EU Energy Policies:
A Driving Force of Nationalist Party Support?

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Abstract

This independent study project will explore the relationship between EU energy policies and support for nationalist political parties within Europe. Based on the literature, I expect to see a positive relationship between perceived unjust EU energy policies and support for nationalist political parties. After a quantitative statistical analysis and a qualitative content analysis, I find that my hypothesis is neither fully supported nor fully unsupported. Though a statistically significant relationship does not exist among all European countries, a statistically significant relationship does appear to exist among Eastern European countries. This has important implications for interstate energy policies, determining causes for nationalist party support, and the role that energy may have within politics.

Table of Contents

List of Tables and Figures

Chapter 1

Introduction

Throughout history, various states, nations, and groups of people have worked to secure political sovereignty, personal liberties, and achieve greater recognition within larger multinational states and the global community. These movements, which have often been classified as nationalist in nature, have shaped global conflicts and led to the creation of new structures of power and systems of government. Though nationalist movements are often considered an archaic global phenomenon, many of these nationalist movements remain strong and influential in dictating world politics. For example, the Scottish Nationalist Party currently holds a majority in the Scottish Parliament and nationalist parties have gained increasing amounts of support in recent elections throughout Europe. In addition, the recent violence in Kiev, Ukraine suggests that the idea of regional controls and authorities, in this case, the idea of Russian influence over Ukrainian politics, remain extremely contentious and controversial (Saeed et all 2014). Furthermore, these nationalist movements inherently contradict regional integration, a more recent global development which is evident through the unification of various states into the European Union. Therefore, determining causes of nationalist party support would provide further insights regarding the sustainability of regional integration and potentially assist governments of various states and global organizations to design and implement policy that would help ensure stability.

Scholars have long debated the roles that various central power structures have assumed in fostering an atmosphere that can lead to nationalist sentiments and movements. This idea and model of a central governing authority was recently adapted to the European Union, a group of twenty-seven states who have united to better secure the well being of Europe.

However, increased nationalism in Europe has prompted some to consider the role of the European Union in fostering an environment that promotes nationalism through various policies. Determining a possible linkage between various policies of the EU and support for nationalist political parties is worthy of examination and exploration. Though a variety of issue areas could be examined, this study will examine the role of energy policy in contributing to nationalist party support for a variety of reasons. For example, some of the most well known European Union policies relate to climate change and the reduction of energy usage. The increased emphasis on energy efficiency, as evidenced by the recent goals of the EU to reduce emissions by 20 percent from 1990 levels (European Commission: Climate 2013), suggests that energy policies are a central focus of European Union policy structures. In addition, in a world in which the finite resources of fossil fuels and land are quickly being consumed, understanding how more regional energy policies may impact nationalist sentiment is crucial in determining future resource relationships between states. Understanding the attitudes of populations regarding centralized resource and energy policy may assist nations and states in developing just and fair policies. Finally, given that national sovereignty would need to be compromised

within interstate energy agreements, determining possible linkages between these policies and nationalist party support can provide insights into the role of energy within politics.

Therefore, in this paper, the hypothesis, **that perceived unjust European Union energy policies lead to an increase in support for nationalist political parties** will be researched through the utilization of statistical and content analysis. Results of this study will provide insights into the rise of nationalist party support, help determine how regional and interstate energy policies are viewed, and provide evidence to draw conclusions about the idea that energy policy is a driving force of nationalist party support. Furthermore, findings of this study may be applicable to other regions of the world considering the adoption of regional energy policies.

This study will consist of four major sections inclusive of the Literature Review and Theory Section, the Methodology section, the Data section, and Conclusion sections. In the Literature Review and Theory section, dominant theories as they relate to nationalism will be examined and discussed. In addition, other studies regarding nationalism will be critiqued. A detailed discussion of the research question, variables, and research design will be provided in the methodology section. Next, statistical and contextual data will be presented within the Data section as well a discussion of the results of the study, and finally, an interpretation of the findings will be discussed within the Discussion and Conclusion section.

Chapter 2:

Literature Review

Social scientists have collectively termed various independence movements as nationalism. Though there are numerous models and alternative forms of nationalism, most political scientists have concluded that a nationalist movement has certain characteristics and attributes (Barrington 1997). According to scholar Lowell W. Barrington, "nearly all would agree, however, that the control over one's own nation-state is a goal for most nationalists" (Barrington 1997, 714). In essence, Barrington claims that territorial autonomy is the driving force behind nationalist movements (1997). John Breuilly, claims that nationalist movements adopt the philosophy defined by, "the interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values" (Breuilly 1993, 2). Ernest Gellner (1983, 1) defines nationalism as, "primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent   It is a theory of political legitimacy" (Gellner 1983, 1). Finally, Brendan O'Leary believes that, "Nationalism the most potent principle of political legitimacy in the modern world, holds that the nation should be collectively and freely institutionally expressed, and ruled by its co-nationals" (O'Leary, 1997). Collectively, one can deduce from these claims that nationalism includes a desire for self-governance and a strong allegiance to the nation as opposed to the larger global structures. In addition, nationalism is a force that attempts to unify the populace to enact change and gain influence.

Though there is consensus regarding some necessary components of nationalism, various potential causes of nationalism have been identified. Many foundational texts of

nationalism were based in the concept of primordialism, or based in the unification of blood, race, and language. According to Clifford Geertz (1973), these are, "ineffable and yet coercive ties, which are the result of a long process of crystallization" (Llobera 1999, 3). Furthermore, these social biologists have concluded that, "Nationalism builds on ethnocentrism towards the in-group and xenophobia towards the out-group"(Llobera 1999, 7).

Theories of ethnic nationalism are commonly utilized to explain those nationalist movements within Europe. However, it seems that these attitudes of ethnic nationalism are often encouraged by other factors. Nagel writes that, "ethnic boundaries and meaning are also constructed from within and from without, propped up by internal and external pressures" (Nagel 1994, 167). In addition, ethnic groups often operate within other defined structures (Nagel 1994, 167). Nagel even asks, "From what social and psychological domains does the impulse toward ethnic identification originate?" (Nagel 1994, 168). Therefore, it seems that strong feelings of ethnic nationalism and identity have an over-arching cause beyond ethnic divisions and therefore supports the notion that other policy areas should be analyzed to determine causes for nationalist sentiments.

Another theoretical approach to explaining nationalism is modernization theories, which, "maintain that nationalism emerges as a result of the process of transition from traditional to modern society" (Llobera 1994, 10). However, these theories are predominantly used to account for nationalist movements during the time of industrialization. As much of Europe is developed and modern, these types of theories will not be useful in explaining more contemporary nationalist movements.

While cultural identity and modernization theories have been provided as possible explanations of nationalism, there are obvious flaws to these approaches and thus, foundations for my hypothesis are based in more economic and structural theories of nationalism.

Though scholars have studied various forms of nationalism throughout the world and different cultures and contexts, the European Union provides an interesting social construct and governing structure to study the causes of nationalism and influences it may have in determining political structures. Furthermore, given that the European Union was largely founded to limit those forms of nationalism which had destroyed much of the continent during World War I and World War II, determining modern causes of nationalism within Europe may enhance understanding of the role nationalism may serve in developing future policies. In addition, unlocking keys to nationalism may also help prevent conflicts. According to Fraser Cameron, a senior advisor on European Policy, "Since the early 1950s, the EU has been a pioneer in regional integration" (Cameron 2010). He also notes that the European Union has found success due to, "The political will to share sovereignty and construct strong, legally based, common institutions" (Cameron 2010) and maintain a "willingness to provide significant financial transfers to help poorer member states catch up with the norm" (Cameron 2010). Given that the European Union has worked to limit nationalism, understanding the relationship between contemporary nationalist movements and the EU is worth further examination as it may provide insights regarding the effects of globalization and regional integration.

As this study is concerned with nationalism within the European Union, it is important to explore reasons for the European Unions creation. According to author Ray Hudson, "The implication (of the EU) was that all would be better off, that spatial inequalities would be reduced, as markets were freed up and capital and labour moved to where returns were highest" (Hudson 2000, 413). Though the European Economic Community originally only had six members, it quickly began expanding in the 1980s. Hudson writes, "the pace of the process of integration via new forms of supra-national regulation again accelerated" (413). This resulted in the EU having, "much greater scope to influence the sectoral and socio-spatial distributions of economic activities, resources and income"(Hudson, 413). Therefore, for new member states to join the European Union or adopt European policies, they had to compromise aspects of their economic and resource sovereignty. Carl Lebeck also notes that the EU policy has resulted in the creation of distinct structures within the EU. He writes, "the structure of the EU comprises two different components, one supranational (the European Community - EC) and one intergovernmental (the European Union) (Lebeck 2007, 501). Furthermore, Madalina Calance believes that, "supranational organizations (such as the European Union), have a major impact on the sovereignty of the national state" (Calance 2012, 24).

Christina J. Schneider also discusses the inherent tension that may occur between the EU and states. She writes, "EU members impose discriminatory measures on new members to redistribute enlargement gains from new members to particularly negatively affected EU members" (Schneider 2007, 85). For example, when negotiating the potential admittance of Turkey in 2004, Germany wanted to restrict the movement of labor while

other EU members advocated, "to refuse an allocation of agricultural subsidies to Turkish farmers" (Schneider 2007, 85).

According to Bellamy and Castiglione, "The related processes of globalization and social differentiation have undermined the state's claims to sovereignty" (1997, 421). Furthermore, they argue that, "these reports of the nation state's demise to be exaggerated" (1997, 421). Bellamy and Castiglione conclude that both "the allegiances of citizens and their forms of economic, social and political interaction, cooperation and organization have become a complex mixture of the sub-national, national, and supranational"(1997, 422). These authors also note that the desire for more local rights of citizens creates tension between the laws of the EU (1997, 431).

According to Jos de Beus, some scholars have adopted the view of supra-nationalism, or the belief that, "democratic political union of Europe requires that its inhabitants consider themselves a single people or choose to remain one" (de Beus 2001, 288-289). In addition, de Beus argues that the European Union refers to the, "case for empowerment of the European Parliament, to all projects of fostering goodwill that try to bring the system of Europe closer to the daily life of ordinary citizens and to broad penetration of European agencies into the classic area of control of the nation state" (2001, 290).

James Anderson and James Goodwin also make note of the likely inherent tension between the EU and individual states. They write, "Sub-state regionalism is encouraged by some of the central institutions of the EU and by forces within the regions themselves responding to the Single European Market" (Anderson and Goodwin 1996, 600). They

also believe nations and states are being, "eroded from below by regionalism and from above by EU institutions and globalization- a pincer movement transforming traditional conceptions of territorial sovereignty and national identity" (1996, 601).

Having reviewed numerous articles regarding the nature of relationship between the EU and member states, there is strong evidence to suggest that there is an inherent tension between the policies of the European Union and the sovereignty of various states. Therefore, these findings provide support for the notion that some European Union policies may lead to personal grievances and dislike for the EU. To determine if these grievances may lead to support for nationalist parties, it is important to document literature that attempts to assess causes for nationalist party support.

While much research has been done with regard to various causes of state nationalism, less research has been directed toward determining linkages between state nationalism and support for nationalist political parties. Though parties are mentioned as a way to coalesce those of a certain ideology, scholars do not explore why some nationalist movements are more inclined to organize politically. While consideration of political structures and constitutional provisions that allow for policy change are evident (Beland and Lecours 2006), the likelihood of support for political parties in various environments is somewhat unexplored. These possible linkages between nationalism and political parties are worth consideration. Furthermore, while some studies have analyzed how certain social policies may increase support for nationalist political parties, less research has been directed at determining whether the nationalist parties themselves

advance or build upon perceived unjust policy. In essence, many studies seem to only provide half of the story as they do not provide content analysis of the parties themselves.

James Adams et al. provides evidence that those, "political parties in Western European democracies tend to shift their ideological orientations in response to shifts in voters' policy preferences" (Adams 2006, 513). Furthermore, William Heller determined that, "regional party participation in national policy making affects outcomes" (Heller 2002, 657). Therefore, it seems that nationalist parties do respond to voter demands and can make policy changes.

Recently, Fortes and Perez examined nationalist during the Basque regional elections of 2012 in which the, "incumbent Socialist Party suffered a dramatic reduction in electoral support." According to the authors, "influence of the economy was stronger than the nationalism issue" (Fortes and Perez 2013, 495). However, economic concerns likely encouraged some traditional socialist voters to consider the Basque Nationalist Party platform.

Other authors have traced nationalist party support to moral and social concerns. For example, Gavin Rae believes that conservative and nationalist party coalitions in Poland are gaining support through their emphasis on the immoral policies of liberalism. He writes, "It combines a criticism of both communism and liberalism, believing that both possess similar atheistic, nihilistic and immoral characteristics" (Rae 2008, 221). Furthermore, he writes that these parties, "propose a politicisation of the public sphere and support closing the gap between the Church and the State" (2008, 221).

Some studies find more broad influences on nationalist party support. Research of the UK Independence Party found evidence that the parties stances on immigration were often found to be popular among potential voters (Flamini 2013). However, the authors found that, "Exit polls after the May election showed more than fifty percent of those who voted for UKIP did so because they shared Farage's core objective of wanting to lead Britain out of the European Union" (Flamini 2013). Therefore, certain factors may have played a role for various individuals, a more general dislike for the European Union may have been more influential.

Anwen Elias analyzed the Plaid Cymru party in Wales and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego in Galicia. The author concludes that, "nationalist party attitudes towards European integration are more complex than is usually asserted in the existing academic literature" (Elias 2008, 557). In addition, Elias notes that these, "nationalist parties have become increasingly critical of Europe" (2008, 557).

Alberto Spektorowski analyzes the recent nationalist movements taking place within France. He argues that, "the European New Right employs a multiculturalism framework," which he defines, "as a recognition/exclusionist one, in order to create a new discourse of legitimate exclusionism of non-authentic European immigrants" (Spektorowski 2008, 41).

Christopher Baughn and Attila Yaprak discuss the role of economic nationalism in leading to support for nationalist political parties. They note that, "Economic nationalism involves discrimination in favor of one's own nation, carried on as a matter of policy" (Baughn and Yaprak 1996, 760). The authors also note that this form of

nationalism, "has come to be associated with a wide range of practices, including protectionism in the form of tariffs, quotas, 'voluntary' restraint agreements, countervailing duties, and regulatory standards barring foreign products from the domestic market" (1996, 760). Finally, the authors note that, "Hostility, prejudice, and feeling threatened may facilitate political attempts to arouse public support for such a campaign" (1996, 760).

In essence it seems that most authors have argued that support for nationalist parties is either based in theories of economics or ethnic conflict. However, it seems that cultural and economic nationalism may become disparate because of other underlying factors. In addition, many of these studies do not mention the European Union as being a major contributing factor in increasing support for nationalist political parties. Furthermore, there may also be another factor that serves as the genesis of both economic and cultural nationalism. Finally, some developments in Europe suggest that resources and energy policy are influential within state level politics.

Scholars have coined the term resource nationalism to define those movements related to seeking greater control over a nation's resources. Halina Ward writes, "Resource nationalism is characterized by the tendency for states to take (or seek to take) direct and increasing control of economic activity in natural resource sectors" (Ward 2009, 5). In addition, though these movements have typically been viewed as being a part of developing countries, some evidence suggests that this trend is shifting. Clifford Chance LLP writes, "Resource nationalism is sometimes mistakenly seen as a purely developing world or emerging market phenomenon"(Hill et al. 2012).

In the 1920s and 1930s, Swedish nationalist parties emphasized utilizing national fuel sources. Ekerholm writes, "At the time, considerable political effort went into finding and establishing a national fuel" (Ekerholm 2013, 63). Furthermore, "Those who argued in favour of the ethanol industry's requests were mainly right-wing politicians, who based their arguments on a nationalist ideology" (2013, 63). In Norway during the 1960s, "New regulation determined that the State owns any natural resources on the NCS, and that only the King (government) is authorized to award licences for exploration and production"(Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, 2013).

In addition, Ireland has seen recent developments in resource nationalist ideology. According to Vincent Salafia, "with growing public awareness and opposition to multiple government policies and programs, all around Ireland, the pressure is mounting on the Government to fundamentally change its policy, and ensure the people get greater control over, and a great share of the benefit from, their valuable natural resources and State assets" (Salafia 2013). According to Salafia, "EU regulations prohibiting turf cutting appear to have been unfairly implemented" (2013). Furthermore, "the manner in which European regulations concerning certain peat bogs are being implemented" is seen as unjust (2013). There have also been numerous protests regarding the EU Common Agriculture Policy within Ireland (2013). In Norway and Great Britain various concerns about the oil reserves and the states' rights have been raised prompting some to consider the growing role of resource nationalism in state politics (Salafia, 2013). Hudson also outlines numerous examples of how European Union policy is "problematic and contradictory" (Hudson 2000, 414). Hudson identifies the Common Agricultural Policy

as an example of how European Union policies are controversial. He writes, "The CAP is symptomatic of the contradictions encompassed within one particular political-economic conception of Europe, and recognition of the political constraints on free market policies. As such, it sits very uneasily with the rhetoric of the superiority of market resource allocation" (Hudson 2000, 414). Furthermore, the recent protests in Ukraine, though not in opposition to the EU, do relate strongly to energy policies. The President of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, "insisted that he was intent on signing historical political and trade agreement with the European Union" (Saeed et al 2014). However, he later backed out of the agreement, which prompted large scale protests that have culminated in violence. According to social scientists, "Russia threatened its much smaller neighbor with trade sanctions and steep gas bills if Ukraine forged ahead. If Ukraine didn't, and instead joined a Moscow-led Customs Union, it would get deep discounts on natural gas" (Saeed et al 2014). Therefore it seems that energy policies can play a role in determining the actions of leaders and controlling policies can indirectly encourage nationalist type movements.

Evidence suggests that the growing emphasis on energy and resources may be a catalyst for dissatisfaction for the EU and increased support for more nationalist political parties within Europe. In addition, these types of relationships may also apply to other regions of the world. Perceived lack of control over resources may encourage forms of ethnic nationalism as the new immigrants are seen as using current finite energy resources. In addition, the lack of control over resources and energy may be seen as detrimental to economic growth. Perhaps concern over energy and resources may serve as a driving force of both economic and ethnic nationalism. Therefore, understanding

linkages between energy and resource policy and nationalist party support may provide new insights into the causes of nationalism and also provide insight regarding the future of international government structures such as the EU.

Chapter 3:

Methodology

Following a review of literature germane to nationalism, the European Union, support for nationalist political parties, and the development of resource nationalism, it seems that energy policies of the European Union may be a driving force of nationalist party support. To further examine my hypothesis that, "Perceived unjust European Union energy policies results in increased support for nationalist political parties within various states within the European Union" a mixed method approach will be adopted and implemented. If my hypothesis is proven and conclusive, it may be prescient as a significant factor in the potential dissolution or restructuring of the European Union. In this chapter, a justification for the mixed method strategy will be provided, variables will be operationalized, and a detailed methodology will be described.

This study will consist of two separate methods, that when combined, should provide insight into whether perceived unjust European Union energy policies are a causal factor of nationalist party support. These two methods will include a descriptive statistical analysis that will subsequently determine which case studies of the dependent variable (nationalist political parties) will be examined through content analysis. By adopting an approach that includes statistical or quantitative analysis, and by incorporating content or qualitative analysis, a more comprehensive overview and examination of the variables can be provided. Furthermore, while a statistical analysis may provide insights regarding correlation of my two variables, some level content analysis is needed to further determine causation between the two variables.

Some authors believe that incorporating both methods of analysis is beneficial to the research process. According to Jick, "qualitative and quantitative methods should be viewed as complementary rather than as rival camps" (Jick 1979, 602). Furthermore, Bryman has noted that, "This has led to the appearance of mixed method approaches and the use of triangulation" (Bryman 2004, 454). Giovanni Sartori writes, "Especially during the last decade comparative politics as a substantive field has been rapidly expanding" (Sartori 1970, 1053). Sartori believes that these methods can be utilized and implemented together. He writes, "To recapitulate and conclude, I have argued that the logic of either-or cannot be replaced by the logic of more-and-less. Actually the two logics(quantitative and qualitative methods) are complementary and each has a legitimate field of application" (Sartori 1970, 1039). In addition, Evan S. Lieberman notes that, "statistical analyses can guide case selection for in-depth research, provide direction for more focused case studies and comparisons, and be used to provide additional tests of hypotheses generated from small-N research" (Lieberman 2005, 435). In addition, Lieberman writes, "In a somewhat different formulation, several scholars have called for greater integration of methodological approaches" (2005, 435). The approach outlined by Lieberman also applies very well to my study. Lieberman notes, "Although all of the examples discussed in the article are concerned with country or national-level analyses, the strategies described here should apply to any comparative analysis of social units for which both quantitative and in-depth case study data can be obtained" (2005, 436). Given that my study will include a more national level of analysis regarding attitudes of European Union energy policies and a more in-depth analysis of nationalist political parties, it will

fit well within a mixed method framework. Lieberman continues by writing, "Thus the approach could be applied to the analysis of individual behaviors or attitudes, but only if the researcher were willing able to gather new data about particular individuals through extensive interview or related approaches..." (2005, 436) Since my study will include analysis of the rhetoric of nationalist party doctrine, I will be able to effectively gather data about particular individuals or groups of people. Therefore, it seems that the quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis can work collaboratively and collectively to provide insight regarding my hypothesis.

Having determined that a mixed method approach would be most effective in analyzing the validity of my hypothesis, it is important to further describe statistical analysis and content analysis respectively. Numerous scholars have encouraged utilization of the statistical analysis method approach. For example, James Hutter attempts, "to draw to the attention of statisticians certain implications important to both disciplines, statistics and political science" (Hutter 1972, 735). Therefore, it seems that Hutter believes statistics and political science can be utilized together and combined. Furthermore, King, Tomz, and Wittenberg write that, "Our proposals for extracting new information from existing statistical models should enable scholars to interpret and present their results in ways that convey numerically precise estimates of the quantities of substantive interest" (1998, 23). Gilham believes that, "quantitative data and its analysis can add to the overall picture" (Gilham 2000, 80). Finally, according to Brad T. Gomez, statistical analysis is beneficial as ,"the use of data to generate descriptions or summaries of political phenomena, facilitating comparisons across space and time, and the use of

available data to draw inferences about the broader political world" (Gomez 2009, 1). Though statistical analysis has obvious benefits in interpreting data, this methodological approach also fits well within the framework of my study.

For example, as this study is concerned with the entire European Union, a statistical analysis of data related to the EU would be effective in providing an aggregate model of my variables to determine if a correlation exists between them. Furthermore, a statistical analysis can allow countries that may have very different economic and social structures to be systematically compared with reference to my variables. For example, a descriptive statistical comparison of the original six members of the European Union with more recent members may provide insights into differences in attitudes of various states. Finally, a statistical analysis can establish variances between my variables within different countries, and therefore, help determine potential case studies.

Though a statistical analysis can provide insights regarding a potential relationship between the variables of my hypothesis, it would only provide an aggregate level analysis due to the absence of perfect data. Therefore, to further prove or disprove my hypothesis, there is a need to adopt a more individual level of analysis or content analysis. Within this study, the process of content analysis will resemble case study analysis as the various doctrines of different nationalist political parties will be analyzed. Bernard Berelson defines content analysis as, "a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communications" (Berelson 1952, 74). BD Prasad writes that, "content analysis falls in the interface of observation and document analysis" (2008, 2) and notes that when utilizing the content

analysis methodology, "The researcher asks the question, 'what do I want to find out from this communication content'" (2008, 9). According to Prasad, "Holsti (1968) says that it is any technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics of messages" (Prasad 2008, 2). In addition, Prasad writes that, Kerlinger (1986) defined content analysis as a, "method of studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective, and quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables" (2008, 2). According to Babbie, content analysis is, "essentially a coding operation," with coding being, "the process of transforming raw data into a standardized form" (Babbie 2001, p.309). Finally, Bryman recognizes that, "There is an emphasis on allowing categories to emerge out of data and on recognizing the significance for understanding the meaning of the context in which an item being analyzed (and the categories derived from it) appeared" (Bryman 2004, p.542). Therefore, it seems that content analysis of nationalist party documents would provide a systematic and objective way to determine possible relationships between my variables. Furthermore, through the process of coding, an applicable model or framework can be used to provide more systematic findings.

Prasad also notes that because content analysis is objective, systematic, and generalizable, it serves as an effective method to resolve hypotheses (Prasad 2008, 3). Content analysis can also, "reveal something about the nature of the audience" (Prasad 2008, 3). In addition, through the implementation of content and case study analysis, greater insight into whether the nationalist parties themselves advocate against European Union energy polices will be provided. Furthermore, this is an approach that seems to

have seldom been adopted by many articles related to nationalism and support for nationalist political parties.

In addition, other methodological approaches are somewhat inadequate for determining the accuracy of my hypothesis. For example, because my study is more concerned with contemporary nationalist movements, archival research is irrelevant. Furthermore, due to obvious limitations regarding travel, accurate survey research and interview strategies are not possible. In addition, a single case study method would provide good insight regarding the possible impact of European Union energy policies within one country. However, research of a single nation would not allow me to compare my results with other countries or areas of the world to confirm the relationship between my variables. Finally, as this study is attempting to provide analysis regarding nationalism and the European Union as a whole, a single case study does not seem to provide enough evidence to prove or disprove my hypothesis. Therefore, due to the in-depth research required as well as the need to systematically compare findings, the mixed method approach is the most effective means to provide an answer to my research question.

Before data collection can be implemented, variables within my study must be operationalized. In addition, data sources must be evaluated, and those nationalist parties that will be examined with content analysis must be finalized. The first objective is to identify each variable, determine how each will be operationalized, and resolve the means of data collection.

My independent variable is perceived unjust European Union energy policies. To operationalize this variable within the statistical analysis portion of my study, I will analyze Eurobarometer survey data. The Eurobarometer has monitored opinions and attitudes within the European Union since 1973 through the use of surveys and data collection regarding key topics and issue areas. One of the questions asked by the Eurobarometer Survey attempts to obtain information regarding European attitudes toward energy policies of the European Union. The question asks, "And for each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the (NATIONALITY) Government, or made jointly within the European Union?" (Eurobarometer 73.4, 561). One of these issue areas is energy policy. Though this question does not provide a perfect analysis of the grievances against European Union energy policies, it does provide a sense as to whether citizens of each European country have more or less faith in the energy policies of the EU as compared to their member states. Furthermore, a state in which many respondents endorse state level energy policy would suggest that European Union energy policy is unjust while a state in which many respondents are in favor of joint energy policy suggests that they consider EU energy policy to be just.

My dependent variable is support for nationalist political parties. To operationalize this variable within the statistical analysis portion of my study, I also will utilize Eurobarometer survey data. One of the questions asked by the Eurobarometer Survey attempts to determine which political party respondents within different countries align themselves. The question asks, "To which of the following political parties do you feel the closest to or the least furthest from?" (Eurobarometer 71.1, 543). This question is

asked to respondents from a number of European countries and utilizes the ZEUS Party Family Code to code those political parties within the individual state. For example, those parties given a number between 600-699 are nationalist political parties. Since the various answers provided to the survey have already been coded, it is possible to determine what number of respondents align themselves with nationalist political parties. Furthermore, since this variable has been coded, it allows the data to be systematically compared between different states (Eurobarometer 71.1, xx).

It is important to note that this data will come from a different survey from the previous year as the independent and dependent variable questions were asked different years. Given that the respondents are different, it will not be possible to run a traditional statistical analysis with the data. However, more basic statistical analyses can be run to provide insight regarding potential patterns and correlations between variables. In addition, it will be possible to utilize descriptive statistics to analyze patterns between EU energy and support for nationalist political parties of this time period.

After completion of this statistical analysis, each member state of the European Union will have data that relates to my independent variable and my dependent variable through the utilization of Eurobarometer survey data.

The following chart provides a sense of what the data may look like if my hypothesis is correct:

**Chart 1: Expected
Data Organization**

High belief that EU energy policies are unjust. (IV) **High levels of support for nationalist political parties. (DV)** <center>**A**</center>	**High belief that EU energy policies are unjust. (IV)** **Low levels of support for nationalist political parties. (DV).** <center>**B**</center>
Low belief that EU energy policies are unjust. (IV) **High levels of support for nationalist political parties. (DV)** <center>**C**</center>	**Low belief that EU energy policies are unjust. (IV)** **Low levels of support for nationalist political parties. (DV)** <center>**D**</center>

After accumulating and analyzing the data within the statistical analysis portion of my study, all countries will fit into one the four quadrants as outlined above. If my hypothesis is correct, most countries will be located in the yellow squares(labeled A and D) and if my hypothesis is not correct, most countries will be located in the green squares, (labeled B and C).

In addition to providing a descriptive statistical analysis of the data from two different data sets, another statistical analysis may be run using only the data from the 2009 Eurobarometer Survey. To operationalize my independent variable within this

statistical analysis, a question regarding the distribution of energy will be utilized. The question asks, "And for each of the following issues in (OUR COUNTRY), do you think that the European Union plays a positive role, a negative role, or neither positive nor negative role?" (Eurobarometer 71.1, 342). Though this question does not provide a perfect analysis of the grievances against the European Union with regard to energy policy, it does provide insights to the attitudes respondents had toward the EU with regard to energy supply. Those respondents who feel the European Union plays a negative role in energy supply would likely feel that the energy policies of the EU are unjust while those who feel the European Union plays a positive role in energy supply would likely view European Union energy policies as being more just than those who believe the European Union plays a negative role. The dependent variable within this statistical analysis will be the same as in the first statistical analysis as the question, " To which of the following political parties do you feel the closest to or the least furthest from?" (Eurobarometer 71.1, 543), will be utilized. In addition, results from questions that ask which political party a respondent last voted for or the party that respondents felt best represented them within the European Union level, will be analyzed and used as dependent variables within the regression models (Eurobarometer 71.1, 540, 679). These results using different dependent variables will be recorded and analyzed. Furthermore, various controls will be added to regression models to further provide insight regarding the relationship of the variables and whether certain contexts change the level of significance between the variables. These would include the time in which certain

countries joined the EU(newer or older members), the geography of countries(Eastern or Western Europe), and the GDP per capita levels of different countries.

After completing the statistical analysis aspects of my study, I will implement the content analysis portion of my study. The content analysis will consist of a further examination of nationalist political parties within two European countries to be determined from results of the statistical analysis portion of my study. The content analysis will consist of analyzing party doctrines of nationalist political parties to determine if they address grievances against EU energy policies. Determining if they do may provide evidence that those nationalist parties gain support by advocating against EU energy policies. Nationalist parties will be further examined in a country that has a high belief that EU energy policies are unjust and high support for nationalist political parties. The other case study will have high levels of the independent variable but not the dependent variable. In other words, the nationalist political parties will be further examined in a country that has a high level of belief that EU energy policies are unjust but low levels of support for nationalist political parties. In addition, the statistical analysis will be utilized to further determine case studies. The case study in which is there a high level of perceived unjust EU energy policies and high levels of support for nationalist political parties will be called Case A. The case study in which there is a high level of perceived unjust EU energy policies and low levels of support for nationalist political parties will be called Case B. Here is a diagram to demonstrate how cases will be chosen:

Chart 2: Case Study Determination

High levels of (IV) High levels of (DV). **Case 1**	High levels of (IV) Low levels of (DV). **Case 2**
Low levels of (IV) High levels of (DV)	Low levels of (IV) Low levels of. (DV)

It is also worth nothing that cases will have similar levels of GDP to isolate my independent and dependent variables as much as possible. The variance in the level of the dependent variable is important for the following reasons. If in Case A, it is found that the nationalist political party strongly advocates against EU energy policies, it would provide support for my hypothesis as it provides evidence that speaking out against EU energy policies is a main reason for the parties support. However, if there is little evidence that the nationalist party in Case A advocates against EU energy policies, it provides evidence in favor of the null hypothesis, or that EU energy policies are not a driving force of nationalist party support. If in Case B, it is found the nationalist party strongly advocates against EU energy policies, it provides evidence in favor of the null hypothesis as the nationalist party does not seem to be gaining support by speaking out against EU energy policies. However, if in Case B, it is found that the nationalist political

party does not advocate against EU energy policies, it provides evidence to support my hypothesis as it could be argued support for the nationalist party is low because they do not advocate against EU energy policies.

In essence, if there is more evidence that nationalist political parties in Case A advocate against EU energy policies as compared to Case B, it provides evidence that perceived unjust energy policies may in fact be a driving force for nationalist party support. Furthermore, it would directly provide evidence that those nationalist political parties that speak out against EU energy policies have more success than those parties that do not. This would suggest that perceived unjust EU energy policies may serve as a stronger causal link to nationalist party support as compared to other factors.

Chapter 4: Data Analysis

Statistical Analysis

As noted in the methodology section, this study will utilize a mixed method approach. The first method consists of a statistical analysis of survey data from the Eurobarometer Survey as it relates to my two variables. Having organized the data into excel tables and subsequently run regressions of the different variables using the Stata program, I am able to report on preliminary findings. Given the number of survey questions I utilized within the statistical analysis portion of my study, I will present the data by individually discussing the findings of each question to provide a more comprehensive analysis. However before individual questions are discussed, it is important to note that while the independent and dependent variables seem to share a relationship based upon P values, many regressions do not provide a statistically significant result. However, different variable models resulted in varying levels of significance.

Data for the first question was gathered from the May 2010 Eurobarometer Survey which asked if respondents were more in favor state level energy policies or joint energy policies with the EU (Eurobarometer 73.4, 561). Only the number of those who voted for state level policies were recorded, as their responses suggest that they have a grievance against the energy policies of the European Union.

The results are presented below with the country and the percentage of respondents in favor of state level energy policies. As noted in the methodology section, data from this question serves as the independent variable.

Graph 1: Percentage in Favor of State Level Energy Policies

Percentage in Favor of State Level Energy Policies

## Percentage in Favor of State Level Energy Policies

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 73.4

As evidenced by the charts above, Austria, Finland, and Great Britain all maintain the most support for state level energy policies. Other countries with higher levels of support for state level energy policies include Romania, Sweden, Northern Ireland,

Greece, and Bulgaria. Countries with the least support for state level energy policies include Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Cyprus, and Germany (Eurobarometer 73.4, 562). It is also important to acknowledge that while there is variance in the levels of support for state level energy policies, only Austria and the United Kingdom have support levels above fifty percent.

In order to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the independent variable of grievances against EU energy policies, data will also be recorded from a February 2009 Eurobarometer Survey which asked respondents to determine whether the European Union plays a negative, neutral, or positive role in the distribution of energy (Eurobarometer 71.1, 342). To measure grievances against EU energy policies, only those respondents said that the EU played a negative role in energy supply were recorded. The results are presented below with the country and the percentage of respondents that believe the EU plays a negative role in energy supply.

**Graph 2: Percentage that Believe EU
Plays a Negative Role in Energy Supply**

**Pecentage that Believe the EU Plays
a Negative Role in Energy Supply**

**Pecentage that Believe the EU plays
a Negative Role in Energy Supply**

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1

Countries with greatest percentage of respondents that said the EU plays a negative role included, Bulgaria, Great Britain, and Lithuania. Countries with the least percentage of people who believed the EU plays a negative role in energy supply include Cyprus and Denmark (Eurobarometer 71.1, 343).

In addition to using the Eurobarometer survey to collect data relating to my independent variable, I also utilized the Eurobarometer survey to collect data pertaining

to my dependent variable. The first question from which data was recorded from came from the February 2009 Eurobarometer Survey, which asked to which political party did the respondents feel the greatest attachment (Eurobarometer 71.1, 543). Respondents that said they felt closest to a nationalist or regionalist political party were recorded. The results are presented below with the country and percentage of respondents that feel the greatest attachment to a nationalist party.

Graph 3: Percentage that Feel Greatest Attachment to Nationalist Party

Percentage that Feel Greatest Attachment to Nationalist Party

Percentage that Feel Greatest Attachment to Nationalist Party

Pecentage that Feel Greatest Attachment fo Nationalist Party

Pecentage that Believe the EU plays a Negative Role in Energy Supply

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1

As evidenced by the chart above, Malta, Northern Ireland, Austria, Finland and Slovakia have the most support for nationalist or regionalist political parties. Denmark and Italy also have higher levels of support. However, countries such as Sweden, Cyprus, and Portugal have minimal if any support for nationalist parties (Eurobarometer 71.1, 544). As a whole, not many countries have more than ten percent support for nationalist parties. However, it is possible that this question was ineffective in capturing whether people have support for nationalist parties. Therefore, data from other Eurobarometer questions will be analyzed.

The second question data was recorded from asked respondents to which political party did they vote for in the last election (Eurobarometer 71.1, 540). Those respondents who said they voted for a nationalist political party were recorded. Results are presented below with the country and percentage of respondents who reported that they voted for a nationalist political party.

Graph 4: Percentage that Voted for Nationalist Party

Percentage that Voted for Nationalist Party

Percentage that Voted for Nationalist Party

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1

Countries with the greatest percentage of respondents that voted for a nationalist party include Malta, Slovakia, Northern Ireland, Austria, and Bulgaria. Countries with the fewest percentage of respondents who voted for a nationalist political party, included Hungary, Ireland, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Sweden (Eurobarometer 71.1, 540).

The final question that data was recorded from asked respondents to which party did they feel closest to on EU issues. Those respondents who said that they felt closest to a nationalist political party were recorded. Results are presented below which the country and the percentage of respondents who reported that they felt closest to a nationalist political party on EU issues (Eurobarometer 71.1, 579).

Graph 5: Percentage that Feel Closest to Nationalist Party on EU Issues

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1

Countries with the greatest percentage of respondents that felt closest to a nationalist party on EU issues included Malta, Slovakia, Northern Ireland, Austria, Bulgaria, and Lithuania. Countries with the fewest number of respondents that felt closest to a nationalist political party on EU issues included Cyprus, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, and Luxembourg. Based on a quick review on the data, it seems Austria, Malta, and Slovakia all have higher levels of support for nationalist parties while Sweden, Portugal, and Ireland seem to have lower levels of support for nationalist parties (Eurobarometer 71.1, 540). Following a report of the variables, regression models of the different variables were designed and run. It is important to note that Northern Ireland and Malta, given their outlier status, were not included in the regressions.

Table 1: Regression Analysis

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	.380 (3.182)	.553 (3.853)	1.033 (4.180).	2.421 (2.692)	.2812 (3.123)	1.014 (3.422)
State Level Support	.135 (.093)	.137 (.112)	.121 (.122)			
EU Plays Negative Role				.106 (.112)	.212 (.130)	.177 (.142)
P value	.159	.235	.331	.355	.117	.226
R^2	.081	.058	.040	.045	.099	.060
N	26	26	26	26	26	26

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 and 73.4. Dependent Variables are different depending on model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.

The first regression that was run utilized the dependent variable of attachment to nationalist political parties and the independent variable of support for more state level energy policies. As reported by Model 1, Table 1, the regression provided a P value of .159, which is not statistically significant and therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The second regression that was run utilized the same independent variable of support for state level energy policies but implemented the dependent variable of support for nationalist parties on EU issues. The results of the regression as reported by Table 1, Model 2, the regression provided a P value of .235, which is not statistically significant.

The third regression that was run utilized the same independent variable of support for state level energy policies but implemented the dependent variable of voted for a nationalist political party. The results of the regression as reported by Table 1, Model 3, provided a P value of .331 which is not statistically significant.

After running regressions using the independent variable of support for more state level energy policies with a variety of dependent variables, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The regression with the most statistically significant P value utilized the variable of support for nationalist political parties. Regressions were also run using the independent variable of a belief that the EU plays a negative role in the distribution of energy.

The first regression included the dependent variable of support for nationalist political parties. The results of the regression, as reported by Table 1, Model 4, provided a P value of .355, which is not statistically significant. As with previous regressions, the

linear graph of the variables suggested a positive correlation, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The second regression included the dependent variable of support for nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression as reported by Table 1, Model 5, provided a P value of .117, which is not statistically significant. As with previous regressions, though the variables suggested a positive correlation, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The third regression included the dependent variable of voted for a nationalist political party. The results of the regression, as reported by Table 1, Model 6, provided a P value of .226, which is not statistically significant. As with previous regressions, the linear graph of the variables suggested a positive correlation, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

After running regressions with the independent variable of a belief that the EU plays a negative role in energy supply with a variety of dependent variables, the null hypothesis cannon be rejected. The regression with the most statistically significant P value utilized the dependent variable of support for nationalist political parties on issues pertaining to the EU. However, none of the regressions provided a significant enough P value to reject the null hypothesis.

Though the regressions that utilized those independent and dependent variables outlined above did not provide a statistically significant P value, incorporating more control variables may provide different results. Therefore the 2011 GDP per capita (constant 2005 US dollars) of different countries will also be incorporated into the next

series of regressions as from the World Bank World Development Indicators Report

(World Bank, October 2013). As with the other regressions, Malta and Northern Ireland

will be excluded as outliers.

Table 2: Regression Analysis

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	14.169 (15.046)	3.024 (12.633)	1.833 (4.264)	2.731 (3.330)	2.709 (4.181)	1.402 (3.835)
State Level Support	.137 (.113)	.135 (.095)	.136 (.113)			
EU Plays Negative Role				.103 (.116)	.160 (.146)	.200 (.134)
GDP Per capita	.001 (.001)	.006 (.001)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
P value	.236	.168	.244	.386	.284	.148
R^2	.092	.082	.080	.036	.081	.109
N	26	26	26	26	26	26

Source: Data from Eurobaromter 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.

The first regression incorporated the independent variable of attachment to state

level energy policies and the dependent variable of support for nationalist political parties.

In addition the control variable of GDP will also be included. The results of the

regression as reported by Table 2, Model 1, provided a P value of .236, which is not

statistically significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

The second regression kept everything the same except the dependent variable shifted to voted for a nationalist political party. The results of the regression as reported by Table 2, Model 2 provided a P value of .168, which is not statistically significant. However, these results are more significant than the first regression.

The third regression changed the dependent variable to support for support for nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The regression as reported by Table 2, Model 3, provided a P value of .244, which is not statistically significant.

The next set of regressions incorporated the independent variable of a belief that the EU plays a negative role in energy supply. The first regression implemented the dependent variable of attachment to nationalist political parties. As reported by Table 2, Model 4, the regression provided a P value of .386, which is not statistically significant. In fact, this regression suggests that hardly any relationship between the variables exists.

The second regression implemented the dependent variable of voted for nationalist political parties. The results of the regression as reported by Table 2, Model 5, provided a P value of .284, which is not statistically significant.

Finally, the third regression implemented the dependent variable of support for nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression as reported by Table 2, Model 6, provided a P value of .148, which is not statistically significant.

After running regressions implementing the control variable of GDP per capita, the results largely mirror those regressions that didn't include GDP per capita. Therefore, it seems that while positive relationships exist between my variables, the resulting P values cannot reject the null hypothesis. However, it may be beneficial to document

difference between member states based upon respective economic wealth or date in

which they were admitted to the EU. These examinations may unlock keys as to what

may drive nationalist party support.

Table 3: Regression Analysis

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	-5.904 (14.578)	2.840 (14.634)	5.018 (17.71)	-4.675 (21.123)	1.978 (5.492)	-1.475 (26.033)
State Level Support	.367) (.560)	.205 (.520)	.128 (.251)	.262 (.473)	.099 (.151)	.221 (.641)
GDP Per capita		-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.001)		.000 (.000)
P value (Dep. Var).	.548	.719	.631	.603	.520	.738
R^2	.097	.446	.204	.065	.023	.020
N	6	6	8	8	20	12

Source: Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy. .

First a regression was run implementing the independent variable of support for

state level energy policies and the dependent variable of voted for nationalist political

parties. This regression only observed 6 case studies, or the original 6 members of the EU.

These include Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, France, Netherlands, and Belgium. The

results of the regression as reported by Table 3, Model 1, provided a P value of .548,

which is not statistically significant.

In a second regression, GDP per capita was added as a control variable. As reported by Table 3, Model 2, this changed the P value to .719 demonstrating a less significant relationship between the variables. This makes intuitive sense on one level because the original six members have higher GDP per capita than other new members.

This view is somewhat confirmed by a third regression that used the same variables but utilized the case studies of the eight countries with the highest GDP per capita. The results of the regression as reported by Table 3, Model 3, provided a P value of .631, which is statistically insignificant.

Interestingly, when the eight countries with the lowest GDP per capita were utilized as case studies, the P value became .603 as reported by Table 3, Model 4. Though this value is insignificant, they are slightly more significant than those of the higher GDP countries. However this difference is not large enough to be seen as a causal connection.

Therefore, the membership status might be a better predictor than the GDP per capita of countries. When the original six members were not included in the regression that implemented the independent variable of support for state level energy policies and the dependent variable of voted for nationalist parties, the P value was .520 as reported by Table 3, Model 5. This value is very similar to those of the original six members of the EU, with the newer members providing a slightly more significant P value.

Finally, when the GDP per capital was added as a control variable when analyzing the newest 12 members, the P value rose to .738 as reported by Table 3, Model 6, suggesting that the relationship was not significant and that new members demonstrate less of a relationship between the variables than the older members.

Though time of membership and GDP do not seem to be highly significant factors, perhaps the geographic location of respective countries may provide further insight regarding the level of significance between variables. Therefore, the EU countries were divided into Eastern and Western groups with twelve countries in the Western Group inclusive of Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. Eastern Group consisted of fourteen countries inclusive of: Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia.

Table 4: Regression Analysis

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	3.524 (5.371)	-1.96 (7.319)	2.530 (5.856)	-2.786 (4.961)	9.911 (22.731)	-1.444 (7.452)
State Level Support	.008 (.107)	.278 (.208)	.059 (.117)	.170 (.148)	-.043 (.455)	.268 (.211)
GDP Per capita	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (000)
P value	.941	.205	.627	.275	.925	.229
R^2	.009	.143	.043	.279	.001	.127
N	12	14	12	14	12	14

Source: Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.

The first set of regressions incorporated the dependent variable of voted for a nationalist party, the independent variable of support for state level energy policies, and a control variable of GDP per capita. The results of the regression using the Western Countries provided a p value of .941 as reported by Table 4, Model 1, which is very insignificant.

The results of the regression using the Eastern Group provided a P value of .205 as reported by Table 4, Model 2, which is not statistically significant, but much more significant than the Western Group. This suggests that the variables within the study might be more significant within Eastern Europe.

The second set of regressions changed the dependent variable to attachment to nationalist political parties. The results of the regression using the Western Group provided a P value of .627 as reported by Table 4, Model 3, which is not statistically significant.

The results of the regression using the Eastern Group provided a P value of .275 as reported by Table 4, Model 4, which is not statistically significant. However, these values demonstrate the same pattern of the variables being more significant within Eastern European Countries.

The third set of regressions changed the dependent variable to support for nationalist parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression using the Western Group provided a P value of .925 as reported by Table 4, Model 5.

The results of the regression using the Eastern Group provide a P value of .229 as reported by Table 4, Model 6. As seen with the previous regressions, the variables are more significant in Eastern Europe as compared to Western Europe.

The next set of regressions incorporated the independent variable with a belief that the EU plays a negative role in energy supply, the dependent variable of voted for nationalist political parties, and a control variable of GDP per capita.

Table 5: Regression Analysis

Model	1	2	3	4	5	6
Constant	7.732 (4.479)	-4.819 (6.347)	8.787 (5.018)	-4.826 (4.087)	6.877 (5.052)	-6.474 (5.186)
EU Plays Negative Role	-.154 (.137)	.369 (.211)	-.152 (.153)	.277 (.136)	-.119 (.154)	.413 (.172)
GDP Per capita	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
P value	.290	.108	.346	.066	.461	.035
R^2	.130	.247	.114	.413	.065	.386
N	12	14	12	14	12	14

Source: Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars. Dependent Variables are different depending on model. Variables listed with coefficient first then standard error in parentheses as from Stata regression. State Level Support relates to state level energy policies and EU plays negative role relates to negative role in distribution of energy.

The results of the regression for the Western Group provided a P value of .290 as reported by Table 5, Model 1, which is not significant.

However, these values are more significant than the values for the Western Group using the previous independent variable. The results of the regression using the Eastern

Group provided a P value of .108 as reported by Table 5, Model 2. This value is extremely close to being statistically significant and remains consistent with the results of the previous regressions.

The next set of regressions changed the dependent variable to support for or attachment to nationalist political parties. The results of the regression for the Western Group provided a P value of .346 as reported by Table 5, Model 3, which is not statistically significant.

The results of the regression for the Eastern group provided a P value of .066 as reported by Table 5, Model 4, which is nearly or even statistically significant. As with previous regressions, the Eastern Group provided a more statistically significant regression.

The next set of regressions changed the dependent variable to support for nationalist political parties on issues pertaining to the EU. The results of the regression for the Western Group provided a P value of .461 as reported by Table 5, Model 5, which is not statistically significant.

The results of the regression for the Eastern Group provided a P value of .035 as reported by Table 5, Model 6, which is statistically significant.

As with previous regressions, the Eastern Group was more statistically significant. Furthermore, given the strong levels of significance, it seems that an argument could be made that variables within this study have a statistical relationship within the context of Eastern European countries.

In addition, it seems that a potential relationship between my variables may be better seen on an individual level. Perhaps the rhetoric of nationalist parties themselves is a linking factor between a dissatisfaction with EU energy policies and support for nationalist political parties. Therefore the rhetoric and party platforms of nationalist parties will be analyzed in two countries. One case study will be a country that has high levels of dissatisfaction with EU energy policies and high levels of support for nationalist political parties and the other case study will consist of a country with high levels of dissatisfaction with EU energy polices and low support for nationalist political parties. Analyzing the rhetoric of the nationalist parties themselves may provide a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between the variables. As evidenced by the data, Finland has high levels of support for state level energy policies and high levels of support for nationalist political parties while the Netherlands has higher levels of support for state energy policies, but low levels of support for nationalist political parties. Comparing the rhetoric and platforms of nationalist parties within these two countries may provide a more detailed examination of any possible connections between my variables.

Content Analysis of Case Studies

To further engage those variables outlined within my methodology section, content analysis of party doctrines of various nationalist political parties will be analyzed. As noted in the methodology section, one aspect of the content analysis will include the examination of those nationalist parties in countries with somewhat equal levels of support regarding the independent variable. However, one of these countries will have low levels of the dependent variable while the other will have high levels of the dependent variable. For this aspect of the study, those nationalist party doctrines within the countries of the Netherlands and Finland will be examined. In the Netherlands, 19 percent of those surveyed believed the EU played a negative role in energy supply while 15 percent of those surveyed in Finland believed the EU played a negative role (Eurobarometer 71.1, 342). However, 8.1 percent of those surveyed in Finland feel the greatest attachment to a nationalist party on EU issues while only 2 percent of those surveyed in the Netherlands feel the greatest attachment to a nationalist party on EU issues (Eurobarometer 71.1, 679). Therefore, if the hypothesized relationship between the variables is correct, it is expected that those nationalist parties in Finland would advocate more strongly against EU energy policies. In addition, it is important to note that the 2011GDP per capita(constant 2005 U.S. dollars is $38,926 in Finland and $41,366 in the Netherlands (World Bank, October 2013).

The nationalist party to be examined within the Netherlands will be the *Partij voor de Vrijheid* or the Party for Freedom. To analyze this party, the party doctrine as found on the website of the PVV will be analyzed. Given that the doctrine appears in

Dutch, the language was translated using Google Translate software. The party platform

begins by noting that the Netherlands should leave the EU and "close bilateral (FTA)

agreements with the EU" (*Partij Voor* 2010*,* 18). Furthermore, it reads, "The Freedom

Party wants to stop things like... various sustainability grants such as solar panels and red

diesel" (*Partij Voor* 2010, 19). In addition, the author writes, "Therefore the PVV

chooses lower taxes and reduce the tax on energy" (*Partij Voor* 2010, 19). In addition,

the author writes, "No more flight tax, CO2 taxes," and that the "energy sector should be

put in Dutch hands" (*Partij Voor* 2010, 21). The author also notes that, "Nuclear energy

remains, provided safely and responsibly," and "Never never ever European taxes"

(*Partij Voor* 2010, 21). Finally, under the Environment section of the platform, it reads,

"So no European rules that hamper growth" Furthermore, it says, "But who is better if

nature is in danger: We or Brussels? Exactly!" (*Partij Voor* 2010, 51) Following an

examination of the party platform, it does seem that the PVV does advocate rather

strongly against EU energy policies. Though, the survey data suggests support for this

nationalist party is low, it has become more powerful and recently became the third

largest party in representation within the Netherlands (Dutch, 2013).

The party that will be analyzed in Finland is the *Perussuomalaiset* or the True

Finns. As with the PVV, the party doctrine as found within the website of the True Finns

will be examined and translated using Google Translate. The True Finns note that they do

not want to "blindly follow the EU elite."(Persus S 2011, 34). In addition, "True Finns are

opposed to the so-called green tax reform" (Persus S 2011, 44). Furthermore, it reads,

"Many of the current government's peremptory tax and fee assessments, green energy

tax... have increased the tangible household costs" (Persus S 2011, 47). It is important to note that these grievances seem more concerned with the current state level government as compared to the EU. The author writes, "the new government must change climate policy direction to ensure basic industry survival and growth opportunities in our country" (Persus S 2011, 48). Interestingly, the author writes, "Categorically quantified emissions targets would have to cut production, which therefore, should be transferred to countries that are not committed to similar goals and decisions as the EU" (Persus S 2011, 48). Therefore it seems that the True Finns are favorable toward EU energy policies. However, the author does note, "The True Finns feel that Finland needs to diversify energy, which in the long be based on self-sufficiency (Persus S 2011, 51). There is a call to develop nuclear power within the party platform. In addition there is an emphasis on preserving rural ways of living and keeping energy costs low and equitable (Persus S 2011, 52-70). The party doctrines of the two parties suggests that the PVV has more volatile rhetoric with regard to EU energy policies as compared to the True Finn party. However, it is worth mentioning that the PVV party has gained more popularity within the Netherlands and has become the third largest party (Dutch, 2013). However, this cannot conclusively be linked to rhetoric against EU energy policy. It also does not seem that rhetoric against EU energy policies drives support for True Finns.

Though parties in the Netherlands and Finland provide an interesting comparison, examining other parties can provide further insight. The Swedish Democrats are a nationalist party within Sweden. Though Sweden has higher levels of support for state level energy policies, they do not have much support for nationalist political parties.

However, this seems to be changing based on recent elections (BBC News). Though they have a similar GDP to Finland and reside in a similar geographic location, support for the nationalist party in Sweden is less than in Finland. The party platform of the Swedish Democrats reads, "It is important for a nation to control its own energy, but this does not exclude that the energy system can be shared and developed through collaboration between nations" (Sweden 2014, 1). In addition they note they are "opposed to a common European Electricity exchange" (Swedish, 2014, 3). Given that recent elections have shown a recent rise in support for the Sweden Democrats, it is possible that their stance against some EU energy controls may play a factor.

The most significant results of the regressions occurred when Eastern European countries were isolated. These nationalist parties may have stronger rhetoric against EU energy policies. The party platform of *Partija Tvarka ir teisingumas* or the Order and Justice Party within Lithuania will be analyzed. The Order and Justice Party is the fourth largest party and lost four seats in the most recent election (Republic 2012). The author writes, "With the integration into the European Union structures, we must employ as much effectively as possible the existing Ignalina NPP resources and to remain the country producing and exporting the safe nuclear energy" (Order and Justice 2014, 6). Therefore, it seems that the nationalist party wants to ensure current nuclear development is sustained. However, the party actually seems somewhat favorable toward EU energy policy arrangements. The author writes, "The energy system should be necessarily restructured according to the European Union directive requirements" (Order and Justice 2014, 6). Furthermore, the platform of the party reads, "the Lithuanian energy system

must be integrated into the Baltic and European energy networks" (Order and Justice 2014, 6). Therefore, it does not seem that this nationalist party views EU energy policy as being unjust. Rather, there seems to be a desire to integrate within the system. However, there is a desire to maintain Lithuanian influence as evidenced by the authors claim that, "Lithuania shall become the important link of energy supply and transit" (6).

To provide further background regarding the attitudes of nationalist parties in Europe, the *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs*, or Freedom Party of Austria will also be examined. The Freedom Party of Austria recently became the third largest party and gained six seats in a recent election (National Election 2013). The author writes, "We want to invest in domestic energy sources and not in the purchase of emission allowances in the so-called environmental support abroad" (FPO 2014, 55). In addition, the author notes that the, "Freedom Party rejects a global emission rights trade and the financing of so-called environmental support from abroad" (FPO, 2014, 56). Furthermore, there is a strong emphasis on "energy independence" to avoid dependency (FPO 2014, 58). The Freedom Party also classifies the European agricultural policy as "a failure" (FPO 2014, 70). However, when discussing a reduction on VAT taxes related to energy, the Freedom Party notes that, "This measure would also correspond to the competition rules of the EU" (55). While both Austria and Lithuania certainly express skepticism toward the EU, there do not seem to be overt attacks against EU energy policies. It is important to note that the Freedom Party of Austria had stronger rhetoric against the EU energy policies as compared to the Order and Justice Party of Lithuania. Given that the Freedom Party of Austria has more support, it does provide some evidence for my hypothesis.

To provide more analysis regarding the relationship between my variables, the *Slovenska narodna strana* or the Slovak National Party will be analyzed. The Slovak Nationalist Party is the sixth largest party in Slovakia and lost nine seats in a recent election (Elections to the Parliament 2014). The author writes that the party will work to, "ensure the population of indigenous renewable energy resources that would have been significantly less influenced by fluctuations in world markets" (*Slovenska* 2014, 7). In addition, the author notes that they, "do not share a view of the opposition that the salvation of Slovakia is seen only in an increasing utilization of foreign investment and repetition of selling off national assets" (*Slovenska 2014*, 8). Furthermore, the author believes the party should, "develop pressure to stand together with other new Member Sates calling for the removal of discrimination and equality subsidy conditions in EU countries (unequal subsidies in old and new EU member states" (*Slovenska 2014*, 12). In addition, the party platform encourages those in power to, "preserve the sovereignty of the Slovak territory, its territorial and political integrity, ensuring internal and external security of citizens" (*Slovenska* 2014, 29). There does seem to be an emphasis questioning those policies of the EU and ensuring Slovakia has access to its own resources.

Finally, the LNNK party of Latvia will be analyzed a party a party which gained six seats in a recent election. The author of the party platform writes, "The main task of the Latvian energy sector, we believe in ensuring the security of energy supply, as well as maximum Latvia -based renewable resources" (*Tevzemei* 2014). However, the author also notes that, "as soon as possible supplying gas market liberalization, which is now the

Russian group 'Gazprom' and its Latvian subsidiary Latvian Gas "monopoly" (*Tevzemei*

2014) Therefore, it seems that the LNNK is more concerned about Russian influence than

EU influence regarding energy. Though the party expresses less caution for the EU than

Russia, the author outlines a way to "meet EU Requirements" (Tevzemei 2014). In

conclusion, it seems that the LNNK expresses more caution toward Russian energy

monopolies than EU energy policies. However, it is important to note that the LNNK

does not have as much support within Latvia as compared to the Slovak National Party in

Slovakia.

Discussion

After review of party doctrines of various nationalist parties within Europe, the results are mixed. Though Finland had more support for nationalist political parties as evidenced by the Eurobarometer survey, the rhetoric of the nationalist party was more favorable toward the EU than that of the nationalist party within the Netherlands. Sweden showed evidence of less support for nationalist political parties in the Eurobarometer survey. Therefore, the lack of strong rhetoric against EU energy policies by the Swedish Democrats suggests that there is some evidence for my hypothesis. However, support for the Swedish Democrats has grown in recent years, which makes it more difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship of my hypothesis within Sweden (BBC News 2010) However, other countries, such as Lithuania, did not have strong rhetoric against the EU even though the statistical analysis portion of the study suggested the Order and Justice Party would take a stronger stance against EU energy policy. The rhetoric of the Austrian nationalist party is more wary of EU energy policies. Given Austria's high levels of both the independent and dependent variables, it could be argued that there is evidence for my hypothesis. Furthermore, since the Freedom Party of Austria has achieved greater support in recent years, this could suggest a relationship similar to my hypothesis. The nationalist party within Slovakia also had stronger rhetoric against EU energy policies, and, given that Slovakia had high levels of both the independent and dependent variables, this also provides evidence for my hypothesis. Though the Latvian nationalist party expressed more angst toward the energy policies of Russia, a similar theme to my hypothesis could be detected which is the idea that a governing structure dictating energy policy can serve

as a source for nationalist party mobilization.

        The data analysis portion of my study also provided mixed results. Though many of the statistical models provided insignificant results, many of these results did provide evidence for a positive correlation between variables, and some models even provided a statistically significant result as reported by Table 5, Model 6. Therefore, a strong argument could be made that a relationship between GDP, negative perceptions of energy policies, and support for nationalist political parties exists within the context of Eastern Europe. These relationships seemed weaker in the context of Western Europe. Furthermore, it does not seem that time of membership had much impact on the relationship between the variables. Together, the statistical analysis and content analysis provides evidence that a positive correlation between variables does exist within a variety of contexts and that these relationships are most prominent within Eastern Europe. However, my hypothesis cannot be considered universally true throughout Europe.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

The purpose of this independent study project was to explore the relationship between energy policies of the European Union and support for nationalist political parties. Literature pertaining to various types of nationalism was reviewed to construct a theory of how perceived unjust EU energy policies affect nationalist party support. I argued that perceived unjust EU energy policies contribute to the rise in support for nationalist political parties. To test this hypothesis, I utilized data found within Eurobarometer Survey 71.1 and 73.4 from a variety of questions that related to my two variables. In addition, I applied numerous control variables. According to regression analyses of the data, it was determined that while there was a positive correlation between my variables, there only existed a statistically significant relationship within the context of Eastern Europe. From a more general standpoint or for Europe as a whole, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. Through content analysis of the party doctrines of various nationalist political parties, my hypothesis was both supported and unsupported. Therefore, the null hypothesis could not be rejected.

Though my hypothesis was not supported, my findings remain interesting and contribute to a greater understanding of the causes of nationalism. Given that nearly all models showed positive correlation between my variables, it suggests that perceived unjust energy policies from an interstate body such as the EU may play some sort of role in encouraging nationalism. However, more research is necessary to fully understand this potential relationship.

To potentially provide a more conclusive answer to my research question, the development of more individual level data is necessary. Though Eurobarometer questions and data were effective, my results were largely the product of aggregate data. Therefore, asking more direct questions, surveying more people, and having access to the responses of individuals, rather than groups, would further advance exploration into my hypothesis. Furthermore, without having direct access to people within various countries, it is more difficult to draw conclusions regarding their respective attitudes. Researchers may want to further investigate those countries within Eastern Europe to find more evidence to support my hypothesis. In addition, applying similar models of research to other regions of the world may provide further insights regarding a potential relationship between nationalist attitudes and energy policies.

Results of this study do have some practical applications for various state governments and those designers of interstate level policies. For example, given that there is some statistical significance between variables in poorer Eastern European countries, it does suggest that determining equitable policies should remain a priority of law-makers. The more general results of my study suggest that interstate energy policies may be beneficial and may not contribute directly to the rise of nationalist parties, suggesting that efforts to "green" current energy systems may not greatly disrupt state policies among those countries with more comparable GDP levels.

While results of this study have various implications, there may be flaws within my methodology that impacted results. I included various control variables to limit possible errors, but controlling for every aspect that may impact nationalist party support

is difficult. Various European countries all have different cultures and economies that GDP per capita may not be able to account for. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer survey questions were not perfect questions as they related to my independent variable. Given that a data set that directly asked about grievances against EU energy policies did not exist, I had to utilize questions that were directed toward energy supply or support for state level energy policies. Having more direct questions and more individual survey data may provide different results. In addition, given that not all questions relating to my variables were asked within the same data set, due to the fact that Eurobarometer Survey does not ask the same questions in each year, it resulted in the need to utilize different data sets of responses by different individuals. This may have contributed to a possible variance in results. Furthermore, given that the surveys only asked roughly 1500 people to respond within each country, the samples of the respondents may not have been representative of actual attitudes of the majority of citizens. Inexistence of perfect data may have resulted in imperfect results. Therefore, further investigation and research into determining attitudes of individuals regarding energy policy and utilizing methods that can result in a more direct data collection would be beneficial in further determining a relationship between energy policies and support for nationalist parties. My results suggest that there is likely no universal cause of nationalist party support. Rather, the context in which variables are applied seems to have great impact on discovering a statistically significant relationship.

In conclusion, my hypothesis that perceived unjust EU energy policies contribute to the support of nationalist political parties was not fully supported, but my results have

important implications for current and further research, as well as in applications for various policy makers interested in developing interstate energy agreements. The production and distribution of energy is critical in meeting the most basic needs of man: food, clothing, shelter. As the finite resources of energy dwindle, the laws of supply and demand will have consequences if technological advances cannot meet the demands. The emergence of nationalism as expressed through nationalist political parties seems if not evitable at some point in time.

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Appendix:
Data Tables Data from Eurobarometer 71.1 and 73.4 and World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars

Table 6: Independent Variable: Percentage In Favor of State Level Decisions Regarding Energy Policy

	Percentage In Favor of State Level Decisions Regarding Energy Policy
Austria	50.20
Belgium	25.10
Bulgaria	38.10
Cyprus	17.00
Czech Republic	39.70
Germany	21.70
Denmark	23.50
Estonia	31.00
Spain	34.00
Finland	49.60
France	26.30
Great Britain	52.90
Northern Ireland	40.90
Greece	37.30
Hungary	26.70
Ireland	33.30
Italy	28.00
Lithuania	22.20
Luxembourg	24.60
Latvia	21.60
Malta	30.30
Netherlands	29.60
Poland	32.50
Portugal	38.10
Romania	44.00
Sweden	41.00
Slovenia	34.10
Slovakia	32.90

Data from Eurobarometer 73.4

Table 7: Independent Variable: Percentage that Believe the EU plays a Negative Role in Energy Supply

	Percentage that Believe the EU plays a Negative Role in Energy Supply
Austria	28.80
Belgium	20.50
Bulgaria	43.00
Cyprus	9.80
Czech Republic	23.50
Germany	25.80
Denmark	10.00
Estonia	12.40
Spain	21.60
Finland	14.50
France	19.10
Great Britain	40.90
Northern Ireland	32.70
Greece	16.30
Hungary	26.40
Ireland	23.20
Italy	28.30
Lithuania	34.10
Luxembourg	19.90
Latvia	25.90
Malta	19.30
Netherlands	19.70
Poland	21.60
Portugal	23.40
Romania	18.70
Sweden	24.20
Slovenia	17.60
Slovakia	19.20

Data from Eurobarometer 73.4

Table 8: Dependent Variable Percentage that Feel Greatest Attachment to Nationalist Party

	Percentage that Feel Greatest Attachment to Nationalist Party
Austria	17.50
Belgium	4.90
Bulgaria	6.00
Cyprus	0.00
Czech Republic	1.30
Germany	2.30
Denmark	10.50
Estonia	1.20
Spain	3.50
Finland	9.10
France	2.20
Great Britain	6.50
Northern Ireland	29.10
Greece	2.00
Hungary	0.00
Ireland	0.00
Italy	8.30
Lithuania	10.20
Luxembourg	0.00
Latvia	6.60
Malta	48.40
Netherlands	4.80
Poland	2.20
Portugal	0.70
Romania	6.60
Sweden	0.00
Slovenia	7.00
Slovakia	12.10

Data from Eurobarometer 73.4

Table 9: Dependent Variable: Percentage that Voted for Nationalist Party in the Last Election

	Percentage that Voted for Nationalist Party in the Last Election
Austria	16.9
Belgium	7
Bulgaria	13.8
Cyprus	0
Czech Republic	0.3
Germany	1.8
Denmark	9.3
Estonia	0.4
Spain	1.8
Finland	7.1
France	2.3
Great Britain	4.8
Northern Ireland	29.2
Greece	1.9
Hungary	0
Ireland	0
Italy	8.3
Lithuania	7.8
Luxembourg	0
Latvia	8.6
Malta	49.4
Netherlands	2.3
Poland	0.8
Portugal	0.3
Romania	7.1
Sweden	0
Slovenia	5.7
Slovakia	22.5

Data from Eurobarometer 73.4

Table 10: Dependent Variable Percentage that Feel Closest to Nationalist Party on EU Issues

Percentage that Feel Closest to Nationalist Party on EU Issues	
Austria	16.9
Belgium	7
Bulgaria	13.8
Cyprus	0
Czech Republic	0.3
Germany	1.8
Denmark	9.3
Estonia	0.4
Spain	1.8
Finland	7.1
France	2.3
Great Britain	4.8
Northern Ireland	29.2
Greece	1.9
Hungary	0
Ireland	0
Italy	8.3
Lithuania	7.8
Luxembourg	0
Latvia	8.6
Malta	49.4
Netherlands	2.3
Poland	0.8
Portugal	0.3
Romania	7.1
Sweden	0
Slovenia	5.7
Slovakia	22.5

Data from Eurobarometer 73.4

Table 11: Control Variable: GDP per capita

Country	GDP per capita	Log GDP
Austria	39,815.40	10.59200905
Belgium	36,941.20	10.51708274
Bulgaria	4,572.00	8.427706025
Cyprus	22,686.10	10.02950768
Czech Republic	14,414.90	9.576017673
Germany	37,271	10.52597082
Denmark	46,699.20	10.75148231
Estonia	11,317.90	9.334140822
Spain	25,628.10	10.15144468
Finland	38,926.30	10.56942539
France	34,405.40	10.44596881
Great Britain	38,032.40	10.54619371
Greece	19,809	9.893891659
Hungary	11,147.10	9.318934653
Ireland	45,866.90	10.733499
Italy	29,156.30	10.28042629
Lithuania	9,577.90	9.16721364
Luxembourg	80,914.90	11.30115326
Latvia	7,840.70	8.967083395
Netherlands	41,366.40	10.63022424
Poland	10,387.40	9.248348812
Portugal	18,385.80	9.819333907
Romania	5,406.00	8.595264727
Sweden	44,078.90	10.69373649
Slovenia	19,126.60	9.858835315
Slovakia	14,730.50	9.597675453

Data from World Bank 2011 GDP per capita, Constant 2005 U.S. Dollars