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THE MANIFEST ANXIETY-DEFENSIVENESS SCALE,
INDUCTION OF THREAT TO SELF-ESTEEM,
AND THE RESOLUTION OF DISSONANCE

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of Psychology
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska at Omaha

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Dennis F. Gardner
August 1970

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Accepted for the faculty of the College of Graduate
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fulfillment of the requirements for the degree Master of Arts.

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"An Artist should never lose sight of the thing as a whole. He who goes too much into details will find the thread which holds the whole thing together will break and instead of a necklace, single pearls will remain in his stupid hands."

Chopin

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It has been suggested that self-esteem is a significant contributing variable in determining defensive behavior (Asch, 1948; Janis & Field, 1959; Lazarus & Longo, 1953; Rosenzweig, 1938; Sears, 1940). Several studies suggest that individuals of high and low self-esteem (SE) manifest different patterns of response to the experience of success and failure (Altrochi, Parsons, & Dickoff, 1960; Stotland & Hillmer, 1962; Stotland, Thorley, Thomas, Cohen, & Zander, 1957). Further, Block and Thomas (1955) and Altrochi, Parsons, and Dickoff (1960) have shown that persons with high SE tend to avoid threatening materials, while persons with low SE tend to approach and experience threatening materials. However, a coherent dynamic picture has yet to emerge from the total pattern of these relationships.

It seems conceptually advantageous to consider the concept of defense in connection with adaptation to real and potential threat to self-esteem. While researchers in this area have concentrated their efforts toward the discovery of individual differences in §s customary mode of ego defense (Carlson, 1954; Caron & Wallach, 1957; Eriksen, 1951, 1952, 1954; Gordon, 1957; Lazarus, Eriksen & Fonda, 1951; Lazarus & Longo, 1953; Truax, 1957), somewhat less attention has been paid to the individual's ability and efficiency to satisfactorily resolve the conflict situation and minimize threat and anxiety.

Millimet (1970) has developed the Manifest Anxiety-Defensiveness (MAD, 1970) scale, a scale purporting to measuring a dimension of personality reflecting low anxiety and effective avoidance defenses against anxiety (LA-HAVD) at one pole and high anxiety and ineffective avoidance defenses (HA-LAVD) against anxiety at the other pole. Millimet suggests that anxiety and defensiveness are inversely related, bipolar variables, as the absence of effective avoidance defenses against anxiety should be expected to lead to the increased experience of anxiety. Conversely, the presence of effective avoidance defenses against anxiety should lead to the decreased experience of anxiety. The MAD scale has been shown to possess very high reliability (test-retest = .95; split-half = .91; k-r 20 = .90) and several studies considering normal and psychiatric samples indicate satisfactory validity (Millimet, 1970). Millimet suggests that an individual scoring at the high end of the MAD scale is highly anxious, and deficient in his ability to avoid real or potential threat. A low scorer on the MAD scale should exhibit the opposite characteristics.

The present study, in part, attempts to clarify the extent of dimensional overlap between a personality instrument devised to reflect a manifest anxiety-defensiveness dimension and an instrument measuring a dimension of self-esteem. Predictions associated with these dimensions may then be related to differential reactions to success and failure.

The prediction based on the ego-psychology model, as discussed above, hypothesizes that the occurrence of defensive behavior is a function of the differential experience of success and failure and efficiency of avoidance defenses as measured by the MAD scale. Individuals scoring at the low end of the MAD scale should manifest high SE and avoid threatening materials, while individuals scoring at the high end of the MAD scale should manifest low SE and approach threatening materials.

An additional aspect of the present study is the consideration of the cognitive dissonance model as an alternate explanation of the results. The basic premise in Festinger's (1957) cognitive dissonance theory is that the existence of dissonance, i.e., the existence of inconsistent relations among cognitions, will motivate the person to try to reduce dissonance, an unpleasant psychological state, and achieve consonance, a more enviable psychological state. Festinger uses the term cognition to refer to any knowledge, opinion or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one's behavior. According to Festinger, inconsistent or contradictory relations between any two of these elements create tension which the individual strives to reduce by making his cognitions more consistent. Many experiments of dissonance have been concerned with one kind of inconsistent pair of elements, namely, self-referent cognitions, i.e., a belief about oneself or one's behavior and knowledge of

action or commitment to action that does not follow from the belief (Brown, 1965).

The best way of illustrating these points is to describe a hypothetical illustration. Take for example, a person who considers himself to be of average intelligence. This person upon taking an intelligence test may be confronted with a result which suggests that, contrary to his belief, he does not possess average intelligence. In fact, the test result indicates that his performance is far below what would be expected for his age group and amount of education. This knowledge is certainly dissonant with his cognition that he possesses average intellectual ability and according to cognitive dissonance theory, there would be pressures to reduce this dissonance. Assuming that appropriate measurement techniques were available, one should be able to observe the attempt to reduce dissonance.

Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) have questioned the methodological integrity of numerous studies (e.g. Cohen, Brehm, & Fleming, 1958) of cognitive dissonance in which much of the data was discarded. The prevailing rationale for the rejecting of cases, as pointed out by Chapanis and Chapanis (1964), was that an unselected sample does not permit an adequate test of the dissonance hypothesis. Many dissonance experimenters contend that if some Ss do not conform in the predicted manner, then the possibility arises that either these Ss are reducing their dissonance through some channel

other than the one predicted, or dissonance failed to occur for these Ss. The dissonance workers maintain that when this happens, it is justifiable to eliminate these Ss from the analysis since their behavior would be inappropriate for the testing of the immediate hypothesis.

It should be understood that there is no guarantee that the experimental procedures will be successful in producing dissonance for all Ss. As indicated above, many studies have rejected Ss from further experimental consideration because they failed to display dissonance. Brown (1965) points out that investigators generally work with combinations of cognitive elements assumed to be dissonant because of an unexpressed premise that these cognitions are ones that almost everyone holds. However, a combination of ideas that is dissonant for one person may not be dissonant for another, it depends on the other things each person believes. It may be understood that many of the experimental manipulations now being used in dissonance research would fail to generate dissonance in a person who had a very low opinion of himself. A thoroughly negative self-conception might eliminate dissonance for many possible experimental manipulations.

To clarify this point, reconsider the hypothetical illustration previously described. This time there are two individuals, A and B. Both consider themselves to be of average intelligence, however, A has a generally high opinion of himself, whereas B has a generally low opinion of himself.

Both are confronted with threatening information which suggests that their level of intelligence is far below what would be expected for his age group and amount of education. For both A and B, this information is inconsistent with their belief that they possess average intelligence. However, for A the information is also strongly dissonant with his belief that he is an effective person. For B, the information is quite consistent with his belief that he is a generally worthless person. Considered in this light, the equivalent information would be strongly dissonant for A, the high SE person, but consonant, or only mildly dissonant for B, the low SE person.

It may be understood that producing dissonance in an experimental situation involves more than simply confronting the individual with a cognition assumed to be inconsistent or incompatible with one that he already holds. The occurrence of a state of dissonance is dependent on each person's psychological expectations.

Many of the criticisms of cognitive dissonance research could be resolved by careful experimental design. Since dissonance derives from premises about oneself and one's behavior, dissonance should vary with one's self-concept. It should be possible, for example, to contrive situations that would be dissonant for a particular group of Ss while at the same time be consonant for a contrasted group of Ss.

The present investigation has three objectives: (1) to consider the extent of common variance between the dimensions of self-esteem and manifest anxiety-defensiveness; (2) to discover the defensive strategies of high and low scorers on the MAD; (3) to consider the conditions affecting the occurrence of cognitive dissonance.

Since an individual scoring at the high end of the MAD scale is highly anxious and deficient in his ability to avoid real or potential threat (Millimet, 1970), he should tend to ruminate about threat, conflict, and the negative qualities of himself. He may, therefore, be expected to manifest low self-esteem. Since an individual scoring at the low end of the MAD is low anxious and possesses adequate avoidance defenses (Millimet, 1970), he should tend to remain unaware of threat, conflict, and negative attitudes and focus on the positive qualities of himself. He may, therefore, be expected to manifest high self-esteem.

Since dissonance derives from premises about oneself and one's behavior, dissonance should vary with one's self-concept. To be sure, the occurrence of a state of dissonance is dependent on one's psychological expectations. The present study considers four groups of Ss: (1) HA-LAVD Ss-failure condition; (2) HA-LAVD Ss-success condition; (3) LA-HAVD Ss-failure condition; (4) LA-HAVD Ss-success condition. The predictions are based on the hypothesis that as LA-HAVD Ss are expected to possess high SE, and HA-LAVD Ss are expected

to possess low SE, it should follow that confronting LA-HAVD Ss with information suggesting that they possess below average intelligence should produce a dissonance reaction. However, the same information when presented to the HA-LAVD Ss should not produce dissonance. The negative information should be consistent with the unfavorable opinion HA-LAVD Ss have of themselves and should lead to the experience of consonance or only mild dissonance.

Confronting LA-HAVD Ss with information which is self-enhancing should be consistent with the view of being nearly perfect individuals. However, the self-enhancing information should be inconsistent with the HA-LAVD Ss view of being unworthy individuals. Consequently, for information which is self-enhancing, one would expect dissonance to occur for the HA-LAVD Ss, but not for the LA-HAVD Ss.

Furthermore, HA-LAVD Ss and LA-HAVD Ss should be expected to differ in their attempts to reduce dissonance. While HA-LAVD Ss should approach threatening material and attempt to distort or modify it, LA-HAVD Ss experiencing dissonance should be more successful in their attempt to ignore or deny these materials.

METHOD

Subjects

Thirty Ss falling at the high end (HA-LAVD) of the Millimet (1970) Manifest Anxiety-Defensiveness (MAD) scale and 30 Ss falling at the low end (LA-HAVD) of the (MAD) scale were selected for further consideration. The male and female Ss participating in this study were drawn from introductory psychology courses at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Prior to participation in the experiment, each S's self-esteem was assessed. An Interpersonal Check List (ICL, Leary, 1957) consisting of 128 adjectives or short adjective phrases, was used for this purpose. The Leary Check List has been shown to possess high reliability (test-retest = .78) and satisfactory validity (Leary, 1957). Each S was asked to check all of the items which he believed described his behavior as he presently sees himself. On a second copy of the check list, S was asked to check the items which describe his ideal, his picture of himself as he should like to be. Absolute discrepancies between perceived-self and ideal-self were determined. The discrepancy between perceived self and ideal self thus provided an index of self-esteem. Self-esteem, as presently defined, varies inversely with the size of the discrepancy score between perceived-self and ideal-self.

Materials and Procedure

The HA-LAVD Ss and LA-HAVD Ss were assigned at random to experimental conditions of failure or success. This experimental design yielded four groups of 15 Ss:

(1) HA-LAVD Ss-failure condition, (2) LA-HAVD Ss-failure condition, (3) HA-LAVD Ss-success condition, (4) LA-HAVD Ss-success condition.

Upon entering the laboratory, Ss were seated one seat apart and told that discussion among them would not be necessary or permitted. At this point, all Ss were administered the Harvard Quick-Scoring Analogies of Intellectual Capacity (Millimet, 1968). The test consists of 20 analogies, all of which are in the form A : B :: C : _____. However, only five of the analogies are solvable, the remaining 15 are ambiguous, frustrating, and have no correct answer.

Each S was given a booklet consisting of instructions and the analogies test (see Appendix A). Ss were informed that this test had been administered in many other universities as well as their own and that they would be given the opportunity to compare their performance with a table of norms (see Appendix B) as a check against their present college standing (Freshman, Sophomore, etc.) which may not necessarily reflect their true intellectual capacity. Ss were then given 12 minutes to complete the test of analogies.

At the end of the allotted time the analogy tests were collected. At this time Ss were administered a brief questionnaire (see Appendix C), while E "scored" the analogies test. The questionnaire referred to the kinds of feelings or emotions intelligence tests may evoke from an individual. Ss were asked to endorse items reflecting the way he presently feels after taking an intelligence test.

After completion of the questionnaire (approximately 10 minutes), Ss received the results of their performance on the analogies test. Each S was handed a form with his score, a table of norms, and a typed explanatory paragraph. The table of norms was included to permit the comparison of S's score with those expected for academic levels ranging from Freshman in high school to Senior in College. The following paragraph was intended to clarify each S's score:

For your own information you may wish to know what your score means. It has been shown that people who score two or more years above their present college level find college much easier than most students and usually go on to do very well. People who score just about what is expected for their age and year level find about the average number of problems and difficulties in college, while those people who score two or more years below their present college standing usually find college exceedingly difficult and many have problems finishing.

Ss under the failure condition were given the score 8 . (upper sophomore in high school), while Ss under success conditions were given a score of 18 (upper junior in college).

Ss were then asked to participate in a survey-type research program which they were told was being carried out

in other universities as well as their own, and which would involve, on their part, filling out several questionnaires of varying nature. They were told that all replies would be held in strict confidence by the research organization, and would be evaluated in terms of averages for all the participants.

After distributing the questionnaires as quickly as possible to prevent any verbal interaction among Ss, the instructions were read aloud by E while Ss followed them in their booklets. Ss were asked to fill in identifying data on the front page before completing the questionnaires.

The first instrument (see Appendix C) served as an index of the way the S was willing or able to characterize his own emotional state at the time of testing. The results were to be used for determining whether dissonance had been produced by the experimental manipulations. A list of adjectives, each followed by a five-point rating scale, was presented with the following instructions:

Intelligence testing produces various feelings in those being tested. This questionnaire does not have any right or wrong answers; you are asked only to report your own feelings as accurately as possible. Place a check mark after each adjective so as to describe how you feel at the present time.

The last questionnaire (see Appendix D) served as a measure of the manner and direction of dissonance reduction. It was comprised of twenty-three items relating to various aspects of the testing situation. Each statement was

followed by a seven-point rating scale, and Ss were asked to indicate the extent of their agreement or disagreement with each statement. This instrument was intended to provide numerous ways of eliminating or reducing dissonance relating to the immediate situation. The score was the sum of the agreement scores for all statements.

The following is a summary of the experimental procedure:

1. Ss were administered an analogies test (see Appendix A) which was purposely designed to be ambiguous and frustrating.
2. Upon completion of the analogies test each S was asked to characterize his feelings concerning the taking of an intelligence test (see Appendix C). The results were used to determine each S's "base-level" of dissonance.
3. Ss then received feedback (see Appendix B) concerning their performance on the intelligence test.
4. After receiving feedback, Ss were asked to characterize their feelings upon hearing their scores on the analogies test (see Appendix D).
5. Ss were then asked to evaluate various aspects of the entire testing situation (see Appendix D).

RESULTS

The Interpersonal Check List (ICL, Leary, 1957) was used to assess self-esteem. Self-esteem as defined in this study varied inversely with the size of the absolute discrepancy score between perceived self and ideal self. The discrepancy scores of the HA-LAVD Ss (N = 43, M = 61.54, SD = 23.45) were significantly higher than the scores of the LA-HAVD Ss (N = 38, M = 33.05, SD = 13.17) (t = 6.62, df = 79, $p < .001$).

Upon examining the data more closely it was determined that the variances of the two distributions were not homogeneous (F-Max = 3.13, $p < .01$). For this reason the Mann-Whitney U-test was chosen for the analysis. On the basis of this analysis it was again concluded that the perceived self-ideal self discrepancy scores of LA-HAVD Ss and HA-LAVD Ss was statistically significant (z = 5.9, $p < .0001$). Thus the hypothesis that LA-HAVD Ss manifest smaller perceived self-ideal self discrepancies than HA-LAVD Ss was clearly supported.

Cognitive Dissonance Analysis

The purpose of this phase of the experiment was to investigate the relationship between anxiety and defense and differential feedback of success and failure upon the occurrence of dissonance. The plan for this experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial arrangement of treatments with repeated measures on the last factor. Factor A reflects anxiety-defense as measured by the MAD scale. Factor B represents

experimental conditions, i.e., success or failure on an intelligence test. Factor C represents a trials component on the dissonance measure, i.e., feelings concerning intelligence tests before and after differential feedback.

TABLE I
MEANS (M) AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS (SD)
FOR BEFORE FEEDBACK AND AFTER FEEDBACK DISSONANCE SCORES
(LOWER SCORES REPRESENT GREATER AMOUNTS
OF EXPERIENCED DISSONANCE)

GROUPS	SUCCESS		FAILURE	
	Before Feedback	After Feedback	Before Feedback	After Feedback
LA-HAVD <u>Ss</u>				
M	157.47	165.67	160.20	154.60
SD	17.66	14.05	15.21	16.66
HA-LAVD <u>Ss</u>				
M	134.13	150.27	139.00	139.00
SD	27.64	25.77	19.91	17.74

The mean dissonance scores before and after feedback are presented in Table I. Examination of the mean Before Feedback dissonance scores suggest that there is a pre-existing difference within each personality group. Because the experimental conditions had not yet been employed, the apparent mean differences within groups is contrary to expectations. If these differences had proved to be significant, any differences between these groups found later on could not be unambiguously interpreted. In order to determine whether these differences were significant, t-tests

were performed on each set of data. The analysis revealed that the differential responses made by the two LA-HAVD groups ($t = 0.45$, $df = 28$, $p > .50$) and the two HA-LAVD groups ($t = 0.55$, $df = 28$, $p > .50$) were not significantly different from each other. On the basis of this analysis it was concluded that the differences in mean dissonance scores within groups were chance differences and that the threat of a possible confounded design had been alleviated. Therefore, the planned analysis was performed.

TABLE II
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF DISSONANCE SCORES
BEFORE AND AFTER DIFFERENTIAL FEEDBACK

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	
<u>BETWEEN Ss</u>	<u>59</u>			
A (GROUPS)	1	10,697.41	16.71	$p < .001$
B (CONDITIONS)	1	407.01	.63	
AB	1	7.01	.01	
<u>Ss w. GPS.</u>	56	640.12		
<u>WITHIN Ss</u>	<u>60</u>			
C (FEEDBACK)	1	658.00	4.41	$p < .05$
AC	1	343.42	2.30	
BC	1	1,680.02	11.26	$p < .005$
ABC	1	10.19	.06	
C x <u>Ss w. GPS.</u>	56	149.16		

The results of a Repeated Measures analysis of variance (Winer, 1962, pp. 337-348) of dissonance scores before and after differential feedback are presented in Table II.

In order to support the hypothesis made prior to the experiment it was necessary to find statistical significance for the Groups x Condition x Feedback interaction (factor ABC). Examination of Table II indicates that the three factor interaction is not statistically significant ($F < 1$). However, since a priori information about the underlying sources of variation in the experimental variables suggest that certain of the trends should be more dominant than others, further examination of the data was appropriate. Comparisons were made between the mean dissonance scores before and after feedback for each of the experimental groups. As a low score suggests greater dissonance, a negative difference score represents a decrease in dissonance.

Although the predicted Groups x Condition x Feedback interaction was not significant, three of the experimental groups changed in the predicted direction. It had been predicted that the LA-HAVD-success and HA-LAVD-failure groups would not experience an increase in dissonance as a result of receiving feedback. These two groups had mean dissonance changes of -8.20 and 0 respectively. It is apparent that confronting LA-HAVD Ss with success resulted in a significant reduction in dissonance ($t = 2.82$, $df = 14$, $p < .02$). Furthermore, as was expected, confronting the HA-LAVD Ss with failure did not produce an increase in experienced dissonance, in fact, they showed no change.

The prediction for the LA-HAVD-failure and HA-LAVD-success groups was that both groups would show an increase in dissonance. Confronting the LA-HAVD group with failure produced a mean increase in dissonance of 5.60 ($t = 2.00$, $df = 14$, $p < .07$). However, contrary to expectations confronting HA-LAVD ss with success produced a mean decrease in dissonance of -16.13 ($t = 2.59$, $df = 14$, $p < .05$).

Further examination of Table II shows that the main effect due to groups (factor A) was statistically significant ($F(1, 56) = 16.71$, $p < .005$). This result indicates that LA-HAVD ss experience considerably less distress and disturbance ($M = 159.48$, $SD = 16.08$) than do HA-LAVD ss ($M = 140.60$, $SD = 23.31$) on a task reflecting intellectual competence. The main effect of Feedback (factor C) was also statistically significant ($F(1, 56) = 4.41$, $p < .05$). This result indicates that the mean amount of dissonance experienced Before Feedback ($M = 147.70$, $SD = 23.11$) was significantly greater than the mean amount of dissonance experienced After Feedback ($M = 152.38$, $SD = 20.92$). However, as the Conditions x Feedback (BC) interaction effect proved to be statistically significant ($F(1, 56) = 11.26$, $p < .005$), the main effect of Feedback should not be interpreted independently of the failure and success conditions.

Tests of simple effects of the BC interaction were then performed. The results of these comparisons indicated that prior to receiving feedback concerning performance on a

difficult intelligence test, Ss experienced considerable distress and disturbance. Furthermore, it was found that Ss who were told that their performance was above average exhibited a marked reduction in dissonance ($F = 14.89, p < .01$), whereas telling Ss that their performance was far below average did not produce a decrease in experienced dissonance ($F < 1$). Therefore, Ss under the failure condition would be expected to manifest more dissonance reducing behaviors than Ss under the success condition. The last questionnaire (see Appendix D) was designed to provide numerous ways to eliminate or reduce dissonance related to the experimental situation.

TABLE III
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
OF THE RESOLUTION OF DISSONANCE SCORES
TO DIFFERENTIAL FEEDBACK

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	
A (GROUPS)	1	735.00	3.44	$p < .07$
B (CONDITIONS)	1	493.06	2.31	
AB	1	.27	.00	
WITHIN	56	213.48		

An analysis of variance performed on the dissonance reduction scores (see Table III) shows that the HA-LAVD Ss and LA-HAVD Ss differed in the amount of dissonance reducing behaviors manifested ($F(1, 56) = 3.44, p < .07$). The results

in Table III suggest that HA-LAVD Ss and LA-HAVD Ss differ in their customary mode and ability (efficacy) of resolving inconsistent cognitions. In order to better understand these differences, a number of further analyses were carried out. The twenty-three items comprising the measure of dissonance reduction were subdivided into categories on the basis of their content and separate analyses were performed on each. The content analysis resulted in five categories. The following is a list of the categories with an example of each:

1. Irrational Aggression (5 items).
Ex. The examiner has a well adjusted personality.
2. Examiner Blame (6 items). Ex. The examiner was to blame for some of the errors I made.
3. Self-Confidence (4 items). Ex. I did not do as well as the other students in the group.
4. Test Criticism (5 items). Ex. This intelligence test did not seem to be getting at what I think intelligence is all about.
5. Rationalization (3 items). Ex. I did not feel physically "up to par" during the testing.

The results of the individual analysis of variances for each of the categories are summarized in Table IV. These analyses indicate that LA-HAVD Ss and HA-LAVD Ss differ in their response to items reflecting low Self-Confidence and Rationalization. These findings suggest that HA-LAVD Ss react to personal threat conditions by rationalizing and

TABLE IV

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF IRRATIONAL AGGRESSION, EXAMINER BLAME,
 SELF-CONFIDENCE, TEST CRITICISM AND RATIONALIZATION SCORES

Source of Variation	#1		#2		#3		#4		#5							
	df	Irrational Aggression	MS	F	Examiner Blame	MS	F	Self Confidence	MS	F	Test Criticism	MS	F	Rationali- zation	MS	F
A (GROUPS)	1	1.07	.03	12.15	.66	60.00	3.82**	62.02	2.32	64.07	3.89**					
B (CONDITIONS)	1	5.40	.17	46.82	2.56	46.80	3.10	212.82	7.95*	35.27	2.14					
AB	1	13.07	.41	.02	.00	13.07	.83	.02	.00	.27	.02					
WITHIN	56	31.88		18.29		15.70		26.75		16.45						

* $p < .01$ ** $p < .07$

distorting their failure, whereas LA-HAVD Ss are more successful in avoiding threatening aspects of the experimental situation.

Further examination of Table IV reveals that categories 1 (Irrational Aggression) and 2 (Examiner Blame) resulted in minimal differences between groups or between treatments ($F < 1$). It was suspected that perhaps an inhibition effect had been present. The items in categories 1 and 2 dealt with devaluating or in some way blaming E for their performance. It may be understood that Ss were reluctant to endorse such items, for at the time E was employed as a teaching assistant for the Introductory Psychology course, the source of the S pool. On this basis, it seemed justifiable to eliminate items from the first two categories and perform an analysis of variance of the 11 remaining items. Table V summarizes the results of an analysis of variance of dissonance reduction scores exclusive of items relating directly to E.

TABLE V
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
OF DISSONANCE REDUCTION SCORES
EXCLUSIVE OF ITEMS RELATING TO E

<u>Source of Variation</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	
A (GROUPS)	1	558.15	5.36	$p < .025$
B (CONDITIONS)	1	756.15	7.26	$p < .001$
AB	1	18.15	.17	
WITHIN	56	104.22		

Table V shows a significant main effect due to groups ($F(1, 56) = 5.36, p < .025$). This indicates that the LA-HAVD Ss and HA-LAVD Ss differ in their mean dissonance reduction scores. HA-LAVD Ss exhibited significantly more dissonance reduction ($M = 50.47, SD = 10.89$) than LA-HAVD Ss ($M = 42.27, SD = 10.30$). Thus the hypothesis that HA-LAVD Ss and LA-HAVD Ss differ in their dissonance reducing behaviors was supported.

Table V also shows that the main effect due to feedback was significant ($F(1, 56) = 7.26, p < .001$). Examination of the means reveals that Ss in the failure condition ($M = 46.87$) scored significantly higher than Ss in the success condition ($M = 39.77$). This finding suggests that the final questionnaire was a suitable tool for the reduction of dissonance experienced by Ss in the failure condition.

DISCUSSION

An intelligence test purposely designed to be ambiguous and frustrating was administered to two groups of Ss. Each group consisted of 30 LA-HAVD Ss and 30 HA-LAVD Ss as defined by the Manifest Anxiety-Defensiveness scale (Millimet, 1970). After taking the intelligence test, but prior to being informed of its result, a measure of dissonance was administered to the Ss. Dissonance was defined by the strength and frequency of endorsement of a series of adjectives differing in positive and negative affect. Thereafter, one group of Ss received information indicating that their performance was far below what would be expected for individuals of their age and education (failure condition). The remaining group of Ss received information indicating that their performance far exceeded what would be expected for individuals of their age and education (success condition).

The result of an initial assessment procedure had indicated that LA-HAVD Ss and HA-LAVD Ss differ in perceived self-ideal self discrepancy as indicated by the Leary (1957) Interpersonal Adjective Checklist. It was found, in accord with the prediction, that HA-LAVD Ss respond with high self-ideal discrepancies (low self-esteem) and LA-HAVD Ss respond with low self-ideal discrepancies (high self-esteem).

Because LA-HAVD Ss possess high self-esteem and HA-LAVD Ss possess low self-esteem, it was predicted that LA-HAVD Ss would experience dissonance under the failure

condition and that the HA-LAVD Ss would experience dissonance under the success condition. Using a similar line of reasoning, it was predicted that LA-HAVD Ss and HA-LAVD Ss would not experience dissonance under the success and failure conditions, respectively. As predicted, LA-HAVD Ss in the failure condition experienced an increase in dissonance, LA-HAVD Ss in the success condition experienced a decrease in dissonance, while HA-LAVD Ss in the failure condition did not experience an increase or decrease in dissonance. However, contrary to the prediction, HA-LAVD Ss in the success condition did not experience dissonance. In fact, this group of HA-LAVD Ss exhibited behaviors which reflected a marked reduction in dissonance, i.e., they endorsed adjectives which reflected relief and satisfaction. Thus the predictions relating the occurrence of dissonance to be a function of the personality dimension of Manifest Anxiety-Defensiveness and the differential feedback of success and failure were only partially supported.

It was shown that HA-LAVD Ss experienced significantly more personal discomfort and distress than was experienced by LA-HAVD Ss during the course of the experiment. This finding is consistent with the results of several studies cited in an earlier section of this paper in that LA-HAVD Ss effectively avoid threatening materials, while HA-LAVD Ss, by virtue of the inability to avoid threatening materials, are forced to experience them. In addition, the results showed that

there were no differences between the success and failure groups on a measure of personal discomfort and distress immediately following the taking of the intelligence test and prior to the experience of the success and failure conditions. However, Ss in the success condition experienced a significant amount of relief and satisfaction, while Ss in the failure condition showed no such increase in relief and satisfaction but continued to endorse adjectives which reflected uneasiness, discouragement and displeasure.

While the results of the main effect of groups (LA-HAVD-HA-LAVD) and conditions (success-failure) are highly provocative, it may be recalled that HA-LAVD Ss in the success condition experienced a significant reduction in personal discomfort and distress, while LA-HAVD Ss in the failure condition experienced a significant increase in personal discomfort and distress. These findings suggest that LA-HAVD Ss are not always free from personal discomfort and HA-LAVD Ss are not always destined to experience this disturbing state, i.e., situational contingencies seem to play an important role in mediating between the behavioral predispositions of Ss high and low in anxiety and defense and the experience of personal discomfort and distress. While LA-HAVD Ss tend to remove themselves from unpleasant circumstances and deny the existence of threatening information, and HA-LAVD Ss tend to approach unpleasant circumstances and uphold the existence of threatening information, these

relationships are not inevitable, but are subject to change when LA-HAVD Ss and HA-LAVD Ss are compelled to experience certain environmental considerations.

Confronting LA-HAVD Ss with information suggesting that they are intellectually competent merely serves to confirm the favorable opinion these individuals already have of themselves. However, when environmental information reflects unfavorably upon them, they are, in turn, thrust into a state of personal discomfort. Confronting HA-LAVD Ss with information suggesting that they are intellectually deficient merely serves to confirm the unfavorable opinion these individuals already have of themselves. On the other hand, when information from the environment reflects favorably upon them, HA-LAVD Ss grasp at this information much like a drowning man grasping for a straw.

It has been shown that Ss in the success and failure groups had experienced an equal amount of dissonance following the taking of the analogies test and prior to the advent of success or failure. The imparting of information indicating that success had been achieved should have provided the necessary cognitive elements for the occurrence of dissonance reduction. Ss in the failure condition, however, had no such opportunity for dissonance reduction. In fact, the imparting of the information indicating that failure had occurred should have led to the increased experience of dissonance. The results, as discussed above, confirmed these predictions.

As dissonance is an unpleasant state, its presence should provide the necessary conditions for the occurrence of dissonance reducing behavior. The final questionnaire used in this study was designed to give Ss the opportunity to reduce any dissonance remaining after the experience of the success and failure conditions. As Ss in the failure condition were experiencing significantly more dissonance than Ss in the success condition, it was expected that the former group of Ss would engage in significantly more dissonance reducing behavior. In this instance, dissonance reducing behavior was defined by the frequency and strength of item endorsement suggesting that the score made on the analogies test was not a function of an intellectual deficiency, but, rather, a product of a variety of situational determinants.

As E was a teaching assistant for many of the discussion sections from which these Ss were drawn and was well known to the remaining Ss, it was decided, after a preliminary analysis, to withdraw consideration for certain items which referred to the general incompetence and ineptitude of E.

The resulting analysis supported the contentions stated above. Ss in the failure condition endorsed significantly more items suggesting that their test performance was a product of test-taking anxiety, lack of self-confidence, and a general inability to perform capably when being timed and observed.

The analysis also showed that HA-LAVD Ss made item endorsements similar to those made by Ss in the failure group. This is not a surprising finding. As HA-LAVD Ss were defined by a high score on the MAD scale, a scale comprised of items reflecting self-disparagement, it was not inconsistent that HA-LAVD Ss should endorse items which reflect test-taking anxiety, lack of self-confidence, and a general inability to perform under stressful conditions.

In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated that many of the criticisms of cognitive dissonance research can be resolved by careful experimental design. The results of this study suggest that precise empirical investigations of dissonance may be developed if certain personality characteristics of Ss are taken into consideration and the conditions in which dissonance is expected to occur are indicated. In using these devices, the present study found only partial support for both the cognitive dissonance model and the ego-psychology model. It would appear that some combination of these models would result in a more accurate prediction of behavior.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

HARVARD QUICK-SCORING ANALOGIES OF INTELLECTUAL
CAPACITY MIDWESTERN EDITION FORM A

This new test has been found to be a highly predictive, quick-scoring method for determining intellectual capacity. It is particularly effective at the college level. Do not underestimate the simplicity and ease in completing this test: The most obvious answer is not necessarily the most correct as content is not always the critical factor. Read each analogy carefully.

1. Animals : Zoology :: Plants : _____
A. Physiology B. Astronomy C. Botany D. Chemistry
2. Red : Ruby :: Green : _____
A. Opal B. Emerald C. Sapphire D. Topaz
3. Hamlet : Shakespeare :: Old Man : _____
A. Spillane B. Faulkner C. Salinger D. Hemingway
4. Achilles : Heel :: Samson : _____
A. Jawbone B. Hair C. Riddle D. Grapes
5. Hammer : Chisel :: Knife : _____
A. Fork B. Dish C. Spoon D. Steak
6. Rabbi : Priest :: Senator : _____
A. President B. Judge C. Vice-President D. Representative
7. Fish : Trout :: Fence : _____
A. Barbwire B. Wooden C. Picket D. Corral
8. Radio : Telephone :: Frame : _____
A. Painter B. Oil C. Photograph D. Picture

9. Sculpture : Art :: Track : _____
A. Team B. Meet C. Animal D. Race
10. Rain : Snow :: Lightning : _____
A. Cyclone B. Hurricane C. Tornado D. Monsoon
11. Psychologist : Archaeologist :: Nurse : _____
A. Lawyer B. Farmer C. Glassblower D. Accountant
12. Spanish : French :: Apple : _____
A. Cherry B. Plum C. Peach D. Apricot
13. Chaucer : Spencer :: Freud : _____
A. Jung B. Adler C. Breuer D. Charcot
14. Retina : Eye :: Teeth : _____
A. Mouth B. Face C. Stomach D. Head
15. Paper : Clip :: Chain : _____
A. Store B. Gang C. Lock D. Saw
16. Burn : Melt :: Destroy : _____
A. Ravage B. Conquer C. Defeat D. Undo
17. Queen : England :: Title : _____
A. Nobility B. Crown C. Monarchy D. Oligarchy
18. Death : Decay :: Birth : _____
A. Life B. Liberty C. Beauty D. Baby
19. Direction : North :: Level : _____
A. Ground B. Head C. Sky D. Load
20. Candle : Illumination :: Atom : _____
A. Proton B. Neutron C. Electron D. Alpha Particle

APPENDIX B

YOUR SCORE IS _____

HARVARD QUICK-SCORING ANALOGIES OF INTELLECTUAL CAPACITY
 MIDWESTERN EDITION
 NORMS

HIGH SCHOOL		COLLEGE
5	LOWER FRESHMAN	13
6	UPPER FRESHMAN	14
7	LOWER SOPHOMORE	15
8	UPPER SOPHOMORE	16
9	LOWER JUNIOR	17
10	UPPER JUNIOR	18
11	LOWER SENIOR	19
12	UPPER SENIOR	20

For your own information you may wish to know what your score means. It has been shown that people who score one or more years above their present college level find college much easier than most students and usually go on to do very well. People who score just about what is expected for their age and year level find about the average number of problems and difficulties in college, while those people who score one or more years below their present college standing usually find college exceedingly difficult and many have problems finishing.

APPENDIX C

DO NOT WRITE ON THIS PAPER

Record your answers on the IBM answer sheet 1 to 50.

Inventory of Feelings

Intelligence testing produces various feelings in those being tested. This questionnaire does not have any right or wrong answers; you are asked only to report your own feelings as accurately as possible. Place a check mark after each adjective so as to describe how you feel at the present time.

Below is a list of 50 adjectives. Rate each adjective according to the following scale:

BLACKEN IN SPACE NO.

1 for EXTREMELY

2 for MODERATELY

3 for SLIGHTLY

4 for NOT AT ALL

5 for CANNOT SAY

Put your name on the answer sheet. Consider each adjective carefully. When you have decided on an answer based on the above scale of 1 to 5, blacken the corresponding space on the answer sheet with a No. 2 pencil. Remember, rate all 50 adjectives so as to describe how you feel at the present time.

Right now I feel:

- | | | |
|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Tense | 11. Calm | 21. Gloomy |
| 2. Irked | 12. Content | 22. Self-Satisfied |
| 3. Happy | 13. Fearful | 23. Worried |
| 4. Annoyed | 14. Inadequate | 24. Hostile |
| 5. Relaxed | 15. Intellectual | 25. Aggressive |
| 6. Depressed | 16. Cheerful | 26. Suspicious . . |
| 7. Angry | 17. Pessimistic | 27. Self-Conscious |
| 8. Uneasy | 18. Nervous | 28. Embarrassed |
| 9. Confident | 19. Wise | 29. Ashamed |
| 10. Satisfied | 20. Anxious | 30. Passive |

- | | | | |
|-----|--------------|-----|-----------|
| 31. | Foolish | 41. | Bothered |
| 32. | Pleasant | 42. | Resentful |
| 33. | Sarcastic | 43. | Bitter |
| 34. | Irritated | 44. | Furious |
| 35. | Tranquil | 45. | Mad |
| 36. | Disgusted | 46. | Worked Up |
| 37. | Up Tight | 47. | Edgy |
| 38. | Frustrated | 48. | Sad |
| 39. | Apprehensive | 49. | Squeamish |
| 40. | Upset | 50. | Flustered |

APPENDIX D

This booklet is part of a survey-type research program. Its purpose is to find out more about the factors involved in a testing situation similar to the one you have just participated in. You are asked to go through this booklet and complete each questionnaire as honestly as possible.

Each questionnaire has its own set of instructions. Read each set of instructions carefully before completing each questionnaire. Note that on one questionnaire you are to use the IBM answer sheet. There should be no need to ask questions and no questions will be answered. Turn to the next page, read the instructions and complete the questionnaires as indicated.

DO NOT WRITE ON THIS PAPER

Record your answers on the IBM answer sheet 1 to 50.

Inventory of Feelings

Intelligence testing produces various feelings in those being tested. This questionnaire does not have any right or wrong answers; you are asked only to report your own feelings as accurately as possible. Place a check mark after each adjective so as to describe how you feel at the present time.

Below is a list of 50 adjectives. Rate each adjective according to the following scale:

BLACKEN IN SPACE NO.

1 for EXTREMELY

2 for MODERATELY

3 for SLIGHTLY

4 for NOT AT ALL

5 for CANNOT SAY

Put your name on the answer sheet. Consider each adjective carefully. When you have decided on an answer based on the above scale of 1 to 5, blacken the corresponding space on the answer sheet with a No. 2 pencil. Remember, rate all 50 adjectives so as to describe how you feel at the present time.

Right now I feel:

- | | | |
|---------------|------------------|--------------------|
| 1. Tense | 11. Calm | 21. Gloomy |
| 2. Irrked | 12. Content | 22. Self-Satisfied |
| 3. Happy | 13. Fearful | 23. Worried |
| 4. Annoyed | 14. Inadequate | 24. Hostile |
| 5. Relaxed | 15. Intellectual | 25. Aggressive |
| 6. Depressed | 16. Cheerful | 26. Suspicious |
| 7. Angry | 17. Pessimistic | 27. Self-Conscious |
| 8. Uneasy | 18. Nervous | 28. Embarrassed |
| 9. Confident | 19. Wise | 29. Ashamed |
| 10. Satisfied | 20. Anxious | 30. Passive |

31. Foolish
32. Pleasant
33. Sarcastic
34. Irritated
35. Tranquil
36. Disgusted
37. Up Tight
38. Frustrated
39. Apprehensive
40. Upset

41. Bothered
42. Resentful
43. Bitter
44. Furious
45. Mad
46. Worked Up
47. Edgy
48. Sad
49. Squeamish
50. Flustered

YOU MAY WRITE ON THIS PAPER

NAME _____

Test of Insight and Social Sensitivity

Frequently we are asked to make judgments about certain aspects of our experiences. This test will show how accurate you are in evaluating various factors involved in the previous intelligence testing. This will give us an indication of the amount of insight you have about your own experiences. Place one check below each statement to describe your opinions.

1. I would have done better with a different examiner.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

2. The time limits were too short.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

3. The examiner is an intelligent person.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

4. I get upset easily while taking tests.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

5. The examiner interrupted too often.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

6. The examiner is competent professionally.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

7. I did not feel physically "up to par" during the testing.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

8. The examiner's personality interfered with my performance.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

9. I could have done better if the test had been given at a different hour.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

10. I did not do as well as the other students in the group.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

11. The examiner was to blame for some of the errors I made.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

12. I cannot do my best on group tests.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

13. I made several unnecessary blunders which I should not have made.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

14. The examiner has good emotional control.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

15. My score on this intelligence test is a good estimate of my intelligence.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

16. The examiner appears to be a dependable person.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

17. I would have done better if the examiner had not been present.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

18. Any errors made on the test were my fault.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

19. The examiner has a well-adjusted personality.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

20. I would have done much differently with a different examiner.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

21. This intelligence test did not seem to be getting at what I think intelligence is all about.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

22. This intelligence test had too few items to get an accurate measure of intellectual ability.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			

23. I must admit that the results of the intelligence test were not very different from what I had believed to be true of myself.

Strongly Agree	_____	Slightly Disagree	_____
Moderately Agree	_____	Moderately Disagree	_____
Slightly Agree	_____	Strongly Disagree	_____
Cannot Say _____			