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Breaking the Criminogenic Code: A Frame Analysis of Neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Propaganda

A Dissertation

Presented to the

School of Criminology & Criminal Justice

and the

Faculty of the Graduate College
University of Nebraska

In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of

Ph.D.

University of Nebraska at Omaha

by

William Travis Morris
July 2011

Dissertation Committee:

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Breaking the Criminogenic Code: A Frame Analysis of Neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Propaganda

Travis Morris, Ph.D.
University of Nebraska, 2011
Advisor: Dr. Pete Simi

Abstract: This dissertation focuses on neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda and its role in defining social boundaries. Frame analysis was used to gain a deeper understanding of how neo-Nazis and violent jihadis construct propaganda to neutralize objections and promote drift. Specifically, diagnostic and prognostic frames were analyzed for 10 “effective” propagandists and two “ineffective” propagandists in a comparative framework. This research uses a social psychological perspective, paying particular attention to the emotion of shame and advances the “violence as communication” model into “terrorism as criminogenic propaganda.” Qualitative and quantitative methods were used to analyze how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists incorporate diagnostic and prognostic frames as techniques of neutralization. Specifically, I analyzed: 1) frame typologies, 2) relationships between frames, 3) location of frames, and 4) frame prevalence. The results provide a better understanding of the link between terrorist propaganda and radicalization and can be used to inform future research and policy decisions.

DEDICATION

To my wife, Carrie, the love of my life.
We walk as one.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Cohen (1955) conceptualizes that when individuals collectively experience social problems, they develop an alternative frame of reference. This frame of reference provides individuals with a subcultural identity. The purpose of this study is to use frame analysis to gain a better understanding of how ideas and emotions are integrated within terrorist propaganda to outline a subcultural identity for a terrorist subculture. By frames, I refer specifically to “diagnostic” and “prognostic” frames that outline problems and solutions in emotionally laden communication defined as propaganda (Snow & Benford, 1988). Diagnostic frames identify grievances and injustices, while prognostic frames outline how a social movement provides a solution to counter and overcome these injustices (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Byrd, 2007). In particular, I focus on two social movements, neo-Nazism and violent jihadism, to answer the following research questions:

1. What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?
2. What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?
3. What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?
 - a. Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda?

Frames organize individual and collective experience (Goffman, 1974); therefore, emotions are central to frames and framing. This study seeks to understand how frames are integrated with emotion in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda. I accomplish this

by operationalizing the presence of emotion in diagnostic and prognostic frames, analyzing the connections between each type of frame, and examining where a propagandist embeds these frames in text. Operationalization is accomplished through the use of an ontology to identify diagnostic and prognostic frames in text. I also analyze the connections between violent frames as solutions to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi problems through the use of network text analysis (NTA).

This study is grounded in a social psychological perspective supported by the “violence as communication” (VAC) analytical model (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982). At the intersection between sociology and political science, “violence as communication” is a model conducive to studying how meaning and interpretation impacts target audiences. VAC provides an analytical starting point from which to answer research questions that address the relationship between emotions, framing, and terrorism.

This chapter outlines the VAC framework and TCP or “terrorism as criminogenic propaganda,” a related concept I have improved to more precisely analyze the emotional dimensions of extremist movement frames.

Defining Terrorism

Terrorism is not a contemporary concept or term. Terrorism has existed in the realm of political violence for thousands of years (Bjorgo, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; Mazarr, 2007). The modern understanding of the term “terrorism” is grounded in French political violence during the 18th century (Hoffman, 2006). Terrorism in France was an effective tactic which led to a complete revolution. Interestingly, the term terrorism, during the French Revolution, was actually seen as a positive form of political violence because it ended an oppressive aristocracy (Laqueur, 2001).

However, the need to define terrorism has increased over the past 50 years. This is due in part to the proliferation of using terrorism as a tactic and the importance placed on legalized operationalization of human behavior (Ranstorp, 2007; Karmon, 2005). Along with an increase of terrorist incidents during the late 20th and early 21st century, have come definitional problems that have made “terrorism” difficult to define (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; 2005; Hoffman, 2006, Gibbs, 1989). Because the term terrorism is so widely used in the national media, it erroneously appears that what constitutes terrorism is clear to the general public (Nacos, 1994; 2003; 2007). However, definitions become more convoluted across cultural or religious contexts and what is apparently clear in one culture can have an opposite interpretation in another (Yonah, 1990; Crenshaw, 1995; Ruthven, 2005; Ganor, 2007). Divergent interpretive paradigms, which are reflected by myriad official definitions, mean that actual terror incidents are not interpreted consistently (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; 2005).

Part of the definitional problem is that target audiences can interpret the same act of terror differently (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982; Roy, 2004). The same incident can be perceived as “heroic,” “cowardly,” or “inhumane.” In this case, the majority or party in power sets the dominant perspective and outlines who and what is terrorism. Commonly summarized as the “terrorist or freedom fighter paradigm,” this philosophical debate is represented in the United Nation’s inability to arrive at an official definition of terrorism because its international membership cannot agree on who is a terrorist and who is a freedom fighter (Hoffman, 2006).

Scholars have also confronted the terrorism definitional challenge. Terrorism is a complex phenomenon that incorporates attributes from politics, religion, and history

(Schmid & Jongman, 2005). Terrorism scholars have generated various definitions only to note the variation between them. Despite differences among terrorism definitions, Laqueur (2001) notes two central threads among all definitions of terrorism: 1) noncombatants are the focus of aggression and/or, 2) violence and the action labeled as terrorism is expected to influence a target audience by advancing the ideological interests of a terrorist or terrorist group. Bruce Hoffman (2006; 25) adds that terrorism is also “conducted either by an organization with an identifiable chain of command or conspiratorial cell structure (whose members wear no uniform or identifying insignia) or by individuals or a small collection of individuals directly influenced, motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist movement and/or its leaders; and perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity.” I define terrorism in this study as:

Terrorism is symbolic violence (or threats of violence) either by word or deed that intends to incite further violence. Individuals, groups or state actors carry out or threaten violence for ideological reasons against targets that serve as message generators to emotionally manipulate target audiences. Terrorists use violence or the threat of violence to produce emotional ‘terror’ or ‘pride’ in their target audience to leverage, intimidate, coerce, inspire or mandate a revolution of ideas into action. Terrorism is method of propaganda that uses violence as its symbolic medium to bring about active or passive alignment in a target audience.

Criminology and terrorism: a review

The study of terrorism now occupies a solid position within criminology and criminal justice (Rice, 2009; LaFree, 2002; 2010; LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2009; Rosenfeld, 2002; 2004; Black, 2004; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005; Hamm, 2004; Smith & Damphousse, 2002; Smith, Damphousse, & Karlson, 2002; Simi, 2010; Simi & Futrell; 2010; Deflem, 2005; Barak, 2004). Prior to 9/11, criminologists who studied terrorism were few in number (Smith & Damphousse, 1998; Smith, 1994, Deflem, 1997;

Turk, 1982; Della Porta, 1995); however, since 9/11, the number of criminologists studying terrorism has increased substantially. Terrorism became a popular subject of inquiry for criminologists because it was suddenly perceived as a pressing social problem, a promising field of inquiry, and backed by millions of dollars in federal funding.¹

Since terrorism is relatively new to criminology, how criminologists approach and study the topic is still evolving. Criminology tends to emphasize either structural or individual levels while neglecting group processes that involve social psychological variables (Katz, 1988, LaFree, 2010; LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2009; Black, 2004; Dugan, LaFree, & Piquero, 2005).² The social psychological perspective as an area of criminological inquiry for terrorism compliments structural and individual approaches (Arena & Arrigo, 2000; Rice, 2009).

Stephen Rice (2009) Addressing the limitations of ignoring a social psychological approach to terrorism within criminology, Rice (2009) suggests that existing criminological scholarship on emotions and generic violence is a good starting point for applying a social psychological lens to terrorism. He postulates that the results would be similar to how emotions and generic crime have advanced new criminological methods, different data sources, and new theories. Seminal scholarship includes Katz's (1997;

¹ Criminologists have emerged as pace setters in the study of terrorism. Criminologists now direct some of the nation's leading research terrorism institutes. Criminologist and criminal justice scholars are now engaged in applying their criminological perspective to terrorism (Black, 2004; Rice, 2009; LaFree, 2002; Rosenfeld, 2002; Barak, 2005) Gary LaFree's National Consortium for Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and Dick Ward's Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) have emerged as the most comprehensive collection of data on terrorism incidents and terrorist groups. Criminologists have also partnered with scholars outside of criminology resulting in a surge of scholarship that adds a much needed criminological perspective. Further examples include a steady increase of research, discussion groups, and panels devoted to terrorism at the American Society of Criminology and the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences' annual meetings since 2001.

² Prevailing models tend to emphasize either the rational actor model of individual choices, while minimizing or dismissing emotions as irrational or irrelevant, or structural approaches which deemphasize the importance of human actors. Although there are exceptions for example (Short and Strodtbeck 1965).

1999) research on violence, Sherman's (1993) study on defiance, Kahan's (1998) work on disgust, Tyler's (1990) study on deference, Hale's (1996) study on fear, and Braithwaite's (1989) examination of shaming.

Despite Rice's (2009) rationale for expanding the role of emotions within criminology and terrorism, specifics of research design, operationalization, and analysis remain vague. Since neither terrorism nor emotions have a long scientific tradition within criminology, it seems logical to borrow analytical frameworks from other disciplines with existing theoretical and methodological grounding.

Violence as communication (VAC) focuses on terroristic violence as a kind of violent language (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982).³ VAC holds significant potential for expanding a social psychological framework of analysis in criminology because it emphasizes the role of propaganda, symbolic interpretation, and constructed meaning for a target audience. However, the VAC model was developed three decades ago and is in need of modification and specificity for four reasons: 1) VAC was developed before Snow and Benford's (1988) work on diagnostic/prognostic frames; 2) news media has changed drastically; 3) VAC did not address emotions; and 4) VAC doesn't attend to social processes that are generated, disseminated, and sustained through individuals and groups. This study advances and updates the "violence as communication" perspective by drawing directly from a criminological perspective.

The analytical framework of violence as communication

Violence as communication (VAC) emphasizes two primary areas: First, a violent incident is a communicative process that involves a message, a messenger, a frame for


³ Developed by Alex Schmidt, a historian and leading terrorism scholar, with Janny de Graaf, a sociologist who worked for the Center for the Study of Social Conflict during the 1980's.

the message, and an interpretation of that message. In the case of VAC, the violent incident itself is the message, the media is the messenger, and the target/communiq  creates a frame that is symbolically interpreted by a target audience. Second, a violent incident itself generates a message to three separate target audiences. Each target audience is equally important, but the objective varies. Ideological supporters are sympathetic to the terrorist’s message and interpret the incident as heroic or just. A neutral audience is defined as the target audience observing the incident in order to form an opinion. A neutral audience is engaged in an interpretative process of trying to determine which parties are “terrorists” and which are “freedom fighters.” The third audience is the target or victims of terror. The victim/target is defined as the audience under assault by the terrorists. Terrorists select their targets/victims because killing, assassinating, wounding, or threatening their victims communicates a message that is connected to their ideology. Terrorist victims are either the source of terrorists’ grievances, symbolically related to the source of their grievance, or provide a mechanism for gaining the attention of the source of their grievance.

Schmid and DeGraff provide further detail on VAC as an analytical model (see figure 1):

“Instead of treating acts of terrorism as ‘senseless violence’, we see them as a kind of violent language. Terrorism does not murder to kill somebody, but to obtain a certain effect upon others than the victim. Terrorism, by using violence against one victim, seeks to persuade others. The immediate victim is merely instrumental, the skin on a drum beaten to achieve a calculated impact on a wider audience. As such, an act of terrorism is in reality an act of communication. For the terrorist the message matters, not the victim.” (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982: 1,14)

Figure 1 The Violence as Communication Concept



What separates VAC from other perspectives is its emphasis on how audiences are impacted differently by communicative interpretation. Interpretation of meaning and symbols is an essential component of VAC as a frame of analysis. Interpretation brings meaning to each event, symbol, action, self and “other” (Charon, 1998; Moghaddam, 2006). VAC emphasizes that acts of terror are “message generators” that communicate meaning in symbols to three separate target audiences. VAC emphasizes deep understanding of how meaning and symbols are interpreted via media outlets (Schmid & de Graaf, 1982).

VAC and Frames

Framing is an ideal starting point for *how* to analyze VAC. *Framing* is defined as “a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner. Frames operate in four key ways: they define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies” (Kuypers, 2009: 8). How an event,

grievance, or a violent incident is framed is significant because frames are the means by which to communicate the terrorist's ideology.

Social movements "package" ideas for a specific interpretation in order to shape attitudes and solidify social ties (Gamson et al 1982; Snow et al 1986; Benford & Snow, 2000; Polletta & Ho, 2006; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow, 2004; Tarrow, 1998).

Interpretation aligns with Snow and Benford's (1988:198) notion of describing the "production of meaning." Snow and Benford (2005:3-4) describe this process as one "to specify the interactive process by which frames are socially constructed, sustained, contested and altered, the phenomenological and infrastructural constraints on those processes, and the consequences of these processes for aspects of mobilization."

Effective framing of data from economics, religion, and politics is used to catalyze a small group into a movement (Snow & Byrd, 2007).

Snow and Benford's (1988) core framing tasks are significant contributions to VAC because they provide a model of how to analyze construction of ideas. Snow and Benford's core framing tasks accomplish distinct objectives. First, a framework is selected to specify the problems or "the injustices" that need to be eliminated and those who are responsible (Snow & Benford, 1988). Snow and Byrd (2007) later identified this "problem" as diagnostic framing. Second, in prognostic framing, solutions are presented to counter injustices, provide strategies, and foster a sense of justice in resolving the problems (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Byrd, 2007). Diagnostic and prognostic frames places priority on the production of meaning that is going on inside people's heads (intellect) *and* their hearts (emotions). Third, motivational framing offers a

concrete rationale for collective action which is required for a target audience to overcome fear and mobilize (Snow & Byrd, 2007; Snow & Benford, 1988).

Refining Violence as Communication: Including Emotions and Propaganda

Greater attention to emotions in diagnostic and prognostic frames is needed in Schmid and de Graaf's model of analysis. Including emotions expands Schmidt's and de Graaf's original VAC model because the study of emotions crosses numerous academic disciplines. Since emotions involve a biological, psychological, cognitive, and interpretive processes, the scope of the TCP should include: 1) biological neurological/endocrinal studies; 2) Social construction, symbolic interaction, cultural construction, and framing studies; 3) Linguistic studies, specifically meaning (semantics and pragmatics) and psycholinguistics (the representation and functioning of language in the mind); 4) Physiological studies that examine the encoding of emotions expressed through voice, facial, and body realignment; 5) Cognition studies, the role of preconceived judgments/interpretations to the biological process. Including emotions into VAC provides a next step toward advancing a social psychological agenda for terrorism in criminology. Focusing on emotions in VAC also aligns with the renaissance of emotions in sociology and an emerging focus in criminology (Goodwin, Jasper & Poletta, 2001; Sherman, 2002).

In particular, recent scholarship in sociology suggests that emotions are "the glue" that connects humans to each other, to ideology, and the world around them (Goodwin, Jasper & Poletta, 2001). Emotions provide powerful biological, social, and psychological motivation to maintain social ties, form attitudes, and act as catalysts or accelerants to violence. An increasing number of criminologists have suggested that both criminality

and justice should be examined from an emotional perspective (Sherman, 2002; LaFree, 2006; Bouffard, 2002; Jang & Johnson, 2003; Carmichael & Picquero, 2004; Barblet, 2002; DeHaan & Loader, 2002; Gray & Farrall, 2002; Karstedt, 2006; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002; Rice, 2009). Emotions are either visible or suppressed in all social action, including violence and criminal associations (Katz, 1988; Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2001; Collins, 1990; Jasper, 1998; Gilligan, 1996).


Including emotions as part of social interaction offers an integrated approach to social behavior (Karstedt, 2006; 2001; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002; LaFree, 2006; Rice, 2009). Terrorism ignites emotional responses that are interpreted differently by supporters, victims and neutral audiences. Terrorism is a tactic that uses violence for an ideological advantage achieved in part through effective framing of emotion laden communication. From a terrorist's perspective, violence is a mechanism to promote a message that is solidified by an emotional interpretation. Whether a target population perceives political violence as fear or pride, terrorism as a tactic and method of communication generates strong emotional responses.

Political, religious, geographic, or ideological variables have meaning because of how they are interpreted ideologically and politically (Blumer, 1969). Moreover, these variables are powerful because the way in which they are emotionally interpreted can "fuel" violent behavior. In other words, violence or any other behavior is not purely economic, political, geographic, or ideological without an accompanying interpretative process (Blumer, 1969; Karstedt, 2006; 2001; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002; Sherman, 2002; Rice, 2009).

Terrorism as Criminogenic Propaganda

I introduce “terrorism as criminogenic propaganda” (TCP) as a concept to advance a social psychological perspective in criminology and to refine VAC, which currently ignores emotionally messaging embedded with criminal intent.

Figure 2: Terrorism as Criminogenic Propaganda



TCP as a model of analysis examines the relationship between how emotions and ideas are framed by individuals, groups, and states (see figure 2). The purpose of TCP as an analytic model is to understand how ideas and emotions are integrated by subcultures to incite political/religious violence. TCP is distinguished from general propaganda and other forms of communication because primary attention is given to criminogenic intent.

Criminogenic intent is defined as producing, promoting, inciting, or increasing the likelihood of criminal behavior. “Criminogenic” distinguishes the intent of terrorism propaganda from other forms of propaganda such as marketing campaigns.⁴ The goal of

⁴ There are problems with simply using the term “propaganda” instead of “criminogenic propaganda” because not all propaganda intends to incite violence or criminality. If propaganda ensures that emotion dominates public discussion, how is this different from a powerful marketing campaign or impassioned

terrorist propaganda is to incite further violence and to catalyze audiences into fear or criminal activity. Criminogenic intent is communicated via diagnostic and prognostic frames to produce either active or passive support in a sympathetic or neutral audience.

Criminogenic propaganda intends to incite intense emotional responses, in order to persuade neutral or supportive audiences to engage in criminal behavior. By leveraging the target audiences' attitudes via emotional frames, beliefs and assumptions may be open to persuasion (Jasper, 1998). Active or passive support can result in increased membership and finances, and/or an ideological realignment of the population. Effective frames intend to "infect" its audience into action (Hatfield, Caciooppo & Rapson, 1994). When an emotional frame works, it produces what Sigal Barsades defines as emotional contagion, "a process in which a person or group influences the emotions or behavior of another person through the conscious or unconscious induction of emotion states and behavioral attitudes" (Schoenewolf, 1990: 50).

Diagnostic and prognostic frames use political, religious, criminal, historical, or cultural information to communicate a single interpretation of how the social world should be emotionally interpreted. Facts, current or historical events, culture and religion are communicated to a target audience so that they maintain the terrorists' interpretation of the world (Taylor, 2003). Meaning is emotionally framed for a target audience so that it dominates how they should feel about certain situations.

"Propaganda" over "Communication" adds specificity to VAC

political rhetoric associated with the democratic process? According to these definitions, it would be easy to describe political campaign "smear" advertisements both by Democrats and Republicans as propaganda. "Dirty" political advertisements do not intend to educate, but to generate and direct an emotional response against an opposing candidate. Under current definitions of propaganda, these emotional political advertisements are propaganda intended to incite highly emotional reactions.

I argue that another important way to refine VAC is by using the term “propaganda” instead of “communication.” Propaganda is defined as a set of communicative methods used to generate and direct emotional responses (Ellul, 1973; Steuter & Willis, 2008). What makes propaganda distinct from other communicative methods is that it intends to incite the emotions of a target audience (Bernays, 1928). Emotional incitement is necessary to reach a point where a message dominates public discussion because attitudes/beliefs have been challenged or changed (Ellul, 1973; Steuter & Willis, 2008). Propaganda is used as a communication method when dissemination is secondary to inciting emotions. Instead of passing along information, the focus of propaganda is to accelerate and direct the emotions of a target audience. Therefore, the term “communication” does not adequately describe the type of communication that is occurring from a terrorism incident to a target audience.

The term “communication” implies that a messenger and receiver are involved in dialogue, when, in fact, dialogue is contrary to what occurs in propaganda. Terrorist propaganda is unidirectional—the terrorist to the target audience. Terroristic incidents are intended to be unidirectional emotional forms of communication that grab the attention of ideological supporters, the neutral audience, and the target/victim. The violent incident is choreographed in such a way to incite emotions in all three audiences in order to benefit the terrorists’ ideology.

Using the term “propaganda” instead of “communication” emphasizes the role of emotions in frames to intentionally motivate attitude formation and incite action. In propaganda, because emotions are integral for motivation, prognostic and diagnostic frames *become* the motivational frames.

While VAC emphasizes communication by the incident, it neglects terrorism communication that occurs in text (word).⁵ The propaganda that precedes and follows terrorist action, along with the terrorist incident itself, and propaganda after, provides the interpretative meaning to all three target audiences. Incidents of terror occur because there is a strong connection between the terrorist ideology and how they select targets, justify their actions, describe their grievances, and explain their behavior. Propaganda by the deed is not possible without some ideological precursor or post-communication found in “propaganda by the word.” An ideological connection is what distinguishes violence associated with terrorism from generic violence. VAC’s neglect of propaganda excludes a significant ideological part of the process. Examples of text-based propaganda are pamphlets, manifestos, speeches, music lyrics, film transcripts, blogs, communiqués, or books.

Including propaganda in text is a significant modification to VAC because propaganda outlines the ideology of a terrorist group both to members and potential converts. Propaganda is also nested in a larger political, historical, or religious element. Including “propaganda by the word” to VAC acknowledges the symbiotic relationship that exists between a terrorism incident and the ideological precursors that distinguish terror from generic violence.

⁵ The popular phrase in terrorism studies, “propaganda by the deed” is defined as the use of an emotional message conveyed by actions over words. Propaganda by the deed is similar to how Johann Most defines the relationship between a violent action acting as propaganda. Most, a 19th century German anarchist, affirmed ‘action as propaganda’ and stated, “What is important is not solely these actions themselves but also the propagandistic effect they are able to achieve. Hence, we preach not only action in and for itself, but also action as propaganda” (Laqueur & Alexander, 1987: 105). It is the violent incident that conveys an emotional message via target selection, the type of weaponry, the number of deaths/injured, or how the aftermath of the violent incident is conveyed via the media. What is interesting about ‘propaganda by the deed’ is that it has not been applied to all forms of terrorism. Propaganda by the deed is still used to describe anarchist terrorism of the early 20th century, despite its application to all forms of terrorism incidents.

“Terrorism” over “Violence” adds specificity to VAC

Using the term “terrorism” instead of “violence” in TCP increases the specificity needed for criminological analysis. Terrorism is a specific form of violence tied to an ideology, intended to incite collective and individual emotions to mobilize. Ideology is manifested in frames by word or deed and distinguishes terrorism as a symbolic form of violence with political or religious motives (LaFree & Dugan, 2004). Terrorism deviates from generic violence because the symbolic nature of terroristic violence is normally communicated by written and verbal communiqués, manuscripts, speeches, books, cyber forms of communication, or published treatises. A death from generic violent crime or terrorism may have the same result, but the meaning of the death is what separates the two. A death by terrorists communicates a message to powerbrokers, victims, ideological supporters, and a neutral audience. Terroristic violence is meant to signal that the existing political or religious structure must change.

A Path Forward

I suggest that identifying, examining, and analyzing how ideas, emotions and diagnostic/ prognostic frames are integrated in text is a tangible way to utilize TCP. Frames are significant because they provide a way to examine the symbolic interaction between emotions and ideas in terrorist propaganda. This study is significant because it defines *how to* expand TCP in two ways: operationalization and analysis. An ontology is used to operationalize diagnostic and prognostic frames in propaganda.

The Ontology: The Key to Operationalizing Emotions in Frames

Operationalizing emotions is critical to determining prognostic and diagnostic frames. An ontology is used to operationalize frames where meanings are rich with

imagery and paradigms reflect individual and collective culture (Carley, 1994). An ontology, defined as a coding scheme or textual boundary, operationalizes affect in order to detect it in text.⁶ The use of ontologies is a common practice in linguistics, natural language processing and sentiment analysis (Liu, Lieberman & Selker, 2003). An ontology is used because it is flexible and accounts for word context and the culture in which they exist. Using an ontology places emphasis on semantic boundaries over the use of relying solely on emotional synonyms. An ontology also places significance on context, culture, semantic and history of the text (Carley, 1994).

In this study, I operationalize diagnostic and prognostic frames by building on Katz's (2002) "naturalistic social ontology." Katz's social ontology stresses that researchers should describe phenomena as it is experienced by people in their everyday lives and how social behavior is: 1) created through symbolic interaction; 2) operationalized as a communicative action; and 3) shaped by corporeal processes visible to the researcher but often beyond the actor's direct awareness (Katz, 2002).

Network Text Analysis (NTA): Analyzing Emotional Frames in Criminogenic Propaganda

Network text analysis (NTA) provides a method for researchers to quantitatively analyze diagnostic and prognostic frames in TCP. A particular strength of NTA is that extracted networks can be collected in a theoretical fashion (Diesner & Carley, 2005).

The theoretical and philosophical assumptions behind NTA are: 1) that a relationship

⁶ Using an ontology as a method to examine emotion is grounded in the philosophy of phenomenology. Phenomenology asserts that researchers should examine knowledge from different points of view, which include that of the propagandist (Macann, 2007; Heidegger, 2000). Phenomenology coupled with symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969; Douglas, 1970; Strauss & Corbin 1990) seeks to uncover meaning behind action and how reality is constructed through the ongoing process of social interaction. The use of an ontology in this research is used to uncover the emotional meaning of text and how emotion is constructed in a ongoing process between the propagandist and the reader.

exists between frames and language; 2) a relationship exists between words and their intended meaning; and 3) social knowledge or shared meaning exists between cultures and context (Diesner & Carley, 2004; 2005). Carley and Palmquist (1992) assert that people's language represents an individual's frame of reference and these concepts can be represented as networks. Researchers use NTA to construct a network of linked words and concepts by identifying the relationships that exists between the words in text (Carley, 2006; Carley & Palmquist, 1992; Popping, 2000).

NTA involves using an ontology to code data that combines ethnographic knowledge with computer assisted quantitative methods associated with network analysis (Carley, 1994). This is done by combining NTA, which uses algorithms derived from graph algebra, with ontological coding (Bonacich, 1972). NTA is a departure from mainstream quantitative approaches and returns to an ecological perspective where social facts are embedded within the contexts of time, space and culture (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Simmel, 1955; Abbott, 1992). Thus the process of using NTA in this study relies on the depth of analysis typically associated with qualitative approaches, while simultaneously benefitting from the precision and inferential strength of quantitative techniques (Carley, 1993; Ragin, 2000).

Neo-Nazism and Violent Jihadism: A Current Social Movement of Ideas

Though there are numerous terrorist ideologies that could be used to examine diagnostic and prognostic frames, I focus on neo-Nazis and violent jihadis for primarily two reasons. First, both ideologies represent significant social problems that are currently impacting the economy and foreign/domestic policy. Both are global subcultural phenomena, although neo-Nazis are more diffusely organized on a sub national level,

while violent jihadis are currently organized in a worldwide network (Simi, 2010; LaFree, Morris, & Dugan, 2010; Sageman, 2004; 2008). Neo-Nazism and violent jihadism are “ideological umbrellas” for numerous subcultural groups and their ideas act as a franchise of violence bent on overturning democracy. Neither ideology has a central single organizational repository but rather any individual or group inspired by neo-Nazism or violent jihadism can stake a claim to the ideology and promote the cause through either words and/or deeds.⁷

Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis are able to bypass traditional media outlets due to the rise of digital communication that includes the World Wide Web (Schafer, 2002; Burris, Smith & Strahm, 2000; Crelinsten, 2005; Gerstenfeld, Grant, & Chiang; Hoffman, 2006b). This allows them to disseminate their propaganda to target audiences in a way that is historically unprecedented. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists intend to craft frames with enough “charge” to gain supporters and mobilize their base. Their objective is to frame political, religious, or cultural data in such a way that incites an emotional response.

The second reason is methodological. The differences and similarities that exist between neo-Nazis and violent jihadis make them excellent candidates for examining diverse ideologies in a comparative framework. A comparative research design is advantageous as a starting point because it maximizes the ability to see if a phenomenon is cross-cultural (LaFree, 2002; Bennett, 2004; Reichel, 1994; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990; Allardt, 1990; Ebbe, 1996). Comparative research emphasizes collecting and analyzing data from different sources in order to observe similarities and

⁷ There is a tendency among some scholars to treat words and deeds in a dichotomous fashion sharply distinguishing between the two. In this study, I challenge this dichotomy and instead view words and deeds as overlapping phenomenon. In this sense, words are deeds and deeds are words.

differences (Durkheim, 1964; LaFree, 1998; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Barak, 2000; Ragin; 1987; 1998; 2000). If parallels exist in diametrically different data sources, these parallels can provide a foundation for future theoretical construction and etiological discovery (Bennett, 2004; Ragin, 2000; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990). The stronger the differences and similarities between a sample in a comparative research design the better. Parallels demonstrate that a phenomenon transcends variable differences. Neo-Nazism and violent jihadism represents two different data sources from which to examine how subcultural ideology is fused with emotions into frames.⁸

⁸ Violent jihadis and neo-Nazi as terrorist groups differ in geography, history, language, religion, world view, politics, philosophy and tactics.

Chapter 2

“Shame is already revolution of a kind;
shame is actually the victory of the French Revolution over the German patriotism that defeated it in
1813.

Shame is a kind of anger which is turned inward.
And if a whole nation really experienced a sense of shame, it would be like a lion, crouching ready to
spring.” Karl Marx⁹

Situational Motivation Theories: Subculture and Strain Theory

The concept of subculture¹⁰ has been used extensively by sociologists to account for social and violent behavior (Adler, 1985; Ball-Rokeach, 1973; Baron, 1998; Cohen, 1955; Cohen & Short, 1958; Cao, Adams, & Jenson, 1997; Elison, 1991; Erlanger, 1974; Felson, Liska, South, & McNulty, 1994; Frazier, 1957; Hughes, 2007; Kennedy & Baron, 1993; Matza, 1964; Miller, 1958; Parker, 1989; Reed, 1972; Shaw, 1930; Sutherland & Cressy, 1974; Thrasher, 1927; Fischer, 1975; Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967). A survey of the literature reveals that scholars have applied subcultural theory to gain a better understanding of delinquent groups, gangs, race, urbanism, economic status, and violence (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). For example, Cohen and Short (1958) define a conflict oriented subculture that prizes prowess in physical contact and Cloward and Ohlin (1960) discuss how violence is necessary for achieving higher status among adolescents. In criminology, the subcultural perspective has emerged into set of theories grounded in symbolic interactionism and context that recognizes certain subcultures are more conducive to crime and violence. One of the most significant developments was Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s (1967) subculture of violence theory.

⁹ Letters from the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx to Ruge, On the canal-boat going to D., March 1843. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/letters/43_03.htm accessed June 2010.

¹⁰ Fischer (1975) defines a subculture as a distinctive culture within a culture where people share a defining trait, maintain a distinct set of values, communicate culturally, and take part in a common way of life. E. B. Taylor (1871:1) defines culture as: "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."

Wolfgang and Ferracuti's (1967) subculture of violence theory proposes that violent behavior results from subcultural systems that support violence as normative. They describe a normative violent subcultural system as: "a potent theme of violence current in the cluster of values that make up the life-style, the socialization process, the interpersonal relationships of individuals living in similar conditions" (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967: 140). A subculture of violence is not completely isolated from conventional culture, nor is it required by adherents to use violence in every situation. Instead, a violent subculture promotes a series of conditions where violence is expected or required. Subcultural norms function as boundaries to interpret specific situations where violence is viewed as the normative response to certain cues. Problems and certain experiences are interpreted as catalysts to which violent responses are perceived as normative and socially rewarded. Members who breach these norms are criticized by others in the subcultural group. In fact, Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) draw attention to how certain subcultures forbid nonviolent responses in certain situations.

Similar to any subculture, a subculture of violence shares numerous values and attitudes that align with conventional culture (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). In order to understand why members of a "subculture" respond with violence, it is essential to examine values and attitudes of the subculture in context. If members belong to a subculture that normalizes violence, then they conform to the conduct norms, attitudes, and ultimately values of that subculture. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) also suggest that subcultural members place a greater emphasis on evaluating each other by the degree of conformity to the subcultural lifestyle.

From a subcultural perspective, Luckenbill and Doyle (1989) suggest that violence is the product of three successive events. The first, naming, involves interpreting an experience as injurious, where the injury is blamed on another individual. In the second event, claiming, the victim must communicate their grievance and demand reparation from the offender. In the third, the offender must reject the victim's grievance. According to Luckenbill and Doyle (1989), it is the rejection of a claim that transforms the interaction into a conflict. The victim may respond to the conflict in a number of ways including perseverance and the use of force. Thus violent incidents can be viewed as transactions in which victims use force to settle a perceived injustice stemming from having their grievance rejected. A subculture of violence, according to Luckenbill and Doyle (1989) promotes a process of naming, claiming, and aggressiveness to resolve conflict. Individuals within a subculture of violence are more likely to persevere and use force after their grievance has been rejected. Again, according to a subcultural perspective, responding with violence in certain situations is required because the situation is interpreted as an attack and the subsequent grievance has been rejected (Luckenbill and Doyle, 1989).¹¹

¹¹ Cohen's (1955) theoretical subcultural statement focusing on the rejection of middle class norms by economically disadvantaged adolescents is another way of explaining how conflict is resolved. Cohen (1955) emphasizes the problems of status and self-respect that economically disadvantaged adolescents need to resolve by being continuously confronted by middle class values and beliefs. When these adolescents reject the dominant middle class value system, they do so with a vengeance. Cohen (1955) asserts that they deny middle class legitimacy and assert values diametrically opposed to it. Gangs are an example of a subculture that pursues short term gratification, crime for entertainment and destructiveness in a complete repudiation of middle class values (Cohen and Short, 1958). Strang (1971:78) summarizes Cohen's view as: "Rejection of the middle class way of life is the culmination of a process having its origins in an individual's failure to meet the conventional criteria of success. Institutions commonly respond to such failure by stigmatizing and ostracizing their offending members, and the offending members tend to react by *rejecting their rejectors* and becoming progressively alienated."

Merton's theory on deviance (1938) originated from analyzing the relationship between culture, structure, and anomie. In his theory, Merton links anomie,¹² with deviance and argues that divergences between culture and structure lead to deviance. Merton developed a paradigm of deviant behavior to distinguish attitudes to goals, attitudes to means and the modes of adaptation (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). Merton (1938) maintains that delinquency can be attributed to the disparity between the cultural emphasis on success and the actual opportunity for achieving it. The modes of adaptation to blocked goals (conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion) describe how "innovators" create their own way achieving goals (Tittle & Paternoster, 2000). Merton defined those that "rebel" either fail to internalize conventional goals (or later reject them) because they cannot achieve them or favor other goals and means.¹³ Tittle (1995: 4) identifies the "rebellion" adaptation of failing to internalize conventional goals and means "is typical of revolutionaries."

General strain theorists hypothesize that certain members of society, largely as a result of structural and individual pressures, commit crime in order to achieve goals they are denied through legitimate channels (Merton, 1938; Cohen, 1955; Dubin, 1959; Agnew, 1992; Akers, 2000; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994). Central to strain formulations are the variables associated with socioeconomic status and perception of limited opportunities. Simply stated, strain theory explains criminal/deviant behavior as an

¹² Derived from Emile Durkheim and is defined as the state of normlessness (Durkheim, 1897).

¹³ Merton (1938: 676) describes rebellion as: "This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different from that of the others. It represents a transitional response which seeks to institutionalize new procedures oriented toward revamped cultural goals shared by members of the society. It thus involves efforts to change the existing structure rather than to perform accommodative actions within this structure, and introduces additional problems with which we are not at the moment concerned."

adaptive process to structural or individual frustrations and pains caused by blocked (or rejected) legitimate opportunities.

The subculture of violence perspective emphasizes norms that define violence as a necessary response to actions that cause pain or frustration. Strain theory emphasizes “innovations” to compensate for blocked goals. Neo-Nazis or violent jihadis that prescribe violence as a necessary method to counter insulting situations are more likely to use violence as a response. According to strain theory, if racial or religious supremacy is perceived to be a legitimate goal, then neo-Nazis and violent jihadis will experience strain at the blocking of a perceived legitimate goal and will engage in crime. Subcultural violent jihadi and neo-Nazi norms are backed up with rewards and punishments that are identified through propaganda and organizational affiliations. Before continuing a review of the criminological/sociological literature, it is important to define certain terms, provide a brief historical context for neo-Nazism and violent jihadism and review the terrorism literature.

Violent Jihadism

Jihad literally translated from Arabic is to “struggle in the way of Allah.” However, jihad is a controversial religious term because its meaning has been altered to justify the use of violence against Muslims and non-Muslims. Jihad in mainstream Islam has two different interpretations, distinguished as the lesser and greater jihad. Greater jihad is defined as fighting against inner forces that detract morally and spiritually from submitting to Allah (Gregg, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; 2006). Lesser jihad is defined as the right to defend Muslims under attack from non-Muslims (Sivan; 1985; Gerges, 2005).

Violent jihadism is used to define individuals and groups that promote a 6th pillar of Islam as the use of violence against the “enemies” of Allah and the Prophet Mohammad. Requiring lesser jihad to be a sixth pillar of Islam makes it equal to the other five pillars: prayer, pilgrimage, profession of monotheism, fasting, and almsgiving. Violent jihadists insist that holy war is an obligation for all true Muslims (Sageman, 2008). Violent jihadism seeks to remove the influence of materialism and other anti-Islamic “isms” from the Muslim world that they claim are a covert invasion to uproot Islamic culture, undermine the moral fabric of society, family, and encourage passivity (Gerges, 2005; Moghaddam, 2006). The few Muslims that benefit from non-Muslim wealth are corrupt Muslim governmental officials that serve as local “puppets” to the West. Violent jihadis label these Muslims as apostates who are ignorant of the “true” faith (Aaron, 2008). Violent jihadism is a call to purification through the use of violence against anything that attacks Islam. Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Shabaab, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and the Al-Asqa Martyrs Brigade are examples of groups that adhere to violent jihadism. Leading violent jihadi figures include: Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman Zawahiri, and Mohammad Maqdisi. Violent jihadis use their view of holy war to distinguish themselves from apostate and passive Muslims they believe have tainted Islam.

The idea of violent jihadism in the modern era arises from a series of ideologues that trace their origin to the early 14th century (Brachman, 2009; Sivan, 1985). One of the most influential ideologues was Taq ad-Din Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah, 1263-1328, who justified “war” as an Islamic duty to fight against invading Mongols (Sivan, 1985). Taymiyyah’s ideas are important to modern violent jihadis because he is perceived as a

legitimate Islamic medieval authority that justifies violence against foreign invaders. More importantly, it was Taymiyyah's argument that Mongols who converted to Islam were not really Muslims (Brachman, 2009). Mongolian Muslims were not true Muslims because they "polluted" Islam with their customs and did not adhere to all aspects of Muslim life and should be considered takfir, defined as apostates who follow an impure version of Islam (Kepel, 2005).

The term takfir was advanced by modern violent jihadism to also label secular Muslims as living in a state of jahiliyyah or state of ignorance (Qutb, 1966; Kepel, 2005). Jahiliyyah, according to violent jihadist, refers to a state of "backsliding" or ignorance that encompasses the majority of Muslims. Violent jihadis assert that the majority of modern Muslims are not "true" Muslims because they represent a polluted version of "true Muslim society" guided by secular laws and innovations (Moghaddam, 2006; Qutb, 1966). Mohammad ibn Adb al Wahhab, 1703-1792, advanced Taymiyyah's ideas to create Wahhabism, who supported the use of violence across the Arabian Peninsula to purify Islam from secular innovations (Sivan, 1985). Almost one hundred and fifty years later in Egypt, Hassan al Banna, 1906-1949, also used Taymiyyah's ideas when he founded the Muslim Brotherhood (Wright, 2006).

Al Banna describes the Muslim Brotherhood as a revivalist Muslim organization to "purify" Egypt from foreign military intervention, economic corruption, and secular interventions (Kepel, 2005). After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War One, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, lead by Hasan al Banna, applied Taymiyyah's ideas to the modern Egyptian Islamic community (Sivan, 1985). Al Banna asserted that modern Egypt resembled the Mongolian Muslim community characterized by secular innovations

and moral pollutants (Gerges, 2005). Al Banna identified aggressive invaders against “true” Muslim communities in the form of growing Arab nationalism, the increasing immigration of Jews to Palestine, promotion of secular governments, European influence across the Muslim world, increasing corruption by governmental officials, and the control of natural resources by a small majority of Muslim government officials (Kepel, 2005).

Sayyid Qutb, 1906-1966, emerged from this time period in Egypt to become the most influential violent jihadi ideologue to date (Brachman, 2009). As a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb advanced Taymiyyah and Wahhab’s ideological work to apply it to the current situation in Egypt (Wright, 2006). Qutb witnessed the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of Arab nation states after World War I, and increasing European interventionism in Egypt in the form of a secular government. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was in response to existing secular Islamic regimes and the invasion of foreign ideas, materialism, and secular innovations into Muslim lands. Qutb perceived this “invasion” as warfare against the Muslim community (Qutb, 1966). Sayyid Qutb’s ideological work influenced the next generation of violent jihadis that expanded his ideas to global jihad (Wright, 2006; Brachman, 2009).

Neo-Nazism

Neo-Nazism is used to describe individuals and groups whose central identity is defined by the “Aryan race.” Furthermore, each individual and group “draws inspiration and symbols from Hitler and Nazi Germany Pagan ritualism, Nordic warrior myths, and the Judeo-Christian Bible, which they interpret from a radical, racist point of view” (Simi & Futrell, 2010; 2). Neo-Nazis perceive that all non-whites and homosexuals are out to destroy the white race and thus maintain a focused hatred of these groups

(Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). Neo-Nazism is based on the premise that the white race is supreme—the apex of evolutionary natural selection denoting intellectual and cultural superiority (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Kaplan, 2000). Neo-Nazism also includes a spiritual dimension that parallels political ideological ambitions (Gardell, 2003). The spiritual dimension epitomizes the white race as the best union between forces in the universe, nature, and humanity. This union is manifested in a genetic code observable in the white race (Michael, 2006). Neo-Nazi spiritualism leads to the notion that one's race should determine their religion (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; White, 2001; Michael, 2006). The National Alliance, Aryan Nations, National Socialist Movement are examples of groups that adhere to neo-Nazism. Leading neo-Nazi figures include: George Rockwell, David Lane, William Pierce, Ben Klassen, Richard Butler, Tom Metzger, and Matt Hale.

Neo-Nazism emerges from an ideological tradition grounded in hundreds of years of perceived European racial superiority (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Feagin, Vera & Batur, 2001). European imperialism expanded European “superiority” to dominate cultures classified as non-white across the globe (Feagin, 2010). White superiority is the notion that the color of one's race determines superior intellectual and physical abilities (Kaplan, 2000). Therefore, European imperialism regularly employed slavery, racial genocide, and segregation as methods to justify racial superiority (Feagin, 2010). These methods were used in the British colonies of America, which later would become the United States.

Despite independence from England, white superiority over non-whites remained part of the newly formed United States (Feagin, 2010). Over subsequent decades, slavery and the notion of white supremacy became an ideological debate that divided the United

States, contributing to the American Civil War. President Abraham Lincoln's 1862 executive order, the Emancipation Proclamation, would grant freedom to all of the slaves in the United States. To counter the southern defeat, the freeing of slaves by the Emancipation Proclamation, and racial integration, the Klu Klux Klan was formed as an agent of informal social control by inflicting fear in non white populations (Kaplan, 2000). The Klan grew in membership throughout the late 19th and 20th century and racial segregation was maintained (Feagin, 2010).

It is the stamp of Nazi Germany that gives modern day neo-Nazism a decidedly different feature over white supremacy in previous generations (Feagin, 2010). The Nazis mixed race and nationalism into an organized government and military (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). The Nazis had also advanced white supremacy in a different direction that existed before World War II. The Nazis focused white superiority against the Jews and built upon hundreds of years of anti-Semitism while establishing a new found science "proving" the superiority of the white race (Baird, 1974). The Nazis advanced the use of racial propaganda and strategies to eliminate Jews and other races/classes that were deemed inferior (Baird, 1974). The Nazis targeted the Jews because they were seen as the catalyst for German poverty, the creation of communism, and systematically weakening Germany (Welch, 1983; Zeman, 1964). When in power, the Nazis did not rely solely on intermitted violence, like the KKK or Russian pogroms, but engaged in a solution of systematic mass genocide of "inferiors."

It was almost two decades after the allies defeated Nazi Germany that white supremacist ideology would become more integrated with Nazi ideology in the United States (Schmaltz, 1998). Specifically, it was existing white supremacist sentiments that

would “advance” Nazi Germany’s anti-Semitic propaganda, “research,” and programs in the United States (Simonelli, 1999). In the early 1960’s, during the Civil Rights movement, the line between neo-Nazi ideology and white supremacist sentiments would blur (Feagin, 2010). On a broad scale, the civil rights movement was met with formal and informal opposition from white supremacists that demanded that Jim Crow laws and racial segregation be maintained (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).


In 1959, George Lincoln Rockwell, 1918-1967, founded the American Nazi Party in part to publicize that the Civil Rights movement was a Jewish strategy to weaken the white race (Simonelli, 1999). According to Rockwell, Jews are more dangerous to whites than blacks over time (Rockwell, 1967). Drawing from Nazi propaganda, Rockwell established a decidedly different strain of American white supremacy, one that blended European notions of racial superiority, with Nazi views of Aryan anti-Semitism and inferior races (Simonelli, 1999). Also in the environment of the 1960’s, George Lincoln Rockwell set into motion the idea that a racial war between whites and non-whites was imminent (Simonelli, 1999; Feagin, 2010). The notion of “racial wars” would become an important distinction between white supremacy and Neo-Nazism. After Rockwell’s death in 1967, the American Nazi Party would split into different groups varying in appearance, location, and organizational structure (Goodrick-Clark, 2002; Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Differences and Similarities between neo-Nazism and Violent Jihadism

Figure 3 illustrates some of the ideological and organizational differences and similarities that exist between neo-Nazism and violent jihadism. Violent jihadis differ from neo-Nazis in that their ideology is grounded in religious superiority while neo-Nazis

emphasize racial superiority. If either ideology were to govern a population, neo-Nazis would rely on racial nationalism, similar to Nazi Germany, while violent jihadis would emphasize dogmatic adherence to Islamic jurisprudence and a unified Muslim community. The historical narratives between the two differ, as do the cultures and dominant languages of individual members. Neo-Nazis are fighting for Aryan preservation against attacks from homosexuals, non-whites, race mixers, and Muslims (Simi & Futrell, 2010). Violent jihadis are fighting to purify Islam from spiritual polluters whom they describe as corrupt Muslims, crusaders (the West), infidels (unbelievers) and blasphemers (Muslims that have converted to other faiths) (Brachman, 2009). Violent jihadis are currently engaged in an active global terrorism campaign that uses conventional weapons of war. Neo-Nazis are engaged in more intermittent domestic terrorism and tend to use weapons typical to generic violence (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Simi, 2010). However, neo-Nazis are frequently arrested for trying to obtain or possessing high powered weapons, explosives, and even chemical or biological weapons in the United States and several European countries (De Armond, 1999; Falkenrath, 1998; Durham, 1996).

Figure 3 Differences and Similarities Between neo-Nazis and violent jihadis.



Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share several similarities. Both ideologies are equally opposed to societies that promote democracy. Neo-Nazism and violent jihadism both assert that current democracies are controlled by a Zionist Jewish agenda, which unites them in sharing violent anti Semitic views (Michael, 2006a; Kuntzel, 2007). Neo-Nazi and violent jihadis are equally engaged in a Holocaust denial campaign because of how “Zionists” have manipulated information to gain world sympathy to use to their political advantage. Both ideologies embrace a historical idyllic model as an objective to emulate in the twenty first century (Herf, 2009). In light of a historic “golden” age, both neo-Nazis and violent jihadis engage in a prolific global propaganda campaign to bring their idyllic model into fruition. Finally, each ideology is tied to a single charismatic

historical leader that serves as a model for individual and social behavior (Morse, 2003). Violent jihadis have all but deified the Prophet Mohammad and neo-Nazis consider Adolf Hitler's life and work to be sacred (Michael, 2006a).

Terrorism Scholarship

The majority of terrorism literature has been published after 1968 (Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Laqueur & Alexander, 1987).¹⁴ The creation of academic journals devoted to terrorism studies spiked in the 1970's and 1980's.¹⁵ Because of the historical and political events of the 1970's, a surge in terrorism literature followed, leveling off until the dramatic increase of studies that occurred following September 11, 2001 (Reid, 1997; 2007; Ranstorp, 2007). Scholars who studied terrorism before September 11th formed a small group, they generally knew each other, and the majority represented the fields of political science, psychology, or international studies departments (Dyesteyn, 2007).

Terrorism scholarship has changed drastically in the last ten years (Sageman, 2008; Bjorgo, 2005; Brannan, Esler, & Strindberg, 2001). The study of terrorism now includes researchers from economics, history, religion, philosophy, criminology, criminal justice, sociology, and anthropology (Silke, 2007). The growth of terrorism research corresponds with an increasing number of disciplines that are attending to the topic.

There are three primary waves of terrorism scholarship that have emerged since the late 1960's (Rapoport, 2006). The first wave to dominate the field of terrorism

¹⁴ J.B.S. Hardman published a piece in the 1934 edition of the *Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* analyzing the phenomenon from a social scientists perspective. Gross, Felix (1957) *The Seizure of Political Power*. New York: Philosophical Library; Roucek, J.S. (1962) Sociological Elements of A Theory of Terror and Violence, *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 21: 2 April, pp. 165-167 and Gross, Felix (1943) *Slavonic Encyclopedia*. New York: Philosophical Library. pp. 531-532.

¹⁵Some Examples: *Terrorism: An International Journal* founded 1977; *Terrorism, Violence, Insurgency* founded 1980; *Violence, Aggression and Terrorism* founded in 1987.

occurred in the late 1970's and early 80's. Terrorists were categorized as "psychopaths" and "sociopaths." The psycho/sociopath paradigm was dominant during these decades and research was designed to study terrorists as pathological (Rapoport, 2006). The second wave, grounded in western psychology, occurring in the late 1980's to the late 1990's, focused on individual traits and generating 'terrorist profiles' (Horgan, 2005). The third wave of research can be described as "behaviorist heavy," emphasizing structural variables, and shifting towards studying terrorists groups as social networks and organizations (Ranstorp 2007; Bjorgo, 2005; Silke, 2007; Ruthven, 2005; Roy, 2004; Levitas, 2002; Sageman, 2004; 2008; Mazarr, 2007; Scheuer, 2002).

Jeff Victoroff (2005) divides the waves of terrorism into two general perspectives: a top down/macro level perspective and the bottom up/individual/micro level perspective. The macro level perspective emphasizes variables that create and influence the environment from which an individual or group resides. Macro-level variables are drawn from political structure, religious ideology, poverty/wealth rates, literacy levels, cultural norms, modernity measurements, and measures of social equality (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Sandler, 2003). The majority of political and sociological theories explaining terrorism concentrate on the macro level perspective (Schmid & Jongman, 2005; Post, Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003; Sageman, 2004; Schmid et al., 1988).

Conversely, the bottom up or individual perspective attempts to explore terrorist behavior from a psychological point of view. The individual perspective is divided into three distinct categories. First, the socio/psychopath perspective, which was dominant in the first research wave, classified terrorists as either a socio/psychopath incapable of rational thought, lacking in cognitive processing skills, and incapable of maintaining

healthy social ties (Post, 2005). The terrorist as psychopath has become popularized in mainstream media and film industry (Victoroff, 2005). Second, the rational actor perspective classifies the terrorist(s) as a logical, even an intelligent tactician, fully cognizant of their behavior. The terrorist can be well educated, wealthy, successful, and possess the ability to develop a logical strategy to act out grievances. A significant distinction is that terrorists are depicted as being devoid of psychological pathology or mental illness (Evans, 2005; Hoffman, 1998; Miller, 2006; Silke, 2003). Third, the mental disorder perspective integrates aspects of the previous two perspectives. An educated, intelligent, rational, individual(s) can maintain healthy social ties and function in society, but a mental disorder creates the absence of a conscious or system of morality (Sageman, 2004).

A Social Psychological Perspective in Terrorism Scholarship

A social psychological perspective emphasizes that human behavior is a combination of both individual and group processes (Scheff & Retzinger, 2000; Rice, 2009; Sherman, 2003). The social psychological perspective asserts that emotions are catalysts that incite, accelerate, and sustain violence (Scheff, 1994; Scheff & Retzinger, 2000; Rice, 2009). Terrorism scholars argue for research that examines the role of emotions in individual and collective behavior (Danchev, 2006; Fontan, 2006; Morgan, 2007; Victoroff, 2005; Rice, 2009; Linder, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Stern, 2003). Ethnographers assert that emotions are powerful motivators Juergensmeyer (2003), Gerges (2005), and Stern (2003) are three of the more widely known terrorism scholars to stress the role of emotions in terrorism (Masters & Deffenbaugh, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005). Though micro and macro level perspectives are important to understanding

terrorism, Pynchon and Borum (1999) argue that emotions cannot be dichotomized as either micro or macro level—they intersect and are intertwined between individual and group processes. Scholars across multiple disciplines have intended to reinvigorate the study of emotions in the field of terrorism. However, progress is slow, and the social psychological perspective in terrorism studies remains slight when compared to micro or macro level approaches (Danchev, 2006; Fontan, 2006; Morgan, 2008; Victoroff, 2005; Rice, 2009; Linder, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Stern, 2003).

A social psychological perspective emphasizes that as individuals and groups interpret situations, these interpretations contribute to emotional responses, which can then result in political violence (Rice, 2009). Separating the individual from the group or the group from the individual is contrary to the social psychological perspective because human behavior is perceived to be a combination of the two (Pynchon & Borum, 1999). Therefore, the social psychological approach intertwines variables that are typically separated when researchers examine only individual or group processes (Masters & Deffenbaugh, 2007; Moghaddam, 2005; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Danchev, 2006; Fontan, 2006; Morgan, 2008; Linder, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Stern, 2003; Haidt, 2006).

My research utilizes a social psychological approach to examine how terrorist propagandists frame ideology with emotion. I refer specifically to diagnostic and prognostic frames in propaganda that outline the problems of the conventional culture and assert the solutions are found in the terrorist subculture (Benford, 1993; Snow & Benford, 1988). Diagnostic or prognostic frames in propaganda are emotionally constructed forms of communication that harness symbolic characteristics so that ideological supporters can easily identify similar situations. Diagnostic and prognostic

framing uses political, religious, criminal, historical, or cultural information in such a way that “charges” the target audiences’ emotions (McVeigh, Myers, & Sikkink, 2004).

Terrorist propagandists use emotions in framing to leverage a target audience’s world view so that current/historical events, culture, and religion are interpreted a certain way (Taylor, 2003). Meaning is emotionally framed to dominate how a target audience should feel about a terrorist subculture. Diagnostic and prognostic frames in propaganda are used to navigate toward a terrorist subculture over conventional subculture. Sykes & Matza (1957) describe techniques of neutralization as a process that assists in moving back and forth between a subculture of delinquency and conventional culture.

Criminology, Techniques of Neutralization, & Framing

So far, criminologists’ work on the relationship between framing, emotions, and ideology is far less substantial when compared to social movement scholarship. When frames are examined in criminology and criminal justice, it generally refers to studies that have examined how the media frames crime, offenders, policies, criminal justice institutions, or legislation (Altheide, 1985; Barak, 1994; Best, 1990; Surrett, 1989; 2006; Lotz, 1991; Potter & Kappeler, 1998; Wykes, 2001). The intersection of ideology, emotions, and frames of political criminals within criminology has yet to be examined. However, existing criminological scholarship in deviance and generic crime does correspond to how members in social movements use “language as communication” to drift in and out of subcultures of deviance.

Sykes and Matza (1957) defined drift as the process of moving back and forth from conventional behavior/values to those of a subculture of delinquency. According to Matza (1964), drift is a gradual process where the motivation to perform delinquent

incidents becomes rationalized and then internalized. Sykes and Matza (1957) argued that subcultures of delinquency maintain a set of values nested within conventional cultural values. Juveniles appreciate conventional cultural norms, but not when they conflict with the norms promoted by a subculture of delinquency. If conventional cultural norms are preferred over deviant subcultural norms, criticism by their peers serves as a form of subcultural social control to leverage a return to delinquency. Therefore, juveniles develop a set of “new” social boundaries that serves to internalize and justify their behavior (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Techniques of neutralization provide a mechanism to develop new social boundaries and justify subcultural values over conventional values (Sykes & Matza, 1957).

Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralization enable a person to shut off “inner objections” to conventional culture that conflict with a subculture of delinquency. Sykes and Matza’s scholarship advances Mill’s (1940) work on “the vocabulary of motive,” where wrong-doers use linguistic techniques to present an act as culturally appropriate and acceptable. Techniques of neutralization include a range of behaviors experienced from denial, condemnation, and “altruistic” beliefs (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Responses of denial range from relinquishing any sense of responsibility to minimizing societal or victim harm, while condemning behavior includes isolating members of conventional culture whose behavior is deemed to be far worse (Sykes & Matza, 1957). “Altruistic” behavior is based on appeals to maintain a sense of loyalty to their peers and members of a subculture. Drift occurs because techniques of neutralization promote subcultural boundaries over conventional boundaries by substituting conventional cultural norms with those associated with subcultures of delinquency.

Denial and condemnation of conventional culture can lead to delinquency or violence by “framing” a subculture as a solution. Sykes and Matza (1957) suggest that delinquency is used to solve problems for those living in environments where the loss of close relationships, loss of status, discriminatory action, poverty, stigma, or abuse is common. Therefore, delinquents construct meaning to rationalize or “frame” the problems and solutions that govern delinquent behavior in a way similar to how members of a social movement define motive and account (Mills, 1940; Orbuch, 1997; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Scully & Marolla, 1984). The need to rationalize problems and solutions does not reside solely with juveniles, but applies to all offenders, and is the reason that techniques of neutralization were expanded beyond the study of juveniles.

The impact of techniques of neutralization has been broad. Techniques of neutralization have been used to explain various forms of criminality (Ball, 1966; Mannle & Lewis, 1979; Minor, 1980; 1981; 1984; Agnew & Peters, 1985; Dabney, 1995; Copes 2003; Rosenfeld, Jacobs & Wright, 2003; Maruna & Copes, 2004; Topalli, 2005). Techniques of neutralization has been used to better understand rape (Bohner et al. 1998), homicide (Levi, 1981), victimization (Ferraro & Johnson, 1983), hate crimes (Byers, Crider, & Biggers, 1999), violent behavior (Agnew, 2004), genocide (Alvarez, 1997), shoplifting (Cromwell & Thurman, 2003), poaching (Eliason & Dodder, 1999), theft (Hollinger, 1991), drug use (Priest & McGrath, 1970), and white collar crime (Shover & Bryant, 1993; Benson, 1985; Simon & Eitzen, 1993). Techniques of neutralization have also promoted an interest in how other linguistic techniques are used to neutralize behavior.

Scholars have focused on similar linguistic techniques used by actors engaged in criminality and problematic behavior (Scully & Marolla, 1984; Hall & Hewitt, 1970; 1973; Hewitt & Stokes, 1975; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Lyman & Scott, 1970; Thurman, 1984; Priest & McGrath, 1970; Minor, 1980; Agnew, 1994). Scott and Lyman (1968) illustrate how excuses, justifications, and accounts are used to neutralize conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from an actor's actions. According to Scott and Lyman (1968), excuses are defined as a means of scapegoating to remove culpability through appealing to the nature of the incident. Excuses often acknowledge the act was "wrong," but appeal to the fact that the nature of the incident was either an accident, a biological or psychological impairment, or that they were influenced by circumstances beyond their control (Lyman & Scott, 1970; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Justifications involve accepting responsibility for the incident, but deny their behavior was wrong because the actor rationalizes the necessity for their action. Scully and Marolla (1984) provide an example of applying excuses and justifications to analyze criminal behavior, specifically how rapists explained themselves and their crimes.

According to Scott and Lyman (1968), accounts are defined as vocabularies that intend to neutralize an incident and its consequences. Accounts are used when an actor is involved in trying to explain themselves and their actions as a rational outcome. Orbuch (1997) summarizes accounts as a theoretical viewpoint and as a method to protect the actor and 1) provide greater control and understanding of the social world, 2) provide a method to cope with stressful and painful events, 3) establish a degree of hope in the future, and 4) create a method to organize relationships and experiences. Orbuch's summary can be applied directly to what techniques of neutralization, accounts, excuses,

justifications, and diagnostic and prognostic frames are designed to accomplish--- promoting particular types of activity in a subculture.

Sykes and Matza (1957) , Mills (1940), and Scott & Lyman's (1968) explanation of rationalization and interpretation is similar to how prognostic and diagnostic frames address problems, accounts, solutions, and motives in social movements (Hall & Hewitt, 1970; 1973, Hewitt & Stokes, 1975; Scott & Lyman, 1968). Influential criminological theories, like techniques of neutralization, take on a different meaning if political ideology and core framing tasks are included. Although Sykes & Matza, Mills, or Scott & Lyman did not apply their work to framing terrorist ideology, their work reflects the fact that actors engaged in subcultural activity, which includes terrorists, need to rationalize their actions, cope with distress, and organize their social world.

Applying neutralization theory to understand terrorism follows other scholars who have applied the theory to crime (Ball, 1966; Mannle & Lewis, 1979; Minor, 1980; 1981; 1984; Agnew & Peters, 1985; Dabney, 1995; Copes, 2003; Rosenfeld, Jacobs & Wright, 2003; Maruna & Copes, 2004; Topalli, 2005). Understanding attitude formation in political criminality acknowledges the importance of specifying subcultural norms over conventional norms. However, unlike common criminality or delinquency, where drift between conventional and unconventional culture is expected (Sykes & Matza, 1957; McCarthy & Stewart, 1998; Thurman, St. John & Riggs, 1984; Topalli, 2005), "permanent drift" into a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture is the desired outcome because terrorist propagandists intend for future recruits to have a permanent neo-Nazi or violent jihadi identity (like themselves) in order to change conventional culture. I argue

that when “drift” involves political/religious ideology, which distinguishes terrorism from delinquency, drift becomes radicalization.

Frames & Framing

Outside criminology, the literature on frames and framing is extensive (Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Price et al., 1997; Valkenburg et al., 1999; Simon & Xenos, 2000; Cable & Shriver 1995; Capek, 1993; Gamson ,1992; Gamson et al 1982; Johnston & Snow 1998; Kubal, 1998; Triandafyllidou & Fotiou 1998; Zdravomyslova, 1996; Snow et. al. 1986). Framing research can be found throughout the social and cognitive sciences and has generated a broad variety of research in communication studies and social movement theory (Goffman, 1974; Ivengar, 1991; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Bennett, 1988). The literature also spans various subfields within political science and includes scholars that have studied social movements, bargaining behavior, mediation, impact of media, public opinion/voting, and deviance/criminality (Benford & Hunt, 1992; Best, 1987; Capek, 1993; Hunt et al 1994; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Jenness, 1995; Weed, 1997; White, 1999; Anheier et al 1998; Cable & Shriver, 1995; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996; Klandermans et al 1999; Benford, 1993; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Marullo et al 1996; McCarthy, 1994; Meyer, 1995; Nepstad, 1997).

Frames function as information boundaries through the inclusion or exclusion of information. To Entman (1993; 52), framing is “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.” Because frames emphasize specific information

while excluding other forms, frames affect individual or groups attitudes and their attachment to others that share similar attitudes.

Frames function as powerful communication agents that impact attitude formation. Frames enable large amounts of information to be quickly assigned to “cognitive categories and to package it (information) for efficient relay to their audiences” (Giltin, 1980; 7). These cognitive categories provide target audiences with guidelines for “ideas as well as interpretations and definitions of a variety of social phenomena” (Gans, 1979; 59).

Frames can impact attitude formation in individuals and groups. McAdam’s (1986) expansion of Snow, Zurcher and Ekland-Olson’s (1980) micromobilization model of social movements outlines the significance of attitude formation and its link to social ties. McAdam’s (1986) approach emphasizes the relationship between receptive attitudes and the formation or maintaining of social ties. Receptive attitudes are a pre-requisite for responding favorably to existing social ties or as a motive to seek out relationships to foster these attitudes. In this way, frames impact receptive attitudes or function to reinforce exiting attitudes and social ties (Ryan, 1991, 53).

Framing as a model of analysis has grown drastically over the past five decades and draws from the work of Erving Goffman (1974). Goffman describes frames as mechanisms to understand social organization, experience, and social expression.

Framing, Erving Goffman, and the Media

According to Goffman (1974) framing is an active process where individuals and groups understand, recognize, and accept or deny social boundaries. Individuals respond to situations based on their understanding of how societal boundaries function in the

world around them. In this way, framing defines almost all situations while providing an understanding of how to interpret them. An individual's reaction to any event originates from understanding the experience and accepting existing social boundaries (Goffman, 1974).

Goffman labeled the way in which individuals understand the world as their primary framework. A primary framework can be seen in how an individual reacts and interprets a particular event to construct meaning. An individual's primary framework is activated when faced with circumstances that trigger the need to interpret and categorize the situation (Goffman, 1974). The primary frame functions as an organizational principle to "to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its terms" (Goffman, 1974; 21). Another way of describing Goffman's organizational principle is to define it as a method to organize the social world—officially labeled "a cognitive organizational structuring system" (Goffman, 1974). The system guides an individual's interpretation of social reality and therefore determines the conscious or unconscious reaction to it.

Goffman organized his primary framework into two broad classes: natural and social. Natural frameworks are physical in nature and are defined as events and occurrences that occur without human interaction; examples include weather, geography, and natural disasters. Social frameworks are the events and situations that result from human interaction. Social frameworks can take many forms and are essential for providing the background, context, and the culture of a specific event (Goffman, 1974). An example of a social framework is a newscaster who covers a natural disaster by using

provocative visual images to generate emotional responses that enhance the narrative to capture the audience's attention (Fahmy, 2007).

Goffman's (1974) frame analysis proved to be a great benefit to communication and media studies because it provided an outline for understanding media and its construction of reality (Tuchman, 1978). Framing analysis has become an important model for studying mass communication and how meaning is constructed by news outlets (Altheide & Snow, 1979; D'Angelo, 2002; Entman, 1993; 2007; Gamson, 1992; Gans, 1979; Gitlin, 1980; Goffman, 1974; Iyengar, 1991; Reese, 2007; Reese, Gandy, & Grant, 2001; Scheufele, 1999; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996; Tankard, Hendrickson, Silberman, Bliss & Ghanem, 1991; Tuchman, 1978; van Dijk, 1985). Social movement scholars have strong interest in framing theory because it provides a theoretical grounding from which to examine how information is presented to target audiences. Part of the benefit of framing theory is that it provides a theoretical model to study words and images in context in order to draw out meaning and interpretation (D'Angelo, 2002).

Framing and Social Movements

In response to the dominance of rational actor models (Olson, 1965) and resource mobilization theory (McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1988; McCarthy & Zald, 1977), scholars interested in the cognitive dimensions of collective behavior began utilizing concepts related to frame analysis (Snow et al, 1986; Benford & Hunt, 1992; Best, 1987; Capek, 1993; Hunt et al 1994; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Jenness, 1995; Weed, 1997; White, 1999; Anheier et al 1998; Cable & Shriver, 1995; Carroll & Ratner 1996; Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996; Klandermans et al 1999; Benford, 1993; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Marullo et al 1996; McCarthy, 1994; Meyer, 1995;

Nepstad, 1997; Weed, 1997). Social movement scholars advanced Goffman's (1974; 21) work to examine how individuals and groups "locate, perceive, identify, and label" occurrences within their life space and the world at large. Frames from a social movement perspective provide meaning to events or occurrences that are organized in a fashion intended to guide action. The framing perspective in social movements is an active process of how ideas and meanings grow into social organizations and influential ideas.

Framing is a dynamic process of reality construction (Gamson et al 1982, Snow et al 1986, Snow & Benford, 1988). Framing in social movements involves the active production and maintenance of meaning for their supporters, antagonists, and neutral observers (Snow & Benford, 1988). Frames provide a way to interpret meaning by simplifying and condensing the social world in such a manner that intends to mobilize a target audience to action.

Snow and Benford (1988) defined mobilization as the intention to catalyze potential ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral audience, and to deflate counter frames. Therefore, frames from a social movement perspective are defined as action oriented beliefs and meanings that are constructed in a way that motivate, incite, and legitimize the actions associated with social movement organization. Frames that catalyze support from a neutral audience tend to be inclusive and flexible, broad in interpretive scope, and maintain greater social boundary appeal. A large number of different types of frames have been identified (Valocchi, 1996; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Cable & Shriver, 1995; Capek, 1993; Berbier, 1998; Coy & Woehrl, 1996; Blum-Kulka

& Liebes, 1993; Noonan, 1995).¹⁶

Snow and Benford (1988) outlined three framing tasks that are prerequisites for mobilization. Snow and Benford (1988) expanded Wilson's (1973) decomposition of ideology into three core framing tasks. They define these core framing tasks as diagnostic framing or problem identification, prognostic framing or solutions, and motivational framing. According to Snow and Benford (1988), diagnostic and prognostic framing forces agreement where motivational framing catalyzes individuals into action. In order to be effective, diagnostic and prognostic frames need to be constructed as believable by a target audience (Snow & Benford 1988; Gamson, 1992). What is important is how believable core framing tasks are, who is creating them, the scope of evidence, and how that evidence is used to increase a frame's broader in appeal. Frames become believable when they resonate with the myths, assumptions, inherent ideology, and worldview of a target audience. When diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational frames are more believable, the frames are more likely to resonate with a target audience, and therefore increase the possibility of mobilization (Zuo & Benford, 1995).

Scholars using frame analysis examine how groups frame their ideology into a message to gain political momentum and seize power (Snow & Byrd, 2000; 2007; Benford & Snow, 2000; Klandermas, 1997; Kuzman, 1998; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988; 1996; Tarrow, 1991; Tilly, 1978; Zald & Berger, 1978; Zwerman, Steinhoff, & Della Porta, 2000). A substantial amount of literature has given considerable empirical attention to diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing in

¹⁶ Frames that catalyze support from neutral audience have been rights frames (Valocchi 1996; Williams & Williams 1995), choice frames (Davies 1999), injustice frames (Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Gamson, 1982), environmental justice frames (Cable & Shriver 1995; Capek 1993), culturally pluralist frames (Berbier 1998, Davies 1999), oppositional frames (Coy & Woehrle 1996), hegemonic frames (Blum-Kulka & Liebes 1993), and a return to Democracy frame (Noonan, 1995).

specific movements and their social movement organizations (Benford & Hunt, 1992; Best, 1987; Capek, 1993; Hunt et al 1994; Jasper & Poulsen, 1995; Jenness, 1995; Weed, 1997; White, 1999; Anheier et al 1998, Cable & Shriver 1995; Carroll & Ratner, 1996; Klandermans & Goslinga, 1996; Klandermans et al 1999; Benford, 1993; Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Johnson, 1997; Marullo et al 1996, McCarthy, 1994; Meyer, 1995; Nepstad, 1997). However, analyzing the use of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames in terrorism studies has not received similar attention.

Terrorism as Criminogenic Propaganda

TCP defines terrorism as a phenomenon of emotionally laden diagnostic and prognostic frames.¹⁷ Terrorism as a phenomenon of frames uses violence as its symbolic medium to bring about active or passive alignment in a target audience. Terrorists create frames of violence or the threat of violence to produce “terror” or “pride” in their target audience to leverage, coerce, or inspire a revolution of ideas into action. The framing process is similar to TCP because both actions and words communicate an ideological message to an audience via frames that produce intense emotions. As a model of analysis, TCP examines how ideology is emotionally framed by individuals, groups, and states.

¹⁷ TCP as part of expanding the social psychological domain in criminology is a crucial area for scientific and counterterrorism research. As the effects of globalization and technology progress, social psychological research focusing on the role of emotions in attitude formation, decision-making, mobilization for action, radicalization, and recruitment grows increasingly important. The internet is a means for neo-Nazis and violent jihadis to network with members, and most importantly, to spread their propaganda through shame laden diagnostic frames (Weimann, 2006). The internet affords a high degree of anonymity that potential members and/or actual members can enjoy through limited interaction without any personal engagement (Rogers, 2003; Ganor, 2007). Rogers (2003) argues that terrorist propagandists now have the power to franchise their form of violence to reach individuals who share in the ideological beliefs of the group but were uncomfortable or cannot officially join an organization. With the perceived privacy of the internet, individuals can still be an ‘ideological’ member, plan attacks, and carry out terrorism incidents. Therefore, determining how shame functions in neo-Nazi or violent jihadi propaganda confronts a pressing social problem that is currently impacting the economy, foreign/ domestic policy, and costing lives.

Similar to Schmid and de Graaf's VAC, TCP is both a perspective and a model of analysis. TCP advances the socio-political work of Schmid and de Graaf in the late 1980's by emphasizing a criminological perspective.¹⁸ TCP as a model of analysis places priority on attitude formation by examining how a social movement's ideas are framed, transmitted, and received. Specifically, TCP as a model of analysis acknowledges that attitude formation and social ties among supporters is influenced by the framing process in terrorist propaganda.

TCP as a perspective emphasizes a target audience's symbolic interpretation of frames. Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda is symbolic because violence itself is not the end state--the goal is to incite further violence ultimately leading to a revolution. Individual, group, or state actors carry out or threaten violence for ideological reasons against targets that serve as message generators to emotionally manipulate target audiences. Frames constructed by a terrorist group use a "freedom fighter" image rather than a "terrorist." Target selection, ideology and strategies communicate different meaning to diverse target audiences. It is *how* information is used in terrorist propaganda to communicate different meaning to diverse audiences.

TCP acknowledges that prognostic and diagnostic frames associated with violence (deeds) or threats of violence (words) are symbolic. Therefore, TCP recognizes the importance of ideology expressed in actions and words to powerbrokers, victims, ideological supports, and neutral audiences. The purpose of TCP is to understand how emotions, frames, and ideology intersect in political violence. Terrorist propaganda by the deed or by the word both share criminogenic intent for the victim/target, ideological

¹⁸ TCP as a perspective draws from the fields of sociology, political science, history, criminology, communication, propaganda analysis, and social psychology.

supporter, and neutral audience. The intention of terrorist propaganda is to incite others to violence or supporting violence.

Terrorist propaganda is criminogenic in nature, which means it intends to produce, promote, or increase criminal behavior. Intent distinguishes criminogenic propaganda from propaganda used in politics and marketing. Criminogenic intent for the victim/target, ideological supporter, and neutral audience is the common denominator in terrorist propaganda by the deed or by the word. The outcome of criminogenic propaganda is to generate an emotional climate that increases the likelihood of violence.

TCP is not one dimensional, but combines how meaning and symbols from propaganda are interpreted by three distinct audiences: ideological supporters, a neutral target audience, and victims/targets. TCP emphasizes a model of analysis to understand how meaning and symbols intend to inflict terror, outrage, or force compliance in their victims. TCP accentuates a model to analyze how terrorists construct themselves as heroic, altruistic, and just. TCP stresses how a terrorism incident is meant to persuade. Terrorists aspire to make a neutral audience aware of their cause and ideology by outlining the altruistic honor of their cause while framing their opponents as dishonorable.

Criminogenic intent is communicated via diagnostic and prognostic frames to produce either active or passive support. Diagnostic and prognostic frames in criminogenic propaganda use strong emotional appeals to outline who is responsible for a terrorist group's grievances and how a group plans to overcome these grievances. The emphasis on persuading audiences through strong appeals in propaganda eliminates the need for motivational framing.

Motivational frames are a third core framing task, but are unnecessary in TCP. In propaganda, prognostic and diagnostic frames are the motivational frames because emotions are integral for motivation. Propaganda emphasizes the role that prognostic and diagnostic frames have in motivation, attitude formation, and inciting action.

The diagnostic and prognostic frames used in TCP intend to produce either active or passive support in a target audience (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). By leveraging the emotions of a target audience, the terrorist propagandist targets beliefs and assumptions that may be open to persuasion (Jasper, 1998). Active or passive support can result in increased membership for the group, a surge in finances, or additional resources. An effective frame in TCP intends to “infect” its audience into action (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson, 1994). One of the most effective forms of persuasive communication is propaganda.

Propaganda

Propaganda is defined as a set of communicative methods used to persuade by generating direct emotional reactions (Ellul, 1973; Steuter & Willis, 2008; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). Persuasion is defined as affecting attitudes¹⁹ by influencing beliefs about the character and nature of the social world (Chaiken, Wood, & Eagly, 1996; Page & Shapiro, 1992). Persuasion in propaganda occurs when a propagandist effectively revises the content of audience’s beliefs about the social world, and replaces it with a different set of beliefs and attitudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Zaller, 1992). While persuasion captures the overt essence of all types of propaganda, attitude priming (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) and agenda setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) are subtle ways

¹⁹ An attitude is a function or outcome of our favorable and unfavorable beliefs about an issue, person, or object (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980; Anderson 1981; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; McGuire 1985; Zaller 1992).

that some forms of propaganda influence attitudes and alter beliefs about the social world.

Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda is distinct from attitude priming and agenda setting, the subtler communicative methods, because criminogenic propaganda “bombards” an audience with violence, forcing a “heroic” or “horrible” interpretation. The goal of TCP is to dominate the media and public discussion with a terrorist message. Terrorists desire that the attitudes and beliefs of their victims, supporters, and a neutral audience are challenged, bolstered, or changed (Ellul, 1982; Steuter & Willis, 2008). The dissemination of information takes a back seat to accelerating and directing the emotions of a target audience to promote violence.

Terrorist propagandists engage in a unidirectional communicative method—the terrorist to the target audience. Violent incidents are intended to be one way emotional forms of communication that grab the attention of ideological supporters, the neutral audience, and the target/victim. Propaganda is intended to challenge the norms of conventional society and dictate an understanding of the world (Cantril, 1938; Carruthers, 1995; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006). The violent incident is choreographed in such a way to incite emotions in all three audiences in order to benefit the terrorists’ ideology. In a broader context, propaganda functions to challenge the status quo and revolutionize social values (Crimley, 2001; Doob, 1935; Jackall, 1995).

Propaganda is designed to specifically form, dominate, and maintain receptive attitudes by using emotional appeals (Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Lee, 1945; 1952; Pratkanis & Aronson, 2001). Attitude formation, social ties, mobilization, and emotions are intertwined. Effective propaganda intends to mobilize an audience through

emotionally laden diagnostic and prognostic frames. Gaining popular support is arguably one of the most important functions of any political, religious, or social movement (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998; International Crisis Group, 2008). If a social movement fails to gain support from the general population, the movement will likely remain marginalized. Therefore, a propagandist is interested in disseminating his or her information as rapidly and broadly as possible to move from marginalization to mainstream (Lee, 1952; Jowett & O'Donnell, 2006). The propagandist's knowledge of the existing political, cultural and religious context of the mainstream population contributes to the effectiveness of propaganda (Jowett & O'Donnell, 2006; Taylor, 2003). Lee (1952) states that "the intelligent and experienced propagandist can serve as a catalyst of social change or as a temporary stumbling block to delay it" (Lee, 1952; 215).

Mobilization is a prerequisite for revolution (Arreguin-Toft, 2005; Tilly, 1978). Revolutions can begin with a small group of ideologues attempting to master the propaganda craft (Carruthers, 1995). Sometimes propaganda by word and deed is effective, thus turning terrorists or revolutionaries into governmental officials. Propagandists who are dedicated students of history know that in order to overthrow a powerful opponent they must gain support from certain populations (Baird, 1974). Propaganda works best when "the hidden and integrated nature of the propaganda best convinces people that they are not being manipulated" (Snow, 2003; 23).

Propaganda relies on the incitement of emotions to persuade audiences to mobilize and in some case carry out a revolution (Most, 1885; Sproule, 1997; Zeman, 1964; Wright, 1990; Welch, 1983). Since the main objective of propaganda is to generate a reaction, it is critical to identify and analyze which emotions catalyze

supporters to violence. Propagandists commonly use the emotion of shame in diagnostic frames to dominate public discussion in an attempt to persuade (Danchev, 2006; Morgan, 2007; Shapiro, 2003; Linder, 2001; 2006).

The Emotion of Shame

Shame is a social emotion derived from seeing oneself from the perspective of others as detestable. Thomas Scheff, a social psychologist, defines shame as “a class name for a large family of emotions and feelings that arise through seeing the self negatively, *if even only slightly negatively*, through the eyes of others, or even for only anticipating such a reaction” (Scheff, *Working Class Emotions and Relationships*, paragraph 8).²⁰ For example, feeling alienated, humiliated, rejected, or devalued are terms that describe how one is negatively perceived by others. An example of shame can be observed from Hollywood films. Until recently, Hollywood directors and producers have consistently cast Muslim characters in humiliating, uneducated, violent, and inhumane roles (Shaheen, 2003). The emotion of shame therefore enables people to see themselves from the social perspective of “the other” (Tangney & Fischer, 1995). In Hollywood’s case, Muslims watching American films are able to see themselves through Western eyes. When watching these films, Muslims can perceive themselves as being depicted as uneducated, backward, violent or inhumane.

Shame is known to be a powerfully persuasive emotion (Marx, 1843; Darwin, 1916; O’Neal, 1996; Cooley, 1922; Goffman, 1963; Lewis, 1971; Elias, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991). According to some observers, shame is the master emotion because of its power to influence social behavior (Marx, 1843; Scheff, 1994; Scheff & Retzinger,

²⁰ Scheff’s work is an extension of the work of Darwin, Freud, Cooley, Goffman, Lewis, Elias and Braithwaite who also examined emotions in their research and recognized the prominent role of shame.

1991;2000; Gilligan, 1996; Linder, 2001; 2006; Stern, 2010).²¹ Shame functions as an emotional catalyst generating anger, rage and ultimately violence (Scheff, 1994; Gilligan, 1996). Shame in propaganda is framed to produce an emotional response in a target audience leading to an attitudinal shift. Moreover, using shame in propaganda is effective. Shame transmits the perceived injustices, grievances, and motivation to local and global populations.

When shame is framed appropriately it is a trigger emotion. Shame can motivate an individual, a group or both to “reject their rejectors” (Schrang, 1971: 79). Shame is holistic; it describes the entire self and may be evoked by failure, social insult, loss of status, public exposure of a private incident or scapegoating (Lewis, 1971). Shame is magnified when negative perceptions are perceived as unjust. Shame is not produced by a specific situation but rather it is the individual’s interpretation of the situation that matters (Tangney& Fischer, 1995; Blumer, 1969). It is *how* information is framed as shame that is significant because it functions as a powerful catalyst to motivate a target audience into action (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998; Berbrier, 1998).

A propagandist uses shame in diagnostic frames to shape attitudes and beliefs about the “problem.” Persuading a target audience to change attitudes and beliefs is accomplished when shame is used to frame problems from politics, religion, crime, history, culture or current events. By leveraging the target audiences’ shame, a propagandist focuses on beliefs and assumptions that may be open to persuasion (Jasper, 1998). Persuading a target audience via shame can lead to active or passive support, such as increased membership for the group or ideological alignment.

²¹ Gilligan states that “The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether towards others or towards the self.” (Gilligan, 1996: 110)

Shame is often disguised to the research subject and researcher. Goodwin, Jasper & Polletta (2001) conclude that shame is omitted because it is a higher order emotion and is often disguised or misdiagnosed.²² A contributing factor to omitting shame is the myth maintained by some western scholars that individualistic societies are not as motivated by shame as collective based societies (Scheff, 1994). An unfortunate byproduct of this myth is how unaware most in the west are to shame and its power over individual and social behavior. If scholars cannot recognize shame in their own society, then their research is even less likely to be able to identify and analyze shame in other cultures or subcultures (Scheff, 2003). Scholars are less likely to identify shame, but will instead focus on the byproducts of shame such as anger or rage.²³ This happens because anger and rage are emotions that translate across cultures easier than shame; similar to fear, joy and sadness (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Goodwin, Jasper, & Poletta, 2001). Also, anger,

²² A recent example of misdiagnosis is evident in Marc Sageman's highly acclaimed research. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist, holding a M.D. and PhD, analyzes Omar Sheikh in chapter 1 of *Leaderless Jihad* (2008). Omar is the man that would use a knife to behead Daniel Pearl and later hold Pearl's severed head by the hair before a camera and shout "God is Great." Sageman (2008) describes how Omar Sheikh grew up in England and lived in a modest home with caring parents. Omar is described as being intelligent and is remembered as generally having a good character. Sageman (2008) then lists all of the problems that this young man faced while growing up in England. Omar was bullied, called a 'dirty Paki,' his religion was called 'crap' and he was constantly involved in fights. He never really fit in. He was always the outcast. Alienated by his English peers and experiencing difficulty integrating into European society, Omar began to feel a strong sense of inferiority. Omar then connected with others who shared Omar's sense of alienation and rejection. This new connection happened to be ideologically-driven violent jihadis and they assisted in focusing his anger. Omar targeted those whom he held responsible for his painful feelings of inferiority. His bullies at school were a metaphor for a bigger issue. The schoolyard bullies were part of a larger system of beliefs that was out to make all Muslims feel inferior. In order to retaliate against those that made him and others feel inferior, revenge against his bullies was not enough. The system was the target. To avenge perceived wrongs, he embraced a violent jihadist ideology and traveled to Pakistan. Eventually, he kidnapped and murdered Daniel Pearl. Later in his book, Sageman states that shame (Sageman uses the term humiliation) had nothing to do with the 19 hijackers of September 11th (Sageman, 2008). This is surprising since Mohammad Atta's personal narrative parallels Omar Sheikh. Sageman does not see how Omar's life revolved around shame. Sageman describes shame event after shame event and fails to recognize it. He states that none in his sample demonstrates shame. Not only does Sageman fail to identify an emotional narrative, he confidently states that one does not exist. Ironically, though he is arguing against shame, Sageman presents a perfect blueprint of its existence and impact.

²³ Anger and rage are deemed to be different levels of emotions. Rage is defined as a more intense and controlling emotion than anger. Both can originate from the same stimuli, but the terms 'anger' and 'rage' are used to describe the different levels of intensity and proclivity to violence (Lewis, 1971).

fear, joy and sadness are individual emotions whereas shame is a shared or social emotion.

Violent Jihadi and neo-Nazi Shame

Violent jihadis place the burden of shame on the shoulders of each individual Muslim. If Islam is under attack and cannot overcome its opponent, then violent jihadis argue that Allah is displeased with their commitment and purity (Brachman, 2009). Violent jihadis assert that the reason for Allah's displeasure is that the majority of Muslims behave shamefully, thereby polluting their faith (Gerges, 2005; Moghaddam, 2006). Violent jihadis claim that it is shameful that the majority of Muslims do not know the Koran, do not pray regularly, seek after material wealth, ignore the teaching of the Prophet, accept immoral practices and embrace the "isms" of the West (Burke, 2004). Violent jihadis criticize Muslims for failing to follow the "true" faith and for allowing infidels and crusaders to dominate them. Passive Muslims are shamed as apostates, infidels or cowards if they ignore the jihadist call to violence (Gerges, 2005). This call requires them to first purify their hearts and respond with violence against those who shame Muslims (Kepel, 2005).

Neo-Nazis claim that the white race is humanity's highest pinnacle of success—the apex of evolutionary natural selection (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Kaplan, 2000; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998). Being at the racial pinnacle should result in being honored by all other races, not insulted. Any loss of status for the white race (e.g. the election of an African American to the office of U.S. President) is regarded as shameful (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Ferber, 1998; Kaplan, 2000). Neo-Nazis portray the Presidency of Barack Obama as undermining racial evolutionary

progress because it places an inferior non-white in the position of governing the ‘superior’ white race.²⁴ It is shameful on a macro level because neo-Nazis contend that the most powerful nation on earth should be led by the “most accomplished race” (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). Neo-Nazis weave Aryan mysticism, white power music and religion into their message asserting the shame of multiculturalism, affirmative action and other liberal social programs for weakening the white race (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Simi & Futrell, 2010; Futrell, Simi, & Gottschalk, 2006). At a micro level neo-Nazis consider it shameful for members of the white race to be passive and allowing ‘inferior’ races to overshadow them. Neo-Nazis are then shamed into fighting to return to a time where the white race was in a position of full power (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998).

²⁴ http://www.adl.org/PresRele/Extremism_72/5387_72.htm accessed June 2010.

Chapter 3: Methods

Research Design

This comparative study uses a mixed methodology to examine how emotions are integrated in terrorist propaganda with diagnostic and prognostic frames to define subcultural boundaries. Mixed methods unify the strengths of human cognition and computer quantitative processing. Qualitative methods, specifically ontological coding, is used to determine the nuances, implied meaning and interpretation of the data (Katz, 2002). Qualitative methods are used because they enable the “deep emotional meaning” in propaganda to be coded according to substantive and theoretical knowledge (Van Maanen, 1979; Ragin, 2000). Ragin (2000; 5) asserts that “discovery must relinquish many of the homogenizing assumptions that undergird conventional quantitative analysis.” Additionally, qualitative methods enable cultural and contextual knowledge to be integrated into the coding process (Denzin, 2006; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Rubin & Babbie, 1993; Babbie, 1986; Ragin, 2000; Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010). Moreover, qualitative methods enable the researcher to code implied meaning and interpretation in propaganda, in contrast to an automated process, which is common in natural language processing.

Quantitative methods in this research are associated with network text analysis (NTA). NTA is based on algorithms associated with graph algebra. NTA is a departure from mainstream quantitative approaches and returns to the ecologically embedded perspective of social facts within contexts of time, space, and culture (Emirbayer & Goodwin, 1994; Simmel, 1955; Abbott, 1992; Bakker, 1987). The ecological perspective is possible because NTA pairs ontological coding, a qualitative method, with the

analytical capabilities of computer automation. NTA enables data to be examined with the depth and proximity associated with qualitative techniques combined with the precision and inferential strength of quantitative techniques (Carley, 1993).

Research Questions

Using frame analysis, this study answers four research questions to gain a better understanding of how ideas and emotions are framed within terrorist propaganda to define subcultural boundaries and neutralize objections. I focus specifically on “diagnostic” and “prognostic” frames that outline problems and solutions in propaganda (Snow & Benford, 1988). Diagnostic frames identify grievances and injustices, while prognostic frames outline how a social movement provides the solution to counter and overcome these injustices (Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow & Byrd, 2007). I focus on two social movements, neo-Nazism and violent jihadism, to answer the following research questions:

1. What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?
2. What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?
3. What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?
 - a. Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda?

Emotions are central to frames and framing because they organize individual and collective experience (Goffman, 1974). Identifying and analyzing how emotions are used to frame terrorist propaganda involves outlining how ideology and emotions intersect. The following section outlines the purpose, rationale, and procedures for each research question.

- What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?

The purpose of this question is to operationalize how emotions, specifically shame, is used by neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists in diagnostic frames. Procedures involve using an ontology as a coding scheme to identify the types of diagnostic frames via content analysis. Ontological coding generates the types of diagnostic frames that neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use over a period of fifty years. Content analysis accounts for culture and context from a symbolic understanding of what is contained in the text (Blumer, 1969; Krippendorf, 2004; Altheide, 1987; 2008; Krippendorf & Bock, 2009). Dyer (1987) and Katz (2002) assert that there is deep emotional meaning in text and that affect cannot be properly identified by any other method. The rationale behind this question is to discover how diagnostic framing functions as an emotional catalyst to inciting criminogenic behavior to neutralize inner conflict and conventional values over violent neo-Nazi and violent jihadi subcultural norms.

- What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?

The purpose of this question is to operationalize the types of prognostic frames used in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. Similar to the first research question, procedures involve using an ontology as a coding scheme to identify prognostic frames. The findings will reveal the types of solutions that propagandists suggest to counter white or Islamic injustices over a period of fifty years. The rationale behind this question is to discover how neo-Nazi and violent jihadis use prognostic frames to promote subcultural solutions over conventional culture solutions. Prognostic frames enable a violent jihadi

or neo-Nazi to shut off “inner objections” to violent or radical solutions by neutralizing irrationality associated with violent or radical solutions. I examine how violent or radical solutions are also framed as “altruistic” responses connected to ensuring the “greater good” for whites or Muslims.

- What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?

The purpose of this question is to understand the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in propaganda. I define the term “relationship” in this study as the degree of contact that prognostic and diagnostic have in the text. The relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames is operationalized by frame prevalence, links between frames (closeness) and frame location. Analytic procedures are based on algorithms derived from graph algebra in NTA.²⁵ Understanding closeness between prognostic and diagnostic frames reveals how propagandists construct their form of propaganda. Closeness is a measure to understand where individual nodes (frames) lie between other nodes in the network. Closeness reflects another way of understanding the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text and over time. Examining the closeness between nodes takes into account the connectivity of the node’s neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that have the shortest paths to other nodes in the network. The specific algorithms, along with other measures associated with NTA, are outlined in Figure 10 in the appendix.

- Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda?

²⁵ NTA reveals the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in the text, visualizes this relationship, and measures network properties.

The purpose of this supporting research question is to identify where a propagandist embeds diagnostic and prognostic frames in order to reveal the propagandist's communicative strategy. A propagandist communicative strategy is important for three reasons. First, communicative strategy is significant for policy reasons. Understanding where a propagandist embeds diagnostic or prognostic frames makes it possible to create counter propaganda using a similar format. Where information is located in any form of communication impacts comprehension and reveals the author's method of conveying intent (or in this case the propagandist's intent). Where information is placed in written forms of communication is significant and specific formats are required in academic articles, fiction, and non-fiction as best practices. Therefore determining if a similar structure exists in propaganda is equally important. Second, frame location reveals the anatomy of propaganda. Understanding where frames are located assists in determining if a propagandist maintains a consistent prognostic or diagnostic theme or if changes across the text. A prognostic or diagnostic theme reveals whether a propagandist's primary task is to diagnose a problem by spending the majority of the text "enlightening" a target audience to a "pressing" subcultural problem or is the "problem" understood and the "right" solution(s) is the central theme. Third, frame location provides another way to examine how diagnostic and prognostic frames are in contact across the document. Frame location assists in determining whether an entire document is skewed prognostically or diagnostically or just certain sections. This is important because frame location provides another method of examining the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in text.

Operationalizing Diagnostic/Prognostic Frames

An ontology operationalizes emotions in diagnostic and prognostic frames. An ontology in this research is defined as a method to operationalize the symbolic interaction between ideology, emotions, and framing. An ontology provides the boundaries for creating a coding scheme to identify emotion in diagnostic or prognostic frames. Using an ontology is absolutely essential when observing “the looking glass self” from the perspective of “the other” (Cooley, 1922). Ontologies are not new, and have been used by cognitive sociologists (Carley, 1984; 1986; Cicourel 1974), cultural theorists (Namewirth & Weber, 1987) and organizational theorists (Feldman & March, 1981). However, using an ontology to code affect in diagnostic and prognostic frames in terrorist propaganda is a new application.

An ontology is grounded in the philosophy of phenomenology. Phenomenology asserts that researchers should examine knowledge from different points of view, which include that of the propagandist (Macann, 2007; Heidegger, 2000). Phenomenology coupled with symbolic interactionism (Blumer 1969; Douglas, 1970; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) seeks to uncover meaning behind action and how reality is constructed through the ongoing process of social interaction.

Katz (2002) emphasized the need to use a “naturalistic social ontology” when research focuses on interpreting textual emotional symbols. The use of symbols forms the basis of symbolic interaction (Blumer, 1969; Stryker, 1980; Mead, 1962; 1964). Katz (2002; 258) explains that the goal of an ontology is not to “elevate any part of social reality above any other” but to define reality as it experienced by different audiences. Criminologists using an ontology as a coding scheme can benefit from its fluidity

because it highlights how emotional symbols communicate different meaning to different audiences.

Dyer (1987) asserts that because of the deep emotional meaning in the text, affect cannot be properly identified by any other method. Automated computer processing of emotions in text cannot compete with human cognition in identifying context or culture (Krippendorf, 2004).²⁶ The word “black” could be used metaphorically or literally and presently a computer cannot distinguish between the two (Altheide, 1987; 2008).²⁷

Coding according to an ontology requires an analyst to become thoroughly familiar with the research subject (Lofland, 1976) and allows hypotheses to emerge throughout the data collection process (Rubin & Babbie, 1993; Babbie, 1986; Krippendorf, 2004).

Criminologists using an ontology are able to operationalize emotions to deconstruct the social, cultural, and historical setting that sheds light on how the subject interprets, understands, and communicates emotion (Denzin & Lincoln, 1998; Blumer,

²⁶ Liu and Lieberman and Selker (2003) identify a model to account for context and culture for affect in text. They combine key word spotting with a large database, the Common Sense Database, to establish a degree of context when mining text for emotions. The ‘Common Sense Database’ enables machines or automated scanning to examine emotions in context and within some rudimentary form of context. The purpose of their model is to account for context/culture while trying to keep the process fully automated. In other words, this methodology uses lexicon spotting but with an additional resource that attempts to provide the proper context. Again, the limitation with this method is the inability to account for deep meaning, sentences, paragraphs, or sub group culture. Though promising, machines cannot compete with human cognition in identifying affect beyond key words, lexical identifiers or markers.

²⁷ Key word in context (KWIC) denotes the process of using ‘markers’ to identify affect with computers. KWIC or key word spotting is widely used to scan the internet or volumes of documents because it is time efficient, reliable, fully automated and systematic. However a significant limitation to KWIC is the reliance of a single word to ‘mark’ shame. Examining shame through a single word marker excludes sentences or paragraphs that do not use any of the key words identified as shame. For example, shame communicated in propaganda that does not use a key word but stories, metaphors, allegories and humor is missed by the KWIC method. For example, when violent jihadis reference Israel’s defeat of Egypt in 1967 it is done so to illustrate a shameful event, but the word ‘shame’ is not necessarily used. Neo-Nazis bemoan the fact that having an African American President is a shameful event for the white race, though a key shame word is not used, Obama’s presidency is seen a shameful event for the United States (Wright, 2006; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Egypt’s defeat or having an African American President would not be marked as a shame because a ‘marker’ or key shame word was not used. Moreover, a second limitation is a machine’s inability to distinguish context or culture in propaganda.

1969).²⁸ Since writing texts is what propagandists do, observing the entire piece of propaganda, rather than excerpts, is the natural setting in which a propagandist's mental and emotional frames can be observed. Therefore, an ontology integrates corporeal process because it accounts for culture and context and a symbolic understanding of the emotional content contained in the text (Blumer, 1969; Krippendorf, 2004; Altheide, 1987; 2008; Katz, 2002).

Outside of criminology, an ontology is defined as a coding scheme or textual boundary, to operationalize emotions in text. The use of ontologies is a common practice in linguistics, natural language processing, and sentiment analysis (Liu, Lieberman & Selker, 2003). Ontologies are flexible because they account for the context of how words are used and the culture in which they exist. When identifying emotions in text, ontologies emphasize semantic boundaries over the more common practice of relying on synonyms.

For example, the emotion of shame, which is considered a higher order emotion, is often disguised to the both the research subject and researcher (Lewis, 1971; Jasper, Goodwin, & Poletta, 2001). Developing an ontology assists not only in detection, but operationalization. Tissari's (2006) analysis of the word "shame" in the English language provides an example of what is meant by an emotional ontology. Kovecses (1986) based the ontological boundaries (see figure 4) of shame from written documents ranging from

²⁸ The goal is to observe affect in textual context (Van Maanen, 1979). This allows the analyst to view the 'natural setting' in which the emotion of emotion is framed.

the years 1418-1998.²⁹ Tissari's (2006) shame ontology was intended for the mainstream use of language and can be adapted to be used for terrorist emotional frames.

Figure 4: Tissari (2006) Emotion Ontology Boundaries

Boundary	Boundary Defined
Failure	Individual or collective non-achievement
Poverty	Economic
Undesired Social Status	Not belonging to a prestigious group, or belonging to a non-prestigious group
Flawed	deficient physical appearance, lack of physical or mental capabilities, skills, or properties
Morally Defective	Deficient moral qualities
State of Weakness	powerlessness, coward, inaction

Ontologies are used in this research to identify emotions embedded in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic and diagnostic frames. How a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi propagandists integrates emotion, ideology, and frames varies; therefore, different ontologies are needed. The boundaries for each diagnostic ontology are based on Tissari's (2006) analysis of the word "shame" in the English language from the year 1418 – 1998 and Kovecses (1986) scholarship on emotional lexical structures.³⁰ However, because Tissari's (2006) shame ontology was intended for mainstream use of language,

²⁹ Linguistic scholars examined several word corpuses to identify the context and how the term has been used historically. Linguists use word corpuses or databases to store natural language in order to examine how the meaning and use of words change over time.

³⁰ Linguistic scholars examined several word corpuses to identify the context and how the term has been used historically. Linguists use word corpuses or databases to store natural language in order to examine how the meaning and use of words change over time.

rather than terrorist ideology, a modified version of the ontology was used for this study.³¹

Network Text Analysis (NTA)

Network text analysis (NTA) provides a method to analyze the integration of emotions, ideology, and frames in terrorist propaganda. NTA has existed for over 50 years and is a subset of social network analysis (SNA)---a widely used research technique in sociology and criminology (McGloin, 2005; Fleisher, 2005; Papachristos, 2006; Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Berkowitz, 1982; Borgatti, 2005; Wellman, 1998; Burt, 1992; Krebs, 2006; Carley, 2006). SNA, which relies on measuring relational ties between nodes, has become an interdisciplinary method (Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Berkowitz, 1982; Borgatti, 2005; Wellman, 1999; Burt, 1992; Krebs, 2006; Carley, 2006; Scott, 2000). Applications of SNA include examining the spread of disease, hiring applications, organizational structure, and family/friends associations. The goal of SNA is to identify, graph, and then visualize all of the relevant ties that exist between individuals, organizations or other nodes.³² In the case of SNA, nodes are typically defined as individuals with relationships with other individuals or organizations, and the links between them are the focal point of examination. As compared to SNA, nodes in NTA can be ideas, concepts, or emotions specifically derived from text. There are currently six NTA methods³³ used to examine textual relationships.³⁴

³¹ See figures 11, 12, 13 & 14 in the appendices for ontologies and definitions.

³² The theoretical grounding of social networks has long history in scholarship. (Durkheim; 1893 Tonnies, 1887; Simmel, 1955; Nadel, 1957; Tilly, 2005; Wasserman, 1994; Berkowitz, 1982; Borgatti, 2005; Wellman, 1998; Burt, 1992; Krebs, 2006; Carley, 2006).

³³ Centering Resonance Analysis (Corman et al. 2002), Functional Depiction (Roberts, 1997), Knowledge Graphing (Bakker, 1987; James, 1992; Popping, 2003), Map Analysis (Carley, 1988, 1977, Carley & Palmquist, 1992) Network Evaluation (Kleinninjenhuuis, Ridder & Reitber, 1996), and World Network Analysis (Danowski, 1982). Each approach varies in the focus of nouns/verbs, the degree of generalization of the concepts, the degree of automation and the visual output. However, they all share the similar belief

A particular strength of NTA is that extracted networks can be collected in a theoretical fashion (Diesner & Carley, 2005). The theoretical and philosophical assumptions behind NTA are: 1) a relationship exists between frames and language, 2) a relationship exists between words and their intended meaning and 3) social knowledge or shared meaning exists between cultures and context (Diesner & Carley, 2004; 2005). Carley and Palmquist (1992) assert that people's language represents an individual's frame and these concepts can be represented as semantic networks. NTA constructs a network of linked words and concepts by identifying the relationships that exist between the words in text (Carley, 2006; Carley & Palmquist, 1992; Popping, 2000).

NTA generates consistent analytic decisions, providing a systematic method to examine how diagnostic and prognostic frames are used in terrorist propaganda.³⁵ Consistent analytic decisions are derived from a systematic process of data entry, coding, and computational analysis providing a reliable method of analyzing frames in propaganda (Diesner & Carley, 2005; Popping, 2000; Scott, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).³⁶ NTA enables diagnostic and prognostic frames to be generated as semantic networks for visualization and analysis (Diesner and Carley, 2004; 2005). Semantic networks are important because they link the relationship between emotional words and concepts that exists in propaganda (Carley & Palmquist, 1992; Popping, 2003). These

that NTA is used as a window to reveal the structure of the text, extract overt and hidden concepts and reveal the author's various 'frames.'

³⁴ NTA in its present form, is derived from an earlier format of hand crafted techniques used by intelligence agencies during the Second World War. NTA, in its current form is a fully automated or semi-automated and continues to evolve with advances in computing (Eden, Jones & Sims, 1979; Roberts, 1997; Stubbs, 1983; Popping, 2003).

³⁶ NTA as a standardized process involves a minimum of four steps: 1) identify concepts; 2) define the type of relationships that exist between those concepts; 3) a semi-automated data cleaning process; and 4) display coded texts visually graphically and/or statistically (Carley and Palmquist, 1992).

links provide the analytic capability for NTA to determine how nodes interact with each other in text.

NTA enables diagnostic and prognostic frames to be mapped and analyzed (Diesner and Carley, 2004; 2005). Using NTA in this manner enables closeness measures to be analyzed between diagnostic and prognostic nodes by creating semantic networks via graph algebra (Diesner & Carley, 2005; Popping, 2000; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

Analytical Procedures

NTA relies on graph algebra, a mathematical system developed to understand the relationship between points (Wasserman, 1994; Bonacich, 1972). Unlike linear modeling, semantic networks are generated by the relationships that exist semantically, proximally, or linguistically between words or concepts (Carley, 1986; Danowski, 1993; Roberts, 1989; Dyer, 1983). Semantic networks are then generated to visually depict the relationships between the nodes in the text. Semantic networks focus on the relationships between concepts and the web of meaning embedded in the text (Fauconnier, 1985; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Genter & Stevens, 1983; Bobrow & Collins, 1976; Sowa, 1984; Kaufer & Carley, 1993; Cicourel, 1974).

Generating semantic networks involves computational modeling of socio-technical systems and link analysis by using Automap and ORA (Organizational Risk Analyzer) developed by CASOS (Computation Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems).³⁷ A semantic network allows network measures of each node to be quantitatively analyzed.

³⁷ Automap and ORA (Organizational Risk Analyzer) are the software packages used for this research. Automap, a semi automated natural language processing software developed by CASOS (computational

Research Sample

Rationale

I used purposive sampling in this study to collect data for frame analysis. The objective of purposive sampling is to obtain data from very distinct populations for in-depth analysis (Patton, 1990; Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010). If a population's characteristics are too narrow or specialized, probabilistic sampling strategies are not conducive to selecting an adequate sample (Patton, 1990; Babbie & Benaquisto, 2010). In contrast to probabilistic sampling, it is the characteristics of the population that determines how a purposive sample is constructed. In other words, research parameters define who should be in the sample, (e.g., terrorists with Ph.D.'s, terrorists who have won the Nobel Peace Prize or terrorists who have attempted to construct biological weapons). In similar fashion, a population of "effective" terrorist propagandists is based on a narrow set of research parameters. The first parameter involved selecting ideologies associated with two different terrorism movements, which resulted in identifying neo-Nazism and violent jihadism.

Neo-Nazism and violent jihadism were selected for two primary reasons. First, both ideologies are significant global social problems. Neo-Nazis tend to engage in

analysis for social and organizational systems), assists researchers in cleaning text data and generating semantic networks (Diesner & Carley, 2005). This software was selected because it can process large-scale textual data, and because it can convert raw text into a semantic network that can be cross-indexed and analyzed with other software packages (Diesner & Carley, 2004, 2005). Automap is intended to be used with ORA or another software package to enable network visualization and analysis. This research uses ORA for visualization and analysis.

ORA was initially designed as a network analysis tool to detect risks in an organizational design structure. ORA use has evolved into having various applications because of its ability to examine over 100 measures in meta matrixes and semantic networks. ORA's input and output requirements are organized according to which measure is queried. The reports are formatted and viewable in log files, on screen and other formats that can be operated by other network analysis software programs. ORA also consists of graphical software for visualizing and editing meta-matrix and semantic data. Data networks can be visualized into network structures and analytical reports can be queried from these networks. ORA also has a Java interface and a C++ computational backend (Carley & Reminga, 2004).

violence on a sub-national level, while violent jihadis are currently engaged in a campaign of worldwide violence (Potok, 2010; Simi, 2010; LaFree, 2009; Rice, 2009; Sageman, 2008; Simi & Futrell, 2010). Neo-Nazism violence includes the 1995 Oklahoma City Bombing, armored car hijackings, assassinations, counterfeit operations, organized military training camps, and detonated bombs (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Kaplan, 2000; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998). Violent jihadi violence includes the attacks on the world trade center in 1993 and 2001 (9/11), the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, the 2004 Madrid train bombings, the 2004 Khobar massacre, and the 2005 London transport bombings (Hoffman, 2006).

Neo-Nazis claim that the white race is humanity's highest pinnacle of success and responsible for the utmost intellectual and cultural progress (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Ferber, 1998; Whitsell, 1995;1998). Neo-Nazi propaganda emphasizes that the white race is a type of religion, the apex of natural selection, responsible for social progress, and is under attack from race mixers, Jews, and non whites (Michael, 2006; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000).

Neo-Nazi ideology perceives that groups are needed to protect the white race and by doing so, racial violence would eventually move from an insurgency to open war. Neo-Nazis believe a race-specific ideology grounded in a white religion sets the perfect stage for white preservation (Simi & Futrell, 2010; Michael, 2006). If whites associate their race to a religion, it is more likely to inspire reverence, loyalty, and activism in segments of the white population. Neo-Nazis argue that the white race is a sacred element; therefore, protecting white children and women is considered a duty for racial

preservation (Whitsell, 1995;1998; Griffin, 2001). Since the white race is sacred and threatened, whites who reproduce with non whites are deemed race traitors (Whitsell, 1995; 1998; Simi & Futrell, 2010). In an increasing effort to preserve the white race, some neo-Nazis forecast a future racial holy war, where racial cleansing ensures white racial salvation (Zeskind, 2009).

Violent jihadis profess that their ideology is the pure manifestation of Islam, an ideology adhering to Sharia or Islamic sacred law, and the teachings of the Prophet (Scheuer, 2002; Aaron, 2008). Violent jihadis use propaganda to prove that all Muslims are under attack economically, militarily, religiously, and culturally, and that it is the defensive obligation of every true Muslim to fight against attacking forces (Kepel, 2006; Qutb, 1988). Violent jihadis cite victory in battle as a sign from Allah of his divine favor (Scheuer, 2002). For example, violent jihadis cite their victory in Afghanistan against the Soviets as evidence regarding the power of their version of jihad (Aaron, 2008).

Violent jihadis assert that the Islamic world has entered a period of occupation and division (Burke, 2004). Propaganda is then used to prove that all Muslims are under attack economically, militarily, religiously, and culturally, and that it is the defensive obligation of every true Muslim to fight against attacking forces (Calvert, 2000; 2007). Using propaganda, violent jihadis claim that non-Muslim forces are occupying and dividing Islam through covert and overt tactics (Aaron, 2008). Violent jihadis rage in their propaganda that “true” Muslims cannot remain passive or indifferent in the midst of a non-Muslim invasion (Gerges, 2005; Moghaddam, 2006).

Violent jihadis argue that Islam has become impure because other Muslims have allowed apostasies and religious ignorance to dominate conventional culture (. Violent

jihadi propaganda claims that “impure Islam” is the reason that Israel continues to exist and non-Muslim soldiers remain in Muslim lands (Brachman, 2009). Violent jihadis seek full submission to the Quran by all Muslims in order to regain the spiritual, economic, and political supremacy that Islam maintained in the past. Full submission to the Quran is implemented by establishing a socio-cultural religious system that acts as a strong form of social control. Violent jihadis assert that secularism, “manmade” laws, and immoral lifestyles are valued by the majority of Muslims over Sharia law (Kepel, 2005). Their version of Islam dictates that any social innovation, such as secular law, is blasphemous and counter to the teaching of the prophet.

The second reason is methodological. A comparative research design emphasizes collecting and analyzing data from different sources to determine if a phenomenon is cross-cultural (Barak, 2000; Messner & Rosenfeld, 1997; Durkheim, 1964; LaFree, 2007; Bennett, 2004; Reichel, 1994; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990; Ragin; 1987; 1998; 2000). Comparative research is advantageous to examine frames in criminogenic propaganda because parallels suggest the discovery of a general principle (Bennett, 2004; Ragin, 2000; Lijphart, 1975; McMichael, 1990).

Effective Propaganda

“Effective” neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda is another purposive characteristic for my sample. By effective propaganda, I mean propaganda that has a documented influence on a target audience. Effective propaganda is defined as having a proven track record of resonating with target audiences in a way that changes attitudes and beliefs. Theoretically, studying effective propaganda supports McAdam’s (1986) emphasis on attitude formation because effective propaganda can contribute to forming

receptive attitudes. Analytically, examining effective propaganda also reveals a propagandist’s “best practices” in how to construct propaganda.

I use a continuum to determine varying degrees of effectiveness. Using a systematic method based on four measures (citation analysis, bibliometrics, frequencies of downloads, and influence), I determined what could be labeled as “effective” propaganda. I created a population of effective neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists from these measures. Propaganda that did not rank high on the continuum was labeled ineffective. From the “effective” propaganda population, purposive sampling was used to determine which propagandists and their published propaganda to include in this study. This systematic method created a sample of 5 neo-Nazi propagandists and 5 violent jihadi propagandist and 10 samples of their written propaganda (see figure 5).³⁸ Conversely, as a control measure, two ineffective propagandists,--a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi-- and their published work are also included for analysis.

Figure 5: Research Sample

Violent Jihadi and Neo-Nazi Propagandist	Published Propaganda
Sayyid Qutb	<i>Milestones</i>
Abdullah Azzam	<i>Join the Caravan</i>
Ayman al-Zawahiri	<i>Knights Under the Prophets Banner</i>
Osama bin Laden	<i>Declaration of War: Jihad Communiqués</i>
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi	<i>This is our Aqeedah</i>
CONTROL-Abd al-Bari	<i>The Slicing Sword</i>
George Rockwell	<i>White Power</i>

³⁸ The sample spans from the 1960’s until 2009.

William Pierce	<i>The Turner Diaries</i>
Ben Klassen	<i>The White Man's Bible</i>
David Lane	<i>The 88 Precepts</i>
David Duke	<i>Jewish Supremacism</i>
CONTROL-Thomas Chittim	<i>Civil War 2</i>

Constructing a population of effective propagandists begins with examining who is popular in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi online libraries. Constructing a population of violent jihadi propagandists, McCants and Brachman (2006), leading scholars at West Point's Combating Terrorism Centers (CTC), determined whose violent jihadi propaganda was being read and referenced. Using the frequency of downloads, citation analysis, and bibliometrics from Al Taweed, the Al Qaeda virtual library, McCants and Brachman (2006) documented which pieces of propaganda and which propagandists were influential among violent jihadis.³⁹ McCants and Brachman's analysis (2006) created a list of "who's who" among effective violent jihadi propagandists. Generating an effective list of neo-Nazis propagandists involved the same process. EBooks proved useful for this task. EBooks, "the world's leading publishers for the racially aware,"⁴⁰ records the highest frequency of neo-Nazi propaganda downloads. In the same fashion, EBooks records the frequency of which effective neo-Nazi propagandists form the population baseline. However, there are limitations to relying solely on on-line libraries to generate a population and sample.

³⁹ www.tawhed.ws accessed Jan. 19 2011.

⁴⁰ <http://wn-pdfs.tk/> accessed Jan. 18 2011.

A primary limitation is that the “degree of influence” of a propagandist is not always measured in the number of times a document is downloaded or cited. McCants and Brachman (2006) acknowledge this limitation. Other factors must also be taken into account, such as a propagandist’s degree of influence is partly a function of one or more of the following: 1) being a founder of a separate group in the neo-Nazi or violent jihadi movement, 2) being an influential leader in their movement, 2) being imprisoned or tortured for their ideology, 3) dying as a martyr, 4) demonstrating unwavering commitment to the cause, 5) serving as a role model to members in the group, or 6) making a significant contribution to ideology. Accounting for degree of influence from this perspective incorporates substantive knowledge absent from online libraries. A propagandist’s “degree of influence” renders certain credibility to their propaganda, thus effectively leveraging a target audience to be persuaded.

Finally, I use face validity to determine degree of influence. To demonstrate face validity, a short biographical sketch outlines each propagandist’s degree of influence either as a neo-Nazi or violent jihadist (see appendices). In purposive sampling, a propagandist’s biography can serve as a measure of face validity to confirm that “effectiveness” parameters are met by my sample of neo-Nazi and violent jihadist propagandists. Biographical sketches highlight the following criteria: 1) founded a separate group in the neo-Nazi or violent jihadi movement, 2) leadership, 2) imprisonment or torture, 3) martyrdom, 4) unwavering racial or religious loyalty, 5) a mentoring role model, or 6) ideological contributions.

CHAPTER 4: Findings-Diagnostic Frames

Introduction

Chapters one and two outline the context and conceptual background for three central research questions. Chapter three examines the data, research design and qualitative/quantitative procedures employed in investigating these research questions. This chapter answers the following research question: What types of diagnostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda?

The first section of this chapter reviews the conceptual role of frames and the emotion of shame in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. The next section identifies the types of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi diagnostic frames and their prevalence. The chapter concludes by examining the similarities and differences in the way neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use shame in diagnostic frames.

How diagnostic frames organize experience can be divided in three central tasks. First, diagnostic frames are selected by a propagandist to specify the problems or what I label as “blame targets.” Blame targets in propaganda function to outline those responsible for racial or religious problems. Second, diagnostic frames contribute in forming attitudes and social ties because they function as powerful communication agents (Ryan, 1991). Third, diagnostic frames assist in drift. Drift is defined as the process of moving back and forth from conventional norms to those of a subculture of violence (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Drift occurs because diagnostic frames function as a technique to neutralize conflicting “inner voices” and conventional culture, by substituting conventional cultural norms with those associated with subcultures of violence.

However, unlike drift described by Sykes & Matza (1957), drift into a terrorist subculture of violence is meant to be permanent.

Directing a target audience to violence begins by shaping attitudes that are receptive towards violent jihadi and neo-Nazi ideology. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists seek to construct reality and organize experience through their point of view. Diagnostic frames enable ideologues to channel the source of injustices, humiliation, and oppression into a series of scapegoats or “blame targets.”

Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use shame in diagnostic frames to shape attitudes and beliefs by casting white or Islamic “problems” as *the* way to organize experience. Similar to how diagnostic frames function in other social movements (Jasper, 1998), neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists also use shame in diagnostic frames to persuade whites or Muslims to support their cause. Persuasion occurs when a target audience begins to organize how they experience the social world through a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi lens.

Figure 6 illustrates the diagnostic typology developed in this research for both neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. A diagnostic typology organizes the ninety-three violent jihadi/neo-Nazi diagnostic frames discovered in this research into six central categories.⁴¹

Figure 6 A neo-Nazi/Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Typology

Category	Category Defined
Out-Group Failures	Individual or collective non-achievement influenced by non-whites/non-Muslims.
Out-Group Generates Economic Hardship for In-Group	Economic disadvantages produced by non-whites/non-Muslims.

⁴¹ Tables 17 and 18 (see appendix) shows the forty-seven neo-Nazi and forty-six violent jihadi diagnostic frame types identified during analysis.

Out-Group humiliates In-group	Inferior “out-group” unjustly targets whites/non-Muslims to humiliate.
Out-group Flaws	Inferior non-Muslims/non-whites possesses deficient physical qualities, substandard mental capabilities, ideas, or properties.
Out-Group Immorality	“Non-whites/non-Muslims possesses and/or contributes immoral qualities to the white race or Islam.
In-Group Weakness	Whites/Muslims are powerlessness, cowards, or passive.

Diagnostic frames are divided into six categories that focus on in-group or out-group conflict. In-group/out-groups is a concept social scientists use to understand how individuals perceive and organize the social world (Simmel, 1955; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Sherif, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961; Bass & Dunteman, 1963; Johnson, 1967; Park, Ryan & Judd, 1992; Sherman, 1993). The six categories defined in figure 6 explain how information is constructed to generate shame by using out-group or in-group conflict. Propagandists maximize out-group/in-group conflict by framing racial or religious problems according to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi ideology. The purpose of each category, from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi perspective, is to validate and rationalize the “wrongness” of the out-group, outline how an inferior out-group (non-whites and non-Muslims) is unjustly treating the in-group, (whites and “true” Muslims) and describe how whites or Muslims are shamefully weak in responding to out-group injustices.

Typologies and Types of Diagnostic Frames

A Typology of Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frames

A neo-Nazi diagnostic typology specifies the categories or “blame targets” that promote moving into a permanent neo-Nazi subculture from conventional culture. Each “blame target” identified in table 4, serves as a form of subcultural social control to leverage neo-Nazis from organizing experience through conventional culture to a neo-Nazi interpretation. Therefore, neo-Nazi diagnostic frames function as a set of “new”

social boundaries that serves to internalize and justify neo-Nazi behavior because of their “validity.” If interpreted from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi perspective, emotive responses are the outcome, specifically shame, which assists in internalizing why neo-Nazism is needed to save the white race from extinction.

Table 1 Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Typological Categories over Time

	Out-Group Failures	Out-Group Generates Economic Hardship for In-Group	Out-Group humiliates In-Group	Out-Group Flaws	Out-Group Immorality	In-Group Weakness
Propagandist						
Rockwell (1967)	15%	2%	5%	48%	16%	14%
Pierce (1978)	35%	1%	6%	25%	10%	23%
Klassen (1981)	25%	2%	3%	38%	19%	13%
Lane (1994)	40%	9%	0%	22%	12%	17%
Duke (2003)	5%	1%	16%	52%	17%	9%
Chittum (1997)	24%	1%	3%	43%	1%	28%
Summary	24%	3%	6%	37%	13%	17%

The most prevalent neo-Nazi emotive triggers used to internalize and justify neo-Nazi behavior are out-group failures and flaws. Table 1 illustrates the prevalence of each type of diagnostic frame when diagnostic frames are divided into typological categories.⁴² An interesting finding is frame consistency over time. Frame consistency implies that the method of how information, specifically blame targets, is framed remains constant over time. Though the exact type of frame may vary, when organized in typological categories, neo-Nazi propagandists show little variation in how they construct

⁴²Table 17 (see appendix) illustrates the forty seven types of neo-Nazi diagnostic frames identified from the data.

propaganda. Though the same pattern is reflected in Chittum's text, (Chittum is a lesser known neo-Nazi propagandist), the finding suggests that replicating "effective" formats or repeating the same diagnostic frames does not always ensure "success." This finding also indicates that factors (i.e., degree of influence, leadership, mentorship, demonstrated racial loyalty) other than how propaganda is constructed are mitigating factors in determining a propagandist's effectiveness.

The diagnostic frames discovered in neo-Nazi propaganda reflect a shared world view over time. A neo-Nazi world view argues that white civilization and culture are on the verge of extinction, blacks are inherently inferior and Jews dominate world affairs through a relatively small "cabal" that controls the media and economy across the globe. Neo-Nazis assert that current democracies are controlled by a Zionist Jewish agenda, which unites them in sharing violent anti-Semitic views. Neo-Nazis also argue that "Zionists" have manipulated information to gain world sympathy to use to their political advantage. The following excerpts from Rockwell and Duke capture this world view.

Communism - largely Jewish. Zionism - all Jewish. The Black Revolution - largely Jewish. 99.9% Jew-financed. Commercial degeneracy and pornography largely Jewish. Commercial racketeering in "religion", with their "K's" and "U's" Jewish, as in Christ's time. Movies, TV, press, books, magazines - strictly kosher. (Rockwell, 1966: 88)

When I learned of the Jewish role in the slave trade, it seemed to me that it could have certainly added to the resentment against the Jews felt by their host populations. Being known as the greatest perpetrators of the slave trade is not the best of public relations for Jews. It is no wonder that the Jewish-dominated media have avoided the issue. Only Jewish scholars, who faithfully record Jewish history, primarily for Jewish readers, are allowed to travel on to such forbidden historical ground. (Duke, 2003: 372)

Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames function as information boundaries through the inclusion or exclusion of information. Meaning is emotionally framed to dominate how neo-Nazis should feel about themselves and non-whites in conventional culture. The

diagnostic frames examined in this research form the “ideological foundation stones” for neo-Nazism and continue to be used despite changes in the social world that have occurred over the past 50 years. Therefore, each neo-Nazi diagnostic frame, from a social movement perspective, can be defined as an action oriented belief constructed in a way to motivate, incite, and legitimize neo-Nazi attitudes and actions.

Diagnostic frames are action oriented because diagnostic frames are intended be inclusive and flexible, broad in interpretive scope, and maintain greater social/racial boundary appeal. Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames are emotionally constructed forms of communication that harness symbolic characteristics so that whites can identify with a neo-Nazi way of organizing their experience. The intended outcome is to convey to all whites the necessity of neo-Nazism in order to mobilize and revolutionize the current racial climate. The following example illustrates how diagnostically framing modern immorality is broad in scope and intended to resonate with members of the white race who find the shift in conventional culture problematic.

Nor have the girls remained entirely passive. Sexual debauchery of every sort on the part of young White men and women-and even children in their pre-teens-has reached a level which would have been unimaginable only two or three years ago. The queers, the fetishists, the mixed-race couples, the sadists, and the exhibitionists-urged on by the mass media- are parading their perversions in public, and the public is joining them. (Pierce, 1978: 58)

Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames function as powerful communication agents that impact attitude formation.⁴³ Maintaining receptive neo-Nazi attitudes is a pre-requisite for responding favorably to existing neo-Nazi ties or as a motive to seek out relationships to reinforce these attitudes. Frames emphasize specific information, while excluding

⁴³ McAdam's (1986) expanded Snow, Zurcher and Eklund-Olson's (1980) micromobilization model of social movements to outline the significance of attitude formation and its link in maintaining or establishing social ties. McAdam's approach emphasizes the relationship between receptive attitudes and the formation or maintenance of social ties (McAdam, 1986).

other forms, impacting individual neo-Nazis or group attitudes because of the significance attached to others who share similar attitudes.

Rockwell reasoned that corrupt Jewish influence catalyzed the Civil Rights Movement, the rising threat of communism in the United States and the decline of American morality. The diagnostic frames used by Rockwell argued that whites being humiliated and oppressed by non-whites to the brink of racial extinction could be attributed to Jewish influence in the government, media and masterminding the Civil Rights Movement. Rockwell also rails against the weakened condition of whites who remain passive despite crime, violence, taxation and all forms of racial pollution occurring around them. Rockwell intends the following excerpts to function as powerful communication agents to impact white attitudes and organize how whites “should” be interpreting their experiences.

A trial of Oswald would have driven into the consciousness of America the unspeakable treason of these people who keep pulling off the same old Communist trick of calling violent Communist terrorists "reformers" until these murderers have seized control of pro-American, Christian governments as Castro did to Batista and Mao Tse Tung did to Chiang Kai-shek - after which the filthy Red fakers in America moan and wring their hands at their "betrayal" by these hard-core Communists who always seem to "fool" these trusting "lovers of "civil liberties" and "civil rights." (Rockwell, 1966: 52)

And such daily exposures would have inevitably and finally aroused the American people to the deadly facts about Communism and the "civil rights" Black Horror which we of the right wing have been trying so hard to warn America. (Rockwell, 1966: 55)

It would have been utterly impossible for Martin Luther King, Queer James Baldwin, A. Philip Randolph, Queer Bayard Rustin and the rest of the "liberal" and "civil rights" Jew and Negro leaders who have infiltrated even our churches to continue their deadly but creeping Communist revolution in America. (Rockwell, 1966: 53)

According to Goffman (1974) framing is an active process where individuals and groups understand, recognize, and accept or deny social boundaries. Propagandists

construct frames throughout their texts to accomplish these tasks. To illustrate, throughout *The Turner Diaries*, Pierce frames that white men and women are increasingly being victimized and oppressed by non-whites. Pierce diagnostically frames that the greatest threat to the white race is the federal government, followed by blacks. *The Turner Diaries* delineates the shameful problems faced by the white race as the federal government employs white race traitors and non-whites to disarm, violate, kill, and ultimately destroy all whites.

The most interesting development is that the Human Relations Councils have also been given emergency police powers, and they are "deputizing" large numbers of Blacks from the welfare rolls, the way they did for the Gun Raids. In the District and in Alexandria some of these deputized Blacks are already swaggering around and stopping Whites on the streets. (Pierce, 1978: 38)

Klassen intends to impact white attitudes by arguing that Jews created Christianity to weaken and eventually destroy the white race. As evidence, he points to the fact that few Jews converted to Christianity and how Christianity teaches to "turn the other cheek." Klassen asserts that Jews created Christianity as a method to pacify whites and was strategically developed to prevent the stronger white race from destroying inferior Jews. The following example illustrates how Klassen frames Christianity as a shameful Jewish invention to devastate the white race.

We have already explored the devastating havoc on the White Race wrought by Jewish influences such as Christianity, race-mixing, mongrelization and hundreds of other programs being promoted by our deadly enemies. (Klassen, 1981: 98)

Framing helps define almost all situations while providing an understanding of how individuals and groups should interpret them. Individuals respond to situations based on their understanding of how societal boundaries function in the world around them. How Pierce and Klassen frame "white problems" and "white victimization" is part

of an active neo-Nazi process that enables individuals and groups to recognize, understand and accept social boundaries according to a neo-Nazi lens.

Table 2 outlines the three primary diagnostic frames that function as the leading organizational principle to identify and validate how a neo-Nazi should interpret the greatest threat to the white race.⁴⁴ Frame prevalence, determined by overall frequency of use, is a way of interpreting the leading primary diagnostic frame for each neo-Nazi propagandist.⁴⁵ For example, Rockwell and Klassen reason that “Jewish influence” has become the greatest threat to the preservation of the white race. The power of whites has been weakened in the United States by Jewish control of the media, material wealth, promoting communism and liberalism. Lane and Pierce reason that the existing federal government represents one of the greatest threats to the white race, while Duke contends that the greatest threat to the white race is the mere existence of Jews and their “corrupting” influence.

Table 2 Primary neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frames by Propagandists

Rank	Rockwell (1967)	Pierce (1978)	Klassen (1981)	Lane (1994)	Duke (2003)	Chittum (1997)
1	Jewish Influence	Federal Government	Jewish Influence	Modern Morality	Jews	Federal Government
2	Communism	Blacks	Blacks	Violation of Racial Natural Law	Jewish Influence	Whites Oppressed
3	Modern Morality	Whites Oppressed	Jews	Federal Government	Whites Humiliated	Modern Morality

All neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to manipulate ideas and behavior into forms that are criminogenic in nature.⁴⁶ Whether the outcome is explicit violence outlined by

⁴⁴ Goffman (1974) labeled the way in which individuals understand the world as their primary framework.

⁴⁵ Table 18 (see appendix) illustrates a comprehensive list of each frame by text.

⁴⁶ Frames provide meaning to events or occurrences that are organized in a particular fashion intended to guide action (Snow & Byrd, 2000; 2007, Benford & Snow, 2000; Klandermas, 1997; Kuzman, 1998; McAdam, 1982; McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1988; 1996; Tarrow, 1991; Tilly, 1978).

violent prognostic frames or ideas that turn other races into blame targets, the goal is to foster an attitude climate of permanent drift into neo-Nazism over conventional culture. Table 17 in the appendix illustrates which diagnostic frames are the most prevalent to each neo Nazi propagandist, the total number of diagnostic frames used in the text and how the use of certain diagnostic frames compares between each text. Each of the frames listed in table 17 is intended organize experiences for whites through a neo-Nazi grid to influence attitudes as a precursor to mobilization.

Mobilization on a large scale is more likely to occur when neo-Nazi core framing tasks are believable, the evidence used is perceived as credible, and diagnostic frames tap into macro level grievances.⁴⁷ Rockwell explains that the Civil Rights Movement and the Vietnam War should be attributed to the Jews. The Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam are broad in scope and Rockwell uses “evidence” to argue Jewish culpability in both events to mobilize whites. Also using broad appeal, Pierce explains that liberalism, materialism, feminism, taxation, and civil rights are benchmarks reflecting a decline of modern social morality and the white race. Klassen intends to mobilize whites by describing violent incidents against white men and women, portraying how non-whites have humiliated whites and how racial natural law has been violated. He argues that these “white atrocities” have occurred all under the guise of broad ideological appeals of racial equality and racial integration. Lane’s broad themes are centered on the failures of modern morality, the violation of racial natural law, and federal government failures. Duke uses information to diagnostically frame how Jews have humiliated whites for

⁴⁷ Snow and Benford (1988) outlined that framing tasks are prerequisites for mobilization. They defined mobilization as the intention to catalyze potential ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral audience, and deflate counter frames. Zuo and Benford (1995) assert that when diagnostic frames are more believable, the frames are more likely to resonate with a target audience and therefore increase the possibility of mobilization.

generations through Zionism, the Jewish version of the Holocaust, and Communist ideology. The following excerpts by Rockwell, Pierce and Lane illustrate how information is crafted to resonate with macro level grievances.

All we got were headaches, responsibilities, and more little spit-in-the-eye wars, anti-American hate, Berlin Walls, "Foreign Aid" handouts, Koreas, Vietnams, Cubas, and endless riots and crime at home. That is the standard pattern of our "wars" today-mutual suicide of White against White, followed by the handing over to Communists, Jews, and Negroes of more and more of our territory, wealth, rights, and power, and the disarming of any real opposition to Jewish-led scum as a form of treason to the "American dream."(Rockwell, 1966: 266)

I understand that the two girls were with the Blacks only because they had been infected with the disease of liberalism by the schools and the churches and the plastic pop culture the System churns out for young people these days. Presumably, if they had been raised in a healthy society they would have had some racial pride. (Pierce, 1978: 77)

No government can give anything to anybody without first taking it from another. Government is, by its very nature, legalized taking. A limited amount of government is a necessary burden for national defense and internal order. Anything more is counterproductive to freedom and liberty. (Lane, 1999: 6)

The significance of developing a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi typology leads to a deeper understanding of how neo-Nazi diagnostic frames are organized as criminogenic catalysts. Each neo-Nazi diagnostic frame is intended to be believable. However, which diagnostic frames are interpreted as such by supporters is beyond the scope of this study, but what is understood is that each neo-Nazi propagandist in this sample has contributed to the evolution of neo-Nazism. Including Chittum's text as a control measure, which is also fiction and shares similar primary diagnostic frames with Pierce, suggest that future research is needed to determine what other factors are significant for a neo-Nazis to internalize propaganda.

A Typology of Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames

A violent jihadi diagnostic typology specifies the categories or "blame targets"

that are intended to assert a violent jihadi subculture over conventional Muslim behavior or values. Each “blame target” identified in table 3, serves as a form of subcultural social control to leverage violent jihadis from organizing experience through conventional culture instead of a violent jihadi interpretation.⁴⁸ Violent jihadi diagnostic frames outline subcultural social boundaries that are meant to internalize and justify “pure” Muslim behavior. Shame is used as an emotional mechanism to rationalize why violent jihadism is necessary to cleanse “true” Islam from pollution.

Table 3 Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Typological Categories over Time

	Out-Group Failures	Out-Group Generates Economic Hardship for In-Group	Out-Group humiliates In-group	Out-group Flaws	Out-Group Immorality	In-Group Weakness
Propagandist						
Qutb (1966)	13%	1%	0%	57%	23%	6%
Azzam (1984)	9%	1%	3%	8%	22%	56%
Bin Laden (1996)	29%	5%	4%	9%	18%	35%
Zawahiri (2001)	35%	0%	7%	5%	19%	34%
Maqdisi (2009)	27%	0%	0%	16%	56%	1%
Al Bari (1850)	4%	1%	1%	17%	69%	8%
Summary	20%	1%	3%	19%	34%	23%

Out-group immorality and failures are the most prevalent violent jihadi emotive triggers used to internalize and justify violent jihadi behavior. Table 3 illustrates the

⁴⁸ Table 19 (see appendix) displays the total types diagnostic frames or blame targets derived from the sample of violent jihadi propaganda from 1967 to 2009. Blame targets are similar to how Orbuch (1997) summarized accounts because diagnostic frames are crafted to catalyze potential ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral audience, and deflate counter frames. Forty-seven total violent jihadi diagnostic frames were identified from the data. These forty-seven violent jihadi frames function as emotive “buttons” intended to neutralize any questions of culpability toward “blame targets” and prime the reader for violent jihadi solutions. Blame targets are used when violent jihadi propagandists are trying to explain themselves and their actions as a rational outcome. The goal of each diagnostic frame is to emphasize a blame target and align the reader’s attitudes and emotions to a violent jihadi cause.

prevalence of each type of diagnostic frame when they are divided into typological categories.⁴⁹ In contrast to neo-Nazi diagnostic frames, violent jihadi typological categories are not consistent over time.⁵⁰ Frame inconsistency implies that the method of how information, specifically blame targets, is framed varies over time, yet still remains “effective.” Though al Bari’s propaganda reflects a different pattern, his use of out-group immorality is more prevalent than any other typological category across the sample and his lack of not being “known” or influential among violent jihadists may be attributed to ineffective construction. This finding suggests that placing primary emphasis on out-group morality over all other grievances may not resonate with current Muslim populations.

The violent jihadists in this sample argue that the West shamefully perceives Muslims as “inferior” and powerless, therefore “crusaders” and “infidels” are killing Muslims. Violent jihadi propagandists cite instances in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Bosnia, Philippines and Palestine as evidence of a “crusader’s” campaign. An unjust “inferior” status is shameful because violent jihadis assert that Muslims are Allah’s standard bearers and therefore they should be honored, yet they are treated with contempt by the “great and little Satan.” Violent jihadis assert that Muslims across the globe are being killed, wounded or persecuted while Muslims remain passive or indifferent. Violent jihadi communiqués assault Muslims with shame for their ignorance, indifference or passivity to the plight of fellow Muslims under siege by crusaders. What matters from a violent jihadist point of view is that all Muslims perceive the modern Islam as “polluted” and are energized to their cause. The following examples by Qutb and Bin

⁴⁹ Whereas the prevalence of each violent jihadi diagnostic frame (n=46) is outlined in Table 17.

⁵⁰ When not organized into typological categories, see Table 18, violent jihadi propagandists show even more variation in how they construct propaganda.

Laden illustrate both external and internal culpability for the current state of Islamic affairs.

External: It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent that the Muslims blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre of Qana, in Lebanon are still fresh in our memory. Massacres in Tajikistan, Burma, Cashmere, Assam, Philippine, Fatani, Ogadin, Somalia, Eretria, Chechnya and in Bosnia-Herzegovina took place, massacres that send shivers in the body and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch and hear, and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its' allies and under the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves. (Bin Laden, 1996: 2)

Internal: We are also surrounded by Jahiliyyah today, which is of the same nature as it was during the first period of Islam, perhaps a little deeper. Our whole environment, people's beliefs and ideas, habits and art, rules and laws-is Jahiliyyah, even to the extent that what we consider to be Islamic culture, Islamic sources, Islamic philosophy and Islamic thought are also constructs of Jahiliyyah! (Qutb, 1966: 15)

Neutralizing blame targets creates the perception that violence or any other action by violent jihadis is "altruistic." For example, Qutb reasoned that Muslims were ignorant of the Quran, were following secular innovations and a failed Islamic government influenced by Jews, flawed "isms" and Satan. Qutb reasoned that any Muslim who claimed to be a Muslim, yet was loyal to the Egyptian government, supported communism, materialism, liberalism, socialism, or oppressed other "true" Muslims, was in fact not a true Muslim. Muslims that exhibited any trace of these behaviors were not really Muslims, but were living in a state of ignorance or Jahiliyyah. Azzam was trying to catalyze Muslim populations from a state of passivity to action. Azzam defined action as financially supporting the Mujahedin in Afghanistan or going there to join them. Bin Laden asserts that Muslims are being attacked and oppressed across the Muslim world by Israelis and the United States. Bin Laden blames Islamic governments, kafirs, Zionists

and the United States for the current state of Islamic pollution. Zawahiri frames violence against “true” Muslims by non-Muslims and secular Muslims as emotive “buttons” intended to neutralize any question of culpability. Maqdisi diagnostically frames that kafirs, secular innovations, jahiliyyah and democracy are the lead polluters of the Muslim world. The purpose of each diagnostic frame is to use information to catalyze potential ideological adherents, increase support from a neutral audience, and to deflate counter frames. The following excerpts from Qutb, Azzam and Zawahiri provide examples of how ignorant Muslims, the United States and Jews are polluting the Islamic world.

If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah, [Ignorance of the Divine guidance] and all the marvelous material comforts and high level inventions do not diminish this ignorance. (Qutb, 1967: 15)

Those of the believers who sit back, except for those who are incapacitated, are not equal with those who strive in the way of Allah with their wealth and their selves. Allah has granted a higher rank to those who strive with their possessions and selves, over those who sit back. And to all of them has Allah promised good. But Allah has favored the Mujahedeen with a tremendous reward, by levels from Him, and with forgiveness and mercy, over those who sit back. (Azzam, 1987:16)

The United States, and the global Jewish government that is behind it, have realized that government by Islam is the popular demand of the nations of this region, which is considered the heart of the Islamic world. They have realized that it is impossible to compromise on these issues. Hence the United States has decided to dictate its wishes by force, repression, forgery, and misinformation. Finally it has added direct military intervention to all the foregoing methods. (Zawahiri, 2001: 52)

Violent jihadi diagnostic frames are information boundaries that define subcultural norms through carefully including or excluding information. Information is emotionally framed to establish cognitive and behavior boundaries while also dominating how a target audience should feel about a terrorist subculture. Therefore, each violent jihadi diagnostic frame, from a social movement perspective, can be defined as a way to motivate, incite, and legitimize violent-jihadi attitudes and actions. The following excerpt

from Maqdisi illustrates how theological information is included to define violent jihadi attitudes and actions.

So we take that as an example until we meet Allah, hence, we declare Barâ [disavowal, freedom] from the Mushrikûn, their helpers, and their allies. We hate them and we declare our Barâ from what they worship besides Allah, and we disbelieve in their methodologies, their religions, and their false paths that oppose Allah. We manifest and announce and make clear our enmity to those who oppose Allah, those who wage war against the truth, and those who openly proclaim their falsehood - and that does not prevent us from giving Da'wah to them and clarifying the truth from the ones of them that want to hear, and we hope for their guidance. (Maqdisi, 2009: 17)

An excerpt from Bin Laden shows how Muslims should interpret the “polluted” concept of human rights and the presence of non-Muslim soldiers on the Arabian Peninsula.

The people of Islam awakened and realized that they are the main target for the aggression of the Zionist-Crusaders alliance. All false claims and propaganda about "Human Rights" were hammered down and exposed by the massacres that took place against the Muslims in every part of the world. The latest and the greatest of these aggressions, incurred by the Muslims since the death of the Prophet (ALLAH'S BLESSING AND SALUTATIONS ON HIM) is the occupation of the land of the two Holy Places -the foundation of the house of Islam, the place of the revelation, the source of the message and the place of the noble Ka'ba, the Qiblah of all Muslims- by the armies of the American Crusaders and their allies. (Bin Laden, 1996: 1-2)

Violent jihadi diagnostic frames also illustrate how linguistic techniques and excuses are used to scapegoat culpability to out-groups. Violent jihadi propagandists use diagnostic frames as excuses to rationalize violence in a similar way that Scully and Marolla (1984) apply excuses and justifications to analyze how rapists explained themselves and their crimes. Similar to how Sykes & Matza (1957), Mills (1940), and Scott & Lyman (1968) focus on rationalization, each violent jihadi frame reflects the need to rationalize the problems confronting Islam from a subcultural perspective. The following excerpts from Bin Laden and Azzam show how excuses are used to justify the need for violent jihadism.

It is out of date and no longer acceptable to claim that the presence of the crusaders is necessity and only a temporary measures to protect the land of the two Holy Places. Especially when the civil and the military infrastructures of Iraq were savagely destroyed showing the depth of the Zionist-Crusaders hatred to the Muslims and their children, and the rejection of the idea of replacing the crusaders forces by an Islamic force composed of the sons of the country and other Muslim people. (Bin Laden, 1996: 20)

Anybody who looks into the state of the Muslims today will find that their greatest misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad (due to love of this world and abhorrence of death). Because of that, the tyrants have gained dominance over the Muslims in every aspect and in every land. The reason for this is that the Disbelievers only stand in awe of fighting. (Azzam, 1987: 16)

Qutb and Zawahiri also use excuses to rationalize the necessity of a violent subculture. Qutb cites that the United States, democracy, capitalism and modern science are disastrous imports from the west that are assaulting the core theological and moral foundations of Islam. Zawahiri asserts that the Jews and the United States are polluting Islam with materialism, modern science, democracy, crime, immorality, Christianity and Zionism. Zawahiri writes that the Islamic government and the majority of Muslims are also living in a state of ignorance where Sharia is ignored and secular innovations replace God's law. Because the majority of Muslims are ignorant of their faith, they have become inundated by innumerable "problems" from the west and of their own doing. Qutb uses modernity, secular innovations and Christianity as excuses to rationalize the need for violent jihadism in the following way:

I, on the other hand, took the position of attacking the Western Jahiliyyah, its shaky religious beliefs, its social and economic modes, and its immoralities: "Look at these concepts of the Trinity, Original Sin, Sacrifice and Redemption, which are agreeable neither to reason nor to conscience. Look at this capitalism with its monopolies, its usury and whatever else is unjust in it; at this individual freedom, devoid of human sympathy and responsibility for relatives except under the force of law; at this materialistic attitude which deadens the spirit; at this behavior, like animals, which you call "Free mixing of the sexes; at this vulgarity which you call "emancipation of women," at these unfair and cumbersome laws of marriage and divorce, which are contrary to the demands of practical life; and at Islam, with its logic, beauty, humanity and happiness,

which reaches the horizons to which man strives but does not reach. It is a practical way of life and its solutions are based on the foundation of the wholesome nature of man.” (Qutb, 1967:15)

Whether the diagnostic frame is “Zionism” or the “United States,” each violent jihadi propagandist attempts to excuse or validate the need for violence against certain blame targets.

Table 4 illustrates violent jihadi primary diagnostic frames. Violent jihadi primary frames function as leading organizational principles to identify and validate how violent jihadis should interpret Islam’s greatest threat. In *Milestones*, Qutb states that the leading “injustice” against Islam is the current state of jahiliyyah maintained by the majority of Muslims. This twist of doctrine is of critical importance because Qutb’s doctrines provided theological justification for violent jihadis to target and kill other Muslims. According to Azzam, the central problem during the 1980’s was that Muslims across the globe were passively observing the Soviets attack Muslim men and women in Afghanistan. Zawahiri argues that the United States is the greatest threat confronting Islam and violent jihadis, while also asserting that Islamic governments and Israel also pose significant threats to every “true” Muslim. Maqdisi surmises that the majority of Muslims are not even aware that Islam is polluted and justifies this claim as evidence to prove that Muslims are living in jahiliyyah. Maqdisi’s diagnostic frames reveal that he believes the central problems of the true Islamic ummah can be traced to theological issues, which differs from how the other propagandists have identified a nation or group responsible in their top seven diagnostic frames. Although Al Bari shares a similar primary frame with Maqdisi, he focuses on two other primary frames that do not receive similar attention from the other violent jihadi propagandists. This finding

suggests that Al Bari emphasis on the moral pollution of Islam and Christianity do not share equal appeal to current violent jihadis.

Table 4 Primary Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames by Propagandists


Rank	Qutb <i>Milestones</i> (1966)	Azzam <i>Defense</i> (1984)	Bin Laden <i>Declaration of War</i> (1996)	Zawahiri <i>Knights</i> (2001)	Maqdisi <i>Aqeedah</i> (2009)	Al Bari <i>Swords</i> (1850)
1	Jahiliyyah	Muslim Passivity	Islamic Government	United States	Kafir	Kafir
2	Paganism	Muslim Women Victimized	Non Muslims attack Muslims	Islamic Government	Secular Innovations	Islam is Polluted
3	Jews	Kafir	Muslim Oppression	Israel	Jahiliyyah	Christianity

Techniques of Neutralization

Similarities & Differences between neo-Nazi & Violent Jihadi Neutralization Techniques

Figure 7 illustrates the differences and similarities between how violent jihadis and neo-Nazis use diagnostic frames to neutralize blame targets. The figure shows how diagnostic frames are used in propaganda to promote permanent drift into subcultures of violence. Although differences exist between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi frames and the styles/format used by their propagandists, a common goal is shared—to gain recruits and catalyze followers.

Figure 7- Similarities and Differences between neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Neutralization Techniques



Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi diagnostic frames function to neutralize conventional values. Neutralizing conventional values enables a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi to shut off “inner objections” to conventional culture that conflict with violent subcultures. Klassen and Qutb intend to neutralize aspects of conventional culture by rationalizing the injustices committed by those outside of their ideology as shameful. Klassen rationalizes that whites suffering from guilt attributed to historical injustices against non-whites, grants racial leverage to non-whites. “White guilt,” according to Klassen, is a shameful tactic used by non-whites and race traitors to target the white race. “White guilt” is

similar to how the Jews created Christianity to “brain wash” whites by “turning the other cheek,” creating white passivity and ultimately the extinction of the white race. The following excerpt illustrates how Klassen compares “white guilt” to the creation of Christianity.

Emphasized by Christianity. The major influence in exacerbating the guilt-complex in the White Man has been his religion, Christianity. The Jews in their mortal war against the Romans recognized the chink in the armor of the Romans, and gave the Romans a religion that drove a powerful wedge into that crack to split it wide open. The Christian religion, invented by the Jews in order to destroy the Romans, placed heavy emphasis on guilt. (Klassen, 1981: 330)

Qutb rails against conventional systems by outlining how Islam is being polluted by false Muslims, who embrace ideas and lifestyles counter to the true faith. Qutb cannot comprehend how “true” Muslims could remain shamefully passive while watching the erosion of Islamic values and fellow Muslims come under assault. Qutb reasons that because Islam has become populated by kafirs living in a state of jahiliyyah, passivity is a logical outcome.

This Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed. The result of this rebellion against the authority of God is the oppression of His creatures. Thus the humiliation of the common man under the communist systems and the exploitation of individuals and nations due to greed for wealth and imperialism under the capitalist systems are but a corollary of rebellion against God’s authority and the denial of the dignity of man given to him by God. (Qutb, 1967: 15)

Diagnostic frames rationalize and thus neutralize conventional cultural norms by removing responsibility from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi. However, how this task is accomplished differs between violent jihadis and neo-Nazis. Violent jihadi diagnostic frames center on divine infractions that are reflected in the violation of Sharia, the

prominent role of Satan, blasphemy against God & his Prophet, and activity that is defined as secular (i.e., modern science and secular laws). Violent jihadis also scapegoat those who do not belong to their version of Islam. This includes Muslims living in a state of ignorance, apostates and those who belong to secondary faiths (Judaism, Christianity) and pagan or polytheistic faiths. Frames that are based on divine violations against a divine being, his messenger and holy book (Allah, his prophet Mohammad and the Quran) do not share an equal presence in neo-Nazi propaganda.

What these people want is that Islam change its character, its method and its history and be reduced to the level of ordinary human theories and laws. They want a short-cut solution to satisfy their immediate desires, which are simply a product of the defeatist mentality in their spirits in the face of valueless, man-made laws. They want Islam to become a mere collection of abstractions and theories, the subject of whose application is nonexistent conditions. But the course prescribed by God for this religion is the same as it was earlier. First, belief ought to be imprinted on hearts and rule over consciences - that belief which demands that people should not bow before anyone except God or derive laws from any other source. Then, when such a group of people is ready and also gains practical control of society, various laws will be legislated according to the practical needs of that society. (Qutb, 1967: 21)

Neo-Nazi diagnostic frames do not want to abolish secular laws and systems, but rather target “flawed” groups and ideas that they perceive threaten the white race. Neo-Nazi propagandists rail against federal taxation, immigration laws, race mixers, the Holocaust and crime. Neo-Nazis scapegoat along racial boundaries; therefore, all non-whites, civil rights, racial equality or integration function as white race “pollutants.” The diagnostic frame “white extinction” is used as a trigger to catalyze whites out of a state of shameful passivity to fight those who are threatening the white race. The “extinction” frame is used by all the neo-Nazi propagandists in this sample and there is not a corresponding violent jihadi “Muslim extinction” frame.

Their evolutionary strategy has been perfected to the point that Europeans and all other races now suffer under Jewish hegemony on a global scale. We must acknowledge their present political and social power, but we also know that their power has come at

the cost of the devolution of our civilization. Failure to defy this power can only lead to our eventual extinction, and this looming genocide gives our task the importance of a life or death struggle — one that has urgency for our people and truly all peoples and nations upon the earth. (Duke, 2003: 339)

Forced integration is deliberate and malicious genocide, particularly for a People like the White race, who are now a small minority in the world. (Lane, 1999: 3)

Diagnostic frames are a means of collective scapegoating that removes individual culpability from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi because they transform the need for violence into altruism. Central to both diagnostic typologies is how violent jihadis and neo-Nazis are being attacked, humiliated, and oppressed by members of the “out-group” using “victimization” frames. Propagandists from each ideology use examples from history, current events, poetry and fiction to demonstrate that their race or religion is under assault. The purpose of this type of diagnostic frame is to reveal the shameful weak status of whites and Muslims permitting these injustices to occur. In other words, if whites or Muslims were in positions of power, these assaults would decrease or be absent. Yet these injustices will continue to occur because of existing passivity and the state of weakness of both whites and Muslims. The ideal is that both Muslims and whites are in positions of power and able to reverse the current violence, oppression, and humiliation taken against their members is reversed. Diagnostic frames are intended to enrage the reader because of attacks carried out against whites or Muslims.

Just as Scott and Lyman (1968) illustrated how accounts are used to neutralize conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from an actor’s actions, neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share the same need to remove individual culpability. In order to illustrate collective failure, propagandists from both ideologies frame current governments as failed.

One gets the impression that except for the Jews, who are really burning the midnight oil in their efforts against us, the rest of the System (Federal government) is a bunch of clock-watchers. Thank "equal opportunity"-and all those niggers in the FBI and in the Army-for that! The System has become so corrupt and so mongrelized that only the Jews feel at home in it, and no one feels any loyalty toward it. (Pierce, 1978: 76)

For this reason the United States chose to begin by crushing the Chechens by providing Western financing for the Russian Army so that when this brutal campaign against the Chechen mujahedeen is completed, the campaign can move southwards to Afghanistan either by the action of former Soviet republics that are US agents or with the participation of US troops under the guise of combating terrorism, drug trafficking, and the claims about liberating that region's women. In this way the United States will have destroyed the two last remaining hotbeds of resistance to it in the Islamic world. For this reason the United States remained silent about the brutal massacres that were carried out in Chechnya and the volcanic fire that was poured on the head of this small republic. (Zawahiri, 2001: 55)

Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis both use history to validate their frames in an attempt to show the reader the degree of governmental corruption. This is significant because both "demonstrating" that those in power are abusing their authority, corrupt or illegitimate supporting the argument that they warrant elimination. Both ideologies scapegoat the Jews and Zionism as the dominant "other" and "masterminds" of violence against whites and Muslims. Thus, the failed state of morality, threats to "true" Islam and the white race, failures in modern morality, usury, communism, materialism and socialism are linked to the Jews and Zionism. The following excerpts illustrate how Rockwell and Qutb use history to "validate" the threat of the Jews in their message.

President Lincoln never preached racial equality, nor any kind of mixing. In fact, Lincoln preached just the opposite - (another example of the way our modern, Jewized society lies to the people). Here are some of Lincoln's best utterances on the Negro, for instance: "He shall have no occasion to ever ask it again, for I tell him very frankly that I am not in favor of Negro citizenship. Now my opinion is that the different States have the power to make a Negro a citizen under the Constitution of the United States if they choose. If the State of Illinois had that power I should be opposed to the exercise of it. That is all I have to say about it" (Speech at Springfield, Illinois on June 26, 1857, Vol. II, p.405-09). (Rockwell, 1967: 197)

The name of Isam al-Qamari deserves a pause. Al-Qamari was a unique individual who has not been given enough credit for his work and his jihad activity

because the media and propaganda tools in our countries are in the hands of groups that do not favor the Islamists. Accordingly, the right of publishing is controlled by them, to the exclusion of the Islamists. In doing so, they are following the footsteps of the West, where Jews are in control of the media and the propaganda tools. (Qutb, 1966: 29)

Though culpability does not rest solely on the Jews, both distribute blame to passive members of their race or religion. Passive members are identified as assisting in the destruction of a superior people and way of life because of their unreceptive attitudes. Passive whites or Muslims are often labeled as polluters or traitors because they care more about self-preservation than Allah's divine law or racial natural law. Enemies of racial law and Allah's divine law are engaged in a campaign to pollute and eventually overthrow the natural or divine ideal. The following excerpts outline how Lane illustrates the violation of racial law and Azzam requires individual obligation to the divine law of jihad.

It is not constructive to hate those of other races, or even those of mixed races. But a separation must be maintained for the survival of one's own race. One must, however, hate with a pure and perfect hatred those of one's own race who commit treason against one's own kind and against the nations of one's own kind. One must hate with perfect hatred all those People or practices which destroy one's People, one's culture, or the racial exclusiveness of one's territorial imperative. (Lane, 1999: 4)

But if they sit back, or are incapable, lazy, or insufficient in number, the individual obligation (fard `ayn) spreads to those around them. Then if they also fall short or sit back, it goes to those around them; and so on and so on, until the individually obligatory (fard `ayn) nature of jihad encompasses the whole world. The individually obligatory nature of jihad remains in effect until the lands are purified from the pollution of the Disbelievers. (Azzam, 1987: 14)

The format in which diagnostic frames are used to neutralize blame targets differs. Violent jihadis differ in propaganda style and format. Violent jihadis use poetry and verses from the Quran to validate diagnostic frames. In contrast, the neo-Nazis in my sample do not use poetry as a medium of expression, but instead use fictional accounts to

disseminate their diagnostic frames.⁵¹ Fiction is used because it has broader appeal, makes propaganda more accessible and yet communicates the same diagnostic frames. Fiction is not used in violent jihadi propaganda, which makes this format unique to neo-Nazi propaganda. Finally, when citing from a religious text, neo-Nazis either cite verses from the Bible in an attempt to demonstrate the fallibility of Christianity or to demonstrate that it is possible to be a neo-Nazi and a Christian.⁵²

Frames associated with masculinity are also used as neutralization technique. Masculinity is central to both neo-Nazism and violent jihadism (Ferber, 2004; Kimmel & Ferber, 2006; Kimmel, 2007; Fangen, 2003; Knuttila, 2004). Masculinity is defined as one's *gender identity* and the need to engage in social and cultural behaviors whose meanings are more dominant, aggressive, competitive, and autonomous manner (Ashmore, Del Boca, & Wohlers, 1986; Burke, Stets & Pirog-Good, 1988; Spence, 1985). Both violent jihadis and neo-Nazis highlight that Muslim or white women are being violently victimized by their enemies and both target the immorality associated with homosexuality. Women should be protected and "led" by strong males and since white and Muslim women are being victimized, the neo-Nazi/violent jihadi "ideal" is being violated. When female victimization and homosexuality are prevalent, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandist describe this as a shameful litmus test that exposes the current immoralities and the weakness of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi men. Weakness is used to describe neo-Nazi or violent jihadi masculinity because a high prevalence of female victimization or homosexuality indicates a shameful failure of neo-Nazi and

⁵¹ Rockwell, Pierce and Chittum use fictional accounts to communicate diagnostic frames.

⁵² It is important to note that Christian Identity propaganda was not part of the sample (who also cite the Bible to support their beliefs). Although a Christian Identity propagandist was not part of my sample, findings from my sample of neo-Nazi propagandists were consistent with how Christian Identity members use the Bible to support maintaining beliefs of racial superiority and "Christian" theology.

violent jihadi masculinity. The following examples illustrate the “rationale” of why neo-Nazism and violent jihadism is needed to protect women and maintain morality.

In other words, rape has been reduced to the status of a punch in the nose. In cases where no physical injury can be proved, it is now virtually impossible to obtain a prosecution or even an arrest. The result of this judicial mischief has been that the incidence of rape has zoomed to the point that the legal statisticians have recently estimated that one out of every two American women can expect to be raped at least once in her lifetime. In many of our big cities, of course, the statistics are much worse. The women’s-lib groups have greeted this development with dismay. It isn’t exactly what they had in mind when they began agitating for "equality" two decades ago. At least, there’s dismay among the rank and file of such groups; I have a suspicion that their leaders, most of whom are Jewesses, had this outcome in mind from the beginning. (Pierce, 1978: 57)

Is it any different here in America, today? The Jews in Germany, before World War II, were pushing homosexuality, loose morals, filthy "literature," crazy "dances" fresh from the African jungles, insane "art," Marxist "music," and self-indulgence for youth. (Rockwell, 1966; 280)

Homosexuality is a crime against Nature. All Nature declares the purpose of the instinct for sexual union is reproduction and thus, preservation of the species. The overpowering male sex drive must be channeled toward possession of females, as well as elements such as territory and power, which are necessary to keep them. (Lane, 1999: 5)

The family system and the relationship between the sexes determine the whole character of a society and whether it is backward or civilized, jahili or Islamic. Those societies which give ascendance to physical desires and animalistic morals cannot be considered civilized, no matter how much progress they may make in industry or science. This is the only measure which does not err in gauging true human progress. In all modern jahili societies, the meaning of “morality” is limited to such an extent that all those aspects which distinguish man from animal are considered beyond its sphere. In these Societies, illegitimate sexual relationships, even homosexuality, are not considered immoral. (Qutb, 1967: 68)

Finally, differences between “ineffective” propaganda suggests that what persuades target audiences may differ between neo-Nazism and violent jihadism. The neo-Nazi control sample, Chittum, reflects a similar construction and diagnostic frames as their effective counterparts. However, analysis illustrates that the control violent jihadi sample, Al Bari, differs in primary frames and the prevalence given to overall diagnostic

frame usage. This is an interesting finding because the results indicate that something other than the propaganda construction is persuading a target audience (i.e., degree of influence variables) for neo-Nazis, while a clear difference is noted in how Al Bari differs in diagnostic frames usage. Future research should be directed to expanding the sample size and also to analyze how neo-Nazis and violent jihadis interpret and internalize or dismiss propaganda.

Conclusion and Discussion

Terrorism is the ultimate form of “targeted violence” in that compared to most violence, terrorism is much more planned, calculated and goal oriented. As such, intentional production and distribution of propaganda is critical where neutralizations for blame targets as receptors of violence are readily available. So because terrorism equals political violence, it is unlike most violence in that terrorism requires substantial “ideological work” (Berger, 2004) including exposures and to some extent internalization of ideas promoting the necessity and justification of violence as a means to communicate.

More generic violent offenders such as rapists employ neutralizations derived from “conventional wisdom” that circulates widely throughout society (e.g. “when women say no they really mean yes”)(Scully & Moralla, 1957), whereas terrorism requires individuals to engage in violence in the name of a radical political position that may have relatively little salience within mainstream society. The challenge for the propagandist is to emphasize bridges between an extreme ideology and mainstream society in a way that guides individuals and groups towards a radicalized state.

Diagnostic frames function to organize experience by simplifying and condensing the social world to mobilize a target audience to action. Terrorism as criminogenic

propaganda defines neo-Nazi and violent jihadi diagnostic frames as the active production of meaning for supporters, neutral observers and victims. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists construct meaning to rationalize or “frame” grievances to promote criminogenic behavior. Additionally, violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists inject emotions into diagnostic frames in order to leverage a target audience to organize experience in a certain way.

In neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda, content is used to generate shame in their supporters to evoke a response. Similar to how Lewis (1971) described shame in clinical settings, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi shame describes the failures, social insults, loss of status or weakness of “true” Islam or the white race. When information is framed as shame, it functions as a powerful catalyst to motivate a target audience into shifting attitudes that align with a violent subculture (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998; Berbrier, 1998). Similar to other phenomenon, shame is not produced by a specific situation, but rather it is the individual’s interpretation of the situation(s) that matters (Blumer, 1969). If shame is interpreted as unjust, then its potential to function as a “trigger” increases because it makes a solution “right.” Moreover, using shame in propaganda is effective because it transmits perceived injustices and grievances to local and global populations.

Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda (TCP) defines terrorism as a phenomenon of emotionally laden diagnostic and prognostic frames. Terrorism as a phenomenon of frames uses violence by word and deed as its symbolic medium to bring about active or passive alignment in a target audience. Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis create diagnostic frames to leverage, coerce, or inspire a revolution of ideas into action. TCP as a perspective emphasizes a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi’s symbolic interpretation of

diagnostic frames and its ultimate goal to promote permanent drift into a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture.

Diagnostic frames in terrorism propaganda function as information boundaries that neutralize inner objections to carrying out criminogenic behavior. Terrorist propaganda is criminogenic in nature, which means it intends to produce, promote, or increase criminal behavior. Criminogenic intent expressed through diagnostic frames is to generate an emotional climate that increases active or passive support and increasing the likelihood of violence. Diagnostic frames in criminogenic propaganda use strong emotional appeals to outline who is responsible for a terrorist group's grievances and target beliefs and assumptions that may be open to persuasion. Active or passive support can result in increased membership for the group, a surge in finances, or additional resources.

After the "in-group" problems are outlined, solutions are then generated via prognostic frames that direct the neo-Nazi or violent jihadi to action. Prognostic frames promote drift into a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture because these solutions are framed as rational responses to white or Islamic atrocities. The next chapter addresses how violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists propose to solve their diagnostic frames through prognostic frames.

CHAPTER 5: Findings-Prognostic Frames

Introduction

This chapter answers the following research question: What types of prognostic frames are present in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda? This research expands how linguistic techniques are used in promoting political violence. The first section of this chapter provides a conceptual review of prognostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. The next section identifies a typology and the types of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic frames. The chapter concludes by examining the similarities and differences between how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use prognostic frames as neutralization techniques.

Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists rationalize criminogenic ideas and solutions. Prognostic frames are used when violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists are trying to explain themselves and their actions as “rational.” Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis use prognostic frames as a method to promote violent jihadism or neo-Nazism but and 1) provide greater control by offering a method to organize responses to their social world, 2) provide a method to resolve stressful and painful events to whites and Muslims, 3) establish a degree of hope in racial or Islamic purification, and 4) create a method to organize relationships and experiences.

Figure 8 illustrates a prognostic typology developed in this research for both neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda.⁵³ A prognostic typology organizes the sixty violent

⁵³ Table 21 and 37(see appendix) shows the thirty-six neo-Nazi and twenty-four violent jihadi prognostic frames identified during analysis.

jihadi and neo-Nazi prognostic frames identified in this research into six central categories. Each category is listed and defined in Figure 8. The purpose of each category, from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi perspective, is to validate and rationalize in-group “solutions” to threats and pollution from the out-group (non-whites and non-Muslims). The six categories defined in table 9 organize how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi solutions are constructed in response to out-group or in-group conflict. This typology advances how scholars have applied frame analysis to examine social movements, by analyzing how terrorist groups frame their solutions to seize power through violent and radical solutions.

Figure 8 A neo-Nazi/Violent Jihadi Prognostic Typology

Category	Category Defined
Violent Solutions	Any form of violence including assault, homicide, terrorism, and conventional warfare.
Policy Solutions	Implementation of policy to change conventional culture.
Religious Solutions	Non-violent religious idea or action.
Moral Solutions	Overcome immoral practices.
Political Solutions	Political action.
Economic Solutions	Economic behavior.

Typologies and Types of Diagnostic Frames

A Typology of Neo-Nazi Prognostic Frames

A neo-Nazi prognostic typology specifies solution categories that serve as a form of subcultural social control to dissuade neo-Nazis from responding through conventional means. Neo-Nazi prognostic frames function as a set of “new” social boundaries that serve to internalize and justify neo-Nazi solutions. Neo-Nazi propagandists aspire to mobilize followers, increase support and deflate counter frames, while also intending to humiliate, kill, deport and/or segregate non-whites.

The neo-Nazi prognostic frames illustrated in table 5 reflect different Aryan solutions intended to counter “white problems.” Neo-Nazi solutions are divided between violent, political, policy, moral, economic and religious categories. Neo-Nazis promote violent solutions such as “white terrorism” and “racial war” in addition to policy solutions, such as maintaining “racial segregation” or religious solutions that promote “white based religions.” Table 5 identifies the prevalence of violent and non-violent neo-Nazi solutions used in the sample to mobilize adherents.

Table 5 Neo-Nazi Prognostic Typological Categories over Time

	Violent Solutions	Policy Solutions	Religious Solutions	Moral Solutions	Economic Solutions	Political Solutions
Propagandist						
Rockwell (1967)	9%	14%	17%	41%	1%	18%
Pierce (1978)	58%	28%	2%	9%	2%	2%
Klassen (1981)	12%	28%	26%	31%	1%	2%
Lane (1994)	6%	12%	50%	28%	0%	3%
Duke (2003)	2%	37%	19%	41%	0%	1%
Chittum (1997)	26%	51%	4%	19%	0%	0%
Summary	19%	24%	20%	28%	1%	4%

The prognostic frames discovered in neo-Nazi propaganda reflect a shared world view over time. The most prevalent neo-Nazi solutions are those that pertain to religious, policy, and morality issues. Figure 13 illustrates the prevalence of each type of prognostic frame and the lack of frame consistency over time when prognostic frames are divided into typological categories.⁵⁴ Frame consistency implies that the method of how

⁵⁴ Whereas the prevalence of each neo-Nazi prognostic frame (n=36) is outlined in Table 21 and 36. Table 21 illustrates which types of neo-Nazi prognostic frames are shared over time. Table 22 illustrates the most

information, specifically Aryan solutions, is framed remains constant over time. Lack of consistency can refer to disagreement over how propagandists should resolve racial pollution.

How prognostic frames organize experience to promote solution validity can be divided in three central tasks. First, by arguing solutions that dominate or physically eliminate non-whites, prognostic frames respond to “blame targets” who are responsible for threatening or humiliating the white race. Second, each prognostic frame intends to align the reader’s attitudes and emotions into either passive or active involvement. Third, prognostic frames assist in moving into a permanent state of drift in a neo-Nazi subculture. Drift occurs because prognostic frames substitute subcultural solutions over conventional cultural solutions in order to neutralize counter frames from “inner voices” and conventional culture.

Neo-Nazi propagandists outline solutions that promote moving from conventional behavior and values into a permanent neo-Nazi subculture. Neo-Nazi solutions are based on appeals to maintain a sense of loyalty to the white race.⁵⁵ Prognostic frames direct neo-Nazis to solve the problems confronting the white race by creating a new reality through the use of violent and non-violent solutions. The following excerpt illustrates a violent and non-violent solution.

Violent: Then, as the TV cameras were preparing to switch from the crowded scene outside the Capitol to the speaker's podium in the House chamber, where the President would be speaking, a mortar round-although no one realized that's what it was-exploded about 200 yards northwest of the building. TV watchers heard the explosion but couldn't see anything except an indistinct puff of gray smoke floating above the Capitol. Mortars are marvelous little weapons, especially for guerrilla warfare. They drop their

prevalent types of prognostic frames in each neo-Nazi text, the total number of prognostic frames used in the text and how the use of certain prognostic frames compares between each text.

⁵⁵ Table 22 (see appendix) illustrates which solutions are the most prevalent to each propagandist.

deadly rounds silently and almost vertically onto their target. They can be fired from total cover, and persons in the target area cannot tell from which direction the projectiles are coming. We saw beautiful blossoms of flame and steel sprouting everywhere, dancing across the asphalt, thundering in the midst of splintered masonry and burning vehicles, erupting now inside and now outside the Capitol, wreaking their bloody toll in the ranks of tyranny and treason. (Pierce, 1978: 61)

Non-Violent: Inter-species compassion is contrary to the Laws of Nature and is, therefore, suicidal. If a wolf were to intercede to save a lamb from a lion, he would be killed. Today, we see the White man taxed so heavily that he cannot afford children. The taxes raised are then used to support the breeding of tens of millions of non-whites, many of whom then demand the last White females for breeding partners. As you can see, man is subject to all the Laws of Nature. This has nothing to do with morality, hatred, good or evil. Nature does not recognize the concepts of good and evil in inter-species relationships. If the lion eats the lamb, it is good for the lion and evil for the lamb. If the lamb escapes and the lion starves, it is good for the lamb and evil for the lion. So, we see the same incident is labeled both good and evil. This cannot be, for there are no contradictions within Nature's Laws. (Lane, 1999: 10)

Neo-Nazi propagandists use prognostic frames as a process of reality construction. Reality construction can take different forms and one form consists of constructing a “new” reality that legitimizes the need for violent solutions. In this study, three different neo-Nazi violent prognostic frames are used to ultimately reverse the “tide” of the growing threat by non-whites: white terrorism, racial war, and eliminating non-whites. White terrorism is defined as a means of sensational violence carried out by coordinated white organizations or lone wolves determined to send a strong racial or political message to the federal government, non-whites, and whites. The prognostic frame “race war” suggests using conventional and insurgent campaigns divided along racial lines where combatants use the tools of conventional warfare: (e.g., medium/heavy weapons, uniforms and military organizational structure). Finally, the prognostic frame “eliminate non-whites” refers to any form of violence to kill non-whites or race traitors in isolated events outside white terrorism or racial war.

Neo-Nazi propagandists illustrate various forms of violence where conventional military arms, organizational structure, and tactics are used to counter a Jewish controlled federal government dominated by non-whites and race traitors. Propagandists suggest that when at all possible, whites should eliminate non-whites using various methods, either as lone wolves or part of an organization. Generating a new reality, from a neo-Nazi's perspective, involves using violent solutions in text to catalyze violent behavior in the United States. Excerpts from Pierce, Rockwell, and Klassen illustrate violent neo-Nazi responses.

White terrorism: An hour earlier, in New York, the Organization used a bazooka to shoot down an airliner which had just taken off for Tel Aviv with a load of vacationing dignitaries, mostly Jews. There were no survivors (Pierce, 1978: 62).

Racial war: The end will be world racial warfare, in which the swarming colored races will be pitted against the minority of Whites for survival. Either the colored swarms, led and inflamed by the Jews, will overwhelm the White minority and inherit a ruined world, or we will smash them. It's "them or us" (Rockwell, 1967: 277).

Eliminate non-whites: Should the Jews use assassination against our members, or our leaders, then the White Race must meet fire with fire, and retribution and vengeance will be our answer. For every one of ours they kill we will exact ten times their number, starting with the rabbis. When law and persuasion no longer protect our rights to survival then we must— as all free, courageous, intelligent people have done through the ages— turn on our tormentors with a furious vengeance and destroy them down to the last man (Klassen, 1981: 350).

All neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to manipulate ideas and behavior into forms that are criminogenic in nature. Whether the outcome is explicit violence outlined by violent prognostic frames or ideas that turn other races into blame targets, the goal is to foster an attitude climate of permanent drift into neo-Nazism over conventional culture. In *The White Man's Bible*, Klassen argues that all whites should be armed and ready for a racial war. He also promotes that hating other races is necessary in order for whites to survive. Klassen argues that whites who are indifferent are “flawed” because their

indifference demonstrates internalized Jewish influence by “turning the other cheek” to keep whites subdued and passive. Ultimately, Klassen envisions a full scale racial war, preceded by white terrorism and incidents of whites killing non-whites. However, unlike Pierce, Klassen suggests that a full white revolution will occur only if it is preceded by a white based religion.

Klassen promotes his version of a white based religion, Creativity, which will enable whites to engage in racial warfare and racial breeding integrity. If the Creativity movement increases substantially, whites will eventually become loyal to their race, resulting in a geographic area governed by white racial nationalism. Klassen’s solutions, including creating a white based religion, are all intended to rationalize criminogenic ideas and behavior. The following excerpts illustrate Klassen’s message of inciting racial war and the need for a white based religion.

The Jews are inassimilable and implacable. The warfare between this biological parasite and the White Race is as irreconcilable as that between the pioneer mother and the rattlesnake, as mentioned in an earlier chapter. The only solution to the conflict is the complete triumph of one side or the other. (Klassen, 1981: 200)

This racial consciousness then must be highly organized and converted into a racial religion, as we have set forth in this book. (Klassen, 1981; 207)

Only by rallying the total power of the White Race and organizing it under a powerful racial religion such as CREATIVITY can we ever hope to break the back of the Jewish Marxist-Communist-Zionist tyranny. (Klassen, 1981: 221)

Terrorism as criminogenic propaganda is a concept that illustrates how neo-Nazis use linguistic tools to rationalize violent or radical behavior.⁵⁶ For example, Rockwell attributes that he and other white males are entitled to lead non-whites because of racial natural law. Racial natural law justifies white supremacy and therefore whites should be

⁵⁶ Mills (1940), Orbuch, (1997), Scott & Lyman (1968), and Scully & Marolla, (1984) define other mechanisms to rationalize behavior.

actively engaged in solutions that prevent the weakening and extinction of the white race. Rockwell suggests that whites should seek positions of power, unify, obtain weapons, and begin a white revolution that will ultimately end in a form of racial war. In order to gather momentum to protect a decaying moral fabric, the dissemination of white propaganda is necessary along with complete racial loyalty mandating that whites reproduce only with other whites, and whites should unite according to race. When neo-Nazis are unified, active and loyal to their race, then whites will be prepared for the approaching racial war and the establishment of white territory. Rockwell rationalizes these solutions into a prognostic vocabulary to promote the evolution of criminogenic ideas to behavior. The following excerpts illustrate how Rockwell promotes radical solutions as rational responses.

America will soon be ready for a leader who has gone through hell to preach pure racism, to fight for our White people, as a race, without any pretty excuses or cover-ups. (Rockwell, 1967: 260)

The second most important law is the law of TERRITORY. (Rockwell, 1967: 288)

People are more inert than it is possible to believe, even after you discover this fact. It takes an incredible amount of propaganda, repeated over and over and over and over to move them even a little bit. (Rockwell: 1967: 246)

Identifying neo-Nazi prognostic frames specifies how vocabularies are constructed to neutralize “inner objections” to violent or radical solutions in politically violent groups. Using emotive vocabularies to create the perception that neo-Nazi solutions are “altruistic” enables culpability to be transferred away from an individual actor to achieving a greater good for the white race. Therefore, “altruistic” prognostic solutions function as a precondition to violent behavior by neutralizing objections to radical solutions. Duke and Lane illustrate how emotive vocabularies are used to

transform culpability away from individuals into “altruistic acts” for the greater good of all whites.

Only when Jewish Supremacism abates will Anti-Semitism disappear. Europeans, Asians and Africans will not accept the deceit or the supremacy proclaimed by Jacob. We will not wear the yoke of subservience. Our dominion shall be won. We have earned the blessings of God and Nature by our genius, our hard work, our creativity and our faith. We will not shrink from the fight for our freedom, and we reject the label of Anti-Semitism from those who are themselves the embodiment of ethnocentrism, intolerance, and anti-Gentilism. (Duke, 2003: 198)

The folk, namely the members of the Race, are the Nation. Racial loyalties must always supersede geographical and national boundaries. If this is taught and understood, it will end fratricidal wars. Wars must not be fought for the benefit of another race. (Lane, 1999: 5)

Neo-Nazi propagandists attempt to provide social boundaries by outlining solutions in an active process. Pierce suggests that whites can gain power by creating effective propaganda to promote racial loyalty and follow racial natural law. Pierce also asserts that whites need to recruit other whites to their cause, arm themselves, and organize into groups.

One of our specialized units in New York has been acquiring military materiel of all sorts and stockpiling it. When we stepped out of the elevator, I gasped in surprise. In a huge, low-ceilinged room, more than a hundred feet on a side, there were immense heaps of every sort of military weaponry imaginable: automatic rifles, machine guns, flame throwers, mortars, and literally thousands of cases of ammunition, grenades, explosives, detonators, boosters, and spare parts. (Pierce, 1978: 64)

Pierce also frames that race mixing is linked to “white racial suicide” and whites that are “guilty” of this “crime” are equal to non-whites and should also be eliminated. Without violent solutions to counter the growing non-white threat, whites will not be able to reproduce with other “pure” whites resulting in racial pollution and the destruction of the white race. The following excerpt illustrates a solution to deal with race traitors.

The first thing I saw in the moonlight was the placard with its legend in large, block letters: "I defiled my race." Above the placard leered the horribly bloated, purplish

face of a young woman, her eyes wide open and bulging, her mouth agape. Finally I could make out the thin, vertical line of rope disappearing into the branches above. Apparently the rope had slipped a bit or the branch to which it was tied had sagged, until the woman's feet were resting on the pavement, giving the uncanny appearance of a corpse standing upright of its own volition. (Pierce, 1978: 161)

Klassen frames that racial natural law should be followed and that whites are in need of “true” education. Klassen perceived that white education should include the history of why whites are superior, how to live a healthy life style and how to continue to strive towards physical and intellectual advancement. *The White Man’s Bible* emphasizes selective racial breeding integrity to advance white achievement in addition to promoting effective health and medical solutions. Klassen emphasizes the need for white organizations to confront the existing non-white threat through a large scale deportation of non-whites. Klassen argues that large scale deportations will occur only after whites perceive that their race is sacred, worthy of the highest degree of loyalty and are led by strong white leaders. Klassen states the following:

Detoxification of the White Man’s Mind. It is one of the purposes of this book to first of all decontaminate the White Man of all the garbage, rubbish and poison that has accumulated in his mind due to the sick religion and sick education with which his mind has been indoctrinated over the many millenniums. It is then our purpose to replace those ideas with healthy, constructive and creative thinking, ideas that are based on the ultimate of all truths: the eternal and unchanging Laws of Nature. (Klassen, 1981: 12)

The White Race is Nature’s Elite, the highest living creature it has produced in all the eons of time. We CREATORS, being members of this Elite, are supremely interested in the welfare and the future for the White Race. (Klassen, 1981: 6)

We then must expel these parasites from our shores. It is our program to ship the niggers back to Africa, and the Mexicans and other mud races back to wherever they came from. (Klassen, 1981:93)

Loyalty or Treason— No Middle Ground. We, of the CHURCH OF THE CREATOR, intend to put every White Racial Comrade in a position where he or she will be forced to take a stand—either for the White Race, or against it— either demonstrate loyalty to the White Race by word, deed and action, or be branded a traitor to it. In our future, there will be no Mr. Inbetweens. (Klassen, 1981: 114).\

How Pierce and Klassen frame “white problems” and “white victimization” is part of an active neo-Nazi process that enables individuals and groups to recognize, understand and accept subgroup social boundaries according to a neo-Nazi lens.

Duke focuses primarily on doctrine and ideological solutions over tactical, organizational or violent solutions. The following excerpt illustrates that Duke is trying to promote “love of the white race” over “killing Jews” and that it is his “right” to defend against the aggression associated with Jewish Supremacism.

I am not an anti-Semite. I simply strive for the life and freedom of my people and all peoples and nations around the world. While having respect for those Jews who act honorably, I must oppose the Jewish Supremacism that plagues so many nations. It is as simple as this: Because I love my own people I have no choice but to oppose those who would harm us or threaten our survival. Such is as natural and life-giving as the breath we take each moment. As long as I live I will breathe. As long as I live I will defend the life and the freedom of my people. (Duke, 2003: 198)

Neo-Nazi primary frames become believable when they resonate with the myths, assumptions, ideology, and worldview of conventional culture.⁵⁷ Lane attempts to broaden the appeal of his message by using Nordic mythology, aspects of natural selection and illustrations from the natural world to resonate with whites. Lane’s prognostic frames center on the supremacy of the white race manifested through racial natural laws. Lane outlines that it is imperative that whites reproduce only with other whites and this will occur if whites are able to discern that racial reproductive regulations do in fact follow racial natural law. When racial natural law is fully understood, whites will logically unify, arm themselves and engage in a racial war. One of the ways of ensuring that whites follow racial natural law is to have strong white leadership and effective white propaganda that leads to racial loyalty and racial nationalism.

⁵⁷ Zuo and Benford (1995) assert that when prognostic frames are more believable, the frames are more likely to resonate with a target audience, and therefore increase the possibility of mobilization.

Pick your strongman wisely! He must be a guardian in his heart. He must be one who has shown that his only purpose in life is the preservation of the folk. His ultimate aim must be to restore the rule of Law based on the perfect Laws of Nature (Lane, 1999: 6)

The White Peoples of the earth must collectively understand that they are equally subject to the iron-hard Laws of Nature with every other creature of the Universe, or they will not secure peace, safety, nor even their existence (Lane, 1999: 1).

A neo-Nazi primary prognostic frame functions as the leading organizational principle to identify and validate how a neo-Nazi should interpret the greatest threats to the white race. Frame prevalence, determined by overall prevalence of use, is a way of interpreting the leading primary prognostic frame for each neo-Nazi propagandist.⁵⁸

Table 10 illustrates that Rockwell and Duke's primary prognostic solution is strong neo-Nazi leadership.

Table 6 Primary neo-Nazi Prognostic Frames by Propagandists

Rank	Rockwell (1967)	Pierce (1978)	Klassen (1981)	Lane (1994)	Duke (2003)	Chittum (1997)
1	White Leadership	White Terrorism	White based religion	Follow Racial Natural Law	White Leadership	Carry out Racial War
2	Follow Racial Natural Law	Carry out Racial War	Follow Racial Natural Law	White Discernment	White Praxis	Establish White Territory
3	White Praxis	Eliminate non-whites	White advancement	White reproduce with Whites	Promote Revisionism	Follow Constitution

Pierce's primary prognostic frames are intended to catalyze whites into using violence as the central means to combat the growing threat to the white race. Klassen's most prevalent prognostic frame is "the need to establish a white based religion." Klassen perceived being enlightened to the fact that "one's race should be one's religion" and that modern Christianity existed to counter that fact. Abiding by racial natural law is Lane's primary prognostic frame, and he argues that if racial natural law is enforced by

⁵⁸ Table 22 illustrates a comprehensive list of each frame by text, while Table 10 outlines the three primary prognostic frames.

whites and non-whites, then all other prognostic solutions are more likely to be implemented.

Finally, the control sample illustrates that ineffective neo-Nazi propaganda differs in both in the prevalence of certain types of solutions and primary frames. Chittum places a greater emphasis on policy solutions more than any other neo-Nazi propagandist and focuses primarily on establishing white territory and following the Constitution. These findings suggest that Chittum is attempting to place a greater emphasis on solutions that other neo-Nazi propagandists have deemed less important. Chittum attempts to replicate Pierce's use of fiction and focusing on the need for a racial war, but results illustrate that Chittum's emphasis on violent solutions is significantly less than Pierce and places a far greater emphasis on policy and moral solutions. This finding suggests that Chittum's emphasis of certain prognostic frames deemed less important by other neo-Nazis may be a factor explaining why his propaganda has not had a similar impact on neo-Nazism as the other "effective" propagandists.

A Typology of Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames

A violent jihadi prognostic typology, table 7, organizes the twenty-four violent jihadis solutions discovered in this research into six categories. Each "solution" defines the boundaries of a subculture of violence because prognostic frames substitute violent jihadi solutions over conventional Islamic solutions. Each prognostic frame serves as a form of subcultural social control to internalize that violent jihadi solutions are "pure" Islamic behavior. Violent jihadi solutions are "legitimate" because prognostic frames are constructed to internalize the "altruistic" nature of violent jihadism to cleanse "true" Islam from secular pollution.

Table 7 Violent Jihadi Prognostic Typological Categories over Time

	Violent Solutions	Policy Solutions	Religious Solutions	Moral Solutions	Political Solutions	Economic Solutions
Propagandist						
Qutb (1966)	12%	0%	61%	19%	7%	0%
Azzam (1984)	34%	8%	45%	10%	3%	1%
Bin Laden (1996)	24%	3%	58%	11%	3%	2%
Zawahiri (2001)	51%	14%	16%	15%	4%	1%
Maqdisi (2009)	6%	2%	73%	16%	2%	0%
Al Bari (1850)	8%	1%	86%	2%	3%	0%
Summary	23%	5%	57%	12%	4%	1%

Religious, moral, and violent solutions are the most prevalent violent jihadi solutions used to respond to threats to “true” Islam. Table 7 illustrates the prevalence of each type of prognostic frame when divided into typological categories.⁵⁹ In contrast to neo-Nazi prognostic frames, violent jihadi typological categories are consistent over time. Frame consistency implies that the method of how information, specifically solutions, is framed remains constant over time.⁶⁰

The prognostic frames discovered in violent jihadi propaganda reflect different solutions to countering the “problems” facing “true” Muslims. Findings from the study illustrate that violent jihadi propagandists argue that when large numbers of Muslims hate other religions more than their own life, they will be willing to engage in martyrdom

⁵⁹ Whereas the prevalence of individual violent jihadi prognostic frame (n=24) is outlined in Table 23.

⁶⁰ Table 23 displays the total types of prognostic frames or blame targets derived from the sample of violent jihadi propaganda from 1967 to 2009. Table 24 illustrates the total number of prognostic frames, which frames are shared, and compares which frames are included in each propaganda sample over time.

ushering in an Islamic revolution. An Islamic revolution, according to violent jihadis, offers redemption to all of humanity because all non-Muslims have the option of converting. The ultimate solution, from a violent jihadi perspective, is not violent jihad, but rather a true Islamic revolution. An Islamic revolution will usher in “pure” Islamic forms of government, materialized in the form of a caliphate. “True” Islamic instruction is a necessary component to a violent jihadi revolution. The revolution will produce a new found desire for the Quran that will overcome the pervasive ignorance that now dominates the Muslim world. The culmination of the Islamic revolution will be reflected in a worldwide Islamic government, which institutionalizes the pursuit of Allah, the lifestyle of the Prophet, and a state of power that silences all Muslim victimization and humiliation.

I am a Muslim who lives only for his religion and is prepared to die for it. I can never remain silent while Islam is being fought on all fronts. (Zawahiri, 2001: 62)

I am not afraid of prison or execution. I am not happy if I am pardoned or acquitted. I am not sad if I am sentenced to death--it will be martyrdom for the sake of God. Then I will say: I have won, O God of the Kaaba. I am a Muslim who lives and dies for his religion. I cannot remain silent while Islam is being attacked everywhere. (Zawahiri, 2001: 74)

We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of jahili society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics, is not worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change ourselves so that we may later change the society. (Qutb, 1966: 11)

The purpose of each prognostic frame is to neutralize any “inner objections” that conflict with violent jihadi radical or violent solutions. Prognostic frames emphasize the culpability of a blame target in order align the reader’s attitudes and emotions to the “rationality” of violent jihadi solution. Blame targets are used when violent jihadi propagandists are trying to explain their solutions as a rational outcome. Both Azzam

and Bin Laden are engaged in a process of constructing violent and radical solutions as rational responses. Azzam was involved in waging violent jihad against the Soviets alongside the Afghan mujahedeen. Azzam associates waging violent jihad with pursuing Allah and following the Prophet Mohammad's example after members of his community were threatened by non-believers. Because of the dire Soviet threat in Afghanistan, Muslims that merely offer verbal support need to put their words and theology into action. It was also during this time that Azzam was involved in a campaign across the Middle East, Europe and in the United States to solicit recruits and monetary support for the Afghan mujahedin.⁶¹ Azzam frames violent jihad as a rational response to the Soviet invasion in the following excerpt.

In any case, there are two duties, which we are trying to establish: the duty of jihad and the duty of arousing the believers. If, in this way, we achieve success, it is from Allah, and should we miss it, it is because of Satan and ourselves. It suffices us that we have striven sincerely and called attention, with insight, to the terror of the situation. And we hope that Allah will provide us with sincerity and steadfastness and that He will accept our deeds from us, and bring us our end in martyrdom. (Azzam, 1987: 6)

Similar to Azzam, Bin Laden also asserts that the solution to the evils confronting Muslims across the globe should not be met by passive restraint, but rather by violent jihad. Violent jihad is a righteous action that follows the example set forth by the Prophet Mohammad. All "true" Muslims cannot remain passive when Palestinian land is occupied by Israelis and non-Muslim soldiers are permitted on Muslim lands.

No other duty after Belief is more important than the duty of jihad. Utmost effort should be made to prepare and instigate the Ummah against the enemy, the American-Israeli alliance- occupying the country of the two Holy Places and the route of the Apostle (Allah's Blessings and Salutations may be on him) to the Furthest Mosque (Al-Aqsa Mosque). (Bin Laden, 1996: 8)

⁶¹ Azzam was also suspected to have connections with the CIA.

If solutions are perceived as altruistic, then permanent drift is more likely to occur because violent jihadi solutions are perceived as rational substitutions to conventional solutions. Qutb asserts that violent jihad is a method to purify Islam from corrupt or ignorant Muslims. He argues that morally corrupt or secular Muslims are not really Muslims, but are pagans masquerading as Muslims. Therefore, it is permissible to target other Muslims actively engaged in polluting Islam.

This doctrinal contribution is significant because Qutb makes it theologically permissible to target Nasser's corrupt Egyptian government and other Muslim governmental officials. Qutb made violence an altruistic act against corrupt Muslims because jihad would rid the world of Islamic polluters and therefore assists in purifying Islam and redeeming humanity. In *Milestones*, Qutb prognostically frames that if violence is used to stop the pollution of Islam, then another Golden Age of Islam will be ushered in. Because Qutb grounds each prognostic frame in religious doctrine, he suggests that martyrdom is a noble endeavor due to the lofty goals of purifying Islam and redeeming humanity. The following excerpt shows how Qutb promotes drift into violent jihadism as an altruistic endeavor.

But the movement which is a natural outgrowth of the Islamic belief and which is the essence of the Islamic society does not let any individual hide himself. Every individual of this society must move! There should be a movement in his belief, a movement in his blood, a movement in his community, and in the structure of this organic society, and as the Jahiliyyah is all around him, and its residual influences in his mind and in the minds of those around him, the struggle goes on and the Jihad continues until the Day of Resurrection. (Qutb, 1966: 71)

All violent jihadi propagandists manipulate ideas and behavior into forms that are criminogenic in nature. Prognostic frames in propaganda are intended to mobilize supporters by using current and historical political, social, economic and cultural variables. Maqdisi manipulates theological doctrine to mobilize supporters to solve

problems from a violent jihadi perspective. Maqdisi argues that Islam is the solution to the “ills of humanity” and it is the duty of all Muslims to bring Islamic salvation to the entire world. Since Islam offers redemption to all, any “true” Muslim cannot stand by and observe Muslims being victimized without intervening on their behalf. Maqdisi outlines that it is the righteous duty of any “true” Muslim to bring salvation to humanity through the use of violent jihad to remove all enemies of the faith. Whether the outcome is explicit violence, outlined by violent prognostic frames, or ideas that turn others into blame targets, the goal is to foster an attitude climate of permanent drift into violent jihadi solutions.

And Jihad is continuous with every group of the Muslims and the person can wage Jihad by himself or with the leaders be they pious or corrupt until the Day of Judgment. It is not allowed to obey them in disobedience to Allah, however, it is permissible to fight those who disbelieve in Allah with those who disobey Allah for a need, from the angle of repelling the greater of the two evils with the lesser of the two. However, the Jihad that is under the banner of the virtuous Sunnah is more beloved with us and foremost and more obligatory. Jihad is an obligation from the obligations. It is not stopped due to the absence of the Imam or the Islamic state. (Maqdisi, 2009: 32)

Rationalizing violent or radical solutions can create attitude alignment where violence is more likely to occur. After a violent jihadi believes that the cause of Muslim victimization and Islamic pollution can be attributed to Americans or Israelis, then killing Americans or Israelis is likely to become a “reasonable” solution. In this sense, killing Americans or Israelis is done on behalf of humanity-- a greater good that transcends individual motives. Identifying the need for violence neutralizes inner voices and functions as a precondition to carry out violence as a righteous duty. Bin Laden attempts to rationalize violent solutions by outlining how the non-Muslims are polluting Islam.

Your brothers in Palestine and in the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy --your enemy and their enemy-- the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of

the sanctities of Islam Exalted be to Allah said in His book: { and if they ask your support, because they are oppressed in their faith, then support them!} (Anfaal; 8:72). (Bin Laden, 1996: 20-21)

Since “true” Muslims are being victimized and attacked across the globe, violent jihad becomes a “rational” righteous duty. Zawahiri asserts that Muslims need to pursue true Islamic instruction to assist in purifying Islam. Additionally, because violent jihad is framed as “rational,” Zawahiri then introduces two prognostic frames to assist in carrying out violent jihad—“seeking weapons” and “starting organizations.” Zawahiri states that in order to effectively engage in violent jihad, Muslims must seek to arm themselves and receive instruction on tactics and weapons. He also outlines the need for violent jihadis to organize and possess territory.

Confining the battle to the domestic enemy, will not be feasible in this stage of the battle. Victory by the armies cannot be achieved unless the infantry occupies the territory. Likewise, victory for the Islamic movements against the world alliance cannot be attained unless these movements possess an Islamic base in the heart of the Arab region. Mobilizing and arming the nation will be up in the air, without any tangible results, until a fundamentalist state is established in the region. (Zawahiri, 2001: 86)

Jihadi organizations bolstered with additional recruits are needed in order to wage successful violent jihad. Organizations attacking blame targets are necessary to establish jihadi territory so that Muslims can live under an Islamic form of government and maintain a lifestyle devoid of un-Islamic ideals. Whether the prognostic frame is “engaging in violent jihad” or “obtaining weapons,” each violent jihadi propagandist needs to use excuses and justifications to validate the violence against certain blame targets.

Jihad was a way of life for the Pious Predecessors, and the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) was a master of the Mujahideen and a model for fortunate, inexperienced people. When there was fierce fighting, they used to stand resolutely by the Messenger of Allah (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) lest he be closest to the enemy. The total number of military excursions which he (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) accompanied was twenty-seven. He himself fought in

nine of these; namely Badr, Uhud, al- Muraysi`, The Trench, Qurayzah, Khaybar, The Triumph of Makkah, Hunayn and Ta'if. The virtuous Companions continued upon the path of the Noble Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace), for the Glorious Qur'an had brought up this generation with an education of Jihad. They had been bathed in Jihad and cleansed of engrossment in worldly matters, just as a wound is bathed in water. (Azzam, 1987: 15-16)

Certain prognostic frames continue to be used despite the changes in the social world that have occurred over the past 50 years. All violent jihadi propagandists assert that Muslims are in need of redemption because Muslims exist in a polluted state of self-destruction. All propagandists assert that Islam, as the redemptive solution, will occur when all of humanity believes in the oneness of God (Tawid), Sharia is prominent, and the Prophet Mohammad's example is followed. Qutb and Maqdisi promote strict adherence to Sharia and following the Prophet Mohammad's example in order to redeem all Muslims and humanity.

The Islamic civilization can take various forms in its material and organizational structure, but the principles and values on which it is based are eternal and unchangeable. These are: the worship of God alone, the foundation of human relationships on the belief in the Oneness of God, the supremacy of the humanity of man over material things, the development of human values and the control of animalistic desires, respect for the family, the assumption of being the representative of God on earth according to His guidance and instruction, and in all affairs of this vicegerency the rule of God's law (al-Sharia) and the way of life prescribed by Him. (Qutb, 1966: 72)

So we single Him out in our acts of worship and in our intention and will- for there is nothing that is worshipped in truth except Him, the Glorified-so we testify just as Allah testified for Himself, as well as the Angels, and those endowed with knowledge-as He is always maintaining His creation with justice-[we testify that] there is none that has the right to be worshipped but Him, al-Azîz [the Almighty] al-Hakîm [the Most Wise]. [We say that] while affirming what this mighty word affirms of singling out the worship for Allah alone, as well as its necessary implications and rights. [And we say that] while also negating what it negates of the types of Shirk and partnerships and what follows behind that. (Maqdisi, 2009: 4)

Other prognostic frames are grounded in specific events that are unfolding in the propagandist's lifetime. To Azzam, part of establishing a true ummah is to put one's

faith into practice, which meant engaging in violent jihad and possibly becoming a martyr against the Soviets, Israelis or corrupt secular Islamic Governments. Azzam suggests that correct Islamic instruction by strong Muslim leaders to dedicated followers of Sharia will create a true ummah to repulse the Soviets in Afghanistan.

But the situation is more serious, and gravely momentous, and the Muslims in Afghanistan are in severe distress and definite, menacing peril. This blessed jihad was established by a handful of youths who were nurtured in Islam, and by a group of scholars who devoted themselves to Allah. But most of this first generation has fallen in martyrdom, and the second generation has advanced. This second generation has not been fortunate enough to receive the same share of upbringing and guidance, and have not come across a stretched-out hand showing an interest in teaching and training them. Such people are in dire need of somebody who can live amongst them to direct them toward Allah and teach them religious regulations. (Azzam, 1987: 12)

Also similar to Azzam, Bin Laden prognostically frames that violent jihadis who engage in martyrdom operations are acting out “true” Islam and bringing honor upon themselves in the afterlife and their families in the present. Bin Laden expanded martyrdom operations to Israelis, secular Muslims and non-Muslims, whereas Azzam referred to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

These youths know that: if one is not to be killed one will die (any way) and the most honourable death is to be killed in the way of Allah. They are even more determined after the martyrdom of the four heroes who bombed the Americans in Riyadh. Those youths who raised high the head of the Ummah and humiliated the Americans-the occupier- by their operation in Riyadh. (Bin Laden, 1996: 19)

Zawahiri considers it a right to have a territory from which to abide by Sharia, pursue Allah and the Quran as prescribed by the Prophet. In the following excerpt, Zawahiri argues that there is no territory in Egypt where violent jihadis can implement the “true” version of Islam.

The problem of finding a secure base for jihad activity in Egypt used to occupy me a lot, in view of the pursuits to which we were subjected by the security forces and because of Egypt's flat terrain which made government control easy, for the River Nile runs in its narrow valley between two deserts that have no vegetation or water. Such a terrain made guerrilla warfare in Egypt impossible and, as a result, forced

the inhabitants of this valley to submit to the central government and be exploited as workers and compelled them to be recruited in its army. (Zawahiri, 2001: 5)

The control sample illustrates that ineffective violent jihadi propaganda differs in the prevalence of certain types of solutions. Al Bari places a greater emphasis on religious solutions, more than any other violent jihadi propagandist and focuses primarily on pursuing divine leadership and following the Prophet Mohammad's example. These findings suggest that Al Bari is attempting to place a greater emphasis this solutions than other violent jihadi propagandist. Although Maqdisi and Bin Laden also emphasize religious solutions, they also suggest that violent and moral solutions are also important. This finding suggests that Al Bari's emphasis of a certain prognostic frame over all others may be a factor explaining why his propaganda has not had a similar impact on violent jihadism as the other "effective" propagandists.

Each violent jihadi primary prognostic frame outlines the leading organizational principle for the text. Table 8 illustrates violent jihadi primary prognostic frames derived from the sample. Violent jihadi primary frames function as leading organizational principles to identify and validate how all Muslims should interpret and respond to Islam's threats. Qutb states that the leading solutions are religious in nature. If Muslims would pursue what is written in the Quran, follow the example set by the Prophet Mohammad and abide by Sharia then Islam would be purified. Azzam's primary prognostic frame asserts that Muslims across the globe should engage in violent jihad against the Soviet Union because of the violence perpetrated against Muslim men, women and children in Afghanistan. Bin Laden's primary prognostic frame argues all Muslims should pursue Allah's divine leadership in all areas of life, especially when Muslims are being attacked by non-Muslims. Zawahiri's primary prognostic frame is a

call to use violent jihad against apostate Muslims and non-Muslims. Maqdisi suggests that the highest calling of all Muslims is to pursue divine guidance from Allah and follow the example set forth by the Prophet Mohammad.

Table 8 Primary Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames by Propagandists

Rank	<i>Qutb Milestones (1966)</i>	<i>Azzam Defense (1984)</i>	<i>Bin Laden Declaration of War (1996)</i>	<i>Zawahiri Knights (2001)</i>	<i>Maqdisi Aqeedah (2009)</i>	<i>Al Bari Swords (1850)</i>
1	Pursue the Quran	Engage in Violent Jihad	Pursue Divine Leadership	Engage in Violent Jihad	Pursue Divine Leadership	Pursue Divine Leadership
2	Follow Muhammad's Example	Pursue Divine Leadership	Engage in Violent Jihad	Muslim Praxis	Follow Muhammad's Example	Follow Muhammad's Example
3	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption	Follow Muhammad's Example	Follow Muhammad's Example	Jihadi Territory	Muslim Praxis	Engage in Violent Jihad

Similarities & Differences between neo-Nazi & Violent Jihadi Neutralization Techniques

Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda is a tool to neutralize “inner voices” that conflict with violent or radical solutions. Violent or radical solutions are framed as rational responses because they can be interpreted as altruistic, connected to ensuring the “greater good” for whites or Muslims. Drastic solutions are “necessary” because the threat of racial or religious pollution is epidemic, requiring violent and radical measures. Neutralizing conventional objections to radical and violent solutions desensitizes adherents to any justification questions and increases the likelihood that prognostic solutions will be put into action. A difference in format between ideologies is illustrated in the following passage where Pierce uses a fictional narrative, while Bin Laden uses poetry to assert the rationality associated with violent responses.

It's still three hours until first light, and all systems are "go." I'll use the time to write a few pages-my last diary entry. Then it's a one-way trip to the Pentagon for me. The warhead is strapped into the front seat of the old Stearman and rigged to detonate either on impact or when I flip a switch in the back seat. Hopefully, I'll be able to manage

a low-level air burst directly over the center of the Pentagon. Failing that, I'll at least try to fly as close as I can before I'm shot down. (Pierce, 1978: 202)

Our women encourage Jihad saying:

Prepare yourself like a struggler, the matter is bigger than words!

Are you going to leave us else for the wolves of Kufr eating our wings?!


The wolves of Kufr are mobilizing all evil persons from everywhere!

Where are the freemen defending free women by the arms?!

Death is better than life in humiliation! Some scandals and shames will never be otherwise eradicated. (Bin Laden, 1996: 20)

Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic frames intend to provide a method to channel emotions generated by diagnostic frames into action. Figure 9 illustrates the differences and similarities between how violent jihadis use prognostic frames to neutralize blame targets over time. Although differences exist between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi frames and style/format, a common goal is shared—to mobilize violent and radical behavior.

Figure 9 Similarities and Differences between neo-Nazi and Violent Jihadi Neutralization Techniques



Findings reveal that violent jihadis differ from neo-Nazis in the types of prognostic frames used to neutralize violent or radical responses (see Figure 13 and Figure 14 in the appendix). Violent jihadi propagandists desire to usher in the “true” ummah or universal Muslim community. This community is not bound by nationalistic boundaries or along racial lines, but on religious piety and devotion to Allah and the prophet. The ummah is emphasized because violent jihadi propagandists argue that a “true” revolution will occur only after Muslims are united behind the use of violent measures. If violence is used to force converts into Islam, then corrupt or ignorant Muslims will be saved from the current polluted version of Islam and non-Muslims would not be able to wage war against Islam. Therefore, violence becomes rational according to this logic, because humanity will be redeemed if Islam is purified.

The requirement of Islamic belief is that it takes shape in living souls, in an active organization, and in a viable community. It should take the form of a movement struggling against the jahili environment while also trying to remove the influences of jahili society in its followers, because they were people of Jahiliyyah before the faith entered their souls, and the influence of Jahiliyyah might have remained in their hearts and minds as well as in their lives. Islamic belief has a much wider range of action than simply academic discussions, as it not only addresses itself to hearts and minds but also includes practices and morals. (Qutb, 1966: 24)

Conversely, a white based religion offers no redemptive value for the rest of humanity. Neo-Nazi prognostic frames differ from violent jihadis in that they do not perceive that the white race provides a form of “redemption” for all humanity. Since race is determined at birth, there is no upward or downward mobility as in the case of non-Muslims converting to Islam. Although neo-Nazi propagandists do integrate a religious component to their ideology, it is only to spiritualize the notion that racial segregation is a sacred duty. Since the white race is the apex of humanity, the white race needs to be preserved through various prognostic solutions designed to prevent racial extinction.

Neo-Nazis argue that the white race has advanced humanity in every aspect and this “fact” determines why violent or radical measures should be used against those determined to extinguish the white race.

The Nordics are thus supreme in those special qualities of character that build civilization; especially energy, idealism and objective, abstract thought. Our great White Race, led by the Nordics, is the most precious thing on this planet, for all those who love the best of civilization, idealism and justice, regardless of one's own position in the racial scale. Let the heritage of hundreds of thousands of years of the White Race be drowned in a flood of darker blood, and all the idealism, justice and culture will perish. (Rockwell, 1967: 191)

Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists desire to neutralize any objections to using violence as a solution. Neo-Nazis frame violent solutions as an effective measure to combat racial extinction, whereas jihadis frame violent solutions to purify Islam.

The Creative Way. To those bleeding hearts (led by the Jews) who scream, “But you can’t do that! That is un-Christian! That is genocide!” we calmly reply, “Yes, you’re damned right it is un-Christian. But then, fortunately, we are not Christians. We are CREATORS. We intend to follow our own program, and we will.” Not to do so would be genocide of the White Race. We are far more interested in our own survival than see the world overrun with worthless mud races. Actually there is no choice. It is either the White Race or the mud races that are going to inhabit the limited space on this planet. If you are White you had better make up your mind whether you are going to join the White Race in its fight for survival, or you are stupidly going to play the traitor, and allow the White Race to be exterminated. (Klassen, 1981: 114)

To a violent jihadi, violence is a religious tool to reverse an immoral and secular tide that will place the true God back into a correct position. Therefore, violence is prognostically framed as “altruistic” behavior taken on behalf of those who truly understand their faith, their God and the documented theology behind using violence. Violent jihadi propagandists advance violent solutions as a justified religious duty in order purify Islam and to usher in a community of “true” Muslims. In this community or ummah, all “true” Muslims are governed by a caliphate, where all matters of the individual, social, economic and political world are governed by Sharia.

The Ummah of Jihad, which is led by extraordinary people who emerged through the long Jihad movement, will not easily lose command, nor serve as easy prey for collapse. It is also not easy for its enemies to make it have suspicions about its heroes' excursions. The Jihad movement familiarizes the Ummah with all its individuals, informing them that they have contributed to the price paid, and have participated in the sacrifice for the establishment of the Islamic community. Thus they will be trustworthy custodians of this newborn community which has relieved the whole Ummah from the agony of its labor-pains. Without a doubt, the Islamic community will be born, but birth cannot be accomplished without labor, and with labor there must be pain. (Azzam, 1987: 19)

Although neo-Nazi propagandists include violence as a means of racial preservation, they do not have a religious precedent similar to jihad, which has been validated by Islamic religious scholars who support violence as an obligation under certain conditions (Brachman, 2009; Calvert, 2007; Gerges, 2005). The controversy that surrounds the concept of jihad is not whether it exists, but rather the correct interpretation. Neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to make violence a religious precedent for a white based religion. If white skin becomes a religious identifier and violence become a spiritual obligation, then neo-Nazi propagandists have successfully replicated what already exists in Islam.

Neo-Nazis also attempt to neutralize objections to racial superiority, deportation and segregation. Unlike violent jihadis, neo-Nazis promote a reproductive solution to neutralize objections to racial superiority because whites must procreate with other whites to ensure that the “sacredness” of the white race continues. Furthermore, because of racial superiority, the threat of an increasing non-white population needs to be confronted, therefore all foreign (non-white) immigration needs to be stopped and the flow of illegal aliens needs to be curtailed. Neo-Nazi propagandists also assert that racial superiority was maintained by “conventional” solutions, segregation and deportation and that both practices should be reinstated in order to preserve the white race. Finally,

because of the serious threat to all whites by the “Jewish problem,” white superiority must be maintained through Holocaust revisionism, replacement theology,⁶² and identifying the Jews as a race

Be fruitful and multiply. Do your part in helping to populate the world with your own kind. It is our sacred goal to populate the lands of this earth with White people exclusively. (Klassen, 1981: 355)

The instinct for sexual union is part of Nature's perfect mechanism for species preservation. It begins early in life and often continues until late in life. It must not be repressed; it's purpose, reproduction, must not be thwarted either. Understand that for thousands of years our females bore children at an early age. Now, in an attempt to conform to and compete in an alien culture, they deny their Nature-ordained instincts and duties. Teach responsibility, but, also, have understanding. The life of a race springs from the wombs of its women. He who would judge must first understand the difference between what is good and what is right. (Lane, 1999: 5)

An honest debate between the high priests of the Holocaust and Holocaust questioners would reveal that the latter are not crackpots or hate-mongers, but people with legitimate questions and arguments based on sound evidence. Such a debate would reveal that revisionists do not deny that Jews, like the Japanese in World War II America, were incarcerated in concentration camps. Revisionists acknowledge that the conditions in the European camps were horrendous near war's end, and they maintain that many thousands of Jews died in the camps, mostly from malnutrition and disease. (Duke, 2003: 296)

...we will physically remove the alien mud races from our midst. This includes niggers, Jews, Chinese, or whatever from all White countries, whether they be England, France, Sweden, Germany or the United States. They must be expelled just as the human body identifies and expels germs, bacteria, virus and foreign bodies from amongst its own cells. (Klassen, 1981: 140)

Violent jihadi propagandists in this sample also differ from their neo-Nazi counterparts in that they have personally engaged in fatal violence. When only the texts are considered, both samples of propaganda promote the use of violence via text. However, when the actual deeds of the propagandists are examined, only one neo-Nazi, Lane, has personally engaged in fatal violence. Conversely, all of the violent jihadis, with

⁶² Replacement theology is a view that substitutes Jews/Israel in the Bible with the modern church (Vlach, 2004). Instead of the modern church, Duke asserts that the white race has replaced the Jews/Israel.

the exception of Qutb,⁶³ has personally participated in violence. Although all of the propagandists possess a strong record of engagement and leadership in their movement, actual participation in violent behavior is skewed towards jihadis. A higher prevalence of violent solutions in jihadi propaganda may suggest a certain “credibility” to advocate violence because of their personal example.

Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share similarities in their use of prognostic frames.⁶⁴ Findings reveal that neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share similarities in how they neutralize violent solutions. Propagandists construct prognostic frames in ways to neutralize conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from an actor’s actions. A technique to neutralize individual responsibility involves promoting violent jihad, even to the point of martyrdom, as the first step in truly abiding in Allah’s favor under the current environment. Thus, violent jihad and martyrdom are honorable actions because they will ultimately redeem humanity, purify Islam of its pollutants and create an ideal civilization led by strong Muslims.

These youths know that: if one is not to be killed one will die (any way) and the most honourable death is to be killed in the way of Allah. They are even more determined after the martyrdom of the four heroes who bombed the Americans in Riyadh. Those youths who raised high the head of the Ummah and humiliated the Americans-the occupier- by their operation in Riyadh. (Bin Laden, 1996: 19)

Hence, it is permissible for a person to fight them even if by himself and even if he is certain of martyrdom and not gaining victory. Jihad is an act of worship and an obligation that is legislated until the Day of Judgment. Nothing invalidates it. It is permissible to perform it in any time such as charity when compared to Zakah. (Maqdisi 2009: 33)

⁶³ Although Qutb did not personally engage in violence, he was severely tortured and imprisoned for over a decade.

⁶⁴ A similarity exists between the control samples, Al Bari and Chittum. Both “ineffective” propagandists place a higher emphasis on solutions over those used by “effective” propagandists. This finding suggests that certain solutions have broader appeal or that a particular solution should be accompanied by a greater emphasis on other solutions.

Neo-Nazi propagandists justify violence as a legitimate means to confront racial oppression and humiliation against whites. Racial violence is also prognostically framed as honorable behavior worthy of making the ultimate sacrifice as a neo-Nazi racial martyr, similar to a violent jihadi martyr.

Heroic Death. As we have stated in NATURE’S ETERNAL RELIGION in the chapter on Horatius at the Bridge— “How can a man, die better than facing fearful odds for the ashes of his fathers and the temple of his gods?” This is the glorious death, the heroic death, and we believe that there is none better. I believe it is much better fighting and dying for a noble cause in the face of your enemies (and taking some of them with you) than dying a pointless death, no purpose, no reason, aiding no cause. I believe one of the worst ways of dying is at the cruel hands of your enemies without even having a chance to fight back and inflict retribution. Even such, if it is a martyr’s death that inspires vengeance and retribution on the enemy (such as the stand at the Alamo) it can be considered a hero’s death and win the acclaim and adulation of our peers. (Klassen, 1981: 317)

Violent jihadi and neo-Nazis prognostic frames also intend to neutralize passivity. Non-violent and violent solutions intend to counter white or Muslim passivity by promoting active engagement (praxis)⁶⁵ in confronting white or religious injustices. One way of promoting active engagement for both ideologies is to cite the need for strong white or Islamic leadership that emulates historic charismatic leaders (Adolf Hitler and the Prophet Mohammad). In addition to finding strong leaders to direct the movement, both sets of propagandists emphasize the need to gain additional recruits and provide all whites and Muslims with correct instruction to counter conventional education. Neo-Nazis and violent jihadis include historical “evidence” to support active engagement. Historical “evidence” is used to validate solution rationality by attempting to outline a historical precedent.

⁶⁵ I define white praxis as whites actively living out their white/religious ideology and actively involved in countering racial/religious injustices.

The war, first of all, between the Texans and the Mexicans, and ten years later between the United States and the Mexicans, was, first and foremost, a Racial War. It was a war of racial hatred between the inferior, mongrel Mexicans and the healthy expansion of the White Race. (Klassen, 1981: 180)

They would have answered the same as Rabati bin 'Amer, Huzaifa bin Muhsin and Mughira bin Shtuba answered the Persian general Rustum when he asked them one by one during three successive days preceding the battle of Qadisiyyah, "For what purpose have you come?" Their answer was the same: "God has sent us to bring anyone who wishes from servitude to men into the service of God alone, from the narrowness of this world into the vastness of this world and the Here- after, and from the tyranny of religions into the justice of Islam. God raised a Messenger for this purpose to teach His creatures His way. If anyone accepts this way of life, we turn back and give his country back to him, and we fight with those who rebel until we are martyred or become victorious." (Qutb, 1966: 46)

Finally, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists intend to neutralize any objections to geographic territory populated only by whites or Muslims. Neo-Nazis want the United States partitioned according to racial boundaries, while violent jihadis desire Muslim lands to be devoid of countering ideologies and religious influences. The desire for territory is offered as a solution in order that whites may "defend" their race from extinction and where violent jihadis can implement a complete form of worship to God, devoid of un-Islamic influences, while honoring the example set forth by the Prophet. Possessing substantial jihadi or neo-Nazi territory reflects what both ideologies desire to see; mobilization on a grand scale driven by adherents that have neutralized any objections to violent or radical solutions.

This will form a mujahid Islamic belt to the south of Russia that will be connected in the east to Pakistan, which is brimming with mujahedeen movements in Kashmir. The belt will be linked to the south with Iran and Turkey that are sympathetic to the Muslims of Central Asia. This will break the cordon that is struck around the Muslim Caucasus and allow it to communicate with the Islamic world in general. (Zawahiri, 2001: 55)

That program must be: relentlessly pressing forward, expanding our territory at the expense of the mud races, crowding them into smaller and smaller territory just as we

did the Indians in the westward expansion of America, and the Mexicans in moving South and West. We must vigorously and aggressively proceed until over the next few generations the White Race will have occupied all the hospitable and productive land on the face of this planet, every square mile that we consider worthwhile inhabiting. (Klassen, 1981: 112)

Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter examines prognostic frames from a sample of effective violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists. The analysis outlines a prognostic typology for both ideologies, illustrates how prognostic frames vary over time and discusses the differences and similarities between neutralization techniques. The prognostic frames outlined by both neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists are constructed in a way that offers individual neo-Nazi and violent jihadis methods to solve problems facing their race/religion. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic frames intend to provide the method to channel emotions to confront blame targets outlined by diagnostic frames. This chapter also analyzes the prevalence of prognostic frames in text for each violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandist.

Findings reveal that although differences do exist between the types of frames used by neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists, there are a number of similarities in how each ideology is framed. This is an interesting finding, given differences in language, culture, history, geography and narratives associated with each ideology. This finding suggests that how terrorist groups frame solutions is not unique among ideologies or propagandists. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists require members to be catalyzed out of a lethargic state into a large scale racial or Islamic revolution where an ideal civilization of emerge. Another considerable finding between both ideologies is the degree of honor given to martyrs who sacrifice fighting for a racial or religious cause.

After “in-group” and “out-group” problems are outlined by diagnostic frames,

solutions are generated via prognostic frames to provide meaning and direct neo-Nazis or violent jihadis to action. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use prognostic frames as a dynamic process of reality construction to solve problems and to organize meaning. Prognostic framing in terrorist propaganda functions in a similar manner to other social movements because the active production of solutions is needed in order to mobilize a target audience to action (Gamson et al, 1982; Snow et al 1986; Snow & Benford, 1988). Snow and Benford's (1988) definition of mobilization can be applied to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists because they also aspire to catalyze, recruit, and neutralize counter perspectives.

Prognostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda accomplish distinct objectives to mobilize. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi solutions are needed to offer a method to combat the grievances outlined by diagnostic frames. Prognostic frames tend to be inflexible because neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists demand that their solutions are necessary and defensive in nature. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists claim that their solutions are defensive because they are in response to whites or Muslims being violated, humiliated, or killed. As a result, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic frames direct members to drift permanently into a subculture that emphasizes violence and dominance, over dialogue or compromise. Prognostic frames promote permanent drift because prognostic frames argue that violent and radical solutions are "logical" and "altruistic."

Prognostic frames are constructed to seem "altruistic" because they appear to be a rational response to the persistent threat against the white race and the Muslim community. Violent and radical solutions are framed to be a necessary outcome to

protect white and Muslims from further injustices. Prognostic frames are then constructed to neutralize conventional cultural norms and remove responsibility from a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi lone wolf or group. Under conventional norms, violent and radical solutions would be considered “wrong,” but because of the magnitude of the “injustices” against whites or Muslims, unconventional solutions are required to stop racial or religious pollution. Therefore, violent or radical prognostic solutions are interpreted as “altruistic” because saving the white race from extinction or stopping the defilement of Islam is for the greater good of humanity.

Interpreting radical or violent solutions as altruistic is also effective for attitude formation. If radical or violent solutions are perceived as legitimate, then neo-Nazis or violent jihadis are more likely to rationalize that violent solutions are necessary for the greater good. Sykes and Matza (1957) suggest that delinquency is perceived as a method to solve problems for those living in environments where the loss of close relationships, loss of status, discriminatory action, poverty, stigma, or abuse is common. The need to rationalize solutions also applies to neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists who need to shape attitudes by rationalizing why violence is required and neutralize any “inner objections” to radical or violent solutions.

A significant contribution to understanding neutralization in terrorist groups is to understand the distinction between how objections are overcome in prognostic frames and diagnostic frames. Where diagnostic frames neutralize “blame target” culpability, prognostic frames neutralize objections to violent or radical solutions. In order for a terrorist attack, segregating along racial lines, or promoting hatred to be perceived as “rational” or “altruistic” behavior, conventional solutions need to be neutralized. If neo-

Nazi and violent jihadi prognostic solutions are to supersede conventional cultural norms, “effective” prognostic solutions need to neutralize conventional inhibitions.

Neutralization of conventional solutions is more likely to occur if humanity is believed to be polluted, because conventional cultural responses then become inadequate, therefore racial or violent methods are necessary to reorient humanity back to its correct path.

The purpose of using prognostic frames is to set the stage for action by supporters and potential supporters. The next step is to examine the relationship between how diagnostic and prognostic frames interact in text. The relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames is analyzed in the next chapter at three different levels. The first is to analyze both diagnostic and prognostic simultaneously, until now, they have been examined independently. The second is to examine specific prognostic frames that promote violence and their links to diagnostic frames in order to better understand their relationship. The third level is to identify where violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists embed diagnostic and prognostic frames in text.

CHAPTER 6: The Relationship Between Diagnostic & Prognostic Frames

Introduction

In this chapter I focus on the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames. This chapter addresses research question three and its supporting research question. What is the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda? Where are diagnostic and prognostic frames located in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda?

Previous chapters analyzed prognostic and diagnostic frames independently, whereas this chapter examines the relationship between both types of frames. Prognostic and diagnostic typologies, in addition to network text analysis, are used to analyze how frames are related in text. The term “relationship” in this study is defined as the degree of contact that prognostic and diagnostic have in the text. The relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames is operationalized by frame prevalence, links between frames (closeness) and frame location.

Four types of figures illustrate the relationship between core framing tasks. The first figure, total frame prevalence, illustrates the combined prevalence of prognostic and diagnostic typologies. The second and third figures are derived from network text analysis. The second figure examines out-group and in-group diagnostic frames that are linked to violent prognostic frames (solutions that promote violent behavior). The third figure outlines the network measure of “closeness” between diagnostic frames and violent prognostic frames. The final figure illustrates frame location or where neo-Nazi and violent propagandists embed diagnostic and prognostic frames in text.

Central Findings

A comparative research design enables propaganda to be analyzed and compared across two types of ideologies. A central finding is that neo-Nazi propaganda is dominantly diagnostic whereas violent jihadi propaganda is prognostically skewed. Neo-Nazi propagandists emphasize “white” problems and the threats posed by non-whites and race traitors. Neo-Nazi propaganda emphasizes the need to neutralize “inner voices” that question the culpability of blacks, Jews, race traitors or the federal government. All neo-Nazi propaganda in this sample follows the same format of emphasizing diagnostic frames over prognostic solutions. This finding is significant because it does not change over time, despite different external variables associated with current events, culture and politics.

When compared to their neo-Nazi counterparts, violent jihadi propaganda is prognostically skewed across the sample. A possible explanation can be found in the difference between racial and religious in and out-groups. Neo-Nazis must convince the white population that their race is the apex of natural selection and headed towards racial extinction. Although institutional racism is prevalent in the United States (Knowles & Prewitt, 1969; Hing, 2009), linking race to natural selection, racial wars and a white based religion does not share the same degree of institutional memory for the current generation of whites. For that reason, neo-Nazis are attempting to *transform* a white population’s view rather than trying to modify it (Feagin, Vera & Batur, 2001; Feagin, 2010). A neo-Nazi transformation method is to emphasize diagnostic frames that are intended to awaken whites to the “racial threat” they face.

Violent jihadis, however, only need to *modify* a worldview over transforming it. Unlike racial wars, violent jihad is a legitimate concept within Islam (Brachman, 2009; Calvert, 2007; Gerges, 2005). Violent jihadis (the in-group) are not engaged in trying to promote “violence as a solution” as a “new” concept separate from Islamic theological grounding, whereas neo-Nazi propagandists are trying to promote violence as a legitimate solution based on racial theological grounds as a response to “white racial extinction/pollution.” Neo-Nazis attempt to legitimize violence by arguing that “ignorant” whites are engaged in shameful “racial treason” by being passive and letting their race become “muddied” or “extinct.” Whites that are involved in race mixing and are actively polluting the white race are deemed equal to non-whites and deserve violent retribution. In other words, neo-Nazis are trying to re-frame problems and solutions where violent jihadis are focused on re-framing the use of a violent solution. This point is illustrated when contrasting neo-Nazi racial wars with violent jihad.

Violent jihadis are attempting to re-frame *how* and when violence should be legitimized. Violent jihadis reframe the argument by claiming that it is only “true” Muslims that engage in violence. Findings reveal that “true” Muslims understand that violent jihad should be a sixth pillar of Islam and is a correct response to the threats, humiliation, or violence directed towards Muslims. Therefore, it becomes logical to reframe an existing violent solution in their propaganda and apply it to current problems experienced by Muslims across the globe. Unlike neo-Nazis, whose solidarity is based on skin color and who must convert whites to their problem/solution interpretations, violent jihadist must convert Muslims to a violent jihadi interpretation of a legitimate

theological solution---jihad. This is quite different and offers a possible explanation of why violent jihadis are skewed prognostically, where neo-Nazis assert diagnostic frames.

Violent jihadis are unified by a theological belief where different races and nationalities form a community—the ummah. Although this community is diverse, it is unnecessary to morph violence into a sacred notion because jihad already exists as a religious concept on a personal and collective level. The focal point for the violent jihadi propagandist is not to transform the dominant Muslim worldview by creating “holy violence,” but to modify how violent jihad is perceived by all Muslims. Neo-Nazi propagandists must equate violence as an individual and collective response to racial pollution in order to transform a “white worldview.” Furthermore, neo-Nazi propagandists must morph racial war into racial *holy* war in order to connect violence to a religious precedent. Neo-Nazi propagandists are endeavoring to create and promote a similar religious concept in which race is a divine characteristic and violence becomes a sacred endeavor to protect it. Disproportionately embedding diagnostic frames in text is a method to accomplish this morphing process.

Where propagandists embed frames in text provides a deeper understanding of a method used to transform or modify a white or Muslim worldview. A central finding is that frame location diverges between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. Frame location is a distinct characteristic to examine how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi construct propaganda. This finding makes frame location unique from previous comparisons in that there are no similarities between where neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandist locate frames.

Understanding that diagnostic frames are far more prevalent and equally distributed across each neo-Nazi text highlights construction uniformity. Frame location reveals another method to examine the degree that neo-Nazi propagandists place on valuing problems over solutions. When textual summaries are analyzed, the emphasis on diagnostic frames represents complete uniformity across all neo-Nazi texts. Where neo-Nazis emphasize diagnostic frames uniformly, violent jihadi propaganda is disproportionately prognostic across the sample.

Another difference between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda is how violent prognostic frames are used as solutions for blame targets. Across the sample, neo-Nazi prognostic frames that solicit violent behavior are less frequent when contrasted to violent responses by jihadi propagandists. Pierce is the only neo-Nazi propagandist whose use of violence in the text reflects a similar prevalence level to violent jihadis. When compared to violent jihadi targets, the targets associated with neo-Nazi violence are more uniform over time. Neo-Nazi propagandists also assert violence against the same blame targets over time when compared to violent jihadi propagandists who disperse violence across various types of blame targets.

Neo-Nazi propagandists also differ from violent jihadi propagandists in that they use more types of frames and distribute them proportionately in their propaganda. Violent jihadis use fewer frames and distribute them more unevenly. Fewer frames and an uneven distribution results in highlighting a “central” or dominant theme, which is followed by a wider margin of tertiary frames. Having more types of frames with a more proportionate distribution, increases the complexity of neo-Nazis grievances because they are more broadly dispersed. Having a higher number of frames also suggests that neo-

Nazi propagandists are attempting to increase the “appeal” of neo-Nazism by tapping into a wider range of grievances held by an ideologically and religiously diverse white population.

Despite various differences, neo-Nazis and violent jihadis share similarities in typology, strategy and use of neutralization techniques. Regarding typology, the majority of the frames were identified in the first sample, Rockwell and Qutb, with little variation from these central themes over time. Although new frames were added as current events and political structure changed, the frames used by Rockwell and Qutb were also used by subsequent propagandists. Using the same types of diagnostic or prognostic types over time illustrates that neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists are not creating new ideas but rather reordering and restricting themes used by previous or contemporary propagandists.

A consistent strategy of using violent solutions at different intervals is reflected by both sets of propagandists. Individual propagandists from both ideologies can be identified as being extremely violent, while others seem to promote a “softer” version with very little violence reflected in their text. Both ideologies mirror each other in format because some propagandists are more violent while others endorse “softer” versions as a precondition for violence. A precondition for violence can be defined as the aligning of attitudes by rationalizing the solutions or problems outlined by neo-Nazism and violent jihadism.

Neo-Nazis and violent jihadi propagandists focus on neutralizing threats to their ideology while promoting criminogenic ideas and behavior as normative. All neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use both diagnostic and prognostics frames to promote

subcultural ideas and behavior deemed criminal under the norms and laws of conventional culture. Both sets of propagandists endeavor to manipulate ideas and behavior into forms that are criminogenic. Whether the outcome is explicit violence outlined by violent prognostic frames or ideas that turn other races or religions into pollutants, the goal is promote or reinforce attitudes that “rationalize” permanent drift into neo-Nazism and violent jihadism over conventional culture. Rationalization must occur to permit permanent drift into a subculture where segregation, deportation, war, terrorism or elimination is perceived as legitimate solutions over any conventional methods of “restoring justice.”

Finally, when diagnostic and prognostic frames are analyzed together and organized into broader categories, both control samples show a greater degree of similarity to their “effective” counterparts. Previous chapters illustrated differences when specific diagnostic and prognostic frames are analyzed independently and on a more detailed level. However, when specific diagnostic and prognostic frames are combined and organized into broader categories, findings suggest typological similarities. Al Bari and Chittum;s texts reflect similarities in prevalence, diagnostic out-group/in-group ratios, closeness measures, and frame location. These findings indicate that although differences do exist when diagnostic and prognostic frame types are analyzed, the “ineffective” propaganda resembles their “effective” counterparts on a categorical level. This suggests that how propaganda becomes effective goes beyond categorical similarities and to factors that are beyond the scope of this study (i.e., degree of influence by the propagandist). Because the data used in this research is known to be “effective,” understanding that the control samples are similar, clearly establishes that “effective”

propaganda is not based on construction or content alone.⁶⁶ On the other hand, when a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi propagandist resonates with a subgroup audience, it is equally important to recognize that the types, mechanics, and structure of “effective” diagnostic and prognostic frames impact ideology, neutralization, and radicalization of subgroup populations.

The Relationship Between Neo-Nazi Diagnostic/Prognostic Frames

Neo-Nazi Total Frame Prevalence

The following figure illustrates frame prevalence for both neo-Nazi diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text. Data were parsed into two separate categories for diagnostic frames, out-group (non-whites and race traitors) and in-group (neo-Nazis) problems while prognostic frames were divided along violent and non-violent solutions. The purpose of table 9 is to illustrate the prominence of either neo-Nazi diagnostic or prognostic frames while distinguishing how diagnostic frames are divided between out-groups or in-groups and prognostic frames are categorized as violent or non-violent solutions.⁶⁷

Table 9 Neo-Nazi Diagnostic/Prognostic Prevalence

	Diagnostic Out-Group Blame Targets	Diagnostic In-Group Blame Targets	Prognostic Violent Solutions	Prognostic Non-Violent Solutions
Propagandist				
Rockwell (1967)	75%	12%	1%	12%
Pierce (1978)	54%	17%	17%	12%
Klassen (1981)	61%	10%	7%	22%
Lane (1994)	48%	13%	4%	35%
Duke (2003)	87%	8%	1%	4%
Chittum (1997)	61%	22%	6%	11%

⁶⁶ It is important to note that construction and content is important and should not be minimized. The findings of this research indicate that Neo-Nazi propaganda should be diagnostically skewed and violent jihadi propaganda should give greater attention to solutions over identifying problems.

⁶⁷ For a complete list of each diagnostic/prognostic types, see Table 25 in the appendix.

Summary	64%	14%	6%	16%
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Table 9 illustrates that the neo-Nazi propaganda samples used in this study are diagnostically dominant. Neo-Nazi propagandists uniformly emphasize diagnostic frames over prognostic solutions. Additionally, neo-Nazi propagandists focus on out-group flaws, failures, and immorality over in-group blame targets. Non-violent solutions are more prevalent across the sample with the exception of Pierce who emphasizes the use of violence over non-violent solutions. Particular attention should be given to the low-degree of violent solutions by Duke who promotes “softer” versions or non-violent neo-Nazi solutions as a precondition for violence (Berbrier, 1998).

The significance of analyzing diagnostic or prognostic frame prevalence is found in knowing whether propaganda emphasizes problems or solutions. Since the sample of propaganda can be classified as “effective,” understanding the relationship between frames can be described as “the code” or best practices of how propaganda channels emotions, assists in attitude change, and promotes action. Combining both types of frames for analysis reveals the degree of prevalence between the two. Each text has a prominent theme, a problem oriented theme (diagnostic) or a solution based theme (prognostic) and knowing the dominant theme reveals how propaganda has mobilized supporters. Understanding a prominent neo-Nazi or violent jihadi theme reveals how propagandists morph content into motivational tools to radicalize individual and group members.

Neo-Nazi Violent Prognostic Frames as Solutions

This section gives particular attention to neo-Nazi violent frames. Specifically, data are analyzed to determine which problems neo-Nazi propagandists argue will be

solved through violence. Network text analysis creates semantic networks that visualize how neo-Nazi propagandists associate violent solutions to white problems. In order to illustrate the prevalence of links between neo-Nazi diagnostic frames and violent prognostic solutions table 10 is divided into two categories, out-group and in-group problems.

Table 10 Violent neo-Nazi Solutions to Out-Group/In-group Problems

	Diagnostic	Diagnostic
	Out-Group	In-Group
Propagandist		
Rockwell (1967)	81%	19%
Pierce (1978)	85%	15%
Klassen (1981)	88%	12%
Lane (1994)	75%	25%
Duke (2003)	66%	33%
Chittum (1997)	59%	41%
Summary	76%	24%

Table 10 combines the three violent neo-Nazi prognostic frames into a single category, “violence,” in order to analyze how violent solutions are connected to diagnostic frames in the text. The three neo-Nazi prognostic codes are: white terrorism, eliminate non whites, and race war.⁶⁸ Table 10 illustrates two central findings. First, violence is more prevalent as a solution for out-groups. Second, neo-Nazis using violence for in-group problems steadily increases over time. Neo-Nazis also uniformly target

⁶⁸ White terrorism is defined as the propagandist suggesting the use or threat of violence for a racial/political intent. The goal of “white terrorism” is to convey an emotionally charged political/racial message to whites and non-whites. The prognostic frame “eliminate non whites” refers to the use of any form of violence by propagandists to kill non-whites/race traitors in isolated events that are not connected to white terrorism or racial war. Finally, the prognostic frame “race war” implies the propagandist suggests using conventional and insurgent campaigns divided along racial lines where combatants use the tools of conventional warfare: medium/heavy weapons, uniforms and military organizational structure.

violence as a solution for out-groups over time and across different types of propaganda. Since neo-Nazi propaganda is predominantly diagnostic, it is logical that the majority of violent solutions target out-groups. However, it is interesting to note that the prevalence of violent solutions to counter out-group problems shows a steady decrease from Rockwell to Duke.

Table 11 illustrates another way of analyzing how violent solutions are connected to diagnostic problems. Table 11 outlines the leading diagnostic types solved through violence, their prevalence, and closeness measure.⁶⁹ Closeness is a measure to understand where individual nodes (frames) lie between other nodes in the network. Closeness reflects another way of understanding the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text and over time. Closeness as a measure takes into account the connectivity of the node's neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that have the shortest paths to violent nodes in the network.

Table 11 Linking Violent Solutions to Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Types, Prevalence and Closeness

Rockwell (1967)	Pierce (1978)	Klassen (1981)	Lane (1994)	Duke (2003)	Chittum (1997)
Frame/Prevalence/ Closeness	Frame/Prevalence/ Closeness	Frame/Prevalence/ Closeness	Frame/Prevalence/ Closeness	Frame/Prevalence/ Closeness	Frame/Prevalence/ Closeness
Blacks 29% 0.9474	Federal Government 30% 0.8718	Blacks 17% 0.9091	Federal Government 50% .6677	Whites Humiliated 33% 0.6667	Federal Government 25% 0.8636
Violence Against Whites 17% 0.7500	Race Traitors 10% 0.6667	Jews 16% 0.8889	Modern Morality 25% 0.6677	White Extinction 33% 0.6667	Violence Against Whites 25% 0.7917
Communism 10% 0.9000	Modern Morality 5% 0.7727	Jewish Influence 15% 0.8163	Race Traitors 25% 0.5455	Holocaust 33% 0.8000	White Oppression 15% 0.7600
Jews 10% 0.7826	Jewish Influence 5% 0.7391	Native Americans 10% 0.7843	*	*	Modern Morality 10% 0.7600
Liberalism 7% 0.9000	Racial Pollution 5% 0.6667	Violence Against Whites 10% 0.7843	*	*	Native Americans 9% 0.6786
Jewish Influence 7%	White Oppression 5%	Traditional Religion 6%	*	*	Non whites Advance Crime 4%

⁶⁹ The definitions for each neo-Nazi diagnostic type can be found in figure 12 in the appendix.

0.6207	0.6939	0.6452			0.6786
Modern Morality 0.9474	Blacks 5% 0.7727	Race Traitors 6% 0.6557	*	*	Blacks 3% 0.6552
Non whites Advance Crime 5% 0.7200	Liberalism 5% 0.7727	Racial Pollution 5% 0.7273	*	*	Racial Integration 3% 0.6786
Native Americans 5% 0.5806	Communism 4% 0.5667	Communism 2% 0.5263	*	*	Whites Humiliated 3% 0.6552
Federal Government 2% 0.6207	Jews 4% 0.6182	Whites Humiliated 2% 0.6667	*	*	Feminism 1% 0.5135

Table 11 illustrates closeness measures for each neo-Nazi propaganda diagnostic frame as it is connected to a violent solution. Closeness in Table 11 reflects the total number of frames that are connected through direct links. For example, closeness from a “target audience perspective” reveals how long it takes information to spread from the problem to the solution in the network. The individual frames with the highest closeness value reveal that the propagandist places the frames within close proximity to each other in the text.

Table 11 reveals Pierce and Klassen argue violence will solve a multitude of threats against whites. Pierce’s text has the highest number of links between violent prognostic frames (n=24). Having the highest number of links illustrates that Pierce is asserting that violence is an all encompassing solution to a greater number of injustices confronted by the white race. Pierce’s highest ranked target for violence is the “federal government” followed by race traitors. Pierce’s *Turner Diaries* is unique in that it provides the reader with the technical and tactical “know how” to carry out his suggested violence.

Although Pierce's text is fiction, the tactical and technical solutions are grounded in reality and provide the reader with a pragmatic handbook of how to carry out violence. This means that in addition to realistic tactical and technical input, the reader's emotions are being constantly directed to use violence against the federal government. When compared to Pierce, Klassen has the next highest number of violent prognostic frames (n=20). In contrast to Pierce, Klassen does not link violence against the federal government. Instead, Klassen argues to use violence against individual blacks, Jews, and their organizations. Klassen also repeatedly discusses the historical violence against Native Americans as a justified solution to solving the current non-white problem.

Figure 10 reveals that Rockwell links violence to solving the problems associated with blacks more than any other diagnostic frame. Rockwell also promotes violence against Jews and communists. Rockwell argues that any violence directed against whites should be countered with violence. Similar to Pierce, Rockwell also links violence against the federal government, but not to the degree reflected in Pierce's propaganda.

Lane and Duke have the fewest links between violent prognostic frames and diagnostic problems. Similar to Pierce, Lane suggests that violence is a viable solution against the federal government, moral decay, and race traitors. Both Lane and Pierce argue that the threat to the white race is derived from federal government failures and the increasing moral decay found in American society. Duke, however, argues that violence is justified when whites are being humiliated and face extinction. Duke is unique among all neo-Nazi propagandists in that he suggests violence should be used to counter the fallacies associated with the Jewish version of the Holocaust.

Finally, violent prognostic frames associated with Lane and Duke's propaganda do not target specific groups, like Rockwell, Klassen or Pierce. The violent prognostic frames associated with the *88 Precepts* and *Jewish Supremacism* link violence differently. Lane and Duke do not specifically target blacks or Jews but rather the impact that non-whites have upon society and government. Lane argues that violence is justified because the federal government is becoming increasingly hostile to whites and the "traditional" way of life is being destroyed by non-whites. Duke asserts that violence is necessary when whites are humiliated and when the Holocaust is being used as leverage to further weaken the white race.

Using violence as a solution appears to have changed from Rockwell to Duke. A possible explanation for this effect is that Lane and Duke wanted to focus more on ideological arguments and less on violent solutions or that they intended to shift solutions that will resonate with a larger target audience. Table 27 (see appendix) demonstrates that across time, the degree of associating violent solutions appears to have shifted to a "softer" and increasing focused approach to violence. In agreement with Berbier (1998), softer does not imply that this type of neo-Nazi propaganda is any less dangerous. Instead, softer refers to a reduction of violent solutions. Yet at the same time, aiming to generate solutions that have a greater appeal to whites suggests that "softer" solutions may be more palatable to generate ideological converts.

Locating neo-Nazi Diagnostic and Prognostic Frames in Text

Frame location is important because it reveals an individual propagandist's communicative strategy and identifies framing trends across neo-Nazism. Identifying frame location illustrates the underlining emotive structure and format of how each frame

type is used in text. Because the data used in this research are effective propaganda, the results reveal the structural process of how target audiences have been persuaded both by the content and location of frames. The propagandist intends both diagnostic and prognostic frames to channel emotions to alter attitudes and incite criminogenic attitudes to engage in certain political action. Channeling emotions via diagnostic and prognostic frames is an important condition necessary for persuading target audiences.

Each sample of propaganda was divided into four equal sections or quartiles in order to determine if a propagandist emphasizes a particular section of text to embed frames. Table 12 illustrates the percentage of diagnostic and prognostic frames in each quartile as they are dispersed throughout the text and how they compare to other texts over time.

Table 12-The location of neo-Nazi diagnostic/prognostic across in propaganda (Quartiles reflecting over 50% prognostic frames are shaded)

Propagandist	Textual Quartile 1	Textual Quartile 2	Textual Quartile 3	Textual Quartile 4	Document Total
Rockwell (1967)	Diagnostic 97% Prognostic 3%	Diagnostic 92% Prognostic 8%	Diagnostic 94% Prognostic 6 %	Diagnostic 67% Prognostic 33%	Diagnostic 87% Prognostic 13%
Pierce (1978)	Diagnostic 72% Prognostic 28%	Diagnostic 69% Prognostic 31%	Diagnostic 73% Prognostic 27%	Diagnostic 68% Prognostic 32%	Diagnostic 71% Prognostic 29%
Klassen (1981)	Diagnostic 68% Prognostic 32%	Diagnostic 69% Prognostic 31%	Diagnostic 89% Prognostic 11%	Diagnostic 62% Prognostic 38%	Diagnostic 71% Prognostic 29%
Lane (1994)	Diagnostic 69% Prognostic 31%	Diagnostic 45% Prognostic 55%	Diagnostic 55% Prognostic 45%	Diagnostic 76% Prognostic 24%	Diagnostic 61% Prognostic 39%
Duke (2003)	Diagnostic 95% Prognostic 5%	Diagnostic 98% Prognostic 2%	Diagnostic 96% Prognostic 4%	Diagnostic 93% Prognostic 7%	Diagnostic 95% Prognostic 5%
Chittum	Diagnostic 91% Prognostic 9%	Diagnostic 77% Prognostic 23%	Diagnostic 84% Prognostic 16%	Diagnostic 81% Prognostic 19%	Diagnostic 83% Prognostic 17%
Summary	Diagnostic 80% Prognostic 20%	Diagnostic 75% Prognostic 25%	Diagnostic 82% Prognostic 18%	Diagnostic 75% Prognostic 25%	Diagnostic 78% Prognostic 22%

Table 12 illustrates that Rockwell emphasizes diagnostic frames across the text as his method of constructing propaganda. Eighty-seven percent of all frames used in *White Power* are diagnostic. Rockwell devotes little attention to prognostic frames in the first three quartiles before directing more attention to solutions in the final quartile. Table 12

illustrates that Rockwell's *White Power* has high variation between framing types. If read chronologically, three-fourths of *White Power* has to be examined before reaching any substantial prognostic frames. This type of structure "bombards" the reader with problems to demonstrate injustices, leading to an emotional reaction that is then directed towards the Rockwell's blame targets. In the last quartile of *White Power*, Rockwell transitions to offering a higher percentage of solutions to the growing non-white "threat." In the end, prognostic frames account for thirty-three percent of the frames used in *White Power*, with the highest percentage in the last quartile.

Duke also disproportionately emphasizes diagnostic frames, but differs from Rockwell by focusing on even fewer solutions. One difference between Duke and Rockwell is that Duke's percentage of prognostic frames is consistent across all four quartiles with a total percentage of ninety-five percent diagnostic frames, the highest of the sample. Like Rockwell, Table 12 reveals that Duke consistently emphasizes diagnostic frames through each of the first three quartiles of the text. However, in contrast to Rockwell, Duke does not increase the number of prognostic frames in the fourth quartile. In other words, Duke's propaganda devotes almost all of the text to addressing problems confronting the white race. Duke is asserting that problems are more important than solutions by adopting a diagnostically heavy format.

It may be possible that Duke's intent for diagnostic frames is to function as a type of solution. Pointing out problems, or the source of a "sickness," is the first step in reaching a point to "solve the problem" or "cure the disease." Duke does include diagnostic frames used by other neo-Nazi propagandists, but some of his solutions differ from those used by other neo-Nazi propagandists. Duke argues that whites should

identify Jews as a race, claims that it is the Jews who are the “real” supremacists, and promotes replacement theology so that whites can maintain “Christian” beliefs as a neo-Nazi. Identifying threats, specifically the threat of “Jewish supremacism,” is a “diagnostic” solution because Duke is attempting to demonstrate the accuracy of what truly is threatening the white race.

In contrast to Duke and Rockwell, Lane offers a much higher percentage of prognostic frames in his work. Lane is unique in that he is the only neo-Nazi propagandist in the sample where the percentage of prognostic frames in a single quartile, fifty-five percent, is higher than the diagnostic frames (forty-five percent). Table 12 illustrates that Lane’s propaganda has the highest percentage of prognostic frames at thirty-nine percent. Lane’s propaganda also has the two highest quartile percentages of prognostic frames in the sample (fifty-five and forty-five percent).

Having a higher number of prognostic frames does not necessarily make Lane’s text more violent.⁷⁰ Violence is determined by the types and frequency of frames that suggest that neo-Nazis should resort to violent solutions as the means to reduce white threats. In fact, Lane’s text does use violent frames, but it is the type of prognostic frames that determine the degree of violence in a text.

Table 12 illustrates that Pierce and Klassen use diagnostic and prognostic frames in a similar manner. The cumulative percentage of diagnostic frames for *The Turner Diaries* and *The White Man’s* are the same, seventy-one percent. This is an interesting finding because *The Turner Diaries* and *The White Man’s Bible* differ from each other in format and style. While *The Turner Diaries* is fiction, *The White Man’s Bible* was

⁷⁰ The *88 Precepts* was written to provide ideological “solutions” or a path for neo-Nazis after the threats have been identified. Some of the ideological solutions involve the use of violence, but the majority of solutions are non-violent.

created as a pragmatic manifesto outlining how to live as a white in a way that acknowledges that “your race is your religion.” The content also differs: as Pierce focuses on the use of racial violence against the federal government, race traitors, blacks and Jews in a future setting, while Klassen, integrates history, nutrition, science and religion to create a lifestyle recipe or booklet as opposed to white power fantasy fiction (i.e. Pierce). Despite the differences in format and content, both neo-Nazi propagandists deliver a mixed bag of diagnostic and prognostic frames. This finding reveals that manifestos or fictional accounts can convey the same percentage of frames to an audience. This finding highlights how fictional accounts can be as just effective to non-fiction political treatises or pamphlets.

Table 12 also summarizes the findings for each text. Duke’s propaganda has the highest percentage of diagnostic frames at ninety-five followed by Rockwell (eighty-seven), Chittum (eighty-three), Klassen (seventy-one), Pierce (seventy-one) and Lane (sixty-one). A noticeable trend in neo-Nazi propaganda is that the first quartile has a higher percentage of diagnostic frames than the last quartile. When summarizing all of the quartiles over time, the final quartile has a higher percentage of prognostic frames than the first (with the exception of Lane). This reveals a couple of things. First, neo-Nazi propagandists emphasize the need to highlight problems at the beginning of the text before concluding with solutions. This structure assumes that neo-Nazis will complete the text and link the problems outlined in the first three-fourths of the text to the solutions in the final section. Again, Lane is unique in that the format of *The 88 Precepts* functions more as a “legal” code and disperses frames differently than the other texts. Second, neo-

Nazi propagandists rely on inciting the emotion of shame consistently over time by promoting in-group and out-group differences.

Neo-Nazi propagandists place a higher emphasis on inciting emotions via diagnostic frames through each text over motivating through solutions. The in-group (whites) is constantly being attacked, humiliated, stigmatized or oppressed by “inferior” out-groups (race traitors and non-whites). Each diagnostic frame is designed to motivate the audience by crafting content to illicit an emotional response and link it to a white “injustice” or problem. Table 12 illustrates that neo-Nazi propagandists are pushing the “shame” button repeatedly throughout each text and over time. A possible explanation is based on a greater need to gain recruits and “enlighten” whites about the threat facing their race. As a result, it seems plausible that neo-Nazi propagandists emphasize diagnostic frames because solutions are secondary to creating “white converts” to neo-Nazism. The emphasis on diagnostic frames reflects the perception among neo-Nazi propagandists that most whites are unaware of white victimization and are in need of “racial enlightenment.”

Violent Jihadi prognostic/diagnostic frames

Violent Jihadi Total Frame Prevalence

The preceding figure illustrates frame prevalence for both violent jihadi diagnostic and prognostic frames in each text. Data were parsed into two separate categories for diagnostic frames, out-group (non-Muslims and secular Muslims) and in-group (violent jihadi) problems while prognostic frames were divided along violent and non violent solutions. Table 13 illustrates how diagnostic frames are divided between out-groups or in-groups and how prognostic frames are split between violent or non-violent solutions.

Table 13 Violent Jihadi Diagnostic/Prognostic Prevalence

	Diagnostic	Diagnostic	Prognostic	Prognostic
	Out-Group Blame Targets	In-Group Blame Targets	Violent Solutions	Non-Violent Solutions
Propagandist				
Qutb (1966)	47%	3%	6%	44%
Azzam (1984)	12%	13%	26%	49%
Bin Laden (1996)	27%	16%	14%	43%
Zawahiri (2001)	39%	18%	23%	20%
Maqdisi (2009)	17%	21%	4%	58%
Al Bari (1850)	34%	5%	5%	56%
Summary	29%	13%	13%	45%

Table 13 illustrates that the violent jihadi propaganda samples used in this study are prognostically dominant. Violent jihadi propagandists across the sample emphasize prognostic solutions over diagnostic problems. Additionally, with the exception of Maqdisi, violent jihadi propagandists focus on out-group flaws, failures, and immorality over in-group blame targets. Non-violent solutions are more prevalent across the sample with the exception of Zawahiri who emphasizes the use of violence over non-violent solutions. Particular attention should be given to the low-degree of violent solutions by Qutb and Maqdisi who promote “softer” versions or non-violent versions of violent jihadi solutions as a precondition for violence.

Jihadi Violent Prognostic Frames as Solutions

This section gives particular attention to violent frames used by jihadi propagandists. Specifically, analysis involves determining which problems violent jihadi propagandists suggest will be solved through violence. Network text analysis creates

semantic networks that visualize how jihadi propagandists associate violent solutions to the problems encountered by “true” Muslims in the text. Network text analysis provides an understanding of the relationship between violent solutions and problems because this method measures the links between violent prognostic frames and diagnostic frames and the total number of diagnostic frames that violence is perceived to “solve.”

Table 14 is divided into two categories, out-group and in-group problems, in order to illustrate the prevalence of links between violent jihadi diagnostic frames and violent prognostic solutions. “Engaging in violent jihad” is the prognostic code used when a jihadi propagandist suggests that “true” Muslims use violence to solve their problems. “Engaging in violent jihad” is defined as using violence to “defend” the “true” faith to kill, threaten or harm non-Muslims or corrupt Muslims. The following figure illustrates how jihadis link violence to in-group and out-group problems.

Table 14 Violent Jihadi Solutions to Out-group/In-group Problems

	Diagnostic	Diagnostic
	Out-Group	In Group
Propagandist		
Qutb (1966)	96%	4%
Azzam (1984)	31%	69%
Bin Laden (1996)	38%	62%
Zawahiri (2001)	61%	39%
Maqdisi (2009)	84%	16%
Al Bari (1850)	71%	29%
Summary	63%	37%

Table 14 illustrates two central findings. First, although it is more prevalent for violent jihadi propagandists to link violence as a solution for out-groups, this pattern is not uniform across the sample. Second, jihadi use of violence for in-group problems

shows a wide range of fluctuation between propagandists. A distinct pattern does not emerge over time and across different types of propaganda because jihadis do not uniformly link violence as a solution for out-groups or in-groups. Since violent jihadi propaganda is predominantly prognostic, it is logical that violent solutions would target in-groups as well as out-groups. However, it is interesting to note that the prevalence of violence as a solution for in-group problems has a more uneven distribution than the out-group.

Table 15 shows the leading jihadi diagnostic problems that will be solved through violence.⁷¹ In addition to showing the type of problem linked to violence, table 15 indicates node prevalence and closeness.⁷²

Table 15 Linking Violent Solutions to Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Types, Prevalence and Closeness

Qutb (1966)	Azzam (1984)	Bin Laden (1996)	Zawahiri (2001)	Maqdisi (2009)	Al Bari (1850)
Type/Prevalence/ Closeness	Type/Prevalence/ Closeness	Type/Prevalence/Ci oseness	Type/Prevalenc e/Closeness	Type/Prevalen ce/ Closeness	Type/Prevalence/Closeness
Islam is Polluted 30% 0.6000	Muslim Passivity 29% 0.6667	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 17% 0.6744	United States 14% 0.7193	Kafir 50% 0.7500	Kafir 29% 0.8462
Jahiliyyah 19% 0.8333	Muslim women Victimization 19% 0.6000	Non Muslim soldier s permitted on Musl im lands 13% 0.5800	Islamic Governments 13% 0.7736	Jahiliyyah 17% 0.6000	Muslims Governed by Non- Muslims 18% 0.6111
Kafir 15% 0.7895	Kafir 14% 0.6122	Kafir 10% 0.6170	Jews 8% 0.6721	Jews 17% 0.6000	Islam is Polluted 18% 0.6471
Modern Morality 7% 0.6000	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 11% 0.5882	Israel Exists 8% 0.5179	Israel Exists 8% 0.6406	Muslim Oppression 16% 0.6429	Islamic Governments 12% 0.6111
Jews 7% 0.7895	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 8% 0.6122	Muslim Oppression 8% 0.6744	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 8% 0.6406	*	Modern Morality 6% 0.5238
Satan 7% 0.7143	Islamic Governments 4% 0.5455	Modern Morality 6% 0.5800	Muslims oppress true Muslims 7% 0.5942	*	Muslim women Victimization 6% 0.5500

⁷¹ The definitions for each violent jihadi diagnostic type can be found in figure 11 in the appendix.

⁷² Closeness measures the location of where individual nodes lie in relation to other nodes in the network. This measure takes into account the connectivity of the node's neighbor and assigns a higher value for nodes that are closer in the text.

Muslim Oppression 4% 0.7895	Secular Innovations 4% 0.5357	United States 6% 0.5918	Muslim violence against true Muslims 6% 0.6308	*	Satan 6% 0.6111
Islamic Governments 4% 0.7500	Christianity 3% 0.5085	Muslim women Victimization 6% 0.5686	Communism 5% 0.6029	*	Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims 5% 0.5500
Liberalism 4% 0.7895	Jahiliyyah 3% 0.6000	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 6% 0.5918	Secular Innovations 4% 0.5857	*	*
Paganism 4% 0.8333	Muslim Oppression 1% 0.5769	Islam is Polluted 4% 0.5686	Kafir 4% 0.5541	*	*

Table 15 illustrates the degree of closeness between violent solutions listed for Zawahiri and Bin Laden. Zawahiri and Bin Laden have the highest number of problems linked to violent solutions.⁷³ Zawahiri's *Knights* has the highest number of links between violent prognostic frames (n=24). Having the highest number of links illustrates that Zawahiri is asserting that violent solutions will counter a greater number of injustices confronted by Muslims. The "United States" and "Islamic governments" are Zawahiri's most prevalent recipients of violence. Bin Laden has the next highest number of violent prognostic frames linked to problems (n=18). Bin Laden's violent solutions differ from Zawahiri in that he focuses less on Islamic governments, but instead links violence to solving the problem related to non-Muslim soldiers on Muslim lands and non-Muslim violence against Muslims.

Qutb and Azzam reflect a similar number of links between violent solutions and problems. Qutb links violent solutions to eleven diagnostic frames (n=11), while Azzam links violence to thirteen diagnostic frames (n=13). Qutb's most prevalent links between violent solutions and problems are the diagnostic frames associated with "religious

⁷³ See Table 28 for a complete list of how Zawahiri and Bin Laden link violent solutions to diagnostic frames.

pollution” and “jahiliyyah.” Azzam links violent solutions to solving problems associated with “Muslim passivity” and the “victimization of Muslim women.” Qutb and Azzam also link violence against kafirs, whom they argue are destroying humanity and weakening Islam. In contrast to Qutb, Azzam links violence against Christianity, Arab Nationalists, secular innovations and non-Muslim soldiers on Muslim lands.

Maqdisi has the fewest links between violent prognostic frames and diagnostic problems (n=4). Similar to Qutb, Maqdisi suggests that violence against Muslim oppressors, Muslims living in a state of jahiliyyah, Jews, and kafirs is a legitimate method to resolve “Islamic” problems. Both Maqdisi and Qutb argue that the threat to Islam is derived from jahiliyyah and the increasing influence of Jews across the globe.

Table 28, see appendix, illustrates two important violent jihadi trends. First, with the exception of Maqdisi, the number of problems solved through violent solutions increases over time. This finding is significant because it demonstrates that jihadi propaganda argues that violent behavior will counter an increasing number of problems facing Muslims. Second, the highest ranked diagnostic frames that are linked to violent frames are diverse across the sample. Qutb links violence to purifying Islam of pollutants, while Bin Laden and Zawahiri both frame the United States as being a source of legitimized violence. Bin Laden links violence against the United States far less than Zawahiri and focuses on violence against Muslims from any non-Muslim source. Maqdisi and al Bari’s propaganda reflects linking violent solutions specifically to Kafirs. Diversity of the most important target for violence suggests that violent jihadis differ on a violent strategy.

Locating Violent Jihadi Diagnostic and Prognostic Frames in Text

Each violent jihadi propaganda sample was divided into four equal sections, quartiles, in order to determine if a propagandist emphasizes a particular section where certain types of frames are embedded. Table 16 illustrates the percentage of violent jihadi diagnostic and prognostic frames in quartiles as they are dispersed throughout the text and how they compare over time. Knowing the percentage of frames in quartiles advances our understanding of violent jihadi prognostic and diagnostic frames because it shows how propaganda is constructed.

Table 16- The location of violent jihadi diagnostic/prognostic across in propaganda (Quartiles reflecting 50% or higher diagnostic frames are shaded)

Propagandist	Textual Quartile 1	Textual Quartile 2	Textual Quartile 3	Textual Quartile 4	Document Total
Qutb (1966)	Diagnostic 45% Prognostic 55%	Diagnostic 37% Prognostic 63%	Diagnostic 50% Prognostic 50%	Diagnostic 67% Prognostic 33%	Diagnostic 50% Prognostic 50%
Azzam (1984)	Diagnostic 23% Prognostic 77%	Diagnostic 29% Prognostic 71%	Diagnostic 33% Prognostic 67%	Diagnostic 16% Prognostic 84%	Diagnostic 25% Prognostic 75%
Bin Laden (1996)	Diagnostic 64% Prognostic 36%	Diagnostic 52% Prognostic 48%	Diagnostic 25% Prognostic 75%	Diagnostic 30% Prognostic 70%	Diagnostic 43% Prognostic 57%
Zawahiri (2001)	Diagnostic 53% Prognostic 47%	Diagnostic 50% Prognostic 50%	Diagnostic 65% Prognostic 35%	Diagnostic 58% Prognostic 42%	Diagnostic 57% Prognostic 43%
Maqdisi (2009)	Diagnostic 21% Prognostic 79%	Diagnostic 16% Prognostic 84%	Diagnostic 21% Prognostic 79%	Diagnostic 59% Prognostic 41%	Diagnostic 29% Prognostic 71%
Al Bari (1850)	Diagnostic 44% Prognostic 56%	Diagnostic 47% Prognostic 53%	Diagnostic 51% Prognostic 49%	Diagnostic 14% Prognostic 86%	Diagnostic 39% Prognostic 61%
Summary	Diagnostic 42% Prognostic 58%	Diagnostic 39% Prognostic 61%	Diagnostic 36% Prognostic 64%	Diagnostic 59% Prognostic 41%	Diagnostic 41% Prognostic 59%

Table 16 reflects that violent jihadi propagandists use a higher percentage of prognostic frames when compared to diagnostic frames. When all of the frames are summarized, violent jihadi propaganda is fifty-nine percent prognostic. Although two propagandists have a higher percentage of diagnostic frames, Qutb at fifty-percent and Zawahiri at fifty-seven, overall the distribution for the sample is skewed toward prognostic frames. This finding advances our understanding that violent jihadi

propaganda emphasizes solutions over problems. Emphasizing solutions suggests that Muslim problems are more widely known, but the “correct” solutions are not being pursued by “true” Muslims. Islam is polluted because secular or ignorant Muslims are not following the “correct” path to resolving these problems.

Table 16 reveals that Qutb’s *Milestones* has a higher percentage of prognostic frames in the first two quartiles and then shifts to emphasizing diagnostic frames in the latter two quartiles. Qutb’s propaganda is unique in that a summary of prognostic and diagnostic frames is proportionate. This is notable since Table 26 (see appendix) illustrates that Qutb has “jahiliyyah,” a diagnostic frame, as the highest ranked frame.

Qutb’s greatest contribution to modern violent jihadi literature is that *Milestones* theologically enables secular Muslims to be identified as non-Muslims, consequently justifying violence toward these individuals. Having a diagnostic frame as the most prevalent frame implies that Qutb is emphasizing that “religious ignorance” is the central problem. Qutb’s proportionate distribution of frames reflects the need to validate a “newer” interpretation of why Islam is polluted and to justify the “correct” solutions required to purify Islam and return to its glorified origins.

Zawahiri has the highest total percentage of diagnostic frames at the quartile level and across the document. Table 16 illustrates that Zawahiri has a greater percentage of diagnostic frames across three quartiles although the second quartile is evenly split between diagnostic and prognostic frames. *Knights Under the Prophets Banner* emphasizes the problems associated with the United States and secular Islamic governments. Zawahiri, similar to Qutb, emphasizes Islamic pollution and only the

“correct” solutions will adequately purify the faith. In contrast to Qutb, Zawahiri places greater emphasis on blaming the United States and Israel throughout the text.

Prognostic frames are more prevalent in Azzam and Maqdisi’s text. Both propagandists emphasize prognostic frames across each quartile (the exception is Maqdisi’s last quartile) reflecting the two highest percentages of prognostic frames for the total document, (seventy-five percent prognostic for Azzam and seventy-one percent for Maqdisi). Although the primary solutions differ, Azzam is arguing for violent jihad and Maqdisi asserts “correctly” following Allah and the Prophet.⁷⁴ These findings are illustrated in table 16 and reveal that both propagandists perceive putting solutions into practice will purify Islam.

The importance of dividing the text into quartiles is illustrated by a closer examination of Bin Laden and Qutb’s propaganda. Bin Laden’s *Declaration of War* is unique in that a higher percentage of diagnostic frames are located in the first two quartiles followed by a significant shift to prognostic frames in the latter two quartiles. Bin Laden also has the greatest variability between the first two quartiles and the last two quartiles. Bin Laden is justifying why current Islamic regimes are corrupt and thus illegitimate. Similar to Qutb’s need to justify that jahiliyyah is the central source of Islamic pollution, Bin Laden outlines why corrupt Islamic regimes are polluting “true” Muslims. Table 16 illustrates the difference in how Qutb and Bin Laden carry out the same task of presenting the information. Qutb places a greater emphasis on diagnostic frames, but it occurs in the latter two quartiles, whereas Bin Laden disproportionately outlines diagnostic frames in the first two quartiles.

⁷⁴ See Table 24 in the appendix for a complete list of Azzam and Maqdisi’s prognostic frames.

Finally, Table 16 illustrates that the location of violent jihadi prognostic and diagnostic frames are inconsistent and do not follow the same pattern. When individual texts are examined, greater variability exists across time and in each document. There is not a uniform method of constructing violent jihadi propaganda that emphasizes certain type of frames in any quartile. Qutb's overall use of frames is evenly split across the sample. Azzam and Maqdisi consistently emphasize prognostic frames throughout the text, resulting with the largest margin of difference between diagnostic and prognostic frames for the entire document. Zawahiri disproportionately uses diagnostic frames in each quartile, while Maqdisi and al Bari both have a single quartile that reflects a higher percentage of diagnostic frames over prognostic frames. Bin Laden's location of diagnostic frames is the opposite of Qutb, but the percentage of usage is higher.

Conclusion and Discussion

This chapter examines the relationship between diagnostic and prognostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. The findings in this chapter assist in gaining a better understanding of how both core framing tasks function together in text. This is accomplished by analyzing the similarities and differences between how neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use prognostic and diagnostic frames. Where the two previous chapters examined diagnostic and prognostic independently, this chapter combined both frames in order to analyze how they function together. Additionally, violent prognostic frames were isolated using network text analysis in order to understand how a propagandist links violent solutions to diagnostic problems. Finally, where propagandists embed diagnostic and prognostic in text was examined in order to better understand the propaganda anatomy and the propagandist's communicative strategy.

This research illustrates that there are unique similarities between neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. Similarities reveal two important details about how neutralization functions in radicalization. First, inner disagreements or doubts about the solutions and problems for either ideology need to be neutralized. Propaganda contributes to the neutralization process by promoting that “white/Islamic problems” must be directed to “blame targets” and the solutions must be believed to be justified as altruistic. Noting the similarities between both ideologies illustrates the importance of the type of “propaganda method” used by neo-Nazis and violent jihadis to catalyze individuals and particular groups. Similarities demonstrate that despite differences, propagandists use similar strategies to channel emotions for neutralization.

Neutralization appears to be a fundamental pathway to radicalization. Techniques of neutralization function in similar patterns despite differences between groups and/or ideologies. Propaganda contributes to the neutralization process by promoting and reinforcing attitudes and beliefs through frames that rationalize why a white or Muslim should drift deeper into a violent subculture. Since the data in this study are considered “effective” propaganda, findings suggest a possible explanation as to why each sample has resonated with neo-Nazi or violent jihadi supporters over time.

Creating diagnostic and prognostic typologies identifies which core framing tasks are intended to motivate target audiences. Typologies reveal how a propagandist uses content to motivate audiences into action. Diagnostic and prognostic typologies provide a way to organize and understand how propaganda is constructed and how frames direct and channel emotions to form attitudes. Channeling emotions to either change or solidify attitudes is the desired outcome of the propagandist. Put another way, this chapter

illustrates how a propagandist fuses frames together with the goal of neutralizing inner voices that threaten to counter neo-Nazi or violent jihadi “blame targets” or violent solutions.

Neutralization is a prerequisite for action and propaganda is a tool that operationalizes ideology. Neutralizing targets and solutions creates the perception that violence or a radical solution is best for whites or Muslims. This occurs because it enables the individual neo-Nazi or violent jihadis to defer culpability. In this sense, if “killing Jews” is perceived as being done on behalf of “humanity,” then the greater good of whites and Muslims nullifies individual motives. As a result, the message identifying the need to “kill Jews” is an implication that both neutralizes inner voices and functions as a precondition to carry out violence. After a neo-Nazi or violent jihadi internalizes the shame associated with racial or religious victimization, loss of power and status, then “killing Jews” becomes a “reasonable” solution. This research identifies these solutions, both violent and non-violent, to understand how propagandists are engaged in a campaign to turn a social movement into a revolution.

Finally, the method used in this chapter contributes a systematic way of analyzing content in order to examine the anatomy of propaganda. Understanding how core framing tasks are linked in the text illustrates how frames function together in a problem/solution dichotomy. This is especially important when violence becomes the “rational” solution to the problems confronting the white race or Islam.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Summary of Key Findings

This study increases our understanding of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda by examining the role of prognostic and diagnostic frames as techniques of neutralization. Techniques of neutralization are intended to promote criminogenic attitudes and behavior which supports permanent drift into a subculture of violence. The ultimate goal of diagnostic and prognostic frames in terrorist propaganda is to assist in a radicalization process of attitude formation ending in permanent drift. Permanent drift into a violent subculture is the goal, as opposed to shifting back and forth between conventional culture and a violent subculture, because propagandists seek to revolutionize conventional culture instead of tolerating it. This study also achieves a deeper understanding of how shame is used in diagnostic frames to radicalize supporters, particularly how information in text is used to catalyze action.

By using a comparative research design, this study provides a better understanding of how propaganda persuades target audiences to engage in criminogenic ideas and actions. Previous chapters discuss neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda framing typologies, illustrate individual frame types, examine the relationship between violent solutions/problems and reveal where frames are embedded in text. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the key findings and how they fit into the larger criminological literature. This chapter also examines the rationale and limitations of the research in order to offer policy and future research recommendations.

This research advances our understanding of how core framing tasks function together in propaganda text. Neo-Nazi propaganda differs from violent jihadi propaganda

in that it is skewed diagnostically (intended to generate shame in supporters). All neo-Nazi propaganda in this sample emphasizes diagnostic frames over prognostic solutions and follows the same format over time. Neo-Nazi propagandists also differ from violent jihadi propagandists in that they use a greater number of frames that are more equally distributed across each text when compared to violent jihadi propagandists. This finding illustrates that a greater number of neo-Nazi diagnostic frames are more dispersed along a broader range of targets and solutions, which is different from where violent jihadi propagandist embed diagnostic frames in text.

Violent jihadis vary from neo-Nazis in that their propaganda is skewed prognostically across the sample. This finding is significant because emphasizing solutions over problems does not change over time, even with the different external conditions associated with current events and politics. Violent jihadi propagandists also differ from their neo-Nazi counterparts in that they use violent prognostic frames more dominantly and frequently across the sample. Whereas neo-Nazis embed diagnostic frames throughout each text, violent jihadi propagandists disproportionately embed prognostic frames across each text. Violent jihadis also emphasize different targets of violence over time, whereas neo-Nazi propagandists demonstrate uniformity of targets. Finally, violent jihadi propagandists differ from their neo-Nazi counterparts in that they have personally engaged in fatal violence.⁷⁵

Despite the various differences between neo-Nazis and violent jihadis, they share similarities in typology and strategy. Similarities suggest that how terrorist groups frame their “problems” is not unique among ideologies or groups despite differences in

⁷⁵ Although all of the propagandists in the sample possess a strong record of engagement and leadership, violent jihadi propagandists have disproportionately engaged in lethal violence when compared to their neo-Nazi equivalent.

language, culture, history, and geography. A similarity is reflected in the fact that both sets of propagandists are not creating new frames, but instead use the same types of diagnostic/prognostic frames over time. Reordering or adjusting themes used by previous or contemporary propagandists illustrates that propagandists are not generating new ideas. Both sets of propagandists reflect a consistent strategy of using violence as a solution at different intervals. Individual propagandists from both ideologies can be identified as being extremely violent, while others seem to promote a “soft” version with very little violence reflected in their text.

Violent jihadi and neo-Nazis argue that all whites and “true” Muslims must be actively engaged in confronting and countering injustices. Both ideologies cite leadership as active engagement and argue the need for strong charismatic white or Islamic leadership. In addition to finding strong leaders, both sets of propagandists emphasize the need to gain additional recruits and supplement all whites and Muslims with correct instruction to counter the pervasive racial and religious fallacies in modern conventional education.

Findings also illustrate that neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists promote maintaining territory governed and populated either by whites or “true” Muslims. The desire for territory is offered as a solution in order that whites may “defend” their race from extinction and where violent jihadis can implement a pure form of worship while honoring the example set forth by the Prophet. Possessing jihadi or neo-Nazi territory reflects what both ideologies desire to see on a grand scale----a revolution.

Finally, neo-Nazis and violent jihadi propagandists focus on neutralizing threats to their ideology, while promoting criminogenic ideas and behavior as normative

responses. All neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists use both diagnostic and prognostic frames to promote subcultural ideas and behavior that violate the norms of conventional culture. Rationalization is required in order to permit permanent drift into a subculture where segregation, deportation, war, terrorism or elimination is perceived as legitimate solution.

Neutralization Theory

This study assesses how applicable diagnostic and prognostic frames are to neutralization theory. I apply neutralization theory to understand how attitude formation occurs in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda to outline subcultural boundaries and neutralize objections. The strength of neutralization theory, its emphasis on attitude formation (cognitive activity), can be extended to include terrorist subcultures and violence. Neo-Nazi and violent jihadi frames intend to shape attitudes by functioning as cognitive techniques to neutralize conventional norms and inner conflict with blame targets. Violent or radical solutions are framed as rational responses because they are promoted as “altruistic.” Violent or radical solutions are defined as altruistic because they counter non-whites, non-Muslims, and traitors for the “greater good” of whites or Muslims. Diagnostic frames in neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda neutralize conventional values because they outline that conventional culture breaks racial or religious laws.⁷⁶ Subcultural laws are expressed through violent jihadi propaganda in order to further separate the social world into in-groups or out-groups.

Reconceptualizing neutralization theory to understand terrorism ideology follows other scholars who have applied the theory to crime (Ball, 1966; Mannle & Lewis, 1979;

⁷⁶ Terrorist propaganda functions to identify neo-Nazi racial natural law, what violent jihadis perceive to be “pure” Islamic law and how conventional culture is violating these laws.

Minor, 1980; 1981; 1984; Agnew & Peters, 1985; Dabney, 1995; Copes 2003; Rosenfeld, Jacobs & Wright, 2003; Maruna & Copes, 2004; Topalli, 2005). Understanding attitude formation in political criminality acknowledges the importance of specifying in-group subcultural norms over out-group conventional norms. Terrorist propaganda identifies the out-groups engaged in a campaign to pollute and eventually overthrow the natural/divine ideal.⁷⁷ However, unlike common criminality or delinquency, where drift between conventional and unconventional culture is expected (Sykes & Matza, 1957; McCarthy & Stewart, 1998; Thurman, St. John & Riggs, 1984; Topalli, 2005), “permanent drift” into a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi subculture is the desired outcome.

Expanding neutralization theory to terrorist propaganda and its role in attitude formation towards permanent drift can be summarized by two central points: first, unlike Topalli’s (2005) description of subcultures and conventional culture, there is clear separation between conventional and nonconventional terrorist cultural values and, second, that allegiance to a given value system needs to be absolute and can expand the concept of “drift” to be defined as “radicalization.”⁷⁸

⁷⁷ In addition to racial and religious ideals, gender roles are also being violated by the out-group. Violent jihadis and neo-Nazis highlight that white and Muslim women are being victimized and masculine roles are being reversed by the increase of homosexuality and feminism.

⁷⁸ It is important to acknowledge that there are neo-Nazis and violent jihadis that co-exist between a violent subculture and conventional culture, so it makes sense to conceive of a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi value system outlined by propaganda, as a radicalization continuum that allows for simultaneous attachment to conventional and unconventional rules of behavior. However it is equally important to acknowledge that thriving in a “polluted” culture is not what violent jihadis or neo-Nazi propagandists’ desire. If these individuals do ‘drift’ they are doing so either because they are sleeper cells where drift serves a higher subcultural value, that they are not completely loyal to their race or religion because they cannot choose between the two cultures, or that because of their current situation it is impossible to reject conventional culture for various reasons. It also makes sense to acknowledge that where a terrorist (or potential terrorist) lies along the radicalization continuum depends on a number of factors that are beyond the scope of this study. The distinction between how individuals maintain intrinsic or extrinsic loyalties is also beyond the scope of this study but certainly warrants attention. It may be that certain types of neo-Nazi or violent jihadi “loyalty breeches” transgressions are more tolerable externally because internal loyalties neutralize any thoughts that minimize racial or religious loyalty.

Topalli (2005: 824) asserts that “conventional cultures, subcultures, countercultures have become more interdependent, with the precepts of one entity bleeding into and altering those of another” he therefore argues that the distinction between criminal subcultures and conventional culture has blurred. Although this may be the case for violent, street offenders, such as drug dealers, armed robbers, and carjackers, the goal of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists is to create a clear distinction between a violent jihadi and neo-Nazi subculture. A clear distinction from previous conceptualizations of subcultures is critical because the end game for terrorists is different from street crime. Terrorists intend to mobilize supporters, ultimately leading to a revolution where the norms associated with a violent subculture becomes formal legislation and those engaged in violence become a governing body. Therefore, it is critical to neutralize any conflict with violence as a rational measure to mobilize the white race and Muslims.

Techniques of neutralization are intended to promote drift or radicalize two different audiences. The first audience can be identified as those who already support violent jihadism or neo-Nazism and the second are those not ideologically aligned. Techniques of neutralization allow violent jihadis or neo-Nazis to drift further (or radicalize) into a terrorist subculture over conventional society. Diagnostic and prognostic frames assert information in such a way that permits radical attitudes or behavior to be perceived as rational and altruistic. Diagnostic frames rationalize and thus neutralize conventional cultural norms by removing responsibility from neo-Nazi or violent jihadi groups and lone wolves. Individual responsibility is removed because whites or Muslims are being attacked, humiliated, and oppressed by members of the “out-

group.” Therefore violent measures are for the greater good and transcend individual culpability. Neutralizing conventional values enable a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi to shut off “inner objections” to counter frames from conventional culture that conflict with a violent subculture. When conflicting conventional cultural values and inner conflict are rejected, permanent drift occurs. Another way to define permanent drift is “conversion” or the complete rejection and withdrawal from conventional culture. Complete rejection of conventional culture is the ultimate goal of neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists because a high number of “converts” indicates social movement towards collective radicalization.

Individuals that are not ideologically aligned with neo-Nazism or violent jihadism are the second target audience. Diagnostic frames are used to “awaken” whites and Muslims to the just nature of neo-Nazism or violent jihadism by focusing on white or Muslim problems as blame targets. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists also use prognostic frames to clearly distinguish between conventional and subculture solutions. Both diagnostic and prognostic frames are used to strengthen social ties (if they exist) with current neo-Nazis /violent jihadis or mobilize individuals to seek these relationships out. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists endeavor to clearly define the differences between a subculture of violence over conventional culture. This distinction differs from Sykes and Matza (1957) orientation between how conventional and subcultures are related.

Sykes and Matza’s (1957) theoretical orientation of neutralization theory argues that a subculture of delinquency was not absolute nor should be permanent. Other studies also support Sykes and Matza’s theoretical orientation that subcultures blur with

conventional culture and are transitory (Anderson, 1990; 1999; Jacobs, 2000; 1999; Wright & Decker, 1997; 1994; Shover, 1996; Wolfgang and Feracuti, 1967; Copes, 2003). This means that it is possible for individuals to behave according to subcultural values while also using conventional culture as points of reference. Subcultural theorists also state that an allegiance to a subcultural code does not negate an individual's ability to co-exist in conventional culture (Wolfgang and Feracuti, 1967; Cohen, 1955; Cohen & Short, 1958; Short & Strodbeck, 1965; Miller, 1958; Shaw, 1930; Cressey, 1983; Anderson, 1999; Fagan, 1996). However, neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists argue the exact opposite because the "end game" or outcomes for political violence is different from common crime. Violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propagandists argue that it is because there is a lack of allegiance to their race or religion that the white race and Islam is being polluted. The objective is to convert an individual from drifting between conventional cultures into an absolute allegiance to a subculture that has every intention of becoming *the* future conventional culture.

Both neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propagandists need to neutralize "inner voices" that question using violence as a solution in a terrorist subculture. Neo-Nazis frame solutions to neutralize violent measures intended to confront racial extinction, whereas violent jihadis frame solutions to neutralize violence to purify Islam. What distinguishes neo-Nazi violent solutions from jihadi violence is that motivation is based on prevention, whereas violent jihad is a religious obligation. Even though neo-Nazi and violent jihad propagandists share a similarity of using violence as a solution, they differ on motivation. Jihadis modify violence into a religious obligation for all Muslims in order to purify Islam and force non-Muslim conversions. To a violent jihadi, violence is a religious tool

to obtain a position of power, reversing an immoral and secular tide. Although, neo-Nazi propagandists include violence as a means of racial preservation, they do not have a religious precedent as do violent jihadis where violence becomes an obligation. Neo-Nazis, however, want to transform violent solutions by aligning violence as a justifiable response promoted by a white based religion.

Neutralization theory is based on the idea that individuals choose a value system that is more important to them. Their choice drives attitude formation (cognitive activity) and behavior. By opening neutralization theory to terrorist propaganda a model is created that differs from Sykes and Matza (1957), Matza (1964), and Topalli's (2005) perspective. Unlike common crime or delinquency, terrorism is part of an ideology meant to revolutionize conventional culture instead of allowing the status quo to continue. Expanding neutralization theory to diagnostic frames in propaganda also permits the role of shame to be examined.

Shame

Examining shame in terrorist propaganda advances what Sherman (2002), Karstedt (2006) and Rice (2009) assert as a pressing need to examine different types of criminality from an emotional perspective. This study joins the effort to increase the role of emotions in criminology and broaden its domain within the field (Bouffard, 2002; Jang & Johnson, 2003; Carmichael & Picquero, 2004; Barblet, 2002; DeHaan & Loader, 2002; Gray & Farrall, 2002; Karstedt, 2006; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002). By exploring framing in terrorist propaganda, this study also address concerns by LaFree (2006) and Rice (2009) who assert that criminologists have examined emotions in certain types of crime but have ignored emotional analysis of political violence.

As suggested by Rice (2009) and Victoroff (2005) I use shame in this research as an ideal emotion to examine terrorism because numerous scholars both in criminology and terrorism studies have noted the frequency of a narrative of shame, and its relationship to political and generic violence (Braithwaite, 1989; 2001; Katz, 1999; Post, 2005; Haidt, 2006; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; 2000; Victoroff, 2005; Scheff, 1994; Rice, 2009, Shaprio, 2003, Lindner, 2001; 2006; Moïsi, 2007; Cook & Allison, 2007; Hafez, 2007; Khasan, 2003; Moghadam, 2002, 2006; Speckhard, 2005; Stern, 2003; Telhami, 2002, 2004; LaFree, 2006; Fattah & Fierke, 2009).⁷⁹ Shame is used to increase recruitment potential, legitimate grievances in order build a social movement that mobilizes into a revolution.⁸⁰ This study is an exploratory attempt to elaborate on the use of shame in propaganda for group mobilization, recruitment, radicalization, and group solidarity.

As this study illustrates, shame is framed in terrorist propaganda to trigger emotions in a target audience leading to attitude change.⁸¹ Shame functions as an emotional catalyst to generate anger, then rage that ultimately leads to violence (Gilligan,

⁷⁹ Although some terrorism scholars acknowledge the power of shame it is not the prevailing terrorism studies perspective (Post, 2005; Victoroff, 2005; Rice, 2009).

⁸⁰ According to some observers shame is the master emotion because of its power to influence social behavior (Scheff, 1994; 2000; Gilligan, 1996; MacDougall, 1908)⁸⁰. Gilligan states that “The emotion of shame is the primary or ultimate cause of all violence, whether towards others or towards the self” (Gilligan, 1996: 110). MacDougall (1908:56) “Shame is the emotion second to none in the extent of its influence upon social behavior.” Shame is holistic because it describes the entire self and may be evoked by failure, loss, social insult, loss of status, public exposure of a private incident or scape-goating (Lewis, 1971). It is *how* shame is framed and interpreted that makes it the master emotion with the potential to become *the* powerful catalyst to motivate a target audience into action (Klandermas, 1984, Jasper, 1998; Berbrier, 1998).

⁸¹ Ethnographers or cultural experts assert that shame is a powerful motivator, most notably, Juergensmeyer (2003), Gerges (2005) and Stern (2003) are three of the more widely known scholars to stress the emotion of shame and terrorism. Masters and Deffenbaugh (2007) provide a short discussion about the role of emotions in motivation while Moghaddam (2005) conceptually examines the deep level of perceived injustices and the feelings of shame among terrorists. Victoroff (2005) asserted that humiliation-revenge theory seems promising, yet five years later this theory has received little attention.

1996). Findings reveal that neo-Nazi propagandists use shame in diagnostic frames as the leading propaganda method to promote attitude change. Neo-Nazis consider it shameful that members of the white race do not resist being overpowered by “inferior” races. Using propaganda, neo-Nazis intended to shame whites into resistance and mobilization by illustrating that their race is facing extinction through racial pollution. Neo-Nazis characterize the majority of whites as shamefully indifferent and powerless, leading to the ultimate demise of the white race. Because whites are “nature’s pinnacle of achievement,” they should be honored, and instead they are treated with contempt by non-whites and this unjust “weaker” status is shameful. Nazi propaganda assaults whites with shame for their ignorance, indifference or passivity to the plight of their race. The reason for their current weaker state is the fact that the majority of whites are not engaged in any form of race preservation and in some cases engage in racial destruction by supporting multiculturalism, civil rights, affirmative action and other liberal social programs.

Findings illustrate that shame is also used by violent jihadi propagandists to motivate individual Muslims, sects, and global communities, but not to the degree as their neo-Nazi counterparts. This research finds that violent jihadi propagandist intend to reach Muslims who are discontented and are feeling either humiliated or frustrated in their current status. Violent jihadi propaganda is constructed in a way that promotes the perspective that the West perceives Muslims as “inferior” and powerless, therefore “crusaders” and “infidels” are killing Muslims because their blood is less valuable. An unjust “inferior” status is shameful because violent jihadis assert that Muslims are Allah’s standard bearers and therefore should be honored, yet they are treated with contempt.

Violent jihadis assault Muslims in their propaganda with shame for their ignorance, indifference or passivity to the plight of fellow Muslims under siege by crusaders. Muslims are to blame for their current weaker state because they are not following the true faith, therefore allowing non-Muslims to dominate them.

Emphasizing emotions in this study is in line with other criminologists who acknowledge that emotions are central to understanding individual and social behavior (Sherman, 2002; Bouffard, 2002; Jang & Johnson, 2003; Carmichael & Picquero, 2004; Barblet, 2002; DeHaan & Loader, 2002; Gray & Farrall, 2002; Karstedt, 2006; Lee, 2001; Katz, 2002). This study also confirms why criminologists should be interested in emotions to understand criminological theory because they are powerful motivators that wield biological, social and psychological influence (Darwin, 1916; O'Neal, 1996; Cooley, 1922; Goffman, 1963; Lewis, 1971; Elias, 2000; Scheff & Retzinger, 1991; Simmel, 1950).⁸² This study also advances how information is fused with emotions, specifically shame, to persuade and convert into neo-Nazism and violent jihadism. The findings of this study provide the motivation for future research to understand how shame plays a role in channeling action, determining opinions, and uniting social ties against a common enemy at an individual and organizational level.

RESEARCH RATIONALE

A strength of this study is that it is exploratory and also advances the understanding of terrorist propaganda as a technique to neutralize criminogenic attitudes and behavior. This study is exploratory on several levels. To my knowledge, this is the

⁸² Collins describes emotions as “the glue of solidarity—and what mobilizes conflict” (Collins, 1990; 28). Alfred McClung Lee (1945) concludes that emotions are “deep, largely un verbalized, and withal powerful in the determination of opinion and behavior” (Lee, 1945: 130). Jasper (1998) argues that “our world is patterned by affect. Our relationship with other humans, even fleeting ones, is charged with emotions” (Jasper, 1998; 405).

only study that uses frame analysis to examine terrorist propaganda from a criminogenic perspective. This is important because frame analysis assists in gaining a better understanding of violent subcultural boundaries outlined in terrorist propaganda. One of the strengths of this study is that the analysis and approach reveals new insights on data readily available to researchers. New insights can compliment or compete with existing ways of understanding attitude formation and radicalization among terrorist subcultures. Perceiving terrorism as criminogenic propaganda reveals a deeper understanding of how frames catalyze emotion in text to evoke participant neutralization. Understanding the process of how neutralization is linked to frames reveals the anatomy of how propaganda functions as a criminogenic tool and how “emotional buttons” are used to radicalize and convert.

This study advances how terrorism is studied in criminology by applying frame analysis to terrorist propaganda. Terrorist propaganda exists to increase crime and catalyze movements against conventional culture. The purpose of criminogenic propaganda is to incite emotions, direct them towards “blame” agents and evoke violent responses. Propaganda analysis is normally outside the research domain of criminologists, therefore understanding the connection between ideology, dissemination and neutralization is a neglected area within criminology and criminal justice. Using frame analysis to examine terrorism propaganda as a process of radicalization expands how criminologists have studied the phenomenon. Violence associated with terrorism involves the dissemination of ideas and this study adapts a criminological lens to reveal new insights into ideas that transform into behavior that is both criminal and political.

Using a comparative research design and mixed methodology are other strengths of this study. A mixed methods approach enables diagnostic and prognostic frames to be analyzed as emotive catalysts used to incite criminogenic behavior through attitude formation. Since emotions are integrated with diagnostic and prognostic frames in terrorist propaganda, mixed methods unify the strengths of human cognition and computer processing. A comparative research design enables similarities and differences to be observed that demonstrate whether a phenomenon is cross-cultural. Qualitative methods enable nuances, implied meaning and interpretation of the data to be determined, whereas quantitative methods are used because they enable cultural and contextual knowledge to be integrated into the coding process.

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS

Generalizability is a limitation of this study because it is exploratory. This study uses a small sample of effective propagandists and while it is valuable for informing future research, it also hinders generalizability. The findings of this study cannot be extended to all forms of violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda without a larger sample size generated by probabilistic sampling. However, a small sample size does increase the depth of analysis and the findings from this study do provide an intricate understanding of the anatomy behind neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda. A suggestion to improve generalizability for future research is to expand analysis to different types of terrorist propaganda over different time intervals.

This research only examines effective propaganda in text, which is another sampling limitation that relates to generalizability. Since effective textual propaganda was the focus of the study, the study was limited to written propaganda by influential

neo-Nazi and violent jihadi leaders. Other forms of propaganda, music or speeches, were not included and should be examined in future research. Additionally, it is not known what percentage of violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda is considered effective. A comprehensive data base of violent jihadi or neo-Nazi propaganda does not exist to determine the percentage of what is considered “effective” propaganda. Specifically, future research is needed to determine the ratio of what is considered effective propaganda in contrast to the number of all types of propaganda published.

Another limitation of this study is the amount of data and the types of measures generated by network text analysis. Specifically, each node can be analyzed independently with each other linked node, creating a high number of combinations between diagnostic and prognostic frames. An exhaustive examination and discussion of all the quantitative network measures for each node in each semantic network was beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, the relationship between violent solutions was chosen as the most important relationship and the measure of closeness was selected to outline proximity of solution/problem in the text. Future studies could explore all of the measures associated with network text analysis to understand the relationship between non-violent solutions and diagnostic problems.

A final limitation is the process of internalization or rejection by individuals or groups of “effective” propaganda. Although the samples in this study have a demonstrated track record of shaping neo-Nazism and violent jihadism, knowing the exact process of how these text were internalized or rejected by different audiences remains a limitation. This research focuses on theoretical and construction issues regarding propaganda, so exactly how propaganda is internalized or dismissed by various

audiences is beyond the scope of this study. Additional research is needed to understand how ideas transcend propaganda and are dismissed or internalized by adherents to increase radicalization to neo-Nazism or violent jihadism. Future research also needs to include how individuals and groups internalize propaganda and to what extent it drives their violence.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Propaganda Analysis

Some of the policy implications drawn from this research can be used to better understand a critical national and international problem confronting the U.S. government⁸³—how to deconstruct violent jihadi and neo-Nazi propaganda.⁸⁴ Specifically, deconstructing propaganda in a way that allows analysts to isolate and examine propaganda from the terrorist’s point of view. Two of the most powerful outcomes of the current information war⁸⁵ are to legitimize neo Nazi and violent jihadi

⁸³ The threat remains that neo-Nazi propaganda has the potential to incite emotions leading a systematic increase of killings, bombings and guerilla warfare by lone wolves (individual actors) and small cells (Simi & Futrell, 2010). Currently violent jihadis are conducting a global campaign to win the hearts and minds of “neutral” Muslims over to their cause. Violent jihadis are using propaganda to attempt to create enough emotional outrage against the West so that Muslims will join, fund, donate or support their efforts. If successful, the outcome would be significant. Increasing violent jihadi organization with recruits, finances, and equipment would lead to a reciprocal response by U.S. and Coalition Forces. A counter surge would expend a great deal of finances and lives.

⁸⁴ In a U.N sponsored conference on racism in 1997, Marc Knobel from the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles, California noted that the 600 Internet sites were devoted to hate (Denning, 1999). In 2010, Abraham Cooper also of the Simon Wiesenthal Center reported that the number of hate and terrorists websites that now included social network pages, chat room, micro bloggers was 11,500 (Lohr, 2010). These figures are supplemented by the spring 2010 report from the Southern Poverty Law Centers indicating a 54% rise of hate groups between 2000 and 2008. The same report identified that almost 1,000 hate groups existed in 2009. However, “anti-immigrant vigilante groups soared by nearly 80%, adding some 136 new groups during 2009” which was an increase from 173 in 2008 to 309 in 2009 (Potok, 2010: second paragraph).

⁸⁵ An information war is defined as global battle of ideas intent on winning the hearts and minds of local and global populations. The ideological battlefield of 2011 has evolved into a warzone defined by digital geography and an enemy that cannot be recognized by a uniform (Crilley, 2001).

grievances and shame a population to anger or rage. Anger arising from perceived injustices is intended to be forceful enough to make targeted listeners support the propagandists' cause. Winning minds implies ideological consent, while winning hearts by terrorists is measured by an increased number of recruits, more funds and resources for their cause.

This research provides a better understanding of the mechanics of how propaganda can persuade audiences to gain popular support in order to mobilize. Gaining popular support is arguably one of the most important functions of any political, religious or social movement (Klandermas, 1984; Jasper, 1998). In order to carry out a revolution with the support of the people their hearts must be "won" (Carruthers, 1995). Without a certain degree of support from the general population, any political movement will remain on the fringes and marginalized. Therefore, a propagandist is interested in disseminating his or her information as rapidly and broadly as possible (Lee, 1952).

Until recently, defeating terrorists and terrorist groups militarily demonstrated success, not winning an information war (Aylin-Foster, 2005; Friis, 2010). Governments are not necessarily interested in "understanding" the emotions of terrorists; defeating the enemy militarily has usually been the logical paradigm (Brannan, Esler & Strindberg, 2001). Without specific nation states to label as the enemy, despite George Bush's attempt to do so in the countries listed as the axis of evil, fighting a terrorist information war was given short shrift. Under George Bush's leadership, the War on Terrorism promoted a strategy that stressed military defeat, not "knowing the hearts of the enemy." An outcome of not knowing the enemy or the local population led to using tactics that

often turned the local population against coalition forces fostering an increase of recruits and resources for the terrorists (Sennott, 2008).

It took an insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan for United States Governmental and military officials to realize that the Cold War conventional war doctrine was not working (Anderson, 2010). Simply killing every terrorist in Iraq was not effective. In response to this problem, the U.S. paradigm shifted in 2007 when a new strategy was implemented by the United States military in Iraq (JCSP, 2009). A central component of this strategy recognized that success depended on understanding the emotional pulse of the local population in which terrorists are embedded (JCSP, 2009).

The U.S. government's hearts and minds strategy is barely four years old and is still an emerging doctrine (Friis, 2010; JCSP, 2009). Identifying, examining, and analyzing how ideas, emotions and diagnostic/prognostic frames are integrated in text is a tangible way to utilize TCP as part of this doctrine. Frames are significant because they provide a way to examine the symbolic interaction between emotions and ideas in terrorist propaganda in order to develop effective counter propaganda and disinformation campaigns in the current information war. This study is significant for future policy implications because it defines *how to* expand TCP in two ways: operationalization and analysis. This is accomplished by incorporating methods and theory from criminology and other disciplines to quantitatively and qualitatively analyze how propagandists frame their problems and solutions in text to radicalize supporters.

FUTURE RESEARCH

In closing, there are several different directions for future research. One of the most pressing is to better understand the relationship between propaganda and

radicalization/recruitment. Neo-Nazi and violent propaganda is intended to promote attitudes that foster conversion or reinforce existing attitudes. Future research can be directed to understand how propaganda persuades recruits to organize their experience through a violent jihadi or neo-Nazi point of view. Additional research is also needed to examine the relationship of propaganda throughout the radicalization process, specifically in attitude formation. Furthermore, research is needed to gain insights in how propaganda also serves as a tool to reinforce radical attitudes of existing members in order to remain permanently in a violent subculture.

Future research should expand propaganda research beyond text and also explore additional terrorist movements. In order to generalize to other terrorist ideologies, propaganda from other terrorist movements needs to be examined. These additional domains can be compared to how information is framed in text. A first step to expanding this research into other domains is the development of a neo-Nazi and violent jihadi propaganda database to collect different types of propaganda generated by either movement.

Finally, neutralization theory is difficult to test because the independent variable (whether someone neutralizes or not) casts a prospective effect on the dependent variable (violation of conventional culture, including offending or not offending) (Topalli, 2005). However, criminologist can advance neutralization theory by examining how individuals involved in terrorist groups neutralize conflicting “inner voices” and counter frames from conventional culture when entering, engaging or exiting violent subcultures. Examining how techniques of neutralization function (or fail) for individual neo-Nazis and violent jihadis can be accomplished through interviews, ethnographic observation or content

analysis. When techniques of neutralization fail is also an interesting approach to examine why neo-Nazi or violent jihadis cut ideological and social ties to re-enter conventional culture. Most studies of neutralization theory are retrospective and it is often hard to distinguish whether individual responses are recollections of a neutralization process or excuses created to justify their actions in response to the researcher (Minor, 1981; 1980). Nevertheless, Agnew (1994) suggests such questions can be answered through longitudinal methodologies that track offenders' use of neutralizations prospectively. Such studies for terrorists would support neutralization theory by distinguishing the effect on radical/violent behavior of neutralizations as a preemptive and ideological reinforcing cognitive process. More important, ethnographic longitudinal studies would allow researchers to illustrate the extent to which the use of neutralization changes across time and whether propaganda continues to remain salient to subcultural attitudes and behavior that makes engaging in terrorism "rational" or "altruistic" behavior.

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Appendices

Violent Jihadi Propagandists:

Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966)

Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian educator and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, is the ideological godfather of violent jihadis (Sivan, 1983; Zimmerman, 2004; Calvert, 2000). Qutb's time in the United States, Egyptian politics, imprisonment/torture in Egypt and his association with other 'radical' thinkers paved the way for his rise to prominence (Wright, 2006; Calvert, 2000). Qutb's ideas theologically legitimized the use of violence to change society (Kepel & Milelli, 2008). Qutb's "altruistic" framework emphasized humanity's "salvation" through the use of violence (Qutb, 1988).

Qutb interpreted *jihad* as a means to free humanity from depravity and the chains of moral corruption. Qutb advanced jihad beyond an inner struggle or a military defensive posture to one of "offense is the best defense." Qutb argued that Muslim nations are currently under attack by a mixture of covert and overt tactics (Qutb, 1988).

By placing jihad as the divine will of Allah and his holy prophet, Qutb theologically made it possible to justify violence against corrupt Islamic governments (Qutb, 1988). The same claim enabled violent jihadis to target individual Muslims who deviated from Qutb's version of Islam (Qutb, 1988). Qutb's idea of jihad as Allah's divine law made violent jihad a duty.

Qutb's stance ideologically moved Muslims from defensive passivity to one of proactive offense (Qutb, 1988). It is a Muslim's duty, according to Qutb, to save humanity from the encroaching ills coming from the West. Qutb compared the moral decay in the 1950's and 1960's in Egypt to what he experienced during his two year stay in the United States. Based on his observations, Islamic society was becoming like the

West: secular, materialistic, corrupt, immoral, and increasingly nationalistic. In Qutb's assessment, Muslims who remain passive ultimately engage in corruption and immorality. Polluting Islam through passivity was not an option in Qutb's Islam.

Qutb projected the future as a time when Islam would become so indoctrinated by the mores of the West that it would lose its unique character. Qutb perceived Westerners as invaders. In Qutb's view, Islam was under an ideological, moral, philosophical, and religious siege.

Qutb did not idly stand by. He became involved in the Muslim Brotherhood and began an active ideological campaign to resist the 'invasion.' Qutb began to write down his ideas and subsequently, Gamal Nasser, the president of Egypt, imprisoned Qutb from 1954 - 1964. Part of the reason for his imprisonment was Qutb's leadership in the Muslim Brotherhood and his continued public criticism of Nasser's regime (Wright, 2006). It was during his prison sentence that he wrote several important works, most notably *Signpost/Milestones* and his commentary on the Quran (Qutb, 1988; Zimmerman, 2004). It is also of great consequence that his most influential publication was written after being tortured and incarcerated at the hands of Muslims. Qutb reasoned that these indescribable injustices could only occur to Muslims by Muslims if: 1) Muslims served Nasser over Allah, 2) worshipped nationalism over Allah, 3) feared the government over Allah, and 4) were ignorant of how to live as a true Muslim. To Qutb, it was inconceivable that other Muslims would torture and imprison 'righteous' Muslims in ways that he experienced (Qutb, 1988).

Qutb observed that most Muslims were not even aware that their faith was under attack. Qutb's believed that the majority of Muslims were ignorant of Islam. Though they

believed themselves to be Muslims, Qutb asserted in reality they were not. Qutb invoked the phrase, “state of ignorance,”⁸⁶ or jahiliyyah to account for Muslims’ general lack of religious awareness as the reason that they were not ‘true’ Muslims (Qutb, 1988).

In 1966, Qutb was executed to silence his increasing popular support.⁸⁷ Since his death, *Signposts/Milestones* has become his most famous work and is the culmination of his life experiences at the height of his ideological maturity (Kepel, 2005). Since his execution in 1966, Qutb’s ideological impact has reached a global level (Zimmerman, 2004).

Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989)

The authors of the mujahedeen’s 7,000 page *Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad*, a book that covers tactics, strategy, weapons, and warcraft against the Soviets, honors Abdullah Azzam by dedicating the book to him. It reads: “To our beloved brother and revered Sheikh Abdullah Azzam who revived the spirit of jihad in the souls of the youth with the work of God...who suffered harm from most people except from the faithful” (Gunaratna, 2003; 71). Prominent violent jihadi scholars label Abdullah Azzam as the father of jihad (Brachman, 2009; Calvert, 2007; Wright, 2002; Figchel, 2001; Trevor, 2010). Azzam is credited with reviving the doctrine of violent jihad in a current context (Azzam 1987a; 1987b, Calvert, 2007). Azzam correlated how fighting against modern forces fits into a classical doctrine of jihad. Arguing that modern invading forces are a current expression of ancient campaigns, Azzam asserted that these forces are purposely besieging Islam in hopes of eternally suppressing Muslim superiority (Calvert, 2007).

⁸⁶ Defined as a prevailing state of ignorance among Muslims that makes them un-Islamic and equal to the time before the Prophet Mohammad (Gerges, 2005).

⁸⁷ His execution also assisted in demonstrating the takfir doctrine (Takfir refers to the concept of the legality of killing other Muslims that have been labeled as apostate) and that the current Muslim regime was not true but was a slave to materialism, communism and later capitalist.

To build the jihadi movement on solid theological doctrine, Azzam used classical Islamic jurisprudence and Middle Eastern history to interpret current events (Calvert 2007). Azzam also used medieval literature to highlight how Muslims encountered enemies in the past to serve as a model to face them in the present (Calvert, 2007). He reduced all Muslim battles to a common denominator: Islam and Allah's supreme ruling over mankind was under attack. This was important because Azzam transformed the modern and 'apologetic' meaning of jihad from an inner spiritual struggle to that of waging a physical campaign. Azzam's physical campaign targeted conventional forces that represented corrupt ideological, political and religious influences (Trevor, 2010). In Azzam's estimation, a violent jihadi was a Muslim warrior, fighting with his intellect and physical strength, which was legitimized by ink and blood. Azzam argued that a "warrior-scholar" is the ultimate culmination of education and strength, and suggested that the Prophet Mohammad was the best role model (Calvert, 2007).

Azzam articulated his doctrine of jihad in *Defense of the Muslim Lands* (1989) and *Join the Caravan* (1989). Though he published many other books, articles and pamphlets, *Join the Caravan* (1987) made Azzam's version of jihad an obligation for every Muslim (Azzam, 1987a; 1988; 2001). Azzam's speaking circuit across Europe, the Middle East, and the United States magnified his influence to recruit fighters and supporters for his version of jihad (Wright, 2006).

Those who heard Azzam describe him as a charismatic speaker that no one wanted to openly dispute (Asharq al-Awsat, 2005). In terms of personality, Azzam blended intellect, charismatic ability, rigid religious discipline, and piety. His personal involvement in fighting Soviet troops in occupied Afghanistan only reinforced his

reputation as a warrior-scholar (Trevor, 2010). To further magnify his influence, Azzam's messages were videotaped, converted to audio messages and disseminated widely. The speaking engagements, books, audio messages, and his videos granted Azzam a substantial impact in the violent jihadi movement (Kholman, 2001). Azzam's speaking circuit was unique because those interested in violent jihad had an outlet to put their ideology into practice by fighting the Soviets in occupied Afghanistan. In this way, potential recruits had the opportunity to demonstrate their level of commitment to jihad.

One of Azzam's most influential ideas was the idea of a "vanguard." To quote Azzam: "Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory for this ideology" (Gunaratna, 2002; 26). After Azzam and both of his sons were killed by a car bomb in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1989, Osama bin Laden⁸⁸ and Ayman al Zawahiri gave Azzam's "vanguard" or "the base" a name and a place in history. Azzam's term vanguard is not as recognizable as its synonym, 'the base,' which in Arabic is translated as al Qaeda. Hence, Azzam's vision of a vanguard was materialized by what became known as al Qaeda.

Ayman Zawahiri (1951-present)

Amongst those who have studied violent jihadis, Ayman Zawahiri, an Egyptian medical doctor,⁸⁹ is known as the intellect behind al Qaeda (Kepel & Milelli, 2008; Brachman, 2009). After Bin Laden's death in 2011, this former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is currently known as al Qaeda's commander. Many experts consider

⁸⁸ Osama bin Laden was one of Azzam's disciples.

⁸⁹ Al Qaeda's second in command graduated from Cairo University in 1978 with a medical degree.

Ayman al Zawahiri to be the most important ideological architect of al Qaeda and the former ideological mentor to bin Laden (Kepel & Milelli, 2008; Aboul-Enein, 2004; Brachman, 2009). Zawahiri's ideology was formed by his studies in science, mathematics and in medicine fused with his experiences in prison, torture and war (Raphaeli, 2002). Zawahiri shares many biographical similarities with Sayyid Qutb, such as being imprisoned and tortured by the Egyptian government. Zawahiri continues to issue communiqués via the internet, audio recordings, and video. The communiqués address current events and how the 'faithful' should respond to them (Sageman, 2004). Zawahiri's ideas and actions continue to impact the violent jihadi movement (Brachman, 2009).

Zawahiri has decades of experience as a violent jihadi in Egypt, Sudan, and Afghanistan (Wright, 2006). Zawahiri grew up in Egypt during the political instability that characterized the period between the 1960's and the 1980's. During this time as a young adult, Zawahiri interacted with Islamic groups that were adamantly against Gamal Nasser's regime (Wright, 2006). Zawahiri hated the corruption in Egyptian politics and believed that Egypt's military loss to Israel in 1967 and 1973 was a result of Egyptian's impure brand of Islam (Wright, 2006; Muntasser, 2004). These events, combined with the execution of Sayyid Qutb, solidified his belief that 'true' Muslims had to respond to existing injustices.⁹⁰

Before founding a violent jihadi group, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, he had been a long time member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Wright, 2006; Muntasser, 2004).

Zawahiri was imprisoned by the Egyptian government after Anwar's Sadat's assassination. In prison, he was tortured, which solidified his view that Muslims who

⁹⁰ The execution of Sayyid Qutb by the Egyptian government was a pivotal movement during his youth.

torture other Muslims could not be true Muslims, thus sharing a similar “revelation” as Sayyid Qutb (Wright, 2006; Muntasser, 2004). After his release from prison, Zawahiri planned to use violent jihad to remove the current Egyptian government and restore “pure” Islam over corrupt Egyptian nationalism.

Zawahiri’s focus on violent jihad in his early years was a type of national jihad, not the global jihad he would later promote. It took several years for Zawahiri to shift his ideology beyond Egypt. After he was released from prison, he left Egypt for Saudi Arabia to practice medicine. During Zawahiri’s stint in Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. After hearing that Muslims were attacked by an atheist army, he believed that it was his duty to assist besieged Muslims (Wright, 2008). Zawahiri joined the Red Crescent and left for Peshawar, Pakistan. From his clinic in Peshawar he served as a doctor in the Red Crescent treating wounded Mujahedeen (Aboul-Enein, 2004). Zawahiri perceived the time in Afghanistan as an opportunity to strengthen Egyptian Islamic Jihad, fulfill a religious duty of participating in jihad and build a stronger platform to later ‘purify’ Egypt (Wright, 2008).

He was preparing to “free” Egypt after the Soviets had been repelled from Afghanistan. Zawahiri used his time in Afghanistan to restructure EIJ, obtain funds, and find new recruits (Aboul-Enein, 2004). It was during this time that he met Osama bin Laden, an encounter that altered both of their lives (Wright, 2006).

Zawahiri was competing with Abdullah Azzam for the attention of Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden was committed to violent jihad and could bring considerable financial resources to a group (Wright, 2006). At the time, Zawahiri direly needed additional funding and recruits so he was traveling to Europe and the United States to raise money

and obtain recruits for EIJ. If Zawahiri could solidify his partnership with Bin Laden, he believed that their collaboration would greatly advance EIJ's capabilities (Wright, 2006)

Bin Laden needed Zawahiri's decades of experience with violent jihadi groups and direction from an ideological advisor (Bergen, 2006). Bin Laden eventually gave his full financial support to Zawahiri for global jihad, not Egyptian jihad. Bin Laden convinced Zawahiri that the best strategy of 'purifying' Egypt was to cut its "umbilical cord" to the west (Bergen, 2006). Bin Laden argued that if violent jihadi's would target the parent of Egypt, the far away enemy, mainly the United States, then Egypt and Israel will fall (Burke, 2004). Shifting the target to the United States was a major change in Zawahiri's ideology and thus global jihad became his new obsession.

Zawahiri's 'new' obsession is outlined in an ideological publication, *Knights Under the Prophets Banner*, written under U.S. aerial bombardments in Pakistan/Afghanistan. Zawahiri describes violent jihad as the way for a "true" Muslim to receive favor from Allah when Islam is under attack (Mansfield, 2006). An army of infidels, crusaders and apostates were waging war against Allah and any Muslim that remained passive was not a 'true' Muslim. Under this definition, Zawahiri describes violent jihad as an obligation in line with the example set by the prophet Mohammad (Sageman, 2004). Zawahiri extends violent jihad to the existing political regimes across the Middle East because they are advancing a tainted strain of Islam (Muntaser, 2004). To counter the political corruption, Zawahiri desires to remove apostate Muslims governments and replace them with violent jihadi leadership (Mansfield, 2006).

Currently, media reports claim that he is hiding in northern Pakistan and regularly issues video and audio communiqués calling for violent jihadis to rise up and attack Islam's enemies wherever they exist.⁹¹

Osama bin Laden (1957-2011)

Osama Bin Laden has become one of the world's most recognizable names and faces. He has gone from obscurity before 2001 to a global phenomenon. The coining of the term bin Ladenism reflects the degree to which his actions and al Qaeda have impacted jihad on a global stage, but this was not always the case (Friedman, 2001).

Bin Laden was born to a wealthy Saudi family that owns the largest construction company in the Middle East; the bin Laden Group (Wright, 2006). His father had moved from Yemen to Saudi Arabia for employment and to seek a better life. Bin Laden's father would work different construction jobs to eventually become the owner of the largest construction company in Saudi Arabia and one of the largest in the Middle East (Wright, 2006). The royal Saudi family trusted bin Laden's father and liked his work, therefore granting large governmental contracts.⁹² After Bin Laden's father died in a plane crash in 1967, his elder brother took over the family business (Bergen, 2006).

Osama attended King Abdul Aziz University in hopes that his education would assist in running the family business (Wright, 2006). While attending King Abdul Aziz University, he met two professors that would later become ideological mentors. Mohammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb, and Abdullah Azzam played key roles in the formation of bin Laden's ideology and future path (Wright, 2006). Mohammad Qutb and Abdullah Azzam discussed jihad with bin Laden and recounted the ideas of other

⁹¹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1560834.stm accessed June 2010.

⁹² He was give the task of redesigning and the Great Mecca Mosque to create a better system for handling the millions of pilgrims that come to Mecca for the Haj.

violent jihadi scholars (Wright, 2006; Calvert, 2007). The personal connection with Azzam served as a catalyst to set bin Laden on a path to violent jihad (Calvert, 2007).

Azzam later moved to Peshawar and founded the Office of Services, an organization to recruit Muslims to fight against the Soviets (Calvert, 2007). Azzam sent a personal invitation to bin Laden to join him in Peshawar. Azzam wanted bin Laden to assist him in recruiting Arabs to assist in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan (Calvert, 2007). This agreement put bin Laden in a war zone to experience violent jihad.

Azzam invited bin Laden to Peshawar because he was a desirable associate to have. Bin Laden was wealthy, pious, humble, and not overly ambitious. During the war against the Soviets, Azzam continued to mentor bin Laden (Calvert, 2007). It was in Afghanistan that bin Laden fought against Soviet forces engaged in attacking Muslims (Wright, 2006; Bergen, 2006).

Bin Laden and other Arabs engaged in a firefight with a Soviet Special Forces unit in the Afghan mountains (Wright, 2006). Bin Laden and the Arabs defeated the numerically larger and better equipped Soviet Forces.⁹³ Bin Laden perceived their victory as a miracle and confirmation that Allah was on their side and granting them favor. Bin Laden interpreted the victory as a similar experience to what the Prophet Mohammad had experienced after overcoming superior forces-- a testament of divine favor. Their victory was confirmation by Allah that violent jihad and pious living were a favorable combination (Wright, 2006).

In a similar vein, after Soviet Forces left Afghanistan in 1989, violent jihadis believed the withdrawal was a sign from Allah rewarding the faithfulness of the Afghan

⁹³ During this engagement with Soviet Forces, Bin Laden captured a special model AK-47 during that has been by bin Laden's side every since. It is a tangible reminder of Allah's favor during his engagement, but also the overall victory against the Soviet Union.

Arabs and the Mujahedeen (Scheuer, 2002). This correlation, no matter how spurious, was key to the future direction of al Qaeda. If pious Muslims can defeat the Soviet Union, no nation or army can withstand the divine favor of Allah. Experiencing Allah's blessing in real time when attacking a superior foe was a lesson bin Laden did not forget (Scheuer, 2002). After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, bin Laden and his fighters needed another front to experience Allah's favor.

Bin Laden's fatwa, *The Declaration of War*, issued in 1996, demanded the withdrawal of America troops from Saudi Arabia and the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Bin Laden also wanted Palestinians, Chechens, and Kashmiris free from invasion (Burke, 2004). Bin Laden condemned America for using atomic bombs in WWII, countless scores of human rights abuses (branding America the worst civilization ever), and a destroyer of natural surroundings by polluting it with industrial waste (Burke, 2004; 23-24). By declaring war, Bin Laden wanted to engage the United States in a war of attrition. Bin Laden wanted to draw the United States into a long drawn out campaign similar to that which occurred to the Soviet Union (Scheuer, 2002).⁹⁴ Bin Laden wanted the United States to retaliate against the Mujahedeen and then they would bleed them dry over a period of time (Wright, 2006). Bin Laden would use this attrition war against the United States as another opportunity to receive Allah's favor by global jihad.

Scheuer (2002) asserts that people are surprised to hear that it was never bin Laden's intention to defeat the United States. The attacks against the United States would in no way destroy the United States, but would send a very clear message. Bin Laden saw the image of what happened to the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen as a metaphor to what he believed should happen to the United States if it invaded Afghanistan (Scheuer,

2002). An advanced and fearsome Navy vessel was taken out of service by explosives packed into a little dingy. To bin Laden, the U.S.S. Cole represented the armament, technology, and godlessness of the United States against the small dingy which represented violent jihadis supported by Allah's favor. The dingy sent the U.S.S. Cole back to the United States in shame, and this was a perfect metaphor to describe the battle between al Qaeda and the United States (Burke, 2004). Bin Laden was certain that the United States would end up like the U.S.S. Cole-wounded, weak, and unable to function.

Bin Laden also wanted to wage a large scale media campaign to win the hearts and support of Muslims across the globe (Bergen, 2006; Hauner, 2007). As a general principle, bin Laden did not want to isolate al Qaeda from Muslim nations or non-jihadi Islamic groups (Burke, 2004). Instead, bin Laden sought to impact popular sentiment to increase the scale of a war of attrition (Scheuer, 2002).

One of the strategic objectives of al Qaeda was to generate a great deal of support for their cause. Bin Laden wanted to frame violent jihad as a logical response to the United States' support for Israel, corrupt Muslim governments, and the U.S. assault on Islam (Burke, 2004). He also wanted to make the Palestinian issue central to al Qaeda's media campaign because this would unite the Muslim world and would eventually turn the American public away from supporting Israel (Burke, 2004).

Bin Laden successfully evaded the United States for almost 16 years until his death in 2011. In the last ten years, he managed to evade capture despite one of the most intensive man hunts in the history of the United States. In 2011, Bin Laden was killed by U.S. Special Forces in a compound in northern Pakistan. Since the United States is responsible for his death, he has already be immortalized as martyr by violent jihadis, in a

similar fashion to Sayyid Qutb. Bin Laden's ideology and actions have set into motion a method for carrying out global jihad that will continue long after his death.

Abu Mohammad Maqdisi (1959-Present)

Abu Mohammad Maqdisi, born in 1959 as Muhammad Tahir Barqawi, has been identified as one of the most influential contemporary violent jihadi propagandists (Wagemakers, 2009; McCants & Brachman, 2006; Brachman, 2009). Barqawi adopted the name 'Maqdisi' as a title because it functions as constant reminder of a violent jihadi goal, the 'liberation' of Bayt al Maqdis (Jerusalem) which is near to the village of his birth Barqa (Kazimi, 2005). Maqdisi's family later moved to Kuwait where he stayed until he finished his secondary education. He wanted to study Sharia law at the Islamic University in Medina but followed his father's guidance and moved to Mosul Iraq to study science (Wagemakers, 2009). In Mosul, he met with members of the Muslim Brotherhood that strongly adhered to Qutbist ideology. It was also in Mosul that Maqdisi was influenced by the work of Juhaiman al 'Uteibi. Utebi, a leader of the 1979 Grand Mosque seizure, later executed by the Saudi government, railed against corrupt Islamic governments. This was significant because Maqdisi's most influential work, *This is our Aqeedah*, was an extension of the Uteibi's letter (Wagemakers, 2009).

Similar to Sayyid Qutb and Ayman Zawahiri, Maqdisi's ideology was impacted by time spent in Muslim prisons. Maqdisi experienced torture during 14 years in a Jordanian prison and a year in solitary confinement (Wagemakers, 2008).⁹⁵ In prison, Maqdisi authored numerous books, which were then translated into many different languages and smuggled into countries where his work is considered illegal. Maqdisi

⁹⁵ In protest to his prison treatment, he went on a hunger strike which resulted in gaining publicity across the Middle East for his cause (Kazimi, 2005).

currently manages al Tawhed.com, an online resource library that McCants and Brachman (2006) have titled al Qaeda's library. His work, *This is our Aqeedah*, has generated the most fanfare among violent jihadis and other Maqdisi publications make the top five downloaded texts on the al Tawheed website.⁹⁶

Maqdisi wrote *This is our Aqeedah* in Kuwait as a theoretical discourse to validate takfir, the practice of declaring apostasy in Islam. He argues that any Muslim is an apostate if they accept secular Islamic governmental laws. Maqdisi rejects the current political reality and labels current political leaders as 'unbelievers' who follow man made inventions. These inventions exist in the form of constitutions, democratic rule, following religious leaders supported by current governments, public education at all levels, and secular police/military (Wagemakers, 2009).

The central component in Maqdisi's ideology was to counter takfir and manmade inventions that hindered complete loyalty to Allah (Wagemakers, 2009). In other words, a 'true' Muslim demonstrates loyalty by rejecting all manmade inventions and worships Allah according to the Quran and the teachings of the Prophet Mohammad. The Taliban demonstrates this type of 'true' worship and claims that Muslims who oppose violent jihad are not true Muslims. Maqdisi is popular among violent jihadis not only for his ideological publications, but because of his credibility. His beliefs do not waiver despite torture or imprisonment, thus leading to Maqdisi to be sought out as a mentor.

Many of Maqdisi's disciples have been killed either in Iraq or Afghanistan. His eldest son, Mohammad, is believed to have been killed in Iraq fighting coalition forces. Zarqawi, his most famous disciple, became the face of al Qaeda before his death in 2006 (Kazimi, 2005). It was in Peshawar, Pakistan that Maqdisi met Zarqawi in the early

⁹⁶www.tawhed.ws

1990's. They would meet again to form the organization Tawhid wel Jihad (Kazimi, 2005).

The objective of Tawhid wel Jihad was to convert youth to the cause of violent jihad. Members of Tawhid wel Jihad engaged in limited forms of violence but preferred to support other groups for carrying out violence. In 1994, both Maqdisi and Zarqawi were arrested in separate incidents and after trial were both given life sentences (Kazimi, 2005). They spent four years together in prison, 1995 – 1999, where Maqdisi became the spiritual mentor of Zarqawi. When the King Abdullah II of Jordan came to power in 1999, he pardoned Maqdisi and Zarqawi. Maqdisi stayed in Jordan while Zarqawi traveled to Iraq.

Zarqawi's use of violence in Iraq as the face of al Qaeda made international news (Kazimi, 2005). Maqdisi later disagreed with Zarqawi's regular use of violence against Muslim women and children. The Jordanian government perceived their disagreement as an opportunity to demonstrate that Maqdisi's beliefs were no longer extreme and that his time in Jordanian prisons had "corrected" his view. The Jordanian government released Maqdisi in hopes that he would condemn Zarqawi's actions and appear more moderate (Kazimi, 2005). But this strategy failed. When it was confirmed that Zarqawi had been killed by U.S. Forces, Maqdisi publically praised Zarqawi as a hero of Islam and was subsequently rearrested. At the time of writing, Maqdisi remains imprisoned in Jordan. His ideas are still perceived as dangerous and despite his incarceration, the al Qaeda library website still functions.

Neo-Nazi Propagandists:

George Lincoln Rockwell (1918-1967)

Known as the American Fuhrer, George Lincoln Rockwell, founder of the American Nazi Party, is considered to be one of the most influential leaders in the white power movement (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). His status in neo-Nazi thought can be compared to Sayyid Qutb's influence among violent jihadis. In June 1967, as Rockwell exited a laundry mat in Arlington Virginia, he was shot and killed by an assassin. Rockwell's execution immortalized him as a neo-Nazi martyr.⁹⁷

During the 1950's and 1960's, Rockwell was a charismatic leader and a polarizing figure across America (Simonelli, 1999). His persona and use of media catapulted him to national attention. Rockwell articulated his ideology through a charismatic communicative style intermixed with stage bravado in public appearances, counter civil rights demonstrations, and a public speaking circuit (Schmaltz, 1998; Simonelli, 1999). Rockwell's parents were successful actors, to which attributed his oratory abilities and the love of being in the public eye (Simonelli, 1999; Kaplan, 2000). When in front of a crowd, Rockwell relied on emotional appeals disseminated through the mass media to propel him as *the* champion of the white race. Understanding how to manipulate the media, he made every attempt to obtain "free press" to spread his ideas.

Rockwell's ideological stamp on the white power movement continues. His ideas, such as denying the Holocaust, the phrase "white power," the use of music in the movement, advocating ties with Christian Identity, expanding Hitler's notion of Aryans,

⁹⁷ Rockwell's assassin was John Patler, a former member of the National Renaissance Party and the American Nazi Party. Rockwell expelled Patler in 1967, due to Patler's character, Marxist beliefs and creating division between American Nazi members. Palter was sentenced to twenty years in prison for Rockwell's murder (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).

or using visual imagery through distinctive dress and public forums set a precedence for other neo-Nazi groups (Simonelli, 1999). Rockwell's example as a leader, public persona, and ideologue also inspired future neo-Nazi leaders. William Pierce, David Butler, Colin Jordan, David Duke, and Matt Koehl all worked with Rockwell (Langer, 2003; Simonelli, 1999, Zeskind, 2009). Rockwell's disciples proved to be "effective" in replicating and advancing what they learned.

The groundwork for Rockwell's ideology was formed during World War II, the Korean War, the civil rights movement, and the Vietnam War (Rockwell, 1979; Kaplan, 2000). To Rockwell, the civil rights movement, moral depravity in the United States, the threat of communism, and the destructive cultural revolution were all signs that society was falling apart (Rockwell, 1979; Simonelli, 1999). He saw a new society emerging that was different from the classical ethos that permeated the United States until the time of the cultural revolution. To counter these changes, Rockwell wanted to start an organization that would effectively turn the tide against a corrupt society that was threatening the white race (Simonelli, 1999; Kaplan, 2000). One day he received a package in the mail that would be the catalyst to create an organization to counter societal decay.

The idea of a new organization originated after a package arrived in the mail (Rockwell, 1979). One of Rockwell's friends sent him a Nazi flag, which after opening, he hung in his home. He felt inspired and lit a couple of candles in honor of Nazi Germany. Rockwell describes standing before the Nazi flag as a deeply religious moment, a moment that altered his future (Rockwell, 1979; Kaplan, 2000). Rockwell was committed to starting a new group that integrated a new religious and political

identity that placed the white race at the center (Kaplan, 2000; Simonelli, 1999).

Rockwell wanted to stand on the shoulders of other proto fascists, racists, and Nazis to carve out a new niche. Rockwell was able to act on his convictions, modified existing ideologies, and persuaded others to join him and his new group (Rockwell, 1979; Kaplan, 2000).

In March 1959, he formed the American Nazi Party (ANP) (Simonelli, 1999).

Rockwell incorporated the Nazi uniform, the swastika and the sieg heil salute to demonstrate his solidarity with the Third Reich and the power of the white race (Schmaltz, 1998). His clean cut look, sharp dress, and corn cob pipe was intended to create a progressive/positive image. By integrating these seemingly divergent socio-political strands, Rockwell's group would form the ANP. Rockwell used visual imagery in public rallies, civil rights counter protests, and speaking engagements to gain attention for the ANP. Rockwell was center stage in the media due to his controversial public appearances and debates, therefore giving the white power movement ample national coverage.

White Power (1967) serves as a manifesto for the ANP. One of the central themes outlines that a race war will be fought based on the color of skin. The white population will be fighting for its survival against an ever increasing non-white populace. Rockwell targeted de-segregation and used the notion of an impending race war to forecast the devastating long range impact on whites. Rockwell also targeted the Holocaust as history used by Jews to leverage sympathy to accomplish their agenda (Rockwell, 1979; Simonelli, 1999) Rockwell argued that the Holocaust was misused as a deceptive device to foster international sympathy to obtain votes from the United Nations for Israeli

statehood (Rockwell, 1979). Civil rights activists were using the same tactic, obtaining sympathy for blacks because of the oppression caused by slavery and Jim Crow laws, which Rockwell argued put the white race at risk. Rockwell stated that the civil rights movement and the Holocaust were effective weapons against the white race, because it gave immense resources, leverage, and political power to non-whites and Jews (Rockwell, 1979, Simonelli, 1999).

One of the ways Rockwell tried to counter civil rights, the Holocaust, the cultural revolution, and communism was to marry Nazi racial and political ideology to a spiritual foundation (Simonelli, 1999). Rockwell reasoned that if politics and religion are fused together, a population is likely to demonstrate a higher level of commitment to a cause. Therefore, in the mid 1960's Rockwell entertained the notion of merging Nazi political philosophy within the Christian Identity Movement (Simonelli, 1999). Christian Identity was a good starting point because a racial theology and anti Semitic views were already present (Kaplan, 2000; Zeskind, 2009). Rockwell insisted that a white political philosophy and spiritual grounding was needed for the white race because a race war was inevitable (Rockwell, 1996). Rockwell was killed before this fully materialized but his disciple, William Pierce, who founded the National Alliance, merged a political philosophy to a spiritual foundation (Griffin, 2001; Kaplan, 2000; Zeskind, 2009; Whitsel, 1995; 1998).

Rockwell's impact can be felt to this day in the neo-Nazi movement. His use of literature, music, the creation of a visual identity, and organizational structure, are still used by the National Alliance, Aryan Nations, and the National Socialist Movement.

Rockwell's death is considered by neo-Nazis as a martyr's death, solidifying his prominence in the white power movement.

William Pierce (1933-2002)

Dr. William Luther Pierce gained national attention in 1995 after the bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City (Ballard, 2005). His fictional work, *The Turner Diaries* (1999), outlines a future race war between whites and non-whites, where characters in the book target an FBI building. *The Turner Diaries* was cited as the inspiration for Timothy McVeigh because the circumstances in the book are similar to those in the Oklahoma City bombing (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Walters, 2000; Ferber, 1998). McVeigh regularly handed out free copies of the *Turner Diaries* and sold the book during gun shows (Michel & Herbeck, 2001). McVeigh's connection to the *Turner Diaries* brought the views and work of William Pierce, pen name Andrew MacDonald, to mainstream America.

Pierce's degree of influence on the neo-Nazi movement has been significant (Kaplan, 2000). Pierce founded The National Alliance (an organization devoted to white separatist ideology), and Cosmotheism (a race based religion). While directing The National Alliance, Pierce supervised National Vanguard Books Incorporated, pioneered neo-Nazi websites, and managed Resistance Records as methods of disseminating neo-Nazi ideology (Kaplan, 2000; Griffin, 2001; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Whitsell, 1995; 1998).

William Pierce graduated in 1962 with a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Colorado at Boulder (Kaplan, 2000). After graduation he obtained an assistant professor position for three years at Oregon State University, 1962-1965 (Griffin, 2001; Kaplan,

2000). Constant media coverage of anti Vietnam protests and civil rights clashes led Pierce to conclude the American social fabric was unraveling (Whitsell, 1995; 1998).

During his first year at Oregon State University Pierce's increasing interest in politics led him to join the John Birch Society (Zezkind, 2009). After three years of academic life in the midst of civil rights protests and the beginning of the Vietnam war, he grew increasingly dissatisfied with academic life and resigned in 1965 (Griffin, 2001; Whitsell, 1995; 1998).

One year after his resignation, he sought out George Lincoln Rockwell and joined the American Nazi Party (National Socialist White People's Party). To Rockwell's delight, Pierce became the editor of the ideological journal, *National Socialist World* (Kaplan, 2000; Simonelli, 1999). Pierce learned a great deal from Rockwell, but their relationship was cut short by Rockwell's death. Then in 1970, three years after Rockwell's death, Pierce emerged as a new neo-Nazi leader. Pierce led the National Youth Alliance and changed the name in 1974 to the National Alliance (Kaplan, 2000; Griffin, 2001; Zeskind, 2009).

Pierce led the National Alliance in a different direction from Rockwell. Pierce distanced himself from the overt use of Nazi symbolism and regalia and moved from Virginia to rural West Virginia (Whitsell, 1995;1998). Pierce replaced the politicized swastika with the Nordic life rune. The life rune, often surrounded by a band of ivy, is a character in the runic alphabet that represents rebirth, life and creation.⁹⁸ The rune is found on the gravestones of SS soldiers to signify their birth date. To Pierce, the life rune

⁹⁸ http://www.adl.org/hate_symbols/groups_national_alliance.asp

symbolizes the white race as a sacred/spiritual element and his ideological leadership initiates a rebirth of white supremacy.⁹⁹

Pierce, like Rockwell, wanted a spiritual movement to parallel his political ambitions. He wanted to advance this idea further than Rockwell (Simonelli, 1999). Pierce inserted a type of neo-Nazi mysticism in what was to be called the Cosmotheist Community Church. The theology associated with Cosmotheism fuses eugenics, white racialism, and pantheism (Griffin, 2001; Whitsell, 1995; 1998). Pierce based Cosmotheism on evolution, arguing that through the process of natural selection, the white race emerged as the pinnacle of the human race (Whitsell, 1995; 1998). Cosmotheism attributes divinity to a universal consciousness over the concept of a single god. Pierce's religion was revealed to mankind through the constant genetic improvement of humanity, preserved in the white race (Whitsell, 1995; 1998). The white race epitomizes the best union between the forces of the universe and humanity. The genetic code of the white race is the manifestation of this union. Pierce perceived that the white race emerged as the "fittest" of the human races. Therefore, Pierce argued that the white race demonstrates more than just skin color, it is a sacred element representing harmony between a universal consciousness and humanity. Protecting this harmony, according to Pierce is a higher calling (Whitsell, 1995;1998; Griffin, 2001).

According to Pierce, the white race was on the verge of extinction and in need of redemption. Since Pierce perceived the white race as sacred, whites who reproduce with non whites are deemed race traitors (Whitsell, 1995; 1998). In order to preserve the white race, Pierce also forecasted a race war, where racial cleansing ensured white racial salvation (Zeskind, 2009). Pierce perceived that a group needed to protect the white race

⁹⁹ http://www.adl.org/hate_symbols/groups_national_alliance.asp

and by doing so, would eventually move conflict to open racial warfare. Pierce fused his ideology in a fictional narrative in the *Turner Diaries*, where such a group waging a race war materializes. Pierce's fictional account of a race war served as the ideological inspiration in the 1980's for a terrorist cell of ten men lead by Bob Matthews, the Silent Brotherhood (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990).

Pierce's political agenda was based around the idea of "white racial redemption" which the National Alliance, National Vanguard Books, Resistance Records, and his radio broadcast, American Dissident Voices, were the mechanism of dissemination (Kaplan, 2000; Whitsell, 1995; 1998). The National Alliance Compound in West Virginia became the headquarters, the site where National Vanguard Books and Resistance Records are distributed, and the location where Pierce would tape his radio broadcasts (Simi & Futrell, 2010).

Since his death in July 2002, the National Alliance continues to function under Erich Glibe, their website is readable in fifteen languages and the publishing and music industry is still going strong.¹⁰⁰ Simi and Futrell (2010; 105) state "almost a decade after his death, the group does not appear to be dissolving. National Alliance's sophisticated Web presence and radio broadcasts still draw a wide Aryan audience."

Ben Klassen (1918-1993)

Ben Klassen, author of the *White Man's Bible* (1981) and founder of the Church of the Creator (COTC)¹⁰¹ is described by Michael (2006; 561) as having "a significant influence on the international far right." Klassen wrote more than fifteen books and hundreds of magazine articles during his twenty year tenure of leading the COTC. Most

¹⁰⁰ <http://www.natvan.com/>

¹⁰¹ Later becoming the World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) under the leadership of Matt Hale.

notably, Klassen created and promoted the concept of “RAHOWA,” a condensed version of “racial holy war” (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000). RAHOWA became a battle cry for the COTC and the ideological backdrop for opening a training center to prepare for the upcoming race war.

Before Klassen was leading members of the COTC, he was a relatively successful realtor and inventor (Zeskind, 2009; Klassen 1993). According to Klassen, his first introduction into the racist political ideology occurred when he was twenty after reading *Mein Kampf* (Klassen, 1993). Klassen states in his autobiography that *Mein Kampf*'s impact overshadows everything else that he had read until then or since (Klassen, 1993). *Mein Kampf* was the catalyst for him to create a new religion based on the white race (Klassen, 1993; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; White, 2001). Klassen believed that after reading *Mein Kampf* and contemplating its meaning, he stumbled on a mystery that he alone seemed to have discovered; race is one's religion and that Jews created Christianity to weaken whites (Klassen, 1993; Michael, 2006).

Klassen's new religion was based on creativity, or the notion that one's race is the determinate for that person's religion (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; White, 2001). Klassen, like Rockwell, felt that his creation of a new racial religion was his destiny and the purpose of his life (Klassen, 1993; Michael, 2006). Klassen firmly believed that establishing a new religion would ensure the survival of the white race. Klassen emphasized that the white race is a religion, the apex of natural selection, responsible for social progress, and was under attack from race mixers, Jews and non whites (Michael, 2006; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000). Ultimately, the only possible outcome of this increasing threat was a racial holy war.

In 1973, Klassen founded the COTC in Florida as a response to the increasing threat against whites (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Michael, 2006). The manifesto of the COTC was Klassen's *White Man's Bible*, a 511 page document that outlined the ideological foundations for the group (Michael, 2006). The doctrine outlined in *White Man's Bible* (1981) claims that the white race is unique and sacred. Members of the COTC asserted that their religion is grounded in the external laws of nature, history, and logic (Michael, 2006; Klassen, 1993). Klassen asserted that the Jews' most powerful weapon against the white race and the COTC was the Jewish invention of Christianity (Klassen, 1993; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).

Klassen asserted that Christianity was a Jewish invention determined to weaken and eventually destroy the white race while protecting Jewish populations (Kaplan, 2000; Klassen, 1993; Michael, 2006). Klassen observed that the entire Christian faith was founded by Jews but was not practiced by Jews (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). Klassen also noted that a central tenet of Christianity was to "love thy neighbor" and "turn the other cheek" (Klassen, 1993). The doctrine of forgiveness was central to Christianity because Jews created the faith to protect them from the stronger white race. Klassen saw this revelation as an epiphany and concluded that the Jews created Christianity as a means to indoctrinate the stronger white race against attacking the 'weaker' Jews (Michael, 2006). Klassen cited the fact that Jews sought to convert non-Jews to Christianity as evidence of the plot (Klassen, 1993). Members of the COTC label Christianity as a religion of violence against the white race, reject the existence of Jesus, and encourage the hating of the enemies of the white race (Michael, 2006; Zeskind, 2009; White, 2001).

Throughout the remainder of the 1970's Klassen continued to publish and build the COTC (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). In 1981, he published *The White Man's Bible*, which outlines the details of how members should live. In an attempt to live out what was written in the *White Man's Bible*, Klassen moved in 1982 from Florida to North Carolina to begin construction of a new COTC headquarters (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). The new location was to be an ideological, physical, tactical, and spiritual training ground to prepare hearts, minds and bodies for the upcoming racial war (Michael, 2006). A personal residence, a three story church, a warehouse, a 'school' building, a small arms firing range, paramilitary barracks, and a barn were constructed. After a year the construction was completed, and Klassen conferred the title "Pontifex Maxims" (high priest in Latin) to himself as leader of the COTC and began a monthly publication, *Racial Loyalty* (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000; Michael, 2006).

Klassen committed suicide by consuming four bottles of sleeping pills in his residence in 1993 (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Kaplan, 2000). His suicide took place shortly after the death of his wife and the completion of his autobiography (Kaplan, 2000). His autobiography outlines the future vision and direction of the COTC. He was buried in the COTC compound. As far as the future of the Creator Movement, Michael (2006; 579), asserts "the theology of the COTC will continue to inspire racial activists in the future."

David Lane (1938-2007)

David Lane, a former member of The Silent Brotherhood, a terrorist group committed to protecting the white race, has had a significant impact on the neo-Nazi movement. Lane's impact is derived from his exploits in The Silent Brotherhood,

being a ‘political’ prisoner, and his publications. Lane created two ‘coded’ phrases that summarize the tenets of the white nationalist movement. Lane’s creation of the 14 words “we must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children” and the 88 precepts, is a way of providing an altruistic mission statement and ‘natural law’ for the white nationalist movement. Before Lane’s death in 2007, the 14 words, the 88 precepts and many other publications were drafted in prison, while he served out his 190 year sentence for racketeering, conspiracy, and civil rights violations.

Lane always sought to lead throughout his career as a neo-Nazi. Lane joined the Ku Klux Klan and in 1979 he became the organizer of the KKK Denver Unit. In 1981, he transitioned to the Aryan Nations and soon was given the duties and responsibilities of being the Colorado State Organizer (Lane, unk). Lane later relocated to Hayden Lake, Idaho (the location of the Aryan Nations compound) and then returned to lead the Colorado Headquarters of the White American Political Association founded by Tom Metzger. It was during this time that he met Bob Matthews; a meeting that would influence the rest of his life (Lane, unk).

Lane later joined Matthews at his home in Metaline Falls, Washington because Matthews was able to channel Lane’s frustration with the passivity of white supremacist groups (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). Matthews led Lane and ten other men in taking an oath to protect the white race and ensure that white children would have a future (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Zeskind, 2009). Lane swore an oath and the Silent Brotherhood, later called Bruder Schweigen, was founded (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). Over the course

of the next two years, Lane was involved in a terrorist campaign to save the white race and spark a revolution (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997).

Lane and members of the Silent Brotherhood carried out armored car hijackings, two assassinations, counterfeit operations, organized military training camps, and detonated bombs (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002; Zeskind, 2009).¹⁰² Each activity was carried out as a series of terrorist incidents which would gain momentum to eventually overthrow the federal government. The actions of the group would lead to the death of Matthews and the arrest of the other members who were incarcerated in federal prisons around the country (Flynn & Gerhardt, 1990; Zeskind, 2009). Lane was arrested in 1985 in North Carolina and sentenced to 190 years in federal prison (Kaplan, 2000). Lane's time in prison increased his status in the neo-Nazi movement, because he identified himself as a "white political prisoner," under persecution by the federal government for his racist political views and actions (Kaplan, 2000).

Lane's status within the neo-Nazi movement was often mythical because of his actions with The Silent Brotherhood (Kaplan, 2000). Mythical because members of the Silent Brotherhood put their ideology into action as fighters and whose leader ultimately paid the ultimate price as a 'race' martyr. Lane's status as a member of The Silent Brotherhood afforded him respect and credibility amongst other neo-Nazis. Lane was often asked for his signature by incarcerated Aryans that revered and respected what he had accomplished. Second, because of Lane's incarceration, he now had time and resources to publish. Lane, his wife, Katja, and Ron McVan,

¹⁰² Many of the ideas for the Silent Brotherhood's action were attributed to *The Turner Diaries* (1999) (Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_US/lane.asp?xpicked=2&item=lane

created 14 Word Press and the three served as editors (Kaplan, 2000). Lane was also a regular contributor to *White Aryan Resistance*, *Racial Loyalty*, *The Klansman* and *Jew Watch*. He wrote numerous pamphlets and published letters, most notably the *14 Words* and the *88 Precepts*. Similar to Pierce and Klassen, Lane also founded a religion based on a contemporary racist ideology. Lane's Wotanism was a blend of racist theology mixed with ancient pagan themes.

Wotanism is a hybrid mix of ancient Norse and Germanic religions fused with white racist ideology (Gardell, 2003; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). Labeled as Wotan or (Will of the Aryan Nations), Lane adapted tenets of the ancient Norse religion to incorporate the worship of Odin, Thor and the Norse Gods with a racist adaptation (Gardell, 2003). Lane's creation of Wotanism was a way to protect the white race primarily from race mixing (Gardell, 2003). Wotanism was also intended to be the intellectual and spiritual precursor to a larger revolution (Gardell, 2003). Lane wanted to provide a spiritual foundation to prevent white women from race mixing and therefore securing the future of white children (Lane, 1999; Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).

The importance of white women and children is a constant thread throughout Lane's written work. Lane constantly reflects about the beauty of white women and how their beauty should be protected and preserved (Lane, 1999). Lane's 14 Words serves both as a battle cry and objective. "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children" serves as a battle cry to fight for the survival of the white race while protecting white women from race mixing (Lane, 1999; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). Lane's (1999) other motto did not reach the same

level of popularity as the 14 Words “Because the beauty of the white Aryan woman must not perish from the earth.”

Lane died on May 28, 2007 in Terre Haute, Indiana in the Federal Correctional Complex apparently due to complications associated with cancer.¹⁰³ He was more influential in prison as a ‘political’ prisoner than a freeman leading neo-Nazi organizations. After his death, small memorial demonstrations for Lane occurred in the United States, Germany, Russia, and the Ukraine, many of which were broadcasted on the internet.¹⁰⁴ The purpose of these demonstrations was to pay homage to an influential neo-Nazi leader that led by armed resistance and by the pen. The use of ‘14’ and ‘88’ in tattoos, slogans, signs, and literature reflect Lane’s impact on the neo-Nazi movement.

David Duke¹⁰⁵ (1950-Present)

Duke describes himself as a white civil rights activist, not a white supremacist (Duke, 2007). Duke has published numerous articles and four books. In 1998, he published a book that outlines his social philosophies in *My Awakening: A Path to Racial Understanding*. In 2002, he published *Jewish Supremacism*, which is considered a comprehensive outline of his beliefs. He currently resides in Austria and is very active on the internet, publishing, and streaming audio messages.¹⁰⁶

Born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, David Duke is nationally known as a neo-Nazi politician (Zatarian, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). He received national

¹⁰³ http://www.adl.org/learn/Ext_US/lane.asp?xpicked=2&item=lane

¹⁰⁴ http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=david+lane&aq=f

¹⁰⁵ David Duke as a propagandist is unique among the neo-Nazi sample. His form of propaganda is covert rather than to the degree that he was elected by a democratic process. It is not that Duke’s propaganda is any softer than others in the sample, it is distinct. This distinction should not be mistaken for weaker, it is only cloaked and packaged differently from the other propagandists in the sample.

¹⁰⁶ <http://www.davidduke.com/>

attention during his failed bid for president of the United States and his role in politics in Louisiana. A former KKK Grand Wizard and mainstream politician, his message has not always been so overt and thus is considered “soft” by those in the neo-Nazi movement (Rose, 1992; Zeskind, 2009). The so called soft approach should not be misinterpreted as weaker (Berbrier, 1998). Duke has a different agenda and seeks a wider audience with a more appealing and seemingly less offensive message over hard line neo-Nazi groups (Landau, 1993; Zeskind, 2009).

Part of this “appealing” to the masses approach is how Duke carefully crafts a positive image of his past. Duke describes himself as a former Louisiana member of the House of Representatives, recipient of a doctorate degree, a teacher, and author of one of the bestselling books in the world (Duke, 1998). Duke uses these titles to establish credibility in order to overcome the stereotype of the ignorant, uneducated, and unsuccessful white supremacist. Additionally, he seeks to be identified as well traveled with international credibility. In 2006, Duke was a delegate in Tehran at the International Conference to Review the Global Vision of the Holocaust and in April 2009 Duke was invited by Czechoslovakian neo-Nazis to deliver three lectures.¹⁰⁷

Duke’s introduction to neo-Nazi ideology started in a small town in Louisiana far from the international flair he now flaunts. It was during high school that Duke was exposed to neo-Nazi and racial theories (Duke, 1998; Bridges, 1995). At the time he was working on a high school paper that opposed racial integration. In order to research the paper, he went to the local office of the Segregationist White Council and met several men who would become his racial ideological mentors (Rose, 1992). Duke was 16 when his father left their family and his mother was an alcoholic who spent time in and out of

¹⁰⁷ He was arrested by Czech officials and was forced out the country a day later.

hospitals in an attempt to deal with her addiction (Bridges, 1995; Landau, 1993). The void created by Duke's parents was filled by men at the White Council and later by William Pierce, founder of the National Alliance, whom he met in the late 1960's (Zatarain, 1990; Zeskind, 2009). The ideological seeds planted during his high school years, would continue to grow deeper in college.

The origin of his future political ambition began at Louisiana State University. In 1970, Duke founded a student group, The White Youth Alliance. Duke borrowed its ideology and organizational structure from the National Socialist White People's Party, formally the American Nazi Party (Rose, 1992; Bridges, 1995). He was an active debater in LSU's free speech area. He would stand in the middle of campus on a soap box with a full Nazi uniform armed in one hand with a copy of George Lincoln Rockwell's *White Power* (1967) (Zatarain, 1990). He would debate anyone within earshot that wanted to disagree with him. He graduated from LSU in 1974 and changed tactics.¹⁰⁸

Duke was no longer interested in overt Nazism, but wanted to create a new and 'softer' brand that would be more appealing to a wider audience (Zatarain, 1990). He entered the KKK and wanted to soften and professionalize its image (Zeskind, 2009). He broadened its membership to include women and Catholics in order to expand the pool of potential members. In 1974, he founded the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in order to promote a new type of Klansman (Zatarain, 1990; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). A KKK Knight should be educated, driven, handsome, professional, and articulate. Duke believed that he embodied these attributes (Bridges, 1995).

Attempting to maximize his public appeal, he appeared on national talk shows as a Grand Wizard (Rose, 1992; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997). His ideology at the time

¹⁰⁸ From Duke Awakenings

focused more on Jews and Nazi ideas than grievances with African Americans.

However, KKK members had problems with his personality, specifically his womanizing, his self promotion, and his personal financial gain (Zeskind, 2009).

Duke formally left the KKK, but desired to retain a softer professional image. He formed the NAAWP (National Association for the Advancement of White People) as a grass roots effort to inflate his political base and aligned himself with Willis Carto, an influential anti Semitic propagandist (Rose, 1992; Dobratz & Shanks-Meile, 1997; Zeskind, 2009). Both Duke and Carto collaborated to disprove the Holocaust. It was during this time that he published his first two books.

African Atto, (1973) a street fighting manual for African Americans in urban areas and *Finders Keepers* (1976), a book for women in how to keep their male companions. He selected misleading pseudonyms for each book; Malcolm X for *African Atto* and Dorothy Vanderbilt and James Konrad for *Finders Keepers* (Zeskind, 2009). The strategy behind *African Atto* was to provide African Americans with better tactics and techniques to kill each other on the street. *Finders Keepers* was to prevent white women from race mixing. Both books were to be published and distributed without drawing attention to the fact that it was a white male pushing a subversive agenda. Duke's modis operandi is subversive, an approach he used in publishing both books and in pursuing political office.

His first run for political office was in 1975 for a 10th district seat in the Louisiana State Senate (Zeskind, 2009). He lost, but received 26% of the votes (Bridges, 1995). He ran a Democratic presidential campaign in 1988 and received 47,047 votes or four percent of the national popular vote. However, in 1989 he changed his party affiliation to

Republican and won the State's House 81st district seat with 3,995 votes or 33% (Bridges, 1995). He served in this post from 1990 to 1992. Then in 1992, now as a Republican, he sought his party's nomination for President, which he failed to obtain (Bridges, 1995). In 1994, he ran for the US Senate seat and lost, but received 44% of the votes or 607,391 (Bridges, 1995). In 1996, he campaigned again for a US Senate seat and in 1999 for the US House of Representatives, where he failed in both attempts (Bridges, 1995; Zeskind, 2009). After his failed political bid in 1999, Duke was finished with running for office.

Any other future political ambitions dissolved after his conviction of filing a false tax return in December 2002.¹⁰⁹ He was sentenced to 15 months in prison where he spent the time in Big Springs Texas. He was released in 2004 and shifted gears. Duke organized a White Nationalism Conference where attendees would agree to unify the white movement, establishing peace within the movement, and foster a new image.¹¹⁰ Duke drafted a protocol that was adopted by those in attendance and has been labeled as the New Orleans Protocol. Paul Fromm, Don Black, Willis Carto, Kevin Strom, and John Tyndall signed the document. The protocol is listed on the Southern Poverty's Law Center website and has three provisions;

1. Zero Tolerance for Violence
2. Honorable and ethical behavior with other signatory groups. This includes not denouncing others who have signed this protocol. In other words, no enemies on the right.
3. Maintaining a high tone in arguments and public presentation.

¹⁰⁹ Freed from prison, David Duke mounts a comeback". Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, Summer 2004. <http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=477>.

¹¹⁰ Freed from prison, David Duke mounts a comeback". Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Report, Summer 2004. <http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=477>.

In 2005 Duke was awarded a Ph.D. from the Ukrainian Interregional Academy of Personnel Management.¹¹¹ His doctoral dissertation, titled “Zionism as a Form of Ethnic Supremacism,” is a “scholarly” attempt to promote his ideology in an academic format. During his studies there, he taught courses in international relations and history.¹¹² Duke has two adult daughters from his wife, Chloe Hardin, who was an active member in Duke’s LSU student group (Bridges, 1995). They married in 1974 and divorced ten years later.

Currently, Duke resides in Salzburg, Austria. He manages a business that is internet mediated. On his website he sells copies of his books, wildlife photography, streams his audio messages and distributes the David Duke newsletter.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Duke, David (2005-09-09). "David Duke Achieves Doctorate in Ukraine". <http://www.davidduke.com/index.php?p=394>. Retrieved 2006-11-16.

¹¹² <http://www.davidduke.com>

¹¹³ <http://www.davidduke.com>

Figure 10 Network Text Analysis Closeness Algorithms

<p>Network Centralization, Closeness</p>	<p>Network centralization based on the closeness centrality of each node in a square network. This is defined only for connected, undirected networks. Type Graph Level Input N: square, symmetric, connected Output $\mathfrak{R} \in [0,1]$</p>	<p>Freeman, 1979</p>	<p>Let $G=(V,E)$ represent the square network, and let $n = V$ let $d_i =$ Closeness Centrality of node i let $\bar{d} = \max\{d_i 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ Then Network Closeness Cent. $= \left(\sum_{1 \leq i \leq n} \bar{d} - d_i \right) / ((n-2)(n-1)/(2n-3))$.</p>
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Figure 11: Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frame Definitions/Codes

Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames	Definitions/List of Codes
Islamic Government	Depicts the failure of Islamic Governments.
Modern Ummah	Depicts the failure of the local and/or global modern Islamic community.
Democracy	Outlines how democracy is a failure and not is opposed to Islam.
Secular Innovations	Delineates how including and following secular laws is a failure.
United States	Depicts that the United States has failed culturally, spiritually, morally, militarily or socially.
Sharia Ignored	Explains how Sharia law is not followed by Muslims individually or collectively.
Modern Morality	Individual or collective morality is depicted as failing or a complete failure.
Corrupt Leaders	Identifies specific Muslim leaders as being corrupt and a threat to true Islam.
Usury	Poverty is created by individually/collective lending and is a violation of Sharia law.
Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims	Non-Muslims depict Muslim culture, religion, skill, piety or fighting ability as being inferior.
Muslims humiliate true Muslims	Muslims depict violent jihadis as being inferior, misguided, corrupt or inept.
Capitalism	Capitalism is a flawed ideology and way of life.
Westernization	Shows that the Westernization of Muslims is flawed.
Jahiliyyah	Illustrates that a prevailing state of ignorance among Muslims makes them un-Islamic and equal to the time before the Prophet Mohammad.
Materialism	Describes how materialism is a flawed objective and lifestyle.
Liberalism	Explains how liberalism is a flawed objective and lifestyle.
Communism	Portrays communism as flawed system of government.
Arab Nationalism	Shows that Arab Nationalism is flawed.
Polytheism	Depicts Polytheism as flawed and theologically incorrect.
Christianity	Delineates Christianity as flawed, tainted and theologically incomplete.
Paganism	Describes paganism as flawed and counter to Islam.
Socialism	Expresses that socialism is a flawed philosophy and system of government.
Science	Describes that secular modern science is flawed.
United Nations	The United Nations as a governing body is corrupt and anti Islamic.
Human Rights	The concept of human rights is flawed and counter to Sharia law.
Apostasy	Apostasy demonstrates flaws in Muslim theology.
Abortion	Abortion is morally defective.

Alcohol	Using alcohol is morally defective and against the Quran.
Blasphemy	Actions or words of blasphemy against Allah or his prophet is morally defective.
Corruption	Corruption outside of Islamic government, ie. businesses, trade, banks, etc.
Crime	The presence of crime is an indicator of a morally defective Muslim society.
Homosexuality	Homosexuality is described as a morally defective practice.
Jews	The Jews by nature are morally defective.
Kafir	“Unbelievers” using a charged label, are morally defective and are outside Islam.
Fornication	Those that practice fornication are morally defective.
Muslims oppress true Muslims	Muslims that oppress ‘true’ Muslims are morally defective.
Islam is Polluted	Those engaged in polluting ‘true’ Islamic doctrine/ummah, specifically against violent jihad.
Satan	Satan is an enemy of Allah and is morally defective.
Zionism	Zionism is a morally defective ideology that is engaged in occupying Muslim lands and the Ummah located there.
Israel exists	The continued existence of Israel despite Arab wars.
Muslim Oppression	Illustrates injustices associated with non violent Muslim oppression by non Muslims.
Injustices tolerated	Expresses how weak Muslims are when injustices outside of violent jihad are tolerated.
Muslims governed by non Muslims	Delineates the state of weakness of Islam if Muslims are governed by non Muslims.
Muslims Passivity	Illustrates how weak Muslims are when they refuse to engage in jihad.
Non Muslim Violence against Muslims	Outlines the injustices and weakness of Muslims when non Muslims are able to use violence against Muslims.
Muslim women Victimization	Portrays the weakness of Muslims when they are not able to protect Muslim women from being victimized.
Non Muslim soldiers permitted on Muslim Lands	Express the weakness of Islam when non Muslim Soldiers are allow on Muslim land.
Muslim violence against true Muslims	Outlines the injustice of Muslims using violence against other Muslims, namely violent jihadis.

Figure 12: Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frame Definitions/Codes

Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Definitions/List of Codes Frames	
Modern Morality	Individual or collective morality is depicted as failing or a complete failure.
Federal Government	Depicts the United States Federal Government as a complete failure or failing.
Violation of Racial Natural Law	Illustrates how the white race functioning as the apex of natural selection is being violated.
Traditional Religion	Depicts how tradition religion has failed the white race.
Modern Education	Explains that modern education is a failure.
Modern Medicine	Shows that modern medicine has failed.
Non whites create poverty	Portrays non whites as creating poverty.
Whites Humiliated	Words or deeds by non whites that humiliate the white race.
Jews humiliate Muslims	Words or deeds by Jews that intend to humiliate Muslims.
Materialism	Explains that materialism is a flawed concept and way of life.
Liberalism	Illustrates that liberalism is a flawed concept and way of life.
Feminism	Delineates that feminism is flawed and detrimental to the white race.
Civil Rights	Explains that the civil rights movement in the United States is a flawed movement that threatens the white race.
Zionism	Outlines that Zionism is a flawed concept to grant more power to Jews.
Racial equality	Expresses that the concept that all races are equal is erroneous and a threat to the white race.

Racial integration	Depicts that racial integration in the United States is a flawed concept and weakens the white race.
Taxation	Federal taxation policies and practices are flawed.
Communism	Communism is a flawed system of government.
Blacks	Blacks are a flawed and inferior race.
Asian	Asians are a flawed and inferior race.
Jews	Jews are historically flawed.
Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants	Foreigners or illegal immigrants threaten the white race and are flawed.
Usury	Poverty is created by individually/collective lending and is therefore an injustice.
Non Whites Advance Crime	Non whites are criminogenic in nature.
Disease	Physical disease is a sign of a flawed lifestyle.
Native Americans	Native Americans are flawed.
Muslims	Muslims adhere to a flawed religion and are inferior.
U.S. aid to Israel	U.S. aid to Israel is a flawed foreign policy.
Holocaust	The way in which the Holocaust has been portrayed by Jews is erroneous.
Abortion	Abortion is a morally defective act.
Homosexuality	Homosexuality is a morally defective lifestyle.
Jewish Influence	Jews maintaining positions of power in government, banking, media, investments, academia and industry is to dominate and weaken the white race.
Jewish Supremacists	Jews perceive themselves as superior to all others and therefore entitled to dominate and control.
Racial pollution	The concept that any form of mixing between race is a form of racial pollution, bent on weakening and eventually

	destroying the white race.
Race traitors	Whites that marry or sympathize with non whites are morally defective.
Media	The modern media is defective and controlled by liberals and Jews.
Injustices are tolerated	Injustices beyond those associated with race are tolerated.
White Extinction	The white race is close to extinction or will be extinct in the near future.
Whites Passivity	Whites do not catalyze when racial injustices to whites occurs.
Whites Unarmed	Whites do not possess firearms preventing them to defend their race and promoting a weaker status.
Violence against Whites	Non-whites use violence against whites revealing the weakness of whites to prevent/stop such violence.
White women victimized	White women are victimized by non whites revealing the weakness of white males to protect them.
Future of white children unprotected	White children are threatened by either the actions and/or words of non whites and/or race traitors.
White oppression	Whites are oppressed by non violent methods by non whites or race traitors.
Decline of white power	The status and power of whites is declining.
White guilt	Whites feeling guilt over past treatment of non whites is a sign of weakness and is erroneous.

Figure 13: Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frame Definitions/Codes

Neo-Nazi Prognostic Frames	Definitions/List of Codes
Interrogate communists	Expose communists embedded in the U.S. through systematic and public questioning.
Control Immigration	Stringent control of immigration of non-whites is a solution to solving the problem of more non whites in the U.S.
Identify Jews as a race	Part of solving the ‘Jewish Problem’ is to identify Jews as a race.
Deport non-whites	Deport non-whites back to their country of origin or simply outside the U.S. as a permanent solution to the increasing non-white population in the U.S.
Eliminate non-whites	The use of any form of violence to kill non-whites/race traitors in an isolated event that is not connected to white terrorism or racial war.
Maintain Traditional Morality	Efforts taken by whites to maintain the state of morality in the United States before the 1960’s.
Establish White Territory	Create a geographic territory in the U.S. for the white race.
Follow Constitution	Endeavor to follow what is outlined in the Constitution.
Whites need to Organize	A proactive campaign for members of the white race to organize into groups.
Punish communists	All communists should be exposed and either incarcerated or deported.
Follow Racial Natural Law	Granting power, influence and dominance to the white race is following natural selection and the natural order.
Empower Racial	Nations where whites reside should be led by a governmental

Nationalism	structure that emphasizes race as a form of solidarity.
Promote Racial loyalty	Whites should maintain a sense of loyalty to their race above all other.
Generate Racial Hatred	Hating other races is promoted as a logical solution.
Carry out Racial War	Conventional and insurgent campaigns along racial lines where combatants use the tools of wars: medium/heavy weapons, uniforms, military organizational structure.
Maintain Racial Segregation	Separating people groups according to race is a solution.
Recruit Whites	Actions or strategies intended to add whites to the neo-Nazi movement.
Understand Replacement Theology	The need for whites to understand that Israel or the Jews are not God's chosen people, they have been replaced by the white race.
Promote Revisionism	The Jewish portrayal of the Holocaust is erroneous and history needs to be revised with the correct version.
Use non-whites for labor	One options for keeping non-whites in the U.S. is to use them for manual labor.
White Advancement	The ideal that the white race needs to continue to advance in education, science, the arts, culture and government to advance humanity.
White Praxis	Whites should be actively living out their white ideology and engaged when injustices to their race occur.
Promote White Education	Modern education is polluted and a correct version centering on the white race is needed.
White Discernment	Whites should be able to think critically and discern the fallacies that exist in the social world around them.
White Based Religion	Whites need a religion based on race.

White Martyrdom	It is honorable to become a martyr for the white race.
White Terrorism	Using or threatening violence for a racial/political intent. The goal is to convey an emotionally charged political/racial message to whites and non-whites.
White Leadership	Strong white leadership is needed.
White Revolution	A revolution according to race is needed, where the white race dominates and threats are reduced or are greatly diminished.
Whites seek positions of power	Whites should seek positions that grant them influence, power and control.
Whites reproduce only with Whites	Whites should avoid polluting their race by reproducing only with whites.
White unity	The white race needs to unify.
Whites create productive economies	A productive economy occurs when whites are in control.
White propaganda	Various media are needed to disseminate neo-Nazism to whites.
Whites to arms	Whites need to own firearms in order to protect their race and freedoms.

Figure 14: Neo-Nazi Prognostic Frame Definitions/Codes

Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames	Definitions/List of Codes
Pursue Divine leadership	Allah will lead all violent jihadis down the ‘right’ path and should be pursued.
Establish True Ummah	A true community of Muslims is needed to replace the current polluted version.
Follow Muhammad’s example	Seek to emulate the Prophets actions in all areas of life.
Abide by Sharia	Sharia law is required over secular innovations.
Start Islamic revolution/movement	A revolution/movement is needed to replace the corrupt and polluted form of Islam followed by the majority of misguided Muslims.
Humanity needs Islamic redemption	Humanity is on the path to destruction and true Islam is needed to save humanity from being destroyed from the inside. Integrating Islam brings a degree of harmony with nature and universal laws to confront moral decay.
Create ideal civilization via Islam	An ideal civilization is created when true Islam is the dominant factor.
Engage in Violent jihad	Using violence to ‘defend’ the ‘true’ faith to kill, threaten or harm non-Muslims or corrupt Muslims.
Muslim Praxis	Muslims should be active in applying their theological doctrines.
Pursue the Quran	Memorizing, studying, reading, reciting and hearing the Quran will assist in drawing closer to God and purifying Islam.
Return to golden age	Modern society should return to the Islamic age where Sharia, the Ummah and the Caliphate were ‘true.’
Strong Leadership	Strong leadership from ‘true’ Muslims is needed.
Tawhid	The doctrine of the ‘oneness’ of God must be incorporated by humanity.
Recruit Jihadis	More violent jihadis are needed.
Engage in Martyrdom	Becoming a martyr for the sake of ‘true’ Islam against its enemies is honorable.
Boycott Western Goods	All true Muslims should refrain from western produced goods.
Generate Religious Hatred	Hating those that are destroying the ‘true’ faith is required.

Islamic instruction	'True' Islamic instruction is needed to replace the dominant corrupted versions.
Punishment	The theological doctrine of retaliation is needed in order to re-set the moral/social balance.
Establish Jihadi territory	Create an expanding geographic location where the ummah exists, Sharia is followed and Allah is correctly worshipped.
Establish Islamic Caliphate	'True' Muslims can only be governed by a legitimate caliphate.
Organize	All 'true' Muslims should organize with other 'true' Muslims.
Tactical instruction	Violent jihadis need to seek to be trained in weapons, strategy and tactics.
Obtain weapons	Violent jihadis need to be armed to defend their faith, their people and their way of life.

Table 17 Types of Neo-Nazi Diagnostic Frames

NEO-NAZI DIAGNOSTIC TYPOLOGY:	Rockwell (1967) Prevalence/ Value	Pierce (1978) Prevalence/ Value	Klassen (1981) Prevalence/ Value	Lane (1994) Prevalence/ Value	Duke (2003) Prevalence/ Value	Chittum (1997) Prevalence/ Value
Modern Morality	3/0.8352	4/0.3760	15/0.1126	1/1	18/0.0613	3/0.5870
Federal Government	12/0.2095	1/1	8/0.2757	3/0.6667	13/0.2290	1/1
Violation of Racial Natural Law	20/0.0511	30/0.0080	22/0.0821	2/0.700	*	*
Traditional Religion	28/0.0102	24/0.0240	4/0.5437	7/0.4333	17/0.0710	*
Modern Education	*	*	16/0.1087	*	27/0.0258	*
Modern Medicine	*	*	14/0.1165	*	*	20/0.0109
non-whites create poverty	13/0.1866	27/0.0188	23/0.0621	25/0.0667	29/0.0129	18/0.0435
Whites Humiliated	8/0.3206	6/0.3120	9/0.2408		3/0.7258	14/0.1848
Jews humiliate Muslims	*	*	38/0.0039	*	6/0.3645	*
Materialism	17/0.0702	17/0.0880	29/0.0350	8/0.4000	30/0.0129	23/0.0109
Liberalism	6/0.5236	9/0.2400	25/0.0583	*	16/0.0806	15/0.1196
Feminism	*	21/0.0360	*	*	29/0.0129	22/0.0109
Civil Rights	21/0.0460	28/0.0080	*	*	36/0.0065	21/0.0109
Zionism	17/0.0728	*	33/0.0194	*	4/0.5323	*
Racial equality	14/0.1584	15/0.1040	19/0.0854	9/0.2667	26/0.0355	10/0.2283
Racial integration	26/0.0255	19/0.0440	17/0.1049	10/0.2667	25/0.0387	5/0.5109
Taxation	18/0.0613	25/0.0200	18/0.1010	11/0.2667	21/0.0516	12/0.2011
Communism	2/0.08838	16/0.0960	13/0.1204	*	5/0.4000	11/0.2228
Blacks	5/0.06897	2/0.4880	2/0.6738	15/0.1333	20/0.0516	9/0.2391
Asian	34/0.0026	*	34/0.0155	21/0.0667	*	*
Jews	4/0.4720	13/0.1480	3/0.6563	17/0.1333	1/1	16/0.0978
Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants	25/0.0255	31/0.0080	30/0.0272	22/0.0667	15/0.2032	7/0.3913
Usury	27/0.0204	*	36/0.0078	5/0.4667	11/0.2548	
Non-whites Advance Crime	11/0.2286	11/0.1920	11/0.1825	16/0.1333	19/0.0613	8/0.3478
Disease	*	*	27/0.0466	*	11/0.2548	*
Native Americans	24/0.0307	33/0.0040	12/0.1709	23/0.0667	31/0.0129	13/0.1957
Muslims	29/0.0077	23/0.0240	28/0.0388	*	14/0.2194	24/0.0109
U.S. aid to Israel	*	*	*	*	22/0.0452	*
Holocaust	31/0.0026	26/0.0160	35/0.0155	*	10/0.2710	*
Abortion	32/0.0026	*	*	24/0.0667	34/0.0097	*
Homosexuality	23/0.0358	32/0.0080	37/0.0039	18/0.1333	37/0.0065	*
Jewish Influence	1/1	7/0.3040	1/1	19/0.1333	2/0.8613	*
Jewish Supremacists	*	*	*	*	8/0.3210	*
Racial pollution	19/0.0613	14/0.1360	5/0.3456	6/0.4667	35/0.0097	*
Race traitors	*	12/0.1720	20/0.0816	20/0.1333	*	*
Media	*	*	23/0.0621	*	9/0.2742	17/0.0652
Injustices are tolerated	9/0.2542	18/0.0840	31/0.0272	*	23/0.0419	19/0.0217
White Extinction	22/0.0409	20/0.3660	7/0.2796	4/0.6667	24/0.0403	25/0.0109
Whites Passivity	7/0.3206	10/0.2360	24/0.0621	13/0.2667	33/0.0129	28/0.0109
Whites Unarmed	30/0.0051	22/0.0320	*	*	38/0.0065	18/0.0435
Violence against Whites	10/0.2299	5/0.3520	6/0.3456	26/0.0667	12/0.2452	4/0.5761
White women Victimized	*	8/0.2680	32/0.0272	12/0.2667	*	27/0.0109
Future of white children unprotected	16/0.0741	*	*	*	*	*
White oppression	15/0.0868	3/0.4080	10/0.2097	14/0.2000	7/0.3419	2/0.7826
Decline of white power	*	29/0.0080	21/0.0816	*	32/0.0129	6/0.4348
White guilt	*	*	26/0.0505	*	28/0.0226	26/0.109

Table 18 Types of Neo Nazis Diagnostic Frames by Propagandist/Text

Prevalence	Rockwell (1967)	Pierce (1978)	Klassen (1981)	Lane (1994)	Duke (2003)	Chittum (1997)
1	Jewish Influence	Federal Government	Jewish Influence	Modern Morality	Jews	Federal Government
2	Communism	Blacks	Blacks	Violation of Racial Natural Law	Jewish Influence	Whites Oppressed
3	Modern Morality	Whites Oppressed	Jews	Federal Government	Whites Humiliated	Modern Morality
4	Jews	Modern Morality	Traditional Religion	White Extinction	Zionism	Violence against Whites
5	Blacks	Violence against Whites	Racial Pollution	Usury	Communism	Racial Integration
6	Liberalism	Whites Humiliated	Violence against Whites	Racial Pollution	Jews Humiliate Muslims	Decline of White Power
7	White Passivity	Jewish Influence	White Extinction	Traditional Religion	Whites Oppressed	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants
8	Whites Humiliated	White Women Victimized	Federal Government	Materialism	Jewish Supremacists	Crime
9	Injustices Tolerated	Liberalism	Whites Humiliated	Racial Equality	Mass Media	Blacks
10	Violence against Whites	White Passivity	Whites Oppressed	Racial Integration	Jewish Holocaust	Racial Equality
11	Non-whites Advance Crime	Non-whites Advance Crime	Non-whites Advance Crime	Taxation	Non-whites Advance Crime	Communism
12	Federal Government	Race Traitors	Native Americans	White Women Victimized	Violence against Whites	Taxation
13	Non-whites create Poverty	Jews	Communism	White Passivity	Federal Government	Native Americans
14	Racial Equality	Racial Pollution	Modern Medicine	Whites Oppressed	Muslims	Whites Humiliated
15	Whites Oppressed	Racial Equality	Modern Morality	Blacks	Foreigners	Liberalism
16	White Women Victimized	Communism	Modern Education	Non-whites Advance Crime	Liberalism	Jews
17	Zionism	Materialism	Racial Integration	Jews	Traditional Religion	Mass Media
18	Materialism	Injustices Tolerated	Taxation	Homosexuality	Modern Morality	Non-white create Poverty
19	Taxation	Racial Integration	Racial Equality	Jewish Influence	Usury	Whites Unarmed
20	Racial Pollution	White Extinction	Race Traitors	Race Traitors	Blacks	Injustices Tolerated
21	Violation of Racial Natural Law	Feminism	Decline of White Power	Asians	Taxation	Modern Medicine
22	Civil Rights	Whites Unarmed	Violation of Racial Natural Law	Foreigners	U.S. aid to Israel	Civil Rights
23	White Extinction	Muslims	Non-whites create poverty	Native Americans	Injustices Tolerated	Feminism

24	Homosexuality	Traditional Religion	Mass Media	Abortion	White Extinction	Materialism
25	Native Americans	Taxation	White Passivity	Non-whites create Poverty	Racial Integration	Muslims
26	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants	Jewish Holocaust	Liberalism	Violence against Whites	Racial Equality	White Extinction
27	Racial Integration	Non-whites create Poverty	White Guilt	*	Modern Education	White Guilt
28	Usury	Civil Rights	Disease	*	White Guilt	White Women Victimized
29	Traditional Religion	Decline of White Power	Muslims	*	Non-whites create Poverty	White Passivity
30	Muslims	Violation of Racial Natural Law	Materialism	*	Feminism	*
31	Whites Unarmed	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants	*	Materialism	*
32	Jewish Holocaust	Homosexuality	Injustices Tolerated	*	Native Americans	*
33	Abortion	Native Americans	White Women Victimized	*	Decline of White Power	*
34	*	*	Zionism	*	White Passivity	*
35	*	*	Asians	*	Abortion	*
36	*	*	Jewish Holocaust	*	Racial Pollution	*
37	*	*	Usury	*	Civil Rights	*
38	*	*	Homosexuality	*	Homosexuality	*
39	*	*	*	*	Whites Unarmed	*

Table 19 Types of Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames

VIOLENT JIHADI DIAGNOSTIC FRAME:	Qutb (1966)	Azzam (1984)	Bin Laden (1996)	Zawahiri (2001)	Maqdisi (2009)	Al Bari (1850)
	Prevalence/ Value	Prevalence/ Value	Prevalence/ Value	Prevalence/ Value	Prevalence/ Value	Prevalence/ Value
Islamic Governments	4/0.2735	11/0.1786	1/1	2/0.7829	7/0.1084	7/0.1176
Modern ummah	*	13/0.1429	14/0.1739	14/0.1711	*	*
Democracy	26/0.0256	*	*	30/0.0132	5/0.1687	*
Secular Innovations	6/0.2564	14/0.1071	15/0.1739	12/0.1974	2/0.6386	*
United States	22/0.0598	*	5/0.6087	1/1	*	*
Sharia Ignored	*	16/0.1071	16/0.1739	17/0.1184	*	*
Modern Morality	14/0.1026	15/0.1071	4/0.6087	23/0.0595	6/0.1325	12/0.0392
Corrupt Leaders	*	*	12/0.2174	*	*	*
Usury	21/0.0684	23/0.0357	33/0.0435	*	*	15/0.0392
Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims	*	10/0.1786	13/0.2174	11/0.2500	*	17/0.0392
Muslims humiliate true Muslims	*	*	19/0.1739	8/0.3158	*	*
Capitalism	24/0.0342	*	*	31/0.0132	*	*
Westernization	*	19/0.0357	22/0.1304	*		
Jahiliyyah	1/1	12/0.1786	29/0.0435	*	3/0.5301	8/0.1176
Materialism	12/0.1197	*	20/0.1304	27/0.0263	*	*
Liberalism	18/0.0684	*	*	*	*	*
Communism	11/0.1197	9/0.1786	24/0.0870	10/0.2632	*	
Arab Nationalism	*	20/0.0357	25/0.0870	*	*	*
Polytheism	25/0.0342	*	*	*	15/0.0241	6/0.1569
Christianity	15/0.0855	21/0.0357	*	26/0.0263	14/0.0241	3/0.03333
Paganism	2/0.3333	22/0.0357	21/0.1304	*	*	*
Socialism	19/0.0684	*	*	28/0.0263	*	*
Science	10/0.1368	*	*	32/0.0132	*	*
United Nations	*	*	26/0.0870	29/0.0263	*	*
Human Rights	*	*	28/0.0435	*	*	*
Apostasy	*	*	*	25/0.0263	13/0.0241	5/0.1569
Alcohol	16/0.0855	*	*	*	10/0.0482	13/0.0392
Blasphemy	*	*	30/0.0435	*	*	*
Corruption	*	*	*	18/0.0943	*	*
Crime	20/0.0684	18/0.0714	31/0.0435	20/0.0526	16/0.0241	
Homosexuality	27/0.0174	*	*	*	*	*
Jews	3/0.3333	24/0.0179	17/0.1739	5/0.5592	8/0.0964	4/0.2353
Kafir	7/0.2393	3/0.5357	6/0.6087	16/0.1316	1/1	1/1
Fornication	17/0.0855	*	*	*	11/0.0482	14/0.0392
Muslims oppress true Muslims	*	*	27/0.0870	9/0.3026	12/0.0482	*
Islam is Polluted	13/0.1111	5/0.3929	9/0.2609	15/0.1579	4/0.2169	2/0.8627
Satan	5/0.2735	8/0.3214	32/0.0435	24/0.0395	9/0.0723	9/0.1176
Zionism	*	*	8/0.3043	21/0.0526	*	*
Israel exists	*	*	23/0.1304	3/0.6579	*	*
Muslims Oppression	8/0.1966	6/0.3571	3/0.6957	18/0.1053	*	10/0.1176
Injustices tolerated	*	*	*	21/0.0377	*	
Muslims governed by non Muslims	*	7/0.3214	10/0.2609	6/0.3947	*	11/0.1176
Muslim Passivity	23/0.0513	1/1	18/0.1739	22/0.0526	*	*
Non Muslim Violence against Muslims	*	4/0.4643	2/0.8696	7/0.3553	*	*

Muslim women victimized	9/0.1453	2/0.6964	11/0.2391	19/0.0789	*	16/0.0392
Non Muslim soldiers permitted on Muslim Lands	*	17/0.0714	7/0.5870	13/0.1842		
Muslim violence against true Muslims	*	*	*	4/0.6053	*	*

Table 20 Types of Violent Jihadi Diagnostic Frames by Propagandist/Text

Rank	Quthb Milestones (1966)	Azzam Defense (1984)	Bin Laden Declaration of War (1996)	Zawahiri Knights (2001)	Maqdisi Aqeedah (2009)	Al Bari Swords (1850)
1	Jahiliyyah	Muslim Passivity	Islamic Government	United States	Kafir	Kafir
2	Paganism	Muslim Women Victimized	Non Muslims attack Muslims	Islamic Government	Secular Innovations	Islam is Polluted
3	Jews	Kafir	Muslim Oppression	Israel	Jahiliyyah	Christianity
4	Islamic Government	Non Muslims attack Muslims	Modern Morality	Muslims attack true Muslims	Islam is Polluted	Jews
5	Satan	Islam is Polluted	United States	Jews	Democracy	Apostasy
6	Secular Innovations	Muslim Oppression	Kafir	Non Muslims govern Muslims	Modern Morality	Polytheism
7	Kafir	Non Muslims govern Muslims	Non Muslim Soldiers on Muslim Land	Non Muslims attack Muslims	Islamic Government	Islamic Government
8	Muslim Oppression	Satan	Zionism	Muslims humiliate true Muslims	Jews	Jahiliyyah
9	Muslim Women Victimized	Communism	Islam is Polluted	Muslims Oppress true Muslims	Satan	Satan
10	Modern Science	Non Muslims humiliate Muslims	Non Muslims govern Muslims	Communism	Muslim Oppression	Muslim Oppression
11	Communism	Islamic Government	Muslim Women Victimized	Non Muslims humiliate Muslims	Alcohol	Non Muslims govern Muslims
12	Materialism	Jahiliyyah	poverty_corrupt_leaders	Secular Innovations	Fornication	Modern Morality
13	Islam is Polluted	Modern Ummah	Non Muslims humiliate Muslims	Non Muslim Soldiers on Muslim Land	Muslims Oppress True Muslims	Alcohol
14	Modern Morality	Secular Innovations	Modern Ummah	Modern Ummah	Apostasy	Fornication
15	Christianity	Modern Morality	Secular Innovations	Islam is Polluted	Christianity	Usury
16	Alcohol	Sharia Ignored	Sharia Ignored	Kafir	Polytheism	Muslim Women Victimized
17	Fornication	Non Muslim Soldiers on Muslim Land	Jews	Sharia Ignored	Crime	Non Muslims humiliate Muslims
18	Liberalism	Crime	Muslim Passivity	Muslim Oppression	Muslim Passivity	*
19	Socialism	Westernization	Muslims humiliate true Muslims	Muslim Women Victimized	*	*
20	Crime	Arab Nationalism	Materialism	Crime	*	*
21	Usury	Christianity	Paganism	Zionism	*	*
22	United States	Paganism	Westernization	Muslim Passivity	*	*
23	Muslim Passivity	Usury	Israel	Modern Morality	*	*
24	Capitalism	Jews	Communism	Satan	*	*
25	Polytheism	*	Polytheism	Apostasy	*	*
26	Democracy	*	United Nations	Christianity	*	*
27	Homosexuality	*	Muslims Oppress True	Materialism	*	*

			Muslims			
28	*	*	Human Rights	Socialism	*	*
29	*	*	Jahiliyyah	United Nations	*	*
30	*	*	Blasphemy	Democracy	*	*
31	*	*	Crime	Capitalism	*	*
32	*	*	Satan	Modern Science	*	*
33	*	*	Usury		*	*

Table 21 Types of Neo Nazis Prognostic Frames

NEO-NAZI PROGNOSTIC TYPES:	Rockwell (1967) Prevalence/ Value	Pierce (1978) Prevalence /Value	Klassen (1981) Prevalence /Value	Lane (1994) Prevalence /Value	Duke (2003) Prevalence /Value	Chittum (1997) Prevalence /Value
Carry out Racial War	6/0.3043	2/0.4844	14/0.1748	4/0.4286	*	1/1
Interrogate Communists	20/0.0145	*	*	*	*	*
Control Immigration	*	*	*	*	*	*
Identify Jews as a race	*	*	*	*	4/0.3333	*
Identify Communists	14/0.0580	*	28/0.0081	*	*	*
Deport non-whites	*	*	7/0.3008	*	7/0.1667	11/0.1333
Eliminate non- whites	10/0.1377	3/0.4375	5/0.4065	*	*	8/0.2667
Maintain Traditional Morality	19/0.217	*	*	*	*	*
Establish White Territory	12/0.1014	11/0.1875	11/0.2033	8/0.1905	*	2/0.7333
Follow Constitution	8/0.2319	19/0.0313	15/0.1585	12/0.0952	9/0.1667	3/0.4667
Whites need to Organize	*	4/0.3906	6/0.3089	*	*	4/0.4667
Promote White Education	*	*	4/0.4146	*	*	*
Punish communists	21/0.0145	*	*	*	*	
Follow Racial Natural Law	2/0.4130	13/0.0938	2/0.5203	1/1	6/0.2083	9/0.2000
Empower Racial Nationalism	4/0.3162	18/0.0313	17/0.1057	7/0.1905	*	*
Promote Racial loyalty	17/0.0290	7/0.3594	10/0.2033	11/0.0952	10/0.0833	*
Generate Racial Hatred	*	*	20/0.0569	*	*	*

Maintain Racial Segregation	16/0.0290	9/0.2500	23/0.0488	*	11/0.0833	6/0.4000
Recruit Whites	*	5/0.3906	27/0.0163	*	*	*
Promote Revisionism	*	*	*	*	3/0.4167	*
Understand Replacement Theology	*	*	*	*	5/0.2500	*
Use non-whites for labor	*	*	29/0.0081	*	*	*
White Advancement	*	*	3/0.4715	*	12/0.0833	*
White Praxis	3/0.3551	16/0.0313	8/0.2846	*	2/0.6250	7/0.3333
White Discernment	*	*	18/0.0813	2/0.4762	*	*
White Based Religion	*	20/0.0313	1/1	*	*	*
White Martyrdom	*	*	19/0.0569	*	*	*
White Terrorism	*	1/1	21/0.0569	*	*	14/0.0667
White Leadership	1/1	14/0.0938	9/0.2195	6/0.2857	1/1	12/0.1333
White Revolution	7/0.2609	10/1875	26/0.0244	*	15/0.0833	*
Whites seek positions of power	5/0.3043	*	24/0.0407	*	*	*
Whites to Arms	15/0.0435	6/0.3906	25/0.0407	9/0.0952	*	5/0.4667
Whites reproduce only with Whites	13/0.0725	17/0.0313	12/0.1951	3/0.4286	*	*
White unity	11/0.1377	15/0.0469	16/0.1301	10/0.0952	16/0.0833	10/0.2000
Whites create productive economies	18/0.0290	12/0.1250	22/0.0569	*	*	*
White propaganda	9/0.1594	8/0.2500	13/0.1870	5/0.3810	14/0.0833	13/0.0667

Table 22 Types of Neo Nazis Prognostic Frames by Propagandist/Text

Rank	Rockwell (1967)	Pierce (1978)	Klassen (1981)	Lane (1994)	Duke (2003)	Chittum (1997)
1	White Leadership	White Terrorism	White based religion	Follow Racial Natural Law	White Leadership	Carry out Racial War
2	Follow Racial Natural Law	Carry out Racial War	Follow Racial Natural Law	White Discernment	White Praxis	Establish White Territory
3	White Praxis	Eliminate non-whites	White advancement	White reproduce with Whites	Promote Revisionism	Follow Constitution
4	Empower Racial Nationalism	Whites need to organize	Promote White Education	Carry out Racial War	Identify Jews as race	Whites need to organize
5	Whites Seek Positions of Power	Recruit Whites	Eliminate non-whites	White Propaganda	Understand Replacement Theology	Whites to arms
6	Carry out Racial War	Whites to arms	Whites need to organize	White Leadership	Follow Racial Natural Law	Maintain Racial Segregation
7	White Revolution	Promote Racial Loyalty	Deport non-Whites	Empower Racial Nationalism	Deport non-Whites	White Praxis
8	Follow Constitution	White Propaganda	White Praxis	Establish White Territory	Eliminate non-whites	Eliminate non-whites
9	White Propaganda	Maintain Racial Segregation	White Leadership	Whites to arms	Follow Constitution	Follow Racial Natural Law
10	Eliminate non-whites	White Revolution	Promote Racial Loyalty	White Unity	Promote Racial Loyalty	White Unity
11	White Unity	Establish White Territory	Establish White Territory	Promote Racial Loyalty	Maintain Racial Segregation	Deport non-Whites
12	Establish White Territory	Whites create productive economies	White reproduce with Whites	Follow Constitution	White advancement	White Leadership
13	White reproduce with Whites	Follow Racial Natural Law	White Propaganda	*	Promote White Education	White Propaganda
14	Identify Communists	White Leadership	Carry out Racial War	*	White Propaganda	White Terrorism
15	Whites to arms	White Unity	Follow Constitution	*	White Revolution	*
16	Maintain Racial Segregation	White Praxis	White Unity	*	White Unity	*
17	Promote Racial Loyalty	White reproduce with Whites	Empower Racial Nationalism	*	*	*
18	Whites create productive economies	Empower Racial Nationalism	White Discernment	*	*	*
19	Maintain Traditional Morality	Follow Constitution	White martyrdom	*	*	*
20	Maintain Interrogate Communists	White based religion	Generate Racial Hatred	*	*	*
21	Punish Communists	*	White Terrorism	*	*	*
22	C	*	Whites create productive economies	*	*	*
23	*	*	Maintain Racial Segregation	*	*	*
24	*	*	Whites seek	*	*	*

			positions of power			
25	*	*	Whites to arms	*	*	*
26	*	*	White Revolution	*	*	*
27	*	*	Recruit Whites	*	*	*
28	*	*	Control Immigration	*	*	*
29	*	*	Use non-whites for labor	*	*	*

Table 23 Types of Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames

VIOLENT JIHADI PROGNOSTIC TYPES:	Qutb (1966)	Azzam (1984)	Bin Laden (1996)	Zawahiri (2001)	Maqdisi (2009)	Al Bari (1850)
	Prevalence/Va lue	Prevalence/Va lue	Prevalence/Va lue	Prevalence/Va lue	Prevalence/Va lue	Prevalence/Va lue
Pursue Divine leadership	7/0.1901	2/0.9484	1/1	13/0.0452	1/1	1/1
Establish True Ummah	*	8/0.1127	9/0.0769	15/0.0271	*	*
Follow Muhammad's example	2/0.9008	3/0.4601	3/0.3846	5/0.1357	2/0.4638	2/0.8283
Abide by Sharia	4/0.6116	12/0.0751	6/0.1231	4/0.2986	*	5/0.1010
Start Islamic revolution/movement		15/0.0563	10/0.0615	7/0.1176	7/0.0870	4/0.1313
Humanity needs Islamic redemption	3/0.7934	13/0.0751	12/0.0462	10/0.0724	4/0.1594	8/0.0404
Creates ideal civilization via Islam	*	16/0.0094	*	*	*	*
Engage in Violent jihad	5/0.5289	1/1	2/0.6615	1/1	5/0.1304	3/0.2424
Muslim Praxis	*	4/0.2723	4/0.2923	2/0.4570	3/0.2464	
Pursue the Quran	1/1	6/0.1502	16/0.0154	19/0.0181	9/0.0580	7/0.0606
Return to golden age	8/0.1653	9/0.1127	17/0.0154	*	*	
Strong Leadership	9/0.1405	7/0.1315	11/0.0615	9/0.0814	*	11/0.0202
Pursue Tawhid	10/0.0661		14/0.0308	20/0.0181	12/0.0145	*
Recruit Jihadis	*	10/0.0939	*	12/0.0633	*	*
Engage in Martyrdom	11/0.0579	11/0.0845	5/0.1385	6/0.1267	10/0.0435	6/0.0606
Boycott Western Goods	*	*	8/0.0769	21/0.0181	*	*
Generate Religious Hatred	*	*	15/0.0154	*	8/0.0725	9/0.0202
Islamic instruction	*	14/0.0657	*	17/0.0181	6/0.0870	10/0.0202
Punishment	*	*	*	18/0.0181	*	*
Establish Jihad territory	*	5/0.2300	7/0.0923	3/0.3258	*	*
Establish Islamic Caliphate	12/0.0165	*	13/0.0308	8/0.0814	11/0.0290	*
Organize	*	*	*	14/0.0362	*	*
Tactical instruction	*	*	*	11/0.0724	*	*
Obtain weapons	*	*	*	16/0.0271	*	*

Table 24 Typology of Violent Jihadi Prognostic Frames by Propagandist/Text

Rank	Qutb <i>Milestones</i> (1966)	Azzam <i>Defense</i> (1984)	Bin Laden <i>Declaration of War</i> (1996)	Zawahiri <i>Knights</i> (2001)	Maqdisi <i>Aqeedah</i> (2009)	Al Bari <i>Swords</i> (1850)
1	Pursue the Quran	Engage in Violent Jihad	Pursue Divine Leadership	Engage in Violent Jihad	Pursue Divine Leadership	Pursue Divine Leadership
2	Follow Muhammad's Example	Pursue Divine Leadership	Engage in Violent Jihad	Muslim Praxis	Follow Muhammad's Example	Follow Muhammad's Example
3	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption	Follow Muhammad's Example	Follow Muhammad's Example	Jihadi Territory	Muslim Praxis	Engage in Violent Jihad
4	Abide by Sharia	Muslim Praxis	Muslim Praxis	Abide by Sharia	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption	Start Islamic Revolution
5	Engage in Violent Jihad	Jihadi Territory	Engage in Martyrdom	Follow Muhammad's Example	Engage in Violent Jihad	Abide by Sharia
6	Pursue Divine Leadership	Pursue the Quran	Abide by Sharia	Engage in Martyrdom	Islamic Instruction	Engage in Martyrdom
7	Start Islamic Revolution	Strong Leadership	Jihadi Territory	Start Islamic Revolution	Start Islamic Revolution	Pursue the Quran
8	Return to Golden Age	Establish True Ummah	Boycott Western Goods	Establish Islamic Caliphate	Generate Religious Hatred	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption
9	Strong Leadership	Return to Golden Age	Establish True Ummah	Strong Leadership	Pursue the Quran	Generate Religious Hatred
10	Believe Tawhid	Recruit Jihadis	Start Islamic Revolution	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption	Engage in Martyrdom	Islamic Instruction
11	Engage in Martyrdom	Engage in Martyrdom	Strong Leadership	Tactical Instruction	Establish Islamic Caliphate	Strong Leadership
12	Establish Islamic Caliphate	Abide by Sharia	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption	Recruit Jihadis	Believe Tawhid	*
13	*	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption	Establish Islamic Caliphate	Pursue Divine Leadership	*	*
14	*	Islamic Instruction	Believe Tawhid	Organize	*	*
15	*	Start Islamic Revolution	Generate Religious Hatred	Establish True Ummah	*	*
16	*	Creates ideal civilization via Islam	Pursue the Quran	Obtain Weapons	*	*
17	*	*	Return to Golden Age	Islamic Instruction	*	*
18	*	*	*	Punishment	*	*
19	*	*	*	Pursue the Quran	*	*
20	*	*	*	Believe Tawhid	*	*
21	*	*	*	Boycott Western Goods	*	*

Table 25 Relationship between neo-Nazi prognostic/diagnostic frames
(Diagnostic Frames are shaded)

RANK:	Rockwell (1967) Frame/Value	Pierce (1978) Frame/Value	Klassen (1981) Frame/Value	Lane (1994) Frame/Value	Duke (2003) Frame/Value	Chittum (1997) Frame/Value
1	Jewish Influence 1.0000	Federal Government 1.0000	Jewish Influence 1.0000	Follow Racial Natural Law 1.0000	Jews 1.0000	Federal Government 1.0000
2	Communism 0.8851	Whites need to Organize 0.8598	Blacks 0.7156	Modern Morality 0.8333	Jewish Influence 0.8476	White Oppression 0.7684
3	Modern Morality 0.8277	White Terrorism 0.4512	Jews 0.6506	Federal Government 0.6667	Whites Humiliated 0.7238	Violence Against Whites 0.6316
4	Jews 0.7478	Blacks 0.3933	Traditional Religion 0.5762	White Extinction 0.6111	Zionism 0.5429	Modern Morality 0.5789
5	Blacks 0.6792	White Oppression 0.3720	White Based Religion 0.5390	Violation of Racial Natural Law 288 0.5833	Communism 0.3937	Racial Integration 0.5053
6	Liberalism 0.5218	Modern Morality 0.3049	Racial Pollution 0.3346	Traditional Religion 0.4444	Jews humiliate Muslims 0.3619	Decline of White Power 0.4421
7	White Passivity 0.3283	Violence Against Whites 0.2805	Violence Against Whites 0.3309	Usury 0.3889	White Oppression 0.3429	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 0.3789
8	Whites Humiliated 0.3159	Whites Humiliated 0.2409	Federal Government 0.2900	Racial Pollution 0.3889	Jewish Supremacists 0.3159	Non whites Advance Crime 0.3368
9	Injustices are Tolerated 0.2484	Jewish Influence 0.2378	White Extinction 0.2751	Materialism 0.3333	Holocaust 0.2984	Blacks 0.2316
10	White Leadership 0.2347	Carry out Racial War 0.2256	White Advancement 0.2416	White Discernment 0.2778	Media 0.2698	Racial Equality 0.2316
11	Violence Against Whites 0.2285	White Women Victimized 0.2073	Whites Humiliated 0.2416	Whites Reproduce only with Whites 0.2500	Non whites Advance Crime 0.2540	Carry out Racial War 0.2316
12	Non whites Advance Crime 0.2247	White Passivity 0.1921	Promote White Discernment 0.2342	Racial Equality 0.2222	Violence Against Whites 0.2413	Communism 0.2263
13	Federal Government 0.2097	Liberalism 0.1890	Follow Racial Natural Law 0.2082	Racial Integration 0.2222	Federal Government 0.2254	Establish White Territory 0.2105
14	Racial Equality 0.1598	Promote racial loyal ty 0.1890	White Oppression 0.2045	Taxation 0.2222	Muslims 0.2159	Taxation 0.1947
15	White Praxis 0.1149	Non whites Advance Crime 0.1463	Eliminate non Whites 0.2007	Carry out Racial War 0.2222	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 0.2000	Native Americans 0.1895
16	Follow Racial Natural Law 0.0949	Race Traitors 0.1463	Non whites Advance Crime 0.1859	White Propaganda 0.2222	Liberalism 0.0794	Whites Humiliated 0.1789
17	White Oppression 0.0849	Whites to arms 0.1159	Native Americans 0.1859	White Women Victimized 0.2222	White Leadership 0.0730	Jews 0.1263
18	White Women Victimized 0.0724	Racial Pollution 0.1128	Deport Non- Whites 0.1747	White Passivity 0.2222	Traditional Religion 0.0698	Liberalism 0.1158
19	Zionism 0.0712	Jews 0.1128	Whites need to Organize 0.1487	White Leadership 0.1667	Modern Morality 0.0603	Follow Constitution 0.1053
20	Empower Racial Nationalism 0.0699	Eliminate non Whites 0.1098	White Praxis 0.1487	White Oppression 0.1667	Blacks 0.0603	Whites need to Organize 0.0842

21	Materialism 0.0687	Recruit Whites 0.0854	Modern Medicine 0.1413	Blacks 0.1111	Usury 0.0603	Maintain Racial Segregation 0.0737
22	Carry out Racial War 0.0674	Communism 0.0854	White Leadership 0.1375	Non whites Advance Crime 0.1111	Taxation 0.0508	White Praxis 0.0737
23	Taxation 0.0599	Maintain Racial Segregation 0.0854	Follow Constitution 0.1338	Jews 0.1111	White Praxis 0.0460	White Unity 0.0737
24	Racial Pollution 0.0599	Racial Equality 0.0793	Communism 0.1152	Homosexuality 0.1111	U.S. support of Israel 0.0444	Whites to arms 0.0737
25	Whites seek Positions of Power 0.0574	Materialism 0.0671	Modern Education 0.1115	Jewish Influence 0.1111	Identify Jews as a Race 0.0444	Media 0.0632
26	Whites Revolution 0.0537	Injustices are Tolerated 0.0671	Modern Morality 0.1115	Race Traitors 0.1111	Promote Revisionism 0.0413	Eliminate non Whites 0.0421
27	Violation of Racial Natural Law 0.0499	White Propaganda 0.0488	Promote racial loyalty 0.1115	Empower Racial Nationalism 0.1111	Injustices are Tolerated 0.0413	Whites Unarmed 0.0421
28	Follow Constitution 0.0474	Whites Revolution 0.0427	Establish White Territory 0.1078	Establish White Territory 0.1111	White Extinction 0.0413	Promote racial loyalty 0.0316
29	Civil Rights 0.0449	Establish White Territory 0.0366	Racial Integration 0.1004	Asians 0.0556	Racial Integration 0.0381	Follow Racial Natural Law 0.0316
30	White Extinction 0.0400	Racial Integration 0.0335	Taxation 0.1004	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 0.0556	Racial Equality 0.0349	White Leadership 0.0316
31	Homosexuality 0.0350	White Extinction 0.0305	Whites Reproduce only with Whites 0.0967	Native Americans 0.0556	Modern Education 0.0254	Deport Non- Whites 0.0211
32	Native Americans 0.0300	Feminism 0.0305	White Propaganda 0.0929	Abortion 0.0556	Understand Replacement The ology 0.0222	White Terrorism 0.0211
33	White Propaganda 0.0300	Whites create Productive Economies 0.0274	Carry out Racial War 0.0911	Follow Constitution 0.0556	White Guilt 0.0222	Injustices are Tolerated 0.0211
34	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 0.0250	Whites Unarmed 0.0244	Racial Equality 0.0818	Promote racial loyal ty 0.0556	Whites need to Organize 0.0190	Modern Medicine 0.0105
35	Racial Integration 0.0250	White Leadership 0.0183	Race Traitors 0.0818	White Unity 0.0556	Feminism 0.0127	Civil Rights 0.0105
36	White Unity 0.0250	Taxation 0.0183	Decline of White Power 0.0781	Whites to arms 0.0556	Materialism 0.0127	Feminism 0.0105
37	Eliminate non Whites 0.0237	Muslims 0.0183	Violation of Racial Natural Law 0.0632	Violence Against Whites 0.0556	Native Americans 0.0127	Materialism 0.0105
38	Usury 0.0200	Traditional Religion 0.0183	Media 0.0595	*	Decline of White Power 0.0127	Muslims 0.0105
39	Establish White Territory 0.0175	Follow Racial Natural Law 0.0152	White Unity 0.0595	*	White Passivity 0.0127	White Propaganda 0.0105
40	Whites Reproduce only with Whites 0.0150	Follow Constitution 0.0122	White Passivity 0.0595	*	Abortion 0.0095	White Extinction 0.0105
41	Whites to arms 0.0125	White Unity 0.0122	Liberalism 0.0558	*	Racial Pollution 0.0095	White Guilt 0.0105
42	Traditional Religion 0.0100	Holocaust 0.0122	Empower Racial Nationalism 0.0483	*	Follow Racial Natural Law 0.0095	White Women Victimized 0.0105

43	Promote racial loyalty 0.0100	White Praxis 0.0061	White Guilt 0.0483	*	Civil Rights 0.0063	White Passivity 0.0105
44	Whites need to Organize 0.0075	Non whites create poverty 0.0061	Disease 0.0446	*	Homosexuality 0.0063	*
45	Muslims 0.0075	Civil Rights 0.0061	White Discernment 0.0409	*	Deport Non-Whites 0.0063	*
46	Whites Unarmed 0.0050	Empower Racial Nationalism 0.0061	White Terrorism 0.0409	*	Eliminate non Whites 0.0063	*
47	Enforce traditional morals 0.0050	Decline of White Power 0.0061	Muslims 0.0372	*	Follow Constitution 0.0063	*
48	Maintain Racial Segregation 0.0050	Native Americans 0.0061	Materialism 0.0335	*	Promote racial loyalty 0.0063	*
49	Whites create Productive Economies 0.0050	White Based Religion 0.0061	White Martyrdom 0.0335	*	White Propaganda 0.0063	*
50	Holocaust 0.0025	Violation of Racial Natural Law 0.0061	Generate racial hatred 0.0297	*	Whites Unarmed 0.0063	*
51	Abortion 0.0025	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 0.0061	Foreigners/Illegal Immigrants 0.0260	*	Maintain Racial Segregation 0.0032	*
52	Asians 0.0025	Homosexuality 0.0061	Maintain Racial Segregation 0.0260	*	White Advancement 0.0032	*
53	*	*	Whites create Productive Economies 0.0260	*	Promote White Discernment 0.0032	*
54	*	*	Injustices are Tolerated 0.0260	*	Whites Revolution 0.0032	*
55	*	*	White Women Victimized 0.0260	*	White Unity 0.0032	*
56	*	*	Zionism 0.0186	*	*	*
57	*	*	Whites seek positions of power 0.0186	*	*	*
58	*	*	Whites to arms 0.0186	*	*	*
59	*	*	Asians 0.0149	*	*	*
60	*	*	Holocaust 0.0149	*	*	*
61	*	*	Whites Revolution 0.0112	*	*	*
62	*	*	Usury 0.0074	*	*	*
63	*	*	Recruit Whites 0.0074	*	*	*
64	*	*	Homosexuality 0.0037	*	*	*
65	*	*	Use non whites for labor 0.0037	*	*	*
66	*	*	Jews humiliate Muslims 0.0037	*	*	*

Table 26 Relationship between violent Jihadi prognostic/diagnostic frames
(Diagnostic Frames are shaded)

RANK	Qutb (1966) Frame/Value	Azzam (1984) Frame/Value	Bin Laden (1996) Frame/Value	Zawahiri (2001) Frame/Value	Maqdisi (2009) Frame/Value	Al Bari (1850) Frame/Value
1	Jahiliyyah 1.0000	Engage in Violent Jihad 1.0000	Pursue Divine Leadership 1.0000	Engage in Violent Jihad 1.0000	Pursue Divine Leadership 1.0000	Pursue Divine Leadership 1.0000
2	Promote the Quran 0.8598	Pursue Divine Leadership 0.9224	Engage in Violent Jihad 0.5814	United States 0.5194	Kafir 0.5977	Follow Muhammad's Example 0.6418
3	Follow Muhammad's Example 0.7317	Follow Muhammad's Example 0.4082	Follow Muhammad's Example 0.3023	Islamic Governments 0.3881	Follow Muhammad's Example 0.3908	Kafir 0.4925
4	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption 0.6707	Muslim Passivity 0.2939	Islamic Governments 0.2791	Muslim Praxis 0.3134	Secular Innovations 0.3563	Islam is Polluted 0.3582
5	Abide by Sharia 0.6463	Muslim Praxis 0.2367	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 0.2442	Israel Exists 0.3104	Jahiliyyah 0.2759	Engage in Violent Jihad 0.1940
6	Engage in Violent Jihad 0.4817	Establish Jihadi Territory 0.2122	Muslim Praxis 0.2209	Jews 0.2746	Muslim Praxis 0.2529	Christianity 0.1269
7	Jews 0.2927	Muslim women Victimization 0.1878	Kafir 0.1860	Muslim violence against true Muslims 0.2746	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption 0.1264	Jews 0.1045
8	Paganism 0.2683	Kafir 0.1306	Muslim Oppression 0.1860	Establish Jihadi Territory 0.2567	Engage in Violent Jihad 0.1264	Start Islamic Revolution / Movement 0.0970
9	Secular Innovations 0.2622	Promote the Quran 0.1306	Modern Morality 0.1744	Abide by Sharia 0.2030	Islam is Polluted 0.1149	Abide by Sharia 0.0896
10	Pursue Divine Leadership 0.2439	Strong Leadership 0.1143	United States 0.1628	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 0.1910	Modern Morality 0.0920	Islamic Governments 0.0597
11	Islamic Governments 0.2195	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 0.1061	Non Muslim soldiers permitted on Muslim lands 0.1628	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 0.1672	Democracy 0.0805	Apostasy 0.0597
12	Satan 0.2134	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 0.1061	Muslim women Victimization 0.1395	Muslims humiliate true Muslims 0.1552	Islamic Instruction 0.0805	Polytheism 0.0597
13	Kafir 0.1951	Islam is Polluted 0.0980	Engage in Martyrdom 0.1047	Muslims oppress true Muslims 0.1493	Start Islamic Revolution / Movement 0.0690	Muslim Oppression 0.0597
14	Start Islamic Revolution / Movement 0.1768	Establish True Ummah 0.0980	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 0.0930	Communism 0.1373	Islamic Governments 0.0575	Jahiliyyah 0.0448
15	Muslim Oppression 0.1463	Return to Golden Age 0.0980	Zionism 0.0814	Follow Muhammad's Example 0.1194	Generate Religious Hatred 0.0575	Satan 0.0448
16	Return to Golden	Recruit Jihadis	Abide by Sharia	Non-Muslims	Jews 0.0460	Engage

	Age 0.1220	0.0816	0.0814	humiliate Muslims 0.1134		in martyrdom 0.0448
17	Strong Leadership 0.1159	Muslim Oppression 0.0816	Islam is Polluted 0.0698	Secular Innovations 0.0955	Promote the Quran 0.0460	Promote the Quran 0.0448
18	Science 0.1098	Engage in Martyrdom 0.0735	Usury 0.0698	Engage in Martyrdom 0.0896	Satan 0.0345	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 0.0448
19	Islam is Polluted 0.1098	Satan 0.0735	Establish Jihadi Territory 0.0698	Modern Ummah 0.0836	Engage in Martyrdom 0.0345	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption 0.0299
20	Muslim women Victimization 0.1037	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption 0.0735	Corrupt leaders 0.0581	Start Islamic Revolution / Movement 0.0836	Muslim Oppression 0.0345	Modern Morality 0.0149
21	Communism 0.0976	Islamic Instruction 0.0571	Boycott Western Goods 0.0581	Non Muslim soldiers permitted on Muslim lands 0.0836	Alcohol 0.0230	Alcohol 0.0149
22	Materialism 0.0854	Start Islamic Revolution / Movement 0.0490	Establish True Ummah 0.0581	Islam is Polluted 0.0716	Fornication 0.0230	Fornication 0.0149
23	Modern Morality 0.0732	Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims 0.0490	Strong Leadership 0.0581	Kafir 0.0597	Muslims oppress true Muslims 0.0230	Usury 0.0149
24	Fornication 0.0732	Jahiliyyah 0.0490	Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims 0.0581	Sharia Ignored 0.0537	Establish Islamic Caliphate 0.0230	Generate Religious Hatred 0.0149
25	Christianity 0.0610	Communism 0.0449	Modern Ummah 0.0465	Establish Islamic Caliphate 0.0537	Apostasy 0.0115	Islamic Instruction 0.0149
26	Alcohol 0.0610	Abide by Sharia 0.0408	Secular Innovations 0.0465	Strong Leadership 0.0537	Christianity 0.0115	Strong Leadership 0.0149
27	Liberalism 0.0488	Islamic Governments 0.0408	Sharia Ignored 0.0465	Tactical Instruction 0.0537	Polytheism 0.0115	Muslim women Victimization 0.0149
28	Socialism 0.0488	Secular Innovations 0.0327	Jews 0.0465	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption 0.0478	Crime 0.0115	Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims 0.0149
29	Crime 0.0488	Modern Ummah 0.0327	Start Islamic Revolution / Movement 0.0465	Muslim Oppression 0.0478	Tawhid 0.0115	*
30	Usury 0.0488	Modern Morality 0.0245	Muslim Passivity 0.0465	Recruit 0.0418	Muslim Passivity 0.0115	*
31	Tawhid 0.0488	Sharia Ignored 0.0245	Muslims humiliate true Muslims 0.0465	Muslim women Victimization 0.0358	*	*
32	Engage in Martyrdom 0.0427	Non Muslim soldiers permitted on Muslim lands 0.0163	Communism 0.0349	Pursue Divine Leadership 0.0299	*	*
33	United States 0.0427	Crime 0.0163	Materialism 0.0349	Crime 0.0239	*	*
34	Muslim Passivity 0.0366	Westernization 0.0082	Paganism 0.0349	Zionism 0.0239	*	*
35	Capitalism	Arab Nationalism	Polytheism 0.0349	Jihadis need to	*	*

	0.0244	0.0082		Organize 0.0239		
36	Polytheism 0.0244	Christianity 0.0082	Westernization 0.0349	Muslim Passivity 0.0239	*	*
37	Democracy 0.0183	Paganism 0.0082	Humanity needs Islamic Redemption 0.0349	Modern Morality 0.0179	*	*
38	Homosexuality 0.0122	Jews 0.0082	Israel Exists 0.0349	Satan 0.0179	*	*
39	Establish Islamic Caliphate 0.0122	Usury 0.0082	United nations 0.0233	Establish True Ummah 0.0179	*	*
40	*	Create ideal civilizati on via Islam 0.0082	Muslims oppress true Muslims 0.0233	Obtain weapons 0.0179	*	*
41	*	*	Establish Islamic Caliphate 0.0233	Apostasy 0.0119	*	*
42	*	*	Tawhid 0.0233	Christianity 0.0119	*	*
43	*	*	Human rights 0.0116	Materialism 0.0119	*	*
44	*	*	Jahiliyyah 0.0116	Socialism 0.0119	*	*
45	*	*	Blasphemy 0.0116	United Nations 0.0119	*	*
46	*	*	Crime 0.0116	Islamic Instruction 0.0119	*	*
47	*	*	Satan 0.0116	Punishment 0.0119	*	*
48	*	*	Generate Religious Hatred 0.0116	Promote the Quran 0.0119	*	*
49	*	*	Promote the Quran 0.0116	Tawhid 0.0119	*	*
50	*	*	Return to Golden Age 0.0116	Democracy 0.0060	*	*
51	*	*	*	Capitalism 0.0060	*	*
52	*	*	*	Science 0.0060	*	*
53	*	*	*	Boycott Western Goods 0.0060	*	*

Table 27: Linking Violent neo-Nazi Solutions to Diagnostic Frames

Rank	Rockwell (1967) Frame/Value	Pierce (1978) Frame/Value	Klassen (1981) Frame/Value	Lane (1994) Frame/Value	Duke (2003) Frame/Value	Chittum (1997) Frame/Value
1	Blacks 29%	Federal Government 30%	Blacks 17%	Federal Government 50%	Whites Humiliated 33%	Federal Government 25%
2	Violence Against Whites 17%	Race Traitors 10%	Jews 16%	Modern Morality 25%	White Extinction 33%	Violence Against Whites 25%
3	Communism 10%	Modern Morality 5%	Jewish Influence 15%	Race Traitors 25%	Holocaust 33%	White Oppression 15%
4	Jews 10%	Jewish Influence 5%	Native Americans 10%	*	*	Modern Morality 10%
5	Liberalism 7%	Racial Pollution 5%	Violence Against Whites 10%	*	*	Native Americans 9%
6	Jewish Influence 7%	White Oppression 5%	Traditional Religion 6%	*	*	Non whites Advance Crime 4%
7	Modern Morality 5%	Blacks 5%	Race Traitors 6%	*	*	Blacks 3%
8	Non whites Advance Crime 5%	Liberalism 5%	Racial Pollution 5%	*	*	Racial Integration 3%
9	Native Americans 5%	Communism 4%	Communism 2%	*	*	Whites Humiliated 3%
10	Federal Government 2%	Jews 4%	Whites Humiliated 2%	*	*	Feminism 1%
11	Racial Pollution 2%	Violence Against Whites 3%	Violation of Racial Natural Law 1%	*	*	Liberalism 1%
12	Injustices are Tolerated 2%	White Passivity 3%	Non whites Advance Crime 1%	*	*	White Passivity 1%
13	*	Whites Humiliated 3%	Liberalism 1%	*	*	*
14	*	Non whites Advance Crime 2%	Muslims 1%	*	*	*
15	*	Materialism 2%	Racial Equality 1%	*	*	*
16	*	Injustices are Tolerated 2%	Racial Integration 1%	*	*	*
17	*	Racial Integration 1%	Decline of White Power 1%	*	*	*
18	*	White Women Victimized 1%	White Extinction 1%	*	*	*
19	*	Violation of Racial Natural Law 1%	White Guilt 1%	*	*	*
20	*	Traditional Religion 1%	White Oppression 1%	*	*	*
21	*	Muslims 1%	*	*	*	*
22	*	Racial Equality 1%	*	*	*	*
23	*	Taxation 1%	*	*	*	*
24	*	White Extinction 1%	*	*	*	*

Table 28: Linking Jihadi Violent Solutions to Diagnostic Frames

RANK	Qutb (1966)	Azzam (1984)	Bin Laden (1996)	Zawahiri (2001)	Maqdisi (2009)	Al Bari (1850)
	Frame/Value	Frame/Value	Frame/Value	Frame/Value	Frame/Value	Frame/Value
1	Islam is Polluted 30%	Muslim Passivity 29%	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 17%	United States 14%	Kafir 50%	Kafir 29%
2	Jahiliyyah 19%	Muslim women Victimization 19%	Non Muslim soldi ers permitted on M uslim lands 13%	Islamic Governments 13%	Jahiliyyah 17%	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 18%
3	Kafir 15%	Kafir 14%	Kafir 10%	Jews 8%	Jews 17%	Islam is Polluted 18%
4	Modern Morality 7%	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 11%	Israel Exists 8%	Israel Exists 8%	Muslim Oppression 16%	Islamic Governments 12%
5	Jews 7%	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 8%	Muslim Oppression 8%	Non-Muslim Violence against Muslims 8%	*	Modern Morality 6%
6	Satan 7%	Islamic Governments 4%	Modern Morality 6%	Muslims oppress true Muslims 7%	*	Muslim women Victimization 6%
7	Muslim Oppression 4%	Secular Innovations 4%	United States 6%	Muslim violence against true Muslims 6%	*	Satan 6%
8	Islamic Governments 4%	Christianity 3%	Muslim women Victimization 6%	Communism 5%	*	Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims 5%
9	Liberalism 4%	Jahiliyyah 3%	Muslims Governed by Non- Muslims 6%	Secular Innovations 4%	*	*
10	Paganism 4%	Muslim Oppression 1	Islam is Polluted 4%	Kafir 4&	*	*
11	*	Arab Nationalism 1%	Zionism 4%	Islam is Polluted 4%	*	*
12	*	Paganism 1%	Non-Muslims humiliate Muslims 4%	Muslims humiliate true Muslims 4%	*	*
13	*	Non Muslim soldiers permitted on Muslim lands 1%	Islamic Governments 2%	Non Muslim sold iers permitted on Muslim lands 3%	*	*
14	*	*	Secular Innovations 2%	Muslims Governed by Non-Muslims 2%	*	*
15	*	*	Materialism 2%	Sharia Ignored 2%	*	*
16	*	*	Muslims oppress true Muslims 2%	Muslim women Victimization 2%	*	*
17	*	*	Corrupt leaders 2%	Muslim Oppression 2%	*	*
18	*	*	Muslim Passivity 2%	Muslim Passivity 1%	*	*
19	*	*	*	Modern Morality 1%	*	*
20	*	*	*	Modern Ummah 1%	*	*
21	*	*	*	Apostasy 1%	*	*
22	*	*	*	Capitalism 1%	*	*
23	*	*	*	Materialism 1%	*	*

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Socialism 1%

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