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Livability and Smart Growth

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Introduction and Acknowledgements

This report offers the story of the Surdna Foundation's Initiative on Smart Growth, which took place in Utah, New Mexico, Maryland, and New Jersey from 1998 to 2003. It provides background on the evolution of the Foundation's Environment program and how that led to the formation of the Initiative, as well as how the Initiative was launched and carried out. It explores what the Foundation's assumptions were about the structure of the Initiative itself, its benefits to grantees and the field, the kind of outcomes grantee work was seeking to effect, and priority strategies for achieving these outcomes. It provides detailed case studies of what happened in each of the four states, both within and beyond the scope of the Surdna grants. Finally, it reflects on the Foundation's process and assumptions and the case studies and lays out lessons learned.

This text is intended primarily for a philanthropic audience: specifically those with interest in issues of smart growth and livable communities who may be able to draw ideas from what the Surdna Foundation did, why, and what it learned. It should also be useful for the organizations described herein who may wish to share the report with potential funders to provide an independent perspective on their work as well as context and examples. At the same time, anyone who is interested in tools and approaches for promoting smart growth should find the case studies and lessons learned useful.

The monograph is co-authored by Julia Parzen, independent consultant, and Hooper Brooks, Program Director for Environment of the Surdna Foundation. It is based upon primary documents such as grant proposals, grant reports, and Surdna Foundation meeting notes; secondary research on the four states; and selected follow up interviews with grantees. Surdna Foundation grantees provided invaluable assistance by reviewing and commenting on drafts of the monograph. Special thanks and recognition go to Alison Van Gorp for providing much of the content for "The Utah Story" through her Master's Project at the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies. We would also like to recognize and thank Dick Mark, whose three-year assessment of the Initiative provided useful background for the case studies and many of the ideas for the "Lessons Learned" portion of the monograph.

The content of the monograph is structured according to the following sections:

> **Context:** provides background on the Surdna Foundation and its transportation and smart growth work. It also reflects on Surdna's definition of smart growth.

The Surdna Foundation Story: describes the Surdna Foundation's goals, strategy, assumptions, and questions going into the Smart Growth Initiative and contrasts them against what actually happened.

The Four State Stories: contains stories from each of the four states, including the context, the roles and goals of Surdna Foundation grantees, and what actually happened.

Lessons Learned: reviews the common lessons, elements, and themes from the case studies, both for philanthropy and smart growth strategy.

Context

Surdna is a family foundation that was established in 1917. It has grant programs in five areas: Environment, Community Revitalization, Effective Citizenry, Arts, and Nonprofit Sector Support. Total annual Foundation grants currently average approximately $30 million. Since 1990, the Environment program has had one grant theme focused on formulating and implementing new policy for the linked goals of transportation and land use reform, namely, smart growth. In collaboration with other funders, the Surdna Foundation has played a leading role on smart growth in the foundation community and fostered significant results in the field.

Around 1990, Surdna started helping to create the institutions and shape the strategies leading to the visionary federal transportation law, the Intermodal Surface Transportation Enhancement Act of 1991 (ISTEA) and its successor, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA 21).[1] These laws and the advocacy for implementation that followed their enactment have made it possible for communities to use federal transportation dollars for a broader range of investments than highway augmentation, and to plan for how transportation can help to establish livable communities.

In the mid-1990s, as public and political awareness and concern about the environmental, social, and economic impacts of sprawl began to grow, the Surdna Foundation began to complement its transportation grants with support for policy development and advocacy for smart growth. The Surdna Foundation's transportation funding focused heavily on change at the top, especially federal spending and policy. It complemented this with a few strategically selected local, regional, and state advocacy campaigns to mobilize the grassroots and local communities to demand implementation of the new federal policy and use it as leverage for local policy and funding reform.

[1] The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) was the successor bill to the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act, which revolutionized the federal government's approach to expanding and maintaining the nation's network of highways, transit systems, and ancillary facilities. Passed in 1998, TEA-21 included completion of the Interstate Highway System; improved air quality in the nation's cities; greater integration of road, rail, transit, marine, and air transportation; and many other accomplishments.

When it came to smart growth, Surdna concluded that the frontlines for action should be at the state and local levels.

The Foundation's ultimate goal was to blaze a trail for smart growth across the country. However, in the absence of an overarching national legal framework for land use,

Surdna saw state mechanisms such as state zoning enabling legislation, statewide growth management legislation, and incentive programs for smart growth, as front-line tools. Reform of land use and environmental laws at the local level also played a role in the Foundation's strategy.

The Surdna Foundation has no single definition of smart growth. Since the Foundation funds different kinds of smart growth groups and projects, ranging from Smart Growth America to select local campaigns throughout the domestic United States, identifying a single set of universally shared criteria is an elusive goal.

For example, Smart Growth America's definition of smart growth is the consensus product of multiple organizations representing the different perspectives of a diverse coalition and diverse regions. It defines smart growth "according to its outcomes – outcomes that mirror the basic values of most Americans. Smart growth is growth that helps to achieve . . . six goals:" neighborhood livability; better access; less traffic; thriving cities, suburbs and towns; shared benefits; lower costs, lower taxes; keeping open space open. Each of the goals is followed by a paragraph that carefully details what the goals entail. This is a good springboard for a national coalition – it should help to begin to move multiple players in the right direction. To be useful in specific cases, however, there should be a more detailed vision of a desired settlement pattern with specific measurements of progress – and as public awareness and political will evolve towards acceptance of the need for smarter growth, the vision should become increasingly focused.

There are many definitions, each crafted to suit the politics, positioning, and timing of the defining group or individual. Therefore, it is not the specific definition that matters as much as the process by which the definition is developed and refined, and how its meaning evolves over time. Surdna strives to understand the baseline conditions at any given place and then looks for increasing clarity over time – about the important levers in the systems that affect growth, about vision, about goals and about metrics.

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The Surdna Foundation Story

DESIGN OF THE SURDNA INITIATIVE FOR SMART GROWTH AND LIVABLE COMMUNITIES

In May of 1999, the Surdna Foundation's staff and its Board Environment Committee began to explore a special grant-making focus on smart growth and development of livable communities. At the time, there were not many success stories. The progress made with land use zoning in Portland, Oregon was somewhat prominent, but groups in other parts of the country found it hard to relate to or replicate what was happening there. Nor was the Portland the only model for smart growth – there was much room to develop creative alternatives.

The Surdna Foundation team decided that the Foundation should help to foster a range of good examples in different geographic and organizational contexts. As a part of this, the Foundation sought places where strategic support of organizations and development of innovative strategies could yield significant results in a discreet timeframe. The results, important on their own, could also provide inspiration for the dozens of other efforts around the country.

To assist the selection process, the Surdna Foundation engaged the research division of the American Planning Association to develop selection criteria and survey the opportunities. The Surdna team also spoke with knowledgeable colleagues. The American Planning Association provided the Foundation with community and organization profiles for seventeen states and regions, and in-depth research and analysis on what it considered to be the five most promising places. The Foundation used this research, in addition to input from the foundation's staff, Board, and colleagues, to select the focus states for the Initiative.

Acknowledging the complexity of addressing smart growth and the long timeframes usually needed to achieve significant results, the Surdna Foundation chose places where there seemed to be momentum for change. The selection criteria included:

a receptive local population;

receptive government;

strong leadership in the business, government, or nonprofit sectors;

strong nonprofit organizational capacity in the region;

potential local, regional, or national funding partners;

a generally shared sense that valuable assets were at risk; and

approaches to smart growth that would seem replicable to other states. [m2]

The Surdna team recognized that not all criteria would be met in every place – rather, they were helpful indicators of potential. The case studies that follow include details on meeting these standards.

The Surdna staff and Board Committee for the Environment Program recommended that the Foundation support smart growth efforts at the state level in four states: New Mexico, New Jersey, Utah, and Maryland.

Once the board gave its approval of the identified areas, the Surdna staff spent several additional months learning about key organizations, issues, and players in each location. At the May 1999 Surdna board meeting, this team recommended that the board allocate $500,000 to get the ball rolling with the understanding that a final detailed set of proposals would be reviewed by the Environment Committee before the end of the fiscal year, (June 1999). The plan was for Surdna to invest about $1 million per year for three to five years in order to achieve a set of specific goals in each place. These investments were also intended to leverage dollars from other funders and support linkage and mutual learning between the four sites and collaborative dissemination of the results of the Surdna Foundation's Smart Growth and Community Livability Initiative.

The initial round of grants went to lead organizations in three of the four states: *New Jersey Future* in New Jersey, the *Chesapeake Bay Foundation* in Maryland, and *1000 Friends of New Mexico* in New Mexico. This preliminary funding was to allow these organizations to convene other groups to map out long-term strategies and broader packages of potential grants. Surdna participated closely in this process. In Utah, *Envision Utah* offered a fairly complete package by itself, so the initial convening phase was bypassed.

The Surdna Foundation's philosophy was to emphasize "learning by doing." Therefore, rather than undertaking a lengthy internal foundation process of additional data-gathering, convening, and study, the Surdna team worked with practitioners in each state to determine the best grant-making strategies for each state. Surdna's initial investment of $500,000 was relatively small once it had been distributed across the four projects. The Foundation staff decided that more could be accomplished faster by putting these dollars to work in the field immediately, then adjusting strategies and grant targets along the way as needed.

THINKING BEHIND THE INITIATIVE: ASSUMPTIONS AND THEORY

Assumptions

Surdna made several key assumptions in the framing of these grants as a part of the Smart Growth and Community Livability Initiative:

> The American Planning Association selection criteria would be a reliable tool for identifying the most promising opportunities.

> The Initiative framework would create greater value for the field of smart growth than the alternative of investing the same dollars over the same time period without geographic targeting, clustering, or convening.

> Surdna, by strategically providing support and opportunities for cross-learning, would help organizations to accelerate activity and develop innovative strategies in a shorter timeframe.

> Grantee organizations and individual players would also be strengthened by the shared learning process, consulting support, and workshops.

> Lead organizations in each location were the best suited to convene other groups and develop, in collaboration with Surdna, a strategic analysis that would lead to a sound long-range grant strategy.

> The outcomes would be important in and of themselves, but would also provide inspiration for other efforts around the country.

> A basic set of progress indicators would be developed in collaboration with grantees to help Surdna track the work, to help the participants assess and adjust strategies for effectiveness, and to help both in describing results.

Outcomes and Theory of Change

Surdna also approached the work with a range of general ideas about what good short-term and long-term smart growth outcomes might be and what combination of strategies, tools, and players would be best for achieving these outcomes.

Short-term outcomes were anticipated in two contexts:

1. Increased capacity of grantee organizations

    > at the individual level with the emergence of leaders in the field;

    > at the organizational level with development of skills and improved management; and

    > at the field level with establishment of coalitions, expansion of networks, development of communications strategies.

2. Changes in the public and/or private sector that would be levers for broader change such as:

    > improved government or private investment plans;

new economic incentives;

increased community participation;

engagement of under-represented groups;

a widely accepted vision, plan, or implementation strategy for each area;

significant, positive changes in policy (e.g. rules and incentives);

compelling pilot projects.

Long-term outcomes were more difficult to project. These would include such things as:

wide-spread changes in behavior of elected officials, developers, the general public;

broad and lasting changes in investment of public and private dollars;

extensive changes in the patterns of land use;

protection of key natural resources; and

development of significant indicators of community livability.

Surdna did not develop a rigid initial "theory of how things would be changed." Nor did it define what strategies, tools, and players should be deployed in each place. As the case studies demonstrate, much depended on the unique conditions of each location and the judgments of the practitioner communities. As such, Surdna approached the Initiative with general principles such as the importance of regional perspectives and the need for smart growth to be equitable growth.

The Surdna team did not think that regional outcomes necessarily required a regional approach from the outset, or that there would be a one-size-fits-all way to incorporate equity. It thought in terms of a kit of parts that would be applied in different sequences and combinations in different places. This kit would include such things as:

broad, diverse coalitions to push for and sustain change;

engagement of key stakeholders such as businesses and faith-based organizations;

the use of decision support tools;

the power of data and analysis to impel and instruct change;

the value of accountability mechanisms to track and adjust progress and keep others informed; and

the use of state-of-the-art communications techniques.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SMART GROWTH INITIATIVE

The Initiative was ultimately funded at approximately $1 million per year for five years, for a total of $5 million to be spent across the four states between May 1999 and May 2004. In addition to grants, the Surdna Foundation invested staff time and some additional dollars in: *leveraging grants, creating a process for learning and improvement, and developing a set of lessons learned.*

Leveraging Grants

Although limits on staff time and resources prevented an intensive level of collaboration, Surdna staff did work with its grantees to engage other local and national funders. In New Jersey, Surdna joined formally and informally with other New Jersey funders to develop a clearer sense of ongoing strategies, gaps in strategies, and funding needs. In Utah, Surdna staff and Dick Mark, on behalf of the Surdna Foundation, worked closely with staff from the Hewlett Foundation in support of Envision Utah. This collaborative effort included a joint site visit. The Foundation also held numerous one-on-one discussions with other funders regarding Maryland (especially Baltimore) and New Mexico. Other funders occasionally attended the Initiative meetings as well.

The Surdna Foundation believes that by bringing new resources to the table and committing to a five-year engagement, its support not only helped to accelerate capacity building, but also helped to leverage other funding support:

> It helped New Jersey Future to stabilize its organization by attracting new support from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation and an increase in annual funding from the William Penn Foundation. As a result, New Jersey Future was able to take on multi-year demographic, economic, and communications research. It was also able to formulate long-term policies, and it still had the flexible funding needed to create and seize opportunities for progress during Governor McGreevey's administration.

> Isles, another New Jersey non-profit organization, credits Surdna with allowing it to launch its urban-suburban regional equity coalition building process. At a time when it was difficult for Isles to attract support from traditional community development funders for this work, its plans were a good fit with the interests of the Surdna Foundation.

> It enabled the Baltimore Regional Partnership and Chesapeake Bay Foundation to expand and play an important roles in the Vision 2030 process. Strong public response to the Vision laid the groundwork for a subsequent series of events leading to the creation of the Baltimore Transit Alliance, which has attracted $250,000 in local funding support.

> It helped Envision Utah to match an Eccles Foundation challenge grant and keep its core program going as it ramped up with a special exit grant from the Hewlett Foundation (a one-time-only $3 million grant). Envision Utah's suc-

cess is directly related to the high level of funding it has sustained over many years. Envision Utah was able to work with and train a large share of Salt Lake City public and private leaders because of its success in raising funds for this purpose.

According to 1000 Friends of New Mexico, without Surdna support, the creation of the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future would not have been possible for several years and the opportunity to encourage debate about smart growth issues during the 2003 elections would have been missed.

At the outset, Surdna's plan was to exit or diminish funding for grantees after five years. The premise for this was that by that time the grantees would have had cultivated other, potentially large, funding sources and that the Initiative would have fostered broader awareness in the funding community of smart growth work. In at least two cases, shifts in the priorities of anticipated future funders and the overall downturn in foundation grant budgets, tracking the economy, meant that long-term funding plans were set back. This has been felt most keenly in New Mexico and Utah, but has generally required programmatic and organizational belt tightening across the board. These are the kinds of changes that make the design of successful exit strategies for programs such as the Smart Growth Initiatives a major challenge. However, the Surdna Foundation was clear about the timeframe from the outset, so the organizations involved were not surprised.

Creating a Process for Learning and Improvement

In keeping with its "learn by doing" philosophy, the Foundation convened four meetings of Initiative grantees – one in each of the Initiative locations – between February 2000 and October 2002. At each meeting, the host state's grantees arranged for informative and provocative site visits and guest speakers to educate the group on relevant local issues and projects. Each meeting also included presentations and updates on grantee work and on smart growth progress in each location, which was followed by constructive group commentary. Surdna also hosted workshops to bring forward important ideas and resources. These provided a venue for experts to speak on topics that could improve grantee work such as decision support tools, list enhancement techniques, and systems thinking. In June 2004, the Initiative grantees came together again for a fifth meeting to share their progress and lessons learned.

The five Initiative meetings helped to build relationships among the grantees and resulted in shared learning. In addition to leaders of grantee organizations, the Initiative meetings included other staff members of these organizations, local elected officials, business leaders, and board members from the grantee organizations and the Surdna Foundation. Over time the grantees began to consult their colleagues in other states on questions and concerns related to their projects. They were also encouraged to critique each other's work, identifying strengths and weaknesses based on their own experiences.

During this time, Surdna also engaged Dick Mark, director of Environmental Media Services and co-founder of the Buttonwood Partnership, as an outside expert

to work with grantees to enrich the learning process. Mr. Mark helped the Surdna Foundation grantees to develop or enhance their measures of progress. The hope was that this work would lead to a simple set of generic indicators that would provide comparability and a common vocabulary, and be a tool to help Surdna, its grantees, and others (e.g., funders and the public) to communicate on smart growth. However, benchmarking and indicators were completely new to most grantees. The general feeling among participants was that it would take more time and resources to get their heads around quality work on indicators than they had, so there was little enthusiasm for taking it on. Grantees felt it was sufficient to develop progress measures for their own organizations without working on comparability of measures. While it proved to be too difficult to compare work and progress between sites and organizations, through this exercise grantees still came to better understand the importance of measurement. As a result, they developed measures of progress for several years of the Initiative.

Dick Mark also provided direct advice to Surdna regarding technical assistance needs of grantees, organizational and policy challenges to success, dissemination of Initiative findings, and opportunities for staff intervention or participation with grantees on other issues. He interviewed leaders in each of the four states and produced a "snapshot" assessment of the grantees' strengths, weaknesses, and strategies. His assessment was edited for public consumption and circulated to all Initiative grantees. While this kind of analysis can raise sensitivities and is not always fully accepted, the grantees generally considered it constructive.

The Surdna Foundation also facilitated the sharing of tools and practices between grantees. For example, after learning about the Envision Utah visioning process through the Surdna Initiative, the Baltimore Regional Partnership decided that this method offered possibilities for the Baltimore 2030 vision plan process. As a result, Envision Utah's executive director met with the Baltimore Regional Partnership and Maryland government officials just prior to the Maryland Initiative meeting. The Surdna Foundation covered the additional travel expenses.

While a complete accounting of all non-grant expenses for the Initiative has not been prepared, Surdna estimates that it spent between $150,000 and $200,000 on additional meeting costs (travel, lodging, meals, meeting space), Surdna staff time, consultants, and report preparations.

Lessons for the Field

Throughout the process, the Foundation staff kept track of findings and insights that could be helpful to other funders and the field. Some of this information has already been disseminated through a Funders' Network on Smart Growth email publication and by selected distribution of Dick Mark's report. This monograph represents the final step in the Surdna Foundation's effort to share its lessons with the field.

The Utah Story: Bottom Up in a Conservative State

A Case Study of Providing the Table Where All Parties are Welcome

"There are not many places like Portland. There are many more like Salt Lake City."
— Keith Bartholomew, attorney, 1000 Friends of Oregon

CONTEXT[3]

Utah is the sixth most urban state in the nation, with 88 percent of its population living in urban areas as of the 2000 census. Utah's population is largely middle class, with a higher-than-average percentage of school-age children and elderly than other states. Utah is a strongly Republican state. In 2003, the governor, both US senators, two of three US representatives, 56 of 75 state representatives, and 22 of 29 state senators were Republicans. Seventy-five percent of Utah's land is publicly owned.

Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints are a strong political force in Utah. Ninety percent of the Utah state legislature are members, as are all of the judges on the state supreme court, and the entire Salt Lake City council. Church members are generally Republicans, with 69 percent reporting GOP affiliation compared to 57 percent of Utahans as a whole. Latter-Day Saints voters generally have a higher voter turnout than those not affiliated with the Church. Because Latter-Day Saints membership is so prevalent, there is cohesiveness to local beliefs, emphasizing family values (Van Gorp 2003).

The Greater Wasatch Area is home to four out of five Utah residents. This is a narrow 100 mile-long corridor that stretches north and south of Salt Lake City. The mountainous topography of the greater

A view of the shoreline along the Great Salt Lake, which Envision Utah has sought to protect through three Quality Growth Demonstration Projects.

Wasatch area provides a natural growth boundary. It is composed of 10 counties, 91 cities, and 157 special service districts, each of which has its own authority over land use decisions.

Utah was one of the fastest growing states in the nation during the 1990s, and 80 percent of Utah's future growth is projected to take place in the Greater Wasatch Area. Nearly three-fourths of this growth will be internally generated, comprised of the children and grandchildren of current residents.[4] The Governor's Office of Planning and Budget estimates that the area will add one million new residents between 1995 and 2020, pushing the population of 2.7 million.[5]

Utah politics strongly favor local control. Any infringement into a local community's ability to make its own decisions about land use would not be tolerated. Thus, while Utah has a history of comprehensive planning laws dating back to the 1920s, voters rejected a referendum on land-use planning in the early 1970s. Mike Leavitt, who was governor at the outset of the Surdna Initiative, was not interested in state land use legislation but supported the concept of quality growth, as have his successors Olene Walker and Jon Huntsman, Jr.

ROLES OF THE SURDNA FOUNDATION'S GRANTEES

Envision Utah was the Surdna Foundation's only grantee in Utah. To understand the Envision Utah case study, it is helpful to know some of the history of Envision Utah and its parent organization, the Coalition for Utah's Future.[6]

The Coalition for Utah's Future was established in the mid-1980s. Within a few years it had established its credibility in Utah as a community problem-solving organization. It had engaged key constituencies, including religious leaders, business leaders, ranchers, local officials, and nonprofit leaders, to work together on a variety of crucial problems, from childcare to transportation.

In 1995, the Coalition's Board formed the Quality Growth Steering Committee, a special committee to research how rapid population growth in the state might impact quality of life. This Committee included business leaders, the Governor's Office of Planning and Budget, Utah's largest residential developer, state legislators, urban planning advocates, and local government officials.

> Robert Grow, a prominent Salt Lake businessman, emerged as the leader of the Committee. Under Grow's leadership, the Committee studied the problems associated with Utah's rapid growth, and how to address them. In 1995, the Committee commissioned a public opinion poll aimed at pinpointing the issues of greatest concern to Utah residents. The poll showed that Utahans were so anxious about future growth that growth ranked above crime, safety, and other issues in the survey.

The Committee began to look for models being employed in other states to address growth issues that might be tailored to fit Utah's unique circumstance. One program

[4] Thompson, Kristin. *Engaging Citizens: Public Consultation and Participation in Urban Transportation Planning and Project Approval and Implementation.* A Report Prepared for the ECMT-OECD Workshop on Overcoming Institutional Barriers to Implementing Sustainable Urban Travel Policies. Palacio de Congresos, Madrid, Spain. 13-14 December 2000. Available at http://www1.oecd.org/cem/UrbTrav/Workshops/InstBarriers/Thompson.pdf. (Accessed 19 November 2003).

[5] Ibid.

[6] Much of this story was adapted from the History of Envision Utah found on the Envision Utah website.

considered was Portland Oregon's Metro 2040 process, which created regional goals and objectives to guide future growth. Another example was the Denver Regional Council of Governments' Metro Vision 2020 Framework, which was adopted in Colorado in 1995.

The Coalition approached Governor Mike Leavitt to ask him to form a committee to coordinate discussion of future growth challenges. The governor refused, as he felt this was a topic better managed by local jurisdictions. However, he did establish a sub-cabinet group within the state government to study the issue of future growth. The group was comprised of representatives from the state Department of Transportation, the Department of Environmental Quality, the Department of Community and Economic Development, the Department of Natural Resources, and others. This group's major recommendation was that the state should hold a high profile "summit" to discuss growth-related issues.

The Growth Summit took place in November 1995. The event was well publicized by the media and well attended by members of the state legislature. It focused on open space preservation and transportation, which were of particular interest to the public due to the impending reconstruction of Interstate 15, the main corridor through the state. The Summit was broadcast live on all four affiliates of the major networks. While television ratings of the event were low, it did raise awareness of the issues.

The Coalition for Utah's Future used the momentum from the Summit and the findings of its research to reach out to state agencies and legislators about the need for and the potential cost savings of a better approach to growth. The State Planning Coordinator, in particular, was impressed with the potential of geographic information system data gathering and modeling to aid better understanding of the impacts and costs of growth trends. During the next legislative session, the legislature appropriated $250,000 for "quality growth efficiency tools" to help regions and the state understand the implication of growth trends.[7]

The Growth Steering Committee then set out to build a public-private partnership of local and state officials and community, business, and civic leaders. The Committee opted to focus its efforts on the Greater Wasatch Area since 80 percent of Utah's future growth was projected to take place in that 100-mile long corridor. In preparation, the Committee interviewed approximately 150 community leaders including religious leaders, educators, business leaders, environmentalists, developers, mayors, city council members, legislators, utility companies, and minority and civic leaders. These interviews were critical both in helping the Committee decide how to proceed and in building support for a process to address growth issues.

As part of its stakeholder interviews, the Coalition for Utah's Future identified names of potential members for the partnership. Rather than inviting the usual cast of characters to participate, the Coalition identified stakeholders who had power to effect change from each of the cities and towns within the Greater Wasatch Area. Each prospective member was asked to bring expertise to the group and to sign a pledge to overlook individual interests. The Coalition invited over 100 people to join the new partnership and only one person declined.

Envision Utah was formally launched in January 1997 at a press conference and

[7] In subsequent years, it appropriated an additional $100,000 per year, with total appropriations reaching $550,000 by 1999.

partnership meeting. Its mission was *to help the residents of the Greater Wasatch Area to find a way to deal effectively with the growth-related challenges facing the region while preserving Utah's high quality of life for future generations.* The coalition's supporters took every opportunity to build relationships with local media, and several key members of the media served as partners or special advisors to the group, so by the time Envision Utah was launched, most news organizations were aware of it.[8]

> Local government support was particularly critical to the success of Envision Utah. Therefore, in addition to including local government officials as formal partners, the group made a point of engaging a range of local officials, including all area mayors, throughout the process – inviting them to meetings, seeking their input, and requesting their support for public meetings.

Envision Utah's initial funding included investments from foundations, in-kind support from the state, and funding from local governments in the study area based on their size and population.

CASE STUDY

A primary goal of Envision Utah was to engage all of the leaders and residents of the region in a process to consider what would define "quality growth" for the region. The group began with a survey to identify the values of people in the region and the strategy that they preferred for addressing growth issues. The poll showed that residents valued the peace of mind they felt living among people with common senses of honesty,

In 1999, Stephen Holbrook, Envision Utah Executive Director, speaks with Michael Leavitt, Utah Governor (1992 – 2003), and Jon Huntsman, Jr., the current Utah governor. Both governors served as Honorary Co-Chairs of Envision Utah.

morality, and ethics. Family ranked as a top concern, and because of this respondents indicated that they cared deeply about the quality of life for the next generation, which they wanted to stay in the region. When asked who could best deal with growth issues in Utah,

42 percent of those surveyed responded that residents were charged with this task;

20 percent thought the state government should handle it;

18 percent indicated that local governments should assume this responsibility; and

14 percent considered Utah businesses best equipped to assume control.

From this, Envision Utah concluded that it needed a process that would engage residents and draw upon the skills of both public and private leaders.

Envision Utah's next step was to use modeling and mapping to project the area's land use over the next 25 years under current conditions, and under several alternative scenarios. The baseline data were released to the public first – Envision Utah wanted people to be aware of where their region was headed if conditions did not change. The governor announced publicly that the state could not afford the projected costs of the infrastructure required for this scenario. At this and every stage of Envision Utah's process, media partners, who were invited to all meetings and kept informed of every step, provided coverage that kept residents informed.

Envision Utah hired Calthorpe Associates, a consulting firm with experience in regional planning. Calthorpe Associates developed a series of workshops to engage local leaders in choosing alternative development scenarios. The first workshop focused on the question of "Where Shall We Grow?" The second workshop took place a month later and focused on the question of "How Shall we Grow?" Envision Utah invited its 100 partners and special advisors, as well as every mayor and city planner in the Greater Wasatch Area to these events. More than 200 people participated.

> At both workshops, small breakout groups were given maps and paper chips to identify areas that should be designated as open space and areas acceptable for development. At the second workshop, the same small groups chose among standard forms of development and alternatives that included walkable, mixed-use developments of different densities. The resulting maps showed a preference for higher density walkable developments, especially along transit corridors (Van Gorp 2003).

Envision Utah also held 15 Regional Design Workshops in communities throughout the Area to engage the broader public as well as seven Community Options Workshops. Together, these events attracted over 1000 residents. At the Community Options Workshops, residents were able to choose between development types through a visualization survey format. Participants preferred the more walkable environments, and design seemed to matter more to participants than density.

Utah residents participate in regional mapping workshops. More than 2090 community workshops have been held to look at housing, transportation, trails, open land, and employment choices.

Envision Utah combined the results of the various workshops into four scenarios for future growth, which represented varying levels of dispersion of housing and investment in public transit. The Quality Growth Efficiency Tools funded by the legislature were employed: the group used a modeling process similar to that of the

baseline study to project out the pattern of growth under each of the scenarios. This modeling also analyzed the costs and benefits of each scenario in terms of vehicle miles traveled, water consumption, and infrastructure costs. The disparity in the impacts of each was dramatic when they were projected out 20 years.

Once the four scenarios were developed, Envision Utah launched a widespread media campaign in January 1999 to educate residents about their efforts and to get them involved in the decision-making process. The group planned this media campaign for over a year. Its leaders felt that their success depended on engaging the public. The group held a press conference announcing the four scenarios and offered a press tour for the managers, editors, and reporters of the largest newspapers and television stations. It placed local television and radio advertisements worth over $200,000, of which $140,000 was donated, asking people to look for an upcoming newspaper insert.

The newspaper insert contained overviews of the four scenarios and a qualitative description of their impacts. It also contained a mail-back survey that asked respondents to rank the scenarios and to indicate what they felt was the most significant challenge currently facing the region. Governor Leavitt and several local celebrities appeared in commercials alongside local children urging residents to get involved. A Public Broadcast Station documentary on the region's growth issues, which Envision Utah leaders had urged, also was aired at this time. A special Envision Utah insert went to teachers throughout the region, with a letter from the governor urging their participation.

Shortly after the newspaper survey was distributed, a series of 50 public meetings were held throughout the Greater Wasatch Area in order to provide a forum for discussion of growth issues within each community. In addition to the nearly 2,000 residents that attended the 50 public meetings, almost 17,500 people returned the survey by mail or on-line. These respondents were overwhelmingly in favor of the scenarios that had less dispersed development patterns and more public transit.

> With greater public awareness, Envision Utah also experienced stronger opposition both from environmentalists who thought the group was advocating growth and libertarians who believed that Envision Utah wanted to constrain property rights. Envision Utah staff and leaders met with every opponent and responded to every letter to the editor. Because news organizations were already familiar with the growth scenarios, they did not jump to report every criticism.

Envision Utah also experienced greater support from the governor. In 1999, he put forward the Quality Growth Act of 1999, which proposed a Quality Growth Commission, incentives for quality growth areas, and guidelines for preserving open space. Envision Utah worked to ensure that local officials were involved in forming the legislation, bringing together possible opposing interests and helping to address potential concerns about the legislation. The group helped to arrange for and sponsor a weekly caucus, which produced many improvements to the drafts. Envision Utah's publicity campaign coincided with the opening weeks of the legislative session. The legislation passed.

Before Envision Utah staff could move forward to promote the type of growth patterns the community supported, they wanted a better understanding of how the community thought changes in growth patterns should be achieved. They held another round of 50 public meetings to collect ideas for how to modify current plans and policies. The findings from the workshops and other data were used to generate a list of Quality Growth strategies. Envision Utah also began working with the recently established Quality Growth Commission to develop a new series of Community Design Workshops. Envision Utah invited all 91 cities and 10 counties of the Greater Wasatch Areas to participate in planning efforts. Eight cities applied to participate in six different projects. Calthorpe Associates worked with each of the cities to develop a plan for growth. Developers, property owners and city officials had the opportunity to work together, see the trade-offs they needed to consider, and reach consensus on how to solve local problems.

Based upon all of these inputs, Envision Utah developed the "ready for prime time" Quality Growth Strategy. This Strategy was a refined version of the scenario preferred by survey respondents. When the Quality Growth Strategy was compared with the original baseline model, it showed that modest changes in personal living decisions could result in major changes in land and resource consumption over the long term. For example, by reducing average lot sizes by 0.06 acres, 116 square miles of agricultural land and 171 square miles of undeveloped land could be spared from development. Envision Utah's Quality Growth Strategy relied on 32 criteria, including:

> pedestrian friendly/walkable communities;
>
> housing choices;
>
> infill development;[9] and
>
> regional public transportation choices.

The Quality Growth Strategy was released to the public with a second media campaign near the beginning of 2000. The format of this campaign was similar to the one announcing the four future growth scenarios. Heavy emphasis was placed on the benefits of the plan to communities. Another newspaper insert including a mail-back survey was distributed, with the aim of getting feedback on the Strategy. Envision Utah received 6,045 responses to the survey, which indicated strong support for the Strategy, especially in the areas of critical lands preservation, public transit, and walkable communities.

Beyond educating residents about the Quality Growth Strategy and its goals, the media campaign helped to motivate residents to support implementation of the Strategy at the local and state levels. Envision Utah held educational presentations on the Quality Growth Strategy for the general public, local elected officials, business leaders, developers, and other key players throughout 2000. The group also polled a representative sample of residents throughout the region on the Quality Growth principles, which helped local officials to understand public the preferences on housing and design.[10]

[9] Infill development: a strategy that takes advantage of land availability closer to urban centers.

[10] Envision Utah continues to conduct regional public awareness campaigns every January, when it is able to get donated media time. In 2001, the campaign focused on tools and resources. In 2002, the focus was encouraging residents to share their vision with local officials. In 2003, the campaign showcased projects in the region that were demonstrating quality growth and invited the public to workshops where they could learn how to promote quality growth in their communities. The 2004 campaign addressed the need for housing choices for people of all income levels and the 2005 advertisements encouraged public involvement in promoting and developing an improved regional transportation system.

Envision Utah's Quality Growth Strategy depended heavily on the development of a regional public transit system and focusing significant portions of future development along the proposed rail lines. The Coalition for Utah's Future had begun laying the groundwork for regional transit back in 1990, when it collaborated with the Utah Transportation Authority to educate legislators about why they should authorize local voters to vote on a sales tax for transit. The legislature passed the authorization, but Wasatch voters rejected the sales tax option two years later. Nevertheless, the first transit line in the Wasatch Area opened in December 1999. It was built with existing funds (an existing 1/4 cent sales tax) and extra money received from the federal government for the Olympics. It was very well received, with ridership far exceeding expectations. Many Wasatch communities are now vying for extensions of the light rail system.

In the Spring of 2000, Envision Utah began to work behind the scenes to promote the region-wide public transportation system. Knowing that voters had rejected this same initiative eight years before, the group undertook an extensive education effort. The system was easier to sell in 2000 because residents could see the benefits of the first light rail line. In November 2000, voters in three counties agreed to tax themselves to build more rail lines and put more buses on the road. This initiative was expected to raise $43 million per year, a huge increase in Utah Transportation Authority's $90 million budget, and leverage hundreds of millions in federal funding. This was an important step in implementing the Quality Growth Strategy.

In the spirit of continuing to foster community involvement, the Envision Utah staff took a tour of 91 cities and towns and 10 county commissions in the Greater Wasatch Area to introduce to local officials the Quality Growth Strategy and to collect suggestions for implementing strategies. On the tour, many local officials expressed frustration about the lack of tools and resources available. At this point, Envision Utah realized that its role needed to evolve. The group hired professionals and brought together a team of 45 local officials, planning commissioners, realtors, developers, and planners to assist with the development of planning tools and tactics. While it would have been possible to adopt planning tools that had been created in and for other states, Envision Utah opted to engage local stakeholders in this process, developing specific strategies for Utah's politics and environment.

The Urban Planning Tools for Quality Growth "Toolbox" focused on 5 key areas:

> protecting sensitive lands;
>
> meeting housing needs;
>
> developing walkable communities;
>
> encouraging infill and redevelopment;
>
> conserving water resources.

The Toolbox included model development codes and design standards, detailed prototypical development types, and model programs to preserve open space.[11]

[11] By 2002 communities were asking for more tools, so Envision Utah created a supplement to the Toolbox that addressed four more areas: Walkable commercial development; Public safety and street design, Energy conservation, and Planning urban forests. In 2005, Envision Utah released a Municipal Economic Development Toolbox at an educational forum it hosted on the subject, and a Compact Housing Toolbox that who distributed to local jurisdictions in individual training sessions. Nearly 3,000 planners, local officials, realtors, developers, and others have attended workshops or more specialized training sessions on the Toolbox.

Once the toolbox was complete, Envision Utah offered a series of workshops for local leaders on how to use the it. The toolbox and workshops raised awareness among communities about what they could do, but people needed on-the-ground examples to convince them that tools could actually work. To this end, Envision Utah invited communities to participate in Quality Growth Demonstration Projects, and selected three communities based on their commitment to an open public involvement process.

A common process based on the strategies that had been successful at the regional level was developed for the three projects. The core process included:

Development of a steering committee made up of local public officials, business and community leaders, developers, environmental interests, and others to oversee all phases of the demonstration project, including developing a vision, selecting stakeholders, providing direction to the public involvement process, and assisting with implementation.

Selection of a consultant through a request-for-proposal process with the stipulation that each consultant agreed to utilize Envision Utah's community involvement approach.

A community involvement process similar to the previous Envision Utah workshops, in which participants were broken into small groups to create rough conceptual development plans. Envision Utah then aggregated the results of the workshop into a master plan for the area, which was presented to the public for comment and revision.

Presentation of the approved plan to each local government involved in the plan by the steering committee of the plan for discussion about their potential role in implementation.

With this level of community involvement, Envision Utah has found that communities are more likely to embrace the plans developed, making changes to their local codes, ordinances, and general plans to ensure successful implementation.

Southern Utah County is home to many beautiful landscapes.

The three initial demonstration projects resulted in the Davis County Shorelands Plan, The Nebo Community Vision, and the Ogden Wall Avenue Corridor Study. In Davis County, all of the nine communities involved in the process adopted the plan for preserving critical lands. Each of these local governments is working to designate sending and receiving areas for a proposed transfer of development rights program,[12] which will be implemented once all of the communities update their local ordinances.

[12] Transfer of development rights: a method for protecting land by transferring the "rights to develop" from one area to another.

Envision Utah has since taken on a number of additional demonstration projects. Among the more notable of these efforts were:

helping Tooele County fund and develop a master plan to protect sensitive lands and community identity in the face of dramatic growth;

working with Brigham City to prepare a general plan and implement transfer of development rights;

planning transit-oriented developments[13] in Sandy and West Valley City;

implementing community plans in the Kearns, Magna and Millcreek townships;

engaging the public to protect a resort atmosphere in the valleys above Ogden; and

streamlining the process to develop brownfield sites.[14]

In addition to the demonstration projects, Envision Utah also developed the Quality Growth Awards in conjunction with Governor Leavitt to recognize on-the-ground quality growth projects as an important factor protecting the quality of life in Utah. Since 2001, Envision Utah has hosted an annual awards ceremony and a publication highlighting each project in local papers. The 55 projects honored to date demonstrate that Envision Utah's goals are both sound and practical. Additionally, these projects provide an example of attractive developments that other communities can emulate. Awards honor both developers and communities in creating quality growth. The awards process has been useful in identifying new projects that fit the Quality Growth definition. Nominees for the awards have been involved in many kinds of development not previously seen in the Greater Wasatch Area.

In early 2001, the Wasatch Front Regional Council, the area's metropolitan planning organization, released its draft long-range plan for 2030. During the public comment period, there was a great deal of criticism about the emphasis of the plan on road building. Envision Utah worked with major mining, petroleum, and manufacturing interests in the region who wanted to air their concerns about the plan with local officials. Through the efforts of Envision Utah, a committee was formed to assess transit needs and recommend changes to the 2030 plan. This committee included representatives of the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Utah Transit Authority as well as several mayors.

Following Envision Utah's success as a facilitating body, the Regional Council voted to give it representation on its Executive Council. The original 2030 plan called for 150 miles of track-mileage or dedicated lanes at $2.1 billion. The revised plan that the committee developed called for 291 miles of track-mileage or dedicated lanes at $3.3 billion, including the most aggressive Bus Rapid Transit proposal in the country. This was another important step in achieving the Quality Growth Strategy.

By early 2002, Envision Utah had made a great deal of progress in what many considered a short time. As one mayor noted: "Walkable communities are now the default position." Planning commissions and mayors were starting to ask, "What does

[13] Transit Oriented Development: residential and commercial centers designed to maximize access by transit and non-motorized transportation.

[14] Brownfield property: property that has previously been developed, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.

This example of a walkable community shows a variety of services.

Envision Utah think?" when considering new developments. Envision Utah had impressive public and political acceptance and demand for its efforts. There was also growing interest from outside Utah for help in transferring and replicating the Envision Utah model.

In 2002, the Quality Growth Strategy took another step forward when the Utah Transit Authority purchased a 180-mile right-of-way from Union Pacific for $185 million. The purchase of this corridor allowed for the expansion of Utah's transit system by ensuring the long-term affordability of rail development. To make the transit-oriented development that was part of the Quality Growth Strategy possible, Envision Utah worked with Calthorpe Associates and Cooper, Roberts, and Simonsen (a local consultant), as well as a steering committee of key stakeholders to develop a set of tools to assist communities in planning for transit oriented development — the *Wasatch Front Transit Oriented Development Guidelines.*

After the release of Transit-Oriented Development Guidelines in November 2002, Envision Utah held workshops to train 500 developers, lenders, local officials, planners, realtors, and other interested citizens. Envision Utah also launched pilot projects in targeted communities located along the rail corridor. The projects used a process similar to that of the demonstration projects focused on developing site plans for transit-oriented development. Many of the communities involved in these projects decided to revise their ordinances to accommodate their plans, including transit-oriented development land use designations and mixed-use ordinances (Van Gorp 2003).

Throughout 2003, Envision Utah continued to hold educational forums, assist new demonstration projects, provide tools and technical assistance to communities, create school education programs, and advocate for planning processes for balanced transportation solutions.

In 2003 Envision Utah was able to catalyze the first "voluntary coming together" to consider alternative plans for growth in the Mountain View Corridor, a major corridor in the region. Local officials, the Utah Department of Transportation, the Utah Transit Authority, and the local associations of governments came together with the encouragement of the governor. There were concerns on all sides of this process. In particular, the Department of Transportation worried about whether there would be honest facilitation, but accepted Envision as Utah as facilitator because of its track record. Envision Utah was able run the process using its proven steps, including

a stakeholder committee;

publicity, (including signed letters to most local interests and advertisements in English and Spanish;

public workshops;

games that revealed options that otherwise would not have been considered;

scenarios;

a vision; and

implementation.

Together, the participants settled on a corridor of mixed-use transit nodes. Ten jurisdictions signed on to the process, two have already committed to implementing it, and the rest are in process.

Envision Utah also began to set the stage for the next step in achieving a regional public transit system. In 2001 the Wasatch Front Regional Council had revised its plan to spend almost a billion dollars more on transit, but it did not yet have the money to do so. The 2030 regional transportation plan assumed the legislature would authorize local voters to consider another 1/2-cent sales tax for transit. Envision Utah helped form a committee to plan the *Investing in Our Future Campaign*, a public awareness campaign in support of the transit expansion and necessary funding. Members of this committee included key legislators, representatives from the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Utah Transit Authority, key Envision Utah board members, and local elected officials. Envision Utah began working with the Salt Lake City Chamber of Commerce and other business groups on the Campaign. Envision Utah strongly suggested having the business community take the lead. At their suggestion, the Campaign expanded to include a road repair package to be funded through an increase in the state's gas tax.

The leaders of the Investing in Our Future Campaign prepared a special presentation for legislators that highlighted the regional benefits of transit and transit-oriented development, including water savings, affordable housing, and lower infrastructure costs. The Campaign's report described hundreds of potential stations

throughout the region and the potential economic and community benefits of each station. Envision Utah did everything it could to increase the credibility of its research, including hiring Cambridge Systematics to prepare the analysis of system costs and benefits and asking the Utah Foundation, a business-supported group, to oversee the release of the report.

The 2005 Legislature did not put anything on the ballot, but it did appropriate approximately $200 million for highways. The coalition worked throughout 2005 and will have a presence in the 2006 Legislature. Governor Huntsman made transportation a priority in his upcoming budget. There is some suggestion that the Legislature will consider putting a referendum on the November 2006 ballot to increase sales tax to accelerate completion of the transit extensions. If the legislature authorizes it, the public will vote on the funding mechanism in 2006. Envision Utah laid the political groundwork for legislative support through a public education campaign.

In January 2005, the local affiliates of ABC, CBS, FOX and NBC generously donated significant airings of two Envision Utah public service announcements. In addition, the NBC affiliate helped to produce and aired a half-hour Envision Utah documentary featuring many community, business, and political leaders expounding the benefits of an efficient public transportation system. Envision Utah also used newspaper ads and radio spots to promote the message.

Envision Utah believes the Quality Growth Strategy can succeed if the transit system can be completed in the next 10 years. The Wasatch Front Regional Council has concluded that if it has the additional 1/2 cent sales tax for transit, using creative financing, it will be able to build a complete system in 10 years, rather than the 30 years originally anticipated. Accelerating the completion of a regional transit system will increase the speed of development around transit stations, enabling the creation of more regional centers to absorb anticipated population growth. Extensive development around the stations in the next 10 years will allow for the best test of the system's ability to meet the mobility needs of the region in time to reconsider the need for many new roads. Every commuter line will offset also at least one lane of freeway traffic. The transit system should reduce the pressure for new roads in the more urban parts of the region and free up resources for needed rural roads in parts of the state that have been left out of past transportation plans.

The real test of Envision Utah's success will be whether it has a significant impact on decisions about infrastructure, land use, and density in the region. It is too soon to tell. Envision Utah is making progress toward this goal by helping to improve the quality of decisions by local governments, the State Department of Transportation and state water quality division, and others. It is seizing every opportunity to help parts of the region prepare new regional and local plans and codes consistent with the Quality Growth Strategy. In addition, it partnered with the area's metropolitan planning organizations, the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Mountainlands Association of Governments, on a new visioning process to develop the next long-range transportation plan. Known as Wasatch Choices 2040, this ambitious regional process incorporated workshops and "chip game" exercises to integrate land use and transportation planning with the plans of the two metropolitan planning organiza-

tions for the first time. Finally, Envision Utah is working on a legally defensible model of growth impacts that is more sensitive to the land use changes that take place around transit stations. Paul Wadell at University of Washington is developing this new model, which will hopefully be ready in time to be used in the 2036 transportation plan and could become the standard for all regions in the nation.

There are promising signs of change in practice since the advent of the Surdna Initiative.

The first light rail line was a success, enabling two more extensions to the rail system.

Suburban areas increasingly want stations and transit-oriented development in their communities, and mixed-use and apartment properties are gaining favor – Envision Utah is credited with these changes in climate.

The transit agency has made ridership its top goal.

The University of Utah, which for years had only a modest undergraduate urban planning program, is now seeing higher demand from students and has created a graduate program in response to the massive expansion of transit and the efforts of Envision Utah.

The Governor's Office of Planning and Budget is working with the Quality Growth Commission on Quality Growth Community Standards to set criteria to guide state investments in infrastructure.

The Wasatch Front Regional Council has a new executive director who is more attuned to smart growth concerns.

The growth principles that came out of the Wasatch Choices 2040 effort have been adapted by the state's largest metropolitan planning organizations, the Wasatch Front Regional Council and the Mountain Lands Association of Governments. These entities are run by mayors which, in effect, means the mayors have adopted these principles. Over time these principles will become significant as the MPOs guide federal transportation funds to communities that implement the principles.

As the Wasatch Front Regional Council begins work on its next long-range plan, it will include project selection criteria that stem from smart growth principles.

In addition, communities are making more and more changes to ordinances, general plans, and developments. There is a range of demonstration projects and community visioning projects, and there is a waiting list of other cities that hope to be involved with the Envision Utah process. Kennecott Land Co., owner of half the remaining developable land in the Salt Lake Valley, is developing a large Calthorpe-designed mixed-use pedestrian-oriented community that its president asserts will be "an enduring legacy of Envision Utah's principles." This community will include transit-oriented development around a proposed extension of the light rail line. Kennecott

intends to extend this model to its proposed developments all along the western bench of the valley. A 2003 Envision Utah poll showed that growth issues have become more important to Utahans, with a strong majority of respondents supporting walkable neighborhoods and housing options for low to moderate income residents.

A University of Utah survey of government planners, administrators, planning commission members, and elected officials showed that

> 100 percent were aware of Envision Utah;
>
> 96 percent were aware of the Quality Growth Strategy; and
>
> 93 percent had sent staff to Envision Utah for training.

Many observers believe that this progress is remarkable, especially in a conservative state.

Envision Utah got another boost in the 2004 elections when Jon M. Huntsman, Jr., former Chair of Envision Utah, was elected as Governor of Utah and Gary Herbert, a long-time member of the Envision Utah Steering Committee, won Lt. Governor.

This is still a small beginning. Envision Utah has finished phase one: It is now safe to talk about growth and tradeoffs. There are model projects and more ordinances. There is still very hard work ahead, as local leaders have to contend with the fact that there will be winners and losers. Not every project can be funded. Not every highway will be built. If tough choices are made, the highway builders and developers of large lot commercial and housing development will feel it. The question will be whether Envision Utah has built a broad enough base of support to carry the Quality Growth Strategy through when confronted with these hard choices.

For years, other regions have asked Envision Utah for help in replicating its process-es and tools. To date, Envision Utah has had little more to offer than a one-hour PowerPoint presentation. Planning organizations, public leaders, and foundations across the nation have expressed interest in discussing how to take the best examples from all of the regions that have adapted Envision Utah's approaches and produce teaching tools for more regions and, possibly, a clearinghouse for resources. There are signs that Envision Utah has a replicable model, and its leaders have began to explore this idea.

WHAT IT TAKES TO DO THIS WORK

The media coverage, the consultants and the staff required to run a program as involved as Envision Utah are relatively expensive. The Envision Utah budget for 2001 was $1,596,000 − $384,600 for salaries; $81,000 for administrative expenses; $1,116,000

for expenses associated with implementation tasks such as public awareness campaigns, quality growth demonstration projects, the local government toolbox, and polling and project assessments; the remainder went to fundraising expenses.

At the urging of a significant funder, Envision Utah decided to hire a planning staff, bringing more work in-house and reducing its consulting budget. Demand for demonstration projects also increased. The Envision Utah budget grew to $1,762,000 in 2004, with $829,000 going to employee compensation. When that funder changed priorities in 2004 and decided not to renew its grant, Envision Utah reduced its budget for 2005 to $1,367,000 with $690,000 going to employee compensation. The group anticipates that its long-run core annual budget will be somewhat smaller than the 2005 budget.

Envision Utah's initial funding sources were reflective of the Coalition's vision of a multi-stakeholder public-private partnership. The George S. and Dolores Doré Eccles Foundation was instrumental in getting Envision Utah off the ground by providing $150,000 in seed money as well as a $500,000 matching grant. This grant was matched two-to-one by public and private sources. The State of Utah provided half of this amount through in-kind support via the Quality Growth Efficiency Tools program. The remaining funding was raised from local governments within the study area, based on the size and population of the community (Van Gorp 2003).

The George S. and Dolores Doré Eccles Foundation has remained a significant source of funding for Envision Utah. This year, the Eccles Foundation made a three-year commitment to provide Envision Utah a two-to-one matching grant of up to $250,000 per year. Other private funding has come primarily from other national foundations, with smaller contributions coming from corporations, civic groups, municipalities, and individuals. Envision Utah has also been successful in securing major public funding sources. It has received federal grants through the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Highway Administration. In addition, it has received three separate appropriations from the U.S. Congress.

The New Mexico Story: Top Down and Bottom Up

A Case Study of Building a Diverse Statewide Coalition to Achieve State Growth Policies While Producing Local Success Stories

CONTEXT

New Mexico was the most rural state in the Surdna Foundation's Smart Growth Initiative and is one of the most rural states in the nation. Geographically, New Mexico is the fifth largest state in the nation, but it has just 2 million residents. It has three significant urban areas, which are where 43 percent of residents live. Fifty percent of New Mexico's land area is owned by the state and federal governments.

Montano Bridge, Albuquerque

The New Mexico state legislature, which includes representatives of both urban and rural constituencies, meets in odd numbered years for 60-day sessions during which all issues may be considered and in even numbered years for 30-day sessions that are limited to fiscal matters and issues that the governor asks the legislature to consider.

New Mexico's three main ethnic groups are Caucasians, Latinos, and Native Americans. About one-third of the people in New Mexico speak Spanish in everyday life. New Mexico residents have long-standing ties of families and neighborhoods to the land. People care about protecting the state's native heritage. They want to increase economic opportunities for everyone, but also to retain the open space and rural centers that make New Mexico so unique. A problem is finding language to match the state's unique rural character (Mark 2001).

The economic boom of the 1990s missed New Mexico, except for some elevated real estate prices for second and third homes around Santa Fe and other areas within easy distance of the state's major ski areas. When the Surdna Foundation Initiative began, communities desperate for jobs and overall economic development were eager to build new "ring" roads for companies willing to locate in their areas. Rural poverty was deep and had existed for multiple generations. The divide between rich and poor was vast, as it was between native and non-native cultures. Mobile homes were blossoming throughout rural areas as the only affordable housing available for low- and middle-income residents. Unemployment was high and out-migration common, especially among young professionals. Rural communities felt disenfranchised (Mark 2001).

Road Construction to Sprawl

Population growth has slowed in New Mexico, defying the prediction of the U.S. Census in 2000 that New Mexico would be the second fastest growing state through 2025. Like Utah, 50 to 70 percent of the population growth in New Mexico comes from the inside, making it possible to argue for protecting New Mexico for those who have grown up there.

In the late 1990s, other than the newest transplants from California or the East, few New Mexicans were worried about sprawl and over-development. The legislature and the governor were conservative about growth issues and had no interest in land use controls or zoning. The state had little precedent for growth management. Decisions about land use in New Mexico were made at the local level. Developers and home-builders were distrustful of the idea of smart growth. Public transportation barely existed. There were few transportation programs that enabled residents to get from city to city, and the bus system within the state's largest city, Albuquerque, provided very limited service (Mark 2001).

The issue that matters most in New Mexico is water, and water affects all development issues. For this reason, rural water associations and acequias, the historical entities that control water rights, have a lot of say in decisions about growth. Water is not only a driving issue, but can also be a bridge issue. Rural areas want to protect their water. Urban areas don't want to pay high rates for theirs (Mark 2002).

In 1999, there was little history of advocacy organizations working well together in New Mexico. There was, however, a long history of mainstream environmentalists seeming to ignore the interests of native populations, which further complicated the capacity to build coalitions around growth issues in the state. Smart growth advocates needed to differentiate themselves from mainstream environmentalists, but still express environmental concerns.

THE ROLES OF THE SURDNA FOUNDATION'S GRANTEES

1,000 Friends of New Mexico, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, the New Mexico Surface Transportation Policy Project, and the Council of Churches were the only groups truly focused on smart growth in the state in 2000.

Started in 1996, 1000 Friends of New Mexico had become the most visible and influential smart growth organization in the state. Its board reflected New Mexico's cultural and professional diversity. Two of its past presidents led redevelopment efforts in New Mexico cities. Other board members have been developers and past city council members. In 1999, 1000 Friends of New Mexico was focused on increasing public awareness of growth issues. The group felt that if it could build a broad statewide coalition, it would be possible to achieve new state growth policies, as well as more local successes in Santa Fe and Albuquerque, including new comprehensive plans, regional plans, and transportation plans that would incorporate smart growth policies.

As part of its Smart Growth Initiative, in 1999 Surdna gave 1000 Friends of New Mexico a grant for the development of a statewide smart growth coalition that would reflect the state's diverse historical, cultural, and demographic perspectives and key interests.[15] Part of the funding also went to 1000 Friends for its own work. The statewide coalition's purpose was to work on policies to address gaps in existing state land use, water management, and transportation laws.

To help address transportation issues, a portion of Surdna's grant to 1000 Friends went to the New Mexico office of the Surface Transportation Policy Project and the New Mexico Environmental Law Center. Funding for the Surface Transportation Policy Project was for state transportation policy research and advocacy. Funding for the New Mexico Environmental Law Center was to hire legal support. To help build the statewide constituency for smart growth, another portion of the grant went to the New Mexico Council of Churches. To help bring rural and water interests into the coalition, a portion of Surdna's 2002 grant went to the New Mexico Acequia Association.

The New Mexico Conference of Churches is a membership organization of 15 regional church bodies representing about 450 Catholic and Protestant parishes and congregations in New Mexico. Membership in these congregations is approximately 636,000, representing 38 percent of the state's population and 64 percent of the total faith adherence in the state. The New Mexico Conference of Churches planned to use the Surdna funding to educate and engage its congregations in the smart growth debate. This group was seen as a progressive organization with a heavy focus on environmental justice.

The New Mexico Acequia Association works to preserve traditional water rights and the economic and cultural traditions that sustain rural life throughout northern New Mexico. The viability of its member communities could be threatened by growth and the increasing value of water, which were creating pressures to sell water rights. The Surdna funding allowed Acequia Association to become part of the coalition.

[15] The Surdna Foundation also made an entirely separate grant to the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group Education Fund for its work on transportation and water issues.

In the last two years of the five-year Initiative, Surdna made a grant to the Western Environmental Law Center. The Surdna Foundation had heard about this group's efforts to assist elected and appointed officials in rural areas to fight unwanted development. Surdna Foundation staff saw a need for additional rural activity and thought that the Western Environmental Law Center could help. The Surdna Foundation asked 1000 Friends to work with Law Center, but provided a separate grant to enable the Law Center to expand its legal support for rural counties in north-central New Mexico to fight unwanted development and resource extraction challenges and, in some cases, to help them write entire zoning ordinances to manage growth.

CASE STUDY

In 1999, 1000 Friends of New Mexico reached out to a small group of New Mexico's expert organizers to discuss planning for a statewide smart growth coalition. This small group met several times and agreed to co-convene a larger group. By the end of the year, 1000 Friends was ready to launch a diverse statewide smart growth coalition. Twenty-five initial partners agreed to team up to build a broad constituency to support new state growth management policies and change the direction of growth management in New Mexico over the next five years. This was a very ambitious agenda, given that there was little precedent or support for land use policies in New Mexico. In addition, it was very difficult to bring groups together in New Mexico, where there had been on-going turf battles and fights over funding. 1,000 Friends and its partners hosted many meetings behind the scenes to allow people to mend rifts and see commonalities.

1,000 Friends of New Mexico and its early partners believed that a broad coalition would help them show how sprawl affected the concerns of the majority population. They agreed that the way to achieve comprehensive change was to focus on specific problems that were of concern to New Mexico residents and pursue specific remedies for them. It seemed especially important to the founding members of the coalition to recruit groups that were working to protect New Mexico's history, heritage, and environment; groups that represented many of the unique rural communities in New Mexico; and groups working for increased economic opportunities for the state. 1,000 Friends envisioned an even broader coalition that included civic, business, development, and agricultural leaders, once the core group was well-organized.

> 1,000 Friends contracted a well-respected consultant to coordinate the coalition and initiated the process of hiring a campaign director to work half-time in support of the coalition and half-time for 1000 Friends on campaign issues. The consultant helped the coalition to agree on its broad priorities, which included affordable housing, access to schools, economic improvement, agriculture lands and open space, community and cultural preservation, and transportation choices. A campaign strategy and timeline were developed with the expectation that statewide smart growth legislation (in whole or in part) could be introduced in 2001 and passed in 2003.

The core components of the strategy were:

1. research to reveal the impacts of current growth patterns (for example, a study of how suburban housing development was affecting home equity held by current Albuquerque homeowners);

2. communications to educate and make the case to communities and decision-makers;

3. on-going coalition building;

4. citizen outreach, including canvassing of 50,000 households by the Public Interest Research Group and Education Fund;

5. tracking development projects throughout the state and supporting the developers who wanted to do good projects;

6. slowing bad projects through litigation, and;

7. publicizing the views of New Mexico public leaders about smart growth, especially before elections.

1,000 Friends also planned to bring in experts from other areas, such as San Diego, Denver, Salt Lake City, and San Antonio, to share their smart growth approaches and what they had accomplished. Because it was important to have some on-the-ground success, 1000 Friends and other coalition members also pursued policy changes in Albuquerque and Santa Fe.

To begin developing specific growth policy options and strategies for consideration by members of the coalition, 1000 Friends contracted the New Mexico American Planning Association to prepare background research on New Mexico law compared with more progressive states. It wanted to identify specific gaps in New Mexico's land use, water, and transportation laws. It also began research to determine what new laws were likeliest to be accepted by policymakers. Given the central importance of improving statewide transportation policy, 1000 Friends proposed a special research Initiative by the New Mexico Surface Transportation Policy Project to help clarify campaign targets dealing with transportation.

By early 2000, the coalition had been named New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future. 1,000 Friends hired Lehua Lopez-Mau to be the Coalition's coordinator. Ms. Lopez-Mau had previously worked in New Mexico on native lands issues and had been a 1000 Friends board member. She was a highly dedicated organizer rooted in, and sensitive to, the many cultures of New Mexico. In her first six months of work, Coalition membership increased to about 35 organizations and work began on broad public outreach. An Executive Committee was formed, which included members from Great American Station Foundation, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group, the New Mexico Conference of Churches, the New Mexico Parent Teacher Association, and a number of state and local community organizations.

Although the Coalition was operating under the auspices of 1000 Friends, 1000 Friends tried to allow it to build an independent agenda. This was a challenge from the

start, which might be expected when a coalition is housed within one organization, shares staff, and receives funding through that organization. The Coalition's steering committee wanted the Coalition to act as a separate entity, while 1000 Friends felt it should exert some control, as 1000 Friends was ultimately was accountable to the Surdna Foundation.

Coalition Annual Meeting

The Coalition began the process of building a field presence geographically in the northern and southern parts of the state. It also stepped up its efforts to broaden support for smart growth policy among key constituencies, including the business community, economic development leaders, and agricultural and rural groups. The Coalition held its first annual meeting in December 2000, convening 40 organizations, which showed strong support for a number of initiatives.

> The Coalition also helped to create an entity called Businesses for Balanced Growth, based mostly in Albuquerque, to gauge public positions on Albuquerque growth issues and identify and support five development projects every year that needed help with neighborhood support or regulatory approval. This group soon had a membership of about 75 local businesses. It was organized around, and had a great deal of success working for, passage of Albuquerque's Planned Growth Strategy in 2002. Businesses for Balanced Growth lost momentum after the Planned Growth Strategy passed and the staff person who had been the engine for the group left. Her replacement was unable to establish the relationships necessary to keep the group together. A number of businesses remain interested in Businesses for Balanced Growth or some equivalent, but 1000 Friends does not have the staff resources to put it together in a way likely to be successful.

In mid-2000, 1000 Friends of New Mexico sponsored focus groups in two parts of the state to improve the Coalition's sense of what New Mexicans were concerned about. A statewide poll followed in April 2001. The polls revealed that public concern about growth issues was lower than in faster-growing Arizona or Colorado, but that New Mexicans were worried about how growth was affecting family, community, and water. The public also had relatively low confidence that growth decisions were being made fairly, honestly, or sensibly.

1,000 Friends and the Coalition advanced new state policy ideas that addressed the issues that the polls and focus groups had indicated were of greatest concern to the public, such as safe routes to school, comprehensive plan enforcement, smart building codes, and water conservation. Coalition members took advantage of every opportunity to raise their issues. They took active roles in advisory committees to the legislature, including a technical advisory team investigating problems in the state's land use laws. All of this activity raised the Coalition's and 1000 Friend's visibility in the legislature and helped to build a case for broader reform.[16]

At the same time, members of the Coalition felt they had to fend off road and development proposals that would contribute to sprawl. This was an appropriate activity for individual members rather than the Coalition. 1,000 Friends led opposition to several proposals to construct roads through the Petroglyph National Monument, which would have promoted sprawl on Albuquerque's west side, and to one loop road around Albuquerque, providing a positive mobility vision instead. In Santa Fe, it assisted local groups that were trying to oppose commercial and residential development around Santa Fe's new bypass. With help from the New Mexico Environmental Law Center and New Mexico Surface Transportation Policy Project, efforts to watchdog the State Highway Department also were much strengthened.

West Side Albuquerque

In 2001, the coalition members could claim some credit for a range of local successes. For example, Santa Fe city and its county adopted a cooperative regional planning authority ordinance based on momentum started by the Coalition. 1,000 Friends was the lead organization in supporting successful county tax measures for open space acquisition. A privately-funded $250 million Albuquerque downtown revitalization Initiative also was helped along by the work of 1000 Friends and its Coalition partners.

The state policy environment looked like it might improve in 2002 with the gubernatorial elections. The existing governor was term-limited, and there was a real possibility of a new governor who might be more sympathetic to the smart growth agenda. The executive director of 1000 Friends had observed how candidate education before and during a campaign could have a powerful impact. It also seemed that this would be something around which to organize the Coalition, which was still struggling to clarify its goals.

1,000 Friends sought to emulate the efforts in New Jersey to elevate smart growth issues to be part of the gubernatorial elections. The Coalition began working with leading gubernatorial candidates from both sides who were expected to run in 2002 to make sure that smart growth was a leading election issue.

In April 2001, 1000 Friends of New Mexico's executive director, Ned Farquhar, left after two years. Losing the person who had envisioned the Coalition and its role was a

[16] The fruits of this labor continue to be evident. In early 2005, the New Mexico Legislature was poised to enact legislation that could provide significant funding for safe routes to school, and water conservation has become a significant political issue, resulting in significant savings through aggressive conservation programs in Albuquerque and Santa Fe.

blow to 1000 Friends and the Coalition, especially since Farquhar had come from out-of-state and had left the state. The decision on a new executive director was made several months later, with a full recognition that it would be a tough task to reestablish 1000 Friends as a New Mexico-rooted organization with a long-term commitment to quality of life in the state. During its time without an executive director, 1000 Friends lost focus and vision, which also impacted the Coalition for a Livable Future. The new executive director of 1000 Friends had to concentrate on internal issues for many months before turning her attention to strategies and priorities for the Coalition.

The Coalition continued to be coordinated by Lehua Lopez-Mau whose skills with people and with coalition-building were nicely complemented by the management and strategic thinking talents of the new executive director of 1000 Friends. The Coalition was gaining new membership from local community organizations and neighborhood associations at the rate of one new member about every other week, including people of color and low-income people. It was achieving its goal of partnering with churches and faith leaders in the state, but it still lacked critical support from business groups, realtors, and developers. It set a goal that by the end of 2002 it would recruit at least six new chambers of commerce (it had two) and another dozen developers and realtors who would not only support its positions, but also help "spread the word" about good managed growth policies.

The Coalition released a new platform in May 2001. Its goals dealt with:

- community growth and development that contributes to healthy communities;

- reinvestment in schools, neighborhoods, and infrastructure in existing communities;

- government accountability and coordination of planning;

- new investments in transportation choices, affordable housing, and economic development in rural and urban communities;

- sustaining historic, cultural, land, and water resources; and

- providing a voice for residents.

However, with the change in leadership at 1000 Friends, the vision for the Coalition began to change. Farquhar had imagined 1000 Friends and the Coalition functioning like Envision Utah, providing a table for everyone, including leading business people, to collaborate on constructive policy ideas and try to help the state take small steps. In reality, the Coalition only represented the more activist nonprofit community. There had also been tension from the start within the Coalition as to whether to take time to build a strong coalition or aim for quick changes in state policy. Rather than focusing on small steps over many years, Coalition leaders decided to set their sights on comprehensive state land use legislation in 2003. Unfortunately, the guidelines for the working relationship between 1000 Friends and the Coalition were lost in the shuffle of staff.

Even in its transition year, 1000 Friends continued to be the most visible and influential smart growth organization in the state. It provided leadership to help many other organizations focus on smart growth and the closely related issues of water and transportation. 1,000 Friends, with help from the Coalition, made some progress on a statewide policy on water management. Coalition members helped to prevent passage of a $1.7 billion road-building bill. The Coalition proposed planning- and zoning-related legislation that did not progress, but still provided an opportunity for legislator education.

As in previous years, 2001 saw several local successes, such as the state's first transfer of development rights program for Santa Fe County. 1,000 Friends was in weekly communication with Santa Fe's city and county officials, and by the end of 2001 it expected both the city and county to agree on a Rio Grande Water Diversion Project for future land use proposals. Also by the end of 2001, 1000 Friends expected that Taos County and San Miguel County would adopt land conservation ordinances to protect agricultural and open space lands based on the unique, award-winning agricultural enhancement ordinance passed by Rio Arriba County a year earlier. By this point, most Santa Fe residents had heard of the Coalition and 1000 Friends, and their consistent (and persistent) growth management messages.

Downtown Albuquerque

At the same time, the Albuquerque downtown revitalization, stimulated in part by 1000 Friends, was taking hold. There was stronger public support for spending on revitalization of core corridors. In 2001, Albuquerque voters approved a 1/4 cent gross receipts tax increase, and the city increased transit service 25 percent by adding routes and times. By April 2002, transit use was up 11.17 percent. Progress also was made on stalling a loop road that would have allowed Albuquerque to sprawl 20 miles farther west. The New Mexico Conference of Churches, New Mexico Environmental Law Center and the Surface Transportation Policy Project all played key roles in this effort.

Northern New Mexico and the middle Rio Grande regions were not the only growth areas in the state. As a result of a Sprawl and Poverty Conference in Las Cruces in 2000 and a "southern tour" by Coalition staff in April 2001, the Coalition was receiving emails and phone calls from southern New Mexico every week. 1,000 Friends believed that the Coalition had to organize a broad constituency in southern New Mexico soon, and within the next year move an agenda of agricultural and open space protection coupled with an affordable housing program (based on several successful Santa Fe models) to address some of the critical needs citizens faced near the southern border. 1,000 Friends created and advertised the position of director for Southern New Mexico, which it planned to fill with an experienced community organizer by September 2001. The initial efforts to place staff in the south have not been successful but the group continues to receive regular requests for help in that

region. 1,000 Friends is aware of the need for organization and support in that area, and will consider an affiliate program when it has the resources.

> The Coalition and 1000 Friends felt increasingly well-positioned to advance smart growth issues during the 2002 election and to advocate for new policies after the election. The level of cooperation between rural communities, nontraditional environmentalists, farmers, churches, and water associations was better than it had ever been. The two groups had an ambitious 2002 action agenda and quality research and recommendations to offer the candidates. 1000 Friends wrote a report called *Taking Charge of Our Water Future: A Water Management Policy Guide for New Mexico in the 21st Century*, which received good press coverage and was praised by the Smart Growth Network. The Coalition delivered presentations on health and sprawl to a range of audiences. The Surface Transportation Policy Project, New Mexico Public Interest Research Group and Education Fund, and other coalition members developed a policy guide for the gubernatorial candidates on transportation and the importance of funding for transit.

The members of the Coalition began to organize their grassroots bases for the 2002 elections and 2003 legislative session. The Surface Transportation Policy Project continued to take the lead on transportation reform efforts, preparing for the 2003 legislature and an effort to involve the public in meaningful participation in transportation decisions in the middle Rio Grande Valley. The group's research revealed that New Mexico had the highest highway fatality rates in the nation and spent little on highway safety. Polling showed that the public supported improving safety. The Surface Transportation Policy Project raised both safety and transit issues in the governor's race. Along with 1000 Friends and the Coalition, it helped to cultivate gubernatorial and legislative champions for transit.

> The New Mexico Council of Churches, part of the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future's executive committee and a recipient of funds from the Surdna Foundation grant, had been focusing primarily on education for the first stage of the grant. In the beginning of 2002, it shifted to proactively engaging communities of faith in smart growth advocacy. In July 2002 the Council of Churches hired a part time project director with a background in environmental planning and organizing, as well as church experience, and organized the 50-member Sustainable Futures Task Force, which eventually grew to 200 people. The Task Force, which included both religious and public interest representatives, began to meet monthly, with about 25 people attending each meeting. It published and distributed white papers analyzing state water planning from the standpoint of eco-justice. It organized a Congregational Outreach Committee to activate church and religious leaders to participate in these policy efforts. It began to speak out at statewide events on matters of transportation and water planning. It also participated in policy advocacy in the state capitol on water conservation and growth management. On all of these activities, it coordinated with the Coalition.

During this time, the New Mexico Acequia Association, which works to preserve traditional water rights throughout northern New Mexico, also began to organize and advocate for smart growth policies to insure the viability of its member communities.

A major priority for 1000 Friends of New Mexico in this period was the passage of the Planned Growth Strategy by the Albuquerque City Council in September 2002. The Planned Growth Strategy was the first piece of smart growth land use policy for the city. It provided a framework for land use and growth through 2025, including provisions for impact fees, concurrency requirements,[17] and a mixed-use zoning amendment to encourage development of traditional neighborhoods. 1,000 Friends helped to form a coalition of organizations, businesses and individuals, obtained endorsements from 140 of them, commissioned a poll to demonstrate public support for planned growth, and generated a favorable public image for the strategy.

[17] Concurrency requirements ensure that specified public services are guaranteed to be available when a proposed development is completed at the time the development is approved.

This new coalition implemented a grassroots strategy that was largely led by Albuquerque Interfaith. In their efforts to bring the Strategy into the limelight, Albuquerque Interfaith and other members of this coalition

- arranged multiple presentations;
- set up a speaker's bureau;
- sent direct mail;
- knocked on doors;
- wrote letters to the editor;
- wrote newsletter articles; and
- provided testimony.

Nob Hill

The diverse coalition that supported the Planned Growth Strategy had a strong impact on elected officials, especially those from largely Hispanic, poor, and working class neighborhoods. The effort brought together and built new relationships between Albuquerque Interfaith, 1000 Friends, Albuquerque Friends Meeting, League of Women Voters, Sawmill Neighborhood Association, Sage Council, New Mexico Public Interest Research Group, New Mexico Council of Churches, and dozens of neighborhood and homeowner groups and businesses. (Colombo 2004)

As the 2002 gubernatorial elections loomed closer and the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future settled on a legislative agenda that it would support in 2003, Coalition staff geared up.

- They set up a listserv for members, a phone bank system, and a weekly newsletter.
- They stayed in constant touch with members to mobilize support for the legislation.

- In addition to polling to demonstrate the increase in voter support for growth management, the Coalition created a policy guide for the 2002 elections, *Leading New Mexico to a More Livable Future: A Voter's Policy Guide for the 2002 Elections*, which offered five key goals for the state. This guide was distributed to voters and candidates across the state.

Member support indicated that the Coalition had become a significant political force – it became a key constituency for the candidates. It used this strength to meet with members of the state legislature and Congressional delegation, as well as city council members to make sure everyone understood the policy goals. It held a press conference and pursued a broader media strategy to raise the visibility of its agenda and the public support demonstrated by its polls. The group received excellent press coverage, particularly when the polls showed that people cared about the issues in the policy guide.

The Coalition's statewide efforts to raise smart growth issues during the elections were successful, even though not all of its goals were achieved. Some state legislative candidates began talking about transportation, land use, and water, although not as many as members as the Coalition would have liked. The impact on the gubernatorial candidate policy positions was more significant. Democratic Candidate Bill Richardson came out in favor of a state water plan. He sought input from the Surface Transportation Policy Project in writing his campaign platform on transportation. Richardson, who was elected governor in November 2002, made environmental issues a key component of his campaign, particularly water, open space, and transportation issues. He proceeded to fulfill these campaign promises. He made a number of appointments that the Coalition supported. Former 1000 Friends executive director Ned Farquhar was appointed special advisor to the governor on energy and the environment. 1,000 Friends staff members were appointed to various task forces and transition teams. The Richardson administration, including the new state engineer and head of the Interstate Stream Commission, demonstrated commitment to state water planning, better transportation planning, and increased spending for transit.

Unfortunately, the Coalition faltered again when its coordinator left shortly before the 2003 legislative session. The Coalition's Executive Committee recommended one applicant, but the ultimate decision lay with the executive director of 1000 Friends, who opted to hire another. This generated hard feelings, and disagreements resurfaced over who should be making decisions for the Coalition and whether the Coalition should be housed within 1000 Friends. The Coalition and 1000 Friends still had not defined the scope of authority or rules for membership and voting for the Coalition since Ned Farquhar had left. An additional complication was that the Coalition's Executive Committee was self-appointed, on a volunteer basis, and without term limits. This was a hold-over from the previous coordinator, and new members of the Coalition wanted the executive committee to be more accountable to members.

Further trouble came as 1000 Friends was forced, yet again, to seek a new executive director. The new Coalition coordinator started just before the 2003 legislative session began. He implemented the existing campaign mechanisms, such as legislative alerts

and press releases, but he lacked guidance from 1000 Friends as they sought a new executive director. Because he did less outreach to members, and did not have the relationships with Coalition members that had drawn them to the meetings in the past, participation began to lag.

Two years earlier, 1000 Friends of New Mexico, the Surface Transportation Policy Project, New Mexico Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, and the Coalition for a Livable Future had set their sights on adoption of significant statewide growth and water policies in the 2003 legislative session. Governor Richardson worked diligently on a range of these issues, as did many Coalition members. In spite of the Coalition's disarray, member groups still supported each other's efforts, which was unprecedented in New Mexico. Even in its weakened state the Coalition brought a cohesiveness to the individual efforts and provided a stronger policy context. A number of bills passed, including:

- **A state water plan** spearheaded by 1000 Friends and the New Mexico Water Dialog;

- **Transferable development rights** advanced by the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group, enabling legislation to mandate local government water conservation and drought management plans;

- **A Regional Transit District Act** put forward by Mid-Region Council of Governments;

- **A Safe Routes to School Program** supported by the Surface Transportation Policy Project;

- **Removal of the $50,000 New Mexico State Highway Transportation Department cap on transit spending** advocated by the Surface Transportation Policy Project;

- **A New Mexico Rail Passenger Study** backed by Reconnecting America and the Surface Transportation Policy Project.

The Coalition also successfully supported the passage of a constitutional amendment allowing state spending on affordable housing. Within two years, 1000 Friends had successfully supported adoption of statutory language enacting the amendment to the constitution.

All of these efforts benefited from a supportive governor, as well as a broad base of support. For example, the New Mexico Public Interest Research Group and Education Fund consulted and worked with farmers and agricultural interests, planners, local elected officials, the New Mexico municipal league, the Association of Counties, the New Mexico Homebuilders Association, and the Coalition to generate backing for the transferable development rights enabling legislation. And the entire Coalition supported the Surface Transportation Policy Project's efforts to remove the state funding cap for transit.

There were disappointments too. While the Surface Transportation Policy Project helped change the state framework for transit, transit funding was not expanded. The

Project attributed this to its inability to cultivate enough institutional champions within the New Mexico Department of Transportation. However, it would have been difficult to increase funding for transit in any case. While the governor was generally supportive of the smart growth initiatives, the highest-priority item on his agenda was a tax cut. Accordingly, a number of bills were tabled. These represented the majority of 1000 Friend's land use agenda. The land use bills gained support of House and Senate leadership, but did not get to the Senate floor in time for a full vote.

The year 2003 was not the watershed for land use planning in New Mexico that the Coalition had hoped for, but there had been legislative progress and it was evident that the new governor would provide vastly improved opportunities. 1,000 Friends and the Coalition continued to support the legislation left on the table in the 2003 session, such as:

- including schools in the Development Fees Act;

- authorizing local governments to tax real estate transactions in order to fund open space and affordable housing programs;

- creating a land use task force to revise land use statutes;

- passing a domestic well bill to restrict wells in critical management areas.

Water continued to be the driving issue for New Mexico. 1,000 Friends hoped to gain public and political support for the domestic well legislation. The group also intended to impact the management of state water resources and advocate specific water resource management recommendations contained in a 1000 Friends water report.

During this time, 1000 Friends was also active at the local and regional levels, where it pursued its water agenda, including participating in the development and implementation of regional water plans. In the Albuquerque and Middle Rio Grande region, activities included:

- continued work to defeat bond issues for road projects;

- monitoring policy developments for the Planned Growth Strategy;

- advancing policy changes to the Subdivision Act, the Development Process Manual, and the Zoning Ordinance;

- promoting the passage of city-county unification;

- advocating water conservation and budget policies and balanced water planning.

In the Sante Fe area and Northern New Mexico, activities included:

- pursuing the purchase of development rights program in Rio Arriba;

- supporting an open space program for Taos, an agricultural protection program in Valencia County;

- conducting a Sante Fe Regional Water Authority feasibility study;

- supporting a Taos Housing Group's press for more affordable housing projects.

All of the Coalition members recognized how importance of working on implementation as well as legislation. 1,000 Friends held workshops around the state to educate land owners on the new Land Conservation Incentives Act. The New Mexico Public Interest Research Group did the same around transferable development rights. Unfortunately, at this point the Surface Transportation Policy Project decided to wind down its efforts, although some of the Project's staff planned to continue these efforts through another entity.

With no big issues looming in the legislature, it was even harder to sustain the momentum of the Coalition. The group's common purpose had been helping to make the governor a proponent of smart growth and to pass 2003 legislation. With a supportive governor in place, the level of urgency was diminished, and with it the drive to work cohesively dwindled. This made it harder to organize. The Coalition also lacked a coherent vision for where to go next. Governance issues that had been quietly simmering bubbled up again. The executive committee questioned the budget and the role of 1000 Friends. New Coalition members questioned the role of the executive committee. In the midst of these problems, Surdna Foundation funding ended. Facing a loss of funding, the Coalition did not have time to repair itself.

Some leading members of the Coalition believed that it could have been reinvigorated with the right staff and leadership. However, 1000 Friends and the few Coalition executive committee members who were still active agreed that the Coalition should evolve into a much looser network. They decided that the network would keep many of the positive aspects of the Coalition, including the listserv, annual conference, training opportunities, and organizing for specific legislation, but there would be no membership requirement or executive committee. Nor would there be any expectations for what members might give or get. 1,000 Friends would become a hub, calling people to offer support and responding to their requests for help – particularly requests to connect to other interests under the smart growth umbrella. This model suited member's needs, while it retaining the option to become a formal coalition again if there was a sufficiently powerful policy agenda.

Results

While the Coalition was frustrating to some, most believe that it was a success. It enabled people who had never before collaborated to work together. Organizations that had been at odds, such as the Acequia organizations and environmentalists, cooperated effectively on the state policy agenda. The Coalition had never expanded to include county planners and businesses, as was originally planned, but it had a broad support base nonetheless. Observers give the Coalition credit for the strength of Richardson's support for smart growth policies. Moreover, the Coalition experience was invaluable to 1000 Friends in establishing its now successful Alliance for Active Living, which has active participation from government planners, advocacy groups, and businesses.

By the end of Surdna's five-year Initiative, the Coalition had changed the nature of the debate about growth in New Mexico.

- Fifty percent of the City Council members in Santa Fe, Albuquerque, and Las Cruces had come to support smart growth policies.

- Albuquerque's mayor said that smart growth was the future of Albuquerque. State legislative support also was much stronger.

- The highway department's name was changed to the Department of Transportation, and it became active in context-sensitive design.

- While five years earlier, the highway commissioner was unwilling even to talk about public transit, the Department of Transportation began to shift to an inter-modal strategy.

- The state backed away from a plan to widen an interstate road.

- There was statewide support for transit planning, and there was active debate about transportation infrastructure, although funding issues loomed.

- Unlike five years earlier, decisions in New Mexico regarding land use included concerns about water.

Due in large part to the efforts of 1000 Friends and the Coalition, Governor Richardson is an advocate of smarter growth.

- He is currently considering an executive order mandating context-sensitive design in all state transportation projects.

- He created a Smart Growth Task Force to develop proposed legislation for the next legislative session. The Task Force included five business sector members (including developers), five local government representatives, and five smart growth advocates.

- He supported domestic legislation on wells, which had been under consideration for five years, but had not yet received gubernatorial backing.

- He committed to expanding rail transportation and expressed interest in transit-oriented development and incentive-based regional planning. This should result in more opportunities to cluster housing and development around transit.

- He mandated that commuter rail be operating between the cities of Belen, Albuquerque, and Bernalillo by the end of 2005.

- He requested the help of Hank Dittmar, the then-Executive Director of the New Mexico-based Reconnecting America, and the Middle Region Council of Governments.

Attitudes in the private sector were also starting to evolve: home builders and realtors were coming around. The National Association of Industrial and Office Properties originally opposed the Albuquerque Planned Growth Strategy, but at a 2004 forum on

who really pays for growth in Albuquerque, two member developers got up and said that impact fees are a good thing. Many Surdna Foundation grantees have had a real say among builders about how New Mexico should grow. In Albuquerque, 1000 Friends began working side by side with the National Association of Property Owners and First National Bank of Sante Fe on a speakers series on smart growth issues. It also had a good working relationship with the Central New Mexico Home Builders Association. Homebuilders who would not talk to 1000 Friends a year earlier served with 1000 Friends on the Governor's Task Force. 1,000 Friends was no longer seen as anti-growth.

In Albuquerque, the Planned Growth Strategy, downtown revitalization, and growing commitment to Bus Rapid Transit and commuter rail were all significant changes. Even though the county did not join the city in embracing smart growth, the Council of Governments began to work well with the governor and smart growth community.

What Happens Next

There are many challenges ahead.

- The most conservative faction of the development community has not budged. Real estate industry groups continue to raise funds to promote political candidates who are friendly to sprawling development. These realtors serve on the Smart Growth Task Forces and are generally better prepared than smart growth proponents (Leinberger 2004).

- Institutional changes are not yet engrained, and smart growth advocates have not yet cultivated significant internal champions at the Department of Transportation or any other state agencies.

- Housing permits still are predominantly in the fringe areas. There are some new-mixed use developments, such as Mesa Del Sol, which could take some pressure off of fringe development, and more in-town housing is being developed, but these are exceptions.

- The fight to stop new roads that will cause unnecessary sprawl continues, including the proposed extension of an existing road through the Petroglyph National Monument. The extension would promote sprawl on Albuquerque's west side. The New Mexico Environmental Law Center is currently litigating a case filed in February, 2005 to prevent construction of this road.

1,000 Friends and the other founders of the Coalition understand that it will be a very long time before they will achieve fundamental change in decisions about growth and even longer before they will be able to document changes in growth patterns. However, the progress to date has inspired actions for the future.

WHAT IT TAKES TO DO THIS WORK

The Surdna Foundation's New Mexico smart growth campaign budget was about $340,000 per year:

$75,000 for the campaign director;

$55,000 for field staff;

$49,000 for outreach projects including Businesses for Balanced Growth;

$27,000 for annual meeting costs;

$34,000 for expenses such as steering committee meetings and organizational improvement;

$42,000 for statewide transportation advocacy by the Surface Transportation Policy Project;

$20,000 for the New Mexico Conference of Churches; and

$28,000 for the New Mexico Environmental Law Center (also for transportation-related work).

Other funders supporting the work of 1000 Friends included the McCune Foundation, Hewlett and Turner foundations, the Educational Foundation for America, and the Thaw Charitable Trust. The Beldon Foundation provided support for the New Mexico Conference of Churches for activities that were complementary.

The Maryland Story: Top Down and Bottom Up

Two Case Studies – Assisting a Visioning Process in Baltimore and Improving the State Policies of a Supportive Governor

CONTEXT

Maryland is a small, largely urban state. It has the third highest median household income[18] and among the lowest poverty rates in the nation. It ranks first among the states in the percentage of professional and technical workers in the workforce (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 2002). The Baltimore Harbor is a shining example of urban redevelopment. At the same time, Baltimore has some of the poorest neighborhoods of any city in the United States. Nearly half a million people live in poverty in Maryland – and much of this poverty is concentrated in Baltimore (Mark 2001).

[18] According to the 2000 U.S. Census.

In the urban centers of Maryland, families have been a part of specific neighborhoods for generations and they tend to hold a special affinity for their neighborhoods (Mark 2001). Still, many have felt unable to leave because of zoning restrictions that limited their opportunities to move elsewhere, (e.g. minimum lot sizes that prevent building small homes or apartments). These neighborhoods have repeatedly watched economic benefits pass them by on the way to the suburbs. Abject poverty and a subcurrent of racism add elements of complexity to the history of growth in the city and the region (Mark 2001).

Maryland is generally a politically progressive state, although it can be deceptively conservative in some areas. Baltimore City and the Washington-area suburbs of

Montgomery and Prince George's County are reliably liberal, while rural counties are more conservative. The Baltimore-area suburbs of Baltimore County and Anne Arundel County tend to swing depending on the issue[19] or the election. In this mildly divisive political climate, the Chesapeake Bay is a defining feature that transcends the state's political spectrum. Part of the state's history and identity, the Bay is close to a universal concern among Marylanders.

Sprawling development patterns in Maryland over the past few decades have dramatically changed the state's landscape. From 1985 to 1997, Maryland's population grew by 19 percent while the state's developed land increased by 35 percent. From 1997 to 2002, Maryland farmers stopped working 115,000 acres of agricultural land. Maryland expects to add another million people and to lose another half million acres of land to development within 20 years (Baltimore Sun, December 2002). While the greater Baltimore region experienced seven percent population growth during the 1990s, Baltimore was the fastest-shrinking major city in the nation. At the same time, outer counties like Harford and Carroll were growing at several times the regional average, 20 and 22 percent respectively. Howard County population grew by nearly one-third.

Governor Parris Glendening

Smart growth already was part of the lexicon among policy-oriented people and government staff in Maryland in the 1990s. In 1992, the state passed the Maryland Economic Growth, Resource Protection and Planning Act. In 1997, Governor Parris Glendening persuaded the General Assembly to enact a package of smart growth legislation, the thrust of which was to require local governments to designate areas inside which growth had to meet certain density criteria and outside of which they would have to forego state infrastructure investment. The 1997 Smart Growth Areas Act was a non-regulatory model that tried to focus growth in designated growth areas by using fiscal incentives and disincentives. The incentives included:

- use of the state budget to encourage redevelopment, infill development, and preservation;

- transportation-related improvements around rail transit stations;

- voluntary cleanup of brownfields; and

- small businesses and job creation in revitalization areas (Lucero 2000).

While there was much room for improvement, the state's top-down and very public commitment to smart growth principles was considered a national model.

Maryland's smart growth policies also faced a number of challenges. Many designated smart growth areas were in existing communities that opposed infill and redevelopment projects. Many local governments did not like the state being involved in land use policy, even if directing growth into smart growth areas was voluntary. Still, the climate for state policy improvement in 2000 was good, with a supportive governor who would be in office for several more years. This was significant, as Maryland's governor is one of the two most powerful governors in the nation.[20] Strengthening Maryland's smart growth policies as quickly as possible was a matter of both opportunity and urgency, since it was unlikely that the next governor would have as great an interest in smart growth as Governor Glendening.

[20] New Jersey's is the other one.

THE ROLE OF THE SURDNA FOUNDATION GRANTEES

Many organizations known to the Surdna Foundation were helping Maryland to realize the potential of its statewide smart growth policy and to press for improvements. Supporters included the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the League of Conservation Voters Education Fund, 1000 Friends of Maryland, and Environmental Defense, among others. The Surdna Foundation had also already supported the Citizen Planning and Housing Association in forming the Baltimore Regional Partnership and the first two years of its very successful work on transportation reform. The partners in forming the Baltimore Regional Partnership included Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 1000 Friends of Maryland, the Baltimore Urban League, Environmental Defense, and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association. The Baltimore Regional Partnership's efforts had already helped to divert $140 million from three highway expansions to travel demand management. The Partnership's goals were to shift more transportation resources, promote mixed-income communities, and preserve rural land.

In response to the Surdna Initiative, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the other partners of the Baltimore Regional Partnership agreed to integrate their smart growth activities at the state, regional, and local levels. The joint project was led by the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the largest nonprofit conservation organization working exclusively to restore the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and Baltimore Regional Partnership agreed to engage other partners as necessary, including the Maryland Public Interest Research Foundation and the Maryland League of Conservation Voters.

Many of the members of this Partnership brought authority and power to the table (Mark 2001). The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the Baltimore Partnership were key players in what would happen on larger public policy issues in the state. All of the partners were important to the proposed work plan, especially since the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's focus on

the Chesapeake Bay and farmland preservation had not engendered strong relationships with low- and moderate-income housing and economic development advocates.

The centerpiece of the regional strategy that the partners presented to the Surdna Foundation was development of a regional vision plan that would integrate land use and transportation for the Baltimore area. The idea was to demonstrate the application of state smart growth policies and provide a vehicle for improvements to these policies. In addition to work on the regional vision plan, the partners agreed to pursue opportunities to achieve smart growth policies at the local and state levels.

The role of the Baltimore Regional Partnership was especially important because it had a much broader base and set of interests than the environment, including housing and transportation. While the state was making progress on saving open space, much more needed to be done to redevelop existing communities and neighborhoods. To this end, the Surdna Foundation funded the Baltimore Regional Partnership to work on a broader suite of issues, all of which seemed important to the future of smart growth in the Baltimore area. These included:

- development of regional indicators;

- continued work on transportation plans and issues;

- making housing in attractive neighborhoods affordable for families of moderate means through new investment products; and

- rural land preservation through downzoning or programs to transfer development rights.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation received Surdna support to assist the Baltimore Regional Partnership in the implementation and expansion of smart growth policy at the state level and in fostering understanding of smart growth statewide. The Foundation's ultimate goal was to reduce the loss of forestland and farmland to development as a way to protect the water quality of the Chesapeake Bay. Proposed activities included:

- communications and outreach;

- creating local models;

- producing growth and accountability report cards;

- providing endorsements for smart growth projects; and

- advocacy (Mofson 2001).

As a part of the Surdna Initiative, the Surdna Foundation made a separate grant to the Maryland Public Interest Research Foundation, which intended to focus on transportation and land use issues. Its foci were:

- sustainable public transportation systems;

- smart transportation choices at the state and county levels, such as transit, walking, and biking; and

- stronger links between transportation and land use decisions.

FROM THE BOTTOM UP: A CASE STUDY OF A VISIONING PROCESS TO PLAN A REGION'S FUTURE

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the other members of the Baltimore Regional Partnership decided that the Baltimore region needed a visioning process to reveal what the public wanted for the region. They believed that if the public had a chance to express its interest, people would support smarter growth, giving it greater political punch at the local level where land use decisions are made. The Baltimore Regional Partnership encouraged the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board – the region's metropolitan planning organization – to undertake such a process for several years. When it seemed that the Transportation Board would delay indefinitely, the Partnership started to prepare for the process on its own. However, in 2001 the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board made good on its commitment of a year earlier, and the Baltimore region's elected officials launched Vision 2030 in May of that year. The Baltimore Regional Partnership thought perhaps this was for the best, expecting that local elected officials would buy in to a process they had led and would have to implement. Donald Fry, president of the Greater Baltimore Committee, the region's primary business association, agreed to chair the visioning process.

If it was successful, Vision 2030 would produce a baseline and shared vision that the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board could use for regional planning for the first time. The visioning process had the potential to shift thinking about planning in the Baltimore Metropolitan region. It was also challenging because of the many complex issues and interests that the process hoped to corral into one shared vision (Mark June 2001). Although the Baltimore Regional Partnership hoped the visioning process would help to implement state smart growth policies in the Baltimore region, this was off the table in any deliberate sense. Local suburban officials in the region were resistant to the state's smart growth laws and to having the state play *any* role in the visioning process.

It was agreed that there should be a Vision 2030 Coordination Committee, which would make decisions on the process and materials created for the process, as well as an Oversight Committee that would represent environmental, social equity, business, smart growth, and other interests. In order to have a unified process, local officials agreed that the Baltimore Regional Partnership and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation should participate on both of these committees.

In September 2001, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation hired a planner to provide staff support for both the vision plan and the Baltimore Regional Partnership. The planner researched regional vision planning throughout the country. Based on the planner's recommendations, the Partnership decided to follow the visioning process model that had been implemented in Salt Lake City, Utah and Portland, Oregon.[21]

The Baltimore Regional Partnership convinced the Coordinating Committee for Vision 2030 to undertake rigorous analysis of the growth and transportation options for the Baltimore region, as had been done for Envision Utah and was underway as part of the Chicago Metropolis Plan process. The Baltimore Regional Partnership agreed to pay for the extra modeling costs and retained Smart Mobility, Inc., the group that was also doing the modeling in Chicago, to project the impact of different growth

[21] This process was developed by Fregonese and Calthorpe Associates.

and transportation scenarios. Together with the Oversight Committee, the Baltimore Regional Partnership developed four scenarios:

1. current trends and plans;

2. reduced transit infrastructure and more highway expansion;

3. mass transit investment, mixed-use development, and less highway expansion; and

4. mixed-use redevelopment with little expansion of transportation infrastructure.

Findings were that the options that emphasized transit and redevelopment would save significant open space, provide greater housing options, reduce air and water pollution, reduce additional time spent in cars and consumption of gasoline by new households, and boost increases in walking and transit trips and accessibility to transit of new households and jobs. The Baltimore Regional Partnership also worked with consultants to develop case studies to illustrate the impact of growth at the community level. These simulations were presented by Vision 2030 facilitators at public meetings.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership also recommended that the Coordinating Committee for Vision 2030 increase the number of public meetings from seven to seventeen. Surdna Foundation funding underwrote the additional ten meetings. However, the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board, the Baltimore Metropolitan Council and Vision 2030 consultants did little to publicize the meetings, especially in comparison to the broad outreach undertaken for Envision Utah. The Baltimore Regional Partnership and its member organizations publicized the meetings to their own membership lists. With funds from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation grant from the Surdna Foundation, Citizens Planning and Housing Association hired six regional organizers – one for each county in the region and one for the city – to generate public turnout. About 500 residents attended the 17 meetings, which was substantially lower than expected.

At the Vision 2030 public meetings, similar to the Envision Utah survey process, participants were shown the four scenarios and asked to choose their preferred scenario for each of the indicators for the region that was most important to them. The surveys indicated a clear preference for scenarios that emphasized mass transit and redevelopment. The participants in the public meetings supported increased regional coordination, investment in transit, regional social equity, and environmental quality.

The president of the Greater Baltimore Committee presented the final Vision 2030 report to the region's chief elected officials in February 2003. The report consisted of 15 vision statements and over 100 strategies addressing economic development, education, environment, government and public policy, livable communities, and transportation. The ideals laid out in the vision statements included:

- a reliable and efficient transit system;

- diversity of housing choices for all ages and income groups; and

- clearly defined borders between developed areas and open space.

The report and the Vision 2030 process were not obvious successes in the short-term. While the vision statements and the strategies in the final report contained important recommendations, there was little focus or cohesion. There were no priorities among strategies or firm timeframes for implementation. The process was neither energizing nor captivating. The findings were also not widely publicized. The Vision did not capture the imagination of regional business leaders, other opinion leaders, or the public at large, as Envision Utah's Quality Growth Strategy seemed to have done. In short, it did not whet the appetite for implementation.

The Greater Baltimore Committee was asked to facilitate a process to decide what entity would oversee implementation of the Vision 2030 recommendations, but this was delayed and then delayed again. Some local elected officials resisted the report's recommendations. Business leaders at the Greater Baltimore Committee chose not to urge implementation. Neither the business community nor any of the other stakeholders were galvanized to implement the Vision. The Baltimore Regional Partnership decided it was not worth investing further time in the process.

On the positive side, the public had responded very favorably to Baltimore Regional Partnership's modeling of four scenarios for the future. A regional poll showed that two-thirds of the public supported an affordable housing requirement for new development and even more supported other positive measures. Also, the Baltimore Regional Partnership model contained enhancements to the Baltimore Regional Transportation Board's transportation model that could be useful in the future. The Partnership turned its model over to the Regional Transportation Board with the hope that it would be used to generate transportation plans with higher sensitivity to the positive impact smart growth and transportation alternatives might have on traffic congestion and air quality.

The most positive outcome of Vision 2030 may be that it laid the groundwork for a new effort to bring a rapid transit system to the Baltimore region that would be on par with the Washington, DC system. The Baltimore Regional Partnership and its members, including 1000 Friends of Maryland, Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Citizens Planning and Housing Association, Environmental Defense, and Greater Baltimore Urban League, had been supporting greater transportation choices for Baltimore for years. Two Citizens Planning and Housing Association leaders served on an advisory committee charged by the Maryland Department of Transportation with developing a new vision for high-quality rapid transit in the Baltimore region. The Regional Partnership monitored this process with

Baltimore Regional Rail Plan

active interest. The resulting report recommended expanding the region's existing 43 miles of rail transit to a comprehensive 109-mile system for metropolitan area mobility. It also suggested supporting revitalization near the stations and channeling new growth into targeted growth areas.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership saw an opportunity to achieve multiple aspects of Vision 2030, such as a greater concentration of growth at the region's center and expansion of transportation choices. It also saw an opportunity to capitalize on the new relationships it had formed with the business community and other constituencies through the Vision 2030 process. By the fall of 2002, it shifted its attention from Vision 2030 to regional transit. The Partnership saw its niche as making sure that the land use aspects of the rail plan received adequate attention.

Together with the Greater Baltimore Committee, the Baltimore Regional Partnership hosted a December 2002 breakfast that attracted 130 business and civic leaders to discuss the transit initiative. At the breakfast, the Partnership released a report, *Transportation Choices: Vibrant Places. Development Opportunities Along the Proposed Regional Rail System*, which showed that nearly half the region's projected job growth by 2025 and one-fifth of its projected household growth could be accommodated along the new rail system's lines. This was in accordance existing local plans for redevelopment. The report received significant media attention and elevated the discussion of the land use aspects of the rail plan.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership worked with the Greater Baltimore Committee to prepare a white paper on the opportunity to build a high performance rail system for Baltimore for the newly elected Republican governor, Robert Ehrlich, who took office in January 2003. The white paper had the backing of the Greater Baltimore Committee president Don Fry, Baltimore Mayor Martin O'Malley, county executives, state legislators, and the Baltimore region's members of Congress. The Baltimore Sun editorial board also came out in support of the project.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership did not yet have sufficiently broad support. The transit plan was in direct competition with a new highway for the Washington region of Maryland, and highway supporters were opposed to all other transit initiatives. The governor tended to agree with the highway proponents. The Partnership realized that it had to build a broader and stronger private sector coalition. By March 2003, it had recruited an informal network of 30 supporters for the project, half from business groups and half from other civic, transit, environmental, and housing organizations and coalitions. The Partnership also coordinated with the Greater Baltimore Committee on an ad hoc basis, which was increasingly important within the new state administration. In fact, when at first Governor Ehrlich declined to request initial construction funds for the Baltimore Transit Plan through the federal TEA-21[22] reauthorization process, the Greater Baltimore Committee, the Partnership, and local elected officials reacted so strongly in unison that the administration relented. This was a small victory, but it gave the Partnership a chance to work together with the local officials with whom it had been at odds during the Vision 2030 process. At this point, the Partnership decided that it needed a more formal entity to champion the implementation of the transit plan.

[22] See earlier note on TEA 21.

The Partnership began to look for partners to create a coalition powerful enough to get the rail plan built. With the encouragement of the Baltimore Community Foundation and business leaders on its board, the Greater Baltimore Committee agreed to house and organize the Baltimore Transit Alliance. This staffed, three-year effort had funding of $250,000 per year from the Goldseker Foundation, the Annie E. Casey Foundation, and the Baltimore Community Foundation. Each of the Baltimore Regional Partnership's member organizations received a seat on the steering committee, as did the Transit Riders League and other community leaders. The goal of the Baltimore Transit Alliance was to secure funding for the first two phases of the transit plan, including federal funding through the surface transportation bill, TEA-3.[23] The state would still have to come up with some funding to demonstrate its commitment.

Most of the effort in 2004 went to winning state and federal funding, but work also began on facilitating a dialog within the communities of the region to head off disputes about alignments and station areas. The Citizens Planning and Housing Association began to convene meetings to discuss development around the transit stops. It pulled together examples of successful community-oriented transit-oriented development, and began showing them to community leaders. The Association also started a communities and transit committee to guide work around land use and opportunities for transit related to the Transit Plan. When the Citizens Planning and Housing Association found that local leaders needed to see concrete examples with their own eyes, it began to bring experts to Baltimore and take community leaders to other regions to show them what was possible. In sum, the Citizens Planning and Housing Association set about becoming the place community leaders could turn to for help with transit-oriented development.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership's founders believe that the Transit Plan can succeed where Vision 2030 failed. It has a much broader base of support. Because of high-level business leadership, it can be bolder. While staff for Vision 2030 consisted of a consultant on contract to the Baltimore Metropolitan Council (the council of governments), the Greater Baltimore Committee has its own employee supporting the Alliance. The member organizations and other participants have learned a great deal about how to work together across constituencies, what motivates the business community, and what political pressures local governments face. There is urgency about the Transit Plan that Vision 2030 distinctly lacked. People have a sense that if they don't act now, an opportunity will slip away. Business leaders are worried about increasing road congestion. They recognize that Baltimore does not have a top quality transit system and that such a system is part of a high performance region.

[23] The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) expired in October 2003. The third iteration of the Act, which is still under consideration in Congress, has been dubbed TEA-3.

Everything that has been learned is being applied to the effort to achieve a comprehensive rail system for the Baltimore region. To succeed, this effort will require even stronger transit alliances; better messaging and communications capacity; and greater understanding of the economics of transit-oriented development and housing markets. The next few years will determine if there is enough energy to make it happen.

FROM THE TOP DOWN: A CASE STUDY OF LONG-TERM POLICY ADVOCACY TO IMPROVE STATE SMART GROWTH POLICIES

In 1999, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had three major objectives for smart growth policy in Maryland:

- ensuring effective implementation of existing state smart growth initiatives;

- expanding smart growth policy to be more inclusive of state infrastructure development and spending; and

- building public understanding and support for smart growth.

The Foundation's state legislative strategy was based upon the assumption that the next governor would be a Democrat who generally supported smart growth. Its strategy was to support the passage of as much smart growth legislation as possible, anticipating that the next governor would maintain existing programs and support their implementation.

In late 1999, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation collaborated with 1000 Friends of Maryland to publish a critique of implementation of Maryland's smart growth laws called *Making Smart Growth Smarter: Recommendations for Increasing the Effectiveness of Smart Growth and for Expanding its Application Through New Initiatives.* The report included an extensive analysis of local water and sewer planning, an evaluation of local responses to state smart growth planning requirements, and a review of state capital agency implementation of smart growth policies and procedures. It also called to light:

Making Smart Growth Smarter

- deficiencies in local plans and calculations for sizing Smart Growth Areas designated by counties;

- the lack of implementation procedures and guidelines for state agencies;

- a poor record of targeting projects to priority locations;

- under-funding for land conservation efforts;

- the absence of legally required reviews of projects with regional impact.

The report garnered favorable reactions from Governor Parris Glendening, some legislators, and several citizen groups active in the sprawl debate. In fact, Governor Glendening specifically responded to the report, stating his intentions to:

- increase funding for the Rural Legacy Program[24] from $25 million to $40 million;

- direct the Maryland Office of Planning to review projects of regional significance;

- introduce brownfields corrective legislation;

- present a bill to elevate the Maryland Office of Planning to a cabinet level agency;

- create a staff position to promote a Live Near Your Work program, which provided $3,000 to employees to live in target neighborhoods near their places of employment;

- instruct his smart growth sub-cabinet to respond to all of the report's recommendations.

Observers agreed that pressure from the Chesapeake Bay Foundation helped the governor to advance his own agenda for smart growth.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation continued to use the report to engage the administration and General Assembly. It also reached out to various editorial boards, including the Washington Post, to communicate its ideas for land use and transportation reform. The Foundation took advantage of the momentum built through publicity about the report to advocate for new legislation. It proposed and advocated for the development and use of smart growth-related performance standards and criteria by the Maryland Department of Transportation. It developed a public relations campaign for this effort, as well as for efforts to promote a "smart codes" initiative to upgrade local building codes, changes to water and sewer planning requirements, and new septic system legislation. At the same time, the Foundation led or was part of a number of efforts to oppose road projects by filing technical and legal comments and using consultants to suggest viable alternatives that would contribute less to sprawl. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and its partners were able to slow a number of projects that would have contributed greatly to sprawl.

While the Chesapeake Bay Foundation continued to place highest priority on improving state policy while Governor Glendening was still in office, it also knew it was important to institutionalize state policy gains at the county level. The Foundation believed that report cards were an important tool for highlighting where smart growth progress could be improved at the county level. It created a county report card template, which 1,000 Friends of Maryland used for a smart growth analysis of the local comprehensive plans and ordinances of five suburban Baltimore counties. The analy-

[24] The Rural Legacy Program provides funds to preserve large contiguous areas of land with significant farm, forest, historic and environmental resources. The program has stimulated preservation planning and formation of partnerships, but it is criticized for not effectively combining resources to be protected, including farmland, forestland, natural areas, and greenbelts (Vermont Smart Growth Collaborative 2003).

sis showed that the counties could do much more to manage growth. It also indicated that much of the growth was rural areas, regardless of what comprehensive plans said. The analysis attracted some attention, but played a role in policy change only much later, when some observers believe it contributed to Carroll County elections that brought about a sea change in county smart growth policies.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation decided to try recruiting local grassroots advocates to complete "report cards" for every county as a way of promoting government accountability. It found a partner in Anne Arundel County and, with training and support from the Maryland League of Conservation Voters, a countywide alliance of smart growth activists formed in Anne Arundel County. As its inaugural activity, the alliance began preparing scorecards that rated the performances of the executive administration and the county council on various growth-related issues for distribution through the press. At the same time, the Foundation prepared briefing papers on transportation, air quality, and water quality for use in developing scores on these subjects. It was difficult for the county activists to work together and finish the report. They were able to complete the report card before county elections, which allowed them to highlight candidate positions on smart growth, but the county effort fizzled out about a year later.

In sum, the report card tool achieved mixed results at the county level. The Anne Arundel County smart growth report card received strong publicity and perhaps had some impact on policy. However, the time it took to organize local activists and complete it was far greater than the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had anticipated. The data collection required seemed to intimidate people. No other county grassroots organizations expressed interest in preparing report cards, and the Foundation decided not to invest more time in them for the time being. Instead, it produced educational pamphlets such as *Stopping Sprawl, Debunking Sprawl Myths,* and *Smart Transportation,* all of which focused on increasing public understanding of the problems and solutions.

Another of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's strategies for solidifying and increasing legislative gains was to develop the business constituency for smart growth in Maryland. The Foundation worked in partnership with the Urban Land Institute to form the Baltimore Smart Growth Alliance in 1999. This was a diverse group of regional leaders, including developers, civic organizations, business leaders and members of the public sector. The objective of the alliance was to help smart growth development projects overcome barriers, such as financing, neighborhood opposition, and inadequate brownfields legislation. The group developed a priority list of barriers to address. Unfortunately, this seemingly promising process for engaging the business community faltered and ended when changes in leadership at the Urban Land Institute reduced the available resources, and therefore the group's ability to make headway.

Meanwhile, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had succeeded with a number of state legislation proposals. For example, in 2000, its advocacy state transportation performance goals contributed to passage of the Maryland Transportation Performance Goals Act,[25] which required the state Department of Transportation to report annually on its progress toward specific, measurable transportation performance goals.[26] The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and its allies also were successful in their support of pas-

[25] This legislation was adapted from Oregon State performance goals for metropolitan regions.

[26] Two years later, the Maryland Department of Transportation had still not implemented the intent of the law. It chose to assess its performance as an agency, rather than the performance of the transportation systems. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation is considering more advocacy, perhaps including hearings, to get the Department of Transportation to implement the law.

sage of smart codes legislation, which created the Maryland Building Rehabilitation Code Program to encourage investment in existing neighborhoods. During this same time, bills for historic preservation tax credit, transit funding and farebox recovery, and critical areas also passed.

Late in 2001, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation chose a new target at the local level. Various studies had indicated that excessive rural growth was occurring in counties with weak rural zoning. The Foundation anticipated that rural zoning would be debated in the 2002 elections in several counties, including Charles, Carroll, Harford, and the six counties comprising Maryland's Upper Eastern Shore. It decided that its resources for local work would be best spent on efforts to improve rural zoning in target counties.

Because of the time and effort required to organize in counties, the Foundation chose to work in just two counties: St. Mary's and Charles. The Foundation developed a strategy that included grassroots organizers, newspaper ads, mailings, printed materials, and other advocacy activities. Work at this level was difficult. For example, the Foundation was able to demonstrate public support for stronger rural zoning in St. Mary's County by attending hearings and public meetings, sending letters to the editor, and coordinating calls and letters to local legislators, but County Commissioners still adopted five-acre zoning.[27]

Bay Watershed

The Foundation also strengthened its public education efforts at the county level. It published a brochure entitled *Six Things Your Next County Officials Can Do to Help Save the Bay* in advance of the November 2002 elections. This leaflet was intended to encourage voters to press candidates for county executive and county councils on their positions on key land use issues and willingness to improve their county's standing. It highlighted data on the Maryland counties that were experiencing the greatest loss of farmland, forestland, and other data.

The November 2002 elections came as something of a surprise. While many of the local officials elected were more supportive of smart growth, a Republican governor won. When Governor Robert Ehrlich took office, there were many smart growth laws on the books as well as initiatives that reflected good intentions for land conservation. However, Governor Ehrlich dismissed these in the face of large budget deficits. He did not come out directly against smart growth, but he did make it clear that smart growth was a low priority for him. For example, Governor Ehrlich was part of a decision to exempt the Route 32 road-widening project from the state's smart growth laws, even though the government study completed for the project showed it would cause extensive sprawl.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and other Maryland smart growth advocates had to move from a proactive to a defensive strategy. The Foundation planned a media campaign to defend existing smart growth programs and, especially, to prevent diversion of the state's dedicated land conservation funding to efforts to reduce the budget deficit. Advocates knew programs would have to be cut because of the deficit, but they hoped to influence where the cuts would be made.

[27] By encouraging consistent medium-sized plots, five-acre zoning does not promote smart growth and it fails to protect ecosystems and agricultural land. It would have been preferable to have zoning for high density in some areas and low density elsewhere.

In the early 2003 legislative session, Governor Ehrlich severely cut funding for many of the programs that had been part of Governor Glendening's smart growth legacy, especially the smart growth land conservation programs Rural Legacy[28] and GreenPrint.[29] The new governor also terminated transportation spending on the Maryland Department of Transportation's Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Program, and shifted funds to cover costs associated with the Intercounty Connector Highway, which Governor Glendening had refused to fund. The Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Initiative had been well-supported by neighborhoods, as it had provided flexible dollars and resources to assist communities that had good revitalization programs to invest in streetscape improvements, bike lanes, pedestrian facilities, and the like. State support for transit also was cut.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation was a member of the coalition called Partners for Open Spaces, which was able to counter efforts to completely eliminate these programs and the real estate transfer tax that was funding open space programs. The Baltimore Regional Partnership played an especially important role, as it represented a broader spectrum of voices speaking for housing, transportation, and environmental issues. The Partnership had built strong relationships among legislators and local officials in the Baltimore region through its education efforts, and in so doing had garnered support for these policies. This is one reason why the Maryland Legislature did not eliminate the smart growth laws. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and other environmental organizations also successfully challenged efforts to enable public-private partnerships for transportation project construction that might avoid compliance with smart growth, clean air, and environmental impact laws. The Foundation helped stop legislation to expand water and sewer service outside of Smart Growth Areas. And it was successful in supporting a brownfields bill, which set up a task force to find ways to improve the Maryland brownfields program.

It is not unusual for new governors to have new goals and to shift resources to implement these goals. It was not a surprise that Governor Ehrlich began to dismantle Maryland's smart growth infrastructure, especially when the programs had only weak support among local officials and in the business community. Governor Glendening had created a 15-person Maryland Office of Smart Growth. Governor Ehrlich gradually reduced staff in that office. In early 2004, the State Department of Planning proposed to eliminate the Office of Smart Growth and shift its responsibilities to the Department of Planning.

If the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had anticipated that a Republican governor would be elected, it probably would have invested more effort in institutionalizing existing smart growth policies. But even a year before the election it was expected that the Democratic lieutenant governor would be elected governor in 2004. Even if Governor Glendening's lieutenant had not shared his ardor for smart growth, she would likely have supported implementation of existing policies. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation used the final years of Glendening's term to make state policy gains with the intention of working to institutionalize these gains under the tenure of the new governor. Only in hindsight were the flaws of this strategy evident.

In the fall of 2003, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation was poised to release a new edition of its successful *Making Growth Smarter* report. However, it delayed this release in order to focus on an opportunity it saw to do something important for the Chesapeake Bay – a choice that reflected the Foundation's foremost commitment to the Chesapeake Bay and water quality. The Foundation shifted its attention to advocating a surcharge on sewer bills and septic systems, funds from which would be used to upgrade technology in sewer treatment plants around the state. The potential impact of reducing nitrogen pollution in the Chesapeake Bay was enormous. The "flush tax" became law in April 2004.

Facing a state government that was making smart growth a much lower priority, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation shifted more of its attention to strategic actions at the county level. The 2002 elections created new opportunities for local smart growth advocacy north of Baltimore in Harford and Carroll Counties, east of the Baltimore region in Queen Anne's County, and in Talbot County on Maryland's eastern shore. In Queen Anne's County an entire slate of pro-growth county commissioners was not re-elected. Support for smart growth policies also grew in Talbot County.

In Carroll County, growth became a lightening rod issue, as residents voiced concerns about school crowding, congestion, and vanishing local landscapes. Carroll County, long one of Maryland's most permissive jurisdictions for residential builders, imposed a year-long freeze on most projects in June 2003.[30] This was a dramatic turnaround.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership, which had built relationships with local elected officials and activists throughout the Baltimore region over many years, hired grassroots organizers in Harford County and intends to hire an organizer in Carroll County. The Harford organizer was initially supervised by the Partnership, and then by Citizens Planning and Housing Association. The Carroll organizer will be hired and supervised by 1000 Friends of Maryland.

In late 2003, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation initiated a partnership with the City of Annapolis, using Surdna Foundation funds, for the city to hire a Clean Commute Coordinator. The goals were to educate businesses about how to use and benefit from available Clean Commute incentives and to demonstrate to local and state policymakers that commuter choice incentives could solve traffic congestion and air pollution. The coordinator developed the program, created program materials, and began marketing the program. By its second year, the Clean Commute Coordinator had:

- enlisted various businesses, primarily in the hospitality industry, in the commuter choice program;

- printed and distributed a program description and promotional materials, including print, radio, and TV ads;

- designed and promoted an employer-provided benefit called "Fare-less Cab," which guaranteed a ride home for transit riders, carpoolers, and bicycle and pedestrian commuters in the case of unforeseen circumstances.

[30] In mid-2004, Carroll Country tightened its development approval process significantly.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and its partners were able to make some progress under the new administration in the Maryland statehouse, especially through a Smart Growth Collaborative with members of the business community that it helped to create in 2002 with the Urban Land Institute. This was the Foundation's second attempt to create a forum to involve the business community in smart growth efforts. The Smart Growth Collaborative brought together business people and developers, as well as environmental interests and state and local government, to discuss growth issues and try to reach consensus. The Foundation was part of the steering committee and hosted the meetings. The Collaborative produced a report with recommendations that was submitted to Governor Ehrlich soon after his election. One recommendation was that Governor Ehrlich establish a development capacity task force, which he did.

In 2004, the development capacity task force presented its recommendations to the governor. Based on these suggestions, the governor agreed that counties would be asked to perform development capacity analyses and that the state would provide technical support to the counties to do the analysis. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which served on the task force, expects that the counties will discover that they have more land with redevelopment and infill potential than they assume, which will expand the existing land inventory. The hope is that counties will attract developers for this land, reducing pressure to expand the growth areas designated under state smart growth policies.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation and 1000 Friends of Maryland's report *Making Smart Growth Smarter*, called for targeting state efforts and capital project funding in smart growth areas. In response, Governor Ehrlich created a Priority Places Initiative to provide special incentives for development projects in key locations within qualified growth areas. Local governments and private parties can nominate these areas and the state provides streamlined regulatory reviews and financial assistance through existing grant programs.

An Agricultural Preservation Taskforce established by the legislature completed work in the fall of 2004. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, which also served on this taskforce, helped to ensure that priority preservation areas were part of the discussion. Under the proposed concept, the state could create a new pot of money for land preservation. To qualify for these incentives, local governments would designate priority preservation areas that would be certified by the state and commit to take steps to prevent development in these areas. The Foundation and the Partners for Open Space Coalition, which has 100 member organizations, will consider advocating for the introduction of legislation for priority preservation areas as part of its 2006 legislative agenda.

What Happens Next

In 2005, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation had intended to release a new version of *Making Smart Growth Smarter,* evaluating the consistency of state and local transportation investments with the state's smart growth program. However, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation redirected its efforts toward open space preservation because of the emergence of state open space preservation as a highly prominent smart growth issue in 2005. In response, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation helped form a statewide coalition, The Partners for Open Space, to fight for retention of full state funding for open space preservation and to counter state efforts to sell off state-owned park and open space lands. The coalition was highly successful during the 2005 session of the Maryland General Assembly in protecting open space funding, in instituting new law requiring the repayment of open space funds diverted to balance the state budget, and in instituting new law requiring proposals for the sale of state park and open space lands to be aired for public and legislative review.

As a result of state policies and administrative decisions under Governor Glendening, there has been a shift in state expenditures and greatly increased investment in downtown areas and other established growth centers in Maryland (Vermont Smart Growth Collaborative 2003). Still, the *Baltimore Sun* reported in April 2004 that, although the Smart Growth policies of former Maryland Democratic Governor Parris N. Glendening have greatly advanced land protection and urban revitalization since 1997, the newest Census data indicate a continued population shift to the far suburbs of Baltimore and Washington, while inner-ring suburbs stagnate (Green 2004). This is a valid observation, but not necessarily an indicator that smart growth policies are failing.

> According to most experts, 10 years is too short a timeframe to achieve systemic change in decisions about growth, let alone to see significant changes in development patterns. It took 50 years to establish the existing patterns of growth. It will take much longer than a decade to reverse the path.

The Chesapeake Bay Foundation, the Baltimore Regional Partnership, 1000 Friends of Maryland, the Maryland Public Interest Research Group, and the other Surdna Foundation grantees intend to continue down the same road. They will be on the defensive to prevent rollbacks in existing policies and programs. They also will look for ways to work with the State administration and to spur change at the local level.

WHAT IT TAKES TO DO THIS WORK

The budget for the first three years of this Initiative was $831,000. The budget for year one was $500,000:

$138,000 for Chesapeake Bay Foundation personnel expenses;

$29,000 for Baltimore Regional Partnership staff;

$237,000 for consultants, interns and direct expenses associated with the 2030 vision plan, report cards, business council development, local case studies, etc.;

$96,000 for administrative costs.

The Baltimore Regional Initiative and statewide activities of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's Maryland office also received support from the Ford, Morris and Gwendolyn Cafritz, Town Creek, Henry M. Jackson, Lockhart Vaughan, Abell, and Baltimore Community Foundations, as well as Prince Charitable Trust and the Clayton Baker Trust.

The New Jersey Story: Bottom Up and Top Down

Two Case Studies – An Insider Approach to Impacting State Policy and a Grassroots Organizing Effort to Promote Regional Equity

CONTEXT

New Jersey is the most urbanized state in the nation. It will likely be the first state in the nation to reach full build out, probably in the next 50 years. Within the state, there is a fierce race to protect open space and a struggle to rescue cities and inner ring suburbs that are in decline.

While New Jersey has the highest median household income in the nation,[31] its urban centers continue to be pockets of institutionalized poverty with insufficient resources for urban reinvestment and redevelopment. Data from late in the 1990s showed that Trenton schools had poverty rates at or above 71 percent, while all other schools in Mercer County had poverty rates at or below 24 percent. Other counties in New Jersey had similar disparities (Mark 2001).

Aerial – SF Houses

[31] According to the 2000 U.S. Census.

While urban leaders fight to save their cities, suburban and rural areas are receiving local and state assistance for maintaining open space and the rebuilding of town centers. The growth patterns to date seem to be heavily rooted in racism (Mark June 2001). At the same time, environmental advocates seem to have no regard for the dearth of affordable housing in the state. These conditions are frustrating, and historically it has been difficult to build coalitions between urban, suburban, and rural communities.

New Jersey may be the most proactive state in the Northeast in terms of state plan-
ning and open space acquisition. The State Planning Act of 1985 established a coordi-
nated planning approach focused on sprawl. The Act relies on incentives for munici-
palities and support for inter-jurisdictional consultation and coordination. In 1992,
the State Planning Commission created under the State Planning Act of 1985 adopted
a State Development and Redevelopment Plan.

> While the State Development and Redevelopment Plan is not binding, it provides
> a powerful vision for the state and a tool for guiding implementation policies. It
> contains goals and strategies for how those goals can be achieved and by whom.
> It includes a map that helps define priority areas for state investment. It is revised
> every five or six years with intensive input from government at all levels and the
> public. By determining where infrastructure and capital investment are directed,
> the State Plan could help to reverse urban disinvestment, protect open space, and
> build more affordable housing (Mark June 2001).

Cape May Beach

Because New Jersey's State Plan is
mostly a guidance document, there is a
huge need for implementation policies,
more incentives for compliance, and
broader public understanding and sup-
port. Since the State Plan was first adopt-
ed in 1992, three New Jersey governors
have signed Executive Orders seeking
state agency compliance with the State
Plan. Republican Governor Christine
Todd Whitman contributed to imple-
mentation of the Plan by introducing a major open space preservation initiative to
protect an additional 1 million acres beyond the hundreds of thousands that already
had been preserved. The next governor, Jim McGreevey, took Whitman's commitment
to a new level both in his rhetoric and by defining new Executive branch responsibil-
ities for smart growth. Smart growth is good politics in New Jersey, which distin-
guishes it from almost every other state.

New Jersey has 566 municipalities, each with strong local control. Statewide, 150
towns have voted to increase taxes for open space in ballot measures, and the public
buzz in many circles is about sprawl and open space. Still, municipalities are coping
with conflicting state policies. The State Development and Redevelopment Plan urges
them to build in specific areas, while property tax policies urge them to build any-
where they can to fund basic services. New Jersey municipalities receive 76 percent of
their total revenue from property taxes – the fifth highest rate in the nation.[32] Many
municipalities also bristle at the idea of top-down growth management. The New
Jersey Builders Association and many developers continue to oppose smart growth.

Republicans and Democrats in New Jersey are all willing to talk about curbing
sprawl and congestion in the state. They have a harder time broaching the issue of

[32] The national average is 45
percent.

"affordable housing." The Mt. Laurel court decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, which stopped towns from zoning to exclude people and demanded that they plan for housing affordable to low- and moderate income families, was unsuccessfully challenged three times up to the New Jersey Supreme Court.

THE ROLES OF THE SURDNA FOUNDATION'S GRANTEES

New Jersey Future

New Jersey Future helped the State Planning Commission to adopt the first New Jersey State Development and Redevelopment Plan. Since then, its primary focus has been to support the implementation of the State Plan, especially encouraging state agencies to use their regulatory and spending authority aggressively to advance the goals, objectives and process outlined in the State Plan.

At the time that the Surdna Foundation's Smart Growth Initiative kicked off, New Jersey Future was considered one of the major players on smart growth in New Jersey. It had a board that included representatives of some of the most important businesses in the state, Republican and Democratic public officials, and the executive directors of several leading environmental and planning organizations. New Jersey Future was seen by state officials and many local planners and enlightened political leaders as a reliable resource. It also had become a primary source for reporters seeking information about growth issues. As the triennial revisions on the State Plan commenced, New Jersey Future believed its next step was to launch an ambitious constituency building, public education, and community organizing process.

Isles

Isles is a 24-year-old not-for-profit community development and environmental organization based in Trenton, New Jersey. The Surdna Foundation had already supported Isles through its Community Revitalization grant program. For several years, Isles' president, Martin Johnson, had been exploring new ways to measure their impacts and success. As Isles began to move from conventionally quantifiable measures of success such as number of homes built or numbers of community gardens or parks created, to measures such as self-reliant families and healthy, sustainable communities, it began to ponder whether it was working on the right objectives and at the right scale. Isles had had very successful on-the-ground projects, but its target communities continued to experience population flight, concentrated poverty, poor school performance, and other negative trends. The group's president felt that the forces that were impacting neighborhoods were regional in nature, and that concentrating efforts at the community level was not enough. Isles began an intensive effort to understand these regional forces.

The Partnership

Central New Jersey is home to one of its most neglected urban centers, Trenton, as well as some of the state's wealthiest communities, which are starting to feel pressure from

rapid growth. Initially, Isles set out to create a new regional organizing group that would bring together interested organizations to discuss the social and economic implications of sprawl in central New Jersey. However, after a few months it became clear that a statewide organization would be more effective than a regional coalition. Isles created the New Jersey Regional Coalition with the intent of developing it into an independent statewide entity.[33]

New Jersey is different from the other Surdna Initiative states because there are dozens of organizations focused on smart growth issues. Other strong smart growth advocates in New Jersey include the New Jersey Conservation Foundation, the New Jersey Association of Environmental Commissions, the Regional Planning Partnership, the New Jersey Public Policy Institute, the Rutgers Environmental Law Clinic, Audubon, the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group, the Sierra Club, and Clean Water Action.

The vast majority of these organizations were approaching smart growth from an environmental perspective – they sought to protect the environment from development. This meant that most of them were disconnected from urban and increasingly suburban areas – those places where appropriate development is most needed and where critical social issues are in dire need of attention. In addition, while there were about 40 organizations involved in promoting smart growth in some way, there was no clear leader. A key challenge was to determine how all of the work being done tied together and harmonize the work of the various groups. For these reasons, the New Jersey Regional Coalition was able to fill an important, non-threatening niche.

NEW JERSEY FUTURE: A CASE STUDY OF GETTING THE MOST OUT OF STATE POLICY BY BUILDING CREDIBILITY WITH PUBLIC OFFICIALS

New Jersey Future was created by a collaboration of business leaders, developers, and environmental and civic leaders who thought that policy was driving the state in the wrong direction. They successfully advocated for the New Jersey State Plan beginning in 1987, and they stayed together to implement the Plan. Achieving smart growth in New Jersey still required:

new legislation;

regulatory changes;

favorable court decisions;

local zoning changes;

new coalitions of support;

a ramping up of public understanding and support.

Hoboken – Row

[33] It is worth noting that at the time of Surdna Initiative, there were two other Surdna grantees that were not formally part of the Initiative, but whose work was in line with the Initiative: the Tri-State Transportation Campaign, which had been making progress in shifting New Jersey Department of Transportation planning and spending away from new roads; and the Natural Resources Defense Council, which was fostering New Jersey legislation that would provide tax incentives for developers to build in accordance with smart growth and green principles.

In 2000, the board of New Jersey Future decided that the quality of life in New Jersey should be a key focus the 2001 elections should address. The group set out to make smart growth a dominant issue in the campaign. As a first step, it conducted an intensive assessment of views among opinion-leaders about smart growth and about the state of land use governance structure in New Jersey. This included "elite" interviews with 36 key decision-makers (planning board chairs, mayors, and county executives) to understand their perspectives on smart growth, to gauge potential support for policy reform ideas, and to identify points of leverage. New Jersey Future also commissioned one of the largest voter opinion polls every conducted. The poll revealed that eight out of 10 New Jersey voters believed the state was running out of land, and 75 percent said the state should give spending priority to existing communities over new development. This was the very attitude that New Jersey Future wanted to nurture. All in all, New Jersey Future's board spent a full year exploring what policy platform it would advocate during the upcoming political campaigns.

New Jersey Future felt that its research opened a significant window of opportunity to change the system. Using data that had not been combined before, the group conducted an analysis that documented which areas were suffering under the existing circumstances. This investigation revealed distress in inner-ring suburbs, some of which appeared prosperous. In order to succeed, the next step was for New Jersey Future to bring this message to the State House and to members of local governments who were reluctant to change directions.

Haddonfield

Because 2001 was a gubernatorial election year, all of New Jersey Future's smart growth activities in that year were aimed at educating candidates on smart growth and building support among the next wave of leaders in the legislature, as well as other key constituents, including the media. The group hired a campaign consultant to advise it on how best to inject smart growth issues into the governor's race and the legislative races.

In April 2001, New Jersey Future released a report called *Achieving Genuine Prosperity: 20 Ways to Move New Jersey Toward a Just, Healthy and Prosperous Future*, which described where the state was "off course" and suggested 20 policies and practices that would correct its course. The report was carefully developed and packaged for the candidates in the upcoming elections – a strategy that exhibited a high degree of sophistication (Mark 2001). New Jersey Future planned a major media campaign around the release of the report, covering every media outlet and taking every advantage to present the findings. The group's staff and board members made a series of editorial board visits that were very successful, with one important paper running the 20-point plan as a series. A series of op-eds also came out of the report. New Jersey Future

was able to capture considerable attention, which it hoped would result in new policies.

New Jersey Future became the "go to" group for information and sound advice on sprawl and smart growth during the gubernatorial campaign in 2001. After the primaries, the group continued to keep its issues at the forefront of the gubernatorial debates and discussions (Mark 2001). The Democratic nominee frequently asked for advice. New Jersey Future briefed the Republican nominee once, and though its staff continued to provide additional material to candidates in both parties, only the Democratic team engaged in discussing the issues.

New Jersey Future tried to work all of the recommendations in the *20 Ways* report into the pre-election debates. Based on the problems highlighted in the report, it launched a number of special reports addressing affordable housing, traffic, taxes, and other issues. It used *Future Facts*, a bi-monthly email briefing, to reinforce its policy recommendations. It worked with debate sponsors and news media to prepare questions for candidates. And it asked the candidates to provide their positions on the 20 policy proposals for smarter growth.

A key indicator that the group's campaign strategy was a success was that a majority of newspaper editorials said that Democratic gubernatorial candidate James McGreevey deserved to win because of his smart growth stance. Just before the election, New Jersey Future decided to conduct a second public opinion poll, piggybacking four questions on to an Eagleton Institute poll. The poll revealed that 71 percent of voters were likely to vote for a candidate who favored affordable housing development.

New Jersey Future did not slow down after the elections. During the transition period, it was active in identifying and trying to help fill the most important jobs within the state administration and provide input on transition strategies. Governor-elect McGreevey established a cross-departmental transition team on smart growth that was charged with making recommendations on how to achieve his smart growth campaign pledges. New Jersey Future staff served

Delaware and Rotham Canal

on the smart growth team and the agriculture team and contributed substantially to both transition reports.

Meanwhile, in December 2001, the State Planning Commission released the newly revised State Plan. The new version more specifically directed state resources to developed areas. It also required municipalities to fulfill their obligations to provide affordable housing in order to receive State Plan endorsement,[34] and therefore have greater access to state funding. These gains were attributed to the efforts of the Coalition for Affordable Housing and the Environment, which New Jersey Future helped found.

[34] As required by the Mount Laurel obligation.

New Jersey Future usually worked alone, but this was an exception. Though there was frequent discord between members, the Coalition for Affordable Housing and the Environment united powerful voices that had been at odds in the past.

The McGreevey administration unveiled a strong anti-sprawl agenda in the January 2002 State of the State Address. It promised a package of legislation including more than a dozen bills. The promised bills incorporated key New Jersey future ideas, such as:

> conservation-focused amendments to the municipal land use law;
>
> transfer of development rights;
>
> incentives for municipal implementation of the State Development and Redevelopment Plan;
>
> more and better county planning;
>
> transportation changes discouraging highway curb cuts and favoring transit and transit-oriented development.

In his first weeks in office, however, the new governor laid off the entire professional staff in the Office of State Planning as a budget cutting measure. New Jersey Future felt that this decision was contradictory, and merited challenge. The group's staff contacted the editorial boards of the state's largest newspapers and asked them if they were aware of what this decision would cost New Jersey. The newspapers wrote editorials and news articles decrying the decision.

Following the flurry of media attention, the governor opted to reinstate the Planning Office as the Office of Smart Growth and asked New Jersey Future for help in writing one of his first executive orders. The resulting orders incorporated key recommendations from the *20 Ways to Move New Jersey* report, including:

> a smart growth shield, under which the state would provide legal protection to municipalities in implementing the State Plan;
>
> alignment of state regulations and policies with smart growth principles;
>
> strengthening of redevelopment programs.

The executive order also created a Smart Growth Policy Council of key cabinet and executive branch leaders, which was a variation on the Smart Growth cabinet-level post recommended in the 20 Ways report.

New Jersey Future offered 57 newly elected or re-elected state legislators in the most distressed legislative districts custom profiles of their districts, including information on disinvestment and sprawl and overviews of who was suffering and how. It also began to engage these legislators in dialogues about the kinds of policies that would benefit their districts. The group also created and staffed the nation's second legislative Smart Growth Caucus, including more than 25 initial members. The purpose of the caucus was to raise awareness about growth issues in the legislature and to address issues across jurisdictions – linking growth to issues such as transportation and the environment. New Jersey Future also shared its district profiles with mayors, but it stayed focused on its primary target, which was state legislators, the governor, and state agencies.

New Jersey Future earned a trusted place in the McGreevey Administration and among a number of legislators, but there were still many challenges, particularly the large state budget deficit. With less spending flexibility, regulation became a more viable tool, but one that was much more politically complex. To help shape the governor's smart growth legislative package, New Jersey Future created three tests for evaluating smart growth legislation and policy, and distributed them widely to policy-makers and to editorial boards:

> Does the initiative promote growth in the right places (according to the State Plan) and inhibit it in the wrong places?
>
> Does the initiative promote inter-governmental coordination between and among state and local governments?
>
> Does the initiative promote predictability in decision-making for both conservation and development?

The group briefed the administration and the editorial boards of the major newspapers on these lines of inquiry, and they have proven invaluable for smart growth analysis and communications. New Jersey Future still uses them to evaluate current policies, as do many news outlets.

New Jersey Future continued to seek other opportunities to advance smart growth. It hosted a 2002 Smart Growth Awards program to bring together business and other leaders to reaffirm the importance of smart growth in New Jersey. The head of the Board of Public Utilities was an advocate for smart growth, so New Jersey Future brought the major utilities together to consider revising the regulatory structure to reward reinvestment in existing communities and shifting the costs for new infrastructure in greenfield areas to those users. With input from utilities, the Board of Public Utilities wrote draft regulations that used the State Development and Redevelopment Planning Areas to ensure that customers in cities and older suburbs no long subsidized new extensions of service. These regulations, which were adopted in 2004, are a model that has only been implemented in a few states. New Jersey Foundation also encouraged the Department of Environmental Protection to provide financial incentives for municipalities to adopt conservation principles in their master plans and zoning ordinances.

Throughout Governor McGreevey's first year of office, New Jersey Future took every opportunity to underscore the message that smart growth is not just about land preservation (which Governor Whitman had championed during her term in office), but also about growth in the right places. The group initiated Smart Growth Awards, wherein they selected the best projects around the state and honored them with awards. These awards honored town officials, developers and corporations for outstanding work in promoting the healthy growth of New Jersey communities. At the group's invitation, the governor presented the awards. About 250 developers and business leaders came to the first annual awards ceremony out of curiosity and for a chance to meet the governor.

By 2004, the Smart Growth Awards were an institution. They received media coverage including one full-page editorial with photos in the Philadelphia Inquirer. The awards call attention to concrete examples of good growth in urban, suburban, and rural contexts. They are also positive publicity for the developers and towns that made these projects happen.

Although New Jersey Future's primary focus had been state policymakers, it also took several steps to spur implementation at the local level. In April 2003, the group opened the Smart Growth Gateway, an online clearinghouse of New Jersey-specific smart growth information that included:

> strategies;
>
> tools;
>
> case studies;
>
> model ordinances;
>
> smart growth scorecards for measuring how "smart" are projects;
>
> sources of technical assistance and funding.

Again taking advantage of its communications capacity, New Jersey Future placed ads and offered monthly prize giveaways to attract users to the site. The hope was that the website could become the one-stop shop for ordinary citizens and professional planners.

In creating the website, New Jersey Future collaborated with many other groups that had specific expertise to create content, including the Voorhees Transportation Policy Institute at Rutgers, the Biodiversity Project, the Greater Mercer Transportation Management Association, the Regional Planning Partnership, and the Stonybrook Millstone Watershed Association. New Jersey Future is constantly on the prowl for new content, and continues to advertise the website in smaller newspapers and news sources for municipalities. The number of regular hits on the website has doubled since the early days of its introduction. Today the site averages about 2,000 hits per month. It has also received an education award from the American Planning Association's New Jersey chapter.

New Jersey Future also developed various materials to aid implementation. It produced a series of easy-to-read pamphlets called the *Smart Growth Recommendation Series*. These pamphlets explain various policies such as transferable development rights and impact fees, they offer examples of policy implementation, and they provide checklists for implementing effective programs. In collaboration with the New Jersey Chapter of the American Planning Association and the State, New Jersey Future also edited a redevelopment handbook for New Jersey municipal officials and local planners to help demystify the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law.

New Jersey Future created two smart growth scorecards, one to help citizens and local officials identify smart growth strengths and weaknesses in proposed development projects and the other to help evaluate municipal commitments to smart growth as reflected in plans, rules, and projects. These scorecards were distributed to all New

Jersey mayors and planning board chairs as well as dozens of other groups. New Jersey Future made presentations to groups of officials, residents, and the press on the use of the scorecards. The press has used the project scorecards to evaluate proposed projects, and feedback has been good. State-level organizations outside of New Jersey have been given permission to reproduce the project scorecard and the group receives regular requests to talk about it. Generally, the project scorecard has been well-received, but there has been less interest in the municipal scorecard. It seems that there is more concern about specific projects than there is about whether communities are heading in the right way.

New Jersey Future also secured pro-bono legal assistance to file several amicus curiae[35] briefs in support of good municipal planning to advance smart growth. One such brief supported a municipality whose zoning techniques to protect farmland were being challenged. In another case, the courts affirmed that municipalities have some latitude in interpreting current law to encourage mixed use projects in order to redevelop downtowns in older communities. This decision helped to make the State Plan the defining line for what is defensible planning.

In 2003, New Jersey Future launched the legislative smart growth caucus. It continued to work on its legislative agenda and to work on revised utility pricing. It began working with mayors to advance their knowledge in various ways through a mayor's coalition, which after an initial strategy meeting now receives monthly e-briefs on key issues. It undertook regular, in-depth research reports on timely legislative and policy issues.

Because the State Plan was taking on increasing importance as a mechanism for guiding municipal activities, New Jersey Future worked on developing a process for determining consistency with the Plan. The group earned a seat on the governor's seven-person Blue Ribbon Transportation Commission and advanced transit and Fix-It-First agendas. It added new content to the Smart Growth Gateway, including transportation case studies, watershed protection information, and many other topics. It also established an Action Network (an idea it sparked by a Surdna Foundation learning session) made up of members and "Future Facts" subscribers that could be mobilized for important initiatives. Finally, New Jersey Future helped to lead the New Jersey Regional Coalition, which is described in the Isles section.

The year 2003 was slow for new policy, but it was an important year for setting the stage. New Jersey Future continually offered policy ideas, urging legislators and the Administration along. It also consistently offered support in advancing policies that focused on impact fees, incentives for redevelopment, transferable development rights, and protecting the Highlands region.[36] The group's staff and sometimes its board members wrote op-eds when a nudge was needed to keep the agenda visible.

When transferable development rights[37] legislation was pulled from a final vote in 2003, New Jersey Future responded to a call for help from the Administration in resolving the impasse. The group called in technical experts on transferable development rights from three states to help develop a solution that would address concerns of farmers and others about the proposal. A typical point of controversy in transferable development rights programs is whether there will be sufficient demand from

[35] Wherein an individual or organization that is not a party to a particular lawsuit is allowed to advise the court regarding a point of law or fact directly concerning the lawsuit.

[36] See details on Highlands protection below.

[37] Transferable development rights allow communities to restrict growth in certain areas and direct it to others, while allowing landowners in the growth-restricted areas to realize an economic benefit from their land. The rights to develop are separated from the land itself in the preservation areas, and sold to developers who can use them to build at increased density in the desired growth areas. The preservation-area landowners retain their land, and receive the market rate for their development rights. Developers can build more units per acre than otherwise possible in growth areas, and the community saves money on infrastructure costs.

developers for farmer credits and a sufficient supply of credits for developers. The final bill stipulated that in order for a town to implement a transferable development rights program, an independent expert must first complete a real estate and economic analysis of supply and demand. New Jersey Future played a key role in the passage of this bill, helping promote the bill's merits to stakeholders and the legislature.

New Jersey Future was also a member of the Highlands Coalition, a group comprised mostly of environmental organizations that came together to advocate for legislation protecting the Highlands regional watershed. More than half of all New Jersey residents get their drinking water from the Highlands, an 800,000-acre swath of largely open land stretching across the northwestern portion of the state. This water supply is threatened by a fragmented approach to managing the area's rapid regional population growth. The natural resources of the Highlands are controlled by thousands of private landowners and some 90 local governments with limited land-use planning and regulatory capacity.

Because the other Highlands Coalition member organizations were environmental groups, New Jersey Future had some difficulty seeing eye-to-eye with them on whether emerging legislation had sufficient growth management incentives. Not for the first time nor for the last, New Jersey Future angered many of the environmental groups with its pro-growth stance. While the payoff was significant, such collaborative efforts are challenging at best in New Jersey.[38]

In early 2004, the collaboration and preparation of the past year paid off: transferable development rights legislation passed. New Jersey Future turned its attention to implementation. It wrote a policy brief and brought local leaders and planners together to learn about the program.

The Highlands Water Protection and Planning Act was introduced the same day the transferable development rights legislation passed. This Act contained proposed measures to protect the drinking water supply including strict protections for about 400,000 acres of "core" watershed lands through land purchases, new environmental regulations, and a regional plan that dictated strict limits on development.

The Highlands Act put a great deal of land off limits to development. The state legislature said it would only support the bill if incentives were provided for putting the development elsewhere. Behind the scenes, legislators worked with the governor on this "fast track" bill. The Highlands Act passed on a Tuesday, and the Governor's Office released a "streamlining" bill, which would streamline the development permitting process, on Friday of that week for a vote on the following Monday. Environmentalists were infuriated by the bill, which they believed would speed development all over New Jersey. New Jersey Future asked for three amendments to the bill and got one: the permitting process would be accelerated only in areas where the State Plan called for development.

With this concession, New Jersey Future decided to support the bill, even though it still would allow development to occur rapidly and without as much oversight as it preferred. Environmental groups felt this was a terrible decision, but New Jersey Future felt it was the best decision it could make at the time.

From a smart growth perspective, the streamlining bill came down to a choice between a terrible bill and a bad one. In hindsight, New Jersey Future felt it should

[38] There is an historic and continuing disconnect between environmental groups in the state, which are aggressively anti-growth, and smart growth advocates, including New Jersey Future. This tension continued to be played out in 2005 in new regulations for ground water standards, and in flawed legislation for streamlining development permits, derisively labeled the "smart growth" bill by the environmental community.

have declined to support either. After careful review of the final fast track statute, the group decided to withdraw its support and to lead a wide, collaborative effort to design an alternative smart growth streamlining project. New Jersey Future remains deeply committed to implementing meaningful incentives for growth in urban areas, inner ring suburbs, and other areas targeted in concert with the State Plan.

What Happens Next

There has been significant progress towards smart growth in New Jersey over the past decade.

The public understands the nature of the problem.

The governor and legislature have passed important pieces of smart growth legislation.

More state transportation resources are being used to *Fix It First* and fewer new roads are being built than in the past.

Hundreds of towns have improved their master plans and decisions and taxed themselves to acquire open space, as have all 20 New Jersey counties.

Thousands of acres of land have been protected.

Development has slowed in the northwest region of the Highlands.

Development has also slowed in the Pinelands Region due to strong regulations limiting development to protect water resources.

In the southern part of the state, efforts to avoid sprawl are shaping new development. The number of nominations for Smart Growth awards have increased each year and more people are coming to the awards events. The quality of the development work being done has also improved.

Some greenfield[39] developers have been leaving the state because it has become more difficult for them to develop new greenfield projects.

New Jersey Future has cultivated relationships with major developers interested in mixed use communities and urban places. Many of these have deep enough pockets to break through the continuing barriers.

However, there are still significant impediments to "doing it right." Most municipal master plans still don't allow for street car suburbs, despite evident demand and higher property prices in areas that offer this amenity. In addition, many municipal leaders are not on board: they are frustrated with the state law that allows density bonuses for developers in communities that don't have affordable housing plans – they don't want to be told what or where to build. They also don't want to have to zone for multi-unit housing, which will attract families with children and raise property taxes for education.[40]

The property tax system is the primary barrier to smarter growth in New Jersey. The relatively modest incentives offered in the State Plan hold little appeal to local officials

[39] Greenfield refers to land that has never been occupied by a permanent structure.

[40] On a per capita basis, New Jersey has the highest property taxes in the nation.

when they are under pressure to attract commercial development to fund local services and to keep out denser development because it might attract more families with children and schools, and thereby raise taxes. In 2004, a citizen's coalition that included New Jersey Future built a statewide campaign for tax reform. The Governor subsequently appointed a commission to recommend tax code changes. New Jersey Future's role going forward will be to ensure that tax reforms are growth-neutral if not supportive of smart growth. Property tax reform figures significantly in the group's preparations for a smart growth platform for the November 2005 elections.

A second barrier to smarter growth in New Jersey is what one legislator dubbed "multiple municipal madness." New Jersey has a weak county government structure. Land use decisions are made by 566 separate but adjoining municipalities, some of which are as small as a square mile. Cities that are large enough to require professional planning rarely have anything but the most minimal staff capacity. The Smart Growth Gateway and other New Jersey Future educational efforts have offered guidance to some local officials, but have not reached the vast majority. New Jersey Future is collaborating with Rutgers, the American Planning Association, the state, and others to write a curriculum and offer classes for local planning board members. Trial classes held in 2004 were a tremendous success, and a second class is being planned. This is a good first step, but much more needs to be done to educate and engage local officials and planners.

A third barrier to smart growth in New Jersey is the "not in my backyard" syndrome. Many residents and leaders appreciate the ideas behind smart growth, but are unwilling to make compromises in their own communities. New Jersey Future has worked at the policy level, supported by a base of business, civic, and public leaders, but it realizes this is not enough. There is a need for a broader grassroots constituency to advance smart growth. This is why New Jersey Future has partnered with regional organizations.

New Jersey Future is also a founding member of the regional coalition that Isles has formed to mobilize grassroots support for policy change. The issues that are bubbling up through the coalition-building process, including tax reform and housing, are among New Jersey Future's highest priorities. The group plays a valued role in New Jersey. Through its strong media efforts and quality research, it has had the ear of state leaders in the legislature and state agencies. Within these bounds, it has been successful. However, New Jersey Future will not succeed alone. Another effort is needed to create a coalition to bridge issues and build a broad base of support for smart growth.

ISLES: A CASE STUDY OF BUILDING THE GRASSROOTS BASE FOR SMARTER GROWTH AND REGIONAL EQUITY

"It is not enough to be right," says Martin Johnson, the President of Isles. According to Mr. Johnson, while elected officials need to be intelligent and committed to smart growth, they must also be supported by an informed public. And that requires a grassroots, constituency-based research and organizing agenda and capacity.

In 2000, Isles began to explore opportunities to ground and link a smart growth agenda with its urban community development agenda in central New Jersey. This is

a link that many experts say is essential for truly successful smart growth strategies, but is unusually difficult to create. Isles was breaking new ground. While there had been much talk about the importance of regional coalition building and integration of urban and suburban organizing and development strategies in order to achieve smart growth, there are few places where such an approach has been implemented (Mark 2001).

Throughout 2001, Isles laid the groundwork for a regional approach to connect the best attributes of local place-based and regional organizing and action. First, Isles began regionalizing all of its program areas – urban agriculture, environmental education, environmental health, brownfield redevelopment, youth job training, and real estate. It began to undertake collaborative projects with regional and statewide groups, including a watershed management and urban growth initiative in partnership with the Regional Planning Project,[41] a regional education campaign in partnership with the Stonybrook Millstone Watershed Association, an affordable housing campaign with the Affordable Housing and Community Development Network of New Jersey and the startup of the statewide Coalition for Affordable Housing and the Environment.

Isles felt that an important part of its efforts would be developing new, broader indicators for healthy, sustainable communities and family self-reliance. It initiated a community indicator project by gathering information on best practices elsewhere. Using this information, it undertook surveys and focus groups to identify meaningful indicators. It also began to work with organizations and luminaries to research and assemble indicators and data on the neighborhood, municipal and, where possible, regional levels. Those involved in this effort included:

New Jersey Future;

Myron Orfield, a former Minnesota legislator and an authority on state and local government and finance, land use, and regional governance;

David Rusk, a former mayor of Albuquerque and a consultant on urban policy with focus on the impacts of urban sprawl, racial segregation, and concentrated poverty on growth patterns;

john powell,[42] the Executive Director of the Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Equity at Ohio State University and an expert on racial justice, social policy and regionalism;

the National Success Measures Project;

A primary goal of this collaborative was to develop comparisons between cities and suburbs, both old and new. Isles wanted to create a learning culture around smart growth and this required good data. The group pooled its GIS[43] resources with that of other advocacy groups to make a regional database available for use by the public. Using Surdna Foundation support, Isles hired a "sustainable development" project coordinator to manage the emerging regional connections and new indicator-supported initiatives. In addition, Isles created two new positions, Vice President of

[41] formerly known as the Middlesex, Somerset, Mercer Regional Council

[42] Professor powell prefers no caps.

[43] Geographic Information Systems

Communications and Director of Research and Development, to help implement its regional education efforts and coordinate a community indicator project.

Working with peer community development and other "place-based" organizations in the region, Isles encountered a challenge. Each group was focused on its own local issues, with little organizational connection to the broader context. Isles used several tactics to address this:

> It increased its investment in community education, organizational capacity-building, and promotion of local dialogues around issues such as concentrated poverty, racist housing policies, property tax reform, and suburban white flight.

> It crafted language to connect better to suburban citizens and churches.

> It recognized the priorities of the various participants and tied their local concerns to broader issues, including talking about how the regional trends were impacting the city of Trenton and vice versa.

> It worked to keep the issues of race and poverty on the table when other smart growth issues were discussed.

> It sponsored forums on poverty concentration and race and regionalism to educate the public on broader forces shaping local communities.

> It completed a study that showed that the highest concentrations of asthma and other diseases were in Trenton and older suburbs, and that these statistics were related to the age of the housing stock as well as income and regional transportation policies. The group used those findings to garner interest on environmental issues in urban communities and to connect to the suburban environmental constituency.

The next step for Isles was to organize the New Jersey Regional Coalition to pursue a research and organizing agenda in support of policies and practices to counter the social and economic impact of sprawl and to support regional equity. The Coalition included the New Jersey Public Policy Research Institute,[44] New Jersey Future, the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, the Regional Planning Partnership, the Jubilee Interfaith Coalition, and the Affordable Housing and Environmental Coalition. The goals of this Coalition were:

[44] The oldest African American policy think tank in the country.

> to help guide effective research, to educate the public;

> to build relationships between traditional sprawl experts and equity-oriented organizations;

> to organize constituency groups;

> to foster policies and procedures that work statewide.

Soon after it was formed, the Coalition hired Myron Orfield and the Metropolitan Area Research Corporation to conduct a study of economic disparity and regional growth in New Jersey that would highlight the impacts on local government fiscal capacity and quality of life. In May 2002, 120 statewide leaders came to hear a kick-off

presentation on the pending study. While the study was underway, Isles began planning business, legislative, and civic leadership roundtables to review the findings and a public education campaign targeting businesses, faith-based institutions, higher education institutions, community organizations, and municipal officials.

By the end of 2002, the New Jersey Regional Coalition, which had grown to nine members, was a unified group. It had successfully struggled to create a common agenda despite disparate interests. It was ready to create and advance an organizing agenda related to sprawl, social equity, and the environment at the regional and state scales.

The preliminary report from Myron Orfield, *New Jersey Metropatterns*, effectively demonstrated the challenges facing the state. The report showed that older suburbs were facing social and fiscal crises similar to the urban centers and that competition for tax base and unplanned growth had hurt almost every community in New Jersey. These findings were very similar to studies done in other states. It was hoped that this concrete information would spur regional cooperation.

Suburban Boardup

After the May 2003 press conference releasing the final report, Isles began to present the report to the general public and to leaders throughout the state, including members of labor organizations, churches, and civic groups. To enhance its public outreach, Isles developed a PowerPoint presentation highlighting key maps and data from *New Jersey Metropatterns*. This presentation was adapted for different audiences throughout the region. The Coalition sponsored a major statewide summit in June 2003 called the People's Summit for Regional Equity. It also sponsored six regional summits and dozens of smaller constituency-based meetings, forums, and presentations. More than 500 individuals attended the statewide summit, representing diverse constituencies, including labor unions, religious organizations, and environmental groups from across New Jersey. Through these outreach efforts, thousands of people were briefed on the study and maps.

Willingboro – Empty Strip

Following the statewide summit, the Coalition brought on additional central and northern Jersey affiliate organizations (until this point, the Jubilee Interfaith Coalition Jubilee had been the only northern Jersey affiliate). Together, these sub-groups would coordinate their activities through the Coalition, which was co-chaired by the President of Isles and the New Jersey Public Policy and Research Institute. In central New Jersey,

the affiliate is the Central Jersey Regional Equity Coalition. The southern New Jersey partner is the South Jersey Regional Equity Organizing Project. In the North, the effort is lead by the Jubilee Interfaith Organization, which was working closely with an organizer from the Gamaliel Foundation. Each of these affiliates created steering committees and began extensive recruitment efforts. A hundred influential church, civic, and government leaders were trained to be leaders in the regional equity movement. Additional research by Myron Orfield's firm that illustrated regional fiscal disparities aided the organizing effort.

Conversations with institutional leaders in the three regions of the state broadened the Coalition's reach and attracted the attention of some of New Jersey's legislators. In 2003, Isles, the New Jersey Regional Coalition, and the regional affiliates in southern, central, and northern New Jersey reached out to nearly 500 institutions. Coalition membership expanded to include community groups, faith groups, environmentalists, regional planners, civic leaders, racial justice groups, business people, and urbanists. The Coalition recruited the majority leaders in the state senate and assembly as allies. Isles was gratified at this strong positive response to the New Jersey Metropatterns report and the eagerness to organize and advocate for change.

A large part of the organizing focus and energy was found in the older suburbs. Suburban parishes, congregations, and communities tend to be more aware of how concentrated poverty in the city is pushing out into the suburbs. Faith-based institutions were especially important partners in the suburbs because there are fewer community-based organizations than in urban neighborhoods. Over 500 suburban congregations participated in Coalition meetings. At each congregation, the Coalition organized a leadership group to get involved in the statewide agenda.

> These new relationships began to change how Isles did business. As the group began working with grassroots suburban groups outside of Trenton, it started working on community development projects in the older suburban areas. In its neighborhood planning, it started to consider how communities fit in their regions, rather than focusing on neighborhoods in isolation. It began to train community residents in Trenton and in the suburbs of Trenton to understand this regional analysis.

What Happens Next

With the New Jersey Regional Coalition's coordination, the regional affiliates are training leaders in organizing skills and developing an agenda for policy change, such as fighting against efforts to transfer affordable housing requirements from wealthy to poor communities. The regional groups began developing policy platforms in the fall of 2004. The goals were:

to continue to build the momentum of the organizing;

to further develop platforms;

to continue to network environmentalists, community development and housing advocates, faith based groups, civil rights groups, business interests, planning organizations, and elected officials.

As this goes to print, the platforms include:

property tax reform;

affordable housing development outside of high poverty areas;

integration of communities;

more regional planning and decision-making.

Based on the Isles vision for the next steps advancing a mass movement in New Jersey around smart growth issues, the Jersey Regional Coalition continues to train leaders, network, and develop organizing strategies around the policy and regulatory platforms.

In some sense, New Jersey Future and Isles are "meeting in the middle." New Jersey Future's modus operandi has been policy leadership. It has used analysis and the media to urge state leaders to change. But while New Jersey Future found a way to deliver media attention, it could not deliver votes. Isles was successful at local development and environmental projects – building neighborhood self-reliance – but the overall trends were working against it. To remain focused on its mission, "to foster more self-reliant families in healthy, sustainable communities," it had to engage the regional forces without impinging on its successful on-the-ground development work. New Jersey Future and Isles found common ground through an alliance based upon an understanding of how regional forces influence community health and what it will take to really impact the region.

WHAT IT TAKES TO DO THE WORK

The budget for New Jersey Future's work on smart growth is about $515,00: $350,000 for staff; $165,000 for operating expenses. Funders have included the Geraldine R. Dodge, William Penn, and Doris Duke Charitable Foundations, as well as the Surdna Foundation.

The Isles sustainable regional project budget was $212,000 for each of the first two years: $137,800 for personnel, $17,000 for consultants, and the remainder for miscellaneous expenses such as transportation, events, telephone etc. Funders included the F. B. Heron Foundation, the Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation, the Princeton Area Community Foundation, the Fund for New Jersey, the Surdna Foundation, and unrestricted direct mail solicitations.

Lessons Learned From the Four-State Initiative

The Surdna Foundation found that it could cull many common lessons from the Smart Growth Initiative case studies, both for philanthropy and smart growth strategy. The lessons are divided into four categories:

> Capacities and Skills to Do Smart Growth Work
>
> Policy Agendas That Advance Smart Growth
>
> Process Steps That Advance Smart Growth
>
> Lessons for Philanthropy

CAPACITIES AND SKILLS TO DO SMART GROWTH WORK

Organizational Infrastructure for State Smart Growth

Four types of organizations play complementary roles in promoting the adoption of smart growth policies:

> an even-handed convener that is dedicated to bringing diverse people together to reach agreement;
>
> an organization dedicated to advocating smart growth, but which keeps channels open to diverse people;
>
> an organization that fights particularly bad sprawl projects to buy time for better solutions;
>
> patient foundations to fund the necessary long-term public-private work.

An Organization That Provides a Table Where All Are Welcome to Work On Growth Issues

Some regions and states already have government entities that can serve as even-handed conveners. Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO) can provide this table for discussing and working through regional growth issues (for example, Portland's MPO is playing this role), although most have not built the capacity yet to carry on this kind of long-term, inclusive regional discussion about growth. Other regions need to create such a structure in the nonprofit sector. In Salt Lake City, Envision Utah is playing this

role. Its broadly inclusive group, including business leadership, is raising and resolving issues and providing political cover for local officials to come out in support of smart growth.

To provide the "open table" for discussion, an organization has to be willing to allow what emerges from the dialogue to be the product of the participants and trust that a well-informed group of people will make good, broadly-accepted decisions. According to community leaders in Utah, the somewhat "mainstream" options that emerged from the visioning process and the development of growth options were important in building broad support for Envision Utah (Van Gorp 2004). As noted by Robert Grow, the first leader of Envision Utah, "It is about problem solving, not philosophizing." The neutral convener can help regional and state leaders to make good decisions by providing both very high quality information and a chance to work together to solve problems.

To keep all channels open, Envision Utah staff took care in handling their relationships with political leaders. While the governor's administrative actions and policies have had a significant impact on how state agencies support the work of Envision Utah, Envision Utah has carefully managed the governor's role because Utahans are vehemently opposed to state intrusion into planning. Observers also credit Envision Utah with doing a clever "dance" with the legislature: educating members on the economic benefits of quality growth in their districts, but not over-pushing and causing a negative reaction among the legislature's most conservative members (Mark 2001).

An Organization Dedicated to Advocating for Smart Growth Policies While Keeping Channels Open to Diverse Stakeholders

Achieving smart growth requires a champion to keep score, scan for opportunities, stay focused on the goal, and form coalitions with diverse groups to pursue specific policy objectives. It is best if it is an organization that is not associated with one issue, such as the environment. A state's smart growth organization should be an advocate for specific policies, but in a way that keeps the lines of communication open to everyone. This kind of an organization would fill a gap even in Utah, where, besides Envision Utah, there are only single-issue organizations (focusing on environment, transit, etc.) following growth issues.

1,000 Friends of New Mexico has effectively played this role for most of its years, pursuing a policy agenda while building and sustaining good relationships with policymakers and business leaders. During the few years that it shifted to more traditional, aggressive environmental advocacy, it burned bridges that it had built to the governor, local governments, and developers. As an outsider, it lost its ability to broker solutions. Now 1000 Friends has reopened communications with these stakeholders. It has made it clear that its role is not to demonize anyone, but to build trust and dialog and to educate. This is close to a "neutral convener" philosophy, but it is coupled with a policy agenda.

This kind of advocate for smart growth is needed even in states with a governor who is supportive of smart growth. Advocacy for smart growth allowed Maryland's smart growth-friendly governor to keep making improvements to state laws. When

the *Making Smart Growth Smarter* report showed that Maryland state agencies had not institutionalized smart growth policies and procedures, Governor Glendening said he would work harder to implement the recommendations in the report. Advocacy was also needed to institutionalize the laws that the governor had passed within state agencies, especially within the Department of Transportation.

An Organization That Will Aggressively Fight Exceptionally Bad Sprawl Projects to Buy Time for Better Solutions

The neutral convener cannot join battles to stop bad projects. Envision Utah has not opposed the Legacy Highway, which would greatly increase sprawl around Salt Lake City, because it was a divisive issue. As the even-handed convener, it needed to stay clear of the most conflict-ridden battles. A smart growth policy advocacy organization can sometimes join such battles, but it should recognize and weigh the potential political costs. It helps to have a third, more strident entity to play the bad cop. Local officials can find it difficult to say no to a road or development project – they may be desperate for tax revenues, be close associates of the builders, or be worried about a lawsuit from a developer who is turned down. Having an organization that is ready to fight bad projects provides political cover for such officials and encourages them to think harder about their choices. The Tri-State Transportation Campaign (Tri-State is a Surdna grantee, but not formally part of the Initiative) has effectively played this role in New Jersey, as has the New Mexico Environmental Law Center in New Mexico.

Patient, Flexible Foundations to Fund this Work

Maintaining an effective organizational infrastructure for smart growth work presents many challenges for foundations:

> It is long-haul work that is best anchored by multi-year grants – for all of the groups in the Initiative the five year time frame was only a slice of a much longer endeavor;

> Its complex nature requires cross-sectoral thinking by the funders — traditional funding categories do not always fit the need;

> The ideal level of education and outreach required is costly (but, as Envision Utah has shown, its larger than average budget – over $1 million per year – delivers greater than average results).

In its early stages, the work can also require high risk support. Although Isles expects that its Coalition members increasingly will support the Coalition through membership fees, it had to raise $500,000 to build the coalition over its first three years. It was difficult to attract funding for this period from Isles' traditional community development funders, in spite of its strong track record, because there were few good examples of regional equity organizing.

Necessary Qualities of the Statewide Smart Growth Organization

There are a few qualities that most effective smart growth organizations seem to share. They tend to be politically savvy, powerfully backed, patient, willing to learn, and opportunistic.

Politically Savvy

It is critical for smart growth advocates to be aware of the vast and very powerful political and economic forces that are in play in the smart growth arena, and how to make those forces work for them. Advocates especially need to understand how to be helpful to elected officials who would like to do the right thing, but need political support to do it. This requires a staff equipped with experienced planners who understand how local governments work and policy wonks who know how to work the system in the capitol.

Envision Utah, for example, built a great deal of credibility in both the economic and political spheres by picking key current and past mayors, county commissioners, and directors of planning to use as wise advisors. In Maryland, smart growth advocates had friends and colleagues inside the governor's office with whom they could test out strategies. New Jersey Future continually tapped the advice of its board, which includes business leaders with political and policy experience, as well as highly placed government advisors, to develop strategies.

Powerfully Backed

Envision Utah created a leadership council that included many visible local leaders, including former governors and mayors, current mayors and county commissioners, prominent business people, media leaders, and leaders from the Latter Day Saints Church. Envision Utah undertook an extensive discovery process to find people to serve on the council – people who would be committed to the process and who could help them identify other leaders who would be approachable on growth issues. In this fashion, the group built a critical mass of political leadership. Although on a different scale, 1000 Friends of New Mexico and New Jersey Future also exercised care in developing diverse and powerful boards.

Patient

It takes patience to change entrenched systems. The current zoning policies were adopted decades ago. Systems that took over 50 years to form can't be changed overnight. Changes that effect smart growth have been small and incremental in most states.

It also takes time to develop a rapport between various interests – it can take two years just to get the affordable housing people and environmentalists to be comfortable together within a broad coalition. It can take two more years just to get organized and build some credibility. It may then take a few years to raise awareness about growth issues and begin a public dialogue. And it takes even longer to achieve policy changes that enable different growth patterns. It will take longer still to see new devel-

opment on a large scale. And, once there is this development, it will take many more years to build new communities and see impacts in terms of quality of life, congestion, and air quality.

In Oregon, considered a national model, it took 10 years to achieve a new framework for growth planning. Envision Utah, another national model, began a decade ago, but the process really began years earlier with the consensus building efforts of the Coalition for Utah's Future. When the New Mexico Coalition aimed for comprehensive legislation within three years, it failed. An incremental approach, including new policies at the state and local levels, has consistently been more effective than a dash for the finish line. Among other things, gradual change also allows time for local officials to absorb and accept new programs.

Perceptions that there are easy fixes to growth problems are a threat to smart growth initiatives. For example, traffic congestion is the driving force behind much of the current agitation for smart growth. In Maryland, smart growth advocates have expressed concern that unless solutions to the traffic problems are found quickly, the support for smart growth proposals may turn to anger or cynicism and defeat the smart growth movement (Mark 2001). If the public expects quick solutions to traffic congestion, it will be disappointed. Solutions will be incremental and the track record will be mixed.

Willing to Learn

Smart growth organizations need to be good listeners and ready learners. They need to be open to new ideas and people and willing to change course based upon new information. Envision Utah did this in multiple ways:

> interviews to inform stakeholders about the Envision Utah process, to inform the Envision Utah staff about barriers and opportunities, and to help draw new people into the process;

> workshops to educate stakeholders about the need for a regional vision and to learn from their locally-based knowledge;

> a public relations campaign about the strategy;

> surveys of the public about their desires for how their region should grow.

New Jersey Future spent a year going talking to leaders throughout the state before it formulated its policy agenda during the Initiative. Isles discussed the findings of its metropatterns research with thousands of grassroots leaders in New Jersey and integrated input from those leaders before beginning to build a policy agenda.

Opportunistic and Entrepreneurial

Smart growth organizations need to be opportunistic. In 2000, the growth rate in New Mexico was high and projected to increase, but it unexpectedly slowed. Formed in the face of an urgent growth challenge, it became much harder for the Coalition to act when slower growth reduced the urgency. Then, when a new governor was elected, new opportunities emerged. In Maryland, support for smart growth shifted radically

in Carroll County after an anti-smart growth slate was not re-elected. New Jersey Future's access to the governor and the cabinet improved with the election of Governor McGreevy, while the Chesapeake Bay Foundation saw its access diminish after gubernatorial elections.

Smart growth organizations need to constantly scan for the best opportunities. When the Wasatch Front Regional Draft Long-Range Plan for 2030 was widely criticized, Envision Utah quickly stepped in to broker solutions and to address the criticisms. Because the Chesapeake Bay Foundation anticipated that rural zoning would be debated in several counties during the 2002 elections, it made sure that people in the counties had tools for the debate.

Grantees often feel under pressure from funders to commit to specific strategies and policy goals. Given the many factors that shift opportunities and possibilities for smart growth, grantees need a relationship with their funders that allows them the flexibility to adapt work plans to get the most bang for the buck.

Valuable Capacities for Championing Smart Growth

There are some organizational capacities that are highly valuable for effectively championing smart growth. These core capacities include strategic planning, score keeping, communications, volunteer engagement, conflict resolution, and expertise in addressing issues of race and class. The core set of capacities shifts (or, perhaps more accurately, grows) with the stages of the work. Skills required to build awareness are different than skills needed to foster implementation. For example, to better respond to growth in demand for its implementation services, Envision Utah made changes to its staff, adding three full time planners, one full time community awareness manager, and one full time government relations manager.

Strategic Planning

Smart growth organizations need to be able to think long-term and have long-term outcomes in mind, even as they face a shifting environment. They must be able to set clear goals and choose strategic priorities. It is not realistic or productive for small organizations to try to be everywhere and cover every issue. Strong strategic planning skills help smart growth organizations to hone in on the best opportunities.

A Way of Keeping Score

Smart growth advocates also need to have a set of indicators in place so they can measure and demonstrate their progress and consciously make adjustments in strategies and tactics as they work towards their long-term outcomes. Development of these indicators seems to pose a real challenge to smart growth organizations. There is a general feeling that the work and outcomes are long term and complex, and that the lack of dramatic short-term progress might turn off funders and scare away public and political support. In many states it also is difficult to find agencies that have the will and/or the resources to collect and analyze the detailed data needed to definitively track the impact of smart growth policy and investment. These are important chal-

lenges. Overall, smart growth organizations need additional assistance in learning how to measure and evaluate their internal and external work to ensure progress and focus on real results.

Communications Skills

Smart Growth practitioners need not only great ideas, but also the communications skills to engage and mobilize large segments of the population. A valuable starting place for good communications is values-based research. As pointed out by Dick Mark, designing new communities and redesigning older neighborhoods is values-laden and values-driven work. It is about identifying and working with people's core values and beliefs about their homes, their families, their neighborhoods, their futures, and their personal and economic security. Some of this work is almost spiritual (Mark 2001).

Effective communications tactics allowed the Envision Utah staff to engage Utah citizens. One of the first steps taken by Envision Utah was to perform a values framework study, which offered insight into the widely-held family values, as well as negative perceptions about population density. Envision Utah appealed to these values by emphasizing the impacts that growth could have on the Utah that will be there for the children and grandchildren of current residents. By concentrating on issues that concerned most Utahans, such as the economy and quality of life for the next generation, Envision Utah gained broader support for its goals and strategies. Through a gradual process, Utah residents are becoming aware of the dire housing situation their children will face under the status quo development scenario and this is prompting them to consider alternatives. Without its excellent communications tactics, Envision Utah probably would have encountered more political opposition and greater difficulty in attracting funding at the level it needed.

Envision Utah succeeded because it hired experienced communications professionals and conducted polling, focus groups, and other pubic opinion research to shape its message and generate media hooks. Envision Utah staff figured out all the key messages, but then hired outside people to design ads and provide imagery. Its staff also worked hard from the very beginning to nurture relationships with media leaders in the region. Several publishers and television managers served on the Envision Utah steering committee And the staff included media managers and owners in every meeting and kept them informed.

Communications skills also can allow smart growth organizations to build their credibility and policy access. Local and state leaders perceive the smart growth organizations that the Surdna Foundation funded as having power, authority, and the ability to make a difference. These organizations have leveraged these perceptions through concerted communications efforts. New Jersey Future systematically and effectively used communications to enhance its stature and ability to influence policy. The greater part of the New Jersey Future case study is a model for effective communications. New Jersey Future brought an experienced communications professional on staff. As a result, its public language was sharp, focused, and easily understood by reporters, political leaders, and the public. New Jersey Future was able to become the primary

source for state and local political leaders and reporters seeking the ideas on growth (Mark 2001).

New Mexico organizations did not dedicate the same level of resources to values-based research as the organizations in New Jersey and Utah, but they were well aware of the need to develop messages that hit peoples' core concerns. Although it was not directly part of the Surdna Initiative, some local observers believe that Albuquerque Interfaith, the grassroots organization that was part of the campaign to adopt Albuquerque's Planned Growth Strategy, made the greatest contribution to adoption of the Strategy by connecting it to continued funding of local governmental services and sufficient school facilities to educate young people. In this way, Albuquerque Interfaith won the support of the Albuquerque Public School Board and many parents Colombo 2004).

Most smart growth advocates still don't have the communication professionals and tools they need. Investment in top-of-the-line communications often is seen as a cost-ly frill by advocates and their funders. Without the means to test potential messages, advocates must guess at which messages will work, making it hard for them to connect to new communities and new constituencies and capture their support for smarter growth (Mark 2001).

Volunteer Engagement Skills

Smart growth organizations can augment their impact by empowering others to carry the smart growth message. Envision Utah has effectively recruited aides and opinion leaders to assist in this process. For example, the 100 business and community leaders who made up the group's multi-stakeholder public-private partnership, and the 40 leaders who comprise the Envision Utah Steering Committee, all are boosters for the plan and sources of ideas for how to improve the process. To keep volunteer leaders engaged, the Envision Utah executive director's philosophy has been to support and recognize volunteers while keeping a low profile for staff.

Conflict Resolution Skills

Smart growth organizations can be valued brokers of compromise. When transferable development rights legislation was pulled from a final vote in 2003, New Jersey Future called in technical experts on transferable development rights from three states to help devise a solution that would address the concerns voiced by farmers and others about the proposal. Envision Utah has played a similar role many times in Utah, including in finding ways to reduce criticism of the region's 2030 transportation plan.

Coalition Building Skills

There are few examples of success in advancing a smart growth agenda where there has not been a broad coalition, including business, community, and government leader-ship. The more people who are in the tent, the fewer there are outside it to subvert the process. Smart growth organizations need to be skilled coalition builders and sustain-ers. They need to be able to recruit and help members to define a clear purpose and

rules for working together. The experience in New Mexico also demonstrates how important it is to reassess purpose and rules on a regular basis to ensure that coalitions don't lose their way as the external context for their work and their leadership change. Leadership changes at 1000 Friends of New Mexico contributed to loss of clear direction for the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future. Although the Coalition continued to play a useful role, it was hampered by the lack of clarity about its purpose and the rules of membership.

Expertise in Addressing Issues of Race and Class

Issues of race and class are at the root of work on smart growth, and increasing attention is devoted to them, but there is little expertise or experience within many smart growth organizations. Some smart growth agendas integrate issues of equity in terms of affordable housing and urban reinvestment, but success in engaging with communities of color has been limited. For example, the term "density" cannot be used in most states for fear of public backlash, but little attention is being paid to what is at the root of this backlash and strategies that might be used to overcome it. Race and class are the "silent" issues in smart growth work and the issues with the greatest potential for blocking progress in both urban and rural states.

Among the four Initiative projects, the work done by the New Jersey Regional Coalition represents a big step in the right direction on race issues. The New Mexico groups have made some progress in this area, but in all cases more work could be done to address issues of race and class and engage a wider range of communities and classes. Efforts along these lines can go a long way to achieving long-term success, but it takes additional support, training, sensitivity, and most of all, leadership of people of color, to make it work (Mark 2001).

POLICY AGENDAS THAT ADVANCE SMART GROWTH

Differences in culture, challenges and opportunities, and capacities of smart growth players have significant impacts on what strategies will work and what outcomes are achievable in various states (Mark 2001). While growth pressures are a driving force in New Jersey, water is the compelling issue in New Mexico. While the values of the Church of the Latter Day Saints guide policy in Utah and, to a lesser degree, other western states, this is not so in the East. In 2002, 1000 Friends of New Mexico saw its opportunities to effect change dramatically improve with the election of a new governor. In the same election year, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation saw its prospects to influence policy diminish, forcing it to make changes in its strategy.

Variability in priorities and circumstances are what make it hard to define an entire strategy that would be replicable from one state to another. Peter Calthorpe of Calthorpe Associates in Utah considers Envision Utah's bottom-up approach the most transferable effort he has seen because Envision Utah's strategy is a process, rather than a set of principles or policies. Using the same process, states can arrive at very different policies and outcomes (Van Gorp 2003).

Still, there is evidence from the case studies to suggest that state policy frameworks for smart growth, such as the Maryland state growth law, are also replicable when the conditions are right. The Maryland smart growth law, a top-down approach, is credited with shifting the policy landscape in Maryland. Various studies have found that a strong state framework is a positive factor in encouraging local governments to adopt smart growth plans and ordinances. As a result, this approach has gained new adherents. Utah has adopted legislation with many similar features to the Maryland law. And Governor Richardson of New Mexico has met with Governor Glendening of Maryland to discuss how this approach might work in New Mexico.

Smart growth advocates debate the effective balance between the top-down approach, such as government-driven method in Maryland, and the bottom-up approach, as employed in Utah. The optimal balance point surely varies from place to place. For instance, in staunchly conservative states, top-down frameworks are not likely to succeed. Even when there is a solid state policy framework in place, effective implementation will require the public buy-in and local understanding that a bottom-up process can engender.

Whatever the approach, a thorough review of the four Initiative projects demonstrates significant overlap in the smart growth *activities* supported. Building on Envision Utah's 32 individual strategies to realize the Quality Growth Strategy, we list these activities below, most of which are applicable across states and regions. The examples of the detailed policies that flow from these activities could easily comprise a monograph unto themselves, so we do not attempt to provide them here.

Activities to Promote Smart Growth Strategies

Development

Foster and promote walkable development where feasible;

Encourage transit-oriented development;

Promote safe routes to school, transit, etc.;

Endorse the creation of a network of bikeways and trails, especially commuter trails linking daytime destinations;

Support mixed use and other zoning amendments.

Population

Promote density bonuses to developers to encourage the development of affordable housing;

Provide information regarding developer incentives and tax breaks for development of affordable and mixed-income housing;

Create local housing trust funds to develop and maintain affordable housing;

Encourage cooperative region-wide "fair share" housing policies;

Help to develop a program of incentives to local governments to create and implement plans for affordable and mixed-income housing;

Devise affordable housing requirements for new development.

Transportation

Promote the building of a region-wide transit system to make transit more convenient and reliable;

Work to increase funding for transit service;

Advance tele-commuting;

Encourage job locations that include retail and services in a walkable configuration;

Support the addition of carpool lanes and promote incentives for their use;

Endorse reversible lanes to reduce peak hour congestion and take advantage of unused road capacity.

Policy

Promote tax incentives for reuse of currently developed areas;

Help to provide incentives for downtown revitalization;

Craft and implement Smart Codes to encourage building rehabilitation;

Establish Historical Preservation Tax Credit Programs;

Promote county-level development capacity analyses;

Advocate clean up and reuse of brownfields sites;

Provide predictability in decision-making for both conservation and development;

Offer flexible funds and resources to assist communities that have good revitalization programs to invest in streetscape improvements, bike lanes, and pedestrian facilities.

Land Conservation

Support the establishment of transfer of development rights programs to promote protection of open spaces and to maintain quality of life;

Support the protection of sensitive lands;

Support land conservation ordinances to protect agricultural and open space land;

Promote use of conservation easements to preserve critical land and organize these areas into a regional network to the extent possible;

Pursue public land trades to create more private developable land, preserve critical lands and watersheds, and protect sensitive lands from development;

Support tax measures for open space acquisition.

Water

Advocate restructuring of water bills to encourage conservation;

Support statewide water management policies;

Provide education regarding low-irrigation landscaping, drought resistant plants, and low water-use appliances;

Promote the use of grey water and secondary water systems;

Encourage local and regional government water conservation and drought management planning;

Propose restrictions on wells in critical management areas;

Advance balanced water planning.

Planning

Encourage inter-jurisdictional cooperation;

Promote local master plans and zoning ordinances that include walkable development and preservation of open space;

Provide incentives to encourage communities to comply with planning requirements;

Advance comprehensive plan enforcement;

Support impact fees;

Advocate concurrency requirements;

Provide technical assistance to communities in drafting their plans and regulations.

Legislation

Explore how to revise the tax structure to promote better development decisions;

Advocate restricting state spending for infrastructure to locally designated growth areas called "priority funding areas;"

Propose use of the state budget to encourage;

- o renovation, preservation, and infill;[45]
- o transportation-related improvements around rail transit stations;
- o voluntary cleanup of brownfields;
- o small businesses and job creation in revitalization areas;
- o affordable housing.

Advance incentives for development projects in key locations within qualified growth areas;

[45] Infill: development that takes advantage of land availability closer to urban centers.

Facilitate the establishment of smart growth-related performance standards and criteria for state agencies;

Help to revise the utility regulatory structure to reward reinvestment in existing communities and increase the costs for new infrastructure in greenfield areas;

Support state "Fix it First" policies.

PROCESS STEPS THAT ADVANCE SMART GROWTH

The experiences of the four Surdna Initiative states suggest that there are specific process steps that help to advance smart growth. These include extensive outreach to opinion leaders; visioning processes embedded in broader stakeholder engagement processes; public relations to raise awareness, involvement, and expectations; building broad coalitions and partnerships; strategic use of reports and research; support for demonstration projects and developers trying to build smart growth projects; education efforts for public officials and planners; smart growth report cards; help for local governments to defend planning and zoning decisions; and litigation to stop the worst projects.

Extensive Outreach to Opinion Leaders

The time New Jersey Future spent talking to opinion leaders and polling the public helped to define the group's legislative agenda and its campaign to raise smart growth issues in the New Jersey gubernatorial election. Extensive outreach to local and state leaders helped in building support, identifying winnable policies and strategies, and garnered suggestions on how to help policymakers advance good policies. New Jersey Future complemented one-on-one interviews with periodic polling to demonstrate public support, to identify how to talk about issues, and to gauge changes in public opinion.

Envision Utah went through an even more extensive discovery process to find the players who could carry quality growth forward and the strategies that would be effective in Utah. It conducted 150 interviews of community leaders before it invited people to serve on its Leadership Council. It asked questions such as:

How do you feel about growth?
What do you think should be done about it?
Is it a good idea to create a process to deal with growth?
Would you be involved?

These interviews were essential both for providing direction as to how the process should go forward and in determining which stakeholders to engage.

Focus Groups, Polls, and Surveys

Smart growth organizations in all of the regions used focus groups and polls to understand concerns and demonstrate support.

> Envision Utah conducted a poll that showed that Utahans were anxious about future growth. It also conducted several surveys to engage the public. In one case, respondents were asked to rank scenarios and to indicate what they felt was the most significant challenge currently facing the region. This was instrumental in informing the group's strategy.

> The Baltimore Regional Partnership conducted a poll that showed two-thirds public support for an affordable housing requirement for new development and even higher public support for other measures.

> 1,000 Friends of New Mexico sponsored focus groups in two parts of the state to improve the Coalition's sense of what New Mexicans were concerned about. It then followed these focus groups with a statewide poll, which demonstrated that people cared about the issues in its policy guide.

> New Jersey Future commissioned one of the largest voter opinion polls ever conducted in the United States. It revealed that eight out of 10 New Jersey voters believed the state was running out of land, and 75 percent said the state should give spending priority to existing communities over new development.

A Visioning Process

In Utah, once-skeptical political leaders say that participating in visioning exercises in their communities is what helped to change their thinking about growth. The visioning processes provided a "safe haven" to learn and debate options without fear of public or political embarrassment. According to Peter Calthorpe, Envision Utah's game-based approach to visioning allowed participants to begin to look at the issues holistically and see the outcomes of their decisions. Envision Utah's game-based process was effective at multiple levels – from neighborhood to region (Van Gorp 2004).

In both Utah and Maryland, the community visioning processes also greatly informed smart growth organizations about the core values of their target audiences. The incorporation of visioning processes and focus groups is much more effective than polling alone in helping smart growth organizations to understand the language community residents use to talk about growth issues, the values that they express, and their hopes and fears (Mark 2001).

Embedding the Visioning Process in a Broader Stakeholder Engagement Process

Many regions have undertaken visioning processes that have resulted in exciting reports that sit on the shelf. A comparison of the visioning processes in Utah and Maryland suggests that such processes have a better chance of being implemented when they are part of a much larger and on-going process of community engagement and are undertaken with a spirit of inclusion.

As previously described, the Envision Utah process began with 150 interviews of key leaders in the region to figure out who cared most about quality growth and should be invited to lead the process. It also conducted research early on the values of people of the region. In this way, Envision Utah was able to tap into a sense of urgency within the business community and galvanize business support in part because of crushing growth pressures.

Baltimore Vision 2030 did not take these steps in selecting its steering committee, designing its process, or in framing the challenges for the public. As a result, Baltimore's business elite did not take ownership of the Vision 2030 process. With much smaller growth pressures in Baltimore, perhaps growth issues should not have been the organizing theme.

Envision Utah was led by an even-handed public interest group representative of local business, civic, *and* government interests. It changed the political dynamic by creating an environment where local officials could act under cover. Envision Utah also offered local public officials help in overcoming their political reasons for not supporting quality growth. In Baltimore, the region's chief local elected officials sponsored the effort on their own and had much less political cover. This does not signify that government-led efforts do not work. As mentioned earlier, the Portland Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) played the convener role successfully, as have several other MPOs, but it requires some trial and error experience to master.

Envision Utah was able to negotiate agreements across a broad set of stakeholders. In Baltimore, public officials held veto power over the Baltimore Vision 2030 process. The Baltimore Regional Partnership tried to use maps similar to those employed by Envision Utah to present options for growth. Local government officials, who were worried about how the maps might affect their master plans, vetoed them. The control that elected officials had over the process politicized it and constrained the creativity, boldness, and excitement.

While producing scenarios with the community is a key part of a visioning process, it is not a substitute for full stakeholder engagement. In Baltimore, there was heavy emphasis on the scenarios, and there was very little outreach or publicity. Envision Utah conducted a tireless education effort for legislators, public officials, the business sector, media, and the public. It began with a region-wide visioning process, and then used the same ploy for sub-regional and community processes. Every process relied on:

> governance structures (diverse steering committees representative of leadership in the region);

> excellent tools for analysis;

> public engagement in choosing strategies (through design workshops);

> publicity;

> work with local officials early and often to encourage and support implementation.

Envision Utah carefully and consistently used media to build expectations and engage the public at every step. In Baltimore there was no such effort. Baltimore Vision 2030 had little publicity and public participation was weak.

The funding arrangement in Baltimore allowed the visioning process to proceed without strong buy in from key stakeholders. The MPO resources that went into Vision 2030 were minimal. Local governments received a federal grant to pay for most of the process and staffed it with consultants. The only other funds were those BRP raised for the modeling work and extra community meetings. In Utah, the business community and local governments all contributed to cover some part of the costs of Envision Utah.

In both Utah and Maryland, local governments were wary of state mandates and did not want the state to dictate local planning, but Envision Utah found a way to tap state help, while Baltimore Vision 2030 did not. In Maryland, the local elected officials who led the process did not want the State involved in any way. Both the State Office of Smart Growth and the State Department of Transportation had smart, experienced professionals who offered assistance. Local governments turned them down. In Utah, the state was very helpful to the visioning process, providing in-kind contributions and other support. It seems likely that in its capacity as a third party, Envision Utah allowed the Utah governor to be helpful without raising concerns among local governments.

Envision Utah has found that it takes a high level of community involvement to motivate communities to embrace the plans developed and to make changes to their local codes, ordinances, and general plans to ensure successful implementation. The Baltimore Regional Partnership and its founders agree with this assessment. They have concluded that while modeling and meetings are catalytic tools, successful visioning processes prioritize engaging leaders and the public and finding solutions to political problems. Unless a process builds strong civic leadership and public support, it won't change the political context and it probably won't be implemented.

Public Relations to Raise Awareness and Increase Expectations

Envision Utah constantly looks for new media "hooks" to garner media attention and to keep the public engaged and excited about the Quality Growth Strategy. Envision Utah discovered that local media outlets were willing to contribute over $1 million in air time in the month of January each year, when other advertising slowed. The group timed annual media campaigns for the beginning of each year to take advantage of this resource. Local newspapers also agreed to distribute surveys, insert Envision Utah pieces, and provide reports to the public. Envision Utah used this news coverage and targeted advertising

> to keep the public up-to-date on each step of the process;

> to inform them of community meetings and opportunities for public participation;

> to give them opportunities to give input via surveys.

New Jersey Future made a shrewd decision when it decided to use the 2001 gubernatorial and legislative elections with its allies to engage policymakers and the public in a discussion of remedies to sprawl and disinvestment. It employed a successful public relations strategy to make smart growth an issue in the New Jersey gubernatorial election. The group's press strategy, which is described in the case study, convinced the gubernatorial candidates that smart growth was important. The frequent positive press coverage New Jersey Future obtained for its policy ideas helped to educate the public and made it easier for the governor and legislators to sign on (Mark 2001).

1,000 Friends of New Mexico and the Smart Growth Coalition in New Mexico used a similar strategy to elevate smart growth issues in New Mexico's gubernatorial race. They launched an effective campaign to get gubernatorial candidates to take positions and make commitments on smart growth issues, which also increased the visibility of these issues to the public.

Broad Coalitions and Partnerships

In all four of the Surdna Initiative states, broad-based support was an essential component. The Baltimore Regional Partnership has a relatively broad base of founders and supporters, including environmental, equity, and housing advocates, as well as relationships it has cultivated with local officials in many counties in the Baltimore region and with business leaders. Observers say that this broad support base has been key to the Partnership's effectiveness with the state legislature on housing and transportation issues, including the legislature's decision to defend the Smart Growth Areas Act, which Governor Ehrlich did not support. The new business-led Baltimore Transit Alliance and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (a member of the Partnership) are working together to facilitate joint transportation and land use planning as part of the first segment of the Baltimore Regional Rail Plan. A recent Maryland Public Interest Research Group report that contained recommendations on transit-oriented development was embraced by both state transportation and Baltimore City planning officials.

Observers believe that the New Mexico Smart Growth Coalition increased the credibility and strength of calls for new smart growth policies by representing all the parts of the state and diverse issues. Although the New Mexico Coalition never included the business community, as originally planned, and did not achieve its land use policy goals, it had many important successes in changing state policy within its five year timeline. In addition, the Coalition's efforts to educate gubernatorial candidates about growth issues and to secure commitments from Governor Richardson were successful.

The experiences in all four states indicate that having the support of business leaders, in particular, improves credibility, political access, and capacity to provide the political cover public officials need to make hard decisions. In Baltimore, the Surdna grantees repeatedly needed the support of powerful private sector alliances or private sector action. This strong business support is the reason why efforts to promote funding for a comprehensive regional rail system in Baltimore are still alive. Developers also have a great deal of influence on political and community leaders, on the behavior and policies of financial institutions, and on the media. When they build the first projects

that demonstrate smart growth principles, the conversation in a community changes. It is imperative that advocates keep identifying, educating, and most of all supporting developers who want to do it right (Mark 2001).

Support from faith organizations can be equally important. This should not be surprising, given how values-laden smart growth work is. In Utah, Peter Calthorpe feels that the support of individual church leaders and of church-owned KSL-TV for the Envision Utah process was extremely important in the acceptance and success of the group's efforts (Van Gorp 2003). In New Mexico, faith-based groups played a critical role in building the grassroots support that Albuquerque's elected officials needed to support the Planned Growth Strategy. Faith-based organizations also played an important role in building the urban-suburban coalition described in the New Jersey story. Isles spent much of its energy on reaching out to leaders in the older suburbs, where faith-based institutions were especially important partners because there were few community based organizations.

Public leaders also play an important role. Envision Utah, the Baltimore Regional Partnership, and 1000 Friends of New Mexico and other New Mexico organizations, invested a great deal of time in reaching out to local public officials and making them partners in smart growth efforts. Envision Utah, New Jersey Future, and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation all also benefited from good relationships with and support from their governors.

Advocacy-based coalitions need to build a broad grassroots base. The lack of such a base has been a barrier to smart growth policies in New Jersey, especially on tax reform. New Jersey Future had the ear of state leaders in the legislature and State agencies, but it didn't have grassroots clout, which is why it helped Isles to form its statewide coalition.

The cost of not reaching out to every leader with an interest in growth issues can be high. Envision Utah learned early that leaving out even just a few leaders could derail plans. As a result, Envision Utah made it standard practice to reach out to every leader who could potentially hinder the Quality Growth Strategy, understand his or her concerns, and try to address them. Because of its role as an even-handed convener, Envision Utah looked for the points of agreement and avoided controversial situations. Smart growth organizations that are advocates still need to try to address the concerns of those who oppose them. If they cannot, they need to find ways to neutralize the opposition.

Broad-based coalitions need to be sustained even when policy goals are achieved. The coalition that helped make the Planned Growth Strategy in Albuquerque possible dissolved once the plan was adopted. According to local leaders, this allowed the mayor to try to undermine implementation. Albuquerque Interfaith is trying build a strong and on-going membership that can ensure further progress if it attracts the foundation support to do so. (Colombo 2004)

Building clear goals and a common agenda for a broadly-based smart growth coalition is important, very difficult work. When there was a clear threat, the New Mexico Coalition for a Livable Future shined. In general, however, the New Mexico Coalition struggled to define its purpose and the role of each member in achieving this purpose.

This has been easier in Utah, because Envision Utah built a common vision and set of strategies for how to achieve the vision.

The New Mexico experience also demonstrates how important it is to clearly delineate the rules for membership in and governance of a coalition. At least in part, the New Mexico Coalition fell to pieces because members became frustrated with the relationship with 1000 Friends of New Mexico, the lack of leadership (during the last year), and the leadership of the executive committee, which was self-appointed without any process for elections. The Coalition should have established a voting process for decisions and a selection mechanism for the executive committee, including the means to replace members and recruit and engage new people. To be sustainable, the Coalition also needed the funding and staff time that would have come from the full support of its members.

Addressing Race and Class Issues in Coalition Building

There is much talk about the importance of integrating urban and suburban planning and promoting regional equity in order to achieve smart growth, but there are few success stories. While it is a bit soon to draw conclusions about the outcomes of the Isles effort to build a grassroots urban-suburban coalition for smart growth and regional equity in New Jersey, the Isles staff believes that there are a some key lessons to draw from its successful experience organizing its coalition.

> *Leaders of the effort to build a grassroots urban-suburban coalition for smart growth and regional equity cannot be wedded to a traditional approach to community or urban development.* Isles went through a fundamental change in its approach to community development as a first step in building its urban-suburban coalition, as described in the case study. It was open to such change, as was the New Jersey Public Policy Research Institute, its partner, which decided it would no longer focus solely on urban issues.

> *Urban-suburban coalition building efforts need both an intellectual base for talking about regions, disparity, racism, and justice and a way to capture data to help people understand how they are impacted by regional conditions.* In New Jersey, Myron Orfield and other leading thinkers provided the intellectual base. New Jersey Future and Myron Orfield provided the research support. New technologies enabled mapping of data in a way that was easily understandable. Integration of GIS and other graphics made the maps come alive, which was key in engaging stakeholders. But it is important to note that good information is best used as a tool for organizing. Many other regions have produced similar maps without making progress to change the conditions that created them. Isles used the maps as the impetus for an aggressive grassroots organizing strategy.

> *Social and racial justice must be addressed.* Because these topics are sensitive, they are often avoided. However, there are effective ways to broach this necessary dialogue. Isles began to build its coalition by pulling together a diverse

group of people with important perspectives on social and racial justice to oversee the analysis of the region and ensure there would be broad buy-in to the analysis. This organizing group felt comfortable confronting issues of race and helping to integrate race into the development analysis.

Building an urban-suburban coalition requires skilled organizers who are not stuck in a conventional or local organizing culture. Further, these organizers should be capable of bringing a diverse range of people together across a region. Still, the core approach is the same as conventional organizing: listening to leaders from throughout the community, allowing those leaders to educate the coalition rather than the coalition educating them, and helping those leaders to address problems they face in their communities. The coalition that Isles helped to create has reached out to thousands of people. To facilitate statewide coordination, Isles helped create regional coalitions for the northern, central, and southern parts of the state.

Organizing takes time. It took three years for Isles to build a statewide coalition that was ready for a public presence. This time was dedicated to extensive outreach, capacity building, joint exploration of the issues, and developing the rules and goals for the coalition. Now the Coalition is reaching beyond meetings and dialogue to set forth an annual legislative agenda for both regional and state policy. Taking the necessary time to do the job right is likely to extend well beyond the capacity of the philanthropic community. In order for a coalition to be sustainable, its members must perceive its work as sufficiently aligned with their own interests to justify supplying funds to cover a substantial part of the budget (the three New Jersey Coalition affiliates are starting to talk about membership fees for this purpose).

Strategic Reports and Research

The experience in both New Jersey and Maryland has been that polished and professional reports can have significant media and policy impacts. In both states Surdna grantees produced and publicized glossy, professional, well-researched reports that recommended improvements in state smart growth policies. Both reports – New Jersey Future's *Achieving Genuine Prosperity: 20 Ways to Move New Jersey Toward a Just, Healthy, and Prosperous Future* and the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and 1000 Friends of Maryland's *Making Smart Growth Smarter: Recommendations for Increasing the Effectiveness of Smart Growth and for Expanding its Application Through New Initiatives* – were specifically mentioned by allies and skeptics alike. These reports, which had long shelf-lives, were used often by policymakers. Each was effective because it was polished and carefully packaged for a target audience (Mark 2001).

New Jersey Future has undertaken regular, in-depth research reports on timely legislative and policy issues to bolster its case, provide well-supported recommendations to candidates, and provide hooks for media coverage. Smart growth organizations in all of the other states have relied similarly on research reports to help make the case for policies. For example, at a transit meeting for business and civic leaders, the Baltimore Regional Partnership released a report that showed that nearly half the region's pro-

jected job growth by 2025 and one-fifth of its projected household growth could be accommodated along the new system's lines, which was exactly in line with existing local plans for redevelopment.

Decision Support Tools

Tools to support new decisions played important roles in three of the four Initiative states. The Baltimore Regional Partnership convinced the Coordinating Committee for Vision 2030 to include more rigorous analysis of the growth and transportation options for the Baltimore region, as had been done by Envision Utah. It felt that this analysis was critical to enabling the public to fully consider alternative growth scenarios. In New Jersey, Isles also felt that an important part of its effort to collect data was to use GIS capability to communicate growth patterns to communities. Envision Utah also used state-of-the-art modeling and visualizing tools in creating its quality growth scenarios. Now Envision Utah is working on a legally defensible model of growth impacts that is more sensitive to the land use changes that take place around transit stations.

Support for Demonstration Projects and Developers Trying to Build Smart Growth Projects

Demonstration projects remain the most powerful tool in the smart growth toolbox. Neither political leaders nor the public can grasp the difference between a good development and a bad one until they see models of good ones. A creative in-fill project or a well-designed transit station can go a long way in garnering enthusiasm for doing things differently (Mark 2001). In Utah, Envision Utah has been very savvy about investing in demonstration projects for exactly this reason (Mark 2001).

"Smart" developers often need help getting these first developments built. They must first convince neighborhoods, planning commissions, and traditional environmentalists to accept something new. Both Envision Utah and the Santa Fe office of 1000 Friends of New Mexico have learned to work with and reward these developers. New Jersey Future has also developed relationships with supportive developers and builders through its awards process and other outreach (Mark 2001).

The experiences in both Utah and New Jersey demonstrated that awards for good projects can be a helpful tool. In both states, Smart Growth Awards have provided the examples and recognition people need. They also offer a way to keep track of changes in the quantity and quality of good projects. It was part of the Chesapeake Bay Foundation's original strategy to develop a business group to highlight good projects in Maryland. This was not possible in the end, but the group still believes it is an important activity.

Systematic Education Efforts For Public Officials and Planners

People act when they have both the desire and the capacity. Lack of capacity is a major barrier to implementation of smart growth policies. Local governments need a lot more training, tools, and technical assistance than usually are available. Envision Utah

has been revolutionary in its engagement with local officials around model plans, demonstration projects, tools, training, and technical assistance. Envision Utah's tool-box, training seminars, and technical assistance are helping local governments to implement the goals of the Quality Growth Strategy. Over 1000 local officials have been trained to use its toolbox through all day and three-hour seminars. Because local planners designed the toolbox, other planners are more likely to use it.

In addition to local elected officials and planners, fire marshals and other code enforcers are key players to educate. They can make or break a project and they tend to not be engaged in education about new designs, new technologies, and new approaches to development. Envision Utah has developed a training module for fire officials to learn from colleagues in other states and cities that includes information on things such as how the narrow streets sometimes called for in smart growth work can be just as safe and accessible for emergency equipment as traditional designs (Mark 2001).

New Jersey Future is starting to provide education tools for local officials and the public through its Smart Growth Gateway. It is collaborating with Rutgers, the American Planning Association, the state, and others to write a curriculum and offer classes for local planning board members. When transferable development rights legislation passed in New Jersey in early 2004, New Jersey Future immediately began to develop models and guides and explore a joint effort to assist communities to adopt transferable development rights.

The Baltimore Regional Partnership is educating public officials and planners about transit and transit-oriented development strategies. Transit and transit-oriented development are also playing important transformative roles in Salt Lake City, Albuquerque, and Baltimore. Both the Citizens Planning and Housing Association in Baltimore and Envision Utah have developed transit-oriented development toolkits and training sessions. All of the new transit lines under development across the country – almost every major metropolitan area has one – provide an education opportunity for smarter growth that should not be missed. The opportunity is especially good because the criteria for selection for federal funding for new transit lines includes land use planning around stations.

Smart Growth Report Cards

Surdna Foundation grantees tried a number of different approaches to promote the use of smart growth report cards to increase accountability. Groups in both Maryland and New Jersey produced report cards on implementation of existing smart growth laws, and in both cases these report cards were well-received and broadly cited. Observers believe that advocates, such as the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, played a valuable role in Maryland by reporting on the progress of the Department of Transportation, Department of Environment, and Department of Housing and Community Development.

Both the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and New Jersey Future also created templates for county and local government report cards, but few grassroots groups showed any interest in completing county scorecards. In contrast, New Jersey Future found that the

three tests it created for evaluating smart growth legislation and policy were well-received. New Jersey Future also found that grassroots groups and media outlets were interested in project scorecards. It seems that people are often concerned about projects long before they are concerned about policy.

Scoring smart growth projects can also be important because there are a growing number of instances of "green scamming" by developers hoping to ride the smart growth bandwagon. In many states, developers are marketing "smart" developments and "walkable" communities that are not actually in line with smart growth strategies (Mark 2001).

Help for Local Governments to Defend Planning and Zoning Decisions

Municipalities need help defending smart growth planning and zoning decisions. New Jersey Future has tried to make the State Plan defensible for municipal planning by submitting amicus briefs defending municipalities' latitude to follow it. The Western Environmental Law Center has gone further in New Mexico, helping small rural communities to write zoning ordinances and defend them. Rural counties and municipalities, in particular, often lack the legal and technical expertise and funds to draft, implement, and enforce land use and subdivision regulations (even though they have the power). Legal counsel and planning staff are overwhelmed and often lack necessary expertise in land use law. The Western Environmental Law Center's "community first" approach to environmental law works particularly well in the traditional communities of northern New Mexico, which historically have been hostile to environmental activism. With this in mind, the Law Center does not impose an agenda on its clients, but, rather, assists traditional communities in developing their own approaches to protection (Mark 2001).

Litigation to Stop the Worst Projects

New road projects can set the course for growth in a region for decades into the future. Many U.S. road projects are implemented in large part due to inertia – once they are in motion within the bureaucracy, they are hard to stop. Litigation to slow the most harmful projects buys time to demonstrate the demand for alternative types of development and the benefits to regions of alternative growth patterns. It also creates an incentive for Departments of Transportation to rethink long-range plans.

Litigation is more effective when it is part of a broader strategy to achieve policy changes and fund alternative projects. Following a decade of advocacy against road projects, the Tri-State Transportation Campaign has seen a significant shift in the New Jersey Department of Transportation's decision-making about key projects. The Department converted one route extension near the Jersey Shore into construction of a 20-mile bike and pedestrian path. It scrapped a proposed Bypass east of Princeton in favor of a small connector road and improvements to local intersections. And, in several counties, the Department announced plans to work directly with municipal and civic leaders to develop integrated land use and transportation plans to avoid "the cycle of growth and widening that has plagued one of the nation's most congested states."

LESSONS FOR THE SURDNA FOUNDATION AND PHILANTHROPY

In retrospect, the Surdna Foundation's opening assumptions were reasonable. The selection process worked well to identify places that would generally yield good results. The duration, scale, and learning components of the Initiative also allowed for real value to be added to the work. But there is room for improvement in shaping future Initiatives. In hindsight, Surdna thinks that more time and money invested in designing the Initiative and throughout the process could have yielded greater clarity of purpose, deeper learning and, arguably, stronger results.

Strengths of the Surdna Foundation Smart Growth Initiative

Five Year Support

The commitment that Surdna made to fund this Initiative over a relatively long term was a cornerstone of the Initiative. So much of what is done in the smart growth arena – building relationships across sectors, informing and engaging community leaders and the public, developing model projects, shaping policy, building new infrastructure – takes years to bear fruit. Long-term funding helps to reduce uncertainty and fosters long-term planning both for the work and the organization. The inefficiencies of just-in-time, hand-to-mouth fundraising are reduced and good development systems can be put in place. Secure funding also creates the perception of stability and solid core support that can help to attract other funding.

Flexibility

Sometimes the best laid plans don't pan out, and opportunities can change quickly. The Surdna Foundation recognized the need to be flexible and was willing for grantees to change gears when needed. It tracked progress formally on an annual basis and informally on an ongoing basis. It also asked for a new proposal and work plan each year, but in most cases, Surdna funding amounted to general support.

Partnership with Surdna Foundation Staff

Foundation staff work from a unique vantage point. Staff often see what is going on across the country and in different fields – information that can be invaluable for grantees regardless of whether the work is at a national, regional, or local level. It is especially helpful when a program officer makes the effort to keep in touch and learn with grantees. Given the long timeframe of the Initiative and his extensive knowledge of the issues, Surdna's program staff for the Initiative, Hooper Brooks, was able to develop a strong relationship with many of the grantees. Grantees reported that it was very helpful to have a program officer who understood the complexity of the work and the politics of changing institutions. The broad U.S. domestic scope of Surdna's program coupled with his role in developing the Funders' Network for Smart Growth and Livable Communities, enabled Mr. Brooks to communicate effectively on what was happening in many places and with many funders.

Meetings

Convening a diverse variety of players can be a powerful tool for learning and build-ing networks. The meetings in each Initiative state turned out to be a wonderful high-light. Two meetings a year were not seen as onerous by grantees, and often provided a welcome break from the day-to-day slog. Surdna considered its investment of between $15,000 and $25,000 in each meeting (for travel, lodging, food, meeting space, etc.) to be money well spent. Meeting attendance was not limited to the executive directors of the participating organizations and thus provided a rare opportunity for junior staff to meet new colleagues and learn. In this case, there was great benefit to sharing sto-ries and lessons between groups. Over the course of the Initiative, relationships deep-ened as did the quality of exchange. Typically, grantees in each location put extensive energy into planning a day of site visits, meetings with local leaders, and hosting din-ners. Surdna staff and board learned as much as anyone else at these events and con-tinue to be deeply appreciative of the extra effort that made them so successful.

Technical Assistance

The technical assistance provided throughout the Initiative was helpful to all involved. Making a consultant like Dick Mark available to grantees and the specialized work-shops at the meetings were both seen as useful for building skill, thinking through the possible role and focus of indicators, providing glue between the groups, and facilitat-ing knowledge transfer between the groups and Surdna – well worth the relatively modest expense.

Foundation Board Members Engaged

Surdna's Board Committee for the Environment program participated in the selection and grant review process. Some Surdna trustees attended select semi-annual joint meetings and others accessed the issue through engagements and relationships with activists in their own communities – in part due to their experience with the issue at the board level.

Ways to Improve Upon the Surdna Foundation Smart Growth Initiative

More Time Upfront to Reach Outside the Grantee Community for Strategic Advice

Surdna might have increased its impact if it had engaged help from outside sources to hone its strategy in each state. This could have taken many forms:

>   closer coordination and consultation with place-based funders;

>   an early and ongoing relationship with a consultant like Dick Mark;

>   more contact with local government officials, journalists, business leaders.

   The main reason these did not happen was lack of time and staff capacity on Surdna's part. There was also a sense that much could be learned by diving in to the grant process. Since the Initiative was launched, the Funders' Network for Smart Growth has learned a great deal about how to catalyze funder/practitioner collabora-

tions at the state and regional levels. The Growth Management Leadership Alliance has also taken on full-time staff and now has the capacity to provide more support to the field. Were Surdna to launch such an Initiative today, it would consider the possibility of working with these organizations as joint venture partners to deepen meeting content and possibly expand participation of other practitioners and funders.

More Time Up Front to Help Grantees Clarify Goals and Develop Progress Indicators

Despite the difficulty encountered in developing simple shared indicators, it would have been helpful to spend more time up-front (and on an ongoing basis) with grantees to aid them in articulating their theories of change and what they were trying to accomplish in the short-term and the long-run. This would have made it easier to track progress and adjust strategies. Just as the American Planning Association selection process was built around selected criteria, a similar joint process in each place would have simultaneously sharpened measurement of progress, created a tighter framework for joint learning, and, in a couple of instances, refined desired strategies.

Clarity About How Joint Grantees Would Work Together

The states where the Surdna Foundation made grants to just one or two organizations had an easier time making progress than those where the funds were split among many organizations. Funding multiple organizations together built in conflict and complexity. While Surdna participated in the job of strategy development and funding allocation, it would have worked better if Surdna had convened and facilitated meetings in Maryland and New Mexico on an annual basis and pressed for stronger protocols about collaboration upfront – possibly including memorandums of understanding.

More Technical Assistance and Capacity Building

Few smart growth organizations have the full capacity needed to succeed. They frequently need consulting support both to strengthen their organizations (fundraising, board development, etc.) and to improve their strategies. Many smart growth advocates could benefit from and would appreciate intensive assistance on fundraising, strategy development, communications, mobilizing the grassroots, legislative techniques, and other topics that would help them take their game to the next level.

If funds had allowed, it would have been ideal to have consultant support to help the Initiative grantees, such as that provided by Dick Mark or from specialized organizations, on-call for the duration of the Initiative. With sufficient time, a consultant along these lines would have been able to evaluate situations on-the-ground and assess the unique strengths and weakness of the lead organizations and individuals. This would have enabled the consultant to provide advice and counsel to the grantees, and this input would likely have been of a higher quality given the trust that might have been established if more time were available.

More consultant time on the Initiative would have also helped to identify additional ways for the Surdna Foundation to be helpful to grantees. For example, when the 1000 Friends of New Mexico director who was in place at the start of the Surdna Initiative

left, the consultant might have seen the need to contract a top flight organizational consultant in the region who could have worked more deeply with the 1000 Friends and the Coalition to identify the best replacement candidates.

Tracking, Evaluation, and Communications

In addition to providing additional technical support for the grantees, if resources allow, it would be helpful to dedicate consultant or staff time from the outset of the project to help track and evaluate the work on a rolling basis, and provide feedback to Surdna and grantees. In addition, rather than waiting for a summary monograph such as this, capturing and communicating the work and the lessons learned at regular intervals to an audience of funders, practitioners, and others would further extend and enhance the learning. There are many options for regular dissemination such as email listservs, blogs, newsletters, and articles.

Tapered Funding

Even though grantees were clear that they would not receive Surdna funding beyond the five years of the Surdna Foundation's Smart Growth Initiative, some of them were still not prepared for its end. Further, much of the new funding that had been expected from other sources fell victim to the unanticipated economic downturn and changing foundation priorities, (although it could actually be argued that Surdna's consistent level of funding over five years may have helped some groups survive these last two outcomes).

  While there is no ideal way to handle this situation, exit strategies need to be discussed upfront in much greater depth by all concerned. Some grantees felt that they might have been more proactive in replacing funding if the five-year support tapered off slowly, and perhaps over a longer time period, as a reminder to grantees that they needed to find other funding. Also, some suggested that at the back-end extra dollars to help groups retain outside development experts might have helped smooth the transition. A better process for collaboration among existing funders might also have yielded the benefits of combined thinking and outreach to new funding sources.

Foundation Board Members More Deeply Engaged in Learning Along the Way

Given the busy lives and schedules of foundation trustees, it is always difficult for them to find the time to be more engaged in specific grants. Given the long timeframe needed for smart growth efforts to flower, it is very important to find ways to maintain trustee enthusiasm – helping them to understanding of the importance of the issues, and commitment to fund. Annual outcomes reports are not enough. In many ways, this is one of the biggest challenges for smart growth practitioners. It might help to structure an Initiative of this type around states where board members live. However, at the time of the Surdna Initiative's inceptions, the issue had not sufficiently ripened in some of these places to offer enough traction.

CONCLUSION

Is it worth it for foundations to tackle smart growth?

The Surdna Foundation's staff and board definitely think so. When growth goes well, multiple benefits flow – environmental, economic, and social. While the gains are slow, there *are* definitely gains. Yet, given the complexity and the slow pace of change, it can be daunting for funders who are used to tracking change issue by issue over a 12 to 36 month period.

It took many years for states and regions of the United States to become as dysfunctional as they are and it is not unreasonable to think that it will take years to slow down and begin to reverse the damage. We are trying to change complex systems. To do it wisely, we need first to understand them and then develop a better sense of how they can evolve over time – and a way to measure that change. Smart growth organizations and staffs change. Agency mindsets evolve. Trends vary. Economies shift. Politics and leadership change. All of that and more has happened in the Surdna Initiative states. But in all four places there has been progress – progress that can be durable. The civil sector must stay engaged and the philanthropic sector is needed to ensure that continuity. Not only does this entail a commitment to significant investment and long-term engagement, but to informed and strategic engagement. Expectations must be realistic and practical, and funding must be carefully targeted. Over time, as the systems that comprise bad growth begin to change, there will be bigger and bigger payoffs that will appeal to increasingly diverse funding agendas.

Is a place-based initiative like Surdna's the best way for a national funder to support the work and add value to grantee activity?

Compared to a more traditional, grant-by-grant, responsive funding approach, Surdna thinks there were clear benefits for the four Initiative states. The case studies certainly bear this out. By providing a stable, predictable source of funding, by facilitating a learning exchange, by providing outside expertise and by providing a strong staff relationship, there was value-added to the quality of the work and to the outcomes. Clearly, more could have been done to make the Initiative more productive and more successful, but not without increased non-grant investment and staff time. Determining how much greater an investment to have made would depend on an assessment of how much value could be added. That is hard to judge in advance. There will be a point of diminishing returns.

So what next for Surdna? What to fund? Where?

Surdna is revisiting some of the questions it asked prior to the Initiative.

What is the best way for a national funder to engage the smart growth issue?

What priorities should a national funder adopt and support regardless of place and time-sensitive political and economic conditions?

What are the next tier priorities that are more dependent on variation in such conditions?

The Initiative was clearly a rich and productive experience. Surdna is still digesting what to do with what it has learned. Does it now make sense to expand Surdna's circle of place-based engagement (and knowledge) to catalyze or support action in new targeted areas where the opportunity is ripe? Or would it make more sense to structure a second round engagement with the original four states? Or should Surdna step back and focus more on using what has been learned to improve the overall structure and capacity of the field through nurturing technical assistance and other kinds of intermediary organizations and the work of place-based funders?

These are questions that might be more appropriately aimed at all foundations that want to see smarter growth.

What is the best path forward?

What will it take to get there?

What is the best role for each kind of funder?

The last decade has seen a marked increase in smart growth activism in many sectors – nonprofit, business, and government. Even though it has not achieved "market share," there is significant policy and on-the-ground change in a few places, broad public engagement underway in more places, and a marked increase in public understanding of the issues in many more. There is also a flourishing of networks and organizations that can help funders understand what has happened, what is likely to happen, what has been learned, and what is needed next – the Funders' Network for Smart Growth and Livable Communities, Smart Growth America, and the Growth Management Leadership Alliance to name a few. This report tells only a few of many stories – stories that these and others can hopefully use as a springboard for charting the future.

Interviews

Dolph Barnhouse, Executive Director, 1000 Friends of New Mexico

Keith Bartholomew, Assistant Professor of Urban Planning, College of Architecture and Planning, University of Utah; former Staff Attorney, 1000 Friends of Oregon

Susan Burrows, Deputy Director, New Jersey Future

Hank Dittmar, Chief Executive, The Prince's Foundation for the Built Environment; former CEO and President of Reconnecting America

Edward Farquhar, Energy/Environment Advisor to New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson; former Executive Director of 1000 Friends of New Mexico

Stephen Holbrook, former Executive Director, Envision Utah

Martin Johnson, Executive Director, Isles

Barbara Lawrence, Executive Director, the Henry and Marilyn Taub Foundation; former Executive Director, New Jersey Future

Richard Mark, Foundation Consultant, The Buttonwood Partnership

George Maurer, Senior Planner, Chesapeake Bay Foundation

Robert Perry, Foundation Consultant; former Program Director, Environment, Geraldine R. Dodge Foundation

Daniel Pontious, Regional Policy Director, Citizen's Planning and Housing Association; former Director of the Baltimore Regional Partnership

Elizabeth Schilling, Executive Director, Growth Management Leadership Alliance

Harriet Tregoning, Director of the Smart Growth Leadership Institute (of Smart Growth America)

DeAnza Valencia, Director, New Mexico Space Alliance Technology Program, New Mexico Regional Development Corporation; former State Director of the New Mexico Office of the Surface Transportation Policy Project

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About the Authors

Hooper L. Brooks is the Program Director for the Environment at the Surdna Foundation in New York City, a family foundation with an 80-year history. Over the past 30 years, Mr. Brooks has worked with a spectrum of environmental, land planning and open space preservation organizations, projects and initiatives. Since 1991, he has been directing the Foundation's Environment program, which currently supports organizations working on transportation, energy, biological diversity and urban/suburban land use issues throughout the United States. This year he also has an appointment as Lecturer facilitating a seminar on land use planning for master's students at Yale University's School of Forestry & Environmental Studies. Mr. Brooks received a B.A. degree from Harvard College and a Master's degree in Landscape Architecture from the Harvard Graduate School of Design.

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Julia Parzen has provided strategic research, program design, strategic planning and evaluation consulting since 1994 to foundations and nonprofit organizations. Earlier, she co-founded Working Assets and received a bronze metal from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for designing a financial assistance program for small firms. She co-authored Credit Where It's Due: Development Banking for Communities (Temple University Press), Enterprising Women (OECD), and Financing Transit-Oriented Development in The New Transit Town (Island Press). She has a BA in economics from the University of Illinois in Champaign-Urbana and an MBA from the University of Chicago. She has served on the boards of mutual, venture capital, and loan funds, as well as various nonprofit organizations, including the Center for Neighborhood Technology.

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