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From Crime to Punishment:

Moral Violations and the Social Function of Emotion

A Dissertation

Presented in

Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

By

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May, 2014

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Biography

The author was born in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, May 30, 1976. He graduated from Ephrata Senior High School, received a Bachelor of Applied Science degree in Electrical Engineering from the University of Waterloo in 1999, a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology from the same university in 2001, and a Master of Arts degree in Forensic Psychology from John Jay College in 2007.

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Abstract

Punishments that are issued by the criminal justice system can enhance factors related to recidivism or contribute to offender rehabilitation. Investigating the ecological element of public attitudes toward punishment can inform efforts of second-order change for reducing recidivism and improving offender and community wellbeing (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Kelly, 1966; Watzlawick, Weakland, & Fisch, 1974).

The form and duration of punishments can be influenced by the goals that punishments are meant to achieve. Punishment goals include retribution, incapacitation, individual deterrence, general deterrence, rehabilitation, and restorative justice. Each of the goals can lead to sanctions that impact offender behavior differently yet substantive predictors of when the different goals are pursued have yet to be discovered.

An important stakeholder in the operations of the criminal justice system is the general public, and public opinions regarding sentencing practices can impact the punishments that are issued (Roberts, Stalans, Indermaur, & Hough, 2003). This paper will whether the moral characteristics of crimes along with social functional accounts of emotion can predict public support for the goals of punishment.

Social functionalist accounts of emotion suggest that different emotions are elicited by appraisals that are made of events in the environment. Emotions then lead to different action tendencies for responding to the appraisals. The action tendencies are goal oriented and may take the form of punishment goals.

The appraisal of a crime by the public can include an assessment of its moral qualities. Moral Foundations Theory suggests there are five categories of moral concern: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity (Haidt & Graham, 2007). This paper examined whether public appraisals of the five types of moral violation predict three appraisals of the offender: whether the offender committed an immoral act, whether the offender was morally incompetent, and whether the offender possessed an immoral nature. These secondary appraisals were then used to predict five emotions that people may experience when being informed of a crime: anger, fear, contempt, sympathy, and disgust. Finally, the emotions, each with their own goal-oriented action tendency, were used to predict the goals of punishment desired by the public.

Predicted relations between the appraisals, emotions, and punishment goals were combined to form a path model. To test the model, 546 participants completed an online survey and a path analysis of the model was conducted. A majority of the predicted relations were significant; however, the model did not fit the data. Additional analyses were then performed to develop a model that did fit the data.

Violations of authority and purity moral principles indirectly predicted support for all the punishment goals. Furthermore, while the appraisal of an immoral act lead to anger and support for retribution, the appraisal of an immoral nature lead to many emotions and support for a variety of punishment goals. Finally, fear did not predict support for any punishment goal, and sympathy for the offender predicted support for rehabilitation and restorative justice.

The findings have implications for theory, interventions, and policy. The study shows that public attitudes toward criminal punishment can be predicted by moral concerns and emotions. Interventions could be developed to reduce the appraisal of an immoral nature, which was a strong predictor for the punitive punishment goals. Finally, the study presents ideas for how policies can be changed to reduce the size of the prison population.

Punishments are necessary for responding to crime, but different punishments produced by different goals can differentially impact recidivism rates. Determining how perceptions of crime can lead to public support for various punishment goals can help inform systems change efforts at improving sentencing practices.

From Crime to Punishment: Moral Violations and the Social Function of Emotion

Social behavior and social systems are based heavily on shared norms that determine appropriate and inappropriate ways to conduct oneself and interact with others. Social systems sustain shared collections of norms by having methods for shaping and correcting individual behavior. For every norm, in fact, there is a corresponding understanding of what may happen if the norm is violated (Clark & Gibbs, 1965). Well functioning social systems with norm enforcement allow individuals a degree of predictability and safety and provide efficiency in social interactions. Violations of social norms may harm individual victims but also undermine normative values and breach the overarching, communal social order (Rucker, Polifroni, Tetlock, & Scott, 2004; Vidmar, 2000). Even people not directly involved in a norm violation can experience a desire for the violator to receive some form of reprimand (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Penalties for norm violations can be issued rapidly by fellow members of the social system and can range in severity from mild criticism to ostracism. Such sanctions serve a variety of purposes that include influencing the violator's behavior, redressing a wrong, and reaffirming the social order. For some of the more serious norm violations, a criminal justice system is used by a social system to determine culpability and to issue sanctions to the group's offenders.

A criminal justice system enforces laws for the protection of individuals and society. The American criminal justice system consists of three branches: law enforcement, the courts, and the correctional system. After a law is broken, the courts issue a sanction to the offender which is then carried out by the correctional

system. Annual expenditures to operate the country's criminal justice systems (at local, state, and federal levels) reached 195.3 billion dollars in 2003 with the correctional branch costing 63.4 billion dollars (Hughes, 2006). At year end in 2010, 7.1 million people in the U.S., or 2.3% of its population, were completing sanctions within the adult correctional systems (Glaze, 2011).

One purpose of punishing offenders is to reduce criminal behavior, but the outcomes of the criminal justice system may not always be in line with this objective. Following release from prison, 68% of offenders are rearrested and 47% are reconvicted of a crime (Hughes & Wilson, 2002). Lengthy terms of imprisonment can reduce an offender's job opportunities, instill a criminal identity, and increase criminal associations (Baillargeon, Hoge, & Penn, 2012; Pager, 2003; Thomas, Peterson, & Cage, 1981) all of which have been associated with increased recidivism (Astone, 1982; Chu, Daffern, Thomas, & Lim, 2012; Fischer, Shinn, Shrout, & Tsemberis, 2008; Fite et al., 2012; Martin, Cloninger, & Guze, 1978; Nikulina, Widom, & Czaja, 2011; Vaux & Ruggiero, 1983). On the other hand, evidence-based, rehabilitation programs are available to the criminal justice system that have been associated with reduced recidivism (Coulter & VandeWeerd, 2009; Jason et al., 2008; Liau et al., 2004; Seave, 2011; Van Stelle, Mauser, & Moberg, 1994).

Reducing recidivism can strengthen communities and improve the wellbeing of released offenders. However, the criminal justice system has varying influences on recidivism. Community psychology theory can contribute to

understanding the operations of the criminal justice system and improve its effectiveness in reducing crime.

Community Psychology Theories and Values

Promoting individual wellbeing and preventing social, emotional, and behavioral problems are goals embedded in community psychology values (Dalton, Elias, & Wandersman, 2007; Jason & Glenwick, 2002). An individual's wellbeing is at risk when convicted of a crime as public resources are funneled through the criminal justice system toward the punishment of the individual, usually by depriving the individual's fundamental right to freedom (De Keijser, van der Leeden, & Jackson, 2002).

Understanding the operations of the criminal justice system and its treatment of offenders can be improved by understanding its ecology. Ecological perspectives of social and justice issues consider how individuals, groups, and settings form dynamic and interrelated systems (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Kelly, 1966; Trickett, 1984). While the criminal justice system can impact the wellbeing of an offender, and influence either offender reform or recidivism, the justice system itself is influenced by attitudes held within the general public. Public opinions regarding punishment are important for establishing criminal justice policies. While it is argued that penal law and practices should not be dictated by public attitudes (Oswald, Hupfeld, Klug, & Gabriel, 2002), punishment statutes and the practices of judicial and correctional systems do need to consider public opinion. Large discrepancies between public attitudes and governmental practices can reduce public trust and increase contempt toward criminal justice authorities

and institutions (Nadler, 2005; Robinson & Darley, 1995; Tyler, 1990). As such, many penal policies in the United States and other countries are indeed influenced by public opinion and even by government officials' misperceptions of public opinion (Roberts et al., 2003; Tonry, 2001). For example, state political orientation, based on public polls, predicts length of sentence for crimes against persons (i.e., rape, assault, and robbery) with conservatism being positively related to longer sentences (Bowers & Waltman, 1993).

One public response to offenders is an opposition to offender reintegration into the community. For example, efforts to establish group homes for people with past deviancies have experienced substantial neighborhood opposition and municipality interference (Jason et al., 2008). Yet developing social capital and a sense of community have been shown to reduce violent acts and other forms of antisocial behavior (Schofield et al., 2012; Zeldin, 2004). For example, experiencing neighborhood and family support have been related to lower levels of individual delinquency (Vieno, Nation, Perkins, Pastore, & Santinello, 2010). Public appraisals of offenders that include perceiving offenders as dangerous or as otherwise objectionable figures may increase a public desire for longer periods of incarceration that can sever important social ties.

Investigating the public's views of crime and punishment can help in understanding the criminal justice system's ecology and would therefore be a step toward effectively implementing second-order change. Second-order, or systems, change addresses the systems and structures surrounding a social issue and is distinguished from first-order change which focuses on the individuals most

directly associated with the issue (Foster-Fishman, Nowell, & Yang, 2007; Watzlawick et al., 1974). First-order change is a frequent approach taken towards crime. When thinking about crime, people generally focus on how criminals should be dealt with or on the individual psychology of criminal behavior. This can be seen in research demonstrating how people consider a disciplinary punishment for an offender when asked to provide a response to a crime, and only consider the victim, surrounding community, or rehabilitation when instructed to do so (Gromet & Darley, 2009).

The theories of community psychology suggest that understanding ecological systems and implementing second-order change are advantageous to achieving its values of promoting individual and community wellbeing. As public attitudes can influence criminal justice practices, which in turn can increase either offender recidivism or rehabilitation, understanding how the general public's opinions regarding criminal punishment are formed can help develop effective methods to improve the justice system and reduce criminal activity. This paper will therefore investigate the psychological underpinnings of the public voice regarding crime and punishment, and by doing so, contribute to the knowledge capital of community psychology.

Understanding Crime and Punishment: Morality and the Social Function of Emotion

Previous studies have investigated how certain characteristics of crimes can affect public attitudes toward punishment goals. For example, Carlsmith (2006) found the magnitude of the harm caused by a crime is related to a desire

for retribution, and the frequency of a crime is related to deterrence. Studies have also shown the perception of a crime's seriousness is positively related to the severity of the assigned punishment (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Warr, Meier, & Erickson, 1983), and that a crime's seriousness is predicted by its perceived wrongfulness (Rosenmerkel, 2001; Warr, 1989). The wrongful nature of a behavior is important for deciding if a behavior is a criminal behavior, and for determining an appropriate punishment, but the concept of wrongfulness requires further exploration.

Morality encompasses considerations of what is right and wrong. When principles and codes of conduct include a moral connotation, they are understood to apply universally to all people and to weigh in on diverse situations (Kant, 1785/1959; Turiel, 1983). Morality allows for individual human dignity and self-esteem to be enhanced (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997) and for groups to survive and prosper as single units (Haidt, 2012). Evolved social norms, traditions, and institutions combine with innate psychological mechanisms to form moral systems that function to moderate individual selfish interests and to allow for people to live within communal settings (Haidt, 2012; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Immoral acts need to be prevented and possibly punished while moral acts are encouraged through social and psychological rewards. A society's moral order is embedded within its more general social order and sustained in part by the functional role of emotions (Haidt, 2003; Shweder et al., 1997).

Functionalist accounts of emotion propose that cognitive appraisals of events and objects lead to the onset of distinct emotions which carry with them

different states of behavioral readiness for responding to the event. Lazarus (1966, 1991) and Weiner (1985, 1986) have proposed two stages of cognitive appraisal. During the primary stage, an event is determined to be relevant to personally desired goals and is appraised as being favorable or unfavorable with respect to those goals. Perceiving the violation of a personally endorsed moral principle, for example, is a primary appraisal. During the secondary appraisal process, causal factors for the event are considered along with considerations about the future. The secondary appraisal stage produces specific emotions, each having a particular action tendency oriented toward achieving a particular goal.

Morality underlies the wrongfulness of crimes. Perceiving a crime, and the moral violations within it, often leads to appraisals of the offender and considerations of the offender's future behavior. Different appraisal outcomes produce different emotions and with them come different goals. It is speculated that the goals of punishment desired of the criminal justice system when a crime occurs are based on the action tendencies experienced in the public when moral violations are perceived and emotions are experienced.

Recent developments in moral psychology have identified five categories of moral principles, which can be violated to different degrees by different crimes. This paper will investigate how primary appraisals of which moral principles are violated during a crime predict secondary appraisals about the offender. The secondary appraisal variables will be the degree to which the offender committed an immoral act, the moral incompetence of the offender, and the immoral nature of the offender. The secondary appraisals will then be used to predict anger,

contempt, disgust, sympathy, and fear. Finally, the emotional states will be used to predict which goals of punishment are desired.

Defining Morality

The concept of morality stretches from daily life events to cultural and religious icons. While most of morality's psychological and social processes progress unnoticed, when a particular moral characteristic is explicit in a person's behavior patterns or nature, we say they have a virtue or are virtuous. If a person's moral behavior is extensive enough or that person is otherwise endowed with having a notable moral nature, they may be considered a saint. Vices, on the other hand, refer to consistent and mild immoral behavior patterns. More extensive immoralities with possible connections to an agent's nature can bring the label "sinner" and onward toward "demon" and "devil" (Brandt & Reyna, 2011).

Values, like morals, can influence attitudes and motivations and guide behavior and decision-making (for a review, see Rohan, 2000). Values can be differentiated from morals, however, in how they apply to judgments of behavior. The importance of values and their implications for judgments of goals and behavior are not always universal but rather are acknowledged to be relevant to the individual or individual social group who holds them (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1994). Schwartz (1992), for example, delineated 10 primary values found to exist in a variety of cultures. The function of values, similar to morals, is to orient individuals and groups toward desirable objectives. Differences in the priority of values across parties, however, do not generate the same judgments of right and wrong as in the case of differences in moral behavior. Schwartz's value

of self-direction, for example, characterized by independence and individualism, has relatively high importance in Western cultures, while the value of conformity, which includes obedience and self-restraint, is given more emphasis by Eastern cultures. While these values and their corresponding value systems shape goals and guide behavior within the respective cultures, the individualism or collectivism of the other culture is not necessarily seen as immoral and in need of correction for the moral welfare of its people. Even within cultures there exist individual differences in value priorities yet these differences are not always attached to judgments of right or wrong. The value of stimulation, for example, varies in importance across individuals, but whether a person prefers a stable, daily routine with little excitement and novelty is not considered a moral issue with moral implications.

Values, or "conceptions of the desirable" (Kluckhohn, 1951; Schwartz, 1999), can acquire a moral quality, however, when their relativity becomes more disturbing, and the value-based misbehaviors of others generate views of right and wrong. Values can be considered moral values when their guidelines for conduct and decision-making are to be endorsed by people in general and are no longer seen as local conventions or to be left to individual preferences. Schwartz's value of benevolence, for example, which includes helpfulness, honesty, and loyalty, functions for many as a moral value by guiding their own conduct as well as their moral evaluations of others.

Much of the decision-making, goal selection, and attitude formation that goes on in the moral domain is performed with little or no conscious awareness

(Lapsley & Hill, 2008), and while people can easily experience clear moral opinions about whether something is right or wrong, they often have difficulty explaining the genesis of their opinions and are left with a consciously articulated, but intuitively derived, it's wrong "because it's wrong" conclusion (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, Koller, Dias, 1993). On other occasions, moral concerns become part of a person's self-concept, producing for him or her a conscious moral identity (for a review, see Hardy & Carlo, 2005). The sense of self as a moral agent paired with particular moral principles and goals can influence conscious deliberation and even drive the pursuit of long-term moral objectives.

Development of Moral Psychology

Past centuries of Western philosophy have influenced psychological conceptions of the content and process of morality. During the 18th century, the Age of Enlightenment brought a cultural movement of advancing knowledge through scientific inquiry and improving society through reason. The paradigm was then incorporated into a process of moral decision-making advocated by Immanuel Kant, who argued that moral judgments and actions should be determined by reason alone and that moral responsibilities only apply to rational agents (Kant, 1785/1959). What the end goals of moral systems should be, or effectively what constitutes the moral domain, was shaped by philosophers such as John Stuart Mill (1859/2003) who argued that societies and states should pursue a form of utilitarianism that maximizes liberty and wellbeing for all individuals. The rationalist views of Kant and the utilitarian arguments of Mill both describe how societies and individuals ought to function and became a part

of Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969) influential psychological theory of how moral judgment develops.

Kohlberg proposed a stage model describing how children develop morally as their reasoning develops. The model included a hierarchy of moral rules. Children would move up the ladder as they resolved moral dilemmas by considering reciprocity, loyalty, then legal rules and laws, and would reach the most advanced stage once their reasoning was based on considerations of human rights and welfare. The model received support in studies on Western populations with liberals reaching higher stages than conservatives, though conservatives would match the performance of liberals when instructed to respond in a liberal manner (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983).

A different model of the moral domain, one removing the hierarchy of moral considerations by positioning multiple moral concerns alongside considerations of justice and human rights, was developed by Shweder and colleagues (Shweder et al., 1997). The research team conducted an exploratory study with residents of Bhubaneswar, Orissa, India, who were mostly Brahmans. Thirty-nine scenarios depicting potential violations of codes of conduct were developed based on ethnographic knowledge of local family and community customs. Participants were interviewed for explanations as to why the depicted behavior was wrong. An inductive iterative classification of the interview content produced 16 thematic categories of rationales used in establishing moral judgments of the scenarios. Cluster analysis and stepwise discriminant analysis were then used to identify three overarching clusters of moral considerations

called the "big three" of moral ethics. The first, the ethic of autonomy, includes considerations of harm, rights, and justice. An individual is seen as an agent with personal preferences and entitled to personal safety, freedom, and wellbeing. Through the ethic of community, a person is considered a part of an interdependent collective. The identity, standing, and integrity of the group guide the ethics of community, and judgments of moral acts and violations are based on considerations of duty, loyalty, interdependency, and roles within social hierarchies. The third ethic, the ethic of divinity, conceptualizes a person as a spiritual entity with an elevated status within a sacred order. Degradation and defilement of the spiritual aspects of a person through sin or pollution are prevented by the ethics of divinity.

A single event could violate any one or all three of the sets of ethics. For the Hindu sample in the study described by Shweder for example, a father opening and reading the mail of his son was a particularly high violation of the ethics of community, while a boy sleeping in the same bed as his mother until he was 12 years old was evaluated as an equal violation of all three sets of ethics.

Within the Hindu notion of morality, each of the three sets of ethics is necessary for enhancing human dignity and self-esteem (Shweder et al., 1997). Without any one, human wellbeing would suffer. At the same time, however, it is not always possible that the benefits offered by the three sets can be maximized simultaneously within a society. The ethical categories themselves may even conflict with each other leaving individuals to struggle over moral dilemmas. Furthermore, not all individuals will experience the same dilemmas as the moral

importance of each of the three categories varies from person to person. In the West, for example, people who endorse liberal views generally rate the ethic of autonomy as more important than people who endorse conservative views, which led to liberals performing better on Kohlberg's autonomy-centered model of moral development (Graham et al., 2011). Conservatives, on the other hand, consider the ethic of divinity as a more important moral principle than liberals do (Graham et al., 2011). Cultures also play a role as they can promote the ethics to different degrees, potentially neglecting one or exaggerating another as they each construct their own "social order as a moral order" in different ways (Shweder et al., 1997, p. 141).

For Western and particularly liberal cultures, behaviors that are harmful to another person are given particular attention as moral violations. To test the existence of Shweder's three ethics, and specifically to determine whether actions could be harmless yet still considered morally wrong, Haidt, Koller, and Dias (1993) asked adults in the U.S. and Brazil for their views on five seemingly harmless yet potentially offensive actions. The "harmless-offensive" actions included events such as a family eating their dog after it was killed in a car accident and a woman cutting up a flag and using the pieces to clean the bathroom. After hearing the scenarios, participants were asked questions that tap into human morality: is the action wrong; did the action hurt anyone; and why is the action wrong or OK. Participants were interviewed in three cities (two in Brazil and one in the U.S.) and were divided into high and low socio-economic status (SES) groups, creating six samples. The percentage of participants in the

samples who thought the actions were wrong ranged from 40% to 91% while the percentage of participants who thought the actions hurt someone ranged from 28% to 51%.

Reasons provided by the participants for why the actions were wrong were coded using Shweder's three categories of moral ethics (Shweder et al., 1997). Reasons relating to harm, rights, justice, or freedom were assigned to the autonomy category. Reasons referring to respect, loyalty, duty, or authority were coded as community reasons. Explanations with reference to disgustingness, beastliness, dignity, or sin were counted as divinity violations. The majority of responses fit one of the categories. Reasons relating to autonomy were used 31% of the time, reasons relating to community 24% of the time, and judgments based on divinity concepts were given 12% of the time. The remaining responses, 33%, were either circular by stating the action was wrong "because a person should not [do the action]" or did not clearly fit one of the categories provided in Shweder's model. High-SES groups were more likely to judge the acts based on reasons related to autonomy and less likely to use community or divinity based explanations. Also, participants in the U.S. were also more likely to make autonomy based judgments, but no differences in community or divinity explanations were found between cities.

The studies described above found the autonomy, community, and divinity categories of ethics to be applied by people across SES levels and in different cities and countries. At the same time, the category of ethics used to judge an action varied in frequency across SES levels and city showing that the relative

importance of the three categories can vary across groups. The intergroup variance in importance of moral ethics suggests that social and cultural factors can influence the moral judgments of individuals. Considering that individual judgment is malleable, altering the messages of media and other directors of culture can alter the psychological moral judgments of the public. Affecting moral judgment may be one means of affecting the punishment goals desired by the public, and therefore one avenue for implementing second-order change and achieving the community psychology goals of reducing recidivism and improving offender and community wellbeing (Dalton et al., 2007; Watzlawick et al., 1974).

To further understand the psychology of morality, the model proposed by Kohlberg (1969) needs to be modified by expanding the moral domain beyond conceptions of harm and fairness. The studies described above showed that people made moral judgments based not only on individual rights and wellbeing but also on preserving the structures and functions of human groups and on protecting the dignity and stature of the sacred and the divine. As moral violations require responses from the surrounding community in order to protect the moral order, and various goals of punishment guide the sentencing decisions of the justice system, perhaps a more detailed model of morality is needed to understand the varied goals of punishment. While Schweder's three ethics of autonomy, community, and divinity expanded the moral domain, a more extensive taxonomy of moral concerns has since been developed and is provided by Moral Foundations Theory.

Expanding the Moral Domain: Moral Foundations Theory

The moral domain consists of all the constructs that bring forth moral considerations and judgments, all the views of right and wrong that go beyond individual preferences for one's own life or community and are applied universally. To explore the moral domain, Shweder and colleagues used cluster analysis of moral arguments provided during discourse and determined the moral domain consisted of three categories of moral concern: autonomy, community, and divinity. Considering that morality might have an evolutionary basis, Haidt and Joseph (2004) surveyed several comprehensive works on morality and values that looked at various cultures and other primates, and analyzed the selected works for common themes. Shweder's (Shweder et al., 1997) descriptions were considered along with Fiske (1991), Schwartz and Bilsky (1990), Brown (1991), and de Waal's (1996) description of the social lives of chimpanzees.

The review produced five categories that the researchers called moral foundations. The names of the five foundations were modified by Haidt and Graham (2007) to become harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. Though Haidt and Joseph (2004) did not intend to confirm Shweder's three ethics in particular, the five moral foundations are closely aligned with these three categories. The harm and fairness foundations correspond closely to Shweder et al.'s (1997) ethic of autonomy, the ingroup and authority foundations are similar to the ethic of community, and the purity foundation includes moral concerns similar to those within the ethic of divinity.

Haidt theorized that each moral foundation is based on different psychological mechanisms that evolved over time to promote individual

wellbeing and group functioning. The foundations produce intuitive views and judgments that sustain different aspects of a moral order. The set of five foundations, along with their evolutionary backdrops and roles in shaping moral systems, is called Moral Foundations Theory.

Haidt and Graham (2007) speculate the harm foundation emerged through evolution, beginning with the maternal concern for the suffering of one's own offspring and since extending to a general dislike in seeing suffering in others. The foundation encourages the virtues of kindness and compassion and discourages the vices of cruelty and aggression. People who rated the harm foundation higher as an important factor in their moral judgments also scored higher on scales of empathy and benevolence and had more positive attitudes toward "caring" groups such as nurses, pacifists, and vegetarians (Graham et al., 2011). Participants were also more likely to disapprove of animal testing, the death penalty, and the use of torture (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012).

The fairness foundation evolved to allow unrelated individuals to mutually benefit from exchanging favors, goods, and services. The psychological mechanisms generating the foundation lead to judgments that favors should be returned and that cheating is wrong. The foundation is primarily found across cultures in the form of proportionality, wherein an act between individuals should be returned in kind, but has also been developed to certain degrees to include social justice concepts of equality. The fairness foundation can be seen in the behavior of students who worked on a proofreading task (Adams, 1963). When

the students felt they were being overpaid, they worked harder in order to reduce the perceived inequity between their lack of qualifications and the pay they were to receive for the task. Fairness means people should contribute to what they receive or offer something in return and may account for attitudes toward welfare. People who believe success in life should be based on one's exerted efforts are less inclined to support welfare (Bowles & Gintis, 2000; Fong, 2001).

The ingroup foundation comes from a long history of people living in small groups. Groups with members who could identify and trust each other and who would even be willing to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the group functioned well and prospered. The ingroup foundation's psychological mechanisms promote the celebration of ingroup heroes and condemnation for those seen as disloyal to the group, especially in the context of a conflict with another group. People who reported the ingroup foundation as being particularly important for them also reported family and national security as being more important and reported more negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants (Graham et al., 2011) as well as more support for national defense spending (Koleva et al., 2012). People who score higher on measures of the ingroup foundation also tend to report higher identification with their favorite sports team (Winegard & Deaner, 2010).

The authority foundation is based on the advantage of having group members who can resolve disputes between other group members, can provide guidance, and can ensure that order exists within the group. The mechanisms of this moral foundation require authority figures to provide good leadership and to

promote the wellbeing of their group and subordinates. The foundation also requires followers to respect and obey the group's authority figures. Aspects of the authority foundation are evident in views of civil responsibilities and rights. Coffe and Bolzendahl (2011) asked democrats, republicans, and independents to rate how important 10 behaviors were for a person "to be a good citizen." Ratings were made on a scale of 0 to 6 and all three groups rated "always obey laws" above a five. Items such as voting in elections, helping other people in your country, and understanding the views of other citizens received lower scores. Coffe and Bolzendahl also asked about the obligations of government authorities. An item stating politicians should take into account the views of citizens before making decisions also scored above five for all three groups. People for whom the authority foundation is particularly important tend to score higher on Right-Wing Authoritarianism and on scales measuring the importance of social order, respect for tradition, honoring parents, and obedience (Graham et al., 2011).

The moral foundation of purity and sanctity evolved from the adaptive reaction to stimuli that could threaten the health of the body such as rotting foods, potentially disease ridden vomit, and creatures that may not avoid eating or touching such items (e.g., maggots). The tendencies of the purity mechanisms to protect the body extended to include feelings about the human spirit, to admire high culture, piety, and chastity, and to admonish disgraceful behaviors and carnal passions. The mechanisms of this foundation are also related to feelings of discomfort or disgust for physical and psychological abnormalities in others. The more the purity foundation is reported to be an important factor in moral

judgments, the more a person is likely to be opposed to cloning and stem cell research, as well as pornography and sexual relationships between people of the same sex (Koleva et al., 2012). People were also more likely to value self-discipline and religious involvement, to have favorable attitudes toward spiritual people and virgins, and to have negative attitudes toward prostitutes and people with tattoos or piercings (Graham et al., 2011).

The individual experience of morality involves judgments of good and bad, right and wrong, and includes codes of behavior that apply to everyone. Moral violations are prevented and punished by moral systems made up of a group's innate moral mechanisms and its social norms and institutions. More serious moral violations may be considered crimes and punished by a region's criminal justice system. The punishment issued for a crime may not just depend on the extent of the moral violation, or generalized "seriousness" of the crime, however, but may also depend on the type of moral violation that occurred in the crime. Moral Foundations Theory provides a taxonomy of the moral domain by proposing five moral foundations: harm, fairness, ingroup, authority, and purity. Different crimes can violate different moral principles, and it is possible the punishment goal desired by the public may vary depending on the type of moral violation. This paper will therefore position the appraisal of moral violations, using the five moral foundations, as the first link in the chain that connects crime to goals of punishment.

Forming general moral appraisals, and making moral judgments, however, is sometimes easier for people to do than to explain (Haidt, 2001; Haidt et al.,

1993). The statement, "I don't know why it's wrong, but it's wrong" is a platform often provided by people during morality debates (but is nonetheless an important one to social systems for estimating consensus and establishing moral orders). To understand the connection between crime, moral judgment, and punishment, it is therefore necessary to explore intuitive processes.

Moral Judgments: Automatic, Intuitive Processes

Much of the research in decision making has focused on conscious reasoning and reflection processes as the systems that generate a person's conclusions and judgments. Many researchers have begun to emphasize unconscious information processing systems, which can include emotional elements, as the principle factors that enable judgment. Zajonc (1980) argued that affective judgments precede cognitive operations in determining preferences, attitudes, and decisions. Furthermore, reactions with an affective basis are made sooner and produce greater confidence than cognitive judgments. Greenwald and Banaji (1995) suggested that much of social behavior, including attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes, is heavily influenced by past experiences operating through implicit mechanisms that are outside of the actor's awareness. Bargh and Chartrand (1999) went a little further suggesting the conscious and intentional abilities are very limited and the vast majority of judgments, emotions, and behaviors are produced by unconscious mechanisms, or they would not occur at all.

Damasio (1994) developed a neurological account of unconsciously driven decision making with his somatic marker hypothesis. According to the hypothesis,

life experiences produce pleasant and unpleasant feelings that may be felt strongly when the whole emotion system is engaged including the body and the somatic experiences it provides. Characteristics of a life experience are stored in memory along with the associated pleasant or unpleasant emotional state, or somatic marker. When contemplating a new decision, the characteristics of the decision that are similar to the characteristics of past experiences trigger the somatic states associated with the past experiences to a mild degree. The somatic markers culminate and produce for the decision maker positive or negative "gut feelings" toward the different options being contemplated in the decision task. With repeated experiences and repeated use of their somatic markers, the body proper (i.e., from the neck down) is removed from the process and the unconscious mind produces for the thinker favorable or unfavorable intuitions regarding decision scenarios. Studying participants with brain damage, Damasio found evidence that the ventromedial region of the prefrontal cortex (VMPC) is central to amalgamating somatic markers and presenting intuitions to the conscious mind. Koenigs and colleagues (Koenigs et al., 2007) found patients with damage to the VMPC applied a consistent utilitarian formula to resolve moral dilemmas whereby they chose the option that would maximize overall wellbeing and minimize overall harm and did not waver from this approach even when the option required the sacrifice of a human life. Those without VMPC damage experienced moral emotions that objected to aspects of the utilitarian option making the moral dilemma more difficult to resolve.

Haidt (2001) developed a social intuitionist model of moral judgment wherein intuitions lead to moral judgments. Conscious moral reasoning may then follow an intuitively derived judgment and be used to develop and articulate moral arguments for the purpose of convincing others of a judgment's validity, but the conscious reasoning is not necessarily tied to the unconscious mechanisms that produced the judgment. The social aspect of the model depicts the effects that consciously produced moral arguments can have on the intuitions of others as they generate their own moral judgments. The bidirectional relationship between intuitive moral judgments and the social environment can stretch to the cultural level. Evolved genetic moral mechanisms of individuals influence the formation of cultural moral orders, and cultural moral emphases can shape the intuitive mechanisms of individual psychological judgments.

The connection between crime, moral judgment, and punishment may therefore not depend as much on conscious reasoning abilities but more on intuitive processes including those involving emotion. Many researchers have suggested that emotions are not just meaningful end states to eliciting situations, but are integral and functional determinants of the decisions people make and the courses of action they take. People can have various emotional reactions to crimes and different emotions may contribute to different punishment goals being desired when moral violations occur at the criminal level.

Functionalist Account of Emotion

The functionalist perspective of emotion suggests that cognitive appraisals of objects and events elicit emotional states that carry with them goal-orientated

action tendencies (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). Emotions may be differentiated in fact by the unique appraisal patterns that activate them and by the action tendencies they provide for fulfilling their functional purpose (Barrett & Campos, 1987; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1985). For example, Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith (2003) found when people are confronted with a threat from another person, they may experience anger or fear. If they perceive their position to be stronger than that of the other, they will experience anger, and with anger comes a tendency to confront or aggress against the other. If they perceive their position to be weaker than the other, they will experience fear, and with fear comes a tendency to distance themselves from the other.

Applying a functionalist perspective of emotion can inform community psychology theory and practice. The concept of community readiness refers to how much a group is aware of a problem and is prepared to address it. While evidence-based and strengths-based interventions to reduce criminal behavior are available, a lack of community readiness for applying the interventions can lead to failed attempts at applying the interventions or to not applying the interventions at all (Guerra & Backer, 2011; McCammon, 2012; Parker, Alcaraz, & Payne, 2011). Assessing and developing community readiness for the application of criminal sentences that are effective in reducing crime are necessary components of crime prevention. By considering public appraisals of crimes and offenders along with the public's emotional reactions, the assessment of community readiness can be more precise and strategies for developing community readiness can be more informed.

Observed events that are unexpected, negative, or important, such as moral violations, are particularly likely to increase attention and activate cognitive and emotional mechanisms (Weiner, 1985). Given that moral outlooks include a universal quality, it is not surprising that violations of moral principles, even when they are distal events, often elicit intuitive emotional responses from third parties who are then in a state of action readiness for responding to the eliciting event. Emotions may therefore play a role in the connection between crime and punishment, but more must be known about appraisals in order to understand when a distinct emotion, with its individual functional purpose, will be elicited.

Most studies of emotion that apply a functionalist perspective consider the cognitive appraisals to occur in a single step (e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Some functionalist models of emotion, however, have proposed that the appraisals preceding emotions occur in two stages of increasing cognitive complexity (e.g., Lazarus, 1991; Weiner, 1985).

Weiner (1985, 1986) developed the causal attribution theory of emotion to represent the connections between appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies. According to attribution theory, an observed event is initially assessed for whether it is positive or negative. Depending on the appraisal outcome of the first stage, a general positive (e.g., happy) or negative (e.g., sad) emotion is experienced. During the second appraisal stage, additional factors are considered that then lead to a wider range of differentiated emotional experiences. The second appraisal stage results in determinations of what is responsible for the event and

expectancies of whether the cause can change. Emotional outcomes of the second stage of appraisals include pride, shame, gratitude, pity, hopefulness, hopelessness, and others.

Weiner proposed that during the second stage of appraisals, the cause of the observed event is assessed according to five dimensional properties. How an event is perceived on the five causal dimensions then determines the specific emotion experienced. Weiner further suggests that while people are capable of developing a vast number of causal explanations to account for the full range of human behaviors, these causes can all be characterized by the five dimensional properties. By applying this type of concise model of causality, one is able to explain why qualitatively different events can elicit the same emotional reactions. Weiner's (1985) five dimensions of causality are locus, controllability, intentionality, stability, and globality. Locus refers to whether the cause is internal or external to a person. Controllability pertains to the notion that people have volitional control over aspects of their conduct. Intentionality refers to the intended goal of a behavior. Stability is a measure of how constant the cause of an event is over time, and globality considers whether the cause is constant across situations.

Attributions of locus, controllability, and intentionality have implications for assigning causal responsibility while stability, and perhaps globality, affect expectancies with whether one's actions can influence the cause and thereby change future events. Depending on the secondary appraisals, different actions will be required of the person, and different emotions will serve as mediators

between the secondary appraisal patterns and the adaptive action tendencies that are produced.

Lazarus (1991) also proposed a two-stage appraisal model of emotion with three types of appraisals occurring in each stage. The first stage includes the primary appraisals which are determining whether an event is personally relevant, whether an event is in line or inconsistent with personal goals, and thirdly the specific type of goal, which Lazarus mentioned could be moral values. The emotional outcomes of primary appraisals are general positive or negative affects depending on whether the stimulus is congruent or incongruent with personally relevant interests. A greater range of emotions emanate from the secondary appraisals. The three secondary appraisals include appraising who or what is responsible for the event, what can be done to address the event, and what is likely to happen in the future.

This paper will apply a two-stage appraisal sequence to investigate public reactions to criminal offenders borrowing ideas from Weiner (1985, 1986) and Lazarus (1991). In the first appraisal stage, an event is assessed for how it is consistent or inconsistent with personal goals. Moral violations, a component of criminal events, are inconsistent with personally relevant and valued principles. The degree to which a crime violates each of the five categories of moral concerns provided by Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt and Graham, 2007) will therefore be used to assess the primary appraisals of a criminal event. It will then be determined if the primary appraisals themselves lead to distinct secondary appraisal patterns. Although various forms of additional information can affect

secondary appraisals, media accounts of crimes often only report the type of crime committed, with more extensive information being provided to judges and juries for their deliberation. Public reactions to crimes can readily occur nonetheless with more diverse responses than just positive or negative affective states. Secondary appraisals allow for a wider range of emotions and subsequent action tendencies so it is possible that the type of moral code violated by a crime allows for more complex secondary appraisals to be made. Secondary appraisal variables have been developed for this paper based on research reviews of moral psychology, emotion, and punishment goals.

Secondary Appraisals

The punishment goals of a criminal justice system are oriented toward preserving and protecting a society's moral order. Violations and threats to a moral order can include the occurrence of immoral acts, the potential for immoral acts to occur, and the presence of immoral entities within the moral order. Detection of a particular type of threat may elicit a particular emotional response that carries with it a unique state of action readiness for responding to the threat. Secondary appraisals of an offender may therefore consist of perceiving the offender as having committed an immoral act, as being incompetent in abiding by moral principles, and as possessing a nature of an immoral quality. The secondary appraisals presented in this paper include elements of the secondary appraisals presented in the models of emotion proposed by Weiner (1985, 1986) and Lazarus (1991), which included determining the cause of an event, assessing the nature of the cause, and considering how the cause may be subject to change.

The secondary appraisals that are proposed to occur in the public are relevant to community psychology values as they can include elements of prejudice toward the offender that may be enduring, remaining as appraisals of the offender long after the crime and punishment have passed. Public appraisals of moral incompetence and an immoral nature can lead to the disempowerment of an offender and reduce the offender's chances for securing employment, building social capital, and experiencing a sense of community (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Rappaport, 1981; Sarason, 1974; Zimmerman, 2000). Identifying such appraisals, determining the contributing factors to their onset, and assessing how they lead to specific emotions and action tendencies toward offenders is imperative for understanding and modifying maladapted punishment strategies of the criminal justice system as well as prejudicial and hostile social experiences offenders may encounter after they complete their sentences.

The three secondary appraisals of immoral behavior, moral incompetence, and immoral nature may seem similar in certain respects to the primary appraisals of moral violation type, and in fact each of the five primary appraisals may predict each of the secondary appraisals. The three appraisals of the offender are classified as separate secondary appraisals, however, because it is anticipated that the five types of moral violation will predict the secondary appraisals to different degrees (Figure 1), and the secondary appraisals will each predict distinct emotional responses to different degrees. The secondary appraisals, and what they

mean regarding perceptions of the offender, are therefore important for

understanding the connections between crime and goals of punishment.

Figure 1. Proposed model of moral foundations and secondary appraisals.

Immoral act. Public reactions to the perpetrator of a crime can be partly

based on the degree to which the offender's actions are perceived to be an

immoral act. Although the act would have already occurred, responding to the

immoral acts of individuals can be necessary for reinstating a moral balance.

Often a crime is a direct act against another individual, and by committing the

wrong the offender has elevated him or herself above the victim. By returning to

the offender a punishment that is comparable to the wrongfulness of the crime, the

disturbed moral balance between parties is restored (De Keijser et al., 2002;

Vidmar & Miller, 1980).

Public concern for a wrongdoing may not only be on behalf of an

individual victim, however, but also on behalf of society. In committing a crime,

an offender acted against and violated important social rules shared and relied on

by the general public. By committing the crime, the offender acted against and

wronged society's laws and therefore elevated him or herself above a perhaps

more important victim, society's social order. Weiner (2006) captures this

concern by pointing out that when calls for justice are made by the public, public concern is for "the victim (which is ultimately society itself)" (p. 135). Appraising the degree to which the individual offender has committed an immoral act is therefore a secondary appraisal with implications for emotional and behavioral responses aimed at addressing the immoral act.

It is predicted that harm and fairness violations will be the moral violations most strongly associated with the secondary appraisal of a person committing an immoral act, and these relations will be positive. Third-party appraisals of an immoral act may be associated more strongly with harm and fairness violations because of a stronger public concern with these aspects of the moral order, especially in the context of crime. Neuberg and Cottrell (2003) have argued for a hierarchy of threat wherein people are more attuned to threats against individual security, followed by threats to group security, and ending with threats to socialization mechanisms and authority structures.

Moral incompetence. Determining an offender's level of moral competency is relevant to expectancies regarding the offender's future conduct and the social trust the public can have in the offender. Competency refers to possessing the knowledge, skill, or capacity of sufficient quantity to adequately perform a task. People who possess the competencies for certain tasks can be approached for their abilities and assistance and included in more permanent social relations. Those who are incompetent may be avoided for their risk of wasting time and resources and their potential for interfering with valued goals (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).

Moral competency refers to the ability to perform moral actions and to avoid moral violations. Moral incompetence can be due to an inability to learn, understand, or follow the codes of a moral order. The appraisal of moral incompetence in others can serve a moral-functional role by protecting people and social orders against those who have demonstrated a deficiency in some moral capacity. The appraisal of moral incompetence also includes the attribution of a somewhat stable characteristic to the offender and can lead to emotions and action tendencies for protecting society from the offender's potential moral failings.

The appraisal of moral incompetence may be especially likely to result from repeated moral violations but could also result from a single violation. It is hypothesized that violations of ingroup and authority moral codes will be the strongest predictors of a moral incompetence appraisal. Ingroup and authority moral foundations are based on the conception of a person as filling a role within a socially interdependent community. Each person has various roles within their social groups and social structures and each role carries certain responsibilities and expectations. Unlike harm violations, which require an offender to commit a harmful act, ingroup and authority violations can occur simply by failing to perform an act, or by simple negligence, and could therefore more readily lead to appraisals of moral incompetence.

Furthermore, the commission of a crime itself is a violation of authority principles. Laws are an authoritative institution, set by the rightful role of legislative bodies and established to provide for the wellbeing of the institutions' subordinates. The act of breaking a law is an act of disobeying a legitimate

authority and could lead to an appraisal of moral incompetence by showing the offender cannot follow the rules put in place for the group and fill the role of a law-abiding citizen.

   Immoral nature. People not only appraise the actions and competencies of others but also their nature. Humans can be conceptualized as spiritual entities holding an elevated status within a sacred order, which includes other beings such as demons, animals, and angels (Brandt & Reyna, 2011; Shweder et al., 1997). Forming judgments of a person's moral nature can be as important to a social group as forming judgments of a person's moral competence. Determining whether a group member is morally competent can be important for establishing trust in social interactions and for protecting the social functioning of the group. Assessing a group member's moral nature can be important for protecting the integrity and shared essence of the group. In a theory of moral motives proposed by Rai and Fiske (2011), and based on Fiske's relational models theory (Fiske, 1991; Fiske & Haslam, 2005), the ingroup and purity moral foundations are combined into a unity moral motive. Guided by the unity motive, people in an in-group not only feel loyalty and collective responsibility to the group but also that the group has a communal essence that needs to be protected. The unity motive can lead a group to protect itself from outsiders, such as by preventing inter-ethnic marriages and pursuing ethnic cleansing, and to protect itself from impure insiders. If an in-group member commits a moral violation, the entire group "feels tainted and shamed until it cleanses itself" (Rai & Fiske, 2011, p. 61). Appraisals of an offender's moral essence may therefore lead to distinct emotions and

behavioral tendencies in the surrounding public that could have significant implications for an offender.

Hutcherson and Gross (2011) investigated whether the concept of an immoral nature is a relevant factor to appraisals and emotions. In one study, participants were asked to indicate which emotion they preferred someone felt toward them. Six emotions were used and were presented to the participants in pairs. After each choice, participants were asked to explain their decision. The responses were coded using nine themes, one of which was whether the emotion "was indicative of one's moral sense or character." The moral character theme was particularly present in choices involving disgust. Another study asked participants to recall an event when someone else did something that had a negative impact on them (the participant), an event when someone else acted in an incompetent manner, and an event when someone else did something immoral. After describing each event, participants responded to questions about their emotional responses and appraisals to the events. One question asked whether the event changed their impression of the actor's moral character and another asked how generally immoral they thought the person was. Both appraisals were related to the emotion items and were particularly associated with feelings of disgust.

It is hypothesized that violations of the purity moral foundation will be the primary appraisal that has the strongest association with the appraisal of an immoral nature. The purity foundation includes concerns with protecting the dignity and sanctity of the human body and the elevated essence of a human's spiritual core. The event of a purity violation can indicate a person may be guided

by a depraved nature or can otherwise attach defilement or degradation to the person.

Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2011) asked participants to read scenarios of harm and purity moral violations and then answer appraisal questions. Two appraisal items assessed the harm done in the scenario, three items measured the intent of the actor, and four items formed an "abnormality" appraisal scale and asked whether the actor "is abnormal," "is a lesser human being," "has become impure," and "appears to be mentally unstable." It was found that the purity violation was associated with higher "abnormality" scores than the harm violation.

Crimes can vary by the types of moral principles they violate, and the nature of a crime may influence the appraisals that are made of the offender. Following a two-stage model of appraisal, moral foundations will be used as primary appraisals of a crime, and perceptions of the offender's behavior, competencies, and nature will be used as secondary appraisals. Having appraised an event, a person may then experience a distinct emotion which carries its own action tendency for responding to the event. The various action tendencies provided by the functionalist account of emotion may account for the different goals of punishment that are desired by the general public when it comes to sanctioning a criminal offender.

Emotions

Categories of emotions have been developed based on the common functions the emotions serve. Many emotions, such as fear and happiness, serve

purposes directly relevant to the self. Fear, for example, occurs when something important to the self is threatened and removing the self from the threat is a viable course of action. Happiness occurs when something of personal value is gained and is accompanied by tendencies to pursue similar tasks or objects or to share the event with others, serving the purpose of strengthening social ties.

Social emotions are those that serve social purposes in the relations between individuals and between groups (Ekman, 1992). They have even been defined as those emotions that are elicited by appraising the mental states of others (Burnett, Bird, Moll, Frith, & Blakemore, 2008). Embarrassment, for example, is felt when a person believes that others see him or herself as acting foolishly, with the action tendency to stop the behavior and possibly repair the damage to the self's social image.

Moral emotions are closely tied to social emotions. Haidt (2003) defines moral emotions as those elicited by events that do not directly affect the self or those closely connected to the self but motivate actions that either benefit others or uphold and benefit the social order. The more an emotion is initiated by an event that does not directly impact the self as an individual yet leads to prosocial action tendencies, the more it would be a prototypical moral emotion. Compassion, for example, can be elicited by the suffering of those one has never met before and provides a motivational state to help remedy the eliciting situation.

Some emotions are certainly not confined to one functional domain. Anger, for example, can be a self-directed emotion, a social emotion, and a moral emotion. Anger can be directed at the self when one fails at something important

and thinks the self is to blame. Anger can be considered a social emotion, such as when a person thinks another deliberately harmed them and they want to take revenge. Anger can also be a moral emotion. When a person hears about an injustice in society involving people he or she does not know, anger could be felt along with a desire to take action against the injustice.

Attention to moral emotions and their connections to prosocial or antisocial behavior had been mainly limited to empathy, guilt, and sympathy prior to the 1980s, but has since expanded. Haidt (2003) delineates four families of moral emotions: the "self-conscious" emotions of embarrassment, guilt, and shame; the "other-praising" moral emotions of gratitude and elevation; the "other-condemning" moral emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust; and the "other-suffering" family centered on sympathy. As examples of the functional account of emotion, the self-conscious and other-praising emotions will be discussed briefly.

Within the self-conscious moral emotions, shame is elicited when a person appraises the self as not measuring up to a moral standard, embarrassment may occur when one's social identity during an interaction is damaged (Keltner & Buswell, 1996; Keltner & Buswell, 1997), and guilt results from seeing one's actions as violating a moral rule, particularly involving harm to another person (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994). Shame and embarrassment create a desire to withdraw or a tendency toward meekness that signals to others the awareness of committing a fault and that actions from others are unnecessary to correct the wrong (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). The action tendencies of shame are stronger than for embarrassment and may even lead to self-destructive behavior

such as suicide (Mokros, 1995). Guilt involves the tendency toward corrective action to repair the harm done by a moral violation (Baumeister et al., 1994).

In the other-praising family of emotions, gratitude is elicited by determining that another has assisted the self and generates a tendency to thank the benefactor or to return the favor (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001). Elevation comes from seeing moral beauty in another as a result of exceptional moral behavior such as kindness or self-sacrifice. The feeling of elevation includes feelings of affection toward the eliciting person but also a tendency to follow the example of the elevated by improving on one's own moral behaviors (Haidt, 2003).

This paper will investigate five emotions because of their relevance to crime and goals of punishment. The emotions include the other-condemning moral emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust, the other-suffering emotion of sympathy, and the self-protecting emotion of fear.

Anger. Anger is often a response to unjustified, negative actions that are directed at the self, such as being insulted, laughed at, lied to, betrayed, stolen from, or otherwise treated unfairly (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Izard, 1977; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, & O'Connor, 1987). Unfairness and general immorality have been found to elicit anger in a variety of cultures (Scherer, 1997). Actions against one's social group elicit anger as well. Threats to group safety, possessions, rights, values, and social coordination have the potential to produce anger (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Anger can even be felt by people not directly involved in the event. Witnessing

one person harming another can elicit anger (Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, & Luo, 2006; Kedia, Berthoz, Wessa, Hilton, & Martinot, 2008). Also, racism, oppression, and exploitation can garner high levels of anger in people who are not within the victimized group (Haidt, 2003).

Anger is often thought of as an immoral emotion because of the violence, harm, and destruction it can cause, but it can also be thought of as a moral emotion as it is also a response to immoral actions and tied to the emotivational state of wanting to address and correct a wrongdoing (Haidt 2003; Tavris, 1982). Anger is therefore a natural emotion elicited in the public when crimes occur. In committing a crime, an offender has committed a wrongdoing not only recognized by society but also the legal system. Just breaking a law itself can be perceived as a moral violation as it disrespects the social order and the traditions of the group, thus violating principles stemming from the ingroup and authority moral foundations.

Anger is in response to an injustice and a number of qualifiers can modify the appraisal of an injustice including Weiner's (1985, 2006) causal attributions of intentionality and controllability. Judgments of the moral wrongfulness of an act depend to a large degree on the understanding that the act was committed by a moral agent who has the human faculties of self- and moral-awareness and operates by willful actions. Natural disasters that kill thousands of people are not considered immoral events, the actions of animals are rarely perceived through a moral lens, and crimes by people with mental disorders affecting information processing systems can lead to deliberations of moral responsibility. Reducing the

intentionality and controllability behind a wrongdoing has reduced judgments of responsibility (Graham, Weiner, & Zucker, 1997; Weiner, 2006; Weiner, Graham, & Reyna, 1997), feelings of anger (Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2008; Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011; Wickens, Wiesenthal, Flora, & Flett, 2011), and severity of assigned punishment (Palazzolo & Roberto, 2011; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Wickens et al., 2011). While reducing the perpetrator's intentionality and controllability reduces perceptions of wrongdoing and feelings of anger, the level of an offender's intent and control are not always presented to the public for consideration but rather are deliberated and established by a judge or jury during the course of a trial.

Intent and control are also not mandatory for culpability to be assigned and punishment issued. Przygotski and Mullet (1993) found manipulations of harm and intent combined additively in predicting punishment, and even harmful events with no intent to harm still resulted in some punishment being assigned. Cushman (2008) found that while intent was related to judgments of an action's wrongfulness, when it came to assigning blame and punishment the mere consequence of the act played a role as well. Also, Ask and Pina (2011) found participants' level of state anger before appraising a criminal act influenced attributions of intentionality and controllability, suggesting that anger felt in response to a harmful act can then lead to attributions of intent and control.

Intentionality and controllability are foundational components of the concept of moral agency, and the moral agency of a person is important for passing moral judgment on the person's behavior. However, I believe that actions

in violation of moral principles, whether intended or not, can activate the moral-psychological mechanisms in observers designed to protect the moral order by addressing all moral violations. In fact, there may even be a bias toward assuming that intentionality and controllability exist in order to err on the side of addressing all possible injustices rather than allowing any immoral action to go unchecked.

The action tendency typically associated with anger is a general readiness to aggress against the source of the injustice (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Izard, 1977; Shaver et al., 1987). With anger comes a desire to attack, punish, or enact revenge for a perceived wrong or injustice, an emotion-behavior link found in a variety of cultures (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). In a comparison with fear, sadness, disgust, frustration, regret, and guilt, feelings of anger were more connected with thoughts of how unfair something was and wanting to hurt or get back at someone (Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994).

Due to the connection between anger and the perception of a wrong, it is predicted that the appraisal of an immoral act will be the secondary appraisal most strongly related to anger (Figure 2). Anger can serve a moral-functional purpose by being elicited in response to the appraisal that a moral agent committed a moral violation and provides a behavioral readiness to aggress against the violator for the sake of addressing the violation. The path model presented in this paper also shows a relation between harm and fairness violations and anger (mediated by the appraisal of an immoral act). Prior research has found harmful and unfair acts against individuals to be associated with feelings of anger in third parties, and more so than for feelings of contempt and disgust (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla,

2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Russell

& Giner-Sorolla, 2011).

Figure 2. Proposed model of moral foundations, secondary appraisals, and

emotions.

Fear. Fear is primarily elicited when there is a threat to one's physical

safety and leads to a desire to escape from the threatening stimulus (Cottrell &

Neuberg, 2005). Generally fear is experienced when there is a threat to something

valuable and it is determined that the threat cannot be stopped so escape is

required (Devos et al., 2003). Fear can be experienced when there is uncertainty

about the future or one's general wellbeing (Roseman et al., 1994). Also, threats

to group values, social coordination, and social trust may elicit fear (Cottrell &

Neuberg, 2005).

Studies investigating fear and crime have generally measured participants'

"fear of crime," which may refer to a general sense of safety in their

neighborhoods or to concern with being the victim of a crime. This

conceptualization of fear fits the self-protective function of fear to arouse and

prepare the individual against potential threats that, once they have commenced, one may not be able to avoid or overcome (Lazarus, 1991).

It is predicted that the appraisal of an immoral act will be the strongest predictor of fear. Perceiving an immoral act committed by another individual may inform a person of a general danger that exists in society, producing in the observer a general concern with being the victim of a crime. Being the victim of a crime or exposed to crime, perceiving social disorder in the surrounding community, and local crime rates have all been positively related to the fear of crime (Liu, Messner, Zhang, & Zhuo, 2009; Riger, LeBailly, & Gordon, 1981; Roccato, Russo, & Vieno, 2011; Russo, Roccato, & Vieno, 2011; Thompson & Norris, 1992). Taking protective measures or developing safeguards to manage the threat ahead of time can be action tendencies associated with fear.

Contempt. Contempt is generally considered to be an emotion falling between anger and disgust and has at different times been said to be based on anger (Lazarus, 1991) and a variant of disgust (Ekman & Friesen, 1975). However, contempt has also been found to be elicited by appraisals different than those for anger and disgust (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999), has been associated with its own unique facial expression (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman & Heider, 1988), and leads to distinct action tendencies (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).

The emotion of contempt brings a psychological separation between the individual and the elicitor and instills a downward, judgmental comparison. Targets of contempt are perceived as morally inferior and less worthy of respect

and warmth (Ekman, 1994; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1995; Smith, 2000). Fischer and Roseman (2007) found people feeling contempt for someone wanted to ignore the person and to have nothing to do with them. Contempt can also be involved in a desire to restrict the target's access to certain positions (Devos et al., 2003).

Contempt can be elicited by perceiving someone as not measuring up to a certain standard. Those who are not fulfilling the responsibilities of their job or role, do not have the abilities required of them, take credit for something they did not do, or do not meet certain moral expectations can be the targets of contempt (Haidt, 2003; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004). Hutcherson and Gross (2011) found contempt, more so than anger and disgust, to be related to appraisals of incompetence. Contempt can last longer than anger and is less likely to change. Situations that elicit contempt for a person are less likely to be resolved than those eliciting anger and the person is more likely to be perceived as having a stable, negative disposition (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011).

Contempt can serve a moral-functional role by protecting people and social orders against those who have demonstrated a deficiency in some social-moral capacity but do not pose a malicious threat (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). People who have committed moral violations by being negligent or not measuring up to their moral responsibilities given their particular role within a social order can be marked with a feeling of contempt and managed through contempt's action tendencies.

Contempt can interfere with the goals of community psychology by leading to the social exclusion of an offender. Developing social capital and positive social ties are related to positive mental health and have also been shown to reduce violent acts and other forms of antisocial behavior (Schofield et al., 2012; Vieno et al., 2010; Zeldin, 2004).

In the case of criminal behavior, an appraisal of moral incompetence may therefore be a cognitive antecedent to a feeling of contempt. Moral incompetence refers to the inability to follow moral rules or fulfill moral responsibilities. People who do not have the abilities required of them or otherwise do not meet their responsibilities can elicit contempt in others (Haidt, 2003; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2004).

Contempt may be particularly connected to the actions, or inactions, of a person who is considered a member of a social group. The ingroup and authority moral foundations pertain to the moral expectations of a person as a community member. Ingroup violations include violations of group loyalty and not acting in the interests of the ingroup. Authority violations consist of not fulfilling the responsibilities of one's role within a social hierarchy. The path model shows a relation between violations of ingroup and authority codes and the feeling of contempt (mediated by the appraisal of moral incompetence), which is a relation that has been demonstrated in prior research by Rozin and colleagues (Rozin et al., 1999). The researchers found violations of ingroup and authority codes elicited feelings of contempt to a greater degree than feelings of anger and disgust for both American and Japanese participants. It is hypothesized that moral

incompetence will be positively related to contempt because the offender is seen as not measuring up to the expectations of him or her as a member of a moral order. The appraisal of moral incompetence could also lead to sympathy, however, if the incompetent person is seen as being in need.

Sympathy. Sympathy is elicited by appraising a state of suffering or distress in another person and develops a desire to help or comfort the sufferer and to alleviate the sufferer's condition (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). A main determinant of whether another's condition elicits sympathy is whether the person is responsible for the condition. If the person's distress is caused by the environment or factors outside the person's control than sympathy rather than blame is more likely to occur (Graham et al., 1997; Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2008; Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Rudolph et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2011).

The secondary appraisal of moral incompetence may be related to sympathy. If the incompetence is seen as something the person cannot control or could overcome if given assistance and the chance to improve, then sympathy would increase. Fiske, Cuddy, and Glick (2003) found a positive relation between the perception of incompetence and the feeling of sympathy for populations such as the elderly and people with disabilities.

It is also predicted that the appraisal of an immoral nature will be negatively related to sympathy. Reed and Aquino (2003) found people were more willing to help those who were considered to be within the help-giver's circle of moral regard. As the perceived moral essence of a person diminishes, the person

may be seen as falling outside the circle of moral regard, and concern for the person's welfare may then decline.

Disgust. Disgust is a feeling of revulsion. Disgust is often elicited by physical objects such as rotting foods, maggots, and rats that may carry diseases or otherwise make the body sick. Disgust's core connection with threats to physical health has expanded, however, into social and moral life (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997). Disgust is not only felt toward hazardous physical objects but to violations and threats to human dignity, group values, and moral standards (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devos et al., 2003; Rozin et al., 1999). Infringements of cultural rules governing body mutations, hygiene, and sexual acts, as well as offensive political attitudes, can lead to disgust (Haidt et al., 1997; MacCoun, 1998). Disgust is the emotional response to a "risk of being contaminated by an indigestible or poisonous idea" (Lazarus, 1991, p. 260).

Action tendencies connected to disgust include the desires to avoid or expel the offensive entity (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devos et al., 2003; Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 1993). The revulsion of disgust keeps people away from physical hazards to bodily health, causes people to recoil at the degradation of human dignity, and leads groups to expunge contaminants of the social-moral order. Disgust's tendency to avoid or remove contaminants suggests the target of disgust is perceived as being or holding an impurity. It is therefore hypothesized that the secondary appraisal of an immoral nature will be the strongest predictor of disgust. Unlike anger which addresses an immoral act, disgust functions by

condemning people "for what they are, not just for what they do" (Haidt, 2003, p. 857).

Disgust may be particularly connected to violations of the purity moral foundation. Violations of purity include not conducting oneself in accordance with the concepts of dignity, civility and culture, and the spiritually elevated status that differentiates humans from animals. The path model shows a relation between purity violations and disgust (mediated by the appraisal of an immoral nature). Disgust has been found to have a stronger empirical connection with purity violations than other emotions including anger, contempt, and fear (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007; Horberg et al., 2009; Moll et al., 2005; Rozin et al., 1999; Schaich Borg, Lieberman, & Kiehl, 2008). Hutcherson and Gross (2011) asked participants to recall events that had elicited feelings of anger, contempt, and disgust and found that when participants felt disgust for someone they were more likely to see the person as having an immoral or offensive character. Disgust was also least likely to be affected by an apology, and not surprisingly, participants least preferred to be the target of disgust. Russell and Giner-Sorolla (2011) had participants read scenarios of a person committing moral violations and then respond to appraisal and emotion questions. The appraisal that the person had an abnormal nature mediated the relation between purity violations and feelings of disgust.

Public disgust can interfere with the community psychology goal of reintegrating offenders into the community. Public opposition to offender reintegration may be particularly high when disgust is experienced, which may

result after perceiving a purity violation such as substance abuse or sexual deviance. As an example, efforts to establish group homes for people with substance abuse histories and other past deviancies have experienced substantial neighborhood opposition and municipality interference (Jason et al., 2008).

To summarize, the functionalist account of emotion suggests that emotions are elicited by appraisals and lead to action tendencies. Appraisals of crimes can include determinations regarding the types of moral principles violated by the crime along with appraisals of the offender's actions, competencies, and moral nature. Appraisals of the offender may then elicit anger, fear, contempt, sympathy, or disgust. Each emotion has its own action tendencies that are goal-oriented and intended to provide an adaptive response to the eliciting event. The emotions just described will be used to predict the punishment goals of the criminal justice system that are desired by the public.

Goals of Punishment

Moral principles are upheld within a moral order, in part, by group members reprimanding moral violations. Reprimands occur on a regular basis through social reprisals ranging from dirty looks to ostracism. For more serious moral rules requiring more severe reprisals, or for those requiring a more systematic method of enforcement, a society can develop laws and a legal system to address legal violations.

Legal punishment is a societal response to those individuals who commit illegal acts. A punishment can be issued for a variety of purposes such as discouraging people from committing similar crimes or confining an offender in

order to protect society. The typical goals of punishment identified in psychology

and legal literatures are retribution, general deterrence, individual deterrence,

rehabilitation, restoration, and incapacitation (e.g., De Keijser et al., 2002;

Hogarth, 1971; McFatter, 1982).

Retribution

Retribution is punishing for the purpose of equalizing the wrong

committed by the offender. In the course of a crime, an offender has harmed

another person or in some way violated the communal values or moral codes of

society. The offender not only wronged another party, but in doing so put him or

herself above the other party (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The retributive response to

a crime bestows suffering on an offender for the purpose of restoring a disturbed

moral balance (De Keijser et al., 2002). The retribution goal of punishment is

often the one in mind when calls for "justice" are made and a retributive

punishment is sometimes referred to as "just deserts." For a punishment to satisfy

the retribution goal, it is important for the suffering inflicted on the offender to be

proportional to the wrongfulness of the crime. The wrongfulness of a criminal act

depends both on the severity of the moral violation and on the deliberateness of

the act (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002). By inflicting suffering on the

offender, proportional harm is returned to the offender and the status between the

offender and the victim is restored. After receiving the punishment an offender

has "paid the debt owed to society."

It is hypothesized that anger will be the emotion that will most strongly

predict the goal of retribution (Figure 3). The functional purpose and action

tendency of anger is to aggress against the perpetrator of a moral violation. Anger

produces a tendency to harm a moral offender, which can serve to equate the

distribution of negative experiences and thus equalize the moral position of

offender and victim (Darley & Pittman, 2003; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Once a

punishment is completed, the goal of retribution is achieved, so anger would

subside. Anger has in fact been found to be more changeable in response to

punishment than contempt and disgust. Anger produces a short-term attack

tendency but once retributive justice is attained, anger fades while other emotions

may remain (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Russell &

Giner-Sorolla, 2011).

Figure 3. Proposed model of moral foundations, secondary appraisals, emotions, and punishment goals.

General and Individual Deterrence

The goal of deterrence is to prevent future crimes. General deterrence refers to discouraging other potential offenders in the general public from committing a crime and individual deterrence refers to dissuading the individual offender from reoffending. Both deterrence goals are achieved by issuing punishments severe enough to convince people the crimes are not worth committing or that "crime doesn't pay." The goal of deterrence rests on the assumption that crimes are committed by rational actors who can consider a priori the costs and benefits of the criminal act. By providing punishments unpleasant enough to outweigh the potential gains from a crime, people will be deterred from criminal activity. The more severe a punishment, the more effective it will be in achieving the goal of deterrence.

For general deterrence, the goal is directed toward the potential criminality within the general public and the threat of punishment should be publicized to achieve the goal (Carlsmith, 2006). The individual crime and culpability of the offender has less influence on the goal of general deterrence and a desire to pursue this goal could overrule the rights of the offender. For individual deterrence, the goal of punishment is directed toward the individual offender and the issued sanction is a direct lesson about what will happen if the criminal offends again.

Despite the aims of deterrence, excessive pursuit of these goals can interfere with community psychology goals and values. Long periods of imprisonment can reduce an offender's employment opportunities, develop a

deviant self-concept, and impede positive social relationships which can reduce

offender wellbeing and may increase recidivism (Astone, 1982; Baillargeon et al.,

2012; Chu et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2008; Fite et al., 2012; Martin et al., 1978;

Nikulina et al., 2011; Thomas et al., 1981; Pager, 2003; Vaux & Ruggiero, 1983).

It is predicted that fear will be the emotion most strongly associated with

the goal of general deterrence. Action tendencies of fear include taking protective

measures or developing safeguards to manage a threat ahead of time. In the

context of crime, instituting behavioral controls for reducing criminal tendencies

within the general public may be associated with a fear of crime. Severe

punishments and statutes requiring stiff penalties are factors related to general

deterrence (Carlsmith, 2008) and the fear of crime has been found to be positively

related to punishment severity and support for capital punishment (Keil & Vito,

1991; Klama & Egan, 2011; Sims, 2003).

Ouimet and Coyle (1991) did not find a connection between the public's

fear of crime and punishment severity, but did find that perceptions of the public's

fear of crime held by court practitioners (i.e., judges, prosecutors, defense

counsel, and probation officers) was positively related to the punishment severity

of sentences suggested by the practitioners. The study's findings reinforce the two

propositions that public opinion can influence criminal justice practices and that

individual cognitive appraisals of the environment are important antecedents to

behavior tendencies.

It is also predicted that contempt will be the emotion most strongly

associated with the goal of individual deterrence. Moral incompetence may be

perceived as a fairly stable quality of an offender and the contempt it generates

can be stable as well. While the action tendencies of anger are based on an

appraisal of an immoral action and directed toward retribution, the action

tendencies of contempt are based on considerations of the offender and on what

the offender may or may not do in the future. The offender needs to be prevented

from committing the offense again and one way to counteract the offender's

incompetence and tendencies to commit moral violations is to provide an

environmental deterrent to the action. Individual deterrence may also be served by

issuing a longer sentence to the offender and beyond that afforded by the goal of

retribution. Contempt for an offender may reduce concern with restricting a

punishment to a level of proportionality.

Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice

The goal of rehabilitation is to change the offender by requiring the

offender's participation in treatment programs (McFatter, 1982). The goal of

rehabilitation is not only to prevent the offender from reoffending when returned

to society but also to enable the offender to lead a productive life and contribute

to society. The objectives of rehabilitation are in line with the community

psychology values of prevention, health promotion, and individual wellness

(Dalton et al., 2007; Jason & Glenwick, 2002). Rehabilitation can include

substance use counseling, education, and job training. An assumption of

rehabilitation is that people are not permanently criminal but can change if public

resources are invested in programs for improving the offender. Participation in

rehabilitation programs has been found to be associated with reduced recidivism

(Coulter & VandeWeerd, 2009; Jason et al., 2008; Liau et al., 2004; Seave, 2011; Van Stelle et al., 1994).

Restorative justice combines some of the aims of the previous goals of punishment but does so by a different approach. The goal of restorative justice is to restore the harm done by the wrongdoing, similar to retribution, and to improve the social and moral functioning of the offender, similar to rehabilitation (Gromet & Darley, 2009). To achieve the goals of restorative justice, those affected by the crime (the offender, victim, and perhaps members of the surrounding community) meet to discuss the wrongdoing and the personal and interpersonal damage that occurred by the crime. Restorative justice goals are based on the view that a crime creates a "social conflict" between parties (De Keijser et al., 2002). The goal of restorative justice is then conflict resolution to repair the sociomoral affront and direct harm to the victim. The parties determine a sanction for the offender aimed to restore the victim, materially and psychologically, and to enable the offender to reintegrate into the social and moral fold of the surrounding community (Marshall, 2003).

Restorative justice provides a unique orientation to punishment and is more in line with community psychology values. The approach allows for citizen participation by creating a process for victims, offenders, and community members to speak and have their views incorporated into how the crime is understood and addressed (Dalton et al., 2007). A specific aim of restorative justice is also to assist in developing and restoring a psychological sense of

community between those involved in and affected by the crime (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Sarason, 1974).

It is predicted that sympathy will be the emotion most strongly associated with rehabilitation and restorative justice goals. Sympathy, like contempt, may be elicited by an appraisal of moral incompetence. The moral incompetence of an offender is the somewhat stable lack of capacity for moral behavior. Contempt may occur when the offender's incompetence is thought to be due to the absence of moral mechanisms within the offender and may therefore lead to engaging the offender's rational cost-benefit thought processes and applying the methods of individual deterrence to prevent future criminal acts. Sympathy, on the other hand, may occur when the offender's moral mechanisms are perceived as changeable and could improve should environmental factors be oriented toward achieving that outcome. While contempt includes a downward judgment and psychological separation between the observer and elicitor, sympathy consists of a psychological connection.

Sympathy has been found to predict helping and prosocial tendencies (Mosher & Danoff-Burg, 2008; Rudolph et al., 2004; Wickens et al., 2011). The goal of rehabilitation is to help the offender lead a law-abiding and productive life by providing the offender with beneficial programs, and one goal of restorative justice is to facilitate the offender's reintegration into the local community. Both punishment goals rest on the belief that the offender's crime does not reflect a permanent aspect of the criminal and that the offender remains an accepted

member of the surrounding moral order. Prior research has found sympathy to predict rehabilitation (Graham et al., 1997; Weiner et al., 1997).

Incapacitation

The punishment goal of incapacitation is to forcibly restrict the behaviors of an offender so the offender cannot commit the same offense again. An example is physical confinement within jails or prisons. The perspective behind incapacitation is that the cause of the crime exists within the offender and the offender will commit a similar offense if given the opportunity (Carlsmith, 2006). The phrase "lock 'em up and throw away the key" encapsulates the goal of incapacitation.

It is predicted that disgust will be the emotion most strongly associated with the goal of incapacitation. Disgust's action tendencies are to avoid, expel, or quarantine potential contaminates to the self or one's ecology. An offender with an immoral nature can be a repugnant threat to a group's identity and esteem and it may be desirable for that person to be removed from the group's social collective. The goal of incapacitation may therefore be in line with the action tendencies of disgust.

In summary, the punishments issued to criminal offenders are not based on a single objective and the desired objectives held by the public are not without their psychological precursors. The goals of punishment within the criminal justice system are akin to the action tendencies in the public when moral violations are perceived and emotions are experienced. This paper will investigate how crime leads to punishment by considering how appraisals of moral violations

lead to appraisals of the offender, how appraisals of the offender lead to emotional responses, and how emotions predict goals of punishment.

Rationale

Punishments are issued in response to criminal behaviors to achieve a variety of objectives. The different goals of punishment can lead to different types of sanctions which can have positive or negative consequences for offender wellbeing as well as recidivism rates. The factors that determine which objectives are pursued are predominantly unknown. This paper used recent developments in moral psychology and in functionalist accounts of emotion to establish how crimes lead to the goals of punishment desired by the general public.

The human experience of morality includes judgments of right and wrong behavior that apply universally. Moral codes are important for protecting and promoting individual human welfare and well-functioning social groups. Moral codes are sustained by innate moral mechanisms operating alongside socially crafted moral orders. Over time, social institutions can be developed to embody and implement the moral views and desires of the group. For moral violations that are inadequately or inappropriately responded to by informal social processes, criminal justice systems have been established to address the moral violations committed by persons within the boundaries of the group.

The domain of moral concern rests on five moral foundations. The foundations relate to individual harm, fairness, ingroup loyalty, social hierarchies, and human purity and sanctity. This paper proposes that responding to a crime with a specific goal of punishment begins with an appraisal of which moral

foundation is violated. Following appraisals that a particular moral violation has occurred, secondary appraisals of the offender occur and include determining the degree to which the offender committed an immoral act, the degree to which the offender is morally incompetent, and the degree to which the offender exhibits an immoral nature.

Following secondary appraisals of the offender, a third-party observer will experience any of a variety of emotions including anger, contempt, disgust, sympathy, or fear. Each emotion provides the lay-judge with an action tendency for responding to the initial moral violation. The action tendencies resonating in the general public are interwoven with the goals of punishment pursued by the public's criminal justice system. This paper tested the relations between the appraisals of moral violations, the secondary appraisals of the offender, the emotions elicited, and the desired punishment goals. Such a model that draws from moral psychology and functional accounts of emotion has not been developed for understanding how crimes lead to goals of punishment.

A pilot study was conducted first to test the validity of the survey items that were used in the main study. The main study was then conducted to test the hypothesized path model using a path analysis. In both the pilot study and the main study, participants were members of the general public who used a web-based marketplace designed for completing tasks online. In the main study, participants were presented with one of four crime scenarios and then responded to items measuring their appraisals, emotions, and desired punishment goals.

Statement of Hypotheses

The proposed path model (Figure 3) will fit the sample data in a path analysis, and all predicted paths will be significant and in the predicted direction. Violations of harm and fairness moral codes will predict the appraisal of an immoral act. Violations of ingroup and authority moral codes will predict the appraisal of moral incompetence. Violations of purity moral codes will predict the appraisal of an immoral nature. The appraisal of an immoral act will predict anger and fear. The appraisal of moral incompetence will predict contempt and sympathy. The appraisal of an immoral nature will predict sympathy and disgust. Anger will predict retribution. Fear will predict general deterrence. Contempt will predict individual deterrence. Sympathy will predict rehabilitation and restorative justice. Disgust will predict incapacitation. All relations will be positive except the relation between an immoral nature and sympathy, which will be negative.

Pilot Study

Overview

A survey was used in the main study to test the hypothesis. The survey included four scales to measure the four sets of variables: the moral foundations, secondary appraisals, emotions, and punishment goals. The items used in each scale were created by the author. Before conducting the main study, a pilot study was conducted to test the validity of the survey items. The pilot study consisted of four matching tasks, one for each set of variables. Survey items that were not sufficiently matched with the variable they were intended to measure were removed from the main study. A separate group of participants was recruited for each matching task.

Method

 Participants and procedure. Participants were recruited through
Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk), a web site people can go to and
complete tasks for payment. MTurk is increasingly being used for research and,
along with other web-based mediums, has been validated as a tool for recruiting
participants and conducting survey research (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling,
2011; Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004; Jasmin & Casasanto, 2012;
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010; Schnoebelen & Kuperman, 2010).

 Participants of web-based studies are self-selected and generally complete
the study because of internal motivations such as enjoyment (Buhrmester et al.,
2011). Self-selected volunteers have been found to provide more complete
responses than solicited participants such as undergraduate students (Pettit, 2002;
Walsh, Kiesler, Sproull, & Hesse, 1992). Furthermore, participants engage in less
social desirability when responding to web-based questionnaires than when
completing paper-and-pencil questionnaires (Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, &
Drasgow, 1999).

 Four matching tasks were developed, one for each scale. For each
matching task, participants were given a description of each variable that was a
part of the scale. Below the list of variable descriptions appeared the survey items
for the scale. Participants were instructed to match the content of each survey item
with one of the variable descriptions. Participants could also respond that the
survey item did not match any of the descriptions. The survey items were
presented in random order.

Participants were presented with the following preliminary instructions:

We are interested in studying moral violations, perceptions of criminal offenders, emotions, and punishment goals of the criminal justice system. Before we begin the studies, we need to see if we have good survey items. In this preliminary study, you will be asked to read the descriptions of some variables and then to match the descriptions with individual survey items.

Participants were compensated for completing a matching task. Compensation was based on the amount of time it was anticipated to complete the task. Participants were compensated $0.05 for completing the emotion task, $0.10 for completing the secondary appraisals task, and $0.15 for completing the moral foundations and punishment goals tasks. The effects of compensation on survey completion have been investigated in prior research. Although the amount of compensation has been found to impact response rate, it has not been found to influence data quality (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Crump, McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013).

Pilot study data were screened for quality based on two criteria. First, participants who selected the same construct description for all the survey items would be removed from future analyses. Removing participants for selecting the same response option across all items has been recommended in reviews of MTurk sampling (Crump et al., 2013). Second, participants who completed the study in less than one minute would also be removed. Based on the two criteria, no participants were removed from the datasets.

The purpose of the pilot study was to test whether the survey items reflected the meaning of the variable they were designed to measure. Therefore, survey items that were matched with the intended variable description by at least 65% of a matching task's sample were retained for use in the main study. The 65% criterion allowed each variable to be represented by a diverse set of items but also required that a majority of participants recognized a connection between a variable and the items that would be used to measure it.

The goal was to develop at least five items for each moral foundation, secondary appraisal, and punishment goal. For each emotion, the goal was to develop three items. Emotions have been measured using three items, and sometimes two items, in previous research (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Each matching task was therefore repeated, using new items, until a sufficient number of items met the retention criterion for each variable. One matching task iteration was required for the moral foundations, secondary appraisals, and punishment goals. Two matching task iterations were required to generate the emotions items.

A single matching task iteration was required to test the moral foundations items. Thirty-four participants completed the task. Participants were 62% female, 85% White, 6% Asian American, 6% Black, and had a mean age of 36.39 years ($SD = 11.31$).

A single matching task was conducted for the secondary appraisals items. Thirty-three participants completed the task. The sample was 58% female, 82% White, 6% Black, 6% Latino/a, and had a mean age of 36.45 years ($SD = 11.23$).

Two matching task iterations were conducted to develop the emotions items. Forty-two participants completed the first iteration. Participants were 57% female, 74% White, 12% Black, 10% Asian American, and had a mean age of 33.36 years (SD = 10.69). The second iteration consisted of 30 participants. The sample was 53% female, 77% White, 10% Black, 7% multiracial, and had a mean age of 29.10 years (SD = 11.09).

A single matching task was conducted for the punishment goals items. Thirty-two participants completed the task. Participants were 63% female, 87% White, 13% Black, and had a mean age of 36.84 years (SD = 15.81).

Materials.

Moral foundations. Thirty-one items were created to measure whether a crime violated the five moral foundations. Each moral foundation was represented by six or seven items. The variable descriptions and survey items for the moral foundations were developed using prior research (e.g., Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Graham et al., 2011; Haidt, 2012; Rozin et al. 1999; Shweder et al., 1997). A sample variable description is "Harm: A person commits a moral violation if they harm another individual. Examples include hurting someone physically or emotionally." A sample item for the harm foundation is "The offender's actions caused direct harm to other individuals." The instructions, variable descriptions, and items for the matching task are presented in Appendix A.

Secondary appraisals. Eighteen items were developed to measure the secondary appraisals. Each appraisal was represented by five to seven items. A sample variable description is "Immoral act: The act committed by the offender is

a moral violation." A sample item for the appraisal of an immoral act is "The act committed by the offender is wrong." The instructions, variable descriptions, and items for the matching task are presented in Appendix B.

Emotions. In the first iteration of the emotions matching task, three items were used for each emotion, making 15 items in total. For example, the items for anger were "Anger," "Furious," and "Outrage." The instructions and emotion items are presented in Appendix C.

In the second iteration of the emotions matching task, five new items were used for contempt. Also, the items "Anger," "Fear," "Sympathy," and "Disgust" were removed in order to shorten the matching task. The second iteration contained 13 items (see Table 4).

Punishment goals. Forty-three items were created to measure the six punishment goals. Each punishment goal was represented by six to nine items. The variable descriptions and survey items were based on prior research (e.g., Carlsmith, 2008; De Keijser et al., 2002; Gromet & Darley, 2009; McFatter, 1982; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). A sample variable description is "Retribution: The sentence should penalize the offender in accordance with what he or she deserves for having committed the crime. The punishment to the offender should be equal to the wrongfulness of the crime. When retribution is achieved, the offender has "paid the debt owed to society." A sample item for retribution is "The sentence should punish the offender for having committed a crime." The instructions, variable descriptions, and items for the matching task are presented in Appendix D.

Results and Discussion

       Moral foundations items. The survey items that were matched with the correct variable description by at least 65% of the participants were retained for the main study. One item from the fairness scale and one item from the authority scale did not meet this criterion and were removed (see Table 1). At least five items met the criterion for each foundation.

Table 1

Percent Frequency Distribution for Moral Foundations Matching Task

Item #	Harm	Fairness	Ingroup	Authority	Purity	None
Harm						
1	**91**		3	6		
2	**88**	3	3	3	3	
3	**91**		3	3	3	
4	**79**	6	6		3	6
5	**82**		3	9	6	
6	**91**	6		3		
Fairness						
1		**100**				
2		**91**		9		
3	3	**85**	6	6		
4	3	**82**	3	3	6	3
5		**76**	9	6	9	
- 6	35	**23**	6	18	12	6
Ingroup						
1	3	6	**88**	3		
2		6	**91**	3		
3		6	**85**	6	3	
4		20	**68**	12		
5		3	**91**	3	3	
6		6	**85**	9		
Authority						
1		6	12	**70**	12	
- 2	3	3	71	**23**		
3	3	3	3	**88**	3	
4		6	6	**85**	3	
5			29	**65**	6	
6		6	3	**65**	20	6
Purity						
1		6	3	3	**79**	9
2	3	3	3	6	**85**	
3	3		3	6	**82**	6
4		3		3	**85**	9
5			3	15	**67**	15
6	3	6	6	3	**70**	12
7			6	6	**88**	

Note. Item numbers correspond to the item numbers in Appendix A. "-" beside an

item number indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for retention.

N = 34.

Secondary appraisals items. All the items from the secondary appraisals

scales met the retention criterion (see Table 2). At least five items were retained

for each scale.

Table 2

Percent Frequency Distribution for Secondary Appraisals Matching Task

Item #	Immoral Act	Moral Incomp.	Immoral Nature	None
Immoral Act				
1	**81**	13	3	3
2	**85**	12	3	
3	**97**	3		
4	**88**		3	9
5	**85**	3	6	6
Moral Incompetence				
1		**97**	3	
2		**88**	12	
3	6	**85**	9	
4	3	**72**	22	3
5		**100**		
6	3	**97**		
7		**97**	3	
Immoral Nature				
1	9	6	**76**	9
2		3	**97**	
3	3	3	**88**	6
4		6	**94**	
5		3	**97**	
6		6	**94**	

Note. Item numbers correspond to the item numbers in Appendix B.

N = 33.

Emotions items. All the items for the emotions of anger, fear, sympathy,

and disgust met the retention criterion (see Table 3). Three items were retained for

each of these emotions. Unfortunately, only one item met the retention criterion

for contempt. Therefore, a second matching task was conducted that contained

five new items for contempt. However, none of the new items met the retention

criterion (see Table 4). Therefore, a new criterion for retaining items was applied.

Items that were matched with contempt by at least 50% of the sample were

retained for use in the main study. The new criterion led to five items being

retained: "Contempt," "Disdain," and "Scornful" from the first iteration, and

"Disrespect" and "Condescension" from the second iteration. Each of these items

was moderately associated with contempt and weakly associated with the other

emotions.

Table 3

Percent Frequency Distribution for Emotions Matching Task: First Iteration

Item	Anger	Fear	Contempt	Sympathy	Disgust	None
Anger						
Anger	**94**	2	2		2	
Furious	**95**		5			
Outrage	**88**		8	2	2	
Fear						
Fear		**94**	2	2	2	
Afraid	2	**93**			5	
Frightened		**93**	5		2	
Contempt						
Contempt	5	5	**78**		12	
- Disdain	2	5	**53**	2	33	5
- Scornful	29		**50**	2	12	7
Sympathy						
Sympathy			5	**93**	2	
Compassion		2	2	**89**	2	5
Pity		2	5	**74**	12	7
Disgust						
Disgust	2		7	5	**86**	
Revulsion	2	2	2	2	**84**	8
Sickened		2	5	2	**89**	2

Note. "-" beside an item indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for

retention.

N = 42.

Table 4

Percent Frequency Distribution for Emotions Matching Task: Second Iteration

Item	Anger	Fear	Contempt	Sympathy	Disgust	None
Anger						
Furious	**100**					
Outrage	**97**				3	
Fear						
Afraid		**100**				
Frightened	3	**94**				3
Contempt						
- Disgrace			**30**		60	10
- Despise	17		**30**		50	3
- Disrespect	10		**52**		7	31
- Condescension			**54**	3	10	33
- Disregard			**45**		3	52
Sympathy						
Compassion				**90**		10
Pity			13	**67**	7	13
Disgust						
Revulsion	7		3		**87**	3
Sickened			7	3	**90**	

Note. "-" beside an item indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for

retention.

N = 30.

Punishment goals items. Seven punishment goals items did not meet the

retention criterion and were removed (see Table 5). At least five items met the

criterion for each punishment goal.

Table 5
Percent Frequency Distribution for Punishment Goals Matching Task

Item #	Ret	Gen Det	Ind Det	Rehab	Rest	Inc	None
Retribution							
1	**69**	9	16	3			3
2	**91**	6	3				
3	**72**	9	3	3	13		
4	**85**	3	3	6			3
5	**66**	6	3	3		3	19
6	**75**	7	9				9
- 7	**59**	3	16	3	3	3	13
8	**82**	9					9
- 9	**53**				6	31	10
General Deterrence							
1		**88**		6	6		
2		**85**	9			6	
3		**94**	6				
4		**85**	3	6	3		3
5		**97**				3	
6		**88**	3	3	3	3	
Individual Deterrence							
1		6	**91**			3	
2		6	**88**	3		3	
3	6	3	**85**		3	3	
- 4	6	6	**50**	3		6	29
5	3	10	**78**	3		3	3
6		3	**91**	3		3	
Rehabilitation							
1		3		**91**	6		
2		3		**91**	6		
3				**97**	3		
4				**100**			
5		3		**88**	6	3	
6		6	3	**91**			
Restorative							
1			3	3	**91**		3
- 2		3	6	13	**59**		19
3	3	6	3	19	**69**		
4	3	3	3	16	**66**		9
5		3	3		**94**		
6		3		9	**85**	3	
- 7			3	29	**48**		20
8			6		**91**		3
- 9	16		3	6	**56**	3	16
Incapacitation							
1		3	6			**91**	
2			6	3	3	**88**	
3			6		3	**88**	3

4			6			**94**	
5				3	6	**91**	
6		3	6			**91**	
- 7	6	3			6	**60**	25

Note. Item numbers correspond to the item numbers in Appendix D. "-" beside an item number indicates the item did not reach the 65% criterion for retention. N = 32.

Main Study

Overview

The hypothesized path model was tested in the main study. To measure participant reactions to crime, participants were first asked to read a short crime scenario. Participants then completed the four scales that were developed in the pilot study. Factor analyses were conducted for the items of each scale. The factor analyses were conducted to remove items that did not load on the intended factor. However, if the items of two constructs loaded on the same factor, the constructs were not combined. This was done so that the hypothesized path model could be tested in its original form (this was the case for general deterrence and individual deterrence). The path model was then tested by a path analysis.

Additional analyses were also conducted. The first additional analysis was a test of the path model while controlling for crime severity. A measure of crime severity was therefore included in the survey. The second additional analysis was to modify the model in order to achieve fit with the data.

Method

Participants. Participants were recruited through MTurk, and were compensated $0.50 for completing the study. The original number of participants

was 664. Participants were first screened by whether they completed the study. The study included 19 subscales, one for each variable in the path model. Participants who did not complete at least 70% of the items for each subscale were removed. Seventy-nine participants were removed based on this criterion. Participant responses were then assessed by whether the same response was given for all the items within any of the four variables sets. No participants were removed based on this assessment. Participants were also screened by whether they gave an unlikely response to either of two questions. Along with the scales for the current study, participants completed a survey unrelated to the current study. The survey was the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Graham et al., 2011). The MFQ measures people's moral outlooks and includes two items that are used to screen participants. One item is "Whether or not someone was good at math." If participants reported that this consideration is "somewhat relevant," "very relevant," or "extremely relevant" to their moral outlook then they were removed from the sample. The second item is "It is better to do good than to do bad." Participants who reported that they disagreed with this statement were also removed. Thirty-six participants were removed based on their responses to these two items.

Finally, participants were screened by how quickly they completed the study. Although people will naturally vary in how long they take to complete a study, some participants may have moved through the study too quickly to provide valid responses to the survey items. Participants were removed for time based on a commonly used statistical criterion: those who were outside a 95%

confidence interval around the mean completion time, and who were on the low end of the time distribution, were considered to have completion times significantly different from the mean time. These participants were removed for completing the study unusually fast. A 95% confidence interval is determined by calculating the mean and standard deviation of the distribution. Before calculating the mean and standard deviation, participants who took a relatively long time, and were separated by neighboring times by over a minute, were removed temporarily (8 cases were removed, times were 33.33 minutes and longer). The mean and standard deviation were then calculated ($M = 15.30$, $SD = 4.94$). Also, the time distribution was determined to be close to normal based on a visual inspection (a method recommended by Field, 2005, for samples with more than 200 participants). Using a z-score of -1.96, the 95% confidence interval was demarcated at the low end at 5.62 minutes. Three participants completed the study in less time and were removed (a full 2.5% of the participants was not removed because participant times were more densely distributed at the low end than at the high end of the distribution). In total, 18% of the original sample was removed, leaving 546 participants.

The necessary number of participants to conduct a path analysis is estimated by the number of free parameters in the model (Kline, 2005). The number of free parameters in the hypothesized path model includes 17 path coefficients, 5 exogenous variable variances, 10 exogenous variable covariances, and 14 endogenous variable disturbances. The total number of free parameters is 46. While 20 participants per parameter is sometimes recommended, 10

participants has also been suggested as being sufficient with five participants

being the minimum number (Kline, 2005). To have 10 participants per parameter,

the current study would require 460 participants. Furthermore, a sample size of

400 has been recommended for models containing only measured variables and

no latent variables (Y. Li, personal communication, February 5, 2012). The

number of participants in the current study was therefore determined to be

sufficient to test the study's hypothesis.

The sample was 56% female and had a mean age of 34.59 years ($SD =$

12.70). The sample was 83% White, 7% Black, 3% Asian American, 2% Latino/a,

1% Native American, and 4% of another race or multiracial. The composition of

political affiliations was 35% Democrat, 26% Independent, 17% Republican, 5%

Libertarian, 1% Green Party, 1% had another affiliation and 15% reported having

no affiliation. A full account of the sample's demographic characteristics is

presented in Appendix E.

Procedure. Participants completed the study using a computer of their

choosing. The study materials were presented to participants by the online survey

program Qualtrics. The following instructions were presented to participants at

the start of the study:

> We are interested in the opinions and judgments people
>
> have about different crimes. In this study, you will read a
>
> description of an event that could result in criminal charges in
>
> some jurisdictions. Following the description are questions asking
>
> about your views of the event. We are interested in *your* reactions,

not in how you think judges, police officers, or others might view

or respond to the event. Please respond to the questions with your

first, natural response.

Participants were then presented with a description of a crime that was

randomly selected from a set of four crime descriptions. Participants then

completed the four scales from the pilot study and a crime severity scale.

Participants were presented with one scale at a time, and the scales were presented

in random order. The items within each scale were also randomized. After

completing the five scales, participants completed a demographics survey.

Materials.

Crime descriptions. Four crime scenarios were written by the author.

Previous studies have also used four crime scenarios to study reactions to crime

(Carlsmith, 2008; McFatter, 1982). The scenarios used in this study represented a

cross section of crime and ranged in type and severity. The scenarios were the

following: "A convenience store knowingly sells alcohol to minors;" "A person

makes counterfeit $20 bills and uses them to buy things;" "A homeless person

mugs a nurse;" and "A protester pushes a police officer during an illegal protest

against the country's involvement in a war."

Moral foundations. The Moral Foundations scale measured the degree to

which participants thought a crime violated the five moral foundations. A sample

item for the violation of harm is "The offender's actions caused direct harm to

other individuals." Responses were provided on a 9-point scale ranging from 1

(*Not at all*) to 9 (*Extremely*). Five to seven items formed each moral foundation

subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .93 (harm), .91 (fairness), .86 (ingroup), .86 (authority), and .88 (purity). See Appendix F for the scale's instructions and an illustration of a scale item.

Secondary appraisals. The Secondary Appraisals scale measured the degree to which participants thought the offender committed an immoral act, was morally incompetent, and had an immoral nature. An example item for the appraisal of an immoral act is "The act committed by the offender is wrong." Responses were provided on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*Strongly disagree*) to 9 (*Strongly agree*). Five to seven items formed each subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .92 (immoral act), .92 (moral incompetence), and .89 (immoral nature).

Emotions. Participants rated the degree to which they felt anger, contempt, disgust, sympathy, and fear "when thinking about the offender and the offender's actions". Ratings were made on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*Do not feel this at all*) to 9 (*Feel this very strongly*). Three to five items formed each subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .93 (anger), .95 (fear), .87 (contempt), .88 (sympathy), and .90 (disgust).

Punishment goals. Participants rated the extent to which they thought retribution, general deterrence, individual deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative justice, and incapacitation should be important considerations when sentencing the offender. Ratings were provided using a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*Not at all important*) to 9 (*Extremely important*). Five to six items formed each subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .83 (retribution), .95 (general

deterrence), .93 (individual deterrence), .88 (rehabilitation), .77 (restorative), and .96 (incapacitation).

Crime severity. The Crime Severity scale consisted of one item. Participants were asked, "How serious is this crime?" Responses were provided on a scale from 1 (*Not serious at all*) to 9 (*Extremely serious*).

Demographics. A demographics survey asked participants for information regarding their gender, age, race/ethnicity, political affiliation, religious affiliation, education, and income. The full survey is provided in Appendix G.

Results and Discussion

Factor analyses and internal reliability analyses were first conducted to improve the psychometric properties of the subscales. Path analyses were then conducted to test the hypothesis and to fit the path model to the data.

Item analysis and scale reduction. An exploratory factor analysis was conducted for each of the four scales: moral foundations, secondary appraisals, emotions, and punishment goals. Factor extraction was conducted by using Principal Axis Factoring along with the eigenvalue > 1 criterion. Factor rotation was done using Direct Oblimin rotation. Individual survey items were retained if they a) had factor loadings greater than .30 on the factor they were designed to measure and b) had their highest loading on the factor they were designed to measure.

Moral foundations. Factor extraction produced five factors. The five factors accounted for 71% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are

presented in Appendix H. Based on the item removal criteria, one item was removed from the fairness subscale and three items were removed from the purity subscale. Internal reliability analyses showed that all the subscales had adequate internal reliability and that the reliabilities would not be substantially improved if additional items were removed. Four to six items were retained for each moral foundation subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .93 (harm), .90 (fairness), .86 (ingroup), .86 (authority), and .86 (purity).

Secondary appraisals. Factor extraction produced three factors, which accounted for 71% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are presented in Appendix I. Based on the item removal criteria, one item was removed from the immoral nature subscale. Internal reliability analyses showed that no additional items should be removed. Five to seven items were retained for each subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .92 (immoral act), .92 (moral incompetence), and .87 (immoral nature).

Emotions. Factor extraction produced three factors. The three factors accounted for 74% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are presented in Appendix J. The items for the fear and sympathy subscales loaded on distinct factors. However, the items for anger, contempt, and disgust loaded on a single factor. Research on emotions (e.g., Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007) and data from the pilot study indicate these three emotions are distinguishable, particularly anger and disgust. A second factor analysis was therefore conducted with just the items from these three subscales. For the second analysis, the number of factors was fixed at three. Factor loadings are presented in Appendix J.

The items for each emotion loaded on a distinct factor, and none of the items were removed based on the item removal criteria. Internal reliability analyses also showed that no items should be removed. Three to five items were retained for each subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .93 (anger), .95 (fear), .87 (contempt), .88 (sympathy), and .90 (disgust).

Punishment goals. Factor extraction of the punishment goals items produced five factors. The five factors accounted for 71% of the variance. Factor loadings after factor rotation are presented in Appendix K. The items from the retribution subscale loaded on three factors. One item had a high factor loading on the "deterrence" factor. After reviewing this item, it was determined that the item was not very specific in terms of punishment goals. The item was therefore removed from the subscale. The remaining items were retained because they were conceptually consistent with retribution and because they were matched with retribution in the pilot study. Furthermore, no additional items needed to be removed based on an internal reliability analysis.

The items from the general deterrence and individual deterrence subscales loaded on the same factor. A second factor analysis with only these items, and with the number of factors fixed at two, did not differentiate the items. However, since the two punishment goals have been distinguished in prior research (Oswald et al., 2002), and since the items were differentiated in the pilot study, the two deterrence goals were kept separate for the current study. Also, no items were removed from these subscales based on the factor analysis.

One item was removed from the rehabilitation subscale and one from the restorative justice subscale. A second item on the restorative justice subscale met the item removal criteria although marginally. After review of the item, it was determined that the item was conceptually in line with the goal of restoration and the item was retained. No items from the incapacitation subscale were removed.

Internal reliability analyses of the scales showed that no additional items should be removed. Five to six items were retained for each subscale. Cronbach's alphas for the subscales were .80 (retribution), .95 (general deterrence), .93 (individual deterrence), .91 (rehabilitation), .71 (restorative), and .96 (incapacitation).

Descriptive statistics. Subscale scores were determined by calculating the mean of the item scores. A subscale score was calculated if at least 70% of the subscale's items held a value. The means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients for all variables are presented in Table 6.

The means and standard deviations for the individual crimes are presented in Appendix L. Each crime was perceived as violating each of the moral foundations. Each secondary appraisal, each emotion, and support for each punishment goal also occurred for each individual crime. This study amalgamated the reactions to the four crimes in order to study reactions to crime in general.

Table 6

Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations

Variable	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1. Harm	4.87 (2.35)	-																		
2. Fairness	5.56 (2.78)	.44*	-																	
3. Ingroup	5.28 (1.99)	.35*	.58*	-																
4. Authority	6.44 (1.82)	.47*	.44*	.69*	-															
5. Purity	4.86 (2.22)	.62*	.57*	.58*	.64*	-														
6. Immoral act	6.29 (2.12)	.47*	.64*	.58*	.68*	.68*	-													
7. Moral incompetence	4.01 (2.06)	.33*	.28*	.41*	.40*	.49*	.49*	-												
8. Immoral nature	2.98 (1.70)	.44*	.42*	.44*	.44*	.61*	.55*	.64*	-											
9. Anger	3.93 (2.43)	.45*	.33*	.41*	.47*	.54*	.53*	.48*	.60*	-										
10. Fear	2.22 (1.84)	.38*	.19*	.25*	.23*	.34*	.22*	.32*	.41*	.47*	-									
11. Contempt	4.03 (2.10)	.33*	.38*	.49*	.52*	.51*	.54*	.48*	.56*	.76*	.35*	-								
12. Sympathy	3.13 (2.09)	.25*	.08	-.11*	-.15*	.03	-.13*	-.10*	-.06	-.08	.21*	-.18*	-							
13. Disgust	3.52 (2.34)	.49*	.37*	.45*	.48*	.64*	.53*	.52*	.65*	.83*	.49*	.76*	-.04	-						
14. Retribution	5.64 (1.66)	.28*	.41*	.41*	.44*	.40*	.45*	.33*	.44*	.40*	.12*	.39*	-.15*	.41*	-					
15. General deterrence	6.13 (2.21)	.29*	.38*	.47*	.57*	.44*	.52*	.39*	.43*	.48*	.17*	.46*	-.27*	.48*	.67*	-				
16. Individual deterrence	6.55 (2.04)	.32*	.47*	.52*	.61*	.50*	.59*	.37*	.44*	.48*	.17*	.48*	-.26*	.47*	.71*	.89*	-			
17. Rehabilitation	5.84 (2.31)	.31*	.35*	.21*	.22*	.24*	.26*	.15*	.06	.11*	.20*	.07	.25*	.08	.18*	.11*	.19*	-		
18. Restorative	5.49 (1.72)	.13*	.11*	.07	.10*	.07	.03	.02	-.05	-.04	.07	-.04	.31*	-.07	.10	-.06	-.03	.55*	-	
19. Incapacitation	3.80 (2.30)	.42*	.48*	.43*	.41*	.49*	.47*	.43*	.60*	.50*	.31*	.43*	-.08	.52*	.61*	.58*	.59*	.20*	-.02	-
20. Crime severity	5.31 (2.22)	.40*	.56*	.49*	.54*	.55*	.66*	.41*	.49*	.54*	.27*	.50*	-.15*	.55*	.41*	.54*	.58*	.22*	-.01	.54*

Note: All subscales range from 1 to 9.

*p < .05.

Test of the hypothesis. The hypothesis was tested using path analysis and the software program AMOS (version 18; Byrne, 2001). A number of fit indices were used to assess model fit. A common and basic fit index is the chi-square value (χ^2). As the fit of a model worsens, the value of chi-square increases. A significant chi-square value, at $p < .05$, indicates poor fit. However, the chi-square statistic is typically significant when tests are conducted with large samples (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980). An alternative use of the chi-square value, which minimizes the impact of sample size, is to calculate the relative, or normed, chi-square (χ^2/df; Wheaton, Muthen, Alwin, & Summers, 1977). When using the relative chi-square statistic, a recommended standard for determining adequate fit is $\chi^2/df < 5.0$ (Wheaton et al., 1977). Along with the relative chi-square statistic, the following fit indices and standards were used: comparative fit index (CFI) > .09, root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) < .10, and standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) < .10 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2005). Based on these criteria, the hypothesized model did not have adequate fit: $\chi^2(144) = 3974.09$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 27.60$, CFI = .45, RMSEA = .22, SRMR = .28.

The path coefficients from the path analysis are presented in Figure 4. Although the model did not fit the data, 15 of the 17 hypothesized paths were significant and in the anticipated direction. The predicted relation between immoral nature and sympathy was not significant. Also, the relation between moral incompetence and sympathy was significant but was negative rather than positive.

An attempt was made to improve the fit of the model while holding to the predicted paths of the hypothesis. The approach that was used was to correlate error terms.

Figure 4. Path analysis of the hypothesized path model. Standardized path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at *p* < .05.

Correlating error terms. An error term, also called a residual, represents the variance of a variable that is not explained by the model. Unexplained variance can be caused by constructs not represented in the model as well as measurement error (Lleras, 2005). The unexplained variances of two variables in a model could be due to the same unrepresented variable and would therefore be related. Correlating error terms can therefore improve the fit of a model without introducing new variables that are not part of the research question. Furthermore, if correlated error terms only occur between variables that do not have a direct path between them, called a bow-free pattern, the model can be analyzed as a recursive model and would not require the more sophisticated methods for analyzing nonrecursive models (Kline, 2005). To prevent bow patterns from occurring, only the error terms of variables within the same variable set were considered. Other considerations included a correlation's modification index and a theoretical rationale. A modification index represents the expected drop in chi-square if a model parameter, such as an error correlation, is allowed to be estimated in a subsequent path analysis (Byrne, 2001).

The modification indices (MI) from the path analysis of the hypothesized model suggested the error terms of the following variables should be correlated: moral incompetence and immoral nature (MI = 102.34), anger and contempt (MI = 132.57), anger and disgust (MI = 164.72), contempt and disgust (MI = 146.65), retribution and general deterrence (MI = 158.36), retribution and individual deterrence (MI = 192.87), retribution and incapacitation (MI = 122.81), general deterrence and individual deterrence (MI = 317.94), general deterrence and

incapacitation (MI = 79.90), individual deterrence and incapacitation (MI = 105.96), and rehabilitation and restorative justice (MI = 139.77).

Along with a high modification index, each of these correlated errors had a theoretical rationale for inclusion. The appraisals of a criminal offender's moral incompetence and immoral nature would likely be caused by common variables other than the moral violations represented in the model. The two appraisals would therefore have related error terms. The three emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust have been grouped together in an "other-condemning" family of emotions (Haidt, 2003). These emotional experiences would likely be related in the context of judging criminal behavior and their error terms would therefore be correlated. The punishment goals of retribution, general deterrence, individual deterrence, and incapacitation can be considered "punitive" goals while rehabilitation and restorative justice can be considered "rehabilitative" goals (Lau, Tyson, & Bond, 2009). The punishment goals would therefore form two interrelated sets of punishment goals. The interrelations of these two sets of punishment goals have been found in prior research (De Keijser et al., 2002).

One additional correlation between error terms had a substantive modification index: anger and fear (MI = 96.28). These two emotions can be caused by similar variables not represented in the model. However, since the modification indices between the error terms of fear and contempt and between fear and disgust were low, it was decided that fear should not be partially connected to the interrelated emotions of anger, contempt, and disgust.

By including the correlated errors, the fit of the model was improved but was still not adequate: $\chi^2(133) = 1858.11$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 13.97$, CFI = .75, RMSEA = .16, SRMR = .28. All the path coefficients that were significant in the first path analysis remained so except for the path between fear and general deterrence.

Additional analyses.

Controlling for crime severity. The perceived severity of a crime may account for many of the relations that were significant in the original path analysis. The severity of an act is related to emotional reactions (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011) and the severity of crime is related to support for punishment goals (Darley et al., 2000; Gromet & Darley, 2006). It is likely that the moral violations and the secondary appraisals would be related to crime severity as well. It is therefore possible that variance in crime severity could produce significant relationships between the variables.

An additional path analysis was conducted to control for crime severity. The same correlated errors from the second analysis were also included. The fit of the model was improved but was still not adequate: $\chi^2(133) = 1343.46$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 10.10$, CFI = .84, RMSEA = .13, SRMR = .13. Three additional path coefficients became nonsignificant: the negative path coefficient between moral incompetence and sympathy, the path between immoral act and fear, and the path between contempt and individual deterrence. The path model is presented in Figure 5.

Figure 5. Path analysis of the hypothesized path model with correlated errors and controlling for crime severity. Standardized path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at *p* < .05.

Fitting the model. Two attempts were made to fit the model to the data. In the first attempt, paths were added to the model using modification indices until adequate fit was attained. In the second attempt, information from the first attempt was used to produce a more parsimonious model that still fit the data. The first attempt began with the correlated errors that were used previously but without crime severity as a control variable. Paths were then added sequentially until model fit was attained. To attain model fit, 21 new paths had to be added. Along with the original 17 paths of the hypothesized path model, 38 paths in total were necessary to fit the model: $\chi^2(110) = 700.28$, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 6.37$, CFI = .92, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .13 (the CFI and RMSEA fit indexes met their standards for fit).

The second attempt to fit the model began by removing all the paths from the first attempt that had coefficients less than .20. Twenty-one paths remained. The error correlations used to test the hypothesized model were also included, and crime severity was added as a control. Model fit was not attained so two additional paths were added based on their modification indices. All fit indices, except the relative chi-square statistic, then indicated adequate model fit: $\chi^2(127)$ = 677.92, $p < .001$, $\chi^2/df = 5.34$, CFI = .93, RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .08. The fitted path model is presented in Figure 6. To improve the clarity of presentation, the same figure, but without the error correlations and the crime severity variable, is presented in Figure 7.

Fifteen of the 23 paths were either direct or indirect effects in the hypothesized path model. New paths were between harm and sympathy, authority

and immoral act, purity and moral incompetence, immoral nature and anger, immoral nature and fear, immoral nature and contempt, fear and rehabilitation, and contempt and general deterrence. All of the additional paths were positive. Also, the path between authority and sympathy was predicted to be positive but was negative.

Figure 6. Path analysis of the fitted path model. Standardized path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at *p*

< .05.

Figure 7. Path analysis of the fitted path model. Error correlations and crime severity are removed from the diagram. Standardized

path coefficients are reported. Solid lines represent significant paths at *p* < .05.

General Discussion

A great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only retribution can restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty to the moral order to punish the criminal. (Yosal Rogat; as cited in Arendt, 1963, p. 277).

Crimes can be perceived as morally wrong for a variety of reasons. The moral violations that are perceived in a crime may then be related to appraisals of the offender which, in turn, elicit emotional reactions. Different emotions, with their individual action tendencies, may then be related to different ways for responding to the crime. Responses to crime, such as punishment goals, would then be geared toward addressing the eliciting moral violations and appraisals of the offender.

Punishments can have a variety of effects. They can bring justice to victims and affirm the values of a group, but also isolate offenders and potentially reduce an offender's relational and economic wellbeing. Many of the issues related to criminal justice are connected to the values of community psychology. Understanding the origins of the punishment goals that motivate and shape punishments can help in pursuing the goals of community psychology.

This study used a categorization of moral concerns and a functionalist theory of emotion to predict support for different punishment goals. To test the predicted relations, a hypothesized model was tested against the study's sample data. Most of the study's variables were related in the sample data. It was expected that the hypothesized model, with specified relations between variables,

would reproduce the relations that were found in the sample data. Should the relations in the sample data be reproduced by the model, it could be concluded that the relations depicted in the model were the reasons for the relations in the sample data. The hypothesized model, however, did not reproduce the sample relations; that is, the model did not fit the data.

The lack of fit may have been due to incorrectly omitting and/or including certain relations in the hypothesized model (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Some important relations that produced the sample data may not have been represented in the model, while some unimportant relations may have been included. For example, to create a model that did fit the data, relations had to be added between an immoral nature and several emotions. Also, moral incompetence had to be removed as a mediator between the violations of ingroup and authority principles and the emotion of contempt.

The hypothesized model was based on available theories of morality and emotion, as well as numerous studies. However, many of the predicted relations had not been explored in prior research, and some relations were not specified correctly in the hypothesized model. Although the hypothesized model did not fit the data, a majority of the predicted relations were significant and in the predicted direction. Furthermore, a modified model that did fit the data consisted mainly of paths that were direct or indirect paths in the hypothesized model. The following section will examine the predicted relations, whether or not they were supported in the final model, and how these findings relate to existing literature and theory. Discussion of the findings will be organized using four categories of punishment

goals: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restorative justice, and incapacitation.

Retribution

The predicted relations that led to support for retribution were all significant in the hypothesized model (whether or not crime severity was included as a control). Harm and fairness violations predicted the appraisal of an immoral act, the appraisal of an immoral act predicted the emotion of anger, and anger predicted support for retribution.

The relations between harm and fairness violations and the appraisal of an immoral act support previous studies that found the consequences for individual victims predicted the perceived severity of criminal acts (Alter, Kernochan, & Darley, 2007; Blum-West, 1985; O'Connell & Whelan, 1996; Rosenmerkel, 2001; Warr, 1989). Also, crimes resulting in severe bodily injury and property theft have been rated as the most serious types of crime (Sellin & Wolfgang, 1964).

The appraisal of an immoral act can then lead to a desire for retribution. When an immoral act is committed, an offender elevates himself or herself above a victimized party. By punishing the offender, the value of the victimized party is reaffirmed, the status of the offender is lowered, and a proper balance is attained (De Keijser et al., 2002; Vidmar & Miller, 1980).

The relation between an immoral act and support for retribution was mediated by anger. These relations support a functionalist account of anger. Anger occurs by perceiving an injustice, motivates an action tendency to attack

the injustice, and dissipates once the injustice is addressed (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fisher & Roseman, 2007; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Public desires for retribution can therefore be fueled by anger and based on perceptions that an immoral act occurred in that an individual victim was wronged.

In the fitted model, authority violations also predicted the appraisal of an immoral act. Theories of morality and social organization support such a finding. Social groups, particularly large groups, can benefit by taking intuitive moral views regarding behavior and formalizing them into group-level rules (Durkheim, 1895/1982). Such rules can protect individual life and property and provide a general structure and order to social life. Justice systems, for example, can take moral views regarding the treatment of individuals and convert them into authoritative, group-level rules and laws. Because of the moral principles of the authority foundation, crimes can then be perceived as immoral acts, not only because of the content of the act (e.g., hurting an individual), but also because the offender is disobeying and disrespecting the group's authoritative laws and values that protect individuals and provide order to the group (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). In the context of crime, the appraisal of an immoral act could therefore be based on the perception of an authority violation. By committing a crime, an offender could be seen as elevating himself or herself above the authority of law. Retribution could then be desired to reaffirm the value of the law and to lower the status of the offender.

In the fitted model, anger was also predicted by the appraisal that the offender possessed an immoral nature. This appraisal was predicted by purity

violations. Purity violations include displays of indecency and they can suggest that abnormalities exist within the moral minds of offenders (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011). Purity violations, and an immoral nature, can violate the moral integrity of a group and its shared moral identity (Rai & Fiske, 2011). An immoral nature is not an act but can still be an offense to the group, and could therefore require retributive punishment in the eyes of the surrounding public. The punishment would again lower the status of the offender and establish a proper moral balance between parties.

The models suggest there are three types of social values or constructs that need to be vindicated by retribution after a crime has occurred. The three constructs are consistent with Shweder and colleagues' three targets of moral concern: individuals, the community, and the divine (Shweder et al., 1997). Harm and fairness violations are acts against individuals, authority violations are acts against the community, and purity violations are acts against the divine (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Shweder et al., 1997). Crimes can therefore be seen as wronging three different parties: they can wrong an individual victim, they can wrong the community's laws that provide order, and they can wrong the idea of decency that is intrinsic to the sacred concept of humanity. Anger can then be experienced in response to each of these violations, and retribution can be desired on behalf of each social construct that was victimized by a crime.

One additional difference between the hypothesized model and the fitted model is that harm violations did not predict the appraisal of an immoral act in the fitted model. In the fitted model, authority violations accounted for some of the

variance in the appraisal of an immoral act and reduced the variance available for the harm and fairness violations. Fairness violations, however, still predicted an immoral act in the fitted model, and this may have been due to the types of crimes that were used in the study. Many of the crime scenarios included a monetary element, which may be connected to the fairness foundation, but did not depict an individual being harmed. Had different crimes been used (more severe crimes involving physical harm), the violation of harm may have predicted an immoral act in the fitted model.

The goal of retribution often receives more public support than other goals of punishment (Darley et al., 2000; Warr et al., 1983). Although retribution is often defined as gaining justice for the individual victim of a crime (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003) the public's desires for retribution may not be based solely on concerns for individual victims. This study found that authority violations and purity violations also led to desires for retributive justice. The connections between moral violations and retribution were mediated by the appraisals of an immoral act and an immoral nature and by the emotion of anger.

General and Individual Deterrence

Another goal of punishment is to create a psychological association between deviancy and punishment in the minds of potential offenders. The purpose of forming such an association is to deter future criminal behaviors. Since the goal of deterrence is different from the goal of retribution, a different emotion may be associated with the goal of deterrence and this emotion may be activated by different moral concerns.

All the predicted relations leading to general deterrence and individual deterrence were significant in the path analysis of the hypothesized model when crime severity was not included as a control. In the analysis that did include crime severity, the paths to and from fear were no longer significant. Furthermore, in the fitted model fear did not predict any of the punishment goals. It was expected that fear would predict general deterrence because an action tendency of fear is to avoid a threat and the goal of deterrence is to prevent future criminal behavior (Carlsmith, 2006; Lazarus, 1991). Prior research also found that fear predicted support for more punitive sentences (Klama & Egan, 2011; Sims, 2003).

Prior findings involving fear, however, did not incorporate the potential effects of other emotions. The action tendencies of anger, contempt, and disgust, for example, are more assertive and hostile, while the action tendency of fear is more aligned with removing oneself from a threat than with aggressing against it (Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991). Public support for punishment may therefore be less affected by fear than by other emotions that are elicited by crime.

Fear may also be experienced to a lesser degree than other emotions when considering crimes that are committed against others (as was the case in this study). Although fear, anger, and disgust are all elicited by perceiving a threat, fear occurs when the threat is stronger than the self and anger and disgust occur when the threat is weaker than the self (Lazarus, 1991). With the strength and size of the criminal justice system, the public may be more likely to feel anger and disgust in response to crimes than they are to feel fear.

An emotion that did predict support for deterrence was contempt. Contempt predicted individual deterrence in the hypothesized model, and predicted both general and individual deterrence in the fitted model. The goal of deterrence is to deter people from committing crime and relies on punishment and the threat of punishment to achieve this end (Carroll, Perkowitz, Lurigio, & Weaver, 1987). Contempt tends to depersonalize the target and to see them as morally inferior (Izard, 1977; Haidt, 2003). Using punishment to control the behavior of an offender, and especially punishing an offender to control the behaviors of others, could be facilitated by feeling contempt for the offender.

Contempt was predicted by ingroup and authority violations in both the hypothesized and fitted models (the relation was mediated by moral incompetence in the hypothesized model). Ingroup and authority violations include failures to carry out the duties that a person has as a member of a group (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Rozin et al., 1999). By committing a crime, an offender could be seen as displaying a contemptuous disregard for the rules of society or for the personal responsibilities that come with being a group member. A common elicitor of contempt is in fact the perception of contemptibility in others (Izard, 1991). An offender's display of contempt for the group's valued social norms could therefore elicit contempt in third-party observers.

The appraisal of moral incompetence did not mediate the relations between ingroup and authority violations and the feeling of contempt in the fitted model. This may have been due to the secondary appraisal of an immoral nature. Although the items for moral incompetence and an immoral nature formed

separate factors in a factor analysis, the two constructs were strongly correlated. Also, in the fitted model, purity violations predicted both secondary appraisals. The appraisal of an immoral nature then predicted contempt, and further relations involving moral incompetence were not needed to fit the model to the data. The construct of moral incompetence may be distinguishable from an immoral nature but the differentiation may require additional information about the offender. For example, the appraisal of moral incompetence may be more likely to occur toward child offenders while the appraisal of an immoral nature may be more likely to occur for adult offenders or offenders with a mental illness.

In summary, although the "fear of crime" is sometimes used in public commentary to explain support for punitive responses to crime, such as deterrence, the action tendency of fear is not consistent with behaving in a punitive manner, and fear did not predict support for punishment in this study. Rather, deterrence was predicted by feeling contempt, which acted as a mediator between group and purity moral violations and support for deterrence.

Rehabilitation and Restorative Justice

While the goal of deterrence is to prevent crime by punishing offenders, the goal of rehabilitation is to prevent crime by assisting offenders. Similarly, while the goal of retribution is to restore a balance between parties through punishment, the goal of restorative justice is to resolve the conflicts created by crime through participation and acceptance. The cognitive appraisals and emotions that predict support for rehabilitation and restorative justice are

therefore likely to differ from those that predict support for other punishment goals.

It was sympathy for the offender that predicted support for rehabilitation and restorative justice in both the hypothesized and fitted models. Support for these punishment goals is therefore related to a concern for the offender and a behavioral disposition to offer assistance to the offender.

It was expected that an appraisal of moral incompetence would be positively related to sympathy. The relation was not significant in the hypothesized model while controlling for crime severity or in the fitted model. In the hypothesized model without crime severity, moral incompetence was negatively related to sympathy. The two variables also had a negative bivariate correlation. The negative relation may indicate that the offender was perceived to be responsible for his or her state of moral incompetence, which would reduce sympathy for the offender. Sympathy is elicited when a person's situation is perceived to be caused by the environment or factors outside the person's control (Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Wickens et al., 2011). If additional information had been provided that indicated the incompetence was due to factors outside the offender's control, sympathy for the offender may have occurred. Without any information about the cause, however, it appears there may be a tendency to assume the offender is responsible for his or her moral incompetence.

The predicted relation between an immoral nature and sympathy was nonsignificant in all the models. In the fitted model, however, an immoral nature predicted all the other emotions. The pattern may be explained by the elicitors of

the emotions. The elicitors of anger, fear, contempt, and disgust can all include some form of threat (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Devos et al., 2003) and as the appraisal of an immoral nature increased, it is likely the perception of a threat increased. The elicitor of sympathy, on the other hand, is that a person needs and deserves assistance (Rudolph et al., 2004). It was expected that as the appraisal of an immoral nature increased, the offender would be seen as less deserving of assistance and would therefore receive less sympathy. Although this relation did not occur, a negative relation between authority violations and sympathy did (in the fitted model). Authority violations include disrespecting a group's laws and values (Vidmar & Miller 1980), and this moral violation may lead to perceptions that an offender is less deserving of assistance and less deserving of sympathy.

Harm violations also predicted sympathy for the offender in the fitted model, and the relation was positive. The harm foundation pertains to concerns for the wellbeing of people as individuals and is somewhat distinct from concerns for the wellbeing of the group (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Graham et al., 2009). Perceiving harm to the individual victim of a crime, and feeling sympathy for the offender of a crime, may both be enhanced by a predisposition to feel concern for other individuals. Variance in this disposition across participants may have produced a relation between the two variables (a third-variable effect): participants who had more overall concern for individuals (via the harm moral foundation) had more concern for the individual victim of a crime and also had more concern for the offender.

Fairness violations also predicted support for rehabilitation, but the relation was not mediated by sympathy. Still, the fairness foundation also pertains to concerns for the wellbeing of individuals (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Graham et al., 2009) and was related to support for rehabilitating the offender.

In summary, rehabilitation programs can help offenders lead more productive lives, and restorative approaches to punishment can help offenders reintegrate back into society (Marshall, 2003). These goals are primarily related to the action tendencies of sympathy. Feeling sympathy for offenders appears to stem from a general concern for the wellbeing of individuals, but sympathy can be reduced by perceiving crime as violations of the authority foundation.

Incapacitation

The final goal of punishment is incapacitation. The goal of incapacitation is to forcibly restrict offenders, typically by physically isolating offenders in jails and prisons (Darley et al., 2000). Some of the strongest relations in the path models were those leading to incapacitation.

The predicted relations between purity violations, an immoral nature, disgust, and support for incapacitation were significant in all the models. The results confirm previous findings that showed purity violations predicted the appraisal of an abnormal and less-than-human nature (Russell & Giner-Sorolla, 2011) and that the appraisal of an immoral nature predicted disgust (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). The findings also show that the action tendency of disgust, which is to avoid or expel the source, predicted public support for the goal of incapacitation.

In the fitted model, the appraisal of an immoral nature was the primary predictor of emotional reactions. The appraisal of an immoral nature, and the accompanying emotions, can justify and motivate punitive reactions and contribute to the isolation of offenders, both during the punishment process and afterward. Attributing the cause of a person's behavior to a stable quality of the person is a fundamental process in human thinking (Reyna & Weiner, 2001; Weiner, 2006). Increasing the public's awareness of environmental and situational factors that cause crime may decrease the appraisal of a stable, immoral nature and thereby decrease feelings of anger, fear, contempt, and disgust towards offenders.

Implications for Theory

Public attitudes regarding crime and punishment are interwoven with the criminal justice system. The moral intuitions (Haidt, 2001), emotions (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), and justice heuristics (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) of the public can interact with environmental norms and institutions to form social-moral systems for preventing and punishing immoral behavior (Haidt, 2008). A justice system's response to crime is therefore, to a significant degree, a public response to crime. Understanding public views of crime and punishment can contribute to understanding the ecology of the criminal justice system and the punishments that are issued to offenders (Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Kelly, 1966; Trickett, 1984).

The intuitive moral concerns of the public include concerns for individuals, groups, and purity. Not every individual, however, shares the same

moral concerns. Liberals tend to value harm and fairness moral principles more than conservatives, while conservatives tend to value ingroup, authority, and purity moral principles more than liberals (Graham et al., 2009). Most psychologists are liberal (Redding, 2001) and there may therefore be a greater focus on the harm and fairness foundations when studying the public's moral concerns. Indeed, Kohlberg (1969) described the highest stage of moral reasoning as consisting of concerns for individual rights and wellbeing. A common view may therefore be that the harm and fairness foundations should play a central role in public reactions to crime.

The findings of this study, however, found that other moral concerns, particularly authority and purity, were substantive predictors of emotional and punitive responses to crime. Some existing theories have also emphasized these group-related concerns. Tyler (1997) has suggested that individual rights and the sanctity of life are group-level values and that violations of these values symbolically harm the group. Tyler goes on to suggest that people desire punishment in order to defend the values and identity of the group. Vidmar and Miller (1980) have also stated that public concern with crime is primarily focused on protecting and preserving the group's values and social order. Similarly, Weiner (2006) has suggested that the ultimate victim of crime is society itself. It can therefore be understood why, in many criminal justice systems, the prosecutors is said to represent "the people."

The study also found that fear did not play a prominent role in predicting support for punishment goals. An implication is that future research on public

support for punishment goals should perhaps focus more attention on anger, contempt, and disgust than on fear. The fear of crime could continue to be studied to understand and improve victim and community wellbeing, and to understand the views that politicians and judges may have regarding public concerns (Ouimet & Coyle, 1991), but the emotion may not be as relevant to understanding the general public's support of punishment compared to anger, contempt, and disgust. However, the finding that fear did not contribute to the fit of the model may have been due to the mild harmful nature of the crimes Future research could establish whether and when fear increases support for punishment.

Community psychology supports the need for studying the psychological and environmental causes of criminal behavior in order to improve the effectiveness of crime prevention initiatives. Similarly, there is a need to study the psychological and environmental causes of punishment in order to improve the effectiveness of policy reform efforts. This paper considers the need for studying the ecology of the criminal justice system and for understanding public concerns with crime and punishment.

Implications for Intervention

Understanding the moral views of the public can assist in framing policy reform recommendations that advance the values and goals of community psychology. The values of community psychology include preventing social and behavioral problems and promoting individual and community wellbeing (Dalton et al., 2007). Criminal behaviors can be reduced, and offender wellbeing increased, by offering rehabilitation programs (Coulter & VandeWeerd, 2009;

Jason et al., 2008; Liau et al., 2004; Seave, 2011; Van Stelle et al., 1994). Public

support for rehabilitation could be increased by disseminating messages within

public and legal domains that advocate for rehabilitation. Such messages should

be designed to increase public and political receptivity to the goal of

rehabilitation. Many of the emotions and punishment goals of the study were

predicted by authority and purity violations. One approach to increasing support

for rehabilitation would be to combine rehabilitation with authority and purity

concerns. For example, associating rehabilitation with increased law-abiding

behavior and decreased purity violations could resonate with the values and

concerns of the public more than messages that focus primarily on the wellbeing

of criminals. Ignoring the moral concerns of the audience, on the other hand,

could increase resistance to reform recommendations.

The appraisals that people make regarding offenders can also be

considered when developing interventions for reforming the justice system. The

appraisal that an offender committed an immoral act and the appraisal that an

offender possessed an immoral nature were particularly likely to elicit emotional

reactions, and perhaps these appraisals are the simplest ones to make when given

limited information about a crime or an offender. The appraisal of an immoral act

indirectly predicted support for retribution while the appraisal of an immoral

nature indirectly predicted support for deterrence and incapacitation. These latter

punishment goals can lead to more punitive punishments (Carlsmith, 2008).

Support for punitive reactions to crime can therefore be increased when public

attention is focused on the immoral nature of offenders or when the notion of a

"criminal element" is proposed to exist and to account for crime. Public focus should be directed toward the immoral act that is committed by crime rather than notions of an immoral nature. By doing so, punishments would more likely be guided by the goal of retribution rather than the more punitive goals of deterrence and incapacitation.

Emphasizing the immoral act over an offender's immoral nature would also allow the public to feel anger in response to crime but would reduce feelings of contempt and disgust. Anger is less enduring than contempt and disgust and also less problematic (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Allowing the public to feel anger, while decreasing contempt and disgust, could be a viable approach to satisfying the public's need for justice while reducing public support for harsh punishments and lengthy terms of incarceration.

Decreasing support for deterrence and incapacitation is one way in which public attitudes could be changed, but public attitudes could also be influenced in order to increase support for these punishment goals. Increasing the severity and certainty of punishment is often viewed as an effective way to reduce crime, and many people feel the criminal justice system should pursue the goals of deterrence and incapacitation (Carlsmith, 2008; Doob, 2000; Tyler, 1990).

Public opinions are often influenced by group identities and group interests (Haidt, 2012). People will advocate for and support social norms and legal procedures that benefit their social groups. Unfortunately, offenders can often be perceived as forming a separate out-group of social outcasts (Western & Petit, 2010). Members of the public who perceive offenders as belonging to a

separate group may therefore be more supportive of punitive measures that are believed to control the criminal out-group. Such punitive measures, however, can increase the social and economic disadvantages of offenders and these disadvantages can perpetuate across an offender's familial relations (Western & Petit, 2010).

One reason for the present study was to understand the psychological origins of support for punishment so that interventions could be developed to modify public opinion. Naturally, the findings of such a study could be used to affect public opinion in any number of ways, and different people, with different group identities and different views of justice and crime prevention, could use the findings to pursue different objectives. Since people are often motivated by group interests, punishments that are less punitive towards offenders would likely be desired by groups that are in some way linked to offenders (e.g., ex-offender associations and communities that are negatively impacted by high incarceration rates). Mobilizing and increasing the political capital of these social groups would increase the likelihood that this study's findings would be applied in a manner that reduces public support for punitive measures and increases public support for rehabilitation and restorative justice.

Implications for Policy

The study presents several implications for policy. One implication is the influence of making a behavior illegal. The perception of authority violations was a substantive predictor of public support for punishment. This finding suggests that simply making an act illegal can elevate the moral wrongfulness of the act, as

the act is then violating a law of society. The moral wrongfulness of a crime influences the severity of punishment that is desired by the public (Pepitone & DiNubile, 1976). Similarly, the severity of punishment that is issued by the justice system conveys the degree of wrongfulness of an act (Tyler, 1990; Vidmar and Miller, 1980). Policies that mandate severe punishments for acts that are otherwise minor moral offences could create a cycle that produces high moral condemnation and unnecessarily high incarceration rates. Reducing the sentences for minor criminal acts, such as consensual sex acts (e.g., prostitution) and minor drug use, or even decriminalizing these acts, could be met with public support over time.

Another implication for policy has to do with the current trend toward prison privatization. Private corporations can own and operate prisons and lease prison beds to the state for profit. Market forces could motivate prison corporations to either advocate for longer terms of incarceration or to use their resources to reduce recidivism rates. Should the prison market be structured in a way that encourages advocating for increased incarceration, the findings of this study could be used to do so. The private prison market, however, could be geared toward decreasing recidivism. Specifically, policies should define the services that private prisons provide in terms of reduced recidivism rates rather than strictly in terms of secure incarceration. Corporations that compete to develop the best services, in order to gain government contracts, would then strive to reduce the recidivism rates of their prisoners.

Policies could also be written for both public and private prisons to increase public perceptions regarding the humanity of offenders and decrease views that offenders possess immoral natures. Such efforts could increase public sympathy for offenders and lead to support for rehabilitation, decrease support for deterrence and incapacitation, and decrease the development of criminal identities in offenders (Pager, 2003). Prison policies could allow prisoners to have a few clothing options rather than a single prisoner uniform. A single uniform can reduce the view that prisoners are individuals and can dehumanize offenders (Bastian & Haslam, 2011). Community service programs could also be incorporated more often into sentences. Such programs would convey images of productivity and community involvement rather than images of physical isolation and stagnation. Changing the image of criminals could reduce the public´s use of an immoral nature schema when trying to understand the behavior of criminals.

Limitations

Some limitations of the study exist. First, the study used a cross-sectional design which means the relations that were found between variables are not necessarily causal relations. Path analysis tests relations that are presumed to be causal but a path model can fit the data when relations are correlational or when they are causal but in the opposite direction as predicted (Kline, 2005). At the same time, the sequence of psychological events that was represented in the path model was based on a causal theory of emotion that has received widespread support from researchers (e.g., Izard, 1977; Weiner, 1985). The causal inferences that were made in this paper were therefore not based on the path analysis alone

but also on theory. However, alternative accounts could be made to explain the relations that were found in this study. One alternative account is that the emotional states of participants caused the appraisals that were made regarding the crime and the offender. Several researchers have proposed that emotions do not only carry action tendencies that shape behavior but they also have appraisal tendencies that shape judgments and evaluations (Chapman & Anderson, 2011; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Future research could include experimental studies to test whether the relations in the path model are causal and whether they occur in the predicted directions.

A second limitation was the small set of crimes. Although small sets of crimes have been used in prior research (e.g., Carlsmith, 2008; McFatter, 1982; Rucker et al., 2004), many types of crime may not have been adequately represented by the stimuli. For example, the three types of crime that make up the greatest portions of the federal prison population are drug offenses (50.1%), weapons, explosives, arson (15.5%), and immigration (10.5%) (Federal Bureau of Prisons, 2014). The crime scenarios used in the study did not depict these crimes, nor many other types of crimes. Although the crimes used in the study formed a diverse set of crimes, some of the tested relations may be dependent on the type of crime and would therefore be affected by the crimes that were used. For example, many of the crimes may have violated the fairness foundation but not the harm foundation. This may be why fairness violations predicted the appraisal of an immoral act, in the fitted model, while harm violations did not. Future research

could determine whether the relations examined here vary across crime type, and could verify which relations occur for crimes in general.

Another limitation is that the crimes were not very severe. This was done deliberately in order to avoid ceiling effects for some of the variables. For example, in a previous study of crime severity, the "planned killing of an acquaintance" received a mean severity rating of 8.09 on a 9-point scale (Rossi, Waite, Bose, & Berk, 1974). Using such a crime in the study could have resulted in negatively skewed distributions for some of the variables, which could have impacted the analyses of the path models (Kline, 2005). However, more severe crimes may also generate different reactions to crime and should be investigated in future studies.

A final limitation is that a single-study design was used to develop the fitted model. Although the overall model had adequate fit with the data, some parts of the model may have fit the data better than other parts (Kline, 2005). It is possible that some segments of the model may fluctuate across samples and study designs in a way that would require the model to be changed in order to achieve fit. The fitted model should therefore be retested with different scenarios and with different samples to identify the more robust aspects of the model.

Future Research

Several areas for future research exist, both within the paradigm of the study and beyond. One area is to further explore the constructs themselves. Some of the constructs may need to be combined while others may need to be divided. The emotions of anger and disgust loaded on the same factor in the initial factor

analysis. Although these emotions have been found to be distinct in prior research on moral transgressions (Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007), they have also been found to merge. For example, Salerno and Peter-Hagene (2013) investigated reactions to crimes and found that moral outrage is a combination of anger and disgust. Future research is needed to determine when these emotions function separately and when they operate together.

Additional research could also be done on the punishment goals. General deterrence and individual deterrence did not emerge as distinct factors in the study. This has also occurred in other studies (e.g., McFatter, 1982), but some have argued the goals are in fact distinct and are predicted by different things. For example, Carlsmith (2006) argues that support for general deterrence increases when a certain crime occurs more often and when detection and prosecution rates for the crime are low. Further research could determine when general and individual deterrence form a homogeneous goal and when support for the two deterrence goals are independent.

The punishment goal of retribution may need to be split into multiple goals. The goal of retribution has sometimes been described as providing justice for the individual victim of a crime and sometimes as reasserting the values of society (Vidmar & Miller, 1980). Also, de Keijser and colleagues (2002) found that items measuring "just deserts" and items measuring the restoration of a moral balance loaded on separate factors in a confirmatory factor analysis. There may therefore be multiple factors that exist within the abstract concept of retribution.

Restorative justice may also need to be divided into several components. Participation by various parties (i.e., the victim, offender, and community members), addressing the needs of various parties, and reintegrating the offender into the community can all be objectives of restorative justice (De Keijser et al., 2002; Gromet & Darley, 2009; Marshall, 2003). Determining whether these elements form distinct punishment goals, and if so, determining what factors predict support for each element could be areas for future research.

The reintegration of offenders into their communities is an important area for future research and it is related to the values of community psychology. This study found that, across a variety of crimes, offenders can be perceived as possessing an immoral nature. This could produce a form of prejudice toward offenders that makes it difficult for them to enter social circles and to gain employment. Studying how prejudicial views of offenders could be reduced would help with offender reintegration.

An offender's demographics may be an additional factor that affects public support for punishment goals. Punishments are justified wrongs; they are issued in part to reinforce societal values and to send a message about the consequences of crime (Carlsmith, 2006; Vidmar & Miller, 1980). The application of punishments to achieve these social goals can be facilitated by the moral status of the offender: those with a lower moral status can be treated with less moral regard and therefore punished more readily (Skolnick & Shaw, 1994). People of low status, such as the poor and racial minorities, may receive more punishments (Byrne & Taxman, 1994). The punishments issued to low status

offenders can serve a social purpose while being less likely to violate moral principles regarding the treatment of individuals (Gerber & Jackson, 2013). Future studies could combine the constructs used in this study with demographic characteristics of offenders to further study public support for punishment goals.

The demographics of offenders could also influence the decisions that are made by parties within the justice system. For example, Black and Latino defendants are more likely to be denied bail during pretrial processing compared to White defendants (Schlesinger, 2005). One cause of this racial disparity could be perceptions that Black and Latino people are more likely to have an immoral nature compared to White people. Such an appraisal could lead justice personnel to act toward incapacitation and to deny minority defendants release on bail. Future studies could sample different parties within the criminal justice system to determine what appraisals (e.g., an immoral nature) are being applied when making legal decisions and sentencing recommendations.

Other variables could also be added to the model to more fully predict support for the punishment goals. For example, the intent of the offender and the purpose for committing a crime have both been related to judgments of offenders and support for punishment goals (Alter et al., 2007; Darley & Pittman, 2003; Hansel, 1987; Weiner et al., 1997).

Weiner's (1985, 1986) five dimensions of causality could also be investigated. Weiner proposed that emotional reactions to behavior are determined by whether the cause of the behavior is seen as controllable,

intentional, local, stable, and global. Furthermore, Weiner suggested that the attributions a person makes is affected by personal history, social norms, causal rules, as well as many other factors. Investigating these factors could contribute to understanding public reactions to crime.

Not only could additional variables be included in the model, but components of the model could be used to study public opinions on matters other than crime. For example, support for not granting citizenship to immigrants, and for increasing border security to reduce the movement of immigrants, could be based on moral concerns related to the ingroup foundation. Immigrants could be perceived as violating the cultural soundness of the ingroup, which could then lead to feelings of contempt toward immigrants and support for measures that would deter people from attempting to immigrate.

Conclusion

In conclusion, public opinions about criminal justice can affect the decision-making processes that create criminal justice policies. Current policies lead to sizeable numbers of punishments being issued every year, and these punishments can impair the lives of many people who commit crimes. Understanding the public's views regarding crime and criminal justice is necessary for developing effective reform initiatives aimed at improving the criminal justice system. This study investigated how moral appraisals and appraisals of offenders predicted emotional reactions to crime and support for a variety of punishment goals. Authority and purity violations emerged as noteworthy moral concerns. They predicted contempt and disgust, which in turn

predicted support for deterrence and incapacitation. Understanding these aspects of crime that shape public opinion is necessary for developing reforms that receive public support.

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Appendix A

Pilot Study – Moral Foundations

The following instructions, variable descriptions, and items were presented to participants:

It has been proposed that there are five types of moral violations that people can commit. The five types are described as follows:

Harm: A person commits a moral violation if they harm another individual. Examples include hurting someone physically or emotionally.

Fairness: A person commits a moral violation if they do not contribute their fair share or if they do not repay someone for helping them. Examples include cheating, stealing, or getting something that is not deserved.

Ingroup: A person commits a moral violation if they are not loyal to a group they belong to. Examples include not protecting the integrity or honor of the group, not defending the group, or betraying the group in some way.

Authority: A person commits a moral violation if they do not fulfill their own individual social responsibilities within a social structure. Examples include not meeting the expectations of one's social role, not obeying or respecting legitimate authority figures and traditions, or authority figures making decisions that are not in the interests of their subordinates.

Purity: A person commits a moral violation if they degrade or defile the sanctity of something. Examples include acting in an impure or disgusting manner, polluting the human body, or desecrating a religious symbol.

Listed below are items describing an offender's actions. The actions may be moral violations according to the types of violations described above. Decide which moral violation is being committed in the actions below. You can also select "none" of the violations. Do not consider whether you agree or disagree with the morality of the moral violations. Just consider the content of the moral violations above and the content of the action items below, and decide if they match.

Harm

1. The offender's actions caused direct harm to other individuals.

   ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity
____ None

2. The offender's actions caused direct physical, emotional, or material damage to other individuals.

   ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity
____ None

3. The offender caused another individual to suffer.

   ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity
____ None

4. The offender acted in a cruel manner.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

5. The offender's actions were violent.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

6. The offender inflicted pain on another person.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

Fairness

1. The offender tried to get something he or she did not deserve.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

2. The offender cheated others for personal gain.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

3. The offender acted unfairly.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

4. The offender took something that did not belong to him or her.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

5. The offender acted in an unjust manner.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

6. The offender violated someone's rights.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

Ingroup

1. The offender betrayed other people.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

2. The offender put himself or herself above the wellbeing of his or her group.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

3. The offender showed a lack of loyalty.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

4. The offender broke the rules of being a team player.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

5. The offender undermined the stability of a group he or she belongs to.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

6. The offender put his or her interests above the interests of his or her group.

_____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

Authority

1. The offender's actions showed disrespect for important traditions or institutions of society.

    _____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

2. The offender failed to fulfill the duties and responsibilities of his or her specific role within a social group.

    _____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

3. The offender's actions could cause social chaos.

    _____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

4. The offender's actions broke the rules that maintain social order.

    _____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

5. The offender's actions disrespected people or organizations that should be respected.

    _____ Harm _____ Fairness _____ Ingroup _____ Authority _____ Purity

_____ None

6. The offender did not comply with important social norms.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

Purity

1. The offender's actions violated natural standards of decency.

    ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

2. The offender's actions were degrading to himself/herself or to others.

    ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

3. The offender acted in an unnatural manner.

    ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

4. The offender's actions were inconsistent with human dignity.

    ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

5. The offender acted like an animal.

    ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

6. The offender's behavior was not virtuous.

    ____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

7. The offender's behavior was impure.

____ Harm ____ Fairness ____ Ingroup ____ Authority ____ Purity

____ None

Appendix B

Pilot Study – Secondary Appraisals

The following instructions, variable descriptions, and items were presented to participants:

We are interested in three types of judgments that can be made when a person commits a moral violation. These judgments concern the offender's actions, competencies, and nature and are described as follows:

Immoral act: The act committed by the offender is a moral violation.

Moral incompetence: The offender lacks the knowledge, skills, or abilities to understand or follow moral rules.

Immoral nature: The offender is inhuman, abnormal, or evil.

Listed below are items describing specific judgments. Determine whether the specific judgments below match one of the judgment types above. You can also select "none" of the judgment types. Do not consider whether you agree or disagree with the nature of the judgment. Just consider the content of the specific judgments below and the content of the judgment types above, and decide if they match.

Immoral Act

1. The act committed by the offender is wrong.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

2. The act committed by the offender violates moral principles.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

3. The act committed by the offender is immoral.

    _____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

4. The act committed by the offender is unacceptable.

    _____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

5. The act committed by the offender is a moral transgression.

    _____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

Moral Incompetence

1. The offender lacks the abilities to follow moral rules.

    _____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

2. The offender is unable to abide by moral codes.

    _____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

3. The offender is not able to conduct himself or herself according to what is right.

    _____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

4. The offender is incapable of behaving appropriately.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

5. The offender lacks knowledge about moral rules.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

6. The offender is ignorant of moral principles.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

7. The offender lacks the skills to behave in a moral manner.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

Immoral Nature

1. The offender has an immoral character.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

2. The offender has an evil nature.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

3. The offender is a bad person.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____

None

4. The offender is abnormal.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

5. The offender is inhuman.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

6. The offender is less than human.

_____ Immoral act _____ Moral incompetence _____ Immoral nature _____ None

Appendix C

Pilot Study – Emotions

The following instructions, variables, and items were presented to participants:

We are interested in studying five emotions. These emotions are

Anger   Fear   Contempt   Disgust   Sympathy

Listed below are several emotions. For each emotion listed below, indicate which of the above emotions it is most similar to. You can also select "none" of the above emotions.

Anger

Angry

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Furious

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Outrage

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Fear

Fear

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Afraid

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Frightened

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Contempt: First Iteration

Contempt

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Disdain

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Scornful

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Contempt: Second Iteration

Disgrace

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Despise

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Disrespect

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Condescension

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Disregard

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Sympathy

Sympathy

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Compassion

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Pity

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Disgust

Disgust

____ Anger ____ Fear ____ Contempt ____ Sympathy ____ Disgust

____ None

Revulsion

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Sickened

_____ Anger _____ Fear _____ Contempt _____ Sympathy _____ Disgust

_____ None

Appendix D

Pilot Study – Punishment Goals

The following instructions, variable descriptions, and items were presented to participants:

When a person is convicted of a crime, they are given a sentence by the criminal justice system. It has been suggested that there are six types of goals that guide the justice system's sentencing decisions. The six goals are described as follows:

Retribution: The sentence should penalize the offender in accordance with what he or she deserves for having committed the crime. The punishment to the offender should be equal to the wrongfulness of the crime. When retribution is achieved, the offender has "paid the debt owed to society."

Incapacitation: The sentence should physically prevent the offender from committing another crime by restraining him or her in some way, such as by confining the offender and isolating him from society. When incapacitation is achieved, the offender would not be able to commit another crime even he wanted to.

Individual deterrence: The sentence should teach the offender that committing a crime will bring a negative consequence to him or her. The sentence shows the offender that "crime doesn't pay." When individual deterrence is achieved, the offender will not commit another crime because he now has a fear of punishment.

General deterrence: The sentence should show people in the general public that if they commit a crime, they will be punished. The sentence shows people in general that "crime doesn't pay." When general deterrence is achieved, potential offenders in the general public will not commit a crime because they have a fear of punishment.

Rehabilitation: The sentence should address the behavioral and psychological deficiencies that contributed to the crime. The sentence could include substance use treatment, counseling, education, or job training. When rehabilitation is achieved, the offender would be a law-abiding and productive member of society.

Restoration: The sentence should restore and heal the individuals affected by the crime and the damaged social relationships between them. The offender, victim, and others in the community meet to present their views of the crime and decide on a sentence. When restoration is achieved, the victim is materially and psychologically restored, and the offender is re-accepted as a member of the community.

Listed below are items describing specific sentencing goals and considerations. Determine whether the specific items below match one of the general goals described above. You can also select "none" of the goals described above. Do not consider whether you agree or disagree with the nature of the punishment goal. Just consider the content of the specific items below and the content of the general goals above, and decide if they match.

Retribution

1. The sentence should punish the offender for having committed a crime.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____ General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

2. The sentence should provide a punishment that is in proportion to the severity of the crime.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____ General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

3. The sentence should make the offender pay the debt he or she owes to society.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____ General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

4. The sentence should be equal to what the offender deserves for his or her actions.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____ General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

5. The sentence should give the offender his or her "just deserts."

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____ General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

6. The sentence should make the offender suffer in proportion to the suffering he or she has caused.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____ General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

7. The sentence should enforce justice against the offender.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

8. The sentence should be based on the rule "an eye for an eye."

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

9. The sentence should even out the wrong that the offender has done.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

General Deterrence

1. The sentence should discourage people in the general public from committing a similar crime.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

2. The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the general public to reduce the likelihood that others will commit a similar crime.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

3. The sentence should show members of the general public that they would be punished it they committed the same crime.

    _____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

4. The sentence should be made public to prevent other people from committing the crime.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

5. The sentence should send a message to others that crimes such as this one will

be punished.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

6. The sentence should be heavy enough in order to discourage other potential

offenders from committing the crime.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

Individual Deterrence

1. The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the offender to reduce

the likelihood that he or she will commit the crime again.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

2. The sentence should discourage the offender from committing further crimes.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

3. The sentence should teach the offender that committing a crime does not go

unpunished.

_____ Retribution _____ Incapacitation _____ Individual deterrence _____

General deterrence _____ Rehabiliation _____ Restoration _____ None

4. The sentence should be more severe than usual to prevent the offender from committing a crime in the future.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____ General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

5. The sentence should show the offender that "crime doesn't pay."

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____ General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

6. The sentence should demonstrate to the offender what will happen to him if he commits another crime.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____ General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

Rehabilitation

1. The sentence should offer programs to the offender that will help him or her be a productive member of society.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____ General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

2. The sentence should include education and/or work-training opportunities.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____ General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

3. The sentence should include rehabilitation programs.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____ General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

4. The sentence should include counseling and therapy.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

5. The sentence should help the offender get back on the right track.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

6. The sentence should make the offender learn the norms and values of law-

abiding society.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

Restorative

1. The sentence should provide an opportunity for the offender to apologize to

those directly affected by the crime.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

2. The sentence should be partly based on input from the offender.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

3. The sentence should allow the offender to be restored as an equal member of

the community.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

4. The sentence should enable the shame from the crime to be removed from the

offender.

____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

5. The sentence should permit the offender and victim to discuss the crime as

   well as alternative sentencing options.

   ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

   General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

6. The sentence should allow both offender and victim to heal psychologically.

   ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

   General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

7. The sentence should remove the stigma of being a criminal from the offender.

   ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

   General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

8. The sentence should resolve the conflict between the victim and offender.

   ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

   General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

9. The sentence should require the offender to provide restitution and

   compensation to the victim.

   ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

   General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

Incapacitation

1. The sentence should isolate the offender from the general public.

   ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

   General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

2. The sentence should physically confine the offender for the protection of society.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

    General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

3. The sentence should restrict the offender's freedoms so he or she cannot commit another crime.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

    General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

4. The sentence should separate the offender from the rest of society.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

    General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

5. The sentence should remove the offender from society.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

    General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

6. The sentence should keep the offender locked up for the safety of society.

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

    General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

7. The sentence should follow the rule "lock 'em up and throw away the key."

    ____ Retribution ____ Incapacitation ____ Individual deterrence ____

    General deterrence ____ Rehabiliation ____ Restoration ____ None

Appendix E

Percent Frequency Distributions of Sample Demographics – Main Study

Gender	%
Female	56
Male	41
Other	1
Missing	2

Race/Ethnicity	%
White	83
Black	7
Asian American	3
Latino/a	2
Multiracial	2
Native American	1
Other	1
Missing	1

Political Affiliation	%
Democrat	35
Independent	26
Republican	17
None	13
Libertarian	5
Green Part	1
Other	1
Missing	2

Religious Affiliation	%
Protestant	23
None	18
Atheist	15
Catholic	13
Agnostic	12
Other	11
Judaism	2
Buddhist	2
Mormon	1
Unitarian	1
Missing	2

Highest Level of Education	%
Some high school	2
High school graduate	12
Some college	26
Technical training	2
Associate degree	10
Bachelor's degree	36
Master's degree	7
Professional degree	2
Doctorate degree	1
Missing	2

Yearly Household Income	%
Less than $20,000	18
$20,000 to $39,999	32
$40,000 to $59,999	19
$60,000 to $79,999	11
$80,000 to $99,999	7
$100,000to $119,999	5
$120,000 to $139,999	2
$140,000 or more	4
Missing	2

Convicted of a Crime	%
No	90
Yes	8
Missing	2

Victim of a Crime	%
No	52
Yes	46
Missing	2

Appendix F

Example Items – Main Study

Moral Foundations Scale: Harm Foundation

Instructions: *Please select a number below each statement that indicates the*

degree to which you think the following happened.

The offender's actions caused direct harm to other individuals.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely

Secondary Appraisals Scale: Immoral Act

Instructions: *Please select the number below each statement that indicates the*

extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement.

The act committed by the offender is wrong.

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Strongly   Strongly
disagree   agree

Emotions Scale: Anger

Instructions: *Indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions*

when thinking about the offender or the offender's actions.

Angry

| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

Do not feel   Feel this
this at all   very strongly

Punishment Goals Scale: Retribution

Instructions: *The person described in the event has been found guilty of committing the crime. When a person has been found guilty of a crime, a sentence is issued that can vary in severity, serve different goals, and consist of different types of sanctions. Some examples of sanctions are incarceration, probation, a fine, community service, restitution (i.e., the offender pays money to the victim), and rehabilitation programs.*

When thinking about the sentence the offender should receive for committing this crime, to what extent are the following sentencing goals and considerations important to you?

The sentence should punish the offender for having committed a crime.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Not at all important				Somewhat important				Extremely important

Appendix G

Demographics Survey

Please indicate the following.

Gender: _____ Female _____ Male _____ Other

Age: _____

Race/ethnicity:

_____ Asian American/Pacific Islander
_____ Black/African American
_____ East Indian/Pakistani
_____ Latino(a)/Hispanic
_____ Middle Eastern
_____ Native American
_____ White/Caucasion
_____ Multiracial/Multiethnic (Please specify) _____
_____ Other (Please specify) _____

Political affiliation: _____ Democrat _____ Republican _____ Libertarian _____

Green Party _____ Independent _____ None _____ Other (Please specify)

_____

When it comes to social issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal,

conservative, or moderate?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly liberal	Liberal	Moderate, leaning toward liberal	Moderate	Moderate, leaning toward conservative	Conservative	Strongly conservative

When it comes to economic issues, do you usually think of yourself as liberal,

conservative, or moderate?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Strongly liberal	Liberal	Moderate, leaning toward	Moderate	Moderate, leaning toward	Conservative	Strongly conservative

liberal   conservative

What is your present religion, if any?

_____ Protestant
_____ Roman Catholic (Catholic)
_____ Mormon (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints/LDS)
_____ Orthodox (Greek, Russian or some other orthodox church)
_____ Jewish (Judaism)
_____ Muslim (Islam)
_____ Buddhist
_____ Hindu
_____ Unitarian
_____ Atheist (do not believe in God)
_____ Agnostic (not sure if there is a God)
_____ Nothing in particular
_____ Something else (Please specify) _____

How religious/spiritual are you?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely
religious   religious   religious

How important is your religion/spirituality to your personal identity?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Not at all   Somewhat   Extremely
important   important   important

How often do you attend religious services or events?

_____ Never _____ Once a year _____ Once a month _____ Once a week ____

A few times a week

What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If currently

enrolled, highest degree received.

_____ No schooling completed
_____ Nursery school to 8th grade
_____ Some high school, no diploma
_____ High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)
_____ Some college credit, no degree

_____ Trade/technical/vocational training
_____ Associate degree
_____ Bachelor's degree
_____ Master's degree
_____ Professional degree
_____ Doctorate degree

Please indicate your yearly household or family income before taxes.

Less than $20,000
$20,000 to $39,999
$40,000 to $59,999
$60,000 to $79,999
$80,000 to $99,999
$100,000 to $119,999
$120,000 to $139,999
$140,000 or more

Have you ever been convicted of a crime? _____ Yes _____No

Have you ever been the victim of a crime? _____ Yes _____No

Appendix H

Factor Analysis of Moral Foundations Items

Item	1	2	3	4	5
Harm					
The offender's actions caused direct harm to other individuals.		**.79**			
The offender's actions caused direct physical, emotional, or material damage to other individuals.		**.71**			
The offender caused another individual to suffer.		**.76**			
The offender acted in a cruel manner.		**.74**			
The offender's actions were violent.		**.84**			
The offender inflicted pain on another person.		**.89**			
Fairness					
The offender tried to get something he or she did not deserve.			**.80**		
The offender cheated others for personal gain.			**.81**		
The offender acted unfairly.	.40		**.40**		
The offender took something that did not belong to him or her.			**.87**		
- The offender acted in an unjust manner.	.52		**.37**		
Ingroup					
The offender betrayed other people.			.34		**.38**
The offender put himself or herself above the wellbeing of his or her group.					**.72**
The offender showed a lack of loyalty.				.30	**.54**
The offender broke the rules of being a team player.					**.62**
The offender undermined the stability of a group he or she belongs to.					**.77**
The offender put his or her interests above the interests of his or her group.					**.65**
Authority					
The offender's actions showed disrespect for important traditions or institutions of society.	**.79**				
The offender's actions could cause social chaos.	**.38**				.31
The offender's actions broke the rules that maintain social order.	**.76**				
The offender's actions disrespected people or organizations that should be respected.	**.64**				
The offender did not comply with important social norms.	**.75**				
Purity					
The offender's actions violated natural standards of decency.	.44			**.47**	
- The offender's actions were degrading to himself/herself or to others		.32			
The offender acted in an unnatural manner.				**.58**	
The offender's actions were inconsistent with human dignity.	.32			**.37**	
- The offender acted like an animal.		.59		**.36**	
- The offender's behavior was not virtuous.	.46				
The offender's behavior was impure.				**.54**	

Note. Loadings > .30 are reported.

"-" beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale.

Appendix I

Factor Analysis of Secondary Appraisals Items

Item	1	2	3
Immoral Act			
The act committed by the offender is wrong.		**.84**	
The act committed by the offender violates moral principles.		**.88**	
The act committed by the offender is immoral.		**.83**	
The act committed by the offender is unacceptable.		**.80**	
The act committed by the offender is a moral transgression.		**.76**	
Moral Incompetence			
The offender lacks the abilities to follow moral rules.	**.82**		
The offender is unable to abide by moral codes.	**.87**		
The offender is not able to conduct himself or herself according to what is right.	**.85**		
The offender is incapable of behaving appropriately.	**.78**		
The offender lacks knowledge about moral rules.	**.71**		
The offender is ignorant of moral principles.	**.63**		
The offender lacks the skills to behave in a moral manner.	**.81**		
Immoral Nature			
- The offender has an immoral character.		.50	**.33**
The offender has an evil nature.			**.68**
The offender is a bad person.		.37	**.47**
The offender is abnormal.			**.44**
The offender is inhuman.			**.79**
The offender is less than human.			**.81**

Note. Loadings > .30 are reported.

"-" beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale.

Appendix J

Factor Analysis of Emotions Items

All Emotions

Item	1	2	3
Anger			
Angry	**.81**		
Furious	**.83**		
Outrage	**.86**		
Fear			
Fear			**.93**
Afraid			**.90**
Frightened			**.93**
Contempt			
Contempt	**.79**		
Disdain	**.86**		
Scornful	**.81**		
Disrespect	**.67**		
Condescension	**.60**		
Sympathy			
Sympathy		**.93**	
Compassion		**.87**	
Pity		**.75**	
Disgust			
Disgust	**.86**		
Revulsion	**.77**		
Sickened	**.74**		

Note. Loadings > .30 are reported.
"-" beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale.

Anger, Contempt, and Disgust

Item	1	2	3
Anger			
Angry	**.78**		
Furious	**.80**		
Outrage	**.76**		
Contempt			
Contempt		**.72**	
Disdain		**.70**	
Scornful		**.59**	
Disrespect		**.61**	
Condescension		**.77**	
Disgust			
Disgust			**.48**
Revulsion			**.91**
Sickened			**.72**

Note. Loadings > .30 are reported.
"-" beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale.

Appendix K

Factor Analysis of Punishment Goals Items

Item	1	2	3	4	5
Retribution					
- The sentence should punish the offender for having committed a crime.	.69				
The sentence should provide a punishment that is in proportion to the severity of the crime.					**.74**
The sentence should make the offender pay the debt he or she owes to society.	.43				
The sentence should be equal to what the offender deserves for his or her actions.					**.74**
The sentence should give the offender his or her "just deserts."	.32		.37		
The sentence should make the offender suffer in proportion to the suffering he or she has caused.					**.35**
The sentence should be based on the rule "an eye for an eye."			.51		
General Deterrence					
The sentence should discourage people in the general public from committing a similar crime.	**.99**				
The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the general public to reduce the likelihood that others will commit a similar crime.	**.81**				
The sentence should show members of the general public that they would be punished it they committed the same crime.	**.94**				
The sentence should be made public to prevent other people from committing the crime.	**.76**				
The sentence should send a message to others that crimes such as this one will be punished.	**.91**				
The sentence should be heavy enough in order to discourage other potential offenders from committing the crime.	**.87**				
Individual Deterrence					
The sentence should produce a fear of punishment in the offender to reduce the likelihood that he or she will commit the crime again.	**.74**				
The sentence should discourage the offender from committing further crimes.	**.79**				
The sentence should teach the offender that committing a crime does not go unpunished.	**.81**				
The sentence should show the offender that "crime doesn't pay."	**.76**				
The sentence should demonstrate to the offender what will happen to him if he commits another crime.	**.74**				
Rehabilitation					
The sentence should offer programs to the offender that will help him or her be a productive member of society.		**.84**			
The sentence should include education and/or work-training opportunities.		**.78**			
The sentence should include rehabilitation programs.		**.90**			
The sentence should include counseling and therapy.		**.80**			
The sentence should help the offender get back on the right track.		**.64**			
- The sentence should make the offender learn the norms and values of law-abiding society.		.74			

Restorative			
The sentence should provide an opportunity for the offender to apologize to those directly affected by the crime.			**.49**
The sentence should allow the offender to be restored as an equal member of the community.		-.35	**.33**
The sentence should enable the shame from the crime to be removed from the offender.			**.44**
The sentence should permit the offender and victim to discuss the crime as well as alternative sentencing options.			**.61**
- The sentence should allow both offender and victim to heal psychologically.		.47	**.40**
The sentence should resolve the conflict between the victim and offender.			**.74**
Incapacitation			
The sentence should isolate the offender from the general public.	**.87**		
The sentence should physically confine the offender for the protection of society.	**.90**		
The sentence should restrict the offender's freedoms so he or she cannot commit another crime.	**.68**		
The sentence should separate the offender from the rest of society.	**.88**		
The sentence should remove the offender from society.	**.89**		
The sentence should keep the offender locked up for the safety of society.	**.89**		

Note. Loadings > .30 are reported.

"-" beside an item indicates the item was removed from the subscale.

Appendix L

Means and Standard Deviations for Each Crime

Moral Foundations

Crime	Harm *M* (*SD*)	Fairness *M* (*SD*)	Ingroup *M* (*SD*)	Authority *M* (*SD*)	Purity *M* (*SD*)
Alcohol to minors	3.15 (1.70)	3.62 (1.92)	4.98 (2.07)	6.04 (2.12)	3.94 (2.21)
Counterfeit money	3.84 (1.71)	7.98 (1.20)	6.20 (1.62)	6.70 (1.54)	5.00 (1.94)
Mugging	7.59 (1.24)	7.83 (1.27)	5.54 (1.90)	6.83 (1.39)	6.50 (1.71)
Protester pushes officer	5.07 (1.86)	2.95 (1.60)	4.40 (1.88)	6.16 (2.00)	4.10 (2.02)

Note: Subscales range from 1 to 9.

Secondary Appraisals

Crime	Act *M* (*SD*)	Incompetence *M* (*SD*)	Nature *M* (*SD*)
Alcohol to minors	5.76 (2.18)	4.01 (2.04)	2.75 (1.59)
Counterfeit money	7.00 (1.65)	4.06 (2.01)	3.06 (1.50)
Mugging	7.50 (1.35)	4.32 (2.09)	3.78 (1.92)
Protester pushes officer	4.93 (2.13)	3.65 (2.10)	2.40 (1.50)

Note: Subscales range from 1 to 9.

Emotions

Crime	Anger *M* (*SD*)	Fear *M* (*SD*)	Contempt *M* (*SD*)	Sympathy *M* (*SD*)	Disgust *M* (*SD*)
Alcohol to minors	3.92 (2.48)	2.09 (1.78)	3.97 (2.17)	2.05 (1.35)	3.36 (2.35)
Counterfeit money	3.72 (2.27)	1.63 (1.26)	4.41 (1.93)	2.54 (1.80)	3.24 (2.08)
Mugging	4.96 (2.49)	3.22 (2.29)	4.41 (2.13)	4.67 (2.15)	4.73 (2.43)
Protester pushes officer	3.16 (2.14)	2.02 (1.53)	3.35 (1.96)	3.36 (2.03)	2.79 (2.02)

Note: Subscales range from 1 to 9.

Punishment Goals

Crime	Ret. *M* (*SD*)	Gen. Det. *M* (*SD*)	Ind. Det. *M* (*SD*)	Rehab. *M* (*SD*)	Rest. *M* (*SD*)	Inc. *M* (*SD*)
Alcohol to minors	5.17(1.63)	6.15 (2.16)	6.32 (2.11)	5.01 (2.29)	4.88 (1.80)	3.21 (2.16)
Counterfeit money	6.25 (1.45)	6.66 (2.02)	7.23 (1.57)	6.15 (2.09)	5.71 (1.50)	4.31 (2.21)
Mugging	5.87 (1.71)	6.37 (2.04)	7.01 (1.77)	6.98 (2.14)	5.56 (1.72)	4.91 (2.20)
Protester pushes officer	5.27 (1.65)	5.32 (2.40)	5.65 (2.28)	5.28 (2.21)	5.81 (1.69)	2.84 (2.03)

Note: Subscales range from 1 to 9.

Crime Severity

Crime	*M* (*SD*)
Alcohol to minors	5.12 (2.26)
Counterfeit money	6.02 (2.02)
Mugging	6.29 (1.57)
Protester pushes officer	3.86 (2.10)

Note: Scale ranges from 1 to 9.