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Conflicting Partial Paradigms: An Analysis of Stratification Articles, 1953-1990

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Conflicting Partial Paradigms:
An Analysis of Stratification Articles, 1953-1990.

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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the relevance of paradigms to the field of social stratification. Social stratification articles appearing in the American Sociological Review and the American Journal of Sociology from the years 1953-1990 are analyzed. The results provide evidence for a multiplicity of paradigms within the field. A life cycle model for paradigm development is proposed to account for the changes exhibited by the paradigms. I suggested that paradigms go through four stages and that movement through each stage is caused by interactions between the paradigms. Similarities and differences to Kuhn's original paradigm concept are emphasized, and suggestions are provided for improving the usage of the concept of paradigm within the discipline of sociology.

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Chapter 1

Theoretical Issues and Statement of the Problem

Overview

Sociology as a discipline has many theoretic viewpoints. Yet, many sociologists use almost exclusively a single theoretic approach. This observation has prompted several sociologists to study theoretic viewpoints and their proponents (see Gouldner, 1970; Ritzer, 1975; Friedrichs, 1970). This thesis takes such an approach as well, namely a sociology of sociology.

This study has three major objectives. The first is to construct a taxonomy for stratification articles. The second is to conduct a content analysis of the American Journal of Sociology (AJS) and the American Sociological Review (ASR) stratification articles, using the new taxonomy. The third is to offer an explanation of the changes in the noted partial paradigms within stratification, revealed by the content analysis.

Four important concepts used in this thesis are "theory", "methods", "partial paradigms", and "full paradigms"[1]. The following are my own operational definitions of these terms. Theory is a conceptual apparatus that a community of scientists use. Methods (research methods) are techniques that a community of scientists use to investigate phenomena. Full

paradigms are concepts of reality that are shared by an entire scientific discipline. Partial paradigms are concepts of reality that are held by particular scientific communities within a scientific discipline. They are called partial because everybody in the discipline does not agree with them.

In this thesis I will use a theory typology as a primary means of identifying partial paradigms. The theory typology consists of ten theory groups, which include Standard American Sociology (SAS), Symbolic Interactionism, New Causal Theory, Structuralism, Radical-Critical Theory, Small Group Theory, Social Forecasting, Ethnomethodology, Neo-Marxism/conflict theory, and Neo-Weberian theory. Some of the key theorists in each theory group include Parsons, Sewell, Guttman, Lieberson (SAS); Goffman, Mills, Shibutani (Symbolic Interactionism); Duncan, Blau, Blalock (New Causal Theory); Bonacich, White, Mullins (Structuralists); O'Connor, Habermas, Zeitlin (Radical-Critical Theory); Homans, Bales, Sherif (Small Group Theory); Bell, Taeuber (Social Forecasting); Sacks, Garfinkel (Ethnomethodology); E.O. Wright, Dahrendorf (Neo-Marxism); and Giddens, Breiger (Neo-Weberian theory).

I will use a taxonomy for article classification derived from Wells & Picou (1981). Parts of this taxonomy also have their origins in the work of Mullins (1973), Snizek (1975), McCartney (1970), and Olsen (1978). This taxonomy will have four dimensions. These include the article type, theory,

methods, and level of analysis. The content analysis will cover the years 1952-1990, and frequency tabulations and line graphs will be used to examine the four dimensions over that time period.

The outline of the thesis follows: in the first chapter I will examine the theoretical issues in the study of paradigms and develop the research problem. In chapter two I will discuss my methodology, and in chapter three I will report my findings. Finally, in chapter four, I will interpret my findings, provide a tentative explanation and discuss the implications of my findings for both sociology and science in general.

Theoretical Issues in the Study of Paradigms & Development of Research Problem.

Paradigms

One of the most important concepts in this thesis is the concept of paradigm. In general, paradigms are shared world-views that are held by a scientific community. An example of such a community would be the scientists engaged in the field of theoretical physics. According to Kuhn (1962, pp.5):

> Effective research scarcely begins before a

> scientific community thinks it has acquired firm answers to questions like the following: What are the fundamental entities of which the universe is composed? How do these interact with each other and with the senses? What questions may legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in seeking solutions?

He defines a paradigm as a set of shared exemplars and a disciplinary matrix. The broadest notion of a paradigm is the disciplinary matrix, which is composed of shared symbolic generalizations, shared models, shared values, and shared exemplars. The shared exemplars are the community's commonly cited examples. Kuhn claims the exemplars are the most basic parts of a paradigm.

He believes a science proceeds through different stages in a kind of cycle. In the beginning a certain paradigm dominates. Then the science enters the "normal science" stage. In this stage, the paradigm is refined and extended. Anomalies soon become apparent and this leads to a crisis stage. A revolution then occurs within the science, which leads to the adoption of a new paradigm. According to Ritzer (1975) the cycle may be viewed as follows:

Paradigm 1 --> Normal Science --> Anomalies -->
Crisis --> Revolution --> Paradigm 2

Kuhn (1977, pp.295fn) acknowledges a "preparadigm period" in which "the practitioners of a science are split into a number of competing schools, each claiming competence for the same subject matter but approaching it in quite different ways." The concept of paradigm has nevertheless been used in disciplines that Kuhn would characterize as being in a "preparadigm period".

While he applies the concept of paradigm to distinct scientific disciplines, Wells & Picou (1981) maintain that this would make the application of the concept of paradigm quite difficult within a scientific discipline such as sociology. For example, it has been argued by certain writers (see Eckberg and Hill, 1979) that the concept of paradigm is not applicable to the discipline of sociology due to the "immature" state of the social sciences. As a result, several writers have introduced the concept of "partial paradigm" (Watson, 1975; Wells & Picou, 1981), which is defined as part of a world-view that is shared by researchers within a certain field. According to Wells & Picou (1981), "A partial paradigm is defined as an incomplete disciplinary matrix based on significant, but less than community-wide, commitment to a particular cluster of ontological and heuristic models, methodological exemplars, and values."

Paradigms: A Review of the Sociological Literature

Much has been written on the application of paradigms to the discipline of sociology. Essentially two approaches have been used in those writings, which may be characterized as epistemological and empirical. The epistemological studies include Gouldner's The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology, Ritzer's Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science, and Friedrichs' A Sociology of Sociology. Some of the empirical studies include Picou et al (1978) and Wells & Picou (1981). All of these works are historical studies. I now briefly summarize these works, beginning with the epistemological studies.

Gouldner's Assessment of Western Sociology

In The Coming Crisis in Western Sociology, Gouldner identifies four key periods in the development of western sociology. They are:

1. Sociological Positivism: This period began in the early nineteenth century. The key figures were Comte and Saint-Simon.

2. Marxism: This period dates to the mid-nineteenth century, during which sociologists attempted to topple Utilitarianism and German Idealism.

3. Classical Sociology: This period began at the turn of the century. Sociologists during this period attempted to

bridge the gap between positivism and Marxism, and included such figures as Pareto, Durkheim, and Weber.

4. Parsonian Structural-Functionalism: This period dates to the 1930s. Key figures include Merton, Davis, Parsons, and W.E. Moore.

According to Gouldner, a new period began around 1970. It grew out of the work of such figures as Garfinkel and Goffman. Gouldner claims that this occurred because Functionalism was divided from its inception, and therefore experienced a kind of entropy. He outlines several reasons why Functionalism has declined in popularity.

According to Gouldner, Functionalism was so pervasive in sociology that it virtually became equated with the discipline itself, assimilating many different sociological viewpoints. The "seed group" of Functionalism from its beginning manifested tendencies towards individual variability (Gouldner 1970, pp.375). The intradiscipline variability grew even worse, and eventually became critical.

Since the 1930s the seed group members also became quickly established at a young age. They were able to train several generations of sociologists, who then began to compete amongst themselves. In addition, many of the Functionalists have been president of the ASA. They have almost exhausted the honors offered by sociology, and are looking elsewhere (to different related disciplines and professions) for new honors. Gouldner

believes all of these factors have contributed to the crisis within Functionalism.

Ritzer's Multiparadigm Sociology

In Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science, Ritzer attempts to identify the dominant partial paradigms within sociology. He identifies three of them: social facts, social definition, and social behavior. Then, he analyzes their internal development and seeks to identify their components. Ritzer views methodology and image of the subject matter as being the primary means of conceptualizing these paradigms. The three partial paradigms are characterized as follows:

1. Social Definition Paradigm: This paradigm includes such theory groups as Symbolic Interactionism and Phenomenology. In this paradigm individuals are viewed as defining their situation. Weber's work is the exemplar.

2. Social Facts Paradigm: This paradigm is composed of such theory groups as Functionalism and Marxism. Members of this paradigm view behavior as directed by social structures. The primary exemplar of this group is Durkheim's work.

3. Social Behavior Paradigm: This paradigm includes Behaviorism and Exchange Theory. The exemplar of this paradigm is the work of B.F. Skinner.

Ritzer (1975, pp.201) acknowledges competition between the paradigms, "each of which is striving to attain dominance within the field." Critics set up "straw men" of their

opponents. In addition proponents exaggerate the explanatory power of their paradigm. Ritzer (1975, pp.189) further claims that sociology has never been a "normal science" in the Kuhnian sense, because "...disciplines of each paradigm are constantly having their basic assumptions questioned by those who accept other paradigms." In sociology, single paradigms cannot be sufficiently developed.

Ritzer also acknowledges that inter-paradigm rivalry is not all bad. Paradigm differences and the debate that follows can lead to clarification. In addition he thinks the debate between paradigm adherents of different paradigms can isolate the best ideas. In general, Ritzer is unhappy with the paradigm differences, and wants sociology to be more unified. The reason he offers is that each of the paradigms is, in itself, incomplete and incapable of adequately explaining any social phenomenon (Ritzer 1975, pp.211).

Friedrichs' Priestly and Prophetic Sociology

In A Sociology of Sociology, Friedrichs distinguishes between two levels of paradigms: first-order and second-order. First-order paradigms are the view that the scientists have of themselves (as scientists). Second-order paradigms are scientists' image of subject matter. Friedrichs divides first-order paradigms into two parts: the prophetic and the priestly. Prophets view themselves as agents of social change. Priests view themselves as "objective"

analysts of their subject matter. Friedrichs believes the first-order paradigm to be the more important of the two, and the second-order paradigms as being dependent on the first order.

According to this view, sociology started out as being mostly prophetic. At the end of WW II, the priestly paradigm emerged. Then, in the late 1960's a new prophetic paradigm emerged because the previous (priestly) paradigm was unable to adequately explain social change and conflict. Friedrichs (1970, pp.296) also believes that "the present paradigmatic battle, if limited to a choice between system and conflict, is more likely to be won by the former." One of the reasons why he believes Functionalism (system) will win is that the increasing use of computers is contributing to the Functionalist theoretical position. Computers permit the researcher to do the kinds of methodological number-crunching that was advocated by the Functionalists in the 1960's. Another reason is that the critics of the system approach use an implicit system approach themselves. Friedrichs believes Functionalism is firmly entrenched in American sociology and is likely to stay there.

Picou et al (1978) and the Stagnation of Rural Sociology

The Picou et al study was an attempt to discern partial paradigms within the field of rural sociology. It offered a content analysis of articles in the journal Rural Sociology

between the years 1965-1976. Here Picou was interested in determining whether rural sociology was experiencing stagnation due to a lack of new ideas.

Picou's study examined both the theoretical and methodological dimensions of the articles. It found that the Functionalist paradigm dominated rural sociology, and that the discipline was stagnate in terms of both theory and methods. A major reason for this situation was the major source of funding was the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). As a result, these researchers then called for an infusion of new ideas into rural sociology, along with a reexamination of funding sources.

Wells & Picou (1981) and the Emergence of a Partial Paradigm

The Wells & Picou (1981) study had many similarities to the Picou et al (1978) work. In Wells & Picou a content analysis of ASR articles was done between the years 1936-1978. The researchers attempted to determine if there was an emerging partial paradigm in the discipline of sociology. The articles were analyzed along four dimensions: type of article, theory, methods, and image of the subject matter. Each dimension had multiple indicators. Other sociologists typologies were used extensively in the construction of this typology. This study found that there was an emerging partial paradigm within sociology. Its conclusion was based on the findings of increasing consensus regarding methodology and image of the

subject matter. For example, the researchers determined that there was an increasing consensus on the use of survey techniques and a system view of the subject matter.

The five studies reviewed so far all have been historical studies of the partial paradigms within sociology. To illustrate some of the disputes, I now summarize several papers that have appeared in the literature.

The Recent Debate in the Literature over Partial Paradigms

Recently, some major advocates of certain partial paradigms have discussed theory and methods. Most of the figures in the debate are classified by Mullins as being members of either Standard American Sociology (SAS) or the New Causal Theory groups. Some of the leading figures in these discussions include Lieberson, Blalock and Lenski. I now briefly summarize each of their arguments.

Lieberson's Concerns over Evidence

Lieberson (1992) expresses concern over the status of sociology as a science. In his article he claims that social scientists are not even sure when their evidence supports or refutes their hypotheses. Such uncertainty makes it difficult to choose between different theories. He also claims that some of our current controversies about evidence are absurdly counterproductive (Lieberson 1992, pp.2), and argues that

sociology should not be fragmented. Lieberson argues for unity in theory, methods, and image of the subject matter.

In addition, Lieberson (1992, pp.7) strongly advocates a probabilistic approach to theorizing: "The first step is to recognize that we are essentially dealing with a probabilistic world and that the deterministic perspective in which most sociological theories are couched and which underlies the notion of a critical test is more than unrealistic, it is inappropriate." Lieberson is concerned that deterministic theories will not adequately describe the world. He thinks the deterministic approach has led to difficulties with confirming or denying theories.

Blalock's Advocacy for a Quantitative Sociology

Blalock (1989) strongly advocates quantitative sociology, believing that it will solve many problems. Ideally, hidden assumptions are made explicit, common sense can be clarified and refined, systematic search procedures developed, intractable problems located, and new theoretical insights obtained (Blalock 1989, pp.447). He insists that conceptualization and measurement is not sufficiently rigorous in sociology. In addition, he believes that the deductive theorizing process is the best one, as deductive reasoning refines common sense. Thus he holds mathematical modeling in high esteem because such models have explicit assumptions. Further, he claims that, while quantitative research has

increased in sociology, the level of math training for students has decreased. He believes that this development has caused a communications gap between teachers and students, and that that gap has increased.

Lenski's Macrosociological Concerns

Lenski (1988) is concerned with the state of macrosociological theories. He has two major complaints. The first is that the theories in macrosociology are not falsifiable. He thinks that for theories to be useful, they have to be falsifiable. His second complaint is that macrosociological theories lack substantive conceptual links to established theories in other scientific disciplines (Lenski 1988, pp.163). In addition, theory construction in general needs more rigor and discipline. He also claims that the lack of rigor in theorizing makes theory building more an art than a science[2].

Lenski is not comfortable with competing theories in sociology. For example, he claims we need only reflect on the muddled state of theory in our field (discipline) to recognize the problem confronting us (Lenski 1988, pp.165). He views science as more than a method of acquiring knowledge; it is a rigorous and highly disciplined mode of reasoning about causal relationships (Lenski 1988, pp.170). Lenski wants social theory to be established, rigorous, and unified.

To sum up these three papers, Blalock wants increased

logical rigor and quantification; Lenski wants increased rigor and conceptual links to other scientific disciplines; and Lieberson wants rigor, quantification, and probabilistic models rather than deterministic ones. As mentioned previously, these three theorists have a common background: SAS and/or New Causal Theory.

Evaluation/Critique of the Sociological Literature on Paradigms.

I now evaluate the material discussed so far. First, I discuss paradigms, introducing a flexible interpretation of Kuhn. Then, I evaluate the debate between theory groups, and finally I evaluate the epistemological and empirical studies. When evaluating epistemological studies, I introduce a new way of looking at how paradigms are possible.

Discussion

The general concept of paradigm is not especially useful for the social sciences. Kuhn meant the concept of paradigm to apply to a scientific discipline that was mostly in a consensus. Sociology, on the other hand, has many theory groups, and if Ritzer is right, marked competition between them. I believe the concept of "partial paradigm" to be much more useful for sociology (as do Wells & Picou). Thus, I will use the term "partial paradigm" in a slightly different

way, referring to paradigms that are competing within a scientific discipline. Ritzer used the same conceptualization, labelling them "paradigms" rather than "partial paradigms." But I have chosen to keep the term "partial paradigms" because in sociology there often is some disagreement within theory groups. As mentioned previously, I use the theory group as a means of conceptualizing partial paradigms. If there is disagreement within theory groups, it makes more sense to call them "partial paradigms" rather than "paradigms".

Evaluation of the Debate Between Theory Groups

Lieberson, Lenski, and Blalock are promoting their ideas of an "improved" sociology. All three are concerned with rigor and unity within the discipline, and they view the competition between partial paradigms as being undesirable. I now address each of these points, beginning with the question of rigor, which seems to be a sensible thing to have within sociology. By scientific rigor, I mean a systematic and careful approach to the study of phenomena. It would be ridiculous to say that rigor is inappropriate for a science. It seems that Blalock's advocacy of rigor is an indicator of his quantitative inclinations. For him at least, rigor means deductive theorizing. But for Lenski, it means that and more: it also means that the theories should be "falsifiable."

When Lenski, Lieberson, and Blalock advocate a rigorous sociology, they really mean that there should be a heavy

emphasis on quantitative research. This, however, seems to be an equivocation of the term "rigor". It is not necessary to have a quantitative approach to be rigorous. I point this position out because it is indicative of the thinking that members of certain partial paradigms have.

These three figures also believe that sociology should be unified. By this they mean there should be an end to the competition between partial paradigms within sociology. The problem with this position is that all of them have different viewpoints. Which partial paradigm should be adopted? There lies the crux of the argument. Theorists agree on some things, disagree on others. Lieberson calls for an end to the "pointless argument" over different theories and methodologies. But I do not view the competition between paradigms as undesirable. Sociology as a whole may never enter the Kuhnian "normal science" phase, but such a phase may indeed occur within a partial paradigm. Evaluation of the Epistemological Studies

I now evaluate the three epistemological studies I summarized previously. The first work I examine is that of Gouldner. I then evaluate the works of Ritzer and Friedrichs. In the second part of this subsection I provide some important background on why paradigms exist.

Gouldner. As I mentioned previously, Gouldner divides sociology into four distinct periods. They include

Positivism, Marxism, Classical Sociology, and Parsonian Structural-Functionalism. Gouldner goes to great pains to discuss the reasons why Functionalism died from within. He claims the Functionalists were really individualists at heart, and this along with other reasons were the cause of its entropy. Gouldner is to be applauded for his implicit discussion of the dialectic within theory groups. Of course, he did not call it a dialectic, but that is really what he seems to mean.

Curiously, the dialectic seems to be more Hegelian than Marxian. When Hegel originally talked about the dialectic, it occurred in geist (Mind) and was the result of a conflict between reason and desire. This seems to be precisely what Gouldner claims happened to Functionalism. He suggests, for example, that its members had achieved the major honors within sociology and then began to look elsewhere. The reason component would be the intellectual commitment to Functionalism, and the desire component would be the longing for honors. When these two components became reconciled, the result was a different kind of Functionalism (New Causal Theory, Neo-Weberianism, etc.). But there seems to be a kind of functional-centrism in Gouldner. Rather than Functionalism being changed from within, it seems more likely that there was pressure from outside. Functionalism may have changed more as a result of competition with other theory groups than from

internal developments.

Ritzer. As mentioned previously, Ritzer identifies three partial paradigms: social facts, social definition, and social behavior. His book is interesting because it analyzes the development of paradigms by examining their components. He makes two important points; the first concerns competition between paradigms, and the second concerns his wish for unity within the discipline.

Ritzer acknowledges competition between partial paradigms, each of which is striving to attain dominance within the field (Ritzer 1975, pp.201). Here I agree with him. It is important to think of partial paradigms as more or less self-contained, and as competing with one another. If there is an internal process that changes a partial paradigm, it was set in motion by an external force.

The second interesting point Ritzer makes is that the partial paradigms are themselves incomplete. The simple fact is that each of the paradigms is, in itself, incomplete and incapable of adequately explaining any social phenomenon (Ritzer 1975, pp.211). He advocates a synthesis of the partial paradigms. The result would be a unified sociology that used the best parts of each of the partial paradigms. Here, I disagree with Ritzer. I think the partial paradigms are able to completely explain phenomena, but only to the satisfaction of strong adherents of the partial paradigm.

Obviously a conflict-theoretic explanation does not satisfy many Functionalists. Within a partial paradigm it seems that there is very little that cannot be explained away. For example, many conflict theorists might say a Functionalist would have difficulty explaining social conflict. But if a Functionalist were asked to explain it, he or she could do so with little effort. Unfortunately, it is quite likely the explanation would be satisfactory only to other Functionalists.

Friedrichs. As I mentioned in a previous section, Friedrichs' typology involves primarily a priest-prophet distinction. The later stages of history are marked by a disappearance of the "system paradigm" (Functionalism) and the ascendancy of the prophetic schools (i.e. Marxism, phenomenology, etc.). The simplicity of the priest-prophet distinction is in a sense attractive. Unfortunately, it seems to be based on the existence of a kind of unrealistic Durkheimian conscience-collective amongst scientists. Friedrichs groups entire theoretic-schools in the priest-prophet typology. It seems highly unlikely that all phenomenologists, exchange theorists, and Marxists see themselves as agents of social change. Many theorists in these schools are in a sense scientifically conservative. Friedrichs' priest-prophet distinction seems to be overstated.

The Absence of Epistemology in the Origin of Paradigms

One glaring problem with each of these three studies is that none of them provide an epistemological argument for how paradigms are possible. Their existence is assumed from the beginning. This assumption is a problem, however, because not everybody believes that paradigms exist. In this section I put forth an argument for their existence. I first discuss the problems of objectivity and rationality. Then I introduce some ideas of Schutz and Wittgenstein that lead to my main points. Once the possibility of paradigms is established, I will be able to define theory and methods in a more satisfactory way.

How Paradigms are Possible

The Problem of Objectivity and Rationality: Schutz's Answer

To produce a believable definition of theory and methods it is necessary to start "at the beginning." It is important to determine how people know certain things, as well as how and why they agree on matters. Alfred Schutz frequently wrote that the state of a human's knowledge is not clear-cut and concise, but is more appropriately described as "cookbook knowledge" or "stock knowledge at hand" (see Schutz, 1964). Human knowledge seems to take the form of hunches, guesses, and habits, as well as "premises" that seem to be both the basis of the knowledge and the results of them.

In Schutz's well known essay on rationality (Schutz 1964, pp.64), he emphasizes that a human's "rationality" is very difficult to define. He also claims that the Parsonian concept of rationality is inherently problematic. Parsons claimed a human was acting rationally if scientists could understand why the person was behaving the way he/she was (if their motivations were clear to the observer) and if the person tried to meet his/her objectives in a scientific manner (Schutz 1964, pp.65). Schutz pointed out (and I think rightfully so) that since a person's knowledge seems to be of the cookbook nature mentioned previously a person could be behaving perfectly sensibly for their circumstances, but still be labeled as "irrational" by Parsons. He argued that to determine if a person is rational it is necessary to consider his/her stock knowledge. Thus it is necessary to study the social context of the person's actions. The theoretical orientation of a human would obviously be both part of the stock knowledge and a result of applying the stock knowledge to experience. The methods humans use for investigating things are also part of the stock knowledge. Again, all of the stock knowledge is mixed with premises that are basically untestable. This means it may be impossible for someone who has a very different stock knowledge to agree with or appreciate another's views. Methods themselves are similarly based on certain assumptions, and it seems that the state of

the "methods" knowledge in a brain is also of such a cookbook state.

Schutz's Life-World

Schutz borrowed the concept of "life-world" from Husserl. The life-world is the taken-for-granted world that permeates a person's mental life. Stock-knowledge is intimately related to the life-world, and the individual uses it to deal with the life-world. But the life-world is also a product of the individual's stock-knowledge. Schutz believed the life-world is taken for granted by the individual, or, in other words, the stock knowledge at hand is rarely consciously reflected upon. Now, according to Turner (1982, pp.397), "Stock knowledge is learned, it is acquired through socialization within a common and cultural world, and it becomes the reality for actors in this world."

So are scientists "rational"? I think any human activity (including science) can be done in an "irrational" manner as well as a "rational" manner depending on the definition used. Probably very little human activity is rational in the Parsonian sense. It seems that the Schutzian model of human activity is more plausible than the Parsonian model. I do not believe that scientists can be completely "objective" and their motives clear-cut.

Assumptions: Is Language the Way Out?

But is not there an end to assumptions? Is not there a point

at which individuals could all agree on something? If the logical positivists[3] were right then it might be possible. For example, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein (1961) claims there is a point in which language can be broken down to "atomic facts". But the acceptance of this work seems also to have a partial basis. It seems that there is no way to escape certain assumptions, and when pressed about these assumptions an individual would have no recourse other than to try to justify them with "scientific" evidence (observations in and of the world). Yet these observations are closely linked to the assumptions themselves.

If a human's knowledge (in this case theory and methods) has the amount of affectivity and "irrational" bases that I think it does, then it is important to ask where the knowledge comes from (i.e. since all of it does not come from a logical process like deduction). One of the more noteworthy assertions in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations was the social nature of all knowledge. This assertion follows an examination of the role that language plays in everyday life. It should be mentioned that this is not completely accepted by many philosophers, and the crux of this disagreement boils down to what has been called the "private language argument."

But if Wittgenstein is right, then the very nature of thinking is a result of the particular language we happen to

use. This position stands in direct opposition to the whole edifice of western philosophy since the Greeks, namely that words stand for ideas in a person's brain. Wittgenstein argues that language determines whether we think of things in the plural or singular, etc. and therefore that concepts and their concomitant constructs are merely agreed-upon ways of expression. In addition, there is no way of stepping outside of language. There is no transcendental point from which it is possible to evaluate the adequacy of one language or form of expression over another in its relation to the noumenal world. So much for "fixing up" our language through science. Kuhn (1977) also mentions the "selective highlighting" aspect of language, as well as the importance of ostension, but does not delve into these aspects in any depth.

The Symbolic Interactionists (such as Blumer) have also claimed that the symbolic communication between individuals defines reality for the people involved. Wittgenstein stresses language rather than the symbolic interactionist's more general concept of "symbolic communication". He believes thinking is nothing more than manipulating linguistic expressions. What makes his approach more useful here is his emphasis on the language users' lack of an idea of how well language reflects reality.[4]

Language seems inherently problematic when used for science. Language cements our assumptions according to the people who

use it, and seems to be at the root of the objectivity problem. I wish to make two major points concerning this objectivity problem and the basis of theory and methods.

Proposition One: Theories and Methods are Tautologies

The first point I wish to make is the essentially tautological character of both theory and methods. Whether or not a particular hypothesis is supported, does not in any way falsify the theoretic perspective itself. In other words, the theoretic perspective is always true regardless of the truth value of the hypotheses. The theoretic perspective is made to be true by posing the "right" kind of question, or by interpreting the evidence in the "right" way. There seems to be no completely detached, objective way of either forming ideas or evaluating them. However, this conclusion itself seems to be based on equally fallible knowledge. If there is any merit to the "test of reflexivity" as such, then this is a serious charge. The way out of this predicament seems to be to claim what Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus, namely that when the reader has realized this much then he/she must recognize the limitations and throw the explanation away. He likened it to ladder that we must throw away once we used it to get to a higher level of understanding.

Proposition Two: Our Stock Knowledge is from our Community

With the summary of this line of thinking I come to my second major point. The reason why people believe the things

they do is mostly because of their significant others, either the people they think are important or who they associate with regularly[5]. This proposition is meant to be a more specific version of what Wittgenstein says, as well as a restatement of Schutz's ideas on phenomenological sociology. I wish to stress, as Wittgenstein does, that language constrains, guides, and comprises our thinking. Because of this role, it is the people with whom we associate and communicate that will ultimately be the test of the intelligibility of our ideas (and whether the ideas are even accepted)[6].

Does this mean that everyone's thinking is merely an effect of his or her environment (language and people)? Probably not. Kuhn seems to think that people are creative in their own way, but a science does not seem to change until a person develops a theory so revolutionary that the other scientists have no way of reconciling their old views with it. This development then leads to a scientific revolution (Kuhn 1962, pp.6-7). While there are creative individuals who change the way people think about things in a fundamental way, they seem to be exceedingly rare (Kuhn cites Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein).

It is important at this point to draw together the two points I have established so far. The first point is that all theory and research methods are tautologies. The second point is that an individual's beliefs are molded and reinforced by

their reference groups and intellectual community. Because of this it is very difficult for, say, a Parsonian Functionalist to convince an orthodox Marxist that he/she is "wrong." Why? Because these individuals are starting with different assumptions, different ways of doing things, different life-worlds, and therefore have different intellectual commitments.

The Implications of the Two Propositions

My two points will now help me to define theory and methods in a more satisfactory way. Social theory is a conceptual apparatus that takes the form of a set of formalized basic assumptions a community of scientists has regarding human behavior. By "formalized" I mean it is understandable by the community. Research methods are a collection of techniques that a community of scientists use for deriving and testing theory. The key here is "community of scientists." The nature of this community is very important. Is a small group of sociologists such a community? The answer to this question is one of the aims of this study.

Summary of the Argument

In this subsection I have attempted to provide a justification for paradigms. The previous epistemological studies have failed to do this. Human knowledge is characterized by untestable assumptions, habits, moods, and recipe-like knowledge. Schutz called such knowledge

stock-knowledge, and theory and methods are part of it. Stock-knowledge is provided through socialization because it is part of the life-world. Scientific stock-knowledge and a life-world become a partial paradigm. Consequently, it is essential to think of methods and theory as being used by certain communities of individuals.

Evaluation of the Empirical Studies

This thesis is an empirical investigation, and therefore I offer my statement of the problem after I review the previous studies. I now evaluate the empirical studies I summarized previously. I first review Picou et al (1978), and then Wells & Picou (1981).

Picou et al (1978)

As mentioned previously, Picou et al examined articles appearing in Rural Sociology and found that rural sociology suffered from theoretical and methodological stagnation. They studied articles from 1965 to 1976, using both a theoretical and methodological dimension. Both dimensions utilized multiple indicators, and the researchers found that there was a particular dominant theoretic viewpoint (SAS) and methodology (survey research).

Their study was informative, and an important predecessor to the Wells & Picou (1981) investigation. It was one of the

very first studies to empirically examine paradigms and to apply the findings in a useful way. The findings were used to call for a change in the kind of theorizing done in rural sociology. Unfortunately, the study was limited because the authors did not focus on the levels of analysis or the types of the articles. In addition, it was of limited use because it covered too short of a time period, and only one journal.

Wells & Picou (1981)

As mentioned previously, Wells & Picou examined ASR articles from 1936 to 1978 and attempted to find an ascendant partial paradigm. They analyzed each article and classified it according to its type, theory, methods, and image of the subject matter. Almost all of the dimensions used multiple indicators, and each indicator was a modification of other researchers' typologies.

While many parts of the study were very carefully done, there were doubts over the generalizability of the findings because only ASR was used for the articles (Bierstedt, 1983). Still, their study was a major influence on this thesis, and I have used several parts of it as templates for my thesis. In the next chapter I elaborate on the differences and my modifications and improvements.

Development of the Problem Statement

Both the epistemological and the empirical studies have not done justice to the multiplicity of the different partial

paradigms. They seem to have focused mostly on a dominant or emerging/disappearing partial paradigm. As a consequence, I believe they have not adequately emphasized the conflict aspect of theory groups. Thus, I intend to empirically investigate two aspects of the historical development of partial paradigms. The first is the paradigmatic state of the field of social stratification. The second aspect is the changes, via interparadigm conflict, that the partial paradigms are undergoing.

This thesis is a descriptive approach to the analysis of differing partial paradigms within the field of social stratification. I examine the similarities and differences between different partial paradigms, and also offer an explanation for the changes in the partial paradigms. The explanation, however, is only meant to be a conjecture, and is not a formally tested hypothesis.

Though this study treats social stratification, the results could be applied to the discipline of sociology in general. I believe the field of social stratification to be representative of the discipline of sociology, and therefore the results of this thesis can be generalized to the field of sociology.

Chapter 2

Research Methodology

Overview of Chapter

In this chapter I discuss the methodology utilized in this thesis. I begin with a review of the previous methodologies used in empirical studies of paradigms. Then I review some of the critiques of these methodologies. Finally I elaborate on my methods, beginning with the instrument and ending with the sampling techniques. My methodology will consist of content analysis of the American Sociological Review (ASR) and the American Journal of Sociology (AJS) between 1953 and 1989, which will allow me to measure the partial paradigms that were exemplified by the journal articles. To a large extent, this approach is very similar to that of Wells & Picou (1981).

Previous Methodologies in Empirical Studies of Paradigms

There have been two important empirical studies of paradigms within sociology. The first is the Picou et al (1978) study, which treated rural sociology articles. The other is the Wells & Picou (1981) study, in which the paradigmatic content of sociology as a whole was examined. I now summarize both studies and discuss the pros and cons of each.

Picou et al (1978)

Picou et al (1978) did a content analysis of articles in

the journal Rural Sociology from 1965 to 1976. The researchers classified articles according to two dimensions in an effort to discern any changes in the partial paradigms within the field of rural sociology. The first treated theory, and the second treated methods. I now summarize each of these dimensions.

The theory dimension was measured with two indicators. The first was the theory typology of Ritzer (1975). As mentioned in Chapter One, it divided sociology into three paradigm groups: social facts, social definition, and social behavior. The second indicator used in the theory dimension was an eight theory-group adaptation of Mullins' typology. There was a mixture category for both of these typologies.

The methods dimension was measured by a simple typology that divided methods into three types. These three types of methods included experimental/quasi-experimental, observation, and sample survey/questionnaires/interviews. Mixtures of methods types were rare, and therefore excluded. The study conducted a census of 242 articles from 1965-1976. The researchers excluded brief articles, research notes, and commentaries, but included presidential addresses. Of the articles considered, 156 (64 percent) had identifiable theory and/or methods components (1978, pp.564).

To sum up, Picou et al used two dimensions: theory and methods. The theory dimension used two indicators; Mullins'

typology and Ritzer's typology. The methods dimension was comprised of three categories. Picou et al did a census rather than a random sample, since they only had 242 articles to analyze.

Wells & Picou (1981)

Wells & Picou (1981) examined sociology as a whole, rather than a field, seeking to determine if there was an emerging partial paradigm within the discipline. The researchers examined articles in the American Sociological Review (ASR) from 1936 to 1979. Each article was classified along four general dimensions. Three of the four were used to conceptualize the paradigm, and one was used as an additional variable, which was the type of article. The types included fourteen categories that ranged from empirical tests to literature reviews.

The first and second dimensions. The first paradigm dimension used in this study was the type of article, while the second dimension was the theoretical dimension. This dimension was measured using two indicators. The first was the theory group as outlined by Mullins (1973), which included eight groups that ranged from Standard American Sociology (SAS) to Ethnomethodology. The second theory indicator was an eleven-category "theoretical viewpoint" typology as outlined by Wallace (1969), which included ecologism, demographism, materialism, psychologism, and technologism, to name a few.

In addition Wells & Picou were interested in how the theory was utilized. They used the typology of Cole (1975) that utilized categories like "authoritative" and "hypothesis development" to describe how the theory was employed in the articles.

The third dimension. The third dimension used by Wells and Picou was the methodology, and it also had two indicators. The first was the data gathering methods. To measure this they derived nine types of data gathering methods, ranging from "historical review of documents" to "experiments". (This nine-category typology was a modification of Snizek (1975)). The second indicator measured the types of analysis techniques. Types of analysis techniques were measured by McCartney's (1970) twelve-category typology. The categories ranged from "frequencies, percentages, averages, and standard deviations" to "Markov chain models".

The fourth dimension. The final dimension measured was the image of the subject matter. Again, this dimension was measured by two indicators. The first indicator was the "analytic image of the social". To measure it they used four basic images of the social as introduced by Wallace (1969). These four categories included "objective definitions and imposed explanations of the social" and "subjective definitions and socially generated explanations of the social." The second indicator was an eleven-category measure

of the unit of analysis, which was originally introduced by Olsen (1978). Some of the categories in his typology included "individuals/roles," "populations," and "societies."

Since the researchers were dealing with a much larger number of articles, they elected to do a stratified random sample of 27 percent of the articles for each year. Between 1936 and 1978, 2,619 articles were identified. There were 43 sampling strata (each stratum was a year). All articles in each volume were numbered, and 27 percent were randomly selected, yielding a grand total of 707 articles that were analyzed.

To sum up, Wells & Picou did a content analysis of articles appearing in ASR between 1936-1978. Each article was classified according to four dimensions; type-of-article, theory, methods, and image-of-the-subject-matter. All dimensions but the type-of-article were measured using multiple indicators. The articles were sampled using stratified random sampling. In a later section I discuss this in greater detail.

Critiques and Reviews of Picou et al (1978) and Wells & Picou (1981)

There have been at least two critiques and/or reviews of the aforementioned studies. The first was Bealer's (1978) critique of Picou et al, and the second was Bierstedt's (1983)

review of Wells & Picou. I now summarize the critique and the review.

Bealer's (1978) critique of Picou et al (1978). Bealer expresses skepticism over Picou et al's results. He is unhappy with both their interpretation of the data, and their conclusions. He is also dissatisfied with their denunciation of the dominance of SAS in the field of rural sociology.

Bealer claims that they equated Ritzer's social facts paradigm and Mullins' SAS. Because of the "confusion", Bealer claimed they had misinterpreted some of the data, amounting to approximately 15 percent of the overall sample. In addition, he is unhappy with their dismissal of 34 percent of the articles as being purely methodological and therefore not useful for analysis. The part of their study that Bealer dislikes most is their value judgments and conclusions. He claims there is nothing wrong with Functionalism dominating rural sociology, if indeed this is the case. In addition, he views plurality in theoretic viewpoints as being undesirable; Bealer (1978, pp.590) claims "diversity in paradigms has not led yet to success."

To summarize, Bealer sees nothing wrong with Functionalism dominating rural sociology, and therefore questions their call for a pluralistic rural sociology. In addition, he believes the combination of Ritzer's typology and Mullins' typology caused Picou et al to confuse SAS and the social facts para-

digm.

Bierstedt. Bierstedt (1983) reviewed the Wells & Picou (1981) study. He is generally quite complimentary of the study, though he has at least two criticisms. The first is the fact that "fitting content into categories inevitably involves subjective judgments, especially when the number of categories is large." (Bealer 1983, pp.294). The second critique is that the kind of partial paradigm that Wells & Picou claim is emerging is unclear. Bierstedt is not sure if it is one of many partial paradigms or a part of a single full paradigm.

Discussion

In this subsection I intend to address three problems with the aforementioned studies and their critics. The first is the theory-dimension problem raised over Picou et al's (1978) study. The second deals with Bierstedt's concern over subjectivity during classification in Wells & Picou (1981), and the third concerns Wells & Picou's use of ASR as a source of articles.

The use of Ritzer's and Mullins' typologies as multiple theory indicators does present problems, but Bealer's concerns are based on his confusion regarding the differences between SAS and social facts paradigm as outlined by Picou et al. SAS is a subset of the social facts paradigm, and was not meant

to be equated with the social facts paradigm (as Picou et al point out in their reply to Bealer). I believe the use of more than one indicator for the theory dimension to be unnecessary. Classifying an article in either typology requires a subjective judgment, and it is unlikely both typologies would provide any additional insight.

The second problem concerns Bierstedt's comment on subjectivity and multiple categories. Subjectivity need not be a problem as long as the judgments are consistent. In addition, the use of multiple categories is not a problem. Frequently it becomes necessary to collapse categories later on in the data analysis. If an article is classified incorrectly, the probability is very good it will be placed in a category close to the correct one. In addition, when categories are collapsed, frequently many similar categories become a new category. Even though there may be many categories to begin with (and erroneous classifications), if the categories are collapsed there will be a substantial reduction in error.

The third problem concerns Wells & Picou's use of ASR. While the prestige associated with this journal cannot be disputed, it seems to me that ASR may not be altogether representative of the discipline of sociology. A more representative sample of articles could be obtained if other journals are used as well. ASR seems to have had a reputation as leaning more

towards quantitative methodologies. If ASR were used together with another journal, a more representative sample could be obtained.

To summarize, there are two important objections certain critics have raised regarding Picou et al (1978) and Wells & Picou (1981). The first is Bealer's concern with the use of two theory typologies used for the theory dimension, and the second is Bierstedt's problem with subjectivity and multiple categories. Bealer's concern is justified, but not in the way he thinks. His concern is not a major problem as long as care is taken in the data analysis. Finally, the use of ASR as the sole source of articles biases the findings. It seems wise to use more than one journal in constructing the sample.

Development of Methodology: My Taxonomy

After reviewing Picou et al (1978) and Wells & Picou (1981), I decided to model my study largely after the Wells & Picou study. In the remainder of this chapter I develop my methodology. Even though I modeled my study after Wells & Picou, there still are some important differences.

The first difference regards the focus of the study. My study is of the field of social stratification, as opposed to their focus on the entire discipline of sociology. My sampling is primarily a stratified random approach, whereas Wells & Picou did a census. In addition, I have modified some of their

taxonomy dimensions as to allow for possible new content of the articles. These modifications are necessary to successfully determine the newer partial paradigms in the field of social stratification. Finally, I have eliminated some of the multiple indicators that Wells & Picou used. This step was necessary because of the difficulty of operationalizing the indicators. In the next few sections I will develop the four dimensions of my taxonomy, starting with the "type" dimension and ending with the "level-of-analysis" dimension.

Dimension One: The Type-of-Article Dimension

The first is the "type of article" dimension. This dimension has four categories. The first is theory related empirical studies. This category covers studies which use both theories and methods. The second is theory development and/or discussion, concept clarification. This category covers articles that use only theory. The third is empirical or historical research without explicit utilization of theory. This category applies to studies that have no explicit theory, just research methods, and includes statistical-technique discussion articles and observations transformed into interpretive or empirical generalizations without the explicit use of theory. The last category is for other articles, which do not fall under the first three. This dimension is a modification of the "type" dimension used by

Wells & Picou (1981).

Dimension Two: The Theory Dimension

The second dimension of my taxonomy will measure the theory group used in the article. The measurement of the theory dimension should be unambiguous and accurate. I now examine the various theory typologies that have appeared in the literature.

A review of previous theory typologies. Several authors have introduced theory typologies in sociology. Some of the authors include Poloma (1979), Kerbo (1991), Wallace (1969), Martindale (1960), and Mullins (1973). I now briefly review each of these typologies, beginning with Poloma and ending with Mullins.

The taxonomy of Poloma as outlined in her book, Contemporary Sociological Theory, is comprised of two variables or dimensions. The first is a naturalism vs. humanism dimension. This dimension is used to discern the objective or the subjective scientific approaches. The second is a priest vs. prophet dimension. This dimension came from Friedrichs (1970). The priest-prophet distinction was outlined earlier in Chapter One.

Kerbo (1991) also introduced a simple typology. The typology that Kerbo (1991) uses also has two dimensions. The first is a critical vs. uncritical dimension (the value assumptions of the theorist) and the second is an order vs.

conflict dimension.

The typology used by Wallace (1969) is comprised of eight categories. These include ecologism, demographism, materialism, psychologism, technologism, the social Structuralism (functional, exchange, and conflict), Symbolic Interactionism, and an unnamed category. Wallace (1969, pp.16) classifies theories into his eight categories by asking:

> What are the principal phenomena that explain the social? Are they imposed on the social of generated by the social? Is this done via characteristics of the participant's environments or of the participants themselves? Are these characteristics principally people,not people, nervous system, or not nervous system?

Wells & Picou used this typology.

Martindale's typology categorizes theories according to their philosophical origins. Some of his types of sociological thought include positivistic organicism, conflict theory, the "formal school of sociological theory," social behaviorism, and sociological Functionalism. Mullins' typology is not a typology per se, but rather a kind of life cycle model of different sociological traditions. He identifies eight theory groups, which include Standard American Sociology (SAS), Symbolic Interactionism, Structuralism, Radical-Critical

Theory, Small Group Theory, social forecasting, and Ethnomethodology. In addition, he finds distinct stages through which each tradition passes.

Evaluation and Critique . None of these typologies are necessarily problematic in themselves, but most have inadequacies that would make them less than ideal for my study. I now evaluate each of them.

The main problem with the Poloma typology is the enormous difficulty one is faced with when operationalizing its different dimensions. If a study such as mine is to have any kind of validity or reliability, the operationalizations of the variables must be as rigorous as possible. Through pilot studies I know that using a typology like Poloma's would be too difficult and prone to classification error.

Kerbo's typology is also quite difficult to operationalize. A pilot study I did using a typology with similar dimensions indicated enormous difficulties in distinguishing the critical vs. uncritical dimension. In addition, the order vs. conflict dimension may be too general to be of much use.

The typology of Wallace is interesting, but I must discard this one as well. As with the others, it also would be very difficult to operationalize. If one managed to operationalize his typology, it is likely that it would not be rigorous enough for a study such as mine. Too many subjective judgments are used in the classification. This problem has been

recognized by Martel (1961, pp.338), who believes "definition of the schools (of thought) are methodologically imprecise."

The typology used by Martindale is a little too complex. Precision is not my primary concern with his taxonomy, but simplicity is. The complexity of the categories in his typology makes it difficult to operationalize them. Though his typology may be a reasonably good one, I must discard it and set my sights on an easier one.

Mullins' taxonomy would be fairly easy to operationalize because he provides listings of the theorists associated with each of his eight theory groups. By noting who is cited in the theory development part of an article, I can identify the theoretical origins of the author(s). This technique has been used successfully in at least two other studies. (see e.g. Wells and Picou 1981; Picou et al 1978). I therefore decided to use Mullins' typology for my study.

<u>The theory group dimension of my taxonomy.</u> The second dimension of my taxonomy is the "theory group" dimension. This dimension is a modification of Mullins' eight-fold typology. My version of this dimension includes two additional categories. The two additional categories are Neo-Marxism/conflict theory group and Neo-Weberian theory group. In my analysis the theory dimension consists of twelve categories. They include:

1. Standard American Sociology (SAS).
2. Symbolic Interactionism.
3. New Causal Theory.
4. Structuralism.
5. Radical-Critical Theory.
6. Small Group Theory.
7. Social Forecasting.
8. Ethnomethodology.
9. Neo-Marxism/conflict theory.
10. Neo-Weberian theory.
11. Other.
12. None.

The "Other" category covers those theory groups which do fall under any of the others, while "None" is reserved for those articles that have no theory (purely methodological articles).

In this dimension I classify articles by two means. The first step is to classify the article according to the modal type of author cited. Here I look up the cited authors in Mullins' lists of authors. For example, if the sample article cited mostly Symbolic Interactionists, I consider it a Symbolic Interactionist article. In the second step, as a check for the first step, I make sure the article's content is consistent with the citations included in it. For example, if

the authors cite mostly Symbolic Interactionists, but the article itself does not give the impression of being Symbolic Interactionist, it is not coded as such. The article is coded according to the most appropriate theory group that was cited.

Dimension Three: the Methodology Dimension

The third dimension utilized to classify the articles is the methodology dimension. Here, I use two indicators; the data gathering methods and the data analysis techniques. To classify the data gathering dimension I use the following fourteen categories:

1. Historical review of documents & Review of records.
2. Other's studies.
3. Systematic content analysis.
4. Informant.
5. Observation.
6. Census data.
7. Other demographics data.
8. Experiments.
9. Self-reports.
10. Interviews.
11. Undefined survey.
12. Questionnaire.
13. Other.

14. None.

"Other's studies" are secondary analyses of existing data and surveys done by others plus any written studies based on that data. "Review of records" examined official statistics, e.g. arrest records, the Uniform Crime Report (UCR), etc. "Informant" refers to data gathering by asking somebody to rate or evaluate either something or somebody else. "Observation" refers to the researcher's observations, usually based upon ethnographic research. "Census data" refers to studies that utilize data from the national census. "Self reports" refers to the self-reported experiences of the subjects. "Other demographics data" refers to studies that use census-like demographics data such as economic or statistical abstracts. "Undefined survey" is used for articles that simply state that "a survey" was used, without informing the reader what kind. The "other" category is used for any gathering methods that do not fall under the other types. This dimension is a modification of the one used by Wells & Picou (1981).

The second indicator consists of the data analysis techniques and consists of the following thirteen categories:

1. Frequencies, percentages, averages, standard deviations.
2. Simple correlation, critical ratio, "t" test,

probability estimates.

3. Chi-square.
4. Anova, F, factor analysis.
5. Multiple/partial correlation, covariance.
6. Regression, path analysis.
7. Sample quotes, typical statements, etc.
8. Indices of similarity/dissimilarity/density states, indices, scores.
9. Stochastic models (Markov models, etc.)
10. Proportions, tau, rho, gamma.
11. Smallest space, cluster analysis, log-linear models, time-series.
12. Other.
13. No discernible method.

The "Other" category is used for analytical techniques that are not covered by the other categories. This indicator is essentially identical to the one used in Wells & Picou (1981).

Dimension Four: the Level-of-Analysis Dimension

The fourth dimension is the "level of analysis." This dimension consists of the following seventeen categories:

1. Individuals/roles.
2. Populations/aggregations.

3. Religion.
4. Race.
5. Ethnicity.
6. Gender.
7. Economic classes.
8. Groups.
9. Families.
10. Communities/neighborhoods.
11. Associations/organizations.
12. Societies/countries.
13. Social artifacts.
14. Geographical region.
15. Status.
16. Other.
17. No discernible level of analysis.

The "Other" category is used for levels of analysis that do not fall into the other categories. The level is coded primarily by determining the unit of analysis, and secondarily by the context of the study. This step is necessary because the unit of analysis does not always indicate what is really being examined in the study. Both of these indicators are essentially extensions of the ones used by Wells & Picou.

The Sampling Technique

As mentioned previously, this study analyzes stratification

articles. In order to obtain a representative sample, I elected to use articles from both the American Sociological Review (ASR) and the American Journal of Sociology (AJS). I believe this approach to be an improvement over the Wells & Picou design, which used only the ASR.

My sampling frame was the period 1953-1990. One of the reasons why the starting date of 1953 was selected was that was the first year that the AJS was covered by the Social Science Index (SSI). The SSI was used as a tool for generating the sample (see below), and 1990 was selected as the ending year so that the study would include the most recent developments in the stratification field. Given the potentially large number of relevant articles, I decided to do a 33 percent probability sample rather than a complete census.

To determine what constitutes a 'stratification' article, I used the SSI and looked under the subject heading of "Social Stratification." But there were no entries under that heading. Instead, it reads "See Social classes, social status." Consequently, I examined those articles under the "Social Classes" and "Social Status" headings.

All relevant articles from 1953 to 1990 were enumerated, and a random number generator was used to choose 33 percent of the articles for study. Of the 507 articles appearing in ASR and AJS from 1953-1990, 171 articles (33.5 percent) were randomly

chosen. Care was taken to avoid literature reviews and other similar articles. The random nature of the sample requires explanation. Originally, I began with a non-stratified random sample (from 1953-90). When preliminary frequency tabulations were run on the data, it became apparent that, by chance, the 1983-1990 period was undersampled. As a result, 13 more articles were randomly chosen from the 1983-1990 period, resulting in a total of 170 (33 percent).

To sum up, I sampled articles in both the ASR and the AJS, using the SSI to select stratification studies. I selected a 33 percent overall random sample, with a small correction for the 1983-1990 period.

A Final Note: the Use of Ideal Types

As a final note, I think it is important to defend the use of ideal types in this type of study. The utilization of such a taxonomy implies the acceptance by the researcher of ideal types. But to justify the use of ideal types requires an examination of their nature.

Weber defined ideal types as including a one-sided accentuation of certain aspects of a thing. Ideal types are therefore closely related to concepts. The use of ideal types usually requires an explicit statement of specific essences or aspects of the concept. Ideal types seem to be the best way to operationally define a concept. For any study to be precise, it must utilize concepts that have been carefully

defined. For a empirical study to utilize precisely defined concepts, ideal types are necessary.

Summary of my Methodology

In the beginning of this chapter I introduced the methodologies used in the Wells & Picou (1981) and Picou et al (1978) studies. I then discussed a few problems with their work. In the second half of this section I elaborated on my methodology, which is very similar to that used by Wells & Picou, but with a few differences. One of the most important is that they have studied all articles within ASR, whereas I have examined stratification articles in both ASR and AJS. They include more categories for the methodology and level of analysis sections than do I. Another difference is that I elected to study the years 1953-1990, whereas Wells & Picou studied 1936-1978. A final difference is that I have taken a 33 percent probability sample (overall, with a small correction for 1983-90), while Wells & Picou chose a stratified random sample (27 percent) of the articles within each year.

Chapter 3

Data Analysis and findings.

Introduction

In this chapter I present the data and findings of my research. It is divided into four sections. The first section gives characteristics of the sample. In the second section I present the frequency tabulations of each of my four dimensions over time. The third section provides cross-tabulation tables of theory groups by the other three dimensions over time, and in the fourth section I focus on a brief interpretation of the data, and suggest that the theory groups evolve through certain phases.

Characteristics of the Sample

As mentioned in the previous chapter, my sample consisted of 170 articles randomly drawn from a universe of 507 articles. The data were examined in four time periods: 1953-62, 1963-72, 1973-82, and 1983-90, and the articles were distributed as follows: 45 articles from 1953-62, 37 from 1963-72, 54 from 1973-82, and 21 from 1983-90. Since there were only 21 articles from 1983-90 in the initial sampling, I oversampled the 1983-90 period and increased the number to 34.

Only one article was coded as "Other" in the type-of-article dimension. The other three dimensions exhibited some mixture

of types. In general, though, the vast majority of the articles were coded in the regular distinct categories. As I shall soon show, the mixtures in the theory dimension are of particular interest to this thesis. In addition, after initial tabulations were performed, I found that there were no Ethnomethodology articles, and therefore that category was eliminated from the tables.

Frequency Tabulations of the Four Dimensions Over Time

Article Types

Of the 170 articles, 131 (77 percent) were classified as theory-related empirical studies, 26 (15.3 percent) were theory development/discussion or concept clarification, 12 (7 percent) were methodological/atheoretical articles, and 1 article was classified as "Other." The distribution of article types over time is given in Table 3.1 (pp. 63). During 1953-62, 64 percent of the articles were theory-related empirical studies, 20 percent were theory development/concept clarification articles, 13 percent were methodological/atheoretical articles, and two percent were "Other." About 26 percent of the sample came from the 1953-62 period. The significance of these findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Theoretical Foundations of Articles

The distribution of theory types over time is given in Table

3.2 (pp.64). The theoretical foundations of the sample (from 1953-1990) are as follows (Table 3.2). Forty-eight percent were classified as Standard American Sociology. Twenty one percent as New Causal Theory, nine percent as Neo-Marxian-/conflict Theory, five percent as Small Group Theory, five percent as Symbolic Interactionism, two percent as Structuralist, one percent as Radical-Critical Theory, one percent as Social Forecasting, and one as Neo-Weberian. There were some combinations of theory groups as well. Two percent of the articles used both Standard American Sociology and Symbolic Interactionism. One percent used New Causal and Small Group Theory, three percent used New Causal and Neo--marxism/conflict, one percent used New Causal and Neo-Weberian, and one percent used Neo-Marxian/Neo-Weberian. In addition, 12 percent of the articles were classified as "other." Seven percent of the articles used no theory because they were purely methodological articles. Figures 3.1-3.2 (pp.80-81) show line-graphs of the percentage of all articles containing certain theory groups over time. The significance of these figures will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Methodology Dimension

The first indicator: Data Gathering Methods. The data gathering methods of the sample (from 1953-90) are as follows: 45 percent of the articles used a survey, 16 percent

used no discernible methods, 13 percent used census or demographic data, and nine percent of the articles used historical review of documents, reviews of public records, and other studies. Eight percent used mixtures (combinations), five percent used experiments, two percent used informants or observational methods, one percent of the articles used content analysis, and one percent used "Other." The distribution of data gathering methods over time is given in Table 3.3 (pp.65). The significance of these findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

The second indicator: Data Analysis Techniques. The data analysis techniques (from 1953-90) included 34 different techniques. Of the studies that employed data analysis techniques, the most common techniques were simple percents 46 percent, frequencies 39 percent, regression 21 percent, chi-square 19 percent, and simple correlation 11 percent. Of the studies employing specific analysis techniques, most of them used more than one technique. The distribution of the analysis techniques over time is given in Table 3.4 (pp.66-67). The significance of these findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. In future tables, for the sake of clarity and convenience I have collapsed the data analysis techniques into two broad categories: descriptive and modeling. See key for details.

Level-of-Analysis Dimension

Sixteen distinct levels of analysis were employed in the 1953-1990 period. These levels can be grouped into nine general types. The most common levels of analysis were societies/countries 19 percent, class/status strata 16 percent, populations/aggregations 13 percent, and communities-/neighborhoods 11 percent. The levels of analysis distributions over time can be found in Table 3.5 (pp.68). As with the data analysis techniques dimension, I have collapsed the level of analysis dimension into four categories for the sake of clarity. See the key for details (pp.15). The significance of these findings will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

Theory group changes over time

As mentioned previously, I believe particular emphasis should be placed on the theoretical dimension of partial paradigms. In this section, I present tables showing the use of various article types, methodologies, and levels of analysis by each theory group. I first examine the article types used in each theory group. Then I show the methodology (both indicators) and the levels of analysis used in the theory groups.

Theory Groups by Types of Articles

Table 3.6 (pp.69-70) shows the use of the different types of articles in each theory group over time. Overall, 79 of the

articles employing Standard American Sociology were theory-related empirical studies and about 19 were purely theoretical. For Symbolic Interactionism, 75 were theory-related empirical studies and 25 were purely theoretical. New Causal Theory had 91 of the studies were theory-related empirical studies, and 9 were purely theoretical. For both Structuralism and Radical-Critical Theory all of the articles were theory-related empirical studies. In Small Group Theory 70 percent were theory-related empirical studies, and 30 percent of the studies were purely theoretical. The single Social Forecasting article was a theory-related empirical study. For Conflict/Neo-Marxism, 78 percent were theory-related empirical studies, and 22 percent were purely theoretical studies. For Neo-Weberian Theory, 40 percent were theory-related empirical studies, and 60 percent were purely theoretical. The articles falling into the "Other" category were mostly theory-related empirical studies (86 percent), with 14 percent being purely theoretical.

Theory Groups by Data Analysis Techniques

In Table 3.7 (pp.71-73) I show how the theory groups used the various data analysis techniques. Overall, SAS used mostly simple descriptive methods, but the use of model building techniques increased significantly over time. For Symbolic Interactionism, simple descriptive techniques were most popular, with a slight increase in modeling techniques by

the time it ends in the 1970s. New Causal Theory used modeling techniques more than any other theory group. Conversely, the Structuralists seemed to start principally with modeling, but later utilized mostly descriptive techniques. Radical-Critical Theory and Small Group Theory only used descriptive methods. The single Social Forecasting article used modeling techniques. Neo-Marxism used mostly descriptive methods in the 1960s, but has recently increased the usage of modeling techniques. Neo-Weberian Theory used more modeling techniques than descriptive methods. Atheoretical articles used mostly descriptive methods in the beginning, but increased the use of modeling techniques in the 1970s.

Theory Groups by Data Gathering Methods

In Table 3.8 (pp.74-76) I have presented the data gathering methods used by the different theory groups over time. SAS has always relied upon survey techniques, but began using census/demographics data more until its demise in the 1980s. Symbolic Interactionism favored mostly survey and informant/observation in the 1950s, but seems to has increasingly relied on experiments and survey by the 1960s. New Causal Theory overwhelmingly favored survey methods initially, and then used more census/demographics in later periods. Structuralists used only survey methods and experiments. Radical-Critical Theory used only census/demographics.

Small group Theory used mostly experiments, but has also used survey methods. The single Social Forecasting article used census/demographics. Neo-Marxism/conflict Theory used both survey and census/demographics, but now relies more upon survey methods, while Neo-Weberian Theory has only utilized survey methods. "Other" articles were mostly mixed between census/demographics, content analysis/other's studies, and survey methods. Atheoretical (i.e. articles with no explicit theory) articles seemed to favor census/demographics.

Level of Analysis

In Table 3.9 (pp.77-79) I present the levels of analysis used by the different theory groups over time. SAS began by focusing on collectivities. But, in the 1960s it began to focus mostly on class. Symbolic Interactionism focused mostly on medium, and later on small, collectivities. New Causal Theory has used status and medium/small collectivities. Structuralists were mostly using large collectivities, but the size of the sample is too small to be of much use. Radical-Critical Theory employed mostly large and medium collectivities. Small Group Theory favored small collectivities. The Social Forecasting article used large collectivities. Neo-Marxism/Conflict focused mostly on class and large collectivities, as did Neo-Weberian Theory. The "other" category was characterized by a fairly even distribution among all levels of analysis, and the atheoretical

articles focused mostly on large collectivities.

Interpretation/Summary

From a preliminary view of the cross-tab tables, it seems that certain theory groups have changed over time in interesting ways. For example, SAS seems to have dramatically diminished in the 1960s with a brief flurry of model building techniques. But New Causal Theory, the successor of SAS (Mullins 1973, pp.217), has always stressed them. Neo-Marxism began with mostly simple techniques, but has recently increased the use of modeling techniques that seem to have coincided with the weakening position of New Causal Theory in the 1980s. These developments lead me to believe that the theory group partial paradigms have interacted in ways that have affected the types, methods, and level of analysis dimensions of certain partial paradigms. In the next chapter I discuss these developments in greater detail, and introduce a tentative model of theory group development.

Table 3.1. Number of Articles (N) by Time Period & Article Type (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		totals	
Type of article:	N	%[a]	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A	29	64	30	81	46	85	26	76	131	77
B	9	20	3	8	6	11	8	23	26	15
C	6	13	4	10	2	3	0	0	12	7
D	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Totals:	45	100	37	100	54	100	34	100	170	100
% of total n(=170):		26		22		32		20		100

[a] % by columns

Key:
A=Theory-related empirical studies.
B=Theory development and discussion/concept clarification articles.
C=Methodological/Atheoretical articles, (no explicit theory).
D=Other.

Table 3.2. Number of Articles (N) by Time Period & Theory Group (1953-90)

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Type of theory:	N	%[a]	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
SAS	23	51	17	45	7	12	1	2	48	28
SI	5	11	2	5	1	1	0	0	8	5
NC	0	0	5	13	24	44	6	17	35	21
Str	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	5	3	2
R-C	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	2	1
SG	2	4	0	0	2	3	5	14	9	5
SFor	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
Marx	0	0	1	2	10	18	5	14	16	9
NWeb	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	1
SAS/SI	2	4	1	2	1	1	0	0	4	2
NC/SG	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1
NC/Marx	0	0	0	0	1	1	4	11	5	3
NC/Web	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	2	1
NM/Web	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	5	2	1
Other	6	13	7	18	4	7	4	11	21	12
No Theory	7	15	3	8	2	3	0	0	12	7
Totals:	45	100	37	100	54	100	34	100	170	100
% of total n(=170):		26		22		32		20		100

[a] % by columns

Key:

SAS=Standard American Sociology (Functionalist school)

SI=Symbolic Interactionism. NC=New Causal (A version of SAS).

STR=Structuralism. R-C=Radical/Critical Theory SG=Small Group

SFor=Social Forecasting. Marx=Neo-Marxism/conflict Theory.

NWeb=Neo-Weberian Theory SAS/SI=Mixture of Symbolic Int. & SAS.

NC/SG=Mixture of New causal and Small Group. NC/Mar=New Causal/Marx.

NC/Web=New Causal & Neo-Weberian Theory Other=Unidentifiable theory.

Table 3.3. Number of Articles (N) by Time Period & Data Gathering Methods (1953-90).

Type of data gathering methods:	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
	N	%[a]	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
A	2	4	5	13	5	9	4	11	16	9
B	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	2	1
C	4	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2
D	17	37	20	54	26	48	14	41	77	45
E	4	8	5	13	12	22	1	2	22	13
F	2	4	2	5	1	1	3	8	8	5
G	5	11	2	5	3	5	3	8	13	8
Other	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
No method	10	22	3	8	6	11	8	23	27	16
Totals:	45	100	37	100	54	100	34	100	170	100
% of total n(=170):		26		22		32		20		100

[a] % by columns.

Key:
A=Historical review of documents, review of records, other's studies.
B=Content Analysis. C=Informants, observational techniques.
D=Survey research. E=Census, demographics data.
F=Experiments. G=Mixture of gathering methods.

Table 3.4. Number of Articles (N) by Time period & Data Analysis Technique (1953-90). Part I*.

Data analysis techniques:	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Frequencies	21	47	25	68	18	33	2	6	66	39
Percents	23	51	28	76	15	28	12	35	78	46
Means	1	2	1	3	8	15	4	12	14	8
Standard Deviation	0	0	0	0	5	9	3	9	8	5
Correlation	3	7	4	11	9	17	2	6	18	11
Critical Ratio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T-test	0	0	2	5	1	2	0	0	3	2
Prob. estimates	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chi-square	14	31	11	30	5	9	2	6	32	19
ANOVA	1	2	1	3	0	0	1	3	3	2
F-test	0	0	3	8	5	9	1	3	9	5
Factor Analysis	0	0	1	3	0	0	1	3	2	1
Mult/part correl.	0	0	5	14	3	6	2	6	10	6
Covariance	0	0	1	3	1	2	0	2	2	1
Regression	1	2	1	3	23	43	11	32	36	21
Path analysis	0	0	1	3	6	11	1	3	8	5
Sample quotes	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	1
Typical statements	8	18	0	0	4	7	5	15	17	10
Indices of simil.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indices of dissim.	1	2	1	3	2	4	0	0	4	2
Density states	0	0	0	0	2	4	0	0	2	1

Note: % by column.

(Continued)

Table 3.4 Continued. Number of Articles (N) by Time Period & Data Analysis Technique (1953-90)*.

Data analysis techniques:	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Scores	2	4	1	3	4	7	2	6	9	5
Indices	6	13	2	5	0	0	0	0	8	5
Stochastic models	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	3	2	1
Mann-Whitney U	1	2	0	0	1	2	2	6	4	2
Proportions	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1
Tau	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Rho	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	1	1
Smallest space	0	0	1	3	0	0	2	6	3	2
Cluster Analysis	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	3	2	1
Gamma	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	3	2	1
Log-linear model	0	0	0	0	3	6	2	6	5	3
Time series	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	1
Other	0	0	2	5	1	2	2	6	5	3
No Disc. Method	10	22	3	8	7	13	12	35	32	19

*Note:% by column, based on the total number of articles for that period. Many studies used multiple analysis techniques, therefore column totals are not meaningful, and are therefore not provided. Row percentages are based on 170 articles, total.

Table 3.5. Number of Articles (N) by Time Period & Level of Analysis (1953-90).

Level of Analysis:	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
	N	%[a]	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Individuals/Roles	2	4	3	8	5	9	3	8	13	8
Populations/Agg.	3	6	7	18	8	14	4	11	22	13
Class/Status	6	13	9	24	9	16	3	8	27	16
Groups	2	4	1	2	1	1	4	11	8	5
Families	1	2	0	0	2	3	2	5	5	3
Communities/Neighb.	9	20	5	13	3	5	1	2	18	11
Assoc./Organizations	5	11	0	0	2	3	3	8	10	6
Societies/Countries	9	20	3	8	14	25	7	20	33	19
Mixture	0	0	1	2	3	5	0	0	5	3
Other	3	6	5	13	2	3	0	0	10	6
No discernible level	5	11	3	8	4	7	7	20	19	11
Totals	45	100	37	100	54	100	34	100	170	100
% of total n(=170):		26		22		32		20		100

[a] % by column.

Key: Populations/agg.=populations or statistical aggregations.
Class/Status= economic classes, race, ethnicity, gender, status.
Communities/Neighb.=Geographical communities, neighborhoods.
Assoc./Organizations=Associations,organizations.
Mixture= Combinations of two or more levels of analysis.
Other=social artifacts,geographical regions, other.

Table 3.6. Number of Articles (N) by Types of articles & Theory Groups and Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Type of article:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Standard American Sociology:										
Theory & Methods	18	72	16	88	6	75	1	100	41	80
Only Theory	7	28	1	5	2	25	0	0	10	20
Symbolic Interactionism:										
Theory & Methods	7	100	2	66	0	0	0	0	9	75
Only Theory	0	0	1	33	2	100	0	0	3	25
New Causal Theory:										
Theory & Methods	0	0	6	100	24	96	9	75	39	91
Only Theory	0	0	0	0	1	4	3	25	4	9
Structuralism:										
Theory & Methods	0	0	0	0	1	100	2	100	3	100
Only Theory	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Radical-Critical:										
Theory & Methods	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	2	100
Only Theory	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: % by column. (Continued)

Table 3.6. (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Types of Articles by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Type of article:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Small Group Theory:										
Theory & Methods	2	100	1	100	1	50	3	60	7	70
Only theory	0	0	0	0	1	50	2	40	3	30
Social Forecasting:										
Theory & Methods	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	100
Only theory	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Conflict/Neo-Marxism:										
Theory & Methods	0	0	0	0	10	90	8	72	18	78
Only theory	0	0	1	100	1	9	3	27	5	22
Neo-Weberian:										
Theory & Methods	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	40	2	40
Only theory	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	60	3	60
Other:										
Theory & Methods	4	66	7	100	4	100	3	75	18	86
Only theory	2	33	0	0	0	0	1	25	3	14

Note: % is of articles in that theory group for that time period. (% by column)
(Continued)

Table 3.7. Number of Articles (N) by Data Analysis Techniques by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Analysis Technique:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
SAS:										
Simple Descriptive	43	98	40	89	13	72	2	67	98	89
Model Building	1	2	4	9	5	28	1	33	11	10
Other	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1
Symbolic Interactionism:										
Simple Descriptive	16	100	5	71	0	0	0	0	21	91
Model Building	0	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	1	4
Other	0	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	1	4
New Causal Theory:										
Simple Descriptive	0	0	9	56	34	56	7	41	50	53
Model Building	0	0	7	44	26	43	10	59	43	46
Other	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	1
Structuralists:										
Simple Descriptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	67	4	50
Model Building	0	0	0	0	2	100	1	17	3	38
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	17	1	13

Note: % by column.

(Continued)

Table 3.7 (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Data Analysis Techniques by Time period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Analysis Technique:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Radical-Critical Theory:										
Simple Descriptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	100	3	100
Model Building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Group Theory:										
Simple Descriptive	6	100	0	0	3	100	5	83	14	88
Model Building	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	17	2	13
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social Forecasting:										
Simple Descriptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Model Building	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	100
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Neo-Marxism/Conflict Theory:										
Simple Descriptive	0	0	0	0	19	68	8	50	27	61
Model Building	0	0	0	0	9	32	7	44	16	36
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	6	1	2

Note: % by column.

(Continued)

Table 3.7 (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Data Analysis Techniques by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Analysis Technique:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Neo-Weberian Theory:										
Simple Descriptive	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	40	2	40
Model Building	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	60	3	60
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other:										
Simple Descriptive	7	100	16	89	4	58	4	50	31	76
Model Building	0	0	2	11	3	43	4	50	9	24
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No Theory Group:										
Simple Descriptive	10	83	7	100	0	0	0	0	17	77
Model Building	2	16	0	0	3	100	0	0	5	23
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: % by column. Percentage is of all occurrences of data analysis techniques for the particular theory group.

Key: Simple descriptive= Means, , frequencies, standard deviations, simple correlation, scores, index, proportions, Mann-Whitney U, T-test, index of dissimilarity.
Model Building= F test, factor analysis, multiple/partial correl., covariance,regression, path analysis, log-linear analysis, smallest space, density states, ANOVA.

Table 3.8. Number of Articles (N) by Data Gathering Method by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Gathering Method:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
SAS:										
Informant/Obs.	2	9	1	5	0	0	0	0	3	6
Census/demographics	6	27	4	20	3	43	0	0	13	26
Content/Other's	0	0	1	5	1	14	0	0	2	4
Experiments	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	1	2
Survey	13	59	13	65	3	43	1	100	30	60
Other	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
Symbolic Interactionism:										
Informant/Obs.	2	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	20
Census/demographics	1	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	1	13	1	50	0	0	0	0	2	20
Survey	4	50	1	50	0	0	0	0	5	50
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Causal Theory:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	4	16	1	9	5	12
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	9	1	2
Survey	0	0	6	100	21	84	9	82	36	86
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Structuralists:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	33
Survey	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	50	2	66
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: % by column.

Key: Informant/obs.=Informant, observation, self reports.
Census/Demographics=census, other demographics, historical review of documents.
Content/Other's=Content analysis, other's studies.
Survey=interviews, 'a survey', questionnaire.

(Continued)

Table 3.8. (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Data Gathering Method by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Gathering Method:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Radical-Critical Theory:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	2	100
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Survey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Group Theory:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	1	50	0	0	1	100	2	67	4	57
Survey	1	50	1	100	0	0	1	33	3	43
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social Forecasting:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	100
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Survey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Neo-Marxism/Conflict Theory:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	5	50	3	33	8	42
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Survey	0	0	0	0	5	50	6	67	11	58
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: % by column.

Key: Informant/obs.=Informant, observation, self reports.
Census/Demographics=census, other demographics, historical review of documents.
Content/Other's=Content analysis, other's studies.
Survey=interviews, 'a survey', questionnaire. (Continued)

Table 3.8 (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Data Gathering Method by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Gathering Method:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Neo-Weberian:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Survey	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	2	100
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other:										
Informant/Obs.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Census/demographics	1	25	3	42	5	100	1	33	10	53
Content/Other's	0	0	1	14	0	0	1	33	2	11
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Survey	3	75	3	43	0	0	1	33	7	37
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
No theory group:										
Informant/Obs.	3	43	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	25
Census/demographics	4	57	2	67	1	50	0	0	7	58
Content/Other's	0	0	0	0	1	50	0	0	1	8
Experiments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Survey	0	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	1	8
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: % by column.

Key: Informant/obs.=Informant, observation, self reports.
Census/Demographics=census, other demographics, historical review of documents.
Content/Other's=Content analysis, other's studies.
Survey=interviews, 'a survey', questionnaire.

Table 3.9. Number of Articles (N) by Level of Analysis by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Level of Analysis:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
SAS:										
Status	1	5	1	6	1	14	0	0	3	6
Class	3	14	9	50	2	29	0	0	14	30
Large Collectivities	8	38	2	11	1	14	0	0	11	23
Med. Collectivities	7	33	4	22	2	29	0	0	13	28
Small Collectivities	2	10	2	11	1	14	1	100	6	13
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Symbolic Interactionism:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Class	2	29	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	22
Large Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Med. Collectivities	4	57	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	44
Small Collectivities	1	14	2	100	1	100	0	0	3	33
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
New Causal Theory:										
Status	0	0	2	33	8	31	1	11	11	27
Class	0	0	0	0	2	8	1	11	3	7
Large Collectivities	0	0	1	17	8	31	1	11	10	24
Med. Collectivities	0	0	1	17	2	8	2	22	5	12
Small Collectivities	0	0	1	17	6	23	4	44	11	27
Other	0	0	1	17	0	0	0	0	1	2
Structuralists:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Class	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Large Collectivities	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	50	2	66
Med. Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	33
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: % by column.

Key: Status=Race, ethnic groups, gender, status. Other=social artifacts, other.
Large collectivities=populations, aggregations, societies, geographical regions.
Medium collectivities=associations, organizations, communities, neighborhoods.
Small collectivities=individuals/roles, groups, families. (Continued)

Table 3.9 (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Level of Analysis by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Level of Analysis:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Radical-Critical Theory:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Class	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Large Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	50
Med. Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	50
Small Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Group Theory:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Class	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Large Collectivities	1	50	1	100	0	0	1	25	3	37
Med. Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Collectivities	1	50	0	0	1	100	3	75	5	63
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social Forecasting:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Class	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Large Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	1	100
Med. Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Neo-Marxism/Conflict:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	13	1	5
Class	0	0	0	0	5	45	1	13	6	32
Large Collectivities	0	0	0	0	4	36	4	50	8	42
Med. Collectivities	0	0	0	0	1	9	0	0	1	5
Small Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	25	2	11
Other	0	0	0	0	1	9	0	0	1	5

Note: % by column.

Key: Status=Race, ethnic groups, gender, status. Other=social artifacts, other.
Large collectivities=populations, aggregations, societies, geographical regions.
Medium collectivities=associations, organizations, communities, neighborhoods.
Small collectivities=individuals/roles, groups, families. (Continued)

Table 3.9 (Cont.) Number of Articles (N) by Level of Analysis by Time Period (1953-90).

	1953-62		1963-72		1973-82		1983-90		Totals	
Level of Analysis:	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Neo-Weberian Theory:										
Status	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Class	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	50
Large Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	50	1	50
Med. Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Small Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other:										
Status	1	17	4	57	1	25	0	0	6	30
Class	2	33	1	14	1	25	1	33	5	25
Large Collectivities	0	0	1	14	1	25	1	33	3	15
Med. Collectivities	2	33	0	0	1	25	1	33	4	20
Small Collectivities	1	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	5
Other	0	0	1	14	0	0	0	0	1	5
No Theory Group:										
Status	0	0	1	33	0	0	0	0	1	9
Class	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Large Collectivities	3	50	2	67	1	50	0	0	6	55
Med. Collectivities	2	33	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	18
Small Collectivities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	16	0	0	1	50	0	0	2	18

Note: % by column.

Key: Status=Race, ethnic groups, gender, status.
Large collectivities=populations, aggregations, societies, geographical regions.
Medium collectivities=associations, organizations, communities, neighborhoods.
Small collectivities=individuals/roles, groups, families.
Other=social artifacts, other.



Figure 3.1.
Note: % based on a sample of 170 articles, total.



Figure 3.2
Note: % based on a sample of 170 articles, total.

Chapter 4

Discussion and Conclusion

Introduction

In this chapter I analyze the trends suggested by the data as outlined in chapter three and offer an explanation for them. In the first section I briefly summarize the chronology of the theory groups, and in the second section I discuss the findings according to the type of article. The third section examines the trends according to the data-analysis techniques dimension. In the fourth section I examine the trends according to the type of data-gathering methods. The fifth section analyzes the trends according to the level-of-analysis used. I will exclude from my discussion the Structuralism, Radical-Critical, and Social Forecasting theory groups because they had very small samples. I conclude with a discussion of a life cycle model of theory groups and discuss the advantages of a sociology of sociology.

Discussion

The Theory Groups: a Chronology.

In this section I briefly summarize the trends in theory group popularity over time. According to Table 3.2, Standard American Sociology (SAS) steadily declined since the 1950s and essentially disappeared during the 1980s. New Causal (NC) Theory (an offshoot of SAS) began in the 1960s and increased

dramatically during the 1970s. New Causal Theory began to decline during the 1980s, perhaps due to its division into NC/Weberian and NC/Marxism Theory groups. Symbolic Interactionism has steadily declined in popularity since the 1950s, and eventually all but disappeared in the early 1970s. Small Group Theory is a curious case; it seemed to disappear during the 1960s, but has made a strong resurgence during the 1970s and 1980s. Neo-Marxism/conflict Theory began in the 1960s, and increased during the 1970s. During the 1980s Neo-Marxism/Conflict Theory has declined somewhat, perhaps due to its division into NC/Marxism and Neo-Marxism/Neo-Weberianism Theory groups. Neo-Weberian Theory appeared in the 1980s, but seldom exists in its pure form. Neo-Weberian Theory is almost always mixed with Neo-Marxism and New Causal Theory.

A presumed interaction exists between the different theory groups. The primary reason for this presumption is that all of them operate within the discipline of sociology. The interaction is facilitated mostly by the journals. Other forms of interaction, such as collegial discussion, are influential as well.

Trends According to the Article-Type Dimension.

In this section I examine the types of articles by the various theory groups over time. As can be seen from Table 3.1, there has been a fairly steady increase in the percentage of articles of the theory related empirical type. The peak

occurred during the 1973-82 period. The trend also is indicated by the changes in the percentage of articles that were theory discussion/concept clarification. There was a high proportion of such articles during 1953-62, and a resurgence during 1983-90. To fully understand why this is the case it is necessary to examine the article types by the various theory groups.

Standard American Sociology. As can be seen in Table 3.6, SAS articles usually employed both theory and methods. But the percentage of articles employing theory only was quite high (28 percent) during 1953-62, a period in which SAS was becoming established. During 1963-72 there was a decrease in the theory-only articles for SAS, but in 1973-82 there was a substantial increase. It was during 1973-82 that SAS essentially experienced its demise (though parts of SAS survived as New Causal Theory). During 1973-82 there was a sudden rise in the prevalence of competing theory groups, namely the Neo-Marxists and Neo-Weberians. I believe the resurgence of theory-only articles in SAS during 1973-82 indicates a last attempt to resuscitate the ailing theory group.

Symbolic Interactionism. As indicated by Table 3.6, Symbolic Interactionism experienced a slight rise in the proportion of theory-only articles with its demise in the 1973-82 period.

New Causal Theory. As shown by Table 3.6, New Causal (NC)

Theory experienced an increase in theory-only articles during 1983-90. This development may be due either to its fractioning into the NC/Marxism and NC/Weberian Theory groups during 1983-90, or perhaps indicates its impending demise for other reasons.

Small Group Theory. According to Table 3.6, Small Group Theory experiences a rise in theory-only articles from 1973-90, but the small sample size makes it difficult to assess.

Conflict/Neo-Marxism. As shown in Table 3.6, the conflict/Neo-Marxism Theory group has experienced an increase in the proportion of articles from 1983-90 that are theory only. This development is perhaps due to the division of the Neo-Marxism researchers into NC/Marxism and Marx/Weber groups.

Neo-Weberian Theory. According to Table 3.6, the Neo-Weberian articles are mostly theory-only during 1983-90. This is possibly due to the fact that Neo-Weberian Theory was in an early stage of development at that point. The relatively large number of theory-only articles could also be due to the fractioning of Neo-Weberian Theory researchers into the NC/Weber and Weber/Marx theory groups. It should be cautioned that the sample is somewhat small for the Neo-Weberian Theory group.

In sum, it appears that theory-only articles are more common to a theory group when it is initially developing as well as

during its decline. The decline of the theory group is characterized by a splitting, or fractioning into somewhat similar or related groups. This inference seems to be supported by the data from SAS, Neo-Marxism, and New Causal Theory.

Data Gathering Methods.

In this section I examine the data gathering methods employed in articles of different theory groups over time. As can be seen in Table 3.3, survey research was the most widely used. The percentage of articles employing this approach went down slightly though since 1972. The popularity of informants and observational data gathering methods peaked during 1953-62. Census and demographics data gathering methods were quite popular through 1982; however, from 1983-90 there was a sudden decrease in the use of such methods. During 1953-62 there was a somewhat high proportion of articles employing a mixture of data gathering methods, but the proportion diminished during 1963-82. There was an increase during 1983-90 in the proportion of articles employing mixtures of methods. To obtain a clearer idea of how theory groups have changed in this dimension, I now discuss the methods used within specific theory groups beginning with SAS.

Standard American Sociology. As can be seen in Table 3.8, SAS employed primarily census/demographics and survey gathering methods, with survey methods the preferred method for SAS.

Census/demographics methods were gaining popularity as SAS declined during the 1970s.

Symbolic Interactionism. As seen in Table 3.8, both informant/observational methods and experiments predominated in Symbolic Interactionist analyses. Survey methods were often used by Symbolic Interactionists; however, with the decline of Symbolic Interactionism during 1963-72 there was an exclusive shift to experiments and survey methods. It should be cautioned that there was a rather small sample for Symbolic Interactionism.

New Causal Theory. Following Table 3.8, New Causal Theory articles employed mostly survey and census/demographics gathering methods. This development is consistent with New Causal theorists' use of modelling techniques (see below).

Small Group Theory. As expected, Small Group Theory articles employed only experiments and survey data gathering methods. Again, it should be noted that Small Group Theory had a very small sample.

Conflict/Neo-Marxism. As seen in Table 3.8, Neo-Marxism /conflict Theory used exclusively census/demographics and survey data gathering methods. As mentioned previously, New Causal Theory also used survey and demographics methods heavily during the 1970s. Since these two essentially diverse theory groups used similar data gathering methods, it appears that conflict/neo-Marxist theorists were fighting New Causal

Theory, utilizing the same methodological approach.

Neo-Weberian Theory. Neo-Weberian articles employed only survey data gathering methods. As mentioned previously, the sample of two for Neo-Weberian Theory is essentially insignificant.

To summarize, survey and census/demographics data gathering methods have been very popular among the theory groups. Census and demographics gathering methods grew in popularity during the 1960s. As I will discuss in the next section, the logic of New Causal Theory (which dominated during the late 1960s) essentially requires the use of such methods. Neo-Marxists used essentially the same methods as New Causal theorists during the 1970s, possibly in an attempt to legitimate Neo-Marxism on methodological grounds. Data Analysis Techniques.

In this section I analyze the data analysis techniques used by the various theory groups over time. As shown in Table 3.4, modelling techniques (log-linear modelling, path analysis, and the like) appeared frequently during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Simple descriptive techniques (frequencies, percents, simple correlation, etc.) have always been popular, though the use of frequencies has decreased since 1973 (see Table 3.4). I now analyze the data analysis techniques by each theory group, beginning with SAS.

SAS. As can be seen in Table 3.7, the use of model building

techniques increased dramatically for SAS during its decline in the 1970s. This development is possibly due to the transformation of SAS into New Causal Theory during the late 1960s.

Symbolic Interactionism. As seen in Table 3.7, the use of simple descriptive techniques decreased dramatically for Symbolic Interactionism during 1963-72. This development was probably due to the demise of the theory group during the late 1960s. Note, however, that the sample for Symbolic Interactionism is rather small.

New Causal Theory. New Causal Theory relies on model building techniques more than any other theory group. Since the 1960s, the proportion of New Causal Theory articles employing modelling techniques has remained reasonably constant; approximately half of the articles employ them.

Small Group Theory. As seen in Table 3.7, articles using Small Group Theory have mostly employed simple descriptive techniques. There were only two instances where an article employed something else. I do not believe the exceptions to be statistically significant.

Neo-Marxism/Conflict. As reported in Table 3.7, Neo-Marxism/conflict theoretic articles have increasingly used model building techniques since the early 1970s. This development is likely due to Neo-Marxism/conflict Theory trying to compete with the methodological hegemony exerted by

New Causal Theory during this period.

Neo-Weberian Theory. As seen in Table 3.7, Neo-Weberian articles have mostly used model building techniques since the inception of the theory in the early 1980s. This might be due to the fact that the theory group was in the early developmental stages, but it more likely reflects the division of Neo-Weberian Theory into NC/Weber and NC/Marx. It should be noted, however, that the sample for Neo-Weberian Theory is quite small.

To conclude, most theory groups began to use more complex modelling techniques during the period of their decline, while other groups, such as New Causal Theory, have always used these techniques. I believe the use of more complex modelling techniques during the late 1960s was viewed by members of many theory groups to be a way to add legitimacy to their ailing theory.

Level of Analysis.

Here I summarize the level of analysis used by the theory groups over time. As seen in Table 3.5, the societal level of analysis was always fairly prevalent. Class and status were often used during the 1960s. Group analysis was used more frequently during 1983-90 than earlier, probably due to the resurgence in Small Group Theory during that time. I now turn to the levels of analysis for each theory group over time.

Standard American Sociology (SAS). As seen in Table 3.9, the

proportion of SAS articles employing a class level of analysis was unusually high during 1963-72 and remained high during the 1973-82 period. This may reflect competition from the Neo-Marxism/conflict Theory group during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The overall emphasis for SAS gradually shifted from larger collectivities (during the 1950s) to the smaller collectivities (during the decline of SAS in the 1970s).

Symbolic Interactionism. As reported in Table 3.9, Symbolic Interactionist articles employed several different levels of analysis during the 1950s. The levels of analysis most often used were class, medium collectivities, and small collectivities. During the 1960s (during the demise of Symbolic Interactionism) there was an increasing emphasis on small collectivities. It is possible that when Symbolic Interactionism was in decline, Symbolic Interactionists increasingly focused on the most appropriate area for the interactionist approach, namely small groups. It is likely this tendency was a response due to a perceived external threat from New Causal Theory.

New Causal Theory. As seen in Table 3.9, the proportion of New Causal Theory articles employing small collectivities has increased substantially since the 1960s. In addition, since the 1970s, New Causal Theory articles have increasingly used class as a level of analysis. Perhaps this development is due to the reawakening interest in class analysis, an interest

clearly related to the rise in conflict/neo-Marxist Theory during the early 1970s.

Small Group Theory. Small Group Theory articles have exclusively employed large and small collectivities. The proportion of Small Group Theory articles employing small collectivities has increased somewhat since the 1950s.

Neo-Marxism/Conflict. As seen in Table 3.9, during 1973-82 many of the Neo-Marxism/conflict articles employed class as the level of analysis. Large and small collectivities became increasingly popular among Neo-marxist/conflict research. This development likely reflects Neo-marxist/conflict theorists wish to broaden the application of the theory group, due to competition from others, the development of more sophisticated methodologies, and the inherent development of the perspective.

Neo-Weberian Theory. Neo-Weberian Theory focused exclusively on class and large collectivities, but the sample of both is too small to generalize from with great confidence.

In sum, it appears that early Neo-Marxist research focused on the class level of analysis, but then broadened its focus. Additionally, as SAS declined during the late 1960s and early 1970s, it began to focus more on class. It is likely that the changes in the level of analysis result from the theory groups reacting to one another.

Considerations Regarding my Small Samples.

Two important considerations regarding my small samples may be noted. The first concerns the reasons for small samples in several theory groups. The second addresses whether they adversely affect my inferences regarding partial paradigms.

As stated in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, I drew a 33 percent sample of the universe of stratification articles contained in two sociological journals. The fact that some of the theory groups have small sample sizes suggests that the journal referees may be somewhat partisan in their recommendation of articles. Also, authors frequently send articles to journals they believe are receptive to their perspective. Additionally, due to the proliferation of specialized journals in sociology it is likely that the two journals I sampled have became less representative of the universe of all stratification articles over the years.

The fact that some of the theory groups have small samples while others do not is not problematic for the life cycle model that I develop. Several theory groups (such as New Causal, Neo-Marxian/Conflict, and SAS) have sufficient size samples to permit me to infer a life cycle model with confidence. I believe that the theory groups with small samples would behave similarly to the theory groups with large samples. Consequently, I remain reasonably confident that my life cycle model of paradigms in social stratification applies to all theory groups regardless of sample size.

A Life Cycle Model of Partial Paradigms

In this section I introduce a life cycle model of theory group development. As mentioned earlier, many characteristics of particular partial paradigms (theory groups) can be explained by examining other concurrent partial paradigms. In addition, as I discussed in Chapter One, the progress of sociology, like most disciplines, is as much a process of reaction and legitimation as of innovation. Consequently, the proposed life cycle model focuses on the conflict aspect of partial paradigm development.

The Life Cycle Model.

As discussed in Chapter One, I conceptualize the partial paradigms of sociology primarily by theory group. I will use the terms "partial paradigm" and "theory group" interchangeably. It should be remembered that I have examined the partial paradigms of social stratification and not the entire discipline of sociology. As a didactic tool I have conceptualized the theory groups in an organic sense. I believe it is helpful to refer to them in this way, but I recognize that the analogy between a theory group and an organism is far from perfect and must be treated with care. My life cycle model comprises four stages, beginning with the inception of the theory group and ending with its

fractionalizing or splitting into other theory groups. The four stages include:

Stage I. The theory development and concept clarification stage. In this stage a theory group develops a theoretical edifice that will be used as a common denominator, the language of conceptual discourse for researchers working from its perspective. Data analysis tends toward simple descriptive techniques. Levels of analysis employed in research largely reflect the level of analysis implicit in the original theory (for example Marxist paradigms rely on class analysis.)

Stage II. The natural growth stage of the theory group. Theory development and concept clarification emphases decrease, with a corresponding increase in more traditional studies uniting both theory and methods. Data analysis techniques become more sophisticated as researchers become increasingly accustomed to their concepts and introduce operationalizations of their variables. Researchers begin to employ levels of analysis other than the ones used in stage I.

Stage III. The crisis stage. Competition from rivals begins to shock the theory group into turning inward to refine its methodology. The complexity and sophistication of its data analysis techniques reaches a zenith. Levels of analysis become more diverse as the theory group attempts to seek theoretical application in diverse areas.

Stage IV. The disappearance of the partial paradigm. The theory group breaks apart or fractionalizes into other groups, which select the most promising theoretical and methodological parts from the prior group and scrap the rest.

The development of the life cycle model is quite similar to the dialectical process. The thesis of the early theory group is asserted, (a) growing contradictions follow, (b) an antithesis is asserted as rival theory groups compete for hegemony, and (c) a synthesis of the thesis and antithesis resulting in the emergence of a new thesis in the form of a new theory group.

Kuhn's Model of Paradigm Development: Differences.

My model is similar to Kuhn's model. According to Ritzer (1975), Kuhn's cycle may be summarized as follows:

Paradigm 1 --> Normal Science --> Anomalies

--> Crisis --> Revolution --> Paradigm 2.

The key difference between the proposed life cycle model and Kuhn's is that his model applies to an entire scientific discipline. Conversely, the proposed model applies only to partial paradigms within a field. Kuhn's model is particularly oriented to those scientific disciplines where a single paradigm largely dominates the entire discipline. Kuhn (1970) did acknowledge the multiplicity of theoretic viewpoints in some disciplines, but he claims such disciplines are in a

"preparadigm" stage. In contrast, my model assumes a plurality of partial paradigms within a scientific field at any given time. Additionally, unlike Kuhn's model, the outcome of my cycle model typically gives rise to several partial paradigms. To the extent that the proposed model resembles Kuhn's, my model offers support for his much maligned concept of paradigm (Eckberg and Hill, 1979; Turner, 1987).

Various other studies have shown the importance of shared cognitive elements for paradigm development and structuring the discipline (see Cappell & Guterbock, 1992; Ennis, 1992). According to Cappell & Guterbock (1992, pp.266), shared cognitive elements between fields often create "proximate fields", or fields that are investigated by the same groups of researchers. The applicability of one type of knowledge to other specialties is the primary mechanism for generating the proximity areas (Cappell & Guterbock, 1992, pp.266). Professional power interests and the social characteristics of researchers themselves have been shown to be important factors in paradigm development (Ennis, 1992). My model also emphasizes the importance of shared cognitive elements. In addition, it seems quite likely that a thorough understanding of a partial paradigm's epistemology would provide information on other issues such as power interests and social characteristics of the members. The shared cognitive aspects of a paradigm manifest as epistemological assumptions in

research. In addition, shared cognitive aspects of research are not static; partial paradigms change. Consequently, a historical approach (in the Hegelian sense) to studying partial paradigms is preferable to the methodologies used in many other studies (e.g. Ennis, 1992; Cappell and Guterbock, 1992).

Advantages of a Sociology of Sociology.

Before I conclude, I want to stress the relevance of a sociology of sociology as a means of fostering understanding within the field of social stratification (and in the discipline generally). Quite a few influential sociologists claim that theoretical and methodological diversity in sociology is undesirable (Lenski, 1988; Blalock, 1989). Following the example set by the postmodernists (Seidman, 1991; Lemert, 1991) I interpret this position as an absurd attempt to assert a uniform hegemony within the social sciences (their brand of uniformity, of course). In a holistic sense, I do not see diversity as counterproductive. A sociology of sociology helps us understand the social production of scientific knowledge (Bourdieu, 1991; Mullins, 1973). It alerts the scientist to epistemological assumptions he/she tacitly accepts (Bourdieu, 1991). It helps us obtain a birds-eye view of the discipline of conceptual battle we call sociology.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the field of social stratification is not a harmonious, theoretically integrated, or hegemonic area of study. As I have shown in this thesis, it has been marked by conflicts between various partial paradigms since 1953. There have been overall trends toward increasing mathematical complexity in research methods, but the theoretical edifices of most paradigms remain largely static throughout their life cycle. Theory groups constitute expressions of partisan intellectual and political interests and represent struggles for power and prestige (Bourdieu, 1991). In addition, the falsification of any theory group is a difficult task given the rather insular existence of partial paradigms and the role value commitments and personal interests play in their development. Recognizing this, it is my hope that a sociology of sociology can contribute a level of meta-organizational analysis to sociological discourse and permit us to agree to disagree. It is also my hope that future research in this area will focus on the social construction of the life-world of the sub-disciplines and the communicative aspects of their boundary maintenance. Research on such aspects will help sociologists of science apprehend the subtle dynamics that are an integral part of the social construction of "reality".

NOTES

Chapter 1

(1) These concepts will be defined in greater detail later in this chapter.

(2) The relationship between theory building and art has been explored by Robert Nisbet (1976). Lenski seems to be using "art" in a pejorative sense, whereas Nisbet thought an artistic influence on theory building would be very fruitful.

(3) The logical positivists were a group of linguistic philosophers who believed language could be broken down into objective factual statements. They were heavily influenced by Wittgenstein's early philosophy.

(4) To my knowledge there has been no investigation of the relationship between Wittgensteinian philosophy and symbolic interactionism. This would be an interesting and fruitful area to explore in other research.

(5) This proposition is ostensibly Functionalist. However, since there are analytic difficulties with Functionalism, I do not completely subscribe to Functionalism. My position is clarified later in Chapter 4.

(6) It may be also argued that language construction is a controlled process in science. However, I argue that the means of control are essentially the sanctioning processes that "control" language learning in any situation. In that

sense, science communication is just as humble an activity as learning from our parents what the different colors are called.

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