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THE CONSIDERATION OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE
AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
John Brayman
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THESIS ACCEPTANCE

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THE CONSIDERATION OF THE YALTA CONFERENCE
AS AN EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT

The story of the Yalta Conference is a complex and a difficult one. The Yalta Conference was one of a series of important conferences which were held among the Allies during the Second World War. Yalta was also the second, and the last, meeting between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin in a face-to-face situation.

The Axis powers of Hitler and Mussolini along with the Empire of Japan had been conducting a ravaging war with the Allies in many areas of the world. At Yalta, when the defeat of the European belligerents was in sight, the Big Three had a two-fold task. One task involved the establishment of the foundations of peace, hopefully a lasting peace, and the second was designed to put Europe back together again, geographically and politically.

To this date, there has been no single formal conference to determine a peace treaty after World War II, but a series of conferences from the signing of the Atlantic Charter to the Potsdam Conference mark the way. Yalta was the most important, for it was there that Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin established the Allied plans for the final military victory and agreed on the partitioning of Germany and on certain plans for future peace.

Not only was the Yalta Conference the most important Allied conference held during the war, but it also became the most controversial.

Those who criticize and analyze this conference seem to fall into three categories. First there are those who show a lack of understanding of American objectives in the conduct of the war and in America's efforts during the war to lay a foundation for a peaceful post-war era. Secondly, there are those who, for reasons best known to themselves, have distorted and perverted the facts to a point at which their statements have little or no basis in reality. The third category consists of those who, in a scholarly and objective manner, try to establish the truth about the Yalta Conference.

Probably the most troublesome problem one encounters when dealing with the Yalta Conference is that there are very few critics in the third category. Much of the writing dealing with Yalta is presented in a biased or prejudiced manner. It is the historian's task to discover the truth, and that task becomes a difficult one when the subject is as emotional, complex, and controversial as the Yalta Conference.

When studying the Yalta Conference and its relation to United States foreign policy, a topic of major concern is Franklin D. Roosevelt's role. Throughout Roosevelt's four presidential administrations, he assumed a tremendous amount of political power. With his election to the presidency in 1932, Roosevelt was confronted with one of the worst problems the United States has ever faced, the Great Depression. President Roosevelt did not hesitate to meet the emergency; he operated on the United States' economy much as a surgeon operates on a cancerous

body. During the New Deal era, Roosevelt became accustomed to wielding the power with which his high office was endowed. President Roosevelt, in collaboration with his companions in the "Brain Trust," was to become the innovator of numerous federal agencies with the purposes of relief, reform and recovery. When an act was proved unconstitutional, a new one was often created to replace the discarded one, as when the National Industrial Recovery Act Section 7a was replaced by the Wagner Act or the first and second Agricultural Adjustment Act. The American populace became used to the "fireside chats" in which President Roosevelt explained the new programs that the Federal government would be unfolding. In fact, the Federal government began delving into areas that were regarded as being "off limits," the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Works Progress Administration and the National Industrial Recovery Act being prime examples. President Roosevelt's use of his executive power and his power's influence was clearly seen in the 1937 "court-packing" attempt and the 1938 purge of the Democratic Party's Congressmen and Senators who opposed President Roosevelt and the New Deal.

The source of much of the criticism of the New Deal lies in the Federal government's increasing role on the domestic scene. The government became an employment agency, an electric power company, an old-age insurance company, and a referee for commercial interests. President Roosevelt, as the head of the executive branch, was accused

of becoming a dictator and some compared his influence with the increasing power of Germany's Adolf Hitler and Italy's Benito Mussolini.

The purpose of this study is to show that with the emergence of World War II and throughout the war itself, President Roosevelt increased the use of his executive powers and in particular expanded the uses of the executive agreement. The executive agreement, given to the president in his role as the United States' chief diplomat, was used by President Roosevelt from the time of the Fifty Destroyers Deal through the Yalta Conference. Justice Sutherland in 1936 gave the Supreme Court's approval "on the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the government in the field of international relations."¹ The use of the executive agreement will be traced through the major military and military-political conferences held during the Second World War that finally cumulated at Yalta in February of 1945.

The first major military-political conference in which President Roosevelt participated was the meeting with Prime Minister Winston Churchill. That resulted in the Atlantic Charter. In August of 1941, the two leaders met off the coast of Newfoundland in a conference that was kept secret due to the threat of German submarines. The three chief topics to be discussed were lend-lease, common defense, and

¹United States v. Curtiss Wright Corporation, 199, U. S. 304 (1936): 819.

a joint policy against Japan concerning her aggression in the Far East. The so-called Atlantic Charter was the result of a press release issued by the two statesmen that set forth their aims for a post-war peace. The common principles of the Charter created by the United States and Great Britain were: (1) neither country would seek any aggrandizement, territorial or otherwise; (2) no territorial changes would occur without the expressed wishes of the people involved; (3) both countries would respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they would live; (4) they would endeavor to trade with the whole world for materials which are needed for economic prosperity; (5) they would give the fullest collaboration with all nations in the economic field; (6) after the destruction of the Nazi philosophy and rule, they hoped for an established peace; (7) this peace should allow men to travel the high seas and oceans freely; and (8) all nations must abandon the use of force and crush the burden of armaments. The Atlantic Charter can be called the Fourteen Points of the Second World War, for it also established the post-war goal for peace and security which was backed by the heads of the two most powerful nations in the world. The Charter is also significant in that it planted the seed for the establishment of the United Nations.

This action by President Roosevelt was a major step in his policy of limited co-belligerency prior to the United States' total involvement. The United States was forming a war and post-war policy

with an active belligerent nation even though America was not involved. In essence, the Atlantic Charter was an implied promise of future American belligerence. Considering the circumstances, this policy was not in accordance with the spirit of the neutrality laws of the 1930's. President Roosevelt's famous "Quarantine Speech" in Chicago, 1937, and his 1941 "Four Freedoms" laid the groundwork for the Atlantic Charter. The United States was in a transitional state between being a seemingly neutral nation and becoming an active belligerent. The United States, by the Atlantic Charter, was involved in an Anglo-American proposal designed to exercise leadership in policing the world both during and after the war. America accepted the responsibility for the defeat of Germany when Roosevelt announced that ". . . after the final destruction of Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries. . . ." ²

The spirit of the Atlantic Charter is quite evident in later conferences involving the United States' role in the war, including Yalta. This monumental meeting in the North Atlantic was not destined to become a formal treaty, nor a signed document, nor even an official state paper. It was an executive agreement issued by President Roosevelt, and its only legal position was a carefully phrased press release. The Atlantic Charter was not the first and not to be the last time

²Samuel Rosenman, ed., The Public Papers of Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), p. 315.

President Roosevelt initiated United States foreign policy without the consent of Congress.

The importance of the Atlantic Charter was soon realized in another executive agreement made by President Roosevelt, the Declaration of the United Nations. Two weeks after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Winston Churchill travelled to Washington and met with President Roosevelt in conjunction with other co-belligerents. The result was a document, dated January 1, 1942, signed by twenty-six nations currently at war with the Axis powers. The Declaration of the United Nations was pledged to the principles set forth by the Atlantic Charter, and the participants agreed not to sign separate peaces, and declared their unity against a common enemy. This executive agreement became a binding military alliance.

The next important conference held during the war was the Casablanca Conference. This meeting, like the Atlantic Charter, was held solely between the United States and Britain. From January 14 to the 24 of 1943, Churchill and Roosevelt met with the purpose of discussing the opening of the Mediterranean to Allied commerce, thereby saving a twelve-thousand-mile trip around the Cape of Good Hope, and regaining a foothold on the European Continent which would hopefully lead to the eventual assault upon the Reich itself. This was against the hopes of Stalin, who wanted to establish a second Allied front in Europe to relieve the pressure on Russia. The United States and Great Britain decided to invade Sicily; but, at the conference, President Roosevelt

mentioned a policy which overshadowed our policy toward the Axis and their satellites. This policy was the one of "unconditional surrender." It was not formed by the State Department, but was revealed in a discussion in the presence of Prime Minister Churchill. The President quickly qualified his statement by saying that unconditional surrender meant ". . . the ending of a philosophy based on the conquest and subjugation of other peoples," not the total destruction of Germany, Japan and Italy.³ This policy of unconditional surrender turned out to be one of the important topics of discussion at later conferences, including Yalta.

Thus, the Casablanca Conference advanced another important step in outlining American foreign policy in the realm of the allied operations during the war. President Roosevelt bound the United States by the use of the executive agreement, for he rationalized that this conference contained top secret planning that would lose its effectiveness if it were made public. Therefore, the agreements made at Casablanca did not go before Congress.⁴

Eight months after the Casablanca Conference, there was a noteworthy conference held in Moscow. The Moscow Conference, which ran from October 19 to 30, 1943, was a meeting attended by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. President Roosevelt

³Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 1570.

⁴Samuel Flagg Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt and Company, 1942), p. 890.

was certain that World War II would lead to some type of an international security system directed toward avoiding further world wars. The governments present at this conference agreed and stated that they believed in the necessity of the establishment of a general international organization. Thus the idea of a world organization which was suggested in the Atlantic Charter continued to be a topic of vital concern among the Allies. During the Moscow Conference, Stalin was informed that President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill had made preparations at the Washington and Quebec conference for a second front in France. Stalin "was so pleased as to promise that when the European war ended he would enter the conflict against Japan."⁵ Later, in a meeting between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo, which was held between November 22 and 26, 1943, the three men agreed that the war would continue until Japan had accepted the unconditional surrender and that the territories taken from China in and after 1894 would be given back to her. Also at the Cairo Conference, they decided that Korea should be free and independent. Stalin was not at this meeting because Chiang Kai-shek was there, and Stalin felt that his presence might provoke Japan to attack Russia, a confrontation which the Soviets were anxious to avoid at that time.

⁵Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 759.

Despite the importance of the Atlantic Charter, the Casablanca Conference, the Moscow Conference and the Cairo Conference, the next conference between the Allied forces was probably the most significant. For the first time, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Marshal Stalin met face to face at the Teheran Conference which was held between November 28 and December 1, 1943. Cordell Hull, in October of the same year, convinced Stalin that the Soviet leader must meet with Churchill and Roosevelt. Stalin suggested the meeting take place at Teheran, for he would leave Moscow only if his destination enabled him to be in direct touch with his General Staff and Teheran was held by the Soviet Army. Stalin also had the feeling that his armies had done better work than the Allied armies; and if he had the conference at Teheran, it might elevate his position.⁶ Finally, Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to the Teheran meeting. At the Teheran Conference, Roosevelt let Stalin know that he was in disagreement with Churchill about the conduct of the war and the plans for post-war peace, and Stalin proposed that Roosevelt should take the "chair" during the meetings.⁷ A possible reason for Roosevelt's action was that he wanted to hear both sides of the story before he committed himself to the British or the Russians.⁸ But, at Teheran,

⁶ Isaac Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 503.

⁷ Chester Wilmut and H. S. Commager, "Was Yalta A Calamity?", New York Times Magazine, August 3, 1952, p. 7.

⁸ Ibid., p. 46.

Roosevelt found Stalin to be correct, stiff, and solemnly incommunicative.⁹ He did try to break through, but only the little stabs at Churchill amused Stalin. Roosevelt is quoted as saying, ". . . I don't know a good Russian from a bad Russian . . . I don't understand the Russians."¹⁰ Stalin and Churchill represented polar positions at the conference. Roosevelt stood between them, although he was closer to Churchill than to Stalin. Stalin viewed Churchill and Roosevelt as the representatives of the capitalist class; consequently, he connected little importance to their professions of democracy. The two most important facets of the Teheran Conference were the Big Three's first meeting and, second, the important decision involving the Allied assault on Europe. They decided on "overlord," which called for Great Britain and the United States to attack Europe on the French coast rather than through the Balkans. Stalin realized that with the Allies invading France, Europe would be cut into two areas of political influence, for while the British and Americans were assaulting France, Russia was to attack the Balkans and the Eastern front to create a diversion. Thus, Russian troops would clear the area in the East, resulting in the creation of spheres. It was stated that "this was a moment of Stalin's supreme triumph."¹¹ It was also

⁹Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, p. 508.

¹⁰Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1966), p. 72.

¹¹Deutscher, Stalin: A Political Biography, p. 508.

reported that only Stalin and Churchill were aware of its implications; Eastern Europe was to be Russia's zone of influence. The question of Russia's entry into the Pacific War was again discussed at Teheran. Roosevelt proposed that American heavy bombers be based north of Vladivostok and that the United States have access to Soviet ports in the East for the possible deployment of naval forces. Roosevelt also requested the immediate exchange of military intelligence concerning the Japanese. Stalin agreed that these proposals should be studied with some concern and that he would not interfere with the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and the recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia. Stalin suggested the internationalization of the Port of Dairen, not a lease. These issues later became the basis for the discussions at Yalta regarding the Soviet entry into the Japanese War.

The stage for the Yalta Conference was rapidly being set. The Teheran Conference, not a treaty but another important executive agreement, was to have the impact of an international treaty.

The final discussion of the plans for a world organization prior to the Yalta Conference was held at Dumbarton Oaks. Representatives of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union met from August 21 to October 7 of 1944. They decided on the idea and purposes which later were reflected in the United Nations' organization. The diplomats from the three major powers decided that there should be a General Assembly, Security Council and other

numerous instrumentalities. The Soviet representative, Andrei Gromyko, proposed that all of the sixteen Soviet Republics have seats in the General Assembly and that the Great Powers should have the veto power in the Security Council. The basic obligations and responsibilities were decided upon which would have to be assumed by the participating states if it were to be an effective organization. The matters of voting procedure in the Security Council and the number of votes in the General Assembly were left open for later conferences.

The time between the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the Yalta Conference is an extremely important issue. The war was of course advanced, but Great Britain and the Soviet Union made some important agreements which would later affect the Yalta discussions. In June of 1944, the British suggested that Rumania and Bulgaria be treated as part of the Russian zone and that Britain take Greece. This was done because Churchill realized his defeat at the Teheran Conference, and he wanted to keep the Russians out of Greece.¹² This was confirmed in October of 1944 when Eden came to Moscow. The Conference decided that between seventy-five and eighty per cent of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania would be Russian while the British would carry twenty to thirty per cent. Churchill and Stalin agreed that the Soviets and British would split fifty-fifty in Yugoslavia.¹³

Prime Minister Churchill contacted President Roosevelt about

¹²Ibid., p. 515.

¹³Ibid., p. 516.

the agreements; and he wanted Harriman, if agreeable to Churchill and Stalin, to attend the meetings in order to report back to him. This was approved. Roosevelt also suggested that their plan for the Balkans should be tested on a three-month trial and that care should be taken to make it clear that no post-war spheres of influence were being established.¹⁴ Roosevelt did not inform the Department of State about this situation until June 12, 1944; and, thus, the actions had already been partly carried out.

Stalin had established two principles to which he tried to get the Allies to agree. The first was that he was free to intervene against the pro-Nazi and Fascist groups and to establish a democratic order in the countries neighboring the Soviet Union. The second was that the governments of these countries should be friendly to the Soviets. These two principles came into play for the first time regarding Poland.

The Teheran Documents had been kept secret, but on January 22, 1944, Prime Minister Churchill tried to persuade Premier Mikolajczyk and Foreign Minister Romer to agree on five points. The first one was that the Polish government (in London) was to accept the so-called Curzon Line as a basis for negotiations with the Soviet government. They were to have a final settlement of the eastern frontier to be linked with the grant of East Prussia to Poland along with Danzig and Upper Silesia to the Oder River. All the Poles left on the Soviet

¹⁴Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1455.

side of Poland's eastern frontier were to have the right to return to Poland, and all the German population within the new Polish borders was to be removed. These enumerated solutions were to receive the approval and guarantee of the three principal United Nations countries.¹⁵ The Soviet radio broadcast appeals for the underground in Warsaw to revolt as the Red Armies moved closer. General Bor was convinced of the accuracy of the broadcast when he learned that Premier Mikolajczyk of the London exile government arrived in Moscow, and under his leadership, the underground troops revolted at 5:00 p. m. on August 1, 1944. Mikolajczyk was forced to realize that the London government was going to lose, and the National Committee of Liberation, as well as fifty per cent of the cabinet posts, would be from the Lublin government, and the eastern frontier of Poland would have to be approximately the Curzon Line. He was assured on August 9, 1944, by Stalin that the Soviets would send military aid to General Bor's forces in Warsaw. This, however, was never done. The Soviet government, with the help of Boleslaw Bierut, a known communist, Osobka-Morawski, the Chairman of the Soviet-created Committee of National Liberation, and Marshal Rola-Zymierski, who was acting on orders from Moscow, set up the Lublin Committee. This committee was to discredit the Polish government in London, for now that the Polish Home Army had been broken by the Nazis,

¹⁵Arthur Lane, I Saw Poland Betrayed (Boston: Western Islands, 1948), p. 47.

there was no remaining leadership to dispute the authority of the Lublin group.¹⁶

On December 18, 1944, Secretary of State Edward Stettinius stated that the United States government stood for a free and independent Poland, but the United States would not raise any objection to the delineation of Poland's frontiers before the ending of hostilities, if a mutual agreement were reached by the United Nations (which was not yet a functioning body). Stettinius continued to say that if, as a result of such an agreement, the Polish government and people should favor the transfer of national groups, the United States would assist Poland in the transfers. This was, of course, subject to legislative authority in regard to aiding any such transfer. But, on December 31, 1944, the Lublin Committee officially announced itself as the Provisional Government of Poland, and on January 1, 1945, Stettinius stated that "this government [the United States] continues to maintain formal diplomatic relations with the Polish Government-in-exile in London."¹⁷ On January 5, Stalin recognized the Lublin government as the Provisional Government of Poland. Churchill replied that he was hampered in his protest by the fact that he had made agreements with the Soviets.

In December of 1944, Stalin told Averell Harriman that the Soviets' interest in the East centered around the re-establishment of their territories as they had existed before the Russo-Japanese War of

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 53.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 75.

1905. The property included the lower half of the island Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the lease ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, and those railroads in Manchuria which were built by Russians under contract with the Chinese government, specifically the Chinese Eastern Railway, a direct line from the Trans-Siberian Railroad through to Vladivoslok and the South Manchurian Railroad making the connection to Dairen.¹⁸ But, before this, during the Moscow Conference in 1943, Stalin told Cordell Hull that when Germany was defeated, the Soviets would join in defeating Japan. Hull states that "the Marshal's statement of his decision was forthright. He made it emphatically, it was entirely unsolicited and he asked nothing in return."¹⁹ Hull felt that this was so important he sent the message back to President Roosevelt, half in Army code and the other half in Navy code. Stalin was changing his mind, and this alteration was to play a big part in the Yalta Conference. The last meeting of the Big Three had been at Teheran more than a year earlier. Many things had changed; and, with the end of the war approaching, Allied leaders needed to plan for world peace after the defeat of Germany and Japan. Problems like the Polish question had to be settled. The first suggestion for another meeting was made by President Roosevelt in a letter to Marshal Stalin dated July 17, 1944, and marked Top Secret, Priority. The letter read:

¹⁸William A. Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union and the Agreements Reached at Yalta," U. S. Department of State Bulletin, XXV, September 3, 1951, p. 372.

¹⁹Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull, p. 1310.

Things are moving so fast and so successfully that I feel there should be a meeting between you and Mr. Churchill and me in the reasonably near future. The Prime Minister is in hearty accord with this thought. I am now on a trip in the far West and must be in Washington for several weeks on my return. It would, therefore, be best forme to have a meeting between the tenth and fifteenth of September. The most central point for you and me would be the north of Scotland. I could go by ship or by plane. Your Army is doing so magnificently that the hop would be much shorter to Scotland than the one taken by Molotov two years ago. I hope you can let me have your thoughts. Secrecy and security can be maintained either aboard ship or on shore. [The underlined was admitted before delivery to Stalin.] ~~deleted~~ Roosevelt²⁰

In a letter dated September 24, 1944, from Ambassador Harriman to the President, it was reported that Stalin was afraid his doctors would not let him travel. Harriman also reported that it had taken Stalin two weeks to recover from an ear attack he had suffered during his flight from Teheran, and his recent illness had been due to a recent trip to the Russian front. In conclusion, Harriman stated, "I am satisfied that Stalin is anxious to meet you but he is definitely worried about his health."²¹ Later, Stalin suggested in a letter to Roosevelt that he would like to meet at the end of November in the Black Sea area, and he stated that Churchill agreed. Roosevelt responded to Churchill on October 22 that the Black Sea idea depended

²⁰U. S. Department of State, Conference at Malta and Yalta (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 3.

²¹Ibid., p. 5.

on the ability to get through the Dardanelles safely, for he wished to travel by ship. Roosevelt then suggested Cyprus or Athens for the site of the conference. Churchill liked this idea and replied that he would check into it, but Stalin still wanted acceptance of the Black Sea. Roosevelt stated that Dr. McIntire said there were bad health conditions in the Black Sea area. In another letter to Churchill, dated the 14th of November, Roosevelt said that the conference would have more meaning if it were held after the inauguration. Since the meeting place was still undecided upon, Roosevelt suggested that the end of January or the first of February of 1945 would be a better time for the conference. He also suggested Jerusalem or Alexandria for the place because his advisors told him they did not want to risk a "capital" ship through the straits, for it would take too much guarding.²²

After the elections, Roosevelt was suffering from physical and mental strain accompanied by a loss of appetite. He was down to 170 pounds, and deepening lines were already appearing on his face. But, Stalin still refused to go to the Mediterranean Sea because of his doctor's advice and the fact that he wanted to be able, as at Teheran, to be in close contact with the Soviet Army. On December 30, 1944, President Roosevelt agreed to go to Yalta. This was followed a day later by Churchill's agreement.

Before discussing the Malta and Yalta Conferences, it is

²²Ibid., p. 15.

necessary to mention the military and political situation at the time of the conference, as well as the aims and purposes the leaders held. While President Roosevelt was meeting with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin in the Crimea, American and British troops had just recovered the ground lost in the Battle of the Bulge. The Allies had not yet reached the Rhine, and the advance in Italy had bogged down. Having swept through most of Poland and East Prussia, Soviet troops had reached some points on Germany's Oder River. Most of Hungary had been captured, and the Yugoslav Partisans had captured Belgrade in November, 1944. By the time of the Yalta Conference, Poland and all of Eastern Europe had fallen to the Soviet troops. United States forces were locked in a bloody battle on Iwo Jima and had not yet taken Okinawa. Some critics feel that the United States was in no position to argue at Yalta; and, if it had used the Balkan strategy that Churchill suggested, rather than the English Channel for a major offensive, the Russians would have been contained. But in view of the military situation at that time, American military officials deemed this idea too expensive and the Balkan area too difficult a terrain for a major Western offensive. Moreover, the United States could not have moved fast enough to be victorious before October of 1944 when the Russians reached Warsaw.²³ Thus, when one takes the time to discover the

²³Rudolph Winnacker, "Yalta: Another Munich," Virginia Quarterly Review, XXIV, Autumn, 1948, p. 534.

military and political conditions in the early months of 1945, he can realize the tremendous difficulties involved in a policy of opposition to the Soviet Union at that time. The objectives of World War II were unconditional surrender of the Axis powers and the establishment of a world order of cooperation which was to be based on the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter. The United States needed the help of Russia to end the war with Germany and to set up a successful world organization. Thus, the United States' aims at the Yalta Conference were to smooth over the problems of Dumbarton Oaks and to establish the United Nations. It was also necessary to settle the future strategy in Europe and the Far East regarding the invasion of Germany and the Soviet Union's entry into the war with Japan. Fear of impairing Allied unity was still another problem facing the Big Three. The United States Ambassador to Russia, William A. Harriman, summed up the Allied attitude toward Russia by stating:

The primary objective of the American and British Governments in our relations with the Soviet Union during the war was to keep the Soviet Army as an effective fighting force against Hitler. It was also our objective to encourage the Soviet Union to join in the war against Japan at the earliest possible date.²⁴

The last objective regarding the Soviet entry into the Japanese war was needed soon enough to save American lives.

President Roosevelt felt that his purpose at Yalta was again to bring Germany to defeat at the earliest date, conquer Japan, and build

²⁴Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union," p. 372.

the foundations for the world peace organization. The President trusted Stalin and believed that the wishes of the Russian and American peoples were compatible; thus, he was confident of winning the Soviets' lasting cooperation at Yalta.²⁵ The President and his advisors Hull and Hopkins felt that diplomacy based on friendship would bring a sympathetic response from the Soviet representatives.²⁶ Roosevelt believed that his role at Yalta should be that of a mediator between Churchill and Stalin.²⁷

Although pertinent State Department reports and data were on board the ship during the voyage to Yalta, it is reported that the President preferred to rest rather than study these documents.²⁸ Among these United States plans were those made between November of 1944 and January of 1945 concerning Central-Eastern Europe. On January 18, 1945, just before Roosevelt left for Malta, Secretary Stettinius presented the President with the black book entitled, Briefing Papers.²⁹ The Briefing Papers contained most of the material needed for the imminent discussions in the Crimea.

²⁵Chester Wilmut, Struggle For Europe (New York: Harper, 1952), p. 639.

²⁶Ibid., p. 639.

²⁷William H. McNeill, America, Britain and Russia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953), p. 547.

²⁸James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 23.

²⁹John Snell, The Meaning of Yalta (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 99. See Appendix B for an example.

Contained in this State Department document were problems and suggested alternatives for guiding President Roosevelt's strategy at Yalta. Many delicate subjects were dealt with, particularly a discussion of the Soviet objectives in Eastern Europe. The State Department suggested the establishment of an "Emergency High Commission for Liberated Europe" that, with the support of the "Big Four," would help form popular governments in liberated Eastern Europe.³⁰ The principles mentioned in the Atlantic Charter had been formulated in the "Declaration of Liberated Europe" and would be used in this effort. Other topics dealt with in the Briefing Papers included the unification of China, spheres of influence in Europe, loans to the Soviet Union, post-war status of Korea, and Soviet participation in the war against Japan with consideration of possible Soviet support of the Chinese Communists.

Marshal Stalin entered the Yalta Conference with a sense of superiority of Russia's contribution toward the approaching victory over Germany. He had very definite aims as to the economic reconstruction of Russia and to the future security of Soviet territory by establishing friendly and cooperative governments between Germany and the Soviet Union. For twice, in a relatively short time, belligerent nations had used the Polish Corridor as a road to Russia. In addition, Stalin came to bargain for the price of Russia's entry into the Japanese War. Stalin believed he had the advantage because

³⁰U. S. Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 97.

of the Soviet Armies' campaigns; in fact, at the beginning of the conference, Russian troops were just fifty miles from Berlin. On the other hand, Prime Minister Churchill was apprehensive when he arrived at the conference, for he remembered what had happened at the Teheran Conference.³¹

With his purposes and objectives in mind, President Roosevelt left Washington by a special train on January 22, 1945. On the 23rd he sailed from an East coast port on the Quincy, an American naval cruiser which arrived at Malta on February 2. The President was met by Secretary Stettinius, Harry Hopkins, William A. Harriman and Winston Churchill. While at Malta, Churchill and Roosevelt met for a discussion before Yalta. Churchill hoped to reach an agreement with President Roosevelt that they could propose to Stalin, but Roosevelt wanted to refrain from making any agreements so that Stalin would not feel he was dealing with any sort of an Anglo-American delegation. Churchill relates that "no hard and fast agreements were made on any of the political issues. Those naturally were to form the subject of the triple conference and they were carefully kept open for the full meeting."³² Even though Roosevelt had been warned by Harriman on January 10, 1945, of the Soviets' policy in Eastern Europe of using secret police, local communist parties and troops to assure

³¹Winston Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1951), pp. 405-407.

³²Congressional Record, 79th Congress, 1st Sess., p. A917, 1945.

the establishment of favorable governments, Roosevelt was less suspicious of the Soviets' post-war intentions than was Churchill.³³ At dawn, the planes left the Malta airfield in ten-minute intervals, with the Saki airfield as their destination. President Roosevelt flew in the Sacred Cow, the airplane especially built for him which included an elevator for his convenience. After the arrival at Saki, the party motored over the mountainous terrain to Yalta. The five-hour trip took them through the devastated areas from which the Germans had been driven. The road was guarded by Soviet soldiers, some of whom were women, who were well armed.

President Roosevelt stayed at Livadia Palace which had been a summer palace for the Czar. Under the direction of Dr. McIntire, the President's room and the palace were cleaned with a ten per cent solution of D.D.T. in kerosene. The beds, bedding, and rugs were given three sprayings and then dusted with D.D.T. There were also daily inspections of the quarters to make sure they were clean. Lieutenant Commander George Fox gave President Roosevelt an alcohol rub and light massage before bed every night.³⁴ Churchill and the principal members of the British delegation had the Vorontsov Villa which was about five miles from the Livadia Palace. Stalin and Molotov stayed at the Yusupov Palace. The remainder of the United

³³U. S. Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 64-66.

³⁴Ross McIntire, Whitehouse Physician (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946), pp. 215-20.

States and British delegations stayed in two rest houses about twenty minutes away. The meetings between Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin were held on the ground floor of the Livadia Palace for the convenience of the President.

The United States' cast at the Yalta Conference included President Roosevelt; Secretary of State Edward Stettinius; Fleet Admiral William Leahy, who was the United States Navy Chief of Staff to the President; Harry Hopkins, Special Assistant to the President; Justice James Byrnes, who was the Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion; General of the Army George C. Marshall, who was the United States Army Chief of Staff; Fleet Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet; Lt. General Brehon Somervell, Commanding General Army Service Forces; Vice Admiral Emory Land, War Shipping Administration; Major General Laurence Kuter, Staff of the Commanding General; William Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union; H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs, State Department; Alger Hiss, Deputy Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State; and Charles E. Bohlen, Assistant to the Secretary of State; together with political, military, and technical advisors.³⁵

Representing the United Kingdom were Prime Minister Churchill; Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Lord Leathers,

³⁵Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1025.

Minister of War Transport; Sir A. Clark Kerr, Ambassador at Moscow; Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of the War Cabinet; Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First Sea Lord; General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense; together with Field Marshal Alexander, Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean theatre; and Field Marshal Wilson, head of the British Joint Staff Mission at Washington, together with military and diplomatic advisors.³⁶

Those representing the Soviet Union were Marshal J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; V. M. Molotov, Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Admiral Nicholai Kuznetsov, Peoples Commissar for the Navy; Army General Aleksei Antonov, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army; Andrei Vyshinski, Deputy Peoples Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.; Ivan Maiski, Deputy Peoples Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R; Marshal of Aviation Sergei Khydyakov; Fedor Gusev, Ambassador in Great Britain; and Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador to the United States.³⁷

The French government was not invited to attend the Conference.

³⁶ Ibid., 1025.

³⁷ Congressional Record, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1025.

Harry Hopkins, who was in France before the Conference, gave the French the feeling that no major decisions would be made behind de Gaulle's back. De Gaulle stated that the Big Three's decisions would not be binding on the French until he had had the opportunity to discuss them with the major Allies on an equal basis and had accepted them. The French press gave the opinion that it was President Roosevelt who did not want de Gaulle because of Roosevelt's ". . . belief that the Big Three would have trouble enough on their hands without adding a man who, as the French put it, is not noted for 'putting oil in the machinery' of diplomacy."³⁸

Secretary Stettinius reported that the President would not recognize de Gaulle until it could be proved that he was really supported by the French people themselves. De Gaulle's personal reaction was that he was offended, but not surprised, for he realized France had not reached her role as a world power yet.

There was no single official record of the proceedings nor was there any stenotypist recording every word, but each delegation kept its own notes. Sir Edward Bridges took the notes for the British and Charles Bohlen for the United States.³⁹ The conference began February 4, 1945. At 10:30 a. m., President Roosevelt met with his advisors, followed by a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The

³⁸New York Times, February 11, 1945.

³⁹Edward Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians (New York: Doubleday, 1949), p. 103.

United States wanted better communication among the Allies, more coordination and exchange of information between General Eisenhower, Field Marshal Alexander, and the Soviet General Staff. They also talked of the United Nations, Germany, Poland, the control commissions for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Joint Chiefs decided to adopt the United States' proposal for the voting formula and to call for a United Nations Conference. They also decided to adopt the Emergency European High Commission to function from the end of the war until the creation of the United Nations. In regard to the treatment of Germany, the Joint Chiefs agreed on the control of the administrative details for the zones of occupation, and Germany's boundaries. They opposed the indiscriminate mass exchange of minorities with neighboring states, and the abolition of German self-sufficiency was agreed upon. Discussions regarding Poland resulted in the acceptance of her boundaries as being the Curzon Line in the North and South and the Eastern line of Lwow Province. The transfer of German territory was to be limited to East Prussia (except Koenigsberg going to Russia), a small coastal salient of Pomerania and Upper Silesia. They also agreed on the formation of new representative governments pledged to free elections with the inclusion of the Mikolajczyk government in Poland. With regard to the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, the Allied diplomats suggested that the United States' representative be assured of his freedom of movement and that there would be

consultation before decisions were made. On the Iran question, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that the President should seek Soviet agreement on not pressing for oil concessions until the end of hostilities and urged the withdrawal of the Allied troops. In China, the Joint Chiefs suggested that Roosevelt seek Soviet-British support for United States efforts to bring about a Kuomintang-Communist agreement.⁴⁰ This was the advice for the President's use in future discussions in the Yalta agenda.

When President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin met at 4:00 p. m., Charles Bohlen, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Pavlov were also in attendance. The informal discussion started with Roosevelt's kidding Stalin about a bet he made on whether United States troops would capture Manila before the Soviets occupied Berlin. Stalin stated that he had better bet on the United States. They then got down to more serious matters. Stalin agreed with the idea of establishing better communications among the Allied troops. Roosevelt then asked how he had gotten along with de Gaulle, and Stalin gave the impression that he did not think too much of him or of the French war effort. Stalin then asked the President's opinion of giving the French a zone in Germany. Roosevelt replied that it was a good idea and that they ought to do it out of kindness. With this remark, Molotov stated that that would be the only reason for giving the French a zone.

⁴⁰State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 573.

At 5:00 p. m., the first plenary meeting between the Big Three was held in the Livadia Palace. This initial discussion concerned basically military matters. Stalin suggested that President Roosevelt take the "chair" as he had done at Teheran; when this was done, General Antonov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, began with a circumstantial and detailed account of the progress of the recent Russian offensive in Poland. General Marshal followed with a description of the Battle of the Bulge and of the Anglo-American plans for resuming the offensive. Admiral Cunningham concluded with some remarks about the anticipated resumption of the German U-Boat warfare.⁴¹ The Military Staffs would meet the following day at noon, and the Big Three would meet at 4:00 p. m. to discuss the political treatment of Germany.

That evening there was a dinner at 8:30 p. m. in the Livadia Palace at which Stalin, Roosevelt, Churchill, and some of their chief advisors were present. The discussion led to the Great Powers' responsibility to the lesser powers. Vishinsky was reported as stating that "Russia will never agree to the right of the small powers to judge an act of the Great Powers."⁴² This viewpoint is important to note, for the topic of discussion for this tripartite dinner was the voice of the smaller powers in a post-war peace organization.

⁴¹ McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 542.

⁴² Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 112.

On the second day of the conference, February 5, the discussions attacked the basic problems to be solved at Yalta. These topics fell into the categories of the United Nations, the questions involving Europe (especially Germany and Poland), and the Far East.

The day started with another Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at 10:00 a. m. After the minutes of the previous meeting were approved, the Chiefs of Staff talked about the British idea of not returning to Malta after the conference, the allocation of the zones of occupation in Germany, and the Russian participation in the war against Japan. They wanted to have Marshal Stalin's answers to two questions. First, did he need to keep the supply line across the Pacific to Eastern Siberia open, and second, would he assure the United States' being granted air bases in Soviet territory? This meeting was followed by the first Tripartite Military Meeting as proposed at the end of the first plenary meeting the day before. Beginning at 12:00 noon in the Yusupov Palace, they talked about the coordination of the offensive operations of the Allies, the movement of German forces from Norway, the liaison arrangements, naval operations in support of the land offensive, the possible date for the end of the war, hopefully July 1. The final discussion involved their future business. At the next meeting, they wished to talk over the coordination of air operations, shuttle bombing, and the war in the Far East. A luncheon meeting of the Foreign Ministers followed at 1:30 in the Yusupov Palace. The subjects, after the toasts, included treatment of Germany along with the

economic matters relative to Germany. The Foreign Ministers decided that the conference should be named the Crimea Conference.

At 2:30, President Roosevelt held a meeting with certain men in his advisory staff, among whom were Hopkins, Matthews and Bohlen. At this time, the President was informed of the happenings during the morning Foreign Ministers' meeting.

The second plenary meeting started at 4:00 p. m. in the Livadia Palace. President Roosevelt opened the meeting by stating that he wished to talk about the future treatment of Germany and by distributing a map showing the zones agreed upon by the European Advisory Commission but not yet accepted by the three governments.⁴³ Stalin then stated that he would like to include in the discussion the topic of partitioning Germany, for there were no agreements made at either Teheran or at Moscow. For example, if the Big Three were to establish a government in Germany, would each section have its own government? Stalin felt there was a need to work out definite terms of the unconditional surrender and the types of reparations and their amounts. Churchill stated that he felt the topic of German partitioning was too complicated to solve at Yalta, but he stated that his mind could be changed. Churchill went on to state that they had agreed that the German territory conquered by the Soviet Army would form part of the Polish agreement, but he wondered whether the Ruhr and the Saar should be under the French, made independent, or be controlled by a world

⁴³State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 591-611.

organization for an extended period. He felt that these questions required careful study, but he had not formed any set plans on the subject. Churchill further suggested that the Big Three should set up a body to investigate these problems and report their findings before any decision was made. President Roosevelt suggested that they agree that Germany should be dismembered, and charge the Foreign Ministers with the task of working out the details. The Foreign Ministers were to add to the surrender terms a clause stating that Germany was to be dismembered by the best method. There had been some debate about putting in the dismemberment terms and whether or not to include the details in the surrender terms. Thus, it was referred to the Foreign Ministers to decide and then report their findings. The next topic which was discussed was that of giving the French a zone of occupation in Germany. Churchill wanted the French to have a zone which would come from the area granted to the British and Americans, and he thought that the French should also have a role in the control machinery, particularly since the British might need help in maintaining their zone. When Stalin asked President Roosevelt how long United States troops could occupy Germany, Roosevelt replied:

I can get the people and Congress to cooperate fully for peace but not to keep an army in Europe for a long time. Two years would be the limit.⁴⁴

Stalin still did not want the French to have a zone, contending

⁴⁴ Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 127.

that they had contributed very little to the defeat of Germany. Churchill countered that the French must have a zone, for they were Germany's most important neighbor. The Big Three finally decided that the French should get a zone and that they would let the Foreign Ministers decide the part France was to play in the administration of occupied Germany.

Deputy Commissar Maisky then presented the Soviet plan for German reparations. He suggested that the Allies remove from the German national wealth all plants, machine tools, and rolling stock, to be completed within two years after the war. Germany would also make annual payments over a period of ten years, thus restoring the Russian economy and establishing the security of Europe. The Deputy Commissar felt it necessary to cut down the German heavy industry by eighty per cent. He stated that the priority for nations receiving the reparations would be based on the proportional contribution that each nation had made to winning the war and its loss of material. The Soviets wanted no less than ten billion dollars in reparations. Maisky concluded by suggesting that a reparations committee from the three governments meet in Moscow to work out the details.⁴⁵ President Roosevelt told the conference that the American people wanted the Germans to live, but not with a higher standard of living than other states, for instance, the Soviet Union. He would support the idea of establishing a reparations committee as suggested, and he thought that this committee should use a twenty billion total with half going to the Soviet Union as

⁴⁵Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 620-21.

a base for discussion.⁴⁶ Churchill felt Maisky's proposal was excessive because they would never get that much money out of a defeated nation, and he said that he could not picture a starving Germany.⁴⁷ It was then agreed that the suggestion for a reparations committee be turned over to the Foreign Ministers, who would then report back. The Big Three set a meeting time for the next day and then adjourned.

The third day of the conference, February 6, began with the Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at 10:00 a. m. at the Vorontsov Villa. After the approval of the minutes, they discussed the levels of supply of petroleum products in the United Kingdom and in Northwest Europe. Other topics included the probable date for the end of the war against Germany, the provision of landing tracked vehicles for the Mediterranean, and the allocation of zones of occupation in Germany. Liaisons with the Soviet High Command talked about the Anglo-American strategic bombing in Eastern Europe. They decided to hold their next meeting at 10:00 a. m., Thursday the 8th, to complete any outstanding items on the agenda. This meeting was followed by the second Tripartite Military Meeting, held at noon in the Yusupov Palace. Field Marshal Brooke presided, and the topics for discussion included the bomblines and liaison arrangements, the coordination of offensive operations, the exchange of information regarding river crossing techniques and equipment, the bases for the United States

⁴⁶Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 28-29.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 27.

strategic bomber forces in the Vienna-Budapest area, provisions of the Soviet airfields for damaged British night aircraft, enemy intelligence, the Pacific operations, very long-range bomber operations against Japan, operations in Burma and China. In addition, the Tripartite meeting settled the question of their future business.⁴⁸

Also at noon there was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at Livadia Palace. The first business was to issue a press release, approved by Eden, Molotov and Stettinius, which read:

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their Chiefs of Staff, the three Foreign Secretaries and other advisors are now meeting in the Black Sea area.

Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with the Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.

The Conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.

Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain peace.

A communique will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 634-54.

⁴⁹ New York Times, February 8, 1945.

There was a luncheon at 1:00 p. m. between Churchill and Roosevelt. Hopkins, Byrnes, Harriman and Cadogan also attended. The luncheon lasted until 3:00, and the third plenary meeting started at 4:00. This meeting began with the reading of the voting formula by Secretary Stettinius.

It was agreed at Dumbarton Oaks that certain matters would remain under consideration for the future settlement. Of these, the principal one was that of the voting procedure to be followed in the Security Council.

At Dumbarton Oaks, the three delegations thoroughly explored the whole question. Since that time the matter has received continuing intensive study by each of the three governments.

On December 5, 1944, the President sent to Marshal Stalin and to Prime Minister Churchill a proposal that this matter be settled by making Section C, Chapter VII of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals read substantially as follows:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members, provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of Paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.⁵⁰

Stettinius went on to give an analysis of this proposal.

We believe that our proposal is entirely consistent with the special responsibilities of the Great Powers for the preservation of the

⁵⁰Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 140.

peace of the world. In this respect our proposal calls for unqualified unanimity of the permanent members of the Council on all major decisions relating to the preservation of peace, including all economic and military enforcement measures.

At the same time our proposal recognizes the desirability of the permanent members frankly stating that the peaceful adjustment of any controversy which may arise is a matter of general world interest in which any sovereign member state involved should have a right to present its case.

We believe that unless this freedom of discussion in the Council is permitted, the establishment of the World Organization which we all so earnestly desire in order to save the world from the tragedy of another war would be seriously jeopardized. Without full and free discussion in the Council, the Organization even if it could be established, would be vastly different from the one we have contemplated.

The paper which we have placed before the other two delegations sets forth the text of the provisions which I have read and lists specifically those decisions of the Council which, under our proposals, would require unqualified unanimity, and, separately, those matters in the area in which any party to a dispute would abstain from casting a vote.⁵¹

Secretary Stettinius explained that there was a necessity for unanimity between the permanent members in order to preserve the peace and there should be provisions for a fair hearing for all the members of the organization, both large and small. He went on to state that the admission of new members, the suspension of a member, expulsion of a member and the elections of the Secretary General would require all the affirmative votes in the Security Council

⁵¹Ibid., p. 142.

along with the votes of the General Assembly. It was also suggested that removal of threats to the peace and suppression of breaches of peace should be subject to a series of questions: whether or not the parties to a dispute can settle it on their own with the recommendation of the Security Council, what actions by a nation would constitute a threat to the peace or a breach of it, and what measures should be taken by the Security Council to restore and maintain the peace and in what manner these actions should be carried out, and lastly, whether a regional agency should be authorized to take measures of enforcement. The Security Council must also have seven affirmative votes for the approval of agreements for the provisions having armed forces representing the World Organization, the formulation of plans for a system of regulation of armaments, and the determination of whether a nation and the activities of a regional agency are consistent with the principles of the organization.⁵² Stettinius finally concluded by stating that the decisions relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes would also require the affirmation of seven Security Council votes and the permanent members unless one of the members was included in said dispute.

After Stettinius finished, the Soviets wanted to look the proposals over and they would be ready to talk about it at the next meeting. Churchill said that his former anxieties had been removed and that he found the American proposal satisfactory.

⁵²Ibid., pp. 143-44.

The leaders of the three governments then turned briefly to the Polish question. President Roosevelt wanted to know if they should start this discussion or not. Stalin stated that he would like to, and Roosevelt suggested that the Eastern Frontier be the Curzon Line and that the Lwow oil fields should go to Stalin, but he would not insist on it. The President said that he wanted Poland to be friendly and have cooperative relations with the Soviet Union. Stalin replied that Poland should be this way with all the Allies. Prime Minister Churchill then stated that the British recognized the London Government, but they did not have any close relations with them. Stalin said that the Soviets would not create a Polish government without consulting the Polish people first and that he had already talked with Mikolajczyk in Moscow in 1944. The meeting was then ended.

That evening a letter from President Roosevelt was prepared by the State Department, and Harry Hopkins was to send it to Marshal Stalin before bedtime. It read:

I have been giving a great deal of thought to our meeting this afternoon, and I want to tell you in all frankness what is on my mind. In so far as the Polish Government is concerned I am greatly disturbed that the three great powers do not have a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland. It seems to me that it puts all of us in a bad light throughout the world to have you recognizing one government while we and the British are recognizing another in London. I am sure this state of affairs should not continue and that if it does it can only lead our peoples to think there is a break between us, which is not the case. I am determined that there shall be no breach between ourselves and the Soviet Union.

Surely there is a way to reconcile our differences.

I was very much impressed with some of the things you said today, particularly your determination that your rear must be safeguarded as your army moves into Berlin. You cannot, and we must not, tolerate any temporary government which will give your armed forces any trouble of this sort. I want you to know that I am fully mindful of this. You must believe me when I tell you that our people at home look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital state of the war. They, in effect, say that if we cannot get a meeting of minds now when our armies are converging on the common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future.

I have had to make it clear to you that we cannot recognize the Lublin government as now composed, and the world would regard it as a lamentable outcome of our work here if we parted with an open and obvious divergence between us on this issue.

You said today that you would be prepared to support any suggestions for the solution of this problem which offered a fair chance of success, and you also mentioned the possibility of bringing some members of the Lublin government here.

Realizing that we all have the same anxiety in getting this matter settled, I would like to develop your proposal a little and suggest that we invite here to Yalta at once Mr. Brerut and Mr. Osubka-Morawski from the Lublin government and also two or three from the following list of Poles, which according to our information would be desirable as representatives of the other elements of the Polish people in the development of a new temporary government which all three of us could recognize and support: Archbishop Sapieha of Cracow, Vincente Witos, Mr. Zurlowski, Professor Buyak, and Professor Kutzeba. As a reason of the presence of these Polish leaders here, we could jointly agree with them on a provisional government in Poland which should no doubt include some Polish leaders from abroad such as Mr. Mikolajczuk,

Mr. Grabski and Mr. Romer; the United States Government and I feel sure the British Government, as well, would then be prepared to examine with your conditions in which they would disassociate themselves from the London Government and transfer their recognition to the new provisional government.

I hope I do not have to assure you that the United States will never lend its support in any way to any provisional government in Poland that would be inimical to your interests.

It goes without saying that any interim government which could be formed as a result of our Conference with the Poles here would be pledged to the holding of free elections in Poland at the earliest possible date. I know this is completely consistent with your desire to see a new free and democratic Poland emerge from the welter of this war.

Most sincerely yours,
F. D. Roosevelt⁵³

This letter would figure in discussions later in the conference, for, in the text, President Roosevelt outlined the opinions and suggestions of the United States which constituted policy of the American state.

The fourth day of the conference, February 7, the discussions began with another meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 10:00 a. m. in the Livadia Palace. They started by approving the minutes of the previous day's meeting and then discussed the utilization of the 15th Air Force in the Vienna-Budapest area, the reciprocal agreement for the prisoners of war, the supplies and equipment requested by the Soviet Union, the protocol on the zones of occupation in Germany and the administration of Berlin, the zones of limitation for the British

⁵³Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 157-59.

and American air operations in the advance of the Soviet Armies, the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General Staff which they wanted on the 8th at 3:00 p. m., and a note was sent to General Antonov. The report by the Combined Shipping Staffs that discussed the need for military shipping and the Russian requirements for additional ships was read. This meeting was followed by a Meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon at the Yusupov Palace. The Foreign Ministers discussed Dumbarton Oaks, the dismemberment of Germany, the creation of a commission to study the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany, the integration of the French into the German Control Machinery on the condition that the French were to receive a zone of occupation and, finally, Germany's reparations. Molotov submitted the Soviet "Basic Principles of Exaction of Reparations from Germany," which would be reported to the meeting of the Big Three that afternoon.

The fourth plenary meeting was held at 4:00 p. m. in the Livadia Palace. The discussions were started with the reading of the decisions agreed on at the Foreign Ministers meeting that morning.

Decisions adopted at the meeting of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden.

I. Regarding the Dismemberment of Germany.

(a) A. Y. Vishinsky, Mr. Cadogan and Mr. Matthews were entrusted with the preparation of the final draft of Article 12 of the instrument "unconditional surrender of Germany" having in view the insertion in the text of Article 12 of the word "dismemberment."

(b) The study of the question of the procedure of the dismemberment of Germany was

referred to a committee consisting of Mr. Eden, Mr. Winant and F. T. Gusen.

II. Regarding the zone of occupation in Germany for France.

(a) The allotment to the French of a zone in Germany to be occupied by French occupation forces has been agreed upon.

(b) As regards to the question of the participation of France in the Control Commission, M. V. Molotov and Mr. Stettinius feel it desirable to refer the question to the E. A. C. Mr. Eden considers it necessary to discuss this question now and give France a place on the Control Commission.

III. Regarding the Reparations to be exacted from Germany.

(a) It was agreed that in paragraph one of the Soviet proposals mention should be made of the sacrifices borne.

(b) It was decided that the residence of the Reparations Committee should be in the city of Moscow. It was agreed that the committee should begin its work immediately upon the approval of the principles of the exacting of the reparations.

(c) It was decided that the discussion of the two documents relating to the matter of the reparations which have been submitted by V. M. Molotov, first, regarding the basic principles of exacting the reparations from Germany, and, second, regarding the organization of an Allied Reparations Committee should be continued at the Crimea Conference.⁵⁴

Following this, Molotov then read the Soviet proposals on the Polish Question. The Soviets wanted the eastern frontier of Poland to be the Curzon Line, with a digression from it some places of five to eight kilometers in the favor of the Polish; the western frontier should be from the town of Stettin (Poland) and in the south along the Oder River and to remain the Neizze River in the west. The Russians

⁵⁴ State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 700-705.

also felt it necessary to add some of the democratic leaders from Polish emigre circles into the Provisional Polish Government so that it would be recognized by the Allied Governments. This government should, as soon as possible, call for elections by the Polish people for the permanent organs of the Polish government. He finished by stating that Mr. Harriman, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and himself were entrusted with the discussion of the question of enlarging the Provisional Polish Government and submitting their proposals to the Big Three.⁵⁵ This ended the plenary meeting for February 7; and on February 8, the fifth day of the conference, the day was again started by a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 10:00 a. m. at the Livadia Palace. During this meeting, the Chiefs of Staff discussed the levels of supplies of all the petroleum products in all the war theaters, the overall review of the cargo and troop shipping positions for the remainder of 1945, the employment of the war-weary United States bombers against the large industrial target areas in Germany, and the subjects to be discussed in the first United States-Soviet Union Staff Meeting.

There was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at noon in the Vorontsov Villa where they discussed the world security organization, the Yugoslavian frontiers, the Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary, reparations, and Iran.

The American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff met at 3:00 in the

⁵⁵Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 181-82.

Yusupov Palace. The persons present were Admiral Leahy, General Marshal, Admiral King, Kuter, Antonov, Khudyakov, and Kuznetson. The subject of this meeting was to discuss the military problems in the Far East. This was done in a series of questions and answers to which Antonov stated that he had no authority to give definite answers or promises without referring them to Stalin, but that he would give his own opinion. During the discussion, Antonov stated that there were no changes in the Soviet Projection plan for the Far East from those described by Harriman in October of 1944, that the Soviets needed the Pacific supply route left open for the Trans-Siberian Railroad could be knocked out, that the American help was useful in defending Kamchatka and Eastern Siberia, that Stalin would determine if a United States survey party could enter Kamchatka or not, and that the Soviets would occupy the southern part of Sakhalin as soon as the Japanese were defeated; but there was no discussion on the United States air bases in Siberia, for Antonov needed Stalin's approval for this.

At 3:30 p. m. in the Livadia Palace, President Roosevelt had another meeting with Marshal Stalin; and the only others present were Harriman, Bohlen, Molotov and Pavlov. When they talked about the air bases in the Far East, Stalin agreed it was all right for the United States to have bases at Komsomolsk or at Nikalaevsk. Stalin also agreed to the use of airfields and survey teams to check the damage in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and said that the United States

could use the airfields around Budapest. President Roosevelt agreed that the United States would sell ships to the Soviet Union after the war was over. In the discussions involving the Far East, Stalin said that the Soviet Union desired concessions for entering the war. The President said there was nothing wrong with the Soviets getting the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands after the war. He also felt that the Russians should gain a warm water port, probably Dairen. Although he had not had a chance to talk with Chiang Kai-shek, he felt that the Russians could get Dairen and certain railroad concessions or rights by either leasing them from the Chinese or by a commission composed of the Chinese and Russians. Roosevelt also suggested the idea of making Dairen a free port under an international commission, to which Stalin agreed. President Roosevelt then suggested the trusteeship of Korea by the United States, Soviet Union and the Chinese until the Koreans were able to carry on self-government. They both agreed that they did not want Great Britain in on this, for Churchill would get too upset.

Regarding the internal conditions of China, the President stated that the United States had been working to keep her alive. Stalin replied that he felt China needed some new leaders around Chiang Kai-shek.⁵⁶ This ended the discussions between Roosevelt and Stalin, for they had another plenary meeting to attend.

The fifth plenary meeting was held at 4:00 p. m. at the Livadia

⁵⁶State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 766-71.

Palace. The first discussion topic concerned the World Security Organization. The Foreign Ministers read a report stating that they had established a sub-committee to further examine the details of the proposals and that they would report later. In reply to Roosevelt's letter of February 6 to Stalin, Mr. Molotov made certain proposals about the Polish question. The President stated that these proposals had been carefully studied and that there were no objections to part one in the Polish boundaries proposal (Eastern boundary would be the Curzon Line with some modifications in favor of Poland); but, in regard to point two, the United States agreed that compensation should be given to Poland by Germany which would include East Prussia south of Koenigsberg, Upper Silesia, and up to the Oder River, but he felt there was little justification in the proposed expansion of the western boundary up to the Neisse River.

The President's reactions to the Soviet-proposed ideas concerning the Polish government were that he wanted to form a Presidential Committee of three men, possibly consisting of Mr. Bierut, Mr. Grabski and Archbishop Sapieha, to represent the Presidential office in the Polish government. This committee would undertake the task of forming a government consisting of representative leaders from the present Polish Provisional Government in Warsaw along with other democratic leaders from inside Poland and abroad. This government would be pledged to the concept of holding free elections in Poland as soon as there were favorable conditions, and of forming a Constituent Assembly

to draft a new Polish Constitution under which a permanent government would be elected. Roosevelt finished by stating that when the Polish Government of National Unity was formed, the three governments would recognize it as the Provisional Government of Poland.⁵⁷

Churchill then delivered the British proposals for Poland. He agreed with the Curzon Line with slight adjustments for the eastern border, while, in the west, Poland would include Danzig, the regions of East Prussia, west and south of Koenigsberg, the district of Oppeln in Silesia and the lands desired by Poland to the east of the Oder River. Churchill added that all the Germans in this area were to be repatriated to Germany, and all the Poles in Germany, in they wished, would be repatriated to Poland. He wanted a fully representative provisional government based on all the democratic and anti-Fascist forces in Poland, including democratic leaders from abroad. These representative leaders should consult each other on the makeup of the provisional government; and V. M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr should talk with these people and submit their conclusions for the consideration of the Big Three. Also, as soon as possible, the provisional Polish government would hold "free and unfettered" elections based on universal suffrage and the secret ballot, with all democratic parties having the right of participating.⁵⁸

Molotov wanted the Lublin government to be recognized and their

⁵⁷Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 209-10.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 211.

leaders included in the new government, plus the Soviet concept of Poland's western boundary. He agreed on the methods by which the Poles should hold their elections. Stalin merely wanted to enlarge the present Lublin government instead of establishing a new one.

Then Churchill suggested that the Foreign Ministers meet every three months in order to keep everyone well informed about changing conditions. All three leaders agreed to this and decided that the first meeting should be held in London.

Stalin wanted to know about Yugoslavia and Greece. Prime Minister Churchill informed him that Tito was to be the Premier, Dr. Ivan Subasitch was to be his Foreign Minister, and the King was to form a new government. In Greece, Churchill was afraid that all the different factions would not be represented, for they had not learned to have necessary discussions and cooperate. The meeting was then adjourned, and at 9:00 p. m. that evening there was a big dinner at the Yusupov Palace with the Soviets as the host. The meal included twenty-five courses, forty-five toasts, and lasted until after midnight. The conversation was general; thus, no business was carried on.⁵⁹ The late hours kept at this meeting were nothing new to the Soviets. Stalin told President Roosevelt on February 4 that he and his staff followed the custom of working all night until 5:00 a. m., sleeping until 10:00 a. m., and then resuming work again. He reported that they did this seven days a week.⁶⁰

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 115.

⁶⁰Ibid.

↑
not true

At 11:00 the next morning, February 9, the sixth day of the conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff held their meeting. This was a meeting consisting of both the United States and the British. The discussions covered the drafting of the final report to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill which included the American remarks that they appreciated the help of the British Chiefs of Staff. At noon, this group met with the President and the Prime Minister, reporting that in conjunction with the Russian and other Allies, they sought to bring Germany and Japan to an "unconditional surrender" at the earliest possible date.⁶¹

Also at noon, there was a meeting of the Foreign Ministers at the Livadia Palace. The points which were still before them involved the Dumbarton Oaks matters and the report by the sub-committee on the form of the invitations and some other details for the arrangements of the United Nations Conference to be held in the near future. They also had to consider the questions of reparations, Poland, Iran, and those dealing with the Yugoslav frontiers. Following this, there was a meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff at 3:30 p. m., which was also held at the Livadia Palace. They talked over what had been done and said at the recent meeting between the President and Marshal Stalin.⁶²

At 4:00 p. m., the sixth plenary meeting got underway, with

⁶¹State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, pp. 827-33.

⁶²Ibid., pp. 802-834.

Molotov presenting a new idea for the Polish problem. He stated that the Lublin government should be reorganized with the inclusion of the democratic leaders from Poland itself and those abroad. He also agreed that the new government would pledge to hold free elections so that the government should be recognized. The Big Three then decided to exchange ambassadors in order to be informed about the internal conditions of Poland and to keep track on how things were going.⁶³

The Big Three also decided on the "British Revised Formula on Poland." This Formula read:

A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Provisional Polish Government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as practicable on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic

⁶³Winston Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 925.

and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.⁶⁴

The Foreign Ministers were in disagreement on the section where the ambassadors from each country would stay in Warsaw to see that the elections were actually "free and unfettered," so they left this to be decided by the three governments at the next plenary meeting.

Following the meeting, a tripartite meeting was held for drafting the agreements regarding liberated prisoners of war and civilians. This was held at the Vorontsov Villa at 4:30 p. m., and those present were Deane, Page, Archer and Novikov. At 10:30 p. m. that same evening, the Foreign Ministers had another meeting in the Yusupov Palace. Their subject dealt with Poland and the Declaration on Liberated Areas. They talked over what had happened in the plenary meeting that afternoon and what was said regarding decisions made on the Polish question.

At noon the next day, February 10, the seventh day of the conference, the Foreign Ministers had another meeting. They again discussed Poland, the Declaration on Liberated Europe, Yugoslavia, reparations, the communique on the Crimea Conference, the world organization, the Austro-Yugoslav frontier, the Yugoslav-Italian

⁶⁴Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, pp. 247-48.

frontier, the Yugoslav-Bulgarian frontier, and Iran.

The seventh plenary meeting was held at 4:00 p. m. at the Livadia Palace. President Roosevelt stated that he wanted to propose a small amendment to the paragraph dealing with the frontiers of Poland because of the American Constitution. Thus, the first words were changed to "The Three Heads of Government," instead of "The Three Powers;" and in the second sentence he wanted to substitute the word "feel" for "agree."⁶⁵ Another argument started over German reparations. Both President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill refused to have a stated amount in the papers, not even in the unpublished ones. Stalin stated that he wanted two decisions. One, that it was agreed that in principle Germany should pay reparations, and second, that the Reparations Commission scheduled to sit at Moscow should fix the amount and take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be a total of twenty billion dollars with fifty per cent going to the Soviet Union. The British still felt committed by the mentioning of a specific amount, and Roosevelt did not like the word "reparations," for in America one might think this meant money only. At this time, Harry Hopkins passed the President a note which stated:

The Russians have given in so much at this conference that I don't think we should let them down. Let the British disagree if they want to and continue their disagreement at Moscow. Simply say it is all referred to the

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 721.

Reparations Commission with the minutes to show the British disagree about any mention of the ten billion.⁶⁶

Next, the subject of the French obtaining an occupation zone was discussed. The President finally agreed with Churchill that the French should be given a zone and a position on the control commission. Surprisingly, Stalin agreed, too. Stettinius stated that "the President never told me just how and when he had persuaded Stalin to make this major concession which was announced so suddenly."⁶⁷ Stalin also agreed that the Tito-Subasitch agreement should go immediately into force and that the members of the Skupschina (the last Yugoslav Legislature) who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch (the Anti-Fascist Association of National Liberation). Marshal Stalin added that he agreed to the actions of the anti-Fascist Vetch, and they would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly.⁶⁸

The discussion then turned to the Montreux Convention. Stalin wanted the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers, after the Crimea Conference, to consider revising the idea that the Dardanelles could be shut down, not only in a time of war but when they felt there was a threat of war. This was agreed on by the Big Three.

⁶⁶ Robert Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 861-62.

⁶⁷ Stettinius, Roosevelt and the Russians, p. 262.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 263.

Just before the conference ended, President Roosevelt announced that he would have to leave Yalta by 3:00 p. m. the next day. Thus, a drafting committee prepared the Conference's Communique for signing by the Big Three. That evening Prime Minister Churchill gave a dinner.

The final day of the conference, February 11, the eighth plenary meeting was held in the Livadia Palace at noon. The Communique was discussed; the Soviets suggested that no mention be made of the voting procedure that Roosevelt had proposed, and this was agreed on.

There was a final Tripartite luncheon meeting held at 1:00 p. m. in the Livadia Palace. The delegations had lunch, and the papers were signed. At 4:20 p. m., the Foreign Ministers held their last meeting to approve the summary of the proceedings of the conference.⁶⁹

The night of the 11th, the President spent at Sevastopol. The next morning he drove to the airport and took a flight to Egypt where he boarded a cruiser in the Great Bitter Lake (on the Suez Canal). On the 13th, he entertained King Farouk of Egypt and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. On the 14th, the President had a luncheon for King Ibn Saud of Saudia Arabia. The following day he arrived at Alexandria and had a talk with Churchill and John Winant. He then left for Algiers where he had a discussion with Kirk, Caffery and Hewitt. On the 19th, the President's ship passed through the Gibraltar Strait where the ship detected the activity of submarines. The following day, the 20th, Major General Edwin M. Watson, who was the Secretary

⁶⁹Department of State, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 931.
See Appendix A.

and aid to the President, died at sea. On the 27th, the ship put in at an East-Coast port, and the President arrived in Washington by special train on February 28.⁷⁰

The major decisions at Yalta fall into three categories: those dealing with the United Nations, those regarding Europe, and those involving the Far East.* In the first category, Stalin did not want certain nations to be admitted to the General Assembly because they did not have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. President Roosevelt replied that they did help the Allies by supplying them with raw materials. The Big Three finally agreed that they would accept any nation that declared war against Germany by March 1, 1945.⁷¹

Byrnes felt that the United States should have more than one vote if the Soviets had three. Stalin agreed on this in a note answering Roosevelt's suggestion of February 10, but in a cable from Hopkins to Byrnes after they left the conference, Hopkins said there was no mention of this in the Official Communique and that it should not be discussed even in private. It was also reported that the President never wanted to talk about it, and the subject was never to be mentioned again.⁷² President Roosevelt was also reported as saying that the colonial system meant war and that he was against

⁷⁰New York Times, March 1, 1945.

⁷¹Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 38-39.

⁷²Ibid., p. 41.

*See Appendix B.

that. When the United Nations was established, there would be no need for spheres of influence.⁷³ Later, Churchill informed Roosevelt that he believed that the President was attempting to destroy the British Empire, and Churchill stated that the Empire meant to hold its own.⁷⁴

The category of the European decisions can be broken down into two separate parts, Germany and Poland. Stalin, who wanted a set figure in regard to German reparations, felt that President Roosevelt had sided with the British; and he was upset. But, when the final protocol came out, the figures were included which showed that Roosevelt had sided with Stalin and left Britain dissenting.⁷⁵ The Soviets also wanted to exact the German reparations by the withdrawal of factories, machinery, machine tools, railways, investments in foreign enterprises, and a cut of the German industry by eighty per cent. The payments were to be made annually for ten years and were to go only to those countries that either lost or had damages to factories, land, homes and personal property. The countries' priority was established on the basis of their help in the winning of the war and the value of their direct material losses. Thus, the Soviet Union was to get half of the total reparations, which made its portion ten billion dollars. This was also a decision made in favor

⁷³Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 635.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 635.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 47.

of the Soviets. The "Declaration on Liberated Europe" provided for "free and unfettered elections" for the liberated nations;⁷⁶ this was a concession by the Soviets. Another concession made by Stalin was in regard to the French obtaining a zone of occupation in Germany. Stalin did not feel the French should have anything to do with German territory because of their inability to contribute during the war. But he did let them have a zone, which was allotted by the United States and Great Britain. He also agreed to let the French have a part in the Allied Control Council. McNeill states:

One reason why the German question was handled so unsatisfactorily at Yalta was the pressure of other business. American attention was focused primarily upon the United Nations Organization; and the problem of Poland usurped an entirely disproportionate amount of time.⁷⁷

The other section from the agreements regarding Europe was in relation to Poland. President Roosevelt suggested that the Soviets leave out the Lwow area with its oil fields and use the Lwow line, but Stalin wanted the boundary extended to the Neisse River and the Lublin Committee to set up the Polish government. Stalin got his way in most of the boundary questions for Poland, but the real debate was over the future government of Poland. Stettinius presented a paper referring to the Atlantic Charter principle--the right of all peoples to choose

⁷⁶ Stephen Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny (London: Cape, 1960), p. 181.

⁷⁷ McNeill, America, Britain and Russia, p. 551.

their forms of government. Stalin finally gave in to the American idea for the reorganization of the Polish government and holding free elections in a democratic method. The President said they wanted this to be beyond question, as pure as Caesar's wife. Stalin replied that even she had some sins, and Roosevelt answered that he hoped she had fewer than this declaration would have.⁷⁸ In a letter to Stalin, during the conference, Roosevelt stated the exact position of the United States and added that he was determined there would be no split over the Polish question. Thus, Stalin got most of what he wanted and so did Roosevelt and Churchill.

Of the three areas of decisions at Yalta, those dealing with the Soviets' entry into the Japanese war are the most controversial. Stalin, in October of 1943, told Cordell Hull that the Soviets would enter the Japanese war when Germany was defeated. Harriman also received this view from Stalin.⁷⁹ But with the intelligence reports the War Department was receiving, it was believed the United States needed this agreement in writing. The United States intelligence estimated the strength of the Japanese Army to be about 5,000,000 officers and men--2,000,000 in Japan proper, 2,000,000 in Manchuria, Korea, China and Formosa, and over 200,000 in Burma, Thailand and French Indo-China, with some 500,000 in the Philippines and more than 100,000 in the bypassed Pacific Islands.⁸⁰ It was a common belief

⁷⁸Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 33.

⁷⁹Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 46.

⁸⁰Ellis Zacharias, "The Inside Story of Yalta," United Nations World, January, 1949, p. 14.

among many high-ranking American officials that the Japanese would fight to the "last ditch."⁸¹ A series of prepared recommendations regarding Russia's involvement in the Pacific War had been given to President Roosevelt. One such note was before the President at Yalta. It was dated January 22, 1945, and it read:

The agreed over-all objective in the war against Japan has been expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by

(1) Lowering the Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japan's naval strength.

(2) Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.⁸²

Another note, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was dated January 23, and was also given to the President at the conference. It read:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have been guided by the following basic principles in working toward the U.S.S.R. entry into the war against Japan. Russia's entry on as early a date as possible consistent with her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations.⁸³

The note went on to say that the Russians should defeat the Japanese in Manchuria and conduct air operations against Japan proper in collaboration with the United States Air Forces based in eastern Siberia and cause maximum interference with the Japanese sea traffic between Japan.

⁸¹ New York Times, February 4, 1945.

⁸² Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union and the Agreements Reached at Yalta," p. 347.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 373.

and the mainland of Asia.

Roosevelt wanted the Russians in the war because he felt that their participation in the Far East would insure their sincere cooperation in a united, peaceful world. He had also been warned by his Chiefs of Staff that without Soviet aid, it might cost the Americans a million casualties to defeat Japan.⁸⁴ Victory had to be as quick as possible, for, as long as the Japanese continued the war, the United States was limited in its operations in other areas of the world. The United States was running short on manpower resources in the early months of 1945, and an agreement with the Soviets would give the added support needed for the defeat of Japan. Thus, an agreement was reached at Yalta whereby the Soviets were to enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies within two or three months after the defeat of Germany on conditions involving territorial gains (Sakhalin, Dairen, and Port Arthur) and concessions involving railroads in Manchuria to which the Chinese government had to agree. This agreement was kept secret until 1955.

One of the sharper criticisms against the agreement is that the United States had the atomic bomb and, thus, did not need Soviet aid. A letter from the commanding general, who was working with the atomic bomb project, to the Chiefs of Staff on December 30, 1944, stated:

It is now reasonably certain that our operation plans should be based on the gun type bomb, which, it is estimated will produce the

⁸⁴Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 641.

equivalent of a ten thousand ton TNT explosion. The first bomb, without a previous full scale test which we do not believe will be necessary should be ready about the 1st of August, 1945. The second one should be ready by the end of the year and succeeding ones at . . . intervals there after.

Our previous hopes that an implosion type of bomb might develop in the late spring have now been dissipated by scientific difficulties which we have not as yet been able to solve. . . . We should have sufficient material for the first implosion type bomb sometime in the latter part of July.⁸⁵

The President had been informed of this situation along with suggestions from the State Department and War Department regarding Russia's entry into the war. The first bomb was successfully exploded in New Mexico on July 16, 1945, but no one could say for certain if it would work before the agreements at Yalta. Winnacker states that "agreements with the U.S.S.R. were . . . likely to raise fewer problems than no agreements at all."⁸⁶ He was referring to the fact that what else could be done? No one was actually sure that the bomb would work.

Other criticisms of the Yalta agreements center around certain individuals who were present. Many wondered about the role of Harry Hopkins and how much influence he actually had on the President. It has been reported that Hopkins did not originate policy and then talk the President into it. "He made it his job to provide a sounding board for discussion of the best means of attaining the goals that

⁸⁵State Department, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, p. 383.

⁸⁶Winnacker, "Yalta--Another Munich?", p. 531.

the President set for himself."⁸⁷ Hopkins was also reported to look to the immediate, rather than the long-range results, and that Roosevelt used him as an implementer rather than as a planner.⁸⁸ At the Malta Conference, Hopkins was sick; and Dr. McIntire told him to stay in bed. He remained ill during the Yalta Conference, and he stayed in bed under doctor's orders, except for the plenary meetings.

Another person, Chester Bohlen, who was at the conference, was the President's personal interpreter and advisor at the conference. He also was the United States delegation's note-taker for the conference, and his work appears in the State Department's official record of the Yalta Conference.

Probably the most controversial person at the Conference was Alger Hiss. In 1948, the House Committee on Un-American Activities uncovered a Soviet spy ring in Washington. A man known by Hiss as George Crosley was a known member of the Communist Party from 1931 to 1938; from 1934 to 1937 he was in an underground organization among the government workers. He was reported to have received government documents in a briefcase, to have had them microfilmed and then returned the case and documents to his source, who would then return the documents to the office. Hiss knew George Crosley, whose real name was Chambers, for at least ten months. The two appeared to have had a close relationship, for Hiss let Chambers use

⁸⁷Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 212.

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 5.

his home and car. While under oath, Chambers named Hiss as a member of the pre-war Communist Party and the source for the stolen documents. The nature of the documents was highly confidential and classified Top Secret by the State Department. The most important ones came from the office of the Assistant Secretary of State, Francis B. Sayre. Hiss denied that he knew that Chambers was a Communist, and he said that he himself was not one.⁸⁹ Hiss was never convicted of being either a Communist or a spy, but he was prosecuted for perjury and convicted and sentenced to prison in January of 1950. The important question is, what was Hiss's role at the Yalta Conference? Bohlen reported to the committee in the Hiss case that "I am absolutely certain that Hiss never saw President Roosevelt in a capacity of advisor to him and never had any interviews with him except that first one when the President met the whole delegation before the opening of the conference."⁹⁰ Hiss was reported to be against the ideas of Stalin in regard to the limitation of the great-power veto in the United Nations, and he also felt that France and China should be included as sponsoring nations for the United Nations.⁹¹

The question of the President's health during the conference is also a target for criticism of the Yalta Conference. While the

⁸⁹House Committee on Un-American Activities, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, 1948, p. 3.

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 20.

⁹¹New York Times, March 18, 1955.

President was at Hyde Park during the Christmas season in 1943, he caught influenza and had acute attacks of respiratory infection during the weeks that followed. To reduce the strain on his heart, Dr. McIntire, the President's personal physician, prescribed a gradual reduction in weight amounting to about ten pounds. The President took so much pride in his flat stomach that he continued to go beyond the dietary requirements as prescribed. On May 10, 1944, the President had a full physical examination by Doctors Harper, Duncan, Dickens, Behrens and Bruenn and was reported to be in good health. When the President left Washington on his trip to Yalta, he had a severe cold and during the trip he rested often. Dr. McIntire states that the President was suffering from sinus infections which made his appearance look bad, but he had greatly improved by the time he reached Malta.⁹² During the conference, his doctor reported that Roosevelt was fatigued, but there was no loss of vigor and clarity.⁹³ A former executive aid to Roosevelt, Jonathan Daniels, states that it was his job to screen the pictures taken of the President by the Army Signal Corps at Yalta, which were to be released to the press. Some of the photos show him marked by "deadly haggard weariness."⁹⁴ Dr. McIntire stated that there were also some very good photos.

When the President returned to Washington, he gave a speech in

⁹²Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 22.

⁹³McIntire, White House Physician, p. 217.

⁹⁴New York Times, April 13, 1957.

Congress in which he stated that during the trip he was in good health. About a month later, on April 12, 1945, President Roosevelt died at Warm Springs, Georgia. Dr. McIntire reported that "the President never had a stroke, never had any serious heart condition and never underwent other operations than the removal of a wen and the extraction of an infected tooth."⁹⁵ He added that the President's heart functioned strongly to the last. Dr. McIntire stated that the President died of a massive intracerebral hemorrhage which ruptured into the subarachnoid space. There was never an autopsy performed.

During the actual conference at Yalta, the press in America had little information; practically everything was kept secret. By February 5, the press speculated that the conference was being held somewhere in the Black Sea area and felt they knew some of the probable issues that would be discussed. They also felt that it was all right to keep the meetings secret because of the military matters that would likely be discussed. The papers were filled with headlines telling of the Soviet Army's advancement across Eastern Europe and about the retreating Germans. The papers expressed a great faith in President Roosevelt, and the New York Times described him as " . . . one of the greatest American leaders of all time and perhaps an even higher prestige abroad than at home."⁹⁶

On February 13, the results of the Yalta Conference were presented

⁹⁵ McIntire, White House Physician, p. 15.

⁹⁶ New York Times, February 4, 1945.

to Congress.* The New York Times reported that "the Big Three statement (papers) won bipartisan applause today in Congress. Both Democrats and Republicans said that it held out high hope for future peace."⁹⁷ Roosevelt felt that the Yalta agreements were a good start toward the goal of world peace and that the conference was a turning point in the war.⁹⁸ The Omaha World Herald reported on February 14 that "American response to the Crimea Conference has been a feeling of relief, an upsurge of hope for the success of international cooperation, and a pat on the back to President Roosevelt for a job well done."⁹⁹ But there were those who looked on the conference with a skeptical eye. Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a Democrat from Montana, felt that this was the greatest victory for Stalin and for Russian imperialism. There were supporters for both sides of the argument.

Following the surrender of Germany, May 8, 1945, another top-level conference was held at Potsdam, near Berlin. This meeting was attended by Marshal Stalin, President Chiang Kai-shek, President Harry S. Truman, and Prime Minister Clement Attlee. During this conference, the former European Advisory Commission was replaced by the new Council of Foreign Ministers which represented China, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and France. The details

⁹⁷ Ibid., February 13, 1945.

⁹⁸ Wilmot, "Was Yalta a Calamity?", p. 7.

⁹⁹ Omaha World Herald, February 14, 1945.

*See Appendix C.

of the control of the occupation zones in Germany were worked out along with the reparations question.

But before the Potsdam Conference, Hurley, the United States Ambassador to China, was sent to Moscow to ask Stalin when Chiang could be told of the agreements and relations started between the Reds and the Chinese National Government could be started as prescribed at Yalta. Stalin wanted to wait for about two months, and Hurley agreed.¹⁰⁰

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Two days later, August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on the Japanese Empire. On August 14, the Soviets and National Chinese Government negotiated the Sino-Soviet Agreements. The Soviets obtained privileges in railroads and ports, but they fully recognized the National Government's sovereignty in both China and Manchuria.¹⁰¹

In the years that followed, the Soviet Union repeatedly violated the Yalta Agreements. In Bulgaria, the Soviet Government, with the help of the local Communist Party, unilaterally subverted the representative democratic process. In 1945, Soviet authorities interfered in the internal affairs of Bulgaria's largest political party by demanding and obtaining the replacement of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov as the Secretary General of the Agrarian Union. In Hungary, the Soviets, with the help of the Hungarian Communist Party, armed forces

¹⁰⁰Harriman, "Our Wartime Relations with Russia," p. 375.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

in Hungary. The Catholic Youth Organization was dissolved in June of 1946; Soviet armed forces arrested Bela Kovacs, who was a member of the Parliament and the Secretary of the Smallholders Party, in February of 1947; they forced the resignation of Prime Minister Nagy in May, and Hungary conformed to Soviet domination by 1947.¹⁰² In Rumania, Premier Radscu's interim representative government was overthrown and a Communist-controlled regime was installed from February to March of 1945; Premier Groza's office remained by his defiance of the King's demands to resign in August; and there were Soviet interferences with the occupational authorities in the election campaign of 1946.¹⁰³ Finally, in Poland, the Polish Peasant Party got only 28 of the 444 seats in the government as a result of Soviet activity. On July 6, 1950, the Soviet-controlled governments of Poland and East Germany signed an agreement making the Oder-Neisse line the definitive German-Polish boundary, and in 1952 the elections were the single-slate Soviet type, and there was not even a token of representative government permitted as the Constitution of July 22, 1952, was approved.¹⁰⁴

Some persons questioned the legality of the secret agreement concerning the Soviets' entry into the Japanese war. Stephen Pan states that in this document, neither the form, contents, nor terminology stipulate when it would come into force, nor is there

¹⁰² Committee on Foreign Affairs, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, 1953, 39.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 40. ¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 43.

anything said about its ratification or termination. The document was signed with the leaders' signatures, but without the official titles of their respective governments. The section regarding the land to go to Russia was against the Sino-Soviet Agreement of 1924; and, therefore, the Russian claims were questionable as to their validity. Pan concluded his study by stating:

In considering the Yalta Agreement as a whole, however, its legal aspects and implications deserve careful examination. This is because this "Leaders' Agreement" was signed in such an unusual manner, as has been pointed out; because it assumed the acceptance by an ally of the claims of another ally; because it is at variance with several outstanding international agreements such as the Nine-Power Treaty, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924, the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration; and because it also involves the Japanese Peace Treaty as well as the very "validity" of the Yalta Agreement itself. Furthermore, the constitutionality of the Yalta Agreement has been raised by some members of the Senate who questioned the authority of the President of the United States of America, as a "leader" of one of the "Three Great Powers." The questions of ratification, duration and abrogation of this agreement are still cloudy. Such loopholes may lead to further legal and political complications in international relations.¹⁰⁵

When the Yalta official protocol and the secret agreement with Russia were released in the spring of 1955, Winston Churchill stated that he found mistakes in the United States version of what happened at Yalta. He was specifically referring to the unfriendly sentiments

¹⁰⁵Stephen Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreement," Journal of International Law, XLVI (January, 1952), 59.

attributed to him in regard to the Polish people.¹⁰⁶ Later, an ex-State Department historian, Dryton Barron, charged that the Yalta Papers were slanted by the omission of certain documents.¹⁰⁷ He stated that he was the original compiler of the papers for the State Department; he was dismissed for insubordination. This view had been expressed by others who feel that there might be some more secret documents that are still unpublished, but for right now this is just speculation, for there seems to be really nothing to substantiate these charges.

There are many different theories attributed to the failure or the breakdown of the Yalta Agreements. Some feel that it was a conspiracy; they feel that Roosevelt sold out half of Europe to Stalin as the result of Communist work in the United States State Department, a theory popularized by McCarthy. Others, like Elliot Roosevelt, have the idea that it failed because President Roosevelt died, for they believe his ideals and statesmanship would have been sufficient to keep the world unity during the post-war period.¹⁰⁸

Still others feel that failure at Yalta was due to an Anglo-American antagonism. Critics have attacked Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, Hopkins, Hiss, and practically everyone else connected with the conference. The Departments of State and War have been accused of negligence in giving

¹⁰⁶New York Times, March 18, 1955.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., February 5, 1956.

¹⁰⁸Borsody, The Triumph of Tyranny, p. 185.

the President information which led him the wrong way. Some take a more realistic approach to the problem. They feel the failure of the Yalta Agreements in the years following this important conference was not due to the United States but that it failed because the Soviets failed to keep their promises which were made at Yalta by the signing of the protocol.

The Yalta documents represent one of the most controversial issues resulting from the Second World War. The conference was held in secret; not even the press or press photographers were invited. In fact, the pictures taken at Yalta were taken by members of the American Army Signal Corps. The official conference communique was carefully worded, only giving the "bare essentials." Immediate reaction, in the main, was favorable. A large number of Americans felt that there was "hope," as the newspaper articles show. But, as the agreements reached at Yalta began to fall apart, the American public became upset. The McCarthy brand of "red scare" that swept through the United States during the early 1950's aroused the public to the Communist threat. When the New York Times published the "Secret Agreements" in the spring of 1955, Yalta again came into the limelight. These "secret documents" dealing with Russia's entry into the war revived the whole Yalta question. The American public asked why these had not been released in 1945. The fact of the matter is that there was never any official Congressional approval or full knowledge of what happened at Yalta. James Byrnes asked President Roosevelt

about the secret documents, wondering if they would be put into the form of a treaty. Roosevelt replied that this would be embodied in an eventual peace treaty.¹⁰⁹

Roosevelt also suggested Congressional action. In his report to Congress on March 1, 1945, the President stated:

Speaking in all frankness, the question of whether it is fruitful or not, lies, to a great extent, in your hands, for unless you, here in the Halls of the American Congress, concur in the general conclusions reached at the place called Yalta, and give them your active support, the meeting will not have produced lasting results. And that is why I have come before you at the earliest hour I could after my return.¹¹⁰

President Roosevelt died soon after, and the Yalta Papers never did come officially before Congress for approval. Whether the President really intended to do this is a question that cannot be answered. To complicate matters, there is no official peace treaty with Germany and Italy. The War Conferences serve in its place, especially Yalta. The United States was bound to these agreements by President Roosevelt's use of the executive agreement.

The President has the right to enter into executive agreements as Commander-in-Chief for military agreements; and, because of his power over foreign relations (that is, chief diplomat), he can enter into political agreements without the advice and consent of the Congress.

¹⁰⁹Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreements," p. 51.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 48.

Although the Constitution does not specifically authorize the President to be the director-in-chief of foreign affairs or grant the power of executive agreements, he may make treaties contingent upon the approval of the Senate. Thus, by implied and/or expanded powers, President Roosevelt was able to use successfully the executive agreement. In 1953, Senator Bricker attempted to challenge this executive power by sponsoring a proposed Constitutional amendment. This amendment, if passed, would require Congressional approval of executive agreements. The Bricker Amendment failed, as did its "watered-down" substitute on February 26, 1954.¹¹¹

With regard to President Roosevelt and the conferences from the Atlantic Charter to Yalta, Congress played a very small role, either as a critic or as a participant. Roland Young sums up the role of Congress in this list of conferences by stating:

Congress did not participate in these military and military-political conferences. It was not invited, and it did not ask to be invited; Congress seemed to consider that the prerogative of making commitments at such conferences belonged to the President . . .¹¹²

The Congress, along with the American public, was accustomed to President Roosevelt's full use of his presidential powers. This pattern started during the Depression and continued throughout Roosevelt's almost four complete administrations. Each conference, the Atlantic

¹¹¹Thomas Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 828.

¹¹²Roland Young, Congressional Politics in the Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), p. 147.

Charter, the Casablanca Conference, the Moscow and Teheran Conference, mark the way to Yalta, almost like stepping stones across a creek. Thus, by the use of the executive agreement and the topics discussed during the pre-Yalta conferences, the Crimea Conference was the culmination of the military, military-political agreements already made. President Roosevelt had become accustomed to using the executive agreement backed by his justification that he expected an "official" peace treaty to mark the end of World War II. It is interesting to note that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt liked being referred to as Commander-in-Chief, rather than President.¹¹³

The question soon arose as to how long the United States was obligated to adhere to the Yalta agreements. Stephen Pan feels that after Roosevelt's death, with a new administration taking office, ". . . the United States could legally consider itself no longer bound by the various Yalta understandings."¹¹⁴ President Truman stated on April 23, 1945, that ". . . if one part of the agreements which they [the Soviet Union] had entered with President Roosevelt at Yalta were breached, he would consider that the entire Yalta Agreement was no longer binding on any of the parties interested."¹¹⁵

The discontinued adherence to the Yalta Agreements also became a part of the Republican political platform of 1952.

¹¹³ Bemis, Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 901.

¹¹⁴ Pan, "Legal Aspects of the Yalta Agreements," p. 59.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 58.

The executive agreement had been used many times before the Yalta Conference, and by Presidents before Roosevelt; and it will certainly be used in the future. But it is doubtful whether it will ever create the controversy that the Yalta Conference did. This conference bound the United States, at least for a time, to many very important agreements. Many historians view the breakdown of the Yalta Agreements as one of the basic causes of the "cold war."

APPENDIX A
PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CRIMEA CONFERENCE

The Crimea Conference of the Heads of the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which took place from February 4th to 11th came to the following conclusions:

1. WORLD ORGANIZATION

It was decided:

(1) that a United Nations Conference on the proposed world organization should be summoned for Wednesday, 25th April, 1945, and should be held in the United States of America.

(2) the Nations to be invited to this Conference should be:

(a) the United Nations as they existed on the 8th February, 1945, and

(b) such of the Associated Nations as have declared war on the common enemy by 1st March, 1945. (For this purpose by the term "Associated Nation" was meant the eight Associated Nations and Turkey.) When the Conference on World Organization is held, the delegates of the United Kingdom and United States of America will support a proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist Republics, i.e., the Ukraine and White Russia.

(3) that the United States Government on behalf of Three Powers should consult the Government of China and the French Provisional

Government in regard to the decisions taken at the present Conference concerning the proposed World Organization.

(4) that the text of the invitation to be issued to all the nations which would take part in the United Nations Conference should be as follows:

INVITATION

"The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and of the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invite the Government of _____ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on 25th April, 1945, or soon thereafter, at San Francisco in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

"The above named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

"C. Voting

- '1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.
- '2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.
- '3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters

should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.'

"Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

"In the event that the Government of _____ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments."

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

It was agreed that the five Nations which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference on the question of territorial trusteeship.

The acceptance of this recommendation is subject to its being made clear that territorial trusteeship will only apply to (a) existing mandates of the League of Nations; (b) territories detached from the enemy as a result of the present war; (c) any other territory which might voluntarily be placed under trusteeship; and (d) no discussion of actual territories is contemplated at the forthcoming United Nations Conference or in the preliminary consultations and it will be a matter for subsequent agreement which territories within the above categories will be placed under trusteeship.

11. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The following declaration has been approved:

"The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

"The establishment of order in Europe and the re-building of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter--the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live--the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to

establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

"The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

"When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

"By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in co-operation with other peaceloving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.

"In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested."

111. DISMEMBERMENT OF GERMANY

It was agreed that Article 12 (a) of the Surrender Terms for Germany should be amended to read as follows:

"The United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall possess supreme authority with respect to Germany. In the exercise of such authority they will take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarisation and the dismemberment of Germany as they deem requisite for future peace and security."

The study of the procedure for the dismemberment of Germany was referred to a Committee, consisting of Mr. Eden (Chairman), Mr. Winant and Mr. Gousev. This body would consider the desirability of associating with it a French representative.

IV. ZONE OF OCCUPATION FOR THE FRENCH AND CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.

It was agreed that a zone in Germany, to be occupied by the French Forces, should be allocated to France. This zone would be formed out of the British and American zones and its extent would be settled by the British and Americans in consultation with the French Provisional Government.

It was also agreed that the French Provisional Government should be invited to become a member of the Allied Control Council for Germany.

V. REPARATION

The following protocol has been approved:

1. Germany must pay in kind for the losses caused by her to the

Allied nations in the course of the war. Reparations are to be received in the first instance by those countries which have borne the main burden of the war, have suffered the heaviest losses and have organised victory over the enemy.

2. Reparation in kind is to be exacted from Germany in three following forms:

(a) Removals within 2 years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organised resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory (equipment, machine-tools, ships, rolling stock, German investments abroad, shares of industrial, transport and other enterprises in Germany, etc.), these removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany.

(b) Annual deliveries of goods from current production for a period to be fixed.

(c) Use of German labour.

3. For the working out on the above principles of a detailed plan for exaction of reparation from Germany an Allied Reparation Commission will be set up in Moscow. It will consist of three representatives--one from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, one from the United Kingdom and one from the United States of America.

4. With regard to the fixing of the total sum of the reparation as well as the distribution of it among the countries which suffered from the German aggression the Soviet and American delegations agreed

as follows:

"The Moscow Reparation Commission should take in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government that the sum of the reparation in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the paragraph 2 should be 20 billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."

The British delegation was of the opinion that pending consideration of the reparation question by the Moscow Reparation Commission no figures of reparation should be mentioned.

The above Soviet-American proposal has been passed to the Moscow Reparation Commission as one of the proposals to be considered by the Commission.

VI. MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

The Conference agreed that the question of the major war criminals should be the subject of enquiry by the three Foreign Secretaries for report in due course after the close of the Conference.

VII. POLAND

The following Declaration on Poland was agreed by the Conference.

"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the Western part of Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should

therefore be reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

"M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

"When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the U.S.A. will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

"The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in

some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognise that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course in the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference."

VIII. YUGOSLAVIA

It was agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and to Dr. Subasic:

(a) that the Tito-Subasic Agreement should immediately be put into effect and a new Government formed on the basis of the Agreement.

(b) that as soon as the new Government has been formed it should declare:

(i) that the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary Parliament and

(ii) that legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation (AUNOJ) will be subject to subsequent ratification by a Constituent Assembly;

and that this statement should be published in the communique of the Conference.

IX. ITALO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER ITALO-AUSTRIA FRONTIER

Notes on these subjects were put in by the British delegation and

the American and Soviet delegations agreed to consider them and give their views later.

X. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS

There was an exchange of views between the Foreign Secretaries on the question of the desirability of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact of alliance. The question at issue was whether a state still under an armistice regime could be allowed to enter into a treaty with another state. Mr. Eden suggested that the Bulgarian and Yugoslav Governments should be informed that this could not be approved. Mr. Stettinius suggested that the British and American Ambassadors should discuss the matter further with Mr. Molotov in Moscow. Mr. Molotov agreed with the proposal of Mr. Stettinius.

X1. SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE

The British Delegation put in notes for the consideration of their colleagues on the following subjects:

- (a) the Control Commission in Bulgaria
- (b) Greek claims upon Bulgaria, more particularly with reference to reparations.
- (c) oil equipment in Roumania.

X11. IRAN

Mr. Eden, Mr. Stettinius and M. Molotov exchanged views on the situation in Iran. It was agreed that this matter should be pursued through the diplomatic channel.

XIII. MEETINGS OF THE THREE FOREIGN SECRETARIES

The Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries; they should meet as often as necessary, probably about every three or four months.

These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London.

XIV. THE MONTREUX CONVENTION AND THE STRAITS

It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention and report to their Governments. The Turkish Government should be informed at the appropriate moment.

The foregoing Protocol was approved and signed by the three Foreign Secretaries at the Crimea Conference, February 11, 1945.

E R Stettinius, Jr

B. Mojib

Anthony Eden

Part V. on Reparations occurs in the official State Department, The Conference at Malta and Yalta, (Washington 1955), 982-3, as an added portion titled PROTOCOL ON THE TALKS BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE THREE GOVERNMENTS AT THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE ON THE QUESTION OF THE GERMAN REPARATION IN KIND, which was signed by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin (Ctajihh) and dated also as February 11, 1945. This is the same wording as appeared above under part V." ¹¹⁶

¹¹⁶ Department of State, op. cit., 975-83.

APPENDIX B

"AGREEMENT REGARDING ENTRY OF THE SOVIET
UNION INTO THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, TOP SECRET"

AGREEMENT

The leaders of the three Great Powers--the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain--have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be

safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.

3. The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

I/I Ctajihh

Franklin D Roosevelt

Winston S Churchill¹¹⁷

February 11, 1945

¹¹⁷Department of State, op. cit., 984.

APPENDIX C

"THE DEFEAT OF GERMANY"

We have considered and determined the military plans of the three Allied powers for the final defeat of the common enemy. The military staffs of the three Allied nations have met in daily meetings throughout the conference. These meetings have been most satisfactory from every point of view and have resulted in closer coordination of the military effort of the three Allied powers than ever before. The fullest information has been interchanged. The timing, scope, and coordination of new and even more powerful blows to be launched by our armies and air forces into the heart of Germany from the east, west, north, and south have been fully agreed and planned in detail.

Our combined military plans will be made known only as we execute them, but we believe that the very close working partnership among the three staffs attained at this conference will result in shortening the war. Meetings of the three staffs will be continued in the future whenever the need arises.

Nazi Germany is doomed. The German people will only make the cost of their defeat heavier to themselves by attempting to continue a hopeless resistance.

THE OCCUPATION AND CONTROL OF GERMANY

We have agreed on common policies and plans for enforcing the unconditional surrender terms which we shall impose together on Nazi

Germany after German armed resistance has been finally crushed.

These terms will not be made known until the final defeat of Germany has been accomplished. Under the agreed plan, the forces of the three powers will each occupy a separate zone of Germany. Coordinated administration and control has been provided for under the plan through a central control commission consisting of the supreme commanders of the three powers with headquarters in Berlin. It has been agreed that France should be invited by the three powers, if she should so desire, to take over a zone of occupation, and to participate as a fourth member of the control commission. The limits of the French zone will be agreed by the four governments concerned through their representatives on the European Advisory Commission.

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazi-ism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to just and swift punishment, and exact reparations in kind for the destruction wrought by the Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions; remove all Nazi and militarist influences from public office and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other

measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world. It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when Nazi-ism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations.

REPARATION BY GERMANY

We have considered the question of the damage caused by Germany to the Allied Nations in this war and recognized it as just that Germany be obliged to make compensation for this damage in kind to the greatest extent possible. A commission for the compensation of damage will be established. The commission will be instructed to consider the question of the extent and methods for compensating damage caused by Germany to the Allied countries. The commission will work in Moscow.

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

We are resolved upon the earliest possible establishment with our allies of a general international organization to maintain peace and security. We believe that this is essential, both to prevent aggression and to remove the political, economic, and social causes of war through the close and continuing collaboration of all peace-loving peoples.

The foundations were laid at Dumbarton Oaks. On the important question of voting procedure, however, agreement was not there reached. The present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty.

We have agreed that a conference of United Nations should be called to meet at San Francisco in the United States on April 25, 1945, to prepare the charter of such an organization, along the lines proposed in the informal conversations at Dumbarton Oaks.

The Government of China and the Provisional Government of France will be immediately consulted and invited to sponsor invitations to the conference jointly with the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As soon as the consultation with China and France has been completed, the text of the proposals on voting procedure will be made public.

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three Governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and

fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter--the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live--the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three Governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of government responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three Governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of

the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom, and general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.

POLAND

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish provisional government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government which is now functioning in Poland should, therefore, be recognized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on

the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present provisional government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of 5 to 8 kilometers in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions to territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.

YUGOSLAVIA

We have agreed to recommend to Marshal Tito and Dr. Subasic that the agreement between them should be put into effect immediately,

and that a new government should be formed on the basis of that agreement.

We also recommend that as soon as the new government has been formed it should declare that:

(1) The Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation should be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Parliament who have not compromised themselves by collaboration with the enemy, thus forming a body to be known as a temporary parliament; and

(2) Legislative acts passed by the Anti-Fascist Assembly of National Liberation will be subject to subsequent ratification by a constituent assembly.

There was also a general review of other Balkan questions.

MEETINGS OF FOREIGN SECRETARIES

Throughout the conference, besides the daily meetings of the heads of governments and the foreign secretaries, separate meetings of the three foreign secretaries and their advisors have also been held daily.

These meetings have proved of the utmost value and the Conference agreed that permanent machinery should be set up for regular consultation between the three Foreign Secretaries. They will, therefore, meet as often as may be necessary, probably about every 3 or 4 months. These meetings will be held in rotation in the three capitals, the first meeting being held in London, after the United Nations Conference on World Organization.

UNITY FOR PEACE AS FOR WAR

Our meeting here in the Crimea has reaffirmed our common determination to maintain and strengthen in the peace to come that unity of purpose and of action which has made victory possible and certain for the United Nations in this war. We believe that this is a sacred obligation which our governments owe to our peoples and to all the peoples of the world.

Only with the continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can be the highest aspiration of humanity be realized--a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Victory in this war and establishment of the proposed international organization will provide the greatest opportunity in all history to create in the years to come the essential conditions of such a peace.

Winston S Churchill

Franklin D Roosevelt

J Stalin¹¹⁸

February 11, 1945

¹¹⁸New York Times, February 13, 1945.

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