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The great debate: Truman's decision to deploy American ground forces to Europe, 1950-1951

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THE GREAT DEBATE: TRUMAN'S DECISION
TO DEPLOY AMERICAN GROUND
FORCES TO EUROPE,
1950-1951

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Gary L. Ruppert
May, 1971

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Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

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PREFACE

Following World War II the United States Government made world commitments which were no less than revolutionary. Sooner or later President Harry S. Truman had to come to a showdown with his critics, for the conservatives and pre-World War II isolationists never readily accepted America's new position in world affairs. As frustration mounted, right wing elements of the Republican Party combined with a few dissident Democrats to challenge the Administration in its handling of foreign affairs. The fall of China followed a short time later by aggression in Korea solidified the Truman critics and opened what amounted to a major discussion of foreign policy goals and the means of achieving those ends. The debate attracted the attention of a growing Air Force lobby and, at the same time, lent itself to political gain for a party long absent from the White House. Like the various opinions expressed at the time, the implications were wide-ranging.

There have been many "Great Debates" in this country, but in referring to this particular one I wish to make it clear the issue is that of Truman's decision to deploy American ground forces to Europe. Writers of this particular era often use the term "Great Debate" to include a variety

of dates and events. The national press of 1950-1951 normally called the troops-for-Europe issue the "Great Debate"; however, a number of historians later referred to the "Great Debate" as that period covering from the fall of China through the MacArthur controversy. It is an arbitrary delimitation and I have so limited this study. At the same time, however, I have attempted in a meager way to relate the larger implications as they apply to events prior to and after the troops-for-Europe episode.

In addition I wish to stress that this study is basically an analysis of American foreign policy and the domestic influence upon it as seen by those who participated in the debate and by subsequent American writers. While some European views have been included, it would take twice again as many pages to detail the European scene and the individual reactions by those governments. The matter of incorporating German army units into an integrated European defense is an entire study by itself.

Most of the conclusions reached in this work were not foregone conclusions simply because I entered the project with a minimal knowledge of the issues. While the partisan aspects manifested themselves rather quickly, the necessity of an integrated European army is still surrounded with some question. On the latter point, the problem arises when one looks closely at the totality of World War II and Cold War diplomacy. Stalin may not have been the most

amenable character, but he and his country did have some legitimate security considerations. At the same time, it is suggested that the Truman Administration cannot be absolved of all blame for the intensity of the Cold War. In effect, what my present research has done is to open another Pandora's Box regarding the Cold War. If nothing else the Great Debate has raised more questions for me than I have answered.

Special thanks are due to Dr. Harl A. Dalstrom not only for suggesting the study but for reading the manuscript and offering pertinent advice, without which I could not have completed the work. For those few senators and public officials who saw fit to answer my letters and the staffs of the Presidential libraries additional credit should be given. Most importantly, I thank my wife, Carol, who made as many sacrifices as anyone to see this through.

Gary L. Ruppert
April, 1971

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CHAPTER I

The Evolution of Foreign Policy, Partisanship, And Special Interest Groups After World War II

Harry S. Truman, in assuming the Presidency in 1945, did not hesitate to fulfill Franklin D. Roosevelt's desire to form a new collective security organization. By supporting the United Nations Charter the new President moved a step closer in tying the national interests to the international order. The United Nations was not created to confront any particular aggressor but rather sought the maintenance of world peace so generally desired.

Two provisions in the United Nations Charter were of major significance in the evolution of American foreign policy. The first, collective self-defense on a regional basis, was embodied in Articles 51 and 52. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, Republican Senator from Michigan, at the San Francisco Conference supported the Latin and South American desires for a hemispheric defense pact and, therefore, was forceful in getting the provisions for regional

agreements incorporated into the Charter.¹ The immediate result was the Rio de Janeiro Pact signed in 1947. The second provision, Article 43, allowed for the establishment of an international army should it be needed. These articles set precedents which were considered in the creation and implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty.

While seeking security in the United Nations, the United States immediately after the war demobilized. Nine months after V-J day the United States Army reduced its manpower from 8 million to 1.8 million men.² On V-E day the United States had 3.1 million men in Europe; one year later only 391,000 men remained.³ By 1947 the Army Air Force was one-eighth its wartime strength; likewise, production of military aircraft declined from 96,000 planes in 1944 to 1,000 aircraft in 1946.⁴ Britain and the other western allies demobilized in a similar manner. Only Russia

¹Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., ed., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1952), pp. 174, 186-98. Hereafter cited as Vandenberg, Private Papers.

²Henry Bamford Parkes and Vincent P. Carroso, Recent America: A History, Book Two: Since 1933 (5th ed.; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1969), p. 289.

³North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1969), p. 14. Hereafter cited as NATO, Facts and Figures.

⁴Kenneth L. Moll, "Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1949: America's First Four Years" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Municipal University of Omaha, 1965), pp. 65, 80. Hereafter cited as Moll, "Nuclear Strategy."

maintained a relatively large military force of some 4 million men, although this was nowhere near its estimated peak strength of 12.5 million during the war.⁵ In the United States aviation and the nuclear bomb had added a new dimension to national power; however, reliance upon a nuclear strike force was unrealistic in that the atomic stockpile was "abysmally small" and the longest range bomber, the B-29, could not be effective without forward bases located on foreign soil.⁶

Historically, a large peacetime military establishment in the United States had been the exception rather than the rule; besides, many envisioned a greater cooperation with the Soviet Union than had hitherto existed. However, in reaction to Soviet expansion and political pressure and the postwar settlement problems the Truman Administration eventually assumed, rightly or wrongly, a much tougher line in dealing with the Russians. Lord Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO, pointed out that "for all practical purposes the Moscow Conference of 1947 marked the end of post-war co-operation between Russia and the democratic countries."⁷

⁵ St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, 1951, p. 1C; NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 14.

⁶ Moll, "Nuclear Strategy," pp. 84-85.

⁷ Hastings Ismay, NATO, The First Five Years, 1949-1954 (The Netherlands: Bosch-Utrecht for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1954), p. 5. Hereafter cited as Ismay, First Five Years. Some analysts now claim the Cold War was initiated much earlier, in part, due to

Following the United Nations Charter, the Truman Doctrine became the first of several building blocks in the Administration's foreign policy. In pledging American economic and military resources to aid Greece and Turkey and resist aggression elsewhere in Europe, President Truman noted "that without American participation there was no power capable of meeting Russia as an equal. . . . This was the time to align the United States of America clearly on the side, and the head, of the free world."⁸ Secretary of State George C. Marshall unveiled the next Administration building block, the European Recovery Program, which eventually did much to rehabilitate Europe's economy. A year and a half later Truman's Point Four program expanded economic assistance to underdeveloped areas throughout the world.

Upon publication in 1947, George F. Kennan's "Mr. X Article" began to pervade American thinking. Such phrases as the "firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" were quickly interpreted by many to mean the

American actions. See Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins 1917-1960, Vol. I: 1917-1950 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1961); William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, A Delta Book (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1962).

⁸ Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: 1946-1952: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956), p. 102. Hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs.

containment of Russia by military means and military threat. Kennan responded saying he had not meant military containment but rather political containment. As much as Kennan attempted to correct the deficiencies of the article, military containment continued to be associated with the Truman foreign policy.⁹

The 1948 Communist coup in Czechoslovakia did not lessen feelings toward the Soviet Union. A few months later the Western powers reacted quickly to the Berlin blockade by initiating an airlift. The possibility of being confronted by armed conflict caused the United States to increase its military might by sending to Europe seventy-five jet fighters and sixty B-29's.¹⁰ The Berlin crisis "exposed the shocking military weakness of Western Europe." According to Dean Acheson the Soviet Union had thirty Russian divisions in its East European satellites while the United States, Britain, France, and the Benelux countries could not muster more than eighteen divisions.¹¹ The

⁹George F. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 354-67. Hereafter cited as Kennan, Memoirs.

¹⁰Moll, "Nuclear Strategy," p. 174.
The author indicated that prior to this action the United States only had sixteen jet fighters and thirty bombers in Europe.

¹¹Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 308. Hereafter cited as Acheson, Present at the Creation.

Western European nations recognized their situation three months before Berlin when they signed the Brussels Treaty. That alliance, which provided for joint defense, neither included the United States nor had it been implemented to any extent by the signatory nations at the outset of the Berlin crisis.

In the United States, Congress expressed much unhappiness over the Soviet use of the veto in the United Nations and sought to remedy the problem. In 1948 numerous Senate resolutions favoring the revision of the United Nations Charter were introduced, but it took the collaboration of Senator Vandenberg and Undersecretary of State Robert A. Lovett to come up with a solution to the ineffectiveness of the Charter and the continuing weakness of Western Europe.¹² Based on Articles 51 and 52, the Vandenberg Resolution aimed at (1) "Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense . . ." and (2) "Association of the United States by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements . . ." On June 11, 1948 the Senate, after only eight hours of debate, approved the resolution by a vote of sixty-four to six. Less than a month later the

¹²Milton O. Gustafson, "The Vandenberg Resolution: A Study in Bipartisanship" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Nebraska, 1963), pp. 8, 15. Hereafter cited as Gustafson, "Vandenberg Resolution."

State Department began preliminary discussions which led to the North Atlantic Pact.¹³

In less than four years the American nation moved from the collective security of the United Nations to collective defense of the North Atlantic Alliance. This shift of emphasis now meant there was an identifiable aggressor, at least by implication. During the North Atlantic Treaty hearings Secretary of State Acheson said the Pact was not aimed at any particular nation but rather, was aimed at armed aggression in the Atlantic area. However, at another point in his testimony he said, "Western European countries have seen the basic purposes and principles of the [United Nations] Charter cynically violated by the conduct of the Soviet Union with the countries of Eastern Europe."¹⁴

According to proponents, the objective of the Treaty was the maintenance of peace and security, and it was intended to fulfill the original aims of the United Nations since that organization had been made ineffective by one power. As an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed attack, the North Atlantic community sought protection through collective efforts. Americans were to join the

¹³Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 407, 411.

¹⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, Part I: Administration Witnesses, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, pp. 7, 17. Hereafter cited as Senate, North Atlantic Treaty Hearings.

alliance not only because the member nations had a common heritage and similar institutions, but, more importantly, because the security of the North Atlantic was "vital to the national security of the United States . . ." ¹⁵ From a military viewpoint the objectives were to deter war or, be militarily effective if war could not be prevented. ¹⁶

The most troublesome points of the Treaty were Articles 5 and 3. By accepting Article 5 the parties agreed "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; . . ." ¹⁷ This article was carefully written to allow member nations to react individually or in concert, thereby letting each nation decide separately as to what course of action it would follow. There were two implications in this. First, nations did not want to be bound to a particular military response since it implied a certain loss of sovereignty. Second, as far as the United States Senate was concerned, Article 5 neither increased nor decreased the constitutional powers of the President or Congress, nor

¹⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Executive Report No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, as quoted in Congressional Record, XCV, 9816-24. Hereafter cited as Senate, Executive Report No. 8.

¹⁶Senate, North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, p. 147.

¹⁷U.S., Department of State, American Foreign Policy 1950-1955: Basic Documents, Vol. I, Pubn. No. 6446 (1957), p. 813. Hereafter cited as: Department of State, Basic Documents.

did it change the relationship between them. In other words, Congress clung to its right to declare war.¹⁸

The other controversial provision was the ambiguously written Article 3. It provided:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.¹⁹

Senators carefully scrutinized the provision, afraid of what it might mean. What kind of aid was involved--money, arms, supplies, manpower? How binding was the obligation--was each nation free to determine its contribution? Administration witnesses felt that any American aid should not exceed one-sixth or one-seventh of the total effort. Opponents, however, pointed out that since the end of the war the United States had furnished five-sixths or six-sevenths of all the aid received by Western Europe.²⁰ Was this to be another large scale Marshall Plan? While the Treaty was being debated the Administration, in fact, proceeded to prepare a separate arms aid program.

Senator Vandenberg and Texas Democrat Tom Connally sought to allay the sensitive feelings over arms aid by

¹⁸Senate, Executive Report No. 8.

¹⁹Department of State, Basic Documents, p. 813.

²⁰Claude Byram Cross, "The United States and the Atlantic Treaty" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State University of Iowa, 1953), p. 76. Hereafter cited as Cross, "Atlantic Treaty."

contending that no specific obligation existed either as to the kind or amount of aid. The State Department concurred in their interpretation. Both Senators placed emphasis on the right of Congress to implement a military aid program; Connally declared, "Congress is where the Constitution puts the responsibility, and that is where we shall put it."²¹ Most Senators favored some kind of military aid program but were wary of treaty obligations. The mere existence of Article 3, the Secretary of State maintained, definitely implied an obligation to help develop the capacity to resist aggression.²² However, beyond that the Administration avoided being too specific, perhaps out of fear that they would lose the Treaty over this one issue.

Throughout the North Atlantic Pact hearings the emphasis placed on Article 3 revolved around arms aid. Material aid appeared to be the logical solution, and this was supported by the fact that Truman was preparing such a bill at that very time. However, Article 3 in no way specified a particular form of assistance. There was, of course, the possibility of furnishing manpower, that is, actual military forces. Senator Forrest C. Donnell, Republican from Missouri, thought he saw the handwriting on

²¹U.S., Congress, 81st Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, XCV, 9193, 9894, 9896. Hereafter cited as Congressional Record, XCV.

²²Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 283.

the wall and pursued his intuition.

Again and again during the hearings Donnell quizzed the Administration's witnesses as to the need for stationing American troops in Europe prior to any aggressive move by Russia. W. Averell Harriman, then Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration, suggested that member nations in Europe would probably resist any American army of occupation permanently stationed there. However, Harriman noted that he was not a military expert and therefore could not testify on his own regarding the matter. When Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testified he avoided the issue by saying he did not think the best interests of the country would be served by answering the question.²³

General Omar N. Bradley, then Army Chief of Staff, spent more time talking about the matter but in the end only contributed to the vagueness of the other testimony. He did admit that a military assistance program could well include military "advisers"; but in regard to mass manpower contributions he said, "I do not see that it [the North Atlantic Treaty] excludes or includes [prior troop commitments]. I do not see how it is involved at all." When asked what kind of military force would be needed to stop Russia he said he knew of no such study ever being

²³Senate, North Atlantic Treaty Hearings, pp. 183, 213.

made by the United States military simply because too many variable factors existed.²⁴ It seems strange for a military organization about to subscribe to such an alliance to have little or no idea of what it would take to establish an effective defense.

The most significant discussion of the troop issue took place between Secretary of State Acheson and Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican from Iowa. That exchange did more than anything to allay Congressional fears that Article 3 implied the use of American ground forces.

Hickenlooper: In other words, are we going to be expected to send substantial numbers of troops over there as a more or less permanent contribution to the development of these countries' capacity to resist?

Acheson: The answer to that question, Senator, is a clear and absolute "No."

Hickenlooper: That is sufficient. That is all.²⁵

Acheson later admitted, "Even as a short-range prediction this answer was deplorably wrong. It was almost equally stupid. But it was not intended to deceive." His intent had been to affirm that troop contributions were not an obligation; however, he also wished to imply that Article 3 did not exclude the possibility of ground forces being a form of mutual assistance.²⁶ A year and a half later

²⁴Ibid., pp. 289, 291, 308.

²⁵Ibid., p. 47.

²⁶Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 285.

Administration opponents used Acheson's seemingly clear testimony to attack the troops-for-Europe program.

One further provision of the Treaty eventually confused attempts to implement the pact. Article 11 called for the Treaty to be "carried out by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes."²⁷ Senator Connally, while claiming authorship of the phraseology, later found the ambiguous wording was an open invitation to struggle.²⁸ The Foreign Relations Committee in reporting out the Treaty insisted that the division of authority between Congress and the President would in no way be altered. Senator Vandenberg spoke for the majority of Senators when he said, "This qualifying phrase refers not only to the process of ratification but to the process of implementation." In effect he declared any implementation of the Pact would require the appropriate approval by Congress—the Treaty was not self-executing.²⁹

Republican Senators Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Arthur V. Watkins of Utah and Kenneth S. Wherry of Nebraska rallied to attack the Pact. They offered three amendments—one

²⁷Department of State, Basic Documents, p. 814.

²⁸Tom Connally, My Name is Tom Connally (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), p. 333. Hereafter cited as Connally, My Name is Tom Connally.

²⁹Congressional Record, XCV, 8893, 9818, 9821-22.

affecting Article 3 and two affecting Article 5. Their intent was to minimize any obligatory implications, thereby almost rendering those Articles useless.³⁰ Senator Taft had hoped to avoid completely such an alliance by substituting a resolution which would have simply extended the Monroe Doctrine to Western Europe.³¹ Taft's idea was not original as John Foster Dulles had proposed similar action in 1948 while Vandenberg and Lovett worked on Senate Resolution 239.³² While Taft approved the warning given to Russia by the Treaty, he also felt that it committed the United States to rearming Western Europe, which, in turn, would eventually lead to another war.³³ He revealed his distaste for ground combat when he said, "At least by implication, it [the Treaty] committed the United States to the policy of a land war in Europe, when we might find that a third world war could better be fought by other means."³⁴

On July 21, 1949, after rejecting the crippling amendments, the Senate by a vote of eighty-two to thirteen overwhelmingly accepted the North Atlantic Treaty. Senator

³⁰Ibid., pp. 9915-16.

³¹New York Times, July 15, 1949, p. 1.

³²Gustafson, "Vandenberg Resolution," p. 24.

³³Congressional Record, XCV, 9205-06.

³⁴Robert A. Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951), p. 89. Hereafter cited as Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans.

Vandenberg had worked hard with the Administration to secure approval of the alliance; however, he was disgruntled with the "little band of GOP isolationists" who had opposed his efforts.³⁵ As a foundation of his foreign policy Harry Truman proclaimed, "With the North Atlantic Treaty . . . we gave proof of our determination to stand by the free countries to resist armed aggression from any quarter."³⁶

The alliance was formed out of fear of the Soviet Union but beyond that it was a very loosely drawn document open to many interpretations. Claude B. Cross in his study of NATO noted the contradictory attitudes of the negotiating nations. They wanted to give the strongest possible warning to Russia yet assume the minimum obligation commensurate with the warning. Each wanted the maximum assurance of collective action while retaining the freedom of individual action.³⁷ The American people held these same attitudes, yet the Truman Administration apparently wanted the alliance at whatever costs. Hoping to secure maximum support, the Administration's witnesses were indeed equivocal when discussing the obligatory clauses of such provisions as Article 3. Admittedly, Senator Donnell raised what seemed to be a remote possibility at the time; however, he was

³⁵Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 500-01.

³⁶Truman, Memoirs, II, 250.

³⁷Cross, "Atlantic Treaty," p. 45.

asking legitimate questions, questions the Administration played down.

While supporting the North Atlantic Pact the editors of the New York Times felt that it would not get far without the enactment of an aid program.³⁸ Four days after the Senate consented to the Treaty, President Truman presented Congress with the military aid program he had been preparing. In it he asked for \$1,450,000,000 to provide arms to foreign nations.³⁹ Senator Vandenberg immediately had qualms and came out in opposition to the original bill because it was "almost unbelievable in its grant of unlimited power to the Chief Executive. It would permit the President to sell, lease, or give away anything we've got at any time to any country in any way he wishes." He concluded that, "It would virtually make him the number one war lord of the earth." Vandenberg was, however, interested in some kind of arms program and was willing to accept an interim bill until the Administration submitted a program clearly coordinated with the Atlantic Treaty. Truman's original bill was a separate measure and lacked the recommendations of the as yet inoperative North Atlantic Council, provided for

³⁸ Editorial, New York Times, July 10, 1949, sec. IV, p. 8.

³⁹ U.S., President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1945-), Harry S. Truman, 1949, pp. 395-400. Hereafter cited as U.S., Truman Public Papers.

in Article 9 of the Treaty.⁴⁰ Senator Vandenberg and Republican Senator John Foster Dulles of New York secured the adoption of an amendment which required integrated defense plans to be formulated before funds in excess of \$100 million could be released. Senator Connally found the military aid bill the most difficult piece of foreign policy legislation to enact since the Lend-Lease Act. The bipartisan foreign policy which had hung together for several years began to come apart when the House cut the appropriation in half.⁴¹ Democratic leaders were able to salvage the bill, and President signed the first Mutual Defense Assistance Act on October 6, 1949.⁴² By February 1950 eight European nations had signed agreements with the United States for a billion dollars in arms and equipment.⁴³

Implementing the North Atlantic Pact proceeded slowly, but a defensive strategy was quickly formulated. In contrast to his evasiveness at the Treaty hearings, General Bradley came to the military aid program hearings better prepared. It was there that Bradley enunciated the integrated defense strategy. In the event of aggression the United States would furnish the air power to deliver the

⁴⁰Vandenberg, Private Papers, pp. 503-04, 507.

⁴¹Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 309-12, 352.

⁴²U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1949, pp. 500-01.

⁴³New York Times, January 28, 1950, p. 1.

atomic bomb and would supplement the British in controlling the seas. Members on the European continent would furnish the "hard core" of the ground forces to meet the initial assault. He implied that the United States would furnish troops subsequent to an attack.⁴⁴ The purpose of the plan was to prevent extensive duplication of forces by each nation. Six months later in January, 1950, the North Atlantic Council approved the so-called integrated defense plan, thus allowing President Truman to release nine hundred million dollars of military aid funds.⁴⁵

The North Atlantic nations now had an alliance and the basis of a strategy but did not exert themselves to expand their national armies. Europe continued to direct its attention to economic recovery--extensive rearmament proved detrimental to that rehabilitation. Moreover, rumors that Russia possessed 175 divisions aroused only academic interest. Europeans simply refused to believe there was any genuine danger of armed conflict with Russia and therefore continued to ignore the warnings.⁴⁶ One year after the Pact was signed the New York Times reported that twenty-two divisions were at the disposal of NATO, but only about

⁴⁴ Ibid., July 30, 1949, p. 1.

⁴⁵ NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 197.

⁴⁶ Barbara Ward, Policy for the West (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1951), p. 56. Hereafter cited as Ward, Policy for the West.

twelve divisions were available for immediate action. Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands were all involved elsewhere in the world and therefore did not have sizeable armies at home.⁴⁷

In the United States, following the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, the Air Force emerged as a separate branch of the military, and during the next few years it made efforts to expand through the aid of powerful allies in Congress. The Air Force touted its role in World War II, and with the postwar reduction of the Army more of the defense burden fell upon the air branch of the military.

President Truman in 1948 appointed Thomas Finletter to head the newly-formed Air Policy Commission. The Commission members concluded that an Air Force of 12,400 planes organized into 70 combat groups was the minimum force which could carry out the mission assigned to it.⁴⁸ To fulfill the so-called 70-Group plan the Administration would have had to increase the defense budget by about 1.5 billion annually for up to five years.⁴⁹ While the plan had supporters in Congress, it lacked White House approval. Truman announced his 1950 fiscal year budget in January 1949.

⁴⁷New York Times, April 10, 1950, p. 1.

⁴⁸Congressional Record, XCV, 12301.

⁴⁹H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 334. Hereafter cited as Westerfield, Policy and Party Politics.

The defense budget of \$15.9 billion was evenly divided among the three military services; however, the Air Force was humbled because Truman was reducing it from the existing 58 groups to 48 groups.⁵⁰

Inter-service rivalries contributed to the unhappiness. Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington continued to set his personal goal at 70 groups. General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, claimed a 48-group air wing could do no more than guarantee "prevention of an early defeat" and bring hope of "eventual" victory. The fear that naval aviation would eventually be absorbed by the Air Force prompted the Navy to strike back. A Navy captain reported that James Forrestal, former Secretary of Defense and a Navy man, had told him the Air Forces' "wild statements" were undermining the security of the country. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall and General Bradley were willing to accept a 70-group Air Force if the Army were likewise increased.⁵¹

The House of Representatives, where Air Force advocates were strongest, insisted on a 70-group air branch and acted accordingly. They increased the overall defense budget by \$630 million and gave both the Army and Navy a smaller slice of the pie than Truman had recommended. The

⁵⁰New York Times, January 11, 1949, p. 1.

⁵¹Ibid., January 11, 1949, p. 1; May 2, 1949, p. 15; September 11, 1949, p. 1; March 22, 1949, p. 8.

House money bill provided appropriations for the retention of only a 58-group air wing, but it established a future goal of 70 groups. The Senate bill likewise approved a 70-group force, but it furnished only enough money to maintain 48 groups, thereby accepting the Administration's budget. Shortly, a House-Senate Conference committee worked out a compromise giving the Air Force its 58 groups. The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Carl Vinson, Democrat from Georgia, became enraged when President Truman promptly impounded the additional \$615 million Congress had approved for more aircraft. Truman reasoned that such expenditure would be an unnecessary economic burden and it would unbalance the equilibrium he wished to maintain among the services.⁵²

Russian explosion of an atomic device in 1949 gave greater impetus to the Air Force arguments. Carl Spaatz, a retired but vocal Air Force General, called for a build up of the nuclear stockpile plus the development of the world's most powerful Air Force.⁵³ W. Stuart Symington placed special emphasis on a long range bomber force as the only means of counterbalancing the enormous Soviet ground forces. Such a force implied the use of atomic bombs to defeat an

⁵² Ibid., March 17, 1949, p. 1; April 14, 1949, p. 1; August 18, 1949, p. 23; August 28, 1949, p. 38; October 18, 1949, p. 1; October 30, 1949, p. 1.

⁵³ Carl Spaatz, "Atomic Monopoly Ends," Newsweek, October 3, 1949, p. 22.

enemy.⁵⁴ The Hiroshima-Nagasaki bombing raids had produced a seemingly simple solution in that it was relatively less expensive, plus it supposedly required less manpower.

Yet, there were those, especially in the scientific community, who were having second thoughts. General Curtis LeMay, who had made his reputation as a bombing expert during World War II and eventually headed the Strategic Air Command, found himself to be the target of these moralistic attacks. The news commentator, Chet Huntley, expressed this thought one night on a radio broadcast when he asked, "Just what reputable atomic scientist has told General LeMay that we can drop atomic bombs with such gay and reckless abandon without signing our own death warrants?"⁵⁵ Others questioned the adequacy of strategic bombing, a strategy aimed at incapacitating an enemy's productive and transportation facilities. The New York Times published a dissenting letter from the faculties of Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology--among the signers were McGeorge Bundy, John Kenneth Galbraith, and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. They pointed out that as a result of the nuclear strategy the United States was ill-prepared to deal with limited aggression or limited war. The maintenance of such a strategy implied the acceptance of mass destruction of human life,

⁵⁴New York Times, April 23, 1950, p. 30.

⁵⁵Congressional Record, XCV, A1741-42. Reprint of Huntley's broadcast.

which, in turn, weakened European morale and confidence. They declared that the existing strategy gave the United States only two choices: "mass slaughter on both sides or outright military defeat."⁵⁶

President Truman wished to maintain a balanced military, and the April, 1950 appointment of Thomas Finletter as the new Secretary of the Air Force did not mean a change of emphasis. Congress did not back away from a 70-group Air Force when first discussing the 1951 fiscal year budget; yet Harry Truman, sounding like a fiscal conservative, opposed an air arm which the country could not afford. The Korean crisis, however, caused the President to make an about-face. He asked for an additional \$10.5 billion for partial mobilization and gave \$4.5 billion of that to the Air Force for building towards a 69-group goal. Lobbying for the expansion of air power, the Air Force Association said 69 groups were too few noting that 273 groups were required in World War II.⁵⁷

Despite some of Truman's successes, certain members of the Republican Party increasingly attacked the bipartisan facade of American foreign policy. Some of the criticism was justifiable discussion of what the goals should be;

⁵⁶New York Times, April 30, 1950, sec. IV, p. 8.

⁵⁷Ibid., April 5, 1950, p. 1; June 22, 1950, p. 1; June 23, 1950, p. 2; July 28, 1950, pp. 1, 10; August 27, 1950, p. 45.

much of it, however, was to create political capital for a party long out of power.

Tom Connally marked the Korean War as the end of bipartisanship in foreign policy.⁵⁸ Actually, a mixed group of Republicans began the break long before that. The House revolt over the military aid program in 1949 has already been mentioned, but an even older issue was China. Historically, Republicans had interests in the Far East going back to the turn of the century. Truman contributed to his own vulnerability by failing to associate any prominent Republicans with China policies. However, one cannot place all the blame on the President because it was not a willful action on his part. Immediately following the war, as during the conflict, China held a secondary position on American priority lists. A sense of urgency normally was not present in the formation of our China policy, but by 1947, as a Communist conquest of that country loomed imminent, Republicans began to apply more and more pressure.

H. Bradford Westerfield in his study of party politics and foreign policy credits certain Republicans with well-timed moves. When these GOP members became aware that Chiang Kai-shek could not be saved, they immediately called for more assistance than the Democratic Administration was willing to give. "Noninterventionist and economy-minded Republicans

⁵⁸Connally, My Name is Tom Connally, pp. 350-51.

could reassure themselves with the almost certain knowledge that the administration itself would ultimately block any heavy aid program."⁵⁹ The fall of China in 1949, although nearly beyond the control of Truman, ushered in a new wave of frustration, a frustration the Republican Party could and did use to its advantage. The American people became even more uneasy when the United Nations forces bogged-down in Korea.

A onetime isolationist, Senator Vandenberg during World War II became the leading Republican espousing greater involvement in world affairs, and he played a major role in securing his Party's support for the Truman foreign policy after the war. Shortly after passage of the North Atlantic Treaty Vandenberg could not carry on his work due to illness. Truman admitted he depended upon Vandenberg in a subsequent letter to him in which he said, "You just don't realize what a vacuum there has been in the Senate and in the operation of our foreign policy since you left."⁶⁰

At first the Administration attempted to bridge the gap by working with Senator John Foster Dulles and Senator

⁵⁹Westerfield, Policy and Party Politics, pp. 245-46, 249, 259, 268, 343.

⁶⁰Harry S. Truman to Arthur H. Vandenberg, March 31, 1950, Official File 386, Truman Papers, Truman Library.

John Sherman Cooper, a Kentucky Republican.⁶¹ Truman apparently made a tactical error in wanting Dulles' senatorial seat filled by a Democrat and, at the same time, retaining Dulles as a tie to the Republican Party. The error was not in wanting another Democratic Senator, but rather the manner it was carried out. Dulles was to run for re-election in 1950; however, Truman, seeking support for his domestic policies, vigorously endorsed Herbert H. Lehman. Assuming Vandenberg would eventually return to his position and hoping to pacify Dulles, the White House offered Dulles a position as policy adviser to the Secretary of State which he accepted.⁶² The blow came when Vandenberg was unable to return and his foreign policy leadership among Republicans gradually passed to a less-than-avid internationalist, Robert A. Taft, who had Presidential ambitions of his own. The conservative faction of the Republican Party attempted to assert control over the GOP leaving the more internationalist-minded members, such as Dulles and Lodge, to fend for themselves. These latter men simply did not have the stature of Vandenberg. In the eyes of the conservatives Dulles had left their ranks.

⁶¹Norman A. Graebner, The New Isolationism: A Study in Politics and Foreign Policy Since 1950 (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1956), pp. 17-18. Hereafter cited as Graebner, New Isolationism.

⁶²Westerfield, Policy and Party Politics, pp. 371, 378.

The election of 1948 had previously added to partisan feelings. Senator Taft, expressing his Party's sentiment, did not understand how the country could "send that roughneck ward politician back to the White House."⁶³ Equally significant, the Democrats elected majorities and therefore organized the new Congress. Senate Democrats poured salt into the Republican wounds when they changed the party ratio on the Foreign Relations Committee from seven-to-six to eight-to-five.⁶⁴ Senator Vandenberg insisted the move was "implicit with hostility" and carried the implication that the Republican senators were "not quite trustworthy."⁶⁵

While Truman was ultimately responsible for his own foreign policy, Republicans quickly thought that they had found a scapegoat--Dean Acheson. Westerfield perhaps has given the best characterization of Acheson:

His presentation possessed a technical brilliance which was intellectually overwhelming. . . . In voice, manner, dress, and suspected sympathies he was far too "English." He found it difficult to restrain himself from demolishing the arguments of congressional opponents with a swift incisiveness which seemed insulting.⁶⁶

His opposition in Congress began when Senator Kenneth Wherry

⁶³Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade--And After: America, 1945-1960, Vintage Books (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 90.

⁶⁴Westerfield, Policy and Party Politics, p. 326.

⁶⁵Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 468.

⁶⁶Westerfield, Policy and Party Politics, p. 328.

cast the only vote against his nomination as Under Secretary of State in 1945.⁶⁷ In the intervening years Acheson gave the GOP political ammunition by his association with Alger Hiss whose loyalty was questioned. When Acheson was nominated as Secretary of State in 1949 six Senators dissented from his confirmation.⁶⁸ The opposition soon realized that he was the major architect of the Truman foreign policy, and promptly credited Acheson with the fall of China--something over which he had little control. Senator Joseph McCarthy continued the assault in 1950 when he declared that he had found the State Department infested with Communists. Such revelations, regardless of their validity, served only to unnerve an already uneasy population. Acheson's relations with Republican Congressmen continued to decline.

The 1950 elections added to Republican strength in Congress and at a Party caucus after the election a petition was circulated asking for Acheson's resignation. Truman angrily rejected the partisan move, and Acheson later

⁶⁷Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 126-27. Senator Wherry and Acheson had a running feud for several years. In 1945 Wherry opposed Acheson because the nominee had, according to the Nebraska Senator, "'blighted the name' of General MacArthur." (Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 126.) Five years later the two nearly came to blows in a Senate appropriation hearing. [Dean Acheson, Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 133-34.]

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 253.

revealed evidence that Senator Wherry was prepared to initiate impeachment proceedings against him.⁶⁹ The Omaha World Herald, supporting the GOP cause, suggested that Congress henceforth assume greater watchdog responsibility for foreign policy.⁷⁰ On the other hand, the Washington Post explained that such responsibility obliged the Republicans to produce an alternative foreign policy, something they had failed to do. An unidentified Democrat, who had not been an Acheson supporter, warned his GOP friends, "Just as surely as Republicans try to fix all the blame on Acheson, Democrats will break their silence on MacArthur. Some of us are prepared to document a case that the general exceeded his instructions."⁷¹ MacArthur had notable support among Republicans because he questioned the Administration's policy in the Far East. Ultraconservative Robert McCormick in his Chicago Daily Tribune sought not only the removal of Acheson but also Harry S. Truman. A Tribune editorial suggested that there were signs of "mental deterioration" in the President and that he should "confess his inadequacy and resign."⁷² The besiegement of Mr. Acheson in particular

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 366, 485.

⁷⁰ Editorial, Evening World-Herald (Omaha), December 20, 1950, p. 24.

⁷¹ Editorial, Washington Post, December 9, 1950, p. 12; December 10, 1950, p. 1B.

⁷² Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 19, 1950, sec. 1, p. 16.

was unjustified in the sense that he was neither solely responsible for the nation's foreign policy nor able to conform the rest of the world to it. It can be said that the Secretary possessed immense stamina in warding off what he called the "attack of the primitives."⁷³

Congressmen undertook a second partisan move in December when Prime Minister Clement Attlee came to Washington for discussions. Attlee asked for the meeting shortly after Truman had done some saber-rattling with nuclear bombs. The British Prime Minister wanted clarification of the American intentions in the Far East and on European defense measures.⁷⁴ Twenty-four Republican Senators proceeded "with the '1000 per cent support' of Senator Wherry" to prepare a resolution demanding that Truman come to the Senate for its advice and consent on any agreement or understanding made with Attlee. Neither Truman⁷⁵ nor the national press responded kindly to the request. Most editors agreed that major foreign policy matters required Presidential consultation with Congress but rejected the resolution because it went beyond the treaty-making process and involved Congress in areas of authority reserved primarily for the executive branch. The Washington Post called the Republican

⁷³Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 364.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 478-79.

⁷⁵Truman, Memoirs, II, 410.

tactic more "mischievous than constructive."⁷⁶

After Senate approval of the North Atlantic Pact in 1949 little was said about sending new American ground forces to Europe. Talk of such action occasionally made the newspapers, but it was not front page material. Some interest was generated when a military analyst and United States Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins called on the Air Force to furnish additional tactical air support for the United States Army and the meager Western European ground forces.⁷⁷

However, Europeans rather than the Truman Administration made the early calls for American troops. Even before the signing of the Atlantic alliance European leaders asked for more American troops over and above those serving occupation duty in Germany. Unnamed "European defense experts" a year later in April, 1950, suggested that United States ground forces be sent to Europe under the alliance. Vice-President Alben Barkley gave the only hint that the Administration might do so. He later clarified it, saying, "I did not have in mind any extension of our occupation forces, with the possible exception that some of the countries in the North Atlantic Pact might ask for some American forces to be stationed within them to help round out their

⁷⁶ Editorial, Dallas Morning News, December 9, 1950, sec. III, p. 2; Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 8, 1950, p. 2C; Editorial, Washington Post, December 8, 1950, p. 26.

⁷⁷ New York Times, May 22, 1950, p. 7; Hanson Baldwin, "Flaw in Pact Defense," New York Times, April 13, 1950, p. 2.

defenses." At the May, 1950, meeting of the North Atlantic Council, so-called authoritative sources reported that the United States would not increase the size of its army for the defense pact.⁷⁸

In fact, just prior to the Korean attack, optimism for peace actually grew. President Truman declared the world was closer to peace than at any time since 1945. Testifying in behalf of the second military aid program General Bradley affirmed that Western European defenses had improved the last year. Secretary of Defense Johnson believed that a small European ground force was sufficient to contain Russia in the early phases of an invasion, and Secretary of State Acheson told Congress that "huge standing armies" were not necessary for the defense of Western Europe. In contrast, the famed military affairs writer, Hanson Baldwin, pointed gloomily to the "tissue paper" defense of Europe.⁷⁹

North Korea doused the Administration's optimism on June 25, 1950. Two days later the United Nations asked for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of North Korean forces from south of the 38th parallel. Truman ordered American air and naval forces into Korea, and on June 30,

⁷⁸Ibid., April 11, 1949, p. 1; April 10, 1950, p. 1; May 23, 1950, p. 4; May 19, 1950, p. 1.

⁷⁹Ibid., June 6, 1950, p. 3; June 7, 1950, p. 1; Hanson Baldwin, "Defenses of the West," New York Times, June 8, 1950, p. 6.

United States ground forces were thrown into the battle.

The President quickly drew an association which may or may not have been correct:

From the very beginning of the Korean action I had always looked at it as a Russian maneuver, as part of the Kremlin's plan to destroy the unity of the free world. NATO, the Russians knew, would succeed only if the United States took part in the defense of Europe. The easiest way to keep us from doing our share in NATO was to draw us into military conflict in Asia.⁸⁰

Throughout the early years of the Cold War the press imprinted on the American mind the monolithic nature of the Communist world. Readers could not help but think Joseph Stalin was the orchestrator of events.

Europe responded immediately, vocally but not militarily. General Charles de Gaulle viewed the Communist attack on Korea as a preparation for an attack on Europe and called upon the Western world to prepare for war. Winston Churchill induced more fear with his analysis that Western European defenses were at a lower level than South Korea's had been. There was not, however, universal belief that a Soviet threat to Europe existed. John J. McCloy, United States High Commissioner in Germany, while desiring more troops, did not believe Western Germany would be attacked. Acheson called a NATO Council meeting in an effort to increase the European contribution of forces on the

⁸⁰Truman, Memoirs, II, 437.

continent.⁸¹ He later reminisced, "When the replies were tabulated, even including substantial British and French efforts, the total available on the central front in Europe fell far short of any candid military view of an adequate defense."⁸²

On September 8, 1950, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican from Massachusetts, proposed an Atlantic Pact military force containing one division of United States troops for every two European divisions furnished. Lodge had some knowledge of military operations, and he, like some others, arrived at a figure of sixty divisions as the total strength needed to resist aggression. He opted for such a military arrangement because it would improve the spirit of Europe and it would be cheaper than allowing the continent to be overrun and then liberated.⁸³ Senator Taft supported the Lodge proposal to increase the strength of the United States Army to thirty divisions but was reluctant to send any of them to Europe.⁸⁴

In August, 1950 the Pentagon submitted a "one package"

⁸¹New York Times, July 12, 1950, p. 14; July 28, 1950, p. 5; July 8, 1950, p. 5; and July 16, 1950, sec. IV, p. 3.

⁸²Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 436.

⁸³U.S., Congress, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record, XCVI, 14396-98. Hereafter cited as Congressional Record, XCVI.

⁸⁴New York Times, September 10, 1950, p. 11.

proposal which called for "beefing up" European defense with American troops and more military aid, the inclusion of a German Army, and a unified command over all NATO units.⁸⁵ On September 9, 1950, President Truman, after consulting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, released a statement in which he announced "substantial increases in the strength of United States forces to be stationed in Western Europe in the interest of the defense of that area." He expected the European partners to make similar troop increases in good faith.⁸⁶ The decision evoked little immediate response, either favorable or unfavorable. The New York Times acknowledged the action as merely a reassurance to Europeans that Korea had not removed our commitment to them.⁸⁷

Secretary Acheson a few days later offered the one-package proposal to the North Atlantic Council. The foreign ministers welcomed the troops and aid and began to work out plans to bring the integrated forces under one command. The question of German participation was another matter. Britain agreed in principle but held many reservations; France could not even agree in principle. Truman and the Congress provided an additional four billion dollars in

⁸⁵Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 437.

⁸⁶U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1950, p. 626.

⁸⁷Editorial, New York Times, September 11, 1950, p. 22.

military aid late in September.⁸⁸

United Nations forces recoiled a month later when Chinese Communist divisions intervened in Korea. The Chinese counter-offensive stalemated the earlier military successes and eventually contributed to an ever growing frustration with the war and the Truman foreign policy. When, on December 1, the President asked Congress for additional defense appropriations the Washington Post declared that a "wait-and-see policy" was no longer acceptable. "We must be prepared for the worst," said the Post, "and that implies something approximating all out mobilization."⁸⁹ The more ardent supporters of the Truman policies called for drastic measures. Editors of the Atlanta Constitution wanted a "real armed force" and the declaration of a state of emergency;⁹⁰ Denver Post editors demanded passage of a universal military training law and new taxes to create the necessary war machine.⁹¹ Even the more moderate Dallas News supported immediate price and

⁸⁸ Ibid., September 19, 1950, p. 14; September 27, 1950, p. 12; September 28, 1950, p. 12.

⁸⁹ Editorial, Washington Post, December 3, 1950, p. 8B.

⁹⁰ Editorial, Atlanta Constitution, December 6, 1950, p. 12; December 13, 1950, p. 16.

⁹¹ Editorial, Denver Post, December 8, 1950, p. 20.

wage controls.⁹²

At mid-December the President proclaimed a national emergency, noting that the danger existed in Europe as well as in Korea. The leaders of the Soviet Union had created the situation, but the President would "not engage in appeasement"; instead, he proposed enlarging the military. Before the Korean attack 1.5 million men were in the Army, Navy, and Air Force--the President's goal was to increase that to 3.5 million men.⁹³ The national emergency brought out Truman's more aggressive opposition. Colonel Robert McCormick's paper, the Chicago Daily Tribune, attacked the Chief Executive saying that he was "leading the nation toward additional gigantic defeats on other foreign battlefields."⁹⁴ The Omaha World Herald saw the nation being turned into a garrison state in which "individual freedom of action will be suspended--for how many years, nobody knows."⁹⁵

Meanwhile, in December Secretary Acheson attended a North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels. The Conference marked the change from a paper alliance with a somewhat vague strategy to a fulfilled, structured military

⁹² Editorial, Dallas Morning News, December 6, 1950, sec. III, p. 2.

⁹³ U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1950, pp. 741-47.

⁹⁴ Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 17, 1950, sec. I, p. 14.

⁹⁵ Editorial, Evening World-Herald (Omaha) December 18, 1950, p. 12.

organization with forces in being. It was no longer a matter of national armies working independently; it was now an international, or European army, composed of units from the national armies. Regarding the structure and troop composition of that army Acheson said, "All of those matters were dealt with . . . and all . . . were acted upon" at Brussels.⁹⁶ Later, many Congressmen questioned what kind of commitment Acheson had made at the conference. In his memoirs Acheson noted that troops were "assigned" but did not clarify fully whether they were contributions in principle or were in fact commitments of specific numbers of troops.⁹⁷ The Brussels Conference was unable to settle the question of German participation, a matter that was prolonged for several years. Lastly, the Council asked Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Commander.⁹⁸

Dwight Eisenhower at that time was President of Columbia University. He had had a limited association with the newly-formed Committee on the Present Danger,⁹⁹ but was very active on the Council on Foreign Relations.

⁹⁶New York Times, December 23, 1950, p. 3.

⁹⁷Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 487.

⁹⁸New York Times, December 20, 1950, p. 10.

⁹⁹The Committee on the Present Danger was formed by a group of university presidents, newspaper editors, and business leaders. It was created because of Soviet aggressiveness and called for such things as the joint defense of Europe and universal military service.

Eisenhower was aware that he was being considered for the position of Supreme Commander and was afraid that he might command an army of no substance. Before his appointment the Council on Foreign Relations submitted a letter, through W. Averell Harriman, to the President. Ostensibly the letter was a product of the Council, but in essence it was Eisenhower airing his personal views. The signers of the letter saw the world falling apart in the face of Soviet imperialism, and they made several recommendations.

The only way in which we and our friends can make the Soviets respect our peaceful intent and moral purposes will be by rapidly producing powerful military forces.

.....

The U.S. must not, under any circumstances, accept national responsibility for military command in Europe except as a consequence of the mutual confidence engendered by a concrete program for the mobilization of forces in North America and in West European countries backed by government pledges of prompt execution.¹⁰⁰

When the troops-for-Europe issue broke into the open President Truman sent General Eisenhower to Europe in January, 1951 on a fact-finding tour to determine if American troops were indeed necessary. From the above letter it is clear where Eisenhower stood already in December. His fact-finding mission in no way changed his mind.

¹⁰⁰Memorandum by Henry M. Wriston, "Eisenhower Study Group letter to President Truman December 12, 1950," April 22, 1968, Wriston Memorandum File, Eisenhower Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

For such leaders as Truman and Acheson the events of the postwar years came fast and unpredictably. The optimism of United Nations collective security soon gave way to retrenchment in collective defense through a regional alliance. No matter how reassuring the Administration sounded, there was a creeping frustration eating away confidence. Foreign policy reversals contributed to this, but there also were those who were yet unwilling to assume leadership and responsibility on the international scene. For those oriented towards isolationism air power and the nuclear bomb appeared to be a simple yet decisive solution. The newly-established Air Force, finding substantial support, not only accepted its responsibility but desired to enlarge it. Increased defense duties at the expense of the other services meant Air Force expansion. The necessity of bipartisanship to prosecute World War II had given way to the needs of the individual parties. Republicans yearned to regain control of the White House, and the conservative faction of the GOP condemned the "me-too" approach of the internationalist wing of the party. More than anything the Korean War bred frustration and gave Truman's foes the impetus to change the nation's direction. Truman had produced a near revolution in American foreign policy and many now felt it was time to re-examine that policy.

CHAPTER II

The Re-examination of the Truman Foreign Policy Begins

Conservatives, especially the right wing elements of the Republican Party, were the main opponents of Truman's foreign policies. Among these a small but militant faction hammered insistently at the President's programs. The anti-Administration group was relatively small in number and relied heavily upon a handful of their most vocal members. That is not to say there were no Democrats opposing the President, for he had support and opposition on both sides of the aisle.

No one incident or event spontaneously touched off the debate; rather, as noted in the last chapter, it was an accumulation of growing anxieties. Besides the partisan moves, the Korean War, especially after the military reversals in November, provided the dissidents an opening. Joseph Kennedy and Thomas Dewey set the tone of the debate in separate speeches on December 12 and 14, 1950, respectively, when they set forth divergent policies for the country.

Joseph Kennedy, a Democrat, businessman, and former ambassador during Franklin Roosevelt's administrations, openly broke with his party's President in a speech before the

University of Virginia Law School. As early as 1946 he began advocating an increase in the nation's military strength while refraining from making foreign commitments which could not be fulfilled. By 1950 he viewed economic aid as unproductive and the Western European armies as militarily incompetent. He compared this situation with the alleged strength of the Soviet Union and declared that any engagement of Russian forces would be "suicidal." The money spent in Europe, he contended, could have been put to better use in this hemisphere. He called for the United States to return to his 1946 fundamentals. In doing so, the United States would get out of Korea, "indeed, . . . get out of every point in Asia which we do not plan realistically to hold in our own defense." This same policy was to be applied to Europe.¹

Response to the Kennedy speech was by no means voluminous. The Truman critics noted it but did not immediately use it. The Wall Street Journal and Seattle Post Intelligencer agreed with Kennedy that the nation's foreign commitments should be reviewed and reduced.² On the other hand, columnists Joseph and Stewart Alsop condemned

¹ Joseph P. Kennedy, "Present Policy is Politically and Morally Bankrupt; United Nations Not a Vehicle to Enforce Peace," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (January 1, 1951), 171-72.

² Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1950, p. 10; Editorial, Seattle Post Intelligencer, December 26, 1950, p. 1B.

the former diplomat for wanting to give the world to the Communists. They wrote, "Under normal circumstances, there would be no great interest in the political views of a successful stock market speculator who makes it a habit to propose surrender whenever surrender is feasible."³

Two days after the Kennedy speech Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New York presented his plan of action. He likewise pointed to Russia's alleged military strength, but instead of retreat he called for national mobilization in the United States thereby providing the leadership for Western Europe to rearm. Noting the United States Army had only ten active divisions, he demanded an Army of "not less than 100 divisions" and an Air Force of "at least 80 groups." Only through military strength could the United States effectively negotiate with Stalin. Europe, not the Far East, was, in his words, the real prize.⁴

The opening round of debate thus ended with a conservative Democrat rejecting Truman foreign policy and a "me-too" Republican backing the President's forthcoming call for a national emergency. The Kennedy-Dewey speeches aroused scant public attention when compared to an address

³Joseph & Stewart Alsop, "Kennedy Plan Would Hand World to Reds," St. Louis Post Dispatch, December 26, 1950, p. 1B.

⁴Thomas E. Dewey, "National Mobilization; A Plan of Action," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVII (January 1, 1951), 167-70.

which Herbert Hoover made a week later.

The former President, while acting on his previously established principles, gave the Administration's critics a shot in the arm. He had long opposed foreign involvement which might lead to war because it undermined the economic stability of the country. In 1938 he said, "We should not engage ourselves to use military force in endeavor to prevent or end other people's wars."⁵ He objected to military alliances because they promoted the status quo, caused opponents to form counter-alliances, and created a fear which induced greater armament. As a result military alliances "produced many wars but never a lasting peace."⁶ Following World War II he beseeched the nation to conserve its resources and end its role as Santa Claus.⁷ In 1945 Truman asked Hoover to return to government service and help solve the food problem in Europe. A close personal friendship developed between Truman and Hoover, a relationship which could never have been realized between Roosevelt and Hoover. Hoover was thankful for being brought back to

⁵ Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1933-1938 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938), p. 306.

⁶ Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1941-1945 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1945), pp. 97-102.

⁷ Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1945-1948 (New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1949), p. 21.

public service, but his principles did not change. In foreign affairs he favored joining the United Nations but was unwilling to get too deeply involved in other commitments.⁸ He believed a war with Russia would bring about the extinction of Western civilization, and told Truman he "had no patience with people who formulated policies in respect to other nations 'short of war.'"⁹

Actually, Hoover was one of the first to confront openly the Administration's plan for sending American troops to Europe. He did so late in October before the national election buoyed Republican spirits and before the reverses in Korea. At that time he resisted the idea of shoring up Western European defense with American troops because in the event of war it would result in the "slaughter of American boys . . ." He wanted no American ground forces on the continent until a "sufficient" European army was in sight.¹⁰

It was after the Kennedy-Dewey addresses, however, when the nation gave Hoover its full attention. On a nationwide radio broadcast, December 20, 1950, he enunciated what popularly became known as the Fortress America thesis.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Memorandum by Herbert Hoover on meeting with Harry S. Truman, May 28, 1945, H. S. Truman File (1945-1946), Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

¹⁰New York Times, October 20, 1950, p. 12.

Communist military strength, according to the former President, was "probably over 300 trained and equipped combat divisions." How he arrived at that figure is unclear but he admitted it included the Communist forces in Europe and Asia. He then observed that a NATO force of sixty divisions could never reach Moscow. Again, he never explained who was proposing to invade Russia and attempt to take Moscow, but by interjecting such an idea he implied, unjustly, that the strategy emanated from either the Truman Administration or the Atlantic Pact nations. As an alternative, he offered his own plan as follows. First, establish a "Western Hemisphere Gibraltar" in the Americas to preserve western civilization. Second, hold the Atlantic, including Britain, and the Pacific, including Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines, by means of air and naval forces. Third, arm the Air Force and Navy "to the teeth." Fourth, having built the needed air and naval forces, the nation could reduce expenditures and balance the budget, thereby avoiding "economic degeneration." Fifth, he wanted no more appeasement, "no more Teherans and no more Yaltas." Sixth, Europeans were to carry their own defense burdens. Western Europe was to organize an army "of such huge numbers as would erect a sure dam against the red flood. And that before we land another man or another dollar on their shores.

Otherwise we shall be inviting another Korea."¹¹

President Truman looked upon the proposals as nothing but "isolationism."¹² Many interpreted the speech in the same manner, yet Hoover differed with those who said he wanted the United States to withdraw totally from Europe and Asia. He felt the Associated Press misrepresented his position and indicated he was in favor of withholding troops and aid only until Western Europe had built up its own defenses.¹³ In a private letter to Anne O'Hara McCormick of the New York Times he reiterated that he had proposed three lines of defense. The first included Western Europe if those countries would "do something real" to establish a defense. The second line included Britain, Japan, Formosa, and the Philippines. The third line was the two oceans--the Western Hemisphere Gibraltar.¹⁴

The speech, indeed, generated a tremendous amount

¹¹ Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1950-1955 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955), pp. 3-9. Hereafter cited as Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1950-1955.

¹² U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1950, p. 761.

¹³ Telegram, Herbert Hoover to Allan Gold, January 2, 1951, Public Statements 3262, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Allan Gold was the editor of the Associated Press.

¹⁴ Herbert Hoover to Anne O'Hara McCormick, December 29, 1950, Public Statements 3262, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

of comment. This was reflected not only in the press but also in Hoover's mail. In addition to personal friends and admirers, a number of Congressmen sent letters of support. In response to a letter from Senator Richard M. Nixon, Republican from California, Hoover wrote, "at least we have the animals stirred up!"¹⁵ Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, then out of favor with the Administration, believed that under a parliamentary system of government the Truman government would immediately fall in favor of someone espousing the Hoover policy.¹⁶ Through friends Hoover learned of General Eisenhower's appraisal of the broadcast. Eisenhower had wished more emphasis had been placed on the United States providing the necessary leadership for European defense efforts.¹⁷

Both the Administration and the Hoover forces claimed public sentiment was running in their favor, and each disputed the figures cited by the other.¹⁸ Truman

¹⁵Herbert Hoover to Richard Nixon, December 29, 1950, Public Statements 3262, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

¹⁶A. C. Wedemeyer to Herbert Hoover, December 19, 1950, Public Statements 3262, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

¹⁷L. Ward Bannister to Herbert Hoover, December 26, 1950, Public Statements 3262, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Bannister, a Denver attorney, had visited Eisenhower after the Hoover speech.

¹⁸Editorial, Evening World Herald (Omaha), January 5, 1951, p. 22.

never disclosed the basis of his contention; however, Hoover's staff gathered the editorial opinions of over 642 newspapers. Their figures indicate 377 papers were "totally favorable" to the speech. Based upon regional circulation they found 67 per cent "favorable" in the New England and Middle Atlantic states, 32 per cent in the South and South Atlantic states, 84 per cent in the Southwest, Mountain and Pacific states, and 67 per cent in the Middle West. The nationwide support appeared impressive but the computations were in fact somewhat misleading. First, the circulation figures of the larger, more influential papers were offset by including numerous papers having much smaller circulations. For example, the Des Moines Tribune's (145,000 circulation) rejection of the Hoover plan was counterbalanced by including eleven Iowa papers, each having less than 30,000 circulation, which supported the former President. Second, other discrepancies appeared in such states as Missouri where the Kansas City and St. Louis papers were never tabulated in the figures.¹⁹ In the final analysis the Hoover staff probably spent more time compiling their data than did the Administration; however their statistical analysis left something to be

¹⁹Memorandum and worksheets of Helene Lockwood, January 14, 1951, Public Statements 3262, Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Helene Lockwood was a member of Hoover's staff who worked on the press response to his December 20 speech.

desired. It cannot be denied that the editors gave substantial backing to Hoover's ideas, but the exact strength is in question.

Editorial response of a cross-section of major papers can be broken down into those undecided, those highly favorable, and those finding fault with the program. The first group included such papers as the Omaha Evening World Herald, Los Angeles Times, San Francisco Chronicle, and Dallas Morning Star. Their editors, while not immediately voicing their support or opposition, viewed the speech as food for thought, and some, after carefully reading the text, even admitted that Hoover was not necessarily for the total abandonment of Western Europe.²⁰ As the re-examination of the nation's foreign policy progressed these papers did align themselves with one camp or another. The conservative Wall Street Journal, Seattle Post Intelligencer, and Chicago Daily Tribune placed themselves firmly in the second group which strongly favored the Hoover program.²¹ Seattle Post editors acknowledged the Hoover thesis as the embodiment of the Hearst newspaper philosophy.²² The

²⁰ Editorial, Evening World-Herald (Omaha), December 21, 1950, p. 30; Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, December 21, 1950, p. 20; Editorial Dallas Morning News, December 21, 1950, sec. III, p. 2; Editorial, Los Angeles Times, December 21, 1950, sec. II, p. 4.

²¹ Editorial, Wall Street Journal, December 21, 1950, p. 4.

²² Editorial, Seattle Post Intelligencer, December 26, 1950, p. 10.

vociferous Chicago Daily Tribune almost proclaimed Hoover as the national savior. Hoover, according to the paper, had done a great service for the country, but it had earned him "the epithet of 'isolationist' from a necktie salesman." The McCormick paper further asked the nation not to be tricked into following the Administration or "a wayward little fool like Dewey."²³

The third group was at least strongly resistant, if not unalterably opposed, to Hoover's plan. The New York Times and Washington Post mildly rebuked the former President's approach,²⁴ but other moderate and liberal papers commenced a full-blown attack on the Fortress America thesis. Ralph McGill, editor of the Atlanta Constitution, called the plan "fantastically fatal and immature" because it gave the Soviet Union the initiative.²⁵ The St. Louis Post Dispatch accused Hoover of undoing the good accomplished at the December Brussels conference because he was calling for a return to isolationism.²⁶

²³ Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 22, 1950, sec. I, p. 14; January 4, 1951, sec. I, p. 18.

²⁴ Editorial, New York Times, December 21, 1950, p. 28; Editorial Washington Post, December 22, 1950, p. 24.

²⁵ Editorial, Atlanta Constitution, December 26, 1950, p. 1.

²⁶ William H. Stoneman, "Hoover's Speech Tends to Shade Europe's Faith in the United States," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 21, 1950, p. 1B; Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 22, 1950, p. 2B.

Papers such as the Denver Post played up the fact that Pravda gave much attention to the Hoover speech by printing the text in full, the implication being that Hoover was doing Stalin's work for him.²⁷ An editorial comment in the Nation described the speech as "a rallying cry for all the discredited forces of isolationism . . ." who have "nursed their infantile illusions of a hemispheric 'Gibraltar.'"²⁸ Ernest K. Lindley, an editor for Newsweek magazine, found the Hoover-Kennedy strategy to command "the support of no more than a corporal's guard of unreconstructed isolationists."²⁹ The Times (London) correspondent in Washington discredited the Hoover thesis as simply a resurrection of his depression policies--hoard the resources and build a wall around the nation. That same correspondent thought it appropriate the isolationists' case was presented "by a man with a record for being wrong."³⁰

Columnist Walter Lippmann joined the debate taking a position very close to Hoover and Kennedy. As he saw it the national sentiment was to get out of Korean-type

²⁷Barnet Nover, "Joe Liked 'Isolation' Theme," Denver Post, December 27, 1950, p. 14.

²⁸Editorial, Nation, December 30, 1950, p. 688.

²⁹Editorial, Newsweek, January 22, 1951, p. 27.

³⁰The Times (London), December 22, 1950, p. 4; December 23, 1950, p. 5.

entanglements and replace these with an "armed isolation."³¹ He said he preferred a policy somewhere between what he regarded as the unworkable extremes of the Dewey proposals and the Hoover-Kennedy strategy,³² but ultimately, his position came much closer to that of the conservatives than that of the Trumanites.

John Foster Dulles, in behalf of the State Department, made a formal public reply to the Hoover program in the last days of December. As merely a reiteration of the established Administration line, it did not produce the same commotion the Hoover speech did.³³ However the Chicago Daily Tribune quickly characterized Dulles as a "renegade Republican" being used by Truman.³⁴

Herbert Hoover made a second speech in February, 1951, as the debate mushroomed. He again called for an American air and naval defense based in this hemisphere. Hoover asserted that the idea of a peacetime NATO army stretched the pact beyond its true intent, and asked Congress to recover its constitutional prerogatives in foreign affairs.

³¹Walter Lippmann, "Toward Armed Isolation?" St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 19, 1950, p. 3C.

³²Walter Lippmann, "The Dewey and Hoover Theories," Washington Post, December 26, 1950, p. 9.

³³New York Times, December 30, 1950, p. 4.

³⁴Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 29, 1950, sec. I, p. 8.

The former President expanded his emphasis on a European army built from European forces by suggesting non-NATO countries such as Spain, Greece, Turkey, and West Germany be invited into the pact. As an air power advocate, he believed that the purchase of 390 B-36's, the most advanced long range bomber in 1951, was a better buy than maintaining ten additional ground divisions for the same cost.³⁵

The national press response was similar to the reaction following his December address. By February the Omaha World-Herald had swung behind the Hoover program because it had "the virtue of clarity and simplicity."³⁶ The Washington Post accused the former President of misinterpreting the Treaty's original intent of building a collective capacity to resist armed aggression. The Post said that the Hoover program would not only allow Russia to overrun Europe but would then subject the continent to devastation by American bombers.³⁷ Walter Winchell reported open hostility existed between Truman and Hoover, but subsequent letters revealed that no such feelings ever

³⁵ Hoover, Addresses Upon the American Road, 1950-1955, pp. 14-22.

³⁶ Editorial, Evening World Herald (Omaha), February 12, 1951, p. 18.

³⁷ Editorial, Washington Post, February 19, 1951, p. 8.

developed.³⁸

Hoover again aired his views a few weeks later at Congressional hearings on the troops-for-Europe issue. By then he had clearly established his position and had given prestigious support to the Truman opponents. His Fortress America speech, indeed sounded like the isolationism of an earlier era. Claiming he was no isolationist in the pre-World War II sense of the word, he accepted Europe as the first line defense if only those nations would prove themselves. As written, the program conceivably gave something to all philosophies and at the same time was intended to scare the Europeans into action. Yet, the overwhelming impression was one of strategic retreat. As an alternative to a sometime costly and frustrating policy, the Hoover plan was simple, effective, and relatively inexpensive. Shortly, the Administration questioned not only the feasibility but also the desirability of such proposals.

On January 5, 1951, Senator Robert A. Taft gave the nation his appraisal of the Truman foreign policy, an appraisal not in harmony with the President's State of the

³⁸ Herbert Hoover to Harry S. Truman, March 7, 1951, and Harry S. Truman to Herbert Hoover, March 13, 1951, H. S. Truman File (1949-1953), Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. In this exchange of letters both men discounted as nonsense a Walter Winchell article in the March 6, 1951 issue of the New York Daily Mirror.

Union message which was given three days later. Unlike Taft, President Truman continued to press for additional economic and military assistance to the rest of the free world.³⁹

Until illness removed Senator Vandenberg from Washington Senator Taft had not been influential in foreign affairs. He left that area to Vandenberg while he made his reputation in domestic policy. Prior to Pearl Harbor Taft had already formulated a conservative view of Presidential power. In the fall of 1941 he questioned Roosevelt's constitutional authority and opposed his alleged attempts to involve the United States in the European war.⁴⁰ To avoid being called an isolationist, Taft called his approach "the policy of the free hand."⁴¹ While he resisted the Truman foreign policies, it was not until after the election of 1950, according to his biographer William S. White, that Taft worked at becoming a foreign policy expert. The Republican Party needed someone to replace Vandenberg's leadership, and, besides, Taft had

³⁹U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1951, pp. 7-10.

⁴⁰U.S., Congress, 77th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, LXXXVII, A4364.

⁴¹Walter Sloan Poole, "The Quest for a Republican Foreign Policy: 1941-1951" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1968), p. 33. Hereafter cited as Poole, "Republican Foreign Policy."

Presidential aspirations.⁴² Since he was his Party's Congressional policy leader he saw no reason not to assume leadership in foreign as well as domestic affairs, a leadership the Party liberals never willingly followed.

He based his philosophy on the abhorrence of war and the protection of the liberty of the individual American. White portrays Taft as having "an immovably mercantile view toward military expenditures . . . ," and this resulted in his placing "price tags" on national security. What knowledge of military operations he possessed came from two sources--his reading the history of the Napoleonic campaigns and Brigadier General Bonner Fellers (retired). From the Napoleonic campaigns he learned that Wellington's success at Waterloo was accomplished with twenty per cent British troops and eighty per cent mercenaries.⁴³ General Fellers, an admirer of General MacArthur, was on the Republican National Committee and had occasion to advise the Senator.⁴⁴

Taft's own book, A Foreign Policy for Americans, underlined his distrust of the Truman foreign policy. For him the ultimate purpose of foreign policy was to protect

⁴²William S. White, The Taft Story (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1954), pp. 145-48. Hereafter cited as White, Taft Story.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 149-53.

⁴⁴Marquis Childs, "Taft Moves Into the Spotlight," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 5, 1951, p. 3B.

individual liberty, which in turn could be secured by moral leadership and "neutrality and non-interference with other nations . . ." He disliked Truman's foreign policy because the strategy was too costly and the policies were not being applied equally all over the world. The Truman strategy was costly in that it required balanced forces to meet any land, sea, or air attack. Maintenance of such huge forces, according to Taft, required individuals to forfeit a certain amount of their economic and personal freedom. He opposed a land war in Europe or Asia because it forced the United States to fight with ground forces, a strategy in which the Communist world had vastly more manpower than the United States. However, he did not call for a retreat from the rest of the world but rather proposed to help defend it with the forces in which Americans held superiority--air and naval power. He pointed out that Britain, relying on her navy, had been effective in the nineteenth century without a large land force. The United States could be just as effective in the twentieth century with air power. On the matter of applying policies equally, he accused the Administration of overextending itself in Europe but only giving a half-hearted effort in the Far East.⁴⁵

The Ohio Senator, having been overwhelmingly

⁴⁵Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, pp. 11-12, 67-68, 77-78, 112-13.

re-elected in the November, 1950, election, asked the new Congress to re-examine the Truman foreign policy. The Administration had not convinced him that Europe should be the first line of defense. When asked if he was against sending troops to Europe Taft said he was not opposed to that in particular but wanted the entire defense strategy reviewed. Taft did not consider himself an isolationist because, according to him, such persons no longer existed. In rebuttal Secretary Acheson rejected the idea that isolationism was dead; instead, it was reappearing under the guise of "re-examinist." Incapable of a sustained purpose, the re-examinist, according to Acheson, was like the farmer "who would pull up his crops in the morning to see how they had done during the night."⁴⁶

When Robert Taft stated his case against the Administration in January, 1951 he centered on three issues: executive consultation with Congress, Presidential powers under the Constitution, and the defense of Europe. On the matter of consultation, he accused the Administration of consulting with Congress only after the President had secretly formulated a program and then indoctrinated his friends in the national press. What Taft wanted was consultation prior to the public unveiling of a decision or

⁴⁶New York Times, November 11, 1950, p. 8; November 14, 1950, p. 1; November 18, 1950, pp. 1, 7.

program. The problem was by no means new, but with the breakdown of the bipartisan foreign policy it had become more evident. This dispute led him to question the President's right to commit American forces to Korea. Under the United Nations Charter the Security Council could negotiate a special agreement to create an international army. In accepting the Charter, Congress required that any such agreement be subject to its approval. From this Taft contended that the President, by committing troops to Korea under United Nations auspices, had illegally bypassed Congress.⁴⁷ The fact was, the Security Council had never negotiated the special military agreement because of Russian intransigence.

He then moved to the Atlantic Pact and the defense of Europe. Passage of the pact was a "tremendous mistake," in his opinion, because Russia could easily interpret it as an aggressive move, and American military participation could induce the Soviets to initiate another war. All that was really needed for an effective deterrent was to make it known that the United States would go to war if Russia attacked Western Europe. He admitted that sending American troops might be a confidence-builder for Europeans but was fearful it might take up to forty divisions to "uphold their

⁴⁷U.S., Congress, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record, XCVII, 55-57. Hereafter cited as Congressional Record, XCVII.

morale." Ultimately, he was afraid of where this might lead: "We could go on indefinitely." Taft was not totally against sending a limited number of troops provided the other nations contributed their share. On the other hand, while giving his support to increased air and naval forces, he realized that air bombardment alone could not stop Communist armies.⁴⁸

Senators Connally and J. William Fulbright, the latter a Democrat from Arkansas, castigated the Ohio Senator for demoralizing the people of Western Europe, but they made no immediate attempt to dispute point-by-point what Taft had said.⁴⁹ As in the case of the Hoover address, the national press responded dramatically. The Los Angeles Times, undecided on the Hoover proposals, now supported Taft on the constitutional and economic issues.⁵⁰ The Omaha World-Herald gave its full approval;⁵¹ however, the Chicago Daily Tribune found the speech went "a little farther in the direction of interventionism than some of us would go . . ." But in comparing Robert Taft and Harry Truman the McCormick paper readily accepted

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 62-67.

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 141-44.

⁵⁰ Editorial, Los Angeles Times, January 11, 1951, sec. II, p. 4.

⁵¹ Editorial, Evening World-Herald (Omaha), January 8, 1951, p. 14.

Mr. Republican.⁵² In the other camp, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch accused Taft of outdoing Senator McCarthy in irresponsibility.⁵³ Washington Post editors characterized Hoover as unwilling to fight until Europe built a wall of protection and Taft as willing to fight but not until Russia overran Europe.⁵⁴

One year earlier Taft claimed the Administration had put an end to any remaining bipartisan foreign policy. However, on January 9, 1951, he offered to sit down with the Democrats in an effort to work out just such a policy. While Truman did not rush to accept Taft's suggestion, the announcement did mean Taft had taken over Vandenberg's position as the Republican foreign affairs leader.⁵⁵

The same week at a press conference President Truman attempted to clarify his position and at the same time answer some of Taft's allegations. He started out saying that he had the power under the Constitution to deploy troops anywhere in the world and that Congress and the courts had repeatedly recognized this. Refuting Taft, he claimed his Administration had "always" consulted with the

⁵² Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 7, 1951, sec. I, p. 18.

⁵³ Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 7, 1951, p. 2C.

⁵⁴ Editorial, Washington Post, January 10, 1951, p. 10.

⁵⁵ New York Times, January 9, 1950, p. 12; January 10, 1951, p. 1.

appropriate Congressional committees on foreign affairs. Consultation did not mean, however, that he would be bound by Congressional advice: "I don't ask their permission, I just consult them." He reaffirmed that a decision had been made to give General Eisenhower sufficient forces to build a defense in Europe and further admitted that General Marshall and Secretary Acheson had already met with the Congressional committees.⁵⁶ Judging from the debate taking place on Capitol Hill, the Administration's private consultation by no means produced Congressional agreement.

Soon Taft's central objection to the Presidential claim of power was that no American Executive could commit American forces to an international army without Congressional approval. He did not deny the other powers as Commander-in-Chief, but observed that an international force could alter substantially the President's control over his own military. From Taft's viewpoint the President had come close to allowing that in Korea, and such a possibility again arose with the creation of a NATO army. In such instances he believed that Congress had the duty of checking the President's actions. As the debate progressed the Ohio Senator refined this particular issue, and in doing so he made some subtle position changes regarding Western Europe. A month after his January 5 speech he rejected the idea of ever withdrawing from the North Atlantic

⁵⁶U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1951, pp. 18-22.

Pact or ever abandoning Europe. He was now convinced that a free Europe was of "vital interest" to the United States, but again he emphasized that action should be taken by the European countries.⁵⁷

Indeed, Robert Taft was not entirely consistent in his stand on the troops-for-Europe issue. In November he was unconvinced that Europe should be the first line of defense. In January he clearly had reservations about sending American ground forces to Europe. In February he backed away from his earlier positions; though not desiring to deploy large numbers of troops he did concede the importance of Europe for the security of the United States. Only in demanding that Europe do its share and in giving support to the Air Force lobby was Senator Taft really consistent. The Washington Post, referring to Taft as a chameleon, found that for all his rhetoric the public still was unsure where he stood.⁵⁸ William S. White recognized Taft as "a man whose record in world affairs was inconsistent almost to the point of inconceivability."⁵⁹

Like Hoover, Senator Taft was a major contributor to the re-examination of Truman foreign policy. He did not align himself closely to the Hoover thesis, but he stood far

⁵⁷Congressional Record, XCVII, 546-47, 1121.

⁵⁸Editorial, Washington Post, February 13, 1951
p. 10.

⁵⁹White, Taft Story, p. 142.

away from the Truman Doctrine. As the leading Republican in Congress he became one of the rallying points for the anti-Truman forces. Anyone with Presidential ambitions could not ignore the potency of the issue when the country exhibited a restlessness over the existing policy. Besides, Taft's Senate Floor Leader, Kenneth Wherry, who had ambitions of his own, had entered the foray.

Senator Wherry entered the Senate in 1943 and from then until his death in November 1951 he displayed an unrelenting opposition--many times based on economic conservatism--to the Roosevelt and Truman foreign policies. He was against the Truman Doctrine because it went against national tradition. He opposed the Marshall plan as too costly to the American taxpayer and later attempted to have the appropriation for the Economic Cooperation Administration cut. Although he voted for the Vandenberg Resolution, he opposed the North Atlantic Treaty because of the implied commitment to implement the pact.⁶⁰

In domestic politics Wherry actively sought Federal spending projects for the benefit of his home state of Nebraska. In 1948 the Air Force selected a site south of Omaha as the new headquarters for the Strategic Air Command. General Curtis LeMay, head of that Command, at first did not

⁶⁰Harl Adams Dalstrom, "Kenneth S. Wherry," Vol. II (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska, 1965), pp. 519, 542, 585-86, 588-89, 903, 913.

favor the location, in part, due to a local housing shortage. Senator Wherry made it his business to see that the Air Force did not change its mind. To solve the housing problem he enlisted the aid of the Omaha Chamber of Commerce and introduced in Congress a military housing bill.⁶¹ The Wherry Housing Act of 1949 convinced General LeMay, who later looked upon Wherry as an "able and farseeing and courageous" man "who saved our bacon."⁶² Out of this came a natural alliance as Wherry proved to be an ardent supporter of the air power lobby.

The Nebraska politician was a staunch conservative at the national level and an isolationist in foreign affairs. As one writer said, Wherry's philosophy "was very sound politics in Nebraska, yet it would be unfair and inaccurate to say that his conservatism was based solely upon political expediency." His isolationism, while being tempered by the realities of the twentieth century, sought a simple solution to the nation's Cold War problems.⁶³ Senator Vandenberg also looked upon Wherry as an old style isolationist when he said, "He [Wherry] is widely regarded as one of the last remaining symbols of Republican isolationism--and I felt

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 792-813.

⁶²Curtis E. LeMay, Mission with LeMay; My Story (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1965), p. 471.

⁶³Dalstrom, "Kenneth S. Wherry," pp. 975-84.

the Party could not afford to renew any part of this label."⁶⁴

As a right-wing Republican the Senator was too much of an ultra-conservative to become a leading policy-maker, but this in no way stopped him from attempting to influence policy. Expressing his "disappointment" with Truman's State of the Union message,⁶⁵ he sponsored a resolution which "declared it to be the sense of the Senate that no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress."⁶⁶ Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 8, or the Wherry Resolution as it was called, initiated the basis for Congressional action.

With this resolution Wherry entered the grey area of Executive-Congressional relations by attempting to undercut Presidential initiative in conducting foreign affairs. "The resolution provides for only one thing," he pointed out, "namely, that the question of commitments by the President of the United States shall be held in abeyance until Congress itself has made the determination." It was aimed

⁶⁴Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 466.

⁶⁵Congressional Record, XCVII, 94.

⁶⁶U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area, Hearings, on S. Con. Res. 8, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, p. 38. Hereafter cited as Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8.

solely at Article 3, the mutual aid clause of the North Atlantic Alliance; in no way did it affect Article 5, the aggression clause. Reviewing the North Atlantic Treaty hearings, he observed that both Senators Connally and Vandenberg had declared that Congressional approval was necessary to implement the pact. Like Taft, he demanded that the President consult with Congress before any decision was reached. The two Senators took similar stands on the sending of American troops to Korea, both contending that Truman had usurped Congressional power in doing so. Administration supporters quickly labelled the resolution as an attempt to control military tactics in that it was specifically aimed at the use of ground forces. They asked if the Air Force would not be affected since that branch of the military needed ground forces to protect their advanced bases in Europe. Wherry answered that the resolution was meant to deal with "policy" and not with what constituted ground forces or military tactics. Ultimately, he viewed commitment of American troops to an international army as a departure from existing policy.⁶⁷

The Wherry Resolution amounted to a veiled partisan attack on the Truman policy. Explaining his resolution, the Senator made it clear that his proposal sought to preserve the "never-dying principles of our Republic,"

⁶⁷Congressional Record, XCVII, 320-26.

principles which had been under attack since the New Deal.⁶⁸
The Chicago Daily Tribune favored the Wherry Resolution as
the only practical means of restraining Harry S. Truman.⁶⁹

Wherry solicited Hoover's support to a greater degree than Taft's since as rivals the policy leader purposely stayed some distance from his floor leader. On the other hand, Wherry and Hoover corresponded regularly with the latter submitting highly usable material to the Nebraskan.⁷⁰ The similarity of the two men's positions undoubtedly promoted such a relationship, in addition to the fact Hoover was not seeking power through a public office.

As more and more persons entered the debate Wherry moved to have public hearings on his resolution. Originally the Senate leadership set aside one day to debate and vote on the resolution, but a few days later Wherry asked the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations to hold joint hearings. The Republican Senator from Missouri, James P. Kem, immediately warned Wherry that

⁶⁸Ibid., pp. 327.

⁶⁹Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 11, 1951, sec. I, p. 18.

⁷⁰Herbert Hoover to Kenneth S. Wherry, May 6, 1950 and January 9, 1951, Kenneth S. Wherry File, Post Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. Both of these letters deal directly with European defense and the American commitment to it.

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, under the chairmanship of Connally, would pigeonhole the resolution.⁷¹ He was not the only one with such feelings; the Washington Post proclaimed, "The routing of Wherryism thus clears the air."⁷² Little did they know Wherry would not be denied so easily.

It was natural for the Senate to direct its attention to the formulation of foreign policy since the Constitution gave it joint powers with the President. Indeed, Senate debate far exceeded any House discussion of the issue. There were, however, lesser efforts being made in the lower house. Representative Frederick R. Coudert, Jr., Republican from New York, introduced House Joint Resolution No. 9 which, though worded differently, proposed the same thing as the Wherry Resolution.⁷³ Coudert looked upon the appropriations power as the only effective means of bringing Truman to Congress.⁷⁴ He had, in fact, been prepared to offer his resolution a year earlier but had been "warned by the G.O.P. leadership that the time was 'not yet ripe.'"⁷⁵

⁷¹Congressional Record, XCVII, 318-19, 477, 487.

⁷²Editorial, Washington Post, January 24, 1951, p. 8.

⁷³Congressional Record, XCVII, 34.

⁷⁴Frederick R. Coudert, Jr. to Herbert Hoover, January 25, 1951, Frederick Coudert, Jr. File, Post Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

⁷⁵"The Hoover Line Grows," New Republic January 15, 1951, p. 7.

Republican Representative James I. Dooliver from Iowa sponsored a similar resolution, but like Coudert's it died in committee. One hundred eighteen members of the House did sign a declaration of policy demanding Executive-Congressional consultation, an impregnable defense in the Western Hemisphere, and the stoppage of aid to Western Europe until those countries started carrying their share of the burden. Democrats did not subscribe to the declaration in a bipartisan spirit as it turned out to be a party line document.⁷⁶ For the most part the House of Representatives sat back and let the Senate talk itself out.

Herbert Hoover, Robert Taft, and Kenneth Wherry repeatedly spoke in behalf of those seeking a review of the nation's foreign policy. They were articulate and held positions from which they could disseminate their views. They were by no means the sole opponents, but they enunciated positions which received significant public attention and drew heavy criticism. Their followers had neither Hoover and Taft's prestige nor Wherry's vocal tenacity. Democrat Joseph Kennedy never sustained his foray on Truman policy, and therefore relegated himself once more to private life.

These men espoused courses which in many ways

⁷⁶Congressional Record, XCVII, 1246, 1258-59.

sounded like an isolationism of an earlier age, and the national press and many public officials openly disavowed them as "isolationists." Such a term by its nature is highly connotative and requires a concise definition. Yet those who bandied the word in public made no effort to define it. The word, "neo-isolationist," likewise very connotative, does little more than identify a new kind of isolationist without defining the original term. If these men were isolationists, their positions did not neatly fit a philosophy of total non-involvement with the rest of the world. Perhaps for this reason the word "re-examinists" better characterizes these spokesmen, for it does not immediately imply a policy of complete retreat.

A number of analysts have attempted to define the re-examinists' philosophy as it relates to an older isolationism. Samuel Lubell found the isolationist feelings of the World War I period centered on aggrieved ethnic groups (mainly German-Americans) and economic protests. World War II altered the earlier alignment; instead of being in the Progressive camp opposing Old Guard Republicans the isolationists were now in the Old Guard Republican camp opposing the New Dealers. This amounted to a movement from the political left to the political right. The Cold War changed the so-called isolationists' philosophy even more because they were no longer anti-war but perhaps more pro-war. Lubell supported this contention by pointing to their

aggressive approach to Communism in the Far East. He concluded that any Republican appeal to a totally non-involvement isolation was reflected only in their disgust with the last war and the alleged mistakes of Tehran and Yalta. He suggested that Taft and Wherry overestimated any serious revival of earlier attitudes because in the 1950 election the Democratic vote held up better in the "old-time" isolationist areas than did the Republican vote.⁷⁷

A "reactionary-nationalist elite," according to Norman Graebner, had espoused a pre-World War II isolationism which emphasized the domestic economy, overestimated the power of the United States, and depended upon unilateral diplomacy. The new or neo-isolationism which followed the war still accepted unilateralism and the belief in national power. Taft wanted the United States to extend unilaterally the Monroe Doctrine to Europe rather than enter into the North Atlantic Alliance. The air power advocates provided an omnipotent military solution. On the other hand, Graebner's neo-isolationists rejected being called isolationists because they had in fact supported many of Truman's commitments to the rest of the world. While the neo-isolationists did support some of the programs, he found they had done so "with the apparent

⁷⁷ Samuel Lubell, "Who Votes Isolationist and Why," Harper's Magazine, April, 1951, pp. 29-36.

intent of an eventual withdrawal."⁷⁸ Other authors called it "an attempt to make the world safe for American retreat from it."⁷⁹ Lastly, Graebner concluded that they displayed a certain irrationality. While being fiercely anti-Communist, they attacked Dean Acheson who had checked the Communists more than anyone else.⁸⁰

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. concurred with Lubell's analysis of the isolationist movement from the political left to the right and with Graebner on the matter of unilateral diplomacy. Schlesinger then turned his attention to the roles of General Douglas MacArthur and Senator Joseph McCarthy in the new isolationist movement. MacArthur's interventionist tendencies did not fit isolationist philosophy, but he provided political capital on which to operate. Senator McCarthy's anti-Communist zeal helped to cover up the attention Pravda had given to such people as Hoover. Senator Taft, according to Schlesinger, typified the new isolationist when he said, "The policy on which all Republicans can unite . . . is one of all-out opposition to the spread of Communism, recognizing that there is a limit beyond which we cannot go." A New York Post editor

⁷⁸ Graebner, New Isolationism, pp. 23-26.

⁷⁹ Thomas I. Cook and Malcolm Moos, Power Through Purpose: The Realism of Idealism as a Basis for Foreign Policy (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 54. Hereafter cited as Cook and Moos, Power Through Purpose.

⁸⁰ Graebner, New Isolationism, p. 64.

called this statement Taft's "all-out, halfway policy."⁸¹

Realist Hans J. Morgenthau characterized the neo-isolationists as disappointed utopians who had fought two wars to make the world safe for democracy only to find they had failed. This postwar failure revived an isolationist attitude of mind. However, instead of refusing to participate in world affairs, the neo-isolationists sought to deal with the world only on their terms.⁸²

The views of these four writers are indicative of the difficulty encountered when attempting to characterize the re-examinists. No one writer arrived at an ultimate definition which would fit all re-examinists.

Yet some generalizations can be made. First, the re-examinists acted because of different motivations. In the case of Republicans, politics played a significant role. On the other hand, there were those in both parties who expressed legitimate concern and asked legitimate questions regarding the Administration's handling of foreign affairs. Taft, for instance, had much more to gain

⁸¹Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "The New Isolationism," Atlantic, May, 1952, pp. 34-38. As quoted by Schlesinger. Hereafter cited as Schlesinger, Atlantic.

⁸²Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 128-29, 134. Hereafter cited as Morgenthau, Defense of National Interest.

politically than did Hoover who appeared to act primarily on his principles. Second, as a group, they were adamantly anti-Communist; and, in so erecting this facade they attempted to make the Administration look soft on the issue of Communism. Senator McCarthy and the attacks on Secretary of State Acheson exemplify this. Third, while they expressed varying degrees of resistance to sending American ground forces to Europe, they were inconsistent regarding the Far East. On the one hand they could support MacArthur's program for total victory through the use of air power in Korea, and on the other hand, capitalize on the unpopularity of the war and call for an end to such entanglements. Fourth, the re-examinists reflected discontent with collective security and collective defense and continually opted for a go-it-alone policy. Taft called for merely the extension of the Monroe Doctrine, while he, Wherry, and Hoover all placed great faith in American air power. Fifth, while denouncing isolationism, their proposals carried distinct overtones of retreatism. Hoover would have Europe as the first line of defense only if stringent conditions were met; and knowing the performance of Europe, people quickly grasped the Fortress America thesis. Taft would defend Europe but only according to his game plan. The Wherry Resolution not only implied a reversal of the Truman foreign policy, but it also kept the spotlight on a highly volatile political issue. Technically, the re-examinists

were not totally withdrawing from the rest of the world but were willing to participate only on their own terms. As a result, their proposals at times amounted to what Senator Vandenberg called the fifteen-foot rope policy. The re-examinists were throwing a fifteen-foot rope to nations drowning thirty feet from shore.⁸³

Whatever their individual positions, the Hoover-Taft-Wherry forces had made a collective assault upon the existing foreign policy. With the promise of open hearings, President Truman, in turn, was preparing a powerful defense in his own behalf.

⁸³Schlesinger, Atlantic, p. 37.

CHAPTER III

The Senate Hearings: The Pros and Cons of European Defense

Truman and his critics alike based their individual positions upon the alleged Soviet strength and West European efforts at creating a viable defense. Both sides generally acknowledged that the military forces of Western Europe were no equal to the Communist bloc; however there was no agreement regarding the seriousness of West European intentions to do something about it.

Within the Soviet military the Red Army posed the greatest threat with its vast numbers and emphasis on mobile armoured units. Allied military authorities conceded that Russia had built tanks equal to those of any other nations during World War II, and that her postwar weapons production centered upon tanks and self-propelled artillery.¹ Not everyone arrived at the same estimate of Soviet ground strength, but the more reliable sources agreed that Russia was fielding 175 to 200 divisions at the end of 1950.

General J. Lawton Collins, United States Army Chief

¹J. D. Warne, N.A.T.O. and its Prospects, The Army Quarterly Series (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1954), pp. 21-22.

of Staff, told the Senate Foreign Relations-Armed Services joint committee in February 1951 that he knew "quite certainly" Russia had 175 to 200 divisions plus the forces of the satellite countries. He hastened to explain that 175 Soviet divisions equalled about 110 American divisions because the average Russian division was composed of 12,000 to 14,000 men while an American division averaged approximately 18,000 men.² The Association of the United States Army concurred with that estimate and further tallied the total Communist strength, including Russia, China, and all the satellite nations, at 467 divisions. In comparison, the free world could only call upon 141 divisions.³ It is evident the figures the Defense Department gave Senators impressed the legislators;⁴ even Robert Taft accepted the existence of 175 Soviet divisions and 60 satellite divisions.⁵

Most people displayed anxiety over the Soviet ground forces but less so regarding the Russian Air Force or Navy. Should war come, many believed it would be a stand-off between the United States Navy and the Russian Navy; the United States had a superior carrier force while the

²Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 168.

³Conrad H. Lanza, "World Perimeters," United States Army Combat Forces Journal, I (June 1951), 44.

⁴Letters to author from Paul H. Douglas, December 13, 1970, and Leverett Saltonstall, November 25, 1970.

⁵Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, p. 7.

Soviets maintained a much larger submarine force.⁶

Regarding the Soviet Air Force, the American Defense Establishment revealed little about Russian air power; however, the French estimated Soviet air strength at 600,000 men and 50,000 planes, of which 10,000 were jet fighter aircraft and 2,000 were medium-range bombers.⁷ Unlike the United States Air Force, the Soviets stressed tactical air support of ground forces with only secondary emphasis on strategic bombing of the enemy. Some analysts estimated that approximately two-thirds of the Soviet aircraft strength was integrated with their vast ground forces. While the United States produced a new generation of bombers, the Soviet Union merely copied the American B-29--a medium range bomber which would have required forward bases to strike the American continent.⁸ Russia had fought World War II primarily with ground forces, and in 1950 that reliance on land forces had not basically changed.

Besides the Soviet army itself, there were signs that Russia was enlarging the satellite forces. Unconfirmed

⁶"How We Stack Up Against Russia," Newsweek, March 13, 1950, p. 17.

⁷"Air Strength," Military Review, XXX (January, 1951), p. 72. Article quoted from the French publication Illustration.

⁸Raymond L. Garthoff, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Modern Air Power," Military Affairs XIX (Summer, 1955) pp. 77, 79. Garthoff was a specialist on Soviet military and political affairs on the staff of the RAND Corporation. He pointed out that the Soviet TU-4 was almost an exact copy of an American B-29, one of which had crashed in Siberia in 1944.

reports showed a fifty per cent increase in the satellite ground forces during the last six months of 1950. In addition, the press reported extensive activity in East Germany: the establishment of a German Air Force exceeded in strength only by Russia, the United States, and England; the laying of double and even quadruple railroad tracks from the Soviet border westward; and the stockpiling of large gasoline and ammunition dumps in German territory.⁹

It is impossible to assess accurately the Soviet strength and the build-up in the satellites. Defense Department estimates of Russian strength may have been reasonably accurate even though Stalin guarded his state secrets well. On the other hand, the reports of satellite build-ups came to the surface in press reports which were never verified by the Defense Department or anyone else. As a result of the estimates provided, Administration supporters and critics alike generally believed a military threat to Western Europe did exist.

At the same time, however, Americans could not agree whether or not Europeans had the will to meet the Soviet challenge. A Frenchman, discussing European rearmament, said,

⁹Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Russia Builds Satellite Armies in Europe, Takes Other Steps that Might Mean War in Spring," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 23, 1951, p. 1B; Chalmers H. Goodlin, "Fourth Largest Air Force in the World Built up by Russia in Eastern Germany, Reports Indicate," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 11, 1951, p. 3B.

"Our apathy has sometimes seemed that of an old goat hypnotized by a python."¹⁰ Truman and his critics both demanded that the other NATO members carry their fair share of the burden, but the critics were more inclined to believe that Europeans no longer had the will for battle. "What is demanded of them," observed Walter Lippmann, "is roughly the equivalent to getting out of a sickbed in order to find out how fast you can run up the Washington Monument."¹¹

Before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees convened hearings on Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 8, President Truman sent General Eisenhower on a whirlwind fact-finding tour of the NATO countries in Europe. Although the Supreme Allied Commander may have had his mind made up, he did investigate the feelings of the European member nations. General Eisenhower, in reporting to Truman, concluded that Europeans had the will to build an adequate defense, but their poor economic conditions prevented them from doing any more than they were already doing. In his opinion, sending equipment and men was the only solution.¹²

The General made these same points on February 1,

¹⁰Michael Straight, "Can the Atlantic Countries Unite?" New Republic, August 21, 1950, p. 11.

¹¹Walter Lippmann, "The Isolationist Tide," Washington Post, December 19, 1950, p. 19.

¹²Truman, Memoirs, II, 258.

1951, in a statement before a joint session of Congress and later the same day when he testified before the joint Senate committees. He emphasized the importance of Europe's industrial capacity and noted that should her potential be given to the Communist bloc the balance of power would become "very critical," even to the point that the safety of the United States would be "gravely imperiled." To prevent that from happening he set a goal of building European morale and confidence. His first priority was increasing American aid in the form of military equipment; second, American ground forces would act to bolster European defense until Europe could carry its own load. He found it unnecessary to match the Soviet Union division for division and suggested that an army a fraction of the Soviet strength could defend significant portions of Europe. Immediately several Senators wanted assurances that the United States would not end up furnishing ninety per cent of the troops as had happened in Korea. Under questioning Eisenhower refused to indicate what the American contribution of men should or would be, but, at the same time, he rigidly opposed setting a limit or a fixed ratio.¹³

Outside of Congress the reaction to Eisenhower's report and testimony was generally favorable. Although the Chicago Daily Tribune predicted that Americans would not be

¹³Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 3, 5, 14, 27, 31.

taken in by his remarks,¹⁴ moderate and liberal papers found the General's matter-of-fact approach to be quite convincing.¹⁵ In fact, such columnists as Arthur Krock, Drew Pearson, and James Reston credited Eisenhower with, if not winning over Congress, at least removing much of the opposition to the Administration's plan.¹⁶ The implication was that Eisenhower, while serving the Administration, accomplished what Truman had not.

The Senate hearings continued throughout the month of February with Truman sending in his first line lieutenants. Among the more notable Administration witnesses were Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest P. Sherman, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Alternate Representative to the United Nations John Sherman Cooper, and former Military Governor in Germany Lucius D. Clay. Until the hearings Truman had, in essence, made only a half-hearted defense of

¹⁴ Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 2, 1951, sec. I, p. 12.

¹⁵ Editorial, Atlanta Constitution, February 2, 1951, p. 22; Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, February 2, 1951, p. 18; Editorial, Washington Post, February 2, 1951, p. 22.

¹⁶ Arthur Krock, "Congress Easily Won to Eisenhower's Views," New York Times, February 4, 1951, sec. IV, p. 3; Drew Pearson, "Eisenhower Wins the Congress to His Corner," Denver Post, February 7, 1951, p. 19; James Reston, "Eisenhower's Magic Wins Over Capital Hill Suspicion," New York Times, February 2, 1951, p. 5.

his decision to deploy United States troops to Europe; now he produced his big guns.

Secretary Marshall, following Eisenhower, made the next major dent in the opposition's case. The Administration, he pointed out, was merely carrying out the Congress' earlier directive--that issued when the military aid program was approved--to integrate the defense plans of the NATO members. The intent of the Treaty and the plans subsequently developed were aimed at preventing war and this, in his view, meant adequate preparations before a war broke out. Like Eisenhower, he found the European will to defend themselves depended upon their morale. The mere reliance upon Article 5 was not enough because waiting for that clause to take effect meant Europe would once again become a battleground, inviting devastation.¹⁷

Finally, Marshall stripped the Hoover-Taft-Wherry forces of one of their main arguments. Until this time the opposition had made much issue of the Administration's alleged desire to send "large" numbers of American forces to Europe. Administration critics never spoke in terms of exact figures but consistently pointed out that the United States was furnishing ninety per cent of the forces in Korea, a situation likely to happen in Europe. Marshall revealed that the Administration proposed to contribute

¹⁷Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 39, 51, 61, 67.

only six ground divisions to a NATO army composed of approximately sixty divisions. Since two American divisions were already in Germany serving occupation duty, only four more divisions would be sent.¹⁸ Truman did not make a last-minute concession to quiet the opposition by proposing this relatively small contribution. Before the President made his September 1950 announcement on sending troops to Europe he and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided that an additional four to six divisions was all that was needed.¹⁹

Secretary Acheson continued the line of reasoning taken by Eisenhower and Marshall. His primary premise was that the security of Western Europe was intertwined with the security of the United States. He suggested the intangible bonds of social, spiritual, and political values and acknowledged the importance of European industrial production to the free world. American policy in Europe, according to the Secretary of State, centered on preventing another war while, at the same time, preserving the free nations of Europe. He, like his associates who testified earlier, found European morale and confidence to be dependent upon American aid and American troops.²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 41. None of the Administration's witnesses admitted that sixty divisions was the original goal of NATO; however, this was the general figure informed sources gave the press.

¹⁹ Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 439.

²⁰ Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 78-79, 81, 84-85, 95-96, 125.

Senator Hickenlooper, a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, resurrected Acheson's testimony given at the North Atlantic Treaty hearings. Acheson was able, with only moderate success, to explain his intent at those earlier hearings. When asked about the December, 1950 Brussels conference Acheson denied that a commitment of troops had been made. True, he said, many of the details for establishing a unified command and an army had been handled, "but no country was asked to, nor did any country commit itself in regard to turning over any additional troops."²¹ Indeed, the Administration may not have obligated itself per se, but merely a vague offer would have the implication of some form of commitment. Numerous Senators looked upon any such commitment as an implementation of the Treaty, an implementation which required Congressional approval.

Truman assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff the task of refuting the re-examinists' military arguments. General Bradley summed up the Administration's case for deploying troops with five reasons: (1) collective security required leadership; (2) protecting the American occupation forces already in Germany; (3) boosting the morale of Europeans; (4) bringing about a military recovery of Western Europe, and (5) it was better to fight a war on European soil than

²¹Ibid., pp. 100-02, 111-14.

American soil.²² The Joint Chiefs of Staff spent considerable effort explaining why American air power was not a good substitute for ground forces.²³ Moreover, the military chiefs resisted, as did all Administration witnesses, any attempts by Congress to limit, either by a fixed number or by a ratio, the quantity of troops to be deployed should more than six divisions eventually be needed. In addition, these subordinates of the Commander-in-Chief meticulously avoided answering questions regarding the President's power to commit and deploy American forces to a NATO army.²⁴

The other Administration witnesses did not deviate from the position already established. Not all the witnesses favoring the deployment of troops to Europe came from the Executive branch, nor were they all Democrats. The positions of Thomas E. Dewey and Harold E. Stassen are examples, for they came out in direct opposition to the Hoover-Taft-Wherry stands thereby exposing the rift within the Republican Party.

Dewey had clearly established himself as an internationalist much earlier, and he now rejected the re-examinationist's proposals as being the wrong approach. He directed much of his attention not only to the importance

²²Ibid., p. 126.

²³See pp. 95-107.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 9-10, 22, 46, 128-29, 156-57, 170, 219, 223, 232.

of keeping Europe free but also towards the securing of natural resources not available in the United States. If Europe fell to Russia then Asia and Africa were sure to follow, and in such a case, he surmised, the United States would be denied the industry of Europe and a whole host of raw materials from other parts of the world. He specifically disliked Wherry's Resolution because its intent was very narrow, that is, "one little toehold of isolationism concerning the sending of ground troops only to one area-- Western Europe."²⁵

Harold Stassen, then President of the University of Pennsylvania, was by no means the leading spokesman for any faction of the Republican Party, but like many others he voiced his opinion whenever the occasion presented itself. He opposed the Wherry Resolution, in part, because it appeared to meddle in military tactics. As a supporter of collective defense he wanted the United States to be firm rather than timid, thereby winning "a victory for civilization and freedom over Communist imperialism."²⁶

In the Senate President Truman found backers among Republicans such as Wayne Morse of Oregon and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts who were not formal witnesses. Senator Morse asked that everything necessary be done to

²⁵Ibid., pp. 527, 529-31, 539.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 480, 487.

"assure the effective implementation of the Atlantic Pact."²⁷

The Administration marshalled its own Democratic supporters, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Connally being the most vocal. Also Senator Paul Douglas, Democrat from Illinois, vigorously spoke up in the Senate on behalf of the Administration. As a student of history Douglas warned that Western civilization and democratic institutions were at stake. As an economist he rejected the argument that the country could not afford the Truman program and even went to the extent of showing how the extra economic burden could be shouldered.²⁸ Senator J. William Fulbright cautioned his associates not to seek oversimplified solutions for the complexities of foreign affairs. Rising above party politics he pointed out the moral obligation the nation had to both NATO and to the past heritage of helping defend Europe.²⁹

Not everyone gave his undivided support to one camp or the other; some stood partially in both camps. Representative John F. Kennedy, Democrat from Massachusetts, is one of the better examples because he fully spelled out his position before the joint Senate committee. Upon returning from a trip to Europe he reported to the House:

If Europe is to be saved, Europe must commence to make sacrifices sufficient for that

²⁷Congressional Record, XCVII, 258.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 243, 249.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 521-22.

purpose and commensurate with the danger that threatens to engulf her peoples. The plain and brutal fact today is that Europe is not making these sacrifices It is important that Western Europe be saved, but we cannot do so ourselves or pay a price that will endanger our own survival. We cannot link our whole fate to what is presently a desperate gamble.³⁰

A few days later, on February 22, 1951, he testified before the Senate committees. In Kennedy's mind Western Europe was vital to American security, and he was fearful that if the number of American occupation troops were not increased or were totally withdrawn the entire European defense effort would collapse. American aid was therefore necessary, but, more importantly, Europeans would have to start doing more themselves. He went on to explain the difference between his position and his father's as one of timing. Joseph Kennedy could not envision Europeans creating an army of sufficient strength before the Red Army began moving across the continent. John Kennedy, on the other hand, felt the risk should be taken, for if war could be prevented for eighteen months then an adequate force could be assembled. He therefore sided with those wishing to furnish American ground forces to Europe; however, he refused to acknowledge the President's power in the absence of Congressional approval. In effect, he went along with the President on the desirability of deploying United States troops and, at the same time, agreed

³⁰Ibid., p. 1302.

with Wherry that the Congress should have the final say.³¹ Kennedy's position is typical of that taken by many in the upper house, Democrat and Republican alike. While a majority of Senators supported the sending of troops, they likewise were attempting to reassert their role in foreign affairs. This was a major reason the debate dragged on for a full month after the hearings.

Senator Wherry, although he was not a member of either committee, sat in on the hearings as a guest with the right to call and question witnesses. Question the witnesses he did, for no one escaped his probing interrogation. He produced a following composed of a variety of individuals and organizations. His most important witnesses included Senator Taft, former President Hoover, and a host of air power advocates.

Wherry, who testified himself, reiterated earlier re-examinationist arguments and relied heavily upon the air power thesis. He clearly revealed his "isolationist" tendencies when Senator Knowland suggested that it might be better to prevent Russia from overrunning Europe in the first place. Wherry replied, "What are you going to save?" Opposing the President and his plan, Wherry said, "Act, I plead with you, to prevent the risk of spreading our manpower around the globe, thin everywhere and strong

³¹Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 424, 427, 433, 443.

nowhere." He went on, "I believe you are taking a miscalculated risk when you give the President and his land-war advisers a blank check." In place of ground forces he again called for "mastery of the air to pulverize Russia into submission."³² While always contending his resolution was aimed at restoring Congress's right to determine "policy" he repeatedly lapsed into a harangue on the omnipotence of air power.

Senator Taft in his appearance before the committees again struck at the economics of the troops-for-Europe issue, the President's alleged power, and the advisability of helping Europe at all. Even though it had been pointed out that the overall size of the United States Army would not be increased by sending troops to Europe, Senator Taft opposed the projected 3,500,000 man army as being beyond the economic capacity of the nation. For all his talk about money, the Senator never revealed what it would cost to establish an adequate Air Force; none of the re-examinists, for that matter, made efforts to produce a cost analysis showing the savings of having an all-powerful Air Force rather than a balanced military. Finding an apparent solution in air power, Taft did not think the loss of Western Europe would necessarily be "fatal." Reflecting his continuing uncertainty he at one point said it would be safer

³²Ibid., pp. 676, 685, 708.

"if we had no army in Europe," but then reversed himself saying that American participation in the European army project was warranted and justifiable because the United States had a "responsibility as one of the occupying powers in Germany." Unlike Hoover, the Ohio Senator did not ask Europe to have an army in being before American troops were sent but only required a promise or commitment of specified numbers of divisions from the Europeans. With more and more emphasis he continued to demand that the President secure Congressional approval before United States troops could be assigned to an international army. Taft favored the Wherry Resolution only because it called upon the President to consult with Congress before any troops could be sent; otherwise he found it to have a negative connotation.³³

Former President Hoover also rehashed his earlier proposals. Although never a military expert he presented himself as such when he claimed that Western Europe could not be defended with less than 100 to 125 divisions. He rejected Dewey's concern over the possible loss of vital resources by saying that such strategic raw materials could be obtained in the Americas for only slightly more money.³⁴ However, he failed to back this up with any cost

³³ Ibid., pp. 57, 138, 611, 614, 617-20, 640-41, 635, 652, 656, 658.

³⁴ Ibid., pp. 724, 735.

estimates or other proof. Overall, his Fortress America thesis remained intact.

Senator Wherry secured backers such as Representative W. J. Bryan Dorn, Democrat from South Carolina, and Representative Lawrence H. Smith, Republican from Wisconsin; however, his primary witnesses were associated in some way with the Air Force. These included such men as Lieutenant General Harold George (retired), Lieutenant General Curtis E. LeMay, Alexander de Seversky, General Carl Spaatz (retired), and Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead. Retired Generals George and Spaatz were clearly lobbying for the establishment of an all-powerful Air Force. Generals LeMay and Whitehead, while having very narrow interests in their branch of the military, were forced to give lip service to the Joint Chiefs' of Staff recommendation because they were on active duty and therefore subordinate to the Pentagon. Unlike General LeMay, de Seversky was not in a position requiring homage to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and therefore could expound at length on the virtues of air power and the weaknesses of sea and land forces. De Seversky, having been at one time or another associated with both the Air Force and the aircraft industry, proved to be one of Senator Wherry's main collaborators.

The Administration's critics, unsure of the European will to defend themselves and unwilling to commit American ground forces, responded with their solution to the dilemma:

air power. They did not deny troops would be needed, but that was a problem for the Europeans. The United States, they contended, could make the most useful contribution in the area of air forces.

The basic air power theory was proposed by an Italian General, Giulio Douhet, between 1921 and 1930, and by 1950 the theory had developed to include long-range bombing raids with atomic bombs. Strategic bombing was aimed at destroying an enemy's industrial, transportation, and energy-producing centers--in other words, disrupting his ability to make war. Besides the material destruction, "civilian casualties would so deplete enemy morale that popular demand would force a suit for peace." Once an enemy's means and his will to make war were gone, ground forces would move in to occupy the territory already won by the Air Force. To prevent the same destruction upon one's own country necessitated building an adequate air defense.³⁵ The air power advocates of the Great Debate used this basic theory as their alternative to the deployment of American ground forces.

World War II had added to the stature of air power as a convincing weapon. Air bombardment, according to General LeMay, who headed the Strategic Air Command, was directly responsible for the collapse of Japan and would have

³⁵Marshall Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power (New York: Rinehart & Company, Inc., 1950), pp. 23-24.

brought about Germany's surrender earlier had adequate air forces been available.³⁶ As it was the Army Air Force and the British air forces did not become really effective until 1944. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey compiled at the end of the war concluded that Axis arms production did indeed decline steadily after July 1944.³⁷

Not everyone, however, agreed on the effectiveness of air power as an offensive weapon. The failure of German air strikes to break Great Britain was a good example of a stiffening resistance rather than a degeneration of morale. Another case was the British refusal to surrender Malta even though the Axis dropped 15,700 tons of bombs on the island between 1940 and 1943.³⁸ Even the most extreme air power advocate recognized that World War II produced no conclusive results; de Seversky pointed out that because sufficient air forces were not available early, the war strategy was not planned around the aircraft.³⁹

The United States Army Air Force, however, made the best use of its war prestige by publishing in 1947 what appeared to be a report of the Strategic Bombing Survey,

³⁶Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 327.

³⁷Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power, pp. 27-28.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 8, 27.

³⁹Alexander P. de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), p. 200.

though it was not. Entitled Air Campaigns of the Pacific War, the book criticized the Navy and gave the Air Force major credit for the successes in the Pacific. An opponent of the Air Force labeled it as a "wonderful collection of half-truths, misconceptions, distortions, unsupportable claims, and self-praise" which contradicted the published findings of the Strategic Bombing Survey.⁴⁰ As a result of such publications aviation enthusiasts claimed that air power was the wave of the future and implied that military air forces alone could win wars.

To defeat an enemy the Air Force would rely upon strategic bombing and the nuclear bomb, but under questioning General LeMay never claimed that strategic bombing was the sole solution. However, he did emphasize that it was the major deterrent to war and would continue to be so for another two or three years, since the contemplated European army would not prevent Russia from overrunning Europe. When asked if he was not contradicting the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he pointed out that the Defense Establishment was not maintaining Russia could in fact be stopped. Under the existing conditions, he agreed with Wherry that it would be better to allow a temporary occupation of Europe while the Air Force destroyed Russia rather than engage the Red Army

⁴⁰ Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power, pp. 114-15.

with inadequate ground forces.⁴¹ Though he never revealed it at the hearings, General LeMay firmly believed that the Air Force at one time could have defeated Russia without ever engaging the Soviet Army. That period he said, "extended from before the time when the Russians achieved The Bomb, until after they had The Bomb but didn't yet own a stockpile of weapons."⁴²

Ultimately, LeMay did not favor the Wherry Resolution, and his associates did not accept his position on strategic bombing. While being a friend of Wherry, he could not disavow his Commander-in-Chief; he therefore opposed the Wherry Resolution because it gave Congress too much say over military tactics.⁴³ On the other hand, the Administration, in effect, disavowed LeMay's stand on strategic bombing. Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg agreed with LeMay that an adequate air force could destroy the war industrial potential of Russia but further pointed out there was more to it than that. The United States might destroy Russia's industrial potential but the effects would not be felt immediately; with existing front-line stockpiles the Red Army could still possibly overrun all of Europe thereby acquiring another industrial base pretty

⁴¹Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 326, 341, 343, 345.

⁴²LeMay, Mission with LeMay, p. 481.

⁴³Senate, Hearings S. Con. Res. 8, p. 328.

much intact.⁴⁴ To deny the Russians the use of the European industries the United States would have to bomb its own allies. Army Chief of Staff Collins further pointed out that during World War II the Germans were able to rebuild industries relatively quickly, and the Russians could probably do the same.⁴⁵ The Joint Chiefs concluded that some kind of European army was necessary to force the Red Army to use up its stockpiles before Europe was totally overrun.⁴⁶

While the Air Force emphasized its need for a superior delivery system, most people assumed the weapon dropped would be the nuclear bomb. "The basic military fact in today's world," wrote Joseph C. Harsh of the Christian Science Monitor, "is that the atomic weapon in the American arsenal is the counterpoint to the mass of the Soviet Army."⁴⁷ David E. Lilienthal, former head of the Atomic Energy Commission, warned that fixation on nuclear warfare was preventing the nation from coming to grips with limited war, such as the Korean conflict, and was driving the

⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 222, 232.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 192.

⁴⁶ Andrews in his Disaster Through Air Power pointed out that during World War II inactive troops consumed six pounds of supplies per man per day while troops actually fighting consumed on the average of seventy-one pounds per man per day. (p. 46).

⁴⁷ Joseph C. Harsch, "The Atom Bomb Means Total War," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 10, 1950, p. 2B.

country to the annihilate-or-be-annihilated formula of preventative war.⁴⁸ Others, including certain military men, opposed strategic bombing with nuclear weapons because it committed the United States to a war against a nation's population rather than against the leaders.⁴⁹

The air power thesis ran into other complications involving the range of the bombers and the need for fighter support. The Hoover-Taft-Wherry followers called for an American-based bomber force capable of flying to any target in the world and returning to the United States, thus alleviating any need to station American forces in foreign territory. Such a bomber did not exist in World War II; moreover, the number of bomber losses depended upon whether fighter escorts were available. By 1951 the United States did have a long-range bomber, the B-36, capable of flying 4,000 miles to a target and returning,⁵⁰ but its vulnerability to fighter attacks was not fully known. The B-36 was designed to fly above 40,000 feet thereby avoiding an enemy's attacking fighters and making ones own fighter escorts unnecessary.⁵¹ On the other hand, the B-36 was a

⁴⁸David E. Lilienthal, "Can the Atom Bomb Beat Communism?" Collier's, February 3, 1951, p. 66.

⁴⁹D. V. Gallery, "An Admiral Talks Back to the Airmen," Saturday Evening Post, June 25, 1959, p. 136.

⁵⁰Moll, "Nuclear Strategy," p. 198.

⁵¹Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power, pp. 31-32.

propeller-driven aircraft which flew considerably slower than jet aircraft. Although such people as de Seversky felt it unlikely, there was the possibility the Russian MIG-15, a jet fighter, could challenge the bomber.⁵²

General LeMay admitted that fighter escorts would minimize bomber losses, but this immediately brought up the question of forward bases since fighters did not have the range of bombers. The United States already had established some forward bases in Europe, and the Air Force acknowledged that Russian ground troops could wipe out those bases. Administration supporters believed this was all the more reason for sending troops to Europe.⁵³ In addition, the Air Force itself was hindering the long-range bomber advocates. The Strategic Air Command had 14 groups of which 10 were medium range groups of B-29, B-50, and B-47's. Thus, the majority of the bomber force still needed forward bases since aerial refueling techniques and equipment were not fully developed.⁵⁴ In fact, the Air Force continued to buy more propeller-driven B-50 bombers,⁵⁵ and

⁵²De Seversky, Air Power, p. 265; Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "The Shield," Washington Post, February 21, 1951, p. 17.

⁵³Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 223-24, 333, 337-39.

⁵⁴Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "A-Bombs Lack Value Without Allies' Bases," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 19, 1950, p. 1C.

⁵⁵Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power, p. 36.

Air Force Secretary Finletter in March 1951 revealed that his service was concentrating on the medium-range B-47 because it was a jet and therefore faster than any other bomber.⁵⁶ In all, it added up to the continued reliance on forward bases in Europe and the Mediterranean which in turn required ground forces to protect them.

Most air power lobbyists wished to build their Air Force around strategic bombers while ignoring the role of tactical support. The role of tactical air missions included isolating the battlefield by disrupting an enemy's supply lines, close support of one's own ground forces, and gaining complete control of the skies. Yet an undisputed control of Korean skies had not defeated Communist forces because the Air Force could not exploit its strategic bombing capabilities by flying beyond the Yalu River and because it had failed to rely immediately upon tactical air support of ground forces. Nor was tactical air power the sole solution, for even General LeMay acknowledged that unlimited tactical air forces could not stop the advance of enemy troops--air support plus ones own troops were necessary to accomplish that.⁵⁷ In fact, the Air Force was ill-prepared to furnish adequate tactical support to ground

⁵⁶"The Growing U.S. Air Force," U.S. News & World Report, March 2, 1951, pp. 30-31.

⁵⁷Senate, Hearings, S. Con Res. 8, pp. 155, 165-66, 329.

forces. When Truman cut the size of the Air Force from fifty-eight to forty-eight groups prior to Korea the Air Force reorganized itself in favor of strategic air power, even though this meant relying upon medium range bombers. Fighter groups of all types were reduced--the number of light bombardment groups for tactical ground support was cut to one--while the bombing groups were increased in number and size.⁵⁸ Moreover, the Air Force and Army clashed over who should have overall command of joint ground-air tactical operations; the Air Force was fearful that Army officers might take over control of all such air missions.⁵⁹

The net effect of the air power thesis was a fixation on total war. Its advocates' key phrase was the "exploitation of the country's air capability," and exploitation meant using long range aircraft and nuclear weapons to bomb an enemy into oblivion. The success of such a strategy supposedly would save the lives of American ground forces. Yet at the same time such a strategy de-emphasized tactical air missions and therefore completely disregarded limited warfare or the necessity of ground forces in any kind of conflict. The Hoover-Taft-Wherry group, by supporting bomber enthusiasts, were, in effect, advocating an all-or-

⁵⁸ Andrews, Disaster Through Air Power, p. 84.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 70; William R. Kinter, "Who Should Command Tactical Air Forces?" United States Army Combat Forces Journal, I, (November, 1950), p. 37.

nothing policy.

The Administration naturally wanted to impress Americans and Europeans with its humanitarian concern for peoples with similar culture, ideas, and institutions and therefore played upon the necessity of a free Europe and the morale of its people. At the same time Truman and his advisers perceived viable military reasons for deploying American troops to Europe along with air forces. Ultimately, the security of North America was at stake, and, in the words of Admiral Sherman, the worst place to protect the United States was on its home soil. Instead, the best place was at locations nearest the likely aggressor.⁶⁰

Many people believed superior air power and the nuclear bomb to be the major deterrent stopping Russia at the time. Agreeing, Secretary Acheson felt this gave the United States a substantial lead, but with the passage of time Russia could eventually neutralize American air power while retaining a decisive ground force. Therefore to remain on parity with the Soviet Union it was necessary to build the nucleus of a European army while Russia closed the air power gap. He further pointed out that in the absence of a viable European defense Stalin might use satellite forces, hoping to avoid a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The United

⁶⁰Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 204.

States would then have to decide whether to use strategic bombing, which in effect would mean another all-out war, or to desert the European allies.⁶¹

Western Europe needed an army immediately said the Administration, and a few American divisions would act as a stimulus for the other NATO members. Even an army relatively smaller than the Red Army could be an effective holding force. The United States already had two occupation divisions in Germany, and according to Bradley, six divisions "would be much better able to take care of themselves than two" should Russia attack.⁶²

Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while acknowledging the growing importance of the Air Force, continually rejected the notion that one branch of the military could win a war by itself. Even if the Air Force could flatten an enemy's industry, ground troops were still necessary to force the opponent to deplete his stockpiles and eventually to occupy territory.⁶³ Soviet military leaders concurred in this analysis, as reflected by their statements and their integration of air and ground forces.⁶⁴

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 79.

⁶² Ibid., p. 128.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 149, 198-99, 221-22; Drew Pearson, "Eisenhower Wins the Congress to His Corner," Denver Post, February 7, 1951, p. 19.

⁶⁴ Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1958), pp. 149, 170.

Even the most avid Air Force authorities, except for de Seversky, eventually admitted that air power could not by itself win a war, though they continued to believe it would be the decisive factor.⁶⁵ Throughout the debate the Joint Chiefs emphasized the necessity for team work among all three branches of service.

In addition, the Administration's witnesses hit hard at the question of European morale. General Eisenhower, after talking with European leaders during his tour of NATO countries, felt reasonably sure that the member nations not only had the will but were in fact acting to bring about changes in their defense establishments.⁶⁶ General Clay and John Sherman Cooper both emphasized the change which had taken place in European attitudes. Clay had seen the European morale situation as hopeless in 1947 and recommended that no more American forces be sent to Europe, but four years later he discovered a resurgence of European will.⁶⁷ European opinion changed drastically, according to United Nations Representative Cooper, between June 1950 and December 1950 due to the see-saw progress in Korea.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 325-26, 381-82, 405-06, 446.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 3-5, 29.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 760, 769.

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 580, 586.

Europeans reflected this new will, at least partially, in their economic expenditures for defense. Several Congressmen presented figures all of which showed increased European defense spending, but questions arose whether the increases were enough. John F. Kennedy felt Europe was not doing its share since his calculations revealed the United Kingdom, which was spending more than any of the other European members, was devoting only one-eighth of its national income to defense while the United States planned to spend about one-fifth of its national income for the same purpose.⁶⁹ Senator Connally, using another basis, presented figures showing the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands each spending a higher percentage of their net national incomes than the United States.⁷⁰ Others offered their own statistics and proceeded to interpret them to suit their cause.

The Senate report, issued by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, gave the advantage to neither the supporters nor the opponents of troops-for-Europe:

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 428.

⁷⁰Congressional Record, XCVI, 9121.

Percentage of Gross National Product Spent
on Defense⁷¹

	<u>United States</u>	<u>European NATO Members</u>
1949	5.0	4.9
1950	5.5	5.6
1951	15.7	8.0

The 1949-1950 figures, interpreted from the viewpoint of Truman supporters, indicate that the European members were spending almost the same percentage of their gross national product as the United States--relatively speaking they were carrying their share. The 1951 figures, however, would tend to uphold the Administration's critics since the United States percentage was nearly twice that of Europe. The value of such comparisons is questionable in that the Committees used "unofficial estimates" when computing all the American expenditures.⁷² In 1967 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization released its own statistics which are perhaps more accurate:

Percentage of Gross National Product Spent
on Defense⁷³

	<u>United States</u>	<u>European NATO Members</u>
1949	5.7	5.7
1950	5.4	5.9
1951	8.7	7.1

⁷¹U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European Area, S. Rept. 175 to Accompany S. Res. 99 and S. Con. Res. 18, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Senate Reports: Miscellaneous, I, 13.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³NATO, Facts and Figures, p. 226.

These figures, although after the fact, tend to support those arguing that Europe was carrying its share of the burden. The difference in the 1951 percentage is not even remotely near that given in the Senate report of 1951.

Defense expenditures and morale were not the only measures for determining the European will. General Eisenhower and Senator Douglas extolled the European efforts at increasing their total number of forces and extending the length of military service. The United States had 14 men in the armed services for every 1,000 of population and was increasing this to 18 per 1,000. The United Kingdom and France were likewise proposing to increase their 16 per 1,000 ratios to 18 per 1,000. While ratios of these three members were roughly the same, the remaining Pact members only had military/population ratios of from 6.5 per 1,000 to 10 per 1,000. On the matter of military service France increased the length from 12 to 18 months and the United Kingdom increased it from 18 to 24 months. The remaining European members were all "considering" increases in their length of military service but had not done so by mid-January 1951.⁷⁴

Eisenhower and Douglas made the most of the favorable figures with hopes that the other nations could be persuaded to make similar efforts. Based on the alleged

⁷⁴Congressional Record, XCVII, 235, 237; Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 3-4.

European change of attitude, the Administration's backers justified the presence of American troops on the continent. In their view, United States ground forces would not defend Western Europe alone, nor would they constitute the major portion of any European army.

The re-examinists quickly found a simpler way of increasing NATO strength without American troops and without making unreasonable demands from the other existing members. The solution was to bring new members into the alliance. None of those favoring troops-for-Europe mentioned new members in their prepared statements at the hearings; however, under questioning they all conceded that European defense could be enhanced substantially with such additions.⁷⁵ Most talk centered around inviting Greece, Turkey, and Spain into the Pact as these three could have added 1.2 million armed forces. Yugoslavia, then in a somewhat precarious position, could have possibly contributed another 500,000 men. Marshall Tito while being a Communist, was at odds with the Kremlin, and General Clay saw no possibility that the Yugoslavs would again submit to Russian domination.⁷⁶ John F. Kennedy even quoted Tito as saying he would fight with the West in a war involving

⁷⁵ Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 47-48, 144, 206, 535, 600.

⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 208, 749.

Russia.⁷⁷

Although it was seemingly easy to discuss Yugoslavian membership in NATO, West Germany posed a far different situation, or so it seemed at the time. The Pentagon's one-package proposal offered in the fall of 1950 included German military participation in European defense, and the President supported the plan. Truman noted that, even though Britain and France had voiced opposition, leaders of both countries realized that some kind of German participation was necessary for an effective defense of the continent.⁷⁸ A Gallup poll taken in December 1950 showed over sixty per cent of Americans were in favor of allowing West Germany to build military forces as part of an integrated European army, while only one-third of the French and two-fifths of the British were in favor.⁷⁹ Coupled with the British and French resistance, Germans themselves were unwilling to do anything until some kind of political settlement was reached. The Germans were demanding political equality plus some assurance that the United States would keep troops stationed in Europe.⁸⁰ As one former Chief of Staff of the German Army put it, "No

⁷⁷Congressional Record, XCVII, 1302.

⁷⁸Truman, Memoirs, II, 254-56.

⁷⁹Washington Post, January 27, 1951, p. 9.

⁸⁰Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 426, 432, 573, 591.

German is willing to serve as a mercenary."⁸¹ Eisenhower, Marshall and Bradley all favored rearming West Germany but none found such a course immediately attainable since the political questions remained unsettled.⁸² The Russians further complicated the political uncertainty by proposing in the fall of 1950 a four-power conference on the German question. The Soviets, Acheson learned, were far more interested in stopping German participation in West European defense than in serious negotiations regarding a German settlement.⁸³

On the whole, Administration forces had difficulty reassuring the critics that the European members of the Treaty would in fact do their share. Taft was up-in-arms because the Administration would not disclose the exact number of troops expected of the Europeans.⁸⁴ Wherry incessantly asked the same question, yet no one gave him an answer.⁸⁵ Referring to the Europeans, Hoover told the committees, "What I am asking now is that you gentlemen not take action until you can see the whites of their eyes."⁸⁶

⁸¹"Can Russia's Army Be Beaten?" U.S. News & World Report, September 8, 1950, p. 24.

⁸²Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 21, 50, 141.

⁸³Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 551.

⁸⁴Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 609.

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 183-85.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 733.

John F. Kennedy, likewise securing no information on the European troop commitments, opposed the Administration by calling for a limit on the number of American troops sent to Europe vis-a-vis the European contribution. He felt the American involvement in Europe would continue to grow and that Congress should ultimately be able to control that trend. To accomplish this he proposed a ratio system to be determined by Congress. He himself favored a six to one ratio whereby the Europeans would field six divisions for each American ground division assigned to NATO. The effect would be to force the Europeans to do their share.⁸⁷ The Administration did not look favorably upon such a proposal, nor did it go far in the Senate.

Throughout the hearings the national press editors continued to extol the position of their favorites while lambasting the other side. The Chicago Daily Tribune looked upon Truman's six division recommendation as "merely a sacrifice force," and further found the "Truman-Acheson-Eisenhower" strategy illogical in that it asked Russia to make no move for two or three years while the allies prepared themselves.⁸⁸ On the other side, the Washington Post, rejecting sole reliance upon air power, asked Senator Wherry if he had ever heard of a country breaking the

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 427-29, 440.

⁸⁸ Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, January 5, 1951, sec. I, p. 14.

shackles of a "temporary" Russian occupation.⁸⁹ In all, the editorial alignment had been pretty well established by the time the hearings began and therefore did not change.

The Truman Administration, in effect, was offering an enlargement of policies developed after World War II; Western Europe was free and she opposed Communist aggression, therefore the United States would come to her aid with men and material. The re-examinists raised a great fanfare regarding the Far East, but Truman realized that the United States had more to lose in Europe than she did in the Far East. A relatively small commitment of American ground forces could well be a sacrifice force, but how many lives would be lost should another D-Day invasion be required?

The re-examinists provided a simple, glamorous solution with air power; yet strategic bombing had not been proved foolproof, and in the extreme situation it would entail bombing ones own allies in order to deny the enemy a new industrial base. Moreover, reliance upon strategic air forces took away the nation's ability to respond in a flexible manner. The lack of even a small European defensive ground force meant that the United States would be forced to respond with all or nothing. It was a policy

⁸⁹ Editorial, Washington Post, February 4, 1951, p. 8.

aiming for total victory, and it left no room for limited conflict and possible stalemate.

The Hoover-Taft-Wherry followers, however, did not reject the idea of a European army. While Hoover and Wherry may not have wanted any American ground forces in Europe, Taft, though still somewhat unsure of his stand, was willing to send a few troops if it would serve to stimulate adequate European efforts. As fiscal conservatives they saw the nation spreading itself too thin and spending itself into bankruptcy. They felt that the NATO army was becoming too much of an American project with six ground divisions as the first of several installments.⁹⁰ De Seversky called the President's plan "an effort to perpetuate the methods and the weapons of the last war"--Maginot Line thinking. As a result, the United States would have to fight on Russia's terms, that is, land war rather than an air war in which America would be superior. Finally, once Stalin realized what was happening he would move the Red Army before the NATO members could build a competent force. De Seversky and his followers repeatedly returned to the theme that the manifest destiny of the United States was in the skies.⁹¹

As the hearings and debate progressed those taking

⁹⁰Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 348, 624, 722.

⁹¹De Seversky, Air Power, pp. 16, 49, 226, 290, 349.

the middle stand--favoring the sending of troops but only with Congressional approval--began to have a greater influence. It became less of a question of whether Europe should be defended with troops than it did of the President's authority to commit those troops. The Connally-Russell Resolutions, replacing the Wherry Resolution, were more positive regarding a token troop commitment but did little to solve the constitutional impasse.

CHAPTER IV

A Change of Emphasis: Constitutional Problems and the Conclusion of the Debate

As the debate progressed Truman and his advisers gathered substantial support for his European program; however, his opponents were unwilling to concede and gradually shifted their focus towards the constitutional questions. Earlier, Senators Taft and Wherry had both challenged Truman's authority to implement the North Atlantic Pact without Congressional approval. Editors of the Saturday Evening Post, typical of the opposition press, were astonished that the President was so insistent "on bearing such a terrifying responsibility all by himself. . . . Our recent diplomatic record is marred by secret agreements, excesses of executive power and cute schemes to by-pass Congress."¹

The foreign affairs provisions of the Constitution have always provided an open invitation for Presidential-Congressional conflict. The President derives his power over foreign affairs from his role as commander-in-chief, his powers to appoint and receive ambassadors, the

¹Editorial, Saturday Evening Post, March 24, 1951, p. 10.

constitutional injunction that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed," and, in part, from his authority to make treaties "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Congress, on the other hand, has the power to declare war, to raise and support armies, to make rules "for the government and regulation of land and naval forces," and to give advice and consent on treaties.² The entire problem of Presidential-Congressional conflict centers on where the President's power ends and that of the Congress begins, or vice versa.

President Truman, in preparing his case for deploying troops, also had his staff develop his constitutional position. An administrative assistant, David D. Lloyd, prepared a study which covered all aspects of Presidential power to deploy American forces outside the United States. Although he made it clear the President did not have the authority to by-pass the Constitution, Lloyd cited a variety of grounds for Presidential action and included numerous examples. The Executive supposedly could use American troops outside the United States, and in fact had done so, for six basic purposes: protection of American citizens or their property abroad, protection of the honor of the United States, expansion of foreign commerce, defense of the country, occupation of a vanquished enemy,

²U.S., Constitution, Art., I., sec. 8; Art. II, sec. 2, 3.

and execution of a treaty.³ On the matter of executing treaties, Lloyd pointed out that court decisions and usage had clearly given the President the power to implement such conventions.⁴ In addition, the Curtiss-Wright decision (299 U.S. 304) laid down a broad interpretation of Presidential authority making it unnecessary for statutes, and therefore treaties, to be explicit in their terms.⁵

Secretary Acheson, when asked about Truman's authority to implement the Pact without Congressional approval, produced his own version of Executive power. In many respects very similar to Lloyd's position, Acheson emphasized that the President had the responsibility of seeing that the laws, including treaties, were faithfully

³Memorandum by David D. Lloyd, "Powers of the President with respect to the disposition of the Armed Forces outside the United States," February 2, 1951, David D. Lloyd File, Truman Papers, Truman Library, pp. 13-32. Hereafter cited as Lloyd memorandum.

⁴Ibid., pp. 25-28.

⁵Ibid., pp. 28-29. The Curtiss-Wright case (299 U.S. 304) arose out of a violation of a joint resolution of Congress empowering the President to forbid the sale of any articles of war to countries engaged in armed conflict. Speaking for the majority Justice George Sutherland said, "In this vast external realm [foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation."

"It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment--perhaps serious embarrassment--is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved."

executed. He also noted that numerous publicists and constitutional authorities had repeatedly conceded the right of the President to deploy forces outside the country without Congressional endorsement. "Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed Forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United States and implementing treaties," he said, "but it is equally clear that this authority may not be interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of powers which it has under the Constitution."⁶ While relying upon the commander-in-chief clause, the statement surely produced resentment among his Congressional enemies.

Many other persons backed Truman's proposed troop commitment and sought to explain his authority to act. Senator William Benton, Democrat of Connecticut, believed that most constitutional lawyers would side with Truman because he was acting in the common defense of the people of the United States. That is, the immediate effect of American troops in Europe would be to protect Western Europe, but ultimately those forces would also be protecting the United States.⁷ Democratic Senator Hubert H. Humphrey of Minnesota, while hoping the President would always consult with Congress, subscribed to Truman's position because the

⁶Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 88-93.

⁷Congressional Record, XCVII, 2853-54.

executive power was "neither increased, limited, nor extended in peacetime or in emergency." The President either had the authority to deploy troops or he did not, and the Congress could not add or take away from that basic power.⁸ Historian Henry Steele Commager agreed with this line of reasoning, pointing out that Truman's critics had already recognized the President's authority to send the Navy and Air Force to the European area. "If he does not have authority to send land forces to points of danger, neither does he have authority to send the Navy or the Air Force to points of danger outside the boundaries of the nation, for his constitutional authority in one arena is precisely the same as in the others."⁹

Those on Capitol Hill, on the other hand, did have certain powers through which limitations could be established on the President's sending of forces abroad. Administration critics fortified themselves through the Congressional powers over the armed forces, the Congressional right to enact legislation to implement treaties, and the Congressional authority to declare war.

Such Administration supporters as Eisenhower, Dewey, and Stassen all acknowledged the absolute power of the

⁸Ibid., pp. 2854, 2859-60.

⁹Henry Steele Commager, "Does the President have too Much Power?" New York Times, April 1, 1951, sec. VI, p. 31.

appropriations clause in the Constitution.¹⁰ As Dewey expressed it, "The power to raise troops and to withhold or grant funds for their support carries within it . . . the power to withhold approval of their use."¹¹ However, Senator Wherry, a member of the Appropriations Committee, disagreed, saying that all too often the Congress was presented with commitments already made. "All you do is help justify it, maybe cut it down in an item here or an item there." The total effect of the Administration's action, in Wherry's view, was to "usurp" the powers of Congress and "establish a military dictatorship."¹²

Regarding Congressional authority to enact legislation to implement treaties, a number of hostile Senators viewed the sending of troops in the same manner as furnishing military material, for both required Congressional approval. Those Senators relied heavily upon Connally and Vandenberg's 1949 statements on Article 11 of the North Atlantic Treaty in which they firmly asserted the right of Congress to implement the Pact.¹³ Senator Wherry, while accepting that interpretation, went beyond it by calling for Congress to determine "policy" before the President could

¹⁰Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 11, 516, 526.

¹¹Ibid., p. 526.

¹²Ibid., p. 516; Congressional Record, XCVII, 3010.

¹³See Chapter 1, p. 13.

carry out any implementation of treaties.

On the matter of the power of Congress to declare war, Senator Taft was particularly unhappy with a document circulating the Senate which was entitled "Power of the President to Send the Armed Forces Outside the United States." One of the conclusions of that document was that due to technological developments wars were no longer declared in advance, and therefore the Congressional power to declare war had fallen into abeyance. "This document," said Taft, "contains the most unbridled claims for the authority of the President that I have ever seen written in cold print."¹⁴ Although he did admit there were cases in which it was unnecessary for Congress to declare war, his main objection was that military assistance in itself might bring about armed conflict. A President in the process of deploying forces to a country or area which was threatened with war could easily allow the United States to become involved in a conflict against the wishes of Congress. On the other hand, Taft was willing to allow the President to send troops to areas not being threatened, provided such a deployment would not cause an unfriendly nation to react

¹⁴Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, pp. 24-25. The House Committee on Foreign Affairs produced a similar study; however, it did not arrive at the same conclusion but rather was a collection of arguments for and against the Executive's power. (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on the Use of United States Forces in Foreign Countries, H. Rept., 127, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, House Reports: Miscellaneous, I, 1-77.

hostilely.¹⁵ "There is one very definite limit . . . on the President's power to send troops abroad," the Ohio Senator observed, "he cannot send troops abroad if the sending of such troops amounts to the making of war."¹⁶

Those favoring a NATO army with American troops came back with counterclaims to defeat Congressional infringement upon Presidential power. One pointed out that a difference existed between creating an army and commanding that army--they were different functions exercised by different branches of government.¹⁷ Another pointed to a statement by Senator Taft's own father in which the former President acknowledged that the mere appropriation of money for an army gave the Executive the means of ordering forces anywhere he wanted.¹⁸ Even Senator Vandenberg, who was unable to take part in the Debate, warned Wherry that a Congressional challenge to the President's constitutional powers could not successfully be sustained.¹⁹

David Lloyd, for the Administration, recognized

¹⁵Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 626, 628.

¹⁶Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, p. 27.

¹⁷Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 599.

¹⁸Congressional Record, XCVII, 228.

¹⁹Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 567.

the Congressional power of the purse;²⁰ however he went on to show, through the decision of Swaim v. U.S. (28 Court of Claims 173-221), that Congress had no other authority to limit the powers of the commander-in-chief.²¹ On the matter of Congressional implementation of treaties he used Professor E. S. Corwin's thesis that treaty provisions are addressed to certain branches of government for implementation. In the absence of explicit directions in the treaty, the President should then make the decision since he is charged with executing the laws of the land.²² Similarly, he rejected Senator Taft's position on declaring of war:

Senator Taft, in short is arguing that the Constitutional power of the President is limited

²⁰Lloyd memorandum, p. 33. Lloyd wrote "... the power of Congress over appropriations is absolute . . .," but someone in the White House apparently disagreed with the use of the word "absolute," as there were question marks penciled in along the side of the sentence.

²¹Ibid., pp. 33-34. In Swaim v. U.S. (28 Court of Claims 173-221) the court ruled, "Congress may increase the Army, or reduce the Army, or abolish it altogether; but so long as we have a military force Congress cannot take away from the President the supreme command. It is true that the constitution has conferred upon Congress the exclusive power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; but the two powers are distinct; neither can trench upon the other; the President cannot, under the disguise of military orders, evade the legislative regulations by which he in common with the Army must be governed; and Congress cannot in the disguise of 'rules for the government' of the Army impair the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief."

²²Lloyd memorandum, pp. 48-50.

by the possibility that our adversaries may take hostile action, even though the conduct of the President is entirely defensive. There is no constitutional doctrine to this effect, and there obviously can be none if the nation is to survive.²³

As already mentioned, Taft's constitutional arguments were, in part rooted in Truman's response to the opening of hostilities in Korea. Article 43 of the United Nations Charter provided for the establishment of an international army by means of Security Council negotiations. At the same time the Senate was considering the United Nations Charter, President Truman sent word that when such agreements were arrived at he would ask Congress for the appropriate legislation to approve American participation in that army.²⁴ The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in reporting out the United Nations Charter, added a proviso allowing the President to negotiate the agreements with subsequent Congressional approval necessary to make such agreements effective.²⁵ The Security Council never made use of Article 43 because the Soviet Union blocked all action upon it.

²³Ibid., p. 41.

²⁴Congressional Record, XCVII, 3012.

²⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Providing for the Appointment of Representatives of the United States in the Organs and Agencies of the United Nations, and to Make Other Provision with Respect to the Participation of the United States in Such Organization, S. Rept. 717, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, Senate Reports: Miscellaneous, III, 2.

With the invasion of South Korea, the Security Council on June 27, 1950, adopted a resolution calling for United Nations members to aid the Republic of Korea in repelling the armed aggression from the North. President Truman responded immediately by sending American forces. Truman gave some thought to asking Congress for a declaration of war, but Senator Connally, afraid of a long Congressional debate which might tie the President's hands completely, convinced him that he had the power as commander-in-chief and under the United Nations Charter.²⁶

Senator Taft already had reservations regarding Presidential power, and now he found Truman committing American ground forces to a United Nations army without ever having complied with Article 43 or the Senate proviso regarding that article.²⁷ The Administration's answer was that it had acted under Article 48 which provided: "The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council . . . shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine."²⁸ David Lloyd further noted that Article 43, which had not been implemented, could "hardly be construed to impair or modify the obligation of the member states to carry out the decisions of the Security

²⁶Connally, My Name is Tom Connally, p. 346.

²⁷Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 608.

²⁸Lloyd memorandum, pp. 52-53.

Council by direct action on their own part."²⁹ He further declared that the Congressional proviso in the acceptance of the United Nations Charter should not be considered a restriction upon the President's power in view of the fate of similar provisions attached to the Selective Service Act of 1940 and the Lend Lease Act.³⁰

Truman's sending of forces to Korea, along with Taft's position on a President making war, convinced the Ohio Republican that Congressional approval was necessary before an Executive could commit American ground forces to any international army.

Senator Taft arrived at that position in a round-about fashion, again reflecting his inconsistency. In the case of NATO, the President, according to the Senator, could not assign to it ground forces without Congressional approval for two reasons. First, Presidential deployment of troops to a threatened area was, in effect, allowing the Commander-in-Chief to make war.³¹ Second, no President could commit American forces to an international army

²⁹Ibid., p. 54.

³⁰Ibid., p. 61. The Selective Service Act of 1940 and the Lend Lease Act both had provisions intended to curb the use of the armed forces, yet President Roosevelt used the Navy in the North Atlantic and sent troops to Iceland and Greenland. Within the Senate there was substantial belief that the provisions could not constitutionally curb the President.

³¹Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, p. 34.

wherein he delegated or forfeited some of his powers as Commander-in-Chief.³² "My position has been that no Commander in Chief can delegate to a council of ten nations the power to direct American Armies," declared Taft, "only the Congress can authorize that particular action."³³ He continued to believe that the President did not have the authority to make such a commitment, and repeatedly asserted that such action could only be carried out by Congress in accordance with Article 11 of the Treaty--the clause providing that ratification and implementation be disposed of by the constitutional processes of the individual members.³⁴

The Ohio Senator may have brought up a valid technical point on the matter of delegating executive power to an international organization, but at the same time he acknowledged Presidential powers which could effectively be used to by-pass his own argument. He accepted the fact that the President could station naval or air forces anywhere even if the particular country was being threatened. Should an aggressor attack that nation, it would be very easy for those American forces to evacuate.³⁵ As far as

³²Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, pp. 603-04.

³³Congressional Record, XCVII, 2852.

³⁴Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 607.

³⁵Taft, A Foreign Policy for Americans, p. 34.

sending ground forces, he even conceded at one point:

I have said that if he [Truman] had authority to do it without the Atlantic Treaty, he had authority to do it if there was an Atlantic Treaty. And I think he has the power, so far as that is concerned, to send six divisions to Germany and tell the general that he shall cooperate with the British and other people.³⁶

In effect, his legal point regarding a commitment to an international army could be circumvented by unilateral action.

Senator Wherry agreed in substance with Taft;³⁷ however, their critics believed the North Atlantic Pact had, in fact, provided the President adequate authority to deploy ground forces. Secretary Marshall admitted that even if Congress did nothing in the way of approving Truman's plan, the Administration would proceed to send troops because it felt it had sufficient authority to do so under Article 3 of the Treaty which called for individual or collective self-help and mutual aid.³⁸ Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican from Michigan, while claiming that the Treaty was neither self-executing, nor did it give the President the authority to commit troops, granted certain prerogatives to the Executive. That is, by approving the Treaty the Senate agreed to its intent, and if the Congress now failed

³⁶Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 632.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 689, 700-01, 705.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 73-74.

to implement the Pact, then the President could take the initiative.³⁹ "The absence of a legal obligation to send troops," observed David Lloyd, "is not a prohibition on sending them if the Chief Executive determines that they are necessary to carry out the purpose of the treaty." He went on to point out that even in the absence of the Treaty the President could act merely upon the "broad considerations of foreign policy and national defense."⁴⁰

The fact that considerable time was spent debating a constitutional issue, which had little to do with the actual defense of Europe, again exposed the necessity of Presidential consultation with Congress. Walter Lippmann blamed Truman for the "botched-up business of the troops for Europe" issue, pointing out that by announcing the decision before talking with Congress the President had alienated support for his plan.⁴¹ Even some of Truman's firm backers criticized the President for failing to come to an accommodation with his opposition.⁴² Throughout the debate Republicans, including those in favor of sending troops, were especially critical of Truman's failure to

³⁹Congressional Record, XCVII, 2940, 2949.

⁴⁰Lloyd memorandum, pp. 65-66.

⁴¹Walter Lippmann, "Mr. Truman's Congressional Difficulties," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 6, 1951, p. 3D.

⁴²Editorial, Washington Post, January 13, 1951, p. 8; James Reston, "Our Basic Crisis is the Crisis of Confidence," New York Times, January 14, 1951, sec. IV, p. 3.

consult with Congress prior to the announcement of the decision.⁴³ Truman admitted he could not operate without the Congress but also acknowledged that Congressmen sometimes demanded information "for the sole purpose of embarrassing and hamstringing the President--in other words, for partisan political reasons."⁴⁴

Playing upon the importance of time, Governor Dewey deplored the Senate's slowness to act once it had been consulted. Congressional debate began in January 1951 and no vote was taken until April--such a delay posed problems should the same procedure be necessary every time the President wished to send more troops to Europe.⁴⁵

Ultimately, neither side won the day with their constitutional arguments. A century and a half of tradition, practice, and constitutional interpretation appeared to give the President the edge, yet Congress had made some valid legal points regarding executive-legislative consultation, and the delegation of executive power to an international body. The fact that the Republicans in Congress continued at length to hammer at the constitutional arguments, arguments which they were unlikely to win decisively, exposed an apparently partisan attempt to keep

⁴³Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 594; Congressional Record, XCVI, 16956; XCVII, 256.

⁴⁴Truman, Memoirs, II, 454.

⁴⁵Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 539.

the national spotlight on an issue already decided in the minds of most men.

Meanwhile, Democrats were working to side-track the Wherry Resolution. According to that measure Congress would determine "policy" before the President could act, and for some this meant Senate militants could filibuster to death any foreign policy proposal regarding Western Europe.⁴⁶ Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 8 was essentially negative in purpose, and it invited further constitutional problems. President Truman wanted a more positive affirmation of Congressional feelings and therefore asked Senator Connally, in his capacity as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to sponsor a resolution replacing the Wherry proposal.⁴⁷ The Democrats were not the only ones desiring a more friendly response. Republican Senators Lodge and Knowland both introduced resolutions which approved the sending of a limited number of troops and, at the same time, required Congressional approval of any additional troop commitments.⁴⁸

The Lodge and Knowland resolutions were never debated because following the hearings on Senate Concurrent

⁴⁶Congressional Record, XCVII, 230.

⁴⁷Blair Bolles, "Curb on President's Troop Powers Gains in Congress," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXX (February 16, 1951), 2.

⁴⁸Congressional Record, XCVII, 1317-18, 1648-49, 1752.

Resolution No. 8 the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees buried the Wherry Resolution and reported out two new resolutions on March 14. The Connally Resolution, Senate Resolution 99, was a simple measure merely expressing the sentiment of the Senate. The Russell Resolution, Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, was identical except that the word "Congress" replaced "Senate" thereby requiring both houses to vote on it. The joint Committee made up of thirteen Democrats and eleven Republicans voted unanimously to report out Senate Resolution 99 and sixteen to eight to report out Senate Concurrent Resolution 18.⁴⁹ Neither the simple resolution nor the concurrent one required formal Presidential acceptance or rejection; only a joint resolution or a bill could force that action.

The Connally-Russell Resolutions, while demanding the European members of NATO carry their fair share of the burden, accepted the necessity of stationing American forces abroad to implement the Treaty. The core of the resolutions was in Section 6 which resolved that

it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four

⁴⁹Senate, S. Rept. 175, p. 5.

additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe.⁵⁰

Upon reading this provision supporters and critics alike aired a barrage of interpretations.⁵¹ The Administration's opponents, although never admitting the Wherry Resolution was ambiguous, suddenly discovered numerous loopholes in Truman's favor and began suggesting various changes to Section 6.⁵² Their prime goal was to make sure the President sought Congressional approval of this and subsequent troop deployments. Some Democrats in the executive committee sessions had already attempted to remove the Congressional approval clause, but had been defeated by two members of their own party.⁵³ As a result the constitutional contest continued.

Republican Senator John W. Bricker from Ohio was dissatisfied with all the resolutions because none of them, even if passed, would be binding upon the President. The public, in his view, had been misled into believing that the Senate vote would have some legal significance.⁵⁴ Republican members of the two committees did make an effort to

⁵⁰Congressional Record, XCVII, 2363-64.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 2556, 2577, 2582, 2658-59, 2661, 2863.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 2576-77, 2772; Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 618.

⁵³New York Times, March 14, 1951, p. 7.

⁵⁴Congressional Record, XCVII, 2863.

report out a joint resolution, which would have forced the President's hand, but failed by a vote of twelve to eleven.⁵⁵ There were, in fact, during the final hours of debate in April, several attempts to have the resolutions reintroduced in the form of a bill or joint resolution. Senator Wherry moved that a joint resolution with the same language as Senate Resolution 99 be considered in lieu of that simple resolution. The Vice-President and Senator Connally quickly found the Nebraska Senator to be in violation of a Senate rule, thereby striking down Wherry's motion.⁵⁶ Other attempts were made by such Senators as South Dakota Republican Karl Mundt who tried to amend the resolutions into a bill, and Senator Bricker who moved to recommit the resolutions to the committees.⁵⁷ None of the attempts succeeded because the majority of Senators felt that the committees would deadlock and would not report out any kind of resolution or bill, or if a joint resolution was passed, they believed it would meet with a Presidential veto which would leave them with absolutely nothing. An overriding element was the fact that the Senate had already eaten up three months debating the issue, and most members

⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 2870, 3173. Senator Knowland reported the 12 to 11 vote, while Senator Hickenlooper indicated it was 13 to 11.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 3063, 3065.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 3107, 3173.

felt that nothing could be gained by spending more time on it.⁵⁸

Unable to secure a bill or joint resolution, several Senators set about to amend the existing resolutions as to when and how Presidential-Congressional consultation should take place. Section 5 of the Connally-Russell measures allowed the Administration to request additional troops by merely consulting with the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees and the House Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees. Republican Senators James Kem of Missouri and Arthur Watkins of Utah immediately resisted the idea of letting four committees speak for the rest of the Congress.⁵⁹ Senator Wherry said he did not think that the acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty meant there would be "star chamber proceedings in which a few Senators, acting in secret, would collaborate with the Executive and his aids in developing and effectuating implementation of the treaty."⁶⁰ Senator Irving Ives, Republican from New York, offered an amendment requiring the Congressional committees that the Administration consulted to submit the information to the full Senate and House for their approval. The Ives amendment was defeated resulting in no gains for

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 3175, 3178-79, 3181, 3190, 3194.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 2661, 2911.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 3013.

those seeking a more foolproof method.⁶¹

Senator John McClellan, Democrat from Arkansas, submitted perhaps the most damaging amendment, if there was such a thing, when he attempted to force Presidential-Congressional consultation prior to any further deployment of troops. Section 6 of the Connally-Russell Resolutions merely asked the President to obtain Congressional approval when assigning troops to Europe--the article did not specify that the President had to secure this approval before actually sending additional troops. The McClellan amendment, on the other hand, sought to add the restrictive language that ". . . it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval."⁶²

Initially the Senate rejected the McClellan amendment, but after other amendments also failed to modify Section 6 to everyones approval, the McClellan amendment was reconsidered and accepted.⁶³ Senator Lodge made a final effort to defeat the amendment by pointing out some technical discrepancies. The McClellan amendment approved the sending of only four additional divisions; in Lodge's

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 3088-89, 3095.

⁶²Ibid., p. 3082.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 3082-83, 3088-89, 3095-96, 3104.

view this did not include support troops or corps headquarters. Ultimately, the lack of those latter command units could mean American divisions would have to be placed under the authority of foreign corps headquarters. Lodge changed few minds since the two corps headquarters needed for the six American divisions only amounted to some 500 men.⁶⁴

On April 4, 1951 Senators offered their last amendments and made their concluding parliamentary moves regarding the troops-for-Europe resolutions. As the final vote came nearer Senators once more explained why they were voting the way they were, as if their associates and the outside world had no idea.

Most Republicans who voted against the Connally-Russell Resolutions did so for similar reasons. The majority found no value in resolutions which were not binding upon the President. Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen called the resolutions a "hoax" in which the American people were being "sold a bill of goods."⁶⁵ Senator Mundt refused to approve the Truman "fait accompli" being presented to Congress.⁶⁶ A few demanded more new Pact members before committing American ground forces.⁶⁷ Although Senator Wherry admitted

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 3145-47, 3154.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 3270-71

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 3277.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 2739.

that the resolutions provided for Executive-Congressional consultation, he believed them to be too weak--Truman could simply ignore the resolutions if he so desired. More importantly for the Nebraska Senator, the measures were actually approving Truman's basic decision to send troops. "I believe," he said, "that if we send any troops, we must send all the troops that are necessary to back up those in Western Europe," and he then embarked on a new harangue demanding "mastery of the air." Senator Connally retorted, "The Senator already has mastery of the hot air."⁶⁸ In the end Wherry voted against both of the resolutions.

Senator J. William Fulbright made it apparent that the negative vote would not be a strictly partisan vote. He completely approved the sending of four divisions to Europe but would not vote for either of the resolutions because it would establish a dangerous precedent whereby the Congress would continue to make greater efforts to determine military tactics and the conduct of war itself. As far as he was concerned, the President had the power to deploy the troops as Commander-in-Chief and therefore no other approval was necessary.⁶⁹

The Republicans who voted for the resolutions, especially the more internationalist oriented, made special

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 3280-82.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 3288.

efforts to justify their positions. Most, but not all, had long ago been convinced of the need for American troops in Europe; however, a number fell back on other reasons. Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin was typical of those who desired the deployment of ground forces while at the same time reasserting the Senate's role in the joint handling of foreign affairs.⁷⁰ New Jersey Senator H. Alexander Smith and Massachusetts Senator Lodge voted for the resolutions even though they had qualms with Section 6 as amended; however, the McClellan amendment was a major reason why one of the Administration's severest critics, Utah Senator Arthur Watkins, voted for the resolutions.⁷¹ In another case, Senator Ferguson voted "yea" because he hoped that once the House received the Russell Resolution it would initiate changes creating a joint, and therefore binding, resolution.⁷² Ultimately, Senator Taft voted for both resolutions because they placed a moral obligation upon the President to consult with Congress. Should they be voted down, he observed, the President could interpret the decision as an authorization to do as he pleased.⁷³

After nearly three months of repetitious,

⁷⁰Ibid., pp. 3275-76.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 3276, 3289.

⁷²Ibid., p. 3289.

⁷³Ibid., p. 3273.

uninspiring debate the Senate voted to allow the President to deploy American ground forces to Europe to implement the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By a vote of 69 to 21 Senate Resolution 99 was passed; Senate Concurrent Resolution 18 likewise carried but by a much smaller margin of 45 to 41.⁷⁴ With the adoption of Senate Resolution 99 President Truman claimed victory saying that it represented a reaffirmation of his foreign policy.⁷⁵

An analysis of the vote helps to identify the regional and party voting pattern. The McClellan amendment, containing the main issue, passed by only a six-vote margin, 49 to 43. Twenty-nine midwestern and western Republicans provided the majority of the 49 yes votes with 9 northeastern Republicans and 11 Democrats contributing the balance. A switch of either the 7 southern Democratic votes or the 9 northeastern GOP votes could have easily defeated this more restrictive amendment. Most Democrats, other than those from the South, supported the wording of the original Connally Resolution and therefore voted against the amendment.

The actual tally on the Connally Resolution, Senate Resolution 99, found 42 Democrats and 27 Republicans combining for a lopsided total of 69 yeas votes. Except

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 3282, 3293-94.

⁷⁵U.S., Truman Public Papers, 1951, pp. 217-18.

for the South where 2 Democrats voted nay, the Administration's party voted unanimously for the Connally measure. Only in the Northeast and Middle Atlantic states did Republicans give a majority of their votes to the resolution; nearly 60 per cent of midwestern and western Republicans opposed it.

When it came to the Russell Resolution, which invited the House to vote on the issue, 9 Democrats joined 36 Republicans to pass the resolution by only a 4 vote margin. Republican strength was fairly uniform with GOP members in each section of the country giving approximately 80 per cent of their party's support. Except for the South, Democrats followed the lead of Senator Connally in voting against spreading the debate to the House of Representatives. Had it not been for 8 southern Democrats the Republicans could not have carried the day.

In summary, Democrats relied upon the northeastern Republican vote to carry the Connally Resolution, while Republicans nationally teamed up with a few renegade Democrats to pass the Russell Resolution. Republican strength in opposition to the Truman program was concentrated in the Midwest and West where they voted unanimously for the tougher McClellan amendment, then rejected the weaker Connally Resolution, and finally gave majorities to the Russell Resolution in hopes the House would prolong the issue. On the other hand, Republicans in the industrial

northeast not only backed the Truman proposal to send four additional divisions but also supported, but only by the very narrow margin of 9 to 8, their party colleagues in demanding that the Congress be informed before the President made any more commitments. Southern Democrats generally favored sending troops to Europe, but the few who voted for the McClellan amendment and the Russell Resolution demonstrated that they were not entirely in accord with their President.⁷⁶

Outside the Senate the national press was hardly exuberant, for the vaguely worded resolutions could be interpreted to suit one's own needs. A variety of conservative and liberal editors were satisfied with the measures either because they reinforced the Atlantic Alliance or because the President was not given a carte blanche.⁷⁷

The Washington Post noted the accomplishments in implementing the Pact but found the Administration's leadership was "pathetically weak" when it came to Executive consultation with Congress.⁷⁸

At the same time, a number of moderate and liberal

⁷⁶For further statistics see Appendix.

⁷⁷Editorial, Dallas Morning News, April 6, 1951, sec. III, p. 2; Editorial, Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1951, sec. II, p. 4; Editorial, New York Times, April 5, 1951, p. 28; Editorial, Evening World-Herald (Omaha), April 5, 1951, p. 34.

⁷⁸Editorial, Washington Post, April 4, 1951, p. 12, April 7, 1951, p. 8.

papers, who normally backed the Administration, found no reason whatever to claim victory. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch blamed Administration "clumsiness" for allowing the passage of "unreal and inconclusive" resolutions.⁷⁹ San Francisco Chronicle editors viewed the results of the debate as throwing icewater on Western Europe,⁸⁰ while the magazine, Nation, unhappy that the President had swallowed so many restrictions, called it a vote of no confidence.⁸¹

The response, or rather lack of response, by Colonel McCormick and his Chicago Daily Tribune was perhaps the most glaring. Day after day the Tribune had fired editorial volleys at Truman and his policies, yet after the Senate voted the editorial page was nearly devoid of comment on this issue. Other than a weak hope that the House would stop Truman from sending even the four divisions,⁸² the editors conspicuously avoided the matter in apparent recognition that the Hoover-Taft-Wherry forces had not defeated the man in the White House.

McCormick's hope for House action never reaped any real successes. In the House Armed Services Committee

⁷⁹ Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 5, 1951, p. 2B.

⁸⁰ Editorial, San Francisco Chronicle, April 4, 1951, p. 18.

⁸¹ Editorial, Nation, April 14, 1951, p. 341.

⁸² Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, April 4, 1951, sec. I, p. 20.

Democrats upset a Republican attempt to attach a restrictive rider to a pending conscription bill. The rider would have forbidden the President from sending any troops until both Houses of Congress gave their express consent.⁸³ In addition, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, having received Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, refused to report out the measure. Unhappy with the Democratic leadership, Representative Frederick Coudert, Jr. offered an amendment to a Defense Department appropriation bill again attempting to restrict the President's power to deploy American ground forces abroad, and again he met with defeat.⁸⁴ Throughout, the House generally took a disinterest in the troops-for-Europe issue perhaps hoping to avoid the protracted debate in which the Senate indulged.

Debate on the troops-for-Europe issue continued to flare-up periodically in 1951 even long after the Senate had seemingly disposed of the matter. In July 1951 Secretary of Defense Marshall revealed that the United States hoped to have some 400,000 men--60,000 Air Force personnel and 340,000 ground forces--in Europe by the end of 1952. This was nearly twice the number contemplated at the Senate hearings in the Spring of 1951, and the critics reacted

⁸³New York Times, March 14, 1951, p. 7.

⁸⁴Congressional Record, XCVII, 3452, 9735, 9746.

accordingly.⁸⁵

Also in July 1951, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee visited General Eisenhower in Europe and sought a progress report on European defenses. Senators accepted the American commitment as a fact but were far more interested in the European response to the deployment of United States forces. They wanted to know what the Europeans were doing economically and militarily to uphold their end of the bargain; in turn, General Eisenhower and his staff provided a favorable analysis in a way only the military could do.⁸⁶

One week after the Senate vote on the Connally-Russell Resolutions President Truman was forced to remove General MacArthur from his command. Although the firing had nothing to do with the troops-for-Europe issue, the re-examinists began a new barrage upon the Truman foreign policy. New debate and new hearings on foreign policy only frustrated the American people more, and as a result, the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees thought it necessary to reassure people at home and abroad.

⁸⁵ New York Times, July 28, 1951, p. 1.

⁸⁶ SHAPE briefings for Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 1951, Congressional Visits File (1951, No. 3), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers 1916-52, Eisenhower Library. Parts of this have been published in: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, On United Economic and Military Assistance to Free Europe, Hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951.

Recognizing the effect of dissident voices in a democracy the Committees, speaking jointly, made it known that the American government was not trying to alarm the world.

"The objectives of the people of the United States are unchanged by anything that has transpired during this ordeal of controversy," the Committee report stated. "We are unshaken in our determination to defend ourselves and to cooperate to the limit of our capabilities with all of those free nations determined to survive in freedom."⁸⁷ The Committees issued this statement as a direct result of the MacArthur controversy, but because the primary issue was one of foreign policy, its implications also applied to the troops-for-Europe issue.

In retrospect the participants in the debate did little to settle the constitutional problems surrounding the proposed policy. Technological change and the Cold War did produce a shift of emphasis from Congress to the White

⁸⁷U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations and Committee on Armed Services, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and the American Policy in the Far East: Joint Statement by the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Relative to the Facts and Circumstances Bearing on the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur and on American Policy in the Far East, S. Doc. 50, 82nd Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Senate Documents: Miscellaneous, X, 2.

House, especially in the use of American troops abroad and in the war-making powers. Prior to the Debate most instances in which the President deployed American forces abroad were cases dealing in some way with the protection of Americans or their property; in such events justification and Congressional approval were self-evident. However, the deployment of troops in times of peace to an international army created a new twist in the conduct of foreign policy. Neither the Administration nor Congress had squarely faced the issue at the time of the Korean intervention in that Article 43 of the United Nations Charter was never carried out. As a result President Truman later acted in the belief that the Constitution and the North Atlantic Treaty provided him with sufficient authority to cope with the country's national interest in the Atlantic area.

In taking the initiative, however, Truman also accepted a heavy responsibility, a responsibility he unwillingly shared. It would have been to his benefit had he rallied an already existing support behind his plan, but in announcing his decision before consulting with Congress he alienated Republicans and a small segment of his own party. As a result Senators and Representatives alike renewed their efforts at reasserting their role in foreign policy. Many expressed concern that they were being presented another *fait accompli* and therefore rightly performed their duty as a sounding board through the use of debate and public

hearings. On the other hand, Truman faced the dilemma of justifying a purely foreign policy matter when dissidents in the opposition party were undoubtedly trying to make it a partisan issue. By shifting the emphasis from European defense to constitutional issues, Republicans prolonged the debate hoping to reap any meager benefits.

The Connally-Russell Resolutions settled very little. They were far more positive than the Wherry Resolution in that they recognized a general feeling that American ground forces were indeed necessary in Europe. Neither resolution, however, settled the constitutional differences over Presidential-Congressional consultation or further implementation of the North Atlantic Pact. Although the measures attempted to solve these problems they were not binding upon the President. Had a bill or joint resolution been enacted an even more severe conflict would have arisen in that the President would have questioned its constitutionality and most likely would have vetoed it. In the final analysis it was perhaps best that the joint powers in foreign affairs were not decided in finality, as the decision may have proved unworkable in different circumstances.

Whatever the significance of the Congressional action, the debate did reveal strong western and midwestern Republican resistance to greater involvement in world affairs. As the editors of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

analyzed it, the vote reflected a regional stronghold of a "particular type of Republicanism which in some cases takes the form of isolationism."⁸⁸

⁸⁸Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch: April 9, 1951, p. 2B.

CHAPTER V

The Great Debate: An Analysis

President Truman's decision to send United States ground forces to Europe and the resulting debate raise two significant questions. First, were the re-examinists genuinely concerned with the direction of foreign affairs or was their goal to make political hay for partisan reasons? Second, was the European army as established under the auspices of NATO a necessity, or were there alternate solutions which would have produced the desired results?

Playing politics with foreign policy is nothing new and the troops-for-Europe debate displayed a continuation of such tactics. This is not to say, however, the re-examinists had no interest in what would be considered strictly foreign policy. Hoover, Taft, and Wherry did more than merely denounce the Administration's failures; they offered their own alternative solutions which appeared to be within the capability of the United States.

This interest in foreign policy, however, lent itself to purely partisan ends. The role of partisanship has already been alluded to by the fact that the greatest opposition to the Truman policy came from conservative

Republicans, but it does not end there. Certain Republicans were indeed looking for issues on which they could defeat Truman, while others perhaps had personal local goals which might be fulfilled.

The press acknowledged that Senator Taft was attempting to consolidate his leadership in the absence of Senator Vandenberg by searching for an issue to rally Republicans behind him, and the troops-for-Europe program fit the bill.¹ This desire to engage the Democratic Administration became clearly apparent in December, 1950, when Republicans set out to force Acheson's resignation. Buoyed by Republican gains in the November election Taft advised a Republican Senate caucus against further consultation with the Administration. As reported by Drew Pearson, Taft told his colleagues, "I see no reason to consult as long as Harry Truman is in the White House. Our duty as Republicans is to criticize, and I think that ought to be made clear . . ." ²

Not only did Taft proceed to make a major foreign policy speech in January; he hoped to keep the discussion going by playing a directing role. A week after Eisenhower's February 1 testimony, and before Marshall's appearance at the hearings, Taft complained publicly that the Administration

¹"Taft's Bid for Power--and Presidency," U.S. News & World Report, January 19, 1951, p. 19.

²Drew Pearson, "Taft, Dewey Head Up GOP Groups on War Issues," Denver Post, December 29, 1950, p. 14.

was still refusing to divulge the size of the contemplated European army and the American contribution to it.³ Yet on January 20, 1951, General Bradley had briefed several Republican Senators, including Taft, on the European army project. At that time Bradley made it clear that the plan was not to send several million men but only four divisions.⁴ Taft obviously was aware of the Administration's plan well before the beginning of the hearings but refused to admit it. A paper from Taft's home state picked up this inconsistency and suggested that as a man of "legendary integrity" the Senator was indulging in "political double-talk."⁵

From these two incidents it may be suggested that Robert Taft had more than just foreign policy in mind. The issue made him a foreign affairs spokesman, but more importantly, it made him the Republican spokesman on foreign policy. He was offering a Republican alternative to the seeming Democratic quagmire, and as a result he was keeping his Party's name in lights for the American people.

Nor was Taft alone in playing politics with foreign affairs. Senator Jenner perhaps expressed best the

³Congressional Record, XCVII, 1117.

⁴Poole, "Republican Foreign Policy," p. 389.

⁵Editorial, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 17, 1951, p. 4A. The editorial was printed with the permission of the Dayton Daily News.

agitation over foreign policy among the conservative Republicans when he said, "We debate the Fair Deal policies; we argue whether the proposals are good or bad, but we are always talking about their policies."⁶ The conservatives who held positions of power, though not necessarily control, in the Republican Party were searching for issues whereby they could lead instead of being led.

Although he refrained from making a personal attack on President Truman during the hearings, Senator Wherry doggedly looked for means to increase Republican influence. The troops-for-Europe issue provided him such a vehicle, but it was General MacArthur's removal which provoked his most vehement partisan objection to the Truman Administration. While calling for a renewed examination of Truman's foreign policy he made it a point to denounce political motives by saying that to inject partisanship was "completely in contradiction with the American way." However, after taking this step forward in behalf of bipartisanship he took two steps backward with a comment considerably less veiled: "Compare the monumental record of General MacArthur with that of his accusers, with their record of moral decay, greed, corruption and confusion . . ."⁷

Beyond national headlines for the Republican Party

⁶Congressional Record, XCVII, 2594.

⁷St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 13, 1951, p. 1D.

the troops-for-Europe debate provided Senator Wherry a chance to plug his own interests and that of his state, that being air power. Nebraska contained no major aircraft industry, but the retention of Strategic Air Command headquarters in the state was important to the Senator. His intense interest in a growing air force during the debate is exemplified not only by his continued lecturing on air power but also by the fact that two of his witnesses, Alexander de Seversky and General George, were in some way associated with major aircraft companies.⁸ In regard to the foreign affairs implications of the Wherry Resolution, General George admitted to the Committees he had not even read the resolution.⁹ Finally, Wherry got wind of a story that a new North Atlantic Bombardment Command would be established as part of NATO and asked General Eisenhower about the possibility of locating that command in Omaha under General LeMay. To the Nebraskan's dismay, no such command ever developed.¹⁰

While the conservative Republicans were hoping to make gains at the expense of the Democratic Party they

⁸De Seversky had been a consultant to the Republic Aviation Company while George, after retiring from the military, became vice-president of Hughes Tool Company which owned Hughes Aircraft Company.

⁹Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 410.

¹⁰Kenneth S. Wherry to Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 20, 1951, Miscellaneous Correspondence File, Eisenhower Papers 1916-1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

found themselves involved in something close to a civil war within their own party. As one analyst put it, the "Republicans failed to harmonize their foreign and domestic leadership" and this resulted in shifting alliances involving at one time or another Taft, Vandenberg, Dewey, and eventually John Foster Dulles.¹¹ When the Great Debate began Senator Vandenberg was no longer able to exert his influence over matters of foreign policy because of his health, and for a period no one was sure who spoke as the Republican foreign policy expert. At the time President Truman announced his troop decision in September, 1950, the New York Times reported that Senator Lodge had become the Republican spokesman on foreign affairs.¹²

On the one hand, the conservatives and liberals within the Republican Party were at odds with each other. The conservatives saw no future in a "me-too" approach to foreign policy, yet Thomas Dewey stood his ground when challenged by the conservatives. As one columnist expressed it, Dewey's testimony and exchange with Wherry at the hearings was a footnote to the 1948 campaign. "Dewey could not express his true convictions in that campaign because in state after state were found Republican congressional candidates who were diametrically opposed to the views of

¹¹ Poole, "Republican Foreign Policy," pp. 2-3.

¹² New York Times, September 9, 1950, p. 5.

the Republican presidential candidate."¹³ His forthright statement on the troops-for-Europe issue indeed alienated the conservative faction of the party. Nor was Dewey the only liberal who was a problem to the right wing of the party; the Chicago Daily Tribune suggested that Senators Margaret Chase Smith of Maine, Wayne Morse of Oregon, Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey, Irving Ives of New York, Leverett Saltonstall and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, George Aiken and Ralph Flanders of Vermont, Charles Tobey of New Hampshire, and James Duff of Pennsylvania all "take a walk" as they would make better Democrats than Republicans.¹⁴

On the other hand, the conservatives within the Republican Party also were not united in their effort. The fact that Taft had Presidential aspirations has already been mentioned, but it should be added that Senator Wherry had like interests.¹⁵ Early in the debate the New York Times recognized that Wherry was taking issue with Taft's more moderate stand.¹⁶ This difference is more recognizable in the final vote in which the two men did not stand

¹³Marquis Childs, "Foreign Policy and 1952," Washington Post, February 28, 1951, p. 9.

¹⁴Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, March 6, 1951, sec. I, p. 16.

¹⁵Dalstrom, "Kenneth S. Wherry," p. 751.

¹⁶New York Times, January 30, 1951, p. 11.

together. According to one historian it was John Foster Dulles who was instrumental in wooing Taft away from the extreme positions of Hoover and Wherry.¹⁷

As much as anything the Great Debate exposed a standing division within the Republican Party. Except for John McClellan and his amendment to the Connally-Russell resolutions and a few other southern Democrats, no such schism developed in President Truman's party.

The ultimate goal in making the troops-for-Europe program a partisan issue was the Presidency in 1952. Taft was especially interested in the Republican nomination and let it be known he would fight tooth-and-nail to prevent a "me-too" Republican from getting it.¹⁸ In addition, the Ohio Senator was being confronted with a new challenger from another quarter--General Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower had not publicly announced his party preference or his intention to run, the press continued to speculate about the growing Republican support for the General and its affect on Taft.¹⁹ Even though the election was nearly two years away a number of Republicans began giving public support to an Eisenhower campaign. Governor Dewey,

¹⁷ Poole, "Republican Foreign Policy," p. 377.

¹⁸ Editorial, Evening World-Herald (Omaha), December 4, 1950, p. 18.

¹⁹ James Reston, "Eisenhower or Taft? A Question Looms for '52," New York Times, February 18, 1951, sec. IV, p. 3.

California Governor Earl Warren, Senator James Duff and Harold Stassen all rejected Taft because of his foreign policy.²⁰ Dewey and Duff were both publicly committed to Eisenhower before the end of March, 1951.²¹

Taft viewed the chance to beat Eisenhower as significant as beating Truman in that the General was in full agreement with the Administration's policy. In effect, Taft saw that either a Truman or Eisenhower victory in 1952 would bring no change of policy. The Chicago Daily Tribune warned conservative Republicans to look inside the Eisenhower political Trojan horse as it appeared that the "New Dealers" were "using Eisenhower to kill off a real Republican opposition."²²

The Eisenhower challenge, announced or not, was very genuine as revealed by an April, 1951 Gallup poll. That survey showed Eisenhower leading Taft by sixteen percentage points within the GOP.²³ Six months later, while Eisenhower was in Europe, he asked W. Averell Harriman to secure for him the voting record of Senator

²⁰Thomas L. Stokes, "Four Men Against Sen. Taft," Atlanta Constitution, March 6, 1951, p. 10.

²¹Fulton Lewis, Jr., "Freshman Senator Duff Readies Blast at Hoover-Taft-Wherry," Evening World Herald (Omaha), March 15, 1951, p. 30; Drew Pearson, "Eisenhower's Snubs Anger Dewey," Washington Post, March 18, 1951, p. 5B.

²²Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, February 24, 1951, sec. I, p. 8.

²³Washington Post, April 15, 1951, p. 1B.

Taft.²⁴ Although the General asked only for the votes on European aid, it can be speculated that Eisenhower was as much interested in future political events as in assistance to Europe. By May, 1952, the conservatives were up in arms at the Eisenhower movement within the Republican Party. Michigan Senator Homer Ferguson helped prepare a study which concluded that a "Military-Internationalist-New Deal" coalition was promoting Eisenhower as a Republican candidate. The conservatives realized that if both parties nominated a firm internationalist the Truman policies would be "safe."²⁵

From all of this it can be surmised that the Great Debate was indeed colored with partisanship. The Republican re-examinists were out to make political hay and a nation frustrated with existing foreign problems provided fertile ground. If Senator Taft was sincerely interested in foreign affairs and his beliefs, why did he vote for the two pathetically weak resolutions? Perhaps he realized the press, the Congress, and the public were not rallying behind Hoover and Wherry. In such a case he could salvage his chance for the 1952 Republican nomination only by

²⁴W. Averell Harriman to Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 14, 1951, W. Averell Harriman File (#2), Eisenhower Papers 1916-1952, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

²⁵Homer Ferguson to Herbert Hoover, May 8, 1952, D. D. Eisenhower File (1948-1953), Post-Presidential Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.

moderating his stand--the Hoover and Wherry positions were too extreme and the Eisenhower challenge was only more of the existing medicine. His position had to be an alternative to the Truman Doctrine yet command the support of a majority of the voters.

Having considered the domestic side of the issue it is now necessary to look at the implications in foreign affairs. This study was not done for the purpose of making a blanket generalization about the Administration's Cold War policy; however, one can indulge in a degree of speculation. Whether Truman's decision was correct or not was debatable not only then but continues to be so.

Throughout the debate both Truman and his critics accepted the premise that a Soviet military threat did exist. It can be conceded that the mere existence of a relatively large Red Army constituted a threat when compared to the meager forces available in Western Europe. The apprehension increased with the aggression in Korea, and as a result it awoke Europe and the United States to the possibilities of a Soviet march across Europe. In 1951 the alternatives for a European defense appeared to be either all-out nuclear retaliation with air power or creating a mixed force capable of a flexible response. The Administration, finding defects in the air power thesis and a nuclear holocaust unacceptable for European morale, opted for a defense which hopefully would keep most of Western Europe

free and thereby prevent the necessity of another D-Day landing. The immediate goal was to strengthen a pitifully weak Europe as quickly as possible.

The question then arises why did Stalin not attack Western Europe before or during the formation of the European Army? One answer given was the American possession of the atomic bomb and her long range bombers;²⁶ however, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff were correct these weapons alone would have not stopped the Red Army. A number of other observers found the answer, in part, to spring from internal problems with non-Russian nationalities within the Soviet Union and the satellites.²⁷ As one writer put it, "The irreconcilability of East Germany with the other satellites is one of the major problems facing the Russians . . ."²⁸ Stewart and Joseph Alsop saw the troop build-ups in the satellites as aimed at subduing Tito and his Yugoslavia rather than at Western Europe.²⁹ John Kennedy felt Stalin would not make a move because the best the Russians could hope for was a stalemate as result of

²⁶Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 755.

²⁷Ibid., pp. 255, 494, 749.

²⁸Drew Middleton, The Defense of Western Europe (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952), p. 81.

²⁹Stewart and Joseph Alsop, "Chance of Peace Rests on West's All-Out Rearming and Meeting Soviet Efforts to Block Build-up," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 26, 1951, p. 1C.

overextending the Red Army.³⁰ The military, political, and economic weakness of Western Europe, according to Hans Morgenthau, was not a threat to the Russian position in central and Eastern Europe and therefore made the acquisition of Western Europe unattractive for the moment.³¹

Others viewed the North Atlantic Alliance and the plans for an army as an effective deterrent causing the Soviet leaders to be content temporarily.³² General Eisenhower, however, contended the Russians could find an excuse for marching with or without the existence of the pact.³³

There were other analyses, some quite debatable,³⁴ but the majority continued to fall back upon the air power and nuclear bomb thesis.

Whether it was air power, NATO, or some other reason

³⁰Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 429.

³¹Morgenthau, Defense of National Interest, p. 161.

³²Daniel DeLuce and Richard O'Regan, "Odds Favor Another Year of Peace in Europe, in Cautious View of Observers in Germany, Austria," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 25, 1951, p. 3B.

³³Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 21.

³⁴The editor of the Chicago Daily Tribune came up with the thesis that Russia would not attack the nations of Western Europe because they were all colonial powers. The argument was to the effect that, if in taking over Europe the Soviets also kept the colonial possessions, Communism would lose its appeal to the colonial populations. On the other hand, if Russia gave the colonies their independence she would also lose the "source of wealth and income from overseas that largely sustains" the West European powers. In all, the thesis was a bit unbelievable. (Editorial, Chicago Daily Tribune, December 25, 1950, sec, I, p. 18.)

that prevented the Red Army from attacking, a considerable portion of the American people agreed with Truman that the Soviet threat was a military one. However, there was a small group headed by George Kennan who viewed the threat as more political than military. Kennan had first-hand experience with the Soviet leaders during his assignment as a Foreign Service Officer in Moscow during the years 1945 and 1946 and was among the first to warn of Russian intransigence.

In analyzing Soviet policy in 1945 Kennan predicted that other than a "baring of the fangs" Russia had "no further means with which to assail the Western World." He further acknowledged that the Red Army would not be demobilized because Stalin needed it to consolidate his power in the newly-acquired areas. "Further military advances in the West could only increase responsibilities already beyond the Russian capacity to meet."³⁵

Two years later in writing his Mr. X article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," he continued to view the threat as more political than military. Communist ideology saw a continuing antagonism between capitalism and socialism, but in Kennan's view this did not mean the Soviets were bent upon a do-or-die program--they were in no hurry. When he asked for a "firm and vigilant containment of Russian

³⁵Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 533, 546.

expansive tendencies," he said nothing about a military threat or military containment.³⁶ Many, including Walter Lippmann, immediately read a military connotation into the passage, and shortly thereafter Kennan attempted to correct Lippmann's false interpretation by pointing out

The Russians don't want to invade anyone. It is not in their tradition. They tried it once in Finland and got their fingers burned. They don't want war of any kind. Above all, they don't want the open responsibility that official invasion brings with it. They far prefer to do the job politically with stooge forces. Note well: when I say politically, that does not mean without violence. But it means that the violence is nominally domestic, not international, violence.³⁷

Unlike Acheson, Kennan attempted to put the brakes on the growing hard line of containment as time passed. This was especially true when as a member of the State Department staff he worked on the North Atlantic Treaty. Recognizing the intent of the pact he protested to his superior, Secretary of State Marshall. Although he accepted the need to bolster European morale he was fearful that a preoccupation with military affairs would be detrimental to the more important fulfillment of economic recovery. "The danger that European NATO partners faced in the political field," he wrote to Marshall, "was still greater . . . than any military danger that confronted them."³⁸ Somewhat later

³⁶"x" [George F. Kennan], "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, XXV (July, 1947), pp. 572-73, 575.

³⁷Kennan, Memoirs, pp. 358-61.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 409-10.

he observed, "I have never seen any evidence that the Soviet leaders have at any time since World War II . . . desired a general war between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist powers."³⁹

Throughout, Kennan consistently warned against overemphasizing military containment at the expense of European economic recovery. The Soviet threat in his view could best be met by a politically and economically stable Western Europe.⁴⁰ Ten years after his Mr. X article Kennan moved ever further away from the militant containment line and turned towards Lippmann's earlier proposal of gradual disengagement in Europe. By then he and Acheson were far apart, with Acheson continuing to demand action based on positions of military strength.⁴¹

In talking about the containment policy Kennan later said

The failure consisted in the fact that our own government, finding it difficult to understand a political threat as such and to deal with it in other than military terms, and grievously misled, in particular, by its own faulty interpretations of the significance of the Korean War, failed to take advantage of the opportunities for useful

³⁹George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 69-70.

⁴⁰George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1958), pp. 88-91.

⁴¹Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 209.

political discussion when, in later years, such opportunities began to open up, and exerted itself, in its military preoccupations, to seal and to perpetuate the very divisions of Europe which it should have been concerned to remove.⁴²

If Kennan's analysis that the threat had always been more political than military is correct, then the decision to form a European Army and Truman's sending American ground forces to Europe only contributed to the intensity of the Cold War. If the military threat was not as great as perceived by the Administration then perhaps the solution was to encourage a degree of rearmament while playing down the creation of a European army aimed at the Soviet frontiers. Due to the conflicting views of the Soviet threat the Great Debate, in a sense, has never ended. The questions grow more encompassing and require further analysis of the origins of the Cold War, Soviet goals, and the American understanding of the Russian mind. The questions perhaps can never fully be answered, but a re-examination of the Cold War deserves more attention.

It has been said that foreign policy cannot be separated from domestic influences--the Great Debate is a manifestation of that premise. Bipartisanship involves a number of conditions including the necessity of the

⁴²Kennan, Memoirs, p. 365.

Executive consulting Congress prior to the public announcement of a decision or policy. President Truman, even though his plan had a legitimate basis, acted hastily and with a determination to shoulder the entire responsibility. Aware that Congress contained a majority of internationalists he felt he could move unrestricted, yet a small but vigilant group of conservatives acting out of frustration and the desire for partisan gain fired broadside into the President's conduct and his entire foreign policy.

The partisan tactics, while draped with legitimate arguments, included both a conservative Republican alternative in foreign policy and constitutional haggling. That is not to say the alternative policy was an entirely unworkable one--the intent was to capitalize on the public frustration with the Truman policy. After finding themselves outnumbered the conservatives resorted to constitutional arguments to deny the President completion of his policy. Ultimately the goal was to elect someone in 1952 who was something less than a liberal and internationalist.

Of the military services, the air power advocates had the most to gain from the debate. The Air Force was expanding and hoped to establish itself firmly as the first among equals. A well-known military historian admitted that the Air Force "overplayed" its hand somewhat, which is "normal in the fight for a larger slice of pie."⁴³

⁴³S. L. A. Marshall to author, December 28, 1970.

The re-examinists asked some pertinent questions when it came to the conduct of foreign policy. Calling the Truman policy one of spreading the United States thin everywhere and strong nowhere they found a glamorous and seemingly effective solution in air power. Indeed, the United States could not be the world's policeman with troops everywhere, but what a number of re-examinists failed to realize was that American interests were not necessarily the same in all parts of the world. On the other hand, Truman by his limited response in Korea and his deployment of troops to Europe acknowledged that there was more at stake in the Atlantic community than in Asia.

The air power solution to the argument that the United States was overextended was perhaps not the best answer. It denied a flexible response, left no room for limited conflicts, and demanded a total victory which in itself meant another world war. The re-examinists argued that it was a deterrent, but as a means to peace it was a deterrent only so long as it did not have to be used. In retrospect the re-examinists were asking some penetrating questions about foreign policy but offering an oversimplified solution.

The air power advocates did make some advances at

this time,⁴⁴ but they received greater attention during the Eisenhower Administration. Once in office Eisenhower was forced to compromise with the fiscal conservatives who wanted to balance the budget,⁴⁵ and as a result the Administration attempted to stretch out the American build-up of forces in Europe. By the beginning of 1954 the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had formulated what became known as the massive retaliation policy. Although it allegedly continued a strategy aimed at preventing Europe from being overrun,⁴⁶ there was a decided emphasis that "Communism could best be handled from a height of 50,000 feet." The overall effect was to cut the total number of American armed forces and place greater reliance upon air power.⁴⁷ This amounted to an acceptance of the re-examinationist arguments even though American forces were not withdrawn from Europe.

From the beginning the European Army never met the intended goal of the planners. It had been hoped that by

⁴⁴ Harry S. Truman, "Nation's Progress in Air Power: The Goal is Worth the Price," Vital Speeches of the Day, XVIII (June 15, 1952), 521-22. Truman noted that by June 1952 the Air Force had been increased to ninety-one wings with a future goal of 143 wings.

⁴⁵ LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, p. 169.

⁴⁶ Paul Peeters, Massive Retaliation; The Policy and its Critics (Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1959), pp 1, 17, 46-47, 126.

⁴⁷ LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War, pp. 169, 178.

the end of 1954 NATO would have ninety-seven divisions, but the quota was never filled "because the European powers were unimpressed by the immediacy of any threat and were content to rely on the U.S. deterrent if any should arise."⁴⁸

The NATO command was established, but nearly six years passed before German participation was a fact; in the mean time Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance. As Acheson observed, "During that [six-year] period the European Army was conceived and miscarried."⁴⁹

At home the re-examinists, while playing upon the nation's frustration, found that neither they nor Truman were in full accord with the public. In Gallup polls taken regarding the troops-for-Europe issue the public readily agreed that Congress should have more voice in the determination of foreign policy. On the other hand, when asked if more troops were necessary in Europe, the public responded, both in January and April, 1951, with a five-to-three margin in favor of the Truman plan.⁵⁰ Whatever the goals of the re-examinists--possible resurrection of Hoover's prestige, partisan gains for Taft, Wherry, and others, or a true reversal of policy--the majority of people were not about to initiate drastic changes.

⁴⁸David Horowitz, The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War, American Century Series (New York: Hill and Wang, 1971), p. 263.

⁴⁹Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 440.

⁵⁰Washington Post, April 8, 1951, p. 3B.

The Senate resolutions were weak and did little to alter the President's plan. While it might be contended that the Great Debate accomplished very little, it did reveal a consistency in the American people. The frustrations of the Cold War cannot be denied and, in fact, regenerated an isolationist spirit; however, the nation did not suddenly disavow its position of responsibility. Whatever the weaknesses of the Truman foreign policy, the American public realized they could no longer depart from the world about them.

APPENDIX A

Senate Concurrent Resolution 8: The Wherry Resolution*

Resolved, that the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations are authorized and directed to meet jointly to consider and report recommendations on whether or not the Senate should declare it to be the sense of the Senate that no ground forces of the United States should be assigned to duty in the European area for the purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty pending the adoption of a policy with respect thereto by the Congress. Such report, which shall be approved by a majority of the combined membership of the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations, shall be limited to the subject matter of this resolution, and shall not contain any recommendation on any matter which is not germane thereto, or which is in substantial contravention thereof, or any recommendation either approving or disapproving the assignment of ground forces of the United States to duty in the European area for purposes of the North Atlantic Treaty, and to be made on or before February 2, 1951.

*Senate, Hearings, S. Con. Res. 8, p. 38.

APPENDIX B

Senate Resolution 99: The Connally Resolution as Originally Introduced*

Whereas the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, the preservation of the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty, approved by the Senate by a vote of 82-13, is a major and historic act designed to build up the collective strength of the free peoples of the earth to resist aggression, and to preserve world peace; and

Whereas the security of the United States and its citizens is involved with the security of its partners under the North Atlantic Treaty, and the commitments of that treaty are therefore an essential part of the foreign policy of the United States; and

Whereas article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledges that the United States and the other parties thereto "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"; and

Whereas recent events have threatened world peace and as a result all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are individually and collectively mobilizing their productive capacities and manpower for their self-defense; and

Whereas the free nations of Europe are vital centers of civilization, freedom, and production, and their subjugation by totalitarian forces would weaken and endanger the defensive capacity of the United States and the other free nations; and

Whereas the success of our common defense effort under a unified command requires the vigorous action and the full cooperation of all treaty partners in the

supplying of materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, and General Eisenhower has testified that the "bulk" of the land forces should be supplied by our European allies and that such numbers supplied should be the "major fraction" of the total number: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That--

1. the Senate approves the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. it is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

4. it is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. the Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European

members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe;

7. it is the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

*Congressional Record, XCVII, 2363-64. Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, the Russell Resolution, is identical except that the word "Congress" was substituted in place of "Senate."

APPENDIX C

Senate Resolution 99: The Connally Resolution as Adopted^{*}

Whereas the foreign policy and military strength of the United States are dedicated to the protection of our national security, the preservation of the liberties of the American people, and the maintenance of world peace; and

Whereas the North Atlantic Treaty, approved by the Senate by a vote of 82-13, is a major and historic act designed to build up the collective strength of the free peoples of the earth to resist aggression, and to preserve world peace; and

Whereas the security of the United States and its citizens is involved with the security of its partners under the North Atlantic Treaty, and the commitments of that treaty are therefore an essential part of the foreign policy of the United States; and

Whereas article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty pledges that the United States and the other parties thereto "separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"; and

Whereas recent events have threatened world peace and as a result all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are individually and collectively mobilizing their productive capacities and manpower for their self-defense; and

Whereas the free nations of Europe are vital centers of civilization, freedom, and production, and their subjugation by totalitarian forces would weaken and endanger the defensive capacity of the United States and the other free nations; and

Whereas the success of our common defense effort under a unified command requires the vigorous action and the full cooperation of all treaty partners in the

supplying of materials and men on a fair and equitable basis, and General Eisenhower has testified that the "bulk" of the land forces should be supplied by our European allies and that such numbers supplied should be the "major fraction" of the total number: Now, therefore be it

Resolved, That--

1. the Senate approved the action of the President of the United States in cooperating in the common defensive effort of the North Atlantic Treaty nations by designating, at their unanimous request, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and in placing Armed Forces of the United States in Europe under his command;

2. it is the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic area;

3. it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, before taking action to send units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, should consult the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives, and that he should likewise consult the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

4. it is the sense of the Senate that before sending units of ground troops to Europe under article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty are giving, and have agreed to give full, realistic force and effect to the requirement of article 3 of said treaty that "by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid" they will "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack," specifically insofar as the creation of combat units is concerned;

5. the Senate herewith approves the understanding that the major contribution to the ground forces under General Eisenhower's command should be made by the European members of the North Atlantic Treaty, and that such units

of United States ground forces as may be assigned to the above command shall be so assigned only after the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify to the Secretary of Defense that in their opinion such assignment is a necessary step in strengthening the security of the United States; and the certified opinions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 shall be transmitted by the Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States, and to the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, and to the House Committees on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services as soon as they are received;

6. it is the sense of the Senate that, in the interests of sound constitutional processes, and of national unity and understanding, congressional approval should be obtained of any policy requiring the assignment of American troops abroad when such assignment is in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty; and the Senate hereby approves the present plans of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send four additional divisions of ground forces to Western Europe, but it is the sense of the Senate that no ground troops in addition to such four divisions should be sent to Western Europe in implementation of article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty without further congressional approval;

7. it is the sense of the Senate that the President should submit to the Congress at intervals of not more than 6 months reports on the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty, including such information as may be made available for this purpose by the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe;

8. it is the sense of the Senate that the United States should seek to eliminate all provisions of the existing treaty with Italy which impose limitations upon the military strength of Italy and prevent the performance by Italy of her obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty to contribute to the full extent of her capacity to the defense of Western Europe;

9. it is the sense of the Senate that consideration should be given to the revision of plans for the defense of Europe as soon as possible so as to provide for utilization on a voluntary basis of the military and other resources of Western Germany and Spain, but not exclusive of the military and other resources of other nations.

*Congressional Record, XCVII, 3282-83. Senate Concurrent Resolution 18, the Russell Resolution, is identical except that the word "Congress" was substituted in place of

"Senate," and section 9 included Turkey and Greece in additon to Western Germany and Spain.

APPENDIX D

Voting Patterns by Region and Party

	McClellan Amendment Yea - Nay	S. R. 99 Yea - Nay	S. C. R. 18 Yea - Nay
Northeast & Middle Atlantic States			
Democrats	2 - 9	9 - 0	0 - 8
Republicans	9 - 8	15 - 2	13 - 3
Total	11 - 17	24 - 2	13 - 11
South & South Atlantic States			
Democrats	7 - 16	22 - 2	8 - 16
Total	7 - 16	22 - 2	8 - 16
Midwest			
Democrats	0 - 4	3 - 0	0 - 3
Republicans	17 - 0	7 - 10	13 - 4
Total	17 - 4	10 - 10	13 - 7
Southwest, Mountain & Pacific States			
Democrats	2 - 6	8 - 0	1 - 5
Republicans	12 - 0	5 - 7	10 - 2
Total	14 - 6	13 - 7	11 - 7
TOTAL	49 - 43	69 - 21	45 - 41

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H. Personal Letters

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Russell B. Long to author, December 7, 1970.

S. L. A. Marshall to author, December 28, 1970.

Wayne L. Morse to author, December 3, 1970.

Richard B. Russell to author, November 25, 1970.

Leverett Saltonstall to author, November 25, 1970.

Twenty-two other inquiries were sent to other Senators and public officials but received little or no response.