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College of Social and Behavioral Sciences

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Alice Mary Wamuyu Kariuki

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Walden University
2019

Abstract

Challenges of Combating Homegrown Terrorism in Kenya: A Youth Radicalization

Perspective

by

Alice Mary Wamuyu Kariuki

MSc, University of Leicester, United Kingdom, 2000

Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Public Policy and Administration

Walden University

November, 2019

Abstract

Radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism has persisted since November 2011 following the decision by the government to send Kenya Defense Forces to fight al Shabaab terrorist groups in Somalia. Using Schneider and Ingram's conceptualization of social construction of target populations as a guide, the purpose of this multicase study was to explore the motivation of young Kenyan males in accepting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and their interpretations, feelings, and perceptions of the policies and strategies in place to empower them. Using a purposeful sampling with a maximum variation strategy, data were collected through interviews with 34 young Kenyan males, 4 of whom were connected to 4 terrorism incidents in Kenya since 2011. Additional data were collected through publicly available data and policy statements. All data were inductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure and cross-case analysis. Findings indicated that young Kenyan males are enticed with financial offers by al Shabaab, and faced social problems that needed solutions, and participants believe the government of Kenya should better protect them from al Shabaab maneuvers. Implications for social change include recommendations for reform of youth policies and programs by the Ministry of Youth Affairs, and implementation of the recommendations of this study so that youth can be properly engaged in nation-building activities.

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August 2019

Dedication

To my dear departed father, Joram Wambiro, who wished that I pursue my education to the highest level: To my dear husband, Humphrey Kariuki: To my dear mother, Grace Nduta Wambiro, to our dear sons, daughters, and grandchildren: And to the youth of Kenya.

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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study

Since 2011, security agencies in Kenya have been grappling with the radicalization of young, Kenyan males and their recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Al-Shabaab militants, an al-Qaeda terrorist cell based in neighboring Somalia, have targeted the male youth for radicalization and recruitment, who are then used as terror cells to carry out terror attacks in Kenya (Botha, 2014). Al-Shabaab militants have cited retaliation as their reason for staging terror attacks after the Kenyan government deployed the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) to Somalia in November 2011 to flush out the group (Lind, Mutahi, & Oosterom, 2015). The Kenyan government was also blamed for enacting draconian laws to deal with the al-Shabaab menace (Lind et al., 2015), which established youth programs that were used as conduits for looting public funds (Lind et al., 2015).

This chapter provides an overview of the study. I outline the study's background and the related knowledge gaps, the problem statement outlining the existing problem that prompted the study, the purpose of the study and why conducting it is important, the research questions, and the theoretical framework underpinning the study. The chapter includes the definitions of the key terms as well as a discussion on the assumptions, limitations, scope, and significance of the study. The chapter then concludes with a summary.

Background

The radicalization of young Kenyan males and their recruitment into homegrown terrorism first emerged after the fall of the Somali government under President Said

Barre in 1991 (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). Civil war broke out immediately after the fall, with clan warlords competing for control of the country (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Lind et al., 2015). Many Somali citizens took refuge in Kenya, where they were received as refugees, with some settling and establishing businesses in the country (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Lind et al., 2015). The Kenyan government struggled to broker peace in Somalia, and in 2004, succeeded in its bid to have the Somalis elect President Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed to head the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The elections were held in Nairobi, with the elected president remaining in Nairobi for some time (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Lind et al., 2015).

In 2009, al-Shabaab, a terrorist group affiliated with al-Qaeda, began radicalizing and recruiting young, Kenyan males, whom they smuggled into Somalia through the porous border with Kenya and then trained them to fight and destabilize the TFG (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). In 2010, al-Shabaab terrorists launched attacks and kidnappings of foreign tourists in the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa, and they operated as pirates in the Indian Ocean, taking vessels captive. To fund its terrorist operations, the group demanded ransoms for the kidnapped tourists and crews of captured ships, killing them in cases of noncompliance (Attah-Asamoah, 2015). These actions prompted the Kenyan government's decision in October 2011 to dispatch KDF troops into neighboring Somalia to flush out al-Shabaab. These troops later joined the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM; Attah-Asamoah, 2015; Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2016).

Previously, Kenya had only experienced global terrorism due to its links with Western countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Patterson, 2015). These acts of terrorism included the bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi on August 7, 1998 (Patterson, 2015); the bombing of Paradise Hotel, an Israeli investment, in the coastal city of Mombasa on November 28, 2002 (Patterson, 2015); and an unsuccessful missile attack on an Israeli aircraft taking off from Moi International Airport, Mombasa, on the same day (Patterson, 2015). Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for these attacks (Patterson, 2015).

Following the incursion of the KDF into Somalia, al-Shabaab threatened retaliatory attacks if the Kenyan government did not withdraw its troops (Attah-Asamoah, 2015; Institute of Justice and Reconciliation, 2016). Al-Shabaab planned to execute its threats using the young, Kenyan males it had earlier smuggled into Somalia. Al-Shabaab brought these youths back to Kenya to stage terror attacks using guns and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which resulted in the deaths of 402 people and injuries to more than 900 people (Anti-Terrorism Police Unit [ATPU], 2014). The attacks took place in different parts of Kenya and targeted churches, mosques, public transport terminals, shopping malls, and universities—all public areas. The worst attacks were those at the Westgate Mall on September 21, 2013 and Garissa University on April 2, 2015 (ATPU, 2015). In the most recent terror attack in Nairobi DusitD2 Hotel on January 16, 2019, 26 persons lost their lives, including five terrorists, and several others were seriously injured. The attack was masterminded by young Kenyans (Kenya Police

Website, 2019). Al-Shabaab has continued to radicalize and recruit young, Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism (Lind et al., 2015; Ochieng, 2015).

The Kenyan government passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act Number 30 of 2012, after compromises with Muslim legislators, which was pivotal in tackling the perpetrators of terrorism. Prior to this, the security agencies had challenges charging suspects arrested in connection with terrorism-related crimes, as the same law had been rejected in 2003, as it allegedly replicated U.S. law (Ochieng, 2015; Patterson, 2015). However, the new law did not adequately address the menace, as incidents escalated toward the year 2014. This prompted the government to introduce other laws and amend sections of the previous law in its Security Laws (Amendment) Act, 2014, which was passed by parliament on December 18, 2014. The amended act further provided for the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Center to coordinate national counterterrorism efforts to detect and deter acts of terrorism. In terms of radicalization, the center develops strategies of counter- and de-radicalization. The penalty for radicalization activities was imprisonment for a term not exceeding 30 years (Lind et al., 2015). However, the bills were challenged in the High Court by opposition politicians and human rights groups, following which 20 sections of the amended act were struck out by the High Court as unconstitutional (High Court of Kenya, 2015).

The causes of homegrown terrorism in Kenya arise from social factors, such as the marginalization and lack of integration of Muslim communities; economic factors, such as high poverty and unemployment rates; religious factors, such as Islamic extremism; poor counterterrorism strategies and policies, which label Muslims as

terrorists and spur condemnation of them; and revenge for KDF going to Somalia to fight al-Shabaab militants. For example, the International Peace Support Center Nairobi contended that high unemployment rates among Kenyan youth rendered them vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Attah-Asamoah (2015) argued that al-Shabaab militants targeted Kenya for revenge after the decision to send KDF troops to Somalia to flush out the terror group. Botha (2014) concluded that inequality based on ethnicity and geographical location, coupled with lack of access to basic services, contributed to marginalization, which later facilitated radicalization. Lind et al. (2015) identified Islamic extremism as a prime factor of radicalization in Kenya.

The Kenyan government's response to this menace was criticized as inadequate, as it only took the form of legislation that imposed severe sentences on those found guilty (Lind et al., 2015). As postulated by Schneider and Ingram (1993), this legislation could be perceived as the creation of a policy design that targets a population (ie., terrorists mainly comprised of young, Kenyan males who are at risk of radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism). This target population falls in the category of negatively constructed groups—regarded as deviants for whom policymakers design policies allocating sanctions instead of benefits. They become proximate targets of punishment policies, and the extent of the burdens they endure is greater (oversubscribed) than is needed to achieve effective results (Schneider & Ingram, 1993).

There is a gap in the literature on the possible motivations for young, Kenyan males in consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The policies, strategies, and programs employed by the government to deter the menace and

deal with those found guilty might have had negative consequences, given the exchanges by the various actors since the government began its policy formulation in 2003.

However, it is not in the scope of this study to examine the question of the effects of these policies and strategies, as this would mean conducting a policy–effect study.

Instead, I highlighted the interpretations and perceptions of young Kenyan males regarding the intentions of current government youth policies, strategies, and programs designed to empower them and to tackle youth radicalization. I also showed how these males have come to learn about the government responses.

Schneider and Ingram (1993) postulated that when beneficial policies, such as rehabilitation programs, are directed at deviant groups (such as young, Kenyan males at risk of radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism), they ordinarily attempt to change the target persons through authoritarian means instead of attacking structural problems. Schneider and Ingram further contended that public policies sometimes fail to meet their intended purposes. Against this backdrop, it would be important to understand the interpretations and perceptions of young, Kenyan males regarding the 2010 Kenya Youth Empowerment Project, a joint venture between the government of Kenya and the World Bank, which was intended to improve youth employability. It was equally important to understand the youths' interpretations and perceptions of, for example, the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, a statute passed by parliament in 2010 criminalizing all organized crime groups. In total, 33 youth groups were identified and classified as organized crime groups. Others who were deemed to assist or harbor these groups were also criminalized under this law (Prevention of Organized Crime Act, 2010). Given that

Kenyan youth operate in groups while engaged in activities under the various government youth programs, it is important to explore how they interpreted and perceived these pieces of legislation. The revelations may assist in understanding the reactions of the target group (young, Kenyan males) to such policies and strategies.

Problem Statement

The radicalization and terrorist recruitment of young, Kenyan males in Kenya since October, 2011 threatens the security of the Kenyan people and visitors to the country. The problem was exacerbated in October 2011 after the KDF incursions into Somalia to flush out al-Shabaab and continues to threaten the security of the Kenyan people and visitors to the country (Attah-Asamoah, 2015). The ease with which young, Kenyan males have admitted their crimes in the courts has puzzled both observers and the legal system. The general perception is that the Somali ethnic group, consisting predominantly of Muslims, is most responsible for terrorism in Kenya (Botha, 2014). Recruiters have started targeting university students (Ochieng, 2015). The Kenyan security agencies' efforts to combat terrorism have not adequately contained the radicalization and recruitment of young, Kenyan males.

Youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism are a social and economic problem. In the social realm, Kenyans have to contend with searches and screenings whenever they access services in public places, such as shopping malls, public transportation, places of worship, and recreational areas. Feelings of fear and insecurity are instilled in the people due to their inability to productively conduct social and nation-building activities. The problem is also economic because it has affected the business and

economic activities of Kenyans. For example, foreign embassies issued travel advisories warning people in their countries not to travel to Kenya, negatively affecting the tourism sector, which contributes to 14% of the country's gross domestic product (CNBC Africa, 2014). The closure of 20 major hotels due to travel warnings has resulted in the loss of 22,000 jobs in the hospitality industry (Kenya Association of Hotelkeepers and Caterers [KAHC], 2014; Kenya Union of Domestic, Hotels, Education Institutions, Hospitals and Allied Workers [KUDHEIHA], 2014). Farmers who rely on selling their products to these hotels have also suffered livelihood losses. Kenya was ranked 12th on the Global Terrorism Index (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2014) of the most terror-hit states, which has also negatively affected the social and economic wellbeing of Kenya and its people. Al-Shabaab has been radicalizing and recruiting young, Kenyan males to stage terror attacks on targets in Kenya (Lind et al., 2015).

The available literature on this phenomenon lacks a clear understanding of the motivations of young, Kenyan males who consent to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism against fellow Kenyans. As explained in Chapter 2, previous researchers on youth radicalization, in particular, and terrorism, in general, have analyzed the prevalence of social, political, and economic factors. Questions regarding what motivates young, Kenyan males to commit terrorist acts and how they have interpreted the government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and also addressing the problem have not been examined. I aimed to bridge this knowledge gap. It is important to investigate the young, Kenyan males' motivations, opinions, perceptions, and interpretations of the current government policies, programs, and strategies aimed at

empowering them and addressing their participation in radicalization and terrorism. The outcomes of this investigation could result in insights to enhance more informed and improved future policymaking to address the problem.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this qualitative, explanatory, multicase study was to describe and explain the motivations of young, Kenyan males in consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. There is a lack of understanding of their motivations; following Creswell (2009), I aimed to improve this understanding and contribute to the body of knowledge in this area. The other purpose was to understand and highlight the interpretations of young, Kenyan males of the current policies, programs, and strategies by the government of Kenya to empower them and address their participation in the vice. Researchers on youth radicalization and terrorism have analyzed social, political, and economic factors as drivers. The questions of what motivates young, Kenyan males to engage in terrorism and how they have interpreted the policies and programs put in place by the Kenyan government to address the problem have not been examined.

I aimed to bridge this knowledge gap. Encouraging young, Kenyan males to talk about their feelings, attitudes, opinions, perceptions, and lived experiences can result in a deeper understanding of their motivations and interpretations of the current policies and programs aimed at addressing terrorism. These youth might be forthright in explaining whether they have been experiencing problems that require solutions (Callahan et al., 2012) that could deter them from indulging in radicalization and recruitment into

homegrown terrorism. This study may reveal issues that young, Kenyan males perceive could be addressed by the government. Such issues, once brought to the attention of the government, could assist policymakers in reforming current policies and programs and formulating new policies of relevance to youth needs.

I employed in-depth, personal interviews with young, Kenyan males, some of whom are employed, unemployed, attending university (all identified as at-risk youth for radicalization and recruitment, as observed by Ochieng, 2015), and those who have been convicted of terrorism charges and incarcerated in Kenyan prisons. Allowing young, Kenyan males to express themselves by answering open-ended questions could reveal their feelings, experiences, opinions (see Patton, 2002), and motivations regarding their radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. In addition, archival materials held by security agencies were consulted.

Research Questions

In qualitative research, clear research questions can assist in exploring the reasons why people do or believe things (Creswell, 2013). Research questions also indicate the researcher's learning intention in interviewing participants (Maxwell, 2013). A study needs to be clear, specific, and achievable. To conduct qualitative research, the question should include an explanation of why people do things or believe in something (Creswell, 2013). Maxwell (2013) maintained that research questions are intended to state what the researcher wants to learn, while interview questions generate data. This qualitative study was purposed on answering the following research questions to enhance an understanding

of why young, Kenyan males agree to being radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism and, specifically, what motivates them:

RQ1: Based on the perspective of young, Kenyan males, why and how is homegrown terrorism perpetrated in Kenya?

RQ2: What motivational factors do young, Kenyan males cite for consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

RQ3: How have young, Kenyan males interpreted and decoded the intentions of the government policies and strategies aimed at empowering them and to address the problem of terrorism?

“How,” “why,” and “what” questions in this qualitative research were central to explaining the experiences, feelings, attitudes, perceptions, and motivations of young, Kenyan males who consent to being radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism (see Simon, 2011a). I explored the motivations behind young Kenyan males’ acceptance of radicalization and terrorist recruitment.

Theoretical Framework

Despite a growing debate about the role of theory in qualitative research, there is a consensus among researchers and scholars that a study must have a theoretical framework (Anfara, 2008). Popper (1972) opined that human knowledge proceeds from problems as well as attempts to solve these problems. These attempts involve the formulation of theories, which are critical in attempting to discover truth (Popper, 1972). Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) theory of the social construction of target populations was selected as the theoretical framework for this qualitative case study.

Although this theoretical framework is about public policy design, it can assist in understanding the problem of youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Solutions could border on policy reforms and formulation. In adopting the theory, I remain cognizant of the view of Schneider and Ingram's (1993) claim that policy designs are currently in a state of crisis because of their failure to solve problems, thereby discouraging many target populations. This is particularly so for negatively constructed populations, typical of radicalization-prone youth. This theory is explained in greater detail in Chapter 2.

Nature of the Study

The selected research design was a qualitative, explanatory, multicase study. In an explanatory case study, the researcher examines the data at both a deep and surface level to explain the phenomena contained in the data (Yin, 1984). The case study approach is pertinent when a researcher is addressing descriptive or explanatory questions of what, how, and why (Yin, 2004). The purpose of qualitative research is to describe, clarify, and explain human phenomena (Creswell, 2009; Maxwell, 2013). The research questions guiding this study were aimed at understanding and explaining why and how (description) homegrown terrorism in Kenya is perpetrated, what motivates young Kenyan males into consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, and recommending interventions for this problem at the individual and policy levels (description, clarification, and explanation). These descriptions, clarifications, and explanations could deepen an understanding of the motivations for radicalization and terrorist recruitment among young Kenyan males (see Creswell, 2009). A qualitative

design was also preferable for this research because, as Creswell (2009) argued, this design enables the capturing of more in-depth information that cannot be appropriately conveyed quantitatively.

Four cases were identified and selected for this study. Convicted perpetrators of these four terrorism cases were interviewed face-to-face and asked in-depth, open-ended questions. As Creswell (2013) explained, this method gives participants the space to express their feelings, attitudes, opinions, lived experiences, and motivations, thereby enabling an in-depth understanding of the selected cases. Babbie and Mouton (2011) supported the use of in-depth interviews and postulated that in addition to providing rich data, they have greater flexibility and minimize errors of misinterpretation and misrepresentation because of probing questions that the researcher can pose to the participants. In-depth interviews are best for complex issues that are emotionally laden (Babbie & Mouton, 2011), such as radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Yin (2003) also postulated that researchers who strive to understand complex social phenomena will benefit from the use of the case study strategy, as it allows them to establish meaningful characteristics of real-life events.

Following the recommendations of Creswell (2013) and Yin (2003), this understanding was further deepened through interviews with other young, Kenyan males, both employed and unemployed as well as university students. Archival materials in respect of the four cases were also analyzed. The analysis included data from declassified materials from police and prisons officers. These multiple sources of evidence helped to enhance the validity and reliability (Yin, 1988) of the study results. Encouraging young,

Kenyan males to talk about their feelings, attitudes, opinions, perceptions, and lived experiences could help policy makers understand their motivations and interpretations in relation to the problems they might have faced, which require solutions, so that they could be deterred from indulging in this vice (Callahan et al., 2012). The data analysis involved identifying and coding themes in the interview transcripts with the help of computer software NVivo 12 to gain an in-depth understanding of the problem. A cross-case analysis of the four case studies was also done. This may also stakeholders design better youth programs to divert young, Kenyan males already affected by radicalization and recruitment and deter those who might be tempted to fall prey. Policymakers could use this understanding to formulate effective counterterrorism policies and strategies to combat radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism in Kenya.

Operational Definitions of Key Terms

Operational definitions are given for the following key terms used throughout this research:

Homegrown terrorism: Acts of force and violence driven by a form of radical Islamic extremism that involves the citizens and/or residents of a given country, even if the perpetrators are themselves killed in the process (Kimberly, Marion, & Courtney, 2008).

Young Kenyan persons (youth): Residents of Kenya who are in the 15–35-year age group (Kenya National Youth Policy, 2006).

Radicalization: The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) adopted the definition of radicalization as the process by which individuals come to believe that engagement in or

facilitation of nonstate violence to achieve social and political change is necessary and justified. It involves the turning of individuals or groups to an extremist mindset and course of action and the growing willingness to facilitate or engage in nondemocratic methods, including the execution of violence to achieve goals (Hunter & Heinke, 2011).

Assumptions

The following assumptions were made in this study:

1. The participants understood the interview questions.
2. The participants answered all the interview questions honestly and to the best of their abilities.
3. The participants honestly, freely, and to the best of their abilities expressed their experiences, opinions, and motivations about the phenomenon under investigation.

Scope and Delimitations of the Study

The key participants in this qualitative case study were limited to young, Kenyan males. Although radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism have evolved to include young, Kenyan females, I focused exclusively on young, Kenyan males due to time and financial constraints. It was beneficial to leave the terrorist recruitment of young, Kenyan females for future research to allow me to focus on young, Kenyan males and obtain in-depth information on the topic studied. Resource constraints meant that the effects of the current radicalization prevention policies and strategies were beyond the scope of this study, as this would require a policy–effect analysis. Instead, I only highlighted the interpretations of the young, Kenyan males regarding the intentions of the

current policies, strategies, and programs aimed at tackling youth radicalization as well as how the participants have come to learn about them (see Schneider & Ingram, 1993). The Kenyan security agencies have dealt with numerous terrorist incidents since 2011. However, only four information-rich cases were selected for this research to obtain in-depth information. It can be valuable if a sample is drawn from a small number of information-rich cases (Patton, 2002).

Limitations

The limitations of this study arose from the selected methodology of a qualitative research with an explanatory, multicase study design. Along with an examination of archival materials, the methodological strategy adopted for data collection included semistructured, face-to-face interviews. I used these interviews to obtain in-depth information on interviewees' feelings, experiences, and opinions on the phenomenon studied (motivations for radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism) and provide opportunities to clarify ambiguities and give feedback to the interviewer (see Creswell, 2009). However, such interviews can also generate large amounts of data that are time consuming to analyze (Creswell, 2013). Tod (2006) asserted that the flexibility that an interview structure presents is one of its greatest strengths. Moreover, setting up and conducting these interviews and identifying and coding the respective themes can be time-intensive, with the added risk of recording equipment malfunctioning during interviews (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). This methodology can also incur high costs if trained data analysts need to be hired. To mitigate these limitations, I carried out the interviews, and only competent assistant was hired to help in the transcription.

The study results will likely not be generalizable. Yin (1994) contended that generalizations of results from case studies, whether single or multiple cases, would only apply to theory and not populations. Generalizing the results to young, Kenyan females in terms of their radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism will require future research. The possibility of the transferability of the results of this study may not be feasible, particularly to radicalization of young, Kenyan females. However, thick description of the data analysis and results of the study were provided so that other researchers can make their own decisions on transferability.

Significance of the Study

This qualitative, explanatory, multicase study was the first to fill the knowledge gap on the radicalization and terrorist recruitment of young, Kenyan males, particularly in terms of their motivations and interpretations of the intentions of preventive policies, strategies, and programs that are already in place as well as government programs designed to benefit them. The study results could provide insights for stakeholders responsible for youth programs in Kenya so as to design effective programs from an informed position. These programs could result in positive social change if they prevent young, Kenyan males from being attracted to radicalization and recruitment for homegrown terrorism. The youth could be diverted to more meaningful activities that are supportive of their own personal development, nation building, and the rehabilitation of those already trapped in this menace (Callahan et al., 2012). Security agencies in Kenya might be able to use the insights herein to formulate effective counterterrorism policies

and strategies to combat the radicalization and terrorist recruitment of Kenyan youth, thereby improving the security of both Kenyans and visitors to the country.

Summary and Transition

This chapter provided an overview of the study. In the background section, I reviewed the history of the problem of young, Kenyan males' radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and the drivers for this behavior identified in the literature, including poverty, marginalization, the labeling of Muslims, and revenge-seeking by al-Shabaab for the invasion by the KDF. I also identified the lack of knowledge on the motivations behind young, Kenyan males' attraction to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and their interpretations of the intentions of government policies, strategies, and programs aimed at addressing the problem. In the problem statement, I reported some terror incidents and the ensuing negative consequences. In the purpose statement, I explained the importance of conducting this study, investigating what motivates young, Kenyan males to consent to being radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism against fellow Kenyans.

The insights obtained could help stakeholders change the ways of doing things at the policy level as well as at the individual level of young Kenyan males to mitigate this menace. The selected theoretical framework underpinning this study, which has been successfully used to address similar problems in other places, was described. The research questions crafted to guide the study were then outlined. Finally, the key terms, assumptions, scope, limitations, and significance of the study were explained. Chapter 2 now follows with a review of the relevant literature.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

Introduction

The main purposes for this qualitative, multicase study were to further understanding of the motivations of young, Kenyan males in consenting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism; to understand and highlight how they have decoded and interpreted the current government policies, programs, and strategies aimed at empowering them and addressing terrorism; and to understand how they came to learn about these programs, policies, and strategies and how they feel about them. I offered policy recommendations and reforms aimed at addressing the problem.

Chapter 2 starts with an explanation of the theoretical basis of the study. I then detail the problem of radicalization of young, Kenyan males and their recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The literature search strategies and the theoretical framework selected for the study are explained. I outline radicalization narratives identified in the literature. This is followed by an identification of a knowledge gap in relation to the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism as well as their opinions, perceptions, and interpretations of the current policies and programs by the Kenyan government to address the problem. The role of policy is explained and the current policies in Kenya in relation to terrorism examined. The identified gap is discussed, followed by the rationale for the qualitative case-study approach. Finally, a summary of the chapter is presented and the transition to Chapter 3 explained.

Literature Search Strategy

The literature search strategy for this study revolved around books, Walden dissertations, peer-reviewed journals, international position papers and briefs, and Kenyan government legislations and youth policy documents. The following databases were used as the primary sources of the articles: Walden University Library criminal justice journals and periodicals; dissertations and peer-reviewed journals retrieved through Google Scholar, ProQuest, and EBSCO; and government literature retrieved from its website. The search terms used to retrieve the literature included *homegrown terrorism, Kenya, Kenyan youth, Kenya youth policies, Somalia, radicalization, recruitment into terror groups, al-Shabaab, al-Shabaab cells in Kenya, al-Qaeda, improvised explosive devices, Muslim extremists, Kenyan Security Forces, and motivations toward radicalization*. Qualitative case studies were consulted using the terms *case study research, terrorism case studies, and radicalization into Muslim extremism*. The search yielded 50 articles, which formed the material for the literature review. Each resource had reference lists, from which additional relevant articles were located, searched, and included. This strategy yielded a total of 150 articles. The search was then narrowed down to articles published between 2014 and 2019.

The Problem of Radicalization of Young Kenyan Males

The radicalization and recruitment of young, Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism in Kenya have been a growing concern since November 2011. This resulted in the decision by the Kenyan government to dispatch KDF troops to join AMISOM in flushing out al-Shabaab terrorist groups from Somalia, a neighbor of Kenya (Attah-

Asamoah, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). The Kenyan government's action was prompted by sporadic attacks on tourist facilities in Mombasa, a Kenyan coastal city, and kidnappings of tourists by al-Shabaab terrorists, holding them captive in Somalia and demanding ransoms. This money was then used to sustain their criminal activities, and failure to pay resulted in the killings of the captives (Attah-Asamoah, 2015; Lind et al., 2015).

Al-Shabaab terror groups then threatened to avenge the Kenyan government's action and have since staged 133 terror attacks using IEDs and guns in different parts of Kenya, killing 264 people and seriously injuring 925 (ATPU, 2014). Shopping malls, churches, mosques, and public transport have been terrorist targets. The revenge attacks have largely been carried out by al-Shabaab cells in Kenya. These cells are comprised of young, Kenyan males who were initially recruited by al-Shabaab militants and smuggled through the porous Kenyan–Somali border for the purpose of radicalization and training to fight the TFG of Somalia (Botha, 2014).

To carry out their revenge mission, al-Shabaab terrorist groups sent the same young, Kenyan males back to Kenya to mount sporadic terror attacks. They also remained within al-Shabaab cells and have since been acting under the direction of Somalia's al-Shabaab (Botha, 2014). They have continued to radicalize and recruit young Kenyan males since then (Botha, 2014). The war between al-Shabaab militants and the African forces in Somalia intensified, resulting in the loss of life of African troops in Somalia.

Efforts by the Kenyan security agencies to combat terrorism did not deter the radicalization and recruitment of young, Kenyan males by al-Shabaab. The recruiters are

now targeting university students (Ochieng, 2015). Terrorist events in the country have instilled fear in the people of Kenya. The screening of people accessing malls, churches, public transport terminals, and all public facilities, including schools, has become the norm. The problem has impacted the economic wellbeing of the country and its people as a result of foreign embassies' issuances of travel advisories to their citizens (CNBC Africa, 2014). The negative publicity has affected the industry, with more than 20 hotels closing down and 22,000 hospitality industry workers losing their jobs (CNBC Africa, 2014; KAHK, 2014; KUDHEIHA, 2014). At the same time, farmers who earned their livelihoods by selling their farm produce to hotels have suffered as a result of the loss of market. Kenya was ranked number 12 in the Global Terrorism Index (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2014) in terms of the most terror-hit states, thereby negatively affecting social and economic activities.

Theoretical Basis of the Study

The theoretical framework selected for this study was the social construction of target populations, developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993). Initially envisaged in the realm of policy studies, it is concerned with how target groups perceive and react to government policies, depending on how they are socially constructed. According to McCauley (as cited in DE Angelis, 2009), terrorism is most accurately viewed through a political lens, suggesting that terrorist actions and government reactions represent a dynamic interplay. This is explained, for example, when a terrorist group commits an atrocity, and the government responds with extreme force. The group may use the government's action to perpetrate further intensive retaliatory attacks, including

marshaling greater antistate sentiments among citizens. There is concern about whether the decision by the Kenyan government to dispatch troops to Somalia in November 2011 resulted in the deadly attacks that followed in Kenya. The idea that policy creates politics, as postulated by Lowi (1972), and the observation by Schattschneider (1935) that new policy creates a new politics are persuasive in terms of viewing this study through a policy lens. The target group's interpretations of the government policies, strategies, and programs aimed at addressing this problem are congruent with the theoretical framework chosen for this study.

Theoretical Framework

Overview

Theory assists in specifying the relationship among variables and is normally in the form of an argument, discussion, or rationale; its importance lies in its assistance in explaining or predicting a phenomenon under research (Creswell, 2009). Popper (1972) opined that knowledge proceeds from problems and attempts to solve them. These attempts involve the formulation of theories, which are critical in attempting to discover truth (Popper, 1972). This study was qualitative in nature, and although there is growing debate regarding the role of theory in qualitative research, there is also a consensus among many scholars that a study requires a theoretical framework (Anfara, 2008). Bradbury-Jones, Taylor, and Herber (2014) contended that the integration of theory and research is essential, without which the quality of qualitative research would be diminished. The theoretical framework acts as a structure or frame of the study and

encompasses the purpose statement, research questions, data collection protocols, and data analysis (Anfara, 2008).

I employed Schneider and Ingram's (1993) social construction of target populations theory. According to the social construction of target populations theory, policies can either bring about benefits or burdens to target populations (Boushey, 2010). Because research questions assist in explaining the reasons why people do or believe things (Yin, 1984), theory was important in exploring why the youth are engaging in radicalization and homegrown terrorism.

Social Construction of Target Populations Theory

This theoretical framework was advanced by Schneider and Ingram (1993) to examine how the social construction of target populations interacts with political power resources to create a typology of target populations as well as how policymakers respond to these target populations in the allocation of benefits and burdens and that public policies sometimes fail to solve social problems. According to the theory, some groups are presented as deserving or undeserving and that policy design can reinforce such perceptions. Schneider and Ingram postulated that there are four types of target populations: (a) advantaged groups who are powerful and positively constructed, (b) contenders who are powerful but negatively constructed, (c) dependents who are politically weak but positively constructed, and (d) deviants who are weak and negatively constructed. Schneider and Ingram contended that the vulnerable, such as children, deserve benefits and protection, whereas deviants, such as criminals, are deemed undeserving, worthy of burdens such as punishment. Similarly, Lowi (1964) theorized a

typology of distributive, redistributive, regulatory, and constituent policy, contending that terms of political interaction depend on this typology. Constituent and distributive cases of tariffs and subsidies are positive and have less remote coercion, while in the regulatory and redistribution arenas, coercion is immediate, as sanctions are imposed and resources are transferred from one part of society to another.

Policies are most effectively classified through these types of coercion (Lowi, 1964). For Lowi, policies that serve broad public purposes are clear and subscribe to the rule of law. They apply to broad categories of people and are consistent. However, powerful, positively constructed groups continue under such policies to be reinforced in the belief of their own deservedness, akin to Schneider and Ingram's (1993) view of the reinforcement of such perceptions by policy design. Conversely, negatively constructed populations continue to view government as a source of problems, with the tendency of inflicting maximum punishment rather than solutions (Lowi, 1964). In this study, the government of Kenya put in place security laws that were criticized, some of which were eliminated by courts for being unconstitutional and interfering with human rights (Kenya High Court Nairobi, 2015). They were not perceived as solutions to youth radicalization and homegrown terrorism.

This theoretical framework was used by Boushey (2010) to illuminate how the theory shaped the diffusion of U.S. criminal justice policy innovations. Boushey arrived at two conclusions. First, that political conflict emerges from the way that policymakers and the broader public understand and define target populations and that target populations are groups of people delimited by a set of shared characteristics; these

populations are identified as recipients of a benefit, burden, or special treatment under the law. Second, such groups tend to have a negative image and are typically targeted with policy burdens, as governments try to alter their behavior through coercion.

Lasse (2012) also used Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theoretical framework of the social construction of target populations. Lasse sought to investigate the Danish government's action plan of January 2009, a radicalization prevention policy, as a partial extension of repressive liberalism trends in Denmark. Lasse also examined whether the policy would be counterproductive because of its attempt at spreading and consolidating liberal democracy among citizens. Lasse concluded that young Muslims who were targeted by the policy felt that they were being labeled as radicals and were stigmatized and isolated. This resulted in their frustration, and they felt that they had nothing to lose from being identified as radicals (Lasse, 2012). According to the young Muslims, the stigmatization and generalizations meant that those who were unaffected by radicalization became affected because they did not see the point of trying not to be radicalized.

In this study, I explored young Kenyans' interpretations of the intentions of the security laws currently in place to deal with radicalization and homegrown terrorism as well as the programs by the government to divert them from the vice. I also provided these young Kenyans with an opportunity to explain what solutions they would like to see in terms of tackling the problem, thereby extending the notion of collective action as it applies to the counterterrorism strategies currently in place. In this qualitative, explanatory multicase research, I explored the motivations of young, Kenyan males

toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and their interpretations of the government policies, strategies, and programs aimed at empowering them and also addressing this problem. This theory was important in determining how these young males interpreted, for example, the Security Law Amendment Act of 2014. This law was passed by parliament on December 18, 2014, amid protests by the opposition party, which alleged that it contravened the 2010 Constitution of Kenya insofar as human rights were concerned. The law provided amendments to the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012, allowing for stiffer penalties for terror convicts and their collaborators, and gave security agencies wide-ranging powers to deal with terror suspects. This regulatory amendment was intended to use coercion to alter the behavior of those involved in terrorism activities, subjecting the target populations (young, Kenyan males) to burdens (Boushey, 2010). Following Lowi's (1964) typology, the regulatory amendment provided for punishment of the deviant population instead of offering solutions to the radicalization problem.

Overview of Literature Review

The phenomenon of homegrown terrorism, and particularly motivations toward radicalization in Kenya, has not received widespread attention, and existing studies have primarily been conducted by researchers outside Kenya, although most of them are Kenyans living or studying abroad. Most of these studies have not conducted fieldwork, with the exception of Botha (2014) and Lind et al. (2015). Most existing studies are based on reviews of the existing literature. Scholars did not include an analysis of the theoretical frameworks guiding their studies as a way of advancing knowledge about

homegrown terrorism and radicalization problems. However, Popper (1972) explained that knowledge proceeds from problems and attempts at solving them. These attempts involve the formulation of theories, which, according to Popper, are critical in attempting to discover truth.

Studies on homegrown terrorism and radicalization in Kenya and around the world have identified the complexities of interviewing terrorists as a cross-cutting challenge. There are myriad reasons why countries around the world suffer from homegrown terrorism and radicalization; for example, Kenya is reported to have been targeted for reasons of revenge by al-Shabaab terrorists for sending its defense forces to Somalia to flush them out (Attah-Asamoah, 2015). Researchers have concluded that the causes of terrorism are associated with social factors, such as the marginalization and lack of integration of Muslim communities; economic factors, such as poverty and unemployment; religious factors, such as Islamic extremism; and inadequate counterterrorism strategies and policies, resulting in the condemnation and labeling of Muslims as terrorists.

Recommendations by various researchers include improvement of counterterrorism strategies and policies, collaboration among various state actors, integration, poverty alleviation, and further research to fill in existing gaps. In this literature review, I address what other researchers have unearthed in seeking to fill these gaps. I examined the themes identified in the various studies, and I refer to as narratives surrounding the phenomena of homegrown terrorism and radicalization.

Radicalization and the Poverty Narrative

The 2010 looting of the Youth Fund (United Nations, 2012) set up by the government of Kenya was attributed to the poverty narrative of radicalization (International Peace Support Center, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). The fund was set up to create projects throughout the country to address the youth unemployment problem (International Peace Support Center, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). The fund was allegedly looted by individuals in the government, thus resulting in disaffection among the youth (International Peace Support Center, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). Lind et al. (2015) and the International Peace Support Center (2015) contended that the youth resented the looting, as it left them poor and jobless. They felt that they had nothing to lose by joining al-Shabaab terrorists, who promised them wealth and a better life. Botha (2014) found that poverty did not drive respondents to radicalization. Botha concluded that there was evidence of inequality based on ethnicity and geographical location, coupled with lack of access to basic services; this factor contributed to marginalization, which later facilitated radicalization.

Radicalization and the Narrative of High Unemployment Rates among Youth

High unemployment rates have been associated with the vulnerability of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism (International Peace Support Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Lind et al., 2015; Patterson, 2015). High unemployment rates in Kenya, and indeed in many other countries, are undisputed. A United Nations report of February 2012 quoted the then United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon (United Nations, 2012) as saying that young people were

increasingly in fear of a future without jobs, with the youth doubting that the education they received would fully equip them for professional life. The UN report further highlighted that young people complained of being made the last in and first out of jobs in firms, resulting in high rates of unemployment among youth around the world—with such rates rising in Kenya from 11.9% in 2007 to 13% in 2009. However, there is no empirical evidence to indicate that high unemployment rates directly contributed to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

There is also no empirical evidence to show that those radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism in Kenya did not have jobs, thus calling for further research to establish the relationship between these two variables. In the Kenyan scenario, evidence from the terror attack at Garissa University showed that one terrorist who died in the incident was a law graduate who worked in a local bank and whose father was a Kenyan government employee (Counterterrorism Center List of Terror Incidents in Kenya, 2015). Botha (2014) also found that 33% of those who joined al-Shabaab were employed and that 17% were attending school at the time of their recruitment.

Radicalization and the Marginalization Narrative

Some researchers have established that al-Shabaab terrorists capitalized on factors relating to alleged and perceived long-standing grievances by communities in Northern Kenya, the Coast Region, and Eastleigh, Nairobi (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Botha, 2014; International Peace Support Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Lind et al., 2015). Al-Shabaab terrorists were busy radicalizing and recruiting young Kenyans from communities in those areas (Lind et al., 2015). Lind et al. (2015) cautioned the Kenyan government not to

view the problem from a counterterrorism angle, but rather to consider factors of alienation, poverty, and historical injustices by past governments of the Republic of Kenya. The marginalization narrative was echoed by Botha (2014), who concluded that there was strong evidence of inequality based on ethnicity and geographical location, coupled with lack of access to basic services, and that this factor contributed to marginalization, which later facilitated radicalization. Nevertheless, affirmative action policies by the government of Kenya facilitated the appointment of Kenyan Somali professionals to key government positions, thereby opening up opportunities for state jobs and higher education (Lind et al., 2015).

In contrast, the most recent terror attack in Nairobi DusitD2 Hotel on January 16, 2019, where 26 persons lost their lives, including five terrorists, and several others seriously injured, was masterminded by young Kenyans (Kenya Police Website, 2019). The 23-year-old Kenyan male was from the Central Province of Kenya (deemed not marginalized) and a son of a KDF soldier, and had been reported missing by his parents since 2015 after completing his high school education, was residing with his wife, who was also not from a marginalized community, but from the Western Province of Kenya. They were living in a rental house in an estate near Nairobi, and neighbors talked of how they were leading a luxurious and secretive lifestyle (Kenya Police Website, 2019). Neighbors were able to identify him through the expensive car used to transport the terrorists to the hotel to stage the attack, which was aired in the news. Neighbors reported him to the police, who then hunted and arrested him. The marginalization narrative is therefore not very much supported.

Radicalization and the Narrative of Political and Socioeconomic Alienation

The radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males has been attributed to the political and socioeconomic deprivation of the Coastal and Northern Kenya populations, relative to the rest of the country (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; International Peace Support Issue Brief No.2, 2015; Patterson, 2016). However, this contention was contradicted by Lind et al. (2015) who observed that affirmative action by the Kenyan government since 2003 played a role in addressing the feelings of those who perceived a long-standing alienation from the government.

Radicalization and the Narrative of Corrupt and Inefficient Security Officers

Endemic corruption was cited as a factor contributing to the woes of the youth in Kenya. After a UN report revealed the looting of the Youth Fund, investigations were not carried out to remediate the situation and sanction those responsible. Notwithstanding, there is no research evidence supporting this narrative as a contribution to the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism. Lax security was cited as a precursor to homegrown terrorism and radicalization (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; Patterson, 2016). There was no empirical evidence in support of these factors, thereby calling for further research to gather data on the issue. There was also no research evidence to the effect that this narrative contributed to the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism.

Radicalization and the Narrative of Porous Borders and the Influx of Refugees

Kenya's porous and poorly protected national borders, which are also sparsely populated and comprise many unstable neighbors, coupled with the high influx of refugees into Kenya, have been identified as a contributory factor to homegrown terrorism and radicalization (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Patterson, 2015). As a result, Somalia's Islamic radicalism was found to be slowly spilling over into Kenya, and al-Shabaab militants had managed a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in North East Kenya, the Coast Region, and Eastleigh (an area of Nairobi where hundreds of thousands of ethnic Somalis have been residing as refugees, both registered and unregistered, from the time they left their country after the fall of their president Said Barre in 1991). The refugees named the Eastleigh area Little Mogadishu (Lind et al., 2015, p. 10) and were found to be accomplices of al-Shabaab militants in staging five terror attacks in the area in 2012 (Lind et al., 2015).

Radicalization and the Narrative of Islamic Extremism

Homegrown terrorism in Kenya has been attributed to the radicalization and recruitment of young persons into Muslim extremism (Botha, 2014; International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). The International Crisis Group Briefing (2014) noted, with supporting evidence from face-to-face interviews with Muslim preachers, government leaders in Northern Kenya, Nairobi, as well as secondary sources, that Islamic extremism (practiced in Mosques for adults and madrassas or Muslim schools for youngsters) leads to religious and social conservatism and intolerance, thereby serving as precursors of

homegrown terrorism. For example, a number of Islamic Sheikhs called for television bans as other Muslims went around town shutting down bars, banned the sale of cigarettes, and enforced a dress code (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). In another incident in the North Eastern Province, Muslim preachers shut public video halls in Mandera town, claiming that the videos shown were a bad influence on children (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). Of special emphasis is the fact that in 2011, Sheikh Ahmed Iman Ali, a founder of the Muslim Youth Center in Pumwani, Nairobi, was named al-Shabaab's leader and coordinator in Kenya because of his large following of jihadists (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Lind et al., 2015; Patterson, 2015). Botha (2014) was of the view that al-Shabaab was driven by a radical interpretation of Islam, which was of an external origin, and therefore, its developments were beyond Kenya's influence.

This view is crucial in the sense that al-Shabaab is a terrorist group with an affiliation to al-Qaeda and is known to use religion to achieve its goals. However, madrassas were used for radicalizing young children, while mosques served as centers for distributing jihadi materials and a recruitment hub to channel youths to Lamu and Kiunga, where they were further radicalized, with their national identity cards and birth certificates being confiscated and burned (International Crisis Group briefing, 2014). To reinforce the Islamic extremism narrative, Botha (2014) showed that 87% of respondents indicated that religion (Islam) motivated them to join. This factor was the most highly scored.

This narrative, however, begs many questions that researchers might wish to explore. This is because in the many terror attacks staged in Kenya since 2011, one was staged in a mosque after Friday prayers on December 07, 2012. A grenade was thrown into a mosque and exploded, killing several Muslims and injuring many others. Among those seriously injured was a Member of Parliament for that area, a Muslim and Somali himself, who was at the mosque for prayers (Counterterrorism Center List of Terror Attacks, 2014). Against this backdrop, a knowledge gap still exists in terms of understanding the motivation for killing Muslims.

Radicalization and the Revenge Narrative

The Kenyan government deployed KDF troops to join others from AMISOM in tracking down al-Shabaab militants (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Lind et al., 2015). Al-Shabaab issued threats to Kenya because of this action and vowed to bring down all skyscrapers in Nairobi (Attah-Asamoah, 2015; International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014; Patterson, 2015). Since then, there have been terror attacks, one being the West Gate Mall attack on September 26, 2013, which claimed 67 lives (Counterterrorism Center, 2014; Institute of Economics and Peace, 2014), and the terror attack staged in Garissa University in April 2015, in which 147 people, most of whom were university students, were killed. Revenge attacks are further cited in terms of avenging for Muslims in Somalia and the world over because of perceived persecution by Christians, so that because Kenya has strong ties with Western countries, revenge attacks remain imminent (Patterson, 2015). In this case, Kenya's foreign policy interpreted by Muslims as to facilitate their persecution acts as a precursor for revenge attacks, (Patterson, 2015).

However, Botha (2014) was of the view that more than any other factor, political socialization was a major contributor to radicalization and recruitment in terms of the high politicization of security. Instead of politicians working together to unite the people of Kenya, they were dividing Kenyans along ethnic lines for their own interests (Botha, 2014).

Radicalization and the Labeling Narrative

Draconian crackdowns on Kenyan Somalis or Kenyan Muslims perceived as terrorists has been observed as a contributing factor in the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2012). This contention was shared by Lind et al. (2015), who postulated that in Kenya, politicians, security agencies, and other government entities, along with some Western officials, believed that the Coastal and North Eastern populations consisted primarily of terrorists. Actors in the Kenyan counterterrorism landscape also shared this belief (Attah-Asamoah, 2015). While supporting the labeling contention, Lind et al. observed that security crackdowns during terror attacks were concentrated in areas predominantly occupied by Somalis and Muslims, whether they were Kenyans or Somali.

However, researchers have also found that al-Shabaab radicalizers and recruiters had targeted Kenya's and Tanzania's coastal Muslims, with evidence that the attacks in North Eastern Kenya were staged by Kenyan Swahili and Somali jihadists, sometimes with the knowledge and assent of Muslim figureheads in those areas (International Crisis Group Briefing, 2014). Botha (2014) found strong evidence to support religious reasons for joining al-Shabaab, (87% of respondents) and some even stronger evidence to the

effect that Islam as a religion was under threat (97%). This empirical evidence indicated the feelings of Muslims as far as their religion is concerned, particularly the feeling of the threat to Islam as a religion. When security operations are directed predominantly at Somalis, especially Muslim residents, as contended by Lind et al. (2015), the labeling narrative is bound to arise and hold. A case in point was that of the non-Somali terrorist: Though recently a Muslim convert, Elgiva Bwire Oliacha from the Luhya community in Western Kenya, was arrested in connection with two blasts; he pleaded guilty and was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment in September 2012 (Lind et al., 2015).

From an international perspective of this narrative, Lasse (2012) analyzed the effects of radicalization prevention policies in Denmark and found that the label “radical Muslim” was viewed as a strategy to lump together Muslims who supported Hamas, for example, with the few who were in support of al-Qaeda. Lasse further found that this label was an important driver of suspicion regarding Muslims. Those interviewed expressed their exasperation of being degraded; they felt no urgency in resisting radicalization by trying to assist in the government initiatives because of the a priori labeling (Lasse, 2012).

Radicalization and the Global War on Terror Narrative

The global war on terror (GWOT), with reference to national politics, regional security, and the international community, was cited as a trigger of terrorism in Kenya (Patterson, 2015). Using literature from other authors, Patterson argued that Kenya became an attractive target for terrorism because of flaws in its counterterrorism strategies, policies, and laws, coupled with the central role that Kenya continued to play

in maintaining global and regional security. For example, Kenya had experienced global terrorism incidents because of its link with Western countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel (Patterson, 2015). The bombing of the American Embassy in Nairobi on August 07, 1998, in which 212 people lost their lives and 4,000 others, most of them Kenyans, were seriously injured, was cited (Patterson, 2015; United States Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism-Kenya, 2015). This marked the start of unprecedented terror attacks and other forms of provocation to the Kenya government, albeit as a proxy. The al-Qaeda terrorist group claimed responsibility and justified the attack as a lesson to Kenya for its links with the United States and Israel (International Peace Support Center Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Patterson, 2015). This was followed by the bombing of Paradise Hotel, an Israeli investment in the coastal town of Mombasa, on November 28, 2002, which claimed the lives of 14 people, three of them Israeli tourists and the remainder 11 hotel workers (International Peace Support Center Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Patterson, 2015).. At this same time, an Israeli charter aircraft narrowly escaped a missile attack shortly after takeoff from Moi International Airport in Mombasa (International Peace Support Center Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Patterson, 2015). Again, al-Qaeda claimed responsibility, justifying the attack as punishment to Kenya for being an Israeli ally (International Peace Support Center Issue Brief No. 2, 2015; Patterson, 2015).

The above narratives are, in some cases precursors for radicalization of young men in Kenya, but do not delve into their motivations or their interpretations of the

intentions of the policies, programs, and strategies that are in place to empower them, and also to address the vice, hence this study.

Role of Policy

Public policy involves the decisions of a government or other authority aimed at solving public problems so as to improve the quality of life of a population. These include statutes, laws, regulations, executive decisions, and government programs (Weible, 2014). Means and goals in the form of procedures and rule statements are also public policies (Weible, 2014). Administrators, also known as street-level bureaucrats, implement policies (Weible, 2014). However, according to Schneider and Ingram (1993), policies sometimes fail to solve public problems.

In 2003, the Kenyan government embarked on the formulation of policies and programs aimed at improving the quality of life of young people and established the National Youth Policy Steering Committee. This committee formulated the National Youth Policy (2006), with the overall goal of promoting youth participation in democratic processes and community and civic affairs. Other youth policies and programs included the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF), the Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP), Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV; jobs for youth), and Uwezo Fund (Empowerment Fund). These policies were developed with the youth of Kenya as the intended beneficiaries. The aim was to empower them and integrate them in the socioeconomic activities of Kenya. These policies also reinforce Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory of social construction of target populations, which stressed that while these youth fall under the category of dependents, they are politically weak but positively

constructed and deserving of benefits and protection. The strategy of Nyumba Kumi (ten households) was conceptualized in 2013 to address security challenges (Ole Lenku, 2013). Another program dubbed “Strengthen Communities’ Capacity against Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kenya” was set up in 2015 by the government of Kenya and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). The 1-year project was aimed at strengthening institutional and community capacity to counter radicalization and violent extremism and to build the capacity of the National Counterterrorism Center to implement radicalization strategies and effective engagement in countering violent extremism (Government of Kenya, 2015).

In the same vein, the Kenyan government embarked on the formulation of other policies and programs in response to terrorism activities that plagued the country. These took the form of statutes, such as the Suppression of Terrorism Bill No. 30 of 2003, the Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2010, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012, and the Security Laws Amendment Act 2014. Paradoxically, these statutes were interpreted by critics as targeting youth, particularly Muslim youths who are viewed as an at-risk group for radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism (Lind et al., 2015). In line with Schneider and Ingram’s (1993) theory of social construction of target populations, the above statutes viewed this group of youth as deviants and as weak; they were negatively constructed, portrayed as undeserving and as worthy of the burdens of stiff punishment. It is important at this juncture to examine these policies and statutes and analyze their congruence with the above theoretical framework selected to underpin this study.

The National Youth Policy

This policy was developed with the overall goal of promoting youth participation in democratic processes and community and civic affairs (National Youth Policy, 2006). The policy envisaged the formation of a National Youth Council to assist in coordinating youth organizations, designing youth programs, continuously reviewing the implementation of youth-focused policies and programs, and mobilizing, sensitizing, and organizing youth to consolidate their voice regarding political, economic, and socio-cultural activities (National Youth Council Act 10 of 2010/2012). The government of Kenya devised this policy in a bid to solve problems and improve the lives of its youth. The targeted youth are dependents who are politically weak, but positively constructed and seen as deserving of benefits and protection (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). This policy acted as a catalyst for other youth policies and programs in Kenya.

The Youth Enterprise Development Fund

The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) is a state corporation under the Ministry of Public Service, Gender, and Youth Affairs. It was launched in the Kenya Gazette in December 2006, with the aim of increasing economic opportunities for, and participation of, Kenyan youth. It also seeks to create employment opportunities for Kenyan youth through entrepreneurship and by encouraging them to be job creators and not only jobseekers. To achieve this, the fund provides easy and affordable financial and development support services to those youth who are keen on starting or expanding business (YEDF, 2006).

Sikenyi (2017) conducted an evaluation of the youth gains through this fund by analyzing secondary data comprising YEDF progress reports and case studies, in addition to conducting semistructured interviews with youth between October and November 2016. The study findings were that the YEDF projects were marred with mismanagement, corruption, lack of supportive implementation structures, and ambiguous eligibility criteria. The youth interviewed revealed that they found it extremely difficult to access finance from the fund. It is doubtful that this program solved the problems of the intended youth beneficiaries. However, further research is required to provide a more accurate assessment. The observation by Schneider and Ingram (1993) that public policies sometimes fail to solve public policy problems is critical here.

Kenya Youth Empowerment Project

The Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP) was set up by the Kenyan government in 2010. It was a 4-year program aimed at building the capacity and improving the employability of youth by providing them with training and internships in the private sector. The project targeted 11,000 youth in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu over a period of four years. The Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA) was appointed by the government to implement the project. No evaluation has been carried out to gauge its effectiveness and benefits to the beneficiaries (Government of Kenya, 2010).

Kazi Kwa Vijana (KKV; Jobs for Youth)

This project was introduced by the Kenyan government and incorporated in the country's 2009/10 budget under the KYEP. The World Bank also partnered with the government and disbursed some funds to support the project. Its aim was to provide

youth with income through public works projects and by tackling youth unemployment. The fund was looted by powerful government operatives, forcing the World Bank to withdraw its financial support (Government of Kenya, 2009). This denied the beneficiaries the intended benefits of the program, who in turn became incensed by the embezzlement. Given that the consequences of radicalization prevention policies and programs will depend partly on their implementation and presentation to citizens by street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 2010), the way in which this program was implemented may have had some unintended negative consequences.

Uwezo Fund (Empowerment Fund)

This fund was set up by the government of Kenya in 2013, with the aims of expanding access to finance and promoting women, youth, and persons with disabilities at the constituency level. It was also intended to provide mentorship to enable the beneficiaries to take advantage of the 30% government procurement preferences (Public Finance Management Act, 2014). No evaluation has been carried out so far on this project, so its outcomes remain unclear.

The Nyumba Kumi Strategy

The government of Kenya conceptualized this strategy in 2013 to address the problem of terrorism. The strategy was integrated into community policing to ensure that the current system of villages under a village elder was restructured into Nyumba Kumi (10 households), with a clear leadership structure that would be responsible for the security of the corresponding households (Ole Lenku, 2013). The concept was borrowed

from Tanzania, where its success was reported in addressing security challenges.

However, the outcomes of this strategy have not been evaluated in the Kenyan context.

Project to “Strengthen Communities’ Capacity against Radicalization and Violent Extremism in Kenya”

This project was jointly established in 2015 by the government of Kenya and the UNDP. The 1-year project aimed to strengthen institutional and community capacity to counter radicalization and violent extremism as well as to build the capacity of the National Counterterrorism Center in implementing radicalization strategies and effective engagement in countering violent extremism. This took the form of developing information, education, and communication material to raise awareness at the community level to counter violent radicalization and extremism; provide training and guidance for trainers who interact with the youth and women; support dialogue between interfaith groups and increase tolerance and harmony between and within groups; and support community awareness in countering violent extremism (Government of Kenya, 2015). The program is yet to be evaluated.

Suppression of Terrorism Bill No. 30 of 2003

This was the first ever statute for dealing with terrorism in Kenya. It was passed by the Kenyan parliament, albeit after a compromise with the Kenyan Muslim community. The same law had been twice rejected in the same parliament in the years 2003 and 2006 for arguments that it was oppressive to Muslims (Lind et al., 2015). The rejection of this legislation was triggered by Muslim preachers who lobbied Muslim legislators in parliament to reject it, alleging that it was meant to antagonize and alienate

Muslims (Lind et al., 2015). Muslims and Kenyan Somalis are negatively constructed populations who complain of being treated with suspicion and as second-class citizens by their own government (Lind et al., 2015). Schneider and Ingram (1993) posited that target groups learn from the framing of certain problems and policy implementation practices. The effect of such implications is that policies fail to yield their intended consequences. For example, groups consisting of Muslims and Kenyan Somali were interviewed by the International Crisis Group (2012), and they expressed the pain they experienced of constantly being questioned and doubted. They indicated that if these policies continued, communal tensions and the risk of homegrown terrorism would increase. What the young Kenyan males felt about this legislation, how they learnt about it, perceived it, and interpreted it are all critical factors for this study.

Prevention of Organized Crime Act 2010

The purpose of this legislation was to criminalize all groups involved in organized crime. In total, 33 youth groups were identified and classified as organized crime groups. Others deemed to assist or harbor these groups were also criminalized under this law (Prevention of Organized Crime, 2010). Given that the youth in Kenya are to operate in groups while engaged in various activities under the very many youth programs set up by the government, this legislation can have unintended consequences. However, research is needed to address this assertion, and the expectation is that this study will help gain some knowledge on this.

Prevention of Terrorism Act 2012

This same legislation was rejected in 2003 and 2006 under the title The Suppression of Terrorism Bill. It reappeared for debate in parliament in 2012 under a new title, Terrorism Prevention Bill 2012. This time, while some Muslims opposed it, the majority supported it, and it sailed through to become law (Government of Kenya, 2012).

Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 (SLAA)

This law altered 20 existing laws in order to strengthen Kenya's counterterrorism legislative framework. For example, it criminalized participation in terrorist training; laid out the foundation for a coordinated border control agency; strengthened the mandate of the Kenya National Counterterrorism Center; and broadened evidentiary standards to allow greater use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions (Government of Kenya, 2014). However, civil society groups, the political opposition, and rights groups appealed against some sections of the law that they viewed as negative, for example, those that affected freedom of speech, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the rights of the accused and refugees, arguing that they violated constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties and contravened Kenya's international obligations. In February 2015, the High Court struck down eight provisions of the SLAA as unconstitutional (High Court of Kenya, 2015).

Policy Implications

The theory of the social construction of target populations, which was selected as the framework unpinning this study, was developed to better understand why public policies sometimes fail to meet their intended purpose of solving public problems

(Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Public policy is considered strong when it solves problems efficiently and effectively, serves justice, supports government institutions and policies, and encourages active citizenship (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Public policymakers socially construct target populations in positive and negative terms, and benefits and burdens are distributed to reflect and promulgate these constructions (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). This incorporation of social construction into policy design can explain the positive and negative effects on society or the failure to solve public problems (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Schneider and Ingram postulated that when beneficial policies and programs are designed for negatively constructed groups, such as deviants, they serve to change target persons through authoritarian means instead of seeking to dismantle structural problems.

There are strong pressures for policy officials to provide beneficial policy to powerful, positively constructed target populations and to devise punitive policies for negatively constructed groups (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). In the same vein, policy designs fail and discourage target populations, such as the undeserving, deviants, or demons. Such policy designs send messages, teach lessons, and allocate values that promote injustice, trivialize citizenship, and fail to solve problems (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). Lowi (1964) also observed that although regulatory policies are important in having an orderly society, negatively constructed populations continue to view government as a source of problems, with the tendency of inflicting maximum punishment rather than offering solutions. According to Schneider and Ingram (1993), given that policy designs structure opportunities and send varying messages to different

socially constructed groups about how they are likely to be treated by government, it is important to examine what messages were sent to different socially constructed groups—whether as benefits or burdens—by the Kenyan government to either improve the quality of life of citizens or respond legislatively to terrorism.

In terms of beneficial policies, the Kenyan government formulated policies and programs aimed at improving the quality of life of young people. As to whether these policies and programs served their intended purposes is a question that requires thorough investigation. One such investigation of the YEDF projects was carried out by Sikenyi (2017), who found that these projects were marred by mismanagement, corruption, lack of supportive implementation structures, and ambiguous eligibility criteria. The youth interviewed revealed that they found it extremely difficult to access finance from the fund. There was looting of the Youth Fund by powerful government operatives, which was viewed as problematic by Kenyan youth. It made them feel worthless, as no one was ever held to account. Even as the fund was set up to assist the youth in engaging in gainful income-generating projects to address the unemployment problem, the beneficiaries did not appear to understand the tenets of the program, thereby resulting in confusion and providing loopholes that encouraged embezzlement (Lind et al., 2015).

In terms of punitive or burden-oriented policies, the government enacted counterterrorism statutes, which were perceived by Muslims and Kenyan Somali ethnic populations as alienating. Muslims and Kenyan Somalis are negatively constructed populations who complain of being treated with suspicion and as second-class citizens by their own government (Lind et al., 2015). Schneider and Ingram (1993) posited that such

target groups learn from the framing of certain problems and policy implementation practices. The effect of such implications is that policies fail to yield their intended objectives. For example, groups of Muslims and Kenyan Somalis were interviewed by Lind et al. (2015), and they expressed the pain they experienced of constantly being questioned and doubted; they indicated that if these policies continued, communal tensions and the risk of homegrown terrorism would increase. This reinforces the contention that negatively constructed groups view government as a source of problems, with the tendency of inflicting maximum punishment rather than offering solutions (Lowi, 1964).

The law creating the National Counterterrorism Center in 2014 was enacted through an amendment of the Security Laws Act. The Counterterrorism Center develops strategies for counter- and de-radicalization, among other functions. Finally, there was the “Nyumba Kumi” (10 Households) strategy that required 10 households to know each other well and to share security information, which they were expected to pass on to security agencies. This strategy was hotly opposed by opposition politicians, alleging because it violated the 2010 Constitution of Kenya. Although the concept appeared akin to community policing, it can be argued that it appeared suspicious to target populations and was probably seen as a vehicle to divide them, a point espoused by Aziz (2014). Aziz posited that community policing in the post-9/11 period was aimed at dividing the Muslim community into “good” and “bad” (p. 148), aggravating the already existing violations of civil liberties. All the above laws and policies were created with the aim of addressing the problems of homegrown terrorism and radicalization of youths in Kenya.

According to Winterman and Nielson (2008), since the efficiency of any policy partly depends on the target group's perception of the policy, questions abound as to the perceptions and interpretations of the target group (young Kenyan males), as elaborated in the above theoretical framework.

The argument of the present study is that the Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012, which had twice been rejected, and the subsequent amendments in 2014 served to target groups that tended to have a negative image, including the application of policy burdens, as the government tried to alter their behavior through coercion (Boushey, 2010). Conversely, the Nyumba Kumi strategy was a soft counterterrorism strategy.

Gap in Literature

A review of literature revealed that al-Shabaab terror groups were radicalizing and recruiting young Kenyan males into their cells for the purpose of staging terror attacks against targets in Kenya (Botha, 2014; International Crisis Group, 2014; Lind et al., 2015). Radicalization in Kenya, and indeed in other parts of the world, is a phenomenon of growing concern, and efforts by the governments of affected countries, Kenya included, have not had tremendous success in countering the problem. For this reason, researchers continue to recommend further research, particularly in the area of understanding what motivates youth involvement in this vice.

In a symposium held at the University of Nairobi on May 07, 2015 under the theme "Discourse Strategies to Counter Terrorism," the then Principal Secretary in the Ministry of the Interior and Coordination of Government Affairs, Ambassador Monica Juma, appealed to scholars to investigate the factors that lead to youth radicalization.

Research of this kind, specifically aimed at determining what radicalized individuals identify with and how they became radicalized, was carried out in Kenya in 2014. Botha (2014) interviewed 95 individuals associated with al-Shabaab and 46 of their relatives. The conclusion of the research was that Muslim youths joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to perceived arbitrary government-imposed punishment and the targeting of Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals. This punishment and targeting were guided by the misconception that they were potential terrorists. The conclusion was that if Kenyans continued to identify themselves along ethnic and religious lines, radicalization would continue (Botha, 2014). This conclusion did not adequately cover the respondents' motivations for joining al-Shabaab and, hence, left a gap requiring further investigation.

It is against this backdrop that the present study was conceived. The view is that it might help us understand the motivations of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. It will also help us understand their interpretations and perceptions of the current preventive policies, strategies, and programs so as to devise policy recommendations and reforms to counter the menace of homegrown terrorism in Kenya. Interviewing individuals of terror-related crimes who have already been incarcerated might help us understand the real motivations because they will be given an opportunity to express their feelings, perceptions, and real-life experiences outside of interrogations by security investigators.

Support for the Explanatory Multicase Study Design

The multicase study approach is appropriate here in terms of understanding what motivates young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. This is a specific problem, and Creswell (2013) postulated that case studies are ideal for understanding specific issues and problems as well as for presenting an in-depth understanding of the selected cases to be used as samples. The questions of “what,” “why,” “how,” and “who” addressed through this study may bring about explanations that might offer an in-depth understanding of the phenomena (Creswell, 2013) of radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and the motivations driving young Kenyan males toward these vices. Their interpretations, perceptions, and feelings about the government policies, programs, and strategies aimed at addressing the problem may be revealed.

Summary and Transition

In the literature review, I identified a knowledge gap in relation to the motivations of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism as well as their interpretation of the policies, strategies, and programs aimed at addressing the problem. This is an issue that has continued to concern Kenyans and has caused immense anxiety within the Kenyan government since November 2011 following its decision to deploy KDF troops to Somalia to flush out al-Shabaab terrorist groups. This decision was prompted by constant incursions into the Kenyan coastal city of Mombasa by al-Shabaab terrorists through the Indian Ocean, causing mayhem by attacking and kidnapping tourists in Somalia, later killing them for failing to secure ransom payments

(Atta-Asamoah, 2015; International Peace Support Issue Brief No.2, 2015; Patterson, 2015). The terrorists vowed to avenge the action of the Kenyan government, staging several attacks on Kenyan facilities, including public transport, shopping malls, schools, churches, and surprisingly, mosques (Atta-Asamoah, 2015; International Peace Support Issue Brief No.2, 2015; Patterson, 2015).

These terror attacks incited fear in Kenyans, who could no longer pursue their social and nation-building activities. The vice also contributed immensely to the decline of the economy due to the impact of the attacks on the tourism industry (CNBC Africa, 2014). Al-Shabaab terror groups mobilized young Kenyan males, whom they had earlier radicalized and recruited to their cells, to dislodge the TFG. The same radicalized youths were then sent back to Kenya to carry out the revenge mission.

The motivations of the young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and how they interpreted the policies, strategies, and programs aimed at addressing the problem, however, are little known. A gap was identified in relation to the motivations behind young Kenyan males' engagement in radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism as well as their interpretations of the corresponding government policies, strategies, and program. This qualitative research, with an explanatory multicase-study approach, is aimed at bridging this knowledge gap and recommending policy frameworks and reforms at the levels of young Kenyan males and policymakers, which might help in reversing the practice. Schneider and Ingram's (1993) social construction of target populations theory was selected to illuminate this study. Chapter 3 follows with a description of the study methodology and

design, the participants, procedures for collecting and analyzing the data, and ethical considerations.

Chapter 3: Research Method

Introduction

The main purpose of this qualitative, explanatory multicase study was to understand, explain, and describe the motivations of young, Kenyan males for accepting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The other purpose was to improve the understanding about the youths' interpretations of the intentions of the current policies and programs in place to empower them and also those for addressing the problem of terrorism.

In Chapter 3, I outline the qualitative method and the multicase study design used to assist in understanding the motivations of young, Kenyan males' toward becoming radicalized as well as their recruitment into homegrown terrorism. I also explain the profiles of the research participants and how they were recruited for this study. Additionally, I outline the procedures for collecting and analyzing the data, ethical protection of the participants, and verification of the findings. Three research questions guided this study:

- RQ1: Based on the perspectives of young, Kenyan males, why and how is homegrown terrorism perpetrated in Kenya?
- RQ2: What motivational factors do young, Kenyan males cite for consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?
- RQ3: How have young, Kenyan males interpreted and decoded the intentions of the government policies and strategies aimed at empowering them and those addressing the problem of terrorism?

Homegrown terrorism in Kenya has been perpetuated by young, Kenyan males following their radicalization, recruitment within al-Shabaab cells, after which they are smuggled into Somalia to train for the purpose of staging terror attacks in Kenya. What was not known, however, was what motivated young, Kenyan males into consenting to join the militants and to then engage in terror against their own country and fellow Kenyans. There are policies and programs devised by the government of Kenya aimed at empowering young people as well as in countering terrorism. It was not known how young, Kenyan males decoded and interpreted the intentions of these policies, programs, and strategies.

Research Methodology, Design, and Rationale

Qualitative Methodology

A qualitative methodology was chosen to answer the research questions of why, what, and how to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations of young, Kenyan males in engaging in radicalization and consenting to recruitment in homegrown terrorism. This methodology was also deployed to understand how the young, Kenyan males have decoded and interpreted the government's policies and programs aimed at empowering them, how they feel about them, and how they came to learn about them. The qualitative methodology was also intended to assist in understanding how the young, Kenyan males decode and interpret the government policies and strategies aimed at combatting terrorism, how they came to learn about them, and how they feel about them.

I chose a qualitative method for several reasons. Qualitative research methods are useful in understanding the meanings people give to the events that they experience

(Bogdan & Bilken, 2003; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). As the purpose of this study was to gain an understanding of the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, this method was best suited for this study.

According to Merriam (2009), qualitative research is characterized by the following four features:

1. The focus is on process, understanding, and meaning.
2. The researcher is the primary instrument of data collection and analysis.
3. The process is inductive.
4. The product is richly descriptive (ie., in seeking to understand and describe barriers to the transition of youth into the workplace). Bogdan and Bilken (1992) chose a qualitative approach because of its descriptive nature in order to understand the whole of youth experiences through insight and discovery.

Although qualitative methodology through interviews have the advantages of obtaining in-depth information on interviewees' feelings, experiences, and opinions on the phenomenon studied (here, motivations for radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism) and provide opportunities to clarify ambiguities and give feedback to the interviewer (Creswell, 2009), such interviews can also generate large amounts of data that are time consuming to analyze (Creswell, 2013). Tod (2006) opined that the flexibility that an interview structure presents is one of its greatest strengths. Setting up and conducting these interviews and identifying and coding the respective themes can be time-intensive, with the added risk of recording equipment malfunctioning during

interviews (Babbie & Mouton, 2011). This methodology can also incur high costs if trained data analysts need to be hired. To mitigate these limitations, I personally carried out the interviews and only hired one assistant who assisted in the interviews transcription.

Rationale for Qualitative Methodology

Qualitative research is best used when a researcher wants to understand how the individuals under study interpret, construct, and assign meaning to their experiences (Merriam, 2009). It is the best approach to the study of social phenomena and is preferable when researchers seek to understand, describe, and define an event or phenomena from the personal experiences of those being studied (Creswell, 2009). In qualitative studies, the researcher is actively involved and attempts to understand and explain social phenomena in order to solve social problems (Mason, 2002). Qualitative researchers rely on logical inferences and are sensitive to human situations, because it involves dialogue with participants (Kvale, 1996). Qualitative methods are useful when the researcher focuses on the dynamics of the process and seeks a deeper understanding of behavior and the meaning and context of phenomena. It is also considered the most appropriate approach for studying a wide range of social dimensions (Mason, 2002).

I selected the qualitative method based on the belief that this would assist in making decisions about the appropriate strategies that would best answer the research questions (Maxwell, 2013). One such strategy was to conduct in-depth, semistructured, face-to-face interviews, whose strength was in obtaining the young, Kenyan males' meanings, feelings, and perceptions (see Creswell, 2009) about their motivations toward

radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Qualitative researchers extract understanding and explanation of phenomena from those being studied in terms of feelings or thought processes. These outcomes would be difficult to extract through other research methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Interviewing, as an act of communication, provided rich and substantive data that assisted me in understanding the phenomenon under investigation, a point corroborated by Janesick (2011). A qualitative design allows researchers to observe and/or interview their study subjects and/or collect documentation relevant to the problem under study (Creswell, 2009).

Because scientists use various research methodologies as investigative strategies to inquire about issues—with a view to extending knowledge that would be regarded as reliable and valid by a community of scholars (Rudestam & Newton, 2015)—I chose the qualitative method to achieve this goal of extending knowledge. I envisaged that the young, Kenyan males would open up about their feelings, attitudes, opinions, perceptions, and lived experiences, thereby providing a deep understanding of their motivations toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. I also envisaged that they would be forthright about their interpretations of the current government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and countering homegrown terrorism. I envisaged that they might explain whether they had been facing problems that required solutions (see Callahan et al., 2012) so that they could be deterred from indulging in radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The belief was that this research would enable the young, Kenyan males to disclose issues that they felt could be addressed by the government. Such issues, once presented to the

government, could assist policymakers in reforming current policies and programs and formulating new policies of relevance to the youth, thereby addressing the problem. It is against this backdrop that I chose the qualitative methodology for this study.

Semistructured, face-to-face interviews with young, Kenyan males were conducted to elicit information on their motivations, experiences, feelings, and opinions regarding the phenomena under study. This kind of information might have been difficult to extract or learn about through other research methodologies (see Straus & Corbin, 1998). For example, the quantitative methodology might not have revealed the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism because there would have been no expressions of lived experiences by the research participants.

Design—Explanatory Multicase Study

To gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomena under study, I employed an explanatory, multicase study design. A multicase study allows a researcher to look beyond the individual case to the phenomenon, in this case, the motivation of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism; how they decoded and interpreted the government policies and programs aimed at empowering them; and how they decoded and interpreted the government's counterterrorism policies and programs. Yin (2009) posited that in order for a researcher to be able to decide on the type of qualitative design for a particular study, the types of research questions being asked play a role. For example, questions of how favor the use of an explanatory case study design and seek to explain how a phenomenon occurred. Questions asking why

favor an explanatory multicase design, as they seek to explain why a phenomenon occurred (Yin, 2009). As a form of qualitative research design, case studies allow the researcher to search for meaning and understanding and emphasize the researcher as the primary instrument of data collection and analysis (Merriam, 2009). In a case study design, the researcher strategizes for inductive investigations and concludes the research study with in-depth and rich descriptions of the phenomenon under investigation (Merriam, 2009). Case study design study results will likely not be generalizable. Yin (1994) contended that generalizations of results from case studies, whether single or multiple cases, would only apply to theory and not populations. Generalizing the results to young, Kenyan females in terms of their radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism will require future research.

Rationale for Explanatory Multicase Design

A researcher may study one or multiple similar cases, allowing him or her to choose information-rich cases that would provide in-depth understanding through semistructured, face-to-face interviews (O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008). Following this insight, I chose four information-rich cases for this explanatory study. According to Yin (1994), the multicase study approach has the advantage of providing insights into detailed behaviors of the research participants in the selected case(s). Because I sought to answer descriptive questions of what happened and explanatory questions of how and why it happened (Yin, 2004), the explanatory, multicase study approach was most appropriate. Moreover, case study research allows in-depth understanding of the case(s) (Creswell, 2013). The case study approach assists in presenting data of real-life situations

(Yin, 1994). I preferred the multicase approach because it enabled depth and breadth to this study, thereby making available techniques for solving chronic problems (see O'Sullivan et al., 2008) characteristic of the young, Kenyan males' radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The selected cases were used as examples of this phenomenon (Stake, 2006), which allowed me to examine the similarities and dissimilarities among the cases. I looked for patterns and uniqueness and particulars and generalizations in the selected cases (see Stake, 2006).

I could have considered the use of a phenomenological approach for this study. This approach is powerful in helping researchers understand the lived experiences of groups of people and gain insights into their motivations and actions (Moustakas, 1994). It is also best for an in-depth understanding of how several individuals have experienced a phenomenon (Creswell, 2007; VanManen, 1990). The approach involves studying a group or groups in terms of their cultural background and behavior to provide interpretations and descriptions based on their beliefs. However, I did not explore cultural aspects of groups; thus, this approach was found to be limiting because the phenomena under study involves events that a section of young, Kenyan males (hence four young Kenyan incarcerated males) got involved in, with another 30 drawn from the broader young, Kenyan male population. The multicase study approach was deemed most appropriate to deal with the cases. Other qualitative design approaches were considered and found not to be as effective as the multicase study. For example, the narrative approach could have been used. However, it might have exposed the storytellers' identities (Creswell, 2013), with ethical implications. Yin (2004) postulated that

compared to other approaches, the case study approach has strength in its ability to examine cases in depth and within their real-life context.

By interviewing the research participants face to face, they were given the opportunity and environment to express their feelings, experiences, opinions, and attitudes regarding the phenomenon. It was anticipated that the participants' expressed attitudes, opinions, and experiences would assist in enhancing understanding of young, Kenyan males' motivations toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Getting the young, Kenyan males to talk about their motivations and interpretations, as in this study, could bring a better understanding of the problems they face and how these might be addressed (see Callahan et al., 2012). Policymakers could be in a position to make policy improvements for Kenyan youth as a way of addressing and fixing the problems expressed by the young Kenyan males. They might also be able to use this understanding in formulating policies that could facilitate effective counterterrorism strategies. Stakeholders concerned with youth programs might be able to better plan purposed programs that might divert young, Kenyan males who are already affected by this phenomenon and deter those who might be tempted to fall prey.

Role of the Researcher

Researchers employing qualitative research methods are tools of data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2013). As the researcher, I was responsible for identifying the data to be collected and from whom, identifying research sites and creating strategies for accessing the sites, negotiating and maintaining access protocols, and collecting the data

and analyzing them. I performed the role of interpreting the participants' perceptions about the phenomena under investigation (see Creswell, 2013).

In qualitative research, and with the researcher being the primary tool of data collection and analysis, it is important for the researcher to acknowledge and consider their own human biases, limitations, and views throughout the process of data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000) because these factors affect study outcomes (Merriam, 1998). Merriam (1998) recommended that researchers state and document their biases as explicitly as possible so that the audiences of qualitative research can evaluate the validity of the conclusions generated from the research data.

Accordingly, it is important that I make a full disclosure of my personal experiences and interpretations of the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and how they have decoded the intentions of the policies and programs aimed at empowering them and tackling terrorism. I am a retired senior police officer in Kenya, having worked in the Kenya Police Service for 37 years. During my service, I was involved in investigating terrorism cases, particularly in the areas of perusing evidence pertaining to such cases and advising investigators. After retirement, I lectured in the areas of criminology and criminal justice, most notably investigative techniques, as well as in the area of terrorism, to undergraduate students in various universities in Kenya for a period of 6 years, 4 of which coincided with my current doctoral studies. My background created insights as well as barriers in this study. Merriam (2009) suggested that rather than seeking to eliminate biases and dispositions, the researcher should monitor them throughout the

process of data collection, analysis, and interpretation to see how they shape the outcomes. I monitored my biases throughout the process, did data triangulation, member check, and participant feedback, all strategies that assist in qualitative research validity.

Data Collection

Sample and Population

In this section, I describe the sample, including the sample size, the categories involved, the sampling procedures and strategies utilized for selecting the participants, and the procedures used to access the participants and the research sites.

Sampling Procedures

The target population for this study was young Kenyan males aged between 18 and 35 years. This age bracket is defined under Kenyan law (Youth Policy, 2006) as the Kenyan youth cohort. I targeted the young Kenyan males because they are the at-risk population for radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. For this study, I chose a purposeful sampling with a maximum variation strategy. Marshalls (1996) noted that purposeful sampling with a maximum variation strategy is the most common sampling technique in qualitative research because it enables the researcher the flexibility of selecting the sample most likely to answer the research questions. This strategy assisted me in differentiating research sites and participants (Patton, 2002). As a strategy, purposeful sampling using maximum variation aims to capture and describe the central themes that cut across a great deal of variation so that the common emergent patterns would be of particular interest and value in capturing core experiences and central shared

dimensions of a phenomenon (Patton, 2002). Because maximum variation involves purposeful recruitment of diverse participants, it plays a pivotal role in allowing for a greater range of applications of the findings by research consumers (Merriam, 2002). Following these insights, I selected four information-rich cases and recruited young Kenyan males from diverse backgrounds for this study. The four cases had already been finalized by the Kenyan courts, and the participants had already been incarcerated after being found guilty of terror charges. I also conducted a document review of the archived reports of the four terrorism cases. It is important to select participants and documents that would assist in the understanding of the phenomenon being studied because qualitative studies focus on describing, explaining, and clarifying human experiences (Miles & Huberman, 1994). I interviewed the four young incarcerated Kenyan males and an additional 30 young Kenyan males who were employed, unemployed, or attending university. This maximum variation sampling assisted me in recruiting various groups of young Kenyan males as my research participants.

Sample Size

I interviewed 34 participants, all young Kenyan males recruited from the following sources:

1. Four young Kenyan males who were already incarcerated following terrorism charges in the four cases selected for this study;
2. Thirty other young Kenyan males comprising: 11 university students, 11 unemployed young Kenyan males; and eight employed young Kenyan males.

This research is a qualitative study. I was guided by Patton's (2002) recommendation that the sample size in qualitative studies depends on what a researcher can do with the available time and resources, what the researcher wants to know, and what will be useful and credible. In qualitative studies, an important consideration is depth instead of breadth of information, which would require a large number of people (Patton, 2002). However, I was also aware that the sample in qualitative studies should be sufficiently large to help obtain feedback for all perceptions (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Initially, I proposed a sample size of 40 participants, which I based on guidelines offered by Patton, that in the planning stage, a researcher should specify a minimum expected sample size. However, after interviewing 34 participants, I realized that no new information was coming. According to Glaser and Strauss (1967), when no additional or new perspectives are forthcoming after additional participants are added, then all perceptions have been obtained, and saturation has been reached. I then closed interviews.

Procedure for Participants' Recruitment

1. On May 24, 2018, I received approval from the Walden University Institutional Review Board to collect field data for my research. The approval (#05-24-18-0293147) expired on May 23, 2019. At the time of expiry, I had already analyzed the data and compiled Chapter 4, which had also been approved by my Dissertation Committee.

2. I applied for and received permission from the Ministry of the Interior to access archived documents regarding terrorism cases between 2011 and 2018 as well as to access the incarcerated participants.
3. I applied for and obtained a research permit from the National Council for Science and Technology (Kenya).
4. I applied for and obtained authorization from the vice chancellor of the selected university for this study in order to access the university site and participants.

After obtaining all the authorizations for my research, I proceeded to the first site on July 10, 2018. I sat down with security officers, who presented me with the archived records of terrorism cases that had been finalized in the courts. After reviewing the archived documents, I selected four information-rich cases for my study. The perpetrators were all incarcerated in various facilities in Kenya. My efforts to recruit the investigators as my participants proved unsuccessful. They declined face-to-face interviews. I attributed this to my status of being a retired security person, who was also their senior. I completed an Adverse Report Form, which I submitted to the Walden University Institutional Review Board.

I started the fieldwork on July 10, 2018, and completed it on October 14, 2018, including member check activities. The following was the step-by-step procedure of how I accessed the research sites, how I recruited the participants, and how the data were collected and managed to answer the research questions:

1. I sought permission from the Ministry of the Interior to (a) access the four young Kenyan males incarcerated in reference to the terrorism cases selected for the study as well as the six security and prisons officers who dealt with these cases and (b) review the archival material relevant to the selected cases. I made personal visits to the representatives of the ministry after writing an official letter expressing all the details of the study. These personal visits established a firm ground for negotiations and the maintenance of research interaction relationships with the gatekeepers of the various research sites (Maxwell, 2013). The process was continuous, in that, negotiation and renegotiation with gatekeepers were held until information to ethically answer all the research questions in the study was obtained (Maxwell, 2013). However, the security officers declined face-to-face interviews and were only able to provide me with the archived materials corresponding to the study cases.
2. I sought and got permission from the Vice Chancellor of the university selected for this study to access the student participants.
3. I ensured early ethics consultations with the Walden University IRB by completing the research ethics planning worksheet.
4. I applied for and was granted a research permit from the National Council for Science and Technology, the body mandated by law under Chapter 250, Laws of Kenya.

5. I looked for office space in the Nairobi Central Business District, which provided easy access to the participants for interview purposes. I managed to get one allocated to me by the Director of Professional Counseling Institute.
6. I sent IRB forms to Walden University, and after a back-and-forth exercise, I was finally given permission to start the data collection.
7. I met the four participants individually at the incarceration facilities and handed them the invitation letters to participate in the study. After two days, I visited them again to find out whether they had made a decision. After confirming their willingness to participate, I handed them letters of informed consent, which they signed. Thereafter, I made arrangements with the gatekeepers regarding the appropriate dates to interview the incarcerated participants, which went on as scheduled. After transcribing the interview audio-tapes, I arranged with the gatekeepers to visit the incarcerated participants and give them the transcripts to read. They read, made corrections, and signed the transcripts and were satisfied that the transcripts accurately depicted the discussion. I then gave them the promised tokens of appreciation, kes 1,000 each, an equivalence of \$10. I was not allowed, as per the gatekeepers, to buy them lunch, so as promised in their recruitment letters, I gave them cash.
8. I visited the university, and together with the dean of students, drafted an announcement to inform students about the research, telling them to see

me in the dean's office after two days for further information. The announcement was given to lecturers to read out to the students during classes, and the others were posted on the notice boards. Two days later, I visited the university and was given an office space at the dean's office. The students came in individually, and I explained the research to them. I then gave them the letter of invitation, which contained my telephone number so that they could reach me once they had made a decision to participate.

9. I visited Thika Road Mall in Nairobi city. Outside, I talked to those who accepted and gave them an invitation letter to participate in the study. The letter contained my telephone contact, which the recipients could use to confirm their interest in participating. The target here were young employed Kenyan males.
10. I visited the Industrial Area Zone in Nairobi, where unemployed Kenyans frequent every morning in search of jobs. I talked to them, gave them invitation letters, and asked them to call me to confirm their participation.
11. Eleven students, 8 employed, and 11 unemployed young Kenyan males called me via the telephone number on the invitation letter. I scheduled them for interviews in a way that none would meet the other. I gave each of them informed consent forms, which they signed.
12. All participants who indicated their willingness to participate in this study made themselves available. However, three participants, who were

security officers, declined face- to-face interviews. I filled an Adverse Report Form and submitted it to the IRB.

13. I allocated an identification code and number to each participant and clustered them into four classes. Class “A” for university-going participants; class “B” for unemployed participants; class “C” for employed participants; and class “E” for incarcerated participants. I then conducted semi-structured face-to-face interviews using open-ended questions, each lasting one hour. The semi-structured interview strategy has the advantage of flexibility and assists in obtaining in-depth information from participants (Patton, 2002). I audio-recorded the interview proceedings after gaining the participants’ consent. I wrote field notes and research journal entries. This exercise started on July 10, 2018 and ended on September 5, 2018.
14. I stored all the research materials in a locked filing cabinet in my home office for security and confidentiality maintenance.
15. With the assistance of one research assistant, who signed a confidentiality agreement, I transcribed the recorded interviews and the written field notes and journal entries, presenting them in a usable form. We did all this in a secure environment in my home office.
16. I then met the participants for the second time, between September 5, 2018 and October 20, 2018, and had them read the transcripts. After verifying the information in the transcribed interview proceedings as an accurate

portrayal of their intended meanings, they signed the transcripts. Some of them made a few corrections.

17. At this point, I handed the promised tokens in form of gift vouchers to the research participants, and paid kes1000/- to each incarcerated participant through their welfare office and in their presence. They all exited the research exercise.
18. To triangulate the collected data, I conducted a document analysis of the archived and declassified materials provided by the state security in relation to the four selected cases.
19. In my home office, I analyzed the collected data.
20. I subjected the themes to peer review for validity (Simon, 2011b). The two peers were Dr. Anne Kanga from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa and Dr. John Mwangi from Egerton University.
21. All the research materials are now securely stored in a locked filing cabinet in my home office until a period of 5 years elapses, after which I will destroy them.

Following recommendations by Merriam (1994), I prepared this audit trail to ensure verifiable research steps throughout the process.

Data Collection

In a multicase study such as that conducted here, Yin (2009) suggested that having multiple sources of evidence would benefit the study by making it robust.

Converging sources of data, also known as triangulation, is an important strategy, as it

ensures comprehensive results that reflect the participants' understanding of the phenomenon under study as accurately as possible and improves the reliability of the case study (Stake, 2000; Yin, 2009). As a first step, and following the first interview, I began identifying patterns that facilitated subsequent data collection (Strauss & Corbin 1998). After analyzing the transcripts of the first interview, I presented them and the emerging themes to the participant, who then indicated concurrence. I then proceeded with further data collection. Following these insights, I conducted a multicase study involving four cases and collected data from a diversity of young Kenyan males: those incarcerated for terrorism crimes, some unemployed, some employed, and some attending university or college. I conducted individual semistructured, face-to-face interviews as well as a document review of the four selected cases.

Individual Interviews

I collected primary data by conducting individual interviews with all the participants. The interviews were face-to-face, semistructured, and open ended. Semistructured interviews may not offer the same reliability as structured interviews. However, the goal was to create an environment in which the participants could feel comfortable and could speak freely about this critical issue of youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The purpose of interviews was to find out what the other person thinks about a phenomenon. I interviewed people to find out from them about the things we cannot observe (Patton, 1980). Researchers ought to exercise caution while conducting interviews by being active listeners and nonjudgmental (Merriam, 2009; Patton, 1987). Establishing rapport and gaining the trust of participants are key to

conducting successful interviews (Patton, 2002). Guided by these insights, I conducted semistructured, face-to-face interviews with all 34 participants recruited for this study. The questions were open-ended, and there was opportunity for me to probe further and clarify the responses. At the same time, the participants had the opportunity to clarify questions and respond to my probes (Kvale, 1996). As recommended by Patton (2002), I used interview guides, which are presented in Appendix D. Each interview lasted 1 hour, and with the participants' permission, I audio-recorded them to ensure that I captured all what they had to say.

Documents Review

I interviewed participants for the collection of primary data and conducted a document review in order to triangulate the data. I was therefore able to clarify and substantiate the participants' statements (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). This assisted in providing thick descriptions of the cases (Merriam, 2002) and provided support during the cross-case analysis. I reviewed the following documents, which were relevant to the four case studies selected for the study:

1. Case study 1: A police report from archived materials in the public domain on the terror attack that resulted in the arrest and incarceration of ER 34.
2. Case study 2: A police report from archived materials in the public domain on the terror attack that resulted in the arrest and incarceration of ER 37.
3. Case study 3: A police report from archived materials in the public domain on the terror attack that resulted in the arrest and incarceration of ER 19.

4. Case study 4: A police report from archived materials in the public domain on the terror attacks that resulted in the arrest and incarceration of ER 39.

Data Analysis

In qualitative research studies, data analysis should follow immediately after collecting data from the first one to two sources, thus enabling the identification of patterns and the facilitation of continuous data collection (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Qualitative data analysis is a creative process rather than a mechanical one, and therefore, I had to establish a strategy that enabled me to use my creativity (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000).

Data Analysis Plan

Data analysis consists of examining, categorizing, tabulating, and testing evidence gathered during fieldwork, the purpose of which is to address the initial goals of a study (Yin, 2003a). As a first step, and following the first interview, I began identifying patterns that facilitated subsequent data collection (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). After analyzing the transcripts of the first interview, I presented them and the emerging themes to the participant, who indicated concurrence. I proceeded with the rest of the data collection and analysis. Because data analysis is a process of making-meaning, and because qualitative studies capitalize on ordinary ways of making sense, analysis means taking something apart (Stake, 1995). I carried out a content analysis to evaluate the collected data (Yin, 2003). This involved the examination of all data by searching for patterns and themes (Yin, 2003).

The data collected during the course of this study were in the form of tape recordings from face-to-face interviews using open-ended questions, which I transcribed with the assistance of one research assistant, who signed a confidentiality agreement (see Appendix D). Other data were contained in the field notes, researcher journals, and document reviews of the case study reports. I converted them into Word documents in order to facilitate analysis (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014).

I continued with the procedure of analyzing the data by reading, rereading, and memoing the interview transcripts, case reports, and field notes. The aim of reading and rereading was to immerse myself in the words of the participants, examining, categorizing, tabulating, and testing the data collected from the interviews and documents. This enabled me formulate general ideas of coding patterns emerging from the data, thereby using the data-driven inductive approach suggested by Patton (2002). Coding patterns may appear as similarities, differences, frequencies, sequences, correspondence, and/or causation (Saldana, 2013).

As I became familiar with the data and began generating coding patterns, I analyzed the interview transcripts, field notes, and documents through detailed descriptions, categorical aggregation, and direct interpretation and then established patterns that enabled me to develop naturalistic generalizations. For example, I determined some general ideas, such as young Kenyan males were approached for radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism in schools/universities, slums, and mosques. Young Kenyan males agreed to being recruited into a terror groups because they needed money or employment and were drawn to promises of a luxurious lifestyle.

They also believed that the government should take action in order to prevent youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

I organized the transcript files, researcher journals, field notes, and case report files into Word documents and imported them to the NVivo 12 qualitative data analysis software, which helped me reorganize and code the data. I then carried out a cross-case analysis to identify common themes across the multiple cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The cross-case analysis involved determining the presence of themes in the cases and moving from the data to assertions, with attention to the strength, usefulness, and importance of these assertions. Instead of being about comparisons, this analysis relied on thick rich description (Stake, 2006) in order to get a better understanding across the cases. I then subjected the themes to two peer reviews for validity (Simon, 2011b). One peer was from the Catholic University of Eastern Africa, Nairobi, and the other was from Egerton University.

Trustworthiness

The trustworthiness of this study was attained through the use of multiple sources of evidence (Yin, 1988). This use of multiple sources, also referred to as triangulation, helped me overcome potential problems regarding construct validity and reliability. The triangulation strategy selected for this study, that is, interviews and analyses of declassified security reports on the four cases, also helped in ensuring reliability.

It is also important to carry out the research and data analysis in a transparent manner in order to achieve rigor and trustworthiness (Creswell, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994), thereby also contributing to credibility, transferability,

dependability, and confirmability. As qualitative researchers are instruments of data collection and carry out the task of interpreting what others mean to say, Stake (1985) and Creswell (1998) cautioned against narrow thinking, advising qualitative researchers to learn to understand their research just as their participants instead of imposing their own assumptions. With credibility being the extent to which the results of a qualitative study are accurate from the perspective of the researcher, the participant, and the reader, I utilized the strategies recommended by Creswell (2009).

I triangulated my data by choosing to collect data from multiple sources: interviews and document reviews. I conducted member checks, resulting in the presentation of the analysis of the first three interviews to the participants so that I could determine whether I was in tune with them. The participants confirmed the content of the analysis and expressed that they felt it was accurate. Finally, after analyzing the data, I presented the themes generated in the analysis to two peers, who also confirmed the results.

I analyzed the data with the software program NVivo 12. This addressed researcher bias and human error. The use of computer software is an efficient way to store and locate data as well as to address human error (Creswell, 2009). Following the recommendation by Saldana (2013), while presenting the results of the analysis, I presented each theme with its respective meaning and evidence from the data and added a visual representation of the themes, their relationships, and ideas to help in better understanding the findings. For transferability, I used thick, rich descriptions, thereby enabling other researchers and readers to make their own decisions about transferability

(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For dependability and confirmability, I provided an audit trail of my fieldwork activities and explained step by step the process of data collection, management, and analysis, indicating how decisions were made in all areas of my study (Merriam, 2002).

Ethical Considerations

The protection of research participants was my first preoccupation when I planned the research exercise. I followed all necessary steps to ensure their protection. To begin with, I sought access permission for the incarcerated males and for the archived material in respect of the four study cases from the relevant government officers, which was granted (see Appendix A). In order to access the university students, I sought and got permission from the university administration (see Appendix A). I looked for a serene office space in a counseling institution, which was made available to me free of charge (see Appendix A). I used this space to interview all participants, except those incarcerated, whom I interviewed in private rooms within the incarceration facilities. After obtaining all permissions, I filled in the Walden University IRB application for permission to go out into the field to collect the data. After some back-and-forth communication with the board, I was granted the required approval (#05-24-18-0293147) on May 24, 2018 (see Appendix A). Finally, I applied for and was granted a research permit from the National Council for Science and Technology, the body mandated by law under Chapter 250, Laws of Kenya (National Council for Science and Technology Research Clearance Guidelines, 2009; see Appendix A).

I started the recruitment exercise by dispatching letters of invitation to participants (see Appendix B). Those who wanted to participate called me via the telephone number provided in the recruitment letters. I scheduled them for interviews in a way that none would encounter the other. Each participant was allocated a code letter and number so as to conceal their identities. Before commencing the interviews, each participant was informed of their rights and why it was necessary for them to participate in the study. Thereafter, they read and signed an informed consent form, which informed them of the voluntary nature of their participation in the research and that they could withdraw at any stage without repercussions (Creswell, 2013).

To further protect the research participants, I allocated an identification code and number to each participant and clustered them into four classes. Class “A” for university-going participants; class “B” for unemployed participants; class “C” for employed participants; and class “E” for incarcerated participants. I conducted the interviews in privacy and with no interference (Patton, 2002). The research assistant who assisted me in transcribing the interviews signed a confidentiality agreement (see Appendix D). After transcribing the audio-taped interviews and presenting the transcripts to the participants for verification, I destroyed the tapes, as I had promised them during the signing of the consent forms. Finally, I have securely stored the collected data in a locked cabinet in my home office until 5 years have elapsed, after which I will destroy them (Patton, 2002).

Summary and Transition

In this chapter, I elaborated on and rationalized the qualitative methodology and multi-case-study design selected for this study as a way to assist in understanding what

motivates young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The profiles of the research participants and how they were recruited for this study were explained in detail. The chapter also provided the rationale for the methodological decisions for this study. The theoretical perspectives, methodology, and methods helped illuminate the various complexities and experiences of the four participants involved in the selected case studies. Additionally, ethical protection of the participants, procedures for collecting and analyzing data, and verification of the findings were provided.

The chapter concluded with a discussion on the strategies used to enhance the trustworthiness of the findings. Chapter 4 now follows with a presentation of the results of the study, while Chapter 5 is a discussion of the findings, draws conclusions based on an examination of the study results and review of the literature, discusses the implications of the study for positive social change, and makes recommendations for future research.

Chapter 4: Results

Introduction

The main purpose of this qualitative, multicase study was to understand the motivations of young, Kenyan males for accepting to be radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism and understand and highlight how the young, Kenyan males have decoded and interpreted the current policies, programs, and strategies put in place by the government of Kenya to empower them and those policies and strategies in place to address terrorism; how they came to learn about them; and how they feel about them. In this chapter, I present the results of the qualitative, multicase study I conducted to answer the following research questions that I formulated to help gain an understanding of the phenomenon.

RQ1: Based on the perspectives of young, Kenyan males, why and how is homegrown terrorism perpetrated in Kenya?

RQ2: What motivational factors do young, Kenyan males cite for consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

RQ3: How have young, Kenyan males interpreted and decoded the intentions of the government policies and strategies aimed at empowering them and also addressing terrorism?

I have organized this chapter by first explaining how data were generated, gathered, and recorded in terms of the participants, interviews, and documents reviewed and then by describing the process that I used to code the data and how I moved from coded units to categories and themes. I describe the codes and themes that emerged from

the data. I explain the process by which meanings emerged through this study. Next, I provide evidence of trustworthiness by describing the implementation of credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability strategies, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Finally, I present the results in terms of the findings and answers to each of the research questions. I discuss each case, the cross-case analysis, and how the analysis addresses the research questions. Then I present the chapter summary.

Setting

On May 24, 2018, I received the Walden University IRB approval to go out in the field and collect data for my research. I received Approval #05-24-18-0293147, which expired on May 23, 2019. I also applied for and received permission from the Ministry of the Interior to access archived documents in respect of terrorism cases between 2011 and 2018, as well as to access the investigating officers of the cases I would sample for this study and also the incarcerated participants. I applied for and obtained a research permit from the National Council for Science and Technology (Kenya), and I also applied and obtained authorization from the vice chancellor to access the university site and recruit research participants.

After obtaining all of the authorizations for my research, I proceeded to the first site. I sat down with security officers who presented me with the archived records of terrorism cases that were finalized in the courts since the year 2011. After reviewing the archived documents, I selected four information-rich cases for my study. The perpetrators were all incarcerated in various incarceration facilities in Kenya. My efforts to recruit the investigators as my participants were unsuccessful. They declined face-to-face

interviews. I attributed this to my status of being a retired security person who was their senior. I completed an adverse report and submitted it to the Walden University Institutional Review Board. I started the fieldwork in July 10, 2018 and completed it in October 14, 2018, including member check activities. I documented all of the activities of the fieldwork in the audit trail provided in Chapter 3.

Sample of the Study

For this study, I chose a purposeful sampling with maximum variation strategy. I interviewed 34 participants, all young, Kenyan males aged between 18 and 35 years, as the source of my primary data. This age bracket is defined by Kenyan law (The Kenya Youth Policy, 2006) as the age of Kenyan youth. As my research was a qualitative study, I was guided by the recommendation by Patton (2002) that the sample size in qualitative studies depends on what a researcher can do with his/her available time and resources, what the researcher wants to know, and what will be useful and credible. In qualitative studies, a consideration is depth instead of breadth of information, which would require a large number of people (Patton, 2002). However, I was also aware that the sample in qualitative studies should be large enough to help obtain feedback for all perceptions (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Initially, I proposed a sample size of 40 participants. I based this on the insight offered by Patton that in the planning stage, a researcher should specify a minimum expected sample size. However, after interviewing 34 participants, I realized that I was not getting new information and there was data saturation. As recommended by Glaser and Strauss, when no additional or new perspectives are forthcoming after

additional participants are added, then all perceptions are obtained, and saturation is reached.

I allocated letter codes and numbers to all the participants to protect their identity. These participants consisted of four incarcerated, young, Kenyan males (given the codes ER 19, ER 34, ER 37, and ER 39), 11 university students (given the codes AR 02, AR 03, AR 04, AR 05, AR 06, AR 07, AR 08, AR 09, AR 10, AR 11, and AR 21), 11 unemployed individuals (given the codes BR 12, BR 15, BR 18, BR 22, BR 23, BR 24, BR 26, BR 27, BR 30, BR 33, and BR 40; [the latter was a returnee from Somalia who took advantage of the amnesty offered by the Kenyan government to young Kenyan males who went to Somalia for terrorism training]), and eight employed individuals (given the codes CR 14, CR 17, CR 25, CR 28, CR 29, CR 31, CR 32, and CR 36).

For the purpose of data triangulation, I reviewed four archived documents for four terror cases perpetrated between 2011 and 2018 by young, Kenyan males who were incarcerated and were among those I interviewed under the code ER. The documents were presented to me by the security officers who were authorized to release them to me. I converted the records into Microsoft Word documents for analysis.

Characteristics of the Incarcerated Participants

ER 34

His father died when he was taking standard VIII. The participant was not able to pass the exams. His mother convinced him to continue his studies, but he declined. Instead, he helped his mother run a bakery, and he began “preaching Islamic teachings.” He did this until the bakery closed shop later on. At that time, the participant was

approached by his neighbor “to fight jihad,” but the participant declined and found a job. When the business was relocated and the participant lost his job, the same neighbor again approached the participant and convinced him that Somalia needed help, as it was being taken over by Ethiopians. The neighbor said that “life there was going to be good” and that he would be trained for his part. The participant consulted sheiks from the mosque he attended, and they explained why he should not go to Somalia. The neighbor insisted that the sheiks were “aligned with the government” and were seeking power for themselves. He was then convinced to go to Somalia. He was given bus fare and traveled to Somalia via Garissa. In Somalia, he and others were trained in weaponry. He was later sent back to Kenya and told to wait for orders.

ER 19

The participant completed Form II in terms of education. His parents died when he was young, and he went to live with his grandmother. The participant said that money became a problem. He attended a mosque where he was approached by Arabic people offering a job to build a mosque in Somalia. A group of young men with different nationalities traveled with the participant. Upon arriving in Somalia, however, he learned that no construction job existed; he and the others who traveled with him as a group were given guns and were trained in warfare. He ran away with others when an opportunity arose and traveled back to Kenya. He had saved a lot of money from the payments he received from the terror groups. With this money, he bought a piece of land and began operating business enterprise. Later he was identified by others who were with him in

Somalia and who were now performing terror attacks. They incorporated him in the terrorism activities that they were carrying out.

ER 37

He was a second-born child in a polygamous family. He finished Form II of high school education. He had an altercation with his father, so he ran away from home. At an early age, he joined a criminal gang committing robberies. Later he apologized to his father and went back home. He then fell in love with a woman his parents did not approve of. The woman left. His parents arranged a marriage for him, but the participant ended up leaving. However, he eventually went back to his father and apologized. At that time, he attended a mosque, but he was an outcast because of his life of crime. He “became lonely” and started visiting friends who were preparing to leave for Somalia. The participant knew about the terrorist acts and radicalization involved in Somalia, as sheiks freely talked about them in the mosque. His friends were convincing him to go with them to Somalia, but he refused at first.

On his own and listening to Madrassa teachings, he decided to use the Internet to research about the jihad in Somalia. The participant was torn between joining the war in Somalia and finding a job in the Middle East. He decided to pursue whichever came to him first. He managed to secure a job as a waiter in Saudi Arabia; however, the participant felt unfulfilled despite the job and the good pay. The participant regretted that he was near the Holy City of Mecca but could not go because of his job. He was also unable to attend mosque regularly. He then left his job and went back to Kenya, where he met a Muslim preacher speaking about radicalization. The preacher spoke about Muslims

being killed in Somalia. He wanted to help, so he approached the preacher. The preacher arranged for him to travel to Somalia. While there, he was joined by a group of young men with different nationalities. They were trained in Al-Shabaab military style. The participant performed well; he was trained in security and asked to lead a team. He was given money and weapons, and with a team of four others, he was sent back to Kenya with a mission of identifying targets and staging terror attacks.

ER 39

This participant had a diploma in electrical engineering and was third among five brothers. He was brought up in the Catholic faith and converted from one Christian denomination to another. The participant ended up living in the slums, where he converted to Islam. He read the Quran and used the Internet to learn about Islam. The participant was introduced to radical groups through the Internet. He traveled to Somalia alone but had contacts who connected him to the terror groups in Somalia. The terror groups received him and trained him in warfare then sent him back to Kenya to wait for orders.

Backgrounds of Other Participants

University Students

The young, Kenyan males in university were given identity of class “A” participants and were given a codename of AR and a number to conceal their identities. The demographics of the university students are provided in Table 1. The table presents the level of education and the program taken by the participants.

Table 1

The University Students

Participant	Level	Program
AR 02	2nd year	Economics
AR 03	Did not specify	Journalism
AR 04	Did not specify	Criminology and security
AR 05	Did not specify	Engineering
AR 06	2nd year	Education
AR 07	4th year	Business administration
AR 08	2nd year	Did not specify
AR 09	Final year	Business information technology
AR 10	Final year	Animal health and production
AR 11	3rd year	Special needs education
AR 21	4th year	did not specify

The Unemployed

The unemployed participants were given identity of class B participants. They were assigned the codename BR and a number to protect their identities. The participants' demographics are summarized in Table 2.

Table 2

The Unemployed

Participant	Highest Education
BR 15	College level
BR 18	College level
BR 22	Class 8
BR 23	College level
BR 24	Form 4
BR 12	University graduate
BR 26	College graduate
BR 27	College graduate
BR 30	College level
BR 33	College graduate
BR 40	Form 3

The Employed

The employed participants were given identity of class C participants. A codename containing CR and a number was used to ensure their confidentiality. The participants' profiles are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3

The Employed

Participant	Employment
CR 14	Security assistant at retail outlet
CR 17	Law firm staff
CR 25	Self-employed
CR 28	Sales and marketing
CR 29	Did not specify
CR 31	Did not specify
CR 32	Clearing and forwarding agency staff
CR 36	Did not specify

Documents Reviewed in Respect of Terrorism Cases

Case Study 1

During the year 2012, the suspects, along with others, were operating within Nairobi. They were planning to bomb the parliament, the airport, and other joints in Nairobi City. On the night of September 13/14, 2012, the police led an ambush and entered the house where the suspects were living. They arrested the suspect (name withheld for the protection of the participant) and recovered four explosive vests, 12 hand grenades, four AK47 rifles, 16 magazines, 481 special ammunitions, CDs containing Al-Shabaab materials, and a motor vehicle that the group purchased for use in their mission.

The suspect was arraigned in court on September 17, 2012. He pleaded guilty to the charges of possessing the materials and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

Case Study 2

On May 15, 2012, a popular night club on a street known for its night life in a Kenyan city and is a popular holiday destination for both Kenyans and foreigners was attacked when assailants hurled grenades into it after being denied entry. The assailants also fired indiscriminately, leading to the death of a security guard and injuries to several other people. The police traced and arrested the attacker (name withheld) in a hospital on May 19, 2012. He was admitted there following injuries that he sustained from the blast. They found him in possession of a bus ticket from a city to Nairobi, and upon further investigations, the officers recovered luggage with bullets and a magazine in the bus he booked to travel in. They also recovered a firearm. He planned to travel after the attack. On Thursday, March 10, 2013, the trial judge said the prosecution provided enough evidence to show that the accused was involved in the attack, and therefore sentenced him to death.

Case Study 3

Between June 15 and 17, 2014, over 80 heavily armed militants attacked a village and township in the wee hours of the night, killing Christian men and youths in cold blood. Half of the attackers were youths from two different cities. The rest were members of Jaysh-Ayman, a criminal group that was attempting to set up bases in a forest. Most of the youths were radical extremists who were recruited and paid. The attackers also went

door to door, pulling people out of their homes and demanding they prove that they were Muslim by reciting Quran verses. Those who could not recite the verses were beheaded.

Case Study 4

On October 24, 2011, there were terror attacks of two explosions in the Central Business District of Nairobi City. One was at a bar, and the other was at a crowded bus terminus. In the bar attack, one person was seriously injured while in the bus terminus attack one person died and 28 others were seriously injured. On October 25, 2011, police investigators traced the two blasts to an al Qaeda Kenyan cell (name withheld for his protection) whom they arrested at an estate. They recovered from his house 13 grenades, four pistols, one AK 47 assault rifle, one submachine gun, and 717 assorted ammunitions. He was arraigned in court and sentenced to life in prison after pleading guilty to all charges. He told the court that he harbored no regrets and that he would not appeal his sentence. However, he later changed his mind and appealed. His sentence was reduced to 15 years' imprisonment.

Data Collection

I collected data by conducting in-depth face-to-face, semistructured interviews and by reviewing documents relating to the four terrorism cases that I sampled for this study. These were four young Kenyan males already incarcerated for the four terrorism-related cases that I selected for this study, 11 young Kenyan males attending university or college, as well as 11 unemployed and eight employed. I conducted the interviews individually with each of the participants. Each interview lasted for 1 hour. I carried out the interviews in a serene office environment for all the participants except the

incarcerated. For the incarcerated, I interviewed them individually in their respective incarcerated facilities where I was provided with private rooms for this purpose.

With the permission of the participants, I audio-recorded the interviews. I then organized the data by transcribing the interviews in Microsoft Word files with the help of one research assistant who signed a confidentiality agreement. I reviewed the documents for the case reports of the four incarcerated participants. I typed and saved them in Word files for analysis. At this point, I made a decision to use qualitative data analysis software. After reviewing several types in the market, I settled on NVivo 12 and purchased it. Since I did not have prior knowledge of using it, I took tutorials through video presentations supplied by the software manufacturers. I gained skills that enabled me to analyze my data.

Data Analysis

The process that I used to analyze the data collected from the 34 participants, the field notes, and the four archived documents was content analysis. Content analysis is described by Patton (2002) as a process of data reduction and a sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative materials and attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings. This involves pattern recognition and theme identification that respond to the questions what, why, and how (Simon, 2011a). I carried out a cross-case analysis of the four cases that I selected for the study by using the same process of pattern recognition and theme identification and analysis (Patton, 2002). Thematic analysis is a search for themes that emerge as important to the description of the phenomenon (see Daly, Kelleher, & Glisksman, 1997). Following the first interview, I began identifying patterns

to facilitate subsequent data collection, as opined by Strauss and Corbin (1998). Data analysis being a process of making meaning and a qualitative study capitalizing on ordinary ways of making sense, Stake (1995) stressed that analysis means taking something apart.

I continued with the procedure of analyzing the data by reading, rereading, and memoing the interview transcripts, case reports, and field notes. The aim of reading and re-reading was to immerse myself in the words of the participants, examining, categorizing, tabulating, and testing the data collected from the interviews and documents. This enabled me formulate general ideas of coding patterns emerging from the data, thereby using the data-driven inductive approach postulated by Patton (2002). Coding patterns may appear as similarities, differences, frequencies, sequences, correspondence, and/or causation (Saldana, 2013). As I became familiar with the data and began generating coding patterns, I analyzed the interview transcripts, field notes, and documents through detailed descriptions, categorical aggregation, and direct interpretation, and then I established patterns that enabled me to develop naturalistic generalizations. For example, I determined some general ideas, such as young Kenyan males were approached for radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism in schools/universities, slums and mosques, and young Kenyan males agreed to being recruited in a terror groups because of the need for money or employment, they were drawn to promises of a luxurious lifestyle, and they think that the government needed to take action in order to prevent them from being recruited.

I organized the transcripts files, field notes, and case report files into Word documents and imported them to NVivo 12, qualitative data analysis software that helped me reorganize and code the data. Appendix G is a representation of the NVivo generated data sets. The software also aided me in creating visual representations of the initial coding patterns. I used the automatic coding feature of the software to determine the frequencies of the most mentioned words. Figure 1 below shows a word cloud of the top 50 most commonly used words generated from NVivo 12. The font sizes represent how frequently the words occurred.



Figure 1. Word cloud.

The figure shows the 50 most commonly used words in the transcripts. The top 50 most commonly used words generally supported my initial ideas for the coding patterns. I therefore proceeded with the data coding. The process involved using descriptive codes, in which I assigned codes to chunks of data to label the texts. With the aid of NVivo 12, I

coded the transcripts manually using the code feature. Each node represented one code. For example, chunks of texts mentioning money, debt, or finances were highlighted and assigned to the node *money*.

I then used the codes to categorize the data. Using the node hierarchy feature in NVivo 12, I grouped the codes together to form a category. For example, I categorized the codes *money*, *idleness*, and *unemployment* as Kenyan male youths' motivation for joining radical groups. Then, I grouped the codes together under *motivation of Kenyan male youths for joining radical groups*. I then tabulated the categories by identifying patterns and generating initial themes. I used the node hierarchy feature in NVivo 12 to visually represent the tabulation. Figure 2 shows the node hierarchy representing the initial theme *unemployment, idleness, and finances*.

Name	Files	Referen
unemployment, idleness, and finances	34	547
motivation of Kenyan male youth to join radic	33	525
money	25	357
unemployment	24	152
idleness	7	16

Figure 2. Node hierarchy example.

The figure visually represents how the theme “unemployment, idleness, and finances” was derived. I tested the initial themes on how they related to one another and how they answered the research questions. For example, the themes *unemployment*, *idleness*, and *finances*; *deception and brainwashing*; and *personal judgment* appeared to be the drivers of acceptance to offers to be radicalized and recruited into homegrown

terrorism among young Kenyan males. This answers the second research question. I finalized the themes.

Cross-Case Analysis

This multicase study provided an opportunity to examine the phenomenon of motivation of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and to understand and highlight their interpretations of the policies and programs put in place by the government of Kenya to empower them, and the policies and strategies to combat the vice. A multicase study allows a researcher to look beyond the individual case to the phenomenon, in this case, the motivation of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The cases provide an opportunity to examine this phenomenon by bringing the findings from the individual case experiences to the research questions (Stake, 2006). The cross-case analysis emphasizes attending to the activity and context of the case so that the researcher is able to make observations about correlations between events occurring together (Stake, 2006). While emphasizing the uniqueness of each case less, the cross-case analysis retains the most important experiential knowledge (Stake, 2006).

The cross-case analysis involved determining the presence of themes from the data, and moving to assertions with attention to the strength, usefulness, and importance of these assertions, so that instead of the analysis being about comparisons, relied on thick, rich description (Stake, 2006). In order to get a better understanding across cases of what motivated the young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, and what their interpretations of the policies and programs to

empower them and also the policies and strategies to combat the vice are, I drew from the important findings from each case report, and thus drew assertions about the motivations and interpretations. All the final themes from the cases and from the interviews that answered the three research questions are presented in the next section and are supported by the participants' verbatim accounts of their experiences and perceptions of the phenomenon under investigation.

Evidence of Trustworthiness

In qualitative research, it is important to carry out research and data analysis in a transparent manner in order to achieve rigor and trustworthiness (Creswell, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994) that also result in credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability. As qualitative researchers are instruments of data collection and carry out the tasks of interpreting what others mean to say, Stake (1985) and Creswell (1998) cautioned about narrow thinking and advised qualitative researchers to learn to understand their research just as their participants instead of imposing their own assumptions. With credibility being the extent to which the results of a qualitative study are accurate from the perspective of the researcher, the participant, and the reader, I utilized the strategies recommended by Creswell (2009). I triangulated my data sources by choosing to collect data from multiple sources, which are interviews and document reviews. I conducted member checks, resulting in the presentation of the analysis of the first three interviews to the participants so that I could identify if I was in tune with them. The participants confirmed the content of the analysis and expressed that they felt it was accurate. Finally, after analyzing the data, I presented the themes generated in the

analysis to two peers who also confirmed the results. I analyzed the data with the software program NVivo 12. This addressed researcher bias and human error. Using computer software is an efficient way to store and locate data, as well as address human error (Creswell, 2009).

Following the recommendation by Saldana (2013), while presenting the results of the analysis, I presented each theme with its respective meaning and evidence from the data, at the same time adding visual representation of the themes, their relationships and ideas to help in better understanding of the findings. For transferability, I used thick, rich descriptions thereby enabling other researchers and readers to make their own decisions about transferability (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). For dependability and confirmability, I provided an audit trail of my fieldwork activities in Chapter 3 and explained step by step the process of data collection and analysis, indicating how decisions were made in all areas of my study.

Results

This section presents the findings. The cross case analysis suggested that five themes were consistent across the four cases that were under this study and also with the interview data of the other participants. The themes were (a) being trained after recruitment; (b) planning attacks; (c) Unemployment, idleness, and finances; (d) deception and brainwashing; and (e) not managed well. For each theme, I extracted data from what each case brought out and what each participant expressed in respect of the theme. This served to highlight the ways in which each of the four cases shared

commonalities. I have organized the results by research question and then by theme. The themes are described and supported by excerpts from the data.

RQ1

This section answers the first research question. Two themes emerged to answer this question. The results revealed how homegrown terrorism was perpetrated in Kenya by (a) being trained after recruitment and (b) planning attacks.

Being trained after recruitment. The majority of young Kenyan males perceived that homegrown terrorism was carried out through the training of recruits. Generally, the participants knew someone who was approached by radical groups or who joined radical groups. The training involved warfare, weaponry, security, faking documents, and arranging travel to Somalia. Figure 3 shows the codes from which the theme was derived.




Figure 3. Node hierarchy for the theme “Being trained after recruitment.”

One of the unemployed participants perceived that the recruits were trained to use explosives “to execute the mission.” BR 15 stated the following:

It depends. Terrorists use a lot; they use IEDs, improvised explosive devices, and they use guns, so you are taught like military personnel. You’re supposed to know how to execute the mission. It takes time; you’ll not be told that, “We are recruiting you, we’re taking you in, and this is what you’ll do tomorrow.” No, you must first be taught. It’s something that’s done for months, or it can even take years. Of course, it depends on the kind of mission you will [undertake].

BR 15 perceived that training the recruits occurred in mosques and houses. One of the employed participants, CR 12, believed that recruits were trained to strategize. The participant shared the following, “They may be taught different things like tactical [matters]; it’s kind of they are engaging in warfare. It may be tactical, psychological, and maybe some tactics to hide, to identify, and to change the morals in what they’re doing.”

One of the participants who was incarcerated, ER 19, shared that the recruits were first trained on how to fight and how to use a gun. He stated, “We were taught how to fight, how to use a gun and all other fighting equipment.”

ER 34, an incarcerated participant, narrated his experiences as a recruit and shared that recruits were not permitted to speak to their families upon arriving at the “lodging.” Recruits first underwent “physical training.” ER 34 shared the following:

All this was happening to me, and my mother had no information. I was ordered to throw away my phone, so I was taken to a place where I found other youths from Kenya, some of Somali origin but from Kenya. They told me we were to

embark on a physical training. I started training with the others, and my legs got swollen. We were also trained in weapon handling, but instead of guns, we were given pieces of wood.

After the initial weapon training, the participant shared that the recruits were taken to a “camp” where groups of young men of different nationalities were further trained in security, explosives, and lethal weapons. ER 34 continued as follows:

Many of them were sent from Mogadishu, and after training, they were to be taken back to Mogadishu. Some were sent to training by warlords, and after training, they collect them to go and guard them. For us, we trained and finished training. We were trained on weapons of all types and also how to operate TNT grenades. After training, those who pass are further trained on bombs, machine guns, and mounted vehicles and bush styles; those who are very sharp are left to train others.

Despite the extensive training, ER 34 revealed that several recruits still did not know how to use the weapons when perpetrating missions. The participant shared his experience with using an explosive jacket in preparation for the mission in which he got caught. The participant stated:

So we were to blow up the Parliament at 4:00 p.m. on September 13th 2012. So we wore the explosive jackets, the four of us. I did not know how to operate the explosive jacket, so all of us were assisted to wear them.

To carry out the attack missions, the recruits were expected to travel from Somalia to Kenya after training. The recruits were given cash and were also expected to

arrange their own travel. ER 37 revealed that a part of the training was to fake their travel documents and hide from the authorities. The participant stated, “Another training was on how to acquire travel documents and how to pass through border points without our identity being discovered.” Incarcerated participant ER 34 revealed that life was difficult after recruitment. The participant mentioned:

We started creating trouble because of the difficult times we were going through. We told them that we did not like to stay there. We did not fear very much since we were also trained. However, none of the recruits attempted to escape for fear of being killed.

Incarcerated participant ER 37 revealed that a part of the training was to “harden” the recruits by putting them through difficulties. He shared the following:

We slept on the floor soaked with water—to be hardened. We woke up at 2 am and did not rest at all. One trainer gave us commands. This was meant to measure our temperament. One of us failed this test. He was a wanted criminal in Kenya for robbery crimes, so he could not return to Kenya.

The recruits were trained to follow orders. Incarcerated participants ER 34 and ER 37 had similar experiences. Both were given instructions to travel back to Kenya from Somalia after training and to wait for orders. Both participants were given money for the attack missions. Participant ER 37 stated that he was waiting for “nothing specific.” The participant also mentioned that he was “just enjoying life” in their safe house. Participant ER 34 expressed the following:

Later, we met with two others, and we were taken to a big house by one person who I was to give the money to. The person did not tell us anything; he just put us in a house. I gave him the money; it was my first time to handle such an amount of money. The person briefed us that there were things that were brought and that we were to use them for the mission. These were guns, ammunitions, explosives, and grenades. I told him I want to see my mother at Komarock. However, he told me to forget about my family and that his family himself was at Nairobi South C and that he had not seen them. The person produced a map showing parliament buildings in Nairobi and that the mission was to blow up the parliament. The Somali youth from America said he wanted to look for a wife, and he was allowed; he got a wife. I was given money to look for a car. There is a car bazaar along Haile Selassie Avenue, and we bought the car there. This was September 13, 2012. We were confined in a house and ordered not to leave.

ER 37 also shared the following:

After the training, our trainers did heavy shopping for us, and we were briefed that the first order was to travel back to Kenya and wait for further instructions. We were given an email address that we could use for communication. We were also given money, \$10,000. The money was entrusted to me, and I was told I was the commander.

Planning attacks. On the basis of the four cases reviewed in this study, homegrown terrorism was generally perpetrated in cities, particularly near government

establishments or non-Muslim places. Figure 4 shows the codes that helped develop the second theme.



Figure 4. Node hierarchy for the theme "Planning attacks."

Case Study 2 included a report stating, "On May 15, 2012... club (name of club withheld for the protection of the participant), a popular night club on a street known for its night life in Mombasa and a popular holiday destination for both Kenyans and foreigners, was attacked." Cases 1 and 4 revealed the attacks in Nairobi City. Case study 3 included a note stating, "Between June 15 and 17, 2014, over 80 heavily armed militants attacked village (name of village not disclosed for protection purposes) and township in the wee hours of the night, killing Christian men and youths in cold blood." Incarcerated participant ER 19 shared the following:

They suggested that we move out people, and the Al-Shabaab were to help in moving out people. That man told me they would start at (...), so I had to tell my

neighbors. Some moved and some refused; they were killed. When they reached, they started with our land. They came and took us, took our phones, and for him, he was a Christian, and for me, I was a Muslim, so they took me with them as they went from house to house where they told people to say any part of the Quran. If you didn't know, they would slaughter you; the men were killed. So we reached a place where a mother was locked inside the house, and the husband was killed; when she saw me, she identified me and said that I was with those people who were killing, and the man we were with was the one who was leading.

Incarcerated participant ER 37 shared how he was leading his team to identify targets for attacks and the actual attacks:

Just enjoying life. We were just waiting for instructions. As we waited, I saw on TV that two of my group members were wanted by the police for robbery crimes. I took them to and hid them at (Names of the two places withheld for protection). I also checked my e-mail and found instructions that I and my group should start identifying tourist points to attack. In our training back in Somalia, the Al-Shabaab trainers informed us that they wanted to bring down Kenya's economy, and one way of doing that was to attack tourist points so that travel advisories could be issued by foreign countries.

He also added:

We had grenades, guns, and ammunition. One of us stored the equipment. He was the operations man. Being their commander, I had my own weapons—a pistol, grenades, and ammunition in my house. So I identified one club where tourists

frequented. I looked for my colleagues. We used to meet at the beach. I got two of them, but one refused to cooperate; one agreed. So I visited the club with the person who agreed. I felt my heart being very heavy, and I could not make up my mind. I suggested that we wait until the weekend when the people there could be in large numbers.

BR 15 unemployed participant related the terrorist attacks to the case of the lawyer in Garissa. He said that planning and executing attacks were not necessarily related to money or political power but to religious beliefs and interpretations of preaching. BR 15 narrated the following:

I talked about Wakafiri (pagans) the people who are not supposed to live. If he was in the school looking at everyone he thinks are not Muslims, they don't even deserve to live; they don't deserve to be a part of society; that is why he did what he did. That's why I told you when it comes to recruitment, they look for various qualifications. That is why like the Garissa guy, (attacker) he's a lawyer, he understands the law; he's well off financially, but now it comes to the teachings. The teachings, what—Yes, the religious teaching, what ideology does he live for? I think that's what informed him, and that is his basis for deciding to mastermind the attack in the university. It's not [unintelligible]—that's why I told you, when they die that way, they believe it's for a good cause. They don't really regret it.

RQ2

This section answers the second research question. Three themes emerged to answer this question. In the perspective of young Kenyan males, the motivational factors

for accepting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism were as follows:

(a) unemployment, idleness, and finances; (b) deception and brainwashing; and (c) personal judgment.

Unemployment, idleness, and finances. The majority of the participants perceived that the motivational factors for accepting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism included unemployment, idleness, and finances. Figure 5 shows the codes that helped generate the theme.




Figure 5. Node hierarchy for the theme “Unemployment, idleness, and finances.”

Two of the four participants who were incarcerated for terrorist attacks admitted that money and unemployment motivated them to join radical groups. BR 40, an unemployed participant and a returnee from Somalia under the Kenya government’s amnesty, also shared how he was going to earn a large sum of money for carrying out terror attacks although he was not paid the money and was told that the money would be paid to his family if something bad happened to him in the process of the attack he was to stage in Nairobi. So he refused to stage the planned attacks and surrendered to the government. He shared the following, “This job had a huge amount of money. Everybody was to be paid 3.5 million each. Before because I, as their senior, I was to be paid KS 7,000,000.”

Incarcerated participant ER 34 also revealed that money was simply promised but not given. The participant continued that he still decided to join the radical group, as he was promised that if he died, his family would receive money. ER 34 shared the following:

I can say that unemployment is driving young Kenyan males to go to Somalia for terrorism activities. They are promised money, but they are never given money. For me, I was told that if I died, my family could be paid money.

Incarcerated participant ER 19 claimed that his parents and grandparents passed away when he was young, and he had no way of financially supporting himself. The participant said that if the Kenyan government provided work opportunities or loans for the youth, they would not turn to radical groups. He believed that Kenyan youths had little opportunity to grow financially and stated:

Kenyan youths should be given work by the government and be given loans so that they will not suffer. Without that, terror will not end in Kenya. They should check on our talents and give us freedom and money so that everybody can work on their talents, there outside. There at Somalia, I used to be paid KS 200,000 per month, so I was there for four years; I had a lot of money because I was not sending money anywhere. I got out with a lot of money, about KS 900,000, and I also left a lot of money there because I couldn't carry it in a bag; I left a lot of money behind more than I carried with me.

AR 5, a university student, believed that money was a major motivator for youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. He asserted the following:

Personally, I know about January, a friend of mine who was with me in high school who told me that they have tried to secure jobs but could not get jobs that paid enough for the sustenance of their families. He told me that he wanted to join Al-Shabaab. My friend, a Luo, a very bright fellow, was a fourth-year university student. They said they wanted to be rich. They said they researched and found that Al-Shabaab paid USD 500,000. So they also approached me to join, so we could be together. But I refused ... Other youths also joined Al-Shabaab because they are lured with money. Money is the main driver and attraction ... You are given the money before you are sent for a mission so that you can enjoy it before you die. This money, we see it. Fellows are squandering the money in big clubs, they drink expensive drinks, and they generally lead luxurious lives, driving posh cars, dressing well, and then they disappear.

AR 5 continued:

Another point is peer pressure whereby one is lured into terrorism because your friend is rich, driving and living in a big mansion. So such friends try to lure us into terrorism convincing us that life there is so luxurious.

AR 11, a university student supported that money is a big motivator to young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. He shared,

For me, the only thing that would make me to join would be to get that money. That can attract me to change my principles and just join. The money plays a major role in decisions to join Al Shabaab.

CR 17, an employed participant, shared the following:

Radicalization and recruitment were rampant. Actually, most of the people in (name of place withheld for confidentiality), they knew because youths would disappear mysteriously and then reappear mysteriously. When they reappeared, they actually come back holier than thou. They come back knowing the Quran, actually quoting the Quran verses that actually more of the ... the disappearance for a while would mean that they've been taken across the border, radicalized and trained in warfare. Then, they come back to Kenya; some of them would come back as a testament to show the other youths that jihad is real, and it is in Somalia. Once they came back with goodies, money, they could change the lives of their family slightly. So the others would be actually motivated. Let's say like a person would have gone there, he's not that religious, and then he comes back.

AR 02, a university student, believed that sometimes, young Kenyan males did not have a choice but to join radical groups in order to pay for their parents' debts. He explained as follows:

Maybe a parent might have a debt to someone, and then the child is taken as a slave because of money. You owe me some money, and then I find that your child is more useful to me than to you. Maybe he's not benefiting you from a family perspective. When I look at him or her, I see that he might benefit the group and also benefit you in clearing your debt.

CR 14, CR 32, and AR 02 believed that radical groups intentionally targeted to recruit youths from poor families. CR 32 stated that youths who were idle were preyed

upon by radical groups. CR 14 and AR 02 believed that there were too many out-of-school or unemployed youth who needed money for themselves or their families.

Participant AR 02 explained the following:

Some years back, even currently, it is going on. Al-Shabaab is recruiting, as many young Kenyans are unemployed and are idle, so they join these terror groups as a form of employment, and when they go there, they are promised to be paid, and because they do not have any other income, they go there to earn something. Maybe due to unemployment, because you see many Kenyan youth; they finish their university education, and there are no jobs for them. So maybe when I am idle, maybe I can join Al-Shabaab. That would drive me to join them but I am not intending to do so. The youth comprise 70% of the population of Kenya, and their unemployment rate is between 30% and 40%.

Deception and brainwashing. The majority of the participants also believed that Kenyan youth may be receptive to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism because of deception and brainwashing. Figure 6 contains the codes that generated this theme.




Figure 6. Node hierarchy for the theme “Deception and brainwashing.”

BR 40 and BR 15, both unemployed, believed that radical groups aimed to recruit as many young males as possible, promising them money that they never paid, and then radicalized them. They give them missions of attacking targets. BR 40 shared the following:

Before in advance and we were supposed to be paid around January. You see? They started pushing forward the payment of money. So attack day was almost there. It reached around the 20th. When we asked, we were told that we were fighting for Allah (God). “What you will do, you’ll go and do whatever you were doing. In case anything bad happens, the money will be given to your family.”

BR 15 believed that

[Recruits] are Christians; you can be anyone. You don't necessarily have to be a Muslim, although a Muslim can come and recruit you. In the first place, you're not a Muslim, but you may be recruited, given another name. Maybe you were called Joseph, but it will change; you become Ibrahim or like that. That's now the name you assume, going forward.

BR 15 perceived that after converting to Islam, the recruits were given false promises of a better life. He expressed this in the following:

You're first told to join Islam, you're given some teachings, and then you're promised wealth. In that, somebody feels, even if I die, I'll have left my family in a better financial position, so you take the risk. You basically take the risk and say, "I'm going to die, but even if I'm going to die, my mom, my sisters, and my siblings will be in a better place." You see, it's very convincing.

Some participants, however, believed that religious leaders deceived the youth.

Participant CR 14 explains as follows:

The youth, when they are approached, they are usually very innocent, and usually, those people who approach them or want to talk to them are those people in society whom they look up to as role models, as the people who will guide them in their way of life, but, for example, when religious leaders approach them and take them to this religious institution where they mostly undertake their radicalization, this is something that is usually the problem. When these young people, when they are taught these, they usually imbibe them and experiment knowing that whatever they have been told by these people they look up to for

advice and guidance is the correct thing to do. First of all, these people corrupt them about the normal system of society, so they make them believe that they exist in a different world or in a different system that is not right in this normal system of society; as a result, they become very defiant, and they take what they have been told by these people who have radicalized them. They become so brainwashed, and whatever they do, they do without knowing what they are doing.

Among the participants who were incarcerated, participant ER 34 shared his experience of being brainwashed into joining the radical group. The participant shared, “The recruiters do not look for any qualifications. But as of late, they have started recruiting university students, those who do not understand Islam. Then, they brainwash them such that there is no other religion except Islam.” This participant was having a difficult time, with the loss of his job and his experience of spiritual conflict, when a neighbor approached him about fighting in Somalia. The participant narrated the following:

He gave me bus fare, and I traveled by road to Garissa. He connected me to someone in Garissa who could make arrangements for me to cross to Somalia. People brainwash others with hate talks by telling them that Muslims are persecuted. I do not even understand why I involved myself in terrorism activities. Many Kenyan youths find themselves in this situation of terrorism activities, but they do not understand themselves.

Incarcerated participant ER 19 also shared:

So people were lied to by the Al-Shabaab, that there is work and that in Kenya, there are no jobs. They are told that there are jobs in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Dubai. They are taken, and they do not even reach Saudi Arabia or Qatar, but they are taken to Somalia, so it means that all this is Al-Shabaab in Kenya, that there are no jobs, and if there are, they could have been given job opportunities and avoid being lied to that they could be given jobs by the Al-Shabaab.

Incarcerated participants ER 34 and ER 37 both experienced a difficult life, and they turned to preachers for religious purposes; however, both participants experienced hearing the stories of Muslims being killed in Somalia, which led them to the decision of joining the radical group. ER 37 narrated the following:

In (name of place withheld for confidentiality), I went to the house of a preacher who was preaching to us in a mosque in (name of place withheld). He had been lecturing to us on radicalization. He was preaching to us that Muslims were being killed in Somalia and that since all Muslims were one body, we, as Muslims, were getting hurt. So, he appealed to us at the mosque to go and assist our Muslim brothers in Somalia by fighting against soldiers. So this time, I told him to make arrangements for me to go to Somalia.

Personal judgment. The majority of the participants believed that accepting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism was due to personal judgment.

Figure 7 presents the hierarchy of codes that led to the development of this theme.




Figure 7. Node hierarchy for the theme “Personal judgment.”

Some of the incarcerated participants for terrorist attacks mentioned wanting to become a martyr, their personal interpretation of the Quran, curiosity, and harboring anger as some of the reasons for deciding to join the radical group. ER 39 shared that people fought and died for their religion. The participant believed in martyrdom. Although none of the members of the radical group promised martyrdom to the incarcerated participant, the participant chose to join the radical group and reasoned the following, “This war is in the Islamic readings that anybody who dies in this war becomes a martyr because he wants to die.”

ER 37 stated that he did not blame anyone for his actions and insisted that he decided to engage in attacks because of his curiosity. The participant stated the following, “I blame nobody. For me, I was just curious to see and know what it all meant to fight for a cause. So mine was curiosity.” However, ER 37 also stated that he decided to join the radical group because of anger. The participant shared the following:

However, I started feeling empty despite the fact that I was being paid well. I felt angry. My mother was also not happy, as she wanted me to work in Dubai because the pay there was better. For me, I wanted to work in Saudi Arabia

because it was near the Holy City of Mecca. So when I got there, I was very happy. It was a 40-minute drive from Mecca. So I stayed happily, but then the happiness dwindled; I cannot go to the mosque due to work. I was working as a waiter in a restaurant. Sometimes, I would be all alone and thus unable to leave work to go to the mosque for prayers. I got angry. This was the year 2010. Here was the holy city, and I was looking for redemption, yet I was unable to go for worship. So I decided I was going to leave for Somalia.

Participant AR 21, a university student shared that he consciously avoided associations with people who were a *bad influence*. The participant also reiterated being active in student organizations in the university. The participant shared the following:

For me, I am a born again Christian. The teachings we receive about associates make me choose my associates carefully so that I do not get into groups that will give me bad influence. It is also very difficult to influence or recruit people who are in leadership positions. That is why I always seek leadership positions in my university, and I like the one I recently held—the president of the students' union. So for me, I could think of nothing that would really attract me to Al-Shabaab.

Similar to the participants who were incarcerated, participant CR 32 also experienced a difficult past. However, the participant shared that he chose to stay away from radical groups and to obtain education and secure a job. CR 32 reported the following:

For me, the way I have been brought up by my parents and even as they divorced, I have gone through many hard times. For example, I worked casual jobs to raise

money to pay for my high school education in forms one and two. I have grown because of those hardships in life, and so I cannot change my mind and my principles and decide to join Al-Shabaab. But for many young people, they fall prey to Al-Shabaab's temptations because of hardships.

RQ3

This section answers the third research question. Two themes emerged to answer this question. The young Kenyan males interpreted policies as (a) targeted to give the youth something to do and (b) not managed well.

Targeted to give the youth something to do. The majority of the participants who were incarcerated mentioned being unfamiliar with youth and counterterrorist programs. However, some employed, unemployed, and student participants believed that the Kenyan government developed programs targeted toward the youth to empower them and occupy their time. Some participants mentioned being familiar with the Uwezo Fund, in which the government provided grants to fund projects initiated by Kenyan youth.

Figure 8 shows the nodes that helped develop this theme.




Figure 8. Node hierarchy for the theme "Targeted to give the youth something to do."

Participant BR 12 explained:

Uwezo Fund, there are groups that the government asks you to join of about 10 to 20 people, and then you're given the funds to do your project. You state your project, and you hand over your manifestos to them to be looked at.

AR 02 believed similarly and stated the following:

As I have said, the youth fund and national youth programs could assist young Kenyans to be empowered by acquiring skills for self-employment. Even Uwezo Fund could assist young Kenyans to become self-employed, and this could reduce the unemployment rate in our country.

AR 02 added that the government could provide counseling in schools and open more employment opportunities for the youth. AR 02 stated the following:

One thing that led many young Kenyans to join Al-Shabaab is the lack of employment. The government should try to reduce unemployment so that the youth could be busy and have no time to think of joining terror groups. Also, in schools, counseling programs should be introduced to sensitize the youth on the evils of joining terror groups. The other thing is about school dropouts. The government should ensure no school dropouts in high schools.

In addition, AR 21 stated that a small-scale project may also help prevent youth radicalization. AR 21 articulated the following:

For small-scale projects, they have worked well, particularly when the government manages to fund such projects. I have seen in my area that the youth are doing various projects, such as poultry, rabbit farming, fruit farming, and many others. The money is given to those who form groups of about 10, and then they are funded. But the government needs to do follow-ups to know if the money given was used for the intended purpose. So I think it has an impact on the youth.

Not managed well. While programs for the youth were available, the majority of the participants believed that these programs were not managed well. Some participants thought that the programs were ridden with corruption. Figure 9 shows the codes from which the theme was derived.




Figure 9. Node hierarchy for the theme “Not managed well.”

Regarding the Uwezo Fund, BR 12 stated the following:

Through the processes, you may find an official who will tell you, “This is not the right thing, or you haven't written the proposal/project as expected.” They want you to bribe them. When you go to the final stage, even though your proposal has qualified, they still want a share of the same funds. Maybe because as a part of his duties, he has worked on the disbursement of the funds you applied for, he feels like he is doing you a favor. So, he takes some small amount of money, and then you don't have the right funds for your project. Again, when you go back to your fellow youths, they have the same question: “We applied and qualified for this amount. Why is the disbursed amount different?”

Similarly, BR 15 claimed the following:

Then, another problem is corruption. There's a lot of corruption that occurs in it.

You know someone who knows someone for you to get at least some amount that is going to help you. Sometimes, you will make the application; the money will show as deposited into your account, but it will never reach your account. So, you have a KSh 100,000 loan. You will make an application for a loan; the money will be disbursed to your account, but it will never get to your account.

Some participants believed that the programs were not managed well and were contributing to the marginalization of the poor. ER 37 shared the following:

I participated in the programs—collecting garbage. They can assist the youth if they have enough funding. But there should be equality, so the youth do not feel marginalized because this makes the youth anti-government. The youth in the slums should be kept busy. Their education should also be stressed because it empowers them. The youth in the slums engage in inter-ethnic skirmishes and then demarcate the slums, giving their portions names of countries where there is terror, and others, they give names of terror groups, such as Kabul, Taliban, et cetera. You will also find that most of the youth who go to Somalia, for example, are criminals. They feel that they are excluded.

AR 3 had the following to say:

These policies and programs have been there and are meant to empower the youth. The primary objectives have not been achieved to a remarkable extent. This is because of a lack of awareness, ignorance, and the government it has not come up with clear modalities. For example, the government has policies like that

of the youth tendering, that a certain percentage is meant for the youth. How many youths know that? Has the government taken any initiative of going to the ground to announce this to the youth? Only those in the urban areas are benefiting from such, but those in the rural areas are not aware, like those in Garissa, Mandera, and other remote areas.

AR 3 continued”

In the NYS, people tendering shillings 600,000,000, surely, this is very unrealistic because they just look for me and use my name to tender, and the money is used by someone else. That is why I told you that they are arm twisting us. So you find that young people are feeling cheated. So I would like the government, like the minister for youth and gender, to go and meet young people on the ground and leave their boardrooms, to listen to the challenges encountered by the young people down there.

AR 5 shared:

All the policies and programs are good but corruption spoils the good. Corruption breeds insecurities. It is the backbone of insecurity in our country. When a country is safe and secure, terrorism cannot flourish but corruption is an underlying evil in our country so I would like to see the government fight it and eradicate it. The government is also not keen to fight embezzlement of funds meant for the youth. So let the government take the people to court and not release them on bond of two million when they have stolen billions from the

youth. The youth are very unhappy with this. Let the people be jailed and not just be released to continue spending the money they stole.

ER 19 shared and recommended:

I had a group after getting out from Somalia, I was trained by USAID and while I was in that group we ask for money but we didn't get, the ones who got are the ones highly connected. People from the slums do not get that money, so for that money to reach to the youth the Government should stop giving responsibility for the youth that comes from rich families and they should come to the slums and give us that responsibility for giving out that money in the slums.

Summary and Transition

This chapter was a presentation of the results of my study that was aimed at understanding, explaining, and describing the motivations of young Kenyan males for accepting radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The results were derived from a review of four terror cases perpetrated from 2011 to 2018, as well as from interviews with 34 young Kenyan males who are incarcerated, are university students, were employed, and some unemployed. Generally, the participants believed that homegrown terrorism was perpetrated in Kenya through the recruitment and training of young Kenyan males and then the planning of terror attacks. Young recruits were generally approached, recruited, and then radicalized. Kenyan youths were given money and travel arrangements to head to Somalia, where they were trained. Training involved drills in warfare and weaponry. Procuring fake documents and dodging the authorities were also a part of the training.

Perpetrating attacks involved planning. Identifying the location of the attack was a part of the strategy. The motive for the attacks was also identified as carrying out orders given to the recruits after they returned to Kenya from training in Somalia. Before leaving for Kenya, they would get orders to go to Kenya, hire safe houses where they lived and stored the weapons for terror attacks while waiting for further instructions. The further instructions included identifying sites to attack, and actually staging the attacks. Generally, the participants believed that young Kenyan males were motivated to accept radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism because of unemployment, idleness, and finances; deception and brainwashing; and personal decisions. The majority of the incarcerated participants shared having a difficult time securing jobs or being out of school. As a result, the participants were idle and experienced financial difficulties.

The other participants perceived that radical groups intentionally targeted idle youth from the slums, as promises for payment and a better life were enough motivation to recruit them. Most of the participants stated that Al Shabaab recruiters enticed young Kenyan males with huge amounts of money and luxurious lifestyles although some were never paid the promised money and were told that if anything happened to them in the course of their staging attacks, the money could be paid to their families. Some participants, however, believed that deceiving preachers and interpretations of religious teachings led to brainwashing. Kenyan youths who were led to believe that they needed to defend their Muslim brethren were motivated to join the terror groups. Nonetheless, some participants believed that personal judgment affected the decision of young Kenyan

males. Growing up in a difficult setting or believing in religious teachings did not necessarily lead to participation in terror groups' involvement.

In terms of policies and strategies in place for empowering young people in Kenya and preventing youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, the participants generally believed that the government had initiatives targeted toward empowering the youth and giving them something to occupy their time. The majority of the participants thought that the management of such programs needed improvement, as some youths were not aware of their existence or that the existing programs were not managed well. Some participants also believed that the programs were affected by corruption or that they excluded the poor.

The discussion of the findings will be presented in Chapter 5. This chapter will present how the findings are related to the existing literature and to Schneider's and Ingram's social construction of target populations' theory that illuminated this study. The recommendations, implications for social change, and conclusions will also be presented in the chapter.

Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations

Overview

The main purpose of this qualitative, explanatory, multicase study was to gain a deeper understanding of the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The other purpose was to understand and highlight how the young, Kenyan males have decoded and interpreted the current government policies and programs aimed at empowering them as well as those aimed at tackling radicalization and homegrown terrorism; how they came to learn about them; and how they feel about them. I used a qualitative methodology and a multiple case study design in this study and reviewed documents relating to four terrorism cases. I also conducted semistructured interviews face-to-face with 34 participants, all young Kenyan males, four of whom were incarcerated for the four terrorism cases selected for this study and whose documents were reviewed. Using triangulation in this study and a qualitative, multiple case study approach provided a richness of information, which, upon conducting content and thematic analyses with the help of computer software NVivo 12, revealed a number of commonalities and differences. By using this approach, the depth of understanding and information was maximized, while at the same time, researcher bias was eliminated.

In this chapter, I include a discussion of the interpretation of the major findings relative to the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and their interpretations of the government policies, programs, and strategies aimed at empowering them and addressing terrorism. The chapter also

includes a discussion of the meanings and importance of the findings reflecting in the literature in Chapter 2. I explain the implications for theory and outline the implications for positive social change, limitations of the study, recommendations to stakeholders and for future research, as well as my reflections as the researcher. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

The following were the research questions that I sought to answer:

RQ1: Based on the perspectives of young, Kenyan males, why and how is homegrown terrorism perpetrated in Kenya?

RQ2: What motivational factors do young, Kenyan males cite for consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

RQ3: How have young, Kenyan males interpreted and decoded the intentions of the government policies and strategies aimed at empowering them and addressing the problem of terrorism?

As reported in Chapter 4, these research questions were answered under seven themes emerging from the data: (a) being trained after recruitment; (b) planning attacks; (c) unemployment, idleness, and finances; (d) deception and brainwashing; (e) personal judgment; (f) targeted to give youth something to do; and (g) not well managed.

The findings of this study both confirm and refute assertions from the existing literature regarding the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism. First, the results of this study align with the literature regarding the radicalization and recruitment of young, Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism. The alignment is particularly acute in relation to the recruitment of young Kenyan males into

homegrown terrorism by al-Shabaab, their subsequent travel to Somalia for training, and their return to Kenya to stage terror attacks on identified targets, in line with the instructions they receive after traveling back to Kenya. The study findings dispute the conclusions of some of the existing literature in relation to the marginalization of some Muslim communities by the government of Kenya as being a cause of the radicalization and recruitment of young, Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism. I found that there are diverse dynamics of terrorism in so far as terrorist operations are concerned, including environmental, planning, recruitment, training, attack, and remaining relevant.

Previous research conclusions may no longer be valid. Previous scholars concluded that recruiters only targeted communities from the remote parts of Kenya and the Coastal region, which predominantly comprised Kenyan Somali ethnic groups and Swahili groups, all Muslims. This is no longer the case. I further found that young, Kenyan males from remote parts of Kenya were forcefully taken from their parents if they were unable to pay debts owed to neighbors. The males were then handed over to al-Shabaab, who paid money to the neighbors and disappeared with the young Kenyan males. Furthermore, when al-Shabaab recruiters approached the young, Kenyan males directly for recruitment, they threatened to kill their family members for refusal to cooperate. These sentiments are reflected in a participant's views:

After reaching a certain level, for example, you have gone to the third stage, which is training, and you indicate that you want to withdraw, they will tell you they will kill you plus your family. So you just have to go on to save yourself and your family. Then you have to agree when they tell you to go and place grenades

in certain places. Otherwise, they will kill you and your entire family. So to save family, you do it. (AR 11)

The findings bridge the knowledge gap identified in the literature review in Chapter 2 in terms of what motivates young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and how these young males have decoded and interpreted the intentions of the government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and tackling terrorism. The findings also add to the body of knowledge in the discipline of public policy and criminal justice, specifically relating to the motivations of young, Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

Interpretation of the Findings

Research Question 1

In this research question, I sought to understand from the study participants why and how, according to their perspectives, homegrown terrorism is carried out in Kenya. This question was answered through two themes emerging from the data: (a) being trained after recruitment and (b) planning attacks. The findings for RQ1 suggested that homegrown terrorism in Kenya is perpetrated by young, Kenyan males who are radicalized and recruited by al-Shabaab. Recruiters target young, Kenyan males who are not fully aware of the consequences of their actions due to poor education or poor family backgrounds. I found that university students are also targeted, thus corroborating the assertion by Ochieng (2015). The university students are targeted by al-Shabaab for recruitment because they are perceived to be able to engage peer pressure, thereby

making recruitment easier. Students are in need of money and lavish lifestyles, which al-Shabaab recruiters are ready to offer.

I found that after recruitment, the youth are facilitated to leave Kenya and proceed to Somalia for training, after which they are sent back to Kenya with orders to hire and occupy safe houses and await instructions. The recruits are sent back to Kenya, armed with firearms, ammunitions, explosive devices, and other material assets, including huge sums of money that would facilitate them to carry out the mission of staging attacks. The recruits receive instructions either directly or through al-Shabaab cells in Kenya. The instructions require the recruits to identify targets for staging attacks as well as to plan and actually carry out the attacks.

Botha (2014) and Lind et al. (2015) concluded that al-Shabaab were recruiting young, Kenyan males and that this took root due to social and political factors, such as the marginalization and lack of integration of Muslim communities; economic factors, such as high poverty and unemployment rates; religious factors such as Islamic extremism; poor counterterrorism strategies that label Muslims as terrorists and spur condemnation of them; and revenge because of the government's decision to send KDF troops to Somalia in October 2011. Some of the findings of this study aligned with some of these conclusions (i.e., the high rates of unemployment). However, I found that al-Shabaab recruiters do not stick to the same narratives; these narratives change with time. There were also conclusions by previous researchers that the government of Kenya and its agents were responsible for terrorism because of a failure to integrate communities from the remote areas of Kenya into government jobs, resulting in the marginalization of

these communities (Botha, 2014; Lind et al., 2015) and poor counterterrorism policies and strategies that labeled Muslim communities as terrorists. However, I found that al-Shabaab recruiters seek to infiltrate all communities for the purpose of youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. I found that there are Kenyans from across the divide are in training camps in Somalia, and a majority of the incarcerated participants for this study were not from marginalized communities in Kenya, with the exception of one. One of the incarcerated who did not hail from the remote parts of Kenya was the son of a female prison officer, and his father had been a high-ranking government officer who, although retired, was able to hire a lawyer for him. Furthermore, the other participants who shared that they had been approached or knew young, Kenyan males who had joined al-Shabaab at some point did not come from marginalized areas in Kenya. A participant's account below supports this assertion.

For me, I was not approached. But I have had an opportunity to share with someone who was recruited. Also from media, I have learnt so much about recruitment of youth into al-Shabaab. For example, a group of youth from Murang'a County (A county in Central Kenya), in the course of mid-last year. 2017), about three young men just disappeared. The families reported to the police that their young men went missing. After three months, they were not allowed to communicate to their parents that they were somewhere being recruited into al-Shabaab terror group. They were in Somalia. They were in a camp where they found many other young Kenyans, most of whom were Kikuyus (from the Central part of Kenya). One of them happened to escape and came back,

and the family was highly celebrating the return of their son. I don't know why Kikuyus are finding that business as lucrative. We used to think that only Kenyan Somalis were joining terrorism, but these days, all tribes are joining al-Shabaab. I don't know why they are accepting to be enticed into the terror group of al-Shabaab. (AR 10)

As explained in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, the most recent terror attack in Kenya, which occurred January 16, 2019, in a Nairobi upmarket hotel DusitD2—where 21 persons were killed and several others injured—aligns well with these findings. Boinnet, the then Inspector General of National Police Service Kenya, informed Kenyans that the mastermind of the attack—who was arrested after neighbors reported that he was the owner of the vehicle that drove the terrorists to the hotel—was a 23-year-old Kenyan male from the Central part of Kenya and the son of a KDF soldier. This soldier had been reported missing by his parents since 2015, after completing his high school education. He and his wife did not come from remote communities, but from the Western Province, and lived in rented accommodation in an estate near Nairobi, where neighbors talked of their expensive and secretive lifestyle (Kenya Police Service, 2019). The study findings in respect of three of the four cases studied align with this latest scenario. In Case Studies 1, 3, and 4, the young Kenyan males were radicalized and recruited, then sent to Somalia for training. After training, they were sent back to Kenya, armed with firearms, ammunition, and explosive devices and given money to hire safe houses and wait for further instructions. When they received instructions, they were ordered to identify places for staging terror attacks and would then stage these attacks.

The young Kenyan male in case study 1 shared that one of them indicated that he wanted a wife and that he was allowed to go out and look for one, which he did. Thereafter, they received instructions to stage terror attacks in various locations in Nairobi, but the plan failed and he was arrested with all the materials they had stored for staging the attack. The study findings therefore bring to the fore the ever-changing tactics of al-Shabaab terror groups in their efforts to remain relevant in their mission.

In all but one of the four cases, the research participants were approached for recruitment by preachers and/or neighbors in mosques. One of them was facilitated in his travel to Somalia by a Muslim preacher and two by Muslim recruiters. Only one of them learned through Islamic literature and decided to go on his own to Somalia, although he got a connection to fund his trip and to have him received and trained in Somalia. The study findings further suggest that youth in Kenya are faced with problems that require solutions (Callahan et al., 2012) in order for them to be protected from the maneuvers of al-Shabaab recruiters.

Research Question 2

This question sought to understand, from the participants, the motivational factors that contributed to them consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, even though they knew very well that they were going to commit terror against their own country and people. Three themes emerged from the data to answer this research question: (a) unemployment, idleness, and finances; (b) deception and brainwashing; and (c) personal judgment. The findings suggest that many factors account for youth motivations toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism,

including job promises, better lives for themselves and/or their families, and huge sums of money for those who agree to join al-Shabaab's ranks. As one participant shared, different motivational factions explain why young Kenyan males consent to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, "If you ask me, there are very many Kenyans in Somalia. Each one is there for different reasons, different from others" (ER 37).

The study findings also suggest that the majority of those who join Al-Shabaab are initially unaware that the promises are terrorism-related until they arrive in Somalia and find themselves in training camps, confronted with the reality but cannot return for fear of retaliation, including being killed by al-Shabaab. The young Kenyan males are duped by al-Shabaab recruiters into traveling and taking up jobs in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Middle East countries, but they are diverted to Somalia. One participant shared:

So people were lied to by the al-Shabaab that there is work and that, in Kenya, there are no jobs and that they're told jobs are found at Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Dubai. They're taken, and they do not even reach Saudi Arabia or Qatar, but they're taken to Somalia. So it means that all this is al-Shabaab in Kenya that there are no jobs, and if there is, they could have been given job opportunities and avoid being lied to, that they could be given jobs by the al-Shabaab. (ER 19)

The study findings further suggest that a few young Kenyan males are brainwashed by Muslim preachers with the narrative that Muslims are being fought in Somalia and that this is an affront to all Muslims in the world. They agree to join; believing that going to Somalia to fight for their Islamic religion is a road to martyrdom.

The findings of this study further unveiled that al-Shabaab pays huge sums of money to those who agree to join their ranks. This is reflected in the words of participant AR 5, a university student, and supported by AR 19 and ER 37, both incarcerated participants.

Personally, I know about January, a friend of mine who was with me in high school, who told me that they have tried to secure jobs but could not get jobs that paid enough for the sustenance of their families. He told me that he wanted to join al-Shabaab. My friend, a Luo, a very bright fellow, was a fourth-year university student. They said they wanted to be rich. They said they researched and found that al-Shabaab paid USD 500,000. So they also approached me to join, so we could be together. But I refused. Other youths also joined al-Shabaab because they are lured with money. Money is the main driver and attraction. You are given the money before you are sent on a mission so that you can enjoy it before you die. This money, we see it. Fellows are squandering the money in big clubs, they drink expensive drinks, and they generally lead luxurious lives, driving posh cars, dressing well, and then they disappear. Another point is peer pressure, whereby one is lured into terrorism because your friend is rich, driving, and living in a big mansion. So such friends try to lure us into terrorism, convincing us that life there is so luxurious. (AR 5)

There in Somalia, I used to be paid kes 200,000 per month. I was there for four years, so I had a lot of money because I was not sending money anywhere, so I got out with a lot of money, about kes 900,000, and I also left a lot of money there because I couldn't carry it with a bag. (ER 19)

After the training, our trainers did heavy shopping for us, and we were briefed that the first order was to travel back to Kenya and wait for further instructions. We were given email address that we could use for communication. We were also given money, \$10,000. The money was entrusted to me, and I was told I was the commander. I was further briefed that once we got back to Kenya, I was to rent and furnish a house for our use. (ER 37)

Awiti and Scott (2016) maintained that the majority of youth in Kenya (50%) believe that it does not matter how one makes money, provided that they do not end up in jail, while 41% admire those who make money through illicit means. This revelation, worrying as it is, substantiates the findings of this study, as some participants described “big money,” “running into millions,” “goodies,” “big cars with loud music to show off,” “expensive drinks, and “state-of-the-art cell phones” as some of the motivators for young Kenyan males’ engagement in radicalization and their recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

Still, there is the element of misleading Islamic teachings in mosques that brainwash the youth into blindly joining al-Shabaab, with the curiosity of what lies ahead of those mosque teachings motivating some youths into deciding to join to see for themselves. Overall, however, the study findings suggest that money and luxury play out significantly as the greatest motivational factors.

Research Question 3

This question sought to understand how the study participants decoded and interpreted the intentions of the government policies and programs aimed at empowering

them as well as those aimed at addressing youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Two themes emerged from the data in relation to this research question: (1) targeted to give youths something to do, and (2) not well managed.

Based on the findings, the majority of the participants perceived that the policies and programs aimed at empowering young people in Kenya were meant to engage them in meaningful business activities so that they could be gainfully occupied and not have time for antisocial activities. These findings substantiate those in the literature in as far as the goals of the youth policies were concerned.

The Kenyan government embarked on the formulation of policies and programs in the year 2003 when it established the National Youth Steering Committee. The committee formulated the National Youth Policy (2006) with the overall goal of promoting youth participation in democratic processes and community and civic affairs. Other policies and programs were devised to operationalize the goals of this policy: the YEDF, KYEP, KKV, and the Uwezo Fund. These policies and programs were developed with the youth of Kenya in mind. The aim was to empower and engage them in the socioeconomic activities of Kenya.

This scenario reinforces Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory of social construction of target populations, as the youth of Kenya fall under the category of dependents that are politically weak but positively constructed and deserving of benefits and protection. However, the study findings indicate that the funds meant for the youth programs were mostly looted by those charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the lives of the young people would be positively impacted by these funds. The findings

further suggest apathy on the part of the Kenyan courts in ensuring that culprits were always released with small amounts of cash bail, even though they had stolen millions of Kenyan shillings from the funds.

The findings further suggest that those who have the responsibility of managing these funds and programs have failed to educate the youth and the majority of the youth, particularly from the remote areas of Kenya, lack awareness of the policies and programs. The young people who actually know about the funds have difficulty accessing them due to corrupt fund management practices. I found that young Kenyan males lack awareness of the policies and strategies for dealing with terrorism. Those who join have no knowledge of the repercussions. This indicates that the youth empowerment intentions of the policies and programs in Kenya are out of sync with their implementation. This failure to solve the problems of young people further reinforces Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory of social construction of target populations, which postulates that public policies sometimes fail to solve social problems in society.

Implications for Social Construction of Target Populations Theory

The findings of the study were pivotal in understanding the motivations of young Kenyan males in consenting to radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism as well as in highlighting these males' interpretations of the government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and addressing the vice. In Chapter 2, I described the social construction of target populations theory developed by Schneider and Ingram (1993), which underpinned the study. This theory contends that social constructions influence the policy agenda and the selection of policy tools as well as the rationales that

legitimate policy choices. Constructions become embedded in policy as messages, which are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and participation. The theory suggests that there are four categories of target populations in society: advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants. The youth of Kenya fall under the category of dependents; they are politically weak but positively constructed and deserving of benefits and protection. The theory posits that public policies sometimes fail to achieve their intended purposes. Accordingly, public policy is considered strong when it solves problems efficiently and effectively, serves justice, supports government institutions, and encourages active citizenship. The theory spells out that public policymakers socially construct target populations in positive and negative terms.

The second purpose of the study was to understand and highlight how young Kenyan males have decoded and interpreted the intentions of government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and tackling radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. The study results, in comparison with the theory of the social construction of target populations, suggest that the Kenyan government's policies and programs were intended to benefit the youth. The policies and programs were aimed at youth engagement in contributing to nation building, in particular, keeping the youth away from the maneuvers of al-Shabaab recruiters and other anti-social activities. The findings suggest that the policies and programs existed in print only, not in terms of impact.

However, a majority of the participants perceived that the policies and programs were not well managed because only very few youth from urban areas were aware of

them. Furthermore, very few have benefitted from them. They felt that there was corruption surrounding the disbursement of the funds to the youth and expressed their frustrations, particularly in relation to the embezzlement by the very people charged with the responsibility of managing the funds to ensure that young people benefitted. Additionally, they took issue with the Kenyan courts for their leniency on those arrested and arraigned on offenses relating to misappropriation. One participant shared:

All the policies and programs are good, but corruption spoils the good. Corruption breeds insecurities. It is the backbone of insecurity in our country. When a country is safe and secure, terrorism cannot flourish, but corruption is an underlying evil in our country, so I would like to see the government fight it and eradicate it. The government is also not keen on fighting embezzlement of funds meant for the youth. So let the government take the people to court and not release them on bond of two million when they have stolen billions from the youth. The youth are very unhappy with this. Let the people be jailed and not just be released to continue spending the money they stole. (AR 5)

These study findings imply that the government's youth policies and programs have failed to achieve their intended purpose of solving public problems, thus providing empirical support for Schneider and Ingram's (1993) theory. These policies and programs cannot be considered strong. The contention is that public policy and policy designs are currently in crisis because of their failure to solve problems, thereby discouraging many target populations, a point reflected in the study findings. The assertion by Schneider and Ingram that public policy is considered strong when it solves problems efficiently and

effectively, serves justice, supports government institutions, and encourages active citizenship is not reflected in the findings.

Conversely, the study findings imply that youth in Kenya are faced with problems that require solutions so that they can be empowered and protected from the maneuvers of al-Shabaab recruiters (Callahan et al., 2012). Embezzlement of youth program funds by powerful individuals in the government and the lack of deterrent action by the judicial arm of the government explain the gap between the intentions of policies and programs aimed at empowering young people in Kenya and their implementation. One participant observed:

Another thing is that it is aimed at addressing areas of sports education, environment, and media. The way these are put in place was a good idea, only that there is no implementation. This year and last year, the National Youth Service scandals that we witnessed have affected youth empowerment negatively. I think some of these ministers and senior personnel in their offices... we saw that two times this year and last year that they stole the money meant for the youth programs, and now it became a difficult thing because youth empowerment was not there. For example, even like youth fund, we see it was put in place but no implementation. (AR 2)

Limitations of the Study

This study incorporated diverse data sources and was able to bring out very important information on the motivations of young Kenyan males toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. Very pertinent issues emerged from the study

on the participants' interpretations of the intentions of the government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and tackling terrorism. I recorded some limitations. First, due to time and resource constraints, the study sample was not very large. Second, while the methodology and design of the study were best suited, the study could nonetheless have benefitted from a mixed-methods research strategy because the phenomenon under study could have incorporated views from other respondents who could not be reached for face-to-face interviews. The study could have benefitted from larger and more varied datasets. Third, according to Creswell (1998), the answers given by research participants during face-to-face interviews may not offer hard facts. More credibility could have been achieved for this study by using a mixture of qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Additionally, a focus on policymakers and implementers could have achieved more credibility for this study in terms of additional perspectives on youth policies.

Recommendations for Action

My recommendations for action reflect the opinions and positions of most of my research participants. Because of the rigor applied to the study in terms of data triangulation and data analysis using the NVivo 12 software, my research bias has been minimized. The recommendations are derived from the perspectives of the research participants and the study findings, which have been interpreted for refinement. The study findings are useful for stakeholders involved in youth issues in Kenya and offer recommendations to assist in ameliorating the current worrying situation regarding the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism.

To the Government of Kenya

The problem of youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism is real in Kenya. It is the feeling of young Kenyan males that the government can protect them from the maneuvers of al-Shabaab recruiters.

Recommendation 1. This will be possible if the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism is made an academic subject that is taught in high schools. It should embody counseling sessions to create awareness and teach the youth how to build resilience.

Recommendation 2. The government should revive the policy of absorbing into the NYS all those who complete high school education. The NYS is a good starting point for young people because they obtain life and technical skills that can be used to engage in empowerment programs, thus properly utilizing the empowerment funds.

Recommendation 3. The government should also ensure the protection of parents from remote areas in Kenya, who stand to lose their sons to al-Shabaab once they fail to pay debts owed to their neighbors, who then snatch these sons and hand them over to al-Shabaab in exchange for money.

Recommendation 4. The participants observed that persons appointed to manage the youth funds are from wealthy families, who embark on pilfering the funds. They recommended that the youth from the informal settlements who have knowledge and skills should be given the opportunity to manage the youth funds because they know what is at stake with the youth and could, therefore, better manage the funds.

Recommendation 5. The findings suggest that al-Shabaab terrorists are unrelenting in their terrorism activities and that they operate dynamically to remain relevant in their cause. The government should amplify research efforts to proactively address al-Shabaab.

To the Judiciary

The study participants felt that there was impunity in the embezzlement of youth program funds because, since 2003, nobody has ever been successfully tried and convicted for crimes relating to the purloining of these funds. They lamented that those taken to court are released on small amounts of cash bail and thereafter enjoy the huge sums misappropriated from the youth funds. They felt that proper punishment could act as a deterrent.

Recommendation 1. The courts should ensure that all those involved in the embezzlement of youth funds since the year 2003 and are arraigned in courts to answer for the alleged crimes are not released on small amounts of cash bail because this allows them to go out and spend the money they stole from the youth funds. They should remain in custody until their cases are finalized.

Recommendation 2. The courts should try all suspects speedily so that others could be deterred. Currently, cases take years in the courts until Kenyans forget these cases and lose track of them.

To the Ministry of Youth Affairs

Young Kenyan males feel that this ministry, the custodian of youth policies and programs in Kenya, needs to be mindful of the country's future. The youth are the future

of the country, and the participants feel let down by this ministry. They made the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1. The youth should be included when the policies are being formulated. It should not be a boardroom matter in the major cities of Kenya. Rather, they would like to see ministry officials go down to the grassroots and engage the youth. When they convene meetings with the youth, ministry officials should not select who to attend. Rather, the meetings should be held at the ward level, and the youth in the ward should all attend and participate. This is in the spirit of making youth involvement mandatory for policy process (Sesan, 2014).

Recommendation 2. The ministry should ensure that the youth are properly sensitized about the youth policies and programs meant to benefit them. Ministry officials should leave boardrooms and meet and engage the youth at the grassroots. Billboards with messages about the youth policies and programs should be displayed, not only in big cities, but down to the ward level.

Recommendation 3. The ministry should ensure that the funds meant for empowering youth are prudently managed. At the moment, the money is simply being embezzled by ministerial employees, and youth are not accessing these funds. Corruption by ministry officials should be dealt with ruthlessly.

Recommendations for Future Research

I sought to bridge the knowledge gap identified in the literature in so far as young Kenyan males' motivation toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism is concerned as well as their interpretations of the government policies and

programs aimed at empowering them and tackling terrorism. While the study was constrained by resources, limited time availability for the study, particularly the time spent on the data collection, and the amount of data collected within the limited time frame, the study findings suggest that the study has narrowed the gap and added new knowledge in the field of criminal justice studies.

The findings also opened a door of opportunity for better research that is not simply academic in nature and that is well funded. This would incorporate more datasets, with a view to bridging the policy gaps identified in this study, particularly the gap between the intent of existing youth policies and programs and their implementation. The study findings imply that there is great involvement of young Kenyan females in radicalization and terrorist recruitment activities, and therefore, future research should embark on this area. The study findings suggest that the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism is a vice that al-Shabaab has perfected and that they continue to find ways to enable changes to their styles and strategies. It is important that researchers keep ahead of the recruiters and bring out implementable recommendations in order for the government to be proactive in dealing with this vice, with a view to protecting the youth of Kenya from al-Shabaab. There is also a need for future research to target policymakers and implementers to look into youth policy issues more broadly.

Implication for Positive Social Change

The study participants, considered the at-risk persons for radicalization and recruitment into terror groups, expressed themselves and observed that they are victims

of al-Shabaab recruiters. They believed that the Kenyan government should protect them. This study gave young Kenyan males an opportunity to express themselves. They disclosed that they have been dealing with feelings or problems that require solution that would deter them from indulging in radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism (Callahan et al., 2012). It is envisaged that when their sentiments are brought to the attention of the various stakeholders of youth issues in Kenya during the dissemination of the outcomes of this study, particularly the recommendations, the stakeholders will be forced to act. If their actions take the form of revising current youth policies and programs and looking at the recommendations for action emerging from the study, then positive social change should be realized. The youth will potentially become engaged in meaningful activities that will improve their personal development and economic status and empower them with skills and knowledge, thereby protecting them from al-Shabaab maneuvers. They could then concentrate on nation-building activities for their own good and for the good of all.

Reflections of the Researcher's Experience

As I commenced this study, I had my own assumptions of the problem of Kenyan youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. For example, due to the high volume of news highlights and public and political rhetoric in the country, I was of the view that Muslim youth were most at risk of this menace. I assumed that those involved in terrorism were youth from poor backgrounds and from remote areas in Kenya and that those involved were touting heroism.

As I went out and conducted the interviews, these assumptions were disrupted. As I listened to the answers to my questions, I noticed how concerned the young Kenyan males were with the problem of youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and how they wished something could be done to eliminate the vice and protect them. I also noted their desire to be fully involved in finding solutions.

Being a retired Kenyan senior police officer who had dealt with cases of terrorism while on the job, I assumed that it would be easy to tackle the study and that the security officers I was to deal with would give me all the assistance I required. However, as the fieldwork commenced, my status worked against me when the security officers whom I was counting on to supply me with documents relating to terrorism cases declined my request to serve as research participants. This was a great eye opener for the remainder of the research process. From then on, I proceeded with an open mind until I successfully completed the fieldwork.

Conclusion

The findings of this study both confirm and disrupt assertions by other scholars and researchers regarding the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism. First, the results align well with the literature regarding the radicalization and recruitment of young Kenyan males into homegrown terrorism. The menace is real. Previous researchers on youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism, in particular, and terrorism, in general, have addressed social, political, religious, and economic factors as well as bad counterterrorism strategies as contributors to the problem. The literature review in Chapter 2 listed the terrorism

narratives espoused by previous researchers, including in relation to poverty, high youth unemployment rates, marginalization, corrupt and inefficient security officers, porous borders and the influx of refugees, Islamic extremism, revenge, labeling, and the GWOT.

In all but one of the four cases studied, the research participants were approached for recruitment by preachers, neighbors, and/or in mosques. One of them was facilitated in his travel to Somalia by a Muslim preacher and two by Muslim recruiters. Only one of them was radicalized through Islamic literature and decided to go to Somalia on his own, although he received a connection to fund his trip as well as to have him received and trained in Somalia. Upon their return to Kenya from their training session in Somalia, three of them managed to stage terror attacks, as instructed, and the fourth was arrested before he and other colleagues staged their planned terror attack. Finally, all these young Kenyan males were arrested by the security agencies in Kenya and arraigned in the courts, where they were all found guilty of terror charges. Two of them pleaded guilty to the charges, while the other two pleaded not guilty but were found guilty after the cases were heard.

The study findings suggest that al-Shabaab militants are relentless in their quest to remain relevant in the terrorism field and continue to change tactics in the areas of recruitment and strategy. They are currently exploiting young Kenyan males by enticing them with huge sums of money and luxurious lifestyles as a means to motivate them to join their ranks and to lure their peers into the vice. They have also enlarged their recruitment scope and no longer concentrate on the remote Muslim-dominated areas of Kenya and are now recruiting in the non-suspect communities of other regions in Kenya.

In terms of the young Kenyan males' interpretation of the intentions of the government policies and programs aimed at empowering them and tackling the vice, the study findings suggest that the embezzlement of youth program funds and the corruption shrouding the disbursement of money under these funds are critical in creating a gap between the intent and implementation of youth policies in Kenya. The youth in Kenya are dealing with feelings or problems that require solutions (Callahan et al., 2012) so that they can be protected from indulging in radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

Finally, the study findings add new knowledge to the existing body of knowledge in the area of young Kenyan males' motivation toward radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. New knowledge to the existing body of knowledge has also been added to the major gap in relation to the intentions and implementation of government policies and programs aimed at empowering young people.

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Appendix A: Requests for Accessing Sites and Participants

DateXXXXXXXXXX

Dear Sir,

REQUEST TO ACCESS INCARCERATED YOUTHS CONVICTED ON TERRORISM CHARGES AND OFFICIAL ARCHIVED DATA ALREADY IN PUBLIC DOMAIN ON THE SAME YOUTHS SINCE THE YEAR 2011

I would like to place my humble request to access and interview incarcerated youths convicted on terrorism charges and also official archived data that are also in public domain in respect of the same youths since the year 2011.

I am a retired police officer and currently studying for my PhD in Public Policy and Administration with a concentration in Criminal Justice. My school is Walden University in the United States of America. My research title is: "The Challenges of Combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A Youth Radicalization Perspective."

I have attached my dissertation prospectus that stipulates the purpose of my research and how it will contribute to social change in Kenya after the youth in Kenya who are the target population for my research are given an opportunity to express their feelings, perceptions, and experiences on this phenomena (radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism) during interviews.

It is also anticipated that the research findings will assist policymakers to come up with policies that would address the issues that will be expressed by the youth who will be interviewed during the course of my research.

Yours Sincerely,

XXXXXXXXXX

APPROVAL LETTER TO ACCESS INCARCERATION FACILITIES FOR
RESEARCH

(Original letter redacted)

LETTER OF AUTHORIZATION TO ACCESS INCARCERATION FACILITIES FOR
RESEARCH (Original redacted)

Dear Sir,

**REQUEST TO ACCESS OFFICIAL ARCHIVED DATA ALREADY IN PUBLIC DOMAIN ON
YOUTH RADICALIZATION AND RECRUITMENT TO HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN
KENYA SINCE THE YEAR 2011 AND SECURITY OFFICERS WHO INVESTIGATED THE
CASES**

I would like to place my humble request to access official archived data that are also in public domain in respect of youth radicalization and recruitment to homegrown terrorism in Kenya since the year 2011 and the security officers who investigated the cases: for the purpose of academic research.

I am a retired police officer and currently studying for my PhD in Public Policy and Administration with a concentration in Criminal Justice. My school is Walden University in the United States of America. My research topic is: "The Challenges of combating homegrown Terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A Youth Radicalization Perspective."

I have attached my dissertation prospectus that stipulates the purpose of my research and how it will contribute to social change in Kenya after the youth in Kenya who are the target population for my research are given an opportunity to express their feelings, perceptions, and experiences on this phenomena (radicalization and recruitment to homegrown terrorism) during interviews.

It is also anticipated that the research findings will assist policymakers to come up with policies that would address the issues that will be expressed by the youth who will be interviewed during the course of my research.

Yours Sincerely,

XXXXXXXXXX

AUTHORIZATION LETTER TO ACCESS ARCHIVED MATERIALS IN
PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR RESEARCH (Original redacted)

DateXXXXXXXXXXXX

The Vice Chancellor
XXXXXX University
XXXXXX
Dear Sir or Madam,

REQUEST TO ACCESS AND INTERVIEW STUDENTS

I would like to place my humble request to access and interview students of Mount Kenya University for the purpose of academic research.

I am currently studying for my PhD in Public Policy and Administration with a concentration in Criminal Justice. My school is Walden University in the United States of America. My research topic is: "The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A Youth Radicalization Perspective."

I have attached my dissertation prospectus that stipulates the purpose of my research and how it will contribute to social change in Kenya after the youth in Kenya who are the target population for my research are given an opportunity to express their feelings, perceptions, and experiences on this phenomenon (radicalization and recruitment to homegrown terrorism) during interviews.

It is also anticipated that the research findings will assist policymakers to come up with policies that would address the issues that will be expressed by the youth who will be interviewed in the course of my research.

Yours Sincerely,
XXXXXXXXXX

AUTHORIZATION REPLY FROM UNIVERSITY

(Original letter redacted)

Date.....

Announcement to students

Research on youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism

To all students:

You are hereby notified that there is a researcher in the campus wishing to talk to young males aged between 18-35 years to participate in a research study on youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.

If you are interested in this research study, please visit the researcher in the office of the Dean of Students between (Date) and..... (Date)

Signed.....

Dean of Students

XXXX University

XXXX

Athorization to access office for reserch interviews (original redacted)

IRB APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DATA COLLECTION

Dear Ms. Wamuyu,

This email is to notify you that the Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved your application for the study entitled, "The Challenges of Combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A Youth radicalization Perspective."

Your approval # is 05-24-18-0293147. You will need to reference this number in your dissertation and in any future funding or publication submissions. Also attached to this e-mail are the IRB approved consent forms. Please note, if these are already in an on-line format, you will need to update those consent documents to include the IRB approval number and expiration date.

Your IRB approval expires on May 23, 2019. One month before this expiration date, you will be sent a Continuing Review Form, which must be submitted if you wish to collect data beyond the approval expiration date.

Your IRB approval is contingent upon your adherence to the exact procedures described in the final version of the IRB application document that has been submitted as of this date. This includes maintaining your current status with the university. Your IRB approval is only valid while you are an actively enrolled student at Walden University. If you need to take a leave of absence or are otherwise unable to remain actively enrolled, your IRB approval is suspended. Absolutely NO participant recruitment or data collection may occur while a student is not actively enrolled.

If you need to make any changes to your research staff or procedures, you must obtain IRB approval by submitting the IRB Request for Change in Procedures Form. You will receive confirmation with a status update of the request within 1 week of submitting the change request form and are not permitted to implement changes prior to receiving approval. Please note that Walden University does not accept responsibility or liability for research activities conducted without the IRB's approval, and the University will not accept or grant credit for student work that fails to comply with the policies and procedures related to ethical standards in research.

When you submitted your IRB application, you made a commitment to communicate both discrete adverse events and general problems to the IRB within 1 week of their occurrence/realization. Failure to do so may result in invalidation of data, loss of academic credit, and/or loss of legal protections otherwise available to the researcher.

Both the Adverse Event Reporting form and Request for Change in Procedures form can be obtained at the IRB section of the Walden website:

<http://academicguides.waldenu.edu/researchcenter/orec>

Researchers are expected to keep detailed records of their research activities (i.e., participant log sheets, completed consent forms, etc.) for the same period of time they retain the original data. If, in the future, you require copies of the originally submitted IRB materials, you may request them from Institutional Review Board.

Both students and faculty are invited to provide feedback on this IRB experience at the link below:

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=qHBJzkJMUx43pZegKlmdiQ_3d_3d

Congratulations!

RESEARCH PERMIT COUNCIL FOR HIGHER EDUCATION



**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,
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Fax: +254-20-318245,318249
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website : www.nacosti.go.ke
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete
Off Waiyaki Way
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/18/89169/23687**

Date: **12th July, 2018**

Alice Mary Wamuyu Kariuki
Walden University
USA

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“The challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A youth radicalization perspective”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Kiambu, Mombasa, Nairobi and Nakuru Counties** for the period ending **11th July, 2019.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education of the selected Counties** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit a **copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

DR. STEPHEN K. KIBIRU, PhD.
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The County Commissioners
Selected Counties.

The County Directors of Education
Selected Counties.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MS. ALICE MARY WAMUYU KARIUKU
 of **WALDEN UNIVERSITY USA 0-100**
Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct
research in Kiambu, Mombasa
Nairobi, Nakuru Counties
 on the topic: **THE CHALLENGES OF**
COMBATING HOMEGROWN TERRORISM
IN KENYA SINCE 2011: A YOUTH
RADICALIZATION PERSPECTIVE
 for the period ending:
11th July, 2019

Permit No : **NACOSTI/P/18/89169/23687**
 Date Of Issue : **12th July, 2018**
 Fee Received : **Ksh'2000**



[Handwritten Signature]
Applicant's Signature

[Handwritten Signature]
Director General
National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation

CONDITIONS

1. The License is valid for the proposed research, research site specified period.
2. Both the Licence and any rights thereunder are non-transferable.
3. Upon request of the Commission, the Licensee shall submit a progress report.
4. The Licensee shall report to the County Director of Education and County Governor in the area of research before commencement of the research.
5. Excavation, filming and collection of specimens are subject to further permissions from relevant Government agencies.
6. This Licence does not give authority to transfer research materials.
7. The Licensee shall submit two (2) hard copies and upload a soft copy of their final report.
8. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of this Licence including its cancellation without prior notice.



REPUBLIC OF KENYA



National Commission for Science,
Technology and Innovation

RESEARCH CLEARANCE
PERMIT

Serial No.A 19360

CONDITIONS: see back page

Appendix B: Letters of Invitation to Participate in the Study

Letter of Invitation to participate in the study (Incarcerated young males)

I am respectfully inviting you to take part in a research study titled: “The challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya: A Youth radicalization perspective.” My name is Alice Wamuyu, a researcher and doctoral student in Public Policy and Administration at Walden University in the United States of America.

The purpose of the study is to investigate what attracts young Kenyan males to accept radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism and attack their fellow Kenyans. The other purpose is to understand if the young Kenyan males know about the youth policies and programs put in place by the government of Kenya for their empowerment, and how they feel about them. Additionally, the study intends to find out if young Kenyan males know about the counterterrorism policies and strategies in place to deal with terrorism and how they feel about them.

This researcher will collect data by interviewing Kenyan males aged between 18-35 years, and who are incarcerated for terrorism offenses. The interviews will take one hour and with your permission, will be audio-recorded and this researcher will also take notes. It is hoped that findings of the research study will result in recommendations that will enable stakeholders to come up with purposed youth programs and help reform counterterrorism policies for the benefit of the people of Kenya.

I will pay you another visit after 2 days so you can let me know of your decision as to whether you will participate.

If you agree to participate, you will be engaged in a face-to-face interview for approximately one hour. I will buy and bring to you a lunch menu of your choice as a gesture of appreciation for your participation.

Letter of Invitation to participate in the study (Employed young males)

I am respectfully inviting you to take part in a research study titled: “The challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya: A Youth radicalization perspective.” My name is Alice Wamuyu, a researcher and doctoral student in Public Policy and Administration at Walden University in the United States of America.

The purpose of the study is to investigate what attracts young Kenyan males to accept to be radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism and attack their fellow Kenyans. The other purpose is to understand if the young Kenyan males know about the youth policies and programs put in place by the government of Kenya for their empowerment, and how they feel about them. Additionally, the study intends to find out if young Kenyan males know about the counterterrorism policies and strategies in place to deal with terrorism and how they feel about them.

This researcher will collect data by interviewing Kenyan males aged between 18-35 years. The interviews will take one hour and with your permission, will be recorded and this researcher will also take notes. It is hoped that findings of the research study will result in recommendations that will enable stakeholders to come up with purposed youth programs and help reform counterterrorism policies for the benefit of the people of Kenya. Those are the implications for social change that this study is intended to bring about.

If you are willing to participate, please contact me on telephone number 070 117 8086 within 2 days so that we can agree on a suitable date time, and place to meet so we can proceed. Further, if you agree to participate, you will be engaged in a face-to-face interview for approximately one hour. As a token of appreciation for your participation, I will give to you a Nakumatt Store gift voucher of kes 1000/-

Letter of Invitation to participate in the study (Unemployed young males)

I am respectfully inviting you to take part in a research study titled: “The challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya: A Youth radicalization perspective.” My name is Alice Wamuyu, a researcher and doctoral student in Public Policy and Administration at Walden University in the United States of America.

The purpose of the study is to investigate what attracts young Kenyan males to accept being radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism and attack their fellow Kenyans. The other purpose is to understand if the young Kenyan males know about the youth policies and programs put in place by the government of Kenya for their empowerment, and how they feel about them. Additionally, the study intends to find out if young Kenyan males know about the counterterrorism policies and strategies in place to deal with terrorism and how they feel about them.

This researcher will collect data by interviewing Kenyan males aged between 18-35 years. The interviews will take one hour and with your permission, will be recorded and this researcher will also take notes. It is hoped that findings of the research study will result in recommendations that will enable stakeholders to come up with purposed youth programs and help reform counterterrorism policies for the benefit of the people of Kenya. Those are the implications for social change that this study is intended to bring about.

If you are willing to participate, please contact me on telephone number 070 117 8086 within 2 days so that we can agree on a suitable date time, and place to meet so we can proceed. Further, if you agree to participate, you will be engaged in a face-to-face interview for approximately one hour. As a token of appreciation for your participation, I will give to you a Nakumatt Store gift voucher of Ksh. 1000/- .

Letter of Invitation to participate in the study (University-going young males)

I am respectfully inviting you to take part in a research study titled: “The challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya: A Youth radicalization perspective.” My name is Alice Wamuyu, a researcher and doctoral student in Public Policy and Administration at Walden University in the United States of America.

The purpose of the study is to investigate what attracts young Kenyan males to accept to be radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism to attack their fellow Kenyans. The other purpose is to understand if the young Kenyan males know about the youth policies and programs put in place by the government of Kenya for their empowerment, and how they feel about them. Additionally, the study intends to find out if young Kenyan males know about the counterterrorism policies and strategies in place to deal with terrorism and how they feel about them.

This researcher will collect data by interviewing Kenyan males aged between 18-35 years. The interviews will take one hour and with your permission, will be recorded and this researcher will also take notes. It is hoped that findings of the research study will result in recommendations that will enable stakeholders to come up with purposed youth programs and help reform counterterrorism policies for the benefit of the people of Kenya. Those are the implications for social change that this study is intended to bring about.

If you are willing to participate, please contact me on telephone number 070 117 8086 within 2 days so that we can agree on a suitable date time, and place to meet so we can proceed. Further, if you agree to participate, you will be engaged in a face-to-face interview for approximately one hour. As a token of appreciation for your time and participation, I will give to you a Nakumatt Store gift voucher of Ksh. 1000/-

Letter of Invitation to participate in the study (Security Officers)

I am respectfully inviting you to take part in a research study titled: “The challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya: A Youth radicalization perspective.” My name is Alice Wamuyu, a researcher and doctoral student in Public Policy and Administration at Walden University in the United States of America.

The purpose of the study is to investigate what attracts young Kenyan males to accept to be radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism to attack their fellow Kenyans. The other purpose is to understand if the young Kenyan males know about the youth policies and programs put in place by the government of Kenya for their empowerment, and how they feel about them. Additionally, the study intends to find out if young Kenyan males know about the counterterrorism policies and strategies in place to deal with terrorism and how they feel about them.

This researcher will collect data by interviewing Kenyan males aged between 18-35 years. Security officers who investigated the terrorism cases sampled for this study will also be interviewed so that this researcher can be able to develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem under investigation. The interviews will take one hour and with your permission, will be recorded and this researcher will also take notes. It is hoped that findings of the research study will result in recommendations that will enable stakeholders to come up with purposed youth programs and help reform counterterrorism policies for the benefit of the people of Kenya. Those are the implications for social change that this study is intended to bring about.

If you are willing to participate, please contact me on telephone number 070 117 8086 within 2 days so that we can agree on a suitable date time, and place to meet so we can proceed. Further, if you agree to participate, you will be engaged in a face-to-face interview for approximately one hour. As a token of appreciation for your participation, I will give to you a Nakumatt Store gift voucher of kes 1000/-

Appendix C: Interview Protocol for Interviewees

Research Proposal: The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since

2011: A Youth Radicalization Perspective

Date of Interview: _____ Start time: _____ End time: _____

Interviewer: _____

Location: _____

Interviewee: _____

Interviewer will briefly explain the research study being conducted and also:-

- Explain why you were selected to participate in the study
- Duration of the interview
- Inform of the wish to audio-record and take notes of the interview proceedings
- Affirm confidentiality

Discussion:

I would like to thank you most sincerely for your time and participation in this study. It will take approximately one hour. I want to assure you that I will treat with strict confidence everything you tell me in this interview. I will not use your name in all the areas of my writing for this study. Instead I will use a code number to identify you. With your permission, I am going to audio-record the interview proceedings and take notes at the same time. I will thereafter type the recordings and bring back to you to read and make any corrections; then confirm the information.

I will store the data I am collecting in a secure and safe place where no one else except me will have access. After the research study, I will further store the data securely for 5 years and then destroy. Do you have any questions?

- Please tell me about yourself

- How were you radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism? Please explain to me the process that you went through.
- What is that one thing you can remember that influenced your decision to agree to be radicalized and recruited? What attracted you?
- Please explain to me your experience from the time you were recruited until now.
- What qualifications do the recruiters look for in their potential recruits?
- Please explain to me if you could resume the terrorism activities after you serve your prison term.
- Please explain to me if you blame anybody for your involvement in radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism.
- Please explain to me what you know about the youth policies and programs that the Kenyan government has put in place to empower youth and if you have ever participated in any of them. Please explain to me how you learnt about them.
- How would you say the policies and programs have assisted the youth of Kenya to be empowered?
- Please explain to me what you as an individual would like to see included in the youth policies and programs.
- What do you know about counterterrorism policies and strategies that are in place for dealing with terrorism and what are your feelings about them? Please explain to me how you learnt about them
- Please explain to me if you think they are assisting to deter youths from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. What improvements, if any, would you suggest be done on them?
- What would you suggest that the government could do to help young Kenyan males keep off from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

Interview Protocol (Employed young males)

Research Proposal: The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A

Youth Radicalization Perspective

Date of Interview: _____ Start time: _____ End time: _____

Interviewer: _____

Location: _____

Interviewee: _____

Interviewer will briefly explain the research study being conducted and also:-

- Explain why you were selected to participate in the study
- Duration of the interview
- Inform of the wish to audio-record and take notes of the interview proceedings
- Affirm confidentiality

Discussion:

I would like to thank you most sincerely for your time and participation in this study. It will take approximately one hour. I want to assure you that I will treat with strict confidence everything you tell me in this interview. I will not use your name in all the areas of my writing for this study. Instead I will use a code number to identify you. With your permission, I am going to record the interview proceedings and take notes at the same time. I will thereafter type the recordings and bring back to you to read and make any corrections; then confirm the information.

I will store the data I am collecting in a secure and safe place where no one else except me will have access. After the research study, I will further store the data securely for five years and then destroy. Do you have any questions?

- Please tell me about yourself
- What do you know about youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism in Kenya?
- Please explain to me if you, or any youth you know has been approached by recruiters? What happened?
- How would you respond to a request by recruiters for radicalization and recruitment if they ever approached you?
- Please explain to me how your status (employed) could impact on your response to the recruiters if ever they approached you?
- What is that one thing that you can say might influence your decision as an individual to agree to be radicalized and recruited? What could attract you?
- Please explain to me what you know about the youth programs and policies that the Kenyan government has put in place to empower youth and if you have ever participated in any of them. Please explain to me how you learnt about them
- How would you say the policies and programs have assisted the youth of Kenya to be empowered?
- Please explain to me what you as an individual would like to see included in the youth policies and programs.
- What do you know about counterterrorism policies and strategies that are in place for dealing with terrorism, and what do you feel about them? Please explain to me how you learnt about them
- Please explain to me if you think they are assisting to deter youths from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. What improvements, if any, would you suggest be done on them?
- What would you suggest that the government could do to help young Kenyan males keep off from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

Interview Protocol (Unemployed young males)

Research Proposal: The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A

Youth Radicalization Perspective

Date of Interview: _____ Start time: _____ End time: _____

Interviewer: _____

Location: _____

Interviewee: _____

Interviewer will briefly explain the research study being conducted and also:-

- Explain why you were selected to participate in the study
- Duration of the interview
- Inform of the wish to audio-record and take notes of the interview proceedings
- Affirm confidentiality

Discussion:

I would like to thank you most sincerely for your time and participation in this study. It will take approximately one hour. I want to assure you that I will treat with strict confidence everything you tell me in this interview. I will not use your name in all the areas of my writing for this study. Instead I will use a code number to identify you. With your permission, I am going to record the interview proceedings and take notes at the same time. I will thereafter type the recordings and bring back to you to read and make any corrections; then confirm the information.

I will store the data I am collecting in a secure and safe place where no one else except me will have access. After the research study, I will further store the data securely for five years and then destroy. Do you have any questions?

- Please tell me about yourself

- What do you know about youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism in Kenya?
- Please explain to me if you, or any youth you know has been approached by recruiters? What happened?
- How would you respond to a request by recruiters for radicalization and recruitment if they ever approached you?
- Please explain to me how your status (unemployed) could impact on your response to the recruiters if ever they approached you?
- What is that one thing that you can say might influence your decision as an individual to agree to be radicalized and recruited? What would attract you?
- Please explain to me what you know about the youth programs and policies that the Kenyan government has put in place to empower youth and if you have ever participated in any of them. What are your feelings about them? Please explain to me how you learnt about them.
- How would you say the policies and programs have assisted the youth of Kenya to be empowered?
- Please explain to me what you as an individual would like to see included in the youth policies and programs.
- What do you know about counterterrorism policies and strategies that are in place in Kenya for dealing with terrorism and what do you feel about them? Please explain to me how you learnt about them.
- Please explain to me if you think they are assisting to deter youths from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. What improvements, if any, would you suggest be done on them?
- What would you suggest that the government could do to help young Kenyan males keep off from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

Interview Protocol (University-going young males)

Research Proposal: The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A

Youth Radicalization Perspective

Date of Interview: _____ Start time: _____ End time: _____

Interviewer: _____

Location: _____

Interviewee: _____

Interviewer will briefly explain the research study being conducted and also:-

- Explain why you were selected to participate in the study
- Duration of the interview
- Inform of the wish to audio-record and take notes of the interview proceedings
- Affirm confidentiality

Discussion:

I would like to thank you most sincerely for your time and participation in this study. It will take approximately one hour. I want to assure you that I will treat with strict confidence everything you tell me in this interview. I will not use your name in all the areas of my writing for this study. Instead I will use a code number to identify you. With your permission, I am going to record the interview proceedings and take notes at the same time. I will thereafter type the recordings and bring back to you to read and make any corrections; then confirm the information.

I will store the data I am collecting in a secure and safe place where no one else except me will have access. After the research study, I will further store the data securely for five years and then destroy. Do you have any questions?

- Please tell me about yourself
- What do you know about youth radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism in Kenya?
- Please explain to me if you, or any youth you know has been approached by recruiters? What happened?
- How would you respond to a request by recruiters for radicalization and recruitment if they ever approached you?
- Please explain to me how your status (university student) could impact on your response to the recruiters if ever they approached you?
- What is that one thing that you can say might influence your decision as an individual to agree to be radicalized and recruited? What would attract you?
- Please explain to me what you know about the youth programs and policies that the Kenyan government has put in place to empower youth and if you have ever participated in any of them. What are your feelings about them? Please explain to me how you learnt about them.
- How would you say the policies and programs have assisted the youth of Kenya to be empowered?
- Please explain to me what you as an individual would like to see included in the youth policies and programs.
- What do you know about counterterrorism policies and strategies that are in place in Kenya for dealing with terrorism? Please explain to me how you learnt about them. What are your feelings about them?
- Please explain to me if you think they are assisting to deter youth from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. What improvements, if any, would you suggest be done on them?
- What would you suggest that the government could do to help young Kenyan males keep off from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

Interview Protocol (Security Officers)

Research Proposal: The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A Youth Radicalization Perspective

Date of Interview: _____ Start time: _____ End time: _____

Interviewer: _____

Location: _____

Interviewee: _____

Interviewer will briefly explain the research study being conducted and also:-

- Explain why you were selected to participate in the study
- Duration of the interview
- Inform of the wish to audio-record and take notes of the interview proceedings
- Affirm confidentiality

Discussion:

I would like to thank you most sincerely for your time and participation in this study. It will take approximately one hour. I want to assure you that I will treat with strict confidence everything you tell me in this interview. I will not use your name in all the areas of my writing for this study. Instead I will use a code number to identify you. With your permission, I am going to record the interview proceedings and take notes at the same time. I will thereafter type the recordings and bring back to you to read and make any corrections; then confirm the information.

I will store the data I am collecting in a secure and safe place where no one else except me will have access. After the research study, I will further store the data securely for five years and then destroy. Do you have any questions?

- Please tell me about yourself
- Please explain to me your experience during your encounter with young Kenyan males facing charges of terrorism?

- What kind of feelings do they express when they talk to you?
- What do they say attracted them to be radicalized and recruited into homegrown terrorism?
- Please explain to me if they express blame on anybody for their involvement.
- Please explain to me what you feel about the youth programs and policies that the Kenyan government has put in place to empower youth.
- How would you say the policies and programs have assisted the youth of Kenya to be empowered?
- Please explain to me if you think the current counterterrorism policies and strategies that are in place in Kenya for dealing with terrorism are assisting to deter youth from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism. What improvements, if any, would you suggest be done on them?
- What would you suggest that the government could do to help young Kenyan males keep off from radicalization and recruitment into homegrown terrorism?

Appendix D: Confidentiality Agreement between Research Assistant


CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENTName of Signer: JERINTA WAMBUI 33402714.

During the course of my assisting activity in this research: **“The Challenges of combating homegrown terrorism in Kenya since 2011: A youth radicalization perspective”** I will have access to information, which is confidential and should not be disclosed. I acknowledge that the information must remain confidential, and that improper disclosure of confidential information can be damaging to the participant.

By signing this Confidentiality Agreement I acknowledge and agree that:

1. I will not disclose or discuss any confidential information with others, including friends or family.
2. I will not in any way divulge, copy, release, sell, loan, alter or destroy any confidential information except as properly authorized.
3. I will not discuss confidential information where others can overhear the conversation. I understand that it is not acceptable to discuss confidential information even if the participant's name is not used.
4. I will not make any unauthorized transmissions, inquiries, modification or purging of confidential information.
5. I agree that my obligations under this agreement will continue after termination of the job that I will perform.
6. I understand that violation of this agreement will have legal implications.
7. I will only access or use systems or devices I'm officially authorized to access and I will not demonstrate the operation or function of systems or devices to unauthorized individuals.

Signing this document, I acknowledge that I have read the agreement and I agree to comply with all the terms and conditions stated above.

Signature: 

Date: 01/11/2018