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The Theory and Practice of the Chinese Communist Party "Two-line struggle": The Course of Conflict in the Leadership

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The Theory and Practice of the

Chinese Communist Party "Two-line Struggle":

The Course of Conflict in the Leadership

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Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to explain and
"predict" Chinese Communist leadership conflicts
through examining the theory and practice of "two-line
struggle."

Chapter One aims to embody the concept of "two-line
struggle": it defines and illuminates the political
significance of the term and pins down the CCP's
professed rules of struggle. The chapter concludes
(1) that a two-line struggle is an irreconcilable (and
often protracted) conflict in the leadership involving
disputes over the estimation of the revolutionary setting
and the formulation a strategic policy guideline for a
particular period of the revolution; (2) that such a
conflict, though basically of a "non-antagonistic"
contradiction, falls on the borderline between
"non-antagonism" and "antagonism"; (3) that the parties
concerned shall not transgress the limits of democratic
centralism.

Chapters Two and Three examine the practice of
two-line struggles. The findings are:

First, the CCP is saddled with a history of
"unprincipled, excessive" struggles: almost all internal

major struggles resulted in egregious violations of the game rules. This is accountable by what the author perceives to be an inextricable dilemma between theory and practice. On the one hand, it is unlikely to confine within non-antagonistic limits a line struggle which theoretically should be waged without compromise. On the other, the rule of democratic centralism further exacerbates the dilemma: while the victor emphasizes "centralism," the loser demands "democracy."

Second, a major struggle is most likely to occur either when the CCP's revolution has resulted in a grave reverse, subjecting the current party line under serious challenge, or when the party has lost a strong leader.

The thesis concludes that incompatibilities between theory and practice are the usual politics during a major struggle. And it offers a line of thought along which to "predict" the trend of a struggle.

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Preface

The purpose of this thesis is to illuminate the
course of conflict in the Chinese Communist leadership
through examining the theory and practice of two-line
struggle.

Two main considerations underlie the purpose:

First, to the author's knowledge, no study has
ever attempted to expose the general tendencies of
the Chinese Communist Party leadership conflict. This
was perhaps due to the notion that the complications
and complexities of the past struggles would preclude
a successful effort. It is nontheless worthwhile to
attempt a tentative probe into those jungles, for
whatever general tendency one is able to infer with some
confidence will be of great help to the study of the CCP
politics of struggle.

Second, studies treating CCP leadership disputes
have not given proper attention to explication of the
two-line struggle theory. A faulty assumption seems
to prevail in the field that because "two-line struggle"
is a term used rather loosely by the Chinese Communists
to simplify complicated disputes it is not significant
enough to warrant anlysis. Another unhealthy bias is

that, when it comes to the CCP's philosophy of struggle, the discussion tends to be so focused upon the "Thought" of Mao Tse-tung that the ideas underneath the seemingly insignificant jargon of two-line struggle are largely neglected.

The research was a strenuous process. The first stage required several months of developing the insight into those jungles by reviewing, as extensively as possible, the literature on major intra-party struggles. The second stage was one of surveying the materials which might be used to substantiate or discard the ideas conceived in the initial thesis plan. Most of the sources in Chinese were found in the University of Chicago Library.

The third stage was the actual writing of this work. Since the examination covered practically all major leadership struggles in CCP history, the difficulty was to balance historical background with the need to attain coherence and lucidity within limited pages and to concentrate on the main topic, the theory and prctice of two-line struggle. Care has been taken to provide in the note pages reference materials which may remedy possible inadequacies of historical discussion.

The usefulness of this study lies in the exposition and comparison of the theoretical and practical aspects of two-line struggle. A particular feature is that efforts have been made to provide the bases upon which

to predict the trends of intra-party disputes, both present and future.

It is hoped that the thesis may provoke further study of its subject matter so as to retest, modify or reject some of the present results.

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December 1981

Introduction

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has weathered
a history of "two-line struggle"; simplified, the
term means struggle between a correct line and an
erroneous one. Before the death of Mao Tse-tung, there
had been ten major leadership struggles in CCP history,
namely, struggles with the "erroneous" lines as
respectively represented bv Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai,
Li Li-san, Lo Chang-lung, Wang Ming (Chen Shao-yu),
Chang Kuo-tao, Kao Kang, Peng Teh-huai, Liu Shao-chi,
and Lin Piao.[1] (For transliterations according to
Wade-Giles and Pinyin, see Appendix.)

The eleventh major struggle broke out on October
6, 1976, only three days short of a month after the
death of Mao, when Hua Kuo-feng, allegedly Mao's chosen
successor, was pressured bv veteran party leaders to
arrest the Gang of Four. This dramatic event took one
back to Mao's words of September 1971, so poignantly
prophetic: "There are people who have attempted to
split our Party ten times. Don't you believe it? Even
if you don't, I at least, do."[2]

As if to further prove Mao's cynicism, the
twelfth major struggle loomed ahead soon after the arrest
of the Gang of Four. Struggling were Hua Kuo-feng's

faction and Teng Hsiao-ping's faction. The former
advanced the theory of "Two Whatever's" in a attempt
to legitimate Hua's Party Charimanship and preclude
the comeback of Teng's group now attempting to "reverse
the verdicts" made during the Cultural Revolution.[3]
The struggle culminated in May 1978, when Teng's group
evoked Mao's theory of "Practice-is-the-criterion-of-
truth" to counteract the effects of the theory of Mao's
infallibility.[4] Finally, in late June 1981, at the
Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee,
Hua lost his Chairmanships of the Party and of its
Central Military Commission for "having advanced, and
procrastinated the correction of, the fallacious
guideline of "Two Whatever,s" . . . (and) having
delayed and obstructed the reversal of verdicts on
wronged cases in history. . ."[5]

Explaining CCP struggles has always been a major
concern of China students. For its leadership the CCP
grows--at least rehetorically--both in wisdom and in
strength after each triumph of a "correct" line. But
struggles "between the lines" are very perplexing to
the outside world indeed. An interpretative theory or
model developed out of the dissection of a struggle
during the Cultural Revolution does not often hold true
for other cases, perhaps much less for those before
and after the Cultural Revolution. The crux lies not
only in the analysis per se, but, more importantly, in

the assessment of the representativeness of a case in question. In other words, the problem involves both the reliability and validity of a theoretical interpretation: the former concerns the question whether or not an interpretation of a struggle can be retested and accepted by others; the latter, the degree of its applicability to others struggles.

For example, after examining one or several cases, one concludes a "factionalism" theory, which purports that struggles in the CCP are based largely on political civility and patron-client relations, with leaders and membership of factions frequently shifting to the vicissitudes of leadership power situation.[6] The reliability of this theory would be challenged if one should, on closer analysis, discern that it is entrenched power bases (e.g. the party, government, and the military), not factions in the sense hereinbefore noted, that account for intra-party struggles. The validity of this theory is limited in so far as political civility is concerned if one considers the fact that during the Cultural Revolution, batches of high ranking officials were condemned as "anti-Party," tormented and dismissed from the party.

Theories or models, when applied in the concrete context of politics, always have their limitations. The author neither proposes any particular theory of his own, nor suggests the rejection of any existing

theory. It is his central concern to explain and
"predict" Chinese Communist leadership conflict
through historically examining the theory and practice
of two-line struggle.

Chapter One deals with the concept of "two-line
struggle" and the CCP's professed rules of struggle.
Students tend to take it for granted that a struggle
is a two-line struggle because the Chinese Communists
call it such. In fact, due to its highly political
significance, the term is often exploited or abused by
actors rivaling for legitimacy. Clear understanding of
the concept is essential not only to the perception
of political overtones when the term is used, but also
to the understanding of CCP's wonted manner of analyz-
ing and settling policy disputes in a two-line ("right-
left") framework. There are several rules of struggle
which have remained substantially unchanged over time,
but rules are one thing and practice is often quite
another.

Chapters Two and Three examine the circumstances
under which a major two-line struggle is likely to
take place, and the CCP's historical problem of striking
a "correct" line in difficult times. At the same time,
the incompatibilities between theory and practices are
considered.

At the end of the thesis, a set of questions is put forth, which, hopefully, will provide a "sense of directions" in "predicting" CCP leadership conflict.

Chapter One   The Theory of Two-line Struggle

To date there seems to be only one study, Lowell
Dittmer's "'Line-struggle' in Theory and Practice,"[7]
which attempts to explain the concept of "two-line
struggle." According to Dittmer, the Chinese model of
two-line struggle is as follows:

> A line struggle functions first of all as
> an authoritative decision-making technique,
> where it provides a means for resolving
> numerous complex issues quickly and simply
> by reducing the available alternatives to the
> basic question of which "road" is correct--
> capitalism or socialism. . . . Its locus is
> therefore "inner-party," where its presence
> causes permanent factional polarization and
> struggle of varying intensity. These conflicts
> are transferred to the masses . . . giving the
> leaders an opportunity to purge their opponents . . .
> and generate momentum for new policies.[8]

While acknowledging the ambiguity of the model and
criticizing the "over-generalization" of the western
versions of the model (e.g., the refomulation of the
Maoist choice between capitalism and socialism as
routiniation vs. charisma, institutionalization vs.
participation, development vs. utopia, etc.),[9] Dittmer
fails to provide a clear concept of "two-line struggle"
because the model, as quoted above, explains more the
process than the concept of two-line struggle. In addition,

some of his views require much thought before one can accept them. They include (1) that a two-line struggle is one between a correct line (the proletarian line or socialist line) and an opposing line (the bourgeois reactionary line or capitalist line); (2) that it "<u>seems</u> to involve an antagonistic contradiction."[10] We shall examine these via the development of the concept of "two-line struggle" in this chapter.

The Origin of "Two-line Struggle"

Dittmer says: "The concept of a two-line struggle did not originate with the Cultural Revolution, but according to refugee informants, it marked the first time the term had been publicly used to characterize Party leadership as a whole since the inner-Party disputes of 1920's and 1930's."[11]

To the author's knowledge, the term "two-line struggle," also translated as "struggle on two fronts," was first used by Lenin in 1908.[12] Wang Ming's booklet, written in February 1931 and entitled "Two Combat Lines," was the first work by a Chinese Communist in which the term was explicitly used. As head of the "Internationalists" or "returned students," Wang Ming made the term intensely operational in his struggle against the Li Li-san line.[13] We shall discuss in the concluding

paragraphs of this chapter the question whether "two-line struggle" had been used as a term or concept in leadership disputes prior to February 1931.

The Necessity for Struggle

The Chinese Communists' belief in the necessity for struggle derives its philosophic grounds from dialectic materialism. For them, the development of anything depends upon the struggle of opposites within itself; "this dialectic law also applies to the development of the CCP."[14] The view is best reflected in Mao Tse-tung's "On Contradiction":

> Contradictoriness within a thing is the fundamental cause of its development . . .
> Opposition and struggle between ideas of different kinds constantly occur within the Party. . . .If there were no contradictions in the Party and no ideological struggles to resolve them, the Party's life would come to an end.[15]

For a party member himself, struggle means self-cultivation. It helps free himself from non-communist, non-proletarian and individualistic thoughts, and enhances his revolutionary spirit and capacity.[16] For the party, struggle safeguards its proletarian purity and prevents its decay from within. The belief is derived from the concept of mutual transformability of two opposites within a thing and the concept of from quantitative change to qualitative change. Mao wrote

of this in 1937:

> . . . (I)n given conditions, each of the
> contradictory aspects within a thing trans-
> forms itself into its opposite, changes its
> position to that of its opposite......
> When the thing is in the first stage of
> motion, it is undergoing only quantitive and
> not qualitative change.....In the second stage
> of motion, the quantitative change of the
> first state has already reached a culminating
> point and gives rise to the dissolution of
> the thing as an entity and thereupon a
> qualitative change ensues.[17]

Suppose an inceptive or potential contradiction
between a socialist line and a "capitalist" line - the
latter being comparatively insignificant at the present
stage - exists in the Party but is not being seriously
handled. In due time and under giben circumstances
(e.g., setbacks of socialist construction), the "capital-
ists" forces will have reached to a point to cause
qualitative change of the Party, namely, the trans-
formation of the Communist Party into a "capitalist"
one. Rightly or wrongly, this was what Mao had feared--
a probable danger of capitalist restoration--when he
initiated the "Cultural Revolution" to subdue Liu
Shao-chi's "capitalist" forces which had been gaining
strength since the frustrating Great Leap "backward."

Liu Shao-chi believed the same:

> intra-party ideological struggles are
> "absolutely necessary and inevitable": for
> if the party does not struggle against
> those non-proletarian ideologies, "left" and
> "right" opportunisms, they may "erode our
> Party or part of it, cause qualitative change,
> and transform it into a non-proletarian

organization; for example, it was in such
a way that social democratic parties in
Europe were corrupted by bourgeois ideologies
and converted into bourgeois parties."18

The Concepts of "Left and of "Right"

The central issue of CCP line disputes is the speed

of the Chinese Communist revolution, which is mani-

fested in the intra-party controversies over the

degrees of the CCP's cooperation with the bourgeois

forces. Before the CCP took over political power from

the Kuomingtang (KMT) in 1949, line disputes had center-

ed upon the question whether armed struggle against

the Government or cooperation with it would be the

party's most appropriate strategy for a given period of

the revolutions; as Mao Tse-tung said in 1939:

One important component of the political
line of the Chinese Communist Party is the
policy both of unity with the bourgeoisie and
of struggle against it....Unity here means the
United front with the bourgeoisie. Struggle
here means the "peaceful" and "bloodless"
struggle, ideological, political and organiza-
tional, which goes on when we are united with
the bourgeoisie and which turns into armed
struggle when we are forced to break with it.
If our Party does not understand that it must
unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods,
it cannot advance and the revolution cannot
develop; if our Party does not understand that
it must wage a stern and resolute "peaceful"
struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting
with it, then our Party will disintegrate
ideologically, politically and organizationally
and the revolution will fail; and if our
Party does not wage a stern and resolute
armed struggle against the bourgeoisie when

> forced to break with it, our Party will
> likewise fail. The truth of all this has
> been confirmed by the events of the past
> eighteen years.[19]

Since 1949, the question has centered upon the
speed of the socialist transformation and construction;
that is, the extent bourgeois modes of production
should be allowed to exist and the speed at which
they are to be exterminated.

Whether a party policy is to be labeled "right"
or "left" is not judged simply by its support for
cooperation with the bourgeoise or confrontation with
it. The standart for judging the correctness of a
policy is whether it corresponds to the objective
reality of the current revolutionary setting at a given
period of the revolution). If it, as determined in the
CCP leadership process, does not correspond to
objective reality, the policy is mistaken and is either
"right" or "left."

"Right" connotes the dual idea of (1) under-
estimating the revolutionary strength of the CCP and
over-estimating the strength of its enemy, and (2)
"making no distinction between ourselves and the enemy
and taking the enemy for our own people."[20] "Left"
means the opposite. "Leftists" tend to under-estimate
the strength of the party's enemy, and to "magnify
contradictions between ourselves and the enemy to such
an extent that they take certain contradictions among

the people for contradictions with the enemy, and regard as counter-revolutionaries persons who are not really counter-revolutionaries."[21] In fact, the Chinese Communists' concepts of "right" and of "left" are derived from those of Lenin, on which Stalin elaborated.[22] The CCP apparently used these concepts at the sixth National Congress, held in Moscow in July, 1928, where Chen Tu-hsiu was branded "right opportunist" and Chu Chiu-pai "left putschist."[23]

Reviewing the Party's work in the White (enemy-occupied) area, Liu Shao-chi said in 1939:

> When the revolution developed into a grave stage, the Party's organizations went under-ground, there were for the present no new revolutionary high tides, and the task of preserving and consolidating the Party was put forward; there often arose in the Party two incorrect tendencies: one being right liquidationism--the doctrine of legality; the other being "left" liquidationism--the doctrine of illegality.[24]

Supporters of the "doctrine of legality" held that since the party was now in straits, it should adopt lawful means in substitution for illegal, underground activities; those of the "doctrine of illegality" contended that under such circumstances lawful forms of struggle were impossible and that all party work should become covert and done through illegal means. For Liu, both doctrines were two extremes and could only lead to the "liquidation" (failure or destruction)

of the revolution. On the one hand, during periods of White terror, the legitimization of the CCP could not be realized and therefore, rejection of covert and illegal ways of struggle would amount to "liquidation" of party work and the party. On the other, since the "doctrine of illegality" completely excluded the possibility of lawful means, it could only lead to the total disconnection of the Party from the masses of legal organizations, and to the liquidation of the party's bases in those areas.[25] The appropriate policy, then, should be neither "right" nor "left," but one that corresponded to objective reality--one that recognized the necessity of carrying on covert activites as the principal means of struggle, yet encouraged lawful means wherever and whenever they were feasible.

Intra-party disputes over CCP's United Front strategy during the War of Resistance against Japan best illuminate distinction between a correct line and a "right" or "left" strategy. Before the War the principal contradiction was one between the CCP and the KMT; when the War broke out, this principal contradiction relative to the new principal contradiction between the Chinese people and the Japanese.[26] Change of revolutionary circumstances and of contradictions entailed reassessment and reformulation of the party line. If the CCP had not adopted the United Front with the KMT, which was leading the people to fight the war, the

Chinese Communists as a party would have been estranged from the masses and the already weakened party strength would have been further debilitated. Leftists within the CCP failed to perceive or ignored this changed revolutionary setting and still zealously advocated armed struggle against the KMT; rightists took the United Front strategy in absolute terms and failed to perceive the need for the CCP to maintain independence and development in the United Front.

As presented above, a two-line struggle must be seen not only simply as one between a correct line and an erroneous one, but also as one of two interrelated combat lines: one front against "right opportunism" and the other against "left opportunism." An intra-party ideological struggle must be waged on the two combat lines of simultaneously opposing both 'right' and 'left' deviations."[27] Clearly, Dittmer's suggestion that a two-line struggle is one of capitalism vs. socialism or of a correct line vs. an erroneous one is inadequate because it cannott epitomize the conceptual significance of the line conflict during the Cultural Revolution.

Dittmer may have confused "two-road struggle" (liang-tiao tao-lu tou-cheng   with "two-line struggle" (liang-tiao lu-hsien tou-cheng
). The latter may also be translated into English as "struggle on two fronts" or as "struggle

on two combat lines." During the Cultural Revolution,
the CCP media often said that the conflict was "the
struggle between two classes, two roads, and the lines."
This indicates that the terms are different. Generally,
both connote the struggle between a correct line (road)
and an erroneous one. Specifically, a two-road struggle,
which involves a definite antagonistic condtadiction,
means one between socialism and capitalism or between
Marxism-Leninism and revisionism, or between any two
such "roads." A two-line struggle, basically of a
non-antagonistic nature, means the struggle on one
front against the right and on the other against the
left. In other words, a two-line struggle is the
struggle if a correct line (which is neither "right"
nor "left") with two erroneous lines (a "rightist"
line and/or a "leftist" line). Although the two
erroneous lines must be struggled with simultaneously,
the CCP must always distinguish which in the principal
contradiction and which is the secondary contradiction.
When the CCP perceived that revolutionary circumstances
required it to adopt a united front strategy during the
War of Resistance against Japan, its primary attention
was directed at defeating intra-party "close doorism"
because "close dorrism" was so "leftist" that it
constituted a formidable opposition to the adoption of
the united front strategy. Once the United Front with
the KMT was established, primary attention was shifted

to the prevention of rightist tendencies because right-
ists within the party neglected the importance of CCP's
independence in the United Front.

The Concept of Line

Generally speaking, "lines" means a party (short-
range) strategy for a particular stage in a given period
of the revolution. The general task of the CCP in
history is to realize Communism; a struggle involving
disputes over this task is not one between "lines," but
one between revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries.
The party's general task before 1949 was to overthrow
the Kuomingtang, which the CCP saw as symbolic of
bourgeois rule. A struggle involving disputes over this
task was not one between "lines" but one between
revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. By the
same token, a struggle involving disputes over the post-
1949 general task of socialist rransformation and
construction of China is not one between "lines" but
one between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

A line struggle involves disputes over the
appropriateness of a party strategy (a general policy
guideline) at a particular stage for carrying out the
general task of a given period of the revolution.
During the period of socialist construction, when
exploiting classes in mainland China have virtually lost

their economic bases bv which their class distinctions
were made, a struggle involving the strategic question
whether class distinctions should be based on economy
or ideology and whether class struggle should be
emphasized or de-emphasized, is one between "lines."[28]
Stalin has written:

> Strategy is the determination of the
> direction of themain blow of the proletariat
> at a given stage of the revolution....Tactics
> are the determination of the line of conduct
> of the proletariate in the comparatively
> short period of the flow or ebb of the move-
> ment, of the rise or decline of the revolution,
> the fight to carrv out this line bv means
> of replacing old forms of struggle and
> organization bv new ones, old slogans by new
> ones, bv combining those forms, etc.[29]

In the above quotation, "strategy" is equivalent to
our "general task," and "tactics" or "line" to our
"(short-range) strategy" (line) or "general policy
guidelines."

The Wang Ming vs. Li Li-san conflict at the third
Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in
July 1930 exemplified the distinction between a general
task and a line. As Wang Ming said:

> 'To overthrow the imperialist KMT rule bv
> armed insurrection and establish a soviet
> regime' is the Party's general, fundamental
> task of this whole revolutionary period. . .
> (T)o   support or to oppose this question is
> to demorcate the lines of being revolutionary
> and of being counter-revolutionarv (this is)
> not a dispute involving different political
> views at a given stage.[30]

The Wang vs. Li conflict did not involve the general

task; in dispute were the strategies respectively espoused by Wang and Li. Li held it to be the correct general policy guideline to revolt on a national basis and at the same time to "strive for nationwide victory." Wang held that the strategy should be "to occupy one or several provinces," consolidate the, and prepare for nationwide revolutionary situation. For Li, Wang's line was an "extremely grave rightist mistake," for it was infeasible to consolidate one or several provinces in the face of the Government's military forces; for Wang, Li was "leftist in form and rightist in substance" because Li, on the one hand, believed the possibility of achieving nationwide victory and, on the other, rejected the possibility of achieving and maintaining victory in certain parts of the land.[31] Therefore the was a two-line struggle.

Their conflict over lines was accountable by their differing perceptions of the current revolutionary setting. While both agreed that there arrived a revolutionary high tide, Li thought it was a nationwide high tide and Wang thought it was an"unbalanced" high tide. Wang stated:

> Usually, when we speak of the question of ...
> intra-party disputes over political lines at
> a given stage of the movement, it is in fact
> the question of evaluating the current
> situation and understanding present strategy
> and task.[32]

The Political Significance of a Two-Line Struggle:

On the Borderline between Non-antagonism and
Antagonism

Basically a line struggle should not be viewed as
one between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries.
To view it in such terms would unquestioably elevate
it to an antagonistic contradiction. However, if it is
not an antagonistic one, should it be viewed definitely
as a non-antagonistic one, and how is it to be
distinguished from those other struggles of a non-
antagonistic nature? The CCP has proclaimed:

> In analyzing the mistakes committed by a
> comrade, it is necessary first of all to make
> a strict distinction between the two types
> of contradictions which are different in
> nature. One must not describe an ordinary
> mistake in work or mistake in understanding
> as a political mistake; nor must one describe
> an ordinary political mistake as a mistake in
> political line; or mix up with a political
> line which is still in the nature of inner-
> party struggle with a question of a counter-
> revolutionary nature involving attempts to
> subvert the Party or the socialist state. . .
> It is necessary to distinguish between those
> who follow their higher-ups or principal
> leading members in committing a mistake of
> political line and those who engage in
> subversive activities aimed at upsurping
> Party and the state leadership.[33]

Some inferences may be drawn from the above: first, of
all the kinds of mistakes that are non-antagonistic in
nature and therefore belong to "contradictions among
the people," line mistakes are of the most serious kind;
second, a "major" political mistake is a line mistake,

though an "ordinary" political mistake is not; third,
the struggle against a line mistake can be of the
antagonistic type of contradictions.

In other words, a line mistake may involve either
a non-antagonistic contradiction or an antagonistic
one. Dittmer's uncertainty that a line-struggle "seems
to involve an antagonistic contradiction" confuses rather
than clarifies the question.[34] To be precise, a line-
struggle per se is non-antagonistic—this, we shall
further discuss later in the chapter.

A mistake in work refers to one in day-to-day
policy implementation. It may be regarded as the
slightest and most easily distinguishable of all the
kinds of mistakes. However, to distinguish the other
mistakes requires the drawing of fine lines. Basically,
an ideological, cognitive mistake (a mistake in under-
standing) per se does not involve concrete policy
formulation and implementation as a political or line
mistake; but ideological mistakes, if not corrected,
may develop into political, line mistakes or even
counter-revolutionary crimes. Roughly between 1949 and
1964 there were implicit or explicit ideological debates
between what later became the conflicting groups
respectively headed by Mao and Liu.[35] The ideological
controversies gradually developed into serious policy
conflicts and large-scale line/power struggles as
manifested in the Cultural Revolution. Political disputes

and organizational splits within the party are in
substance ideological struggles.[36]

But how is a political mistake to be distinguished
from a line mistake? In actuality, the difference is
a matter of degree, not of kind. A major political
mistake is tantamount to a line mistake, but carries
less serious political overtones. Teng Hsiao-ping once
remarked:

> Chairman Mao's errors were political errors.
> This does not diminish them, true, even less
> it does not justify them. But it is one
> thing to speak about political errors and
> another thing to speak about crimes like the
> crimes of Lin Piao's or the Gang's. Of
> course, it was Chairman Mao who permitted Lin
> Piao and the Gang of Four to exploit his
> political errors to unsurp the power.....[37]

Here Teng takes pains to exculpate Mao. By implication,
he regards Mao's mistake as a serious political one
tantamount to a line mistake, but is unwilling to call
it such because to do so would be politically
impractical: a line mistake is one the borderline
between non-antagonism and antagonism, and the facile
association of Mao's mistake with the "counter-
revolutionary" acts of Lin Piao and the Four could by
all odds render Mao's mistake antagonistic. Further,
Teng treats what Lin Piao and the Four did, not as a
line mistake, but as counter-revolutionary acts which
are unquestionably antagonistic in nature.

The determination of whether a line mistake is or

is not antagonistic is based on the "standard" of
whether or not the parties concerned will repent and
correct. Mao said:

> If comrades who have committed mistakes can
> correct them it will not develop into
> antagonism....But if (they) persist in them
> (mistakes) and aggravate them, there is the
> possibility that the contradiction will develop
> into antagonism.38

In actuality, the "standard" is highly flexible,
susceptible of Machiavellian maipulation. Non-
anatgonistic mistakes are regarded as such only on
the presumption that the parties concerned are devoid
of any intent to challenge the official ideology, unsurp
the party or sabotage the socialist state. During the
Cultural Revolution Mao's supporters clearly treated
"those in power taking the capitalist road" as enemies
who would remain "unrepentant for life." Today, those
"unrepentant capitalists" have accused the Gang of
Four of being counter-revolutionary.

Definition of a Two-line Struggle

    Based on our previous discussion, a two-line
struggle is defined as a major conflict between two
(or more) sides in the CCP leadership each of which,
because of different perception of the current situation
of a particular stage in a given period of the revolution,

advances a party strategy (line) the other side finds
irreconcilibly erroneous ("left" or "right") for
carrying out the general task of that whole period.

A "major conflict" implies, first that it is a
highly sigificant struggle because it involves the
choosing of a general policy guideline fatal to the
success of a particular stage of the revolution; second,
it may persist for a long period of time since the
opposing side(s) may remain adamant to its (their) own
"correct" line(s). "Between two (or more) sides"
suggests that the dominant side may face oppositions
either from the "left" or from the "right", or both.
"In the leadership" implies that a two-line struggle is
essentially an intra-party leadership struggle. "Because
of different perception of the current situation"
suggests that conflict over the correctness of a party
line is essentially one over the correct evaluation of
a current revolutionary setting. "Party strategy
(line)" implies that disputes about day-toOday policy
implementation or formulation are in themselves not
line struggles. "Irreconcilably" connotes that the
question of line is one of principle, an either-or
choice, allowing no room for compromise; therefore, if
the opposition persists in its "mistake," the
contradiction will develop into antagonism.

A party line may at its inception face serious

challenge from those leaders who find it infeasible in
the current revolutionary setting; or, otherwise, it
may later prove to be erroneous or unfit for changing
realities.. In either case, a two-line struggle is on.
At some critical point of time, either when the revolution
has suffered some grave setback, or when there have
been some significant changes in the leadership power
relations (or both), the struggle becomes intensified,
and a reshuffle of the leadership and change of line may
occur. This is the basic pattern of a two-line struggle.

The Cultural Revolution (November 1965-April 1969)[39]
was only the intensified period of a protracted two-
line struggle. The orgin of this struggle goes back
to as far as the initial years of the regime during
which there were theoretical disputes over the speed of
socialist transformation.[40] The spectre of the struggle
began to loom ahead--the dismissal of Marshall Peng
Teh-huai was a case...in point[41]...after...the grave
revolutionary setback of the Great Leap "backwards."
Then, in the early 1960's, power relations in the CCP
leadership were gradually changing, with moderate forces
in the ascendants. Mao's uneasiness and suspicion over
these developments finally impelled him to initiate the
"Cultural Revolution," which was declared victorious
at the Ninth National Congress in 1969. Then there was
the interlude of the Lin Piao Incident, largely a power
struggle with little concerning line dispute. The

Cultural Revolution's ultra-leftism went on to manifest itself in disastrous proportions when Mao died. The loss of this charismatic leader, coupled with the gravest setback of the revolution, anticipated the comeback of the moderates who presured Hua Kup-feng, the then Party Chairman, into rounding up the Gang of Four at one stroke. Thus a historic victory of a "correct" line was soon announced.

Rules of Struggle

Since both the philosophy and experience of the CCP necessitate constant struggle within the party, there are certain basic rules of the game--that is, the party's professed norms of struggle.

The Rule of Princile

The CCP prohibits "unprincipled" struggle. A struggle is "unprincipled" if (1) it does not involve a matter of "principle"; or if it does, it is not conducted in accordance with the party's organizational procedures; (2) it involves only matters of day-to-day policy formulation or implementation, but is conducted irreconcilably (only struggles involving principles are to be waged without compromise.); (3) it is waged for

individual or factional expediency.[42]

A matter of "principle" is one involving policy formulation with strategic significance to the accomplishment of the party's general task during a certain period of the revolution. Thus, a struggle over lines i s a struggle over principles. Questions of principle must be met with all seriouness; as Liu Shao-chi put it, a mistaken principle may produce "svstematic, continuous mistakes on a whole range of concrete matters."[43] For both Liu and Mao, irreconcilibilitv on matters of principle was not absolute. They agreed that in given circumstances (e.g. in time of exigency), temporary compromise on lesser principles may be desirable; but when such circumstances no longer existed, there was no room for compromise even on lesser principles. Liu said in 1941: "This is not a pacifying or middle line on principles . . ."[44] Mao's speech in 1971 had similar vein: "On questions of line, questions of principle, I never give up; on momentous questions of principle, I never compromise."[45]

In fact, CCP's concept of no compromise on matters of principle is just that of Stalin's:

> On questions of day-to-day administrative
> affairs, on questions of purely practical
> nature, we can and should compromise with
> those within the party who hold different
> views; but, if questions involve differences
> on principles, any compromise, any "middle"
> line will be of now avail. On questions of
> the nature of princople, either these or

        those principles shall be the basis for
        party work.46

The Rule of Democratic Centralism

        Originally Lenin's invention which began to take

shape in 1903, when Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had hot

debates over organizational rules of the Russian Social

Democratic Labor Party.[47] Since 1921, democratic central-

ism has been the supreme organizational principle for

the CCP. The term first appeared in the CCP party

constitution adopted in 1927, and has since been clearly

stipulated in every subsequent party constitution as

the organizational principle of the party.[48] The

importance of the rule of democratic centralism

cannot be overemphaized as Stalin said: "After the

correct political line has been laid down, organizat-

ional work decides everything, including the fate of

the political line itself, its success or failure."[49]

        In democratic centralism, "centralism" is the

end and "democracy" the means to the end.

        "Centralism" consists of an absolute power

structure that requires a party member to obey the

decisions of the party and a lower unit to obey the

decisions of a higher unit.[50] Even if the member or

the unit does not agree with the decisons from above,

they shall execute them unconditionally.

The absolute power structure is "deomcratic" in four senses.[51] First, it is based on majoritv rule: because the party is composed of all partv members, an individual member shall obey its decisions; because a higher unit represnets more party members, a lower unit shall obey its decisions. Second, a unit or a party member, when disagreeing with the instructions from above, may refer its or his ipinion to the immediate superior; if the superior turns it down, the opinion may be referred to the level higher. (Under no circumstances shall the subordinate refuse to carry out or obstruct the decisions from above.) The superior shall not force the subordinate to discard a dissenting opinion which the subordinate may, within the partv channels, put forward again. Third, an important decision shall not be made unitl exhaustive, possible discussion by all members or units concerned is done.[52] Fourth, any member may criticize the work of any member or any unit.

While there are serious disputes over a partv line, democratic centralism serves three preventive functions. First, it prevents the implementation of the current party line from being obstructed by those dissenting members or units, for "centralism" requires the absolute carrying out of party decisions. Second, it prevents an erroneous party line from goint unnoticed and uncorrected, for "democracy" encourages criticism and

reference of dissenting opinions. Third, but not
least in importance, it prevents the formation of
"organized groups" and the breakdown of the party.
Full discussion, the majority rule, criticism and
reference of opinions all help vent individual
dissatifications; more importantly, the rigid hierar-
cial party channels of "centralism" obviates the
formation of orgnaized groups. One will commit the
gravest kind of "unprincipled" struggle, if "he thinks
that as long as (his) political views are 'corrrect'...
he may in an intra-party struggle use various kinds of
means not in conformity with party discipline to
struggle with the opposition."[53]

One interesting thing to note is that neither
radicals nor conservatives in the CCP leadership dare
to challenge the rule of democratic centralism, at
least on paper. The Party Constitution drafted by the
victors of the Cultural Revolution and passed by the
Ninth National Congress in 1969 still maintained the
Article: "The Party's organizational principle is
democratic centralism."[54] Wang Hung-wen, one of the
Gang of Four, in his 1973 report on the revision of the
constitution, recommeded the creation of a political
environment of "centralism and democracy" and of
"dicipline and freedom."[55] The Party Constitution
adopted by the Eleventh National Congress held in 1977
after the defeat of the Gang of Four, also retained

the article on democratic centralism. Yeh Chien-yin,

in his 1977 report on the revision of the constitution,

said:

> The elventh line struggle further evidenced
> the importance of democratic centralism....
> The 'Gang of Four' intentionally trampled
> upon our party's organizational principle,
> having earnestly carried on anti-party
> sectarian and deviationist activities.[56]

The Rule of Discriminating Treatment of Contradictions

Since the Chinese Communists believe that struggles

of different kinds and varying intensity constantly

exist, the question is not the presence of absence of

contradictions, but one of proper treatment of different

kinds of condtradictions. Contradictions "among the

people themselves" and those between the people and

the enemy are qualitatively different and must be

resolved by qualitative different methods. Contradict-

ions among the people are non-antagonistic in nature

and thus should be resolved through "democratic

(peaceful) method, the method of discussion, of

criticism, and of persuasion and education";

contrdictions between "ourselves and the enemy" are

"antagonistic" and must be resolved through the

"method of coercion and repression."[57]

A line struggle is on the borderline between non-

antagonism and antagonism. In other words, a line-

struggle is essentially non-antagonistic in nature but
is the most serious kind of contradiction "among the
people"; if the persons within the party have committed
line mistakes, refused to correct them, and aggravated
them (e.g. bv organizing factions), the line struggle
would escalate to the level of antagonism. The CCP's
preference for treating a line-struggle as a non-
antagonistic contradiction is substantiated by both
Mao's and Liu's works. In "On Contradiction" (1937),
Mao wrote: "Contradiction within the Communist Party
is resolved by the method of criticism and self
criticism. . ."[58] In "On the Correct Handling of
Contradicitions Among the People" (1957), he wrote:
"The democratic method of resolving contradictions
among the people was epitomized 1942 (when the two-
line struggle was directed against Wang Ming line) in
the formula "unity, criticism, unity."[59] In 1972, he
also reiterated the approach of "curing the sickness to
save the patient" in treating those cadres who have
committed mistakes."[60]

The above shows - at least, rhetorically--a line
of consistence in Mao's treatment of line struggles as
essentially non-antagonisitc in nature.[61] In a
similar vein are Liu's two important works on intra-
party struggle: "On the Cultivation of the Communist
Party Members" and "On Internal Party Struggle."[62]

The previous discussion has focused upon the theoretical aspect of two-line struggle, namely, the illumination of the concept of"two-line struggle" and identification of the CCP's professed game rules. Before the thesis proceeds to examine the pratical aspect, it is necessary to add a few words about the validity of the research resluts of this chapter.

The sources on which we based our discussion were drawn with purposeful efforts to assure both "breadth" and "depth"[63] so that there would remain little doubt as to the validity of the definition of "two-line struggle" and the certainty of the game rules. However, there remains the question whether or not "two-line struggle" had been used as a term or concept in leadership disputes prior to February 1931, when Wang Ming pulbished has booklet entitled "Two Combat Lines." If the answer were negative, the concept would be invalid for the analysis in the following chapter of those struggles during the initial years of the CCP, particularly the case of Chen Tu-hsiu.   .

As far as one is able to ascertain, the answer is positive, although the trouble will remain one of knowing the exact time of the term being first introduced in a leadership dispute. As noted earlier in this chapter, the CCP's concept of "two-line struggle" is basically derived from Lenin and Stalin. This--coupled with the fact that the CCP in its infancy relied heavily

on the Comintern for theoretical guidance--inclines one
to believe that "two-line struggle" had been used prior
to February 1931 in fact if not in sepecific name.

This belief is further supported bv two facts.
First, Chen Tu-Hsiu was acused of "right opportunism"
at the August 7 Emergency Conference, 1927, and Chen
Tu-hsiu and Chu Chiu-pai were denounced at CCP Sixth
National Congress June 8-July 11, 1928 respectively
because of "right Opportunism" and Left "putschism."
It is therefore evident that the concepts of "right"
and "left" as embodied in "two-line struggle" were used
on those occasions. As the Letter to all Commrades of
the Party issued by the Sixth Congress stated: "Comrades!
All the aforesaid tendencies can lead to the danger of
drifting either rightward or leftward. We must take serious
steps to correct those mistakes."[64] Second, as criti-
cized by Wang Ming in his booklet, Li Li-san had
particularly since June 1930 often supressed dissenting
opinions on the justification that "two lines could
never be allowed to co-exist within the Party."[65]

The theory of two-line struggle examined in this
chapter is therefore valid for our analysis in the next
chapter of the major struggles prior to February 1931.
It is valid also because the struggle against Chen
Tu-hsiu's "right opportunism," the first major intra-
party struggle in CCP history, continued in the period
during which Li Li-san's "left adverturism" was in full
swing.

Notes

Introduction of Chapter One

[1]"A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with
Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his
Inspection Tour (mid-Aug.-Sept. 12, 1971)," CCP
Central Document, Chung-fa (1972) No. 12, Classified
Chinese Communist Documents: A Selection, ed. Chai
Wei-pin et al., Eng. ed. (Taipei: Institute of
International Relations, 1978), pp. 45-9.

[2]Ibid., p.51.

[3]"Learn Documents Well; Grasp Guidelines Well, "
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Feb. 7, 1977; this
editorial puts forth the theory of "Two Whatever's"--
to wit: "Whatever policy decision made by Chairman
Mao, we all resolutely uphold; whatever directives of
Chairman Mao, we all follow out"--to lend legitimacy
to Hua Kuo-feng, to whom Mao had written these words:
"You manage; I do not worry."

[4]"Practice Is the Sole Criterion of Truth," Guangming
Ribao, May 12, 1978. The title of this article is the
reporduction of the words of Mao in his "On Practice,"
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, trans. from 2nd Chinese
ed. (1965; rpt. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977),
I, 297 & 235. (Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent
references to the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung,
hereafter SWoM, are based on the 1977 rpt.) For an
introduction of the process of the Hua vs. Teng debate,
see Hsi Hsien, "The Debate, see Hsi Hsien, "The Debate
on the Question of the Criterion of Truth," China Daily
News, March 19, 20, 21, 1980.

[5]"Resolution on Certain Historical Questions of the
Party Since the Founding of the Nation," Guangming
Ribao, July 1, 1981.

[6]Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP
Politics," China Quarterly, Nos 53-56, (Jan,-Mar. 1973),
pp. 35-36; the model will be further examined in the
conclusion of the thesis.

[7]Lowell Dittmer, "'Line-Struggle' in Theory and Practice: The Origins of the Cultural Revolution," China Quarterly, Nos. 69-72, (Oct.-Dec.1977), pp. 675-712.

[8]Ibid., 683.

[9]Ibid., 683-85.

[10]Ibid., 675-83.

[11]Ibid., 675.

[12]If Lenin did not literally use the words "struggle on two fronts" in 1908, he used "words to that effect;" see "Notes on a Publicist," Selected Works of Lenin, trans & ed. J. Fineberg (New York: International Publisher, 1943), IV, 45.

[13]Chen Shao-yu (Wang Ming), Two Combat Lines (Wuhan, China: CCP Publication Dept., 1931), in Selected Works of Wang Ming, ed. Hisako Honjo (Tokyo: Soku Publisher, 1973), III, 7-113; Chang Kuo-tao, My Recollections (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Monthly, 1973), II, 861.

[14](Lo Ming), Party Building (1938; rpt. Taipei: Yangmingshan Chuan, 1951), P. 63.

[15]"On Contradiction," SWoM, I, 313 & 317.

[16]Liu Shao-chi, "On the Cultivation of the Communist Party Members (originally a speech at Marxist-Leninist Academy, Yenan, July 8, 1939)," Selected Works of Liu Shao-chi (Tokyo: Chinese Cultural Service, 1967), pp. 9-38. The speech revised by Liu in 1949, was first published in book form bv People's Publisher, Peking, the same year. The contents of the said editions vary.

[17]"On Contradiction," SWoM, I, 338 & 342.

[18]"On Internal Party Struggle (originally a speech at the Party School of the CCP Middle China Bureau, July 2, 1941)," Selected Works of Liu, p. 78.

[19]"Introducting the Communist," SWoM, II, 290-91.

[20]"On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People," SWoM, V, 396; similar ideas found in "On Practice," SwoM, I, 307.

[21]Ibid.

[22]See "Controversial Questions," Selected Works of Lenin, IV, 124-45; "Left-wing Communism An Infatile Disorder," ibid., X, 57-147; Commission on Party History, the Communist Party of Soviet Union (Bolshevik), The Concise Textbook of the History of the Communist Party of Soviet Union (Bolshevik) trans. China Publisher (Yenan: China Publisher, 1946), pp. 144-48.

[23]For a discussion of "right opportunism" and "left putschism" at the Sixth National Congress, see Warren Kuo, Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1978), Book Two, 45-91. (hereafter, Analytical History).

[24]Liu, "On Overt and Covert Works (October 20, 1939)," A Special Collection of Materials on Liu Shao-chi ed. Fang Chun-kuei (Taipei: Institute for the Study of Chinese Communist Problems, 1970), p. 73.

[25]Ibid., pp 73-4. In fact, Liu's view of the Party's two forms of "Liquidationism" is based on Lenin's comment on "liquidationism;" see "On to the High Road (Feb. 1909)," Selected Works of Lenin, IV, 3-12 and "Controversial Questions," ibid., 124-48.

[26]Sup. note 16, pp. 27-8; Sup. note 15, 313.

[27]Lo, Party Building, p. 74; similar words found in "The role of the Chinese Communist Party in National War," SWoM, II, 205: "Broadly speaking, in the last seventeen years our Party has learned to use the Marxist-Leninist weapon of ideological struggle against incorrect ideas within the Party on two fronts-- against Right opportunism and against 'Left' opportunism."

[28]For an analysis of Mao's views on class distinctions, see Richard Curt Kraus, "Class Conflict and the Vocabulary of Social Analysis in China," China Quarterly, No. 69 (March 1977), pp. 54-74.

[29]Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism (1924)," The Essential Stalin: Major Theoretical Writings, 1905-1952 ed. Bruce Franklin (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1972), p. 288.

[30]Sup. note 12, p. 82.

[31]Ibid., pp. 47-50.

[32]Ibid., p. 83.

[33]"Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life (resolution adopted by the Fifth Plenary Session of the CCP Eleventh Central Committee)," _Renmin Ribao_, Mar. 15, 1980; for the English text, see Beijing Review, no. 14, April 7, 1980, pp. 11-19.

[34]Sup. note 7, p. 683.

[35]The Revolutionary Mass Criticism Writing Group of the Party School under the CCP Central Committee, _Three Major Struggles on China's Philosophical Front (1949-64)_ 2nd ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1976).

[36]Sup. note 18, p. 79.

[37]_The Washington Post_, Aug. 31, 1980, p. D4; Teng's view was enunciated in "The Milestone in Socialist Democracy and Legal System—On the Trial of Lin Piao, Chiang Ching Counter-revolutionary League," _Renmin Ribao_, Dec. 22, 1980.

[38]Sup. note 17, 345.

[39]The period ranges from Nov. 1, 1965 (when Yao Wen-yuan published in the Shanghai Wen Hui Bao his "Review of the Newly Complied History Drama 'The Dismissal of Hai Jui'" to prelude the Cultural Revolution) to April 14, 1969 (when the CCP held its Ninth National Congress and declared the victory of the revolution.

[40]Sup. note 35.

[41]Philip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution:' Origin and Development," _China Quaterly_, No 29 (Jan.-Mar. 1967), pp. 2-3.

[42]Sup. note 18, pp. 99-113; also, Chen, sup. note 12, pp. 162-72.

[43]Sup. note 18, p. 102.

[44]Ibid., p. 104.

[45]Sup. note 1, p. 34.

[46]Quoted from Liu, sup. note 18, p. 80.

[47]"An account of the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903)," _Selected Works of Lenin_, II, 341-357; "Speeches Delivered at the Second Congress," ibid., 358-65.

[48]Chinese Revolution Museum, The Collected
Edition of Party Constitution of the Chinese Communist
Party (1921-77) (Peking: People's Publisher, 1979),
pp. 23, 36, 51, 155, 209 & 230. The Party Constitution
adopted by the CCP 2nd National Congress in July 1922,
though without the term "democratic centralism,"
contained words strongly to that effect.

[49]Stalin, "Report to the Seventeenth Congress of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)
on the Work of the Central Committee (1934)," The
Essential Stalin, p. 288.

[50]Lo, Party Building, p. 34; "Rectifying the Party's
Style of Work," SWoM, III, 44.

[51]Lo, pp. 34-9; Liu, "Report on the Revision of
Party Constitution (presented at the 7th National
Congress, May 14, 1945)," A Special Collection of
Materials on Liu Shao-shi, pp. 165-69; Liu, Self-
cultivation in Organization and Discipline (n.p.:
Frontier Committee's Propaganda Dept., (CCP, 1952),
pp. 29-37; Ho Kuang, "Also Talk About Democratic
Centralism," Renmin Ribao, May 22, 1980; Ko Lo-chi,
"live in thought, Unified in Action," Renmin Ribao,
June 19, 1980; sup. note 33.

[52]"Possible" means that in time of eziquency,
"complete" discussion may not be possible. Under-
standably, discussion will have to be done through
availalbe party channels, for example, meetins at
various levels of the party organizations. The extent
of discussion will be determined on rational basis.
This means that, for instance, a party decision on the
punishment of a Poliburo member must not be made
until full disucssion within the Poliburo or the Central
Committee is done. Of course, the extent of such a
discussion should not reach to lower levels of the
party committee; i.e., the ones at the provinical and
local levels.

[53]Sup. note 18, p. 104.

[54]Sup. note 48, p. 209.

[55]Wang Hung-wen, "Report on the Revision of Party
Constitution (presented at the Tenth National Congress,
Aug. 24, 1973)," Sup. note 48, p. 223. In fact, Wang's
quoted words were first used by Mao, "On the Correct
Handling of Contradictions among the People," SWoM,
V. 389.

[56]Yeh Chien-yin, "Report on the Revision of Party
Constitution (presented at the Eleventh National
Congres, Aug. 13, 1977)," sup. note 48, p. 242.

[57]Sup. note 15, 318 & 321; Mao, sup note 54, 385 & 389.

[58]Sup. note 15, 322.

[59]Mao, sup. note 54, 390.

[60]Sup. note 1, p. 31. The formulae of "curing the sickness to save the patient" and of "unity, criticism unity" were both initiated, with the "desire for unity," in the Rectification Movement (1942-45).

[61]For excerpts from Mao's works relating to two-line struggle, see Chairman Mao on Intra-party Two-line Struggle (China: n.p., n.d.), Duplicated by Center for Chinese Research Materials Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D.C.

[62]Mao, Liu and Chou En-lai all viewed line struggles as essentially non-antagonistic; see "Restore the True Face of the Comrade Liu Shao-chi's 'On Internal Party Struggle'," Wen Hui Bao, Mar. 1, 1980; Chen Yeh-ping, "Hold the Thought Weapon; Strengthen Party Building: Learn Comrade Chou En-lai's Thought on Party Building," Hong Qi (Red Flag), No. 3, Feb. 1981, pp. 16-22,44.

[63]We have referred to the individual works of Wang Ming, Chang Kuo-tao, Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Lenin and Stalin, and many others collective sources such as the Party Constitutions and resolutions. The fruits of this chapter are presumably sound because they are based on such a variety of data ("breadth") covering the entire history of the CCP ("depth") They seem more convincing since they are essentially primary sources and are therefore, compared to secondary ones, more conducive to the understanding of what the CCP has said or says is the theory of two-line struggle.

[64]Analytical History, Book Two, pp. 98-99.

[65]Sup. note 12, p. 81.

Chapter Two   Pre-1949 major stuggles

Line Struggle or Power Struggle

    Scholars in the field of Chinese studies have
devoted much time to interpreting CCP internal
struggles, and a variety of persectives and methods
have been used for that purpose; yet the problem of
prediction has remained very much neglected. Although
some attempted to "predict" an unsettled major struggle
by way of shorthand conclusions, the question of
reviewing the circumstances under which a major
struggle is likely to take place has not been specif-
ically adressed. The author attempts in this chapter
a tenative probe into that question.

    Simply speaking, there are two prerequisite
conditions for a major struggle to occur: first, that
the CCP has suffered a grave reverse in its revolution,
subjecting the current party line to serious challenge
either by those who legitimately question its correct-
ness and advance a substitute line, or by those who
exploit the situation for power under the pretext of
line struggle; second, that the Party lacks or has lost
a strong leader, which makes it likely for an otherwise

secondary strongman to succeed inchallenging the

party line previously upheld by the lost leader. The
following points need be noted here. First, a line
struggle often starts and ends with a power struggle.
As evidenced in history the party leadership must
always adopt a "correct" line to provide a sense of
direction for its members and to serve as a legitimate
basis for its rule; if the line proves to be erroneous,
the legitmacy of the leadership becomes untenable and
there will, in most cases, be a reshuffle of the
leadership and adoption of a new line. Second, a
power struggle does not necessarily involve line
conflicts; the Kao Kang and Lin Piao cases were such
examples because neither Kao nor Lin ever advanced a
particular Party line in the sense that two cases as
"great line struggles" was partly because he used the
term, as the CCP often does, rather loosely; and partly
because the term connotes "irreconcilability" and
"antagonism" once it is determined that the opposing
parties refuse to "repent and aggravate their mistakes."

Basically there are two different views on
struggles in the CCP leadership: that they are
essentially line struggles; or, conversely, that they
are of the nature of power rivalry. Both Warren Kuo and
Lucian W. Pye hold that power struggles are essential
elements in the Chinese political system and that

policies and lines are not as important as power.[1]
Kuo particularly disagrees with the view that policy
and line disputes constitute the major factor for CCP
leadership struggles or the view that struggles arise
from both line disputes and power rivalry, without
making the distinction whether line conflict or
power rivalry constitutes the major factor for struggle.[2]
He contends that the correctness of a party line is
not determined by objective standard but by real
power holders. Any party line, when put into practice,
will always result in both achievements and short-
comings. In upholding the party line under challenge,
the power holders may adopt "resolutions" to emphasize
achievements and de-emphasize shortcomings; in overruling
an opposing line, they may do the reverse by treating
mistakes as the "principal aspect" and merits as the
"secondary aspect."[3]

For the author of the thesis, the crux lies not in
whether policy/line disputes or power rivalry constitutes
the amjor factor for intra-party struggles, but in
whether we have established a clear concept of two-line
struggle. We must, first of all, determine whether a
policy in dispute has the significance of a line. We
cannot broadly treat all policy disputes as line
disputes. If a conflict involves a party "line"--whether
it is a line in itself or simply a policy purposely
elevated to the level of a line by actors; then it

involves power since the correctness of a line
constitutes the legitimate basis for the struggle in
which lines are involved and rules of struggle are
observed, line conflict is the cause of struggle, and
power rivalry, the necessary effect. Obviously,
disagreements over policies should not be viewed
solely in terms of power rivalry; otherwise, it seems
one would have to accpet the assumption that politics
in the CCP are basically irrational. Of course, in
cases such as those of Kao Kang and of Lin Piao,
where apparently no line is involved, power rivalry
constitutes the predominant factor for conflict. In
such cases, self-aggrandizement is the main cause of
conflict. Although there may be some policy issues
involved, they are not line issues.

Our discussion will virtually cover all major
struggles in CCP history—a formidable task for the
thesis, it seems—yet our concern is not about the
detaisl of struggles, but about the circumstances from
which a major struggle arose, the "lines" in dispute
and the game rules in practice.

We shall in the chapter discuss pre-1949 struggles,
with the case of Chen Tu-hsiu and the case of Li Li-San
as our primary concern. This is based on two major
considerations. First, case-by-case examination would
be too unwieldy with the limits of the thesis. It is
also inappropriate to set arbitrary lines on when a

struggle actually began and ended: the struggle
against Chen Tu-hsiu's "right-opportunism," for
example, actually continued well into the height of
the struggle against Li Li-shanism.   Second, the case
of Chen was the first major line struggle in CCP
history; the case of li was the most intense of the
pre-1949 struggles.   Focus on these cases, with
discussion of othermajor cases for necessary develop-
ment, will best illuminate the tenor of the CCP
history of intra-party struggle.

From "Right Opportunism" to "Left Adventurism:" Chen Tu-hsiu and Li Li-san

When the CCP temporary central organ was set up
in May 1920, it was faced with a struggle on two fronts.
From the right and outsi e the formative party there
were reformists, most notably Liang Chi-chao, who
advocated China's evolution toward some form of
socialism through industrialization.   They held that
China's problem lay not in the conflict between the
bourgeoisie and the proletariat, but in the lact of a
sizable working class because of underdevelopment.
From the left and within the formative party there were
anarchists who, in a temporarv alliance with Chinese
Marxists due to common opposition to warlordisn,
believed that Bolshevik preletarian dictatorship never

would end, thus making Communism unattainable and un unacceptable. The voice of the reformists soon died down after Liang's retreat from politics. The anarchists, after failure to reach a compromise on the program of the CCP, either withdrew or were expelled from the party.

At the CCP First National Congress, in July 1921, there were heated disputes. Liu Jen-ching's leftist group opposed any legal activities while Li Han-chun's rightiest group advocated the propagation of Marxism through legal means and opposed the development of worker movements. The Congress rejected both the arguments and adopted a party line, according to which the CCP would be an underground organization, with no connection with other political organizations, and the party's central task was to develop trade unions on the open front--that is, party members were to develop trade unions legally, without revealing their capacity in the CCP.[5] Li Han-chun disassociated himself from the party in June, 1922.[6]

The CCP's Second National Congress in July 1922 saw a sharp turn of the party line to the right--the United Front strategy. The party was to encourage its members to join the KMT in their individual capacity in order to help the bourgeois revolution from outside the KMT, they accepted the "bloc within" policy under Comintern authority. Chen recalled:

> At that time, all the five members of the
> Party Central . . . were opposed to this
> proposal (from Comintern representative G.
> Maring). The primary reason was that alliance
> within the KMT would . . . interfere with our
> independent policy. . . . (I)n deference to
> International discipline, the CCP Central
> could not but accept the proposal. 7

That a reshuffle of the leadership did not follow
the drastic change form the "close door" party line of the
first Congress to the "open-door" policy was accountable
by the fact that the previous line did not result in any
serious setback of the revolution--there was no cause for
blame; moreover, the Comintern which had real control of the
CCP both organizationally and financially, had not found
the CCP Central intractable.

It was not until April 1927, when the right-wing
National Government in Nanking purged the Communists, that
the United Front line was called into serious question.
The Comintern, to retain its authority, had to find
scapegoats for the failure of the United Front; and in such
an atmosphere, many member of the CCP leadership went out
of their way to escape the imminent struggle unscathed.

The United Front party line had proved very fruitful
up to the March of 1927. By then it had undergone several
tactical escalation. The Second National Congress in June
1925 decided to enlarge the left, criticize the middle,
and unite the left and the middle to oppose the right in
the KMT.[8] By the end of 1926, CCP membership had swollen

from 950 in 1925 to 50,000.[9] About one third of the representatives of the KMT Second National Congress in January 1926 held membership both in the CCP and the KMT; of the thirty-six Central Committee members elected at this Congress, seven were Communists in disguise; of the nine members of the KMT Central Standing Committee, four were such Communists.[10] However, what seemed propitious now was soon to take a downturn. The Chungshang Gunboat Incident of March 1926,[11] in which the Communists attempted to abduct Chiang Kai-shek to Moskow, galvanized the right-wing Nationalists into vigilance against CCP's attempt to usurp the leadership of the national revolution.

In April 1927, the right-wing KMT began to purge Communists. In July, the left-wing Nationalist government in Wuhan was also compelled to purge Communists after their instigation of radical peasant movements which collapsed the economy of many villages, victimized many families of the military and generated a common revulsion against Communists.[12] Following the purges, the CCP membership dwindled from 57,977 in April 1927 to 10,000 in August.[13] At this juncture, the Comintern instructed the CCP to discard the United Front and adopt a new party line which later was to result in "left putschism."

It was against such a background that a major line struggle arose. At the August 7 Emergence Conference in 1927, Chen Tu-hsiu was accused of having committed "right opportunism."[14]

Ironically, Chen, an opponent of the "bloc within" strategy, bore the blame which fairly should have been laid upon Comintern representatives. We have noted earlier, that the Party Central under Chen had dissented from the United Front line at its adoption. And prior to the purge by the right-wing KMT, the CCP Central had perceived the danger of a broken United Front which would "more than destroy the whole revolution";[15] and Chen had made a proposal to the Third International to change "cooperation within the KMT" into "alliance outside it," but had suffered a rebuff.[16] Even when the left-wing Nationalists were about to purge the Communists, the Comintern still insisted that the CCP stay within the KMT despite Chen's repeated demands for the CCP's withdrawal.[17] The Comitern in its November 1926, March 1927, and July 1927 resolutions on China question, criticized the idea of withdrawal from the KMT as "mistaken" or "absurd," and decreed that CCP members remain in the KMT.[18]

With the instruction and support of Comintern representatives Besso Lominadze, and in the atmosphere that the label of "right opportunism" could be put on anyone who attempted to defend Chen at the expense of the Comintern, Chu Chiu-pai severely took Chen to task and became the Party Secretary. Chang Kuo-tao has recalled that after Chu and Michael Borodin had discussed the question of responsibility for the vain policy of "bloc within,"

Chu told Chang:

>Although what the CCP did was based on the
>directives from the Third International, the
>latter must not be held responsible for the
>failure; for the loss of Moscow's esteem and
>authority would cause Trotskyists to brace up
>in their attack on Stalin and generate among
>the Chinese Communists distrust in the Comintern's
>leadership. . . . If all CCP Politburo members
>should bear the blame, the Central's leadership
>would go bankrupt. . . . [Now that] Chen Tu-hsiu
>is now adopting a passive attitude [see below*],
>why don't we shift on to him the whole
>responsibility for the failure. . . .19

*(On July 15, 1927, Chen wrote a resignation to the Party
Central, complaining: "The Comintern, on the one hand,
wants us to carry out our own policies; and, on the other,
does not allow us to withdraw from the KMT. In fact, this
is a dilemma; I cannot work." That Chen, as Party Secretary,
adopted such a "passive attitude" at this critical juncture
was most inappropriate. Thus, this was to be exploited
by Chu and Lominadze in their attack on his "right
opportunism." 20

Peng Shu-chih also spoke of the question of responsibility
in September 1929:

>For the then opportunist mistakes of our Party,
>we ought to admit each one's responsibility with
>candor. Of course, the whole opportunism
>originated from Comintern guidance; but as far
>as the CCP was concerned, every one with
>leadership responsibilities should not have
>shifted the blame . . . (Chu) Chiu-pai, (Li)
>Li-san, (Li) Wei-han, (Chou) En-lai were also . . .
>responsible for the opportunism. . . .21

Chen Tu-hsiu himself did admit that he should be held

responsible for his right opportunism because he, as the

then Party Secretary, directed the implementation of the

United Front line due to pressure from the Comintern and

failed to oppose resolutely and correct this mistaken line. In his Letter to All Commrades of the Party, he said remorsefully:

> The infantile Party of China did not have the ability to invent theories or decide policies so that it blindly executed the Comintern's opportunist policy. . . . It is my firm belief that had I and the other leading commrades understood so profoundly and contended against so resolutely the mistake of the Comintern's opportunist policy as Comrade Trosky did, and if we had not only so contended but also started enthusiastic discussion and debate among all comrades of our Party. . . . the revolution would not have led to such a humiliating failure failure. . . .22

Although the United Front failed at last, it had been a valuable experience for the CCP. First, having worked within the KMT and the National Governments, the CCP not only gained experiences in administrative and military affairs and in worker and peasant movements; more importantly, it had obtained the opportunity to view China's revolution from above. Second, the KMT had been badly split into right, middle and left. the result was that the ideological seeds of the left were to become the chronic headache for the KMT in its efforts to maintain a party unified in thought and in action. During the War of Resistance against Japan, and during the Third Revolutionary Civil War (The "Liberation War"), many a Nationalist top military officer, together with his troops, defected to the CCP was a conspicuous example.

But we are not here concerned with the merits of the
first United Front strategy. Our purpose has been to
demonstrate that this major line struggle arose when the
CCP was undergoing grave adversities. While the revolution
was not suffering reverses or while it was making progress,
line disputes would not develop into major line struggles.
Before the August 7 Conference, the CCP had convened five
national congresses. Although there were heated line
debates, they did not develop into serious proportions.[23]
Even though the United Front policy, adopted at the
Second National Congress, was in fact not faithfully
carried out by many party members due to their doubts about
its feasibility and even though serious "right" and "left"
mistakes had been made since the Third National Congress,
Chen Tu-hsiu was continuously elected Party Secretary.[24]

The struggle against "right opportunism" was to go on
within increasing intensity after the August 7 Conference.
Had the Third International and the CCP observed the
rules of struggle, subjecting past party line to full
discussion and review rightly on its merits and without
expedient exculpations and incriminations, the emporary
failure of the revolution would not have later led to a
leadership crisis. But principled struggle, democratic
centralism and discriminating treatment of contradictions
were not well observed; "in Party organiations, sectarian,

excessive intra-party struggles were started."[25] Every

ruling elite, past and present, in China or elsewhere,

tends to be self-perpetuating. This very idea of self-

perpetuation (retention of power) more or less explains

this awkward situation.

To begin with, the August 7 Emergence Conference

was not held in accordance with proper rules. Anticipating

that the then five standing members of the CCP Central

would obstruct the reshuffle of the party leadership,

Comintern representatives Besso Lominadze and Heirz

Neumann first dispatched three of them to Nanchang, and

then summoned at Chiuchiang the conference to "elect"

Chu Chiu-pai the Party Secretary. The legitimacy of the

conference was justified on the grounds of "emergency."

Worthy of note is that Chen Tu-hsiu, the principal founder

of the CCP and the Party Secretary elected at five

successive National Congresses, was excluded from the

conference.[26] Obviously, the conference lavelled him

"roght opportunist" and deposed him from Party Secretaryship

without legality. The "Letter to All Members of the Party,"

which denounced this veteran Party Secretary, was written

in advance by Rominadze and was "passed" at the conference

without discussion.[27]

After the August 7 Conference the Party Central

under Chu Chiu-pai, in order to gag Chen Tu-hsiu, excluded

him from all party meetings.[28] This was in stark vilation

of democratic centralism; for Chen, as a party member, was

legally entitled to voice his views, however "opporunist"
they might seem, at meetings he had the right to attend.
Perceiving that the harsh criticism of him at the conferece
was proof enough of the Comintern's determination to
sacrifice him, Chen defied orders summoning him to Moscow
to "discuss" China's revolution.[29]   In fact, except for
Chen and Chang Kuo-tao, hardly any leaders of the CCP
under the atmosphere of anti-right opportunism dared to
challenge the leftist party line of "armed uprisings"
adopted at the conference.[30]   But Chang was wxpelled from
the Central Committee at the November 11, 1927 enlarged
poliburo conference, at which he was deprived of the right
to be present.[31]   Afterwards, Chang offered to Chen the
idea of organizing a new party, to be named "Worker-Peasant
Party" and independent of the Third Internation; but Chen
thought it would not work because of financial and other
practical difficulties.[32]

Ironically, Chu Chiu-pai had also contended that
during Chen's Party Secretaryship, the CCP had functioned
from the "standpoint of bureaucratic discipline," with
centralism and without democracy.[33]   Chen's leadership
was of the style of "family head" commonly associated
with traditional Chinese intellectuals; however, available
documents do not indicate that he ever conducted "excessive"
struggles to suppress dissidents in the party.

In its struggle against "right opportunism," the CCP

had forgotten to prevent the emrgence of leftist
tendencies. A series of armed uprisings followed the adoption
of the desperate party line, all to no avail. The failure
generated a general pessimism and ideological confusion
among the Chinese Communists. Many disassociated themselves
from the party or reported themselves to KMT authorities;
others began to question the wisdom of armed uprisings;
and still others became all the more radical and desperate.
All these led to unprincipled struggles, as the "Letter to
All Comrades of the Party," issued by the CCP Sixth National
Congress, held at Moscow, June 18-July 11, 1928, stated:

> Opposition against opportunism and against
> putschism has resulted in personal abuses and
> entangled struggles out of mutual revenge. . . .
> Now within the Party there is a small groups
> tendency. . . . Some people with the greed to
> become leaders . . . have been exploiting these
> connections to attack those holding ppositions
> higher than or equal to his own. Therefore, a
> variety of ignoble, nasty means . . . have
> developed.34

At the Sixth National Congress, Chu Chu-pai stepped
down from his party secretaryship for having commiteed
"left putschism." The Congress decided that the party
line of armed uprisings per se had been correct and that
the failure of the line had been due to the failure to
prevent putschism. This judgment would allow the Comintern
to redress leftist errors, without at the same time lending
excuse for "right opportunists" to "reverse the verdicts";
for, in fact, Chen had pointed to the leftist dangers of

of the policy of armed uprisings:

> The policy of taking premature actions is
> worng (when there is acually no revolutionary
> high tide). . . . As for the present movement,
> it cannot be developed without staging uprisings. . .
> (But) staging uprisings is our last resort, not
> our goal. At this moment, we should not
> entertain the illusion that political power could
> be seized by armed uprisings.[35]

The Congress also determined that the revolutionary
high tide which had arisen after the breakup of the United
Front had now subsided as a consequence of putschist errors;
but a new high tide would inevitably arise, when victory
and establishment of soviets in one or several provinces
would become possible. It further decided that before
a new revolutionary high tide arrived, "armed uprisings"
would be a slogan for propaganda, not for action; and that,
for the present, the party should actively prepare for the
arrival of a high tide.[36] Since it reaffirmed that a high
tide did arrive after the August 7 Emergence Conference,
the Congress found itself justified in further excoriating
"right opportunism." In a word, the Congress made
deliberate distinctions between the struggles against
"right opportunism" and "left putschism": it treated the
former as a line in itself and regarded the latter as a mere
leftist tendency which had not taken on the significance
of a line.

At the Congress, the CCP was divided roughly into
four groups: (1) one, headed by Li Li-san, acknowledging
that Chu Chiu-pai had committed errors but holding that

the present leadership be maintained; (2) the group,
headed by Chang Kuo-tao, insisting upon Chu's confession
of mistakes, and reshuggle of the party leadership; (3)
another, led by Wang Jo-fei, holding that the party line
had been erroneous; (4) the Internationalist group (later
to be called "China Stalin's Section" or "returned students"),
led by Wang Ming, proposing that a complete new
leadership be instated.[37]   The Li Li-san group emerged
victorious, probably because its view conformed to the
intentions of Comintern representatives.   On the one hand,
it did not challenge the wisdom the party line after the
August 7 Conference; on the other, the Comintern intended
some veteran leaders to lead the CCP while the time for
the Internationalists to take over power was not yet ripe.
Hsiang Chung-fa was made the Party Secretary because
the Comintern regarded him as a model for the Chinese
proletariat.   But his political gaucherie was to make
himself a puppet of Li Li-san.[38]

Having determined that a nation-wide revolutionary
high tide had come since Generals Yen Hsi-san and Feng
Yu-hsiang rebelled against the National Government in May
1930 the CCP Central planned a series of immediate political
and economic strikes, armed uprisings in key industrial
cities, and troops revolts[39]--all soon failed one after
another.   In September 1930, Chu Chiu-pai was sent back
from Moscow to correct the CCP's "adventurist," "militant"
errors, but Chu actually adopted a conciliatory attitude
toward the Li Li-san line because he thought

the failure had been due to tactical mistakes, not a line mistake.[40] In January 1935, when the CCP had suffered grave adversities after the Nationalist fifth encircling offensive, the Internationalist dominance--to usher in a period of Mao's rise in power.

The period sketched above saw a series of complicated line/power struggles, most of ¬which resulted from subtly conflicting interpretations of the party line adpted at the Sixth Congress and subsequent directives from the Comintern.

On October 26, 1929, the Comintern sent a letter to the CCP, pointing up that China was moving toward a period of "nation-wide crisis" which was manifested in the recurrence of chaotic wars among warlords and in upsurging worker and peasant movements; and that the time for actively preparing the masses for the overthrow of the bourgeois regime had come. On February 26, 1930 the CCP issued Circular No. 79 decreeing that Red armies attack central cities because recent developments clearly pointed to the prospect of victory in one or several provinces. In May the Poliburo decided tha, although outbreaks of revolutuion might first appear in one or several provinces, victories in such areas must be immediately extended to the whole nation under the imminent, inevitable nationwide revolutionary high tide. On July 21, the Central issued Circular no. 84 reaffirming previous estimations of the political situation.[41]

Two days later the Comintern adopted a resolution on

China question:

> Decisions made by both the CCP Sixth National
> Congress and the Comintern Sixth World Congress
> (stated) that a new upsurge of the Chinese
> revolution is inevitable. The correctness of
> these decisions have been borne out by the chain
> of events in China. . . . .
> The tendency of most recent developments shows
> that the revoltuionary situation, even if short
> of vovering the whole country , has at least
> covered several provinces. . . .42

Although differing from each other on the scope and

timing of the revolution, both the Comintern and the CCP

concluded that the revolutionary tide was rapidly

escalating and that victory in several provinces was

possible. This encouraged the growth of Li Li-san's

"adventurism." Warren Kuo has written:

> (Comintern instructions) could be interpreted in
> many ways. Counsel was given for either an
> offensive strategy or a defensive stand. Should
> the aggressive line of Li Li-san become a success,
> the credit would go to the Comintern. . . . If
> it turned out to be a failure, Li Li-san would
> become a soapegoat.43

But the revolution failed and Li was made a victim

of the Moscow line.[44] After the Fourth Plenum of the Sixth

Central Committee, he was summoned to Moscow for the

correction of his "left adventurism"—only to remain there

for fifteen years.[45]

Earlier, in the latter half of 1928, particulary after

the Comintern Sixth World Congress, Moscow was covered with

ominous clouds of "anti-right opportunism," particularly

directed at Troskyists and Bukharin's group. This
greatly encouraged Li Li-san in his struggle against
those who demurred to his leftist policies.[46]

Expressing his opposition to the party line which Li
Li-san was impetuously pursuing, Chen Tu-hsiu wrote
several letters to the Party Central and requested full
discussion and review of the party line. For Chen, since
the Sixth Congress also recognized that for the time being
there was no revolutionary high tide, to use "armed
uprisings" even as a slogan for propaganda, not for action,
was inappropriate and ineffective. Slogns for democracy,
such as "Oppose KMT military dictatorship" and "Convene
National Convention" would really appeal to the masses and
effectuate mass movements; and only then could slogans
"Overthrow KMT Government" and "Establish Soviet Regime"
become operative.[47]

But Chen's letters to the Party Central were pigeonholed.
Under such circumstances Chen despaired of voicing his
opposition within the organization channels of the party.
He freed himself from the restrictions of party discipline
and began circulating those letters among his comrades.[48]
For the Comintern and the Party Central, the line which Chen
had been advancing since the August 7 Conference was
similar to that of Trosky's, and the struggle against such
a line was not only irreconcilible but also antagonistic.
For Chen, the Party Central violated democratic centralism

in suppressing his opposing views. Because he also

deeply regretted being indecisive and conciliatory in

opposing the Comintern's "bloc within" policy during the

first United Front, he felt justified and constrained

to take extralegal actions to oppose the leadership under

Li Li-san. Chen quoted Lenin for justification: "When

there arise within the Party fundamentally different

political views and when there are no ohter alternatives

to resolve them, a small organization is proper."[49]

Consequently, Li Li-sanists accused Chen Tu-hsiuists of

violating the game rules and vice versa.

The party resoltuion on the dismissal of Chen Tu-hsiu

et al. stated that:

> Chen . . . advanced a line fundamentally different
> from that adopted at the Sixth National Congress
> and demanded open discussion within the Party . . .
> . . . .
> Before the Central made a decision and replied, he
> openly circulated his letters . . . and actively
> incited comrades to oppose the Party. This is
> obviously anti-Party, small organization activity. . . .
> Obeying the instructions of guiding organs is the
> supreme principle of Bolshevik democratic centralism.
> Sabotage of this principle . . . is an anarchist
> act. . . .[50]

Chen retorted:

> My letters to the Central concerned grave
> intra-party political questions. It is known to
> quite a few comrades that the Central revoked my
> membership on unjustifiable justifications which
> were mere bureaucratic paper work covering its
> abhorrence of . . . my criticism within the
> Party. . . . The Central has forfeited Bolshevik
> organizational line, abusing authority, restricting
> intra-Party self criticism, and dismissing from
> the Party batches of comrades who voices their
> political opinions. . . . .

> The Party would win the masses only if it bravely
> conducted self-criticism. It is also an evil to
> be indifferent and reticent when we perceive that
> the Party is making for its doom!51

While the Chen vs. Li struggle involved two distinctively different lines (Chen denied the existence of a high tide and opposed armed uprisings; Li held the contrary), the lines involved in Wang Ming vs. Li conflict reflected controversial subtleties. While both perceived the emergence of a a revolutionary high tide, Wang held that the tide was "unbalanced" and that it was dangerous to launch attack in areas where the situation was not yet ripe; li held that it was a nationwide balanced tide, and that the situation was ripe for an immediate, general attack. Wang's view was relatively moderate and more in comformity with the party line adopted at the Sixth Congress and subsequent directives from the Comintern. But Wang's party membership was given a "siz-month probation" for advocating a "right opportunist" line and developing "small organizations."5¿

Perceiving that the policy of armed struggle was being carried out with imprudence, the Comintern dispatched Chu Chiu-pai back from Moscow to struggle against Li Li-san. However, Chu deemed that, pursuant to the party line adopted at the Sixth Congress and subsequent directives from the Comintern, Li had merely made "discret" mistakes, not a systmatic line mistake. He also deemed justified the punishment rendered to Wang Ming, for Wang had conducted an unprincipled struggle by elevating differences respecting

the implementation of the party line to the level of

conflicts between two lines. Wang contended:

> 'The Comintern line is offensive and the Party
> Central also acts on the offensive; therefore,
> the lines are the same.' Yes; but simply
> speaking of 'offensive' does not make any
> real sense. The question of 'offensive' lies
> in how and in which direction. . . . There are
> Bolshevik offensive line and Menshevik offensive
> line. . . .53

Once Wang gained ascendance, he accused Li of having

adopted an organizational principle which "revitalized

the punitive and patriarchic systems denounced by the

Sixth National Congress, and accused Chu of having

committed "conciliationism." Not surprisingly, those

verdicts on Wang Ming et al. were reversed.[54]

Li Li-san's suppressive style of leadership and the

failure of the revolution as a consequence of his "left

adventurism" resulted in a dangerous splinter tendency

in the CCP. On January 31, 1931 Lo Chang-lung formed an

opposition—the Extraordinary Central Committee (ECC).

The contradiction involved more power than lines.

Earlier, in late July 1930, Lo had demurred to Li

Li-san's "adventurist" policies. Lo held that since a

series of armed uprisings had failed, the revolutionary

high tide was subsiding. Therefore, he deemed that the

Comintern's resolution of July 23, 1930 on China's

political situation was erroneous and could not serve as the

basis for policy formulation. The correct party line for

him now should have been one of retreat. But Lo failed
to stand firm on his principle after Li reprimanded and
threatened to punish him in September. At the Fourth Plenum,
January 1931, outnumbered by the "returned students,"
Lo's group failed in its attempt to take over the leadership.
The ECC claimed that Lo's group was the first to have
opposed the Li Li-san line; that the Plenum was usurped by
"China Stalin's Section"; that the returned students adopted
a party line similar to the Li Li-san line (because they
still advocated armed uprisings); and that the party
strategy of armed struggle since the Sixth Congress had
been erroneous. Whether or not the Plenum was indeed
usurped by the returned students, it was they that were the
first to have opposed the Li Li-san line and have remianed
adamant to their stande.[55] That Lo's group formed a
splinter party central was an outright violation of the
rule of democratic centralism.

Lo's splinter group was for a moment a serious
menace to the new CCP leadership mainly composed of
upstart returned students. This was particulary so
because Lo, with his seniority and popularity which he
earned from his long leadership in worker movements, had
considerable appeal to grass-roots members.[56] In May 1931
Chen Tu-hsiu also formed an opposition party, which
rejected armed struggles and advocated legal means
because it deemed that the bourgeois rule was in the
ascendant and that the revolutionary movement at low ebb.[57]

Chenists promoted the notion that the Comintern had been encouraging the "returned students" to usurp the leadership under the pretext of anti-Li Li-sansim and therefore the struggle was unprincipled.[58] Both Lo's and Chen's opposition against the returned students may be interpreted in a way as an "anti-imperialism" struggle within the CCP. But straitened for finances, the two splinter groups went downward rapidly, and after Lo and Chen were arrested by the National Government in 1933, they fell apart.

Our previous examination has shown an inextricable dilemma between the theory and practice of two-line struggle. A line struggle involves basically an irreconcilable, either-or choice. If the losing side keeps voicing its opposition and demanding re-examination of the line of the winning side within the organization channels of the party, should or should not the winning side, in accordance with with democratic centralism, allow it? If the winning side should legally vote through a party decision that prohibits further discussion of an opposing line deemed infectiously inimical to the growth of "correct" thinking, should or should not the opponents quiet down? If the opposing sides keep voicing their opposition within legal channels, should or should not the winning side treat the contradiction as antagonistic on the ground that the opponents aggravate their mistake? If the opponents perceive that the winning side is pursuing a disastrous party line, refuses to discard it, and

suppress intra-party self-criticism, should or should
not they elevate the contradiction to the level of
antagonism and adopt exta-legal means? And should this
be judged a principled or unprincipled struggle?

While the party is in ordinary or propitious times,
it may not be too uncomfortable for the Party Central to
allow intra-party self-criticism,for the opposition may
be too wean and insignificant. But when the party is in
difficult times, the above questions become immediately
sticky. Proponents of the party line under formidable
challenge tend to find any criticism intolerable, whether
it is directed at day-to-day policies or it is voiced in
support of an opposing line. The rule of democratic
centralism contains an inherent contradiction: on the one
hand, it requires the party to operate like a military
command system; on the other, it stressed "democracy."
The theory of irreconcilable struggle over principles
further exacerbates that contradiction; in addition,
what is or is not a line is often a troublesome question
in itself--probably not in theory but in practice. When
there arise within the party sharp conflicts over lines,
the game rules are likely to fail.

The previous discussion has also indicated that
the Comintern played a decisive role in line formulation
and each major line/power struggle. CCP leaders never
fully had their own discretion, partly because the party
depended heavily on the Comintern for finances and partly

because, being a branch of the Comintern, it was subject
to the restraints of International discipline. Furthermore,
the leaders, particularly in the party's infancy, were
unconfident of what they perveived to be the right policy
and felt a real need for the guidance of their foreign
master. This was evident in the period of the first
United Front, as revealed by a remorseful Chen Tu-hsiu.
However, the leaders often grumbled and sometimes covertly
obstructed the will of their foreign master. The boss
first found a complaining Chen Tu-hsiu, who, after being
made a goat, bade open defiance to him; then he found a
two-faced Chu Chu-pai who conciliated the irreconcilable
struggle against the Li Li-san line; then, the fanatic Li,
who laid an iron hand on the returned students intended
for the new party leadership. Probably there was in the
CCP a kind of Chinese Nationalsim which would later account
for the defeat of the returned students.

The Comintern's Demise and Mao's Rise to Power

From the Sixth Plenum, January 1931 the Party Central,
dominated by returned students, adopted a relatively moderate
line: to consolidate soviet base areas, strengthen the Red
Army and prepare for victory in one or several provinces.
As far as intra-party struggle was concerned, struggle
against right opportunist tendencies was given primary

attention not only because there were still influences from Loists and Chenists but also because Li's adventurism had resulted in a widespread pessimism within the party.

The party line and policies worked well in resisting the second, third, and fourth Nationalist encircling offensives. (During the third and the fourth, Nationalist troops were also engaging the Japanese.) However, owing to Chian Kai-shek's policy of "pacifying the internal (communist rebellion) before resisting the external (Japanese invasion)" and fortifying tactics, the fifth offensive, begun in the Spring of 1934, caused the CCP's calamitous defeat. The Communists first abandoned eight major base areas and then the "Central Soviet Area," and started their nightmarish Long March (October 10, 1934-December 12, 1936).[59] Previous experience suggests that this was a situation where a major struggle was likely to occur. It did.

At the Chun-I Conference, January 6-8, 1935, a line struggle broke out. At issue were whether or not the military strategy and tactics used in resisting the fifth offensive and whether or not the party line since the fourth Plenum had been correct. Peng Tei-huai and other principal commnaders were very much disgruntled with the military line. Mao asserted that the party's "purely defensive" miliary line accounted for the loss of the

Central Base Area. Liu Shao-chi flayed the Central for
having committed left adventurism in party work in the
White area which nearly caused the total collapse of party
organizations under White terror. Chang Wen-tien contended
that the party line was correct in that the party had
created a red army of 300,000 and broken through several
Nationalsit offensives, and that the failure in resisting
the fifth offensive was due to the mistaken military
line, not of the party line per se.[60]

After the Chun-I Conference the leadership was mildly
rearranged, not reshuffled. Chang Wen-tien became the
Party Secretary, displacing Chin Pang-hsien, who was
held responsible for the military line. Mao became
Chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission,
displacing Chou En-lai.[61] Surprisingly, the conference
wound up with a pragmatic compromise. There seemed to have
been no violation of democratic centralsim: no one was
suppressed for his criticism. Probably, in the face of
censorous military commanders, the Internationalsits had
to compromise. The legitimacy of their leadership was
not shaken, for the correctness of the party line was
reaffirmed. The lose nothing in displacing Ching because
the new Party Secretary was also a "returned student."
But Mao's assumption of Chairmanship of the Military
Commission marked the beginning of his rise to power.
Still, this major struggle did not end with the Chun-I

Conference, which was only a prelude.

In June 1935, after about eight months of the Long March, the First Front Red Army of around 8,000 and the Fourth Front Red Army of more than 70,000 converged at Lianghokou. A poliburo meeting was held there on the twenty-fifty of the same month. Chang Kuo-tao, commander of the Fourth Front Red Army, questioned the wisdom of the party line since the Sixth National Congress. He contended that the attempt to establish soviets had been the fundamental cause of the party's adversities.[62] This obviously challenged the legitimacy of the party leadership after the Chun-I Conference (where the challenged party line was vindicated), forcing the Internationalists and Mao's supporters to vote down Chang's opposition. In August 1935 another poliburo meeting was held at Maourhkai, where Chang again failed in his challenge.[63] Frustrated and disgruntled, he formed a new party central the September.

In early 1936, the Comintern sent Chang Hao, a CCP representative, to Chian to mediate the party split. A detente was reached pending future negotiations on rearrangement of the leadership. In January 1937 the CCP Central and all major troops settled down in Yenan; and an unprincipled struggle loomed ahead. the Central first summoned all military officers above the regiment level to the Party School to undergo training[64]--Mao's scheme to peacefully disarm Chang Kuo-tao and prevent a troop mutiny.

The unsuspecting Chang was then severely criticized for his
"warlordism" and opportunism and compelled to write a
confession. Around forty indignant ranking officers at
the School made an abortive attempt to rescue Chang out of
Yenan in order to rearm and rebel.[65] In April 1938, Chang
defected to the KMT. He has written:

> Uncultured in democracy, the CCP is gauche at
> resolving internal conflicts. . . . .
> . . . .
> Moscow and Yenan are as dark. . . . . The CCP
> has completely transformed itself--far away
> from the ideals I, one of the founders, have
> espoused. . . .66

Whatever the justification, that Chang formed a
splinter party central was in stark violation of the game
rules. Mao was no more principled: he defeated Chang not
through organization channels of the party but by plot.
When Chang questioned the then Party Secretary Chang Wen-tien
why the Party Central refused to resolve the conflicts that
had caused party splits by holding an open conference at
which Chang Hao would serve as the intermediator, the
Secretary replied: "Old buddy Mao has eaten his words;
I cannot do anything."[67] Aparently, Mao was virtually
assuming the reins of the CCP.

During the Long March the Comintern was losing hold
of the CCP because of the fluid routes of Red troops. The
party rel ed on itself for finances, and learned to make its
own policy choices. The priority of military affairs
further accentuated Mao's position as Chairman of the Military
Military Commission. All these had eclipsed the role of the

returned students. Particularly after the defeat of
Chang Kuo-tao, Mao became the real strongman. The
returned students were now in a precarious position.

Pursuant to the policy of an anti-imperialist united
front adopted by the Comintern Seventh World Congress, Wang
Ming issued in Moscow in 1935 the "August 1 Declaration,"
calling for the establishment of a national anti-Japanese
united front.[68] The CCP was not informed of this due to
difficulties in communication during the Long March. It
was not until December 25, 1935 at the Wayaopao Meeting
that the CCP adopted the united front strategy.[69] Since
then, the party had been making impressive gains. There
were policy disputes in the leadership but they did not
develop into major struggles. It was not until February
1942, when a major struggle (the rectification movement)
occurred. This time, the struggle arose not becuase there
was any real revolutionary setbacks but because the
Comintern had lost any real control of the CCP.

The Comintern Seventh World Congress (July 25-August
20, 1935) adopted a decentraliaing policy.[69] It has
since refrained from interferring with the internal
organization affairs of its branches and encouraged them
to rely on their own experiences and to flexibly apply
Marxism to the concret situations in each individual
nation.[70] In the Spring of 1942, the "proletarian
motherland" was in precarious situation in resisting

Hitler's invasion. Apparently the foreign boss was incapable of backing up the "returned students" in the rectification movement, which Mao initiated in early 1942 to rectify the dogmatic style of the party leadership and defeat his political foes. Further to their disadvantage was the fact that the Comintern was dismissed in 1943.

Before 1942, Wang and Mao already had disputes on the question of the CCP's independence in the second United Front. For Wang, the CCP's survival depended upon whether or not the United Front would be tenable; therefore, all future policies had to be geared to the consolidation of the United Front. Mao divided the United Front into three stages. (1) Compromising stage: superficial obedience to the National Gvoernment to insure the CCP's existence. (2) Competition stage: expansion of the party's political and military strength to become capable of confronting the Nationalists. (3) Attack stage: seizure of leadership from the KMT.[71] But the principal source of conflict lay in the dogmatism of returned students who regarded inviolate directives from Moscow. Earlier, in the chapter, we have noted a kind of xenophobia among veteran CCP leaders. Now that Moscow had lost control of the CCP, the positions of returned students became untenable.

When the rectifiction movement began in February 1942,

Mao alluded to the returned students:

> Dogmatists can easily assume a Marxist guise to
> bluff, capture and make servitors of cadres of
> working-class and peasant origin who cannot
> easily see through them; they can also bluff and
> ensnare the naive uouth . . . .
> If we overcome dogmatism, the comrades with
> practical experience will have good teachers to
> help them raise their experiences to the level
> of theory. . . .72

There appeared to be no obvious violations of the game

rules at the leadership level, but one is unable to locate

documents recording the opposition of the returned students.

Probably, prior to the movement, Mao had already assumed

control of the whole situation; the air over Yenan was

suffocating. Wang's group could not have failed to

appreciate the tenor of Mao's words:

> A person with appendicitis is saved when the
> surgeon removes his appendix. So long as a
> person does not hide his sickness for fear of
> treatment or persist in his mistakes until he
> is beyond cure, so long as he honestly and
> sincerely wishes to be cured and to mend his
> ways, we should welcome him and cure his sickness
> so that he can become a good comrade.73

The returned students could not have wished to be adjudged

"beyong cure." There was some truth in it when Moscow

broadcast in Chinese the following words:

> In substance, the so-called CCP rectification
> campaign that took place from 1942 to 1944 meant
> a reform and purge of the Party. During that
> period, most of the legitimate Communists--
> Internationalists--were labeled as foreign agents

and dogmatists. . . . But this was not the whole
story. Once so labeled, the legitimate
Communists would suffer political and physical
persecutions. . . . (A) majority of the
Internationalists and more than 40,000 Communists
were persecuted.74

This chapter has shown that there existed a wide gap
between the theoretical and practical aspects of the rules
of struggle. The "gap," as previously examined, resulted
in part from the conflicting values which underlie
democratic centralism and also from the acual difficulty
of confining within "non-antagonistic" bounds a "line"
struggle which must be waged irreconcilably. It seemed
that when a major line struggle occurred, the Chinese
Communist leadership would be bogged down in this dilemma.

Although it is largely true of every political
leadership that a grave failure presages a leadership
struggle, the question remains whether or not such a struggle
tends to be resolved through peaceful means. "Unprincipled,
excessive" struggles seemed to be the haunting headache
for the CCP. The party was not unaware of this, for Liu
Shao-chi pointed out in 1941 that although unprincipled
excessive struggles also occurred in foreign Communist
parties, the CCP particularly had such deviant tendencies.[75]
To see whether or not the Chinese Communists would be
able to rid themselves of these tendencies, we now turn
to Chapter Three.

Notes

Chapter Two

[1] See Warren Kuo, "Factional Dissension in Communist China," Issues & Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 9 (Sept. 1980), pp. 11-13.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Cheng Hsue-chia, The Vicissitudes of CCP History (TaipeiL Chung-hua Magazine, 1970), II, 564-94; Warren Kuo, Ananlytical History of the Chinese Communist Party, Eng. ed. (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1970), Book One, pp. 10-11 (Hereafter, Analytical History); For a glimpse at Chen Tu-hsiu's argument against Chinese anarchism, see Chen, "Discussion with Chu Sheng-pai on anarchism," Reference Materials on the Chinese Communist Party History, ed. Teaching and research Office, CCP Central Party School (Peking: People's Publisher, 1979), Vol. I, pp. 281-99. (Hereafter, RM-CCP Hist.)

[5] Analytical History, Book One, PP. 12, 45-9.

[6] Kuo et al. eds. Who is Who in Communist China, 2nd ed. (TaipeiL Institute of International Relations, 1978), Appendix I, p. 36.

[7] Chen Tu-hsiu, Letter to All Comrades of the Party, Dec. 10, 1929, photostat, University of Chicago Library, p. 2.

[8] "Resolution Concerning the National Movement and the Question of Kuomingtang, June 1923," RM-CCP Hist., I, 422; "Resolution Concerning the National Revolutionary Movement (adopted by the CCP 4th National Congress, Jan. 1925," ibid., II, 79-81.

[9] Who is Who, Appendix III, p. 71-2.

[10] Keh Yung-hsiang, History of the Chinese Communist

Rebellion, 2nd ed. (Taipei: Institute of Russian Issues Study, 1975), pp. 34-5.

[11] See Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, Inc., 1957), pp. 37-48.

[12] "Report on An Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan," SWoM, I, 23-56; Chen Tu-hsiu, Telegram to the Comintern, June 15, 1927, in Szu-ma Lu, The Separation of the KMT and the CCP in 1927, Vol. V of CCP History and Selected Documents (Hong Kong: Chih Luen Press, 1977), pp. 350-52.

[13] Sup. note 9.

[14] See Analytical History, Book One, p. 283.

[15] Peng Shu-chih, Review of Chang Kuo-tao's "My Recollections": The Cause, Effect and Lesson of China's Second Revolutionary Civil War (Hong Kong: Vanguard Publisher, 1975), pp. 21-23.

[16] Sup. note 7, p. 3-4.

[17] "The Comintern's Resolution on China Question, July 1927," Szu-ma, The Separation of the KMT and the CCP in 1927, pp. 375-78; Chen, Letter, p. 5; Peng, Review of Chang Kuo-tao's "My Recollections," pp. 20-21.

[18] "The Comintern's Resolution on China Question, Nov. 1926," RM-CCP Hist., II, 337; "The Comintern's Resolution on China's Political Situation, July 1927," Szu-ma, The Separation, pp. 159, 377.

[19] Chang Kuo-tao, My Recollections (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Monthly, 1973), IIm 678; Chu Chiu-pai was not pleased with Chen Tu-hsiu's leadership style, ibid., 495.

[20] Ibid., 20; Chen, Letter, pp. 5-7; Chen's "dilemma" is best illustrated by Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The UnitedFront in Chinese Communist History (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 20: "If the growth of the Kuomingtang meant a corresponding growth in the influence and strength of the Russians and the CCP, then the Kuomingtang should be made as strong as possible. But an increase in its power increased its independence and

its ability to suppress any attempt to subvert it. Therefore—and this was what made the dilemma so angonizing—the CCP became more vulnerable as it became stronger.

[21] Quoted from Analytical History, Chinese enl. ed. (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 1973), Book One, p. 268.

[22] Chen, Letter, pp. 7-8.

[23] Analytical History, Book One, pp. 126-40; 209-10; 315-21; Cheng, The Vicissitudes of CCP History, III, 444-466

[24] "Resolution concerning the National Revolutionary Movement (adopted by CCP 4th National Congress, Jan. 1925)," RM-CCP Hist., II, 76-79.

[25] "Resolution concerning Certain Historical Questions," SWoM, Chinese ed. (Peking: People's Publisher, 1953), III, 959-60.

[26] Analytical History, Book One, pp. 374-76.

[27] Chang, My Recollections, II, 744.

[28] Sup. note 22, p. 9.

[29] "Resolution on the Dismissal from the Party of Chen Tu-hsiu and on the Confirmation of Chianghsu Provincial Committee's Resolution on the Dismissal from the Party of Peng Shu-chi, Wang Tse-kai, Ma Yu-fu, Chia Chen-teh (passed by the poliburo conference of Nov. 15, 1929)," Szu-ma, The CCP Sixth National Congress, Vol. VIII of CCP History and Documents (Hong Kong: Chih Luen Press, 1978), p. 235; Chang, II, 771-72. Probably since the United Front became untenable, the Comintern had found Chen intractable and determined to punish him; this was evident in "The Comintern's Resolution on China's Political Situation, July 1927," Szu-ma, The Separation, pp. 377-78; and was corroborated by Chen's "Letter to the Comintern: A Reply (Feb. 17, 1930), Szu-ma, The CCP Sixth National Congress, pp. 256-59.

[30] "A Letter from Chen Tu-hsiu (Nov. 12, 1927)," Analytical History, Book One, pp. 411, 474.

[31] "Resolution on Political Discipline (passed on Nov. 14, 1927 by the enlarged conference of the Provisional Political Bureau of the CCP CC," Analytical History, Book One, p. 472; Chang, II, 745-46.

[32] Chang, II, 769-70.

[33] Chu Chiu-pai, Controversial Questions during China's Revolution, 2nd ed. (Wuhan: the CCP, 1928), pp. 180-83.

[34] "A Letter to All Comrades, passed on Nov. 15, 1929, by the CCP 6th National Congress," Analytical History, Chinese ed., Book Two, p. 76.

[35] "A Letter from Chen Tu-hsiu (Nov. 12, 1927)" Analytical History, pp. 79-81.

[36] "The Political Resolution of CCP 6th National Congress (July 9, 1928)," Szuma, The CCP Sixth National Congress, pp. 55-58;"Message to All Comrades, Nov. 11, 1928," Analytical History, pp. 96-103.

[37] Szu-ma, ibid., pp. 34-35; Chang, II, 785.

[38] Who is Who, Appendix I, p. 23; Chang, II, 787.

[39] "The New Revolutionary High Tide and Victory in One or Several Provinces (adopted at the Politburo conference, June 11, 1930)," RM-CCP Hist., III, 4.

[40] Selected Works of Wnag Ming, pp. 79-81.

[41] Analytical History, Book II, pp. 109-16; "CCP CC Circular No. 84 (July 21, 1980)," ibid., 142-46.

[42] Ibid., 117.

[43] Ibid., 124-25.

[44] See James P. Harrison, "The Li Li-san Line and the CCP in 1939," China Quarterly, No. 14 (April, 1963), pp. 178-94; No. 15 (July 1963), pp. 140-59.

[45] Who is Who, p. 173.

[46] See Chang, II, 821-44.

[47] Chen, Letter, p. 9; "Resolution on the Dismissal from the Party of Chen . . ." sup. note 29.

[48] Chen, p. 9.

[49] Chen, p. 14.

[50] "Resolution on the Dismissal from the Party of Chen . . ." sup. note 29.

[51] Chen, Letter, pp. 9, 12-4; similar vein is shown in his letter of Feb. 17, 1930, see sup. note 29.

[52] "Resolution on Cancellation of Disciplinary Measures against Comrades Chen Shao-yu, Chin Pang-hsien, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Ho Tse-shu (adopted by the CCP CC Poliburo on Dec. 16, 1930)," Analytical History, Book II, pp. 194-95.

[53] Chen Shao-yu, Two Combat Lines, p. 82.

[54] Sup. note 52.

[55] For sources regarding this paragraph, see Chen Shao-yu, Supplement, Two Combat Lines, 2nd ed., (published in March 1932), Selected Works of Wang Ming, pp. 114-56; Chang, II, 873-74; "Resolution on the Problem of Comrade Ho Meng-hsiung (passed by the Poliburo on Dec. 16, 1930)," Analytical History, Book Two, p. 196.

[57] Analytical History, Book Two, pp. 75-76.

[58] Chen Shao-yu, sup. note 55, p. 137.

[59] For a summary account of the CCP's establishment of base areas and of Nationalist encircling offensives, see Keh, History of the Chinese Communist Rebellion, pp. 94-118; for more detailed account, see Analytical History, Book Two, chs. XII, XIV, XXII.

[60] Analytical History, Book Three, pp. 16-23.

[61] Ibid., pp. 23-4.

[62] "Decision concerning Comrade Chang Kuo-tao's Mistakes (Sept. 12, 1935)," RM-CCP Hist., III, 162-63; Analytical History, Book Three, pp. 76-82.

[63] Chang, III, 1151-178.

[64] Analytical History, Book Three, p. 237.

[65] Ibid., pp. 241-45; Chang, III, 1266-267.

[66] Chang, 119, 1338-339.

[67] Chang, 1261.

[68] "The August 1st Declaration (abridged)," Analytical History, Book Three, p. 111.

[69] Ibid., p. 142-48.

[70] "On the Work of the Communist International Executive Committee--Resolution adopted Aug. 1, 1935 by the CI Congress," ibid., pp. 108-111.

[71] Analytical History, Book Three, p. 292.

[72] "Rectifying the Party's Style of Work," SWoM, p. 42.

[73] Ibid., p. 50.

[74] "The Yenan Period in the Formation of Mao Tse-tung Thought," A commentary in the Radio Moscow's Chinese broadcast of April 6, 1970; quoted from Analytical History, Book Four, pp. 405-06.

[75] Liu Shao-chi, "On Internal Party Struggle," Selected Works of Liu, pp. 87-79.

Chapter Three   Post-1949 Struggles

Consideration of the Role of a Strong Party Leader

  in Struggles

     At the CCP Seventh National Congress, April 1945

Mao Tse-tung was elected Chairman of the Central Committee,

the Central Secretariat, and the Central Military

Commission. The Party Constitution adopted at the Congress

stipulates that the Chinese Communist Party "use Mao

Tse-tung Thought as the guideline for all Party work."[1]

It also made the study of the foundations of Marxism-

Leninsim and the Thought of Mao the first obligation of

party members.[2] Thus, Mao occupied all crucial positions

of the party leadership and the "thought" of Mao became

legitimatized and sanctified. Why such an arrangement?

Perhaps, it was the result of Mao's inordinate power

consciousness: both Chang Ku-tao and Wang Ming, Mao's

long-time collegues, have pointed out such a personality.[3]

     But another deeper reason for such an arrangement

will become perceptible if one scrutinizes what Liu

Shao-chi had to say about the role of a strong party

leader in intra-party struggles: "What are the sources . . .

of intra-party unprincipled, mechanic and excessive

struggles? First . . . for so long a time, a leader,
a center of the whole Party has not really developed. . . .[4]
By implication, the primary reason for past major struggles
was that the CCP did not have a leader strong enough to
hold the leadership together once there were serious
line/power conflicts. On the face of it, the attribution
of leadership instability to the lack of a strong leader seems
correct, if one reviews CCP history of intra-party struggles
up to the Cultural Revolution. Chen Tu-hsiu, Chu Chiu-pai,
Li Li-san, Wang Ming—none of them was able to keep a
leadership tenable for long. From the Seventh Congress to
the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, Mao's strong
leadership had apparently foreclosed any overt, formidable
opposition.

However, that the existence of a strong party leader
may preclude unprincipled, excessive struggles is only a
half-truth. In upholding this half-truth, one must take
into considerations of the following factors. First,
unprincipled struggles are unlikely to emerge only if
the strong leader finds his colleagues or subordinates
faithful. And he finds them faithful or tolerable only
when the revolution is going well. Paradoxically, the
CCP failed to recognize the fact that those unprincipled
leadership struggles had been due to both the lack and
the existence of a strong leader. One only has to
recall that the Comintern, the real leader of the CCP,

played a decisive role in those major struggles. Just
as the faithful execution of the Comintern's lines and
directives had been a must for the CCP, so was now the
fidelity to Mao's principles an "obligation." When
truth are monopolized, the game rules are observed only
on paper. The struggles against Chen Tu-hsiu's "right
opportunism" and against Liu Shao-chi's "bourgeios
reactionary line" were such examples.

The second factor is that while both the lack or
existence of a strong leader may account for unprincipled,
excessive struggles, such struggles often took place when
the party has suffered a grave reverse in its revolution.
Without the collapse of the Great Leap, Mao would not have
treated Peng Teh-huai's "letter of opinion" as representing
a systmatic opposition.

The third factor is that when a strong leader is
lost or dead, a major struggle is likely to break out.
Both the case of the returned students and the case of
the Gang of Four, particularly the latter, were such
examples.

The Case of Kao Kang: A Power Struggle

From the CCP Seventh National Congress to the Great
Leap backward, the party had enjoyed the most propitious

times ever in its history. In about four and half years,
it defeated the Nationalists and assumed political power
over mainland China. In the first decade of the Chinese
Communist regime, the course of the revolution ran rather
smoothly. Although in 1954 the Kao Kang case occurred,
yet it was handled without much difficulty.

The Kao Kang case may well be viewed as a power struggle
with little concerning lines.[5] Kao used to be a powerful
man in the border area of Shenhsi and Kanhsu. In October
1935, Mao's shabby troops of around 2,000, including most
members of the CCP Central, fled to north Shenhsi, where
the Central would not have survived the Long March without
Kao's support. This accounted for Kao's promotion in 1953
of the theory that the CCP consisted of two parts: one came
from the base areas and the military, and the other the
White area. He deemed himself representing the first
part. Since the party was born out of the gun, he wanted
to be the Secretary General of the Central Secretariat, or
the Vice Chaiman of the Central Committee and the Premier.[6]

He had since 1949 engaged in "anti-Party, sectarian"
activities and formed an "independent kingdom" in Manchuria.
(In July 1949, he was a poliburo member, Chairman of the
Northeast China People's Government and First Secretary of
the CCP Northeast China Bureau.)[7]

Kao's "independent kingdom" apparently incurred the
displeasure of Chairman Mao and other leading members of

of the party (Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Chou En-lai,
Chu Teh, etc.) who came from either the base areas and
the military or the White area, or both. In February
1954, Kao was arrested. The main cause of his defeat was
that he struggled purely for power--which is tabooed by
CCP discipline. As shown in history, those who struggled
for power always advanced a plausible "line" as a pretext.
Teiwes has written: "(I)t is not suprising that the
activities of Kao Kang . . . were 'unprincipled,' that
they lacked substantial policy content."

Kao Kang may have abused the meaning of "Political
power comes out of the gun." It is indeed an axiom that
the party commands the gun.[9] The gun is used to seize
political power from the enemy of the party, but "Political
power comes out of the gune" serves no cause for power
redistribution within the party.

The Case of Peng Teh-huai

While the case of Kao Kang was a discrete incident,
all the other post-1949 major struggles may be treated as
a sequential whole of a protracted two-line struggle, which
rumbled with the failure of the Great Leap.

> We should seek experience and learn our
> lesson. . . . Everybody had a share of the
> responsibility, including Comrade Mao Tse-tung . . . .
> . . . .

> In our Party, it has always been difficult to
> correct "Leftist" ones and comparatively easy
> to correct Righties mistakes. Whenever
> something Leftist comes up . . . many people
> dare not speak out. . . . .
> The people's communes appeared somewhat too
> early. . . . Moreover, no experiments were made
> in communalization. . . . .
> Politics and economy have their respective laws.
> Therefore, ideological education cannot replace
> economic work. The high prestige of Chaiman
> Mao and the Party . . . cannot be found elsewhere
> in the world. However, it would not do to abuse
> this prestige. . . . Wrong things must be
> opposed. . . .10

The above was Peng Teh-huai's criticism of the Great

Leap at the meetings of the northwest group of the Lushan

Meeting (the preliminary meeting for the Eighth Plenum

of the Eighth Central Committee), July 3-10, 1959. On

July 14, Peng submitted to Mao his "letter of opinion"

in which he used similar words but showed all due respect.[11]

Peng made proper use of the legal channels of the party:

he expressed his opinion in party meetings and candidly

referred it to the Chairman. Moreover, he did not

engage in organized opposition, although he was later

alleged to have done so.[12] Nevertheless, he was found

intolerable in the eyes of the Chairman, who, a man of

inordinate power consciousness, had now maintained the

status of unchallengeable supremacy for nearly fifteen

years.

The Chairman kept his eyes open, for he learned from

the party history that if he allowed the criticism of the

Great Leap to run its course, his legitimacy could be

called into serious question. He treated the case as an

outright line-struggle and reversed the target of the
spearhead: "At present, the problem is not to oppose the
'Left' but to oppose the Right. It is a problem of the
Right Opportunism frantically attacking the Party. . . ."[13]
In fact, Mao was conducting an unprincipled struggle. As
Wang Jo-hsui, deputy chief editor of the Renmin Ribao, has
suggested:

> At first, Chairman himself also found out and
> began to correct some 'Left' problems in the
> work of 1958, but after Peng Teh-huai submitted
> his letter of opinion, he immediately changed
> his mind. To be fair, the letter was correct
> in content, benevolent in wording, and
> organizationally legal; but Chairman Mao treated
> it as an 'right opportunist, anti-Party program' . . .
> elevating the question to the level of class
> struggle.14

Peng's opposition, though unorganized, was a real
threat then, as Peng's forced confession has it:

> Should these absurd statements spread, they
> would . . . help those who opposed the general
> line to enhance their influence, would make
> those who were already not firm to waver all the
> more and, as far as the broad cadres and masses
> were concerned, would cause extremely acute
> depression. All these consequences, in
> combination, would negate the general line for
> socialist construction. . . .15

Mao was so concerned about a potential party split
that he remarked: "If the Chinese People's Liberation
Army should follow Peng Teh-huai, I would resort to
guerilla activities."[16]

After all, Mao's power and prestige obviated any
overt hostility. The tragedy of Peng and his few
associates was the irony of the paradox that a strong party

leader may preclude unprincipled struggles. Peng was labeled right opportunist and accused of organized opposition. Apparently, most CCP leaders dared not go so far as Peng, not to say to overtly side with him once Mao adjudged him "anti-Party."

The "Cultural Revoltuion"

Although the case of Marshall Peng did not shake Mao's legitimacy, it reflected a potential moderate force within the party which continued to grow, quietly, until Mao finally came to realize that it ahad become entrenched in the party and the bureaucracy and that it could not be uprooted without a revolution from below.

Prior to the Cultural Revolution, there were no obvious line polarization; but the conflict had been well under way, discernible only by telltale differences. The conflict between Mao and Liu did not involve any explicit lines. In fact, after Mao gave up his State Chairmanship to Liu and retreated to the "second line (as the Party Chairman)," Liu was left with the exacting task of coping with the aftermaths of the Great Leap which were further exacerbated by subsequent natural disasters. The adversities required pragmatic policy adjustments and defied any clear-cut general program like a Great Leap.

Since there were no explicit line disputes, one is provoked to trace the "lines" underneath the "two roads"

polemics of the Cultural Revolution. The "lines" were
already taking shape in the early years of the regime.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, there had been three quiet
struggles on the philosophical front. One involved the
question of economic base; another, the question of identity
between thinking and being; the third, the question of the
unity of two opposites.[17]

The first question which faced the CCP after its
assumption of political power over mainland China in
1949 concerned the speed of socialist transformation.
"Liuists"[18] supported the theory of "synthesized
economic base." According to it, retaining capitalist
modes of production was necessary while China's productive
forces remained backward, and during this period both
the socialist sector and the capitalist sector of the
economy "can develop in a balanced and coordinated way."
"Maoists" advocated the theory of unifor (socialist)
economic base, meaning that the capitalist sector of
the economy would be eliminated as soon as possible.[19]

It is difficult to examine how these two theories
were manifested in the concrete context. Suffice it to
say that agricultural collectivization, originally
intended to be completed in eighteen years, was done in
eight years, from Winter 1949 to Spring 1957.[20] This
indicates that the supporters of speedy transformation
wan the debate.

The question of identity between thinking and being had to do particulary with the speed of socialist construction. Both "Liuists" and "Maoists" were of the materialistic view that thinking was the reflection of being; but "liuists" denied the reverse and "Maoists" "creatively"--in fact, rather idealistically--believed the concrete impact of thinking on being.[21] In the practical sense, when it came to matters of the economy, "Liuists" were inclined to de-emphasize the role of politics while "Maoists" tended to resort to thought preparation and political exhortation in order to giver impetus to production. As indicated by the Marshall's criticism of the Great Leap, the case of Peng may well be viewed as a manifestation of the controversy over the speed of the socialist transformation and construction and the relative importance of the role of politics in economic matters.

As for the question of the unity of two opposites, "Liuists" advocated the theory of "combine two (opposites) into one (unity)," placing emphsis on the synthetic aspect of a contradiction; and "Maoists" advocated the theory of "divid one into two," placing emphasis on the antithetical aspect of a contradiction.[22] This philosophical difference may explain why Mao initiated the theory of "continuous revolution in the early 1960s and why Liu Shao-chi was frequently criticized during the Cultural Revolution as having advanced the theory of "dying out of struggle."

Liu opted for the distinction of classes on the basis of
economy. For him, contradictions among classes were
diminishing after the socialist transformation of the
society which had eliminated the economic bases of
exploiting classes. Mao, on the contrary, laid great
emphasis on class struggle. He even believed the
necessity for class struggle after China reached the
stage of Communism.[23] For him, since "bourgeois
reactionary thinking" could not be eliminated together
with its economic bases there always existed the danger
of capitalist restoration and the struggle "between
the socialist road and the capitalist road." Therefore,
to prevent capitalist restoration, it was essential to
"continue the revolution under the dictatorship of the
proletariat."[24]

The ideological differences examined above had
profound implications, for as Mao said: "The struggle
against the capitalist faction within the Party is
the principal task, but not the aim (of the Cultural
Revolution). The aim is to resolve the question of world
view. . . ."[25] These differences made explicable the
dichotomiew between "Liuists" and Maoists," as revealed
in the polemical formulae of "red vs. expert," "politics
in command vs. economics in command," "proletarian
revolutionary line vs. bourgeeis counter-revolutionary
line," etc.

But the quiet conflict between Mao and Liu before

the Cultural Revolution involved more than the above
questions. Their past experiences, personality
characteristics, and political styles were different—
reconcilable in the short run, but incompatible in due
course.[26] Liu was generally regarded as a person of
prudence, rationality and orderliness. Perhaps these
characteristics were derived from his long years of
underground work in the Shite area where circumstances
required great measures of circumspection to avoid any
potential risk. Mao was a man of self-assurance, enterprising
and prone to "rebel."[27] These personal differences suggest
that Liu stood on the moderate side and Mao on the radical
side of those three theoretical questions examined above.

The "lines" were real, though not readily perceptible.
Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the "Liuist" force
had become entrenched in the party and the government,
perhaps not in the military yet. Mao was not on the
alert until he found himself under an allusive assailment
prudentially backed up by a formidable opposition in the
party and government apparatus. In the fall of 1965, Mao
saw through Wu Han's history drama, "The Dismissal of
Hai Jui." Wu had written?

> In the feudal era, hardly was it heard that
> the emperor was criticized. It was Hai Jui
> who criticized the Emperor, and did him
> unreservedly. Hai Jui was sharpest to the
> point when he let fly? 'You've spent a lot of
> money on religious superstition . . . to the
> effect that the people became destitute.[28]

This was insinuative enough: Peng Teh-huai was compared
to Hai Jui and the Great Leap a "religious superstition."
It was particularly satiric that the Emperor dismissed
Hai Jui just as Mao did the Marshall.

After Mao decided that "The Dismissal of Hai Jui"
was a serious political question, Peng Cheng, mayor of
Peking, meber of the Poliburo and secretary of the Central
Secretariat, managed to divert the question to an academic
one through bureaucratic channels.[29] At that time, the
apparatus in Peking was so closed to Mao that he was unable
to "stick a single needle in it."[30] He had to go to Shanghai
to direct the publication of Yao Wen-yuan's "Review of
the Newly Compiled History Drama: 'The Dismissal of Hai
Jui'" to prelude the Cultural Revolution.[31]

In fact, with his retreat to the "second line" in late
1958, Mao was gradually alienated from concrete policy
matters of both the government and of the party (Liu
Shao-chi as the State Chairman; Teng Hsiao-ping as the
Secretary General of the Central Secretariat). Prior to
the Cultural Revolution Mao deeply felt that his will was
often obstructed or diluted in bureaucratic channels, as
he said: "At that time, I could not take hold of the power
in the Party, in propaganda, in the provinces. . . .
Therefore, I didn't object to idolization; I really needed
some idolization."[32] The situation seemed to correspond
to Max Weber's argument that a charismatic leader may
find his power gradually sapped by formal rationality in
bureaucracy.

One is provoked to ask why Mao dared to start this unprecedented, large-scale line/power struggle in the face of formidable opposition? The answer is found in Lin Piao's speech on August 9, 1967:

> Our initiation of the great Cultural Revolution was based on two conditions: first, the Thought of Mao Tse-tung and the supreme prestige of Chairman Mao; second, the strength of the Liberation Army. Without these two conditions, particularly the (first) condition . . . it wouldn't have worked.[33]

Although the influential party officials were capable of obstructing Mao's will through bureaucratic channels, they became feeble once Mao invoked his symbolic power and exhorted the revolutionary young to defend the thought of Mao and defeat ani-party "capitalist roaders." The tragedy of Liu Shao-chi and a great many veteran leaders was that slthough they, out of tacit understanding, were capable of exercising considerable institutional power vis a vis the cult of Mao, they became extremely vulnerable as individuals when Mao's cohorts played up whatever differences they had with Mao or his thought. For not only was the thought of Mao virtually elevated from the level of "pratical ideology" to that of "pure ideology" during the Cultural Revolution,[34] there was now no clear distinction between the physical Mao and the spiritual Mao. The effect was to make inviolate whatever Mao had said or written—regardless of whether they concerned day-to-day policies or party lines.

This work will not get into the process of the
Cultural Revolution, nor the details of how Liu and
other veteran leaders were purged,[35] but will focus on
the game rules of dissension within the CCP. To begin
with, Liu Shao-chi and his associates never really intended
to "pull Mao off the horse" (topple Mao); even if they did,
they should not have been accused of being "anti-Party."
so long as they did so via available party channels. In
fact, when Mao started the Revolution, most the leaders
did not understand what he was doing. It was Mao, his
wife, Lin Piao and few other cohorts who were engaging
in underhanded activities. This is evident in Lin's words:
"(O)nly our Chairman was prescient . . . and anticipatory
in theoretical line, in thought and in policies . . . .
Or only the comrades with high theoretic level were ready.
Other ordinary comrades were not prepared in thought."[36]
Liu's self-examination also revealed his failure to know
Mao's intent: "Not until August 5 (1966), when Chairman
Mao's 'Cannon the (Capitalist) Headquarters Ta-tzu-pao
(big character poster) was posted, was I aware that I
had committed serious mistakes. . . . "[37] And when Red
guards questioned whether he trusted Mao, Liu replied:
"Of course, I trusted Mao; if I didn't, I would definitely
not have lived up to today."[38] But after he had devoted
nearly fifty years to the CCP's revolution, first risking
his life for party work in the White area, and then
strenuously working for the socialist transformation and
construction of mainland China, Liu was dismissed from

the party "forever" on charges of "renegade, spy and
quisling."[39] The irony remains this: how could Mao have
worked side by side with this "renegade, spy and quisling"
for long years without seeing through him? The case of
Liu was only an outstanding instance of such Machiavellian
incriminations.

It would take more than one book to exhaust Mao's
unprecedented, unprincipled, excessive struggles during
the Cultural Revolution. Many of the purged veteran leaders
were not only dismissed from the party without proper
procedures, but also physically and spiritually tortured.
Even if Mao did not personally instruct those tortures,
he loved to see them happen. Wang Jo-hsui has spoken of
this: "Undoubtedly, Comrade Ho Lung (then vice premier)
was framed to death by Lin Piao. But why did Premier
Chou failed to protect Comrade Ho? Comrade Ho was missing
for so long a time; did Chairman Mao ever asked about
this?"[40]

For Mao, the Cultural Revolution was a life and
death struggle between "proletarian" and "capitalist"
headquarters. It was an extremely antagonistic
contradiction; and to defeat those "capitalist roaders"
within the party, he had to "correctly" use the ruthless
method of suppression and coercion, while paying lip
service to the game rules. After 1978, instances of
torture were gradually revealed. Liu Shao-chi, after
three years in confinement, died in 1969 on a train
which took him to Kaifeng in exile; Peng Teh-huai
suffered kickings and beatings in late 1966 and died in

1974 in dark confinement. Many others suffered similar or more gruesome tortures.[41]

Maoists' gravest violation of the game rules was perhaps not the purge and torture of top level leaders, but the destruction of party organizations. In the end of 1967, all party committees from the Bureau level (between the Party Central and the Provinces) down to the county level were destroyed.[42] It was not until late August 1971 that all provincial party committees were reconstituted. (The provincial party committee of Hunan was first reestablished in November 1970.)[43] Thus, during the Cultural Revolution, the CCP Central lost its formal bases and ruled with centralism and without democracy. If there remained any little democratic centralism, it would be in the revolutionary committees, which, however, were essentially governmental organizations under the State Council.

Mao's "revolution from below" was most unprincipled; for, in carrying it out, he deviated from the organization channels of the party and incited those outside the party to attack those within it. Furthermore, he antagonistically treated many of his long-term associates who indeed did not advance any explicit lines. Even it they did, intra-party discussion and debate should have been exhausted before any "organizational conclusions" (punishments according party discipline) were imposed upon them. Wang Jo-hsui has spoken of Mao's violation of the game rules:

> (T)he discussion of the Cultural Revolution
> should allow the expression of different
> opinions. It was unjustified to politically
> exterminate a person (and he was a party Vice
> Chairman (Liu Shao-chi)) simply because he
> expressed opposing views. Did not Chairman Mao
> say: 'Unite those who oppose you, wrongly oppose
> you'? We cannot speak of unity only with
> revisionists, and Chairman Mao thought that all
> those who differed from his view points were
> revisionists.44

The tragic in the Cultural Revolution was that the CCP had created a Frankenstein's monster that eventually devoured the party itself.

The Case of Lin Piao: A Power Struggle

The Preambele of the Party Constitution, adopted by the CCP Ninth National Congress, April 1969, stated: "(C)omrade Lin Piao is the Comrade-in-arms of Chairman Mao and his successor." This is contrary to the common sense of the CCP, which theoretically stresses the values of democratic centralism. The victors of the Cultural Revolution thus denied party members the right to choose their own party chairman. Properly viewed, the Ninth Congress itself was illegal because it was convened at a time when all provincial party committees had not been reconstituted. The representatives of the Congress were thus not elected or selected through due process.

In September 1971, things took a drastic change. It was reported that Lin Piao died on September 13 on a

Trident aircraft, which took him to flee after his
abortive coup and crashed in Undur Khan in Mongolia.
The incident was the result of a major power struggle
which began to loom agead _at the Second Plenum of the
Ninth Central Committee, August 23-September 6, 1970.
In dispute was the question of rewuming the State
Chairmanship (which Lin was supposedly to hold) abolished
since the Ninth Congress.[45] This apparently lacerated
the scar left in Mao after his painful battle with
Liu Shao-chi. Considering Mao's inordinate power
consciousness and Lin's military ascendance since the
Cultural Revolution, one deems that the conflict at the
Second Plenum was probably real. The military occupied
125 of the 279 seats in the Central Committee after the
Ninth Congress; of the twenty-one poliburo members eleven
came from the military; of the twenty-nine first
secretaries on the provincial level twanty-one (72%) came
from the military.[46] Although it is difficult to know
how many of these military influentials were willing to
support Lin at the expense of Mao, the numbers provided
do indicate that Mao's intended three-way alliance (the
military, cadres, and masses) power distribution was upset.

After the Lin Piao incident, the CCP went out of its
way to argue the far-fetched idea that Lin had used
Confucianism as an ideological weapon to "usurp the Party,
seize power and restore capitalism," and that Lin Piao's
line was "extremely rightist in substance."[47]
Even if the Mao-Lin alliance during the Cultural Revolution

was due to expedient considerations and not due to mutual
agreement on policy matters, one would need the
greatest stretch of imagination to believe that a
"Lin Piao line" ever existed. Even if Lin really had a
Confucian world view, he would not have been so indiscrete
as to advance such a "feudal" line that is an anathema to
Chinese Communists.

Mao's letter of July 8, 1966 to his wife, Chiang
Ching, revealed that Lin Piao was power oriented during
the Cultural Revolution. He exploited Mao's prestige to
defeat Liu Shao-chi, but Mao had to unite with Lin because
Liu was their common enemy. Mao wrote in the letter:
"(I) cannot but go to Liangshan (see note 48). I think
their (referring to Lin Piao, et al.) real intent is to
beat the ghost (Liu Shao-chi) with the aid of Chung Kuei
(a legendary exorciser). Thus, I've become a Chung
Kuei . . . ."[48]

It seems that Mao did not deem Lin to be a real
threat until the Second Plenum; otherwise on would find
it difficult to explain why Mao acquiesced in Lin's
becoming the "Constitutional" successor at the 7th
Congress.[49]

The case of Lin Piao was obviously a major power
struggle, although much doubt remains as to whether Lin
really died in that crashed airplane. Some have held
that the coup plan ("571 Engineering Project") was
fabricated to frame Lin; others have surmised that Lin
was killed at the time of his arrest or at a meeting.[50]

Whichever the case, either Lin attempted the coup or Mao murdered Lin, the incident was the result of an unprincipled struggle.

Teng Hsiao-ping vs. Chiang Ching vs. Hua Kuo-feng:
   The "Cultural Revolution" ends

With the death of Lin Piao, the question of Mao's successor became immediately imperative. In 1972, Chou En-lai (Premier since 1949 and the most tactful politician in the CCP, who never got himself entangled in leadership line/power disputes)[51] was found to have a cancer. The party badly needed a man who would be capable of winning the support of its influential civil and military people and who would be competent in the Premiership after Chou's death. A pragmatic compromise was then struck, with Teng Hsiao-ping and seventy purged veteran cadres reinstated at the Tenth National Congress.[52] This created a tense relationship between Chou-Tengists and the upstarts of the Cultural Revolution, particularly the Gang of Four.

In 1975 Teng was a Vice Chairman in the party, First Vice Premier in the government and Chief of General Staff in the military. He was also the virtual premier because Chou already had one foot in the grave. Between August and September, he directed the drafting of "On the General Program for All Work Items of the Whole nation," which implicitly warned the Gang of Four:

> They . . . have for years been engaging in . . .
> the so-called struggle between the rebel faction
> and the conservative faction, between new cadres
> and old cadres, between Confucianists and
> Legalists. . . . .
> Some comrades are still metaphysically treating
> the relationship between politics and economics,
> between revolution and production . . . always
> separating politics from economics, revolution
> from production. . . . (T)hey give out caps of
> "productionism" and . . . (of) revisionism.53

The crudical point of the General Program lay mot in
those words but in its elevating Mao's three directives
("Study the theory of proletarian dictatorship," "Promote
stability and unity," and "boost up national economy")
to a single general program (equivalent to a general line
in significance).54 Since Mao's general line was "Never
forget class struggle," Teng tactfully utilized Mao's
directives to assail his political foes and circumvented
Mao's leftist line.

Mao was apparently on special alert. He knew from
experience that if he let Teng have his way, the Gang of
Four would be defeated--which meant the legitimacy of the
Cultural Revolution would be challenged. On January 8,
1976 Chou breathed his last; and seven days later, after
Teng delivered the funeral oration, he disappeared from
the public scene. From early February, the Renmin Ribao
published a series of articles aimed at "beating back
the wind of rightist reversal of verdicts." The February
6 edition published the article "Continue and Deepen the
Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," saying that the
"wind" was that "still unrepentant capitalist roader

within the Party."[55]

On April 5 there occurred the riotous, bloody Tien An Men Incident--partly a spontaneous riot occasioned by the Gang of Four's attempt to remove the wreaths laid on the square by the masses grieved over the death of Chou, and partly a movement incited by Tengists who, reportedly, posted slogans like "Overthrow Empress Dowager" and "Overthrow Indira Gandhi."[56] On April 7, the Poliburo published a resolution:

> Having discussed the counter-revolutionary incident... and Teng Hsiao-ping's latest behaviour, the Poliburo . . . holds that the nature of the Teng Hsiao-ping problem has turned into one of antagonistic contradiction. On the proposal of our great leader Chairman Mao, the Poliburo unanimously agrees to dismiss Teng Hsiao-ping from all posts both inside and outside the Party while allowing him to keep his membership so as to see how he will behave in the future.[57]

Thus, the Gang of Four, temporarily won the struggle with the backing of Mao, who said: "[Teng] had promised not to reverse the verdicts; Ah, unreliable!"[58]

On September 9, 1976, Mao died--a premonition of the Gang of Four's defeat. Earlier, on April 7, when Teng was deposed, Mao made Hua Kuo-feng the First Vice Chairman and acting Premier. The question is raised: why did Mao choose Hua rather than any of the Four? Part of the answer is that Mao doubted very much the tenability of the Four after his death. He clearly understood that the Four, having for years carried on radical hostility against Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai and Teng Hsiao-ping, had incurred the enmity of most veteran leaders.

> Don't be fond of the limelight . . . . I do not
> intend you to choose and head the Cabinet (the
> State Council) (Be the boss behind the scenes);
> you've laid yourself open to too much rancor.
> Unite the majority. . . . A person is hardly
> wise enough to know himself.[59]

In May 1975, Mao wrote to her: "Why don't you unite with
the two hundred odd Central Committee members? Cliquish
activity is not good, has never in history been good."[60]

In the eyes of Mao, Hua was his best choice, for want
of a better. First, Hua was a staunch supporter of Mao;[61]
it was unlikely that Hua would attempt to negate the
Cultural Revoltuion. Second, he was not deeply entangled
in leadership complications; third, he had the practical
experiences from the county level up to the central.[62]

With Mao's death the Chairmanship became the hot
target. At that time, Chiang Ching's group controlled
the majority of votes in the Poliburo. But the power
situation was very treacherous then. Had Mao been alive,
the Gang of Four would have been able to enforce, with
the backup of Mao, "democratic centralism" to dominate the
leadership. The Poliburo's resolution on the deposition
of Teng Hsiao-ping was just the result of such "democratic
centralism." Being upstarts from the Cultural Revolution,
the Four did not have any substantial power base to ensure
their formal majority in the Poliburo. They were only capable
of commanding the support of some militia forces, particularly
in Shanghai and radical masses who were formidable only
under such circumstances as had existed during the
Cultural Revolution. The odds were against them.

Chiang Ching was simply an excellent actress in the comitragic China, not a politician. She should have realized long before Mao's death that the power of her Gang was real only while her husband was alive. She should also have realized that those who gave her applause might one day give her a curse.

On October 6, 1976 Hua, diplomatically in collaboration with veteran leaders, directed the arrest of Chiang Ching and her cohorts at one stroke. Not suprisingly, Jua, the first Vice Chairman before Mao's death, had ascended the throne "legally." However, Hua's Chairmanship was immediately called into serious question. Being a beneficiary of the Cultural Revolution, he had to safeguard the legitimacy of the Revolution which was now under formidable challenge by Teng Hsiao-ping and other purged or already "liberated" veteran leaders who pushed for the reversal of verdicts. His weak political background indicates the ineluctability of his decline in power. He served in the party and government apparatus on the county lebel in Shensi five years, on the provincial level in Hunan twenty-three years, and on the national level five years. He had practically no influence in the military, and his influence in the party and the government was very limited.

Since Mao could no longer intervene, Teng Hsiao-ping (the ancestral leader of the Second Field Army system, veteran Secretary General of the Central Secretariat, and experienced vice premier) easily outweighted Hua. In

July 1977, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central
Committee, Hua lost ground and Teng was rehabilitated
to become Vice Chairman of the party and of its Central
Military Commission, vice premier, and Chief of General
Staff. In February 1980, the Fifth Plenum decided on
Liu Shao-shi's posthumous rehabilitation--a signal that
Teng had finally defeated Hua while allowing Hua to be
the nominal leader of the CCP.[63] In June 1981, at the
Eleventh National Congress, Hu Yiao-pang was elected the
Party Chairman, with Teng as the back stage boss. Ushering
in a new era for the CCP, the Congress adopted the
"Historical Resolution," which completely negated the
Cultural Revolution but vindicated the Thought of Mao.[64]

At the beginning of this chapter, we have considered
the role of a strong leader in intra-party major struggles.
As previously examined, the foreign master (the Comintern)
and Mao Tse-tung were functionally similar in leadership
disputes: both served as the source of legitimacy which
in turn became the source of conflict. Once their
legitimacy was under challenge, they sided with their
supporters and won, though not every time without
difficulty. CCP history has shown that the existence of
a dictatorial, powerful party leader constitutes a
major factor for unprincipled, excessive struggles. It
would be ideal that "centralism" is legitimized by
"democracy." The legitimacy of the party leadership
must not be founded on personality cult, nor on the

"correctness" of the thought, line, or policies of any specific person or group.

Aside from the theoretical dilemma we have examined in the preceding chapter, another problem is the lack of institutionalized, differentiated channels for settling leadership conflicts. Because the party, the government and the gun are interlocked, they are easily embroiled in a leadership conflict. If the CCP is to prevent such excessive struggles as those during the Cultural Revolution efforts must be made to ensure that the gun and the institutions with police power will be able to remain neutral in critical times. An intra-party conflict must always be confined within the party proper.

Noticeable was the fact that the struggle between Teng Hsiao-ping and Hua Kuo-feng was properly confined within non-antagonistic limits. On the cover of <u>Beijing Review</u>, No. 10, March 10, 1980 there is a picture of Hua <u>smiling</u> at the Fifth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee where he obviously failed in his defense of the legitimacy of the Cultural Revolution because the Plenum granted Liu Shao-chi's posthumous rehabilitation. Although the Sixth Plenum, June 1981 criticized Hua's attempt to vindicate the Cultural Revolution and obstruct the reversal of verdicts, it affirmed Hua's contribution in the struggle against the Gang of Four. Also, the Plenum, in its "Historical Resolution," deliberately using terms which might give the impression of antagonism with Hua. It also attributed the party's failure, after the arrest of the Gang

of Four, to rectify the erroneous theories and plicies of the Cultural Revolution to <u>both</u> "the limitations of historical conditions" and "Comrade Hua's leftist mistake in thought guidance."[65] The wording is surprisingly mild, if one considers the fact that Hua had vehemently advanced the theory of "Two Whatever's." While Hua lost his Chairmanship, he was elcted Vice Chairman.

All the above indicates that the game rules were not violated--at least in formalities. That the Teng vs. Hua struggle was conducted non-antagonistically was perhaps due to Hua's diplomacy in avoiding hostility with veteran leaders and Teng's confidence in his eventual victory, and due to the inclination of both sides to observe the game rules. With the death óf Mao, the arrest of the Gang of Four, and the gradual rehabilitation of moderate veteran leaders, the atmosphere within the party seemed to have changed from one of "continuous revolution"[66] to that of "dying out of class struggle." The moderate veteran leaders seemed more inclined to resolve disputes within the limits of non-antagonism. Especially, the party as a whole seemed to be in deep, sober reflection after the tumultuous "Cultural Revolution" which had produced disruptive effects to the whole party and the nation. At the Fifth Plenum, the party adopted the resolution, "Guiding Principles," which, reflecting the anuishing lesson the CCP learned in the past, reiterated: (1) "Uphold collective leadership, oppose the making of arbitrary decisions by individuals;"

(2) "Safeguard the Party's centralized leadership and strictly observe Party discipline;" (3) "Uphold Party spirit and eradicate factionalism;" (4) "Promote inner-Party democracy, take a correct attitude towards didissenting views;" (5) "Guarantee that the Party members' rights are not encroached upon;" (6) "Adopte a correct attitude toward comrades who have made mistakes."[67]

Whether or not the Guiding Principles will be seriously violated depends on (1) whether or not the Four Modernizations will result in a grave failure; (It seems unlikely that in the moderate, pragmatic ways of Tengists, the Modernizations will result in anything like the collapse of the Great Leap.) (2) whether or not Teng, seventy-eight years old in 1981, will live long enough to enable the Party Chairman Hu Yiao-pang, the Premier Chao Tzu-yang, and other "Tengists" to become entrenched in the leadership. (Teng's death may result in a tricky blance of power among factions of the second-generation influentials.)

Conclusion

A few scholars have either explicitly or implicitly
proposed a model or theory which may be used for the
interpretation of struggles in CCP leadership. It is,
of course, not true that proponents of a certain theory
deem it applicable to all cases. To this author's
knowledge, two theories have been used to explain CCP
leadership struggles: the power bases theory and the
factionalism model.[68]

Dittmer has briliantly proposed a pwer bases theory
suggesting that persons in leadership struggles derive
their respective power (distinguished from formal authority
associated with positions in the Poliburo, the State
Council, etc.) from their different political backgrounds
and that background factors are crucial to an individual's
political survival.[69] He contends that the Gang of Four
lost their struggle with veteran party bureaucrats not
because the formal authority of the former was weak as
compared to that of the latter, but because the former's
power bases were both "narrow" (mostly confined in one
functional system of culture and propaganda) and "shallow"
(referring to the degree of influence relative to the
temporal duration of career--the Four were upstarts during
the Cultural Revolution.).[70]

We have implicitly used Dittmer's theory in our
discussion of "Teng vs. Chiang vs. Hua" in the preceding
chapter. The theory may also be used to explain the case
of the returned students who, after the Comintern could
no longer support them, lost their struggle with Mao's
group because their power bases were not only "shallow"
(They were upstarts after the collapse of the Li Li-san
line) but also "narrow" (They held positions mostly in
the Party Central and had practically very little power
over the gun). Instrumental as it is, the theory, if
applied to a struggle involving two prestigious veteran
leaders, may give rise to the sticky problem of
distinguishing the power bases of one actor from those of
the other. It would be practically impossible to distinguish
the power bases of a Liu Shao-chi and of a Chou En-lai;
even if we are able to distinguish them, the problem
remains that of measuring the relative strength or
weakness of each side.

Nathan's factionalsim model purports that struggles
in the CCP leadership are of the kind of factionalism
involving clientist groups which engage in struggles within
a tacit code of political civility.[71] He contends that such
factionalsim based on political civility is the usual
politics of CCP leadership and that CCP elites hardly
resort to severe sanctions: the factions may temporarily
unite behind a suitable leader to employ severe scanctions
to counter-elites who challenge the legitimacy of the

factional system.[72] His idea of "political civility"
is faulty at best--particulary he bases the validity of
the model on the Cultural Revolution, during which
severe sanctions were rife. His assumption of the
applicability of his factionalism model to earlier periods
of CCP political history becomes shaky if one will only
note the CCP's proclivity to hostility toward the defeated
in a major intra-party struggle.[73] Nanthan's assertion
of "political civility"--if one does not question the
actuality of the facts on which he builds the model--
propably has some usage for the struggle between Teng and
Hua or such minor struggles as occurred in the CCP Second,
Third, and Fourth National Congresses.

Theories or models do have their limitations; some
may even be seriously flawed. The brief discussion above
serves for a footnote on why this author has avoided the
"model" approach--either working out a particular theory
of his own or explicitly using any specific model. The
complexity of CCP leadership struggles requires flexible
perspectives and approaches. In our examination of those
major struggles we have flexibly approached each case
with relative emphsis on circumstantial, personality, and
"power bases" factors.

Our examination seems to show that intra-party
"left-right" complications are the inexorable fate of the
Chinese Communist Party. However, this probably is only
a deceptive impression formed out of our intensive focus

on major struggles—the peaceful aspect of the internal
political life of the CCP, which presumably intervenes
somewhere between two major struggles, has not reveived
our proper attention. We need not recapitulate our
explanation of the theory and practice of CCP two-line
struggle, for we have summarized our main points wherever
in a chapter we found it useful to do so. We have to only
note that incompatibilities between the theoretical and
practical aspects of the game rules are the usual politics
during a major struggle.

In regard to "prediction," we are now able to provide
a set of questions leading to that purpose:

1. Does the current struggle concern policies, lines,
or "roads"? If it concerns policies, then the struggle is
non-antagonistic, mild, and is unlikely to result in any
significant chage in the leadership. If it concerns
lines (whether they are genuine lines or policies deemed
by actors as lines), then the struggle involves an
either-or choice, proceeds on the borderline of
non-antagonism and antagonism (though basically
non-antagonistic), and more often than not, will result
in a significant reshuffle of the leadership (often the
deposition of the party leader—if he loses the game—
as a necessary condition). If it concerns "roads," then
the struggle involves a definitely antagonistic
contradiction and will result in revocation of party
membership and/or other more severe sanctions.

2. Do available data indicate that policies at issue

are <u>purposely</u> elevated to become "lines," or that policies
or lines at issue are <u>purposely</u> elevated to become "roads"?
If so, then there will be grave violations of the game
rules, leading to instability of the leadership or worse,
of the political system.

3. Do Available data indicate that the current
party line (explicit or implicit) has resulted in a grave
failure? If so, a major struggle is by most odds
bound to occur.

Notes

Chapter Three & Conclusion

[1] The Party Constitution, adopted June 11, 1945
by the CCP 7th National Congress, The Collected Edition
of Party Constitutions of the Chinese Communist Party, p. 46.

[2] Ibid., p. 49; Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Revision
of the Party Constitution (at the CCP 7th National Congress,
May 1945)," ibid., p. 107.

[3] Chang Kuo-tao, My Recollections, III, 1155, 1252-254;
Wang Ming, "The Fate of a Lonely Monk," Classified Chinese
Communist Documents, Chinese ed. (Taipei: Insitute of
International Relations, 1977), pp. 226-48.

[4] Liu, "On Internal Party Struggle," A Special
Collection of Materials on Liu Shao-chi, p. 110.

[5] See Richard C Thornton, "The Structure of Communist
Politics," World Politics, XXIV, No. 4 (July 1972), 504-
13; Frederick C. Teiwes, "A Review Article: The Evolution
of Leadership Purges in Communist China," China Quarterly,
No. 41 (January 1970), pp. 122-26.

[6] "Resolution on the Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih Anti-Party
League," Renmin Riba, April 5, 1955.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Teiwes, sup. note 5, p. 125.

[9] Cf. Stuart R. Schram, "The Party in Chinese
Communist Ideology," China Quarterly, No. 38 (April 1969),
pp. 2-3.

[10] "Excerpts from Peng Deh-huai's Talks at the
Meetings of the Northwest Group of the Lushan Meeting,

July 3-10, 1959," <u>The Case of Peng Teh-huai 1959-1968</u>
(Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1968), pp. 2-4;
for an introduction in economic perspective of the Great
Leap, see Alexander Eckstein, <u>China's Economic Revolution</u>
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 58-59;
72-73.

[11] "Peng Teh-huai's 'Letter of Opinion,'" <u>The Case of
Peng</u>, pp. 7-13.

[12] "Peng Teh-huai's Speech at the 8th Plenary Session
of the CCP 8th Central Committee," ibid., pp. 36-38.

[13] "Mao Tse-tung's Talk at the 8th Plenary Session
of the CCP 8th Central Committee," ibid., pp. 27-30.

[14] Wang Jo-hsui, "The Imoprtant Lesson (Learned) from
the Cultural Revolution Is to Oppose Personality Cult,"
speech mad on Feb. 13, 1979, at the CCP Central Theory
and Work Conference, <u>Ming Pao Monthly</u>, Vol. XV, No. 2
(Feb. 1980), pp. 2-15.

[15] Sup. note 12, p. 35.

[16] "Peng Te-huai's Testimony (record of interrogation
on Peng in Custody Dec. 28, 1966-Jan. 5, 1967)," Sup. note
11, p. 121.

[17] <u>Three Major Struggles on China's Philosophical
Front (1949-64)</u>; also indicative of these questions is
Liu Shao-chi's speech of Sept. 14, 1959, "On the Victory
of Marxism-Leninism in China," <u>A Special Collection of
Materials on Liu Shao-chi</u>, pp. 309-18.

[18] "Liuists" and"Maoists" do not mean two distinctly
conflicting groups; they imply that there existed within
the Party a moderate force and a radical force which were
latently developing and finally became two vauely
perceptible groups respectively represented by Liu and Mao.

[19] <u>Three Major Struggles on China's Philosophical
Front</u>, pp. 2-4.

[20] Huang Tien-chien, <u>The "Change" and "Decline" of the
Maoist Communist Regime</u> (Taipei: Cheng-chung Publisher, 1974),
pp. 3-4.

[21] Sup. note 19, pp. 34-5, 43.

[22] Sup. note 19, pp. 48-63.

[23] "A Summary of Chairman Mao's Talks with Responsible Comrades at Various Places during his Inspection Tour," Classified Chinese Communist Document, pp. 51-2.

[24] Sup. note 19, p. 9.

[25] "Mao Tse-tung's Talk with Albanian Military Delegation in Peking," A Selection of Important Documents of the Cultural Revolution, ed. Defense Ministry Intelligence Agency, Republic of China (Taipei: DMIA, RoC, 1968), p. 197.

[26] Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-chi and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 173-213; Stuart R. Schram, "Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi, 1939-1969," Asian Survey, XII, No. 4 (April 1972), 275-93.

[27] Mao used to write a short versed prose, "Hsin-yuan Chun Tzu," suggesting that in terms of hero worship, he was nonpareil to those greatest emperors of the Chin, Han, Tang, Sung Dynasties. One day, when he was thirteen years old, he played truant to protest against his rigorous teacher. Afterwards, the teacher became less severe. Mao thought of this anecdote as "the first victorious strike" in his life. For the above, see Who is Who in Communist China, Appendix I, pp. 10-11. Mao once said to several leading red guards: "I used to be unruly in the schools; my principle was (simply) not to be dismissed. . . . I'm not afraid of fighting battles at all. I become excited whee I hear of a battle. There was nothing like a real battle in Peking . . . except several shots. What happened in Szechwan was a real one, with several thousands on each side, with guns and battery. . . ." See Classified Chinese Communist Documents, Chinese ed., pp. 529-538.

[28] Wu Han, "Hai Jui Upbraids the Emperor," A Special Edition on the Problem of Peng Teh-huai, Vol. III of A Selection of Materials on the Cultural Revolution, ed. Ting Wang (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Monthly, 1969), p. 59; for the full text of Wu's drama, "The Dismissal of Hai Jui," see ibid., pp. 68-104.

[29] The 6th Section of the KMT Central Committee,

The Peng Chen Anti-Mao League (Taipei: 6th Section, KMT CC, 1968), pp. 73-8.

30 Sup. note 25, p. 195.

31 Yao Wen-yuan, "Review of the Newly Compiled History Drama: 'The Dismissal of Hai Jui,'" Wen Hui Bao, Nov. 10, 1965.

32 Wang Jo-hsui, p. 4.

33 "'August 9' Important Talk (by Lin Piao in 1967)," sup. note 22, p. 215.

34 For the concepts of "practical ideology" and of "pure ideology," see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd enl. ed. (Berkeley: University of Calif. Press, 1968), pp. 24-53.

35 For an overview of the process of the Cultural Revolution, see Philip Bridgham, "Mao's 'Cultural Revolution': Origin and Development," "Mao's Cultural Revolution in 1967: The Struggle to Seize Power," and "Mao's Cultural Revolution: The Struggle to Consolidate Power," China Quarterly, No. 29 (Jan. 1967), pp. 1-35; No. 34 (April, 1968), pp. 6-37; No. 41 (Jan. 1970), pp. 1-25; also, Alan P. Lo Liu, Political Culture and Group Conflict in Communist China (Santa Barbara: Clio Books, 1976); for an collection of 34 articles on major events of the Cultural Revolution, see Chen Li-sheng, The CCP's "Cultural Revolution" and Political Struggle (Taipei: Li-ming Cultural Enterprise, 1974).

36 Sup. note 25, p. 217; also see Wang Jo-hsui, p. 3.

37 "The 2nd Self-examination (by Liu Shao-chi on July 9, 1967)," A Special Collection of Materials on Liu Shao-chi, p. 626.

38 "Liu Shao-chi's Testimony (during Interrogation by Red Guards, August ?, 1967)," ibid., p. 315.

39 "Report on the Investigation of the Crimes of Renigade-Spy-Quisling Liu Shao-chi (by CCP CC Special Case Investigation Group, Oct. 18, 1968)," sup. note 29, pp. 631-710.

40 Wang Jo-hsui, p. 14.

41 See Renmin Ribao, April 2, 1970; Sept. 1, Oct. 7,

Dec. 10, 12, 1978; Jan. 3, 12, 20, 22, Feb. 8, 26, June 8, Aug. 7, Sept. 24, 1979; etc.

[42] "Opinion and Problems concerning the Shake-up, Revovery, and Reconstitution of Party Organizations (CCP Central Doc., Dec. 2, 1967)," A Selection of Important Documents on the Cultural Revolution, pp. 15-7.

[43] Chen Li-sheng, The CCP's "Cultural Revolution" and Political Struggle, pp. 239-41.

[44] Wang Jo-hsui, p. 4.

[45] "Communique on the 'September 12' Lin Piao Anti-Party Affair (abridged)," CCP Central Doc., Chung-fa (1971) No. 61, Classified Chinese Communist Documents Chinese ed., pp. 117-18; "The Struggle of Smashing the Counter-revolutionary Coup of Lin Piao Anti-Party League," CCP Central Doc., Chung-fa (1972) No. 24, ibid., p. 148.

[46] The 6th Section of KMT CC, An Analysis of the "Lin Piao Affair" (Taipei: 6th Section of KMT CC, 1972), p. 16.

[47] Wang Ming, "The Fate of the Lonely Monk," pp. 240-43; "Lin Piao and the Confucian-Mencian Way," CCP Central Dec., Chung-fa (1974) No. 1, sup. note 45., pp. 548-66.

[48] "Mao Tse-tung's Letter to Chiang Ching (written on July 8, 1966 and published in Sept. 1972)," ibid., p. 39. "Cannot but go to Liangshan" is a Chinese idiom which means "be compelled by circumstances to do something as a last resort."

[49] Wang Jo-hsui, p. 11.

[50] Cheng Hsue-chia, From the Cultural Revolution to the 11th Congress: The Last Tragedy Produced by Mao (Taipei: Chung-hua Magazine, 1978), pp. 48-9; Wang, "The Fate of the Lonely Monk," sup. note 45, pp. 240-43. For the CCP's official account of Lin Piao's coup, see Hua Fang, "Lin Biao's Abortive Counter-revolutionary Coup d'Etat," Beijing Review, No. 15, Dec. 22. 1980.

[51] Szu-ma Chang-feng, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, 3rd enl. ed. (Hong Kong: Yi-shan Bookstore, 1979).

[52] Mao and Chou needed Teng's influence in the 2nd Field Army to counterbalance Lin's posthumous influence in the military, particularly in the 4th Field Army; Chou also needed Teng's group to dull the edge of the Gang of Four; see Chen Li-sheng, p. 348; also, sup. note 38, pp. 19-21: Table I Evolution and Change of Chinese Communist Military Factions; For CCP politics of rehabilitation, see Hong Yung Lee, "The Politics of Cadre Rehabilitation Since the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, XVIII, No. 9 (Sept. 1978), 934-55.

[53] Chi Hsin, A probe of the Gang of Four Affair, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: 70's Magazine, 1977), pp. 117-18.

[54] Ibid., 116; Jurgen Domes, "The 'Gang of Four'-- and Hua Kuo-feng: Analysis of Political Events in 1975-76," China Quarterly, No. 71 (Sept. 1977), p. 481.

[55] "Continue and Deepen the Great Cultural Revolution," Renmin Ribao, Feb. 6, 1976.

[56] "Reverse the Perverted History as a Result of the 'Gang of Four's' utilization of the Renmin Ribao," Renmin Ribao, Nov. 21, 22, 1978; Kang Ming-shu, "Observation of the 'Spontaneous' 'Tomb-visiting Riot' in Peking," Kang, Before and After the Gang of Four Affair (Taipei: China Times Press, 1978), p. 35.

[57] China New Analysis, No. 1039, May 7, 1976, p. 2.

[58] Wang Jo-hsui, p. 14.

[59] "Evidence of the Crimes of the Wang Hung-wen, Chang Tsun-chiao, Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan Anti-Party League," CCP Central Doc., Chung-fa (1976), No. 24, Classified Chinese Communist Documents, Chinese ed., p. 61.

[60] Ibid., p. 62.

[61] Who is Who in Communist China, p. 755.

[62] Ibid.

[63] For the line dispute between Teng and Hua, see p. 2 of the thesis; for a collection of 52 articles on Teng's rehabilitation, see Editorial Board, China Times ed. Inside Stories about Teng Hsiao-ping's Rehabilitation (Taipei: China Times Press, 1977).

[64] "Resolution on Certain Historical Questions of the Party since the Founding of the Nation," Guangming Ribao, July 1, 1981.

[65] Ibid.

[66] See John Bryan Starr, "Conceptual Foundations of Mao Tse-tung's Theory of Continuous Revolution," Asian Survey, XI, No. 6 (June 1971), 610-28; Graham Young and Dennis Woodward, "From Contradictions among the People to Class Struggle: The Theories of Uninterrupted Revolution and Continuous Revolution," Asian Survey, XVIII, No. 9 (Sept. 1978), 912-33. During the Cultural Revolution Mao fervently advocated the "theory" of "continuous revolution" to the effect that a "bourgeois headquarters" existed within the CCP. The Sixth Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in late June 1981 denounced the "theory" as erroneous because it laid excessive emphasis upon class struggle.

[67] "Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life," Beijing Review, No. 14, April 7, 1980.

[68] Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of Power in Chinese Politics: A Theory and an Analysis of the Fall of the 'Gang of Four,'" World Politics, XXXI, No. 1 (Oct. 1978), 26-60; Andrew J Nanthan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics, " China Quarterly, Nos. 53-56, No. 53 (Jan. 1973), pp. 35-66. Models (e.g. the totalitarian model, "Chinese models," "Maoist models," etc.) which are meant for the interpretation of the Chinese Communist political system as a whole are excluded from our discussion; theories, models or frameworks which are not explicitly proposed or are explicitly proposed only for the explanation of a particular case of struggle- are also excluded; for a brief introduction and lists of books and articles about such interpretations, see James R. Townsend, Politics in China, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1980), pp. 274-75.

[69] Dittmer, ibid., pp. 26-40.

[70] Ibid., pp. 41-59.

[71] Nathan, sup. note 60.

[72] Nathan, sup. note 60, p. 50.

[73] Tang Tsou, "Prolegomenon to the Study of Informal

groups in CCP Politics," _China Quarterly_, Nos. 65-68, No. 65 (March 1976), pp. 98-104.

Appendix

Transliterations according to Wade-Giles and
Pinyin of the names of persons which appear in the
text of the thesis; last names before first names.

Wade-Giles*	Pinyin
Chang Hao	Zhang Hao
Chang Kuo-tao	Zhang Guo-tao
Chang Wen-tien	Zhang Wen-tian
Chao Tze-yang	Zao Zi-yang
Chen Shao-yu	Chen Shao-yu
(Wang Ming)	(Wang Ming)
Chen Tu-hsiu	Chen Du-xiu
Chiang Ching	Jiang Qing
Chou En-lai	Zhou En-lai
Chu Chiu-pai	Zhu Qiu-bai
Chu Teh	Zhu De
Chung Kuei	Zhong Kui
Feng Yu-hsiang	Feng Yu-xiang
Hai Jui	Hai Rui
Ho Lung	Ho Long
Hsiang Chung-fa	Xiang Zhong-fa
Hu Yao-pang	Hu Yao-bang
Hua Kuo-feng	Hua Guo-feng
Kao Kang	Gao Gang
Li Han-chun	Li Han-jun
Li Li-san	Li Li-san
Li Wei-han	Li Wei-han
Liang Chi-chao	Liang Qi-chao
Lin Piao	Lin Biao
Liu Shao-chi	Liu Shao-qi
Liu Jen-ching	Liu Ren-jing
Lo Chang-lung	Luo Zhang-long
Mao Tse-tung	Mao Ze-dong
Peng Chen	Peng Zhen
Peng Shu-chih	Peng Shu-zhi
Peng Teh-huai	Peng De-huai

Teng Hsiao-ping	Deng Xiao-ping
Wang Hung-wen	Wang Hong-wen
Wang Jo-fei	Wang Ruo-fei
Wang Jo-shui	Wang Ruo-shui
Wang Ming	Wang Ming
(Chen Shao-yu)	(Chen Shao-yu)
Wu Han	Wu Han
Yeh Chien-ying	Ye Jian-ying
Yen Hsi-san	Yan Xi-san

*The circumflex, breve and umlaut are omitted.

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        <u>Documents: A Selection</u>. Taipei: Institute of
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        (Szu-jen-pang Shih-chien Tan-suo). Hong Kong:
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