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Edward Cardwell and the reform of the British Army, 1868-1874

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EDWARD CARDWELL AND THE REFORM
OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 1868-1874

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the College of Graduate Studies
University of Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Dennis R. Dubs
January 1966

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Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate Studies of the University of Omaha, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

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PREFACE

Although long interested in the dramatic aspects of military history, I must admit that I had little interest in the subject of military reform until the autumn of 1964. In a seminar conducted by Dr. A. Stanley Trickett on the reform movements in nineteenth century Britain, I became aware of the military reforms which Edward Cardwell instituted in the British Army during his secretaryship at the War Office between 1868 and 1874. After writing a seminar paper on one aspect of the Cardwell reforms, I became deeply interested in all the military reforms which he introduced. This thesis is the result of that interest.

Only one work, Robert Biddulph's Lord Cardwell at the War Office, has been devoted to the full nature of these reforms. Written by Cardwell's personal secretary at the War Office and published in 1904, this work provides a good description of the Cardwell reforms, but due to Biddulph's close relationship with Cardwell it lacks a sense of historical objectivity. Then too, the date of publication prevented the author from reaching any conclusions about the

impact of the Cardwell reforms on the British Army during the period immediately preceding the First World War.

In recent years Arvel B. Erickson has written a biography of "Edward T. Cardwell: Peelite," and has published it in the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. XLIX, Pt. 2, (1959). In this work, the first biography of the life of Cardwell, Erickson recognizes that in the history of nineteenth century Britain Cardwell's importance largely rests on his achievements as an Army reformer. Unlike Biddulph, however, Erickson limits his evaluation of the Cardwell reforms by looking at them as the apex of a political career which exhibited tremendous talent for administrative duties. While such a point of view is undoubtedly true, it is nevertheless too narrow.

Recognizing the weaknesses of both Biddulph's work and Erickson's biography, I have sought to re-evaluate the Cardwell reforms. The task of preparing this thesis has not been easy as the decisions involved in its organization and composition were difficult and frustrating to say the least. But decisions were made and conclusions were drawn, and I assume all responsibility for any shortcomings that may have resulted. Now that the task is finally finished I can

truly understand what the poet Kahlil Gibran meant when he wrote, "Your joy is your sorrow unmasked."

I wish to express my gratitude and appreciation to Dr. A. Stanley Trickett for his aid and encouragement in the preparation of this thesis. Without his advice and counsel this work might never have been completed. I also wish to thank the other members of the history faculty at the University of Omaha as each one of them has been of some help to me at one time or other during my graduate career thus far. Finally, I wish to thank Miss Ella Jane Dougherty for her help in locating books from libraries all over the country through the facilities of inter-library loan.

January 1966

Dennis R. Dubs.

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CHAPTER I

SETTING THE STAGE

Heavily burdened with immense military expenditures during the Napoleonic Wars, Great Britain was determined to reduce her large military establishment following Napoleon's final defeat at Waterloo in 1815.¹ In the interest of national finance the Duke of Wellington recognized that a general reduction of the military forces was imperative, but he urged Parliament to refrain from embarking on a policy of retrenchment that would destroy the regiments and battalions which had served him so faithfully on the continent. Fearful of impairing Britain's fighting capability in the future, military economists in Parliament heeded the Duke's advice and applied much of their "scrapping and scraping" to the supporting services of those combatant units.² It was not possible, however, to limit all the military reductions to

¹ Robert Biddulph, Lord Cardwell at the War Office (London: John Murray, 1904), p. 38. Hereafter cited as Biddulph.

² George Arthur, From Wellington to Wavell (London: Hutchinson and Co., [1942]), p. 63. Hereafter cited as Arthur.

transportation and supply sections as Britain's Army totaled 297,364 men in June 1814.³ With little need of a large military establishment in the post-war years, additional reductions were authorized in the ranks of the combatant units.⁴ By 1821, only six years after Waterloo, the British Army was reduced to approximately 100,000 men of whom 50,000 were stationed at home, 30,000 were distributed in the various colonies, and 20,000 were located in India.⁵

With Napoleon removed from the European political arena, no foreseeable danger prevented Great Britain from reducing her Army to this extent. In need only of a small force to preserve order at home and to maintain control of her colonies abroad, Britain could afford to restore her traditional reliance on the defensive protection which the English Channel and the Royal Navy offered.⁶ Surrounded

³Great Britain, British Sessional Papers, House of Commons, edited by Edgar L. Erickson, "Estimates of Regular and Militia Forces," IX (1814-1815), 321. Hereafter cited as B. S. P.

⁴Arthur, p. 63.

⁵Eric William Sheppard, A Short History of the British Army (4th ed.; London: Constable and Company, Ltd., 1950), p. 206. Hereafter cited as Sheppard.

⁶Peter Gibbs, The Battle of the Alma (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963), p. 12. Hereafter cited as Gibbs, Alma.

by water, the insular position of the British Isles offered its inhabitants a sense of security which Coleridge poetically described:

'Ocean, 'mid his uproar wild,
Speaks safety to his island child.'⁷

To be sure, the British did not forget their Army in the years which followed. After 1821 it was periodically increased in size until it reached approximately 140,000 men in 1854.⁸ But in spite of this increase in manpower, which was mainly distributed in the colonial stations, a corresponding concern was not given to the organizational and administrative needs of an Army spread around the world. With troops dispersed in small detachments throughout the Empire, no provision was made for a system of periodic transfer during the enlistment period of twenty-one years. Living in isolated out-of-the-way places, the men became less concerned with military drill or other activities that would promote efficiency within their ranks. Instead, they

⁷Great Britain, 3 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, CCXIV, 1078. Hereafter cited as Hansard's. Mr. W. Fowler, M. P., quoting Coleridge.

⁸Sheppard, p. 207; Ernest Llewellyn Woodward, The Age of Reform, 1815-1870, Vol. 13 of The Oxford History of England, ed. G. N. Clark (2nd ed., 14 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 271. Hereafter cited as Woodward.

married into native populations, settled on small farms to raise chickens, and grew fat from lack of activity.⁹

By 1850, the British Army was composed of little more than a confused hodge-podge of infantry battalions, cavalry regiments, and artillery batteries. The divisional and corps organization of the Peninsular Wars no longer existed. Regular maneuvers were no longer held, transportation and supply sections were maintained only within a skeleton framework, and officers had neither professional skill nor attitude as commissions were obtained by the system of purchase.¹⁰

Much of this degeneration was attributable to the state of dormancy which affected the organization and administration of the Army after the Napoleonic Wars.¹¹ It seemed that Wellington and Waterloo had proven the worth of the Army during its struggle with Napoleon; therefore, in the years that followed few attempts were ". . . made to modify or improve the armament, equipment and methods" ¹² When changes and adjustments were made, the modifications could

⁹ Arthur, pp. 63-64.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

¹¹ Gibbs, Alma, p. 15.

¹² Sheppard, p. 207.

best be described as piecemeal in character and patchwork in nature which resulted in a "sorry-looking" and "loudly-creaking" machine.¹³

The fact that the Army establishment became antiquated was largely due to no fault but its own.¹⁴ The cry for reform went up time and again both in and out of Parliament, but the Army high command continually turned a deaf ear. In 1837, for example, a Royal Commission, presided over by Lord Howick (later Earl Grey), made numerous recommendations to the Army for correcting imperfections within its organization and administration. As its prime suggestion, the Royal Commission recommended that the Secretary at War be made responsible for the entire administration of the Army.¹⁵ Since the Duke of Wellington believed that military matters must be kept entirely separate from politics, he vigorously opposed this recommendation and successfully led the fight against the acceptance of the proposals given by the Royal Commission.¹⁶

¹³Arthur, p. 64.

¹⁴Owen Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present (London: Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1914), pp. 149-150. Hereafter cited as Wheeler.

¹⁵Arthur, p. 81.

¹⁶Ibid.

Because Wellington personified the Army in its days of past military glory,¹⁷ much of the Army was left in the condition which the Duke desired.¹⁸ After all, as Wellington put it, there could be nothing drastically wrong with the Army which had triumphed at Waterloo.¹⁹

Not only did the Army high command oppose the reform of its administration and organization, but it did little to improve the circumstances of the common soldier. By any standard, life in the enlisted ranks of the Army left much to be desired. The men lived in crowded and unsanitary barracks, existing on an improper diet, drinking impure water, and wearing inadequate clothing.²⁰ As E. L. Woodward

¹⁷Gibbs, Alma, p. 12.

¹⁸"Against such changes--as the abolition of the Master-General, and the consolidation of the War Department under one Civil Head--the Duke of Wellington, in official intercourse, had solemnly warned the Ministry of Lord Melbourne in 1838, and of Earl Russell in 1849. They both heeded his warnings, or in deference to his great experience in War and Politics, abided by his advice." As stated in Charles M. Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown; Their Administration and Government (2 vols.; London: John Murray, 1869) II, 391. Hereafter cited as Clode.

¹⁹Anthony Wood, Nineteenth Century Britain, 1815-1914 (London: Longmans, 1960), p. 193. Hereafter cited as Wood.

²⁰Arvel B. Erickson, "Edward T. Cardwell: Peelite," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, XLIX, Pt. 2 (1959), 68. Hereafter cited as Erickson.

states, ". . . urinal tubs, which stood in the rooms during the night were emptied out in the morning and used for washing."²¹ As a result of such conditions, the men were easily susceptible to various diseases which attributed to a death-rate among the home forces that was five times greater than that of the civilian population. Living conditions were even worse overseas with the death-rates also much higher. Under such circumstances discipline could be maintained only through the use of severe punishments such as branding and flogging in an effort to prevent stealing, brawling, drunkenness, and desertion.²²

In retrospect, it is difficult to comprehend why such conditions were allowed to exist, especially when much of Great Britain was actively engaged in social, political, and economic reform. In general, three reasons can be cited for this disgraceful state of affairs. First of all, it was impossible to persuade Parliament to appropriate the necessary funds for financing reforms as the nation was involved in a mania for economy after 1815; therefore, military questions

²¹Woodward, p. 266, n. 2.

²²Erickson, p. 68; Woodward, p. 267.

gradually came to be considered in terms of economy alone. Secondly, Army officers were adverse to improving the living conditions of their troops just as they neglected to acquaint themselves with the technical aspects of their profession. Thirdly, the public recognized that reforms were needed but remained indifferent as it was convinced that reforms would be impossible to put into effect. In addition, the public failed to improve the situation by utilizing the enlisted ranks of the service as a means of "reforming" the problem men of the day. As a result, many good men often refrained from "picking up the King's shilling," and the presence of a large number of low caliber recruits was often used as an excuse to justify the lack of reform.²³ Thus, a man who was not a social outcast before enlisting in the Army soon became one when he did.²⁴ With these attitudes permeating the whole of British society mid-way in the nineteenth century, conditions were hardly conducive to reform. The advent of war, however, would soon change this situation.

The opening of the Great Exhibition in London on May 1, 1851, was hailed by many Victorian leaders as the

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Gibbs, Alma, p. 13.

beginning of a new era in international relations. It was hoped that in the future peaceful economic competition would replace military struggle as the means of settling international differences.²⁵ With the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854, such a dream was short lived. Excluding drab colonial skirmishes within the Empire, the British Army had not participated in a war since the struggle with Napoleon.²⁶ The Army, therefore, eagerly looked forward to the Crimean War as an adventure in which it could re-capture the "pools of military glory" in which it had bathed in previous years. With the excitement of a fox hunt the British Army embarked for the Crimea,²⁷ but once in the peninsula the Army discovered neither adventure nor glory; it experienced a nightmare instead.

Psychologically, the Crimean War was a shock to the Army establishment as it brought home the realities of

²⁵ John W. Dodds, The Age of Paradox: A Biography of England, 1841-1851 (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1952), pp. 469-470.

²⁶ W. H. Goodenough and J. C. Dalton, The Army Book for the British Empire (London: Harrison and Sons, 1893), p. 24. Hereafter cited as Army Book.

²⁷ Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), p. 138. Hereafter cited as Woodham-Smith.

Lord Bacon's proverbial addage, "'Let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great that is not awake upon any just occasion of arming.'"²⁸ As the British Army stumbled into the Crimea, confusion reigned supreme. Combat revealed the Army establishment to be almost totally unprepared for war; military leadership was almost non-existent as most officers were either inept or over-aged; and no clear-cut chain of command existed.²⁹ The systems of supply were inadequate and frequently broke down; the troops were often left without adequate means for waging war.³⁰ Matters became even more confusing when officers ignored the advice of their intelligence reports and left the transportation of troops to chance.³¹ As casualties and disease mounted, deficiencies in the ranks became widespread as the supply of reserve troops could not keep up with the demand.³²

The victims of this "system of mismanagement" were the British soldiers, and the horrors they suffered are too

²⁸Statement by Lord Bacon as cited by "The Military Forces of the Crown," Edinburgh Review, CXXXIII (January, 1871), 207. Hereafter cited as "Military Forces."

²⁹Erickson, p. 68.

³⁰Arthur, p. 28.

³¹Woodham-Smith, p. 136.

³²Wheeler, p. 149.

well known to bear repetition.³³ But in spite of privation, suffering, and death, the fighting quality of the British troops compensated for almost every lack in their leadership. As Peter Gibbs credits in his book The Battle of the Alma, the British soldiers saved the day for their leaders who did all but throw it away.³⁴

Responsibility for Britain's military ineptness cannot be blamed on leadership alone as due credit must also be given to the lack of an adequate administrative system. Immediately prior to 1854, the business of the Army was managed by the following eleven departments, all of which were independent of each other and communicated by letter: the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies; the Home Secretary; the General Commanding-in-Chief; the Secretary at War; the Ordnance Office; the Treasury; the Army Medical Department; the Audit Office; the Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital; the Board of General Officers; and the Paymaster-General.³⁵ Dr. Andrew Smith,

³³For a complete description of the mismanaged efforts of the British Army during the Crimean War see Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954).

³⁴Gibbs, Alma, p. 14.

³⁵Appendix A, p. 138.

Director-General of the Army and Ordnance Medical Department, when asked by the Sebastopol Committee investigating the conduct of the Crimean War who his superior was, replied, "The Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary at War, the Minister of War, the Master-General of Ordnance, and I hardly know how many more."³⁶

At the outbreak of the Crimean War it was recognized that unity in the Army administrative arrangement was badly needed. Hastily, a scheme for amalgamating the various departments was adopted, but this plan lacked defined objectives for effecting a purposeful amalgamation. Accordingly, in June 1854, the War Office was separated from the Colonial Office and placed under a newly created Secretary of State—the Secretary of State for War.³⁷ In December, the Commissariat Department was transferred from the Treasury to the War Office.³⁸ Early in February of the next year, the office of the Secretary at War was

³⁶Great Britain, Parliament Papers, "Report of the Select Committee on the Army Before Sebastopol," IX (1885), Pt. 1, 392, as cited by Erickson, p. 68, n. 6.

³⁷Biddulph, p. 9; Erickson, p. 69. Hereafter, when referring to the Secretary of State for War the shortened title of Secretary of War will be used.

³⁸Appendix A, p. 139.

combined with the duties of the Secretary of War.³⁹ In March, the control of the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers, was removed from the Home Office and given to an Inspector of Militia, who was made directly responsible to the Secretary of War. Shortly thereafter, the Secretary of War assumed responsibility for the Army Medical Department and the Army clothing establishment.⁴⁰

By 1856, the Secretary of War, having under his control all the civil administrative offices of the Army, was head of the whole administration of the Army at the War Office. The only Army department which was not located in the War Office at Pall Mall was the office of the General Commanding-in-Chief whose office was located at the Horse Guards. When the Secretary of War transferred the command and discipline of the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers to the General Commanding-in-Chief in May 1855, the General Commanding-in-Chief became the administrator of all the combatant branches of the Army.⁴¹ Technically, however, the

³⁹ Woodward, p. 292, n. 1. The office of Secretary at War continued to remain part of the duties of the Secretary of War until 1863, when it was finally abolished.

⁴⁰ Erickson, p. 69; "Military Forces," CXXXIII, 212-213.

⁴¹ Biddulph, pp. vi-vii, 9.

General Commanding-in-Chief was subject to the civil authority of the Secretary of War, but since his office was physically separated from the War Office and communicated with it by letter, the office of the General Commanding-in-Chief was considered a distinct department.⁴²

Thus, the immediate effect of the Crimean War was a revamping of the Army administrative system from numerous independent and mutually conflicting offices to two such offices—the Secretary of War, responsible for the civil administration of the Army, and the General Commanding-in-Chief, responsible for the military command and discipline of the fighting forces.⁴³

At first glance, it would appear that such sweeping reforms in the Army administrative system would have removed from the War Office much of its inefficiency, mismanagement, and lack of organization. Perhaps this might have been the case had the War Office been reconstructed under a clearly devised system. As it was, various departments were thrown

⁴²Wheeler, pp. 175-176; Biddulph, p. 10.

⁴³Sheppard, pp. 216-217. Hereafter when referring to the General Commanding-in-Chief, the title which was adopted in 1887 will be used--Commander-in-Chief. Erickson, p. 67, n. 1.

together under one head without having been properly combined.⁴⁴ At the end of the Crimean War the reconstructed War Office consisted of part of the Colonial Office, part of the Ordnance Office, all of the Secretary at War's Office, part of the Treasury, and part of the Home Office.⁴⁵ Consequently, duties were duplicated and further inefficiency resulted. Sir Robert Biddulph described this reconstruction in one word—catastrophe.⁴⁶

Administrative reform, however, was not the only lesson which the Crimean War had taught. On the plea of the recent experience of mismanagement, suffering, and privation in the Crimea, the public urged that greater concern be given to the common soldier as a tribute to his efforts during the war. As a result, the Victoria Cross for bravery was instituted in 1856, and it was open to all ranks.⁴⁷ Military hospitals were built at Netley and Woolwich, and a medical school was established in 1859 for the study and treatment of wounds and diseases.⁴⁸

⁴⁴"Military Forces," CXXXIII, 213.

⁴⁵Biddulph, p. vi.

⁴⁶Ibid.

⁴⁷Woodward, p. 292.

⁴⁸Wood, pp. 203-204.

Likewise, sums were appropriated for the construction of reading rooms, gymnasia, and other recreational facilities.⁴⁹

With the defects of the British military system clearly revealed in the Crimean experience and to a lesser degree by the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857,⁵⁰ rapid progress in the development of a reformed Army establishment was, nevertheless, not immediately forthcoming.⁵¹ During the interval between the close of the Crimean War and the advent of the first Gladstone Ministry in late 1868, many changes were made in the military system, but these changes were mechanical in nature; few, if any, were fundamentally organic.⁵²

The character of Army reform during this period can be explained, in part, by the frequent changes in the office

⁴⁹Erickson, p. 69.

⁵⁰The Indian Mutiny brought to light many defects in the inelastic system of recruitment in the British Army. For details see, "Inefficiency of the British Army," London Quarterly Review, CXXIX (October, 1870), 278.

⁵¹Sheppard, p. 215.

⁵²Clode, II, 390. In a work of this kind it is extremely difficult to apply any sort of justice to the changes which occurred during this interval. Admittedly, many changes were made, but it would be futile to list them all for they did not organically affect the structure of the Army's organization. For a brief account of the changes which occurred between 1854 and 1868 see Appendix A.

of the Secretary of War since its institution in 1855. Lord Panmure held the office for three years (1855-1858), and Sidney Herbert held it for two (1859-1861), but in two other instances the term of office did not last one year.⁵³ Military legislation, therefore, was not governed by uniform policy for any great lengths, and this contributed to much vacillation in purpose and planning.

There seemed little hope of lifting the Army out of its rut as the War Office failed to provide it with an administration and organization which was more in harmony with the requirements of the day. Prussia's fantastic rise to a powerful position of military strength, however, roused Britain from her lethargy, not to panic, but to a healthy sense of weakness by military comparison.⁵⁴ After Napoleon crushed the Prussians at Jena in 1806, the British observed the Prussians as they gradually rebuilt their Army into a high state of efficiency and power. In the meantime Britain's military strength dissipated with each succeeding generation.⁵⁵

⁵³Appendix B, p. 146.

⁵⁴J. S. Omond, Parliament and the Army, 1642-1904 (Cambridge: The University Press, 1933), p. 106. Hereafter cited as Omond.

⁵⁵Ibid. pp. 106-107.

In 1864, during the Schleswig-Holstein War, the Prussian Army tested its worth on the battlefields of Denmark. Two years later in the short Seven Weeks' War (Austro-Prussian War), the British were given additional proof of the efficiency and power of the Prussian Army by witnessing its rapid mobilization, its advanced weaponry, and its completeness in detail. The brilliant successes of the Prussian Army in these two campaigns illustrated the power of a nation which possessed a relatively small peacetime establishment, yet one which could be expanded at short notice to many times that strength. Britain realized that in the event of war with Prussia she could expect a decisive blow at an early moment. It, therefore, became a necessity to place the total military strength of the country on the battlefield at the very outset of war.⁵⁶ With the existing military system this was impossible.

The Crimean War brought to Great Britain the realization that many Army reforms were badly needed, but no one came forward to make them a reality. With the shadow of Prussian war-clouds rising over the continent radical

⁵⁶Army Book, pp. 44-45.

changes in the military system were imperative. The military resources of the country had to be made more available on sudden emergencies than recent experience had shown them to be. The stage was set, but where was the man of genius who would give impetus to a wise policy and guide it in its progress?

With the Liberal victory at the polls in November 1868, William E. Gladstone became Britain's new Prime Minister. In his Cabinet Gladstone chose his able and respected friend Edward T. Cardwell to become Secretary of War. Unknown but to fate, this Peelite from Liverpool was to lead Britain's archaic Army establishment into an era of military reform which was unprecedented in British History.

CHAPTER II

CARDWELL ARRIVES AT THE WAR OFFICE

Edward T. Cardwell was born in Liverpool on June 24, 1813, during the height of the Napoleonic Wars.¹ As the son of John Cardwell, a prosperous merchant with extensive business interests, young Edward was destined to receive an excellent education. He prepared for the University at Winchester, and after completing his preparatory studies, he entered Balliol College, Oxford, in 1832, where he did exceptionally well in his scholastic efforts. Possessing an excellent mind, which he diligently applied to all his tasks, Cardwell won an open scholarship and earned a double first class in classics and mathematics. Following the completion of his undergraduate studies, he was elected to a fellowship where he continued to display his scholarly abilities.²

¹Erickson, p. 5.

²Erickson, p. 6; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; Wheeler, p. 16. See also, George Stronach, "Edward Cardwell," Dictionary of National Biography, III, 952. Hereafter cited as D. N. B.

In addition to pursuing his education at Oxford, Cardwell formed life-long friendships with many able men who later held high public office, including among others, Sidney Herbert, Robert Lowe, Roundell Palmer, and William E. Gladstone.³ In turn, each of these men later played vital roles in Cardwell's political career.

After quitting the University, Cardwell was called to the bar in 1838 where he soon became quite prominent as a lawyer. His financial circumstances, however, allowed him to remain independent from a profession, and he decided to enter public service. In 1842, Cardwell chose to run for Parliament and was elected as a free-trade Conservative, representing Clitheroe.⁴ During his first few years in Parliament, Cardwell quietly acquainted himself with parliamentary processes without distinguishing himself in any particular manner. In the meantime, however, he developed a close political, as well as personal, relationship with

³Erickson, p. 6.

⁴Erickson, p. 6; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; Wheeler, p. 186; D. N. B., III, 952. Clitheroe was a small borough in the northeast corner of Lancashire.

Sir Robert Peel.⁵ Their friendship was a natural one as Cardwell resembled Peel in character and industry,⁶ while Peel, in turn, admired Cardwell's special ability for handling financial and commercial affairs. By 1845, Cardwell had so developed these talents he was firmly established as a reliable defender of commercial interests. That same year Peel rewarded him with an appointment to his Conservative Ministry as Secretary to the Treasury.⁷

With the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, a rupture occurred in the Conservative Party between Peel and the protectionists. The wound was fatal, and Peel's Conservative Ministry fell. In the period of political instability which followed, Cardwell remained true to his chief and, together with a small group of Peelites, continued to hold conservative views in general politics and liberal views in regard to commercial questions.⁸ In 1847, during Cardwell's successful

⁵Erickson, p. 6; D. N. B., III, 952. Their relationship became so close that on Peel's death in 1850, Cardwell was appointed his literary executor in conjunction with Lord Mahon. Biddulph, p. 16.

⁶D. N. B., III, 952.

⁷Erickson, pp. 6-7; Biddulph, pp. 15-16; D. N. B., III, 952.

⁸D. N. B., III, 952.

campaign for the Liverpool seat as an independent Conservative, he and other Peelites attempted to organize the free-trade members of the Conservative Party into a separate political body. The effort failed, but this group of moderate progressive statesmen (about forty in number) of liberal-conservative principles voted together so consistently for a decade thereafter, they were often referred to as the Peelite Party.⁹

As Liverpool's representative between 1847 and 1852, Cardwell supported free-trade principles so consistently that few of his constituents could find fault with him.¹⁰ In the election of 1852, however, he lost his seat in the House of Commons, but not in consequence of having voted for the repeal of the Navigation Acts.¹¹ His defeat came as the result of a religious controversy arising from the issuance of a Papal Bull in 1850, which divided England into Territorial Sees and established a hierarchy of

⁹Erickson, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 9.

¹¹George Stronach, author of Cardwell's biography in the Dictionary of National Biography, states that Cardwell lost his Liverpool seat in 1852 for having voted for the repeal of the Navigation Acts. This is utter nonsense for commercial Liverpool was committed to the repeal of the Navigation Acts just as was Cardwell. See D. N. B., III, 952.

bishops. This action was widely denounced throughout the country, and in response to it, Lord John Russell introduced to Parliament an Ecclesiastical Title Bill to prevent the Bill from being put into effect. Cardwell, along with other Peelites, vigorously opposed the bill, but their efforts were in vain. As a result of this high-church position, Cardwell alienated enough of Liverpool's Protestant electors by 1852 to prevent his election.¹²

Cardwell contested another seat at Craigie, Ayrshire, that same year, but again his high-church stand blocked his return to Parliament. Early in January 1853, the Oxford seat was vacated, and again Cardwell sought election. This bid was successful¹³ as Cardwell's high-church convictions and conservatism were more at home in the Oxford representation. Even though Cardwell spent the rest of his public life in the House of Commons representing Oxford, he continued to hold the "Liverpool line" in his economic principles just as he had in the past.¹⁴

¹²Erickson, p. 10.

¹³Ibid., p. 12; D. N. B., III, 952.

¹⁴Erickson, p. 12.

With the formation of Lord Aberdeen's coalition Government in 1852, Cardwell was invited to become President of the Board of Trade. In Lord Aberdeen's Ministry, which consisted of six Whigs, six Peelites, and one Radical, Cardwell assumed his position on the Board of Trade without having a seat in the Cabinet as Whig leaders protested the large number of Peelites in the coalition.¹⁵ Cardwell's appointment, aside from his party role, was met with almost universal acceptance as he was widely recognized as a learned financier with a healthy appetite for work. As President of the Board of Trade, Cardwell was presented with a real challenge for despite its partial reorganization in 1840, when a railway department was added, it remained in a confused state of affairs. This challenge he eagerly accepted.¹⁶

During the Crimean War, Cardwell had little to do with military matters, but his office skillfully handled all the commercial problems relating to it.¹⁷ These

¹⁵ D. N. B., III, 952.

¹⁶ Erickson, p. 13.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 14.

concerns were not all demanding, however, as the Crimean War was fought without significant disruptions in Britain's commercial activities. Most of Cardwell's attention was directed toward difficulties at home concerning the British railroad system. At this time the British railways were in a highly chaotic state of affairs as they had developed haphazardly over the years without governmental supervision. For the sake of public convenience, Cardwell proposed legislation for the purpose of standardizing and systematizing the various railway lines. His proposed legislation, however, did not squarely face the question of whether the railroads were public or private affairs, and it left railroad regulation strictly in the hands of private enterprise. Consequently, his efforts were unsuccessful.¹⁸

While Cardwell failed to meet the needs of internal trade in dealing with the railway system, he had more success in regulating coastal and foreign shipping. His Merchant Shipping Bill of 1854,¹⁹ codified existing laws relating to shipping, added important amendments and

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 15-16.

¹⁹For a discussion of the Merchant Shipping Bill and its amendments, see Erickson, pp. 16-19.

additions, which to this day, forms the basic foundation for the code of the British Merchant Marine.²⁰

In January 1855, Lord Aberdeen's Government gave way to a subsequent Ministry by Lord Palmerston, but Cardwell continued to remain at the Board of Trade. On the discovery, however, that Palmerston intended to give in to a demand for an inquiry into the conduct of the Crimean War, a demand which Lord Aberdeen had refused, Cardwell, along with Peelites Sir James Graham, Sidney Herbert, and William E. Gladstone, resigned. After his resignation, Palmerston attempted to retain Cardwell's services by offering him the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer. Cardwell was flattered, but out of loyalty to his friends he refused the offer.²¹

During his next few years in Parliament, Cardwell voted as an independent liberal-conservative, but gradually gravitated toward the Liberal Party.²² Late in 1856, however, he voted against Lord Palmerston's Ministry on a censure resolution pertaining to the Chinese War. The

²⁰ D. N. B., III, 952.

²¹ Biddulph, p. 16; Erickson, pp. 19-20.

²² D. N. B., III, 952.

passage of this resolution brought about Palmerston's resignation, and on the appeal to the country which followed, Cardwell lost his Oxford seat in the House of Commons in the spring elections of 1857. Charles Neate, the successful candidate, however, was unseated by petition for violating the Corrupt Practices Act, and in a new election Cardwell was returned to Parliament by a majority of fifty-three votes over his opponent, William Thackery.²³

Despite the vote of confidence which Palmerston received in the elections of 1857, he remained as Prime Minister hardly a year when the Orsini assassination attempt on the life of the French Emperor Napoleon III brought about his downfall. As a result, Lord Derby formed a completely Conservative Ministry in 1858, but the wily Palmerston was back in office the following year.²⁴ In the Palmerston Cabinet Cardwell was chosen to become Secretary for Ireland. At this post he continued to demonstrate his usual patience and industry,²⁵ but despite his good intentions, Cardwell's efforts had little effect on

²³D. N. B., III, 953; Erickson, pp. 21-22.

²⁴Erickson, pp. 23-25. ²⁵D. N. B., III, 953.

Ireland's economic plight. As a result, he was quite uncongenial in this position.²⁶

In July 1861, ill-health forced Sidney Herbert to resign from the Palmerston Ministry as Secretary of War. In the Cabinet re-shuffling which followed, Cardwell became the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, a Cabinet position without portfolio.²⁷ Cardwell could hardly regard this change as a promotion, but the Ministry utilized this senial office to engage his advice and counsel for all government departments. In this respect Cardwell was of special aid to Gladstone, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he provided him with assistance on financial, banking, and currency questions.²⁸

Cardwell remained as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster from July 1861, to April 1864, when he became Colonial Secretary upon the resignation of the Duke of Newcastle.²⁹ As Colonial Secretary, he played an important

²⁶For details of Cardwell's performance as Secretary for Ireland, see Erickson, pp. 26-32.

²⁷Erickson, p. 32; D. N. B., III, 953.

²⁸Erickson, p. 32.

²⁹Ibid. For a detailed account of Cardwell's activities in the Colonial Office, see Erickson, pp. 32-66.

role in the development of a policy which his predecessor had initiated shortly before his resignation.³⁰ At a time when a large proportion of the British Army was serving in the colonies, Cardwell carried out Newcastle's principle of withdrawing Imperial troops which the Colonies would not financially support during peace time. This policy not only relieved the British taxpayer of an expense, but it also promoted the development of Britain's modern system of colonial self-government and self-defense.³¹ Later, it would have an important bearing on Cardwell's subsequent work as an Army reformer.³²

Upon the death of Lord Palmerston in 1865, Cardwell remained at the Colonial office until Palmerston's successor, Lord Russell, resigned on June 27 of the following year.³³ Russell's resignation came on the question of reforming the Parliamentary franchise, something which Russell had long

³⁰Hansard's, CXCV, 1116.

³¹D. N. B., III, 953; Wheeler, pp. 186-187.

³²See below, pp. 38-39.

³³Biddulph, p. 16; Erickson, p. 16.

desired.³⁴ Exhausted from his labors at the Colonial Office, Cardwell departed for an extended vacation in

Italy.³⁵

Upon his return, Cardwell found the Conservative Derby Government vitally taken up with the question of Parliamentary Reform. When the Derby Ministry came to power following Russell's resignation, few thought it would have any chance to pass a reform bill. Derby's minority Government was looked upon as an interim, whereby the Liberals could re-form their party lines, return to power, and pass a franchise bill. Mainly through the efforts of Benjamin Disraeli, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Conservative leader in the House of Commons, this did not occur as he successfully managed the Reform Bill of 1867.³⁶

³⁴ Elie Halévy and R. B. McCallum, Victorian Years, 1841-1895, Vol. IV of Halévy's A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, Translated by E. I. Watkin (6 vols.; New York: Barnes and Noble, 1961), 441. Hereafter cited as Halévy.

³⁵ Erickson, p. 66.

³⁶ "The Bill As It Is," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CII (August, 1867), 253.

In February 1868, Disraeli replaced the ailing Derby as Prime Minister,³⁷ a position Disraeli would hold less than a year. Although Disraeli had successfully manipulated the reform of the Parliamentary franchise, the popularity of his Ministry waned as he absorbed defeats in April and May of 1868, on Gladstone's resolutions proposing the disestablishment of the Irish Church.³⁸ Unable to sustain such defeats, Disraeli announced that Parliament would be dissolved that autumn so general elections could take place under the franchise created by the Reform Bill of 1867.³⁹ Both parties waged vigorous campaigns, but on November 23, 1868, the Liberal Party overwhelmed the Conservatives at the polls.⁴⁰ With the Liberal victory, Gladstone was summoned by Queen Victoria on December 1 to become Britain's new Prime Minister.⁴¹

Many assumed that in the new Liberal Ministry Cardwell would become Chancellor of the Exchequer, as he had been

³⁷John Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone (New York: The Macmillian Company, 1903), II, 244. Hereafter cited as Morley.

³⁸Halévy, IV, 444.

³⁹Erickson, p. 66.

⁴⁰Morley, II, 251.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 252.

offered the post in the past.⁴² Instead, on December 4 Cardwell received Gladstone's invitation to become head of the War Office. Three days later on December 7 an official announcement was made of Cardwell's decision to accept the appointment.⁴³

As Cardwell assumed the office of Secretary of War, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine lamented, "It is impossible not to be sorry for Mr. Cardwell."⁴⁴ He ". . . reigns, the supreme head over the most expensive, and we may venture to add, by far the most inefficient military establishment on the face of the earth."⁴⁵ Such remorse was unnecessary for Cardwell was not unaware of the difficult tasks which lay ahead. During the Crimean War, while serving as President of the Board of Trade, and then

⁴²Erickson, p. 67.

⁴³Biddulph, p. 1.

⁴⁴"How Is The Country Governed?" Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CX (September, 1871), 394.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 393. Such a charge was not too difficult to substantiate as the British Army was only one-sixth the size of the French Army, but yet the expenditures for both were almost equal. In comparison with the Prussian Army, the British Army was only one-twelfth the size, yet military expenditures were double. J. E. Cairnes, "Our Defences: A National or a Standing Army," Fortnightly Review, IX (February 1, 1871), 170.

later, and more directly, as Colonial Secretary, Cardwell had gained ample knowledge of the costly inefficient Army system. He was firmly convinced that the War Department could be run more efficiently and more economically. As the new Secretary of War he would have almost six years to prove it.⁴⁶

Cardwell knew that if ever unity and economy were to be introduced into the organization and administration of the military forces, his energy as Secretary of War had to be dedicated toward achieving three objectives. First of all, he had to continue the unification of the War Office begun during the Crimean War. Secondly, he had to effect a proper division in the administrative duties of the War Department. Thirdly, he had to lay the foundation for arranging the military forces of Great Britain into an effective system of national defense.⁴⁷

These objectives were by no means a radical departure from the past, but Cardwell knew that before these goals ever became realities many obstacles had to be overcome. First, there was the question of finance. Military reforms involved great sums of money, and Parliament was not eager

⁴⁶Erickson, p. 67.

⁴⁷Biddulph, pp. 25-26.

to appropriate funds for such purposes.⁴⁸ Secondly, reform involved social difficulties, particularly among the upper-classes. This section of British society was indisposed to severing ancient connections, especially when Army reform involved land owners and the nation's institutions. In addition, Army officers were looked upon to provide color and gaiety at social functions; the upper-classes did not wish to see this dimmed by Army reform.⁴⁹ Thirdly, neither the Conservative Party nor the Liberal Party was inclined toward reform but both for different reasons. The Conservatives were the natural ally of the wealthy upper-classes, who for social reasons, wished to maintain the status quo for the Army. The Liberals, on the other hand, were economy minded for financial reasons and not above reducing reform budgets.⁵⁰ Lastly, Army reform faced serious constitutional difficulties for traditionally the control of the Army rested in the hands of the Crown. Reform measures, emanating from the Secretary of War, would only weaken the authority and influence that the control of the Army gave to the Crown.

⁴⁸Erickson, p. 69; Wheeler, p. 187.

⁴⁹Erickson, pp. 69-70.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 70.

Naturally, neither Queen Victoria, nor her cousin the Duke of Cambridge, the Commander-in-Chief, nor the bulk of the Army officers, would look with favor upon weakening the military prerogative of the Crown.⁵¹

Early in December 1868, shortly after his appointment, Cardwell began preparing a memorandum on the whole question of Army reform for presentation to the Cabinet.⁵² As recent events in Europe had already brought the question into focus, Cardwell felt the new Liberal Ministry would soon be forced to deal with the matter. In this memorandum, which Cardwell presented to the Cabinet early in January 1869,⁵³ he accurately forecast that before anything could be done about general Army reform the Secretary of War had to be acknowledged the final authority on all military matters.⁵⁴ Cardwell explained to the Cabinet that theoretically the Commander-in-Chief was subordinate to the Secretary of War, but in reality both offices held dual control over the military establishment as neither office was independent, nor subordinate to the other.⁵⁵ Even though

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Biddulph, p. v.

⁵³Erickson, p. 70.

⁵⁴Biddulph, p. v.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. vii.

the Duke of Cambridge, as Commander-in-Chief, had tacitly submitted to the Secretary of War as his superior, Cardwell stated that this would not do as an official arrangement.⁵⁶

As Cardwell attempted to deal with this problem of Army administration he encountered much opposition for two schools of thought existed on the matter of military control. The first was the "professional" school, and it maintained that any individual who administered the affairs of the Army had to possess a distinguished record in the military service.⁵⁷ Cardwell, however, was not of like mind as he was never a member of the military service, a fate for which the Quarterly Review soundly condemned him as not having a single qualification for heading the War Office.⁵⁸ Instead, Cardwell chose to belong to the "constitutional" school of thought which held the view that the Army was under the control of Parliament and its representative. Since Cardwell based the authority of his office on this principle, it was only natural that his initial efforts at ending dual control

⁵⁶Erickson, p. 70.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 67.

⁵⁸"Inefficiency of the British Army," Quarterly Review, CXXIX (July-October, 1870), 509. Hereafter cited as "Inefficiency of the British Army."

would be met with severe opposition from Army officers and their friends, both in and out of Parliament.⁵⁹

Before Cardwell could gain much momentum toward ending dual control in the military establishment, he had to direct his energies toward the preparation of the Army Estimates for the coming year. As Secretary of War Cardwell knew that he was expected by the Ministry to cut military expenditures without weakening the nation's defenses at home or abroad.⁶⁰ He did not consider such a task impossible for on January 9, 1869, in a letter to Gladstone, Cardwell proposed an arrangement whereby an efficient defensive force could be maintained at a greatly reduced cost. He informed Gladstone that he was prepared to reduce the colonial forces from 50,000 to 26,000, place the discipline of the Militia under the War Office and train it with the Army, and eliminate the inefficient corps within the Volunteers and combine its training with the Militia and the Army.⁶¹

The first of these changes, the reduction of colonial forces, was the most important as Cardwell considered this

⁵⁹Erickson, p. 67.

⁶⁰Biddulph, p. 25.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 26.

policy to be a progressive step toward general Army reform. This proposed action was merely a continuation of the principle of colonial self-reliance which had its development during his tenure as Colonial Secretary.⁶² By reducing the colonial forces Cardwell hoped that in the future it would not be as difficult to encourage enlistments as it had in the past. With increased enlistments the period of foreign service could eventually be reduced and a balance struck between home service and service abroad. Cardwell hoped that this would pave the way to a shorter enlistment period, something which he considered essential for a healthy Army organization.⁶³

On March 11, 1869, Cardwell presented his much-awaited Army Estimates to the House of Commons for the coming fiscal year—April 1, 1869, to March 31, 1870.⁶⁴ He announced the net expenditure for the Army services at £12,047,600 which compared to £13,331,000 for the previous

⁶²See above, pp. 29-30.

⁶³Biddulph, pp. 26-27.

⁶⁴Hansard's, CXCIV, 1111. For an itemized account of expenditures see, B. S. P., "Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective Services for 1869-70," XXXVI (1868-1869), 2-201.

year, a reduction of £1,283,400.⁶⁵ This retrenchment was made possible during Cardwell's first year in office by his policy of withdrawing troops from the colonies which, in turn, activated further reductions in the purchase of military supplies.⁶⁶ By reducing the number of troops in the colonial stations Cardwell was able, not only to reduce military expenditures, but also to increase the estimate of troops for home defense in the coming year to 92,015 men, as compared with 87,505 for the previous year.⁶⁷

To many individuals it looked as if Cardwell was strengthening home defenses at the expense of the colonies, but he argued the latter would not be weakened. On the contrary, his policy would strengthen the colonies for it would force them to rely more on their own resources.⁶⁸ Furthermore, the colonies had no need of fear for as Cardwell stated, ". . . they live under the aegis of . . . England, and . . . war with them is war with England."⁶⁹

During Cardwell's long speech on the Estimates, he outlined to the House of Commons what his future intentions

⁶⁵Hansard's, CXCIV, 1111.

⁶⁶Erickson, p. 72.

⁶⁷Hansard's, CXCIV, 1114.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 1117.

⁶⁹Ibid.

were for the Army. He felt that Great Britain, protected by her insular location and large Navy, needed only a small but efficient peace-time Army, yet one capable of easy expansion. This Army needed to be provisioned with matériel of the highest quality, but he cautioned that supplies should never be allowed to accumulate to such large proportions that wear or obsolescence became a danger.⁷⁰ Furthermore, he stated that necessity demanded stronger relations be developed and maintained between the Regular Army and the auxiliary forces in order to derive the maximum advantage from their combined strength.⁷¹ Cardwell concluded by stating that the Army Estimates were founded on the ". . . determination that nothing should be allowed to injure the efficiency of the service, or the interests of the country."⁷²

At the conclusion of his address, Cardwell received warm praise from both sides of the aisle, not only for showing a considerable reduction in the Estimates, but also for conjecturing future improvements in the military system.⁷³

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 1123.

⁷¹Ibid., pp. 1124-1129.

⁷²Ibid., p. 1139.

⁷³Ibid., pp. 1140, 1151, 1157, 1162, 1165.

Strangely enough, Cardwell made only slight reference to the fact that the relationship between the War Office and the Horse Guards was under review, and made no mention of needed administrative reforms at the War Office.⁷⁴ As a result, the professional soldiers were somewhat relieved at what they considered to be a mild program of Army reform; nevertheless, they remained apprehensive as to what Cardwell might do next.⁷⁵ They would not have long to wait.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 1139.

⁷⁵Erickson, p. 73.

CHAPTER III

WAR OFFICE REORGANIZATION

Upon accepting the seals of the War Office, Cardwell stipulated that Lord Northbrook be appointed his Under-Secretary of State for War.¹ Cardwell's preference for this important position was a man who possessed excellent credentials as an administrator. Prior to his elevation to the House of Lords, Northbrook served in the House of Commons for ten years, holding appointments as Lord of the Admiralty, Under-Secretary of State for War, for India, and for the Home Office.² A man of Northbrook's ability and experience might well have sought higher office, but he chose to accept Cardwell's invitation to become his Under-Secretary. As it turned out, the office proved to be more important, and the work more arduous, than many other offices of higher rank.³

Capitalizing on the thoroughness and energy with which Northbrook discharged his administrative duties,

¹Bernard Mallet, Thomas George: Earl of Northbrook (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1908), p. 48. Hereafter cited as Mallet.

²Erickson, p. 70.

³Mallet, p. 48.

Cardwell appointed him chairman of a small committee to inquire into the existing arrangements for conducting the business of the Army departments, including the Horse Guards.⁴ Northbrook's Committee, as it was known, conducted a thorough investigation, and its conclusions were presented to Parliament in three successive reports—one in March 1869, a second in May of the same year, and a third in February 1870.⁵

The first of these reports was submitted to Parliament on March 11, 1869, the same day that Cardwell presented his Army Estimates for the fiscal year 1869-1870. In this report the Northbrook Committee analyzed the supervision of expenditures incurred by the various administrative departments within the War Office. It discovered that the Army departments functioned under the traditional theory of financial control, whereby they were constantly checked, watched, and distrusted. Thus, two antagonistic powers

⁴Ibid.

⁵B. S. P., "Report of the Committee appointed to Inquire into the Arrangements in Force for the Conduct of Business in the Army," XII (1870), 3-24. In addition to Northbrook, the following individuals were also on the committee: J. Stansfeld, W. G. Anderson, and Edward Lugard.

existed within the War Office as the various departments sought to increase expenditure, while administrative policy sought to check expenditure. Efficiency and economy were thus in conflict.⁶ The Northbrook Committee recommended that a better system of management lay in the harmonization of finance and administration through the Secretary of War. Rather than maintaining a critical division of War Office administration, the Northbrook Committee suggested that the Secretary of War, since he was responsible for both finance and administration, could attend to financial considerations on administrative policy from its inception. Thereby, he could prevent financial matters from hindering administrative policy during the development of the latter during each fiscal year.⁷

Since it was impossible for the Secretary of War to observe all the demands of financial expenditure, the Northbrook Committee advised that a subordinate Parliamentary officer be created to assist him ". . . in the success of the whole administration of the Army" ⁸ Termed the

⁶Ibid., p. 3.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid.

Financial Secretary, this officer, using the existing Accountant-General's Department as his staff, could supervise the compilation of the Army Estimates which originated in the various administrative departments.⁹ By imposing on the department heads the responsibility of constructing the Estimates in accordance with the financial and administrative policies of the government as set forth by the Secretary of War, efficiency and economy could more easily be introduced into the overall administration of the Army.¹⁰

Ironically, the newly recommended policy of harmonizing finance with administration was anticipated by Cardwell. During the preparation of the Army Estimates for 1869-1870, he had instructed the various department heads in the responsibility of constructing Army expenditures in accordance with administrative policy. As a result, Cardwell was able to reduce the Army Estimates for the coming fiscal year by a considerable amount; therefore, in the conclusion of its first report, the Northbrook Committee commended Cardwell for having previously adopted a policy which made this reduction possible.¹¹

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 4.

¹¹Ibid.

On May 7, 1869, two months after submitting its first report, the Northbrook Committee presented a second in which it reviewed administrative policy on the question of Army transport and supply.¹² Two years earlier, in 1867, a committee presided over by Lord Strathnairn, recommended the fusion of the departments of Supply, Transport, Commissariat, Stores, Purveyors, and Barracks under a Controller-in-Chief.¹³ Sir John Pakington, then Secretary of War, accepted the recommendation of the Strathnairn Committee and appointed Sir Henry Storks as head of the newly created Control Department by placing him in charge of the reorganization.¹⁴ While Pakington carried out the main recommendation of the Strathnairn Committee, the Northbrook Committee pointed out that he did not adopt its proposal to create a separate Ordnance Department. With the understanding that Pakington had left this suggestion for future consideration,¹⁵ the Northbrook Committee recommended that the provision, custody,

¹²Ibid., p. 6.

¹³Ibid., "Copy of Correspondence between the Treasury and the War Office respecting the formation of the Department of Control," XLII (1867-1868), 877.

¹⁴Ibid. Sir Henry Storks remained as Controller-in-Chief under Edward Cardwell, Pakington's successor.

¹⁵Ibid., XII (1870), 6.

and issuance of war munitions continue to remain part of the Control Department. In regard to this question the Northbrook Committee felt that unity of administration greatly outweighed any advantages which might be derived from the creation of separate departments.¹⁶

After submitting its second report Lord Northbrook's Committee immediately proceeded to its third task which involved an investigation of the administration of the War Office and the Horse Guards. In pursuit of this inquiry it took a considerable amount of evidence, and its third report, which led to important results, was not presented to Parliament until February 12, 1870.¹⁷ In the report the Northbrook Committee pointed out that dual control existed:

. . . between the War Office and the Horse Guards, and the habit is still to prefer a system of unnecessary check, double labour, and divided responsibility to one of well-defined responsibility, simplicity, and confidence.¹⁸

Instead of dual control, the Northbrook Committee recommended that a sound system of Army administration be based on the

¹⁶Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 9.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 10.

following principles: (1) The Secretary of War was the responsible head of Army administration; therefore, all Army departments had to be responsible to him; (2) The Secretary of War, of necessity, dealt with the large questions of policy and planning; therefore, the daily task of Army administration had to be conducted by the department heads under him and their subordinates. In conclusion, the Northbrook Committee stated that these recommendations were based on the assumption that arrangements were in progress for ending dual control.¹⁹

Upon becoming Secretary of War, Cardwell realized that until his civilian office was established as the supreme, unquestioned authority of Army administration, the War Department would continue to remain subject to separate staffing, duplication of duties, and departmental squabbling. Thus, while the Northbrook Committee was preparing and presenting its reports, Cardwell was struggling to centralize the administration of the Army under his control. These efforts were made extremely difficult by the presence of the Duke of Cambridge in the office of the

¹⁹Ibid.

Commander-in-Chief at the Horse Guards.²⁰ Since becoming the Commander-in-Chief in 1857, the Duke had conducted his command without significant interference from the War Office; therefore, he had come to regard his position as almost unassailable by 1869.²¹ Not only was the Duke unduly autocratic and extremely conservative in military matters, but he was also ". . . imbued with the most rigid opinions as to the relationship of the Sovereign with the Army" ²² In addition, he possessed a strong sense of personal dignity which fortified his conviction that the prestige of the Commander-in-Chief would be destroyed if his office were moved to Pall Mall and placed under the direct control of the Secretary of War.²³

In the same strain the Queen wrote to Cardwell admonishing him that ". . . such a step could not fail to damage the position of the Commander-in-Chief."²⁴ Along

²⁰Erickson, p. 73.

²¹Wheeler, p. 184.

²²Ibid., p. 164.

²³Omond, p. 112.

²⁴George Earle Buckle (ed.), The Letters of Queen Victoria (2nd series; New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), I, 584-585. Hereafter cited as Letters of Queen Victoria.

with her cousin the Duke of Cambridge, the Queen simply did not understand the necessity of reorganizing the administration of the Army. Her opposition, therefore, forced Cardwell to postpone any definite action on dual control until the Northbrook Committee completed its study and made its recommendations.²⁵

Meanwhile, to avoid Her Majesty's displeasure Cardwell proceeded with great caution. In answer to questions in the House of Commons he denied that dual control existed either in theory or principle,²⁶ and defended this position by referring to an Order-in-Council, issued on October 11, 1861, which restricted the Commander-in-Chief to the authority of the Secretary of War.²⁷ Cardwell, however, was aware that communications between his office and the Horse Guards were conducted by official correspondence just like any two other government offices.

²⁵Erickson, p. 73.

²⁶Hansard's, CXCVII, 145.

²⁷B. S. P., XXXVI (1868-69), 591.

which were entirely independent of each other.²⁸ As Secretary of War, he conducted the civil administration of the Army while the Commander-in-Chief exercised direct authority over the military forces.²⁹ Realistically, however, Cardwell knew that dual control existed but to openly admit it and advocate its abolition meant an attack upon the military prerogative of the Crown before he had the political support to do so.³⁰

After the Northbrook Committee made public its recommendation to end dual control, Cardwell's effort to abolish the system gained considerable momentum. But before Cardwell could take political action, he had to maneuver the Duke of Cambridge into attending weekly meetings of the War Council which was composed of the heads of the various Army departments. When Cardwell first suggested such meetings for the purpose of

²⁸The drawbacks of such an arrangement were obvious. Matters that could be easily settled with the spoken word were clumsily drawn out by correspondence. Later that same year (1869) Cardwell forbade correspondence between the War Office and the Horse Guards and established a common registry for the letters of both. This reduced the number of letters for that year by thirty-thousand in the War Office alone. Biddulph, pp. 54-55.

²⁹Ibid., p. 226.

³⁰Erickson, p. 73.

administrative planning, the Duke agreed with the idea but refused to attend unless his staff was allowed to accompany him. The Duke, inclined to be overly concerned with his prestige as Commander-in-Chief, was worried that his dignity would be impaired if his advisers were not present in the assemblage of Cardwell's staff. Cardwell, however, denied the Duke's request as he informed His Royal Highness that he did not need the advice of the Duke's staff, but he did need the counsel of his Commander-in-Chief.³¹ Diplomatically, Cardwell wrote to the Duke stating that he was prepared "to look to Your Royal Highness as my principle military adviser, in a sense, and to a degree, not yet practiced" ³² In deference to this cajolery by the Secretary of War the Duke agreed to attend the War Council meetings without his staff, and regular meetings of the War Council were held on a weekly basis for the first time in British History.³³

By no means ignorant of Cardwell's intention to remove his office from the Horse Guards and place it in the

³¹ Ibid., p. 75.

³² Cardwell Papers 30/48/3-13: 208. Cardwell to the Duke of Cambridge, April 12, 1870, as cited by Erickson, p. 75.

³³ Erickson, p. 75.

War Department at Pall Mall, the Duke of Cambridge fully realized that his position as Commander-in-Chief was gradually becoming more and more subordinate to the authority of the Secretary of War. In an effort to forestall his inevitable removal to the War Office, the Duke compromisingly suggested that he go to Pall Mall whenever the Secretary of War wished to see him. Cardwell, however, refused to grant such a concession.³⁴

In the meantime Cardwell prepared a draft of an Order-in-Council which clearly defined the duties of the Commander-in-Chief as subordinate to the Secretary of War and limited the Duke's successors to a five year tenure. Cardwell sent this document to the Duke who reluctantly approved it after the Secretary of War agreed to extend the command of His Royal Highness over the British military forces in Canada and Ireland.³⁵ Fearing a threat to her Royal military prerogative, the Queen did not wish to sign the Order, but did so on June 4, 1870,³⁶ on the formal request of her Prime Minister.³⁷ With Her Majesty's

³⁴Wheeler, p. 196.

³⁵Erickson, p. 75.

³⁶B. S. P., XLII (1870), 683.

³⁷Morley, II, 360-361.

signature the office of the Commander-in-Chief became what Cardwell intended it to be, a departmental office under the direction of the Secretary of War.³⁸ Although the Commander-in-Chief and his staff were not removed from the Horse Guards to Pall Mall until 1871,³⁹ the Duke was given a temporary room at the War Office where he lamentingly wrote his letters under the address, "Horse Guards, Pall Mall."⁴⁰

In spite of the removal of the Commander-in-Chief from the Horse Guards to the War Office, Cardwell knew this would not end the confusion and inefficiency which resulted from administrative mismanagement. Hence, he was still faced with the task of evolving a workable administrative arrangement at the War Office. It appeared to the Secretary of War that the best solution to the problem was to make a statutory distribution of administrative duties in the War Department.⁴¹ Fortunately, along with recommending the

³⁸Erickson, p. 75.

³⁹Biddulph points out that some individuals had suggested the move should not have taken place until a new War Office building was constructed. Such a sine die postponement would have been unwise for a new War Office building was not completed until 1903. Biddulph, p. 142.

⁴⁰Omond, p. 114.

⁴¹Biddulph, p. 238.

abolition of dual control, the Northbrook Committee outlined such a distribution in its third report. It recommended that the business of the Army be conducted by three large departments: the Military, the Control, and the Financial. In addition, it recommended that Army administration be given more representation in Parliament as the Army was limited to the Secretary of War and his Under-Secretary. The Royal Navy, on the other hand, was represented by four officials plus all the members of the Board of Admiralty. The Northbrook Committee suggested, therefore, that the heads of the Control and Financial Departments be made eligible to assist the Secretary of War in representing the Army in Parliament.⁴²

Acting on these recommendations in extenso, Cardwell secured the passage of the War Office Act in April 1870.⁴³ This act divided the administration of the Army into three huge departments, the heads of which became eligible to represent the Army in Parliament.⁴⁴ Under the provisions

⁴²B. S. P., XII (1870), 10-11.

⁴³For the complete bill, see B. S. P., IV (1870), 779-780.

⁴⁴Biddulph, p. 54.

of this act, the Military Department was placed under the Commander-in-Chief who became the Secretary of War's chief military adviser.⁴⁵ In addition to the Regular Army, the Commander-in-Chief was given charge over the auxiliary forces as well as the following branch departments: Military Education, Chaplain's, Medical, and Topographical, of which the latter ultimately became the Intelligence Department.⁴⁶ The second division of Army administration was the Control Department. Its head, the Controller-in-Chief, newly named the Surveyor-General of Ordnance,⁴⁷ was charged with all matters concerning supply, transport, clothing, and war munitions. The third department, the Financial branch was

⁴⁵B. S. P., XII (1870), 11.

⁴⁶Biddulph, p. 54. Cardwell established the Intelligence Department in 1873. The function of this department was to prepare information regarding fortifications, equipment, means of supply and transport, numbers of all military units in every part of the country, and anything else which might be desired by the Secretary of War or the Commander-in-Chief. Since the department was patterned after the logistics branch of Prussian military science, the Intelligence Department in no way carried out the functions which are generally associated with the Army Intelligence of the present day. Hansard's, CCXIV, 871-873.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 52. Sir Henry Storks was elected M. P. in 1870 and continued as the head of this department until the end of Gladstone's first Ministry in 1874.

placed under a Financial Secretary who became responsible to the Secretary of War for preparing the Army Estimates. In addition, he was charged with the appropriation, accounting, and audit of all funds which Parliament made available to the Army.⁴⁸ In conjunction with the three major divisions of Army administration there was also a fourth, but it remained outside the three main branches and dealt with matters which did not pertain to any of the other three. This minor branch was called the Central Department and was headed by the Under-Secretary.⁴⁹

To complete the fusion of all military and administrative departments under the Secretary of War Cardwell felt yet another change was necessary. In a memorandum to the Queen in January 1871, Cardwell suggested that the Military Secretary be appointed by the Secretary of War so that matters of discipline and appointments in the military forces could be submitted to the Secretary of War by a public official.⁵⁰ Up until this time the Military Secretary

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 54. Cardwell appointed J. C. Vivian as Financial Secretary in 1869. He was followed in 1871 by Henry Campbell-Bannerman. Wheeler, pp. 193-194.

⁴⁹Wheeler, pp. 190-191.

⁵⁰Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 113.

had been a member of the personal staff of the Commander-in-Chief and chosen by him.⁵¹ The Queen was reluctant to change such an arrangement as she was fearful that in matters relating to discipline and appointments the Secretary of War would consult the Military Secretary instead of the Commander-in-Chief. She felt this would place the Duke ". . . in a very anomalous position" ⁵² In order to remove her apprehensions Cardwell informed the Queen that the Military Secretary would continue to remain an officer of high rank, subject to approval by Her Majesty and subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, he added that without her approval on this matter Parliament would:

. . . not consent to vest in the Commander-in-Chief the extensive power of selection, which is necessary both for the abolition of purchase, and also for the union of the Reserve Forces with the Regulars.⁵³

In spite of this appeal, the Queen remained immovable in her position. Finally, Cardwell agreed to a compromise and allowed the Commander-in-Chief to select the Military Secretary, but he remained insistent that the appointment

⁵¹ Erickson, p. 76.

⁵² Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 115.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 116.

be confirmed by the Secretary of War.⁵⁴ With the assurance that this proposed arrangement would in no way alter the position of the Commander-in-Chief on military matters concerning discipline and appointments, the Queen gave her consent to Cardwell's arrangement.⁵⁵

With the fulfillment of this compromise, Cardwell completed his plan for reorganizing the administration of the Army under the control of the Secretary of War. Unlike his predecessors at the War Office, Cardwell did not attempt to build an efficient military department on the confusion of administrative offices; instead, he sought to remedy the confusion before he attempted to develop an efficient Army organization.⁵⁶ It was on this premise that he secured both the abolition of dual control and the passage of the War Office Act. Thereby, the Secretary of War was made responsible to Parliament for all the administrative departments of the Army whose duties were now clearly defined.

Having "put his house in order," Cardwell began to turn his attention toward developing a plan to abolish the

⁵⁴Omond, pp. 116-117.

⁵⁵Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 118.

⁵⁶Biddulph, p. vi.

centuries old practice of purchasing military commissions in the British Army. Cardwell did not know it, but he was facing his most difficult test as an Army reformer.

CHAPTER IV

THE ABOLITION OF PURCHASE

The system of purchasing military commissions had long attracted much public attention as over the years it had been repeatedly investigated by Royal Commissions, heatedly debated in Parliament, and voluminously discussed in pamphlets and newspapers.¹ In the House of Commons annual motions called for its abolition but without success. As Secretary of War, Sidney Herbert once entertained the idea of seeking its abolition but dropped the matter when he encountered strong opposition from many quarters.² In spite of this renewed agitation for the abolition of the purchase system, the issue did not gain much momentum until the advent of Gladstone's first Ministry,³ which coincided

¹"Purchase in the Army," Quarterly Review, CXXIV (January-April, 1868), 525. Hereafter cited as "Purchase in the Army."

²Omond, p. 121.

³Justin McCarthy, A History of Our Own Times (New York: United States Book Company, 1894), IV, 566. Hereafter cited as McCarthy.

with the dramatic achievements of Prussia's military system on the continent.

Witnessing the military might of Prussia, exemplified first in 1866, and then 1870, Edward Cardwell realized that if Great Britain were to defend herself against the possible threat of Prussian militarism, it would be necessary to amalgamate the auxiliary forces with the Regular Army in order to create a more harmonious and compact fighting machine.⁴ This task imperatively demanded the abolition of the purchase system as every question of Army reorganization was tied to the pecuniary interests of its officers. As long as purchase existed, an officer in the Regular Army could not be transferred to a reserve unit as the auxiliary forces were under the leadership of non-purchase officers. Neither could a purchase officer be forced to take a commission of inferior rank in another regiment. Hence, Cardwell was denied any direct control of Army reorganization as it was impossible to contract or expand Army units from one regiment to another without creating new pecuniary interests or interfering with those already existing.

⁴Biddulph, pp. 98-99.

Cardwell, therefore, regarded ". . . the abolition of purchase, not at the end but at the beginning of any system of reorganization of the Army."⁵

The actual origin of the purchase system is a debatable issue as some historians point to 1627 when two different rates were paid for military commissions, as one rate existed for civilians seeking initial commissions and another for officers seeking higher rank. Other historians point to the Restoration period when non-military positions were bought and sold.⁶ At any rate, it is known that Charles II recognized the system by Royal Warrant in 1683; ten years later, William III abolished the system by the same means.⁷ It was revived again by Queen Anne, and subsequently recognized as a legal institution in the Ive vs. Ash decision of 1702.⁸ In the years that followed

⁵Hansard's, CCVII, 1059.

⁶Erickson, p. 77.

⁷The Annual Register: A Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1758-), CXIII, Pt. I, 69-70. Hereafter cited as Annual Register.

⁸R. C. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914, Vol. XIV of The Oxford History of England, ed. G. N. Clark (14 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 10. Hereafter cited as Ensor.

the purchase system became an accepted institution. During the reign of George III, Parliament passed an act forbidding the sale of government offices, but the Crown retained the right to continue the sale of military commissions.⁹

In actual practice the purchase system developed out of the Crown's prerogative to raise troops for the Army. As Parliament imposed taxes for this purpose, the Crown used these funds to make contracts with certain individuals for the purpose of raising a number of soldiers—usually a regiment. In return, these individuals were given command of the regiment and allowed to nominate their own officers. Since the financial terms of these contracts were seldom sufficient to raise whole regiments, the regimental commanders made sub-contracts with their friends to raise companies within the regiment. As the officers of the regiment, these sub-contractors acquired rights of property in their commissions as they shouldered the major expense of raising the regiment. Later, when they wished to retire, they were able to compensate for their expenditures by selling their commissions to the highest bidders.¹⁰

⁹Wheeler, p. 201; Morley, II, 361.

¹⁰Erickson, p. 77.

Through the years the Crown and Parliament refined the manner of obtaining commissions until it became stabilized in the following procedure. Initially, an individual was required to pass an examination which in essence proved that he had the education of an aristocratic gentleman.¹¹ After receiving his first commission, advancement depended upon seniority so long as the officer had the money to purchase the next commission above him. Thus, if a major's commission were available, the senior captain in the regiment had the initial opportunity to purchase it. If he did not care to purchase, or could not, the next senior officer could do so. Commissions could be purchased through the rank of lieutenant-colonel, but higher ranks were never for sale.¹² These positions, as well as all commissions vacated by death, were filled on the basis of seniority.¹³

Commonly applied the purchase system affected only the Cavalry and Infantry regiments. In the Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery officers were required to have some technical training, and promotion was based on merit alone.

¹¹Ibid.; "The Government Army Bill," Quarterly Review, CXXX (January-April, 1871), 569.

¹²Erickson, p. 77.

¹³Wheeler, p. 201.

Most purchase officers, however, were aristocrats by birth and training, and they tended to ignore these technical branches as beneath their dignity as gentlemen.¹⁴

Although a price scale for the sale of commissions had been established in 1719,¹⁵ and a ceiling for that scale had been added by Royal Warrant in 1776,¹⁶ it was impossible to keep the system within prescribed regulations. In selling their commissions most officers unlawfully exceeded the scale limit by seeking whatever price they could get. The purpose behind these over-regulation payments was to induce officers into an early retirement, thereby providing ambitious junior officers with more rapid means of advancement.¹⁷

Although the problem of over-regulation prices had been investigated many times in the past,¹⁸ Cardwell appointed a new commission on April 5, 1870, to inquire

¹⁴Erickson, p. 77; Woodward, p. 267.

¹⁵Erickson, p. 77; Biddulph, p. 82.

¹⁶B. S. P., "Report of the Commissioners appointed to Inquire into Over-Regulation Payments on Promotion in the Army," XII (1870), 203.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 211.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 203.

into the matter.¹⁹ In its report this commission, under the chairmanship of Sir George Grey, admitted that it was unable to ascertain exactly when the practice of over-regulation payments began but assumed that it existed from 1719, when the regulation of commission prices was first established.²⁰ It pointed out that over-regulation payments had been prohibited by Royal Warrant until 1807, when a clause was inserted into the Mutiny Act. This clause prohibited the sale of commissions by persons who acted as unauthorized Army agents negotiating the purchase or sale of commissions. Thereafter, future changes in the regulation of commission prices were made under this clause in the Mutiny Act²¹ until February 3, 1866, when regulation prices were again set by Royal Warrant.²² But in spite of statutory law and royal Warrants, the Grey Commission reported that regulation prices were generally exceeded throughout the Army.²³

¹⁹Ibid., p. 202.

²⁰Ibid., p. 209.

²¹Ibid., p. 205.

²²Ibid., p. 201.

²³Ibid., p. 209. Even though the actual over-regulation prices varied from regiment to regiment the following scale of an infantry regiment is a good illustration of over-regulation payments. The reader should keep in mind that the officer who sold his commission to purchase another paid only the difference in cost between

The Grey Commission concluded its report by stating that the practice of paying over-regulation prices was known to exist by the government, but it was never formally recognized; official knowledge of its existence was denied, and regulation prices were hardly, if ever, enforced.²⁴ In fact, the Grey Commission found only two cases on record where attempts were made to enforce regulation prices.²⁵ Much of the lack of enforcement was due to the fact that the purchase of a military commission was handled in private by an authorized Army agent, and the actual transaction was never recorded.²⁶

Since the purchase system was based on monetary interests, it was open to many forms of abuse. Most aristocratic young men who entered the military service to become officers had little aptitude for the profession,

the old commission and the new, plus the over-regulation price. Ibid., p. 210.

	Regulation	Over-Regulation	Total
Ensign	£450	-	£450
Lieutenant	£250	£100	£350
Captain	£1,100	£600	£1,700
Major	£1,400	£800	£2,200
Lieutenant-Colonel	£1,300	£1,000	£2,300

²⁴Ibid., p. 218.

²⁵Ibid., p. 219.

²⁶Wheeler, p. 202.

and they possessed little desire to make a study of it. As Army officers they paid little attention to the technical questions of military science and wasted most of their time entertaining themselves with military reviews and parades. Using their wealth to gain prominence and prestige,²⁷ they rapidly advanced over junior officers who were unable to purchase higher rank, even under the inducement of borrowing funds at exorbitant rates of interest.²⁸ This led to great incongruities in the length of Army service as certain lieutenants might have served twice as long as some of the captains.²⁹ In effect, the purchase system prevented the development of a professional standard among Army officers as it bestowed security and high rank upon incompetent officers who were seldom denied the right of purchase.³⁰

In spite of all the self-evident weaknesses, the system had its vehement defenders. Service opinion was almost universally in favor of purchase as the Duke of

²⁷Woodward, p. 268.

²⁸B. S. P., XII (1870), 213. ²⁹Biddulph, p. 77.

³⁰Wheeler, p. 201. The regimental commander had to give his approval to the purchase, but since he was also a product of the system his approval tended to be only a formality. Erickson, p. 77.

Wellington extolled the virtues of the system in an 1833 memorandum.³¹ Likewise, in 1841, Lord Melbourne's Commission praised the purchase system for furthering the promotion and retirement of officers. Similar military reports which followed during the next thirty years were likewise confirmatory.³² In these military reports most of the defending arguments centered on the advantages which the purchase system bestowed on the public. For example, it could not be denied that under purchase Army officers avoided the favoritism and interference of strong personalities which was inevitable under a system of merit.³³ In addition, the defenders of the system argued that purchase considerably lowered the cost of the Army Estimates as only a few officers retired on full pay after thirty years service, but the number was limited by a very moderate sum allowed for the purpose in the Estimates. Thus, the sale of an officer's commission provided him with a retirement pension which ordinarily would have been a public expense.³⁴ The defenders of the system argued that by abolishing purchase

³¹Hansard's, CCIV, 1952.

³²Ensor, p. 10.

³³Erickson, p. 79.

³⁴Biddulph, pp. 93-94.

the public would incur a great increase in the Army Estimates, and it would witness lower-class men who had no connection with the interests and fortunes of the country becoming high military officers. As long as Army officers were men of property, they would serve the country for less and would maintain the established order as their stake in society tended to prevent them from lending support to revolutionary activities.³⁵

With much of the public indifferent toward the existence of purchase,³⁶ Cardwell realized that it would be extremely difficult to terminate a system which had deep roots in British society. Such a task would encounter almost insurmountable opposition from many quarters, including among others, Parliament, the Army, the Duke of Cambridge, and the Queen.³⁷ But in spite of the unfavorable odds, Cardwell decided that an attempt had to be made for it was futile to think of reorganizing the Army without the abolition of purchase.³⁸

³⁵Hansard's, CCIV, 1438.

³⁶"Purchase in the Army," CXXIV, 525.

³⁷Erickson, p. 79.

³⁸Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 99.

Early in 1870, Cardwell began his attack on the system of purchase by proposing the abolition of the lowest officer ranks—cornet in the Cavalry and ensign in the Infantry.³⁹ Cardwell's predecessor at the War Office, Sir John Pakington, originally initiated the proposal in 1868, but left office before he could prepare a plan for presentation to Parliament. As Pakington's successor, Cardwell took it upon himself to complete this task by proposing that every candidate for a first commission be made a lieutenant at once, and that the government reimburse the cost of purchasing the commission of lieutenant.⁴⁰ This proposal was met with a dismal reception in the House of Commons and was rejected on the grounds that no provision was made for over-regulation prices.⁴¹

Not to be discouraged by his initial defeat, Cardwell spent the entire summer and autumn of 1870, preparing a plan for the complete abolition of purchase. Taking the advice which Lord Grey had given in 1857, Cardwell informed Lord Granville, the Foreign Secretary, that he agreed with Grey's

³⁹Erickson, p. 80.

⁴⁰Biddulph, p. 95.

⁴¹Illustrated London News, March 19, 1870, p. 303.

comment, "'it was better to let the Purchase System alone, unless you were prepared to abolish it altogether.'"⁴²

Gladstone warned Cardwell to "'go slowly'" with "'this enormous business,'" but by mid-October the plan was in final form.⁴³

Parliament and the public had little knowledge of Cardwell's ambitious plan until February 16, 1871,⁴⁴ when he surprised both the Army and the nation by inserting into the Army Estimates an Army Regulation Bill, of which the main provision was the abolition of purchase.⁴⁵ This bill provided that Army officers would be compensated by the government for their commissions according to the market which existed for over-regulation prices on January 1, 1871.⁴⁶ While the Army Regulation Bill did not include an estimate of the probable cost of abolishing purchase, the Report of Denham Robinson and Robert Davey,

⁴² Cardwell to Granville, November 1870, Granville Papers, 30/29/68:84, as cited by Erickson, p. 80.

⁴³ Gladstone Papers, 34: f.157-160 (Br. Mus. Add. Mss., 4119), as cited by Erickson, p. 80.

⁴⁴ The Times (London), July 21, 1871, p. 9.

⁴⁵ Wheeler, p. 203.

⁴⁶ B. S. P., "Army Regulation of Forces Act," I (1871),

which was made public at this same time, stated that if the maximum number allowed for each rank to retire a year did so, the total cost would amount to approximately £8,000,000 through 1896. Purchase, however, would not entirely disappear until 1906-1907.⁴⁷

On February 16, 1871, in his speech introducing the Army Estimates, Cardwell stated that the sole purpose behind the Army Regulation Bill was to promote the amalgamation of the Army and the auxiliary forces.⁴⁸ The key to the whole bill was, of course, the abolition of purchase, but the bill also contained two other major provisions. The first removed jurisdiction from the lord lieutenants of counties over the appointment of officers in the auxiliary forces and gave this authority to the Crown.⁴⁹ Future promotions for officers in the auxiliary forces would hereafter be made on the basis of merit, but the advice of the lord lieutenant of the county

⁴⁷ Ibid., "Report by Messrs. Robinson and Davey on the Probable Cost of Abolishing Purchase in the Army," XXXIX (1871), 677.

⁴⁸ The Times (London), July 21, 1871, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Hansard's, CCVI, 65. The lords lieutenants of counties regained their connection with the auxiliary forces in 1907, when Secretary of War Richard B. Haldane established the Territorial Force as part of his Army reorganization scheme. Omond, p. 124.

would be sought for all first commissions.⁵⁰ The second provision gave power to the Secretary of War to lengthen or shorten the period of enlistment service in the Regular Army as he felt necessary under certain conditions from time to time.⁵¹ In addition to the major provisions of the bill, there were many other minor clauses which related to them.⁵²

While the Army Regulation Bill was more than just the abolition of purchase, this became the sole issue of debate in the House of Commons.⁵³ On March 6, 1871, Colonel Loyd Lindsay opened discussions on the bill by declaring that national defense did not justify an expenditure of £8,000,000 for the extinction of purchase. He argued that it would destroy the regimental system which had successfully won Britain's wars for two hundred years.⁵⁴ Lindsay's efforts were supported by a group of extreme military critics, dubbed the "Parliamentary Colonels," who led the

⁵⁰Biddulph, pp. 111-112. ⁵¹Ibid., pp. 110-111.

⁵²See Appendix C, pp. 147-148. ⁵³Ensor, p. 10.

⁵⁴Illustrated London News, March 11, 1871, p. 230.

fight to save the purchase system.⁵⁵ They argued the abolition of purchase would stagnate promotion, introduce favoritism,⁵⁶ and destroy ". . . the Army which our Great Duke has bequeathed us."⁵⁷ Night after night the debates raged; discussions became heated, arguments were repeated, and many amendments were proposed.⁵⁸ So much ". . . wrangle and jangle . . . accompanied every word of every clause . . ."⁵⁹ one member of Parliament was forced to cry out in disgust, "Here we are, after a fortnight, still discussing one clause."⁶⁰ As a result, Sir Roundell Palmer accused the "Parliamentary Colonels" of ". . . endeavouring to baffle the majority by mere consumption of time."⁶¹

⁵⁵Ibid., February 25, 1871, p. 182. This group included not only Colonel Lindsay, but Captain Stanley, Lord Mahon, Colonel Gilpin, Major Arbuthnot, General Herbert, Captain Talbot, and others. Ibid., March 11, 1871, p. 230.

⁵⁶Ibid., March 11, 1871, p. 230.

⁵⁷Wheeler, p. 208.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 204.

⁵⁹Illustrated London News, June 24, 1871, p. 622.

⁶⁰Hansard's, CCV, 72.

⁶¹Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 71.

If, by chance, Cardwell heard Palmer's reference to a majority favoring the abolition of purchase, no doubt he wondered where it was hiding. As if the opposition of the "Parliamentary Colonels" and the Conservatives was not serious enough,⁶² Cardwell had to face considerable resistance from factions within his own party. One group of Liberals was insistent that the Ballot Bill be placed first on the Ministry's legislative agenda for the 1871 session.⁶³ Both Gladstone and Cardwell, however, refused to accommodate this request as they knew that if the Ballot Bill passed first, this faction would desert the government when it came time to pass the Army Regulation Bill. In addition to this faction, some of Cardwell's fellow Cabinet members opposed him as well. Both Robert Lowe, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and H. C. E. Childers, First Lord of the Admiralty, did not like the bill and refused to support it.⁶⁴

⁶²McCarthy, IV, 567.

⁶³The Ballot Bill was designed to introduce a system of secret voting at the polls. It failed to pass in the 1871 session, but was passed the following session in 1872.

⁶⁴Erickson, p. 82.

With few members of the government giving their full support to the Army Regulation Bill, the major burden of defending the measure fell squarely on Cardwell's shoulders.⁶⁵ Angered by the vicious attacks which the bill was receiving, Cardwell presented an eloquent defense of the measure on March 16, 1871. After expressing his concurrence with the eulogies that had been given in regard to the heroism and gallantry which the British soldiers had displayed in the past under the system of purchase, Cardwell added that there was a lesson to be learned from the late Franco-Prussian War. He pointed out that much of the Prussian success in France was largely due to the professional education and training of its officers. Similarly, Great Britain needed the abolition of purchase if it was to increase the professional efficiency of its officer corp as neither heroism or gallantry could compensate for professional training ". . . in these days when arms of precision shoot down soldiers at immense distances."⁶⁶

In answer to the charge that the abolition of purchase would destroy the esprit de corps of the regimental system,

⁶⁵Biddulph, p. 115; Erickson, p. 81.

⁶⁶Hansard's, CCV, 135-136.

Cardwell bluntly stated that few of the regimental commanders had actually risen through the ranks of the regiment they were now commanding.⁶⁷ He added that if the regimental system depended upon purchase then it must be concluded that neither the Royal Artillery, the Royal Engineers, nor the Royal Navy possessed the means for preserving order and discipline in their branches of service as they were not subject to purchase.⁶⁸ In his summation Cardwell openly admitted that the bill was an attack on a class interest which held a monopoly on commissions, but he defended the abolition of purchase on the grounds that it would create a true aristocracy based on merit and professional talent.⁶⁹

In spite of Cardwell's efforts to secure quick passage of the Army Regulation Bill, it was met in committee with so many dilatory motions and amendments that by June it was no nearer passage than it was in March. Due to ". . . unparalleled obstructions . . ." ⁷⁰ which were

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 142.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 146-147.

⁷⁰Philip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1934), p. 318. Gladstone to Queen Victoria, June 10, 1871. Hereafter cited as Guedalla.

" . . . without precedent in the present generation . . . ,"⁷¹
Cardwell announced the government was dropping three parts
of the bill in an effort to secure its passage.⁷² These
included: (1) the proposal to give the Secretary of War
power to shorten or lengthen the period of enlistment
service, (2) the proposal to enact compulsory military
service in the case of emergency, and (3) the proposal to
lend money to counties for building Militia barracks.⁷³
These clauses were of little importance to the bill in
comparison with the cardinal principle of the abolition
of purchase, but they did offer the opposition numerous
opportunities for inflicting further delays in its passage.
The abandonment of these three proposals lightened the bill
by half of its original thirty-four clauses and to carry
them all would probably have resulted in defeat for the
whole measure.⁷⁴

⁷¹Ibid., p. 319. Gladstone to Queen Victoria,
June 14, 1871.

⁷²Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 72.

⁷³Hansard's, CCVII, 1545-1546.

⁷⁴Biddulph, pp. 126-127.

When the government dropped these proposals in the second week of June, the Conservative opposition screamed that the Liberal Ministry had abandoned Army reorganization. On June 12, 1871, Benjamin Disraeli, the Conservative leader in the House of Commons, protested against the fact that Cardwell had introduced the Army Regulation Bill as an attempt to reorganize the Army. As the measure appeared now, it was stripped of those proposals and nakedly stood before the House of Commons as an abolition of purchase bill.⁷⁵ Cardwell denied this charge by stating:

. . . the other powers proposed to be conferred by the Bill, though useful, are not absolutely necessary⁷⁶

Furthermore, he argued that the reorganization of the Army was:

. . . a matter for the Executive Government, and as that Executive Government we cannot begin organization until purchase has been abolished, and until the powers of Lords Lieutenant of counties have been transferred.⁷⁷

Resistance to the bill continued, but gradually enough opposition gave way to secure its passage on

⁷⁵Hansard's, CCVI, 1907-1908.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 1906.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 1922-1923.

July 3, 1871, by a fifty-eight vote majority. Thus, after four months of debate the House of Commons finally gave its approval to the Army Regulation Bill.⁷⁸

On July 4, 1871, the bill was brought from the Commons and read for the first time in the House of Lords.⁷⁹ Lord Northbrook, Cardwell's Under-Secretary, opened the debate on the bill with a clear exposition of the government's policy regarding it.⁸⁰ He denied that the Ministry was without a plan for Army reorganization but later stated that it had no place in the bill. Like Cardwell, he held Army reorganization to be a function of the Executive Government, not Parliament.⁸¹

At the very outset of the debates in the House of Lords it was apparent that the peers were in conflict with the decision of the House of Commons ". . . by class motives on a class issue."⁸² Many of the members of the House of Lords were heads of families who regarded the purchasing of commissions as their own perquisite, and it was not

⁷⁸Ibid., CCVII, 1073. ⁷⁹Ibid., p. 1077.

⁸⁰Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 72-73.

⁸¹Hansard's, CCVII, 1545. ⁸²Ensor, p. 12.

difficult to equate their own interests with that of the nation.⁸³

Rather than overtly denounce the abolition of purchase the peers decided to outflank the government by a quick maneuver. On July 13, 1871, the Duke of Richmond, who led the Lords in opposition to the bill, moved that the measure be tabled until the government offered a complete scheme for Army reorganization.⁸⁴ Four days later, on July 17 this motion was passed by a vote of 155-130.⁸⁵ Thus, by appearing to demand more information the peers cleverly tabled the bill without openly voting it down.⁸⁶ But blocking its passage amounted to nothing more than the rejection of the bill.⁸⁷

A month before the House of Lords passed this killing motion, Cardwell anticipated a postponement in the passage of the bill. He decided that an indefinite deferment would considerably delay Army reorganization;

⁸³Erich Eyck, Gladstone, trans. Bernard Miall (London: Unwin Brothers Ltd., 1938), p. 209. Hereafter cited as Eyck.

⁸⁴Hansard's, CCVII, 1577-1581. ⁸⁵Ibid., 1867.

⁸⁶McCarthy, IV, 568.

⁸⁷The Illustrated London News, July 22, 1871, p. 58.

therefore, on June 12, 1871, he stated in threatening words:

We now have the power . . . to put an end to purchase; but we do not see how [we can obtain] the full compensation and security [for Army officers] . . . without an alteration of the law.⁸⁸

Although Cardwell did not reveal it then, the power to which he referred was the Royal Warrant. He knew that the purchase system existed on that basis alone, and if need be, it could be abolished by the same means.⁸⁹

On July 18, the day after the Lords passed their killing motion, Cardwell suggested to the Cabinet that the action of the Lords made the use of the Royal prerogative necessary, and the Cabinet gave its approval.⁹⁰ Since Gladstone had informed the Queen of the possibility of such action three days earlier, she was willing to sign the Royal Warrant on the formal request of the Cabinet.⁹¹ After the Cabinet complied with this request, the Queen

⁸⁸Hansard's, CCVI, 1906.

⁸⁹McCarthy, IV, 569.

⁹⁰Guedalla, p. 323. Gladstone to Queen Victoria, July 18, 1871.

⁹¹Morley, II, 363; Wheeler, pp. 205-206.

signed the Royal Warrant on July 20. On the following day this fait accompli was presented to Parliament.⁹²

Immediately, the government was vehemently denounced by the opposition, including The Times (London) which had given the government strong support up until this point.⁹³ It was generally agreed that the action was legal, but the point in condemnation was the procedure.⁹⁴ After first seeking the abolition of purchase by an act of Parliament, the government failed to achieve its purpose and it resorted to the Royal prerogative.⁹⁵ No clever argument could acquit the Ministry of this charge of inconsistency.⁹⁶

While many a cry of "foul" went up in Parliament, no vote of confidence was ever called over the sudden and shocking use of the Royal Warrant.⁹⁷ By the same token, however, it cannot be said that the procedure made the

⁹²The Times (London), July 22, 1871, p. 7.

⁹³Ibid., July 21, 1871, p. 9.

⁹⁴McCarthy, IV, 571-572.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 573.

⁹⁶Eyck, p. 210.

⁹⁷"The Coup D'Etat," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CX (September, 1871), 365.

Ministry more popular.⁹⁸ Perhaps the situation called for a vote of confidence, but the reason why none was called can partially be explained by the course of events. The day after the government announced the Royal Warrant abolishing the purchase system, the Duke of Richmond was forced to move that discussion of the matter be postponed in the House of Lords until July 31, 1871.⁹⁹ As the patron of the horse races at Goodwood which took place during the fourth week in July, the Duke of Richmond was prevented from leading the antagonized feelings of the Lords for some ten days. When the peers met on July 31, the outraged emotions in both houses of Parliament had subsided, and violent action against the government failed to materialize.¹⁰⁰ In effect, the House of Lords had no choice but to unshelve the Army Regulation Bill and pass it for without their approval Army officers would be unable to receive the

⁹⁸J. L. Hammond and M. R. D. Foot, Gladstone and Liberalism (London: English Universities Press, Ltd., 1952), p. 119.

⁹⁹The Times (London), July 22, 1871, p. 7.

¹⁰⁰The Illustrated London News, July 29, 1871, p. 86.

generous compensations which the bill provided for their commissions.¹⁰¹ After passing the bill the peers, still angered by the government's procedure, added a censure resolution which strongly condemned the Ministry for attempting ". . . to deprecate and neutralize the independent action of the Legislature."¹⁰²

On October 30, 1871, the day before the Royal Warrant abolishing purchase became effective,¹⁰³ a new Royal Warrant was issued outlining a new system of promotion that was based on the dual principles of seniority and merit. The lowest officer ranks of cornet and ensign were abolished,¹⁰⁴ and initial appointments for lieutenancies were made on the basis of competitive physical and mental examinations. Thereafter, promotions were based on one of two methods. The regimental commanders or lieutenant colonels would be obtained by selection based on merit, and all vacancies below that rank would be filled by qualified senior officers. But when an officer reached the rank of major-general,

¹⁰¹ Ensor, p. 10; McCarthy, IV, 570.

¹⁰² Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 78.

¹⁰³ See Appendix D, p. 149. ¹⁰⁴ Biddulph, p. 141.

retired, or died, the vacancy would be filled on the basis of selection. This distinction was designed to prevent officers from filling vacancies on the principle of seniority by the voluntary acts of the officers themselves. Hence, officers could no longer make secret bargains for advancement.¹⁰⁵

With the abolition of purchase an accomplished fact, Cardwell's immediate problem was to put into effect the provisions of the Army Regulation Bill which related to the government's purchase of officer commissions. This task he turned over to a purchase commission which consisted of Edward Lugard, Charles Richard, Earl De La Warr, and James Cornelius O'Dowd.¹⁰⁶ Almost immediately, Army officers echoed complaints against the commission for unfair treatment. Their dispute stemmed from the fact that under the Army Regulation Bill each officer who decided to sell his commission, yet remain in the Army, was given what he would have received for it under the purchase system. In the future, however, he would have

¹⁰⁵Erickson, p. 84.

¹⁰⁶The Times (London), October 4, 1871, p. 8.

to earn his promotions and forfeit his retirement pay. On the other hand, an officer who decided to leave the Army would receive all the money he had invested in commissions, but junior officers would find it more profitable to stay in the Army, accept future retirement benefits, and forfeit the smaller sums which he had paid for commissions. Purchase officers could not understand why they had to forfeit any sum at all, and this was the grounds of complaint.¹⁰⁷

On January 30, 1872, Army officers made their complaints public by circulating a petition in the House of Commons. Cardwell was irked by this action and made note of it to the Duke of Cambridge who in turn sent out a circular disapproving of the action of the officers. This attempt to discredit the dissatisfied officers backfired as they now petitioned the Duke. Because of the widespread dissatisfaction, the Queen suggested an inquiry into the matter. Cardwell, however, felt the purchase commission was doing its task admirably, but he reluctantly informed the Queen that he would not object to the appointment of an inquiry,¹⁰⁸ if it became necessary.

¹⁰⁷Biddulph, pp. 144-145.

¹⁰⁸Erickson, p. 84.

In July 1873, the House of Lords demanded an inquiry into the mounting officer complaints. In reference to this motion the Duke of Cambridge implied that officers had been dealt with unjustly. Therewith, Cardwell became extremely annoyed with the Duke for he knew that a few well-chosen remarks from the Commander-in-Chief could have put a stop to the agitation.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, Cardwell agreed to the appointment of a Royal Commission. After exhaustive studies the Royal Commission made its report in June 1874, three months after Gladstone's Ministry had left office. The report stated that the grievances of the officers were not traceable to the Army Regulation Bill or to the purchase commission but were due to conditions which were sometimes inseparable from Army service under the purchase system.¹¹⁰ It admitted there were irregularities in the compensation for officers' commissions, but it stated this was natural when dealing with an extremely complex subject.¹¹¹ The Royal Commission concluded its report by expressing the hope that the discontent of the officers would gradually

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Biddulph, pp. 145-146.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 148.

dissipate as the government was doing its best to administer the purchase of commissions in a fair and proper manner.¹¹²

Ultimately, this hope was realized. Gradually, the Army officers accepted their new circumstances, and eventually, the Army became far more attractive as the abolition of purchase brought forth the development of a professional standard for its officers.¹¹³

The abolition of purchase was truly a remarkable achievement for with it the Secretary of War gained full responsibility for the organization and management of the Army for the first time in British History.¹¹⁴ Undoubtedly, the abolition of purchase involved the expenditure of a large sum of money, but it was necessary. Without the abolition of purchase the Army could never have been reorganized into the efficient force which the nation needed.¹¹⁵ Cardwell's accomplishment was referred to by Gladstone in these glowing words:

. . . I venture to affirm that no man who ever held the seals of office since the Secretaryship at War was established has done so much for the reform and efficiency of the Army¹¹⁶

¹¹²Erickson, p. 84.

¹¹³Biddulph, p. 148.

¹¹⁴Annual Register, CXIII, Pt. I, 81.

¹¹⁵Wheeler, p. 209.

¹¹⁶The Times (London), October 30, 1871, p. 3.

CHAPTER V

REORGANIZING THE MILITARY FORCES

During the period between the Crimean War and Cardwell's arrival at the War Office, the structure of the British military forces can best be described in the words of an unknown Prussian officer, "Your material is excellent, but you have no organization."¹ Unlike the Regular Army, the auxiliary forces of Great Britain were not subject to the Commander-in-Chief but were under the direction of an Inspector-General of Reserve Forces, who reported to the Secretary of War.² As a result, the auxiliary forces which consisted of the Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, Enrolled Pensioners, and Army Reserves, lacked a sense of unity and cohesion with the Regular Army. Contributing to this nebulous relationship was the fact that during the long years of peace following

¹Hansard's, CXCVI, 1519.

²Biddulph, p. 226. The Commander-in-Chief was given control of the auxiliary forces with the passage of the War Office Act in April 1870. See above, pp. 56-57.

the Napoleonic Wars the auxiliary forces had quickly deteriorated in size and quality.³

Of all the auxiliary forces, competent military authorities had the least regard for the Yeomanry.⁴ Armed with antiquated firearms, this reserve cavalry force numbered 17,000 men in 1868. It was required to drill six days a year, but the actual drill was about as irregular as the target practice.⁵

The Volunteer Force numbered approximately 360,000 men in 1814, but it practically ceased to exist during the long European peace which followed after Waterloo.⁶ In 1859, however, this force was reestablished by a roused British populace who feared a French invasion as a result of the Orsini plot to assassinate the French Emperor Napoleon III. Even though the government provided little guidance and direction for the Volunteers,⁷ this force, by

³Erickson, p. 85.

⁴Biddulph, p. 5.

⁵Erickson, p. 85.

⁶"Military Forces," CXXXIII, 210.

⁷"Inefficiency of the British Army," CXXIX, 519-520.

1868, developed into the nation's third line of defense behind the Regular Army and the Militia.⁸

The backbone of the British auxiliary forces was the Militia as it served two purposes: first, it provided trained replacements for deficiencies within the ranks of the Regular Army; and second, it presented a line of defense for the home front. These two objectives, however, were somewhat contradictory as the Militia could hardly provide adequate home defense with raw recruits if it continued to supply large numbers of trained men for the Regular Army.⁹ Thus, serious thought was given to solving this dilemma by creating the Army's own reserve force.

The first move toward creating a specific reserve for the Regular Army came in 1843, when Parliament authorized the Crown to enroll a force of 10,000 men who were on military pensions. Since Britain lacked a system of rural police, the primary objective of this enrollment was to create a military unit which could aid civil authorities in controlling possible disturbances among the populace. As a secondary objective, the Crown was

⁸Army Book, p. 43.

⁹Hansard's, CXCVI, 1508-1509.

given authority to use the services of these men in the event of a national war.¹⁰

In 1859, Secretary of War Sidney Herbert instituted the first real Army Reserve through an act which gave the Crown authority to create a force of 20,000 men who had at least five years' service in the Regular Army. Later, under the Reserve Force Act of 1867, the Reserve of 1859 and the Enrolled Pensioners were established as the Second Class Reserve. The Reserve Force Act of 1867 also created a First Class Reserve which was limited to 20,000 men.¹¹ The result of these measures, up to December 1868, was highly unsatisfactory as there were only 13,068 men in the Enrolled Pensioners, 2,847 in the Reserve of 1859, and 2,033 in the First Class Reserve of 1867.¹²

Barring the way to the formation of an adequate Army Reserve was the system of long-term enlistment.¹³ After 1829, under the peacetime conditions which followed Waterloo, servicemen enlisted for a period of twenty-one years. In 1847, the length of enlistment was lowered to

¹⁰Army Book, pp. 49-50.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., p. 50.

¹³Wheeler, p. 215.

ten years, but in 1867, it was raised to twelve, and reengagements for nine years were encouraged to complete the twenty-one years required for pension.¹⁴ With every soldier in the Infantry required to serve over half of their enlistment period abroad, which was usually in India or the tropics, the men were simply too old and too exhausted to participate in military exercises once they were discharged from the Regular Army.¹⁵ Thus, under this long-service system it was impossible to establish a reserve of trained men in the prime of life which could be used to reinforce the Regular Army in a national emergency.¹⁶

Shortly after Cardwell became head of the War Office in late 1868, he discovered that the Reserve Force Act of 1867 was failing to supply the necessary reserves which the country so desperately needed. Due to the lack of adequate pay and the undue proportion of foreign service in the Regular Army, very few men joined the Army Reserves, and

¹⁴Army Book, pp. 53-54.

¹⁵Ensor, p. 13.

¹⁶"On the Limitation of Enlistment and Army Reserves, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CVI (September, 1869), 284.

its ranks were far from full.¹⁷ As a result, on March 11, 1869, Cardwell announced to the House of Commons that he felt it was necessary to reduce the period of foreign service in order to establish an adequate Army Reserve. To facilitate the reduction of enlistment service abroad, Cardwell began to withdraw troops from the self-governing colonies, to disband colonial regiments created and maintained by Imperial Estimates, and to encourage the formation of colonial forces for their own defense.¹⁸

As Secretary of War, Cardwell believed that Great Britain needed only a small peacetime Army, but it was imperative that her Army Reserves be large in order to provide the Regular Army with easy expansion on the outbreak of war. Cardwell felt that the creation of a large Army Reserve necessitated the establishment of a shorter period of enlistment. As he explained to the House of Commons on June 10, 1869, this would enable men to become part of the Army Reserve while they still possessed the vigor of youth.¹⁹ Comparatively speaking, he pointed out

¹⁷Biddulph, p. 68.

¹⁸See above, pp. 39-40.

¹⁹Hansard's, CXCVI, 1535-1536.

that France required only a five year enlistment; in Prussia the enlistment was no longer than three years. In the case of Prussia, however, Cardwell admitted circumstances were somewhat different as Prussia utilized conscription to fill its Army Ranks while Great Britain depended upon attraction and voluntary enlistment. In addition, he explained that Prussia had no large Army stationed abroad whereas Britain's Army was spread around the world.²⁰

Much discussion was given to the establishment of an adequate Army Reserve during the 1869 session of Parliament, but no definite plan was adopted. As a result, Cardwell prepared a scheme which he presented to Parliament on March 3, 1870, in the form of an Army Enlistment Bill. Cardwell explained that the bill would maintain the period of enlistment service at twelve years, but the men would serve not more than six, nor less than three years, in the Regular Army at the option of the Secretary of War. The balance of six or nine years would be spent as a civilian in the Army Reserve with the liability of recall to the Regular Army whenever necessity demanded it.²¹ Later, in

²⁰Ibid., p. 1543.

²¹Hansard's, CXCIX, 1175-1176.

May when the bill was being debated, Cardwell informed the House that:

The object of the Bill is to have a Reserve Force . . . trained in the Army, by the Army, and for the Army, and constituting in the moment of emergency a Reserve upon which the Army may rely.²²

While the Army Enlistment Bill was before the House of Commons, the Franco-Prussian War was in progress on the continent. Many members of Parliament felt Britain was unprepared for war and had no business adopting a measure that would promote further military unpreparedness. They advocated that the bill be dropped and urged the adoption of universal conscription in order to obtain more men for the Army. Cardwell, however, could not be convinced that a definite need for conscription existed, and he refused to drop the bill.²³ Resistance to the bill continued through most of the summer of 1870, but in late July the House of Commons finally passed the measure; the House of Lords did likewise in early August.²⁴ With the Queen's

²²Ibid., CCI, 788.

²³Erickson, p. 87.

²⁴Hansard's, CCIII, 1516. See B. S. P., I (1870), 83-88, for the complete Army Enlistment Bill.

Royal assent, Britain possessed a new system of short-service based on voluntary enlistment.

The passage of the Army Enlistment Act was an important milestone in the history of Great Britain as the Prussian victory over the Austrians at Sadowa proved that a soldier of short-term enlistment was fast becoming the most formidable of all Europe.²⁵ Not only did the act provide for the creation of a large Reserve Force of 60,000 men,²⁶ but the adoption of short-service established a more voluntary system of recruitment. Previously the Army establishment held the notion that any man would do for the service, no matter how bad his character, since he could be easily kept in line by a system of severe discipline. Naturally, the presence of common criminals in the ranks of the Army tended to deter many respectable men from enlisting. This made it necessary to induce men to enlist by giving them a bounty upon joining the service ranks. This practice not only encouraged enlistments, but it also encouraged desertions and fraudulent reenlistments to obtain new bounties. In order to prevent this practice

²⁵Morley, II, 359.

²⁶B. S. P., I (1870), 85.

a soldier who was convicted of desertion by court-martial might be sentenced to a severe flogging and/or to an indelible marking with the letter D—if guilty of bad conduct he was marked with the letters BC. Cardwell realized that the subjection of soldiers to flogging and marking tended to prevent men of good character from joining the Army; therefore, in 1869, Cardwell abolished flogging under peacetime conditions,²⁷ and the following year he completely abolished marking also.²⁸ In June 1870, Cardwell abolished the payment of bounty for enlistments and compensated soldiers for the abolished bounties by giving monetary rewards to those who completed two years of good conduct.²⁹ Two months later in August 1870, with the passage of the Army Enlistment Act, Cardwell introduced a new policy of discharging men of bad character from Army service.³⁰

As a result of Cardwell's efforts to obtain a more voluntary system of enlistment, the Army became far more

²⁷Flogging was not altogether abolished until 1881. Army Book, p. 26, n. 3.

²⁸Biddulph, pp. 208-209. ²⁹B. S. P., XIV (1870), 188.

³⁰Biddulph, p. ix.

popular than it had ever been before as it was now open to a new class of men. Twelve months after the introduction of short-service, the number of recruits totaled 23,000 which was nearly double what it had been during the last year (1869) of short-service.³¹ In addition, the number of enlistees who deserted before joining their regiments dropped from 5,000 in 1859 to 800 in 1872.³²

Having insured the development of an adequate Army Reserve through the Army Enlistment Act, Cardwell faced the problem of organizing the various auxiliary forces in such a manner that they would all work together with the Regular Army in a national emergency. In April 1869, he had taken a vital step in this direction by securing the passage of a bill which permitted the Militia, Volunteers, and Yeomanry to train with the Regular Army.³³ But in spite of this achievement Cardwell desired something more. He wanted:

. . . to weld and consolidate every branch of the service—the Regular Army, the Militia, the Volunteers, and the Reserve Forces that they may

³¹Arthur, p. 71; Biddulph, pp. 211-212.

³²B. S. P., "Report on Recruiting for the Regular Army," XVIII (1873), 27.

³³Erickson, p. 86.

be animated by one spirit and directed by one purpose, and constitute together the great defensive force of our country.³⁴

Consequently, on February 6, 1871, Cardwell presented to the House of Commons a bill "For the Better Regulation of the Regular and Auxiliary Land Forces of the Crown." This bill called for an increase of 45,000 men in the Militia, and it also made provision for improving the quality of the Militia by extending the training period and requiring an annual drill. In addition, arrangements were made to organize training camps in a manner which would not hinder the flow of men from the Army to the Reserves.³⁵ Cardwell, however, was unable to gain the passage of this bill as he was largely concerned with the abolition of the purchase system during the spring and summer of 1871.³⁶

Having abolished the purchase system with the passage of the Army Regulation Bill in late July,³⁷ Cardwell returned his attention toward the reorganization of the military forces during the autumn of 1871. Using the initial reports

³⁴Hansard's, CXCVI, 1539.

³⁵Erickson, pp. 87-88.

³⁶Wheeler, p. 217.

³⁷See above, pp. 82-83.

of General P. L. MacDougall's Commission on Military Organization³⁸ and the memorandum of the Duke of Cambridge on the same subject,³⁹ Cardwell prepared a scheme for the localization of the military forces.

On February 22, 1872, Cardwell presented the House of Commons with his localization scheme for consolidating the military forces into one harmonious body. He explained to the members of Parliament that by localization of the forces he meant:

. . . identification with a locality for the purposes of recruiting, of training, of connecting the Reserves with those who are actually under the standards.⁴⁰

Cardwell believed that this scheme would attract men from classes who formerly did not wish to join the Army, associate the Army with family ties and kindred, induce men from the Militia to join the Army, and destroy the recruiting competition between the Army and the Militia.⁴¹

The essential idea of the localization scheme called for the organization of all the Infantry forces into military

³⁸B. S. P., "Report of the Commissioners on Army Organization," XVIII (1873), 1-23.

³⁹Ibid., "Memorandum of the Commander-in-Chief on Localization," XXXVII (1872), 385-399.

⁴⁰Hansard's, CCIX, 895.

⁴¹Ibid.

districts, of which there would be sixty-six in Great Britain and Ireland. Each territorial district would contain two battalions of Army Infantry, two Militia battalions, and a certain quota of Volunteers, Enrolled Pensioners, and Army Reserves.⁴² A depot center would be established at the hub of each district where the supplies and headquarters for the troops of that district would be located. At this district command headquarters, the Infantry and Militia battalions would receive their training, and as a general rule all the recruits for both forces would be obtained within the confines of the district.⁴³ In each of the sixty-six districts one of the Regular Army battalions would always be stationed abroad and the other at home. The object of this arrangement was to have the home battalion supply men and equipment for the twin battalion serving abroad. In each home district, therefore, an Army battalion and two Militia battalions would always be ready for activation on a war-time footing. This arrangement would greatly facilitate mobilization of the country's entire military forces and would place them in battle readiness at short notice.⁴⁴

⁴²Ibid., p. 896.

⁴³Ibid., pp. 896-897.

⁴⁴Ibid., pp. 897-898.

Although Cardwell described the localization scheme only as it applied to the Infantry, he also had similar plans for the Royal Artillery. Like the Infantry the nation would be sub-divided into districts, but in this instance there would be twelve districts in comparison with sixty-six for the Infantry. Each Artillery district would contain the Royal Artillery plus the Artillery of the Militia, Volunteers, and Army Reserves.⁴⁵ Later, this organization would prove to have less success than the localization of the Infantry regiments because of the continued maintenance of the Royal Artillery as a single regiment. But during his remaining years at the War Office, Cardwell tried to compensate for this shortcoming by increasing the total of horse-drawn guns in the Royal Artillery from 180 to 336, and by adding about 5,000 men to its ranks.⁴⁶

Cardwell made no mention of his plans for the Cavalry in his speech on the localization of the forces, but as it later developed, the Cavalry forces were divided into two districts with the same organization as the Infantry and

⁴⁵Biddulph, p. 173.

⁴⁶Ensor, p. 15.

the Royal Artillery.⁴⁷ As with the Royal Artillery, this scheme was met with less success than the localization of the Infantry due to the social entrenchment of its officers. Again Cardwell compensated for this arrangement by increasing the strength of the Cavalry from 8,762 to 10,422 men.⁴⁸

In contrast with most of Cardwell's previous legislation, his localization of the forces scheme was received by both sides of the House of Commons with a general chorus of approval. Cardwell was praised for having constructed a plan which when perfected would form the foundation upon which a sound military organization might be erected.⁴⁹ Even the specific details of the plan were not harshly criticized, though some members of Parliament strongly advised that each pair of regiments should be fused together. This sound advice, however, was not acted upon until 1881, when the officers and men of the linked battalions were amalgamated into one regimental corps.⁵⁰

After Parliament gave its approval to the localization scheme, Cardwell proposed the Military Forces Localization

⁴⁷B. S. P., XVIII (1873), 1.

⁴⁸Wood, p. 328.

⁴⁹Biddulph, p. 177.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 178

(Expenses) Bill to effectuate the plan. In the bill, Cardwell asked Parliament for the appropriation of £3,500,000 to purchase land on which the depot training centers could be established and also to construct barrack housing on those centers.⁵¹ The localization scheme was not, however, the sole reason for the need of buildings as additional housing was also required for the Militia. In addition, the withdrawal of Army troops from abroad created the imperative need for additional barrack construction at home.⁵²

Even though Parliament heartily approved of the localization scheme, serious opposition developed over the bill designed to put it into effect. The arguments against the appropriation measure were many and varied. Some members of Parliament argued that the expense was too great; some felt that localization would eventually turn Great Britain into a military state; others thought the depot centers would become focal points for immorality and vice throughout the nation.⁵³ During the violent debates on the bill,

⁵¹B. S. P., "Military Forces Localization (Expenses) Bill," III (1872), 217. Of the sixty-six depot centers, forty of the old stations were to be reconverted, and twenty-six new stations were to be constructed.

⁵²Biddulph, pp. 182-183.

⁵³Erickson, p. 89.

Gladstone remained silent on the matter as it was his custom to let his ministers carry their own bills. In this instance, however, Cardwell became annoyed by Gladstone's silence. He informed Gladstone that the opposition would cease "'if they clearly understood from you that the Bill is part of the Army policy of Government, and that . . . it is indispensable.'"⁵⁴ With this urging Gladstone rose to defend the bill and did so with great skill. As a result, shortly before the session ended,⁵⁵ on August 10, 1872, the measure was passed.⁵⁶

Like most of Cardwell's reforms the localization scheme was not entirely new. Even Cardwell admitted this and attributed the principle on which it was established to William Pitt (the younger) who stated in 1803:

'The Army must be the rallying point. The Army must furnish example, must afford instruction, must give us the principles on which the national system of defence must be formed, and by which the . . . [auxiliary] forces of this country, though in a military view inferior to the regular army, would, fighting on their own soil . . . , be invincible.'⁵⁷

⁵⁴Cardwell to Gladstone, July 22, 1872, Gladstone Papers, 35: f/ 40-41 (Br. Mus. Add. MSS., 44120), as cited by Erickson, p. 89.

⁵⁵Erickson, p. 89. ⁵⁶Hansard's, CCXIV, 866.

⁵⁷Ibid.

Cardwell was not the first to propose the linked battalion system either, for in 1825, Lord Palmerston attempted to create such a system. This attempt failed because strategic defense demanded that a greater proportion of regiments be kept abroad rather than at home.⁵⁸ Cardwell's success in linking the battalions resulted because the need for garrisoning troops all over the world no longer existed. With the development of the steamship, Cardwell was allowed the liberty to concentrate British forces at home as modern steamships could quickly transport British troops to any threatened point.⁵⁹ This fact changed the concepts of defending British interests abroad, and Cardwell capitalized on it. Admittedly, the ideas on which the new British Army were established were not entirely Cardwell's, but the fact remains he gave them new meaning by making them a reality.

⁵⁸Arthur, p. 70.

⁵⁹Omond, pp. 109-110.

CHAPTER VI

MEN, MATÉRIEL, AND MOBILIZATION

In spite of administrative and organizational reforms, Cardwell realized that Britain's military system would fail to show much improvement if the Army continued to rely on the weaponry and combat skills required in the past. Admittedly, a modern military system needed both an administration and an organization which were highly efficient, but in and of themselves they did not constitute an army. Cardwell knew that without the most modern weapons and systematic training, the bravest and best administered soldiers were doomed to defeat. During his tenure at the War Office, Cardwell was constantly aware of this fact and continually sought to improve the officers, weaponry, and combat readiness of Britain's fighting forces.

Prior to the abolition of purchase in 1871, the British Army was weakened by the mediocrity of its officers as few opportunities were provided for their instruction

in the art of warfare.¹ Holding firm to his belief that no officer should be allowed to command men in combat unless possessed with the ability and knowledge for such a command, Cardwell took necessary steps to improve the military education of Britain's Army officers.² Previous to his arrival at the War Office, a Royal Commission had been appointed in 1868 to study the state of military education in the Army. After nearly two years of gathering information, it presented its report to Parliament on February 1, 1870.³ In this report the Royal Commission advised that a Director-General of Military Education be established to facilitate a badly needed program of officer education. Given this advice, Cardwell abolished the inactive Council of Military Education on March 31, 1870, and created the office of the Director-General of Military Education.⁴ Acting through this new department, Cardwell established military schools for Army officers at various military posts throughout the

¹B. S. P., "First Report by the Director-General of Military Education," XVIII (1873), 63.

²Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 90.

³Hansard's, CC, 1553.

⁴B. S. P., XVIII (1873), 49. Cardwell appointed William Napier as the first Director-General of Military Education.

country.⁵ Beginning instruction on September 1, 1870,⁶ these schools offered courses in military law, field fortifications, military sketching, and reconnaissance.⁷ In conjunction with these schools reference libraries were also established to encourage individual study of military subjects.⁸

In addition to recommending the establishment of a Department of Military Education, the Royal Commission advised that the Army require of its officer candidates nothing more than the ordinary liberal education of the country.⁹ Using this principle as its guide-line, the Royal Commission further recommended that in the competitive examinations for new officers the government place a greater reliance on the classical subjects and depress the modern languages and sciences.¹⁰ In making this recommendation the Royal Commission argued that "cramming" for the entrance exams could be prevented as it was of the

⁵Ibid., p. 63.

⁶Letters of Queen Victoria, II, 90.

⁷B. S. P., XVIII (1873), 63.

⁸Ibid., p. 64.

⁹Hansard's, CC, 1576.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 1561.

opinion the sciences could more easily be committed to memory than classical knowledge.¹¹

Many members of Parliament reacted to this advice by voicing their immediate protest against the Royal Commission for suggesting that "... our officers . . . sleep on antique Greek and Roman beds. . . ." ¹² Adding a ringing tone to their argument, these members exclaimed with astonishment that classical knowledge was certainly not the emphasis in Prussia. In answer to this charge the Royal Commission admitted a higher standard of scientific knowledge did exist in the Prussian Army, but it explained this was due to the fact that science largely composed the general education of the country; in Great Britain this was not the case. If Britain wished to apply a remedy then it should do so in its schools and universities before it demanded higher requirements for scientific knowledge in the officer entrance examinations. Remaining convinced that the Army must follow the country, not lead it as in the case of Prussia, the Royal Commission stood its ground.¹³

¹¹Ibid., p. 1565.

¹²Ibid., p. 1567.

¹³Ibid., p. 1576.

Seeking to encourage Britain's best educated young men to enter the Army, Cardwell assumed a moderate position in the wake of this controversy. Rather than disparaging the sciences for the purpose of raising the classics or vice versa, Cardwell thought it best to seek a varied education in the officer entrance exams. Viewing the Army as a microcosm of the nation, Cardwell maintained that the military service ought to contain every excellence which the country could produce.¹⁴ Keeping this objective in mind, Cardwell instructed the Director-General of Military Education to draw up a detailed scheme of military education in which stricter examinations would be required for commissions. As a result, entrance examinations were constructed around a liberal program of education rather than emphasizing the sciences or the classics. Knowledge of subjects such as Hindustani, geometry, and drawing was no longer required, but at the same time, knowledge of the French and German languages was made mandatory. In addition to the stricter entrance examinations, promotions in rank were made dependent upon similar exams which indicated high mental and physical proficiency.¹⁵

¹⁴Ibid., p. 1579.

¹⁵Erickson, p. 93.

Ever since the Austro-Prussian War, British authorities recognized that much of Prussia's military success was due to her custom of assembling a large number of troops under conditions which closely resembled war. Divided into two opposing armies, these maneuvers were of special value to the Prussian Army as they implemented classroom knowledge through the practical instruction of troops, staff, and commanding officers.¹⁶ As a means of implementing military education in a similar manner, Cardwell decided to institute annual maneuvers in the British Army. In adopting this Prussian practice, Cardwell was again departing from tradition as Britain had held only one Army maneuver between Waterloo and the Crimean War, and it involved only 10,000 men.¹⁷

Early in 1871, Cardwell secured the passage of an act which provided for the assembling of troops that coming autumn in Berkshire and parts of Hampshire and Surrey counties. Precautions were taken to prevent unnecessary damage to property, and a court of arbitration was established.

¹⁶Army Book, p. 46.

¹⁷Erickson, p. 90. Training on a large scale was largely neglected during this period because the Army was dispersed throughout England and Ireland in small police units. Woodward, p. 268.

to assess the unavoidable damages caused by the operation.¹⁸ On July 31, 1871, shortly before the maneuvers were planned to begin, the whole operation was called off as it was decided to hold a similar but smaller operation between Chobham and Aldershot. When asked about this change of plans, Cardwell replied that a late harvest was expected in the Berkshire area, and the farmers' horses, which were needed for Army transport, would still be in use. This excuse was highly inadequate, and the press promptly issued a barrage of criticism. In rebuttal Cardwell stated that the War Council had investigated the Berkshire region and discovered it was not a suitable location for holding maneuvers due to the following reasons: the region lacked proper fencing; its impure water made it a typhoid area; and its clay soil would make it difficult for the troops to maneuver if it rained during the operation. Poor as these arguments were, Cardwell knew the real reason for canceling the large maneuvers at Berkshire was due to the fact that the Control Department was not equal to the task. Cardwell, however, would not publicly admit this fact because such

¹⁸Erickson, p. 90; Biddulph, p. 189.

action would have merely redirected the criticism to Henry Storks, the head of that department.¹⁹

With the large maneuvers at Berkshire having been canceled, a smaller maneuver was held around Aldershot during the first part of September. It proved to be a real fiasco. The whole operation was indicative of its start as the horses of the first Life Guards stampeded. Throughout the maneuver the officers remained similarly spirited, but they lacked a definite knowledge of procedure. As a result, orders for the next morning's activities were never issued the night before; therefore, the troops were left almost totally ignorant of what was going on. Making matters worse, much of the equipment was obsolete, and this resulted in frequent breakdowns.²⁰ In addition, the troops made numerous complaints about their daily meat rations as the Cattle Contagious Diseases Act required that all animals be slaughtered in London. Instead of having the animals sent along with the troops in flocks and herds, the meat was sent out daily from London to the troops by

¹⁹Erickson, p. 90.

²⁰Ibid.

train. But by the time the meat passed through the various depots and commissaries, the troops received their rations late at night or not at all.²¹

Despite the many shortcomings of the maneuver, the operation proved valuable as it revealed precisely where improvements were needed.²² Realizing that no one individual could be blamed for the failure, Cardwell criticized no one. Instead, he attributed the disappointing results to a general lack of experience in holding military maneuvers. In the future, however, he hoped the Army would rectify its mistakes and prevent them from recurring.²³

The following year (1872) Army maneuvers were held on a much larger scale in the counties of Wiltshire and Dorset.²⁴ Many foreign observers from various continental armies were invited to attend this assemblage of troops which was considerably larger than the British force that

²¹Ibid.; "Autumnal Manoeuvres," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CXI (March, 1872), 325. Hereafter cited as "Autumnal Manoeuvres,"

²²Erickson, p. 90; "Autumnal Manoeuvres," CXI, 323.

²³Erickson, pp. 90-91.

²⁴Biddulph, p. 189; Erickson, p. 91.

landed in the Crimea in 1854.²⁵ Luckily, these maneuvers went off much more successfully than the previous year, and all Army departments, with the exception of the Control Department, exhibited considerable improvement.²⁶ As usual the Control Department performed its duties badly. For example, men who were familiar only with the issuance of medical supplies and utensils were suddenly placed in charge of purchasing hay and oats for the Cavalry horses.²⁷ Together with various other mismanaged arrangements, it was no wonder the system of transport and supply broke down.

Maneuvers were held once again in the autumn of 1873, but since the Duke of Cambridge felt that it was unwise to assemble the entire force each year, three smaller operations were held at Dartmoor, Cannock Chase, and Curragh.²⁸ In each instance the officers and men performed their duties well, but once again the Control Department proved unequal to the task. This time, however, the reasons

²⁵Biddulph, p. 189.

²⁶Erickson, p. 91.

²⁷"Our Autumn Manoeuvres," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CXII (November, 1872), 639.

²⁸Erickson, p. 91; Biddulph, p. 190.

for its breakdown were obvious. The department was simply being overworked as it lacked sufficient men and equipment to perform its functions properly. In addition, its tasks were made more difficult by the officers and men of the combat troops who consistently failed to give the department their full cooperation.²⁹

Since Cardwell prepared the Army Estimates for the last time in 1874, he arranged to have maneuvers held during the coming autumn. After 1874, however, maneuvers were not held again until 1898.³⁰ Regretably, this was a great mistake for while the annual maneuvers were held the officers and troops gained training and experience which could be acquired in no other way short of war. In addition, the annual maneuvers were important because they brought public attention to the military forces. The nation saw that it could field an Army of 100,000 men and still have a small but steadily growing Reserve Force to back it up. Correspondingly, the public realized that the Militia was better prepared to fight along side the

²⁹Erickson, p. 91.

³⁰Ibid.; Biddulph, p. 190, n. 1.

Regular Army, and that the Volunteers were better trained and more reliable for home defense. As The Times (London) put it:

These are facts which the country ought distinctly to appreciate, and if the Autumn Manoeuvres did nothing else but bring them prominently forward, the exertions of Mr. Cardwell and of the officers who have so ably carried his views into effect would be well repaid.³¹

Up until the Austro-Prussian War, the Infantry of the British Army relied on the Enfield rifle which was first used successfully during the latter part of the Crimean War.³² This muzzle-loading weapon was highly regarded by the military authorities until the outbreak of the Schleswig-Holstein War when it was discovered the Prussian breech-loader could fire three rounds for every round fired by the Enfield.³³ Frightened by this report British military authorities appointed a committee in 1864 to investigate and report on the practicability of adopting a breech-loading

³¹The Times (London), September 13, 1873, p. 9.

³²E. G. B. Reynolds, The Lee-Enfield Rifle (London: Herbert Jenkins, 1960), p. 17. Hereafter cited as Reynolds.

³³"Inefficiency of the British Army," CXXIX, 520.

rifle for use in the British Army.³⁴ After the committee reached a favorable decision, an exhaustive testing program was established at the Woolwich Arsenal where some fifty different breech-loading systems were closely examined.³⁵

While the British were conducting their exhaustive trials at Woolwich, the Austro-Prussian War erupted on the continent. The overwhelming effect of the breech-loader in the hands of the Prussian Infantry forced Britain to speed the adoption of a similar arm for its own use.³⁶ In 1867, as a temporary expedient, the British adopted a breech-loading system submitted by an American, Jacob Snider,³⁷ because it allowed for the conversion of the muzzle-loading Enfields into breech-loading Sniders. Hence, the official name for the new arm was the Snider-Enfield rifle, and it had the distinction of becoming the first breech-loader adopted for use in the British Army.³⁸

³⁴Reynolds, p. 18. It is interesting to note that shortly before the death of Prince Albert in 1861, the Queen's husband had unsuccessfully urged Lord Palmerston to seek the adoption of a breech-loading weapon for the Army. Ensor, p. 14.

³⁵Reynolds, p. 19.

³⁶Biddulph, pp. 36-37.

³⁷Reynolds, p. 19.

³⁸Ibid., p. 20.

Since the Snider rifle was adopted only as a stop-gap measure, a new committee was appointed in late 1867 to inquire into the possibility of adopting a weapon superior to the Snider conversion system. After considering many possibilities the committee recommended for trial a weapon embodying a breech action invented by Frederich Von Martini of Switzerland and a barrel designed by Alexander Henry of Edinburgh.³⁹ Before the Martini-Henry rifle could be officially adopted, however, it was necessary to test it under varying conditions and different climates. As a result, some of these rifles were issued for trial at home, in India, and in Canada.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, on becoming Secretary of War in December 1868, Cardwell discovered the Regular Army was only partially equipped with the breech-loading Snider-Enfield, while the Militia and Volunteers were still using the old muzzle-loading Enfields.⁴¹ Early in 1869, Cardwell took necessary steps to speed up the gradual arming of the Regular Army and the auxiliary forces with the Snider-Enfield rifle.⁴² When

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Biddulph, pp. 36-37.

⁴¹ "The Government Army Bill," CXXX, 560.

⁴² Biddulph, p. 36.

the Franco-Prussian War broke out in 1870, sixty-five regiments of Militia and fifteen of Yeomanry had been so armed. Cardwell, however, wanted all the military units equipped with these weapons, and the issuance continued until May 1871, when the task was finally completed.⁴³

In presenting the Army Estimates on March 11, 1869, Cardwell informed the House of Commons that he had been urged by competent authorities to substitute the Martini-Henry rifle for the Snider-Enfield. Cardwell noted that this advice could not be realized at the moment since the Martini-Henry rifle had not yet undergone all of its extensive testing.⁴⁴ It was not until two years later that prolonged examination proved the worthiness of the Martini-Henry rifle, and in April 1871, it was officially adopted for use in the British Army.⁴⁵ This weapon was by far superior to the Snider-Enfield, and between 1871 and 1874 the British Army was issued its first satisfactory breech-loader.⁴⁶

⁴³Ibid., p. 69.

⁴⁴Hansard's, CXCIV, 1134.

⁴⁵Reynolds, p. 21.

⁴⁶Ensor, p. 14.

In the final analysis Cardwell knew that the quality of the British Army depended not upon its administration, organization, officers, or weaponry as much as it did upon the welfare of the common soldier. Through the Army Enlistment Act of 1870, which has been examined previously, Cardwell improved conditions in the service for the common soldier by shortening the length of enlistment, by abolishing barbarous punishments, and by discharging men of bad character.⁴⁷ While these reforms vastly improved the quality and quantity of recruits, the men still did not enlist in sufficient numbers as the unskilled laborer earned somewhat higher wages than the ordinary soldier. Since this especially tended to prevent men from joining the military service during prosperous times, Cardwell insisted on increasing the wages of the troops. After overcoming some opposition, he secured the adoption of an increased pay scale in 1873.⁴⁸

Prior to the wage increase each soldier received 1s. 3d. per day which included 1d. per day for beer money. The net pay of each soldier, however, was only 10½d. per

⁴⁷See above, pp. 101-102. ⁴⁸Erickson, pp. 92-93.

day as the ration stoppage fee of 4½d. was deducted for his bread and meat rations. Since these monetary fractions complicated Army accounting on payday and were a general nuisance, Cardwell abolished the ration stoppage and increased each soldier's wages to an even 1s. per day. At the same time he arranged to have this pay scale adopted for the Militia also.⁴⁹ As a result of this wage increase, The Times (London) commented that the Infantry soldier would be one of the best paid unskilled laborers in the country as each soldier would receive food, lodging, clothing, education, and medical care plus 1s. per day.⁵⁰

Supplementing the wage increase, Cardwell saw to it that the soldiers received many other extra benefits. He increased the allowances of men on furlough and made arrangements to give honorably discharged soldiers employment preferences in the civil services, in the metropolitan police force, and in the Post Office. In addition, Cardwell provided separate quarters for married soldiers and ordered that all barracks be repaired. Recognizing that much of

⁴⁹Hansard's, CCXIV, 876.

⁵⁰The Times (London), February 25, 1873, p. 9.

Army life involved "organized idleness," Cardwell directed commanding officers to arrange with the Royal Engineers and the Control Department that all barrack repairs be made by military labor whenever possible. In the process of making needed repairs the soldiers were not only paid for their work, but they were also taught various trades which would be of help to them once they were discharged from military service.⁵¹

As a result of the foregoing improvements, together with Cardwell's organizational and administrative reforms, the British Army was better prepared for a national war in 1874 than it had been in 1868. During the nearly six years in which Cardwell reformed and reorganized the Army, he was very fortunate that no large-scale war erupted. In his last year at the War Office, however, one small colonial war involving the Ashantee tribe on the Gold Coast of West Africa did occur. Due to the British embargo on slave trade and the British control of the Gold Coast port cities, the slave-trading Ashantees were annoyed because the British were menacing their chief source of wealth. Failing to

⁵¹Erickson, p. 93.

obtain the chief port of Elmina by negotiation, the Ashantees invaded the British protectorate early in 1873, in an effort to acquire a slave emporium.⁵²

At first, opinion in Gladstone's Cabinet was badly divided over what action it should take. On the insistence, however, of the Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, and Cardwell, the Cabinet decided to send an expedition against the Ashantees.⁵³ Sir Garnet Wolseley was placed in command of this expedition, and suffice it to say that after landing on the Gold Coast in October 1873, the expedition was brought to a successful conclusion five months later. Ironically, the news of the successful expedition did not reach Britain until after Gladstone's Ministry had fallen from power as a result of the Liberal defeat at the polls in the general elections of February 1874.⁵⁴

It might be said, therefore, that Cardwell's last act as Secretary of War was to make an effective use of the Army which he had so diligently reformed and reorganized.⁵⁵

⁵²Ibid., p. 94.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Biddulph, p. 223; Erickson, pp. 94-95.

⁵⁵Biddulph, p. 223.

On the day before he left the War Office Cardwell wrote to Lord Northbrook referring to the Ashantee Expedition in these words:

'Precision had anticipated everything that could be desired, and if it were to be done over again, . . . nothing different [could be suggested]. How was this accomplished? Not by any knowledge on my part of such affairs, but by the simple fact . . .⁵⁶ [of] having an admirably organized office. . . .⁵⁶

In terms of efficiency the Ashantee War of 1873-1874 proved that Cardwell's work was not in vain for a larger but similar campaign in Abyssinia in 1868 had cost £8,600,000 while the Ashantee Expedition had cost only £900,000.⁵⁷

To be sure, the Ashantee Expedition was only a small-scale war against savages, but it must be remembered that it was performed in an area where no European troops had previously served. Had not an efficient Army organization been in existence, the expedition might have entailed greater cost, or possibly it might have ended in disaster.⁵⁸

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 224.

⁵⁷Wheeler, p. 221.

⁵⁸Biddulph, p. 225.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

Unlike many of his fellow Liberals, Cardwell was elected to the House of Commons in the general elections of February 1874.¹ Shortly thereafter, he was elevated to the House of Lords as Viscount Cardwell of Ellerbeck.² During the next few years Lord Cardwell continued to participate in public affairs within the calmer atmosphere of his peerage, but never again did he become a minister of state.³

Cardwell's years at the War Office placed a heavy burden upon his health,⁴ and after he stepped down from his secretaryship, it rapidly deteriorated. By 1879, he was quite ill and rarely attended the House of Lords. A year later Cardwell went to Montfleury, France to rest and recuperate. His health, however, continued to deteriorate, and by 1883, he no longer had normal use of his once

¹Erickson, p. 99. ²Ibid.; D. N. B., III, 953.

³D. N. B., III, 953. ⁴Erickson, p. 99.

brilliant mind for a large part of the time. From Montfleury, he was taken to Cannes, and from there to Torquay, England,⁵ where he died on February 15, 1886.⁶

As a political figure in nineteenth century Britain, Cardwell's importance largely rests on his performance at the War Office. When he became Secretary of War late in 1868, the Army establishment existed largely unchanged since the days of the Stuarts. Its administration was highly inefficient; its organization was archaic; its officers lacked technical and professional skills; and, its conditions of service were barely tolerable for the common soldier. During his administration at the War Office Cardwell managed to reorganize the administration of the Army, abolish the systems of dual control and the purchase of commissions, introduce the system of short-service, improve the conditions of military service, and adopt the principle of localization for the Army and Reserve units. As a result, when Cardwell departed the War Office early in 1874, Great

⁵Ibid., p. 100.

⁶Ibid.; D. N. B., III, 953. Upon his death Cardwell's peerage became extinct for his marriage to Annie, the youngest daughter of Charles Stuart Parker of Fairlie, Ayrshire, in 1838, was not blessed with children. D. N. B., III, 953.

Britain possessed a modernized Army that was larger than any previous peacetime force in British History. Yet for all his efforts Cardwell left the Army Estimates at a lower figure than when he assumed office in 1868.⁷

On Cardwell's departure from the War Office many members of the Conservative Party urged that his successor, Gathorne-Hardy, drastically alter the essential parts of the Cardwell reforms. Recognizing that the Cardwellian system met the momentary needs of the British people both at home and abroad, Gathorne-Hardy, as well as his successors, refused to make significant changes in it.⁸ As the recipient of this fitting tribute, the Cardwellian system contributed significantly to the good fighting record of the British troops in the overseas colonies during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But due to the fact that Cardwell's successors accepted the Cardwellian system without adding necessary alterations to meet changing needs, the eventual breakdown of the Cardwellian system became inevitable. As Cardwell left it, the British Army was a well-organized fighting machine; nevertheless, there was

⁷See Appendix E, p. 150. ⁸Erickson, pp. 99-100.

room for further reform. In a period when continental armies were introducing General Staffs to handle the complex problems of military administration, Cardwell's successors allowed the Duke of Cambridge to remain as Commander-in-Chief until his retirement in 1895. Eventually, the combined effect of the Duke's presence in the office of the Commander-in-Chief together with the lack of a General Staff yielded humiliating results during the Boer War in South Africa.

With the conclusion of the Boer War, the opening years of the twentieth century brought forth a new era of military reform in Great Britain. These years saw the creation of an Imperial General Staff, the improvement of the territorial system, and the construction of the British Expeditionary Force. These reforms were long overdue, but nevertheless, on the eve of World War I the British military system still rested on the principles which Cardwell had introduced. Short-service still supplied men for the Army Reserve; localization still associated the regiments with territorial districts; and, the fighting units at home were still balanced with those

serving garrison duty abroad.⁹ Thus, Cardwell's reforms were of such magnitude that he can be called the father of the modern British Army.

As an able Victorian administrator Cardwell ranks as one of the greatest military reformers in British history. Unlike Scharnhorst, his Prussian counterpart during the early nineteenth century, Cardwell did not achieve his reforms with the impetus of military defeat such as the Prussians received after Jena. Unquestionably, the impact of Prussian militarism served to weaken the old Army order in Britain, and Cardwell's cause was thereby given indirect aid. Nevertheless, his reforms were viewed with suspicion by many and staunchly opposed by the Queen, by the Duke of Cambridge, by the Army establishment, by the Conservative Party, and by many members within his own Liberal Party. Due to this almost insurmountable opposition, Army reform might never have been achieved between 1868 and 1874 without Cardwell's indomitable courage, perseverance, tact, and pressure. To be sure, Great Britain was served more brilliantly by other men of his generation, but none served their country more faithfully, more strenuously, or with more lasting results.

⁹ For details of Army reform during this period see, John K. Dunlop, The Development of the British Army, 1899-1914 (London: Methuen, 1938).

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

MEMORANDUM SHOWING THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE WAR OFFICE BETWEEN 1854 AND 1869¹

Prior to the year 1854, the different Departments connected with the Army, Militia, and Volunteer forces, were as follow:—

- (1) Two Secretaries of State for War and Colonies and Home.
- (2) General Commanding-in-Chief.
- (3) Ordnance Office.
 - Master-General of the Ordnance.
 - Clerk of the Ordnance
 - Surveyor-General of the Ordnance.
 - Principal Storekeeper.
 - Inspector-General of Fortifications.
 - Director-General of Artillery.
- (4) Treasury (Commissariat).
- (5) Secretary at War.
- (6) Army Medical Department.
- (7) Audit Office.
- (8) Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital.
- (9) Board of General Officers.
- (10) Paymaster-General.

On 12th June, 1854, a fourth Secretary of State was established for the Department of War, and on the 11th August, 1854, an Order in Council was passed providing the necessary Establishment for carrying on the duties of the Office.

¹Cited verbatim from Clode, The Military Forces of the Crown, II, 769-776.

On the 14th November, 1854, another Order in Council was passed, adding a second permanent Under-Secretary of State for the War Department.

The other Military Departments still existed separately, but the Secretary of State for War assumed and exercised control over all of them.

In December, 1854, the Commissariat was transferred from the Treasury to the War Department, including the Banking business connected with the Treasury Chest, as well as the business hitherto performed by the Audit Office of the examination of the Commissariat Cash and Store Accounts.

In January, 1855, a Topographical Department was formed under a Director.

In February, 1855, the office of Secretary at War was combined with that of Secretary of State—the Secretary of State for War receiving, in addition to his Patent as Secretary of State, a Commission as Secretary at War.

In March, 1855, the Business connected with the Militia was transferred from the Home Office to the War Department.

On the 18th May, 1855, the Business connected with the Militia was transferred from the Home Office to the War Department.

On the 18th May, 1855, a Patent was granted to the Secretary of State for War, vesting in him the administration of the Army and Ordnance, "except so far as relates to and concerns the Military Command and discipline thereof shall have been committed to, vested in, or regulated by the Commander-in-Chief;" and on the 25th May the Secretary of State transferred the Command and discipline of the Ordnance Corps to the General Commanding-in-Chief, who was thus placed in command of the whole Army. An act (18 & 19 Vic., cap. 117) was also passed, vesting in the Secretary of State all the estates and powers formerly held and exercised by the Board of Ordnance.

On the 6th June, 1855, an Order in Council was passed, settling the future constitution of the Civil Departments of the Army as follow:—

- (1) Clerk of the Ordnance.
- (2) Inspector-General of Fortifications.
- (3) Director-General of Artillery.
- (4) Director-General of Naval Artillery.
- (5) Director-General of Stores.

- (6) Director-General of Contracts.
- (7) Director-General of Clothing.
- (8) Accountant General; and
- (9) Superintendents for each of the Manufacturing Departments.

These Officers were in addition to those included in the Establishments of the War Department, War Office, etc.

In January, 1856, a Committee was appointed by the then Secretary of State (Lord Panmure) to consider and recommend a definite distribution of the duties of the Officers consolidated under the Secretary of State for War, and of the several classes of Clerks, so as by an uniform scale of remuneration to render them available for any branch of the War Department.

The recommendations of the Committee, which reported on the 3rd January, 1856, were agreed to by the Treasury, and the consolidation of the several branches of the War Department was then completed.

This consolidated Department thus included the duties of the Secretary of State's Office the Militia business of the Home Office, the War Office, the Ordnance Office, Commissariat and Medical Departments, the examination of the Cash and Store Accounts of the Commissariat Department, the examination of the payments made by the Paymaster-General for non-effective Services, and the duties of the Board of General Officers relating to Clothing.

The Commissioners of Chelsea Hospital still retained the duty of placing soldiers on the Out-pension List, though the expenditure of both In and Out pensions was borne on the Army Estimates.

On the 2nd February, 1857, another Order in Council was passed (revoking the Orders of the 11th August and 14th November, 1854, and 6th June, 1855), by which the following alterations were effected in the Superior appointments of the Office.

- (1) One Under-Secretary of State reduced.
- (2) One Clerk of the Ordnance abolished.
- (3) One Director-General of Clothing reduced.
- (4) One Principal Clerk discontinued.

The Naval Director-General of Artillery was appointed Director of Stores, continuing to perform the duties of the former Office.

And the following Offices were created:—

- (1) One Assistant Under-Secretary of State.
- (2) One Secretary for Military correspondence.
- (3) The Office of Deputy Secretary at War was merged into that of Under-Secretary of State.

In July, the Topographical Department, the Military Depot of the Quartermaster-General's Office, and the Ordnance Survey, hitherto a branch of the Inspector-General of Fortifications' Office, were placed under an Officer of the Royal Engineers as a Director immediately responsible to the Secretary of State.

In September, the Banking business connected with the Treasury Chest was re-transferred to the Treasury.

In October, the Office of Examiner of Army Accounts was abolished, and a Senior Clerk, under the title of Assistant Accountant-General, was appointed to perform the duties.

In 1857 the business connected with the Army Schools was taken from the Chaplain-General and entrusted to a Military Officer—Inspector-General of Schools. A Board of Military Officers, called the Council of Military Education, was also established on the 1st of June in this year for conducting the examination of Officers, and placed under the control of the General Commanding-in-Chief.

In the same year, upon the gradual disembodiment of the Militia after the Russian War, a Military Officer, to act under the Secretary of State, was appointed as Inspector of Militia.

In April, 1858, the Treasury appointed a Committee to enquire into the duties of the Account Branch of the War Office. The main recommendation of the Committee was the transfer of the preparation of the Estimates of the Accountant-General. Owing to a change in the Government, nothing was done to carry out this recommendation.

In May, 1859, the following alterations in the organization of the War Office were decided upon:—

1. Transfer to the General Commanding-in-Chief of the purely Military duties of the Inspector-General of Fortifications and Director-General of Artillery, and the abolition of the latter office.
2. Formation of a permanent Defence Committee.
3. Reconstruction of the Ordnance Select Committee.
4. Transfer of the management of Regimental Schools and Libraries to the Council of Military Education, the abolition of the appointment of Inspector-General of Schools.

The Inspector-General of Fortifications still remained the Official Adviser to the Secretary of State on all questions relating to fortifications and other works, and was also charged with the execution of those works; he was also a member of the permanent Defence Committee; but he was wholly relieved of his Military duties as Commandant of the Corps of Royal Engineers.

The Ordnance Select Committee was re-constructed, and the President of the Committee took charge of that portion of the duties of the Director-General of Artillery which still remained in the War Office.

In November, 1859, the Treasury appointed a new Committee to enquire into the duties of the Account Branch; and in June, 1860, the Committee made a first Report, repeating the recommendation of the Committee of 1858, in regard to the transfer of the Estimates to the Accountant-General, and further recommending the separation of the Account Branch from the General Office in respect of establishment and promotion.

The appointment of an additional Assistant Accountant-General was also recommended, who should be charged with the preparation of the Estimates and the Bookkeeping Branch.

These recommendations were carried into effect in August, 1860.

The Volunteer Force having so largely increased in 1859, and a Military Officer being required to superintend the organization and discipline of the Force, an Inspector-General, with a deputy, was appointed in January, 1860, and placed in charge of the Civil business of the Force.

In March, the transfer of the superintendence of Army Schools and Libraries to the Council of Military Education under the control of the General Commanding-in-Chief was carried out, and the appointment of Inspector-General of Schools abolished.

In November, a Librarian and Precis-writer was appointed.

In December, the Inspector of Militia was placed in charge of the Civil business of the Militia in the War Office, and the designation of the appointment was altered to that of Inspector-General.

In January, 1861, a recommendation, founded on the report of the Select Committee on Military Organization, was referred to the Treasury for the appointment of a Director of Ordnance, who would relieve the President of

the Ordnance Select Committee of that portion of his duties as Adviser to the Secretary of State on Artillery and Armaments, and also be placed in charge of the whole of the Manufacturing Departments.

At the same time the Secretary of State expressed his intention of appointing at some future date a Director of Supplies, who would be charged with the supply and issue of all stores (not being munitions of War). In accordance with this proposal a Director of Ordnance was appointed in July, 1861.

In May, the Secretary for Military Correspondence (Major-General Sir E. Lugard) was appointed Under-Secretary of State, the former appointment being abolished.

About the same time a Military Officer, on half-pay and receiving Staff-pay, was appointed to assist the Under-Secretary of State.

In November, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State died and his appointment was not filled up.

In December, a Military Officer was appointed to assist the Director of Ordnance, and styled Assistant Director of Ordnance.

In February, 1862, a Committee which had been appointed to inquire into the Establishments of the several branches of the War Office, fixed the number and classification of the Clerks to be in future borne on those Establishments, exclusive of the Account Department and Solicitors' Branch.

In May, the Office of Assistant Under-Secretary of State was revived, and Captain Galton, appointed thereto, the third Under-Secretary of State being at the same time abolished.

In June, the Barrack Department was transferred from the control of the Inspector-General of Fortifications, and was formed into a separate branch under an Engineer Officer as Superintendent.

In September, the designation of the Inspector-General of Fortifications was altered into Inspector-General of Engineers and Director of Works; in the former capacity he was reinstated in the command of the Corps of Royal Engineers and placed in immediate communication with the Commander-in-Chief; in the latter he was under the direct control of the Secretary of State for War. The Office of Deputy Inspector-General of Fortifications was abolished.

Two Deputy Directors of Works, one for Barracks and the other for Fortifications and Civil Buildings, were created. (These Officers of the Royal Engineers had

previously held similar appointments under the Inspector-General of Fortifications.)

In June, the Clothing business was separated from the Store Department, and on 23rd February, 1863, was made into a distinct branch under a Director of Clothing.

In May, 1863, an Act was passed abolishing the Office of Secretary at War, and vesting in the Secretary of State the duties and powers of that office.

In June, 1864, another Committee was proposed to the Treasury for the purpose of inquiring into the Establishment of the War Office. The reports of this Committee commenced in September, 1864, and continued from time to time until May, 1865.

Their recommendations resulted in the following important changes:—

1. The separation of the department, which had been previously under the sole control of the Accountant-General, into two branches. One under the Accountant-General, the other under the Chief Auditor of Army Accounts, an office for the first time created. The latter Officer took over a portion of the duties hitherto performed by the Accountant-General and his two assistants; also the Audit of Barrack, Store, and Kit accounts from the Barrack and Clothing branches; and eventually (1866) the audit of the Store Accounts from the Store Branch.
2. Of the two Assistant Accountants General, one was abolished on the appointment of the Chief Auditor; the other is to be abolished when a vacancy occurs.
3. The abolition of the appointment of Librarian and Precis-writer.
4. The substitution of Out-Station Clerks of the Royal Engineer Department in place of War Office Clerks in the office of the Director of Works.
5. The substitution of Barrack Officers and Military Clerks in the place of War Office Clerks in the Barrack branch.
6. The separation of the Clerical Establishment of the Army Medical Department and Clothing Branch from the rest of the War Office on distinct and lower scales of pay.

7. The withdrawal from the Commissariat of the Clerks on the Establishment of the War Office, and the substitution of Commissariat Officers and Staff.
8. The introduction into the Chief Auditor's Branch and Clothing Department of Military and pensioned Non-commissioned Officer Clerks.
9. The formation of a Regulation Branch, with a view to the codification of the regulations.

In August, 1866, it was decided, in consequence of the great and important changes in Naval Ordnance, to appoint an officer of the rank of Rear-Admiral, to be attached to the Admiralty and to Act as Director-General of Naval Ordnance.

In December, 1867, in consequence of the recommendation of a Committee, presided over by Lord Strathnairn, appointed in June, 1866, to consider the question of Army Transports, but subsequently directed by General Peel to extend its inquiries into the administration of the Supply Department of the Army, a Military Office was appointed as Controller-in-Chief, to supervise and direct the various Departments of Transport, Commissariat, Store, Purveyor, and Barrack. Another Military Officer was appointed (temporarily) as his assistant.

In April, 1868, a Royal Warrant gave effect to this arrangement.

In consequence of this change, the appointments of Director of Stores and Superintendent of the Barrack Department were abolished in December, 1868.

In January, 1868, "with a view of increasing the efficiency of the local Military Forces, and also of securing unity of action in the event of their being at any time required for Service," an Inspector-General of Reserve Forces was appointed to supervise the Militia, Yeomanry, Volunteers, and Enrolled Pensioners.

In November, a Director-General of Ordnance was appointed in place of the Director of Ordnance. A Deputy was appointed at the same time.

The Ordnance Select Committee was abolished, and a smaller Committee, styled the Artillery Committee, presided over by the Deputy Director-General of Ordnance, was appointed in its place.

The Director-General of Ordnance was also made Commandant of the Arsenal at Woolwich, and the heads of the various Manufacturing Departments were placed under his orders.

APPENDIX B

SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR WAR BETWEEN 1855 AND 1900¹

Term	Office-Holder
February 8, 1855	Lord Panmure
February 27, 1858	Jonathan Peel
June 19, 1859	Sidney Herbert
July 22, 1861	George Cornwall Lewis
April 28, 1863	G. F. S. Robinson
February 16, 1866	Spencer Compton Cavendish
July 6, 1866	Jonathan Peel
March 8, 1867	John Pakington
December 9, 1868	Edward Cardwell
February 21, 1874	Gathorne-Hardy
April 2, 1878	Frederick Arthur Stanley
April 28, 1880	Hugh Culling Eardley Childers
December 16, 1882	Spencer Compton Cavendish
June 24, 1884	William Henry Smith
January 4, 1887	Edward Stanhope
August 18, 1892	Henry Campbell-Bannerman
July 4, 1895- October, 1900	Henry Charles Keith Petty-FitzMaurice

¹F. Maurice Powicke and F. B. Fryde, Handbook of British Chronology (2nd ed.; London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 1961), p. 121.

APPENDIX C

THE ARMY REGULATIONS ACT—ARRANGEMENT OF CLAUSES¹

- Part I. Commissions in Her Majesty's Forces.
1. Abolition of purchase after November 1, 1871.
 2. Compensation to officers holding saleable commissions.
 3. Compensation to officers of certain Indian regiments.
 4. Provision for expense of compensating officers.
- Part II. Army Enlistment
5. Enlistment rules.
- Part III. Auxiliary Forces
6. Jurisdiction of lieutenants of counties re-vested in Her Majesty.
 7. Number of auxiliary forces.
 8. Voluntary enlistment in the Militia under ordinary circumstances.
 9. Training for Militia.
 10. Increase of Militia in case of emergency by voluntary enlistment, or, if necessary by ballot.
 11. Liability to serve in case of ballot.
 12. Classification for purposes of the Militia.
 13. Engagement in Volunteers to qualify for exemption from the ballot.
 14. Application of Mutiny Act to Volunteers when in training.
- Part IV. As to Sale of Commissions
15. Appointment of Commissioners to compensate officers.
 16. Appointment of clerks by Commissioners.

¹B. S. P., I (1871), 11-13.

17. Powers and duties of Commissioners.
18. Decision of Commissioners to be conclusive.

As to the Ballot

19. Mode of balloting for the Militia.
20. Provisions to give effect to the ballot.
21. Definition of counties and division of counties.
22. Definition of justices of division, session, and clerks of division.
23. Mode of ascertaining population for purposes of the ballot.

Rules by Secretary of State for War

24. Power to make rules.
25. Determine how returns in Militia to be made.

Part V. Miscellaneous

26. Power of Government to take possession of the railroads in an emergency.
27. Power of county or municipal boroughs to build barracks.
28. Incorporation of certain clauses of the General Acts.
29. Loan by Public Works Loan Commissioners.
30. Payment by Secretary of War for use of barracks.
31. Power of militia and volunteer corps to acquire land for any necessary purposes.

Penalties and Saving Clauses

32. Recovery of penalties.
33. Provision as to Quakers.
34. Saving of General Acts.

APPENDIX D

THE ROYAL WARRANT ABOLISHING PURCHASE IN THE ARMY¹

Whereas by the Act passed in the Session held in the fifth and sixth years of the reign of King Edward VI, chapter 16, intituled "Against Buying and Selling of Offices," and the Act passed in the forty-ninth year of George III, chapter 126, intituled "An Act for the Prevention of the Sale and Brokerage of Offices," all officers in our forces are prohibited from selling or bargaining for the sale of any money for the exchange of any such commission, under the penalty of forfeiture of their commissions, and of being cashiered, and of diverse other penalties; but the last-mentioned Act exempts from the penalties of the said Acts purchase, or sales, or exchange of any commissions in our forces for such prices as may be regulated and fixed by any regulation made or to be made by us in that behalf.

And whereas we think it expedient to put an end to all such regulations, and to all sales and purchases, and all exchanges for money of commissions in our forces, and all dealings relating to such sales, purchases or exchanges.

Now, our will and pleasure is that on and after the 1st day of November in this present year all regulations made by us or any of our Royal predecessors, or any officers acting under our authority, regulating or fixing the prices at which any commissions in our forces may be purchased, sold or exchanged or in any way authorizing the purchase, or sale, or exchange for money of any such commissions, shall be cancelled and determined.

Given at our Court at Osborne, this 20th day of July, in the thirty-fifth year of our reign. By her Majesty's command.

Edward Cardwell

¹The Illustrated London News, July 29, 1871, p. 95.

APPENDIX E

TABLE OF ARMY ESTIMATES¹

Year	Net Amount
1868-1869	£13,331,000
1869-1870	£12,047,600
1870-1871	£12,661,765
1871-1872	£14,422,732
1872-1873	£13,582,000
1873-1874	£13,231,400

¹Hansard's, CXCIV, 1111; B. S. P., XXXVII (1872), 4; B. S. P., XL (1873), 3.

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