Uldaho Law **Digital Commons** @ **Uldaho Law**

United States v. Anderson (Spokane Tribe)

Hedden-Nicely

9-7-1977

Reply Brief of the Department of Natural Resources

J. Lawrence Coniff, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for Department of Natural Resources

Slade Gorton Attorney General

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/anderson

Recommended Citation

Coniff, Jr., J. Lawrence and Gorton, Slade, "Reply Brief of the Department of Natural Resources" (1977). *United States v. Anderson (Spokane Tribe*). 24.

https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/anderson/24

This Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Hedden-Nicely at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in United States v. Anderson (Spokane Tribe) by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

FILED IN THE U. S. DISTRICT COURT Eastern District of Washington

SEP 0 1977

J. R. FALLOUIST, Clerk Deputy

CIVIL NO. 3643

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

BARBARA J. & JAMES ANDERSON,

DEFENDANTS.

REPLY BRIEF OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 3643

BARBARA J. & JAMES ANDERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

REPLY BRIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

I. INTRODUCTION.

Natural Resources desires to respond to legal arguments injected by the Government's Reply Brief. Our arguments are limited to new issues raised in response to our Opening Brief. 2

SLADE GORTON ATTORNEY GENERAL

J. LAWRENCE CONIFF, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Department of
Natural Resources
310 Public Lands Building
Olympia, Washington 98504
(206) 753-5318

 $[\]pm$ The Spokane Tribe's Reply Brief does not raise new legal issues and will, therefore, be dealt with in a peripheral manner -- where relevant.

The Government's characterization of our arguments invite an "in kind" response. (Eg: U.S. Br. p. 19 & p. 25, "absurd"; U.S. Br. p. 2, "incredible", etc.) We decline.

Three subjects will be discussed. They are: (1) the effect of the Indian Claims Commission award, (2) the scope of the "Winter's" Doctrine, and (3) the date of priority for any "reserved" water rights in favor of the Spokane Tribe of Indians. These subjects will be discussed seriatum.

II. THE EFFECT OF THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION AWARD.

The Government seeks to avoid resolution on the merits of the issue submitted by Natural Resources by arguing that Rule 8(c) F.R.C.P precludes its consideration. As previously noted, the award of \$6,700,000.00 to the Spokane Tribe by the Indian Claims Commission included the value of waters arising or located on lands over which the Indians held aboriginal title. The purpose of this lawsuit, filed by the Government on behalf of the Spokane Tribe, is "to adjudicate the rights in and to the waters of Chamokane Creek and its tributaries."

The arguments raised by Natural Resources are two-fold. The leading prong of our argument is jurisdictional. Simply put, it is that the appropriation and beneficial use of waters, under state law, by citizens in the Chamokane Basin may be an impairment of otherwise impliedly reserved water rights. A lawsuit for vindication of these rights should be properly filed with the Indian Claims Commission which possesses exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine such matters. In fact the Commission's jurisdiction was invoked by the Spokane Tribe and a judgment entered in their favor which included the value of waters arising or located outside reservation boundaries. It is hornbook law that jurisdictional

<u>3</u> U.S. Reply Br., p. 33

 $[\]frac{4}{}$ Nat. Res. Opening Br., pp. 3 - 15.

⁵ U.S. Opening Br., p. 1

 $[\]frac{6}{2}$ Nat. Res. Opening Br., pp. 13 - 15, and Appendices attached.

issues may be raised at any stage of a judicial proceeding and that they need not be pled.

The anterior prong of our argument is that the fact of payment to the tune of \$6,700,000.00 to the Spokane Tribe of Indians, which includes the natural resource values of the lands aboriginally held, is a factor which should be considered in limiting the scope of any impliedly reserved water rights. In a case such as this, where such broad relief is sought, $\frac{1}{2}$ all factors may properly be considered by the court in ascertainment of the amounts of water actually impliedly reserved by virtue of creation of the Spokane Indian Reservation. This is the very point of the lawsuit. Natural Resources does not contend that all water rights were paid for or destroyed by payment of \$6,700,000.00 to the Spokane Tribe. We contend that the legal ability of the tribe to enjoin beneficial use of water outside reservation boundaries for non-agricultural purposes has been lost to the extent claimed by plaintiff. To illustrate, assume that the area over which the Spokane Tribe held aboriginal title is three times the size of their present reservation. Also assume that water is equally and economically beneficially used over the entire aboriginal area. Thus:

A - 1 unit of	B - l unit of
water	water
C - 1 unit of water	D - l unit of water (Reservation)

Natural Resources submits that, under this illustration, it is unfair to give the Indians more than D with lunit of water, leaving off-reservation areas A, B and C without any right to use water.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

The Spokane Tribe's Reply Br., p. 21, makes the point that mere passage of a tribal resolution declaring the entire natural stream reserved for recreation and aesthetic reasons totally precludes any citizen's beneficial use of ground or surface waters in Chamokane Basin pursuant to state law.

The fact that the Indians were paid for areas A, B and C (over which they formerly held aboriginal title) including the value of the 3 units of water arising on them is clearly relevant to the Government's claim to 4 units of water for reservation area D. This may properly be considered by the court in mitigation of said claim.

Under the illustration set out, if there were only 2 units of water available for the four parcels, the result should be .5 units of water available for each of parcels A, B. C and D. Such an allocation recognizes the right of the reservation Indians to share equally in the water (for actual agricultural uses) but does not discriminate against off-reservation non-Indian landowners. result would take into account the factor mentioned, i.e., the Indian Claims Commission award and yet defines and reserves in favor of the Spokane Tribe a proportionate and vested right to share in the beneficial use of available water. The result contended for by the Tribe and the Government ignores the factor of the award -- and its basis -- in the relief they seek. Resources submits that the Indian Claims Commission judgment is a valid factor to consider when fashioning relief appropriate to the circumstances of this case. Rule 8(c) F.R.C.P. should not be misconstrued to dis-allow this important factor from the court's consideration. $\frac{8}{2}$

The Government, beyond its Rule 8(c) avoidance argument, also doubts whether the findings of fact entered by the Indian Claims Commission "can be used by a non-party to bind either the government or the tribe." No citation of authority is offered in support of this novel proposition and, to this writer's knowlege, none is available to support it. Basic historical facts concerning the

33

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

 $[\]frac{8}{2}$ References to the basic statutes, legislative history and case law on these points are set forth in Natural Resources Opening Brief and will not be re-iterated here. See: pp. 8 - 11 and pp. 13 - 15.

⁹ U.S. Reply Br., p. 35

Spokane Tribe and their dealings with the United States should not
be altered at convenience of a party to litigation -- even if that
party is the Government, itself. The "revisionist" school of history
has no place in this litigation. 10

III. THE SCOPE OF THE "WINTERS" DOCTRINE.

In the outstanding analysis of Indian law by Felix S. Cohen, Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) is described:

"The <u>Winters</u> decision effects a prohibition against the diversion of water from a stream above and outside the reservation insofar as such division deprives the tribe of water necessary for the irrigation of tribal lands." <u>Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Dept. of Interior</u>, 1942 (Original reprinted by U. of New Mex. Press)

Cohen discusses the judicial progeny of <u>Winters</u>, <u>circa</u>, 1941 and concludes that the extent of the impliedly reserved water right is to irrigate lands actually cultivated and in use or to the extent reasonably necessary to supply the needs of the Indians in their agricultural pursuits. <u>Handbook</u>, <u>supra</u>, pages 316 - 319.

As of 1941, the decisional law (as reviewed by Cohen) did not provide a basis for concluding that Indian reserved water rights were for any purpose other than irrigation. Thus the Government (and the Spokane Tribe) must look to recent judicial opinions to provide the necessary theoretical underpinning to their claims in the instant case.

The Government's prime reliance is upon two decisions subsequent to 1941. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976) and Arizona

REPLY BRIEF OF DNR - 5

An example is the alleged historical dependence of the Tribe upon fish in Chamokane Creek. Another is the assertion of a water right priority date of "time immemorial". (U.S. Opening Br., p. 16 and p. 39)

The decisions subsequent to Winters reviewed by Cohen include:
United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939); United States v.

McIntire, 101 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Parkins,
18 F.2d 643 (D.Wyo. 1926); Anderson v. Spear-Morgan Livestock Co.,
79 P.2d 667 (Mont. 1938); Conrad Inv. Co. v. United States, 161 Fed.
829 (9th Cir. 1908); Skeem v. United States, 273 Fed. 93 (9th Cir.
1921); Walker River Irr. Co. v. United States, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939).

v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Neither decision overturns
 Cohen's conclusion or supports an extension of the Winters rationale
 beyond irrigation purposes.
 Cappaert, supra, supports only the following proposition:

... Supports only the lottowing proposition.

"The implied reservation of water doctrine, however, reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more." (426 U.S. at 141)

Cappaert, supra, does not extend the Winters implied right beyond agricultural pursuits.

Arizona v. California, supra, was a complete river adjudication between various states, federal agencies, Indian tribes and private parties. The Court expressly approved the findings of Special Master Simon Rifkind. Among the issues resolved by the Special Master was the extent of water rights reserved to several Indian tribal claimants

"I hold only that the amount of water reserved, and hence the magnitude of the water rights created, is determined by agricultural and related requirements, since when the water was reserved that was the purpose of the reservation."

Report of Special Master, Arizona v. California, at page 265.

To sum up, Natural Resources submits that none of the decisions interpreting and implimenting the implied <u>Winters</u> water right go as far as the Government and the Spokane Tribe are asking this court to go. There is no support in <u>stare decisis</u> for the position that a <u>Winters</u> right encompasses water reserved for recreational, aesthetic or cultural purposes.

Our opening brief sets forth Natural Resources position on the issues of:

- (a) failure of proof of entitlement to particular irrigable acreages (Opening Br., pp. 31 36)
- (b) alienated lands are not entitled to reserved water rights (pp. 25 29)
- (c) Congressional classification of lands for timber production supercedes any "implied" water right for agricultural purposes (pp. 29 31)

Those arguments will not be rehashed except to point out that neither

2

the Government nor the Tribe has satisfactorily answered them.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

31

One minor point remains. At page 42 of its Reply Brief, the Government seems to take the position that repurchase of alienated land within the reservation somehow revests it with a <u>Winters</u> type of water right with its original priority. No authority is cited for this proposition. <u>United States v. Hibner</u>, 27 F.2d 909 (D.Ida. 1928) is the complete answer to this contention. $\frac{12}{12}$

IV. THE PRIORITY FOR ANY WINTERS' WATER RIGHT ON THE SPOKANE RESERVATION IS JANUARY 18, 1881.

Natural Resources maintains that, until some formal action is taken by either the Executive or Congress, no basis exists for establishing a priority date for impliedly reserved water rights. Northern Pac. Ry. v. Wismer, 246 U.S. 283 (1918) was decided upon stipulated and incomplete facts. $\frac{13}{2}$ We submit that Spokane Tribe v. United States, 9 Ind. Cl. Comm. 236, 240-245 (1961) accurately sets out the historical facts. The Spokane Reservation was created by Executive Order on January 18, 1881. That is the priority date for Winters water rights. This was the method used by Special Master Simon Rifkind in Arizona v. California, supra, which was approved by the Supreme Court. For example, the Chemehuevi Indian Reservation was created by an order of withdrawal from entry made by the Secretary of Interior dated February 2, 1907. That date is the priority. (Master's Report, page 267). The Cocopah Indian Reservation was established by an Executive Order of September 27, 1917. That date is the priority. (Master's Report, pages 267 - 268). Similar priorities were established for the Yuma Reservation, Colorado River Reservation, Fort Mohave Reservation, and for national forests, recreation areas, parks, memorials, monuments and lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management. (Master's Report, pages 268 - 304).

 $[\]frac{12}{12}$ We cover this point at pages 28 - 29 of our Opening Brief.

 $[\]frac{13}{33}$ Obviously, we don't agree with Government that this contention is "absurd". U.S. Reply Br. at p. 25.

The priority date for the Spokane Reservation should be January 18, 1881.

V. CONCLUSION.

Natural Resources stands by its recommendation that this court "apply sound legal concepts and precedent to the resolution of the questions presented herein". We do not share the Government's view that such a recommendation is a professional "discredit". $\frac{14}{}$

"Federal Indian law does exhibit a systematic interconnectedness of parts, but to discover and define the common standards, principles, concepts, and modes of analysis that run through this massive body of statutes and decisions is an analytical task of the first order." (Forward by Nathan R. Margold, Solicitor General, 1940, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, U. of New Mexico Reprint.)

We submit that such a task $\underline{\text{requires}}$ the application of sound legal concepts and precedent to the facts of this case.

DATED this

day of September, 1977.

Respectfully submitted,

SLADE GORTON ATTORNEY GENERAL State of Washington

J. LAWRENCE CONIFF, JR. Assistant Attorney General 310 Public Lands Building Olympia, Washington 98504 Telephone: (206) 753-5318

U.S. Reply Br., pages 60 - 61.

^{32 |} ______

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff,

CIVIL NO. 3643

BARBARA J. & JAMES ANDERSON, et al.,

Defendants.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on the 7th day of September, 1977, I mailed a copy of the Reply Brief of the Department of Natural Resources to all parties on the attached list.

SLADE, GORTON ATTOKNEY GENERAL

J. LAWRENCE CONIFF, JR. Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Department of Natural Resources 310 Public Lands Building

Olympia, Washington 98504 Telephone: (206) 753-5318

19

1

2

3

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

20

21

22

23 24

25

26

31

32

33

ROBERT S. LINNELL
Acting United States Attorney
JAMES B. CRUM
Assistant United States Attorney
851 United States Courthouse
Box 1494
Spokane, Washington 99210

ROBERT DELLWO KERMIT RUDOLPH Attorneys at Law 1016 Old National Bank Building Spokane, Washington 99201

WILLARD ZELLMER
PATRICK CERUTTI
Attorneys at Law
555 Lincoln Building
Spokane, Washington 99201

CHARLES ROE Assistant Attorney General Department of Ecology Olympia, Washington 98504

ROBERT McNICHOLS
Attorney at Law
Fifth Floor, Spokane & Eastern Building
Spokane, Washington 99201

JOHN McRAE Attorney at Law 911 West Sprague Avenue Spokane, Washington 9920

FRED N. and RUTH M. STAHL 202 Mt. View Drive Pullman, Washington 99163

KENNETH and ELIZABETH SWIGER P. O. Box 706 Ford, Washington 99013

LEONARD E. LYONS
P. O. Box 84
Springdale, Washington 99173

JOHN F. CAMPBELL Attorney at Law 1306 Washington Mutal Bank Building Spokane, Washington 99201

LAWRENCE L. TRACY Attorney at Law Ries & Kenison P. O. Drawer 610 Moses Lake, Washington 98837

JOSEPH J. REKOFKE Attorney at Law Fifth Floor, Spokane & Eastern Building Spokane, Washington 99201 MICHAEL R. THORP Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice Land and Natural Resources Division 10th and Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20530

1

2