the evidence for pathways to participation outside of the entitlement-blame-anger model, beginning with selective incentives.

5.2.2.   Alternative Explanations for Participation

Selective Incentives.   Would-be participants may be motivated primarily by the prospect of personal reward, rather than any deep-seated blame of the outgroup. In situations of intergroup violence, people may "riot for profit," as Banfield (1970) put it. Indeed, looting was quite common in 2008, with 78% of residents stated that "some" or "many" people had looted.

The question is whether looting is an epiphenomenon that occurs during incidents of intergroup violence or whether mass participation is actually propelled by the promise of looting. The multivariate analysis in Table 5.2 can provide some insight. The coefficient for perceived opportunities for looting, however, is negative in Table 5.2. This indicates that the promise of looting does not make individuals more willing to participate in future intergroup violence.[9] The hypothesis of selective incentives is not supported.

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[9]The negative effect of this variable is surprising, but is possibly because would-be participants do not see themselves as looters. If participation is motivated by anger and blame, then participants regard their actions as righting a wrong (see also Horowitz 2001). Some of the open-ended responses corroborate this view that

This result is not very surprising when one considers other features of intergroup violence. In Alexandra in 2008, for example, there were thousands of participants. The targets were fewer in number and were, in any case, hardly wealthy themselves. The *a priori* probability of reward from looting would thus appear to be low.

Social influence. Rather than be motived by rewards, participants may be motivated to avoid the costs of non-participation. Leaders and other participants may apply social pressure to those who appear less interested in taking part. These pressures range from the subtle to the coercive, from feelings of shame and guilt to threats of violence. Whatever the mechanism, these pressures can be more readily brought to bear on residents who attend community meetings. These are the occasions where the 2008 violence was organized. They also involve repeated face-to-face encounters between community members and community leaders.[10]

Evidence from the survey shows that some level of coercion does occur. Fifteen percent of respondents claimed that "some" or "many" people were intimidated into taking part in 2008, and 3% admitted, in the open-ended questions asked after the participation intention items, that such social pressures would compel them to take part.[11]

However, the regression results do not show any substantial association between

participants separate themselves from looters: respondent 10363, for example, said that "some stupid people don't understand toyi-toying. They become wild and steal from innocent people."

[10]Attendance at these meetings is high: 31% of respondents claimed to have attended at least one meeting from January to May 2011; 4.2% attended six or more.

[11]Respondent 10185, for example, said he will "just pretend to join in to show solidarity so people don't see me as an outsider too." Respondent 10423 would also join in, "because if I don't my community will think I'm a sell-out."

meeting attendance and participation intentions.[12] There is thus no evidence that exposure to social pressures, whether coercive or not, is sufficient to increase an individual's intentions to take part in violence.

Indeed, a strategy of coercion would seem to suffer the same problem as paying participants: the chaos of the riot means that it would be next to impossible to monitor those who had been coerced. Organizers would have to expend all their efforts in coercing and monitoring an otherwise unwilling mob. Rather than taking part in intergroup violence out of social pressure or coercion, people appear to join willingly. As Horowitz (2001, 266) put it, "the deadly ethnic riot is a pickup game."

Meeting attendance may play a slightly different role however. Scacco (2010) suggests that it increases the likelihood of participation through a conditional relationship with collective incentives. This hypothesis is discussed next.

Realistic Group Competition. Locals and immigrants compete over three major material resources in Alexandra: jobs, government housing, and customers for street traders. An attack on immigrants might increase the supply of all of these.[13] They are public goods, however, because nonparticipants cannot be excluded from also benefitting. Thus, while such collective incentives provide a possible motive for participation, exposure to social pressure provides the means by which collective motives are transformed into individual action. Participation, according to this model, requires that individuals both stand to benefit from the provision of some collective good, and be discouraged from free-riding. The three collective incentives are measured with, respectively, indicators for being unemployed, living in low

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[12]Scacco also finds that meeting attendance, by itself, has little impact on participation in riots in Nigeria.

[13]Several respondents made this point when asked why they intended to participate in violence in future. Respondent 10377, for example said: "if things go well, I will also benefit;" while respondent 10014 noted that: "it's my chance to have opportunities, to fight for a better life."

quality housing, and making a living as an informal trader. Exposure to social pressure, as before, is measured with the variable for attendance at community meetings.

The conditional nature of these hypotheses requires that they be tested using interaction terms between each of the three incentives and meeting attendance. Only the interaction term for being an informal trader and attending meetings is significant, and is reported in Models 5.2.3 & 4.[14]

This interaction term reports the effect of working as an informal trader as the level of meeting attendance increases from the lowest observed level (no meetings attended) to the highest observed level (six or more meetings attended). The theory is a little more specific, however. It requires that being a trader would only be linked to increased participation intentions when the individual attends community meetings. Consequently, not only should the coefficient be greater for those who attend compared to those who do not, it should be close to zero in the former instance and positive in the latter. We require, in other words, the marginal effects of the interaction terms.

Marginal effects are most readily communicated using figures. Figure 5.2 shows the marginal effects of making a living as an informal trader as meeting attendance (x-axis) increases. It is clear that the required pattern is shown: the effect is close to zero for respondents who did not attend any community meetings in 2011, and positive for those who attended meetings. Moreover, the effect is significantly greater than zero for respondents who attended at least one meeting in 2011.

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[14]The coefficient for the unemployed × meeting attendance term is −.11 (S.E = .10); for the low quality housing × meeting attendance term, it is .03 (S.E = .08). Table 5.2 also shows that Alexandra residents who are not active in the labor force are significantly less likely to want to take part in future violence than those who are working (the omitted category of the dummy variable). Additional analyses, not reported here, find that most of this effect is produced by the students in the sample. An interaction term for between being inactive in the labor force and attending meetings is not significant.

Figure 5.2. Marginal Effects of Working as a Trader on Participation Intentions by Level of Meeting Attendance

The bold line indicates the marginal effects of being a trader on participation intentions (vertical axis) by level of meeting attendance (horizontal axis). The dashed lines show the 95% confidence intervals around the marginal effect estimates. Covariates from Models 5.2.3 included.

Despite the prevalence of narratives describing competition over housing and jobs as the trigger of the 2008 violence, locals who earn their livings as informal traders appear to have more credible reasons to attack foreigners than those who are unemployed or lack adequate housing. The difference is that traders can reasonably expect that attacking their foreign competitors will reduce the competitive threat. In order to conduct business in Alexandra, a trader must actually be present at a stall or table in the area. For a foreigner to return to their stall after an episode of anti-immigrant violence would be very risky.

There is no similar rationality of violence for South Africans who experience competition in the general labor market or over access to housing. Many of the jobs that residents of Alexandra hold or seek take the form of wage employment throughout the city of Johannesburg (Center for Development and Enterprise 2008). While attacking one's foreign competitors in Alexandra may drive them out of the immediate area, such localized ethnic cleansing is not sufficient to prevent the target group from continuing to hold jobs in other

parts of the city. The housing motivation for participation in collective violence is also dubious because the 2008 attacks did not feature mobs trying to force people out of government houses, and indeed, violence did not occur in these areas. The victims were from the old area of Alexandra and lived in shacks and backyard rooms (Misago et al. 2010).

The effect of being a trader and attending community meetings suggests an alternative, instrumental pathway to participation in violence.[15] This instrumental pathway appears to be quite separate to the entitlement-blame-anger mechanism because adding the interaction term to the equation does not reduce the effects of anger and blame at all (compare Models 5.2.1 and 5.2.3). There is also no significant interactive relationship between being a trader, attending meetings, and either anger or blame.[16]

Frustration-Aggression.   In Berkowitz's revised frustration-aggression theory (1989; 1990), aversive conditions produce aggression, which is displaced onto some target. Two measures of aversive conditions are used in the regression models in Table 5.2: poverty and support for an opposition party. Both show a positive bivariate correlation with participation intentions.[17] When included in Table 5.2 with the other covariates, however, these effects are no longer significant. The frustration induced by poverty and support for an opposition party thus does not directly increase intentions to take part in intergroup violence. Later in this chapter, I will explore whether these variables have indirect effects on participation, which are mediated through either blame or anger.

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[15]This alternative pathway is not a general explanation for participation in intergroup violence. There were only 17 respondents who reported working as traders. This is less than one-third of the proportion of Alexandra residents who admitted taking part in the 2008 attacks. This calculation is based on the proportions as weighted by the sampling weights.

[16]These interaction models are not shown.

[17]The poverty correlation is .13; that for opposition party support is .23. See Table 5.1.

Culture of Violence. Some authors argue that South African townships are afflicted by a culture of violence given that the state has historically neglected to provide impartial justice and, indeed, has instigated much violence itself. Subscription to this culture of violence is measured with two items capturing a respondents' support for violence. The correlation between this index and participation intentions is fairly strong (.27). As the regression in Table 5.2 show, this association remains significant when the effects of other covariates are controlled.[18] Individuals who believe that violence is an acceptable strategy for the group to pursue its interests are more willing to take part in a future attack on foreigners.

5.2.3. Summary

This concludes the analysis of the direct determinants of intentions to participate in intergroup violence. As hypothesized, anger plays an important role. But blame and support for violence also shape decisions about taking part in an attack. We now shift our attention to the triggers of anger. Given the substantial association between anger and participation intentions, any variable that has a direct effect on the former may also have an indirect, mediated effect on the latter. Both sorts of relationships will be considered in the next section.

5.3. The Triggers of Anger

5.3.1. Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model

Table 5.3 presents three regression models of intergroup anger. As before, these are survey regressions with weighted estimates and design-based standard errors. They also include fixed effects for community policing sectors and interview language. The first model, Model 5.3.1, includes all the explanatory variables that were hypothesized to trigger anger, notably,

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[18]The standardized regression coefficient is .17.

Table 5.3. Determinants of Intergroup Anger

	5.3.1		5.3.2		5.3.3	
Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model						
Blame	.50	(.06)***	.58	(.06)***	.50	(.06)***
Group entitlement violations	.10	(.12)	.06	(.14)	.10	(.12)
Alternative Explanations						
Support for violence	.11	(.05)*	.13	(.05)*	.11	(.05)*
Employment: not in the labor force	−.01	(.04)	−.01	(.04)	−.01	(.04)
Employment: unemployed	.03	(.03)	.03	(.03)	.03	(.03)
Employment: street trader	.07	(.05)	.07	(.05)	.06	(.05)
Low quality housing	−.01	(.03)	−.01	(.04)	−.01	(.03)
Poverty	−.03	(.07)	−.03	(.08)	−.03	(.07)
Party support: none	−.02	(.03)	−.03	(.03)	−.02	(.03)
Party support: opposition	.01	(.03)	.00	(.03)	.01	(.03)
Control Variables						
Blame from peers	.05	(.03)	.04	(.04)	.04	(.03)
Blame from leaders	.14	(.07)*	.14	(.07)*	.13	(.07)
Meetings attended	−.09	(.05)	−.09	(.06)	−.09	(.05)
National identity	.10	(.04)*	.11	(.05)*	.10	(.04)*
Age	−.03	(.08)	−.04	(.08)	−.03	(.08)
Years in Alexandra	−.02	(.11)	−.02	(.12)	−.02	(.11)
Gender: Male	.02	(.02)	.02	(.03)	.02	(.02)
Education	−.03	(.06)	−.03	(.07)	−.03	(.06)
Previous participation					.03	(.05)
Adjusted R^2	.38		.38		.38	
Fixed effects: sectors and interview language	✓		✓		✓	
Log transformations: anger and blame			✓			

Survey linear regressions. Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. Design-based standard errors in parentheses. $N = 497$. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$.

blame. The next model, 5.3.2, repeats this specification, but uses the log-transformed versions of anger and blame to ensure that any results are not driven by skewness. The final model, 5.3.3, adds the indicator for previous participation to the equation 5.3.1.

The entitlement-blame-anger model postulates that intergroup anger is triggered by a belief that the outgroup is to blame for some unjust hardship or harm suffered by the ingroup. The bivariate correlation between these variables is indeed large, .57. The regression effect is also substantial; the standardized coefficient is .49. Including controls for material competition with the outgroup, aversive conditions, gender, education, and previous participation in violence does not reduce the strength of the blame-anger link by very much.

The entitlement-blame-anger model posits a mediational role for anger. We have already seen that blame has a direct effect on willingness to participate in future intergroup violence, but, according to the model, blame also works by triggering angry reactions to the outgroup. Blame is thus hypothesized to also have an indirect effect. The substantial effects of blame on anger, on the one hand, and anger on participation intentions, on the other, are consistent with this indirect pathway between blame and participation intentions. The size of this mediation effect is .13. A formal test confirms that this effect is significant.[19]

I have shown that the blame-anger link is robust to controlling for various possible confounds. But could this association be the result of a reverse effect, where feelings of anger produce increased blame? Existing research does, in fact, find evidence for this causal pathway. Quigley and Tedeschi (1996) and Lerner, Goldberg, and Tetlock (1998), for example, find that experimentally manipulated anger increases the tendency to blame another party, while Miller (2001) and Solomon (1990) argue that perceptions of injustice are both a consequence and a determinant of anger. Anger, in short, may result in blame, as well as blame resulting in anger.

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[19]Sobel test statistic = 3.04, $p < .01$.

To test the reciprocal effects of blame and anger, I move from using separate regressions to a simultaneous equation model. More specifically, I move from the assumption of a recursive model, where effect follows cause without feedback loops, to a non-recursive model. As Figure 5.3 indicates, this model includes the endogenous variables of blame, anger, and participation intentions. The relationship between anger and participation intentions is treated as a single pathway from the former to the latter. Blame and anger, however, are modeled as having reciprocal effects on each other.

Figure 5.3. Non-Recursive Simultaneous Equation Model With Feedback Loop

Observed variable simultaneous equation model. Estimates are obtained using maximum likelihood. Regression coefficients, along with design-based standard errors in parentheses, are indicated next to their respective paths. Instrumental variables are shown in grey. All the other covariates from Models 5.2.1, 5.3.1, and 5.4.1 are included in this SEM. Overall model fit: Akaike Information Criterion = −343.92.

Non-recursive models, such as this one, are not identified without some unique information about the endogenous variables (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyat 2011). Identification of this particular model requires at least one unique predictor for each endogenous variable of anger and blame.[20] To serve as a unique predictor, we require a variable that theory or past experience has shown to have an causal relationship with one of the endogenous

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[20]This model is block recursive: the block containing the endogenous variables of blame and anger is non-recursive, but the block containing the endogenous variable of participation intentions is recursive, given the former block. I thus focus this discussion on the non-recursive block and its two equations.

variables, but not the other. In other words, two instrumental variables are required: one for anger and one for blame.

The theoretical model suggests a possible instrument for blame: group entitlement violations. I have argued that violations of group entitlements are the likely source of attributions of outgroup blame, but there is no reason to suspect that this variable will have an effect on anger, aside from the entitlement-blame-anger pathway. In other words, group entitlements violations should not be correlated with the residuals of the equation predicting anger.

There is also a potential instrument for anger: the respondent's support for violence. Research has shown that the extent to which aggression is believed to be an acceptable option actually influences whether anger is experienced (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009). There are no theoretical explanations that link such beliefs with increased blame of an outgroup, however.[21]

This non-recursive model is specified as a set of two simultaneous equations—one with anger as an endogenous variable and blame as an exogenous variable, and the other with the reverse pattern. The equations also include the two instrumental variables; support for violence is included in the first equation, but not the second; and group entitlement violations is included in the second but not the first (see Figure 5.3). The two equations also include an identical set of control variables.[22]

The results of this simultaneous equation model are shown in Figure 5.3. The effect of blame on anger remains positive and significant. The reverse effect is small, however, and

[21]Note that support for violence would be expected to have an effect on participation intentions, independent of its effect on anger. This does not matter for identifying the two simultaneous equations for anger and blame, however, as participation intentions is not part of this non-recursive block of endogenous variables in Figure 5.3.

[22]These control variables are those included in Models 5.2.1 and 5.3.1.

not significantly differentiable from zero. The results suggest that the covariance between these two variables can be largely accounted for by the first pathway, that of blame on anger. A comparison of a measure of model fit, the Akaike Information Criterion, for both the recursive model (which lacks the feedback loop between anger and blame) and this non-recursive model shows that the recursive is the better fitting model.[23] I thus stick to the simpler recursive model for the remainder of this chapter.

The evidence thus supports the hypothesis that blame of the outgroup triggers anger toward that group. A large number of existing studies, often using experimental methods, have shown the link between blame and anger (Averill 1982; Frijda, Kuipers, and ter Schure 1989; Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Betancourt and Blair 1992). Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) and van Zomeren et al. (2004) have additionally shown that outgroup blame produces intergroup anger. My findings confirm these existing results using data from a real context of intergroup conflict.

I proposed several additional hypotheses for why respondents might express anger to the outgroup. The evidence for these hypotheses will be examined below.

5.3.2. Alternative Explanations for Anger

Realistic Group Competition. Respondents who are more likely to experience conflict with immigrants over material resources are hypothesized to be more angry at this out-group. As outlined earlier, there are three subgroups of Alexandra residents who are partic-ularly likely to experience intergroup relations as conflictual: the unemployed, those living in shacks and hostel rooms, and those working as street traders. As Table 5.3 shows, how-ever, none of these variables exhibit any meaningful association with anger. Anger at the

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[23]The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is a relative measure of model fit that penalizes the log-likelihood by $2k$, where k is the number of estimated parameters. The lower the value of the AIC, the better the fit. AIC for recursive model: -343.9; AIC for nonrecursive model: -345.4

outgroup is thus not a function of competition for resources with that group.[24] The previous section showed that exposure to material threat from the outgroup does not independently increase the likelihood that one participates. It also does not have an indirect effect on participation that operates through the mechanism of anger.

Frustration-Aggression. Contemporary revisions of the frustration-aggression theory (Berkowitz 1989, 1990) hold that frustrations may result in anger as well as aggression. The previous section found that neither poverty nor opposition party support had a significant effect on participation intentions. Table 5.3 shows that neither exhibits a relationship of any significance with anger. There is thus no evidence for the frustration-aggression model when it comes to reactions of intergroup anger.

The Culture of Violence. Support for violence may not only increase the likelihood of taking part in violence, but also the likelihood of even feeling angry. As I described in Chapter 3, one of the appraisals that results in anger is an evaluation of the costs of aggression. To the extent that respondents regard violence as normatively acceptable, they will be likely to evaluate acts of aggression as low in cost, and thus more likely to experience anger. Support for violence does indeed show a significant association with anger in the regression models in Table 5.3.[25] Individuals who do not support violence are thus less likely to experience anger, even holding the intensity of blame constant.

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[24]Unlike the realistic group competition hypotheses for participation intentions, there is no expectation that being unemployed, for example, must be coupled with meeting attendance for an effect to be observed on anger. Meeting attendance mobilizes the desire for confrontation; this is necessary for participation, but not for anger. We are thus interested in the unconditional relationships between these measures of collective incentives and anger.

[25]The standardized effect = .09.

Other Variables. Hearing leaders blame the outgroup for harms to the ingroup also shows a significant effect on anger. This effect is unexpected. In Alexandra, much of the authority enjoyed by the leaders of community policing fora comes from their engagement with the police (Steinberg 2008*b*). Blame from community leaders may thus add an authoritative stamp of approval to violence against foreigners.

5.3.3. Summary

In conclusion, the regression analysis presented in this section confirms that blame of an outgroup is closely related to anger at the group. Blame has by far the largest effect on anger of any variable that was considered here. While some authors argue that anger and blame actually have reciprocal causal relationships, using simultaneous equation models, I find no evidence that anger leads to blame. The anger-participation intentions and blame-anger links have both been supported thus far. In the next section, I move on to consider the determinants of blame, and whether the evidence supports the hypothesized link between entitlement violations and blame.

5.4. The Roots of Blame

5.4.1. Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model

We have seen that individuals who blame the outgroup are particularly likely to feel anger toward that group and be willing to take part in violence against that group. To embed these participants in the contexts in which violence actually occurs, we need to search for the foundations of anger and blame.

To this end, Table 5.4 includes four survey regression of blame. The first model, 5.4.1, includes the group entitlement violations variable, all the other independent variables that were hypothesized to have an effect on blame, and other control variables. The second

model, 5.4.2, disaggregates group entitlement violations into its constituent parts: ingroup and outgroup violations of entitlement. The third model, 5.4.3, breaks these down further into the four basic group endowment and entitlement evaluations. The final model, 5.4.4, returns to the specification used in 5.4.1, but also includes an interaction term between authoritarianism and group entitlement violations.

The entitlement-blame-anger model argues that the roots of blame lie in violations of group entitlement: when the actual positions held by the in- and outgroups are believed to be incongruent with those positions that the in- and outgroups are believed to deserve. Model 5.4.1 shows that group entitlement violations do in fact exhibit a strong, positive association with blame. The standardized effect is .52, which is virtually the same as the bivariate correlation of .54. Blame and group entitlement violations are thus clearly closely related.[26]

The appeal of this measure of group entitlement violations is not primarily its high correlation with blame, but rather that it offers a means of linking attributions of blame to contexts and history. Perceptions of group endowments, on the one hand, are contextual evaluations, and thus shaped in large part by who gets what. Perceptions of group entitlement, on the other hand, are shared beliefs about who ought to get what. These latter perceptions are thus influenced by historical forces (Blumer 1958). In the case of Alexandra, the position and privileges believed to be entitled by locals and foreigners are shaped heavily by the experience of apartheid (see also Landau 2012). The central feature of apartheid was the denial of citizenship, with its attendant rights, to black South Africans. This exclusionary ideology appears to live on in the inequality that Alexandra residents belief should exist

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[26]Blame mediates the effect that group entitlement violation has on anger. The mediation effect is .47 (Sobel test statistic = 7.38, $p < .001$).

Table 5.4. Determinants of Blame

	5.4.1	5.4.2	5.4.3	5.4.4
Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model				
Group entitlement violations	.94 (.07)***			.48 (.13)***
Ingroup violation entitlement		.32 (.08)***		
Ingroup endowments			−.27 (.06)***	
Ingroup entitlements			.09 (.08)	
Outgroup violation entitlement		.60 (.05)***		
Outgroup endowments			.26 (.04)***	
Outgroup entitlements			−.42 (.04)***	
Alternative Explanations				
Blame from peers	.18 (.04)***	.18 (.04)***	.16 (.04)***	.20 (.04)***
Blame from leaders	−.02 (.05)	−.02 (.05)	−.02 (.04)	−.02 (.05)
Aversive emotions about 2008 riots	.02 (.03)	.01 (.02)	.01 (.03)	.03 (.03)
Authoritarianism	.08 (.04)*	.08 (.03)*	.06 (.04)	−.39 (.12)**
Authoritarianism × group entitlement violations				.76 (.20)***
Employment: not in labor force	−.01 (.04)	.00 (.04)	.01 (.04)	−.01 (.04)
Employment: unemployed	−.02 (.02)	−.01 (.02)	−.01 (.02)	−.02 (.02)
Employment: street trader	−.08 (.03)**	−.07 (.03)*	−.06 (.03)*	−.09 (.03)**
Low quality housing	−.01 (.02)	−.01 (.02)	−.02 (.02)	−.02 (.02)
Meetings attended	.07 (.06)	.08 (.06)	.09 (.06)	.08 (.06)
Poverty	.12 (.06)*	.12 (.06)*	.13 (.06)*	.13 (.06)*
Party support: none	.01 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)	.00 (.02)
Party support: opposition	.00 (.04)	.00 (.04)	−.01 (.04)	−.01 (.04)
Control Variables				
National identity	.08 (.05)	.07 (.05)	.07 (.05)	.05 (.05)
Age	−.16 (.08)	−.16 (.08)	−.19 (.09)*	−.14 (.08)
Years in Alexandra	.25 (.09)**	.25 (.09)**	.25 (.09)**	.22 (.08)**
Male	.04 (.02)**	.04 (.02)*	.04 (.02)	.04 (.02)*
Education	−.07 (.04)	−.06 (.05)	−.05 (.05)	−.05 (.05)
Adjusted R^2	.44	.44	.45	.44
Fixed effects: sectors and interview language	✓	✓	✓	✓

Survey linear regressions. Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation. Design-based standard errors in parentheses. $N = 497$. ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$.

between locals and immigrants.[27]

The responses to the open-ended questions about why the attacks of 2008 took place and why they intended to participate (or not participate) in future vividly illustrate this comparison between the status and welfare believed to be enjoyed by each group and the status and welfare believed to be deserved by each. Respondent 10141, for example explains her intention to take part as follows (emphasis added): "I think I will be fighting for *my rights* of getting a job and a house." Like many others, this respondent understands her motives in terms of competition over resources, but this understanding is colored by a view that she deserves a job and a house; she has an entitlement to such resources. Some of the responses go further in suggesting that not only do locals deserve such resources, but that foreigners do not. Respondent 10099 puts it as follows: "nothing belongs to them here, all they have is ours and I hate them with all my heart."

A number of respondents link differing group entitlements to South Africa's transition to democracy, echoing Landau (2012) and Nieftagodien (2012), who emphasize the historical roots of the violence. Respondent 10267, for example, argues that: "we South Africans don't enjoy our democracy because of foreigners; they get everything that we're supposed to get." Respondent 10016 expresses a similar view: "I don't think it is fair for us to share our freedom and democracy with them; our fathers suffered alone to put South Africa where it is today."

This feeling of normative violation infiltrates other perceptions: foreigners do not just take jobs, they undermine wages; they do not just buy government houses, they bribe officials; they are not merely in South Africa to work, but also to commit crime and sell drugs. Respondent 10107 claims that "foreigners act like they are more South African than us;" while respondent 10199 asks: "just imagine feeling like a stranger in your own country."

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[27]See Figure 4.9.

Moving back to the regression results, models 5.4.2 and 3 include disaggregated measures of group entitlement violations. Model 5.4.2 uses separate measures of ingroup and outgroup violations of entitlement. The former is the degree to which the ingroup is getting less than deserved; the latter is the degree to which the outgroup are getting more than deserved. While both show positive and significant associations with blame, the effect of outgroup violations of entitlement is especially strong.[28] The degree to which the outgroup is believed to have exceeded its entitlement thus matters more for blame (and anger) than the extent to which the ingroup is getting less than it deserve.

In Model 5.4.4, these measures are disaggregated further into the four basic components of ingroup and outgroup evaluation. One of these evaluations, the level of ingroup entitlement, shows no significant effect. But the other three evaluations are linked with blame. The level of welfare and status deserved by the outgroup shows a particularly strong (negative) effect on blame.[29]

While existing theories of intergroup conflict, such as relative deprivation theory (Gurr 1970; Runciman 1966), do make use of intergroup evaluations, they tend to focus on three of the four possible intergroup evaluations: the in- and outgroup's actual level of welfare, and the level of welfare that the ingroup believes it is owed. Few scholars have followed the lead of Blumer (1958) and Horowitz (1985) and included the fourth evaluation that I consider: what the other group deserves. As these results show, the level of welfare and status to which the outgroup is entitled is the most important of the set of intergroup evaluations when it comes to attributions of outgroup blame.

The rest of this section examines the evidence for other pathways to blame.

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[28]The standardized coefficient for outgroup violations of entitlement is .44; for the ingroup measure, it is .17.

[29]The standardized effects are, ingroup endowments: $-.20$; ingroup entitlements: .06; outgroup endowments: .22; outgroup entitlements: $-.38$.

5.4.2. Alternative Explanations for Blame

Social Influence. Respondents who hear friends and neighbors blaming foreigners for taking jobs and houses are more likely to attribute blame to foreigners themselves. Exposure to blame from peers has a substantial and significant effect on outgroup blame.[30] This result supports an interpretation that expressions of blame are subject to social conformity, where individuals are influenced by the opinions and beliefs of the majority. While there may be some pressure to express views that are consistent with one's peers, the mechanism here is likely to be informational rather than normative. The frequency with which one hears attributions of blame provides information about the distribution of such beliefs among the peer group. When outgroup blame is common in an individual's social network, then she is likely to attribute blame to foreigners herself.

Elite Mobilization. Community leaders do not appear to be able to influence mass perceptions of outgroup blame. The coefficients for this variable are close to zero. The role that leaders play in organizing violence is thus more circumscribed than it appears in accounts of intergroup violence that imply a strong, even deterministic role for leaders (Snyder 2000; Wilkinson 2004). Rather than "stoking tensions" or "stirring up trouble," the role of leaders may be limited to organizing the focal points for violence, such as meetings or other collective events.[31]

Realistic Group Competition. Individuals who are particularly exposed to competition with immigrants over jobs and houses were hypothesized to be more likely to blame this outgroup for unfairly taking these resources. Yet this hypothesis is not supported. None

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[30]The standardized coefficient (Model 5.4.1) is .22.

[31]I also showed that blame from leaders has an small effect on anger. This may represent an ability to add authoritative approval to aggression against the outgroup.

of the subgroups who are particularly likely to compete with foreigners for resources—the unemployed, those living in shacks and hostel rooms, and informal traders—show an increased level of blame of this outgroup. In fact, informal traders show lower levels of blame compared to people who make their living in other ways.[32] The realistic group competition model thus does not account for any of the three dependent variables of participation intentions, anger, or blame.

Frustration-Aggression. Individuals who experience aversive conditions are hypothesized to be more likely to attribute blame to immigrants. There are two measures of aversive conditions: poverty, and supporting an opposition party. Table 5.4 shows that poverty is indeed associated with higher levels of outgroup blame, holding all other variables constant.[33] There is no such effect from being an opposition supporter. Thus, while poorer individuals are readier to blame immigrants than individuals who live more comfortably, opposition party supporters are no more likely to blame the outgroup than supporters of the ANC. The frustration-aggression model, in sum, appears to help explain the displacement of blame, rather than aggression, onto another group.

Authoritarianism-Threat. Threats to the ingroup have been shown to activate authoritarian predispositions, resulting in a pattern of intolerant and aggressive cognition and behavior (Feldman and Stenner 1997). In particular, I hypothesized that threats and authoritarianism will show a conditional relationship; when an individual both perceives threats to

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[32]This finding may be surprising, considering that traders who attend community meetings express keener intentions to take part in violence against the outgroup. This shows that, to the extent that such collective interests have any relationship with participation, they exert influence through a pathway other than blame and anger.

[33]The standardized regression coefficient is .11.

the ingroup and holds authoritarian values, he will be attribute more blame to the outgroup. The measure of threat is group entitlement violations because it captures both the inequality of group endowments as well as the gaps between what each group has and deserves. An interaction term between group entitlement violations and the authoritarian scale is included in Model 5.4.4. The effect is positive and significant.[34]

The theory of the authoritarian-threat dynamic proposes a more specific pattern of interaction than merely a positive interaction, however. It argues that high levels of threat to the ingroup activate authoritarian values. The implication is that, at low levels of threat, authoritarians do not differ significantly from non-authoritarians in their political attitudes (such as outgroup blame); only when threat is higher does a difference between these two types emerge. To test this more specific set of hypotheses, we need to examine the marginal effects of the interaction terms. The theory is supported to the extent that the marginal effect of authoritarianism is approximately zero when threat is low, and significantly positive when threat is high.

The marginal effects of the interaction terms are displayed graphically in Figure 5.4. The solid line shows the regression effect of authoritarianism on blame, across the observed levels of group entitlement violations. The figure shows that at the lowest observed levels of threat, authoritarianism has a negative effect on blame. Yet there are few observations at the extremes of the group entitlement violation scale. It is preferable to only consider the marginal effects of authoritarianism across the interquartile range of group entitlement violations—from .5 to .7. At the lower quartile, the effect of authoritarianism is not significantly different than zero; at the upper quartile, it is significantly greater than zero. As hypothesized, at low levels of threat, authoritarianism has no effect on blame, while at higher levels, it has a positive effect.

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[34]The standardized effect is .13.

Figure 5.4. Marginal Effects of Authoritarianism on Participation Intentions by Group Entitlement Violation

The top plot displays the marginal effects of authoritarianism on blame (vertical axis) by group entitlement violations (horizontal axis). The smaller, bottom plot shows the distribution of the group entitlement violation measure. All covariates from Model 5.4.4 are included.

Psychoanalytic Projection. The final alternative model of blame to consider is the psychoanalytic theory of projection. This theory argues that individuals unconsciously project negative emotions onto another group; they then blame this scapegoat. As the regression coefficients in Table 5.4 show, respondents who reported experiencing aversive emotions (shame and anxiety) toward the 2008 riots do not, however, express higher levels of outgroup blame. There is thus no support for the theory of projection in this data.

5.4.3. Summary

The section showed that group entitlement violations are strongly related with attributions of outgroup blame. I argued that the appeal of the former is that it permits us to link individual emotions, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies to broad, historically-shaped evaluations

about each groups' endowments and entitlements. Hearing peers blame the outgroup is also associated with greater individual blame of the outgroup. Finally, the aversive conditions of poverty produce a pattern of displaced blame, where foreigners are the targets. To conclude this chapter, I will summarize the main findings.

5.5.   Conclusion: Summary of Findings

This chapter has tested the proposed entitlement-blame-anger model using survey data collected in Alexandra. The four key variables of participation intentions, anger, blame, and violations of group entitlements are all highly intercorrelated, as the model predicts.

I then test each causal link of the model using regression analysis. The assumption of this method is that the causal processes implicit in the model can be tested by controlling for possible confounding factors. The evidence supports the model: anger has a positive effect on intentions to participate in future intergroup violence; blame, a positive effect on anger; and violations of group entitlements, a positive effect on blame.[35] Blame turns out to be even more important than hypothesized, because it also has a large, positive effect on participation intentions. These effects obtain after controlling for background factors such as gender, age, and education, as well as alternative theoretical explanations, including the extent of material competition with the outgroup, exposure to social influence, and beliefs about the availability of selective incentives.

I also use theoretical explanations to argue that none of these effects could be interpreted as a causal effect in the opposite direction to that hypothesized. In the one instance where theory suggested that both causal directions were possible—the association between anger and blame—the use of instrumental variables supports the hypothesis that blame produces anger, and not the reverse.

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[35]See Figure 5.5 for a graphical summary.

Figure 5.5. Results of Entitlement-Blame-Anger Model

Estimated using pseudo maximum likelihood. Covariates from models 5.2.1, 5.3.1, and 5.4.1 included. Effects are standardized.

Perceiving that the ingroup is getting less than their just deserts and that an outgroup is getting more than they are entitled results in the outgroup being blamed for harming the ingroup. The effect of the former is stronger than the latter, indicating that shared beliefs about the rights and privileges deserved by the outgroup are a particularly important, but neglected, component of intergroup conflict and violence. Blame then triggers feeling of intergroup anger, and anger and blame together increase the motivation to attack the other group. Laboratory experiments have already pointed toward the roots of intergroup anger in perceptions that the other group have committed a normative harm, and have already shown the tendency of those experiencing intergroup anger to desire confrontation with that group. This data from Alexandra, where group conflict permeates everyday life, adds external validity to these experimental findings.

This chapter has also presented a number of other significant findings. A summary of the hypotheses is displayed in Table 5.5. Hypotheses that are supported by the evidence presented in this chapter are shown in boldface font.

The social influence model is supported for blame but not for participation intentions. Blaming the outgroup is partly a function of hearing one's peers doing the same. But attending community meetings does not make people readier to take part in intergroup violence. The evidence here therefore suggests that social networks may shape beliefs about

Table 5.5. Summary of Hypothesis Tests

Models	Dependent Variables		
	Participation Intentions	Intergroup Anger	Blame
Entitlement-Blame-Anger	**Anger (H1.1)**	**Blame (H2.1)**	**Group entitlement violations (H3.1)**
Selective Incentives	Opportunities to loot (H1.2)		
Social Influence	Meeting attendance (H1.3)		**Blame from peers (H3.2)**
Elite Mobilization			Blame from leaders (H3.3)
Realistic Group Competition	Unemployed × meeting attendance (H1.4)	Unemployed (H2.2)	Unemployed (H3.4)
	Trader × meeting attendance (H1.5)	Trader (H2.3)	Trader (H3.5)
	Low quality housing × meeting attendance (H1.6)	Low quality housing (H2.4)	Low quality housing (H3.6)
Frustration-Aggression	Poverty (H1.7)	Poverty (H2.5)	**Poverty (H3.7)**
	Supports opposition party (H1.8)	Supports opposition party (H2.6)	Supports opposition party (H3.8)
A Culture of Violence	**Support for violence (H1.9)**	**Support for violence (H2.7)**	
Authoritarianism-Threat			**Authoritarianism × Group entitlement violations (H3.9)**
Psychoanalytic Projection			Aversive emotions to 2008 (H3.10)

The three dependent variables are listed at the head of each column. Explanatory models are listed in the leftmost column. Explanatory variables are listed in the cells of the table with hypothesis numbers in parentheses. Entries in boldface font indicate hypotheses that are supported by the data analysis.

the outgroup more easily than behavior toward that group.

The realistic group competition model argues that a collective incentive is required in addition to peer mobilization to produce collective action against some outgroup. This model is supported for one measure of exposure to realistic competition with the outgroup —working as an informal trader. Informal traders—who stand to benefit if their foreign competitors are too afraid to sell their goods in Alexandra—show a greater willingness to take part in future violence, but only if they attend meetings where their motives can be mobilized. None of the other kinds of realistic intergroup competition show any effect on participation intentions, anger, or blame.

The frustration-aggression model is supported for blame, but not anger or participation intentions. The aversive conditions of being poor is associated with greater blame of the outgroup. The other measure of aversive conditions, supporting an opposition party, does not show any effect, however.

There is strong evidence for the culture of violence model. Respondents' support for violence turns out to have significant effects on both anger and intentions to take part on future intergroup violence. There is thus both a direct effect on participation intentions—those who support violence are less constrained by the normative costs of attacking others—as well as an indirect effect that operates through anger.

Finally, the authoritarianism-threat model is supported. Authoritarianism and group entitlement violations show a significant and positive interaction term in the blame regressions. The evidence also shows, in agreement with the model, that authoritarian predispositions are activated by the threat posed by incongruent group endowments and entitlements. When this threat is at a low level, authoritarianism has no effect on blame; when threat is higher, authoritarian values are associated with greater blame of the outgroup.

In the next chapter I offer some concluding comments and discuss the broader implications of this research.

CHAPTER 6

Conclusion

There is a large scholarly literature on intergroup violence. Most of this research, however, searches for causes at the ecological level. Although necessary, theories at this level of analysis are not sufficient for a full understanding of intergroup violence. They explain why leaders or groups may stand to benefit from an attack against another group, but they do not account for why a multitude of people participate. The question of why people participate, moreover, does not appear to have a straightforward answer because, on the face of it, the dangers and risks of taking part appear to outweigh any private material benefits.

Existing explanations for participation in collective violence in the political science literature include mechanisms such as selective incentives (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), group security (Scacco 2010), and social influence (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Fuji 2009; McDoom 2011). But all these factors appear to underdetermine participation given the risks, the weakness or absence of leadership, and the lack of any substantial material benefit to participants or groups. Instead, I propose an emotional theory of participation in intergroup violence: the entitlement-blame-anger model.

According to this model, participation is motivated by emotional reactions of intergroup anger. Anger is useful in this respect because it shapes both the preference for confrontation and beliefs about the risks of taking part (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Lerner and Keltner 2001). Intergroup anger, in turn, is triggered by appraisals that the out-

group are to blame for some harm suffered by the ingroup. Blame and anger are then rooted in evaluations of group endowments and group entitlements. These are widely-shared beliefs concerning who gets what and who deserves what in a given society. Thus, when group endowments and group entitlements are incongruent, either because the outgroup are enjoying resources to which they are not entitled, or the ingroup getting less than their share, the outgroup is blamed, anger is experienced and large numbers of ingroup members may become willing to take part in violence directed at that group.

I test this model using survey data from Alexandra, a township in Johannesburg, South Africa, where a national wave of violence between locals and African immigrants began in 2008, and where intergroup tensions remain. At the end of the previous chapter, I summarized the evidence offered by this survey data for the entitlement-blame-anger model. Let me quickly recap the highlights. I find that intergroup anger is associated with intentions to take part in another attack on outgroups. As hypothesized, anger is triggered in large part by outgroup blame. Blame also has a direct effect on intentions to take part in future violence against the outgroup, in addition to this indirect effect mediated by intergroup anger. Finally, blame rests in large part on perceptions that the outgroup are getting more than they deserve and the ingroup, less.

6.1. Contributions

This dissertation makes two major contributions. First, it proposes a novel theory for participation in intergroup violence. Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) first developed the concept of intergroup emotions and showed the role this concept plays in conflict. My dissertation goes further by tailoring intergroup emotions theory for the context of violent conflict between ethnic, religious, and communal groups. As such, I propose outgroup blame as the immediate precipitant of intergroup anger. I also link blame and anger to shared beliefs

about group entitlement and group endowment. This permits individual emotions and participation decisions to be embedded in the broader literature on conflict. There is a particular link with theories that emphasize group entitlement (Horowitz 1985), group position (Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Blumer 1958), group status (Petersen 2002), and relative deprivation (Gurr 1970; Runciman 1966).

Second, I test the proposed model using a new individual-level dataset gathered in a setting where intergroup violence is a salient and realistic phenomenon. A few political scientists have already examined the determinants of participation using survey data collected in violence-prone settings (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Scacco 2010). These researchers, however, ignore psychological factors such as intergroup emotions and group entitlements. And political scientists who do consider emotions use macrolevel approaches (Petersen 2002), which cannot separate participants from nonparticipants, or interview methods (Wood 2003), which are not ideal for testing hypotheses about emotions. A third set of scholars, typically social psychologists, use experimental tests of the effects of emotions on intergroup conflict. They do so, however, using artificial laboratory situations, and using Western, student samples (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; van Zomeren et al. 2004). My dissertation is thus the first project to examine emotions and participation in intergroup violence using individual-level data gathered in a setting where such violence is only too real.

6.2. Generalizability

While the theory is tested using data from a native-immigrant conflict in South Africa, it is designed to be of relevance to episodes of violence occurring in other parts of the world and directed against other kinds of outgroups—religious, racial, linguistic, ideological, and so on. Indeed, the main variables of group entitlement evaluations, blame, and anger are

useful partly because they are universal psychological constructs. They can thus provide explanatory leverage even as the cultural and historical backdrops to conflicts vary. Whether the theory indeed generalizes in this respect is an empirical matter that should be verified with future research.

One specific factor that might be thought to limit the generalizability of the study is the extent to which intergroup violence is endemic or, alternatively, novel in a given context. As described, Alexandra experienced intergroup violence in 2008 (as well as partisan violence in the early 1990s). Aside from this episode, mass participation in violence against immigrants has never previously occurred. To what extent can the results be generalized to settings where (1) intergroup tensions exist, but without having previously manifested in violence, or (2) intergroup violence is endemic?

It seems plausible that in situations of chronic conflict, the costs and benefits of taking part become clearer to would-be participants, given the ability to observe the consequences of others' participation. Private incentives, in other words, would seem to play a larger role in decisions to take part or not. As Brass argues, in India, where Hindu-Muslim violence is endemic, an "institutionalized riot system" is said to exist, where numerous actors have discovered means of profiting from riots. Yet despite the possibly more pronounced role of instrumental motivations when it comes to participation in situations where intergroup violence is endemic, the thousands of participants that are observed in these settings points toward a diversity of motivations, including the emotional pathway I have proposed here. And with respect to settings where intergroup tensions have never previously produced violence, it would seem that would-be participants have less idea about the possible benefits and costs of taking part. If anything, an emotional explanation should have even more utility for accounting for participation in these settings than in Alexandra.

6.3. Limitations

Two caveats should be acknowledged and addressed. First, while we are interested in the behavior of participation, my dependent variable is respondents' intentions to participate in the future. This measurement strategy was taken to permit valid measurements of emotions and other independent variables. It is no use, for example, to use actual participation as the outcome and three year old memories of intergroup emotions as the explanation.

Nevertheless, these intentions might not translate readily into actual behavior if respondents underestimate the costs of taking part or the situational factors that push people into conflict. I tested these possibilities using interaction terms. These interactions—of anger and previous participation in intergroup violence, and anger and meeting attendance —are not significant. The effects of anger on participation intentions are thus no lower among respondents who understand the costs of taking part, because they have done it before, or among respondents who are exposed to the mobilizing effects of social networks.

The second caveat concerns the testing of the causal links in the model. I sought to measure and control for as many confounds as possible, including background factors such as gender and age, material conflict with the outgroup, and exposure to the influence of peers and leaders. My cross-sectional, observational data are, however, not perfect for testing causal relationships. Nevertheless, as I argued, experimental methods are either not practical, for ethical reasons, or require a design that entails an artificial laboratory situation, divorced from the real world context of intergroup violence.

In addition, the nature of emotion should increase our confidence that the association that I have demonstrated between anger and participation intentions represents a causal effect of anger on violent behavior. The evolutionary function of anger as a credible deterrent against rapacity and norm violation (Frank 1988; Sell, Tooby, and Cosmides 2009) implies that the emotion cannot be used in a self-interested way, whether to mask one's true

motives, or to serve as a means of accessing some other resource.

6.4. Broader Implications

The primary aim of this dissertation is to contribute to our understanding of why thousands of people take part in collective violence against another group. My research, however, has two further implications: for the macrolevel literature on conflict, and for the political participation more generally. I begin with the former.

While I try to answer the question of why people participate in intergroup violence, my findings perhaps also shed some light on the bigger question of why intergroup violence occurs at all. In particular, the entitlement-blame-anger model intersects both with the body of research that focuses on the mobilizing role of leaders, as well as the literature that emphasizes group-level motivations.

Although I do not situate my research at this level of analysis, my findings are consistent with the idea that intergroup violence requires mobilization by leaders (e.g. Wilkinson 2004). In particular, my research suggests two methods by which leaders can organize a mob to attack another group. First, leaders may be able to provide some authoritative support for violence[1] by linking the outgroup to some alleged normative violation. I find that hearing leaders scapegoat the outgroup in this fashion increases levels of intergroup anger. Second, although I show that anger at the outgroup increases the intention to take part in future violence, even widespread anger is not sufficient for an attack on the outgroup to take place. At a minimum, there also needs to be a focal point to coordinate the intentions of so many disparate individuals. Leaders would be well-placed to provide such a focal point by, for example, organizing a meeting or march, where where, among the collective, passions

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[1]In Alexandra, this authority is derived from the close relationship that leaders of community policing fora have with police. In other contexts, it may stem from different sources, such as holding elected office.

can spill over into violence.

My research also resonates with the broader literature that emphasizes group level motivations for intergroup violence. One such theory holds that competition between two groups over material resources leads to violence between these groups (Dancygier 2010; Olzak 1992). Another theory argues that the relative deprivation produced by a gap between ingroup endowments and expectations results in conflict (Gurr 1970; Runciman 1966). My findings suggest, however, that neither realistic group competition, nor relative deprivation is sufficient for intergroup violence to occur. What also matters is the belief that the other group has no right to take resources that "belong" to the ingroup. Indeed, my evidence shows that these normative evaluations of "who deserves what" are more important than the brute facts about "who gets what." Thus, according to my entitlement-blame-anger model, labor market competition may result in intergroup violence, but primarily because it produces a sense of normative violation. And while fraternal relative deprivation might also be linked to fraternal violence, much of the force of this link depends upon beliefs about the entitlements of the other group.

A second further implication of my dissertation is for political participation. Although I focus on the question of why people take part in violence against other groups, my model could be adapted for confrontations against the state. If one expands the concept of group to include the state,[2] group entitlements and intergroup anger can be used to explain participation in protests, riots, and rebellion. Thus, if the authorities are believed to have acted in a way that exceeds their entitlements, the ingroup may perceive a normative violation, feel anger, and be eager for a confrontation.[3]

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[2]Such a usage is fully consistent, by the way, with Mackie and Smith's intergroup emotions theory (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000).

[3]The most likely point of contact with the authorities is the police. The 1992 Los Angeles riots, 2005 French riots, and 2011 English riots, for example, were all linked to excessive behavior by police.

This extension of the model to aggressive political participation (Muller 1979) would also help extend the literature on emotions and politics. The concept of emotion is currently thriving in studies of American political behavior. It has also been used by qualitative scholars of conflict in comparative politics (Petersen 2002; Wood 2003). However there appears to be considerable scope and utility in using emotion in quantitative studies of comparative political behavior.

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