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Palestine: The origin and establishment of a mandate, 1914-1922

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PALESTINE: THE ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT
OF A MANDATE - 1914-1922

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Pamela M. Haviland

November, 1971

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Accepted for the faculty of The Graduate College of
the University of Nebraska at Omaha, in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

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Chairman *Hist*

PREFACE

The study and/or investigation of Judaism, Zionism, and the state of Israel is one of general interest to the modern world, for more reasons than its place in contemporary world affairs; it is also closely connected with a high degree of emotionalism. The primary reason for this emotional interest is that Israel—the old Palestine—is the natal land of three major religious sects: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

The period of time covered by this thesis—1914-1922—is of significance to the investigation of modern Israel in that the Twentieth Century state was born during this brief span of time. The success of a late nationalistic movement, late in comparison to the emergence of nationalism, can be seen in the natal stages. Perhaps more than a nationalistic movement, the Zionist movement was a nativistic attack on Europe in that Zionism fulfills the terms of a defined nativistic movement, i.e., a belief that your group is being submerged, and that everything—real and ideological—is being taken from you. Just as Wivoka of the Paiute appeared at a propitious time in his cultural history, so did Theodore Herzl and Chaim Weizmann appear in the Jew's. Whereas most of these movements do not ultimately succeed,

the Zionists did. They accomplished their goal of universal recognition as a group, and as a nation.

Whereas this thesis covers a vital period in the history of Zionism, it is not a systematic and complete analysis of the subject. The emphasis, rather, is on the evolutionary political/diplomatic process which created the Jewish state, from whence sprang many of the current and contemporary problems of the world. The use and spelling of Arabic and Turkish terms and names created some problem, in that different sources used different spellings. With the exception of direct quotations I have adopted a consistent system of spelling for this enterprise. Although it might differ from contemporary spellings, the forms used, did tend to appear in sources more frequently than others.

In an attempt such as this, full acknowledgement of help—scholastic and other—can only be barely touched upon. The careful and considerate advice and direction of my advisor, Dr. A. Stanley Trickett, should be duly noted, and much thanks given for his patience. To Dr. Ert Gum, Dr. Roy M. Robbins, and the other members of the graduate faculty at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, grateful appreciation is felt for the course work and also for the opportunity to complete my Master of Arts program through the aid of a Graduate assistantship, without which this degree could not have been completed. To Marian Nelson special thanks are offered for the constant "prod," the

needed and necessary criticism, and the welcome friendship. Although only indirectly connected with this thesis, the faculty and my students of John F. Kennedy High School, in Bloomington, Minnesota, should be mentioned as a catalytic agent in my completion of the requirements for this degree. The time and work of my typist, Mrs. Henry Pinkerton, is also recorded with great appreciation, but is also deeply felt, in that she took on the job when I was desperate, and did so with no complaint.

Last, but definitely not least, this thesis could not have been completed without the loving consideration and encouragement of my family. My mother, who aided in portions of the preliminary typing; my father for his interest and willingness to discuss problems and theories; and to my brother Francis, and sister CeLora for their concern, if not their understanding, in the enterprise. To my family, then, I deeply and lovingly offer my thanks for the constant query: "How's the thesis coming?"

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage ourselves.¹
—Theodore Herzl¹

The issuance of the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 was not a spontaneous action on the part of Great Britain. Rather it was an effort to support common British and Zionist interests in the Middle East, primarily in Palestine, and represented the culmination of joint British and Jewish activities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It appeared that world events, and the needs of Zionism, "embraced each other at the most propitious" moment as if the two were "on a divinely pre-arranged planned parenthood."²

Zionist philosophy, a new interpretation of the Jewish quest for a homeland, sprang from the reactionary pressures exerted by nineteenth century Eastern Europe, and

¹Theodore Herzl, The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question (New York: American Zionist Council, 1946), p. 28. Hereafter cited as, Herzl, Jewish State.

²Max I. Dimont, Jews, God and History (New York: Signet Books, 1962), p. 395. Hereafter cited as Dimont, Jews.

an increasingly anti-semitic Western Europe. The basic aim of Zionism was the preservation of Jewish culture in spite of growing forces aimed at its destruction. Despite opposition, the Jews developed a blueprint for their state; and a concept for survival was, by the late nineteenth century, being forged into an actual strategy for survival.³

British affairs in the Middle East were grounded in nineteenth century imperialistic interests, and the need to protect the lifeline to India and the Far East. Although less importantly and less obviously, there also appears to have been a strong desire to rectify the wrongs that had been committed against the Jews. The factors contributing to the eventual creation of a Jewish state, however, would evolve from political and diplomatic motivations, rather than religious idealism.

While the British interest in the Middle East was relatively recent, the restoration of the Holy Land to the Jews was not a new idea, nor was Great Britain the only nation interested in the plan. With the decline of the Turkish Empire during the nineteenth century, there was a growing interest on the part of European powers to establish a better basis for influencing, and controlling, developments in the area. The three dominant contestants in this battle

³Dimont, Jews, p. 395. cf. Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (2nd ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 55 ff. Hereafter cited as Halpern, State.

for influence and supremacy were France, Russia and Great Britain, and after the completion of the Suez Canal this contest increased. The significant questions to be answered were: How did the modern Jewish program for autonomous Jewish statehood come into being? And, what nation could best sponsor the drive for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine?

As the contest for imperialistic supremacy between France, Russia and Great Britain developed in the Middle East, a movement among Eastern European Jews occurred simultaneously. The transformation of a nebulous idea, or theory, regarding a Jewish state into an actual plan for such a state began to take place about 1860. At that time the messianic idea of a return to Zion was converted into a hard political reality for a return to Palestine.⁴ The general attitude among Jews appeared to be that a peaceful life could not be achieved by simply moving to another country, or another city, but only through the establishment of an independent Jewish state. According to Judah Pinsker, an early Zionist,

⁴S.W. Baron, A Social and Religious History of the Jews (12 vols.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), II, 329. Hereafter cited as Baron, History. The motivating factor in this change in philosophy appears to be when the anti-Jewishness of the Middle Ages changed to the anti-semitism of Modern History; the old feelings being one of religious prejudice and the new one of racial prejudice. Dimont, Jews, p. 395. cf. Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc., Palestine: A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies (2 vols.; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), II, 1. Hereafter cited as Esco, Palestine.

anti-semitism was a problem that could not be solved by exchanging a minority status in one country, for minority status in another. Anti-semitism, according to Pinsker, was a permanent, psycho-pathological phenomenon which could only be eliminated through the creation of a separate Jewish state.⁵

Through the authors of a series of books and pamphlets published between 1860 and 1890, the route from the Diaspora to Palestine was "paved with a succession of ideas."⁶ The authors of these tracts were primarily East European Jews, and it was through their writings that the way was prepared for the man who would be the epitome of the militant Jew—Theodore Herzl.

The result of the nineteenth century drive to achieve the "Jewish ideal" was the World Zionist Organization, largely the work of Theodore Herzl. The creation of an independent state in Palestine became the goal of that group. Political sovereignty, however, was not an absolute and immediate goal of the movement. Whereas in other nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, sovereignty was an

⁵Leo W. Schwarz, ed., Great Ages and Ideas of the Jewish People (New York: Random House, Inc., 1956), p. 435. Hereafter cited as Schwarz, Ideas.

⁶Among these nationalist authors can be found such names as Moses Hess, Peretz Smolenskin, Samuel Mohilever, and Judah Pinsker, whose Auto-Emancipation was definitely anti-assimilationist in its outlook, and became a dominant theme with Herzl. Dimont, Jews, p. 396.

urgent demand, the Zionists first desired a land in which to concentrate their efforts; sovereignty was, therefore, of secondary importance. It was the search for a homeland that dominated Zionist activities in the early stages of development.⁷

Herzl's interest in the Jewish problem was not dominant in his life until 1882, when he discovered Eugen Dühring's The Jewish Problem as a Problem of Race, Morals and Culture.⁸ Prior to the reading of this book, Herzl felt that assimilation was the solution for the problem confronting the Jews of Europe. After reading Dühring, however, with its dominant theme of the need for reinstatement of the Medieval ghetto, Herzl amended his philosophy.⁹ Where he had previously thought that assimilation through any means—even apparently impractical ones, such as mass baptism, or a romantic confrontation between Gentile and Jew in a public duel—were desirable, there was one train of thought common to all of his proposals: the firm conviction that the Jewish question had to come to the attention of the public, and had to be openly discussed, by both Jew and Gentile, if a

⁷Halpern, State, pp. 22-23.

⁸This work, published in 1881, represented an early attempt to give a scientific basis for anti-semitism.

⁹Alex Bein, Theodore Herzl: A Biography, trans. by Maurice Samuel (Philadelphia: Jewish Publishing Society, 1940), p. 35. Hereafter cited as Bein, Herzl.

workable solution was to be found.¹⁰

The Dreyfus Affair in France acted as the catalytic agent that drastically changed Herzl's philosophy, for in this trial he recognized the complete failure of his earlier theories of emancipation and assimilation. Dreyfus personified the assimilated Jew, and in the treatment received by him, Herzl saw the emancipated-assimilated Jew forced back into the ghetto and role of scape-goat. To him the entire affair embodied more than a judicial error, it embodied

the desire of a vast majority of the French to condemn a Jew, and to condemn all Jews in this one Jew."¹¹ It was only after he had accepted this revelation of the basic fallacy in his previous theories, that the idea of a Jewish state began to dominate his philosophy. Only after he realized that anti-semitism stemmed from a characteristic of the social structure—and not a religious difference—did Theodore Herzl become a Zionist.¹²

Realizing that the primary problem confronting widely separated Jews was the absence of political leadership, Herzl formulated a theory to rectify the difficulty. With the initiation of the publication Der Judenstat, the messianic

¹⁰Josephine Kamm, The Hebrew People: A History of the Jews (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 177. Hereafter cited as Kamm, Hebrew. At this time Herzl was not aware of Hess and Pinsker, and thought of his philosophy as a unique one.

¹¹Herzl, Jewish State, p. 34

¹²Dimont, Jews, p. 398.

desire for a return to Zion became an active and cohesive political force. The philosophy of the Zionist movement was simply stated in the preface of Herzl's book: "The idea which I have developed in this pamphlet is a very old one: it is the restoration of the Jewish State."¹³ In giving definite expression to the idea of an independent Jewish state, Herzl verbalized the old ideal of the Jewish people—"Next year in Jerusalem!"¹⁴ At no place in the pamphlet did he specifically mention a preferred territory, although two areas referred to were Argentina and Palestine—one was fertile with a good climate and small population; while the other was the historic homeland of the Jewish people. The ultimate choice of location, determined by Jewish public opinion, would make the resultant move a voluntary exodus to a selected and defined area possessing potential for the evolution of an autonomous Jewish state.¹⁵ In an effort to aid colonization by Jewish settlers in the proposed territories, the Jewish Colonization Association was established in 1891, with a founding capital of £2,000,000.¹⁶ The

¹³ Bein, Herzl, pp. 160-61.

¹⁴ D. R. Elston, Israel: The Making of a Nation (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 11. Hereafter cited as Elston, Israel.

¹⁵ Dimont, Jews, p. 398.

¹⁶ Nahum Sokolow, History of Zionism: 1600-1918 (2 vols.; London: Longmans and Greene, 1919), I, 258. Hereafter cited as Sokolow, Zionism. Memorandum of association: "To assist and promote the emigration of Jews

initial plan was to seek the financial aid of wealthy Jewish bankers and philanthropists, and acquire a charter from the Ottoman Sultan which would permit Jewish colonization in Palestine, for it was felt that the Jewish immigrant could not love the Argentine as he loved the "Promised Land" and the "historic home" of Jerusalem,¹⁷ despite the geographic advantages offered by the Argentine.

During the convocation of the first Zionist Congress in Basle, 1897, the Zionist Organization firmly stated its basic purpose:

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law . . . [and] preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent . . . to the attainment of [this] aim of Zionism.¹⁸

After the establishment of the Zionist Organization and the formal statement of its philosophy, steps were taken to find a sponsor. It was not surprising that Herzl's native state, Germany, was the first choice. The bulk of the Zionists held German or East European heritage, but negotiations with the Kaiser's government deteriorated into a

from any part of Europe or Asia—and primarily from countries in which they [may be persecuted or discriminated against]—to any parts of the world, and to form and establish colonies in various parts of North and South America and other countries for agricultural, commercial and other purposes.

"To purchase and acquire . . . any territories, lands, or other property . . . for developing . . . the same for colonization." Ibid., I, 253.

¹⁷ Sokolow, Zionism, I, 259.

¹⁸ Ibid., I, pp. 268-69. cf. Basle Program, Appendix A, p. 152.

frustrating discussion of conflicting interests and claims. Discouraged by Germany's response to the suggestion of establishing a protectorate, the Jews began the search for another sponsor.¹⁹

In 1901 Herzl attempted to convince the Sultan that Jewish industrial and intellectual awareness could be of great assistance in the reorganization and modernization of the Turkish economy. The Sultan expressed interest in the idea, however, he appeared to be more interested in having the Zionist Organization fund the national debt of the Ottoman Empire.²⁰ The following year a final attempt was made to obtain the permission of the Ottoman government to establish a Jewish land commission for Palestine. Hopefully, such a commission would be allowed to plan for unlimited Jewish settlement, with local autonomy for the settlements. The Sultan, however, refused to accede to the requests for autonomy, but offered instead, permission to settle, in all parts of the empire—with the exclusion of Palestine, as

¹⁹The reversal in Germany's original interest in the proposal was probably the result of her fear of upsetting Turkey, who disfavored the plan; and out of the apparent possibility of creating trouble with the Triple Entente—each of which had a very real interest in the Middle East. cf. Bein, Herzl, p. 307.

²⁰Howard Morley Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History (New York: Dell Publishing House, 1958), p. 273. Hereafter cited as Sachar, Modern Jewish History. cf. Schwarz, Ideas, p. 437, and Leonard Stein, The Balfour Declaration (London: Vallentine-Mitchell, 1961), p. 23. Hereafter cited as Stein, Balfour.

citizens of the Ottoman Empire.²¹

Another bid for sponsorship, made to the Vatican, proved to be unsuccessful also. Through Cardinal Merry del Val, of the Papal court, the Church refused sponsorship to the Zionists as long as they remained unconverted to Catholicism. The Pope, more outspoken than his representative, stated simply: "We cannot favor this movement."²²

Desperately turning to Russia for sponsorship, the Zionists pointed out to von Plehve, the representative of the Tsar, that support of their program would bring an end to much of the religious turmoil in Russia. Von Plehve, anxious to rid Russia of the troublesome Jewish element, appeared interested in the scheme, only to reverse his opinion when diplomatic negotiations revealed that other members of the evolving Triple Entente were not in favor of such a move. The dire political situation in Russia also necessitated immediate attention, to the abandonment of the Zionist program and its possible support by the Tsar.

The Jews were finally forced to turn to Great Britain, for the support necessary to allow the implementation of their plans for the founding of a Jewish state—a program which had gained the endorsement of the World Zionist Conference.²³ It was in England that Herzl saw possible success because "of

²¹Schwarz, Ideas, p. 439.

²²Ibid.

²³Bein, Herzl, p. 379.

the general situation there it was the Archimedian point where the lever could be applied "24 most effectively. The Zionists felt that England seemed more willing to recognize the significance of their movement and with the convocation of their Fourth Congress in London (1901), the English publicly issued comments favoring the drive for a Jewish state.²⁵

The Zionist hierarchy entered into negotiations with Great Britain for an area of land in the Sinai Peninsula—El-Arish—an enterprise eventually doomed to failure because of British affairs in Egypt, and the arid conditions of the area which were not favorable to agrarian enterprise. In the summer of 1903, however, Herzl was notified by Joseph Chamberlain that an ideal location had been found for Zionist settlement—in Uganda, a portion of British East Africa. The terms of the Uganda Project were stated in a letter to L. J. Greenberg, which included a proposal for a Jewish Colonial Trust to support the settlement in East Africa and to initiate the colonization process.²⁶ Herzl reluctantly accepted the Uganda offer as offering temporary Jewish asylum, and prepared to present the British offer to the Sixth World Congress (1903) for ratification.

During the Jewish-Turkish negotiations the once-united Zionist front had suffered an internal breach which

²⁴Sokolow, Zionism, I, 295.

²⁵Ibid., I, 296.

²⁶Ibid., I, pp. 296-97.

continued to expand and which became openly apparent at the Fifth Zionist Congress (1901). The difficulty centered on internal opposition to Herzl and his leadership. The Congress split between those loyal to Herzl and his belief that persistent diplomacy would win the fight for a Jewish state; and the "Politicals" (The Democratic Zionist Fraction) —the activists—who felt that since diplomacy had failed, violence and weapons must be employed to decide the question of statehood.²⁷ The latter segment included, primarily, Russian Jews who, because of the severity of the pogroms of 1903-1904, felt an almost fanatical need to reach Palestine, and, thus, expressed open dissatisfaction with the slowness of the diplomatic methods of Herzl. It was to these Eastern Jews—the Democratic Zionist Fraction—that the ultimate leadership of the movement would pass. This group, while not ignoring the political character of Zionism, tended to emphasize the cultural aspects of Judaism, and aimed for an expression of nationalism which was based on a common cultural heritage of world Jewry.²⁸

The dissension in the Zionist Organization became openly evident in 1903, when Herzl presented the alternate British proposal of a Jewish settlement in Uganda. In spite of the fact that he stressed that it was to be used as a Nachtasyl—a temporary home—and a preparatory step towards

²⁷Dimont, Jews, p. 399.

²⁸Halpern, Jewish State, p. 1

the eventual colonization of Palestine, the proposal was received with mixed emotions. Herzl's opponents felt that the basic policies of Zionism had been betrayed. As a result, Menahem Mende Ussishkin, head of the Russian delegation, presented a resolution to the meeting that Herzl not be allowed to continue the negotiations for territorial recognition in the name of the Conference, unless the territory involved was Palestine or Syria. Nothing but Palestine, "the land of the Book," would be acceptable to the eastern faction of the Congress.²⁹ The faction that supported Herzl, on the other hand—the western or aristocratic faction—tended to agree with Herzl, that a quick political settlement, even though temporary, was the best possible action to take.³⁰

A committee sent to investigate Uganda as a possible area for settlement, reported in 1905 that the proposed territory was unsuitable for agricultural settlement. After the majority of the Congress voted against Uganda as a stepping stone to Palestine, or as an end in itself, the project was shelved.³¹

The East African offer

not only precipitated a crisis within Zionism, but also—and here-in lies its significance—raised Zionism to the rank of a political movement of international importance, and demonstrated the

²⁹Elston, Israel, p. 12.

³⁰Sacher, Modern Jewish History, p. 278.

³¹Esco, Palestine, I, 49.

interest of the British Government in a solution of the Jewish problem.³²

Even though Herzl's one political success, the Uganda scheme, failed, it established a very important precedent for future negotiations between the two parties. It set the stage for the Zionist's shift from Germany and Turkey and concentration of all her efforts on England. In the future, the door that had been carefully opened by Chamberlain's African offer permitted "an easier access to the England of Balfour ."³³ and, eventually, to the recognition of a Jewish state.

The refusal of the Eastern Jews to follow Herzl resulted in their calling a separate convention in Kharkov, Russia, where they committed themselves "permanently and exclusively to the idea of Palestine"³⁴ as the sole site for Jewish colonization. It was the ideological conflict within the Jewish movement that revealed, to the Herzl faction, the strength of the eastern faction's desire for Palestine.

It was then, too, that Herzl grasped an inescapable portent: it was only a matter of time before the potent reservoir of Ostjuden [Eastern Jews] would take over the movement altogether.³⁵

With the death of Herzl and the election of David Wolffsohn as President, in 1907, a fusion of the "practical"

³²Sokolow, Zionism, I, 297-98.

³³Herzl, Jewish State, p. 16.

³⁴Sachar, Modern Jewish History, p. 278.

³⁵Ibid.

and the "political" elements occurred, and this united group pledged itself to seek Palestine as the area for settlement, as the only area that would satisfactorily solve the problem of persecution in Eastern Europe. It was generally conceded that all agricultural settlements in areas other than Palestine had failed, and it was

not far from Russia [and Central Europe], and [was] unquestionably so adapted to cultivation that as soon as the soil [was] prepared the main stream of . . . migration [would] be directed . . . ³⁶

there. The Congress of 1907 created the Palestine Department to aid in the colonization of Palestine. The next decade would witness the bulk of the major developments in the Zionist movement taking place in Palestine, and on the eve of World War I, the World Zionist Organization of the German-Jewish "politicals," came under the control of the "more numerous and infinitely more passionate folk-Zionists of the Pale"³⁷—the Eastern Jew.

While negotiations for recognition and support had been going on, Jewish settlement in Palestine had been slowly, but steadily, taking place. In 1905 a new wave of immigrants began to arrive in Palestine—the second Aliyah, (the first having been in 1882 by the "lovers of Zion.") Small, but consistent, and primarily agrarian based pre-World War I colonization occurred, so that by the outbreak

³⁶Sokolow, Zionism, II, lii.

³⁷Sachar, Modern Jewish History, p. 283.

of the war approximately forty Jewish settlements in Palestine existed, with a total population estimated at twelve thousand on farms and an estimated fifty thousand Jewish settlers in towns or cities.³⁸ The language problem, resulting from the varied nationalities of the settlers, resulted in the encouragement of Hebrew as a national language—a development which aided in the formulation of a national identity and unity.

As a result of the activities of the Zionist Congress and its subsidiaries, the foundation of a Jewish home in Palestine had already effectively been started by 1914. Political recognition of the Zionist cause had received tentative approval by both German and English governments, but public recognition and acceptance was still required if a Jewish state were to become a reality.

The "moral-legal" foundation for establishing a Jewish state in Palestine was built during the first World War, the resultant Peace Conference at Paris, and creation of the League of Nations. The accomplishment of this fact came about, primarily, as the result of two documents: the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, and the Mandate for Palestine, which implemented the Balfour Declaration, issued

³⁸ Arthur Ruppin, The Jewish Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1934), p. 368. Hereafter cited as Ruppin, Jewish World. The Israel State Handbook, Facts About Israel (Jerusalem, 1966), gives the total Jewish population in the area as being 85,000.

on July 24, 1922. Three main groups or factions were connected with these documents, and, therefore, with the resolution of the problem of political recognition of a Jewish state. The desires of the Jews to have a homeland was the first, and foremost, concern of the Jewish element; second, the desire of the Arabs to obtain independence from the Turks must be met; and the imperialistic interests of England and France, in reference to the Middle East, had to be reconciled. The solution to the problem of the Jewish state was inextricably tied up with all three, and the creation of the Mandate for Palestine evolved out of a comedy of errors resulting in attempts to solve all three problems without regard for the future consequences of the multiple promises made during the course of the negotiations.

CHAPTER II

SECRET TREATIES AND ABORTIVE PROMISES

. . . and whosoever considers that the nature of men, especially of men in authority, is inclined rather to commit two errors than to retract one, will not marvel that from this root of unadvisedness, so many and tall branches of mischief have proceeded.

—Clarendon, History of the Rebellion¹

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo and the world war which followed, reshaped many states in Europe and the Middle East, and instituted a marked change in the world Jewish community. Despite the fact that during the same period a new wave of anti-Semitism swept the continent, the Zionists gained additional support for their program and finally achieved their goal of reaching Palestine—the British would conquer the Middle East, "and the Zionist dream [would] become a reality."² It is doubtful, if this goal could have been realized, had it not been for the violent transformation in diplomacy which evolved as a result of the all-encompassing conflict of the Great War.

¹Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle-Eastern Studies (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 82. Hereafter cited as Kedourie, Chatham House.

²Abram Leon Sachar, A History of the Jews (5th ed.; New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), p. 362. Hereafter cited as Sachar, Jews.

The dichotomy of Great Britain's foreign policy was part of this process. England had to shelve long-term goals in the interest of relatively short-term goals; goals that were necessary for "securing immediate tactical advantage over the enemy."³

Between early August and the end of October, 1914, Great Britain tensely waited for a move by the Turkish Empire to end its neutral status and, because of the immediacy of the situation, England was forced to make a "number of contradictory commitments" ⁴ among them the Husain-McMahon Agreement and the Sykes-Picot Treaty—negotiations dictated by need and expediency. Should the Turks enter the war on the side of Germany, England would be faced not only with a two-front war, but also with the possibility of losing access to natural resources and supplies from the East. Because of this great threat, the War Office worried about the defense of the route to India, while the Admiralty was equally concerned over the safety of English oil resources in Persia,⁵ for the

³George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to Modern Times (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 129. Hereafter cited as Kirk, History of the Middle East.

⁴Ibid., p. 124.

⁵Ann Williams, Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa (London: MacMillan, 1968), p. 9. Hereafter cited as Williams, Britain and France. For an explanation of the impact of Persian oil cf., Yahya Armajani, Middle East: Past and Present (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), pp. 228 ff. Hereafter cited as Armajani, Middle East.

. . . Turkish Empire lay across the track by land or water to [Britain's] great possessions in the East It was vital for . . . [England's] interests that once the Turks declared war against . . . [her] , [they] should defeat . . . them.⁶

Prior to the outbreak of the war in 1914, the Foreign Office gave only slight attention to relations with the Arab people, primarily because of its traditional policy towards the Ottoman Empire—a policy dictated by the necessity to protect routes to the Middle East, and the Far East. Any independent contact with the Arabs would directly violate this policy and would question the supremacy and sovereignty of the Ottoman government in this area. England could not risk antagonizing the Porte in any way so long as it remained neutral. Lord Kitchener, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt,⁷ however, toyed with the idea of British sponsorship of the establishment of an Arab state to offset any imperial loss of influence, which might result from the growing friendliness between the Sultan and Germany.⁸ As early as February, 1914, the Arabs had approached Kitchener, through their representative Abdullah, one of the sons of the Sharif

⁶David Lloyd George, War Memoirs (6 vols.; London: 1933-36), IV, 1802-03.

⁷Sir Llewellyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War of 1914-1918 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 114. Hereafter cited as Woodward, Great Britain.

⁸H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris (6 vols.; London: Henry Frowde and Hodder & Stoughton, 1924), VI, 120. Hereafter cited as Temperley, Peace Conference.

of Mecca, regarding the possibility of British aid, or support for an Arab revolt against the Turkish Empire. The Consul-General refused the representative's request, and even denied a request for partial aid. Great Britain felt she could not support a rebellion against a country with which she had friendly diplomatic relations. However, to ascertain the exact wishes and position of Husain, Ronald Storrs, Oriental Secretary to the British Agency in Egypt, was sent to Abdullah shortly after this initial contact had been made. Storrs was asked "categorically whether Great Britain would present the Grand Sharif with a dozen machine guns"⁹ to be used by the Arabs against the Turks. This request was refused by Storrs, who once again reiterated that Great Britain could not support a rebellion against a country with which she had a working diplomatic arrangement.¹⁰ Although nothing came of these early Anglo-Arab conversations, a foundation had been established for future contacts between the two parties, should the need arise.

From August through October, 1914, the Turkish government continued to maintain a neutral position, at least theoretically. However, when it became apparent that Turkey was

⁹Ronald Storrs, Orientations (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson, 1937), p. 143. cf. G. P. Gooch and H. W. V. Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origin of the War (10 vols.; London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1926-38), X, 827. Hereafter cited as Gooch and Temperley, Documents.

¹⁰Storrs, Orientations, p. 143.

moving towards a German alliance, Great Britain rapidly revised her policies toward the Arabs. New arrangements were necessary to fill the vacuum which would result from a German-Turkish alliance. After Turkey entered the war on November 5, 1914, England prepared to exploit the mutual antagonism that existed between the Arabs and the Ottoman Empire. Generally, it was the attitude of the British representatives in Khartoum and at Cairo, that successful military campaigns against the Turks required Arab support for the allied effort. Should the Ottoman Sultan declare a Jihad¹¹ against the allied countries, by claiming the war to be anti-Muslim in its orientation, the possibility of countering such a program in the Arab world, as well as among Moslem troops of the Indian Army, could only be found in some form of Anglo-Arab alliance.¹²

Lord Kitchener directed Storrs, in September, 1914, to approach Husain on the possibility of an alliance between England and the Arabs. In return for Arab support, Kitchener proposed to supply and support an Arab revolution, which he had previously refused to do. The Sharif, in a rather ambiguous and noncommittal statement, replied that he would be willing to negotiate such an agreement with England, but

¹¹Jihad is Arabic for "holy war." To participate in Jihad was one of the methods to achieve Paradise, according to Islamic doctrine.

¹²Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 16. cf., Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 120.

indicated that immediate military action on his part was not possible because of the lack of preparedness among the Arabs.¹³ He offered cooperation in non-violent ways, however, by agreeing to refuse the Jihad to be proclaimed in any of the mosques under his control.

Initiation of formal negotiations between Husain and Great Britain can be dated with the cable which Kitchener sent to Cairo on November 1, 1914:¹⁴

If Arab nation assist England in this war England will guarantee that no intervention takes place in Arabia and will give Arabs every assistance against external foreign aggression.¹⁵

Husain, repeating his earlier message, informed the Foreign Office in Cairo that he favored supporting England and desired British aid in any revolution, but stipulated that overt action against Turkey could not come from the Arabs without extensive preparation. He maintained that the Arabs lacked sufficient strength, at that time, to wage an all-out rebellion against Turkey.¹⁶

Great Britain declared war on Turkey, November 5

¹³Gooch and Temperley, Documents, X, 831-32. cf., Storrs, Orientations, p. 175.

¹⁴Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 120. The Ottoman Empire had joined Germany on October 31, 1914, and the British telegram was sent the following day.

¹⁵Storrs, Orientations, p. 176.

¹⁶George Antonius, The Arab Awakening in the Story of the Arab National Movement (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939), pp. 132 ff. Hereafter cited as Antonius, Arab Awakening,

1914, thus abandoning her traditional Eastern policy and included the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as one of her war aims. According to Grey, it was "the Ottoman Government who rang the death-knell of Ottoman dominion not only in Europe, but in Asia,"¹⁷ not England and her allies. In The Times, November 16, 1914, the British Foreign Office, now convinced of the importance of an Arab revolt against the Turks, stated that England had no plans to conduct military operations in the Near East unless it became absolutely necessary to protect Arab interests "against Turkish aggression, or to support attempts by Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule." Hoping to expedite Husain's actions, Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the Sudan,¹⁸ received instructions to encourage the Arabs to break with the Ottoman Empire, by issuing "liberal promises of future aggrandisement,"¹⁹ and to let it be known that should the Turks be defeated, Great Britain would make it one of the peace conditions that the Arabian Peninsula and the Holy Cities of the Hejaz be left

¹⁷The Times (London), November 10, 1914.

¹⁸Wingate wanted to back the Arabs and was openly sympathetic towards their cause. He also felt that an Anglo-Arab alliance would greatly increase Great Britain's position in the area, for the ". . . historic position of the Arabs within Islam made them the only effective counterpoise to the anglophobia of the Ottomans, which . . . would increase after the war." Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 17.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 14.

in the control of an independent Moslem state. Husain still delayed in taking any military action against the Turks, but did fulfill his promise of refusing the Sultan's request to preach Jihad against the allies, which had been declared on November 23, 1914.²⁰

While the fighting had just begun in the East, the diplomats of the Western powers already assumed "the death of the Turkish Empire and were planning its obsequies."²¹ These movements and activities involved the completion of viable agreements with the Arabs, England, France, and Russia, and also included plans for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

Great Britain sought an Arab alliance with full awareness of Arab animosity towards the fulfillment of French imperialistic desires in Syria and Palestine. Working for a strengthened position in the area, the British viewed the mobilization of Arab and Bedouin troops along the southern border of Palestine as a definite threat to the security of her position in this area. The unsuccessful Turkish attack on the Suez Canal in February, 1915, brought the strategic importance and location of Palestine as a possible sight for future Turkish-German attacks on the canal, forcibly to the attention of the British War Office.

²⁰ Armajani, Middle East, p. 291.

²¹ Williams, Britain and France, p. 11

In the early spring of 1915, the Foreign Office appointed a committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, to study the problem of the future of the Ottoman Empire.²² Instructions to this committee directed them to pay special attention to British desiderata in the Middle East, and more specifically to Palestine.

In accordance with British interests in the area, the committee reported to the War Council on June 30, 1915, that, in their opinion, the French should not be allowed to annex Palestine, for a French Palestine might pose a future threat to British security in the Suez region. They opposed British annexation, however, for the " . . . Empire [was] wide enough already and [the] task [was] to consolidate the possessions [they] already [held] . . . ,"²³ not to increase the imperial confines. They proposed, rather, a new formula for Turkish partition, and, in anticipation of the eventual defeat of Turkey, nine specific areas of interest were

²²The Committee was composed of: Mr. G. R. Clerk, Foreign Office; Sir J. W. Holderness, India Office; Admiral Sir H. B. Jackson, Admiralty; Major-General C. E. Callwell, War Office; Sir Mark Sykes and Sir T. H. Smith, Board of Trade. A copy of the committee's report can be found in the Austen Chamberlain Papers, (Box AC 19), University of Birmingham, Birmingham, England.

²³Great Britain, Cabinet, Ad Hoc Committees (secret), "Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister. 1915. British Desiderata in Turkey-in-Asia," Cabinet Meetings 27/1, p. 4. Hereafter cited as Cabinet, Ad Hoc., as cited by Aaron S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 5. Hereafter cited as Klieman, British Policy.

proposed or identified. The committee recommended official "recognition and consolidation" of England's position in the Persian Gulf, for the exploitation of the oil production in this area; the "exploitation of Mesopotamia as a granary" and a possible area for future Indian immigration; and the solidification of England's position in the Eastern Mediterranean and Persian Gulf through a "minimum increase of naval expenditure and responsibility." The de Bunsen Committee also gave specific recommendations concerning the Arabs, by recommending the enforcement of the "assurances" that had already been given to Husain and any that might be made in the future. The retention of the Moslem Holy Places "under independent Moslem rule" should be guaranteed.²⁴ Lastly, Palestine had to be recognized as a country whose destiny was the concern of both belligerent and neutral, and, therefore, should be the subject of special negotiation after the conclusion of the war.²⁵ The consensus of the committee was that partition of the area was the answer to the Eastern question, but with retention of a substantially intact Empire with a decentralized administration,²⁶ which, besides being

²⁴Klieman, British Policy, p. 5.

²⁵Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and Command), 1939, Vol. XIV (Reports, vol. 83), Cmnd. 5974, "Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916," p. 51. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, Report.

²⁶Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 15

of vital interest to England, would "give Turkey in Asia some prospect of a permanent existence," and yet free Anatolia, Armenia, Iraq and Palestine from Ottoman domination, thereby allowing "them a chance to foster and develop their own resources " and destinies."²⁷

The members of the committee thought that their recommendations would satisfy England's allies who were insisting "upon an alteration of the status quo ante bellum and an end to Ottoman independence."²⁸ The tone of the de Bunsen findings was detached and simply advised Great Britain to abandon any idea of claiming Palestine, for the committee was certain that the French would not be successful in their attempts to claim the area, and, therefore, Britain would not have to be overly worried about its disposal.²⁹ The de Bunsen proposal, however, never received official endorsement by the government, and it soon became evident that only the complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire would satisfy the various interests of the Entente. Even though the modest recommendations of the de Bunsen committee failed to receive government endorsement, its basic framework was used in the future negotiations with the Arabs, French and the Zionists.

²⁷Cabinet, Ad Hoc, p. 6.

²⁸Klieman, British Policy, p. 6

²⁹Stein, Balfour, p. 247.

The de Bunsen statement became the pivotal point for the ensuing British diplomatic relations with regard to the Middle East. The Committee report provided for

any future policy at a time when the exigencies of war, the effects of uncoordinated decision-making, and the excesses of secret diplomatic bargaining had not yet complicated Great Britain's position

in the Middle East.

In the early months of 1915, Great Britain was still free of any obligations to support an Arab revolution, but she had made a commitment to recognize an Arab state.³¹ On July 14, 1915, the first move towards active Anglo-Arab collaboration was made when Husain, who had been tentatively accepted as Arab spokesman by the Arabs, after he had agreed to accept the terms of the Damascus Protocol,³² sent the first of many letters to Sir Henry McMahon.³³ In this letter the Sharif asked for England's approval of several "fundamental propositions," if a revolt against the Turks was to become a reality. The proposals requested British recognition of Arab independence in the Arabian Peninsula and all

³⁰Klieman, British Policy, p. 5.

³¹Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 123.

³²The Damascus Protocol stated that if the Arabs revolted against the Ottoman Empire, England would have to recognize an independent Arab state in Arabia, Palestine, Syria and Iraq. Kirk, History of the Middle East, pp. 125-26.

³³Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 157.

of Syria, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, and Palestine. Aden was excluded from the demands and was to be left as it was—under the control of the British. The area proposed as Arab was to be bounded to the east by Persia, on the west by the Mediterranean up to Mersina and Adana, on an angle where the Syrian coast joined Asia Minor.³⁴ In return for British acceptance of these terms, Husain promised to give preferential economic treatment to Great Britain in the newly created Arab countries.

McMahon, not authorized to accept, nor prepared to expect, such definitive territorial demands, replied to Husain on August 30, that Great Britain would be willing to stipulate that the Arab Caliphate for the creation of an independent Arabia was the desire of the British government, providing a Moslem majority desired this. The territorial demands of Husain's letter were left unanswered, McMahon basing dismissal of the boundary question on the premise that it was too

³⁴Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and Command), 1939, Vol. XXVII (Reports, vol. 573, misc. No. 3), Cmnd. 5957, "Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon, His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo, and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca: July, 1915--March, 1916," p. 3. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence. "England to acknowledge the independence of the Arab countries, bounded on the north by Mersina and Adana up to the 37° of latitude, on which degree fall Birijik, Urfa, Mardin, Midiat, Jezirat, Amadia, up to the boarder of Persia; on the east by the boarders of Persia up to the Gulf of Basra; on the south by the Indian Ocean, with the exception of the position of Aden to remain as it is; on the west by the Red Sea, the Mediterranean Sea up to Mersina." Ibid.

premature to consider such matters at that time.³⁵ Husain's reply of September 9, offered no concessions to his original territorial demands, and he re-emphasized their importance by stating that they were not merely based on personal desire, but rather represented the wishes of all Arabs. He inferred that this territory was necessary for the creation of a workable Arab state.³⁶ These first letters, while not generally accomplishing anything, set the tone for future contacts by revealing the divergent emphasis that would be placed on territorial acquisition by the two parties.³⁷

McMahon had one immediate objective in conducting this correspondence with the Arabs: acquisition of Arab committal to revolt against the Turkish Empire, thereby allaying an Islamic front in the East. Because of the immediacy of the situation, he wanted to avoid any long, drawn-out negotiations that might hinder direct and immediate action on the part of the Arabs. His terms, therefore, tended towards the abstract. Husain, on the other hand, dealt with specifics—the form of military and financial aid required and what would have to be supplied, and specific territorial boundaries to delimit future Arab states. He wanted definite commitments before any action on his part. The British negotiations were directed with short-term goals in mind, while the Arabs worked

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Ibid., p. 5

³⁷Klieman, British Policy, p. 9.

for long-term goals. On October 9, McMahon wired the Home Office that immediate action was necessary if the Arabs were to be brought into the conflict as allies. Commitment could no longer be avoided.³⁸

Doubting that Husain was in fact representing the total Arab element, Great Britain contacted an Arab who had deserted from the Turkish Army—Muhammad al-Faruqi.³⁹ Al-Faruqi asserted that though the Arabs would like to obtain total independence—meaning independence of all Arab areas—they were aware of French interests and concerns in Syria and the British interests in Iraq. The Arabs, accordingly then, would undoubtedly insist on the independence of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus in any negotiated agreement, but they would understand and probably agree to "a general reservation of the areas in which Great Britain was not free to act" because of other arrangements and/or treaties.⁴⁰

McMahon, with the approval of the British government and with the knowledge of al-Faruqi's statement, sent Husain the key-letter of the eight month correspondence on October 24, 1915. In it he stated that Great Britain, with

³⁸Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 17.

³⁹Al-Faruqi was a staff officer in the Ottoman Army and had met with Faisal in April, 1915, at Aleppo. He was aware of Arab plans and was regarded by McMahon and Sykes as being representative of the Arab leaders. Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956), pp. 36 ff. Hereafter cited as Kedourie, Middle East.

⁴⁰Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp. 168-69.

certain reservations, would be willing to accept the terms of Husain's letter dated July 14, 1915. With special reference to the territorial demands, however, two areas would have to be excluded: "the two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo."⁴¹ These areas could not be included because they were not purely Arab, and portions of the described territory were of special interest to France, therefore, England could not make any conclusive promises or guarantees concerning these areas.⁴² Great Britain also stated that the vilayets of Bagdad and Basara, because of their geographic position and England's interest in them, would require special administrative arrangements to be established in the future.⁴³ Subject to the modifications listed, McMahon stated that Great Britain "was prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs in all the regions within the limits demanded by the Sherif of Mecca."⁴⁴

Husain replied to this offer on November 5, agreeing to the British provisions concerning Mersina and Adana, but adamantly refusing to exclude the vilayets of Aleppo and

⁴¹Great Britain, Report, pp. 23-24. cf. McMahon Correspondence, pp. 7-8, and the Wingate Papers, file 135/4, dispatch from McMahon to Grey, October 26, 1915.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., p. 24.

⁴⁴Great Britain, Report, p. 24.

Beirut, since they were a purely Arab population, and also withholding concession to the British demands concerning Bagdad and Basara, which were historically Arab areas. He agreed, however, to temporary military occupation by the English after the war, provided a "suitable sum [be] paid as compensation to the Arab Kingdom for the period of occupation."⁴⁵ The Home Office appeared reluctant to accept Husain's demands, but Wingate pushed for the acceptance on the grounds that no harm could possibly come from the governmental approval of Husain's terms.

If the embryonic Arab state comes to nothing, all our promises vanish and we are absolved . . . —if the Arab state becomes a reality, we have quite sufficient safeguards to control it"⁴⁶

Further, no matter which of these resulted, Great Britain required the support of the Arabs as a counter-balance in the Middle East.

Despite the necessity of acquiring Arab support, the Foreign Office, through McMahon's letter of December 14, flatly refused the Arab demands concerning Aleppo and Beirut on the grounds that England could not give concessions involving these areas because they were of interest to France. Husain, in a letter to McMahon dated January 1, 1916, agreed, for the time being, to drop the question of the Syrian coast

⁴⁵Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence, p. 6.

⁴⁶Wingate Papers, file 135/5, as cited by Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 19.

because of the Anglo-French negotiations. He reserved the right, however, to reopen and pursue, after the war, the Syrian question until Arab wishes had been satisfied. It was completely impossible for the Arabs, according to Husain, "to allow any derogation that gave France a span of land in those regions."⁴⁷ The British were reluctant to accept this temporary solution, and in the eighth letter of the series, dated January 25, 1916, McMahon warned Husain that the Anglo-French alliance would, in all likelihood, be stronger after the war than it was at the present, and, therefore, her position on Syria would undoubtedly remain the same.⁴⁸

In a letter dated February 18, Husain accepted the terms of the British as they had been stated by McMahon's letter of October, 1915; the Arab revolt would not become a reality, however, until July, 1916.⁴⁹ With the conclusion of the correspondence, the Anglo-Sharifian negotiations emerged framed in a manner consistent with any Anglo-French agreement that might materialize in the future.⁵⁰

To further deal with the situation of the Ottoman Empire, outside of the Arab situation; two secret treaties

⁴⁷Great Britain, McMahon Correspondence, pp. 13-14.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 15.

⁴⁹Infra., chap. iv, p. 82.

⁵⁰Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 21.

among the allies, during an era of secret treaties and agreements, were directly concerned with the disposition of Turkey and, therefore, with Palestine; the Constantinople Agreement and the Sykes-Picot Treaty.⁵¹

The Constantinople Agreement consisted of a series of diplomatic exchanges between Russia, France, and Great Britain over a period of five weeks from March 4, to April 10, 1915. Sergei Dmitrievich Sazanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, initiated the formal negotiations for the agreement when he approached the French and British ambassadors at Saint Petersburg. He informed them that Russia was interested in annexing Constantinople and the Dardanelles, if the allied war effort proved successful.⁵² The British gave tentative agreement to Russia's wishes to control Constantinople and the Straits, if Russia would honor French and British counter-claims in the area. England was interested in certain areas of Persia which had previously been designated as neutral in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, and they also wanted an

⁵¹Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 7. The treaties and suggestions that were concerned with the Ottoman Empire, in general, were: The Franco-British Treaty, Sazanov Agreement and the Anglo-Italian Convention—1914; the London Pact and the Anglo-Hejaz Treaty—1915; the Saxonby-Paléologue Agreement and the Sykes-Picot Treaty—1916. Sachar, Jews, p. 365.

⁵²E. L. Woodward and R. Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy: 1919-1939 (12 vols.; London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1952), 1st Series, IV, 634-36. Hereafter cited as Woodward and Butler, Documents.

independent Moslem power to be created in Arabia which would have complete control over the Moslem Holy Places.⁵³

France also agreed to the Anglo-Russian statement, with the stipulation that her approval be contingent upon a settlement which would insure her interests in the Middle East—the annexation of Syria, " together with the region of the Gulf of Alexandretta and Cilicia up to the Taurus [Mountain] range."⁵⁴ It was assumed, on the part of the French, that the term Syria included Palestine, but to assure that this was the case, Maurice Paléologue, French Ambassador, informed the Russian Foreign Minister that "the French Government [referred] also to Palestine when speaking of Syria."⁵⁵ The Tsar agreed to the French terms and France, on April 10, 1915, gave formal approval to the Russian claims to Constantinople and the Dardanelles.⁵⁶

No final statement as to the specific conditions or demands, however, appeared during the above series of diplomatic encounters, and the question of the disposition of the Ottoman Empire remained open. French and British interests in the Middle East, at this time, conflicted with reference

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 636-38.

⁵⁴ J. Polonsky, trans., Documents diplomatiques secrets russes 1914-1917 d'après les archives du ministère des affaires étrangères à Pétersbourg (Paris, 1928), p. 288. Hereafter cited as Polonsky, Documents . . . Pétersbourg.

⁵⁵ Polonsky, Documents . . . Pétersbourg, pp. 636-38.

⁵⁶ Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 638.

to portions of Syria—primarily Palestine. Some arrangement or compromise had to be arranged between the two countries before any definitive settlement could be finalized.

Fearing that Britain would be denying herself the spoils of a successful war, "while her present allies—but potential rivals—acquired new territory",⁵⁷ England opened formal negotiations with Husain in July, 1915, and by October these negotiations approached a satisfactory stage. Sir Edward Grey, anticipating a successful conclusion of the Husain-McMahon correspondence, although originally opposing the Pan-Arab movement—having agreed with Austen Chamberlain,

that such a scheme would be a useless and embarrassing liability and would make agreement with France impossible,"⁵⁸ thought it was time to inform the French of these negotiations. The British-French accord over the Middle East was, in fact, initiated just prior to the end of the Husain-McMahon negotiations, and the opening of the Anglo-French discussions were definitely related to the progress of this correspondence.⁵⁹ On October 21, therefore, Grey notified the French Ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, of the Husain-McMahon correspondence and of the conditions that then existed.⁶⁰

⁵⁷Klieman, British Policy, p. 6.

⁵⁸Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 20.

⁵⁹Stein, Balfour, p. 249.

⁶⁰Temperley states that R. S. Baker believed the French to be ignorant of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence

He then proposed that the two governments meet to discuss the questions of their mutual interests in any future partition of the Ottoman Empire.⁶¹

Great Britain appointed Sir Mark Sykes, an authority on Middle Eastern affairs, to act in their behalf. The French appointed Charles Francois Georges-Picot, formerly the French Consul in Beirut, as his counterpart. In the beginning of these negotiations, France evidenced extreme skepticism regarding any Arab movement, as did certain members of the British government.⁶² On November 23, Picot, illustrating his country's skepticism and self-interest, stated that Mosul, Bagdad and Basra would be sufficient for any Arab state, and claimed all of Syria and Palestine, minus the Holy Places, for France. A compromise between the two countries was finally arranged where Syria (Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus) would comprise an Arab state under French influence and guidance.⁶³ By February, 1916, Sykes and Picot agreed on a provisional formula for the future

until March, 1919, although this is not the generally accepted interpretation of the situation. Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 128.

⁶¹For the pre-arrangement situation see Stein, Balfour, pp. 240 ff.

⁶²The British Foreign Office was skeptical and the India Office was definitely opposed to any support of an Arab nationalist movement by Great Britain.

⁶³E. Marmostein, "A Note on Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo," St. Anthony's Papers, no. XI, 1961.

partition of the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The principle terms of this joint effort subsequently received endorsement by Cambon and Grey.

Basically the agreement stated that neither the British nor the French would annex any territory in the Arabian Peninsula, nor allow a third party to do so. This would assure the creation of an independent Arab state in Arabia. The areas of Iraq and Syria—excluding Palestine—were to be divided into four zones. Two letter zones, (A) and (B), and two color zones, Blue and Red, were created and assigned to the two powers. Zone (A) was to be composed of the interior of Syria, from and including the cities of Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus to the west, to and including the Mosul district in the east. Zone (B), that area lying to the south of (A), was to be bounded on the west by a line running from Gaza to Aqaba, crossing the Trans-Jordan eastward to the Red zone, with a northern arm jutting into Persia and a southern extension toward the Persian Gulf. The Blue zone was to be the province of Cilicia and all of coastal Syria west of (A) with the cities of Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus on the fringe of the border. The Red zone was to be composed of the provinces of Basra and Bagdad. Palestine, which was west of the Jordan and south of Galilee, was to comprise a fifth region designated as the Brown zone.⁶⁴

⁶⁴Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 245.
cf. Appendix I, 163.

The creation of this special zone was the result of the strong interests of both countries in Palestine, both desiring domination of the area.

In (A) and (B), Great Britain and France agreed to recognize semi-independent Arab states, or a confederation of Arab states under a single leader. However, the privilege of appointing foreign advisors and the right of certain economic considerations and privileges would be guaranteed to the French in (A) and to the British in (B). In the color zones, France (Blue) and England (Red) were to "be allowed to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they [desired] and as they [might have thought] fit to arrange with the Arab State or Confederation",⁶⁵ and that the Brown zone constituted an internationally administered area, the form to be created after consultation with Russia, the other allied powers, and the Sharif of Mecca.⁶⁶

In Palestine, Great Britain was to control the ports of Haifa and Acre, thereby forming an enclave in the international zone, and Haifa was to become a free port for the

⁶⁵Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 245-46.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 246. "That France and Great Britain are prepared to recognize and protect an independent Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States in the area (A) and (B) marked on the annexed map, under the suzerainty of an Arab Shiek. That in area (A) France, and in area (B) Great Britain, shall have priority of right of enterprise and local loans. That in area (A), and in area (B) Great Britain, shall alone supply advisors or foreign functionaries at the request of the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States." Ibid., p. 245.

British. England also received assurance of control of the proposed Haifa-Persian Gulf Railroad.⁶⁷

Sykes and Picot, after reaching the above agreement, presented the agreement to Sazonov and the Russian government, in March. Russia accepted the proposal, with the condition that an agreement allowing it to annex certain areas in Asia Minor be attached to any formal document. The area that Russia wanted was the southern area of the eastern end of the Black Sea—Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis, and the region of Kurdistan.⁶⁸ A Franco-Russian agreement concerning these terms was negotiated in a series of correspondences in April, 1916, in which Russia agreed to the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty.⁶⁹

In spite of protests of Paléologue, who was still desirous of a French Palestine, and with Russia's acceptance of the terms, Grey and Cambon, believing the agreement to be the most equitable agreement that could be arrived at, pushed the treaty through for ratification on May 16, 1916.⁷⁰ This agreement existed as a product of the times,

. . . a time when there was as yet no decided plan formed of launching a definite campaign in the East, when the prime necessity was some sort of agreement, since otherwise no progress would have been made.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 246.

⁶⁸ Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 248.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 241-43, and 249-51.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 245 ff. ⁷¹ Sokolow, Zionism, II, xxvi.

Therefore, in May of 1916 the position of Palestine was one of proposed international control and administration. At the same time, Great Britain accepted the Sykes-Picot Treaty with a definite understanding between the three signatories, that Homs, Hama, Aleppo, and Damascus were to comprise an independent Arab state or confederation. This understanding was in complete harmony with the terms of the Anglo-Arab agreement that had been arrived at by Husain and McMahon.⁷²

Had the situation remained as it was in May, 1916, when the Paris Treaty was signed, many complications might have been avoided. This proved not to be the case, however.

Because of its concern and occupation with Arab affairs and their diplomatic relations with other members of the Entente, Great Britain had not carried on any serious or active negotiations with the Zionist movement. However, the Zionist movement possessed active involvement in their Palestine program and certain prominent and influential members of the British government were beginning to listen attentively to Zionist positions and statements. Though no true progress was made on the part of the Zionists during the early years

⁷²The Sykes-Picot Treaty, as ratified, remained one of the war's many secret treaties, until it was published by the Bolsheviks in Pravda, on December 20, 1917; it also formed the foundation for the Anglo-French talks concerning the Middle East at the Paris Peace Conference. Tempereley, Peace Conference, VI, 5.

of the war, definite advances appeared during 1916-1917, in spite of the secret agreements arrived at between the Entente.

The secret negotiations were systematically complicated and confusing enough, and those countries involved in them were engaged in

. . . back door intrigues in the attempt to guarantee and advance . . . [their] own political and economic interests. And then in the midst of all the conferences and negotiations, Britain⁷³ officially endorsed the Zionist program . . .

by issuing the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. What had previously been a muddled and complicated state of affairs, became even more so when Great Britain issued this statement.

⁷³Sachar, Jews, p. 366.

CHAPTER III

BRITISH ALLIANCE WITH ZIONISM

A DIPLOMATIC NECESSITY

The Jews have always hoped—it was an article of faith for the religious and even non-religious Jews—that a day might come when they would be allowed to return to the land of their ancestors.

—Chaim Weizmann¹

The Zionist movement immediately prior to the outbreak of the war was at an apparent political standstill. A fact recognized at the Eleventh Zionist Congress (1913), when, cognizant that encouragement for their cause would not come from the "Turkish nor from any other Government,"² Chaim Weizmann declared that the greatest hope for the realization of the goals of the movement rested with the Jewish people, not with any national power.³

During the early weeks of World War I, when the Arabs

¹Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1945 (London: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 17-18.

²Stein, Balfour, p. 65.

³Ibid., p. 66. "The greatest of the Great Powers we have to deal with is the Jewish people. From this Power we expect everything; from the other powers very little." Zionist Congress, Report to the XIIth Zionist Congress, Protocol, (London: National Labour Press, 1921), p. 168. Hereafter cited as XIIth Congress.

were striving for recognition and acceptance of their territorial claims in the Middle East, the Zionists participated in activities which they hoped would lead to the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. However, the war was disruptive to the cohesiveness of the Zionist organization. The division of Europe, into two antagonistic camps made any concerted effort on behalf of the Organization's goals difficult.⁴ The primary problem facing the Organization was where to relocate the central offices, which, in 1914, were in Berlin. Selection of a site was complicated by the fact that any choice would be regarded as an indication of the support of the policies of one or the other combatants, and the alliance of Zionism with one antagonist or the other. A compromise solution was eventually engendered, with no true central offices created or continued. In accordance with the compromise proposition the Organization office in Berlin remained, to handle the affairs of Central Europe; a bureau was created in a neutral zone—Copenhagen; Nahum Sokolow and Dr. Yehiel Tschlenow were transferred from Berlin to London to create a bureau for the allied countries; and an individual, already in the United States, was designated as a representative to handle affairs in the Western Hemisphere.⁵

⁴William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 262. Hereafter cited as Yale, Near East.

⁵Stein, Balfour, p. 97.

Regardless of the compromise nature of the arrangements, however, the outbreak of the war witnessed the inevitable transfer of the center of the Zionist movement from the continent of Europe to Great Britain and the United States. These two countries would provide the impetus for the solidification of purpose and method to foster the creation of a Jewish state.

World events soon determined that the bureau in England would become the center of the movement. Tschlenow and Sokolow went to England for two reasons: to secure British recognition of Zionism, and to gain the actual support of the English Jews.⁶ London soon assumed the responsibility for formulation of political policy and instigation of negotiations.

It was at once clear that England was destined to play a most important part in Zionist politics. London from the beginning was the . . . centre of the Zionist Organization and the Mecca of political Zionism.

Weizmann assumed the leading role in the negotiations with Great Britain, even though Tschlenow and Sokolow officially represented the Organization. Weizmann had originally emigrated from Russia in 1904 to work as a teacher at The Victoria University in Manchester, where he eventually became involved in important defense work.⁸ Feeling that England

⁶Ibid., p. 170.

⁷Sokolow, Zionism, II, 43.

⁸For the early aspects of Weizmann's life and activities see Chaim Weizmann, Trial and Error (New York: Harper

was the country most interested in, and, therefore, most likely to support the Zionist cause, Weizmann wanted to begin political negotiations with the Government immediately after the war broke out.⁹ As early as September, 1914, he requested permission of the Zionist leaders to initiate negotiations with influential officials in the British government. The leaders of the movement, however, favored a more cautious approach, not wishing to commit themselves to a losing power and thereby forfeit all chances for recognition of their program. They preferred to wait for the propitious moment to arrive when they could safely select a power with which to work.

When Turkey declared war on Great Britain Asher Ginsburg—Ahad Ha'am—indicated to Weizmann that "the great historic hour for the Jews and for Palestine [had] struck ."¹⁰ and urged immediate action. Ginsburg felt that moderation must be the by-word in any and all talks, and that the immediate goal should be the right of colonization and the freedom of cultural expression in Palestine—nothing more.

& Bros., 1949). Hereafter cited as Weizmann, Trial and Error. The defense project that he was concerned with involved the search for a smokeless gunpowder. He eventually came up with the use of cordite to contain the amount of visible smoke.

⁹Sokolow, Zionism, II, 46.

¹⁰Asher Ginsburg, Iggrot Ahad Ha'am (6 vols.; Tel Aviv: Yavne, 1923-1925), V, 204, as cited in Esco, Palestine, I, 78. cf. Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 139-41, 215-16, 231-32, et passim.

In the event these goals were achieved it was hoped that ultimately an autonomous state, under English control, could be secured.¹¹ The enumeration of these goals represented a definite step, a firm commitment; through it the Zionists indicated their belief that the allies would be victorious and recognized the fact that British support was essential for the success of their program.¹²

While working to secure government support, Weizmann, already a good friend of Lord Rothschild, a leader of the British Jews, approached former Prime Minister Arthur James Balfour, a Conservative leader. Balfour listened attentively to his account of the plight of the Jews and asked Weizmann to explain Zionist proposals regarding a solution to the problem. Weizmann gave no definite answer, but requested that once the military situation stabilized, the Zionists be allowed to return to Balfour with the outlines of a program for Jewish settlement in Palestine. Balfour "enthusiastically" replied that he would be more than willing to talk further with the Organization representatives, as they worked for a great cause, one in which he was deeply interested.¹³

C. P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian, also came under the influence of Weizmann¹⁴ and, in addition to

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Yale, Near East, p. 266.

¹³Blanch E. C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (2 vols.; London: Hutchinson, 1936), II, 224. Hereafter cited as Dugdale, Balfour.

¹⁴Scott acted as a "confessor" and confidant of Weizmann. Weizmann, Trial and Error, pp. 177-78.

his pro-Zionist editorials, further contributed to the movement by introducing Weizmann to Herbert Samuel and David Lloyd George.¹⁵ Samuel, the first non-converted Jew in the British Cabinet, evidenced both sympathy and enthusiasm for the idea of the restoration of the Jewish state, and began broaching the subject after the Turkish declaration of war. In November, 1914, he quickly suggested to Edward Grey that the changing situation in the Middle East provided the ideal opportunity to create a Jewish state in Palestine,¹⁶ especially since

Turkey had thrown herself into the European War and that it was probable that her empire would be broken up, the question of the future control of Palestine was likely to arise.¹⁷

Because of the difficulty which would arise from the division of the area, due to European jealousies, and with the disintegration of Turkey, "perhaps there might be an opportunity for the restoration of a Jewish State."¹⁸

Grey replied to this proposal in a truly "political" manner, stating that the idea of a Jewish state "had always had a strong sentimental attraction for him" and that he

¹⁵Stein, Balfour, p. 131.

¹⁶Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 52.

¹⁷Viscount Herbert Samuel, Grooves of Change: A Book of Memoirs (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1946), pp. 139-42. Hereafter cited as Samuel, Grooves.

¹⁸Herbert Samuel, Great Britain and Palestine (London: Cresset Press, 1935), pp. 12 ff. Hereafter cited as Samuel, Great Britain. cf. Stein, Balfour, p. 103.

¹⁹Samuel, Grooves, p. 141.

would be willing to work for the idea if the opportunity should ever present itself.²⁰

In January, still pursuing some form of official commitment on the Cabinet's part, Samuel sent a memorandum to Lord Asquith, which, he in turn gave to the Cabinet. In it, Samuel argued " that British imperial interests required a British protectorate over Palestine and that this might provide an opportunity for ."²¹ Jewish immigration into the area. Samuel received instructions to present this opinion in a formal memorandum, to again be presented to the Cabinet for their consideration and possible approval.

In March, 1915, Samuel circulated the formal memorandum among the members of the Cabinet. He included five possible solutions to the problem of the disposal of Palestine. As he saw the situation, the possibilities were: France might annex Palestine; the area might remain under Turkish control; an international commission might be created to govern the territory; an autonomous Jewish state might be created; or, Great Britain might establish a protectorate over the area and encourage unlimited Jewish immigration.²² The memorandum received mixed reactions, and failed to

²⁰Samuel, Grooves, p. 141.

²¹Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 52.

²²Samuel, Grooves, p. 142. cf., Leonard Stein, Zionism (London: Keegan Paul, 1925), p. 81; and Halpern, Jewish State, pp. 162-62.

acquire total acceptance by the Cabinet members,²³ and no action was taken on their part.

The progress of the Eastern campaign in late 1915, the threat of a Turco-German attack on the Suez Canal, and the increasing adamancy of French claims and demands for Palestine, convinced Samuel that Palestine had to become a British territory.²⁴ Although his proposals appeared to be falling on barren soil, he remained persistent.

By the end of 1915 Zionism began to receive favorable recognition and consideration in some areas of the British government.²⁵ The primary concept for the re-creation of a Jewish state began to be associated with various strategies concerned with strengthening England's military position in the Middle East. Herbert Sidebotham, in the Manchester Guardian, pointed out that with the loss of the Ottoman Empire as an ally, a void had been created in the British defense of the East. To fill this chasm he suggested the creation of a buffer state in Palestine, which would protect the Suez area. He further proposed that the Jews would be

²³ Herbert Henry Asquith, Memoirs and Reflections, 1852-1927 (2 vols.; London: 1928), II, 71 and 78. "I confess I am not attracted by this proposed addition to our responsibilities, Curiously enough, the only other partisan of this proposal besides Samuel is Lloyd George, who I need not say does not care a damn for the Jews or their past or their future" Ibid.

²⁴ Stein, Balfour, p. 108.

²⁵ Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 172.

the most likely to succeed in building such a state, because of their desire to return to the area.²⁶

After reading the article, Weizmann approached the editor with the idea of elaborating upon his original article for possible submission to the Foreign Office as an official memorandum from the Organization. Sidebotham agreed and the revised memorandum was submitted to Ronald Graham, head of the Near and Middle Eastern division of the Foreign Office, in April, 1916. The Foreign Office, however, proved unfavorable to the Jewish plan, for at that time they favored a pro-Arab alliance to counteract the vacuum created by Turkish desertion.²⁷ The entire course of discussion on the Sidebotham memorandum emphasized political realism—the illustration of how the British could benefit from a Jewish alliance in this area. With the collapse of the old Middle Eastern policy, a new stratagem was required if the Suez Canal and Egypt were to be protected. Sidebotham argued that the Jews represented the only people who were truly capable of forming a strong state capable of opposing the enemy. Even if this were not the case, the restoration of the Jewish state definitely qualified as one of the basic ideals that the war was being fought over—the maintenance

²⁶ Manchester Guardian, November 22, 1915. cf., Herbert Sidebotham, Great Britain and Palestine (London: 1937), pp. 24-27. Hereafter cited as Sidebotham, Palestine; and Kirk, History of the Middle East, p. 150.

²⁷ Sidebotham, Palestine, p. 33.

of international law and justice, and the protection of national minorities.²⁸

During the Sidebotham-Graham discussions, the War Office contemplated the possible advantages of supporting Zionist desires in Palestine, not in preference to, but rather in conjunction with, the pan-Arab movement. Would open support of the restoration of Palestine to the Jews, as a Jewish state, aid the war movement in any way? It was the general consensus of prominent non-Zionist English Jews, that there would be some benefit derived from such an alliance; such an association might possibly lead to world-wide Jewish support for the allied cause. Even though this non-Zionist element voiced regret at the formation of a nationalistic Jewish organization, they felt that if any wide-spread Jewish support was to become a reality, the Zionist program would have to be included in any governmental program.

The British were correct in assuming the strength of the Zionists in swaying public and governmental opinion, especially in the United States, and Great Britain was especially interested in obtaining the support of the United States for her war effort. The Honorable Louis D. Brandeis, Associate Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, and head of the American Zionist Organization, was apparently responsible for the success in "persuading President Wilson that a pledge

²⁸Ibid., pp. 38-40.

of support to the Zionist organizations would be a good thing ,"²⁹ and Wilson's neutrality slowly turned toward support for England and France.

While the Zionist Organization was increasing it's activities, the Board of Deputies of British Jews, under the leadership of Lucien Wolf, submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office in March, 1916. In this statement Palestine's attraction to the Jews is referred to as an historic interest, but any definitive terms which would officially recognize a national character of Judaism was intentionally avoided.³⁰

Negotiations had reached the point where England was beginning to seek the opinions and advice of her allies in reference to recognition of the Zionist program. Sir George Buchanan, British ambassador in Petrograd, informed Sazanov in an aide-mémoire, dated March 13, of England's proposed intention of recognizing Jewish claims to Palestine. The

²⁹Frank H. Epp, Whose Land is Palestine: The Middle East Problem in Historical Perspective (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing House, 1970), p. 135. Hereafter cited as Epp, Whose Land is Palestine. Brandeis, two years before the Balfour Declaration, gave the aims of Zionism as being " . . . to establish in Palestine, for such Jews as chose to go and remain there, and for their descendents, a legally secured home, where they may live together and lead a Jewish life, where they may expect ultimately to constitute a majority of the population, and may look forward to what we should call home rule." Book of Documents, General Assembly of the United Nations Relating to the Establishment of the National Home for the Jewish People (New York: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1947), p. 2.

³⁰Great Britain, Foreign Office, Zionism Peace Hand-book, No. 162, 1920, p. 39. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, Handbook. cf., Halpern, Jewish State, p. 166.

aide-memoire stated that despite the major split among world-Jewry—Zionism vs. Assimilationism—there appeared to be a uniform feeling among the Jews that a proposal concerning their interest in Palestine was needed.³¹ Because

. . . the most influential part of Jewry in all the countries would very much appreciate an offer of agreement concerning Palestine which would completely satisfy the aspirations of the Jews. [Favorable results could be achieved by such action, such as] . . . the conversion, in favour of the Allies, of Jewish elements in the Orient, in the United States, and in other places, elements whose attitude . . . [was] opposed to the Allies cause.³²

Great Britain wanted an agreement which would ensure Jewish support for their cause in the war. Because of the political and military results that might evolve out of such an action, Great Britain was contemplating such a diplomatic move. The possibility existed that countries or areas currently neutral or hostile to the war might be swayed to the allied cause, if influential Jewish pressures to form some type of an alliance

³¹Leonard Stein, Zionism (London: Keegan Paul, 1925), p. 81. Hereafter cited as Stein, Zionism. "In the event of Palestine coming within the spheres of influence of Great Britain and France . . . the Governments of those Powers will not fail to take account of the historic interest that country possesses for the Jewish community." Ibid.

³²E. A. Adamow, ed., Die Europäischen Mächte und die Türkei während des Weltkrieges: Die Aufteilung der asiatischen Türkei nach den Geheimdokumenten des ehem. Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten (5 vols.; Dresden: C. Reisner, 1930-1932), V, 64-65, cited by Stein, Zionism, pp. 138 ff., and Halpern, Jewish State, p. 166.

with the Entente, were applied in key governmental positions.³³ The French were not enthusiastic over this plan, feeling it to be too restrictive to achieve any worthwhile results.³⁴

By the middle of 1916 the Zionist program for colonization in Palestine achieved positive consideration among the Entente members as a probable means of expanding their war effort. The time had arrived when the program, which had originally been proposed in Basle at the first Zionist Congress, could no longer be thought of as the dream of a few fanatics or idealists.³⁵

During the negotiations with the Grey Cabinet, the Zionists and Conjoint Foreign Committee, still divided, recognized that a united Jewish front would have more strength with which to negotiate, and made an attempt to form a working coalition that would be representative of all Jews. The Foreign Committee, however, held far less interest in the colonization of Palestine, than did the British government.³⁶

³³"The only object of His Majesty's Government is to devise some agreement which will be sufficiently attractive to the majority of Jews to facilitate the conclusion of a transaction securing Jewish support. [With this in mind], it appears . . . that if the scheme provided for enabling the Jews, . . . to take in hand the administration of the internal affairs of this region . . . , then the agreement would be much more attractive for the majority of Jews." Stein, Zionism, p. 81, as cited from Adamow, pp. 161 ff.

³⁴Dugdale, Balfour, II, 227.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶Stein, Balfour, pp. 174-75.

Hoping to salvage some unity of action, Nahum Sokolow proposed that the two organizations solidify their actions by concentrating on the improvement of the civil rights of the East European Jews. He felt that the problem and question of Palestine need have no bearing on any joint action of the two organizations. The Zionists would deal with any formal negotiations concerning Palestine; the Conjoint Foreign Committee could remain aloof from any involvement in this area. Lucien Wolf, on behalf of the Conjoint Committee, rejected the plan, on the grounds that any activity involved with the colonization of Palestine would endanger and infringe upon those freedoms and rights that the assimilated Jew had already managed to obtain. The idea of any concerted action disappeared, and the wealthy English Jew, once again became openly opposed to Zionism. This opposition came "from a small, well-placed group of wealthy English Jews who were concerned lest Zionist propaganda expose Anglo-Jewry to the charge of 'dual loyalty'."³⁷ In spite of their attempts to abort the negotiations, the Zionist Organization had gained the ascendancy in governmental recognition of Jewish programs.³⁸

In October, 1916, an official proposal stating the

³⁷Howard Morley Sachar, The Course of Modern Jewish History (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1958), p. 373. Hereafter cited as Sachar, History.

³⁸Dugdale, Balfour, II, 228.

Zionist program was submitted to the Foreign Office for their consideration and possible approval.³⁹ The document made no specific reference to a Jewish state, but administrative powers were to be granted to a Jewish charter company, or the area would be granted autonomy. This document represented the first official proposal by the Zionists, and was based on the assumption that the area would come under the influence of either Great Britain or France.⁴⁰

The British government, deciding to open negotiations with the Zionists, hoped to influence the United States. In fact, when Woodrow Wilson had rejected the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, Sir Mark Sykes was advised by James A. Malcom, President of the Armenian National Committee in London, to influence Wilson through Justice Brandeis. Malcolm believed that by guaranteeing Palestine to the Zionists, Brandeis, as head of the American Zionist Organization, might be induced to bring pressure upon Wilson to give support to the British.⁴¹

³⁹"Outline of a Programme for a New Administration of Palestine for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine in accordance with the Aspirations of the Zionist Movement." cf., Appendix B, p. 154.

⁴⁰When this proposal was submitted the Zionists were not aware of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, nor had Sykes been informed of the negotiations with the Zionists. S. Landman, "Balfour Declaration: Secret Facts Revealed," World Jewry, London, February 20, 1935, p. 6.

⁴¹Times Literary Supplement (London), Letter from Malcolm Thomson, July 22, 1949, p. 473, citing Dr. Adolf Boehm, Die Zionistische Bewegung, II, p. 656. cf., Halpern, Jewish State, p. 161, and Yale, Near East, p. 268.

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Sykes, at some time during 1916, became enamored with the Zionist cause. In addition to the possibilities of influencing the United States, he also saw the possibilities of a cultural link between Europe and Asia with a Jewish restoration, and a definite improvement in the economic situation in the Middle East, if a joint Jewish-Arab effort could be successfully organized.⁴² When the Second Coalition Government was formed under David Lloyd George, Sykes acquired the authority to initiate negotiations with the Jews. After the establishment of initial contact between Sykes and Weizmann, Sykes agreed to meet with the Zionists at the home of Dr. Moses Gaster,⁴³ and official negotiations between the two parties opened on February 7, 1917.⁴⁴ The British finally appeared willing to declare their interest in, and intent to create a Zionist state in Palestine.

The Zionists adamantly demanded British sponsorship of the embryonic state and completely opposed any idea of a condominium or internationalized control of the area.⁴⁵ Sykes pointed out, to the members of the meeting, that the

⁴²Stein, Balfour, pp. 234-35.

⁴³For information on Moses Gaster in the English Zionist Organization, cf., Stein, Balfour, chap. xviii.

⁴⁴Sokolow, Zionism, II, 52. Those in attendance were Sir Mark Sykes, Lord Rothschild, Mr. Herbert Bentwich, Mr. Joseph Cowen, Dr. Moses Gaster, Mr. James de Rothschild, Mr. Harry Sachar, Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, and Nahum Sokolow. Ibid.

⁴⁵Stein, Balfour, p. 278.

real obstacle to their proposed plan was France, for with French demands for all of Syria, Palestine's future status was doubtful.⁴⁶ Before any promises could be made, the French would have to be consulted, and he recommended that the Zionists select a representative to approach Georges-Picot with the proposed plan for Palestine. Nahum Sokolow was chosen by the Gaster committee to carry out future negotiations with France.⁴⁷ No matter what the motives of the British government, it appeared that the Zionist's goal of reaching Palestine, with international approval, was nearing fruition.⁴⁸ The interpretations of the members of the government as to the reasons behind this movement toward the Organization, differed.

Some observers believed that the declaration would win the support of the powerful Jewish financial interests in the United States and Europe; others that it would be bait to the Jews of Russia, who might be influential in keeping Russia in the war; still others that it would add another to the discontented and aspiring minority groups among the Central Powers.⁴⁹

⁴⁶Halpern, Jewish State, p. 273.

⁴⁷Sokolow, Zionism, II, 52, and Stein, Balfour, 374.

⁴⁸George Antonius suggests that Great Britain supported the idea of a Jewish state because of their desire to control Palestine, to the exclusion of France, and that they chose the Zionist movement as their method for obtaining this goal. Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 263.

⁴⁹Sachar, History, p. 366. Asquith reported in his Memoirs that Lloyd George favored the Zionist cause in Palestine because he thought it would "be an outrage to let the Holy Places pass into the possession or under the protectorate of 'agnostic atheistic France.'" Asquith, Memoirs, p. 71.

The propagandist impact of this type of declaration could not be underestimated.

Preliminary conversations were held between Sokolow and Picot on February 8, 1917. Sokolow pointed out the possibilities of solving the Jewish question in Europe by creating a Jewish homeland in Palestine. When asked what nation would sponsor a drive for this state, Sokolow candidly replied that the choice of the Organization was Great Britain, and that England had tentatively accepted such a sponsorship. Picot voiced his support of the ideas of the Zionist cause, but added that his country would not easily renounce its claims to Palestine.⁵⁰ Sokolow returned to Weizmann and Sykes with a report of his talks with Picot, and with tentative French approval, began drafting plans for the opening of future international negotiations. The three men prepared a six-point program—the Bases de l'accord—which became the framework for these negotiations.⁵¹

⁵⁰Stein, Balfour, p. 376.

⁵¹Esco, Palestine, I, 95. Composed under the following headings: 1. Recognition of Palestine as the Jewish National Home; 2. Regulations for Jewish Settlement in Palestine; 3. Immigration into Palestine; 4. The establishment of a Chartered Company; 5. Communal autonomy; 6. Language. There appears to be some confusion as to the existence of this document, although N. M. Gelber, Hazarat Balfour ve-Toledoteha (Jerusalem: Zionist Organization, 1939), does refer to it and gives a file reference where it can be found in the Zionist Archives. Paul L. Hanna, British Policy in Palestine (Washington, D. C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), reports that he was unable to find any trace of such a document. Ibid.

In March, 1917, Sokolow went to Paris to discuss the program with the French government. Alexandre Ribot, head of the French Ministry, informed him, on March 22, that France favored the program, and had informed the Zionist Organizations in Russia and the United States of its position on the issue.⁵² However, while the Organization succeeded with the French government, they failed to gain the endorsement or support of the French Jews—the Alliance Israelite Universelle⁵³—although no open opposition emanated from them. The silence of the French Jews resulted primarily from the work of Edmond de Rothschild, who had insured their silence during the Sokolow-Ribot talks, and this silence cannot be over-emphasized in determining the favorable outcome of these talks.⁵⁴ Had the French Jews voiced their protest over the Zionist's proposals, it is doubtful that the French government would have listened to Sokolow.

Sokolow went to Italy in the month following the relatively successful French talks, where he was even more successful, although, again, not totally so. While not receiving complete support from the Italian Jews, he obtained an endorsement from the Italian Federation of Jewish

⁵²Sokolow, Zionism, II, 52.

⁵³George W. Robnett, Conquest through Immigration (Pasadena: Institute for Special Research, 1968), p. 117. Hereafter cited as Robnett, Conquest.

⁵⁴Sokolow, Zionism, I. xvii.

Communities. With the aid of Angelo Sereni, leader of the Jewish community in Rome, Sokolow presented the program to Prime Minister Boselli. Italy, through Boselli, gave the complete support of its government to the Bases de l'accord.⁵⁵ Sokolow "was assured that the Italian Government in conjunction with the Allied Powers would support the Zionist programme."⁵⁶ While in Rome, the Zionists contacted the Pope. He also promised that the Church would not oppose the Zionist program so long as the Holy Places were given special attention and consideration.⁵⁷

Upon returning to Paris after his Italian venture, Sokolow and the Zionists received the official French statement concerning the Zionist program. The French declared their readiness to support the Zionist plans in Palestine.⁵⁸ (A French veto to the proposal at this juncture would have aborted the as yet unborn Balfour Declaration.⁵⁹)

With the success of these diplomatic negotiations, the next logical move was to secure American acquiescence to

⁵⁵ Stein, Balfour, pp. 413-15.

⁵⁶ Sokolow, Zionism, II, 53.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Sokolow, Zionism, II, 53. cf., Stein, Balfour, p. 418. "The French Government, which entered the present war to defend people wrongfully attacked, and which continues the struggle to assure the victory of right over might, can but feel sympathy for your [the Zionist] cause, the triumph of which is bound up with that of the allies." Sokolow, Zionism, II, 53.

⁵⁹ Ibid., I, xvii.

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the program. This was accomplished shortly after the entrance of the United States into the war in April, 1917, and resulted from joint Anglo-Zionist activities.⁶⁰ Wilson's response to the Zionist program appears to have been a fairly rapid one. When asked by the British, through Colonel Edward House, for his feelings on the situation, Wilson gave a positive response and declared his approval for the program as it had been outlined to him. Wilson's feelings on the subject were not, however, universal among the members of his Cabinet, nor within the United States government. The British seemed satisfied with his acceptance, as did the Zionists, however, and the negotiations between the Zionists and His Majesty's Government continued.

Great Britain now felt able to issue an open statement of policy concerning the Jews, and their interest and concern in Palestine. All that remained to be settled were the terms of the actual statement. The government's decision to support the Jews must have come prior to the official note from France, which was released in June, for on May 20, 1917, Chaim Weizmann announced in London that he had received word that " His Majesty's Government was ready to support" the Zionist plans.⁶¹

With the public acknowledgement of British support

⁶⁰Yale, Near East, p. 269.

⁶¹Sokolow, Zionism, II, 56.

for the Zionists, the non-Zionist element in England voiced its opposition to the program. Once again the assimilated Jew, through the Conjoint Foreign Committee, voiced his concern over the promotion of the idea of a Jewish race, which was being indirectly inferred by the idea of a Jewish state for the Jewish people.⁶² Public opinion, however, supported the Zionist program.⁶³

Despite this, the British government could not completely ignore the opinions of the wealthy assimilated Jew, and their objections eventually led to the modification of the terms of the Balfour Declaration. Had the assimilationists not possessed the influence that they did, the Declaration would have been more definite in its terms.

The Political Committee of the Zionist Organization, after many trial drafts, prepared a statement to be considered for endorsement by the government.⁶⁴ Lord Rothschild presented the draft on July 18, 1917, to the Lloyd George.

⁶²The Times (London), May 24, 1917.

⁶³The Times (London), May 29, 1917, editorial, "The Future of the Jews," showed that the paper was convinced of the justice of the Zionist program; again on October 23 and 26, The Times urged governmental support for the Jewish state; other favorable articles appeared in New Europe, the Manchester Guardian and the Yorkshire Post. For a complete listing of those magazines and newspapers favoring the Jewish state cf., Sokolow, Zionism, II, 64-80.

⁶⁴This statement was written through the joint efforts of Weizmann, Sokolow, Ginsberg, Jacob Unger, Sachar and James de Rothschild; before submission it was read and approved by Sykes, Edmond de Rothschild, and President Wilson. cf., Appendix C, p. 155.

Cabinet. The members failed, however, to agree on the memorandum. Although Balfour, Lloyd George, Milner, and Cecil were for acceptance, Lord Curzon hedged on affixing his approval, because of a confusion of some of the terms, and the lack of an adequate definition of Zionism.⁶⁵ Adamant refusal to accept the memorandum came from Edwin Montagu, Secretary of State for India. Montagu, an assimilated Jew, was afraid of the connotations that might be derived from such a statement, fearing that the political status of the Jew might be questioned.⁶⁶

The Cabinet, as a result of the disagreement, modified the Zionist draft and received approval for it from the Foreign Office on September 19, 1917. While this formulation was being forwarded to Woodrow Wilson for his approval, the anti-Zionist element was working for further modification of the statement with some success. The resulting statement was then sent to Wilson for his consideration, in October, and after minor alterations by the American Zionist Organization, the draft was returned to London with Wilson's approval.⁶⁷ This amended document was then sent to the Zionist Organization where Sokolow and Weizmann gave

⁶⁵Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1122-32.

⁶⁶Ibid., II, 1132.

⁶⁷Jacob de Haas, History of Palestine: The last Two Thousand Years (New York: MacMillan, 1934), pp. 485 ff. cf., Appendix D, p. 156.

reluctant approval. They approved the document, although it proved not what they had expected, nor been led to believe would result. Despite their disappointment they regarded the proposed declaration as a point of departure for future considerations. A launching pad had been created.⁶⁸

Upon receipt of the Zionist's approval, Balfour presented the final draft to the Cabinet for ratification. Acknowledging the internal disunity of the Jews, Balfour explained that, in spite of this, a Jewish majority in Russia and the United States favored a statement regarding Palestine.⁶⁹ The French⁷⁰ and American governments also favored such an announcement. With the qualification that the term "national home" meant some form of an allied protectorate with Jewish autonomy, and not an independent Jewish state, the War Cabinet ratified the document on October 31, 1917.⁷¹

On November 2, 1917, Arthur James Balfour informed Lord Rothschild, by letter, of the support of the British government for the Zionist program in Palestine. Great Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration.⁷²

⁶⁸Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 203.

⁶⁹Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1135 ff.

⁷⁰Balfour read the French statement of June 4, 1917, supra, p. 64, f.n. 58.

⁷¹Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1135 ff. cf., Stein, Balfour, p. 546.

⁷²From the British point of view, it was "less of a political commitment" to issue the Balfour Declaration to Rothschild, a philanthropist, as opposed to giving it to

The Zionist victory was, in reality, only half a triumph, for "the launching of the Balfour Declaration at that time was due to propagandist reasons."⁷³ The allies were in a serious situation—the Rumanians had been crushed. The Russians were hovering on actual withdrawal from the war. The French were bogged down on the Western Front. The Italians had been defeated at Caporetto. And the United States had not yet been able to send troops to the Western zone. British shipping was constantly threatened and lost tonnage at tremendous rates. In such critical times it was hoped that by issuing the Declaration, Jewish sympathy would confirm American Jewish support, thus making it difficult for Germany "to reduce her military commitments and improve her economic position in the Eastern front".⁷⁴

The issuance of the Balfour Declaration would also, it was hoped, influence the Russian Jews in exerting force on the Russian government to remain in the war. The major evolutionary steps of the Declaration took place during the interval between the Russian Revolution of March, 1917, and

Chaim Weizmann who was a politician. Charles Raddock, Portrait of a People (3 vols.; New York: The Judaica Press, Inc., 1967), III, 158. Rothschild communicated the declaration to the English Zionist Organization on November 18, 1917. cf., Appendix E, p. 157.

⁷³Great Britain, Report of the Palestine Royal Commission: The Peel Report, June 22, 1937, Cmnd. 5479, (1946 reprint), pp. 17-18. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, Peel Commission.

⁷⁴Great Britain, Peel Commission, pp. 17-18.

the events immediately preceding the Bolshevik coup in November, 1917. England hoped to insure the loyalty of the Russian Jew, if not the government.

The Zionists realized that

Palestine was not being designated as the territory to be set aside for the creation of a Jewish majority leading to statehood; the final language was that a Jewish national home would be created in Palestine, and the very imprecision of this formula was to help lead⁷⁵ to all the troubles of the next three decades.

Basically the Declaration marked the end of an era and the beginning of another. Four days after the Declaration, the Bolsheviks seized control in Russia. Simultaneously with this revolution, came the increasing impact on world affairs of the United States—acting as an anti-colonial force.

In 1917 . . . the end of empire was already visible; with Lenin's and Wilson's proclamations, there began the vast popular upheaval which led⁷⁶ to Asian and African independence . . .

and the end of nineteenth century imperialism. The Jews, and Great Britain, had seized a moment for action "which might never have returned."⁷⁷

The idea at the time of its issuance was " that

⁷⁵Sokolow, Zionism, I, xviii.

⁷⁶Meyer W. Weisgal and Joel Carmichael, eds., Chaim Weizmann: A Biography by Several Hands (London: Wedenfeld and Nicolson, 1962), p. 166. Hereafter cited as Weisgal, Weizmann.

⁷⁷Weisgal, Weizmann, p. 166.

a Jewish State was not to be set up immediately by the Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes of the majority of the inhabitants ."⁷⁸ of the area. It was assumed, however, that when it became necessary for "according representative institutions to Palestine, if the Jews had meanwhile responded to the opportunity afforded them and had become a definite majority ."⁷⁹ in the area, then Palestine would become a Jewish Commonwealth.

⁷⁸Great Britain, Peel Commission, p. 18.

⁷⁹Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

MOTIVATIONS AND REACTIONS

While the direct responsibility for the calamity that overtook the Palestinian Arabs was on the heads of the Zionist Jews who seized a Lebensraum for themselves . . . a heavy load of indirect, yet irreputiable, responsibility was on the heads of the United Kingdom.

—Arnold Toynbee¹

Great Britain, through the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, became more deeply involved in the struggle for pre-eminence in the Middle East. She became involved with her ally, France, in the matter of the Syrian and Lebanese regions of Greater Arabia as well as in the contest between Arab and Zionist for Palestine. The world-wide reactions to this declaration were not of the spontaneously positive nature that Great Britain had originally expected, nor that she had been led to expect.

Jews throughout the world welcomed the Declaration as a pseudo-Magna Carta²—as a Jewish Declaration of Independence. "The caution and ambivalence of its formulation could

¹Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History (10 vols.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), VIII.

²Abba Eban, My People: The Story of the Jews (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 366. Hereafter cited as Eban, My People.

not dim its inner glow,"³ and Jews, internationally, were ecstatic because of its issuance. In a manifesto issued by the Zionist Organization, and signed by Weizmann, Sokolow, and Tschlenow, it was declared that the aspirations of the Basle program had been achieved with the Balfour Declaration. "The period which began [the movement] was Expectation the period which now begins is Fulfillment."⁴ Jews, generally, regarded the document as elaborating the foundation upon which the Jewish state would arise.

The English people received the Declaration with mixed emotions, especially in the Jewish community. The Conjoint Foreign Committee—the group of wealthy English Jews—failed to participate in the celebration of the Zionists. Several weeks after the Declaration, the Conjoint Committee was responsible for the formation of the League of British Jews, with the goal and intention of altering the political implications of the Declaration. Especially important among the Committee's conscience was the question of citizenship of British Jews who, while professing the Jewish faith, wished to remain subjects of the Crown.⁵ Such Jews feared that the Declaration contained the possible recognition that the Jews composed a separate and distinct political nationality. The anti-Zionist element in Britain

³Ibid.

⁴Sokolow, Zionism, II, 124-27.

⁵Stein, Balfour, p. 565.

remained irreconcilable, at least until the end of the war, after which the Anglo-Jewish community appeared to be more united in support of the Zionist's aims.⁶

A more favorable reaction met the Declaration on December 2, 1917, at a demonstration of appreciation and celebration held at the London Opera House. There governmental officials, Zionist leaders, and several representatives of foreign powers, and members of various ethnic groups, voiced their approval of the Declaration. Lord Robert Cecil, reiterating the opinion of the British government, stated that England's "wish [was] that Arabian countries [should] be for the Arabs, Armenia for the Armenians and Judea for the Jews."⁷ Nevertheless, while seeming to suggest a unity of purpose, the meeting was not representative of the whole British community.⁸

In France and Italy the Balfour Declaration was not received with any great enthusiasm. Both countries felt that they had a right to participate in arrangements involving any future partition of the Middle East.⁹ Neither of the

⁶Ibid., p. 566.

⁷Sokolow, Zionism, II, 127.

⁸Using the Jewish representatives as being illustrative of the "un-representative" nature of the meeting, the situation can clearly be seen. Those present were, Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, Nahum Sokolow, James de Rothschild, and Dr. Moses Gaster. Not a representation of the Jewish community, but of the higher echelons of the Zionist Organization.

⁹France by the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and Italy by the Conference of St. Jean de Maurinne.

two had been consulted by Great Britain before the issuance of the Declaration, although brief unofficial contact had been made with both by the British branch of the Zionist Organization, regarding the matter.¹⁰ Balfour, when asked in the House of Commons if the Jewish national home in Palestine was an allied war aim, or strictly a British goal, admitted that no " official communication [had] been made to the Allies on the subject, ."11 but because of the Zionist activities in the allied countries it was believed to have been a common goal, and that His Majesty's Government understood that both President Wilson and the Provisional Russian government were favorably inclined towards such a Declaration.¹² Balfour was also aware that Germany and the Turkish Empire were also making overtures to the Zionists at this time and, with this knowledge, urged Great Britain to act when she did because delay would have lessened the impact of the Declaration, or rendered it useless.¹³

Pressure to secure the approval of Italy and France for the Declaration was applied, but, once again, the effort

¹⁰Supra., chap. iii, pp. 63-64.

¹¹Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. XCIX (19 November 1917), col. 838. Hereafter cited as Parl. Debates.

¹²The only countries that had been contacted by governmental representatives were the United States and Russia.

¹³Weisgal, Weizmann, p. 161.

came from the Zionist Organization rather than the British government. In January, 1918, Nahum Sokolow went to Paris to seek the French government's approval of the British statement of policy. Acting in conjunction with Baron de Rothschild, Sokolow, on February 9, received from Minister Pichon a statement of French support for the Balfour Declaration, and official French approval was published in the form of a communiqué on February 14, 1918.¹⁴

Italy objected to the possible English monopolization of the Palestinian area, but since the Italian Jews, in 1917, had voiced their support of the Zionist program, the Italian government could not ignore the Balfour Declaration. No formal endorsement came from Rome until May 9, 1918, when the Italian Ambassador in London, the Marquis Imperiala, acting on instructions from Foreign Minister Sonnino, issued a statement of Italy's approval of the Declaration.¹⁵

¹⁴February 9, 1918: "Monsieur Sokolow, representing the Zionist Organizations was this morning received at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Monsieur Stephen Pichon, who was happy to confirm that there is complete agreement between the French and British Governments in matters concerning the questions of a Jewish establishment in Palestine." Sokolow, Zionism, II, 128. February 14, 1918; note from Pichon to Sokolow: "As arranged at our meeting on Saturday, the 9th of this month, the Government of the Republic, with a view to defining its attitude towards Zionist aspirations looking to the creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine, has published a communique in the press." Ibid.

¹⁵Sokolow, Zionism, II, 129. ". . . His Majesty's Government are pleased to confirm the declarations already made through their representatives . . . to the effect that they will facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a Hebrew national centre . . ." Ibid.

The United States, like France and Italy, was hesitant to identify itself with the Declaration, although for different reasons. Whereas France and Italy were at war with the Ottoman Empire and, therefore, concerned with the disposal of territory they regarded as war spoils, the United States possessed no involvement in the Turkish conflict. Robert Lansing, in recognition of this non-combatant status, urged the President to not officially recognize the Declaration. Wilson, taking Lansing's advice, "dropped the idea of making it publicly known that he approved the Declaration."¹⁶ As a result, ten months elapsed before Wilson yielded to Zionist pressures, and issued a statement concerning the Balfour Declaration. This occurred after Rabbi Stephen Wise, Brandeis' successor as the head of the American Zionist Organization, pointed out that no mention had been made of the war, or post-war arrangements for governing the protectorate. The question of suzerainty would be determined at the peace talks, and, hence, the United States should be vitally interested in the situation. Accordingly, Wilson, in a letter to Rabbi Wise, dated August 31, 1918, assured the Zionists of his good wishes for their program, although he still withheld any formal state-

¹⁶Stein, Balfour, p. 594. cf., Esco, Palestine, I, 240 ff., for an analysis of the Lansing-Wilson role in reference to recognition of the Zionist program and Balfour Declaration.

ment concerning official American policy on the subject.¹⁷

When the Balfour Declaration was communicated to Husain in January, 1918, "he took it philosophically, contenting himself with an expression of goodwill towards a kindred Semitic race, which he understood was to lodge in a house owned by the Arabs."¹⁸

Britain's allies were confused by the ambiguous wording of the Balfour Declaration and it is proper to ask the question, "what had Britain actually meant?" Did the government desire to establish a Jewish state, or did they only mean to create in Palestine a refugee center for displaced Jews? What had motivated Great Britain to take a step so confusing to her allies without consulting them?

Lloyd George maintained that a Jewish state would, at some time in the future, be established in Palestine. This "Jewish Commonwealth" would become a reality after the Jews had demonstrated their ability to handle the problems attending such a state, and when the Jews constituted a majority of the population in the area.¹⁹ Although the

¹⁷Sokolow, Zionism, II, 130-31. The Congress did not give recognition to the Declaration until September, 1922.

¹⁸Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 132. Husain, speaking on Jewish immigration: "We saw the Jews . . . streaming to Palestine from Russia, Germany, Spain, America . . . , they knew that the country was for its original sons, for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland." Misha Louvish, ed., Facts About Israel (Israel, 1966), p. 14.

¹⁹Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1138-39.

Declaration was not explicit in its terms, this represented the Prime Minister's interpretation of it, and his view

was received with almost universal approval of the British press, [and] was nearly everywhere accepted as a promise of a Jewish state to be created within some measurable future.²⁰

Therefore, the Declaration was "understood" to be an offer of opportunity offered to the Jews for settlement and colonization in Palestine. Thus, while nothing definite was intended in the matter of the immediate creation of a Jewish state, the development of such a commonwealth was expected to come about in due time.²¹ The British were seeking "to reconstitute a new community and definitely building for numerical majority in the future."²²

The motives behind the Declaration, already alluded to,²³ vary according to the individual and vary also in a spatial sense, for over the years the need for reinterpretation and re-evaluation of the document became almost mandatory. Prior to the end of the war no definite answer was given by any of the Cabinet members questioned by Parliament as to the meanings of the Balfour Declaration.²⁴ Lord

²⁰Paul L. Hanna, British Policy in Palestine (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942), p. 37. Hereafter cited as Hanna, British Policy.

²¹Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1139. cf. C. R. Ashbee, A Palestine Notebook: 1918-1923 (New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1923), p. 67.

²²Stein, Balfour, p. 625. ²³Supra., chap. iii, pp. 55ff

²⁴Parl. Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. XCIX (19 November 1917), col. 99.

Curzon, in the House of Lords during 1920, cited strategic reasons for its issuance; it was nothing more than a war policy.²⁵

Winston Churchill, elaborating on this idea in 1922, gave the motive for issuance as providing a method of obtaining both the moral and financial support of world Jewry for the war effort.²⁶ Lord Harlech, in 1937, however, declared that the motivation for the Declaration involved the restoration of the Jewish home in Palestine, with a secondary cause of war support.²⁷ Lloyd George, of course, maintained that the Declaration represented a purely propaganda measure. Great Britain, according to him, issued the document when the Zionists promised "to rally to the Allied cause Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world."²⁸ Balfour's motivation stemmed from some strange sense of idealism, having been converted early in his life to the Zionist cause and having become "convinced that the revival of Jewish unity ."²⁹ had to become one of the allied war aims.

²⁵Ibid., (House of Lords), 5th ser., Vol. XL (29 June 1920), col. 1028.

²⁶Ibid., (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. CLVI (4 July 1922), col. 3289.

²⁷Parl. Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. CCCXXVI (21 July 1937), col. 3289.

²⁸Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1139. Asquith's interpretations of Lloyd George's motivations were quite different from his own. Supra., chap. iii, p. 52, f.n. 23.

²⁹Dugdale, Balfour, II, 215.

The strategic consideration provided the essential motive, however³⁰—the protection and strengthening of Great Britain's trade routes to the East, and the impact that such an announcement would have on the Jewish communities in the Central power countries. In September, 1917, Germany, realizing the impact Jewish support could have on their war effort, made "serious efforts to capture the Zionist movement."³¹ It was also apparent that a declaration favoring the Zionist program would strengthen England's position in Palestine, "when the time came to establish administration for the Sykes-Picot Brown Zone."³² Through careful negotiations England gained the ascendancy in Palestine, there-by displacing the French. The first diplomatic move placed the area under international control in the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Great Britain saw the possibilities of eventually creating a British protectorate in the area. If the British army conquered Palestine, creating possession by conquest, the necessary moral backing for a position in Palestine could be achieved by supporting the Zionists for a Jewish national home in the area. Lloyd George felt that England would be in Palestine by conquest, and that she would remain entrenched in the area. Any problems that might be created by her position there, could be handled in the

³⁰Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 171.

³¹Ibid., VI, 173.

³²Hanna, British Policy, p. 37

future.³³

Husain and the British had reached their agreement in January, 1916, but Husain withheld action until June, when he decided that a noncommittal policy was no longer beneficial.³⁴ On June 5, 1916, the Sharif's sons—Ali and Faisal—declared their father King of the Arabs,³⁵ after which they waged a successful campaign against the Turks at Mecca. This revolt received British support; the British ultimately provided two British artillery companies from the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to aid the insurgents. With the fall of Mecca, Husain was declared King of the Arab countries by an assembly of Arab leaders, which he had convened, on November 2, 1916. Those Arab princes' and notables not at the convention, and Great Britain denied recognition of the title, although, England finally accorded him recognition as King of the Hejaz, on January 3, 1917.

The main importance of the Sharifian troops, who were trained and equipped by the British and led by Lawrence,³⁶ and other English officers, to the campaign in

³³ Stein, Balfour, p. 628.

³⁴ The "motivation" for Husain's action against the Turks was the threat of invasion of the Hejaz by a Turkish contingent, which was being led by a German Military Mission.

³⁵ Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp. 194-95.

³⁶ The military importance of Lawrence was not as strategic as it might appear to be, when compared with the gigantic proportions of the total war. No other figure, "carried so mysterious a glamor of romance, enhanced as much

the Middle East outside the Hejaz. As the British forces progressed towards Palestine, the importance of Arab troops and of the Syrian revolt played no apparently essential role in the determination of the outcome of the Palestine operation.³⁷

With the cabinet change in late 1916, the Eastern campaign was stepped up with the appointment of Sir Edward Allenby, an extremely able commander, as head of the Egyptian Expeditionary Forces in June, 1917. Allenby "had immense vitality and determination, and was popular with his troops ."³⁸ having earned a good reputation in France. The British initiated the attack on the Turkish-German forces in October, and captured Beersheba on October 31st³⁹—the same day the Cabinet approved the Balfour Declaration. On December 9, Allenby accepted the surrender of Jerusalem. The Eastern campaign then slowed down for several months,⁴⁰ but

of his aloofness and wilfulness as by superb prose in which he has recounted his story." The so called Lawrence of Arabia myth distorts the truth. C. R. M. F. Crutwell, A History of the Great War: 1914-1918 (2nd ed.; Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 613. Hereafter cited as Crutwell, Great War.

³⁷Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 130.

³⁸Llewelyn Woodward, Great Britain and the War: 1914-1918 (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1967), p. 118. Hereafter cited as Woodward, War.

³⁹The Turks were generally outnumbered by nearly two to one in infantry and ten to one in cavalry. Crutwell, Great War, p. 613.

⁴⁰This slow down was the result of the German offensive on the Western front, and the withdrawal of 60,000

in September, 1918, the British moved into the Jordan valley. This troop movement preceded a rapid advance to the north, and the capture of Damascus,⁴¹ Beirut and Aleppo. In the final days of Allenby's campaign in 1918, the Arab troops assisted in conquering Syria and in the capture of Homs and Hama. "The Turkish armies, ill-supplied, and with no hope of adequate reinforcements, were beginning to break up."⁴² Constantinople, by way of Thrace, was now accessible, and the Turkish government possessed no alternative, but surrender. On October 20, 1918, Turkey asked for an armistice, and on October 30, 1918, a truce was signed aboard the British battleship Agamemnon.⁴³

Because of the disorderly retreat of the Turkish forces from Palestine and Syria, civil records were destroyed or taken with the rapidly departing Ottoman officials.

troops from the Middle East to reinforce those troops in France. Woodward, War, p. 121.

⁴¹Although Faisal "occupied" Damascus, it is believed that he was merely allowed to occupy it, the actual fighting being done by a company of Australians; Faisal was then allowed to claim Damascus for the Arabs, thereby giving an incentive to other Arab troops in the war. Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914-1921 (London: Bowes & Bowes, 1956), pp. 120 ff. Hereafter cited as Kedourie, England and Middle East.

⁴²Woodward, War, p. 122. The Ottoman government appeared to be more interested in acquiring territory in the Caucasus region, because of Russia's collapse, than in saving Palestine by reinforcing her position there. Ibid., p. 402;

⁴³Ibid., p. 122.

During the last month of the Palestine campaign the political problems of the area outweighed the military.⁴⁴ As a result of the lack of civil administration and the increasingly confused situation in the area, a temporary military administration was established. The newly established "government" of the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration hoped to solve immediate civil problems; to implement the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, in recognition of the adamant demands of the French; and also to meet their obligations to the Arabs.⁴⁵ The administration of the area was divided into three zones:⁴⁶ Palestine, north to Acre and east to Jordan, was placed under English control; the coastal area of Syria was placed under French administration, and comprised the northern area of the Territory; Trans-Jordan and non-coastal Syria was placed under the control of Faisal, and comprised the eastern zone of occupation. Although not strictly satisfying the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, since Palestine was not internationalized, the arrangement tended to satisfy the French, and the Arab zone was treated as had been stipulated in the

⁴⁴Crutwell, Great War, p. 122.

⁴⁵Kedourie, England and Middle East, pp. 117 ff. The Occupied Enemy Territory Administration consisted of the Military governor, thirteen district military governors, fifty-nine British assistants, and seventeen Arab officers. Epp, Whose Land is Palestine, p. 140. For connection to the Sykes-Picot Treaty cf., Kedourie, England and Middle East, pp. 128 ff.

⁴⁶Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 128.

secret treaty.⁴⁷ Conflict over the occupation of certain areas, however, developed. Some means of modifying the terms of the Sykes-Picot Treaty had to be devised, or it had to be abandoned completely. The necessary modification came with the joint Anglo-French resolution of November 8, 1918.⁴⁸

The Arabs, watching the French and British entrench themselves in the Middle East and learning of the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty and the Balfour Declaration, began to voice concern over their status and position in the Middle East.

Husain, upon learning of the Declaration, asked for a definition of its meaning and Great Britain's intentions in Palestine. Accordingly, England sent David George Hogarth, a member of the Arab Bureau in Cairo, to offer explanations of British intentions, on January 4, 1918.⁴⁹ The basic intent of his mission was to reassure Husain that the allied countries still desired the creation of an Arab state in the Middle East, and, also, to inform him of the future status of Palestine as he understood the situation.⁵⁰ According to the message, no nationality in Palestine would be subject to

⁴⁷ Supra., chap. ii, pp. 39-43.

⁴⁸ Infra., p. 94.

⁴⁹ Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 267.

⁵⁰ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Palestine: 1915-1939 (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 115. Hereafter cited as International Affairs, Great Britain.

another. Because of the multiplicity of religions, however, there would have to be some type of "a special régime to deal with"⁵¹ the holy places. The Mosque of Omar, however, would not be controlled by a non-Moslem authority.⁵² Hogarth clearly stated that England had decided to aid the Zionist cause in Palestine and

in so far as [it was] compatible with the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political, no obstacle [would] be⁵³ put in the way of the realization of this ideal.

Husain, according to Hogarth, agreed to the plan as it had been outlined, although the Sharif adamantly opposed any independent Jewish state in the area.⁵⁴ Husain appeared to understand that England was expecting to aid the development of a Jewish home in Palestine, and that Palestine, because of their commitment to the Zionists, was to be excluded from any Arab state created in the Middle East. The basic intent in the Hogarth message was to reassure the Arabs that they would not be dominated by the Jews, and that all Jewish settlement would be closely supervised by Great Britain.⁵⁵

⁵¹ Stein, Balfour, p. 632.

⁵² International Affairs, Great Britain, p. 116.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 117.

⁵⁴ Stein, Balfour, p. 633.

⁵⁵ The Hogarth message can be found in Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons and Command), 1939, Vol. XXVII (Reports, vol. 881, misc. No. 4), Cmnd. 5964, "Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the Future States of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire," p. 3. Hereafter cited as Great Britain, Hogarth Report.

Shortly after the Hogarth mission, the Bolsheviki published the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty, which further complicated the situation. With the public knowledge of this document, Jamal Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Syria, made a diplomatic attempt to regain Arab allegiance. Jamal Pasha attempted to convince Husain that Great Britain was using the Arabs "to serve their own ends" by making "mendacious promises" with no intention of keeping them. He cited the Sykes-Picot Treaty as positive evidence that England had never contemplated an independent state, and that the Entente had made definite plans to divide the Arab area among themselves.⁵⁶ Husain's motives in rejecting the approach remain obscure—whether he rejected Jamal Pasha's plan because he considered the terms unsatisfactory, or if he felt unable to "escape from his involvement with the Entente Powers," or if England discovered the negotiations, and he put on a façade to placate the British, remains subject to conjecture.⁵⁷

Great Britain, acting rapidly to counteract the Ottoman statements, and hoping to set Husain's mind at ease in reference to the Sykes-Picot Treaty, sent a telegram, through Wingate. This telegram stated that the Sykes-Picot Treaty had been drawn up by the three Entente members in

⁵⁶ Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 255.

⁵⁷ Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 107. The entire year of 1917 was disastrous for the allies, the climax of which was the defection of Russia shortly after the Bolshevik coup. Ibid.

1916, but since Russia had withdrawn from the war, its terms no longer were applicable to any future considerations in the Middle East. On February 8, 1918, a formal, though vague and non-committal, note was sent to Husain by J. R. Bassett, British Agent at Jedda, reaffirming the terms of the previous British pledges to the Arabs. Great Britain regarded herself as firmly committed to the "liberation of the Arab peoples."⁵⁸

Early in 1918, Great Britain sent a Zionist commission to Palestine to study the situation and evaluate the possibilities for future Jewish settlement in the area.⁵⁹ Upon reaching Palestine, Weizmann, who headed the commission, approached General Allenby with his credentials from the government. Allenby informed Weizmann that the mission was useless—nothing could be done at that time.

The messianic hopes [that the Zionists] had read into the Balfour Declaration suffered a perceptible⁶⁰ diminution when [they] came into contact with . . .

General Headquarters.

The attitude of the British officers toward the Jews was distinctly antagonistic and presented an atmosphere unfavorable for any concise action on the part of the

⁵⁸Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 432. cf. Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 109.

⁵⁹The delegation was composed of representatives of the allied countries; Levi Bianchini, Italy; Sylvan Levi, France; and Joseph Cowen, Dr. David Eber, Mr. Leon Simon, and Mr. I. M. Sieff, England.

⁶⁰Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 218.

commission.⁶¹ The anti-semitic attitude of the military was widely known among the Sharifians in Palestine, and they felt "encouraged to hope that their natural and long-standing opposition to Zionism could deflect the British from a policy " favoring the Jewish settlement of the area.⁶² Whether the Arabs got active encouragement from the British officers to oppose the program or not, "Arab hostility gained in momentum as the days passed ."⁶³

Hoping to use the commission to allay growing Arab restiveness, Allenby suggested that Weizmann approach Faisal and, hopefully, obtain tentative Arab agreement to the Zionist program.⁶⁴ The Zionists readily agreed to the suggestion and proceeded to Faisal's encampment in June, 1918.

Handling the situation in an extremely diplomatic manner, Weizmann assured Faisal and the Arabs of the honorable intentions of the Zionists. The Zionists only wanted the right to settle in Palestine, and in no way would this settlement "be to the detriment of any of the great communities already established in the country ."⁶⁵

⁶¹Ibid., p. 221. The Jews constantly complained about the "lack of sympathy" of the military administration in Palestine, until Samuel's appointment and "the official records in the archives does bear out their complaints." Kedourie, Chatham House, p. 57.

⁶²Kedourie, Chatham House, pp. 57-58.

⁶³Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 224.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 232. ⁶⁵Stein, Balfour, p. 634.

Faisal informed Weizmann of his agreement with what had been said, and promised to relate the conversations to his father.⁶⁶ Weizmann's explanation of the Zionist's goals appeared to have had "a gratifying affect and had produced a better atmosphere."⁶⁷

It soon became apparent to Weizmann and the other members of the commission that they could do little work or study in Palestine, for the country was under Military administration, and the army was preparing for another offensive push in the Middle East. The commission, realizing that "the war was working up to its crisis" left Palestine for their respective countries.⁶⁸ Upon reaching London, Weizmann made an appointment to relate his findings to Lloyd George. The appointment was set for November 11, 1918; although the two men did meet, the turmoil resulting from the announcement of the armistice discounted any truly finite discussions of the subject.⁶⁹

In the spring of 1918, seven Syrian leaders, in exile in Egypt, submitted a memorandum to the Foreign Office in Cairo, in which they voiced their concern over the disposal of Arab territory in the event of an allied

⁶⁶Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 235.

⁶⁷Stein, Balfour, p. 634.

⁶⁸Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 238.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 239.

victory.⁷⁰ On June 16, 1918, England answered the questions of the seven nationals, taking the opportunity to once again attempt to reassure the Arabs.⁷¹ The declaration made specific reference to four territorial categories: lands that were free and independent before the war; Turkish territory that had been liberated by the sole activity of the Arabs; those areas that had been liberated through the concerted action of the allies and Arabs; and, those areas that were still under Turkish domination.⁷² Areas that came under the first two categories, those that had been free prior to the war and those liberated by the Arabs, would be recognized by England as being completely independent under Arab aegis. Those areas that were liberated through concerted action would be administered on the "principle of the consent of the governed."⁷³ The Turkish areas would have to be dealt with after the war, but England would continue to work for the freedom of the area, and the independence of the people in the area.⁷⁴ Great Britain pledged itself to the recognition of the independence of any Arab area that had been liberated from Turkish control through independent Arab

⁷⁰The seven Syrian nationals were members of the Party of Syrian Unity, which wanted the independence and sovereignty of Syria. Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 113.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 113 ff. The Declaration to the Seven is printed in Great Britain, Hogarth Report, pp. 5-6.

⁷²Klieman, British Policy, p. 16.

⁷³Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 434.

⁷⁴Ibid.

action.⁷⁵

The Declaration to the Seven, which was made to the seven anonymous Syrians,⁷⁶ basically represented a reaffirmation of British policy in the Middle East, and Arab troops operated almost solely in those areas to which they had been assigned in the Sykes-Picot Treaty. Although the total independence of these areas was inferred in the Declaration to the Seven, such independence was not to become a reality (with the exception of those areas designated in the Sykes-Picot Treaty). Palestine, as in past statements, from the Jordan to the Mediterranean was excluded from any commitments in the Declaration.⁷⁷ The motives prompting the British statement were partially to counter the growing strength and frequency of German and Ottoman propaganda, and to, once again, reassure the Arabs of their good intentions in the area.

Arab restiveness, in spite of the many statements of 1918, tended to increase in magnitude throughout the year. By the end of 1918 Arab unrest had reached such a point of turmoil, that the War Cabinet received messages from the Middle East emphasizing the seriousness of the situation.

⁷⁵Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 116.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 114. The Seven remained anonymous because when compared to Husain, they had little authority and were afraid of retribution on the part of Husain. Ibid.

⁷⁷T. E. Lawrence, The Seven Pillars of Wisdom (Garden City: Random House, 1935), p. 555.

Lord Curzon, addressing the Middle Eastern Committee of the Cabinet, warned that the activities of the Zionists in Palestine had antagonized and aroused the suspicions of the Arabs. There was " . . . an increasing friction between the two communities . . ." ⁷⁸ and something had to be done if a peaceful solution was to be found for the situation in the Middle East. British strategy in the area had been dependent upon fostering the national aspirations of the Arabs and also the Zionist goals in Palestine. In carrying out these strategems, England had created a vacuum in Palestine into which both groups were rushing.

Hoping to finally reassure the Arabs, without alienating the Jews, and to also illustrate the "unanimity" that existed between the allies, a joint Anglo-French declaration was issued on November 8, 1918. England and France decided to assure the Arabs that they had no desire to annex the territory which had been promised to the Arab state. ⁷⁹ This declaration gave the formal statement of the allied war aims in the East as being

the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national Governments . . . from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous population. ⁸⁰

⁷⁸Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1143.

⁷⁹Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 132.

⁸⁰International Affairs, Great Britain, p. 118.
 "The object aimed at by France and Great Britain in prosecuting in the East the War let loose by the ambition of Germany

Though the tone of the joint declaration is one of generalities, the specific mention of Syria and Mesopotamia, and the failure to mention Palestine are relevant. The exclusion of Palestine is indicative of England's intent to fulfill her promises to both the Arabs and the Zionists.

The documents that succeeded the Balfour Declaration—the Hogarth Message, Bassett Letter, the Declaration to the Seven, and the Anglo-French Declaration—all represented attempts to reassure the Arabs of British intent to fulfill the promise of Arab independence in Syria and Iraq. Because of increased self-interest, concern over Arab unrest, the rapid movement of the military campaigns, and Woodrow Wilson's twelfth point concerning self-determination, Great Britain created a series of declarations which, intentionally or unintentionally, encouraged Arab hopes, while, in all reality, they attempted to limit and define "that endorsement of Arab independence first extended in 1915."⁸¹ These

is the complete and definite emancipation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous population. "In order to carry out these intentions France and Great Britain are at one in encouraging and assisting the establishment of indigenous Governments and administrations in Syria and Mesopotamia, now liberated by the Allies, and in the territories the liberation of which they are now engaged in securing, and recognizing these as soon as they are actually established." Great Britain, Parl. Debates (House of Commons), 5th ser., Vol. CXLV, col. 36.

⁸¹Klieman, British Policy, p. 17.

documents did not rescind the Balfour Declaration, nor did they alter the special status of Palestine in the future post-war decisions, for by not including Palestine in any of the documents, its special status was emphasized in a de facto manner.

Attempting to allay the cynical and contradictory impact of the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and to use Arab nationalism for the promulgation of their own desires in the Middle East, Great Britain, perhaps, acted before carefully considering the results. This, however, was common under the stress of war. The results of its diplomacy would have to be treated after the war at the peace conferences. The primary problem in the Middle East remained one of handling the rampant nationalism that Great Britain had so eagerly encouraged. The nationalism of the Arabs—aspirant nationalism—tended to be more interested in the spirit of the pledges made during the war, rather than the specifics of these promises.

Although the war with Turkey took less time to fight than the Western aspects of the conflict, and despite her complete defeat, peace negotiations took longer than with the other members of the defeated forces. The primary blame for this lies in the duplicity of agreements and arrangements which concerned this area. In 1919 the battlefield and the strategy were not military, but rather political and diplomatic.

CHAPTER V

A FAILURE AT PARIS

Appetites, passions, hopes, revenge, starvation, and anarchy ruled the hour; and from this simultaneous welter all eyes were turned to Paris.

—Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis¹

The end of World War I signaled the defeat of the Central Powers by the twenty-four allied powers. The Peace Conference, held in a vain attempt to create some stability out of the chaos of war, commenced its deliberations with little, if any, true preparation or sentiment favoring a negotiated peace. The war had ended, but disruptive forces now threatened the work of the Conference from within.

The various tasks of the Conference included consideration of the question of the possible creation of a Jewish state. Palestine existed as an idea, rather than a reality, until the boundaries had been determined and the mandate awarded. The essential problem of establishing a Jewish state was complicated by self-interest on the part of the powers at the Conference. While the Paris Peace Conference was attempting to re-structure a broken Europe, there were three groups working for national supremacy in the Middle

¹Klieman, British Policy, p. 33.

East: the Franco-British group, which was involved in an imperialistic contest for dominance of the region; the Zionists, who wanted the fullest implementation of the Balfour Declaration; and the Arabs, represented by Emir Faisal and others, who wanted the assurance of independence that they had been promised during the war.²

The British, after the Treaty of Mudros, felt that the Sykes-Picot Treaty was no longer binding upon them and felt it should be modified, in order to safeguard His Majesty's Government's interests in the region. At the end of military operations British troops were stationed throughout the Fertile Crescent, exercising exclusive occupation and control of the Palestine-Mesopotamia region, and sharing joint occupation, with France and Faisal, in Syria. In matters "of men and material, the overwhelming expenditure,"³ in the Middle Eastern campaign had been British. This fact, above all others, determined the thinking of the British in enumerating peace claims at Paris.

Another complication at the Peace Conference concerned the three diplomatic agreements arrived at during the war: the McMahon-Husain Pledge to the Arabs; the Sykes-Picot Treaty arrived at with the "plenipotentiary of a sovereign nation";⁴ and the Balfour Declaration, a public statement of

²Klieman, British Policy, p. 34.

³Ibid., p. 20.

⁴Ibid., p. 21.

intent to the Zionist Organization. These three agreements were recognized by all of the signatories—the Sharif Husain, the French, the Zionists, and the British.⁵ Because of the change in war aims, however, and the renewed and intensified interest in the Middle East by members of the Entente, revision of the agreement between France and Great Britain was necessary, if war commitments were to become a reality.

On November 30, 1918, Clemenceau and Lloyd George met in London to consider concessions that might be made to achieve their national desires and determine what procedure would be followed at Paris. Lloyd George asked for two major revisions to the Sykes-Picot Treaty: the addition of the Mosul to Great Britain's area of control in the Middle East, and the removal of Palestine from the area of international supervision and its placement in the British sphere.⁶ His request, which was based on an expanded concept of the strategic importance of the Middle East and stemmed from a passion for possession through conquest, was accepted by Clemenceau. The French acceptance was based on a quid pro quo for each concession,⁷ and France agreed to the British demands, if it received certain concessions on the Rhine and also an appropriate share of the oil resources in the Mosul.⁸

⁵Williams, Britain and France, p. 18.

⁶Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 340 and 483.

⁷Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 182.

⁸Williams, Britain and France, p. 19.

France also solicited complete British support against any possible American objections to her territorial demands, and, if the Mandate system was adopted, British support of French mandates that included Damascus, Aleppo, Alexandretta, and Beirut.⁹ Although these talks were unofficial, they predetermined the final negotiations concerning the Middle East and were in keeping with the imperialistic temper of the future conference.¹⁰ Revisions of the Sykes-Picot Treaty were agreed to in Paris on January 30, 1919, when, at this and subsequent meetings, Lloyd George requested reductions of the French area of control in the Middle East. "The French Government, however, regarded these proposals as absolutely unacceptable, and quite incapable of being defended in the French Chambers."¹¹ The former allies neared an impasse in negotiations and events in early 1919 soon revealed that the Entente Cordiale of 1904 did not assure agreement on all matters. The facade of Anglo-French unity, while it may have temporarily suppressed historical differences, had not resolved them. France still retained her interest in Syria and the Middle East, and actively voiced concern over British attempts at dominance in the area.¹²

⁹Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 182; cf. Williams, Britain and France, p. 19.

¹⁰Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 182.

¹¹Ibid., p. 142.

¹²Klieman, British Policy, p. 26.

The French were determined to maintain a hold on territory in the Middle East, partly as compensation for losses in the European theatre, but primarily because of a traditional position of economic interest in the Levant. Clemenceau, therefore, demanded Syria—as agreed upon in the Sykes-Picot Treaty—in the hope of limiting Great Britain's pre-eminence in an area which promised to be of "great economic potential and strategic importance."¹³ France also refused to be bound by any promises that Great Britain had made to the Arabs during the course of the war.¹⁴ The British Prime Minister replied to Clemenceau with apparent surprise at the French attitude, closing his message with the hope that Anglo-French relations would not become so strained as to halt the Conference, and that the alliance which had won the war would continue to be a viable force in world affairs.¹⁵ Despite these assurances, Lloyd George was determined to get Palestine into a British sphere of influence.¹⁶

With the rapid disintegration of mutual good faith between the two countries, little direct, concise action could be taken in reference to the Arab-Zionist question.

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 521.

¹⁵Ibid., IV, 489.

¹⁶Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 288.

The breach, which had reopened in the final stages of the war, widened in the clash of ideas and personalities in 1919, and persisted thereafter as an important irritant in the rectangular relationship between the French, British, Arabs, and Jews.¹⁷ In spite of this difficult and near-explosive situation, both the Arabs and the Zionists prepared their delegations to present war claims and platforms to the Peace Conference.

Realizing that some type of accord between the Arabs and the Zionists was required, if peace were to be successful in the Middle East, Great Britain advised Faisal to come to England for consultation prior to the opening of the Conference. Lloyd George was also interested in promoting a meeting between Faisal and the French, hoping that Faisal could be persuaded to accept the French claims to Syria, and that the French would then be willing to make concessions in Greater Syria to Great Britain. Acting as the representative of his father, Husain, Faisal arrived in France on November 26, 1918, where he received a rather cool welcome, and subsequently went to London on December 10.

His stay in England was marked by a display of great cordiality and good will which left him in no doubt of the sincere desire of the Government, . . . to do what was possible in furtherance of legitimate Arab and Syrian aspirations.¹⁸

¹⁷Klieman, British Policy, p. 28.

¹⁸Temperley, Peace Conference, IV, 142.

While in London, the Emir was advised to accept the possibility of French control in Syria. Faisal was beginning to realize that the Arab position at the impending Conference would be that of a supplicant, and not as an equal member "of the victorious coalition"¹⁹ that had won the war. Aware of French opposition to the war claim of independence by the Arabs, and still uncertain as to British intent, Faisal turned to the Zionists as a potential ally for the future negotiations.

At the end of December, 1918, Faisal met with Zionist leaders in London. He entered these negotiations on the hope that out of them would come an accord and unity of action. On December 12, he was quoted by The Times as saying:

The two main branches of the Semitic family, Arabs and Jews, understand one another, and I hope that as a result of interchange of ideas at the Peace Conference, which will be guided by ideals of self-determination and nationality, each nation will make definite progress towards the realization of its aspirations. Arabs are not jealous of Zionist Jews, and intend to give them fair play; and the Zionist Jews have assured the Nationalist and Arabs of their intention to see that they too have fair play in their respective areas.²⁰

Faisal stated that no modern state could grow and prosper in the Middle East without the aid of the heritage

¹⁹Klieman, British Policy, p. 35.

²⁰Moshe Perlmann, "Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 1918-1922," Jewish Social Studies, vol. VI, No. 2, April, 1944, p. 133. Hereafter cited as Perlmann, Arab-Jewish Diplomacy.

of Europe; the Jews were the perfect intermediaries to translate this heritage into a formula that fit the Arab situation. The Arabs, through the Emir, promised to support Jewish demands at Paris.²¹ Extending the terms of his meeting with Weizmann in June, 1918, Faisal signed an agreement with the Zionists to concert their actions in Paris, on January 3, 1919.²² The nine articles of this agreement were designed to promote the "good will and understanding" between "the Arab State and Palestine."²³ The Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, was to be implemented²⁴ in any settlement, and in return for Arab support the Zionist Organization promised to use "its best efforts to assist the Arab State in providing the means for developing the national

²¹"In Palestine the enormous majority of the people are Arabs. The Jews are very close to the Arabs in blood, and there is no conflict of character between the two races. In principles we are absolutely at one. Nevertheless, the Arabs cannot assume the responsibility of holding level the scales in the clash of races and religions that have, in this one province, so often involved the world in difficulties. They would wish for the effective super-position of a great trustee, so long as a representative local administration commended itself by actively promoting the material prosperity of the country." David Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, 1918-1919, (22 vols.; New York: Appeal Printing Co., 1924), IV, 298 ff. Hereafter cited as Miller, Diary.

²²A copy of the agreement can be found in Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp. 437-39.

²³Pearlmann, Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, pp. 135-36.

²⁴"In the establishment of the Constitution and Administration of Palestine all such measures shall be adopted as will afford the fullest guarantees for carrying into effect the British Government's Declaration of November 2, 1917." Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 247.

resources and economic possibilities ."²⁵ of the natal Arab state. Both parties further stipulated that if a dispute should arise between the two groups, Great Britain would be asked to act as the arbitrator.

In signing the agreement, Faisal incorporated a proviso that the agreement would be "deemed void and of no account or validity if the Arabs failed to obtain the independence which they sought through the good offices of Great Britain."²⁶ The effectiveness of this Arab-Zionist accord, then, would be determined by the treatment accorded the Arabs by the Great Powers in Paris.²⁷ This agreement implied Faisal's acknowledgement that Palestine would not be incorporated into a larger Arab state, and that the area remained outside the territorial limitations of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence. While the Faisal-Weizmann agreement indicated an accord between Arab and Zionists, this was not the case, for the Arabs in Palestine were already beginning to display open opposition to the Balfour Declaration and Jewish immigration.²⁸ When tension increased between Arab and Jew,

²⁵Pearlmann, Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, pp. 135-36.

²⁶Kliemann, British Policy, p. 35.

²⁷"If the Arabs are established as I have asked in my manifesto of January 4th addressed to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I will carry out what is written in this agreement. If changes are made, I cannot be answerable for failure to carry out this agreement."
Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 247.

²⁸The Zionist archives report the opposition included widespread propaganda meetings, "gatherings in private homes attended by officers serving Faisal's army, agitation inc.

Faisal ignored the January accord by implementing his post-script; since the Arab demands had not been met, he regarded the agreement as null and void.²⁹ It soon became apparent that Faisal's apprehensions and anxiety concerning the status of the Arabs at the Peace Conference were not unnecessary, for the Arabs were rapidly becoming a pawn in the imperialistically-oriented "games" that were taking place in Paris.

On January 1, 1919, the Hejaz delegation submitted a memorandum, to the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference, which stated the aim of the Arab nationalist movement: the eventual unification of all Arabs into one nation, as an independent and sovereign state.³⁰ In a supplement to this memorandum, dated January 29, 1919, and implementing Woodrow Wilson's principles as a defense for their demands, the Arabs stated that the Hejaz peoples hoped that the European powers would attach a greater degree of "importance to the bodies and souls of the Arabic speaking peoples than to their own material interests."³¹

Faisal, accompanied by Colonel Lawrence, appeared

cafés, the allocation of money for arms purchases, complaints to the authorities against alleged pro-Jewish discrimination, . . . and threats against Jewish Homes." Aharon Cohen, Israel and the Arab World (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), p. 147. Hereafter cited as Cohen, Israel.

²⁹Ibid., p. 143.

³⁰Miller, Diary, III, 297.

³¹Miller, Diary, IV, 199.

before the Supreme Council on February 6, 1919, to present the Arab case, which had previously been outlined in the two memoranda of January 1 and January 29, respectively.³² His remarks were in keeping with his agreement with Weizmann and the Zionists.³³ The presentation of the Arab case resulted in avid discussion among the delegates and it initially appeared that the chief delegates were ready to make some concrete proposals concerning the matter. England and France, however, reversed the situation when they became enmeshed in arguments

deriving from their persistent differences over the secret treaties, apportioning responsibility for them, and³⁴ the degree to which they were still binding . . .

upon the signatories.

With the apparent abortion of the unanimity that was needed between France and Great Britain, the possibility of finding a solution was remote. President Wilson pointed out to the Council that Russia had been a signatory to the 1916 agreement, "but had now disappeared, and the partnership of interest had therefore been dissolved,"³⁵ making a new accord necessary. To overcome the impasse, he suggested that those

³²Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1039-40.

³³Cohen, Israel, p. 143.

³⁴Klicman, British Policy, p. 36. cf. Miller, Diary, IV, 297-99, and Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 145-48.

³⁵Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 148.

peoples directly concerned with the situation should be consulted on the question as to which power would become the mandatory. An international committee proposed by Wilson, would ultimately be sent to the Middle East to ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants.³⁶

Both Clemenceau and Lloyd George gave tentative approval to the idea of such a commission, as did Faisal, who placed great hope on the outcome of the commission's findings. France soon changed her mind, however, and indicated that she would not participate in any investigation, the sole intent of which was to expose anti-French attitudes in Syria. With the extension of the Committee's area of investigation to Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia, Great Britain also withdrew support. Wilson, however, had already appointed the two United States representatives—Dr. Henry C. King and Charles R. Crane—and they had left for the Middle East by May, 1919.

At the meeting of the Council of Four, on March 20, 1919, a compromise was reached with the French, but a betrayal of the Anglo-Arab promises of independence was the cost of this rather tenuous solution. Lloyd George adamantly maintained that Great Britain had no designs on Syria, but the French remained wary, and tension still continued between the two countries.³⁷

³⁶Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), pp. 143-44. Hereafter cited as Nicolson, Peacemaking.

³⁷Williams, Britain and France, p. 20.

In April, 1919, Faisal met with Clemenceau, who informed him that France expected to receive the mandate for Syria. Great Britain had abandoned its support of an Arab-Zionist front to oppose French claims in the area, apparently having given in to some of the French demands and claims to the area. This reversal of policy left Faisal bereft of any truly strong allies to back up his claims.³⁸

Faisal left Paris in May, greatly discouraged, but still hanging onto the hope of a favorable finding on the part of the King-Crane Commission. Attempting to prepare his people for the investigation, he addressed an assemblage of Syrian notables in Damascus, on May 5. Pledging himself to continue the pursuit of a program for independence, he asked the Syrian leaders to "depend and trust in [the] Allies who helped [them] and who wished [them] good success and progress."³⁹ After receiving verbal proof of their support, the Emir proceeded to instruct the convocation on the manner in which to answer any questions that might be asked by the Commission. He directed the people of the area "to ask for complete independence for Syria, and, at the same time to express a hope that it [would] be granted to other Arab countries."⁴⁰ This was, possibly, his last chance

³⁸Cohen, Israel, p. 151.

³⁹Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 267-72.

⁴⁰Ibid., IV. 264.

to gain independence for Syria, and by making such a demand, Faisal hoped to unify the Arabs, indicating a desire on his part to fulfill his father's wish for a united Arab state. If independence was not granted, the Syrians would not be willing to accept France as the mandatory power, if neither Great Britain nor the United States would accept the trusteeship, then a joint commission of Great Britain and France would be acceptable.⁴¹

Even though the other powers had pulled out of the investigation, there-by compromising the success and authority of the fact-finding expedition, the King-Crane Commission, which was already in the Middle East, received instructions to carry out the investigatory inquiry from June until August. While their final report confirmed the anti-French attitude of the Syrians and their total rejection of a French mandate, the findings were not acted upon by the Conference—possibly because of embarrassment at lack of Conference participation, and also because of a desire to satisfy individualistic imperialist desires. In the report the

majority of the Syrian population desired absolute and unqualified independence; that failing such independence America would be preferred as the Mandatory Power, and, failing America, Great Britain; but that strong opposition to control by France had been revealed.⁴²

⁴¹Ibid., IV, 265.

⁴²Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 149.

The report also designated Palestine as an area that should be connected to Syria, under the leadership of Faisal, and not given to the Zionists under any conditions. This aspect of the report, had it been officially recognized by the Conference, would have led to a great deal of difficulty for the Jews. The American inquiry, however,

produced no practical results, for before the return of the Commission to Paris, the more important treaties had been signed and President Wilson had left for home.⁴³

While Faisal and the Arabs had presented their cause to the Conference, and he had departed to prepare his people for the "Allied Commission" of inquiry, the Zionists feverishly prepared for their appearance before the Supreme Council and the statement of their demands. Although it was still impossible to convene a Zionist Congress, because of the still chaotic post-war conditions, a number of leading Zionists gathered in London in January, 1919.⁴⁴ A commission, created out of this assemblage, set about drafting a statement of official policy for the Organization, for presentation to the Supreme Council.

This committee, under the chairmanship of Herbert

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Among those that assembled in London were: Dr. Shmarya Levin (New York), Victor Jacobson (Copenhagen), I. L. Goldberg and Israel Rosoff (Russia), Mr. Jacobus Kahn (Holland), Herbert Samuel, Chaim Weizmann, and Nahum Sokolow (Great Britain).

Samuel⁴⁵ prepared the draft of policy and Simon Marks presented it to Ormsby-Gore, who represented the British Foreign Office. The proposal was rejected by the Foreign Office, however, on the grounds that it was too impractical, and the Zionists were informed that it would not be accepted unless the Organization came "down to earth"⁴⁶ and eliminated such outrageous demands as a Jewish governor and the requirement that the majority of the governmental officials be Jewish.⁴⁷

All the same, the draft which Ormsby-Gore had considered so fanciful formed the substantial basis of the statement which was eventually submitted to the Conference on February 23, 1919.⁴⁸

While the Actions Committee continued its sessions in London, discussing possible revisions of the statement, a summons came requesting the Zionists appearance before the Supreme Council. Weizmann left for Paris where he joined Sokolow and the other members of the Zionist delegation⁴⁹ in order to appear before the Council.⁵⁰

⁴⁵Other members of the committee were Meynard Keynes, Lionel Abrahams, and James de Rothschild. Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Ibid., Infra., Appendix F, pp. 158-59.

⁴⁹Nahum Sokolow, Zionist Organization; Jacob de Haas, United States Zionist Organization; André Spire, French Zionists; Sylvan Lévi, French Jews. Miller, Diary, XV, 104-05.

⁵⁰The Council of the Ten was composed of, for the Zionist presentation, Balfour and Lord Milner for Great Britain; Tardieu and Pichon for France; Lansing and White

Appearing before the Council of Ten, the Zionist presentation was begun by Sokolow with a "short, concise speech upon the first point, namely, the historic claim of the Jewish people to Palestine ."⁵¹ In his statements he referred to the "favorable declarations" which various governments had made on the subject, and also gave an explanation of the "attachment of the Jewish people to Eretz Israel."⁵² The local Jewish questions in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, according to his presentation, could be solved by creating a national home in Palestine.

Weizmann, the next speaker for the Organization, "dealt with the economic position of the Jewish people."⁵³ The war had displaced the East European Jew, leaving "Jewry and Judaism" in a weakened condition never before seen, thus creating "a problem very difficult of solution."⁵⁴ The solution—since the problem revolved around the homelessness of the Jew—was to be found in the creation of a national home.⁵⁵ The essence of the Zionist desires was that: the mandatory would promote Jewish immigration; cooperate with a Jewish council or agency in the development of the Jewish

for the United States; Baron Sonnino for Italy; and Clemenceau was present for the first few minutes of the session. Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243.

⁵¹Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1157-58.

national home in Palestine; and would offer priority to the Jewish Agency in obtaining concessions for growth and development, for natural resources which the mandatory government might desire.⁵⁶

After comments by Ussishkim, and Andre Spire,⁵⁷ the final speaker was Sylvan Lévi. His remarks can be divided into two parts: "In the first he soared to heaven, [and] in the second he came plumb down to earth."⁵⁸ He began his presentation by pointing out the great achievements of the farming colonies established by Baron de Rothschild, in Palestine; and made the point that the work of Choveve Zion, and the significance of the Alliance Israelite Universelle could hardly be ignored. The only significance of the Zionist movement, however, according to Lévi, was that "it had uplifted the Jewish masses and oriented them to Palestine."⁵⁹ Lévi then proceeded to damn the entire future of the Organization and its goals. Palestine was too small and too poor to absorb the millions of Jews that would want to migrate to the area. The large influx of this "foreign" population would lead to the eventual displacement of the 600,000 Arabs already in the area.⁶⁰ He then continued in a

⁵⁶Miller, Diary, XV, 108.

⁵⁷Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 243.

⁵⁸Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 244.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

highly rhetorical manner stating his belief that the bulk of the Jews who would flock to Palestine would come from Russia. The Russians, "who were of 'explosive' tendencies,"⁶¹ would create countless problems in the area. Possibly the most dangerous result of such a venture by the Zionists would be the introduction of the dangerous idea of dual citizenship among world Jewry, possibly consigning the Jew to the ghetto as in the Middle Ages.

The Zionist representatives sat in shocked and embarrassed silence, regarding Lévi's discourse as a "public desecration" of their being.⁶² The four Zionists did not want to degrade themselves, the Organization, nor the Council, by turning the meeting into a debate, which would have been "an exceedingly undignified spectacle."⁶³ Their problem was resolved, however, according to Weizmann, by "something in the nature of a miracle."⁶⁴ The American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, at the end of Lévi's discourse, interpolated a question which allowed Weizmann a rebuttal to the "traitor's" remarks. Lansing asked Weizmann what was actually meant by the term "Jewish National Home." Did it mean an autonomous Jewish government?⁶⁵

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 244.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Miller, Diary, XV, 104-17. cf. Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1158.

In answering the question, Weizmann replied in the negative.⁶⁶ The Jewish national home meant the creation of an administration which would come from the natural conditions of the country—never to the detriment of the non-Jewish community. Through immigration it was hoped that Palestine would eventually become Jewish as England was English.⁶⁷ As to Lévi's charge of dual allegiance, Weizmann maintained that there was nothing in any of the Zionist proposals which could possibly raise such a problem.⁶⁸ The charge against the Russians was without foundation, for although they lived in an "excitable atmosphere," the early work in Palestine, which had been praised by Monsieur Lévi, had been done by Russian Jews.⁶⁹ The proceedings ended with this conversation. The Zionists had stated their case, and Weizmann had delivered his rebuttal, according to Balfour, with the sureness of "the swish of a sword."⁷⁰

⁶⁶"The Zionist Organization did not want an autonomous Jewish Government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a Mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually. The Zionist Association would require to have permission at the same time to build Jewish schools, where Hebrew would be taught, and in that way to build up gradually a nationality which would be as Jewish as the French nation was French and the British nation was British. Later on, when the Jews formed the large majority, they would be ripe to establish such a Government as would answer to the state of the development of the country and to their ideals." Miller, Diary, XV, 104-17.

⁶⁷Weizmann, Trial and Error, p. 144.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 244.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 245. Weizmann and the other members were at a loss to understand Levi's motivations, for on the

The Zionists appeared to be receiving favorable reception for their program in France, and the night of the Zionist hearing, Tardieu issued a statement that France would not openly oppose Palestine as becoming a British mandate, nor would they oppose the creation of a Jewish state. This openly friendly reception apparently scared Faisal, for in an interview with Le Matin, he was openly hostile toward the Jewish state.⁷¹ Although this was a surprising shift in position, Faisal probably acted out of pressure from the various Arab nationalist movements, in an attempt to reinforce his own position at home. Faisal's secretary, when contacted by the Zionists, disavowed the attitude, and a meeting between Felix Frankfurter, an American Zionist, and the Emir was arranged. After the meeting Faisal sent Frankfurter a letter, which restated the friendly attitude of the Arabs towards their ethnic brothers.⁷² Faisal was not afraid of the Zionist program in Palestine.⁷³ Apparently Faisal was straddling the diplomatic fence, hoping to achieve western support and also to maintain supremacy

Palestine Commission in 1918 he had acted "correct enough"; there was also confusion as to why Baron de Rothschild "supported his candidacy for membership in the delegation . . ." to come before the Council. Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 245-46.

⁷³"Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted by the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through; we will wish the Jews a most hearty welcome home." Ibid.

at home.

Just as Faisal had prepared the Syrians for the coming of the King-Crane Commission in May and June, so did the Zionists prepare the Palestinian Jews. In a letter to Friedenwald, a member of the Zionist Commission in Jaffa, Weizmann asked that the Zionist cause be presented to the Commission "with firmness, moderation and dignity on [the] lines submitted " to the Peace Conference.⁷⁴

In placing all their hopes on Faisal, the Zionists had acted in the belief that he would help them in negotiating an agreement with the Palestinian Arabs.⁷⁵ With the increase in Arab tensions in the Middle East, however, Faisal was forced to change his position, and from April onward there was increased activity among the Arabs in Palestine in an effort to insure the exclusion of the Zionists from Palestine.⁷⁶ This attitude was expressed by the Palestinian Arabs when they were questioned by the King-Crane Commission, and was also evident in Faisal's statements at Damascus in June.

At the time of the Arab and Zionist appearances in

⁷⁴Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 278. The note then continued: "Inform them our cooperation with Feysal and our desire to work harmoniously with Arab population for the good of Palestine. Draw their attention to achievements Jewish colonization under difficult circumstances and great possibilities now when greatest majority Jewish people all over world resolutely supports Zionist aims and considerable numbers waiting first opportunity settle Palestine." Ibid.

⁷⁵Cohen, Israel, p. 143.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 148.

Paris, an undeniable entente existed between Great Britain and these two parties, with reference to the disposition of Palestine in accord with the Balfour Declaration. Although each party must have had a different interpretation of the Declaration there was unanimity on the main point—the Jews would be allowed to settle in Palestine. The Arabs, at this time, agreed to the creation of Palestine as a separate unit from the Arab state or states, and also that a government, safeguarded by Great Britain, would be instituted and would work for the development of a Jewish national home. It was only after Damascus that Faisal's attitude changed, for in conjunction with the other statements there his remark on Palestine was an uncompromising one:

We oppose the pretensions of Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and oppose Zionist migration to any part of our country; for we do not acknowledge their title but consider them a rare peril to our people from the national, economical, and political points of view.

The Paris Conference did not immediately work on the problem of the Middle East after the initial presentations had been made. As soon as the hostilities of the war had ceased, the enthusiasm for the creation of the Arab and Jewish states began to diminish.

At the Peace Conference, all ideals of national self-determination and of making the world safe for

⁷⁷Hanna, British Policy, p. 43.

democracy withered away in the icy climate of power politics and insatiable greed for territorial expansion.⁷⁸

Nothing cohesive could be accomplished in drafting or awarding mandates until the petty squabbles between France and Great Britain had been resolved.

The Anglo-French disagreement was complete by March, but England and France still awaited a solution of their difficulties. They had, however, no doubt that they would eventually be able to bridge the chasm of differences that was separating them. The unpleasant consequences of their quarrel fell on the

luckless countries of the Near East They were now to be made the sport of antagonistic ambitions . . . and political and sectarian passions were to be awakened and continually⁷⁹ sustained among their restless populations.

Faisal's hope for Arab independence slowly disintegrated over the months of 1919, and the safeguards that he had employed, and had hoped would assure independence were removed one at a time: the principle of self-determination was being ignored; multilateral negotiations, with the influence of disinterested third parties, had not worked; attempts to use a European type of diplomacy had resulted in failure; the reliance upon England to implement her war promises, and to intervene, on the Arab's behalf, with the

⁷⁸Sokolow, Zionism, II, 443.

⁷⁹Kedourie, England and Middle East, p. 141.

French, did not materialize; direct bilateral conversations with the French had come to no avail; and, ultimately, the King-Crane Commission—with its hope of an "impartial" report—had been ignored.⁸⁰

However, while the Arabs fared quite badly, the Zionists were actually beginning to realize their dream of a Jewish national home. The implementation of the mandate, however, had to be postponed for the resolution of the Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East. The calming of this altercation began to occur in September, 1919.

⁸⁰Klieman, British Policy, p. 39.

CHAPTER VI

THE CREATION OF CONFLICT

Indifference to the significance of the Near East in the scheme of world affairs has been carried so far that it is not appreciated that almost irreparable harm is being done to British interests.

—The Near East, 2 January 1920¹

Basking in the after-glow of victory, Britain and France, in the immediate post-war period, extended and intensified their activities in the Middle East. The resultant contest for supremacy led to serious international problems and had grave results for all concerned. Elements in both Syria and Palestine were seeking Great Britain as a mandatory power and the joint Zionist and Arab requests for British protection greatly aided Britain in the diplomatic struggle with France for pre-eminence in the area.² This arrangement also created some difficulties when the time came for a joint Anglo-French accord at the Peace Conference.³

To solve the many imperialistic rivalries evident at Paris, two solutions were introduced and, after discussion,

¹Klieman, British Policy, p. 45.

²Supra, chap. v, pp. 99-100.

³The Chronicles of the Hagana, I, part 2, p. 542, as cited by Cohen, Israel, p. 161.

combined: Woodrow Wilson's idea for a League of Nations, and Jan Christian Smuts' suggestion for a system of mandates. Under the mandate plan, the principal allies would become trustees for new states to be carved out of the land confiscated from the defeated Central Powers, with supervision of the administration of the areas to be a responsibility of the League. Though a compromise, this system appeared to be the only possible way of reconciling the differences that existed between the imperialistic reality of the conference, and the idealistic desire for self-determination, that was so evident among the "submerged nationalities."⁴ The mandate system was incorporated into the Covenant of the League of Nations, in Article 22. In the implementation of this program, Greater Syria, as well as other areas of the defeated Ottoman Empire, came under the influence of Great Britain and France.

Great Britain, already having secured France's approval of her policy towards the Zionists in Palestine,⁵ opened formal discussions with the Zionist representatives at the Peace Conference in Paris, for the primary purpose of determining the terms of the proposed mandate.⁶ The first

⁴Quincy Wright, Mandates under the League of Nations (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930), p. 591. Hereafter cited as Wright, Mandates.

⁵Supra, chap. iii, p. 62.

⁶The negotiations for drafting the mandate was under the directions of Weizmann and Sokolow; auxiliary aid came from Felix Frankfurter.

stage of the negotiations included a tentative draft of mandate arrangements which was sent to David Hunter Miller, for his opinion, on March 28, 1919.⁷ The general suggestions contained in this draft, delivered by Felix Frankfurter, were designed to establish Palestine as a mandate under the auspices of the League, but the League would not be allowed to dominate. The preamble of the draft spoke specifically of establishing in Palestine a Jewish national home, through historic right, and included the request that Great Britain be assigned the position of mandatory power. After several conferences, and resultant revision, this draft was submitted to the members of the British delegation in Paris on July 15, 1919. Its framers intended that the draft, in its final form, would be included in the peace treaty with Turkey as an integral part of that document.

A later text of July 15, however, was inclined to

⁷"Whereas the inhabitants of Palestine are unable at the present time effectively to constitute and to maintain an autonomous commonwealth, and

"2. Whereas the League of Nations and the Signatory Powers recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute Palestine as their national home: and there to establish the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth, and

"3. Whereas it is the wish of the inhabitants of Palestine and of the Jews that governmental and administrative powers to be exercised over the territory and its inhabitants should be confined to Great Britain as the Mandatory of the League and as trustee of the Signatory Powers,

"4. Now therefore the Signatory Powers hereby constitute Great Britain the Mandatory of the League of Nations for the Government and Administration of Palestine."

Miller, Diary, pp. 369 ff.

favor French interests. Negotiated by Weizmann and Sokolow, as representatives of the Zionist Organization, it was constructed in such a way as to cause the Zionists to think that it would be acceptable to both the British and the French.⁸ Amazingly enough, however, the objections to it came, not from France or England, but from the Zionist Action Committee in London. They felt that the draft was not specific enough, and said that it should be made more clear that the "historic connection" was, in fact, an "historic right" of the Jewish people to settle in Palestine. Because of the internal friction among the Zionist leaders, a second text was prepared. Generally, the moderation of Weizmann and Sokolow was carried

⁸"1. Recognition should be given to the 'historical connection' of the Jews with Palestine and the claim which this gives them to found a national home in that country.

"2. The proposed mandatory should be made responsible for placing Palestine under such political, administrative and economic conditions as would secure the establishment there of the Jewish national home.

"3. The ultimate aim of the mandate should be the creation in Palestine of a self-governing commonwealth.

"4. A provisional--to be changed subsequently into a permanent--Jewish Council should be formed representing Jewish opinion in Palestine and in the world at large

"5. The Palestine administration should be under a Governor appointed by the Mandatory Power who would be assisted by an Executive Council. Not less than half of the members of the Executive Council should be representative of the Palestine population, Jewish and non-Jewish, and of the Jewish Council. Provision should also be made for a Representative Assembly of an advisory character, gradually to be given wider powers as the Palestinian nation progressed toward full self-government.

"6. Jewish immigration and colonization should be facilitated by the British government.

"7. Hebrew was to be recognized as an official language." Reports of the Executive to the XIIth Zionist Congress, I, p. 28.

over into the revised document. The revised document was completed by the end of 1919, and apparently received the approval of the British government. Although the term "historic connection" was not replaced by the stronger term "historic right," the revised draft did tend to be a more generally worded document: there was to be a wider concept of self-government and administration of the state, and the Zionist Organization appeared to have won certain necessary conditions for the development of a Jewish national home. The idea of a Jewish Commonwealth, however, was not favored by Great Britain, and the phrase was dropped from the draft.⁹

The spring of 1920 witnessed a set-back for the Zionists in negotiations with Great Britain with regard to the terms for the mandate: the Arabs were creating a great deal of difficulty in the Middle East, and Lord Curzon, known for his anti-Zionist attitude, replaced Balfour as Foreign Secretary. Curzon felt a need for a more lenient policy towards the Arab groups, which proved to be detrimental to the Zionists' goals. As a result, basic changes were made in the drafted mandate, and a new proposal issued by the government on June 10, 1920. In this government prepared draft—the first official draft from the British—reference to the "historic connection" of the Jews to Palestine was deleted; limits were placed on the authority of the Jewish

⁹Reports of the Executive to the XIIth Zionist Congress, I, p. 30.

Agency; and the idea of a Jewish Commonwealth was completely dropped.¹⁰

Finally realizing that Weizmann had been correct in his moderation, the Actions Committee concentrated on re-obtaining a position which they had previously disfavored. The members consolidated their efforts to work out a compromise, directing their attention to three essential areas: the necessity for the inclusion of the idea of "historic connection"; need for a "self-government" clause was necessary because of Palestine's status as a Class A Mandate; and the right for internal autonomy was necessary if the area was to become self-supporting.¹¹ Between June and November, 1920, the Zionists were actively involved in attempts to modify the "restrictive" governmental draft.¹² In spite of the activities of the Organization and Lord Balfour, who had once again come to the aid of the Zionist group, only one change was allowed: the phrase "historic connection" was reinstated. On December 6, 1920, Balfour submitted the approval draft for the mandate to the League of Nations for its ratification. One major triumph for the Zionists, which was incorporated into the draft, was the replication of the Balfour Declaration; this statement, therefore, would become part of the formal mandate for Palestine.

¹⁰Reports of the Executive to the XIIth Zionist Congress, I, p. 30.

¹¹Ibid., p. 31.

¹²Ibid., p. 32.

The draft, circulated in the Council of the League, did not survive intact, however, for certain changes were deemed necessary. Changes in the mandate were not concerned with Palestine, however, but rather with the Transjordan area. With the addition of Article 25, Great Britain was given the right to withhold implementation of the Balfour Declaration in those territories that were located east of the Jordan River,¹³ and the terms of the final draft awarded Great Britain complete control over foreign, legislative and administrative, and defense policies. Because the mandatory was bound "so far as circumstance [permitted, to] encourage local autonomy"¹⁴ and in compliance to this, a Jewish Agency was set up for the purpose of advising and jointly controlling the administration of Palestine.¹⁵

The "final draft" was submitted to the British Parliament in August, 1921, and eventually ratified by the League of Nations on July 24, 1922. There were numerous events which delayed its final ratification and implementation, however, not the least of which was the still existent Anglo-French rivalry. France refused to give its consent to

¹³The Transjordan was separated from Palestine in 1922, and therefore not open to Jewish immigration as described in the mandate. Williams, Britain and France, p. 27. Infra, chap. vi, p. 140.

¹⁴Williams, Britain and France, p. 24.

¹⁵Ibid. Text of the mandate can be found in Wright, Mandates, pp. 600 ff., and Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, II, 1194-1201.

British intent in the Middle East, until Britain had resolved its differences with her concerning the Syrian question. Also holding up the peace treaty with Turkey was the uncertain and "ambiguous attitude of the United States."¹⁶ The assumption had been made that the United States would participate in the Turkish negotiations, but by the fall of 1919, this was becoming doubtful, and American delay was creating an increase in the tension of an already irritable situation.¹⁷

The French were in a very precarious position in the Middle East at the end of the war. After informal talks with Lloyd George in November and December of 1918,¹⁸ Clemenceau returned to France confident that the problem had been solved. Both he and Lloyd George had handled the situation in the manner they were most familiar with—the methods of nineteenth century imperialism. Neither of them had any "experience with the green timber of Wilsonian idealism in the construction of a 'new world' ."¹⁹ and out of this confusion of method came the inevitable conflict.

As early as March, 1919, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were meeting in Paris to discuss allocation of the mandates which they felt would be granted by the future League. On

¹⁶Stein, Balfour, p. 652.

¹⁷Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 826-27.

¹⁸Supra, chap. v, pp. 99-101.

¹⁹Yale, The Near East, p. 334.

March 7, 1919, the two leaders came to the understanding that France would receive Syria, and Great Britain would be allocated both Palestine and Mesopotamia, including the Mosul.²⁰ France was still suspicious of British activities in the Syrian region, due to the presence of a military force, and in spite of constant reassurance from Great Britain²¹ that it would not accept a mandate for Syria,²² her suspicions remained. "French opinion saw in the continued British occupation only a sinister agency ."²³ for the implementation of British desires.

This problem was slowly rectified, however, and in August, 1920, Lord Curzon made the public statement that

a Mandate for Syria had been accepted by France and a Mandate for Palestine and Mesopotamia had been accepted by Great Britain. Each country had left the other with a free hand to proceed with those Mandates, and this decision had been pursued with equal loyalty by both sides.²⁴

On September 15, 1919, an agreement concerning the military aspects of the problem was reached, and plans were made for withdrawal of British troops, and their replacement by French troops. The French military would garrison Syria, west of the line agreed upon in the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and

²⁰Lloyd George, Peace Treaties, I, 288.

²¹Ibid., II, 1046.

²²Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 298.

²³Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 151.

²⁴Woodward and Butler, Documents, VIII, 109.

Cilicia; Arab forces would occupy Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo.²⁵ This agreement fulfilled, in part, Great Britain's undertakings with the French in the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and also the pledges that had been made to Husain in the McMahon-Husain Correspondence. The joint move by the French and British, however, left the Arab regime in Damascus without British aid in dealing with the French, and the Syrian Arabs were becoming desperate as a result of imminent French occupation.

Faisal, upon hearing of the possibility of such an Anglo-French arrangement, wrote Lloyd George on September 9, 1919, that only a guarantee of Syrian unity could prevent the collapse of his regime, and, therefore, the "peace" of the Middle East. The Emir left for London, in a vain hope to forestall any agreement that would endanger the unity of his country, and "before any decision [was] taken in London or disaster [overtook them] both ."²⁶ in London and Syria. He arrived too late to stop the agreement, however, and November 1, 1919, was set as the date for British troop withdrawal.²⁷

While in London, Faisal did participate in several meetings where he attempted to have troop withdrawals

²⁵ Ibid., IV, 384-85.

²⁶ Ibid., IV, 388.

²⁷ Ibid., IV, 395-400, 413-19, 458-63.

cancelled, or, at the minimum, postponed, until the situation in the area was not so tenuous. Hoping to bring an end to the Syrian problem, from the British standpoint at least, Lloyd George wrote Faisal, on October 10, 1919, that the British government had no recourse, but to implement the decision it had arrived at with France.

His Majesty's Government [had] made up their mind that it [was] impossible . . . to continue the occupation of Syria by British troops.²⁸

Considering the domestic situation and the public statements of March and August, that Britain would not accept a mandate for Syria,²⁹ they could no longer consider the occupation of Syria and Cilicia as part of their duty, at least until the Peace Conference had settled the situation.³⁰ Great Britain, through this letter, illustrated its desire to withdraw from the complicated and embarrassing Syrian situation, and to halt its role as mediator between France and Faisal. Desperate because of the situation at home, and wary of the severe criticism from his father, Faisal, upon the advice of Lloyd George, left for Paris for direct negotiations with Clemenceau.³¹

British troops began their withdrawal from Syria on November 1, and by early December were completely out of the

²⁸ Woodward and Butler, Documents, IV, 451.

²⁹ Ibid., IV, 449.

³⁰ Ibid., IV, 451.

³¹ Ibid., IV, 475.

area. As a result of British withdrawal the "French and Arab troops now faced each other across the new zones of occupation."³² To further complicate the situation, Henri Gouraud, French Commissioner for Syria, arrived in Beirut on November 1, thereby illustrating France's determination to secure and entrench itself in Syria. All of these occurrences, which Faisal had attempted to prevent, occurred while he was in France, and his absence from the area tended to make the situation in Damascus and Syria grow at a worsening rate. His meetings and correspondence with Clemenceau proved useless, for he was out of his element in these negotiations, and Clemenceau had won the round.³³ The Emir felt, not unjustly, that he had been betrayed and "handed over, tied by feet and hands, to the French."³⁴

With the French occupation of Syria, the "hour of grace" between the Zionists and Arabs came to an end, for the Arabs had not secured their "big Arab State," and therefore were not willing to concede Palestine to the Zionists.³⁵ "Savage disappointment gripped the Arab national movement"³⁶ and with the expulsion of Faisal from Damascus, by

³²Klieman, British Policy, p. 41.

³³Williams, Britain and France, p. 21.

³⁴Klieman, British Policy, p. 41.

³⁵Supra, chap. v, p. 119.

³⁶Eban, My People, p. 376.

the French, the Arab nationalist movement made claim for complete liberation of Syria, union with Palestine, and militant resistance to the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine.³⁷

The distribution of the controversial mandate was soon to be settled. The proposal for

unqualified Syrian independence . . . stood no chance of acceptance by the Conference, if only for the reason that the granting of such independence would mean the definite end of French dreams in the Levant . . . ,³⁸

but with the events which preceded the Conference, the Syrian fate had been decided—there would be no independence. With the Arabs acknowledgement of this fact, riots broke out in the Middle East, in which the Arabs made vain attempts to overthrow the French and bring the plight of their situation before the Conference.

Confronted with this situation, Great Britain and France condemned the activities of the rebels, stating that the mandate question had to be settled by the Peace Conference, and not through violent revolution. The Paris Conference had adjourned without discussing the situation of the mandates, however, thereby passing it on to the San Remo Conference.

On April 24, 1920, the Conference decided that both Syria and Iraq would become independent states, according to

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Temperley, Peace Conference, VI, 156.

Article 22, under the protective guidance of a mandatory power. The powers were to be the French in Syria, and the English were to administer Iraq and Palestine.³⁹ The mandates for Syria and Lebanon were conferred upon France by the Supreme Council on April 4, 1920, and consequently confirmed on May 5, 1920. The mandate for Palestine was granted at the same time as those for Syria and Lebanon. The terms of the mandates were drafted and "deposited with the Council of the League in December, 1920."⁴⁰ They were then approved, as drafted, by the League on July 24, 1922, and, therefore, ready for promulgation in the designated areas.

The basic guide lines for the division of the Ottoman territory in Syria were those that had been drawn up in the Sykes-Picot Treaty of 1916, in accordance to the revisions of 1918.⁴¹ In the Treaty of Sévres, August 10, 1920, the mandate for Palestine and other areas in the Middle East were described in specific and minute detail. Turkey, however, did not ratify the Treaty, and the terms were not officially in effect until September 28, 1923, with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. On the premise that the Treaty of Sévres would be ratified, the main principles of the mandate had been used to direct the government in Palestine from July 1,

³⁹Ibid., VI, 157.

⁴⁰Ibid., VI, 169.

⁴¹Supra, chap. v, pp. 100-101.

1920, when the military government was replaced by a civil administration.

The basis for the Palestine government was incorporated into the mandate in the form of the Balfour Declaration. Although there were originally many objections to its inclusion,

. . . all the Powers could do was to concede the substance of the Declaration—that is, to subscribe to the establishment of a national home for the Jews.⁴²

Because of this concession, on the part of the other powers, the Declaration became a corporate part of the mandate.

Looking for an administrator for Palestine, Curzon, Lord George, and Balfour settled upon Herbert Samuel—a Jew who was also a late convert to the Zionist cause. When he was offered the position on April 24, Samuel was hesitant about taking the post, but through the urgings of Zionist leaders in San Remo, he accepted.⁴³ In taking the job, Samuel hoped to be representative of all Palestinians.

Speaking

with regard to the non-Jewish population, [he desired] not only to treat them with absolute justice . . . but also to adopt active measures to promote their well-being.⁴⁴

⁴²Woodward and Butler, Documents, VIII, 168.

⁴³The appointment of a Zionist to this post can be interpreted to be an expression of Lloyd George's belief that a Jewish Commission was to be created in Palestine. This Commission would work for the eventual independence of the Jewish state.

⁴⁴Storrs, Orientations, p. 458.

To pursue this policy of equality, after his arrival in Jerusalem on July 1, 1920, one of his first official acts was to declare a general amnesty for all Arab participants in the Jerusalem riots of May, 1920.⁴⁵ Hoping to capitalize on the calm this created, Samuel then began to translate British proposals into actual programs. The most important move was the creation of an advisory council composed of Jewish, Arab, and British representatives—the "first step in the development of self-governing institutions."⁴⁶

By the end of October, the High Commissioner was able to report some progress in Palestine: travel restrictions, because of the "calm" atmosphere, had been modified; pilgrimages were being allowed and even encouraged to be re-newed; and the new Jewish immigrants, who were arriving daily, were not creating any serious threat to the status-quo of the area. Because of the easiness of the situation, Samuel was very optimistic about the ease of transition for Palestine to a Jewish national home.⁴⁷

Samuel was definitely acting in a sincere attempt to govern for all of the inhabitants of the country, and believed that a policy of good will towards the Arabs would

⁴⁵Eban, My People, p. 378.

⁴⁶Foreign Office, "Confidential Prints, Eastern Affairs, Iraq, 1920-22," Enclosure 2 in no. 83, 10 October 1920, Paper E 13008, file 85/44, volume 406/44; as cited by Klieman, British Policy, p. 65.

⁴⁷Klieman, British Policy, p. 65.

serve the best interests of Palestine and the mandatory power. Because of this apparent pro-Arab sentiment, he faced much criticism. In spite of this, he was of the general opinion that the goal of the Balfour Declaration was the eventual creation of a Jewish state in Palestine,⁴⁸ and he never veered from this contention. His Arab policy was not to the detriment of the Palestinian Jew, but rather was implemented to promote the necessary conditions of peace that were required for full independence of Palestine. Because of this position as a government official, his main purpose was not immediate implementation of the idea of a Jewish state, but rather "to subject that aim to the task of securing tranquility within the Arab community."⁴⁹ Samuel was doing his job in fulfillment of his obligations to the British government, of whom he was the official representative in Palestine.

The end of 1920 witnessed the strengthening of Great Britain's position in the Middle East, primarily as a result of Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir Percy Cox, serving as High Commissioners in Palestine and Mesopotamia, respectively. Because of the capabilities of these two men, Palestine and Mesopotamia had been able to avoid the violence of 1920 that

⁴⁸It was Samuel who was the first member of the War Cabinet to move for the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine, and he was also active in the eventual fulfillment of this desire when the Balfour Declaration was issued. Supra, chap. iii, p. 51.

⁴⁹Eban, My People, p. 379.

had ravaged other regions in the Middle East. Hoping to maintain this status, the Cairo Conference was convened on March 12, 1920, in an attempt to coordinate the policies involved in the administration of the Middle East, and, hopefully, to end any potential threat of riot. This meeting was one of Winston Churchill's first official acts in the area of Middle Eastern affairs, and set the stage for his White Paper of 1922.⁵⁰

While enroute to Cairo, Churchill was approached by an Arab Executive Committee, and asked to revise the government's policy towards Palestine—to recind the Balfour Declaration. Churchill informed the delegates that he neither wished, nor was able, to repudiate the Balfour Declaration or to halt Jewish immigration.⁵¹ Great Britain had promised to aid the development of a national home for the Jews and, obviously, this involved Jewish immigration into Palestine. It was also on the basis of the Balfour Declaration that Britain had received and eventually accepted the mandate for Palestine. Therefore, the mandate would have to be implemented on these grounds.⁵²

Because of the increasing troubles in the area and the violent riots of May, 1921, it was finally realized that

⁵⁰Klieman, British Policy, pp. 105ff. The discussions concerning Palestine at this conference were primarily concerned with the creation of a Palestinian defense force, and not with territorial questions. Ibid., pp. 118ff.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 128.

⁵²Ibid.

some conciliation with the Arabs would have to be formulated, and pressure was applied to force the Colonial Office to move away from its apparently pro-Zionist position. An offer was made in 1921 to extend Arab representation in the government of Palestine, but this was refused by the Arabs on the grounds that it was only a nominal gesture, and that such a council would not have any real function in governmental affairs.⁵³ The Arab delegation felt it useless to talk about a constitution, unless Britain denounced the Balfour Declaration, halted non-Arab immigration, and granted immediate and complete self-government.⁵⁴ Arab-Zionist discord in Palestine continued to grow until May, 1922, when Samuel was forced to go to London and ask for an official declaration from the government to aid in the conciliation of the Arabs. Great Britain was ready, after listening to Samuel, to sponsor proposals for independence, which included recognition to the existing Arab majority in Palestine, and, because of this, limit Jewish immigration into the area.⁵⁵ As a result of the actions of the Arab delegation in London, and Samuel's interpretation of the situation, the Churchill White Paper of 1922 was issued to explain and re-define the political situation of Palestine. As a preface to the White Paper, Trans-jordan was excluded from the provisions of the Palestine

⁵³Ibid., p. 202.

⁵⁴Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 200-02.

mandate, thereby limiting Jewish immigration into the area, and partially fulfilling some of the demands made by the Arab delegation.⁵⁶

The White Paper was composed of nine major points: 1) the Balfour Declaration was reaffirmed, and the British declared that it was not susceptible to change or alteration; 2) a national home for the Jews would be established, and those people in residence were there "as of right and not on sufferance"; 3) the British government did not contemplate the "disappearance or subordination" of the Arab peoples, language, or culture; 4) all citizens would be regarded as Palestinians; 5) His Majesty's Government intended to foster, gradually, a full measure of self-government; 6) the special position of the Zionist Executive did not entitle it to share in the government of the country; 8) immigration would be regulated by the legislative assembly in consultation with the administration; and, 9) any religious community or "considerable section of population" which claimed that the mandate's terms were not being met, had the right to appeal to the League of Nations.⁵⁷

The Arab delegation, on June 17, 1922, replied in the

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 230-34.

⁵⁷Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons & Command), 1922, Vol. XXIII (Reports, vol. 8), Cmnd. 1700, 26 June 1922, "Palestine: Correspondence with Palestine-Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization," pp. 17-21. The outline of the White Paper may be found on pp. 30-31 of the same report.

negative, still demanding that Britain sever her tie with the Balfour Declaration; the Executive of the Zionist Organization, on June 18, 1922, reluctantly agreed to conform to the new statement of policy.⁵⁸ The Churchill statement, however, failed to reconcile any of the differences in Palestine, and when the mandate was approved the following month, the government repeated this same mistake, when it emphasized that it would implement the mandate along the lines of the Churchill White Paper.

In 1921-1922 the Arabs, Jews, and High Commissioner in Palestine could agree on only one item: any definition of policy had to come from London, and a definition was drastically needed. This mood was indicative of the slowly evolving crisis in Palestine. The Middle East Department, however, showed little willingness to re-define the government's position, blindly believing that the Cairo Conference and the Churchill White Paper had been sufficient, and the problems no longer existed. The Palestine riots in May, 1922, illustrated the failure of this policy. With the increase of tension in Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Transjordan, as these three areas attempted to catch up with the spirit of Arab nationalist riots in other areas of the Middle East, action had to be forced from the British government. Churchill, however, was more concerned with the Irish problem,

⁵⁸Klieman, British Policy, p. 203.

and appeared to have lost interest in the situation taking place in the Middle East.⁵⁹ The government would not go beyond the White Paper of 1922, which remained the official policy until 1939.

Great Britain was not ready to use force to assist its authority in Palestine, and tended to favor a policy which would ensure a mood of tranquility. Another aspect of British policy, which began in 1921 and continued throughout the period of the mandate, was a tendency to accept the responsibility for Palestinian affairs, and yet this feeling of obligation was "a strange air of resignation and even cynicism."⁶⁰ Great Britain preferred to persist in maintaining a rather precarious status-quo, instead of actually dealing with the situation and attempt a solution. The apparent calm of Palestine, which experienced only minor riots in comparison to other Middle Eastern areas, was deceptive, for the calm was only temporary—only superficial. Due to its indifference, Great Britain was doomed to failure in Palestine and the Middle East—resulting in catastrophe for its inhabitants.

⁵⁹Klieman, British Policy, p. 204.

⁶⁰Ibid.

CONCLUSIONS

As I sit in the Foreign Office and look out on the scene I am reminded of one of those lava-lakes . . . observing a great liquid expanse, an uneasy movement troubling the surface, a seething and bubbling going on. From time to time a violent explosion occurs; here the banks slip down into the mud and are engulfed, while there you see new landmarks emerge. That is the picture of what is going on all over the world at the present moment.¹

—Lord Curzon, 1st Marquess of Kedleston¹

Prior to World War I British policy in the Middle East was clear-cut: to defend the routes to India and the Far East, and to protect the Suez Canal. The war, however, brought greater responsibilities to Britain, primarily because of an extension of Imperial commitments. Exhausted by the war and confronted by new Middle Eastern problems following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain faced unprecedented problems in the area—a hot-bed of intrigue, revolution, and rebellion. It is not surprising, therefore, that mistakes were made; what is surprising is the over-emphasis by some, and under-emphasis by others, of the facts that led to the situation in Palestine.

The basic misunderstanding regarding Palestine during this period was the failure to realize that it became the

¹Klieman, British Policy, p. 77.

"twice-promised land" as a result of the tangled and confusing obligations which sprang from the Husain-McMahon Correspondence (1915), the Sykes-Picot Treaty (1916), and the Balfour Declaration (1917). Such failures, however, do not provide a valid excuse for many of the actions of statesmen and nations during this period.

The question of whether or not Palestine was included in the terms of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence is easily answered. If the language of the Correspondence is carefully studied, and the geographical limits carefully noted, Palestine was unmistakably excluded from the area that was reserved for Arab independence.² If a line is drawn in a north-south direction through those cities that are mentioned—Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus—and is then extended to the south Palestine clearly falls outside the Arab area.³ There can be little doubt that McMahon intended to exclude both the northern and southern areas of the Syrian coast, the exclusion being based on his belief that the area was not "purely Arab,"⁴ and also that firm commitments regarding any area could not be made without the consent of France.⁵

To clarify the confusion regarding the interpretation

²Supra, chap. ii, p. 33.

³Infra, Appendix H, p. 162.

⁴Supra, chap. ii, p. 33.

⁵Supra, chap. ii, p. 34.

of the Correspondence, Sir Henry McMahon, in a letter to The Times, dated July 23, 1937, reiterated what governmental committees had said in the past:

I feel it my duty to state, and I do so definitely and emphatically, that it was not intended by me in giving this pledge to King Hussein to include Palestine in the area in which Arab independence was promised.

I also had every reason to believe at the time that the fact that Palestine was not included in my pledge was well understood by King Hussein.⁶

Whatever the true explanation—whether there was a misunderstanding between McMahon and Husain, or whether the Sharif temporarily agreed, hoping to alter the arrangement at a later time—is not the important problem, for this was not the major point of Arab claims at Paris. Faisal was to use the Correspondence at Paris only as an auxillary reinforcement to the primary claim of the Arabs—the right to govern by possession. In fact he did not refer to the Correspondence when he presented their terms at Paris, but rather based Arab claims on the military contribution of the Arabs; the raising of the Arab flag over Damascus; the recognition of the Syrians as belligerents; and upon the basis of the broad promises for independence which were made at the end of the war.⁷ D. G. Hogarth feels that the British "were guiltless, therefore, of any betrayal of King Hussein. The

⁶The Times (London), July 23, 1937.

⁷Supra, chap. v, p. 102.

sole condition of his action—that he be freed from his Ottoman overlords and recognized as an independent sovereign had been fulfilled."⁸

From the standpoint of international law the claim to the area by the Arabs on the basis of the Correspondence, was without validity, since it was not endorsed by the allied countries, nor the League of Nations. Great Britain had acted in a unilateral manner, but had backed up any pledges with the proviso that they were subordinate to their commitments to France. Husain had accepted this provision.⁹

The Sykes-Picot Treaty was dictated by the imperialistic motives of the three signatory powers. The British, in negotiating this agreement, did everything possible to include considerations that would be beneficial to the Arabs.¹⁰ Sykes insisted that Aleppo, Hama, Homs, and Damascus should be left in Arab hands, and was seeking to

⁸D. G. Hogarth, "Wahabism and British Interests," Journal of the British Institute of International Affairs, IV (1925), pp. 72-73.

⁹Supra, chap. ii, p. 35. The argument that Palestine was included in the Arab region—west of the vilayet of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo—is unfounded since the vilayet of Damascus went to the Gulf of Aqaba, and Palestine was to the west of this region. The invalidity of such an argument rests on the fact that there were no such things as vilayets of Homs and Hama; they were included in the vilayet of Damascus. It follows, therefore, that the term vilayet, which can have two meanings, was intended as "district" and not "territory." To argue in any other way is not logical, nor is it profitable. Kirk, Middle East, p. 146.

¹⁰Supra, chap. ii, p. 40.

keep the treaty as consistent as possible with Great Britain's pledges to Husain.

With the publication of the Sykes-Picot terms by the Bolsheviks, Great Britain stated that the agreement had only been a "provisional" treaty, and had been compiled prior to the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire.¹¹ The problem created by this document was that both France and Britain had limited definitions of Arab sovereignty, each considering themselves the protectors of the Arab peoples. Each felt that only they could create adequate administrative systems that could function in the area, and out of this attitude came the future problems of the Peace Conference.¹²

Generally speaking, the Sykes-Picot Treaty did place Great Britain in a position of seeming duplicity, and little can be said in her defense. The best that can be said about the Treaty is that the Arabs were guaranteed more than they had had prior to the war—which was practically nothing. The only possible improvement in the Arab position could have been if "the agreement could have been carried out faithfully

[for] the Sykes-Picot Agreement might have offered a workable compromise of English, French and Arab interests in the Levant."¹³ It was not the Treaty that created the

¹¹Antonius, Arab Awakening, p. 257. Supra, chap. ii pp. 38 ff.

¹²Supra, chap. v, p. 107.

¹³Hanna, British Policy, p. 30.

undesirable post-war situation, however, but the fact that it was not followed in its entirety. It was the breakdown of the Treaty, when it came time for its implementation and enforcement, not its contradiction with other agreements that created the conflict.¹⁴

The precise impact of the Balfour Declaration on the Arab peoples of the Middle East is not clear as there is no clear evidence that Palestine was included in the negotiations with Husain; and as it was provided in the Sykes-Picot Treaty that the region was to become an internationally controlled area.¹⁵ Likewise, statements made by Faisal, prior to and during the Peace Conference, indicated that Palestine would not be included in the area destined for Arab independence.¹⁶ In addition, Faisal at this time often talked of friendship between the Zionists and Arabs, based upon their ethnological relationship.¹⁷ Husain, as well, seems to have understood that Palestine was to be opened to Jewish immigration and settlement.¹⁸

This quixotic gesture of the British to the Zionist Organization, created nothing but controversy, however. The general opinion as to the motivation for the Declaration

¹⁴Supra, chap. v, pp. 98-105.

¹⁵Supra, chap. ii, p. 64.

¹⁶Supra, chap. v, p. 105.

¹⁷Supra, chap. v, p. 103.

¹⁸Supra, chap. iv, p. 87.

clearly indicates that it was a war measure designed to win support after the collapse of Tsarist Russia. It was only intended that a home for the Jews would be established in Palestine at some undetermined time in the future.¹⁹ Lord Balfour stated that the Declaration was

. . . inspired by sentiment, although I am free to admit I think we owe the Jews something substantial for the way . . . they have rallied to the support of the Allies . . . I came out for a Jewish homeland in Palestine in so far as it could be established without infringing on the rights of the Arab communities . . . I should think any person would see that my pronouncement was not dictated by sentiment, but was a war measure.²⁰

Because of the revisions in the Sykes-Picot Treaty, and the unofficial status of the Husain-McMahon Correspondence, the Balfour Declaration—a tenuous document, at best, which was open to wide and varied interpretation—became the basis at San Remo for the mandate for Palestine. The problem which Palestine created, arose out of the ambiguous nature of the Declaration. Nobody knew what a "national home" was, or was not; the term "Jewish people" did not refer to a recognized judicial entity, but rather a loose grouping of peoples with different goals and varied backgrounds; certainly there was no such country, at the time the Declaration was issued, as Palestine—it was merely a geographic

¹⁹ Supra, chap. iv, pp. 78-82.

²⁰ Stephen Bonsul, Suitsors and Supplicants: The Little Nations at Versailles (New York: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1946), p. 61. Hereafter cited as Bonsul, Suitsors and Supplicants.

region in the southern area of Greater Syria. This was the basic problem of the Declaration: What did it mean? The Declaration, and its impact on the world, had, in fact, been underestimated by the British and its authors.

The resistance of the Arabs to Jewish nationalism was intense throughout the entire period of this study, but at no time did it present problems that defied solution. The fact that no attempt was made by the mandatory power to explain to the Arabs, or define the ideological basis of the Jewish state is evidenced by the fact that revisions were not made to the Churchill White Paper of 1922—even after future disturbances broke out.²¹ The rising tide of Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East—a nationalism that seems to have been nurtured, in part, in England, appears to have been overlooked by the British government. Years later, Israeli statesman Abba Eban said:

A clear support of Jewish adjudication in Palestine in the 1920's and 1930's might have prevented the 'inevitable' conflict that was evolving, but Faisal's vision was allowed to perish. Arab nationalism and²²Zionism were locked in mortal combat

He saw developments as a clear result of the indifference of Britain and the world powers to problems of the area.

Regardless of the interpretation of the three documents, and in spite of where the blame is laid for the Middle

²¹Supra, chap. vi, pp. 142 ff.

²²Eban, My People, p. 377.

Eastern problem, there is one undeniable fact: Great Britain, for its own reasons and advancement, encouraged the Zionist movement, while at the same time the London government was clearly encouraging Arab nationalism. These two movements created an explosive situation which was destined to erupt in sharp conflict.

Responsibility for the Middle East cannot, of course, be placed on the shoulders of the statesmen of any one country, rather it is a responsibility of all of the allied powers of the First World War for as Colonel Lawrence said at the Paris Conference:

The main trouble is . . . there have been too many cooks out there and²³ between them they have certainly spoiled the broth.

²³Bonsul, Suitors and Supplicants, p. 50.

Appendix A

Basle Program

The aim of Zionism is to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.

The Congress contemplates the following means to the attainment of this end:

1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.
2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.
3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.
4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.

Appendix B

Outline of a Programme for a New Administration
of Palestine for a Jewish Resettlement of Palestine
in Accordance with the Aspirations
of the Zionist Movement

1. The recognition of a separate Jewish nationality or national unit in Palestine.
2. The participation of the Jewish population of Palestine in local self-government insofar as it affects all the inhabitants without distinction.
3. The protection of the rights of minority nationalities.
4. Autonomy in exclusively Jewish matters, such as Jewish education, religious and communal organization.
5. The recognition and legalization of the existing Jewish institutions for the colonization of Palestine.
6. The establishment of a Jewish chartered company for the resettlement of Palestine by Jewish settlers.

Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization
to the XIIth Zionist Congress, Part IV (London: National
Labour Press, 1921), p. 71.

Appendix C

Zionist Proposal Submitted to Balfour
by Lord Rothschild on July 18, 1917

His Majesty's Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its national life in Palestine under a protection to be established at the conclusion of peace, following upon the successful issue of the war.

His Majesty's Government regard as essential for the realization of this principle the grant of internal autonomy to the Jewish nationality in Palestine, freedom of immigration for Jews, and the establishment of a Jewish National Colonizing Corporation for the re-establishment and economic development of the country.

The conditions and forms of the internal autonomy and a Charter for the Jewish National Colonizing Corporation should, in the view of His Majesty's Government, be elaborated in detail and determined with the representatives of the Zionist Organization.

Appendix D

Amended Draft of October 10, 1917

His Majesty's Government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish race and will use its best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed in any other country by such Jews who are fully contented with their existing nationality and citizenship.

Report to the XIIth Zionist Congress, I (London: National Labour Press, 1921), pp. 12ff.

Appendix E

The Balfour Declaration

Foreign Office

November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR

Appendix F

Statement of the Zionist Organization
Regarding Palestine
 (February 3, 1919)

1. The High Contracting Parties recognize the historic title of the Jewish people to Palestine and the right of the Jews to reconstitute in Palestine their National Home.

2. The boundaries of Palestine shall be as declared in the Schedule annexed hereto.

3. The sovereign possession of Palestine shall be vested in the League of Nations and the Government entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory of the League.

4. (Provision to be inserted relating to the application in Palestine of such of the general conditions attached to mandates as are suitable to the case.)

5. The mandate shall be subject also to the following special conditions:

(I) Palestine shall be placed under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment there of the Jewish National Home, and ultimately render possible the creation of an autonomous Commonwealth, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

(II) To this end the Mandatory Power shall inter alia:

(a) Promote Jewish immigration and close settlement on the land, the established rights of the present non-Jewish population being equally safeguarded.

(b) Accept the cooperation in such measures of a Council representative of the Jews in Palestine and of the world that may be established for the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine and entrust the organization of Jewish education to such Council.

(c) On being satisfied that the constitution of such Council precludes the making of private profit, offer to the Council in priority any concession for public works or for the development of natural resources which it may be found desirable to grant.

(III) The Mandatory Power shall encourage the widest measure of self-government for localities practicable in the conditions of the country.

(IV) There shall be forever the fullest freedom of religious worship for all creeds in Palestine. There shall be no discrimination among the inhabitants with regard to citizenship and civil rights, on the grounds of religion, or of race.

(V) (Provision to be inserted relating to the control of the Holy Places.)

Appendix G


Outline of Personages.

- Allenby, Field Marshal Sir Edmund, 1st Viscount of Megiddo
(1861-1936)
1917-1919 Commander-in-chief of Egyptian
Expeditionary Force
1919-1925 High Commissioner for Egypt
- Asquith, Herbert Henry, 1st Earl of Oxford and Asquith
(1852-1928)
1908-1916 Prime Minister and First Lord of the
Treasury
1920-1921 Leader of the Opposition
- Balfour, Arthur James, 1st Earl of Balfour (1840-1930)
1902-1905 Prime Minister
1916-1919 Foreign Secretary
1919-1922 President of the Council of State
- Cambon, Paul (1843-1924)
1898-1920 French Ambassador to London
- Churchill, Winston Spencer (1874-1965)
1919-1921 Secretary of State for War and Air
1921-October, 1922 Secretary of State for the
Colonies
1940-1945 Prime Minister, First Lord of the
Treasury, and Minister of Defense
- Clemenceau, Georges (1841-1929)
1917-1920 Premier of France
- Faisal ibn Husain (1885-1933)
1916-1918 Commander of the Hejazi Army in Middle
Eastern Theatre
1919 Representative for the Hejaz at Paris
1918-1920 Head of British administration in Syria
August 23, 1921 Proclaimed King of Iraq
- Georges-Picot, M. F.
1915-1916 Represented France in negotiations with
Great Britain on future disposal of
Arab regions

- 1917 With General Allenby in Palestine to uphold French claims in the area; High Commissioner in Beirut until 1920
- Grey, Sir Edward, 1st Viscount of Fallodon (1862-1933)
1905-1916 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
- Hogarth, David George (1862-1927)
1916 Director of Arab Bureau in Cairo
1919 Nominated as British member of Inter-Allied Commission (King-Crane)
- Husain ibn Ali (1856-1931) Sharifian of the family of Hashim
Sons: Abdullah (Transjordan), Faisal (Iraq)
1908 Emir of Mecca
1916 Self-proclaimed "King of the Arab Countries"
- Lloyd George, David (1863-1945)
1915-1916 Minister of Munitions.
1916 Secretary of State for War
1916-1922 Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury
- McMahon, Colonel Sir Henry (1862-1949)
1914-1916 First High Commissioner for Egypt; represented Great Britain in correspondence with Husain
1919 Nominated as a member of the Inter-allied Commission (King-Crane)
- Samuel, Herbert, 1st Viscount of Mount Carmel and Toxteth (1870-1963)
1914-1915 President of the Local Government Board
1920-1925 High Commissioner of Palestine
1931-1935 Leader of the Liberal Parliamentary Party
- Sokolow, Nahum (1860-1936)
1920-1931 Chairman of the Zionist Executive
Author of History of Zionism, 1600-1918
- Sykes, Lieutenant Colonel Sir Mark (1879-1919)
1911 Elected to House of Commons
1915 Member of deBunsen Committee
1916 British representative in negotiations with France over partition of Arab regions
1916 Chief Advisor to the Foreign Office on Near Eastern Policy
- Weizmann, Dr. Chaim (1874-1952)
President, World Zionist Organization and Jewish Agency for Palestine (1921-1931 and 1935-1946).
First President of Israel

Appendix H


Palestine and Syria in 1915



Esco Foundation, Palestine, I, 185.

Appendix

The Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1916



Appendix J

Arab Territories and Palestine



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