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RESIST

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a call to resist illegitimate authority

BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SOCIETY

Inspiration is the key ingredient needed for those desiring and working towards positive social change. It provides a burst of energy, a clear vision and the courage to struggle from day to day against the increasing criminal injustices carried out by the Reagan administration.

It is not easy to find a genuine source of inspiration; one that can break through and overcome the negativity, deception, apathy and alienation that permeate our society and constantly drain our much needed energies.

Who can provide such a source of inspiration during these dismal times? The people of El Salvador.

In the midst of a civil war, the foundation of a new society is being built in El Salvador by young and old, women and men. Against seemingly incredible odds, the popular forces, led by the FMLN, now control over 20% of the country and are rapidly gaining unprecedented momentum and support. Even *Newsweek* admits that "when they (the Guerrillas) capture a town, they treat the civilians well, paying for food and holding destruction to a minimum." In the liberated zones, local democratic governments are being elected and schools and health care systems are being organized. Many peasants are receiving immunization shots and learning how to read and write for the first time. Military training and the making of homemade bombs are as much a part of everyday life as cooking, farming and literacy classes.

The only dependable resource in the liberated zones is the creativity and collective commitment of the Salvadorans. It is with these two abundant resources that the people of El Salvador have resisted a right-wing campaign of state terror which has received over one billion of U.S. support since 1979. The Salvadoran peasants have proved to the world that the collective will of a people committed to a just cause can counter and move towards defeating the sophisticated, technical and expensive counter-insurgency campaign led by the world's deadliest force—the Pentagon. U.S. aid, if we allow it to continue, can postpone, but not prevent, the ultimate liberation of El Salvador.

The determined spirit of the Salvadoran people, who have been forced to fight for their lives, is something that we can learn and gain from.

THE LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR: An Interview with Noam Chomsky

PAUL SHANNON

American imperialism has suffered a stunning defeat in Indochina. But the same forces are engaged in another war against a much less resilient enemy, the American people. Here, the prospects for success are much greater. The battleground is ideological, not military. At stake are the lessons to be drawn from the American war in Indochina; the outcome will determine the course and character of new imperial ventures.

Noam Chomsky, 1975

Q: When the Indochina war ended in 1975 you wrote that our nation's "official" opinion makers would engage in distortion of the lessons to be drawn from the war so that the same basic foreign policy goals could be pursued after the war. You felt then that in order to keep the real meaning of the war from penetrating the general public they faced two major tasks: First, they would have to disguise the fact that the war "was basically an American attack on South Vietnam—a war of annihilation that spilled over to the rest of Indochina." And secondly, they would have to obscure the fact that the military effort in Vietnam "was restrained by a mass movement of protest and resistance here at home which engaged in effective direct action outside the bounds of propriety long before established spokesmen proclaimed themselves to be its leaders." Where do we stand now on these two issues—seven years later?

Chomsky: As far as the opinion makers are concerned, they have been doing exactly what it was obvious they would do. Every book that comes out, every article that comes out, talks about how—while it may have been a "mistake" or an "unwise effort"—the United States was defending South Vietnam from North Vietnamese aggression. And they portray those who opposed the war as apologists for North Vietnam. That's standard to say.

The purpose is obvious: to obscure the fact that the United States did attack South Vietnam and the major

war was fought against South Vietnam. The real invasion of South Vietnam which was directed largely against the rural society began *directly* in 1962 after many years of working through mercenaries and client groups. And that fact simply does not exist in official American history. There is no such event in American history as the attack on South Vietnam. That's gone. Of course, it is part of *real* history. But it's not a part of official history.

And most of us who were opposed to the war, especially in the early 60's—the war we were opposed to was the war on South Vietnam which destroyed South Vietnam's rural society. The South was devastated. But now anyone who opposed this atrocity is regarded as having defended North Vietnam. And that's part of the effort to present the war as if it were a war between South Vietnam and North Vietnam with the United States helping the South. Of course, it's fabrication. But it's official "truth" by now.

Q: This question of *who* the United States was fighting in Vietnam is pretty basic in terms of coming to any understanding of the war. But why would the U.S. attack South Vietnam, if the problem was not an attack from North Vietnam?

Chomsky: First of all, let's make absolutely certain that *was* the fact: that the U.S. directed the war against South Vietnam.

There was a political settlement in 1954. But in the late 50's the United States organized an internal repression in South Vietnam, not using its troops, but using the local apparatus it was constructing. This was a very significant and very effective campaign of violence and terrorism against the Vietminh—which was the communist-led nationalist force that fought the French. And the Vietminh at that time was adhering to the Geneva Accords, hoping that the political settlement would work out in South Vietnam. [The Geneva Accords of 1954 temporarily divided Northern and Southern Vietnam with the ultimate aim of reunification through elections.—*editor's note*]

And so, not only were they not conducting any terrorism, but in fact, they were not even responding to the violence against them. It reached the point where by 1959 the Vietminh leadership—the communist party leadership—was being decimated. Cadres were being murdered extensively. Finally, in May of 1959, there was an authorization to use violence in self-defense, after years of murder, with thousands of people killed in this campaign organized by the United States. As soon as they began to use violence in self-defense, the whole Saigon government apparatus fell apart at once because it was an apparatus based on nothing but a monopoly of violence. And once it lost that monopoly of violence it was finished. And that's what led the United States to move in. There were no North Vietnamese around.

Then the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam was formed. And its founding program called for the neutralization of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. And it's very striking that the National Liberation Front was the only group that ever called for the

independence of South Vietnam. The so-called South Vietnamese government (GVN) did not but, rather, claimed to be the government of all Vietnam. The National Liberation Front was the only South Vietnamese group that ever talked about South Vietnamese independence. They called for the neutralization of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia as a kind of neutral block, working toward some type of integration of the south with North Vietnam ultimately.

Now that proposal in 1962 caused panic in American ruling circles. From 1962 to 1964 the U.S. was dedicated to try to prevent the independence of South Vietnam. The reason was of course that Kennedy and Johnson knew that if any political solution was permitted in the south, the National Liberation Front would effectively come to power, so strong was its political support in comparison with the political support of the so-called South Vietnamese government.

And in fact Kennedy and later Johnson tried to block every attempt at neutralization, every attempt at political settlement. This is all documented. There's just no doubt about it. I mean, it's wiped out of history, but the documentation is just unquestionable—in the internal government sources and everywhere else.

And so there's just no question that the United States was trying desperately to prevent the independence of South Vietnam and to prevent a political settlement *inside* South Vietnam. And in fact it went to war precisely to prevent that. It finally bombed the North in 1965 with the purpose of trying to get the North to use its influence to call off the insurgency in the South. There were no North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam then as far as anybody knew. And they anticipated of course when they began bombing the North from South Vietnamese bases that it would bring North Vietnamese troops into the South. And then it became possible to pretend it was aggression from the North. It was ludicrous, but that's what they claimed.

Well, why did they do it? Why was the United States so afraid of an independent South Vietnam? Well, I think the reason again is pretty clear from the internal government documents. Precisely what they were afraid of was that the "takeover" of South Vietnam by nationalist forces would not be brutal. They feared it would be conciliatory and that there would be successful social and economic development—and that the whole region might work!

This was clearly a nationalist movement—and in fact a radical nationalist movement which would separate Vietnam from the American orbit. It would allow Vietnam to become another Philippines. It would trade with the United States, but it would not be an American semi-colony.

And suppose it worked! Suppose the country could separate itself from the American dominated global system and carry out a successful social and economic development. Then that is very dangerous because then it could be a model to other movements and groups in neighboring countries. And gradually there could be an erosion from within by indigenous forces of American

domination of the region. So this was no small thing. It was assumed that the key to the problem was preventing any successful national movement from carrying out serious social and economic development inside Indochina. So the United States had to destroy it through a process which would become the war against South Vietnam. And, it should be pointed out that on a lower level we were doing the same things in Laos and Cambodia.

Q: So the irony is that the very reason given in the United States for fighting the war—the independence of South Vietnam—is exactly what had to be destroyed.

Chomsky: Exactly.

Q: Do you think this distortion of the war is successful?

Chomsky: *It's hard to say. People who lived through the period know better. But younger people who are being indoctrinated into the contemporary system of falsification—they really have to do some research to find out what is the truth. In the general population, people forget or don't care that much. And gradually what you hear drilled into your head everyday comes to be believed. People don't understand what you're talking about anymore if you discuss the American war on South Vietnam.*

Q: And the role of the anti-war movement?

Chomsky: The main effort has been to show that the opposition to the war was of two types. One was the serious responsible type that involved Eugene McCarthy and some senators—who turned the tide because we realized it wasn't worthwhile, or was too expensive or something. And then there were these sort of violent and irrational groups, teenagers and so on, whose behavior had little to do with the war really, and whose activity was a form of lunacy. Now, anyone who lived through the period would have to laugh.

But my impression is that the effort to portray the peace movement this way is not working very well. For example, at the beginning of his administration, Reagan tried to set the basis for American military intervention in El Salvador—which is about what Kennedy did when he came into office in regard to Vietnam. Well, when Kennedy tried it in Vietnam, it just worked like a dream. Virtually nobody opposed American bombing of South Vietnam in 1962. It was not an issue. But when Reagan began to talk of involving American forces in El Salvador there was a huge popular uproar. And he had to choose a much more indirect way of supporting the collection of gangsters in power there. He had to back off.

And what that must indicate is a tremendous shift in public opinion over the past 20 years as a result of the participation in the *real* opposition to the war in Indochina—which has lasted and was resurrected when a similar circumstance began to arise.

Q: So you see the inability of the government to maneuver as it would like in El Salvador as directly related to



the anti-war movement.

Chomsky: Oh yes. They even have a name for it: "Vietnam Syndrome." See, they make it sound like some kind of disease, a malady that has to be overcome. And the "malady" in this case is that the population is still unwilling to tolerate aggression and violence. And that's a change that took place as a result of the popular struggle against the war in Vietnam.

Q: So you feel it was the group officially defined as the "riff-raff, lunatic fringe" who really was the peace movement?

Chomsky: Oh, there's no question. You can see what happened. There were very extensive grass roots efforts beginning in the mid 60's, developing quite gradually against tremendous opposition. So that in Boston it was impossible to have an outdoor public meeting against the war until about the fall of 1966. Until then they would be broken up. And the media more or less applauded the violence and disruption that prevented people from speaking. But gradually that changed. In fact, it reached such a point that by 1967 it was impossible for the President to declare a national mobilization for war. He was restricted and forced to pretend he was conducting a small war. There were constraints. Because of public opinion which by then was considerably aroused by demonstrations and teach-ins and other types of resistance, Johnson had to fight the war with deficit spending. He had to fight a "guns and butter" war to show it was no big war.

And this policy just collapsed. And it collapsed totally with the Tet Offensive in 1968 [the National Liberation Front's surprise temporary takeover of virtually all of South Vietnam's cities overnight.—Ed.] which led

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TURKEY AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

FRANK BRODHEAD

In November, 1982, 26 leaders of the Turkish Peace Association were brought into a military court in Ankara, Turkey. They were clad in blue prison uniforms, and their heads were newly shaved. Among their number were the president of the Turkish Bar Association, the head of the Turkish Medical Union, a former ambassador, and former members of the Turkish parliament.

The accused were arrested in late February, 1982, and charged with "forming a secret organization, propagating communism and separatism, and praising activities that the law classifies as felonies." As if that were not enough, they were accused of "opposing the bilateral military defense agreements... , military bases, and NATO," and "allowing slogans such as 'World without exploitation and war' and 'The working people will save world peace' to be shouted at Turkish Peace Association meetings."

If convicted, the leaders of the Turkish Peace Association could be given sentences of up to 30 years in jail.

The Turkish Peace Association (TPA) is the first broad-based peace organization in Turkish history. It was initiated by the Istanbul Bar Association in 1977. Forty-four organizations participated in its founding, including DISK (a leftwing trade union federation), many professional associations, and the nation's largest youth and women's movements. At its founding conference the TPA declared that its aims were to inform pub-

lic opinion and to initiate debate on three basic principles: nuclear disarmament, support for the Helsinki Agreements, and peaceful settlement of all international disputes, particularly those between Turkey and Greece.

The initial focus of the Turkish Peace Association was on the neutron bomb. Later it protested NATO plans to put Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe. In 1979, prior to the massive growth of the disarmament movement in Europe, the TPA organized a march attended by 100,000 people. The Association has also organized conferences and exhibitions; and at the annual Izmir International Fair, their stand was reportedly visited by over one million people.

The cause of the Turkish Peace Association is widely known in Europe, and actively taken up by European peace movements. Largely because of this pressure, nineteen defendants were released in late December. Yet the Turkish Peace Association remains virtually unknown here in the United States. This is unfortunate not only because the TPA needs and deserves our support, but also because of the growing role of Turkey in the Reagan administration's military plans for the Mediterranean. Let us look at this broader context.

State Terrorism

The repression suffered by the Turkish Peace Association is shared by broad sections of the Turkish people. Since the military coup of September 12, 1980, overthrew the constitutional regime established 20 years earlier, Turkey has endured a reign of state-directed repression.

While the total number of political prisoners in Turkey cannot be determined precisely, Amnesty International's *Report for 1981* said that more than 122,000 people had been arrested in the first eight months of martial law alone. According to Turkish authorities,

THE MEANING OF "TERRORISM": One Town's Story

According to the State Department's recently released *Report on Human Rights Practices for 1982*, Turkey's generals took power in September, 1980, "after a long period of mounting terrorist violence from both extreme right and left. . ." Since that time, the State Department maintains, "there has been a significant reduction in human rights violations due to terrorist activity."

The fate of the Turkish town of Fatsa helps give meaning to what the State Department means, and doesn't mean, by "terrorism," and what happens to people when it is "significantly reduced."

Fatsa is a Black Sea coastal town with a population of 25,000. Most of the people earn their livelihood through fishing and agriculture. The major crop is hazelnuts.

Always progressive politically, in September, 1979, the people of Fatsa elected an independent leftwing candidate as mayor. Fikri Sonmez, a tailor, received more

than 3,000 votes, while his opponents from the two major parties received a combined total of less than 2,000. Sonmez had been supported by, among others, the revolutionary organization Dev-Yol, or "revolutionary road."

After the election a series of neighborhood committees were chosen, beginning a campaign for grassroots democracy. Their first collective effort was to fix the roads, and in a week they removed the mud and paved them. The committees also lowered the price of bread, arranged for the distribution of water, and launched an effective campaign against drunkenness.

The local government of Fatsa became a national issue. Conservative newspapers labelled it a "red base," and denounced Fatsa's "red terror." Turkey's conservative government imposed an embargo on Fatsa: food and supplies began to be cut off, and the town's hazelnuts could no longer be sold. In response, the people of Fatsa organized a hazelnut festival. The event in the spring of 1980 brought people to Fatsa from throughout Turkey and even other countries, and took on the character of a demonstration in solidarity with Fatsa's new self-government.

A few months later the central government, acting on

29,000 people were still being held for political offenses on the second anniversary of martial law. Amnesty International has also documented many cases of torture, and an estimated 1,000 people have been simply gunned down in the street by government death squads. Kurdish areas in eastern Turkey have suffered particular hardship. Capital punishment, effectively abolished for nearly a decade, has returned; and the Generals' regime has executed more than 20 people. By mid-December, 1982, an additional 111 people had been condemned to death, while 3,000 more still on trial also faced death.

Turkey's military regime has effectively crushed most of the nation's political life. Leaders of the four major political parties are imprisoned or are on trial, and the parties themselves have been dissolved. The trade union DISK has also been dissolved, and the prosecution has asked for the death sentence for 52 of the union's leaders, now on trial. Members of the several organizations on the revolutionary left have been among the chief targets of repression. Newspapers are regularly censored, and some have been banned altogether. The universities have been "reorganized" by the military. Rigged elections in November, 1982, only perpetuated the repressive changes made by military rule.

The United States and Turkey

The repressiveness of Turkey's martial law regime has drawn widespread criticism in Europe, and several countries have cut off or threatened to cut off aid to Turkey. During his trip to Turkey in December, 1981, however, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said that the United States would continue sending aid to Turkey—now rising to \$930 million a year—no matter what Europe did.

The reason for U.S. support for Turkey's military rulers is not hard to determine. It lies in Turkey's key

strategic location, whose value has been enhanced even more by the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the election victory of the socialist PASOK party in Greece. The "loss" of Iran was particularly damaging to U.S. strategic interests in the region; and the United States is working to have Turkey play Iran's former role as the base for listening posts directed toward the Soviet Union, and as a U.S. surrogate force in the Near East.

A Congressional Research Study in April, 1979, concluded that the United States had some 60 active military facilities in Turkey, nearly one-third of its total in the Mediterranean. Six of these facilities are major bases, with nearly 5,000 U.S. servicemen. The most important base is the Incirlik air base in southeast Turkey. Incirlik is now the closest U.S. base to Teheran and the Persian Gulf. Other major U.S. bases include facilities for electronic intelligence gathering, long-range radar and communications, seismic detections for monitoring Soviet underground explosions, and fuel, ammunition, and weapons storage sites. There are also NATO bases, missiles, planes and other weapons in Turkey.

Turkey's army, with more than 500,000 men, is the second largest in NATO after that of the United States. While much of its equipment is out of date, the United States has made Turkey the third largest recipient of its military aid (after Israel and Egypt), in an effort to modernize Turkey's armed forces. In March, 1980, a "Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement" was signed between the United States and Turkey. While many of its provisions are secret, the public part of the agreement commits the United States to provide high levels of economic and military assistance, and to help Turkey establish its own arms industries. A joint U.S.-Turkey military commission was established to

false reports that Dev-Yol had kidnapped two military officers, surrounded the town with soldiers. In spite of an urgent joint message from the leaders of Fatsa's mainstream political parties that "there was not any disturbance in Fatsa and no need for the operation," the troops attacked the town. They were accompanied by members of the neo-fascist Idealist Youth Organization, who pointed out leftists to be arrested by the security forces. After the fighting the governor of the province reiterated that no security officers had been kidnapped.

More than one thousand people, including the mayor, were arrested in Fatsa. Seven hundred forty are now on trial, and the death penalty has been asked for 273 defendants, who are charged with "attempting to overthrow the state with a view to establishing a Marxist-Leninist regime." Fikri Sonmez is charged with masterminding the hazelnut festival. Others are charged with "setting up cultural enters" and "organizing a campaign against mud."

In June, 1983, the Turkish government arrested Professor Mumtaz Soysal. Professor Soysal, who was formerly a member of Amnesty International's Information Executive Committee, had written an article for the Turkish paper *Hurriyet* in July, 1980, detailing the cir-

cumstances which led up to the military assault on Fatsa. The government has charged him with violating article 142 of the constitution, which prohibits "making propaganda for the domination of a social class over other social classes," and has asked for the death penalty.

How has the U.S. media reported this "repression of terrorism" in our Turkish ally? The only notice it has taken is an Associated Press dispatch on January 12, 1983, which said that "a mass trial of 740 suspected Marxists opened today" on charges "stemming from an aborted leftist takeover of the Black Sea town of Fatsa," and "trying to establish Communist rule." It noted without comment that "all forms of Communism are banned under the new martial-law Constitution."

—Frank Brodhead

implement the agreement, which assures continued U.S. access to the military bases. In addition, along with other NATO nations the United States is contributing to a \$1 billion a year economic aid fund in an attempt to stabilize the Turkish economy.

One major unanswered question is Turkey's possible role in the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, which was elevated to the status of Southwest Asia Military Command on January 1, 1983. The Persian Gulf has traditionally been outside the operations area of NATO. Turkey has occasionally indicated that it would support U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf; but at other times it has seemingly resisted U.S. pressures, citing both the limitations of the NATO treaty and its desire to have closer relations with the oil-producing states in the Gulf. While this ambiguity continues, there have been several important developments linking Turkey with potential U.S. aggression in the Middle East. These include:

**The "Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement" of March, 1980, apparently includes loopholes that would allow the United States to use Turkey's bases for operations in the Persian Gulf;

**A meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in May, 1981, made a formal decision to allow for NATO intervention in areas where NATO's interests are threatened, even if these areas lie outside of the boundaries of its member countries. This decision was reinforced by a NATO communique in early December, 1982, authorizing action outside of Europe and the North Atlantic area "to deter threats to the vital interests of the West;"

**In October, 1982, the United States and Turkey signed an agreement to modernize 10 Turkish airfields. In the following month it was announced that the United States would build two new airbases in eastern Turkey. According to the *Washington Post*, the purpose of the new bases was "to put NATO fighter-bombers within easy striking distance of Soviet forces nearest to the Persian Gulf." Moreover, the runways on the new bases will be built long and wide enough to accommodate aircraft needed by the Rapid Deployment Force, such as tankers, long-range bombers, and huge cargo aircraft like the Air Force C5.

Another unknown is whether Turkey will provide bases for U.S. Cruise missiles. According to the *European Nuclear Disarmament Bulletin* for July-August, 1982, "secret negotiations are being conducted on the siting of Pershing II and Cruise missiles" in Turkey, but this cannot be confirmed.

Turkey and the Peace Movement

The Reagan administration has loudly defended the right of peace movements to exist—in the Soviet bloc. At the most recent session of the United Nations, for example, the United States sponsored a resolution urging nations "to encourage their citizens to express their own views on disarmament questions and to organize and meet publicly for that purpose."

The purely propaganda nature of the United States' position is made clear by its refusal to act in support of the Turkish Peace Association, and its continued aid to

Turkey's military dictatorship. It is clearly hypocritical to defend the rights of peace movements in areas where the United States has little influence, while failing to speak out in defense of a peace movement in an allied nation, heavily dependent on U.S. aid.

The U.S. peace movement should show some solidarity with the Turkish Peace Association. We would certainly be organizing demonstrations if the leadership of the British, Dutch, or West German peace movements were on trial and their organizations abolished. Not to speak up for the TPA would be to betray a northern European chauvinism that has no place in a worldwide struggle for peace.

We also need to become more informed, and inform others, about the situation in Turkey. Are there negotiations to put Cruise missiles in Turkey? We should make the U.S. role in Turkey a part of our campaigns against the Cruise and Pershing. Is Turkey to be a jumping off point for the Rapid Deployment Force? We should demand that the secret provisions of the March, 1980, executive agreement on military base access in Turkey be made public, and the provisions debated in Congress. It is also doubtful that the American people would support the continuation of such vast sums of military aid to Turkey if they knew about the brutalities of the martial law regime there. Precisely because Turkey and the United States are so closely linked through NATO, the peace movement should actively hold the U.S. government accountable for supporting and financing the dictatorship.

Frank Brodhead, a former staffperson at RESIST, now lives in Philadelphia.

For more information:

1. The Committee for Human Rights and Democracy in Turkey, GPO Box 2922, Brooklyn, NY 11202. The CHRDT publishes *News from Turkey*, a very useful source. \$10 a year.
2. Campaign for the Defense of the Turkish Peace Association, 12, Bolton Walk, Andover Estate, London N.7, Great Britain.



major sectors of American power—corporate power and other centers of power—to realize we could not carry it off at this level. Either we go to war like in the Second World War, or we pull out. And that was a direct effect of the activities of the peace movement. After this decision was made, then politicians like Eugene McCarthy—whom you had never heard of before that time—came to announce themselves as the leaders of the peace movement.

But by then the basic decision to put a limit to direct American troop involvement had been made. You had to fight for a long time to get the U.S. out, but the basic decision had been made at the Tet Offensive. That's when the programs related to Vietnamization were put in place, and we began to fight a more capital intensive war with less direct participation of American ground troops.

Incidentally, another reason for this was that the American army began to deteriorate internally because, after all, the United States was fighting a very unusual type of war. It's very rare for a country to try to fight a colonial war with a conscript army. Usually wars like the Vietnam War are fought with mercenaries—like the French Foreign Legion. The U.S. tried to fight what amounts to a colonial war with a conscript army. And a colonial war is a very dirty kind of war. You're not fighting armed forces. You're fighting mostly unarmed people. And to fight that kind of war requires professional killers, which means mercenaries. The 50,000 Korean mercenaries we had in Vietnam were professional killers and just massacred people outright. And the American army did plenty of that, too, but it couldn't take it after awhile. It's not the kind of job you can give to conscripts who are not trained to be murderers.

Q: And they had also heard of the anti-war movement's ideas against the war back home.

Chomsky: Exactly. It was a citizen's army, not separated from what's happening in American society in general. And the effect was that, very much to its credit, the American army began to crumble and deteriorate. And it became harder and harder to keep an army in the field.

Q: Are you aware of any other time in history when soldiers came home from the war and organized against their government as many Vietnam veterans did through the Vietnam Veterans Against the War organization?

Chomsky: It's rare. For example, it's happening now to a certain extent in Israel with reservists who are also fighting a war against a civilian population in Lebanon. And it's the same kind of phenomenon. If they just kept professional military men involved they could probably carry it off. But reservists are connected with the civilian population. That's why countries like France and England used mercenary forces to carry out these kinds of wars.

Let me make one final point about the peace movement which is often forgotten. When you look back at the internal documents that we have now you can see that when the big decision was made around the Tet

Offensive in 1968—about whether or not to send a couple hundred thousand more troops—one of the factors was that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned that they would not have enough troops for internal control of the domestic American population. They feared tremendous protest and disruption at home if they sent more troops to Vietnam. This means that they understood the level of internal resistance to be virtually at the level of civil war. And I think they were probably right about that. That's a good indication from inside as to how seriously they took the peace movement.

There are indications that the huge demonstrations of October and November of 1969 severely limited Nixon's ability to carry out some of the plans for escalating the war that he had. The domestic population was not under control. And any country has to have a passive population if it is going to carry out effectively an aggressive foreign policy. And it was clear by October and November of 1969 just by the scale of opposition that the population was not passive.

So those are all important events to remember. Again, they're sort of written out of history. But the record is there and the documentation is there, and it's clear that that's what happened.

Q: What is the current U.S. foreign policy toward Indochina?

Chomsky: Well, towards Indochina I think the main policy is what's called "bleeding Vietnam." Even conservative business groups outside the United States are appalled at what the United States has been doing.

We fought the war to prevent Indochina from carrying out successful social and economic development. Well, I think the chances of that happening are very slight because of the devastation, because of the brutality of war. But the U.S. wants to make sure it will continue. And therefore we first of all of course refused any reparations. We refused aid. We try to block aid from other countries. We block aid from international institutions. I mean, sometimes it reaches a point of almost a fanatic effort to make them suffer.

For example, there was one point when the United States prevented the government of India from sending a hundred buffalo to Vietnam. (The buffalo stock in Vietnam had been decimated by American bombing.) We prevented them by threatening to cut off Food for Peace aid.

So in every conceivable way the United States has tried to increase the harsh conditions of life in Indochina. And right now one of the main ways we're doing that is by supporting the Khmer Rouge on the Thai-Cambodia border.

This article is reprinted from "The Legacy of the Vietnam War," a special 16-page edition of the *Indochina Newsletter*, a publication of Indochina Aid and Friendship Project, recipient of a RESIST grant. The special issue is available for \$1.00 from the Project by writing P.O. Box 129, Dorchester, MA 02122. Noam Chomsky is a member of the RESIST board and a professor of linguistics at MIT.

GRANTS

WOMEN'S PEACE MOVEMENT (c/o Donna Cooper, 1213 Race St., Philadelphia, PA 19107).

Seneca Falls, NY, was for many years a focus for women fighting for abolition and suffrage; it was a stop on the underground railroad and the site of the first Women's Rights Convention. In 1590, women of the Iroquois nation met in Seneca to demand an end to war among the tribes. This summer, continuing in that tradition, a Women's Peace Encampment will take place. Women from the US and abroad will be gathering in nearby Romulus for a Women's Peace Encampment at the Seneca Army Depot. Why the Seneca Army Depot? In the fall of 1983, NATO first-strike missiles—the Cruise and Pershing II—will be deployed in Europe. The Seneca Army Depot is one of several facilities used to store nuclear weapons for the Department of Defense. It is the storage site for the neutron bomb, the Pershing II missile and other tools of war. It is also the main point on the East Coast from where nuclear weapons are shipped to Europe. The encampment will start July 4th weekend, 1983, and go on for eight weeks throughout the summer; each week will explore themes such as Herstory, Economics, Violence, Spirituality and Resistance. RESIST's grant paid for a leaflet which will be used for Boston organizing for the encampment. For up-to-date information, contact Donna Cooper in Philadelphia at 215/563-7110 or at the above address.

CHICAGO RELIGIOUS TASK FORCE ON CENTRAL AMERICA (CRTFCA, 407 S. Dearborn St., Rm. 370, Chicago, IL 60605).

The Chicago Religious Task Force on Central America (CRTFCA) is organizing sanctuary projects nationwide for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Goals of the projects are to: 1) raise consciousness about Central America; 2) mobilize opposition to US aid for the repressive regimes in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and US destabilization of Nicaragua; 3) generate aid for Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Central American refugees are denied asylum in the US because the INS categorizes them as economic, not political, refugees, even though most, if not all, of them would be killed if deported to their countries. This denial of asylum for people escaping political prosecution in Guatemala and El Salvador is, of course, directly connected to US support for the repressive regimes in these countries. It seems, on the surface, that the purpose of a sanctuary project is to resettle families, but an organizer from the CRTFCA told RESIST that they make a distinction between resettlement and sanctuary. A central purpose of this project is to make the situation of these refugees a public issue. "Aiding one family doesn't do much, but speaking about it publicly helps a lot of families indirectly." Once a family has been given sanctuary, members of the family speak in the community about the political situation in their country. Addi-

tionally, to become a sanctuary, a religious congregation must make a unified decision that they want to take the project on. This process itself raises issues and consciousnesses. CRTFCA has written two booklets: one explains the history and purpose of sanctuary; the other is an organizing manual for congregations. RESIST's grant will cover costs of translating these booklets into Spanish.

GAY COMMUNITY NEWS PRISONERS PROJECT (167 Tremont St., 5th Floor, Boston, MA 02111).

In 1975, a *GCN* staff member took an interest in lesbian and gay prisoners, began to send them free subscriptions, and ran their pen-pal ads in the newspaper when there was room. As a result of this initial effort, *GCN* was deluged by correspondence from prisoners, which has never stopped. Since then the project has expanded to include soliciting alternative presses for their damaged books, which are sent to prisoners on request; running a half-page of prisoner pen-pal ads every other week; and writing at least quarterly to each prisoner they are in contact with. In 1981, *GCN* began running a regular column of prisoners' articles. There is also a legal end to the project which began in 1980 when *GCN* and the National Gay Task Force sued the federal prisons in order to allow prisoners to receive gay periodicals. *GCN* is currently serving as the advisor on lesbian and gay rights to the National Committee to Safeguard Prisoners' Rights (a network of legal advisors, most of them in prisons, organized by prisoners). Before the fire which destroyed *GCN*'s office in July, 1982, they had acquired a small but helpful law library and, with their network of jailhouse lawyers, were successful in getting legal assistance for prisoners. RESIST's grant will help *GCN* purchase legal material so they can reestablish their law library.

"DON'T LET THE DRAFT BLOW YOU AWAY" is the title of a new documentary videotape just released by the Selective Service Law Panel of Los Angeles. Designed to provide an alternative to the official government position on draft registration and the possible resumption of the draft, the one-hour documentary also provides concrete information about the options available to potential draftees and urges them to obtain draft counseling.

The tape is available for purchase at cost to any organization or individual engaged in anti-draft activities. To order a copy of the tape or to obtain more information, write to: Selective Service Law Panel VIDEO, 1911 Wilshire Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90057, or call Becca Wilson at 213/250-5188.