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Logic and Emotion, Persuasion and Argumentation: “Good Reasons” as an Educational Synthesis

Warren Sandmann

The words of 17th century philosopher John Locke provide an appropriate starting point for a discussion on the art of persuasion:

If we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness; all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment . . . and therefore, however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided . . . (Simons, 99).

The art of persuasion neither demands nor receives favorable attention from the general public today (Simons, 101). It receives little better, at times, from those scholars who study rhetoric (Simons, 114). Persuasion is usually associated with purely pejorative terms: propaganda, indoctrination and brainwashing. The practice of persuasion is in the hands of Madison Avenue and used car dealers. Persuasion is what people use when the “truth” is unavailable or contrary to their position (Simons, 1986). Opposed to persuasion, in this admittedly simple dialectic, is argumentation. Persuasion is emotional; argumentation is logical. Persuasion appeals to the base motives of people; argumentation appeals to reason. While this is a simple breakdown of two complex acts, it is

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also the manner in which persuasion and argumentation are generally viewed by the public, and is also too often the manner in which these communicative approaches are taught. This is also a misguided and inappropriate dichotomy. It is my contention that, for discourse aimed at securing conviction, there is no useful distinction between argumentation and persuasion. Discourse which aims at influencing the actions or attitudes of others is and should be considered argumentation and persuasion. To distinguish between persuasion and argumentation as differing approaches to influencing actions and/or attitudes is to continue to divide emotional appeals from logical proofs.

The purpose of this essay is three-fold. First, I will summarize the history and development of persuasion and rhetoric in the classical and renaissance world, demonstrating the manner in which argumentation, or conviction by means of logical proof, and persuasion, or conviction by means of a unified appeal to emotions and reasons became separated. Second, I will look at the manner in which persuasion and argumentation are presented educationally today by analyzing four of the most popular public speaking texts. Finally, I will argue that there is a more effective method for teaching the combined principles of argumentation and persuasion, as can be seen in the works of Karl Wallace, Walter Fisher and Douglas Hesse, and as seen in the argumentation texts of Barbara Warnick and Edward Inch and also Josina Makau.

There are three additional objectives for this research. First, to convince instructors of the introductory communication course and authors of texts for the introductory course, that the dichotomy between persuasion and argumentation has a misinterpreted historical background. Secondly, that instructing our students that conviction by appeals to emotion and conviction by logical proofs are two separate processes is fallacious. Finally, I wish to show that presentation of the principles of argumentation and persuasion, "rhetorical argumentation" (Warnick and Inch, 1989), based on the

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principle of “good reasons” is necessary in order to provide our students with the ability to effectively and ethically use and critique communication in the modern world.

I define persuasion as it was defined by Aristotle and refined by Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian in the classical world; that is, as conviction through the use of both emotional appeals and appeals to reason. The inclusion of reason is a necessary element of persuasion. When I use the term “argumentation,” I am defining it as conviction through the use of appeals solely to reason. Though this once again seems a too simplistic analysis of two complex processes, I intend to show that the manner in which persuasion and argumentation have been presented pedagogically leads to the dichotomy of argumentation as logic and persuasion as emotion, and that this dichotomy in turn offers a skewed view of the role of discourse in securing conviction. This distinction is seen easily in Fisher’s 1987 discussion of the dichotomy between *logos* and *mythos*. *Logos*, in Fisher’s terminology, corresponds to the definition of argumentation as conviction solely by appeals to reason. *Logos*, then, is the backbone of the “rational-world paradigm” (61-73). *Mythos*, then, corresponds to the combination of appeals to reason and appeals to emotion; or, in other words, persuasion as I have defined it. It is “rhetorical argumentation” (Warnick and Inch, 1989), argumentation that takes into consideration the notion that human beings are more than analyzers of fact and evidence, that they take emotional appeals and ethical credibility into consideration when they reason.

In the classical world which gave birth to rhetoric, there were three major approaches (Clark, 1957): The moral philosophical view of Plato; the technical philosophical view of Aristotle; and the practical view of Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian. (In these three views it is possible to see the coming split between the logical and “truthful” use of rhetoric and the practical, illogical and deceitful use of persuasion.) Plato emphasized absolute truth, a truth that was achievable

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to exceptional men through the strenuous practice of dialectic. Rhetoric, for Plato, was at first a pale and unworthy imitation of the dialectic, but was later seen as of some possible use to the honorable man (Plato, 1987 & 1988). Aristotle took a somewhat different view of rhetoric. Instead of disputing the use of rhetoric or even the existence of an art of rhetoric, he classified it. Aristotle advanced and expanded upon the use of rhetoric proposed by Plato in *Phaedrus*. To Aristotle, rhetoric should be used to expound upon the truth, because even though what is “true” and “just” are naturally more agreeable to a listener than their opposites, they can always benefit from a little help (Aristotle, 11).

Aristotle advanced Plato’s theory of rhetoric, but it was still a theory. It took Isocrates to take theory and make it a practice. (In discussing Isocrates, along with Plato and Aristotle, it is important to remember that a handbook of rhetoric has been developed prior to these thinkers: Corax of Sicily is credited with that invention.) In his many writings on the subject of rhetoric, or what he called the “art of discourse” (Clark, 52), Isocrates took rhetoric into the worlds of politics and literature, into the world of everyday people. He taught the most famous orators, historians, writers and critics of his day — he showed the practical use of persuasion as well as the need to be wary of the possible abuses of this power. As Clark puts it:

In Greece in the fourth century B.C. there was a three-cornered quarrel among the leading teachers concerning what it takes to make a successful speaker. From this quarrel Isocrates . . . came out triumphant. More than any other Greek rhetorician he left his stamp on subsequent Greek and Roman educational theory and practice (5-6).

One area where Isocrates and his view of rhetoric has a major influence was in the early Roman rhetoricians, most notably Cicero. Cicero, in his publications *De Oratore* and *Partitiones Oratoriae*, melds the classification of rhetoric that

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Aristotle accomplished with the method of educating the orator that Isocrates proposed. *Partitiones Oratoriae*, in particular, reads like a summary of Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*. In *De Oratore*, Cicero provides a concise summary of the two major divisions of rhetoric: The Platonic-Aristotelian view propounded by the character of Crassus and the more practical (albeit watered-down) view of Isocrates as embodied in the character of Antonius. Cicero then argues for the use of philosophy (Plato) by the trained rhetorician (Isocrates) to help aim humanity toward happiness (Aristotle).

It is in this quick and brief summary of classical rhetorical development that we see the beginnings of a split in rhetoric, the split between logic and emotion, between argumentation and persuasion, a split that unfortunately still exists. An exploration of this split begins with a closer (but still brief) look at Aristotle's *Art of Rhetoric*, continues with a look at the split widening in Cicero's *De Oratore*, and concludes by examining the current nature of this split today.

The split between logic and emotion begins with Aristotle; not through any apparent intention on his part, but simply because of his tendency to classify all areas of argument. Aristotle popularized the division of rhetorical proof into three types: Logos, Ethos, and Pathos. There was no problem with that, since a close reading of Aristotle reveals the need to combine all three elements in order to construct an effective argument (Grimaldi, 1952; Fortenbaugh, 1970; and Rowland and Womack, 1985). The problem comes through later misreadings of Aristotle's theory, misreadings that separate, rather than classify, emotional appeals (pathos and ethos) and logical appeals (logos).

This separation of emotion and logic is seen in the writings of Hermagoras, the first major teacher and rhetorical theorist after Isocrates (Kennedy, 303-321). Hermagoras neglected the use of either ethical or emotional appeals as part of his theory of rhetoric. Though rhetoric was still aimed at persuading, the persuasion was to take place simply by

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using logical argument, by informing the audience. This separation of emotion and logic continued in this rhetorical era (falling between Isocrates and Cicero, circa late third to early first century B.C.). Theoreticians such as Theophrastus and Demetrius (Kennedy, 273-290; Grube, 1959) took rhetoric and persuasion to the other side of the division by concentrating their writings and teachings on style, on methods of appealing to the audience through technique rather than through the truth of the logical arguments. The schism between logic and emotion was widening.

In the first century B.C., the Romans attempted to close the gap between logic and emotion. Cicero's *De Oratore* provided, in the persons of both Antonius and Crassus, a view of rhetoric encompassing both logic and emotion. Though differing in how much outside learning an orator must possess (Antonius believed a quick dip in a shallow pool of outside knowledge would suffice, while Crassus held that the true orator would be more akin to the philosopher-orator that Plato idealized, one who remained in the sea of learning), both Antonius and Crassus realized the need to interweave emotion and logic. As Antonius put it:

. . . for purposes of persuasion the art of speaking relies wholly upon three things: the proof of our allegations, the winning of our hearer's favour, and the rousing of their feelings to whatever impulse our case may require (Cicero, Book II of *De Oratore*, 281).

Antonius used persuasion to mean both logical proofs and emotional appeals. More importantly, he went on to call for the use of emotional appeals within the logical proofs themselves.

And because . . . there are three methods of bringing people to hold our opinion, instruction or persuasion or appeal to their emotions, one of these three methods we must openly display . . . whereas the two remaining methods should be

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interfused throughout the whole of the structure of our speeches like the blood in our bodies (435).

Following Cicero, Quintilian also argued for the effective use of persuasion and emotion in oration. Quintilian argued more for the use of emotion in specific parts of the speech, the exordium and peroratio especially, but he acknowledged the need for effective use of emotion in the entire oration. As Kennedy wrote in his book, *Quintilian*, "Emotion should not be forgotten in any part of the speech in Quintilian's view, but it figures especially in two parts: The exordium, where the emotional factors are first intimated, and the peroration, where they are fully developed" (73).

It is also important to note that the teachings and writings of Cicero and Quintilian, in addition to emphasizing the interdependence of emotion and logic, also widened the scope of rhetoric to include more than just the art of persuasion. Rhetoric became the mainstay of the complete liberal arts education, and in the work of Cicero and Quintilian, the moral nature of rhetoric and the rhetor, as conceived by Isocrates in classical Greece, received renewed attention (Golden, Berquist and Coleman, 53). The interdependence of emotion and logic, and the role of rhetoric as more than just the art of persuasion, remained the province of rhetoric from the time of Quintilian through the Middle Ages and up to the time of seventeenth century. Golden, Berquist and Coleman state,

It seems evident that despite innovations which occasionally altered its scope or emphasis, rhetoric at the close of the sixteenth century was still primarily an integral part of an old and cherished system dating back to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian (53).

In the early seventeenth century, rhetoric began a renaissance of its own, a renaissance that carried and reached its zenith in the eighteenth century with the writings and teachings of George Campbell and Richard Whately. Combin-

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ing the classical tradition from Plato to Cicero with the new thinking of Locke and others, most notably the idea of “faculty psychology” (Campbell, 93), Campbell proposed a four-step approach to persuasion. He wrote, a message must first be understood (faculty of understanding), then be attended to and remembered (faculty of imagination), and finally felt (faculty of passion) in order to move the will. In proposing the need for the passions to be excited in order to persuade effectively, Campbell did not state that the passions were more important than reason, which was the mover of the will. Instead, the passions “are her [reason] handmaids, by whose ministry she is enabled to usher truth into the heart, and procure it there a favourable reception” (101).

Campbell emphasized the important of emotion, of emotional appeals in the process of persuasion. He emphasized again the interdependency of logical appeals (reason) and emotional appeals (passions). But what was also seen in the writings of Campbell was a hierarchy. The movement of the will was accomplished with the use of emotional appeals as servants to reason. The split made possible by Aristotle’s classification of Logos, Ethos, and Pathos remained. As can be seen by John Locke’s essay above, even when the study of rhetoric was once again popular, the emotional appeal of rhetoric was downplayed in favor of the logical certainty of argument.

The interweaving of emotion and logic that Aristotle proposed can be seen in Campbell’s four-step method of conviction. It is also possible to see, in the emergence of rationalism that also occurred in the eighteenth century, a new eminence for reason at the expense of emotion. Locke’s comments show some of this distrust of emotion. Although Locke was aware of the need for emotional appeals to buttress rational appeals, he was wary of them. Emotional appeals, Locke believed, created what he called “uneasiness” in people, and led people to change their views in order to rid themselves of their uneasiness. (The relationship between Locke’s

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idea of “uneasiness” and the modern psychological theory of cognitive dissonance is readily apparent.) The very term that Locke used to describe the effect of emotion on people tells much about his opinion toward emotional appeal (Golden, Berquist and Coleman, 84).

This historical review of the development of rhetorical theory, of the role of both emotion and logic in discourse designed to convince, shows that in the original rhetorical theory of Aristotle, as adopted and adapted by Cicero and Quintilian, the interdependence of emotion and logic to secure conviction was both acknowledged and emphasized. Campbell’s four-step process for conviction, while still acknowledging the role of emotion in conviction, helped pave the way for the further separation of logic and emotion. What is the status of persuasion today? How is it being taught and presented, at least in the introductory communications classes, classes beyond which many of our students never advance? An analysis of four of the more popular introductory public speaking texts can help answer the above question. The texts to be examined are *Public Speaking* (Osborn and Osborn, 1988); *The Art of Public Speaking* (Lucas, 1983); *The Challenge of Effective Speaking* (Verderber, 1982); and *Principles of Speech Communication* (Gronbeck, Ehninger and Monroe, 1988).

In the textbook *Public Speaking* by Osborn and Osborn, one chapter is devoted to persuasive speaking. A look at the four major approaches to speech design advocated by the text shows that the division between logic and emotion remains prevalent. The first design offered for a persuasive speech is the problem-solution design. As the text has it, “The problem-solution design first convinces listeners that they have a problem, then shows them how to deal with it” (359). The speaker is given the task of proving the problem exists and then proving that his or her solution will solve the problem, There is no mention of the need for any appeals to emotion, or of any use of emotion whatsoever. (There are obvious reasons for the

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popularity of the problem-solution design. It is far easier to teach students how to use evidence to state and support a problem, and then simply solve the problem, than to try to teach them how to use the language to do so persuasively as well.) It may be argued that specific mention of the role of emotion is not mentioned because it is assumed that emotional appeals will play a part in any successful presentation. That is precisely the problem. The lack of a specific reminder that emotion does and should play a role leads to an exclusion of emotion, with a “successful” speech being one that demonstrates the existence of a problem through evidence, and then shows deductively how the solution solves the problem. The problem, of course, is that simply showing your solution works is no guarantee that it will be adopted by your audience.

A second approach, design by analogy, allows for emotion in attempting to relate the speaker’s proposal with an already popular proposal, but it does not call for the use of any type of emotional appeals to the audience within the argument. A third approach, the motivated sequence, does call for the use of emotional appeals, but limits the use of appeals to the first step, “Arousing attention,” and the fifth and last step, “Calling for action.” The fourth approach, “Refutative design,” also calls for more of a logical approach, instructing the speaker to attack the opposition by pointing out inconsistencies in the argument. With the exception of the motivated sequence approach, these approaches ignore or limit the use of emotion in persuasion. They call instead for logical, argumentative approaches to persuasion.

The section on persuasive speaking in the Lucas text is quite similar to the section in the Osborn and Osborn text. The section on speaking to persuade divides persuasive speaking into questions of fact, value and policy, addresses the need for audience adaptation in persuasive speaking, and presents techniques for composing the persuasive speech, including the use of evidence and reasoning, and appeals to

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emotion. As was seen in the Osborn and Osborn text, though the use of emotional appeals in persuasion is called for, the interdependence of emotion and logic, the necessity for emotion in all persuasive arguments, even those based on reason, is not stressed.

Principles of Speech Communication (Gronbeck, Ehninger and Monroe) does a much more effective job of showing the interdependence of emotion and reason in the art of persuasion, mainly through its detailed presentation of the motivated sequence of persuasion, the need for appealing to the motives of the audience. Gronbeck *et al.* write of the use of motivational appeals that “speakers can use to arouse in their listeners a particular feeling, emotion or desire in an attempt to stimulate one or more of the primary motive needs” (1984, 265). The motivated sequence design of persuasion goes a long way toward the inclusion of emotion in a persuasive argument. In some instances, it goes a bit too far in that the motivated sequence design, while allowing for the inclusion of reason in its design, places more emphasis on motive, on what could be termed the psychological basis of persuasion.

As in the two previous texts, this text provides a separate section on argumentation, or on speaking that is designed to convince more on logical means than on appeals to emotion. “Arguers commit themselves to rationality, to a willingness to proceed logically” (1984, 267). This is where the problems lie. A separate section on argumentation teaches students that there is a fundamental difference between discourse that persuades and discourse that attains conviction by means of logical proof.

The Verderber text, similar to the Lucas and Osborn and Osborn text, devotes a special section to persuasion and persuasive speaking. And like those two, it repeats the call for logical (arguments) and emotional appeals. Verderber does, however, see the two types of appeals as interdependent:

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I like to look at logic and emotion as inseparable elements within an argument. Thus, we should not look for some additional material that will arouse fear or pity or joy or anger or guilt or love — we should look for a good, logical, supportable argument that will, *if properly phrased* (author's italics), arouse fear or pity or joy or anger or guilt or love (249).

These four approaches to the presentation of persuasion in the basic communication course, with the exception of the Verderber text, present a conventional view of the dichotomy between persuasion and argumentation. While none of the texts forbid the mixture of these two approaches to discourse, simply by providing for separate sections on the two leads students — and teachers — to the conclusion that there is a fundamental difference between argumentation and persuasion. So just what is the problem with promoting a logical approach to persuasion? Of ignoring the emotional aspect? As can be seen in this gloss of the public speaking texts, one of the major problems lies in the logical or quasi-logical format or argumentation, wherein the process determines the success of the argument. If a speaker presents a logically sound argument, she or he has done her or his job. This emphasis on logical form obscures the content and the context. Persuasion, therefore, is left with the job of using the content and the context to secure the conviction of the audience, not just its appreciation of a logically well-constructed argument.

Cicero, speaking through the persona of Antonius, described another problem:

Now nothing in oratory . . . is more important than to win for the orator the favour of his hearer, and to have the latter so affected as to be swayed by something resembling a mental impulse or emotion, rather than by judgment or deliberation. For men decide far more problems by hate, or love, or lust, or rage, or sorrow, or joy, or hope, or fear, or illusion, or some other inward emotion, than by reality, or

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authority, or any legal standard, or judicial precedent, or statute (325).

Simons argued in the same vein, calling persuasive arguments, while not entirely rational, at least “extra-logical.” As he states:

According to this view, prototypical persuaders such as salespeople and politicians offer facts and reasons to their audience, but acceptance of their arguments by audiences always rests on something *more than*, or *other than*, the evidence of the logical arguments they present (102, author’s italics).

That is again where the problem lies in our pedagogical presentation of persuasion and argumentation as different processes of discourse. By stressing the logical development or arguments, the emotional acceptance of these arguments is left untouched. Even though the introductory texts examined allow for and even encourage the interdependence of emotion and logic, they still allow for and encourage the split between persuasion and argumentation, between convincing by the means of appeals or emotion leading conviction by reason (persuasion) and convincing by logical arguments (argumentation).

As was seen in looking at Osborn and Osborn’s *Public Speaking*, argumentation at the introductory level is still being taught as almost a purely logical matter. Students are being told that if they simply prove logically that a problem exists and that their solution is the best one to meet their defined problem, they have met the criteria for success. How do we answer them when their audience fails to respond to their logical presentation but instead supports a less well-thought out but more emotionally-wrought argument? Additionally, by instructing students in argumentation as logic, we fail to equip these students with the ability to critique persuasive messages effectively. We fail to deal with

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issue such as the ethical use of emotion in arguments if we simply teach students to use logical arguments solely. We end up perpetuating what Walter Fisher described as a “rational world paradigm” (Fisher, 1987, 143-57).

Instead of continuing the split between persuasion and argumentation, between conviction including emotion and conviction based solely on logic (a form of conviction that may exist but has yet to be found, since people are human and not machines), there is a need for a synthesis, an understanding that even so-called “logical” conviction uses emotional appeals of some sort. This synthesis can be reached by applying the ideas of Wallace (1963) and Fisher (1978) and the concept of “good reasons,” and the work of Douglas Hesse (1989). A modern pedagogical approach that begins to encompass this plan can be seen in the Warnick and Inch text and their notion of “rhetorical argumentation” (1989).

In his seminal article in 1963, “The Substance of Rhetoric: Good Reasons,” Wallace noted first the problem which remains in our public speaking texts: We tell student how to construct effective speeches, but we do not deal with the substance of these speeches. As Wallace stated: “Most of our textbooks pay little attention to what speeches are about; rather, their point of view is pedagogical. They concentrate on how to make a speech and deliver it” (241). Wallace further argued that rhetoric, that speeches, are all, to some degree or another, persuasive. “Much discourse and discussion that is thought of as didactic is probably persuasive in effect if not in intent,” Wallace wrote. “In brief, it would appear that expository speaking and writing recognize choices and values that differ from those of persuasive discourse principally in that they are more remote and less apparent” (242).

Given that expository discourse contains elements of persuasion, the dichotomy between argumentation (argument based on fact, on reason) and persuasion (argument based on emotional appeals and reason) does not exist. Since intentionally informative discourse, discourse based on facts, can be

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just as persuasive in effect as discourse based on emotional appeals and reason, students should be taught to use persuasive methods in speaking and to understand the persuasive nature of supposedly informative discourse (Kinneavy, 1971). Wallace also argued that persuasive discourse, which is for all practical purposes all message-transmitting discourse (in the sense that even informative discourse has a persuasive flavor), is delivered as judgment statements, “statements having to do with action, motives, feelings, emotions, attitudes and values” (242). These judgments are responses to two fundamental question: “What shall I do or believe? What ought I to do?” (242).

Since message-transmitting discourse, then, is persuasive in either intent or effect, Wallace asked rhetoricians to adopt the term “good reasons.” Good reasons, in Wallace’s definition, are statements offered in support of ought propositions or value propositions — what shall I do? and what shall I believe? The use of good reasons in discourse would have the effect, Wallace continued, of “reminding the speaker, as well as [rhetoricians and teachers], that the substance of rhetorical proof has to do with values and value-judgments, i.e., with what is held to be good (248). Additionally, the use of good reasons as the basis for support in discourse would take care of the problem of distinctions between logical and emotional proof. As Wallace stated:

Any distinctions that modern rhetoric may be trying to maintain between logical, ethical, and emotional modes of proof would immediately become unreal and useless, except for purposes of historical criticism For the theorist . . . of discourse, the disappearance of these weasel concepts, logical proof and emotional proof, would permit a description of the materials of practical discourse in terms of two broad categories: materials deriving from the specific occasion, and materials consisting of general value judgments (248-49).

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This conception of rhetoric as the search for good reasons begins the step toward a theory of persuasion that encompasses logic and emotion effectively, that acknowledges the role that emotional appeals play in conviction. However, Wallace never offers a way to distinguish between good reasons and, so to speak, “bad” good reasons, or appeals that appear to function as supports to ought statements, but instead function as more base appeals. Fisher attempts to provide a model for the use of good reasons (1978).

Fisher first offers a definition of good reasons that goes little beyond Wallace’s. Fisher terms a good reason “those elements that provide warrants for accepting or adhering to the advice fostered by any form of communication that can be considered rhetorical” (376). Fisher takes a step forward when he provides an ethical standard for measuring between good reasons and “bad” good reasons. A good reason is “good” when it is tied to a value that “makes a pragmatic difference in one’s life and in one’s community” (383). Fisher, making it plain that he opposes the imposition of any hierarchical standard of values, offers a definition that provides a method for evaluating good reasons. In order for this evaluatory scheme to function, however, it is necessary to add one word to Fisher’s definition. A good reason is one that makes a positive pragmatic difference in one’s life and in one’s community. (Fisher may have included the idea of a positive difference in his use of the word pragmatic.) By positive, I mean a difference that improves in some manner the quality of life for an individual or a community while at the same time not decreasing the quality of life for another member of the community. Fisher further defined what a “good reason” is with a more-developed five-part “Logic of Good Reasons” are “Consequence,” “Consistency,” and “Transcendence.” These three components provide instructors and students criteria for determining the credibility and probably efficacy of a “good reason.”

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What does this conception of good reasons as the substance of discourse mean for the teaching of persuasion? First, by acknowledging the concept that even so-called factual statements are, in effect, persuasive statements, the distinction between conviction by persuasion (emotion and reason) and conviction by argumentation (reason alone) can be discarded. There is no need for separate sections in our introductory public speaking textbooks to teach argumentation skills. Argumentation and persuasion should be presented as one and the same thing. Secondly, the concept of good reasons requires that we as teachers and as textbook writers spend less time talking about the components of persuasive discourse (since we have decided that the components are good reasons) and more time talking and writing about how to discover and use good reasons in discourse production, and how to analyze discourse, especially so-called factual discourse, in order to ferret out the good reasons in the discourse, to discover why the facts are facts. In short, we will be required to teach students not just to follow guidelines that will enable them to produce discourse, but to question the very substance of the “factual” evidence and “emotional” appeals. This approach would dissolve the distinction between logical appeals, appeals to “fact” (argumentation), and emotional appeals (persuasion). It would end the preference given to “factual” argument with its insistence on the persuasive nature of facts.

Douglas Hesse (1989) offers a method for this style of teaching. Although writing primarily to introduce a method of critical reading, Hesse’s method also works well, with adaptation, for teaching students to come up with good reasons for their arguments. To adapt Hesse:

1. What shared assumptions allow the audience and the speaker to communicate? Why are those assumptions shared?

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2. Imagine a different audience, an audience that would have difficulty understanding the discourse. What assumptions would that audience share?
3. What makes us take the discourse seriously? How does it attract our attention? Or why do we invite it into our attention?
4. What desires does the discourse fulfill?
5. Who benefits from attending to this discourse? Why? How?
6. Who would not benefit from this discourse? Why? How?
7. What is absent from this discourse? (21)

These seven steps would best be put to use in the construction and critique of arguments and evidence. Rather than simply providing a checklist of criteria for credible evidence and reputable sources, this approach requires students to acknowledge both the special nature of the subject and the audience to which the discourse is aimed. By using the above method, or a variation of this method, we require our students to think. In creating or evaluating persuasive discourse, this method requires students to be aware of the audience as both reasonable and emotional actors. It is not enough to construct an argument that has equal parts of logical, ethical and emotional proof; it is not enough to “logically prove’ that a problem exists and then offer a solution to the problem that “logically solves” it. Instead, students must come up with arguments that acknowledge the interdependence of logic and emotion and the blurring of the distinction between fact and belief. By the same token, requiring our students to use this method in producing their discourse will also provide them a method for evaluating the discourse of others. Rather than accepting as “fact,” evidence presented to bolster an argument, students will be allowed and encouraged to question the evidence as “fact.”

Does this require a massive rethinking of teaching methodology? No. Does this require all new textbooks? No. Modifications of teaching methods to allow for the teaching of

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critical thinking skills in place of methods that teach students to simply fill in the dots to produce discourse will help. Good teachers do that already. Emphasis in our introductory public speaking textbooks on the inter-relationship of logic and emotion and acknowledgement that argumentation and persuasion are the same thing will also help. Warnick and Inch emphasize, especially in the section on the rhetorical perspective of argumentation, the interdependency of logic and emotion. They also acknowledge and emphasize the ethical role of argumentation. Ethical arguments are more than simply logically valid arguments. They must also be arguments that enhance the quality of life of the community — arguments, in other words, that employ the "good reasons" of Wallace and Fisher. Warnick and Inch write: "The humanistic standard [of ethics] assumes that if the process of argumentation has certain characteristics [good reasons], the potential of all parties for making choices that enhance self-development and their quality of life is encouraged" (16).

Josina Makau, in *Reasoning and Communication: Thinking Critically About Arguments* (1990) also provides some interesting pedagogical approaches to teaching rhetorical argumentation. Makau highlights the interdependence of logic and emotion in effective argumentation. "Logic is not enough for reasoned interaction. Emotions also play an important role. *Good argumentation involves a balance between logic and emotion*" (46, author's italics). In illustrating this balance between logic and emotion, Makau asks students to analyze arguments not merely for their logical structure and use of evidence, but also for the values that undergird the arguments (206). She uses what she describes as "Family Life Issues" (205) to illustrate the interdependence of logic and emotion, of fact and value, the need to discover and understand the value premises that support the arguments. In completing these activities, students come to see that simply constructing a logically coherent argument is not enough — values and beliefs must be considered.

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By upgrading the teaching of persuasion, the teaching of practical discourse, by returning to the notion of reasoning that has been credited to argumentation, by ending the unnecessary distinction between argumentation and persuasion, we will return the practice back to its origin, back to when rhetoric was the power to persuade and convince and improve the condition of humanity. We will return to persuasive discourse the ethical quality that will help to rescue it from derogation as sophistry and trickery. We will prepare students to become the type of people that Isocrates envisioned as products of his rhetorical training. We are, to put it simply, teaching people to think critically and act ethically. That should be our role as communication educators.

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