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Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Imperialism and the pursuit of auctoritas

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TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS:
IMPERIALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF *AUCTORITAS*

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
University of Nebraska at Omaha

by
Jeffrey S. Volcheck

May 2002

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
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
Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College,
University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree Master of Arts,
University of Nebraska at Omaha

Committee





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TITUS QUINCTIUS FLAMININUS:
IMPERIALISM AND THE PURSUIT OF *AUCTORITAS*

Jeffrey S. Volcheck, MA

University of Nebraska, 2002

Advisor: Dr. Charles King

In the early second century BC, Rome built an empire that encompassed the Western Mediterranean basin and most of the Italic Peninsula. The necessity of using manpower provided by Italian treaties, the desire for economic gain, the differing treatment of Eastern and Western peoples, and especially, the political competition among the *nobiles* all created the Roman imperialistic war-machine. Growth had its consequences, though, as the Hannibalic War diminished the number of qualified generals, which allowed younger men to assume command of the legions. These circumstances allowed Titus Quinctius Flaminius to rise swiftly through the ranks of Roman Republican politics and develop a highly successful career by exploiting the elements of Roman imperialism.

As Rome entered into a new stage of imperialistic development, Flaminius took advantage of the new situation, as Scipio had before him, to create a successful career. In accordance with standard cultural practices, Flaminius unerringly pursued *auctoritas* and personal benefit from the outset of his career. Throughout the Second Macedonian

and Spartan Wars he manipulated military and political scenarios to retain his command and settle those conflicts before another ambitious Roman could steal his glory. Following his martial exploits, Flamininus continued to compete for political preeminence through his diplomatic work in Greece prior to the Syrian War. After serving as censor, however, Flamininus wisely curtailed his political activity to prevent himself from being the object of jealous rivals.

Titus Quinctius Flamininus stands as a notable figure in Roman imperialistic history, whose involvement in Greece helped to continue the expansion of the fledgling empire. His actions in the East have been interpreted as being motivated by philhellenism and duty to allies among other reasons, but Flamininus found his motivation from the desire to effectively compete and succeed within the politico-cultural setting of the middle Republic.

To my wife Teresa, without your love and dedication,
none of this would have been possible.

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This thesis is the culmination of a desire I have held since completing my Bachelor's degree at the University of Nebraska at Kearney. During my junior and senior years I took a course in Roman history and a course on Alexander the Great from Dr. James Ermatinger. They captured my imagination and I wished that they had not come to me so late in my studies. After graduation, I viewed the chance of returning to school to study ancient history as a passing fancy. Almost eight years later, however, circumstances brought me back to Omaha and allowed me the chance to fulfill this dream. I have only finished this project because many people helped me along the way.

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writing this thesis, without whose assistance I would not have been equal to the task. I deeply value them sharing their expertise, providing aid to my problems and queries, and being understanding.

INTRODUCTION

Roman involvement in the East played a definitive role in the growth and collapse of the Republic, and arguably, the survival of Rome after the Western Empire had fallen. Although the reasons why Rome concerned herself with Eastern affairs have been debated endlessly, when Republican Rome encountered states in the East during a period of expansion, she proved herself to be militarily superior to them in every conflict. Minor wars with Illyria and Macedon led finally Rome into the Second Macedonian War, which established Rome as a perpetual participant in Eastern affairs. After assuming the consulship in 198,¹ Titus Quinctius Flaminius appears as a pivotal figure in Roman expansion into the East and his impact cannot be underestimated. He spent five years in Hellas fighting two wars before returning to Rome as, arguably, the greatest man in the Republic, albeit for a short time.

It seems unnecessary to explain the actions of Flaminius as being motivated by philhellenism, or long-term foreign policy goals, because his motives can be better explained as the actions of an ambitious politician attempting to use the mechanisms of Roman imperialism to advance his short-term career goals within the context of the political system of the second-century Roman Republic. He likewise cannot be dismissed simply as an instrument of the government, performing consular functions prescribed to him by the Senate.

Ambition propelled him to seek the highest public honors of the Republic, and Roman imperialism provided the environment for Flaminius to reach his goals. The quest for *gloria* and *auctoritas* induced Flaminius to stay in Greece until he had

vanquished Philip V of Macedon, and then Nabis of Sparta. Even after returning to Rome, Flaminius could not quench his desire for more prestige. The Senate appointed him as an Eastern ambassador in order to retain Greek allied support against the propagandist campaigns of Antiochus and the Aetolians. Though Flaminius toiled in the interests of Rome, at the same time he began to overstep the boundaries of his office in pursuit of further *gloria*. Yet despite these “transgressions,” he remained popular and influential. The cultural maxims of Roman politics compelled Flaminius to push the limitations of his place and his authority in the Republic.

Although not the focus of this thesis, an important point must be briefly touched on concerning Flaminius’ long-term impact on the Republic. While advancing Roman expansion, Flaminius’ political career illustrated trends that would continue and would later contribute to the accumulation of power by generals such as Sulla or Marius, who would pose such a significant threat to the stability of the Republic. Although he had planned nothing insidious and did not possess the wherewithal to become a Sulla – even if that had been his intention – his actions demonstrated how the acquisition of personal *gloria* in a growing empire clashed with oligarchic control. In the time of Flaminius, the Senate held too much power for him to be more than a servant of the state; but his career effectively foreshadows what is to come.

SOURCES

Before delving more deeply into the subject at hand, we must consider the primary sources, which for this period of Roman history are paltry at best. Little remains for the historian, student, or dilettante to use for investigation. What has come down to

us, of any real length, is to be found in Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch, with some additional evidence available in Appian, Dio Cassius, Diodorus and others.

Polybius had been a statesman and military leader in the Achaean League until the conclusion of the Third Macedonian War. The Romans deported him back to Italy as one among 1,000 hostages chosen for their high social standing. By good fortune, Polybius befriended the young Scipio Aemilianus and joined the famed Scipionic Circle. It was during this time and under this influence that Polybius learned about the Rome he wrote of in his *Histories*, which sought to explain how the Romans came to rule the world in a mere 53 years.²

Scholars take Polybius (200-118) as the most reliable source for Roman expansion in the East, as he lived within the scope of most of the events. In reaction to the contemporary trend in historical composition where historians sacrificed truth for dramatization and sensationalism, he presented his *Histories* in a more analytical and logical format, following the Thucydidean tradition of interviewing participants in the events, studying the geography, scrutinizing the available sources, and drawing on his own experience as a military and political leader. Although Polybius did not strictly adhere to this style, his methodology allowed him to present a more accurate account than his contemporaries most of the time.³

The modern historian, however, cannot use Polybius without noting his biases. He composed *The Histories* mostly for a Greek audience to explain how Rome accomplished her conquests. His central premise presents Rome as superior to Greece in terms of organization of her government and military, which led to Rome's success. As a

matter of thematic continuity in the *Histories*, Polybius omits much of the political infighting among the *nobiles*. Still, Polybius catered to his Roman patrons. While in Rome, he remained a political prisoner, and then afterward a client of the Scipios, and as a consequence, his narrative ignored much of the political intrigue between Roman nobles. He never questioned Roman policy and naturally went to some lengths to praise the Scipio clan. Peter Green has also assailed Polybius as being a propagandist, Rome's spokesman who overemphasized the importance of Greece in Roman affairs. The use of Tyche, or Fortune, remains the last drawback found within Polybius. Often when the results of events seem outrageous or unlikely, Polybius attributed their result to Tyche. Despite all of these things, Polybius remains our only extensive, extant contemporary.⁴

Livy (59 BC-17 AD), the source with the largest volume of information, typically ranks next in terms of quality. A Paduan, Livy never participated in public affairs and seems to have been an historian exclusively. Modern historians have attacked him as unreliable, and in truth, Livy presents many problems for modern scholars. He had a poor knowledge of military affairs and often simplified battles for the reader. Chronological mistakes abound, as do mistranslations of Greek. In much of his work, Livy followed annalists, who added or eliminated events, changed chronology to suit their purpose, or simply invented things to maintain the flow in their narrative. Luckily, he relied mostly on Polybius for events in Greece and Macedon, but he put his own spirit into his writings, and molded Polybius for his own intentions and view of history. Livy saw his Rome as a place of fallen morality, and ethical instruction drove his writing as

much as the telling of an accurate history. On the other hand, Livy provides important data on Roman religion and politics, not to mention the Roman mindset.⁵

The simple fact remains, however, that he is the only source remaining for some events. Polybius may be more reliable in terms of his methods or his nearness to the events related, but in terms of the Second Macedonian War, only fragments of Polybius exist. It behooves the historian to note them, and then continue on. In a discussion of Maurice Holleaux, P. S. Derow aptly comments on the futility of trying to discover what Livy took from Polybius versus what he took from other historians.⁶ Livy possesses problems and errors and cannot be taken at face value without examination, yet he must be discussed. This investigation of Flamininus will necessitate the use of Livy for a large part of its content, because not enough of Polybius remains intact.

Finally, Plutarch (46-120 AD) stands as the third most important source, yet he is a biographer recording history as a means to moral instruction, and this presents obvious problems for the modern historian. Especially taxing is Plutarch's inclination to follow proper chronology only loosely for the sake of reinforcing a specific theme. At times he rearranged events to suit his ethical paradigm.⁷ In addition, Plutarch tended to portray flaws in his Roman subjects when comparing them to famous Greeks. Flamininus himself never quite measures up to Philopoemen. *The Lives* contain much vital material not found in other sources, but one must attempt to determine what factual data he altered or sacrificed in order to convey his moral. Nonetheless, Plutarch, like Livy, remains one of the few sources left to the modern historian for this period, and is important to the study of Flamininus.⁸

IMPERIALISM

Before continuing on to explore more completely the impact that Flaminius had in his dealings with Macedonia and Greece, we should establish our view of Roman imperialism. A number of perspectives exist, both in modern scholarship and the ancient sources, regarding Roman imperialism.

What does it mean to be imperialistic? Erich Gruen gives an interesting discussion of the evolution of the term, but does not define it.⁹ For this study, imperialism will be defined as the expansion of Roman power, whether for economic, territorial, strategic, or political interests – or any combination thereof – through the control, directly or indirectly, of other peoples. Conquest of enemies does not necessitate annexation of land, but it does mean that Rome manipulated them, as best they could, by some means.

Many different viewpoints on the nature of Roman imperialism exist in modern study. Major scholars, like Frank, Scullard, and Gruen – to mention a few – propound the theory that Rome did not want to interfere in overseas affairs, and specifically not in the East. Each of them may have a slightly different twist on why the Romans eventually did become involved in Macedon and Greece, but none strays from the overall idea that Rome was non-interventionist or non-expansionist in nature.

For some, fear stands as the primary motivation behind Rome's imperialism. The Romans developed a fear of invasion, most likely from their experiences in the sack of the city by Gallic Brennus and the Senones in 387. The intrusion by Hannibal in 218 only reinforced this phobia. For these scholars, such as Badian and Scullard, Rome

became involved in the Second Macedonian War mainly out of fear that a stronger Philip might invade the Italic peninsula at a time of Roman weakness.¹⁰ Mommsen, Errington and Dickson, however, see Rome as acting out of protection for her interests. Philip V had taken land from Roman allies, and endangered shipping lanes by Macedonian or Illyrian piracy.¹¹ Tenney Frank asserted that the Roman people favored expansion and bent the nobility to its will at times, even though the oligarchy remained defensively minded.¹²

And finally Gruen believes that the intrigues of Macedon, Greek *poleis*, and other Hellenistic states drew Rome into Hellenic affairs. In this theory, Rome becomes involved, and then tries to disentangle herself, only to be convinced to intervene again. Roman military intervention resulted from Rome trying to settle events to prevent further dealings in the region.¹³

At the other end of the spectrum, William Harris stands as the foremost proponent of Roman expansion being a result of conscious Roman aggression. Harris views the Romans as a naturally war-like people whose culture drove them to conquer their neighbors and expand their territory. But he also posits financial gain as a powerful reason, as Roman citizens, soldiery, and senators all condoned war for the taking of booty, and later, slaves.¹⁴ Harris makes sound points in his easily more convincing economic argument than he does by claiming that the Romans were simply a more brutal people than others in the ancient world.¹⁵

Although, these theories contain strong points, none of them seems suitable in their entirety, so rather than reducing Roman expansion to a single explanation, a

composite model seems more appropriate as many factors played a part in Rome creating an empire that eventually encompassed the Mediterranean world. This model embraces the premises of economic gain and protection of Roman interests, while rejecting the notions of non-expansionism and fear, just mentioned above, as aspects of imperialism. At the same time, several theories not mentioned, including Italian alliances, Roman treatment of Eastern versus Western states, and the role of political competition, shall be introduced into the model to provide a more complete analysis of Roman imperialism.

Four major reasons exist as to why the Romans became imperialistic. First, they had developed a series of treaties with numerous Italian states – due to conquest or alliance – which required the state to provide troops whenever Rome needed them for war. This provision existed no matter what the status of the people, and allowed Rome, almost nonchalantly, to use war as an instrument of foreign policy at any time. The Italian allies were estimated to be able to provide up to 360,000 men (Polyb. 3.24). Thus, Rome could absorb heavy loss of life, as they had a gigantic pool of reserves from which to draw. The allies were responsible for most of the cost of arming and provisioning their men, so Rome imposed a light annual tribute upon them. This situation allowed the Romans to create an immense military machine at a low cost to themselves.

If many of the allies had become part of the system by force due to defeat in warfare, Rome nonetheless experienced few major allied uprisings for hundreds of years.¹⁶ The system survived and thrived because Rome supported allied aristocracy in times of local insurrection, as events at Arrentium in 302 (Livy 10.3-5) and Lucania in 296 (Livy 10.18.8) provide examples. Also, the allies received shares of booty in the

form of money, land, and slaves.¹⁷ Once the system had become established, the Romans had to go to war on a regular basis in order to keep drawing troops, and thus, keep the system intact. If Rome had forgone war for several years, then her allies would miss the opportunity to capture booty, yet still had to pay a tribute and this could have led to uprisings. So war had to be sought out, just to keep the peninsula stable. In truth, Rome only benefited from her empire by going to war and requisitioning troops because she only levied a small amount of money.¹⁸

Second, simple economics pushed Rome into being imperialistic. As Harris wrote, “economic gain was to the Romans (and generally in the ancient world) an integral part of successful warfare and of the expansion of power.”¹⁹ For the people, farmland proved to be an important spoil in the Italian Wars, and piracy against Italian merchants can be considered a reason for both Illyrian Wars.²⁰ Most Romans and Italians benefited economically from war. The gains that people received did not result from a premeditated senatorial policy, but because of a collective self-interest on the part of individuals. Soldiers gained booty by successful campaigns, and pains were taken to make sure that allies received equal shares. Slavery had become a vital industry in the fourth century, and victories in war kept slaves coming into Rome,²¹ and war-making industries such as arms manufacturing, tanning, and tailoring all greatly benefited as a result by providing equipment for annual campaigns. Although Rome did not fight to establish trading posts, these economic centers became a natural aftereffect in the wake of Roman victory. Senators and *equites* acquired land, and especially later on, *publicani* (private contractors) had more areas from which to collect taxes, with the shadow of

Rome engulfing the Mediterranean world. Again, money from expansion later funded public works projects and temples.²²

Third, as per the definition given earlier [the expansion of Roman power, whether for economic, territorial, strategic, or political interests, or any combination thereof, through the control, directly or indirectly, of other peoples] Rome sought to increase her influence over her neighbors, but as Badian astutely points out, she did it differently in the West than in the East. Since Rome believed herself to be culturally distant from the Celts, Gauls and Spaniards, she naturally implemented more violent means to augment her control in the West. As Rome did not see the Western peoples as civilized, she rarely availed herself of diplomatic tools in dealing with them, and thus engaged in almost constant warfare for most of the second century to subdue them.²³

Rome, however, identified more closely at a cultural level with the Greeks and Syrians, just as she had with the Carthaginians. The Eastern peoples had developed robust economies, complex political structures and social hierarchies; they were civilized states. Because of this familiarity, Rome tended to establish hegemonic control over them with treaties and agreements of *amicitia* (friendship) after defeating them. For example, when Rome won the Hannibalic War, she did not govern Carthage through continual belligerence, but instead directed Carthaginian foreign policy: Carthage had to have Roman permission to wage war inside and outside her territory (Polyb. 15.17.3-7; Livy 30.37.1-6). Flaminius later followed this theory utilizing diplomacy to settle finally the conflicts with Philip, and later with Sparta as well, after he had first exacted a

military solution. He had no intention of conquering Hellas, as Caesar would later conquer Gaul, and the Senate had no expectation of this either.

Finally, Flaminius existed in a world of extreme competition for the prizes of power and recognition. Roman nobles spent their lives vying to gain a chance at attaining prestige and glory for themselves and their families and this task proved to be difficult for most, and impossible for some.

A Roman became involved in politics in the hope of increasing his *dignitas*, his personal reputation of public honor and esteem. Although working in the law courts, passing legislation, and capturing the lower magistracies did allow a man to increase his *dignitas*, these things counted primarily as stepping-stones towards the highest political honors.²⁴ Of course, attaining a quaestorship or tribunate might have been a mark of great prestige among some *novi hominis*, or families with a lower social standing, but to capture the greatest accolades meant going further up the *cursus honorum*. A Roman normally had to ascend certain stepping-stones – becoming a quaestor, then serving as an aedile, followed by election as a praetor – before he designated himself prepared for the state's highest office, the consulship. Once elected consul, a Roman joined an elite group, which increased his own *dignitas* and the prestige of his family.²⁵ Having been consul, however, guaranteed nothing for Romans looking to gain *auctoritas*, public prestige and respect. This does not mean that being consul meant he had no *auctoritas*, but that to become truly powerful and influential on the political scene later required something more.

The real goal of any consul was to be granted a military command by the Senate. Only on the field of battle did a consul have the opportunity to attain enough *gloria* and *laus* – glory and praise – to magnify his *dignitas* and *auctoritas*, and put him above his peers on the social ladder. Like all generals, the consul wanted victory, but even more importantly, he must achieve a memorable victory. The destruction of 5,000 or more enemy troops in a battle usually met the standard requirement for being granted a triumph by the Senate,²⁶ and a triumph stood not just as a mark of success, but of immense success. Great *gloria* and *laus* came from its celebration, and thus the accumulation of *dignitas* and *auctoritas*,²⁷ though there existed no guarantee that the Senate would vote the triumph to a conquering general. Becoming a great man entailed the following tasks: becoming a consul, serving in a war, defeating the enemy significantly, and celebrating a triumph as a result.

Flaminius, like so many before and after him, chose to attempt this path. As will be shown in detail later, Flaminius achieved the consulship with the help of powerful friends, and their continued aid, as well as his own maneuvering, kept him in Greece long enough to overcome Philip V. After three years of war with Macedon, Flaminius had virtually assured himself of a triumph after winning at Cynoscephalae, yet he forced hostilities upon Sparta to gather in even more *gloria*.

Going through this process successfully was not an easy feat. The steep road to *auctoritas* contained many pitfalls and obstacles, since aristocrats were also encouraged to pursue *inimicitiae*, enmity, against their rivals in the public arena.²⁸ This enmity could be displayed in many ways, such as breaking off social contact, joining a faction of one's

enemies in order to hinder his attempts to get elected or block his actions once in office, or even to prosecute him in a court of law.²⁹ Not only did Romans exhibit *inimicitiae* in various ways, but they also entered into it for numerous reasons: violating relationships based upon trust or obligation, interfering with the career of another, or attacking clients.³⁰

Yet *invidia* – which translates as jealousy – stands, perhaps, as the most common reason of them all for *inimicitiae*. Romans who reached the highest spires of political greatness also became the largest targets for *inimicitiae*, making themselves the objects of constant attack, as the *nobiles* all feared the concentration of too much power in one man's hands. Individuals might work to become successful generals and then powerful members of the Senate, but at the same time they knew that the more *auctoritas* they accumulated, the more *invidia* they created among their peers. One man with a great amount of *auctoritas* wielded a large amount of power, thus curtailing the influence of others. The development of *invidia*, which resulted in *inimicitiae*, served as a natural check against the reappearance of a *rex*: a king. Members of the upper class targeted actions by an individual who seemed too powerful, or who worked too much towards the benefit of himself.³¹

What of those consuls who failed on the battlefield, a legitimate query as the legions returned many times as the defeated? Nathan Rosenstein dealt with this specific question in his work *Imperatores Victi*. In a world of such intense political competition for renown, one would naturally think that those commanders who returned to Rome in defeat would then fall by the wayside politically, because they had not achieved *gloria*.

What better way to reduce the number of competitors for high office? Men who lost wars, however, still played a necessary part in Roman government. The “elimination” of the *imperatores victi* from the forum and Senate as viable participants could only narrow the field of candidates, thereby allowing power to be concentrated in the hands of fewer individuals and for this reason, was resisted. Rosenstein also argues that the continuance of the *imperatores victi* in the political arena occurred because of two cultural factors deeply ingrained in the Roman psyche.³²

The first was the impact of religion upon defeat. Rosenstein wrote, “War and religion were inseparable at Rome.”³³ The Romans carried out elaborate rites in the form of sacrifices, vows, auguries, and auspices, in order to appease the gods before going to war, and they watched religious ceremonies with great scrutiny. Mistakes in performing a rite caused it to be repeated and, sacrifices and auguries that portended negative outcomes were also sometimes redone in order to find a more positive answer. A fortuitous ceremony did not guarantee victory for the consul, however, but indicated that the *pax deorum* – peace of the gods – remained intact. Once a defeat had occurred, then the actual mechanics of the ritual implementation were closely examined. Often times, priests discovered a convenient flaw in the performance of the ceremony, however many people from all levels of society took part in the performance of rites, and so enemies, and even friends, of the defeated general could thus be open to blame. Members outside the upper class usually took the political fall, and errors in the religious realm might nullify the culpability of the defeated, keeping them in the political arena.³⁴

The second factor was placing the blame for the defeat upon the soldiers. The commander blamed poor discipline or lack of courage on the part of the men serving as the cause of a loss on the battlefield. Romans expected soldiers to follow orders unflinchingly and stand their ground unless ordered to retreat, yet the fierceness of hand-to-hand combat created an environment in which emotion could easily overpower discipline. Soldiers who disobeyed or fled incurred blame, thus keeping the losing general in the maelstrom of Rome politics despite defeat.³⁵ Safety valves of this kind relieved the pressure for *imperatores victi*, who vied for a powerful spot in the political scene.

Such a political system, deeply infused with cultural *mores*, had crafted an environment wherein Romans fought to increase their personal standing and power through election to office and conduct of war. Jealousy and hatred developed as the upper class jockeyed for position. Some men fell victim to their opponents and to circumstance, while many others survived because of natural checks built into the system. This maintained the competition necessary to prevent any one individual from accruing too much influence, and at the same time sustained a system that permitted Rome to acquire an empire.³⁶

Flaminius could work for his goals knowing that he had built-in scapegoats to blame for almost any mistake he might make during his operations. This did not, however, relieve him from the machinations of others. Throughout his campaigns in Macedonia and Greece, Flaminius constantly had to worry about *invidia*, which might lead to attacks from Rome. For example, as 197 dawned, his enemies tried to steal the

Macedonian command away from him. He had not failed in his duty; he had in fact beaten Philip at Aous Valley, but he had not concluded the war. Thus Flaminius' friends in Rome worked to gain him a proconsular command to finish the war, while his enemies sought to wrench it from him. Newly-elected consuls attempted to supplant him in the Macedonian theater in 196 and 195, as well. His status kept him a target for jealousy even towards the end of his career, as Cato expelled Flaminius' brother Lucius from the Senate in an attempt to injure Flaminius' *auctoritas* in a roundabout way.

Flaminius can also be seen as a part of a much larger trend of political change in the late Republic. Eventually, men like Marius, Sulla, Pompey and Caesar tore apart the Republic with their strivings after power and *gloria*. Yet, it is difficult to determine whether any of these men actually desired acclaim and influence more than Flaminius or Scipio did in a younger Rome. What helped to change the political realities between the time of Flaminius and that of Caesar? I believe the relationship between the Senate and the magistrates holds the key.

The Senate managed the raising of troops, collection of supplies, and logistics of travel, just to name a few of its duties.³⁷ In the field, the commander had leeway to make decisions based on the situation at hand, but in early Roman wars against Latin tribes and Gauls, the Senate issued orders that they expected the consul to follow, if possible.³⁸ Of course, circumstance did not always grant the wishes of the Senators, and this is not to say that the Senate normally controlled the decisions of the commander in the field. Yet, campaigns in Italy never took place far from Rome, and the Senators could be called upon for aid or advice within a short period of time, if needed. The Senators trusted that

a fellow member of the Senate possessed the necessary skills to conduct a war and would perform in the best interests of the state.³⁹ At the same time, they recognized the potential for a single man to become more powerful politically after defeating an enemy, but *invidia* and *inimicitiae* provided checks against any man rising too high. Overseas commands changed this, however, affecting the realm of competition in an unforeseen manner.

Until the last years of the Hannibalic War, fighting had not involved a commander holding *imperium* for an extended period of time outside of Italy. Yet Scipio held *imperium* for his entire time in Africa, and Flaminius himself possessed *imperium* for five straight years in Greece. These *extended* commands allowed opportunities for men like Scipio and Flaminius to greatly magnify their *dignitas* and *auctoritas* in strange, exotic places where other members of the upper class had little, if any, experience. Defeating Celts and Gauls was celebrated, but these accomplishments did not hold the same mystique or prestige as the overseas provinces did. Men like Scipio and Flaminius returned to Rome with enhanced power and influence, *and* the desire to exert it. But Flaminius impacted Roman history beyond mere personal achievement or short-term foreign affairs; his actions had major repercussions to the continued growth of the empire and the eventual fall of the Republic. He, along with Scipio, pushed political competition and the use of personal power to a higher level, one that the great men of the later Republic equaled, and then greatly surpassed.

After five years of successful warfare and diplomacy in Hellas, Flaminius decided upon Roman hegemony for Greece instead of annexation. Moderns afforded the

benefits of hindsight may cringe at the fact that Flaminius might have saved Rome fifty years of fighting and politicking if he had simply proposed annexation of Macedonia and Greece instead. The four imperialistic motives previously cited influenced Flaminius to implement a hegemonic settlement on the Hellenes rather than inflicting continuous campaigns upon them. These four motives – with the exception of Rome’s treaties with the Italians, which simply provided the resources to continually wage war – provided the framework from which previous commanders created postwar settlements, and these former settlements presented Flaminius with two options: profit through annexation and the desire for hegemonic control.

When looking at the models available to Flaminius, first we turn to occasions where Rome annexed areas of defeated nations, but it must be noted that the peaces negotiated for the Punic Wars combined elements of both annexation and hegemony, (most likely because Carthage had represented a true threat to Roman security, whereas Macedonia and Illyria did not) and the former portion of the settlements will be examined here. After rejecting an earlier treaty of the First Punic War, the *comitia centuriata* agreed to reparations of 3,200 talents along with control of Sicily and the islands in-between (Polyb. 1.62-63). The senators must have seen the possible Carthaginian possession of Sicily as a threat to their security, whether in terms of invasion or of blocking trade lanes. Rome acted to secure the major staging base in the Mediterranean closest to Italy, not to mention a new source of troops, taxes, and grain. Although Sicily became the first “Roman province,” Rome did not directly administrate it to a large degree for many years; instead, Roman officials relied primarily on established forms of

government and jurisprudence.⁴⁰ Rome took control of Sardinia and Corsica shortly thereafter. With Carthage exhausted from the war, the senators claimed these islands to weaken the power of Carthage, increase revenue, and have a larger base of Mediterranean operations. By 238, Rome had ousted them and taken control, and a debilitated Carthage was in no position to resist her.⁴¹

The peace ending the Hannibalic War was much harsher than the first, as Rome imposed an indemnity of 10,000 talents paid over a fifty-year period and confiscated Spain, and portions of Africa conquered during the war (the African lands were distributed to Rome's African allies). Rome took possession of Spain to prevent Carthage from gaining a foothold in Europe, but more importantly to have access to the prolific mines throughout the region. Rome, however, found herself fighting war after war against the Spaniards, but she settled on this situation for two reasons. First, Spain represented a huge economic windfall in terms of both the mines and the plunder⁴² that Rome did not want to give up through a peace treaty. Second, as Badian argued, the Romans perceived the Spaniards to be barbarians who did not have the culture to understand or respect a negotiated settlement. Thus, as she had done with the Gauls, Rome engaged in almost yearly campaigns to subdue the Spanish tribes, and did not finish the task until the end of the second century.

A second can be seen when Rome shaped hegemonic settlements for the purpose of controlling problematic or threatening neighbors, and protecting allies. By placing limitations on defeated states, Rome protected her interests and maintained openings for further intervention. The First Punic War yields little in the way of hegemonic

restrictions except forbidding Carthage from making war on Syracuse or her allies, and evacuating Sicily (Polyb. 1.62). The Illyrian Wars of 229-228 and 220-219 – which resulted from increased Illyrian piracy that threatened Italian trade routes in the Adriatic Sea – offered an example of a very *laissez-faire* type of hegemony.⁴³ Once Rome had defeated Queen Teuta in the first war, Illyria was restricted to using only two ships near Roman trading lanes in order to prevent piracy. Rome returned the recently expanded Illyria to its previous dimensions, and established a protectorate over Illyria and the surrounding Greek settlements.⁴⁴ The Second Illyrian War came about because the Illyrian ruler Demetrius of Pharos had started his own campaign of expansion. He, not unlike Teuta, increased piracy in the Aegean and threatened Roman allies, and Rome swooped down on Demetrius (who escaped to Macedon) and quickly ended his aims.⁴⁵ The Romans did not add any territory, but simply stopped a threatening problem before it became too damaging to their commerce and relations with other states.⁴⁶

The Hannibalic War offered a much more severe form of hegemony than the previous conflicts. Rome forced Carthage to strip her navy down to almost nothing, to no longer possess or train war elephants, to restore territory and goods to Masinissa and to enter into a treaty with him, and not to wage war inside or outside of Africa without prior permission from the Senate.⁴⁷ Rome had seen the rebirth of Carthaginian power in Spain as a future threat. Rome might have humbled the maritime power before, but it had taken twenty-three long years, and a foe of that magnitude could not be allowed to reclaim her strength. So, Rome not only subjected Carthage to more than the extraction of wealth or the annexation of Spanish territory, but she also necessarily controlled Carthaginian

foreign policy. Thus, Roman benefits were twofold: she accumulated more wealth and she placed Carthage under her dominion so the African nation could not regain power. Thus after Zama, Rome had eliminated the Carthaginians as a viable power in the Western Mediterranean, and this severe peace eventually led to the Third Punic War and the extinction of the Punic independence.

Thus, prior to the Second Macedonian War, Rome had used different methods in settling her overseas conflicts. She had annexed Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia, and Spain for their strategic locations, and for the wealth they generated. When the seizure of land seemed overly difficult, unnecessary, or inappropriate (as in the case of dealing with Eastern and Western peoples⁴⁸) she implemented sanctions to sustain some form of control over conquered states, as the cases of Carthage and Illyria demonstrate. The variability of each situation made every peace unique, and many factors determined the type of settlement the Romans used in managing the conquered. Thus, Flaminius had a plethora of examples to select from when it came time to deal with Macedonia after Cynoscephalae. He decided on a hegemonial arrangement rather than a provincial one, for the same reasons that Scipio resolved the Hannibalic War in that way. Macedonia and Greece were not nomadic, tribal societies like the Gauls and Celts, or even the Illyrians, whom the Romans managed with a few sanctions and the threat of force. Instead they had advanced cultures similar to Rome's, and the Hellenes valued negotiation, whereas the Western peoples understood the sword. Flaminius identified with them culturally, and so, used diplomacy.

In addition, without a distinct threat of invasion at the time of the Macedonian War, it is doubtful that Rome would have had the desire – or could have forced the Italians – to muster the numerous legions that would have been needed to reduce Greece completely. It had no immediate strategic value like Sicily. In addition, Greek loyalty was dubious and Pergamum, Rhodes, and even Egypt remained influential in the region, not to mention the resurrected Seleucid Empire had entered the area as a force to be reckoned with. The Roman people, too, had not been overly supportive of the Macedonian War at the outset, and it had taken three years just to corner Philip and defeat him. It seems very unlikely that the people, or the *patres*, would have supported an effort to turn Hellas into a province at this point. Finally, as Andrew Lintott notes, Rome tended to be tolerant of civilized rival powers at this time in Republican history, preferring to enforce hegemony rather than to create provinces.⁴⁹

Attainment of *gloria* and *auctoritas*, however, persisted as the most influential factor on Flamininus' career. As proceeding chapters will demonstrate, his actions exhibited an unflinching effort to successfully compete to reach the apex of authority, acknowledgment, and reputation in his culture. When obstacles intervened in his hunt for glory, he circumvented them by virtually any means, with little regard for the consequences they entailed for Rome.

THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

Before investigating Flamininus' career in the Second Macedonian War, it is vital to review briefly the events of the First Macedonian War and Rome's original intervention into the region. In 215 during the Hannibalic War, after the debacle at Lake

Trasimene, Hannibal had signed a treaty with the Macedonian ruler Philip V, hoping that an eastern front could be opened against the Romans. As Philip had invaded Roman protectorates in Illyria, he looked menacing to many Romans after that pact became known, and the Senate declared war on Macedon to prevent Philip from becoming a new factor in the Hannibalic War. With theaters in both Italy and Spain, however, Rome did not have the manpower to transport an army to Macedonia, so she recruited the aid of the already embattled Aetolians and Achaean League to conduct it for her.

Once the First Macedonian War had begun, imperialistic intentions emerged. Rome kept a small fleet in Greece during the whole war, and a small contingent of Roman soldiers sacked Greek cities for loot in 205. The Senate had sent a 10,000-man army under Publius Sempronius to take command of the war effort in 205, but upon arriving he discovered that the Aetolian allies had just made peace with Philip.

This leads to the Second Macedonian War, and the time period that this thesis will focus upon. Historians have endlessly debated the causes of this conflict and its place in Roman imperialism.⁵⁰ Scholars have promulgated many theories that attempt to absolve Rome of imperialistic intentions, yet these hypothesizes, which focus primarily on defensive or fear-related reactions to foreign states' actions, seem less plausible than the Roman motivation for expansion.

In the wake of the First Macedonian War, Philip V began to expand Macedon's position in the balance of Hellenistic powers, and the Eastern political situation involved numerous complex relationships. Philip wanted to reclaim Macedonian hegemony over Greece. He built up the Macedonian navy and became active in the Aegean, taking cities

to establish control of the Hellespont, and also acquiring areas in Illyria. He helped sponsor Aetolian pirates in return for a cut of the booty to build a fleet. Then, he turned on the Aetolians by refusing to cede territory to the Aetolian League that he had previously promised. As the Hannibalic War wound down, Philip became more daring in his raids into Greece and took control of trading lanes in the Adriatic. The efforts of Rhodes and Pergamum – although these slowed him down for a time – failed to stop Philip.

Earlier, in 203-02, the Aetolian League had sent an embassy to ask for Roman intervention against Macedon. The Senate gave no aid, as the Hannibalic War was still undecided. In fact, they harshly rebuked the Aetolians, against whom they still felt resentment for concluding the First Macedonian War without asking Rome (Livy 31.31.20). But in 201, Attalus, ruler of Pergamum, came to the Senate with an embassy of Rhodians bringing news of Philip's encroachment into Pergamese and Greek lands. Both the Pergamenes and Rhodians had been losing to Philip at sea, and now saw an alliance with Rome as the only way to ensure victory.⁵¹ Rome sent embassies to Greece to examine the situation. Soon after, an Athenian embassy arrived in Rome to complain about the aggression of Philip also. The Senate proposed a declaration of war, but the people voted down the declaration. Shortly thereafter, according to Livy (31.7), Publius Sulpicius Galba made a speech describing Philip as a second Pyrrhus, successfully inciting the people, and within three days, they ratified the declaration.⁵²

Rome declared war on Philip for several reasons. Although he had grown in power, he actually represented a small threat to Italy, Rome had several allies to placate

and commerce to protect, and the Senate, still harbored anger over Philip's pact with Hannibal. Livy claims that they felt snubbed by Philip for the Treaty of Phoenice, though he also claims that they blamed the Aetolians for it (Livy 31.1.9-10). The latter seems more likely, as the treaty had prevented Rome from the further involvement that she had wanted: to send forces. Finally, the speech of Galba illustrates the economic and cultural motivations for the war.⁵³ The Hannibalic War had left Rome exhausted, and yet legions continued to fight campaigns in Spain and Gaul. The drive to expand her influence – powered by greed, revenge and vanity – pushed Rome into war with Macedon.

The first two years of the war produced mixed results. Neither Publius Sulpicius Galba in 200, nor Publius Villius Tappulus in 199, accomplished much against Philip. Galba did enjoy more success than Tappulus, whose harsh treatment of the Greek and Macedonian people actually damaged Roman support in the region, but any successes amounted to little in the whole of the conflict (Livy 31.23-32.8).

Roman fortunes in the region would change in 198, as the 29-year-old patrician Titus Quinctius Flaminius became consul, despite the efforts of the tribunes named Fulvius and Manius to prevent it (Plut. *Flam.* 2; Livy 32.7.5-15). He entered into office during a time of empire building, where Rome gained an almost inexhaustible supply of manpower from treaties with Italian tribes, and moreover, the desire for wealth and control of her enemies pushed her into one war after another. Beyond that, the culture of political competition manufactured the career goals of the *nobiles* as generals wistful for success attempted to gain the consulship whereby they could secure a campaign to attain *gloria* and *laus*. These same factors that had propelled Rome to create that empire,

especially the last one, molded the motivations and actions of Flamininus throughout his career, which was marked by the consistent pursuit for *auctoritas*, even to the point of putting himself before Rome in some cases.

INTRODUCTION ENDNOTES

1. Unless otherwise specified all dates are BC.
2. F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957), 1-6.
3. Walbank, *Commentary*, 7-9.
4. Walbank, *Commentary*, 16-26; Peter Green, *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 269-85. Green finds Polybius' tendency to fall back on Tyche for explanations to be a serious problem in his credibility, at times.
5. P. G. Walsh, *Livy, His Historical Aims and Methods* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961),
6. P. S. Derow, *Greek Historical Documents: The Hellenistic Period* (Chico: Scholars Press, 1987), 25-37.
7. R. H. Barrow, *Plutarch and his Times* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1967), 60-1; D. A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1972), 14, 57-8.
8. C. P. Jones, *Plutarch and Rome* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 54-59.
9. Erich S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 3-8.
10. Ernst Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), 3-4; H. H. Sculliard, *Roman Politics: 220-150 BC*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 89-91.
11. Theodor Mommsen, *History of Rome*, vol. 2, trans. William Purdie Dickson (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1898), 414-6; R. M. Errington, *The Dawn of*

- Empire: Rome's Rise to World Power*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 3-4; Green, 435-436.
12. Tenney Frank, *Roman Imperialism*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1914), 66-7, 106, 357.
 13. Erich S. Gruen, 728-729; F. W. Walbank, *The Hellenistic World: Revised Edition*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 230-6.
 14. William V. Harris, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327-70 BC* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 41-53.
 15. He reaches this conclusion by examining their actions in warfare. His notes overflow with examples of Roman cruelty in the form of soldiers destroying cities, massacring surrendered peoples, and raping women (Harris, 52-3, 263-4). Though his argument has force, Harris goes too far. Other peoples in the Mediterranean and its periphery practiced heartless acts as well. Two examples from Alexander's career demonstrate that cruelty was not a Roman preserve. Alexander butchered men, women (who were raped as well), and children in the razing of Thebes in 335 (Arr. 1.8; Plut. *Alex.* 11.12; Diod. 17.14) and Alexander's army slaughtered every inhabitant of the Malli after Alexander suffered an arrow wound (Arr. 6.9.11; Diod. 17.98.3-99.4; Curt. 9.4.26-9.5.18; Plut. *Alex.* 63.1-4. A. B. Bosworth, *Alexander and the East: The Tragedy of Triumph* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) even makes the argument that Alexander was an overtly vicious man. Cruelty was neither a Roman preserve, nor a cultural trait specific to them alone, as examples of brutality by other peoples exist in plenty. The Akkadians demolished Nineveh and enslaved most of the population that survived and later, the Assyrian general Nabonidus slaughtered the inhabitants of Akkad. After capturing the city of Ekron, the Assyrian king Sennacherib slew the nobility and hung the corpses from poles, and Sargon II conquered and burned the city of Qartar, then had the rebels killed and their king flayed (James B. Pritchard, ed. *The Ancient Near East Volume I: An Anthology of Texts and Pictures* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 195-203). Even the Greeks practiced extreme violence as the Athenians razed Melos and butchered the adult men after the Melians attempted to exit the Delian League (Thucy. 5.17.84-116).
 16. T. J. Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome: Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000-264 BC)*, London: Routledge, 1995), 365. A major uprising of the Falerii occurred 241 and a revolt of the Fregellae happened in 125. Rome quashed both with alacrity.

17. Cornell, 393-4.
18. Cornell, 364-8.
19. Harris, 56.
20. Gruen, 367; De Souza, 76-80.
21. Cornell, 393; Harris, 84.
22. Harris, 100-04.
23. Badian, *Imperialism*, 10-12.
24. Harris, 18-20.
25. Harris, 23.
26. Leslic Adkins and Roy A. Adkins, *Handbook to Life in Ancient Rome*, (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1994), 91-2.
27. Harris, 20, 25-30.
28. David F. Epstein, *Personal Enmity in Roman Politics, 218-43 BC*, (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 1-12.
29. Epstein, 64-89.
30. Epstein, 30-47.
31. Epstein, 48-54.

32. Nathan Rosenstein, *Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 1-52.
33. Rosenstein, 54.
34. Rosenstein, 54-91.
35. Rosenstein, 92-113. It may be conjectured that poor discipline would reflect badly on a general: that he had performed his duties inadequately, thus causing the obedience of his men to falter. This is a strong, pragmatic argument, but the refutation lies in the culture of Roman oligarchic power. Almost all the generals came from the same class, and to keep a degree of parity among them, they had to propagate a myth of universally competent commanders. Finding fault in a general, except under very unusual circumstances, would put every leader under the suspicion of incompetence. That would be a grave mark against the rule of the oligarchy. In addition, it would bring into question the use of soldiers as a scapegoat when Rome lost in the field. Once more, the power of the *patres* could be found suspect and so the soldiers continued to shoulder the burden of the blame.
36. Rosenstein, 3, 168-73.
37. J. A. North, "The Development of Roman Imperialism," *JRS*, 71 (1981): 8.
38. Arthur M. Eckstein, *Senate and General: Individual Decision making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 3-4.
39. Eckstein, 322-4
40. Andrew Lintott, *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration* (London: Routledge, 1993), 28-9, 38-9, 55-60; Frank, 92-106.
41. Errington, 32-4.

42. Leonard A. Curchin, *Roman Spain: Conquest and Assimilation* (London: Routledge, 1991), 19-20, 30-1, 136-8.
43. Polyb. 2.8; Gruen, 366-7; De Souza, 76-80.
44. Polyb. 12.11.4-2.12.3; App. *Ill.* 2.7; Gruen, 367. He does not think “protectorate” to be a proper term as Rome entered into *amicitia* with several of the *poleis*; the relationship was not formal as “protectorate” implies. Errington, 39, concurs with him on this point.
45. Polyb. 3.16.7-19, Appian *Ill.* 8, *Zon.* 8.20.
46. Gruen, 372-373.
47. Polyb. 15.18; Livy 30.29-35. Only Livy makes the statement concerning the elephants.
48. Badian, 7-12.
49. Lintott, 9..
50. Fear of Macedonian invasion does not convince, since Philip had a small navy and could not defeat the combined forces of Rhodes and Pergamum, let alone defeat the Roman navy and land an invasion force. Neither did Rome make preparations for an invasion when Philip’s aggressions became apparent to them. The breaking of clientship is also untenable as Rome did not defeat Philip in the First Macedonian War, but signed a treaty more beneficial to him than to her. The circumstances of the treaty make it doubtful that the Romans held the Macedonians to be clients at this point. Defense of allies has been proposed, but the sources make no mention of it. Philhellenism is ludicrous (as we shall see later), and the hypothesis that Rome eventually dragged herself into the conflict as a matter of pride and improving her image in Greece lacks substance as well. Lastly, A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank, “The Origins of the Second Macedonian War,” *JRS*, 27 (1937): 206, resurrected the famous hypothesis of Maurice Holleaux concerning the pact between Philip and Antiochus as the cause of the Second Macedonian War. The theory has some strong points such as Rome’s fear that the combined might of the Philip and Antiochus would have been more formidable than the Macedonians alone. News of the pact is found in

many of the sources: Polyb. 15.20.2, 16.1.8, 16.10.1; Livy 31.14.5; App. *Mac.* 4. The rulers agreed to the treaty to carve up the possessions of Ptolemy Philopater after his death, yet the sources do not indicate any intention by the rulers to invade Rome as a coalition. As J. P. V. D. Balsdon criticizes in "Rome and Macedon, 205-200 BC," *JRS* 44 (1954), Holleaux has crafted his widely accepted hypothesis based on conjecture. When the sources and Roman actions are examined, the pact theory does not hold up.

51. Chester G. Starr, Jr., "Rhodes and Pergamum, 201-200 B.C.," *CP* 33 (1938). Neither Rhodes nor Pergamum had been Roman allies, so Rome took advantage of the situation to get involved in Macedonia.
52. Galba played the demagogue in this situation. He wanted a chance to capture some *gloria*. Though Philip did not have the resources or the aim to invade Italy, it does not mean the Roman people believed that. They had just lived through sixteen years of war and conjuring up old ghosts right after Hannibal's defeat was a shrewd political maneuver.
53. T. A. Dorsey, "Contributory Causes of the Second Macedonian War," *AJP* 80 (1959): 292; McDonald and Walbank, 206.

CHAPTER ONE

Before scrutinizing the career of Flaminius, the competitive political atmosphere and the new political opportunities brought about in the aftermath of the Hannibalic War for ambitious *nobiles* will be examined first. After seventeen years of conflict many of the old traditions that had governed Republican politics before the hostilities changed because of the devastation the war had caused. Out of this, the young, but newly anointed Africanus emerged as the paramount Roman. The newly transformed political climate imparted to him the chance for success, and he converted that possibility into a consulship, victory over Hannibal, and the position of *senatus princeps*. Flaminius stood among a crowd of young, ambitious men who aspired to reach the consulship when Scipio emerged as an archetype of success. Observing the circumstances of Scipio's exploits and the accolades he had won Flaminius took Africanus as a model to emulate.

Scipio provides a relevant role model to Flaminius for several reasons. Scipio took liberties in self-aggrandizement by allowing the Spanish to mint coins bearing his image and consenting to have them call him *imperator*. Flaminius would later mimic both of these actions, in Greece. Next, both men served extended proconsular terms in which the Senate gave them license to decide the fate of their provinces and their settlements' impacts on the future of Rome. During their lengthy overseas appointments, both had to fight off challenges from invidious competitors to retain their posts. Finally, as contemporaries, Flaminius saw what could, and could not, be accomplished in the present by observing Scipio.

The two men had almost parallel careers, which will be examined here and in ensuing chapters. Both men rose to the consulship at a young age, if through different circumstances. Each of them fought a war on foreign soil and dictated the settlements. Both sought and became, for a time, the greatest men in Rome and followed this up by holding the censorship. The quest for *gloria* and *auctoritas* motivated each man's ascension.

Little evidence remains concerning the early life of Flaminius. Born circa 229 or 228, Flaminius belonged to the patrician *gens* Quinctii, and surely received an upper-class education, as well as the requisite military training and service to which all young men from his social station were subject.¹ At the approximate age of 12, however, the Hannibalic War broke out and Flaminius grew up in the newly transformed competitive world of Roman politics. The great loss of life inflicted upon the Romans by Hannibal and his armies at the battles of Trebia, Trasimene, Cannae and subsequent campaigns drained the manpower pool from which the Roman state drew its leaders.² Thus, two things resulted from the decimation of the older nobility: younger, inexperienced men could receive promotions to high offices they would normally have had to wait many years to achieve, and the political maneuvering between members of the aristocracy entered a more vicious dimension.

The actual machinery of Roman politics is not a clear-cut issue among scholars. H. H. Scullard argued that the nobility controlled policy in the Republic by dominating elections and religious offices. This nobility was divided into family groups, who in turn contrived to determine the direction the Roman state would take. Through intermarriage

and obligation, several *gentes* joined together to form parties in order to make themselves more difficult to defeat in elections or policy decisions. Although at times, matters of concern for the state or the overriding will of the people limited the power of the *gentes*, in general these families dominated the political scene until the time of the Gracchii.³ Before going on, it is important to briefly address this theory about political factions.

P. A. Brunt argues convincingly that no hard evidence exists to corroborate Scullard's theory. Brunt proved that these "factions" lacked long term stability, forming and dissolving depending upon circumstances.⁴ Scullard had suggested kinship bonds as the glue that maintained factions over long periods of time, however, many families intermarried, and obligations could thus be owed to opposing groups. Further, Brunt explained that kinship and friendship ties were not the foremost catalysts of motivation for politicians. More often than not, personal advantage – the pursuit of *auctoritas* - prompted men to act with one faction or another, or to change sides along the way.⁵ Large, long-term coalitions attempting to control the Roman political scene simply did not exist at this time. Instead, men joined together for numerous reasons, primarily personal advantage. Factions coalesced, merged, disintegrated and remerged across the Roman political scene. Once again, the competition to become preeminent drove relationships among the Romans. This environment educated Flaminius to look for opportunities whenever they appeared.

The struggle with the Carthaginians took an enormous toll on the manpower of Rome. As a result, the Senate and the people constantly searched for the right men to

bring an end to a war. The *patres* did not limit the hunt, but looked for almost anyone who could bring victory.

The significance of the situation was not lost on older men like Fabius Maximus and Marcellus, who had held the consulship on several occasions during the war before their deaths.⁶ The Senate even recalled the condemned, as they appointed Marcus Livius Salinator consul in 207 (Livy 27.34). Experienced men, however, were not the only ones who benefited from the situation. Glory-hungry youths also recognized that possible opportunities existed to quickly climb or even jump rungs in the *cursus honorum* to reach the consulship without paying the usual dues. Gneaus Fulvius Centumalus had only been praetor in 213 before becoming consul in 211 (Livy 25.41.8-13). Sulpicius Galba, who would later lead the legions against Philip in 200, also became consul in 211, but without holding any previous curule offices (Livy 25.41.8-13). Lucius Cornelius Lentulus held the consulship in 199 without having been a praetor (Livy 31.49.8-12). Scipio's own colleague, Publius Licinius Crassus was only 30 when he was elected (Livy 27.6.17). Now, given the right circumstances, even a young man could command armies and hold *imperium*. Flaminius later found himself using this new environment to elevate his career, but he was not the first. The most relevant example is Scipio Africanus.

Scipio had survived the Roman defeat at the Battle of Cannae and had reached the office of aedile in 213, at the age of 21 (Livy 25.2.3-6). This popular young man was essentially following the normal career path of the *cursus honorum* (although young and having never served as a quaestor). Actions in Spain changed his fortunes. In 211, his uncle and father, Gnaeus and Publius Scipio respectively, died in combat against the

Spanish, which left the recently acquired stronghold in southern Spain in grave danger (Livy 25.34-36). The Senate dispatched Gaius Claudius Nero to take the fallen Scipios' place. However, the people elected young Scipio, invested with proconsular *imperium*, to replace Nero (Livy 26.17.1-18).

Livy's account portrays the Roman people overwhelmed by emotion, which caused them to support the son and nephew of the fallen commanders in taking his vengeance. Scipio may have been given the post for the reason described by Livy, but other factors likely figured into his promotion: a shortage of experienced leaders, the fact that he was a more offensive-minded campaigner, and a promising record of previous military service. The Senate wanted someone they could trust to command effectively, not just a sentimental favorite. Scipio had some proven military skill and this garnered him the Spanish command as the first private citizen to hold *imperium* without attaining the magistracies of praetor or consul. Scipio provided an example for other men who craved *auctoritas*. The Hannibalic War had begun to transform the political climate in Rome. Desperation for leaders of any promise pushed the people to elect little-known men in hopes that their youth and energy would end the war.

Scipio proved to be a man of nearly unmatched military prowess. He took New Carthage in 209, then continued his success by defeating Hasdrubal Barca at Baecula in 208, and Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, at Ilipa in 206.⁷ With the Carthaginian forces defeated, Scipio secured Spain and, in 205, he returned to Rome to stand for the office of consul. The young conqueror provoked some jealousy, especially after a Saguntine embassy told the Senate of his exploits and their desire to call him king. Scipio had told

them to refer to him as *imperator* instead. No one had taken this title previously.⁸ Nevertheless, Scipio enjoyed immense popularity and the *comitia centuriata* unanimously voted him consul.

The Senate assigned him the province of Sicily, and Scipio's grand strategy began to unfold as he planned the crossing into Africa. The *invidia* of some senatorial members had not ceased and his fitness as consul became a topic of investigation. Yet when the commission came to Sicily and saw the magnitude and quality of his preparations, they dropped the allegations. Next, he traversed over to Africa and held proconsular power from 204 to 201, until the defeat of Hannibal at Zama and the subsequent settlement of the war. After his victory over Hannibal, Scipio formulated all of the conditions of the peace, to which the Senate whole-heartedly agreed. Scipio concluded all of the affairs in Africa and returned to Rome to celebrate a grand triumph.

During this time Scipio fell prey to many attacks from *invidia*. In 202 just before Zama, the new consul Tiberius Claudius Nero had received a share of the African command after persuading the Senate. This act represented an attack on Scipio as Nero tried to steal some of his *gloria*, thus diminishing Scipio's accomplishment. Nero, however, never reached Africa because a storm destroyed his fleet. Again in 201, *invidia* took part as the newly elected consuls – Publius Aelius Paetus and Gnaeus Cornelius Lentulus - attempted to replace Africanus, in order to steal away the settlement with the Carthaginians. After the interference of the tribunes, a compromise by the senate gave *imperium* to Scipio on land and *imperium* to Lentulus at sea (Livy 30.40.9-16)

After the Hannibalic War, Scipio settled down to a political role, with brief military interludes during his consulship in 194, and later serving as the legate to his brother Lucius in the War against Antiochus. Though little evidence remains, much speculation exists concerning the influence that Scipio exerted on the Roman state until his downfall in 183. Several examples, however, can be given to demonstrate Scipio's sway.

Within two years of his return from Africa, Scipio rode his wave of popularity into the censorship and the title of *senatus princeps* (Livy 32.7.1-3). Never before had a man so young achieved so high an honor. But *invidia* abounded throughout the Senate and for a time, his influence waned, though in terms of *dignitas* and *auctoritas*, no one else in Rome came close. In 200, Africanus was not even considered for the command in Macedonia as most feared that the defeat of Philip at his hands would give him the power to make changes in the state.⁹

Though "factions" or "groups" changed and mixed, Scipio had definite designs for Roman policy and he necessarily kept a large group of supporters around him. He clearly affected elections, since friends and relatives held praetorships and consulships year after year, in order to continue his influence in policy decisions.¹⁰ In addition, he gained for his brother Lucius the province of Greece, so that he might face the threat of Antiochus. Scipio achieved this for Lucius because he promised the people he would serve as legate (and it increased his own *auctoritas*). The people voted the province to the Scipios unanimously (Livy 37.1.7-10). Finally, if the anecdote can be believed, Scipio used his prestige to save his brother Lucius from accusations of embezzlement.

He tore apart the account books of the Asian campaign in front of the Senate. Then, he delivered a speech about the 2,500 talents from the war deposited into the treasury and the services he had rendered to his country versus the 500 talents his brother had supposedly taken (Livy 38.35). Although his actions only postponed further accusations, they demonstrated the power he wielded.

Africanus had saved his brother, but only for a time. The show of *auctoritas* had opened Scipio to accusations and his long time enemy, Cato the Elder, soon pressed the attack. Without going into detail, Cato accused Scipio of entering into treasonous negotiations with the Seleucid king Antiochus. The onslaught proved too strong to withstand, but Scipio extricated himself from conviction by reminding the people of his past services. However, his political life had been terminated and he retired to Liternum where he died in 183.¹¹

The preceding has been a brief encapsulation of the actions of Scipio. Several times in his career, Scipio had challenged the limitations of wielding power. Examples include trying to gain Macedonia as a province in 194; using his name to save his brother; negotiating privately with Antiochus as a legate with no *imperium*, then saving himself with his own name. These examples serve as comparative material for the career of Flaminius. The actions of Flaminius were not unique, but he had a model in Scipio, who used his *auctoritas* to reach for greatness, resulting in a backlash against him by his fellows.

Scipio's ambition to be great provides a splendid illustration of the connection between imperialism and aristocratic competition. The desire, and in truth, the necessity

to achieve more to stay at the top forced men like Scipio to expand Roman authority. Their competitive nature infected the senate as well, as all were *nobiles*. So Rome pushed her influence further, until the necessity of being greater forced a man to begin to step outside the boundaries of lawful authority. The new overseas commands contributed to this by stationing a man far from his *patres* and leaving *him* to make decisions alone. Though he may have had experienced legates, they had no *imperium* to force the commander not to act.

Parallels can be seen in the careers of Flaminius as he served as a military tribune under Marcellus in 208 (Plut. *Flam.* 1.3-4). By 206, he had likely held the magistracy of quaestor and served under his uncle at Tarentum. His uncle died in 206 or 205, and due to a lack of commanders, Flaminius took over the position of governor with propraetorian *imperium*.¹² Once again, because of a manpower shortage, Flaminius continued at this post until 202 in possession of full *imperium*.¹³ For up to four years, Flaminius enjoyed the experience of total control, a position that fell to him at the age of twenty-five, after only a quaestorship, which was not even a curule magistracy. Normally, men had to go through a series of offices, each with an increasingly greater measure of prestige and power. Only older men who had acquired a large degree of *dignitas* and experience were traditionally eligible for magistracies invested with *imperium*.¹⁴ As a naturally ambitious young man¹⁵, Flaminius must have seen new possibilities with the ascension of Scipio, his senior by only a few years.

At the age of 25 Scipio had held *imperium*, and at 30, had become consul without holding an office higher than the aedileship. Many Romans probably viewed Scipio's

circumstances as a fluke of the war, or as divine providence.¹⁶ Scipio had reached the pinnacle of achievement, but others had found a way around the system as well. For example, Licinius Crassus had held the consulship in 205 with Scipio, and was the same age. In addition, Crassus had become Pontifex Maximus in 212 at the age of 23, and in 210, had become censor without ever having been consul (Livy 27.6.17). As has already been stated, the great losses brought upon Rome by the Carthaginians forced changes and exceptions to be made in political and military appointments, in order to fight the war effectively. Men like Crassus and Scipio benefited from these conditions.

Flaminius found his career profiting from the wartime circumstances as well. He had only held the lowest of offices, and yet went on to hold authority over a major city, even exercising *imperium*. Surely Flaminius saw the possibilities and what the future might hold for him. Why not try to rise to the top quickly? At this point, the only consequences for those who had done so appeared to be glory and renown.

Plutarch cites Flaminius as being an extraordinary administrator and military commander (Plut. *Flam.* 1.3-4). After the Hannibalic War had concluded, the Senate chose Flaminius – due to his previous good service – as one member of two separate commissions delegated to settle colonists and soldiers. First, he served on a ten-man commission assigned to settle Scipio's veterans in southern Italy. Next, he led a three-man commission, with Gaius Varro and Publius Cornelius Scipio being his juniors, to settle people in the area of Venusia, as well as in the cities of Narnia and Cossa (Plut. *Flam.* 1.4; Livy 31.49.5-6).

Plutarch said that these prestigious assignments inspired him to reach for greater places, despite his lack of normal prerequisite offices (*Flam.* 2.1). Plutarch evaluated Flamininus correctly for the most part, but these land commission assignments just made him more eager to try for the consulship. Actually, Flamininus had experienced first hand the changes in Roman policy concerning magistracies. He knew a competent man did not have to follow the normal path to become a great man; a little experience, the right circumstances, and luck might make him another Scipio Africanus.

Flamininus stood for the consulship in the year 198. The Second Macedonian War had been going on since 200. Little, however, had been accomplished by either Galba in 200 or by Villius in 199. Flamininus' candidacy provoked two tribunes, Marcus Fulvius and Manius Curius, to threaten to veto his application to the office. They asserted that Flamininus lacked the qualifications to be a consul: he was too young, had not held any curule offices, and was denigrating the *cursus honorum* itself. A debate ensued in the *comitia centuriata*, and when referred back to the senators, they decided to have the people vote on the matter. Manius and Marcus agreed to stand down and await the verdict of the people. The people returned the 29-year-old Flamininus as consul (Livy 32.7.8-13; Plut. *Flam.* 2).

A major point of dissension among scholars remains whether the Senate gave the province of Macedonia to Flamininus, or if he simply drew it by lot. The theory promulgated by both Badian and Scullard holds that the Senate handpicked Flamininus to succeed Villius in Macedonia. This interpretation of Flamininus posits that he held a large degree of diplomatic expertise concerning Hellas and that the majority of the Senate

knew about it, but the fact that the Senate did not appoint him any earlier and, more importantly, that little evidence remains to support this conclusion discredits their argument. The reasoning behind this hypothesis, however, is that the war was not going as the Senate had planned. Both Villius, and Galba before him, had proven unable to establish a believable propaganda campaign with the Greek allies or the Macedonian people. At the outset of the war, a council of the Aetolians met to determine whether to continue their treaty with Philip or to join in the effort against him. Galba sent Lucius Furius Purpurio to argue the case of the Romans. He failed to convince the Aetolians, who let the matter hang in the balance, obviously waiting for more decisive action to determine which side to join (Livy 31.31-32). Galba had been especially harsh in his treatment of the defeated, using terror to gain results, but this tactic had failed.¹⁷ Flamininus had spent four years in Tarentum, a mostly Greek city, learning and dealing with the Greek mindset. He had proven to be an excellent governor, and Rome needed someone with diplomatic skills to keep the Greeks on their side against Philip.¹⁸

In the field, neither Galba nor Villius had proven overly successful. At both Athacus and Ottolobum, Galba had experienced mild success against Philip, but none of the results proved decisive (Livy 31.34.5-37). Villius never even had a chance to engage Philip before the arrival of Flamininus (Livy 32.6.5-7). Plutarch claimed Flamininus had great military skills in addition to his political ones, all the more reason for him to replace Villius.

Livy (32.8.4) and Plutarch (*Flam.* 2.2) both wrote that Flamininus and Pactus drew lots, and Flamininus ended up with Macedonia. However, Badian and others assert

instead that Flaminius was “selected” to take the position in Macedonia. Paetus had no military experience or experience with Greeks, and obviously lacked the qualities necessary to lead a successful campaign against Philip. Badian argues that Galba, an “Eastern expert,” received Macedonia in the same way in 199.¹⁹ Livy and Plutarch both mentioned the drawing of lots, even though the Senate had offered the two an opportunity to decide the matter between themselves. Badian takes the argument a step further by citing the practice of false allotment; the ceremony was fixed so Flaminius would win. He says the ceremony was held to gain the sanction of the gods instead of simply having the two candidates choose their provinces.²⁰

Arthur Eckstein argues against this commonly held view that Flaminius had the Macedonian command handed to him. He cites several examples where less qualified men succeeded to a command by lot against a more qualified candidate. Little evidence exists that demonstrates any fixing of allotments for the more qualified took place. The evidence that does remain for fixing lots comes from the time of Cicero, and is thus late.²¹ In addition, though Philip had proven to be a proficient and wily opponent, he did not represent the same kind of threat as Hannibal, or even the Gauls. The Macedonian war had merely stalled. No invasion from the East seemed imminent, and there had been no great loss of Roman life.

Eckstein rightly notes that the tribunes objected to Flaminius’ candidature because he was not a proven man. When Africanus had stood for the consulship, he had defeated the best Carthaginian generals on several occasions, managed an army, and conducted affairs in the province of Spain. Flaminius had only been a garrison

commander. Plutarch said that Flaminius had shown great skill as a military commander, but no details exist.²² Certainly, if Flaminius had done something extraordinary, Livy would not have failed to note it. It seems likely that he did not have any experience commanding an army in the field or taking part in any large battles as a general before crossing over to face Philip. There is not much reason why he would be preferred to Paetus, as all Roman men go through military training. Knowledge of the military system and how to command were available to all. He would not have been in the field alone, but would have been accompanied by experienced legates to advise him.

Most importantly, the two men rejected the chance to decide the division of the provinces between themselves (Livy 32.8.1-4). Competition is the reason. Though not as militarily experienced as Flaminius, Paetus surely foresaw the prospect to become the man who won the Second Macedonian War. Others had failed to defeat Philip in a decisive manner, and only *gloria* could ensue from a victory over the Macedonians. Allowing Flaminius to go would only damage Paetus' position in Roman society, whereas not choosing the correct lot simply meant that the gods had favored Flaminius on this occasion.

Once the province of Macedonia had fallen to Flaminius, he made preparations for taking charge of the campaign. Intelligently, Flaminius levied the 3,000 Roman infantrymen allotted to him by the Senate from the veterans of Scipio Africanus (Plut. *Flam.* 3.3; Livy 32.8.1-3). Eventually Scipio and Flaminius would become rivals during Flaminius' service in the East, but scholars have attempted to define their relationship prior to Flaminius' success, to explain the use of Scipio's veterans.

Richard Haywood portrays them as friends and claimed that Flaminius' election came about largely due to the support of Scipio, the main link between them being their philhellenism. Haywood also cites Flaminius as a member of the Scipionic veteran settlement commissions (Plut. *Flam.* 1.4; Livy 31.49.5-6) and sees his drafting of Scipionic veterans for his upcoming campaign (Plut. *Flam.* 3.3; Livy 32.8.1-3) as support for their friendship.²³ Scullard does not go so far as Haywood, but does view Scipio as a possible supporter or at least, as friendly towards Flaminius. He, too, cites the manpower recruitment as evidence, and sees philhellenism as common ground between them, but he finds them approaching it in different ways.²⁴ Badian finds no definite connection between them; they were neither friends nor enemies, though Badian agrees with Scullard in terms of the Scipio allowing Flaminius to recruit his veterans.²⁵ A. H. McDonald differs from the others seeing them as rivals. He finds no evidence to support Scipionic aid in the election of Flaminius or any subsequent actions.²⁶

All of these historians bring out good arguments, but Badian seems most convincing. As has been mentioned previously, Scipio possessed too much *auctoritas* and inspired too much *invidia* to garner him the appointment in the East. Flaminius was largely an unknown quality, and a victory over Philip was uncertain at best. Flaminius was about eight years younger than Scipio, and the possibility exists of Flaminius being related to the Fabii, a *gens* that had feuded with the Scipios at times,²⁷ which would preclude the likelihood of any strong, friendly association between them. Philhellenism guaranteed nothing; similar cultural appreciation does not have to include close political ties. So Scipio and Flaminius held neither friendship nor enmity toward one another.

The source evidence, however, centers on the drafting of Spanish and African veterans by Flaminius. Examining this problem logically, it only makes sense that Flaminius would recruit the victors of many a Carthaginian battle. The goal, after all, was to win the war. Scipio could not have refused him. Villius had already commanded 2,000 Scipionic veterans in Macedonia, and he cannot be numbered among the supporters of Scipio.²⁸ The veterans themselves must be considered as well. The Hannibalic War had decimated large tracts of farmland, leaving some veterans without a stable livelihood. The chance to take up the *gladius* and *scutum* offered them regular pay and the chance for booty. Others simply remained soldiers and were looking for a new campaign. Scipio would only have damaged his reputation among his former soldiers by trying to prevent them from enlisting with Flaminius. Individual loyalty to commanders had always existed, but the transference of allegiance from Rome to the general belongs to the Marian reforms almost a hundred years later.²⁹ Flaminius recruited from the Scipionic veterans because they were the best warriors available and he wanted a strong core in his forces.

For a time, bad omens detained Flaminius and Paetus in Rome until they had performed the necessary rituals to placate the gods (Livy 32.9). The problem of Flaminius dealing with religious rites before crossing over to Macedonia will be dealt with in the material concerning his prorogation in 198.

Flaminius had taken into account the history of the proceeding consuls of Macedonia, and determined that they had squandered valuable time in Rome instead of rushing over to prosecute the war. Flaminius relinquished the normal privileges and

honors due to a newly elected consul so as to reach Macedonia with more time to face the Macedonians (Plut. *Flam.* 3.4). With 8,000 infantry and 800 cavalry, Flaminius crossed over to Brundisium and moved inland, relieving Villius earlier than expected (Livy 32.9.6-8; Plut. *Flam.* 3.4).

The early careers of Scipio and Flaminius provide an important study of the effects the Hannibalic War had on Roman politics. Ambition was a requisite trait for the *nobiles* to possess if they wanted to advance up the *cursus honorum*, but men like Scipio and Flaminius had an excess of it. The massive devastation of the Hannibalic War, in conjunction with the fact that traditions, such as age requirements to hold certain offices, lacked strict guidelines allowed for both men to “bend the rules” and rapidly ascend the *cursus honorum*. The deaths of veteran officers provided unexpected commands for both men and allowed them to take up a positions of authority unusual for young men. Each situation gave them confidence and valuable experience, which supplied an edge in the diminished field of competitors contending for the consulship. The Hannibalic War had made the boundaries to political power more permeable than before, thus allowing a variety of men previously considered ineligible to cross them. The similarities between Scipio and Flaminius continued beyond their early careers and will be noted in the following chapters.

CHAPTER ONE ENDNOTES

1. Polyb. 18.12.5; Plut. *Flam.* 2.2; Livy 33.33.3; E. Badian, "The Family and Early Career of T. Quinctius Flaminius," *JRS* 61 (1971) 102-8.
2. H. H. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 56-7, 67-8.
3. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 8-30.
4. P. A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 430-445.
5. Brunt, 450-70.
6. Fabius Maximus was consul twice in 209 and 214 (and dictator once in 217). Marcellus was consul three times in 214, 210 and 208.
7. New Carthage, Livy 26.44-46; Baecula, Polyb. 10.1215; Livy 27.18; Polyb. 10.39; Ilipa, Livy 28.14-15; Polyb. 11.22-24.
8. H. H. Scullard, *Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), 167. The Spanish also struck coins with his image. These actions precede Flaminius, but definitely indicate that Scipio was working to make himself greater and acquire *clientela*.
13. Scullard, *Politics*, 99.
14. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 75-127. The following is a brief list of some of the Scipionic supporters who attained office: L. Furius Purpureo (pr. 200, cos. 196), C. Sergius Planeus (pr. 200), M. Sergius Silus (pr. 197), C. Cornelius Cethegus (cos. 197), T. Sempronius Longus (cos. 194), and Manius Atilius Glabrio (cos. 191).
15. Scullard, *Scipio*, 210-224.

16. Plut. *Flam.* 1.3-4; E. Badian, "Titus Quinctius Flaminius: Philhellenism and Realpolitik," in *Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple Second Series, 1966-1970*, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press for University of Cincinnati, 1973), 298.

17. Livy 29.13.6; E. Badian, "The Family and Early Career of T. Quinctius Flaminius." *JRS* 61 (1971), 109.

18. Adkins, 41-43.

15. In his *Life of Flaminius*, Plutarch comments several times on Flaminius' ambition being his motivation to become great (1.2; 2.1; 7.1-2; 9.4; 13.2-3; 20.1). This is the theme of Plutarch's biography.

16. Richard Mansfield Haywood, *Studies on Scipio Africanus*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1933), 21-25.

17. Livy illustrates several examples: Romans burned granaries, fired buildings and slaughtered people at Chalcis in 200 (31.23.5-9); soldiers butchered the men and razed the town of Antipatrea (31.27.3-8), sacked Aegina (Polyb. 9.42.5-8) and then sacked Dyme (Livy 32.22.10; App. *Mac.* 7; Paus. 7.17.5).

18. Scullard, *Politics*, 100-02.

19. Badian, "Philhellenism," 300-2.

20. Badian, "Philhellenism," 300-2.

21. A. M. Eckstein, "Titus Quinctius Flaminius and the Campaign Against Philip in 198 B.C.," *Phoenix* 30 (1976), 120-6.

22. Eckstein, 125. Though Flaminius held *imperium*, Plutarch's comment suggests little more than skirmishing at best (*Flam.* 1.3).

23. Haywood, 73-79.

24. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 99, n.1; *Africanus*, 191-4.
25. Badian, "Philhellenism," 299-300.
26. McDonald, 155.
27. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 99.
28. Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 96.
29. Livy 31.49.5-6. It is reasonable to assume that Flamininus had a good name among the Scipionic veterans for having settled some of them in 199.

CHAPTER TWO

After arriving in the Greek World in 198, Flaminius would remain there until 194 before returning to Rome and in those five years, he distinguished himself like no other of his era, with the exception of Scipio himself. Flaminius' aspiration for *gloria* influenced the military and political strategies he utilized to win the war. He consistently toiled to affect a martial solution for the conflict. His focus on reaping a decisive victory in the field gives testimony to his being a product of the militant culture of the *nobilitas*. He did not endeavor to settle the campaign peacefully because he feared losing the accolades of war and power. When necessary, though, he openly employed diplomacy to retain his command and insure Greek support, or at least, to keep the Hellenes inactive. He worked as both an agent of imperialism while exploring the limits of his personal authority.

After taking command of the Roman forces at the Aous River, Flaminius did not wish to waste time, but intended to force Philip into a pitched battle. Flaminius knew that the only way to become a truly great man would require him to defeat the Macedonians decisively in the field. But he faced an enemy defensively situated in formidable terrain.

Prior to the arrival of Flaminius, Philip had begun to feel the winds of change blowing against him. The Aetolians and Achaeans were waffling as remaining allies, and he feared his own Macedonians might turn against him if things did not improve. Philip decided to prevent the Romans from entering Macedonia by garrisoning the passes into his kingdom. Reconnoitering the area, he decided upon a site near the Aous River as the

best spot to set up a headquarters (Livy 32.5.1-10). The Aous flowed fast through a narrow gorge between high mountains on either side of the river (Livy 32.5.11; Plut. *Flam.* 3.4-5), and the Macedonians took up positions in the foothills to both sides of the defile. Only a small detachment stood guard where the topography proved especially difficult to pass, but in the more accessible locations, the soldiers constructed defensive works and assembled artillery (Livy 32.5.12-13).

The previous consul, Villius, had accomplished nothing against Philip's fortifications, and Flaminius eagerly called a council to determine the best way to force Philip into battle. Filled with eagerness and driven by ambition, Flaminius unwisely decided to attack Philip where he had dug in.¹ He tried on several occasions to dislodge the Macedonians from their positions, but only succeeded in racking up the casualty count. The Macedonians held a virtually impregnable spot against frontal assaults.² After forty days without progress (Livy 32.10.1), Philip, under pressure of an Epirote embassy, contacted the Romans to set up a peace conference.

Flaminius met with Philip to discuss the terms of the peace, and demanded that the Macedonians remove garrisons from cities, restore recoverable property to people of the areas he had devastated and then be evaluated by a selected board. Philip replied that cities he had captured would be released, but some of the cities belonged to Macedonia because of hereditary and legal possession and were not subject to the consul's demands. Philip agreed to arbitration for unrecoverable property, but only by states friendly to both Macedonia and Rome (Livy 32.10.1-5; Diod. 28.9.11). Flaminius answered that no arbiters were necessary and that Philip was obviously guilty of aggression in the conflict.

He declared Thessaly, a region under Macedonian control since the fourth century, should be the first state freed from Philip's sway. Incensed at Flaminius' demand, Philip dissolved the council (Livy 32.10.6-8; Diod. 28.9.11).

At a first look, Flaminius seemed to have failed where a possible compromise may have been made, but peace had never been the consul's intention. He essentially offered Philip a *rerum repetitio*, a quasi-legal device in which the enemy was offered terms that they would never agree to fulfill.³ Flaminius gave terms to Philip that he knew the king would not agree to because of their harshness and the strong position Philip held at that point in the conflict. Although much has been made of the Aous Declaration, Flaminius – whether he had some type of instructions from the Senate or not – intentionally sabotaged the summit in order to return the conflict to the field.⁴ The Senate would not have granted a triumph to Flaminius for a peace treaty with Macedon. Time still remained to find a military solution to the Second Macedonian War, and Flaminius refused to give in so easily. He wanted a victory on the battlefield, not at the conference table.

More attempts to extricate the Macedonians failed, but fortune – and allies – saved Flaminius from his folly (Livy 32.10.9-12). An Epirote named Charopus sent a local shepherd to Flaminius; the man knew a trail that could lead a Roman force behind the Macedonians (Livy 32.11.1-3; Plut. *Flam.* 4.3). Though the shepherd was an unknown quantity who might possibly lead the Romans into a trap, Flaminius saw the opportunity to solve the puzzle of Philip's position. By circumventing the Macedonian pickets and using a surprise attack, Flaminius envisaged the decisive battle he longed to

fight. Without victory, Flaminius could not sate his ambition, and so decided to take the risk.

Flaminius led assaults against the Macedonian fortifications for two days as a feint. Then, he had a military tribune take 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry along the secret pathway by night. As a precaution, he shackled the shepherd. Flaminius waited for two days and then, on the third, he attacked (Livy 32.1-12.1; Plut. *Flam.* 4.3-4).

The consul brought up his army, divided it into three columns and sent them against the Macedonian ramparts. The Macedonians answered and sent their forces out to meet the Romans. As the battle raged, the Romans slowly pushed the Macedonians back up to their defensive works, but in doing this, they found themselves in a dangerous situation. Philip's troops began to rally. At this point the hidden Roman detachment gave their smoke signal, which at first appeared to be only the morning mist of the mountains until it thickened and darkened. The hard-pressed Romans revived themselves and counterattacked with great vigor. Then a shout from the height came down, and the second Roman force assaulted the Macedonians from the rear. A rout ensued as the Macedonian soldiers broke formation to flee. The rough terrain prevented the Roman cavalry from pursuing and allowed the majority of the enemy, including Philip, to escape. The Macedonian casualties stood at 2,000. No ancient source provides a figure for the Roman side.⁵

Flaminius had taken a large risk in sending the detachment into the hills hoping that they would be in position to turn the battle for the Roman side. Yet, the consul knew that he had a limited amount of time to force Philip into battle. Unfortunately, the Battle

of Aous River did not become the decisive battle that Flaminius had anticipated. Topography proved to be the consul's undoing.

Philip fled into Thessaly and burned many towns along the way to keep their supplies out of Roman hands (Livy 32.13.1-9). Yet the Macedonian king had more problems as the Aetolians and the Athamanes had begun to capture areas in Thessaly, since they assumed Philip was too occupied with the Romans to march against them (Livy 32.13.10-15). Flaminius took advantage of these new players on the scene by detaching some troops to help the Athamanes storm, and finally take, the vitally situated fort of Gomphi in Thessaly (Livy 32.14.1-3).

The Roman failure to end the war at the Aous River, and Philip's subsequent escape, left Flaminius little choice but to start considering other options in case he did not succeed in bringing the Macedonians to battle again. Some think that Flaminius' diplomatic skills were a strong reason for his gaining the consulship in the first place, but negotiating in war differed greatly from daily governing in Tarentum. The sources give no specifics about Flaminius' actions as a diplomat or general in southern Italy.⁶ Certainly, he had never commanded an army before, and now found many obstacles before him.

Although his foremost priority was to defeat Philip in a decisive battle, Flaminius understood that with the campaigning season growing short, he might need to resort to diplomatic means to conclude the war. Signing a treaty with Philip before the new consuls took office would be prestigious, possibly even gain him an *ovatio*.⁷ That would be better than simply chasing after Philip and accomplishing nothing. But

Flaminius yearned for *gloria* and *auctoritas*, and he knew that he had only this one chance to win the war, or the Senate would appoint someone else to do it instead.

He had to pursue Philip, but first he needed to secure his rear and establish safe supply lines. Flaminius marched into Epirus as he chased after Philip, and he knew this region would become his rear flank as the hunt continued. Subduing the area might take months that Flaminius did not have to waste, so he ordered his troops to refrain from plundering in order to gain Epirote confidence, and after he entered the country, the Epirotes hurriedly fulfilled his requests and obeyed orders.⁸ Flaminius tactfully negotiated with them, procuring both their allegiance and some auxiliary troops as well (Livy 32.15.4-8). This took little time, and soon the Romans set out after Philip by the route previously protected at Gomphi.⁹

The genesis of Flaminius the philhellene is often associated with this crossroads in his career, but this is a modern scholarly construct, ill supported by the evidence. In this older view he is seen as an excellent diplomat whose love of Greek culture allowed him to finish the war and free the Greeks from the tyrannical designs of Philip, however, Flaminius dealt with the Greeks too meekly, and this led to the future problems between Greece and Rome.¹⁰ Yet this antiquated model of Flaminius' motives fails under close scrutiny. As both Badian and Gruen have noted, Flaminius did not fit this early modern perception.¹¹

Flaminius did speak Greek (Polyb. 18.1, 18.4-9, 18.36-37; Plut. *Flam.* 5.5, 6.1-3), though Badian debated his actual fluency,¹² and he had spent time in Tarentum governing a Greek population where he became exposed first hand to their culture. He

jested with Philip and other Greeks during his time in Hellas. Yet, the sources reveal no evidence that he was enamored with philosophy, art, theater or anything else culturally Greek. Language can be a useful tool and does not necessitate a love of the culture. In Plutarch's *Lives* (*Flam.* 12.5-8), Flaminius inscribed some silver bucklers at Delphi and a golden wreath to Apollo to show his appreciation of liberating Greece, yet the inscriptions themselves focus on the gift-giver – Flaminius – more than the gift itself. In the dedication to Apollo, Flaminius identifies himself as “great leader of the children of Aeneas” and “god-like.” Nothing shows an appreciation for Greek culture. (These words ring of Hellenistic propaganda.)

Occasions occurred when he showed himself to be as cruel as Galba: the decimation of Phaloria (Livy 32.15.2-4), the sack of Elatia (Livy 32.24) and the plundering of a golden statue of Zeus for display in Rome (Cic. *Verr.* 2.4.129). These provide excellent examples of Flaminius' “sentimentalism.” In negotiations with Philip, Flaminius readily offered terms against the wishes of the Greeks, all for the betterment of Rome and himself (Livy 32.35; Polyb. 18.8). Flaminius only worried about satisfying the concerns of the Greeks when those concerns influenced his plans, not because of some special appreciation for them.

Truly, Flaminius was a typical example of Roman aristocracy and a vector for Roman imperialism. He had immense ambition, and he wanted renown and power in Rome; being “sentimental” for the concerns of the Greeks would not get him these things. Gruen puts it well, “The divide stood not only between individual inclination and collective policy, but between sentiment and behavior”.¹³ Even if Flaminius had

admired Greek culture (and there is no evidence in the sources for it), that admiration could not be allowed to get in the way of his ambitions. Nor would the Senate or the Roman people permit a consul to follow a policy that did not favor perceived Roman interests,¹⁴ even if Flaminius would have desired to do so. Philhellenism existed in Rome, but it only included a small group of the upper class. Other senators and *equites* – not to mention the average Roman – derided Hellenism as weak, alien, and morally corrupt. Cato openly attacked the invasion of Greek culture into Rome,¹⁵ and in 186, the Senate outlawed the Bacchanalian cult because they viewed it as subversive.¹⁶ Philhellenism may have been practiced, but it was far from a popular movement. Roman philhellenes had to be careful not to display their fondness for things Greek too prominently, or else risk harming their *dignitas*.¹⁷

Some evidence does exist that might portray Flaminius as a philhellene: he composed inscriptions in Greek, conversed and joked with Philip and the allies in their own tongue, and kept art treasures he captured in war. Whether this actually proves he was a philhellene or not matters little as his actions throughout his command in Greece point to a man serving the imperialistic ambitions of himself and his own country. At no time did Flaminius trade Roman interests for Greek.

As Flaminius entered Thessaly, he did not engage in diplomacy to settle matters as he had in Epirus. He had time yet, and so opted for battle instead. Laying siege to Phaloria, he destroyed it, and this example caused other Thessalian towns to surrender, creating a secure supply line from the Ambracian Gulf to the pass at Gomphi (Livy 32.15.5-9). Next, he moved on to Atrax.

As Eckstein has shown, and the evidence makes clear, Flaminius still pursued his goal with force, not politics.¹⁸ It is true that he had used diplomacy to settle Epirus, but in that case time had become a factor. In addition, Epirus had poor grain production, and thus did not represent a good source of food. Although they held a pro-Macedonian stance, they remained officially neutral. Rome tended to handle neutral states by diplomatic means rather than military ones.¹⁹ As he laid siege to Atrax, Flaminius remained bent on securing a decisive victory on the battlefield in pursuit of *gloria*.

Atrax proved to be too big an obstacle for Flaminius to handle, however. Repeatedly, as soon as success seemed imminent, the Macedonian garrison would rally. Despite being furious and ashamed at this failure, time demanded that Flaminius end the siege (Livy 32.17.4-18.3). The legions needed winter quarters, and because of the necessity of supplying them by sea,²⁰ Flaminius moved south toward Anticyra in Phocis. Along the way he brought other *poleis* under Roman control, for security. Things seemed grim (Livy 32.18.1-9). The campaigning season was concluding and the consul was nowhere close to bringing the wily Macedonian king to battle. At this point, with a military solution fading as a probable option, Flaminius began to devise ways to achieve something definite before being superseded.

Though diplomacy always remained a tool for his use, and he had used it well in Epirus, Flaminius had otherwise gone out of his way to bring the Second Macedonian War to a close with arms. This was why he had decided to forego the route through upper and central Macedonia, instead opting to attack Philip's elevated and fortified position in the Aous Valley, and then issuing a *rerum repetitio* to quash any possibility of

a peaceful settlement. He had taken a chance on finding a secret route to the rear of Philip's position, and had ousted the king from his stronghold, but could not pursue him. He had given over Roman troops to the Athamanes to help sweep away the Macedonians, and had used force to bring parts of Thessaly under his control. The only time he had used diplomacy was in Epirus, and reasons have been given for his application of it. Atrax, though, showed the price of his failure at Aous. Force alone would no longer do.

Operations continued in Thessaly, as Roman legions besieged Elatia and the combined Roman-Rhodian and Pergammese fleet prepared to attack Corinth (Livy 32.18.9-19.1-4). Then an opportunity presented itself that allowed Flaminius to hope for a second chance.

The Achaean League represented the majority of the *poleis* in Greece and Cycliades, leader of a pro-Macedonian faction, had kept the league in support of Philip. Now Aristaenus, the pro-Roman president of the league, had ousted Cycliades. Via Lucius, Flaminius hastily sent ambassadors to the Achaeans, requesting that they join the Romans, who in turn would reunite Corinth with the league and free them from the Macedonian king's oppression. The situation was not so clean-cut for the Achaeans, though. Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, threatened the league with possible invasion, and Roman force frightened them. They might be unsure of Philip, but they owed him for acts of kindness. Thus, none of these options seemed attractive, but the Achaeans gave an audience to the Romans, Pergamenes, Rhodians, Macedonians, and Athenians at Sicyon. That way, they could decide what course of action to follow.

For an entire day the discussion raged with no outcomes but, on the second day, Aristaenus delivered a powerful speech that accused Philip of many things including failure to provide aid in 199 against Nabis as he had promised, allowing the Romans to attack his “allies” in Thessaly while running for home, and a series of murders at Messene (Livy 32.19.2-13). He continued by outlining the Romans’ position in the war as greatly superior to Philip’s. Rome did not need to ask for help from the Achaeans; they could simply take Achaea if they so wished, since she had control of the sea, as well as allies in the Rhodians and Pergamese. Nothing prevented them with making an alliance with Nabis to destroy the league entirely (Livy 32.21). The delegates reacted strongly to Aristaenus’ words, which caused an even five-to-five split among the council. Argument continued, but it resolved nothing.²¹

On the final day, the council proclaimed that a decision had to be reached, and it soon became clear that enough support existed for the Romans to win over the council. Pisas of Pellene had convinced his son, Memnon, to vote pro-Roman by threatening his life and begging him to preserve the existence of the Achaeans (Livy 32.22.4-9). And as they saw the momentum of the council against them, delegates from Megalopolis and Dymae left the council in disgust, since Philip had aided them in the past (Livy 32.22.9-12). With their departure, the council swung to the Roman side and approved the alliance with Rome and her allies. Then the Achaeans reinforced the Roman troops at Corinth (Livy 32.23.1-3).

Much has been made of the Achaean League joining the Romans. Some historians, notably Badian and Wood, have presented the alliance as part of Flamininus’

policy in Greece.²² Besides the necessity of securing Epirus, Flaminius had not moved to make any alliances or form diplomatic relations with the Greeks. He wanted to end the war militarily, not diplomatically. However, with time against him, the consul saw that other means had to be put into play.

Gaining the support of the Achaeans had not been a sure thing, but when it did occur, Flaminius accomplished two things. First, he had a better chance to end the war, as Philip now had fewer followers on whom to call for help against a growing coalition of Roman allies, and his thoughts must have turned naturally to a settlement.²³ Second, with the Achaean League as an ally, Flaminius had the support of the greater part of Greece behind him. (This eliminated the possible danger that he might have to fight on both northern and southern fronts.)

He continued with his military strategy in the field, but with the knowledge that it would be extremely difficult to bring Philip to battle before the Senate found a possible replacement for him. Flaminius had hoped to accomplish enough to be prorogued by the Senate.²⁴ Friends and relatives had been instructed to present his case to the senate when the allotment of provinces for 197 took place, as he did not want to lose his chance at greatness while it was still within his grasp (Livy 32.32.6-9). His *amici* in Rome could present the *patres* with solid evidence of his progress, which greatly exceeded that achieved by either Galba or Villius. He had defeated Philip decisively, although not conclusively, at Aous; he had befriended the Epirotes and set up a secure supply line from the sea; he had reduced many enemy towns by force; and he now had formed an

alliance with the largest and most powerful league in Greece. This new coalition gave him some pull in his plans for prorogation in Macedonia.²⁵

Elatia fell to Flaminius, but Philocles, Philip's general, brought reinforcements to Corinth and raised the coalition's siege. Philocles, who had learned that the people supported Philip, accepted an Argive offer to join the Macedonian side (Livy 32.23.4-25). Flaminius had made great progress in 198, but the year-end reverses put him into an uncertain position for the future.

Elections took place in Rome with Gaius Cornelius Cethegus and Quintus Minucius Rufus voted into the consulship for 197 B.C. These new consuls prepared to draw lots for the provinces of Italy (as there had been worrisome movements from the Celts) and Macedonia. Two tribunes, Lucius Opius and Quintus Fulvius, interceded with an objection to the drawing. The tribunes claimed that Flaminius had made great progress, and would have won the war by now if he had not been detained in Rome for months tending to sacred rites. Surely, with no shake up in command, Flaminius would finish the Macedonians by summertime (Livy 32.28.1-8).

This brings up an interesting problem. The tribunes had made a case for Flaminius' accomplishments as a reason to keep him in command, but also claimed that he had spent the greater part of the year dealing with religious duties.²⁶ Yet Livy, however, tells us that during the apportioning of provinces in 198, Flaminius was detained for only a short time as the consuls conducted one day of prayer and performed some sacrifices (32.9.1-5). They then hurried off to their provinces. Livy then mentions that Flaminius arrived to relieve Villius earlier than had been expected (Livy 32.9.1-6).

So Livy contradicts himself between chapter 9 and chapter 28, yet the tribunes may have used religion as a lever against Flaminius' replacement. He had spent time getting the favor of the gods, and his results testify to that. Now, there was no reason to interfere with success.

Fear of the veto and, likely, the possibility of divine disfavor moved the consuls to allow the Senate to decide the issue. The Senate declared that both consuls would take Italy as a province to deal with the Celts, while Flaminius would remain in Greece (Livy 32.28.4-10).

All sources claim the *amici* of Flaminius convinced the *patres* to keep Flaminius in command,²⁷ but other factors may have contributed to the decision. First, senatorial fear of a large Celtic attack made it easier to assign both consuls to handle the problem and leave Macedon to the man already there. Lack of success had been brought on by constant changes in command, so it was better to keep the experienced and successful general in the area he knew.²⁸

Once again, though, circumstance favored Flaminius. The people of Opus, in Locris, had tried to oust the Macedonian garrison, but the soldiers had blockaded themselves into the citadel. The poorer members of Opus called upon the Aetolians for help, while the more affluent summoned the Romans. Neither side was able to elicit surrender from the Macedonians. Before the Romans began besieging the citadel, a messenger from Philip arrived to propose a peace conference (Livy 32.32.1-6; Plut. *Flam.* 5.4). Flaminius granted the conference with some reservation, not knowing whether he

would be prorogued. But, the meeting provided him with a unique opportunity to chart his success.

Flaminius knew that a treaty had to be confirmed by the Senate before it became binding, thus, if Philip – who at this point seemed anxious for an end to Roman involvement – could be convinced that a reasonable treaty would be granted to him, then it gave Flaminius the chance to orchestrate affairs in one of two directions. If the Senate had chosen one of the new consuls to replace Flaminius, then his *amici* and agents would push for the ratification of the treaty. Once ratified Flaminius would then be given credit for concluding the war on favorable terms toward Rome. On the other hand, if the *patres* prorogued him, the *amici* were to sabotage the peace talks in Rome and have war restarted.²⁹

The conference took place at the Malian Gulf near Nicaea. On the first day of the meeting, the coalition demanded much from Philip. Flaminius demanded that Philip remove his garrisons from all Greek cities, return any captives of Romans allies, restore Illyria to Rome, and return certain cities to King Ptolemy of Egypt. Attalus wanted ships and prisoners from the battle of Chios returned, and the restoration of the Temple of Venus. The Rhodians wanted the region of Peraea and the evacuation of garrisons in Iasus, Bargyliae, Euromenses, Sestus and Abydus. They also demanded that Perinthus be returned to the Byzantines, and all ports in Asia to be free, whether or not Philip controlled them. The Achaeans wanted Corinth and Argos returned to the league, and the Aetolians reiterated the Roman demands and added that they wanted all former possessions returned to them (Livy 32.33.3-11; Polyb. 18.1.12-2.6).

The demands were sweeping, and Philip said he would only agree to some of them, such as returning Peraea to Rhodes, Argos to the Achaeans and ships and men to Attalus. He brushed off the other points and intimated that he wanted to speak to Flamininus about them. The day ended with nothing resolved (Polyb. 18.4.4-7.7; Livy 32.34).

The conference was scheduled to begin again in the morning, but just before sundown Philip requested a private meeting with Flamininus. The consul granted the meeting reluctantly. After a while, the new terms were delivered to the allies. Rome regained Illyria, Argos and Corinth were returned to the Achaeans, Peraea went back to Rhodes, the ships and men, and the orchard for the temple of Venus were rewarded to Attalus, while Pharsalus and Larisa were given to the Aetolians. This news upset all the allies, and the second day ended with nothing accomplished (Livy 32.35; Polyb. 18.8).

On the third day, Philip requested that the matter be referred to the Roman senate to decide. The allies feared that Philip was seeking a delaying tactic in order to build up forces, but agreed to a two-month truce if the Macedonian garrisons at Locris and Phocis were withdrawn. Flamininus sent his own embassy made up of Appius Claudius, Quintus Fulvius, Quintus Fabius and the Greek Amynder, who had helped free Gomphi (Livy 32.36; Polyb. 18.9.6-10.11). Flamininus knew Amynder would support whatever his friends directed (Polyb. 18.10.5-8).

Flamininus had achieved his goal. He had lured Philip into attempting arbitration in Rome. Many issues turn on this event and those following. One of the major questions concerns the change in Flamininus' position from the first day to the second.

His terms on the first day closely resembled those at Aous. They were harsh and all encompassing; Philip must free all of the Greek cities. But on the second day, after their private conference without any allied representatives present, Flaminius delivered extremely lenient terms. This massive shift in position has understandably attracted much attention from scholars.

But Flaminius had simply changed his position in order to give himself the chance to end or continue the war. Absolute freedom of Greece was not a policy that bound him in his negotiations.³⁰ Obviously, the consul negotiated terms that would be agreeable to the Senate, or else he would not have announced them. If the Senate refused the terms, hypothesizing that they, in truth, wanted all of Greece free, the renewal of combat did not guarantee Flaminius prorogation (as many other ambitious men could take his place).

When embassies arrived in Rome, it was discovered that Flaminius had been prorogued.³¹ The Greek allies spoke first and focused on geography. The envoys made it clear that if Philip held Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth in Achaea, then Greece would remain under the Macedonian king's power. Philip had called the cities the "Three Fetters." The speeches of the Greek ambassadors had a strong impact on the Senate (Livy 32.37.1-4; Polyb. 18.11.1-13). When the Macedonian representatives began giving their argument, the Senators interrupted to ask if Macedon was prepared to evacuate the "Three Fetters?" The envoys replied that they had no instructions concerning the Fetters, and the Senate simply dismissed them without

hearing any more, or granting a peace.³² Once the Greek envoys had left, the Senate gave Flamininus complete discretion to end the war.

Flamininus had played a very serious game with his allies and Philip. The content of their private meeting is lost to history, but it remains logical to assume that he duped Philip. Several reasons will serve to illustrate the point. First, Philip suggested arbitration to the Senate. If he had believed there was a good chance he would not get at least some of what he had been promised, then he would not have agreed to arbitration in the first place.³³ Second, the “Three Fetters” were not part of the deal. Whether Flamininus promised Philip that the Fetters would not be a topic of arbitration, or that they never even discussed them, is impossible to prove, and irrelevant.³⁴ What matters is Flamininus had let Philip believe they were not an issue. Thus, the Three Fetters became the instrument of disruption for his followers to make use of in Rome, if needed. In the end, circumstances had favored Flamininus, and he was able to continue the war.

Erich Gruen presents another viewpoint on the controversy. He saw the Greek allies’ demands and schemes as a difficulty that Flamininus had constantly to factor into his own plans. To Gruen, the Greeks were not mere pawns for Flamininus to use as he felt, but people trying to accomplish their own designs at the expense of the Romans and Macedonians.³⁵ He makes a good point, especially when it comes to Nicaea, where Flamininus had needed their support to show his progress to the Senate and thus keep his plans in motion. On the other hand, up to this point, Flamininus had only been diplomatic out of military necessity. He had made peace with Epirus for supply lines, and lent troops to the Amanthanaes to help capture Gomphi. His recent diplomacy had

been done out of a fear of being replaced, not because the Greeks' requests factored heavily into his plans.

When word reached Philip that the war would be decided on the battlefield, he gathered his forces and sent an offer to Nabis of Sparta to take control of Argos, in order to deal with the southern portion of Achaëa. Nabis had wanted the citizens to invite him to take their city, but when he discovered their contempt for him, he accepted Philip's offer, and by night, the Macedonians snuck the Spartans into Argos (Livy 32.38.1-7).

But Nabis had his own plans. With the large number of Greek *poleis* joining the Romans, he saw Philip's likelihood of victory dwindling. In an attempt to solidify Nabis' support, Philip had promised him the city if Rome should overcome Macedon. So, Philip decided to insure its loyalty. Upon taking possession of Argos, Nabis had levied enormous fines against the nobility, and any who failed to pay were tortured. Then he cancelled debts and redistributed land to the lower classes in order to gain the majority support (Livy 32.38.7-9).

Now with Argos under his control, Nabis double-crossed Philip and offered Flamininus his aid. The two met at Mycenica, near Argos. Flamininus – having been joined by his brother and Attalus – demanded auxiliaries from the Spartans and an end to the conflict with Achaëa. Nabis agreed to the first demand, but would only agree to a temporary armistice until the Macedonian war had concluded (Livy 32.39). Flamininus had never shown concern over the involvement of the Spartans, but with them turned against Philip, he gained two advantages. First, he did not have to worry about a relief force coming up from the south either to join Philip or to cut into his supply lines.

Second, Nabis' defection kept the Achaean allies focused on the task at hand rather than on affairs at home.

In the spring, Flamininus eagerly prepared to bring Philip to battle. First, though, he wanted to secure Boeotia, a region that had been previously undecided in their support. Along with Attalus and other allies, Flamininus approached the Boeotian capital of Thebes without any accompanying soldiers. Flamininus, however, had ordered 2,000 men to follow a mile behind. The hilly terrain of the area hid their presence, and the Thebans watched the Boeotian leader Antiphilius meet Flamininus outside the walls. Seeing no troops, the city defenses were lax. As the proconsul and Antiphilius neared Thebes, however, the *hastatii* rushed past them into the city. The Boeotians, believing their leader had betrayed the city to the Romans, did not mobilize in retaliation, and a council was held (Livy 33.1).

Attalus began the council, but collapsed during his speech.³⁶ Aristaenus replaced him, conveying the same message that he had to the Achaean League: Roman force must be heeded and better to support it than battle it. Flamininus himself then briefly discussed Roman loyalty to allies, and the fearful Boeotians unanimously voted to join the coalition (Livy 33.2; Plut. *Flam.* 6). Flamininus did not employ peaceable means to win over the Greeks; he used raw force to compel the Boeotians into an alliance. With their city in the hands of the coalition, the Thebans had no choice but to follow the Romans. Flamininus' real goal behind gaining the "confidence" of the Boeotians was to secure the remaining areas in his rear (Livy 33.2.9), not because he wanted them free from Macedonian oppression.

Flaminius now had virtually all of Greece in alliance, with the exception of some cities like Atrax that had resisted his sieges.

Cynoscephalae is often glossed over as an easy victory for the Romans, and that the outcome was never in doubt. In the mind of Flaminius, this sentiment may very well have been true, but in reality, the Roman victory was far from certain. Nonetheless, it was upon the outcome of this battle that the future of Flaminius turned.

After the failure of the embassy in Rome, Philip had few options. He had lost the support of Greece, and years of constant warfare forced him to bolster his ranks with sixteen-year-old boys (Livy 33.3.1-6). The Macedonian army amounted to 23,500 men and 2,000 cavalry.³⁷ Instead of returning to the hills, he decided to risk the outcome of the war on a single battle.³⁸ Philip's next goal was to find a suitable place in Thessaly to fight the Romans, whereas Flaminius simply wanted to do battle as soon as possible.

Flaminius moved north from Elatia to Heraclea where he asked the Aetolian council for aid; they mustered 6,000 infantry and 400 cavalry for the Romans. This brought the Roman army up to about 26,000 men.³⁹

Flaminius moved toward Phthiotic Thebes, near the Pagasean Gulf, hoping it would come over to his side. He sent a small force that was repulsed and almost destroyed, had a relief force not saved them, and Flaminius gave up on taking the city when he received word that Philip had entered Thessaly (Livy 33.5.1-5).

Both armies had encamped near Pherae; Philip to the north and Flaminius to the south. A brief and inconclusive cavalry skirmish took place. Each commander decided to move away from the area, as gardens and low walls predominated the area, not making

a desirable battleground. Philip headed southwest toward Scotussa, a city with many fields, to resupply his army. Flaminius anticipated this move, and hastened to reach the fields first, to burn them out.⁴⁰

Hills separated the adversaries, which caused them to lose sight of each other. They marched for three days, making camp without the other in sight. On the third day, the Romans had encamped near Thetideum and remained inside their walls because of a strong thunderstorm and thick fog. Philip had broken camp, but the fog proved to be too dense to find the road, so he made a fourth camp near the hills called Cynoscephalae. The king then sent a force to hold the summits of the hills. Although Flaminius kept the army within the camp, he sent out a reconnaissance force in an attempt to locate Philip (Livy 33.6-7.4; Polyb. 18.19-20).

The following description is a condensed version of the battle. The Roman scouting party discovered the Macedonians, despite the fog. Skirmishing took place as messengers rushed back to their respective camps. The Macedonians pushed back a Roman scouting force until reinforcements (mostly Aetolian) arrived from Flaminius, forcing the Macedonians to retreat to the hilltops. As the Romans advanced toward the summits, a Macedonian relief arrived, forcing the Romans to retreat to the base of the hills.

Flaminius led his army out in battle formation. He placed half the Romans and half the Greek allies on the left wing. On the right, he did the same, with the majority of the allies here being Aetolian, and stationed elephants in front of the entire line. Philip, who had sent out large foraging parties because he did not think a battle would occur,

rushed to recall troops and put them into formation. Flaminius led the left wing up the hill, while ordering the right to remain as it was. With half of the phalanx, Philip moved down the slopes to meet the Roman advance. The phalanx pushed the Romans backward, and seeing victory within his grasp, Philip had the phalanx reform to double depth to finish the Romans. As this went on, the remainder of the Macedonian phalanx formed at the top of the hill. Flaminius switched over to his right wing and ordered them to advance before the phalanx was fully organized. With elephants and cavalry leading the way, the Macedonian left broke and began to flee. Thus, the right wings of each army were dominating. Then the decisive moment came: an unknown Roman tribune within the Roman right – comprehending the entire situation – detached 20 maniples and sent them downhill into the rear of the Macedonian phalanx. Disorder followed, and a rout ensued. Philip fled with a small body of men. The total casualties for the battle were 8,000 dead, plus 5,000 captured on the Macedonian side and 1,000 dead on the Roman side.⁴¹

The victory had importance comparable to Zama, in terms of its long-lasting consequences to the growth of the Empire. In the aftermath of Cynoscephalae, Rome solidified a role in Eastern affairs until the Western Empire fell and the conquest placed Flaminius closer to his aim of being a great man. Flaminius had consistently pushed for a crucial battle to end the conflict as he needed a military solution to insure a triumph, and power that accompanied it. Nothing else could have fulfilled his ambition. From the outset, he had attempted to force combat on Philip, even chancing the attack on the well-fortified positions at Aous Valley. His strategy always favored resolution by arms. For

example, Flaminius besieged numerous towns such as Atrax, Gomphi, and Phaloria; he used a stealth attack to force the surrender of Thebes; he negotiated with the Epirots *only* to secure supply lines; and he deceived Philip to continue the war. He had taken numerous risks to secure *gloria* and *auctoritas* for himself, and although he had chosen an uncertain course, it gained him the desired end.

CHAPTER TWO ENDNOTES

1. Plut. *Flam.* 4.1; Livy 32.9.8-10. Once he reached the Aous Valley he attacked. Eckstein (“Flaminius,” 127-8) following Livy (32.9.6-11) says that at the council Flaminius called, upon relieving Villius of command, he and most others favored the strategy of going through the Dassaretii to Lynceus to reach the interior of Macedonia – most likely to assault Pella. Plutarch offers a more likely version. Flaminius recognized immediately the possible danger to his supply lines if the legions traveled through the mountainous terrain into the interior (*Flam.* 4.1). Plutarch and Livy both mention Flaminius’ fear that Philip would disappear into the forests and the campaigning season would be wasted. Another reason must have been the fear that Philip might be able to trap, ambush or flank them in unknown territory. Both Plutarch and Livy portray Flaminius as overly eager to begin the campaign. The new consul’s quick arrival in Macedon surprised Villius (Eckstein, “Flaminius,” 128) as Flaminius rushed over to Hellas to defeat Philip before his time ran out. Upon taking command of the Roman camp, and finding Philip and the entire Macedonian army before him, the decision to forego the roundabout stratagem must have been too appealing.

2. I follow the account in Plutarch (*Flam.* 4.2) rather than in Livy (32.9.6-11-10.1). Flaminius was eager and had hastened to his province (Livy 32.9.6-11), having even foregone the normal privileges and honors of his office to get to Macedonia with alacrity (Plut. *Flam.* 3.1-3). A determined man like Flaminius would not waste 40 days trying to decide a course of action; he would act. N. G. L. Hammond (“The Opening Campaigns and the Battle of Aoi Stena in the Second Macedonian War,” *JRS* 56 (1966) 52, n.37) disagrees, using the sentence in Livy (*diesque quadraginta sine ullo conatu sedentes in conspectu hostium absumpserant*) as evidence against sorties (32.10.1). Hammond also notes, however, that Plutarch does suggest constant fighting up until the conference with Philip and that Plutarch’s account seems more accurate.

3. Harris, 166-171.

4. Much of the scholarship involves examining Flaminius as an agent of the Senate, which gave the consul instructions dealing with Greek freedom and treaty terms. Badian hypothesizes that the Senate had developed a policy to create a Greek protectorate with Philip serving them as a client-prince. Badian wants to give Flaminius credit, with help from the Greek allies, as the progenitor of the policy slogan “freedom of the Greeks.” The policy was not mere propaganda, but directly reflected the core interest of Rome to bring Greece under their suzerainty.

He believes that Flaminius acted under direct orders from the senate (*Foreign Clientela*, 66-71). Walbank (*Philip V of Macedon*, Archon Books, 1967, 150), Frank (161, n. 29) and Gruen (101-103) all agree that Flaminius put forth the demands according to senatorial orders. Wood believes that Flaminius had instructions of some type, but that his own zeal and inexperience made him get carried away and ask for too much ("Campaign of Titus Quinctius Flaminius in 198 BC," 282). The one who comes closest to it is Eckstein (*Senate and General: Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 277). He conjectures that the Senate had a general war aim, but with nothing set. Possibly eager for glory, Flaminius decided to make the terms harsh, so that if Philip accepted them, then everything Rome wanted would be achieved and the Senate would heap praise upon him. Most likely, the Senate did not have many specific guidelines as Flaminius altered his demands to a large degree at the Conference of Nicaea. This paper posits that Flaminius, despite flexible or indeterminate instructions from the *patres*, did not view a peaceful settlement as a viable option at that time. He had approximately ten months to continue prosecuting the war, and simply, he wanted to overcome Philip on the battleground. He gave Philip terms the man would never accept. Gruen theorizes that Philip surprised Flaminius when he tried to negotiate and that Flaminius thought the king tried to shift the blame for the war onto the Romans (Gruen, 102-3). It merely gave Flaminius the chance to make the terms harsher. *Gloria* awaited the victorious general, not the formulator of a peace treaty. His culture demanded a finish wrought in blood, not inscribed in stone.

5. Livy 32.12; Plut. *Flam.* 4.4-6. Here I chose to combine both Livy and Plutarch, as the events of the battle flow together better. Livy says that the tribune should send up a smoke signal upon reaching the designated spot and then await the reply signal (32.11.8). However, this seems unlikely as the Macedonians were stationed all over the defile and surely would have noticed a smoke signal going up in the rear of their forces. In addition, holding off the attack until the Romans sighted the signal leaves time for the Macedonians to prepare their forces for the coming assault. Also, Livy does not mention a reply signal actually having been given. Plutarch provides a more realistic version and was the one followed in this text. Waiting until the battle raged would be the best time for the signal. Naturally, the detachment force would have sent out scouts to determine the best time to enter the battle, so as to completely demoralize the Macedonians. Starting the smoke signal lightly is a good tactic as well, since many of the enemy soldiers would have been familiar with the region and morning mist would not have caused undue alarm.
6. Plut. *Flam.* 1.3; Scullard, *Roman Politics*, 100-1.

7. Adkins, 92. A less spectacular version of a triumph.
8. Plutarch notes that the leniency dictated by Flaminius helped him win over the Achaeans (*Flam.* 5.1-4). This point has some soundness, but he had demonstrated clemency on a very infrequent basis. The fear of military force is what convinced them to join Rome
9. Eckstein makes a valid point in his argument that Flaminius did not turn south until Gomphi fell to the Roman-Athamane coalition, as that way had been previously blocked with a Macedonian garrison. He states, however, that Roman forces had already been fighting with the Athamanes ("Flaminius," 131-134), though Livy stated clearly that the Athamanes did not launch any rejuvenated assaults until after news of the Roman victory had spread (32.14.1-2). One may postulate that Flaminius had foreseen the possibility of failure at the Aous River and accordingly started secondary operations. The sources say nothing of this, so it must be assumed that he simply took advantage of a favorable opportunity.
10. Mommsen, 428; Badian "Philhellenism," 273-297; Balsdon, "Flaminius," 179.
11. Badian, "Philhellenism," 274-327; Gruen, 256, 259, 268.
12. Badian, "Philhellenism," 326.
13. Gruen, 268.
14. Gruen, 270-2.
15. Plut. *Cato*. 23.1-3; Gruen, 260-1; Alan E. Astin, *Cato the Censor*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978, 170-5.
16. Livy 39.8-18; Gruen, 262.
17. Gruen, 260-272.
18. Eckstein, "Flaminius," 131-2.

19. Eckstein, "Flaminius," 131-2.
20. Flaminius' brother Lucius managed the naval arm of the command.
21. Badian claims that Aristaenus' use of Roman force, as a means to push the council over to the pro-Roman side was empty. He thinks Flaminius would not have attacked the council if they had refused. In terms of Flaminius' obsession to bring Philip to battle, the likelihood of him turning to punish the Achaean League was slim ("Philhellenism," 287). But as Eckstein illustrates, Lucius crushed the Acarnanians in 197 when they rescinded Roman friendship after having agreed to it. Though different in details, the cases are similar. Roman force remained a definite possibility and a possibility is all that was needed to be guaranteed in the negotiation ("Flaminius," 140-1).
22. Frederic M. Wood sees the Achaean alliance as one part in Flaminius' plan to end the war and set up Roman-Hellenistic relations for the future ("The Military and Diplomatic Campaign of T. Quinctius Flaminius in 198 B.C.," *AJP* 32 (1938): 177-189). In reaction to the Holleaux theory that Roman arms pushed the Achaeans into the alliance (n. 28), Wood posits Flaminius and his "plan" as the reason for Roman success. They feared Rome, and Flaminius just happened to be the one who had proven successful. Badian states that, "What mattered was less the quick defeat of Philip than the winning of Greece ("Philhellenism," 309). And when diplomatic progress in Greece proved slow because of well-founded old suspicions which the first two years of the new war had done nothing to dispel, the resort to military pressure against the Achaeans can be seen as almost a measure of despair." This statement misses the point. Flaminius still wanted his military victory. As Eckstein states very well, "Flaminius in 198 considered diplomacy with the Greeks no more than a side-show to the war with Philip" ("Flaminius," 140). Flaminius did not go to the conference, nor did he instruct his brother to do so, but sent a legate instead. Each brother stayed intent upon his military operations.
23. Walbank states that the Achaean League had no choice, as they could only fail against Rome. The coalition also crushed Philip's chance at central power in Greece (*Philip V*, 158-9).
24. Gruen sensibly argues that prorogation was not guaranteed. Gallic revolts and the efforts of his supporters enhancing his accomplishments played more of a part in convincing the Senate than anything else (214-7).

25. Walbank, *Philip V*, 159.
26. Neither Polybius nor Plutarch mentions the religious circumstances. This is only found in Livy.
27. Plutarch (*Flam.* 7.1-2), Livy (32.32.6-8), and Polybius (18.11.1-3) all agree that the friends of Flaminius got him prorogued. The extended combat in the Punic Wars may have influenced some senators to place value in keeping a successful commander in the field longer rather than replacing him every year. Scipio ended the Hannibalic War by commanding in Africa for three consecutive years and before dying in battle, Marcellus had made great headway by commanding in Sicily.
28. Mommsen presents the view that a change of command had been one of the factors in the lack of Roman success (432). Gruen has reservations about this premise, but does not completely discount it (215-6).
29. Badian, "Philhellenism," 310.
30. The topic of senatorial instructions has already been discussed in note 5, but bears reiteration: Flaminius had no set policy to follow. The idea that Flaminius deceived Philip to gain the best possible outcome for himself is followed by several scholars including Badian ("Philhellenism, 310-3), Scullard (*Roman Politics*, 103), Eckstein (*General*, 281-2) and Walbank (*Philip V*, 162).
31. Livy (32.28.8-9) and Polybius (18.11.1-3) both agree that the Senate had prorogued Flaminius before the Macedonian and Greek embassies had an audience with the *patres*. Plutarch's chronology of the situation is unclear (*Flam.* 7.1-2).
32. The basic story of the Macedonian allies being asked about the "Fetters" and then dismissed by the Senate exists in several sources: Livy 32.37.5, Polyb. 18.11, *Zon.* 9.16, *App. Mac.* 8 (from the Same). Plutarch (*Flam.* 7.1-2) only mentions that the Macedonians failed, but gives no details beyond the aid of Flaminius' friend in foiling it.
33. Eckstein, *General*, 280-1.

34. Eckstein, *General*, 281-2.
35. Gruen, 447.
36. An old man Attalus probably suffered a stroke during the speech as Livy (33.2.1-4) describes him collapsing and having partial paralysis. He died sometime after Cynoscephalae and both Livy (33.21.1-5) and Polybius (18.41) had words of praise for him.
37. Livy states he had 16,000 men in the phalanx, 2,000 peltasts, 2,000 Illyrians, 2,000 Thracians, 1,500 auxiliaries from various Greek *poleis* and 2,000 cavalry (33.4). The cavalry arm of Philip V lacked the same mobility that had allowed Philip II and Alexander to be so effective with it. Although he had 2,000 horsemen, they did not prove to be a decisive factor in the battle.
38. Livy 33.3.1-2; Walbank, *Philip V*, 167. Philip understood the reality of Rome's purpose. Even if Flamininus failed, someone else would replace him. Trying to defeat Flamininus remained the best option.
39. Livy (33.3.6-7) states that the Aetolians only provided 600 troops whereas Plutarch (*Flam.* 7.2) gives 6,000 as the number. Walbank (*Philip V*, 167, n. 3) sides with Plutarch and believes Livy mistranslated Polybius. Based upon the frequent complaints about credit for the victory by the Aetolians after Cynoscephalae, it is logical to agree with Walbank.
40. Livy 33.6; Polyb.18.19-20.1-4; Walbank, *Philip V*, 169-70.
41. Livy 33.7-10; Polyb. 18.20-27; Plut. *Flam.* 8. The description in Plutarch is quite brief.

CHAPTER THREE

In the aftermath of Cynoscephalae, Flamininus created further imperialism in the East for Rome, and at the same time had to deal with the failure of his own settlement of Greece. To be welcomed home as a true conqueror, and a great man, Flamininus had to leave a pacified Greece behind him. A region embroiled in post-war chaos only invited a successor to “properly” reduce the area, and a situation like that would diminish his *auctoritas*. Flamininus knew very well that the Senate had no intention of annexing Greece or Macedon. Thus, with Flamininus’ original need for glory satisfied, employing military force became a secondary tool. Diplomacy, and more precisely propaganda, became his primary instrument to peacefully settle Greece.

He had used diplomatic measures on a limited basis to insure a military solution to the war: securing supply lines in Epirus, garnering Achaean support, and deceiving Philip at Nicaea, all were aimed at continuing the war. Now, Flamininus wielded propaganda as his weapon, and with its twisted edge, he hacked out the peace settlement in Greece. Driven by the necessity of a definite conclusion to the war so another could not pilfer his *gloria*, Flamininus worked within established Greek propaganda. He disseminated the idea of Greek freedom (*eleutheria*) – an old Hellenistic device – by promising to remove all Roman troops from Greece. His intention was to solidify his place as a man comparable to Scipio, by propagating Roman hegemony in the East.

Flamininus utilized the propaganda slogan “freedom of the Greeks” after Cynoscephalae. One of the major disputes about this slogan is its origin. Badian argues that the phrase had a Roman origin. He says it was a natural evolution of Roman foreign

policy. The Greeks who gained their freedom were truly free, but had an extra-legal obligation to Rome as per the patron-client relationship. He does not, however, provide any examples or evidence for his hypothesis.¹

In fact, Lintott rejects the term “client-king” and the patron-client relationship as a valid way of viewing the association between Rome and those she defeated in war. He thinks Rome placed Macedon into a dependent affiliation, but that this relationship had a loose definition of what obligations the “client” actually had to Rome. Even though Rome bound Macedon by treaty, in many ways she allowed Philip, and later Perseus, a great deal of liberty in their actions most of the time. Patron-client may be a convenient way of terming the relationship between Rome and defeated foreign powers, but it does not possess the strictly defined duties or notions of reciprocity that characterized the patron-client relationship on the personal level.²

Also in refutation to Badian, Gruen identifies the slogan as one used throughout the East from the beginning of the Hellenistic Age. The meaning of the phrase lacked preciseness on purpose; it was a diplomatic implement to win the support of the people. Gruen cites numerous examples including: Polyperchon using it to rally support against Cassander and Antigonus in 319 (Diod. 18.55-57); Antigonus Doson employed the slogan against Philip in 220 (Polyb. 4.25.6-8); and Philip used it in trying to ally with Elis in 218 (Polyb. 4.84.4-5). It had become a familiar motto preached by commanders throughout the East, to legitimize their actions. Flamininus took the idea and made use of it in the perfect context. What better way to convince people of a pretended closeness to their culture then to use a time-honored phrase at a time of great uncertainty.³

After the battle Philip had escaped, gathered survivors, and fled to Larisa. As Flamininus approached Larisa, a herald met him and asked for a truce and burial rights. Flamininus granted both and said the king should not be afraid. The Aetolians became angry, claiming Flamininus had changed and did not consult the allies with the battle now won (Livy 33.11.4-6). Here began the rift between the Aetolians and Flamininus, which proved to be a gaping hole in his peace settlement.

The Aetolians had antagonized Flamininus because during the battle many had abandoned pursuit of the Macedonians to sack the enemy camp. Roman troops complained to Flamininus that they had won the battle, but the allies collected all the booty (Livy 33.11.7; Polyb. 18.27). The Aetolians had also insinuated that Flamininus had tried to extort loot and favor from Philip at their expense. Indignant over the charges, not to mention the complaints of his men, Flamininus did what he could to diminish the Aetolian role in post-war proceedings.⁴ They may not have been far off the mark, though. Now that Philip had been conquered, things had changed; Rome held all the cards.

Before meeting Philip, Flamininus called a conference with the allies. The majority wanted conditions imposed that allowed Greece the ability to enforce her own peace and freedom in the absence of Rome. In addition to this, the Aetolians wanted Philip eliminated, saying he would bide his time and assault Greece again. Flamininus answered with three arguments. The first being that Rome did not obliterate surrendered foes, but showed mercy to bring peace, as in the case of the Carthaginians. Next, he pointed out that the peoples bordering Hellas—the Thracians, Illyrians and Gauls—would

sweep through Greece if a strong Macedon were not there to act as a line of defense. Last, he told the Aetolians that Macedon would no longer be able to start a war once the peace terms were concluded (Livy 33.12).

Interestingly enough, Flaminius did not mention Gauls or Celts among those peoples shown clemency to by Rome. In fact, his enumeration of Gauls and Thracians among the border peoples indicates Rome perceived them to be barbaric, and thus relegated to a less civilized form of dominion. His words echo and reinforce Badian's theory of hegemonial imperialism being suited for Eastern states, versus all out warfare and reduction in the West.

All of the points Flaminius had given were to some degree true. Rome did not eradicate surrendered opponents, with Carthage and Illyria being good examples at this time,⁵ although the peace Rome brought to each did involve the conquered accepting Rome's dominion over them. Illyria had become a protectorate, and Carthage no longer determined her own foreign policy.⁶ Yet the whole threat of the Thracians and Gauls could be real, and the Illyrians to a lesser extent, Rome worried little about the incursions of these peoples. She was more concerned about balancing the area. If Macedon ceased to be, then it was likely that the Aetolians would invade the region of Macedonia, or possibly the Achaean League might grow to dominate Greece. Rome did not necessarily fear invasion, but the Hannibalic War had proven that a neighboring state that had grown too powerful could pose a grave threat.⁷ In addition, snubbing the Aetolians before the other Roman allies diminished their importance in the proceedings, rebalancing the Greeks.

A peace conference with Philip followed, in which the king willingly granted all concessions from the previous peace and, playing to Flamininus, would let the Senate decide any other conditions. When the Aetolians requested several cities to be returned, Philip agreed. But Flamininus objected to the Aetolians' request, only giving them Phthiotic Thebes. The Aetolians claimed that it belonged to them by right of the 211 treaty with Rome. The conditions gave land and cities to the Aetolians, while the Romans took moveable booty. Flamininus retorted that the Aetolians had broken the treaty by making a separate peace with Philip, and the treaty did not include cities that surrendered to Rome (Livy 33.13.1-13; Polyb. 18.39).

Much discussion has gone into this quarrel,⁸ but at this point the legality of the situation was moot. Whether or not the Aetolians had a legal claim to the cities did not matter to Flamininus. The Romans were the victors in the war, and with the allies' support behind him, he did not brook with any kind of negotiation from the Aetolians. Simply put, as the winners, the Romans could decide the fate of Greece.⁹

Flamininus made Philip pay 200 talents and surrender hostages, including his son Demetrius, in exchange for a four-month truce, to allow his ambassadors to go before the Senate. If peace were not granted, then all would be returned to Philip (Livy 33.13.13-15; Polyb. 18.39).

Did Flamininus hurry to construct a peace agreement with Philip because he had news of Antiochus' preparations for an invasion of Greece, and did he fear that Philip would flee to a city and await Seleucid help? If this occurred, Rome might send a new consul to replace him, and he would lose *gloria* for not finishing the war. The news most

likely caused Flaminius some consternation, but Philip himself had no desire to drag the conflict out any longer. He had been at war for three years, and had lost two major engagements in the past year alone. All of Greece opposed him, and the likelihood of Antiochus coming to his aid was bleak.¹⁰ Whether Flaminius remained or left did not matter to Philip. Rome would send someone else, and a greater army. Philip understood the realities of his position vis-a-vis Rome. He decided to recoup Macedon by settling for peace.¹¹

In other areas around Hellas, the last remnants of Macedonian opposition were being squashed. A Greek force under Nicostratus defeated the Macedonian general Androsthene (Livy 33.14-15), and Lucius Flaminius defeated the pro-Macedonian Acarnanians (Livy 33.16-17). Last, Rhodes, with the support of other Greek troops, retook Peraea (Livy 33.18).

Back in Rome, elections of 196 were held. Lucius Furius Purpureo and Marcus Claudius Marcellus won their bids for the consulship. The previous year's consuls had both fought Gauls on the borders of Italy, and the Senate again suggested Italy as the province for the two newly elected consuls. Both consuls – but especially Marcellus – appealed to the Senate to declare Macedonia as one of the provinces. He claimed that Philip planned to rebel when Roman forces left. His words carried away the imaginations of many senators, but the tribunes, Quintus Marcius Ralla and Gaius Atinius Labeo, threatened to veto the motion until the people voted for the peace. The people unanimously passed the motion for peace. At that time, news of a Roman defeat in

Nearer Spain reached the Senate. The Senate prorogued Flaminius for another year with *imperium* (Livy 33.25.4-11).

Since his involvement in Macedonia, Flaminius' *amici* had taken measures to insure his success. In 198, senators had forced tribunes opposing his candidature to relent in favor of a vote. In 197, his *amici* had tribunes threaten to veto senatorial motions to replace Flaminius. In 196, tribunes had again threatened the veto in order to have his peace treaty passed. On these two occasions, the tribunes had withheld exercising the veto by allowing the decision to be referred to the *comitia centuriata*. Each time they were successful. Flaminius had his supporters in place and made clever use of the tribunate to prevent *invidia* from ending his pursuit of *auctoritas*. Rewards could ensue as Atilius, the tribune who had help him in 197, became praetor only two years later.

Compared to Scipio, Flaminius needed to go to greater lengths to keep his military command. Only in 201 did the tribunate help Scipio retain his proconsular power against the attack of Lentulus, and one of the tribunes – Glabrio – benefited handsomely from the relationship, as he went on to become consul in 191. Scipio's own abilities, his immense popularity, and the continued threat of Hannibal had insured his reappointments. At the end of his tenure in Greece, Flaminius did enjoy some degree of Scipio's popularity, but Philip was not a threat to Rome in the same way Hannibal had been, and so Flaminius had to utilize other tools to keep himself in power.

Rebellion broke out in Boeotia when the people elected Brachyllas, a pro-Macedonian, as the Boeotarch. The pro-Roman contingent feared that Philip would recapture the area once the Romans left, and the two rebel leaders, Peisistratus and

Zeuxippus, had Brachyllas assassinated. The plot was subsequently uncovered and Peisistratus and his followers were executed, though Zeuxippus escaped. The Thebans revolted, as they believed that Zeuxippus had acted with Roman consent. Hundreds of Roman soldiers died. Flamininus besieged Thebes when the murderers of his soldiers and reparation payment were not brought to him. A group of Achaeans and Athenians arrived gaining the Boeotians an audience with Flamininus after saying they would join the Boeotians against Rome if they were refused. The audience was granted and Flamininus ended the siege when 30 talents and the criminals were handed over to him (Livy 33.27.5-29; Polyb. 18.43).

This incident demonstrates the tenuous nature of the peace.¹² Though still unofficial, many Greeks were dubious about the permanency of the settlement. With Philip still in power, and the history of Macedonian involvement in Greece, some thought the king would return and reintroduce Macedonian hegemony, while others believed they had merely traded masters. This forced Flamininus to return to arms as a solution, instead of relying on the Greek model of third-party mediation. He stood in a precarious place. If revolts broke out and he took the wrong step, Greece might invite Antiochus – or even Philip – to oust the Romans, and his *gloria* would vanish and a replacement proconsul would strive for victory in his place. The Achaeans were far from demanding, but the hint that they might turn against Rome showed Flamininus that they had to be placated rather than quashed.

Ten ambassadors from Rome arrived in the spring with the approved peace. The terms were as follows: all Greek cities in Europe and Asia should exist under their own

laws and freedom; all cities under a Macedonian garrison were to be given over to Rome by the Isthmian Games; Macedonian garrisons were to be removed from key cities (Euromum, Pedasa, Bargyliae, Iasus, Myrina, Abydus, Thasos and Perinthus in Asia); all Roman prisoners and deserters should be returned, all warships beyond five should be surrendered; a maximum of only 5,000 troops and no elephants could be kept; no war outside Macedonia could be waged without senatorial approval; and Philip must pay a reparation of 1,000 talents to Rome (Livy 33.30; Polyb. 18.44).

Rome had taken an extra measure to placate the Greeks by granting liberty to *all* Greek cities in Asia, even though the treaty (as mentioned above) had enumerated only those specific cities under Macedonian control. The inclusion of all the Greek cities gave the impression that Rome was hegemon of the entire Greek world, to help insure their loyalty. Furthermore, the addition of the Asian cities gave Rome an excuse/ambiguity in order to go to war with Antiochus, as the Seleucid king's expansion into Europe worried the Senate.

The terms of the treaty greatly reduced the power of Macedon. Rome left Macedon too weak to present any kind of threat. It also sent a message to the rest of Greece; Philip no longer posed an overwhelming danger to them, but was still strong enough to balance Aetolia, Achaia and Sparta.¹³ In part, the terms reflected earlier ones that Flaminius had proposed to Philip at Nicaea. They also resembled the imperialistic terms given to Carthage at the end of the Hannibalic War. Rome did not annex any Macedonian land, but she controlled their foreign policy. Just as Scipio had done with

the Carthage, Flaminius concluded the war by establishing hegemonial authority over Macedon.

The Aetolians complained about the vagueness of the peace terms since the only named cities to be freed were in Asia, while the European towns went over to the Romans. They called the peace empty, as the Three Fetters remained in Roman hands (Livy 33.31; Polyb. 18.45). Though most of Greece supported Rome, the words of the Aetolians began to gain credence with some individuals (Polyb. 18.44.8). Flaminius knew firsthand the power of Greek opinion and did not want the Aetolians to rouse a rebellion that would jeopardize his chance to conclude the war.¹⁴

He met with the ten Roman commissioners concerning the Roman presence in Hellas, and put forth a policy of de-garrisoning the countryside to insure the goodwill of the Greeks. The commissioners had no problems with Flaminius' policy, except for the Three Fetters. Concern over the maneuvers of Antiochus existed in the Senate, who did not want to leave Greece open to a possible invading Seleucid army, since Antiochus could view Rome's declaration that the Asian cities were free of a provocation not a warning. Arguments continued until the Achaeans received Corinth back, while Flaminius kept Chalcis and Demetrias garrisoned until apprehensions over Antiochus had waned (Livy 33.31; Polyb. 18.45.9-12). Flaminius wanted to stop the possibility of a revolt, keeping Greece stable under Roman power and-most importantly-he wanted Greece pacified so that he gained full credit for ending the war. His anxiety for personal profit took precedence over concerns about Antiochus. At this point, however, he could not convince the commissioners to follow his advice.¹⁵

Possibly Flaminius' most famous act, the Isthmian Declaration, came next. At the Isthmian Games, rumors had circulated about a pending announcement concerning Roman occupation of Greek cities, and the people waited in anticipation. A Roman herald announced that Flaminius had declared the Corinthians, Phthiotic Achaeans, Locrians, Magnesians, Euboeans, Phocians, Thessalians, and Perrhaebians—who had been under Philip's power—to be free and under their own laws. The crowd rejoiced, but made the herald announce it a second time to insure they had heard him correctly. Later on, in their appreciation crowds mobbed Flaminius.¹⁶

As has been mentioned before in this paper, Flaminius did not act out of love for Greece, but from political necessity. With the fighting over, he then turned to diplomatic procedures to conclude the war. Flaminius had not thrown around the phrase “freedom of the Greeks” much before the conclusion of the war.¹⁷

Although he had beaten Philip, and the Senate had accepted the peace proposal with a few modifications, the situation in Greece was not stable. The aggressive movements of Antiochus, the uprising of the Boeotians, and the threat that the Achaeans and Athenians might join it – as well as the growing discontent of the people caused by Aetolian complaints – all endangered the peace settlement.

At some point, Flaminius convinced the Roman commissioners to evacuate Greece completely. By making the “freedom of the Greeks” proclamation, he solved all his problems. The use of the familiar Hellenistic device astounded the Greek audience and led them to believe that Rome had genuine knowledge and concern for Greek affairs. In truth, most knew this did not mean absolute freedom, but a new hegemon¹⁸ whom they

hoped would remain out of their affairs until they needed her. Flaminius' announcement also silenced the Aetolians, who had chattered about the Romans simply feigning departure, and left them appearing ungrateful. Specifying Asian cities as part of the resolution, additionally sent a message to Antiochus to stay out, as those cities were now free and not to be subjugated. The Greek response to Flaminius' announcement sent another message to the Seleucid king: Greece supported Rome, the state that had freed them and would stand against him if he invaded. Personally, these actions imbued Flaminius with a large degree of prestige and trust from the Greeks and aided him in his future diplomatic work in the region.

The ten commissioners then spread out to different *poleis* to finalize the peace settlement. The commissioner Gnaeus Cornelius went first to Tempe and convinced Philip to send ambassadors to the Senate, followed by a trip to Thermopylae to address the Pylaic Council. The Aetolians complained, again, about the Romans cutting them out in terms of prizes for the settlement, but had to be content with envoys sent off to Rome (Livy 38.35). Here, once again, is a perfect example of Rome spreading her influence and using her allies.

Flaminius' time in Greece looked to be at an end, but in the elections for 195 the Senate received word of Nabis stirring up trouble in Greece. He had seized Argos, and expanded his piratical activities in the Adriatic. Problems in Spain and worries over the position of Carthage, if Antiochus should declare war, also held the attention of the *patres*. After much debate, the senators decided that the Spartan problem was of less importance than the others and prolonged the command of Flaminius. They gave him

power to do whatever was best for the state in the settlement of the conflict (Livy 38.43.6).

The significant question is why would the Senate be concerned with Nabis at all? Why not let the Greeks deal with him? The Isthmian Declaration had calmed affairs, but Nabis still held Argos, a *polis* important to Achaean safety, and the Achaeans still feared that the Roman “freedom” lacked true sincerity, especially if a tyrant continued to hold Argos by force. The Senate wanted the situation stabilized before it complicated things. Antiochus’ shadow loomed over Greece and the Aetolians planted discord with their constant accusations of Roman deception. Failing to deal with the situation might cause the Greeks to welcome Antiochus, and then join him. If this only existed in possibility, it warranted a solution before it bloomed into something more. On a more fundamental level, any act of independent foreign policy by a *polis* threatened Rome’s hegemony. Greek freedom only existed because Rome allowed it to, and she could not permit actions that undermined her authority. The Senate did not even declare war on Sparta, but trusted Flaminius to reconcile it, whether by force or diplomacy.¹⁹

This situation differed from previous ones. No tribunes came into play to continue Flaminius as a proconsul. The war in Macedonia was finished and the state of affairs changed when Nabis had fermented trouble. The actions of Sparta seem to have been unexpected as there is no evidence of the allies going to Flaminius with complaints of Spartan chicanery. In truth, when Flaminius received the senatorial orders, the situation put him in a predicament. He had ended the Second Macedonian War, quieted the seething Greek atmosphere, and was prepared to return home when the *patres*

prolonged his command. On the one hand, Flaminius had the opportunity to increase his own *gloria* by crushing the Spartans. On the other hand, he might lose face if he failed to rectify the problem within the year, and be replaced by another proconsul.²⁰

He called a council in Corinth with all of the allies. Flaminius pleaded with them to join together and oust the Spartans from Argos. He explained to them the fate of the city had little bearing on Rome, except that her claim of freeing Greece would bear a tarnish. As the Greeks discussed what action to take, the Aetolian contingent aired past grievances and accused Rome of making up excuses for keeping an army in Greece. Aristaenus spoke next, persuading the other allies to support war against Nabis. Flaminius commanded all of the allies to send auxiliaries to wage the war (Livy 34.22-25).

The Romans arrived at Argos just after the Spartan garrison had put down an attempted coup. A short skirmish with the Spartans resulted in an easy Roman victory. Next, Flaminius arranged a council to decide if the forces should besiege Argos. All of the allies had voted for the siege when Aristaenus suddenly put forth a motion to carry the war into Sparta. Flaminius supported this motion, despite allied opposition. The proconsul disbanded the council and made preparations to march on Sparta (Livy 34.22-26).

Flaminius had decided to take the war south for a swift end to the Spartan problem to avoid a protracted siege at Argos. He would gain little *gloria* in just recapturing Argos. By defeating Nabis himself, Flaminius looked to increase his *auctoritas* and Roman influence at the same time.²¹

To accomplish these goals he had played on Greek fear and hatred to gain their backing. At the same time, he knew the Achaeans craved removal of the Spartan threat, and that he could count on their support.²² As an example of their hatred, the allies later called for the utter decimation of Sparta when the war was winding down (Livy 34.33.6). By satisfying the allies' wishes, Flaminius believed he bound them closer to Roman interests. Along these same lines, by having the Greeks provide the majority of the troops and supplies, he prevented bad memories of Roman cruelty from the First and early parts of the Second Macedonian Wars. Seeing a lone Roman army marching through Greece plundering and pillaging in the process of defeating Nabis could only jeopardize the peace.

Though Livy expounds upon the Spartan War in great detail, we shall condense it for the sake of brevity. Flaminius assembled an army of 50,000 men and a navy of 88 ships. Seeing the writing on the wall, Nabis used terror to suppress any possibility of internal dissension, including the execution of 80 men. He then gathered a contingent of 15,000 Spartans and Cretans to face the invader (Livy 34.27). After Flaminius arrived in Sparta, Nabis ordered sorties on two separate occasions, both of which failed miserably. Flaminius had the surrounding countryside razed in reaction to the Spartan offensive.

At the same time, Lucius Flaminius had reduced several coastal towns with the navy when he discovered that Gytheum functioned as a fortified storehouse for supplies and weapons. Aided by the newly arrived fleets from Rhodes and Pergamum, and a 4,000-man contingent from Flaminius, Gytheum fell (Livy 34.29).

With the fall of Gytheum, Nabis offered to negotiate a settlement. At the meeting, Nabis claimed to hold Argos rightfully by the 197 treaty with Philip and by the *amicitia* entered into with Rome. Flamininus denied his claim to *amicitia* by saying that Rome had entered into friendship with Pelops, a legal ruler, not a tyrant. He added that Nabis had used force to secure Argos and had attacked the Roman ally Messene and aided Philip before changing sides. After Flamininus had finished, Aristaenus advised Nabis to lay down his authority in order to reclaim a his good name (Livy 34.31-33).

The next day, Nabis gave up Argos and waited for further conditions. Flamininus called the allies together, but they wanted to besiege Lacedaemon and eliminate Nabis. Flamininus wanted a peace settlement. He told the allies that Antiochus had come to Europe and Rome needed her legions, not to mention the length and difficulty of the proposed siege. The allies were not convinced, and Flamininus worried that a long siege of the well-fortified Lacedaemon would lead to an extension of war, and he would be replaced, losing the *gloria*. Changing his argument Flamininus asked the allies to contact their respective *poleis* for money and supplies in order to hasten to siege. The allies, dismayed by images of jealous and angry citizens, relented and agreed to a peace settlement.²³

The treaty terms were as follows: withdraw garrisons from Argos and all Argive towns; keep only two ships; repatriate all fugitives and captives to their rightful cities; return all property to Messene; return women and children to Lacedaemon exiles; return property to mercenaries; relinquish towns in Crete to Rome; found no city on non-Spartan land; give over five hostages, including Nabis' own son, to Rome; wage no war

against Roman allies or Crete; and pay reparations of 100 silver talents immediately, followed by 50 talents a year for eight years (Livy 34.35).

The terms upset the tyrant, but when the Spartan people heard them, they became outright angry and refused to agree. Nabis called an assembly and roused the people to resist, requiring Flamininus to lay siege to the city. After a short time, however, the Spartans surrendered and agreed to the peace terms.

Flamininus announced the freedom of Argos at the Nemean Games, though not all of his allies were happy. Both the Achaeans and Aetolians complained. The former had been given Argos as a part of the league, but they noted that Nabis still held Lacedaemon. The latter, accused Rome of being friends of tyranny for allowing Nabis to reign. Flamininus approved of the discord because he wanted a balance of states, and allowing Sparta to survive in the Peloponnese secured the Achaeans as allies.²⁴

Elections for 194 came around and Scipio reached the consulship for a second time. He argued, indirectly, for the chance to take Macedonia as a province since Antiochus had invaded Europe with Hannibal as an advisor, and the Aetolians had invited the Seleucid king to come to Greece. The Senate rejected his proposal and both consuls were allotted Italy as a province. The senators decreed that Flamininus should demobilize his troops and return to Rome (Livy 34.44).

Hearing this, Flamininus called a council of all the allies in Corinth, to announce that the Roman garrisons would evacuate the Fetters, and all Roman forces would leave Greece. When asked about Nabis, Flamininus said he could not allow a strong *polis* like

Sparta to be destroyed; its destruction would be a greater injury to freedom than allowing a weakened *rex* to rule over it (Livy 34.48.2-49).

Fanfare followed as Flaminius went to both Chalcis and Demetrias to remove the garrisons. He made a brief detour in Thessaly where turmoil prevailed. He calmed the disorder and chose all of the senate and magistrates on the basis of property.

Flaminius had fulfilled his vow to the Greeks: no Roman garrisons remained stationed anywhere in Hellas. He had won two wars and placed Greece and Macedon under “hegemonial imperialism.” Sparta, the Achaean League, Aetolia, Rhodes, Pergamum, and Macedon composed the Greek East: a group of states who were *clientela* of Rome and a barrier against the Seleucid monarch. These states, however, were not unified. Flaminius had actually erected a pseudo-barrier, nothing substantial. It proved unstable when Antiochus marched into Greece.

The “Greek buffer” failed for several reasons. First, Flaminius had incensed the Aetolians with his snubs and humiliations. As a measure of revenge, they invited Antiochus into Greece to get a bigger share of the spoils. Second, Achaea concentrated on the local problem of Nabis rather than on Antiochus, as she still smarted from Flaminius leaving the tyrant in power.²⁵ She sent only a token force of 1,000 hoplites for garrison duty during the war. Third, and most importantly, no legions remained in Greece as a reminder and tool to compel the Greeks to execute the role Flaminius had scripted for them.²⁶

It seems logical to conclude that someone with years of experience in Greece, like Flaminius had, would have foreseen the flaws in his construction. Yet Flaminius was

not a Greek, or even a philhellene, and misunderstood the Greeks interpretation of *amicitia*, just as they themselves had misconstrued it. They expected Rome to act as the hegemon (war leader), whereas Rome presumed the Greeks would behave as good clients, and simply follow Roman instructions. This misunderstanding, compounded by bad feelings regarding Greek “freedom” only aided in the failure of Flaminius’ settlement.²⁷

In fact, Flaminius parleyed the troop withdrawal from Greece on account of *gloria* and *dignitas*. He put himself before the state. As has been cited numerous times, Flaminius dreaded the theft of his *gloria* by another, and he hastened the Spartan settlement so no one would steal his thunder. He was not negligent or ignorant, but he may have not genuinely comprehended the cultural misunderstanding over *amicitia*, with unfortunate results. He believed his settlement benefited Rome, but ambition superseded concern over a possible war with Antiochus.²⁸

After the Macedonian War, Flaminius had changed his straightforward military approach in dealing with the Hellenes by moving to a more fluid strategy wherein he blended negotiation with arms. He did recognize the Greeks reliance on mediation to resolve issues and made use of it. By applying the correct tactics in a given situation, Flaminius maximized the political benefits for himself. Additionally, it must be noted that with Rome fighting wars with the Seleucids, the Aetolians, and the Macedonians in the following years, Flaminius’ settlement failed as a long-term Eastern solution for Rome, but it proved effective in the short-term for Flaminius. With affairs settled, Flaminius crossed back over to Italy, landing at Brundisium and making his way to

Rome in triumphal fashion, displaying his booty as he went. The Senate voted him a triumph, and the magnificent gala lasted for three days (Livy 34.52; Plut. *Flam.* 13.6).

CHAPTER THREE ENDNOTES

1. Badian, *Clientelae*, 33-43, 73-75.
2. Lintott, 32-6.
3. Gruen, 133-153.
4. Livy 33.11.5-9; Eckstein, *General*, 287-90.
5. Rome became more aggressive in the next fifty years as she later sacked Athens in 148 and Carthage in 146.
6. These terms were detailed in the introduction, 30 and 32.
7. John Briscoe, "Flaminius and Roman Politics," *Latomus* 31 (1972), 33; Errington, 152.
8. Badian, "Philhellenism," 50-53. Badian makes a lengthy argument about the Aetolians having a lawful claim to the cities.
9. Balsdon ("Flaminius," 184-5) and Eckstein (*General*, 292-3) both find the obvious conclusion: treaties did not matter to the victor.
10. Livy 33.18. This seems unlikely as Rome was still in force in Macedon with the support of all the allies. It may be perceived that the Aetolians were against Rome, but not officially. They were still in the process of trying to gain some of the war prizes. Antiochus, at this juncture, could easily have been portrayed as an invader, not a liberator, since Roman propaganda claimed to have just secured the Greeks their freedom.
11. Walbank, *Philip V*, 173-5.

12. Gruen views the situation as an example of Rome trying to escape the web of Greek affairs, until the murder of Roman troops prompted Flamininus to act (449-50).
13. Briscoe, 33; Errington, 152.
14. Errington, 155; Eckstein, *General*, 300.
15. Errington, 153.
16. Livy 33.32-34; Polyb. 18.46; Plut. *Flam.* 10.3-6; App. *Mac.* 9.4.
17. Eckstein, *General*, 301; Gruen, 150.
18. Errington, 153.
19. Paul Cartledge and Antony Spawforth, *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities*, (London: Routledge, 1989), 76-7; Gruen, 451-2. Gruen notices that Flamininus remained, and had leeway to do about anything because the Senate did not view Sparta as a threat in any way. This faith in Flamininus makes evident Eckstein's argument that the Senate relied almost completely on the field commander's judgment in the affairs of overseas provinces. He had the on-site intelligence, knowledge and familiarity of local custom and geography that they did not (*General*, 303).
20. Eckstein (*General*, 303, n. 147-8) and Briscoe (30-2) rightly attack Schlag's notion that Flamininus engineered the Spartan War to keep his proconsular appointment. The evidence for Antiochus mounting an invasion is weak. The conflict almost spoiled his achievement.
21. Gruen argues that Flamininus did not devise the Spartan War with *gloria* as his top priority, but it was a Greek war. Defeating Nabis was in their best interest (451). Gruen has a good point, but Flamininus did not attempt to use diplomacy first. Instead, he convinced the allies to bring the war to Sparta, a campaign he directed to capture *gloria*.

22. Cartledge, 76; Eckstein, *General*, 305.
23. Livy 34.34; Eckstein insightfully comments about Flaminius worrying over the likely election of Scipio to the consulship and his taking Greece as a province to deal with the possible invasion of Antiochus and Hannibal (*General*, 306-7). Scullard's argument has no weight, as the ancient sources note Flaminius' obsession with leaving Greece in a state of peace that did not require a replacement (*Roman Politics*, 115, n.4).
24. Livy 34.41; Cartledge, 76; Eckstein, *General*, 305.
25. Gruen, 467.
26. Eckstein, *General*, 314.
27. The slogan of *eleutheria* had become an all-too-familiar catchphrase in Greece. The Hellenistic monarchs used it as nothing more than propaganda, and the Greeks expected the hegemon to protect them, not leave them to their own devices (Gruen, 329-34). Whereas, Flaminius had only recently implemented the old slogan to stabilize the region. He still understood the relationship between the Greek world and Rome to be one of clientship where the Greeks had a moral, extra-legal responsibility to fulfill Roman wishes (Badian, *Clientela*, 10, 13, 42, 47, 53, 68; Lintott, 37).
28. Scholars have given other reasons for the evacuation of Greece. The "sentimental politics" of Flaminius are simply wrong (Frank, 157-9). Errington sees a successful, although short-term, amalgamation of Greek ideas of freedom and Flaminius' idea of a buffer region. This is not far off, but he ignores Flaminius' ambition as a factor (154-5). Scullard finds Flaminius working to insure that the word of Rome (and himself) was true. Rome said they would evacuate and so they did (*Roman Politics*, 116-8). It seems that Eckstein (*General*, 309) and Briscoe (33) have it right. Eckstein (310) also makes a good point concerning the Senate's trust that Flaminius, as the man on the spot, had organized a secure situation.

CHAPTER FOUR

Flamininus had risen from being a relatively unknown and untested young city governor to the conqueror of both Macedonia and the legacy of Alexander the Great in just five years. Before he took command in Macedonia, previous Roman consuls had stymied effective actions and accomplished little, yet with prodigious tenacity, he had pursued his hope of greatness through the fields, mountains, and forests of Hellas using almost any means possible until he toppled Philip at Cynoscephalae. Flamininus did not stop there, but endeavored to establish a balanced state of affairs in Greece – so no other could steal his *gloria* – when the Senate demanded that he confront the problem of the encroaching Nabis. Working within a limited timeframe, Flamininus successfully exploited the fears of the newly-won Greek allies to quash the Spartan king and to organize the affairs of Hellas in a manner acceptable to the Senate before returning to Rome.

Flamininus made a tangible demonstration that he had reached his goal of becoming a *magnus vir* by celebrating a magnificent triumph during his homecoming in 194. He had acted as a successful vector of imperialism, spreading Roman hegemony to the Greco-Macedonian world, but upon returning home he reentered the political arena where *imperium* was only a memory. There, he had power through *auctoritas*, but had to contain his ambitions within a diplomatic setting. In a sense, the entire post-war life of Flamininus can be chronologically divided into two distinct parts with phase one covering 194-189 and phase two covering 188-174. In the first phase Flamininus embarked on a diplomatic career that showed remarkable continuity with his military

one, where as a negotiator, he coped with the uncertain task of maintaining Greek allied support in the face of Seleucid propaganda. His task, and the tools to accomplish it, had changed, but his overall objective remained the same: capture *gloria* to increase his *auctoritas*. After his censorship in 189, Flaminius became inactive for the most part and only appears in the ancient sources three times before his death in 174, thus ending his past striving after *gloria*, except in the case of Hannibal's (discussed below).

From the time of his arrival in Rome, Flaminius enjoyed great popularity and influence, outshining even Scipio for a short while as the greatest Roman of his time. His ascension had elicited *invidia* from many, making him an adversary of Scipio and other *nobiles*. Yet despite the difficulties that jealous rivals might have presented, Flaminius nevertheless took the forefront, and over the next five years he continued his quest for more *auctoritas* by means of rhetoric and prestige rather than arms. The ancient sources provide a number of cases

POSTWAR CAREER: PHASE ONE

After the celebration of his triumph, the senators ratified the terms of his treaty without making any changes.¹ This is a perfect example of the Senate bequeathing power to an individual because they were in no position to amend Flaminius' decisions. The Senate's lack of knowledge in the situation, their distance from the events, and Flaminius' time in Greece had given him a degree of authority that the Senate did not question. More importantly, he now possessed a measure of clout as a specialist in Eastern matters that would later allow him to pursue more *gloria* in Greece.²

Later, when such far-flung campaigns occurred on a regular basis, the Senate did not always rubberstamp the treaty conditions proposed by a general. For example, the *patres* made large changes to Tiberius Gracchus' settlement in Spain.³ But at this time, foreign treaties were too new for the Senate to confidently overrule the commander, and thus generals like Scipio and Flamininus essentially finalized their respective peace settlements.

The elections of 193 brought Flamininus back into the political melee as his brother Lucius Quinctius stood for his first consulship. Quinctius' strongest opposition came from Publius Cornelius, the cousin of Scipio. Cornelius had won recent victories in Spain, while Quinctius had won several naval engagements under Flamininus. Even though the aspirants had strong personal qualifications for office, they depended on the canvassing of their famous relatives. Flamininus and Africanus campaigned for their candidates, but the newly won *gloria* of Flamininus helped to carry the necessary votes, and Quinctius took the consulship. Livy himself commented on the growing rivalry between Flamininus and Scipio.⁴ Up to this point, Scipio had been the singular great man, but now a *novus homo* had stolen his place. Scipio had been the model for what a man could accomplish, and Flamininus had been a good student. Domestic politics, however, soon faded into the background as events in the East recaptured Flamininus' attention and would be the cause of his return to Greece.

In the eyes of most Greeks, Rome stood as the hegemon of the region, while the Romans viewed them as *amici* tied to Rome by bonds of loyalty.⁵ Yet each side – to simplify – miscalculated the other's understanding of the relationship. Rome wanted

Hellas as a bulwark against other peoples in the East, but without any garrisons left behind, a situation about which even some of the senators were dubious.⁶ Rome already faced problems in the West as she sent legions over to deal with Spaniards and Gauls each season. Now, a new force had emerged in the East: Antiochus the Great.

Antiochus III came to the throne of the Seleucid Empire in 223 after the murder of Seleucus III by his own officers. His cousin Achaeus, a man of skill and vision, set Antiochus upon the throne (Polyb. 5.40.4-6). Early on, Antiochus seems to have dreamed of recapturing the old empire of his great-great-grandfather, Seleucus I.⁷

He began his campaign in Syria, and success came quickly as his forces took or caused the surrender of Samaria, Galilee, Tyre and other areas, until he reached Coele-Syria. This area had been long disputed, and coveted, by both the Ptolemies and Seleucids (Polyb. 5.58-62).

Antiochus spent time negotiating with Ptolemy IV, who had built up his army in anticipation of conflict. In 217, the kings met at the Battle of Raphia, which ended in defeat for Antiochus (Polyb. 5.79-87). He withdrew from Coele-Syria and turned to face an internal problem; Achaeus had been managing the armies in Asia Minor and had begun to wear a diadem and call himself king. Achaeus' presumption lost him his mercenaries, and left him a rogue figure, and by 213, Antiochus had captured and killed him (Polyb. 5.57-58.1, 5.72-78).

Antiochus then turned to his primary aim: the reconquest of the old Seleucid empire. He had already retaken parts of western Asia Minor, Persis, Babylon, Media and

Susiana, and now prepared an eastern campaign to regain the lost Successor territories, either by force or treaty.⁸

In 209, the expedition began. Over the next four years, Antiochus made a treaty with Parthia and the Indian Kingdom of Subhagasena, brought Bactria and Soghdiana under terms after besieging king Euthydemus for several years, reconstituted Drangiana and Archosia into the empire, and made a pact with the Gerrhaean Arabs.⁹

He returned home in 205 and assumed the title of Great King. Several of his “conquests” (Euthydemus, Subhagasena and the Gerrhaeans) had ended in treaties without the complete subjugation of his foes. It has been argued that Antiochus had economic motives in mind, mostly trade routes and access to gold mines, as the primary reason for his *anabasis*. Though this is possible, I do not think it was Antiochus’ primary motivation. If he had simply wanted trade agreements, he would not have spent two years (211-210) preparing an army for a massive campaign throughout the eastern part of an empire he thought had seceded. His many military engagements, the taking of the title Great King, and his eventual move across the Hellespont, all indicate empire as the true reason for his campaigning.¹⁰

The pact between Philip and Antiochus followed in 205, and the Seleucid ruler invaded the Ptolemaic territories of Palestine.¹¹ He annexed Coele-Syria and defeated the Egyptians at Panion. By 197, he had taken more coastal territory in Cilicia and Caria, and invaded parts of Pergamon. Next, Antiochus crossed the Hellespont and started to set up a base in abandoned the Lysimacheia,¹²

When the Seleucid king entered Europe, the Romans began to take serious notice. Previously in 200, a Roman embassy had stopped in Egypt to help resolve a dispute between Antiochus and Ptolemy, to prevent a possible conflict that could have spread into the Aegean while Rome battled Philip. Gruen refutes the theory that the envoys gave Antiochus an ultimatum to curtail his possible invasion of Egypt.¹³ At the time Antiochus entered Coele-Syria, Rome had shown little interest in the area, beyond stability.¹⁴ Even when Attalus had asked for aid against Antiochus in 197, the Senate had sent only an embassy to request that Antiochus, as a friend of Rome, not assault another friend of the *populi Romani* (Livy 32.8.9-16). Rome had her attention focused on Macedon and the West; Antiochus did not threaten her interests.

In the spring of 196, however, with the Seleucid forces rebuilding Lysimacheia on the European side of the Hellespont, the Senate sent an embassy to confront Antiochus. The embassy told Antiochus to stay out of all the *poleis* in Asia Minor, to remove his army from Thrace, and to evacuate Europe. In reply, Antiochus claimed hereditary entitlement to the areas he invested, and denied the Roman envoys' other accusations of belligerency toward Rome. The frustrated emissaries returned home while Antiochus continued with his expansion. Rome had proclaimed the Asian *poleis* free as a check against possible Seleucid incursions – and to validate a war if necessary – but she had not been prepared to refute the justifications that Antiochus had given for his expansion. With matters in Greece unresolved, and warfare flaring up in the West, the Senate did not take action against Antiochus for several years.

Flaminius saw a potential for more *gloria* in a campaign against Antiochus, but knew that he must wait ten years before being eligible to stand again for the consulship. His role in Rome had changed. With his experience and reputation in Greece, the Senate believed that Flaminius possessed expertise in dealing with Eastern affairs. While other Romans prepared for war with Antiochus, Flaminius played an important diplomatic role in the early stages of the war, but at the same time he acted to enhance his own *auctoritas*.

By 193, an embassy from Antiochus had arrived in Rome to enact a friendly alliance. The envoys informed the Senate that they had no right to tell Antiochus which Asian *poleis* he could involve himself and which he could not. The Senate appointed Flaminius to answer the Syrians, and he told the envoys that Antiochus had two choices. If the Seleucids abandoned their positions in Europe, then Rome would not interfere in Seleucid dealings with any of the Asian *poleis*, however, if they refused to leave Europe, then Rome would defend her allies in Asia Minor. The envoys claimed that Antiochus had hereditary rights to territory in Greece, and that the Romans had no right to prevent him from reclaiming them. Flaminius rebutted this argument by saying that the Greeks had been promised freedom under Rome and it could not be abandoned for Seleucid rule. The Senate told the envoys to pick, but they declined, as they did not have the authority to make that decision, which was subsequently postponed as Rome sent a three-man embassy to meet with Antiochus (Livy 34.57-59; Diod. 28.15).

Flaminius' reply clearly revealed the truth behind Roman propaganda: Greek freedom depended on Roman foreign policy and Rome did not hold *eleutheria*

sacrosanct. His answer demonstrated Rome's desire to maintain a balance in the East, but at the same time, a willingness to become involved in Seleucid affairs. Flamininus had not issued a *rerum repetitio*, but Antiochus would lose much prestige if he followed the terms. Imperialism remained the vague, uncharted policy of Rome and Flamininus' answer demonstrated a readiness to continue Rome's incursions into the East.

News of several developments came to Rome. First, Hannibal had fled Carthage and allied himself with Antiochus. Second, it was rumored that the Aetolians, still bitter over being snubbed in the Second Macedonian War, had invited Antiochus to free them from Rome. Rome reacted by sending an embassy, headed by Flamininus, to Greece to shore up support and prevent any *poleis* from siding with the Seleucid King (Livy 35.23.3-5)

In just two years, the situation in Greece had changed drastically. Nabis had broken the treaty and attacked areas along the Spartan coast. The Achaeans, meeting at the council of Sicyon, wanted to take action, but waited for Flamininus to advise them. Here the Greeks deferred to Rome, their hegemon, and particularly to Flamininus, whose reputation still held much influence. Flamininus replied that the Achaeans should wait for the Roman fleet under Atilius to arrive (Livy 35.22.1-4). The Greeks were split on whether to obey, until Philopoemen – who had become *strategos* for the fourth time – decided not to linger for Rome. Mobilizing the Achaeans, he went after Nabis, and following a short campaign, the Achaeans defeated the Spartans. The people celebrated the achievements of Philopoemen as greater than those of Flamininus (Livy 35.25-30; Plut. *Flam.* 13.2, *Philo.* 15.2-3).

Thus had the ethereal nature of the Roman settlement begun to show. The Greeks had successfully used the Romans to get rid of Philip, but with the removal of Roman might from Hellas, they then returned to their own domestic interests.¹⁵ Here, the emptiness of Flaminius' propaganda began to reveal itself to the Romans. Livy briefly mentioned that the embassy did not meet with the Achaeans because their attack on Nabis showed their loyalty to the Roman position (35.31.1-3). Though this statement has some truth, it shows mostly that Flaminius was too trusting of them and did not recognize their own ambitions.¹⁶

While the Achaeans waged war, Flaminius and the other envoys traveled throughout Attica, Chalcis, and Thessaly to prevent losing allies to the Aetolian exhortations to join Antiochus. Upon arriving at Demetrias, Flaminius attended the Magnetes Council, who debated whether to join Rome or Antiochus. Anti-Roman council members saw the post-war treatment of Philip as too lenient, and Flaminius angrily reminded them that troops under his command had freed the city from a Macedonian garrison, an act that had resulted in peace. He also reminded them to keep Macedon as an ally with the approach of the Seleucid monarch. The Magnetes sided with Rome, and the rabble-rousers fled to Aetolia (Livy 35.31.1-8).

The Panaetolian Council met to decide whether they should support Rome or Antiochus. Menippus, the Seleucid delegate, told the Aetolians that Antiochus would restore true freedom to Greece, not liberty under Roman hegemony. The Athenian envoy told the council not to decide hastily, reminding them of the alliance and services of Rome, which had freed them of Philip, and that Flaminius himself was approaching to

settle the affair. The Aetolians, however, voted to support Antiochus (Livy 35.32-33.1-2). Shortly thereafter, Flamininus arrived and addressed the council. He reminded them of their history as treaty-breakers with Rome, and urged them to dispatch ambassadors to the Senate to reconcile the affair or they would have war with Rome (Livy 33.49.9). Thoas, the chief Aetolian, countered Flamininus' argument by reiterating Antiochus' claim to bring freedom, and this carried the opinion of the council. They decided to support Antiochus (Livy 35.33).

Flamininus did well in Demetrias by falling back on his reputation, but he failed at the Aetolian council because of his past history with them.¹⁷ He had downplayed their contribution to his victory at Cynoscephalae, had claimed land for Rome that they had claimed, and had refused their petitions for the return of Pharsalus, Leucas and other cities, as per an earlier treaty. The Aetolians viewed their alliance with the Romans as detrimental. Flamininus' own *dignitas* had demanded that he not bear the earlier insults of the Aetolians – the plundering of the Macedonian camp at Cynoscephalae and the attack on his generalship – but in the process, he had lost their future support.

The inner council of the Aetolians planned to seize the cities of Lacedaemon, Chalcis and Demetrias by arms to prove themselves to Antiochus. The attacks, however, failed and the Aetolians did not capture either Lacedaemon or Chalcis. Flamininus sent Galba to Demetrias, hoping to convince them to remain Roman allies before an Aetolian force arrived, but the conference between Galba and the Magnetes ended badly, and the Magnetes went over to the Aetolians (Livy 35.34-38, 35.42.4-5).

Meanwhile, Antiochus had crossed over to Demetrius with a small force, and the Aetolians rallied around him. In an attempt to undermine the Roman position, Antiochus and the Aetolians sent ambassadors to the Achaean council at Aegium where Flamininus resided. The Syrian ambassador claimed that the might of Antiochus was greater than either Hannibal or Philip, and the best choice Rome could make was not to take part in the coming war. The Aetolian envoy, Archidamus, echoed the words of the Seleucids, and then harshly insulted Flamininus and the Romans. Flamininus called the envoys' words empty and their might insignificant. He reminded the Achaeans of past Roman help and their loyalty to the alliance, and they overwhelmingly supported him. He had played to a receptive crowd, as they had directly benefited from the defeat of Philip, and saw no reason to chance fate by going over to Antiochus.¹⁸

Up to this point, Flamininus and the other envoys had been following their assignment. As Livy mentioned, the Senate had ordered the ambassadors to use *auctoritas* to keep the support of the allies, as none of them possessed *imperium* (35.23.4-5). For the most part they had been successful, except for the loss of Demetrius. Most importantly, they had prevented the Achaeans from changing sides, which could have caused many others to follow. Flamininus productively had used his *auctoritas* to contribute to the war effort. For example, he had ordered King Eumenes to deploy 500 men to Chalcis after the Aetolians had attacked it (Livy 35.38.1-3). Later, he commanded the Achaeans to send 500 troops to both Chalcis and Piraeus to keep those cities on the Roman side (Livy 35.50.3). Just his presence in Athens put down a bribery conspiracy favoring Antiochus (Livy 35.50.4), and without force of arms at his

immediate disposal, he had made steady progress in keeping the Greek *poleis* as allies. After Antiochus captured Chalcis, Rome officially declared war (*Zon.* 9.19-20).

Flaminius' success in effectively using diplomacy came from the power he enjoyed because of his *auctoritas*, and at the same time he accumulated more *gloria* and *laus* by the effectual manipulation of the Greeks to the benefit of Rome. Yet, he was the same man who had taken great risks in the Second Macedonian and Spartan Wars to become a *Magnus Vir*, and whatever prestige he had gained so far as an ambassador paled before his previous accomplishments. With this new war in progress, Flaminius yearned for even more *gloria* and began to explore the vagaries of his office and the nature of his duties. The nebulous nature of his assignment coupled with his *auctoritas* impelled Flaminius to test the limits of his power.

No specific mention of the Senate's wishes exists in Livy's text, beyond using *auctoritas* to keep the allies on the Roman side. Obviously, one can infer that Flaminius looked out for Rome's best interests, but soon he began to pay attention to his own as well.¹⁹ To illustrate, the Achaeans were besieging Messene, a *polis* that had refused to join the league, since they sympathized with the Aetolians. The Messenians sent to Flaminius with a proposal of surrender, and Flaminius instructed Diophanes – the Achaean *strategos* – to raise the siege, which Diophanes did. Flaminius then hurried to Messene, to admonish Diophanes for acting without receiving Roman advice. Then Flaminius had the Achaean army disbanded (*Livy* 36.31.1-8).

Flaminius' behavior certainly seems odd, but he had gained control over an important city, which benefited Rome and secured him a little more *gloria*. This action

definitely favored an imperialistic stance, and unfortunately, it had been at the expense of their strongest Greek ally. Flaminius had likely exercised extra-legal authority to secure the city and his actions may possibly be seen as damaging to Rome's status in Greece, but he still wore the mantle of the "liberator" and the Greeks did as he asked.

Shortly after this, Flaminius addressed the Achaean Council and insisted that they return the island of Zacynthos to Roman custody, asserting that the island had passed down to the Achaeans illegally, and it belonged to Rome by right of conquest over Antiochus. Flaminius further convinced his audience by reminding them that expanding outside the mainland would only endanger their safety. Opposition folded and Flaminius acquired Zacynthos for Rome.²⁰

Flaminius had put his *auctoritas* to good use and Rome had profited by acquiring a strategic island in the Adriatic. Once again, Flaminius may be accused of stepping beyond the normal mandate of an ambassador by obtaining Zacynthos, but he simply negotiated from a much stronger position than others because of his reputation in Greece. Flaminius hoped to increase his own *auctoritas* by increasing Roman hegemony over Greece. Though he did not march onto the battlefield, he pursued *gloria* anyway.

It may be argued that Flaminius had accomplished a diplomatic *coup* by annexing the island.²¹ He had used his *auctoritas* in an imperialistic fashion and the state had benefited. This action may have caused *invidia* and consternation among some of his peers, but the majority of *nobiles* accepted him doing these important things for Rome, even if he had accomplished them in a somewhat dubious fashion. At this point no one

would find fault in his deeds; this was not the first century where the powerful individuals like Pompey challenged senatorial power.

Another good example of Flaminius testing the limits of his power involves his intervention in the Roman siege of Naupactus in Aetolia. Manius Acilius, the consul, had besieged the city for two months and was close to destroying it. Flaminius crossed over to Naupactus and dressed down Acilius for wasting time attacking a city while Philip had reorganized his forces and had begun to reincorporate lost territory into his state. He also told the consul that the loss of the Aetolian people would leave an easily exploitable power vacuum for Philip. Acilius did not want to leave, but deferred to Flaminius, who told the fawning Aetolians to request a truce and then send delegates to the Senate (Livy 36.34-35.6).

In this case, Flaminius had definitely transgressed boundaries. He had no *imperium*,²² yet had convinced Acilius to defer to him, showing that his *auctoritas* was great enough to surpass a man actually wielding *imperium*. Yet this episode does not demonstrate elements of imperialism, but just the opposite as Flaminius prevented a strategically positioned *polis* from being captured. Both Livy (36.34.1-3) and Plutarch (*Flam.* 15.4-5) say that Flaminius did not want to see the genocide of the Aetolians, which seems an overstatement. Possibly Flaminius thought that this defeat might weaken the Aetolians enough to allow Philip an easy conquest, if taken to its conclusion. Flaminius' actions, however, betray his true motivation in that he was competing against Acilius to regain *dignitas*. The peace he had recently arranged had proven to be ineffective as Antiochus threatened Greece and the Aetolians were already fighting the

Romans. Flaminius saw the chance of both reclaiming some *dignitas* in the wake of the ruined settlement and stealing away some of Acilius' *gloria*. To the Greeks, Flaminius embodied a foreigner who understood Hellenic politics and culture, whereas Acilius represented a typical Roman bent on conquest. Thus, taking advantage of Aetolian perceptions of himself versus Acilius, he used his *auctoritas* and special relationship with the Hellenes to filch the victory from Acilius. Flaminius had enjoyed power for a long time and still wanted to exercise it. At times, his actions demonstrate a belief that his authority superceded the *mores* and laws that governed Roman politics. His ambitious character, naturally complimented by Roman imperialism, began to make Flaminius look beyond the limits of individual duty, in favor of personal gain

The envoys had stabilized the allied situation, which left all of Hellas supporting Rome, with the exception of the Aetolians. With the diplomatic work in Greece concluded, Flaminius returned to Rome in 190. Although other Romans like Acilius and Lucius Scipio would soon celebrate triumphs of their own for victories over Antiochus, Flaminius had managed to preserve, and likely augment, his *auctoritas*. One last goal remained: to capture the censorship and join the elite *nobiles*.

Flaminius reached the pinnacle of the *cursus honorum* in 189, becoming censor with Marcus Claudius Marcellus. Illustrious candidates like Acilius, Scipio, and Cato had entered the election, but a scandal concerning booty embroiled Acilius and Cato in a feud. At one point, the tribunes – Publius Sempronius Gracchus and Gaius Sempronius Rutilius – even threatened to veto the entire election. In the end, Flaminius proved victorious and defeated Scipio once again (Livy 37.57.9-58.2). Although, Flaminius

accomplished little during his tenure as censor (Livy 38.28.1-4), attaining that august magistracy remains the salient point because being censor mattered more in terms of prestige than the actual activities of the office-holder. After winning the crowning magistracy at 41 years of age, Flamininus commenced a different phase in his public life. Whereas previously he had dared much and constantly been in the public eye in order to climb to the top of the *cursus honorum*, after his censorship, he became mostly inactive politically for the remainder of his life, and subsequently disappeared from historical view for five years.

POSTWAR CAREER: PHASE TWO

Accomplishing little in the five years following his censorship, it seemed that his star had waned. The likely reason was that he had already achieved most available honors and further competition would risk diminishing his status, and so he became more selective in using his influence in front of the public. Younger men might battle for honors, but Flamininus did not overtly exert his *auctoritas*, as he understood the ferocity of *invidia* and believed that trying to snatch more *gloria* after such an exceptional career would probably cause him problems. As a result, he emerges only three times in the ancient sources after 189, though these examples do not themselves show a radically different approach to his using *auctoritas*

In 184, Marcus Porcius Cato held the censorship and expelled Lucius Flamininus from the Senate, charging him with abuse of his consular power: Lucius had killed a young Gaul to impress his Carthaginian lover, Philippus. Flamininus had stood at his brother's side to defend him when Cato made the story public, but Cato's tale had

brought popular support to the attack on Lucius, and it injured Flamininus' *dignitas* in the process.²³ Incensed by Cato's attack, Flamininus used his influence and retaliated by gathering together a group of supporters angry with Cato, and had the funds for some of his public works projects cut. He also induced several tribunes to fine Cato two talents for "injury" to the people (Plut. *Cato*. 19.1-2). Flamininus not only found himself indirectly under attack on account of Cato's morality power play, but the attack had injured the *Quinctii gens* as well. Flamininus had taken it upon himself to recover some of his family – not to mention his own – *dignitas*. If he was no longer vying for the consulship or censorship, his previous extensive successes still made him a convenient target for *inimicitiae*. The fact that he had the clout to successfully retaliate against Cato demonstrates the great amount of *auctoritas* that he still possessed.

In 183, the Senate sent the seasoned Flamininus as an ambassador to King Prusias, who was rumored to be fermenting war against Eumenes and giving refuge to Hannibal. The assignment fired Flamininus' old ambition and he saw it as a chance to regain some prestige by urging the weak-willed Prusias to surrender Hannibal to him. Prusias agreed and sent soldiers to capture the Carthaginian. Although Hannibal had prepared seven escape routes, the soldiers discovered them all, and rather than return to Rome in chains, Hannibal drank poison.²⁴ When news of the incident reached Rome, the consensus was split between those who supported Flamininus and those who saw his actions as a violation of his duty as an ambassador. Still others saw him as someone trying to steal away the *gloria* of the Scipios (Plut. *Flam*. 21.1-6). No longer perceived as

the successful young conqueror, Flaminius had misread the situation and not only had failed to recapture some of his faded glory, but had also lost support in the process.

After his altercation with Hannibal, Flaminius disappeared for another nine years. Likely, he attended the Senate meetings and took part in day-to-day political affairs, but no evidence exists for further military or diplomatic missions. He had bucked against the Senate and cultural norms in many ways: the evacuation of Greece in 194, the acquisition of Zacynthos in 191, the usurpation of Acilius' *imperium* at Naupactus, taking on royal Hellenistic trappings while in Greece (see below), miscalculating popular reaction by his attack on Hannibal, and allowing himself the title of *imperator*. It is possible that Flaminius suffered a decline in status during this time because of the cumulative effect of all these actions, or perhaps, his abortive attempt to resurrect his diminished career convinced him that his time as the foremost Roman had passed, and thus he intentionally faded into the background that was the oligarchy.

In contrast, Scipio had become too bold for his enemies to bear. He had returned to prominence as legate to Lucius Cornelius, although he was the true commander. With the victory over Antiochus at Magnesia, his *auctoritas* had grown to such an extent that *invidia* among his peers could not be satisfied with anything but a censure of the great man. Indicted for fraud, he saved himself only by calling upon the memory of his services to Rome. Yet at the same time his renown saved him, it became the reason for his final demise in the public arena. He died in self-exile.²⁵

Although, Scipio had proven to be Flaminius' example so many times in the past, this time Flaminius did not emulate him. Instead Flaminius did subtle things to

deflect covetousness and odium, such as not taking another *cognomen* as Scipio Africanus had done. Rather, Flaminius avoided blatant abuse of his *auctoritas*. He attacked Cato in a culturally acceptable fashion, and let his brother fall from grace. Also, he may have attempted little during his censorship in order to avoid too much attention. Cato's famous censorship brought with it much hostile reaction. In the end, Flaminius had walked a humbler path, avoiding the public emasculation that Scipio eventually suffered.

Flaminius appears one more time in the ancient sources. His last recorded act took place in 174, when he honored the memory of his father with a series of gladiatorial games and banquets (Livy 41.28.11). Some time after this, Flaminius died, but the ancient sources record no specifics about his death, except that it was peaceful (Plut. *Flam.* 21.8).

The second phase in Flaminius' postwar career had the feel of a man satisfied with his lot for the most part – except for the brief episode with Hannibal – confirming that Flaminius had chosen wisely in 188, to opt for a more subdued political existence. By taking up the livelihood of a regular member of the senatorial class, he continued to affect dealings in Rome and could enjoy the success he had garnered. Flaminius had achieved all that a Roman could desire. He had become consul, celebrated a triumph after winning two wars, developed into a major political and diplomatic figure, and served as censor. His tenacious and unerring pursuit for *gloria* made him a notable personage in the pantheon of great Romans much as he had hoped that he would.

CHAPTER FOUR ENDNOTES

1. Livy 34.52; Eckstein, *General*, 308-310
2. Badian puts forward the idea that Rome sent men with 'Eastern experience' over to Greece to handle diplomacy (*Clientela*, 63-6, 90). Gruen refutes Badian's argument, but concedes that Flamininus was an exception to the rule (203-49).
3. App. *Iber.* 43-44; Badian, *Foreign Clientela*, 123.
4. Livy (35.10) comments that the people were envious and tired of Africanus, while Flamininus was a fresh face. But, the rivalry was more than that. Africanus had tried to take Macedonia away from Flamininus in 194, and in 189, he ran against him for the censorship.
5. Lintott, 33-4.
6. Africanus argued vehemently against the evacuation of troops from the "Fetters" (Livy 34.43.4-5; Eckstein, *General*, 309-10) informing the *patres* that it only invited the incursion of Seleucid arms.
7. Green, 288.
8. Polyb. 10.27-31, 10.49; Green, 293.
9. Polyb. 11.39, 13.9.
10. Green, 294-5.
11. The pact has been discussed in the Introduction, n. 48.
12. Polyb. 16.18-9; Livy 33.19.8, 32.19.8-16; Green, 303-5.

13. Gruen (680-2) finds the tradition of the ultimatum (App. *Mac.* 4; Just. 30.2.8) to have little weight, as it is not found in Livy and Polybius states that the embassy only went to reconcile the two kings (16.27.5).
14. Green, 304; Gruen, 680.
15. Gruen, 464-7.
16. Gruen's basic thesis of *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* is that the Greeks often manipulated the Romans and intrigued in their own politics, despite the presence of Rome.
17. Eckstein, *General*, 292-3.
18. Livy 35.48-50.5. The Achaeans gave aid, yet it signaled anything but full-fledged support for Roman action: they provided only a small number of soldiers.
19. Badian, "Philhellenism," 317.
20. Livy 36.31.9-32. Gruen (170-1) portrays the Achaeans as somewhat nervous about Flaminius' request, and they offered little resistance.
21. Gruen believes that Flaminius took the island because he had the support of the Senate (170-1). Rome had briefly occupied the island during the First Macedonian War, but it had not been mentioned since that time (Livy 26.24.15). No evidence exists to back a Roman interest in Zacynthos until Flaminius' surprising request. This was not part of some senatorial directive, but only Flaminius' attempt to snatch more *gloria*.
22. Plutarch (*Flam.* 15.2) alleged that Acilius had made Flaminius his lieutenant. Livy, however, provides no evidence for this assertion, and specifically noted that the ambassadors had no *imperium*.
23. Livy 39.42.5-43; Plut. *Flam.* 19. The accounts differ in details and Livy provides the more believable of the two.

24. This story is found in both Livy (39.51) and Plutarch (*Flam.* 20). I followed Plutarch, as Livy gives several possible reasons for the eventual suicide of Hannibal, including Plutarch's, but does not want to accuse Flamininus of following his ambition over possible instructions of the Senate.

25. Livy 39.52.9.

CONCLUSION

Flaminius had a remarkable career because he effectively took risks, survived in the hostile world of Roman politics, and exploited the mechanisms of imperialism to advance his own interests. He had more than succeeded on the individual level by producing a string of accomplishments that quickly placed him among the select few *nobiles* of his time. Flaminius efficiently had manipulated political situations such as forcing his reelection in 197, finagling the Macedonian peace settlement, and winning the censorship. He also properly managed military affairs as in the cases of defeating Philip at Cynoscephalae, acquiring Achaean support, and vanquishing Nabis. At every turn he had exploited the environment and instruments of Roman imperialism and built for himself the career he had envisaged.

Being a *virum magnum* required climbing to the top of the *cursus honorum*, which Flaminius did by leaps and bounds. Benefiting Rome and increasing his *auctoritas* always remained his goal, which he pursued with an amazing, singular focus despite virtually all obstacles, even to the disregard of the state's best interests at times. Flaminius represents a typical member of the *nobiles*, who selfishly chased after *auctoritas* to glorify himself, and Rome by proxy.

All *nobiles* strove within a cultural system regulated by natural checks and balances to prevent anyone from gaining too much renown. In the aftermath of the Hannibalic War, the Republic had expanded, necessitating the Senate's commission of generals with overseas commands and almost unlimited authority, to actualize the will of

Rome. Victories abroad provided them with *gloria* and wealth few others could equal. Following the example of Scipio in Africa, Flaminius exploited the situation in Greece to become a Great Man. He had not taken a unique course of action, but had helped to blaze a trail for others like Lucius Aemilius Paullus, Lucius Mummius Achaicus, Scipio Africanus Minor, and Quintus Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus. Flaminius never looked out for the best interests of Hellas, except when Roman and Greek concerns coincided. Philhellenism did not dictate his dealings in Greece anymore than it influenced Paullus' activities after Pynda. As a product of his time and culture, Flaminius looked after Rome and himself, not the conquered.

Imperialism increased as commanders attempted to reach their goals. Victory became the sole prerequisite to obtain greatness and, as such, generals feverishly toiled to vanquish Rome's enemies and bring the defeated under Roman control. As men struggled to find *gloria* in foreign lands, they increased Roman supremacy by their victories. Flaminius himself fostered imperialism in the East, which would make Rome the undisputed master of the Eastern Mediterranean within fifty years. His removal of all the Roman garrisons from Greece and his open-ended declaration of complete Greek liberty, including the Asian *poleis*, invited a clash with the empire-building Seleucids. Also, the hegemonial settlement he used to end the Second Macedonian War lacked strict enough guidelines and enforcement, which accidentally precipitated two major conflicts in Hellas.

To reach, and remain, at the apex of Roman politics, Flaminius had forced the limits of his power throughout his career. In the beginning he competed against Scipio's

accomplishments by imitating them. He called himself *imperator* at the Isthmian Games in 196 and had gold coins bearing his portrait minted – both an echo of Scipio.¹ What he unintentionally gained that Scipio had not was his own cult in Chalcis due to Greek hero cults.² He had procured honors, which inspired *invidia* and mistrust among some of his fellow oligarchs, and ambition that reaped rewards of this magnitude, simply on the personal level, raised the standard others would have to reach to be considered great men. He ended the Macedonian War with a treaty similar to Scipio's settlement of the Hannibalic War. After his triumph he sought to make himself useful to the state and acquire more *gloria* by increasing Roman authority during his diplomatic work in Greece. Here, he may have overstepped his authority, but success is difficult to argue with. Even after he had held the censorship and assumed a more understated role, the appeal of reputation enticed him to try once more to obtain *gloria* by attempting to capture Hannibal.

Flaminius, however, evaded an ending like Scipio's. He had done much for Rome, and had profited handsomely in return. By curbing his ambition and defending himself at the right moments, he retained a sizable amount of power and influence throughout his career. Flaminius heeded the checks and balances, and the Senate left him alone, for the most part. His actions rarely interfered with the rule of the state or directly threatened its security, but he did chip away at the Roman political foundation, just as Scipio had done with his contraventions.

A new generation of Romans had to accomplish more than their predecessors to gain similar acclaim. Flaminius did not, however, act against his culture, but in

accordance with it. He pursued greatness, and in so doing, ironically revealed a weakness of the state. Imperialism and the pursuit of *gloria* complimented each other in the beginning, but in the later Republic, competition became fiercer, the prizes to be won even greater, and as the state grew, the imposition of senatorial controls eventually became impossible.³ In the end, the Senate would be forced to bow before the great men, who had armies at their disposal instead of mere *auctoritas*. These seeds of revolution were planted by the culture, nurtured by empire in the age of Scipio and Flamininus, and bore fruit under later leaders such as Marius, Sulla and Pompey.

CONCLUSION ENDNOTES

1. Livy 33.32.5; Scullard, *Africanus*, 76-7, 260-1, n.57. Scullard believes Scipio used the term to gain favor with his men.
2. Plut. *Flam.* 16.3-4. Although Flamininus became the first Roman to have a hero cult dedicated to him, it was actually an old Greek tradition. To illustrate, Brasidas had been honored at Amphipolis in 424, the Spartan Lysander on Samos in 404, and Dion at Syracuse in 357. The Macedonian monarchy also seems to have had a royal hero cult.
3. Mary Beard and Michael Crawford, *Rome in the Late Republic*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 68-71. Rosenstein, 177-8.

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