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Leadership: The Missing Variable in the Economic Development of Sub-Saharan Africa

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**LEADERSHIP: THE MISSING VARIABLE IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

by

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**A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of**

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY


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ABSTRACT

LEADERSHIP: THE MISSING VARIABLE IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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Old Dominion University, 2002
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Contemporary economic theories, modernization and dependency, have overlooked the fact that the development process depends on the interaction of social factors. Specifically, the theories have ignored the role of leadership in analyzing economic development. This dissertation seeks to incorporate the importance of leadership into the analysis of development. It argues that sub-Saharan African countries have not developed economically because leaders in the region have been less than successful in establishing a culture conducive to industrialization. African leaders have failed to establish the high moral and scientific cultures necessary to promote economic progress. In place of those cultural attributes, the leaders have fostered corrupt and authoritarian political cultures that undermine the general economic development of their societies.

This dissertation offers a detailed paired comparison of the colonial and postcolonial experience of Ghana and Botswana. The two countries constitute an effective comparison because they were once colonies of Great Britain and have similar resource endowments. Since independence, Botswana has achieved greater social and economic progress because its leaders have established a high moral culture. Ghana, on the other hand, has experienced stagnation, and in some respects actual decline, in its standards of living due to its leaders' inability to establish a high moral culture. Despite

differences in standards of living, neither country has achieved diversified industrialization due to a lack of a scientific culture.

The inability to establish high moral and scientific cultures is partially due to the colonial experience and the political philosophy of Senghorianism. Direct colonial rule in Ghana replaced the traditional leadership of the country that had shown a greater political commitment to the general public. In contrast, the colonial protectorate in Botswana recognized traditional leaders as autonomous authorities without undermining their legitimacy. Botswana's leadership continuity preserved the government's moral obligation to the general public.

The lack of socio-scientific culture in both countries is due, to a considerable extent, to the influence of Senghorian philosophy on post-colonial leaders. Senghorianism argues that analytical scientific thinking reflects the dichotomous European culture and contrasts with the holistic African intuitive mode of knowing. The adherence to this philosophy by sub-Saharan African leaders has inhibited the emergence of a scientific culture that would promote industrialization and economic development.

**This dissertation is dedicated to the global
poor whose desire for material development
has been set back by their own leaders.**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAC	African Advisory Council
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolution Council
AT	Appropriate Technology
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BIP	Botswana Independence Party
BMC	Botswana Meat Commission
BNI	Bureau of National Investigation
BPP	Botswana People Party
CDR	Committee for the Defense of the Revolution
CMB	Cocoa Marketing Board
COCOBOD	Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board
CPP	Convention Peoples Party
CSO	Central Selling Organization
ERP	Economic Recovery Program
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JAC	Joint Advisory Council
LCD	Leadership, Cultural, and Development
LMP	Leader Motive Profile
LMX	Leadership Member Exchange Theory
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
MFJ	Movement of Freedom and Justice
MPL	Marginal Product of Labor
NCD	National Commission for Democracy
NLC	National Liberation Movement
NPP	National Patriotic Party
NPP	Northern Peoples Party
NRC	National Redemption Council
PDC	Popular Defense Committee
PNDC	Provisional National Defense Council
SACU	South African Custom Union
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SMC	Supreme Military Council
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TSM	Two Sector Surplus Model
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nation Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization
WDC	Workers Defense Committee
WP	Wage of Production.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, Julius Ihonvbere, a Nigerian political economist, presented a grim picture of Africa. In his words, “hunger, malnutrition, poverty, uncertainty, disillusionment, ethnic, regional and religious conflicts, coups and counter-coups, the suffocation of civil society and gross human rights abuses, massive rural migration, crime, prostitution and violence, agricultural stagnation and urban decay, de-industrialization and delegitimation of the state have become common features.”¹ Ihonvbere’s brief summary of the continent is unfortunately true. In recent years, people in the region are being displaced by wars, ethnic conflicts, and the greed of their leaders. Today, the so-called African leadership has become the enemy within, repressing their people and plundering their continent.

Before independence African scholars had a different image of the continent. They believed that the enemy was the colonizer from afar. Walter Rodney’s study of how European imperialism underdeveloped Africa possibly best represents this perspective.² Admittedly, Professor Rodney’s assessment had some merit, and his contentions drew upon considerable empirical evidence. The gap between the rich North and the poor

This dissertation is written along the stylistic requirements of *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

¹ Julius Ihonvbere, “The Third World, Africa and the New World Order.” Unpublished Paper presented at the African and African-American Lecture Series, Central Connecticut State University, New Britain, CT. May 1992.

South serves as a testament to this basic reality. Even today, half a century after independence, major colonial debris profoundly limits Africa's economic and political development. It would, however, be an oversimplification to conclude that the colonial legacy is the only obstacle to economic and political advance in the region.

The problem of economic underdevelopment in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is more complex than the contemporary development literature admits. The problem is not mainly due to exogenous factors such as colonialism or the exclusion of the region from the global financial system. Even though these factors play some role, the economic improvement of Botswana and Mauritius in sub-Saharan Africa seriously undermines the case of African marginalization as its proponents claim.³ Part of sub-Saharan Africa's economic stagnation and retrogression has to do with the failure of leaders in the region to establish a socio-scientific culture that promotes technological innovation and stimulates economic development.

The importance of leadership and culture to the development process has been well noted in social science studies. Lublin Doe, for instance, argues that the economic development of a nation is a complex phenomenon, where success or failure depends on the political will and determination of its leadership.⁴ Similarly, in a pioneering work, Mark Casson demonstrates the importance of leadership in building a national culture that

² Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Washington, DC: Howard University Press, 1982).

³ Manfred Bienefeld, "The New World Order: Echoes of a New Imperialism," *The World Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994): 31-48.

⁴ Lublin Doe, "Economic Development of Francophone Africa: A Comparison with Republic of Korea," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (March 1997): 105-21.

reduces transaction costs and enhances national economic performance.⁵ Other scholars argue that the poor economic record of a nation may be attributed to leadership problems.⁶ This seems to be the case in sub-Saharan Africa's economic development, because of failed leadership in the region.

In general, a review of the literature suggests that effective leadership is one of the most critical prerequisites for national economic development. As such, D. R. Ilgen, D. A. Major, J. R. Hollenbeck, and D. J. Segó stress that "we cannot overlook the role of leaders and leadership" in economic development.⁷ Similarly, the importance of culture has been well established and noted by various scholars as part of the foundation for human activities. Institutional economists and other social science researchers have emphasized the relevance of culture in economic development.⁸ Casson, for example, argued that societies that are able to foster high morals and scientific beliefs have enhanced economic performance, while societies without these cultural attributes lack the prerequisites for economic development.⁹ It is the inability of postcolonial SSA leaders to foster and legitimize high moral and scientific culture that has resulted in the region's economic stagnation.

⁵ Mark Casson, "Cultural Determinants of Economic Performance," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (June 1993): 418-42.

⁶ J. S. Oakland, *Total Quality Management* (Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1989).

⁷ D. R. Ilgen, D. A. Major, J. R. Hollenbeck, and D. J. Segó, "Team Research in the 1990s," in M. M. Chemers and R. Ayman, eds., *Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1993), 248.

⁸ Ann Jennings and William Waller, "Evolutionary Economics and Cultural Hermeneutics: Veblen, Cultural Relativism, and Blind Drift," *Journal of Economics Issues*, Vol. 28, No. 4 (December 1994): 997-1030.

⁹ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

In sub-Saharan Africa, the leadership has failed to initiate a cultural change to transform the region's traditional production function into a dynamic technological production function. In industrial scientific terms, all the countries in the region depend on outside scientific cultures to meet their industrial goods needs. On the global scale, SSA has 20,000 research scientists and engineers. This means that the region has a meager 0.36% of the world's research scientists and engineers, and produces only 0.3% of the world's total industrial output. The whole region spends approximately 0.4% of the world's total expenditure in research and development towards industrial scientific culture.¹⁰ This reflects the paucity of funds that leaders and their governments allocate to the scientific culture of creation in the region. This lack of leadership initiative and insight leaves SSA's industrial scientific culture with negligible outcomes as far as industrialization is concerned. For example, in Ghana, according to the latest indicators available, low-end industrial production constitutes 5.9% of total economic output. Likewise in Botswana, the total economy depends on raw material production mostly in diamond mining and cattle raising, with only 4.7% of the total output in low-end industrial production.¹¹

Instead of building a socio-scientific culture, the SSA leadership is marked by high levels of corruption.¹² Political elites embezzle from the national treasury for personal use, thereby undermining the accumulation of financial capital resources

¹⁰ Aqueil Ahmad, "Science and Technology Policy for Economic Development in Africa," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 27, Nos. 1-2 (January-April 1992): 5-10.

¹¹ World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).

¹² David Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption and Underdevelopment in the Third World: The Case of Zaire* (New York: Praeger, 1980).

essential for economic development. The personal accumulation of public wealth and funds by leaders cuts across the region. The late President Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of Congo had, according to one estimate, well over \$5 billion in a foreign account, an amount about the size of Congo's foreign debt at the time.¹³ The records of extravagance of King Bokassa of the Central African Republic, President Idi Amin of Uganda, and President Ibrahim Babangida of Nigeria are all fresh in the memories of their compatriots.¹⁴

Politically, the SSA leadership has always built organizations where networks of trust are confined to families and cronies, and those of mistrust and suspicion are relegated to outside groups. They have intensified the divide-and-rule concept, left over from the colonial period, to serve their political interests. The horrible images of human rights abuses emanating from the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and economic impoverishment in the region, are partially attributed to the leadership's inability to establish a cultural mindset capable of economic and political progress.¹⁵ SSA has not always been this way. In the late 1950s and 1960s, many countries in the region achieved economic growth rates ranging between 5 and 7 percent.¹⁶ Lately, however, the region's economic and political deterioration are due to leadership ineptness.¹⁷ Prior to

¹³ *The Economist*, Vol. 327, No. 7807 (April 17, 1993): 82.

¹⁴ Tunde Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism: Betrayal of a Historical Cause," *The Western Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Summer 1997): 106-16.

¹⁵ Lance Morrow, "Africa: The Scramble for Existence," *Time Magazine* (September 7, 1992): 42-44.

¹⁶ Angus Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy*, (Paris: OECD, 1995).

¹⁷ Samuel M. Muriithi, *African Crisis, Is There Hope?* (NY: University Press of America, 1996).

colonialism and its subsequent postcolonial eras, there existed precolonial Botswana and Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa, headed by traditional leaders who organized and managed their societies with less economic and human suffering.

Precolonial Botswana was composed of a variety of autonomous nations ruled by traditional leaders. Politically, the nations were organized hierarchically with succession based on inheritance under participatory democracy and on the *kgotla* (ward) systems.¹⁸ Economically, the leaders allocated lands and loaned cattle through the *mafisa* system that allowed citizens to undertake economic activities. Through that patronage system, both political and economic systems of the societies were stabilized, and the Tswana community as a whole progressed with fewer socio-economic problems. In times of security needs, leaders like Khama the Great rallied other traditional leaders and their followers to form alliances to repel attackers.¹⁹ In 1885 the territories became a protectorate under the British government, serving as a shield against the South African Boer invasion. The colonial protectorate system allowed the Tswana leaders to organize their societies without foreign interference in their domestic affairs. Throughout the colonial protectorate era, traditional leaders remained effective in maintaining social order, with their traditional laws guarded by socio-moral obligations between the ruled and the rulers.²⁰

For almost a century, the protectorate system allowed leaders like Tshekedi Khama to preserve their national sovereignty and political institutions through a

¹⁸ Anthony Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History* (NY: Barnes and Noble, 1974).

¹⁹ Thomas Tlou, "The Nature of Botswana States: Towards a Theory of Botswana Traditional Government: The Botswana Case" *Botswana Notes and Records*, Vol. 6 (1974): 57-75.

traditional leadership legitimacy framework. Both leaders and their followers recognized their fiduciary relationship with each other and refrained from any immoral behavior that could have had negative consequences on societal welfare. In essence, high moral ethical standards were maintained in the community to protect gradual social progression. In 1966, the colonial system came to an end and Botswana gained its independence. The country changed its political system from a hierarchical inheritance system to a representative political system without changing its leadership class.²¹ This elite continuity during the transition from colonial to postcolonial preserved the leadership's moral obligation in achieving society's welfare. The first postcolonial leadership, under Seretse Khama, emphasized high moral cultural standards and created institutions based on democratic principles to serve the collective interests of Botswana. Khama's successors have adhered to a high moral leadership culture that minimizes corruption, thereby enabling them to use national financial resources to improve the living conditions of their people. Despite these efforts, however, Botswana remains industrially underdeveloped due to the lack of a scientific culture.²²

The ability of Botswana's postcolonial leaders to foster and maintain a high moral leadership culture that reduces corruption is unique among SSA leaders. In contrast to Botswana, the leaders of Ghana, which was also a British colony, have led their country into economic impoverishment since its independence in 1957. Precolonial Ghana was

²⁰ Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*.

²¹ Jack Parson, ed., *Succession to High Office in Botswana* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1990).

²² Marilyn Carr, "Intermediate Technology in Botswana: A Review of Botswana Technology," Occasional Paper, No. 10 (London: Intermediate Technology Development Group, 1984).

similarly composed of different nations headed by traditional leaders and based on a hierarchical system of inheritance. The leaders controlled the economic system through allocation of land, and ensured that everyone had access to land to pursue their economic activities. Traditionally, there were fiduciary and moral obligations between rulers and the ruled, with traditional institutional arrangements preventing leaders from engaging in corrupt activities and abusing their power.²³

Precolonial Ghanaian nations waged wars among themselves and, as a result, were unable to amalgamate their societies into one homogenous grand society. Between 1850 and 1902 the British colonized the nations and divided the region into three sections, instituting direct rule in all the areas.²⁴ During the direct rule period, many of the traditional leaders and their institutions fell under the subjugation of British rule, while other leaders were sent into exile. This process severely strained the moral obligations established between leaders and followers, and resulted ultimately in a moral decline and lawlessness in the Ghanaian society.²⁵

After the period of traditional leadership demoralization and subjugation, a new class of local leadership, made of people with western education, emerged. The new leadership group gained its legitimacy from the British colonizers who had utilized the group to gain its political and economic interests. At the end of colonial rule a century later, a political system adopted from the British helped transfer the national political

²³ George B. N. Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos* (NY: St. Martin's Griffin, 1999).

²⁴ F. M. Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence 1919-1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960).

²⁵ Roger Gocking, "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony," *The Journal of African History*, Vol. 34, No. 1 (January 1993): 93-113.

power to the new educated leadership group. Lacking local legitimacy, the new group of postcolonial leaders recognized their authority and power to rule as emanating from Britain.²⁶ As a result, they failed to see themselves as morally obligated to the welfare of the local population. Based on that mindset, they have continuously engaged in low-moral behaviors that serve their personal interests instead of high-moral behaviors that advocate collective social interests. Lacking a well-intentional leadership group, Ghana found itself unable to promote socio-economic development. In other words, when Ghana gained independence, the traditional leadership group, which held a moral obligation and fiduciary relationship with the local people, was sidelined. Thus, unlike in Botswana, the change to self-determination meant that the postcolonial era in Ghana began with leadership discontinuity and a new political machinery.

The first postcolonial leadership under Kwame Nkrumah, instead of initiating political socialization to include all the citizens in the political process, disenfranchised traditional leaders from national governance. Despite his popularity as the best leader that Ghana has ever had, Nkrumah did not institute high moral ethical standards among his political officials and inadvertently allowed them to engage in corruption.²⁷ The Ghanaian situation, where low moral leadership culture facilitated corruption and institutional decay, is symptomatic of many sub-Saharan African nations. In addition to a culture of corruption, the regional leaders have been unable to establish a scientific culture.²⁸ In

²⁶ Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1968).

²⁷ David Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1989).

²⁸ Ahmad, "Science and Technology."

essence, the lack of both high moral and scientific cultures undermines the economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Even though countries in the region have repeatedly expressed their interest in economic development, a social phenomenon that received worldwide attention when the newly independent nations emerged after World War II, they remain largely underdeveloped.

Immediately following their independence, which coincided with the beginning of the cold war, both Botswana and Ghana embarked on a path of market-led economic development. However, due to lack of a development paradigm in the world at that time and to cold war politics, the countries became victims of the economic growth doctrine.²⁹ Both countries, along with many others in Africa, adopted an economic approach encapsulated in modernization theory and used it as a vehicle for achieving economic development. Based on the theoretical underpinning of modernization, that more capital investment leads to growth, the nations were encouraged to mobilize sufficient investment to accelerate growth without concern for establishing the appropriate cultures for development.³⁰

A comparison between these two countries is instructive. Botswana has been able to minimize corruption with high moral leadership culture, while Ghana is marked by pervasive corruption because of the leadership's low moral culture. These different cultural paths have one common denominator, the lack of a scientific culture. The postcolonial leadership of Seretse Khama in Botswana and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana failed to establish a scientific culture that could induce industrialization in their respective

²⁹ Michael P. Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World* (NY: Longman, 1985).

³⁰ Peter W. Preston, *Development Theory: An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).

countries. Their failure to foster and legitimize scientific culture is shrouded in both leaders' adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy, which was advanced in defense of Africans' cultural denigration, postulates that the African mode of knowing is an intuitive form of rationality and is therefore different from western analytic scientific thinking, which Senghorian philosophy deemed un-African.³¹ The belief in this philosophy allows African leaders to move their culture away from criticism. In essence, it acts as a cultural inhibitor in leadership thinking and thus prevents them from accepting other human cultural traits that could aid in their nation's economic development and growth.³²

Given the lack of scientific culture that prevents both countries from being industrially developed, Botswana's economy has improved, while Ghana's economy has stagnated. The Leadership, Culture, and Development (LCD) model discussed in Chapter 3 explains the reasons for the improvement in Botswana's economy. The model, drawing on the *theory of association* and the work of Mark Casson, stipulates that the two prerequisite cultural elements for economic development are high moral and scientific cultures. Leaders who are able to foster, legitimize, and establish these cultures are more likely to further economic development and prosperity than are those who are unable to do so. This logic explains Botswana's better economic status compared to that of Ghana, with the former's leadership success owing in part to its ability in establishing a comparatively higher moral culture.

³¹ Leopold Sedar Senghor, *Prose and Poetry* (London: Heinemann, 1976).

³² Olusegun Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest: The Problem of Self-Definition and African Philosophy," *Africa Today*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1995): 26-38.

The high moral culture has enabled Botswana's leaders to curtail corruption, while the postcolonial Ghanaian leaders have not been able to do likewise. The difference in moral culture in the two countries is attributed to differences in the ways both countries were managed during the colonial era. A protectorate colonial system existed in Botswana and allowed the traditional leaders to maintain their political institutions with their high moral values. In Ghana however, direct colonial rule eliminated traditional leaders along with their political institutions, and undermined traditional moral values. In view of these social metamorphoses post-independence Botswana has had leadership continuity with high moral culture, while Ghana's new leadership group has been unable to establish high moral culture conducive to development. Implicitly therefore, Ghana's economic woes emanate partially from its postcolonial leaderships' inability to establish either of the prerequisite cultural elements essential for economic development.

After Nkrumah's democratically elected government was ousted from office in 1966, the interlude leaderships that ruled Ghana until 1981 abandoned all industrialization projects that Nkrumah had started. However, they did not abandon the autocratic and corrupt cultures that had been initiated.³³ Jerry Rawlings' leadership, which lasted for 20 years and ended in January 2001, intensified those cultures. Rawlings further exacerbated those negative development cultures by committing severe human rights abuses. His leadership further undermined Ghana's development through his Economic Recovery Programs (ERP). Under Rawlings' ERP, the country accumulated

³³ Youry Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability 1957-1992* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993).

approximately \$6 billion in debt under the auspices of structural adjustment programs (SAP).³⁴

In contrast to what happened in Ghana after Nkrumah, the leaderships in Botswana have ruled differently. After the death of Khama in Botswana, his successors, including the current president, Festus Mogae, have all followed a high moral leadership culture of intolerance for corruption. They further increased institutional efficiency in managing Botswana's financial resources to enhance the country's economy. Despite Botswana's economic improvement, however, both countries have lacked leaderships that would have rallied their people to establish both high moral and scientific cultures. Only the simultaneous creation of these two cultures can lead to the sustainable economic development of their countries. Without the leadership to foster and legitimize both cultures synchronously, sustainable development has stalled and will continue to do so in both countries, just as it will in the whole SSA region.

THE PURPOSE

The purpose of this dissertation is twofold. First, it brings into focus an introspective analysis as to why development has stalled in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa by investigating the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic development in the region. In so doing, it extends the search for a strategic approach towards economic development in general for developing countries, most specifically for those in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, it analytically investigates and explains why immoral cultural behavior by leaders has impeded economic development in Africa. It

³⁴ World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997).

does that by using the colonial rule differential factor to elucidate how some traditional African leaders with moral concern for society were replaced by those with less moral obligation.

ASSUMPTIONS, HYPOTHESIS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

There are two central assumptions in this research. The first assumption is that a low moral leadership culture impedes economic development in SSA. This assumption is predicated on the fact that when SSA leaders and their officials engage in immoral acts of corruption, they siphon national financial resources away from public accounts and into their private foreign accounts. This behavior diverts resources that could otherwise have been used for development. In the institutional organizational structure, low moral leadership creates economic moral decay that translates into production inefficiencies and increased transaction costs that undermine and slow development.

The second assumption is that SSA leaders' inability to rally their citizens to establish appropriate socio-scientific cultures has caused the region to remain industrially underdeveloped and poor. This assumption is underpinned by the fact that development is a transformational process requiring the accomplishment of certain social human activities. In SSA, leaders have failed to foster and legitimize human behavioral activities that involve rigorous analytical thinking that builds scientific culture. The lack of that culture has inhibited the people in the region from indulging in scientific creativity and innovation. That, in turn, has prevented industrialization from occurring in SSA. Consequently, the region's economic production depends on raw materials with little or no manufacturing. The inability to manufacture what they need to improve their lives

makes the people materialistically poor and dependent on the outside world, which has its own scientific cultures that do provide that world with the industrial goods it needs.

Based on these two assumptions and the identified research gap in the scholarly literature on development, especially neglecting the importance of leadership and culture in economic development, this study posits the consideration of one hypothesis and three questions for empirical research. The main hypothesis asserts that African leaders have failed to establish a socio-scientific culture that promotes technological innovations and high moral culture capable of fostering sustainable economic development. To investigate this, the study considers three questions. First, in what ways has the leadership of SSA failed to establish the basic socio-scientific culture needed for economic development? Second, granted that there is failure, what culture has the leadership created in place of socio-scientific culture to impede economic development? Finally, it asks what colonial experience might have contributed to the ineffective leadership that undermines sub-Saharan Africa's development. The main causal relationship for these questions and their answers will be tested through case studies in chapters four and five.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK

The neglect of leadership's responsibility in creating culture conducive to development in SSA makes this work important.³⁵ The failure to fully incorporate culture into past studies was probably due to the difficulty of untangling the convoluted elements of culture. In this project, the elements of culture are separated in order understand their impact on economic development. Also, due to the difficulty in operationalizing culture,

³⁵ Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics."

traditional economic theorists focus their attention on rational analytic functions that exclude human issues. Hence, economic development theory has dealt with leadership issues and its functions, including that of cultural formation, from a distance.³⁶ The result of this state of affairs has been the exclusion of the role of leadership in economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. This work will show that economic behavior and culture are complementary, as far as development outcomes are concerned.

This work collectively synchronizes those important variables in investigating the lack of development in Africa. The inclusion of leaders' responsibility in the search to achieve economic development in underdeveloped areas makes this study significant. The importance of cultural inclusion in development is well articulated by several authors, including Samuel Huntington, who acknowledge the need for systematic and empirical study of the impact of culture on development.³⁷ This research attempts to advance this agenda. The inclusion of leadership's responsibility in development strategies extends the search for strategic approaches towards economic development in SSA. Last, by using the colonial factor as an explanatory tool, this work assists us in understanding why many contemporary African leaders indulge in immoral behavior that undermines the region's economic prosperity.

³⁶ Mark Casson, *The Economics of Business Culture* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).

³⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington, eds., *Understanding Political Development*, 3-32 (Prospects Heights, IL: Wave Press, 1994).

METHODOLOGY

In order to test the hypothesis and make a contribution to the literature, this research investigation uses a deductive case study approach. This methodology is chosen for two reasons. First, it is a method that permits a systematic examination of theoretical propositions and thereby assists in confirming or denying a theoretical claim.³⁸ Second, case studies allow for an in-depth empirical analysis, thereby enhancing the ability to make accurate inferences about the variables being studied. In this study, these variables include leadership, culture, and economic development. Most importantly, case studies are valuable for their methodological advantage in minimizing difficulties that are often hard to eliminate in cross-cultural studies.³⁹ It further assists in discussing issues in details, clarifying the relationship of the theoretical components to the hypothesis being tested, and also demonstrating the real world applicability of this methodological approach. Finally, for this particular study, the operational difficulty in analyzing both leadership and culture makes the case study useful because it challenges the research gap by examining those variables academic development scholars avoid altogether or give only a cursory glance.

The two countries selected for analysis are Ghana and Botswana, both of which are located in the sub-Sahara region. Many factors make these countries unique and justify their choice for research. Both were once colonies of the United Kingdom during

³⁸ Theodore Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 4 (1964): 677-715.

³⁹ Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby, eds., *Strategies of Inquiry, Handbook of Political Science*, Vol. 7 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975): 79-138.

the colonial period. Since the two countries achieved their independence, Botswana has had a stable political system with virtually no political turmoil. Ghana, on the other hand, has been politically unstable and experienced several military coups. Beginning at independence, Botswana was comparatively poor vis-à-vis Ghana. It had a per capita income of about \$50, with little or no economic infrastructure. In fact, the British government built the country's capital of Gaborone only in 1960 at the dawn of the country's independence. Prior to that, the country was administered from Mefiking, a city located in South Africa.⁴⁰ By contrast, Ghana had a per capita income of about \$242 and moderate infrastructure at the time of independence. Its state government had already been established at Accra, the current capital city. Both countries, however, are equally endowed with precious minerals (gold and diamonds) and their economies depend on the production of raw materials.

Since gaining independence, the economic performance of these countries has diverged considerably. In a dramatic turn of events, Botswana's economic improvement has surpassed that of Ghana. Its current per capita income hovers above \$3000, and the nation experienced a 7.7% annual growth rate between 1965 and 1997. By comparison, Ghana's per capita income is around \$400 and it experienced an anemic 0.9% annual rate of growth between 1965 and 1997.⁴¹ Given that they were both colonies of the same country, and possess roughly similar mineral resources, the current gap in economic

⁴⁰ Willie Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation," *African Affairs*, Vol. 89, No. 354 (January 1990): 27-56.

⁴¹ P. Collier and J. W. Gunning, "Why Has Africa Grown Slowly," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 3-22. The economic data are quoted from African Development Bank, *Basic Indicators on African Countries* (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: African Development Bank, 1999) and World Development Indicators (1999)

prosperity in favor of Botswana makes their comparison an important area of research.

The information gathered from the case studies will be used for comparative analysis in investigating how leadership has impacted the economic status of these two countries.

The information gained from the research will shed light as to whether the leadership role has an impact on development.

In order to investigate the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic development in relation to the research hypothesis and questions, the relationship between leadership and culture is first be established. Thereafter, the relationship between culture and economic development is also established. Then, utilizing the theory of association,⁴² this study explains the relationships between the three key variables. In an appropriate operating format towards answering the research questions, leadership is employed as the independent variable. As a transitional mode, culture is employed as the intervening variable, while economic development becomes the dependent variable.

Culture is divided into *reserve* and *universal zones*.⁴³ The distinction allows the identification of the cultural elements that are essential and ought to be established in order to spur development. This separation will be equally important to establish the reason why a developmental culture has not been established in Africa. The categorization will also assist in determining the strengths and the weaknesses of the cultural problems, and the kind of transformation that the nations of Africa need to undergo to enable them to cope with development challenges.

⁴² Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁴³ Kwasi Wiredu, *Philosophy and An African Culture* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Oladipo, "Reason, Identity and the African Quest."

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Following this introductory chapter, chapter 2 provides a literature review on leadership, culture, and the two main theoretical schools of economic development-- modernization and dependency. The chapter summarizes the major economic development debates from these two perspectives. Attention is also paid to governance. To avoid any confusion, the chapter makes a distinction between *governance* and *leadership*. It also makes a distinction between *economic growth* and *economic development*. Based on the detailed literature review, I argue that the two major development camps have neglected to consider the importance of leadership and culture in their economic developmental analyses in general, and with respect to sub-Saharan Africa in particular. The failure to include a domestic institutional analysis provides a theoretical foundation from which I develop assumptions, hypothesis, and research questions for empirical investigation.

Chapter 3 uses the *theory of association* to build a theoretical framework that links the variables of leadership, culture, and economic development. It uses the *leadership-culture-development (LCD)* model to illustrate how the cultures that leaders legitimize impact the outcome of national economies. The LCD emphasizes culture, and explains how it can be divided into two broad aspects of the *reserve zone* and the *universal zone*. It further examines and isolates scientific and high moral cultures as essential cultural elements for economic development. In addition, the chapter analyzes the historical antecedents that led to the Senghorian philosophy that restrained modernization by suppressing the actions of SSA leaders in establishing scientific culture.

Chapter 4 offers a case study of Botswana. The chapter examines Botswana's leadership from the precolonial era through the colonial protectorate era, including its contemporary leadership. This section also analyzes how the various leaders organized their societies towards economic and political progression throughout these times. It offers explanations as to how the colonial protectorate system was different from that of direct colonial rule in other parts of Africa. In addition, the chapter explains how leadership continuity was made possible during the protectorate era. The chapter gives an account of how Seretse Khama instilled high moral culture into his political officials, to minimize corruption once independence was achieved. This analysis demonstrates how Seretse strategically built efficient democratic capitalist economic institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), and the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) to advance his country's economic progress. Finally, it touches on how Khama's belief in the Senghorian philosophy intervened to discourage him from embarking on a path that would establish scientific culture.

Chapter 5 turns to the Ghanaian case. The chapter similarly examines leadership and economic development from the precolonial era through the colonial era, including that nation's contemporary leadership. Emphasis is placed on demonstrating how the direct colonial rule in Ghana disrupted the moral obligatory relationship between traditional leaders and their followers. Of critical importance is the vacillation of colonial policies and practices, and how two groups of leaderships were created in Ghana, resulting in the ultimate moral decay of its institutions. The moral decline in the contemporary leadership ranks has legitimized and spurred corruption and human rights abuses in the country. The chapter further examines Ghana's experience with military

leaders and *coup d'états* beginning with Kwame Nkrumah's ouster from power up through the Rawlings' coup, which put him in power for twenty years. In addition, it examines how the *interlude leaders* helped legitimize a corrupt culture that has undermined the Ghanaian economy. Finally, I look at Rawlings' economic policies under the structural adjustment program (SAP) which exacerbated the nation's economic problems.

The comparative analysis of the two case studies is the focus of chapter 6. Here, I examine how the colonial differences affected the leaderships of Botswana and Ghana. The section compares the economic cultures that leaders in both countries established, as well as the impact of those cultures on the economic development outcomes of these countries. It compares and analyzes the economic status of Botswana and Ghana by using the LCD model to offer a theoretical explanation for the economic position of each country. The chapter reviews the economic cultures that exist in both countries and analyzes what brought about those conditions. Towards the end, the chapter uses the Senghorian dimension to explain why both countries lack scientific cultures.

Chapter 7 concludes the research with a summary of the empirical investigation. It calls attention to the inability of sub-Saharan African leaders to establish the essential cultures needed for economic development. The chapter discusses implications that this research on leaders in the region might have, and suggests what could be done to minimize the underdevelopment in the region. Finally, the chapter suggests that future studies on economic development strategies need to include analysis of leadership and culture.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Since decolonization, the study of sub-Saharan Africa's economic and political development has been dominated by liberal views that envision the development of market system democracies similar to those found in the Western countries.¹ This approach is encapsulated in the modernization paradigm.² Modernization theory uses modern economic theory and statistical analysis to portray the internal process of changes that developing countries ought to go through if they are to become successful in attaining sustainable economic growth.

However, the modernization euphoria was challenged from 1960 to the mid-1980s by dependency theorists who demonstrated that political and economic developments can proceed in many paths. Dependency views underdevelopment in Third World countries in terms of international and domestic power politics, institutional and structural economic rigidities, and the proliferation of dual economies and dual societies both within and among the nations.³ Dependency theory, therefore, emphasizes that external and internal institutional and political structures constrain economic development in poor countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to resolve the underdevelopment

¹ Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation* (NY: St. Martin's, 2000); Richard Higgot, *Political Development Theory: The Contemporary Debate* (London: Croom Helm, 1983).

² Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World* ; Preston, *Development Theory*.

³ Raul Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (NY: United Nations, 1950).

problems, dependency theory advocates the restructuring of the global system and fails to mention the need for cultural re-orientation of underdeveloping nations by their leaders.⁴

The overall structure of the arguments in the literature can be viewed as a series of related claims about the nature of social theorizing and the business of theorizing development. However, any specific theorizing with respect to the dynamics of complex changes towards development in the Third World, according to Peter Preston, must be understood as a discrete exercise in order to make sense out of the arguments.⁵ In other words, the business of analyzing social developments, whether politics or economics, is a complex descriptive task that requires one to disentangle crucial axes of development events. The central purpose of this chapter is to review some of the cumulative information regarding theories of leadership and development.

In order to assist in deciphering the social complexities related to the hypothetical question posed in chapter one, this chapter is divided into three sections. The first reviews the theories of modernization and dependency. In the second part, attention shifts to reviewing the literature on leadership and cultural theories, including the role of leadership in development. In part three, I analyze the historical antecedents of SSA leadership as a prelude to my empirical research.

⁴ Paul Streeten, *The Frontiers of Development Studies* (London: Macmillan, 1972).

⁵ Preston, *Development Theory*.

MODERNIZATION THEORY

Earlier twentieth-century economists believed in an economic orthodoxy that was based on an equilibrium concept.⁶ Among those theorists were W. S. Jervons, Alfred Marshall, Leon Walras, and Vilfredo Preto. They argued that if the market were left alone, it would function to maximize the well-being of society at large.⁷ Unfortunately, the human misery of the great depression in the 1930s called into question the equilibrium thesis and gave prominence to a state intervention scheme constructed by John Maynard Keynes.

Keynes demonstrated that economies could go into depression equilibrium where various factors of production are left idle. This fact, Keynes argued, results in unemployment, misuse of resources, and a possible domination of the economy by monopoly firms. To rectify this problem, Keynes proposed an alternative view involving deficit spending to stimulate economic growth.⁸ In this way, Keynes introduced the intervention growth theory into development economics. As an approach within development studies in the Third World, the growth theory was elaborated upon between the 1940s and 1950s and was absorbed into modernization theory. It became the first legitimate intervention development approach until the arrival of neoliberal development policies such as structural adjustment program and governance in the 1980s.⁹

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ C. Napoleon, *Economic Thought of the Twentieth Century* (London: Martin Robertson, 1972).

⁸ K. Kurihana, "The Dynamic Impact of History of Keynesian Theory," in R. V. Eagly, ed., *Events: Ideology and Economic Theory, 178-199* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1968).

⁹ Julio Faundez, *Good Governance and Law: Legal Reforms in Developing Countries* (NY: St. Martin's, 1997).

The theoretical underpinning for modernization theory is that more investments lead to more growth, which ultimately results in development.¹⁰ In this context, the process of development is seen as a series of gradual and successive stages.¹¹ In order for poor countries to go through the process, they are told to mobilize sufficient investments from both domestic and foreign sources to accelerate economic growth.¹² In another form, the modernization growth theory indicates that for an economy to develop, capital, in the form of new investment, is necessary.¹³

The outspoken advocate for the doctrine of economic growth under the banner of modernization was the economic historian W. W. Rostow. According to Rostow, all countries go through “stages of growth” as leaders seek to transform their traditional agriculture-based economies into industrial economies. The stages of growth doctrine argue that industrialized nations have gone through the first three stages and passed to the stage of “self-sustaining growth.” Thus Rostow believed that undeveloped countries could do the same in propelling themselves into sustainable growth.¹⁴

In addressing development problems of African countries, modernization theory emphasizes structural changes in production. This approach involves mechanisms by which countries can transform their economic production from a traditional to a modern

¹⁰ E. Hobsbaum, *Ages of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991* (London: Michael Joseph, 1994).

¹¹ Paul Baran and E. Hobsbaum, “The Stages of Economic Growth,” *Kyklos*, Vol. 14 (1961): 234-42.

¹² W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

¹³ Preston, *Development Theory*.

¹⁴ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*.

system, one composed of industrialized, diverse manufacturing products and services. A well-known structural change approach is based on a model of development formulated by Nobel Laureate W. Arthur Lewis in the mid-1950s, known as the “two sector surplus model (TSM).”¹⁵ The model was later modified and extended by John Fei and Gustav Ranis and became accepted as the theory of development process in labor surplus in Third World countries.¹⁶

TSM focuses on both the process of labor transfer and the growth of output and employment in the industrialized modern sector. According to Lewis and his colleagues, the underdeveloped economies consist of two sectors. One of the sectors is the overpopulated rural traditional agriculture sector characterized by zero marginal labor productivity and thus classified as having surplus labor. The other sector is the modern industrial sector with high productivity but without sufficient labor. The model recommended that the excess labor in traditional agriculture should be transferred to the urban modern industrial sector to increase output to stimulate growth and economic expansion.¹⁷ Economic expansion, according to this theory, is determined by the rate of industrial investment and the capital accumulation in the modern sector.¹⁸

¹⁵ Arthur W. Lewis, *The Economic Growth* (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1955).

¹⁶ John C. Fei and Gustav Ranis, *Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

¹⁷ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*; Todaro, *Economic Development*; Lewis, *The Economic Growth*.

¹⁸ Preston, *Development Theory*; Todaro, *Economic Development*.

The transfer of labor from the rural sector is made possible by high productivity in the modern industrialized sector, which means high wages in that sector. The economic rationalization of higher wages in modern industry is based on the usual assertion that wages are determined by the marginal product of labor (MPL) which is equal to the wage of production (WP). The Lewis model assumed wage rates in the urban industrial sector would have to be at least 30% higher than the average rural income to induce workers to migrate from their homes.¹⁹

To ensure an appropriate environment for growth, modernization theory offers a proposal for political stability in the developing world. In the political domain, modernization theorists place emphasis on classic theories of democratic pluralism.²⁰ They believe that the key to political development is a rapid growing electorate both willing and able to participate in domestic politics. According to the theory, political participation plays a crucial role in economic development.²¹ The political approach that became popular with modernization was structural functionalism. Structural functionalism assumes that all political systems perform similar “functions” despite structural differences. It is, therefore, assumed that a senator in the United States Congress and a chief in Nigeria perform the same political function within their respective political systems.²²

¹⁹ Todaro, *Economic Development*, 68.

²⁰ A. F. K. Organski, *The Stages of Political Development* (NY: Knopf, 1965).

²¹ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation..*

²² Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, *Politics in Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960).

According to Peter Schraeder, structural functionalism represents modernization advocates' desire to promote a "value neutral [bias-free] scientific framework for comparing any political system, regardless of its culture or history."²³ By this assumption, modernization theorists believe structural functionalism can enable ethnic divisions in Africa to cease. In essence, this logic represents wishful thinking on the part of architects of the structural-functionalist approach. Their framework suggests that all African political systems will ultimately evolve into stable multiparty democracies similar to that of the United States and other Western countries. In spite of its good intentions, modernization theory overlooks the importance of local leadership in the creation of the democratic culture.

Criticism of Modernization Theory: A Cultural Perspective

There are many shortfalls of the Keynesian-based modernization theories. However, we look at the deficiencies that are relevant to development in sub-Saharan Africa. First, the theory is derived from advanced economies based on implicit assumptions of efficient and adequate institutional structures that are characteristics of industrialized countries. Cultural attributes which are absent in most developing countries, particularly those in SSA. This underscores incompatibility of modernization theory in the region, especially when there is leadership absence to establish the culture that is conducive to the applicability of the theory.

²³ Schraeder. *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*, 25.

Second, the TSM assumes that surplus labor exists in the rural agriculture sector, while there is full employment in the urban industrialized sector. Most contemporary research seems to indicate that the reverse is true in developing countries. That is, in general there is substantial unemployment in urban areas as opposed to surplus labor in the rural areas. This condition seems to be substantiated by the fact that “development economists today seem to agree that the assumption of urban surplus labor is empirically more valid than the opposite Lewis assumption of a general rural surplus labor.”²⁴

Lewis’ assumption of the automatic transfer of readily available trained skilled labor is also troubling because it indicates that the rural areas in the developing nations have trained labor. Contrary to this assumption, it is the lack of a diversified industrialized culture of skilled labor in those areas that constitutes problems for development in SSA. As agrarian economies, labor in the region is not alternatively trained and therefore lacks any industrialized culture that makes it readily available to be utilized in the modern sector. Following this line of reasoning, unless the TSM is associated with some sort of skill training-- which is usually lacking in developing countries-- Lewis’ theory of labor transfer could be considered less relevant with respect to economic development. Quite to the contrary, it can be argued that without the proper leadership to establish the appropriate culture, the TSM model under the modernization paradigm undermines growth. This conclusion is based on the fact that many rural migrants, before their migration to the urban areas in search of jobs, were productive, regardless of how meager the actual scale of production.

²⁴ Todaro, *Economic Development*.

Characterization by the TSM model that the MPL of labor in the rural sector is equal to zero could be argued to be invalid because labor in the rural sector is not applied to the production of one product, nor is all labor applied to one unit of land. People in the agricultural industry, just like other industries, have equally important though different functions that make the division of labor also applicable to rural labor. Contrary to this reality, the model attempts to group all labor under one task, allowing the theory to validate its assertion of zero marginal productivity of labor.

Modernization assumes that the faster the rates of capital accumulation, the higher the growth rate of the modern sector and faster the rate of new job creation in that sector. Two flaws arise from these assumptions. First, there is no guarantee that profits will be reinvested in those countries since the capital for the modern industrial sectors are often mobilized from offshore.²⁵ It has been argued by dependency theorists that foreign investors in those sectors repatriate their profits to their home countries.²⁶ Even when capitalists decide to re-invest, as Todaro has argued, they may do so by investing in sophisticated labor-saving equipment, rather than by hiring more labor as the Lewis TSM model assumes.²⁷

In the political arena, several trends call into question optimism about modernization's structural functionalism in developing countries in Africa. At the time the strategy was intensively advocated, the political culture for such a system was (and still is) non-existent in those areas. One example among the trends in the region at the

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ C. Furtado, *Accumulation and Development* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1976).

²⁷ Todaro, *Economic Development*.

time, and even today, is political violence. There was a spread of guerrilla insurgencies and civil wars along the terrain, notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan. In fact, the trend later caused a shift in modernization literature from optimism in political and economic developments in SSA, to a pessimistic expectation, which was characterized by Huntington as political decay.²⁸ In a later work, Huntington argued that rather than contributing to democracy and stability in Africa, modernization's political recommendations rendered the developing countries in the region politically unstable.²⁹ Drawing on Huntington's analysis, it is fair to argue that modernization's political structural functionalism was incompatible with the political cultures that existed in some developing nations and could have contributed to instability in some areas of the region.³⁰

One shortcoming of modernization theory in SSA has to do with investments. The theory's ambiguity on investments for development has made economic planners from developing nations view pecuniary investment as a panacea for their development problems. Because of this, they neglect other vital variables, such as leadership and scientific cultures, which are essential for development. On the other hand, if the proponents of the theory should argue that by investment, they mean all possible factors that make development possible, then modernization theory has definitional problem for

²⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Order in Changing Societies and Political Decay," *World Politics*. Vol. 17, No. 3 (1965): 386-430.

²⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

³⁰ Leonard Binder, *Crises and Sequences in Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

investment.³¹ This definitional vagueness makes the theory fall short of its prescriptions for development since investments in any of the above-mentioned areas (scientific culture, leadership, etc.) contribute towards economic development in the less developed countries. This ambiguity creates obstacles and puts constraints on the potential effectiveness of modernization's growth model.

If one takes into account the labor saving bias, reinvestment alternative, the possibility of capital flight in the form of profit repatriation, the nonexistence of rural surplus labor,³² the growing urban labor surplus, and the unavailable skilled labor to be transferred to the modern sector, then modernization in the form of a TSM of development needs modification to make it suitable for development in SSA. Ironically, as a state intervention approach, modernization fails to mention the role of state leadership in its economic development. Coupled with that, it fails to address the cultural environments in which its recommended policies should be implemented. In short, the theory is silent on cultural compatibility in which state economic policy would be applied. Despite its many flaws, it is modernization's state approach to development that has come under attack from the neoliberal advocates in its own camp. They profess that the failure of development in Africa and elsewhere is due to state intervention. In the subsequent paragraphs, I consider the neoliberal concept of modernization.

³¹ Maurice Scott Friezgerald argues that investment be sought in other things besides innovative technological changes. While this assertion may be technically correct, it fails to direct developmental planners which directions to take in their pursuit of national development. Please see: Maurice Scott Friezgerald . *A New View of Economic Growth* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Neoliberalism and the New Development Paradigms

In the past, underdevelopment was largely seen as a consequence of a series of structural constraints, which called for a massive increase in domestic investments relying mostly on the state. Under the new approaches by neoliberal economists, the diagnosis and prescription have both changed. Structural constraints have come to be regarded as distorted consequences of misguided state intervention that could only be overcome by greater reliance on free markets.³² The free market paradigms have therefore become dominant in developmental strategies in SSA and all other developing countries.³³ The crux of these new neoliberal developmental strategies is that if the developing countries want to develop, then they should open their economies to the outside world. The paradigm under the auspices of globalization espouses that the opening up of markets by underdeveloped nations will bring them investments, technology, management skills, and other resources necessary for their economies to grow and ultimately develop.³⁴

To benefit from this “open border” development mechanism, the sub-Saharan African countries are told to embark on export promotion to sell their products, which consist mainly of raw materials.³⁵ In conjunction with export promotion, the countries are advised to privatize their national companies and cut social services to their citizens

³² Montek S. Ahluwalia, “Structural Adjustment and Reform in Developing Countries,” in United Nations, *International Monetary and Financial Issues for 1990s*, Vol. 4, 129-141 (NY: United Nations, 1994).

³³ Faundez, *Good Governance and Law*.

³⁴ Ahluwalia, “Structural Adjustment and Reform.”

³⁵ John Sender, “Africa’s Economic Performance: Limitations of the Current Consensus,” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer 1999): 89-114.

to reduce government expenditures.³⁶ These neoliberal approaches in sub-Saharan Africa are being pushed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, under their Structural Adjustment Program and “good governance” policies.³⁷ Consolidation of the strategies has been accelerated by the decline of communism in Eastern Europe and the removal of socialist ideology. These events have helped to alter the socioeconomic development of the underdeveloped nations around the world, including those in the SSA region, in favor of the liberal tradition and at the expense of revolutionary nationalists in Africa.³⁸

The irony of the neoliberal free market approach in the form of structural adjustment programs, however, lies in its historical antecedents. As previously stated, the economic orthodoxy of the industrialized world was once based on the free market equilibrium concept, a condition which was identical to what neoliberalism advocates today for the developing countries and one which ultimately led to the great depression in the 1930s. The question that arises to undermine the validity of the SAPs then becomes: What makes the neoliberals believe that these similar conditions will result in development in sub-Saharan Africa when the region does not have the productive culture that the industrialized world had when it experienced its depression under similar conditions? In other words, the neoliberal development policies that advocate a hands-off

³⁶ World Bank, *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action*, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1981).

³⁷ Fantu Cheru. *The Silent Revolution in Africa: Debt, Development and Democracy* (London: Zed, 1989).

³⁸ Timothy Shaw, “Reformism, Revisionism, and Radicalism in African Political Economy During 1990s,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (1991): 191-212.

state approach without examining other human social factors, such as leadership and culture, stands to contribute little in terms of development for African nations.

As the Ghanaian experience shows, the new neoliberal development paradigm, with its disregard for leadership to establish the appropriate culture for sustainable development, has many flaws. In Ghana, the adoption of SAP policies in 1983 resulted in the dismissal of 20,000 workers from the National Cocoa Board, thereby exacerbating the living conditions of many Ghanaians.³⁹ Advocates of the program pointed to Ghana's growth rate of 5% for three consecutive years and hailed Ghana as a development miracle without mentioning the fact that the average citizen has been made worse off now than prior to the introduction of SAPs.⁴⁰ According to reports on Ghana, adjustment programs have not improved, but rather have worsened the poor's basic needs measured in terms of income, consumption, and access to social services. The devaluation of the Ghanaian currency associated with the program also has brought massive increases in living costs to all residents in the country.⁴¹

One major dilemma for neoliberalism is that in terms of development, SAPs can hardly be characterized as a developmental tool if development includes social justice and democracy.⁴² The dilemma stems from the incompatibility of SAPs and social

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ *Africa Research Bulletin*, No. 11347 (July 16- August 15, 1993).

⁴¹ Hutchful Eboe, "Smoke and Mirrors: The World Bank's Social Dimensions of Adjustment Program," *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 62 (1994): 569-84.

⁴² Claude Ake, "The New World Order: A View from Africa," in Hans-Henrik Holm and George Sorensen, eds., *Whose World Order: Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, 19-42 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995); For social aspect for development, please see Gunnar Myrdal, "What is Development?" *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 8 (1974): 729-36.

democracy. The program can only be successful in non-democratic environments where social resentment to the program is repressed by dictatorial rules.⁴³ Due to the non-democratic nature of the program, its implementation undermines the democratic political side of the development equation. For example, the Ghanaian growth rate cited by the IMF as a success story can be attributed to the dictatorial rule of the Rawlings regime in the country for the last twenty years.⁴⁴

The idea that SAP is an economic growth tool makes it less of a development tool because the two concepts (growth and development) are not the same, and as it will be shown in chapter three, growth does not necessarily lead to development.⁴⁵ For that reason, the SAP cannot be labeled as a developmental tool for developing countries, including those in SSA. As this study will also show, neither will governance culminate in development. Governance relates to the administration of a status quo and is therefore only a managerial tool with little or nothing to do with development, which is a transformation process.⁴⁶

Despite the flaws of modernization theory and its free market approaches, classical modernization theorists and their neoliberal cohorts are optimistic that the correct mixture of economic policies by developing nations will generate economic development. However, the dependency school, by contrast, is much less optimistic with

⁴³ Jeong Ho-Won, "Ghana: Lurching Towards Economic Rationality," *World Affairs*, Vol. 159, No. 2 (Fall 1996): 64-71.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ The distinction between growth and development is revisited in chapter three of this dissertation.

⁴⁶ Christopher Hood, "A Public Management For All Seasons," *Public Administration*, Vol. 69 (1991): 3-19.

the structural change development approach. Not only do they disagree with the structuralists, but also the dependency school argues that structuralists divert attention from the real issues in the global economy that prevent the Third World countries from developing.⁴⁷

DEPENDENCY THEORY AND ITS REVOLUTION

Dependency theory emerged as a major alternative to liberal theories of development in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Dependency specialists criticize both liberal and critical theorists alike for being too “Westerncentric” in their analyses.⁴⁸ Dependency wages most of its wars against capitalism just as Marxism does.⁴⁹ Ironically, it criticizes Marx as a European who was primarily concerned with the fate of Europeans, but not Asians or Africans.⁵⁰ Dependency theorists are more concerned with understanding why the regions of the southern hemisphere are suffering from economic stagnation, dictatorial leaders, unrest, and political instabilities despite the optimistic projections of modernization theory.

⁴⁷ Preston, *Development Theory*.

⁴⁸ Andre G. Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1967).

⁴⁹ Avineri Shlomo, *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization: His Dispatches and other Writings on China, India, Mexico, Middle East, and North Africa* (NY: Doubleday, 1968).

⁵⁰ Stephen Katz, “The Problem of Europecentrism and Evolutionism in Marx’s Writings on Colonialism,” *Political Studies*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1990): 672-86.

The core argument of dependency is that “international relations between capitalist countries and the developing areas are inherently exploitative, and that the international capitalist system is the primary source of this exploitation.”⁵¹ It is this relationship that has impeded development in Africa, Latin America, and large parts of Asia. In *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney argued that prior to the spread of international capitalism in the sixteenth century, Africa was developing politically and economically, in much the same way as other regions of the non-European world.⁵² According to Rodney, the European invasion of Africa culminated in a form of direct colonial rule, and led to the total incorporation of Africa into the global capital system. This had profoundly negative consequences for the continent’s development. As a result, he concludes that European domination led to the underdevelopment in Africa. According to Rodney, African development was “blunted, halted, and turned back.”⁵³ In order to resolve the underdevelopment problem in developing countries, dependency theorists advocated restructuring the global financial and production system.⁵⁴ One strand of dependency that places emphasis on global production and trading discrepancies between the developed North and underdeveloped South is the circulationist view.

Drawing on the works of Arghiri Emmanuel, a group of scholars emerged in the 1970s under the banner of dependency. They became known as the circulationists. This group offered more sophisticated analyses of the development and underdevelopment

⁵¹ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*.

⁵² Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 224.

⁵⁴ Prebisch, *The Economic Development of Latin America*.

thesis by focusing on the international trade relationship that benefits industrialized nations at the expense of developing nations.⁵⁵ In a massive three-volume work, Immanuel Wallerstein detailed the historical analysis of what he refers to as “the capitalist world economy,” a worldwide capitalist system controlled by exploitative industrial powers. The author believes this system is intentionally manipulated to improve the economies of the metropolis while the economies of the satellites grow more impoverished.⁵⁶

By using a concept based on the indirect rule model, Wallerstein explains that capitalism has orchestrated a pyramid scheme making it more difficult to accumulate capital for the development of economies of poor countries. Drawing from the metropolis-satellite model originally proposed by Andre Gunder Frank, Wallerstein pointed to and added a third tier of nations, which he called the semi-periphery. These are the nations he considers as neither very powerful nor very impoverished but as rising regional economic and politically powerful nations with aspirations that someday they will join the metropolises in controlling the global capitalist system.⁵⁷

The theoretical argument of the circulationist is that the semi-periphery nations have become buffer zones. They are being exploited by the metropolises, while the semi-

⁵⁵ Emmanuel Arghiri, *Unequal Exchange: A Study of Imperialism of Trade* (London: New Left, 1976).; Higgot, *Political Development Theory*.

⁵⁶ The titles of Wallerstein's three volumes are as follows according to the volume numbers. Volume One: *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* 1979; Volume Two: *Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy 1600-1750*, 1980; Volume Three: *The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy 1730-1840s*, 1989. Academic Press in New York published all volumes.

⁵⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein. “Dependence in an Interdependence World: The Limited Possibilities of Transformation within the Capitalist World Economy,” *African Studies Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1974): 24-30.

periphery nations turn around and exploit the periphery countries in their regions.⁵⁸ The intermediate role played by the semi-periphery nations prolongs the polarization needed to keep the capitalist regime in place by undermining the creation of a unified front against the metropolises. This structure maintains the capitalist reign, keeping the underdeveloped nations impoverished and undermining their political and economic development. While circulationists concentrate on a comprehensive analysis for all the regions in the South, the neo-Marxist strand of dependency emphasizes the development of African workers vis-à-vis their relationship with the capitalist North.

Neo-Marxism

While the classic dependency and circulationist theorists focus on the exploitation of the developing nations by the metropolises, the neo-Marxists, also under the umbrella of dependency, emphasize the importance of African workers who are kept in the underdeveloped status quo. The neo-Marxists dominated the critical traditions of African politics in the late 1970s and 1980s. For them, what is important to socialist African leaders are labor laws and working conditions for workers in their countries.⁵⁹ Samir Amin serves as the intellectual bridge between neo-Marxists, dependency theorists, and circulationists. Using West Africa as an example, Amin argues that the unequalization of the regions is made possible because the economies in the regions are structured around production that serves the interest of the metropolises but not that of the developing

⁵⁸ Karen Mingst, "The Ivory Coast at the Semi-Periphery of World Economy," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 32 (1988): 259-74.

countries. This state of affairs, he further argues, has been made possible because leaders in West Africa have reinforced this structural reality.⁶⁰

Amin uses the economy of Senegal as an example and points to the fact that the country's economy has been planned around the production of only groundnuts. According to Amin, this agricultural specialization provides France with inexpensive oil, which is a derivative of groundnuts grown by Senegalese, and hampers the economic development of Senegalese workers by paying them little or nothing for their labor. While dependency theory does well at describing the structural relationship between the North and South, it does not offer concrete solutions to the underdevelopment of the South. The only proposal put forward is for the South to divorce itself from the international economic structure, a strategy that does not seem to be especially feasible.

Criticism of Dependency Theory

Dependency theory is effective in describing the global capitalist system. It claims that the industrialized capitalist nations have undermined social and economic progress in less developed countries. However, this theory, fails to offer a strategic approach for development in the periphery countries, though there is some validity in the assertion that, via trade, some surplus might have been extracted from the satellite areas. It is equally valid to argue that the development of the metropolises was not contingent upon the surplus

⁵⁹ For the overview of the neo-Marxists' literature and the critique of both classical Marxism and Dependency, see Marenin Otwin, "Resolving Epistemological Contradictions in Marxist," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1989): 641-70.

⁶⁰ Samir Amin, *Neo-colonialism in West Africa* (NY: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

from the South.⁶¹ In that sense, dependency may be inaccurate in attributing all responsibility for the lack of development in the underdeveloped countries to the metropolises.

One of the core arguments of dependency is that the lack of development in the underdeveloped world stems from its association with the industrialized world. Realistically, no matter how convincing this argument may sound, it remains invalid because development is a process of endogenous transformation. Therefore, the peripheral countries could have pursued a self-reliant development path as the core European countries did in sixteenth century. In fact, in arguing against this core-periphery argument, Amin in, '*Delinking Towards a Polycentric World*', suggest that the periphery can pursue autocentric development by gradual withdrawal in various degrees from the capitalist world economy.⁶² Amin further rejects the circulationists' thesis by arguing that the capitalist world economy is not the only mode of production within the international system.⁶³

In addition to Amin, Claude Ake also rejects the development of underdevelopment thesis of dependency. Even though Ake agrees that capitalism is exploitative, he disagrees with dependency theory's contention that the expansion of capitalism has permanent regressive effects on Africa. Instead, Ake views the spread of capitalism to Africa as one "developmental" stage in the overall movement towards

⁶¹ Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

⁶² Samir Amin, *Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World* (London: Zed, 1990).

⁶³ Samir Amin, "Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism," *New York Monthly Review* (November 1976): 293-386.

socialism.⁶⁴ Even within the dependency camp itself, there is no unanimity about the negative impact of capitalism on the development of the peripheral areas. As the literature indicates, there are dependency scholars who believe that the periphery can achieve development within the capitalist world system.⁶⁵

If Henrique F. Cardoso's assessment that development for the south is possible within the prevailing global structure is correct, then the lack of development in those areas can be attributed to some of their endogenous factors. In this respect, an internal analysis of domestic culture and leadership's role is warranted. Yet, dependency fails to examine either. Even though the theory describes the structural collaboration between local and external leadership in exploiting local workers, it fails to explain that collaboration. It fails to say anything about the culture that the "compradors" have legitimized to undermine potential development in poor countries.⁶⁶ In short, while both dependency and modernization are state-oriented theories, they fail to incorporate in their development analyses an explication of the leadership that controls the state apparatus. On a more crucial note, the two theories are silent on culture, the socially accepted systems of practices and behavior upon which economic operations rely.

⁶⁴ Claude Ake, *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).

⁶⁵ Henrique F. Cardoso, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).

⁶⁶ Compradors are local elites in less developed countries who collaborate with the core countries to undermine economic development at home through exploitation for their personal gain as opposed to national interest.

CULTURE

Even though the two dominant theories in development--modernization and dependency-- might overlook culture, the importance of culture in development has been well established and noted as part of human activities by various scholars.⁶⁷ For the purpose of this study, culture is defined as an accepted system of social practice of behavior and prescriptions.⁶⁸ This definition means that cultures are meaningful orders of persons and things. In an economic sense, cultures are compatible with the view that individuals optimize, and their behaviors sustain an economic equilibrium. This equilibrium reflects the values and beliefs of the leaders who establish the culture of the group. The accepted systems of cultural behavior are an unfolding process. Their evolution can be viewed as an evolving hermeneutic system. The evolving nature allows culture to be dynamic. It also means open-endedness rather than closure, allowing cultural flexibility and the potential for human intent, discretion, and problem solving with critical reasoning.⁶⁹ Culture's dynamic characteristics make it not a rigid "set," but an open-ended complex set of rules, an organized and organizational hermeneutic network in which no trait of rule stands alone or drives any cultural force apart from its context. In the broad sense, culture is everywhere and it is everything. In its generalistic

⁶⁷ Amartya Sen, "A Matter of Choice: Is Culture Merely an Adjunct to Development?" *UNESCO Courier* (September 1996): 10-13.

⁶⁸ Diane Hughes, Edward Seidman, and Nathaniel Williams, "Cultural Phenomena and the Research Enterprises: Toward a Culturally Anchored Methodology," *American Journal of Community Psychology*. Vol. 21, No. 6 (December 1993): 687-703.

⁶⁹ Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics"; Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

term, culture is an interpretive integration of material objects, behaviors, and their meanings.⁷⁰

Anthropologists have made the study of culture paramount in their field.

Institutional economists and other social science researchers emphasize the importance of culture in economic development.⁷¹ For example, Casson argues that cultural activities and behaviors have significant impact on economic development. He also notes that societies with high morals and scientific beliefs as cultural attributes have high economic performance, while societies with low characteristics of these cultural attributes lack the prerequisites for economic development.⁷²

Similarly, other scholars have suggested that the difference in economic development may be attributed to culture. Findings by Adelman and Morris indicate that religious and linguistic diversity impact economic development.⁷³ In the area of political development, Haug finds that cultural diversity negatively impacted political stability.⁷⁴ In a more recent study, Reynolds compares 37 less developing nations and concludes that the culture of each of those nations affects their economic growth rates.⁷⁵ In another comparative study by Mardsen, the author establishes that not only is there a big gap

⁷⁰ Wiredu, *Philosophy and An African Culture*; Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics." Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁷¹ Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics."

⁷² Casson . *The Economics of Business*; Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁷³ Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economics Development* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1967).

⁷⁴ Marie R. Haug. "Social and Cultural Pluralism as a Concept in Social System Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 73 (November 1967): 294-304.

⁷⁵ Lloyd G. Reynolds, *Economic Growth in The Third World 1850-1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

between African countries and their counterparts in Asia, but that the difference in economic development between the two regions is due to their cultural differences.⁷⁶ From this he concludes that culture is an important factor in development.

There is widespread agreement in the literature that culture is one of the most important variables in economic development.⁷⁷ To the extent that Brad Lian and John R. Oneal emphasize that, "ignoring cultural influences on economic development seems particularly unwise," they see the current neglect of the cultural variable in development analysis as misguided.⁷⁸ Vernon Ruttan shares this position. He summarizes the situation in the following way:

Cultural consideration have been cast into the "underworld" of developmental thought and practices. It would be hard to find a leading scholar in the field of developmental economics who would commit herself or himself in print to the proposition that in terms of explaining different patterns of political and economic development... a central variable is culture.⁷⁹

Though the authors emphasize the importance of culture in economic growth, they fail to identify which cultural elements are important and essential for economic development. Neither do they mention leadership's responsibility for establishing the right culture for promoting economic development.

⁷⁶ Keith Mardsen, "Why Asia Boomed and Africa Busted," *Asian Wall Street Journal* (June 11, 1985): 8.

⁷⁷ Mardsen, "Why Asia Boomed"; Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economics Development*; Reynolds, *Economic Growth in The Third World*; Haug, "Social and Cultural Pluralism"; Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁷⁸ Brad Lian and John R. Oneal, "Cultural Diversity and Economic Development: A Cross-National Study of 98 Countries, 1960-1985," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (October 1997): 61.

⁷⁹ Vernon W. Ruttan "What Happened to Political Development?," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 39 (January 1991): 275.

Criticism of Culture

As the literature shows, many scholars have argued that culture is crucial to development. The problem, however, is that the literature fails to identify and distinguish which cultural attributes are essential for development. For example, in a cultural study by Adelman and Morris, the authors use ethnicity and language as variables to determine economic development.⁸⁰ The authors overlook the cultural attributes they employ in their studies. The ones that they identify have no value bearing on the transformation process and are, therefore, negligible to development, though they are only strictly utilized for self-actualization.⁸¹

Aside from failing to make the distinction between cultural attributes based on their usage, the literature on culture fails to make leaders responsible for cultural engineering. This neglect allows leaders to escape accountability for a dysfunctional culture as far as economic development is concerned. The one exception in this regard is Casson, who shows that leadership is responsible for cultural establishment through legitimation of behavior.⁸² Leadership's responsibility in establishing an appropriate culture for social progression in politics and economics illustrates the importance of leadership in development.

⁸⁰ Adelman and Morris, *Society, Politics, and Economics Development*.

⁸¹ Kwasi Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996); Wiredu, *Philosophy and An African Culture*.

⁸² Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

THE POSITION OF LEADERSHIP

Although the phenomenon of leadership has been around since antiquity, the systematic study of leadership did not start until the beginning of the early 1930s.⁸³ Since then, a considerable amount of work has been done in the fields of psychology, sociology, and business, which contribute to the accumulated information in the literature on leadership. However, the literature is deficient with respect to studies of political leadership.⁸⁴ The findings related to team leadership, however, provide information useful for understanding the importance of political leadership on group performance in general, including that of economic development.⁸⁵ In this section, I review the literature on leadership theories and make a distinction between leadership and governance. The remainder of this section is devoted to the review of African leadership from a historical perspective.

Leadership theorists point to a wide range of definitions on the concept of leadership with little consensual agreement among them as to which definition is appropriate.⁸⁶ Despite the definitional confusion, there is a fair degree of consensus concerning the nature of leadership in the literature that focuses on the study of phenomenon. Burns, one of the pioneer scholars of leadership theory, defines the concept as “the reciprocal process of mobilizing, by persons with motive and values, various

⁸³ Robert J. House and Ram N. Aditya, “The Social Scientific Study of Leadership: Quo Vadis?” *Journal of Management*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (May/June 1997): 409-73.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ M. J. Steven and M. A. Campion, “Staffing Teams: Development and Validation of the Teamwork-KSA Test,” Unpublished Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Nashville, TN, April 1994.

⁸⁶ A. I. Bryman, *Leadership and Organizations* (London: Routledge and Regan Paul, 1986).

economic, political, and other resources, in a context of competition and conflict, in order to realize goals independently or mutually held by both leaders and followers.”⁸⁷

From the same perspective, Bryman suggests “the common elements in these definitions imply that leadership involves a social influence process in which a person steers members of a group towards a goal.”⁸⁸ Therefore, the common consensus among scholars of leadership issues is to define the concept of leadership as an influencing process that integrates the purpose of leaders and followers into a symbiotic and mutually interdependent relationship.⁸⁹ Kenneth Boulding distinguishes this relationship from threat and exchange and identifies it instead as a source of power.⁹⁰ Although leaders and followers are bound together by a common quest, Burns clarifies the definition of leadership by drawing a distinction between leaders and followers. According to him, a leader “takes the initiative in making the leader-led connection.”⁹¹ A leader becomes the active focus of the group, and therefore “exercises a determining influence on the behavior of the group members and on the activities of the group.”⁹²

⁸⁷ J. M. Burns, *Leadership* (NY: Harper and Row, 1978).

⁸⁸ Bryman, *Leadership and Organizations*.

⁸⁹ G. Gemmil and J. Oakely, “Leadership: An Alienating Social Myth?” *Human Relations*, Vol. 45 (1992): 113-29; Burns, *Leadership*.

⁹⁰ K. E. Boulding, *The Image* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956).

⁹¹ Burns, *Leadership*, 20.

⁹² B. M. Bass, *Handbook of Leadership* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 27.

Burns draws attention to a differentiation in leaderships by categorizing them into transactional/supervisory and transformational/strategic leaderships.⁹³ This taxonomy has taken on considerable importance in the literature on leadership because it assists in drawing a clear distinction among leaders. Transactional leaders operate within the framework of the self-interest of the followers, engaging them in a quest with the promise of a reward. On the other hand, transformational leaders usually look for potential motives in followers, seeking to satisfy their high needs, and engage them to achieve their mutual quest. As a result, transforming leadership is based on a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that make leaders effective moral agents.⁹⁴

For Burns, leadership is further categorized by making a distinction between supervisory and strategic leadership. Strategic leadership usually gives purpose, meaning, and guidance to organizations. This they do by providing a vision with inspirational appeal to the members of organizational and external constituencies on which they are dependent. In terms of large organizational groups like a nation, strategic leadership functions include: making strategic decisions that concern the welfare and security of the inhabitants, allocating and distributing resources, providing direction for the nation's prosperity, and most importantly, establishing a systematic culture that possesses the capabilities to improve and maintain the entire group's interests.⁹⁵ Supervisory leadership, on the other hand, is a behavior that provides guidance, support, and corrective feedback for day-to-day activities of the group members. In other words,

⁹³ Joe L. Wallis, "Integrating the Ideas of Dissenting Economist into Theory of Transformational Leadership," *Review of Social Economy*, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Spring 1993): 14-39

⁹⁴ Burns, *Leadership*.

supervisory leadership is a task involving person-oriented leadership behavior void of making any significant changes.⁹⁶ In conjunction with Burns, Bass argues that transformational leaders have both charismatic and inspirational traits.⁹⁷

Charismatic leaders are considered to be exceptional individuals who inspire the creation of organizational cultures that subsequently become tradition.⁹⁸ Modern studies of charismatic leadership find that the charismatic phenomenon is widely distributed throughout every social community.⁹⁹ All writers on leadership, however, do not share this view of charismatic leadership.¹⁰⁰ Leadership literature focuses on the search for individual characteristics that differentiate leaders from non-leaders. In doing so, it identifies several studies in which traits are associated with leaders' effectiveness.¹⁰¹ In the coming paragraphs, I review some of those traits and what they reveal about leadership.

⁹⁵ House and Aditya, "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership."

⁹⁶ Ibid., House and Aditya provide elements of strategic leadership for organizations but caution that those elements can be modified to suit the needs of individuals.

⁹⁷ B. M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations* (NY: Free Press, 1985).

⁹⁸ House and Aditya, "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership."

⁹⁹ J. A. Conger and R. A. Kanungo, "Towards a Behavioral Theory of Charismatic Leadership in Organizational Settings," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 12 (1987): 637-47.

¹⁰⁰ C. Lindholm, *Charisma* (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

¹⁰¹ R. M. Stogdill, "Personal Factors Associated With Leadership : A Survey of the Literature," *Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 25 (1948): 35-71; C. A. Gibb, "The Principles and Traits of Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 42 (1947): 267-84.

The Leadership Trait Paradigm

There are a number of specific traits that are associated with effective leadership. Studies that investigate personal characteristics include psychological traits and motives such as authoritarianism, intelligence, need for power, needs for achievement, and appearance to measure the effectiveness of leaders.¹⁰²

In line with trait theory, McClelland's Achievement Motivation Theory has had a great deal of relevance to the practice of leadership.¹⁰³ The core of McClelland's theory is that individuals who engage in goal-setting and self-regulating behavior are high performers who become effective leaders.¹⁰⁴ It has been empirically demonstrated that groups that are managed by such leaders perform better than groups that are managed by non-achievement motivated leaders.¹⁰⁵

Similarly, McClelland's 1975 work argued that the combination of nonconscious motives such as high power motivation and high concern for moral exercise of power are predictive of leaders' effectiveness. This combination of motives is referred to by McClelland as the Leader Motive Profile (LMP). Power motivation theoretical logic centers on the assumption that nonconscious concern for acquiring status and having an impact on others derives from a desire to have power. Thus, it induces leaders to engage

¹⁰² Stogdill, *Personal Factors Associated With Leadership*.

¹⁰³ D. C. McClelland, J. W. Atkinson, R. A. Clark and E. L. Lowell, *The Achievement Motive* (NY: Irvington, 1976).

¹⁰⁴ A. Bandura, *Social Foundation of Thought and Action: A Social Cognitive Theory* (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1986).

¹⁰⁵ G. H. Litvin, and R. A. Stringer Jr., *Motivation and Organizational Climate* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1968).

in social influence, a behavior that is required for effective leadership. The central argument of this leadership theory is that highly motivated individuals obtain more satisfaction from the exercise of influence, and this satisfaction sustains their interest in the exercise of leadership. Therefore, if enacted in a socially constructive manner, high power motivation results in effective leadership performance.¹⁰⁶ The problem is unless disciplined to use the power in a constructive manner, power motivated leaders exercise power in an impetuously aggressive manner for self-aggrandizing purposes that are a detriment of their communities.¹⁰⁷

The theory further hypothesizes that leaders with high concern for the moral exercise of power act in an altruistic and collective-oriented manner. Such leaders are ethically concerned about the consequences of their actions on others.¹⁰⁸ The point of LMP theory, therefore, is that the combination of higher power motivation and high disposition towards the moral exercise of power results in leadership that induces followers' trust and respect for the leader, and commitments to the leader's vision.

Parallel to the power motive within the LMP is *affiliative motivation*. It is a nonconscious concern for establishing, maintaining, and restoring close personal relationships with others. Leaders with affiliative motivation are non-assertive and are reluctant to monitor subordinates even when required to do so. Leaders with this trait manage on the basis of personal relationships and show favoritism towards some people.

¹⁰⁶ D. C. McClelland, *Power: The Inner Experience* (NY: Irvington, 1975).

¹⁰⁷ House and Aditya. "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership."

¹⁰⁸ D. G. Winter and N. B. Barenbaum, "Responsibility and Power Motive in Women and Men." in A.J. Stewart and M. B. Lykes, eds., *Gender and Personality*, 247-267 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985).

In comparing the two traits, leaders with a need for power do not engage in dysfunctional behavior that is associated with leaders with affiliative motivation such as favoritism, submissiveness, and reluctance to monitor and discipline subordinates.¹⁰⁹ Contrary to affiliative motivation, when the self-aggrandizing tendency associated with the power motivated leader is inhibited by a high concern for morally responsible exercise of power, leaders with the power motive trait engage in an effective exercise of power.¹¹⁰

The above theoretical analyses indicate that achievement motive is predictive of leadership's effectiveness.¹¹¹ Robert J. House, for example, found in 1991 that motive components of the LMP predicted U.S. presidential charisma and presidential performance effectiveness.¹¹² In another study, House also contended that leaders with high confidence, strong motivation, and strong convictions in moral correctness of their beliefs are strongly motivated to attain and assert influence in society. This group of leaders he referred to as charismatic leaders. These are the leaders who advocate change and are usually determined to accomplish their objectives. Due to their confidence, convictions, and willingness to transform society to meet their higher needs, they often

¹⁰⁹ D. C. McClelland, *Human Motivation* (Glenview, IL: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1985).

¹¹⁰ These theoretical expectations have been confirmed; see R. J. House, S. Shane, and D. Harold, "Rumors of the Death of Dispositional Theory and Research in Organizational Behavior are Greatly Exaggerated," *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1996): 203-24.

¹¹¹ D. C. McClelland and D. H. Burnham, "Power is the Great Motivator," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (January-February 1995): 126-39.

¹¹² R. J. House, "The Distribution and Exercise of Power in Complex Organization: A MESO-Theory," *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1991): 323-52.

challenge the status quo.¹¹³ They are more persistent in the face of obstacles and therefore become effective leaders.

The works by Simonton, Spangler, and House have shown that assertiveness and self-confidence associated with charismatic leaders is usually correlated with their risk-taking and pro-social dominance. In different operationalizations of the same data, both studies found that U.S. presidents' risk-taking behavior is related to presidential greatness and effectiveness.¹¹⁴ Charismatic leaders are effective because of their ability to mobilize people to follow the leader's vision. Usually, such leaders advocate the vision of a better future for the collective social system and, in all cases, avoid self-aggrandizement. From these accounts in the literature, the success and the effectiveness of leaders are associated with their sense of social responsibility and collective interests rather than self-interest.¹¹⁵

From the above theoretical discussion, it can be asserted that traits such as intelligence, morals, motive for power, and affiliation motive help to differentiate leaders. Also, in the domain of trait theory, pro-social influence motivation and achievement motivation help to explain how leadership effectiveness is enhanced in certain situations. For example, achievement motivation illustrates effectiveness and success when tasks are challenging. Despite its usefulness, questions regarding the accuracy of predictions of

¹¹³ R. J. House, "A Theory of Charismatic Leadership," in J. G. Hunt and L. Larson, eds., *Leadership: The Cutting Edge*, 189-207 (Carbondale, IL: South Illinois University Press, 1977).

¹¹⁴ D. K. Simonton, *Greatness: Who makes History and Why* (NY: Guilford, 1994); W. D. Spangler and R. J. House, "Presidential Effectiveness and the Leadership Motive Profile," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 36, No. 3 (September 1991): 364-96.

¹¹⁵ House and Aditya, "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership."

trait theory on the effectiveness of leadership sparked the formulation of other theories, such as Leadership Member Exchange theory.¹¹⁶

Leadership Member Exchange Theory

As opposed to traits or behavior of either the leader or the follower, leadership member exchange (LMX) examines relationships. It explains that a high degree of mutual influence and obligation between leaders and followers will result in several important positive outcomes such as high performance in a group, citizenship behavior, satisfaction, and commitment of the group. The core of the theory is that effective leadership consists, in part, of the good relationship between leaders and followers.¹¹⁷ A good relationship in this sense is characterized by trust, respect, and mutual obligation. These traits, in turn, generate mutual loyalty and influence between superiors and subordinates, and result in high performance of the group. In a recent study, Deluga finds evidence of an association between the quality of LMX and self-reported citizenship behaviors. These include desirable courtesy, conscientiousness, altruism, and sportsmanship-- elements that are necessary for economic and other social developments.¹¹⁸ Despite the usefulness of the above theories, the leadership studies have a number of weaknesses.

¹¹⁶ These theoretical expectations have been confirmed., see R. J. House, S. Sahne and D. Harold, "Rumors of the Death of Dispositional Theory."

¹¹⁷ G. B. Grean and M. Uhl-Bien, "Relationship-Based Approach to Leadership: Development of Leadership Exchange (LMX) Theory of Leadership over 25 Years: Applying a Multi-Level Multi-Domain Perspective," *Leadership Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1995): 219-47.

¹¹⁸ R. J. Deluga, "Supervisor Trust Building, Leaders-Member Exchange and Organizational Citizenship Behavior," *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology*, Vol. 67 (1994): 315-26.

Criticism of Leadership Theory

One salient problem within the leadership studies is that leadership research has been studying management and supervision and not leadership as it claims to do. This has been done because it has always been easier to study supervisors and managers than higher level executives, and also because relatively large samples of lower-level managers are more accessible to investigators. The problem, however, is that leadership studied at those levels is almost exclusively supervisory as opposed to strategic. For classifying managers as leaders, the leadership studies have mainly focused on business environments and have completely overlooked the importance of strategic transformational leadership in national development.¹¹⁹

With respect to national development, leadership studies are deficient on the question of political leadership.¹²⁰ The exceptions to the political leadership flaw are the two separate works done by Simonton and House on the effectiveness of U.S presidents.¹²¹ These works, however, only address local leadership-- in this case the United States-- and cannot be universally applied due to reserve zone cultural differences.¹²² Leadership is an integrative process in all societies that influences other social functions such as economics in different societies, including those in Asia, Latin America, and Africa, which should not be overlooked. Neither should leadership, as a

¹¹⁹ Abraham Zaleznik, "The Difference Between Leadership and Management," *Harvard Business Review* (May/June 1977): 67-78.

¹²⁰ House and Aditya, "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership."

¹²¹ Simonton. *Greatness: Who makes History*; Spangler and House, "Presidential Effectiveness."

¹²² "Reserve zone" in this case means cultural attributes that deal with self-actualization. This concept is clarified in chapter three, where culture as a comprehensive concept has been categorized into two broad aspects.

behavioral concept, be left to the studies of only a few disciplines such as psychology and business, as seems to be the norm. Rather leadership studies should incorporate other areas, such as development, because such efforts will strengthen the utilization and the application of the knowledge resource provided by the leadership discipline. For example, a clear distinction between leadership and governance within the field of leadership itself, as provided next, clarifies the roles of people in those positions.

The Difference Between Leadership and Governance

As earlier alluded to, the distinction between leadership and governance, as management has come to be called, is warranted in the literature for the clarification and assignment of responsibilities in social affairs.¹²³ Even though a distinction exists and has been clearly articulated by Zalezink, the literature obfuscates the distinction and uses governance and leadership synonymously.¹²⁴

Leadership, as defined earlier, is a transformational process that involves articulating organizational vision, introducing of major changes, providing inspiration, and dealing with troublesome aspects of both internal and external environments of an organization. On the other hand, governance or management is viewed as the implementation of leaders' vision and changes introduced by leaders as well as the maintenance and administration of organizational infrastructures. Subsequently, after Zaleznik's categorization, a similar distinction between managers and leaders by Bennis

¹²³ Faundez. *Good Governance and Law*.

¹²⁴ Zaleznik. "The Difference Between Leadership and Management."

and Nanus was made. They state that “managers do things right and leaders do the right things.”¹²⁵ Some scholars of leadership contend that these distinctive findings are qualitative suggestions and therefore need empirical demonstrations through rigorous methodologies.¹²⁶

For the development scenario, a contemporary demonstrative empirical evidence for this distinction is the vision of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that economic development in the developing countries can be accomplished through structural adjustment programs with emphasis on good governance. This view led both institutions to instruct the leaders in those countries to implement structural adjustment programs. The articulation of that vision, and its introduction by IMF and the World Bank in conjunction with instructions to the developing countries to adopt, implement, maintain, and administer those institutional infrastructures serves as empirical evidence of a distinction between leadership and governance. In this example, both the IMF and the World Bank played the strategic leadership role and the so-called leaders of the developing countries became managers or governors or, at best, supervisory leaders in implementing the SAP vision formulated by both institutions for development purposes in sub-Saharan Africa.

As the above example illustrates, leadership and governance involve separate processes. Leadership is a social process that needs to be undertaken by people, and even though the leaders need not be present at all times, if the process is being done then

¹²⁵ W. Bennis and B. Nanus, *Leaders: The Strategies for taking Charge* (NY: Harper and Row, 1985).

¹²⁶ House and Aditya, “The Social Scientific Study of Leadership.”

leadership is being exercised. The essence of the argument between the two concepts is that managers or governors are oriented towards stability and leaders are oriented towards innovation.¹²⁷

Based on the contrast between leadership and governance, it can be asserted that governance is a behavior of one in a position of formal authority to maintain compliance of the group members with their normal role requirements. Its other functions include: coordinating and staffing the components for the group activities, administering the infrastructure of the organizations, and handling the day-to-day problems that emerge in the process of strategy and policy implementation and ongoing organizational functions. In short, there is a difference between leadership and governance: the former provides vision, direction, strategy, and inspiration to group units and behaves in a manner that reinforces the vision and its inherent values. while the latter manages, implements, and administers the vision of the leader.

Given the clarification between leadership and governance plus the relevancy of leadership as some of the theories illustrate, the essential question for our purpose is: What is the importance of leadership to development? As noted earlier, there is a deficiency in the leadership literature regarding political leadership. However, the findings relating to team leadership provide information useful for understanding the importance of leadership in development.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ G. Yukl, *Leadership in Organizations*. 3rd. ed. (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994).

¹²⁸ Steven and Campion, "Staffing Teams."

IMPORTANCE OF LEADERSHIP IN DEVELOPMENT

The importance of leadership in development has been noted in the social science studies. For example, in comparing the economic development of Francophone Africa and Republic of Korea, Lublin Doe shows that economic development of a nation is a complex phenomenon, where success or failure depends on the political will and determination of its leadership.¹²⁹ Also, in a pioneer work, Casson demonstrates the importance of leadership in building a national culture, which reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances the economic performance of the nation as a group.¹³⁰ In other works, scholars have argued that most failures in teamwork can be attributed to leadership problems and not to individual team members.¹³¹

According to Larson and Lafasto, leadership does more than just influence team effort. Effective leadership fundamentally changes what a team effort is all about.¹³² Burgess, Riddle, Hall, and Salas further explain the relationship between leadership and group effectiveness, stating that “effective team leader behavior will lead to effective team performance, and ineffective team leader behavior will lead to ineffective team performance.”¹³³ Likewise, Pratt and Jiambalvo suggest that team effectiveness cannot be maximized without addressing issues of leadership behavior.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ Doe, “Economic Development of Francophone Africa.”

¹³⁰ Casson, *The Economics of Business*; Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”

¹³¹ Oakland, *Total Quality Management*.

¹³² C. E. Larson and F. M. J. Lafasto, *Teamwork: What Must Go Right / What can Go Wrong* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989).

¹³³ K. A. Burgess, D. L. Riddle, J. K. Hall, and E. Salas, “Principle of Team Leadership Under Stress.” Paper Presented at the 38th Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Psychological Association, Knoxville, TN., March 1992.

In general, a review of the leadership literature suggests that leadership is one of the most critical ingredients in effective team performance, such as the economic development of a nation, impacting all team processes, both directly and indirectly.¹³⁵ As such, Ilgen, Major, Hollenbeck, and Segó stress that as we look at teamwork, of which economic development of a nation is part of, "we cannot overlook the role of leaders and leadership."¹³⁶ Given all the economic performance failures in developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa, several important questions arise: Why have development theories not evaluated the region's leadership experience? Where does the African leadership fit in this framework of global economic development? Do the region's leaders play a legitimate role in the region's economic development?

All the above questions are pertinent, yet the development literature continues to ignore the role of leadership in the region's development. One exception is the recent work by Marina Ottaway, who looked at new African leaders and their neoliberal economic policies designed towards economic growth.¹³⁷ Ottaway's work utilizes a neoliberal perspective to evaluate some African leaders who are adopting market liberalization and democratization policies for growth. By contrast, this research investigation focuses on leadership's role in establishing cultural conditions that make

¹³⁴ J. Pratt and J. Jiambalvo, "Relationship between Leader Behaviors and Audit Team Performance," *Accounting Organizations and Society*, Vol. 6 (1981): 133-42.

¹³⁵ Casson, "Cultural Determinants," ; Burns, *Leadership*; House and Aditya, "The Social Scientific Study of Leadership," ; Pratt and Jiambalvo, "Relationship between Leader Behaviors,"; Larson and Lafasto, *Teamwork*; Doe "Economic Development of Francophone Africa."

¹³⁶ Ilgen, Major, Hollenbeck, and Segó, "Team Research in the 1990s."

¹³⁷ Marina Ottaway, "Africa's New Leaders: African Solution or African Problem?" *Current History*, Vol. 97, No. 619 (May 1998): 209-13.

development possible. However, before the leadership role is addressed, a review of sub-Saharan African leaderships and their relation to the developmental journey of the African people needs to be undertaken.

African Leadership in Historical Context

Leadership in sub-Saharan Africa can be divided into three historical periods: precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial. Here, the first two leadership groups are briefly discussed. Precolonial leaderships in SSA were made of two main types of indigenous political institutions with a further differentiation within each. The first type is based on tribal grouping. Tribes existed as separate political entities and governed themselves independently. They were headed by chiefs chosen by the people, and their attendant administrative and judicial institutions were referred to as chiefdoms. The second type was the imperial rule. This was when some conquered tribes came under the hegemon of others, as in kingdoms and empires.¹³⁸ In matters of serious consequences concerning the entire population, including new laws and declaration of war, the chief summoned all members of council elders in addition to his advisors. At such meetings, the chief presided over the council and sought its opinion. Such practices were common throughout most parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Tribes that practiced this leadership model included the Yoruba of Nigeria and the Swazi and Zulu of South Africa.¹³⁹

¹³⁸ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

¹³⁹ D. Boama-Wiafe, *Africa: The Land, People and Cultural Institutions* (Omaha, NB: Wisdom Publication, 1993).

The African village meeting under the tree and the European parliament were just different locational, structural, and administrative forms of the same institution of democracy. The only salient difference was that the indigenous African system was based on direct participatory democracy, while its European counterpart was, and still is, a representative democracy. The unique characteristic of the precolonial African democratic system of government was that it was open and inclusive. One did not have to belong to a political party or a family to participate in the process. At village meetings, the people expressed their views freely, and no one was punished for disagreeing with the chief.¹⁴⁰

Leadership Role in Precolonial Economy

Precolonial leaderships established the cultural conditions for their citizens to conduct economic activities. In agriculture, the role of the chief and the king was to ensure that access to land was available to everyone who wanted to farm. The supervision of access to land did not inhibit the freedom of choice because the leadership did not interfere or dictate what crops the peasants should raise.¹⁴¹ The cultural sentiment was that a restriction placed on an individual's economic activity translated into a burden on the economic welfare of the entire society."¹⁴² The notion was that as individuals prospered so did their families and the societies at large, and unless an individual act of

¹⁴⁰ J. K. Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours 1700-1807* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971).

¹⁴¹ P. Wickins, *An Economic History of Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981).

¹⁴² Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*, 109.

economic activity conflicted with society's well-being, the leaders had no authority to interfere.

Outsiders, mostly Europeans and Arabs, who first came upon precolonial Africans' ways of living, denigrated the culture as a primitive communism.¹⁴³ Ironically, postcolonial nationalist leaders joined the denigration chorus and described the indigenous culture as socialism. Both assertions are incorrect. African communities did not run communal enterprises or have widespread state-ownership of the means of production.¹⁴⁴ The means of production in precolonial Africa were privately owned and the profit motive was present in all market transactions. People did not seek permission from their chiefs before conducting economic activities. They engaged in economic activities based on their own initiatives and free will.¹⁴⁵ Economic activities, however, were made possible due to civic cultural conditions of honesty, trustworthiness, and security that existed at the time, conditions that were made possible by leadership guidance through legitimization and interpretations of moral and ethical norms.

Unfortunately, the power of the precolonial leadership was disputed and challenged by the intruding colonial power. In most instances, the colonial powers used force to take power from indigenous leaders.¹⁴⁶ By those actions, it is correct to state that the colonial powers staged *coup d'etats* against democratic governments. Such actions

¹⁴³ C. L. R. James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution* (London: Allison and Bushy, 1977).

¹⁴⁴ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁶ Adam Hochschild provides convincing evidence as to how Europeans terrorized African leaders to impose colonization. See Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold's Ghost* (NY: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

ultimately disrupted the prevailing political and economic systems in precolonial Africa.¹⁴⁷ The question then becomes, what kind of leadership did the colonial power offer to sub-Saharan Africa?

Colonial Leadership

African colonization by Europeans received its official seal of approval at a conference in Berlin between 1884 and 1885. At the conference, the African continent was formally partitioned among the then seven European powers: Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.¹⁴⁸ The colonial leadership adopted different but similar administrative apparatus to rule their colonies. British colonialism took on two specific forms. In territories with white settlers, the British envisioned granting some form of independent status within the British Commonwealth following the models of Australia and New Zealand. In the remainder of the colonies in Africa, with few exceptions, British colonization was based on institutional direct rule.¹⁴⁹ French colonialism, by contrast, was based on a centralized form of direct rule based on assimilation.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ The intrusion of colonial powers in Africa is a vital concept because it sets up the foundation for the illegitimacy, in most African minds, of the contemporary governments in Africa. For a brief description of the conflicts between the Asante Empire and the British colonial intrusion, and how the British forcefully deposed an Asante King, see "Asante And Ghana: A Close-Knit Glove" *Africa News Service* (August 5, 1999).

¹⁴⁸ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*.

¹⁴⁹ C. Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

¹⁵⁰ Jean Suret-Canale, *French Colonialism in Tropical Africa 1900-1945* (NY: Pica Press, 1971).

In the aftermath of the imposition of colonial rule, colonial leaders forcefully re-arranged trading routes to ensure that all economic interactions within a given empire took place exclusively between European colonial powers and their individual colonies. For example, in the colony of Togoland, the German colonial leadership eliminated cross-border trade with the British colony of Gold Coast and the neighboring French colonies of Dahomey and Upper Volta and, instead, restricted Togoland's trading economic ties exclusively to Germany.¹⁵¹

The forced colonization of Africa came with the imposition of five destructive conditions that crippled the region's developmental potential. These conditions included the imposition of the European nation system, incorporation of several African nations into one state, destruction of indigenous checks and balances, introduction of authoritarian political regimes, and the creation of export-oriented mono-crop economic industry.¹⁵² All the above conditions are important to our hypothesis in chapter one, and I examine the three that are crucial to the development of the region.

The first of the three destructive conditions to the region's development was the erection of authoritarian state rule in Africa. As mentioned above, in the precolonial days, African politics reflected democratic principles, in which the relationship between the leadership and the masses was based on legitimacy, freedom, and free dialogue.¹⁵³ On the contrary, the colonial leaderships lacked the legitimacy but intended to rule, and thus created authoritarian states. The authoritarian model of state-society relations became

¹⁵¹ Woodruff D. Smith, *The Germany Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).

¹⁵² Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*.

commonplace in colonial Africa and was usually referred to as “Bula Matari,” which in the context of state-society relations embodies the vision of a state that crushes all resistance.¹⁵⁴ Parts of its apparatus were coercive police-military forces that maintained the enforcement of local compliance with colonial rules and regulations. Unfortunately, this authoritarian state model remains in place in contemporary Africa as a carryover from the colonial era inhibiting all forms of democratic developments in the region.

A second far-reaching colonial leadership impact in the region was the imposition of the European nation state system on the rich and varied African political system that existed in precolonial days.¹⁵⁵ The grafting of the European nation-state system created a series of artificial states that did not evolve gradually according to the wishes of the indigenous African people. Today, that colonial legacy, as usually witnessed on television, has contributed to the ethnic violence across sub-Saharan Africa, impeding any political cooperation that could make development possible.

The third colonial economic legacy was the turning of the states into mono-crop economies designed to serve as convenient and cheap sources of raw materials for European industry. One most cited example of this model is the relationship between France and Senegal, where France artfully manipulated the Senegal to cultivate peanuts to feed the France’s industries and made Senegal’s economy dependent on only peanuts.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵³ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

¹⁵⁴ Young, *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*, 1.

¹⁵⁵ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

¹⁵⁶ Sheldon Gellar, *Senegal: An African Nation Between Islam and the West* (Boulder: Westview, 1995).

The above vestiges of colonial leadership in sub-Saharan Africa embodied in authoritarianism, a closed economy, and the dependency on raw materials, have become impediments to the region's development. Unfortunately, postcolonial leaders have not been able to eradicate colonial social cultures and, in their places, erect cultures of democracy, private ownership, regional trade, honesty, and scientific culture. In proverbial terms, the colonial leadership acted as a double-edged sword: one side halted African's precolonial social democratic system, while the other side simultaneously undermined regional economic integration and progression.

POSTCOLONIAL SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN LEADERSHIP

The roots of the collective African contemporary leadership can be traced to the formation of the Pan-African Congress movement of the twentieth century, which shaped the struggle for Africa's independence. The initial objective of Pan-Africanists such as Edward Blyden and, George Padmore was the salvation of blacks in the new world.¹⁵⁷ In 1927, during the fourth Pan-African congress meeting in New York, Africans from the Gold Coast (modern Ghana), Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Nigeria added their voices to the demand for greater autonomy, liberty, freedom, and self-development.¹⁵⁸

The organization changed its objective and strategy in 1945 and directed its attention to Africans who acknowledged their capacity to overthrow colonialism. From then on, the activities of the Pan-African congress became instrumental in the attainment

¹⁵⁷ Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism."

¹⁵⁸ J. Langely Ayodele, *Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973)

of independence by African nations. Its first success came in 1957, when it assisted the black African nation of Ghana to gain its independence.¹⁵⁹

With the attainment of independence, most African leaders, notably Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania tried to keep the Pan-African spirit alive. Since the organization facilitated the independence of most African nations, Nkrumah advocated its immortalization into a continental union of Africa.¹⁶⁰ But, against Nkrumah's advocacy of a continental African Unity, Nigeria's first Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa raised a staunch opposition by asserting that a United States of Africa was premature.¹⁶¹

Even though many African leaders, then, including Kenneth Kaunda, Sekou Toure, and Julius Nyerere, spoke in favor of continental African unity, the new independent nations remained divided as the colonial power had left them. Each state proceeded to develop and nurture micro-nationalist consciousness that eventually multiplied to threaten the corporate existence of the states. The lack of consensus on the part of leadership to bridge the states together, as the United States had done 150 years earlier, can be construed as a partial explanation for the continent's woes today. For, continental unity could have brought the African people peaceful coexistence if not quick material development, given that the freedom of movement could have preemptively resolved some of the ethnic conflicts that engulf most of the states.

¹⁵⁹ Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism."

¹⁶⁰ *Some Essential Features of Nkrumaism* (London: Spark and Panaf Books, 1975).

¹⁶¹ Gideon C. M. Mutiso and S. W. Rohio, eds., *Readings in African Political Thought* (London: Heinemann, 1975).

Nkrumah made several attempts to address the complex task of nation building beyond achieving national sovereignty. As reflected in his writings and speeches, Nkrumah called upon African leaders to initiate policies that catered to the well-being and welfare of their societies, with the intention of reconciling the disparate ethnic groups and wielding them into a nation.¹⁶² In essence, Nkrumah sought to resolve the structural contradictions inherited from colonial leaders and to pave the way for advancing human welfare.¹⁶³ His idea of African prosperity was shared by many African leaders including Nigeria's first president, Nnamdi Azikiwe, who added in his own words that "the African leviathan -- whatever form it takes -- (shall) enhance the standard of living of Africans, safeguard their existence, guarantee freedom under the law, with fundamental human rights."¹⁶⁴

The above observations reflect the dedication of some earlier postcolonial leaders and their intentions to move their communities towards social and economic development. However, the call upon their fellow leaders to assume responsibility for the welfare and prosperity of the African people proved to be problematic because some of the leaders turned out to be immoral minorities whose interests were more personal than the collective interest of their societies. That group includes leaders like Mobutu Seseku of the Democratic Republic of Congo, Idi Amin of Uganda, and Leopold Senghor of

¹⁶² Kwame Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism: The Stage of Imperialism* (NY: International Publishers Company, 1966).

¹⁶³ Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism."

¹⁶⁴ Nnamdi Azikiwe, "My Plan for Africa," in Rupert Emerson and Martin Kitson, eds., *The Political Awakening of Africa*, 157-175 (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1965).

Senegal of the earlier days, and Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Charles Taylor of Liberia, and General Abacha of Nigeria these days.

Contemporary Leadership and Development

Politically and economically, African leaders have adopted different development strategies. Economically, at the time of independence, some leaders inherited or adopted economic systems based on the capitalist model of development. Others decided to approach their inherited economic strategies differently.¹⁶⁵ Cote d'Ivoire, under the leadership of Felix Houphouet-Boigny, adopted a brand of capitalism that relied on a close link to France. President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya adopted capitalist values which Daniel Arap Moi, his successor, has maintained.¹⁶⁶ Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal maintained close economic ties with the West and promoted a national development that drew on capitalist principles.¹⁶⁷ Under these models, the countries have virtually depended on the free market system for development and have produced only raw materials for international trade.

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, on the other hand, launched a socialist development experiment in Tanzania under a traditional name of Ujamaa (brotherhood). However, twenty years after its inauguration, the program brought no development and has

¹⁶⁵ John Sender and Sheila Smith, *The Development of Capitalism in Africa* (London: Methuen, 1986); Paul Kennedy, *African Capitalism: The Struggle for Ascendancy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

¹⁶⁶ David Throup and Charles Hornsby, *Multi-Party Politics in Kenya* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1998).

¹⁶⁷ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*.

therefore been gradually dismantled by Nyerere's successors.¹⁶⁸ In most cases, the leaders continue the mono-crop production policies that were instituted by the colonial leaders. Similarly, their trading partners continue to be their former colonial masters. Moreover, the postcolonial leaders have failed to diversify production in their countries and continue to export raw materials, while importing domestic consumer goods from the industrialized world.¹⁶⁹ Regional trade, such as the trans-Sahara trade that had invigorated the West African economy during the precolonial days, but which was halted by the colonial leadership, has not been resuscitated to spark regional development in trade. In short, all the five destructive vestiges of colonialism previously mentioned are left untransformed by the postcolonial leaders. Consequently, none of the economic development approaches adopted by the leaders has been fruitful in their respective countries.

Politically, whether a civilian or military government, most African leaders have maintained the authoritarian state they inherited from their colonial predecessors, thus making the development of political democracy impossible in most parts of the region. In the early 1960s, the lack of economic development coupled, with political repression by the leaders, brought resentment and dissatisfaction in many African countries that ultimately led to military coups in the region. By 1998, there had been as many as 83 successful military coups in Africa, with the majority of them occurring in SSA. The

¹⁶⁸ Rodger Yeager, *Tanzania: An African Experiment* (Boulder: Westview, 1991).

¹⁶⁹ Wosene Yefru, "The African Challenge to Philosophical Paradigm: The Need for a Paradigm Shift in Social, Economic and Political Development of Africa." *Journal of Black Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (January 2000): 351-82.

phenomenon brought in a new form of leadership, made of military officers.¹⁷⁰ Today, out of the 45 countries in the region, only five (Eritrea, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, and Djibouti) have not experienced a *coup d'état* and thus may have been spared from a military dictatorship.¹⁷¹

Military leaderships, like their previous civilian counterparts, have been less effective in transforming economic and political institutions that could bring about development in SSA. Political developments in the region show that the military leaders learned some useful lessons from their predecessors, lessons that have become crucial to their own political survival. They retained the divide-and-rule policies from colonialism and have been accentuating the problems of multi-ethnic differences and tensions instead of resolving them. Though the leaders often profess to address “national interests,” their development policies and programs focus on narrow sectional and ethnic biases. To maintain their political power and security, they often appealed to and coopted their respective ethnic and regional constituencies and, in the process, turned people against each other.¹⁷²

Social harmony has been lacking in many African communities because postcolonial African leaders, with the exception of a few like presidents Khama of Botswana, Nyerere of Tanzania, and Mandela of South Africa have failed to harmonize their discordant ethnocentric and cultural groups. The increase in ethnocentric provincialism and economic deprivation are evident in sub-Saharan Africa. Though in

¹⁷⁰ Pierre Englebert, “Precolonial Institutions, Post-Colonial States, and Economic Development in Tropical Africa.” *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 2000): 7-36.

¹⁷¹ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation*.

varying degrees, the embers of ethnocentrism, fueled by leaders' egocentric attitudes, splinter the countries. Nigeria is a prominent example of this phenomenon. As a result of demands by particular ethnic groups for their own separate political framework, Nigeria is torn between conflicting demands for secession and independence by aggrieved and alienated minority groups.¹⁷³

The situation in Nigeria is a microcosm of socio-political development in sub-Saharan African countries. This situation results from leadership neglecting to defend and sustain the interest and aspiration of the African people. As leaders reneged on their responsibilities, the citizens began to search for a sense of meaning and identity within their separate and respective ethnic enclaves, making it possible for the cancer of ethnocentrism to further fragment Africans, turning many into second-class citizens in their own countries, and under their own governments. One outstanding exception to the contemporary African leaders' behavior is that of former president Nelson Mandela of South Africa, who was able to bring freedom to his people through his own personal sacrifice.¹⁷⁴

Another example from Nigeria illustrates how the leaders have publicly denounced their responsibilities to the African people. About a decade ago, when Nigeria faced hunger and starvation, the domestic attention zeroed in on the visible and unjustifiable affluence of members in the ruling class. The then information minister,

¹⁷² Englebert. "Precolonial Institutions."

¹⁷³ Adeleke. "Africa and Pan-Africanism."

¹⁷⁴ Kent R. Rasmussen, *Modern African Political Leaders* (NY: Facts on File, 1998).

Tony Momoh, told the citizens of his country that the government did not owe any of them a living.¹⁷⁵

In addition to separating their citizens into ethnic enclaves to advance their own political interest, another leadership behavior that has done extensive damage to the region's development is corruption. For our purpose, *corruption* will be defined as the abuse of public office for private gain. The term will be limited to those actions by government officials that are illegal, such as when public officials use authority to advance personal interests rather than encompassing those interests that government was designed to serve. In this sense, corruption includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits. Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon;¹⁷⁶ however, the type of corruption endemic in African leadership has been especially detrimental to the region's economic growth and development.¹⁷⁷

Notorious among African leadership corruption is the late President Mobutu of Congo. Mobutu and his associates plundered more than \$8 billion from their country's coffers, of which Mobutu siphoned about \$5 billion into his personal accounts around the world.¹⁷⁸ Unfortunately, the Mobutu regime and its officials were not the only predators in SSA. A long list of corrupt leaders and officials exists, such as Mbidio Biko, one-time Oil Minister of Nigeria, who took \$3 billion and fled to Great Britain. Moussa Traore,

¹⁷⁵ Blaine Haren, "Foreigner's Impression." *African Concord* (January 27, 1996): 46-48.

¹⁷⁶ A. J. Heidenheimer, *Political Corruption Reading in Comparative Analysis* (NY: Holt Rinehart and Wiston, 1970).

¹⁷⁷ Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption*.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

once president of Mali, also salted away \$1 billion.¹⁷⁹ In all instances, the leaders left their countries stranded and in need of foreign financial capital for economic development. This high-level theft has directly contributed to the lack of economic development in the region.

Regardless of how African leaders assume power, whether by the military or civilians, the above-mentioned tactics are employed in weakening societal cohesion. This is one of the tragic paradoxes of sub-Saharan Africa. While it is no longer threatened from outside, the national sovereignty, human welfare, and economic development of the countries in the region have fallen victim to the policies and behaviors of the very leaders entrusted with their defense. From the previous analysis, it is obvious that in sub-Saharan Africa, the lack of efficient and adequate institutional structures, characteristic of developed countries, acts as a constraint on development. Therefore, in order to spark development that will yield social and material satisfaction for the African people, similar scientific cultural characteristics must be established to make development possible. It is the establishment of these cultures that makes leadership utterly important in the development of the less developed nations. This transformation is essential because, as Paul Bowels once wrote, “things don’t just happen, it depends on who comes along.”¹⁸⁰ In terms of social development, whether in politics or economics, the ones who come along to make things happen are transformational leaders.

¹⁷⁹ *The Economist*, Vol. 327, No. 7807 (April 17, 1993), 82.

¹⁸⁰ Paul Bowels, “Shattering Sky,” *New York Monthly Review* (December 1999): 18-24.

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL ROLES: NEGLECTED GAPS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

The literature review makes it clear that economic development theorists have largely overlooked the role of leadership and the importance of culture in economic development in developing countries, including those in sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁸¹ Even though both modernization and dependency theories suggest that Third World states have a promethean capacity for economic and social development through industrial modernization, both are silent on the question of leadership.¹⁸² Furthermore, the theories also neglect to consider the cultural behaviors that the state and its leadership should establish and maintain towards achieving developmental goals. Due to this neglect, little research has been conducted that links the role of leadership to nation building and development in less developing countries, especially those in sub-Saharan Africa. Likewise, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic development analyses of developing nations with the simple assumption that economic rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity.¹⁸³

This neglect has created a gap in the development literature because development, as previously defined, is a social transformation process that requires leadership guidance that has not been discussed in the literature. The exclusion of leadership in the development analysis renders the theories and their impacts incomplete. In fact, it is not the lack of leadership alone that is critical to development, but also the cultures that

¹⁸¹ Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics."; Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

¹⁸² Franck Petiteville, "Three Mythical Representations of the State in Development Theory," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (March 1998): 115-24.

leaderships establish. Even though the literature does not deny the importance of culture in social development,¹⁸⁴ the dominant theories, as alluded to, have downplayed the significance of culture when analyzing development in the global South. This neglect of culture, like that of leadership, again leaves a gap in our understanding of why African countries have experienced developmental stagnation. The concern for this cultural gap has been raised by many authors, including Samuel Huntington. Huntington argues that culture and its impact on development require systematic and empirical study.¹⁸⁵ This dissertation addresses that concern. It categorizes cultural elements for easy utilization in developmental analysis, isolates cultural elements that are necessary for development purposes, links leadership and culture to development, and uses both concepts to explain why development has not progressed in sub-Saharan Africa. By doing this, the dissertation offers an original contribution by filling the leadership and cultural gaps that currently exist in the development literature.

¹⁸³ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

¹⁸⁴ Sen, "A Matter of Choice."

¹⁸⁵ Huntington, "The Goals of Development."

CHAPTER III

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

As the previous chapter has shown, modernization, dependency, and neo-Marxist theorists have failed to examine how economic developmental successes are shaped by the interaction between leadership convictions and cultural attributes at the global, national, and local levels. Most studies of economic development conducted under these three dominant doctrines are focused on other variables than leadership and culture. Implicitly, the three theories have ignored the fact that development processes are complex and depend on the interaction between social factors.

The exclusion of these social factors, it can be argued, has contributed to the inability to effectively explain the dismal economic progress in sub-Saharan African countries. This, in turn, produces dissatisfaction with the above theoretical models because the attempts to explain the economic dynamic process in sub-Saharan Africa fall short of reality.¹ According to Chazan, Mortimer, Ravenhil and Rothchild, this shortcoming means “social scientists have had little alternative but to undertake a search for a new conceptual framework that would afford a fuller insight into the dynamic processes unfolding on the continent.”² Many scholars such as Hyden argue that “Africa

¹ Samir Amin, “Underdevelopment and Dependency in Black Africa: Origins and Contemporary Forms,” *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 10 (1972): 503-24 ; Colins Leys, *Underdevelopment in Kenya: The Political Economy of Neocolonialism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975); Claude Ake, “Rethinking African Democracy,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 2 (1991): 32-44.

² Naomi Chazan, R. Mortimer, J. Ravenhil and D. Rotchild, eds., *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1983).

needs a new paradigm, or set of paradigms” to explain the region’s development processes.³

Using the ideological message of association,⁴ this chapter builds a theoretical framework that links leadership, culture, and economic development. The chapter is divided into three sections. Part one examines the relations between leadership and culture. Part two looks at the relations between culture and development. The phenomena between and within these three elements create a framework from which an answer will be sought for the question posted in the hypothesis. The second section separates culture into two broad aspects in an attempt to isolate and identify the cultural elements essential for economic development. Part three provides the philosophical and historical debate surrounding Africans’ cultural dilemma that prevents the leadership from establishing the appropriate culture for development. Before delving into the relationships, section one begins with the definitions of the basic concepts: culture, economic development, and leadership.

Definitions of Culture, Economic Development, and Leadership

As stated, culture is defined as accepted systems of social practice of behavior and prescriptions. This means that culture is a meaningful order of persons and things. In an economic sense, culture is compatible with the view that individuals optimize, and their

³ Goran Hyden, *No Shortcuts to Progress: African Development Management in Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 193.

⁴ Association theory relates cultural values to economic performance, and leadership is part of the mechanism that links the two. Unlike sociological theory, association retains the methodological individualism of economic analysis. Associationists’ standpoint is represented by institutional economics. For more on association theory, see R. H. Frank, *Choosing the Right Pond* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1985); Casson, “Cultural Determinants.”

behaviors sustain an economic equilibrium. This equilibrium reflects the value and beliefs of the leaders who establish the culture of a group. This accepted system of behavior (culture) is an unfolding process. Its evolution can be viewed as an evolving hermeneutic system. The evolving nature allows culture to be dynamic and prevents it from becoming static. It also means open-endedness rather than closure, allowing cultural flexibility and the potential for human intent, discretion, and problem solving with critical reasoning.⁵

Culture's dynamic characteristics make it not a rigid "set" but an open-ended complex set of rules, an organized and organizational hermeneutic network in which no "trait" of "rule" stands alone or drives any cultural force apart from its complex processual context. In the broad sense, culture is everywhere and it is everything. In its most general sense, culture is an interpretive integration of material objects, behavior, and their meanings.⁶

In this work, economic development is defined at a national level. Development occurs when a nation, through accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires the understanding of natural law of creation and uses it to attain the technological capacity to enable it to produce diverse products to satisfy its population's need. In other words, a society develops economically as its members jointly increase their capacity for dealing with their environments. This capacity for dealing with the environment is dependent on the extent to which they understand the laws of nature

⁵ Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics"; Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁶ Wiredu, *Philosophy and An African Culture*.

(science), and to the extent to which they put that understanding of knowledge into practice by devising tools (technology), and in the manner in which work is organized to benefit and sustain the entire welfare of the society.⁷

Economic development thus reflects the utilization of the understanding of natural law to devise technology so as to enable mankind to harness resources to sustain and improve their living. On the national level, development is when a group of human species confined within a geographical location has been able to understand natural law to enable them to collectively organize to increase their capacity of production through technological innovations.⁸

Leadership is a reciprocal process of mobilizing people by individuals with motives and values and other resources in order to realize goals that are independently or mutually held by both the leader and the group members.⁹ Leadership occurs when an individual, or a group, with a high moral quality has the capability of inspiring citizens of a nation and engaging them to achieve a mutual objective. There are transformational and transactional leaderships. Transformational leadership usually seeks to satisfy the high needs of their groups and engages the group members in achieving those needs. It is based on a relationship of mutual stimulation and elevation that converts leaders into high moral agents.¹⁰ Transactional leadership, as opposed to transformational leadership,

⁷ Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

⁸ Richard L. Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development: Towards a Conceptual Clarification," *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1995): 1171-88; Simon Kuznets, *Economic Growth* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Myrdal, "What is Development?"

⁹ J. C. Rost, "Leadership Development in the New Millennium," *The Journal of Leadership Studies*, No. 1 (1993): 99-108.

¹⁰ Burns, *Leadership*.

operates within the framework of self-interest and promises rewards to followers.¹¹ Both transformational and transactional leaders can be inspirational and charismatic.¹²

Writers on leadership point to a wide range of definitions for this phenomenon. However the common elements in all the definitions imply that leadership involves a social influence process in which a person or a group of persons steer[s] members of a group towards a goal.¹³ Leaders and followers are bound together by a common quest. However, the leader becomes the focus of the group actively and therefore exercises a determining influence on the behavior of the group. Through such a role, leadership is able to legitimate some behaviors while denouncing others, and consequently creating a culture for the group.¹⁴ Leadership, regardless of the type, is a source of power that rallies group members to modify cultural behavior.¹⁵

LEADERSHIP AND CULTURE: THE LINK

In most groups leadership is responsible for establishing a culture conducive for welfare and development. The assumption here is that leadership has good morals, the right ethical beliefs, and is able to rally group members towards a mutual quest to their benefit. The above assertion is based on the premise that, in every nation, citizens delegate social regulation to leadership with an implicit assumption that the leadership is

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Bass, *Handbook of Leadership*; Burns, *Leadership*.

¹³ Bryman, *Leadership and Organizations*.

¹⁴ Bass, *Handbook of Leadership*.

¹⁵ Boulding, *The Image*.

responsible for engineering the social system. Politically, this is synonymous with a mandate. The delegation of such a responsibility from the population to the leadership always comes with authoritative power of some kind allowing the leadership to legitimate cultural behavior deemed conducive to achieving national welfare. In other words, a nation entrusts its leadership with the practice of intellectual division of labor in processing information to establish an appropriate environment to enable the nation to maintain and improve its existence. Therefore by the theory of association, the culture that leadership ordains through interpretation and legitimation has an impact on a nation's ability to achieve its economic material needs.¹⁶ In this respect, the leaders are responsible for engineering a culture that effectively coordinates all social intricacies within a nation to improve and sustain the national economy.

The unspoken contractual relations between the citizens and leadership make the latter obligated in providing a social aura in the form of a culture conducive for society's economic satisfaction. The inherent leadership responsibility is important because, from a cultural point of view, a nation's economic operational systems is like that of a firm. They both encounter a coordination problem that can lead to high transaction costs. However this problem can be overcome in a nation by moral manipulation of leaders through engineering a sense of obligation by articulating legitimate objective. This indeed is the main role of leaders, by which they create national cultures.¹⁷

¹⁶ It is important to note that leaders play an instrumental role in association theory. According to a recent work done by Casson, the author established that association theory relates cultural values to economic performance and leadership is the link between the two. See Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

¹⁷ Casson, *The Economics of Business*.

As an evolving accepted system of social practices and behaviors, cultural behavior and its formation implies that evolutionary selection is part of, rather than subsequent to novel cultural variation. The psychological mechanics that cause individuals to behave the way they do, also known as teleological actions, are rooted in the complex meaning of the cultural matrix in which the actions occur.¹⁸ The reason is that the hermeneutic complexity sets limits on the ranges of both the meanings of various acts and the actions that individuals are likely to consider as they pursue their objectives. The important point is that the social logic that acts as the behavioral regulator is designed by leadership's legitimation and interpretation as previously mentioned. This ability gives leaders the power to influence or modify the cultural behavior of citizens.

But why, it may be asked, are group members so easily influenced? Do not their own life experiences dictate their preference? Theoretically, the answer is that preferences need to be psychologically legitimized and life experiences need to be interpreted. As Casson explains, "preference legitimation requires a moral system¹⁹ and interpretation of life experience requires a scientific theory of some kind."²⁰ Both services are provided to members of a group by leadership. By providing both legitimation and interpretation of

¹⁸ Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (NY: Mentor, 1953). The idea of teleological act was originated by Veblen when he offered the description of complexity in the *Theory of the Leisure Class* in 1899; the concept was again reprinted in 1953 by Mentor Publishers. Recent work by Ann Jennings explained that the concept equally applies to complex cultural processes. Individual and group cultural behavior is formed in response to a given stimulus and will necessarily affect the character of the response to other stimuli. As a result, the modification of human nature at any point becomes a modification to the general population as a whole. See Jennings and Waller, "Evolutionary Economics."

¹⁹ There is no definitive way of appraising moralities. Therefore in our case, the implicit ranking of moral systems is by their instrumental contribution to material economic development.

²⁰ Casson, "Cultural Determinants," 422.

the system, the leader legitimizes certain kinds of culture and denounces others.²¹ This makes a leader responsible for establishing cultural expectations. Armed with the overbearing power of influence, it becomes obvious that leadership relativism can reduce cultural dynamics by requiring adaptations to comport with fewer cause and effect relationships. The point being made here is that the kind of culture and how a culture of a society changes to suit a mutual quest depends on a leader's beliefs.

Cultural formations can amplify problems and dislocations, requiring more concerted and coordinated efforts than single individuals can provide to induce change within the system. On such occasions, legislative and judicial actions by governments can provide solutions. Here too, the importance of leadership in cultural establishment becomes imperative. A good example of this is what Daniel Rodger described as the “transformation of social meanings of the state” in relation to “democracy and the people” during the Jacksonian era in the United States.²² As earlier alluded to, the mechanics of social engineering comes by legitimation and interpretation. The interpretation helps to provide the acquisition methodologies. Acquisition in this context signifies the way and manner in which the intended cultural evolution is undertaken by the leadership. There are two options, *speciation* and *adaptation*, that are usually available for undertaking such cultural evolution²³.

Cultural adaptation involves reinterpreting hermeneutic linkages to accommodate the novelties arising from individual, and some times group, teleological behavior. It does

²¹ Ibid.

²² Daniel T. Rodgers. *Contested Truths* (NY: Basic Books, 1987).

²³ Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics.”

not refer to changes in singular behaviors or habits, but to the complex patterned habits and activities that constitute individual lives in a cultural setting.²⁴ It is commonly applied ex-post to changes that have already appeared, meaning the changes that are made are “selected” as beneficial adaptations.²⁵ In most cases, conventional notions of beneficial evolutionary “selection” express both dominant cultural habits of thought and self-congratulatory cultural impulses. Meaning adaptations are filtered but not predetermined.²⁶

Speciation, on the other hand, occurs by reintegrating the existing structural elements of an organism and recreating the organism-environment relationship. It is a tautological “default category” containing those cases that do not seem to fit adaptation. Speciation is a discontinuous change, in contrast to the “continuous” change of adaptation. As a discontinuous cultural change, speciation is important in part because it offers an explanation for why, in an analytical sense, economic development in some developing countries has become problematic. It involves more dramatic reintegration of the cultural hermeneutic than those permitted by ambiguous flexibility. It implies a cultural leap into interpretations that are highly countered intuitive from the standpoint of earlier understandings, consequently yielding relativism in human knowledge across cultural species.²⁷

²⁴ Veblen, *The Theory*.

²⁵ Jennings and Waller, “Evolutionary Economics.”

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

Macroevolutionary biological theories, used by some anthropologists have discussed speciation as an event involving regulatory, rather than structural formation.²⁸ However, it is necessary to note that neither relativism in human knowledge nor cultural discontinuity is absolute because ambiguity in culture accommodates the interpretive potential needed for cultural evolution. Dialectically, as the above analysis indicates, the legitimation and interpretation power of leaders makes them the cultural architects of a group. Thus leaders become responsible for providing the milieu in which the expected outcome for national welfare will be possible. The role of leadership in providing appropriate culture is essential because from an economic point of view, nations and the groups of people within them are no more than a nexus of contracts. The contracting parties are individuals each playing some functionally specialized role that requires an optimistic view of other individuals' intentions and moral commitments of one's own to bring about successful outcomes. Therefore, when leadership fails, through its legitimation and interpretation, to establish a appropriate cultural milieu, the result is a negative performance of the nation's economy.

Some Implications For sub-Sahara Africa

The implication of the above discussion of leadership's role as a cultural engineer concerns its link to cultural relativism among leaders and its impact on social progress. In most parts of sub-Saharan Africa, elitist and leaderships form limits evolutionary potential by restricting the cultural dynamic and protecting the cultural myths that sustain

²⁸ Paul Diener, "Quantum Adjustment, Macroevolution, and the Social Field: Some Comments of Evolution and Culture," *Current Anthropology*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1980): 423-30.

social hierarchy. Consequently, this undermines the cultivation of rigorous analytical cause-and-effect scientific culture that possesses the capability to spark material economic development. In that region of the world, the cultural myth, as identified in Senghorian philosophy, has created a scenario that avoids inter-and intracultural communication in the domain of thought, especially in critical scientific thinking. The belief in mythology has maintained the status quo for the countries in the region to engage in counter-productive development approaches based on the neoclassical Keynesian doctrine of growth.

CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE LINK

As the hypothesis infers, a relationship exist between economic development and culture. However, the question remains as to how economic process is connected to culture. From a general observation, culture clearly plays a significant role in economic development in the sense that it influences individuals' values and serves as a motivating force for them to achieve what they deem essential.²⁹

The Veblen dichotomy serves as one explanation of the connection between culture and economic development. The dichotomy can be interpreted as having a dynamic technology juxtapose to ceremonial nature of social institutions. The inference here is that technology conceptualized as social capital and permeable to scientific knowledge serves as a dynamic instrumental function in improving economic living.³⁰ In the same line of reasoning, Kuznets characterized economic development as an epoch in

²⁹ Sen, "A Matter of Choice."

³⁰ Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development."

which both economic production and social organization became permeable to the application of science.³¹ Such a culture-conception of technology, which includes both social (factory system) and material (steam engine) factors, helps to explain the connection between technology and culture.

In fact, there is no distinction between technology and culture because they are opposite sides of the same coin, the coin of useful knowledge. For, knowledge as a protean concept appears in its application form as technology and in store as culture. Here culture, as previously defined, is the accepted systems of practices and behavior. Through this technological association, we see that the relationship between culture and economic development becomes clearer.³² This establishes the link between the two.

By definition then culture is omnipresent, thus making cultural behavior both deeply habituated and systematically complex in all social endeavors, including that of economics. A careful observation reveals that economic interest does not act in isolation from ones cultural behavior. Indeed, the matrimony between culture and economics is so complete and everlasting that it enabled Veblen to write “the economic interest does not act in isolation, for it is but one of the several vaguely isolable interests on which the complex of teleological activity is carried out by the individual.”³³

Veblen’s observation is applicable to market economies of the contemporary world. For, if we focus on a “subset” of our social process, it is recognized that market activities are predicated upon an entire complex of individual teleological activity rather

³¹ Kuznets, *Economic Growth*.

³² Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development.”

than vaguely isolated economic interests. A salient indication that economic behavior, though as uniquely complex and non-compartmentalistic as it may be, is rooted in cultural continuity, a significant evidence that economic development and cultural process cannot be partitioned.

Culture, as previously stated, is an accepted system of social practice and behavior that in economic terms has a collective subjective connotation. *Subjectivity* has two meanings in economics. One has to do with the idea that individual preferences are not directly measurable but are revealed only indirectly through behavior. The other meaning of subjectivity is within the context of *probability*. Unfortunately, probability too cannot be measured directly. It, however, can be observed that when individuals maximize their expected utility, changes occur in their behavior. The changes that occur when people maximize their utility are affiliated with the modification of an individual's subjective probability.³⁴ Deductively, what this implies is that behavior or culture is economically driven via utility maximization.


From the above analysis, it can be concluded that there is a clear link between culture and economic evolution and its development. One caveat about the two meanings of subjectivity mentioned above is that individual preferences and beliefs differ. However, generally speaking, people belonging to the same group do have similar preferences and beliefs. The explanation for this similarity is that preferences and beliefs are malleable and that individuals exposed to the same influence tend to conform in these

³³ Veblen, *The Theory*, 77.

³⁴ This conditional probability is well discussed in psychology and is the same concept underlying Pavlov's work. For more information see Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

respect. These influences, in turn, affect individual behavior through its impact on preferences and beliefs. An attribute that is critical within the realm of economic development to the extent that Casson wrote, “it affects individual behavior towards each other. Which in turn can affect both efficiency and equity within the group.”³⁵ These characteristics are essential in economic development and in all organizing economic societies.

Figure 3-1.
The Leadership, Culture and Development (LCD) Model for Developing Nations.



As the above analysis has qualitatively shown, there is a correlation between leadership, culture, and economic development. As Figure 3-1 shows, through legitimation and interpretation of values, leadership establishes an accepted system of practices and behavior that leads to a culture of a group, in our case, a nation. The Veblen dichotomy serves as one explanation for the connection between culture and economic development through technology. Culture as a technology is linked to economic development as a social capital. It is also clear that from an economic perspective, culture is compatible with an individual’s utility optimization. Deductively therefore, culture becomes economic driven and becomes linked to economic development. The phenomena between and within these three elements demonstrate the relationship

³⁵ Casson, “Cultural Determinants,” 420.

between leadership and economic development, practically, in all human social groups. There is one problem, however regarding how development and growth are treated in the contemporary development literature that needs some clarification.

As one may recall from chapter two, different scholars have identified several cultural elements and their contribution to economic growth, when they are in fact addressing development problems. This situation means that growth is equal to development or will ultimately lead to development. This view allows writers to use the two terms synonymously.³⁶ This however is a serious misconception that has been taken for granted in the discussions of developmental approaches, one that often leads to ill-defined developmental policies in less developing nations including those in SSA. In what follows, a distinction is made between those two terms, growth and development, in order to clarify the prevailing misconception.

The Difference Between Economic Growth And Development

Contemporary economics based on neoclassical synthesis has always treated economic development and economic growth as virtually synonymous.³⁷ The difference between the two is discussed here to assist in alleviating the confusion that exists within the contemporary development theories for using the two terms synonymously. The lack

³⁶ Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development."

³⁷ H. W. Ardnt, *Economic Development: The History of an Idea* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Robert Dorfman, "Review Article: Economic Development from the Beginning to Rostow," *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 29 (June 1991): 573-91.

of clarification may have contributed to irresponsible policy formulation that has undermined prospects for economic development.³⁸

Economic development is a dynamic transformation, which takes place between equilibrium positions such as from tradition to modernity. In a simple context, it is a transformation that deals with sequential pattern of structural changes; a process whereby one structure gives rise to a new structure with the acquisition of knowledge.³⁹ It is associated with non-traditional economic variables such as transformation of values and the impact of technology.⁴⁰ Development serves as an independent variable upon which growth is dependent. In other words, it is development that leads to growth, not vice-versa, as the conventional development theories, (modernization, dependency, and the neoliberal globalization) suggest.⁴¹ It is a change that has a continuous direction and which culminates in a phase that is qualitatively new from the previous phase.

A country's economic development reflects a long-term rise in capacity to produce diverse economic goods for its population. This growing capacity is based on technology, as well as social and ideological cultural institutions that are essential for its support. One institutional economist who emphasized the social nature of the developmental process is Gunnar Myrdal, who defined development as "the movement upward of the entire social system."⁴² The entire social system, depicted by Myrdal, is

³⁸ Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development."

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Myrdal, "What is Development?"

⁴¹ Simon Kuznets, "Modern Economic Growth: Findings and Reflections." *American Economic Review*, Vol. 63 (June 1973): 247-58; Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development."

⁴² Myrdal, "What is Development?" 729.

what one British anthropologist referred to as “that complex whole,” known as culture.⁴³ Culture constitutes the substantive nature of that which experiences accumulation and metamorphosis in the dynamics of economic evolution.⁴⁴

Economic growth, on the other hand, is a quantitative static analysis, or at best, one of comparative static. It deals with changes within a structure without relating to the transformation of the structure. Growth by itself is seen as a replication of a given structure that does not lead to development. It is a measure of development, but by itself is not development, and it is measured by a quantitative concept of GNP/capita.⁴⁵ The discussion of prerequisite technology and social transformation lay outside the Keynesian matrix upon which a growth model rests. Hence, an economic growth model, as a derivative of the Keynesian matrix is inadequate to explain the social and cultural transformation structures that are required in a theory of the dynamics of economic development.⁴⁶ This deficiency is not unknown within the economic profession. Indeed, some economists have sought to overcome the comparative static inherent in the growth model.⁴⁷

⁴³ R. L. Brinkman, “Growth Vrs. Development,” in F. N. Magil, ed., *Survey of Social Science: Economics Series*, Vol. 2, 948-955 (Pasadena, CA: Salem Press, 1991); R. L. Brinkman, “Culture Evolution and the Process of Economic Evolution,” *International Journal of Social Economics*, Vol. 19 (1992): 248-67.

⁴⁴ Brinkman, “Culture Evolution.”

⁴⁵ Brinkman, “Economic Growth versus Economic Development”; Myrdal, “What is Development?”

⁴⁶ Brinkman, “Growth Vrs. Development”; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*; Myrdal, “What is Development?”

⁴⁷ R. F. Solow, *Growth Theory: An Explanation* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1970).

In drawing a line between growth and development, it can be concluded that growth is a measure of development. It relates to the replication of the same structure. The process of economic development, however, is different. It is a dynamic transformation whereby one structure gives rise to a new structure. The transformative capacity is based on the acquisition of technology. The levels of GNP/capita characteristic of economic growth are achieved not by growth process but are due to the results from developmental process of cultural and social transformations.

As discussed in chapter two, there is a general consensus in the literature that culture has an impact on economic performance. Even though this assertion is valid, there has been no identification as to what cultural characteristics have a direct correlation with development. In what follows, cultural elements essential to economic development are identified. Before that is done, however, culture as a whole is categorized into two broad aspects to help avoid the generalization that is often associated with cultural analysis. The categorization will assist in identifying the cultural characteristics that are essential to spurring development in developing countries.

THE TWO BROAD ASPECTS OF CULTURE

The fact that culture is not well understood is often interpreted as an inherent limitation of the subject, either because it is difficult to quantify or because it is everywhere. In order to overcome this impending stumbling block so as to enable us to utilize culture in an acceptable manner in this analysis, this section categorizes culture into two broad aspects. This distinction is important, at least for our purpose, because in

Africa cultural sensitivity is so high that some clarification is warranted to avoid the misrepresentation that is often associated with cultural analysis.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the sensitivity to invoking culture in economic development debates has a subjective legitimacy as opposed to an objective one. This is mainly due to the complex nature of culture as a sociological attribute for self-identification and the difficulty associated with deciphering the network of culture as a whole. Therefore, the distinction will help create a rational understanding for shedding some of the cultural emotional sensitivity. Lastly, the distinction helps to alleviate the confusion that hangs over culture by allowing us to separate the needed prerequisite cultural elements essential to development from the convoluted cultural elements. In doing so, it assists in our efforts to resolve the African developmental dilemma by highlighting the coexistence between culture and economic development. In the African context, the distinction is not only critical but it is also very important, for the failure to categorize cultural elements and understanding their implications is one of the major weakness of cultural traditionalism that implicitly undermines African development.⁴⁸

The Distinction

Culture is a complex human phenomenon or attribute. It is seen in people's work and recreation, in their worship and courtship, in their way of investigating nature, and in utilizing the possibilities of nature. Culture is also seen in the manner in which people house and clothe themselves, their method of conducting war and peace, their system of statecraft, education, of rewards and punishment; the way they regulate personal relations;

⁴⁸ Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest."

and the ideas underlying these institutions and practices.⁴⁹ In this sense, it is easy to acknowledge that culture is an amorphous complex human phenomenon.

Despite its complexity, culture's constitutive elements are of two broad types. There are those that "have no essential bearing on the question of either human well-being, truth, or falsehood."⁵⁰ These aspects of culture include procedures, customs, and usage such as language, style of apparels, dance, music, recreation, and style of courtship. These according to Olusegun Oladipo constitute the *reserve zones*, in which each nation is able to develop its own identity. Within the reserve zone, all nations can cultivate their identities without compromising the idea of unity and equality of the human species.⁵¹ Kwasi Wiredu strengthens the reserve zone by adding to it that, "all of this and more are contingent," in the sense that adopting one rather than the other "often makes no objective difference to human well-being or to one's belief about the world."⁵² Due to this reason, "there cannot be any compelling reason to change such elements of culture in favor of foreign ones."⁵³ To do the contrary, however, is to engender a loss of identity.

As opposed to the reserve zones, the other aspect deals with the elements of culture that are anchored in truth-value or have some essential bearing to the quality of human life. These include philosophy, science, and religion. In these areas the story is

⁴⁹ Wiredu, *Philosophy and An African Culture*.

⁵⁰ Kwasi Wiredu, "Problems in Africa's Self-Definition in the Contemporary World," in Kwasi Wiredu and K. Gyekye, eds., *Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, NO.1* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992), 65.

⁵¹ Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest," 30.

⁵² Wiredu, "Problems in Africa's Self-Definition," 66.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 65.

different. Here, it is unwise to ignore development in other cultures because they are areas that are not crucial to self-definition.⁵⁴ Wiredu's assessment suggests that these "are areas of human experience in which the effects of cultural differences could conceivably be eliminated through peaceful give-and-take dialogue among cultures."⁵⁵ The key point is that, since this sector of culture is primarily concerned with the domain of thought where truth is sought, it would be foolish for any culture to ignore whatever development has taken place in other societies by invoking the protection of self-definition or actualization.⁵⁶

The above analysis helps to categorize culture into two sectors as Figure 3- 2 illustrates. One of the sectors, the *reserve zone*, is unique to certain groups of people who are sometimes confined within a geographical area. So this term is utilized for self-definition. The *universal zone*, by comparison relates to the domain of thought. It comprises philosophy, science, and religion, and suggests that an overlap exists among human beings regardless of geographical location.⁵⁷ The *universal zone* is the one that contains the culture of ingenuity. It is within the *universal* domain that one finds the science of creation that offers informative ways of understanding natural law to enable human beings to improve their living. It is equally within this *universal* domain that religion is anchored. Religion offers the moral guidelines upon which society as a whole is organized towards improving human lives. In organizing human economic affairs,

⁵⁴ Oladipo, "Reason, Identity and the African Quest"; Wiredu, "Problems in Africa's Self-Definition."


⁵⁵ Wiredu, "Problems in Africa's Self-Definition." 65.

⁵⁶ Oladipo, "Reason, Identity and the African Quest."

⁵⁷ Wiredu, *Cultural Universals and Particulars*.

morality, a derivative of religion, regulates a culture of trust, which is essential for the synchronization of economic activities.

Figure 3-2
Two Broad Aspects of Culture



This diagram draws upon “Two Aspects of Culture” intellectual constructs separately presented by Professor Kwasi Wiredu and Professor Olusegun Oladipo in their respective works “Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspectives” and “The African Quest: The Problem of Self-Definition and African Philosophy”.⁵⁸

What this indicates is that it is within the universal domain of thought, rather than the reserve zone that is often associated with high subjectivity, that nations should seek to improve their scientific and moral cultural elements to enable them to acquire knowledge that will assist them in producing their material needs. The above distinction between the two broad aspects of culture illustrate that the *reserve zone* points to self-definition while the *universal zone* is associated with values of absolute truth that contribute to quality of

⁵⁸ Professor Wiredu believes there are universal cultural attributes that are shared by all human beings, and it is based on these attributes that universal human communication becomes possible regardless of race or geographic location. Those interested may see Kwasi Wiredu *Cultural Universals and Particulars*. Professor Oladipo’s work compliments Wiredu’s work by further drawing the distinction between the Reserve Zone and the Universal Zone, and the utilization of the former for identification. See Olusegun Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”

human life. The underlying implication here is that “a culture can shed off many of its traits and gather foreign accretions without losing its identity.”⁵⁹

This being the case, nations need not demonstrate their uniqueness, especially within the domain of cultural thought by clinging to all elements of their traditional culture to maintain their cultural identity. In fact, by using Wiredu’s distinctive rational analysis, what they need to do to ensure their self-identity is to safeguard those contingent aspects of their culture. This action will reduce cultural confusion and allow them to avail themselves to the opportunities offered by advances made by others in those areas of culture relating to the domain of thought (e.g. in science, which has a positive impact on human well-being). This route is the only logical one that developing nations, particularly those in Africa, can use to guarantee that their intellectual future will not be “exclusively decided by the fact of the economic and technological superiority of the already hegemonic cultures of the metropolitan world.”⁶⁰ This method of safeguarding their way of life is the most likely way they can effectively participate in the quest for development which is “a continuing world-historical process in which all peoples, Western and non-Western alike, are engaged.”⁶¹ Now that it is clearly established that a nation can pursue its self-actualization without hampering its economic development, the question of what cultural elements need to be established in order to spur economic development takes precedence.

⁵⁹ Wiredu, “Problems in Africa’s Self-Definition.” 65.

⁶⁰ Anthony Kwame Appiah, “African-American Philosophy,” *The Philosophical Forum: A Quarterly*, Vol. 24, Nos. 1-3 (Fall/Spring 1992-93): 23.

PREREQUISITE CULTURAL ELEMENTS FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In an attempt to answer the question posted with our hypothesis in the first chapter, one objective of this investigation is to show that the African leadership has failed to establish the essential cultural characteristics appropriate for economic development. The logical question therefore becomes what are those cultural characteristics? As one institutional economist has identified “it is surprising as well as disappointing that no such model has been advocated.”⁶² Though economic theory of culture does not yet exist, contemporary market analysis makes it possible to identify some key cultural characteristics that condition the economic development performance of a nation.

The following section identifies two basic cultural prerequisites that are essential to economic development. This is done with the affirmation that economic performance of societies are inversely related to these cultural characteristics and without them it will be difficult, if not impossible, for an economy to develop.⁶³ In what follows, I identify the culture of scientific differentiation and trust as the two basic cultural prerequisites essential for economic progress in all developing nations.

⁶¹ Wiredu, *Philosophy and An African Culture*, 43.

⁶² Casson, “Cultural Determinants,” 431.

⁶³ Casson, *The Economic of Business*.

Scientific Culture

A vital prerequisite culture for material economic development is scientific culture with moral differentiation that enables the utility of science for material improvement.⁶⁴ Morality in this sense is identified with legitimation of ends, in other words, what society accepts as socially right or wrong, while scientific knowledge is an informed and appropriate means of doing things--creating technology.⁶⁵ It is acquired through a linear methodological investigation and the understanding of natural law of creation.⁶⁶ Scientific culture is characterized with the application of science to processes of material production. In other words, accepted systems of practice and behavior allow both material production and social organization to become permeable to scientific knowledge acquired through the investigation of natural law and creation.⁶⁷

The origin of scientific culture is attributed to discoveries of scientists and philosophers like Copernicus, Newton, and Bacon, whose works were eagerly studied by enthusiastic middle class Europeans who were eager to apply new ideas to industry and commerce.⁶⁸ Scientific culture propagates a cultural paradigm with a mindset that is helpful in understanding the process of innovation and invention. It is a culture that

⁶⁴ Kuznets, *Economic Growth*; Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development"; Casson, "Cultural Determinants"; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. All these authors have illustrated the importance of science in economic development. Walter Rodney specifically illustrates how Europe's economic development was accelerated by scientific technology.

⁶⁵ Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism"; Casson "Cultural Determinants."

⁶⁶ John F. Wilson, "Scientific Culture and the Making of Industrial West," *Business History*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (April 1998): 152-53.

⁶⁷ Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth*.

⁶⁸ Wilson, "Scientific Culture."

influenced the European Industrial Revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by improving their understanding of nature.⁶⁹

Scientific culture is a convoluted behavior mixed of material technology and social technology that provides the power of science and reveals an orderly understandable universe, thereby laying an enduring base for free rational discourse towards innovation and inventions. Wrapped in a passion to know, scientific culture nurtures collective knowledge to investigate natural law and contributes to indefinite human progress. On the other hand, this approach avoids metaphysics and despises revelations and dogma. It is a culture that provides a practice of intensive creative thinking through education, honesty, and void of corruption in human behavior. This culture sees our universe as one in which humanity, through continued inquiry, perpetuates development.⁷⁰ In its real sense, scientific culture offers a society the ability to manipulate the environment for the purpose of enhancing the process of living.

SCIENTIFIC CULTURE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The literature shows that the importance of scientific culture in economic development goes far back to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries during the industrial revolution in Great Britain.⁷¹ Similarly, the American Progressive Era (1896-1916) was fueled by the quantum leap in American scientific culture at which time technical

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Edward O. Wilson, "Back to the Enlightenment: We must know, We will know," *Free Inquiry*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Fall 1988): 21-22.

⁷¹ Ian Inkster, *Scientific Culture and Urbanization in Industrial Britain* (Ashgate, VT: Aldershot and Brookfield, 1998).

rationality was laid.⁷² It was a scientific cultural revolution that precipitated science-and technology-driven socioeconomic development in Europe and led to the formation of scientific societies that were later emulated around the industrialized world. For example, Academic des Sciences in Paris in 1666, the Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin in 1700, and the New York Academy of Sciences in 1817 are some of the first scientific societies to emerge in the industrialized world.⁷³

All those scientific societies and their national leaderships recognized the importance of scientific culture for development in the West. In England, the Royal Society is credited for pioneering the movement in 1660.⁷⁴ The point here is that societies that are able to establish a culture of understanding the natural law of creation enhances their technology and increases their ability to improve living by manipulating natural laws. In comparison, societies that lack the scientific culture of understanding natural laws are less likely to possess the ability to manipulate natural law to their benefit.

In developed countries, there are scientific cultures that seek to understand the appropriate way of doing things through the understanding of natural law of creation. Those countries have further distinguished between science and morality. This does not suggest that industrialized countries are secular. In fact, developed nations are not secular, but what they have done is differentiate science from morals. This distinction enables them to devote science in discovering natural laws, while regulating their societies with

⁷² Guy B. Adams and Virginia H. Ingersoll, "Culture, Technical Rationality, and Organizational Culture," *American Review of Public Administration*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (December 1990): 285-302.

⁷³ Leo T. W. Hin and R. Subramaniam, "Chemical Societies Boost Development." *Chemistry and Industry* (February 7, 2000): 90-91.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

moral laws. This cultural ability to differentiate science from morals is the key to material development. Differentiation opens up the route to economic development through technological advancement, thus making it possible to raise material consumption above subsistence levels. This process becomes possible because natural restrictions are surpassed by progressive missions that harness resources to higher levels, while morality is used to establish norms of both equity and efficiency for society.⁷⁵

Efficiency

In all human endeavors as with all aspects of life, efficiency is not only critical but also paramount for human progress. This is especially true with respect to economic development where “culture that encourages a realistic and sophisticated view of the environment is likely to support better informed and more successful decision.”⁷⁶ Within this line of reasoning it becomes apparent that a culture that encourages good behavior such as trust and integrity is likely to improve the coordination of different individuals’ decision, reduce transaction costs, and enhance efficiency to economic development.

Culture of Trust

Trust is an optimistic view of parties’ intentions and moral commitments of one’s own. If parties have trust then each will validate the others beliefs and a successful

⁷⁵ Gunnar Myrdal explains how society as a whole has to be elevated to high level within the framework of development. It can be argued that his intentions were affiliated with moral aspect of development with works in convolution with scientific aspect of culture. Societies that are able to dissect and at the same connect the two stand the chance of becoming sophisticated from an economic point of view.

⁷⁶ Myrdal, “What is Development?” 733.

equilibrium outcome in the market will be achieved.⁷⁷ Between the two cultural prerequisites identified here as essential for economic development, trust is the most vital one in all social organization.⁷⁸ Indeed, if the culture of scientific knowledge is considered as the engine behind economic development, it is unequivocally right to isolate trust as the lubricant that keeps the developmental engine running most smoothly. For without trust, both the moral and the scientific cultures will break down, the trio works simultaneously together. A market economy depends on the culture of trust. When trust is high, buyers and sellers function with more confidence and less pessimism. Different stages of the national economy can be safely delegated to different firms, since the risk of contractual default between them is low. In every economy, developed or underdeveloped, synchronization of valid and accurate information is essential to keep the day-to-day mechanics of the economy operable in such a manner that reduces transaction costs. When low transaction costs are associated with a high trust culture, economic outcomes are realistically more egalitarian.⁷⁹

In societies where a pessimistic view of human nature is prevalent, it is more difficult to foster economic development because transaction costs are high and the problems are well known.⁸⁰ In other words, a person's beliefs about human nature affect

⁷⁷ A. Parfit, "Prudence, Morality, and Prisoner's Dilemma," in J. Elster, ed., *Rational Choice*, 34-59 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Amartya Sen, *Ethics and Economics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).

⁷⁸ N. H. Leff, *Trust, Envy, and the Political Economy of Industrial Development: Economic Groups in Developing Countries* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986).

⁷⁹ J. Coleman, *The Foundations of Social Theory* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); J. Widner and R. Putnam, *Associational Life, Government Effectiveness and Economic Development in Africa* (Washington DC: World Bank, 1993); A. Mundt and J. Widner, "Researching Social Capital," *Africa*, Vol. 6, No.1 (Winter 1998): 1-24.

⁸⁰ P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, *Economics, Organization and Management* (Englewood Cliff: Prentice Hall, 1992).

both his own behavior and his expectation of other people's behavior. Therefore, pessimism of human nature in the absence of trust can precipitate self-validating distrust, which will simultaneously ruin any potential for building a sustainable economic development. Hence, a culture of trust is imperative in providing an optimistic view of human nature to make economic development possible in a market economy.

High Trust Generates Labor Specialization

In a national economy the internal synergistic operation runs well to inhibit economic bottlenecks when trust is high. *Trust culture* encourages specialization because everyone surrounded by a cultural aura of trust becomes confident that the specialists upon whom their needs rely on will not let them down. This sense of feeling does not only apply to production, but rather permeates all other spheres of economic functions including that of decision-making.

In the realm of economic development, trust is particularly important for all kinds of investments, in the sense that human resource investors are assured that their specialties will be demanded. Financial investors, likewise, have the trust that their pecuniary investments will not only come back, but they do come back with profits. Due to this unspoken assurance emanating from trust, people in high trust societies will be less reluctant to release the resources they own to other people, or to delegate the decision about the use of their resources to other decision-makers.⁸¹ In both cases, the resource-

⁸¹ In field research conducted by Mundt and Widner in Botswana and Tanzania, it was found that in regions of those two African countries where there was trust among the members there was a high local investment. For more analysis on that research, see Mundt and Widner, "Researching Social Capital."

owner and the decision-maker who make decisions on their behalf act judiciously but with less hesitation when there is an atmosphere of trust. For example, the fact that forty percent of Africa's wealth is held in overseas investments, indicates that African resource-owners have a greater sense of security investing overseas.⁸²

The point is that civic cultures, particularly those that deal with efficiency, honesty, and trust, constitute a social capital that shapes economic productivity. Even though they are by no means the only factors involved in economic development, their contributions are substantial. For example, it is the trust culture that allows economic sectors like engineering departments in high institutions of learning to work jointly with businesses on product development to create society's material wants.⁸³ In regard to the decision-making, an obvious question that comes to mind is, how does the decision-maker arrive at a decision? This question represents critical function that is required of leaders. This brings us to the relativism on leadership's ability in establishing an appropriate environment for economic development, which is judgment.

Judgment: The Deciding Factor

The question as to how leaders make strategic decisions to benefit their nations is important because of the success and the consequences of that decision. Here too, culture is important. In decision-making, some societies emphasize a theoretical approach and others emphasize a pragmatic approach. People who choose a theoretical culture in

⁸² J. E. Stiglitz and L. Squire, "International Development: Is it Possible?" *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1998): 138-51.

⁸³ Mark Dogson, "Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration," *Human Relations*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 1993): 77-95.

decision-making are usually more interested in understanding the situation before acting. On the other hand, those who emphasize pragmatism believe that it is sufficient to know that a certain action produces good results in certain circumstances without knowing exactly why this is the case.⁸⁴ The consequential differences between theoretical and pragmatic decisions are reflected in social organizations and have an impact on economic development. Therefore a leader's orientation in any of the two has an impact on his or her nation's economic performance. However, the question as to which one of the two is appropriate for development is difficult to discern.

In reality, neither of the cultural approaches has an absolute comparative advantage over the other. Because, even though, the theoretical culture is useful for interpretation of evidence, no single theory is ever entirely adequate. On a similar note, pragmatism by itself is not always sufficient in interpreting evidence without theory. In this respect, a successful combination of theory and pragmatism is the hallmark of a successful decision-maker, a quality that is needed for the smooth functioning of all economic systems.⁸⁵

The foregone analysis has identified two key cultural characteristics, a scientific culture with moral differentiation and a trust culture as prerequisite factors that are crucial for sustainable economic development. The lack of these basic prerequisite cultural elements will have a negative impact on any process of economic development. Societies that have established these behavioral characteristics, and have improved their scientific

⁸⁴ Casson, *The Economics of Business*.

⁸⁵ Mark C. Casson, *The Entrepreneur: An Economic Theory* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982).

culture, have been characterized as developed economic countries. Those that have not established the prerequisite scientific cultures are still producing their material needs within the constraints of nature without the ability to manipulate natural laws to reduce their transaction costs. This deficiency restricts those societies from harnessing natural resources to meet their needs. For that reason, they are considered less developed countries and associated with material poverty.

The last scenario is the predicament in which sub-Saharan African countries find themselves. Leaders in that region of the world have not established the prerequisite culture of scientific know-how to understand the law of nature so as to enable those countries to manipulate nature to their advantage. Part of the leaders' inability to establish the appropriate culture stems from their deficiency in interpreting how the world around them is constructed. This has become a hindrance to their ability to legitimate the culture needed to make scientific knowledge possible.⁸⁶

As the theoretical section of this chapter demonstrates, there is a relationship between leadership beliefs and cultural environment within groups, such as a nation. Hence the presence or the lack of a specific cultural environment can be attributed to leaderships' orientation and beliefs. Through this associational concept, the economic situation in a country can be linked to the leadership's ability to create the needed culture for prosperous development. In this respect, it is important for leaders to be evaluated based on the cultures they have legitimized and what becomes of the culture as far as economic development is concerned.

⁸⁶ Casson, "Cultural Determinants"; Adeleke, "Africa and Pan-Africanism."

As discussed in chapter one, both current political and economic pictures of Africa demonstrate that developmental conditions of the African people look disappointing; from hunger in Somalia and Ethiopia, to political violence in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The perturbing question is why Africa finds itself in such a debilitating situation and why is it that the leaders are unable to minimize the misery of the African people. In other words, why are the African leaders unable to establish scientific cultures that could have made sustainable economic development possible? There are multiple reasons for the current impoverished economic conditions in the region. Many scholars have pointed to colonialism and postcolonial encroachment in the global financial system.⁸⁷ Returning to the colonial debate alone will only propagate the same paralysis of analysis that African scholars have been engaged in for the past half-century⁸⁸.

However, in order to understand the African developmental predicament, it is important to understand some of the images that were established during the colonial era as explanatory tool for a point of departure. Out of those images is the difference between colonial protectorate and direct rules that helps explain why there is high moral leadership consciousness in Botswana as compared to Ghana. The theoretical logic of the difference emanates from the fact that the protectorate system allowed traditional leaders to maintain their institutional legitimacy, and in doing so preserved the moral contractual relationship between leaders and followers in Botswana. On the contrary, under the direct rule that existed in Ghana, the high moral cultural relationship that existed between leaders and

⁸⁷ Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

⁸⁸ Yefru, "The African Challenge."

their followers was replaced by a low moral relationship between postcolonial leaders and their citizens. Those images form part of the background knowledge with which the African leadership has failed to establish cultures conducive to economic development. In other words, the images of colonized Africa that were established during the colonial days have continued to influence the way most postcolonial African leaders think. For that reason, I offer a brief summation of the origin of contemporary African cultural dilemma that is inhibiting development in sub-Saharan African.

THE ORIGIN OF THE CULTURAL DILEMMA IN AFRICA

The lack of an appropriate economic culture in Africa is linked to how Africans, mainly the postcolonial leadership, take culture in its totality as only a tool of self-identification. In doing so, they apply both broad aspects of culture in all areas without the appropriate distinction. This problem originated from the colonial and post-colonial attempts by African nationalist leaders to defend African culture against its denigration by European scholars. It is one of the issues, according to Masolo, which defines “the struggle for identity in Africa by means of definition of reason, its nature, and its functions.”⁸⁹ The attack of the African culture by Europeans and its defense by Africans poses two problems. The first pertains to the question of how best to respond to the European denigration of African cultures and traditions. The second problem relevant to

⁸⁹ D. A. Masolo, *African Philosophy in Search of Identity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994).

African development is how can Africans achieve the prerequisites for economic progress without compromising their identity.⁹⁰

The Debate

There has long been a European discourse on Africa that underestimated, denigrated, and disparaged African culture and identity. Specifically, the discourse “denied that reason played a significant role in the development of society and culture in Africa as it did in Europe.”⁹¹ To the Africans, this assertion was part of an ideological myth that was designed to legitimate the European colonial enterprise. C. L. R. James, an authority on African politics, eloquently summarizes that myth in its elemental terms as follows:

Africans are, and always have been, a backward and barbarous people who have never been able to establish any civilized society of their own.... these barbarous people were brought into contact with civilization by the brutalities of the slave trade. However, the unhappy slave trade is happily behind us, and as a result of their contact with European civilization, primitive Africans become a part of unified world.⁹²

James’ description makes it quiet obvious that, to the colonizers, Africans were an inferior race of people who lacked intellectual and moral acumen. Hence, it was deemed the moral mission of the Europeans to “civilize” the Africans.

⁹⁰ Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.”

⁹¹ Ibid., 26.

⁹² James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*, 29.

To correct this denigration of their culture by the Europeans, Africans had to initiate a counter discourse. The purpose of the African discourse, of course, was to reclaim African humanity. The reclamation was made in the form of demonstrating the rationality of African beliefs within the framework of people's world-views and cultural practices. In epistemological terms, according to Oladipo, "it involved the postulation of a form of rationality unique to Africans who, in metaphysical terms were said to have personality different from, but not in anyway inferior to, the European personality."⁹³

THE SENGHORIAN PHILOSOPHY

One African scholar who exemplifies the above description is Leopold Sedar Senghor who postulated an "African mode of knowing." For Senghor and his followers,⁹⁴ the African mode of knowing is a holistic one, in which dualism between man and nature, subject and object, mind and matter are absent.⁹⁵ The mode of knowing is contrasted with another, which is considered to be characteristically European. This mode of knowing is analytic and therefore promotes all sorts of dichotomies between man and nature, subject and object, and body and mind. Senghor gave the proper characterization of this contrast when he wrote:

⁹³ Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest." 28.

⁹⁴ K. C. Anyawu, *The African Experience in the American Market Place* (NY: Exposition Press, 1993). Anyawu is one of the important followers of Senghor's philosophy.

The life surge of the African, his self-abandonment to the other, it[is] thus actuated by reason . But here the reason is not the eye-reason of the European, it is the reason-by-embrace which shares more the nature of logos than ratio. Ratio is compass, set-square and sectants, measure and weight, where logos, before its Aristotelian tempering, before it become diamond, was living speech. Speech, which is the most typically human expression of neo-sensory impression, does not cost the object, untouched, into rigid logical categories. African speech, in raising itself to the word, rubs and polishes things to give them back their original color, with their transparency penetrating their surreality, or rather their underlying reality, in its freshness. Classical European reason is analytical and makes use of the object. African reason is intuitive and participates in the object.⁹⁶

The above contrast marked the beginning of “the struggle over the control of identity by means of the definition of reason, its nature and functions” in the arena of scholarly discourse in Africa.⁹⁷ The Senghorian philosophy has become the mythological bedrock upon which African leaderships unknowingly undermine the development of their people by neglecting to create scientific cultures.

In Senghor’s response to the European degradation of African culture and traditions, there is a certain kind of African cultural traditionalism with certain characteristics. Among them are affirmation of an African world-view that is guarded by a distinctive form of rationality; a certain degradation of scientifico-technical rationality; and an acceptance of intuition as an alternative source of knowledge. A situation described by Oladipo as “an attempt to move African culture to a site out of criticism by celebrating locality as the ultimate determinant of cultural authority, and belief action; and recommendation of a solution to the crisis of self-definition in Africa which says that

⁹⁵ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 33-34.

⁹⁷ Masolo, *African Philosophy*, 40.

Africans should discover what they were previously and take steps to be such again.”⁹⁸

However, taking and accepting the demarcation made by Senghor carries negative consequences for African development.

Implications of Senghorian Philosophy on Africa’s Development

Before we examine the implications of the above position, it is important to understand that the Senghorian demarcation was a response to the European degradation of the African personality. The dehumanization and the social subjugation were regarded by Africans as not only insults but also as enemies “of their authentic African traditions and their will to cultural identity.”⁹⁹ It was, therefore, psychologically necessary that those traditions and identities be protected by any means necessary. This protection was vital not only because of the need to undermine the ideological myth of the colonial enterprise, but also essential because of the need for the Africans to regain “pride in themselves as worthy human beings inferior to none.”¹⁰⁰

In fact, there is nothing wrong with the affirmation of an African identity in the face of European ethno-centrism. The problem, however, is that the Senghorian response considers Africans as different from other human beings. It does that by claiming that there is a process of human development that is unique to Africans, and concludes that

⁹⁸ Oladipo, “Reason, Identity, and the African Quest,” 29.

⁹⁹ Wole Soyinka, *Art, Dialogue, and Outrage: Essays on Literature and Culture* (Ibadan, Nigeria: New Horn Press, 1988), 179.

¹⁰⁰ Rahman Anisur, “Towards An Alternative Development Paradigm.” *International Federation Development Alternatives*, Vol. 81 (April/June 1991), 23.

the African culture, which is supposed to be a product of process, has already exhausted its potential human creativity.

There are many flaws with this assertion of Senghor's argument. First, let us look at the response to the European degradation of the African culture, which I consider as essential and necessary. Senghor attempted to argue for the equality of human race and the need for the mutual recognition and appreciation of African cultures by other human beings. However, to achieve this purpose, he asserts African difference and particularity.

While above concession may have been acceptable, it undermined African identity with other human beings, mainly, the universals of culture.¹⁰¹ It would have further, and ironically, confirmed the belief that Africans were people quite unlike others. In other words the acceptance of the Senghorian philosophy in totality constitutes Africans own self-denial of equality with other humans. On a more crucial note, it is injurious to progress. For in that frame of thinking, a dynamic culture conducive to a responsive development process degenerates into a liability that must be overcome.

It should, however, be noted that Africans do have certain cultural traditions which are indigenous, mainly those in the reserve zone. However, they share with others the cultural attributes in the universal zone. It is due to the possibility of this sharing that allows them to interact and communicate with other human beings,¹⁰² especially at this time of "globalization of the productive forces and relations, internationalization of

¹⁰¹ Kwasi Wiredu, "Are There Cultural Universals?" *The Monist*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January 1995): 52-64.

¹⁰² Kwasi Wiredu, "A Philosophical Perspective on the Concept of Human Communication," *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1980): 199-206; — "Cannons of Conceptualization" *The Monist*, Vol. 76, No. 4 (October 1993): 450-76.

consumption patterns and markets, and the complexity in the intensification of the operations of technological communications.”¹⁰³

The above-discussed Senghorian philosophy of complacency based on a thinking embedded in a mythological paradigm inhibits African leaderships from formulating policies towards scientific culture. A culture that could have allowed Africans to tap into their domain of thought to understand natural law towards creation, and ultimately enable them to enhance their productive capability and ameliorate natural transaction costs that intensify regional poverty. Clearly African leaders have failed to establish scientific culture to stimulate the region’s economic development. Ironically, the leaders of Africa’s dominant institutions, e.g. politics and economics still follow the colonial paradigms that were established before independence.¹⁰⁴ In many cases the leaders have accelerated negative aspects of those paradigms, rather than transforming the culture.

Contemporary leadership activities, especially in pursuit of personal wealth and power, have been inhibiting the establishment of cultures of science and trust. As is shown later, the postcolonial leaders actions have hampered economic development in SSA. Their violent actions have been brutal, creating a culture of distrust. Most thinking and planning in governments, firms, universities, educational systems, the media, religious institutions, and other areas, in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to ignore the culture of scientific analytical thinking. This ‘fatal flaw’ is what has undermined sub-Saharan Africa’s economic development.

¹⁰³ N’Dri Assie-Lumumba and Lumumba-Kasongo, *The Silent Crisis in the International Transfer of Knowledge in African Societies and Their Education System: A Theoretical Perspective*, *CODESRIA Bulletin*, No. 4 (1994): 9.

¹⁰⁴ Adeleke, “Africa and Pan-Africanism.”

SUMMARY

Leadership is obviously important for a nation's development. In fact, the literature suggest that a nation's economic development depends on the ability of leadership to transform the society and economy¹⁰⁵ Along the same line of reasoning in the literature, Casson also articulates the importance of leadership in building a national culture, which reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances the economic performance of a nation as a group. The author further notes that societies with high morals and scientific beliefs as cultural attributes have high economic performance, while societies with low characteristics of these cultural attributes lack the prerequisites for economic development.¹⁰⁶ However, despite the importance of leadership and culture in development, little research has been done by modernization and dependency theorists in linking the role of leadership to development in developing countries. Likewise, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic development analysis by the two major development paradigms with the assumption that economic rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity.¹⁰⁷

This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework for linking leadership, culture, and economic development. The leadership, culture, and development (LCD) model highlights the link between the three variables. Through interpretation and legitimation of values, leadership establishes an accepted system of practice and behavior that leads to a culture of a group. Culture as a technology is linked to economic development as social

¹⁰⁵ Doe, "Economic Development of Francophone Africa."

¹⁰⁶ Casson, *The Economics of Business*.

capital. It is also clear that from economic perspectives that culture is compatible with an individual's optimization. Deductively, therefore, it becomes economically driven and becomes linked to economic development. The interactive phenomena between and within these three variables demonstrate the relationship between leadership and development.

Leadership is a process phenomenon where individuals with high moral capability rally group members to achieve a mutually beneficial outcome for the group. Leaders accomplish such objectives through interpretation and legitimation of social norms with the power invested in them by the group members as a whole. Dialectically, the legitimation and interpretation powers of leaders make them social engineers as well as cultural architects upon whom citizens rely for society's development. Cultures are accepted systems of social practice of behavior and prescriptions, meaning that cultures are meaningful orders of thoughts and values with maximum utility for human living.

There are two broad aspects of culture, namely, the reserve and the universal zones. The reserve zone is mainly utilized for personal actualization that has no essential bearing on the question of human well-being, truth, or falsehood. On the other hand, the universal zone anchors cultural elements of religion, the science of creation, and philosophy, all of which possess human values essential to the quality of human life. Religion offers moral attributes from which legal trust culture is derived, while scientific beliefs offer informative ways of understanding technological manipulation and industrial creation. Together, both elements form the basic fabric upon which social and material

¹⁰⁷ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

development of a nation is erected. Therefore, the ability for leaders to establish these cultural attributes in their societies may determine how the society as a whole develops.

Countries with leaderships that are able to engineer these scientific and moral cultural attributes develop a certain level of social and scientific knowledge that, when applied, become technology, which assists them in improving their living from nature. It is the acquisition of the capability to improve and sustain living that constitutes development. Based on this reasoning, the prerequisite for development becomes socio-scientific culture. Hence, the lack of it brings about underdevelopment as most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing. Development then is when a nation, through accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires an understanding of the natural law of creation and uses it to attain technological capacity enabling it to produce diverse products and services to meet social needs.

As the analysis of this chapter shows, leadership and culture are therefore essential to development, especially in regions of the world like sub-Saharan Africa. The importance of these variables is reflected in the difference of development in Ghana and Botswana. In the next two chapters, the case studies of Botswana and Ghana empirically demonstrate the relationship between leadership, culture, and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa.

CHAPTER IV

LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF BOTSWANA

There is a general consensus about the importance of leadership and culture in national development. However, other than the work of Casson that focuses on leadership and culture in industrialized countries and Eastern Europe, none of the development theories articulate the relationship and the importance between leadership, culture, and development.¹ To strengthen the connection between leadership and development, a theoretical analysis was devised in chapter three to establish the link between leadership, culture, and development. The linkage was demonstrated with an LCD model. The connection, as previously explained, was made possible through leadership's ability to legitimize some behaviors while denouncing others. This exercise of power by leaders produces socially accepted systems of behavior. It was emphasized that societies that are able to establish both high scientific and high moral cultures become prosperous through industrialization and moral altruism. In order to draw qualitative conclusions about the research question posed in chapter one, this chapter and the next consider two case studies to address this question. I begin by examining the role of leadership in Botswana's development.

In 1800, the territory of modern-day Botswana was populated by a variety of independent autonomous societies: Kwena, Ngwato, Ngwaketse, and Tawana.² The communities were affected by the global capitalist economy long before they collectively

¹ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

² Louis A. Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985); Sillery, *Botswana: A Short Political History*.

became British protectorates.³ After becoming protectorates in 1885, the traditional chiefs became colonial chiefs, partially subjected to the authority of European officials in Mafeking, South Africa. In 1966, following decades of political maneuvering by traditional leaders such as Tshekedi Khama and their Western educated young heirs, the territories were amalgamated into the nation of Botswana to gain its independence from Great Britain. Recently, Botswana, under the tutelage of its leaders, has been considered a “miracle” country with phenomenal economic growth and a well-entrenched multi-party democratic system that surpasses almost all countries in sub-Saharan Africa.⁴

When Botswana attained its independence on September 30, 1966, few people were optimistic about the country’s prospects for social and economic progress. Indeed, there were many African experts who doubted whether Botswana would survive as a separate nation. At the very least, the consensus was that it would become a “puppet” of South Africa’s apartheid government or a Bantu state.⁵ The pessimism arose from the superficial knowledge of British colonial history and from South Africa’s prior determination to incorporate Botswana into the Union of South Africa.⁶ Perhaps, judging from the overall economic performance of African countries, those who held a low expectation of the country’s economic performance at the time may have had good

³ Neil Parsons, “The Economic History of Khama’s Country in Botswana 1884-1930,” in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*, 113-143 (London: Heinemann Press, 1977); Isaac Schapera, *Tribal Innovators: Tswana Chiefs and Social Change 1795-1940* (London: Atholne Press, 1970).

⁴ John D. Holm, “Democratization in Africa, Botswana: An African Success Story,” *Current*, No. 366 (October 1994): 36-40.

⁵ Michael Crowder, “Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1987): 25-42.

⁶ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

reason. Land-locked Botswana's geographic position left it at the economic and political mercy of South Africa, making the prospects for development grim if not impossible.⁷

At independence, Botswana inherited an agreement with South Africa, under which Botswana received a small share of South Africa's custom revenue. In monetary affairs, the country had no currency of its own but used the South Africa's *rand*.⁸ Botswana's only physical contact with free Africa was a ferry across the Zambezi River through Zambia. The citizens lived off their cattle and what little food they could grow on the arid land depending on rainfall. The economy was mainly agrarian and the population had no alternative means of getting cash except to work in mines in apartheid South Africa. The conditions were exacerbated by a long succession of drought years that caused the death of hundreds of thousands of cattle and had left about 25 % of the population dependent on relief aid for their basic food needs.⁹ The country's transportation and communication depended on dry-weather roads and tracks. Its railway system was owned, managed, and controlled by Rhodesia Railways.¹⁰ In short, when the Protectorate was lifted and Botswana become sovereign, it was completely impoverished and one of the poorest nations in the world.¹¹

⁷ Crowder, "Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."

⁸ Derek J. Hudson, "The Establishment of Botswana's Central Bank and the Introduction of New Currency," *Botswana Notes and Records*, Vol. 10 (1978): 119-35.

⁹ John Cathie, *Food Security and Macroeconomics Stabilization: A Case Study of Botswana 1965-85* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

¹⁰ Richard Paul Stevens, *Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland: The Former Higher Commission Territories* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1967).

¹¹ Steven C. Smith, *Case Studies in Economic Development* (NY: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1997).

Botswana's economic status today proves that the pessimists overlooked two crucial factors in their assessments: the Tswana culture of cohesiveness (*kagisano*) and the conscientiousness of their colonial and postcolonial leaders like Tshekedi Khama and Seretse Khama. As a leader of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) and president at the time of independence, Seretse Khama remained undaunted by the above economic facts. As a committed high moral conscientious leader, he followed the steps of both his grandfather, Khama the Great, and his uncle, Tshekedi Khama, and devoted his energies to maximizing his people's welfare. Seretse did not allow himself to be caught up in the surface glamour and inevitable privilege as a head of state.¹²

From the beginning of his leadership, Seretse emphasized and strengthened the culture of self-reliance and internal moral discipline. He stressed the importance of democracy and the involvement of the people in decision making through a combination of traditional and modern institutions. He then designed the actions of his government to promote such attitudes. Under his leadership, emphasis was given to promoting moral principles that could prevent corruption so as to create the kind of society that could bring development and prosperity to the people of Botswana.¹³ In his search for a path toward the future, he began modernization by grafting institutions upon the roots of traditional values and traditional practices under the rubrics of *kagisano*: unity, harmony, and a sense of community.¹⁴ The achievements of his leadership, and that of his successors, are

¹² Gwendolen M. Cater and Philip E. Morgan, eds., *From the Frontline* (London: Rex Collings, 1980).

¹³ Roger Charlton, "Exploring the Byways of African Political Corruption: Botswana and Deviant Case Analysis," *Corruption and Reforms*, Vol. 5 (1990): 1-27.

¹⁴ Pauline E. Peters, *Dividing The Commons: Politics, Policy, and Culture in Botswana* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1994).

that no one questions the reality of Botswana's existence and the economic progress it has made since independence.

This chapter focuses on the role of leadership in the development of Botswana. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section deals with the precolonial era of Botswana. It demonstrates how leaders organized their societies towards social development until the British protectorate was sought to shield the then Bechuanaland from Afrikaner encroachment during the latter's migration into Africa's interior.¹⁵ The second section focuses on the "colonization" era when the British tried to transform the Protectorate Bechuanaland into a colony. I demonstrate how Britain's colonization of Botswana was indeed different from other colonies in Africa. The section also sheds light on one of the "colonial" traditional leaders, Tshekedi Khama. He prevented both Britain and South Africa from colonizing and annexing Botswana. This allowed the Protectorate Bechuanaland to preserve its traditional institutions with leadership legitimacy to provide political stability for its economic development in later years. Finally, the third section looks at the postcolonial era of Botswana's development under the tutelage of its first President Seretse Khama and his successors.

¹⁵ Louis A. Picard, *The Politics of Development in Botswana: A Model of Success?* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1987).

PRECOLONIAL BOTSWANA

Modern Botswana occupies a land that had been inhabited for thousands of years.¹⁶ However, little is known about the origins, social, and political organizations of the early people.¹⁷ The origin of the current population dates primarily from the eighteenth century, when the migration of the Tswana groups moved westward from South Africa.¹⁸ Prior to the creation of the protectorate, a series of tribal states occupied much of the territory. The four main Tswana tribal states were Bangwato, Kwena, Tawana, and Ngwaketse.¹⁹

Politically, the states were hierarchically organized with succession following inheritance rules. The chief (*kgosi*) was the embodiment of the community as a whole. He was the guardian of the people, their livestock, and their land. His powers included the power to allocate land for grazing, crops, and residence. He was responsible for the defense of his people by mobilizing the males into an army when necessary. The chief exercised his authority through a hierarchy of relatives and officials, including his close advisors, traditionally known as the *kgotla* (ward). The *kgotla* was the administrative and ideological center of the nation. The chief usually discussed national matters and law making with his headmen before bringing them up for popular discussions in the public.

¹⁶ Jack Parson, *Botswana: Liberal Democracy and the Labor Reserve in Southern Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984).

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ L. Ngcongco, "Origins of the Tswana," *Pula. Botswana Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1997): 21-46.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ In most of the states, non-Tswana groups and conquered communities were subordinates and were retained in a position of servility by the Tswana. The non-Tswana groups rendered tribute in the form of produce and labor, and, even within the Tswana communities, there existed ranking of subordination.²¹

Economic control during this period was rooted in, but not limited to, the ownership and control of cattle. The chief (*kgosi*) owned large herds of cattle.²² The ruling class allocated land, adjudicated disputes, and made decisions about social service and collective behavior.²³ The chiefs loaned their cattle to those on whom they depended for political support. This socio-economic system that bonded the chiefs and their people together was referred to as *mafisa*.²⁴ The society's production limits were the limits of technology, nature, and social and political relations. The societies were autonomous, based on pre-capitalist tributary social formation marked by the existence of two major classes. The peasantry organized communities and the ruling class that monopolized the function of the given society's political organization and exacted tributes from rural

²⁰ Peters, *Dividing The Commons*.

²¹ Thomas Tlou, "Servility and Political Control: Botlhako Among the Batswana of Northwestern Botswana ca. 1750-1906," in Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff, eds., *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives*, 367-390 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

²² Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country."

²³ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

²⁴ Ismail Abdi Samatar, *An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999).

communities.²⁵ Through this patronage-client system, both economic and political systems were stabilized.²⁶

To maintain the social structure for continuity, young people were inducted into the social strata through age regimentation known as *mephato* that was always presided over by a *kgosi*.²⁷ The initiation process instilled a sense of group unity and educated young people about Tswana tradition with emphasis on dedicating their loyalty to their nation (*morafe*) and the chief.²⁸ Using this indigenous traditional Tswana custom, the leadership established a culture of solidarity and unity among young people to erase tribal differences and to create unanimity among Batswana.

Was Botswana Ever Colonized?

Most writers on Botswana treat the country as a one-time colony of Great Britain.²⁹ This label is far from accurate because in the true sense of the word, Botswana was never a colony but rather a protectorate.³⁰ By the same token, others disagree with this assessment and argue that there is no difference between a colony and a

²⁵ Amin, "Unequal Development."

²⁶ Tlou, "The Nature of Batswana States."

²⁷ Peters, *Dividing The Commons*.

²⁸ Tlou, "The Nature of Batswana States."

²⁹ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

³⁰ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*,

protectorate.³¹ This unresolved situation clouds the true status as to whether Botswana was colonized or not, and therefore warrants a qualitative definitional clarification.

The difference between the two concepts is that the protectorate was based on a mutual arrangement between the indigenous leaders who requested it, and the British government who provided it as a security measure to keep the territories out of reach from intruders. On the other hand, colonization was a rule that was arbitrarily imposed by a colonizer.³² In this context, the protectorate could not be characterized as a colony; rather it could be deemed as an alliance that was based on a mutual agreement between two parties. With such a distinction, it is fair to assert that technically Botswana was not colonized.

The cause for the protection and its request by the traditional Tswana leaders was a protracted phenomenon in the late nineteenth century. However, the final straw that precipitated it was the forced migration that brought Afrikaners to the interior of Africa. During the course of their migration, the Afrikaners came in contact and in conflict with the Tswana people that resulted in hostilities.³³ As time went by, there were more and more invasions of Tswana territories by the Afrikaners that led to the development of informal protectorate agreement between the British government and Tswana chiefs.³⁴ Subsequent German and Afrikaner hostilities against the territories forced the Tswana

³¹ William Duggan, "The Kweneng in the Colonial Era: A Brief Economic History" *Botswana Records Notes and Records*, Vol. 9 (1977): 1-20.

³² Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

³³ Kevin Shillington, *The Colonisation of The Southern Tswana 1870-1900* (Johannesburg, South Africa: Ravan Press, 1985).

³⁴ *Ibid.*

leaders into a formal protectorate alliance with the British, whom the Tswana chiefs believed could help them resist the Afrikaner's encroachment. Initially, the Protectorate Alliance was deemed as a beneficial agreement between the two parties.³⁵ The agreement secured British influence in the region and access into central Africa. In 1893, during the rule of Khama III, the alliance led by the Tswana chiefs assisted the British to win the war against the Matebeles from Rhodesia. For the Tswanas, the protectorate eased the pressure of the Afrikaner encroachment from the southeast and the German pressure from the west.³⁶ Based on the described circumstance that led to the protectorate, it can be determined that the conventional belief that Botswana was fully colonized by the British is questionable. Even if that belief is upheld, it can be further argued that the colonization was different based on traditional institutional and leadership freedom that existed in the territories at the time.

The Difference in Botswana's Colonization

The establishment of British protectorate meant Bechuanaland, as Botswana was formally known, became part of the British Empire. Politically, the embryonic stage of the protectorate had both external and internal dimensions. Internally, parallel rule existed until 1930. Under the mechanics of the parallel rule, each of the Tswana tribal chiefs was recognized and retained authority under the supervision of a European layer of administration. The parallel rule concept was based on the idea that the protectorate administration and the native administration could be simultaneous but mutually

³⁵ Parson, *Botswana: Liberal Democracy*.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

exclusive from each other. The external protectorate idea was also based on the concept that protection affected only external affairs, including matters dealing with missionaries and European affairs in the territories. It left the tribal leaders free to handle their internal social affairs independently and without outside interference.³⁷

Externally, the Protectorate Bechuanaland was viewed as an appendage of South Africa in Britain. For example, the British representative in South Africa was, until 1963, the chief administrative officer of the protectorate. He reported to the Dominion, not to the colonial office in Britain. This management meant that the tribal territories were not considered as colonies, but as part of the Dominions. Inherently, the association of the territories with the Dominion implied that the British accepted their presence in Bechuanaland not as colonizer, but regarded the territories as autonomous areas with their legitimate traditional political and judiciary institutions. Based on the above analysis and reasoning, the proclaimed Botswana colonization, if it is accepted as such, has to be viewed with some reservations because it was different from other colonies that experienced direct and indirect foreign institutional colonial rule.³⁸ The main difference was that while the other colonies suffered arbitrary imposition of colonial rule, Botswana's protectorate was based on a mutual arrangement. More importantly, the Tswana leaders were allowed to rule their people without foreign authorities questioning their domestic legitimacy.

³⁷ Anthony Sillery, *Founding a Protectorate: History of Bechuanaland 1885-1995* (London: Mouton, 1965).

LEADERSHIP ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING COLONIAL ERA

The protectorate administration in the territories was assigned to cater to the issues between the traditional rulers and the outside world, including missionaries and European affairs in the territories. In this respect, the protectorate administration was to act only as a foreign affairs department for the territories. Given this distinctive assignment, however, the protectorate administration intervened constantly in issues affecting social, political, and economic life in the territories in an attempt to impose direct colonization over the territories.³⁹ As if the intrusion into the domestic affairs was not enough, the protectorate agreement was further thrown into confusion by the Act of South Africa, which authorized the incorporation of the territories into South Africa.⁴⁰ By several accounts, South Africa raised the annexation issues several times only to be unequivocally opposed, on all occasions, by the traditional leaders.⁴¹

Between 1933 and 1934, under the leadership of Tshekedi Khama,⁴² the leaders' stiffened resistance to the annexation paid off when the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and Statute of Union Act of 1934 solidified the sovereignty of the Union of South Africa.

³⁸ Roger Gocking, "Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor in Ghana and Lesotho," *Africa*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Winter 1977): 61-85.

³⁹ Thomas Tlou, "A Political History of Northwestern Botswana to 1906," Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1972.

⁴⁰ P. M. Landell-Mills, "The 1969 South African Custom Union Agreement," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1971): 263-81.

⁴¹ Neil Parsons, "Victorian Triumph of An African Chief: Visit of Bechuanan Chief to England During 1890s," *History Today*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (April 1998): 25-30.

⁴² Tshekedi Khama became the leader of Bangwato Royal Family after the death of his brother Kgosi Sekgoma in 1925. The rightful ruler, Seretse Khama, was only four years old and so by tradition, Tshekedi become the regent until his nephew would have become of age to rule. See Neil Parsons, Willie Henderson, and Thomas Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980* (Braamfontain, South Africa: Macmillan, 1997).

By construction, the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and the Statute of Union Act of 1934 voided the immediate transfer of the territories to the Union of South Africa.⁴³ The conjuncture temporarily prevented the annexation of the protectorate of Bechuanaland. However, it did not deter the British government's determination to colonize the Tswana communities. The protectorate administration made changes aimed at placing the territories under colonial rule. First, the Dominion Offices under which the territories were protectively administered changed their patterns of recruitment for the protectorate administrative service, by bringing officers directly from Britain as part of the "Oxbridge" generation of colonial administrations.⁴⁴ After those changes were made, the protectorate administration presented indirect rule reforms to the traditional leaders and proceeded to legislate the Proclamations of 1934 and 1938.⁴⁵

Under the proclamations, the British intended to alter the traditional ruling institutions and their legitimacy with four major changes. First, the reforms intended to regulate the traditional judiciary process of the chiefs and to modify them with a British system. Second, the proclamations established tribal councils to counsel the chiefs on the affairs of Tswana communities. Third, they introduced a European bureaucratic administrative system by which the chiefs would have administered the affairs of the tribal communities. Fourth, in 1937, the protectorate administration introduced a British financial system by creating tribal treasuries in each district with its own financial staff to

⁴³ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

⁴⁴ Louis A. Picard, "Role Changes Among Field Administrative in Botswana: Administrative Attitudes in Social Change," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1977.

⁴⁵ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*,

assist the tribal leaders.⁴⁶ The traditional leaders did not want any part of the colonization and, under the leadership of Tshekedi Khama, waged a relentless political campaign to save their peoples' freedom and protect their land from going under the colonial yoke.

THE LEADERSHIP OF TSHEKEDI KHAMA: 1925-59

Tshekedi Khama came to the throne of Bangwato Royal House in 1925 as a Regent when his brother Sekgoma Khama died, and the right heir to the chieftaincy, Sekgoma's son Seretse, was only four years old.⁴⁷ Tshekedi's rule was met with the British proclamations of 1934 and 1938 that entailed strategies for direct colonization of the territories. As leaders, Tshekedi and Chief Bathoen's collective resistance to the British proclamations was the second major political undertaking during the protectorate era.⁴⁸

The two leaders staged outright opposition to the British proclamations and reforms. They sued the High Commission's administration, citing that the imposition of the proclamation impinged upon the internal sovereignty of the chiefs, which was reserved under the treaty. The chiefs' primary concern was that the proclamations "broke with Tswana tradition and that they were in violation of the original nineteenth century Protectorate agreements with the traditional leaderships."⁴⁹

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Crowder, "Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."

⁴⁸ The first major leadership action taken during the protectorate was the activities that led to the creation of the "Native Advisory Council" which was utilized as a forum to resist the annexation of the territories by the Union of South Africa. Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

⁴⁹ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*, 13.

The court ruled in favor of the High Commission's office by citing that the protectorate administration had "unfettered and unlimited power to legislate for the government an administration of justice among the tribes of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and that this power was not limited by the Treaty or Agreement."⁵⁰ Even though the chiefs lost the legal skirmish, they won a major battle. Due to the court challenge by the leaders, the protectorate administration was forced to drop the concept of tribal council-- which would have undermined the traditional rule-- from the reforms. In addition, the earlier adopted judiciary reforms in the territories were also dropped, and the traditional trial by the *kgotla* (ward) was reinstated to become the only recognized judiciary system of the "tribes."⁵¹ In both practical and technical terms, those actions released the territories from direct colonization and allowed their traditional institutions to remain in place to evolve at a gradual pace. It also meant that Tshekedi's conscientious efforts led to the preservation of the internal institutions with their legitimacy sans polarization among its social elements. This legacy has played a crucial role in Botswana's political stability and has contributed greatly to its economic growth.

The British attempt to colonize Bechuanaland was only one of the major obstacles that had the potential to undermine the Tswana social development during Tshekedi leadership. Another indirect obstacle was the annexation of the territories by South Africa, which was supposed to have been ameliorated by the 1931 and 1934 Acts of Westminster that granted sovereignty to South Africa.⁵² How did the problem emerge,

⁵⁰ Stevens, *Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland*, 132.

⁵¹ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

⁵² Crowder, "Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."

and what did Tshekedi do, once again, to deliver these nations from another regional colonial “yoke,” one that could have been more disastrous than the previous one attempted by the British government.⁵³ To understand this, I first examine the disguised form in which the second annexation attempt came, and thereafter look at how Tshekedi Khama resolved it in order to allow a gradual social development of his country.

As noted previously, during the 1920s and 1930s the Tswana leaders stiffened their resistance and luckily won a victory against the incorporation of their territories into the Union of South Africa. The solution was serendipitous rather than deliberate, owing to South Africa gaining its sovereignty. The annexation problem emerged again after World War II in a different form when Jan Smut asked for the incorporation of South West Africa into South Africa as a reward for his participation alongside Britain in the war against Germany.⁵⁴ He tried to convince the newly created United Nations to consider terminating the mandate of South West Africa, and to incorporate the territory as an integral part of the Union on the basis of geographical contiguity, ethnic kinship, natural economic advantage, and the desire of its people.⁵⁵ That was how the disguised annexation of the protectorate Bechuanaland emerged.

⁵³ There was a general knowledge among the leaders in the territories as of how poorly the South African government treated its black population. Tshekedi was aware of the injustices that the South West African people suffered from Germans and South Africa, since there were a large number of refugees from the area living in his own nation. See Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*; Crowder, “Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa.”

⁵⁴ Crowder, “Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa.”

⁵⁵ John H. Wellington, *South West Africa and Its Human Issues* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1967).

Tshekedi Versus Smut: The Leadership of National Preservation

Tshekedi's decision to become involved in the South West Africa issue was important. Almost from the day he became the Regency of the Bangwato, he resisted British attempts to hand over the Bechuanaland Protectorate to South Africa. In 1946, the concern was still very much a live issue to Tshekedi when Smut requested the integration of South West Africa. Smut had communicated to the House of Representatives in Cape Town early that year his intention of raising the protectorate issue on his trip to London because he believed that the territories were part and parcel of the Union.⁵⁶ For that reason, Tshekedi was concerned that if South Africa had gotten its way with South West Africa, the people of Bechuanaland would have suffered a loss of sovereignty. By subscribing to the domino theory concept, Tshekedi reasoned that once one of South Africa's neighbors had fallen into her clutches, others like Bechuanaland would have inevitably followed. From this line of reasoning, Tshekedi saw the bureaucratic annexation of South West Africa by Smut as his "fight" which deserved his full leadership attention to wage.⁵⁷

Tshekedi began his strenuous campaign to prevent Smut from taking over South West Africa by asking the British High Commissioner in South Africa to forward, on his behalf, a telegram to the presiding officer at the United Nations dealing with the mandate of South West Africa. In the telegram, Tshekedi urged the UN to consider using its power to keep South West Africa as a separate entity from South Africa until its permanent policy of suppression of black people had ended. By using South African apartheid

⁵⁶ Tshekedi Khama, *The Case for Bechuanaland* (Mafeking, South Africa: Pretoria Press, 1946).

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

policy, Tshekedi had invoked a human rights issue, which South Africa, itself, had helped the United Nations to design. Therefore, the case received the UN's attention.⁵⁸

After sending the telegram to the United Nations, Tshekedi mobilized the support of his fellow chiefs behind his campaign against Smut. All the chiefs signed a memorandum to the United Nations' Trusteeship Committee to consider four issues that were important to them and the people in South West Africa. First, they requested that the committee disregard the request for incorporating South West Africa into the Union of South Africa. Second, they urged the committee to consider transferring the mandate of South West Africa directly to Great Britain. Third, they requested that the Bechuanaland Protectorate be given a free and direct access to a West Coast port. Fourth, and finally, all the chiefs requested that a pending case that related to refugees from the South West Africa, who were in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, by that time, be given consideration.⁵⁹ By including the chiefs, Tshekedi skillfully transformed the case from a personal one to a national one and gave it more weight on the international level.

To intensify his campaign, Tshekedi devised another strategy. He related the case to a discriminatory measure that had been imposed on Indians in Natal and then sought help from the Indian delegation at the United Nations to lead the opposition against Smut's request.⁶⁰ Thereafter, Tshekedi gave extensive interviews to newspapers in South Africa in which he condemned South Africa's imperialist ambition in the region. He described the Union as having oppressive imperialist intentions aimed at undermining the

⁵⁸ Crowder, "Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."

⁵⁹ Ibid.

development of neighboring territories as a way of ensuring cheap labor for its mining industries.⁶¹ Even in Britain where Smut's support was high, Tshekedi organized his network of allies to put pressure on the British government to refuse granting Smut his wish. In the end, due to the long campaign waged by Tshekedi Khama, the United Nations' General Assembly rejected the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union of South Africa.⁶² In the process, Tshekedi also made the possibility of the incorporation of his own territories into the Union of South of Africa more remote and assured them their future independent sovereignty.

The above activities by Tshekedi and his compatriots during the "colonial era" demonstrate the effects of leadership roles on national political development of modern day Botswana. From those activities it becomes obvious that each step towards Botswana's nationhood was a well thought out strategy orchestrated by both "colonial" and precolonial leaders. Leaders such as Khama the Great, for example, had established the culture of national cohesiveness underpinned by Tswana's philosophy of unity, harmony, and a sense of community.⁶³ The same culture motivated Tshekedi and his successors to carry out Botswana's national development. From the preceding analysis one sees that Tshekedi and his colleagues strengthened the Tswana-dom by building a unified political force indivisible by outsiders so as to preserve Botswana's sovereignty with its institutional legitimacy.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ "Chief Tshekedi Attack Union Policy," *Pretoria News* July 21, 1946.

⁶² Wellington, *South West Africa and Its Human Issues*.

⁶³ Cater and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

By all accounts, Tshekedi was a moral conscientious leader who believed in preserving the freedom of his people and their land.⁶⁴ He was unique as an African leader in taking up the cudgel against colonial rulers on behalf of both his own people and neighbors. Tshekedi stood apart as the first African leader to see the possibilities of using the newly created United Nations to plead a case of oppressed people against the colonizer. The most remarkable aspect of Tshekedi was his high moral commitment to the cause he championed, freedom for his people. The commitment was shown in his devotion to the Tribal Council functions that propelled the territories into the nation of Botswana under his nephew, Seretse, who he had groomed to carry the torch of Tswana development.⁶⁵ As a leader, Tshekedi continued his father's work by preventing the Tswana nations from falling into colonial hands.

Leadership Role in Economic Development in "Colonial" Bechuanaland

As noted, the colonial economy of Botswana was organized according to patron-client pre-capitalist structures. Subsistence living was based on extensive cattle production and food crops supplemented by hunting. During the protectorate era, with its capitalist activities, subsistence farming was not utterly stripped off as a means of production. Some land was retained and family labor remained intact, as did political relationships with the headmen and chiefs.⁶⁶ Those social activities continued to be underpinned by *mafisa* practices and relations of subordination. However, the demands of

⁶⁴ Mary Benson . *Tshekedi Khama* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960)

⁶⁵ Neil Parsons, William Henderson, and Thomas Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

⁶⁶ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

additional needs, in the form of money to pay colonial taxes, brought increasing economic burdens upon families. These financial burdens made the prevailing economic system inadequate.⁶⁷

Initially, the capitalist approach did stimulate economic growth in the autonomous territories. The economy prospered by supplying wagon trains, controlling trade, and responding to other opportunities. This fact implies that the capitalistic activities, in themselves, did not undermine the integrity of the Tswana economy and polity. In fact, the capitalist approach helped the leaders find new avenues for surplus in manufacturing goods. The leaders considered capitalism a rational response to market opportunities. However, they failed to see it as an exogenous influence for the reorganization of production. In other words, to the leaders, there was no need for restructuring the social relations of production.⁶⁸ However, coercive capitalism subordinated the territories to extract agricultural produce and create a labor reserve to serve mining interests in South Africa.

The mechanism used to create the labor reserve was underpinned by two strategies. The first one was *peasantization*, a process whereby a small group of people who wanted to make living by agricultural production (through selling part of their crops or herds) was created. The second was *proletarianization*, where part of the society was made to become wage earners by selling its labor for low wages to the South Africa

⁶⁷ David Massey, *A Case of Colonial Collaboration: The Hut Tax and Migrant Labour*, Unpublished Paper, 1978; Quil Hermans, "A Review of Botswana's Financial History 1900-1973," *Botswana Notes and Records*, Vol. 6 (1974): 89-116.

⁶⁸ Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country."

mines.⁶⁹ In some areas, the strategy was orchestrated by restricting access to land through the creation of freehold farms or limiting peoples' access to land through the formalization of territorial boundaries.⁷⁰ In conjunction with the limitation of access to land, new demands in the form of taxation were also placed on households. The first tax was in the form of a *hut tax* in 1899 in the amount of one British pound per year. In 1919, the hut tax was increased in conjunction with another tax, the *native tax*, which was imposed on households.⁷¹

The search for money, due to above cited conditions, compelled people to participate in market economy outside subsistence agriculture.⁷² Even in the agriculture sector, bureaucratic restrictions were devised. For example in the cattle market, there was an imposition of discriminatory regulation in South Africa against Bechuanaland cattle imported to South Africa. The regulation decreased Batswana's ability to sell cattle, which was the main agriculture product from the territories.⁷³ Other forms of economic activities, such as trade, were restricted to Batswana. The restriction spared no social class in Bechuanaland and even chiefs were denied licenses to trade.⁷⁴ These strategies

⁶⁹ Martin Legassick, "Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1885-1970: From Periphery to Sub-Metropole As a Forced Labour System." in Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*. 175-200 (London: Heinemann, 1977).

⁷⁰ Donald Kowet, *Land, Labor, Migration and Politics in South Africa: Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland* (Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1978).

⁷¹ Massey, *Case of Colonial Collaboration*.

⁷² Isaac Schapera, *Migrant Labour and Tribal Life: A Study of Conditions in Bechuanaland Protectorate* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947).

⁷³ Hermans, "A Review of Botswana's Financial History."

⁷⁴ Alan Best, "General Trading in Botswana, 1890-1968," *Economic Geography*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 1970): 598-611.

were employed to undermine the pre-protectorate economic system in order to allow the creation of a colonial economy that served capitalist interests.

Against all odds, the chiefs tried to resuscitate the local economy, but to no avail. For example, Kgosi Isang Pilane of BaKgatla organized a tribal boring scheme to get water to the cattle grazing lands for his subjects.⁷⁵ Unfortunately for the leaders, however, the social and economic facilities of the ruling class were intertwined with the underdeveloped facilities of the subordinate majority class. In so doing, the capital formation of the indigenous ruling class upon which the rest of the economic structure relied was undermined.⁷⁶ With the chiefs losing their autonomy and the British taking away lands, the chiefs were left with less means to improve their economies.⁷⁷ Even the land that was available could not produce much food for the population due to lack of manpower since the male aged 15-44 years were working in South African mines.⁷⁸ The poor economic conditions of the territories were further exacerbated by natural conditions over which leaders had no control. Drought and rinderpest epidemic were two natural conditions that worsened economic conditions.

In the capitalist labor reserve sector, there were only few jobs created to manage the administrative system and the economic infrastructure of the labor reserve. The jobs that were created included clerks, translators, messengers, drivers, and shop assistants.

⁷⁵ Zbigniew A. Konczacki, Jane L. Parpart, and Timothy M. Shaw, eds., *Studies in Economic History of Southern Africa: South Africa, Lesotho, and Swaziland*, Vol. 2 (London: Frank Cass, 1990).

⁷⁶ Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, eds., *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa* (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1977).

⁷⁷ Kowet, "Land, Labor, Migration and Politics."

⁷⁸ Schapera, *Migrant Labor and Tribal Life*.

These jobs required some education including basic literacy at a primary level. Thus a small cadre of primary school teachers developed. Such groups of people were necessary for the protectorate enterprise as a link between the *peasants* and the *proletarians*, but they also became essential in making the whole economy of the protectorate viable. The access to education, regardless of how mediocre, was the only important economic transformation that occurred during the protectorate era. In terms of material development, the traditional protectorate leadership achieved less for their communities. A reversal of that was not seen until Botswana achieved its independence in 1966. The lack of economic achievement during the protectorate era does not suggest that colonial leaders played a less important role in the Botswana's development. Rather, while the traditional leaders used their time in winning the "war" of sovereignty by preventing direct British colonization and South African annexation, they put material development at the bottom of the priority list to be tackled by the next batch of leadership under the tutelage Seretse Khama.

THE LEADERSHIP OF SERETSE KHAMA

Seretse Khama was born in Serowe to the Bangwato Royal Family in Bechuanaland in 1921. After the death of his father in 1925 and that of his mother in 1930. Seretse was put under the custody of his uncle, Tshekedi, the then regent of the Bangwato Throne. In 1931, at the age of ten, Tshekedi sent Seretse to school at Lovedale in South Africa. Later, Seretse attended schools at Adams College in Natal, Tiger Kloof in Rhodesia, and in 1945, he left from Cape Town to study law at Oxford University.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."

Marriage and Exile

After one year in Oxford, Seretse moved to London. At a dance at Nuffled House in June 1947, he met Ruth Williams. They fell in love and married in September 1948.⁸⁰ The marriage outraged Tshekedi who felt that his nephew did not consult him. In addition to his uncle, authorities in Southern Rhodesia and in South Africa also protested against the marriage. Both countries used their influence through the office of the High Commission in South Africa to induce the British to ban Seretse from Bechuanaland. The process through which the banishment was undertaken was by deception. In early 1950, Seretse Khama was invited to London to discuss the constitutional position of his marriage to a white woman. Once in London, he was asked to renounce his chieftaincy and Seretse declined to do so. Based on his refusal to renounce the chieftaincy, he was banned from returning home to Bechuanaland.⁸¹

During his exile in London, Seretse became involved with the decolonization discussions that were taking place in British political life. As he became more involved in the British political life and in the decolonization process, Seretse modified his attitude towards the office of the chieftaincy. When the relationship between him and his uncle improved, Seretse intensified his efforts to return home. In 1956, Seretse Khama reluctantly renounced the chieftaincy and agreed to return to Bechuanaland as a private

⁸⁰ John Redfern, *Ruth and Seretse* (London: Gollancz, 1955).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*

citizen with the proviso that he could participate in the political life in the protectorate of Bechuanaland.⁸²

The Return to Bechuanaland

On October 10, 1956, Seretse returned to Bechuanaland with the intention of re-establishing himself as a cattle farmer.⁸³ Seretse's return coincided with political reforms that had been initiated by the High Commissioner. The protectorate administration, based on instructions from the High Commissioner's office, was gradually phasing out the principle of hereditary rule and was replacing it with a limited form of local representative democratic system. Based on his uncle's recommendation, Seretse accepted a position as an assistant Tribal Secretary that allowed him to follow Tshekedi to tribal meetings. Despite these developments, Seretse downplayed any interest in active national political leadership, even though he had been involved in development discussions with the then District Commissioner of Serowe. It was only after the death of Tshekedi in 1959 that Seretse began to assert his political position.⁸⁴

Prior to Tshekedi's death, Seretse had been encouraged to play an active role in the process of political change. In 1958, as an assistant to his uncle, he attended both the Joint Advisory Council (JAC) and African Advisory Council (AAC) meetings with Tshekedi and made contributions to the debates of both organizations. In the JAC, he supported a call made for the creation of a Legislative Council (Legco) by Tshekedi and

⁸² Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."

⁸³ "Seretse Given a Delirious Welcome," *New Age (Johannesburg)*, Vol. 2, No. 51 (October 18, 1956).

Russel England.⁸⁵ After the death of Tshekedi in 1959, Seretse took over his uncle's position in the Tribal Council.

At some time before the Legislative council meeting in June in 1961, Russell England approached Seretse Khama with a proposition of forming a political party. Seretse respectfully declined Russell's suggestion and expressed no interest at the time. Despite this seeming disinterest, Seretse continued to play a role in the legislative council. According to Henderson, Seretse was operating on a similar traditional realm like his grandfather Khama the Great and Tshekedi, his uncle, all before him. He was concerned about the issue of stability and racial harmony. He opposed communism and approved of discussions and negotiations as strategies towards resolutions of conflict of interest.⁸⁶

The Formation of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP)

In August the same year, Seretse met President Kennedy's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Mennen Williams during the envoy's visit to Botswana.⁸⁷ Shortly after the two men met, during the November 1961 session of the legislative council, Seretse called together a caucus of Legco African members and urged them to consider forming a political party. With the nod of the African members, Seretse

⁸⁴ Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."

⁸⁵ Russell England was born in Poland but identified himself as a British Bechuanalander. He was agriculturist turned settler farmer and by that time had lived in Bechuanaland for forty years. See Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

⁸⁶ Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."

⁸⁷ Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou. *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

founded the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP).⁸⁸ To his dismay however, Chief Bathoen and Chief Mokgosi disassociated themselves from the party.⁸⁹ At the party's inaugural meeting in Gaborone in 1962, its leadership was diverse. There were few white members, and a significant number of the members were heirs to the traditional chiefs.⁹⁰ At the inaugural, Seretse Khama was elected president of the party, and the vice-president position was given to Archie Tsoebebe. Benjamin Steinberg, a white trader and a cattle owner, was elected treasurer.⁹¹

The Consultation Constitutional Talks

At the beginning of 1963, the secretariat of the protectorate administration invited the leaders of the three political parties, Philip Matante of Botswana People's Party (BPP), Seretse Khama of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), and Motsamai Mpho of Botswana Independence Party (BIP), together with the traditional chiefs to attend constitutional talks at Lobatse.⁹² At the constitutional talk, a plan was devised to forge a unified leadership between the traditional chiefs and the new emerging political officials. In a more cautious fashion, the leaders made concessions to each other and agreed on a political equation that would serve the interest of both parties and the nation at large. The

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Quett Masire was a well-educated journalist who prior to joining Botswana Democratic Party worked for Bantu World as a correspondent. He was a self-made man who possessed a large herd of cattle and later became the President of Botswana after the death of Seretse Khama in 1980.

⁹⁰ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

⁹¹ Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

⁹² Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

new generation political parties' leaders reserved an un-contested place for the traditional leaders in the new legislative assembly underlined by a constitutional guarantee. The traditional leaders, in turn, voluntarily transferred the national institutional legitimacy to their heirs who had become the new political officials. In a bipartisan manner, the two groups of leaders put Tswana national interests beyond their personal interests to build a united leadership.⁹³

The smooth transition and leadership unification can be traced to the membership of the BDP and the leadership provided by Seretse Khama. At the outset Khama adopted the concept of political socialization.⁹⁴ Based on that concept, the elements of the BDP were drawn from the then newly reformed tribal councils in all the territories, whose members were mostly the heirs of the traditional leaders.⁹⁵ By using that strategy, Khama assured his party of political legitimacy in that the choice of the membership defused potential power struggles in his would-be nation. Moreover, his choice of membership signaled that his party stood for a unified nation as opposed to the inter-tribal federalism that existed at the time.⁹⁶ Furthermore, by adopting political a socialization strategy, Khama implicitly minimized the concept of tribal politics that has commonly undermined nation-building efforts in Africa.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Here political socialization is defined as a gradual orientation of various community member into participating in national political process. See Michael Jones-Correta, "Different Paths: Gender, Immigration and Political Participation" *International Migration Review*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer 1998): 326-49.

⁹⁵ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

⁹⁶ "The Role of Chiefs Today" *Botswana Daily News*, 27 November 1969.

To solidify legitimacy, traditional leaders were included in the new political machinery in two ways. First their heirs who were in the tribal council that had become part of the BDP were included in the political process. In addition, Khama supported a constitutional mechanism for guaranteeing the chiefs a place in the new legislative assembly in the form of a House of Chiefs.⁹⁷ Those political moves allowed Khama to forge a bond between the new political officials and the old traditional leaders.⁹⁸ Khama's political transformation was well orchestrated and executed with the right socially legitimized class, to the extent that the roles and functions of social classes were maintained to avoid social conflict and political instability.

In essence, the transition was smooth and the leadership was unified for two reasons. First, most of the new political officials were heirs to the traditional chieftaincies whose political institutions had ruled in the territories since precolonial times. Second, colonialism had preserved the traditional leaders and their institutions without subverting them and replacing them with new leaders. Seretse Khama, for example, was the heir to the Bangwato royal family. Chief Bathoen, who by constitutional arrangement, sat in the House of Chiefs was a traditional ruler of the Bangwaketse royal house.⁹⁹ The smoothness of the transition was also due to the fact that the changes related only to the political apparatus and not to the vicissitudes of the power base. In other words, the Botswana constitutional talks that prepared the nation for independence was mainly

⁹⁷ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

⁹⁸ Randwezi Nengwekhulu, "Some Findings on the Origin of Political Parties in Botswana," *Pula,, Botswana Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1979): 47-76.

⁹⁹ Kogsi Sir Beepitso, the current Botswana Ambassador in the United States, is the son of Chief Bathoen.

related to the political machinery than changes in political power as occurred in other African nations during the decolonization process. This partially accounts for much of the success of the transition that assured the future political stability and economic growth of Botswana.

The General Election Towards Botswana's Independence

The Lobatse constitutional arrangements of August 1963 changed the political landscape of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Thereafter, the important political issue at hand was no longer about cooperation and conflict; rather it was the concern for the principles and policies of future governance. After the talks, political developments advanced smoothly, and in 1964 the secretariat announced March 1st, 1965 to be general election date.¹⁰⁰ The three registered political parties, Botswana Independence Party, Botswana People's Party, and Botswana Democratic Party intensified their campaigning. The BDP was represented at all 31 constituencies; the BPP contested in 26 constituencies, and the BIP contested in 24 constituencies. On March 1st, 1965, the elections were held peacefully all across the territories. The election results came in slowly from the beginning but when the votes were finally tallied, the BDP won by a landslide victory, capturing 28 out of the 31 seats. The BPP managed to secure three seats with its leader, Matante being elected in Francistown. The third party, BIP, did not secure any seats. Out

¹⁰⁰ Konczacki, Parpart, and Shaw, *Studies in Economic History of Southern Africa*.

of 140,788 votes cast, Seretse Khama's BDP received 113,167; Philip Matante's BPP received 19,964; and Motsamai Mpho's BIP received only 6,491 votes.¹⁰¹

On March 9th, 1965 the new cabinet was sworn in with Seretse Khama as the first Prime Minister. In his inaugural address to the new legislative assembly, Khama set a developmental agenda for Botswana. He emphasized democratic principles, efficiency, and education as the important attributes that the country needed. In conjunction with those Khama made it clear to his countrymen that, due to the lack of qualified Batswana, his government was adopting a policy of slow localization for the civil service. This, he argued, was important because the country needed an efficient bureaucratic system to effectively administer the aid that the country was receiving towards development. Based on that need, the prime minister told his people that his government was retaining all foreign expatriates who wanted to stay and work in the country. Emphasizing the scarcity of resources and the dependency of Botswana on foreign aid, Khama emphatically told the people, especially the leadership, to refrain from waste and corruption. The avoidance of corruption later became the theme in many of his speeches, which helped foster a lack of tolerance for corruption in Botswana.¹⁰²

After the general assembly elections in 1965, national political events proceeded quickly. On the morning of September 30th, 1966 Botswana became independent with Seretse Khama sworn in as its first president. Botswana adopted an open parliamentary democracy with a president and national assembly, which comprise Elected Members, an

¹⁰¹ Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernard Thibaut, eds., *Elections in Africa: Data Handbook* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 113.

¹⁰² Naomi Mitchison, *Mochudi Dairies No. 13* (NY: University of New York Press, 1965).

Attorney General, and the House of Chiefs.¹⁰³ Seretse Khama and members of his leadership team had built a nation out of the territories that his uncle Tshekedi had protected from being colonized by the British. The same territories that his grandfather, Khama the Great, 81 years earlier, had unified into a confederacy and for which he sought British protection.¹⁰⁴

EVALUATION OF BOTSWANA'S DEVELOPMENT SINCE INDEPENDENCE

At independence, the economy of Botswana depended on a meager agriculture production supplemented with migrant labor remittance from South Africa.¹⁰⁵ The per capita income of the population was estimated at \$50, and the country had about twenty miles of tarred road, with its capital Gaborone still under construction. Besides traditional herbalists, no modern healthcare facilities were in existence for most of the local residents.¹⁰⁶ Statistically, there were only 247 primary schools in Botswana with a total enrollment not exceeding 75,000 or half of the school age population.¹⁰⁷ There were only 1,400 students enrolled at the secondary school level (Table 4-1). Jobs were scarce in Botswana therefore people were forced and work in mines in apartheid South Africa.

¹⁰³ Peters, *Dividing The Commons*.

¹⁰⁴ Parsons, "Victorian Triumph of An African Chief."

¹⁰⁵ Cathie, *Food Security*.

¹⁰⁶ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

¹⁰⁷ Republic of Botswana, *Transitional Plan for Social Economic Development*, School of Oriental and African Studies Library (London: London University Press, 1966).

Table 4-1
Education Enrollment in Botswana 1966-95

	1966	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995
Primary Sch. Enrollment (in'000)	75	83	116	171	223	283	319
Primary Sch Enrollment Rate %	50.0	63.0	71.0	91.2	105	114	112
Secondary Enrollment (in' 000)	1.4	3.9	12.1	18.3	32.3	56.9	104
Secondary Enrollment Rate %	---	7.5	15.4	18.8	29.0	42.5	63.5
University Enrollment (in'000)	.083	.140	.465	.928	1.77	3.68	5.50

Sources: Clark J. Leith, *Botswana: A Case Study of Economic Policy Prudence and Growth*, Washington DC: World Bank, 1999; Republic of Botswana, *Transitional Plan for Social Economic Development*, London: London University Press, 1960

As Table 4-1 shows, the trends however have changed since independence.

Primary school enrollment has gone from 75,000 in 1966 to 319,100 in 1995. That translates into a yearly average compound growth of 5.4%. Meanwhile, secondary school and university enrollments, from a much lower base at independence, have grown at double digits growth rates. Improvements have also occurred in other human development sectors. For example, the healthcare system fared badly when the country came under the leadership of Seretse Khama. As depicted in Table 4-2, there were only four doctors to every 100,000 people and only about 1,000 hospital beds in the country. Today, Botswana's healthcare system has considerably improved. Virtually all urban and 83% of the rural residents are within 10 miles of a primary care facility.¹⁰⁸ This has resulted in a dramatic fall in the infant mortality rate from 95 per 1000 live births in 1970

¹⁰⁸ Kwesi Dugbatey, "National Health Policies: Sub-Saharan African Case Studies 1980-1990," *Social Science and Medicine*, Vol. 49 (1999): 223-39.

to 58 in 1997.¹⁰⁹ The improvement has largely been due to leadership's policy and strategies, which since the mid-1970s have emphasized the widespread provision of primary health care.

Since 1980, the government has expanded the health care system by increasing the hiring of nurses in the primary care clinics (Table 4-2). Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, where the average is 50 nurses to every 100,000 people, Botswana has 217 nurses to every 100,000 people. Similarly, there are 24 doctors to every 100,000 people in Botswana as compared to the region's average of 11 doctors to every 100,000 people. In addition to human development, Botswana has experienced an increase in its per capita income. In 1998, the per capita income of Botswana was \$3, 070 as compared to the \$50 at the time of independence. Moreover, the country's per capita income in 1998 was six times sub-Saharan Africa's average per capita income that stood at \$500.¹¹⁰

Table 4-2
Botswana Health Care

	1966	1980	1985	1990	1994	*A/A 95
Doctors per 100,000	4	15	17	18	24	11
Nurses per 100,000	---	124	156	216	217	50
Hospital Beds (in '000)	1.00	2.0	2.5	3.2	3.3	

Sources: Clark J. Leith, *Botswana: A Case Study of Economic Policy Prudence and Growth*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999

*A/A 1995: The African Average.

¹⁰⁹ World Bank, *Development Progress Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).

¹¹⁰ World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 1997.

The above economic picture supports the testimony of many social science observers in sub-Saharan Africa who have positively evaluated Botswana's economic performance.¹¹¹ The evidence clearly shows that Botswana living conditions since independence have far surpassed those of the protectorate era. To some, the cause of Botswana's success has been attributed to the country's revenues from its mining industries.¹¹² Others have associated the economic improvement to the ethnic homogeneity of the country.¹¹³ These factors have clearly contributed to the overall development of the country, but they are not sufficient conditions to explain Botswana's achievement because the mining wealth could have been squandered, as is obvious from other countries experiences.¹¹⁴ There are countries in the region such as Nigeria, Gabon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Ghana that possess mineral endowments that are greater than those of Botswana. However, none of these countries has experienced the level of growth that Botswana has nor has any utilized its resources effectively to upgrade the living conditions of its people. By comparison, in spite of the doubling of the country's population, the real GDP of Botswana has increased about tenfold since

¹¹¹ Christopher Colclough and Stephen McCarthy, *The Political Economy of Botswana: A Study of Growth and Distribution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Charles Harvey and Stephen R. Lewis, *Policy Choice and Development Performance in Botswana* (Basingstoke, South Africa: Macmillan, 1990); J. R. Parkison, "Botswana: Adjustment to Wealth," in Chris Milner and A. J. Rayner, eds., *Policy Adjustment in Africa: Economic Studies in Economic Development*, Vol. 1 (Basingstoke, South Africa: Macmillan, 1992): 197-219.

¹¹² Stephen R. Lewis Jr., "The Potential Problems of Diamond-Dependent Development," in Charles Harvey, ed., *Papers on Economy of Botswana* (London: Macmillan, 1981): 14-28

¹¹³ Smith, *Case Studies in Economic Development*.

¹¹⁴ Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption*.

independence, and in most years the country's economic growth has been in double digits.¹¹⁵

From Botswana's political and economic achievements since its independence, it is hard to doubt the country's prosperity. But then, one may legitimately ask, how did Botswana manage to achieve this impressive growth with improvement in its human development? Just as some associate Botswana's success with its diamond revenues, others hold the conviction that the success of the country's economic growth and improvement in living conditions is associated with the country's leadership quality.¹¹⁶ It is the latter conviction that this study postulates. Towards supporting that argument, the next section focuses on some of the economic policy methodologies that Khama and his successors have used to achieve the current economic status of Botswana.

Khama's Solicitation and Utilization of Foreign Assistance

After Botswana's independence, Seretse turned his attention to the financial issues he deemed critical for his country's development. To secure more finance for his country's budget and economic development, Seretse and Quett together with a team of negotiators went to London to secure a post independence British contribution to match Bechuanaland's financial needs.¹¹⁷ Thereafter, Khama devised a strategy for future development assistance. He flew to Israel where he sought and received commitments from the Israeli government to assist Botswana with technical aid in dry-land farming and

¹¹⁵ John A. Wiseman, "The Slow Evolution of the Party System of Botswana," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3 (August 1998): 241-64.

¹¹⁶ Samatar. *An African Miracle*; Harvey and Lewis. *Policy Choice*.

water development. In addition to Great Britain and Israel, Seretse Khama solicited aid from other parts of Europe and North America.¹¹⁸

By the early 1970s, Khama's solicitation of aid and his democratic political ideology began to pay dividends. Nordic countries, the United States, Canada, and West Germany responded with multifaceted assistance. Botswana received grants, volunteers, and technical aid in such areas as healthcare, education, water, road construction, and economic development administration. The country's donors were diverse and consistent with aid, and Botswana leaders used the foreign aid strategically, with most of it going into social services. Norwegian aid was primarily channeled into healthcare and road construction, while Swedish aid was directed towards water development for people and livestock in rural areas. Aid from the United States focused on provision of primary and secondary education as well as private sector developments while aid from Great Britain was used for balance of payment adjustments.¹¹⁹ After securing financial aid, Khama and his government turned to institution building to create an environment for the effective utilization of resources toward development.

Khama's Institution Building

At independence Botswana's economy was in poor condition and needed to be resuscitated. To do that, Seretse Khama embarked on building effective institutions. Out of the many institutions he built, the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

¹¹⁷ Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

¹¹⁸ Stephen John Stedman, ed., *Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993).

(MFDP) and the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) have become hallmark institutions in Botswana's economic growth. In order to make the institutions effective and efficient, policies were designed to shield them from particularistic interventions by the group's individual members. The successors of Khama, former president Masire and, now, Festus Mogae have adhered to the same approaches to enable them to protect the collective interests of the country as opposed to personal gains.

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP)

Established in 1970, the MFDP is the institutional brain to the economic policy-making process. Its central role includes overseeing the complex development planning and Botswana's budgetary process. By maintaining the no tolerance for corruption policy, which became the theme in Seretse Khama's public speeches during his presidency, the institution thoroughly checks for corruption in all national dealings in two ways.¹²⁰ First, before any project is included in the country's development plan, sectoral ministries are obliged to justify the project's economic viability. Projects that pass the viability test are the only ones included in the annual development budget as a precaution to avoid budget deficits and corruption. Second, to avoid corruption in the MFDP itself, the institution and the government have created monitoring and auditing systems to ensure and enforce proper legitimate use of public funds.¹²¹ This has allowed the government and its leaders

¹¹⁹ Colclough and McCarthy, *The Political Economy of Botswana*.

¹²⁰ Carter and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

¹²¹ Jan Isaksen, *Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy: The Case of Botswana*, Research Report No. 59 (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of Africa Studies, 1981).

to hold all public officials accountable for abusing their office and, as such, minimized systematic corruption and excessive rent seeking in the institution.¹²²

In Botswana, the stringent practices of institutional autonomy and accountability to ensure efficiency and effectiveness are not limit to the financial sector. The leaders apply similar standards to the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC), one of the important institutions that serve the interests of the general population. It was established in 1966 as a non-profit institution to cater to the needs of livestock owners. Also operating autonomously and adhering to the policy against corruption, the BMC has become very effective and beneficial as the sole exporter of meat and it's by-products for both the *peasantry* and the dominant classes. The commission has successfully generated capitalist economic development in the livestock industry for the last three decades. It manages its financial affairs without falling into the two main traps of African parastatals: huge losses and heavy extraction of resources from producers.¹²³ The commission has increased supplier/producer prices and consistently returned bonuses to producers despite monopolistic power. For the last twenty years, the BMC's affiliate, the Ministry of Agriculture's Animal Health and Production Department, has helped the rural livestock owners by keeping the country disease-free, particularly from foot and mouth disease.¹²⁴

¹²² Kenneth Good, "Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana: A Best Case Example," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* Vol. 32, No. 3 (1994): 499-521.

¹²³ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

The achievements of both MFDP and BMC in Botswana's economy stand in sharp contrast with the general decay of African public institutions.¹²⁵ The problems of African institutions fundamentally represent the incapacity of African leaders to create institutions capable of successfully imposing a developmental agenda. These failures emanate from the leaders' inability to recognize that their collective interest requires discipline within the leadership ranks. That is, the need to protect state institutions from themselves and other interest groups. The achievements of the MFDP and the BMC demonstrate that Botswana's leaders, unlike their counterparts in other sub-Saharan African countries, do realize their social responsibility and the necessity of building effective public institutions which ensure society's common interests. In Botswana the elements responsible for this leadership success include a disciplined leadership consciousness and an efficient accountable civil service shielded from power politics.¹²⁶ Khama adopted similar precautionary measures in other policy areas, especially in monetary, trade, and mining policies.

Policies in Mining and Trade

Botswana's independence in 1966 was followed by the discovery of diamond deposits in the country. With cautious planning, Khama negotiated with private investors in the mining industry to receive a portion of the equity in the mining operation at no charge for his country. By the arrangements, he was able to extract for his nation a

¹²⁵ Zambia, Botswana's neighboring country, has some of the worst managed parastatals institutions in sub-Saharan Africa. See Kenneth Good, "Systemic Agricultural Mismanagement: The 1985 'Bumper' Harvest in Zambia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (March 1986): 257-84.

significant share of continuous mineral revenues. In addition to the distribution of the revenues from the mining operations between the nation and foreign investors, the leaders strategically bought into capturing a share of the market rents by participating in the Central Selling Organization (CSO). As a member of the cartel, this allowed Botswana to obtain long-term access to high profits in mineral rents.¹²⁷ The policy has paid off for Botswana by generating most of its national revenues from the diamond mining industry. The careful leadership planning and policies are not only directed to the mining industry but are also applied to the trade industry.

In trade, shortly after independence, Seretse Khama embarked upon export promotion to strengthen the trading position of Botswana. First, he renegotiated Botswana's trading position in favorable terms within the South African Custom Union (SACU), of which the country had been a member since 1910.¹²⁸ The renegotiated arrangement has allowed Botswana to earn more revenues as its imports grew rapidly with the growing diamond revenues.¹²⁹ Khama and his successors have utilized the regional trade association to reach other markets. The provisions of the arrangement allow members to have transit rights through other members' territories with goods for other destinations. Since Namibia's independence in 1990, the provisions have allowed Botswana to gain another route to a seaport besides those of South Africa.

¹²⁶ Leith, *Botswana: A Case Study of Economic Policy*.

¹²⁷ Harvey and Lewis, *Policy Choice*.

¹²⁸ Cathie, *Food Security*.

¹²⁹ Clark J. Leith, "The Static Welfare Effects of a Small Developing Country's Membership in Custom Union: Botswana in South African Customs Union," *World Development*, Vol. 20, No. 7 (1992): 1021-38.

On the international arena, Khama played a key role in securing market access for Botswana's beef. He personally attended the Lome Convention to arrange for his country to receive a special provision of 90 percent rebate on European Union (EU) import levy; thereby allowing Botswana to receive a net price nearly equal to the internal European price for its beef exported to the EU.¹³⁰ Even though beef exports are modest relative to diamonds, the widespread ownership of cattle allows this trade policy of Khama to have a positive effect over a large part of the population, especially farmers in the rural areas.

Botswana's Monetary Policy After Independence

Botswana's financial sector was basic in 1966 when independence was achieved. Currency in circulation was the South African *rand* and banking activities were provided by agencies, which opened a few hours a week.¹³¹ With the prospects of growing revenues from minerals, the leaders decided to issue a national currency for Botswana. In 1974, the leadership began preparation for the country's own central bank, and a new currency, the *pula*, was launched in August 1976.¹³² In establishing monetary policy to manage the licensing of financial institutions and foreign exchange reserves, Khama adopted a transparent system to regulate monetary affairs.¹³³ His administration placed monetary affairs under the joint management of the Central Bank and the Ministry of

¹³⁰ Clark, J. Leith, "Botswana's International Trade Policies," in J. S. Salkin, ed., *Aspects of the Economy of Botswana: Selected Papers*, 527-548 (Oxford: James Curry, 1997).

¹³¹ H. C. L. Hermans, "The History of the Bank of Botswana," *Bank of Botswana Research Bulletin*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1996): 1-48.

¹³² Hudson, "The Establishment of Botswana's Central Bank.

¹³³ Republic of Botswana, *A Monetary System for Botswana: Government White Paper, Government Paper No.1* (March 1975).

Finance and Development as a strategy to check government fraud and to prevent any potential corruption.¹³⁴

In 1982, due to high influx of revenues from newly discovered mining centers, the country accumulated a substantial balance of payments surplus. To prevent inflation the leadership, under president Quett Masire, refrained from unnecessary expenditures and devised new ways to put Botswana's money to effective use. The leaders did two things in this regard. First, operating on a fixed exchange rate, the government set the country's rate of exchange level below what would have been indicated by the equilibrium flow.¹³⁵ Masire's policy allowed Botswana to deliberately avoid "Dutch Disease," a well known economic problem caused when a strong currency undermines exports. Second, the government devised a strategy, with the World Bank's cooperation, to invest its excess foreign reserves to earn more revenues for the country.¹³⁶ President Masire turned his nation's excess foreign reserves into an income earning property for their country. Today, the use of excess foreign reserves to generate income has become second only to the diamond industry as an income generating instrument for Botswana.¹³⁷

Since independence, Botswana's leaders have strategically devised three major revenues sources to fund social developments. The first one relates to the mining industry, which since independence has consistently generated high revenues for the

¹³⁴ Herman, "The History of the Bank of Botswana."

¹³⁵ Clark J. Leith, "Botswana's Exchange Rate Policy," *Bank of Botswana Research Bulletin*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (September 1996): 21-35.

¹³⁶ Lina K. Mohohlo, "Central Bank as a Protector of National Wealth: Botswana's Case," in J. S. Salkin, ed., *Aspect of the Economy of Botswana: Selected Papers*, 241-271 (Oxford: James Curry, 1997).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

country. The second one is the renegotiated of the customs union arrangements in conjunction with trade arrangements with the EU, which also continue to generate revenues for the country. The third is the strategy devised by the leaders to use excess foreign reserves to generate more revenues. Botswana's leaders have managed to channel most of the revenues towards improving basic living conditions.

Large portions of the revenues spent by the government have gone into basic infrastructure, including electricity, water, roads, and government services to the mining and agriculture sectors. These expenditures have been growth promoting, because without such infrastructure and service very little growth would have occurred. The ongoing success of the country's economic improvements has been mostly due to the quality of the country's leadership.

DOES BOTSWANA'S ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT MEAN DEVELOPMENT?

If the definition of development means the reduction of poverty,¹³⁸ then the argument can be made that Botswana is on the right track. However, if development is defined, as the acquisition of the ability to produce diverse goods and services to satisfy the population's needs, then Botswana, like many other African nations, has not been successful. The nation does not produce most of its industrial needs. The reason for this deficiency is because Botswana lacks the technological industrial capacity needed to manufacture its own industrial goods. In economic terms, it does not have the

¹³⁸ George Akeya Agbango, ed., *Issues and Trends in Contemporary African Politics: Stability, Development and Democratization* (NY: Peter Lang, 1997).

comparative advantage in industrial production due to a lack of scientific culture in creation.

This deficiency is obvious by looking at its production sectors. Despite the country's accomplishments in economic growth, a careful observation reveals that the structure of its economy is dominated by mining and service sectors. Those two areas have grown considerably since independence. As Table 4-3 shows, the mining industry, which was at only an exploratory stage during independence, grew to 31.6% of the national GDP in a decade. By 1986, due to more discoveries of mining centers, the sector constituted more than half of the country's GDP. As of 1998, mining was still commanding 48.0% of the national economy. Simultaneously, the service industry reached a high of 50.5% of GDP in 1996 and declined slightly to 48.6% in 1997. Conversely, the agriculture sector has continuously declined from 25% of GDP in 1976 to 3.40% in 1997. Similarly, the manufacturing sector of the country that was 6.8% in 1976 has also consistently declined throughout the years to 4.7% of GDP in 1997.

The inference here is that Botswana's economy lacks growth in its industrial sector; hence, the dwindling of its industrial production sector in the overall economy. This suggests that while the leaders have been effective in devising monetary and trade policies, they have failed in other important areas. Despite their high moral convictions that have helped to improve living conditions for the people, they have failed to devise a coherent progressive policy towards establishing scientific culture; a culture that is needed to help gravitate the nation towards industrial creativity and ultimately induce industrialization.

Table 4-3
The Structure of Botswana National Economy 1976-97

% of Gross Domestic Product	1976	1986	1996	1997
Agriculture	25.0	5.5	3.8	3.4
Mining Industry	31.6	58.3	45.7	48.0
Industrial Manufacturing	6.8	5.1	4.7	4.7
Service	43.5	36.2	50.5	48.6
Private Consumption	60.9	37.3	30.0	28.4
General Govt. Consumption	18.2	22.0	28.2	26.8
Imports of Goods & Service	62.4	47.3	35.3	37.5

Sources. World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998).

Botswana's Scientific Culture

As Table 4-3 shows, the size of the country's industrial production signals that there is very little scientific culture in Botswana. By all accounts, basic science and intermediate science courses are part of the country's school curriculum up to the university level.¹³⁹ However, the leaders have failed to synergistically integrate scientific education and industry.¹⁴⁰ In this case, Botswana, just like the rest of sub-Saharan African countries, has no definite scientific policy that attempts to establish long-term scientific culture towards industrialization. The industrial related technology that is being pursued in Botswana is small scale technology known in many African countries as **Appropriate**

¹³⁹ Carr, "Intermediate Technology in Botswana."

¹⁴⁰ Ahmad, "Science and Technology."

Technology (AT).¹⁴¹ AT focuses on devising technologies that are deemed suitable and applicable to rural food production and processing. From a development perspective, the major problem with AT is that it is more labor intensive and less technologically oriented, and therefore lacks the potential to assist in developing the culture needed for Botswana's industrial development.¹⁴² For that matter, Botswana cannot claim that adopting AT will propel it towards scientific culture capable of industrialization and ultimately assist it in attaining sustainable economic development.¹⁴³

In other words, Botswana lacks adequate national policies aimed at establishing scientific culture of creation suitable for industrialization and sustainable economic development as defined in chapter three. For this reason, and despite its high moral code of ethics that minimizes corruption, Botswana is not yet developed. What Botswana's leadership, however, has done is to distribute social services to benefit its citizens by using the revenue from its depleting natural resources endowments. This they have been able to do because, as the improvement of the country shows, the leadership has fostered one of the two aspects of the prerequisite cultural elements of development mentioned in chapter three, namely, moral culture. The evidence shows the veracity of this occurrence because corruption is low in the country, and the leadership has been altruistic to provide social services to the population.¹⁴⁴ In comparison with other sub-Saharan African

¹⁴¹ Aaron Segal, "Appropriate Technology: The African Experience," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, Vol. 27, Nos. 1-2 (1992): 124-33.

¹⁴² Francis Stewart, ed., *Macro Policies for Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries* (Boulder: Westview, 1987).

¹⁴³ R. S. Eckaus, "Appropriate Technology: The Movement Has on A Few Clothes On," *Issues in Science and Technology*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Winter 1987): 62-71.

¹⁴⁴ Good, "Corruption and Mismanagement in Botswana."

countries, as the human development indicators have shown in this case study, the leaders have devised effective policies to improve the living conditions of their citizens.

SUMMARY

This chapter has shown that the precolonial Botswana leaders organized their societies based on the political rule of an inherited hierarchical system underpinned by a patron client economic system.¹⁴⁵ In those days, the leaders established a well-entrenched political and economic apparatus that served the mutual interests of both the ruled and the rulers. Economically, production in Botswana at the time was mostly agrarian, and the elite and leaders controlled the distribution of land and owned most of the cattle that were used for both production and consumption. Through their cattle loaning (*mafisa*) system, the political leadership was able to establish a social fiduciary relationship that supported and maintained social stability.

The social system was maintained by inducting young people into the social strata by age regimentation. The process instilled a sense of group unity among the Tswana youth by acting as a catalyst to create unanimity among Batswana by erasing tribal differences.¹⁴⁶ That social methodology, created by the precolonial leaders, facilitated the creation of a Tswana-dom that crystallized in the ethnic homogeneity founded in Botswana today.¹⁴⁷ In precolonial days, social matters concerning the whole community were democratically deliberated in traditional wards (*kgolta*). In times of security crisis,

¹⁴⁵ Parson. *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

¹⁴⁶ Tlou, "A Political History of Northwestern Botswana."

leaders like Khama the Great rallied other traditional chiefs to form military alliance to repel attackers from their territories. By these organizational strategies, political and economic issues were managed by leaders to serve the welfare of their communities and to facilitate social development.

In the mid 1800s, the migration of the Afrikaner Boers into the interior of Africa brought them into conflict with the Tswana nations. The Tswana sought an alliance with the British government that later turned into a protectorate agreement. Politically, the protectorate was underlined by a parallel rule that allowed the protectorate administration and traditional rule to exist simultaneously, but mutually exclusive from each other. The arrangement obliged the British to recognize the traditional leadership as autonomous authorities without impinging on their legitimacy to rule. The arrangement also made the British government treat the Bechuanaland protectorate as part of the Dominions. The association of Bechuanaland with the Dominions allowed the territories to remain autonomous with their indigenous internal political institutions and its leadership with less foreign institutional influence. This characteristic made Botswana's colonization different from other African colonies that experienced both direct and indirect foreign institutional colonial controls that came with leadership different from what existed prior to colonization.¹⁴⁸

When the British attempted to change the protectorate arrangement of Botswana by replacing it with direct colonial rule, the traditional leaders resisted the change and

¹⁴⁷ Smith, *Case Studies in Economic Development*.

¹⁴⁸ Michael Crowder, *West Africa Under Colonial Rule* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968); Gocking, "Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."

preserved their legitimacy. Tshekedi Khama, the traditional leader of the Bangwato at the time, took the High Commissioner to court to stop it from imposing outright colonization on Botswana. In addition to his efforts against the British, Tshekedi successfully used the United Nations to prevent South African from annexing the High Commissioner's territories of which Botswana was part. By Tshekedi's relentless efforts, traditional leaders consciously averted Britain's colonization and South Africa's annexation attempts. The leaders efforts preserved Botswana's domestic institutions with their legitimacy without creating polarization among its social elements. This legacy has played a crucial role in Botswana's political and economic development. Despite colonial leaders' political accomplishments, they were unable to transform Botswana's economy to benefit their people materially. The territories were turned into labor reserves to serve capitalist interests in South African mines. At independence, Botswana was plagued with high unemployment and with a very poor economy.

As the new leader of independent Botswana, Seretse Khama emphasized and strengthened the culture of self-reliance and internal discipline. He stressed the importance of democracy in decision-making through a combination of traditional and modern institutions and designed the actions of his government to promote such attitudes. Khama emphasized moral principles that avoided corrupt attitudes among leaders and brought about economic growth and prosperity for his people. In search of benign paths towards economic growth, he began modernization by grafting institutions such as the MFDP and BMC on roots of traditional moral values under the principles of *kagisano*: unity, harmony, and sense of community. He did that by emphasizing rural development

and human development by providing clean water, education and health facilities for his people.

Today, with effective governance and little corruption, Botswana's per income capita stands above \$3000. Leaders since the death of Khama in 1980, such as former president Quett Masire and current president Festus Mogae, have followed the moral culture laid by Khama. Both leaders have taken actions and made policies that meet the needs of their people in villages. Improvements have been done to develop cattle raising by providing grazing land for the poor. However, these actions by no means suggest Botswana has solved its development problems.

Botswana's economy still remains agrarian with most of its revenues coming from raw materials in the mining industry. There is hardly any industrialization in Botswana due to lack of scientific culture to empower creativity and technological innovations. Unfortunately, the leaders have failed to design policies that could establish the scientific culture needed to make sustainable economic development possible. However, in comparing both economic and political standards in Botswana with other countries in the region, Botswana leaders have made great progress in laying a moral cultural foundation upon which development can flourish.

The development of Botswana has undergone three leadership phases, with each phase adding some progressive dimension to it. The first phase was led by Khama the Great, who laid the foundation for ethnic homogeneity by bringing different tribes together under the Tswana-dom. Khama sought British protection against Afrikaner Boers who attempted to overtake the Tswana territories. In 1895, he led a delegation of

chiefs to London to oppose the annexation of their land by Cecil Rhodes of South Africa in order to protect the freedom of his people and their land.

Tshekedi Khama led the second phase during the 'colonial' era. During that time, Tshekedi successfully resisted the British attempt to impose outright colonization and preserved the established leaders legitimacy. The preservation of that legitimacy provided the foundation upon which political stability has been provided for Botswana's contemporary development. The third, and the current phase, also began under the tutelage of Seretse Khama. It started at the dawn of Botswana's independence and it is still unfolding. Seretse started the third phase by politically doing two things. First he united the chiefs and the commoners by transforming the individual tribal councils and their territories into the nation of Botswana. Second, he transformed the country's rule of inherited hierarchical system to an open democratic system.

Economically, Seretse transformed the previous production system that used to be based on patron-client relations into one based on the class relations of capitalism. In order to achieve a political stability, he transformed the traditional aristocrats into elements of petty bourgeoisie. Knowing that economic development was the ultimate goal that his people were seeking, he fostered an anti-corruption culture and built autonomous, but accountable, institutions catering to collective interests. His personal distaste for corruption prevented leadership kleptocracy, thereby enabling the nation to channel available revenues from the mining industry into social services (e.g., education, healthcare, and clean water) to improve the welfare of his people.

Before Khama's death in July 1980, he had laid a moral foundation that has become a guiding principle for his successors. The immediate successors of Khama,

Quett Masire and the current successor, Festus Mogae have adhered to democratic principles, promoted intolerance for corruption, and sought bureaucratic efficiency in serving the people of their country. No one knows for sure how and where the third phase will end. For now, however, Botswana is an example in sub-Saharan Africa. The country's experience demonstrates how leadership and moral quality are central for social and economic progress.

CHAPTER V

LEADERSHIP AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF GHANA

Modern day Ghana occupies a land that used to be controlled by the Ashanti Empire. However, until the emergence of that Empire, the area was occupied by different nation-states such as the Fanti, Denkyira, and Dagomba. The nations had two types of leadership namely Chieftaincy and Kingship. Chiefs headed tribal groups, and the Kings headed hegemonic nations. Each of the leaderships organized their societies based on their own set of rules and institutions. The communities were agrarian societies, which also engaged in commerce. Moreover, the global capitalist economy affected them before they were colonized in the late nineteenth century. Before the colonization, however, the leaders failed to collectively organize their societies. Instead, they led their individual states and waged wars against one another for political and economic control.¹

Following colonization, the British put the nations together and named it the Gold Coast. Thereafter, the British demoralized the traditional leaders, disenfranchising them from the political economic decision-making process. In the mid twentieth century, nationalist movements emerged to demand self-rule. In 1947, nationalists such as Joseph B. Danquah and others organized UGCC toward the objective of nationalization. The Gold Coast attained independence in 1957 under the leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, a Ghanaian who had studied in the United States during the depression years.² In 1966,

¹ Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

² Kwame Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957).

military officers, led by Lieutenant-General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel A. A. Afrifa, toppled in a bloody coup the elected government of Nkrumah. Between 1966 and 1981, Ghana alternated from one military regime to another, which included intermittent civilian leadership. This turmoil of political corruption and poor economic policies ruined the country's economy. Today, Ghana is considered one of the poorest countries in the world.

When Ghana attained independence in 1957, the nation was the envy of its neighbors. Though its economy was predominantly agrarian, it had foreign exchange reserves in excess of US \$300 million.³ The country was self-sufficient in food supply and food imports had a negligible trade impact.⁴ Many African experts were optimistic about Ghana's future development.⁵ Undoubtedly, judging from Ghana's economic position and its educated class at the time, there was no cause for alarm in terms of its future prosperity. It was the leading world producer of cocoa, which was commanding high prices on world market. The nation's mining of gold and diamonds was not the highest in the world, but both had good prospects. In addition, the forestry industry provided some of the best wood in West Africa, together with the human potential that was waiting to be tapped.

Ghana's current economic status has proven that the optimists overlooked the role of leadership's ability in establishing the appropriate culture to induce economic development. Since Ghana's independence, its leaders have taken the economic

³ Dickson A. Yeboah, "Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana," *Applied Economics*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (June 1985): 395-419.

⁴ *Gold Coast Annual Reports 1892-1954* (NY: Andronic, 1972).

development of their country hostage by failing to establish a domestic culture that is conducive to development. As the first national leader, Nkrumah failed to forge an alliance between party officials and traditional leaders to create the needed political stability upon which economic development could thrive.⁶

From the beginning of his leadership, Nkrumah avoided democratic dialogue. He adopted instead a means of establishing a national stability through the legislative Preventive Detention Act. In addition, he failed to establish high moral principles to avoid corruption, allowing his party officials to use state economic institutions to satisfy their personal interests as opposed to fulfilling collective national interests.⁷ In search of economic development, Nkrumah failed to transform the traditional system into a democratic capitalistic system, which values the force of self-motivation that unleashes human creativity vital to economic development. Instead, he innovatively modified the socialist economic system, which he thought was more closely reflective of traits of the African culture and which could have been operable in Ghana.⁸ This path, however, stagnated the national economy. For failing to institute a combination of capitalism with high moral standards, Nkrumah legitimized corruption and it was intensified by his successors, thus thwarting Ghana's economic development. The legislative preventive act also laid the foundation for an authoritarian political culture that his successors from the

⁵ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

⁶ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

⁷ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁸ Yuri Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah* (NY: International Publisher, 1987).

military leadership and civilians leadership modeled and effectively used to undermine both political and economic developments.

In 1966, Nkrumah was overthrown in a military coup. Successive leaders adopted both cultures of corruption and authoritarianism that have become the hallmarks of development in Ghana. Both cultures together created the recipe for Ghana's poor economic experience over the last 43 years. In 1981, Rawlings' military leadership took over power and added a culture of political violence. For twenty years, he remained in power legitimizing this type of malignant culture. The successive Ghanaian leaders after Nkrumah not only adopted negative cultures of development, but also abandoned all industrial projects that had earlier been initiated by Nkrumah. The collective achievements of these leaders, through the cultures they have created and legitimized, are amplified in Ghana's underdevelopment and the poverty of its people.

This chapter focuses on the role of leadership in Ghana's economic development. It is divided into three sections, with the first dealing with the leadership in precolonial Ghana. This section attempts to show how those leaders organized their societies towards social development until colonization was imposed. It also sheds some light on how colonization was imposed. The second section looks at colonial leaders and explains how colonization in Ghana was different from a protectorate in administrative terms. It also looks at the economic development in the colony under the leadership of Governor Frederick Guggisberg and leadership of Ofori Atta, a traditional leader. The third section, then, examines postcolonial leaders and the cultures they have established to the detriment of Ghana's economic development. This section itself is sub-divided into three, with the first covering Ghana's development under the tutelage of its first President,

Nkrumah. The second looks at what I term the *interlude leadership era*. It covers the years from 1966 to 1981, when the leadership vacillated between military dictatorships and civilian politicians until the second coming of Rawlings. Within this discussion, the hypothesis of this chapter states that even though the nation of Ghana is endowed with mineral resources and human potential, national leaders have failed to establish the appropriate political and economic environments to channel the resources into positive development to the benefit the of Ghanaian public.

PRECOLONIAL GHANA AND ITS POLITICAL ECONOMY

Modern day Ghana was once occupied by various small nations of Fanti, Denkyira, Dagomba, and other tribes until the emergency of the Ashanti Empire in the seventeenth century.⁹ Politically, there were two kinds of leadership in precolonial Ghana. The first kind was chieftaincy. Chiefs, with their administrative and judicial systems that headed tribal groupings, formed the top of the chieftaincies. The second type of leadership was the kingship. At the top of that system was the king. He headed an imperial system of a hegemonic nation, similar to that of the Ashanti Empire during the precolonial era.¹⁰ Many of the tribal nations' leadership systems were hierarchically organized with succession following inheritance of different lineages. The Dagombas followed paternal inheritance, while the Ashantis followed maternal inheritance. The leaders administered the operations of their communities with the assistance of three

⁹ The best narration of the groups that constituted precolonial Ghana is contained in Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

¹⁰ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

different institutions. These were, the Privy Council, Council of Elders, and Village Assembly of Commoners.¹¹

The Ashanti Empire was created under the leadership of Osei Tutu. However, it was other leaders such as Opoku Ware and Osei Bonsu who turned the nation into an empire by militarily conquering other nations.¹² The central government of the empire was in the hands of a Union Council, which was guided by the Ashanti constitution and headed by the King of Ashanti. Even though the Ashanti political system was effective from the beginning, it later became ineffective due to the expansion of the empire. Incorporation was, therefore, kept to a minimum, allowing autonomy for conquered nations under the imperial rule.¹³ The problem with the Ashanti political machinery, however, was that conquered people did not identify their corporate interests with the one of the empire. This indifference caused the Ashanti Empire to suffer a series of internal revolts. Consequently, rising instabilities prevented social transformation and the crystallization of the conquered nations into a homogenous society. In other words, the Ashanti leaders' method of building society through military conquest, as opposed to consociational democratic approach, had an inherent instability that prevented social homogeneity in precolonial Ghana.¹⁴

Economically, the nations were agrarian societies that also engaged in commerce. The means of production were mainly land. For that reason, leaders supervised the access

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

¹³ David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955).

¹⁴ Ibid.

to land to ensure that those who wanted to farm were not denied that opportunity. Leaders used their supervisory role to bind to them those on whom they depended for political support.¹⁵ However, the leaders did not monopolize the means of production and hardly extracted tributes from citizens except on a volunteer basis in the form of gifts. The general cultural sentiment of leaders avoided placing restrictions on individual economic activity because they perceived intervention as producing an economic welfare burden on the entire society. In that regards, the leadership created the necessary cultural conditions for their citizens to engage in progressive economic activities.¹⁶

In commerce, precolonial Ghana consisted of great trading nations and was rich in natural resources such as gold, ivory, and spices. On the southern shores, the nations engaged in international commerce with agents of various European nations.¹⁷ All the nations regarded the trade with Europeans as important because it was seen as a means to procure guns that enabled them to embark on political and economic expansion.¹⁸ The competition for access to trade directly with Europeans made the Ghanaian leaders shortsighted and selfish, thus preventing them from rallying themselves into a unified and homogenous society for mutual social benefits. The myopic leadership in precolonial Ghana enhanced tribal divisions that, in turn, prevented political and social cohesion prior to the colonial tribal demarcation at the colonial epoch. In other words, precolonial Ghana

¹⁵ Wickins, *An Economic History of Africa*.

¹⁶ M. J. Fields, *Social Organization of The Ga People* (Accra, Gold Coast: Government of Gold Coast Printing Press, 1940).

¹⁷ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

¹⁸ W. E. F. Ward, *A History of the Gold Coast* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1948).

did not become a *social melting pot* like the United States, even though the federal characteristics of the Ashanti constitution were comparable to that of the United States.¹⁹

Despite civil wars and the lack of able leadership to construct a homogenous society, corruption among leaders was eschewed by institutional arrangements in precolonial societies. For example, chiefs in Ashanti were prohibited by law to meet with any foreigner without a member from the council of elders. Such a traditional injunction was intended to enhance the sanctity of the leadership and also check the misuses of power. Violations resulted in immediate removal from office.²⁰ Apart from the leadership's inability to form a homogenous society, the nations were free of corruption and leaders maintained economic and political stability to ensure social welfare until colonization.

Was Ghana Colonized?

As previously defined in chapter four, colonization is an arbitrary imposition of rule and authority by a stronger nation over a weaker one, with the intention of the ruler to economically exploit the ruled. During such imposition, the ruler sets the laws and regulations of the weaker nation to the advantage of the strong and to the disadvantage of the weak.²¹ Was this what happened in precolonial Ghana? The competition for trading with the Europeans formed the primary cause of the tribal fighting in Ghana. The internal domestic tribal wars left the nations to defend themselves against each other.

¹⁹ For a brief review of the Ashanti Constitution see Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

²⁰ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

²¹ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

Consequently, they became collectively vulnerable to outside influences. For that reason, the Fantis at the coast affiliated themselves with the European traders as a shield against the Ashanti because of the European's firepower.

Part of the trade between the nations and the Europeans was in the slave trade, which was taking place clandestinely despite the fact that it was outlawed in 1807.²² In the first half of nineteenth century, the British government's dissatisfaction with the company of merchants' inability to prevent the slave trade in conjunction with the killing of Charles MaCarthy by the Ashantis led the British to withdraw the company's charter and to contemplate abandoning the Gold Coast.²³ The British Merchant Companies, on the other hand, found the business there valuable and, in 1830, sent George MacLean to take care of their forts at the coast. He was given limited jurisdiction and was restricted to the narrowly prescribed area of the settlements only. It was under MacLean's jurisdiction that the first real social and political impact of Western institutions made themselves felt on the coastal people.²⁴ Through his own personal honesty, MacLean gained an esteemed local reputation as a judge, a reputation that went beyond his official duties at the forts.²⁵ The Fanti chiefs brought their disputes to MacLean to settle whenever there was one among the chiefs. Though his position was unofficial, the chiefs accepted his adjudication without question. It was within this judicial sphere of influence that MacLean affected

²² Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

²⁵ J. D. Fage "The Administration of George MacLean on the Gold Coast, 1830-44," *Gold Coast and Togoland Historical Society*, Vol. 1, Part 4 (1947): 22-35.

later policies of British rule in the Gold Coast. In 1842, after MacLean had established peace between the Fantis and Ashantis and commercial activities were flourishing, a committee in England recommended that the control of the Gold Coast be reverted back to the Crown and that the government recognize the informal method of jurisdiction that MacLean had established.²⁶

MacLean's system had no legal foundation but had arisen only out of necessity. It was given legitimacy and a formal recognition by the British government in 1843. In that year, in an effort to clarify the relations between the English and the Fantis, an agreement document known as the Bond of 1844 was signed by both parties.²⁷ The agreement contained a vague acknowledgment on the part of the Fanti chiefs of transfer of jurisdictional power to the British. This concord stated:

1. Whereas power and jurisdiction have been exercised for and on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland, within divers countries and places adjacent to Her Majesty's forts and settlements on the Gold Coast; we, chiefs of countries and places so referred to, and adjacent to the said forts and settlements, do hereby acknowledge that power and jurisdiction, and declare that the first objects of law are the protection of individuals and property.
2. Human sacrifices, and other barbarous customs, such as panyarring, are abominations, and contrary to law.
3. Murders, robberies, and other crimes and offenses, will be tried and inquired of before the queen's judicial officers and the chiefs of the districts, modeling the customs of the country to the general principles of British laws.²⁸

²⁶ Ward, *A History of the Gold Coast*.

²⁷ Joseph. B. Danquah, "The Historical Significance of The Bond of 1844," *Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana*, Vol. 3 (1957): 1-15.

²⁸ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*, 33-34.

This above document sold the soul and sweat of the Gold Coast people into colonization. The agreement coerced the coastal chiefs to abdicate their legitimacy and authority to rule their territories and transfer those to the British government. The last section of paragraph 3 of the Bond became the cornerstone of the colonization effort because it de-legitimized the authority of the chiefs by setting aside their guidelines of ruling embedded in traditional institutions. Second, “molding the customs of the country to the general principles of British laws in the Bond became the central piece of the British political objective of the Gold Coast.”²⁹ Though no protectorate was proclaimed, nor was there any mention of a territorial cession in the document, the British took the Bond agreement as a point of departure to unilaterally impose colonization on the coastal areas. Though the Fantis might have been looking for protection against the Ashantis, they did not have a mutual agreement with the British based on those facts. In that context, the arbitrary imposition of the British rule on the coastal people constituted colonization rather than protection.³⁰ Even if the implied protective argument is invoked and accepted under that pretext, it would be hard to see how the Bond of 1844, due to the parties involved, could have been applied to the Ashanti and the Northern regions in the Gold Coast. This second condition substantiates the fact that the British rule in Gold Coast was arbitrarily imposed and therefore constituted colonization.

²⁹ Gocking, “British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony.”

³⁰ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

The Three Phases of Gold Coast Colonization

The colonization of precolonial Ghana by the British has always been treated as a one-day event that was not well planned.³¹ This view of the former Gold Coast is misleading because the region was not under a political structure that could have made one-step colonization possible.³² The colonization of Ghana was gradual and took three phases. The first phase was achieved with the Bond of 1844, by which the coastal leaders were coerced into abdicating their inherited thrones to transfer their legitimate powers to the Queen of England.³³ The second phase of the British colonization of the Gold Coast was the annexation of the Ashanti province.

The years preceding the annexation of the Ashanti province were filled with many events making British control of the Ashanti desirable. Those events can be traced back to 1807 when the Ashantis conquered the Fantis, demolished one of the British forts, and forced them to pay rent on the coastal land they occupied. Since that time the military superiority of the Ashanti became a dilemma for the British and the desire to do something about it became apparent.³⁴ In 1872, the transfer of Elimina forts from the Dutch to the British incensed the Ashantis. That anger, in conjunction with other political incidents, led to an outbreak of another war, the sixth one, between the Ashantis and the British and its allies on the coast. This time, the British decided to settle the matter for good. In 1874, the British brought in troops from England with new technological

³¹ Donald Ray, *Ghana: Politics, Economics, and Society* (London: Fances Pinter, 1986).

³² Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

³³ Danquah, "The Historical Significance of The Bond of 1844."

³⁴ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition; Fynn, Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

fighting weapons. The contingent marched to Kumasi, the Ashanti capital, and defeated the Ashantis and left the capital in flames. The war ended with the treaty of Fomena, which urged the Asantehene to renounce his suzerainty over the states that the Ashantis had previously recognized in the MacLean Treaty of 1831.³⁵

In 1895, due to the British suspicion of France's possible encroachment from the East, and German advancement from the West, they urged the Asantehene, Osei Prempeh, to accept protection. Besides the demand for his submission, which Prempeh refused, the British requested an immediate payment of an overdue indemnity of 50,000 ounces of gold. Confronted with the demand to pay such a huge sum of money and the possible demise of his kingdom, Prempeh reluctantly accepted protection but refused to pay the money. As a punishment for refusing to pay, the British exiled him to the island of the Seychelles.³⁶

The deportation caused an outrage among the Ashantis and led to the Yaa Asantewaa war against the British in 1896, which the Ashantis lost.³⁷ Following the war, the British annexed the Ashanti Territory to the Crown colony in January 1902.³⁸ The annexation of Ashanti marked the second phase of the British colonization of the Gold Coast. Simultaneously, with the Ashanti annexation, the British declared a protectorate over the Northern territories and subsequently annexed the region. The annexation of the

³⁵ Ward, *A History of the Gold Coast*.

³⁶ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

³⁷ The Ashanti war of 1896 is often referred to as the Yaa Asantewaa War. Yaa Asantewaa was a Queen Mother of an Ashanti Town call Ejisu, located 12 miles from Kumasi.

³⁸ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in The Third World*.

Northern Territories marked the third phase of the British colonization of the Gold Coast.³⁹ The opening of the twentieth century, therefore, found precolonial Ghana completely colonized and divided into three divisions consisting of two colonies and one protectorate.

British Colonization of Ghana and its Administration

The colonization of precolonial Ghana can be attributed to global changes. At the time, industrial competition made the need for global markets, raw material, and investment opportunities imperative for the British. That political economic euphoria led the British to identify new interests in colonial expansion and contributed to their desire to colonize the Gold Coast.⁴⁰ Therefore, the British decision to remain in precolonial Ghana and eventually annex it as a colony is found in the commercial interests at home.

The British ruled the Gold Coast with a mixture of direct rule by a central government and indirect rule. Under the system, a governor, assisted by an executive and legislative councils and staff of political and technical officials, administered the colony.⁴¹ Once the administrative apparatus was in place, traditional leaders were subjugated by a deliberate strategic approach through which the colonizer de-legitimized the traditional institutions. For example, in the Ashanti province, the leadership was completely demoralized by literally deporting king Prempeh to the Seychelles Island. After the deportation of Prempeh, the Ashanti region was put under the administration of

³⁹ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

a British chief commissioner Sir Francis Fuller. He immediately dismantled whatever institutional and leadership power was left in the Ashanti confederacy. Even in the traditional courts where a few traditional subjugated leaders were allowed to adjudicate trivial civil cases, British laws were in competition with traditional laws.⁴²

Similarly, in the coastal areas where colonization had been imposed since 1850, the traditional judiciary system was replaced by the British judiciary system.⁴³ This delegitimization of traditional institutions continued as a means of taking local power away from local leaders. In 1883, for example, a Native Tribunal Ordinance was passed with no provision for traditional leaders to enforce their decisions when rendered. That systematic elimination of the traditional leaderships' power and the implementation of the British judiciary system in the Gold Coast are key differences between the colonization in the Gold Coast and that of the protectorate system where local institutions were allowed to operate without being subverted.⁴⁴

COLONIAL LEADERSHIP AND THE GOLD COAST ECONOMY

There were two groups of leaders in the colony, those who came from Britain and traditional leaders whose power had been appropriated. Before examining these two groups, it is important to consider the structure of the colonial economy. The precolonial economy

⁴¹ A detailed description of the Gold Coast's government is given by Sir Frederick Lugard in *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (London: Oxford University Press 1922).

⁴² Gocking, "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."

⁴³ David A. Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana: The Rise of Gold Coast Nationalism, 1850-1928* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963).

⁴⁴ Gocking, "British Justice and the Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony"; Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

was transformed from the predominance of the slave trade and forest commodities, such as palm and rubber, to that of cocoa beans, gold, diamond, manganese, and timber. By 1911, gold and cocoa constituted 76% of exports of the Gold Coast as compared to 12% in 1901.⁴⁵ Between 1946 and 1947, revenues from the crops quadrupled from 9.5 million to 41 million British pounds sterling.⁴⁶ As far as economic infrastructure is concerned, there was complete railway service from the coastal town of Sekondi to Kumasi between 1919 and 1929, with extended branch lines from Tarkwa to Prestea. During the same period, another railway service was completed to link Accra, the national capital, to Kumasi through Nsawam.⁴⁷ In addition to the railroad tracks, 4,578 miles of new roads were constructed. Moreover, a harbor was completed at Takoradi to improve shipment of goods in and out of the colony. The colonial development projects also included communication, medical, and education facilities, with the first university being established in 1948.⁴⁸

Leadership of Governor Frederick Guggisberg 1919-1927

Sir Gordon Guggisberg arrived in the Gold Coast in 1919. He was familiar with the region. For a few months in 1914 he worked as a director of public works in the Gold Coast. During that time, he became convinced that it was only the lack of opportunity that

⁴⁵ Dennis Austin, *Politics in Ghana* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964).

⁴⁶ Francis K. Danquah, "Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana: 1945-51," *Agricultural History*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Winter 1994): 1-19.

⁴⁷ Frederick Guggisberg, *The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events of 1920-1926 and the Prospects of the 1927-1928* (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Printing Press, 1927).

⁴⁸ Kwame Arhin, "In Search for Constitutional Chieftaincy," in Kwame Arhin, ed., *The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah*, 27-52 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press., 1993).

prevented Africans from reaching an intellectual development comparable to that of the Europeans.⁴⁹ With this spirit and conviction, Guggisberg was happy to be back in order to help the people of Gold Coast develop their society. The first economic project involved developing a scheme to improve and extend the Gold Coast's national transportation system that would expedite the shipment of the colony's agricultural products to the world market. Guggisberg started with railroad construction. By 1927, he had laid 233 miles of railroad tracks out of the 250 miles that were surveyed.⁵⁰

In spite of the governor's disbelief in the development of the automobile industry at the time and, therefore, a disinterest in constructing motor roads, he built nearly 3,378 miles of new roads and reconditioned 1,310 miles.⁵¹ Some of them were tarred with macadam making the colony's motor roads the best in British tropical Africa.⁵² To reach the world market, the governor proceeded to construct a harbor in 1921 at Takoradi, which began commercial operations in 1928. At its completion, the harbor contained wharves for cocoa, timber, and manganese exports, including sufficient storage and loading space. Besides those facilities, the harbor had a petroleum berth equipped with pipelines from ships to tanks located two and half miles inland.⁵³ Guggisberg's Development Plan included extended communication facilities that increased both

⁴⁹ Baron Sydney Olivrer, *Dictionary of National Biography: 1922-1930* (London: Muller, 1937).

⁵⁰ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁵¹ Olivrer, *Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁵² Rita Hiden, *Plan For Africa: A Report Prepared for the Colonial Bureau of the Fabian Society*, (NY: Oxford University Press, 1942): 149-55.

⁵³ Frankel S. Herbert, *Capital Investment In Africa: Its Course and Effects* (NY: NY University Press, 1938).

telephone and telegraph service. The governor's economic infrastructure was topped off with provisions for medical and educational services for human development.

In education, the governor appointed a committee to study the educational situation in the Gold Coast. The committee submitted to him a report that recommended a method by which the colony's schools could be improved similar to those, which have been successfully established at Tuskegee and other institutions in the United States.⁵⁴ Using this report, Guggisberg drew guidelines for his officials to improve education in the colony. The guidelines emphasized the importance of teacher training, well-staffed and equipped secondary schools, equal opportunity for boys and girls, and above all an absolute necessity for character training so that the Gold Coast people could develop personal worth and leadership potential.⁵⁵ Compared to the *laissez-faire* atmosphere of the nineteenth century when the missionaries provided little educational opportunities to the local people, education had increased in the Gold Coast by the end of the first half of the twentieth century. One outstanding success of the governor's education plan was the Prince of Wales College at Achimota. It became one of the best schools in modern Ghana. Guggisberg financed most of the projects with loans and surplus money generated by the economic boom that characterized the colony's cocoa market in 1919 and early parts of 1920.⁵⁶

Contrary to the economic achievement of Guggisberg's leadership, there was no positive political development for local people. By the very nature of colonialism, the

⁵⁴ Thomas Jesse Jones, *A Study of West, South, and Equatorial Africa* (NY: NY University Press, 1922).

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

British judicial system was adopted to subdue local judicial and political institutions. Political development plummeted to autocratic rule suppressing all democratic processes. It obstructed justice and prevented local people from participating in decision-making that affected their lives.

Nana Ofori Atta: Traditional Leadership in the Colonial Era

Ofori Atta, born in 1881, was educated at Basel Mission in Akropong where he studied to be a missionary. After graduation he changed his mind and worked as secretary for his uncle, a paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa. In 1913, Ofori Atta inherited the chieftaincy after the death of his uncle. Three years later he was selected to the provincial council. In 1925, Guggisberg selected him to the colony's legislative council, a position he held until his death in 1943.⁵⁷ While there, he worked to forge cooperation between native council members in finding ways to influence the colony's political process. In 1934, when two ordinances were introduced concerning water supply and the persecution of seditious acts, Ofori Atta and the rest of the native council members objected to the ordinances due to their ill effect on local peoples.⁵⁸ Despite the united protest of the native council members, both bills passed at the same session by the usual vote of 20 to 9. The twenty members who voted in favor were European members; the nine voting against

⁵⁶ Guggisberg, *The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events*.

⁵⁷ Martin Wight, *The Gold Coast Legislative Council* (London: Faber and Faber, 1947).

⁵⁸ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

the bill were indigenous members. The outcome of the votes made the indigenous council members feel helpless before the European majority members.⁵⁹

Ofori Atta saw the problem as a lack of influence on the legislative council by the indigenous and felt something had to be done. Rallying his colleagues together, he presented a case of unfair representation in the council to the colonial office in London. He accomplished that by urging his native colleagues to broaden their grievances in the council to include their dislike for the constitutional set up and demand more political power. In July 1934, he led a delegation and presented the case to the colonial secretary in London. In the petition, Ofori Atta demanded the elimination of the official majority on the legislative council, for a permanent native representation on the governor's executive council, and for the eligibility of non-chiefs as provincial members of the legislative council.⁶⁰ Though the petition was rejected, Ofori Atta continued his call for political change. Other political challenges involved getting the government to increase the number of local people in the colonial civil service. This was an issue advanced by Guggisberg but which was halted after his departure.

To expedite native training for future self-government, Guggisberg had initiated a gradual inclusion of natives in positions usually reserved for Europeans. However, after Guggisberg's departure the program was halted, and, by 1938, the number of natives in advance government positions was only 41 as compared to the 151 that had been

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Gold Coast Government, *Legislative Council Debate: Papers Relating to the Petition of the Delegate from the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti-Session No. 11* (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1934).

projected by the Guggisberg administration.⁶¹ It was Ofori Atta's belief that the stagnation of native recruitment for advance positions was a deliberate attempt by Guggisberg's successors to slow the process of future self-rule. To resolve that problem, Ofori Atta, once again, campaigned for the support of his colleagues. In 1938, he proposed the acceleration program for native inclusion in high positions of government. Because of his persistence, the government developed a new policy for the civil service in 1939, which included an intermediate grade for native officers. When native officers proved competent, they were sent to England for direct preparation and advancement in the government's civil service.⁶² While Ofori Atta's political achievements were dismal, his contributions in the area of economics were greater. One of the economic acts that won Ofori Atta respect was a boycott that he led against European cocoa buyers. The protest was used to protect the economic welfare of cocoa producers.⁶³ The reasoning behind Ofori Atta's involvement was clear and simple. By the chief's rationale, anything that impinged on the marketing of cocoa had a direct economic impact on his people, including himself, since he was also a farmer.⁶⁴

Ofori Atta's action to lead the boycott was prompted by an agreement reached between cocoa buying companies. In 1936, the price of cocoa was set at forty-four British pounds sterling per ton from twenty-one pounds in the early thirties. In the following year, the European cocoa buying companies in the Gold Coast made a secret agreement to

⁶¹ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., 66.

⁶⁴ Dennis Austin, Joseph B. Danquah, and W. R. B. Akokoaso, *A Survey of a Gold Coast Village* (London: Oxford University Press, 1943).

control the price in an attempt to prevent price competition between themselves.⁶⁵ That act by the cocoa buyers was the root cause for Ofori Atta's action to lead the cocoa boycott. He saw the buyers' act as an attempt at price collusion that would have robbed millions of dollars from the cocoa producers. In order to prevent this from happening, Ofori Atta rallied almost all traditional chiefs in cocoa growing areas and the farmers union to take action together. The chiefs decided that the best remedy was to stop selling their cocoa to the buying companies. To make sure the boycott became successful, Ofori Atta held consultative meetings with cocoa producing farmers of the colony on the subject of halting cocoa sales to European buyers.

In October 1937, as the main cocoa season began, the farmers united under the guidance of their chiefs, and the farmers unions and stopped selling their cocoa to the European buyers. Not only did they refuse to sell their cocoa, they also boycotted the retail stores of the companies connected with the cocoa buying companies.⁶⁶ The boycott continued until a representative from London, William Nowell, arrived in the Gold Coast to negotiate a deal between the parties. In April 1938, a deal was struck in favor of the producers. A later report issued by the Nowell Commission strongly condemned the buyers attempt to control cocoa prices.⁶⁷ With his strong leadership commitment, Ofori Atta was able to protect the economic interests of the Gold Coast cocoa producers.

⁶⁵ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁶⁶ Joseph B. Danquah, *Liberty of the Subject: Gold Coast Cocoa Hold Up and Boycott of Foreign Goods 1937-38* (Kibi: Gold Coast Press, 1942).

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

As the evidence in this case study portrays so far, the colonial development legacy was more positive in some areas than in others. In the economic arena, leaders were able to transform the precolonial economy of slavery and spices trade to a more desirable commodity based on cocoa production, an economic transformation that helped raised the welfare of the people along with a greater moral and humanitarian touch. They also laid an economic infrastructure and introduced some social services including education and medical provisions for human development. However, while colonial leaders had been partially successful in the economic arena, their achievements in the political sector were minimal.

As Ofori Atta's delegation to London demonstrated with its petition, native participation in decision-making was non-existent. The colonial rule was autocratic, and even when the legislative council was introduced in 1925, its membership excluded representatives from both the Ashanti and the Northern territories.⁶⁸ That action meant that both the Ashanti and the Northern territories had no representation and were only dictated to by their chief commissioner who was stationed in Kumasi.⁶⁹ From those political lenses, it can be asserted that Ofori Atta's leadership was only regional as opposed to national. He condoned the colonial autocratic divide-and-rule system and failed to fight for the inclusion of the other regions in the legislative council. In essence, he became a *comprador* for British rule and failed to provide the leadership needed for unifying the colony towards social transformation and development.

⁶⁸ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

⁶⁹ Sir Francis Fuller, *A Vanished Dynasty: Ashanti* (London: Cass, 1968).

Despite their political shortcomings, the evidence suggests that these colonial leaders left a mixed legacy. The legacy had a positive economic development on one hand and a negative political development on the other, yet without corruption and political violence. That was the legacy mantle left to be picked up by subsequent leaders in the postcolonial era. Whether or not that torch was progressively carried after independence was achieved will be treated later. However, before discussing the postcolonial leaders and their activities towards socio-economic development, attention is first given to an examination of how self-rule was achieved in the Gold Coast.

Gold Coast's Road to Nationalist Self-rule and the 1948 Riots

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of educated commoners and their chiefs had crystallized into an opposition force against colonial rule.⁷⁰ However, a broad nationalist movement did not emerge until the 1948 riots in Accra.⁷¹ Nevertheless, the immediate preceding years had witnessed political and economic welfare changes. Prior to the 1948 riots, the dissatisfaction of the Burns constitution prompted a few educated elites and some businessmen to form the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) in 1947. The UGCC's main objective was to attain self-rule for the colony at the earliest opportune time.⁷² The party recruited Kwame Nkrumah, who at the time was studying in London, to become its general secretary. Those changes amounted to nothing until the 1948 riots in Accra.

⁷⁰ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

⁷¹ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁷² Thomas Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa* (NY: NY University Press, 1957).

The 1948 riots were triggered when a group of ex-service men marching to the governor's residence to present their grievances were fired upon by government police. Two ex-service men were killed and five people wounded. The disturbances continued for two days and quickly spread to other cities and towns. Six UGCC leaders were arrested and blamed for inciting the riots. The six men, included Kwame Nkrumah and Dr. J. B. Danquah, became popular heroes and were widely acclaimed as the "Big Six."⁷³ A commission was appointed to investigate the cause of the riot. It determined that the frustration over the lack of social mobility and limited opportunities in government angered the educated classes.⁷⁴ As a solution, the report recommended constitutional reform and suggested the formation of a native government. The publication of the study and its recommendations became known as the Watson Report.⁷⁵

The Constitutional Talks and the Birth of the Convention Peoples Party

In January 1949, the government invited thirty-eight people, including chiefs, educated leaders, and some members of the UGCC, except Nkrumah, to discuss a new constitution. The commission's final report recommended the adaptation of a British type of representative government for the Gold Coast without specifying a role for traditional leaders.⁷⁶ The report received high praise and became the building block of the 1951 Gold Coast Constitution. However, many people, including some educated elites whom the

⁷³ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁷⁴ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

report had favored, did not accept the constitution. The main flaw of the constitution, according to its opponent, was that it gave little power to local people and their leaders.

As expected, by his exclusion from the constitutional talk, Nkrumah and his growing supporters rejected the new constitution. The *Accra Evening News*, Nkrumah's newspaper, characterized the group's position in regards to the constitution as follows:

As for us, we have already declared our stand with regards to the new Constitution that only full Dominion Status...will satisfy us and by this demand we shall stand and face all storms however strong they are. Ghana must be free and free NOW.⁷⁷

The above position brought Nkrumah into conflict with the UGCC leaders who supported the constitution. The executive committee of the UGCC leadership felt Nkrumah had betrayed the trust they had given him in his appointment as secretary of the organization. This difference created a divide between Nkrumah and the UGCC leaders. Therefore, Nkrumah together with his followers, which included K. A. Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio, came to the conclusion that a separate political party was necessary. This decision marked the beginning of a new type of nationalist movement in the Gold Coast, one that appealed to the politically awakened masses, the Convention Peoples Party. On June 12, 1949, Nkrumah and his followers founded the CPP. Nkrumah was careful to explain to the rank- and- file of the UGCC that it was their leadership that the CPP opposed. The purpose of the opposition, he made clear, was that the UGCC leaders were fighting for "full self-government within the shortest possible time."⁷⁸ On the other hand,

⁷⁷ Quoted from Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*, 172.

⁷⁸ Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*.

the CPP was interested in gaining “self-government NOW.”⁷⁹ After the formation of the CPP, Nkrumah’s opposition to the constitution remained strong. He attacked it as a “Trojan gift horse” and as “bogus and fraudulent”, speaking instead of the need for “positive action.”⁸⁰

In spite of the government’s warning that political strikes were illegal, the CPP declared a nation-wide strike and boycott effective at midnight, January 8, 1950. On January 20th, Nkrumah and his organizers were arrested, tried, and sentenced to prison. While Nkrumah was serving his term in prison, elections for the 1951 constitution were held on February 10, 1951.⁸¹ Extensive campaigning by the two parties dominated the months preceding the elections. Leaders of the CPP, who had finished their prison sentences, campaigned vigorously throughout the country. Nkrumah, who had stood for a seat in the elections in one district in Accra, campaigned from prison with taped speeches to the public. When the election ballots were counted, the CPP won a decisive victory. Nkrumah won a seat from prison, and Sir Charles Arden Clarke released him on January 12, 1951, to form a government, in which, he was given the position of government leader of business.⁸²

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid. ; Nkrumah’s definition of positive action was “ the adoption of all legitimate and constitutional means by which we could attack the forces of imperialism in the country. The weapons were legitimate political agitation, newspapers and boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principal of absolute no-violence as used by Gandhi” in Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*, 111-112.

⁸¹ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

DEVELOPMENT UNDER KWAME NKRUMAH'S LEADERSHIP

The years following the formation of the Nkrumah's colonial government were marked by some degree of economic development. The prosperity was due to the accumulated surplus during the war and the high prices of cocoa in the world market. As Table 5-1 demonstrates, when the first native government was formed, the Gold Coast had 137.2m British pounds in reserves.

Table 5-1
Gold Coast (Later, Ghana) Reserves 1950-57

Year	Balance in Reserves (Millions of Pounds)
1950	113.3
1951	137.2
1952	145.1
1953	160.1
1954	197.4
1955	208.2
1956	189.8
1957	171.4

Source: Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer; *Ghana: End of an Illusion*, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1968, 45.

Despite the reserves balance from 1951 until independence in 1957, Ghana was underdeveloped. The economy was narrow in its dependence on only cocoa and limited mineral exports. Even though Guggisberg had made important advances in economic infrastructure, basic public services of all kinds needed to be expanded. In this regard, Nkrumah continued the development strategy initiated by previous governments,

⁸² Ibid.

providing agricultural services, improving road systems, and extending power and water supplies to several parts of the country.⁸³

In the social services, Nkrumah also extended services to both Ashanti and Northern regions where those services were lacking, introducing free universal basic education and healthcare. On some economic fronts, Nkrumah and his ministers showed great maturity and prudence, while on others they were less successful due to the emergence of corruption in the administration.⁸⁴ The handling of large sums of money in the interest of the nation opened the door of temptation to many ministers in Nkrumah's colonial cabinet. Corruption and misuse of national funds became rampant, leading to inquiries on some ministers and resignations by others.⁸⁵ Corruption also permeated the CPP and its affiliated organs including the Cocoa Marketing Board.⁸⁶

Nkrumah's Political Challenge: Partial Reason for Political Instability

The first political challenge that faced Nkrumah dealt with the local government administration. Prior to his ascendancy to power, Nkrumah was against the new constitution because it gave little power to local leaders. He had described it as a Trojan horse. After winning the elections, he decided to make good use of the constitution during

⁸³ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁸⁴ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

⁸⁵ Gold Coast Government, *Report of the Commission of Enquiry in Mr. J. A. Braimah's Resignation and Allegations* (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1954).

⁸⁶ Gold Coast Government, *Report of Commission of Enquiry in the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Co. Ltd "The Jibowu Report,"* (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1956)

the period until a new instrument of governance could be obtained.⁸⁷ The problem that faced Nkrumah was that he had to implement a constitutional ordinance for local government that shifted power at the local level from the traditional leaders to political party officials in the form of a representative local council.⁸⁸ To the chiefs, the instrument was deemed as undemocratic because the nature of the ordinance assigned them to the political sidelines and transferred their traditional powers to local council members leaving them with no role to play. In addition, the chiefs argued that the constitution gave political officials, who happened to be in the CPP, domination over local as well as national politics.⁸⁹ Most important to the chiefs was the shift in power. The change meant a loss of influence and revenue, and indeed, of their very position as leaders of the people. Nkrumah recognized the problem himself, and it had influenced his decision, prior to his winning the election, to oppose the constitution.⁹⁰

A solution to the problem could have been to amend the constitution to include the traditional leaders in power sharing, as Nkrumah might have thought about himself.⁹¹ An opportunity arose for Nkrumah to do that when the secretary of the colonial office asked him to seek the opinions of chiefs and other political groups to a possible constitutional change towards self-rule. In response to Nkrumah, many groups suggested

⁸⁷ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁸⁸ Gold Coast Government, *Local Government Reforms in Outline: Government Ordinance of 1951, No. 29* (Accra, Gold Coast: Government Press, 1951).

⁸⁹ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

⁹⁰ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁹¹ This thought might have occurred to Nkrumah when he decided to use the 1951 constitution until such a time that a new constitution could be approved. See Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

that a second chamber in the house be included in the constitution to accommodate the chiefs. This institutional accommodation, the proponents argued, was important because it would honor and safeguard the chiefs and their traditional roles. In addition, the proponents believed that an upper house for the chiefs would have enabled them to add their experience to the immature policies of the newly emergent parties.⁹² In essence, the inclusion of the chiefs would have resolved the constitutional flaw of excluding them from the national rule and could have acted as an alliance formation tool between the old guard and the new political officials. To the dismay of many groups, Nkrumah rejected the suggestions regarding the inclusion of the upper house that could have included the traditional leaders in the national democratic building process.⁹³ In essence, Nkrumah's government failed to make any provisions for the traditional leaders to participate in the power sharing.

The above narration of the local government problem and Nkrumah's refusal to include the traditional leaders demonstrated that once Nkrumah gained power, he became increasingly authoritarian. He refused to allow participatory democracy that could have enabled stability to thrive, and his decision to do so meant he failed to provide the democratic leadership needed for economic development. In response to the above circumstances, the chiefs and their allies raised a staunch opposition to Nkrumah and his party. The opposition caused, in many areas of the Gold Coast, violence in party

⁹² Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

⁹³ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

politics.⁹⁴ In retrospect, Nkrumah's refusal to allow traditional leaders to participate in the political process was seen by the chiefs as dictatorial on Nkrumah's part. That belief, in turn, set the tone for non-cooperation on the part of the chiefs and led to the crystallization of political instabilities in undermining economic development in Ghana.⁹⁵

As an outgrowth of the political opposition to Nkrumah, a new political party, the National Liberation Movement (NLM), was formed in 1954 in the Ashanti region with the support from the Asante King and his traditional chiefs.⁹⁶ The party demanded a federal form of government that Nkrumah rejected. Thereafter, the NLM adopted a new strategy against the CPP and its request for self-rule.⁹⁷ It allied with the Northern Peoples Party (NPP) and, together, the parties sent a joint delegation with a resolution to Britain that their territories wanted to secede from the Gold Coast. The succession bid became not only a political nightmare but also a dilemma for Nkrumah because the Gold Coast self-rule was based on the conditions that all the territories would remain together.⁹⁸ By its implication, any disagreement among the regions had the potential to jeopardize the self-rule that Nkrumah was seeking. In fact, by the delegation's request at the time, the independence of the colony was in doubt. Fortunately, the situation was saved by Lennox

⁹⁴ A. Hannigan, "Local Government in the Gold Coast," *Journal of African Administration*, Vol. 12 (July 1955): 73-86.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*.

⁹⁷ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

⁹⁸ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

Boyd, the secretary of state for the colonies, who visited the Gold Coast to broker a deal between the three parties and amended the constitution.⁹⁹

Many chiefs were embittered when they sensed that the country was falling under the control of the CPP. The Ashanti chiefs were not the only group that distrusted Nkrumah and his CPP. Antagonism developed in various regions based on the conflict between sectional and national interest. In the Northern Territories, for instance, sectional feelings also ran high. The conservative chiefs in the region looked askance at the possibility of Southern control. The ambivalence made them cling to treaties of friendships, trade, and protection that their former chiefs had signed with the British.¹⁰⁰ In fact, Northerners acceptance to join the Gold Coast in its transition to the nation of Ghana was based on the condition that the British would ensure that their regional rights were protected in the constitution of Ghana.¹⁰¹ The roots of the ambivalence emanated from their witness of Nkrumah's intolerance to weave a natural cohesiveness essential for political and economic developments in advancing the welfare of the people. Even though Nkrumah repeatedly emphasized in his public statements the importance of fostering a spirit of national consciousness in nation-building in Ghana,¹⁰² the irony was that under his leadership the government never heeded that advice.

The evidence presented suggests that the years between 1951 and 1957, when Nkrumah took over the colonial government, can be characterized as a "double edge

⁹⁹ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*

¹⁰⁰ R. S. Rattray, *Tribes of the Ashanti Hinterland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932).

¹⁰¹ *London Times*, September 18, 1956.

¹⁰² Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*.

sword” in terms of development. On the economic front, there were some positive developments, however the emergence of the corrupt culture undermined overall economic achievements. On the political front, however, development was mediocre at best. Nkrumah’s refusal to include traditional leaders halted any possible democratic process in the country and accelerated the drifting apart between the leaders and their people. In short, Nkrumah failed to lay the political cultural foundation upon which economic development could thrive. At independence, Ghana had a fractured and divided political structure with embedded animosity among various groups. The question that faced Ghana at independence was whether Nkrumah could turn the country around, reach out to the traditional leaders, and form a national union that could have laid a culture of political stability needed for economic development.

Postcolonial Leadership in Ghana

On March 6th, 1957, Ghana gained independence and became the first sub-Saharan African nation to throw off the imperial yoke. At the time, it had adequate foreign exchange reserves in excess of \$300 million.¹⁰³ The education system had improved to include university level learning, and there were 4,882 primary schools with an enrollment of 468,000 students.¹⁰⁴ The health service was one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa with thirty government hospitals equipped with approximately 2,630

¹⁰³ Yeboah, “Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana.”

¹⁰⁴ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

hospital beds.¹⁰⁵ The country also was self-sufficient in food supply and food imports were negligible. In addition, the per capita income was about \$242.¹⁰⁶

Presently, the trends have changed for the worst because Ghana's economy has deteriorated.¹⁰⁷ On the national balance sheet, Ghana continues to have negative foreign exchange reserves (see Table 5-2). In 1975, Ghana's reserves were in the red at negative \$108 million. Twenty years later, in 1994, this figure improved only slightly to negative \$93 million. As Table 5-2 shows, the national debt rose from \$721 million in 1975 to \$ 5.8 billion in 1995, including a rapid increase in debt service. This poor financial position indicates that since 1975, the national economy has deteriorated constantly affecting all essential developmental social factors including health and education.

Table 5-2
Ghana's National Debt and Debt Service 1975-95 (Millions US\$)

	1975	1985	1994	1995
National Total Debt	721	2,257	5,463	5,874
Total Debt Service	57	159	367	370
Change in Net Reserves	-108	48	-93	-

Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism*.

¹⁰⁷ Alan Roe and Hartmut Schneider, *Adjustment and Equity in Ghana* (Paris: OECD, 1992).

Between 1994 and 1998, the share of public education expenditures as a percentage of GDP remained roughly 3.6%.¹⁰⁸ With the cost of inflation adjustment, the overall education expenditure declined by 4 % annually.¹⁰⁹ Within the same time as, Table 5-3 shows, the share of education expenditure allocated to universities in the country declined 8.3% while enrollment doubled.¹¹⁰ What is even more alarming is the stagnation in enrollment of the country's basic education system. Based on data from the Ministry of Education, the enrollment in senior secondary schools declined from 236,000 in 1994 to 188,000 in 1998. In the junior secondary, the enrollment inched up from 693,000 in 1994 to 695,000 in 1998. In percentage terms the change was nominal with only an increase of 0.1 %. Primary school enrollment also rose slightly from 1,960 in 1994 to 2,027 in 1998, seeing an increase of 0.8%.

Together these figures indicate that between 1994 and 1998 there was less than one percent annual growth in basic education. Given a population growth of 3 % these figures imply a decline in basic education enrollment.¹¹¹ There also has been deterioration in the healthcare industry. For example in 1970, there were 9 physicians to every 100,000 patients in Ghana. Today, there are 4 physicians to the same number of patients.¹¹² The situation on the political front does not look brighter either, especially considering the

¹⁰⁸ Sudharshan, C., and Xiao Ye. *Public Health and Education Spending in Ghana 1992-1998* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).

¹⁰⁹ Perran Penrose, *Budgeting and Expenditure in Education Sector in 1995* (Accra: Ghana Ministry of Education, 1998).

¹¹⁰ Sudharshan and Ye, *Public Health and Education Spending*.

¹¹¹ United Nations, *Committee on the Rights of the Child: Initial Report of Ghana* (NY: United Nations, 1995).

¹¹² Sudharshan and Ye, *Public Health and Education Spending*.

fact that five coups have led to five different administrations.¹¹³ Ghana has suffered political violence and human rights abuses.

Table 5-3
Education Enrollment in Ghana 1990-98 (in thousands)

	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1998
Primary Enrollment	1,803	1,807	1,848	1,903	1,960	2,027
Junior Sec. Enrollment	569	592	629	660	693	695
Senior Sec. Enrollment	168	199	225	247	236	188
University Enrollment	---	---	11	12	13	26

Source: C. Sudharshan and Xiao Ye, *Public Health and Education Spending in Ghana in 1992-1998*. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999.

The above conditions suggest that Ghana has not only remained undeveloped but it has also receded economically and politically. According to orthodox explanations, Ghana's problems, like the rest of sub-Saharan Africa, are caused by exogenous factors such as globalization and the impact of multinational institutions.¹¹⁴ There is no doubt that those factors play a role in Ghana's economic affairs, but they alone are insufficient to explain the country's economic underdevelopment since there exist examples of nations, such as Mauritius and Botswana, with similar exogenous environments that have not fallen into such deplorable economic conditions.¹¹⁵ In contrast to this view, others

¹¹³ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹¹⁴ George B. N. Ayittey, "How the Multinational Institutions Compounded Africa's Economic Crisis," *Law and Policy in International Business*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Summer 1999): 585-600; Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

¹¹⁵ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

believe that Ghana's economic problems are largely its own doing. This group of pundits relates the current negative economic state of affairs in Ghana to bad policies, abuse of power, and corruption.¹¹⁶ It is this school of thought to which this research subscribes. This study, explicitly argues that Ghana's developmental problems are due to a lack of leadership to establish a culture conducive to development.

Nkrumah's Leadership in Postcolonial Ghana

As noted above, Kwame Nkrumah was not new to Ghanaian politics at the time of independence. Nkrumah was born in 1909 at Nkroful in the Nzima area of Ghana. During the depression years, he lived and studied in the United States. After ten years in the United States, he went to England to study and also helped organized Pan -Africanist movement. In 1947, he returned to the Gold Coast as the Secretary General of UGCC. Nkrumah left the UGCC in 1949 and formed his own political party, the CPP in 1949. He was the first native during the colonial rule to become a national leader of government business from 1951 to 1957.¹¹⁷ He led Ghana to its independence and became its prime minister and, later, the nation's first president.

Prior to independence Nkrumah had a firm belief that national unity and stability were essential for development.¹¹⁸ The issue became more compelling because political quibbles between the various leadership groups immediately before independence had divided the political groups to the point where the need to unify the nation for stability

¹¹⁶ Douglas Rimmer, *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950-1990* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1992).

¹¹⁷ Nkrumah, *The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah*.

towards development became imperative. The main duty, therefore, facing Nkrumah was to patch the loose factions of the nation into a strong state. Prior to independence, different political groups had submitted a petition to Nkrumah to amend the constitution to include traditional leaders. Nkrumah, however, rejected that provision. The opposition then resorted to political violence because they felt that the democratic means of participating in political ruling was no longer a viable option. The opposition made a couple of attempts to disrupt Nkrumah's government. First, it tried to overthrow the government and, later tried to kill Nkrumah.¹¹⁹ The above events, coupled with Nkrumah's inclinations to exclude other political groups from sharing power, led him to the conclusion that political "pluralism" was both inapplicable and dangerous in the context of Ghana's young independence.¹²⁰ This decision caused Nkrumah to orchestrate two political strategies, both aimed at achieving stability through authoritarian dictatorship.

With the intent to secure national stability for development, Nkrumah used the legislative process to adopt the Preventive Detention Act in July 1958.¹²¹ This act allowed his government to arrest individuals suspicious of engaging in treason or subversive activities, without sanction by judicial bodies, to be jailed for five days. Once arrested, if the case was considered to be a threat against the state, then the person was tried in court; otherwise, the individual was released. Nkrumah used such intimidation tactics to crack

¹¹⁸ Arhin, " In Search for Constitutional Chieftaincy."

¹¹⁹ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

¹²⁰ Peter Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship* (London: Hurst and Company, 1970).

¹²¹ *Ibid.*

down on democratic expression and established an authoritarian culture as a means of maintaining stability and control.¹²²

To enhance this authoritarian form of rule, Nkrumah sought for and received a new constitution that bestowed upon Ghana the status of republican sovereignty. The constitution allowed him to dissolve the provincial assemblies and transferred full legislative and executive powers to the national assembly. The constitution also weakened the regional powers and created a presidential position with broad powers including cabinet appointments, making changes in governmental bodies, and also making the president the commander in chief of the army. After the constitutional changes, Nkrumah called for a national referendum in the process of selecting a president. He asked the people to choose between him and the opposition leader for the presidency. The referendum approved Nkrumah as the president by 89%.¹²³

On July 1st, 1960, Ghana became a republic, and Nkrumah became the president. Those political developments initiated by Nkrumah helped him to erase all that remained of Ghana's democratic features. In other words, the above actions by Nkrumah immediately after independence transformed Ghana's political system from the semi-democratic system that had previously existed to a complete dictatorial system. The traditional domestic political institutions and their leaders were completely disenfranchised from the official national political process. Until the morning of the February 24, 1966 coup that toppled the CPP government, Nkrumah had removed any

¹²² L. Rubin and P Murray, *The Constitution and Government of Ghana* (London: Cass, 1961).

¹²³ Ibid.

hint of a real democratic process from the political system and had turned the electoral process into a political ploy.¹²⁴

A second major political development was the transformation of party politics in Ghana from that of a multi-party system to a one-party system. To do this, Nkrumah argued that Ghanaians needed to be conscious of their “Africaness.” He denounced the multi-party democratic system as a Western concept that had no kinship with African political culture and, as such, was incompatible for Ghanaian politics. In place of the multi-party system, Nkrumah urged Ghanaians to adopt the one-party system, in this case, his CPP.¹²⁵ The irony, however, is that, on the one hand, Nkrumah was disenfranchising the traditional leaders, while, on the other, he was telling them to be conscious of their Africaness in terms of political culture. By 1964, the one-party system was inaugurated in disregard of the feelings of Nkrumah’s political opponents and Ghanaians in general.¹²⁶

When Nkrumah made Ghana a one-party state, the CPP became the only political institution through which citizens could participate in national politics. Therefore, many Ghanaians who did not identify themselves with the CPP were excluded from the national political process.¹²⁷ By adopting the one-party system, Nkrumah also found a political means to prevent his leadership from being accountable to the populace. In this context,

¹²⁴ T. Jones, *Ghana's First Republic 1960-1966* (London: Methuen, 1976).

¹²⁵ George P. Hagan, “Nkrumah’s Leadership Style: An Assessment From a Cultural Perspective,” in Kwame Arhin, ed., *The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah*, 177-206 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993).

¹²⁶ Dominic K. Agyeman., “Social and Political Outlook,” in Kwame Arhin, ed., *The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah*, 147-157 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993).

¹²⁷ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

Nkrumah's political transformation represented a transfer from the political dictatorship of the aristocracy of precolonial days to that of a contemporary dictatorial presidency. In that regards, there was no political achievement as far as progressive democratic development is concerned. There is no doubt that Nkrumah mobilized people in Ghana and made them strike for freedom;¹²⁸ however, his later actions purged civil liberties and rights from Ghana's political process and thereby halted Ghana's democratic evolution for many years.

POSTCOLONIAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER NKRUMAH

Despite Ghana's good financial position at the time of independence, the national economy was underdeveloped. The productive sector was backward with a lopsided structure. Ghana's main exportable commodity was cocoa beans, and most of its industrial consumption commodities were imported. Taking that national position as a point of departure, Nkrumah embarked on a new economic policy in which he sought to do two things. His first goal was to diversify the agricultural sector, and the second objective was to embark on industrialization.¹²⁹ Knowing very well that Ghana's development cannot be financed by the price volatilities of cocoa, Nkrumah solicited development assistance.¹³⁰

¹²⁸ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third world*.

¹²⁹ Hagan, "Nkrumah's Leadership Style."

Nkrumah's Solicitation of Financial Assistance

Nkrumah had sought financial and technical assistance for Ghana's development long before independence. In 1951, during his visit to the United States as the leader of government business, he spoke of the need of technicians, machinery, and capital to develop Ghana's natural resources. He visited the United Nations in New York and signed an agreement with the UN Secretary General to obtain technical aid from the organization. The agreement allowed Ghana to receive multilateral aid from the International Labor Organization, World Food and Agricultural Organization, World Health Organization, and United Nations Educational Scientific Cultural Organization.¹³¹

On the bilateral level, Nkrumah campaigned for aid from both East and West. In the West, Nkrumah sought aid from Europe and North American countries. In 1958, he visited Canada and the United States. While in America, he was received by both President Eisenhower and Vice-President Nixon. Nkrumah used these occasions to appeal for technical and financial aid. Canada responded generously to Ghana's request for aid from that time onward, donating millions of dollars in aid. Nkrumah used the Canadian financial and technical aid to drill water wells in the Northern Territories of Ghana. Assistance from the United States went towards the construction of a hydroelectric dam, the centerpiece of Nkrumah's development project.¹³²

¹³⁰ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Accra Evening News*, May 28, 1957.

Nkrumah's Economic Approaches

For the first couple of years of independence, Nkrumah adopted economic policies based on liberal economic approaches laid down by Arthur Lewis. The policies adhered to outright privatization without government intervention.¹³³ However, since Ghana's private sector was limited, the nation had to rely on foreign private capital investment as an instrument of economic development. But, despite Nkrumah's incentives and guarantees to foreign investors, there was a lack of private capital inflows that could stimulate the economy. Ghana started to experience a large foreign trade deficit and sharp decreases in currency reserves contrary to the gains that were supposed to have come from economic liberalism.¹³⁴ In the beginning of the 1960s, Nkrumah came to the conclusion that development based on economic liberal concepts was inoperable and thus adopted a socialist model. He made an official visit to the Soviet Union and subsequently adopted a communist central planning system.¹³⁵

Nkrumah's plan was to mobilize available resources to implement industrialization. In the agriculture industry, he embarked on a gradual withdrawal from the monoculture specialization. Instead of relying on only cocoa as the export product, Nkrumah planned to increase the production of maize, millet, yams, plantains, and meat for domestic consumption and export. To accomplish that objective, Nkrumah established state farms and created Worker's Brigades for the countryside. The Worker's Brigades became one of the main avenues for job creation for young people. By the mid-1960s, the

¹³³ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*

program had created about 35,000 jobs and substantially reduced unemployment in the cities.¹³⁶

In the industrial sector, Nkrumah embarked on several projects throughout the country. One of the largest projects was the completion of the hydroelectric dam. Nkrumah saw the project as essential because it was to be the source of energy to run all the industries in the country and also provide energy for residential use. In addition to the hydroelectric dam, industrial development projects included the construction of an oil refinery, prefab house-building factories, chocolate factories, meat processing factories, several canneries, and textile factories.¹³⁷ Nkrumah's development projects included social services with a special emphasis on health services and education. As a leader of government business, he had introduced free education. Ten years later, after independence, he offered free and compulsory primary education for all school age children in Ghana. Nkrumah was, and still remains, the only Ghanaian leader to link scientific education to economic growth in a development approach. In health service, he created universal healthcare for Ghanaians.¹³⁸ While Nkrumah achieved success in social services and industrial sectors of the economy, his strategy for national development fell short in establishing a proper institutional culture to support his development projects.

¹³⁵ Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism*.

¹³⁶ Republic of Ghana, *Central Bureau of Labor Statistics* (Accra, Ghana: Government Printing Press, 1976).

¹³⁷ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹³⁸ E. A. Haizel, "Education in Ghana, 1951-1966," in Kwame Arhin, ed., *The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah*, 53-82 (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1993).

The Cocoa Marketing Board

One of the institutions that was, and still is, central to Ghana's development is the Cocoa Marketing Board. The CMB coordinates the sales and marketing of Ghana's most exportable product, cocoa. It was established in 1948 with the purpose of buying cocoa at a lower producer price and selling it at a higher price on the world market. The objective was to use the difference as a reserve fund to insulate cocoa producers from world price volatility when needed.¹³⁹ When Nkrumah took over the CMB from the colonial government, he did not design effective policies to shield it from particularistic interventions by CPP members, so as to enable the institution to protect the collective interest of Ghana's development. The CMB had no auditing and monitoring system in place to ensure proper legitimate use of public funds or prevent corruption. The loose institutional cultural atmosphere allowed it to be used by its officials as *carte blanche* in corrupt activities without accountability.¹⁴⁰

As with other African public institutions, the CMB became less useful to the cocoa producers it was suppose to serve.¹⁴¹ Instead it served political elites, who freely extracted resources from producers by plundering the CMB. During Nkrumah's leadership, much of the money generated from the CMB ended up in the hands of dubious elements of the CPP.¹⁴² Even though Nkrumah had "spoken and warned that

¹³⁹ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

¹⁴⁰ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

¹⁴¹ As Kenneth Good has reported, many countries in sub-Saharan Africa have poorly managed institutions that have become burden to those countries development and cites especially Zambia as one those countries. See Good, "Systemic Agricultural Mismanagement."

¹⁴² Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

bribery and corruption were evil and needed to be stamped out,”¹⁴³ he failed to take direct measures to establish non-tolerance policies against corruption, thus allowing his officials of the CMB to engage in corrupt deeds that harmed the collective national well-being. In essence, Nkrumah’s failure to make the institution autonomous from political interests hampered the role the CMB was designed to play in Ghana’s economic development. By the time Nkrumah’s government was toppled on February 24, 1966, the CMB had become the source of patronage for CPP followers.

On February 24, 1966, Nkrumah was in China when a military junta led by Lieutenant General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel A. A. Afrifa toppled his regime. For a certain period thereafter, Ghanaian leaderships vacillated between military officers, who seized power through coups, and civilians who acquired power through elections. That routine of leaderships became the pattern in Ghana’s political economy until Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings staged his December 31, 1981, coup and stayed in power for the following 20 years. That period from 1966-1981, which I consider as the *interlude era*, warrants a special analysis.

Before examining the interlude leaderships, however, it is important to note that by the time Nkrumah was overthrown, he had begun to lay an industrial base for Ghana’s material development and had complimented that with basic education and health services. Unfortunately, he had also established a political culture that was uncomplimentary to economic development because it neglected democratic practices that are essential for development. Nkrumah also nurtured a corrupt culture by not confronting the corruption of party officials. In regards to institutional building, he failed

¹⁴³ Ibid. 63

to build checks-and-balances into the CMB when it came under his administration. The lack of effective institutional policies allowed the institution to be used for individual interests as opposed to economic development. However it has to be noted also that on some economic fronts, Nkrumah achieved progress while on others his success was limited due to external factors that were beyond his control. Nkrumah's ascendancy to power came during the early stages of cold war politics with two competing development political ideologies between the West and the East. This created a hostile external environment for all the newly independent African nations and their leaders. In attempt to avoid the cold war conflict, Nkrumah subscribed to a neutralist ideology and made Ghana a member of the non-aligned movement.¹⁴⁴ However, the non-aligned strategy did not free Nkrumah from external influences.

Economically when Nkrumah came to power, he had expected to industrialize Ghana with Western aid and investment. However many western donor countries curtailed development aid to Ghana. Moreover, the private investments that Nkrumah had hoped for from the west to stimulate Ghana's development did not materialize. Western governments, including Great Britain who had temporary broken diplomatic relations with Nkrumah's administration, used their positions in world financial institutions to prevent Ghana from securing international development loans.¹⁴⁵ Consequently, economic growth in Ghana began to decline. In response to western countries' action, Nkrumah changed his economic strategy from a capitalist market system to a socialist

¹⁴⁴ W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

¹⁴⁵ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

economic system and strengthened relations with the Soviet Union. Nkrumah's action prompted western countries to categorize him as a communist ally, which led to greater economic isolation from the west.

External forces also offered support to Nkrumah's political opponents to destabilize his government and its policies. In 1962, Ghana's opposition party with the assistance of foreign collaborators made an assassination attempt on Nkrumah's in the town of Kulungugu as they sought to overthrow his government.¹⁴⁶ These external conditions had collective adverse impact on Nkrumah's development efforts and objectives. To some extent, these external influences did undermine the country's social and economic progress during the Nkrumah years continue to impact contemporary sub-Saharan African leaders' development policies.

THE INTERLUDE LEADERSHIP ERA IN GHANA

As mentioned above, Lieutenant General E. K. Kotoka and Colonel. A. A. Afrifa led the February 24, 1966 coup in concert with a few military and police officers. The group formed the National Liberation Council (NLC) as their government body, and chose Lieutenant General Joseph A. Ankrah as the Head of State. The NLC became the first group of the interlude leaderships. Politically, the NLC also became aware of the importance of stability if Ghana was to economically develop. It, however, abstained from a democratically consociational approach. On the contrary, the leaders adopted repressive methods to silence potential opposition and crack down on democratic

¹⁴⁶ Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966*.

principles. Approximately one week after the coup, the NLC adopted a preventive detention strategy through a decree that allowed the military the right to imprison any person without charge or open trial.¹⁴⁷ The NLC made no attempt to solve the antagonistic relations among the different socio-political groups that undermined political unity. Rather, they clung to power by adopting repressive tactics through decrees and Ghana remained politically polarized.

Economically, Ankrah and his military colleagues made no efforts to transform the economy or to improve productivity as Nkrumah had attempted to achieve. Instead, the NLC cut social services, including education and health care. In the industrial sector, the NLC leadership abandoned all industrial development projects that Nkrumah had initiated. These projects included a meat processing plant, sugar factory, canneries, and a car manufacturing plant. In addition, they privatized 78 state-owned companies.¹⁴⁸ After abandoning the projects, Ankrah and his group awarded national contracts to their associates in return for bribes. With that behavior, the NLC leadership legitimized and strengthened the already corrupt culture established in Ghana. The suspension of the projects exacerbated the negative economic situation and resulted in unemployment for the first time in Ghana.¹⁴⁹ Abandonment of projects, increased in corruption, and the rise in unemployment led to negative economic growth in all sectors of the economy

¹⁴⁷ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁹ Debora Pellow and Naomi Chazan, *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty* (Boulder: Westview, 1986).

including agriculture. Growth in agriculture was 0.6% in 1966. In 1967, however, it reached 1.6%, and, declined in 1968, to 0.8 %.¹⁵⁰

With a deteriorating economy characterized by high inflation and corruption, the Ghanaian society became discontent with the NLC. Political agitation and labor strikes increased. In view of public discontent with the economic conditions, NLC handed power to a civilian government in 1970. The NLC leaders who proclaimed themselves as liberators became the first, but not the last, to disappoint Ghanaians by failing to correct the economic culture for which the leaders themselves had blamed their predecessors. It is worth noting that, while the NLC leaders abandoned industrial projects, they held on to their forerunners corrupt practices.¹⁵¹ In retrospect, they followed a similar political economic culture established by Nkrumah, yet with a somewhat more damaging effect because they suspended social services in education and health. On August 29, 1969, an election was held, and the Progress Party, which was favored by the NLC, won the election with 58.7% of the votes.¹⁵² On March 1, 1970, Afrifa, the then Head of State handed power to Dr. Kofi A. Busia as the new Head of State.

The Leadership of Dr. Kofi A. Busia 1970-1972

Busia was an Oxford educator and a former opposition party leader during the struggle for Ghana's independence. He went into exile in England soon after Ghana's independence and remained there until Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966. When he

¹⁵⁰ R. Pinkey, *Right-Wing Military Government* (Boston: Twayne, 1990): 140.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut, *Elections in Africa: Data Handbook*, 434

became the premier, Ghana was still entangled in political instabilities that he had helped to create in the 1950s.¹⁵³ In conjunction with the political problems, there were still the economic problems that had been intensified by policies of the NLC.¹⁵⁴ The question for Busia was simple, would he be able to find a solution to the problems of which he contributed?

Politically, Busia amended Ghana's constitution but failed to correct the undemocratic flaw that prohibited the traditional leaders from participating in the political process. Instead, he amended the constitution and fired 568 government high officials from different tribes, which Busia said his government could not trust.¹⁵⁵ Busia's action deepened the polarization in Ghana, making any chance of political unity and stability impossible. In the economic arena, he did not make any attempts to diversify or transform Ghana's economy. He continued with the privatization of public industries that NLC had initiated. To increase productivity he put the remaining government industries on a self-sufficiency basis and abolished replacement funds for obsolete equipment. In other words, spare parts needed for public industries could not be ordered. His policies worsened the already dilapidated Ghanaian economy.

To resuscitate the economy, he devalued the *cedi*, increased taxes, raised interest rates, increased gasoline prices, abolished universal medical care, and finally eliminated free basic education for children.¹⁵⁶ The elimination of access to medical care resulted in

¹⁵³ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

¹⁵⁴ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

¹⁵⁵ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹⁵⁶ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

a deteriorating quality of life for the poor who could not afford to get medical care on their own. Likewise, the elimination of free basic education stopped some children from poor families from receiving education. In that regard, Busia's policies became anti-development more so than pro-development. He made no efforts to limit the corrupt practices that had flourished under his predecessors. In fact, corruption escalated during his administration due to further economic deterioration. The impact of his austerity measures made the administration very unpopular. In 1972, approximately two years after Busia took office, Colonel Ignatius Acheampong overthrew the elected Busia government.¹⁵⁷ Busia left Ghana's political scene with nothing achieved towards development. The democratic deficiency, which he had correctly identified twenty years earlier before becoming a premier, was left unresolved.¹⁵⁸ Economically, his monetary policies did not revive the negative growth trends that Ghana experienced. In human development, his austerity measures did more harm than good to the poor by preventing them from receiving medical services for themselves and education for their children. One practice however, that Busia assisted in promoting and legitimizing was corruption.

The Leadership of Ignatius Acheampong

Acheampong's regime under the National Redemption Council (NRC), which later became the Supreme Military Council (SMC), broke away from the policies of the previous governments. In an attempt to find a solution for Ghana's political disunity,

¹⁵⁷ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹⁵⁸ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

Acheampong proposed and held a national referendum between 1977 and 1978 for what he described as Union Government (Unigov). He suggested that Ghana abolish party politics and adopt a system of government where both the military and the civilian jointly rule the nation.¹⁵⁹ Ghanaians viewed Acheampong's *Unigov* as the same one-party system that Nkrumah had once tried to impose. Even though the referendum was approved, the opposition was so strong that the idea was aborted. Economically, Acheampong set up a consultative committee to evaluate the country's economic problems. Thereafter, he revalued the Ghanaian currency that had suffered devaluation under Busia's administration. Acheampong restored some of the public social service that previous administrations had halted. He launched an "Operation Feed Yourself" program, by which he convinced the nation to stay away from imported foods and to grow more food for domestic consumption.¹⁶⁰ Acheampong reinvigorated the national sector of the economy by nationalizing some companies outright and buying 55% shares of others such as Ashanti Goldfields. In 1972 he made a unilateral decision to pay what he termed as "just" national debt and forgo what he considered an "unjust" debt. Those he deemed as just were placed under 10 years moratorium.¹⁶¹ The unilateral action made Acheampong very unpopular with Western creditors and foreign direct investment to Ghana rapidly declined.

¹⁵⁹ R. H. Green, *Stabilization and Adjustment Policies and Programmes: Country Study I* (Accra, Ghana: Wider Publications, 1987).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ignatius K. Acheampong., *Speeches and Interviews, Volumes 1-3* (Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1974).

In governance, army officers who lacked expertise ran most of the government bodies. Lack of expertise and favoritism increased bribery and corruption. At Acheampong's time, young women were given millions of *cedis* worth of import licenses, which they often resold for about two times their value. Besides the department heads, the members of the ruling body of the SMC not infrequently abused their power. Acheampong himself personally interfered with the operations of the Bank of Ghana, where he instructed the overprinting and over-issue of *cedi* notes.¹⁶² He personally granted unqualified concessions to his associates in contravention of government policies and regulations. In addition to the abuse of power, the regime was fraught with other social evils such as illegal arrests.¹⁶³ Economic hardships increased in 1974 when prices of cocoa dropped and prices of oil increased. To mitigate the suffering of the people, Acheampong increased subsidies; however, by 1978, the economic situation in Ghana had become unbearable.

In the midst of the economic turmoil, there was a palace coup, in which Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Akuffo replaced Acheampong as the Head of State. The only economic pronouncement Akuffo made was to emphasize the promotion of private enterprises, development of free-market system, and the need for aid from Western countries.¹⁶⁴ Politically, sometime late in 1978, Akuffo reaffirmed his government's intention of transferring power to a constitutional government in July the following year. Akuffo's intended transfer of power did not happen before Flight Lieutenant Jerry John

¹⁶² Yeboah, "Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."

¹⁶³ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

Rawlings overthrew his regime on June 4th, 1979. Like other military leaders before him, Akuffo could not find a formula for a political coalition that could have brought national political unity. Neither was he able to establish a favorable economic culture to help Ghana recover from its economic decline.

Leadership Under Jerry John Rawlings

The June 4th coup of 1979 that brought Rawlings to power was staged by a group of junior officers who called themselves the Armed Forces Revolution Council (AFRC). In regards to concrete political and economic changes only a few, if any, had a definite view of how to proceed.¹⁶⁵ The AFRC consisted of a group of men with frustrations that were shared by most Ghanaians due to economic hardships coupled with a lack of sense of political direction by previous leaders. “Cleansing” the society of negative phenomena, including corruption and distrust of leaders, was the sole objective of the group who made themselves national leaders through the barrel of a gun.¹⁶⁶

In their attempt to clean house, Rawlings and his men set up military tribunals and made a decree that individuals found guilty in actions against the state would be subjected to capital punishment.¹⁶⁷ Defendants of the first trial by the tribunals were 33 army officers, of which three were former heads of state. The AFRC sentenced all three former Heads of State and many other military officers to death and carried it out with the public watching the firing squad at Teshi near Accra. The first round of killings took

¹⁶⁵ Zaya Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power* (London: New Beacon Books, 1991).

¹⁶⁶ Kevin Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor* (NY: St. Martin's, 1992).

place on June 16 and thereafter on June 29th, 1979.¹⁶⁷ Within a few weeks, Rawlings killed many Ghanaians faulted for the country's economic problems. Market women, whom the government suspected of overcharging sales prices on items, were sent to prison or flogged in public. One day of August in 1979, Rawlings and a group of soldiers went to Makola, one of the main markets in the capital and destroyed the market.¹⁶⁹ Today, the area where the market once stood is called "Rawlings Park" which ironically has become a monument to his brutalities.¹⁷⁰

Besides intimidations, killings, and confiscation of property from civilians, the emergence of Rawlings failed to produce any positive political or economic gain for Ghanaian society. At best, the June 4, 1979 coup can be characterized as an explosion of social antagonism driven by constantly deteriorating living conditions. In the midst of the chaos, the AFRC allowed the already scheduled election by the previous Akuffo administration to take place. On September 24, 1979, Rawlings transferred power to a civilian government under the leadership of Dr. Hilla Limann.

Leadership Under Hilla Limann

When Limann took over the reigns of power, he faced the same lingering economic deterioration and political instability that previous leaders had tried to suppress through dictatorship. To resuscitate the economy, Limann made a trip around the world

¹⁶⁷ *West Africa*, June 26, 1979.

¹⁶⁸ *West Africa*, July 2, 1979.

¹⁶⁹ Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*.

¹⁷⁰ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

looking for aid but refused to accept IMF and World Bank's structural adjustment programs.¹⁷¹ With less consumer products on the market, inflation escalated and, in turn, exacerbated the corrupt culture that already existed. Workers who felt the economic hardship turned to the streets to demand immediate solutions, which the Limann's government could not deliver. In trying to overcome workers' protest and strikes,¹⁷² Limann resorted to various repressive methods like arrest and detention rather than engaging in democratic dialogue with workers and other groups.¹⁷³ To make matters worst, a corruption scandal broke up in Limann's ruling party where the general secretary and the chairman of the party misappropriated funds from the party's coffers. The money that the party leaders squandered was a bribe that a foreign company had paid to secure the job of printing Ghana's currency.¹⁷⁴ While the corruption case was unrevealing, Jerry Rawlings took advantage of the workers discontent with the economy and staged another coup to overthrow Limann's government on December 31, 1981.

Rawlings' second regime marked the end of the interlude leadership era. It is important to note that all the interlude leaders had followed similar pattern of economic and political policies. In the political arena, each had criticized the others for being dictatorial, yet they all adopted repressive mechanisms to enforce stability. None of the leaders could devise a political consociational approach to form a democratic platform to

¹⁷¹ Jeffrey Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana, 1982-1991* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).

¹⁷² There were estimated 70,000 people on strike in Ghana in 1981 during the Limann administration due to workers discontent. United Nations, *Yearbook on Labor Statistics* (Geneva: United Nations, 1982).

¹⁷³ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹⁷⁴ *West Africa*, November 30, 1981.

enhance political development that could ensure stability. Unfortunately, for democratic development, Rawlings' first regime introduced political violence. The civilian leaders during the interlude era failed to amend the constitutional flaw that brought about the political instabilities in the first place. Instead of forging alliances with different political groups to establish a strong nation state, leaders like Busia played the tribal card to make the situation worst.

Economically, the NLC administration that came to power after Nkrumah abandoned all industrial development projects, including a food-processing plant. Thereafter, all the leaders' economic policies hinged on going around the world to look for aid rather than focusing on building productive sectors of the economy to stimulate domestic production. All the leaders within that time period pursued monetary economic policies that undermined human development. Busia cut funds from education and health care, which made it hard for the poor to improve their living conditions. While Acheampong restored some of the educational and health care services, he nationalized foreign companies. In addition, he unilaterally declared a policy of none-payment of national debt. That policy halted the inflow of foreign direct investment into Ghana and slowed the nation's economic growth. Another common denominator among Ghanaian interlude leaders was their inclination towards corruption. Even though corruption had started during Nkrumah's regime, it escalated during this time period. In essence, the interlude leaders failed to correct the corrupt culture and the political repression that they had condemned before coming to power. Instead, they adopted the same cultures and inadvertently legitimized them. They also failed to transform the Ghanaian economy or improve the lives of Ghanaians.

GHANA UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF RAWLINGS 1981-2001

In evaluating leadership in Ghana, the solution to both economic progression and cohesive political stability provides the best litmus test because Ghana has been free from foreign threats since the precolonial era. The only foreign threat that Ghana faced was colonialism,¹⁷⁵ which in itself was made possible due to internal territorial political instability in precolonial days.¹⁷⁶ Fortunately, the attainment of independence in 1957, and the subsequent gaining of republic status in 1960 by Kwame Nkrumah dismantled colonialism.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, when Rawlings returned to power in 1981, the problem of economic underdevelopment and political instability were readily apparent.

Jerry J. Rawlings

Jerry John Rawlings was born in 1947 at Dzeluko in the Volta Region of Ghana. His mother is an Ewe from Volta Region and his father was a Scottish citizen who was once on duty in the Gold Coast during the colonial days. As a boy, Rawlings attended school at Achimota College. After completing his secondary education, he went to military training school and enrolled as an Air Force cadet. In 1978 he was commissioned as a Flight Lieutenant.¹⁷⁸ Rawlings first came on the Ghanaian political scene in June 1979 when he was released from jail by junior officers to become a leader

¹⁷⁵ Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

¹⁷⁶ Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

¹⁷⁷ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

¹⁷⁸ Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*.

of a coup. On September 24, 1979, he handed over the reign of government to a civilian government. Nearly two and half years later, he staged another coup and toppled the very civilian government he helped to install. Thereafter, he ruled Ghana by dictatorial decree for twelve years, transforming himself to become a civilian leader after democratic political elections and remained in power for eight more years.

Immediately after the December 31, 1981 coup, Rawlings told Ghanaians that the reason for his return to power was to rearrange the foundations of Ghana's politics through the transformation of social, economic, and political relationships. In other words, he intended to establish a democratic system where all citizens would participate in national decision-making.¹⁷⁹ He suspended the constitution of 1979 and his Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) assumed national power with him as the chairman.

Bureau of National Investigation

Politically at the time of the coup, the PNDC was made of different factions with only one common denominator. The commonality involved waging holy war to free Ghana from corrupt imperialists and their masters in the west so as to enable Ghana to redistribute national resources equally among its citizens.¹⁸⁰ But, to do that required a political formula for national stability. To build political stability, Rawlings, just like his predecessors, decided to use intimidation and repressive mechanisms to coerce other factions in the PNDC and the whole country to succumb to his dictatorial ways.

¹⁷⁹ Pellow and Chazan, *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty*.

¹⁸⁰ Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana*.

Rawlings and his security chief, Kojo Tsikata, successfully established institutions to facilitate the creation of a dictatorship and to assist in cultivating fear in Ghanaians. Among the institutions created for those purposes, the most successful and important one is the Bureau of National Investigation (BNI). The BNI was restructured from a previous special branch of the police force in 1982. Its main functions were to arrest, detain, and execute anti-PNDC elements and its agenda of dictatorship. Through the BNI, violence became decentralized and was perpetuated by autonomous groups in the armed forces and civil society.¹⁸¹ It operated by relying on intimidation and political repression to silence the public. Executions and torture carried out by the BNI had frequently come from the direct instructions of Rawlings. One case in point was the death of Alhassan Atusnab, a cook of a German friend of Rawlings. Soldiers on the orders of Rawlings beat the cook to death on a July 1st, 1989, on suspicion that the cook had stolen a 100 Deutschmark.¹⁸²

The violent purge of civilians after the 1981 coup by the BNI led to the period between 1982 and 1990 being one of the most sordid times in Ghana's political history. The political repression led to what later became known as a *culture of silence*. The method used by Rawlings to create that culture included torture, imprisonment, and executions. In Africa, Emperor Bokassa had used similar tactics in the Central African Republic, Idi Amin used it in Uganda, and Samuel Doe used it in Liberia. In the 1950s, Nkrumah established the culture with Prevention Detention Act. Thirty years later, Rawlings re-enforced it with widespread human rights abuses.

¹⁸¹ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*

Rawlings' Economic Development Approaches

Rawlings' first economic act was to set up an Economic Review Committee to assess the extent of Ghana's economic crisis. Based on a socialist framework, the committee came up with a formula with three tenets to steer Ghana towards development. First, they decided to deal with corruption in business, state corporations, banking, civil service, and personal taxation. Second, the committee recommended that wealth be redistributed to the people. Finally, the third tenet of Rawlings first economic approach was for the nation to solicit aid from socialist countries.¹⁸³

To tackle the problem, the PNDC set up a citizen's vetting committee to deal with corruption. It set up defense committees to take care of the distribution of wealth by confiscating from the rich and giving to the poor. In regards to the solicitation for aid, Rawlings sent delegations to Libya, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union to seek assistance. Unfortunately for Rawlings, the hope that aid from socialist countries would lift Ghana out of its economic chaos proved fruitless. With the exception of Libya, the socialist aid that Rawlings had banked on to assist his revolution was not forthcoming.¹⁸⁴ In other words, the implementation of the three prescriptions based on the socialist framework did not bring any relief to Ghana's economic crisis, and Rawlings was forced to change strategies. He approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank for financial assistance and was granted a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP)

¹⁸³ Emmanuel Hansen and Paul Collins, 'The Army, The State and the Rawlings' Revolution in Ghana.' *African Affairs*, Vol. 79 (January 1980): 3-23.

package by the two institutions. Rawlings was encouraged by these institutions to shift his economic policy away from redistribution and instead concentrate on increasing industrial and agricultural production.¹⁸⁵ In view of that recommendation, Rawlings embarked on an Economic Recovery Program (ERP).¹⁸⁶

In order to implement the program, Rawlings and his finance minister contacted the chairman of the Trade Union Congress and asked for the support of the workers. On December 30, 1982, Rawlings launched the ERP under the auspices of structural adjustment. In line with the program, Rawlings made cutbacks in government expenditures, devalued the national currency, and removed subsidies on essential consumer items. Price control mechanisms were also removed.¹⁸⁷ The devaluation was immediately felt because it resulted in an inflation rate of 174% in 1983. The price increases were not well received by Ghanaian workers, people rioted in the streets of Accra and in other cities throughout the country as a show of resistance to the Economic Recovery Program by Rawlings and his PNDC.¹⁸⁸

To explain the high prices, Rawlings called a rally at Tema. It, however, ended in confusion when workers bluntly told him they were dissatisfied with his budget. Infuriated, Rawlings burst into anger and the workers jeered him. He then reacted by smashing his microphone to the ground and storming off in an armored car. The budget

¹⁸⁴ D. Rothchild and E. Gyima-Boadi, "Ghana's Economic Decline and Development Strategies," in John Ravenhill, ed., *Africa in Economic Crisis*, 254-285 (NY: Colombia University Press, 1986).

¹⁸⁵ Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana*.

¹⁸⁶ Jeong Ho-Won, "Ghana: Lurching Towards Economic Rationality."

¹⁸⁷ Herbst, *The Politics of Reform in Ghana*.

¹⁸⁸ "Report on the 1983 Budget," *People's Daily Graphic*, 24 April 1983.

issue and the manner in which Rawlings handled it reduced the PNDC's image at home, but the government's image with the international agency soared. The World Bank sponsored a donor's conference for Ghana in Paris in November 1983. At the conference, the PNDC unveiled its long-term economic plan that included privatization of government enterprises. At that juncture, the World Bank agreed to loan Ghana \$120 million if the latter agreed to compensate Lonrho company for sequestration in 1972 of its 55% stake, a condition to which the Rawlings' team immediately agreed.¹⁸⁹ In other words, the government took a loan in 1983 to pay for an investment that had gone sour a decade earlier.¹⁹⁰

In the monetary sector, Rawlings allowed the Foreign Exchange Bureau to freely quote their buying and selling of other foreign currencies simultaneously with the *cedi*. Those actions in concert with the devaluation plunged the value of the *cedi* as much as 545% between 1983 and 1986. The cumulative effect was the spread of poverty in Ghana.¹⁹¹ Other methods of implementation of the program included intensification of workers retrenchments, privatization of government plants, and abandonment of welfare services, including education and healthcare. These policies were not different from the ones that Rawlings predecessors had implemented to slow human development from reaching the poor sector of the society.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

¹⁹⁰ *London Economist*, October 6, 1984, 79.

¹⁹¹ "Neglected Engine of Growth," *West Africa*, (January 9-15, 1989).

¹⁹² Kojo Senah, "Problems of Health Care Delivery System," in Kwame Ninsin and Emmanuel Hansen eds., *The State Development and Politics in Ghana*, 242-265 (London: Codesria, 1989).

Economic Policies in Mining and Forestry

Among all the policies that Rawlings adopted under the ERP, two areas that were especially harmful were in the natural resources sector of mining and forestry. In the mining industry, the government issued about fifty licenses in 1985 to foreign companies prospecting for gold mining without negotiating in good faith. The conditions of the licenses did not disclose the benefit that Ghana would receive from the deals. But, it was known that about ninety percent of all profits were allowed to be repatriated immediately to offshore investors.¹⁹³ Such deals tell the story of how Rawlings, through corruption, sold out Ghana's resources. As one foreign mining manager described it, "the change has come about entirely because the PNDC has made foreign investment attractive. We can export profits, have tax concessions, and our foreign exchange retention rate has doubled. They changed the rules of the game."¹⁹⁴ The above testimony of a foreign investor reveals how Rawlings' economic policy depleted the national resources without benefiting Ghanaians.

Mismanagement and Corruption in the Forestry

Mismanagement and corrupt activity that Rawlings nurtured was also evident in the forestry industry. A number of timber companies, agents, and officials in the government became involved in illegal activities that resulted in widespread corruption in

¹⁹³ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

¹⁹⁴ *Home Front Newsletter*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Ghana High Commission in London, March 1988): 8

the timber industry.¹⁹⁵ A case in point involved Silviconsult, a consulting company that advised the Ghanaian government to set up a Timber Export Development Board to promote Ghanaian Timber abroad and to help Ghanaian Timber Merchants to obtain better prices. Fraudulently, Silviconsult agents accepted orders from sister companies at low prices and passed them through to the Timber Export Development Board. The representatives of Silviconsult, acting as double agents, turned around and sold overpriced equipment to Ghanaian timber companies.¹⁹⁶ This example is only one of several, the network of corruption in the timber sector is much wider. The web of corruption in the Rawlings' government spanned across PNDC officials, timber merchants, senior civil servants, and some officials in the World Bank. Between 1986 and 1989, the National Investigations Committee investigated about thirty different cases of corruption in the timber industry and found that within that time period more than \$38 million was siphoned from Ghana's foreign exchange by corrupt officials and their foreign accomplices in the industry.¹⁹⁷

Unfortunately, these corrupt practices were not restricted to the mining and forestry industries alone, nor did only lower officials participated in such corrupt practices. Corruption permeated the executive branch of government officials, including Rawlings himself. According to a former PNDC member, Sergeant Allolga Akata-Pore, a former confidant of Rawlings, the former head of state and his national security officer, Kojo Tsikata, had dipped into the national coffers as well. According to Akata-Pore,

¹⁹⁵ William Keegan, "Forest Pay as Ghana Loses Out," *Financial Times* (February 8, 1989).

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁷ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

Rawlings and all the members of PNDC were embezzling huge sums of money from the National Consolidation Fund. The officer confessed to having participated in these actions.¹⁹⁸

Evaluation of the Economic Recovery Program

The success of Rawlings' economic program since coming to power is debatable. By some economic indicators, ERP and its adjustment program have been successful in controlling inflation and reducing the government deficit. It is estimated that, between the mid-1980s and 1990s, the program helped Ghana's economy grow 5 % a year for a decade.¹⁹⁹ With this evidence, Ghana was hailed as the IMF 's great success story in economic development.²⁰⁰ While the fiscal policy section of Ghana's budget might have improved due to reduction in subsidies, it did not set the economy on a development path.

In the industrial sector, Rawlings' economic policies have adversely impacted the development of Ghana's local industries. Faced with competition from abroad, they are unable to sell goods and foodstuffs that are locally produced. For example, companies like the Ghana Industrial Holding Corporation, and major textile companies are unable to compete with imported goods and therefore go out of business.²⁰¹ The result is the virtual

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹⁹ Jeong Ho-Won, "The Structural Adjustment Program in Ghana," *Journal of Law and Political Science*, No. 3 (January 1995): 167-92.

²⁰⁰ Julian Samboma, "Debt: Africa Dealt a Rum Hand" *African Business*, No. 209 (April 1996): 33-35.

²⁰¹ Thomas M. Callaghy, "Lost Between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment in Ghana, Zambia, and Nigeria", in Joan Nelson, ed., *Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World*, 278-304 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

absence of a manufacturing base, while the economy remains underdeveloped and dependent on imports. This condition, in turn, creates more economic problems through a balance of payment deficits. In the social sector, the ERP has had a negative impact on families through workers' retrenchment.

The introduction of the ERP came with retrenchment as part of the conditionalities originally devised at the donors' conference in Paris.²⁰² At the conference, the Rawlings' team was urged to make substantial cuts in labor as a way of reducing wages and salary bill.²⁰³ The first target of the retrenchment program was the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board (COCOBOD). As a result, the staff of the COCOBOD fell from over 100,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in June 1989.²⁰⁴ Other government corporations suffered a similar fate including the State Fishing Corporation and the Ghana Water & Sewerage Corporation. In the public service sector, healthcare and education were also affected. At the completion of retrenchment, a total of 107,166 people were dismissed from their jobs.²⁰⁵ As stated early, if the litmus test for Ghana's leadership is how the leaders rally the people towards solving economic problems to benefit the people, then the above evidence points to the failure of Rawlings' leadership. However, others do not share this evaluation of Rawlings. For instance, a recent article in the *New York Times* described the Rawlings' leadership in a "borrowed robe" as a success and hailed his

²⁰² Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana*.

²⁰³ Poku Adaa, "Solution for Ghana's Labor Crisis," *Talking Drums* (January 28, 1985): 5-11.

²⁰⁴ K. N. Owusu, Ghana's Cocoa Industry: Overview of the Industry, Challenges, Prospects and Constraints; Unpublished Paper presented at the National Seminar of Cocoa Industry, November 15-17, 1989, Accra, Ghana.

²⁰⁵ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

transfer of power as “ An African Success Story.”²⁰⁶ Such assessments appear to give credit to Rawlings for supposedly voluntarily and democratically relinquished power.

Ghana’s Road to Democracy under Rawlings

Jerry Rawlings had promised a democratic framework in the national decision-making process. Towards this end, he organized the Workers Defense Committee (WDC) and Popular Defense Committees (PDC) as democratic vanguards.²⁰⁷ However, after realizing that the two organs had too large role in the decision-making process, he merged the PDC and the WDC together and renamed it the Committee for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). He shifted the CDR’s functions from taking part in decision-making to that of a conduit for interpreting and explaining to the people the “aim of the revolution” as defined by the central government.²⁰⁸ Rawlings also realized that if the promise of involving the masses in the decision-making process was to be fulfilled, then a well-defined democratic framework had to be deduced. In place of liberal Democratic Party politics, Rawlings set up a National Commission for Democracy (NCD) and entrusted it with building a network that would become the instrument of a democratic process. In 1987, the NCD submitted its “blue book” report to the PNDC on how best to institutionalize participatory democracy and recommended that elected local assemblies be the vehicles through which people can participate in the decision-making process.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ “An African Success Story,” *New York Times*, January 8, 2001.

²⁰⁷ Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

Between 1987 and 1988, the NCD, under the instruction of the PNDC, drew a comprehensive voter's register and increased the number of administrative districts from 65 to 110.²¹⁰ Out of that data, the PNDC created a structure and established functions for a future elected district government and proceeded to conduct an election for district assemblies on a non-partisan basis. The condition was similar to the one-party selection process that had been previously suggested by both Nkrumah and Acheampong. The pattern of the district assemblies' elections did indicate that Rawlings was not interested in implementing a true democratic system in Ghana. This assessment is fair because all the candidates for the district assemblies had been affiliated with the PNDC. Moreover, the government, without holding an election had appointed about one-third of all the assembly members of all the districts.²¹¹ In practice, therefore, all the members of the district assemblies were associates of Rawlings who made the entire process undemocratic.

The undemocratic nature of the process drew high criticism from a broad spectrum of opposition groups in Ghana. The most vocal among the opposition was the Ghana Bar Association. It organized public opposition against the Rawlings' process. The opposition adopted the line of liberal democracy and called on Rawlings to lift the ban on political parties, release political prisoners, set up constituent assemblies, and draw up a new constitution. This internal pressure coincided with external pressure from international organizations and donors who demanded that Rawlings adopt democratic

²¹⁰ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

²¹¹ Kumi Ansa-Koi, 'District Assemblies As Institutional Framework for Decentralization and Democratization: A Case Study of the Akwapim North District Assembly,' Unpublished paper presented at

political practices.²¹² In 1990 the opposition members saw the Rawlings' NCD and the district assemblies with two views. First, they viewed the developments as an attempt by Rawlings to "finesse a constitutional legitimacy" for his PNDC government. Second, they saw it as another one-party system similar to Acheampong's ill-fated Unigov experiment of 1977 to 1978. Based on those perceptions, the opposition members joined together to form the Movement of Freedom and Justice (MFJ) and built a whirlwind of momentum to steal the democratic initiative from Rawlings and his PNDC.²¹³

When Rawlings and his advisors realized the opposition's legitimate strategy, they reneged on their so call democratic enlargement policy. In a dramatic change of events, Rawlings decided to rely on his ready network of district assemblies to compete for power. With this strategy, Rawlings made a quick turn around and laid out a new political agenda where he asked the NCD to produce a report to recommend a "way forward" towards a Consultative Assembly, a proposal for a new constitution.²¹⁴ In other words, both domestic and external forces compelled Rawlings to abandon his national one-party system to join a liberal multi-party democratic process.

In March 1991, the NCD published its report and recommended the adoption of a multi-party system. Simultaneously, a special committee of constitutional experts was set up to formulate a specific constitutional proposal, which was to be placed before the

a Conference on Democratization and the 1992 Elections in Ghana, August 5-6, 1993, School of Oriental Studies London.

²¹² World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. A Long Term Perspective Study* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1989); Ray, *Ghana Politics, Economics, and Society*.

²¹³ Mike Oquaye, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992. A Dissenting View," *African Affairs*, Vol. 94, No. 375 (April 1995): 259-75.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*

consultative assembly.²¹⁵ From then on, the democratic process took on a new dimension and matters proceeded at a faster pace. By the end of July 1991, the Constitutional Committee published its proposal to be considered by the consultative assembly. In August, the proceedings of the Consultative Assembly began, and at its opening, a time table was set for the return to a full constitutional government with a national election scheduled to be held in the third quarter of 1992.²¹⁶

The Election of 1992

In May 1992, Rawlings lifted the ban on party politics. Almost immediately, eight parties formed included the National Democratic Congress (NDC) of Rawlings and his associates.²¹⁷ Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on November 3 and December 29, 1992, respectively. With his network of the district assemblies, Rawlings won the presidential election and his party won most of the parliamentary seats.²¹⁸ On January 7, 1993, Rawlings became the president of the Fourth Republic.

Politically, Rawlings could not rally the political muster to correct the constitutional flaw that had laid the foundation for Ghana's political instabilities to unify the country. Economically, Rawlings continued the structural adjustment program that was entering its second phase and was dominated by the privatization of state-owned

²¹⁵ E. Gyimah-Boadi, "Notes on Ghana's Current Transition to constitutional Rule," *Africa Today*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Fall 1991): 5-17.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Oquaye, "The Ghanaian Elections of 1992. A Dissenting View."

²¹⁸ Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut, *Elections in Africa: Data Handbook*. 435.

enterprises. The national debt expanded and interest payments increased. Rawlings failed, like his predecessors, in establishing high moral and ethical standards among his official cadre. His first term ended without much improvement in the Ghanaian economy and the country still remains industrially underdeveloped due in part to corruption and public sector mismanagement.

The 1996 elections had a little competition, yet the NDC managed to win a victory with Rawlings winning a second term presidency with 57.5% of the votes.²¹⁹ Rawlings second term ended in 2000, and his Vice-President John Atta-Mills became the presidential candidate for NDC. At the 2000 elections, the opposition, New Patriotic Party's (NPP) candidate, Joseph A. Kuffor beat Atta-Mills in a run off election. On January 7th, 2001, Rawlings twenty-year rule in Ghana came to a peaceful end when he transferred power to the elected president from the opposition party.²²⁰

TOWARDS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR CONTINUED DECLINE?

Utilizing the UNDP's human development index, Ghana is economically impoverished.²²¹ By the same token, if development is defined as earlier stated in chapter 3, then here too Ghana, just like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, is not

²¹⁹ Ibid. 438.

²²⁰ "An African Success Story," *New York Times*, January 8, 2001.

²²¹ According to the United Nation's human index definition, development is when a nation is able to translate its economic gains into improving the living standard conditions of its citizens and residents. See, Mark McGillvray, "The Human Development Index: Yet Another Redundant Composite Development Indicator?" *World Development*, Vol. 19, No. 10 (October 1991): 1461-68.

economically developing.²²² This is so because, after twenty years of Rawlings' structural adjustment policies, Ghana still depends on imports for its consumer goods. The reason for this is that the economic program has not helped Ghana to develop the industrial capability needed to enable it to manufacture industrial goods to satisfy its domestic needs. In economic productive terms, Ghana lacks the comparative advantage in industrial production and, as such, its economy is still dominated by agricultural raw material simply because it lacks the scientific culture of creation for economic industrialization.

As Table 5-4 shows, a careful observation of the economic structure of Ghana reveals that the agricultural sector has remained approximately 50 % of the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since 1975, while the manufacturing sector has been declining. The manufacturing sector since 1975 has declined from 13% of the GDP to 5.9 % in 1995. Prior to 1985, the decline in manufacturing within one decade had been from 13% in 1975 to 11% in 1985. Within the same timeframe of ten years (1985-1995), when Rawlings implemented his economic policies, the manufacturing sector, which demonstrates the ability to create and thus constitutes development as defined in chapter 3, did decline from 11% of the GDP to 6.5 %. It further deteriorated from 6.5 % to 5.9% between 1994 and 1995, a significant indication that economic policies under Rawlings' leadership have made Ghanaians economically worse off than they were prior to his coming to power in 1981.

²²² This work defines development as a nation's ability to acquire scientific culture that enables it to technologically produce diverse industrial goods. See chapter three of this work.

Table 5-4
The Structure of Ghana's National Economy 1975-95

% Of Gross Domestic Product	1975	1985	1994	1995
Agriculture	47.7	44.9	46.4	46.3
Mining Industry	21.0	16.7	16.0	15.8
Manufacturing Industry	13.9	11.5	6.5	5.9
Service	31.3	38.4	37.7	37.9
Private Consumption	73.3	84.0	83.8	77.5
General Govt. Consumption	13.0	9.4	11.6	12.4
Imports of Goods and Services	18.4	13.6	36.9	33.5

Sources: World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1997.

Again, Table 5-4 also indicates that the agriculture sector has remained fairly constant between 44.9% and 47% of the GDP from 1975 to 1995. The services sector, which includes education and health services, increased from 31.3% to 38.4% between the same periods. However, from 1985 to 1995 the service sector remained relatively the same, between 37.7% and 38.4%. However, when an inflation rate of 27.7%, which was seen to be the lowest recorded in Ghana within that time period, is taken into consideration, then social services have been deteriorating since 1985.²²³ Ghana faces serious development problems because the economy as a whole lacks industrial capacity as demonstrated by its dwindling manufacturing sector. From a developmental perspective, the country's situation is troubling because it suggests that the leaders have not been able to establish the cultural attitudes and behavior necessary for development. As this case study shows, leaders have legitimized low moral culture that have resulted in

²²³ Oxfam, *Ghana Country Profile 1998-1999* (London: Oxfam, 2000)

corruption and human rights abuses, both of which are detrimental to development. The leaders have also failed to devise coherent progressive policies towards achieving a scientific culture of creation.

What Are the Moral and Scientific Cultures in Ghana?

As noted above, the level of corruption among party affiliates and the COCOBOD institution in Ghana since Nkrumah's time demonstrate that there is low moral conviction on the part of Ghanaian leaders. The corrupt behavior has been prevalent in all administrations. During the Rawlings' period, corruption skyrocketed in institutions such as the National Timber Export Board. There was also a rise in human rights violations.²²⁴

As far as the scientific culture is concerned, Table 5-4 reflects the decline in growth of Ghana's industrial manufacturing sector. Although basic and intermediate science was part of Ghanaian school curriculum up to the university level in early the twentieth century, the country does not have the industrial scientific ability to induce industrialization.²²⁵ The importance of scientific culture in Ghana's development, with the exception of Nkrumah's leadership, has received virtually no attention from Ghanaian leaders.²²⁶ Since 1966, they have failed to integrate scientific education into national economic development policies. In fact, since the leaders of the 1966 military coup abandoned industrial projects that were under construction, Ghana's idea of development

²²⁴ Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana*.

²²⁵ J. Anamuah-Mensah, "Science Education as a Tool for National Development: The Missing Framework," Unpublished Paper presented at Eastern Washington University, May 1998.

²²⁶ *Ibid.*

has always been based on export promotion as opposed to industrial promotion. Indeed, the neglect of research and development is not unique to Ghana, but it is a common phenomenon in the entire sub-Saharan Africa world.²²⁷

In Ghana, the lack of a development vision by leaders has led all postcolonial leaders, with the exception of Nkrumah, to avoid meaningful scientific policies as a way of achieving economic development. In place of intensive economic research and development, Ghanaian leaders have adopted small-scale technology known in Africa as *Appropriate Technology* (AT).²²⁸ As mentioned in chapter four, AT focuses narrowly on technologies suitable for rural food processing and production. It is also labor-intensive as opposed to being technological oriented. Hence, it lacks the potential to stimulate an industrial culture essential for economic development.²²⁹ For this reason, Ghanaian leaders cannot claim that adopting AT policies will propel the country towards a scientific culture capable of fostering industrialization and sustainable economic development capabilities.

While Ghana's first leader, after independence, theoretically formulated scientific culture policies that could have assisted the country in attaining sustainable development, he had little time to practically establish such a culture before he was deposed. Unfortunately, Nkrumah's successors have been less motivated to formulate and implement adequate policies that take scientific culture into account. In addition to the absence of scientific culture, the leaders have lacked the high moral discipline to abstain

²²⁷ Ahmad, "Science and Technology."

²²⁸ Segal, "Appropriate Technology."

²²⁹ Stewart, *Macro Policies for Appropriate Technology in Developing Countries*.

from indulging in corruption. Therefore, they have been unable to foster the appropriate culture for material economic development. After forty-three years of independence, Ghana, a nation endowed with natural and potential human resources, remains one the poorest and underdeveloped countries in the world.²³⁰

SUMMARY

This chapter has shown that precolonial Ghana was occupied by different autonomous nations such as the Ashanti, Fanti, and Dagomba. The nations had somewhat similar political and economic institutions headed by chiefs and kings.²³¹ Chiefs headed tribal groupings while the kings presided over hegemonic nations such as the Ashanti Empire. Precolonial leaders were selected through a hierarchical inheritance system, and they administered their societies in a participatory democratic fashion. Leaders administered their societies with the assistance of three different political institutions, namely the Privy Council, Council of Elders, and Village Assemblies of the Commoners.

Economically, the nations were agrarian societies that engaged in subsistence farming and commerce. Land was the main factor of production and its supervision by leaders made them very important and powerful. The economic role of leaders made them aware of their social status and moral obligations to the wider societies. Leaders refrained from monopolizing means of production and extracted little tribute from citizens.²³² There were institutional checks-and-balances to limit the misuse of power. Leaders

²³⁰ Rimmer, *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy*.

²³¹ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

created a high moral culture, void of corruption, which facilitated citizen engagement in progressive economic activities. Through such political and economic synergism, the individual societies maintained social stability.

At the same time, none of the leaders, with the exception of Osei Tutu of Ashanti, were able to establish a political system with the purpose of integrating the nations into a homogenous society. Ashanti leaders used military conquest as a method of building a homogenous empire. To manage the Ashanti Empire, the leaders created an imperial system under the supervision of the Union Council headed by the Ashanti king and guided by the Ashanti constitution.²³³ Due to unequal treatment from the Ashantis, conquered nations did not identify their interests with the empire as a corporate union. The indifference flowing from that disconnection led to revolts. The instabilities prevented the crystallization of the nations into a unified and homogenous society.

As commercial societies, the competition to gain access to European trade also intensified tribal rivalries. That fracture left them to defend themselves against each other and made each tribe vulnerable to outsiders. Under the circumstance, the Fantis gravitated to the European traders in search of security against the Ashantis. Through the association, the British colonized the Fanti in 1850 through an agreement known as the Bond of 1844.²³⁴ In contrast to the Fantis, the Ashantis waged one hundred years of war with the British to ward off colonization. They accomplished and maintained this goal until 1902 when they were defeated and colonized. The colonization of the Ashanti

²³² Wickins, *An Economic History of Africa*.

²³³ Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*.

²³⁴ Danquah, "The Historical Significance of The Bond of 1844."

occurred simultaneously with the annexation of Dagombas in the North. These three phases of gradual imposition of the British rule constituted the colonization of Ghana.²³⁵

Colonial rule subjugated all indigenous leaders together with their institutions and rules to those of the colonial administration. The colonial leaders sent from Britain imposed British rules, and de-legitimized the chieftaincy to the extent that the nature of leadership lost its respect among its own people. Politically, the subjugation of traditional leaders and the imposition of British rule are the key differences between colonization in the Gold Coast and protectorate in other parts of Africa. One of the earlier colonial leaders to arrive in the Gold Coast was Frederick Guggisberg. In 1919, when he arrived in the Gold Coast his administration focused on economic development as opposed to political development.

Despite the negative political impacts, there were some positive economic consequences from colonization. Guggisberg laid and improved the Gold Coast's national transportation system. He laid railroad tracks to help expedite the shipment of the colony's agricultural products to the world market. Besides the railroad tracks, new automobile roads were constructed in conjunction with a harbor at Takoradi. The governor topped his infrastructure plan with development in education and medical services for the colony. By 1929, the colony's economy had been transformed from the predominance of slave trade and forest commodities such as spices, palm produce, and rubber to that of cocoa beans, gold, diamonds, manganese, and timber.²³⁶ On the

²³⁵ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

²³⁶ Hiden, "Plan for Africa."

traditional side. Ofori Atta was one of the first leaders to serve on the colonial legislative council. Politically, he led a delegation to England to ask for constitutional change to allow more local people on the legislative council. He also worked hard to increase the number of natives in the colonial civil service. Economically, he led a boycott against colonial cocoa buyers who had conspired to cheat cocoa producers. Despite his efforts in both economics and politics, he failed to provide national leadership because he failed to speak for the nation as a whole and became a *comprador* for the British system of divide-and-rule.

Colonial rule lasted until 1946 when nationalist movements started to demand self-rule. In 1947, nationalist leaders formed the UGCC with the objective of attaining self-rule for the colony. The nationalist movement reached its climax in 1948 when a riot in the capital turned into a national disturbance. After the riot, constitutional talks held in 1949 adopted a British type of political structure that excluded traditional leaders from the national political system. Nkrumah, one of the opponents of the constitutional framework, broke away from the UGCC to form the CPP. Elections were held in 1951, and the colonial government transferred power to Nkrumah and his victorious CPP party. Nkrumah's quest of power prevented him from making political concessions to include the traditional leaders. Economically, he advanced the policies that were in place and increased education and health services to other parts of the country where they were lacking.²³⁷ However, large amounts of government funds created temptation and brought corruption to Nkrumah's regime.

²³⁷ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

Prior to independence, Nkrumah had an opportunity to change the constitutional flaw that had undermined national politics. He, however, refused to do so. Instead, he adopted the Preventive Act of Detention in 1958 as a means of stabilizing the nation. In doing so, Nkrumah laid the foundation for a dictatorial political culture that also, in turn, laid the foundation for Ghana's political instability.²³⁸ In the end, Nkrumah could not forge a leadership consensus to build a stable foundation to facilitate socio-economic development.

After independence, Nkrumah first pursued liberal economic policies but switched when they failed to yield positive results. He then adopted a socialist approach to economic development. This inward-orientation transformed Ghana's economy and initiated industrial projects throughout Ghana from a meat processing plant to car manufacturing plant.²³⁹ Nkrumah, however, failed to provide moral leadership against corruption. His party members turned the CMB into a corrupt institution and used it to extract money from producers to satisfy the personal interests of party officials as opposed to broader national interests.²⁴⁰ Corruption and political agitations led to a downward spiral in the economy, and the opposition took advantage to support the military to stage a coup to overthrow Nkrumah's government in 1966.

The overthrow of Nkrumah's regime marked the beginning of the use of military in the resolution of political conflicts in Ghana. From that time until 1981, Ghana moved from one military junta to another with intermittent civilian rule creating the *interlude*

²³⁸ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

²³⁹ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

²⁴⁰ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

leadership era. The interlude leaders failed to formulate economic policies to alleviate Ghana's economic crisis. Instead, they all adopted austerity measures to cut social services which caused economic hardship for the poor. In some cases, the cutbacks denied education to poor children. Interlude leaders, starting from Ankrah and Afrifa in 1966 to Limann in 1979, all abetted the legitimization of corruption and political suppression of traditional leaders.²⁴¹ The interlude leadership ended when Rawlings returned to power in 1981.

Politically, Rawlings maintained authoritarian rule under his PNDC for 12 years before contesting elections in 1992. As an elected leader Rawlings ruled until 2001. During this period, he was unable to resolve the political flaws that continue to undermine the political and economic stability of Ghana. Socially, Rawlings inspired *bullyboys* within the military, specially trained commandos and BNI agents to use brutal force against the civilian population. In the immediate aftermath of the 1981 coup, military brutality became a thorny problem in Ghana. Rawlings set up military tribunals that condemned people to death by public firing squad, and killed many citizens including three former heads of state.²⁴²

Economically, Rawlings adopted structural adjustment programs as an economic development strategy. The conditions of these programs required the removal of social subsidies, devaluation of *cedi*, and privatization of government enterprises, which led to

²⁴¹ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

²⁴² *West Africa*, July 2, 1979.

an unemployment of 107,000 workers.²⁴³ His policies in mining and forestry also increased corruption to the extent that in one year more than \$38 million was siphoned out of the forestry industry.²⁴⁴ After almost 20 years of Rawlings' ERP, Ghana is overburdened with debt and its per capita income stands around \$400. The policies have also brought massive increases in the cost of living for the poor, and the country remains un-industrialized with most of its revenues coming from raw materials. There is little industrialization in Ghana due to a lack of scientific culture that is required to empower scientific creativity and technological innovations. All evidence points to the fact that Ghana's underdevelopment is mostly a result of its own doing, due in large part to the inability of its leaders to establish social cultures conducive to economic development. In place of a socio-scientific culture that promotes development, the leaders have established and legitimized corrupt and dictatorial cultures that Rawlings furthered through legitimization of political violence.²⁴⁵

The postcolonial leaders have made both the economic and political situation worse. By legitimizing corruption, dictatorship, and political violence, they have undermined the economic progress made during the colonial days. In so doing, the postcolonial leaders have made Ghana one of the poorest countries in the world.²⁴⁶

Ghana has experienced three leadership phases. The first one was the precolonial leadership; the second was the colonial leadership, and the third is the current

²⁴³ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

²⁴⁴ Keegan, "Forest Pays as Ghana Loses Out."

²⁴⁵ Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana*.

²⁴⁶ International Monetary Fund, *International Financial Statistics Yearbook* (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1983).

postcolonial leadership. The precolonial leaders managed their individual societies economically well but waged wars among themselves without establishing a homogenous society. The colonial leaders embarked on a course of meaningful economic development but without a democratic political apparatus. Unfortunately, the postcolonial leaders have undermined development by establishing a corrupt culture that siphons national financial resource for personal use as opposed to being utilized for national development. Political leaders have been less motivated to establish a scientific culture of creation to spur industrialization and sustainable development.

CHAPTER VI

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

Evidence from the case studies suggests that since independence Ghanaian leaders have fostered and legitimized a low moral culture, which has produced endemic corruption. Moreover, the leaders have been unable to establish scientific culture to induce industrialization. In addition to these conditions, Kwame Nkrumah's first government constitutionally disenfranchised traditional leaders from Ghana's postcolonial political order. The problem however was that with previous local patterns of socialization and political participation by chiefs, Nkrumah's action created resentment from the chiefs. Successive leaders, since Nkrumah, have continued this practice of excluding traditional chiefs who have local political support and the loyalty of rural people. This exclusion of traditional leaders from national governance has, for a long time, crystallized into opposition by local leaders and their supporters towards many development policies that have been formulated by postcolonial leaders. These conditions have collectively contributed to economic underdevelopment and abject poverty in Ghana.¹ It was also seen that Nkrumah's initiative to transform the economy towards industrialization was incomplete. Since his ouster, his successors have abandoned industrialization and have adopted monetary economic policies with little attempt to transform the monoculture productive system of Ghana.² Politically, Nkrumah adopted

¹ Rimmer, *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy*.

² Nkrumah initiated industrialization as means of transforming Ghana's productive system, but he did not adopt capitalist methodology. For Nkrumah's socialist economic system see Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

authoritarianism through legislative acts and disenfranchised traditional leaders from participating in national politics. Nkrumah's successors have followed a similar political path.³ The last 20 years of Rawlings' administration further widened the negative political culture to include human rights abuses.⁴

In contrast to Ghana, Botswana has enjoyed greater economic progress. The country's economic conditions improved because its leaders have been successful in establishing a high moral culture to curtail corruption. Immediately after independence, Seretse Khama emphasized and strengthened the culture of internal moral discipline. His personal distaste for corruption prevented his officials from kleptocracy; thereby ensuring financial resources were used for social services such as education and healthcare.⁵ In production, Khama was able to transform the previous production system, based on patron-client relations, into class relations based on capitalism, to induce economic growth.⁶

Politically, Khama stressed the importance of democracy and structured his government to achieve this political ideal. In terms of political socialization, he and his party leaders allowed traditional leaders a role in the governing of Botswana by incorporating chiefs in the legislative assembly through constitutional means. This political inclusion of traditional leaders and their followers enabled Botswana to maintain political stability. Khama's successors have adhered to political socialization to enhance

³ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Political Stability*.

⁴ Shillington, *Ghana and the Rawlings Factor*.

⁵ Charlton, "Exploring the Byways of African Political Corruption."

⁶ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

Botswana's pluralist democracy. His successors have also adhered to high moral culture with no tolerance for corruption practices. By establishing high moral culture, Botswana's economy is doing better than that of Ghana. The explanation lies in Botswana's leadership's ability to establish high moral culture, as one of the prerequisites cultures needed for development.⁷ By the same token, the stagnation of economic development in Ghana is explained by its leaders' inability to establish a high moral culture capable of preventing corruption in order to channel financial resources to human development.

The difference in the protectorate system that existed in Botswana during the colonial era in contrast to that of direct rule in Ghana explains why Botswana leaders are able to establish a high moral culture to benefit their country. The protectorate system allowed the traditional leaders and their institutions with their moral obligations to the people to be preserved in the postcolonial era. The inability of contemporary Ghanaian leaders to establish high moral culture is partially attributed to direct colonial rule. Direct rule eliminated the traditional leadership class and, in its place, created a new leadership group who had no fiduciary relations or moral obligation to the local people.

The divergence in leadership behavior, partially explains the economic progress of Botswana in comparison to Ghana. Botswana's annual per capita income rose from \$50 at the time of independence to over \$3000 in 1997, while that of Ghana only rose from \$242 at the time of independence to about \$400 in 1997. The economic difference is also reflected in educational attainment between adults and children in both countries. Botswana's illiteracy rate is 30%, while Ghana's stands at 36%. At the elementary level,

⁷ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

school enrollment for children in Botswana is 112% compared to 76% in Ghana.⁸ Despite the difference in economic improvement that favors Botswana, both countries are still industrially undeveloped due to the absence of a scientific culture, which could assist them in being more self-sufficient by enabling them to produce industrial goods domestically. The inability of leaders in both countries to establish scientific culture finds support in their adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy, used by Senghor as a defense for African self-identification, postulates that scientific culture is not an African cultural trait as it is in the western European culture.⁹ Strict adherence to this philosophy by the first postcolonial leaders of Ghana and Botswana, Nkrumah and Khama respectively, made them less inclined to consider or pursue scientific culture as a tool for fostering economic development. Successive leaders of both countries have also neglected scientific culture, thereby leaving their societies technologically behind and developmentally bankrupt.

As already mentioned, the information from the previous two chapters offers convincing evidence that there is a vast difference in the economic prosperity of the people in Botswana vis-à-vis their regional Ghanaian neighbors. This evidence also shows the dissimilarities that emanate from their respective leaderships' policies and systems of governance. However, such a conclusion neglects any qualitative theoretical explanation and comparative analysis. This chapter attempts to fill that void in three ways. First, it compares the similarities and differences in leadership in Botswana and

⁸ African Development Bank, *Basic Indicators on African Countries* (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: African Development Bank, 1999).

⁹ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

Ghana relative to their countries' economic development. We look at leadership differences during the colonial era, and how leadership transferred power to postcolonial leaders. The second section reviews the economic status of both countries immediately after their independence and compares them to their current economic status. The section uses the LCD theoretical model to explain the difference in the economies relative to the leaderships' ability in fostering moral and scientific cultures. Third, in this chapter, I use the colonial factor and Senghorian dimension to elucidate why the leaders are able, or unable, to establish high moral and scientific cultures needed to stimulate economic development in their respective countries.

SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND ECONOMICS

In terms of economic similarities, both precolonial Tswana and Ghanaian communities were affected by the global capitalist economy long before they became politically affiliated with Britain under colonization.¹⁰ Aside from being influenced by the capitalist system, the two were agrarian societies. Subsistence farming in forest commodities dominated the economy of Ghana, while cattle rearing was dominating in Botswana. In both countries, leaders played important roles in the economies because they owned or controlled the means of production in the form of cattle and land.¹¹ Both communities also engaged in commerce. The Ghanaian communities traded in forest commodities such as spices, rubber, and also engaged in the slave trade. The Tswana

¹⁰ For information on precolonial Ghana coming in contact with capitalist economy, see Fynn, *Ashanti and Its Neighbours*. ; For information on precolonial Botswana coming in contact with capitalist economy, see Picard, *The Evolution Modern Botswana*.

communities traded in cattle with their neighboring communities. In colonial days, however, the economies of the two countries changed. Ghana's economy was transformed from slave and spice trade to commercial crop of cocoa beans, gold, and diamonds. The economy of Botswana became dominated by capitalist activities such as supplying wagon trains, controlling trade, and other capitalist opportunities.¹²

Both economies prospered during the colonial era, with the Ghanaian economy benefiting the most. In Ghana, cocoa exports quadrupled and revenues from the crop increased.¹³ This generated income for most local inhabitants and provided revenue for economic infrastructure and development. Governor Frederick Guggisberg, for example, partially financed his development projects including railroad tracks, education, and medical services with surplus cocoa revenues.¹⁴ Botswana also experienced economic growth in the earlier stage of its encounter with capitalism but was later subordinated by capitalists in their need to create a labor reserve out of Botswana's citizens.¹⁵ In addition to turning the territories into a labor reserve, capitalists also restricted Tswana from participating in other forms of economic activities such as trade.¹⁶

Unfortunately for Botswana, its leaders could not do very much to assist in alleviating the economic hardships because the main factors of production (land and

¹¹ Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country"; For earlier economic system in Ghana see Wickins, *An Economic History of Africa*.

¹² Palmer and Parsons, *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*.

¹³ Danquah, "Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana."

¹⁴ Guggisberg, *The Gold Coast: A Review of the Events*.

¹⁵ Massey, *Case of Colonial Collaboration*.

¹⁶ Best, "General Trading in Botswana."

cattle) had been strategically constrained by British and South African governments. The British government devised means of taking lands, while the South African government put discriminatory restrictions on Tswana's ability to export their cattle into its country.¹⁷ However, even against those odds, some traditional leaders tried to invigorate the economy. For example, Kgosi Isang Pilane of BoKgatla organized a Tribal Boring Scheme and drilled boreholes to get water for cattle grazing land for his subjects.¹⁸ In comparison to Botswana, the traditional leaders in Ghana had a more positive impact on their economy because there were less colonial restrictions on how they could use their lands vis-à-vis Botswana's traditional leaders.¹⁹ For example, Ofori Atta, a traditional chief, was able to lead a boycott against European cocoa buyers in Ghana when he felt that the buyers' price collusion could have robbed local cocoa producers of substantial resources.²⁰ In colonial politics, however, the Ghanaian traditional leaders had less impact in contrast with their Botswana counterparts because of differences in the protectorate and direct rule systems.

COLONIAL DIFFERENCES IN PROTECTORATE AND DIRECT RULES

In terms of colonial affiliation, Botswana became part of the British Empire with the establishment of a protectorate over the former Bechuanaland in 1885.²¹ The

¹⁷ Palmer and Parsons, *The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and Southern Africa*.

¹⁸ Konczacki, Parpart, and Shaw, *Studies in Economic History of Southern Africa*.

¹⁹ Those interested in how other traditional leaders were involved with the development of the cocoa economy in colonial Ghana see Danquah, "Rural Discontent and Decolonization in Ghana."

²⁰ Danquah, *Liberty of the Subject*.

²¹ Parsons, "The Economic History of Khama's Country."

protectorate system was tied to a parallel rule arrangement, where the protectorate administration and the local rule were simultaneous but mutually exclusive from each another.²² Under the mechanics of the system, there was only British supervision of the central traditional government since the British did not directly govern the local people. The protection offered by the British affected only external affairs of the territories, including matters dealing with European affairs in the protectorate. Moreover, it allowed the chiefs to manage their internal affairs without interference.²³

Unlike the protectorate in Botswana, the British colonization of Ghana entailed direct governance of the local people that came in three phases. The first involved the colonization of the coastal areas in 1850 through the Bond of 1844. That direct rule was followed by an annexation of the Ashanti province in 1902, with a simultaneous inclusion of the Northern territory.²⁴ To avoid competing authorities once the colonial apparatus was in place, the British subjugated traditional leaders, preventing them and their people from participating in the national decision-making process.²⁵ Another profound distinction between the two systems was in the judiciary sectors of the two countries. Under the direct rule, the traditional judiciary systems in Ghana were replaced with the British judicial system that forced traditional leaders to abdicate their right to adjudicate.²⁶ In Botswana, however, traditional leaders dealt with judicial matters

²² Shillington, *The Colonisation of The Southern Tswana*.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

²⁵ Lugard, *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*.

²⁶ Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana*.

concerning the indigenous people under their *kgotla* judicial system. This helped to preserve the moral obligations, rule of law, and legitimacy of leaders in Botswana. In Ghana, by contrast, the competition between the customary laws and British colonial laws brought about non-compliance of traditional laws, which resulted in social polarization, illegitimate leaders, and changes in moral values.²⁷

Based on the above differences, traditional leaders in both countries had different roles during the postcolonial era. In colonial Ghana, traditional leaders had been ostracized, humiliated, demoralized, and in many instances forced out of their political positions, making their impact on development mediocre at best. Under the protectorate affiliation, however, Botswana leaders maintained virtually all their domestic roles and had more impact on the domestic political process.²⁸ Compared to their counterparts in Ghana, two Botswana chiefs, Tshekedi Khama and Chief Bathoen, played significant roles in ensuring their country was not polarized through colonization. The leaders waged relentless campaigns against British efforts to colonize their country and, in so doing, indirectly preserved their society's moral obligation based on the Tswana tradition of *kagisano*.²⁹

Tshekedi's challenge and resistance to the British was only one of the fierce political campaigns he and his colleagues had to wage in protecting Botswana from going under foreign rule. On another occasion, Tshekedi waged international war through the

²⁷ Gocking, "Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor. "

²⁸ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

²⁹ In regards to South Africa's attempt to annex Bechuanaland see Landell-Mills, "The 1969 South African Custom Union Agreement"; On the British attempt to colonize Botswana see Picard, "Role Changes Among Field Administrative in Botswana."

United Nations to prevent Jan Smuts of South Africa from indirectly annexing Botswana through an annexation attempt on South West Africa.³⁰ With social cohesiveness under the protectorate system, Tshekedi devoted the latter part of his life to organizing tribal councils in the territories from which his nephew, Seretse Khama, selected the members of his Botswana Democratic Party to lead the country to independence and to its current economic prosperity.³¹ The above activities are indicative of how the protectorate system enabled Botswana's chiefs to orchestrate political strategies that preserved their moral values and guided political developments in a gradual evolution that offered stability for Botswana's postcolonial development. In contrast, the direct rule in Ghana produced a different leadership scenario. Ghana was divided into three regions and administered separately to prevent collective national leadership from posing a threat to the colonizer.³² On the regional levels, leaders were subjugated, de-legitimized, and barred from adjudicating and maintaining social order. The above-narrated colonial difference shows that both colonial systems offered different leadership contingencies in the two countries at the dawn of their colonial eras and well into the postcolonial era.

Transition to Postcolonial Leadership in Botswana and Ghana

In comparison to Ghana, where the transition to postcolonial leadership started with political agitation,³³ the British Protectorate Commission initiated Botswana's

³⁰ Crowder, "Tshekedi Khama, Smuts, and South West Africa."

³¹ Khama, *The Case for Bechuanaland*.

³² Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

³³ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

transfer of power to postcolonial leadership without societal conflict. It was initiated by introducing the British democratic style of politics in an attempt to phase out the country's traditional principle of hereditary rule.³⁴ Ironically, the commission used the traditional leadership forum by encouraging chiefs, their heirs, and other Botswana citizens, including those of foreign descent, to form a Joint Advisory Council (JAC) and an African Advisory Council (AAC) as transitory organizations. Tshekedi Khama, the chief of the royal house of Bangwato, Seretse Khama's uncle, sat on both councils.³⁵ When Seretse returned to Botswana in 1956, Tshekedi recommended that he accept a position as an assistant tribal secretary. In 1958, a legislative council (*legco*) was created to allow Botswana to take care of its external affairs with minimum protectorate administrative supervision.³⁶ The establishment of *Legco* and the advancement of the political process towards autonomous self-rule led to the formation of three political parties in Botswana. Among the three parties was the Botswana Democratic Party, which Seretse Khama headed.³⁷

By contrast, the transition arrangements for the transfer of power from colonial to postcolonial leaders in Ghana were not clear-cut. The transition was not initiated by the colonial administration, but rather was marked by political agitation between locals and the colonizer as well as between the locals themselves. The rivalry was due to the nature

³⁴ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

of the direct colonial rule.³⁸ The antagonism developed because, during the consolidation of the colonial rule, the British created another group of leaders by allying itself with local educated elite through the legal prism to protect its economic interest.³⁹ Later, however, the British faced challenges emanating from some of the educated groups, such as the Aborigines Rights Protection Society, which wanted to protect their national lands from being taken over by the colonizer. With those challenges from some of the educated groups, the British changed its policy and allied itself with the traditional chiefs in line with a new indirect rule policy.⁴⁰ That vacillation of colonial policies within the local elements created two problems for the transition. First, the turbulence created two leadership groups (the traditional leaders and the educated elite), both of which wanted to inherit power from the colonizer. Second, it created a dilemma for the colonizer because there was no unified national leadership group to be utilized as a medium for the transition process.⁴¹ Therefore, in contrast to Botswana where the protectorate had preserved the leadership group for the transition, direct colonial rule eliminated traditional leaders and created leadership uncertainty in Ghana.

Botswana's Leadership and Power Transition

As Botswana moved closer to the transition of power, the protectorate secretariat invited officials of the political parties and the traditional leaders to constitutional talks in

³⁸ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

³⁹ Gocking, "Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."

⁴⁰ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

⁴¹ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*; Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

1963. Due to the nature of the protectorate arrangements, the secretariat realized the important role of the traditional leaders and called a special meeting to consider the position of the chiefs in the ongoing political process.⁴² The chiefs' role in the process was deemed critical because, during the protectorate era, they were basically allowed to govern their tribal territories according to their social institutions and thereby maintain law and order without foreign intervention. For that reason, the new political officials recognized the role the chiefs could play in the administration of the country. It was acceptable therefore, at the constitutional talks, to include a house of chiefs in the legislative assembly, so the chiefs could share power and play a central part in the national affairs.⁴³

The inclusion of the chiefs in Botswana's Legislative Assembly meant two things that were essential for the country's development. First, the transition of power would reside in both groups of leaders. This prevented the emergence of domestic political rivalries that might compete for power as happened in the case of Ghana.⁴⁴ Second, the inclusion of chiefs meant tribal loyalty was secured. The traditional leaders were of great value. Their presence offered political legitimacy and contributed to a more effective local government. The traditional leaders, like their emerging political officials, also shared the need to build a unified domestic leadership and made the necessary concessions in that regard. They transferred their national legitimacy to the new political

⁴² Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

⁴³ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

⁴⁴ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

officials.⁴⁵ In essence, the protectorate conditions made it possible for the new political leaders to realize the importance of the traditional leaders and, in that regards, reserved an un-contested place for them through the House of Chiefs in the Legislative Assembly. By the same token, the traditional leaders reciprocated by transferring the national institutional legitimacy to the new political officials. With those arrangements, a unified domestic leadership was created for a smooth transition of power into the postcolonial era in Botswana.

In a way, the transition was smooth. The leadership in Botswana was unified partially because the protectorate system allowed the transformation to be orchestrated and executed with the right socially legitimized class, to the extent that nothing changed as far as the functions of social classes were concerned. In a more abstract manner, the traditional leaders knew they were transferring power to their heirs who were becoming political officials. For example, Seretse Khama and other leaders of the Botswana Democratic Party, who were becoming the new political officials, were heirs to the various royal families in the territories.⁴⁶ In that context, because of the protectorate system, the change in Botswana from the colonial era to the postcolonial era involved only the political apparatus, not a change in the leadership group.

Ghana's Leadership and Power Transition

The background history of Ghana's transition to postcolonial power was a short one, lasting from 1947 to 1957. Nevertheless, the immediate preceding years had

⁴⁵ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

witnessed national political movements. Many of the most highly educated citizens and some chiefs joined the opposition to colonial rule. That led to the formation of the UGCC in 1947 as a political organization. However, steps towards self-government did not occur until the infamous riot of 1948.⁴⁷ In investigating the causes of the riot, an appointed commission concluded that the riot reflected the frustration of the educated classes with the lack of opportunities in Ghana. As a remedy, the commission recommended constitutional reforms to be followed with a government made of local citizens.⁴⁸

Based on the commission's report, the colonial government invited thirty-eight people to formulate a new constitution. The group was composed of chiefs, educated leaders, and some members of the UGCC, the only political organization at the time. Unlike the transitional group in Botswana, the absence of a national traditional leadership forum in colonial Ghana and the presence of two competing leadership groups made the transition different. Given the structure of the direct colonial rule, the constitutional commission overlooked the role of the traditional chiefs and did not discuss power sharing between traditional leaders and new emerging political officials.⁴⁹ Instead, with the colonial influence, the commission adopted a British type of representative political structure that meant a transformation from the traditional inherited political system to a new democratic process, the effect of which sidelined traditional leaders and their

⁴⁷ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

followers. By the end of the talk power was subtly transferred to the educated classes with the chiefs being left out of a role in the national constitutional rule.⁵⁰

In retrospect, the direct colonial rule made the conditions feasible for power to be taken from the legitimate traditional leaders and given to a new group that held no collective legitimacy. Direct colonization did that, first, by usurping the legitimate authority from the traditional leaders during the initial consolidation of power. At other times, it usurped power by the arbitrary removal of chiefs from their positions.⁵¹ Second, direct colonialism made the transfer of power to educated groups possible because, after one century of its rule, it had positioned itself as the natural source of legitimate authority. This belief created an illusion in the minds of the commission members about the irrelevancy of traditional leaders and their role and also enabled the commission to exclude them from participating in the constitutional rule.

Therefore, based on the differences in direct colonization in Ghana vis-à-vis the protectorate in Botswana, the transition of power in Ghana brought about two changes. First, there was a change in the political apparatus from that of an inherited system to a representative form of government. Second, there was a change from the previous traditional leadership group with legitimacy to a new educated leadership group without legitimacy. On the leadership front, Ghana had a new leadership group without power sharing and was backed by foreign colonial legitimacy without domestic legitimacy, while Botswana had a continuous amalgamated leadership which had been made possible by its protectorate colonial legacy.

⁵⁰ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁵¹ Gocking, "Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."

ECONOMIES OF BOTSWANA AND GHANA: BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE

During the colonial days, capitalist interests subordinated most economies in Africa. That situation also applied to the economies of Botswana and Ghana. During the protectorate era, Botswana was turned into a labor reserve to serve mining interests in South African goldmines. That goal was achieved by a strategy devised by capitalists to turn some of Botswana's citizens into wage earners by selling their labor for low wages by working in South African mines.⁵² Even in Botswana agriculture, capitalists orchestrated strategies to restrict access to land through the creation of free hold farms as a means of forcing farmers into selling their labor.⁵³ Through such strategies and others, like trade, the protectorate economy of Botswana was undermined by the capitalist system.⁵⁴

By the time Botswana attained its independence, a large part of its population supplemented their living with income remittance from their relatives who worked in the mines in apartheid South Africa.⁵⁵ At independence, poverty had escalated and the average annual per capita income of the Botswana was approximately \$50. Modern healthcare facilities were not in existence to cater to the needs of the local residents, and people had to depend on traditional herbalists.⁵⁶ In education, the problem was even

⁵² Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

⁵³ Legassick, "Gold, Agriculture and Secondary Industry."

⁵⁴ Best, "General Trading in Botswana."

⁵⁵ Cathie, *Food Security*.

⁵⁶ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

worse because only half of the school age children had facilities to attend school and there were only 1,400 students enrolled in secondary schools.⁵⁷ Botswana's capital, Gaborone, was still under construction, and the country could boast of only twenty miles of tarred road.⁵⁸ Financially, Botswana had to depend on Great Britain to balance its meager national budget.⁵⁹

In comparison to Botswana, Ghana was in a strong economic position at the time of independence. The colonial leadership, under Governor Frederick Guggisberg, undertook extensive economic infrastructure development. There were railroads tracks connecting all major cities in the southern part of the country. Ghana's healthcare service, as noted in chapter five, was one of the best in sub-Saharan Africa. There were about thirty well-equipped government hospitals with approximately 2,630 hospital beds catering to a population of less than three million.⁶⁰ Unlike Botswana, educational facilities in Ghana were adequate with close to 5,000 primary schools and a student population of 468,000. In addition, higher education was well advanced with a university having been established in 1948.⁶¹ Financially, Ghana was in a comparatively better position than its Botswana neighbor and had approximately \$300 million in its foreign

⁵⁷ Republic of Botswana, *Transitional Plan for Social Economic Development*.

⁵⁸ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

⁵⁹ Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

⁶⁰ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road To Independence*.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

exchange reserves.⁶² On the average, Ghana's per capita annual income was about \$242 in comparison to Botswana's \$50 per capita at the time.⁶³

Since the early days of independence, the economic fortunes of both countries have reversed. Botswana's economic and social improvements have surpassed that of Ghana's. On the micro level, the annual per capita income of Botswana is over \$3,000 as compared to Ghana's per capita income of approximately \$400.⁶⁴ In education, the adult illiteracy rate in Botswana is 30%, while in Ghana the adult illiteracy rate stands at 36%. In basic education, where Botswana had only half of its school-age children enrolled during independence,⁶⁵ enrollment is up 112%. In contrast, Ghana's education enrollment is 76% for school age children. Comparatively speaking, Botswana has a higher ratio in the area of primary education than does Ghana, and it also has a higher rate in adult literacy.⁶⁶

However, both countries are still engaged in the production of raw material. Ghana's economy is dominated by its major exports of cocoa, gold, and timber. Botswana's economy is dominated by the diamond mining and cattle industries.⁶⁷ As raw material producers, both Botswana and Ghana depend on imports for their industrial consumption needs. Botswana imports 80% of its industrial products from neighboring

⁶² Yeboah, "Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."

⁶³ Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism*.

⁶⁴ African Development Bank, *Basic Indicators*, 1999.

⁶⁵ Republic of Botswana, *Transitional Plan for Social Economic Development*.

⁶⁶ African Development Bank, *Basic Indicators*, 1999.

⁶⁷ Lewis Jr., "The Potential Problems of Diamond-dependent Development."

South Africa,⁶⁸ while Ghana buys its industrial needs primarily from European nations. Financially, there has been a vast difference between the two countries since their independence. At independence, Ghana had a considerable amount of foreign exchange reserves.⁶⁹ However, its financial position has substantially deteriorated. Since 1975, Ghana has had negative net reserves in its foreign accounts. In addition, the country's national debt has soared from a mere \$721 million in 1975 to over \$5 billion in 1997.⁷⁰ By comparison, Botswana had no reserves at independence and therefore, it had to depend on Great Britain for post-independence financial contribution to supplement its budgetary needs.⁷¹ For what can be considered as a dramatic change of events, Botswana had over \$5 billion in excess of its foreign accounts in 1998. In collaboration with the World Bank, it devised a strategy to invest the excess foreign reserves to earn interest revenues.⁷²

This financial comparison makes it clear that Botswana's monetary position is better than that of Ghana's, in the sense that Ghana has become a debtor nation while Botswana has become a lender nation. Another profound change that has occurred in both countries that is important in measuring economic development lies in healthcare service. Improvements in healthcare relate to life expectancy, infant mortality rate, and access to clean water, all of which are considered to be reasonable gauges of economic

⁶⁸ Cater and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

⁶⁹ Yeboah, "Control Theory Application to Economic Policy Analysis in Ghana."

⁷⁰ World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 1997.

⁷¹ Colclough and McCarthy, *The Political Economy of Botswana*.

⁷² Mohohlo, "Central Bank as a Protector of National Wealth."

development.⁷³ At independence, the average Ghanaian had access to a universal free healthcare service, while the average Batswana, at independence, had to depend on traditional herbalists for their healthcare needs.⁷⁴ These days Botswana's healthcare service looks different. The infrastructure has been well developed with district primary health care facilities and teams scattered across the country providing services to the people.⁷⁵

In relation to Botswana, Ghana's healthcare service is now characterized by a lopsided allocation of resources favoring urban inhabitants. Rural dwellers have only limited access to health services. At the managerial level, Ghana's health service suffers from qualified labor shortage and problems with poor management.⁷⁶ These conditions have put Ghana's healthcare service on less favorable terms in comparison to Botswana. For example, while 83 percent of rural residents in Botswana live within ten miles of a primary healthcare facility, only a few rural dwellers in Ghana have access to health services.⁷⁷ On the national level, there are four physicians to every 100,000 patients in Ghana, in contrast to twenty-four physicians to the same number of patients in

⁷³ World Bank, *Better Health in Africa: Experience and Lessons Learned* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994).

⁷⁴ Parson, *Succession to High Office in Botswana*.

⁷⁵ L. Owuor-Omondi, D. Attholang, and R. Diselco, *Botswana: A National Health Status Evaluation* (Gaborone: Botswana Ministry of Health, 1987).

⁷⁶ World Bank, *World Development Report: The Challenge of Development* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1991).

⁷⁷ Dugbatey, "National Health Policies."

Botswana.⁷⁸ In comparing the general population, 60% of Ghanaians have access to health services compared to 88% of their regional neighbors in Botswana.⁷⁹

Clearly, Botswana's leadership policies have helped the country to improve healthcare services better than that of Ghana. The above improvement has made Botswana's human development impressive, with the one exception of HIV infection.⁸⁰ The result of Botswana's health improvement is that there has been a dramatic fall in its infant mortality rate from 95 per 1000 live births in 1970 to 58 per 1000 live births in 1997, as compared to Ghana's infant mortality decline from 100 per 1000 live births in 1970 to 73 per 1000 live births in 1997.⁸¹ Life expectancy in Botswana, before accounting for the impact of HIV/AIDS, has risen from 50 years in 1966 to the upper 60s by the mid 1990s, while life expectancy in Ghana only stood at 58 years by the mid 1990s.⁸²

Using the UNDP's Human Development Index definition of economic development as the ability of a country to translate economic gains into improved living conditions,⁸³ the preceding analysis suggests that, since independence, Botswana's economy has fared comparatively better than Ghana's. This is the case because, among the several economic development indicators, Ghana is trailing Botswana. There is a

⁷⁸ Leith, *Botswana: A Case Study of Economic Policy*.

⁷⁹ Dugbatey, "National Health Policies."

⁸⁰ World Bank, *African Findings: Botswana, An Example of Prudent Economic Policy and Growth* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2000).

⁸¹ World Bank, *World Development Indicators* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).

⁸² World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 1997*.

⁸³ McGillivray, "The Human Development Index."

common consensus in the literature that Botswana's recent economic success is due to its wealth in diamonds and ethnic homogeneity.⁸⁴ In defense of Ghana's dilapidating economic conditions, African scholars argue that the country's economic woes emanate from external factors including colonialism, globalization, and the impact of multinational institutions.⁸⁵ These arguments, undoubtedly, have merits given the interdependency that characterizes the global economy. However, the arguments fall short in providing a complete explanation. Ghana and Botswana are both in the same global system, yet Botswana is doing economically better.

Similarly, the mineral arguments being advanced to explain Botswana's success is also less convincing for two reasons. First, in relation to Ghana, the argument is less substantive because Ghana also has minerals such as gold, diamond, and bauxite. Moreover, exploration began in that country long before Botswana began its exploration in the 1960s.⁸⁶ Second, the Botswana mineral argument is not convincing enough because there are other countries in the sub-Saharan region, such as Democratic Republic of Congo, that possess an abundance of mineral resources but have not experienced similar economic successes as Botswana.⁸⁷ Thus, the explanation for Botswana's success can be said to lie somewhere else other than in the exogenous and mineral endowment arguments that have been advanced.

⁸⁴ Robert L. Curry Jr., "Botswana's Macroeconomic Management of Its Mineral-Based Growth: It Used Mining Revenues for Development and Service but Now Must Broaden the Beneficiaries," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (October 1987): 473-88.

⁸⁵ Ayittey, "How Multinational Institutions Compounded Africa's Economic Crisis."

⁸⁶ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

⁸⁷ Gould, *Bureaucratic Corruption*.

As the two cases in chapters four and five qualitatively show, an important cause for the difference in the economies of Botswana and Ghana lies in the kind of social cultures that have been established and legitimized by their postcolonial leaders in managing the countries. As explained in chapter two, national economic development is a complex phenomenon to the extent that, even though the mainstream variables of analysis, such as colonialism, internal natural resources, and globalization, play a role, it is the determination of leadership to create the appropriate political culture in transforming the economic welfare of the society that is essential.⁸⁸ From that contextual point of view, the question emerges as to the comparative differences in cultural conditions that leaders in Botswana and Ghana have established and legitimized in their respective countries. The human factor on leadership can greatly explain the difference in their economic outcomes.

Postcolonial Development Cultures in Botswana and Ghana

Before delving into a comparison of the postcolonial cultures in the two countries, colonial differences need to be reiterated and taken into consideration in relation to cultural establishment and legitimization by the postcolonial leaders. First, due to the nature of the protectorate rule in Botswana, there was a continuation of leadership in the postcolonial era that provided stability without political antagonism in that country. Second, the leadership of Seretse Khama in Botswana had legitimacy willingly transferred to his political officials from the traditional chiefs. On the other hand, the colonial direct rule under which Ghana had existed did not make those qualities available

⁸⁸ Doe, "Economic Development of Francophone Africa."

in that country after colonial rule ended. Kwame Nkrumah was not continuing a leadership that was in existence and he also did not have legitimacy from the traditional chiefs.⁸⁹

In contrast to Seretse Khama who was an heir to the royal traditional leadership, Nkrumah came from the commoner educated leadership group that was vying for power with the traditional leaders. Therefore, when power was transferred to Nkrumah and his Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) from the British colonial leaders, there was no continuation of leadership. In the eyes of the traditional leaders, Nkrumah was a usurper of their legitimate authority. Therefore, the competition for power continued and the political stability that existed in Botswana did not exist in Ghana.⁹⁰ On the other hand, given the legitimacy and the political stability that came with the Botswana transition, Khama combined the traditional *kgotla* democratic system with the British representative system and stressed the importance of democracy in decision-making. He then designed the actions of his government to promote such attitudes. In Ghana, the lack of collective legitimacy and the antagonistic political struggle between Nkrumah and the traditional leaders, immediately before independence, led Nkrumah to turn to dictatorial rule as opposed to democratic dialogue for stability.⁹¹

On the economic administrative front, Seretse Khama set high moral standards to prevent corruption from becoming part of the social culture. In many of his public speeches, he denounced corruption and administratively established and maintained

⁸⁹ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

⁹⁰ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

policies of non-tolerance against corruption.⁹² In a practical move to avoid the appearance of corruption, Khama and his officials required national institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), to create oversight systems to monitor and audit the government and thereby ensure the proper use of public funds. That step allowed his government and the leadership to hold public officials accountable for corrupt practices.⁹³ Seretse formulated policies designed to shield institutions from individual interests and to cater instead to the collective national interests. In the economic production sector, he established a capitalist production culture by turning the colonial productive system that was based on a traditional patron-client system into one based on market relations.⁹⁴

Like Khama, Nkrumah began his economic development by using a market approach in Ghana immediately after independence. However, he did not change the colonial feudal system that existed in Ghana. Instead, he adopted policies that encouraged privatization without government intervention in the productive sector.⁹⁵ In the beginning of the 1960s, however, Nkrumah dropped the capitalist culture due to his conviction, at the time, that development based on economic liberal culture was inoperable in Ghana. In its place, he adopted a socialist economic culture.⁹⁶ Unlike

⁹¹ Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship*.

⁹² Carter and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

⁹³ Isaksen, "Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy."

⁹⁴ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

⁹⁵ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

⁹⁶ Nkrumah, *Neocolonialism*.

Khama, Nkrumah failed to set high moral standards for his officials. Even though he had spoken and warned against bribery and corruption, he failed to take direct measures against corruption.⁹⁷ For failing to adopt punitive measures to stamp out corruption, Nkrumah inadvertently, through the concept of *contributory negligence*, legitimized corrupt culture. This outcome became apparent in the way in which his leadership managed national economic institutions. For example, when his government took over the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), no auditing and monitoring mechanisms were established to ensure the proper legitimate use of public funds. Without an oversight system, the CMB was used for institutional corruption by CPP officials, which established precedents in the culture of corruption.⁹⁸

To enhance economic productivity, Nkrumah began to transform the Ghanaian productive sector, from one solely based on an agrarian economy, to one diversify in industrialization and farming productions. Industrialization was Nkrumah's way of introducing scientific technology into Ghana's economy but his transformation was incomplete before he was ousted from office.⁹⁹ The military leadership that seized power from Nkrumah, a group that I have described as the *interlude leadership*, abandoned the industrial scientific culture that Nkrumah had initiated.¹⁰⁰ Since then, no other Ghanaian leader has attempted to foster scientific culture to enhance economic production. Unlike Nkrumah, Seretse Khama did not initiate scientific culture to transform the Botswana

⁹⁷ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah, The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

⁹⁸ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

⁹⁹ Hagan, "Nkrumah's Leadership Style."

¹⁰⁰ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

economy from agrarianism to industrialization, but emphasized export promotion of the country's agriculture based-products, especially cattle. For that reason, Botswana also lacks a scientific culture of creation. As the two case studies show, the successors of both leaders have, with few exceptions, basically followed the cultures initiated by their predecessors.¹⁰¹ The above description depicts the picture of the political cultures that the postcolonial leaders in the two countries have created. Botswana has advanced high moral and low scientific cultures towards economic production. Ghana, on the other hand, has created low moral and low scientific cultures.

THE LCD MODEL'S EXPLANATION FOR ECONOMIC DIFFERENCE

The Leadership Culture Development model developed in chapter three suggests a reason why economies of African countries are underdeveloped. It states that African leaders have been unable to establish appropriate cultures that spur economic development. The model lays out a theoretical argument that the attainment of sustainable economic development is conditional upon two inseparable and simultaneous premises. First, national leaders who are able to rally their societies in establishing a high moral culture with altruism in their societies satisfy one of the vital requirements for economic development. In addition to the high moral culture, the second requirement, according to the LCD model, asserts the need for a scientific culture of creation. In other words, leaders who are able to engender a scientific culture of creation that enables their societies

¹⁰¹ In Ghana, successors to Nkrumah have abandoned the industrialization projects he initiated. The Jerry Rawlings government added human rights abuses in the form of killings innocent people and his political opponents to the political equation. For more information on human rights abuses by the Rawlings' government see Herbst, *The Politics of Reforms in Ghana*.

to create their material economic needs, also satisfy the other vital requirement for sustainable economic development. The establishment of both cultures ought to be synchronous. The simultaneity of both cultures is vital and critical to the attainment of sustainable economic development, since the combination is the only way to achieve a development stage that yields full economic benefits to the collective interests of society.

Given the above premises of the LCD model, its explanation or justification for the difference in the two economies flows logically. Botswana's economic success vis-à-vis Ghana is due to the country's leaders establishing and legitimizing one of the two cultural conditions that is essential for sustainable economic development. In its case, Botswana has been able to establish the moral culture. The leaderships' ability to establish one of the appropriate cultures conducive for economic development explains Botswana's economic progress. In other words, the high moral attitude has enabled them to abstain from corruption and avoid siphoning national financial resources away from the public treasury for personal use.¹⁰² That abstinence, in turn, has allowed financial resources to be utilized in improving human development and social welfare; which, the leaders have done by providing clean water, education, and healthcare services indiscriminately to all members of their society.¹⁰³ However, according to the premises of the LCD model, it should not be assumed that Botswana has economically developed because it lacks the scientific culture of creation that the LCD model requires as a component in order for a sustainable economic development to occur.

¹⁰² Carter and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

¹⁰³ Colclough and McCarthy, *The Political Economy of Botswana*.

In contrast to Botswana's positive economic performance, the LCD model also explains Ghana's poor performance as due to its leaderships' inability to establish or legitimize either of the two prerequisite cultures. The lack of high moral culture has resulted in endemic corruption by the leadership that misdirects the use of financial resources, thereby leaving the country with little financial resources for social development.¹⁰⁴ The lack of scientific culture in Ghana, just as in Botswana, has resulted in its inability to produce most of the industrial consumption goods it needs. For that reason, Ghana has become dependent on foreign sources for industrial goods, which has resulted in the accumulation of debt that is undermining its prospects for economic development.¹⁰⁵ Based on the LCD model, both Botswana and Ghana are economically underdeveloped. However, if economic development is taken in terms of human development then, as this comparative analysis between Ghana and Botswana has shown, the latter is developing in comparison to the former.

THE COLONIAL FACTOR AND THE SENGHORIAN DIMENSION

As discussed above, part of the reason why the leaders of Botswana have been able to establish high moral culture to benefit their economy is due to the country's unique colonial experience. However, before looking at the colonial connection, we first consider what high moral culture is, and why it became part of the Tswana political culture in the postcolonial era. High morality is a human psychological attitude that takes

¹⁰⁴ Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power*.

¹⁰⁵ How interest payments are draining Ghana's financial resources, see World Bank, *World Development Indicators, 1997*.

time to nurture. It deals with doing what is collectively good for society, and its importance in socio-economic relationships and to political economy is well known.¹⁰⁶ In Botswana, this leadership attribute can be traced back to precolonial days when relations between leadership and their followers were seen as a social contract.¹⁰⁷ Under the social contract, precolonial leadership positions were based on the loyalty and the support they received from their followers. In a reciprocal fashion, it was, and still is, an obligation for the leadership to do what is morally right in order to continue to maintain the legitimacy to safeguard their positions. Through these mutual social relations, the need for high moral virtue became an obligation for the leaders not to uphold as their own personal attribute, but to foster it throughout society. As an old Tswana leadership tradition,¹⁰⁸ the virtue was passed on to the postcolonial leaders, who themselves were heirs of traditional leaderships and had received psychological nurturing of high moral virtues.¹⁰⁹

It was under such a moral framework and psychological mindset that Seretse Khama fostered the culture of high moral discipline among his officials and the community at large. From that perspective, Seretse was doing his duty, as traditional customs required of him. His background as royal heir of the Bangwato clan fostered in

¹⁰⁶ Richard M. Coughlin, "Whose Morality? Which Community? What Interest? Socio-Economic and Communitarian Perspectives," *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1996): 135-52.

¹⁰⁷ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

¹⁰⁸ In Botswana, precolonial and colonial leaders such as Khama the Great and Tshekedi Khama saw to it as their moral obligation to keep their society together and protect its sovereignty.

¹⁰⁹ Seretse's mother, Tebogo, knowing that her son was one day going to be a kgosi (Chief) instilled in him the Royal virtues of honesty and attention that the position will require. See Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*, 22.

him these traditional leadership qualities.¹¹⁰ In other words, high morality as a fiber of human individuals behavior and conscience had been transferred to Seretse through familial nurturing.¹¹¹ This cultural framework compelled him to fulfill his moral obligation as a leader and further compelled him to establish it as a socio-cultural fixture that could only benefit the development of his country. The question that arises then is how was this traditional human quality able to survive the colonial era and be fostered by postcolonial leaders? The difference in colonial rule becomes a factor at this point.

Under colonial protectorate rule, the British did not interfere in the domestic affairs of the Tswana chiefs. They left them to maintain and regulate their own customs and values.¹¹² Under those conditions, the traditional institutions and their values that they held were allowed to continue without being subverted by new values that are usually associated with other institutions. This condition made preservation of the high moral obligation a duty of leaders to be kept and also be fostered towards social development in the community.¹¹³ From that lens, the colonial factor becomes the difference between direct colonial rule elsewhere in Africa, including Ghana, and the colonial protectorate system that existed in Botswana. With the latter making it partially possible for the high moral obligation to be preserved and transposed into the postcolonial era by leaders who were themselves royal heirs with that same mindset. Dialectically, therefore, on a personal level, Seretse Khama was motivated to foster high

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ William Murchison, "Those Relativist Next Door," *The Human Life Review*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Summer 1998): 7-14.

¹¹² Schapera, *Tribal Innovators*.

¹¹³ Peters, *Dividing The Commons*.

moral culture due to his belief and values, which were underlined by his psychological mindset.

Besides his beliefs, Khama recognized that to build a nation in which all citizens, irrespective of race and tribe could live in peace, he needed a guiding national principle with a traditional belief. In that regard, he adapted a Setswana concept of *kagisano*, which means unity, peace, harmony, and a sense of community. It embodied the Tswana national identity that retained its social cohesion and stability throughout the protectorate era. The concept requires high moral behavior to be fulfilled because it is based on doing what is good for an entire society.¹¹⁴ The desire and motivation to advance *kagisano* as a national guiding principle also made establishing high moral culture an obligation and duty for Seretse Khama. Here, too, there was a colonial link in the sense that the preservation of the *kagisano* traditional concept was made possible because of the protectorate system. In other words, the colonial protectorate system made the protection of traditional beliefs, such as the *kagisano*, possible and the belief, in turn, influenced postcolonial leaders of Botswana to establish a high moral culture.

The above explains why Botswana's postcolonial leaders have been able to establish, foster, and maintain high moral culture as one of the prerequisite elements of the LCD model for development. In essence, the preservation of the leadership and the *kagisano* national concept, were in themselves preserved under the protectorate colonial system. Hence, the colonial factor in the ability of postcolonial leaders in Botswana to legitimize high moral culture.

¹¹⁴ Carter and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

The Colonial Factor and the Lack of Moral Culture in Ghana

Prior to colonization, the nations that constituted precolonial Ghana had political and economic systems similar to those in Botswana. The nations were under the rule of chiefs, with their institutions for keeping peace, law, and order guided by their customs and moral values. To preserve high moral attitudes and behavior among leaders as a way to protect society, there were social institutions in place to prevent leaders from abusing their office and engaging in corrupt practices.¹¹⁵ Why then, it is that postcolonial leaders in Ghana are unable to foster a similar high moral culture to satisfy one of the conditions espoused by the LCD model for improving economic development? Just as with Botswana, part of the explanation lies in what transpired socially during the colonial era. It was, in part, due to the type of colonial administration that Ghana experienced. In other words, the colonization factor also contributed to Ghanaian moral decay.

Unlike the protectorate rule in Botswana, the British ruled colonial Ghana with a mixture of direct rule by a central government as well as indirect rule. Through that social metamorphosis, direct colonial rule eradicated the traditional moral responsibility as a social contract between the ruled and the rulers and brought about domestic moral decay in the postcolonial era.¹¹⁶ The nature of colonialism in Ghana brought with it its own legal system that illegitimized local authority and induced local citizens not to comply with social norms that had been ordained by the traditional authority and its

¹¹⁵ Ayittey, *Africa in Chaos*.

¹¹⁶ A detailed description of the Colony's government is given by Sir Frederick Lugard in *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*.

institutions.¹¹⁷ This disrupted the status quo of socially accepted moral values and fueled the behavior of lawlessness from a perceived attitude by followers to question the legitimacy of their traditional leaders. In essence, to the local people, the chiefs did not merit their respect because of the judicial challenge that the colonial system posed for the local chiefs and their institutions. Why, then did this metamorphosis take place in the colonial legal realm? It does so because it is within the legal arena that social elements within a community engage each another in contesting access to resources and labor, the relationship of power and authority, and the interpretation of morality and culture.¹¹⁸

In the Ghanaian context, as the colonial legal system evolved, new institutions that emerged gave the local social elements opportunity to regulate their relationships with the colonizer. In the process, it also gave the local elements an opportune way to regulate their relationship among themselves. It was through that regulation and re-organization of relations among the social elements and the colonizer that interpretations of morality took a new form and priority for a high moral relationship. The result was the disintegration and the breaking of the moral responsibility that used to exist in precolonial Ghana.

No clear reason exists as to why postcolonial Ghanaian leaders are unable to establish high moral culture to improve Ghana's economic development. Clearly however, leadership egocentrism and direct colonial rule are two reasons for the lack of high moral culture in Ghana. This seems to be the case because, in terms of leadership egocentrism, high morals would have prevented leaders from achieving their personal

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ K. Mann and R. Robert, *Law in Colonial Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1991).

interests through corruption since those high ideals emphasize what is best for the general public.¹¹⁹ In other words, high moral culture requires proper utilization of national resources and equitable distribution of national income. Leadership grounded in such moral certitude would disdain the misuse of public trust. Thus, the absence of high moral culture allows postcolonial Ghanaian leaders, such as the late General Acheampong, to use national money to purchase personal houses abroad.¹²⁰ Similarly, establishing high moral culture could have acted as a psychological deterrent to stop some of Rawlings' officials such as the ex-Deputy Finance Minister, A. Sorlemy, from achieving his ambition of amassing foreign currency for his personal interests.¹²¹ The culture would have similarly prevented the former president, Jerry Rawlings, from repressing his political critics and opponents as a means of securing his political position through authoritarianism and dictatorship as opposed to democratic dialogue.¹²² In all the above instances, any attempt by the leaders to establish high moral culture would have been detrimental for them in achieving their personal interest. Therefore, the ambition of satisfying self interests acts as a motivating factor for postcolonial Ghanaian leaders to avoid establishing high moral culture, simply because low moral culture serves their economic and political interests.

¹¹⁹ Coughlin, "Whose Morality? Which Community?"

¹²⁰ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

¹²¹ Thomas Friedman, "Here Comes the Sun: Ghana Digs in to Dig Out," *New York Times* (May 4, 2001).

¹²² Gyima-Boadi, "Notes on Ghana's Current Transition to Constitutional Rule."

The colonial experience of Ghana is also critical to understanding contemporary conditions. In the colonial days, the nature of direct colonial rule in Ghana orchestrated two strategies in the process of consolidating its power and that has had an economic impact in postcolonial days. First, the colonial rule de-legitimized traditional leaders who ruled in colonial Ghana through the legal system and initiated the outright removal of chiefs from office.¹²³ The traditional leaders who were removed were sometimes replaced with those sympathetic to colonial interests.¹²⁴ Second, traditional leaders who were left in power were subjugated, while other local citizens were excluded from the national decision-making process.¹²⁵ Later, when there was an amendment to allow limited local participation in politics, the right to participate in the political structure was contingent upon certain types of behavior that demonstrated moral obligation and loyalty to the colonial interest as opposed to the domestic interest. Those who were absorbed into the system were personally rewarded.¹²⁶

The inclusion of locals in the colonial political structure prompted two moral psychological metamorphoses in Ghana's social development. First, all those in positions saw their authority as emanating from the colonizer and therefore pledged their allegiance to the British government, shifting their moral obligations from their country. Few chiefs who were allowed to participate saw their inclusion as gratifying because they felt their

¹²³ In 1873 the British sent Kobina Gyan, a traditional leader of Elimina, into exile in Sierra Leone for opposing British rule of the Gold Coast. He was not allowed to come back until 1896. See Gocking, "*British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony.*"

¹²⁴ Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation.*

¹²⁵ Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana.*

¹²⁶ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition.*

positions were supported by the weight of the British authority. To the educated commoners, who became part of the colonial system, it was a satisfying recognition of status because it gave them the chance to examine problems and give decisions on public issues.¹²⁷ That was how the high moral culture that existed was eliminated during the colonial era. It was those who were absorbed into the colonial system that later became the national postcolonial leaders.¹²⁸ Hence, they had no motivation for establishing a high moral culture that would undermine their personal interests. In essence, the legitimization of low moral culture allowed leaders in Ghana to satisfy their personal interests through corruption, human abuses, and political authoritarianism. This is the direct colonial factor that has inhibited the motivation for postcolonial leaders in Ghana to establish high moral culture.

In Botswana's case, however, the protectorate system provided a political shield that resulted with less damage to the way the people organized their social affairs. The protectorate provided stability that helped to preserve high moral obligation among social elements. The altruistic nature of leaderships' high moral culture has resulted in abandonment of individual egocentrism in executing a fair distribution of national income to improve the living conditions of the Tswana people. Despite the favorable economic conditions that have come about due to the high moral culture, Botswana is industrially underdeveloped like Ghana. As previously noted, the industrialization inefficiency is due to the lack of scientific culture of creation in both countries. The lack of scientific culture,

¹²⁷ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

¹²⁸ In 1954 those leaders who became part of the colonial government, including Nkrumah, also guided Ghana to its independence and eventually became the postcolonial leaders. See Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

as earlier noted, is in turn due to the adherence of Senghorianism by the regional leaders including both Nkrumah and Khama.

The Senghorian Dimension

The Senghorian dimension is a philosophical argument advanced by Leopold Sedar Senghor.¹²⁹ Senghor's argument claims that an African way of knowing how the world works is different from that of European's way. He asserts that the African mode of knowing is a holistic one. It is absent of dualism between men and nature. European thinking, by contrast, is analytic and promotes dichotomies. Senghor's philosophy postulates an intuitive form of rationality that is unique to Africans. He asserts that Africans have a different personality that is not inferior to the European personality.¹³⁰ The argument was used by Senghor in an attempt to defend African culture and correct its personal denigration by some Europeans.¹³¹ The problem, however, is that this argument denigrates analytic scientific rationality and accepts intuition as a source of knowledge.¹³² The denigration of scientific analytic rationality is not empirically evident nor is it physically obvious. However the philosophy's analytical indication to that effect is apparent. It is illustrated by Senghor's claim and description of European's analytic

¹²⁹ Leopold Sedar Senghor was once the president of Senegal. For more information on Senghor, see Rasmussen, *Modern African Political Leaders*.

¹³⁰ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

¹³¹ Masolo, *African Philosophy*. For a brief discourse on the denigration of the African culture by Europeans and its response from Senghor, see Chapter three of this dissertation. For more detail analysis see the work of James, *Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution*.

¹³² Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest."

rational mode of knowing as a dichotomous and conflict promoting culture.¹³³ This assessment of the European mode of knowing by the philosophy implicitly infers the denigration of scientific culture and its technological rationality. Even though this interpretation may not be acceptable, and opened to debate, due to the opinion of others that Senghorianism is intended for the defense of African's self-definition and cultural behavior.¹³⁴ Despite such argument, however, the philosophy's implied denigration of the European analytic scientific mode of knowing is quite obvious and can hardly be denied.

Senghor's assessment of African's mode of knowing as intuitive, inferring its no need for step by step analytic approach to understand how the world works, is in itself indicative of superiority of intuitive knowledge and a denigration of analytic scientific thinking. In other words through comparative analysis, the philosophy hints at the idea that intuitive knowledge does not have the need to go through the trial and error mechanics to acquire the accumulative knowledge base that empowers human thinking. Deductively the philosophy implies that due to its nature, intuitive knowledge avoids the dualistic conflicting characteristic that is associated with dichotomous analytic mode of knowing and makes it superior.

The denigration of European analytic rationality by Senghorianism goes far beyond its dichotomous nature and its non-intuitive qualities. In another writing, Senghor uses Frobenius to illustrate the inferiority of analytic mode of knowing in comparison

¹³³ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

¹³⁴ Oladipo, "*Reason, Identity, and the African Quest*."

with intuitive mode of knowing.¹³⁵ In his writing on Frobenius and the Revolution of 1889, Senghor argues that the dialectical European rationalism, including Cartesian and anti-Hellenic rationalism were really not satisfactory. He further goes on to stress that indeed the traditions associated with German romanticism in the Schlegels, in Novalis, and Fichte were only re-enforcement and often degradation of quintessential European rationalism.¹³⁶ Unarguably, such a view of Senghor in describing European rationalism and its analytical mode of knowing in no simple terms a denigration, while he viewed and described African cultural antiquity and its potential for development.

It was Senghor's belief that Frobenius achievements laid in his breaking away from the kind of structural analytic rationalism of which Claude Levi-Strauss was the chief advocate.¹³⁷ To Senghor, Frobenius was thus unlike both Levi-Strauss and Durkheim, and was not interested in the "perpetual accumulation of facts" rather he was concerned with perpetual global perspectives. According to Senghor, Frobenius approach sought the rejection of discursive reason and a return to feeling or intuition "as mean of gaining insight into values, not facts of quantities" which Senghorianism deems as superior to analytic scientific rationalism.¹³⁸

In comparing African intuitive and European analytic modes of knowing, Senghorianism sees African intuitive culture as a true balance in civilization and affirms

¹³⁵ Michael J. C. Echeruo, "Negritude and History: Senghor's Argument with Frobenius," *Research in African Literature*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (Winter 1993): 1-12.

¹³⁶ Leopold Sedar Senghor, "The Revolution of 1889 and Leo Frobenius," in Isaac James Mowoe and Richard Bjornson, eds., *Africa and the West: The Legacies of Empire*, 77-88 (NY: Greenwood Press, 1986).

¹³⁷ *Ibid.* 82.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.* 83.

it as the equilibrium between feeling and will, soul and mind; a feature which the philosophy notes as missing in analytic mode of knowing. Senghor concurs with Frobenius that European analytic mode is engaged in a pattern of steady and destructive influence of rationalism.¹³⁹ Some adherents of the philosophy share similar views about analytic scientific mode of knowing and address it in identical denigrative way. Among that group, there is no reminder of the analytic denigration approach of the particular acuity of Senghor's response than a comment of Nnamdi Azikiwe. In his evaluation of analytic mode of knowing, Azikiwe wrote: "I was convinced that although the western system was more systematic than that of African, nevertheless African philosophy was practical in the sense that people did not waste time on logic and frivolous arguments. Their philosophy was more pragmatic in that it was related to practical problems of everyday life which they solved by adapting themselves to the logic of reason and experience."¹⁴⁰ Most contemporary African leaders have accepted this Senghorian dimension in its totality as a way to preserve African identity. In one sense, the acceptance allows them to psychologically move African culture to its own locality, away from criticism, thus serving as a solution to the crisis of African self-definition. The dilemma is that, in doing so, postcolonial African leaders have psychologically acknowledged that the indigenous Africans' mode of knowing and understanding of how the world works lacks scientifico-technical rationality.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ Echeruo, "*Negritude and History: Senghor's Argument with Frobenius.*"

¹⁴⁰ Nnamdi Azikiwe, *My Odyssey: Autobiography* (London: Hurst, 1970): 120.

¹⁴¹ Oladipo, "*Reason, Identity, and the African Quest.*"

As a result, contemporary sub-Saharan African leaders are less motivated to establish scientific culture in an attempt to understand the natural law of creation through analytical thinking. In other words, the rejection of a scientific culture of creation, based on the belief that it is an area of foreign culture per Senghor's argument and the acceptance of intuition as source of knowledge embedded in mythological paradigm, as a reason for African cultural uniqueness, inhibits the leaders from fostering and legitimizing scientific culture. It is within this psychological mindset that both contemporary leaders of Botswana and Ghana, including all their colleagues in the sub-Saharan region, operate, thus making them unmotivated to establish scientific cultures in their respective countries. The first postcolonial leaders, Seretse Khama of Botswana and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, were adherents of the Senghorian philosophy and believed in the uniqueness of African culture in its totality without noticing the universality of culture in some aspects. The subscription of Senghorian philosophy by Khama and Nkrumah, along with their successors, is evident by the two leaders public declarations in support of African cultural uniqueness.

Nkrumah, in his days as the leader, realized that the only way Ghana's economy could be developed to increase productivity and serve the diverse needs of the population was through industrialization.¹⁴² To accomplish that objective, he embarked on setting up industrial projects in Ghana and sending students to study in European and North American countries.¹⁴³ However, his adherence to the Senghorian philosophy and his conviction to protect all aspects of African cultural uniqueness made him apprehensive in

¹⁴² Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

¹⁴³ Agyeman, "Social and Political Outlook."

replacing the mythological intuitive part of the Ghanaian culture with scientific analytic culture. Nowhere did Nkrumah take as much pains to demonstrate his Senghorian convictions as in his speech “African personality,” a concept underpinned by the Senghorian distinction. On the occasion, when Nkrumah was inaugurating the institute of African studies, he declared that “the personality of the African was stunted in this process can only be retrieved from the ruins if we make a conscious effort to restore African’s ancient glory.”¹⁴⁴ In this regard, Nkrumah was identifying the cause of Africa’s retrogression as its cultural alienation from the past, something he considered as African’s unique personality. He went on to say that it is only in condition of total freedom from foreign interference that the aspirations of Africans can be fulfilled and “the African genius finds its expression.”¹⁴⁵ By alluding to the concept of African genius, Nkrumah was not only endorsing the uniqueness of the African mode of knowing, but he was also advocating its preservation. Nkrumah made a further distinction between African culture and others by saying “by African genius, I mean something positive, our social conception of society, the efficiency and the validity of our tradition.”¹⁴⁶

After being discouraged by the lack of capital inflows from the west to spur Ghana’s economic development, Nkrumah shifted from a market approach to economic socialism. In order to justify this cultural isolationist approach towards economic development, Nkrumah told Ghanaians that it was essential for the nation to follow a development path that will enable Ghana to undergo economic transformation that

¹⁴⁴ Kwame Nkrumah, *The African Genius* (Accra, Ghana: Government Press, 1963): 5.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

“would not affect the roots of society.”¹⁴⁷ In other words, Nkrumah’s African socialism was theoretically conceived as a paradoxical concept, one in which, the Ghanaian society could have been able to associate itself with a material technical base without becoming part of what is deemed by Senghorian philosophy as European culture. In that context and on a practical structural basis, Nkrumah’s African socialism can be viewed as a parallel existence of material technical ability and a holistic mode of knowing that could have been simultaneous but mutually exclusive, with the objective of enabling Ghanaians to preserve their self-identification.

In a sense, Nkrumah was caught in what can be termed as the *Senghorian cultural economic dilemma*. This situation faces many sub-Saharan African leaders and prevents them from being able to establish a scientific culture to develop. In Nkrumah’s case, and perhaps in that of other African leaders, he did not intend to change the Ghanaian culture by defying his Senghorian belief. In that context, what he meant by African socialism can be fairly and accurately interpreted as creating an economic productive system different from the one that used to be promoted by European social democrats in the 20th century.¹⁴⁸

One logical explanation as to why Nkrumah was toiling with the African socialist idea was his belief in the Senghorian philosophy. He had come to believe that an analytical culture that promotes dichotomies is a characterization of an European epistemology. This was amplified in his belief of wanting to separate the material

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 6

¹⁴⁷ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*, 63.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

technical base from the roots of culture. In regards to whether the idea is feasible or not, the problem that African socialism inherently poses is that it is not theoretically feasible to unite a material technical based culture and solely intuitive culture. The reason is that the two create an antagonistic pair. The difficulty of their coexistence emanates from the fact that there is an inverse relation between the two aspects. The predominance of a culture of holistic intuitive knowledge depends on the lack of understanding in an analytical manner as to how the world works. On the other hand, a high magnitude of material technical base depends on how well one understands the analytical scientific informative structure that underlines natural law.

In essence, Nkrumah wanted to have the best of both worlds but that was not possible in such a situation. That was part of Nkrumah 's dilemma that partially inhibited him from being able to foster, establish, and legitimize a scientific culture in Ghana before he was ousted from office. A similar predicament has befallen all of Nkrumah's successors, in the sense that, all postcolonial Ghanaian leaders have been caught in the Senghorian cultural economic dilemma. They have neglected fostering, establishing, and legitimizing a scientific culture of creation based on the philosophy of Senghor, which advocates that African's culture falls outside the scientific paradigm.

As with Ghana, Botswana also lacks scientific culture as the country depends on foreign sources for basically all its industrial consumption goods. Its economy is dominated by mining and agricultural raw material production. Since independence, the leaders have paid less attention to fostering a scientific culture capable of inducing industrialization and, instead have been pursuing small scale *Appropriate Technology*

which is unsuitable for industrialization that spurs economic development.¹⁴⁹ Again, the question becomes why was Seretse Khama, a highly moral conscientious leader, unable to establish analytical scientific culture that could have stimulated the minds of his fellow citizens to pursue an understanding of the natural law of creation that could further develop Botswana?

From his youth, even though from a privileged house of the Bangwato royal family, Seretse Khama was confronted by European discrimination. In his native Bechuanaland, black children were denied schooling beyond the primary level. Only those who came from royal families had the chance to attend segregated black schools like Tiger Kloof in South Africa.¹⁵⁰ Given that background, Seretse Khama had always been aware of how Europeans treated black Africans with humiliation. He tried to be oblivious to the discrimination but had to deal with it on a personal level in his marriage to Ruth Williams, a white woman from England.¹⁵¹ Protests by white leaders in South Africa and South Rhodesia to induce British leaders to ban Seretse from Bechuanaland due to his marriage made it more obvious to him as to how white Europeans scorned black Africans.¹⁵² Neighboring South Africa's apartheid treatment of blacks and its government's ban against Seretse from entering that country following his marriage, all contributed to Khama's resentment of the European denigration of black African culture and identity. In that regard, and as an African nationalist leader, Seretse viewed the

¹⁴⁹ Segal, "Appropriate Technology."

¹⁵⁰ Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."

¹⁵¹ Redfern, *Ruth and Seretse*.

¹⁵² Henderson, "Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation."

European degradation and its social subjugation as an insult and disgrace to the authentic African tradition and culture and as such accepted the Senghorian response in totality. Consequently, he also became a believer in the Senghorian response and accepted the notion that the African way of knowing was different from the analytical European way.

Adhering to this principle, Khama portrayed the African culture as different and therefore categorized scientifico-technical rationality as characteristically European, rather than African.¹⁵³ With this psychological mindset, he neglected to formulate policies to pursue scientific culture. Khama demonstrated his conviction to the philosophy by making a distinction between African and non-African cultures and made public declarations to that effect. For example, in advocating *kagisano* and in responding to an accusation that his government had no traditional guiding principles, Khama clarified that Botswana's economic development was not going to follow the path of alien cultures conceived in a "faraway land." He asked his people that Botswana's economic development be built "on the foundations provided by Botswana's culture and Botswana's values and traditions."¹⁵⁴ Khama went on to conclude that foreign cultural beliefs and ways "may be perfectly suitable for the countries and continents in which they have developed, but they can have little meaning for the majority of Botswana."¹⁵⁵

From the above position one can deduce that Khama was viewing Botswana's total culture as unique from others in terms of human development, a position that falls in line with the Senghorian belief. Captivated by the uniqueness of the African culture,

¹⁵³ Carter and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 148.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

Seretse pursued relentless economic policies based on export promotion of raw materials, which Botswana possessed naturally or the ones that were produced under nature's constraints, without pursuing scientific culture of creation. As Nkrumah in Ghana, Seretse believed in the Senghorian philosophy and came to accept that, by nature, the scientific-technical culture is European. For this reason, he was unmotivated to foster scientific culture. This path has been followed by Seretse's successors. Because of this, scientific culture is not being established in Botswana, rather the country is pursuing what is considered as *Appropriate Technology* which is more labor intensive and less technologically oriented.¹⁵⁶

SUMMARY

This chapter has shown that, in comparing the impact of leadership on economic development in Botswana and Ghana, differences and similarities exist. The differences in the leaderships relate to differences in colonization. The colonial administration type helps explain cultural ramifications that defined the economic outcomes in both countries. In terms of colonial difference, Botswana's protectorate system allowed the traditional leaders to manage their internal political administrative affairs without foreign interference.¹⁵⁷ Unlike Botswana, Ghana's colonization came with direct British governance of the local people.¹⁵⁸ Protectorate and direct colonization, due to their administrative differences, had significantly different impacts on leadership evolution in

¹⁵⁶ Segal, "Appropriate Technology."

¹⁵⁷ Shillington, *The Colonization of Southern Tswana*.

the two countries during the colonial era that, in turn, has had a postcolonial impact on both countries economies. The state of political affairs helped to maintain leadership continuity and moral obligations between the leaders and their followers in Botswana. In contrast to the leadership continuity in Botswana due to the protectorate model of colonization, the direct colonial rule in Ghana resulted in leadership discontinuity. At the time of direct colonial rule, Ghana's traditional leaders and their institutions were subjugated to a British colonial judicial system.¹⁵⁹

The colonial systems provided two different leadership contingencies for both countries at the dawn of the colonial era. During the transition from the colonial to postcolonial era, Botswana's leadership remained continuous with the same class of traditional leaders.¹⁶⁰ In Ghana, the direct colonial rule created another group of leaders made up of an educated class that had self-interest in the colonial administration. It was to that group that the colonizers transferred postcolonial leadership, with the traditional leaders who previously had local legitimacy being excluded from the national constitutional rule.¹⁶¹ Without legitimacy at home, the educated leadership group looked to Great Britain for its legitimacy and accordingly aligned its moral obligation with the colonizers. Based on that relationship, postcolonial Ghanaian leaders felt that they had no moral obligation to local peoples. This structural problem combined with low morals allowed them to satisfy their economic and political interest through corruption and

¹⁵⁸ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

¹⁵⁹ Gocking, "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."

¹⁶⁰ Parsons, Henderson, and Tlou, *Seretse Khama 1921-1980*.

¹⁶¹ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

repression. In the early years of his leadership Nkrumah spoke against bribery and corruption but did not take any direct measure to combat the practice, thus allowing it to permeate economic institutions.¹⁶²

Botswana leaders, on the other hand, have always thought of themselves differently. Given their past relationship with the people through their family backgrounds, as being heirs from the royal families of the individual tribes, they have always been aware of their fiduciary relationships with the people and the importance of keeping their moral obligation. Botswana postcolonial leaders have kept their traditional moral obligation through the Tswana concept of *kagisano*, which emphasizes high morals between the government and people. Khama, the first postcolonial leader, established a high moral culture by emphasizing and developing policies of non-tolerance against immoral acts of corruption in his government. Khama and his successors have followed the high moral ground and have designed national institutions to achieve collective interests as opposed to fulfilling personal interests.

In essence, postcolonial leaders in the two countries have established two different social cultures. Botswana postcolonial leaders have been able to establish a high moral culture void of corruption and a democratic capitalist system teeming with political stability. Both traits have cumulatively resulted in higher per capita income, more education for all school age children, and good healthcare service for the majority of citizens in Botswana. The Ghanaian postcolonial leaders, on the other hand, have not been successful in establishing high morals. Their low moral culture has led to corruption and political authoritarianism. Those conditions have resulted in the theft of

¹⁶² Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

national financial resources and political instability. These have deprived the society of economic benefits such as education to all children and universal healthcare.

Unfortunately for both countries, however, their leaders have been unable to establish scientific cultures, which could induce industrialization and enable their countries to supply their own industrial material needs.¹⁶³

Based on UNDP's Human Development Index, current economic indicators show that Botswana is doing well vis-à-vis Ghana. The theoretical explanation for this difference provided by the LCD model, is that Botswana's leaders were able to establish a high moral culture as one of the essential prerequisite cultures needed for economic development. The high moral culture has enabled the leaders to significantly curtail corruption and altruistically direct national financial resources into social welfare. Again, Ghana's economy is doing poorly because its leaders have been unwilling to establish high moral culture. The absence of this feature has allowed the leaders to siphon national resources for personal uses. The diversion of national resources for personal interests means that fewer resources are available for social welfare improvement and human development.

Despite the economic improvement, Botswana is still industrially underdeveloped and its economy relies on raw material production because it lacks the scientific culture of creation to enable it to produce industrial goods. Just like Botswana, in that context, Ghana also lacks scientific culture and depends on raw material production. In other words, Ghanaian leaders have not been able to establish either high moral culture or

¹⁶³ Ahmad, "Science and Technology."

scientific culture needed for economic development; hence, its economic impoverishment. While reasons for failing to establish high moral culture is partially attributed to the colonial past, it can also be attributed to the Senghorian beliefs of their leaders and their desire to preserve what they erroneously deem as an African culture.

The Senghorian philosophy postulates that the African way of knowing is intuitive rather than analytic, one that denigrates analytic scientific thinking.¹⁶⁴ Even though the original argument was used to defend African self-identification, most contemporary African leaders have accepted its premises in totality in terms of African culture. Part of the reason why Nkrumah and Khama accepted this concept of reasoning is that it helped them to psychologically move African culture away from criticism as a solution to the crisis of African self-definition.¹⁶⁵ Both leaders believed in the Senghorian explanation to the point that the acceptance of what the philosophy deems as European culture meant the denial of who they are as Africans. Hence, the leaders' lack of enthusiasm to pursue a scientific culture that is essential for economic development, but which is characterized by Senghorianism as un-African. It was that dilemma that led Nkrumah to adopt African socialism as a developmental approach. Through that path, he thought Ghana could gain a material technical base without negatively affecting its cultural roots.¹⁶⁶ To avoid a similar dilemma, Khama believed the way to develop Botswana's economy was to use African culture as opposed to cultures from foreign lands.¹⁶⁷ To do that, he pursued

¹⁶⁴ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

¹⁶⁵ Oladipo, "Reason, Identity, and the African Quest."

¹⁶⁶ Smertin, *Kwame Nkrumah*.

¹⁶⁷ Carter and Morgan, *From the Frontline*.

export promotion based on raw material production, which relies less on scientific culture that Senghorian philosophy condemns as un-African. This belief has been followed by all the successors of the two leaders and has resulted in the absence of industrialization. In essence, the lack of scientific culture of creation in both countries has impaired their desire for sustainable economic development.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Immediately after the World War II, the global political economy changed. Many nations in Africa that had been previously colonized by European countries began asserting their sovereignty. The independence phenomenon swept across the continent, and within a generation, most of the nations had become free from European colonization. However, the end of the colonial rule came with a challenge of economic development to the new leaders who took over the reigns of power in the newly independent countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Since then, many of those countries have remained economically underdeveloped. In many cases, most of these countries have had economic development set back, and abject poverty has become the norm for the past four decades. The regional leaderships have created cultural conditions that have undermined hopes for socio-economic development that could improve living conditions and fulfill the aspirations of their people.

In this research, I have examined the leadership problems that underlie the poor economic conditions of countries in sub-Saharan Africa. In this final chapter, I conclude the research by first reiterating the initial objective and review the theoretical linkage upon which the study was based. Second, I review the major findings, and highlight the work's contributions to the literature. Third, the chapter looks at the limits of the research and suggests other avenues for future research relating to leadership, culture, and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, the chapter considers some of the

study's implications for sub-Saharan Africa countries and offers modest policy recommendations.

OBJECTIVE AND THEORETICAL LINKAGE

The economic development literature maintains that leadership and culture are important determinants of economic development. Despite this assertion, however, a careful review of the literature shows that contemporary economic development advice offered to sub-Saharan African countries and the thinking that underlies it is misguided. The advice ignores a substantial body of evidence about the importance of leadership and culture in economic development.¹ Taking the above condition as a point of departure, two assumptions were made for this research study. First, it was assumed that leaders have been impediments to economic development in sub-Sahara African countries. The second assumption argues that the economic underdevelopment conditions in the region are due to the absence of socio-scientific culture. Based on those assumptions, a hypothesis and two research questions were formulated. The hypothesis states that sub-Saharan African leaderships have failed to establish socio-scientific culture that can promote technological innovation for economic development. The first question asked: Why have the leaderships in the region failed to establish the prerequisite scientific culture needed for economic development? The second question assumes a failure in establishing the appropriate cultural environments needed for development and asked: What culture, created by leaders, impedes economic development in the region?

¹ Casson, *The Economics of Business*.

In answering the above questions, the hypothesis has been tested by case studies of Botswana and Ghana. Utilizing the leadership, culture, and development (LCD) model in conjunction with the case studies, this research has shown a correlation between leadership and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. The LCD model highlights the association between the three variables in analyzing the progress of a nation. It articulates that leadership is a process phenomenon where individuals with high moral capability rally group members to achieve a mutual quest that benefits the group. Leaders accomplish such objectives through legitimization and interpretation of social norms with the power invested in them by the group members as a whole. Dialectically, the legitimization and interpretation powers of the leaders make them cultural architects.²

Cultures are accepted systems of social practices of behavior and prescriptions embedded with technology in the form of knowledge. They are linked to economic development as a social capital.³ Culture is also economically related, in the sense that, it is compatible with individuals' optimization. Deductively, therefore, culture becomes economically driven and becomes linked to economic development.⁴ There are two broad aspects of culture, namely, the *reserve* and the *universal* zones. The reserve zone is useful for personal actualization and has no essential bearing on human truth or falsehood. On the other hand, the universal zone anchors cultural elements of religion and science of creation that has true human values and is essential to the quality of human life. Religion offers moral attributes from which moral culture is derived, while scientific beliefs offer

² Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

³ Brinkman, "Economic Growth versus Economic Development."

informative ways of understanding the natural law of creation (i.e., technology). The two cultural elements form the basic fabric upon which human values rely.⁵ Therefore, the motivating desire and personal ability of leaders to establish those cultural attributes determines how their societies progress economically.⁶

Countries with leaders that are able to engineer both scientific and moral cultural attributes acquire a certain level of social and scientific knowledge that when synchronously applied, become social and material technologies. These, in turn, help to improve societal living standards. It is the acquisition of this capability to provide the foundation for sustainable improvement in living conditions for a nation that constitutes development. Development, therefore, occurs when a nation, through accumulative causation by virtue of cultural process, acquires the understanding of the natural law of creation and uses it to attain socio-scientific capability that enables the society to produce diverse products and services to satisfy its population's need.⁷ Hence, its absence brings about socio-economic underdevelopment, which most countries in sub-Saharan Africa are experiencing.⁸

As discussed in chapters three through six, the hypothesized relationship between leadership and economic development in Botswana and Ghana is strongly supported by the evidence in the case studies. As the evidence suggests, the economic improvement

⁴ Sen, "A Matter of Choice."

⁵ Wiredu, "Problems in Africa's Self-Definition."

⁶ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁷ Kuznets, *Economic Growth*; Myrdal, "What is Development?"

⁸ Muriithi, *African Crisis, Is There Hope?*

that has occurred in Botswana is symptomatic of the presence of high moral cultural standards, which its postcolonial leaders have fostered and nurtured through policies and public speeches.⁹ In Ghana, by contrast, the economic stagnation reflects the low moral cultural standards that its contemporary leaders have legitimized.¹⁰ The difference in leadership that is being exercised by the leaders of both countries is partially elucidated by their different colonial legacies, and partially by the Senghorian philosophy.

Taking into account the cultures that the leaders have established and the difference economic outcomes that have materialized in both countries, this study concludes that the hypothesized relationship between leadership and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa is strongly supported by the evidence from the case studies. The case studies show that the leaders have been unable to establish high moral and scientific cultures synchronously. It is the absence of both cultures to minimize corruption, increase institutional efficiency, and provide innovative creative thinking that explains the economic underdevelopment in the region.

The evidence from the case studies suggests that the answer to the first research question, why the leaders have failed to establish the two prerequisite cultures for economic development lies in part with the colonial discourse and the Senghorian dimension. The colonial factor emphasized that the different colonial administrations provided different postcolonial leaderships in sub-Saharan Africa. In Botswana, where there was a protectorate administration, the precolonial leadership was left intact to allow leadership continuity into the postcolonial era. That state of affairs allowed postcolonial

⁹ Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

¹⁰ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

leaders to acknowledge their self-interest duty and to remain committed to the economic interests of the general population. With that psychological mindset, contemporary Botswana leaders have a motivation to foster and legitimize a high moral culture towards economic improvement.

In colonial areas like Ghana, where there existed direct colonial rule, local precolonial leaders with traditional legitimacy were subjugated and eliminated during the colonial era.¹¹ Towards the postcolonial era, new leadership groups without traditional legitimacy were given national political power in the region by the colonizer. Without fiduciary relations with the general society, the leaders are psychologically disconnected from the masses. This fragmented relationship has led to a leadership focused on personal rather than collective interests. This situation has created a leadership group of immoral minorities, who dominate the sub-Sahara Africa's political scene and remain unmotivated to establish a high moral culture for collective national developmental interests. The case study evidence suggests that the reason for the leaders' inability to establish scientific culture resides in their adherence to Senghorianism. This philosophy advocates that the African mode of knowing is intuitive as opposed to being analytic.¹² The acceptance of this doctrine by the SSA leaders inhibits them from establishing a scientific culture capable of inducing industrial economic development.

¹¹ Gocking. "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."

¹² Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

Finally, regarding the question as to what culture has been created instead of high moral and scientific cultures: the case studies show that Botswana has been able to establish a culture that minimizes corruption, while Ghana has failed to do so. In Ghana, leaders have established low moral culture that has resulted in leadership corruption, political authoritarianism, and human rights abuses. It is the Ghanaian socio-economic cultural type that the sub-Sahara African leaders have established in place of the prerequisite socio-scientific culture that is essentially needed for region's economic development. Based on the evidence from the two case studies and using deductive reasoning, this study finds that the economic underdevelopment in sub-Saharan African nations has been due to leaderships' inability to foster and legitimize the prerequisite socio-scientific cultures for economic development.

MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE CASE STUDIES

It was found that precolonial Ghana was occupied by different nations. The nations were led by leaders who waged wars among themselves for political and economic supremacy and, therefore, were unable to form a homogenous society with a consolidated national leadership. In the fifteenth century, the Ashanti Empire emerged with a central government guided by the Ashanti constitution. Even though the centralized political system was effective from the beginning, it later became ineffective due to expansion of the empire. For that reason, the Ashanti leaders adopted a repressive method of ruling, as opposed to consociational democracy, that led to the disintegration of the homogenous society they were trying to build.¹³ Economically, precolonial Ghana

¹³ Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*.

was composed of agrarian societies that also engaged in commerce. The means of production was land, and, in lieu of that fact, leaders supervised the access to land to ensure that people who wanted to farm were not denied that right. In commerce, the nations regarded their trade with the Europeans as important because it allowed them to procure guns to embark on political and economic expansion.¹⁴

The nations were colonized between 1850 and 1902 by the British and were joined to create the Gold Coast. Unlike a protectorate, the British administered the Gold Coast under direct rule and eliminated most of the traditional leaders by either removing them from their positions or sometimes sending them into exile.¹⁵ Traditional leaders who were allowed to remain found their institutions subjugated to the colonial judicial system.¹⁶ In the process, the British created another class of local leadership made of educated elites. During the transition from colonial rule to the postcolonial era, the newly created local leadership group became a competitor to the traditional leaders and vied for national power. Due to vacillating policies of the colonial administration the two local leadership groups could not unite to form a united leadership for the good for their country.

By the end of the colonial rule, the national political power had been seized from the traditional leaders and was given to the new educated groups. With the adoption of the British representative system of democracy, the traditional leaders were excluded

¹⁴ Ward, *A History of the Gold Coast*.

¹⁵ Gocking, "British Justice and Native Tribunal in Southern Gold Coast Colony."

¹⁶ Gocking, "Colonial Rule and the Legal Factor."

from the national constitutional rule.¹⁷ The transfer of power to the new educated leadership group during the transition stimulated a moral psychological metamorphosis in Ghana's social development. The leadership group that inherited power from Britain lacked local legitimacy because its legitimacy to rule emanated from the colonizer. With that psychological perception, the leaders shifted their moral obligations and loyalty to the colonizer to satisfy their personal interest as opposed to seeking to serve Ghana's national collective interests.

As a result, the direct colonial rule did two things that have had an impact on Ghana's socio-economic development. First, by eliminating and replacing traditional leaders who had fiduciary relations with the masses, the direct colonial rule eradicated moral responsibility as a social contract between the rulers and the ruled, causing a moral decay in the Ghanaian society.¹⁸ This disrupted the traditional political economy system of the country. Those who became postcolonial leaders had no motivation in establishing high moral standards that could have undermined their personal interests. In 1951 when Nkrumah became the head of the colonial government, his quest for power prevented him from making political concessions to build a unified leadership for Ghana.¹⁹ Instead, he adopted an authoritarian approach to stabilize the nation and, in so doing, laid the foundation for dictatorial political culture for Ghana's postcolonial era.²⁰

¹⁷ Bourret, *Ghana: The Road to Independence*.

¹⁸ Lugard, *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa*.

¹⁹ Rooney, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Political Kingdom in the Third World*.

²⁰ Omari, *Kwame Nkrumah: The Anatomy of an African Dictatorship*.

Economically, Nkrumah embarked on social projects to enhance development. However, after independence, he failed to foster a high moral culture to curb corrupt practices. Nkrumah allowed his party officials to use national economic institutions, like the Cocoa Marketing Board to extract money from producers to satisfy their personal interests at the expense of national development interests.²¹ Through authoritarian rule, Nkrumah's successors have followed and intensified the economic and political practices that undermine development in Ghana. Today, Ghana's economy is overburdened with debt, and its per capita income stands at approximately \$400.²² In education, Ghana has an adult illiteracy rate of 36%, and a basic education enrollment of 76% for school age children.²³ The universal healthcare service that Ghanaians enjoyed at the time of independence has long been abandoned by contemporary postcolonial leaders. Today many citizens do not have access to healthcare. On the average, there are four physicians for every 100,000 patients with few rural dwellers having access to physicians.²⁴ This economic decline has been further worsened by the last twenty years under the Rawlings' government.

Not only has the Ghanaian economy stagnated; it is also unable to produce industrial goods due to lack of scientific culture of creation.²⁵ The lack of scientific culture is due to its postcolonial leaders' adherence, beginning with Nkrumah, to

²¹ Fitch and Oppenheimer, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*.

²² African Development Bank, *Basic Indicators on African Countries* (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: African Development Bank, 1995).

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Dugbatey, "National Health Policies."

²⁵ Ahmad, "Science and Technology."

Senghorianism. This philosophy advocates, by way of defending African self-actualization, that analytical scientific thinking is a European cultural trait as opposed to an African one.²⁶ In evaluating Ghana's economic development since its independence, the evidence points to the fact that the country's current deplorable economic state of affairs is largely due to its leadership's abuse of power and corruption.²⁷ In essence, since the end of the colonial era, Ghanaian leaders have all inhibited the country's development.²⁸

In examining leadership and development in Botswana, it was found that precolonial leaders established a well-entrenched political and economic apparatus that served the mutual interests of the rulers and the ruled. Acknowledging that their legitimacy came from the people, the leaders maintained their moral obligation to the society as a whole. Politically, the leaders organized their societies based on participatory democracy, adjudicated disputes, and made decisions about social service. Economically, the ruling classes were the guardians of the people and made sure that people had land for grazing, crops, and residence. Through the cattle loaning (*mafisa*) system, the political leadership established a fiduciary social relationship with the people to support and maintain social stability and progression. In times of security needs, leaders, like Khama the Great, rallied other traditional chiefs into military alliance to repel attackers. By the time of Khama the Great's death, he had built a homogenous Tswana society.²⁹

²⁶ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

²⁷ Rimmer, *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy*.

²⁸ Petchenkine, *Ghana: In Search of Stability*.

²⁹ Picard, *The Evolution of Modern Botswana*.

In the mid 1800's, the Tswana nations sought an alliance with the British. The relationship later turned into a protectorate agreement. The arrangement obliged the United Kingdom to recognize traditional leaders as an autonomous authority without impinging on their legitimacy. That characteristic allowed the leaders to maintain their moral obligations to the people and also made Botswana's colonization different from that of other African colonies that experienced direct rule.³⁰ When the British attempted to change the protectorate arrangement to replace it with direct rule, Tswana leaders, led by Tshekedi Khama, resisted the change to preserve Botswana's traditional institutions and the leaders' legitimacy without polarization among the local social elements. That colonial protectorate legacy allowed Botswana to have leadership continuity during the transition from the colonial era to the postcolonial era.

The first postcolonial leadership under Seretse Khama used traditional institutional moral obligation to foster high moral standards to prevent corruption.³¹ In addition to high moral standards, Khama stressed the importance of democracy in decision-making and designed the actions of his government to promote democratic attitudes. With high moral culture minimizing leadership corruption and good governance, Khama channeled national resources into human development. Since Khama's death, his successors have followed the path of high moral cultural standards, which he laid, and also have formulated policies that have improved the economic living

³⁰ Crowder. *West Africa Under Colonial Rule*.

³¹ Isaksen, "Macroeconomic Management and Bureaucracy."

standards of the Botswana people.³² Today, Botswana has a high literacy rate of 70% and a basic school enrollment has increased 112% for school age children; and many of the citizens live within ten miles from health care centers.³³ Botswana's per capita income is over \$3,000 and is the only country in sub-Saharan Africa that is debt free.³⁴

Despite the above economic achievements, Botswana, like Ghana, is industrially underdeveloped because its leaders have been less motivated to foster a scientific culture of creation that can induce industrialization. The reason for the lack of enthusiasm in establishing scientific culture is due to its postcolonial leaders' adherence to the Senghorian philosophy. It defends African self-actualization and argues that analytical scientific thinking is a European culture, not an African one.³⁵ However, in comparing Botswana and Ghana's current economic status, based on UNDP's Human Development Index as the ability of a country to translate economic gains into improving living conditions, Botswana's economic living conditions have dramatically improved. The leadership's ability to foster high moral culture has enabled the poor desert country that was virtually seen as another Bantu state at the time of its independence, to surpass Ghana. Even though the high moral culture has not resulted in economic development due to the absence of scientific culture, it puts Botswana on the first stage of the development hierarchy that Rostow proposed.³⁶ The country's acquisition of scientific

³² Samatar, *An African Miracle*.

³³ Owuor-Omondi, Attholang, and Diselco, *Botswana: A National Health Status Evaluation*.

³⁴ African Development Bank, *Basic Indicators*, 1995.

³⁵ Senghor, *Prose and Poetry*.

³⁶ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*.

culture will complete its second stage of development process and propel it into the 'take off' stage as described by Rostow.³⁷

Just like the rest of the sub-Saharan African countries, there is no clear indication as to when both Botswana and Ghana will be able to foster and legitimize scientific cultures. As this research has shown, that situation will depend on when leaders emerge in those countries to break away from the Senghorian myth and legitimize scientific cultures. In Botswana, the acquisition of scientific culture can occur if a leader arises to rally the people in establishing a scientific culture in conjunction with its present high moral culture.

In Ghana, and in most parts of sub-Sahara Africa, where corruption, poor governance, and political instabilities are rampant, more needs to be done to change the prevailing dominant culture that promotes economic inefficiencies. Those countries need leaders who can rally the people, foster, and legitimize both high moral and scientific cultures. Ghana's leadership problem mirrors that of most sub-Saharan African countries.³⁸ As this study has shown, even though Botswana leaders have been able to establish high moral culture that minimizes corruption, the leadership's ability to rally people in Botswana towards a scientific culture is presently absent. This plight is similar among the leaders in Ghana and many countries in all parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, leadership constitutes the missing variable in sub-Saharan Africa's economic development.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Muriithi, *African Crisis, Is There Hope?*

CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

While reviewing the literature, the importance of leadership in development was asserted. In fact, the literature attests that the success or failure of a nation's economic development depends on the determination and the intentions of leadership.³⁹ Following this line of reasoning, Casson also articulates the importance of leadership in building a national culture that reduces transaction costs and ultimately enhances economic performance.⁴⁰ Despite the importance of leadership and culture in development, no research had been conducted by any of the major schools of thought on development to link the role of leadership to underdevelopment in the less developed countries.

By using leadership's impact to illustrate the difference in economic outcomes in Botswana and Ghana, this research has introduced the leadership variable into the development equation. It has taken leadership beyond the governance level to show how leadership is responsible for transforming human behavior towards economic development. Previously, the importance of cultural behavior has been neglected in economic development analyses by the two major development paradigms with the assumption that economic rationality is not compatible with cultural subjectivity.⁴¹ This work has demonstrated that this perception needs to be re-examined. This dissertation has shown the types of cultural attributes that are essential in order to promote and achieve economic development in sub-Saharan Africa countries.

³⁹ Doe, "Economic Development of Francophone Africa."

⁴⁰ Casson, "Cultural Determinants."

⁴¹ Ibid.

Besides leadership and cultural variables, the study also has introduced the colonial argument in a new way. It has used the colonial argument as an explanatory tool to account for the moral difference between postcolonial leaderships in Botswana and Ghana. Through the moral obligation lens, the colonial difference argument helps us to explain why Botswana leaders, through their fiduciary responsibility, have interests in the welfare of their people and are therefore psychologically prone to refrain from excessive corruption that negatively impact a nation's economic development. This contribution to the literature is important because colonialism in Africa has always been looked at with tunnel vision and without distinction to how the differential impact of colonial methodologies on Africa's socio-economic development.⁴² Such a narrow approach clouds the understanding as to why a country like Botswana is economically improving and countries like Nigeria and Democratic Republic of Congo, both with comparably larger mineral and human resources, are socio-economically impoverished.

Finally, it attempts to use culture to explain the extent to which countries progress unevenly towards economic development. Scholars, such as Huntington recommends such an explanation. By using culture to explain economic differences between Botswana and Ghana, this work offers a more comprehensive explanation for the actual experiences of both countries. By introducing the above three variables, leadership, culture, and colonialism and how they impact economic development in sub-Saharan Africa, this work makes an original contribution to the development literature.

⁴² Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.

IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

The implications of this work can be many for different segments of the African and non-African communities alike. For the African nationalists, one implication of this study is that in order to achieve development to improve the living standards of Africans, due cognizance must be taken of the depth and enormity of African leadership problems. Another implication is that in order for them to assist in resolving economic problems, the African nationalists need to engage in organizing their communities to pressure governments to embrace, foster, and cultivate high moral standards. In addition, they also need to pressure leaders to implement policies and programs that will enhance the economic well being of the people and reconcile, rather than divide and alienate, diverse ethnic groups.

For the current leaders, the first implication is that they need to steer themselves towards high moral standards and embark on strategies that will enhance institutional efficiency and minimize official corruption in government. It is urgent that the leaders institute monitoring and auditing mechanisms to hold themselves and their officials accountable of misusing public financial resources and abusing their offices. In governance, leader will need to institute policies that enhance transparency and enable their economic institutions to communicate clearly to avoid inefficiencies and redundancies. The social implications for current leaders are great. It is imperative for them to modify their current psychological mindset by developing a renaissance consciousness committed to their citizens, rather than one committed to ethnic preferences or close associates. Most importantly, there is an implicit mandatory

implication that the leaders engage in instituting democratic systems with respect for human rights.

In the productive sector, the implications for the sub-Saharan Africa leaders are also significant. Regional leaders must adopt a long-term vision towards sustainable development as opposed to one emphasizing growth policies alone.⁴³ This direction will require that they embark on transforming their economies from focusing solely on raw material production to ones that include industrial production. In order to do that, it is urgent for them to abandon their Senghorian conviction and embrace scientific culture. That can be done only with an understanding that there are two aspects of culture, namely, the reserve zone and the universal zone. The former offers them and their societies self-identity or actualization, while the latter will offer self-improvement and greater human quality.⁴⁴ The knowledge of this distinction will enable them to pursue the acquisition of scientific culture from the universal zone without the fear of alienating their self-identity.

Certainly, the enormity of African debt and lack of financial resources have always been the hindrances of economic development in sub-Sahara Africa.⁴⁵ One alternative approach to minimize this financial stumbling block is for sub-Saharan African leaders to divert military expenditures to the acquisition of scientific culture. To attain scientific culture, financial resources need to be allocated to education. Specifically, the money should be channeled into research and development at the domestic level. The

⁴³ Todaro, *Economic Development*.

⁴⁴ Wiredu, "Problems in Africa's Self-Definition."

⁴⁵ Cheru, *The Silent Revolution in Africa*.

implication for development agencies is that there is a need to re-examine leaderships' role, not only in regards to their governance abilities, but also in terms of their behavior as social engineers and in terms of the political cultures they establish and legitimize.

Future Research

Future scholarship is need in various areas. First, our discussion has personified the leadership function in terms of a simple individual in a group. Even though that was done for analytical simplicity, in reality, not all groups have this kind of leadership. Second, in some instances, our analysis has been general and the central feature that is assumed to influence economic performance has been viewed in abstract terms. The third limit of this research is due to the fact that in the analysis we have assigned cultural legitimization solely to leadership. Though this makes theoretical sense, it maybe too simplistic, especially, in these days of high information technology where people are influenced by information from everywhere and not just that is promulgated by their leaders.

Based on the universal applicability of leadership, culture, and economic development that has been argued in this research, any future research pertaining to the above areas will help advance the principle concept of this study. Until any of the above research initiative is undertaken, it is fair to note that this research illustrates the importance of leadership and culture in economic development. Hence, achieving sustainable economic development in sub-Sahara Africa will be difficult, if not impossible, until leaders emerge to establish the appropriate prerequisite socio-scientific and high moral cultures.

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