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THE STORY OF THE FRONTIER PROVINCE

J. M. E.

AFGHAN
COLL.
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363
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1922

THE
NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

Scale 1 Inch = 16 Miles or $\frac{1}{1,013,760}$

Miles 25 20 15 10 5 0 25 50 75 Miles

REFERENCES

External boundary of India, demarcated
Internal Province or State boundary, demarcated
" " " " undemarcated
District and Tribal Boundaries
Railways
Roads, Main
Roads, Minor
Passes
Trigonometrical Stations with heights △ 6970
Intersected Points 8909



Helio., S. I. O., Calcutta.

No. 592, S. I.—July 03.—250.
No. 722, S. I.—Dec. 03.—250.
Reg. No. 1803 E., 09.—L.—400 + 400
Reg. No. 3062 E., 10.- 300.
Reg. No. 3597 E., 11.—500.
Reg. No. 3597 D., 11.- 700.

Published under the direction of Colonel St. G. C. Gore, C.S.I., R.E., *Surveyor General of India,*
June 1903.

Corrections up to 1910.

NOTE.—The Longitudes are referrible to the Greenwich Meridian, taking that of Madras Observatory as 80°-17′-21″ East. They require a correction of —2′-27″ to make them accord with the most recent value of the Geodetic Longitude of that Observatory, *viz.*, 80°-14′-54″.

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



THE

STORY OF THE

FRONTIER PROVINCE

BY

J. M. E.

Peshawar

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS.

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





Attock

INTRODUCTION

THE traveller who crosses the Indus leaves India behind and enters the outworks of Central Asia, a region of mountain and valley populated by a virile race of highland warriors. Even the new-comer can appreciate this fact as he looks at the types of humanity around him and sees the Indus as the outer ditch and the hills as the wall and projecting buttresses of a mighty fortress.

The fortress has numerous gates, screened from view at a distance, through which has poured every invasion of India from the beginning of history. Ranjit Singh, one hundred years ago when he had established his rule over the Punjab, saw this picture and hastened to close the gates and push back through them the outposts of the enemy that threatened him. The power of the British Empire succeeded Ranjit Singh and for seventy odd years has spent blood and treasure in the watch and ward of the Frontier and building up there a stable wall of defence against invasion.

It is in the attempt to sketch the history of these gateways and to tell something of the character of the people who dwell in their neighbourhood and of the work of the gate-keepers that this book is written.



The Story of the Frontier Province.

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

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} In envelope in binding.

CHAPTER I.

Early History.

THE key to the History of the North-West Frontier lies in recognition of the fact that it has always been more closely connected with Eastern Iran — from which sprang Afghanistan — than with India. Early history finds the Iranians dominating the whole Indus valley, to be succeeded by the Greeks. Alexander the Great came down the valley of the Kabul River and Greek generals ruled as satraps, till they in turn gave way to the Hindu dynasties which introduced Buddhism. After the death of the Great Asoka in the year 231 B. C., the country witnessed the rise and fall of many more or less petty rulers till, early in the Christian era, the Central Asian highlands disgorged the Kushans. For some 600 years the dominion of these nomads and their successors continued and the period was one of great development in Art and Religion, especially in the reign of Kanishka, who extended his rule over Northern India as far as Benares. Meanwhile the Mohamedan advance from the west had been coming nearer. Kabul first felt the shock in A. D. 655, but the force of the invasion was deflected for a time towards Multan and Sindh. The establishment of the Ghaznavid dynasty at the close of the 10th Century marks the real beginning of Mohamedan

rule and early in the 11th Century the famous Mahmud of Ghazni held all the trans-Indus portion of the present Frontier Province in fief.

From this point on the story of the Province is one long and somewhat bewildering series of invasions and counter-attacks by the warring Mohamedan dynasties who made the history of Northern India, down to the time of the Sikh Kingdom and the coming of the British. Mohamed of Ghor, Chengiz Khan, Timur, all debouched from this gateway of Central Asia on to the plains of India and all left their traces on people and country. To them succeeded the Afghans, and the present distribution and composition of the inhabitants of the North-West Frontier are directly and clearly traceable to the continuous pressure from the north and west of Afghan tribes upon the earlier inhabitants and, again, of still more Afghans upon the first comers.

Even at the height of Moghal power the Frontier knew no peace. Tribe warred against tribe, Governor against Governor; the central power intervened to establish its rights only to see fresh disturbances arise immediately. And all this time there was no frontier where "the Frontier" is now. All territory west of the Indus was part of Afghanistan, though the latter term was not then in use. The Borderland was

no part of India and, as India did not hold the gates, she had no protection from recurring invasion.

Before leaving the era of Mohamedan rule and describing the coming of the Sikhs it is necessary to relate in somewhat greater detail the closing phases of the former and the birth of the Afghan Kingdom as it now exists. It has been shown that the country which is now Afghanistan was an outlying province of the Moghal Empire. The decay of that empire, synchronising with the disintegration of the Saffavi dynasty in Persia, provided the opportunity in the middle of the 18th Century for a Turkoman bandit named Nadir Shah — a name which is still used on the Frontier and in the Punjab to signify any particularly outrageous act of tyranny or cruelty. Nadir Shah won the throne of Persia by driving back the Afghans and Russians who threatened the country, and then secured the services of the Afghans for the invasion of India by allowing the Moghal Governor of Kabul to retain his position as a feudatory. Assassinated while returning, laden with booty, from the sack of Delhi, his throne and his treasure fell to one of his generals, Ahmed Shah, the founder of the Durrani Empire. Though this Empire did not long survive its founder, from it grew Afghanistan. In the height of his power Ahmed Shah ruled Sindh, the Derajat, Kashmir and the Punjab

as far as Lahore, as well as Peshawar and all that is now Afghanistan, with Baluchistan and slices of Persia. But he lived too late and his successors were too inefficient to carry on the old tradition of invasion of India. The Sikh power in the Punjab was growing and, behind it, the British were beginning to take an interest in preventing aggression from the North.

Taking advantage of the chaos and misrule which followed Ahmed Shah's death, the Sikhs between 1818 and 1834 occupied Peshawar and the trans-Indus country up to the hills. Their rule over the country was that of the sword alone, but it brought the first Englishman actually to administer a portion of the Frontier, when Herbert Edwardes, in the service of the Sikh Durbar, went to Bannu in 1847. It produced other noted figures too in the persons of Hari Singh, who first took Peshawar from the Afghans and was later defeated and killed by them near the mouth of the Khyber, and General Avitabile, the Italian, who governed Peshawar for the Sikhs from 1838-1842.

Side by side with the Sikh advance the interest of the East India Company's Government in Frontier Affairs had been increasing. Actually the first Englishman to meet the Afghan was Mountstuart Elphinstone, who had been sent in 1809 to Peshawar to meet Shah Shuja, then on

the throne of Kabul. It was not till 1837, however, that British official relations with Afghanistan commenced. The occasion was the need of a counter-stroke to the threatening attitude of Russia in the north. Lieutenant Burnes (afterwards Sir Alexander Burnes), who had passed through Kabul five years before on a journey to Bokhara, was sent as Envoy. Burnes' mission led directly to the First Afghan War. The terms on which the reigning Amir, Dost Mohamed, Barakzai, was ready to accept a British legation were rejected and the resolution was taken to replace him on the throne by Shah Shuja, the last survivor of the Durranis, living at the time as a refugee in India.

The execution of this policy began with the advance of an army, 21,000 strong, under Sir John Keane, *via* the Bolan Pass. Shah Shuja was crowned in Kandahar in April 1838 and, after Ghazni had been taken by storm, Dost Mohamed fled and Kabul was occupied in August. The bulk of the army was then withdrawn, a force 8,000 strong being left in Kabul to support Shah Shuja and the British Envoy, Sir W. Macnaghten, who had Sir A. Burnes as his colleague. For two years these conditions continued. Dost Mohamed surrendered in November 1840 and was given honourable asylum in India. The outward calm lulled the political authorities into oblivion of the

unpopularity of the new Government and neglect of warnings. Revolt broke out suddenly on November 2nd, 1841. Burnes and other officers were murdered and disaster followed disaster. The incapacity of the British command was only surpassed by the treachery of the Afghans. On December 3rd Sir William Macnaghten was murdered in open council by Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mohamed. On the 6th, after a convention had been signed guaranteeing safe conduct on condition of our evacuation of the country, the force, still 4,500 strong with 12,000 followers, set out from Kabul for Jelalabad. The rest of the story is only too well known. Confusion, privation and massacre, culminating in the slaughter in the Pass of Jagdalak, left only 20 men to muster at Gandamak on the 13th. Only one man, Dr. Bryden, wounded and half dead, struggled into Jelalabad to tell the tale.

Kandahar under Nott and Jelalabad under Sale still remained in British hands and, from these bases, retribution was undertaken. Pollock forced the Khyber, relieved Jelalabad and re-occupied Kabul by September 1842 and was joined there by Nott. The Citadel and Bazaar of Kabul were destroyed, after which Afghanistan was evacuated and Dost Mohamed returned to the throne. Though the story of the first Afghan War is a sorry one from the British point of view, there arose from it results which

were to prove of far-reaching importance not many years later. Dost Mohamed had learnt in India the strength of the British power. While determined to brook no interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and refusing to allow even a British envoy at Kabul, he had fully made up his mind never again to pit his strength against Great Britain in the field.

CHAPTER II.

British Rule, 1849—1901.

THE coming of the Sikhs to the Frontier has been described. The succession of the British to their rule and the acceptance of responsibilities far beyond anything accepted by them followed naturally from the Second Sikh War. In 1849 the country up to the foot of the Frontier hills became part of the Punjab. The five districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan were formed and were administered on the same system as the rest of the Punjab, but a special irregular Military force was raised and maintained under the direct orders of the Government of the Punjab for the defence of the border. This was the famous Punjab Frontier Force — "the Piffers" — and consisted at first of the Corps of Guides, five regiments of cavalry, five battalions of infantry, three light field batteries, two garrison batteries and two companies of sappers and miners. Changes of composition and constitution occurred from time to time in this force, until it was finally removed from its special role by Lord Kitchener in 1903 and made part of the general service Indian Army; but the records and traditions of the old Force are carried on by the famous regiments which are still entitled to the letters "F. F." after their names.

The Frontier had experienced for a bare eight years the first beginnings of settled rule, when the Indian Mutiny burst forth and threatened to engulf far more than this outpost of the Empire's defences. The intervening years, though hardly a period of peace, had witnessed no serious rising. The "Piffers" had been "blooded" in dealing with refractory tribes on the Hazara (Black Mountain) border, with Mohmand marauders round Peshawar and in punitive operations in the Kohat Pass and on the Kohat and Derajat borders. Further, we had thus early been drawn into an advance up one of the valley gateways through the mountain barrier by the attempts of the local Afghan Governor to annex the Kurram.

The highest tribute to the effect of these few years of British rule on a people whose turbulent history has been briefly sketched in the foregoing chapter is to be found in their attitude during the Mutiny period. When news of the events at Meerut and Delhi reached Peshawar by telegram, those in charge of the situation might well have despaired. The Afghan situation was menacing. Since 1842 Dost Mohamed had been strengthening his position and extending his power. We had helped him against Persian aggression in Herat and he had finally come in person to Peshawar in 1857 and signed with Sir John Lawrence a treaty of definite

alliance. But the ink of these signatures was hardly dry and none could tell whether the Amir would give way to the temptation of an opportunity, such as was never likely to recur, of regaining his lost Indus provinces and the City of Peshawar, that jewel in the plain which was, and perhaps still is, the desire of every Afghan ruler's heart. It is a matter of history that not only did the Amir entertain this idea, but the ruler of the Punjab seriously considered handing the Peshawar valley over to him and withdrawing to the Indus. The tribes had one eye on the Amir and the other on the British Frontier officers and Military commanders. The latter proved worthy of the occasion. The Hindustani troops in Dera Ismail Khan and Kohat were disarmed without difficulty. Within 24 hours the Guides set off on their memorable march to Delhi. On May 21st the 55th Native Infantry rose in Mardan — only to perish in the ruthless pursuit led by John Nicholson or later at the hands of the men of the Hazara hills. Next day the three mutinous regiments at Peshawar were disarmed successfully. These examples turned the scale. Help came flocking in from all sides, trans-and cis-border. Edwardes and Nicholson called on their old friends, the chiefs of the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan districts, and met with a ready response. Levies and irregular regiments of horse and foot were raised and rapidly despatched Delhi-wards. The

next few months were not free from anxiety. One other Native regiment had to be disarmed and one attempted to regain its arms and was practically annihilated in consequence. Fanatical enemies tried to raise the border tribes against us, but one salutary lesson at Narinji, on the Buner border, sufficed to quell such attempts. The Frontier in the Mutiny not only filled its proper role as the guardian of the gate from external aggression, but helped and helped very materially in dealing with the internal situation. Instead of marking a set back or complete destruction of the young administration, the Mutiny year is now looked back on by officials and people as one of untarnished honour, and the Pathan gentleman to-day who cannot produce as his most cherished heir-loom a faded bit of Mutiny medal ribbon or a letter of commendation from Edwardes or Nicholson to his grandfather feels that there is a blank space in his escutcheon.

The twenty years succeeding the Mutiny, though military operations ranking as expeditions were undertaken on eleven occasions, formed on the whole a period of quiet development. The Black Mountain tribes required a force of some 15,000 men to bring them into subjection in 1868 and in 1863 the Ambeyla campaign, on the Buner border, which had been initiated as little more than a counter-raid, developed, owing to

unexpected opposition, into a serious campaign which cost us over 900 in total casualties.

It was during the latter part of this period that recognition was first given to the principle of employing Militia and Levies as the first line of Border defence. The Punjab Frontier Force, called upon to act in conjunction with and perform the duties of regular troops, had already lost the rough and ready character with which it originated and a more loosely constituted and local organisation was needed for the every day work of dealing with raids and petty trouble with the tribes. A further valuable object in enrolling purely local levies was—and is—the opportunity it gave of utilising in the defence of the border the custom of the country as regards local communal responsibility and of giving employment to the young men of the tribe.

After this period of comparative quiet progress was interrupted by the Second Afghan War. Amir Dost Mohamed had died in 1863 and it was not till 1868 that his son, Sher Ali, was firmly established on the throne. Though he owed much at this time to the Russians, Sher Ali feared them and turned to Great Britain for support. A variety of circumstances, however, tended to estrange relations between the two countries and the Amir leant more and more towards Russia. The final *casus belli* was the refusal to accept a British mission at



The Khyber Gorge

Kabul, after a Russian one had been received. In consequence of this Sir Donald Stewart occupied Kandahar; Sir Frederick Roberts crossed the Peiwar Kotal and the Shutargardan and menaced Kabul and another column advanced to Jelalabad. The first campaign ended in May 1879 with the flight and death of Sher Ali and the conclusion with his son, Yakub Khan, of the Treaty of Gandamak, whereby, for the first time, Afghanistan placed her foreign relations under the control of Great Britain in return for guarantees, and a British Envoy was accepted at Kabul. When all seemed well, the British Envoy, Cavagnari, was murdered and his escort of "Guides" were massacred after a heroic defence. This tragedy was quickly avenged by Roberts, who won the battle of Charasia and occupied Kabul. Yakub Khan surrendered and was sent to India. Six months later Abdur Rahman, a nephew of Amir Sher Ali, returned from his retreat in Russia and gained the throne of Kabul. To all intents and purposes he ratified the Gandamak Treaty and was recognised as Amir of all Afghanistan except Kandahar. The attack on the latter City by Ayub Khan, another claimant to the Amirship, resulted in the defeat of a British force at Maiwand, in retaliation for which Roberts made his famous forced march of 313 miles from Kabul to Kandahar. The latter City was then handed over to Abdur Rahman and all British forces

were withdrawn from Afghanistan, not to set foot in the country again for close on 40 years. Abdur Rahman became the greatest of all Amirs and reigned till 1901. Throughout this time he realised his dependence on India and England and strictly observed his Treaty obligations, but he jealously guarded his internal independence.

The course of events described above inevitably reacted strongly on the border tribes. Between 1877 and 1881 there were no less than twelve Frontier expeditions of a punitive nature on the borders of Peshawar, Kohat and Dera Ismail Khan. On the withdrawal of the Army from Afghanistan in 1880, the Khyber was also evacuated and the Militia principle was extended to the defence of this famous Pass. The new force, raised locally from the Afridis and known at first as the "Jezailchis," became later the Khyber Rifles and its history is closely connected with famous names such as Warburton, Nawab Sir Aslam Khan and Roos-Keppel.

Before proceeding with the tale of the gradual development of the Frontier Administration, a glance forward will serve to explain relations with Afghanistan from the close of the Second Afghan War to the time when Great Britain was again forced to take up arms against her neighbour. The close of the campaign of 1878-80 found British authority extended considerably in tribal territory and Afghanistan correspondingly

contracted. The permanent occupation of Quetta was recognised and the boundary advanced to the foot of the northern slopes of the Khojak range, half way on the road to Kandahar. In the North, British jurisdiction was extended to the Peiwar Kotal, at the head of the Kurram valley, and to Landi Khana at the Eastern end of the Khyber, and the Amir renounced all claims to these areas and to the country and passes of the Mohmands. Once Abdur Rahman's position, after the British evacuation of his country, became clear, the main pre-occupation of the student of Afghan politics was whether any possible successor could hold what he succeeded to. This question was answered by the peaceful accession in 1901 of Habibulla, the favourite son of Abdur Rahman. In 1905 the Dane Mission was received at Kabul and the terms of the treaty with Abdur Rahman were renewed. At the end of 1906 the Amir visited India, returning in March 1907. The conclusion shortly afterwards of the Anglo-Russian agreement removed the pressure of the Russian menace.

Though concrete results of Habibulla's visit to India were not perhaps very obvious at the time, the consequences were far-reaching. The impression he then gained of British might and British character kept him unwaveringly on our side during the Great War. On the other hand

the visit itself, followed by an over-enthusiastic attempt to develope his country under the guidance of European experts and a somewhat childish addiction to Anglicised habits and luxuries, which he had acquired in India, made him very unpopular with his people. Though his policy had been vindicated by the Allied Victory in the War, Turco-German intrigue had worked upon private and dynastic jealousies and his general unpopularity created the atmosphere which rendered possible, without any popular outcry, his murder in 1919 and the seizure of his throne by his third son, Amanulla.

With a strong hand governing for the first time in history a clearly defined Afghanistan and the gates closed against aggression, the development of the Frontier proceeded normally from 1880 to 1897. With the exception of punitive expeditions on the Black Mountain in the North and against the Sheranis in the South, the fighting of this period was connected with the gradual extension of British control over the Frontier tribes, necessitated, as ever, by the responsibility of giving security to the settled districts on the border and to India as a whole. These forward movements were as follows. In 1891 the ridge of the Samana was occupied in order to control the Orakzais and to protect the Miranzai valley, which it flanks. In 1892 the Kurram valley was peacefully occupied. Since the valley had been declared free of the Amir's

jurisdiction, as already related, chaos had reigned and the inhabitants of the valley were alternately guilty of aggression against their Afghan neighbours and sufferers from their retaliation. Finally the suggestion of the Amir that it was the duty of the British "Raj" to control them, coupled with the Turis own plea that the only alternative to British occupation was submission to Afghanistan, led to the setting up of the loose form of administration which has continued, to the general satisfaction of all parties, to this day. This move, incidentally, brought on to the stage of the Frontier a player who was soon to fill a star part and for many years was destined to head the bill. Roos-Keppel's name will appear again in these pages. It was as Political Officer and Commandant of the Kurram Militia that he made his debut.

The opening up of connection between Baluchistan and the Punjab Frontier *via* the Gumal Pass in 1890 led to another advance. In 1893 Sir Mortimer Durand had concluded a convention which defined the limits of the British and Afghan spheres of influence over the greater part of the long belt of Independent Tribal territory. Under this convention the Amir renounced all claim to influence in Waziristan.

However, when an escort went up to Wana in 1894 with the Political officers sent to demarcate the "Durand Line," the unrest which

had been prevalent for some years culminated in a fierce night attack on their camp. In consequence of this a punitive expedition over-ran Mahsud Wazir country and, in the following year, an advance was made into the territory of the Darwesh Khel Wazirs and Daurs of the Tochi valley. It was decided to take the whole of Waziristan under closer control and Political Agents were posted to Miranshah and Wana with garrisons found by the Punjab Frontier Force. Thus the Agencies of Northern and Southern Waziristan were constituted.

Yet another advance, this time in the North, was necessitated partly by the conduct of the tribes, partly as a countermove to Russian advances in the Pamirs. Chitral had first been visited in 1885 by Sir William Lockhart and, subsequently, the Government of India had maintained friendly touch with the rulers of the country. From 1892 onwards a struggle for the throne had kept the country unsettled. In 1895 one of the claimants, assisted by Umra Khan, the Pathan chief of Jandol, attacked Chitral and besieged the British Agent, Major Robertson, who had come from Gilgit to instal as Mehtar the nine-year old Shuja-ul-Mulk. After the relief of this siege by a force which advanced from Nowshera under Sir Robert Low and a column from Gilgit under Colonel Kelly, garrisons were stationed on the Malakand Pass and at Chakdara and Chitral and the Political Agency of Dir, Swat and Chitral was constituted.

The Frontier tribes had watched this penetration of their hitherto independent valleys with growing anxiety. The demarcation of the Durand Line, with its accompanying definition of spheres of influence; the setting up of Political agencies and, finally, the passage of troops in all directions through their territory and the garrisoning of those tracts, which were not only strategically important but the most fertile portions of tribal country—all this was regarded as part of a deliberate menace to their independence. Such a menace was bound to arouse the ever-present fanaticism of the Pathan and there were not wanting those to fan the smouldering fires of this spirit to flame by the appeals to religion. Specific grievances were played upon, all the passions of the Pathan were whetted by appropriate preaching by Mullas and intriguers, and suddenly that happened which had never happened before. In the presence of what they considered a common danger, the tribes found some sort of union. Their democratic spirit could not permit, even under such conditions, any unified leadership or councils, but a comparatively trifling and isolated incident set the whole Frontier in a blaze.

This first incident was the attack, on June 10th, on the Political Officer of the Tochi and his escort at Maizar. This village in the Upper Tochi valley had been visited in a friendly manner and the visitors were hospitably received.

Suddenly a treacherous and fanatical attack was made and all the British Military officers were killed or wounded and numerous other casualties inflicted. In spite of these heavy initial losses, the troops under their Indian officers executed a retirement which lives in Frontier history as a magnificent example of grit and steadiness. Retribution for this occurrence was undertaken at once, but the fire had been lighted. On July 26th the tribes of the Malakand suddenly rose, flocking to the standard of an eccentric and wildly fanatical Mulla. Early in the afternoon of that fateful day so little apprehension was there of an immediate outbreak that the officers of the Malakand garrison had gone as usual to play polo at Khar. While the game proceeded Mulla Mastan was setting forth from Landakai, only some eight miles away, with six young boys, his pupils and devotees. Ere night fell he had a following of thousands and was severely pressing the garrisons of Malakand and Chakdara. Thus quickly can the cry of "Ghaza" be responded to! For the full story of all the gallant deeds of the following few days the reader must be referred to the numerous detailed publications on the subject. We must pass quickly to events elsewhere. By August 7th the blaze had spread to Mohmand country; a fortnight later Afridi and Orakzai Tirah were alight. Shabkadr was attacked; the Khyber Posts fell and the Pass was in the hands of our enemies; the forts of Samana had been attacked and the Kurram



Nomad Wazirs

valley threatened. The southward spread of the conflagration was checked by the fact that the first outbreak had occurred — prematurely from the point of view of united action by the tribes— in Northern Waziristan. Punitive operations were already well advanced there before the Afridis and Orakzais rose and the troops in the Tochi were able to interpose a fire-proof screen between Tirah and the Mahsuds. Thus it happened that the latter tribe was the only one of importance that did not rise in 1897.

The campaign of which the initial stages have been briefly recorded above abounds in incidents famous in Frontier song and story. The storming of Dargai heights is perhaps the best known incident to the world at large. The Indian Army and the Frontier official remember with even greater pride the heroic defence of the ill-built, ill-found tower of Saragarhi on the Samana for seven and a half hours against overwhelming odds by a little band of twenty-one men of the 36th Sikhs, who fell fighting to the last man before they would surrender their charge, on which depended the signal communications of the ridge.

This general rising of the tribes necessitated Military operations on a scale hitherto unprecedented on the Frontier. Forces under Sir Bindon Blood and General Elles traversed the whole of the Mohmand country, Bajaur, Utman

Khel, Swat and Buner, and an army of 40,000 men under General Sir W. Lockhart invaded Tirah, dealing first with the Orakzais and later with the Afridis. These operations were long and difficult but eventually successful, and by March 1898 all the tribes from the Tochi northwards had submitted. The Khyber was re-occupied; the Khyber Rifles were re-established and road-making and the building of a new and more up-to-date system of Forts for the safeguarding of the Pass was commenced.

In the next few years there were no serious disturbances on the Frontier. The Mahsuds, however, though they had not risen as a body in 1897, had been giving continuous trouble and had harried the Derajat with their raids. In December 1900 they were placed under blockade. This form of reprisal — commonly used in a greater or less degree as a less drastic and expensive alternative to a punitive expedition—consists in forbidding to the offending tribe all egress from their barren mountain haunts and so bringing them to subjection by cutting off the trade and other intercourse with British Territory without which existence in any degree of comfort is impossible. The difficulties of making effective such a measure over the long length of the Mahsud border deprived the policy of 1900-1901 of success. Late in the latter year the passive blockade was varied by numerous sudden offensive raids

into Mahsud country. This produced the desired settlement and for some years the tribe gave no serious trouble. While the Mahsud blockade was in progress momentous changes had been brought about in the administration of the Frontier, which must be described in a separate chapter.

CHAPTER III.

The North-West Frontier Province.

THERE had existed for many years a school of thought which considered that the administration of the Frontier was too important a matter to form merely a portion of the duty and responsibility of the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. The latter had innumerable demands upon his attention in the increasing problems of the rapidly developing districts east of the Indus. Individual Lieutenant-Governors might or might not have experience of, and sympathy with, the special characteristics and requirements of the Frontier. At the best there must be delay, due to the many other important claims on the attention of the Head of the Province, in matters that brooked no delay, and a lack of decision and consistency in policy. So argued the separationists. Their opponents held that a small Frontier administration would be expensive and inefficient for lack of senior supervisors and that there would be a tendency to subordinate the rights of the inhabitants of directly administered districts to considerations of policy as regards the tribes or Afghanistan.

Schemes had been propounded from time to time with a view to giving the central

Government of India a more direct control over Frontier administration and policy and to improving the relations of the British districts with their trans-border neighbours. The most important of these schemes was that propounded in 1877, during Lord Lytton's Viceroyalty; but the Second Afghan War caused it to be shelved. The experiences of 1897 brought the subject again to the fore and in 1901, after much discussion and deliberation and in the face of considerable opposition and genuine misgiving in some quarters, Lord Curzon's scheme for the creation of the North-West Frontier Province as a separate administration, under a Chief Commissioner specially selected by the Governor-General, was introduced.

In geographical outline the new Province can be readily likened to an outstretched hand, the five "settled districts" of Hazara (cis-Indus), Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan lying in the palm, while the thumb and five fingers stretch out to occupy and close against aggression the five gateways of the Malakand (with Chitral), the Khyber, Kurram, Tochi and Gumal. Incidentally, the clenching of the hand exercises pressure upon the turbulent tribal areas lying between the fingers.

Side by side with the inauguration of the new Province Lord Curzon, with the assistance

of Lord Kitchener's great organising ability, remodelled the strategic control of the Frontier. As far as possible regular troops were withdrawn from the small garrisons in the Districts and Agencies and concentrated in the larger Cantonments, their places in the outpost line being taken by an extension of the tribal levy system into Militias and Border Military Police. Simultaneously the construction of roads and railways was undertaken, to ensure that the regular troops of the Peshawar Division and the Frontier Brigades could be rapidly moved to any threatened point. As a part of Lord Kitchener's general scheme of Army re-organisation, the Punjab Frontier Force lost its old corporate existence and its units took their places as part of the new model Indian Army, all portions of which were in future to take their share of service on the Frontier.

For ten years from the conclusion of the 1897 campaign and for the first seven years of the new Province, the Frontier enjoyed almost unbroken peace. This period bore fruit later. Though too short to work a complete or lasting change in the warlike habits of the people, it was long enough to dispel to some extent the suspicion of our aggressive intentions engendered by the events of the '80's and '90's. It also served to introduce the trans-border tribesmen to the possibilities of hitherto undreamt of

prosperity from peaceful trade, while the extension of canal irrigation from the Swat and Kabul rivers and, in a minor degree, from the Indus in Dera Ismail Khan gave openings to many of them to settle down as British subjects to the agricultural development of land newly made cultivable.

The necessity in 1908 of military operations to punish the Zakka Khel Afridis for continuous raiding on the Peshawar border, instead of causing a sympathetic revolt of the whole Afridi tribe, as might well have happened had not the suspicions of 1897 been allayed, led to what "Punch" called a "Week-end War", the Afridis as a whole promptly negotiating the terms of settlement with their recalcitrant section. A month later in the same year punitive action against the Mohmands, who had also been guilty of serious raiding, was complicated for a moment by Afghan intrigue and the participation of irresponsible Afghan tribesmen; but our relations with the Amir were not seriously jeopardised and, after their country had been traversed for two months by two Brigades, the Mohmands submitted. The rest of the Frontier was unaffected by these two expeditions on the Peshawar border, in spite of much fanatical preaching.

During the next few years the storm centre shifted from the Peshawar border further South.

Three problems arose about this time, one local and two affecting the whole border and Anglo-Afghan relations. These problems were the Mulla Powindah, the Gulf Arms Trade and the Outlaw Question. The Mulla Powindah was a combination of priest and politician of a type not unknown in medieval European history. He attained spiritual domination over the Mahsuds and his efforts to extend his temporal power — even at one time to the extent of an attempt to unite the whole of Waziristan into one nation under his leadership — were at the root of most of our troubles in the southern half of the Province between 1906 and his death in 1913. Throughout this period the necessity of military operations against the Mahsuds seemed imminent. The Mulla's influence countered all attempts to build up a solid body of representative opinion in the tribe, who could settle matters with the Political authorities. The bill against the tribe for raids and the like was swelled enormously by a series of fanatical murders of British officers, culminating in 1913 in the murder of Major Dodd, the best friend the Mahsuds ever had, and two other officers by a trusted Mahsud orderly. In all these offences the hand of the Mulla was traceable and he was directly concerned in an attack on Sarwakai Fort in 1911. This incident, however, did him more harm than good.

A Caravan in the Khyber

He organised the attack to rehabilitate himself from the effects of several previous set-backs, but received no general support from the tribe who promptly condemned the action and paid up the fine of Rs. 10,000 levied as a punishment. Thus, in spite of difficulties, some progress in getting control over the Mahsuds had been made. To cope with the problems of the situation a special appointment of Resident in Waziristan was created and the experiment — very successful up to a point — was tried of enlisting Mahsuds in the Army. The Mahsud is the finest fighter of all the Pathan races and did excellently on service until political and religious considerations necessitated, in the course of the Great War, the discontinuance of enlistment of trans-Frontier Pathans.

The Gulf Arms Trade between 1907 and 1910 revolutionised the Military position on the Frontier. 1907 did not mark the beginning of the change; the importation of rifles and ammunition of European manufacture had begun soon after the Frontier rising of 1897, but ten years later the re-armament of the tribes with weapons far more effective than those possessed by our own Militias and Military Police had proceeded to an extent which could no longer be disregarded and a climax was reached when a single consignment



of 30,000 Martini Henrys was run through from the Gulf to Kandahar. This particular consignment, incidently, consisted largely of the late armament of the Australian and New Zealand forces, which had received the "·303" at the time of the South African War, the old, but perfectly good Martinis being sold to enterprising dealers, who eventually obtained touch, through French and German armament firms, nondescript tramp steamer companies, owners of fast sailing dhows and other devious channels, with the equally enterprising customer from the North-West Frontier. In three years 1907-1909 no less than 90,000 rifles, including an increasingly large number of "·303's", was run through to the Mekran coast. Most of these reached the tribes sooner or later. When the market had become sufficiently well-known, the tribsmen—whose increased wealth during the preceding years of peace has been already referred to—sank all their capital in the organisation of gun-running caravans. More especially the Adam Khel Afridis of the Kohat Pass, finding the value of their "home-made" rifles enormously reduced, raised every penny they could and either went themselves to the Gulf, or entrusted their money to Ghilzai caravan leaders.

Just when the Frontier had entered wholesale upon this enterprise the Government of India stepped in with a naval and military

blockade, which "spoilt sport" to such an extent as nearly to bring about another Frontier war. In 1910 the Afridis, led by the Adam Khels, were in a very embittered frame of mind owing to their financial losses from the blockade. With the ingenuousness that is a refreshing, if at times annoying, characteristic of the Pathan, they demanded that Government should compensate them. This demand, and the situation generally, was firmly dealt with and by 1911 the Gulf Arms Trade was to all intents and purposes killed. The re-armament of the tribes however had been effected. The relative position of our forces and theirs could never again be the same. Where formerly a dozen partially trained Border Police with Martini Henrys could safely be sent out to meet a raiding gang of 30 or 40, strong detachments of 50 were now required. A re-arming of the local forces and a general re-organisation and re-grouping were necessitated. Also the villagers themselves had to be given some wider means of self-protection than the Indian Arms Act's strict interpretation allowed. Between 1909 and 1913 the Militias were re-armed, the Border Military Police gave way to the better armed and better trained Frontier Constabulary and the system was inaugurated of issuing rifles to villagers for their own protection and to enable them to co-operate with the Government forces in the defence of the border.

The third great problem of these years was outlawry. This was one of the unanticipated results of the demarcation of the "Durand Line," defining the limits of Afghan and British spheres of influence. The Pathan gradually woke up—in some amazement and perplexity—to the fact that, however indefinite that "Line" might be in the eyes of Afghan Frontier officials to whom intrigue was as the breath of life and who could never resist posing as champions of Islam at the expense of the neighbouring British Government, it was regarded as a very concrete barrier to their activities by the absurdly scrupulous "Feringhis." It followed that, if an exuberance of spirits or the demands of the Pathan Code of Honour brought an individual into conflict with the Indian Penal Code, he had only to betake himself more or less hurriedly to the nearest Alsatia beyond that Line—Ningrahar and Khost were the favourites—to be out of reach of the arm of the Sirkar, which would assuredly have dragged him forth, in the old days, from any asylum he had sought among Independent tribes under political control. But, having reached his Alsatia, the outlaw found that life for the landless and the stranger who could not pay his footing was a hard problem, and he took to joining with others of his kidney and the more lawless and daring of his Afghan neighbours in raiding British territory for loot. Soon he found that the most profitable form of loot was the prosperous Hindu of some village in the plains of Bannu or Peshawar, or

the flocks or persons of his own enemies in his home village. So grew up the pernicious trade of kidnapping to ransom, which is one of the most difficult, if not the most difficult, of Frontier problems to this day.

The difficulty is too obvious to need lengthy explanation. So long as outlaws from British territory can find asylum in the uncontrolled or ill-controlled Frontier tracts of Afghanistan, the local political system is to a great extent defeated. Only exceptional energy, consistent hunting out of the inevitable harbourer and spy and the seizure of every opportunity of enforcing communal responsibility for these offences can keep the scourge within limits. Inability to strike at the root of the trouble has undoubtedly, at times, produced a feeling of helplessness and has resulted in a slackening of effort to keep our own sphere of influence clear of this blemish. The permanent cure can only come when the Amir can exercise a stricter control over the outlying tracts of his kingdom. His difficulties are great and not unlike ours. In 1912 and 1913 Khost was in revolt and Afghan regular troops, driven from their forts, took refuge in the Kurram. He has a crowning difficulty, which we have not—corrupt Frontier officials whose over-mastering ideas are to create unrest and to evade the orders of their central government. The late Amir, Habibulla Khan, did his best, as one man against a host, loyally to live up to his

treaty obligations. There is every reason to hope that his son, Amanulla Khan, has the same intention and is aided by conditions more favourable to success.

This discussion of the problems of the period brings us down to the outbreak of the Great War. The years preceding that cataclysm marked real progress, in spite of set-backs and difficulties. Two subjects merit mention before we pass on to the War period. The rise in internal crime from 1907 onwards, due partly to the trans-Frontier conditions which have been discussed in this chapter, had already directed attention to the question as to whether the rigid penal and procedure codes of India did not need some adaptation to Frontier conditions. An educational experiment of far-reaching significance had been made in the inauguration, under the close personal guidance of Sir George Roos-Keppel, of the Islamia College, situated on the plains between Peshawar and Jamrud. In it many scions of the families of both trans- and cis-Frontier chiefs were receiving an education, which must have a very great bearing upon the conditions on the Frontier in the coming generation.

CHAPTER IV.

The Frontier and the War.

THE outbreak of the war in Europe had no disturbing effect at first. When it is remembered how little the significance of the event was realised even in England, it is not surprising that the Pathan should have visualised the position in the light of what experience he had to guide him. The only guides he had were memories of the Mutiny and a few hazy ideas about the South African War. It was realised by all classes that we were in a big fight, but they had never heard of the Germans and were puzzled to hear of the Russians—whom they had been brought up to consider as our and their hereditary enemies—as our allies. The leading men of the Province, headed by ruling chiefs like the Mehtar of Chitral and the Nawab of Amb, came forward at once with the willing offer of all their resources. Public opinion in the cis-border area, which had seen the benefits of sixty years of settled rule, was unanimous in our support. The Independent Tribes, for whom those same sixty years had had a different history, were necessarily an uncertain quantity. They looked to Kabul for a sign, and received it in the Amir's open avowal of complete neutrality. They were further influenced by the large stake they had deposited with us in the persons of

thousands of their young men, serving in the Indian Army and local corps. All these were at the moment thoroughly staunch and eager for a share in the fray.

It was not long, however, before disturbing factors appeared. The possibility of Turkey being drawn in on the side of our enemies was viewed with the greatest concern even by our best friends. The shock, when it came, was weathered with surprising ease. There had been time, in the intervening three months, to prepare the people for the event and the Amir's reiterated declaration of neutrality and condemnation of the bellicose folly of the Turks was of incalculable value. Still, the situation in tribal territory was anxious in the extreme. The outbreak of war had, fortunately, found no ready lit fire which could be quickly fanned to a blaze, but from the first moment fanatical Mullas and the anti-British party in Kabul had been doing their utmost, though without cohesion or settled plan, to stir up trouble. The first outbreak came from the Afghan Province of Khost, where the tribes were defiant of the Amir and resentful of the reprisals, recently taken against their trade and intercourse with India in consequence of the outlaw trouble. Late in November 1914 our Militia post at Miranshah in the Tochi was attacked from Khost. The attack was repulsed without serious difficulty but was repeated in 1915 upon the outpost of Spina Khaisora in the

Upper Tochi. Miranshah and the Tochi generally continued to be threatened by gatherings from Khost till a strong "lashkar" was severely defeated by a combined force of troops and Militia in March 1915.

Meanwhile trouble was brewing further north. In Buner there have been settled for close on 100 years a strange colony, half refugee and half fanatic. Their origin traces back to Syed Ahmed of Bareilly, who acquired a temporary ascendancy early in the 19th Century in the plains of Yusafzai—now the Mardan sub-division of the Peshawar District—and challenged the advancing power of the Sikhs. Defeated with immense slaughter, Syed Ahmed and the remnants of his following found refuge in the hills west of the Indus. In the early days of British rule this colony was a constant storm centre, but for more than twenty years it had sunk into insignificance, though still receiving some support in money and recruits from the Wahabi Mohamedan element of Hindustan and Bengal. With the entry of Turkey into the war, the Hindustani Fanatics, as they are known, again became active. The situation of the colony made it a convenient link between the pan-Islamic and pro-Turk party, which was already beginning to raise its head in India, and the anti-British party in Kabul. "Muhajirin,"—i. e., Indian Mohamedans unwilling to live longer in a land at war with the Khalifa—fled to the colony and were thence passed

on to Kabul. A use having been found for the Fanatics, money in increasing quantities began to reach them from Kabul and from India.

This digression has been necessary because the Fanatics figured largely in the fighting which broke out all along the northern Peshawar border in the spring and summer of 1915, and they have remained one of the chief danger points on the Frontier ever since. In April 1915 the Mohmands, the most priest-ridden of all the tribes, started the campaign by an attack on Shabkadr. They were repulsed, but not defeated, and trouble spread. At this period the military forces in India were depleted far below the danger point, and stories of the terrific nature of the fighting in Flanders were beginning to reach the country-side through sepoys returning wounded or discharged. These circumstances led to some decline in morale and encouraged the war party in the tribal area, but did not affect the loyalty of the mass of the people. The summer of 1915 saw serious risings on the Buner border, in the Malakand and on the Mohmand line. The latter led to serious fighting and necessitated the blockade of the whole tribe. The concluding months of 1915 were the most critical of the whole war on the Frontier. The causes specified above coupled with the idea, sedulously spread by agitators and by a Turco-German mission which had arrived in Kabul, that the alliance of Germany and Turkey was a Holy War in which





Persia would soon join, and that then a combined army, including Afghanistan, would invade India, gave increased vigour to war propaganda. The Amir was very nearly driven into war, but held his own; the Afridis, the keystone of the Frontier arch, remained staunch, and the succeeding years showed a steady strengthening of our position. German and Turkish intrigue continued to the end in Kabul and in tribal territory, and Mohamedan agitation in India spread its ripples to the Frontier. By 1916, however, we were again strong in actual military resources. Masses of white tents convinced the boldest that we had more troops than we could house; the drone of aeroplanes in the sky and the hum of motor transport on the roads were an impressive novelty and, above all, the remarkable staunchness of one of India's greatest benefactors in the war, Amir Habibulla Khan, checkmated the efforts of those who would have made catspaws of the tribes by tales of the coming again of one of the old-time invasions from the North and West.

A punitive expedition against the Mahsuds could no longer be postponed in 1917, but this was hardly a result of the war; every effort had been made to stave off the necessity, involving as it did the employment of troops badly wanted elsewhere; but an attack on Sarwakai, resulting in the death of the Commandant of Militia, precipitated matters. The expedition was remarkable for the fact that it was carried through,

under every conceivable disadvantage of terrain, communications and weather, in the height of the summer by troops unseasoned to the Frontier and was completely successful. It resulted in two years of such peace to the Derajat as had not been known for nearly a decade.

With the trans-Frontier situation well in hand, though a never-ceasing source of anxiety, the settled portion of the Province weathered the concluding years of the war with astonishing tranquility. Internal lawlessness actually decreased, the war was little thought of or discussed and very little use had to be made of the Indian "D. O. R. A." Manifestations of loyalty were constant. The Indian Army had, before the war, drawn largely on the fighting races of the Frontier. Under stress of circumstances, already related, the classes enlisted from Independent Territory had proved unreliable and had been discharged. Nevertheless, during the period of intensive recruiting in 1917-18 a higher percentage was enlisted in relation to the total male population of fighting age than was attained by any Province in India, not excepting the Punjab. This result was obtained in spite of the terrible epidemic of influenza in the autumn of 1918, which claimed 93,000 victims in two months as against a normal death-rate for a year of 60,000. Though the Province is far from being a rich one, its subscriptions to War Loans, Red Cross funds and the like represented something like ten annas a head of the population.

It would be misleading to attribute this tranquility entirely to disinterested loyalty or exceptional political acumen. The fact is that once the nervous period of 1915 was passed, when wild rumours, agitation and religious fervour came near to causing general demoralisation, the high prices obtained for agricultural produce, high rates of labour, soldier's remittances from the field and the daily spectacle of the Civil Administration, though with a depleted staff of British Officers, going about its ordinary business unruffled, steadied people. On the "once bitten, twice shy" principle, they listened less and less to prophets of disaster and came to regard the Turco-German Army, which was so often reported to have reached Herat, as the myth it actually was. Agitators had no real grievance to work on. Even the rapidly rising prices of food-stuffs and cloth during the closing period of the war only accentuated the growing desire for a British victory as it was confidently expected — and by wiser heads than the Frontier Pathan — that peace would bring immediate plenty.

CHAPTER V.

The Aftermath.

THE diagnosis of the War spirit on the Frontier attempted at the close of the preceding chapter is of importance as a guide to subsequent events. The absence of a grievance had kept things tranquil during the war. The presence of grievances prepared a fertile soil for subsequent troubles.

The news of the Armistice in November 1918 evoked demonstrations of genuine enthusiasm on all sides. The prestige of the British name was at its zenith and even the crushing defeats of the Turks in Palestine and Mesopotamia struck no jarring note in the general rejoicings. At first it seemed that expectations were going to be fulfilled. There was an immediate drop in the price of necessaries; the bestowal of rewards for war services was promptly commenced and the general sinking back from the attitude of strain was facilitated by peace in our borders and release from the influenza scourge. Early in 1919 the situation began to change. One hope after another proved slow of realisation. The drop in prices turned out to be illusory and the cost of living rose more and more; the release of soldiers who had joined up for the war emergency only was delayed. The people could not understand it all. Perplexed and with a half-

defined feeling of having been defrauded in their just hopes, they heard the ever-growing reverberations of discontent in the Punjab — the agitation over the Rowlatt Act, built up on a similar foundation of general soreness.

Meanwhile, when he had steered his country safely through the tempest, proved the wisdom of his vision and helped his British allies to an extent that cannot be over-estimated, Amir Habibulla Khan was foully murdered at Jelalabad. The event caused no great stir on the Frontier and, after an abortive attempt by his brother, Nasrulla Khan, the throne was occupied by Amanulla Khan. The new Ruler found his position none too secure. The news which reached him of events in the Punjab and their echoes in Peshawar offered what he thought was a good opportunity for creating a diversion. Misled by an entirely inaccurate appreciation of the situation and with the lure before his eyes of the restoration of the pristine glories of the Durrani Empire and the capture of the riches of Peshawar, he took up a truculent attitude and sent troops to violate the Frontier at the head of the Khyber. Simultaneously, overwhelming evidence was discovered of an officially inspired plot to foment disturbance in Peshawar and elsewhere. The Third Afghan War resulted.

At first all went well. The Afghan intruders in the Khyber were evicted and our troops advanced and occupied Dakka. The fighting

which occurred demonstrated the hopeless inferiority of the Amir's troops, while the tranquility of the tribes and the inhabitants of British territory proved the worthlessness of the intelligence service on which Afghan policy had been based. Jelalabad and Kabul were bombed from the air and all was ready for an advance to the former town, when the Amir sued for an Armistice. Before this could be granted, an Afghan advance in the region of Thal, ably conducted by the Afghan general in Khost, Nadir Khan, now Commander-in-Chief of the Afghan Army, had led to our Militia garrisons of the Upper Tochi and other outlying posts being withdrawn to Miranshah. This was followed by the withdrawal from Wana and the Gumal.

These events were too much for the stability of the Waziristan tribes and the trans-border elements in the Militias. The Afridis of the Khyber Rifles had wavered from the start and the corps was disbanded to forestall a mutiny. In Waziristan, when the withdrawal took place, mutinies occurred both at Miranshah and Wana. A large proportion of the men remained loyal, though severely shaken. Miranshah, supported by Regulars, was held; Wana and the posts of the Gumal route were evacuated in face of opposition both from mutineers and tribesmen, and the loyal portion of the Wana garrison, retiring on Zhob, was severely handled and had

practically all its British Officers killed or wounded. Darwesh Khel Wazirs and Mahsuds, finding the omens of victorious "Ghaza" too clear to be ignored, were ready to rise "en masse" had any further Afghan backing been forthcoming. As it was, the country was flooded with deserters with the rifles and ammunition they had taken with them and raiding and attacks on picquets started on an intensive scale in the Derajat and in Peshawar, where the state of the Afridis was much the same as that of the Wazirs.

Meanwhile on August 8th a treaty of peace with the Afghan Government was concluded at Rawalpindi. But we were left with a border in a state of turmoil from the Khyber southwards and the residents of four of the five settled districts with the added grievance of insecurity from raids. To restore the situation time and a re-grouping of forces were needed. The Army was overdue for demobilisation and, even after the most pressing claims in this direction had been met, it was untrained in Mountain and Frontier warfare, whereas the enemy to be dealt with was more formidable than ever before, by reason of his vastly improved armament and the strong nucleus of Militia deserters, trained by the daily practice of years in just those tactics that they were now employing against us. The northern portion of the Frontier remained quiet in spite of the most intensive

hostile propaganda. Here the lessons taught the northern tribes in 1915 bore fruit. The Afridis as a whole kept steady and, though the tribal Maliks had a hard task in controlling their deserters, a settlement was gradually effected by political means, with little more than the threat of military force. With the Afridi settlement came into being the Khyber Khassadars—a tribal levy, un-uniformed and providing their own arms, who have now, for more than a year, satisfactorily fulfilled their duty of keeping the peace on their own tribal border.

Further south the restoration of order among the tribes and of peace to the harried dwellers in the plains was a more serious business, which is hardly yet completed. The Rawalpindi Peace led to no cessation of intrigue and minor acts of hostility, and the belief was sedulously fostered that after six months war would break out again. So long as this attitude persisted the efforts of Political officers could avail little and military action could with difficulty cope with the sporadic activities of raiding gangs. Nevertheless the Kohat border was gradually settled during 1920. In Waziristan the situation amounted practically to a general rising of the tribes and there was no alternative to the thorough re-conquest of the evacuated country. A start was made with the Tochi, where, after only slight opposition, terms were dictated. The Mahsud campaign was then undertaken and

resulted in desperate battles in the wildest and most difficult country, which drew from men who had served on many fronts throughout the World War the admission that, in his own country and in defence of his home, the Mahsud is unequalled as a fighting man. Gradually, and with heavy losses on both sides, the country was over-run and Mahsud resistance broken down. The Wana Wazirs were next dealt with and Wana re-occupied. Their behaviour throughout had been worse than that of any tribe on the Frontier, showing a combination of treachery, lawlessness and fanaticism unrelieved by the fighting ability and courage of the Mahsuds. The year 1921 found us with the back of resistance broken and passed in the long drawn out negotiations—interspersed with continual guerilla attacks on small bodies of troops—to settle terms and get them complied with. This latter stage appears now to be nearing its conclusion and side by side with it has proceeded the gradual restoration of normal conditions in the neighbouring districts. With the set-back which the progress of the civilising influences of British rule had received in 1919, the scourge of kidnapping to ransom had again raised its head and assumed menacing proportions. A quiet border is the first essential to the peaceful progress of the districts of the plains, and reasonable safety of person and property is the first claim to which the people of those districts have a right. It was more than ever necessary at

this time to meet that claim, because upon the groundwork of grievances which has already been described had been built up, during 1919 and the following years, a structure of discontent and unrest which was a source of danger.

While the settlement of the tribal difficulties was proceeding, a further inconclusive stage in our relations with Afghanistan had been marked by the Mussoorie Conference of 1920. Though this did something to allay the anticipation of another war, the effect was far more than counterbalanced by the Khilafat agitation and Hijrat movement.

The delay in the conclusion of peace with Turkey had given time for the growth of a movement in India in support of the traditional Khalifa of Islam. It has been stated already in this chapter that no such feeling manifested itself at the actual moment of the most crushing defeat of the Turks; but the lapse of time between the Armistice and the Treaty of Sevres provided the opportunity for what was in origin a political and anti-British agitation to obtain a real hold upon the devotion — often based on the vaguest possible conception of actual historical facts — of the Indian Mohamedan for the Sultan of Turkey, his recognised spiritual chief and the custodian of the Holy Places. In this matter a reversal of historical precedent occurred which is significant to the student of Frontier politics. The disturbing influence came from India, not

from Central Asia. Though hostile elements in Afghanistan were ready enough to profit by the agitation, zeal for the Khilafat did not emanate from there. Throughout 1919 the attempt to arouse a widespread Mohamedan agitation with the object of saving Turkey from the natural consequences of misgovernment and misdeeds had been gaining force in India. In 1920 this agitation first seriously affected the Frontier Province through the raising of the cry of "Hijrat," or religious emigration from a country ruled by infidels. An intensive campaign, not unconnected with local faction-feeling, seriously affected the portions of the Hazara District nearest to the border. Similar agitation, re-inforced by the passage through the district of large bodies of emigrants, or "Muhajirin", from the Punjab and Sindh, threw Peshawar off its balance, and the infection spread southwards. During the early summer of 1920 tens of thousands of the inhabitants of the Province either performed or prepared to perform the "Hijrat" to Afghanistan, in the belief that it was their religious duty. There is no doubt that, misguided as was this transitory frenzy, it was genuine in so far as minds unskilled in reasoning and ignorant of the world-wide effects of war seized on an apparent affront to their faith as the crystallisation and climax of the various concrete and worldly grievances under which they suffered. It was therefore a wise policy which, while doing all that was possible to convince the

people of the fallacy and dangers of the movement, opposed no absolute interdiction to it. The madness passed within a short period, sanity being restored by the Amir's announcement that his country could receive no more of these immigrants and by the return of the vast majority of the adventurers disillusioned, destitute and bearing tales of the direst suffering. Large numbers of those who had left Peshawar and other districts on this pilgrimage had, before departure, disposed of their property for next to nothing and their position on return was desperate. The Government intervened unasked to rehabilitate these sufferers and so, in the end, won more than it had lost by the movement, in widespread gratitude and the removal of distrust and sullenness.

Unfortunately, an agitation based on religion was bound to affect the peculiar temperament of the Frontier Mohamedan in ways not strictly religious. In Hazara the unrest spread to the trans-border tribes, necessitating military operations to restore order. Throughout the Province, and especially in Bannu, this agitation engendered a spirit of lawlessness and defiance of authority, which was aggravated by a continuance of bad seasons and soaring prices of the necessaries of life. The problem of the past year has been the restoration of public confidence in the ability of the administration to cope with

this lawlessness and to safeguard the interests of the agriculturist and trader.

All this time and right up to the last days of 1921 relations with Afghanistan were unsettled—and the sketch of the history of the Frontier which these pages have endeavoured to present has shown, if it has shown anything at all, how this factor dominates all others. From January to December 1921 the British Mission under Sir Henry Dobbs was in Kabul negotiating, in face of an apparently unending series of difficulties, an alliance which would react to the mutual benefit of all parties concerned. Success crowned these efforts and the short period that has elapsed since the signature of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of November 22nd, 1921, gives ground for sanguine hope in the future relations of the two powers. With the ground thus cleared, it is possible to regard the long years from 1914 to 1921 of wars, world-wide and local, and the aftermath thereof as ended and to look forward to the resumption of interrupted progress.

CHAPTER VI.

The Province and its People.

IN surveying the early and recent history of the Frontier, some of the peculiar characteristics of the country and its inhabitants have emerged. It has been shown how the North-West Frontier Province came to be created and what its chequered and stormy history has been. The turbulence and, still more, the cost to the Indian Exchequer of the past few years have concentrated a considerable weight of Press and Parliamentary criticism upon the Frontier Administration, and the whole question of Lord Curzon's policy and its results have come under review. Proposals have been put forward for complete or partial re-amalgamation with the Punjab, and the arguments of those who objected to the separation twenty years ago have been disinterred and set up as monuments of prevision. A few facts about the Province, its constitution and its people will perhaps help to an understanding of the various aspects of this controversy.

The area administered by the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province extends from the neighbourhood of that "hub" of the mountain system of Central Asia, North of Chitral, where, till two of them became Republics, three Empires met, to the confines of Baluchistan —



Afghan Types

a length of just over 400 miles. In breadth it is a narrow strip, whose greatest width extends, indeed, to 279 miles, but averages not more than 100 miles. Nearly two-thirds of the total area of 38,665 square miles is "Independent Territory," in which term is included not only the five fingers of the hand, which has previously served as an illustration, but the unadministered tribal country between them. The boundary on the North, territorially part of Afghanistan, is actually the bulwark of the Hindu Kush, beyond which are the Pamirs, thence westward and southward the Province marches with Afghanistan, till Baluchistan and the Punjab form its Southern limit. To the East the Indus separates it from the Punjab, except where the Hazara District adjoins Kashmir. The spurs of the Himalaya and the Hindu Kush, linked by the low hills of the Mohmand country to the Sufaid Koh range, which flanks the Kurram valley, are succeeded by the Suleiman mountains of Waziristan. Mountain and hill — varying from the eternal snows to the low, rocky hills which are the most familiar feature of every Frontier landscape — leave room only for occasional fertile valleys over the greater portion of the Province. The only considerable plains are those of Peshawar, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan and a portion of the Hazara District which adjoins the Punjab. Of these plans, Peshawar is bountifully watered by five rivers and two great — and several minor — canal systems;

Bannu is half intensely fertile, half dependent upon a precarious rainfall; Dera Ismail Khan, though cultivable where irrigation can be obtained, is, to a great extent, a barren waste. The reader of this description may exclaim, in the light of the history of the Frontier, "Why all this pother over a small strip of rude intractable highland?" This is the argument of the school of politicians and strategists who would like to see a withdrawal behind the Indus, and it is beyond the scope of this, or any other, book to settle this age-long problem.

As will be readily understood, the variations of climate and scenery in this area of mountain and valley, glacier and river basin are extreme. The rolling uplands and forest-clad hills of Hazara, the towering giants, blizzard-swept passes and solitary lakes of Kohistan and Chitral are at one extreme, the flat bare plains of the Derajat and the barren hills and stony ravines which characterise the bulk of tribal territory are at the other. Between these lie the fertile plains of Peshawar and Bannu and valleys filled with the sound of running water, like Miranzai, the Kurram, Swat and many a lovely glen in the sub-montane portions of Hazara. In winter and spring nothing can be more delightful than the climate of these plains and valleys. The clear atmosphere, the crisp keeness of the snow-born breeze, invigorate the body, as the green expanse of young wheat, barley, and gram, interspersed

with patches of sugarcane or rice-lands and plentiful timber delight the eye. In summer, though still verdant with the crops of the season — maize, millet and ripening rice — the valleys swelter in a steamy, malarial heat which cannot be described but only experienced, while the unwatered tracts and the boulder-strewn hills and torrent beds of Waziristan and most of the actual borderland provide a foretaste of the regions of the damned which almost breeds as regards a future state, the proverbial offspring of familiarity.

The Province depends mainly upon agriculture; the towns are either important entre-pots for Central Asian, as well as local trade, as in the case of Peshawar and Dera Ismail Khan, or little more than Bazaars, grown up round the Military Cantonments. The agricultural classes include, though in numbers which tend to decrease as irrigation and other causes encourage a more settled existence, a considerable proportion of nomadic or semi-nomadic graziers. The winter population is largely swelled by immigrants from Afghanistan, who deposit their families, camels and flocks in the trans-Indus districts, while their able-bodied men earn a good livelihood by undertaking the heavier forms of unskilled manual labour or peddling cloth or other goods over the length and breadth of India, till the approach of the hot weather sends them trooping back to block the passes in April and May with their teeming caravans.

Out of a population in the settled districts of 2¼ millions, 92 per cent. are Mohamedans. In tribal area, of which no regular census has ever been taken, but which is estimated to have a population of some 2¾ millions, the proportion is much higher. The non-Mohamedan element is composed entirely of traders, soldiers and officials. Among the Mohamedans, Pathans or speakers of the Pashtu language, largely predominate but, ethnographically, they are of very mixed origin. With Afghan, Turkish, Tartar, Persian and Indian strains intermingling, the only common bonds are religion and history. Both inculcate a spirit of fiery independence, which is fostered by surroundings and conditions of life. This spirit is the keynote to the understanding of the Pathan. It permeates his politics and his personality. Add to this the facts that the invigorating climate and life of his native haunts produce an extraordinarily high average of physique, that he habitually goes armed — except where the law forbids him to do so — and knows how to use his weapons and that, in the greater part of the Province, life is so hard that the land could not support even the scanty population it produces but for the extraneous aids of trade, labour and Military service, and the result is a man. This man may be a Swashbuckling braggart, he may be cruel, treacherous, fanatical; he may have other vices, but he bows the knee to none, save to him who can uphold his right to be obeyed. To set

A Wazir Dance



against his vices the Pathan is brave, sober, religious according to his lights and, on the whole, clean living; he has a ready sense of humour, and great traditions of hospitality; he is a lover of sport and athletic outdoor games and, when his respect and esteem have been won, he is capable of great devotion. This description is of the elemental Pathan of Independent Territory. His cousin of the settled districts has undergone the modifications naturally consequent on a greater degree of civilisation and still further mixture of descent. He is inclined in youth to substitute for the rifle, cartridge belt and dagger, of which British law deprives him, a gaudy waistcoat and embroidered shoes, gambling and other expensive luxuries, while later in life he is excessively prone to litigation. But he retains most of the vices and virtues of his type, including among the latter the love of sport. The enthusiasm of the country people when the Peshawar Vale Hounds run through their fields and past their villages; the excitement when a "jack" is viewed; the cheery joking crowd which comes running to help the sportsman in difficulties, suggest the West of Ireland at its best. Games like "Toda" and the wildly energetic round dances in which the Wazir and Khattack youths delight are the pastimes of athletes.

On both sides of the border the blood-feud is rife. According to the Pathan code of honour

an insult, especially if it is in any way concerned with his women-folk, must be repaid in blood. But blood too must be paid for in blood, and so arise and continue for generation after generation the vendattas which, in tribal territory, confine a man to his tower during the hours of daylight for weeks and months at a time, and make it unsafe for him ever to venture abroad unarmed and, in the settled districts, fill the law courts, jails and hospitals with the parties to cases of murder, broken heads and bloodshed.

Enough has been written of the characteristics of the country and people to show that their administration presents problems quite different to those of the Punjab or other parts of India. First and foremost of these problems is that of assuring the safety of the settled population of the plains from aggression on the part of their turbulent neighbours of the hills, while, at the same time, preserving sufficiently friendly relations with the latter to enable military operations to be dispensed with and the civilising influences of contact with British rule gradually to leaven the mass. It has been explained how the increase in tribal armament and the custom of outlawry complicate this problem. The first of these complications admits of no cure, but has necessitated a great increase in the means of protection provided for the defence of the districts. The Militia and tribal

levy system is of long standing. Innate in the system of the indigenous community is the idea of communal responsibility for defence. Present policy aims at co-operation between Government and the people to provide a plan of defence, suited to the varying needs of localities and occasions, by a broad-based combination of these two systems. Subsidiary objects are the provision of employment for the surplus population and the strengthening of the natural and hereditary leaders of the people by helping them to organise the defence of their own boundaries. In this system Militia or Scouts, whose role is to protect Government servants and property and to keep open Government communications in tribal territory in normal times; Frontier Constabulary, who are a Military Police force; Tribal levies or Khassadars, to protect a special area or perform some specific duty; and the village "Chigha" or pursuit party, all have their share. The "Chigha"—the Hue and Cry of old England—is the raw material of the whole and it is the duty, both in custom and Frontier law, of every able-bodied man to turn out under his "Malik" when the "Chigha" drum is beaten. To enable these village pursuit parties to meet raiding gangs on something approaching equal terms, large numbers of rifles are issued on loan to responsible persons in villages liable to attack, or which lie upon well-known raiding routes. The outlaw problem with its accompaniment of kidnapping has been discussed in a previous

chapter. One aspect of this question is the incompatibility of British-made law and the Pathan code of honour. This is too complicated a subject to be discussed here, but many a legally proclaimed "outlaw" has done no more than establish himself in his own and his neighbours' eyes as a man of honour.

The established remedy for this conflict between law and custom is the "jirgah" or council of elders, which is supposed after investigating the facts, to come to a decision which shall strike a fair balance between the demands of the State and the individual moral code. The "jirgah" system is indigeneous and in tribal territory is still the only means of settling disputes great or small without recourse to violence. Whatever faults or abuses in the system may manifest themselves in the settlement of cases in the districts, it has the merit of bringing a large number of men of status into direct touch with the administration to the mutual advantage of both sides. The whole subject of the legal machinery of the Province, including the "jirgah" system, is one on which considerable controversy centres at the present time and it would be unsafe to prophesy the direction in which changes will be made. It is obvious, however, and undisputed that steps are necessary to adjust our judicial methods to the needs of the times, and that among these steps will have to be one for reconciling custom and law in certain classes of case. At present the "jirgah"

system is necessary as the only means of mitigating the effects of the conflict.

Apart from these two special features of defence and the working of the "jirgah" system, the administration of the five settled districts does not differ materially in general outline from that of a district in India. The charge of a Frontier district includes, however, the control of a varying extent of adjacent tribal territory and in this respect the duties of the District Officer are those of a Political Agent. The Deputy Commissioner in his political capacity and the Political Agents of the five trans-border agencies control the tribes in their charges by purely executive means; no legal code is in force and the King's writ does not run. The executive means employed are based on the interests of the tribes. The object aimed at is to restrain them from lawless depredations on their more settled neighbours by the menace of the withdrawal of facilities for trade, employment, etc.; by assisting them in settling their private or inter-tribal disputes according to their own customs and by paying them allowances in return for services rendered. This system of allowances is often misrepresented as sheer blackmail. It is not so. The allowances are given in return for something definite. They may be compensation for the construction of roads through tribal country, or for the infringement, by our

occupation and control, of some long-standing right or custom, or they may be rewards granted in recognition of some special service. The Khyber Afridis afford the most striking example in illustration of this. The British Government now receives in tolls from the caravan traffic of the Khyber much more than it paid, till recently, to the tribes, who took those tolls themselves in times past. Subsequent increases to the Khyber allowances have been as rewards for the very signal service the Afridis rendered us by remaining staunch during the Great War, in spite of every inducement to turn against us, and as compensation for the land compulsorily acquired by us for roads, railways and camps. Moreover all allowances, for whatever reason they may have been given, are conditional on continued good behaviour and are liable to forfeiture in part or in whole, if offences are committed. This forfeiture is the commonest and most effective weapon of retaliation upon a lawless tribe and the value of the system of "allowances" is best shown by our comparative impotence in dealing with those tribes which are not thus subsidised.

The relation of some of the special characteristics and problems of the Frontier Province brings the reader back to the question of future policy. Are the conditions such as can best be handled as part of the problems of a large Province, such as the Punjab, or do they require the whole-time services of a fully-empowered

expert and the close personal attention of the Government of India. This is the real question to-day, and it should not be obscured by discussion of the detailed merits or defects of the existing Administration. The Frontier has never in its history had as much as twenty consecutive years of undisturbed development. Progress occurred between 1880 and 1897; progress was again made between 1898 and 1914. Inevitably between 1914 and 1921 not only has progress been checked but in many respects there has been deterioration. Above all the Frontier has not remained unaffected by world movements. People see changes and reform all round them and there is apt to be some dissatisfaction with old conditions. In face of these historical facts and general causes, none can claim that the present administration is perfect. The decision to be taken is whether improvement can be worked out from within or whether a complete change of policy is necessary.

Whatever the future may hold, the Province can at any rate regard itself as fortunate in one respect. In the past twenty years, not only have men who knew it well been especially picked out to rule it, but those men have stayed. Sir Harold Deane, K.C.S.I., was Chief Commissioner from 1901 to 1908; his successor, Sir George Roos-Keppel, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., stayed till 1919. Others who have held officiating charge at intervals or whose term of office is not yet

complete are Mr. O'Dwyer—later the pilot of the Punjab through the stormy season of the war,—Sir John Donald, Mr. Merk, Sir Hamilton Grant and Sir John Maffey, all experts in administration and of more than local reputation.

CHAPTER VII.

Peshawar.

THE two things which the average visitor to the Frontier first wants to see are the Khyber Pass and Peshawar City. He probably has already some idea of the significance of the former, strategically and as a trade route. His mental picture of the latter is apt to be less defined, but vaguely suggestive of the Arabian Nights. In this respect he is not altogether wide of the mark, though he must be prepared for disappointments and surprises. Peshawar City has no great architectural or scenic beauties; its interest lies in the variety of its human types and the multitude of their pursuits. Entering by the Kabuli Gate, the Qissa Khani — the Street of the Story-Tellers — raises romantic expectations. The street is a broad straight one and, except for the shops of dealers in Turkoman carpets, Bokhara silks and embroideries and the like, presents little of interest on the surface. But see it on a Friday, with the whole roadway filled from wall to wall with a hundred different types of humanity, and it is an epitome of the Frontier and its history. The camels laden with the carpets, furs, silks, embroideries and gold thread of Bokhara, the fruits and drugs of Afghanistan, the "postins"

and woollen cloaks of Kabul will not be found here. They enter by the Bajauri gate and settle down in the numerous Serais in that quarter. But the crowd in the Qissa Khani comprises elements of every race from the confines of China to Samarcand, Merv and Herat mingling with Afridis, Mohmands or Swatis from the trans-border tracts and towns-people and villagers from Peshawar and its neighbourhood. Threading their way through the crowd, perched high upon mountainous saddles under which amble sturdy Kabuli ponies, come half a dozen Uzbegs — Turki-speaking Mongolians from far away Kokand — bound on the long pilgrimage to Mecca; sitting round one of the many teashops with their huge brass or copper Samovars, are a couple of Jews from Herat, comparing notes with fellow Semites from Bokhara and discovering evidence of the wonderful organisation of the scattered Jewish race in the fact that they all have letters of introduction to the same co-religionist in Jerusalem. On the verandah of a shop may be a well-to-do merchant of Yarkand or Kashgar, just arrived after months of travel, *via* Chitral and the Malakand and arranging the first steps of a transaction for disposing of his silks. Further up the street the ear is assailed by the sound of a multitude of hammers tapping incessantly upon metal.



The Copper-smiths' Bazaar, Peshawar

Turning the corner, the noise is seen to proceed from the Copper-smiths' Bazaar, where in a long row sit men and boys, master craftsmen and apprentices in a hereditary trade for which Peshawar is famous. So in a ramble round the City are found, all collected in the area belonging to their guild, the bird-sellers; potters with their display of glazed pipe-bowls and utensils in all variations of green, yellow and blue; silk embroiderers; goldsmiths; shoemakers busy cutting, hammering or sewing the handsome and much sought after Peshawari shoes and "chaplis" with their gold embroidery and gaudy silk "pom-poms." In another corner are the shops where can be bought the silk "lungis" banded in gold and silver, favoured by the man of fashion from Calcutta to Kabul; near by is the "Kulla-doz" quarter, where are made the round or peaked caps, rich in silk and gold thread, on which the "lungi" or turban is wound. Amongst and around all these craftsmen wanders the motley throng, food for many a day's interesting study, busy in the affairs, great and small, of the commerce of a continent. When the open streets and their shops have yielded up their story, there are still behind the scenes the workshops of the potters and the tanners; carpenters busy on the local "pinjra" work — thin wooden strips held together in lattice work

patterns by their own pressure on each other — and the caravan serais packed with the squatting forms of shaggy Central Asia camels and their loads — all the varied produce that breaks bulk and is transhipped from camel-back to railway truck at Peshawar.

Anything of architectural value that ever existed in the present City of Peshawar was destroyed by the Sikhs at their coming. The only building of any antiquity that remains is the Gor Khatri, now the Police Headquarters, formerly the residence of Avitabile, the famous Sikh Governor, who, in the intervals of hanging criminals by the dozen and gathering in revenue at the head of a Brigade of Sikh soldiery, built the present City wall. The Gor Khatri had once been a place of Hindu pilgrimage and is mentioned in this connection by Babar early in the 16th Century, but for years it had been used as a Serai. The present British Fort was built by the Sikhs on the site of the Durrani Bala Hissar, which they had destroyed.

The whole Peshawar valley is, in one sense, a mean and undistinguished structure founded on the ruins of a great civilisation. The Mohamedan invasions of the 10th and 11th Centuries literally devastated the valley and destroyed the last traces of the ancient kingdom of Gandhara. Where now stand mud villages, the mighty City of Pushkalavati and many another

stone built fort and township once marked a stage of civilisation which elicited praise from the early Chinese travellers of the fifth and following Centuries of the Christian era. Close to the site of the present City of Peshawar was the "City of Poros," capital for long years of Gandhara and the goal of pilgrims from all the Buddhist world, on account of the huge Stupa containing the sacred relics which, as the result of recent excavations, now rest in the keeping of the Buddhists of Burma at Mandalay. The Frontier is rich in archæological remains of the pre-Mohamedan era, and some of the most famous of these are to be found in the Peshawar District. The monasteries, mausoleums and fortifications of Takht Bahi, between Mardan and the Malakand, Jemal Garhi, Sahri Balol and the Khyber, and the rock inscribed edicts of Asoka at Shahbazgarhi, near Mardan, have disclosed to explorers of recent years a wealth of sculpture, coins, inscriptions and mural decorations, which have added enormously to the world's knowledge of the early history of India and of the Hellenistic and other influences which helped to shape it.

But, with the exception of the Gor Khatri, already mentioned, there is nothing now standing in Peshawar of greater age than the suburban villa of one of the Durrani Governors, which

now houses the offices of the Peshawar Brigade and was formerly the Residency, whence George Lawrence had to flee with his family to Kohat, when the Sikh troops rose at the beginning of the Second Sikh War. Another Durrani building is now used as the Church Missionary Society's school. The Cantonments were not laid out till 1850, after the first British garrison had lived for some months in temporary quarters to the North-East of the City, the only remaining trace of which is an old British Cemetery.

The life of Peshawar has one feature which is distinctive. That is its gardens. Gardening in the European style amply repays such efforts as the shifting British population of Cantonments can achieve, as a drive along the roads in March or April amply testifies. The Shahi and Wazir Baghs are fine examples of Public Gardens under Municipal management, but it is to the miles of orchards and gardens to the North and South of the City that the population throngs for shade in summer and for pleasant recreation — sometimes for less reputable recreation such as gambling — in the autumn and spring. These orchards produce most valuable crops of apples, quinces, peaches and other fruits and are interspersed with plots of cultivation, walled gardens and summer houses of the rich residents of the City.

Jamrud and the Entrance to the Khyber



From a point of vantage on some high roof top in the City, the whole valley of Peshawar and its surrounding hills can be taken in at a glance and much of the history of the Frontier can be pictured as unrolling itself before the the eyes. To the South a gap in the low hills shows where the Kohat Pass takes the road through a neck of Afridi country down the 200 miles of Frontier to Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In the villages of this Pass has been carried on for years a flourishing trade in rifles and ammunition. The episode of the Persian Gulf trade is now forgotten in the busy outturn of cheap but serviceable rifles of Martini-Henry and Lee-Metford pattern for which there is a ready sale all along the border. Further along to the South-West are the hills of Tirah, the main Afridi stronghold, followed by the prominent peak of Tartarra, which divides the Khyber Pass from the Kabul River gorge. The wall of hills continues through Mohmand country, round to the North, till the gap of the Malakand is picked out, beyond which run the Buner ranges culminating in Mahaban, with the Black Mountain, on the far side of the Indus, showing snow-crowned in the distance on a clear day in winter. Below in the plains can be seen gleams of sunlight upon water, indicating where the Kabul river spreads itself into three branches to share with the two branches of the Swat river, after the latter's emergence from the hills at Abazai, the task

of fertilising the whole district from the walls of Peshawar itself to Mardan. North, West and East of Mardan from Abazai to the Indus and over the greater part of the once desert Sar-i-Maira now flow the transforming streams of yet more water from the Swat, taken off at Amandarra and brought by tunnel under the Malakand Pass into the thirsty plains.

Of all this panorama the two most significant points—though insignificant to the eye at a distance—are the Khyber and the Malakand. On two days in the week the road that stretches West from Peshawar to the foot of the hills is thronged with camels, mules, donkeys, ponies and a medley of travellers—the weekly Khyber Caravan coming to or leaving Peshawar. The Khyber of to-day is crowded not only with camels and pilgrims but with the signs of its importance as the strategic key to the Frontier. A double and, in places treble road winds up beneath the cliffs of Rohtas, past forts and picquets to the Shahgai heights, then down to Ali Masjid; thence through the frowning gorges into a more open valley dotted with the fortified villages of the Zakka Khel, till it emerges on the Loargai plateau and reaches Landi Kotal. Thence it drops over Michni Kandao to Landi Khana and the Afghan boundary and disappears round a spur to Dacca. Alongside the road now runs an aerial ropeway and, sometimes up on the cliffs above the road, sometimes below it,

proceeds the work of tunnelling, cutting and embanking for the railway that is to be.

In the other direction from Peshawar the Grand Trunk Road can be seen running away East to the Cantonment of Nowshera, whence, through the Cavalry station of Risalpur and Mardan, the home of the Guides, runs the road that winds up over the Malakand Pass, with its memories of 1895 and 1897 to Chakdara Fort and thence, a fortnight's march away, to Chitral.

So, standing in Peshawar, the Queen of the Frontier and the centre of its life, a scene is unfolded that is filled with the history of invasions, wars, attack, defence, the march of successive waves of conquerors and the efforts to build a barrier, behind which the people of the plains and the Indian Empire may work out their political and economic destiny. Westwards the index finger points up the Khyber in the direction of danger; eastwards lie other and subtler difficulties and in both directions the future holds problems of which no man can tell the solution, but which will give the sightseer, as he decends from the roof-top, material for many an hour's thought, hopeful or foreboding, according to his temperament.







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
PANORAMIC VIEW FROM
PESHAWAR
PESHAWAR
MARDAN
NOWSHERA
ATTOCK
Multan Sar
Laram Pass
SWAT
DIR
CHITRAL
Snowy range near Lowarai Pass
Exit of Swat River from the hills
Hazar Nao
6245'
Barchanrai
6681'
Malakand (Guides Hill)
3802'
Mora Pass
BUNER
Ilam
9239'
Pajа
6747'
CHAMLA
Karamar
3393'
Mahaban
7373'
Lawata
10200'
Snowy Range east of Runar R.
Koh-i-Mohr
8118'
Chagan Sarai
2800'
Nabakki Pass
Kashmund Range
9640'
Tarakai Dheri
1580'
Takht-i-Bahi
1768'
Inzari Kotal
Khazana Sar
4692'
Toratiggar
4928'
Exit of Kabul River from the hills
Kaidar Khan
3561'
Toratsuka
4458'
Jalalabad
(Afghan town on Kabul R.)
AFGHANISTAN
Landi Kotal (Behind this Hill)
Asrag
5795'
20 Miles
Entrance to Kheibar Pass
Jamrud Fort
1607'
Zera
4707'
BAZAR VALLEY
Sughar
6362'
Samghaki Pass
Besai Spur
2515'
TIRAH
RARA VALLEY
Mauloghar
7102
Kohat Pass
5365'
4724'
Shamshattu Police Post
Sheik Baba Ziarat (White Tomb on Hill side)
Jalala Sar
5034'
Mir Kalan Sar
4545'
KHATTAK
Cherat Cantonment
4545'
ADAM KHEL
AFRIDI
Akhor
5010'


Chitral
Landi Kotal
MOHMANDS
Dir
TIRAH
Ali Masjid
Malakand
Parachinar
Abbottabad
Jamrud
PESHAWAR
Nowshera
Thal
KHOST and WAZIRS
Kohat
NORTH WEST FRONTIER
PROVINCE
Miram Shah
Bannu
MAHSUDS
Tank
Dera-Ismael-Khan
Wana