

2013

Queen Elizabeth's Leadership Abroad: The Netherlands in the 1570s

Peter Iver Kaufman

University of Richmond, pkaufman@richmond.edu

Follow this and additional works at: <http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jepson-faculty-publications>



Part of the [Economic History Commons](#), [European History Commons](#), [Leadership Studies Commons](#), and the [Medieval History Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Kaufman, Peter Iver. "Queen Elizabeth's Leadership Abroad: The Netherlands in the 1570s." In *Leadership and Elizabethan Culture*, by Peter Iver Kaufman, 73-87. Jepson Studies in Leadership. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2013.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Jepson School of Leadership Studies at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jepson School of Leadership Studies articles, book chapters and other publications by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

*A version of the article was published in *Leadership and Elizabethan Culture*, by Peter Iver Kaufman, 73-87. Please take any quotations from the published version.

Queen Elizabeth's Leadership Abroad: The Netherlands in the 1570s

In 1576, after Edmund Grindal, archbishop of Canterbury, presumed to lecture Queen Elizabeth on the importance of preaching and on her duty to listen to such lectures, his influence diminished precipitously, and leadership of the established English church fell to Bishop Aylmer. Grindal's friends on the queen's Privy Council, "forward" Calvinists (or ultra-Protestants), were powerless to save him from the consequences of his indiscretion, which damaged the ultras' other initiatives' chances of success. This paper concerns one of those initiatives. From the late 1560s, they urged their queen "actively" to intervene in the Dutch wars. They collaborated with Calvinists on the Continent who befriended Prince William of Orange and who hoped to help him hold together a coalition of religiously reformed and Roman Catholic insurgents in the seventeen provinces of the Low Countries. The English ultra-Protestants would have their government send money, munitions, and men in arms to the Netherlands, to tip the balance against viceroys sent by King Philip II of Spain. Grindal's setback undermined the English Calvinists' efforts to form an Anglo-Dutch alliance which, they assumed, would boost the prospects for an international Protestant league.¹ Yet Elizabeth did assist the Dutch as they wrestled with decisions forced on them by developments in the Netherlands during the 1570s, and she did so more consistently and more cleverly than many historians of Tudor diplomacy have thought.

Two competing assessments determine the way questions are formulated in the study of the queen's and regime's Dutch diplomacy. The general consensus is that she was indecisive and

inconsistent. Paul Hammer characterizes Elizabeth's responses to the crises in the Low Countries as a "zigzag of different" ("even contradictory") maneuvers. Wallace McCaffrey and R. B. Wernham agree that England's "hesitations and gyrations" do not pass as coherent, creditable policy. Charles Wilson scolds Elizabeth for being timid and tepid--incapable of enthusiasm for "a great cause." But David J.B. Trim's striking counterthrust depicts the queen's overtures to Netherlanders as part of her courageous--and "confessionally driven"--foreign policy; Trim replaces "hesitation" and "zigzag" with a coherent "Protestant programme of action prioritized by the Elizabethan government" with the aim of improving prospects for "Calvinist internationalism."²

What follows is an alternative to all these characterizations, one that, as noted, finds evidence for greater consistency and coherence in Elizabeth's leadership and less confessional "drive." That she would have been uneasy around religious extremists ought not to astonish us; her father's, step-brother's, and step-sister's reigns as well as the start of her own were disturbed by zealous subjects, who were bent on shoring up or dismantling the realm's religious settlements.

Conflict and Coalitions

During the 1570s, King Philip's ambitions to keep the Netherlands Catholic and to win England back for Rome coupled the fate of the Dutch rebellion with that of Queen Elizabeth's regime. Philip had married Elizabeth's half-sister and predecessor Mary Tudor in 1554 and had lived in their realm for thirteen months, but he was occupied elsewhere when she died in 1558. He never returned to his wife's realm. When Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, sought refuge there

and seemed a plausible, Catholic candidate to succeed Elizabeth, Philip's envoys conspired to improve her chances. But Spain had more pressing business on the Continent in the 1560s and thereafter.

For Dutch dissidents opposed King Philip's proposals to increase the number and decrease the size of dioceses. The reorganization would have cost influential abbots healthy portions of their endowments and would have diminished the Dutch nobility's considerable influence over local churches. The protests of those likely losers led to the recall of Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle, the Low Countries' leading prelate (and principal architect and advocate of the plan). Yet dissidents' demands escalated. They prevailed upon Philip's regent, Margaret of Parma, to suspend all decrees against heresy, but the religiously reformed preachers--forced from pulpits into nearby fields--in retaliation, incited their "sheep" to sack Catholic churches. Still, the fear that King Philip meant to export the Spanish Inquisition to the Netherlands and that Spanish sovereignty would trump traditional Dutch liberties prompted many Calvinists and Catholics to make common cause. Margaret urged Philip to come and ease tensions; he had toured the Low Countries more than a decade before and had been well received. But the king sensed that the crisis called for more than royal processions and receptions. So, in 1567, he dispatched Don Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, duke of Alba, who quickly earned a reputation for ruthlessness.³

Prince William of Orange and his brother, Louis of Nassau, rallied the resistance, but Alba's feints and dodges denied the rebels anything remotely resembling the decisive victory that could have inspired widespread Dutch and foreign support for the insurrection. William's initiative was frustrated at nearly every turn and has been called a military and public relations "fiasco."⁴ By contrast, rebel mariners had significant successes at sea. Elizabeth permitted them ("pyrates," according to Alba; "sea beggars" to their friends) to resupply in several of her realm's

ports. The Dutch mariners were, in effect, her allies “off the books” in England’s unofficial trade war with Philip. Spain, of course, complained. Repeatedly, into the early 1570s, Alba’s agents in England urged the queen to demilitarize her coast. Early in 1572, she complied.⁵

Alba got what he wanted but not what he expected. The deported “pirates” descended on the Dutch coast, capturing Brielle weeks after the English sent them packing. They took several cities in quick succession and gave the insurgency what historian Peter Arnade calls its “second wind.”⁶ Historians concur but disagree about England’s and Elizabeth’s part in the rebels’ resurgence. That the queen first defied Alba then acquiesced and finally had the sea beggars cast off could illustrate what her modern critics call “hesitations and gyrations,” although Olaf Mörke plausibly contends that Elizabeth’s responses to Alba were calculated to wage “a cold war”--but to keep it from coming to a boil.⁷

A small English expeditionary force was sent to Flushing two months after Elizabeth evicted the Dutch mariners in 1572. Her move looks to have been a modest measure to protect her realm’s commerce with Antwerp--from the French as much as from Alba--rather than a bold strike to ensure the beggars’ conquest and command of the coast. The rebels’ partisans hoped to have a larger English presence, but they were disappointed.⁸ Alba weathered consecutive months of misfortune after Brielle fell to the rebels. He held important cities in Zeeland, yet his soldiers there and elsewhere had no pay for long periods. Word reached England that his garrisons were “in gret penurye.” King Philip recalled him in 1573 and appointed Luis de Requesens to succeed him.⁹ Yet Spain’s military offensives during the next several years were generally unproductive. Prince William’s position improved. Swatches of rebels acknowledged him as supreme commander. He and his agents were authorized by delegates to the Estates General to negotiate for foreign aid. But obstacles seemed insurmountable. How could he impress prospective allies

with the insurgency's chances when so much of the Netherlands remained in his enemy's hands? In 1575, guests invited to his wedding were warned they would find travel to the ceremonies treacherous.¹⁰

What may have most vexed Prince William, however, was the anxiety among Catholic insurgents, who were unsure of his ability to control Calvinist extremists, dispossessed by Alba in the late 1560s and ready for revenge in the early 1570s. Catholics frequently fled the regions rebels overran, and Catholic malcontents in the rebel ranks looked beyond William. From their perspective, it was best to "break [his] monopoly."¹¹ In 1577, they invited Archduke Matthias, twenty-year-old son of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II, to become governor-general. William did not seem to object; instead, he mentored and almost immediately mastered the inexperienced youth, but--with that maneuver--we have stepped into the first months of 1578, well ahead of our story, and we should acknowledge that, both before and after the archduke's arrival, Prince William labored to reduce the tensions between Dutch Calvinist insurgents and Dutch Catholics who served with or supported them. He promoted religious tolerance. The Pacification of Ghent, signed in 1576, in the aftermath of a Spanish mutiny that torched parts of Antwerp, proscribed persecution of the religiously reformed. Efforts to that end, however, failed. Calvinist worship was disallowed or disrupted in provinces other than Holland and Zeeland, and Catholics in those two provinces had reason to fear the consequences when they practiced their religion publicly. Enduring antagonisms wrecked nearly every experiment with religious pluralism.¹²

Frances Yates, presuming Elizabeth's indulgence, suggested that the queen approved wholeheartedly of such experiments. She did, after all, declare her concern for the safety of French Calvinists.¹³ Yet, in 1570, she also confided that any Valois resolve to leave them in

peace was not at all “agreeable with [her] action and proceedings against [her] subjects [who] lately sought . . . the libertie to use the Roman religion.”¹⁴ William was wise, therefore, not to urge his scheme on the queen. Her agent William Davison reported that the prince hoped she would have a “tender regard” for all her subjects but that he came no closer to criticism of intolerance in England.¹⁵ Orange’s letters to Elizabeth and to the ultra-Protestant interventionists in her realm rarely commented on confessional interests. Dutch appeals for English aid were not faith-based. They underscored the military rather than the religious predicaments that Elizabeth’s subjects would face if her government failed the prince and his partisans. England, William said, was “voyd of stronghouldes to stayer [an] enemy any whyle,” so--being “neighbored” by Spain to the southwest, it could ill afford having Philip’s regents in the Netherlands establish an arsenal to its east.¹⁶

Orange’s arguments for more abundant and conspicuous English support for the Dutch insurgency were less effective stirring the queen’s regime than was Philip’s appointment of an ambitious new regent after Requesens’s death in 1576. Don John of Austria was known for his military prowess and militant Catholicism. Whereas Alba, when he had commanded the Spanish troops in the Netherlands, thought the conquest of England unworkable, Don John considered the invasion of England an obvious sequel to his pacification of the Netherlands. He planned to cross the Channel, storm ashore, depose Elizabeth, and marry Mary Stuart, disclosing his plans to the Queen of Scots’s partisans in France, who were said to be receptive to his requests for help.¹⁷

Bishop Richard Curteys of Chichester told Elizabeth’s Council that Catholics in his diocese grew “worse and worse,” referring, it seems, to their insolence, as rumors about Don John’s imminent invasion reached them.¹⁸ Perhaps to prevent his celebrity from deflating the queen’s confidence in Prince William’s abilities, the realm’s ultra-Protestants expressed fresh

confidence in his resourcefulness. Yet, as their sovereign's eyes, ears, and advisers, they were also obliged to report challenges that appeared to overtax his gifts and resources: he could not keep Calvinist troops from misbehaving while defending predominantly Catholic regions, and his strategies for reconciling disaffected Catholic rebels and Calvinist extremists and for forging a united front against Spain were ultimately undermined by the "particularism" that plagued the seventeen provinces, especially as regional resentments were exacerbated by confessional commitments.¹⁹ Despite his efforts, the latter were turning the insurrection into a series of civil wars.²⁰ One pamphleteer portrayed Prince William as a Dutch Brutus, admirably bent on contesting Caesar's (King Philip's) right to reign yet finally and woefully incapable of achieving a consensus among those Catholics, Calvinists, Gelderlanders, Ghentois, and others, whose reciprocal antipathies gave Spain reasons to believe that its commanders could ultimately divide and reconquer.²¹ The English government, informed of all this, was unlikely to think that William was flirting with success. Francis Walsingham's copybook mentions that "dissensions in the [Low] Countries" vexed delegates to the Estates General, trying to collect revenues for collective defense--"dissensions" that resulted in defections.²²

Defections were common after Alexander Farnese, prince of Parma, joined forces with Don John and after Spain's decisive win at a battle near the village of Gembloux in early 1578. Most rebel casualties were Catholics, but, as Rolf Bremmer suspects, Gembloux was "a heavy blow" for all insurgents to absorb (een geduchte klap).²³ Setbacks followed: Gravelines soon capitulated to Don John; Parma took Maastricht. The year 1578 would be critical for William and Elizabeth.

Prince William worked overtime to avoid his coalition's collapse. He appealed to France for assistance. He courted François Hercule d'Valois, duke of Anjou, King Henry III's younger brother. As early as 1575, rumors circulated in Spain that Anjou was eager to lead an army of French Calvinists into the Netherlands to fight alongside the Dutch rebels.²⁴ He seemed just as eager in 1578, notwithstanding the efforts of his brother and redoubtable mother, Catherine de Medici, to dissuade him.²⁵ At that later date, Anjou was no longer friendly with the religiously reformed in France, so he led a largely Catholic force into the Low Countries. For their part, the English ultra-Protestants were livid. Walsingham had been in Paris in 1572, during the massacre of Calvinists there, and mistrusted the "underhanded" French, although he and his queen had no choice but to accept their intervention. Prince William was resolved; still, Walsingham weighed in, warning the Dutch, early in 1578, against indulging the duke. And even after Elizabeth had warmed to Orange's and the Estate General's new Valois ally, Walsingham expressed grave reservations about Angevin involvement.²⁶

At first, Elizabeth had been as anxious as Walsingham remained. She insisted that only an imperceptive statesman could have missed the obvious, namely, that English support for the insurgency, from 1570, had been proffered to keep the French away.²⁷ William was aware of the "obvious" yet complained that English support fell far short of Dutch expectations, implying that the consequences of the shortfall--Parma's and Don John's conquests during the first few months of 1578--should have alarmed the queen and her Council, inasmuch as the insurgents and Estates General, as a result, "standeth on . . . terms of extremitie." William conceded that inviting Anjou was risky, but, he continued, no good alternative presented itself.²⁸

Elizabeth supplied an alternative. She sent and subsidized a surrogate, John Casimir, son of the Elector Palatine. William apparently welcomed him, if only to have Calvinist Casimir, as a counterweight to balance Catholic Anjou and presumably to improve the prospects for a confessionally bipartisan rebel front. But neither duke--Casimir nor Anjou--proved able to control what James Tracy describes as the "ill paid and ill-disciplined troops" each brought with him.²⁹ Casimir caused additional difficulties for Prince William (and Elizabeth) by encouraging religiously reformed extremists whose "greate instancy" or impetuosity, the queen was told, had incensed Catholics and moderates in Ghent.³⁰ Ghentois moderates blamed England; Ambassador William Davison relayed that news late in 1578, yet, by then, without allowing that the fault was hers, Elizabeth had reevaluated her collaboration with Casimir. As we learned, she changed her mind about Anjou's initiatives--and about Anjou. The English ultra-Protestants learned to their dismay that French emissaries would soon be at their queen's Court "to break ageyn into the matter of mariadg."³¹

English ultra-Protestants believed their queen's "cold dealing" with the Dutch rebels was responsible for Prince William's partnership with Anjou.³² And many English Calvinists would have been delighted with the ostensible thaw, had Elizabeth not opened pre-nuptial negotiations. She must have known that news of her revived interest in the Anjou match would distress many religiously reformed subjects, even though any surviving offspring of that match would have excluded the Catholic Queen of Scots from the succession. Yet Elizabeth had no wish to sift matrimonially-related pros and cons with her Council. During the summer of 1578, traveling through Suffolk and Norfolk, she kept Leicester at arm's length. Historian Patrick Collinson is certain that "never before or after, in the correspondence among themselves" did Leicester and Walsingham "do less to disguise the fact that they had the greatest difficulty in inclining their

queen to their way of thinking.”³³ Walsingham, who was abroad at the time, was cautioned to keep his displeasure under wraps.³⁴ So, with little prompting from her subjects who displayed greatest interest in international Protestantism, their queen determined that her realm’s safety depended on Dutch rebels’ abilities to preoccupy the Spanish, which, in turn, depended on Anjou’s participation in their insurrection. And she seems also to have decided that flirting with the duke--perhaps marrying him, if it came to that--looked to be a last brass, if the scales needed tipping to that end.³⁵

Or was it love? Was Elizabeth as seriously smitten as Ilona Bell suggests? Bell finds the queen’s letters to Anjou “heavy with the language of love” A sonnet “On Monsieur’s Departure” that Bell attributes to Elizabeth casts the narrator as a second Dido.³⁶ Yet we cannot be confident that the queen had a hand in that sonnet’s composition, and the rhetoric of the letters, which may have been literary exercises, seems too slender a thread to support the idea that the usually strategic, spinster queen was pining for a duke, twenty years her junior. But this is not to question that Elizabeth was in love with being courted. Nearly all historians writing about the courtship’s early innings concede that she enjoyed her young suitor’s attention, and most who attend to its late phase (from summer, 1578 to the duke’s death in 1583) mention her romance with romance. But Bell’s slender thread is the only support for objections to the generalization that, on matrimonial matters, Elizabeth usually led with her head, not with her heart.³⁷

Nor did her faith dictate her policy. She seems not to have been tempted in 1578 by the ultra-protestants’ efforts to cobble together an international Calvinist coalition. Conceivably, she rekindled Anjou’s interest in marriage that year to explore an alternative. Maybe the Angevin courtship was part of an ambitious yet relatively low-cost plan to “breed pikes” in the Netherlands, to prompt England’s enemies, France and spendthrift Spain, to battle to exhaustion

well away from England. Those pikes and the idea surface in a letter that Nicholas Bacon, Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, sent to Walsingham. Bacon believed that the duke's opportunism and arrogance could be turned to English advantage. Anjou, he guessed, would eventually refuse to play second fiddle to Prince William, defy both the Dutch Estates General and Spain, and seize parts of the Dutch provinces for himself. "That Spain will endure" the seizure was improbable, yet, with Anjou "bringing [what he seized] within the governance of France," Bacon could not "see that the French king will suffer him to lose it."³⁸

Religiously reformed polemicists continued to fret about Anjou's religion. Had Elizabeth been attracted to the ultra-Protestants' dreams of an international Protestant coalition, she would likely have fretted as well.³⁹ But, if I am correct, she construed the Angevin match as a possible answer to an enduring foreign policy question: how might her realm keep a hand in the business of war without having it lopped off. To Bacon and Elizabeth, by 1578, keeping the Netherlands unquiet seems to have replaced other objectives that spurred the queen to offer herself as go-between and mediator. But "breed[ing] pikes," to some extent, was consistent with what she and her regime had been doing during the 1570s, propping up Prince William just enough so that the Dutch "not [be] opprest."⁴⁰ Anjou was a prop, buttressing the Dutch, battling Spain, and, should Bacon have his way, setting the French and Spanish at each other's throats in the Low Countries.

Conclusion

Elizabeth did not share English ultra-Protestants' confidence in Prince William's ability to draw the Dutch Calvinists together and into an international Protestant league before, during, or after 1578. Nor did his effort to promote religious tolerance in the Low Countries strike her as

a compelling reason to intervene decisively. The effort looked to be doomed as long as Spanish troops' successes frightened Calvinists and emboldened Catholics. Could the latter have helped perceiving Don John's and Parma's advances as symptoms of Catholic resurgence? How could Dutch Calvinists have doused suspicions that their Catholic countrymen would ultimately form fifth columns in areas controlled by the religiously reformed yet threatened by King Philip's commanders? Moreover, even the Catholics who opposed Spain's regents in the Netherlands would have seen their churches desecrated and their coreligionists serving as magistrates ousted by Calvinist neighbors. Dutch Catholics, that is, could be excused for having thought that Prince William's efforts to guarantee them freedom to worship in regions under Protestant control were ineffective if not also insincere or, as one historian speculated, sneaky (geniepig).⁴¹ Was William decreeing tolerance merely to buy time, to forestall confrontations in which the numerical superiority of Netherlanders professing the old faith would tell in their favor?

What may have troubled Elizabeth more than William's difficulties winning Dutch Catholics' trust was his failure to control unruly Calvinist extremists. The problem, on that count, was structural as well personal, for Dutch Calvinism was bishop-less. And that deficit accounted for the kind of pluriformity that the English queen believed to be treacherous. She relied on her bishops to preserve religious uniformity. From the 1560s, the English critics of episcopacy were relentless; the hierarchy of their established church seemed to them warmed-over Catholicism. To Elizabeth, however, a bench of bishops was the mainstay of an adequately reformed religious settlement. She resisted those critics' efforts, from the start of her reign to its end, to confiscate bishops' estates and to force her mitred proprietors to live--as little more than diocesan notaries--on petty pensions. She very likely judged the Dutch Calvinists' discipline in the light of her experience trying to bridle their friends in her realm who were fond of the way

Calvinism on the Continent had developed. But neither the Swiss nor Prince William saw the need for religiously reformed bishops. The latter apparently did not think Protestant pluriformity was repulsive; Elizabeth did. That difference, combined with other factors discussed here, quite possibly discouraged the English queen from heavily investing in the Dutch rebellion. That she pilloried Archbishop Grindal, whom, as we learned at the start, ultra-Protestants supported, might suggest as much, for he was thought to have encouraged pluriformity among the realm's religiously reformed. In 1576, speaking for Elizabeth and against Grindal, Nicholas Bacon maintained that pluriformity was tantamount to "nulliformity" or anarchy.⁴²

Still, notwithstanding structural problems that the unsettled confessional affairs in the Low Countries exhibited to Elizabeth and England, the queen and her Council seem determined not to abandon William and the insurgents to the Spanish. True, English policy and practice did not serve the rebels as well as they hoped they might during the 1570s. And landmark successes that were later anticipated when one of the queen's favorites, Robert Dudley, earl of Leicester, accompanied Anjou to Antwerp (in 1582) were not forthcoming. Leicester soon left, and the tensions between François Hercule and the Estates General, which expected to keep him on a short leash, disappointed Prince William and drove the duke to distraction until his death the following year.⁴³ William, for his part, tried to appease delegates to the Estates General. In theory, according to J.J. Woltjer, the assembly could have well served--and have been well served by--its field commander. In theory--as long as Orange did not pound piston-like the delegates or the more prosperous Dutch cities with unreasonable requests--his prerogatives, the cities' autonomy, and the Estates's authority ought to have been preserved, even as concessions accommodated war-time crises and avoided political and social destabilization. But in practice, disequilibrium prevailed.⁴⁴

As Elizabeth and England looked on, confessional differences among the Dutch thwarted Prince William's attempts to build coalitions during the 1570s. The queen could not overlook the malcontents' complaints and recriminations to see what ultra-Protestants on her Council saw, the makings of an international Calvinist collaborative. Nor did she share the vision often attributed to Orange and his close associates, which surfaces in the conviction among some historians that "a new state [was] emerg[ing]" in the late 1570s, "in coexistence, and as if in interaction, with a complex and fiercely defended religious diversity."⁴⁵ To the end of that decade--and probably to William's assassination in 1584, Elizabeth saw things differently; so she put off the Spanish, propped up the Dutch--to a point--and kept wars from her shores.

¹ I use “Netherlands” and “Low Countries” interchangeably. The former term was increasingly popular from the 1560s, although the English, then and during the next decades, commonly referred to the seventeen provinces that sent deputies to the Estates General as “Flanders.” For terminology, see Alastair Duke, “The Elusive Netherlands: The Question of National Identity,” Handelingen van de Koninklijke Commissie voor Geschiedenis 171 (2005): 187-88; for the “Protestant ultras,” consult Patrick Collinson, The Elizabethan Puritan Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) 199, but also Blair Worden, The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s “Arcadia” and Elizabethan Politics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 50-53. Collinson’s ultras were always apprehensive that Elizabeth would favor those who “flattered her own more cautious thoughts” and who became Grindal’s (and their) fiercest critics. But what is most important for our purposes is that the English ultra-Protestants urged the queen not to underestimate “the international peril facing Protestantism,” as Worden confirms, and not to minimize the “need for international cooperation to withstand it.”

² Accusations of inconsistency, insincerity, or indifference--for which, see inter alia, Paul Hammer, Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government, and Society in Tudor England, 1544 - 1604 (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, 111; R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada: The Emergence of the English Nation, 1485 – 1588, New York: Norton, 1966), 336; Wallace T. McCaffrey, Queen Elizabeth and the Making of Policy, 1572 – 1588, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 272-73; and Charles Wilson, Queen Elizabeth and the Revolt in the Netherlands, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970), 136--either overlook or undervalue Elizabeth’s persistent attempts to broker peace between Dutch insurgents and King Philip. Simon Adams, “Elizabeth I and the Sovereignty of the Netherlands, 1576 – 1585,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th series 14 (2004): 315-17 convincingly puts the queen’s efforts back into play. David J. B. Trim, “Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience

on the Continent, 1558 – 1585,” in Tudor England and Its Neighbors, ed. Glenn Richardson and Susan Doran (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 139-77, however, emphasizes Elizabeth’s religious motives, developing arguments introduced in E. I. Kouri, “For True Faith or National Interest? Queen Elizabeth I and the Protestant Powers,” in Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Tom Scott and E. I. Kouri (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987), 411-36. Nonetheless, Kouri (425-26) concedes that Elizabeth’s leadership of international Protestantism existed mainly in the minds of would-be Calvinist allies on the Continent and that the queen “preferred to pursue a policy of officially correct neutrality” in the 1560s, and--I will argue--less scrupulously, yet still circumspectly well into the 1570s. I will also question whether Elizabeth saw as clearly as Trim now does that Dutch Calvinists, “by their willingness to defy the military logic of their situation in the 1570s, provided the motor for the revolt”; see Trim’s “Conflict, Religion, and Ideology,” in European Warfare, 1350-1750, ed. Trim and Frank Tallet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 289.

³ See Margaret’s letter to Philip, July 1567, Correspondance français de Marguerite d’Autriche, Duchesse de Parme avec Philippe II, 3 vols. ed. J. S. Theissen (Utrecht: Kemink, 1925 - 1942) 1: 385-86. Consult J. Andriessen, “De katholieken te Antwerpen,” Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van het Zuiden van Nederland 70 (1987): 62-63, for Alba’s “repressiepolitieck,” and, for depictions of Alba as “God’s rod” and wrath and depictions of his troops as hellish monsters, see Daniel Horst, De opstand in zwart-wit: Propagandaprenten mit de Nederlandse (Zutphen: Walburg, 2003) 92-94 and 102.

⁴ Maarten Hageman, Het kwade exempel van Gelre: De stad Nijmegen, de Beeldenstorm, ende Rand van Beroerten, 1566 – 1568 (Nijmegen: Vantilt, 2005), 252.

⁵ See the queen’s instructions in British Library, Additional MS. 32323, 34v. To sample Spain’s protests, Alba’s complaints, and England’s responses just prior to the queen’s and regime’s compliance, review Relations politiques Pay-Bas et de l’Angleterre sous le régime de Philippe II, 11 vols., ed. Joseph Marie Bruno Constantin, Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels: Hayez, 1882 - 1900) 6: 321-59.

⁶ Peter Arnade, Beggars, Iconoclasts, and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008) 203-204. J. C. A. De Meij, De watergeuzen en de Nederlanden, 1568 - 1572 (Amsterdam: Noord Hollandsche Uitgever, 1972), 234 claims that coastal locals had warned Alba who told them to be vigilant ("*geode wacht de houden*") but was too worried about French overland incursions to redeploy troops.

⁷ See Olaf Mörke, *Wilhelm van Oranien (1533 – 1584): Fürst und "Vater" der Republik* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), 148-50.

⁸ See the letter from the citizens of Flushing to Elizabeth, March, 1572, Relations politiques 6: 490-91.

⁹ Brune to Burleigh, October 19, 1573, Relations politiques 6: 836. For the new regent's moderation, see Monique Weis, Les Pays-Bas Espagnols et les Etats du Saint Empire (1559 – 1579): Priorities et enjeux diplomatie en temps de troubles (Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2003), 341-42.

¹⁰ See the letter from Jan van Nassau to Philips van Marnix, May 7, 1575, De onuitgegeven briefwisseling van Marnix van Sint-Aldegonde, ed. Aloïs Gerlo (Brussels: Interuniversitair Instituut voor Studie van de Renaissance en het Humanisme, 1985), 23.

¹¹ Eric Aerts, "Spanje of Oranje? Loyale en dissidente regenkamers in Brabant en Vlanderen bij het begin de tachtigjarige oorlog (1577 – 1585)," Miscellanea archivistica studia 118 (1999): 36-37; for the Catholic refugees, see Geert Janssen, "Quo Vadis? Catholic Perceptions of Flight and the Revolt of the Low Countries, 1566 – 1609," Renaissance Quarterly 64 (2011): 478-83. Judith Pollmann, Catholic Identity and the Revolt of the Netherlands, 1520 - 1635 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 106 mentions the malcontents' reactions to Orange's "monopoly."

¹² Alastair Duke, Reformation and Revolt in the Low Countries (London: Continuum, 2003), 224-25.

¹³ Frances Yates, Valois Tapestries, reprint edition (London: Taylor and Francis, 1999). 107-108.

¹⁴ “Instructions” to Francis Walsingham, August, 1570, British Library, Harleian MS. 36, 98v-99r.

¹⁵ Davison to Leicester, April 17, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 411.

¹⁶ See Prince William’s discourses “at soundry times,” paraphrased by William Herle in 1573, British Library, Harleian MS. 1583, 199r-201v; Lord Burleigh’s memorandum, October 17, 1575, Relations politiques 7: 597; and Leicester’s letter to Wilson, October 18, 1577, Relations politiques 10: 26-27.

¹⁷ For knowledge in England of Don John’s conversations with the Guise in France, see Thomas Wilson’s letter to Davison, August 30, 1577, National Archives, State Papers, Foreign 83/2, 125. The English likely expected that alliances of that sort would be complicated--and eventually compromised--by Spanish Gallophobia, for which, consult Jean Michel Ribera, Diplomatie et espionage: Les ambassadeurs du roi de France auprès de Phillipe II du traité du Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) à la mort de Henri III (Paris: Champion, 2007), 341-47. Yet influential papal nuncio, Niccolò Ormaneto, expressed support for Don John’s scheme was in place even before Philip’s regent arrived in the Netherlands; see P.O. De Törne, Don Juan d’Autriche et les projets de conquête de l’Angleterre, 1568-1578, 2 vols. (Abo: Acta Academica Aboentis, 1915 - 1930) 2: 60-62.

¹⁸ Curteys to Walsingham, March 24, 1577, National Archives, State Papers, 12/111, 113.

¹⁹ For the deployment of Calvinist troops, see James D. Tracy, The Founding of the Dutch Republic: War, Finance, and Politics in Holland, 1572 – 1588 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 156-57; for ultra-Protestants’ insistence on William’s abilities and popularity among “the multitude,” see Davison’s letter to Leicester, October 27, 1577, National Archives, State Papers, Foreign 83/3, 75. But, for William’s unpopularity, see J. Decavele, “De mislukking van Oranjes ‘democratische’ politiek in Vlaanderen,” Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de geschiedenis des Nederlanden 99 (1984): 625-27.

²⁰ See Guy Malengrau, L’esprit particulariste et la révolition des Pays-Bas au XVI^e siècle (1578 – 1584) (Louvain: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1936), 64-67; Rolf H. Bremmer, Reformatie en Rebelle: Willem van Oranje, de calvinisten en het recht van opstand tien onstuimige jaren, 1572 – 1581 (Franeker: Wever, 1984), 216; and

James D. Tracy, For Holland's Garden: The War Aims of the States of Holland, 1572 – 1588 (Amsterdam: Amsterdams Centrum voor de studie van de Gouden Eeuw, 2004) 24-25.

²¹ Pieter Geurts, De Nederlandse opstand in de pamfletten, 1566 – 1584 (Nijmegen: Centrale Drukkerij, 1956), 276.

²² See the undated entry, National Archives, State Papers, 104/163, 88r-91v.

²³ Bremmer, Reformatie, 158-59.

²⁴ Pierre Ernest to Requesens, September 23, 1575, Correspondance du Cardinal Granvelle, 1565 - 1586, 12 vols., ed. Edmond Pouillet and Charles Piot (Brussels: Hayez, 1877 - 1896), 5: 614.

²⁵ See Henry III's letter to Catherine de Medici, June 28, 1578, Lettres de Henri III, Roi de France, 7 vols., ed. Jacqueline Boucher, Pierre Champion, and Michel François (Paris: Klincksieck, 1959 - 2006) 4: 30-32.

²⁶ Walsingham to Paulet, January 14, 1578, National Archives, State Papers 78/2, 5v and Walsingham's later reflections on "whether it be good for Her Majestie to assist the duke d'Anjou," November, 1581, British Library, Harleian MS. 1582, 39v.

²⁷ The instructions to John Hastings issued on October 29, 1575, British Library, Harleian MS. 285, 26v-27r, were explicit on that count.

²⁸ As argued in a note to John Sommers, August, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 722.

²⁹ Tracy, Dutch Republic, 141.

³⁰ Cobham and Walsingham to Queen Elizabeth, July 6, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 571. Casimir teamed with Peter Dathenus, whom moderate Calvinists attempted to exclude from synodical deliberations; for which, see Thomas Tilius's letter to Arnold Crusius, April, 1577, "Briefwisseling van Thomas Tilius," Bijdragen en mededeelingen van het Historisch Genootschap 55 (1934): 129. For Dathenus, see Willem Nijenhuis, "Varianten
19

binnen het Nederlandse Calvinisme in de zestiende eeuw," Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis 89 (1976): 364. And, for Casimir's prior acquaintance with Dathenus, whom he earlier invited to a Palatine conference of Calvinists, see Johannes Arndt, Das Heilige Römische Reich und die Niederlande, 1566 bis 1648: Politische-konfessionelle Verflechtung und Publizistik im Achtzigjährigen Krieg (Cologne: Böhlau, 1998), 179.

³¹ Burghley to Cobham and Walsingham, July 29, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 660. For Davison's later analysis, see his letter to Walsingham, November 17, 1578, National Archives, State Papers 83/10, 37v-38r.

³² Leicester to Walsingham, August 29, 1578, National Archives, State Papers 83/8, 55.

³³ Patrick Collinson, "Pulling the Strings: Religion and Politics in the Progress of 1578," The Progresses, Pageants, and Entertainments of Queen Elizabeth I, ed. Jayne Elisabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring, and Sarah Knight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 124.

³⁴ Leicester to Walsingham, August 1, 1578, Relations politiques 10: 679-80.

³⁵ Susan Doran, Monarchy and Matrimony: The Courtships of Elizabeth I (London: Routledge, 1996), 210-11 suspects that Burghley tipped the queen in that direction.

³⁶ Ilona Bell, Elizabeth I: The Voice of a Monarch (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 151-59.

³⁷ Natalie Mears, "Love-Making and Diplomacy: Elizabeth I and the Anjou Marriage Negotiations, c. 1578 – 1582," History 86 (2001): 442-50, is less convinced than I of the importance of the Dutch wars for the Anjou match and for policy in general.

³⁸ Bacon to Walsingham, July 29, 1578, British Library, Harleian MS 168, 94v-95r. Kervyn de Lettenhove prints the letter (Relations politiques 10: 633-35), but misattributes it.

³⁹ John Stubbs, The Discoverie of a gaping gulf whereinto England is likely to be swallowed by another French marriage (London 1579) is an excellent specimen of the ultra-Protestant polemicists' vilification of Anjou, predicting that the duke's retainers, "the scombe of all France, which is the scombe of Europe," would become burdens to England's taxpayers and would test their queen's commitment to religious reform (C6v-C7r). Stubbs's screed and similar anti-Anjou literature have long been read as expressions of the ultra-Protestants at Court, but the argument that courtiers' opposition to the match somewhat subsided by the time Stubbs's Gaping Gulf was published has been corroborated by Natalie Mears, "Counsel, Public Debate, and Queenship: John Stubbs's The Discoverie of a Gaping Gulf, 1579," The Historical Journal 44 (2001): 643-48, which maintains that Stubbs's Gulf and similar protests "emerged independently from an articulate, middle-ranking, politically and confessionally conscious circle."

⁴⁰ Instructions for John Smith, November, 1576, British Library, Harleian MS. 6992, 61r.

⁴¹ P. J. H. Ubachs, "De nederlandse religieverde van 1578," Nederlandsch archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 77 (1997): 41-42.

⁴² See the text of Bacon's address to Parliament, British Library, Harleian MS. 36, 98r-99v.

⁴³ Frédéric Duquenne, L'entreprise du duc d'Anjou aux Pays-Bas de 1580 à 1584: Les responsabilités d'un échec à partager (Villeneuve d'Asq: Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1998), 73-74 and 114-16.

⁴⁴ J. J. Woltjer, Tussen vrijheidsstrijd en burgeroorlog: Over de Nederlandse Opstand, 1555 – 1580 (Amsterdam: Balans, 1994), 121-22.

⁴⁵ Willem Frijhoff, "Religious Toleration in the United Provinces: From Case to Model," Calvinism and Religious Toleration in the Dutch Golden Age, ed. R. Po-Chia Hsia and Henk van Nierop (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 29-30.