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A STUDY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF JAPAN
1902-1922

A THESIS
Presented to
the Faculty of the Graduate Division
The University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
MALCOLM FRANKLIN SLAYTER

November 1958

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PREFACE

I desire to express my appreciation to the following persons who have greatly aided in the preparation of this thesis:

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The library staff of the University of Omaha, the University of Nebraska, Offutt Air Force Base and the Command and General Staff College.

My wife and family, each of whom aided in some way.

The writer, however, accepts full responsibility for the material presented.

The Japanese practice of giving family names first has been followed in referring to Japanese persons. The Romanization of Japanese names after the Kenyūsha system has been followed.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The period from 1902 through 1922 is an important phase in the international relations of Japan. At the outset of this period, Nippon signed a defensive Alliance with Great Britain which served as a warning to the other European Powers who had interests or designs in the Orient. A few years later, Japan astounded the world by defeating Russia in a war waged because of conflicting ambitions in Manchuria and Korea. While Nippon did not obtain a monetary indemnity from St. Petersburg, she did gain recognition of her paramount interests in Korea, territorial and economic concessions on the Liaotung peninsula and Manchuria and outright cession of the southern half of Sakhalin. Of greater importance was the enhancement of her prestige throughout the Orient. At the same time, the European Powers awakened to the fact that they could no longer encroach with impunity upon the mainland of Asia.¹

The Russo-Japanese War was followed by a period in which Tokyo consolidated her gains on the mainland of Asia

¹A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1954), p. 400; G. Nye Steiger, A History of the Far East (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1944), pp. 718-726.

by obtaining agreements with France and Russia. The exchange of the Root-Takahira notes of 1908 were interpreted by the Tokyo Government as recognition of her existing gains in China rather than emphasis on the "open door." Korea's annexation was accomplished in 1910 without any official protest by the West and Tokyo now had a de jure right for a permanent foothold in Asia. The signing of the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1911 gave the Nipponese firm grounds for entering the World War. While her military role was small in comparison to that of the Western Powers, Tokyo emerged from the war holding possession of the Kiaochow leasehold in Shantung and the German colonies north of the equator.²

Negotiations at the Peace Conference at Paris were conducted by the Tokyo delegation in a largely defensive way. It was readily evident that they were outmatched in diplomatic manouvering by the Chinese with their superior training in Western techniques of communication and propaganda. Nippon's ultimate victory was "negative" in the sense that it was obtained only as a means to save the Conference.³ Seeds of

²Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1928), pp. 213-214; Thomas E. Ennis, Eastern Asia (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1948), p. 292.

³Roy W. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 279.

doubt were planted and Great Britain realized that she must seriously weigh the effects of a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; both as it would affect her relations with the Dominions and the United States.⁴

Sometime after the Peace Settlement, the Japanese somewhat reluctantly agreed to attend a conference in Washington in 1921 to discuss the limitations of armaments and the problems of the Far East and the Pacific. The Washington Conference culminated in the drawing up of a Four-Power Pact, a Five-Power Naval Treaty, a Nine-Power Treaty concerning China and the settlement of the outstanding problems concerning Shantung, Yap, and the Japanese troops remaining in Siberia. Under the pressure of world opinion, the Tokyo Government was forced to give in on many issues growing out of gains made at the Paris Peace Conference and Japan accepted a changed role in the Far East.⁵

It is the purpose of this thesis to set forth the historical data which directly contributed to Japan's rise in international power and prestige during the twenty year period of 1902-1922. No attempt has been made to either justify

⁴A. Whitney Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938), pp. 273-282.

⁵Steiger, op. cit., pp. 789-804.

or condemn the Tokyo Government's role during these years, but merely to present the significant historical events as they occurred. An attempt has been made to incorporate as many Japanese works as possible in order to set forth a balanced history of this period.

In order to better correlate the events between these twenty years, it will be necessary to summarize some of the more important developments in Japanese internal and foreign relations from the time of Perry's visit to Japan in 1853; a visit which prompted the end of the era of isolation.

CHAPTER II

FROM FEUDALISM TO IMPERIALISM

Japan's foreign relations prior to the sixteenth century were mainly limited to contacts with Korea and China. Indeed, Japan gained most of her culture from China as evidenced by her adoption of the Chinese method of writing, painting, sculpture, and family system. This culture was transmitted to Japan by her contacts with China, and with Korea which was under the suzerainty of China.¹

The English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish were the first western nations to enter Japan. While all of these nations were primarily interested in commerce, the Portuguese and Spanish actively attempted to convert the Japanese nation to Christianity. Early success attended the efforts to propagate the Gospel; between 1549 and the arrival of Francis Xavier and the end of the century, some 300,000 Japanese became Christians.

In 1636, the shōgun Iyemitsu expelled all foreigners

¹Robert P. Porter, Japan The Rise of a Modern Power (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919), p. 6; A. L. Kroeger, Anthropology (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company), pp. 743-744.

²Porter, op. cit., p. 36; Lawrence H. Battistini, Japan and America (New York: The John Day Co., 1954), p. 4.

from Japan. Thirteen survivors from a Portuguese ship, which defied the edict and entered Nagasaki Bay four years later, were permitted to return to Macao with the message: 'So long as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come to Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the God of the Christians shall pay for it with his head.' As a warning, the rest of the crew were executed.³ While trade with the Portuguese and Dutch was permitted, the former were confined to an artificial islet at Deshima, near Nagasaki; the Netherlanders faced similiar restrictions at Hirado.⁴

In 1853, President Fillmore decided to dispatch a strong naval force to Japan for the dual purpose of retaliating for affronts and establishing commercial relations with Japan. On July 8th of that year, Commodore Matthew C. Perry arrived in Japan with a squadron of four paddle-wheel type ships. After stopping off at Uruga, Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay where he presented the President's letter to the Japanese officials and announced to them that he would return a year later for an answer. While the Americans were mainly interested in making arrangements for the welfare of shipwrecked American sailors and providing for the refueling and provisioning of American ships, Perry was also interested in ob-

³Porter, op. cit., p. 77.

⁴Payson J. Treat, The Far East (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928), p. 180.

taining a foothold in Japan, Korea, the Liu Ch'ius and Formosa in order to counteract the expansion of Russia and England in the Far East.⁵

At the time of Perry's visit to Japan, the shōgun, or military ruler, actually held the political and economic reins of the government, while the Emperor mainly concerned himself with court matters and the bestowal of titles. Under the shōgunate were certain feudal lords or daimyō who owed their allegiance to the shōgun. The shōgunate sought the advice of the daimyō after receiving President Fillmore's letter and while their opinions were divided, most of them favored the continuance of the exclusion policy.⁶

The Russians learned of Perry's expedition and dispatched Admiral Putiatin and four naval vessels to Nagasaki with a demand for a boundary settlement as well as the establishment of trade relations with the Japanese. However, the Admiral's fleet suddenly left in October of 1853 when he learned that his country was preparing for a war, later to be

⁵Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1949), p. 22; John F. Embree, The Japanese Nation (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1945), pp. 12-28.

⁶Claude A. Buss, The Far East (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955), pp. 130-131.

known as the Crimean War.⁷

Perry returned to Japan on January 16, 1854 upon learning of Admiral Putiatin's visit and put in at Kanagawa to receive the reply to the President's letter. The Japanese decided to receive the Americans and after the exchange of gifts and several weeks of negotiations, the Treaty of Kanagawa was signed on March 31, 1854. The treaty contained the following ten articles which are briefly summarized:⁸

Article I - Peace and amity established between the United States and Japan.

Article II - The ports of Shimoda and Hakodate opened to United States ships.

Article III - In the event of a shipwreck, crews to be delivered to one of the above two ports.

Article IV - Shipwrecked Americans and other United States citizens are not subject to confinement.

Article V - Shipwrecked Americans are free to travel within seven miles from Shimoda.

Article VI -

Article VII - United States ships are permitted to exchange gold and silver coins for other articles.

Article VIII - Wood, water and provisions are to be obtained only through authorized Japanese sources.

Article IX - The United States and her citizens are to be granted any additional rights subsequently granted to any other nations.

Article X - United States ships are not to enter any other ports except in an emergency.⁸

The treaty was not entirely satisfactory to the United States since neither one of the two treaty ports was suitable for commercial trade and because such trade as was permitted

⁷Yanaga, op. cit., p. 22.

⁸Ennis, op. cit., pp. 167-168.

would be essentially on a barter basis. Nevertheless, the treaty represented a diplomatic advantage over both the Netherlands and Russia, who failed to obtain a treaty, and it marked the reopening of Japan to membership in the family of civilized nations.

Similar treaties were negotiated between Japan and Great Britain, (October, 1854); Russia, (February, 1855); and Holland (January, 1856). By 1856, each of these powers was given the status of a most favored nation and entitled to: obtain supplies at Shimoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki; trade through Japanese officials at these ports; appoint consuls at Shimoda and Hakodate; make residence at Nagasaki; limited extra-territorial jurisdiction.⁹

On August 21, 1856, the first American Consul-General, Townsend Harris, arrived in Japan. Although the Japanese were at first suspicious of his motives, he gradually convinced them of his sincerity and as a result of his patient efforts, he obtained an additional treaty which was signed on June 20, 1858. This treaty of amity and commerce provided:

- (1) The exchange of ministers and consuls.
- (2) In addition to Shimoda and Hakodate, the ports of Kanagawa (now Yokohama), Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo were to be open to American ships.
- (3) Customs were to be imposed on imports and exports.

⁹Paul H. Clyde, The Far East (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., Third Edition, 1958), p. 191.

(4) Extraterritoriality to be recognized for United States nationals.

(5) Freedom of worship was to be allowed.

(6) The President of the United States, upon request of the Japanese, was to act as a mediator between Japan and European Powers.

(7) The Japanese were entitled to purchase ships and munitions and engage American naval and other military personnel, scientists, artisans, mariners, etc., in order to develop the country.

The treaty was followed by a similiar treaty between Japan and Holland, Great Britain and France.¹⁰

The years from 1859 until the end of the shōgunate in 1867 were marked by internal dissention between the daimyō and the ruling Tokugawa clan. There were also frequent anti-foreign outbreaks and in September of 1863, a British subject, G. L. Richardson, was killed near Yokohama. As a result of this incident, the British Government demanded a heavy indemnity, and the trial and execution of the assassins. Following this incident, the Emperor, on June 25, 1863, ordered the expulsion of all foreigners. On that day, ships and forts belonging to the Lord of Chōsu opened fire on American trading ships at anchor near Shimonoseki. Then followed a series of similiar attacks on French and Dutch ships which evoked British retaliation when they bombed Kagoshima in order to enforce their demands for the capture of Richardson's assassins. Later in August the British joined the American, Dutch and French

¹⁰Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 26-27; William Elliot Griffis, Townsend Harris - First American Envoy in Japan (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895), pp. 266-277.

ships in an attack against Chōsu and by September 8th, all shore batteries had been silenced through their combined efforts.¹¹ The following month, the shōgun signed a convention in which Japan agreed to pay a \$3,000,000 indemnity to the foreigners. In addition, the straits of Shimonoseki were not to be fortified and it was agreed that they would be open to the commerce of all nations.¹²

The Emperor Komei died on February 3, 1867 and was succeeded by his fourteen year old son, Mutsuhito, who ruled under the name of Meiji, or "Enlightened Government." Soon after the new reign began, the power of the shōgun, who had ruled Japan for more than 250 years, was broken and destroyed by the restoration of the imperial power.¹³

Following the restoration of the Emperor, the Japanese attempted to normalize relations with the Korean Government and in 1870, and again in 1872, envoys were sent to Seoul to explain the recent changes in the government. The Koreans repelled any attempt to reestablish friendly relations since they classified the Japanese in the same category as the "western barbarians." Japanese-Korean relations continued to deteriorate until 1875, at which time the two nations became

¹¹Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States 1853-1921 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1921), pp. 54-66.

¹²Yanaga, op. cit., p. 32.

¹³Porter, op. cit., p. 109.

involved in a brief conflict. The Koreans fired upon a Japanese warship, ostensibly on a coastal survey mission, which had put into the Korean port of Kanghwa for fuel. The Japanese easily overcame the coastal defenses and took advantage of the situation to force a treaty of commerce upon the Korean Government. The Treaty of Kanghwa, signed in February of 1876, provided for the opening of the three ports of Fusan, Jinsen and Sensen, the exchange of Ministers and Consuls and the establishment of consular jurisdiction. However, it was not until 1880 that the final details governing the opening of the ports and the exchange of Ministers was outlined and made effective.¹⁴

The signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa touched off a struggle between the progressive and conservative factions at the Korean court. The progressive faction favored closer relations with Japan while the conservative faction acknowledged the traditional suzerainty of China over Korea. In a riot in Seoul in 1882, the Japanese legation was attacked and several Japanese were killed; during the fighting, the Japanese Minister, Mr. Hanabusa, was forced to take refuge aboard a British ship. The Japanese immediately dispatched two warships and an infantry battalion and demanded: (1) an official apology

¹⁴Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 186-187; Treat, Japan and the United States, pp. 287-288.

for the incident; (2) punishment of the perpetrators; (3) an indemnity to the families of those killed and an indemnity for the damage to Japanese property. The affair was settled by the Treaty of Chemulpo of August 30, 1882. In addition to meeting all the demands of the Japanese, the treaty also provided for the stationing of troops in Korea to protect the Japanese Legation. A similar provision pertaining to the stationing of Chinese troops was agreed upon.¹⁵

The treaty did little to solve the internal unrest among the two factions. On December 4, 1884, followers of the pro-Japanese faction set fire to the Seoul Post Office, which was about to be dedicated, and assassinated several members of the Korean cabinet in attendance at the ceremonies. The progressive faction then formed its own cabinet and appealed to the Japanese Minister, in the name of the Korean King, for protection. At the same time, the conservative faction made a similar appeal to the Chinese Government. Troops from both nations clashed on the palace grounds and bitter feelings developed between the Japanese and Chinese in Korea. The Japanese Government dispatched the Minister of the Imperial Household, Ito Hirobumi, to negotiate with the Tientsin Viceroy, Li Hung-chang. The resulting Tientsin

¹⁵ Yanaga, op. cit., p. 196; Steiger, op. cit., p. 662.

Convention, also known as the Li-Itō Convention, provided that the troops of both nations would be withdrawn from Korea within four months and specified that neither nation was to take part in the training of Korean troops. In the eventuality that troops were again needed to put down any grave disturbance, China and Japan agreed to consult in writing in advance and, following the settlement of the matter, to withdraw the troops without further delay.¹⁶ The Li-Itō Convention was only a temporary solution to the problem of internal intervention in Korea and a few years later, trouble would again break out over conflicting interests.

The Japanese Government had long desired to replace the unequal treaties with the foreign governments and, in 1870, each nation with whom she had a treaty was notified of her desire for a treaty revision. No immediate steps were taken however, since it was considered more desirable to institute domestic reforms and undertake a thorough study of European and American governmental, financial, industrial and educational institutions. In 1874, a decision was reached to create a special bureau for consideration of the treaties which might be revised. Two years later, Vice Minister Tera-shima and Minister Yoshida opened negotiations to this end.

¹⁶Ennis, op. cit., pp. 277-278; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 188.

A treaty was finally signed in Washington on July 25, 1878 which restored tariff autonomy to Japan with the provision that the other treaty nations must also agree to the change. Since Great Britain and the other interested nations objected, the treaty did not take effect. Following extended negotiations, the British Minister, Mr. F. R. Plunkett, announced on April 10, 1884, that unequal treaties would be abolished at such time as the Japanese adopted a legal code similar to that of the western nations. The Japanese immediately undertook to compile such a code and hired several foreign legal experts to assist them.¹⁷

On May 1, 1886, Foreign Minister Inoue again reopened negotiations with the representatives of the foreign powers for a treaty revision. An Anglo-German draft was submitted, setting forth a joint proposal concerning the civil and criminal code; the establishment of courts of consular jurisdiction, the appointment of foreign judges and procurators for the trial of foreigners, and the revision of tariff and import duties.¹⁸ The provision for the appointment of foreign judicial officials became known throughout the nation and a storm of protests arose. Foreign Minister Inoue resigned from

¹⁷Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

¹⁸Ibid.

office and was replaced by Okuma Shigenobu. Okuma wisely decided to negotiate separately with each power and following the signing of an equal treaty with Mexico on November 30, 1888, similiar treaties were obtained with Great Britain, (1894); United States, (1894); Italy, (1894); Germany, (1895); Russia, (1895); and France, (1896). In general, these treaties provided for: equal treatment in travel and trade; acceptance of a most favored nation clause; abolition of alien land ownership rights after the expiration of the lease; a new tariff ad valorem rate.¹⁹ By these treaty revisions, Japan obtained political and economic equality with the West.

In 1894, a Korean dissident sect called the Tong Haks, precipitated a war which served to demonstrate Japan's military strength to the West and at the same time, the internal weakness of China. The Tong Haks were founded in 1850 with the object of combining the better elements of Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. However, they had developed into a chauvinistic, anti-Japanese military group. As a result of repeated riots for which they were responsible, the Korean King called upon the Chinese for troops to quell the disorder. The Chinese dispatched 1,500 troops and then notified the Japanese, under the terms of the Li-Itō Convention, that the

¹⁹Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 194-197.

troops would be withdrawn following the settlement of the disturbances. The Japanese thereupon sent 3,000 troops to protect the 15,000 Japanese residents in Korea and established a headquarters at Chemulpo. The Korean King asked the Chinese troops to leave but they declined to withdraw until after the Japanese left. The Japanese, in turn, declined to leave until the Chinese gave guarantees that they would carry out the terms of the Li-Itō Convention.²⁰

On July 25, 1894, the Chinese fired upon three Japanese warships enroute to Korea; the Japanese retaliated, sinking one Chinese troop transport and capturing another. A few days later on August 1st, Nippon declared war upon China and immediately began a vigorous military campaign. A month later, the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Itō, captured the Chinese Fleet in a battle fought in the Yellow Sea and the Nipponese demonstrated their naval superiority for the duration of the war. In rapid succession, Nipponese ground forces captured the Chinese strongholds in Korea and invaded Manchuria, the Liaotung and Shantung peninsulas, capturing Dairen, Port Arthur and Chinchow. Other forces captured the Pescadores Islands south of Japan proper.²¹

²⁰Ennis, op. cit., p. 278; Porter, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

²¹Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 244-245; Porter, op. cit., pp. 133-138.

The Chinese unsuccessfully sought the intervention of Great Britain and Russia to end the war. Viceroy Li then attempted to negotiate peace terms through a German named Detring who was employed in the Chinese Customs Service. The Japanese refused to deal with anyone other than a high ranking Chinese official with full powers to negotiate a peace. Li was therefore dispatched to Japan to discuss a peace settlement. On March 23, 1895, four days after his arrival at Shimonoseki, a Japanese made an attempt on Li's life. This incident greatly embarrassed the Japanese Government and also tended to weaken the Tokyo Government's position. Nevertheless, on March 30, 1895, Li agreed to immediate surrender and on April 17th, signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki.²²

Hornbeck aptly summarized China's humiliating defeat when he wrote:

The largest, the oldest, the most populous country in the world, a huge continental empire long accustomed to esteem itself the sole repository of national strength and substance was defeated in war and invaded by the armed forces of a little insular neighbor.²³

By the terms of the treaty, China agreed to recognize the independence of Korea; to cede to Japan the Liaotung peninsula, Formosa and the Pescadores; to pay an indemnity of

²²Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 245-246.

²³Hornbeck, op. cit., p. vii.

200,000,000 taels; to open four new treaty ports to Japanese trade and residence; to conclude a new treaty of commerce, granting to Japan the status of a most-favored-nation.²⁴

The other Western nations were both surprised and alarmed at Japan's success against what had been thought of as a mighty nation. Russia, joined by France and Germany made a demand that Japan retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula to China on the grounds that such a position would threaten China and Korea and disturb the peace of the Far East. The Japanese, rather than face war or lose any other benefits, yielded to the demands of the three nations on May 5, 1895 and four days later, the ratification of the treaty took place. The Japanese were particularly embittered by the intervention and would long remember this in future wars with Russia and Germany. The Western Powers in turn, saw China's defeat as a golden opportunity to press for concessions in a vast land heretofore considered a "sleeping dragon" that should not be disturbed.²⁵

After expelling the Chinese from Korea, the Japanese soon learned that they would now have to deal with Russia. By the terms of a Convention signed on May 13, 1896, both Russia and

²⁴Steiger, op. cit., pp. 626-627; Clyde, op. cit., p. 302.

²⁵Treat, Japan and the United States, pp. 158-159; Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 247, 252.

Japan gained the right to station 800 troops each in Seoul as a legation guard force. A year later, Russian military and financial advisors were attached to the Korean Court. In order to counterbalance the growth of Russian influence, the Nipponese secured the right to guard the Japanese-built telegraph lines between Fusan and Seoul; this was followed by permission to build a railroad between these two cities.²⁶ On April 25, 1898, the Nishi-Rosen Protocol, while reasserting the independence of Korea, pledged both Russia and Japan not to take any action concerning the nomination of financial and military advisors to the Korean Court without a prior mutual agreement. Russia also recognized the right of Japan to develop industrial and commercial relationships with Korea.²⁷

China did not obtain the intervention of the European Powers on her behalf without cost. Shortly after the end of the Sino-Japanese War, France secured a revision in her favor of the Sino-Annamese frontier and ratification of a Franco-Chinese boundary convention. France and Russia also made a 4 per cent loan to China in order that the latter might pay her war indemnity to Japan. Russia obtained an important

²⁶Porter, op. cit., p. 144.

²⁷Steiger, op. cit., p. 719.

concession when she was given the right to build the Chinese Eastern Railroad as a connecting link to the Trans-Siberian Railroad. By the terms of the Li-Lobanov Treaty, the Russians virtually gained control over the entire railroad zone extending across Northern Manchuria.²⁸

Germany, without success, tried to gain the cession of a Chinese port by diplomatic means. Her opportunity to make a demand for territory came following the murder of a German priest in 1897. In a treaty signed on March 6, 1898, Germany was granted a ninety-nine year lease to the port city of Tsingtao and two hundred square miles of territory surrounding the Kiaochow Bay.²⁹ A few weeks later, on March 27th, China granted to Russia a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur together with 1,300 square miles of land with the right to build a railroad connection from Port Arthur to the Chinese Eastern and Trans-Siberian Railroads.³⁰

The United States became concerned over these scrambles for territory in China and on September 6, 1899, Secretary Hay sent his "open door" notes to Great Britain, Germany and Russia; these were followed by similar notes to Japan, Italy,

²⁸Clyde, op. cit., pp. 310-311.

²⁹Treat, The Far East, pp. 326-328.

³⁰Ibid., p. 329.

and France. The notes asked for equal commercial opportunity within the various spheres of influence in China. The replies to the notes were guarded and vague; Russia rejected the proposal while Great Britain conditioned her acceptance on similar assent by the other powers. Actually little was gained by the notes since Washington was not willing to support her diplomacy with military action.³¹

This steady influx of foreigners into China led to an increasing number of anti-foreign outbreaks. A Chinese nationalist group known as the I Ho Chuan or "Fists of Righteous Harmony," called "Boxers" by the Europeans, instigated a series of attacks on the foreign settlements and the pro-Western Chinese Christians. They gained several initial successes and received the support of the Dowager Empress, who issued the following proclamation:

I command that all foreigners, men, women and children, old and young, be summarily executed. Let no one escape so that my Empire may be purged of this noisome source of corruption and that peace may be restored to my loyal subjects.³²

In June of 1900, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations in Peking and only the joint intervention of Japanese, European and American troops prevented the annihilation of the diplo-

³¹Griswold, op. cit., pp. 74-86.

³²J. O. P. Sland and E. Beckhouse, China Under the Empress Dowager Tzu Shi (London: William Heinemann, 1915), p. 285.

matic personnel.³³

The Boxer uprisings provided Russia with the excuse for extending military control throughout Manchuria. Following the agreement of the Boxer Protocol of September 7, 1901 by which China agreed to pay heavy indemnities to the nations whose nationals had been attacked by the rioters, Russia attempted to conclude a separate military agreement with Peking that would confirm her new control of Manchuria. Only after the strong intervention of the other treaty powers was Russia finally forced, on April 8, 1902, to agree to evacuate Manchuria.³⁴

³³Clyde, op. cit., pp. 350-351.

³⁴Porter, op. cit., p. 154.

CHAPTER III

PRELUDE TO THE WAR

On January 30, 1902, Nippon signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain. This alliance was destined to have a marked effect upon the foreign relations of Japan for the following twenty years. There was no precedent in Nipponese foreign relations for such an alliance and the cabinet ministers and political advisors to the Emperor were divided in opinion as to whether Japan should undertake such an alliance or to attempt to reach an understanding with Russia.¹ Both the Tokyo Government and Great Britain were afraid that Russian advances in Manchuria, if allowed to continue unchecked, would threaten their interests in North China and the Yangtze Valley.² On the other hand, Marquis Itō and Marquis Inouye, both elder statesmen of considerable influence, felt that a direct rapprochement with Russia would be a more practicable solution and they were not fully sympathetic to the idea of an arrangement with the British.³

The negotiations leading to the alliance were prompted

¹Ishii Kikujiro, Diplomatic Commentaries (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1936), pp. 35, 49.

²Yanaga, op. cit., p. 295.

³Ishii, op. cit., p. 43.

by a visit of the German Charge d'affaires, Baron von Edkhardstein, to the Japanese Minister at London, Hayashi Tadasu. The German diplomat suggested that his country, Japan and England join together in an alliance for the purpose of maintaining the balance of power in the Far East. The alliance was to be the Far Eastern counterpart of the Triple Alliance, giving Japan a free hand in Korea. In the event of a war involving one of the parties, the other parties would remain neutral unless a third party came to the assistance of the enemy at which time the remaining two allied nations would intervene.⁴

The Tokyo Government decided to explore the possibility of undertaking such an alliance and at the same time sound out St. Petersburg on reaching an acceptable agreement. Hayashi conferred with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, on April 17th, 1901, and was encouraged to think that a British alliance might be secured. Actual negotiations, however, did not officially commence until the following October.⁵

Marquis Itō, with the approval of the Japanese Government, visited Russia in a private capacity in November of 1901, in an attempt to negotiate an understanding. Itō first visited the United States where he received an honorary degree

⁴Ishii, op. cit., p. 37; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 298.

⁵Yanaga, op. cit., p. 300.

from Yale University on the occasion of its bicentennial celebration in October of 1901. The elder statesman then continued on to Paris where he briefly talked with Minister Hayashi who showed him a draft of a proposed alliance treaty submitted by the British Government. From Paris, Itō went on to St. Petersburg where he conferred with the Tsar, Foreign Minister Lamsdorff and Finance Minister Witte. During the discussions the Japanese leader made the following proposals as a basis for an understanding between Japan and Russia:

(1) A reciprocal guarantee of the independence of Korea.

(2) A reciprocal guarantee not to use any part of Korea for strategic purposes nor to take military measures along the Korean coast which would hamper freedom of passage through the straits.

(3) Russia to recognize Japan's freedom of action in political, commercial and industrial matters in Korea. Japan would also have the exclusive right to assist the Korean Government in its internal operation and if necessary, to dispatch troops.⁶

The Russians, however, were unwilling to agree to such terms and Itō left for Berlin where he awaited the completion of the Anglo-Japanese negotiations.⁷ The British, in the meanwhile, learned of Itō's visit to Russia and decided to speed up their negotiations in order to forestall any agreement between Japan and Russia. The British and Japanese by now had agreed not to invite Germany to participate in the alliance

⁶Yanaga, op. cit., p. 301.

⁷Ibid., p. 302.

talks due to the growing hostility of the British people toward Germany. Furthermore, Japan had no real basis for reaching an understanding with Germany. Marquis Itō had given up his hopes of an agreement with Russia and on December 14th, he wired his consent to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the Foreign Ministry. The Emperor gave his approval after receiving a favorable report from the Privy Council and the document was signed for their respective governments by Lord Landsdowne and Mr. Hayashi on January 30, 1902.⁸

The new treaty provided that the two nations would "uphold the status quo and general peace in the extreme East." The two nations pledged themselves to support the "independence and integrity of the Empire of China and Korea," and promised to maintain "equality of opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations." Perhaps more important were the defensive arrangements which provided that if either Japan or Great Britain, in defense of its interests, became involved in war with another power, the other party would remain neutral. However, if a fourth or other powers joined in the hostilities, both parties to the Alliance pledged themselves to make war in common.⁹

On April 8, 1902, Russia and China signed a convention

⁸Ishii, op. cit., pp. 47-49; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 301.

⁹Ishii, op. cit., pp. 328-329.

by which Russia agreed to withdraw from Manchuria. Three zones within Manchuria were defined and the withdrawal was to be staged over three six-month periods with the entire evacuation scheduled to be completed not later than October 3, 1903.¹⁰ The first step in the evacuation was completed as scheduled but the withdrawn troops were merely relocated in the second zone or at Port Arthur. During the second evacuation period, the troops were moved to the Korean border where Russia had forestry concessions along the Yalu River area. Further pretense of evacuation was halted by Russia on April 18, 1903 and demands were made upon China for concessions which, if granted, would establish a virtual Russian protectorate over all Manchuria and Mongolia.¹¹

The Japanese became alarmed when Russia failed to evacuate Manchuria as provided in the agreement of April 8th and, at a meeting held before the throne on June 23, 1903, it was decided to approach Russia regarding the matter. On August 12, 1903, Ambassador Kurino delivered a note to Mr. Lamsdorff in which the following proposals were made:

- (1) Mutual engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean

¹⁰Manchurian Treaties and Agreements (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921), pp. 65-68.

¹¹Treat, The Far East, p. 366.

Empires and to maintain the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in these countries.

(2) Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating interests in Korea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in Manchuria such measures as may be necessary for the protection of their respective interests as above defined, subject, however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement.

(3) Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and Japan not to impede development of those industrial and commercial activities of Japan in Korea and of Russia in Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipulations of Article 1 of this Agreement.

Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines.

(4) Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia to Manchuria, for the purpose either of protecting the interests mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to create international complications, the troops so sent are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions are accomplished.

(5) Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance including necessary military assistance.

(6) This Agreement to supplant all previous arrangements between Japan and Russia respecting Korea.¹²

Russia countered with a series of delaying tactics and did not make a reply to the note until October 3rd, by which time she announced that the subject of China and Manchuria were removed from the discussions. On October 30th, the Japanese then submitted a counter proposal insisting upon China

¹²Treat, The Far East, pp. 369-370.

being included in the negotiations. In subsequent proposals, Japan agreed that Manchuria was outside of her sphere of interests provided that Russia respected the integrity of China and Korea. When a reply was not received to the note dated January 13, 1904, the Japanese became convinced that further negotiations were useless and it was decided to terminate the negotiations and sever diplomatic relations--a step that ultimately led to war.¹³

The first hostilities in the Russo-Japanese War took place on February 8, 1904 when a fleet of ten Japanese destroyers suddenly attacked Russian ships anchored near Port Arthur. The following day, the Japanese engaged a Russian cruiser and gunboat outside the harbor of Chemulpo in Korea and successfully put them both out of action. The port was then employed for the debarkation of Japanese troops on the mainland. Two days later, on February 10th, Tokyo officially declared war on Russia.¹⁴

The Japanese gained military superiority from the very outset of the war and easily overran Korea. On February 23rd, about 350,000 Russian troops faced 400,000 Japanese along a

¹³Takeuchi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1935), pp. 137-141; Treat, Japan and the United States, p. 180; Treat, The Far East, pp. 371-372.

¹⁴Yanaga, op. cit., p. 306.

front of over 40 miles, near the city of Mukden. After two weeks of incessant fighting and the combined loss of over 130,000 casualties, the Japanese occupied Mukden and forced the Russians to withdraw to Harbin.¹⁵ Port Arthur surrendered on January 2, 1905 after a siege of several months during which Japanese losses were extremely heavy. By May, the Russians suffered further defeats at the Yalu River, Kinchau and Nauschan. The coup de grace was administered when the Russian Baltic Fleet, enroute to Vladivostok, was defeated on May 28th by Admiral Togo while passing through the Tsushima Straits. The Russians lost six battleships, six cruisers, five destroyers and five other ships. Three ships were captured and three others managed to escape. Nearly 12,000 Russian sailors went down with their ships in this historic naval battle.¹⁶

Early in 1905, with both nations showing signs of war weariness, the first steps had been taken to bring the fighting to an end. Premier Delcassé of France offered to mediate in peace talks between the two belligerents and at the same time, Cecil Spring-Rice, Councillor to the British Embassy at Saint Petersburg, was invited to present his views in Washington on Russian conditions. Both the Japanese and Russian Governments

¹⁵ J. F. C. Fuller, Military History of the Western World (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1954), III, pp. 142-165.

¹⁶ Fuller, op. cit., p. 165; Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 308-309

asked the United States to intercede and on June 8, 1905, identical notes were dispatched to the two governments formally inviting them to participate in a peace conference.¹⁷

A few months prior to the peace-talk invitations, the British Government negotiated the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Both nations were confident of the ultimate victory of the Nipponese in the war and Great Britain desired to prevent any possible rapprochement at the end of the struggle between Russia and Japan. Under the terms of the renewal, Japan recognized Great Britain's special interests "in all that concerns the security of the Indian Frontier," as a quid pro quo for British recognition of Japan's "paramount political, military and economic interests" in Korea. The terms of the original alliance were also modified to provide that either party of the alliance would come to the aid of the other if attacked by a third party. It was further agreed that the attack or threat of attack need not originate in the Far East. The treaty was signed on August 12th and published on September 27, 1905, prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth.¹⁸ While the Japanese considered the revised treaty as symbolic of a new concept of mutual defense of territorial rights, the Russian

¹⁷Ennis, op. cit., p. 288; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 310.

¹⁸G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, (ed.) British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914 (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1929), IV, pp. 164-165. (Hereafter cited as British Documents).

Government considered the treaty as being directed against its position in the Far East.¹⁹

The peace negotiations commenced at a conference held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire on August 10, 1905. President Theodore Roosevelt took a leading role, (which he obviously enjoyed), in conducting the day-to-day negotiations and in the drafting of the treaty. The two enemy nations came to an impasse over the issue of payment of an indemnity by Russia to Japan. President Roosevelt, unknown to the Nipponese, learned that the Russians might be willing to give Japan the southern half of Sakhalin in lieu of a money indemnity. The President cajoled the Japanese into accepting this proposal and the treaty was signed on September 5, 1905. In addition to ceding the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan, Russia acknowledged the Tokyo Government's paramount political, military and economic interests in Korea and agreed not to intervene in the measures of control and guidance taken in that country. Manchuria was to be returned to Chinese control except that the leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula, together with the ownership of the South Manchurian Railway and control over the railroad zone, was to be transferred to Japan subject

¹⁹ Ishii, op. cit., p. 54; British Documents, IV, p. 203.

to the consent of the Chinese Government.²⁰ The terms of the peace treaty, while agreed to by the Imperial Government of Japan, were not readily accepted by the Japanese people who felt that Russia should have been required to pay an indemnity. Severe riots broke out in several Japanese cities and it was sometime before the people were quiet again.²¹

Following the ratification of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Baron Komura was dispatched to Peking where a new treaty effecting the transfer of the Russian leasehold in Manchuria to Japan was signed. Nippon now gained an undisputed foothold on the mainland of Asia and virtually a carte blanche to absorb Korea within her growing Empire.²²

Following the Russo-Japanese War, France sought to better her relations with Japan. Her extensive holdings in French Indo-China made such action necessary as she was afraid of Japanese retaliation for her permitting Russian naval vessels to use supply facilities in Madagascar and at Camranh during the war. A Franco-Japanese agreement was signed on

²⁰ Elting E. Morison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), IV, pp. 1307-1323; Ishii, op. cit., pp. 65-69; Harley F. MacNair and Donald F. Lach, Modern Far East International Relations (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1950), p. 153.

²¹ Ishii, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

²² Westel W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests in China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920), pp. 311-312.

June 10, 1907. After the traditional acknowledgements of the independence of China, the signatories announced that they would support each other in maintaining "peace and security in those regions with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of . . . each in the Continent of Asia."²³ Although the spheres of interests were not delimited, the provinces of Kwantung, Kwangsi and Yunnan were considered within the French sphere; for Japan, the Fukiensien Province, Manchuria and Mongolia.²⁴

The French treaty was followed by a far more important entente with Russia. On July 30, 1907, the two nations agreed to recognize the integrity of China and "the principle of equal opportunity in whatever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire, and engage to sustain and defend the maintenance of the status quo and respect for this principle by all pacific means within their reach."²⁵ In an additional secret convention, the two powers established in Manchuria a line running north and south over which each would not encroach. Russia recognized Japan's interests in Korea while Nippon gave similar assurances to Russia's

²³John V. A. MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China 1894-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), I, p. 640.

²⁴MacNair and Lach, op. cit., p. 157.

²⁵Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 314-315.

interests in Outer Mongolia.²⁶

In an effort to ease growing tensions between the United States and Japan, Secretary of State Elihu Root and Ambassador Takahira exchanged notes on November 30, 1908, which set forth their joint policy in the Far East. The two governments promised the maintenance of the status quo in the Far East and each agreed to respect the territorial rights of the other and support the "independence and integrity of China." Actually, Japan interpreted the Root-Takahira notes as tantamount to American acceptance of her treaties with France, Russia and England and the recognition and acceptance of her special position in China and Korea.²⁷

In August of 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea. The first step in this direction was taken in 1905 when the Tokyo Government announced the establishment of a protectorate over Korea. Two years later, the Korean King dispatched a secret mission to the Second Hague Conference in an attempt to gain the freedom of his country. His efforts were unsuccessful and as a result, he was forced to abdicate in favor of his son. The Nipponese thereupon initiated complete

²⁶ Meredith E. Cameron, George E. McReynolds and Thomas H. D. Mahoney, China, Japan and the Powers (New York: The Ronald Press, 1952), p. 355.

²⁷ Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1898-1919, I, p. 769.

control over internal as well as foreign relations. The Korean people quite naturally resented the presence of the Japanese in their country and actively opposed the program of the Japanese Resident General in Korea, Prince Itō. When he was assassinated on October 26, 1909 at Harbin by a Korean fanatic, the Japanese public clamored for annexation of Korea. As the Tokyo Government had already gained wide recognition of her special position in Korea, the annexation was carried out with little difficulty on August 22, 1910.²⁸

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the last time on July 13, 1911. Actually, the alliance was no longer as popular as a decade before. Strong anti-Japanese sentiments had developed among the people of the British Dominions and even in England. In Japan too, there had been a change in attitude, touched off by the British criticism of Nippon's policy in China. Nevertheless, the leaders of both governments felt that the continuation of the alliance would serve to check against both Germany and Russia. The British Government, however, found itself in a delicate position in that by the terms of the alliance, she was obligated to aid Tokyo in the event of a war between Japan and the United

²⁸ Henry Chung, Korean Treaties (New York: H. S. Nichols, Inc., 1919), pp. 225-226; Kenneth Scott Latourette, A Short History of the Far East (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), pp. 512-513; Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 343-345.

States. This issue was neatly solved by the addition of a saving clause which read:

Article IV. Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.²⁹

The revised agreement also omitted any further references to Korea, Britain's Indian Frontier, or the Russo-Japanese War; otherwise it was substantially the same as the previous agreement signed in 1905.

On July 4, 1910, Russia and Japan signed a convention by which they agreed to eliminate the competition between their railroad lines in Manchuria. Each agreed to maintain the political and economic status quo in Manchuria and consult with each other in the event the status quo was threatened.³⁰

Two years later, in March of 1912, both Tokyo and St. Petersburg business interests were invited to join a Four-Power group of American, French, German and English bankers in forming a syndicate to arrange a loan of 10 million pounds to China. The loan would be used for currency reform and

²⁹Ishii, op. cit., pp. 54-59, 333.

³⁰Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1898-1919, I, p. 805.

the industrial development of the Three Eastern Provinces in Manchuria. The other Powers had originally excluded Japan and Russia and only admitted them to the Consortium after the two nations made strong objections to China.³¹ The two former enemy nations drew closer together following their united stand against the Four-Power Consortium and on July 8, 1912, Japan and Russia signed a treaty at St. Petersburg confirming the provisions of the secret conventions of 1907 and 1910.³²

In summary, during the decade from 1902 to 1912, Nippon gained important concessions and alliances which demonstrated her leading position in the Far East. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance secured her against encroachments by Russia and Germany and provided a powerful ally in Great Britain, whom she would later be called upon to aid during World War I. The defeat of Russia in 1905 demonstrated Japan's military might and assisted her in obtaining legal recognition of her demand for concessions in Manchuria and elsewhere on the mainland of Asia. The several agreements with European Powers, plus the Root-Takahira Notes of 1908 provided Japan with implied recognition

³¹Clyde, op. cit., pp. 407-408.

³²Ernest Batson Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), pp. 77-90

of her special position in Korea which she ultimately incorporated into the Japanese Empire in 1910. Finally, the united stand of Russia and Japan against the Four Power Consortium demonstrated a new closeness of relations between these two nations which served as a warning to the West that neither Russia nor Japan intended to relinquish control over Manchuria and Mongolia to outside powers.

CHAPTER IV

SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AND THE WAR YEARS

There were no major problems in international relations between China and Japan during the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, China's policy towards all foreign nations was marked by the principle of i shih t'ung jen, or "to treat all with the same kindness."¹ The opening of Japan and the growth of Western influence in China however, worked changes. These were demonstrated by China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, after which China faced a constant demand for concessions from both the European Powers and her neighbor, Japan.²

A decree on February 12, 1912, signed by the Dowager Empress Lung Yu, in her capacity as Regent, abolished the Manchu rule in favor of a republican form of government. The entire country had been seething in revolt for over a year and although the Manchu leaders had made belated attempts at reform, the old order failed to reestablish popular confidence. The Japanese Government at first sided with the monarchy and hoped for a joint Anglo-Japanese intervention under the

¹Shuhsi Hsu, An Introduction to Sino-Foreign Relations (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsn, Limited, 1941), p. 37.

²Shuhsi Hsu, China and Her Political Entity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1926), p. 347.

Alliance with London. The British, however, were reluctant to take action against the revolutionary elements as they controlled the Yangtze area where English interests were extensive. The revolutionary leader, Sun Yat Sen, was elected President of the Chinese Provisional Government but proved unable to maintain control and was forced to flee to Japan. Yuan Shih-kai, the head of the conservative and constitutionalist element, succeeded Sun Yat Sen and became President of China.³ The first years of the new republic were marked by confusion and disunity which played directly into the hands of the Japanese and Western Powers seeking to extend and strengthen their growing economic footholds.⁴

As World War I began, on August 4, 1914, the French Minister to Japan proposed that Nippon and France conclude a treaty of alliance. The proposal was later amended to provide for France to become a member of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Membership in the Alliance was desired by the Paris Government in order to safeguard interests in French Indo-China. A week later, Russia made a similar overture for participation in a tripartite alliance. Neither Sir Edward Grey nor Foreign Minister Kato wanted the two other nations to join

³Ennis, op. cit., p. 194.

⁴Hsu, China and her Political Entity, pp. 348-349.

the Alliance since it would serve to dilute its effectiveness. As an alternative to these proposals, Japan was invited to adhere to the Declaration of London of September 4, 1914. This was accomplished in October of 1915 when Japan, along with the other parties to the declaration, agreed not to make a separate peace and to consult with the other parties on all peace proposals.⁵

The British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir C. Greene, advised the Japanese Government on August 3rd that Britain would rely upon her help in the event the British concessions at Hong Kong and Wei-hai-wei were threatened. The Japanese Government replied that it would consider such an attack as sufficient basis to invoke action under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.⁶ Sir Edward Grey then dispatched a message in which he thanked the Japanese Government for their offer of assistance and expressed the hope that Nippon's involvement in the war would not be necessary.⁷ However, after war was declared, the British attitude underwent a change. The British plan called for the seizure of the German wireless stations in New Guinea, Yap and Nauru by the Australian Navy. The Australian Government

⁵Ishii, op. cit., pp. 101-103; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 356.

⁶British Documents, XI, p. 298.

⁷Ibid., p. 329.

now felt that the German Pacific Fleet, under Admiral von Spee should be destroyed prior to any attack on the German island possessions. The British and Dominion Naval Forces could not undertake such an operation without additional ships and on August 7th, the British Government formally asked Japan to "hunt out and destroy the armed German merchant cruisers." The request went on to say, "this of course means an act of war against Germany, but this is, in our opinion, unavoidable."⁸

Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese public had shown but little interest in the affairs of Europe. However, the newspapers throughout the nation now took up the war cause and reminded the Japanese people of the part Germany played in the Triple Intervention of 1895; of Nippon's obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; and of Germany's threat to neutral shipping in the Far East.⁹ Three courses were now open to Japan, namely, to remain neutral, to join the Central Powers, or to join the Allies. While some of the Elder Statesmen felt that Germany might possibly win the war, Baron Kato made a strong plea for participation in the conflict as a token of Japan's friendship for England.

⁸Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 353-354.

⁹Ibid., p. 354.

The cabinet, on August 8th, decided to enter the war and to demand not only the surrender of German ships in the Pacific waters, but also the surrender of the Kiaochow leasehold.¹⁰ Actually, the Tokyo Government did not feel that it had a legal obligation to enter the war under the terms of the Alliance, nevertheless, it welcomed the "opportunity to destroy the German influence from Eastern Asia and to enhance the prestige of Japan."¹¹ The British Government feared that the inclusion of Kiaochow in the Japanese military action would involve China and perhaps effect England's commercial interests in her concession areas. London therefore asked Tokyo, on August 11th, to postpone all military action and withdrew its request for assistance.¹² The Japanese Government replied that war had already been decided upon and that there was a general widespread popular demand for revenge against Germany. The reply went on to say that Japan did not harbor any territorial ambitions nor would its entry into the war effect British trade.¹³ Grey now reversed his previous stand and on August 13th, he agreed to a Japanese ultimatum

¹⁰Ishii, op. cit., pp. 353-354.

¹¹Takeuchi, op. cit., pp. 169-170.

¹²Yanaga, op. cit., p. 355.

¹³McCair and Lach, op. cit., p. 177.

to Germany for the surrender of armed vessels and the Kiaochow leasehold but asked Nippon to confine herself "to the German Base and neighboring Chinese seas."¹⁴ Two days later, the Japanese Government issued an ultimatum to the German Government using phraseology similiar to that used by Germany in 1895 when she demanded that Japan renounce her claim to the Liaotung Peninsula:

(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds and to disarm at once those that cannot be so withdrawn.

(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 15, 1914, to the Imperial Japanese authorities without condition or compensation the entire leased territory of Kiaochow, with a view to eventual restoration of the same to China.¹⁵

The German Government was given until noon on August 23rd to signify her acceptance of the terms, otherwise, the Japanese Government would be free to take such action as it deemed necessary to meet the situation.¹⁶ In the meantime, in an effort to limit Japan's role, the British Government issued the following statement:

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan having been in communication with each other are of opinion that it is necessary for each to take action to

¹⁴MacNair and Lach, op. cit., p. 177.

¹⁵Edwin A. Falk, From Perry to Pearl Harbor (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1943), p. 218; MacNair and Lach, op. cit., p. 178.

¹⁶MacNair and Lach, op. cit., p. 179.

protect the general interests in the Far East contemplated by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance It is understood that the action of Japan will not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so far as it may be necessary to protect Japanese shipping lanes in the Pacific, nor beyond Asiatic waters westward of the China Seas, nor to any foreign territory except territory in German occupation on the continent of eastern Asia.¹⁷

In an effort to allay suspicion of Japan's motives, Premier Okuma issued the following public statement:

. . . Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to secure more territory, no thought of depriving China or other people of anything which they now possess. The Government and my people have given their word and their pledge which will be honored and kept as Japan always keeps promises.¹⁸

Upon learning of Japan's preparations to enter the war, China made a last minute attempt to cede the German leasehold at Tsingtao to the United States for immediate transfer back to China. However, Secretary Lansing replied to this suggestion that "it would be quixotic in the extreme to allow the question of China's territorial integrity to entangle the United States in international difficulties."¹⁹ The way had now been paved for the Tokyo Government to enter the conflict with international recognition of her course of action in China.

¹⁷Clyde, op. cit., p. 415.

¹⁸Robert Young, "Japan at Kiaochow and the Peace Conference," The Contemporary Review, CXV (March, 1919), p. 281.

¹⁹Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 172.

Japan declared war on Germany following the expiration of her ultimatum on August 23, 1914. Tokyo's major military role during the war was the capture of Tsingtao, (and brief mention will be made of this campaign as well as some of the other military actions in which Japan participated). Kiaochow is situated on the eastern extremity of the Shantung peninsula. Tsingtao, the capital city, was the site of the German administrative center for the leased territory which comprised approximately 200 square miles. The Germans spent a considerable sum of money in constructing modern facilities and in improving the Kiaochow Bay which had one of the finest natural harbors in the Orient.²⁰ German defense forces were divided into land and sea defenses with the land forces being charged with protection against attack from the north. The principal line of defense consisted of five organized tactical infanteriewerke, each with from two to three hundred men. To the rear of these forts were about 50 heavy 37 mm. machine guns for close defense of the positions. Heavy batteries were located on the hills for both land and sea defense. The German forces consisted of about 3,800 regular troops which were supplemented by 1,200 reservists who had been called to active

²⁰Francis J. Reynolds, Allen L. Churchill and Francis T. Miller, The Story of the Great War (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1916), III, pp. 46-48.

duty from their homes scattered all over the Far East.²¹

The Japanese plan called for an expeditionary force under the command of Lieutenant General Kamio, consisting of the 18th Independent Division, reinforced by artillery and support troops. An additional force of 1,369 British troops from the British garrisons in North China was attached to the Japanese forces. The Nipponese troops landed at Lungkow on September 2, 1914 and marched 200 miles overland to Tsingtao. The port at Laoshan was later utilized since it was only 15 miles from Tsingtao. On September 27th, the Japanese arrived at the outer defense posts of the city and captured Prinz Heinrich Hill. The Japanese were in no immediate hurry to obtain a victory since the Germans were bottled up within the city and had no hope of escape. A general siege began on October 31st, which was the Mikado's birthday, and 142 heavy guns, joined by Japanese ships which blockaded the harbor, began a bombardment which lasted seven days. The Germans had expended most of their supplies and surrendered the garrison on November 7, 1914.²² The German naval units under the

²¹Homer Case, "The Capture of Tsingtau," (unpublished research study, The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1933), pp. 6-10.

²²John C. Ferguson, "Japan's Use of her Hegemony," North American Review, CCX (Oct., 1919), p. 458; The Literary Digest History of the World War (New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1919), IX, pp. 168-176.

command of Admiral Spee managed to escape from Tsingtao prior to the arrival of the Japanese naval units. Admiral Spee's fleet of four cruisers initially hid in the waters near the Carolines; they then boldly came out from hiding and went north, passing by Guam and the Marianas and eventually made their way to the Falkland Islands where they were defeated on December 8th.²³

China was greatly upset by the passage of foreign troops outside of the leased territory and filed a vigorous protest when Japanese troops seized the Shantung Railway between Tsingtao and Tsinanfu. The Chinese Government also announced a "special" war zone to which they sought to confine the military operations of the belligerents. This was largely ignored by the Japanese and thus, soon withdrawn by China when it proved impossible to make it effective.²⁴

Following the capture of Tsingtao, the Japanese troops took over complete control of the leased territory. On December 24, 1914, the victors announced new provisional regulations for the Custom House and required that all customs documents be written in Japanese. The Japanese Government refused to accept any of the candidates nominated for the post of

²³Falk, op. cit., p. 219; Porter, op. cit., p. 254.

²⁴G. Zay Wood, The Shantung Question (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1922), pp. 48-49.

Customs Commissioner by the Chinese Government and operated the service with their own customs personnel. Finally, an agreement was reached on August 6, 1915 by which the Chinese Maritime Customs Office was reopened with the Japanese Government exercising all rights formerly enjoyed by the German Government.²⁵

In addition to the campaign at Tsingtao, Nipponese naval units captured the German islands north of the equator, most of which were in the Marshall and Caroline Groups. For the remainder of the war, the Japanese Navy escorted Australian and New Zealand troopships en route to the Suez Canal and performed guard duty in the Pacific Ocean. Nippon refused to send an expeditionary force to the Western Front on the grounds that her obligations under the Alliance could be best discharged in the Far East. This viewpoint was somewhat modified in 1917 when German submarines attacked Japanese merchant vessels. Following these incidents, the Tokyo Government dispatched three destroyer divisions to the Mediterranean where they joined other Allied naval units in patrol duties.²⁶

On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Ambassador at Peking,

²⁵Wood, op. cit., pp. 55-58.

²⁶Porter, op. cit., pp. 253-254.

Mr. Hioki, presented a series of demands directly to the President of China. The demands had their origin in a long series of grievances against China and the cancellation of the war zone was used as the occasion to retaliate. The demands, written on Imperial War Office stationery, were prefaced by the statement: ". . . our great Imperial policy depends on our being able to avail ourselves of the world's general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and decide upon a course of action toward China which shall be practical in execution. . . ." ²⁷ The demands were divided into five groups. Group I pertained to the Shantung province and China was requested to agree in advance to any understanding which might be made between Japan and Germany in reference to the disposition of the German rights in Shantung; China to promise not to cede to any third power any land in or along the coast of Shantung; Japan to be permitted to construct a railway to connect the Kiaochow-Tsinan network with Chefoo or Lungkow; certain cities and towns to be opened as commercial centers. ²⁸

Group II pertained to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia. The Chinese were asked to extend the lease

²⁷Ennis, op. cit., p. 206.

²⁸Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 411-422.

of Port Arthur, Dairen and the Antung-Mukden Railroad to ninety-nine years; Japanese subjects to be permitted to lease or own land for both farming and commercial purposes; Japanese to be permitted to travel or reside in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; China to obtain the consent of Nippon before granting any concessions to a third power for the construction of railroads; the Tokyo Government to be consulted if any foreign advisors required; the control of the Kirin-Changchun Railroad to be given to Japan for a period of ninety-nine years. These demands were probably the most important to the Japanese since they would perpetuate their control in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and protect the Korean border.²⁹

Group III pertained to the Han-Yeh-Ping Company, a Sino-Japanese company recently nationalized by China. The Japanese demanded that they be given joint ownership of the company. Such control would thereby give them access to the large mineral resources owned by the company in the Yangtze area.³⁰

In Group IV, Japan requested that China not cede or lease to any other nation any harbor, bay or island along the coast of China. Finally, Group V contained a series of general

²⁹Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 411-422.

³⁰Smith, op. cit., p. 206.

demands which were considered especially obnoxious by the Peking Government. China was to employ influential Japanese as advisors in political, financial and military affairs; Japanese churches, schools and hospitals were to be given the right to own land; propagation of the Buddhist religion in China was to be permitted; police departments in all large centers were to be jointly staffed by Chinese and Japanese; a fixed amount of China's ammunition requirements, (fifty per cent was suggested), was to be purchased from Japan or else a Sino-Japanese arsenal was to be constructed; Nippon was to be permitted to construct a railroad connecting Wuchang with Kiu-kiang and Nanchang with Chaochow and Hangchow; Japan was to be consulted before borrowing money for the purpose of working mines, building railways and constructing harbor works or dock-yards in the Fukien province.³¹

The Chinese Government revealed almost at once the nature and scope of the demands to the foreign press, the diplomatic circles and the Chinese people. While the Chinese nation became violently incensed over the demands, the European Powers were too involved in the war to become greatly concerned over issues in the Orient. The demands made an unfavorable impres-

³¹Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China 1894-1919, II, pp. 1231-1234; Ennis, op. cit., p. 207.

sion upon the United States Government, particularly since the Tokyo Government attempted to conceal the requests contained in Group V. Washington objected to the issues in this latter group and also considered it appropriate to make the following statement concerning Japanese rights in Shantung, South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia:

While on principle and under the treaties of 1844, 1858, 1868, and 1903 with China and the United States has grounds upon which to base objections to the Japanese "demands" relative to Shantung, South Manchuria and East Mongolia, nevertheless, the United States frankly recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations between Japan and these districts.³²

The negotiations between the two countries extended for three and one half months and during this time, both China and the Western Powers were becoming increasingly critical of Japan. The leaders of the Tokyo Government obtained approval from the Emperor to issue an ultimatum to Peking and on May 7th, the Chinese Government was notified that a categorical reply to the demands would be required before 6:00 p.m., on May 9th. The Chinese Government was now thoroughly alarmed and in return for future negotiations with Japan on the demands in Group V., the Chinese gave their consent to the other demands. The revised agreements between the two nations were contained in the Sino-Japanese Treaties of May 25, 1915 which were to be

³²Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1928), pp. 105-111.

ratified by the President of China and the Emperor of Japan. Under the Chinese Constitution, the treaties were also required to be ratified by Parliament and since this was not done, the Peking Government would later claim that the treaties were invalid.³³

Upon learning of the acceptance of the ultimatum by China, Secretary of State Bryan dispatched a note to China and Japan which said in part:

. . . The Government of the United States has the honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of China that it cannot recognize any agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of the United States and its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China commonly known as the open door policy.³⁴

In addition to facing domestic unrest and strained relations with Japan, China was required to reconsider her relations vis à vis Germany. Following America's break in diplomatic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, President Wilson notified all the neutral countries that he believed it would "make for the peace of the world if the other neutral powers can find it possible to take similar action to that

³³MacNair and Lach, op. cit., p. 197.

³⁴Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, p. 146.

taken by this Government."³⁵ This statement, which was intended to be general in scope, was immediately used by the American Minister at Peking, Mr. Paul S. Reinsch, as authority to urge China to sever relations with Berlin. Premier Tuan however, was not willing to enter the war except for a price. The Chinese demanded that they be given a military loan of \$10,000,00; allowed complete control over their forces and supplies; and that the United States fund its share of the Boxer indemnity and urge the other Allied nations to do likewise.³⁶ Reinsch was unable to communicate the terms to Washington immediately since the cable line was broken. Nevertheless, the American Minister went ahead and intimated that the United States Government would approve China's requests. When Washington learned of Reinsch's action, the Minister was warned against giving any further unauthorized promises or assurances since the United States did not want to give the impression that it was buying China's support.³⁷

In the meantime, in exchange for her support of China's entry into the war, Japan determined to obtain from the Allies a pledge to support her claims to Shantung and the German

³⁵Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, Supplement I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1923), p. 108.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 401-402.

³⁷Ibid., p. 408.

islands in the North Pacific as Tokyo realized that her temporary control over these German interests was subject to final disposition at the Peace Conference. The first of a series of written confirmations were received in February of 1917 when the British Ambassador, Conyngham Greene, handed the following message to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

With reference to the subject of our conversation of the 27th ultimo when Your Excellency informed me of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive an assurance that, on the occasion of a Peace Conference, His Britannic Majesty's Government will support the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the Islands North of the Equator, I have the honor, under instructions received from His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to communicate to Your Excellency the following message from His Britannic Majesty's Government:

His Majesty's Government accedes with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in Islands North of Equator on the occasion of Peace Conference, it being understood that the Japanese Government will, in eventual peace settlement, treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claim to German Islands South of Equator. . . .³⁸

In a note dated March 1st, 1917, the French Government gave similar assurances to Japan and also asked that Japan "give its support to obtain from China the rupture of her

³⁸Wood, op. cit., p. 68.

diplomatic relations with Germany."³⁹ The British and French notes were followed by similar assurances from Russia on March 5, 1917 and Italy on March 23, 1917.⁴⁰

The question of entry into the war became the occasion for a struggle for power between Premier Tuan and the Chinese Parliament. The Chinese people were largely pro-German and there was no universal demand for entry into the war. The Kuomintang majority in Parliament was opposed to war since it would give Tuan an excuse to perpetuate himself in office. On May 10th, the Tuan Government attempted to force a declaration of war, however, the legislators would not give ground in face of threats and, as a result, all the cabinet members except Tuan and one colleague resigned. President Li thereupon dismissed Tuan and dissolved Parliament. Three weeks later an attempt was made to restore the young Manchu Emperor to the throne but the war-lords, supported by the former Premier, invaded Peking and restored Tuan to power. Whereupon, Tuan established a frankly pro-Japanese militarist government and promptly declared war against Germany on August 14, 1917. It should be noted that China made this declaration without

³⁹Wood, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 74-76.

any definite promises of financial support or other concessions from The Allies.⁴¹

Tokyo was greatly disturbed by America's entry into the war as the Japanese suspected that the United States intended to check Nippon's growing power in China and the Pacific. Indeed, Lansing states that Japan could not understand America's altruistic purpose of "fighting for liberty and democracy in Europe."⁴² The Foreign Office also felt that the United States was unduly influencing Chinese foreign policy and it was decided to send Viscount Ishii to the United States in order to "exchange with responsible American officials frank views concerning problems in China and reach some form of understanding and settlement."⁴³ At the same time, Washington hoped to preserve the peace and status quo in the Pacific, and thus, permit the United States to concentrate on the Western Front.⁴⁴ The Ishii Mission arrived in the United States on September 1, 1917, but serious negotiations were not begun until after the Viscount filled several speaking engagements in which he defended the "Japanese Monroe Doctrine" for Asia.⁴⁵

⁴¹Clyde, op. cit., pp. 423-429.

⁴²Robert Lansing, Lansing War Memoirs (Indianapolis: Babb-Merrill Co., 1935), pp. 285-286.

⁴³Ishii, op. cit., p. 112.

⁴⁴Griswold, op. cit., p. 217.

⁴⁵Ishii, op. cit., p. 119.

Ishii had interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as "as assertion of primacy or paramount interest by the United States in its relations to other American republics. . . ." and applied this principle to Japan's position in China. Lansing, on the other hand, argued that this was an incorrect interpretation and that the Monroe Doctrine was actually intended to prevent foreign encroachments and permit the individual self-development of nations.⁴⁶ The American Secretary of State proposed that the two nations formulate an 'Open-Door' policy which would serve the purpose of alleviating tensions, particularly in China. The two diplomats gave much time to the phrasing of a statement which they intended to issue and when Mr. Lansing inquired as to the definition of Japan's interests in China, Ishii replied that the term "paramount interests" was thought to be the correct expression. Lansing objected to this as it implied that other nations would be obligated to acquiesce to any action undertaken by Japan in China. After considerable discussion, the phrase "special interests" was substituted for "paramount interests." Notes incorporating the Lansing-Ishii agreement were exchanged on November 2, 1917. The agreement was immediately subjected to misinterpretation on both sides

⁴⁶Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1940), 11, p. 436. (Hereafter cited as The Lansing Papers).

and controversy developed when Japan interpreted the term "special interests" in the sense of the Japanese equivalent word ri-eki; this word can only be used in its literal interpretation meaning advantage, profit, or concrete interests. Lansing had only intended the term to be used in its economic and non-political sense. The notes caused much dissatisfaction in both the United States and China and the declaration was finally abrogated in 1923.⁴⁷

The Russian revolution of 1917 resulted in the overthrow of the Imperial Tsarist Government in favor of a liberal constitutional monarchy. The Lvov-Kerensky regimes lasted only eight months and were followed late in 1917 by the Bolsheviks who promptly sued for peace with Germany.⁴⁸ The French and British were alarmed over the prospect of increased enemy forces on the Western Front and the two nations proposed the intervention of Japan to eliminate the threat of an enemy penetration along the Sino-Siberian border.⁴⁹ General Dimitri L. Horvat, manager of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, attempted to organize an anti-Bolshevik force and obtained the support of a Cossack, Captain Gregory Semenov. The Horvat-

⁴⁷Jeremiah W. Jenks, "Japan in Action," North American Review, CCX (Sept., 1919), p. 319; Griswold, op. cit., pp. 214-218; Ishii, op. cit., pp. 127-133.

⁴⁸George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), pp. 234-295.

⁴⁹Curry, op. cit., p. 214.

Semenov forces obtained the support of the British, French and Japanese Governments and operated along the Trans-Siberian Railroad area where they distinguished themselves largely by their brutality.⁵⁰

The British War Cabinet was concerned over the possibility that 648,000 tons of military supplies in Siberia would fall into the hands of the Reds and Sir Robert Cecil of the British Foreign Office formally proposed the military intervention of Japan in Siberia. Washington immediately rejected this proposal and Ambassador Roland Morris advised the Foreign Office that such intervention would only serve to aid German propoganda. President Wilson was quite upset over the proposal and wrote that he did not know "when he had ever had a more tiresome struggle with quicksand than in trying to do the right thing in respect with our dealings with Russia."⁵¹ In an effort to out-manouver Wilson, the British brought their proposal before the Supreme War Council in Paris. Since the decisions of the Council required unanimity, the American Delegate, General Tasker Bliss, referred the question back to Washington. The United States made clear its stand on Japanese intervention in the following message:

⁵⁰Curry, op. cit., p. 215.

⁵¹Curry, op. cit., citing Wilson Papers, II, p. 133, VI, p. 64.

It has no objection to the request being made, and it wishes to assure the Japanese Government that it has entire confidence that in putting an armed force into Siberia it is doing so as an ally of Russia, with no purpose but to save Siberia from the invasion of the armies and the intrigues of Germany and with entire willingness to leave the determination of all questions that may affect the permanent fortunes of Siberia to the Council of Peace.⁵²

After some misgivings on giving Japan tacit approval to intervention, the original message was withdrawn and in a subsequent message, Wilson declared that it would be unwise to intervene as it would play into the hands of both Germany and the enemies of the revolution.⁵³ However, Great Britain was not undaunted in her efforts and again proposed intervention to Wilson. In the meantime, rumors circulated that 80,000 German and American prisoners were occupying Irkutsk and this event, together with the opening of the German spring offensive, favored the hopes of the interventionists. Following Allied reverses in the war and repeated pleas from the British, Wilson authorized discussions between Lansing and Ishii on the subject. The Japanese had already landed troops in Vladivostok following the murder of a few Japanese and the precedent for intervention was already established. Further support was gained when Wilson learned that some

⁵² The Lansing Papers, II, p. 355.

⁵³ Curry, op. cit., p. 223.

70,000 Czech forces were bottled up at Irkutsk and that they desired to make their way to Vladivostok and eventually back to France by sea in order to continue fighting Germany. Wilson now reluctantly agreed to intervention and made his decision known to his staff.⁵⁴

The United States proposed that each of the two nations furnish 7,000 men for the purpose of guarding the lines of communication in Siberia and that Japan was to immediately dispatch troops while those from the United States would follow later. The Japanese Government delayed in answering the proposal and the Acting Secretary of State, Frank L. Polk, thought that this delay was prompted by the question of command over the joint expedition and, with Wilson's consent, the Japanese were advised that they could have the senior position.⁵⁵ Tokyo replied on July 24th that it could not set a limit on the number of troops since this would show lack of confidence on the part of the United States in Nippon's motives. Ishii, however, indicated that the Japanese intended to send 12,000 troops and Polk replied that Washington would not object to the dispatch of a Division.⁵⁶

⁵⁴Peyton C. March, "Japanese Strategy in the Far East." Yale Review, XXIII (Sept. 1933), p. 84.

⁵⁵Curry, op. cit., pp. 231-232.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 234.

The American contingent of 9,000 troops was placed under the command of Major General William S. Graves. The Japanese claimed that the United States, by exceeding the 7,000 figure, abrogated the original agreement and rapidly increased their forces from about 10,000 to 60,000 men and extended their control along the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern Railroads. The railroads were later placed under the control of a technical board with an American, Mr. John F. Stevens, in charge but were actually operated by the Russian Railway Service Corps.⁵⁷

Most of the nations participating in the intervention relied upon White Russian groups for aid. The Japanese relied mainly on the Cossacks, the worst of whom was Semenov. The Cossack leader was merciless in dealing with his enemies; he delighted in sending out indiscriminate raiding parties, robbing banks and pilfering freight shipments. It has been argued that the Japanese supported the Semenov faction in order to keep Siberia in a state of unrest which would require their presence to maintain order. The Japanese later sought to establish Semenov as the puppet leader of a Pan-Mongol movement which would unite the Mongolian people under Nippon. The movement failed due to lack of financial support

⁵⁷Curry, op. cit., p. 240.

and the inability to organize the various national groups.⁵⁸

In 1918, China and Japan entered into a series of agreements which later proved damaging to China at the Paris Peace Conference. Notes were signed between the Chinese Minister in Tokyo, Tsung-Hsiang Chang, and Baron Shimpei Goto, the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. Wood claims that the Minister exceeded his authority in negotiating with the Japanese and that the agreements were illegal since they were not ratified by the Chinese Government.⁵⁹ There is no doubt however, that the government authorities were well aware of the discussions and it is apparent that money considerations out-weighed other factors. The first two agreements related to the construction of the two railroads in Shantung between Tsinan and Shunteh and Kaomi and Hsu-chow. The Chinese Government agreed to borrow the necessary capital in Tokyo to finance the construction of these railroads and agreed, if the Japanese considered them inadequate from a standpoint of operations, to allow them to construct similiar facilities in other areas in Shantung. Meanwhile, the Chinese pledged the railways as security for the construction loans, estimated at 70,000,000 yen. At the same time, the two countries entered

⁵⁸ John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), pp. 193-205.

⁵⁹ Wood, op. cit., p. 98.

into similiar arrangements for the construction of four other rail systems: between Changchun and Taonan; Kai-yuan, Hailung and Kirin; Taonan and Dalny; Taonan and Jehol to a seaport, the exact location of which was to be determined at a later date. All of these lines were located in Manchuria and Mongolia and were considered of strategic importance to the Japanese.⁶⁰ In addition, Tokyo also agreed to pay Peking 20,000,000 for the purpose of underwriting a "War Participation Loan" which would be used for the purpose of organizing a defensive army and to pay expenses of participating in the war.⁶¹ Actually, this money was needed by Premier Tuan to hold out against dissident elements in the south and had little bearing upon China's war efforts, which were negligible.⁶² Perhaps the most damaging of all the provisions was the agreement that provided for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from Kiaochow and the connecting railroad to Tsinan in return for a Chinese agreement that the line would become a joint enterprise. Japanese personnel were to be employed at the Headquarters and training school of the Chinese police force as well as at the principal railway stations. This latter agreement served to

⁶⁰MacMurray, op. cit., II, pp. 1445-1452.

⁶¹Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 395-396.

⁶²Wood, op. cit., p. 98.

bolster Tokyo's claims for concessions in the province when the Peace Conference met in Paris.⁶³

By the time the Armistice was declared in November of 1918, the Japanese completely dominated Eastern Siberia. Secretary Lansing protested this by stating, "The United States has viewed with surprise the presence of the large number of Japanese troops now in north Manchuria and eastern Siberia. . . . Such monopoly is certainly opposed not only to the purpose of this Government to assist Russia but also to its views regarding China."⁶⁴ Following this protest, the Japanese managed to remove about 50,000 troops from the areas specified by the Secretary. Nevertheless, they did not relinquish their control over Siberia until 1922.⁶⁴

Japan had now gained most of her announced objectives. Through her alliance with Great Britain she played a limited role in the Great War yet reaped benefits in excess of what was justified by her wartime efforts. From a weak Chinese Government whom she had openly bribed with money and threats, Tokyo obtained legal recognition of its foothold in China. By means of secret agreements with the European Powers, she gained, prior to the Peace Conference, support for her claims

⁶³Wood, op. cit., p. 314.

⁶⁴White, op. cit., p. 210.

to the German islands north of the equator and on the Shantung peninsula. By participation in the Siberian intervention, she extended her influence and control throughout Eastern Siberia and even dreamed of a puppet state in Mongolia which would be dependent upon Japan.

CHAPTER V

THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE

Japan entered the Peace Conference negotiations with the status of a Great Power. This standing was granted only after some misgivings on the part of the leader of the French Delegation, M. Georges Clemenceau, who declared:

We have agreed that Japan should have five delegates like the Great Powers. Japan participated in the war in the Far East, but who can say that in the war she played a part that can be compared for instance to that of France? Japan defended its interests in the Far East but when she was requested to intervene in Europe, everyone knew what the answer was. . . .¹

In a plan submitted to Colonel House by the French Foreign Office and later incorporated into the Jusserand note of November 29, 1918, addressed to the United States Government, Japan was not listed as one of the Great Powers that would discuss the preliminary organization of the Peace Conference. However, in a meeting held on December 2 and 3, 1918, the Premiers of France, Great Britain, and Italy had agreed that the Tokyo Government should be included as one of the Great Powers to meet at an Inter-Allied Conference.² At

¹Foreign Relations of the United States-The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), III, p. 506. (Hereafter cited as Paris Peace Conference).

²Paris Peace Conference, I, pp. 341, 365-371.

the first session, the Japanese were advised by M. Clemenceau, the President of the Conference, that they would be granted the right to attend all sessions and commissions. While the Tokyo delegation was obviously pleased with this recognition, Viscount Ishii commented that his government's position was not due to "any good-will or patronage on the part of the other powers," but to the "united efforts of her officials and peoples under the leadership of the emperors Meiji and Taisho" and "her participation in the London Declaration."³

After the Conference became organized, the Supreme War Council was replaced by the Council of Ten, with two representatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. This council met from the opening of the sessions in January until late in March when the workload was shifted, first, to the five Foreign Ministers or Council of Five, and then to the Four Premiers who were designated as the Council of Four. The Nippon delegation was not entirely happy with this latter arrangement. It was explained to them that since their Premier was not in attendance at Paris, they would be excluded from the deliberations of this group. However, President Wilson instructed Colonel House to assure Baron Makino that the Japanese would be given an opportunity

³Ishii, op. cit., p. 103.

to participate in world matters not concerning purely European affairs.⁴

The Nippon delegation consisted of the following five members: Marquis Saionji Kimmochi, former Premier, the second President of the Seiyukai Party, and genrō or elder statesman; Viscount Chinda Sutemi, Ambassador to Great Britain; Mr. Matsui Keishiro, Ambassador to France; Mr. Ijuin Kanetomo, Ambassador to Italy.⁵ The delegation was carefully selected by the Hara Government. Prince Saionji was a distinguished statesman and nobleman who had previously met Clemenceau while a student in France about 1870. Baron Makino was appointed a plenipotentiary at the specific request of Marquis Saionji and the Baron, together with Viscount Chinda, participated in the sessions while the aged leader mainly stayed in his suite at the Hotel Bristol.⁶ The other three members were drawn from the important diplomatic posts of London, Paris and Rome.

It was readily apparent at the Peace Conference that the Japanese delegation members were mainly interested in matters affecting their own country and were little concerned

⁴Russell H. Fifield, Woodrow Wilson and the Far East (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952), p. 114.

⁵Yanaga, op. cit., p. 368; Takeuchi, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

⁶Takeuchi, op. cit., p. 221.

over the affairs of Europe,⁷ The delegation received its instructions from the Gaiko Chosakai or Advisory Council on Foreign Relations and had but little leeway in making independent decisions on policy matters.⁸ The Nippon diplomatic representatives came to Paris with the determination that Japan would not be reduced to the status of a second or third class power and with the specific objectives of obtaining the cession of the German rights in Shantung; permanent control over the German islands north of the Equator; a declaration of racial equality as a basic principle of the League of Nations.⁹

The Chinese delegation, which was destined to become the main foe of the neighboring Nippon, consisted of an equally distinguished group who were undoubtedly better able to communicate and play upon the sympathy of the other nations:¹⁰ Lou Tseng-siang, Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of the delegation; Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, former Minister of Agriculture and Commerce; Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, Minister at Washington; Sao-Ke Alfred Sze, Minister at London; Suntchou Wei, Minister at Brussels. The Peking group hoped

⁷Yanaga, op. cit., p. 363.

⁸Takeuchi, op. cit., p. 221; Ishii, op. cit., p. xii.

⁹Royama Masamichi, Foreign Policy of Japan (Tokyo: Japanese Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941), p. 28.

¹⁰Treat, Japan and the United States, p. 231.

to obtain the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity; the return of Shantung; the abolishment of extraterritoriality and other special rights held by foreign nations in China; the recognition of the right of China to fix her own tariff rates and the abrogation of demands conceded to Japan by the Treaties of 1915 and 1918.¹¹

President Wilson hoped that the subject of the League of Nations would be given the first priority followed by the subjects of (2) Reparation; (3) New States; (4) Frontiers and territorial changes; (5) Colonies.¹² Lloyd George, at a meeting of the Council of Ten held on January 23, 1919, opposed this agenda on the grounds that "Oriental questions and Colonial questions were less involved," and could be disposed of more quickly. Wilson replied that "the world's unrest arose from the unsettled condition of Europe, not from the state of affairs in the East or in the Colonies. . . ." The President however, did not insist upon his agenda and the subject of the disposition of the colonies came up for discussion the next day.¹³

The Nippon case for the retention of the former German islands came up for discussion at a meeting of the Council

¹¹Steiger, op. cit., p. 769.

¹²Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 700.

¹³Ibid., pp. 718-719.

on January 27th. Four alternatives were open to the Council concerning the former German colonies: (1) outright annexation; (2) restoration to Germany; (3) internationalization; (4) placement under a mandate.¹⁴ The Tokyo delegation already knew that Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa strongly favored annexation while Great Britain preferred a mandate system. Britain, France and Italy were already committed to support Nippon's claim and it was almost pre-determined that Japan would retain control over the colonies by one of the above means.¹⁵ President Wilson opened the discussion by suggesting that the appropriate delegations be heard prior to making any piecemeal disposition of the Pacific colonies. In the procedural discussion that followed, it was agreed that the Dominion delegates should participate in the Nipponese presentation concerning the colonies while China would attend the discussions concerning Kiaochow.¹⁶

Baron Makino opened his case by declaring:

The Japanese Government feels justified in claiming from the German Government the unconditional cession of: (a) The leased territory of Kiaochow together with the railways, and other rights possessed by Germany in respect of the Shantung Province. (b) All of the Islands in German possession in the Pacific Ocean

¹⁴Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 718-719.

¹⁵George H. Blakeslee, "The Mandates of the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, I (Sept., 1922), pp. 99-100. Wifield, op. cit., p. 122.

¹⁶Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 737.

north of the Equator together with the rights and properties in connection therewith.

• • • • •
 The Japanese forces have, in conjunction with the British contingents, succeeded in taking the leased territory as well as the railway line connecting Tsingtau with Chinanfu, which the Germans used for military purposes. Japan has continued in possession of the rights enjoyed by Germany.

• • • • •
 The circumstances demanded that the German South Sea Islands should forthwith be taken possession of in order to defeat the enemy's object, and the German possessions north of the Equator have since remained under Japanese occupation and control. . . . Japan being in actual possession and having regard to the circumstances which led to such occupation and to the present conditions above alluded to, and further, in view of the public opinion of Japan which is unanimous in this connection, she claims the definite possession of these Islands where she may continue to protect the inhabitants and to endeavor to better their conditions.

In conclusion, it may be stated that, in view of the extent of their efforts and achievements in destroying German bases in the Extreme Orient and the South Seas, and in safeguarding the important routes on the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Mediterranean waters to say nothing of their contribution in other respects, the Japanese Government feels confident that the claims above advanced would be regarded as only just and fair.¹⁷

Upon conclusion of the speech, Doctor Wang of the Chinese delegation asked the Council to reserve decision until China also had the opportunity to be heard.¹⁸

The meeting of the Council on January 28th brought to light the existence of the secret treaties between China and

¹⁷Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 738-740.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 754.

Japan and the ensuing discussions over these treaties had ramifications all the way back to Tokyo and Peking. This meeting also marked the only time when both of the Oriental countries argued face-to-face before the council.¹⁹ Lloyd George opened the session by stating that Britain was willing to follow the mandate system insofar as territory conquered by her was concerned. Clemenceau then followed by stating that he thought that any conventions concluded by the parties to the hearing should be brought before the Council and asked whether Japan would agree to this action. Baron Makino replied that "he had no objection in doing so," and would send all such agreements to the Chairman. Makino was only referring to the secret agreements of 1917 reached with the European Powers. The Council went on to discuss the Kiaochow issue and Clemenceau asked the Oriental delegates if they were prepared to lay before the Council any agreements or engagements undertaken between the two nations. Makino, somewhat taken aback at this request stated that he must first obtain permission from his home government.²⁰ He then went on to say, "Japan was in actual possession of the territory," [Kiaochow], and "before disposing of it to a third party it was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free dis-

¹⁹Paris Peace Conference, III, p. 754.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 754-755.

posal from Germany."

Doctor Koo then followed with a brilliant presentation of China's case. The delegate cited the fact that he was spokesman for over 400 millions or one quarter of the human race. He flatly asked the Council for the restoration to China of the Leased Territory, the railway in Shantung and all other rights Germany possessed before the war. Koo then went on to cite the diplomatic history concerned with the leasehold and that while China appreciated Japan's efforts during the war, China now asked for direct restitution to the Peking Government of all of Germany's rights in Shantung.²¹

The meeting on January 27th was but a forerunner of further difficulties for the Nipponese delegation and Makino and the other members realized that they would have to face the hostility of not only China but also the United States. Lou Tseng-tsiang had stopped off at Tokyo on the way to the Peace Conference and had a talk with Foreign Minister Uchida. The Japanese were led to believe that China would cooperate with them at Paris and thus were quite surprised to note Tseng-tsiang's absence with Koo acting as spokesman for the delegation.²² China, on the other hand, feared a reprisal for assenting to produce the texts of the secret agreements. This

²¹Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 755-756.

²²Fifield, op. cit., p. 140.

fear was not without foundation for on February 2, 1919, Minister Obata Torikichi called upon Mr. Chen-Lu, Chinese Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and expressed the Tokyo Government's displeasure at the trend of events at Paris. Obata reminded Chen-Lu of the strength of the Japanese Army and Navy and of China's heavy indebtedness to her neighbor.²³ The American Ambassador, Mr. Paul Reinsch, was instructed by President Wilson to advise the Chinese Government to "stand firm" and not give in to the Nipponese.²⁴ Nevertheless, the Chinese Cabinet at first decided not to publish the secret agreements but upon President Hsu Shih-ch'ang's insistence, the texts of the agreements were eventually published.²⁵

The racial equality issue came up for discussion during the month of February. The basic instruction to the Tokyo delegation read:

The Imperial Japanese Government considers the League of Nations the most important organization of peace and agrees to its purpose. However, the racial discrimination still prevailing in international relations would endanger the very purpose for which the League of Nations was constituted. This situation may bring considerable disadvantage to our nation. . . . You are instructed to exert your utmost effort in order to obtain as far as possible the necessary guarantee against any possible

²³Fifield, op. cit., p. 145.

²⁴Griswold, op. cit., p. 245.

²⁵Fifield, op. cit., p. 154.

disadvantage that may be caused by this racial prejudice.²⁶

Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda decided to seek out Colonel House and ask him for assistance in preparing the racial equality resolution. The Colonel recommended that they prepare two proposals; one which they desired, and one which they would be willing to accept in lieu of their first proposal. House later showed President Wilson the two drafts. The first proposal was immediately discarded as too radical. The President made some changes in the second proposal and the draft was handed back to Chinda.²⁷ The Japanese considered this latter revision too watered-down and meaningless and prepared their own version which was submitted to the Commission on the League of Nations on February 7th in the following form:

The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord, as soon as possible, to all alien nationals of States members of the League equal and just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, either in law or in fact, on account of their race or nationality.²⁸

The resolution was vigorously opposed by Lord Robert Cecil at a meeting of the Plenary Session held on February 13th and

²⁶Fifield, *op. cit.*, p. 158, citing letter to author from Japanese correspondent, March 15, 1951.

²⁷Charles Seymour, (ed.) The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1928), pp. 309-310.

²⁸David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), II, p. 236.

the matter was temporarily dropped. However, a few weeks later, President Wilson was handed a message by the Japanese delegates asking for further assistance in drafting a racial equality clause stating that "any suggestions from the President will be entertained with great pleasure."²⁹ Following the President's return from Paris on March 14th, the Nipponese decided to deal directly with their opponents and visited Premier Hughes of Australia and advised him that their proposal "seeks only the recognition of the principle but does not request immediately any concrete measures."³⁰ The delegates were unsuccessful in swaying the Australian leader and a week later, they visited Colonel House and showed him a new proposal which read:

As a principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to endorse the principle of equal and just treatment to be accorded to all alien nationals of states members of the League.³¹

(The collection of the House Papers by Seymour makes no reference to this proposal). Prime Minister Hughes would not agree to any form of racial equality provisions being adopted and when a revised proposal was brought before the Dominion Prime Ministers, Hughes stomped out of the room declaring, "It is

²⁹Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), II, p. 236.

³⁰Fifield, op. cit., p. 163, citing letter to author from Japanese correspondent, March 15, 1951.

³¹Ibid., p. 163.

not a question of wording or phraseology. Australia repudiates the whole idea behind this proposition. You are free to act on your own. I shall maintain my stand.³² In spite of such opposition, the Tokyo delegates decided to submit a proposal to the League of Nations Commission on April 11th, asking that the preamble of the Covenant be amended to include the clause, "by the endorsement of the principle of the equality of Nations and the just treatment of their nationals" without making any specific mention of the controversial term "race." Lord Cecil replied to the Nipponese proposal that it would be encroaching upon the sovereignty of the members of the League and that he would vote against the measure. Viscount Chinda strongly retorted that the Japanese people were behind the proposal and that if it was rejected, it would be an indication that equality of members was not recognized by the League.³³

President Wilson was placed in a delicate situation since he was presiding at the vote of the Commission. While eleven members present, representing Japan, France, Italy, Brazil, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and China voted for the measure, Wilson ruled that unanimity was required

³²Field, op. cit., p. 164.

³³Miller, op. cit., I, p. 461.

and the proposal was defeated.³⁴ The Japanese nation was greatly distressed over this defeat and President Wilson shared the major portion of the blame with the Osaka Mainichi declaring that "he had a female demon within him."³⁵

The Nipponese delegation was now firmly determined not to yield on the Shantung issue. Their instructions from the Gaiko Chosakai read:

In compliance with the terms of the official documents exchanged in connection with the Japanese-Chinese agreement of May 25, 1915, in the matter of the province of Shantung, our Empire has the definite intention of returning the Kiaochow Bay settlement to China after we acquire the unconditional cession of said settlement in the treaty with Germany. Naturally there will be no objections to the indication of this decision by our peace envoys at any proper opportunity. However, our government cannot agree to make retrocession a condition for the assignment of the said settlement from Germany to Japan. It must be clearly understood that this matter should be settled absolutely by Japan and China alone.³⁶

The Shantung issue was presented to the Council of Four at the meeting held on April 8th, when the Council reviewed a list of subjects awaiting consideration, the last of which read: "Japanese questions as regards Kiaochow sic and Shantung."³⁷ While waiting for their appearance before the Council

³⁴Miller, op. cit., I, pp. 461-466.

³⁵Fifield, op. cit., p. 169, citing Osaka Mainichi.

³⁶Russell H. Fifield, "Japanese Policy toward the Shantung Question at the Paris Peace Conference," The Journal of Modern History XXIII (Sept. 1951), p. 267.

³⁷Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 65.

the Nipponese delegation occupied themselves with pourparlers in an effort to strengthen their case. The Advisory Council on Foreign Relations dispatched the following additional instructions to Marquis Saionji:

Regarding your telegram Ko. No. 620, the policy of our Empire in regard to the negotiations relative to Tsingtau is, as stated in our telegram Ko. No. 126, to acquire the same unconditionally from Germany and to return the same to China according to the terms of the Japanese-Chinese agreement. This is the final decision of our government and no change is permissible. Therefore in case our proposal is not approved or the mandatory principle under the League of Nations is applied to our terms on Tsingtau, do not sign the Covenant of the League of Nations and advise us to that effect. If you have made certain commitments against the above mentioned policy, there will be no room for adjustment. Therefore, do your utmost under the circumstances.³⁸

At the afternoon session of the Council of Four, held on April 21st, Wilson reported the substance of a conversation that morning with Makino and Chinda. The President suggested that all claims in the Pacific "should be ceded to the Allied and Associated Powers as trustees leaving them to make fair and just dispositions." The Japanese were reminded that they already received a mandate for the German islands north of the Equator. The delegates retorted that they were "set on obliging China to carry out the bond," and that the Powers

³⁸ Fifield, "Japanese Policy toward the Shantung Question at the Paris Peace Conference," pp. 267-268.

should "trust Japan to carry out her bargain with China."³⁹

The following day, the Council met at President Wilson's house with Baron Makino as the first speaker at the session. Makino gave a long and detailed resumé of the Kiaochow leasehold and denied that the lease was abrogated, ipso facto, by China's declaration of war. Upon conclusion of his speech, Mr. George retorted that the other nations such as Australia might make a similar claim for the surrender of German territory and that there was hardly time to settle all such matters before signing the treaty with Germany. Viscount Chinda foresaw the possibility of delaying tactics and informed the Council that if the Shantung demands were not met, the Japanese delegation would not sign the treaty. After detailed questioning by President Wilson over the Japanese operation of the leasehold, Chinda and Makino agreed to the President's intention of hearing the Chinese case on the following afternoon.⁴⁰

The session with the Chinese commenced by the President reviewing the entire gamut of Sino-Japanese relations during the war years, noting specifically the secret agreements of 1915 and 1918. Wilson informed the Peking delegation that he was unable to gain the acceptance of the Japanese for a five-Power trusteeship over Kiaochow nor the renunciation of the

³⁹Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 109-110.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 123-133.

claims of the Tokyo delegates. The President went on to state that while there was some doubt in his mind over the validity of the wartime agreements between China and Japan, "there was no doubt whatsoever" as to the agreements entered into by France and Great Britain. Mr. Koo was reminded that all unjust treatment of China "had not by any means been confined to Japan," and that it would not do to identify justice with the unfortunate engagements of the past.⁴¹

Marquis Salongji, although not taking a direct part in the negotiations, was becoming impatient over the delays in settling the controversy and dispatched the following note to Clemenceau:

Mr. President: The Chiefs of the Government of the Great Powers having already heard the Delegates of China on the subject of the question of the Province of Shantung, I wish to express in the name of the Japanese Delegation, the desire to see as soon as possible a further meeting to expedite the definitive settlement of this question.

Considering the peculiar importance of this question for Japan, I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you would keep us, so far as possible, informed of all steps in its furtherance.

Accept etc.⁴²

The Chinese decided to submit a four-point proposal which would be compatible with their national interests and which read:

⁴¹Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 146.

⁴²ibid., p. 248.

I. Germany renounces to the Five Allied and Associated Powers her holdings, rights and privileges in Shantung for restoration to China.

II. Japan, being in possession of the said holdings, rights and privileges, engages to effect the said restoration to China within one year after the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Germany.

III. China agrees to make a pecuniary compensation to Japan for the military expenses incurred in the capture of Tsingtao, the amount of the said compensation to be determined by the Council of Four.

IV. China agrees to open the whole of Kiaochow Bay as a commercial Port, and to provide a special quarter, if desired, for the residence of the citizens and subjects of the treaty powers.⁴³

At the Council meeting held at the President's residence at 6:30 P.M., on April 25th, the three Council members reviewed Marquis Saionji's letter, a report of the committee studying the Shantung problem and the statement of the Chinese which incorporated the four-point proposal. After reviewing the documents, it was suggested by Mr. George that someone should be appointed to sound out the Japanese before they appeared before the Supreme Council. At President Wilson's suggestion, both Mr. George and Mr. Balfour were asked to visit Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, however, Mr. George assigned the task to his Foreign Minister. Later the same evening, Wilson discussed the Shantung issue with Mr. Baker and commented that "they are not bluffers, and they will go

⁴³Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 250.

home unless we give them what they should not have."⁴⁴

The American Chief Executive was deeply disturbed over the failure to resolve the Shantung problem and on the afternoon of April 26th, the President and the four Commissioners met together to consider the matter. Three of the Commissioners, Lansing, White and Bliss, favored holding out against the Nipponese demands while Colonel House felt that such a stand might lead to a Japanese withdrawal from the Conference.⁴⁵ Mr. Lansing was asked if he would visit the Japanese delegation in an effort to dissuade them from their demands. Lansing was personally unpopular with the Nipponese and the meeting was not only unsuccessful but quite stormy. The delegation, in a report to Tokyo, stated that Lansing intimated that the Japanese might prolong the retrocession of Kiaochow or make unreasonable demands for compensation. Lansing, according to the Japanese report, went on to say that "an agreement made under certain overpowering conditions cannot necessarily be recognized as valid."⁴⁶ The American Secretary of State in recalling this visit states that Viscount Chinda made it clear that his country intended to insist upon

⁴⁴Baker, op. cit., II, p. 258.

⁴⁵Seymour, op. cit., p. 451.

⁴⁶Fifield, "Japanese Policy toward the Shantung Question at the Paris Peace Conference," pp. 270-272.

her "pound of flesh" and the meeting was an utter failure.⁴⁷

Balfour was somewhat more successful in his meeting with Baron Makino, and was able to draft a formula for the return of Shantung to the Chinese. Balfour summarized his report of the visit by stating:

In the first place, the Japanese strenuously deny either that they intend to modify in their own favor the conditions which the Germans had imposed upon the Chinese in connection with the Shantung Peninsula, or that, in fact, their treaties with China would have had that effect.

They say, on the contrary, that they propose surrendering all military control over the Peninsula, including the 50-kilometre zone around Kiaochow within which German troops were allowed but not Chinese, and all interference with the civil administration of the territory. Their intention is fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory. . . .⁴⁸

Wilson expressed some doubt over the exact meaning of the Japanese proposal and added that "if the Japanese would concede all military rights and make their agreement a purely economic one, he would agree to what they desired."⁴⁹ Balfour was authorized to communicate with the Tokyo delegation and in a very conciliatory letter, he commented:

. . . The only points on which your colleagues expressed anxiety were the temporary arrangements with

⁴⁷Robert Lansing, The Peace Negotiations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Co., 1921), p. 255.

⁴⁸Baker, op. cit., III, p. 311.

⁴⁹Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 318.

regard to guarding the lines and garrisoning Tsinan. These, as they pointed out, were not merely interferences with Chinese sovereignty, but interferences in excess of anything which the Germans could claim under their Shantung arrangements. They hoped you would consent to discuss this relatively unimportant aspect of the Shantung problem tomorrow at 11 o'clock.⁵⁰

The day of decision for Nippon arrived on April 29th and the last point in disagreement was the issue of guarding the Shantung railways. Chinda and Makino took the stand that since the former German owners had enjoyed extraterritoriality, the same provision should apply to the Japanese owners to include control over the railway police. Both the President and Mr. Balfour rejected this theory. Mr. Wilson stated that since the Japanese already had control over the Board of Directors, they could in turn control the appointments to the railway police force without requiring such a stipulation in the Peace Treaty. Mr. Balfour, who seemed to have the most success with the Mikado's delegates, stepped into the scene and told the Japanese that "he was surprised at the tone of the present conversation" and that he understood "that the intention of Japan was fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within the leased territory, and only to retain rights which were economic in character."⁵¹ After considerable discussion

⁵⁰Baker, op. cit., III, pp. 312-313.

⁵¹Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 331.

over the police issue, Mr. Balfour made the following proposal:

1. The declared policy of Japan is to hand back to China in full sovereignty the Shantung Peninsula and to retain only the economic privileges possessed by Germany.
2. Any employment of special police on the railway is merely to give the owners of the railway security for traffic and will be used for no other purpose.
3. Such Japanese instructors as may be required to assist in policing the railway may be selected by the company.⁵²

The meeting adjourned with the two delegates stating that they would give the proposal their serious consideration. At 6:30 P.M., that same day, Mr. Balfour advised the President that the Japanese accepted in substance the draft of the amendments. Wilson returned a note to Balfour giving his final re-wording of the amendment. The formula, as approved by the Council and the Tokyo delegation read:

1. The policy of Japan is to hand back the Shantung Peninsula in full sovereignty to China retaining only the economic privileges granted to Germany and the right to establish a settlement under the usual conditions at Tsingtao.
2. The owners of the Railway will use the special police only to ensure security for traffic. They will be used for no other purposes.
3. The Police Force will be composed of Chinese, and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the Railway may select will be appointed by the Chinese Government.⁵³

⁵²Paris Peace Conference, V, p. 335.

⁵³Ibid., p. 363.

The last steps for the settlement of the Shantung controversy were taken on April 30th. Makino and Chinda felt that their countries should receive reimbursement for the expenses involved in keeping between 4,000 and 5,000 German prisoners-of-war. This cost was unilateral since only a very few Japanese were captured by the Germans. After Mr. George explained that if Japan put in such a claim, other nations would want similar considerations, Makino replied that he would not press the issue. The final step involved was the presentation of the draft of the Articles for incorporation into the Treaty concerning the disposition of the German rights and property in Kiaochow. The Japanese draft became the basis for Articles 156 and 157 of the Treaty of Versailles.⁵⁴

The Shantung settlement caused great consternation among the Chinese delegation and in fact, China later refused to sign the Treaty.⁵⁵ Reaction against President Wilson was equally bitter and the American press by large, condemned him for giving in to the Tokyo delegation. Wilson felt that the settlement was the best that could be obtained under the circumstances and expressed the hope that the League of Nations

⁵⁴Wiffeld, op. cit., p. 262.

⁵⁵Wood, op. cit., p. 21.

would mediate the abrogation of all foreign rights and interests in China.⁵⁶

A further source of friction between the United States and Japan arose over the little island of Yap. This island, located in the Carolines, was the center for the German cable to the Dutch East Indies, Shanghai and Guam. Through Guam, the cable connected with the American-owned Pacific cable which provided a communication network to the United States and across the Atlantic to the German cable system. By controlling Yap, the Japanese could virtually tie up all communications to the Orient. On April 21st and again on May 1st, Wilson made oral reservations that Yap should not be included in the Japanese Mandate. Nevertheless, the Japanese were awarded a mandate over the former German islands north of the equator on May 7th and Yap was not excepted from the Mandate. There is also not any official record that the President made an objection at the time of the award. This controversy continued until it was finally resolved at the Washington Conference in 1922.⁵⁷

In summary, the Japanese nation fared quite well at the Paris Peace Conference. Although the demand for racial

⁵⁶ Baker, op. cit., III, pp. 315-316.

⁵⁷ Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 506-508; Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 43-44.

equality to be included as a provision in the Treaty was not met, Nippon gained her other two objectives; continued control over the islands which she occupied and the transfer of the German leasehold in Shantung.

CHAPTER VI

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

The Paris Peace Conference left unsolved many issues arising out of the World War. One of the great areas of tension was in the Orient where neither China nor Japan was entirely satisfied with the post-war developments. The Chinese delegation refused to sign the Versailles Treaty and left Paris en route to Peking with the firm conviction that their country had been abandoned to the whims of the Japanese.¹ The Tokyo delegation returned home flushed with victory, having gained all of the desired objectives except for that of having racial equality written into the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Kasumigaseki, or Japanese Foreign Office, had to face equally vexing problems in the immediate post-war period. Tokyo's relations with Washington had rapidly deteriorated over the Siberian Intervention, the Shantung settlement, and the mandate of the island of Yap.² A new source of irritation and a blow to the Japanese pride arose over the question of restriction of immigration to the United States. The news of alien land laws and other meas-

¹Wood, op. cit., pp. 135-137.

²Latourette, op. cit., pp. 520-521.

ures directed against the Japanese in California incensed the Nipponese newspapers to almost hysterical proportions and served to foster anti-American feelings.³

Relations between London and Tokyo were also being re-evaluated. The Japanese military, political and industrial leaders favored renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had brought them participation in the war, a staunch ally in the peace negotiations and international prestige in the Far East. Britain, on the other hand, viewed the forthcoming renewal with mixed feelings. Nippon, with the third largest navy in the world was already challenging British spheres of influence in China and England's benefits from the Alliance were by no means commensurate to those gained by her partner. Mr. Lloyd George, while aware of America's anxiety over British obligations in the event of a war between the United States and Japan, decided in favor of renewal and gradually won all of the Dominion Prime Ministers to his viewpoint except Mr. Jan Smuts of South Africa who favored a revision of the Treaty and Mr. Arthur Meighen of Canada who proposed outright abrogation and placed Canada at the side of the United States.⁴ In an effort to allay the suspicion

³Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1936), III, pp. 17-18.

⁴Raymond L. Suell, The Washington Conference (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1922), p. 122; Griswold, op. cit., p. 298; J. B. Brebner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," Political Science Quarterly, L (March, 1935), p. 53.

of the United States and Canada, the two Alliance nations presented a joint declaration to the League of Nations in which they recognized that the Treaty, while in "harmony" with the spirit of the League, was not entirely consistent with the letter of the Covenant. The declaration went on to say that if the Alliance was renewed by the two partners, it must be in a form consistent with the Covenant.⁵

The most vexing post-war defense problem to Japan was the naval construction race. The Naval Service Appropriation Act of 1916 embarked the United States on an ambitious building program which would give America a naval fleet second to none.⁶ The Japanese Government planned an "eight-eight" construction program of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers but, for reasons of economy, the project was reduced in 1916 to eight battleships and four cruisers. Later, in 1919, the Tokyo Government, following the lead of Washington and London, reinstated the original plan.⁷

Following the war and peace provisions, sentiments developed in London and Washington for a reduction in the ship-

⁵Raymond L. Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1922), pp. 132-133.

⁶Benjamin H. Williams, The United States and Disarmament (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1931), pp. 133-136.

⁷Ichihashi Yamoto, The Washington Conference and After (Stanford University: Stanford University Press, 1928), p. 4.

building program of the three nations could be substantially reduced. In similar vein, Lord Lee of Fareham, First Lord of the Admiralty, suggested a naval understanding with the United States on the basis of parity.⁸

The White House announced on July 10th that the Governments of Great Britain, Japan, France and Italy had been approached to ascertain whether or not they would be willing to participate in a conference to consider limitation of armament and the problems of the Far East and the Pacific. The addition of the latter element was included by Secretary Charles E. Hughes at the suggestion of Lord Curzon.⁹ Actually Curzon wanted a preliminary meeting between representatives of London, Tokyo and Washington in order to prepare an agenda but Secretary Hughes was adamant and declared that he ruled out "a meeting which would partake of the nature of a preliminary conference."¹⁰ This was followed by formal invitations to Tokyo and other interested governments and which were extended by President Harding on August 11, 1921.¹¹

Nippon viewed such wide discussions with great suspi-

⁸Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1936), I, p. 27.

⁹Grissold, op. cit., pp. 293-296.

¹⁰Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, I, pp. 44-47.

¹¹Yanaga, op. cit., citing Ashida Hitoshi, Saikin Sekai Saikoshi, Vol. III, pp. 742-743.

cion. Some newspapers declared that the conference invitation created a national crisis. While the idea of an armament reduction program gained ready acceptance by the Japanese public, the inclusion of Far Eastern and Pacific affairs was not considered as a logical approach by the Japanese mind. The Foreign Ministry hesitated in accepting carte blanche the inclusion of discussion of far Eastern matters until "precisely informed of the nature and scope of these problems."¹² Secretary Hughes thereupon decided to sound out the views of Lord Curzon; he particularly wanted to know whether any suggestion of topics had already been made in Tokyo. Curzon replied that he thought that the conference should be limited to discussion of the "open door," the territorial integrity of China, Shantung, and "leased territory in and around the Pacific Ocean." The British wanted to eliminate from the discussion such matters as opium traffic, immigration, "possessions of Germany in the Pacific," (i.e., mandated areas), and the integrity of Russia.¹³ Hughes thereupon advised the Japanese Government of the general nature of the topics but held off on preparing a definite agenda, expressing the hope that the Japanese Government "would not press its inquiry in this

¹²Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, I, p. 31.

¹³Ibid., pp. 36-37.

matter because of the desirability of complete acceptance of this Government's invitation, leaving open to later determination the exact agenda."¹⁴ Tokyo reluctantly agreed to attend the Conference with this qualification that "the agenda thereof should be arranged in accordance with the main object of the discussions as above defined, and that introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern to certain particular powers or such matters that may be regarded accomplished facts should be scrupulously avoided."¹⁵ Nippon's dilemma was expressed in the following article which commented:

. . . the tone of the Japanese press indicated that the invitations had come as somewhat of a shock. The outstanding difficulties between Japan and the United States, involving the Conference issue; the objection of the United States to the Pacific mandates north of the Equator accorded Japan by the Peace Conference, especially as regards the cable rights of Yap; the disapproval of Japan's policy toward China and Siberia, and the alleged tendency of the United States to encourage the Chinese in their anti-Japanese campaign--all these, complicated by mutual distrust and the increase of naval armaments on both sides, made President Harding's invitation a not altogether agreeable surprise for Japan. . . .¹⁶

The delegation selected by the government to travel to Washington consisted of Navy Minister Baron (and Admiral)

¹⁴Foreign Relations of the United States, 1921, I, pp. 39-
42.

¹⁵Ibid., pp. 43-45.

¹⁶"The Disarmament Conference," Current History, (September, 1921), p. 217.

Katō Tomosaburō; House of Peers President Prince Tokugawa; Ambassador to the United States, Baron Shidehara Kijūrō; Vice Foreign Minister Hanihara Masano. The delegation was accompanied by over seventy legal, military, technical and administrative assistants. Prince Tokugawa later commented that the delegation was not equal in education and experience to that of some of the other leading powers.¹⁷

The basic instructions to the delegation were prepared by the Gaiko Chosakai and provided that: (1) Nippon is prepared to accept a curtailment of her naval armament as long as the national security is not impaired thereby; (2) She has no establishments in the Pacific which threaten the security of other nations nor did she intend to make any; (3) She was prepared to conclude an agreement to abolish all military and naval establishments in the Pacific that would threaten the peace and would abandon the military construction already started; (4) Japan was ready to extend the open door policy to Yap; (5) the principle of the open door would also apply to China. (6) the Shantung issue would only be discussed by direct negotiation with China.¹⁸

By September 10, 1921, the United States Government had prepared the draft of an agenda which was later approved

¹⁷Yanaga, op. cit., p. 419, citing Tokugawa Iyesato, "Kafu Kaigi ni Tafurū Toron," Taiyo, (March, 1922), pp. 98-99.

¹⁸Takeuchi, op. cit., p. 233.

by the nations attending the meeting subject to the qualification that additional items might be introduced:

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENT

I. Limitation of Naval Armament, under which shall be discussed:

- a. Basis of limitation.
- b. Extent.
- c. Fulfillment.

II. Rules for control of new agencies of warfare.

III. Limitation of land armament.

PACIFIC AND FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

I. Questions relating to China.

1. Principles to be applied.
2. Application.
 - a. Territorial integrity.
 - b. Administrative integrity.
 - c. Open door--equality of economic and industrial opportunity.
 - d. Concessions, monopolies, or preferential economic privileges.
 - e. Development of railways, including plans relating to Chinese Eastern Railway.
 - f. Preferential railroad rates.
 - g. Status of existing commitments.

II. Siberia (Similar headings)

III. Mandated Islands (Discussion of those questions not settled by earlier discussions).

ELECTRICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC

A discussion of unsettled questions involving the nature and scope of commitments under which claims of rights might be asserted.¹⁹

¹⁹ Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1922), p. 10. (Hereafter cited as Conference on the Limitation of Armament).

The opening session began on November 12, 1921, with Mr. Charles Evans Hughes presiding. President Harding officially welcomed the delegates and then left the hall, turning the meeting over to his Secretary of State. Mr. Hughes then launched into a speech which was marked by the absence of the platitudes and generalities usually presented in an opening session.²⁰ Mr. Hughes went directly into the heart of the matter by presenting a proposal for the limitation of armaments and declared:

. . . the core of the difficulty is to be found in the competition in naval programs, and that in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production must be abandoned. . . . There is only one adequate way and that is to end it now.

It is apparent that this cannot be accomplished without serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon ships under construction and building programs which are now under way cannot be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the present construction of capital ships goes forward, other ships will inevitably be built to rival them and this will lead to others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue lasts. The effort to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face them or yield our purpose.²¹

Mr. Hughes went on to state that "it would also seem to be a vital part of a plan for the limitation of naval armament

²⁰Latourette, op. cit., p. 522.

²¹Conference on the Limitation of Armament, p. 58.

that there should be a naval holiday. It is proposed that for a period of not later than ten years, there should be no further construction of capital ships."²² The Secretary also detailed the specific American, British and Japanese ships that should be scrapped. The entire assembly hall was electrified by the sweeping proposals presented in such an unexpected and dramatic manner. Sullivan states that Admiral Beatty of the British Navy "came forward in his chair with the manner of a bulldog sleeping on a sunny perch who had been hit in the stomach by the foot of an itinerant soap canvasser."²³ Another writer states that the Japanese took Mr. Hughes' speech "without the flicker of an eye," while Current History, to the contrary, described the Nipponese as "surprised."²⁴

The first agreement concluded at the Conference was the Four Power Pact, the terms of which were announced to the press on December 10th. The newspapers and indeed, many

²²"Arms Conference in Action," Current History, XV No. 3 (December, 1921), pp. xxx-xl.

²³Williams, op. cit., p. 144, citing Mark Sullivan, The Great Advantage at Washington (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1922), pp. 27-28.

²⁴Williams, op. cit., p. 144, citing Ida M. Tarbell, Peacemakers-Blessed and Otherwise (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 45; Current History, XV, op. cit., p. xx.

of the delegates were taken by surprise since the matters covered in the Pact were not included in the agenda.²⁵ Negotiations between Britain and the United States began on the evening prior to the first conference session. When two of the Japanese delegates called upon Mr. Balfour to discuss the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, Balfour dumbfounded them by telling the delegates that he was considering the replacement of the Alliance with a tripartite agreement and had already given the United States Government a draft of such a proposal.²⁶

Secretary Hughes wanted to broaden the Pact to include France. The Americans wanted to win France over to accepting her naval ratio and also felt it desirable to generalize the responsibilities under the Treaty. While neither Britain nor Japan wanted to include Paris on the grounds that it would dilute the effectiveness of the Pact, by December 7th, both nations agreed to permit the fourth member to enter into the negotiations.²⁷ In the meantime, Italy learned of the meetings and asked that she be included, however, Hughes turned down the request on the grounds that the Rome Government did

²⁵ Joan Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace, (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1955), pp. 151-152.

²⁶ Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 121.

²⁷ Ibid.

not have possessions in the Orient.²⁸ The final discussions pertaining to the Four-Power Treaty took place in the home of Secretary Hughes on December 8th and 9th. At the first of these meetings, Baron Shidehara proposed an amendment which provided that two of the powers could "in mutual agreement with each other" invite the remaining contracting parties to a joint conference. Hughes suspected that the Nipponese were using this as a means to continue the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and declared that this proposal was not acceptable.²⁹

By the terms of Article I of the Treaty, the four nations agreed to "respect their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean." They would further consult if there should develop "a controversy arising out of any Pacific question and involving their said rights." Article II provided that the Powers would, in the event of a threat by an outside Power, communicate with one another fully and frankly in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the ex-

²⁸ Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 121.

²⁹ Vinson, op. cit., p. 156.

agencies of the particular situation.³⁰ Japan fell into the category of an insular possession under the terms of the Treaty and many Japanese took it as an affront that the Treaty "should be interpreted as obligating the other contracting parties to extend even a moral assistance to the safeguarding of the territorial integrity of Japan proper."³¹ The Treaty was later amended to define Japan's insular possessions to include "only Karafuto, Formosa, the Pescadores and the islands under the Mandate of Japan."³² Under Article IV, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated, and thus a great source of concern to the United States was removed. Senator Lodge, in summarizing the effect of this termination declared that it "was necessary to the successful conclusion of the naval treaty."³³ The Nipponese delegation, obviously not happy over the outcome, dismissed the announcement of the new work with a brief statement that Japan would approve the treaty and that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance "had done much for the preservation of peace and liberty."³⁴

³⁰Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament (New York: Federal Trade Information Service, 1922), pp. 27-28.

³¹Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, Japan's Pacific Policy (New York: E.T. Dutton and Co., 1922), p. 66.

³²Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, p. 26.

³³Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 127.

³⁴Ibid., p. 126.

The negotiations for arriving at armament limitations commenced on November 19th with a meeting between Mr. Hughes, Baron Katō and Mr. Balfour. Baron Katō suggested that naval experts from the three countries form a sub-committee to examine the American proposal of a 5-5-3 ratio of capital ships. This committee was composed of Admiral Coontz and Captain Pratt for the United States; Admiral Beatty and Rear Admiral Chatfield for Britain; Vice Admiral Katō and Captain Uyeda for Japan.³⁵ The group had no sooner met than it became deadlocked over the issue of the ratio and Admiral Katō issued the following public statement on November 28th:

Owing to her geographical situation and to her peculiar national conditions, the imperative need of a navy is recognized by Japan in no less degree than by any other country; but Japan is resolved not to possess armaments in excess of the minimum strength for the bare necessity of insuring her national security. Japan is unable to accept the ratio of 60 per cent, because she considers it impossible to provide for her security and defense with any force less than 70 per cent. She desires to have the proposed ratio modified so that the relative strength of the three navies will be 10-10-7.³⁶

Mr. Balfour later called upon Baron Katō and expressed his disappointment that Japan could not agree with the pro-

³⁵Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 47.

³⁶Ibid., p. 48.

posed ratio and hoped that some way could be found to continue the negotiations and arrive at a settlement. Balfour asked Katō if he had any suggestions in which means could be found to reconcile the differences. The Baron replied that he could not act contrary to the considered opinion of his advisors nor against his government's wishes, however, he would do the best he could to break the deadlock. Katō went on to say that his country would like to see the "Settsu" substituted for the "Mutsu" which was scheduled to be scrapped in the proposal submitted by the Americans. Katō also expressed the desire of an agreement concerning the Pacific fortifications.³⁷

The following day, in a meeting with the other members of the "Big Three," the Tokyo delegate reiterated his desire for a 10-10-7 ratio by declaring:

A word as to the "Mutsu." She was completed a month ago and is fully equipped and manned. She was commissioned yesterday and has joined the fleet. But according to the American proposal she is in the list of ships to be scrapped. I must have good reasons for scrapping her. I face a situation at once serious and difficult; on one hand, I desire a harmonious conclusion on the limitation; and on the other hand, I must be equipped with reasons which will enable me to explain to the satisfaction of Japan. So far, I have been unable to find any means whereby mutual satisfaction can be obtained.

³⁷Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 49.

However, I said yesterday to Mr. Balfour, should it be possible for the Powers situated in the Pacific, particularly the United States and Japan, to maintain the status quo on their Pacific fortifications and naval bases, that would give me reason to satisfy the Japanese people.³⁸

Mr. Balfour followed by declaring that Great Britain was not entirely satisfied with the ratio either, but that his country was willing to accept with the desires of other states in an attempt for further disarmament. The committee did not meet again until December 12th at which time Katō reported that he received instructions from his Government in which Nippon would accept a 10-10-6 ratio provided that there was a clear understanding that the Powers, (including Japan), would maintain the status quo of the Pacific fortifications. Katō continued his Government's instructions by advising that the Mutsu was already 100% completed and in fact had made her first cruise of over 2,500 miles. The delegate argued that the Japanese people would not understand the reason for scrapping a ship that was already commissioned and that it would be a blow to the morale of the Japanese Navy. However, it would be possible to scrap the Settsu as a substitute.³⁹ Mr. Hughes countered Katō's proposition by declaring that the substitu-

³⁸ Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

tion of a post-Jutland type ship would upset the entire plan since it would mean that America would want to be compensated with similar appropriate substitutions. In line with this, Hughes later proposed that the United States keep the California and Washington and replace these ships with the North Dakota and the Delaware which in tonnage would amount to fifteen American ships to nine of the Japanese, with a maximum limitation of 35,000 tons each.⁴⁰

It was now the turn for Britain to make her claim and Balfour proposed that England retain the two "Super-Hoods" of 50,000 tons each. Balfour justified this action on the grounds that the plans had already been drawn and if substitution of style was required, new plans would take over a year to accomplish.⁴¹ A compromise agreement was finally reached on December 15th in which Great Britain was allowed to scrap four "King George V" type ships and build two "Super-Hoods" of 35,000 tons each. Even at this, Great Britain would have a total of 587,000 tons of capital ships against 525,000 for the United States. Finally, both the United States and Great Britain were limited to 525,000 replacement tonnage while

⁴⁰Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 55.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 56.

Japan was allowed 315,000. The agreements concerning France and Italy are not of particular significance to this thesis, however, after extended negotiations, both France and Italy agreed to a limitation of ten capital ships with the replacement tonnage established at 175,000.⁴² Agreements were also reached limiting the size of Aircraft Carriers to 10,000 tons; regulating the use of submarines in the attack of commercial ships and a prohibition against the use of noxious gases.⁴³

The agreements concerning the status quo of naval fortifications and bases in the Pacific provided:

The United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder:

1. The insular possessions which the United States now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands.

2. Hongkong and the insular possessions which the British Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, east of the Meridian of 110 degrees east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its territories, and (c) New Zealand.

3. The following insular territories and possessions of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo

⁴²Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, pp. 17-21.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 22-26.

Islands, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire. 44

In addition to the written agreement, the Powers agreed to apply the status quo to Guam, the Philippines, Hongkong, Amami-Oshima, the Bonins, Formosa, and the Pescadores.⁴⁵

The terms of the Treaty were especially significant to Japan since the nearest base where the United States could strengthen her existing fortifications was Hawaii, a distance of over 3,000 miles to Tokyo. At the same time, Japan was secure from an attack by Great Britain. This provision, together with the armament limitation program gave Tokyo a reasonable degree of security and Baron Katō, in a speech before the Japan Society of New York summarized his Government's viewpoint:

I think it is possible for me to say with reasonable certainty that the Conference on Disarmament has succeeded beyond the hopes of those who called it into being, and, in this connection, I have in mind your great President, who has done so much for this cause of international peace.⁴⁶

One of the most serious problems at the Conference concerned the settlement of the issues involving China and

⁴⁴Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁵Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 91.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 112.

her strained relations with Japan. Indeed, President Harding commented that "there existed with regard to the Far East causes of misunderstanding and sources of controversy which constituted a serious potential danger. These difficulties centered principally about China, where the developments of the past quarter of a century had produced a situation in which international rivalries, jealousies, distrust, and antagonisms were fostered."⁴⁷

The Tokyo delegation did not want to deal with any matters that were already a fait accompli. Japan however, had made several overtures for settlement of the Shantung problem and made several proposals to the Peking Government for the opening of direct negotiations.⁴⁸ China did not want to open direct talks on the basis that it implied a form of recognition of Japan's status in the peninsula. China's bargaining position was already weakened by the prestige of Japan, gained during the naval arms limitations discussions and public opinion somewhat changed in favor of Nippon. Nevertheless, China hoped to gain three concessions: tariff autonomy, the return of Shantung and cancellation of the Twenty-One De-

⁴⁷E. H. Carr, International Relations Since the Peace Treaties (London: Macmillan and Co., 1943), pp. 154-155.

⁴⁸Wood, op. cit., pp. 220-236.

The tariff concessions granted to the European Powers and Nippon had long worked a disadvantage to the Chinese Government. Since the signing of the Treaty of Nanking of 1842, China had been required to limit her tariff to 5% ad valorem rate on both imports and exports. While it was originally agreed that this tax would be modified commensurate to the rise and fall of prices, there were no revisions between the years 1853 and 1902, and between 1902 and 1918.⁵⁰ Yet the Powers did not hesitate to set their tariff rate for imports at from 25% to 100% ad valorem. In addition, China had a tax in the amount of 2½% which was collected by the various provincial governors for all goods passing in transit. This tax or likin weakened China's case since Great Britain, the United States and Japan agreed in 1902 and 1903 to pay a 12½% customs fee if the likin was abolished. This was never accomplished and her net return was decreasing with each rise in prices.⁵¹

Mr. Koo presented a request for tax revision to the Council on November 23, 1921, proposing a 12½% duty and

⁴⁹Duell, op. cit., pp. 242-245.

⁵⁰Ibid., 242-243.

⁵¹Ibid.

abolition of the likin. The matter was referred to a sub-committee which recommended an increase of 2½% which could be increased 5% for luxury goods. An ambiguous provision was included in the Treaty which was signed on February 22, 1922, and provided:

Within three months, a Special Conference shall meet in China to take immediate steps . . . to prepare the way for the abolition of the likin tax and raising the tariff to 12½ per cent. . . .⁵²

While this was not considered a satisfactory settlement by China, it nevertheless represented a marked improvement.

With reference to the Shantung issue, it was useless for Peking to bring the matter before the Conference since six out of nine Powers already adhered to the Treaty of Versailles. The way was opened for negotiations between the two hostile countries when the British and American delegations proposed that they furnish observers who would sit in on the talks and insure that China was not intimidated by Japan. The Peking delegation agreed to this proposal on November 30th. The main points at issue were the disposition of Japanese property (including the former German holdings), and control over the Tsingtao-Tainanfu Railroad. This line had been valued at \$32,000,000 silver dollars and Germany was credited with this amount in her reparation account. The

⁵²Buell, op. cit., p. 252.

Peking delegation agreed to pay this amount in a meeting held on December 14th, provided that Japan would then immediately relinquish control. The Tokyo group rejected this offer and proposed that China borrow the money from Japan, repaying it back over a period of twenty years. They further proposed that Nipponese experts be assigned the positions of Chief Engineer, Chief Accountant and Traffic Manager. China made a counter-offer of furnishing Treasury Notes which would be payable over a twelve year period. This was unacceptable to Japan and the delegation now proposed that China make a cash payment with the purchase price to be paid in Mexican dollars and deposited in a neutral bank. To this, China suggested that payments be made every three months over a nine month period. This was rejected and the conference adjourned sine die on December 20, 1921. Negotiations reopened on January 5th only to break up again the following day over a similiar deadlock.⁵³

A compromise settlement was hastened by the news that United States Senator Walsh introduced a resolution calling upon the President to furnish information as to the state of the Shantung negotiations.⁵⁴ The Japanese were aware of the

⁵³Buell, op. cit., pp. 255-260.

⁵⁴ibid., p. 261.

fact that the Senate would hardly ratify the Naval Treaty if an agreement could not be found concerning Shantung. In a final agreement, China was to pay Japan the assessed valuation of the railroad with Treasury Notes which might be spread over a fifteen year period. Public properties constructed by Japan were also to be reimbursed by China with the provision that no payment was to be made for former German property. This was later followed by an agreement to withdraw all Japanese troops from the Tsingtao-Tsinanfu railroad zone and by May 4th, all Japanese troops had been withdrawn.⁵⁵

China, on December 14th, submitted her demand for the abrogation of the Treaties of 1915, (based upon the "Twenty-One Demands"). The Peking delegate cited the constant stand that the treaties were not legally recognized by China since they were unilateral and inconsistent with the principles of the Conference. The Japanese, in a conciliatory move, agreed to withdraw her reservation for later negotiations of Group V of the demands, (miscellaneous demands), and also agreed to forsake the question of furnishing Japanese advisors or instructors on political, military or police matters in South Manchuria. After China reserved the right

⁵⁵Wood, op. cit., pp. 262-275.

for future action, the matter was dropped on February 4, 1922.⁵⁶

Secretary Hughes introduced the question of the "Open Door" policy on January 16th by offering a draft resolution which read in part:

With a view to applying more effectually the principle of the open door or equality of opportunity for the trade and industry of all nations, the powers represented in this conference agree not to seek or support their nationals in asserting any arrangements which might purport to establish in favor of their interests any general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region of the territories of China.⁵⁷

Article IV of the draft of the agreement provided that "any provisions of an existing concession which appear inconsistent with those of another concession or with the principles of the above agreement" might be referred to a board of reference.⁵⁸ Baron Shidehara objected to this provision on the grounds that it might imply a retroactive application. Sir Robert Borden proposed that this article be dropped and this was agreed upon by the other Powers in attendance. The Nine Power Treaty was signed on February 6th, 1922, by the United States, Japan, Belgium, The British Empire, China,

⁵⁶ Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 305.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 193-194.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 196.

France, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal. In this fact the Powers agreed:

1. To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China.
2. To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government.
3. To use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China.
4. To refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.⁵⁹

In the remaining articles, the Powers pledged to carry out "the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity in China;" to refrain from creating "spheres of influence;" to respect China's right as a neutral in case of war; and to consult with each other "whenever a situation arises which . . . involves the application of the stipulations of the present Treaty."⁶⁰

China was not successful in her plea for the termination of extraterritoriality and further action was postponed until 1925. The Powers, including Japan, resolved to abolish all

⁵⁹Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference of the Limitation of Armament, p. 32.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 32.

foreign post offices within China effective January 1, 1923. This provision did not apply to the leased territories nor to those areas where they were operated with the consent of the Chinese Government.⁶¹

The matter of the mandate of the island of Yap was settled in a satisfactory manner. The United States and Japan signed a treaty on February 11, 1922, which provided that American citizens would be given equal footing with Japanese subjects "in all that relates to the landing and operation of the existing Yap-Guam cable," or any other cable that the United States might construct in the future. In return, Washington gave recognition to Tokyo's mandate over the island.⁶²

The remaining issue involving the presence of Japanese troops in Siberia was quickly resolved when Baron Shidehara read a fifteen minute speech in which Nippon disclaimed any designs on Siberia and promised to evacuate "as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government."⁶³

The Washington Conference did much to stabilize the

⁶¹Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference of the Limitation of Armament, p. 41.

⁶²Buell, op. cit., pp. 445-449.

⁶³Ibid., p. 311.

peace in the Orient and better the strained relations between Japan on one hand and the United States and China on the other. The concessions made by Tokyo at Washington greatly raised her stature in the eyes of the Western Powers and provided a temporary improvement in her relations with China. The success of the Conference was largely due to the dynamic leadership and persuasion of Secretary Hughes, who was assisted by Mr. Balfour in many of the negotiations with the Japanese. While the Conference was not a success insofar as the long term effect upon Sino-Japanese relations were concerned, it was a far better example of the above board conduct of diplomatic negotiations than the Paris Peace Conference which preceded it a few years before.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The chief diplomatic events which directly contributed to Japan's rise in international power and prestige during the twenty year period, 1902-1922, have been briefly presented.

The years following the arrival of Perry's "black ships" demonstrated to Nippon that the West had a materialistic superiority and technical knowledge which she too must gain in order to develop into a modern nation. The treaties forced upon her by the American and European powers demonstrated Nippon's lack of governmental and legal knowledge of diplomatic methods. The restoration of the emperor would mark a period of national cohesion and which demonstrated the Japanese nation as perhaps the most thoroughly integrated country in the world. The constitutions and governmental machinery, legal codes, armed forces and industrial techniques were studied in the leading capitals of the world in order to bring Yamato out of the feudal age.

The success of the modernization period was demonstrated by the crushing defeat over China. Yet the Triple Intervention served as a warning that Tokyo could not expect to

stand alone against a combination of nations. Following her second major military victory in the Russo-Japanese war, the Tokyo Government undertook by a series of treaties, alliances and "notes" both open and secret, to define her status in China and Korea. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, first signed in 1902, and renewed in 1905 and 1911, was Tokyo's first defensive alliance with any foreign nation and it cannot be denied that Japan lived up to the obligations towards her partner, Britain.

The World War years brought Nippon both praise and universal condemnation. While she participated in the war to a limited degree, her harsh treatment of China as represented by the "Twenty-One Demands" did much to sway world opinion in favor of China. The Peking Government however, was not entirely without fault. Avarice for money, power struggles and national disunity contributed to China's weakness. On one hand, China could deliberately negotiate heavy loans involving millions of dollars; on the other, she could disown them on the grounds that they were not legal in form.

Prince Saionji led his delegation to Paris convinced that, with the exception of the racial equality issue, Japan could not possibly lose its case since she had already obtained advance approval of two of her desiderata by secret

treaties and agreements concerning the Shantung leasehold and the German colonies north of the equator. The achievement of these two goals gave her a temporary victory which was to be partially shattered at the Washington Conference.

Prince Tokugawa and his colleagues went to Washington in 1921 with a suspicion that Nippon was due to lose some of her wartime gains. The open and frank approach of Secretary Hughes, so contrary to the indirect and vague approach so peculiar to the oriental concept of "face," startled the Japanese delegation. They wholeheartedly joined in the spirit of the negotiations and one cannot but admire their forthright manner in negotiating the Five Power Naval Treaty. By the terms of this Treaty, Nippon gained a reasonable assurance that it would not be attacked by either the United States or Great Britain. At the same time, Japan was allowed to retain a relative share of its naval tonnage.

The failure of London to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alliance came as a blow to the delegation and indeed, to Japan. The Four Power Pact, while acceptable in form, was not considered to be in the same light as their first defensive alliance which endured the test of time.

The Nine Power Treaty, in turn, was a keen disappointment to China in that it did not go far enough in giving her

complete autonomy over her affairs. In face of world opinion, Tokyo gave Peking some concessions which were at least equal to those of the West.

The matter of the Shantung settlement was hotly debated and the mediation of Secretary Hughes and Mr. Balfour largely aided the two nations in reaching a satisfactory settlement. The remaining issues of Siberia and Yap were easily disposed of. In a fifteen minute speech, Baron Shidehara promised that Japanese troops would leave Siberia. The Yap mandate to Japan was confirmed by the American Government; Nippon, in turn, agreed to grant full use of the cable station to the United States.

The reasons behind Japan's actions are not treated in this study. However, during these twenty years, she was striving for status and power. The achievements of these objectives was readily gained and the events of later history serves to illustrate that this is so.

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An English version of Viscount Ishii's work, Gaiko Yoroku. Ishii not only discusses Japan's role in diplomacy during his thirty years as a diplomat but also presents his private views on Japan's place in the world. This work is especially valuable because of his detailed discussion of the controversial issue of the Lansing-Ishii "Notes."

Kawakami, Kiyoshi K. Japan's Pacific Policy. New York: E. T. Dutton and Company, 1922.

A defense of Nipponese foreign policy by a prolific writer of a series of similiar articles and books, most of which attack the West.

Kroger, A. L. Anthropology. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1948.

A standard Anthropology text of secondary importance to this study.

Lansing, Robert. The Peace Negotiations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921.

A chronological review and defense of Lansing's role at the Paris Peace Conference negotiations written in answer to criticism by President Wilson of the Secretary of State's role in Paris.

_____. War Memoirs. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935.

The recollections of the former Secretary of State concerning his tenure of office during the war years. This work is important to this study because of Lansing's direct negotiations with the Ishii Mission.

MacNair, Harley F. and Donald F. Lach. Modern Far East International Relations. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1950.

A standard college text which emphasizes the twentieth century events in the Far East. The text contains excellent maps and illustrations and is useful for a supplementary reference source.

Porter, Robert P. Japan - The Rise of a Modern Power. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919.

A historical and socio-economic survey of Nippon which portrays the rise of Japan as a Great Power and which traces Japanese history from 66 B.C., to the World War I period.

Price, Ernest Batson. The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1933.

A collection of the secret and public treaties concerning the spheres of influence and other agreements reached between the Tokyo and St. Petersburg Governments in reference to Manchuria and Mongolia.

Royama, Masamichi. Foreign Policy of Japan. Tokyo: Japan Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941.

A brief survey of the foreign policy of Japan which includes a discussion concerning the aims of the Japanese Government at the Paris Peace Conference.

Reynour, Charles. The Intimate Papers of Colonel House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1923.

A chronological collection of the papers of Colonel House arranged in a narrative form and covering the period from June, 1918 to August, 1919. The text is an excellent study of the American Commissioner's role at the Peace Conference in Paris.

Steiger, G. Nye. A History of the Far East. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1944.

A detailed history of the Far East with emphasis upon China and Japan

Takeuchi, Tatsuji. War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire. New York: Doubleday Doran and Company, 1935.

A scholarly study of the constitutional organization of Japan and the procedural conduct and control of foreign policy.

Taylor, A. J. F. Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1875-1918. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1934.

A masterful history of Europe which has but limited application to this study.

Tokutomi, Iichiro. Japanese-American Relations. New York: Macmillan Company, 1922.

A short study of relations between Japan and the United States which places emphasis upon many controversial matters such as immigration, alien land-laws, anti-Japanese legislation, etc. In general, the text is critical of the foreign policy of the United States towards Japan.

Treat, Payson J. Japan and the United States. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1921.

A short history of Japanese-United States relations during the period 1853-1921.

_____. The Far East. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1928.
A basic text on Far Eastern history of limited value to this study.

Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954.

A standard text on the history of Russia which has but limited application to this study.

Vinson, John Chalmers. The Parchment Peace. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1955.

A study of the Washington Conference with emphasis on the role of the United States Senate at the Conference.

Willoughby, Westel W. Foreign Rights and Interests in China. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1920.

A study of the rights of the Western Powers and Japan in China. The text is well-documented and a valuable contribution to the field of Chinese foreign relations.

White, John Albert. The Siberian Intervention. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.

This text details the history of the Siberian Intervention from the initial development of the plans for intervention to the final withdrawal of the Japanese forces in 1922. It is especially valuable to this study because of the complete coverage of the subject matter.

Williams, Benjamin H. The United States and Disarmament. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1931.

An informative and detailed study of the role of the United States in international conferences pertaining to disarmament. Williams analyzes the "Sea-Power Theory" of history as well as the American naval needs. The section pertaining to the Washington Conference has excellent details as to the personalities and negotiations.

Wood, Ge Zay. The Shantung Question. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1922.

A study of the Shantung controversy from the German occupation of the Kiaochow Bay in 1897 to the conclusion of the Shantung Agreement on February 4, 1922. The text tends to play down the irresponsible Chinese officials who negotiated treaties and loans with the Japanese Government.

Wright, Quincy. Mandates Under The League of Nations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930.

A documented and thorough study of the various mandates granted by the League of Nations.

Yanaga, Chitoshi. Japan Since Perry. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1949.

A complete chronological history of Japan with excellent detail and documentation. The author's knowledge of the Japanese language and his extensive research into Japanese historical and political science articles has given his text a more balanced view without becoming overly pro-Japanese.

Young, A. Morgan. Japan Under Taishō Tenno 1912-1926. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1929.

A survey of Japanese history during the reign of Emperor Taishō. This work is of limited value because of its superficial coverage of many of the issues during these important years.

B. BOOKS: PARTS OF SERIES

Baker, Ray Stannard. Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. 3 vols. New York: Doubleday Page and Company, 1922.

The first two volumes discuss the role of Wilson and his American and foreign associates at the Paris Peace Conference while the third volume contains the text of various letters and memoranda issued by Wilson and the American delegation.

Halsey, Francis W. (ed.). The Literary Digest History of the World War. 10 vols. New York: Funk and Wagnalls Co., 1919.

A popular history of the World War. Volume IX contains an excellent account of the Japanese campaign for the capture of Tsingtao.

Miller, David Hunter. The Drafting of the Covenant. 2 vols. New York: Doubleday Page and Company, 1922.

The first volume presents a detailed discussion of the various meetings leading to the drafting of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The second volume contains reprints of the documents concerned with the drafting of the Covenant.

Horison, Elting S. (ed.). The Letters of Theodora Roosevelt. 3 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951.

A collection of the letters of the former President dating from 1868 until his death in 1919. In the cited volume, there is some coverage of the President's role at the Portsmouth Peace Conference.

Reynolds, Francis J., Allen L. Churchill and Francis T. Miller, The Story of the Great War. 3 vols. New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1916.

Another popular series on World War I., which gives some detail to the military role of Japan.

C. PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, LEARNED SOCIETIES,
AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

Conference on the Limitation of Armament, Washington, November 12, 1921 - February 6, 1922. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.

A French-English detailed account of the proceedings at the Washington Conference.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914; 1914-1920 (The Lansing Papers, II); 1917 (Supplement I); 1919 (Paris Peace Conference, I, III, V); 1920, III; 1921, I. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922, 1940, 1923, 1931, 1943, 1936, 1936. (Year of publication listed in the order cited).

A collection of notes and other official documents pertaining to the foreign relations of the United States for the years referred to. This series is especially valuable as a primary source of information.

Gooch, G. P. and Harold Temperley. (ed.). British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914. 11 vols. London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1926.

An edited collection of British documents which is another excellent primary source of material.

History of the Japanese-German War of 1914. 4 vols. Volumes are on file at the Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas and were translated from Japanese volumes bearing the same title in 1935. No author or editor's name is given and the name of the translator is not stated.

A Japanese General Staff report on World War I as it pertained to the Japanese Army and Navy.

MacMurray, John V. A., (ed.). Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China 1894-1919. 2 vols. New York: Oxford University Press, 1921.

A collection of state papers and other documents pertaining to treaties concerning China and published under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Manchurian Treaties and Agreements. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1921.

A short summary of the provisions of treaties concerning Manchuria.

The Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States, 1917. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1918.

A summary of the Ishii Mission's visit to the United States.

Treaties and Resolutions of the Conference on the Limitation of Armament. New York: Federal Trade Information Services, 1922.

A short compilation of some of the more important treaties and resolutions at the above conference.

D. PERIODICALS

"Arms Conference in Action," Current History, XV, No. 3. (December, 1921), pp. xxx-xl.

A descriptive article concerning the proceedings at the opening phase of the Washington Conference.

Blakeslee, George H. "The Mandates of the Pacific," Foreign Affairs, I (September, 1922), pp. 99-100.

A short article on the mandated Pacific islands which includes a discussion of those islands under the suzerainty of Japan.

Brebner, J. H. "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," Political Science Quarterly, L, (March, 1935), p. 53.

A summary of Canada's stand on opposing the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Ferguson, John C. "Japan's Use of Her Hegemony," North American Review, CCX (October, 1919), p. 458.

An analysis of Nippon's plan to extend her influence and control on the mainland of Asia.

Fifield, Russell W. "Japanese Policy toward the Shantung Questions at the Paris Peace Conference," The Journal of Modern History, XXIII (September, 1951), p. 257.

A summary of the Japanese stand on the Shantung issue.

Jenks, Jeremiah W. "Japan in Action," North American Review CCX (September, 1919), p. 319.

A news article concerning Japanese negotiations during the Lansing-Ishii discussions.

"The Disarmament Conference," Current History, (September, 1921), p. 917.

An article which in part describes the effect upon the Japanese public of the invitation for Nippon to attend the Washington Conference.

Young, Robert. "Japan at Kiaochow and the Peace Conference," The Contemporary Review, CKV (March, 1919), p. 231.

A restatement of the Japanese position at Kiaochow and her negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference.

E. UNPUBLISHED MATERIALS

Case, Homer. "The Capture of Tsingtau," unpublished research study, The Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1933.

An excellent military study of the campaign for the capture of Tsingtau, complete with maps and documentation from both Japanese and German sources.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LIST OF IMPORTANT PERSONAGES

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION AT TIME OF REFERENCE</u>
Baker, Ray S.	Director, United States Press Bureau, Paris Peace Conference.
Bliss, General Tasker H.	United States Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Bryan, William Jennings	U. S. Secretary of State.
Cecil, Lord Robert	British Under-Secretary of State.
Chang, Tsung-hsiang	Chinese Minister at Tokyo.
Chinda, Sutemi	Japanese Ambassador at London and Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Clemenceau, Georges	President of the Council of the Republic and leader of the French Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference.
Curzon, Lord George N.	British Foreign Minister.
Delcasse, Theophile	French Foreign Minister.
Fillmore, Willard	President of the United States.
George, David Lloyd	British Prime Minister.
Goto, Shinpei	Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Graves, General William S.	Commander of American Forces in Siberia.
Greene, Sir J.	British Ambassador at Tokyo.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION AT TIME OF REFERENCE</u>
Grey, Sir Edward	British Foreign Secretary.
Hanabusa, Yoshimoto	Japanese Minister to Korea.
Haninara, Masanao	Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister.
Harding, Warren G.	President of the United States.
Harris, Townsend	American Consul at Japan.
Hay, John	U.S. Secretary of State.
Hayashi, Tadasu	Japanese Minister at London.
Hioki, Eki	Japanese Minister to China.
Horvat, General Dmitri L.	Manager of the Chinese-Eastern Railway and Russian anti-Bolshevik leader.
House, Edward M.	Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Hughes, Charles Evans	U. S. Secretary of State.
Hughes, W. M.	Australian Prime Minister and Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Ijuin, H.	Japanese Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Inouye, Kaoru	Japanese Foreign Minister and Elder Statesman.
Ishii, Kikujiro	Japanese Special Envoy to the United States.
Ito, Hirobumi	Japanese Elder Statesman and Resident-General of Korea.
Iyemitsu	Japanese Shōgun.
Kamio, General	Japanese Commander in battle for capture of Tsingtao.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION AT TIME OF REFERENCE</u>
Katō, Takaaki	Japanese Foreign Minister.
Kerensky, A.	Leader of Russian Provisional Government.
Komura, Jataro	Japanese Foreign Minister.
Koo, V.K. Wellington	Chinese Minister at Washington and Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Lansing, Robert	Secretary of State.
Li Hung-chang	Chinese Viceroy.
Li Yuan-hung	President of China.
Lvov, Georgii	Prime Minister of Provisional Russian Government.
Makino, Nobuaki	Japanese Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Matsui, H. K.	Japanese Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Meighen, Arthur	Canadian Prime Minister.
Morris, Roland S.	American Ambassador at Tokyo.
Okuma, Shigenobu	Japanese Foreign Minister.
Perry, Matthew C.	American Admiral (then Commodore).
Plunkets, F. A.	British Minister to Japan.
Reinsch, Paul S.	American Minister at Peking.
Roosevelt, Theodore	President of the United States.
Root, Elihu	Secretary of State.
Saionji, Kimochi	Leader of the Japanese Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.

<u>NAME</u>	<u>POSITION AT TIME OF REFERENCE</u>
Semenov, Gregory	Russian Cossack Military Leader.
Shidehara, Kijuro	Japanese Ambassador to the United States and Delegate to the Washington Conference.
Smuts, Jans Christian	South African Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Spring-Rice, Cecil	British Minister at Washington.
Sun-Yat-Sen	Chinese Revolutionary Leader.
Sze, Sao-Ke Alfred	Chinese Minister at London and Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Takahira, Baron	Japanese Ambassador to the United States.
Tokugawa, Prince	President of the House of Peers and leader of the Japanese Delegation to the Washington Conference.
Tuan, Chi-jui	Chinese Prime Minister.
Ts'u Hsi	Chinese Dowager Empress.
von Eckhardstein, Baron	German <u>Charge d'Affaires</u> at London.
Wang, C. T.	Chinese Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Wei, Sunchow	Chinese Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference.
Wilson, Woodrow	President of the United States.
Witte, Sergei	Russian Minister of Finance.
Yuan Shih-k'ai	President of China.

APPENDIX B

AGREEMENT RELATIVE TO CHINA AND COREA, JANUARY 30, 1902¹

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan, actuated solely by a desire to maintain the status quo and general peace in the extreme East, being moreover specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of Empire of Empire of China and the Empire of Corea and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations, hereby agree as follows:

Article I. The High Contracting Parties having mutually recognized the independence of China and Corea declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view however, their special interests, of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Corea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Corea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects.

Article II. If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defence of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally.

Article III. If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

¹British Documents on the Origins of the War, II,
pp. 115-118.

Article IV. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the interests above described.

Article V. Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, the above-mentioned interests are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly.

Article VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for five years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said five years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof, etc.

Done in duplicate at London, the 30th day of January, 1902.

[L.S.] LANSDORNE

[L.S.] NAYASHI

APPENDIX C

AGREEMENT RESPECTING THE INTEGRITY OF CHINA, THE GENERAL
PEACE OF EASTERN ASIA AND INDIA AND THE TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
AND SPECIAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES IN THOSE REGIONS
AUGUST 12, 1905

The Government of Great Britain and Japan, being desirous of replacing the Agreement concluded between them on the 30th January 1902, by fresh stipulations, have agreed upon the following Articles, which have for their object:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and India.

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions.

Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard these menaced rights or interests.

Article II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

¹ British Documents on the Origins of the War, IV,
pp. 165-169.

Article III. Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations.

Article IV. Great Britain having a special interest in all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right to take such measures in the proximity of that frontier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions.

Article V. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

Article VI. As regards the present war between Japan and Russia, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict neutrality unless some other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against Japan, in which case Great Britain will come to the assistance of Japan, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with Japan.

Article VII. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the Contracting Parties who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interests.

Article VIII. The present Agreement shall, subject to the provisions of Article VI, come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date.

In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof etc.

Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 1905.

[L.S.] LANSDOWNE
His Britannic Majesty's Principal
Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

[L.S.] TADASHI HAYASHI
Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary of His
Majesty the Emperor
of Japan at the
Court of St. James.

APPENDIX D

AGREEMENT RESPECTING THE INTEGRITY OF CHINA, THE GENERAL
PEACE OF EASTERN ASIA AND INDIA AND THE TERRITORIAL RIGHTS
AND SPECIAL INTERESTS OF THE PARTIES IN THOSE REGIONS,
JULY 31, 1911¹

PREAMBLE

The Government of Great Britain and the Government of Japan, having in view the important changes which have taken place in the situation since the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of the 12th of August 1905, and believing that revision of that Agreement responding to such changes would contribute to general stability and repose, have agreed upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as the said Agreement, namely:

(a) The consolidation and maintenance of the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India.

(b) The preservation of the common interests of all Powers in China by insuring the independence and integrity of the Chinese Empire and the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations in China.

(c) The maintenance of the territorial rights of the High Contracting Parties in the regions of Eastern Asia and of India, and the defence of their special interests in the said regions:

Article I. It is agreed that whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights and interests.

Article II. If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any Power

¹British Documents on the Origins of the War, VIII,
pp. 532-533.

or Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the preamble of this Agreement, the other High Contracting party will at once come to the assistance of its ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.

Article III. The High Contracting Parties agree that neither of them will, without consulting the other, enter into separate arrangements with another Power to the prejudice of the objects described in the preamble of this Agreement.

Article IV. Should either High Contracting Party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it is agreed that nothing in this Agreement shall entail upon such Contracting Party an obligation to go to war with the Power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force.

Article V. The conditions under which armed assistance shall be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the present Agreement, and the means by which such assistance is to be made available, will be arranged by the Naval and Military authorities of the High Contracting Parties, who will from time to time consult one another fully and freely upon all questions of mutual interest.

Article VI. The present Agreement shall come into effect immediately after the date of its signature, and remain in force for ten years from that date. In case neither of the High Contracting Parties should have notified twelve months before the expiration of the said ten years the intention of terminating it, it shall remain binding until the expiration of one year from the day on which either of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounced it. But if, when the date fixed for its expiration arrives, either ally is actually engaged in war, the alliance shall, ipso facto, continue until peace is concluded.

In faith whereof, etc.

Done in duplicate at London, on the 13th day of July 1911.

S. GRAY
His Britannic Majesty's
Principal Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

TAKAAMI KATO,
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty
the Emperor of Japan at
the Court of St. James.

APPENDIX E

THE TREATY OF ANNEXATION, SIGNED AUGUST 29TH, 1910 BETWEEN
RESIDENT-GENERAL VISCOUNT TERAUCHI AND MR. YI WAN-YONG,
MINISTER PRESIDENT OF STATE OF KOREA.¹

ARTICLE I

The Emperor of Korea to make complete and permanent
cession to the Emperor of Japan of all rights and sovereignty
over the whole of Korea.

ARTICLE II

The Emperor of Japan to accept the above-mentioned
cession, and to consent to the complete annexation of Korea
to the Empire of Japan.

ARTICLE III

The Emperor of Japan to accord to the Emperor of Korea,
ex-Emperor and Crown Prince of Korea and their Consorts such
titles, dignities, and honors as are appropriate to their
respective ranks, and sufficient annual grants to be made
for the maintenance of such titles, dignities and honours.

ARTICLE IV

The relatives of the Emperor of Korea also to receive
due dignities, titles, honours and solatia.

ARTICLE V

The Emperor of Japan to confer peerages and monetary
grants upon Koreans who, on account of meritorious services
are regarded as deserving special recognition.

ARTICLE VI

In consequence of the aforesaid Annexation, the Govern-
ment of Japan will assume the entire government and administra-
tion of Chosen and undertake to afford full protection for the
life and property of Koreans obeying the laws in force, and to
promote the welfare of all such.

¹Chung, op. cit., pp. 225-226.

ARTICLE VIII

The Government of Japan, so far as circumstances permit will employ in the public service of Japan, Koreans who accept the new regime loyally and in good faith and who are duly qualified for such service.

APPENDIX F

TEXT OF THE JAPANESE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST GERMANY¹

We hereby declare war against Germany and we command our Army and Navy to carry on hostilities against that empire with all their strength, and we also command all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.

Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effort of which we view with grave concern, we, on our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, our ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiao-chau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while her armed vessels, cruising the seas of eastern Asia, are threatening our commerce and that of our ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy.

Accordingly, our Government and that of his Britannic Majesty, after a full and frank communication with each other, agreed to take such measures as may be necessary for the protection of the general interest contemplated in the agreement of alliance, and we on our part, being desirous to attain that object by peaceful means, commanded our Government to offer, with sincerity, an advice to the German Government. By the last day appointed for the purpose, however, our Government failed to receive an answer accepting our advice.

It is with profound regret that we, in spite of our ardent devotion to the cause of peace, are thus compelled to declare war, especially for our lamented mother.

It is our earnest wish that, by the loyalty and valor of our faithful subjects, peace may soon be restored and the glory of the empire enhanced.

¹History of the Japanese-German War of 1914, (translation from the Japanese original source and on file at Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), I, pp. 10-11.

APPENDIX G

THE LANSHING-ISHII EXCHANGE OF NOTES, NOVEMBER, 1917¹Note from the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, November 2, 1917

Excellency:

I have the honor to communicate herein my understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversations touching the questions of mutual interest to our governments relating to the Republic of China.

In order to silence mischievous reports that have from time to time been circulated it is believed by us that a public announcement once more of the desires and intentions shared by our two governments with regard to China is advisable.

The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the government of the United States recognized that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous.

The Territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired and the government of the United States has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the Imperial Japanese government that while geographical position gives Japan such special interests they have no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted by China in treaties with other powers.

The governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China, and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China.

¹The Imperial Japanese Mission to the United States, 1917 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1918), Publication No. 15, pp. 121-122.

Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed to the acquisition by any government of any special rights or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.

I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm this understanding of the agreement reached by us.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Robert Lansing

Note from the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State

THE SPECIAL MISSION OF JAPAN

Washington, November 2, 1917

Sir:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today, communicating to me your understanding of the agreement reached by us in our recent conversation touching the questions of mutual interests to our governments relating to the republic of China.

I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorization of my government, the understanding in question set forth in the following terms:

Here the special Ambassador repeats the language of the agreement as given in Secretary Lansing's note.

(Signed) K. Ishii
Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary of Japan
on Special Mission

Honorable Robert Lansing
Secretary of State